Security in Latin America
The Development of a Zone of Peace in the Southern Cone

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Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
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July 2003
Abstract

This thesis studies the development of bilateral relations in two pairs of states (dyads); Argentina-Brazil and Argentina-Chile. It takes on a moderate constructivist approach that incorporates into the analysis of international relations the role of identities, ideas and perceptions as well as of material forces, and understands that the former are affected and change during interaction. It also resorts to securitization theory to explain how issues come or cease to be considered security matters through social construction.

Using this framework, the thesis analyses how states within the dyads have gradually stopped viewing each other as threats to their security. For most of their history, they have defined their relationships in terms of rivalry, and have perceived one another accordingly. In turn, this has resulted in a situation of negative regional peace in the Southern Cone of Latin America. Since the late 1970s, however, mutual images have shifted, and the Southern Cone has evolved, alongside the dyads, toward a situation of positive peace.

The thesis argues that these bilateral rapprochement processes were set out by changes in domestic and international material situations, encouraging key actors in each state to reassess their interests and needs. These reassessed material considerations, coupled with particular ideologies and foreign policy traditions, reshaped the actors' awareness of the scope of possible bilateral foreign policy actions. Thus, new political options came to be viewed as plausible, old ones were ruled out, or existing political trends were reinforced. Despite differences between the dyads, in time these processes led to the desecuritization of both bilateral relationships. Once the processes of desecuritization and rapprochement were set in motion in each dyad, they promoted changes in the perceptions of themselves, the other, and the relationship; a fact that has redounded to growth of mutual trust and the stabilisation of regional peace.
Acknowledgements

Although I am still not sure about how one thing led to the other, the story is that what began on 30 August 1997 as a 9-month stay in London suddenly became five years and a half and a PhD thesis. As in most cases, writing the thesis was mostly a solitary work. Yet, along the way, friends and colleagues made me feel less isolated, as we shared and exchanged ideas, experiences, opinions, and each other's chapters and papers. In one way or another, most of this is reflected in the work, since they helped me to rethink most of my initial beliefs, even in those cases when our conversations and shared moments had nothing to do with the studies. Although many names are present in my mind, here I can only mention those without whom, I feel, writing this work would have been impossible.

During the years of my Masters and my PhD, several organisations, as well as my parents, gave me the financial support needed to carry out my postgraduate studies. These were the British Council, Fundación Antorchas, Fundación Estenssoro/YPF, and the LSE. Also Nutford House, where friends and colleagues made it feel like a generous scholarship rather than a job. I am also grateful to my supervisors, Christopher Coker and Francisco Panizza, for their academic support and intellectual guidance, and for keeping up with my anxiety during the final stage of this research.

Rolando's patience, love and encouragement have made the past two years much happier, and have helped me keep some mental sanity during the last two months. My parents, my sisters, and my grandmothers, as well as my three brilliant 'step-sisters' Astrid, Carla and Lila, were simply incredible in the unconditional support and invaluable understanding that they gave me all the way through. This has been so important that there are hardly any words to express my gratitude.

Nicky Short and Franziska Hagedorn have been excellent travelling companions, as well as great friends. Clearly, without them and their brave performance in the Hungarian countryside, this thesis would not have been possible. Again, no words will ever be enough.

Special thanks also to Paul Phibbs, Tani Kahan, Robert Funk, Alberto Lidji, Paris Yeros, Pamina Firchow, Ralph Emmers, Louiza Odysseos, Annika Bolten, Christina Malathouni, and Rut Diamint for their generous friendship, of which I took advantage, asking them to comment, proofread, and even edit parts of this thesis.
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PART I

INTRODUCTION AND FRAMEWORK
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

During the twentieth century certain core regions of the world—most notably Western Europe, North America, and the North Atlantic area—have moved away from situations of balance of power and mere absence of war. Within these areas reasonable expectations of peace and peaceful change have become the norm, whilst the use of violence in bilateral as well as regional relationships has become simply inconceivable. In most instances the processes underpinning these changes began in the aftermaths of the Second World War, taking shape earlier or later depending on the region in question. By the end of the twentieth century, these areas can arguably be seen as zones of peace, and among those, some even have come to constitute zones of stable peace.

To many this conclusion may seem wishful thinking. In the present age of globalisation terrorism and international crime—and all the violence they involve—appear to reach, or at least to have the capacity to reach, every corner of the world. Peace and tranquillity cannot be guaranteed in any state any longer (if they ever could), regardless of how distant and remote that state may be from the centre of the international scene or how strong its defences may be. Recent events speak for themselves; there is no need to detail the many examples beyond 9/11 that confirm this trend.

Such argument is in tune with realist thinking in undermining any perception of stable regional peace. According to realists, states ultimately have to care for their own interests, even if at the expense of others, if they want to survive. In this self-help system, no one state should rely on another for its security, particularly in this era of non-state, transnational enemies. States may seek alliances and even multilateral action, yet “not out of goodwill or a rush to world government, but out of clear-eyed self-interest.”

The existence of invasive terrorist activities and violence, and the persistence of realist mistrust do not denude, however, from the existence of geographic regions in which political dialogue and mutual trust have become the norm. The argument that the next chapters will develop and chart is how countries of the Southern Cone of Latin America...
America have followed a similar path, developing into a zone of stable peace over the past twenty years. Nevertheless, in the one hundred and fifty years preceding the late 1970s, relations between Argentina, Brazil and Chile were predominantly unstable and characterised by tension and mistrust, if not open hostility. The regional scenario was dominated by war plans, which made up a substantial part of their security doctrine, and were used as a justification for the expansion of defence budgets. By the early 1980s, however, the geopolitical environment had started to relax, and since then it has continued to improve.

1. **What is the Southern Cone?**

Before advancing into the argument, some of the geographical terms used in the chapters that follow must be clarified: partially to avoid confusion for readers not familiar with the terminology and, partially because some of these terms are not at all unequivocal in their definition. Firstly, within this work, 'the Americas' are taken to mean one single continent, being constituted by the subregions of North, Central and South America, as well as the Caribbean. While this is how geography is conventionally taught from Mexico to the south, U.S. and Canadian literature usually hold that North and South America constitute two different continents. In the present study the terms 'the Americas,' 'Western Hemisphere,' and 'American continent' will be all used as synonymous, and are understood according to the former definition.

Secondly, alongside the subdivision of the Americas into North, Central and South America, which is geographical, a secondary distinction can be made between Latin and Anglo-Saxon America, which refers to cultural and linguistic differences. The former geographic division is easily outlined: Canada, the U.S.A., and Mexico belong geographically to North America; Central America extends itself from Mexico's southern border to the Isthmus of Panama; and South America, which begins to the south of the Isthmus of Panama, includes Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname, French Guiana, Ecuador, Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina.

As well as the geographic division, however, it is important to define the cultural divide between Latin and Anglo-Saxon America. The latter provides an area covering Canada and the U.S.A., as well as the English speaking islands in the Caribbean. The former, meanwhile, incorporates all the Spanish and Portuguese speaking countries, including Mexico, regardless of whether they are geographically located in North,
Central, or South America. A further complication is introduced here by the fact that in Spanish, at least, it is also often talked of Spanish America (*Hispanoamérica*), stressing thus the difference between the former Spanish and Portuguese colonies.

With the exceptions of Guyana, Suriname and French Guiana, the whole of South America belongs to Latin America, although not all of Latin America is located in South America. Therefore, the terms Latin America and South America are not used here as exact synonyms. Some claims are going to be made about the whole of Latin America, whereas some others will just refer to South America, thereby excluding Central America and Mexico.

This seems sensible, given that despite Latin America sharing an important cultural heritage, many of the political, economic, social, and security questions differ immensely between its subregions. And this is true even within South America. For example, the Andean states are tied together by issues that combine guerrilla warfare and drug trading in a way that has so far had little impact on the Southern Cone. Similarly, the Amazon area has had its own regional dynamics regarding certain environmental problems, although sometimes these are further complicated by a spillover of the factors encountered in the Andean zone. Finally, the Southern Cone has its own distinct set of questions. As Selcher observes, "this region has been identified as particularly conflict prone, because it is the setting for numerous frontier disputes, resource conflicts, and the two major axes of historical interstate rivalry on the continent (Chile-Argentina and Argentina-Brazil)."

Finally, the last term that needs some clarification is the one of 'Southern Cone.' Southern Cone refers to the shape on the map of the southernmost part of South America rather than to some strict and original affinity among the countries. But both history and vicinity have unquestionably left their mark on regional relationships. Unfortunately there is no unequivocal definition of the geographic limits of the Southern Cone. All authors agree that Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay are a part of it. However, many also include Brazil (or just its southern part) or Bolivia or both in their account of Southern Cone.

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2 In addition to their cultural differences, in time the two Americas have also performed very differently regarding levels of economic, technological and industrial development achieved.

This study takes on the latter, broader approach, understanding that the Southern Cone encompasses all six states. It does so while acknowledging the difficulties involved in conceptually delimitating regions. As Andrew Hurrell points out,

contemporary debates remind us that there are no 'natural' regions, and definitions of 'region' and indicators of 'regionness' vary according to the particular problem or question under investigation. [...] Moreover it is how political actors perceive and interpret the idea of a region that is critical: all regions are socially constructed and hence politically contested.4

The Southern Cone is identified as a region, basing this claim more on the concept of Regional Security Complex (RSC) than on any positive process of regionalisation or regional integration.5 As will be discussed in chapter two, an RSC is distinguished by the interdependence of the security concerns and the security perceptions of a set of units; in the present case these are states. These can be either positive or negative—that is, the RSC can be characterised by patterns of amity or enmity—although more frequently the term has been used to describe the latter.

In the case of the Southern Cone, when the area originally grew into an RSC, it did so undoubtedly driven by patterns of enmity. The so-called A-B-C countries (Argentina, Brazil and Chile) have ever since been at its core. Rivalry and disagreements shaped the A-B-C into two pairs of states, or dyads, Argentina-Brazil and Argentina-Chile. They, in turn, have dragged the other, smaller states of Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay into the RSC. They did so in two ways that appear most distinctly in the case of Argentina and Brazil. First, the smaller neighbours were brought in by the larger states' competition for influence, thereby functioning both as 'prizes' and as buffer states. Secondly, when the form of relationships eventually changed from negative to positive, when rapprochement started in the dyads, the smaller countries were attracted into the region, perceiving the higher costs of exclusion vis-à-vis the potential benefits of inclusion. The obvious and concrete example is the creation of Mercosur (or Mercosul, in Portuguese); an economic integration agreement of which Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay are at present full members, and Bolivia and Chile are associated members.6

6 Mercosur stands for Common Market of the South (sometimes also translated as Southern Cone Common Market), and was created in 1991. Chapter seven deals with Mercosur in more detail.
2. **Research subject**

The main topic of the present research is the development of relationships within the dyads formed by Argentina and Chile, and Argentina and Brazil. In particular, the focus is on the positive transformation that they underwent over time. One of the central questions guiding this research is, thus, "why and how has the geopolitical agenda in the Southern Cone lost its prevalence over other issues?" Or, to put it another way, "why and how did desecuritization in the region develop?"

One could attempt to answer such questions on the basis of theories of interdependence and neoliberal institutionalism. These would argue that in an interdependent world—or rather, in the interdependent part of the world—the traditional realist distinction between high and low politics loses its relevance, and issues change their position in the agenda. However, the Southern Cone hardly conformed to the minimum requirements of interdependence in the 1970s and 1980s. This was a case of rapprochement followed by the construction of a regional integration project first, and growth of interdependence later. And even if it had not been so, the questions would still hold: why and how did it happen that countries in the Southern Cone increasingly ceased to behave according to realist premises, and started to observe the principles of interdependence? What made it possible for countries in this region to eventually rule out from their relationships geopolitical approaches, and instead start talking about cooperation and integration? How can this transformation be explained?

A striking observation at the beginning of the research was the speed of the rapprochement that occurred between Argentina and Brazil, which allowed the relationship to move from open hostility to a comprehensive co-operation and integration project in a matter of some six years. It started initially in the sensitive field of nuclear technology, and resulted a few years later in Mercosur. How and why these states, still ruled by military regimes, managed to set in motion this process and favourably alter the perceptions of each other grew thus into a central research question.

A second focus of the research is on how and why improvements within the two dyads occurred at such different paces, despite a certain number of commonalities. For instance, both disputes escalated in the late 1970s, in both cases this happened after long histories of animosity, in neither case did war actually break out, and both rapprochement processes started when at least one of the states was still ruled by a
military government. Yet besides these similarities, the processes were marked by several differences. Although the peaks of tension in the dyads were around the same period—in 1978 in the case of Argentina and Chile; throughout the 1970s in the case of Brazil and Argentina—the Argentine-Chilean rapprochement took considerably longer to take off. Once it started, its dynamic was completely different as well. Thus, another set of key questions informing this study refers to the reasons for such differences. What had precluded rapprochement in each case for so long? And what encouraged it to eventually occur? Why did these processes take such diverse paths, the Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement being much faster, more far-reaching and deeper than the rapprochement between Argentina and Chile?

Finally, after having observed these two dyads in a more systematic fashion, some other questions arise. Is desecuritization in the Southern Cone a regional trend? If it is, is it leading to a pluralistic security community? Is there room for formal security cooperation, and eventually political integration, in the region?

In answering these questions, this study will first explore the particular domestic conditions of each of the three countries during the period that goes from the post Second World War until the 1980s, as well as the regional and hemispheric contexts. The focus will then shift to each of the two dyads, examining later the region in the 1990s in order to discuss, in chapter seven, the transformations that followed the rapprochement processes. Throughout the study particular attention will be paid to the blend of security, economic and political aspects involved in these processes, as well as the security, economic, and political considerations of the actors.

This approach is thus different from those employed by the majority of previous studies. Apart from few exceptions that deal with rapprochement and integration in the Southern Cone in a more comprehensive manner, the region has been mostly studied

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7 As just mentioned, when rapprochement started between Argentina and Brazil both countries were under military rule. In the case of Argentina and Chile, it started when General Pinochet was still in power while Argentina had already begun its democratic transition.

either in economic terms—focusing on Mercosur— or institutional terms—stressing the effect of regime change on the region. Additionally, research has focused either on Argentina and Brazil, or on Argentina and Chile, but rarely on the region as a whole or engaging in a comparative exercise of both dyads.


It is claimed here that economic co-operation and integration between the countries in the region have only been possible because major changes in these states' relationships had taken place, and this, in turn, had an effect on the Southern Cone as a whole. The next few pages give a background to, and summarise, the nature of this shift, as it is understood in this work.

The 1980s and 1990s are seen in sharp contrast to the period between the 1940s and 1970s. The 1980s were greeted in the Southern Cone with goodwill, rapprochement processes, a more viable economic co-operation project than those attempted in the 1960s and 1970s, and improved relations between the new democracies. On the contrary, the period of the Second World War and the three subsequent decades was characterised by political dissent, foreign policy disagreements, competition for regional prestige and natural resources, and territorial disputes. In addition, the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s were marked by very hostile domestic political and economic conditions in most of Latin America.


In the region, the Cold War took the form of violent clashes between left-wing guerrilla and terrorist movements on the one side, and military governments that carried...
out fierce repression and state terrorism (i.e. the State employing terrorist techniques outside the law with the purpose of fighting terrorism) on the other. The governments of the Southern Cone managed to set up a quite efficient co-operation scheme concerning their repressive activities—the Condor Plan—which has lately been the focus of thorough investigations. It constituted a system of trans-border exchange of intelligence information and illegally detained prisoners between the military governments of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay during the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, this enterprise counted on the blessing of the U.S. government of the time. In terms of international security, during this period members of nationalist factions often held key governmental offices. All too frequently, strategic and geopolitical perspectives, and regional war hypotheses dominated the foreign and defence policy agendas. The decade of the 1970s is paradigmatic of this regional disposition. In the Southern Cone the dispute between Argentina and Brazil involving water resources in the River Paraná (part of the River Plate Basin) took hitherto unseen dimensions. In addition, in 1978 Argentina and Chile found themselves on the verge of war due to longstanding territorial disagreements. These cases were by no means isolated in the region. Throughout its history, South America has been far from a peaceful region, despite the relative absence of major wars. Historic animosities between states have been synthesised by Federico More already in 1918 as follows:

Brazil and Argentina, but foremost Argentina, have fallen into the sin of believing that it is up to them to lead South America. [...] As it is known, when Brazil took sides with Yanquilandia [the United States] during the war against Germany, it asked in exchange to be Washington's deputy in South America. [...] Brazil is the most dangerous country in the continent [...] Between Chile and Brazil there is something of an alliance [...] and together with Chile and Brazil there are Ecuador and Colombia. The friendship between Santiago and Rio has to do with their common rivalry with Argentina; the one of Quito and Bogota with Santiago has to do with their common rivalry with Peru.

Most of these patterns survived throughout the twentieth century. Clearly, the absence of major armed conflicts did not prevent South American states from engaging in arms races, a practice that became more extended during the 1960s and 1970s. The

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dispute over hydroelectric resources in the River Plate Basin fed military spending both in Argentina and Brazil, and served as a justification for some of the largest arms purchases in the history of the region. The dispute between Argentina and Chile over the Beagle Channel also encouraged a significant expansion of their military budgets. While those disputes brought Argentina’s adversaries closer together—which was reflected for instance in Brazil’s arms sales to Chile—, Argentina moved closer to Bolivia and Peru, exporting arms to these countries. Not surprisingly, Bolivia and Peru, in turn, have historically held territorial claims on Chile that come from the time of the Pacific War (1879-1884). Despite Chile being an arms importer itself, it also exported arms to Ecuador, a state in conflict with Peru over a region rich in natural and energy resources. This dispute dates back to the Peruvian occupation of Ecuadorian territory in 1942.16 And this list could go on.

David Mares argues along these lines in his Violent Peace: Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin America, where the author points out that in spite of appearances "the use of violence across national boundaries has been a consistent trait of Latin America’s international politics."17 Furthermore, Mares highlights the entangled and interconnected nature of the region’s conflicts by illustrating how “Central American balance of power dynamics, the Nicaragua-Colombia territorial dispute, and the 1995 war between Ecuador and Peru provide more contemporary examples of the indirect links among distinct bilateral conflicts.”18

Throughout the period of the 1960s to 1980s, the economy of region saw different states implement successively import substitution and protectionist policies, inward-looking industrialisation programmes, socialism, and neoliberal and unilateral deregulation and privatisation schemes. Most of these projects resulted in, at best, short-lived successes. More often, however, they simply failed to achieve their basic objectives, which typically comprised industrialisation, stabilisation of economic variables, reduction of inflation, and redistribution.

18 Mares, Violent Peace: Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin America, pp. 29-30. Latin American conflicts are discussed again in more detail in chapter four of this thesis.
However contradictory, those decades also witnessed attempts to set up economic co-operation schemes in Latin America. As chapter four discusses, all too frequently a rather wishful rhetoric would be at odds with the major states' actual attitudes towards the region. In 1960 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay signed a treaty creating the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), to which later Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela and Bolivia also adhered. The goal of this Association was to raise intra-Latin American trade through tariffs reduction. The programme did not prosper in the long run, and the same countries that took part in LAFTA tried to renew their commitment transforming it in 1980 into its successor LAIA, the Latin American Integration Association. However, also LAIA's achievements fell short of its original targets, and once more, Latin America failed to accomplish the goal of achieving a sustained project of regional integration.

In the context of consecutive fruitless integration efforts and tense bilateral and regional relationships, the Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement appears as a curious occurrence; an even more remarkable development as it started under two military governments. Equally extraordinary seems to be the bilateral economic co-operation scheme that unfolded soon after the first steps were taken; the 1986 PICE (Economic Integration and Co-operation Programme—Programa de Integración y Cooperación Económica), which was in turn ensued by the creation of the Common Market of the Southern Cone, Mercosur. As Philip Kelly notes,

The Brazilian-Argentine rivalry for regional leadership has solidified the continental checkerboard, made shatterbelts more likely, kept frontier tensions high, and prevented regional integration. Yet, of late, because of the potential for profit through South American economic integration and diplomatic cooling between Brazil and the United States, conflict has changed to cooperation between the two states. This represents a monumental reversal of traditional geopolitics, and the two countries' foreign policies and resources now seem to be melding into an integrative structure of regional peace. 19

Nevertheless, as already noted, the Argentine-Chilean relationship evolved quite differently. It advanced at an undeniably more cautious, and therefore clearly slower, pace. Having also had an extremely tense relationship in the 1970s—which almost resulted in a war in 1978, literally avoided in the last minute—co-operation and deeper rapprochement first came in the late 1990s. Only then the consideration of the bilateral use of force was completely and confidently ruled out. Reasons for this longer and slower process are of course various and complex ones. Among the most commonly

alleged factors, the long Chilean military dictatorship and its much later transition towards democracy, as well as the fact that the pending disputes with Argentina were about territory, have certainly played a role.

Yet beyond the most frequent arguments that explain rapprochement in the Southern Cone, which usually rely on type and change of regime, it will be suggested here that further factors played a decisive role. These have to do with the self-perception and the perception of the other. That is, how a state—usually through its government, and more certainly so in the case of military regimes, such as the Southern Cone's ones in the 1970s—sees itself, perceives its needs, strengths and vulnerabilities, and ranks its priorities accordingly, and how it sees others; in this case bordering neighbours and the further region surrounding it, as well as the global context.

Such an approach is in line with the central ideas involved in constructivist perspectives, which in general claim,

[f]irst, that, in contrast to rationalist theories, we need to pay far more attention to the processes by which both interests and identities are created and evolve, to the ways in which self-images interact with changing material incentives, and to the language and discourse through which these understandings are expressed; second, that it matters how actors interpret the world and how their understandings of 'where they belong' are formed; and third, that both interests and identities are shaped by particular histories and cultures, by domestic factors and by ongoing processes of interaction with other states.20

As chapter two discusses more closely, such an approach does not neglect material incentives and material forces. Nevertheless, the latter do not constitute the only or main factors explaining international behaviour. On the contrary, the 'moderate' constructivist perspective21 chosen here assumes that material incentives as well as "shared knowledge, learning, ideational forces, and normative and institutional structures," and their inter-subjective constitution are key to understanding the way states behave and "the ways in which interests and identities change over time."22 This comes somewhat closer to Alexander Wendt's position, as opposed to more reflectivist, post-modern or discursive branches of constructivism:

brute material forces—the true 'material base'—can still have independent effects [...]. These effects interact with interests and culture to dispose social action and systems in certain directions and not others. The term 'interaction' is

20 Hurrell, 'Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics,' pp. 352-353.
21 For a collection of constructivist essays that are positioned in different points between the two extreme poles of rationalism and reflectivism, see T. Christiansen, K. E. Jørgensen, and A. Wiener (eds.), The Social Construction of Europe (London, Thousand Oaks, CA, and New Delhi: SAGE, 2001), particularly their Introduction (pp. 1-19), where the differences between the several constructivist positions are spelt out.
22 Hurrell, 'Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics,' p. 353.
significant here, since it means that at some level material forces are constituted independent of society, and affect society in a causal way. Material forces are not constituted solely by social meanings, and social meanings are not immune to material effects. On the other hand, it is only because of their interaction with ideas that material forces have the effects that they do.\textsuperscript{23}

Thus, the next chapters try to explain the process of change of perception of self and other that took place in the Southern Cone and that allowed rapprochement, or desecuritization, to advance. It will be claimed that the reassessment of one country's own vulnerabilities and needs is crucial to the way a country perceives itself and others. In particular, it will be argued that the process of desecuritization between Argentina and Brazil can only be understood in the context of their perception of deterioration or failure of their individual economic projects, especially in the late 1970s. Hence the serious consideration given, for the first time in a serious manner, to economic cooperation, which was the original goal of rapprochement. This was combined with a tradition both in Brazil and Argentina of a high profile in regional affairs, given that they were both competing for regional leadership, which ruled out the option of isolationism from their range of alternatives.

Conversely, in the late 1970s Chile seemed to be improving its overall economic performance, even if later this proved to be a short-lived success. Therefore, its sense of economic vulnerability and need to co-operate did not seem so urgent as to encourage rapprochement with Argentina. Additionally, Chile had never pursued a policy of hegemony towards the region, although it had historically held a high profile in international affairs. The Pinochet administration openly put an end to this tradition, focusing mainly on international trade but dismissing other areas of international affairs. This government did not appear too worried about international political isolationism.

Argentina's and Brazil's transitions towards democracy would reinforce the vision that political and economic co-operation were fundamental for their purposes. There is little discussion about the fact that Mercosur was born as a strategic 'development alliance' with clear political and economic goals: institutional (democratic) and economic stabilisation, economic growth, and increase of political leverage in international affairs. Riordan Roett writes

in 1991, driven by a shared belief that economic integration and harmonization was the best way to push forward the process of regional economic stabilization

and ultimately to end the cycle of hyperinflation and economic mismanagement, Mercosur came into existence with the Treaty of Asunción.24

Although I share with the author this conclusion, it will be argued here that the belief Roett talks about had been developed much earlier than he acknowledges.

In order to build up my argument, I have extensively reviewed secondary sources, including historical, as well as political, economic and social academic accounts. I have also relied on a number of chapters and volumes written by political leaders and state officials of the period under study. Newspapers and official documents have also been an important part of this research. The personal interviews with many of the protagonists of the events that I had so closely studied were highly stimulating. Mostly between March and April 2001, I met with former ambassadors and former ministers of government, as well as academic specialists, in Buenos Aires, Rio and Brasilia.

I have briefly introduced so far some important clarifications, the principal subject of this research, some of its core questions and assumptions, and its relevance. The remainder of this introduction outlines, chapter by chapter, the plan of the thesis.

3. Plan of the thesis

The thesis builds one cohesive argument, but covers different aspects of analysis through four parts, each of which consists of two chapters. Part I acts as a general introduction to, and theoretical framework for, the present research. It comprises chapters one and two, which are this introduction and the theoretical chapter, respectively.

Chapter two, "Theories of Regional Security and Peace," proceeds in consecutive steps laying out the theoretical approach that this study adopts. It does so by first reviewing the concept of region, the difficulties defining regions, and the advantages of taking a regional approach, focusing, in particular, on the notion of Regional Security Complex. It then examines the debate on international security as it has developed in the last two or three decades, concentrating next on the constructivist Securitization Approach. The relevance of this latter section rests on the fact that it presents the notion of 'securitization,' which will be then used throughout this research to study the processes of desecuritization of the Southern Cone. Through such processes states in the region progressively ceased to perceive one another as potential enemies, and began to allow the idea of potential partnership to grow. In addition, it is argued that along with

desecuritization a process of stabilisation and consolidation of peace took shape. Consequently, the concept of peace is discussed in some detail, peace hypotheses are reviewed, and a regional peace scale is constructed to differentiate between several types of peace, including the category of Security Community as the deepest and most consolidated type of international peace in a region.

Part II addresses the ‘contexts’ surrounding the dyadic relationships, examining these from the domestic and regional perspectives. Chapter three, on “Domestic Conditions,” provides a discussion of the particular direction taken by Argentina, Brazil and Chile especially during the 1970s, the underpinning principles of their policies, and the consequences of such policies. Its primary focus is on the political and economic ideologies and performance of the different governments, and on how these affected their vision of the regional and global contexts, and their perception of strengths and weaknesses, of options and opportunities. The argument contends that in the case of Argentina and Brazil, political and economic conjunctures and a tradition of high profile in regional affairs combined in such a way to allow the broadening of the perceived range of policy options, and to favour rapprochement. It will be shown that in Chile’s case, its domestic situation and the government’s lack of interest in regional or international politics resulted in the perception that there was no need to consider a broader range of policy alternatives.

Chapter four, “The Hemispheric Context,” looks at different aspects of the broader regional background. It highlights the fact that the regional context was highly hostile to co-operation over many years, despite rhetoric to the contrary and several attempts to formalise co-operative projects. In so doing, this chapter reviews and discusses several hemispheric/continental regimes, pointing out the usually contradicting expectations held by the United States and the Latin American countries, and the generally detrimental effect that the presence of the superpower had on a continent of rather weak states. The chapter then examines the history of disputes in Latin America, showing that in spite of the relative absence of major wars, it is inappropriate to define Latin America as a region of stable peace. Finally, it discusses Latin America's two major economic integration attempts prior to 1980, LAFTA and LAIA, explaining their poor outcomes in terms of the unreceptive regional context.

The Third Part shifts the focus to case studies of the two dyads, each in its own chapter. The objective of this part is to examine the peaks of tension in either dyad and the ensuing processes of rapprochement in the terms of the framework developed in chapter two, as well as taking into account the countries’ domestic circumstances,
reviewed in chapter three. Both chapters have a similar structure in order to highlight differences and similarities between the cases.

The first of the pair, chapter five, entitled “Bilateral Relations between Argentina and Chile,” explores briefly the history of the relationship between the two, and discusses how the construction and adoption of negative mutual perceptions resulted in an oscillation between fragile and unstable peace. This was clearly reflected in the development of the Beagle Channel dispute, and of other territorial issues. As will be seen, attempts to solve such issues often resulted in very protracted negotiations, which in turn slowed down and delayed the desecuritization process and the improvement of the quality of bilateral peace.

The sixth chapter is on “Bilateral Relations between Argentina and Brazil.” As with chapter five, it pays particular attention to their historic construction of mutual rivalry as the dominant dyadic logic, and to the main ‘concrete’ dispute that these states had, one that came close to escalating, although it was kept within the limits of diplomacy. The issue at stake was the construction of dams on the River Paraná for the exploitation of its hydroelectric resources at Itaipú and Corpus. In addition, the attempts by both countries to develop nuclear capabilities in the context of their longstanding competition also receives a thorough examination, not least because it was in this sensitive field that Argentina and Brazil made the first steps towards co-operation immediately after resolving the Itaipú-Corpus dispute. Those first steps were rapidly followed by increasing desecuritization and notable efforts on the part of the governments to improve the relationship and deepen integration.

Finally, Part IV returns to the Southern Cone region after the processes of rapprochement and desecuritization, and draws some final conclusions from the central arguments of the previous chapters. In chapter seven, “Regional Integration in the Southern Cone,” some implications of the integration initiative that resulted in Mercosur are considered. By looking at its original state-driven conception, its slow consolidation and expansion, its underpinning political principles, and the spillover of its success into the societies, I discuss whether Mercosur to some extent helped to develop a common ‘identification’—a softer term than ‘identity.’ This chapter also addresses the more recent debate about whether integration should spill over into security by assessing the state of affairs in the military field and the timid emergence of a sense of community.

The concluding chapter summarises the main themes discussed in this dissertation, raises some questions about the current situation in a region that seems never to be fully ‘at peace’ with itself, and, hopefully, opens the way for new discussions.
CHAPTER 2
THEORIES OF REGIONAL SECURITY AND PEACE

1. Introduction

The key focus of this thesis is, as already discussed, the processes of bilateral rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil, and Argentina and Chile. In trying to explain the causes of the rapid and far reaching development of the former dyad vis-à-vis the slower and less committed development of the latter dyad, I will study and compare domestic economic and political conditions in all three countries, their foreign policy orientations, and the evolution of their bilateral relations. The focus is mostly on the decades of the 1970s and 1980s, for it was then that both relationships reached their peak of tension to be followed by processes of rapprochement. The underlying assumption is that both domestic and international circumstances influenced the way in which political actors and elites perceived the needs of their countries, and the way they ranked their countries' priorities. These perceptions were also influenced by existing foreign policy traditions or historical foreign policy orientations. The combination of perceptions and foreign policy tradition translated, consequently, into a particular set of policy attitudes towards their neighbours (see Figure 2.1).

![Figure 2.1: Basic process of formation of foreign policy orientation](image-url)
This chapter discusses the theoretical framework that informs my research, which, conceptually, deals with processes of increasing and decreasing bilateral—and ultimately regional—tension. Moreover, as this chapter seeks to understand how geopolitical considerations may be subject to the influence of concerns originating in other areas of politics, it will need to examine broader approaches to security than what traditional strategic studies have to offer, since their focus is almost exclusively on military affairs.

This interest comes from the more empirical observation of the Argentine-Brazilian détente of the 1980s, as opposed to the longer-lasting Argentine-Chilean animosity. This thesis argues that in the late 1970s domestic and international concerns both in Argentina and Brazil became so unfavourable that the consideration that bilateral cooperation could bring about benefits promoted the easing of tension between the two in spite of traditional geopolitical attitudes. Conversely, a relatively positive (even if short-lived) political and economic outcome in Chile after the 1973 coup discouraged a rapprochement with its immediate neighbour, at a time when nationalism and doctrinal geopolitics were predominant on both sides of the Andes. The underlying claim is that non-military issues have had a major influence on the security agenda, advancing or hindering a change of vision of the neighbouring state, and consequently a change of attitude with regard to longstanding bilateral disputes. Therefore, the relationship between military and non-military issues needs to be explored more closely, as well as its relationship to the concept of security.

In this context, the notions of securitization and desecuritization are central to this research, as they conceptualise the increasing and easing of tension from a constructivist perspective. Social constructivism highlights that facts and evidence are as important in the making of policy as perceptions, attitudes and the presentation of those very facts by policymakers (or securitizing agents, as will be discussed shortly), as well as past history and traditions. In addition, a revision of the concept of peace seems appropriate in order to contextualize this research, given that in the cases studied here no actual war was fought.

Different IR theories explain the absence of war by different means. The argument that democracy has a powerful effect on the incidence of peaceful relations has become something of an accepted ‘natural law’ in the discipline. While not disputing this, the present dissertation deals with cases in which the process of stabilisation of peace began under at least one military regime. Therefore, an underlying claim is that under certain circumstances military governments may advance the stabilisation of peace as
effectively as democracies. A stable and consolidated peace implies a certain *quality* of peace, substantially different from a more negative, unstable type. This becomes apparent when stable peace is contrasted with peace as the mere absence of war. As will be seen below, in the last decade or two numerous scholars have discussed the concepts of peace, stable peace and pluralistic security community, paying particular attention to the role of identities, perceptions, and trust; that is, taking on board constructivist notions. To be sure, in the same way as security studies have been approached by constructivism, similar considerations have permeated peace theories.

This thesis claims that the eventual improvement in the relationship of each dyad has had a regional impact, improving in turn the quality of regional peace. Chapter one has highlighted the relevance of the chosen empirical cases. This chapter offers a theoretical basis to support the study of these dyads. It argues that they constitute two subsystems of a same regional security complex. Therefore, the regional security complex approach is the subject of the second section of this chapter. The third section turns to the debate on security studies and places it within IR theory. The securitization approach, developed by the so-called Copenhagen School, is identified as one of the attempts to redefine and set new boundaries to the field of security studies. While taking a critical view of some aspects of their approach, I borrow some of their concepts, and generally share with the Copenhagen School the belief that a constructivist approach can make important contributions to our understanding of international relations. Consequently, the fourth part discusses the concepts of securitization and desecuritization in more depth.

Section five turns to peace. It reviews first, fairly conventional peace hypotheses as put forward by different IR schools, and second, peace scales or gradations that refer to regional peace. Here I build up a typology that is helpful in understanding the developments in the Southern Cone. In its third part, this section introduces a constructivist model to understand the evolution of peace, centred on the concept of trust. Lastly, the concluding section integrates the ideas previously discussed, presenting some final thoughts on the theoretical approach informing this thesis.
2. **A Regional Approach**

2.1. The region as a level of analysis

The classic distinction between the three images or levels of analysis drawn by Kenneth Waltz is widely known to IR scholars.¹ According to his structural realism, there have been attempts to explain the international behaviour of states by focusing on personality and psychological features of statespersons, or by focusing on the features and characteristics of societies and states themselves. Waltz calls these levels of analyses the first and second images. However, both these approaches to international politics, according to Waltz, are reductionisms; they miss 'the whole' that rules international dynamics. The systemic level or third image, rather than the first and second images, is the key for building up a theory to account for international politics, since it is the international system that constrains the units' international behaviour.

In *Theory of International Politics*, Waltz is much more resolute in his assertions about the capital importance of the third image than in *Man, the State and War*, published some twenty years earlier. In the latter book, devoted to the cause of war, Waltz emphasises the importance of the third image while also stressing the need to look at the other two levels. Thus, he concludes,

> The third image describes the framework of world politics, but without the first and second images there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy; the first and second images describe the forces in world politics, but without the third image it is impossible to assess their importance or predict their results.²

An instance that seems to be absent from this analysis is the region, both as an analytical focus and as a discernible 'image' that may also condition the state's external behaviour. However, I would argue that focusing on regions pushes us to take a more comprehensive perspective; more than if the focus is on other levels. When the analysis concentrates on a region, it becomes crucial a) to study the domestic circumstances of the states involved, given that their effect on regional dynamics is more immediate (and therefore more apparent) than the effect they are likely to exert on global dynamics, b) to examine the relationships between regional states, and c) to assess the influence on

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the region of extra-regional powers and of the international system as a whole. The same is true for the study of dyads.

The conception and development of the European Community conveniently highlights these points. A full appreciation of the formation of the European Community should not and cannot neglect the background of the Second World War, the historical rivalry between France and Germany, the context of the Cold War, and the role of the U.S. in Western Europe. Moreover, regional relations in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s also illustrate the importance of comprehensive analyses. Domestic conditions dominated by the presence of guerrilla, terrorism, and chaos, the widespread reach of nationalist ideologies and high incidence of military regimes, and the spread of communist and socialist ideas in the region, combined with the role of the U.S. as the continental hegemon. All this shaped the Cold War in the region and accentuated the already contemptuous character of regional relations in Latin America.

The creation of Mercosur may serve as another example. Even when extra-regional powers did not seem to have played an obvious role, the constitution of Mercosur is difficult to understand if global trends towards globalisation, regionalisation, and the building up of economic blocs are overlooked. But domestic circumstances of the demise of military governments, redemocratisation, and the need to be integrated into the world economy on the domestic side, and the overcoming of disputes and the consequent improvement of relations between Brazil and Argentina on the regional side, are also crucial factors in understanding the creation of Mercosur. Thus, pure inside-out or bottom-up analyses that explain regional outcomes by looking solely at the units appear rather incomplete, in the same way as pure top-down approaches do.

Indeed, the neorealist/systemic approach, as developed in Theory of International Politics, fails to appreciate the effects that individual states may exert on regional dynamics. Not to recognise the role of domestic configurations in the shaping of regional relations seems to be missing (or at least underestimating) the 'raw material' on which the structure works. Regional analyses, more clearly than other types of analyses, demand attention to both systemic and unit factors in order to explain the functioning of regional dynamics.

In this sense, regional and dyadic approaches favour, and even force attention to all other three levels of analyses (personalities/bureaucracies, societies/state, global system). They emphasise the reciprocity of impact between the region and its external influences, on the one hand, and the region and its units, on the other. They highlight the interaction between all levels. Furthermore, regions should not be studied as isolated
'small global systems,' even if they may resemble the system's dynamics in many aspects. This is the way in which neorealists tend to analyse regions. In some respects, subsystems may reproduce a systemic logic, but precisely because they are open to the influence of the global system in which they are located—and the global system is not subject to any other higher influence!—they cannot be understood as mere minute reproductions of the global system.

At the same time, even if each region has its own set of patterns and features, its own internal dynamics, some general patterns identified in a particular region may result useful to understand others. Furthermore, some regions do share general patterns of behaviour. Broadly speaking, it is possible to sort regions into large categories in accordance with their most distinctive features. For instance, regions characterised by amity, ideological and cultural affinity, trade and interdependence can be sorted out from those distinguished by rivalry, conflict, and violence. The latter can surely be subdivided according to the level of violence and the type of predominating conflict, be it territorial or border disputes, hegemonic competition or competition for regional prestige, ethnic struggles, ideological conflicts, and others.

A comparative analysis of regions with similar relational patterns can highlight commonalities and differences, thus facilitating the development of a more solid theoretical body for each category. The theory of complex interdependence, for instance, constitutes a study of the main features of a certain type of region in which commercial exchange and economic interdependence stand out. While studying almost the same region although aiming to explain a different outcome, Karl Deutsch's, and later Adler and Barnett's volumes on security communities are attempts to look systematically at regions in which a sense of community has arisen.

In this sense, regions are neither mini-systems, whose characteristics can be universalised, nor totally unique phenomena in the international system. Some degree of generalisation is feasible, even if at the same time a great deal of attention must be paid to the internal dynamics distinctive of each region. Thus, a regional approach taking on a multilevel perspective is the approach endorsed here.

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2.2. Regional Security Complexes and the boundaries of regions

The choice of taking a regional approach raises other questions, such as the definition of the region's boundaries. This problem comes up less frequently when the focus of analysis is on the state. Unless the discussion is on a state with highly contested borders, states are generally historically defined units with internationally recognised boundaries. If the focus is instead on the systemic level, then the problem of the boundaries does not apply, as the analysis encompasses the entire system. Regions, instead, are territorial subsystems held together by a feature of the wider international system. The chosen feature may vary; for instance, it can be trade, common culture, or security/insecurity relationships. The key element in all of them is the territorial proximity of the units.6

As the present thesis concentrates on the political and security relations of two dyads in the Southern Cone, the remainder of this section reviews the concept of Regional Security Complex (RSC), as developed by Barry Buzan in People, State and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, and revised later with a constructivist turn in Security: A New Framework for Analysis.7 What follows is not intended to be an exhaustive appraisal of Buzan's theory, but rather seeks only to highlight some aspects of the RSC approach most relevant to this research. The main concern in this part is to back up conceptually the choice of states under study.

According to People, State and Fear, from a security perspective, ‘‘region’ means that a distinct and significant subsystem of security relations exists among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each other.”8 Such a geographical subsystem must show durable, significant and self-contained features of the security problem, where self-contained means not ‘‘totally free standing, but rather a security dynamic that would exist even if other actors [extra-regional powers, for instance] did not impinge on it.”9 Thus, an RSC is defined as a set of two or

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6 Other types of grouping different from regions are possible, even if taking into consideration the same variables. For instance, the states of the Commonwealth of Nations claim cultural affinity. That may make them a subsystem. However, it does not make them a region, as they do not have territorial proximity.
8 Buzan, People, State and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 188.
9 Ibid., p. 187, brackets added.
more states within a particular geographical area, whose primary security perceptions and concerns are interlinked so closely that their national security problems cannot be reasonably analysed apart from one another.\textsuperscript{10} That is, states in such a complex are engaged in a relationship of security interdependence. This, in turn, might be either negative or positive, as security complexes need not imply only enmity patterns.

The border of a regional security complex can thus be placed where interdependence becomes low, and security perceptions and concerns become characterised by relative indifference. In this manner, it is the distinctive pattern of security interdependence of an RSC that marks off the members of such a complex from other neighbouring states. Usually, regional security complexes will also include some smaller states less powerful than those constituting the core of the complex. Mostly, they will have little impact on the structure of the complex, but their alignment with one or the other major regional power can potentially become crucial. As will be discussed in chapter six, a great deal of the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry was dominated by their efforts to bring Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia into their spheres of influence. In a similar manner, historical territorial disputes between Chile and Argentina encouraged them to covertly assist whatever other state—regional or otherwise, as illustrated by Chile's assistance to Great Britain during the Falklands War—held a cause against the other one.

A final feature of this theoretical approach that I find valuable is its emphasis on the historical context in which complexes develop, and the consequent importance given to processes of change, which could actually be defined as the general topic of this research. Certainly, RSC theory manages to avoid a frequent criticism to which structural realism is subject, and that is that of ahistoricism. Given that structural realism developed with the explicit goal of founding a systemic theory that could produce something similar to the general laws of natural sciences in order to be able to predict outcomes in international politics, it was often criticised for referring to system-level abstractions detached from their historical context.

Instead, security complexes are understood to be durable, rather than permanent features of the global system. They are subsystems in which structural changes may occur. According to Buzan, they may happen due to changes in a) the arrangements of the units (for instance, partitions or integration processes), b) the relational patterns (amity/enmity), and c) the distribution of power among the principal units. These three

variables are defined as *components of the essential structure.* The changes may have either purely internal causes or may be fed by extra-regional intervention, as illustrated by the case of an extra-regional power arming up one state in the complex or otherwise actively supporting it.

In any case, changes in any of these components may bring about major redefinitions of the complex. Some of these transformations can be quite dramatic indeed. I would argue that in cases of major structural changes new complexes can come into existence, old complexes can dissolve, and the same complexes can stay, but suffering alterations in their relational patterns, i.e. they may shift away from a negative security dynamic towards a positive one, or vice versa.

**a) RSC formation in Latin America**

This can be nicely illustrated by a quick revision of interstate relations in Latin America. After decolonisation and independence, neither Latin America as a whole nor any of its subregions constituted a security complex. Mostly, territorial borders ran either through high mountains, dense jungles, or unpopulated deserts, and the newly independent states were more concerned with institutionally organising themselves than with demarcating every corner of their territory. But by the 1880s border disagreements started to arise, some of which have survived to this day. Thus, in the years that followed, South America grew into a security complex separated from the Central American one; one that could be analysed in its own right, as suggested in chapter one.

However, by the 1960s, and more clearly by the 1970s, the Southern Cone could be separated as a subcomplex of the South American complex, with its three main actors, Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and the smaller Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia, playing balancing games, keeping revisionist claims alive, and staying very vigilant on strategic changes and extra-regional influences. The main disputes arising in the region involved Argentina with either Brazil or Chile. While these disputes can be relatively isolated from other security spirals taking place further north, they can hardly be considered totally isolated from one another. It need not be pointed out that Argentina was well aware of the fact that it could not afford to face major conflicts on two fronts

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simultaneously; indeed a fact of which its neighbours were well aware, too! This, naturally, entered into the calculations of all of them.12

Moreover, the Southern Cone can be seen as an autonomous security complex after the noteworthy transformations undergone in the 1980s and 1990s, when it shifted away from being a zone of unstable peace towards becoming a zone of stable peace.13 Indeed, in the 1990s the Southern Cone could be set apart as a complex on its own characterised by amity patterns, as opposed to the northern part of South America, where some conflict-prone relational features persist.

b) Weaknesses of the RSC approach

While the premises of the RSC approach appear valuable in defining the Southern Cone as a regional security complex, it seems equally pertinent to point out two important weaknesses of classical RSC approach as presented in 1991. These weaknesses stand out under the light of this particular research and its cases, and become more apparent the further the Cold War falls behind.14

Firstly, even though its second edition was published when the Cold War had already come to end, and explicitly trying to overcome a Europe-centred perspective, RSC theory still lays excessive weight on great power rivalry and on the way it impinges upon local security complexes, with the likely outcome of suppressing indigenous security dynamics. This effect is called overlay. The most conspicuous examples of overlay have been Europe and Northeast Asia, and earlier, the period of European colonialism in Africa and Asia. Buzan suggests, in addition, that great power penetration can also be unipolar, having then a similar effect to overlay and consequently suppressing local conflicts, and illustrates this with the American role in Latin America and the Soviet role in Eastern Europe. However, upon a closer look, the

12 Wayne A. Selcher also argues that the Southern Cone constitutes "a loose but active subsystem [...] identified as particularly conflict prone, because it is the setting for numerous frontier disputes, resource conflicts, and the two major axes of historical interstate rivalry on the continent (Chile-Argentina and Argentina-Brazil)." See W. A. Selcher, 'Recent Strategic Developments in South America's Southern Cone,' in Heraldo Muñoz and Joseph S. Tulchin (eds.), Latin American Nations in World Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 102-103.

13 See section 5.2 on peace scales.

Latin American example, at least, turns out to be much more complex than that. In the Southern Cone superpower and ideological rivalry did not permeate interstate relations but rather domestically oriented military violence against revolutionary armed groups and civil movements. From an ideological point of view, the governments of the Southern Cone showed a fairly homogeneous nature during most of the 1970s. However, it is during this period that interstate tension escalated the most, contrary to what overlay would suggest. As will be discussed in chapter six, the United States as an extra-regional power had a significant impact on the Argentine-Brazilian relationship, having usually a double, contradictory effect. At times, foreign policy towards the U.S. helped to intensify mutual distrust in the local security complex. This happened when Brazil proclaimed alignment with the U.S., whereas Argentina conducted a foreign policy of open opposition to the United States. At other times, in contrast, American policy towards the region helped to highlight both areas of coincidence between Argentina and Brazil and room for policy coordination to oppose the U.S.. This was particularly the effect of the United States’ non-proliferation and human rights policies.

The second deficiency probably originates in the fact that RSC theory is indeed heavily informed by structural realism, as well as in the already mentioned weighty role assigned to the overlay phenomenon. As a consequence, the influence of the global system or the higher-level complex on lower-level complexes is extensively elaborated upon at the expense of neglecting the effects of changes in the internal composition of states on local complexes. As just seen, a security complex may be redefined by major shifts in either the patterns of amity and enmity, or in the distribution of power among its main states. Changes in the distribution of power, it was noted, can have internal or external sources, but other than that, “the logic is the same as that for analysing the polarity of the system as a whole.”15 Instead, changes in amity/enmity patterns “occur either because an existing dispute has been resolved, or because new disputes have developed.”16 How those changes happen; what triggers them; why states may eventually be willing to resolve their disputes—all this seems to fall within the black box of the state, beyond the reach of the approach.

The regional shift from enmity to amity in the subcomplex of the Southern Cone is the focus of the present research. In order to understand the process that took place in the region, domestic, bilateral, regional and global factors will be evaluated. The broad

16 Ibid., p. 213.
principles of such an approach have indeed been advanced by RSC theory. Most importantly, however, RSC theory informed the delimitation of the selected region and the choice of the two dyads as the key regional components.

3. The Security Debate

3.1. Narrowers

Barry Buzan's RSC theory, and, furthermore, his broader framework of security, which differentiates five major sectors of security,17 came to join an ongoing debate on security studies that had started in the 1980s. Indeed, in the last decades security has become a very contested concept. Its definition has been the object of multiple interpretations, while many scholars have elaborated new definitions. This was probably the result, at least partly, of the development in military technology, particularly of nuclear arms, and the end of the Cold War; both of which have challenged traditional understandings of security and stimulated new thinking about it.

The 1980s and 1990s witnessed the rise of a debate about security. Very schematically, two 'sides' could be identified: those who understand the concept of security 'narrowly' and those who understand it 'widely.'18 The narrow definition of security has its grounds in the classical Strategic Studies, which were dominant during the Cold War. Traditionally, the meaning of security has involved any issue that has to do with the threat or use of force by an external aggressor against a state. Accordingly, even post-Cold War revised realist approaches to security refer primarily to the military agenda. They see national security in military terms and strongly reject attempts to broaden its content too widely. In this thinking, the nation-state plays a central role as the (almost exclusive) focus of security policy.19

17 The idea of the five sectors was first presented in Buzan, People, State and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, and then further developed in Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis.

18 Krause and Williams differentiate between attempts to 'broaden' the security agenda—that is, to include a wider range of potential threats to the neorealist conception of security—and attempts to 'deepen' it—that is, to move either down to the level of individuals or human security, or up to the level of international or global security, where regional and societal security would appear as possible intermediate levels. See K. Krause and M. C. Williams, 'Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods,' Mershon International Studies Review vol. 40, no. 2 (1996).

This traditional thinking is intellectually rooted in the realist school of International Relations (IR). Founded on a Hobbesian approach to IR, it regards the international system as a ‘state of nature,’ an anarchic, self-help scenario, where nation-states struggle for survival, and the way they do it is through the accumulation of military power. For classical realist/neorealist authors, such as Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, it is military power that ensures the state, through deterrence, its security.20 This overwhelming preoccupation with national security led them to make military issues a top priority in policy agendas and IR academic research. In the context of the Cold War, and with the pre-eminence of American schools in political science and IR, this was indeed what happened. As a consequence, issues on the agenda came to be divided into ‘high politics’ and ‘low politics,’ where high politics had to do with military security and security through diplomatic means, nuclear weapons policy, national security, and conventional warfare. Meanwhile, economy, trade, social policy, ecology, and all other issues belonged to the realm of low politics.

However, as Krause and Williams note, it is not just that contemporary realists/neorealists advocate for a narrow perspective and a specific ontology based on an implicit Hobbesian heritage. In addition, they ground the study of security, as well as IR in general, in a particular understanding of evolutionary and scientific knowledge; one which claims to represent objective, cumulative, necessary, useful and practical knowledge. This seems to confer them authority to define the limits of the very debate about security; to determine what is security and what is not, what can be discussed in the field of security studies and what cannot.21 Contrary to their claim to knowledge, especially after the end of the Cold War (but also before) realists/neorealists’ foundations appear to be challenged both from an epistemological point of view and for their limited capacity to explain new international conditions.

An alternative tradition in IR—although sharing with neorealist theories important underlying premises, such as a pessimistic conception of the human condition in the state of nature, and a methodological individualist assumption, both of which allow them to view the international system as anarchic, the state as a unitary actor, and its behaviour as rational22—is neoliberalism, with its variants liberal-institutionalism and

22 This is further explored in Krause and Williams, 'From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies.'
complex interdependence. This school stresses the potential for co-operation and order in the international system, rather than its inclination toward conflict, and point at entire regions ruled by such logic as opposed to the logic of geopolitics. These are regions that tend to grant higher value to the benefits of trade, exchange, and industrial development, than territorial gains and military balance games.

However, these authors recognise, even in such regions where liberal democracy and economic interdependence shape interstate relations not all is harmonious. Tension and disagreements may arise, although related to commercial and economic matters rather than to territorial, ideological, ethnic, or religious issues. But given the prospects of absolute gains that interdependence highlights, the role of regional institutions, and the costs and unpopularity of wars, disputes tend to be settled without recourse to military threats, hence not constituting military security problems. In this sense, neoliberals underline the role of international institutions, multilateralism, integration, non-state actors, and trade in inducing states to conduct peaceful relations.

As hinted, these principles apply to the analysis of only certain intraregional relations. History shows that democracy, economic development, and interdependence may exert a positive influence on the relationship between like-minded countries, but not necessarily between democratic and developed countries, on the one side, and countries ruled by other types of regimes and/or in other stages of industrial development, on the other. Thus, wars between Western and non-Western states, or developed and Third World states have been rather frequent lately.

3.2. Wideners

In the last two decades or so, critical voices of the realist perspective have called into question the very basic principles of realism in a way that neoliberalism had not; a fact explained by their profound epistemological coincidences. With regard to security, in particular, they claimed that new analyses and definitions were needed in order to reflect the end of bipolarity and other global changes, as well as the security realities of non-Western, non-superpower, and even non-state actors. Their argument for a broader approach to security studies provoked, as expected, a heated debate in the field. These

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voices have been raised from different sources, amounting to an eclectic choir rather than a consonant theory. Where they are all in agreement is that "in a highly interdependent world facing multiple security threats [...] a state-centric analysis, which focuses exclusively on the political/military dimensions of security, is no longer adequate."25

Critical scholars have emphasised the existence of non-military dimensions of security that encompass issues such as failure to provide basic needs (food, health, housing, money), environmental degradation, natural disasters, crime, drug trafficking, and demography, among others. The nature of these ‘new threats’ also denounces their critical view of the traditional exclusivity of the state as referent object and provider of security. They stress, conversely, that an adequate analysis of security demands consideration of the individual level as well, arguing that the security of the individual is often not reducible to the security of the state. Krause and Williams identify three overlapping arguments that reorientate the debate, exposing the ways in which individual security may conflict with claims of state security.26 The first regards individuals as right-bearing persons. Therefore, it understands that

protection of individuals within a community is not equated with support for states, and this leads to a focus on individual human rights and the promotion of the rule of law, which protects persons from each other and from predatory state institutions.

The second focus is on individuals as citizens or members of a society, and thus it highlights the fact that "the most direct threats to individuals can come not from the anarchic world of international relations and the citizens of other states, but from the institutions of organized violence of their own state." Finally, the third argument understands individuals as being members of a transcendent global community (humanity), which brings to light a great deal of common global concerns, such as environmental threats. Here, the state as a sufficient security provider is called into


question, as, for instance, many of these common global threats can be met by no one state alone.

In this manner, rather than the national security of the state, critical scholars call for a comprehensive understanding of security that deals with both the global and individual dimensions of security. As feminist authors often highlight, "the unitary state actor model favoured by realists conceals the extent to which individuals' insecurities are dependent on race, class and gender, categories that also cross state and regional boundaries."27

A broader perspective of security should "look at the ways in which the objects to be secured, the perceptions of threats to them, and the available means of securing them (both intellectual and material) have shifted over time."28 However, as critical authors acknowledge, "the alternative ways of studying security [...] possess their difficulties, and they also all present considerable epistemological challenges." They have been "conspicuously vague or even silent" about how conditions of stability and security can be achieved, and often underestimate "the importance of the ideas, institutions, and instruments of organized physical violence" in its direct and brutal form.29

The focus of these alternative approaches to security is often perceived as a variety of diffuse societal challenges to individual and collective well-being posed by a wide range of different threats, not exclusively embodied by states. The room for national security policy, and for international security as a field of study, becomes as a result too complex, broad and vague. In fact, the very boundary between security and public policy, and security and social policy, becomes rather blurred. Security understood in this broad sense expands its reach to the detriment of its capacity to offer a defined meaning that would serve both the development of a theoretical body, and the understanding of current events and subsequent policy making. Trying to highlight these difficulties, Ronnie Lipschutz asks himself,

What, in the final analysis, is being secured? If ozone holes are a threat, is the enemy us? If immigrants are a threat, do police become soldiers? If the economic competitiveness of our allies is a threat, is corporate America to be protected against leveraged buyouts by foreign capital or against those who have been fired during self-protective downsizing? If one social group threatens the mores of another, are there front lines in the "culture wars?"30

While such critical approaches have enriched the debate, posed new and important questions, and vigorously challenged traditional accounts—all facts that in themselves should be welcomed, as they encourage more and better creative thinking—their perspective often appears to be too broad. In other words, they stretch the meaning of security so much that finally everything—and thus nothing in particular—may end up being a security problem. Security runs the risk of losing its focus, as it may refer to a general question of social order encompassing all possible sources of threats posed to a large variety of objects of security (individuals, social groups, states, mankind, etc.).

However, it also seems reasonable to question the narrow definition of security. As defined by traditional Strategic Studies it proves to be too narrow a concept to analyse current security concerns of states, regions and even the global system, not to mention the security concerns of non-state actors, such as nations. Since the mid-1980s it has become apparent that there are non-military threats to security that are left untouched by the traditional approach dominant during the Cold War. As expressed by Simon Dalby, critical approaches to security have raised

the crucial issue of whether the discursive practices of Cold War security policy, premised on the necessity of ensuring military preparedness, maintaining secrecy, and working out strategies for using nuclear weapons in international conflict, really offer a useful policy approach or scholarly framework for dealing with political problems of economic dislocation, political violence, the growing numbers of refugees, environmental degradation, and the failure to think or act seriously concerning questions of sustainable livelihoods around the globe.\textsuperscript{31}

The works of the so-called Copenhagen School, which emerged from the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) with Barry Buzan and Ole Waever among its most prolific members, constituted an attempt in the direction of bridging this gap. Building upon the scholars' previous developments, such as Buzan's RSC and sectors of security, and Waever's securitization/desecuritization,\textsuperscript{32} they envisaged an approach that tried to reflect the new reality of not exclusively military security while retaining a specific meaning of security that would allow the differentiation between


The next section draws upon their treatment of the processes of securitization and desecuritization, and explains the relevance to the present research. Rather than revising the Copenhagen School's whole agenda, which is unquestionably much larger than what this research intends to cover, it just focuses on some elements of the securitization approach. In the end, it suggests amending the slightly neglected definition of emergency measures, a key element in securitization. And it does so by arguing that if the component of violence—or rather, the *consideration* of violence—is brought back in, it would help to differentiate more clearly between security and non-security. In addition, the presence of the *consideration* of use of force, even if eventually not used, helps highlight the existence of different qualities of peace, which is the topic of section four.

4. **Securitization Approach**

Given the room left between narrowers and wideners to develop a theory that envisages a broader, yet coherent and discernible, definition of security, the Copenhagen School sought to find coherence by "exploring the logic of security itself to find out what differentiates security and the process of securitization from that which is merely political." This project entailed not yet a new list of threats to account for a

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33 J. Huysmans, 'Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, on the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe,' *European Journal of International Relations* vol. 4, no. 4 (1998), p. 487. See this essay also for a review of how the Copenhagen School developed the ideas of security sectors, the meaning of security, and regional security dynamics.


36 For a critique similar to the one presented below, although calling back for a much narrower understanding of security, see O. F. Knudsen, 'Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization,' *Security Dialogue* vol. 32, no. 3 (2001).

new definition of security, but rather a search for the logic that drives the securitization process; that is, the process by which issues come to be seen as security matters.\textsuperscript{38}

The answer, in Waever's words, lies in the specificity of security, which "is to be found in the field and in certain typical operations within the field (speech acts—'security'—and modalities—threat-defense sequences), not in a clearly definable objective ('security') or a specific state of affairs ('security')."\textsuperscript{39} Building upon language theory, Waever argues that 'security' can be regarded as a speech act: the mere invocation of something using the word 'security' declares its threatening nature, "invokes the image of what would happen if it [security] did not work,"\textsuperscript{40} thereby justifying the use of extraordinary measures to counter it.

Security, hence, is the realm where emergency measures beyond ordinary political procedures become allowed. When an issue makes it into the sphere of security because it has been successfully presented as a threat, then it has been securitized. In other words, securitization is the process by which a securitizing actor succeeds in presenting a threat or vulnerability as an existential threat to a referent object, thereby attaining endorsement for emergency measures. These measures would otherwise not have been legitimised by the audience.

Several elements need to be disaggregated from this basic definition in order to understand its implications and be able to make a substantial criticism of the approach. The remaining part of this section concentrates on the process of securitization, discusses what I find to be an important drawback of the theory, and suggests an amendment for the approach to regain coherence.

In the process of securitization five components play a key role; referent object, securitizing actors, threats, securitizing audience, and emergency measures. As it is argued below, the approach loses consistency because the nature of the emergency measures that are to be legitimised is left ill-defined, which results in the securitization approach suffering from similar weaknesses as other wide approaches to security. But let us start revising the elements of the securitization process.

First, the referent object refers to what is being declared as existentially threatened and as having a legitimate claim to survival. Traditionally, this has been the state. When

\textsuperscript{38} Also Jef Huysmans argues that "although the debate on expanding the security agenda to non-military sectors and non-state referent objects launched an interesting discussion about the security (studies) agenda, it has not really dealt with the meaning of security." J. Huysmans, 'Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier,' European Journal of International Relations vol. 4, no. 2 (1998), p. 226.

\textsuperscript{39} Waever, 'Securitization and Desecuritization,' p. 51.

\textsuperscript{40} Ole Waever, "Security the Speech Act: Analysing the Politics of a Word," quoted in Waever, 'Securitization and Desecuritization,' p. 61.
the state's territory, for instance, is seen as threatened, it can be argued that the state's survival is at risk. Another recurrent referent object has been the nation. In this case, the survival of its collective identity is claimed to be at risk (societal sector of security). But if one accepts that securitization is a modality of operation rather than a closed list of threats, then "a much more open spectrum of possibilities has to be allowed. In principle, securitizing actors can attempt to construct anything as a referent object." However, as the authors of *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* acknowledge, certain types of referent objects are more likely to be successfully securitized, and this tends to be the case when the "security action is [...] taken on behalf of, and with reference to, a collectivity." In this sense, it can be said that security is, even today, a state-dominated field, "in which the state is still generally privileged as the actor historically endowed with security tasks and most adequately structured for the purpose."

Besides the military sector (with the state as its referent object) and the societal sector (with collective identity at its heart), the securitization approach differentiates another three sectors of security. Traditionally, the political sector has also enjoyed pre-eminence. Political security deals with non-military threats to sovereignty both of states and other political units. Threats can "typically be made to either the external pillar of stability—recognition—or the internal pillar of stability—legitimacy." Furthermore, there are also the environmental and economic sectors, where referent objects can vary widely, and are sometimes difficult to pin down.

The division into five different sectors of security is analytical rather than empirical. In reality, security issues tend to interconnect and cut across different sectors, mutually affecting one another. For instance, economic policy has major impacts on the political and societal sectors, and links to military security in complex ways as well. Conversely, military policy has powerful long-term effects on economic standing. The societal sector may have a parochial dimension or a cosmopolitan one, depending on the feeling of threat to identity or culture by migrations or general foreign influence. From a parochial point of view, the mobilisation of public opinion behind a 'societal threat' leads to a power-security dilemma through its impact on political perception and military behaviour. The cosmopolitan element in the societal sector, reflected in the idea

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41 Societal security is centred on collective identity. It is important to differentiate it from social security, which is about individuals and is largely economic.


43 Ibid., p. 37.

44 Ibid., p. 145.
of an international society, in contrast, facilitates both the pursuit of joint gains, and the avoidance of joint loss in many areas of military, political, economic and environmental policy.45

The second element in the security action is the securitizing actor. Securitizing actors are different from their referent objects. They speak on behalf of them, they declare referent objects as existentially threatened, thus performing the security speech act. Securitizing actors can be state officials, governments, bureaucracies, leaders of political, national or religious parties, the armed forces, environmental groups, lobbyists, and pressure groups, among many others.

Thirdly, there are the threats, which have to be presented as existentially endangering a referent object in order to have a chance of successful securitization. The threats need to be seen as putting at risk the very survival of the referent object. According to the proposed wider agenda, in the same way as referent objects vary across the different sectors of security, so varies the nature of threats.

It is important to note, however, that the question is not so much about the presence of a real existential threat, but rather about the fact that it be presented and perceived as such. This relates to the constructivist (rather than objectivist) perspective of securitization, which conceives security as a specific form of social praxis. In the words of the authors,

Security issues are made security by acts of securitization. We do not try to peek behind this to decide whether it is really a threat (which would reduce the entire securitization approach to a theory of perceptions and misperception). Security is a quality actors inject into issues by securitizing them, which means to stage them on the political arena [...] and then to have them accepted by a sufficient audience to sanction extraordinary defensive moves.46

In a similar vein, Jef Huysmans implicitly understands security as a speech act, and argues that security in a thick signifier approach "becomes self-referential. It does not refer to an external, objective reality but establishes a security situation by itself. It is the enunciation of the signifier which constitutes an (in)security condition."47

The definition of security as socially constructed implies that it is not simply a subjective perception of threats; it is not a matter that individuals decide alone, but has instead an intersubjective character. Consequently, the actual content of the concept of security is built up by the securitizing actor in a delicate bargaining process with the


legitimising audience on the grounds of actual facts. Once those facts are extensively perceived as existentially endangering something and make it into the security agenda, they translate into security policy. The process of securitization is then mostly a political choice. It is the combination of both facts and the successful spread of perceptions of threat that makes up security and becomes security policy.

Hence, the fourth element capital to securitization: the audience. The audience is who, in a more active or more passive way, accepts (or not) the discourse of securitization and renders possible the adoption of emergency measures, as it legitimises the breach of rules. Often the audience is 'public opinion.' However, and partly depending on the type of society or type of regime, a relevant audience can be made up of pressure groups, or political, military, intellectual and other elites. The audience is crucial in the process, as "the security act is negotiated between securitizer and audience—that is, internally within the unit." Thus, "successful securitization is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience of the security speech act." \(^{48}\)

The fifth component, finally, is the emergency measures that become legitimised, regardless of whether in the end they are implemented or not. Unfortunately, the authors leave this component, which I find to be key, rather loose and ill-defined. The most that is said about these emergency measures is that they break ordinary rules, they become absolute priorities, and they are actions outside the normal bound of political procedure.

However, emergency measures are the key to understanding why, when the authors explore one by one each security sector at the different levels (local, regional, global), they find the economic and environmental sectors to be, but for few occasions, rather difficult to securitize. \(^{49}\) I suggest that while referent objects, threats, actors and audiences may be specific to, and different in, each sector of security, the emergency measures that become legitimised have one commonality across the board. They have to refer in some way to the threat or use of force, or to its avoidance, even if it means to argue that "if this [the emergency measure] is not done, the situation may become violent/may require the use of violence." It is this that will make an issue a security matter. In other words, the type of legitimated emergency measure is key to differentiating a process of securitization from one of politicisation. Whilst politicisation may also imply policy priority, mobilisation of resources, urgency and

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\(^{49}\) This is not to say that these issues cannot be successfully securitized. Below are some examples of such securitization. Also, T. F. Homer-Dixon, 'On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict,' International Security vol. 16, no. 2 (1991); and T. F. Homer-Dixon and M. A. Levy, 'Environment and Security (In Correspondence),' International Security vol. 20, no. 3 (1995).
gravity, it is the reference to a measure that can ultimately involve violence (or seeks its avoidance) that characterises securitization.

Thus, a last condition can be added to the definition of securitization: it takes place when a) a security actor presents an issue as existentially threatening a referent object, b) his/her discourse is accepted by the relevant audience, and c) thereby emergency measures that make reference to the use of force or its avoidance become legitimised. As mentioned earlier, legitimisation of such measures need not equate to the actual recourse to violence. It only means that its consideration has been rendered legitimate.

This new conceptualisation of security still allows for a wide range of threats, referent objects and actors. For instance, as will be discussed in chapter six, the River Paraná’s water resources became a security issue between Argentina and Brazil, because at a certain point on both sides the violent option was contemplated in order to solve the issue. The concrete and explicit dispute was not about borders, arms balances, identities or ideologies, but rather about how much water the Brazilian dam, which was being built upstream, would have capacity for, and whether or not that would affect Argentina’s projected dam to be built downstream.50 In the eyes of Argentine geopoliticians, the potential consequences would range from floods to droughts to the spread of diseases. In the eyes of Brazilian geopoliticians, Argentines just wanted to slow down the speed of their industrial and economic growth.

If this issue were to be located in a security sector, it would be either the environmental (as it was about natural resources) or the economic sector (as the dams were for the production of hydroelectric energy needed for industrial development). What made it a security matter—regardless of in which security sector—was that securitizing actors presented the issue as so dangerous and important that they received endorsement by the audience (political and military elites in this case, since both states were ruled by authoritarian regimes that left little space for public opinion) to resort to violence, if necessary.51

Another example that shows the need for a reference to force in order to securitize an issue is given by the treatment of the Amazonia issue from the 1960s through the early 1990s on the part of successive Brazilian governments. The issue of the exploitation of natural resources in Amazonia and the international debate that it

50 As chapter six discusses, there were naturally many more issues at stake, such as a historic rivalry for regional hegemony and a race to achieve nuclear capacity. The ‘official’ dispute, however, was about hydroelectric resources.

51 This happened more obviously so in Argentina. However, as it became apparent through the interviews, also Brazil had prepared contingency plans for the eventuality of escalation.
generated was picked up by the Brazilian military, in addition to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The military institution made Amazonia a top priority of their agenda gaining influence on the Executive power both during the authoritarian government and the first years of the democratic rule, which signals that it had become a security issue. The question, certainly, was not only about the environment, but also about sovereignty, potential foreign intervention, and economy.\(^{52}\)

This different conceptualisation of the security act, binding it back to issues of force, surely strengthens the realist element of the perspective. Nonetheless, it does so—it is hoped—without compromising its constructivist component, which will allow the approach to potentially remain fairly broad. At this point, with this understanding of securitization, also the process of desecuritization can become clearer. Desecuritization, in principle, involves "the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere."\(^{53}\) Yet more can be said; it implies that issues, for which the potential use of force had been legitimised before, now start to retrace their steps taking the opposite direction, whereby violence ceases to be a legitimate option. The same or other actors that had previously securitized an issue may now encourage the process of desecuritization by negotiating again appropriate responses with relevant audiences.

Under this lens it becomes apparent that security and insecurity are not necessarily opposites, but rather different ends on the same continuum, as both refer to the existence of a security problem and the presence or absence of measures to deal with it. The actual opposite situation is one in which an issue transcends the security language and moves away from such terms, becoming, instead, desecuritized, and thereby 'only' politicised.\(^{54}\) Desecuritization, in other words, implies the de-escalation from the security sphere back into the political realm.

What encourages both this move and its reversal? As expected, it will be a combination of many different factors that need detailed study in each empirical case. They can range from changes in the constitution of domestic governments, changes in domestic preferences, pressure from interest groups in one direction or another, emergence or decline of other concerns that make actors re-rank priorities, and regional and global transformations, among many others.


\(^{54}\) Waever, 'Securitization and Desecuritization,' p. 56.
In any case, it is important to note that even when issues have been securitized, it does not necessarily mean that we are in the presence of a situation of violence. As already observed, it only means that a response involving violence has been considered legitimate. Therefore, in the context of a regional security complex, it is quite possible to find regional relationships conducted in a peaceful manner even when certain issues in those relationships are securitized. That is, a relationship can be securitized, or have securitized issues, and yet be peaceful. If this may be so, then the existence of different types of peace, or different ‘qualities’ of peace should become apparent. The presence or absence of securitized issues between members of an RSC will have a critical influence on the quality of the resulting regional peace. We can expect peace to be more stable and consolidated in the absence of mutual security concerns or when issues have been effectively desecuritized. As will be seen next, the factor of ‘trust’ plays a crucial role in the move from security to politics, and in the actual quality of peace achieved. In order to explore this, peace hypotheses and types of peace, including peace scales are the subject of the next section.

5. Peace

5.1. Peace Hypotheses

a) Realism

Peace and war, needless to say, have traditionally been at the centre of the field of international relations. A key concern of scholars has been how to account for the occurrence of international war, and in doing so they have also reflected on the occurrence of peace in an anarchic system. Realism and neorealism have offered strong arguments to explain the absence of war; a phenomenon that, in their view, amounts to peace—even if only to a certain type of peace, as will be discussed below.

According to (neo)realists, in an anarchic system, actors (states) seek to survive, and the safest way to ensure survival is through the accumulation of power, which is measured in capabilities. As all states do the same, more important than the absolute amount of accumulated power is the state of one’s own capabilities vis-à-vis the capabilities of others. Thus, all states seek to gain relative advantages, taking note not only of how much they have got, but also how much the others possess.

States preoccupation with relative gains soon results in a security dilemma. States arm themselves for their own security, and seeking to maintain and increase their relative advantage over others. These, in turn, may (mis)interpret this as an offensive
rather than a defensive strategy, and as a consequence may feel compelled to increase their own arsenals too, thus leading to arms races. For realists, this is indeed a very effective mechanism by which wars are prevented: through arms balances and deterrence.55 Explicitly enough, John Mearsheimer contends, "[p]eace is mainly a function of the geometry of power in the international system, and certain configurations may be very peaceful while others are more prone to war."56 Other factors that according to realists may prevent regional armed conflicts are the presence of a regional hegemon,57 the strong influence of an extra-regional power,58 or the existence of a common external threat that may encourage alliance formation.59 Other than these, if states in a region do not engage in war it is probably because of impotence, geographical isolation, or sheer strategic irrelevance.60

Moreover, realism, with its emphasis on rational models and strategic alliances, can also explain rapprochement and desecuritization. Indeed, bilateral or multilateral rapprochement can be seen as the outcome of power, interests and capabilities calculations, according to which strategic co-operation is evaluated as more efficient for the accomplishment of certain goals than alternative means, such as war. For instance, the easing of tension between Argentina and Brazil in the late 1970s could be interpreted as power balancing strategies and rational calculations on the part of both states. On the side of Argentina, it was facing a critical period. The Videla government had recognised Brazil's strategic superiority; internal politics were in a state of havoc; and relationships with Chile were deteriorating in a rapid and unfavourable manner. Confrontation with Brazil could result more destabilising, while a rapprochement could bring about some material advantages, and could help balancing Santiago.

On the part of Brazil, its 'special relationship' with the United States had come to an end in 1967, when Brasilia refused to join the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear

58 As mentioned earlier, Buzan calls this effect 'overlay.' See Buzan, *People, State and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, pp. 219-221.
Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco). In the second half of the 1970s it had only worsened as a consequence of Jimmy Carter's human rights and nuclear proliferation policies, which were actually punishing Argentina as well. This common opposition to the U.S., combined with Brazil's recognition of the superiority of Argentina's nuclear programme, encouraged Brasilia to reorient its foreign policy and ease the tension with Buenos Aires.

Even though realism may explain rapprochement, its account tends to imply a rather contingent type of peace based on circumstantial calculations rather than on some deeper commitment, and as a consequence, it might not be durable. At most, realism explains the absence of conflict, a situation that amounts to just one type of peace: negative peace.

Halfway between realist and liberal theories, which will be discussed below, Arie Kacowicz identifies the hypothesis of 'peace by satisfaction,' according to which peace is more likely to be maintained when states are satisfied with their territorial status quo. This situation, he contends, is more likely to be found at the regional than at the global level. Thus, territorial satisfaction becomes a sufficient condition for the maintenance of regional negative peace, understood strictly as the absence of war. As Kacowicz notes, "a very large proportion of international wars, though by no means all of them, have been a product of dissatisfaction with existing boundaries, and attempts to forcefully change them." Indeed, it seems that, other things being equal, territorial disputes escalate more easily into war than other types of disputes; which, of course, is not to say that all territorial disputes escalate into war. Instead, absence of territorial claims, i.e. satisfaction with the territorial status quo, works as one positive factor easing the achievement and maintenance of peace.

b) Liberalism

Theories of interdependence and institutionalism take on a liberal stance. These liberal theories argue that states—or at least economically developed and prosperous states—are inclined to avoid to war because they hold absolute gains higher than relative gains, regard negatively the costs of going to war and positively the benefits of trade and commercial exchange, and recognise the importance of a peaceful context for the achievement of the latter. Such states consider favourable trade and commerce

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61 Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of International Institutions.'
63 Ibid., p. 48.
results to be of higher value—as well as to contribute more to the accumulation of wealth—than territorial conquest. Neoliberal institutionalists emphasise the role that international institutions play in achieving common goals and overcoming the obstacles created by interdependence. In other words, co-operation, for liberals, can take place even in the context of anarchy mainly because the actors see more instrumental advantages in peace and co-operation than otherwise. Under this lens, peace is more convenient than war, and is therefore preferred by actors.

In addition to these approaches, another variant of liberal theory, democratic peace, turns to domestic political regimes to account for the external behaviour of states. Democratic peace theory was born of Immanuel Kant's proposition of peace within a federation of republics, and has almost become a social scientific law in International Relations. Its basic assertion is based on an empirical observation: consolidated liberal democracies have tended not to wage war on one another. Explanations for this outcome are diverse, but all of them resort to the presence of democracy as the type of domestic political regime to account for the non-occurrence of war.

Bruce Russett offers two possible arguments to account for the causal link in this statistical coincidence. The first is normative, and contends that the internal organisation principle—liberal democracy—is reflected externally, and thus its domestic values influence the state's international behaviour. For instance, in democracies certain norms and procedures have been institutionalised, such as representation, respect for human rights, individual freedoms, and constitutional principles. Among these, the use of force is not considered a legitimate means to resolve disputes. On the contrary, democracies share the commitment to peaceful conflict

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resolution. Leaders of non-democracies, on the other hand, resort more frequently to the use or threat of violence, a fact that is likely to spill over internationally.70

The second argument stresses structural-institutional factors. It claims that democracies have an institutional structure involving representative systems and broad political freedoms that function as an instance of control on the use of force (accountability), be it domestic or international. And as wars have generally become unpopular incidents with public opinion, and politicians need public support to succeed politically in democratic societies, they will try to avoid taking decisions that would diminish their own popularity. Autocratic elites, instead, are not subject to these checks, and usually find themselves in a much more insulated position vis-à-vis the interests of the people. As a result, these elites are more prone to follow their own narrow interests, even if these imply the initiation of international violence.71

In a similar vein, it could be claimed that it is risky to include new or fragile democracies into the democratic peace provision. The argument in this case would suggest that leaders of young and/or unstable democracies may find it tempting to try to broaden their political support by resorting to nationalist and populist discourses, which easily result in revisionist claims at the expense of regional peace.

In any case, the explanations presented so far do not necessarily argue about peace among democracies, but rather about the inclination of democratic states to avoid war with any other state, regardless of its political regime. Aware of the fact that this is not empirically true, and complementing those hypotheses, authors have most often added yet a further proposition, whereby democratic states recognise each other as such; that is, they recognise in one another the same institutional constrains of accountability and/or their adherence to the same values, norms and principles. As a result, they perceive each other as being more predictable and less prone to resolving international disputes by violent means, and thus tend to conduct peaceful relations among themselves.72

72 Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World, pp. 35-42; and Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part I,' pp. 228-230.
c) Constructivism

Moving beyond this commitment to rationalism shared by both liberals and realists, constructivist and critical theorists have sought to understand the processes of identity construction and mutual recognition that rationalist accounts take for granted. Basically, they have raised the question of how it is that liberal democracies recognise each other; or what it is that they see as having in common. By doing this, they refuse to accept so unproblematically "the process of objective recognition of essentially 'liberal' structures, or consensual mutual recognition on the basis of common norms." Moreover, they have also critically appraised the absence of the notion of power in traditional understandings of both democracy and the construction of identity.

While enormously stimulating, this particular discussion, as well as the more general one of democratic peace, is beyond the scope of this dissertation. As mentioned earlier, the main concern here involves the development of two processes of bilateral rapprochement or desecuritization that began when at least one state in the dyad was ruled by a military regime. Obviously, democratic peace theory can hardly be applied to explain the absence of war and the stabilization of peace in these cases.

As will be seen, I will acknowledge that in the cases covered by this study both liberal and realist peace hypotheses bear some explanatory force to account for the absence of war even during the most tense periods, and for the initial steps towards rapprochement. However, a factor that they tend to neglect, which constructivists tend to highlight, is the role and the development of trust as a central element in understanding a more positive type of peace, one that is qualitatively different from the mere absence of war. By redefining their mutual negative perceptions into gradually growing positive perceptions of one another, states—whether democratic or not—can

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potentially open a space for the development of mutual confidence and trust. In this way, they will be much more inclined to avoid the use or threat of force in their relationships.

This latter argument involving trust and confidence is not necessarily related to democracies, but rather to the transformation of negative zones of peace into positive ones, and of zones of stable peace into security communities. As is further discussed below, although democracy is not a sine qua non for the stabilisation of peace and the development of trust, it seems to favour to a great extent the consolidation both of peace and of security communities. The next section elaborates on different types of peace and proposes a peace scale, while the following one focuses more closely on the role of trust.

5.2. Types of regional peace

From the previous discussion about peace and peace hypotheses, a few thoughts can be provisionally drawn. Firstly, no particular type of domestic political regime is indispensable for the maintenance of a zone of peace. Stable democracies seem to favour it, but other types of regimes have been capable, too, of conducting peaceful relationships and avoiding war. Secondly, peace at the international level refers to the type of relationship that two or more states maintain. When the talk is about peace, rather than about a pacific foreign policy, clearly more than one state has to be involved. It can thus be said that peace is a relational concept. It is necessary that two or more states conduct some sort of relationship or interaction to be able to say that it is peaceful. Therefore, the mere absence of war may be pointing to the lack of relationship rather than to meaningful peace. In a regional context, however, it is very rare to find neighbouring states with no relationships at all.76

A further element that I would add to this understanding of peace is that it is a process, and as such, dynamic. To be maintained, peace demands permanent attention and dedication. There is nothing in even the most stable type of international peace that makes it irreversible. On the contrary, it is an inherently fragile process, much easier to reverse than build. However, if successfully built, peace may reinforce itself, resulting in an increasingly stable and consolidated type of peace.

The differentiation between types or levels of peace has already been noted by several scholars, who have constructed scales or typologies of peace that typically cover

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76 From now on, references to peace will imply interstate regional peace, unless otherwise stated.
all the range from a very fragile and unstable peace to situations of consolidated and stable peace. A possible further step that some authors consider in these gradations is the establishment of a pluralistic security community, alluding to the situation in which war has become unthinkable due to the emergence of a sense of community among elites and societies of the states involved.

The remainder of this section reviews categorisations of peace by several authors. It is interesting to note that the typologies are not essentially divergent. In fact, they all point, with slight differences in emphasis, to similar stages of the same process of peace. The differences between them relate to the aspects that each scholar prefers to highlight as a consequence of his or her own research interests, rather than to fundamental conceptual disagreements.

Thus, for instance, Kalevi Holsti introduces a threefold scale including no-war zones, zones of peace, and pluralistic security communities. In no-war zones military capabilities are targeted toward specified enemies (usually neighbours), and alliances and arms races are prominent features of the diplomatic and strategic landscape. Although militarised clashes are frequent, war does not result from them. In zones of peace, however, capabilities are not targeted at fellow members of the zone and operational war plans do not include 'conflict hypotheses' with them. Militarised disputes may break out from time to time (e.g., the Anglo-Iceland cod wars in 1972 and 1975), but war has literally become unthinkable in mutual relations. Finally, pluralistic security communities are characterised similarly, except for the fact that militarised conflicts of any type have become unthinkable. In addition, "a zone of peace has a foundation in the relations of states; a pluralistic security community rests on the social foundations of community between individuals and societies."77

Similarly, Arie Kacowicz composes a gradation of increasing quality and endurance of regional peace. Beyond the situation of war, he identifies three other categories in this scale: negative peace, defined as the mere absence of war; stable peace, which precludes the expectation of violence among states; and a pluralistic security community of nation-states "with stable expectations of peaceful change, in which the member states share common norms, values, and political institutions, sustain an identifiable common identity and are deeply interdependent."78

78 Kacowicz, Zones of Peace in the Third World: South America and West Africa in Comparative Perspective, pp. 9-11.
Kenneth Boulding reviews relational patterns taking into account space and time. This allows him to distinguish on a map four different types of areas; those at war, where war is virtually incessant; those of unstable war; those of unstable peace, where the periods of peace are longer than those of war; and those areas of stable peace, where "the probability of war is so small that it does not really enter into the calculations of any of the people involved."\(^{79}\)

Alexander George, in turn, suggests the distinction between precarious, conditional, and stable peace. Precarious peace amounts to little more than the temporary absence of war. Conditional peace is less acute, but general deterrence is still predominant. In a zone of stable peace, however, neither the threat nor the use of military force is thinkable.\(^{80}\) Benjamin Miller also uses a triple categorisation that covers cold, normal, and warm peace. Cold peace describes the situation in zones where there has been war until recently, and disputes have not yet been resolved. Consequently, the use of force is still a strategic option that the parties consider. Normal peace refers to a situation in which all conflicts have been resolved, although the threat and use of force have not been ruled out. Finally, in warm peace, as in stable peace, war has become unthinkable, even when some disputes may survive.\(^{81}\) As Kacowicz and Bar-Siman-Tov note, Miller's normal peace lies somewhere between George's conditional and stable peace.\(^{82}\)

Slightly differently, Ole Waever puts together a 4-stage spectrum of relational possibilities sorted by the degree of amity and enmity that define security interdependence. These range from chaos, where all relations are defined by enmity, to security community, in which members do not fear or prepare for violence among themselves. Between these extremes, Waever identifies 'regional conflict formations' that are characterised by tension although amity seems possible; and security regimes, where an explicit effort is made to avoid war and to peacefully resolve disputes, promote confidence and overcome the security dilemma.\(^{83}\)


\(^{83}\) Taken from Buzan, *People, State and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, pp. 218-219. According to Buzan, the concept of 'regional conflict formation' was coined by Raimo Väyrynen, 'security regime' by Robert Jervis, and 'security community' by Karl Deutsch.
Finally, Patrick Morgan presents a typology, which discerns categories depending on the dominant patterns of security management within Regional Security Complexes. Morgan calls these patterns 'regional orders.' Although in this case it is not a continuum, one could assume an increasing order of stability and predictability in the relationships of states taking part in these arrangements. The first regional order, based on 'power to restrain power,' implies the principle of traditional international politics, the balance of power. The second, 'great-power concert,' is defined as the mechanism by which the major powers of a region co-operate to deal with security issues and to manage their conflicts. Thirdly, 'collective security' points to the presence of regional organisations and regimes where management is exercised collectively and multilaterally. Fourthly, 'pluralistic security community' applies when states, while retaining their national autonomy, have fully renounced the possibility of using force against each other. Finally, 'integration'—in its early stages and when security is the primary objective—involves transnational institutions to manage the members' interactions.84

Based on these peace scales and categorisations, I have tried to develop yet another arrangement in order to better understand the path undergone by the dyads under study here. Thus, I have found it useful to distinguish first between two broad categories of peace, negative and positive.85 Negative peace refers to the situation where the absence of threat or use of force is not necessarily expected. Under negative peace there is no war, but there are preparations and contingency plans for war. Depending on how often, and how far back violent clashes last occurred, this category can be subdivided into fragile, unstable, and cold peace.

I understand fragile peace to characterise the relationship in which there are yet pending disputes, the armed forces work on regional conflict hypotheses, and the states prepare for war. Peace is occasionally interrupted by military clashes, but they are kept below the level of international war. For instance, Argentina and Chile had a relationship of just fragile peace for most of the twentieth century, with many territorial disputes pending, preparing themselves to go to war against one another, playing balancing games and displaying power, and occasionally exchanging fire in border conflicts.

84 Morgan, 'Regional Security Complexes and Regional Orders,' pp. 31-38.
85 Kenneth Boulding made first the argument that peace could be either positive or negative, the former involving "good management, orderly resolution of conflict, harmony associated with mature relationships, gentleness, and love," and the latter implying "the absence of something—the absence of turmoil, tension, conflict, and war." See Boulding, Stable Peace, p. 3.
zones. Until some time ago, also the Middle East could be said to be in fragile peace, although unfortunately this has not been the case lately.

Under **unstable peace**, preparation and contingency plans for war are also present, but without any armed confrontations having occurred, or only in the distant past. However, confrontations, and even war, have not only *not* been ruled out, but also deterrence and threats continue to play a critical role in this type of relationship. The Argentine-Brazilian relationship can be analysed this way at the time of the escalation of tension due to the Itaipú- Corpus dispute. Clearly, U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations during the Cold War would fit into this category.

Finally, **cold or conditional peace** is a less extreme type of non-war. Relationships are still characterised by the absence of war, rather than by the presence of confidence, but war and confrontation do not appear to be such a realistic eventuality. In other words, although the use of violence has not been discarded, it does not seem to be as likely an outcome as in fragile and unstable peace. Display of force can be used as a means to apply pressure during negotiations, and parties have no reason not to expect this. Argentina and Brazil have had such a relationship for most of their history as independent states. This is also the sort of relationship conducted by Argentina and Britain in the years that followed the Malvinas/Falkland Islands War of 1982.

If negative peace and its three subcategories (fragile, unstable, and cold peace) are defined by the absence of war, then **positive peace** is defined by the presence of confidence and trust. States in a relationship of positive peace do not prepare for war, nor do they expect other states in the zone to do so. This does not necessarily mean that all disputes have been resolved. Issues and disagreements may persist, but no party conceives of force to sort them out. Zones of positive peace can be subdivided into zones of **stable peace** and **pluralistic security communities**. In both, members of such zones have ruled out the possibility of war among themselves, and are confident that their fellow members have done so too. All are certain that any potential changes in the status quo will be peaceful and agreed.

A **pluralistic security community** stands out because it appears as a more 'participatory' kind of stable peace in that not only has war become unthinkable, but also the societies have developed links, mutual sympathies, and some sort of common identification\(^a\) that makes them perceive each other as members of one same

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\(^a\) I prefer the use of the term 'identification' rather than 'identity' in this context, implying a looser understanding of the concept. The difference between the two is explained in some more detail in chapter seven, footnote 1 on page 197 of this thesis.
community. In addition, states may be bound by common political institutions, similar political systems, and considerable economic interdependence. To be sure, all pluralistic security communities are zones of stable peace. However, not all zones of stable peace are pluralistic security communities. Examples of stable peace are the current Argentine-Chilean relationship, and relations among members of the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since the late 1970s. On the other hand, members of the European Union, and Canada and the United States are clear examples of pluralistic security communities, whereas Argentina and Brazil can be said to be part of an incipient security community.

This peace categorisation can be summarised as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.1: Peace categories</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negative peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fragile peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unstable peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cold or conditional peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>Positive peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pluralistic security community</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.3. Trust as the key for the evolution of regional peace

The categorisation presented above implies the consideration of mainly two variables, the stability of peace, temporally determined by the length of the absence of military confrontation, and the solidity of peace, signalled by the presence or absence, and degree, of trust in the relationship. Of the two, I consider the solidity of peace to be the crucial element to distinguish between the different types of peace.

The factor of time plays a weightier role in situations of negative peace, where aggressive behaviour may have occurred in a not too distant past. Collective memory of past aggression influences the degree of trust between states and peoples. While it holds true that recent armed conflicts make the development of trust more difficult, the opposite is not necessarily the case. Even relationships with a long record of absence of actual military conflict may be dominated by mistrust. Therefore, time, while important

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(especially if there have been recent confrontations), tends to have only an indirect effect on the type of peace, mostly by affecting the level of trust.

The development of mutual confidence, consequently, is key to understanding the process of desecuritization implied in the transformation of negative into positive peace, and in the stabilisation and later consolidation of peace. The level of confidence shows the solidity of the peace that the relationship rests upon. In other words, the higher the degree of mutual confidence, the more solid the peaceful relationship. And also, the harder it will be that the process be reversed (although not impossible). Conversely, the higher the degree of distrust—and therefore the less solid the basis for peace—the easier it will be that even a small misunderstanding or misinterpretation develop into military violence, and possibly war.

Although stability can be measured in years of absence of conflict, I am reluctant to set a fixed amount of years that indicate whether peace has become unstable, cold, or stable. Rather, I understand it to be a delicate blend of stability (time) and solidity (trust) that points to one type of peace or another. However, one might possibly say, in accordance to Kacowicz, that a zone of peace, whether negative or positive, is one in which

a group of states have maintained peaceful relations among themselves for a period of at least thirty years—a generation span—though civil wars, domestic unrest, and violence might still occur within their borders, as well as international conflicts and crises between them.88

For its part, a quantitative measurement of trust is indeed difficult. Instead, one has to rely on the interpretation of the presence or absence of certain indicators. For instance, the deployment of two states’ troops along a common border is most probably a sign of fragile or unstable peace. The presence of a system of mutual accountability through confidence and security building measures (CSBM) is likely to be indicative of cold or stable peace. Common institutions, high level of interdependence, compatible domestic regimes, withdrawal or absence of troops on common borders, among others, point to the existence of trust, and thus to a situation of stable peace, or even to a pluralistic security community.

The existence of pending disputes in itself should not be an indication of distrust. There may be pending issues along with a firm commitment to find agreed solutions. Conversely, distrust can define a relationship even when no apparent conflict exists. While by no means an exhaustive list, I suggest that the presence or absence of the

88 Kacowicz, Zones of Peace in the Third World: South America and West Africa in Comparative Perspective, p. 9.
following should be taken into account when the solidity of regional peace is to be assessed:

- recent war, repeated exchanges of cross-border fire, deployment of troops in border areas, arms races, existence of contingency plans for war, few and distant (in time) diplomatic visits, mistrust and antipathy between societies, obstacles for the mobility of persons;
- diplomatic visits and public speeches pointing at the easing of tension, CSBMs, problem-solving mechanisms;
- fluid communication channels, common projects that involve joint expected benefits (a common market, for example), common institutions, high degree of interdependence and exchange, compatible self-images, free or easy mobility of people.

The first set of indicators points at a situation of either fragile or unstable peace, depending mainly on whether force was used in the recent past or not. In any case, they reveal a high degree of distrust and suspicion, and the rather ease with which peace can be reverted. The second set of indicators manifests a clear intention to try to handle potential misperceptions, implicitly acknowledging that they can indeed occur. Mutual confidence is not high, but parties have developed common mechanisms to try to make their behaviour more predictable and transparent. These mechanisms actually represent the basis for whichever degree of mutual confidence there exists. States in such a situation have a relationship of cold or conditional peace. If one of these mechanisms fails, peace can revert into unstable or fragile, and war can even break out. Conversely, they may make explicit efforts to improve the degree of mutual confidence and trust, and thus achieve stable peace. Nevertheless, states might also choose to stay in conditional peace, being careful not to make it unstable, but without pursuing closer links either. Even in this case, I argue, peace is a dynamic process, in that it will require an active effort on the part of governments to be kept this way.

The last set of signs indicates a high level of mutual trust, which can point at a relationship of stable peace, or even at the existence of a pluralistic security community if a sense of we-feeling and community among states and societies has developed as well. As already mentioned, the most important feature of such a high level of mutual confidence is that the use or threat of force has become unthinkable to resolve disputes and disagreements, and indeed all parties perceive it in this manner. States in a situation
of stable peace or in a security community neither expect this situation to change, nor
are prepared to wage war on one another.

The last question to be addressed here refers to the mechanisms of expanding the
solidity of peace. How does the qualitative transformation occur that expands trust and
confidence, and rules out interstate violence between certain states to the point of
making it unthinkable? This, as suggested earlier, involves a complex learning process that
requires a redefinition or reevaluation of the parties’ national interests, so that
each party will perceive a mutual interest in establishing and maintaining the
peace between them as the most important factor in assuring each other’s
security and even existence. 89

The resort to constructivist theory helps to better understand the process at work
here.

Key concepts in explaining the development of mutual trust are those of social
learning and cognitive structure, the latter being understood as a set of shared beliefs,
meanings and understandings that can be modified by social learning. Specifically,
transactions and social exchanges trigger processes of social learning that imply a re-
assessment of the actors’ meanings, beliefs and understandings.90 These form their
cognitive structure, influencing the way they perceive others and themselves, which in
turn constitutes and constrains (or broadens the range of) their actions. When this is a
positive process, it redounds to the expansion of trust, which is in turn reflected in
policy decisions, such as, say, withdrawal of troops from common border areas,
expansion of co-operation, and so on.

Thus, the development towards a more consolidated peace involves “an active
process of redefinition or reinterpretation of reality—what people consider real, possible
and desirable—on the basis of new causal and normative knowledge,” where social
actors “manage and even transform reality by changing their beliefs of the material and
social world and their identities.”91 Crucial actors in this process are policy-makers and
other political, economic, and intellectual elites, who will try to transmit to the public
(audience) their re-interpreted perception of reality—that is, their modified cognitive
structure—with the aim of producing concrete policy, broadly legitimised.

90 E. Adler and M. N. Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities,' in Emanuel
Adler and Michael N. Barnett (eds.), Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998).
91 Ibid., pp. 43-44.
6. Final remarks

The pieces introduced throughout this chapter can now be put together again to present the conceptual framework informing this research. Regional security complexes, zones of peace and security communities are analytical devices to which the present research resorts extensively. Rather than being alliances or any kind of formal political arrangement, they are empirical developments embedded and rooted in the historical and geopolitical context of a certain region. Security and peace are understood broadly enough as to overcome realists' narrow focus on geopolitics and the absence of war, but remain closely related to the use of violence and the possibility of developing trust, respectively.

The thesis deals with processes of rapprochement in the Southern Cone of South America. It argues that the Southern Cone constitutes a regional security complex with two main dyads, Brazil and Argentina, and Chile and Argentina. This RSC, however, has constituted a zone of (negative) peace for most of the twentieth century. In the period between the late 1970s and the late 1980s, relationships in both dyads were significantly transformed, to the point that their relational patterns changed from enmity to amity, and the quality of their peace moved from negative to positive.

This doctoral thesis studies these changes by focusing on the two dyadic relationships. This choice presents two advantages. First, to focus on a dyad directs attention to domestic, bilateral, regional, as well as extra-regional factors, thus allowing a comprehensive exploration. And second, the contrast between the two cases will hopefully contribute to illuminating the causes of their differences. In other words, by means of studying these dyads individually, and comparing them, I expect to find out why Argentina and Brazil were able to desecuritize their military relationship so rapidly and shift in only some six years from an unstable to a stable peace, and even started developing an incipient security community, while Argentina and Chile took much longer to begin the process of rapprochement that brought them from a fragile to an unstable peace, which only recently developed into a stable peace.

Desecuritization explains the domestic changes by which rapprochement becomes possible, that is, accepted and legitimised by the relevant domestic audiences. The advantage of taking a rather constructivist perspective to explain the changes in mutual and self-perceptions is that such an approach also considers how changes in concrete circumstances affect learning processes, and thus cognitive structures. And while peace and co-operation cannot be understood in merely rational cost-benefit terms, a
A constructivist approach can incorporate the element of rational calculations into the social learning process. In this way, a constructivist perspective need not preclude interest-based factors. Some element of calculation and self-interest must be present in the construction of any peace zone and security community, and it should be identified in the analysis.

The initial diagram on page 25 (Figure 2.1) could be completed as follows (Figure 2.2, from the perspective of the state and its representatives/policy makers):

Figure 2.2: Complex process of formation of foreign policy orientation

(De)securitizing actors—in the case of this research the political and economic elites—are faced with certain domestic, regional and global circumstances. Their exposure to these circumstances makes them re-assess their set of shared beliefs, meanings and understandings, which is also influenced by traditions and history. This leads them to try to pursue a certain course of action, probably different from a previous one, for which they need legitimisation by a relevant audience. Once there is political room for manoeuvre, it translates into new policy decisions, which in turn modify the
domestic and regional context, feeding back into the process. One can imagine this as a positive circuit where trust develops and grows, turning peace into a more stable and consolidated condition, or one can imagine it as a deteriorating circuit. Nevertheless, this does not imply a determined and fixed flow, but, on the contrary, the path can be broken and the tendency can change. If the above graph represents one state, it is not difficult to imagine two or more states aggregated, each one affecting the regional environment where they interact, and thus feeding into one anothers' complex learning process.

Hopefully, it is clearer now why it was said earlier that a relationship of peace is a dynamic development in constant 'movement,' under a continuous process of social learning, even if it stays for long periods in the same category of peace (fragile, unstable, cold, or stable peace, or security community). It is incessantly redefined by changes in the cognitive structures of the actors. These changes, brought about by the interpretation of new 'information'/reality,' contribute towards the maintaining, strengthening or deterioration of trust, thus directly affecting and redefining the quality of the peace achieved.

In the case of the formation of a security community, in addition to trust building among elites, the process spills over bringing about trust and eventually some kind of shared identity among the societies involved. As the role of societies is crucial in the definition of security communities, it seems reasonable to argue that states which are members of a security community have regimes that allow a great deal of participation and involvement of their civil societies in all aspects of political and social life. That is, states with high levels individual and political freedoms. Usually, such states are democratic.

Finally, it seems relevant to recall a last argument before moving on to the empirical studies. The existence, or lack, of border disagreements is not by itself a determining factor for the development or hindering of trust. As observed earlier, states may have disputed borders as well as a strong commitment to resolving the issue peacefully. Conversely, other states may not have any territorial disagreement and still present very low degrees of mutual trust. However, when border disputes exist and levels of mutual confidence are low, the cycle of increasing distrust seems more likely to perpetuate itself to the point of escalation into war, probably because territorial claims encourage governments to deploy troops in the disputed areas. The proximity of distrustful armed forces increases the chances of fire exchanges, which in turn feeds in the process described above.
PART II

DOMESTIC AND REGIONAL CONTEXTS
CHAPTER 3
DOMESTIC CONDITIONS

1. Introduction

This chapter explores the domestic conjunctures of Argentina, Brazil and Chile, focusing especially on the decade of the 1970s. The relevance of studying the beliefs and principles guiding policy design, as well as its implementation, lies in the importance given here to domestic factors in the development of an image of self, that is, of how a state gets to see itself. As discussed in chapter two, a government’s perception of the success, failure, strength, weakness, vulnerability, and so on, of its own state’s performance will affect its perceived range of available policy options. In other words, how a government assesses its own and its country’s performance may expand or restrict the scope of foreign policy choices that it visualises as possible, and thereby, alternatives not envisaged before may become apparent, or, similarly, alternatives seen as possible before are later ruled out.

This chapter argues that the particular direction taken by Argentina, Brazil and Chile during the 1970s, the underpinning principles of their policies, and the consequences of such policies led to a specific political configuration in each country by the second half the decade. In turn, those different individual conjunctures led to divergent perceptions and assessments of their own political choices; a fact that persuaded policy makers in Argentina and Brazil in the late 1970s to revise their mutual attitudes, whilst, conversely, it led Pinochet’s highly centralised regime to become even more intransigent. In the same way as previous experiences had shaped the nature of the state and the political developments of the 1970s in each country, the 1970s themselves and their backdrop shaped the character that bilateral politics took in each dyad.

The next three sections set out the historical backgrounds of Argentina, Brazil and Chile for the analysis of their domestic, economic, foreign and foreign trade policies and developments in the second half of the 1970s. Attention is centred on these policy areas given that they were of key concern to governments and people during the period studied. Coups d’état, guerrilla, and political and economic instability were common features of Latin America from the aftermath of the Second World War up until the late 1980s. Neither the 1970s nor the countries of the Southern Cone were an exception.
2. Argentina

2.1. Between Perón and Perón: fault-lines in Argentine politics

"Argentina's efforts to stop high inflation are almost permanent," wrote Roque Fernández in 1991, who a few years later became minister of the economy, "and the last decades are full of attempts to stabilize prices. Attempts were made by populists, liberals, and conservative governments, by military dictatorships and democratic governments." Indeed, inflation and economic instability have been at the core of Argentine collective preoccupations for a long time. Not longer, however, than political instability. Between 1930 and 1983, democracy was only an intermittent institution. The recurrence of military coups d'état every few years was not only expected, but often widely supported as well. Of the forty years between 1943 and 1983, the armed forces were in power for twenty-one, and carried out five successful coups.

According to Adolfo Canitrot, during those years the state could be seen as an instrument of power or as the prize of permanent political struggles. The main contenders were the armed forces and Peronism, whose bases of support lay at opposite ends of the social spectrum. Whereas Peronism was backed by working and lower-middle classes, the armed forces found most allies in the entrepreneurial sector and right-wing upper class liberals and conservatives. Despite their differences, both shared a nationalistic and Roman Catholic ideology, as well as strong anti-Marxist convictions.

A related struggle was that of the two traditional interest groups in the Argentine business sector, the agriculturalists (agro-exporters) and the (import-substitution) industrialists, who competed to gain influence over the state's economic policies. After having been 'the breadbasket of the world,' in the post-Second World War era Argentina saw many of its export markets close and the international terms of trade for its traditional primary goods exports worsened. This fact, in addition to weakening the country's position in the world economy, forced almost every government from the 1940s to the 1970s to try to pursue inward-looking growth, thus favouring industrialists, but funding industrialisation with primary agricultural export revenues. The memory of the wealthy and promising 1920s and 1930s was to survive in the minds of politicians

and military, and the pursuit of the ‘destiny of greatness’ became the goal of every nationalist or industrialist administration.

The post-war period coincided with Perón’s first and second governments (1946-1955), during which a strong, pervasive, nationalist and populist state was built. While the active participation of the working classes in the political system is an undeniable legacy of this period, the Peronist era left Argentina with an institutionally weak and intrinsically incoherent state apparatus, which lay on only very fragile legitimacy. What followed the Perón administrations were a series of brief civilian governments that indefectibly ended in military coups, the proscription of Peronism, only lifted in 1973, and a deep political fault-line dividing the country between Peronists and anti-Peronists.

The ‘Liberating Revolution’ (1955-1958) of General Pedro E. Aramburu and Admiral Isaac Rojas unsuccessfully tried to bring back the past by attempting to reimpose the old model based on agricultural exports and to de-Peronise society. The desarrollista (developmentalist) government of Arturo Frondizi (1958-1962), which had won the elections with Peronist support, gradually lost this key support as it imposed a stabilisation plan in line with the indications of the International Monetary Fund. Caught between Peronist unions and the anti-Peronist military, the desarrollista programme was left unfinished. Also Arturo Illia, during his brief and weak administration (1963-1966), tried to carry out a limited developmentalist plan, although more influenced by Yrigoyen’s traditional nationalism. The lack of support either from Peronist forces, the military, or the industrial or agricultural bourgeoisie marked the demise of the government. The ‘Argentine Revolution’ (1966-1973) of Generals Ongania and Lanusse was the next attempt to overcome the profound division left by Perón, and to set in motion the reconstruction of that ‘destiny of greatness’ promised in the 1940s. However, by the late 1960s and early 1970s, the country had grown politically polarised and economically uncertain.

Fed by a balance of payments crisis and increasing inflation and unemployment rates, it soon became clear that the ‘Argentine Revolution’ would not fulfil its self-proclaimed mission of “[constructing] a new political economy free of the vices of both liberalism and populism.” In 1972 inflation was almost twice as high as in any previous

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3 Military governments have been inclined to give themselves names. Thus, the ‘Revolución Libertadora’ ruled between 1955 and 1958, the ‘Revolución Argentina’ between 1966 and 1973, and the ‘Proceso de Reorganización Nacional’ between 1976 and 1983.

year of Argentine history (except for the 1959 inflationary peak), reaching 64.2 percent, and was perceived as "a process apparently out of control." In addition, those years witnessed the emergence of the first guerrilla movements, the FAP (Peronist Armed Forces), the Guevarist FAR (Revolutionary Armed Forces), the Marxist ERP (Popular Revolutionary Army), and the Peronist Montoneros, which led Ongania to adhere to the 'ideological borders' thesis and to campaign for anti-subversive cooperation with the neighbouring dictatorships.

Amidst economic turmoil, and as social and political violence proliferated in the form of strikes and popular demonstrations and revolts at the same pace as the forces of Peronism grew stronger, General Lanusse decided to call for elections allowing the Peronist party to run, although not Perón himself. The result was a confusing 1973, during which Argentines underwent two electoral processes—the second one with Perón as the main candidate—and had three presidents, in addition to outgoing Lanusse. Héctor Cámpora, who ran instead of Perón and belonged to the more progressive wing of the party, was forced to resign after some 50 days in office. Following the procedure indicated by the constitution, the president of the Chamber of Deputies, Raúl Lastiri, was appointed temporary president, in what clearly implied an advance of the right-wing faction.

Finally, after the September elections, Juan Domingo Perón assumed the presidency in October 1973 under the slogan 'Argentina Potencia,' having obtained over 61 percent of the votes. Despite this massive popular support, polarisation between left and right-wing Peronism had already become extreme and violent in a highly politicised and ideologically charged climate. Each of the different groups supporting Perón expected him to materialise their national project. For instance, some sectors within the military viewed him as the one who would restore the rules of the political process and neutralise the action of the guerrilla, thus achieving 'national unity,' whereas the more

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8 This is well shown by the events that took place upon Perón's return to Argentina after his 17-year exile. What was supposed to be a welcoming festivity of 2 million people at the airport quickly turned into armed violence between the left-wing and right-wing extremes of the party, leaving 200 people dead.
radicalised sectors expected the Peronist government to carry out a process of national revolution and liberation, or even a socialist revolution. 9

The division within the party soon translated into virulent struggles to exert influence on the leader and his government. Yet Perón was old, had moved further to the centre, and his right-wing Social Welfare Minister José López Rega was the most influential around him. López Rega was to gain yet more power when Vice President Isabel Perón took over after her husband’s death on 1 July 1974. As the right-wing faction of the party tightened its grip on the government, open opposition by trade unions and youth sectors, as well as guerrilla actions, intensified. The official reaction came soon; under the co-ordination of Minister López Rega, the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance, or ‘Triple A,’ was founded: a paramilitary group responsible for the counter-assassination and kidnapping of Marxists and left-wing Peronists. The organisation continued its activities after the military coup of 1976, this time under the direct command of the armed forces, in what became sheer and systematic state terrorism.

The political transformation of the successive Peronist administrations, moving away from more progressive and combative postures advanced by Cámpera, towards the extreme right policies of Isabel/López Rega was also reflected in their foreign policies. 10 During his brief administration, Héctor Cámpera followed a more radical version of Perón’s traditional foreign policy principles. Thus, the ‘Third Position’ between capitalism and Marxism, and the adherence to the Third World and Latin America, translated into anti-American speeches at the Organisation of American States (OAS) and a call for Latin American unity to defy external domination.

Instead, both Lastiri and Perón moderated their confrontation with the United States. Feeling surrounded by military governments in Bolivia, Paraguay, Brazil and Chile, they thought that Argentina was not in a strong position to promote an autonomist shift in the region. Alternatively, under both governments Argentina sought to strengthen ties with Western and Eastern Europe, China, Third World countries, and Latin America. In the context of the latter, keeping and improving the country’s position in the balance of power with Brazil was central. To that end, Perón actively sought to remove all potential causes of tension and advance co-operation with Paraguay, Uruguay and Bolivia.

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10 See Juan Carlos Moneta’s excellent study on the subject, Moneta, 'La Política Exterior del Peronismo, 1973-1976.'
After Perón’s death the shift was rather abrupt. The government’s desperate need for international credits led to “a profound change regarding the position to be adopted vis-à-vis the hegemonic power.”\(^{11}\) In addition, while it distanced itself from traditionally friendly states, such as Peru and Mexico, the government sought allies in the dictatorships of Chile and Uruguay. The Isabel administration abandoned, gradually or abruptly, depending on the case, most of the autonomist goals once announced by Perón.

Domestically, the *Rodrigrazo* of 1975, as the major economic adjustment programme implemented by Minister Celestino Rodrigo came to be known, contributed to exacerbate the chaos.\(^{12}\) When in March 1976 the military led the coup d’état that ousted the Isabel administration, a sense of eventual relief was felt by a society appalled by terrorism and turmoil, a bourgeoisie whose sympathies had never lain with Peronism, and a working class that had lost all empathy for the government a long time ago. Indeed, “the triumphant Peronism of May 1973 underwent the unprecedented internal crisis which led to its virtual dismemberment as a political force and to the self-destruction of its project for ‘Reconstrucción Nacional’.”\(^{13}\) The incoming authoritarian administration, despite giving itself the name of ‘Process of National Reorganisation,’ proved to fall short of its aims too.

### 2.2. Military dictatorship and economic neoliberalism: an unholy alliance

By the time of the 1976 coup, the armed forces had had vast experience of being in power. Nonetheless, and in spite of economic reorganisation being one of their central aims, the military did not have their own economists nor a clear economic programme. Their stand was mainly based on their aversion to the prominence of trade unions, (intellectual) middle-class groups, and national entrepreneurial sectors, most of which had flourished under the protection of Peronism. According to the military, these were the sources of all Argentine problems, and the rapid disempowerment of such groups—

\(^{11}\) Ibid., p. 92, my translation.

\(^{12}\) During his fifty days in office, Rodrigo implemented a 100 percent devaluation of the financial exchange rate, 80 percent of the tourist rate and 160 percent of the commercial rate; and increased prices of oil, gas, electricity, transportations and other public services between 40 and 181 percent. Wages, instead, were in principle subject to a maximum (officially approved) increase of 38 percent, which three days later became 45 percent, and seventeen days later, 80 percent. Workers and firms signed collective bargaining arrangements on wage increases of between 45 percent (construction union) and 203 percent (workers of leather). Just in the month of July 1975, inflation reached 34.9 percent. See Sturzenegger, ‘Description of a Populist Experience: Argentina 1973-1976,’ p. 86 and p. 105.

\(^{13}\) Smith, 'Reflections on the Political Economy of Authoritarian Rule and Capitalism Reorganization in Contemporary Argentina,' p. 45.
penetrated by international communism, they argued—was set to be the new government's main goal.

This view was also shared by the so-called 'new hegemonic coalition': exporters, importers, and the upper strata of the national and international bourgeoisie, led by the financial sector. Furthermore, both the military and the new hegemonic coalition saw in Marxism the greatest danger; a "looming threat to the continuity of the social relations of class domination, i.e., the sensation that the survival of the state and capitalist society itself face[d] immediate peril." Anti-Marxism became the key word of a highly ideological regime, which made of the 'National Security Doctrine' and the 'annihilation of the internal enemy' its absolute political priority. The frequent reference to terms such as 'national security,' 'internal security,' 'subversion,' and to the 'need to suspend all political, parliamentary and trade union activities' in early speeches and the junta's Acts makes this clear.

In meetings held prior to the coup this new hegemonic coalition had given the military the diagnosis they wanted to hear: the dominant economic order since the 1940s—protectionist and inward-looking industrialism heavily reliant on state intervention—had resulted in chronic inflation, over-dimension of the state, an oligopolistic industrial sector, disincentives to export, crises of the balance of payments, and low growth rates. The political model underpinning these economic distortions had created and reinforced a corporatist structure that gave excessive power to pressure groups, such as trade unions, political parties, and industrial sectors in the face of a weak state. Clearly, neoliberal elites blamed populist practices conducted mainly, but not only, by the Peronist governments. The prescribed remedy entailed, therefore, a complete reversal of the old model, in economic as well as in political terms.

Attracted to each other by these shared dislikes and fears, military and neoliberals formed a close alliance with the aim of politically and economically transforming the country. A representative of the Argentine oligarchy was appointed minister of economy. As Joseph S. Tulchin explains in rather graphic words, the armed forces

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14 See R. Russell, 'Argentina: Ten Years of Foreign Policy toward the Southern Cone,' in Philip Kelly and Jack Child (eds.), Geopolitics of the Southern Cone and Antarctica (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988).
“handpicked José ('Joe') Martínez de Hoz as their economic czar to purge the economy in the same way that they were prepared to purge the society of its antinational, Marxist, subversive cancer with a powerful diuretic, at whatever cost to the body politic.”

Yet beyond these few coincidences, there were profound incompatibilities between the free-market economy à la Milton Friedman of Martínez de Hoz—even if conceived of in rather loose terms—, and the geostrategic and national security objectives of the junta. After all, the armed forces’ key missions—“the reorganisation of the nation, a task undertaken with a true spirit of service,” and preventing the advance of international Marxist subversion in the region (not just in the country), in order to “recapture the historic destiny of Argentina in Latin America”—allowed for no budget constraints.

The economic model was based on several free-market principles, including the liberalisation of prices, which had been state-regulated under previous governments; the non-interference of the state in the economy, which implied the end of subsidies and the privatisation of public enterprises; and the opening of the economy to international markets. The aim was to encourage foreign competition in domestic markets in order to achieve a price structure more in line with that of international markets, thus focusing on improving efficiency in those areas where Argentina had comparative advantages. According to the designers of the programme themselves,

the opening of the economy allows not only greater competition, but also a higher and more efficient specialisation, as well as taking advantage of the modern international labour division, through which production and exchange of industrial goods are achieved between different states in accordance to their comparative advantages derived both from their natural resources and from economies of scale.

The new model, in opposition to previous ones, was one of outward-looking development.

However, not long after implementing the tariffs reductions and announcing a system of further gradual reduction and unification of tariffs during the following five

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21 Ibid., p. 72, my translation.
years, it was also announced that the government would be entitled to accelerate such reductions at its own discretion as a means of fighting inflation. The resulting loss of credibility, and, foremost, of predictability of the government’s actions, had an unsurprisingly negative effect on potential investors, as it became clear that ultimately the whole system was subject to the government’s arbitrariness. Furthermore, the decision of rapidly reducing the tariff on capital goods had very high social costs, adding to the low credibility of the plan.

Deregulation also reached the financial system, where a preannounced schedule of mini-devaluations of the exchange rate (widely known as ‘la tablita’) was put into effect. Very convenient interest rates vis-à-vis both the inflation and devaluation rates attracted large amounts of short-term speculative capital from abroad that inundated the domestic market and left soon after cashing the interest.22 Hence the larger amount of capital leaving Argentina than the amount of currency entering. In turn, the low exchange rate was financed with foreign debt, which grew between 1976 and 1980 from $9.2 billion to $27.1 billion.23

It was not long before many small companies that had taken out loans found themselves in default due to the elevated interest rates, taking out new loans to repay old ones; a strategy that mostly backfired. First, smaller financial institutions, but soon banks as well, were forced to declare themselves insolvent. By 1980, the Argentine financial system had collapsed.

The failure of the model is partially explained by the high level of corruption, which was not effectively dealt with, and partially by reference to the model’s inherent contradictions and mismanagement. Martínez de Hoz was a pragmatic liberal rather than a dogmatic monetarist. This differentiated the Argentine and the Chilean economic teams, as will be seen below. The greater orthodoxy of the latter, much more closely associated with the Chicago School, helps to explain the higher degree of consistency of

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22 Lücke and Pascual Spada highlight that the difference between the interest rate and the announced devaluation rate allowed a speculative benefit in dollars of up to 50 percent annually, and that while the most common fix-term accounts were only 30-days deposits, in many cases they even were 7-day deposits. See A. Lücke and T. Pascual Spada, La Interdependencia del Orden Económico y Político: Dos Experiencias Latinoamericanas, Argentina (1976-81) y Chile (1973-83) (Buenos Aires: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung-CIEDLA, 1986), p. 41.

the Chilean programme. Conversely, Argentina's was marked by contradictions, flaws, and incoherencies.24

The concepts of 'private property' and 'market economy' were presented as 'ethical imperatives':

The proposed industrial policy tends to deepen the application of the rules of the game of a system of private property and market economy, with the aim of revitalising it and strengthening its philosophical basis, thus fulfilling its ethical imperative.25

Yet the armed forces soon found that indiscriminately applying the 'ethical imperative' of the free market to all fields was against the principles of national security. The chemical, oil, steel, iron, aluminium and paper industries, electric and nuclear energy, and communications and other public services, all constituted 'strategic' areas to be exempt from the 'ethical imperative.' Not only did they escape privatisation, but in turn some previously private enterprises, such as the electricity company Italo or the airline Austral, were nationalised.26 'Strategic industries' were put under the direct management of military officials, thus being out of reach for the Ministry of Economy. The result was an expanding ensemble of huge state companies that very soon turned into heavy bureaucratic corporations.

Additionally, the armed forces engaged in expensive arms purchases, costly military campaigns, and the organisation of colossal events, such as the 1978 Football World Cup.27 Faced with these decisions, Martínez de Hoz chose not to defy the military and to ignore the resulting incoherencies. In the end, the model paid the consequences of retaining and expanding both public expenditure and the size of the state despite its neoliberal discourse.

The 'natural' inclination of the armed forces towards interventionism and statism did little to help a programme doomed to fail. Yet most other aspects of the liberal plan fell short of its objectives. The financial liberalisation ended up in capital flight abroad. The level of corruption was extraordinary, and foreign debt grew 179 percent between 1976 and 1980, at which point it represented 37.3 percent of the GDP.28 In addition,
high interest rates and the "shock opening of the economy in 1976" destroyed large parts of local industry that had been used to protectionism and suddenly found itself unable to adjust to the new situation. Finally, until 1979 inflation had failed to be contained, oscillating between 139.7 (1979) and 169.8 percent (1978), after having reached 347.5 percent in 1976.

By the end of the 1970s, experts' confidence in the economic programme and in the military government was eroding rapidly. The armed forces had become an unpredictable and risky actor, both for the business community and the public in general. This feeling would intensify a few years later with the Malvinas/Falklands defeat. In addition, the methods first introduced by the 'Triple A' were perfected and systematised when the armed forces took over. Whilst the regime's planned terror had practically achieved its goal of "annihilating the operation of subversive elements" by 1979, its campaign against Marxism had hit far larger sectors of society in the name of 'National Security.'

If the political plan of the authoritarian government was plagued with excesses and the economic programme with inconsistencies, its external behaviour was not entirely different. Although the regime seemed to reintroduce the 1960s concept of 'ideological borders' for the design of its foreign policy—illustrated by its participation both in the Condor Plan (exchange of prisoners and intelligence information about subversive activities with neighbouring dictatorships), and in the Bolivian coup d'état of 1980—, national borders and territorial integrity had not at all become irrelevant. The rather sharp division within the regime between 'hawks' and 'doves' explains many of its contradicting decisions. For instance, the 'Operation Sovereignty' in the Beagle

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29 Lewis, Argentina: A Short History, p. 82.
30 Indec - Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos, 'Serie Histórica del Índice de Precios al Consumidor (IPC) en el Gran Buenos Aires.'
32 According to Argentina: Nunca Más: The Report of the Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1986), 8,960 cases of 'disappearance' were denounced to the National Commission on the Disappeared. Alfred Stepan, in Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), highlights that this equals to 32 disappearances per 100,000 people; while for every person who disappeared or died in official custody in Brazil during the bureaucratic authoritarian regime, over three hundred died in Argentina. Human rights organisations generally estimate that the figure of 'disappearances' could reach 30,000.
33 The concept of 'ideological border' as opposed to 'territorial border' was popular in the second half of the 1960s among Argentine and Brazilian anti-Marxist nationalists. See Cisneros and Escude, Historia General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la República Argentina, Volume XIV, Chapter 66, http://www.argentina-rree.com/14/14-001.htm.
Channel and the invasion of the Malvinas/Falkland clearly show the ascendancy of the orthodox nationalist 'hawks,' represented mainly by Generals Suárez Mason and Menéndez, and Admiral Massera, who were also strongly opposed to Martínez de Hoz's economic liberalism. In contrast, the 'doves,' such as President Videla, General Roberto Viola and Minister Martínez de Hoz, were more inclined to search negotiated solutions on pending disputes with neighbours, as shown by the outcome of the disputes with Chile and Brazil.

However, they were all in agreement on the method to be used to counter domestic subversion; a matter that strained relations with the United States when Democrat Jimmy Carter took office in early 1977. Indeed, whereas the Republican Ford administration received the new authoritarian government's proclamation of alignment with the Western and Christian world—a world threatened by (internal and external) communism—with eagerness, after 1977 friction increased to the point that bilateral dialogue was interrupted in 1980 until the election of Ronald Reagan.

Human rights turned into a sore issue as the Carter administration denounced Argentina and other Latin American countries at international fora, reduced military help by half in 1977 and then cancelled it in 1978, and pressured the OAS into sending a delegation of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to Buenos Aires. Yet the military—hawks and doves equally—felt that they were being misinterpreted and their efforts to defend capitalism and Christianity were not being appreciated. They saw themselves "locked in a virtual crusade as the lonely and misunderstood guardians of one of the most vulnerable outposts of 'Western Civilization'."35

Argentine governments had traditionally maintained a rather distant, at best ambivalent, attitude towards the hemispheric power, which was accentuated by the historic U.S.-Brazilian special relationship, as will be discussed in chapter six. Buenos Aires' decision to stay within the Non-Aligned Movement, which it had joined during the previous Peronist government, or its systematic refusal to join nuclear non-proliferation regimes since the late 1960s were of increasing concern to the U.S.. Equally, the armed forces' support in terms of arms, funds, intelligence and logistic for the Bolivian coup caused deep resentment in the Carter administration, which was

trying to promote democracy across the region. Perhaps even more suspicions were raised by the ties the country had developed with states on the other side of the iron curtain, whose corollary would be Argentina's refusal to adhere to the cereal embargo stipulated by the United States against the Soviet Union in 1980. While it is true that Buenos Aires used its relationship with the Soviet Union to counterbalance U.S. and Western European pressure on human rights issues, many analysts explain the rejection of the embargo in terms of the pragmatism that had characterised the 'economic diplomacy': the country was in desperate need for export markets for its agricultural products, and the Soviet Union had become its main importer.

Also, the eventual rapprochement with Brazil can be interpreted as the acceptance of a pragmatic vision among government members at the expense of a nationalist position. As just seen, by the second half of the 1970s the government had surrounded itself with a larger, rather hostile and potentially unstable context, both in domestic and external terms. Against this background, the acceptance of the existing gap between a stagnant Argentina and an 'economic miracle' Brazil made some members of the government aware of the potential benefits of co-operation in economic matters. According to Martínez de Hoz, the Foreign Trade Department of the Ministry of Economy was the first to insist on the need to reach a deeper understanding with Brazil. The minister and his team, as well as President Videla, were convinced of the importance of developing good trade relations with the Brazilian industrial sector, whose success they admired and hoped to emulate. Accordingly, they worked under the slogan "Argentina and Brazil are not rivals but partners." As Martínez de Hoz put it clearly, "there was indeed a shift of 'political intention.' Such shift originated in the Ministry of Economy and encouraged changes in other areas of government."

36 Rapoport, Historia Económica, Política y Social de la Argentina (1880-2000), p. 772. Roberto Russell highlights that intervention in Bolivia responded to ideological as much as to power political reasons, in that the Argentine Army felt compelled to occupy a regional space that otherwise would have been won by Brazil. See also Russell, 'Sistemas de Creencias y Política Exterior Argentina: 1976-1989,' p. 19-23.
The 'economic diplomacy' of Martínez de Hoz managed to influence the hawks' typical 'military diplomacy' as the government acknowledged its military and geopolitical inferiority vis-à-vis the most powerful state in the region. In the words of geopolitical thinker General Juan Guglialmelli, "Brasilia consolidated [...] its several proposals of hegemony based on parameters among which the spatial factor and the economic development carry a definitive weight."

As the relationship with Brazil was considered for the first time in pragmatic terms, both the integrationist discourse of the Peronism years and the geopolitical disposition of the 1960s and 1970s were played down, and instead a less ideological and more opportunity-seeking view was promoted.

In 1979, Martínez de Hoz met twice with Antônio Delfim Netto, then the Brazilian Minister of Agriculture, to discuss agreements of economic complementarity, and once with Karlos Rischbieter, Minister of Finance of Brazil, to propose the joint construction of a gas pipeline going from the North of Argentina, through Uruguay, to the South of Brazil. Although internal opposition and domestic instabilities delayed these projects, the old geopolitical stance regarding the larger neighbour had been reassessed; a fact reflected in the nuclear agreements that soon followed the resolution of the Itaipú- Corpus dispute. After many decades of tension, one thing had become apparent: there eventually was room for a different relationship with Brazil. A non-hostile relationship was finally perceived as possible.

3. Brazil

3.1. Getulio Vargas and his legacy

Like Argentina, Brazil has also experienced populism. Between 1930 and 1945 the country was ruled by populist leader Getulio Vargas, who in 1937 led an auto-coup closing the Congress, banning political parties, and imposing himself as president of the newly promulgated Estado Novo, or New State. Vargas initiated a programme of nationalisation that included mines, energy sources, banks, insurance companies, and basic and essential industries; promoted redistribution, and encouraged the formation of

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41 Telephone interview with José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz.
loyal workers' unions.\textsuperscript{42} He laid down the basis for a large, entrepreneurial state that retained its centrality in the country's economy during much of the following decades.

The formula of state interventionism backed by populism inherited from the Vargas years was reproduced by almost every government, albeit with differences in styles and accents, until the coup d'état of 1964. Among these administrations, that of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961) stands out. After promising 'Fifty Years of Progress in Five' through his 'Targets Programme,' Kubitschek promoted the development of basic sectors, such as metallurgy, cement, chemicals, heavy mechanics, shipbuilding, and the automobile industry; emphasised the areas of energy, transportation, and food supply; and provided investment incentives to foreign companies investing in Brazil. It was also this government that built a whole new capital city in the middle of a tropical savannah within four years. Brasilia symbolises to this day, as originally intended, Kubitschek's enterprising administration, during which Brazil's GDP expanded at an average rate of 8 percent yearly as a result of an active policy of industrialisation, protection of the local industry, and heavy public investments.

Although 1964 marked the first time that the Brazilian armed forces retained and directly exercised power since their 1889-1894 rule following the overthrow of the emperor, they were in fact used to taking part in politics. For a long time, civilian politicians—mainly from the anti-populist, anti-Varguist National Democratic Union—turned to the armed forces when confronted with undesired elections results, assigning them the role of final arbiters in the political system.\textsuperscript{43} Prior to 1964, their interventions in the political process had always been followed by rapid restorations of civilian governments.

Ambassador Marcos Henrique C. Côrtes explains the relatively low degree of disruption of the democratic rule by the Brazilian military—low, when compared to the armed forces' interventions in Argentina—by referring to its middle class extraction: "The military in Brazil had natural contacts with the common people, nothing programmed or especially planned. As a matter of fact, the first time the military intervened in politics was to favour the Republic against the monarchy."\textsuperscript{44} This, according to the diplomat, marks a striking difference with the Argentine armed forces,

\textsuperscript{42} In particular, see 'Constituição da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil.' (1934) accessed: 20 May 2003, http://www.georgetown.edu/pdba/Constitutions/Brazil/brazil34.html, Title IV On The Economic and Social Order.
\textsuperscript{44} Interview with Ambassador Marcos Henrique C. Côrtes in Rio de Janeiro, 4 April 2001. Ambassador Côrtes was Minister Counsellor at the Brazilian Embassy in Buenos Aires between 1974 and 1978, and is currently professor at the Brazilian War College (Escola Superior de Guerra).
whose members had traditionally belonged to the vernacular aristocracy, and therefore felt part of the national political elite with a right to intervene in politics.

Vargas gave the military a prominent role during his first administrations and the Estado Novo, of which they became a key supporter. When in 1945 Vargas threatened to not call for open elections, the military organised a discrete overthrow that ended in the appointment—by civilian politicians—of General Eurico Dutra, Vargas' minister of war, with the intention of maintaining political stability. Since then, and up until the 1964 coup, at least one member of the armed forces ran as candidate in every presidential election. Yet, in addition to having their own candidates, at times the military's political participation was more resolute (and coercive) than that. In 1954, they led a coup d'état to remove, again, President Vargas from power, a situation that resulted in his suicide; in 1955, there was an attempted coup to prevent Juscelino Kubitschek from taking office; and finally, in 1961, another coup failed to stop Vice President João Goulart from succeeding Jânio Quadros after his resignation.45

Goulart was seen as the heir of Vargas, as a symbol of the communist penetration of the Brazilian political system. The manifesto issued by the military ministers on 29 August 1961 as part of their attempted coup shows the uneasiness felt by a faction of the armed forces in relation to Goulart’s appointment:

> Being at the presidency of the Republic in a regime that grants vast personal authority and power to the chief of government, Mr João Goulart will undoubtedly become the most evident incentive for all those who wish to see the country plunged into chaos, anarchy, civil war.46

While this attempt was unsuccessful, by 1964 the loss of control over the economy and the increasingly radicalised initiatives of the government led to the consolidation of consensus among the armed forces and set the scene for a new coup d'état. This time the military remained in office.

3.2. The developmentalist military

The arrival to power of General Humberto Castello Branco (1964-1967) and Marshal Arthur da Costa e Silva (1967-1969) initiated an era of decisive influence of the Brazilian War College (Escola Superior de Guerra) and its geopoliticians on the

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political developments in the country. In particular, it meant the practical implementation of the National Security Doctrine, taught at the War College since 1954, which translated internationally into understanding the region and the world as divided by 'ideological borders,' and domestically, into a process of centralisation of power and decline of civilian influence, which was put into practice through several Institutional Acts.

Whereas at the beginning of the military rule the regime could be defined as semi-constitutional in that, for instance, some electoral processes were allowed and the Congress continued to function—albeit with seriously curtailed faculties—, its character soon changed, particularly after the issue of the Institutional Act nr. 5 (1968). By then, however, the 1946 Constitution had already been severely modified, some former politicians and public servants had been declared ineligible to hold public office, electoral laws had been rewritten to provide for the indirect elections of state governors, a new official political party had been founded (National Renovating Alliance–ARENA) whilst only one opposition party (Brazilian Democratic Movement–MDB) was allowed, thus replacing the previous 13-party system; and political and administrative power had been further centralised in the hands of the military president. The Fifth Institutional Act, in turn, opened the door for shutting down Congress, suspending political rights and habeas corpus, and imposing press censorship.

National security, anticommunism, internal enemies, and membership of the Western and Christian world were all key concepts underpinning the policy choices of the first three governments of the military regime. Indeed, not only were the administrations of Castello Branco and Costa e Silva driven by strong ideological principles both in domestic and in international politics, but the years of General Emílio Garrastazu Médici (1969-1974) also witnessed an increase of authoritarian tendencies. Several guerrilla and terrorist groups had emerged, and for some time posed a serious threat to the stability of the regime, as the case of the kidnapping of the U.S. ambassador in 1969 illustrates. However, rather than weakening the regime, this served to justify a stronger and more repressive turn, which was legitimised and supported by

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48 As part of the 'ideological borders' principle, Brazil participated in the invasion of Dominican Republic in order to prevent the instauration of a second Cuba in the continent.
middle and upper-class sectors. Unquestionably, Médici was the most repressive, but also the most popular of all military presidents.

Simultaneously, other objectives became increasingly central to the War College, and thus, by extension, to the regime. These were the principle of self-determination, understood as synonymous with national sovereignty; national integration, including territorial, economic, political and social integration; and prosperity and international prestige and power, to be achieved through economic development and growth.\(^{51}\) In this sense, General Meira Matos, a geopolitical thinker of the War College, stated that there was a 'mutual causality' between economic strength and security, although "economic growth in itself already represents security [...] ''.\(^{52}\)

State interventionism saw its height during the Médici years. In this period, Brazil's industrial growth achieved most extraordinary results. Minister Delfim Netto introduced 'crawling peg' devaluations, managing to neutralise the exchange rate deadlock. This allowed Brazil to significantly increase its exports of industrial goods at a time when world trade was also expanding, while continuing to enlarge its own domestic market. The productive activities of the public sector also expanded significantly during these years, which clearly contributed to the impressive growth of the economy. The share of industry in GDP reached 30 percent in 1972, after having remained constant at 26 percent between 1960 and 1967. Since then, Delfim Netto’s name has been associated with Brazil's 'economic miracle,' fully under way between 1968 and 1973 when the GDP attained growth rates of an average of over 10 percent annually, as table 3.1 shows.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\hline
GDP Growth & 9.8\% & 9.5\% & 10.4\% & 11.4\% & 11.9\% & 13.9\% \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Annual GDP growth rate in Brazil, 1968-1973}
\end{table}

When General Ernesto Geisel took office in early 1974, the first oil crisis had already broken out. As Brazil's industry was heavily dependent on oil—80 percent of which was imported—the new president centred his ambitious investment programme


upon the generation of energy; the construction of power plants, oil mining, and the production of alcohol as an alternative to fuel. This explains the determination with which the project of the hydroelectric plant at Itaipú was set in motion, in spite of endless Argentine complaints and the intensification of the bilateral dispute over the water resources of the River Paraná, a matter explored in more detail in chapter six.

Resources to fund such grand plans and the needed oil imports came mainly from dramatically increasing state debt, both domestic and foreign, and from drawing on foreign exchange reserves. Only in 1974, Brazil increased its net external debt from $6.2 billion to $11.9 billion, and by 1978 it had reached already $31.6 billion.\textsuperscript{53} Imports shot up by 104 percent, thus more than doubling 1973 imports and causing a trade deficit of $4.7 billion. The government’s deficit as a percentage of GDP grew from 1.4 percent in 1974 to 13.1 percent in 1979. At the same time, inflation rose from 15 percent in 1973 to 34.5 percent in 1974, reaching 46.3 percent in 1979, revealing the fact that the average yearly inflation for the 1974-1978 period (37.9 percent) had been almost twice as high as the average inflation rate for the period between 1968 and 1973 (19.3 percent).\textsuperscript{54}

These figures were the cause of deep concern, which increased when it became clear that what had kept inflation under control thus far had indeed been the policy of indexation and mini-devaluations. According to Thomas Skidmore, although Geisel was able to maintain a respectable economic growth in 1974 (as shown in table 3.2), the economic record for that year already “indicated what was in store for the Brazilian economy in the second half of the 1970s. [...] In 1974 Brazil had survived the initial impact of OPEC’s economic blackmail. But how long could the ad hoc response succeed?”\textsuperscript{55}


\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., p. 180.
As the economic miracle died out and the international context changed, the old conceptual body of the National Security Doctrine began to be revised. General Geisel started the route towards re-democratisation through a long and slow process of *abertura*, or political liberalisation, that was only completed when General João Figueiredo (1979-1985) called for direct municipal, state, and national offices elections in 1982, and indirect presidential elections in 1985. Among other measures, Geisel eased censorship, restored habeas corpus, allowed the first massive strike (1978) since 1964, and abolished the repressive Fifth Institutional Act.

The Geisel administration overlapped with Jimmy Carter’s presidency in the United States, and Brazil, like Argentina, was the object of strong criticism by the new Democrat administration for its human rights record. Although Brazil deplored a report published by the U.S. State Department on human rights as constituting an intolerable interference in its internal affairs, Geisel made the respect of human rights a priority of his government. By 1978, Geisel had taken a series of decisions by which the issue of human rights violations had been practically overcome.

1979 not only marked the beginning of the Figueiredo administration, the last government of the authoritarian regime, but was also the year of the second oil shock and rising interest rates. This posed an especially serious challenge given that the new government inherited an external debt whose servicing took up 67 percent of export revenues. As Roett points out, “[t]here was a sense of both crisis and expectation surrounding the presidential inauguration” as President Figueiredo “had to address the challenges of an overheating economy and rising social expectations.”

The government had to carry out urgent measures to deal with the rampant crisis, which forced Delfim Netto—now in the Planning Ministry—to scrap “the pre-fixing of devaluation and indexation adjustment, and unceremoniously [dump] the high-growth

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strategy” by 1980. Despite the expected results, the plan ended in yet higher inflation, rising from 77 percent in 1979 to 110 percent in 1980, and in 1981 Brazil’s GDP not only failed to grow for the first time since 1942, but it declined by 1.6 percent.

Thus, by the start of the second half of the 1970s, the Brazilian economy showed the signs of what was about to come. Soon, the domestic front was at the centre of the concerns of political and economic elites, who became aware of the need for changes. Similarly, the external scenario had been deteriorating in the previous decade, especially in what refers to relations with the United States and with Argentina.

U.S.-Brazilian relations had seen years of oscillation between ‘special relationship’ and open antagonism: close ties in the aftermaths of the Second World War, distance in the early 1960s with Quadros’ and Goulart’s ‘autonomous’ foreign policy, favourite partnership again in the beginning of the military regime, and nationalist shift in the late 1960s as Brazil’s national interest was redefined. By then, the ‘economic miracle’ was taking off, and, as mentioned before, goals such as national self-determination, national integration and the accumulation of power were gaining weight on the agenda at the expense of ideological borders and alignment with the U.S.. In Brasilia, it was felt that the country’s economic strength could translate into a more prominent role internationally, or, in the words of Riordan Roett, that Brazil “would take second place to no one.”

As the country pursued an autonomous foreign policy and defined its own profile in the international scene, the United States became less of a supporter—let alone a partner—and more of an antagonist. Antagonism became overt in 1967 and 1968, when Brazil refused to join the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), and the Treaty of Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); and was exacerbated in 1975 when Brazil recognised the new, independent government of Angola despite U.S. opposition, and signed a nuclear agreement with West Germany, also despite vigorous American objections. The situation further deteriorated in the second half of the 1970s, when Jimmy Carter’s human rights foreign policy pointed the finger directly at Brazil. At this point, Brasilia unilaterally cancelled its military agreements with the United States.

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Against this background, Geisel and his foreign affairs minister, Antônio Francisco Azeredo da Silveira—who had left his position as Brazilian Ambassador in Buenos Aires to take up this new post—began the shift that placed Latin America at the centre of Brazil’s “pragmatic, ecumenical and responsible foreign policy.” When then Figueiredo took over, the specific instruction that his foreign affairs minister, Ambassador Saraiva Guerreiro, received was to carry on in this direction, deepening relations with the Latin American neighbours even further and promoting regional economic integration.

During this period, personal ideology and preferences played an important role in the relationship with Argentina and the region. The deepening of links with Latin America and above all the resolution of the dispute with Argentina were, to a great extent, promoted by Minister Saraiva Guerreiro and President Figueiredo. In his youth, João Figueiredo had spent some years in exile in Buenos Aires as his father had to flee Vargas’ dictatorship. Those years had had an important influence on him. He felt a personal attachment to the country, which may have contributed to his decision to resolve all outstanding disputes with Argentina and begin a process of rapprochement and co-operation, a matter considered in greater detail in chapter six. In any case, Figueiredo openly showed a “special interest in overcoming the longstanding problem with Argentina” with more celerity than his predecessor, who had begun intricate and protracted talks with its neighbour.

Similarly, Figueiredo was determined to continue and speed up the process of political liberalisation started by Geisel. Here, too, his personal experience exerted a significant influence. Figueiredo’s father, General Euclydes Figueiredo, had been a firm opponent of the Vargas regime. Upon his return from exile in Argentina, he was jailed by the Estado Novo in 1937. Most probably, his father’s democratic convictions persuaded him to accelerate and complete the abertura under way. Figueiredo removed the ban on the creation of new political parties, granted amnesty to political exiles, re-established direct elections for governors, and restored some powers to the Congress, all of which was firmly in place by the end of 1982.

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60 Menéndez and Kerz, Autocracia y Democracia: Brasil, un Camino al Mercosur, p. 58.
62 See Russell, ‘Sistemas de Creencias y Politica Exterior Argentina: 1976-1989,’ where the author shows that personal beliefs, motivations and ideologies constitute important domestic sources to understand and analyse foreign policy decisions and behaviour.
63 Interview with Ambassador Ramiro Elysio Saraiva Guerreiro.
Thus, it was a distinct blend of factors, encompassing domestic and international circumstances, as well as personal experiences and preferences, that encouraged Brazilian foreign policy makers to reassess their range of options, and consider a wider spectrum. The signs of exhaustion of Brazil’s developmentalist model and the end of its ‘economic miracle’—palpable already after the first oil crisis—, the erosion of domestic support for the regime, the increasing opposition to and from the United States, and the crucial role played by Figueiredo and his foreign affairs minister, all contributed to make rapprochement with Argentina desirable; an option that, until not long before, had appeared inconceivable.

4. Chile

4.1. A case of democracy and distribution

Until the coup d’état of 1973, Chile had enjoyed a stable and consolidated democratic history that constituted a hallmark in Latin America. Since the 1930s governments had been uninterruptedly appointed by democratic elections. After the 1950s the country grew ideologically divided into three rather equally influential groupings: the National Party; the Christian Democratic Party; and socialists and communists, who later converged with other left-wing groups in the Popular Union (UP).

Post-war Chile had faced chronic high inflation, moderate growth, and frequent balance of payments crises. For instance, President Jorge Alessandri’s (1958-1964) main goal was to stabilise inflation. It was then argued that growth and distribution would come later, once the anti-inflationary programme had proven effective. Christian Democrat President Eduardo Frei (1964-1970), instead, made redistribution one of his priorities. He introduced gradual and slow structural changes, such as the beginning of a process of land reform seeking to “change the skewed pattern of land tenure and to incorporate peasants to the political and economic structure,” and the participation of the Chilean state in the ownership of large copper mines, which had until then belonged to American companies. As part of this same project, the government increased expenditures in social areas and increased wages. In line with the U.S.-sponsored

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Alliance for Progress, the Frei administration—under the slogan 'Revolution in freedom'—intended to generate a capitalist programme with a 'human face.' The sharp economic slowdown during the second half of Frei's government, and the imbalance between increased political and social participation of the lower classes and unfavourable economic outcomes resulted in a loss of support in the 1970 elections. The coalition Unidad Popular (UP) of left and centre-left parties led by Salvador Allende obtained around 36 percent of the votes, only slightly over 1 percent more (less than 40,000 votes) than right-wing candidate Alessandri, who finished in second place. The vote in Congress of the Christian Democrats in favour of the UP became crucial for Allende's nomination, in accordance to the constitutional provision for the eventuality that no candidate obtained the absolute majority.

4.2. The socialist interlude

The general direction set by Frei's programme laid the foundations of the three-year socialist experience of Salvador Allende's Popular Union (1970-1973). However, whilst Frei sought to improve the distribution of wealth through a gradual process of land reform and 'Chileanisation' of the mining industry, and improving social services and salaries, Allende's far more ambitious goal was to democratically 'overcome capitalism' carrying out a socialist-Marxist restructuring of the state. Ultimately, this proved to be very difficult. Society became deeply polarised in ideological terms, and politics became the arena of virulent conflicts. As the government did not have a majority in Congress, every negotiation became very arduous, and increasingly resulted in sheer confrontation.

According to the socialist government, structural reform was needed in four main areas in order to alter the monopolistic, externally dependent, and oligarchic structure of the Chilean economy. They envisaged the total nationalisation of the mining industry, socialisation of the industrial sector, completion of the agrarian reform, and nationalisation of the banking and financial system.\(^\text{65}\) Once in office, the UP moved fast to achieve these goals. However, only the reform of the mining sector raised general consensus, being in fact the only one to obtain congressional approval. In order to complete the remaining three parts of the programme the government had to either resort to old and obscure legislation, to extralegal means, or it had to purchase

\(^\text{65}\) The summaries of the reforms in all four sectors are based on Larrain and Meller, 'The Socialist-Populist Chilean Experience, 1970-1973,' pp. 184-189.
properties directly. In spite of difficulties, political opposition, and lack of a legislative majority, by 1973 the state controlled 100 percent of utilities, 85 percent of the banking system and mining industry, 70 percent of transportation and telecommunications, and 40 percent of industry.\textsuperscript{66}

The dramatic growth of the state and the public sector was accompanied by impressive macroeconomic results in UP's first year in office. In 1971, GDP grew by 8 percent, more than doubling the previous year's growth rate; inflation decreased to reach only 22.1 percent, a good outcome against the background of Chile's record in the 1960s; and unemployment was reduced to 3.8 percent, the lowest rate hitherto registered in Chilean statistics. These outcomes were the successful consequence of policies aiming to increase aggregate demand.\textsuperscript{67}

Yet after this initial success, the years 1972 and 1973 were of fast decline, and ultimately represented the collapse of the socialist experience. Signs of disequilibria of numerous indicators—such as increases of budget and fiscal deficits, sharp reduction of international reserves, negative trade balances, large increases of money supply, an increase in consumption accompanied by a drop in investment, and the appearance of shortages, black markets and rationing—had been ignored since the beginning of the UP administration. In time, and since the government pursued no corrective policies, this led to the destabilisation and failure of the model, carrying with it high levels of inflation, recession, public deficit, and the deterioration of real wages. Further factors seriously damaged the Chilean economy: the severe drop in the international price of copper in 1971, the suspension of external funds by Chile's traditional credit providers, and the so-called 'invisible blockade' and destabilisation campaign by the United States.\textsuperscript{68} As a result of this situation, in November 1971, Chile suspended the payment of its external debt service.

Against this background, social unrest and political opposition to the government were growing fast. Unsatisfactory macroeconomic outcomes were only part of the


\textsuperscript{68} The United States resorted to countless means to weaken Allende's government. Abraham Lowenthal indicates that between 1970 and 1973, the United States spent around $8 million financing political activities among many different civic groups, stimulating 'news' stories and editorials in the Chilean press, and promoting articles on Chile by CIA-subsidised 'journalists' from other countries. In addition, it worked to 'cut off Chile's access to international loans and credits and by encouraging local capital flight. [...] The Allende government faced a great deal of domestic opposition, to be sure, but U.S. efforts were significant in preparing the way for the 1973 coup.' A. F. Lowenthal, \textit{Partners in Conflict: The United States and Latin America in the 1990s} (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), p. 34.
problem. Additionally, from the start the UP had been an intrinsically weak administration, having come to power with only a—literally—tiny advantage over the right-wing party. Moreover, early government decisions generated the opposition of important sectors of the public that might otherwise have stood by Allende. For instance, the process of land reform targeted originally only farms of over 80 hectares. Yet soon also farms of under 80 hectares were occupied by peasants while the government turned a blind eye. As a result, even small landowners felt threatened by the UP and withdrew their initial support. Similarly, in the beginning, expropriation and pressure to sell companies were aimed exclusively at owners of large firms, but then expanded to also include medium and small-sized companies, who could have otherwise constituted some basis of support. Instead, they soon became a source of strong opposition, resorting to judicial means and lockouts to prevent expropriation. Finally, on 27 August 1973 the Chamber of Deputies, dominated by opposition parties, declared illegal all actions taken by President Allende.

As pointed out by Manuel Antonio Garretón, the radicalisation of the programme had the effect of mobilising moderate actors who would normally have stayed on the sidelines, pushing them to take authoritarian positions. Thus, "in an increasingly polarized and de-institutionalized climate, the traumatized middle classes and the military put an end to reforms they believed threatened their survival."69 On 11 September 1973, a military coup d'état led by General Augusto Pinochet brought President Allende's socialist experience to an end.

4.3. Pinochet, geopolitics, and the stabilisation of the accounts

The last period of the Allende government resembled to some extent the collapse of the Peronist administration in 1976, except for the latter's daily manifestations of open violence and terrorism. In Chile, the polarisation of social and political forces, and the acute distributive impact of economic disequilibria made socio-political confrontations virtually intolerable.70 Joseph Ramos observes that both the frustration with the economic performance and the severity of the immediate socio-political and economic

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70 For instance, in 1972 there were 3,300 strikes, being declared illegal 96 percent of them. See W. Sánchez G., 'Las Tendencias Sobresalientes de la Política Exterior Chilena,' in Walter Sánchez G. and Teresa Pereira L. (eds.), 150 Años de Política Exterior Chilena (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria, 1977), pp. 396-397.
crisis made the public receptive to the drastic measures proposed by the neoconservative forces.\textsuperscript{71}

This Chilean neoconservative faction, composed of conservative military and neoliberal economists, shared some common aspects with its Argentine counterpart. They, too, saw the crisis as the result of the economic and political order dominant since the 1930s, of which the UP was just the radicalisation of an already present tendency. The obvious recipe to rescue the country from such a distorted economic order—and from the political model that had underpinned it—was the pursuit of its complete reversal, both in economic and political terms. In the words of Philip O'Brien,

\begin{quote}
Backed by leading sectors of the Chilean capitalist class, and international capitalist agencies and U.S. business interests, [the economic team] argued the need for a revolutionary overhaul of Chilean economy and society: an overhaul that would depolitizise the dangerous Chilean working class with their stubborn adherence to Marxist ideology. Their technocratic, authoritarian approach to economic problems appealed to certain sectors of the military [...].\textsuperscript{72}
\end{quote}

The re-privatisation of nationalised properties, the opening of the economy, the liberalisation of markets, and a free-market price and resource allocation became nearly dogmatic principles for the Chilean economic policy-makers. The state saw its size and role transformed accordingly. Following neoliberal premises, it turned into a 'subsidiary state' that only carried out those activities that the private sector could not or did not want to perform, and a 'neutral state' which interfered in the economy only to establish general rules that applied equally to all.\textsuperscript{73} Distribution—a fundamental assignment of the state according to previous administrations—was no longer seen as a state responsibility.

The eradication of communism and the de-politicisation of society became key political objectives. As in Argentina, the new government took drastic measures to fulfil these goals, including shutting down Congress, dissolving all political parties, detaining or forcing into exile former officials, political activists and sympathisers, and suspending trade unions, the right to strike, and any union-related activity. Any attempt by workers' movements to influence and participate in politics was severely repressed.

Curiously, the economic team saw no contradiction between the need for economic liberty and the lack of political freedom. This was one of the few differences between


\textsuperscript{73} Lücke and Pascual Spada, \textit{La Interdependencia del Orden Económico y Político: Dos Experiencias Latinoamericanas, Argentina (1976-81) y Chile (1973-83)}, p. 25.
the Chilean ‘Chicago boys’ and their American teachers: American neoliberals based their theory on the preservation of individual freedom. According to Pinochet himself, in Chile, instead, “we can point out that in the inter-relationship between the economic and the social and political orders, economic freedom is a necessary requisite for the existence of a truly free political system”—a belief shared by Argentine economists and military.

Despite a few similarities, Chile constituted a ‘purer’ case of neoliberalism than Argentina in that economists applied the recipes of the Chicago School rather strictly. Additionally, in comparison to Argentina, it turned out to be easier to implement the programme in Chile given its economic, political and social constitution. The country had achieved lower levels of industrial and agricultural development and autosufficiency, and was therefore more inclined to an open economy. Its middle class and intermediate organisations were less sophisticated and organised, and thus less capable of representing a serious obstacle to a policy of structural reform that did not take them into account. Chile’s ‘purer’ model was also the product of the prevalent consistency in the country’s economic thought; a fact that permitted the continuity of a sustained programme between 1975 and 1982, even if under different economic teams.

Finally, the Chilean military constituted a more homogeneous and vertical body than its Argentine counterpart. Although Chile’s armed forces were also inclined to developmentalism—and consequently statism—particularly in those areas of the economy that were perceived as strategic, they did not have a definite stand with regard to the general economy, partly because they had not participated in politics or in the government recently. This, again, made the implementation of the new economic programme significantly easier, diminishing any potential opposition within the very military government.

As noted earlier, the cases of Argentina, and more strikingly of Brazil, were very different. In Brazil, the military openly assumed an active developmentalist economic policy, whilst in Argentina they took on Martinez de Hoz’s neoliberal programme, but then widened the definition of ‘strategic areas of the economy’ with which the super-minister was not allowed to interfere. Oil and energy, transport, communications and

74 Most of the members of the economic team had attained degrees from the University of Chicago.
77 Lücke and Pascual Spada, La Interdependencia del Orden Económico y Político: Dos Experiencias Latinoamericanas, Argentina (1976-81) y Chile (1973-83), pp. 31-33.
other public services were as 'strategic' as the arms and nuclear industries and therefore not subjected to privatisation or to budget constraints. In Chile, the only area where privatisation was strongly objected was the copper industry. While the economic team claimed the need to privatise it with the same celerity and political determination that had characterised the privatisation of expropriated, intervened and public enterprises, the armed forces refused to sell its companies in the copper industry.

The first few years of the military regime did not translate into immediate economic recovery. The sudden liberalisation of prices meant that the (relatively) repressed inflation that had built up during the UP years shot up. While already at over 160 percent in 1972, and 150.5 percent for the first three quarters of 1973, inflation exploded after the coup, reaching between 143.7 and 302.4 percent during the last quarter, depending on the calculation method. Hence, the accumulated annual inflation of 1973 reached 508.1 or 908.1 percent.78

Milton Friedman, a professor from the University of Chicago whose model was being followed, took a personal interest in Chilean politics, and during a visit to the country in 1975 suggested the implementation of a stabilisation shock treatment. Not long after Friedman’s conference in Santiago, the Minister of the Economy Cauas was given special powers to abandon gradualism and carry out an anti-inflationary shock treatment, the 'Plan of Economic Recovery.'

Through a sharp cutback of civil servants, a dramatic cut by around 50 percent of the real salary of the remaining ones, and the elimination of subsidies, the new economic policy managed to reduce the deficit and bring inflation down to a two-digit rate by 1977.79 Despite the high costs in terms of distribution of wealth, it was reassuring for a country with hyperinflationary experience to see inflation ‘under control,’ even when that meant at a rate of around 30 or 40 percent.

Additionally, during 1974 and 1975 the financial sector was again privatised and expanded, and the financial market deregulated, freeing interest rates for deposits and loans.80 Although the system almost collapsed in 1982 and the Central Bank had to intervene in several banks and financial firms and guarantee the repayment of deposits, in the second half of the 1970s the Chilean economy seemed successful to government

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80 Ibid., pp. 47-50.
and economists. After the sharp contraction of 1975, the country was indeed performing better than the Latin American average (see table 3.3). According to a World Bank country study of 1980, "under extraordinarily unfavorable circumstances the Chilean authorities have engineered an economic turnaround without precedent in the history of Chile."  

Table 3.3: Average Annual GDP growth rates in Chile and in Latin America, 1976-1980

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<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
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Finally, the expansion of foreign trade was central to the Pinochet administration. Exports were soon favored by a series of mini-devaluations carried out for much of the period between 1974 and 1978, by the elimination of complicated administrative procedures and by the creation of ProChile, a division within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs whose aim was (and still is) the promotion of Chilean exports. This way, Chile went from being "an economy which, until 1974, had generated no more than 10-13 percent of its gross national product from exports, [to] reaching a 30 percent-plus figure."  

The government of Pinochet thus broke with several traditions of Chilean politics. First of all, the longstanding tradition of democracy. The second break was with the policy of redistribution of wealth, which had started very timidly with Alessandri, had been deepened by Frei, and had seen its height during the Allende period. The third fracture was in the realm of foreign policy. President Frei had universalized diplomatic relations, normalising political and diplomatic links with the Soviet Union and countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Also, he had endorsed processes of Latin American integration—an enterprise supported even more firmly by Allende—which was reflected in the creation of the Andean Pact, the backing of the Latin American

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82 Ibid., p. 936.
83 For Chile's foreign policy, see F. Rojas Aravena, 'Chile: Cambio Político e Inserción Internacional, 1964-1997,' Estudios Internacionales vol. XXX, no. 119-120 (1997).
Economic Commission (ECLA), and the foundation of CIPEC, an association of copper producing countries.

Allende's foreign policy followed the basic lines of the previous governments. As Frei's, his administration emphasised its universalistic orientation, pragmatically defending the principles of non-intervention and self-determination regardless of the ideological and political position of the other states. Contrary to expectations, socialist Chile did not receive strong support from the Soviet Union. Instead, Santiago sought to counterbalance U.S. opposition and its 'invisible blockade' by relying on Latin American solidarity and deepening relations with Western and Eastern Europe. A good example of this is that in spite of political and ideological differences with the government of General Lanusse, the relationship with Argentina improved considerably during this period. The administrations were able to agree on Her Britannic Majesty formally assuming the role of arbiter in the Beagle Channel controversy, and on a new General Treaty on Judicial Solution of Controversies to replace the 1902 one. Additionally, bilateral trade was increased significantly.

After the coup, Chile's foreign policy did a U-turn, becoming praetorian and ideologically driven, in strong opposition to the civil-pragmatic foreign policy that had hitherto prevailed. In effect, a central element that guided most of the regime's foreign policy was its deep anticommunism. Accordingly, diplomatic relations were broken with the Soviet Union and the Soviet block, and relations with social-democratic Western Europe and populist Latin America cooled down drastically, to the extent that some European states withdrew their ambassadors from Santiago.

As Manfred Wilhelmy observes, there were only two partial exceptions to this principle; "the relations with neighboring border countries—where the traditional logic of power politics dominates—and international economic relations." Regarding the latter exception, the prominence given to integration into the world economy allowed Chile to maintain uninterrupted, and often growing, trade relations with states with which diplomatic relations had severely deteriorated, or even been broken. Such were the cases of Mexico, the UK, West Germany, Spain, France, and Italy. International isolationism in political terms was tolerated as long as it did not translate into trade

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84 Varas, 'The Soviet Union in the Foreign Relations of the Southern Cone.'
constraints. An eloquent example of this is Chile’s withdrawal from the Andean Pact in 1976, which simultaneously points to its preference for autonomous integration into the world economy and its disregard for regional politics.

Regarding the former exception, foreign policy towards neighbouring countries was characterised by its nationalism and territorialism, guided primarily by Pinochet’s geopolitical thought. It is interesting to note that whilst in other countries geopolitics may have influenced the government to a greater or lesser extent, in Chile the very president of the nation was a former geographer, professor of geopolitics at the Army’s War Academy, and author of the book *Geopolitica* (1974). A key idea in *Geopolitica* is that states resemble living organisms. Thus, “the man needs space for its development, and the same happens with the State; when it is growing, it needs to extend itself over larger spaces,” which explains why, according to Pinochet, all relations between states are power relations. As will be seen in chapters four and five, this conception guided a great deal of Pinochet’s foreign policy towards its immediate neighbours.

Finally, by the second half of the 1970s the bilateral relationship with the United States began to deteriorate quickly. In 1976 a bomb exploded in Washington under the car of a former Chilean minister of Foreign Relations, Orlando Letelier, killing him and his secretary. This political assassination, carried out by agents of Chile’s secret police, brought bilateral relations to a critical point, particularly as “Chile contempituously rebuffed the Carter government’s attempt to extradite the accused members of the Chilean military.” Moreover, the emphasis of the Carter administration on human rights and the consequent sanctions against the Southern Cone regimes translated into a further deterioration of relations between both states. In this context, Pinochet chose to defy criticisms and pursue political autonomy as a geopolitical objective. Two instances illustrate this attitude. Firstly, in a public speech in 1977 Pinochet declared that he had “recently provided that we resign the application for a foreign credit, whose granting [they] tried to publicly make conditional upon the examination by a foreign Government on the evolution of our situation in terms of human rights.” And secondly, also in 1977, following the fourth consecutive United Nations condemnation of Chile for human rights violations, Pinochet called for a national ‘consultation,’ so that

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89 Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, pp. 138-139.
every man, every woman, and every youth in this country will have to decide, in the secrecy of his conscience, whether he supports the president in his defense of the dignity of Chile and reaffirms the legitimacy of the government of the Republic [...] or whether, in contrast, he supports the resolution of the United Nations and its pretension to impose our future destiny on us from abroad [...]  

Not even the Reagan period proved much friendlier toward the Pinochet regime. By then, re-democratisation was gradually gaining position in the American agenda towards the region. Yet Chile showed no signs of considering a democratic transition until the late 1980s.

By the mid-1970s, the political and economic context had changed so dramatically that the set of foreign policy options that the Pinochet regime saw as necessary, possible, and desirable was fundamentally different from what previous governments had envisaged. The regime’s main concerns lay with the maintenance of the satisfactory macroeconomic performance that it had achieved after 1975, the increase of foreign trade as part of its aim of integration into the world economy, and the emphasis on its absolute national sovereignty.

5. Final remarks

In the same manner as strongly ideological and nationalist policies at home appear to be less tolerant of internal dissent, less prone to dialogue, and less inclined to compromise than other type of policies, ideological and/or nationalist-territorialist policies in international affairs have a similar effect on bilateral and regional relations. Ideological, nationalist and territorialist foreign policy can be characterised as dogmatic and rather inflexible, in contrast to a pragmatic foreign policy, better disposed to revise and accommodate its orientation to changing circumstances.

A self-image of success coupled with a dogmatic foreign policy appears to preclude the search for policy alternatives. On the contrary, it seems to lead to the toughening of dogmatic postures. Such was the case of Brazil in the height of its ‘economic miracle,’ when it pursued a distinct profile and an autonomous posture in international politics, distancing itself from the U.S., and even defying it. Similarly, once authoritarian Chile appeared to have overcome the economic and political crisis of the first half of the 1970s, and signals were pointing at success (relative to the goals of military regime), the

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country toughened its international political attitudes giving main priority to its foreign trade performance.

The appearance or continuation of failures appears to have the opposite effect of widening the horizon of envisaged choices, hence allowing the consideration of more pragmatic policies—in this case, rapprochement-seeking policies with former adversaries. The cases of Argentina and Brazil in the late 1970s can be analysed in this way. Amidst an unfavourable context both domestically (perhaps with the sole exception of the 'successful' annihilation of subversion, although only completed around 1979) and internationally, Argentine hard-liners within the government reluctantly agreed to revise their attitude towards Brazil, which amounted to starting revising their vision of Brazil. Similarly, facing the exhaustion of its 'economic miracle,' beginning the process of domestic abertura, and confronted with the opposition of its former ally (the United States), the Brazilian government gave serious consideration to straightening out the bilateral dispute and longstanding competition with Argentina.

Furthermore, the fact that both Argentina and Brazil had traditionally held high profiles in the region as part of their aspirations to prestige and regional leadership, and of their mutual competition, precluded them to take on an isolationist posture. In contrast, Santiago’s goals were rather limited to improving its trade relations and maintaining or improving its achieved geopolitical condition, much less concerned than its neighbours about international prestige. Therefore, the choice of political isolationism was not seen as a terrible loss, as long as foreign trade continued to expand.
Table 3.4: Summary of policy orientation in Argentina, Brazil and Chile in the second half of the 1970s

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<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Chile</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic policy</strong></td>
<td>• National Security Doctrine</td>
<td>• Abertura (slow political liberalisation)</td>
<td>• National Security Doctrine</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Anticommunism</td>
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<td>• Anticommunism</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic economic policy</strong></td>
<td>• Neoliberal</td>
<td>• Interventionist</td>
<td>• Neoliberal and monetarist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Although inconsistent with underpinning principles</td>
<td>• Industrialist</td>
<td>• More consistent with underpinning principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• De-industrialising</td>
<td>• Consistent with underpinning principles</td>
<td>• Export-oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Falling short of own goals</td>
<td>• Exhaustion of 'economic miracle''</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign policy</strong></td>
<td>• Nationalist</td>
<td>• Searching autonomy from U.S.</td>
<td>• Ideological/anti-Soviet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Territorialist</td>
<td>• Oriented towards Latin America</td>
<td>• Guided by Pinochet’s geopolitical principles: nationalism and territorialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Autonomist</td>
<td>• Professional</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• (Pragmatic turn regarding Brazil by the late 1970s)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign economic policy</strong></td>
<td>• Pragmatic</td>
<td>• Inward-looking</td>
<td>• Pragmatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Export-oriented (primary goods)</td>
<td>• Export of industrial goods</td>
<td>• Aggressive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Dynamic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In these circumstances, the constitution of a certain domestic configuration, and of an according image of self, facilitated or hindered a shift in external behaviour. This was the first step in a much longer development, one in which the internalisation of changes—and thus the transformation of identities and interests—occurred as part of the process itself. As Alexander Wendt explains, identities and interests are a continuing outcome of interaction, always in process, not an exogenous input.\(^{92}\) In transforming and internalising the vision of the other, Argentina and Brazil, first, and later also Argentina and Chile, were able to advance rapprochement and desecuritize bilateral relations to the point of ruling violence out of the equation. By doing so, they managed to transform the quality of regional peace.

Before engaging in the study of the two dyads, the next chapter explores the Latin American and hemispheric backgrounds, aiming to show the unfavourable nature of the regional context for desecuritization.
CHAPTER 4
HEMISPHERIC CONTEXT

1. Introduction

After having discussed domestic conditions in the three countries studied in this thesis before and during the period in question, this chapter explores broader hemispheric and regional issues. The main purpose is to give a background that will help understand why, despite numerous attempts, most regional projects to coordinate policy in political, defence and trade matters failed or had only very limited success. It will be suggested that beyond specific explanations provided for each individual attempt, there are two fundamental and more general reasons underpinning these outcomes.

The first has to do with the role played by the United States in the Western Hemisphere during the period following the Second War, and the existence of divergent expectations between the U.S. and the Latin American states. Hemispheric undertakings have usually responded to American initiatives, and consequently to U.S. political and ideological interests, which were strongly shaped by the Cold War. Frequently, Latin American governments failed to recognise this, leading them to hold high expectations for economic and military co-operation and assistance, which, more often than not, went unfulfilled. This, in turn, tended to lead to a perverse effect in which regional elites would develop a mistrust of the U.S., while competing with other Latin American countries for U.S. favouritism. Simultaneously, these elites would develop suspicions of any other countries deemed to be viewed favourably by the U.S..

The second factor helps to explain the failure of both hemispheric and purely Latin American co-operation programmes, and refers to the background of regional conflicts. Given the extended history of regional disputes and conflicts—most of them over territorial and border issues—trust has usually been low among Latin American states, despite a longstanding discourse of Latin American solidarity and fraternity. To an important extent, it was this background that prevented co-operation projects from advancing.

In both cases—those involving hemispheric co-operation and those of just Latin American partnership—the rhetoric used and the prospective goals set were much more
ambitious than what was achievable. This has probably made their failure even more resounding and the ensuing disappointments even deeper.

The remainder of this chapter is divided into four parts. The second section reviews the development of hemispheric institutions and co-operation processes. The third part focuses on intra-Latin American disputes and conflicts, latent and active, that lingered on to some extent into the 1960s and 1970s. This will serve as the background of the next section, section four, in which two specific Latin American economic integration attempts will be discussed, the 1960 Latin American Free Trade Agreement (LAFTA) and the 1980 Latin American Integration Agreement (LAIA). The last section draws some conclusions from these arguments.

2. **Hemispheric regimes and U.S. influence**

Early proposals for the creation of a Western Hemisphere institution date back to the 1889 First International Conference of American States in Washington, which was convoked at the invitation of U.S. Secretary of State James G. Blaine. But the resulting Pan American Union was only reluctantly accepted by Latin American nations, which "viewed with great skepticism the presence of an autonomous inter-American Secretariat in Washington, D.C., and consistently refused to delegate any operational responsibilities to the director of the Pan American Union."¹ In 1915 Woodrow Wilson proposed the agreement on a comprehensive Pan American Pact with the aim of protecting the republican form of government in the continent, guaranteeing territorial integrity, and controlling the manufacture and sale of armaments. The First World War, and the priority given to universal schemes such as the League of Nations, nevertheless, eventually prevented the pursuit of the project.

In 1933 President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced his Good Neighbour Policy, accepting Latin America's long-sought principles of juridical equality and non-intervention, which after the Second World War finally culminated in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and the Organisation of American States. These two, together with the Inter-American Treaty for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes (Pact of Bogotá), first made up what became known as the inter-American system.²

² Ibid., pp. 2-19, and p. 21.
The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, known as Rio Treaty, was the result of the 1947 Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, which was held in Rio de Janeiro. Its main provisions stipulated that the signatory parties committed themselves to resolving peacefully all disputes that could arise between them (Article 2), and that any attack on a state in the Americas would be considered an attack on all countries in the Americas, and therefore would be repelled collectively (Article 3). More importantly, it also stipulated that any aggression different from an armed attack, or any extra-continental or intra-continental conflict that endangered hemispheric peace and security would prompt the Consultation Committee to meet immediately. The Committee would determine the measures to be taken in support of the aggressed, or, in general, those measures aiming to achieve a common defence and the maintenance of peace and security in the continent (Article 6).³

In fact, this treaty was based on very unequal expectations of benefits to be derived from U.S.-Latin American military relations. Whereas the Latin American military had been looking for professionalisation and military assistance, and ultimately the development of hemispheric institutional relations in the field of security, the United States was looking for allies to defend the Western Hemisphere from a potential Soviet attack. When it became clear that Latin American armies could offer only very limited support in the case of an East-West confrontation, the United States started to promote bilateral co-operation schemes aimed to strengthen the domestic policing roles of the Latin American military. These schemes took the form of bilateral Military Assistance Programmes (MAPs), signed by all Latin American governments and the United States between 1951 and 1958.⁴

Again with the wrong idea, Latin American governments expected these programmes to bring modernisation to their armed forces and economic development, since equipment was to be provided together with factories of ammunitions and installations for their maintenance and repair. However, this expectation did not materialise, and the most they got was “a modest transfer of secondhand weapons used during World War II.”⁵ For David Mares, the MAPs functioned as the United States’

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⁵ Ibid., p. 49.
unilateral arms control mechanism in the region. In the 1960s the focus of pan-
American military relations turned instead progressively to the ideological
indoctrination of military personnel, training them to carry out internal political security
tasks aimed at domestic security threats. In other, more explicit words, the objective was
that they could deal with, and stop, growing anti-U.S. movements and the spread of left-
wing guerrillas in the region.

While Latin America grew in political-ideological importance in the eyes of the
United States, strategically it was becoming increasingly irrelevant. For Augusto Varas,
"the crisis of the so-called 'panamerican military system' at the beginning of the 70s
was a result, therefore, of the politicization and ideologization of the relations between
South American and U.S. armed forces."  

U.S. political influence on the continent was further enforced by the creation of the
Organisation of American States (OAS) in 1948. According to Abraham Lowenthal, the
OAS "was headquartered in Washington primarily to facilitate regional political
leadership by the United States." This became apparent in the years that followed its
establishment, as evidenced by Jerome Slater's assertion in 1969 that "the United States
increasingly sought to use the OAS as an anticommunist alliance to mobilize the
hemispheric states on behalf of its cold war policies." And indeed, many Latin
American governments soon adopted U.S. Cold War concerns as their own, a fact
which, more often than not, undermined the ability of the inter-American system to
constrain the United States' increasing unilateralism.

However, until the 1970s the OAS also played a prominent role in preserving peace
in Central America. Jorge Domínguez notes that its intervention was key to put an end
to the Honduras-El Salvador war in 1969, and served as a useful background to their
bilateral negotiations during the following decade. Nonetheless, as OAS Secretary
General Alejandro Orfilia declared in his resignation speech on 14 November 1983,
since the mid-1970s

the OAS has been estranged from, or at best only partially committed to, many
of the fundamental issues that affect the present and determine the future of the

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6 D. R. Mares, 'Regional Conflict Management in Latin America: Power Complemented by
Diplomacy,' in David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (eds.), Regional Orders: Building Security in a
7 A. Varas, 'Controlling Conflict in South America: National Approaches,' in Michael Morris and
8 A. F. Lowenthal, Partners in Conflict: The United States and Latin America in the 1990s (Baltimore
10 J. I. Domínguez, 'Los Conflictos Internacionales en América Latina y la Amenaza de Guerra,' Foro
Americas. In some cases, it has been conspicuous by its absence; in other, even worse, it has been completely ignored.11

The most obvious and blatant case was the 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada, when the Organisation was not consulted at all. Neither before nor after the incident.

The OAS, as well as the Rio Treaty, paid the price of declining legitimacy and efficiency due to the contradictory expectations of its members. Here too, it was a case of wanting to reconcile two mutually exclusive goals:

from the Latin American viewpoint, the OAS should have served as an instrument of cooperation to further the economic development of the whole region. For the United States, the OAS served as an instrument of power to be used to secure political stability in the region and thus its own hegemonic position.12

Although the United States seemed to have an interest in Latin America in the 1950s, its concern did not stretch much beyond signing the bilateral MAPs and making sure that its own agenda and initiatives were also priorities of its southern neighbours. This latter goal was fulfilled with great success, as very soon U.S. Cold War concerns had also permeated Latin American domestic and foreign policy-making. For instance, international communism was barred from the Hemisphere through an OAS resolution in 1954, and many states even broke off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

Reciprocity, however, was out of the question. During this decade, Latin American leaders put forward proposals outlining their own pleas for expanding aid and promoting economic development. In 1954, at a meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council of the OAS, Raúl Prebisch, director of the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), suggested the creation of an Inter-American Development Bank to increase and facilitate credit and aid, and advance commodity price stabilisation and industrial development. In 1958 the president of Brazil, Juscelino Kubitschek, submitted a proposal for a hemispheric development programme, Operação Panamericana or Pan-American Operation. Latin Americans were seeking the promotion of some sort of Marshall Plan directed at them. Both instances, however, were summarily dismissed by the United States.13

Augusto Varas makes the following diagnosis regarding the United States' attitude towards Latin America: “the United States, following an autistic approach to this issue, often used the [Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance] and the OAS as

11 My translation, ibid., p. 8.
13 Lowenthal, Partners in Conflict: The United States and Latin America in the 1990s, p. 30.
mediums to implement its own interest in the Latin American region."\(^{14}\) American hegemony in the region after the Second World War, the non-reciprocal nature of the U.S.-Latin American relationship, and the increasingly apparent reality of divergent interests eventually resulted in growing negative reactions towards the United States that translated into strong anti-American sentiments among intellectuals and politicians first, and very soon among wider circles of Latin American public opinion.

This became clearer than ever with the 1959 Cuban revolution. After a failed attempt by Washington to reverse Cuba's course, it decided to try, at least, to prevent this tendency from expanding throughout the Western Hemisphere. Thus, renewed attention and involvement in the region were to follow. In 1960 the United States finally agreed to the creation of the Inter-American Development Bank, and in 1961 the newly elected President Kennedy announced an ambitious multibillion-dollar programme, the 'Alliance for Progress,' that included political, economic, and security measures to assist Latin American development. The unilaterally proclaimed Alliance reflected Kennedy's determination to re-establish U.S. dominance in the Americas.

As Lowenthal points out,

> the architects of the Alliance recognized the revolutionary potential of extreme poverty and inequality. Accordingly, the United States undertook to promote economic development and social reform in Latin America as an antidote to revolution.\(^{15}\)

They did so by focusing on the expansion of middle-class sectors, social reform, and democratic politics, all designed to prevent Latin Americans from preferring leftist alternatives. U.S. economic assistance, however, came along with "military aid and training programs [that] would be expanded and reoriented toward counterinsurgency."\(^{16}\)

Being the provider of numerous grants and loans whose importance was quite significant in the context of the modest size of the Latin American economies, very soon Washington was in the position of determining by itself what military equipment Latin American countries were to acquire, which economic choices they were to make, and which social, economic, and even cultural reforms they were to pursue.

Yet despite the ambitious original plan,

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\(^{15}\) Lowenthal, Partners in Conflict: The United States and Latin America in the 1990s, p. 32.

\(^{16}\) Ibid.
the Kennedy administration backed away from many of its early commitments. Security assistance was unstintingly provided, even when it conflicted with the aim of curbing military intervention in politics, but other aspects of the Alliance atrophied. Economic assistance fell short of original projections. Much of the aid that was provided turned out to be mainly a device to secure immediate advantages for a variety of U.S. private interests. The Kennedy administration’s commitment to constitutional democracy also proved to be short-lived; by the time President Kennedy was assassinated in 1963, the objective had been shelved in the wake of the Honduran and Dominican coups.17

With the appointment of Lyndon B. Johnson and the beginning of the Vietnam War, U.S. attention to Latin America became at best sporadic and short-term. The Alliance for Progress abandoned its originally proclaimed intent of favouring democracy and constitutionalism, as the United States ceased to transfer public resources to Latin American countries. Instead, it began to promote private investment in the region, and to intervene on behalf of its private investors’ interests. In addition, it adopted a ‘mature partnership,’ implying that it would take a neutral stand on domestic affairs and accept the existing regimes as they were.18

Despite this change of policy, successive U.S. administrations would still dedicate a great deal of effort and energy to maintaining control over the Hemisphere’s ideological and political developments, putting more emphasis on anti-communism than on democracy. Thus, many authors argue that the early rhetoric of the Alliance for Progress was in the end counterproductive and void, or at least fruitless, for it did nothing to prevent the wave of antidemocratic coups and anti-American reactions in the early and mid-1960.19 Probably 1973 marks a watershed for Latin American-U.S. relations. While that year many Latin American countries took more determined and co-ordinated action to defend their autonomy vis-à-vis the United States, between 1973 and 1976 a series of political and economic changes would start to affect the outlook of the region, such as the coups or ‘self-coups’ in Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Argentina.20

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17 Ibid., p. 40.
18 Ibid., pp. 40-43.
20 In 1973 Peru and Ecuador seized American fishing boats within the 200 miles of their zones of territorial waters; Panama claimed the devolution of the Canal before the U.N. Security Council; Mexico actively promoted the defence of the rights of developing countries through the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States; and within the OAS, resolutions were adopted recognising the existence of ‘ideological pluralism’ and promoting Cuba’s readmission. See C. J. Moneta, 'La Politica Exterior del Peronismo, 1973-1976,' in Rubén M. Perina and Roberto Russell (eds.), Argentina en el Mundo (1973-1987) (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1988), p. 55. As for the changes, Pinochet led a
The Carter administration once again took up a policy of rapprochement toward Latin America trying to respond to changing continental realities, but fell short of translating this into concrete actions. Moreover, not only was foreign aid to support economic growth in the region not expanded, but also certain decisions on tariffs, taxes and other matters directly harmed individual Latin American states. Latin American claims for improved access to markets, capital, and technology of advanced industrial states; increased aid to less developed countries; more stable and favourable commodity trade arrangements; and more responsiveness by multinational corporations vis-à-vis the host countries, all remained unattended.

Relations with many Latin American governments were strained even further due to Carter's human rights policy, which ranged from condemnation of regimes that violated human rights to withdrawal of military and economic aid. Carter's policy "caused Guatemala and Brazil to reject U.S. aid in 1977 and caused the United States to discontinue military aid to Chile and Uruguay in 1976, and to Argentina, Nicaragua, and El Salvador in 1978." Soon, the U.S. government was accused by many in Latin America of interfering in their domestic affairs, if not of totally misinterpreting the duty of Latin American armed forces to defend the Western Hemisphere from the (internal) communist cancer.

The main achievement of the Carter administration in this regard was that it managed to weaken the widely spread image of U.S. official support for—and even identification with—authoritarian military dictatorships. And while Carter's human rights policy promoted U.S. dissociation from repressive and illegitimate governments, and thereby helped increase domestic and international support for American foreign policy, it seems neither to have made Latin American armed forces more respectful of human rights and democracy, nor to have lasted long enough as to become a state policy. Ronald Reagan's government, which interpreted Carter's commitment to human rights as a sign of declining U.S. power abroad, returned to the old policy of strong support to anticommunist regimes, regardless of their human rights record. However, as Andrew Hurrell points out, much of Reagan's

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21 Grabendorff, 'Interstate Conflict Behavior and Regional Potential for Conflict in Latin America,' pp. 276-277.
'reassertion of hegemony' remained on the level of rhetoric [...] but its impact was not entirely absent further south and was most notable in the increasingly forceful trend in U.S. trade policy and, negatively, in the United States' unwillingness to make concessions on debt management.23

Thus, the main attempts at hemispheric co-operation had only meagre results, especially if seen from the perspective of Latin American expectations. While the United States was successful in spreading their Cold War ideological-political agenda across the region, Latin American states and armed forces failed to at least receive the collateral benefits of such an adoption in terms of modernisation, professionalisation, and economic support.

Partly as an outcome of the region's disappointment, and partly because of the U.S. increasing capacity to interfere in the region, Latin American countries became gradually more wary and suspicious of the United States. This happened, however, at a time when confidence among themselves was also in decline. The next section explores the regional background of past disputes, some dormant and some active, in order to highlight the enormous hurdle they represented to any co-operation proposal.

3. Disputes within Latin America

Projects of integration of different kinds have always been present in Latin America. While still under Spanish rule, in the days of independence wars, Latin American liberators José de San Martín and Simón Bolívar viewed the various declarations of independence of Latin American countries as a step towards a broader goal, the establishment of a large Confederation of South American States. This view encompassed a desire for the newly independent states to gain political leverage and international recognition, as well as to counter Spain's potential attempts to restore the monarchic domination. Security and defence were part of the rationale underpinning this initiative, although it was indeed about a much wider political enterprise. However, this early nineteenth century scheme would not prosper.

Within the field of security, further unsuccessful undertakings were pursued in the years following. In 1915, the ABC Pact between Argentina, Brazil and Chile materialised, establishing a permanent and automatic mechanism of conflict resolution. It was intended to serve as the basis for an alliance. Yet this initiative encountered both internal and external opposition. Domestically, neither the congresses of Argentina or

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Chile acted to ratify this initiative. And although it was ratified by the Brazilian Congress, shortly afterwards Rio opted to give priority to its relationship with the United States, by offering its support and declaring war on Germany in 1917. This was in contrast to Argentina, Chile, and most other Latin American countries, which preferred to maintain their neutrality during the First World War.

Externally, the ABC Pact was not greeted warmly by any other South American country, nor was it particularly welcomed by the United States. The former were wary of a pact between the three most powerful states of the region, which would increase their regional hegemonic power, while the latter perceived it to be in competition with Woodrow Wilson’s Pan-American Pact. As was evident by these early international hemispheric tensions, and as became even more strikingly apparent in the developments that took place in 1960s and 1970s, a notable lack of trust among states in the region dominated their relations with one another, despite rhetoric to the contrary. To a large extent, it is argued here, this was a natural consequence, shaped by a history of longstanding—as well as contemporary—regional conflicts.

Although more precise economic explanations of why particular integration programmes failed are, indeed, very helpful—and some are reviewed in section four of this chapter—they tend to overlook the possibility of non-economic causes behind the failure of such regional co-operative enterprises. In the case of Latin America, I suggest that an important part of the explanation rests on the fact that the governments of the region were not ready to trust each other given the proliferation of regional disputes and conflicts. A minimum degree of trust is a key element for successful co-operation, a fact that sounds almost commonsensical, but appears to be often ignored in practice. In other words, although there has been sustained discourse about Latin American (or inter-American) co-operation, even to the extent of encompassing the notion of ‘brotherhood’ within such discourse, the history of the region has not provided a favourable backdrop for governments to realistically envisage and implement co-operation and trust.

Augusto Varas also notes this gap between proposals—and even formal agreements—on the one hand, and measures actually taken on the other, and illustrates it with the case of disarmament and arms limitation policies. In Latin America, not only declared intentions and actual measures do not seem to match, but also “the relative failure to implement disarmament and arms limitation measure contrasts with the

'success' of the regional arms race, which has pushed military expenditures to more than six billion dollars in 1981.'\textsuperscript{25}

Historically, most disputes in Latin America have involved borders and territory. Very often, these have had a symbolic meaning as much as a strategic or economic one, as Peter Calvert rightly points out. "Given the widespread practice in Latin America of military intervention in politics, all governments, military and civilian, have a high degree of sensitivity to questions of national dignity," he argued in the early 1980s, adding that "the government that incurs the odium of giving up even a square metre of the historic soil of the fatherland, may find its term of office abruptly curtailed."\textsuperscript{26}

Regardless of whether these disputes be strategic, economic, or symbolic, Philip Kelly points to a typical geopolitical checkerboard pattern forming in South America throughout the twentieth century, where "neighboring states became opponents, and neighbors of neighbors became confederates."\textsuperscript{27} Thus, in almost every bilateral dispute third states have become involved in some way. Therefore, assertions such as the following should be read with care:

It is not necessarily disparaging to observe that Latin American militaries have dressed better than they have fought because, happily, they have fought (each other) so seldom. Nor is it disparaging to note that these militaries have been more likely to be preoccupied with governing than with responding to external threats.\textsuperscript{28}

While there is some degree of truth in this claim,\textsuperscript{29} unfortunately, Latin American militaries have also devoted large amounts of money, energy and time to draw war and defence plans targeting their own neighbours. Geopolitics informed indeed a great deal of Latin American strategic thinking, and for a long time it was a major component of military and political decision-making. As pointed out by Jack Child, geopolitical thought was used largely as a basis to justify competition, prominently so in the Southern Cone. While Child concludes that regional peace and co-operation would require democratic institutions powerful enough to counter the influence of

\textsuperscript{25} Varas, 'Controlling Conflict in South America: National Approaches,' p. 74.


\textsuperscript{29} Also David Mares points out that even "during the heyday of ABC geopolitics, roughly the forty years between 1945 and 1985, the only war that occurred was the Malvinas/Falkland war in 1982." D. R. Mares, 'Foreign Policy in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile: The Burden of the Past, the Hope for the Future,' \textit{Latin American Research Review} vol. 29, no. 1 (1994).
geopoliticians, for many years such institutions did not benefit from a high status in the region, nor did they enjoy the necessary strength to withstand non-democratic forces.\footnote{30 J. Child, \textit{Antarctica and South American Geopolitics: Frozen Lebensraum} (New York: Praeger, 1988).}

What follows is a brief summary of the most salient disputes in Latin America and their resolution, or not. Starting from south to north rather than keeping to a chronological order, the first conflict is the 1982 Malvinas/Falklands War between Argentina and the United Kingdom. Although it involved an extra-regional power, that war clearly generated the checkerboard logic described by Kelly, thereby contributing to the deepening of regional patterns of distrust and jealousy. Whereas Peru and Venezuela sided with Argentina, and Brazil took an ambivalent position, eventually offering timid support to its neighbour, Chile was generous to the British forces, letting them use its facilities against the Argentines.

This surely caused little surprise among observers. In 1978, not long before the Malvinas/Falklands conflict, the Beagle Channel dispute between Argentina and Brazil escalated literally to the verge of war. In fact, that was not the first time, since also in 1899 and 1902 they had been on the brink of war over the same issue. As this is analysed in chapter five in more detail, suffice it to say here that the dispute derived from historically poorly demarcated borders, and that it was only one among many clashing claims. With the 1977 pronouncement of the Arbitral Court coming down heavily on the side of Chile, the Argentine military felt the decision “to be a further tightening of the Chilean-Brazilian encirclement of Argentina; [a] fear [that] has traditionally colored the republic’s geopolitics.”\footnote{31 Kelly, \textit{Checkerboards and Shatterbelts: the Geopolitics of South America}, p. 146.}

Argentina had long been very sensitive to this ‘Chilean-Brazilian encirclement,’ given its traditional animosity towards both its neighbours. In particular, Argentina and Brazil have been engaged during most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in a rather implicit competition for regional hegemony. Only in exceptional occasions did this take the form of concrete disputes. In the 1970s the Itaipú Corpus controversy over the hydroelectric resources of the River Plate Basin threatened to become a dispute of critical proportions. Its resolution in 1979 marked a watershed for bilateral relations. Chapter six of this thesis, which is entirely devoted to the Argentine-Brazilian relationship, discusses both this and their nuclear competition in more detail.

The River Plate Basin, of which the River Paraná is part, had already been the source of another dispute, as well as the ‘source’ of its resolution. By the 100\textsuperscript{th}
anniversary of the War of the Triple Alliance (1865-1870)—a war seen by Paraguayans as the 'martyrdom of a race' (see below)—relations between Brazil and Paraguay had again become very tense due to a border dispute involving waterfalls of the River Paraná with hydroelectric power potential, which were located at Salto de Sete Quedas/Salto de Guairá (Seven Falls/Guaira Falls, according to its name on the Brazilian or Paraguayan side). Brazilian military forces had occupied the area in 1965 despite Paraguayan claims over the Guaira Falls. The issue only made it to the negotiating table in 1966, when Brazil offered Paraguay to build Itaipú, the largest dam in South America. Part of the plan was to flood the disputed region, and turn the new Lake Itaipú into a shared territory. In the words of the then Brazilian ambassador in Asunción, Mario Gibson Barboza, “in this manner, we managed to ‘submerge’ the problem.”

An old dispute still affecting regional relations to the present day is the War of the Pacific, which involved Chile, Bolivia and Peru. In 1879 Chilean workers and businessmen expanded the exploitation of nitrates into Bolivian and Peruvian territories. When Bolivia protested, Chilean troops occupied the Bolivian port of Antofagasta. However, Bolivia and Peru had secretly formed a military alliance in 1873, and when this incident occurred, both declared war on Chile. The allied defeat was so sound that very soon Chile had occupied the Peruvian towns of Tarapacá, Arica, and Tacna, and even the Peruvian capital, Lima. For Bolivia, instead, it meant the loss of Antofagasta, cutting off its only access to the Pacific.

In 1904 Bolivia and Chile signed a treaty formally ending war, by which Bolivia recognised Chile’s possession of Antofagasta in exchange of the construction by Chile of a railway linking La Paz with the seaport of Arica. With the Treaty of Ancón of 1929 Chile and Peru also eventually reached an agreement. Chile retained Arica, but accorded Peru port facilities at its harbour, while Peru recovered Tacna. Bolivia stayed thus as the big looser, being left without any access to the sea.

The issue has remained obstinately present in Bolivian politics and collective memory ever since. Eventually, in 1975, as the 100th anniversary of the War of the Pacific was approaching, the President of Bolivia, General Hugo Banzer, submitted a proposal to his Chilean counterpart, General Augusto Pinochet, for the re-establishment of negotiations on the dispute. Despite optimism, the process encountered at least two

obstacles that complicated its resolution, and eventually condemned it to failure. First, the conditions demanded by Pinochet as compensation for the cession of a coastal corridor were so high that they became unacceptable for the Bolivian government and public opinion. Second, Peru, as by the 1929 Treaty, had veto power in the matter. Using this prerogative, Lima submitted a counterproposal suggesting the tripartite administration of the port of Arica and surrounding territory that Pinochet refused to even consider. Since this incident in 1978, Bolivia and Chile have not re-established diplomatic relationships.

Bolivia was engaged in yet another war, this time on its southeastern border with Paraguay. The Chaco War (1932-1935) was, as Eduardo Galeano dramatically words it, a war between the two poorest countries in South America, the countries with no sea, the most defeated, the most stripped; a war for some possible oil on a hostile and deserted piece of map. The result was a bloody three-year confrontation, in which Paraguay secretly received help from Argentina in the form of ammunitions and fuel, in this way prompting Brazil and Chile, although much more timidly, to side with Bolivia in an attempt to balance power. In the end, a cease-fire was agreed in 1935, although peace was not signed until 1938, after the mediation of other Latin American countries. Paraguay was awarded possession of the greater part of the Chaco region, while Bolivia was guaranteed rights of navigation of the River Paraguay, having thus secure access to the Atlantic route. After the war Bolivia found itself with the least favourable frontier since 1879. In any case, oil, which seems to have been the main motive for this conflict, was never found in Chaco.

If the Chaco War carried terrible costs for both Bolivia and Paraguay, the earlier War of the Triple Alliance (1865-1870), between Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay on one side, and Paraguay on the other, carried the most dramatic consequences for the latter in terms of loss of human life and territory; destruction of industrial infrastructure, cities, agriculture, and livestock; and the imposition of an onerous war compensation. Although historians do not agree on the actual causes of the war, it seems clear that

36 Calvert, Boundary Disputes in Latin America, p. 15.
territory was not the issue. Rather, it was a political war; a war motivated by the balance of power in the River Plate, competition for political influence, interference in the Uruguayan civil war, and the intervention of British diplomacy.

W. B. Gallie compares the War of the Triple Alliance to Clausewitz's concept of 'absolute war':

But he might have been expected to consider the abstract possibility that war, when escalated to the limit of the resources—physical and moral—of any people or civilizations, might result in its total dissolution: as the Paraguayan war of the 1860s was said almost to have done, leaving that helpless country destitute of all but infants and old men and women.

Indeed, the Paraguayan people had been fanatically committed to their leader Solano López and to the war effort, fighting, as a result, to the point of dissolution. Despite having been before a rather developed country for Latin American standards of the day, Paraguay has not been able to recover from such destruction, and was left utterly prostrate still to the present.

Ecuador and Peru, too, have a history permeated with conflict. The River Marañón area has been in dispute since the late nineteenth century, and numerous attempts to mediate failed in 1887, 1936 and 1938. In 1941, after repeated border incidents, full scale fighting broke out. In highlighting again the checkerboard logic of this short war, Kelly points out that Argentina backed up Peru, while Chile and Colombia sided with Ecuador. In 1942 Ecuador and Peru signed the Protocol of Rio de Janeiro, by which Ecuador, under pressure to make "a gesture towards inter-American solidarity at a time of grave crisis" (as was the Second World War), ceded a large part of the disputed territory. The United States, Brazil, Argentina and Chile were guarantors of the settlement.

Since 1960, when the Ecuadorian government tried to declare the Protocol null and void—a decision rejected by the guarantors—, Quito has officially refused to recognise its validity. For Ecuador, what was at stake at the Cordillera Cóndor was its status as an Amazonian state. In the following years, several armed clashes occurred that threatened to escalate into war. In 1981 and 1995, they became armed crises of importance, where combats registered casualties and, in the latter, the loss of military airplanes. It was only in 1998 that the dispute was resolved.

37 Cisneros and Escudé, Historia General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la República Argentina, volume VI, especially chapter 29 on the different historiographic approaches on its causes.
39 Calvert, Boundary Disputes in Latin America, p. 16. See also Kelly, Checkerboards and Shatterbelts: the Geopolitics of South America, p. 142.
Colombia, in turn, has had border problems with Venezuela at the mouth of the Gulf of Venezuela, and with Nicaragua on rival sovereignty claims to two islands, San Andrés and Providencia. Although the governments of Venezuela and Colombia have committed themselves to find a peaceful solution, the dispute, which involves rights to a maritime zone where oil resources have been discovered, has survived since 1941.

Yet another surviving issue is the one between Venezuela and Guyana on the Essequibo basin. It dates back to the late nineteenth century, when Venezuela and Britain were in dispute over the River Orinoco. Arbitrators decided largely in favour of Britain, awarding however the mouth of the river to Venezuela. After Guyana’s independence in 1966, Venezuela claimed that Britain had exerted unfair influence on the arbitration by bribing the Russian chairman, and Caracas could therefore no longer accept its result. The area demanded by Venezuela comprised some two-thirds of Guyana’s national territory. Through the Protocol of Port of Spain (1970) the parties agreed to ‘freeze’ the issue for twelve years. Thereafter, however, no other arrangement has been reached, nor the agreement renewed, and the discrepancy remains unresolved. Soon after Venezuela’s refusal to renew the Protocol, Brazil reached an agreement with Guyana committing itself to construct a road through, and promote industrial development in, the disputed area. As Calvert points out, this worked both as a check on the possibility of Venezuelan expansion to the east, as well as a signal of Brazilian influence northwards.40

In Central America several disputes and conflicts have taken place, such as early unresolved boundary disagreements between El Salvador and Honduras, and their later Football War in 1969; a border conflict in 1957 between Honduras and Nicaragua; and Nicaragua’s long history of frontier disputes with Costa Rica, which survived until the fall of Somoza in 1979, who was ousted by revolutionary forces that benefited from some Costa Rican support.41

All the issues reviewed here had survived in some way or another into the 1960s and 1970s, and still retain weight in Latin American politics. As a matter of fact, they constituted the background against which the lack of trust among states in the region would persist. Most of these disputes have remained unresolved, badly resolved, or have otherwise left deep scars in the collective memory of the countries, thus leaving room for their potential reactivation. Furthermore, they have been a key element in defining

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41 Calvert, *Boundary Disputes in Latin America*, p. 22.
the traditional isolation between regional neighbours, their mutual distrust, and their inclinations to arms races. As Domínguez notices, the fact that between 1960 and 1980 the GDP of Latin America grew 211% made it possible for many governments to significantly raise their military expenditures without raising the military share of national resources. This 'militarisation without pain' was most visible in Brazil, Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela, although countries with slower economic growth also engaged in the expansion of their arsenals and war industries, as was the case with Peru, Chile, Ecuador, and Argentina.42

4. LAFTA and LAIA: Two Latin American integration attempts

It was, thus, in this rather unromising context that Latin American countries pursued their two major regional integration efforts. Not surprisingly, these attempts fell short of their original goals, even though the Latin American Integration Association still exists. There were sound economic reasons that account for their failure that will be discussed next. However, the political background of Latin American relations, as just discussed, was not conducive to reinforcing the sense of commitment needed for such joint projects. A central claim of this thesis is that trust and confidence are key elements to the success of a co-operative programme, such as an economic integration process. As will be examined in chapter seven, the fact that Mercosur endured as a project even when interdependence was very low, and eventually grew into an imperfect customs union is partly explained by the strong political will of the time, and the positive development of mutual trust and confidence between the major partners. Instead, trust and confidence were missing factors in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s. The remainder of this section focuses on the two economic integration associations, the Latin America Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and the Latin America Integration Association (LAIA), and their main economic features.43

LAFTA was created in 1960 by the Treaty of Montevideo, partly inspired by the treaties establishing the European Economic Community. Its goal was the formation of a free trade zone and the gradual elimination of trade restrictions within the following 12 years. It was envisaged as a partial and flexible mechanism that would take into consideration the uneven development levels of the member states and their difficulties

42 Domínguez, 'Los Conflictos Internacionales en América Latina y la Amenaza de Guerra,' pp. 4-5.
43 For an exhaustive study of both associations, see J. M. Vacchino, Integración Latinoamericana: de la ALALC a la ALADI (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Depalma, 1983).
to reduce restrictive trade policies. Thus, trade liberalisation would advance progressively starting with products where intraregional competition was lower.

Its planning dates from 1956, when a Trade Committee was established under the direction of the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) to study the mechanics of setting up a Latin American Common Market. By 1959 Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay began the process of establishing a free trade zone in the Southern Cone. However, ECLA persuaded them to extend this trade zone to Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru, Mexico and Venezuela. In 1960 the Montevideo Treaty was signed by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay, and later joined by Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela and Bolivia.

There was a sound case for the establishment of a common market, since both the size of domestic markets and the access to foreign markets was very limited. A regional market would allow fuller and more efficient utilisation of existing productive capacity to supply regional needs. In addition, it would lead to regional specialisation, thus reducing costs and expanding output; and, finally, it would attract new investment as a result of the appeal regional market areas hold.4

At that time, the work of Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch was very influential in Latin America and ECLA. Prebisch argued strongly that the law of comparative advantage worked against underdeveloped countries preventing their industrialisation and thus perpetuating the status quo. The solution for those countries, then, lay in industrialisation via import substitution or, as Prebisch argued later, export-creating industries. Either type of industrialisation would benefit from an expanded and integrated common market for previously imported goods, protecting its infant industries with a common external tariff.

Despite a large number of products negotiated in the first few years, and an important increase of intraregional trade, LAFTA’s initial dynamism did not last. By 1968 the Association attempted to instrument an automatic tariffs reduction to inject new vigour into the arrangement. However, the outcome was rather a generalised failure to comply with the commitment. The ambitions of LAFTA’s project had stretched perhaps too far, and, in addition, it had to confront several material obstacles. The diversity of the countries involved, the fact that they were just beginning the process of industrialisation, and their different levels of development turned out to be greater impediments than originally thought. Rampant inflationary processes in Argentina,

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Brazil, Chile and Bolivia—although ascribed to different causes—were also highly detrimental ingredients.

Furthermore, because Latin American countries produced and traded similar goods, they had built up substantial trade barriers between each other. This presented them with the dual challenge of reorienting the existing national industries toward the regional market, and improving the efficiency of these national industries so that they could compete regionally. And the problems went on. There was an absence of channels of trade and financing, commercial contacts, clearing and payment mechanisms, sources of supply, and market outlets, in addition to poor transportation and communication systems not only between countries, but oftentimes within countries as well.45

Eventually, the Latin American countries were not able to live up to the challenge. National governments continued to think along near-autarkic lines, withholding their support for integration.

Diana Tussie points yet to other factors to explain LAFTA’s demise. While highlighting “its –partial– achievements,”46 Tussie emphasises the decline in influence of the structuralist school associated with ECLA and its stress on import substitution and protected markets at the hands of the supporters of the neoclassic tradition favouring free markets. This new policy orientation translated by the late 1970s into drastic tariffs reductions in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and to a lesser extent in Peru, hence eroding the margin of preference that covered trade among LAFTA members. Tussie observes that

As these countries reduced or withdrew regional preferences, the remaining members of the Association were inclined to reciprocate treatment in self-defence. [...] Thus (and even though the goal of a common external tariff had never been in sight) the carefully negotiated LAFTA tariff structure, where all members applied matching high import duties to outsiders lay on shaky ground.47

In 1980, the members of a dying LAFTA tried to save the advances attained by it, and negotiated a new treaty signed again in Montevideo, the Latin American Integration Association. LAIA was based on what they called ‘LAFTA’s historic heritage,’ and came to replace it, taking on more flexible conditions and less ambitious objectives. LAIA, too, aimed to achieve a Latin American Common Market in the long run, but instead of starting up by constituting a free trade zone as LAFTA had, LAIA formed a

47 Ibid.
preferential trade area consisting of three mechanisms: regional tariff preference vis-à-vis third countries, regional agreements with the participation of all member countries, and so called ‘partially binding agreements’ between two or more member countries but not all. According to this last rule LAIA members were no longer obliged to grant each other most-favoured-nation treatment, but instead it allowed interested parties to negotiate bilateral agreements covering exclusively the trade between them. In this way, it left the door open to sub-groups of countries to pursue closer economic ties, which was eventually the path chosen by Argentina and Brazil first, with Uruguay and Paraguay later, thus founding Mercosur.

In August 1982 Mexico announced a unilateral default on the payment of its external debt services, which provoked the rise of interest rates in the international markets. The 1982 debt crisis marked the beginning of Latin America’s ‘lost decade,’ as the 1980s came to be known in the region. Most domestic economies experimented major instability when their external financial obligations rose at the same time as the developed countries cancelled all credits to the region. Their exports stagnated as the price of oil and other commodities fell, leaving them with few choices but to reduce imports and follow, once again, protectionist economic policies. Thus, intraregional trade fell back considerably, reducing LAIA to little more than a symbolic arrangement serving as an umbrella for bilateral preferential agreements.48

Some argue that LAFTA/LAIA represented the artificial creation of a juridical infrastructure where there was no real market infrastructure in existence. In the words of Felipe Salazar Santos, “in spite of rhetorical declarations on Latin American solidarity, it did not exist except on paper.”49 Also Francisco Orrego Vicuña points to the disparity between the “solemn and declarative treaties” and the “basic realities of the participant countries.”50 Félix Peña similarly observes that the experiences of LAFTA and LAIA resulted in

an imbalance between the broad geographic territory and the objectives of deepening, which translated into an enormous distance between the rhetoric and

49 Quoted in M. I. Dugini de De Candido, Argentina, Chile, Mercosur: Cambios y Continuidades (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Ciudad Argentina, 1997) p. 21, my translation.
formal commitments and their actual impact on trade flows and investors' expectations.51

5. Final remarks

The economic and structural obstacles that a successful Latin American integration programme would have had to overcome were indeed substantial, and that fact seemed not to have been recognised by the parties concerned. It was not fully acknowledged that Latin America actually found itself very far from fulfilling some minimum, commonsensical requirements to be able to pursue effective regional co-operation. Employing the concepts of the peace scale introduced in chapter two, it is important to bear in mind that except for the 1969 Football War between Honduras and El Salvador no other war broke out in the region during the 1960s and 1970s. In that sense, one might be tempted to say that Latin America constituted a zone of peace. But if so, what kind of peace was it? Certainly, negative peace; the kind of peace that simply highlights the absence of war.

As discussed in chapter two, negative peace can be divided into three subcategories: fragile, unstable, and cold or conditional peace. Depending on the type, war may seem more, or less, imminent, but never impossible. In none of them has the threat or use of force been ruled out as a means to put pressure on others during a negotiation, or to achieve one's own goals. This explains why states in a zone of negative peace are wary and cautious, and their relationships are dominated by mistrust and suspicion.

The existence of a situation of positive peace, instead, is characterised by the presence of confidence. The sole idea of resorting to violence to resolve disagreements or to exert pressure on fellow members in the zone of positive peace has been discarded. It is the passage from cold or conditional peace to stable peace that will increase the chances for a co-operation arrangement to work out. As long as suspicions survive to the point where one government believes that some other state may be preparing its forces for the eventuality of war, and consequently prepares itself for war too, it is highly unlikely that economic co-operation projects, or any other kind of co-operation project where confidence is key, may succeed.

Confidence was a missing element in Latin America, and was equally absent from Latin American-U.S. relationships. The latter proved to be too imbalanced a relationship. The motives encouraging Latin American states to hemispheric co-

operation have been different to those behind U.S. rationale. Being the case that common institutions were ultimately dominated by the United States, it was eventually American, rather than Latin American, interest that prevailed. This fact often resulted in Latin American dissatisfaction and frustration with the hemispheric superpower.

Regarding the relationships between Latin American states, this chapter has shown that they were dominated by dormant disputes, some of them dating back to the early days of Latin American independence; active claims; and dissatisfaction with the status quo. Almost every country had had a border dispute with a neighbour, or had intervened, more openly or more covertly, in its neighbours' internal affairs or international conflicts. Other than that—that is, other than relations mediated by antagonism and intervention—what characterised Latin America was the isolation existing between states. Gerardo Arellano calls this the 'neighbour syndrome,' present even in the midst of integration programmes. According to this syndrome it resulted less costly in political terms to develop closer ties with trans-Atlantic states and extra-regional powers than with immediate neighbours, to whom it was easier, instead, to maintain a conflict-prone attitude.52

Thus, in addition to this tendency towards isolationism fed by geographical obstacles and lack of infrastructure, as well as by an adverse foreign policy preference, there was a general sense of animosity, which Mathis detected in 1969:

The movement toward a Latin American Common Market is faced with a broad spectrum of economies with extreme physical diversity and problem disparity. These disparities are further widened by national jealousies and military accusations and fears.53

The next two chapters deal with the bilateral relations between Argentina and Chile, and Argentina and Brazil. During the 1960s and 1970s, hostility was the main feature in both relationships. This is not surprising given the broader context just discussed, and the particular history of these dyads, as will be seen next. What instead results striking is the development, after 1979, of the Argentine-Brazilian relationship, and their construction of a new regional integration arrangement, Mercosur. This, in turn, will be explored in chapter seven.

53 Mathis, Economic Integration in Latin America: The Progress and Problems of Lafta, p. 16.
PART III

THE DYADS
CHAPTER 5
BILATERAL RELATIONS
BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND CHILE

1. Introduction

Historically, political relations between Chile and Argentina have not been any easier than those characterising the relations between other nations of Latin America. It was in the mid-1800's—many years since independence from old colonial powers and once the civil wars scaled down enough to allow political leaders to focus on their external borders—that the first disputes arose between Argentina and Chile. Many of those disputes persisted over long periods of time and were not completely resolved until the 1990s. Throughout this time, their mutual perception was that of sure adversaries and potential enemies. This feeling of animosity gradually grew on both sides and resulted in the use of aggressive language and mutual displays of power.

One author described Argentina’s bilateral relations in these terms:

[i]f Brazil’s rivalry with our country [Argentina] [...] is almost metaphysical, Chile’s rivalry, instead, is biological. Chile feels us—not only thinks of us—as enemies, as that what they have to eliminate in order to be again a grand nation, at least in South America.1

Interestingly, this has been the way Argentina and Chile have regarded one another, and the way each has thought it was perceived by the other. The fact is that relations between Argentina and Chile deteriorated to a much greater extent than relations between Argentina and Brazil. Despite never having waged war on one another, Argentina and Chile dangerously approached the brink of war on more than one occasion. Most recently in 1978 when the situation escalated to such a degree that both countries’ militaries were mobilised on land and sea into the Beagle Channel zone, and even declarations of war were drafted. It was only through a last minute Papal intercession, in December 1978, that the armed confrontation was averted.

Whilst Argentine-Brazilian antagonism rested on political perceptions and competition for regional leadership, Argentine-Chilean disputes were more a

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consequence of geographical facts. Faced by the third longest border of the world (over 5,300 km, around 3,300 miles), the two states attempted to establish general criteria to determine their borders and resolve disputes, enshrining these in the 1881 Borders Treaty. Notwithstanding this treaty, the protocols were inadequate and unable to successfully resolve subsequent disputes, which were mostly confined to territory along the Andes, and to the Beagle Channel and three islands located therein, south of Tierra del Fuego. These disputes, although present since the nineteenth century, were felt once again in the middle of the twentieth century.

As the next sections discuss, two factors have been the underlying causes for delaying successful rapprochement between these two countries. The first was the prevalence of geopolitical, territorialist and nationalist doctrines in both countries that viewed concessions on territorial issues purely in terms of a zero-sum game, and felt them as ‘losses’ and ‘dismemberment.’ And second was the importance attached to the difference of political regimes, which was crystallised once Argentina initiated its democratic transition.

This chapter analyses the evolution of the bilateral relation between Argentina and Chile in four stages that correspond to different categories of regional peace, in accordance with the classifications which were introduced in chapter two. Section two, reviews the history of the bilateral relationship until 1977, and explores how the construction and adoption of negative mutual perceptions resulted in an oscillation between fragile and unstable peace. Section three focuses on the escalation of the Beagle Channel dispute in 1977 and 1978 in order to draw attention to the nature and dimension that it achieved. It also discusses the peaceful resolution of the dispute in 1984, after democracy had been restored in Argentina, although not in Chile. The Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed that year marked the end of potential hostilities, although not yet the beginning of a friendship, which is the subject of the fourth section. Section five examines the final resolution of the remaining border disagreements, and the ensuing co-operation, which characterised the 1990s. By then, not only were both states ruled by democratic regimes, but they also had implemented neoliberal economic reforms. These two facts facilitated rapprochement, the transition to a positive peace, and the advance of bilateral co-operation. The last section concludes the chapter by reflecting on key points raised.
2. **Between fragile and unstable peace**

In the days of the Spanish Empire, the General Captaincy of Chile and the Viceroyalty of the River Plate constituted two separate administrative dependencies. After 1810, the Republic of Chile and the United Provinces of the River Plate declared independence on the territories of those former imperial dependencies, respectively. The years that followed were devoted to imposing their sovereignty claims on the Spanish Crown through wars of independence—a process only completed in 1816 by Argentina and in 1826 by Chile—and to consolidating their inner territory and domestic institutions. As in the rest of Latin America, the principle guiding the establishment of the external borders was the *uti possidetis*, according to which newly independent states inherit the territory formerly ruled by an individual colonial administration.²

For many years neither the question of accurate territorial demarcation nor that of competing national identities appeared problematic in Spanish-speaking America. Distinguished names responsible for establishing the first national institutions in the newly independent countries were often natives of other South American territories. Such was the case of Andrés Bello, whose name is associated with the foundation of the University of Chile and with the design of Santiago’s first stable foreign policy, but who in fact was born in Venezuela and for some time represented the independent Venezuelan government in London. Similarly, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, who would later become president of Argentina, his country, was for over a decade a prominent journalist and devoted civil servant of Chile. And the founder of the Bolivian Military College, Bartolomé Mitre, was another Argentinean, who also was to become president of that country.³

It took South American political elites many years to become aware of the fact that the demarcation of their frontiers was not at all clear. Along with that realisation came a growing sense of actual or potential territorial dispossession at the hands of neighbouring states. Whilst the harmful effects of this on regional relations lingered on during much of the twentieth century—and in some cases can still be seen to this day—, the construction of the notion of one’s neighbour as an aggressive ‘other’ turned out to be an integral part in building distinct nations and national identities in countries with people with many more commonalities than differences.

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Professor Carlos Escudé demonstrated through extensive research how South American states created inaccurate historical accounts of their territorial evolution and losses that in time allowed them to feed on nationalistic and revisionist theses. Most often, these accounts were also reproduced in history textbooks, whereby new generations of students were educated with biased and distorted visions of their own as well as of the neighbouring states’ histories. Daniel Prieto Vial indicates that Bolivian and Peruvian primary schools teach anti-Chilean history, in the same way as Chilean children learn that Argentina ‘stole’ Patagonia from them, and Argentineans are taught that Chile stripped them of the Magellan Strait, half of Isla Grande de Tierra del Fuego and the Western Patagonia.

Two agreements signed by the governments of Argentina and Chile in the 1930s confirm that negative images of one another were widespread; probably a consequence of the biased education that Prieto Vial observed. On 2 July 1935 “the two Governments agree[d] to ban [...] in their territories the screening of cinematographic films that refer to the other country in ways that the Government of the latter may consider offensive.” And on 4 May 1938 both ministers of Foreign Affairs agreed on

the revision of the teaching of, and textbooks on, national and American history and geography. The Revising Committees that the Governments will appoint [...] will proceed to cleanse texts of words that are offensive to the dignity of the States, and with documented truths and censuses they will save historic omissions and statistical and geographic errors.

When in 1847 Argentina and Chile started to discuss historic rights to Patagonia and the Magellan Strait, the issue proved to be particularly difficult to settle. As the Spaniards had never occupied the lands of Patagonia, it had belonged to neither colonial administrative authority, being thus the rule of uti possidetis very difficult to demonstrate. Negotiations turned out to be protracted and complex, and were fruitless for more than thirty years. The defence of their mutually contradictory claims both in juridical and moral terms became so passionate—as well as plagued with fallacies, lies

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7 Convenio relativo a la Exhibición de Películas Cinematográficas de Carácter Ofensivo - República Argentina y República de Chile, signed in Buenos Aires, 2 July 1935, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Cult of the Argentine Republic, Treaties Department, my translation.
8 Declaración de Chile sobre Acercamiento Intelectual, signed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Argentina and the Republic of Chile, in Santiago, 4 May 1938, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Cult of the Argentine Republic, Treaties Department, my translation.
and adulterations\textsuperscript{9}—that when the issue was finally resolved in 1881, no party could admit to see the compromise as an achievement. The Treaty on Borders did not manage to diminish either the sense of territorial loss or of danger of further losses at the hands of the other.

This first dispute embodied the start of the construction of negative, antagonistic images of one another. Moreover, it represented the establishment of a relational pattern that would survive during most of the next hundred years. As will be discussed below, this relational dynamic did not remain fixed throughout history. During favourable periods it improved with negotiation and exchange, and during others it worsened with nationalistic and intransigent claims. Overall, however, until the 1980s bilateral relations underwent a gradual but steady process that reinforced negative mutual visions and consolidated a culture of antagonism.

Even if the 1881 Treaty on Borders could have served as a tool to overcome divergences and to smooth negative images out by solving old disagreements and allowing the subsequent construction of a different type of relationship, this did not happen. The Treaty stipulated that the border should run through the highest peaks of the Andes that divide rivers to the Pacific and the Atlantic, except in three parts. North of the Magellan Strait the Treaty drew a line from west to east granting the territory to the north to Argentina, thus confirming its sovereignty in Patagonia; the Magellan Strait itself was granted to Chile; and finally Tierra del Fuego was divided along the 68\textsuperscript{th} 34' meridian (see map 5.1).\textsuperscript{10}

However, the Treaty left undefined the exact course of the Beagle Channel, which was established as the southern boundary of Tierra del Fuego; an issue that took the neighbours to the brink of war almost a century later. Yet neither the clause of ‘the highest peaks that divide rivers’ was very clear. When in 1892 experts appointed by both parties met to start drawing up the boundaries, they failed to come to a unified interpretation of the clause. The Argentines understood that the line should run through the highest peaks of the Andes, whereas the Chileans sustained the divortium aquarum principle, according to which the demarcation should follow the line separating the rivers that flow into the Atlantic from those that flow into the Pacific. The problem arose south of the 40\textsuperscript{th} parallel, where geography becomes complex and the two


\textsuperscript{10} \textit{Tratado de Límites entre la República de Chile y la República Argentina}, signed by Francisco De B. Echeverría and Bernardo De Irigoyen, in Buenos Aires, 23 July 1881, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Cult of the Argentine Republic, Treaties Department.
principles are incompatible. As a matter of fact, the orographic thesis defended by Argentina would have given it an access to the Pacific Ocean in Puerto Natales, whereas the hydrographic line suggested by Chile would have moved the border a considerable stretch to the east.\textsuperscript{11}

Map 5.1: Tierra del Fuego, including areas of the Magellan Strait and Beagle Channel

Note: Based on “Expedia.co.uk find a map”: http://www.expedia.co.uk/pub/agent.dll, entry: “Tierra del Fuego (island(s)), South America.”

In the years that followed, and as the demarcation committee tried to solve discrepancies, Argentina and Chile started to devote important resources to renew their military arsenals, focusing primarily on their naval fleets. Chile had inflicted a massive defeat on Peru and Bolivia in the War of the Pacific, which on the one hand inflamed nationalist ambitions in Santiago and gave its leaders military self-confidence, whilst on the other reinforced in Argentina the vision of Chile as expansionist, aggressive and not trustworthy.\textsuperscript{12} In 1898 the demarcation committee stopped meeting given the lack of progress in its mission. It had been able to place provisional boundary stones along just

\textsuperscript{11} Cisneros and Escudé, Historia General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la República Argentina, Volume VI, Chapter 34, http://www.argentina-ree.com/6/6-090.htm.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., Volume VII, Chapter 36, http://www.argentina-ree.com/7/7-001.htm.
2,560 km (around 1,600 miles), that is, less than half of the total length of the border. By then, both states were calling up their reservists.

Against this backdrop, and in an attempt to avoid an armed confrontation, the governments agreed to submit the issue to British arbitration, as established by the 1896 protocol. There were other instances in which Argentina and Chile tried to favour a political solution over a military conflict. In 1899, for example, the U.S. plenipotentiary minister in Buenos Aires, William Buchanan, was asked to intervene to find a solution to the issue of Puna de Atacama. In 1902 the governments signed the so-called May Pacts, spelling out the extended prerogatives of the British arbitrator, and establishing limitations to the acquisition of naval weaponry as well as a reduction in naval squadrons in order to stop the arms race under way and reach a balance between the two powers.

In 1915 they even tried to create a tripartite entente together with Brazil, known as the ABC Pact. It established a permanent commission for the resolution of controversies that could not be resolved by means of previously agreed mechanisms. However, in a similar way as border treaties failed once and again when the parties tried to advance on the border demarcation, the ABC Pact too failed to take effect due to domestic and international obstacles, as commented in chapter four. Further attempts to revive the Pact in the 1920s were also unsuccessful.

1952 appeared to inaugurate a new period of convergence and mutual understanding. Between 1952 and 1955 General Carlos Ibáñez and General Juan Domingo Perón coincided in power in Chile and Argentina respectively, sharing a good friendship and ideological affinity, as well as similar styles and backgrounds. The two had spent their careers in the army, both had become popular—and populist—caudillos, and both had been elected president with resounding victories over their opponents, thus enjoying a fairly strong political mandate. Perón won in 1946 with 52.5 percent of the votes, and was re-elected in 1951 with 62.5 percent. Ibáñez, who years before his election had spent a long time in exile in Argentina, obtained 47 percent of the popular

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13 The text of the Award pronounced by His Majesty King Edward VII on 20 November 1902 is reproduced in M. I. Dugini de De Cándido, Argentina, Chile, Mercosur: Cambios y Continuidades (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Ciudad Argentina, 1997), pp. 63-72.

14 The May Pacts may have been the first and most advanced treaty of its sort for many decades to come. See M. A. Scenna, Argentina-Chile: Una Frontera Caliente (Buenos Aires: Editorial de Belgrano, 1981), pp. 124-129; and F. Ghisolfo Araya, Origen y Desarrollo del Diferendo Limitrofe Austral (Santiago: Instituto de Investigaciones del Patrimonio Territorial de Chile, Universidad de Santiago, 1983), p. 18.

votes in the Chilean presidential elections of 1952. Unlike Perón, who was ousted from office by a coup in 1955, Ibáñez completed his six-year mandate.\textsuperscript{16}

This period may have witnessed the most important rapprochement in over a century and a half of bilateral relations, only surpassed in the 1990s. Bilateral talks did not just involve political issues but sketched a project of harmonisation of the economies aiming at economic integration, which in 1953 became the Chilean-Argentine Common Market and Economic Union through the Act of Santiago and the Treaty of Buenos Aires.

However, as Miguel Angel Scenna observes, “the honeymoon was brief.”\textsuperscript{17} After the 1955 coup relations deteriorated again, resulting in the 1958 crisis of the islet of Snipe. Whereas Perón and Ibáñez had managed to set aside or at least play down the prominence of territorial issues, after 1958 political attention turned back to them. Although the Snipe dispute was rapidly solved, most bilateral documents, declarations and agreements of the following years made reference to borders, arbitration, demarcation, and limits.\textsuperscript{18}

Despite ideological differences, a final apparent period of goodwill took place during the socialist government of Salvador Allende and the military administration of Alejandro Agustín Lanusse, after a mutually acceptable compromise on the terms of arbitration was reached on 22 July 1971. The Queen of England would be restricted to accepting or rejecting as a whole the pronouncement of an Arbitral Court composed of five members of the International Court of Justice. The appointment of an impartial panel resulted from Argentina’s long objection to the neutrality of Great Britain in the light of the renewed Malvinas/Falkland Islands controversy. The leaders’ optimism was palpable in a joint declaration they made two days later: “the Argentine-Chilean friendship and co-operation are irreplaceable factors for the preservation and consolidation of peace in America in a context of justice and economic and social progress.” Equally optimistically, they congratulated themselves on the growth of


\textsuperscript{17} Scenna, \textit{Argentina-Chile: Una Frontera Caliente}, p. 170.

bilateral trade, which in 1970 had reached "the highest level in its history," and celebrated the rising interdependence, which allowed "the development of new common interests."\(^{19}\)

Again, Miguel Angel Scenna points out that this rapprochement had more to do with domestic problems and weaknesses in each country than with a real change in the political attitude.\(^{20}\) The arbitral agreement and the more general convergences between the two governments rose strong opposition and suspicions among nationalistic sectors in both countries, which ultimately had a fatal effect on the initial enthusiasm.\(^{21}\) And while the Argentine 1976 coup d'etat brought the Videla and the Pinochet regime closer—a fact crystallised into joint declarations and the signing of 16 agreements raging from economic and physical integration, to financial matters and nuclear cooperation, all in November 1976—the announcement of the arbitral decision a few months later suddenly brought back the nationalist-territorialist language to the dyad, as the next section examines.

The fact that repeated agreements and good intentions were soon reversed by the recurrence of disputes is indicative of the type of bilateral relationship that predominated between Argentina and Chile. While such initiatives may have temporarily cooled down animosities, their spirit failed to solidify; it failed to alter the relational dynamic or, following Alexander Wendt, the predominant culture of anarchy, which remained a Lockean one. According to Wendt, the Lockean culture is based on the logic of rivalry, one in which

rivals expect each other to act as if they recongize their sovereignty, their 'life and liberty,' as a right, and therefore not to try to conquer or dominate them. […] Unlike friends, however, the recognition among rivals does not extend to the right to be free from violence in disputes.\(^{22}\)

The Beagle Channel and its three islands Picton, Nueva and Lennox, the issue of the escalation of the 1970s, moved to the centre of attention for the first time in 1904. The 'Almirante Brown,' a warship of the Argentine Navy, claimed to have demonstrated that the course of the Beagle Channel, which constituted the agreed border, ran south of


\(^{20}\) Scenna, Argentina-Chile: Una Frontera Caliente, p. 216.


\(^{22}\) Italics in the original. A. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 279.
the islands. As a consequence, those three islands under Chilean jurisdiction since 1881 were now claimed as Argentine. Negotiations, protests, exchanges of diplomatic notes, proposals and counter-proposals, as well as draft agreements of arbitration were produced in 1904-1905, 1915, 1938, and again in 1948. Unilateral requests for arbitrations were made in 1964 and 1967. Yet failure of the governments to reach an agreement (1905, 1948, 1964 and 1967), and of the congresses to ratify the agreements (1915 and 1938) left the issue unresolved and contested.

Except for one border incident in 1965 that left one Chilean carabinero (military police officer) dead, the period that goes from the beginning of the disputes to the mid-1970s did not involve actual violence. Nevertheless, tension, display of power, arms races, and the possibility of that fragile peace being broken were present during most of the period. Whereas until the mid-1970s the relationship oscillated between fragile and unstable peace (as these categories were defined in chapter two), in the second half of the decade it definitely moved towards the former. The main feature of the dyad until the escalation was that, despite sporadic attempts and frequent rhetoric, the states failed to start trusting each other.

3. Further fragilisation of peace in the 1970s

3.1. The escalation

As discussed above, the Beagle Channel became the focus of dispute in 1904 resulting from the 1881 Treaty’s declaration that the Channel was a boundary line whilst failing to stipulate its exact course between a number of islands. The issue of contention in this dispute was whether three small and barren islands in the eastern entrance to the Beagle Channel—Picton, Nueva, and Lennox—were located south or north of the Channel itself. While the islands became the centre of the controversy, the cause resulted from a far broader and more geopolitically sensitive issue: maritime jurisdiction surrounding the Beagle Channel itself. The Channel, lying as it does south of Isla Grande de Tierra del Fuego and separating it from a series of lesser islands, links the Atlantic with the Pacific Oceans above the Cape Horn. Hence, it was of vast geopolitical importance to both Chile and Argentina.

The controversy escalated in 1977 after a panel of five members of the International Court of Justice, with the concurrence of the British Crown, awarded the disputed

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territory to Chile. The possession of the islands granted Chile projection into the South Atlantic, a prerogative that violated a tradition very dear to both states, namely the biocceanic principle. According to this principle access to the Magellan Strait from the South Atlantic was Argentina’s domain, while access from the Pacific was controlled by Chile; and, by extension, ‘Argentina on the Atlantic, Chile on the Pacific.’ In spite of this principle, Chile has historically accused Argentina of trying to gain a Pacific coastline, and by the same token Argentina has long complained about Chile’s perseverance in trying to gain an Atlantic exit. For instance, Ricardo Alberto Paz asserts, “today as yesterday, [Chile] covets the Patagonia, ports on the Atlantic, naval and ground bases from where to look down as a lord on Argentina [...]” Similarly, the Chilean counterargument contends,

the aggressive geopolitics of Buenos Aires has since last century uninterruptedly sought [...] to reach, at any price, the coasts of the Pacific Ocean. For that end they use the trick of stating that the sea south of Tierra del Fuego, Isla de los Estados and the archipelago south of the Beagle Channel are all part of the Atlantic Ocean.

Thus, a critical question in the biocceanic principle, and in this particular dispute, was where to set the limit between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. As Child explains, “giving the Chileans sovereignty of the three Beagle Channel Islands [pushed] the oceanic limit too far east to be acceptable to Argentina.” There were also other reasons that made the decision unacceptable to Buenos Aires. Firstly, Argentina’s port and naval base at Ushuaia in Tierra del Fuego, located on the Channel and west of the disputed islands, was left inaccessible through Argentina’s own waters. The thesis of the ‘dry shore’ for Argentina had long been demanded by some nationalistic sectors in Santiago, which understood that according to the 1881 Treaty “the Argentine sovereignty, in strict reality, goes only as far as to touch the Beagle Channel but not beyond; the Channel, its waters and its islands are Chilean in all their extensiveness.”

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26 H. Santis Arenas, Chile y su Desarrollo Territorial (Santiago: Instituto de Investigaciones del Patrimonio Territorial de Chile, Universidad de Santiago, 1984), p. 25, my translation.
28 Ghisolfo Araya, Origen y Desarrollo del Diferendo Limitrofe Austral, p. 23.
Secondly, awarding the islands to Chile endangered the validity of Argentine claims to a sector of the Antarctica, thus jeopardising the concept of tricontinental Argentina—mainland, insular, and Antarctic Argentina—, or even more extreme, of “peninsular Argentina; [...] continental, bi-maritime and Antarctic.” Not surprisingly, geopoliticians in Santiago developed a similar concept of tricontinental Chile. Also in Santiago there was a strong sense that geographic continuity between all three parts had to be defended in order to protect the Antarctic claim. Moreover, Chilean geopoliticians placed a significant emphasis on their geographic proximity to Antarctica so as to give their tricontinental concept priority over Argentina’s, as well as on the fact that their Antarctic claim was older.

The controversy was fed by a great deal of nationalistic literature. Argentine Admiral Isaac Rojas, a prolific nationalist geopolitician and founder of the Movement for the Affirmation of the Sovereignty, warned in his writings about a series of geopolitical ‘mutilations’ that Argentina had suffered at the hands of Chile, arguing that acceptance of the ruling of the British Crown would mean another dismemberment of Argentine sovereignty. On both sides of the Andes the phrasing chosen to refer to one another was rather similar; ‘aspirations of territorial expansion,’ ‘policy of conquest and imposition,’ ‘obstructionism,’ ‘spurious arguments,’ ‘attempts at dismemberment.’ Hardliners on both sides were gaining increasing influence on their governments with a discourse of territoriality and sovereignty.

When in April 1977 the ruling came down heavily on the side of Chile, and Santiago was granted jurisdiction over the three main islands, together with 200 miles of the Atlantic coastline, the award was immediately accepted by the Chilean government. In Argentina, it was received with surprise and consternation. The government expressed officially its disquiet, delayed the time of declaring the arbitral decision null—a delay partly due to the junta’s internal dissension—, and sought to open a

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30 For the concepts of tricontinental Argentina and tricontinental Chile, and their relationship to the Beagle Channel, see J. Child, Antarctica and South American Geopolitics: Frozen Lebensraum (New York: Praeger, 1988), especially Part II, chapters 4 and 5.
process of bilateral negotiation. Two rounds of negotiations took place in July 1977 in Buenos Aires, and in October 1977 in Santiago. By the end of these Chile had rejected Argentine proposals to modify the terms of the arbitral decision, and both parties had hardened their positions.\(^\text{32}\)

In spite of further attempts at bilateral negotiation, the enchantment of 1976, when Videla and Pinochet and their Foreign Affairs ministers jointly repudiated international terrorism and subversion, and asked for the international community’s understanding instead of condemnation, had been definitely broken.\(^\text{33}\) Once more, what dominated the bilateral relation was distrust, geopolitical calculation, and hard language hinting at war. And the expected war, according to Pinochet himself, “would have been a total war.”\(^\text{34}\)

In the midst of intensifying political statements and mutual demonstrations of military power, on 25 January 1978 Buenos Aires rejected the award as irreversibly null and void,

on the grounds (among others) that it contained ‘gross errors,’ ‘violations of essential juridical rules,’ and that it ‘exceeded its authority,’ since the award arrived at conclusions affecting geographic regions beyond the area it was supposed to consider.\(^\text{35}\)

The military presidents of Argentina, Jorge Rafael Videla, and Chile, Augusto Pinochet, held summits just before—in Mendoza in January 1978—and just after—in Puerto Montt in February 1978—the nullity declaration. Whilst during the former both leaders stated their determination of not going to war and of creating a bilateral

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committee to avoid its occurrence, during the latter language and attitudes had hardened considerably. Pinochet read a speech in which he warned that “the arbitral judgement is not under discussion, and any agreement that may be reached will not affect any of the rights awarded to Chile by the judgement.” Videla, surprised and more inclined to compromise, gave a lukewarm answer that infuriated hardliners in his government:

Argentines and Chileans are faced with the prospect of strengthening our ties, of perfecting our integration, and of better defining our common interests in key areas, such as the Antarctica. What is discussed today between Argentina and Chile constitutes a vital interest for both states. It transcends the moment coming from the past, and is key for the harmonic definition of what is to come. Today, as in other circumstances of our history, we try the road of negotiation.

The Argentine junta’s hawks, instead, produced their own answer, targeted at both Videla and Pinochet in the same speech, when Admiral Emilio Eduardo Massera asserted,

The whole country is looking towards the South, confident that the government of the Armed Forces will not exchange the Argentines’ honour and goods for the decorative praise of those who mask their weakness or interests behind fallacious appeals to peace. [...] As well as the Army’s and Air Force’s units, all components of the naval power too are ready to fulfil the mandate of a people who admit no more distortions, conscious that our war power will never be at the service of aggression but of reason [...]. No one should forget: the time of words is running out.

In any case, at Puerto Montt the leaders decided to create mixed commissions (COMIX 1 and COMIX 2) as part of a bilateral negotiation scheme aiming to find a solution within a period of six months. Except those openly favouring war, it was in the interest of both sides to maintain an open line of communication. The possibility of an Argentine-Bolivian-Peruvian alliance against Chile had always been seen as an unwanted possibility by military strategists in Santiago, who were aware that they had to simultaneously keep a strong military presence in both the north and the south. For Argentina, war also had risks. It would imply invading and fighting in a foreign

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38 'Mensaje del Excelentísimo Señor Presidente de la Nación del 23 de Febrero de 1978 dirigido a todo el país,' reproduced in Ricardo Luis Quellet (ed.), El Canal del Beagle (Buenos Aires: Escuela de Comando y Estado Mayor de la Fuerza Aérea Argentina, 1978), p. 120.
39 Admiral Emilio Eduardo Massera, member of junta, quoted in Scenna, Argentina-Chile: Una Frontera Caliente, pp. 288-289.
territory, and facing a well-prepared army. In this context, nothing ensured a low-cost victory against Chile.\textsuperscript{40}

However, after six months of the creation of COMIX 1 and 2 no significant progress had been made, and tension had only increased as both countries appeared to enter a new arms race. Augusto Varas highlights that Argentina's rejection of the British arbitration produced an action/reaction effect, which explains the simultaneous increases in 1977 through 1979 of Argentine and Chilean military expenditures.\textsuperscript{41} Simultaneously 'hawks' on either side of the mountains advanced war proposals and were openly making militaristic declarations.

In the face of the failure of COMIX 2, an incessant exchange of notes and military contacts, both official and unofficial, was initiated. The Argentine military secretaries of the three branches of the Armed Forces met secretly with Pinochet in late October in an attempt to soften Chile's rigid opposition to carry on bilateral talks. In that meeting the Chilean president agreed to consider the possibility of a Papal mediation for the first time. A few days later, however, at the final meeting of COMIX 2, Pinochet demonstrated that he had changed his mind, the Chilean delegation having been instructed to refuse any kind of mediation.\textsuperscript{42}

As it became clear that Santiago was not willing to reach a compromise, the more conciliatory position of President Videla and his Foreign Affairs minister, Carlos Washington Pastor, weakened within a divided junta, in which the hawks grew increasingly strong. During the months of November and December, the military machines of both countries prepared for war, and mobilisation orders were issued.\textsuperscript{43} By mid-December there was a further proposal for mediation, but as the ministers of both countries were not able to agree on the scope of the mediation, the hardliners in Argentina gained prevalence and forced the Foreign Affairs minister to end communications. As discussions were halted an operation plan was finalised. Receiving the code name of \textit{Operación Soberanía} (Operation Sovereignty), the plan was to be


\textsuperscript{42} See Russell, 'El Proceso de Toma de Decisiones en la Política Exterior Argentina (1976-1989).'</p>
launched on 21 or 22 December, and involved the military occupation of two islands, Nueva and Hornos. Once the islands were secured the Argentineans intended to await Chile’s reaction, and only afterwards would they respond.

Videla and Pastor, representing the more pragmatic and conciliatory wing of the government, needed Chile to adopt a more flexible and compromise-inclined position if they were to avoid open war. Indeed, the bilateral relationship had reached a level of securitization where the use of force seemed imminent. Videla and Pastor needed to demonstrate that they had in Pinochet an interlocutor if they were to have the chance to improve their internal position and advance desecuritization. Using the securitization/desecuritization sequence presented in chapter two, it can be seen here that one faction of the Argentine military and junta (hawks) was the *securitizing* actor, whereas the other (doves) was the *desecuritizing* actor, and in their competition, they constituted each other’s bargaining audiences.

Yet Chile’s rigidity was leaving Argentine *desecuritizers* with no room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis the belligerent faction within the very government. As a last resort, Videla sent secret missions to the Vatican, Washington, and Moscow in the hope that, by informing the papacy and the external governments of the development of events and the prospect of war, they might place political pressure on Chile. If they managed to make Pinochet’s position more flexible, they might manage to soften hawks as well.

At the same time, U.S. ambassadors in Buenos Aires and Santiago, Raúl Castro and George Landau, and the Papal Nuncio in Buenos Aires, Pio Laghi, played key roles, exerting pressure on the military of both countries by having meetings with politicians and high ranking military officials, as well as urging the Vatican to intervene diplomatically. Finally, on 21 December 1978 a high official of the Vatican very close to Pope John Paul II, Cardinal Agostino Casaroli, called the Chilean and Argentine ambassadors to the Vatican for separate meetings, and conveyed to them the Pope’s intention to send a special delegate, Cardinal Antonio Samoré, to mediate in the crisis. Chile’s conformity was immediate, whereas in Buenos Aires the junta’s internal disagreements delayed the positive response some 24 hours. Only six hours away from

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45 José Claudio Escribano notes, in that respect, "each chapter that Samoré negotiated with the members of the official commission was then being reinterpreted by the spokespersons of each of the Armed Forces." See J. C. Escribano, 'Años de Enajenación y Dolor,' *La Nación Line*, (Buenos Aires: 23 October 1999), http://www.lanacion.com.ar/99/10/23/p34.htm.
the deadline set for the beginning of armed hostilities, the Argentine Executive called off the operation. As the whole war machinery had been set in motion already,

it was a miracle—in part thanks to the severe weather conditions in the Austral Sea area where the islands to be occupied are, and in part thanks to the efficiency of communications—that the offensive action could be stopped in time.46

3.2. The slow resolution

Christmas of 1978 found Cardinal Samoré flying back and forth between Santiago and Buenos Aires, and organising an exhausting series of meetings until he finally obtained both parties' commitment to accept Papal mediation and a pact of non-aggression, which they signed on 8 January 1979 in Montevideo. The moral authority of the Pope exerted the necessary weight on both military governments, which had a strong catholic discourse and identity. Nonetheless, it would still take several years until rapprochement began.

On 12 December 1980, the Pope submitted his Peace Proposal based on a compromise. As had been the case in the 1977 arbitration award, the three islands in question and all the other islands located south of Cape Horn were awarded to Chile,

drawing an enclosing line that covers all the lines in dispute. Using this line as a starting point, Chile has a strip of territorial waters of six miles, and a second strip of exclusive economic zone of another six miles. The remainder, out to 200 miles, will be devoted to common or joint activities (Sea of Peace), with Argentine sovereignty, but at perpetual service of Chile.47

Thus, Chile would limit its projection into the South Atlantic, dissipating Argentine fears of Chilean penetration into that sensitive region and protecting the bioceanic principle. But the Argentine government was again not entirely satisfied with this outcome and the proposal failed to break the deadlock. Whereas Chile accepted the ruling on 8 January 1981, the Argentine junta, immersed once more in internal disputes, objected to it on 25 March. Argentine Minister Carlos Washington Pastor wrote in his letter to the Pope: "The positive attitude of the Argentine Government has not been able to dissuade you from the conclusion that the renunciations that your proposal suggests are grave."48

Throughout 1981 several border incidents took place, violating the Montevideo Agreement, which anyway had been signed with little enthusiasm. Argentina went as far

47 Russell, 'Argentina: Ten Years of Foreign Policy toward the Southern Cone,' p. 81, n. 8.
as to close its borders with Chile. Soon afterwards, the 1982 Malvinas/Falklands War contributed to augment suspicions on both sides. Pinochet’s attitude during the war did little to dissipate Argentine doubts about Chile’s sincerity in insisting to reach a common solution, and the war itself did little to dissipate Chilean doubts about Argentina’s potential behaviour. As Jimmy Burns summarises,

throughout the war [Chile] offered constant logistical and military support to the Task Force, putting its own navy and troops on standby near the Argentine-Chilean border. Chile had no doubt that the Argentine invasion of the Falklands formed part of the junta’s territorial ambitions, and from the outset of the conflict worked on the assumption (based on its own intelligence assessments) that an Argentine victory over the British would be quickly followed up by an occupation of the Chilean-owned islands in the Beagle Channel—historically disputed by Argentina.49

After the war, events succeeded each other at a dizzy pace in Argentina. The demise of Galtieri’s government, the transitory military government that followed, the elections, and the democratic transition, all delayed any attention being focused on the Beagle Channel issue, and ultimately left the matter on hold until 1984. When the new government took office the solution of the dispute became a key priority. Eventually, five years after signing the Montevideo Agreement, the governments of Chile and Argentina got together again at the Vatican to sign a Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship (23 January 1984), which led later to the Treaty of Peace and Friendship (29 November 1984).

When President Alfonsín was sworn in on 10 December 1983, his government planned a change in foreign policy, alongside changes in many other areas. The military regime, in spite of other notorious inconsistencies, had strongly adhered to the East-West model, claiming its membership to, and its active participation in the defence of, the Western world and values. Also, it had showed a certain disregard for Latin America, except for issues relating to stopping the advance of Marxism in the region and its competition with Brazil for gaining influence over neighbouring states.

Alfonsín’s foreign policy maintained the existing cultural adherence to the West, whilst simultaneously opposing the merely strategic components of the East-West conflict, returning thus to the Non-Aligned Movement. In addition, the government gave priority to relationships with the developing world in general, and with Latin America in particular, reflecting thus their importance to Argentina. For instance, the Alfonsín administration supported various schemes of selective co-operation and

integration, especially in Latin America. Democratic Argentina worked actively for the creation of the Contadora Support Group, which backed up the efforts of the Contadora Group to solve the crisis in Central America, trying to prevent yet more direct U.S. intervention. It was also actively involved in the Cartagena Consensus (June 1984), by which the countries of Latin America claimed for a political treatment of the external debt issue, as well as in the Rio Group (December 1986), which sought to systematise political coordination among some Latin American states to face common problems. Integration with Brazil became a political priority, as will be discussed in chapter seven.

The administration of Alfonsín marked an important break with the policies of the military regime towards the region. It is in this context that the urgency to overcome and resolve the problems with Chile has to be understood. The newly found determination was clearly stated by Dante Caputo, minister of Foreign Affairs of the government of Alfonsín:

Our priority was peace, to become a state that would use its resources to develop and live in a civilised manner, not to wage war [...] to have ruled out the possibility of war with Chile constitutes one of our most important achievements, both at the personal level and as government action.51

Nevertheless, the negotiation of peace with Chile turned out to be a far from easy process for Raúl Alfonsín, not least because of the intense domestic opposition of some sectors. As Roberto Russell indicates,

using a systematic propaganda action, accompanied by various mechanisms for self-censorship (which had been in operation from the beginning of the Process), the military regime was able to spread its geopolitical schemes—unfortunately, with considerable success—over a large sector of the population, and awoke in it strong anti-Chilean and bellicose feelings.52

Such feelings remained among sectors of the political elite and public opinion for some time after the dictatorship was over.

President Alfonsín's political party did not have a sufficient majority in the Senate to guarantee the ratification of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed with Chile, and an important element of the Peronist opposition repeatedly warned that they would not pass the agreement easily. Alfonsín and Caputo realised that the government would need a strong public endorsement if it was to exert pressure on the opposition and have the Treaty approved. Hence, the strategy they envisaged was to call for a voluntary and non-binding plebiscite:

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50 Russell, 'Argentina: Ten Years of Foreign Policy toward the Southern Cone.'
52 Russell, 'Argentina: Ten Years of Foreign Policy toward the Southern Cone,' p. 81 n. 6.
We want Argentineans, all Argentineans, to participate by taking a position regarding whether it is convenient or not to find a rapid and peaceful solution to a problem that has constituted an element of tension with Chile for the last century. [...] Solving the Beagle dispute would not only constitute the end of an old litigation but also, and foremost, it would be an essential factor for the construction of a future that is quickly approaching.53

The plebiscite, it was thought, would have several benefits, in addition to the immediate purpose of showing the public’s preference for peace with Chile. Firstly, it would serve to strengthen democratic institutions. Secondly, it would expose the profound differences with the military government’s policy making. And thirdly, it would shift, at least symbolically, the location of the desecuritization process’s legitimising audience away from Congress, where ratification was not secured, onto the citizenry, where the government expected to find more responsiveness.

The plebiscite took place on 25 November 1984, and the voluntary participation exceeded 70 percent. Of this number, over 81 percent voted in favour of signing the peace agreement, 17 percent voted against it, and around 1 percent returned a blank voting paper. In addition to this resounding outcome, Alfonsín sent the Treaty to Congress for its approval making a forceful appeal:

The Treaty, submitted to the consideration of the Honourable Congress, has an important political and strategic significance for Argentina’s external interests, establishes a transactional solution for a dispute that has persisted for decades, and interprets the will of the majority of our people. [...] We thus collect a lesson from history. Argentine prosperity has only been possible in times of fraternal relationships with our neighbours.54

Despite the resounding outcome of the plebiscite and the president’s request, the Senate hosted an intense and protracted debate, after which 23 senators voted for the ratification, 22 voted against, and one abstained.55

As Ramón Huidobro points out, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, and Argentina’s later agreements with Brazil substantially modified the state of affairs in regional geopolitics.56 The Treaty had a far-reaching political relevance, offering the possibility to Argentina and Chile of relating to each other in a completely new way. It

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54 Mensaje 3849 y Proyecto de Ley del Poder Ejecutivo: Expediente Diputados 058-PE-84, 'El Poder Ejecutivo somete a consideración del Congreso el proyecto de ley por el que se propone aprobar el Tratado de Paz y Amistad del Vaticano del 29 de Noviembre de 1984,' 11 December 1984, my translation.
56 R. Huidobro, 'Las Alternativas de una Concertación Diplomática entre Chile y Argentina,' in Francisco Orrego (ed.), Chile y Argentina: Nuevos Enfoques para una Relación Constructiva (Santiago de Chile: Pehuén Editores, 1989), pp. 18-19.
allowed bilateral integration policies to be envisaged and then promoted, such as the establishment in October 1985 of the Binational Commission for Economic Co-operation and Physical Integration. The resolution of the Beagle Channel issue facilitated rapprochement and allowed the resolution of the other pending disputes, although this only happened in the 1990s. The period immediately following the Treaty, however, failed to install a deeper sense of mutual confidence. The possibility of war had been driven away, but co-operation was not in place yet, let alone the perception of some kind of common identification.

4. Cold peace – 1980s

As just discussed, the resolution of the dispute and the stabilisation of relations with Chile were of great importance to democratic Argentina. Equally, the regime of Pinochet was interested in closing an issue that had proved to have the potential for instability, particularly since it had seen in the previous years some sources of debilitation, such as the 1982 financial collapse and a series of demonstrations against Pinochet between 1983 and 1985. However, as Mark Laudy argues, "[t]he domestic political situation in Argentina was clearly one of the most significant factors driving the [Papal] mediation process, and changes in that situation were quite arguably the primary impetus for the settlement ultimately achieved."\(^{57}\)

If change of regime in Buenos Aires proved to be key to easing tensions and removing the obstacles to the signing of the Peace and Friendship Treaty, the fact that the regime changed only in Argentina, but not in Chile, was the main reason hindering a more rapid rapprochement. According to Jorge Lavopa, "[Alfonsín’s Foreign Affairs Minister] Dante Caputo set an ideological frontier with Chile. Formally, there was a rapprochement, but the relationship still remained very cold and distant."\(^{58}\) The Alfonsín administration was not only deeply committed to democracy at home, but also to supporting democracy throughout the region. An eloquent indication of this is the fact that during 1988 and 1989 the *Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia*—the

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58 Interview with Dr Jorge Lavopa, Director of the Committee for the Study of Latin American Affairs at the Argentine Council for International Relations (CARD) in Buenos Aires, 30 March 2001.
coalition that would later win the elections in Chile—held its meetings at the Argentine Embassy in Santiago when planning its political campaign.59

It is in this light that the government’s apprehension about a deeper rapprochement with Chile’s military dictatorship has to be seen. And Alfonsin and his administration manifested their apprehension in several other political attitudes. For instance, in Washington in 1985, during a visit of the Argentine president to his American colleague, Alfonsin insisted on the need of a democratic restoration in Chile; an issue that the Chilean regime took as a violation of the principle of non-intervention in other states’ internal affairs. In March 1987, at the meeting of the U.N. Human Rights Committee, the Argentine delegation voted in favour of the condemnation of the Chilean dictatorship. Later that year, on 11 September, the Argentine ambassador in Santiago repudiated the celebration of the coup’s new anniversary, while the Argentine Foreign Affairs Ministry gave its support to Bolivia’s territorial claim. Each of these decisions provoked Chilean responses, which ranged from repudiation, to accusing Argentina of allowing Chilean subversive activities in its territory, to the country’s refusal to take part in a joint ceremony to commemorate the Montevideo Act.60

In addition, some 24 border disagreements still survived from the time that the 1941 Mixed Commission was set up to demarcate the frontier line. Although the pending issues did not appear to pose a threat of escalating into political or military conflict, they remained unresolved until the 1990s. In this sense, Oscar Camiñón seems to be right when he argues that whereas states can coexist peacefully with problems, they cannot with bad, inadequate or premature solutions. If the dynamics of the bilateral relationship—the ‘philosophy of the relationship,’ in Camiñón’s own words—are clearly defined, then two states can coexist with a pending border issue until they find a satisfactory solution. If, instead, a solution is pushed or imposed upon them—by force or otherwise—but is not underpinned by a genuinely defined ‘philosophy of the relationship,’ then dissatisfaction will eventually arouse revisionist claims.61

In the Argentine-Chilean dyad, after the agreement of 1984 a new relational pattern evolved that allowed the two states to coexist with their disagreements for a number of years. The improvement of the quality of peace only came about after the resolution of

59 Telephone interview with Minister Gustavo Bobrik, Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Culture in Buenos Aires, 26 March 2001. This was also confirmed by Minister Marcelo Giusto, current Chief of Cabinet of the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, who worked at the Argentine Embassy in Santiago de Chile between 1984 and 1989, and 1992-1998.
the Beagle Channel dispute. In this sense, the second half of the 1980s opened a period in which the escalation into war seemed highly unlikely, in spite of persisting mutual claims, opposing political ideologies (and regimes), and lack of mutual trust. During this phase, Argentina and Chile maintained a cold peace; a step that seemed necessary after so many decades of tense, territory-centred unstable and fragile peace.

It was only when Chile restored democratic rule and in Argentina the second democratically elected government took office that all territorial issues could be finalised, and more decisive and concrete schemes of co-operation, both bilateral and regional, could be implemented. This was also coincidental with the beginning of Argentina’s economic liberalisation programme, which permitted large sums of Chilean investment to flow into the country.

5. Stabilisation of peace – 1990s

Indeed, as President Patricio Aylwin took over from General Pinochet in early 1990, he established as a primary goal of his foreign policy the reinsertion of Chile into the international community after over a decade and a half of deteriorating relationships and isolationism. That the regional environment had improved and that neighbours welcomed Aylwin’s initiative was reflected in the fact that both the presidents of Argentina and Peru—countries with which Chile had had very tense relations—attended the inauguration ceremony.

Five months later, in August 1990, Presidents Carlos Menem (Argentina) and Patricio Aylwin (Chile) had signed a protocol committing their governments to complete the task of border demarcation entrusted to the old Mixed Commission of 1941. As a result, within one year 22 out of the 24 pending border issues were resolved by technical teams, and in August 1991 Menem and Aylwin met again to sign the agreement confirming these resolutions.

Indicative of the predominant optimism was the fact that this was done on the occasion of the official visit to Buenos Aires of the Chilean president, who was joined by an important delegation that included seven ministers. Aylwin was received and honoured by the mayor of Buenos Aires, the Argentine Congress, the president of the supreme court of justice, and several governors, in addition to President Menem himself. In addition, at the same meeting where the border agreement and an important number of declarations and treaties were signed, the leaders also signed the significant
Agreement on Economic Complementation, known as ACE 16, under the umbrella of LAIA/ALADI, as is discussed below.

The remaining two border disagreements proved to be rather difficult to settle. Nonetheless, the development of negotiations, even if dense and protracted, showed the striking transformation of the dyadic relationship. The first pending issue, Laguna del Desierto, was only resolved in 1994 through the arbitration of a Latin American commission, whose decision favoured the Argentine thesis. Prompt acceptance by both governments undoubtedly eased the situation, and permitted the relationship to advance further with some co-operation schemes being initiated despite the last boundary disagreement pending resolution.

The last dispute centred on an area of perennial snows that constitutes the third largest surface of ice cap in the world—22,000 square km (13,750 square miles)—which Chileans call Campos de Hielo Sur, and Argentineans Hielos Continentales. The already controversial border principle of ‘highest peaks that divide waters’ was technically even more difficult to apply here. The first attempt by the governments to resolve the dispute in 1991 resulted in an accord based on a polygonal line, representing a political solution rather than one based on the geography or the history of the region. The issue generated an extended debate, not just within political and policy-making spheres, but also among the general public. Although the need to provide a final solution to all the territory discrepancies between the two countries was pressing, the polygonal line was not an acceptable option to any party.

The bitter and prolonged debates that ‘the Polygonal,’ as it came to be known, generated in both countries were reflected in a special issue of the journal Archivos del Presente in 1996, which collected articles by the vice-minister of Foreign Affairs and a representative of the Chamber of Deputies of Argentina, a Chilean senator, and academics and other informed actors. After seven years of discussions, the congresses on both sides of the Andes finally refused to grant the polygonal line ratification. Instead, in 1998 a new arrangement was agreed upon by members of the two congresses in reserved meetings. The resulting proposal was later transformed into a treaty signed by Presidents Carlos Menem and Eduardo Frei, and finally it was simultaneously approved by both legislatures on 2 June 1999. As well as putting an end to the controversy, the treaty envisaged measures to protect the environment, the promotion of

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63 See Archivos del Presente 2.6 (1996).
joint research activities, and the adoption of common strategies in the case of natural
disasters in the region.  

The manner in which this last territorial disagreement was resolved symbolised the strong political will existing in both states to find a mutually satisfactory, and thereby durable, solution. Such solution was in the end found by members of the congresses, after a debate that involved society at large and the media. Also interesting to note is that during the whole period of bilateral negotiations co-operation and physical integration between Argentina and Chile continued to advance in the framework of ACE 16, signed in 1991.

As will be seen in chapter seven, the Agreement on Economic Complementation was much less ambitious than the Argentine-Brazilian Treaty on Integration, Co-operation and Development of 1988, which expressed the aim of constituting a common market. ACE 16, instead, referred only to the expansion of commercial exchange and reciprocal investment, as well as to the furtherance of physical integration. This last point faced a significant challenge since it sought to facilitate the transit of people and trade, both bilaterally and to third markets through a long and mountainous frontier that had only one paved border crossing.

Of particular importance are the Agreement’s protocols on gas interconnection and natural gas supply, co-operation and integration of the mining industry, and terrestrial, maritime and air transport. These protocols certainly opened the door to further agreements, such as those on co-operation and complementation of the mining industry (1 July 1996, 29 December 1997, and 20 August 1999), electric energy interconnection and electric energy supply (29 December 1997), and those on the construction of oil and gas pipelines (20 August 1999). The political and economic importance of these treaties has been highlighted in several interviews. Through these agreements, Argentina and Chile were launching interdependence in areas that not long before had been labelled as strategic.

Another critical factor in the process of political rapprochement between Argentina and Chile was Chile’s association with Mercosur. As chapter seven discusses in greater

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65 Acuerdo de Complementación Económica entre la República Argentina y la República de Chile, signed in Buenos Aires, 2 August 1991, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Cult of the Argentine Republic, Treaties Department.

66 These were the interviews with Juan Alemann, former Treasury Secretary between 1976 and 1981; Dr Jorge Lavopa, and Gustavo Bobrik.
depth, in 1996 Chile became an associated member of Mercosur. The importance of this association has to be read in the context of the broader process of rapprochement, since it added flesh and substance to a process that had for many decades only reflected half-hearted intentions. It was only the backdrop of other factors that allowed rhetoric to lead to concrete results.

Some suggest that the key to understanding the shift was the simultaneous change of regime in Chile—by which it became a democracy, like Argentina—and a change of economic programme in Argentina—by which it became neoliberal, like Chile’s. In fact, Chile became the Latin American leader in economic growth and modernization in the 1980s when it was still ruled by Pinochet. Jorge Castro points out that Chile has become a capital exporter since the mid-1990s, with Argentina becoming the main destination for this wealth. According to Castro, this fact has played a key role in the new co-operative relationship. Chile has indeed envisaged an extraordinary internal savings capacity due to a high level of capitalisation of its private pension system. Argentina, in contrast, had been involved throughout the 1990s in a major campaign to attract direct foreign investment. These factors combined to result in Chile becoming the second largest foreign investor in Argentina, and Argentina the destination of 63 percent of Chile’s investment abroad. When the Argentine government began to sell off its debt-ridden state concerns in 1990, Chilean firms moved in. The author argues that the process of interdependence that began in the 1990s between the two countries has become deep and irreversible. This has become a two-way dependency, as Chile depends largely on Argentina for its energy supply, of both oil and gas. In the words of Joaquin Fernandois,

in the same way as prejudice against [foreign] investment in sensitive sectors—such as electric supply—has been overcome in Argentina, so have Chileans accepted, for their own economic convenience, to be strongly dependent upon Argentine gas, in spite of some people seeing it as a 'strategic dependency.'


Developments in the area of military security are also indicative of greater policy convergence, showing that the basis for further rapprochement was not only economic. The government of Chile published the Book on National Defence (*Libro de la Defensa Nacional*) in 1997 based on reports prepared by the Ministry of Defence, which had been in turn the result of many meetings of a group of specialists, both military and civilians, composed of academics, diplomats, parliamentarians, and other politicians.\(^7\) The document, which constitutes Chile’s defence strategy, reflects the stands of a broad range of the country’s political spectrum.

The establishment of the Book on National Defence is of interest for several reasons. Firstly, it demonstrates the changes that the political system has undergone in the country, despite the transition being very gradual and the military retaining a great number of prerogatives. And secondly, it shows that Chile has begun to make its defence planning and concerns regarding the region more transparent. For instance, it indicates that Chile considers that all its borders have been delimited by international agreements, and therefore discards any expansionist claims by Chile itself or by any other bordering country. It is to be noticed that the book was published before the dispute of *Campos de Hielo/Hielos Continentales* had been solved, demonstrating an underlying belief that this last disagreement would find a rapid and peaceful solution. Additionally, the document replaced the old concept of ‘bordering country’ as one which sets a border, a limit, with a new concept of ‘neighbouring country,’ giving the idea of members of the same neighbourhood.\(^7\)

In April 1999 President Menem presented the Argentine White Book on National Defence, showing that a similar process had occurred in Argentina. The book highlights that the area of Mercosur ‘broadly defined’—that is with its full members, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, and its two associated members, Bolivia and Chile—has been declared a ‘zone of peace,’ and that the country has peacefully resolved all its border disagreements, making here special reference to Chile and the issue of the *Hielos Continentales/Campos de Hielo*, then still awaiting ratification by the congresses.\(^7\)

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\(^7\) *Libro de la Defensa Nacional* (Santafé (Chile): Imprenta de la Armada, 1997).

\(^7\) G. Gaspar, 'La Política de Defensa de Chile,' in Francisco Rojas Aravena (ed.), *Argentina, Brasil y Chile: Integración y Seguridad* (Caracas, Venezuela: FLACSO-Chile and Editorial Nueva Sociedad, 1999), p. 195. Gaspar’s chapter offers a good analysis of the contribution of the Book on National Defence towards Chile’s defence strategy.

Another coincidence in the field of military affairs between the governments of Argentina and Chile has been their active participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations. Argentina has kept a very high profile in the United Nations since 1991, taking the lead in Latin America in the number of personnel contributed towards U.N. missions. In addition, in 1995 the Argentine Peacekeeping Academy (CAECOPAZ) was created, offering peacekeeping courses and training for both its own national troops and those of foreign countries. Although not as prominent in its involvement as Argentina, Chile has committed its participation in peacekeeping operations as well. In its Book on National Defence peacekeeping is listed as a new type of mission for the Chilean armed forces; a new responsibility along with the defence of the country’s sovereignty.

The decision to publish White Papers, as well as much of their content, points to a convergent orientation of their defence and security policies. This is indicative of an important shift in the strategic planning of both countries. As they have ceased to perceive threats in their immediate region, they have begun to consider participation in international missions a vital task of the armed forces. Furthermore—and of a more immediate regional impact—they have been able to transform their perceptions of one another and their mutual understanding.

Finally, in 1995 Argentina and Chile signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the Strengthening of Co-operation in Security Matters, creating a Permanent Security Committee. In 1998 military forces from both countries carried out joint exercises and combined practices that included the deployment of troops and equipment. This, however, generated certain uneasiness among some sectors of the armed forces. Nonetheless, in August 1998 both navies performed a joint mock search, localisation and rescue operation in the zone of the Drake Passage and Beagle Channel. Later that year the air forces carried out a series of joint exercises in the Andes. The symbolic importance of these practices should be highlighted, not least because they were carried out in zones which, not too long ago, both parties were ready to fight a war over.

More recent events have given the bilateral relationship a final confidence boost. Argentina openly supported Chile’s claim in the case of General Pinochet’s detention in London when, at the 1999 Mercosur summit in Rio de Janeiro, Menem called the presidents of the member and associated states to publicly manifest their solidarity with

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The result was a document signed by all and which defended the principle of territoriality, which was the argument advanced by President Frei in order to have Pinochet taken to court in Santiago rather than in Madrid. Chile’s gratitude to Menem’s initiative came soon afterwards, when Frei pressed for the prohibition of flights between Chile and the Malvinas/Falkland Islands.

6. Final remarks

During most of their history as independent states, both Argentina and Chile have considered territory to be of vital national interest. This fact, coupled with the various border disputes which have arisen over the years, has led to a relationship based on negative mutual perceptions and mistrust. These permeated not just the military, but also political elites, media, and public opinion. Indeed, even during military regimes, where it enjoyed only limited political participation, public opinion on either side of the Andes was successfully mobilised in support of their governments.

As long as territorial sovereignty remained at the centre of dyadic concerns, it became very difficult for Argentina and Chile to escape the Lockean dynamics of adversaries. In the absence of military confrontations, peace oscillated between instability and fragility. The escalation of the dispute in 1977 and 1978 situated it definitely on the side of fragile peace, seriously threatening to give in to war by the end of that period. With the return to democracy in Buenos Aires, the new government worked hard to break the domestic deadlock that obstructed the peace treaty. Thus, in 1984 Minister Caputo declared,

not all foreign policy can be reduced to territorial issues. [...] The main objective is to recover credibility and predictability before the international community, because it is that way that national sovereignty is defended.

Argentine democratisation did not dramatically transform mutual perceptions, but it at least reduced the possibility of armed confrontation. The eventual process of easing tensions, shifting mutual perceptions and desecuritizing the relationship between these two countries resulted in a very gradual and slow evolution. It still took them a few more years to start more substantive co-operation projects. The pace of the process was

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74 Interview with Rut Diamint in Buenos Aires on 17 August 2000.
75 See Wilhelmy, 'Las Decisiones de Política Exterior en Chile,' and Russell, 'Argentina: Ten Years of Foreign Policy toward the Southern Cone.'
marked by the transitions to democracy. While the relationship moved towards a cold peace after the change of regime in Argentina, it was only after the return to democracy in Chile that rapprochement became deeper and more genuine, and that mutual trust began to emerge.

However, the shift in mutual perceptions was not the sole result of change of regime, as past experiences in the same dyad demonstrated. Following the model presented in chapter two (see figure 2.2), transformations in both the international and domestic circumstances of the two states as well as the recovery of certain foreign policy traditions contributed to the reassessment of the terms of the bilateral relationship.

The Alfonsin administration aimed to improve the international image of Argentina, re-orientate its foreign policy towards Latin America in order to unite forces, and promote democracy in the region. These goals needed to explicitly rule out all possibilities of regional conflict. At the same time, the policy of maintaining a high profile in the defence of human rights and democracy obstructed the possibility of a deeper transformation in the image the government in Buenos Aires had of the government in Chile. Hence the importance of ruling out the possibility of war, while also not engaging in too close and amicable relationships with Pinochet’s dictatorship. Argentina’s support for Chile’s democratic transition paved the way for the important improvements of the 1990s. With the election of Carlos Menem, pragmatism and economic liberalisation came to predominate. This coincided, as noted earlier, with Chile’s restoration of the democratic rule, and the availability of capital to be invested in Argentine privatised enterprises.

Chile’s strategic shift was as much a response to domestic changes as to the changes which occurred in the region. The restoration of democracy in Chile implied a return to its traditional foreign policy orientation towards the region after 17 years of political isolation that the authoritarian regime had entailed. As was seen in chapter three, the effects of the abandonment of a tradition of international involvement, and the resulting political isolationism, were compensated for by Chile’s entry into the world economy. Chile opened its markets internationally, reduced tariffs unilaterally, engaged in a process of massive privatisation, and offered substantial benefits to foreign investors. Economic liberalisation became a priority of the military regime.77

Alfonsín’s support for the Chilean transition made the new democratic government favour a rapprochement with its neighbour. In addition, the whole Southern Cone was changing its outlook, and Chile sought to adapt to the new reality as well. In the words of the Juan Gabriel Valdés Soublette, then Chile’s Foreign Affairs minister,

From a strategic perspective, Chile’s insertion in South America has to be understood as Chile’s response to the great shift in the Argentine-Brazilian relationship. [...] The fact that two brother-countries that are so relevant to Chile have been able to transform their relationship formerly marked by rivalry into a true economic and strategic alliance, this has represented a shift that could not and should not be ignored by our foreign and defence policy.\[78\]

In sum, the outcome of the very long process of rapprochement was a qualitative change in the strategic relational pattern of these two states. This involved a shift of priorities, as well as a necessary transformation of the mutual perceptions. In the 1960s, 1970s and part of the 1980s, territory, oil, gas, and the ability to produce electricity had been considered strategic assets of a state, and required self-sufficiency in order to ensure freedom of action. Also the control of communications, from telephones to mass media, had been considered of vital strategic importance. The whole idea of delegating such control to the private sector, let alone to foreign companies, together with the exploitation or production of them, would have been thought of in terms of vulnerability and thus contrary to one’s own national security. The fact that some of Argentina’s privatised plants for the production of electricity now belong to Chilean capital, and that Chile is dependent on Argentina’s oil and gas provision, certainly reflects that extent of the rapprochement.

The next chapter turns to the Argentine-Brazilian relationship. As between Argentina and Chile, the history of the Argentine-Brazilian dyad is mostly characterised by distrust and competition, and, only fairly recently has an ability to reassess mutual perceptions and to transform rivalry into partnership been possible. Nevertheless, as will be discussed below, there were also a number of differences that made rapprochement between Brasilia and Buenos Aires easier.

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CHAPTER 6

BILATERAL RELATIONS

BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL

1. Introduction

Still in the early 1980s, notwithstanding declamatory pronouncements by Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela in favour of general and complete disarmament, these countries were the main forces behind the regional arms race. For decades “Argentina’s active participation in disarmament and arms limitation proposals [was] in strong contradiction with its policy toward actual agreements.” But Argentina was not the only country with an ambiguous discourse. Until the mid-1990s neither Argentina nor Brazil nor Chile had signed and ratified the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) or the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Nor had the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) fully entered into force in those countries. One of the explanations for this ambiguity was that no state in the Southern Cone was willing to be the first to sign an agreement that would bind it while not binding its neighbours. Rivalry and competition have been a constant in the relational pattern of the region.

In contrast with the Argentine-Chilean relationship, in which the state of their border issues was the main indication of the state of their peace, the rivalry between Argentina and Brazil was for regional prestige and leadership, and therefore less concrete and tangible. Ultimately, it crystallised into two matters that strained bilateral affairs during the 1960s and 1970s. The first was the dispute for hydroelectric resources of the River Paraná. Although it threatened to escalate, the controversy came to a peaceful end with the 1979 Agreement of Itaipú-Corpus. The second issue was the covert nuclear race. Claiming that they were in the search of nuclear energy with peaceful ends, both states refused to adhere to multilateral non-proliferation regimes. By doing this, they manifestly kept open the possibility of developing warlike nuclear technology. Although external pressure played an important role in the evolution and resolution of the nuclear competition, domestic political will was a crucial factor in the development of both the nuclear and the hydroelectric issues.

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This chapter explores the Argentine-Brazilian relationship focusing first on how the historic origins of the antagonism moulded predominant visions of one another, and then how, through the successful resolution of the hydroelectric and the nuclear matters, those visions developed into an increasingly positive mutual attitude in the 1980s and 1990s. It is thought here that the manner in which these two issues were resolved represented a cornerstone in, as well as a reflection of, the shift from open hostility to open friendship.

What appears as both puzzling and striking about the Argentine-Brazilian case is the fact that efforts to ease tensions began under the rule of military governments in both states. It is generally thought that military regimes hold a geopolitical vision of the region they live in, if not the world. And as the previous chapters have shown, that was mostly the case in the Southern Cone.

Given the centrality of the evolution of the hydroelectric and nuclear competitions in this dyad, this chapter is structured as follows. Section two discusses the historic Argentine-Brazilian rivalry, from the times of the colony until the late 1970s. It aims to trace the origins of the construction of the relationship in terms of rivalry and competing mutual images. Section three focuses on the River Paraná dispute, involving their hydroelectric power projects; an issue that connects with their competition for industrial development and regional hegemony. It was its resolution that cleared the way for a different type of relationship. This fact was reflected in the nuclear rapprochement of the 1980s and co-operation of the 1990s after some 30 years of nuclear distrust. This is the subject of section four. It examines the parallel nuclear developments in Argentina and Brazil as well as their domestic relevance in terms of the search for international prestige and autonomy; the global context of non-proliferation regimes surrounding these developments; and the different phases of their nuclear relationship. Finally, section five draws some conclusions from the previous discussion, and links the post-1979 rapprochement to the later bilateral economic co-operation.

2. The historic construction of cold peace

Authors dealing with the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry date its origin back to the seventeenth and eighteenth century, when their fatherlands, the Spanish and Portuguese empires, competed to assert their control of the River Plate. Since Portugal founded the town of Colonia del Sacramento in 1680 in an effort to establish itself on the east bank of the River Plate, it was constantly faced with Spanish opposition. The Spaniards, in
turn, tried to assert their dominance on both banks of the river. The later foundation of Montevideo (1729) was part of this campaign.²

The competition continued after independence, and eventually in 1825 war broke out between the Argentine Confederation and the Brazilian Empire. After protracted negotiations and the intervention of a British mediator, the Peace Treaty of 1828 created the Oriental Republic of Uruguay as an independent, buffer state. The war of 1825 has been the only armed conflict between Brazil and Argentina. Four decades later they engaged in war again; this time, however, in coalition with Uruguay to fight the devastating War of the Triple Alliance against Paraguay (1865-1870). Nonetheless, the alliance was not without problems, and relationships between Argentina and Brazil strained again, as the development of the war and of the ensuing peace shows.³

By the end of the nineteenth century Argentina and Brazil were engaging in different strategies to pursue economic development. Argentina, on the one hand, sought its consolidation and growth in close association with Great Britain. Between 1860 and 1930 it had achieved such rapid modernisation that it was considered ‘a small Europe’ in the Americas. Brazil, on the other hand, under the Baron of Rio Branco (the notorious minister of Foreign Affairs between 1902-1912) prioritised relations with the United States, anticipating the weight that the latter would have on the continent’s affairs. After the First World War, and even more so after the Second, as Europe started to withdraw its influence from the new continent, the U.S.-Brazilian alliance grew stronger.

With the beginning of the twentieth century, “[i]creasingly, each country viewed the other as a competitor, as an opponent in many areas, and even as a possible enemy.”⁴ The divergent development paths chosen by Argentina and Brazil reinforced a relationship characterised by mutual suspicions of expansionist strategies and perceptions of hegemonic attitudes. Indeed, the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry was mainly driven by threat perceptions rather than by concrete disputes.

Argentina would see in Itamaraty, Brazil’s Foreign Ministry, the source of Brazil’s imperial ambitions pursuing “the expansion and westward movement (‘la marcha hacia el oeste’) of the Portuguese-speaking world,” while Brazilian geopoliticians would

express concern "over the Argentine dream of restoring the viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata [River Plate], a restoration that would be partially at Brazil’s expense and would tend to polarize the South Cone." Furthermore, Stanley E. Hilton claims that the "enduring image of Argentina as an aggressive, expansionist state lies at the core of the sense of threat that has pervaded Brazilian strategic circles for generations." As most authors acknowledge, "the relative absence of war did not amount to a peaceful, cooperative region."

The perception of irreconcilable and competing destinies would only intensify throughout the twentieth century, fostered by divergent foreign policies. For instance, they maintained different positions during World War I, when Brazil joined the Allies while Argentina remained neutral; supported opposing sides during the bloody Chaco War (1932-1935) that erupted between Paraguay and Bolivia, when Argentina backed Paraguay, and Brazil and Chile sided with Bolivia; and clashed again during the Second World War, when Argentina took a neutralist and ultimately pro-Axis position throughout the conflict, declaring war on the Axis only in the last minute, whereas Brazil had increasing participation in the Allied cause. Indeed, after extensive talks between Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Getúlio Vargas, Allied air bases patrolled the South Atlantic from Brazilian shores, and the Brazilian Expeditionary Force was deployed to Italy, where it was attached to the U.S. Fifth Army as a division.

According to Andrés Cisneros and Carlos Escudé, the Brazilian foreign minister declared during the Second World War to be more concerned about a potential Argentine attack on its southern border than about a Nazi threat in the northeast. In addition, the regime established in Argentina after the 1943 coup only helped to increase those suspicions, given that the new government campaigned openly for the establishment of a "bloc of nations with similar ideas to isolate Brazil and fight the influence of the United States."

The 1946 election of Juan Domingo Perón in Argentina did little to pacify Brazilian fears. The Peronist administration was a populist nationalist regime that maintained an unusually high level of expenditures on the armed forces, while promoting closer

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commercial, financial, and cultural ties with its Spanish-speaking neighbours. Yet Perón’s overthrow in 1955 would not improve the situation. Brazilians geopoliticians remained extremely suspicious, and Argentina continued to be a main focus of their national strategy.9

At the same time, Argentina saw with concern the U.S.-Brazilian special relationship; a concern that would be exacerbated by the openness with which Brazil acknowledged this partnership, and “by the large amounts of U.S. economic and military aid that flowed to Brazil during World War II and shortly thereafter.”10 Another factor that had preoccupied Argentines from the early 1920s was the emphasis of Brazilian geopolitical thinking on its ‘inevitable path to grandeza’ (greatness); “the code word for the moment when (and never if) Brazil will become the first superpower to emerge from the Southern Hemisphere.”11 To this end, Brazil counted on U.S. support. Statements like the following were promptly picked up by Argentine geopoliticians, and fed into their perception of Brazil: “Brazil has to seek its own authenticity and universalism in order to be able, one day, to abrasileirar [‘brazilianize’] America, and abrasileirar the world.”12

The United States played a major role in the relationship between Argentina and Brazil. For most of the twentieth century and until the mid-1970s, Brazil saw in the U.S. a major ally with whom to align its foreign policy, expecting in return its support for subregional leadership. Argentina, instead, systematically opposed the United States since 1889, when the First Pan-American Conference took place in Washington. Regardless of the ideological orientation of the government—from the conservatives of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, democratic governments such as those of Presidents Irigoyen and Alvear, to the military that seized power in 1930, or again conservatives and military that alternately took office until the rise of Perón—none of them saw U.S. hegemony with good eyes, and all regarded Brazil’s alignment as suspicious, and even looked at it with disdain.13

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11 Ibid., p. 34.
This history of bilateral relations was thus both reinforcing, and reinforced by, the construction of a certain vision of the other, a particular vision of themselves, and a specific relational logic. In this sense, mutual and self-perceptions were as much the outcome as the cause of this type of dyadic relationship. Mutual and self-perceptions were exogenous to the process (to interaction) only in the beginning, thus being part of the cause of the type of relationship that ensued. Yet immediately afterwards, they became a part of it, thus being themselves affected by the dynamics of the relationship. As Alexander Wendt points out following interactionist theory, "even when the ideas that constitute identities and interests are not changing, they are being continually reinforced in interaction."\textsuperscript{14}

Arie M. Kacowicz observes that the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry also had important reverberations in the domestic and international politics of the region, since it consistently involved 'buffer states' such as Uruguay, Bolivia, and Paraguay.\textsuperscript{15} Both Brazil and Argentina would compete to gain increasing influence on these states by signing bilateral agreements to build rail links between their major cities and Argentine or Brazilian ports (particularly in the case of Bolivia and Paraguay, which are landlocked), to open banks, to build bridges and roads, to co-operate on communications and trade, and to undertake joint developments of oil fields.\textsuperscript{16} They also competed for access to the buffer states' arms market, given that both Brazil and Argentina possessed developed arms industries, and for providing military advisors and awarding scholarships to cadets from those states to attend military academies in Argentina and Brazil.\textsuperscript{17}

As the following sections discuss, another two very important fields of bilateral rivalry were the competition for natural resources, such as Paraguayan hydroelectric energy, and for attaining nuclear capacity. Both these aspects of the rivalry would later become the key to rapprochement, and this is why they are considered to have a particular relevance. The next section discusses the dispute over the hydroelectric power resources of the upper River Paraná. The following section, in turn, is devoted to the nuclear issue.

\textsuperscript{14} A. Wendt, \textit{Social Theory of International Politics} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 334, italics in the original.
\textsuperscript{17} Child, \textit{Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: Quarrels among Neighbors}, pp. 99-100 and p. 106.
3. **Itaipú and the deterioration of peace**

By the 1970s both Buenos Aires and Brasilia had long viewed their relationship in terms of a cold peace. Mutual trust had mostly been absent, except for brief interludes that did not last long enough as to let it solidify. On the contrary, what solidified was the perception of the other as a rival, a competitor always trying to take advantages at the other's expense. In the decade of the 1970s, as the Argentine-Brazilian relationship became dominated by the dispute over the exploitation of resources of the River Plate Basin, negative images and distrust intensified, geopolitical visions gained prevalence over more conciliatory ones, and the quality of peace seemed to deteriorate.

The most delicate issue concerned the use of the hydroelectric power and water resources of the River Parana, which has its source in Brazilian territory, and goes on to mark the border between Brazil and Paraguay and later between Paraguay and Argentina, ultimately finishing in Argentina. Both Brazil and Argentina were planning the construction of dams in association with Paraguay. However, as the Brazilian venture advanced, Argentine officials feared that its construction at Itaipú on the upper River Parana—which would become the world's largest hydroelectric power plant—would considerably endanger the viability of their downstream projects at Corpus and Yacyretá-Apipé, as well as the navigability of the river. All these bilateral plans had a deep geopolitical significance, given their backdrop of a longstanding Argentine-Brazilian competition for development and regional influence.
Brazil’s rapid industrial expansion was highly dependent on oil. Even before the first oil crisis in 1973, it was clear that the country needed other large sources of energy in order to maintain its levels of economic growth. In this context, the exploitation of the River Paraná had long been in Brazil’s plans. The concrete project of a joint dam with Paraguay, however, only started to take shape in June 1966 with the signing of the Yguazú Act. It originated partly as a strategy conceived by Ambassador Gibson Barboza to try to “submerge in the river a Paraguayan territorial claim.” The colossal project would be entirely funded by Brazil and only later paid back by Paraguay. Each country would own half of the produced energy, and Paraguay would sell to Brazil the

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18 As will be seen in the next section, the pursuit of the nuclear fuel cycle can also be explained by development and industrialisation goals. Interview with Ambassador Marcos Henrique C. Cortes in Rio de Janeiro, 4 April 2001. Ambassador Cortes was Minister Counsellor at the Brazilian Embassy in Buenos Aires between 1974 and 1978, and is currently professor at the Brazilian War College (Escola Superior de Guerra).

19 Interview with Ambassador Mario Gibson Barboza in Rio de Janeiro, 5 April 2001. Ambassador Gibson Barboza was, among many other appointments, ambassador in Paraguay between 1966 and 1967, and Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1969 and 1974.
surplus energy that it did not consume. For Paraguay, one of the poorest nations in South America, the prospective income was a large boost to its economy.\textsuperscript{20}

After carrying out studies to determine the most suitable location for the binational hydroelectric power plant, in 1970 it was established that the originally planned site at Porto Mendes, some 50 km south of the Guaira Falls, was technically unsuitable. Instead, they "marked the optimum location to be near Foz do Iguaçu [...] some 200 km down the river, very close to the border with Argentina."\textsuperscript{21} (Indeed, it was only 17 km-10 miles away from the border. See map 6.1). The report caused great preoccupation among Argentine authorities and aroused suspicions among influential nationalist sectors.

The old discourse of 'ideological borders' of General Onganía, when during a visit to Brazil he argued openly for the establishment of bilateral military co-operation in order to counter communism,\textsuperscript{22} faded away as soon as Brazil announced the project of Itaipú. In fact, the 'ideological borders' rhetoric, which Castello Branco liked as much as Onganía, had only had a limited impact on the Argentine-Brazilian relationship during the 1960s and 1970s. Their interests repeatedly clashed, as reflected in their attitudes toward issues as varied as the U.S. proposal for the creation of an Inter-American Peace Force, the recognition of the left-wing regimes in Chile and Peru, and the limit of maritime sovereignty.\textsuperscript{23}

When Brazil's hydroelectric power plan became public, Argentina began an open campaign to gain international support with the clear goal of stopping the project. Buenos Aires claimed that although every state has the right to carry out construction works in its own territory, it has to assume responsibility for the consequences that those works may have beyond its own borders. In particular, Argentina campaigned for the recognition of the principle that downstream countries on international watercourses, like the River Paraná, must be consulted before construction projects by which they may be affected are carried out. The thesis of 'prior consultation' was put forward at several international fora—such as the 1967 Meeting of South American

\textsuperscript{20} As Gibson explained, the hydroelectric plant would have a capacity of 12,600,000 MW to be divided between Brasilia and Asunción. But Paraguay only had an installed capacity of 240,000 MW. The difference between what Paraguay would consume and its half of the total production of energy would be bought by Brazil at an agreed price. The negotiation of this price alone took three years.

\textsuperscript{21} Interview with Ambassador Mario Gibson Barboza.


\textsuperscript{23} See Cisneros and Escudé, \textit{Historia General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la República Argentina}, Volume XIV, Chapter 66, \url{http://www.argentina-ree.com/14/14-015.htm}.
Foreign Affairs Ministers, the Fourth Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers of the River Plate Basin (1971), the U.N. Conference on Environment in Stockholm (1972), the 1973 OAS Meeting in Lima, the Fourth Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Algiers (1973), and the U.N. General Assembly of November 1973—with different degrees of success, although mostly winning endorsement.\textsuperscript{24} Argentine President Alejandro Agustín Lanusse also campaigned openly against Brazil on his visits to several other Latin American countries.

The very creation of the Treaty of the River Plate Basin in 1969 as a multilateral regional forum has its origins in this dispute. It was established following an Argentine proposal aiming to force Brazil to discuss its initiatives within this context rather than to act unilaterally. Furthermore,

through the Treaty, Argentina sought to put pressure on Brazil and make it stop the construction of hydroelectric power projects, and otherwise to prevent Brazil from taking economic development initiatives that could affect Argentina's own economic development. The Treaty was clearly framed by the geopolitical animosity between Argentina and Brazil, and the power connotations of the exploitation of hydroelectric resources.\textsuperscript{25}

Paradoxically, many in Argentina—not only orthodox-nationalist, but also developmentalist groups—were very critical of the Treaty, since they understood that it would only serve Brazilian interests and would reaffirm its dominance in the region.\textsuperscript{26} For nationalist-developmentalists, Argentina needed to bridge the gap between the development of its own hydroelectric projects and those of Brazil in order to be able to establish a new, balanced alliance between the two. They sought to promote a balanced rapprochement with Brasilia and, in this manner, break up its alliance with Washington, which would otherwise only bring dependency to the region.\textsuperscript{27}

Opinion in Brazil was also divided. Whilst nationalist sectors vigorously called in the pages of the newspaper \textit{O Globo} for decisive action against Argentina's obstructionism regarding Brazil's hydroelectric development, others took on a more


\textsuperscript{25} Interview with Ambassador Eduardo dos Santos, who was Second Secretary (1979-1982) and First Secretary (1982-1984) at the Brazilian Embassy in Buenos Aires. See also Cisneros and Escudé, \textit{Historia General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la República Argentina}, Volume XIV, Chapter 66, \url{http://www.argentina-ree.com/14/14-027.htm}.

\textsuperscript{26} For instance, Admiral Isaac Rojas set up and presided a "Commission for the Defence of Argentine Interests in the River Plate Basin" (\textit{Comisión Pro Defensa de los Intereses Argentinos en la Cuenca del Plata}).

conciliatory stance highlighting the potential of co-operation. The latter channelled their positions mostly through newspapers such as *Journal do Brasil* and *O Estado de Sao Paulo*.28

A resolution of the dispute seemed close when in September 1972, just before the XXVII U.N. General Assembly, the Foreign Affairs Ministers Eduardo Mc Loughlin (Argentina) and Mario Gibson Barboza (Brazil) personally and privately negotiated and signed the New York Act that was then unanimously approved by the Assembly. The New York Act, however, became the target of the criticism of Argentine nationalist sectors, and was soon denounced by the incoming Peronist administration of Héctor Cámpora in 1973, in an effort to distance itself from any initiative taken by the previous government.29 This decision infuriated Brazilian nationalists, who intensified their media campaign, writing heated leader columns referring to their neighbour as ‘hostile,’ ‘provocative,’ ‘megalomaniac,’ ‘threatening,’ and ‘conflictive.’30

After 1973, discussions and negotiations adopted a mainly technical character, revolving around the height above the sea level allowed at the *projected* Corpus and the number of turbines that would be at work at the *already-under-construction* Itaipú. However, it was clear that the main issue preventing a resolution was political rather than anything else. Against this backdrop, Argentina was confronted with Brazil’s policy of ‘doing work,’—the ‘kilowatt diplomacy,’ as Argentines called it—and thus, despite protests and accusations, Brasilia not only refused to delay the project, but instead speeded up the construction.31

Probably driven by Brazil’s greater stability and executive capacity, Paraguay sided with the larger partner. In 1973 Asunción accused the government of Buenos Aires of repetitively attempting to limit “every state’s sovereign right to use the natural resources located within its own territory.”32

In the face of such diplomatic failure, Argentina’s new military government of 1976 decided that the only recourse left was to minimise losses through bilateral or trilateral negotiations. This attitude was encouraged by Martínez de Hoz, the new minister of economy and one of the strongest men in the government, who already suspected that

29 Interview with Ambassador Mario Gibson Barboza.
31 Interview with Eduardo dos Santos.
Corpus would never be built in the end, and regarded rapprochement with Brazil as a priority. He saw the resolution of the issue—an issue which would most probably not exist in the future—as a purely political scheme to achieve the much needed overcoming of the old rivalry.\textsuperscript{33}

Martínez de Hoz in fact admired Brazil’s economic performance, and was keen on establishing good relationships with Brazilian business circles. In his own words, from the Argentine side rapprochement with Brazil

sprang from a shift of political intention of the Ministry of Economy that was only later taken up by wider governmental sectors. The slogan under which the Ministry and the Secretary of Foreign Trade worked was ‘Argentina and Brazil are not rivals but partners.’\textsuperscript{34}

In this, Martínez de Hoz counted on President Videla’s full support, who in 1978 appointed his brother-in-law, Carlos Washington Pastor, as Foreign Affairs minister. Pastor’s ‘pragmatic’ views came to replace the previous hardline stance of Ministers Guzzetti and Montes.\textsuperscript{35}

In addition, the new government of 1976 offered the Embassy in Brasilia to Oscar Camilión, former member of the developmentalist administration of Arturo Frondizi. All three members of the junta—Emilio Eduardo Massera, Jorge Rafael Videla and Orlando Ramón Agosti—met with him and confirmed this offer separately, giving Camilión assurance that he would be given the green light to negotiate the resolution of the dispute with Brazil. This was meant to be as much a sign to him as to Brazil, since Camilión had held diplomatic responsibilities in the Argentine Embassy in Brazil during the government of Frondizi between 1959-1961, and was well known for his position on the need to advance a bilateral entente. Back then, Camilión’s and Ambassador Carlos Manuel Muñiz’s mission in Brazil had been to achieve a rapprochement, and even more, a partnership between the two countries. Frondizi’s desarrollista profile was close to Kubitschek’s policy ideals, and shared important principles with the Quadros administration as well. Furthermore, Frondizi sought to conform a ‘loose Argentine-


Brazilian axis,' but with a firm pro-Western basis, which would focus on joint and complementary industrialisation.36

Against this background, Camilion's appointment as ambassador hinted at Videla's conciliatory inclinations towards Brazil. Camilion delineated a strategy for reaching an understanding with the Brazilian government on the basis that co-operation would be beneficial for both. The first step in this strategy consisted in establishing regular contacts and an open dialogue with the Brazilian press, thereby initiating and gradually achieving a shift in the way the Brazilian public opinion and government perceived Argentina.

On the side of Brazil, Augusto Varas resorts to the professionalism of Itamaraty to account for the fact that a policy of negotiation prevailed over one of imposition by force; an option favoured by the military:

This is most notable, since Brazil is the top military power in South America. [...] Especially in the case of Argentina, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry has tried to achieve joint cooperation agreements in the hydroelectric and nuclear areas, as well as a considerable number of other negotiations and agreements.37

Ambassador dos Santos considers that a very important factor in the change of attitude was the realisation on the part of the Brazilian government that

the strategy of unilateral, autonomous development, according to which a state takes decisions irrespective of the interest, aspirations and goals of its neighbours, had been exhausted. By then the import substitution model was in serious decline. Thus, in the context of a rather hostile international scenario for Latin America, the possibility of uniting efforts in the interest of policy coordination and co-operation took shape.38

Other academics and former government officials also believe that the oil shocks, the exhaustion of model of industrialisation via import substitution, and the end of the 'economic miracle' played an important role in Brazil's new predisposition towards its neighbour.39 In addition, the change of government within the military regime and the personal attachment to Argentina of the new president, General João Figueiredo, were significant favourable conditions for the rapid resolution of the dispute, as seen in chapter three.

38 Interview with Eduardo dos Santos, my translation.
39 This was put forward in several interviews, as for instance with Dr Juan Alemann, Secretary of the Treasury of Argentina 1976-1980, Buenos Aires, 27 March 2001; Prof Amado Luiz Cervo, History Department, University of Brasilia and Editor of the Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, Brasilia, 2 April 2001.
The inauguration of the Figueiredo administration in Brazil in March 1979 was accompanied by the firm decision of deepening relations with Latin America and with Brazil's neighbours in particular, partly due to the deterioration of the global context.\(^{40}\) The resolution of pending issues with Argentina thus became a priority; a fact that brought about a reshuffling of diplomats at Itamaraty and the Brazilian missions in Buenos Aires and Asunción, definitely helping to clear the political air.\(^{41}\) Finally, on 19 October 1979 Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay signed the Tripartite Agreement on Itaipú-Corpus that brought the dispute to an end. Although it met opposition in all three countries, it marked a watershed after which Buenos Aires and Brasilia were able to find a different way to relate to one another.

The dispute over the use of shared natural resources damaged relations between Argentina and Brazil for over a decade, turning into a political and geopolitical issue although at times presented as a merely technical one. In a sense, the dispute was the crystallisation of the controversial relationship that the countries had had throughout their history. The titles of some books and journal articles of the 1970s still reflect this.\(^{42}\) Yet the situation changed remarkably in the 1980s, and this, too, was reflected in the new optimistic literature, which is reviewed mainly in the next chapter. In line with most academics from both countries, who were strongly in favour of the mutual understanding, Juan Archibaldo Lanús writes,

> The issue of the exploitation of the River Plate Basin took up the centrality of the bilateral relation between Argentina and Brazil. [...] Geopolitical fear only fosters reciprocal isolation, competition, and regional rivalry, all of which damage the full participation of both countries on the world stage. To keep the division is to increase the reign of the others.\(^{43}\)

\(^{40}\) This deterioration was characterised by a declining understanding with the United States, the escalation of the East-West conflict, the rise of oil prices and international interest rates, among other factors.


4. The nuclear issue

The nuclear issue constitutes the second major issue in the Argentine-Brazilian relationship, and an important element in their rapprochement. Their complex relational logic can be seen reflected in their conflictive nuclear relationship, which allowed periods of limited policy co-ordination, despite being mostly dominated by mutual suspicions and jealousy. The same issue that aroused their strongest mutual distrust was the one that encouraged the ultimate rapprochement. Indeed, in the same way as Argentina felt the pressure of Brazil's greater hydroelectric and industrial development, Brazil recognised with concern Argentina's advantage in the nuclear field. It was partly Argentina's nuclear superiority that induced Brazil to negotiate on hydroelectric matters.

The following pages analyse the centrality of nuclear development in both Argentine and Brazilian domestic politics, and the role it played in their bilateral relationship. The first subsection explores separately the nuclear development in both countries. Then, their nuclear progress is placed into the global context, and the refusal of Argentina and Brazil to adhere to international and regional non-proliferation regimes is discussed. The third subsection focuses again on the bilateral relation. It turns first to their nuclear competition and then to their nuclear co-operation, taking into account domestic and international pressures.

4.1. The search for autonomy

After the end of the Second World War the potential of using nuclear energy for development and industrialisation became clear. This awakened the interest of many countries, among them the most developed ones in Latin America, Argentina and Brazil, which in the 1950s decided that they, too, would carry out nuclear programmes. At that time, developmentalist agendas with important nationalist components were in place both in Brazil and Argentina, and the role of the military in politics was prominent. Those were the years of Getúlio Vargas's second administration (1951-1954), Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961), and statist-nationalists Jânio Quadros and João Goulart (1961-1963) in Brazil; and, in Argentina, Juan Domingo Perón's two governments (1946-1955), the military coup that put Pedro Aramburu in office (1955-1958), and the election of Arturo Frondizi (1958-1962).

Perón was determined to drive Argentina through the path of nuclear grandeur to the forefront of industrial-technological development. To that end he hired the Austrian
physicist Ronald Richter, a refugee from World War II, and put him in charge of the nuclear programme. Soon it became clear that Richter would not deliver what he had promised and Perón had announced to the world—namely, a controlled fusion reaction in the laboratory—and thus, in 1952, the whole project was cancelled and Richter dismissed. However, far from being discouraged by this failure, Perón decided to empower the recently created National Commission of Atomic Energy (CNEA, founded in 1950) by hiring the best technicians and placing it under the strong influence of the Navy in order to centralise and promote scientific and technological nuclear research.

Carlos Castro Madero and Esteban A. Takacs distinguish four periods in the Argentine nuclear development between 1950 and 1983, to which Julio César Carasales adds another two that go from 1983 to the present. The first phase, between 1950 and 1958, was characterised by the exploration of uranium deposits and the beginning of the formation of a professional body of nuclear specialists. The creation of the Institute of Physics “José Antonio Balseiro” in the city of Bariloche was a part of this plan. This phase coincided with the lift of the secrecy surrounding nuclear technology as a consequence of the programme Atoms for Peace (1953) sponsored by U.S. President Eisenhower. Through this programme Argentine professionals gained access to scientific information and training in nuclear plants and laboratories abroad. Mónica Serrano emphasises the character of Argentine nuclear development: “from the early stages Argentina began steadily to pursue an independent nuclear route by developing natural uranium methods which enabled it to limit international control over its nuclear programme.” This period concluded in 1958 when the first experimental reactor of American design, but entirely built by Argentine technicians, was put into operation.

The second period (1958-1967) witnessed the development of the applications of radioisotopes, internal sources of radiation, and experimental reactors, and the feasibility study for the construction of the first nuclear electricity-generating plant in Argentina. Between 1967 and 1976, the third phase, the first plants of nucleoelectric energy were established in Latin America. A heavy-water power reactor for the plant Atucha I was purchased from the West German company Siemens, and another one for

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44 Carlos Castro Madero was president of the CNEA between 1976 and 1983, and Esteban A. Takacs was the Argentine ambassador in Canada (1976-1981) and then in the United States (1981-1982), and one of the main negotiators of Argentina’s nuclear deals. The phases of Argentine nuclear development are elaborated in C. Castro Madero and E. A. Takacs, Política Nuclear Argentina: ¿Avance o Retroceso? (Buenos Aires: El Ateneo, 1991), pp. 51-144; and J. C. Carasales, De Rivales a Socios: El Proceso de Cooperación Nuclear entre Argentina y Brasil (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1997), pp. 11-16.

the plant Embalse was purchased from Canada.\footnote{Construction of Atucha I started in 1968 and finished in 1974. The purchase of the heavy-water power reactor for Embalse was contracted in 1973.} The construction of the latter began in 1974. However, the Indian nuclear explosion that same year made Canada harden its position regarding technology transfers and safeguards, a situation that resulted in a very long and difficult renegotiation of the contract. Finally, the reactor came on-line three years behind schedule, in March 1983, and at five times the initial cost.\footnote{M. Reiss, Bridled Ambitions: Why Countries Constrain their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), p. 46.}

The fourth period marked the height of Argentine nuclear development. Between 1976 and 1983, the years of the last military dictatorship, Argentina started to build a third nuclear power plant, Atucha II in 1980, and a commercial heavy-water plant that would eliminate the need for overseas suppliers for the Atucha I and Embalse plants. For Atucha II, the reactor was purchased from West Germany, and the heavy-water production facility from a Swiss company. Since the beginning, Argentina opted for the utilisation of natural uranium as fuel, and heavy water as a moderator and coolant, given that the country already had large reserves of uranium in its territory, and therefore would not be dependent on foreign supply.

In the late 1970s Buenos Aires clandestinely built a gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment facility at Pilcaniyeu that was not subject to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Mitchell Reiss suggests that this enterprise was partly motivated by U.S. refusal, announced in 1974, to supply enriched uranium for Argentina's research reactors, and partly by Brazil's 1975 nuclear deal with West Germany, which is discussed below. Officially, its secrecy was later explained by the fact that its publicity would have made Canada cut off its assistance to the Embalse power plant, which was still under construction.

In 1983, the uranium enrichment technology had been finally fully developed at Pilcaniyeu. Argentina had thereby achieved a goal that it had long pursued—the mastery of the complete nuclear fuel cycle—and so it was publicly announced exactly one month before President elect Raúl Alfonsín took office after the seven-year military regime. This capacity, together with the reprocessing facility to extract plutonium achieved at a spent-fuel reprocessing plant at Ezeiza some time earlier, meant that Argentina possessed, in theory, the capacity to extract enough plutonium for one or two...
nuclear weapons per year, and to enrich enough weapons-grade uranium for four to six nuclear bombs per year.48

After 1983, the nuclear activity came to a standstill. Carasales’s fifth period coincides with the first democratic administration (1983-1989). In this case, the change of regime accounts to a significant extent for the changes in the approach to nuclear issues.49 Upon taking office, Raúl Alfonsín replaced Navy Captain Carlos Castro Madero, who had been the president of the CNEA since 1976, with civilian Alberto Constantini. He also made the CNEA accountable to a council of ministers within the Foreign Ministry, limiting the high degree of autonomy to define and implement policy that it had enjoyed since its beginnings.50 Finally, Alfonsín also reduced the CNEA’s budget by 40 percent during his first year in office.51 While the change of regime seems to partly explain the changes of nuclear policy—such as the effort to make it more accountable—the actual stagnation was largely due to the lack of public resources to finance projects.

Lastly, Carasales distinguishes yet a sixth period between 1990 and the present. He laments that “nuclear energy does not arouse the enthusiasm it used to, and the economic situation prevents the State from assigning the CNEA the support it would need.”52 In this phase Argentina’s nuclear policy made a drastic shift. For instance, international and regional non-proliferation treaties, to which Argentina had refused to adhere for decades, were at last signed within a short period of time. Moreover, under Menem, Argentina also adhered to all other treaties on non-proliferation of arms of mass destruction, and abruptly dismantled the Cóndor II project, a ballistic missile that could have potentially carried a light nuclear load.

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48 This capacity was achieved only in theory. The Pilcaniyeu plant could produce low-enriched uranium for Argentina’s research reactors, which is uranium that consists of less than 20 percent U-235, whereas weapons-grade uranium is uranium that consists of 90 percent or more U-235. See Reiss, Bridled Ambitions: Why Countries Constrain their Nuclear Capabilities, pp. 46 and 47, and n.7 pp.74-75. See also J. R. Redick, Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and Brazil (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1995), p. 2.

49 Castro Madero and Takacs quote, with a hint of regret, the words of the new government’s appointed Secretary of Science and Technology, Dr Sadosky, on the announcement of the achievement at Pilcaniyeu: “Every research comes to an end.” Castro Madero and Takacs, Política Nuclear Argentina: ¿Avance o Retróceso?, p. 88.

50 The CNEA was ultimately under the aegis of the Navy, although reporting solely to the President. This allowed a remarkable continuity of leadership and the vertical functional integration of the nuclear sector. All research, international bargaining, licensing, and financing functions were the CNEA’s responsibility. See E. Solingen, Industrial Policy, Technology, and International Bargaining: Designing Nuclear Industries in Argentina and Brazil (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1996).

51 Reiss, Bridled Ambitions: Why Countries Constrain their Nuclear Capabilities, p. 48.

52 Carasales, De Rival es a Socios: El Proceso de Cooperación Nuclear entre Argentina y Brasil, p. 15, my translation.
Motivated, as Argentina, by the vast potentialities offered by the nuclear energy, Brazil created in 1951 the National Research Council. However, it was not until 1956—following the 1955 signing of the Atoms for Peace agreement with the United States—that Kubitschek founded the National Commission of Nuclear Energy (CNEN). Yet Brazil’s CNEN never enjoyed the autonomy, continuity, and centralisation of its Argentine counterpart.

Brazil had hoped to benefit from its special relationship with the United States as well as from its condition as a uranium exporter to that same country. There had been intense debates on whether to utilise natural uranium and heavy water, or enriched uranium and light water for the production of electric energy. The former—Argentina’s choice—had a higher cost but also involved greater independence, whereas the latter was a more widely available technology, but one that ensured dependency on U.S. exports of enriched uranium. Brazil opted for the second alternative, and in 1969 a turnkey nuclear power plant, Angra I, was acquired from the American company Westinghouse, which the government agreed to put under IAEA safeguards. In this way, the programme was, until 1975, entirely dependent on U.S. supply of enriched uranium and controlled through U.S. assistance. Progress had thus far been very slow.

1975 stands out as a key year in Brazilian nuclear history. It was in 1975 that Brazil and West Germany closed a deal for an extensive transfer of sensitive technologies, by which the latter committed itself to provide Brazil with technology covering all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium exploration to nuclear waste storage. According to Reiss, it represented the largest transfer ever of nuclear technology to a developing country.53

Nonetheless, this impressive deal with West Germany had some drawbacks. For instance, the transferred method to enrich uranium was of an experimental kind. Indeed, the aerodynamic jet-nozzle technology was only then being developed by West Germany. Also, Brazil was pressured into accepting the strictest IAEA safeguards of the time, agreeing to rigorous international inspections. In addition, as Itamaraty conducted all negotiations of this agreement secretly, the Brazilian scientific community justifiably felt that it had been marginalized, and thus generally opposed it on the grounds that it was excessively ambitious for Brazil’s electric energy demand and for its economy, and that it was technologically challenging given the domestic scientific and engineering

53 Reiss, Bridled Ambitions: Why Countries Constrain their Nuclear Capabilities, p. 49. Not everyone is of the same opinion, though. For instance, Redick calls the amount of advanced nuclear technology actually transferred through this agreement “unimpressive.” See Redick, Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and Brazil, pp. 6-14.
resources available. Yet despite criticisms and difficulties, the government decided to carry on with the deal.

The Indian nuclear explosion of 1974 not only resulted in the Canadian government hardening its non-proliferation policy but so too did the Carter administration increase its opposition to the transfer of sensitive technology, and fiercely censured the West German-Brazilian agreement. For instance, one of Carter's first measures towards Latin America was to send Warren Christopher to Brasilia and have him deliver a speech attacking Brazil's nuclear policy and pressing it to denounce the agreement with West Germany. As Camilion notes, this came as a great shock to the Brazilian government, not used to finding itself in open conflict with the interests of Washington.

Ironically, American hostility on this matter produced an effect opposite to that expected, eventually unifying domestic support for the nuclear deal with West Germany. Even Argentina, having real grounds for concern given their bilateral history, publicly manifested through its ambassador, Oscar Camilion, its opposition to U.S. obstructionism and its absolute confidence in the peaceful intentions of Brazil's programme.

After the controversial signature of the agreement with West Germany, all three branches of the armed forces started to develop their own, 'autonomous' nuclear projects. These constituted Brazil's secret, later known as 'parallel' programme, and were 'coordinated' by the CNEN's president, Rex Nazareth Alves, who was closely associated with President Figueiredo (1979-1985). The Navy, in particular, concentrated its efforts on the enrichment of uranium by orthodox methods—as opposed to Germany's experimental one—at the ultracentrifuge enrichment plant Aramar in Iperó. It did this independently from the German deal and it was not subjected to international safeguards. It seems reasonable to believe, as Brazilians have, that the Germans would have cut off Brazil's access to nuclear technology, had they known about this enterprise.

In any case, the more the implementation of the 1975 agreement slowed down, the more the execution of the parallel research programme intensified; especially after Argentina announced in 1983 the achievement of the complete development of the uranium enrichment technology. In 1986 the parallel programme was denounced for the first time by a Brazilian newspaper, but the armed forces profusely denied it and

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56 Ibid., pp. 202-204.
disavowed all knowledge of the matter. In 1987 a West German intelligence service published a report on the existence of this parallel programme, which served later as the basis for a second report by a German parliamentary group, which concluded that there had been significant leakage from the safeguarded to the unsafeguarded parallel programme.\textsuperscript{57} Additionally, in September of that same year, President Sarney announced that Brazil had conducted the successful laboratory-scale enrichment of uranium. In other words, it recognised that the Navy’s clandestine programme had achieved its goal—outside of IAEA safeguards.\textsuperscript{58}

4.2. Global context of nuclear regimes

Along with an international increase in the interest on atomic energy after the Second World War, so too was there an increase in the concern for the threat of nuclear proliferation. This was immediately reflected in the first resolution of the United Nations General Assembly in 1946, which called for the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes, and the elimination of nuclear weapons from national armaments under a system of effective safeguards.\textsuperscript{59}

During the following decades various comprehensive plans were devised calling for general and complete disarmament, or alternatively proposing the establishment of an international authority to own, manage and control all atomic energy activities throughout the world, as put forward by the “Baruch Plan” of the 1940s. Other proposals envisaged less ambitious measures of disarmament or arms regulation and control. Regarding the latter, Joseph E. Johnson notes that 1963 stands out as a banner year:

In June of that year, what is known as the “hot line” communications link was established between Moscow and Washington as an arms control or confidence-building measure which could help to avert war by miscalculation, accident, or breakdown in communications; in August, the partial test ban treaty prohibiting nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater was signed in Moscow (and subsequently signed or acceded to by more than 100 states); and in October the General Assembly of the United Nations called for a permanent ban on nuclear and mass destruction weapons in outer space, and welcomed the expressions of intention by the Soviet Union and the United States to that effect.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{57} Redick, \textit{Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and Brazil}, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{58} Reiss, \textit{Bridled Ambitions: Why Countries Constrain their Nuclear Capabilities}, p. 51.
\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Ibid.}, p. xii.
Furthermore, in April of 1963, the presidents of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico signed a Joint Declaration on the denuclearisation of Latin America, and in November 1964 a Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearisation of Latin America was established. Within the context of those declarations and resolutions the term 'denuclearisation' was used to refer "exclusively to military denuclearisation," whereas "the peaceful use of atomic energy is not only permitted but encouraged," since it "can be of incalculable benefit in accelerating the development of the Latin American countries."

In order to make clear that what was intended was not civil but only military denuclearisation, the Preparatory Commission changed the original name from 'Treaty for the Denuclearisation of Latin America' to 'Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America' at its last meeting. The Treaty would later be known as Treaty of Tlatelolco.

While Brazil was the one proposing the creation of a Latin American nuclear weapon-free zone in September 1962, Argentina supported the proposal rather reluctantly at the United Nations General Assembly. The background to Brazil's initiative was Goulart's 'independent' foreign policy—'independent' from the United States, which had naval bases in Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal zone. Yet Brazil's enthusiasm did not last long. In 1964 General Castello Branco ousted President Goulart and moved away from the latter's 'independent' foreign policy. In contrast, Castello Branco (1964-1967) hardened Brazil's position with respect to the Tlatelolco negotiations, as it considered that "a position of non-alignment and support for the nuclear weapon-free zone would compromise Brazil's ability to develop into a great world power."

The negotiations of the Treaty of Tlatelolco took place between 1964 and 1967. They were preceded by Cuba announcing its alignment with the Soviet Union, and soon thereafter, Kennedy calling for the Alliance of Progress (1961) and leaving Cuba in regional isolation. In October 1962, the Cuban missile crisis further complicated the relationship between the continent and the island, and made the U.S. reconsider its interest in Latin America's denuclearisation initiative. The Chinese nuclear detonation of 1964, in turn, had two effects in the region. On the one hand, there is little doubt that

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61 Ibid., p. xx.
62 Ibid., p. 13.
63 Tratado para la Proscripción de las Armas Nucleares en la Amé rica Latina y el Caribe (Tratado de Tlatelolco) con las Enmiendas Aprobadas por la Conferencia General, signed in Ciudad de México, 14 February 1967.
64 Redick, Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and Brazil, p. 17.
Argentina and Brazil were rather impressed by it. On the other, it also provided new impetus for the goal of non-proliferation and the creation of nuclear free zones. The 1974 Indian nuclear explosion, when both Argentina’s and Brazil’s programmes were well under way, once again caused similar reactions.

In 1967 the two nations signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco. However, Argentina failed to ratify it, and whilst Brazil did ratify it, it failed to waive the conditions specified in Article 28, which delays entry into force until all eligible countries have signed. Hence, the Agreement did not come into force either in Argentina or Brazil until 1994, when it was amended and they revised their positions, as will be seen below.

Although the Treaty’s rules apply to all countries equally, Argentina and Brazil felt particularly affected by them, since they were the only two in the region to have attained significant progress in the nuclear field. This fact had an important impact on Argentine-Brazilian relationships: it allowed them to identify, for the first time, an area of potential co-operation. As John Redick highlights, during the Tlatelolco negotiating process, “two suspicious rivals discussed fully and frankly the most sensitive issues of nuclear policy and reached common positions.”

Argentina and Brazil were in disagreement with the rest of the Latin American nations mainly in four areas. Firstly, the issue of the prohibition of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs). Whilst Article 18 states, “Contracting Parties may carry out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes,” it was interpreted that PNEs would only be permitted once the technology required for them could be distinguished from the technology necessary for the manufacture of atomic bombs. As that was not yet the case, the goals of any one nuclear explosion remained ambiguous. Yet neither Argentina nor Brazil were willing to renounce the right of PNEs.

Secondly, Argentina and Brazil argued for a complete prohibition on the transportation of nuclear weapons by nuclear weapon states through the zone covered by the Treaty, whereas the majority of the Latin American states interpreted it to be a question of free exercise of sovereignty on the part of each country, in tune with the U.S. and Britain. Thirdly, the Treaty ‘reservations’ also became a contentious issue. Both states opposed the proposal that the nuclear powers, whose adherence to Protocols

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67 Redick, Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and Brazil, p. 19.
68 Tratado para la Proscripción de las Armas Nucleares en la América Latina y el Caribe (Tratado de Tlatelolco) con las Enmiendas Aprobadas por la Conferencia General, signed in Ciudad de México, 14 February 1967, Article 18.
I and II was sought, could include ‘interpretative statements’ accompanying their protocol ratification. In spite of the existence of an article explicitly rejecting treaty reservations (Article 27 of the original treaty, 28 of the amended version), the Argentine-Brazilian claim did not prevail.  

A final shared objection was regarding Article 13, which requires members to sign “multilateral or bilateral agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of its safeguards to its nuclear activities.” While Argentina and Brazil opposed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the IAEA sought to get them to accept the same agreement on safeguards that it applied to NPT parties. The NPT was rejected on the grounds that it consisted of an unequal and discriminatory regime, which would force them to give up the possibility of developing their ‘young but ambitious’ nuclear programmes. It not only ensured that the number of nuclear states did not increase, but it also guaranteed that the number did not decrease.

The emphatic refusal of Argentina and Brazil to sign the NPT, to fully adhere to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and their insistence on the right to carry out peaceful nuclear explosions was defended until the 1990s, when eventually both states revised their nuclear policy, as is explored below.

4.3. Bilateral nuclear relationship

The bilateral nuclear relationship can be divided into three stages. The first stage covers the period from the 1960s up until the late 1970s, and mainly involves competition and isolation between the Argentine and the Brazilian programmes. The second phase is one of rapprochement and the beginning of co-operation. This comprises the first contacts in the late 1970s, the first nuclear agreements of 1980, when both countries were still under military rule, and stretches until the late 1980s, when nuclear co-operation and exchanges intensified under democratic governments. Although during the 1980s gestures and rhetoric dominated, rather than concrete co-operation initiatives, some decisive first few steps towards transparency and confidence building were then taken. Finally, the third period takes place during the 1990s. It was then that the most significant changes in nuclear policy occurred, not only in the context of the bilateral nuclear relationship, but more strikingly, in their attitude vis-à-vis global

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70 *Tratado para la Proscripción de las Armas Nucleares en la América Latina y el Caribe (Tratado de Tlatelolco) con las Enmiendas Aprobadas por la Conferencia General*, signed in Ciudad de México, 14 February 1967.
nuclear policies. This period is characterised by the final adherence of Argentina and Brazil to several non-proliferation regimes. In a sense, it constitutes the deepening and consolidation of the previous phase. These latter changes involving adherence to multilateral nuclear regimes could not have taken place were it not for the preceding stage of bilateral nuclear rapprochement.

a) The competition

Argentina's and Brazil's nuclear developments were marked by differences, as discussed earlier. Buenos Aires carried out a coherent and continuous nuclear policy, characterised by a single and centralised direction. Reiss observes that "the history of the Argentine nuclear energy program—the oldest and most sophisticated in Latin America—is one of slow but steady progress, marked largely by stability, professionalism, and the quest for energy independence." Indeed, its programme had been generally insulated from the country's political and economic turmoil. For instance, while Argentina had sixteen presidents between 1950 and 1983, its National Commission of Atomic Energy had only four directors. And although presidents of the CNEA came mostly from the Navy, the Commission reported directly to the head of state. Moreover, the nuclear programme was generally backed by the Argentine scientific community and public opinion.

Conversely, in Brazil there was very little consensus with respect to nuclear development at the political and scientific levels as well as at the level of public opinion. Brazilian scientists remained largely estranged from, if not overtly opposed to, their country's programme. The CNEN never enjoyed the autonomy of its counterpart in Buenos Aires, alternating its dependency between the Presidency and the Ministry of Mines and Energy. Further, as discussed earlier, the Commission of Nuclear Energy was not the only institution carrying out a nuclear project, but nuclear efforts were rather dispersed. The civilian-led programme under IAEA safeguards co-existed with indigenous—unsafeguarded—parallel programmes controlled by the different branches of the armed forces. In this context, the CNEN constituted at best the institution that presided a "federation of autonomous or semi-autonomous entities performing related

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71 Reiss, Bridled Ambitions: Why Countries Constrain their Nuclear Capabilities, p. 46.
activities."\(^{74}\) All this made the development of nuclear technology in Brazil, unsurprisingly, slower than that which took place in Argentina.\(^{75}\)

However, this fact was not always seen this way in Argentina, particularly after the 1975 West German-Brazilian deal. Thus, Osiris Villegas warned

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\text{the relative nuclear situation can become critical for Argentina in the geopolitical field as a consequence of Brazil's dynamism regarding nuclear policy, which is propped up by abundant financial resources and foreign technology. It becomes imperative that Argentina adopts as soon as possible measures ensuring the completion of a plan that will end with the political lack of definition, foreign dependency, and with the frustration that has led to the exodus of hundreds of prominent scientists since 1973.}^{76}
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Both nuclear developments evolved in the context of a competition for the achievement of prestige, power and development. Aspiration for regional leadership, and sustainability of a technological and scientific lead over the rest of Latin America can be counted among the main reasons for this rivalry. In this sense, Juan Guglielmelli congratulated the Argentine policy of nuclear minerals prospecting and exploitation, given that it allowed Buenos Aires "to have a clear lead over the whole of Latin America and in particular over Brazil, as well as to share with only few other countries the status of being 'close' to the Nuclear Club."\(^{77}\)

It was crucial to be ready to 'go nuclear' as a hedge against the possibility of the neighbour's nuclear bomb. Looking back, Carasales explains,

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\text{Although the Argentinean government always gave assurance that its nuclear program had exclusively peaceful objectives, it is probable that there was one exception: the possibility that a neighboring country, in particular Brazil, would manufacture a nuclear weapon or, at least, set off a peaceful nuclear explosion. It was always assumed, without needing to be stated, that in such a case, for strategic and national security reasons, Argentina would have no option but to do the same.}^{78}
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Despite the fact that it was constantly and profusely denied by the governments, both countries were suspected of wanting to acquire a nuclear bomb. Argentina's selection of technologies for its nuclear programmes, which could potentially produce bomb-grade materials, reinforced these fears. Equally, the Brazilian Navy's interest in

\(^{74}\) Carasales, \textit{De Rivales a Socios: El Proceso de Cooperación Nuclear entre Argentina y Brasil}, p. 22, my translation.

\(^{75}\) See in particular Chapter 11 "The Quest for Nuclear Autonomy in Argentina and Brazil" of E. Adler, \textit{The Power of Ideology: The Quest for Technological Autonomy in Argentina and Brazil} (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1987).

\(^{76}\) O. G. Villegas, 'Puntos de Vista para una Política Nuclear Nacional,' \textit{Geopolitica} vol. July-December, no. 5/6 (1976), pp. 11-12, my translation.


\(^{78}\) Carasales, 'The So-Called Proliferator that Wasn't: The Story of Argentina's Nuclear Policy,' p. 56.
enriched uranium for submarine propulsion, the 1975 nuclear deal with West Germany, and certain declarations—“all the material of the future co-operation between Brazil and the Federal Republic of Germany will be subject to safeguards; but nothing of what Brazil does in the nuclear field outside that co-operation with Germany will be subject to them"79—aroused concern among external observers.

Both states judged technological autonomy as primordial to their national security and development. Military, strategists, nationalists, and developmentalists were increasingly convinced about this, especially after the 1973 oil shock, when the disadvantages of being dependent on imported oil as a source of energy became evident. As the effects of the oil crisis were threatening to derail the Brazilian economic boom, a significant investment in nuclear power could help ensure that the national energy demand would be met.80

Yet on the other hand, both states had strong incentives not to pursue the nuclear option. By the mid-1970s, a nuclear race appeared to be all too costly for both Argentina and Brazil, and the need for substantial investment in the nuclear field was becoming excessively heavy for their economies. Hence Guglialmelli’s advice not to "begin a race with Brazil of enormous financial costs, at a time when both nations need to apply the most of their resources to projects ensuring their socio-economic, spiritual and cultural progress."81 Furthermore, their nuclear agendas were contributing to the negative image that not only international non-proliferation advocates had of them, but also international creditors, both groups led by the United States.

b) The detente of the late 1970s and rapprochement of 1980s

During the 1960s Argentina and Brazil shared several nuclear policy premises, particularly their opposition to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, their belief in the advantages of, and the right to pursue, nuclear energy, and their search for an independent nuclear path. Within the context of the negotiations of the Tlatelolco Agreement, Brasilia and Buenos Aires managed to co-ordinate some policy positions, as was discussed earlier.

80 See Meira Matos, *Brasil: Geopolitica e Destino*, in particular Chapter IX “No Limiar da Era da Energia Nuclear.”
The rationale for a co-ordinated strategy of negotiation was renewed by their resentment toward the nuclear suppliers’ decision to restrict nuclear exports; a policy reflected in the 1977 London Club agreement on export guidelines. In addition, the deterioration of the relationship between the U.S. and Brazil due to the latter’s nuclear contract with West Germany opened further spaces for joining forces.

An influential group of Argentine nationalist-developmentalist military—led by General Juan Enrique Guglialmelli, director of the War College and editor of the journal *Estrategia*, and partly inspired by the Dependency Theory—began to call for nuclear rapprochement with the larger neighbour. While they observed Brazil’s undeniable industrial and economic superiority, they also identified common problems shared by the two, which could be more easily overcome with co-operation. In this sense, Hugo Scarone observed,

> The suspension of American military assistance has accelerated Brazil’s national development with regard to arms, aiming at self-sufficiency; and the confrontation with the United States regarding the socio-political problem of human rights and, more fundamentally, the technological-political problem of nuclear development, could lead to Brasilia accelerating and hardening its atomic programme, and to its supremacy in this field in the Southern Cone. However, common problems with Argentina bring both countries of the River Plate Basin closer, and we are witnessing the signs of a new type of relationship between the neighbours.82

And he concluded that the saying of a Latin American diplomat,

> ‘if Brazil sneezes, the OAS gets a cold, and if Argentina sneezes, the OAS gets a cold. But if both sneeze, the OAS catches a pneumonia’ should express the wish that a shared sneeze in the basin should call our attention, and bring, in the future, good health back to the continent.83

Less poetically, and also more cautiously, Guglialmelli warned, “it will be more prudent, before embarking ourselves on the construction of our bomb, if we tried to obtain effective and real assurances, which, of course, should be reciprocal.”84 Similarly, José Dion de Melo Teles, president of the Brazilian National Research Council, praised the public support given by Argentina to Brazil vis-à-vis U.S. pressure after the nuclear deal with Germany, and called for the establishment of a co-operation scheme between the two countries in the field of atomic energy.85

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83 Ibid., my translation.
Argentina's pronouncement in favour of Brazil's sovereign right to make technological progress without foreign obstruction had not been entirely without self-interested motives. Buenos Aires feared the same potential problems arising with Canada, its principal nuclear supplier at that time, if the latter decided to back the U.S. non-proliferation policy. In any case, that circumstance contributed to a growing feeling of solidarity aimed at defying international pressure on nuclear issues; a pressure that indeed backfired for a long time. According to Oliveiros S. Ferreira, "were it not for the insistence of the U.S. government that Buenos Aires and Brasilia sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, both countries would not have felt the need to coordinate policies in the face of pressures that affect them equally."86

The United States' role in the Argentine-Brazilian dyad had been a significant and longstanding one. Ferreira notices that Brazilian nationalist factions were better disposed than liberal ones to promote an entente with Argentina, because they "sought in Argentinean antagonism against the United States common points for supporting a foreign policy that was intended to be independent."87 This could be observed in the brief rapprochement attempts of Vargas, Kubitschek and Quadros. Liberals, instead, were all the more concerned with Argentine nationalism, and tended to see in the U.S. an ally with whom to align in order to counterbalance Argentine regional ambitions.

In the second half of the 1970s a combination of concrete common external challenges, coupled with Brazil's incipient process of political abertura and the return of Latin America to a prominent place in its foreign policy during the administrations of Geisel (1974-1979) and Figueiredo (1979-1985) contribute to explain the embryonic entente with Argentina. Indeed, after 1974 the government started to reassess Brazil's place in the international community, adopting an "ecumenical, pragmatic and responsible diplomacy."88

Nuclear rapprochement—and thus political rapprochement—was made easier by an existing consensus among bargaining audiences in this field. In Argentina, CNEA had remained a non-partisan institution throughout time, relatively insulated "from political and economic ideological contests between right and left, Peronism and liberalism, the civilians and the military: the nuclear autonomy ideology and policy made some sense

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87 Ibid., pp. 66-67.
to everyone." At CNEA, scientists retained a large degree of liberty of action to design their programme. A strong idea among them was that nuclear energy was linked to technological and industrial dependency, which led them to define their objectives as

- the achievement of nuclear technological and industrial autonomy;
- the development of a science and technology infrastructure; and
- the creation of a demonstration effect, showing that indigenous R&D is possible in a dependent (and politically and economically troubled) country before structural economic changes have taken place.

A similar ideology was sustained by the aforementioned nationalist-developmentalist faction of the military. These two groups, the ones most interested in nuclear development and the ones who could have presented important opposition to cooperation, did in fact favour it.

In Brazil, diplomatic and scientific-technological circles shared the preoccupation for the lack of concrete results of their nuclear programme. Both perceived that

- the maintenance of a conflictive pattern in the relationship with Argentina, in a context in which this country had demonstrated its superiority in the nuclear field, could become an increasingly dangerous factor.

The possibility of co-operation was seen by these two key actors as an opportunity to help to reactivate the Brazilian nuclear programme.

Although a proper rapprochement would not commence until the energy and water dispute was solved in 1979, it was as early as 1977 that Buenos Aires and Brasilia agreed on the initiation of technical exchanges between the CNEA and CNEN. John R. Redick points out that through these exchanges the "nuclear energy commission officials began to develop personal linkages and familiarity with their counterparts over the period of years," a fact that would later facilitate the development of the joint Argentine-Brazilian Accounting and Control System (SCCC) and its administrative institution, the Argentine-Brazilian Agency of Control and Accountability (ABACC).

After the resolution of the hydroelectric dispute, 1980 stands out as a key year. Carasales sees here the turning point in the bilateral nuclear relationship, on which all later changes of Argentina's international nuclear policy rested. One could equally assert that together with the 1979 agreement, the year 1980 marks the turning point on which all later changes in the Argentine-Brazilian relationship rested. In May that year,

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89 Adler, The Power of Ideology: The Quest for Technological Autonomy in Argentina and Brazil, p. 299.
90 Ibid., p. 295.
92 Redick, Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and Brazil, p. 20.
during the first visit of a Brazilian president to Buenos Aires in 40 years, Figueiredo and Videla signed agreements establishing co-operation in eleven areas; among them, an agreement on nuclear fuel cycle co-operation, which—despite being rather symbolic—represented the end of competition and the beginning of collaboration on nuclear matters. It signalled, too, the possibility of economic and political co-operation in the years to come.

However, in 1979 and 1980 the basis for concurrence was convenience rather than a radical shift in mutual perceptions or a wider convergence of political interests. After the Falklands/Malvinas War, this seems to start changing. Although during the war Brazil's backing was discrete and lukewarm—it supported Argentina's sovereignty claim but not the military invasion—after the war Brazil took on the representation of its neighbour's interests where Argentine diplomatic channels had been broken. This constituted an important backing that continued after the change of regime in Argentina. Some authors read key significance into Brazil's support, and regard it as the cornerstone "that made possible some sort of 'non-written-alliance' between Argentina and Brazil in regional security matters." A more profound and substantial change would come about after 1985; one in which nuclear matters would still have an important place. Along with the new regime of 1985, Brazilian scientific groups and newly empowered politicians were able, for the first time, to lobby openly for a specific policy on nuclear activities. Many of these efforts helped to build a political environment more conducive to the implementation of bilateral and international safeguards. In 1985, Raúl Alfonsín and José Sarney signed a Joint Declaration on Common Nuclear Policy in Foz do Iguaçu, which was followed by state visits; mutual technical assistance; exchange of students, scientists and information; and joint action in the international arena. With the restoration of democracy in both states, the establishment of a climate of mutual trust and confidence advanced swiftly.

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93 Acuerdo de Cooperación entre el Gobierno de la República Argentina y el Gobierno de la República Federativa del Brasil para el Desarrollo y la Aplicación de los Usos Pacíficos de la Energía Nuclear, signed by Argentine Minister of Foreign Relations and Cult Carlos W. Pastor and Brazilian State Minister of Foreign Relations Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, in Buenos Aires, 17 May 1980, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Cult of the Argentine Republic, Treaties Department.


95 This Declaration was in fact part of a broader economic integration agreement, which is discussed in chapter seven. Foz do Iguaçu is located on the Brazilian side of the border between Argentina and Brazil. That makes it a symbolic town and accounts for the fact that numerous bilateral treaties and declarations have been signed there.
The 1985 Joint Declaration reiterated the commitment to develop nuclear energy exclusively with peaceful purposes, the goal of close co-operation in all fields of peaceful use of nuclear energy and of mutual complementation in those aspects deemed convenient, and the hope that this co-operation be extended to other Latin American countries with similar goals. Additionally, it averred that co-operation between both countries not only constituted a multiplying factor of the beneficial effect that the use of nuclear energy can provide to both countries, but also would allow them to better confront the increasing difficulties found in the international supply of equipment and materials.\footnote{Declaration Conjunta sobre Política Nuclear, signed by President Raúl Ricardo Alfonsín and President José Sarney, in Foz do Iguaçu, 30 November 1985, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Cult of the Argentine Republic, Treaties Department.}

After the Declaration of Foz do Iguacu, the Declaration of Brasilia of 1986 defined several areas of nuclear co-operation and joint development. Also in 1986, the Integration Act of Buenos Aires was agreed, where—under numerous co-operation protocols—a protocol on immediate information and reciprocal assistance in case of nuclear accidents was signed. In 1987 President Sarney visited the Argentine uranium enrichment plant in Pilcaniyeu, and both presidents signed the Declaration of Viedma reaffirming, among other things, the peaceful purpose of their nuclear programmes. In 1988 President Alfonsín visited the Brazilian Aramar Experimental Centre in Iperó. Furthermore, also in 1988 Sarney visited the laboratory of radiochemical processes at the CNEA in Ezeiza, signing another two Joint Declarations in either visit.\footnote{Declaration Conjunta sobre Política Nuclear, signed by President Raúl Ricardo Alfonsín and President José Sarney, in Brasilia, 10 December 1986, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Cult of the Argentine Republic, Treaties Department; Acta para la Integración Argentino-Brasileña, signed by President Raúl Ricardo Alfonsín and President José Sarney, in Buenos Aires, 29 July 1986, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Cult of the Argentine Republic, Treaties Department; Declaración Conjunta sobre Política Nuclear, signed by President Raúl Ricardo Alfonsín and President José Sarney, in Viedma, 17 July 1987, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Cult of the Argentine Republic, Treaties Department; Declaración de Iperó sobre Política Nuclear, signed by President Raúl Ricardo Alfonsín and President José Sarney, in Iperó, 8 April 1988, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Cult of the Argentine Republic, Treaties Department; and Declaración de Ezeiza sobre Política Nuclear, signed by President Raúl Ricardo Alfonsín and President José Sarney, in Buenos Aires, 29 November 1988, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Cult of the Argentine Republic, Treaties Department.}

However promising these series of agreements and understandings were, none of them actually incorporated reciprocal control measures, bilateral safeguards, or inspections. “Each was expected to place its trust in the other’s good faith and in the possibility of checking up on suspicious activities by visits, exchanges, etc., none of which were enforceable,” as Carasales observes.\footnote{Carasales, 'The So-Called Proliferator that Wasn't: The Story of Argentina's Nuclear Policy,' p. 57.} Nor had they changed their policy
towards the NPT or the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Hence the persisting, although much diminished distrust of the international community.

As Isabella Alcañiz points out, the unobtrusive but steady progress in the bilateral nuclear realm shows that co-operation was not the sole result of democratic forces. Had this been the case, then the shift in nuclear policy would have been much more extraordinary than it was after 1985, or absolutely absent before that year. Instead, rapprochement started before the change of regime. After the restoration of the democratic rule, the policy chosen represented as much a common effort for consolidation of democracy as an attempt to send clear signals to the international community and, especially, to the core economies. As the demands of the international financial system became more pressing, the initiative of Foz do Iguacu to further bilateral transparency contained a message: “we meet you halfway. Brazil and Argentina would give in to international pressure without forfeiting control of their nuclear programs.”

(c) The multilateral 1990s

The 1990s heralded an era where both countries had new governments that were more receptive to the demands of the nuclear supplier nations. For the first time the pressure of the United States and West Germany led to a drastic change of policies. The United States had consistently linked better economic relations to the acceptance of full-scope safeguards and the renunciation of peaceful nuclear explosions. Bonn, on its side, had announced in September 1990 that it would authorise nuclear exports only if the recipient country were subject to full-scope safeguards. As both Argentina and Brazil were nuclear importers from Germany, and both were willing to improve their relations with the U.S. given, in part, their difficult economic situations, they eventually came to reconsider the possibility of accepting IAEA safeguards for all their nuclear facilities.

Yet there are further factors that help explain Argentina’s and Brazil’s decision to change their nuclear policy. With the end of the Cold War the importance of nuclear weapons in the global scene diminished. Simultaneously, the number of binding agreements aiming at preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction increased significantly, as did the number of states ratifying them. Yet above all, the fact that Argentina and Brazil had already overcome their rivalry, and had even set up a

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100 Ibid., p. 166.
programme of nuclear co-operation, greatly helped to facilitate the implementation of a new strategic foreign policy in both countries.

The 1990 Declaration on Nuclear Policy of Foz do Iguaçu reflected these later bilateral changes. In it, the new presidents Carlos Menem and Fernando Collor expressed their firm determination to 1) deepen the commitment initiated by their predecessors by stipulating the creation of a Joint System of Accountability and Control (SCCC) that included reciprocal inspections to be applied to all nuclear activities; 2) consider acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards; and 3) adhere to an amended Treaty of Tlatelolco.

After only a few months, the Agreement on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy of July 1991 made a reality the first of the planned measures, the SCCC, by establishing the Argentine-Brazilian Agency of Control and Accountability, ABACC, to administer and apply the SCCC. Also, the Treaty banned PNEs in their territories “given that presently the technical possibility does not exist to distinguish between peaceful and warlike nuclear explosive devices.”101 In this manner, after many decades of defending the right to conduct PNEs, both states renounced them.

In December 1991, Argentina, Brazil, the ABACC and the IAEA signed an agreement on full-scope safeguards, thus fulfilling the second measure envisaged in the 1990 Declaration. By this arrangement, also known as the Quadripartite Agreement, both states consented to the application of IAEA safeguards on the totality of their present and future nuclear installations and activities, even on those indigenously developed; a possibility that had also been resisted for decades. The Quadripartite Agreement, which was ratified in 1992 by Argentina and in 1994 by Brazil, resembled the model applied to NPT parties.

The third measure envisaged in Foz do Iguaçu, the amendment and adherence to Tlatelolco, materialised soon thereafter, when a set of amendments proposed by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico were unanimously approved by the parties in 1992. By May 1994, the three countries of the Southern Cone of South America had ratified the treaty.102 Finally, in 1995 Argentina became a party to the hitherto resisted


102 Acuerdo entre la Agencia Argentina-Brasileña para el Control de Materiales Nucleares y el Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica -OIEA- para la Aplicación de Salvaguardias -Protocolo,
NPT, advocating for its indefinite and unconditional extension. In time, the NPT became nearly universal, and even Brazil revised its position, eventually ratifying its adherence to it in 1998.

5. Final remarks

As it has been discussed in this chapter, since their beginnings Argentina and Brazil constructed their relationship upon negative perceptions of one another, which reinforced the dominant relational pattern defined in terms of rivalry. After World War II only a few governments made feeble attempts at improving bilateral dialogue, mostly when pursuing an 'independent' foreign policy that would put them in confrontation with the United States. That was the case of Perón and Vargas, for instance, and of Frondizi, and Kubitschek and Quadros.

However, both Perón’s and Vargas’s regimes were of nationalist-populist character with a very strong doctrinal content, which in general precluded the growth of positive mutual visions. The second period of coincidence, that of Frondizi in Argentina and Kubitschek and Quadros in Brazil, resulted too short to bear fruit. Frondizi, who based his administration on a developmentalist agenda, was willing to reach an understanding that would enable the two countries to work on a co-operative and complementary programme. In this case, institutional problems and rumours of coup d'état during the terms of Kubitschek and Quadros in Brazil, as well as the successful coup in Argentina frustrated this initiative.103

In the years that followed, the recurring intervention of the armed forces in politics served to intensify geopolitical distrust and competition for regional influence and power. The emergence of the dispute on water resources on the River Paraná made both militaries update their ‘war hypotheses’ against one another,104 while they were embarked on a race to develop nuclear technology.

By then, the cold peace that had prevailed in the dyad began to deteriorate. If so far competition, display of military capacity, and zero-sum calculations had constituted the military’s and politicians’ frame of mind, during the 1970s, when the hydroelectric power dispute escalated, the relationship reverted to a situation of unstable peace.

signed in Vienna, 13 December 1991, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Cult of the Argentine Republic, Treaties Department; and Tratado para la Proscripción de las Armas Nucleares en la América Latina y el Caribe (Tratado de Tlatelolco) con las Enmiendas Aprobadas por la Conferencia General, signed in Ciudad de México, 14 February 1967.

103 Interview with Ambassador Carlos Manuel Muñiz.
104 Interviews with Ambassador Gibson Barboza, and with Ambassador Córtes.
Bilateral tension increased to the extent of making dialogue very difficult and the consideration of resorting to violence more credible.\textsuperscript{105} During this period, peace was just a precariously sustained situation.

However, it was also then that international and domestic circumstances concurred, generating a favourable environment that made it easier for co-operative postures to gain influence on domestic decision-making circles. Internationally, U.S. pressure on nuclear development matters clearly encouraged the identification of a common ground for policy coordination. Domestically, a combination of several key factors made it more appealing to overcome old disputes. These were, in Brazil, the exhaustion of its economic boom and of its model of inward looking development, as well as the gradual \textit{abertura} of its political system and the recognition of Argentina’s nuclear superiority; and in Argentina, its convoluted political and economic scenario, coupled with pressure for an entente from sectors as different as Martínez de Hoz’s pragmatic liberals and Gugialmelli’s nationalist-developmentalists.

In the face of international and domestic adverse circumstances, decisive actors favoured a process that implied the abandonment of contending perceptions, and the adoption of more positive images of one another with the prospective goal of easing tensions and pursuing co-operation. Through this mechanism a slow process of desecuritization of the bilateral relation evolved. This task was eased by the absence of territorial disputes, and by the fact that, strictly speaking, the issue that confronted Argentina and Brazil was more hypothetical than actual.

There was yet another relevant factor constraining their perceived policy options. Neither Brazil nor Argentina had had a tradition of isolationism in foreign policy. Much to the contrary, both had pursued positions of regional hegemony, and were used to seeking allies and friends among their smaller neighbours. Therefore, the option of reverting hostility into co-operation eventually appeared as a stronger possibility than the one of persisting in the conflict, seeking independent solutions to common problems.

With the restoration of democracy in both countries in the mid-1980s, improvements in the bilateral relationship accelerated. The fall of the military rule in Argentina in 1983 led to the election of Raúl Alfonsín, who launched major initiatives to defuse the traditional economic and military rivalry between Argentina and Brazil.

\textsuperscript{105} Camilión quotes Commodore Hughes, air force attaché in the Argentine Embassy in Brazil, telling him that if negotiations on Itaipú Corpus did not prove successful, “we will have to bomb Itaipú.” Camiión, \textit{Memorias Políticas: De Frondizi a Menem (1956-1996)}, pp. 200-201.
However, the process that formally started in 1986 with the Programme for Argentine-Brazilian Integration and Economic Co-operation (PICE) was actually the culmination of a process of rapprochement that had gained momentum since 1979, when the negotiations of the Itaipú-Corpus dispute came to a satisfactory end with the signature of the Tripartite Agreement. As pointed out by Mônica Hirst and Eduardo Bocco, the "solution of the essentially strategic conflict over the use of the hydroelectric resources of the Paraná River was decisive in settling old rivalries between the two countries."¹⁰⁶

The possibility of co-operation arose first in a particularly delicate area, namely the nuclear field. Their finding of common technological and military interests opened the door to the consolidation of nuclear co-operation, which after a modest beginning became the main political triumph in Argentine-Brazilian integration. In fact, the political impact of their nuclear rapprochement largely counterbalanced other difficulties.¹⁰⁷

This chapter has shown that Argentina and Brazil engaged in a process of entente in the late 1970s whilst under military governments. As soon as they resolved the Itaipú-Corpus dispute, a steady process of rapprochement and mutual confidence building began to develop, which resulted in the coordination of common foreign policies on nuclear matters. Most importantly, however, it permitted the realisation that cooperation could be a more advantageous strategy in other fields too, for instance, in the field relating to economic matters, where both countries were at that time suffering serious difficulties. Chapter seven discusses the successful Argentine-Brazilian co-operation programme that followed the process just examined, and its larger impact on the Southern Cone.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 216.
PART IV

THE SOUTHERN CONE AND ITS PROSPECTS
CHAPTER 7
REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE SOUTHERN CONE

1. Introduction

So far, this study has discussed the beginning of the rapprochement processes in the Argentine-Brazilian and Argentine-Chilean dyads. Despite differences in speed and intensity, both dyadic transformations converged on one major development; the stabilisation of peace in the Southern Cone.

The more rapid and further reaching rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil resulted in the creation of Mercosur, the Southern Cone Common Market. The regional integration programme was initially led by Argentina and Brazil. Paraguay and Uruguay soon joined the project, and Chile and Bolivia became associated members. As will be seen next, Mercosur further contributed to reshape identities and interests in the Southern Cone.

Crucial to this regional renovation was the gradual change of perception from 'neighbour as rival' to 'neighbour as partner.' What started as a governmental programme advanced by the political elites has extended, in time and as relations intensified, to include wider segments of the societies. This latter development has been more apparent between Argentina and Brazil.

However, in the late 1990s, Mercosur took a more commercial profile. Trade disputes, and divergent political priorities and foreign policy orientations have slowed down progress in the Association. As this happened, optimism about the possibility of Mercosur moving beyond a customs union and developing into a proper common market seemed to dilute. Simultaneously, the political bases underpinning the project seemed to weaken.

This chapter concentrates on the period that followed the resolution of bilateral disputes and the initial phase of rapprochement. It covers the time between the early conception of the integration project and the first several years of Mercosur, highlighting how convergent political interests set out a profound transformation in the region. Whilst perceptions at the level of political and economic elites were deeply reshaped, changes in the societies and the armed forces, however present, have proved more measured.
The next section focuses on the political and economic aspects and objectives of the Southern Cone regional integration, identifying the cognitive changes that it brought about in governments and elites. Section three turns to the spillover of political and economic rapprochement into the societies, and enquires about the emergence of a shared identification between Brazilian and Argentine people. The fourth section deals with the debate that emerged around the possibility of integration extending to the military field. Finally, the last section of this chapter draws some conclusions from the previous discussion.

2. Political and economic transformations

Given Latin America's past failed attempts at integration, such as LAFTA and LAIA, and the rivalry that had characterised relations between Argentina and Brazil until the late 1970s, when these two countries began the talk about a Southern Cone common market, the announcement aroused little optimism. Despite the initial lack of confidence in the project, there is now a shared consensus among academic, business and policy-making circles that Mercosur has constituted a fairly successful enterprise since its beginning. Between 1991 and 1997 intraregional exports rose at a rate that trebled the growth of exports to the rest of the world. In addition, there was greater cooperation among firms establishing subsidiaries and joint ventures, as well as stepped-
up purchase of equity shares within the region. However, the actual goal of implementing the common market is still to be achieved.\textsuperscript{3}

As Mercosur progressed, interest and enthusiasm rose; a fact reflected in an increasingly vast literature. Although it is not comparable with the literature on the European Union, studies on Mercosur have become great in number, albeit rather uneven in quality. Most of them have concentrated on economic and trade aspects of the agreement.\textsuperscript{4} Others have studied its political features and the foreign policy of the members with regards to Mercosur,\textsuperscript{5} and fewer have focused on cultural aspects.\textsuperscript{6}

This section on Mercosur highlights the extent to which the project of regional integration was underpinned by political ideals, as strong as, if not stronger than, the economic ones. It is argued that its political content became a crucial element in the transformation of interests and identities, and in the development of mutual trust, which is a defining factor of stable peace. In addition, economic integration has facilitated interaction and exchange between societies, thus contributing to develop social links beyond the competence of the governments.

The project of Mercosur sprang from the initiative of Argentina and Brazil. Although it was created by the Treaty of Asunción in 1991, it was conceived some years

\textsuperscript{3} See R. Bouzas, \textit{A Mercosur-European Union Free Trade Agreement. Issues and Prospects} (Buenos Aires: FLACSO, 1999); and Pereira, 'Toward the Common Market of the South: Mercosur's Origins, Evolution, and Challenges.'


earlier, when the democratically elected Argentine and Brazilian presidents, Raúl Alfonsín and José Sarney, met in Foz do Iguaçu in November 1985. The fact that democracy had been restored in both countries played a key role in the establishment of a bilateral co-operative agenda, as will be discussed below. However, the ongoing rapprochement, which had started in 1979, had already paved the way for co-operation.

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, two developments marked the turning point in the bilateral relationship. The first was the termination both of concrete controversies, such as the River Paraná dispute, and of a more subtle rivalry for regional prestige, such as the one reflected in the competition for nuclear capacity. The second was a change at the level of public discourse and political attitudes. In this sense, the presidential summits in Buenos Aires and Brasilia, in May and August 1980, were of importance. They lasted several days, and the presidents travelled with large delegations of ministers and state secretaries. According to Carlos W. Pastor, Argentine Foreign minister at that time, the personal ties that developed between the presidents and the other members of the governments translated into authentic mutual understanding, which in turn was reflected in the signing of 22 documents. These put in motion joint infrastructure enterprises, such as the construction of a bridge over the River Iguazú linking Puerto Iguazú (Argentina) and Porto Meira (Brazil); the first of its kind since 1947. They also established nuclear and hydroelectric co-operation, the sale of Argentine gas to Brazil, and the interconnection of their electricity systems. Other important attitudes that eased rapprochement were Brazil’s agreement to represent Argentine interests in London during and after the Falklands/Malvinas war, as well as its support for Argentina’s sovereignty claim at the U.N. and OAS, and the decision of not authorising British airplanes flying to the South Atlantic to schedule a regular refuelling stop in Brazilian territory.

With the restoration of democracy in both countries, mutual gestures of goodwill multiplied. For instance, one of Sarney’s first measures upon taking office was to increase the purchase of gas, oil and wheat from Argentina in order to revert a trade deficit that was at the centre of concerns of economy authorities in Buenos Aires. The 1985 Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy, and the mutual visits of Presidents Alfonsín

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and Sarney to nuclear facilities, carried out for the first time in Argentine-Brazilian relations in 1987 and 1988, were perhaps more significant, given both the bilateral history and the sensitive nature of the issues involved.

It is sometimes argued that these declarations and gestures did not go far beyond rhetoric, and that they failed to constitute any concrete co-operation scheme. While it is true that the rapprochement of the early 1980s did not translate into an immediate programme of action, this 'mere rhetoric' should be given greater credit: easing the relationship at the discursive level was a crucial step to strengthening political optimism and to later promoting more concrete projects. After four decades of nuclear competition and regional rivalry for prestige between Argentina and Brazil, the importance of the shift in the 'discursive mood' should not be underestimated.

Grand gestures backed by determined political decisions were crucial signs that the governments were sending to one another and to their domestic publics. Indeed, in addition to overcoming mutual distrust, the governments needed to persuade public opinion in both countries that the neighbour did not constitute a realistic threat any longer. To this end, the two factors—the signing of treaties and agreements, on the one hand, and rhetoric as the manifestation of political will, on the other—proved useful in helping to build up trust and confidence, and develop these into viable policies backed by the public.

Although in the past several years, economic integration has become Mercosur's primary force, its original motivation was mainly political. This was reflected in the Declaration of Iguazú, where the two presidents highlighted their political agreement. They congratulated themselves for the inauguration of the bridge 'Tancredo Neves' over the river Iguazú, which had been projected five years earlier. Sarney reiterated Brazil's historic support for Argentina's claim over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands; and both resolved to revive the project of Latin American co-operation and integration. To that end, the presidents decided to create a High Level Joint Commission that would advance a bilateral integration project. A few months later, it had resulted in the Programme for Economic Integration and Co-operation (Programa de Integración y Cooperación Económica, PICE), signed in Buenos Aires on 29 July 1986. Rather than

9 Solingen, Regional Orders at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy, p. 141.
10 Declaración de Iguazú, signed by President Raúl Ricardo Alfonsín and President José Sarney, in Foz do Iguacu, 30 November 1985, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Cult of the Argentine Republic, Treaties Department.
being promoted by the Ministries of the Economy, PICE was originally proposed by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs.\(^{11}\)

The backdrop for these initiatives was a more general convergence of both governments' foreign policy orientations, as well as of domestic and external challenges. Regarding the former, goals such as strengthening peace and discouraging regional arms races, keeping Latin America outside of the strategic conflict of the superpowers, consolidating continental representation instances, and advancing Latin American integration became central. Argentina and Brazil took common stances on the crisis in Central America, the Uruguay Round of negotiations on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, nuclear proliferation regimes, and the South Atlantic peace zone.\(^{12}\) Regarding common domestic and external challenges, both governments shared concerns about issues such as high inflation, the democratic transition, the improvement of their international images, the external debt crisis, and developed countries' trade protectionism. Hence, regional integration was conceived as a strategy with multiple purposes, as much economic as political, and domestic and regional as well as international.

The project was mainly driven by the governments and their agencies, rather than by industrial and commercial groups. This can be seen in that a debate about integration only started after the 1986 treaty had been signed, and not before. In fact, the PICE agreement took many by surprise.\(^{13}\)

In 1988 a further Treaty on Integration, Co-operation and Development was signed, this time with the aim of consolidating the bilateral integration process, and establishing a first period of ten years to build up a common economic area by gradually dismantling reciprocal trade barriers. In July 1990, the newly elected presidents, Carlos Menem and Fernando Collor de Mello, signed the Buenos Aires Act accelerating the timetable for the establishment of the bilateral common market by the end of 1994, and instituting automatic tariffs reductions and the elimination of non-tariff barriers across the board.


Shortly afterwards, on 26 March 1991, Paraguay and Uruguay joined the project, and the four countries signed the Treaty of Asunción finally creating Mercosur.\(^{14}\)

As Roberto Bouzas explains, “closer links between Argentina and Brazil acted as a magnet for Paraguay and Uruguay. [...] Enhanced co-operation between the two larger partners thus acted as a centripetal force in the sub-region.”\(^{15}\) Uruguay needed to be part of the agreement in order to avoid erosion of its relatively generous non-reciprocal preferential access to Argentine and Brazilian markets. In the case of Paraguay, Mercosur played a central political role. It was to contribute to its transition to democracy after decades of authoritarian rule.\(^{16}\)

The earlier bilateral co-operation scheme between Argentina and Brazil, and the later foundation of Mercosur rested upon three general political purposes, besides the commercial advantages of the preferential trade agreement. First, it aimed to consolidate democracy at home and throughout the region. Second, it sought to improve the members’ external political and economic performance. And third, it hoped to help the states to overcome their serious domestic economic difficulties, by providing them with a more stable context. With respect to all three matters, there was consensus that a co-operation agreement in the Southern Cone was a worthwhile strategy. Furthermore, the following subsections argue that these three areas, in which integration was expected to bring about improvements, were key to strengthening the vision of the neighbours as partners, and developing a shared sense of common destiny.

Some of the conditions that Karl Deutsch indicates as contributing to the formation a security community—and hence the growth of a common identification—have developed between Argentina and Brazil, and, to a more limited extent, among the other Mercosur partners as well.\(^{17}\) Deutsch’s essential conditions are three; mutual compatibility of major values, mutual responsiveness, and mutual predictability of behaviour. Helpful but not essential conditions, according to the author, are a distinctive way of life, superior economic growth, expectation of joint economic reward, wide range of mutual transactions, broadening of elites, links of social communication,

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\(^{14}\) At the time of writing, the actual goal of a common market still remains to be achieved. What was created on 1 January 1995 was an imperfect customs union.


\(^{16}\) Ibid.

\(^{17}\) Attention will mainly concentrate on Argentina and Brazil, and to a lesser degree on Chile, given that the former have been the force behind integration and where transformations has been more remarkable.
greater mobility of persons, reluctance to wage ‘fratricidal’ war, outside military threat, strong economic ties, and ethnic and linguistic assimilation.\textsuperscript{18}

According to the definition of security community introduced in chapter two of this thesis, its main feature is a sense of ‘we-feeling,’ of common belonging among elites and societies of the states involved. Not only is war unthinkable in a security community. In addition, the societies have developed links, mutual sympathies, and some sort of common identification that makes them perceive one another as members of the same community. The rapprochement and political co-operation that resulted in the process of creation and evolution of Mercosur in the late 1980s and early 1990s brought about the incipient emergence of such feelings.

2.1. Integration and democracy

The fragile nature of the Southern Cone democracies aroused a shared perception of vulnerability and mutualism.\textsuperscript{19} By the second half of the 1980s Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Uruguay had started their democratic transitions, but Chile and Paraguay were still ruled by authoritarian regimes (until 1990 and 1993 respectively). Among the former, ‘democracy’ had become a key value in structuring their foreign policies, and moulding, to an important extent, their vision of the world. Argentina was determined to promote democracy across the region, for instance by giving support to opposition parties in Chile and Uruguay before their democratisations. For Sarney, “the first road to peace is freedom, and the political organisation of freedom is democracy. […] The new humanism should be centred on solidarity and peace. Peace only exists with freedom, with democracy.”\textsuperscript{20}

However, the democratic transitions in the region encountered several obstacles. In Argentina, the government of Alfonsín confronted three carapintadas (‘painted faces’) military uprisings in April 1987, and January and December 1988, and Carlos Menem one, in December 1990. In Brazil, President elect Trancrédio Neves died shortly before taking office, leaving his running partner Vice President elect José Sarney with the responsibility of the democratic transition. Whereas Neves was a skilled politician, who had won the vote in the Electoral College with 480 votes out of 686, and who counted


\textsuperscript{19} The term ‘mutualism’ was coined by Hirst, ‘Mercosur’s Complex Political Agenda.’

on the approval of the armed forces—after assuring them that no military official would be prosecuted for human rights violations—, Sarney was seen as traitor, who had left the regime-backed Party of Social Democracy (PDS), which had given him the post of senator, to unite forces with Tancredo Neves. Moreover, Sarney belonged to the patrimonial order, thereby awakening little popular enthusiasm. Confronted with this domestic scenario, President Sarney sought external allies to help him strengthen his government in particular, and Brazilian democracy more generally.

Yet another acute crisis of government occurred in 1992, when the last minute resignation of President Fernando Collor de Mello averted his impeachment under the charges of being directly involved in major corruption scandals. In a democracy such as Brazil’s, where the armed forces had retained an important share of power, it was not guaranteed that a crisis of this type would be resolved without military intervention.

In Paraguay, the 1996 attempted coup d'état generated immediate, strong and energetic responses by Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. Brazil and Argentina not only gave public support to the Paraguayan democracy, but also flew their representatives into Asunción to contain the crisis and assist President Wasmosy to preserve the constitutional rule. The Brazilian Ambassador declared that a military uprising would find no support in Mercosur, and the Argentine President said that Paraguay would be marginalized from the Agreement if there were an internal constitutional failure.

These crises of government were eventually resolved reasonably quickly before they became 'crises of regime,' that is, they were resolved within the rule of law, and democracy survived in spite of the instability that the crises provoked. Although Mercosur may not have been the defining factor in the successful resolution of the events, it provided a stabilising framework, in which certain political behaviour was not to be acceptable.

Liberal democracy has been one of the ideals underpinning Mercosur's creation and consolidation. It has become a major common value structuring the members' priorities and expectations. Since its beginnings, leading actors on all sides of the Agreement have placed particular emphasis on democracy, by stressing the role that it has played in

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redefining their interests and reshaping their identities and sense of common purpose.24 Democracy has been at the centre of the region's new political identity, and this was eventually reflected in the Agreement. Whilst it had already been included in previous Mercosur Presidential Declarations, the 1998 Ushuaia Protocol, signed by Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay, and Bolivia and Chile, established the 'democratic clause,' whereby democracy became an essential and explicit condition for membership.

2.2. Integration and international political leverage

A second important goal of regional integration referred to enhancing the region's external performance. Three related aspects can be identified as part of this broad objective. First, the improvement of the countries' international image, of their credibility and prestige before the international community. Second, the increase of their international political and economic leverage. And third, their competitive insertion into the global economy, in an era when regional trade blocs were consolidating in the world. Particularly with regard to the latter, as the 1990s approached, there was

a powerful perception in Latin America that dynamic economies are internationalized economies, that growth depends on successful participation in the world economy, and that the accelerating rate of technological change undermines projects aimed at autonomous, nationally based technological development.25

The decision of building Mercosur implied a shift of identities and interests, which was translated into the gradual development of the idea of bloc and of 'regional habitat.'26 To that end, increasing transparency and predictability between members, coordinating common diplomatic positions in international negotiations, and setting up Mercosur's external agenda helped to reinforce a feeling of common belonging. The audiences of such desecuritization initiatives were simultaneously each other's government, their own publics, and the international community.

Brazil and Argentina's early nuclear transparency measures allowing mutual inspection of nuclear facilities in the 1980s, and the establishment of their Agency for

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Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material in the 1990s were initiatives pointing in this direction. They represented signals of openness aimed at each other’s government and armed forces. They involved declarations, meetings and visits in order to transmit a feeling of mutual trust and confidence to their domestic publics. Finally, the measures were also showing the international community—and international creditors, as seen in chapter six—that Argentina and Brazil had become credible and trustable.

Again, trying to transform their international image, they sought to co-ordinate a ‘diplomacy of prestige’ by jointly sponsoring Brazil’s proposal to create a ‘zone of peace’ and cooperation in the South Atlantic, the formation of the Cartagena Consensus, and the creation of the Contadora Support Group. As the ‘diplomacy of prestige’ continued, and common norms and practices of confidence building and transparency became systematic, they made possible the development of new mutual visions that contributed to the further stabilisation of bilateral and regional peace. In this sense, identities and interests were affected by the process of interaction, while also the process of interaction was affected by them. In the medium term, this complex process of social learning allowed the passage from negative to positive peace; two situations involving radically different logics. Instead of viewing one another as rivals and guiding their behaviour according to Wendt’s Lockean culture, the emergence of trust rendered possible the development of a (loose) Kantian culture, which “is based on a role structure of friendship.”

The political decision and determination which characterised the resolution of the pending border issues between Argentina and Chile, as well as the maturity that the Congresses and publics in both countries showed, can also be read in terms of their will to advance mutual confidence, and break with their old international images. Similarly, Chile’s eventual acceptance to become an associated member of Mercosur reaffirmed its policy of strengthening ties with Latin America (and represented a good alternative to the frustrated incorporation into NAFTA).

In Argentina, the agreement with Chile was supported by an eager government, which based its enthusiasm on commercial, strategic and political grounds. Besides the economic calculation of access of Argentine (and Mercosur’s) products to Pacific ports and markets, the possibility of finally tightening bonds with a neighbour with which it had been on the verge of war was also appealing. On the side of Brazil, the prospect of the increased bargaining power of Mercosur plus Chile in the Free Trade Association of

the Americas (FTAA) negotiating process finally encouraged Brasilia to go along, despite lack of enthusiasm for a free trade area with Chile among the smaller Mercosur partners.28

The need to get a stronger voice in a globalised international system was a serious consideration not just by Brazil and Argentina, but also by Chile. During a visit to Brazil, Chile's newly elected president, Ricardo Lagos, declared,

   it is only by integrating that South America will have a say in the world of the next decade. Nothing will be achieved if every country is on its own: we will get globalised, rather than being members of a globalised world.29

The free trade agreement between Chile and Mercosur also had important economic motivations. Conversely, the free trade agreement with Bolivia did not involve large trade values from Mercosur's perspective. Rather, it constituted a further step towards building up a network of consistent free trade agreements throughout the region, with the eventual goal of forming a South American Free Trade Area.30

The adoption of common stands by the countries of the Southern Cone has contributed to strengthen a sense of mutual responsiveness as well as a common feeling of mutual support. This was reflected in the region's reaction to the attempted coup in Paraguay. Yet other instances illustrate this too. For example, at the presidential summit in Potrero de Funes (June 1996), the heads of state of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay signed the so-called 'Malvinas Declaration' in support of Argentine rights over the islands. In addition, these countries repeated their support before international fora.31 This constituted an important gesture that symbolised changes in the internal logic of the region, not least on the part of Chile, a country with strong ties with Great Britain.

Playing as one single actor in international negotiations reinforced the feeling of
community. Indeed, reaching consensus within Mercosur and then talking on its behalf
with one single voice involved a qualitatively different commitment than that of acting
individually in a co-ordinated manner. An opportunity to put the former into practice
were the negotiations following the Miami Summit (December 1994), where the U.S.
government announced its decision to guide the formation of a Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA) by 2005. According to declarations by Jorge Herrera Vegas, chief of
the Argentine delegation, "Mercosur is negotiating without fissures. [...] Within
Mercosur, there is only one position."32

Following Brazil’s proposal, which was backed by the Mercosur bloc, it was finally
agreed that countries would carry out negotiations towards the agreement as members of
the already existing subregional groups, as well as individually, as was advocated by the
United States. According to Cason, “the partners have begun to forge a Mercosur
‘identity’ with respect to the rest of the Americas, and the bloc appears quite strong as it
faces the possibility of a hemisphere-wide free-trade area.”33 Looking at the FTAA
negotiations, Bouzas concludes, “Mercosur’s main accomplishment has been to
contribute to making that process a negotiating exercise rather than a framework for
extending NAFTA to the rest of the hemisphere."34

The Protocol of Ouro Preto (December 1994) gave Mercosur international juridical
personality, enabling it to participate as a single entity in international negotiations.
Following this, Mercosur reached an economic co-operation agreement with the
European Union (EU), at least partly motivated by the drive to increase political
leverage vis-à-vis the United States. The EU-Mercosur agreement created an
institutional mechanism to conduct a regular policy dialogue between the two regions.
The aim was to pursue co-operation in entrepreneurial matters and economic and social
reforms, rather than the formation of a free trade area. In part, this was possible because
of Mercosur’s success in improving the international image and leverage of its
members, both individually and collectively. The EU saw in Mercosur a trade and
investment partner; an image of partnership that the EU would not have had of the
region before.35

32 'Discrepan el Mercosur y EE.UU.,' La Nación Line, (Buenos Aires: 14 May 1997),
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/97/05/14/e02.htm.
33 Cason, 'On the Road to Southern Cone Economic Integration,' p. 24.
35 Ibid., p. 90.
2.3. Integration and domestic economy

Between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s the gradual process of rapprochement, co-ordination, co-operation and integration initially promoted by Brazil and Argentina developed into a solid institution. During this period, Mercosur’s motivations were as much economic as political. In fact, while the latter gave it a more substantive support, the former tried to make it more attractive to domestic business circles, which were not used to regional interdependence.

Mercosur sought to improve its members’ productivity by taking advantage of economies of scale, and to become a more attractive region for international trade and investment. In this sense, it was not radically different from past attempts. However, Marcelo Stubrin asserts that this time regional integration was part of a ‘paradigm change’ taking place in the Southern Cone in the 1980s;

For centuries Latin Americans thought of themselves in terms of ‘stripped rich.’ This has happened since the times of Pizarro, when the Spaniards stole the gold of the Incas. [...] Instead, the new paradigm of the 1980s understood that our poverty was absolute. It assumes that the fault of our poverty is ours, and, therefore, solutions have to come from us. Mercosur is an outcome of this paradigm change, carrying with it a change of development strategy.36

However, integration was a challenging undertaking, given that co-operation was to take place among states that showed a low level of interdependence. Even once Mercosur had been formally founded in 1991, interdependence continued to be remarkably low, and pre-eminence was given to domestic programmes of stabilisation and reform. In addition, the countries had looked at one another as potential enemies for most of the century, rather than as potential partners. Brazilian Ambassador Sebastião do Rego Barros summarises the effort made by Argentina and Brazil, putting later trade disputes into perspective:

The integration process between Brazil and Argentina began there, where it was most difficult: the nuclear, security, and defence areas. [...] Once absurd hypotheses of mutual destruction fade away, it would be any country’s dream to have stingy discussions about chicken, textiles, pork meat, the shoe industry, milk, etc.37

A new impetus was felt when Collor and Menem established unilateral trade liberalisation programmes in their countries in the early 1990s, and gave a more

decisive push to the integration process as a fundamental part of the restructuring of their domestic economies. Between 1990 and 1993 intra-Mercosur trade flows and investment increased impressively, and economic interests began to consolidate. These were, undoubtedly, some of Mercosur's early goals. Since the mid-1990s genuine dynamics of interdependence between the economies of the area have been evident. Whereas in 1990 Mercosur accounted for 4.2 percent of Brazilian exports and for 11.2 percent of its imports, by 1996 these figures had risen to 15.5 and 15.6 percent respectively. If this is true for Brazil—Mercosur's largest and strongest partner—the other three member countries have become yet more dependent on access to each other's markets, especially Brazil's.

The increasing level of trade and economic exchange put in evidence a growing interdependence, which, in turn, facilitated the uncovering of important grounds for joint profits, as well as for joint losses. With this, Deutsch's condition of mutual responsiveness gained more importance in the relationship between Argentina and Brazil. As trade disputes became bitterer, the countries have mostly succeeded in resolving them co-operatively; most often, however, at the level of the Executives.

Additionally, increased exchange and interdependence brought the business communities of both countries closer together, which in turn resulted in increased communication and co-operative interaction amongst them. With exchange and fluid dialogue, the business circles came to realise that co-operation could bring about greater advantages; a fact that facilitated the identification of shared interests. Economic calculations were finally seen as positive-sum game, where absolute gains became more important than relative gains.

In Argentina, there was increasing awareness that economic growth in Brazil would redound to Argentina's benefit. Indeed, the growth of the Brazilian economy soon translated into higher imports from Argentina. As some sectors of the Brazilian industry reached the limit of their production capacity, demand to foreign suppliers increased, and Argentina was in a privileged position to cover that need. Similarly, when Brazil experienced a break or a fall in its growth, this was immediately felt by the smaller partner, which sent 30 percent of its exports to Brazil.

Although to a lesser degree, Brazil has also been affected by Argentina's economic performance. While in 1990 Argentina ranked 10th on the list of Brazil's most important

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markets, accounting for just 2 percent of total exports, in 1994 Argentina had become Brazil's second largest trading partner, taking up half of Brazil's trade with South America, and making up 10 percent if its exports. On a more negative note, after the latest financial crisis of Argentina (2001/2002), the Brazilian Real lost 20 percent of its value in less than a year. The cause probably lay more on concerns about Argentina's debt crisis spreading to Brazil than on inherent problems with the Brazilian economy. However, the shared sense of vulnerability arose again.

3. Identity transformation

If the integration process was state-led, as argued earlier, the same has been true for the gradual emergence of a common identification. It has indeed been a state-driven, politically engineered development, rather than a spontaneous mutual identification of the peoples involved. Yet this has not been a completely new experience in the Western Hemisphere. Nation-states in both North and South America have been the result of conscious nation- and state-building enterprises in the years that followed colonial dependency, independence and civil wars. In the case of the Southern Cone, the economic and political consolidation of Mercosur started to timidly arouse a shared identification among the peoples. Yet, this only happened after the project of integration was set in motion. In what follows, attention is paid to this development in the case of Argentina and Brazil.

The shift of mutual perception from opponent to partner has been a parallel and concomitant outcome—rather than a by-product—of the transformation of the Southern Cone into a zone of stable peace. The incipient emergence of a common identification and of a security community are two sides of the same coin, insofar as they are mutually reinforcing aspects of a single process.

As discussed above, common political experiences contributed to the emergence of a shared, although still loose, identification between the peoples in Argentina and Brazil. Not only had both states undergone authoritarian dictatorships during the 1970s and faced difficult transitions, but they had experienced economic instability, the debt crisis of the 1980s, underdevelopment, and hyperinflationary peaks as well.

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41 However, it must be noted that the democratic transitions and the evolution of civil-military relations in Argentina and Brazil were very different.
In addition, as Karen Remmer observes, even though proximity punctuated their relationships with military tensions and rivalries, shared borders, riverine systems, and transportation linkages created an extended history of subregional links and cooperation. Indeed, in some regions, where the countries share borders, the cultural assimilation and mixture has been remarkable. Ambassador Gibson Barboza emphasises that

in Argentina, Uruguay, and Southern Brazil there are all the same gauchos. That area is a discrete geographic unit, divided up by political borders. Even linguistically, the Portuguese of the state of Rio Grande do Sul, especially, has taken a lot from the Spanish of the River Plate. It sounds very different from the rest of the country.

In recent years, there has been a rather active, although not explicit policy aimed at spreading this common identification to broader parts of society. This can be observed in the field of culture, which is the one that has more immediate impact on the identity of the peoples. Intensified links of social communication have contributed to thicken a mutual cultural familiarity. Increased tourism, as highlighted by Ambassador Botafogo Gonçalves, has played an important role in this sense, as it has engaged locals and visitors in interaction and exchange, and has allowed them to directly observe and get to know one another.

Similarly, cultural events and festivals bringing artists from the other country have also contributed to closer contacts and friendliness. ‘Porto Alegre in Buenos Aires’ has been a repeated major festival involving music, theatre, dances, literature, tourism, films, education and plastic arts. A similar festival has taken place in Porto Alegre, with the participation of artists from Buenos Aires.

Also, at Brazil’s Diplomatic Academy candidates receive Spanish courses besides English and French. This may not seem that remarkable, given that Brazil is located, after all, in a Spanish-speaking region. Yet at the Argentine National Institute of Foreign Service, which depends on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, learning Portuguese has become mandatory. Moreover, demand for Portuguese language has not stopped at the diplomatic level. The multiplication of Argentineans studying Portuguese led to the

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43 Interview with Ambassador Mario Gibson Barboza, in Rio de Janeiro on 5 April 2001.
44 Interview with Ambassador José Botafogo Gonçalves in Brasilia on 3 April 2001.
need to open special courses to train local teachers, since the number of Brazilian teachers has become insufficient.45

A further example has been the emergence of topics such as ‘Mercosur’ and ‘Regional Integration’ as sub-disciplines at Argentine and Brazilian universities and research centres. In 1996 the University of Buenos Aires created a Masters programme in Regional Integration with emphasis on Mercosur, while the University of Brasilia has a Centre of Mercosul Studies. This has happened in response to increasing interest and demand by academic and political circles, and public and private enterprises for specialists capable of efficiently understanding, advising and predicting the effects of the integration process.

The formal process of integrating Mercosur has very gradually awakened a perception of common or shared destiny not just among political and economic elites, but also in wider circles of society. The appearance of such a perception by the latter has taken much longer than in the case of the former. In fact, to an important extent, it has been the result of both policies to that end, and spillover from political and economic developments. Yet once this was in motion, societies have gradually and increasingly got involved in the process, and so have they started to share a partial but growing identification in terms of self-image and interests, and mutual sympathy and loyalties. The commonality of interests, and the more familiar and trustful mutual perceptions among societies have gone beyond economic and political agreements. As Peña argues, “public opinion now regards Mercosur as an appropriate way to face the challenges and opportunities of globalization and to forge a regional identity, strengthening the respective national identities.”46

4. Security in the Southern Cone

4.1. Mercosur’s security spillover and the debate on security integration

A last aspect to consider in this chapter is whether the cognitive changes that have taken place at the political and social levels have also affected the military field. Given that the processes of rapprochement involved the transformation of visions of former rivals, who at times became almost enemies, the question about Mercosur’s effect on

military security appears relevant. This section discusses the chances of more institutionalised integration, or co-operation, between the armed forces of the region.

Mercosur seems to have undergone the inverse path of the European Community. Whereas the latter sprang from the necessity for military security as a strategy to contain Germany and avoid another war in Europe, in the Southern Cone military rapprochement was advanced because of economic and political needs. Once Mercosur was founded, defence and security were absent from multilateral discussions, and were only dealt with on a bilateral basis.

The reason for such omission is understandable. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, it was generally realised that what could endanger to a greater degree the survival capacity of the states in the region was not so much a strategic-military threat coming from their neighbours as in fact their own severe socio-economic and political difficulties. While in the late 1970s the perception that these crises could eventually result in ungovernability and unviability was still overshadowed by dominant geopolitical visions, later in the decade of the 1980s it was feared that they could result in the weakening and collapse of their newly acquired democracies. The source of these instabilities was domestic, rather than external to their borders. Druetta, Tibiletti and Donadio, for instance, talk about Latin America’s ‘risk of Libanization.’

There is yet another reason for the absence of discussions about regional security in the early days of integration. The United States had maintained a Cold War security agenda in the continent, monitored through the Rio Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 and the Organisation of American States (OAS) of 1948, in addition to periodic unilateral interventions in the region. However, in the nineties the situation changed. As David Pion-Berlin argues,

> With the countries less reliant on the United States for military hardware than in the past and more mindful than ever that they must assume responsibility for their own individual and collective security, the time would appear to be right for more localized defense alliances. Mercosur’s successes would seem to reinforce this view.

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In this context, an Argentine Defence minister asserts that Mercosur has become a formidable tool to foster confidence-building measures, with the potential to grow into a co-operative security system.\(^4\)

The optimistic state of military and security affairs in the region in the 1990s was the direct result of the dyadic processes of rapprochement studied in this thesis. Often, the transitions to democracy and the establishment of neoliberal economic programmes across the region have also been interpreted as having facilitated regional co-operation in the area of economics and, to a lesser extent, security.\(^5\) According to Pablo Cabrera, sub-secretary of the Chilean Navy, this is what has to be defended in the post-Cold War international context;

> At present, now that the Cold War and the bilateral conflicts have been overcome, the only thing that we have to defend is the politico-democratic stability and the economic development. Therefore, we consider decisive that these issues be dealt with in the context of Mercosur.\(^6\)

The constitution of Mercosur and the inclusion of Chile in the regional project have deepened and strengthened the countries' commitment to regional and international peace and stability. Only in the mid-1990s the specialised literature began to discuss whether common security institutions should be expected to develop as an outcome of the deepening of the Common Market association. As this happened, some authors started to explore the prospects of a formal security arrangement. The envisaged possibilities ranged from a co-operative security regime to a collective arrangement to a defence alliance.\(^7\) Alongside this academic discussion, there were enthusiastic proposals by Argentine government officials to link economic integration to regional security. For instance, Argentine academic, military, and diplomatic circles have insisted on the formation of a centre to collect strategic data, and to carry out military

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technical exchange, co-operation in the field of the arms industry, and co-operation for civil protection.53

Whereas Argentine circles were very keen on the possibility of setting up a common security arrangement, Brazilian accounts proved far more cautious, despite also acknowledging the existence of a crucial consensus among the Mercosur countries, for instance with regard to the maintenance and defence of democratic regimes, peaceful resolution of disputes, the relevance of regional integration, and even a gradual increase of military co-operation. According to Eliézer Rizzo, Brasilia defined the issue of regional security in terms of its disposition to co-operate and to expand military exchange with the countries of Mercosur and of South America. However, the government “does not envisage a project to constitute a regional security and/or defence institution.”54

In this same line, Brazil repeatedly highlighted that the mission of the armed forces was to preserve the integrity and sovereignty of the state. Moreover, the government expressed concern about U.S. insistence on assigning the armed forces domestic and policing roles. The Brazilian Defence minister declared that

\[\text{[t]he [Brazilian] Armed Forces do not have policing powers or rights. They do not deal with drugs trafficking issues, as other countries would like to see it done, even when those countries do not use their own military to deal with drugs related problems.}\]55

In addition, Brazil has opposed the pressure of developed countries concerning the regulation of advances in military technology. Keeping an autonomist profile, it has called for a common strategy aiming to neutralise the obstacles put by industrialised states to the access of developing countries to sensitive technology. In this context, it was feared that Argentina’s announced ‘automatic alignment’ with the U.S could lead Buenos Aires to unconditionally back American security proposals. Thus, while


supportive of a common strategy, Brazilians considered Argentine initiatives of defence integration 'premature.'

Yet, in the security field, along with the signing of treaties on nuclear matters, Argentina, Brazil and Chile signed the Joint Declaration on the Complete Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons in 1991, known as the Declaration of Mendoza. Later, also Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Uruguay adhered. In addition other joint developments have taken place. There has been a series of yearly symposia on strategic studies attended by the Chiefs of Staff of all four Mercosur states. It started in 1987—that is, only two years after the Declaration of Iguazú—as a bilateral event where the Argentine and Brazilian Armed Forces' Chiefs of Staff met with the aim of deepening the co-operative spirit of the Declaration. Later, Uruguay and Paraguay were also invited, and since 1992 Chile has joined the symposia as well.

A positive outcome of these meetings was the 1998 Declaration of Ushuaia, by which the four Mercosur states together with Chile and Bolivia declared the Southern Cone a 'zone of peace'; that is, a region free of weapons of mass destruction, and supporting international mechanisms aimed at the non-proliferation of those weapons. The declaration also announced the willingness to make the region a zone free of anti-personnel mines, seeking to expand this condition to the whole continent; the commitment to expand and systematise the information provided to the U.N. Register of Conventional Weapons, and to establish a uniform methodology to report military spending; the reinforcement of co-operation in matters related to the peaceful and safe use of nuclear power and space science and technology; the strengthening of regional mechanisms of consultation and co-operation on security and defence issues, and the implementation of confidence building measures. Finally, through the Declaration of Ushuaia the signatory states committed their support to the OAS Commission on Hemispheric Security.

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56 See T. G. D. Costa, 'Mercosur, Seguridad Regional y Defensa Nacional en Brasil,' Revista Seguridad Estratégica Regional vol. 4 (1993). Although the author assumes responsibility for that paper, he attributes most of its content to a speech given by the Brazilian Ambassador Rubens Barbosa. See also, D. G. Vieira, 'La Variable Estratégica en el Proceso de Constitución del Mercosur,' Revista Seguridad Estratégica Regional vol. 5 (1994).


During the years that followed the signing of the Treaty of Asunción, numerous military co-operation schemes were implemented. Co-operative activities involving the three branches of the armed forces have included joint exercises, periodic military visitations, exchange programmes for cadets, military observers attending their neighbours' border exercises, and joint war game and peacekeeping operations.59

However, this co-operation in military affairs failed to translate into a programme involving military integration. The latter would imply "a defense system that unites states militarily to fend off potential aggressors, in which an attack against one is an attack against all," and whose "nature, persistence, and depth of unity would vary depending on the exact arrangement."60 Security integration could take the form of an alliance or a system of collective security, for instance.

While alliances function permanently, pool resources, intelligence and command systems, and focus on specific adversaries, collective security systems view security as indivisible and are organised according to a reactive mechanism by which an attack against any of its members is countered collectively. Both alliances and collective security agreements differ from a co-operative security arrangement in their internal organisation and aims. Co-operative security and its confidence and security building measures (CSBM) work on the basis of prevention rather than reaction, and focus on the internal dynamics between members rather than on external enemies. Both alliances and collective security systems are defence systems, whereas a co-operative arrangement is a system of common security, but not of common defence.

In the 1990s, co-operation and security in the Southern Cone were mostly about CSBM. These have aimed to make information about one's own capabilities and intentions available by increasing transparency, reliability, reciprocity, and communication between the armed forces. Although the benefits of moving beyond this type of co-operation to some kind of more committed military integration could be manifold, counterarguments have also been convincing.

First, military integration would have improved professionalism through exposure to other armed forces, exchange, joint exercises and action, and coordination of strategies. However, this has also been attainable through participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations, to which Argentina, Brazil and Chile contributed extensively during the 1990s. Second, it would have reflected in an actual institution the political

60 Ibid., p. 47.
will and commitment of the countries to maintain the Southern Cone as a ‘zone of peace.’ By doing so, they would have been giving clear signals to the international community and foreign investors about the long-term peaceful nature of the region. Nevertheless, this would not have differed very much from what security co-operation was already bringing about. Another advantage about setting up security integration that seemed not to be attainable through alternative arrangements involved the economic benefit of sharing the cost of access to hardware and technology purchased by other partners.

On the other hand, the purpose of military integration did not appear very clear, and obstacles seemed to outnumber potential benefits. The main reason for scepticism about possible military integration involved lack of support by the very armed forces in the region. According to Pion-Berlin, the military’s position was based on several considerations. First, the fiscal changes that neoliberalism and economic openness imposed on the region brought about a critical shrinkage of defence budgets. Thus, the military tended to associate their own institutional losses—and possibly their organisational survival—with neoliberalism and processes of economic integration, opposing security integration as well.

Secondly, from a military point of view, the armed forces still perceived their primary mission to be the defence of the national territory, integrity, and sovereignty. The model of the European Union, where economic integration and defence alliance were giving way to political integration, was far from attractive. The sole idea of state borders fading away seemed too dangerous in the military’s eyes for them to support a project of military integration. Thirdly, a regional defence system would have inevitably involved a thorough reassessment of the overall strategic doctrine of nations that until recently had defined each other as adversaries. This was something that many in the armed forces were not ready to do yet.

However, the main obstacle to a common defence system would have been its mission. It was suggested that a regional security force would have been most effective in handling transnational challenges, such as rising drugs trafficking, the persistence of terrorism, the emergence of non-ideological and drugs-linked insurgency movements, and environmental degradation. However, neither the military nor most of the political leaders in the region seemed to share this view, as it was explicitly stated by the

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61 Ibid., pp. 58-62.
Brazilian minister of Defence in the passage quoted above. There were four reasons for this resistance. First, being these domestic—even if transnational—missions, it had to be the domestic security forces that dealt with such issues. Secondly, because of the nature of their training, the armed forces tended to define targets in terms of enemies, which may have easily resulted in abuses. And the fact that such policing responsibilities would have brought soldiers into direct contact with the civilian population may have revived old memories of human rights violations. Thirdly, it would have increased the chances of corruption, an evil that affected police forces but of which armed forces had managed to stay relatively clean. Fourthly, in strategic terms, states in the region had different threat perceptions. Security threats were heterogeneous throughout the area, and very often they combined in different forms in each country, thus leading to potentially critical situations. Even transnational issues could take a peculiar vernacular shape. This was the case, for example, of narcoterrorism, the ‘indigenous factor,’ poverty, and illegal immigration, affecting areas of Brazil, Bolivia and Paraguay.

If transnational/domestic missions were ruled out, an alternative justification for setting up a common defence system rested necessarily on an external, extra-regional enemy. However, there has not been such a regional or extra-regional adversary or threat during the 1990s (or at present) to validate such system. As Pion-Berlin rightly points out, “[u]ntil one can be found or manufactured, one that does not lead armies into ill-advised, unprofessional campaigns, then the raison d’être of the regional alliance will be repeatedly questioned.”

4.2. Security co-operation in the Southern Cone

Despite the apparent lack of mission of a formal military integration system, it can be argued that during the 1990s the Southern Cone became a zone of stable peace, and even a loose security community. The establishment of a concrete institution, such as an alliance or a common security pact, is not necessary for a region to become a security community. Furthermore, the existence of a security arrangement does not automatically ensure that the member states are part of a security community, as the case of the Warsaw Pact shows. Soon after the Pact was dissolved, war in the Balkans broke out, proving that peace was only carefully kept by the communist authorities.

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63 Balza, 'La Seguridad entre los Países del Mercosur.'
64 Pion-Berlin, 'Will Soldiers Follow? Economic Integration and Regional Security in the Southern Cone,' pp. 61-62.
Therefore, while military co-operation treaties do not always bring about community, pluralistic security communities can evolve despite the lack of legal instruments backing them up.

Similarly, the existence of a pluralistic security community does not necessarily entail a process of security integration. Instead, it involves ruling out the mere consideration of the use of violent as a means to resolve interstate disputes among a group of states. Moreover, it involves the mutual confidence that no party to the community will consider to use force within it. To do so would be regarded as fratricidal violence, given that elites as well as societies have developed a sense of common belonging.

As has been extensively discussed already, this sense of community is given by the growth of a common identification, shared values, and common long-term interests. The perception of a common destiny worth preserving precludes the idea of resorting to force in the case of disputes. This shared identification of elites and societies sets apart a security community from a zone of stable peace. In line with this, the 1998 Argentine White Paper on National Defence declares that the old perception of the neighbour as a potential threat to one’s own security has been replaced by another one; that of their risks having also become one’s own.65

Thus, the road towards security community involves both a strong build-up of mutual military trust and a political effort aiming to develop a common identification in political, economic, and social circles at large. The set of confidence and security building measures, and regional symposia discussed earlier formed part of the armed forces’ contribution towards this goal. Not only have these activities increased the levels of confidence and trust in the region, but they have helped to develop personal ties between members of the forces of the different countries as well.66 In the case of Brazil and Argentina, where this process went the furthest, the armed forces stopped referring to ‘confidence building measures,’ since it was considered that these were no longer necessary. Instead, they started to call them ‘measures for co-operation and friendship.’67

In the same way as rapprochement took longer in the Argentine-Chilean dyad than in the Argentine-Brazilian one, also military co-operation proved to move at a slower

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65 Ministerio De Defensa Nacional De La Republica Argentina, 'White Paper on National Defence.'
pace. Nevertheless, as it was seen, also in this case results were remarkable. Achievements were reinforced by the habit of Argentina, Brazil and Chile to collectively discuss decisions that may have a regional impact, and try to reach coordinated positions in regional and global regimes, such as the United Nations and the OAS, as well as at numerous ad hoc meetings, such as the Summit of the Americas, meetings of the Ministers of Defence, and conferences on security, as Rut Diamint highlights.68

In general, the combination of bilateral and multilateral schemes led by Argentina, Brazil, and Chile regarding both economic and physical integration, as well as military co-operation have had a broader impact on the region. It has been pointed out that initiatives such as the Declaration of Mendoza banning chemical and biological weapons, the yearly Chiefs of Staff symposia, and the 1998 Declaration of Ushuaia proclaiming the Southern Cone a ‘zone of peace’ free of weapons of mass destruction, aimed at the inclusion of all the countries in the Southern Cone and as many in Latin America as possible. While to some extent the developments led by Argentina, Brazil, and Chile contributed towards Latin America’s pacification, they were certainly crucial in the stabilisation of peace in the Southern Cone.

5. Final remarks

As previous chapters showed, the desecuritization of dyadic relations in the Southern Cone involved a complex process of cognitive change. As material contextual conditions changed, so too changed the perception of needs, interests, identities and visions of the others. In principle, this was enough to begin the process of stabilisation of peace. This sufficed to leave behind fragile and unstable situations, even when that only meant cold (or conditional) peaceful co-existence.

The return of democracies paved the way for the second stage of peace stabilisation, which implied the passage from negative to positive peace. With democratic governments in the region, the successful implementation of the integration project advanced. Political motivations encouraged not only new practices, but also new perspectives from which to look at the world and at one another. Regional integration deepened and intensified the development of mutual trust between states in the region, and eventually some of its positive results spilt over into society. Under the lead of Argentina and Brazil, and fostered by the remarkable advances of Argentina and Chile,

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68 Diamint, 'Integración y Seguridad. La Dialéctica de los Actores Argentinos,' p. 53.
the Southern Cone moved away from negative peace in the direction of positive, stable peace.

However, these processes of cognitive change and construction of mutual confidence, whereby former adversaries become true friends, take long to reach societies, and take even longer to consolidate within them. When such a development was beginning to take place in the Southern Cone, Mercosur's profile started to become increasingly commercial. Argentine and Brazilian foreign policies proved to be too divergent in the years of Menem and Cardoso for Mercosur to keep the pace of its political progress. In the late 1990s, Mercosur's political content and base of support seemed to be thinning down, diluting the timid feeling of community that was only starting to arise.

Even in this case, it must be highlighted that relations between the states of the Southern Cone have improved to levels which were unthinkable only twenty or twenty-five years earlier. Although no peace process is ever irreversible, the development that began in the late 1970s with the Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement has consolidated into a stable and strong regional peace in the 1980s and 1990s.
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION

The primary focus of this thesis has been the development of a zone of peace in the Southern Cone of Latin America. This transformation was far from an inevitable evolution of the Southern Cone regional security complex. On the contrary, until the late 1970s the Southern Cone's fate seemed inexorably marked by competition and distrust, and the resort to military force was not an unthinkable possibility. Nevertheless, after peaks of tension in the second half of the 1970s, the political ambience in the region began to change. As the preceding chapters have argued, this transformation was the product of manifold changes in the countries' perceptions, involving a reassessment of their self-perception and priorities, as well as their visions of neighbours and of the regional context. Since the 1980s, the relationships between Argentina and Brazil, and Chile and Argentina have stabilised the quality of their bilateral peace, moving away from negative towards positive peace. These shifts have resulted in the stabilisation of regional peace in the Southern Cone. However, this does not seem to be a generalised trend in Latin America, where many disputes and sources of mistrust have survived.

This concluding chapter proceeds in three parts. The first section briefly reviews the main arguments developed in the study, and draws some thoughts from the discussion. The second highlights the differences between the Southern Cone and the rest of Latin America. Finally, the third section ventures into the more contemporary scenario of the Southern Cone, which has been beyond the focus of the study. It reconsiders the evolution of the Southern Cone in the late 1990s and early twenty-first century in terms of the main concepts used throughout the previous chapters; that is, the present condition of the Southern Cone regional security complex, its status as a zone of stable peace and, possibly, as a pluralistic security community.

1. Final thoughts on the study

This study was structured in four main parts, each covering different aspects of the research, and together gradually building up the argument that the Southern Cone evolved, since the 1950s, from a zone of negative into one of positive peace. In this process, the late 1970s and the 1980s stood out as a turning point in the quality of
regional peace. It was shown how this transformation was the product of global, regional and domestic changes and that, whilst it may have sprung from material considerations, it also required, and indeed involved, a re-evaluation of perceptions and identities.

Part I served as general introduction and theoretical framework. In chapter one a few initial conceptual definitions and the principal subject of research were set out, as well as the main research questions and assumptions. The relevance of the present study was also highlighted.

Chapter two, "Theories of Regional Security and Peace," discussed the theoretical debate around the key concepts 'security' and 'peace.' After reviewing different theoretical perspectives, it was argued that within the context of this study security and peace were to be understood in rather broad terms, although still remaining closely associated to the consideration of use of violence or its avoidance, and with the possibility of developing trust. In this way, it was argued, the realists' narrow focus on geopolitics and absence of war could be overcome, whilst retaining a defining element that would differentiate international/national security from other types of policy. The chapter expanded on notions that were then used throughout the dissertation, such as regional security complex, zones of peace, and security communities. These were defined as empirical developments embedded and rooted in the historical and geopolitical context of a certain region, rather than as necessarily constituting alliances or any other kind of formal political or military arrangement.

Three issues were highlighted in chapter two. Firstly, it was stressed that a focus on dyads and on regions induces a comprehensive study, including domestic, bilateral, regional, as well as extra-regional factors. Second, it drew attention to the advantages of taking a constructivist approach for explaining the changes in mutual and self-perceptions, which in turn helped to explain the processes of desecuritization and rapprochement. A constructivist approach, it was argued, allows the incorporation of the element of rational calculations into the social learning process, thus acknowledging the presence of material factors in the construction of identities and perceptions. Accordingly, it was claimed that some element of calculation and self-interest must be present in the construction of any zone of peace and security community, and that this instance should be properly identified in the analysis. Finally, regional peace was understood as a relational concept, as well as a dynamic, although fragile and reversible, process. The type of peace that a region enjoys, it was argued, is marked by the level of trust. When trust extends beyond the circles of the elites, and spills over bringing about
mutual sympathies and, eventually, some kind of shared identity among the societies involved, then these can talk about the emergence of a security community.

Part II dealt with the 'contexts' surrounding the dyadic relationships. Chapter three discussed the domestic circumstances in Argentina, Brazil and Chile, while chapter four reviewed regional and hemispheric developments. Overall, both chapters shed light on the difficulties of the Southern Cone to promote stable peace, pointing to the role of domestic, regional and hemispheric factors in hindering the development of confidence and trust between states not only in the Southern Cone, but also within Latin America and between Latin American countries and the United States.

Chapter three, on “Domestic Conditions,” showed, through an enquiry of domestic developments in Argentina, Brazil and Chile between the 1950s and 1970s, that economic and political performance, as well as foreign policy traditions, significantly informed the vision the states had of themselves and the world surrounding them, of their own strengths and weaknesses, and of their policy options and opportunities. It demonstrated that the differences in the economic and political achievements in the three countries by the late 1970s had significantly shaped their outlook. The repressive regime of Argentina had not managed to bring the situation under control in political but above all in economic terms, whereas the authoritarian government in Chile appeared to be finding stability after the rather chaotic last years of Allende and first few years of Pinochet. This, in fact, did affect self-perceptions in each country. In Argentina, a faction of the junta felt the need for building more stable bases for external political and economic support, thus trying to avoid new fronts of conflicts. Nonetheless, internal opposition and contradictions inherent to the government prevented this from becoming a successful and sustained policy—which the case of the relationship with Chile in the 1970s so clearly shows, as discussed in chapter five. In contrast, the Chilean situation gave the government a boost of confidence and sense of self-sufficiency that were reflected, for instance, in the country's new foreign policy. In Brazil, the years of the 'economic miracle' had gone, the special relationship with the United States had not only long finished, but the opposition of interests between the two was clear, and the decline of public support for the 'military republic' was stimulating the beginning of a slow process of abertura. The Brazilian self-perception of omnipotence of the previous years was also changing to a more vulnerable image, encouraging a re-assessment of its policy towards the region.

In addition to analysing the impact of domestic political and economic conditions, chapter three also examined how foreign policy traditions played a significant role in
shaping regional relationships. Argentina and Brazil had traditionally maintained a high profile in regional affairs, which also continued during the military periods (not least as a consequence of their regional hegemony ambitions), whereas Pinochet’s Chile abruptly broke off with Santiago’s former foreign policy orientation of universal diplomatic relations. The key focus of the Pinochet administration in foreign affairs was the promotion of external trade and foreign investment. Beyond that, this government was not too concerned about international political isolationism.

Thus it was shown how, especially in the case of Argentina, although also present in the case of Brazil, there were, potentially, significant material incentives to pursue rapprochement. In an unstable domestic and external scenario, the easing of tension between the two countries could solve a longstanding and expensive competition, prevent future conflicts, and advance coordination and co-operation in different areas, not least in nuclear and economic matters, in which they were being pressured and punished by developed countries and international creditors. In contrast, Chile had given priority to domestic economic and foreign trade policies that were showing signs of success, and as a consequence it saw no material incentives in solving its dispute with Argentina.

As was the focus of chapter four, the regional and hemispheric context have also to be taken into account as these importantly affected the countries’ perceived range of policy options, in addition to the role played by domestic performances and foreign policy traditions. After successive U.S. initiatives towards Latin America failed to bring the benefits that the latter expected, a sense of resentment and lack of reciprocity grew in the region. Furthermore, distrust and resentment were also the dominant patterns of bilateral relations between many Latin American countries. It was shown that Latin American history was full of regional and bilateral controversies, dormant conflicts, and unforgotten and unresolved claims. Almost every country had had a border dispute with a neighbour, or had intervened, more openly or more covertly, in its neighbours’ domestic affairs or international conflicts. A key feature of the region was the complex set of regional allegiances that resulted in its ‘checkerboard’ design.¹

Another important regional feature was the apparent absence of war, despite a significant potential for war. In consequence, it was argued that Latin America as a whole was, during most of its history, a zone of negative peace, in which states were wary and cautious, and relationships were dominated by mistrust and suspicion. This

¹ P. Kelly, Checkerboards and Shatterbelts: the Geopolitics of South America (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1997).
was the case of the Southern Cone as well, given that its main two dyads, the Argentine-Chilean and the Argentine-Brazilian, did not develop trustful, transparent and co-operative relationships until the 1990s and 1980s, respectively, as Parts III and IV showed.

Without repeating in full the arguments of the particular cases discussed in Part III (chapters five, "Bilateral Relations between Argentina and Chile," and six, "Bilateral Relations between Argentina and Brazil") a few brief points summarise the argument here. The comparison of the peaks of tension and subsequent processes of desecuritization in the two dyads further supported the claim that domestic factors and visions of self and other affected the range of perceived policy options, precluding or advancing—depending on the case—an early bilateral rapprochement. The presence of concrete territorial disputes between Chile and Argentina, meanwhile, added intense nationalistic sentiments to the controversy, involving wider circles of society—although just to a limited extent due to the nature of both regimes. The Chilean-Argentine relationship contrasted with the more implicit and covert competition for regional prestige, which dominated relations between Brazil and Argentina. As a consequence, the resolution of the former disputes proved to be more protracted and difficult than the Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement, remaining on hold for many years and then only advancing very gradually.

In fact, until the 1984 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, the relationship between Argentina and Chile had been one of negative peace, oscillating between fragile and unstable peace for most of the time. The escalation of the dispute in 1977 and 1978 moved the dyad definitely into a situation of fragile peace, seriously threatening to devolve into war by the end of that period. After the change of regime in Argentina in late 1983, the relationship moved from unstable to cold peace, hence starting a long process of stabilisation.

Argentina and Brazil initiated their process of rapprochement when neither state was under a democratic regime. Once the hydroelectric issue had been solved, the absence of territorial disputes facilitated the adoption of more positive images of one another with the prospective goal of easing tension and pursuing co-operation. The shift from unstable to cold peace, following the 1979 Treaty of Itaipú- Corpus, was quick and, to a certain extent, audacious, as co-operation began in one of the most sensitive fields and where competition had been most obstinate—the nuclear field.

The fact that both the Argentine-Brazilian and Argentine-Chilean processes of rapprochement were initiated when at least one of the governments was still
authoritarian showed that the type of regime did not play such an important role in the initial stage of the process of peace stabilisation. It is not, however, a conclusion of this study that military dictatorships are (the most) appropriate actors to conduct rapprochement processes. In fact, the tensest peaks and the instances in which war seemed closest happened under such regimes, and not under democracies.

Nonetheless, the observation that the long and gradual processes of desecuritization started under at least one authoritarian government appeared at the beginning of this research as an empirical curiosity. The study of the cases showed that the military governments in the Southern Cone were able to move between different types of negative peace: that is, they were able to ease tension, achieving, at best, a relationship of cold or conditional peace. According to the typology presented in chapter two, cold or conditional peace is a type of negative peace, where the absence of trust, as well as of war, is the main feature. Nonetheless, as it became clear in chapter seven, for this process to continue towards the consolidation and stabilisation of peace, for it to become positive peace, and, eventually, for an incipient security community to emerge, the presence of democratic regimes was indeed a determining factor.

In the case of Chile and Argentina, the most striking changes took place once both countries were ruled by (neo)liberal democracies. Then, the Chilean government returned to its traditional foreign policy orientation towards the region after 17 years of political isolationism, and Argentina had an active interest in maintaining a high (and compromise-inclined) profile in international affairs, partly as a strategy to attract foreign investment. The last few border issues could be resolved, and interdependence grew between the two states. Even if only reaching limited circles of society, such as the political and business elites, the mutual image changed, and with it, the quality of the bilateral peace, which in the 1990s finally became a positive, stable peace.

For Brazil and Argentina, the Itaipú- Corpus Treaty and the nuclear co-operation agreements brought about a change of mutual attitudes, which became a solid basis for the transformation of their cold peace into stable peace after the restoration of democracy in both countries in the mid-1980s. Thus, also in this case democratisation was key in accelerating the process of peace stabilisation and consolidation.

The period that followed the initial steps towards rapprochement and the restoration of democracy in the region was dealt with in chapter seven, in Part IV. This last Part turned to an exploration of the Southern Cone at the regional level, after the chapters in Parts II and III had focused on the domestic, hemispheric and dyadic levels.
The creation of Mercosur in 1991 was the almost exclusive result of the Argentine-Brazilian partnership, which had been launched in 1985. Chapter seven claimed that, under the lead of Argentina and Brazil, and fostered by the remarkable advances of Argentina and Chile, the Southern Cone moved away from negative peace in the direction of positive, stable peace. Furthermore, it was argued that in the early 1990s Brazil and Argentina saw the incipient emergence of a security community between the two. This happened as not only political and business elites became aware of the importance of the partnership and the compatibilities and deep commitment between the two states, but also wider social circles converged on this view. With the enthusiasm of the late 1980s and early 1990s, a feeble common identification begun to arise among some parts of both societies, as a result of shifts in their mutual perceptions and growing levels of trust and confidence. Undoubtedly, this constituted an enormous political triumph.

The spillover effect of both the Brazilian-Argentine desecuritization process and the equally remarkable process of rapprochement between Chile and Argentina on the Southern Cone security complex entirely transformed the outlook of the region. The shift from negative to positive peace is never an easy one, as demonstrated by the huge political will that was involved in these two cases. The result at the end of the period under study, in the early 1990s, was that violence had become unthinkable as a means to resolve dispute between states in the Southern Cone. However, this has not been the situation in many other areas of Latin America, which is discussed next. And even in the Southern Cone, although the positive outcome has not been overturned, in the last few years a number of crises in the region have slowed down impetus of the early 1990s. This is the issue of the last section.

2. Peace and security in Latin America

Many differences have marked the evolution of peace in the Southern Cone vis-à-vis other areas in Latin America, where, like in the Southern Cone, the relative absence of open interstate violence has been a key feature throughout the twentieth century. However, in the last fifteen years a series of issues that either remained in the security agenda from the 1980s or before, or became securitized, thus making it onto the security agenda, threatened to destabilise and deteriorate the already negative regional peace.
Mónica Serrano identifies five areas of domestic or transnational problems in Latin American states that have had external repercussions.² These are ethnic self-determination, environment, insurgency and civil violence, migrations, and weapons and drugs trafficking and organised crime in general. While the countries most affected by these have been Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Mexico, securitization of issues such as drugs trafficking has often been induced by the U.S.. Furthermore, the potential capacity of these ‘security threats’ to spill over across national borders has often led to increasing tensions with neighbouring countries.

The case of the Colombian guerrilla—a complex issue involving insurgent and paramilitary groups as well as narcotraffic activities—is paradigmatic. In the last few years regional tension has been rising, with paramilitary leaders threatening to internationalise the conflict. In addition, Venezuela, a country with which Colombia still has pending maritime issues, has been trying to establish dialogue with the guerrilla. Ecuador, instead, has accepted U.S. military presence in its territory, whereas Brazil has undertaken a unilateral military build-up on its border with Colombia.³ U.S.-sponsored Plan Colombia against drugs trafficking, far from making Colombia’s neighbours feel more secure, has led to a strengthening of control in border areas in Venezuela, Peru, Panama, Ecuador and Brazil.⁴

Alongside these ‘new’ security problems, some old-fashioned border issues have survived, further preventing the emergence of trust and the stabilisation of peace. In 1995, Ecuador and Peru clashed over territory, and three years after the armed confrontation, government officials in both Quito and Lima were once again initiating a verbal escalation, showing that distrust and negative mutual visions had not been overcome.⁵

Finally, as Carlos Alberto Montaner highlights, the late 1990s also were a tense period in Central America. Tension grew between Belice and Guatemala after the

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³ Indeed, Carlos Castaño, leader of the *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* is reported to have warned neighbouring Venezuela, "if guerrilla leaders are going to find refuge in Caracas, then the *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* [paramilitary group] will reach Caracas." See 'Amenaña a Venezuela el Conflicto Colombiano,' *La Nación Line*, (Buenos Aires: 16 March 1999), http://www.lanacion.com.ar/99/03/16/x11.htm. Ecuador agreed to U.S. military presence in Manta; and Brazil undertook a unilateral build-up on its border with Colombia, "including the inauguration [...] of its $1.4 billion Amazon-wide radar system, SIVAM (Sistema de Vigilancia da Amazonia)." G. Kourous, 'Return of the National Security State?,' *Americas Program* (Silver City, MN: Interhemispheric Resource Center, 18 November 2002), p. 6.
murder of two farmers, a fact that served to awaken old territorial claims of Guatemala; between Nicaragua and Costa Rica for the incursion of the latter's police into the former's territory; and between Honduras and Nicaragua regarding maritime territory. Although most of these Central American instances were successfully contained, they reflect the negative character of regional peace.

Does the survival of such issues prevent a change of perception of neighbours and of the region, or does the maintenance of hostile mutual visions prevent the resolution of disputes and the overcoming of distrust? This thesis has argued that the two shifts tend to go hand in hand and are in fact two sides of the same coin. In any case, political will is a key factor to put in motion the mechanism for this transformation. In the absence of it—that is, in the absence of a prevailing will to pursue a process of desecuritization—the enterprise becomes unattainable.

3. The present of the Southern Cone and its prospects

In the 1990s, with neoliberal administrations in Argentina and Brazil, Mercosur adopted a primarily economic and commercial profile, playing down the importance of its initial political spirit. This shift happened at a time of global financial crises that spread from Mexico, in 1994, to East Asia, in 1997. Not long afterwards, in 1998, the economies of Russia and Brazil also crashed, adding the 'vodka' and the 'caipirinha' (or 'samba') effects to the 'tequila' and 'dragon' (or 'saki') effects, as the crises came to be known.

As Mercosur's attention turned to trade, the parties failed to comply with several commercial agreements they had signed earlier, mainly by resorting to the imposition of different types of non-tariff barriers to intra-Mercosur trade. Not surprisingly, the result was the extension of the list of trade conflicts and a decline of credibility of, and confidence in, new negotiations. These drawbacks had been minimised in a context of trade expansion, such as the one that took place until 1998, but the Brazilian currency devaluation of 1999 and the simultaneous recessions in Brazil and Argentina aggravated the problem and halted the process of integration. What followed were bitter trade disputes between Mercosur's two largest partners extending until mid-2000. The recent Argentine financial and economic crisis that resulted in the end of the convertibility plan (2001/2002) slowed down the development of the Common Market even more.

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In the absence, or at best the thinning down, of the political basis that had underpinned the co-operation programme in the 1980s, these circumstances implied an important reversal of Argentine-Brazilian relations, given that the most solid grounds for shared benefits had come to be the now-declining commercial exchange. In other words, both the Brazilian and the Argentine crises have had important implications for regional trade, bilateral relations, and even for the viability of Mercosur, and this, in turn, has undoubtedly had an effect on their mutual perceptions.

Indeed, the fact that the emergence of a security community between the two main partners in Mercosur has only developed slowly despite an early enthusiastic beginning can be partially explained by the trade disputes and the partners' economic and political instabilities. Major crises provoked doubts in the responsiveness and predictability of the other party as a trustworthy partner. On the other hand, Mercosur has so far survived every crisis, and, repeatedly, crises have been followed by renewed enthusiasm to 're-launch' the programme. One could thus interpret that periods of tension merely highlight the partners' own vulnerabilities and the on-going need to co-ordinate long-term action.

The relationship between Argentina and Chile, and Chile and the region, in turn, has advanced mainly in the field of the economy, although achievements in other areas, such as defence and security, have been remarkable, as examined in chapter seven. However, Chile's economic success—in contrast with its neighbours' problems and at times the apparent lack of a solid integration project—makes Santiago look for alternatives and partnerships beyond the region. This, of course, also has an impact on mutual and self-perceptions.

One way or another, the present study hopes to have opened some spaces that can shape an interesting future research agenda. In this sense, the Southern Cone provides a rich ground on which to explore how economic and financial crises may affect mutual perceptions, and how these, in turn, may have an impact on the quality of peace and regional security. At the turn of the new century, the process of consolidation of peace that was beginning to develop into a Southern Cone security community had been to some extent reversed. Nevertheless, the absolute confidence of states in the region that no other fellow state will resort to violence to solve disagreements implies that stable peace remains on secure ground.

The most solid base, however, seems to be political rather than economic. The newly elected authorities in Buenos Aires and Brasilia have expressed their firm decision to work in this direction and to strengthen their political alliance. If the
Southern Cone countries succeed in recreating a common political foundation on which to build a sincere commitment to shared interests and common perspectives, then the benefits of closer interaction and more familiarity with one another are likely to spill over into larger sections of society. This way, hopefully, social actors may become active participants in the process of the further consolidation of peace. If this occurs, it appears that a more sustained security community will evolve in the Southern Cone.
Appendix: Interviews

1. **Dr Juan Alemann**
   Argentine Treasury Secretary, 1976-1981.

2. **Ambassador João Hermes Pereira de Araújo**
   Secretary and Counsellor at the Brazilian Embassy in Buenos Aires, 1964-1971.
   Head of the River Plate Basin and Chile Division, Itamaraty, Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations, 1972.

3. **Ambassador Mario Gibson Barboza**
   Minister-Counsellor at the Brazilian Embassy in Buenos Aires, 1956-1959.
   Brazilian Ambassador in Asunción, 1967.

4. **Minister Gustavo Cristian Bobrik**
   Held positions at the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Cult in the following Departments:
   Consultive Council on the South Atlantic (CASUR), since 2000.

5. **Prof Amado Luiz Cervo**
   Interviewed in Brasilia on 2 April 2001.
   Editor of 'Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional.'
   History Department, University of Brasilia.

6. **Ambassador Marcos Henrique C. Côrtes**
   Minister-Counsellor at the Brazilian Embassy in Buenos Aires, 1974-1978.

7. **Prof Rut Diamint**
   Interviewed in Buenos Aires on 17 August 2000.
   Department of International Relations, University Torcuato Di Tella, Argentina.
Specialist in civil-military relations and defence.

8. **Prof Carlos Escudé**

9. **Carlos da Fonseca**
   Interviewed in Brasilia on 2 April 2001.
   Department of Mercosul, Itamaraty, Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations.

10. **Minister Marcelo Giusto**
    Chief of Cabinet of the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, since 2002.

11. **Ambassador José Botafojo Gonçalves**
    Interviewed in Brasilia on 3 April 2001.
    Special Representative of the Brazilian President on Mercosul Affairs, 2001-2002.
    Brazilian Ambassador in Buenos Aires, since 2002.

12. **Ambassador Ramiro Elvísio Saraiva Guerreiro**

13. **Dr José Horacio Jaunarena**
    Argentine Secretary of Defence, 1984-1986.

14. **Dr Jorge Horacio Lavopa**
    Chairman, Committee of Latin American Affairs, CARI, Argentine Council for International Relations.

15. **Dr José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz**
16. **Ambassador Carlos Manuel Muñiz**

President of CARI, Argentine Council for International Relations.

17. **Prof José Paradiso**

Head of International Relations Department, University of El Salvador, Argentina.

18. **Celso de Tarso Pereira**

Interviewed in Brasilia on 2 April 2001.
Department of Mercosul, Itamaraty, Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations.

19. **Prof Mario Rapoport**

Director of the Economic and Social History Research Institute, Faculty of Economics, University of Buenos Aires.

20. **Ambassador Eduardo dos Santos**

Secretary at the Brazilian Embassy in Buenos Aires, 1979-1984.
Special Consultant of the Brazilian President’s Cabinet, 1999-2002.
Brazilian Ambassador in Montevideo, since 2002.

21. **Marcelo Stubrin**

Interviewed in Buenos Aires on 17 August 2000.
Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Chamber of Deputies of Argentina, 1999-2001.
Participant in the reserved meetings with Chilean representatives to find a solution to the dispute of Hielos Continentales/Campos de Hielo Sur, 1998.

22. **Ambassador Juan José Uranga**

Interviewed on the telephone in Brasilia on 3 April 2001.
Argentine Ambassador in Brasilia.
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