Strategic Versus Communicative Approaches to Peacemaking: A Critical Assessment of the Dayton Peace Initiative

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To my parents.
While the objective of peacemaking efforts is the institution of a self-sustaining peace, the international community has not been able to accomplish this important goal in many war-torn societies around the world. Thus, the challenge to peacemakers is not necessarily the negotiation of a peace agreement, but its implementation in order to re-integrate a divided society and allow former combatants to address contentious issues non-violently. In light of this reality, this doctoral thesis argues that contemporary peace initiatives have not established conditions of self-sustaining peace because the majority of peacemakers have conceive their efforts according to the tenets of the strategic approach to peacemaking. The strategic approach strongly believes that a self-sustaining peace can be achieved through state-building practices. Hence the international community has devoted much of its time and resources to strengthen state structures, strongly arguing that a strong state can integrate society and make negotiated peace agreements self-sustaining. Influenced by Habermasian critical theory, this thesis presents the theoretical foundations of the communicative approach to peacemaking. The communicative approach argues that state-building projects will not integrate society, at least in the short term, but foster more conflicts between contending groups. It places a higher premium on reconciliation efforts, civil society movements, and deliberative forms of democracy. Using the Dayton peace initiative as a case study, the thesis shows the reasons why the Office of the High Representative and other international agencies in Bosnia have been unable to establish a self-sustaining peace. It also critically reviews different ‘bottom-up’, society-centred peacebuilding programmes practiced in Bosnia since the signing of the peace agreement, exposing both its limitations and potentials. As a result, this doctoral thesis concludes by showing that new peacebuilding strategies must incorporate aspects of both approaches to peacemaking to make peace in Bosnia self-sustaining.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction: ‘Problematizing’ Peacemaking</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part One: Theoretical Foundations</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Conceptualizing Peacemaking: A Comparative Analysis of the Strategic &amp; Communicative Approaches</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Habermasian Insights &amp; the Study of Peacemaking Efforts</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Approaches to Peacemaking: A Comparative Analysis</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concluding Remarks</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. State-Centred Peacebuilding: The Challenge of Social Integration in War-Torn Societies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Ethnic Conflict &amp; the Problem of Social Integration</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. State-Centred Peacebuilding</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concluding Remarks</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Criticising State-Centred Peacebuilding</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Habermas’s Society-Centred Social Theory</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Examining Peacemaking Initiatives</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concluding Remarks</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part Two: The Dayton Peace Initiative</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The Bosnian War, International Quarrels &amp; the Motivation for American Action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. The Bosnian War in the Context of Yugoslavia’s Unmaking</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. America’s Decision to Intervene</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concluding Remarks</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. America’s Dayton Peace Initiative: The False Promise of the Strategic Approach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. The Road to Dayton</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. The 'Proximity' Peace Talks &amp; the Final Agreement</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concluding Remarks</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. From Military to Civilian Conceptions of Peacebuilding: The Rise of the Office of the High Representative</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. The Consolidation of Political &amp; Economic Power</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concluding Remarks</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Strengthening the Office of the High Representative’s Mandate: Peacebuilding as State-Building</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Charting a New Direction?</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concluding Remarks</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Specters of Society-Centred Peacebuilding in Bosnia</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Examples of Society-Centred Peacebuilding in Bosnia</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concluding Remarks</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion: Critical Reflections for a Self-Sustaining Peace in Bosnia</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Towards New Syntheses</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concluding Remarks</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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INTRODUCTION

‘Problematizing’ Peacemaking Efforts

In the post-Cold War era, ethnic conflicts and intrastate wars have been a major cause of international concern. Apart from the sheer destruction these wars cause, the methods employed by combatants to fulfil their interests directly challenge the great powers’ ability to realise their more immediate foreign policy objectives. In fact, the atrocious methods utilise by combatants to ethnically cleanse conquered territory have not only made a mockery of international human rights regimes, but more important these have also caused serious refugee crises that have equally threaten the economic and social structures of many neighbouring nation-states. As a consequence, these wars have forced Western publics to pressure their governments to intervene in these conflicts and put an end to the hostilities.

While public pressure is not a guarantee for foreign intervention, governments in the Western world have recognised that non-intervention is a high price to pay. This is the case for at least two reasons. First, in a world where new technologies are challenging nation-states’ ability to control their populations, the success of a secessionist campaign will only incite more secessionist wars. Second, these wars affect the composition of the established international system and might even question the position of the strongest actor. In other words, these wars can challenge the dominant position of the United States, while also revealing the weakness of other actors, such as the European Union. While intrastate in nature, these ethnic conflicts have demonstrated that ‘the problem of contemporary and future international politics, it turns out, is essentially a problem of domestic politics’ (Holsti 1996: 15).

While this proposition is important, it is also necessary to recognise the fact that these ethnic conflicts have become a problem for the international community. As Jara Choprat notes (1997: 179), the international community has been successful at ending wars, but not at re-constituting civil order, which is necessary for peace to become self-sustaining. The best example of this reality is the international community’s response to
the Bosnian war. While the Dayton peace initiative, crafted by the Clinton administration with the assistance of its European allies and Russia, has settled the conflict, the implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFA), more commonly known as the Dayton Peace Accords, has not resolved the conflict that led the three communities to war. Hence the challenge the international community faces today is not only the prevention or the settlement of ethnic wars, but more important their resolution, so a self-sustaining peace can be established, allowing international actors to dedicate their resources to other conflict situations or other issues of pressing concern.

Using the Bosnian war as a case study, this doctoral thesis argues that current peacemaking practices, that is to say the combination of efforts employed by actors to settle and resolve conflicts, will not establish the foundation of a self-sustaining peace. Building on the critical work of David Campbell (1998), this thesis problematizes these ‘accepted’ peacemaking practices in order to show why the Dayton initiative has not been able to achieve this important objective in Bosnia. The term ‘problematization’ was first conceived by Michel Foucault’s works. Campbell argues that problematization is a process that makes ‘it possible to think in terms of problems and solutions.’ Citing Foucault, he states that this process makes “possible the transformations of the difficulties and obstacles of a practice into a general problem for which one proposes diverse practical solutions.” (1998: x).

Consequently, the problematization of the peacemaking practices that produced GFA and the implementation of this agreement’s provisions in post-Dayton Bosnia demonstrate that these practices are ill-suited to the challenges posed by ethnic conflicts. This thesis not only provides a critique of the Dayton peace initiative. It also shows how new conceptions of peacemaking can have a positive influence in post-Dayton Bosnia and serve as an intellectual resource to peacemakers attempting to deal with on-going ethnic conflicts in the Balkans or other parts of the world.

As a result, this thesis is influenced by both theoretical and practical concerns. At the theoretical level, it argues that peacemaking activities can be differentiated into two general approaches: the strategic and the communicative. It is important to add that Jürgen Habermas’s critique of strategic reason and his expanded understanding of reason,
which he calls communicative reason, heavily influence this thesis’s examination of these
two approaches to peacemaking. Apart from these different conceptions of reason, the
difference between each approach to peacemaking is also determined by the objectives
pursued by peacemakers and by the mechanisms they employ to make a negotiated peace
settlement self-sustaining. Moreover, this thesis attempts to show how the
overwhelmingly influence of the strategic approach has led peacemakers to execute
strategies that are successful at ending wars, but not at instituting a self-sustaining peace.

At the more practical level, this thesis considers whether communicative
peacemaking mechanisms can establish a self-sustaining peace. This is even more
important at the present time, as corrective measures taken by these international
institutions have failed to adjust the current peacebuilding strategy to changing
circumstances. In this way, it argues that the problem with the Dayton peace initiative
and its current peacebuilding strategy is that they are still caught within the tenets of the
strategic approach. But, can communicative peacemaking mechanisms present a solution
or should the international community combine insights from these two approaches to
construct more effective peacemaking mechanisms?

This manuscript is divided into two parts. Part one, which is divided into three
chapters, addresses theoretical issues. Chapter one shows the influence of Habermas’s
research, in the context of this manuscript, and presents a comparative analysis that
clearly differentiates the theoretical foundations of the strategic approach from those of
the communicative approach. It is important to note that this review of both approaches
tends to explain the overall motives that force peacemakers to intervene in conflict
situations and the objectives of their efforts. Chapter two continues with this
investigation, but it shows how strategic peacemaking practices attempt to translate the
provisions of peace agreements into reality. Because this manuscript is primarily
concerned with ethnic conflicts, a review between different paradigms that attempt to
explain the nature of ethnic conflict and its relation to organised violence is offered. By
showing that these conflicts are caused by an ethnic group’s decision to change existing
social structures or to create a new society that exclusively represents its needs and
interest, the investigation illustrate how strategic peacemaking efforts use state-centred
practices of social integration to build new social structures that can settle and manage
these conflicts. In this manner, strategic forms of post-conflict peacebuilding institute and strengthen state structures in order to integrate society and weaken the position of those that oppose such projects.

Chapter three presents Habermas's society-centred social theory. Building on the critique of contemporary peacebuilding operations and their inability to establish the basis of a self-sustaining peace, communicative forms of peacebuilding argue that peacemakers must pay more attention to the reconstruction of society's symbolic structures. These symbolic structures enable former combatants to participate in dialogical processes that de-construct the identities that fuelled the conflict and construct new ones according to shared understandings of post-conflict situations. Communicative peacebuilding practices argue that state-building projects will not be able to integrate society, at least in the short-term, and that the interaction of individuals in the organs of civil society have that ability of constructing social discourses that might integrate society and direct peacebuilding efforts according to the needs, values and interests expressed by these individuals and other civic organisations. This chapter concludes by stressing the tensions between strategic and communicative approaches and by raising questions whether they are polar opposites or different sides of the same coin.

Part two of this manuscript, which is divided into five chapters, presents a critical assessment of the Dayton peace initiative. Its purpose is to test the assertion that this peacemaking initiative was heavily influenced by the insights provided by the strategic approach. Chapter four presents a short examination of the domestic, regional, and international dynamics that fostered the Bosnian war. This chapter also explains the motives that led the Clinton administration to take control of international peacemaking efforts and create the Dayton peace initiative.

Chapter five shows how Richard Holbrooke and his negotiating team dominated the pre-settlement and the settlement-making stage of the Bosnian war. It also illustrates how the American negotiation team bullied the European and Russian delegations, Slobodan Milošević, Franjo Tudjman, and Alija Izetbegović to accept the agreement's provisions, even though these did not reflect their more immediate interests. Instead, the GFA embodied American interests and a minimalist peacebuilding strategy that emphasised military objectives over civilian ones.
Chapters six and seven reviews the work conducted by the Office of the High Representative (OHR). In conjunction with other international and regional bodies, the OHR has not been able to establish the much sought-after self-sustaining peace. Chapter six discusses the challenges it faced in the first 18 months of peace implementation. It explains why the international community had to change the nature of the peacebuilding mission. At the Clinton administration’s behest, as documented in chapter five, this was basically a military operation supported by a civilian component. Its objective was to secure an end to the war and the creation of a balance of power between each community’s military forces as a way to prevent the re-occurrence of the armed conflict. Because of the slow implementation of the GFA’s civilian provisions, the international community, fuelled by European concerns and the US’s dissatisfaction with the peacebuilding mission, decided to transform it into a civilian operation supported by the NATO peacekeeping force. As documented in chapter seven, this transformation enabled the international community to impose the GFA’s provisions, even though at times extreme nationalist leaders and their political parties successfully hindered these peacebuilding efforts. It is for this reason that the OHR’s powers were strengthened and its mandate expanded, to the point that the OHR became the *de facto* ruler of Bosnia. Presently, the OHR has been pushing through a number of corrective measures, including a state-building programme, in hopes that its peacebuilding efforts will lead to a self-sustaining peace.

Chapter eight provides review of some “bottom-up” peacebuilding programmes in order to show what society-centred forms of peacebuilding could look like. By reviewing the work of non-governmental organisations and intergovernmental organisations at the grassroots and society’s middle-level, the chapter shows both the potential and limitations of society-centred practices. The concluding chapter underscores both the value and limits of both approaches. As a result, this doctoral thesis concludes by showing that new peacebuilding strategies must incorporate aspects of both approaches to peacemaking to make peace in Bosnia self-sustaining.

With this in mind, the work conducted in this thesis is theoretical, but with practical intent. Building on Robert Cox’s infamous assertion that: ‘Theory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose’ (1996: 87), this thesis problematizes peacemaking efforts
to show how these practices are actually influenced by a strategic approach. Using Habermas's work and the research conducted by those that support conflict resolution and conflict transformation mechanisms of conflict intervention, this thesis presents an alternative understanding of peacemaking. The communicative approach's insights may provide new ideas and practices that can facilitate individuals in post-conflict settings the theoretical and practical tools to establish the necessary foundations of a self-sustaining peace.

This thesis attempts to fill the gap between the theory and practice of peacemaking in order to illustrate the significance of the communicative approach in order to reconsider the validity of strategic forms of peacemaking. While it attempts to fulfil this objective, it is hoped that this thesis' findings can also inform the work of other scholars, conflict analysts, and decision-makers involved in peacemaking efforts in other conflict situations around the world.
PART ONE:

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
CHAPTER ONE
Conceptualising Peacemaking: A Comparative Analysis of the Strategic and the Communicative Approaches

INTRODUCTION

The term ‘peacemaking’ is employed throughout this doctoral thesis to describe a set of interdependent practices that are conducted at three, but interrelated stages of a conflict: (a) pre-settlement activities designed to move contending parties closer to mediation or negotiation; (b) settlement-making and the drafting of peace agreements that promote new social structures that increase cooperation between the parties; and (c) post-settlement peacebuilding, that is to say the combination of efforts to implement a peace agreement. This understanding is informed by the interconnected or the contingency approach (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2000; Bloomfield 1997; and Keashley and Fisher 1996), which stresses that successful peace initiatives are those that can target different types of peacemaking activities to a conflict’s different stages. Seen from this perspective, peacemaking efforts must first settle the conflict and then work with the parties to engender a new social system that allows former combatants to work together to meet their mutual needs and interests.

From a theoretical standpoint, peacemaking activities cut across three levels of analysis: (a) the international, (b) the regional, and (c) the domestic. Because each level of analysis includes a series of factors that affect a conflict’s dynamics, that is to say its escalation or de-escalation, peacemakers must recognised these factors and address the problems posed by each level of analysis if their peace initiatives are to prove successful. It is important to note that although this theoretical model is a useful analytic tool to judge if peacemaking initiatives are a success or a failure, this thesis does not favour one level of analysis over the other, as Kenneth Waltz did in Man, The State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (1959). Instead, it specifies that a successful peacemaking initiative must address each level’s problems and challenges. This implies that making peace is a
systemic process; where by a peacemaker's work at one level can have either constructive or negative consequences on overall peacemaking efforts.¹

The peacemaking process that gave life to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFA), more commonly known as the Dayton Peace Agreement, started in March 1994 when the Clinton administration decided to settle the conflict between the Bosniaks² and the Bosnian Croats, by pressuring the leaders of the two communities to establish the Croat-Bosniak Federation. From March 1994 to November 1995, the international community, headed by the United States' intent to end the war and preserve the legitimacy of Europe's security infrastructure, used a combination of political, military, and economic resources to force the contending parties to meet with the Contact Group at the Wright Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio to negotiate an end to the war and to design the institutional structure of the new state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.³

Even though the signing of the GFA in Paris on 14 December 1995 started a new chapter in Bosnia's recent history, increasing bickering between international actors and among Bosnia's ethno-communal leaders has questioned the viability of the GFA as a credible tool of peacemaking. The agreement was a direct result of American power, European compliance with American demands, and the international community's decision to ignore the needs and interests of the people directly affected by the war. By combining military coercion, diplomatic arm-twisting, and economic incentives, the Clinton administration, with the assistance of its European partners, was successful in forcing representatives of Bosnia's contending factions to accept the peace agreement at Dayton and to start the implementation of its provisions to build a new country modelled on recognised international norms and principles of governance and of economic organisation.

¹ Even though this framework of analysis will be developed in this chapter, it will not presented in full until the end of chapter three. In fact this framework serves as a tool to critically assess the Dayton peace initiative and judge if it has successfully establish a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia.

² Other studies label members of this group as Bosnian Muslim.

³ Even though the official name of the country is Bosnia and Herzegovina, for the sake of brevity the name: Bosnia will be used throughout this thesis.
Has the Dayton peace initiative been a success? An attempt to answer this question provokes yet another question: what defines the success of peacemaking efforts? While the 'notion of success is inherently relative', Fen Osier Hampson's (1996a: 10) research suggests that the success of peacemaking initiatives is related to a war-torn society's 'ability to make an effective transition from a state of war to a state of peace marked by the restoration of civil order, the re-emergence of civil society, and the establishment of participatory political institutions.' Even though many commentators might argue that a successful peacemaking initiative is one that settles a conflict and makes post-conflict peacebuilding possible, this investigation goes a step further. Successful peacemaking efforts are those that institute a self-sustaining peace. Conceptualising success in this way strongly suggests that the transformation and resolution of conflict situations is possible.

Accordingly, a self-sustaining peace is reached when the parties to a conflict can work together to implement the provisions of a negotiated peace agreement and address possible conflicts regarding this agreement's implementation by way of non-violent and democratic means. More important, the existence of a self-sustaining peace requires individuals' participation in the peacebuilding process. While this definition does not nullify the active presence of international actors, working to ensure the agreement's full implementation, a self-sustaining peace must include a transfer of power from these international actors to domestic institutions and social groupings interested in the process of post-conflict rehabilitation. International actors often play a dominant role in these peacebuilding missions to fulfil their self-interests (Regan 1998: 757). As a consequence, a self-sustaining peace is not always the final objective of peacemaking efforts. Instead, the goal might be more limited; that is the settlement of a conflict and the establishment of a balance of power between contending parties that can prevent the recurrence of the conflict's violent expression. Seen from this perspective, the parties are not seen as partners in peacebuilding, but as subjects that must follow a set of pre-determined rules, conceived by international actors to secure the settlement's viability.

In Bosnia, a self-sustaining peace seems to be a fading reality. The GFA's execution is directly dependent on the work being carried out by the Office of the High Representative, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO) peacekeeping force,
and other international actors. The Peace Implementation Council (an *ad hoc* international body that oversees the GFA's implementation and is responsible for creating new strategies to meet the agreement's objective) has noted in its many reports that the GFA's implementation is possible thanks in part to international pressures and incentives. The willingness of the parties to support the GFA, as it currently stands, is minimal. More surprising, moderate and nationalist politicians have campaigned for the agreement’s re-negotiation. Many reports put together by Western research institutions have convincingly demonstrated why the international community needs to re-evaluate its role in Bosnia and question the GFA’s viability. While criticisms in and outside Bosnia seems commonplace, the international community has repeatedly expressed its commitment to fully implement the peace agreement, though it has modified the strategy used to translate the agreement’s provisions into reality.

Noting that the international community has failed to institute a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia, it seems that the first question posed above (has the Dayton peace initiative been a success?) can be answered with a simple ‘no’. It is important to remember that a successful initiative is not only one that stops the fighting, but one that can make peace self-sustaining. Although there is general acceptance of the Dayton initiative’s failure, in this regard, the problem is that alternative policies being suggested by influential think-tanks and other international bodies to correct the current peacebuilding strategy are just quick-fix solutions that will not make peace self-sustaining in Bosnia. For this reason, it is not enough to question the viability of the Dayton peace initiative, but to also show the reasons why it has failed. Such an exercise will unearth the guiding principles and interests that have motivated international actors to intervene in the Bosnian war. Moreover, this theoretical exercise will demonstrate that the problem with the Dayton initiative, including subsequent corrective changes executed after Bosnia’s first post-settlement elections, is not merely related to how the strategy is being implemented. The failure of this initiative can be also linked to the ‘operational code’ or the analytic approach that inspired the intervention, the negotiations, and the writing and implementation of the peace agreement.

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4 By an operational code, it is meant the preconceived values, notions, and ideas that influence the making and implementation of policies (Cingranelli 1993: 5).
Subsequently, this thesis proposes that the failure of the Dayton peace initiative is not necessarily connected to international actors’ unwillingness to enforce the agreement (Woodward 1999a) or the resistance of nationalist elements to implement the GFA’s provisions. Instead, the Dayton peace initiative has failed because it has been forged according to the tenets of the strategic approach to peacemaking. Subsequently, any alternatives that attempt to correct the existing peacebuilding strategy must distance themselves from strategic conceptions of peacemaking, if these are to secure the foundations of a self-sustaining peace. These alternative strategies have to embrace new theoretical approaches to peacemaking, so new practices can emerge that allow Bosnia’s citizens to construct a social condition that advances their needs and interests without worries that former enemies will renew the fighting. As David Chandler’s (1999) critique of post-Dayton democratisation efforts advocate, new peacebuilding strategies must place the needs and interests of Bosnia’s citizens at centre stage, while equally empowering them to re-direct peacebuilding efforts in their country.

However compelling Chandler’s criticism is, his critique falls short of presenting a different theoretical framework that can give life to alternative strategies of peacebuilding in post-Dayton Bosnia. Learning from this shortcoming, this doctoral thesis presents the theoretical basis of a competing approach to peacemaking modelled on the critical work of Jürgen Habermas. This approach serves as the theoretical foundation of an alternative peacebuilding programme for Bosnia, which is presented in this thesis’s last chapter. As a result, this investigation plans to show how international actors, closely following the tenets of the strategic approach, have crafted a peacemaking process that has put in doubt the possibility of instituting a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia, at least in the foreseeable future.5

This chapter is a first step in this thesis’s assessment of the peace initiative that gave life to the GFA. The objective is to ‘problematize’ (Campbell 1998) the theoretical underpinnings of the strategic approach in order to present the theoretical tenets of the

5 It is important to mention that the current strategy may produce a self-sustaining peace, if the international community stays involved in Bosnia at present levels for a generation or two. This was actually the view of Carlos Westendorp, the second High Representative in Bosnia. However, the PIC and other international actors have expressed their unwillingness to stay in Bosnia for such a long time.
communicative approach. This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part makes the case that Habermas's theoretical insights can be used to analyse peacemaking efforts in Bosnia and in other regions of the world. The second part conducts a comparative analysis between strategic and communicative approaches to peacemaking. The comparison clearly specifies the similarities and differences between these two approaches.

I. HABERMASIAN INSIGHTS & THE STUDY OF PEACEMAKING EFFORTS
Critiquing the Dayton peace initiative requires first an analytical framework that makes it possible to 'problematize' an established interpretation by juxtaposing it against a competing explanation. Without this framework it would be difficult to assess peacemaking practices in Bosnia or to advocate changes to current peacebuilding efforts.

Habermas argues that individuals engaged in unhindered communicative processes, ingrained in the public sphere, have the ability of restructuring social arrangements according to principles of inclusion, mutual recognition, and deliberation. From this simple assertion flows Habermas's entire work in the realm of philosophy, sociology and politics. While his philosophical insights are important elements that guide this thesis's analysis, it is Habermas's socio-political research that lies at the heart of this investigation.

Building on his proposition that communication can serve as a steering mechanism, his socio-political project has been directed at creating an emancipatory social theory that secures the foundations and reproduces the social structures of a deliberative democracy. This conception of democracy transcends the limitations inherent in liberalism's and socialism's socio-political programmes by pointing at the weaknesses and strengths of both traditions. His first major work, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (originally published in German in 1966 but translated and published in English in 1991), started this project by demonstrating the progressive and degenerative traits of liberalism. These degenerative traits, associated with the expansion of the welfare state, the intrusion of public interests in private matters, and the increasing organisation of society according to capitalist criteria, undercut the progressive characteristics of the liberal tradition, as
captured in the ability of individuals to meet in public spaces to express their opinions and influence societal processes. According to Habermas's project, the encroaching powers of the state and the market have to be substituted with the positive aspects of socialist ideals, which envision an inclusive society where individuals, participating in process of political will-formation, can build new strategies of social change. These themes were continued in his two-volume study, The Theory of Communicative Action (1984 and 1987), and lie at the heart of his most recent book, Between Facts and Norms (1996a) and a number of essays collected in the volumes: The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory (1998), and The Postnational Constellation (2001).

In addition, Habermas has also dedicated his career to the 'reconstruction' of the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, especially the works conducted by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer produced in the United States during and shortly after the Second World War. Although Habermas might be thought of as the Frankfurt School's heir, he really is not as he directly questions Adorno's and Horkheimer's conclusions and presents a competing philosophical approach, which serves as the base of his theory of communicative rationality, discourse ethics, and deliberative democracy. His reconstructive work is not solely aimed against the Frankfurt School. It is also levied against post-structuralism, systems theory, and classical sociology running from Karl Marx to Emile Durkheim to Max Weber to Talcott Parsons. Consequently, Habermas's socio-political project has been directed at explaining the working of modern societies in order to demonstrate ways social actors can re-structure these according to their values and principles. This serves as the practical and theoretical foundations of his model of deliberative democracy.

This thesis use of Habermas's insights and analytic framework may be baffling, as most of his work explains the workings of advanced capitalist systems, mainly found in North America and Western Europe. In fact, Habermas has little to say about societies such as Bosnia. Apart from some articles where he addresses some of the events that led to the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia and some other essays where he deals with the sources and consequences of nationalism, his theories have not explained the nature of ethnic conflicts. In recent articles, Habermas does address the limits and possibilities of
contemporary humanitarian interventions, but the reality is that these ideas are not
developed fully.

Another limitation with Habermas's theories is that although he is interested in
creating a practical philosophy of social change, his ideas are so complicated that many
critics have lambasted him for not presenting a clear link between theory and practice
(Leonard 1990). Although some of these critics raise a very important point, it is also
important to note Andrew Parkin's argument that Habermas's work can be best described
as a research programme. In this way, Habermas's critical theory 'aims to contribute to
the struggles of the disempowered by offering an understanding of the processes and
tendencies that reproduce social relations of power. The intention is that the insights and
interpretations offered by [his work] will be of relevance to those involved in the politics

Even though Habermas has not addressed issues concerning peacemaking
processes, his insights have been widely used by researchers attempting to critique the
international dynamics and conflict intervention mechanisms that have inspired
different peacemaking efforts. An important example is Denoil Jones's (1999) book,
Cosmopolitan Mediation? Conflict Resolution and the Oslo Accords, which critically
evaluates the mediation efforts that produced the Oslo Accords.

While this thesis is influenced by Jones's analysis, it is important to mention that
it does not accept all of its conclusions. The main reason for opposing aspects of Jones's
work is that his research, although using aspects of Habermas's research, tends to
question the role critical theory can play in transforming established social orders.
Indeed, Jones concludes his book in a sombre note, demonstrating how mediation
processes based on dialogical exchanges did not introduce a new condition that permitted
the Palestinian people to achieve their national self-determination. He convincingly
narrates how the Norwegian sponsored mediation process legitimised the inequality of
the Palestinian people and re-created a state of occupation, where the Palestinian cause
was tied to Israeli security concerns (Jones 1999: 160-63).

This conclusion does not diminish the value of Jones's investigation. On the
contrary, while he demonstrates the weaknesses of critical theory and questions the
efficacy of conflict intervention mechanisms based on the facilitation of dialogical
exchanges, the importance of his work is that it rightly argues that critical theory is a useful tool to scrutinize peacemaking processes and explain how the provisions of mediated peace agreements can question their emancipatory potentials. In this way, Jones’s work tends to support Parkin’s understanding of Habermasian critical theory as a research program, indicating the value of Habermas’s research to the study of peacemaking processes.

This thesis borrows Jones’s framework of analysis. He differentiates mediation processes into two approaches: ‘the power-politics/geostrategic’ and ‘the facilitation/problem-solving’. By clearly differentiating between these two types of mediation practices, Jones ‘problematises’ (Campbell 1998) mediation initiatives based on the power-politics approach and uses the insights provided by the facilitation approach in order to criticise the diplomatic process that led to the Oslo Accord. By juxtaposing one approach against the other, the problem with the overall process becomes apparent and a settlement that was seen by many as a legitimate means to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is in doubt. Borrowing this approach and building on Habermas’s work, this doctoral thesis divides peacemaking efforts into: ‘strategic’ and ‘communicative’ approaches (Habermas 1984, 1987 & 1996). The first approach covers ‘conflict management’ and ‘conflict settlement’ strategies and the second includes ‘conflict resolution’ and ‘conflict transformation’ practices. At first glance, these peacemaking strategies seem to be attempting to reach a solution to the conflict and set the institutional foundations of a self-sustaining peace. A more in depth analysis reveals not only theoretical differences, but also practical distinctions concerning the final objective of these strategies and the interests guiding peacemakers’ actions.

II. APPROACHES TO PEACEMAKING: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
As noted above, Habermas’s socio-political project was directed against the Frankfurt School’s findings, especially Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique of reason in Dialectics of Enlightenment (originally published in 1942 and republished in 1973). If the Enlightenment tradition has established that reason is a mechanism that allows human beings to break with oppressive social orders by giving them the tools to understand their social environments and design strategies of societal change, Adorno and Horkheimer’s
study, building on Max Weber’s rationalisation thesis, argued that the opposite was true as well. Reason could be employed by society’s administrators (i.e. the state) to co-opt humanity and to prevent dissatisfied individuals from designing strategies of social change. Their pessimistic descriptions confirmed Weber’s claim that the triumph of bureaucratic rationality leaves individuals powerless to affect the composition of their society.

As one of Adorno’s most talented assistants, Habermas turned against Adorno and Horkheimer by proposing that reason could still serve as a mechanism of social change and human emancipation. This is not to say that Habermas completely disagreed with Adorno and Horkheimer’s conclusions. Rather, he believed that their study painted a one-dimensional understanding of reason, history, and human emancipation. Thus, Habermas’s work can be best described as a reconstructive effort. By this Habermas explains that ‘reconstruction’ is an analytic endeavour in which ‘one takes a theory apart and puts it back together in a new form, in order to better achieve that goal which it set for itself. This is the normal way…of dealing with a theory that requires revision in many respects, but whose potential for stimulation has not yet been exhausted’ (cited in McCarthy 1981: 233). Following this methodology, Habermas not only turns Frankfurt School critical theory on its head, but he shows how a “reconstructed” sense of reason, grounded on his conception of communicative rationality, may empower individuals to create social movements attuned to social change.

Building on this observation, peacemaking has to be understood as a series of different, but interdependent endeavours pursuing a common goal. The term in itself suggests that the goal is to ‘make’ ‘peace’. However, ‘peace’ is a highly contested concept. It is for this reason that some analysts recommend that one define peacemaking as a process that ends war in order to build some kind of peace (Evans 1993). While this definition does not tell us much about the specific traits that define peacemaking as a distinct set of activities different from other activities, former UN Secretary General, Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali in his Agenda for Peace, provided a more widespread definition, which has had much influence on contemporary peacemaking initiatives.

Article 33 of The UN Charter clearly states that armed conflicts should be resolved via the following mechanisms: ‘negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation,
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or agreements’ (cited in Evans 1993: 89). In order to pressure the parties to undertake conflict resolution mechanisms, the UN Security Council, in conjunction with regional bodies and UN member countries, uses a combination of pressures and incentives, including the use of force, to persuade parties to peacefully settle their differences. It is no surprise that Boutrous-Ghali defines peacemaking as a set of ‘comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will...consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people’ (1992). Based on this definition, he strongly insists that peacemakers must not only help contending parties settle their conflict, but they must also make sure that peace agreements include clear provisions to move the parties towards a condition of self-sustaining peace.

Depending on the intensity of and the social consequences of the conflict being addressed, Boutrous-Ghali (1992) argues that these provisions should include a combination of the following activities:

...disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and the destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening government institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.

Consequently, and as demonstrated by Eva Bertram’s (1995: 388) review of UN peacebuilding operations from 1988 to 1995, peacemaking is a way of re-building or making state structures, while equally devising a formula that secures co-operation among former combatants in the transition from war to peace.

There at least two problems with this definition of peacemaking. First, while evidence indicates the relative success of peacemakers in the pre-settlement and settlement-making stages, the success of contemporary post-settlement peacebuilding efforts is in question. In the case of Bosnia, and this observation may apply to other similar cases, the traditional conception of peacemaking might not provide the adequate analytic framework to address protracted conflicts and move the contending parties towards peace. The second problem with this understanding is that it tells us little of the theoretical traditions and the interests that guide peacemakers’ activities. This last point is
important because peacemaking activities do not always follow the interests and values of the UN, but the more narrow values or interests of the state actors that intervene to put an end to the fighting.

The following two sections present the differences between the strategic and communicative approaches to peacemaking. Such a comparative analysis is influenced by normative concerns. Peacemaking efforts, as traditionally defined, have a worthy objective. The problem is that this definition has not advanced conditions of self-sustaining peace in Bosnia. This thesis argues that this understanding of peacemaking (which approximates this thesis’s understanding of the strategic approach) has been too influential in Bosnia. The case study on peacemaking efforts in Bosnia should not only demonstrate this reality, but it should also demonstrate the reasons why an epistemological break with strategic conceptions of peacemaking is necessary, if a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia is to materialise. In this way, the comparative analysis, presented below, will also introduce the theoretical foundations of a new peacebuilding programme for Bosnia.

With this said, section one describes the theoretical foundations of the strategic approach. The second section defines those of the communicative approach. The distinctions are captured by each approach’s interpretations of the following common themes: (a) conception of rationality; (b) definition of peace; (c) the interests that influence third parties to intervene in a conflict’s dynamics; (d) the conflict intervention mechanisms used by third parties and the goals of these mechanisms; (e) the type of diplomacy used by outside players; (f) the role of local actors and outsiders in the implementation of a peace agreement; (g) the importance of reconciliatory mechanisms; (h) the ideal type of social integration practices; and (i) the type of democratisation being pursued. Before continuing, it is important to keep two things in mind. First, the comparative analysis provided in the next two sections addresses these common themes in the context of Habermas’s research. Thus, Habermas’s insights are crucial in understanding the differences of the strategic and communicative approaches. As will be seen below, the thesis’s intent to describe these approaches to peacemaking as “strategic” and “communicative” are related to Habermas’s socio-political project. Second, the last two of these common themes will be described in full detail in the next two chapters,
which address questions concerning social integration; that is to say the causes of ethnic conflicts, state-failure, state-building, and peacebuilding.

A. The Strategic Approach
In the opening pages of the *Theory of Communicative Action*, Habermas (1984: 7) argues that any theory, which attempts to explain the dynamics that produce social order or foment disorder, has to be based on a conception of reason. In doing so, a theory not only explains how actors acquire knowledge (e.g. rationalism), but it must also make clear the relationship between knowledge and social action; that is to say how actors put into practice acquired knowledge so they can achieve certain specific ends (e.g. rationality). Consequently, such explanations can demonstrate how the application of rationality can transform social relations and the structural composition of society (e.g. rationalisation).

For Habermas, theories can be divided into two camps: (a) those theories that build their arguments and prescriptions according to the insights provided by the 'philosophy of the subject' and (b) those that follow the tenets of the 'philosophy of communication'. In the context of this thesis, the strategic approach to peacemaking is founded on the former, while the communicative approach is based on the latter. This section explains the interplay between strategic peacemaking and the philosophy of the subject.

1. Strategic Rationality and Social Action
The philosophy of the subject is modelled on the tenets of Newtonian physics. This model maintains that individuals attain knowledge by: (a) separating the observing subject from the observed object; (b) confirming the scientific character of observations through empirical techniques; and (c) establishing casual relationships by detecting 'the invariant temporal relationships between observed events' (Smith 1996: 15). This model conceptualises social action 'as the intentional, self-interested behavior of individuals in an objectivated world, that is, one in which objects and other individuals related to in terms of their possible manipulation.' (White 1988: 10). Consequently, strategic
rationality foments goal-oriented action: ‘Actions are valued and chosen not for themselves, but as more or less efficient means to a further end’ (Risse 2000: 3).

Goal-oriented action can be divided into two types: (a) instrumental, and (b) strategic (Habermas 1984: 285). These two forms of actions are similar in many respects, but these are practiced in different circumstances. Regarding their similarities, theories based on strategic rationality ‘treat the interests and preferences of actors as mostly fixed during the process of interaction’ (Risse 2000: 3). Building on this understanding, and closely approximating Max Weber’s account of Zweckrationalität, the main theoretical components of this approach are: ‘coherence/consistency’ and ‘efficiency’ (Gellner 1983: 20-21). These two elements describe the process that enables actors to identify its ‘interests’ and ‘preferences’.

The element of coherence/consistency specifies that social problems can only be addressed according to a scientific method that enables actors to make sense of complex issues by ordering all observed facts and determining the objective to be carried out by an actor. Thus, gathering and ordering information is a basic prerequisite of action. The element of coherence also sets a hierarchy of options an actor can pursue to address the problem at hand. Which response an actor employs depends on the second element, efficiency. In this way, an actor creates a strategy based on a cost-benefit analysis of each preference. The option that enables an actor to achieve its interests by minimising the costs and maximising returns is the one that an actor will put into practice. Noting the similarities, it is now important to present the differences between instrumental and strategic forms of action.

Habermas (1984) describes instrumental action as non-social behaviour, while strategic action occurs in the social world. While Habermas does not clearly differ one form of action from the other, research conducted in international relations can explain how they differ. According to the tenets of realism, nation-states, the sole actors in international politics, operate in conditions of anarchy, roughly resembling a Hobbesian

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6 Max Weber did not specify these two elements in these words. This follows Ernest Gellner’s (1983: 20-21) interpretation of Weber’s understanding. However, the element of order is close to Weber’s analysis that maintains that rationality or rationalization results from the attempt at ‘organizing’ social spaces for particular ends. How to achieve this organization is dependent on ‘calculation’ of best ‘techniques’ to accomplish these ends (Weber 1958: 13).
state of nature. Nation-states’ chief concern is survival. Survival in this respect is both an interest and an end. Nation-states pursue foreign policies that increase their ability to survive, while at the same time attempting to prevent other nation-states from hurting their position. Because all nation-states behave in similar fashion, interstate relations are marred by competition and distrust. Accordingly, this type of behaviour is non-social or instrumental because nation-states employ technical knowledge, that is knowledge acquired via an objective and scientific approach, to select the best means to achieve a particular end, without taking into consideration an opponent’s own interests.

In contrast, strategic action takes place within established social structures. An actor’s ability of achieving a particular end can be either constrained or empowered by these structures. In the case of instrumental action, actors are relatively equal in power. The existence of strategic action presupposes that some actors are more powerful than others; hierarchical relations of power, not anarchy best describes the social conditions where these acts take place. The structure of the system impels actors to not only follow the rules of rational choice models, but they also have to think of ways of influencing their opponents’ decisions. Hence, strategic action is social because actors recognise that existing social conditions and hierarchical relations of power can prevent them from fulfilling their self-interest (Habermas 1984: 285; and White 1989: 37).

It is not an accident that this definition of strategic action closely resembles neorealist explanations of international relations. This is not to say that liberalism’s explanations of interstate interactions are not based on the same understanding of rationality. Current international relations research has asserted how this analytic framework derives its explanations from this understanding. Whether these frameworks share or not the same conception of rationality is not at the centre of this investigation. This debate has already been reviewed by Miles Kahler (1998), while theorists influenced by the ‘interpretive turn’ in international relations have convincingly demonstrated how the same conception of rationality is shared by competing traditional frameworks of international relations (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996: 60-61). Even so, it is important to demonstrate how the liberal approach to international relations shares the same conception of rationality; as such an exercise reveals other features of the strategic approach.
Liberalism, as recently presented by Andrew Moravcsik (1997 and 1999), challenges realism's material understanding of world politics, arguing that non-material factors, such as international norms, ideas, identities, and institutions, can influence an actor's behaviour in a specific situation. For proponents of liberalism, actors are not solely nation-states, but also include non-state actors (e.g. trans-national organizations, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and so forth). As a result, liberal theory presents a world in which institutions, ideas, and social norms matter. This is especially true in situations where actors see institutions as mechanisms they can use to achieve their preferences. As Frank Schimmelfennig (2001: 48) demonstrates in his review of the European Union's (EU) decision to expand eastward, actors can be 'concerned about their reputation as members [of the EU] and about the legitimacy of their preferences and behavior.' While an actor's interests may remain fixed, the existence of institutions and accepted norms of behaviour force actors to reflect on the best possible strategy to achieve their interests.

It is important to stress that the existence of non-material factors and established institutions does not imply that actors will not behave strategically. Far from it, actors still behave strategically, but they are more concerned about the efficient pursuit of their self-interests (Jervis 1999: 45-47). They understand that their actions might have negative consequences on their position within the system, so they use calculative thinking to devise means that further their self-interest without breaking the norms that are supposed to regulate action. This is so for two reasons. First, breaking the established rules of the game might question the need of established institutions, permitting other actors to take similar steps and increasing the probability of conflict. Second, an actor's decision to defect would force another actor or a group of actors to sanction this behaviour via different political, military, and economic means. The rationale behind this response can only be understood by actors' motivations to create institutions and norms of accepted behaviour.

Actors create and support institutions when they consider these to be mechanisms that advance their particular self-interests (Jervis 1999: 57-58). Liberal theory concedes that competition is a feature of international relations, but the destructiveness associated with competitive behaviour forces rational actors to device ways that permit them to fulfil
their interests without having to resort to coercion and violence (Moravscik 1997: 517-18). Institutions serve this purpose because they tend to increase contact between actors. This process allows actors to learn more about opponents' patterns of behaviour, while also reducing the informational uncertainty that competitive relations tends to breed. Consequently, conflict is minimised and competitive behaviour, while possible, tends to be managed by existing institutions.

While this view tends to present a picture of politics as a bargaining process, rather than a zero-sum game, relations between actors are not characterised by co-operation, as many liberal theorists might argue, but by manipulation and domination. Enough research has demonstrated how strategically motivated actors can advance their interest by means of co-operation (Keohane 1984 and 1989). Nonetheless, it is important to add that manipulation and domination are prevalent because liberalism cannot solve the problem of power distribution. Indeed, non-material factors may provide reasons for actors to co-ordinate their actions, but these by themselves do not guarantee that actors will not employ force or other coercive tactics to attain their goals. This axiom especially holds true for the most powerful actor within the system, which plays an important role at keeping order by creating, with the assistance of other actors, accepted norms and rules of behaviour. When these norms and rules fail to keep actors in line, the strongest actor, often in conjunction with other actors, employ its resources to reprimand dissenters, as their actions can question the established order, which in turn questions the position of the strongest power.

This review of strategic rationality and its influence on realist and liberal frameworks of analysis finds that the differences between these two frameworks can be best described as a sibling rivalry. Indeed, Robert Jervis argues that both traditions arrive at different conclusions because they tend to study different facets of the same world. Liberalism examines the relations of actors dealing with issues pertaining to the 'international political economy and the environment', while realists tend to explain the 'causes, the conduct, and consequences of wars.' The former 'is more concerned with efficiency' and the latter 'focuses more on issues of distribution, which are closely linked to power as both an instrument and a stake' (Jervis 1999: 45). Jervis's observation is important because it not only confirms that both frameworks share the same conception
of rationality, but more important because together these frameworks’ conclusions
avert that an actor will attempt, via different mechanisms, to establish and maintain
an international order that empowers it to satisfy its interests.

Because this thesis analyses the peacemaking efforts that produced the Dayton
peace initiative, it demonstrates how the structure of trans-Atlantic relations and how the
United States’ changing perception of the Bosnian war impacted the overall peace
process. As demonstrated in chapters four and five, the Clinton administration crafted a
foreign policy toward Bosnia firmly based on this conception of strategic rationality. This
meant that the United States had to employ its resources to first press its European allies
and Russia to accept its peace initiative and then to coerce Bosnia’s warring factions to
accept the peace plan drafted at the Wright Patterson Airbase in Dayton, Ohio. But, this is
only part of the story. Peacebuilding efforts, as demonstrated in chapters six and seven,
were not conducted according to the American design proposed at Dayton. After it
became evident that the American plan could not produce a self-sustaining peace in
Bosnia, the European governments, with America’s consent, were free to design a policy
that closely approximated their interests. The only problem is that the agents that
designed this new peacebuilding strategy were also strongly influenced by a strategic
conception of rationality.

2. The Importance of Order

It is important to mention that the above review of strategic rationality and its influence
in liberal and realist theories of international relations can also be extended to theories
that explain how actors relate to each other in established domestic orders. The link
between strategic rationality and a nation-state’s social system is established in the next
chapter’s review of the problem of social integration and the challenge peacebuilding
efforts have to confront in divided societies. One of the reasons that the above subsection
described the influence strategic rationality has had on traditional approaches to
international relations is that peacemaking tends to be an international practice, where
outside parties intervene in a conflict to move warring factions towards peace.

The objective of this practice is to establish a new set of institutions that enables
parties to co-exist without fear that one party will rely on organised forms of political
violence to achieve their self-interests. If war can be described as a condition where parties relate to each other instrumentally, then this approach to peacemaking must be seen as a set of activities that enables these warring parties to relate to each other strategically. The aim is to force the warring parties to start co-ordinating their actions so they can agree on new institutions, norms, and rules that may guide their future behaviour. Consequently, peacemakers attempt to create order at both intrastate and international levels. Even though the goal of establishing order at both these levels motivates peacemaking efforts, it is important to stress that strategic peacemaking is primarily guided by the need to safeguard the basis of international order. To put it differently, the stability of an established international order can be secured by re-arranging domestic systems according to “accepted” international norms and values. This maxim is especially applicable when the peacemaker is a great power that perceives intrastate disorder to be questioning the foundations of the international order, putting in doubt the institutions, norms and values that enable it to achieve its self-interests.

This observation raises the following question: if third party interveners are stimulated by a desire to preserve international order, then what are some of the mechanisms they employ to make peace at the intrastate level? The growth of the discipline of conflict analysis has produced a number of conflict intervention mechanisms: (a) conflict settlement, (b) conflict management, (c) conflict resolution, and (d) conflict transformation. The first two are discussed in this subsection, as these are part of the strategic approach to peacemaking; the other two will be reviewed in the next section.

These mechanisms can be differentiated according to the objectives peacemakers expect to accomplish. Motivated by the creation of order, peacemakers acting strategically tend to employ mechanisms that settle or manage the conflict. Conflict settlement, as Joseph Scimecca avers (1993: 392), ‘produces an outcome that does not necessarily meet the needs of all concerned but is accepted because of the coercion of a stronger party.’ Consequently, peacemakers tend to rely on conflict settlement mechanisms in the pre-settlement and settlement-making stages. As noted above, the objective is to terminate the violent expression of conflict and impose the foundations of a social order that forces parties to co-ordinate their actions with their opponents. While
conflict settlement mechanisms are usually employed at the above-mentioned stages, this
does not mean that these cannot be employed at the stage of post-settlement
peacebuilding. However, peacemakers understand that coercion is an inefficient way of
safeguarding the viability of a settlement and the social order that it creates, because ‘it
does not provoke voluntary compliance’ (Hurd 1999: 384). For this reason, peacemakers
depend on conflict management mechanisms to encourage the parties to implement the
peace agreement.

Strategic peacemakers do not believe that a conflict can be resolved (Zartmann
and Touval 1996; and Jones 1999: 14-15). They argue that it can be managed. Thus,
peacemakers assume that ‘conflict is an organizational problem that can be managed by
changing the conditions within social institutions’ (emphasis added, Scimecca 1993:
382); the emphasis is not to transform social structures, but to search for ways to
accommodate the interests and needs of displeased groups and individuals by allowing
them to have more access to political and economic structures.

This perspective sees conflict in a negative light, for it tends to question the
viability of negotiated settlements, which are built on a modern conception of politics.
Politics is not defined on conceptions of social justice or, what Habermas calls discourse
ethics. Instead, politics is defined as a mechanism that determines who gets what, when,
and how. It is therefore described in material fashion as a process that attempts to
regulate citizens’ actions in order to satisfy the needs and interests of society. Not
surprisingly, this understanding stresses that social conflicts are a threat to the established
social order, questioning the social institutions that have been conceived to enable
individuals to satisfy their interests and needs, while equally challenging the legal system
that guide the work of these institutions and regulate the behaviour of society’s citizens.

In this vein, conflict management is more than just a set of practices that prevent
parties from undermining or toppling the established social order; it is the key element in
the founding of a self-sustaining peace. Once established social institutions can manage
conflict in these societies, peacemakers can dedicate less resources to secure the basis of
intrastate order and pay more attention to other conflicts or issues of concern. Conflict
settlement and conflict management mechanisms do not only complement each other, but
both mechanisms are also influenced by the tenets of the strategic approach and by the
peacemakers' attempt to control the peacemaking process.

This is an important observation because it demonstrates that peacemakers are
agents of social control. By pursuing order and stability, they tend to ignore the needs and
interests of the conflicting parties. Peacemakers are therefore aware of their interests and
manipulate the conflict situation to secure the attainment of these interests. Their goal is
not to create new social conditions that may be amenable to the contending parties. In
fact, peacemakers see themselves as problem-solvers, utilising a scientific method to
understand the conflict at hand and provide a settlement that may end its violent
expression. Peacemakers use this scientific method to describe facts and make
generalisations concerning these facts; hence the observer's experience conforms to these
generalisations.

The problem with this approach is that the peacemaker affirms 'the externality
and the objectivity of reality', but it 'never raises the question of how such a reality has
come about' (Keyman 1997: 96). The historical past is therefore not taken into
consideration and existing social structures are taken for granted. Subsequently,
peacemakers' understanding of conflict situations 'conforms to the ideas' of the
peacemaker and 'not to experience itself' (Rasmussen 1996: 18), leading to what Georg
Luckáš called 'reification' or 'the process through which human beings are turned into
things, and thing-like, objectified relationships and ideas come to dominate human life...'
(Kellner 1989: 10). Consequently, peacemakers tend to ignore the underlying causes of a
conflict and freeze existing social relations as a way of moving the parties towards peace.
As Robert Cox (1996: 88) argues, a problem-solving stance requires the researcher or the
peacemaker to take the world as he or she finds it, 'with the prevailing social and power
relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework
for action. The general aim of problem solving is to make these relationships and
institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble.'

Accordingly, the Bosnian war, as demonstrated in more detail in chapter four,
challenged NATO's role in the post-Cold War era and the Clinton administration's vision
of Europe. Once the United States understood that Bosnia was questioning its privileged
position in Europe, it decided to end the conflict by pushing the parties to accept a new
Bosnian state, modelled on internationally recognised democratic standards and the protection of human rights. It was argued that such a policy would not only stabilise the region, but it would also reinforce the principles of state sovereignty, multiethnic democracy, and capitalist doctrines of economic organisation. Consequently, the United States, via the Contact Group, was sending a clear message to secessionist movements in Southeastern Europe, and the rest of the world, that they had to reconsider their strategies, for the international community would not tolerate violent secessionist struggles.

It can be said that strategic forms of peacemaking reinforce the importance of Westphalian ideals. It is significant to note how the Contact Group was effectively securing the basis of international order since 1648: international stability can only be secured by nation-states, while intrastate order can be assured by creating an effective state apparatus that could manage or in extreme cases forcefully settle social conflict. Consequently, the Contact Group's decision to create a new Bosnian state was not only guided by the belief that the state is the legitimate representative of Bosnia's citizens in the international arena. More important, and building on the historical development of Western societies, the Contact Group also argued that the new state would integrate Bosnia's divided society and start the transformation of the Bosnian economy along capitalist principles.

Note how state-building, the process by which a state is created and strengthened against other social sources of power (e.g. nationalist parties and their organisations), becomes a peacebuilding mechanism. Indeed, many experts believe that the state can do more than just settle or manage social conflicts; it can actually engender processes of interethnic reconciliation. In theory, the sense of security created by the state and the economic interdependence that results from economic reforms should provide each community's leaders incentives to co-operate and support this state-building program. It would also impel individuals from different backgrounds to increase the level of contacts and start the healing process needed to normalise social relations.7

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7 President Bill Clinton (1999: 1529) reinforced the general acceptance of this proposition during a press conference in 9 August 1999, when he was asked by journalist from the former Yugoslavia to comment on peace processes in Bosnia and Kosovo and the prospects of a sustainable peace in these situations in the near future.
The only problem with this view, and as experienced in America’s intervention in Panama, Haiti, and Somalia, is that reconciliation is not an objective in itself. Rather, it is seen as a by-product of state-building programmes. The aim is to construct state institutions to secure social order, stability, and the necessary reforms to move war-torn societies closer to internationally recognised standards of political and economic organisation, which reinforce Western conceptions of international relations. Consequently, strategic peacemaking practices are guided by the twin objectives of internal order and regional stability. In light of this, strategic peacemaking can also be described as negative peacemaking, as the twin objectives closely resemble Johan Galtung’s (1996: 30-32) definition of ‘negative peace’, which is defined as the absence of illegitimate acts of violence, that is to say violent acts not conducted by the state.

Therefore, this form of peacemaking is mostly driven by official diplomacy or what Joseph Monteville (1991) calls ‘Track-One’ diplomacy. The pervasive use of this type of diplomacy has two effects on peacemaking processes. First, peacemakers, who tend to represent governments and international or regional organisations, usually negotiate with their political counterparts, which usually tend to be the same leaders that started and waged wars against the other parties. Ironically, this ‘official’ interaction tends to legitimise these leaders position of power and grants them the authority to negotiate with peacemakers the makeup of the new society. Strategic peacemakers ignore the needs and interests of individuals that are not represented by the leaders of warring parties. In fact, those moderate leaders that actually believe in multiculturalism and democracy tend to be sidelined during official negotiations because they lack the material resources to force the warring parties to end the war. While peacemakers agree that this official process may undermine the work of moderate movements and empower extreme forces that oppose the implementation of the peace agreement, they believe that in the long run new institutions and the introduction of democratic mechanisms and human right provisions will empower the citizens of war-torn countries to elect new leaders that support a multicultural ethos and democratic values of social organisation.

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Second, the use of official diplomatic tools suggests that the newly created government will be responsible for enforcing the peace agreement’s provisions. This is not to say that non-governmental organisations or private individuals will not have a role in these efforts. Their presence and activities are determined by their willingness to act in accordance with the provisions of a negotiated peace agreement, which represent the interests of peacemakers and the leaders that signed the agreement. Hence, peacebuilding tends to be dominated by a set of interests imbued in the provisions of the peace settlements. It is exactly for this reason that peacemakers strongly support the active presence of international organs in the process of post-settlement peacebuilding. Undeniably, the past failures of many brokered agreements and the escalation of violence that accompanies these failures has obligated the international community to manage and settle possible conflicts in post-settlement situations, while the new structures of power are created and strengthened. For this reason, the international community has learned that challenges to peace agreements must be confronted by modifying existing peace implementation strategies, so the objectives that encouraged outsiders to intervene in the conflict are met (Walter 1999). Keeping in mind the traits of strategic rationality, strategic peacemaking stresses that the peace implementation strategy may be altered to fit changing circumstances, but the objectives tend to remain the same.

In the end, traditional forms of peacemaking tend to equal this review of strategic peacemaking. The objective is the preservation of domestic stability as means to keep intact the structure of the international system. It is for this reason that peacemaking is generally described as an international practice led by state actors that are affected by a given conflict situation. Because the outsider tends to be stronger than the parties to the conflict, strategic peacemaking establishes social orders that reflect its needs and interests, while marginalising the needs and interests of the parties caught in the conflict.

B. The Communicative Approach

Communicative peacemaking has to be understood as an ideal, exalted by many scholars working in the tradition of critical theory. As demonstrated in Jones’s work, it has rarely affected the dynamics of intractable conflicts. Scholars working along the lines of strategic conceptions of international relations theory have characterised critical theory as
a mere theoretical exercise that has little value in the making of public or foreign policies. For instance, Robert Keohane (1988: 392) argues that:

...the greatest weakness of the reflective school [the critical approach] lies not in deficiencies in their critical arguments but in lack of a clear reflective research program that could be employed by students of world politics. Waltzian neorealism has so research program; so does the neoliberal institutionalism, which has focused on the evolution and impact of international regimes. Until the reflective scholars or other sympathetic to their arguments have delineated such a research program and shown in a particular studies that it can illuminate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins, largely invisible to the preponderance of empirical researchers, most of whom explicitly accept one or another version of rationalistic premises.

Despite the fact that Keohane’s views have been extremely influential, a growing amount of evidence shows that strategic peacemaking efforts in Bosnia and other parts of the world have not achieved its intended objectives.

It is not only important to question these peacemaking efforts, but it is also imperative to show the theoretical foundations of an alternative peacemaking approach that can guide new research and, in the case of this thesis, a different peacebuilding programme for post-Dayton Bosnia. Such a counter-approach is based on Habermas’s philosophy of communication. This is not to say that communicative forms of peacemaking are only influenced by Habermas’s work. Critical international relations writers and those that support the use of conflict resolution and conflict transformation mechanisms also influence this peacemaking approach. Consequently, this section is divided into two subsections. The first describes the theoretical basis of Habermas’s understanding of communicative rationality, while the next subsection links Habermas’s insights with the other two mechanisms of conflict intervention.

1 Communicative Rationality and Social Action

Habermas contends that the problem with the philosophy of the subject, and its conception of reason, is its inability to grasp the importance of human inter-subjectivity. The poverty of this approach is that it argues that actors are solely motivated by self-interests and self-preservation. Hence, actors objectify other actors in hopes of
manipulating existing social circumstances and achieve their self-interests. This explanation even holds true when institutions and social norms influence actors' behaviour. While these might limit actors' capacity to fulfil their interests, what changes is not the objective or the motivational impetus for action, but the strategy designed and implemented to meet their interests.

Consequently, strategic models of action reduce interaction to the realm of labour or technical reason. Generally speaking, labour is the sphere in which individuals 'produce and reproduce their lives through transforming nature with the aid of technical rules and procedures' (Roderick 1986: 7). By comparison, interaction refers to the sphere in which individuals 'produce and reproduce their lives through communication of needs and interests in the context of rule-governed institutions' (Roderick 1986: 7). The danger of the strategic model of action is that it has equated human emancipation or practical reason with technical mastery of social relations.

Breaking with this model of action, Habermas argues that self-interest is not the only motivation for human action. Instead, human beings also orient their actions 'toward creating or maintaining institutions and traditions in which is expressed some conception of right behavior and a good life with others' (White 1989: 16). This conceptualisation not only separates labour from interaction, but it also holds that reason 'is not situated in any one particular subject at all but rather in subject-subject relations' (Brand 1990: 10). For Habermas, emancipatory reason equals communicative reason. As he puts it at the end of the first volume of the Theory of Communicative Action (1984: 392):

The phenomena in need of explication are no longer, in and of themselves, the knowledge and mastery of an objective nature, but the intersubjectivity of possible understanding - at both the interpersonal and intrapsychic levels. The focus of investigation thereby shifts from cognitive-instrumental rationality to communicative rationality. And what is paradigmatic for the latter is not the relation of a solitary subject to something in the objective world that can be represented and manipulated, but the intersubjective relation that speaking and acting subjects take up when they come to an understanding with one another about something. In doing so, communicative actors more in the medium of a natural language, draw upon culturally transmitted interpretations and relate simultaneously to something in the one objective world, something in their common social world, and something in each actors' own subjective world.
Habermas’s shift to the philosophy of communication entails an ontological and epistemological change that sets the basis for his new theoretical framework. Epistemologically, the philosophy of the subject’s conceptualisation of rationality is completely displaced by this competing approach, which establishes that interacting subjects in communication processes can also attain knowledge. In other words, all knowledge is fallible as individuals can enter processes of argumentation with other individuals in order to test the validity and facticity of their propositions, which are a product of established facts, norms, and values (Habermas 1996a: 15).

Habermas’s research shows that individuals caught in processes of argumentation and deliberation employ four validity claims to support the significance of their propositions. The first validity claim is that of comprehensibility. The second validity claim is a claim to truth (is what a speaker saying accurate?). The third validity claim questions the rightness or the normative legitimacy of an utterance, while the last validity claim is that of authenticity, where an actor questions if an utterance is sincere according to the speaker’s feelings, beliefs, moral values, etc.

The process of argumentation demonstrate that individuals will employ these validity claims to convince others of their arguments’ relevance. In raising a claim to validity, an individual produces an utterance knowing that other individuals can contest the utterance’s validity. For this reason, an individual’s ability to refute or accept, with a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer, the argument defines this mode of conversation as cooperative, because the communicative exercise, for it to be fortuitous, must end in an agreement that the utterance in question is valid. As Maeve Cooke points out, the importance of this communicative act is not only related to its co-operative character, but to the fact that it also represents an effort to recognise others in a conversation (Cooke 1994: 12). Recognition of other individuals is of psychological value in intra-social relations.

Ontologically, Habermas’s theoretical framework breaks with the philosophy of the subject by postiting three different ‘worlds’, rather than one objective world. Such a notion means that individual behaviour is not only influenced by (a) an objective world made up of facts, but also by (b) a world of social norms and values created by subject-subject relations, as well as by (c) a subjective world, where an individual’s internal
makeup can help him or her question or reaffirm the validity of norms, values, and facts. For Habermas, the philosophy of communication establishes that communicative action is more than just communication; instead it becomes a mechanism to co-ordinate social action. The argumentation process described above can only be productive if individuals in a conversation are able to employ the four validity claims and relate them to these three worlds. Hence, each of these worlds is connected to each of the validity claims.

A subject in the objective world acting strategically raises a claim to truth or accuracy; in the subjective world a claim to rightness is advanced to either question the legitimacy of a norm or to act according to it; and in line with the subjective world, a subject acts to reveal to others how his or her inner-make-up guides his or her behaviour, thus raising a claim to authenticity or truthfulness. The claim to comprehensibility is not connected to a particular world because it is necessary to communicate with others.

The stress on inter-subjectivity must not be downplayed, as this communicative characterisation of human action is very similar to strategic forms of human action. As discussed above, strategic forms of action, just as this communicative type (White 1989: 16), emphasise that non-material factors can influence human behaviour. The differences between these two approaches can be captured by two factors: (a) the motive for action; and (b) the mechanisms utilised by actors to co-ordinate their actions with other actors. While strategic action is influenced by self-interest and the attainment of social order, actors behaving according to the communicative rationality are motivated by a need to reach mutual understanding of a given situation. The individuals caught in these processes determine the end of these communicative processes. Hence, the process is not so much guided by control. Instead, social transformation is possible as dialogical processes can create new norms, rules, and social structures, if actors can agree on what things needs to be changed. The importance of this axiom is that it emphasises that social norms and rules must change according to the changing needs and interests of participants. Thus social orders are not static, but always adapting to new realities.

Second, the communicative model of rationality argues that communication becomes a mechanism to co-ordinate actors’ behaviour. This is an important trait of this model because the strategic model of rationality argues that communication is only one possible tool actors can employ to co-ordinate their action preferences with other actors.
For this reason, Habermas (1984: 94) asserts that actors behaving strategically use communication 'one-sidedly.' 'Only the communicative model of action,' he states (1984: 95), 'presupposes language as a medium of uncurtailed communication whereby speakers and hearers, out of the context of their preinterpreted lifeworld, refer simultaneously to things in the objective, social, and subjective worlds in order to negotiate common definitions of the situation.' In all, Habermas presupposes that unhindered communication processes are able to bring about a break with ineffective, but established social structures, norms, values identities, so these can create new ones that truly reflect the needs and interests of a diverse public (1984: 69).

2. The Importance of Social Transformation

This conception of rationality presents a new understanding of society. Society is not only composed of institutional structures that administer it, what Habermas calls 'the system'. Society also encompasses a symbolic world of cultural traditions, social practices, and moral norms that empower individuals to determine how society should be organised. In addition, and as Habermas (1984: 70) argues, this symbolic world or lifeworld (Lebenswelt) is crucial because it supports the communication and the relational structures that permit individuals to reach mutual understanding of given situations:

Subjects acting communicatively always come to an understanding in the horizon of a lifeworld. Their lifeworld is formed from more or less diffuse, always unproblematic, background convictions. This lifeworld background serves as a source of situation definitions that are presupposed by participants as unproblematic. In their interpretive accomplishments the members of a communication community demarcate the one objective world and their intersubjectively shared social world from the subjective worlds of individuals and (other) collectives (Habermas 1984: 70).

The concept of the lifeworld can be linked with research conducted in conflict analysis and peace studies. Because communicative peacemaking places a heavy premium on undistorted processes of dialogue as a social mechanism of action coordination and because these processes establish that social transformation must occur according to the changing needs of social actors, then it is important to understand the role of conflict in society.
On the one hand, conflict analysts take the position that social conflicts are a threat to the organisation of society, as conflicts can put a heavy burden on a society's symbolic fabric. This would not only make communication between actors very difficult, but this burden could equally question 'the normative functioning of social systems' (Scher and Milovanovic 1999: 25) and endorse the violent division of society. The only problem with this view is that it legitimates the intervention of 'the system', that is to say administrative structures or outside powers, in order to protect the integrity of existing lifeworld contexts as a way of hindering conflicts from escalating. While the intervention could occur according to the principles of communicative rationality, historical examples demonstrate that interventions in conflict situations happen according to the tenets of strategic rationality because conflict analysts tend to explain social conflicts as a threat that has to be contained in order to secure the basis of social order.

On the other hand, even though social conflict results from groups and individuals that are dissatisfied with the way the social system is organised, a conflict is not necessarily a threat (Deutsch 1991: 27). This view defines conflict as a discourse that expresses the need for social change. This is not to say that social conflict does not have the potential to become a threat to peace. Indeed, a conflict that is ignored or forcefully settled may escalate into violence. In multi-ethnic societies, the existence of social conflicts can put undo pressure on a society's symbolic fabric, slowly disintegrating the 'thin' lifeworld contexts that enable groups that share different identities from communicating and relating to each other.

In this way, conflicts are constructive if society is organised in a way that permits dissatisfied groups and individuals to express their frustration and work with other groups and individuals to transform society according to new understandings of given social realities. Social conflicts become destructive when society's strongest group opposes the transformation of existing social structures. Under these circumstances, dissatisfied groups may decide to divide society physically and symbolically in order to strengthen their struggle for social change or the creation of their own nation-state. The physical destruction of society, that is to say the creation of new structures of administration and economic organisation, leads to the creation of a new symbolic world in which old neighbours are transformed into enemies and those next of kin are presented as friends.
Hence, communication is employed strategically; it becomes a mechanism to unite the ethnic groups in its struggle for change. In such cases, each group operates according to their own ‘lifeworld’ and its norms, values, and identities, making communication oriented towards reaching understanding difficult, if not impossible. It is important to note how the new administrative structures and group leaders use language one-sidedly in order to mobilise group cohesiveness and prepare its constituents for war.

Subsequently, Tarja Väyrynen (1997) argues that the partition of lifeworld contexts and the intensification of ethnic-based conflict ‘seals off alternative ways to typify the world’, strengthening dominant interpretations or understanding of “reality.” She further finds that ethnic conflict hampers ‘alternative self-definitions of the group and therewith exclude alternative identifications, roles and modes of actions.’ As a consequence, she argues that conflict intervention mechanisms must reconstruct these communicative processes via dialogical processes of conflict resolution. While this is an important suggestion she fails to explain what type of conflict intervention mechanisms peacemakers should employ to reconstruct these communicative structures.

Different conflict intervention mechanisms have been developed to address violent conflicts. These include: (a) conflict management, (b) conflict settlement, (d) conflict resolution, and (d) conflict transformation. The first two were said to be elements of the strategic approach and, as it will be demonstrated in part two of this thesis, they have had a profound influence on the Dayton peace initiative. The last two conflict intervention mechanisms have had less of an impact in Bosnia, but they show the possibility out of negative situations of peace. Indeed, conflict transformation, and conflict resolution to a certain extent, argues that ‘a sustainable peace requires far more than elite agreements’ (Ross 2000). The process must be open to the public at large so their needs and interests can affect and influence the peace process.

As a result, peacemakers that use conflict resolution mechanisms, such as interactive problem-solving workshops, bring together influential leaders from each group so they can address mutual issues of contention. These workshops’ organisers do not control the process. Their work tends to be driven by an expanded notion of peace.

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9 This assertion is implicitly implied in Sauner’s work (1996: 424).
Thus, they intervene in order to stimulate dialogue and make it possible for participants to comprehend their opponent’s views of the conflict dynamic. Herbert Kelman, as an organiser of numerous workshops on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, argues that the workshop’s facilitation of unrestricted dialogue enables ‘the parties to explore each other’s perspective and through a joint process of creative problem solving, to generate new ideas for mutually satisfactory solutions to their conflicts’ (1996: 501).

Even more important, this process of open dialogue serves as an instrument to deconstruct the ethnic identities that separate the conflicting parties and allow the construction of a new, but a “thin” identity based on relational empathy. Benjamin Broome’s (1993: 111) research on cross-cultural communication is especially important in this respect, as he shows how dialogical processes of conflict resolution can de-escalate the conflict by transforming adversarial attitudes and nurture a new ‘third culture’ that emanates from these processes. This ‘third culture’ is important because it provides the means for the involved parties to reconcile their opposing interests and develop working relationships that can lead to the conflict’s resolution, while building also a culture of trust and co-operation.

As promising this may sound, these problem-solving workshops have not been able to translate their outcomes in macro-sociological terms. For the most part, they have not affected the way society is organised. While these workshops have been able to generate new ideas and solutions to the conflict, the participants find a number of obstacles that keep them from translating these ideas into actual social processes of macro-sociological change (Ross 2000: 1027). As result, Raimo Väyrynen (1999: 149-150) strongly critiques this approach, arguing that these workshops’ organisers fail to capture the complex dynamics that energise these violent conflicts. It is for this reason that he makes the case that conflict resolution must be complemented with conflict transformation mechanisms.

Conflict transformation is a theory and practice of social change. In contrast to conflict resolution, conflict transformation is not concentrated on micro-mechanisms (e.g. mediation, workshops, etc.). Instead this approach focuses on how the ‘environment around a conflict can be transformed’ in order to solve the conflict by building grass-root initiatives ingrained in civil society (Ryan 1996: 216-17). This does not mean that this
approach rejects the use of micro-mechanisms to change society. It clearly does employ them. The difference is that these mechanisms are part of a larger societal process. This process can be subsequently divided into two levels: (a) micro-sociological level mechanisms, and (b) those operating at the macro-sociological level.

At the micro-sociological level, conflict transformation facilitates a number of mediation seminars and conflict resolution workshops. While the literature on conflict transformation establishes that peacemakers need to be highly selective of the people they invite to these workshops and seminars, it is important to find people that are representative of the different groups affected by the conflict’s dynamics. All societies have influential leaders at different levels. John Paul Lederach (1997: 39) argues that influential individuals can be found at three social levels: top, middle-range, and grassroots. The top level includes military, political and religious leaders with 'high visibility.' These are leaders, who are usually involved in ‘Track-One’ diplomatic initiatives (Montville 1991: 162). The grassroots level encompasses local political leaders, heads of indigenous non-governmental organizations, local relief workers, factory workers, construction labourers and small business owners, to name a few (Lederach 1997: 143). The middle-range level, and the most relevant for the purpose of this investigation, includes academics, journalists, business owners, non-visible political and religious leaders, leaders of non-ethnic, civic-based political parties, artists, actors, leaders of trade unions and other influential people in each community (Lederach 1997: 41-42). It is important to tap into the resources offered by the middle-range level. These individuals are the ones that have the most influence on the other two leadership levels of society (Lederach 1997: 48). If middle-range leaders from each community are brought together and they can reach a transformation of their attitudes and establish cross-communal working relations, people in the grassroots level might be more inclined to interact with individuals of other ethno-national communities. In fact, this could be the basis of Broome’s ‘third culture’, in which a new understanding of the conflict can generate and give life to new social movements campaigning for social justice and peace.

In many ways, this phase of conflict transformation emphasises the importance of reconciliation and forgiveness. At this level, it is important for the participants to not only mutually recognise each other’s needs, interests, and identities, but it is also important
that they come to term with their past and move forward by constructing new ways of resolving their differences without 'thereby negating their own narrative and threatening their own identity' (Kelman 1999: 199). This stage suggests that participants are empowered by this experience because they come to question established social narratives that foster division and conflict.

A second purpose of this phase is to encourage participants to establish broader social projects intended to transform how people behave in society. For instance, individuals can be brought together to address issues of common concern, such as those in the fields of public health, economics, environmental protection and so forth (Kelman 1999: 201). One such example is the Institute for Resource and Security Studies, Health Bridges for Peace project in Bosnia, directed by Paula Gutlove (1997). She brings together health professionals from the different ethno-national communities so they can expand their conflict resolution capacities in order to create strategies that build an integrated health sector in Bosnia. At both these stages, the emphasis is placed in building trust and encouraging cross-communal communication.

The peacemaker plays an important role in these conflict resolution mechanisms, but there are differences among experts in the fields of conflict analysis and peace studies as to what this role is. Lederach argues that the intervener can decide to impose a format on the participants. Calling this the 'prescriptive approach', he argues that it 'sends the subtle message that the trainer's ways are best, that resources for empowerment lie outside the setting [or workshop], and that productive conflict resolution – like other models of development – lies with emulating those who have made more "progress"' (1995: 68). This approach, which is widely utilized by peacemakers, is dangerous for it allows the peacemaker to interject his or her own interests into the conflict resolution process. Hence, the 'prescriptive approach' can easily give way to strategic models of peacemaking, by which peacemaker's interests overpower those of the parties affected by the conflict.

In contrast, Lederach argues that an 'elicitive approach' can be more useful. Its strength is 'its diligence in respecting and building from the cultural context, in fostering participatory design, and in constructing appropriate models in the setting' (1995: 68). It is important to note that Lederach's 'elicitive approach' empowers people to re-imagine
their social landscape in order to build a new future. More important, this approach enables them to use values and norms created in their particular lifeworld contexts to construct conflict transformation mechanisms that can address issues of contention in order to build new lifeworld contexts and political cultures that can be embraced by the members of each contending party.

The intent of these workshops is to reconstruct fractured social relations by encouraging participants to come up with their own practices of conflict resolution in hopes that these will affect the way society is organised. Ideally, the move towards reconciliation should entail change, but powerful individuals that see inter-ethnic cooperation in negative fashion can thwart these projects. This is an important problem that has impelled critics of this approach to describe it as an idealistic enterprise.

While the success of conflict transformation can only be measured if the participants invited to these micro-mechanisms of conflict resolution can build and encourage others to create new social networks and movements to transform existing social structures according to their interests and needs, a successful peacemaking mission cannot completely ignore the significant role of international actors attempting to end the hostilities. In contrast to strategic peacemaking, the communicative peacemaking follows the tenets of multi-track diplomacy. According to Louise Diamond and John McDonald (1996: 1), this type of diplomacy is ‘an expansion of the “Track One, Track Two” paradigm’, developed by Joseph Montville (1982 and 1990). Track-Two diplomacy is described as peacemaking activities carried out by professional conflict resolution experts and non-governmental groups. Hence, the ‘Track One, Track Two’ paradigm emphasises that interveners must have competence with the tools and concepts necessary to bring peace to different conflict situation. Multi-track diplomacy argues that just as the challenges to ‘Track One’ diplomacy forced practitioners to develop ‘Track Two’ diplomacy, current challenges to peace operations necessitate a more expanded definition of diplomacy that gives non-professional conflict resolution organisations the ability to influence peace processes. Examples of these new players are business organisations, religious groups, private citizen initiatives, educational institutions, grant-making organisations and other non-governmental organisations that address different issues of
international concern (e.g. human rights, social justice, sustainable development, environmental protection, democratisation, and so forth).

Diamond and McDonald's model suggest that peacemaking must be based on a systemic approach that stresses the importance of interconnected spheres of different systems and action processes; meaning that the action of one actor will have an impact on the work of other actors. As result, the success or the failure of peacemaking activities can be measured by the way the parts interact with each other in order to achieve the objectives of a particular peacemaking mission (Diamond and McDonald 1996: 13). Although this system approach is also shared by strategic peacemaking, the communicative model, building primarily on Habermas's sociological analysis, argues that undistorted communication processes of conflict resolution should have primacy over other peacemaking efforts based on strategic conceptions. In many ways, communicative peacemaking embraces aspects of strategic peacemaking. While communicative peacemaking places an emphasis on the construction of a new society, it argues that regional stability is necessary and that international actors have an obligation to intervene in conflict situations to prevent wanton acts from furthering destabilising social relations. To a certain extent, communicative peacemaking has to work within the model of strategic peacemaking because the creation of new social structures involves the creation of state institutions and market mechanisms that can only be constructed via strategic models of rationality.

In this manner, outsiders should intervene in conflict situations not to enforce their settlement on the contending parties, but to facilitate conflict resolution processes that enable the parties to rehabilitate their broken bonds and construct a new society consistent with their mutual needs and interests. The communicative model works within established social systems, but it emphasises that the Westphalian principles and modern practices of societal organisation and social integration must be substituted with new models that empower individuals to participate in communication processes of political and will formation. Thus, this model finds that the values of democracy are important in the formation of a new inclusive society, while pointing to the importance of civil society and its organisations in the peacebuilding phase. Even though an in-depth analysis of these issues will be offered in the next two chapters, it is important to emphasise that the
creation of a strong state and the institution of a capitalist economy is secondary to the reconstruction of common lifeworld contexts.

The primacy of the lifeworld not only stresses the power of undistorted communication. It also accentts the importance of individual action and the malleability of social structures. This is part of Habermas’s work, as he attempts to demonstrate a way that individuals meeting in the public sphere can create new discourses and social movements that can affect the way society is organised. This is not to say that Habermas’s sociological model ignores the work of the system, that is to say the subsystem of administrative power (i.e. the state) and the subsystem of the market. He emphasises the importance of the system in producing society’s material needs and keeping order by devising rules and norms of accepted social behaviour. What Habermas does underscore is that system imperatives, which are guided by the mediums of administrative power and money, must not guide the social integration of society or the socialisation of its citizens. This responsibility must be left in the hands of individuals freely operating in the public sphere, which is ingrained in lifeworld contexts.

In the end, communicative peacemaking efforts are driven by a humanitarian interest that places the needs and interests of those directly affected by the conflict’s dynamics before outside intervener’s interests. The institution of a negative peace based on social order, regional stability, and peacemakers’ attainment of their interests does not solely define the success of a peacemaking mission. Instead, peacemaking missions are successful if they can institute a positive conception of peace at the societal level and stability at the international level. By positive peace it is meant a condition that is entirely representative of society’s members needs and interests, while also stressing the importance of social change driven by individuals in processes of undistorted communication.

The attainment of international stability is important because peacemaking would not be possible if the strongest international actor (e.g. a hegemon) does not lead or approve such an operation. As Habermas’s analysis finds, the importance is to empower individuals to reconstruct their broken bonds so they can build a new society. Peacemaking in this sense is not about the reconstruction of international orders, but that of domestic orders, even though the resolution of conflicts and the reconstruction of
fractured social relations can potentially re-enforce the organisational principles of international orders. Just as Habermas believes that the institutions of the state is important because it makes the work of the public sphere possible, the construction of internal orders according to the values of communicative rationality must include a role for international actors. International peacemakers have the resources to assist the parties constitute new social orders. Without the international community many of these conflicts would end when one side imposes its values, norms, and identities on its opponents. This reality just re-enforces the legitimacy of violence as a tool actors can employ to fulfil their self-interests, while giving strategic forms of action free play in established social systems.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
States and non-state actors are working with and against each other to transform oppressive social systems according to internationally recognised principles of social organisation. The recent outbreak of intrastate war, fuelled by ethnic antagonisms, has forced international actors to intervene in these conflict situations in hopes of settling them. Regrettably, and as experienced in Bosnia, these wars, and all the inhumane acts that characterised them, have become all too common.

Consequently, peacemaking activities have dramatically increased in the last decade. Because most of these peacemaking missions have faced many challenges, the academic community has been creating new analytic tools to assist peacemakers achieve their objectives in a more efficient manner (Stern and Druckman 1999). In this way, this thesis, influenced by Habermasian thinking, shows the influence of the strategic approach to peacemaking, while also presenting a competing approach that can stimulate a debate on the feasibility of contemporary peacemaking practices to secure the basis of a self-sustaining peace in conflict situations, propelled by ethno-national claims.

It is important to emphasise that this thesis's objectives, while influenced by Jones's work on the Oslo peace process, goes a step further. Because Habermasian thinking is both a theoretical and a practical project, this thesis provides an alternative peacebuilding programme modelled on the communicative approach. While Jones work is similar to this thesis in that both works critique a peace process to explain how it was
influenced by strategic conceptions of peacemaking, Jones's work is uncertain about the feasibility of the Habermasian project. This is not the case in this investigation, as it illustrates the significance of the communicative approach to peacemaking as a theoretical resource to construct new peacebuilding efforts that make the peace in Bosnia self-sustaining.

This divergence is not stressed to reduce the significance of Jones's work. Indeed, both works deal with different types of peacemaking initiatives, as peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is usually defined strategically. The objective of the Oslo Peace Accords was supposed to institute a process that would have secured the independence of Palestine. This is exactly what the international community has been trying to avoid in the Bosnian case.

Habermas's ideas do not only explain how and why individuals are motivated to co-ordinate their actions, but more important his theoretical project also provides insights on how to integrate divided societies via communicative action processes working at a macro-sociological level. In other words, Jones's only deals with one aspect of Habermas's work. He focuses on Habermas's micro-sociological investigation, but fails to consider Habermas’s macro-sociological work, as captured in his conception of deliberative democracy. This is an important fact that clearly demonstrates the differences between Jones's book and this investigation.

With this said, this critical assessment of the Dayton peace initiative must answer the following question: what factors determine the success of a peacemaking initiative? An answer to this question needs to see peacemaking in a systemic manner. Hence, the success of this initiative is related to the general success of peacemaking activities in its three constitutive stages (i.e. pre-settlement, settlement-making, and post-settlement peacebuilding) and by clearing defining the interests that motivated peacemakers to intervene in a given conflict situation. In addition, peacemaking initiatives can only be successful if these address the following problems at three different levels of analysis: (a) the international, (b) the regional, and (c) the domestic.

For this reason it is important to keep in mind Robert Cox’s (originally published in 1981, republished in 1996: 87) oft-quoted assertion: ‘Theory is always for someone and for some purpose’; meaning that theories are not conceived in a social or a political
vacuum. They emanate as a reaction to a social problem, by which it can show how to fix
the problem in order to preserve the established social order or to demonstrate the
importance of social change. Theories are conceptualisations of the social world,
providing guidelines for human action. In so doing, theories define the moral and ethical
limits of human praxis, which provide a sense of legitimacy to certain kinds of actions,
while denouncing other practices. For this reason, the move from strategic forms of
peacemaking to communicative forms starts at the level of theory. Thus, theory is in itself
a practical way of demonstrating the inadequacies of the strategic approach and the
significance of its communicative counterpart.

It is important to note that this chapter's comparative analysis of the strategic and
communicative approaches to peacemaking have said little about the challenges outside
interveners and contending parties face in post-conflict situations. Building on this
comparative analysis, the next chapter will demonstrate how the tenets of the strategic
approach have influenced state-centred forms of peacebuilding, while chapter three
questions the soundness of these practices, arguing that society-centred peacebuilding
strategies, founded on the ideals of the communicative approach, can best make
negotiated peace agreements self-sustaining.
CHAPTER TWO
State-Centred Peacebuilding: The Challenge of Social Integration in War-Torn Societies

INTRODUCTION
The single greatest challenge all social systems face is the problem of social integration. It is even more difficult in multiethnic societies, where citizens do not see themselves as part of one single group, but as part of different groupings; each with its own traditions, identities, and values. This problem is even more complex in newly re-created, war-torn societies that have experienced prolonged ethno-national violence. As the number of ethno-national wars increase, the international community and the discipline of international relations have devoted more time and resources to explain the causes and consequences of these wars and to device practical mechanisms to resolve existing wars and prevent their future occurrence.

Keeping in mind that the success of peacemaking initiatives depends on how peacemakers address domestic issues, this chapter addresses the problem of social integration in societies that have started to implement negotiated peace agreements. In this way, the chapter argues that international actors' role in post-settlement peacebuilding is influenced by their desire to build internal orders that secure the basis of established international orders. Noting that the previous chapter presented two approaches to peacemaking and argued that strategic forms of peacemaking have played a dominant role in contemporary international affairs, the analysis provided in this, and the next chapter, continues with last chapter's comparative analysis and re-affirms the dominance of strategic forms of peacemaking. As a result, this chapter demonstrates how the tenets of the strategic approach influence peacebuilding operations.

The post-conflict stage is the most crucial stage in any peacemaking initiative, as a negotiated peace can only be viable if the parties are willing to put their weapons aside and work together to create a new society and establish a self-sustaining peace. But this conundrum also demonstrates the difficulty peacemaking initiatives face. As Massimo Calabresi (1998: 38) finds, 'diplomats can negotiate peace, and foreign soldiers can
enforce it. Well-intentioned civilian supervisors can even provide day-to-day services. But no one has ever figured out how to make former combatants bury their hatreds along with their casualties.' This challenge raises an important question: how are war-torn societies integrated?

Theoretically speaking, there are two general ways of integrating society. Traditional peacebuilding, founded on the tenets of the strategic approach, is based on a state-centred understanding of social order. Building on the Western European experience, this understanding finds that the state, legitimated via democratic means, with its monopoly over the use of legitimate violence, and its ability to legislate and impose legal rules, can create the necessary mechanisms to integrate society. Consequently, state-building initiatives aims to integrate society by creating strong social institutions that: (1) reduce the threat of inter-group conflict, (2) minimise the power of secessionist movements, and (3) prevent the outbreak or the resumption of political violence. Even though peacemakers argue that democratic mechanisms can secure the peaceful integration of society, the state, backed by international actors, arduously works to promote the benefits of social integration and provide disincentives, including the use of force, to groups and individuals that threaten the established order.

Countering this way of thinking, Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato describe a society-centred understanding of social order (1990). This understanding is based on Habermas's conceptualisation of society as 'system' and 'lifeworld' and his model of deliberative democracy. This envisioned paradigm of peacebuilding argues that civil society processes should direct these efforts, rather than international actors. This is not to say that international actors should not be part of peacebuilding missions. On the contrary, international actors should play a vital role in society-centred peacebuilding practices, but the objective of the mission should not solely be the creation of state structures. These missions must also promote social empowerment, so individuals, regardless of their ethnic lineage, can work with other individuals to forge new and re-structure existing social arrangements according to their needs and interests.

As stated before, this chapter examines state-centred forms of peacebuilding. It attempts to show the relationship between traditional peacebuilding exercises and state-building programmes, as these have been executed in the Western experience. Hence, this
chapter maintains that peacemakers’ use of the strategic approach requires them to equate peacebuilding with state-building. But, before conducting this analysis, it is first important to review some theories of ethnic conflict, as many social scientists and policy-makers have argued that the Bosnian war was fuelled by ethno-national antagonisms.

I. ETHNIC CONFLICT & THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION

Since Plato’s Republic, the problem of social integration has challenged the stability and subsistence of established political communities (Richmond 1984: 5). Even though many studies have addressed this problem and have informed different social integration practices, the problem still affects contemporary political systems. Different factors have questioned the existence of many nation-states. Although economic transformation (prompted by modernisation, a transition to capitalism, industrialisation, or globalisation) and political changes (impelled by democratisation) have taken their toll on established political orders, many social scientists have noted that the renaissance of ethnicity and the economic and political claims associated with this resurgence are responsible for the fragmentation of social orders, the phenomena of “state failure,” and ethno-national violence, driven by ethnic groups’ claim to the right of self-determination.

As a consequence, the augmentation of ethno-national violence, following the end of the Cold War, has forced international relations scholars to devote more time to understand the nature of ethnicity and its relation to the escalation of violence in divided societies. From an international relations perspective, ethno-national wars are becoming a threat to the established international system; and in the case of this investigation to the United States’ and its European allies’ ability to pursue their foreign policy interests. Ethno-national wars, while intrastate in nature, have the potential to spread across international borders, while creating refugee crises that can affect the economies of neighbouring states and the constituents of the developed world. Indeed, the European allies wanted to settle the Bosnian war and the one in Kosovo so refugees could return home (Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000: 4). While Haiti was not driven by ethnic conflict, American intervention was driven by the same rationale (von Hippel 2000: 102), even though the level of refugees in the United States was lower than those of Bosnia’s citizens in Western Europe.
With this said, an ethnic group is commonly defined as a community of people that share one or a combination of the following elements: a language, a common territory, past historical experiences, cultural traditions, and religious beliefs. Although most scholars agree with this definition, they disagree on the nature of ethnicity and its relation to inter-ethnic conflict. Anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists, to a certain extent, have examined and explained this relationship by means of two paradigms: primordialism and instrumentalism. A third paradigm has been added to this debate in the post-Cold War era. Termed, constructivism, it questions primordial and instrumental explanations of ethnic conflict by demonstrating that ethnic conflicts tend to escalate in certain types of society and they are driven by both material factors and the protection of a particular way of life.

During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the individual works of Edward Shils and Clifford Geertz introduced the foundations of primordialism (Wicker 1997: 2-4). Supporters of this approach perceive ethnicity and its traits as fixed. These are understood to be biological traits or a set of cultural practices, passed from one generation to another, that are so ingrained in the ethnic makeup of the group that these are seen as immutable and permanent. In essence, primordialism believes that the complex historical processes that have defined the main attributes that differentiate one ethnic group from another group are responsible for inter-ethnic conflicts (Smith 1986: 3-17). For this reason, ethnic identity is central in the construction of political communities, overriding other types of social identities. Ethnic conflicts are inevitable and all attempts to settle these by transforming social structures or by weakening a group’s identity will be fruitless as this would threaten a group’s way of life, forcing it to struggle for the creation of its own political community (Smith 1991).

In the case of Bosnia’s ethnic war, proponents of this paradigm have argued that the partition of the country is the best formula to end and prevent the future re-ignition of hostilities, as conflict and violence between the three ethnic groups is inevitable. While this approach is popular in some political circles, it is limited in at least two ways. First, it does not provide an adequate explanation of why some ethnic groups have transformed their identities with the course of history. For instance, while many rejected the League of Communists’ national “Yugoslav” identity, many of today’s Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats
and Bosnian Serbs once described themselves as Yugoslavs (Burg and Berbaum 1989; Malcom 1994; and Weine 1999). Second, and more important, primordialism's incapacity to account for the peaceful co-existence of different ethnic groups within the structures of different societies, raises many questions about this approach's understanding of ethnic conflict. A vast amount of sociological and anthropological literature documents how Bosnia's three ethnic groups lived in harmony between 1945 and 1991 (Bringa 1993; and Weine 1999). Many critics maintain that ethnic conflicts are not necessarily about the protection of identity or a way of life, but about access to political and economic resources (Sisk 1996: 12).

Building on these two criticisms, the instrumental paradigm holds that ethnicity is not fixed; it is subject to manipulation. As a result, instrumentalists view ethnicity as a mechanism used by individuals in position of power and influence to achieve a set of material goals. Elite sectors of society mobilise people by reminding them of historical, physical, or ideological affinities that unite them in order to encourage them to struggle for a common cause. In this respect, political or economic leaders disguise their individual objectives by arousing collective emotions. As Ernest Gellner's (1983) research on nationalism emphasises, this becomes a process of social engineering to unite various interests under one common identity and a set of shared goals. Instrumentalists, mostly influenced by Gellner's link of nationalism to the rise of modernity, argue that ethnic conflicts are a by-product of conflicts for material resources among different sectors in any communal order. It is important to stress that instrumentalists believe that conflict for material and political resources are characteristic of any form of social organisation.

Instrumentalists argue that the fall of Yugoslavia was caused by a political power struggle between the different leaders of the country's republics. Consequently, each leader employed the "ethnic card" as a tool to mobilise its followers against other groups that were equally struggling for the same resources. Although this paradigm is extremely popular, David Lake and Donald Rothchild (1998: 6) criticise it by pointing out that 'ethnicity is not something that can be decided upon by individuals at will, like other political affiliations, but is embedded within and controlled by the larger society.' This approach therefore ignores how social structures can construct, deconstruct, strengthen or
weaken ethnic identities. Ethnicity, as Milton Esman (1994: 13) argues, has to be interpreted within a 'relational framework.' Esman's observations and primordialism's and instrumentalism's inherent flaws have led Lake and Rothchild to synthesise aspects of these two contending theoretical frameworks to produce one that might account for the nature of ethnicity and its relation to conflict in the post-Cold War world. They have called this the constructivist paradigm.

Constructivism recognises both the social roots and the natural character of ethnicity. This approach holds that 'as social interactions change, conceptions of ethnicity evolve as well' (Lake and Rothchild 1998: 5). In this sense, ethnicity is not necessarily conflictive. Ethnic conflict 'is caused by certain types of what might be called social pathological systems, which individuals do not control' (Lake and Rothchild 1998: 6). While political leaders might attempt to mobilise ethnic groups, according to their self-interests, different forms of societal organisation provide institutional counterweights that hinder them from accomplishing their objectives. Thus, constructivism argues that political leaders that want to mobilise ethnic groups to attain their own self-interest have to transform the way society is organised first, so they can dismantle the social structures that will inhibit them from fulfilling their interests.

For instance, the mobilisation of ethno-national movements in Yugoslavia during the mid-1980s had to first weaken the ideological apparatus that had traditionally kept these movements from expressing their sentiments or attempting to transform the established social order. In fact, the late Franjo Tudjman, who was a strong supporter of Croatian nationalism and eventually became Croatia’s president in 1990, tried to achieve this objective in the late 1960s by challenging the League of Communists’ (LCY) version of the events that occurred during the Second World War. Tudjman’s views were menacing because Josip Broz Tito’s state-building project was based on Partisan’s victories, which were often exaggerated. Tudjman’s re-interpretation de-legitimised Tito’s official historical interpretations and presented competing visions of the future of the country (Glenny 1999: A34). Tudjman was only one of the many dissenting voices that emanated in Yugoslav society. To assure the viability of the Yugoslav state, Tito took a two-faced conflict intervention strategy. Tito ordered the arrest of those that promoted dissenting ideas, but he successfully managed the escalating conflict by starting
the reform process that led to the Constitution of 1974. The latter strategy repressed counter-hegemonic tendencies, while the other appeased the masses, which wanted social change. The important aspect of this policy is that it gave the Yugoslav state primacy in the reform process (Lampe 1996: 294-98). In the end the message was simple, the LCY controls all social processes, while defining who could participate in these processes.

Consequently, the destruction of Yugoslavia had to first deconstruct the idea of Yugoslav unity and the state apparatus that enforce this idea. Once this was done, nationalist political figures, as Tudjman, Slobodan Milošević, and Milan Kučan, were free to construct new political identities and form social structures to support such identities. These identities were built on ethno-national characteristics imagined or reconstructed from the past. The breaking of these structures destroyed the networks that had kept society together and the “official” history of the Yugoslav nation was replaced by the particular histories of each ethnic group. Neighbours became strangers and as the conflict became more pronounced the stranger became the enemy. Each community saw the other as an obstacle to its self-determination, so the path was to divide Yugoslavia into other nation-states, even if this path led to war and the suffering and deaths of thousands of civilians.

It is important to notice that individuals could not stop the leaders from inducing the break-up of Yugoslavia. Indeed, there were many people, especially in Sarajevo and Tuzla (Campbell 1998: 3-5) that resisted these ethno-national projects (Glenny 1993: 142). Many of these people did not see themselves as Muslim, Croat, or Serb, but as Yugoslavs. Despite the fact that they were against the division of country, their views were not influential because the structures of Yugoslavia did not provided an outlet for their expression. In fact, each community controlled its own media outlets, thus the interpretations of social events were manipulated according to the interests of ethno-national political movements. Universities and research centres were not independent, so they could not challenge their political leaders’ actions. In short, there was no civil society, as the ones that developed in Poland and Czechoslovakia, to counter the perspectives endorsed by each republic’s power structure (Leff 1999). Would history be any different if these groups could have been able to participate in society and challenged these false stereotypes that painted members of other ethnic groups as enemies? It would
be difficult to say, but multiethnic societies founded on democratic principles that have not fallen prey to ethnic violence attest that individuals' participation in political processes of will-formation can prevent leaders from conducting their self-interested projects.

The constructivist paradigm establishes that the sources of ethnic conflicts are usually related to the nature of political communities. Most types of social organisations, though differing on their philosophy, agree that the state is a necessary institution because it can achieve the integration of society. This is part of the development of the state throughout modern history. The problem with this understanding is that the state, historically speaking, has initiated processes of inclusion and exclusion. Essentially, states that erect boundaries that differentiate one ethnic group from other groups usually influence these excluded groups to struggle for the transformation of society or for the creation of their own nation-states. In this light, the constructivist approach is important because it 'enhances our understanding of ethno-politics by suggesting that the origins and consequences of ethnic groups, nations, nationalism, and ethnic conflict in world politics are contextual and interactive' (Robertson 1997: 266). Thus, this paradigm suggests that the transformation of society and the construction of new social processes that destroy these exclusionary practices and open social structures to all individuals or groups can redress the pathological currents inherent in this types of societies.

In the context of this doctoral thesis, the significance of this paradigm is that it allows theorists and policy-makers to study the nature of ethnic conflict and the outbreak of ethnic violence through the 'system-lifeworld' model proposed by Habermas (1987) or the 'state-society' model presented by Joel Migdal, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue (1994). These models attempt to explain the integration of social systems by asking the following question: which sphere of social life should integrate society and determine the working of modern social systems? Because ethnic conflicts affect the workings of these systems, an answer to this question also determines which peacemaking approach is used to address these conflicts. Those analysts and policy-makers that believe that the 'system' (or the state) is more important than social relations tend to argue that peacebuilding activities must create state structures and market mechanisms in order to regulate the behaviour of social groups and individuals and re-order society according to its vision of
strategic rationality. Alternatively, those that believe that lifeworld processes should
direct the integration of society and determine its workings argue that peacebuilding
activities must rehabilitate shattered inter-ethnic communicative networks. These
processes will enhance the activities of civil society and allow individuals and groups to
organise and transform society’s institutions according to their interests, values, and
interests.

It is important to notice that both models are not entirely contradictory. Both
argue that the system and the lifeworld or the state and the society are necessary elements
of any social system. Notwithstanding, peacemakers using the strategic approach tend to
reduce the importance of social relations and give primacy to the creation of state
structures as a prerequisite for the institution of a self-sustaining peace. Unsurprisingly,
these peacemakers tend to explain ethnic conflict and the outbreak of ethno-national
violence through the lenses of the instrumental paradigm. They fail to see how ethnic
discourses are constructed and reproduced in divided societies, how these challenge the
established order, and how these mobilise group members to struggle for social change.

Explaining ethnic conflicts and the outbreak of violence via constructivism not
only informs this thesis, but it confirms the view that the sources of ethnic conflicts are
usually related to the way society is organised. Thus, peacemakers employing
constructivism’s insights to explain ethnic conflict should also draw on the insights of the
communicative approach to intervene in conflict situations. By focusing on how state
structures and inter-ethnic competition can destroy the fabric that holds society together,
these peacemakers tend to emphasise that a self-sustaining peace must give way to new
social relations that permit individuals to work together in forging a new society that is
representative of all forms of life and tolerant to difference.

II. STATE-CENTRED PEACEBUILDING
Strategic peacemaking efforts are informed by instrumental explanations of ethnic
conflict. Competition for resources and control over state institutions lead leaders of
ethnic group to mobilise their communities to support secession or the transformation of
the established order. The state's failure to manage or settle this conflict permits these
groups to pursue their objectives via violence. As a result, peacemakers create detailed
peace initiatives that attempt to establish the foundations of new state structures, while providing incentives and disincentives to pressure the combatants to put down their weapons and to enter co-operative relationships with their former enemies. Seen from this perspective, peacemakers are in the business of re-making “failed states” into viable nation-states. Therefore, peacemaking efforts, especially those practices executed in the post-settlement peacebuilding stage, are closely associated to state-building projects.

From historical and theoretical perspectives, state-building and peacebuilding practices seem to be two different tasks. In the case of Bosnia and other contemporary post-conflict situations, the marriage of these two projects best explains the current actions of the international community. To understand the link between these two projects, it is first important to define the elements of state-building projects. This examination is conducted in section one, while section two presents how “traditional” or mainstream understandings of peacebuilding practices embrace aspects of state-building projects to achieve internal order and international stability.

A. Defining State-Building

Due to length constraints, it is difficult to conduct an in-depth review of state-building projects. However, it is important to note that these projects were not only the key to the economic, political and cultural development of advanced Western democracies, but they also have become the standard developing countries must adhere to if they want to reach the same levels of development. In many ways, state-building strategies enabled states to transform ‘state-nations’ (Saravamuttu 1989: 3) into nation-states.

While there is no such thing as a singular state-building project, it is important to highlight a number of common elements that most state-building enterprises share: (a) the centralisation and consolidation of state power; (b) nation-building strategies that enable the state to address the competing claims of universal and particular interests; and (c) economic modernisation projects.

It is essential to notice that this thesis’s definition of state-building differs from nation-building. Indeed, nation-building exercises are an integral part of state-building
projects. In addition to these common elements, it is necessary to recognise how the constraints and opportunities the international system places on state-building initiatives affect their ability to attain their objectives. Whereas some international actors might support these state-building programmes, other actors, especially those that form part of an emerging global public sphere, have been calling for more humane ways of achieving the stabilisation of social orders and the institutions of self-sustaining peace. Nonetheless, the international community, especially its strongest members, have been supporting more robust state-building programmes in order to stabilise the international system and prevent the outbreak or proliferation of secessionist-armed struggles.

Building on these assumptions, state action is guided by a need to rationalise social relations in order to reduce complexity and increase the overall stability of the system (McCarthy 1981: 228-229; and Habermas 1975). Complexity becomes a threat to established social orders because social events that cannot be controlled can result in different crises that question the institutions and practices that administer society. Hence, the state and its administrative apparatus are means to an end (van Creveld 1999: 189-91). The end is social order, as order supports the rationalisation of social life, which is supposed to reduce social conflict and support processes of economic modernisation and collective self-determination; the former satisfying the material needs of society's members, the latter permitting individuals to meet their self-interests with like-minded individuals via the state's legal apparatus. As a result, the state and its legal system assume 'a superordinate position vis-à-vis the socio-cultural and economic systems' (Habermas 1975: 5).

It is also important to keep in mind that state-building projects were made possible by an important historical turning point. This was the Treaty of Westphalia, which's provisions set the foundations of the modern international system. As Stephen Krasner notes (1993:235-36), the "Peace of Westphalia of 1648 is routinely understood to have ushered in or codified a new international order; one based on independent sovereign states rather than on some earlier medieval concept of Christendom, or feudalism, or empires." In essence, the Treaty stipulated that territory, clearly controlled by a sovereign, was the 'key requirement for participation in modern international politics' (Knutzen 1992: 71). In order to assure that a sovereign would keep control of his
or her territory, the Treaty also specified that a sovereign would be free to do as he or she pleased within the boundaries of the nation-state. As a consequence, the concept of sovereignty also ascertains that other nation-states cannot interfere in the domestic matters of other nation-states.

The reasoning for this non-interference standard is simple. It would minimise international conflict, help nation-states strengthen their capabilities, via state-building projects, and, in the end, strengthen the balance of power system set by Westphalia's architects. While this chapter does not study the impact the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 has had on international relations, it is important to keep in mind, as Charles Kegley and Gregory Raymond (2002) have recently argued in a recent book, that many contemporary practices in international relations stem from the ideals, concepts, and principles enshrined in this document. The question for the purpose of this study is the following: How did these principles, concepts, ideals, affect state-building projects in Western history? Seen from this perspective, the Treaty of Westphalia did not only set the foundations of the modern international system, but it also enabled new intra-national mechanisms to flourish and challenge "pre-modern" patterns of state-society relations (Ruggie 1993).

1. State-Society Relations and the State-building Project

The concept of territoriality allows for the establishment of the political boundaries of society. Armed by the principle of sovereignty, the state was in the business of establishing these boundaries. But, the state's drive to organise society according to its visions has usually been opposed by different social classes or social groupings. The state, as Anthony Richmond suggests, has used different strategies to achieve its objectives. Historically speaking, the state has relied on two approaches (Richmond 1984: 5).

The first represents societies as being held together by the coercive power of the dominant groups whose interests are, in the last resort, maintained through military force. This force is used to repel external sources of threat as well as for the maintenance of order within society. The alternative view emphasizes the importance of a common value system
which binds people together in a social contract or consensus concerning
the necessity for order.

The first reflects Max Weber's definition of political power, characteristic of modern
statehood: a monopoly over all instruments of legitimate violence. Nonetheless, coercion
can go so far as modern revolutions have demonstrated. The state needs to create policies
that are attuned to citizens' needs and interests, thus the alternative of permitting citizens
to influence and participate in the process of societal integration. To this extent, the
distinction of these two approaches is purely theoretical, as both 'operate simultaneously
and with varying degrees of emphasis' (Richmond 1984: 5). For any regime to hold
power in the long-term it needs to find way of legitimating its practices. Without a degree
of legitimacy, integrating society to assure necessary conditions of stability and peace
will not eventuate. Without these conditions, society would be economically
impoverished and politically vulnerable to other visions emanating from within or outside
its boundaries.

Richmond's insights on the combination of these two practices correspond to Joel
Migdal's attempt to define modern society by way of an analysis of state-society
relations. Migdal notes that there are at least two definitions. On the one hand, society
can be understood as a site of contention between different elements or agents that want
to dominate the organs of the state in order to institutionalise its ideal conception of
social order. This definition views 'society as fragmented, often conflictual, organizations
exercising social control; the emphasis here is on the components of society - its innards
- and how the parts of the melange interact' (Migdal 1996: 93). The other definition notes
that societies are cohesive units. 'This is a definition that points to the unity of society
and, in particular, questions of integration...'. To put it simply, this interpretation
highlights the state's ability to construct a sense of 'boundedness, or that outermost
structure' (Migdal 1996: 93) that holds society together. Building on these two
perspectives, Migdal's definition is a synthesis of these two, holding that societies are
essentially made up of conflicting elements that are brought into line by the institutions of
the state. But, the opposite is true as well. The state's hegemonic ambitions and its violent
strategies can serve as a stimulant to counter-hegemonic struggles, leading to the
disintegration of society. The end-result depends on the mechanisms the state employs to
integrate society. As Kalevi J. Holsti (1996) points out, states' that lack popular legitimacy are more likely to experience outbreaks of collective political violence, than states' that have the support and approval of its citizens.

Migdal’s conclusions reveal an important reality: the dialectic between state power and social resistance means that society is essentially divided into public and private spheres. The state represents the interests of the public, while the private individuals make the other sphere. The clash of public and private spheres gives life to civil society, where discourses give life to social movements that support or counter state action (Habermas 1996a: 353). Ironically, while the clash can give rise to civil society, this does not mean that civil society can organize society independently of the state, as the state has to enable its workings by granting and protecting individuals’ rights and freedoms so they can come together in informal processes of political will-formation (Chandhoke 1995). It is important to notice how Migdal’s definition, as the other two, assigns the state a significant role in the integration of society. Consequently, the principal paradigm of societal evolution centres on the need of building a state and its institutions in order to establish social order. This project, which can be named state-building, ‘is the process by which the state not only grows in economic productivity and government coercion, but, also, in political and institutional power’ (Jaggers 1992: 29). In other words, a state-building project is a strategy used by the social elite to organise society according to their needs and interests, while forcing other social groupings, which might not necessarily approve of this undertaking, to support their project.

Ordering society according to the state’s vision is more than just creating social institutions to support the state-building process. In fact, the state must also create an ideology that specifies which acts are legitimate or illegitimate. This ideology must incorporate ‘cultural and political forms, representations, discourses, practices and activities, and specific technologies and organization of powers that, taken together, help to define public interest, establish meaning, and define and naturalize available social identities’ (Nagengast 1994: 116). State-building enterprises can be described as a form of colonisation. Instead, the colonising project is not implemented by foreign elements per se, but from within.
State-building projects, though aimed at creating order, do actually foster social conflicts and acts of collective violence. As Youssef Cohen, Brian R. Brown, and A. F. K. Organski (1981: 902) find in their study of state-building projects in Western and non-Western societies, 'increasing central state claims for resources – for the material means of state-making and domination – intrude into and compete with preexisting structures of rights and obligations which tie those resources to sub-national collectivities and/or “polities.” Conflict, resistance, and violence are...often the result.' However, this same study also reveals that in the long-term state-building projects can provide the basis for order by transforming their practices and permitting repressed voices to express themselves and influence the organisation of society. But, this is done once the protagonists of this project have been able to significantly secure their bases of power. Therefore state-building projects are paradoxical in nature. Stability can only be achieved after a period of violence conducted by the state against certain element in their societies.

The state’s centralisation of power and the monopolisation of force represent only one face of state-building projects. As Cohen, Brown and Organski suggest, the state-building project eventually establishes social order. How is this done? Once the state has consolidated its power base, it executes nation-building and economic modernization programmes. The reasoning behind these programmes is to demonstrate to society’s citizens that the attainment of the state’s interest will benefit them as well. To this extent, these strategies are designed to create support for the state-building enterprise. In the end, nation-building and economic modernisation projects are implemented to build legitimacy for the way society is organised. The former is instituted to allow people to participate in the state-building project and to satisfy an individual’s psychological need of being part of a community, while the latter is practiced in order to meet the material needs of society’s members. State-building projects aim not only to centralise and expand the state’s power base, but they also intend to establish an ideology that can solve the conflict between the universal and particular, bringing diversity into line with the state’s conception of uniformity.
2. The State and the Integration of Society

Nation-building strategies were a product of the challenges the Enlightenment presented to the absolute state and its state-building initiatives. The Enlightenment was aimed against totalising ideologies that infringed on individuals’ human rights and their abilities to achieve full self-determination and freely accomplish their full human potential (Habermas 1997: 89). The absolute state’s monopoly of political and military power was challenged through violent and non-violent revolutions. The bourgeoisie was asking for more participation and when the absolute state attempted to enforce order through force, the bourgeoisie rallied the masses to overthrow the “old regimes.” This was probably best exemplified by the French Revolution. The French Revolution, though legitimising many of the Enlightenment’s ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity, did not weaken the institutions of the state or undid the importance of territoriality in the ordering of political spaces. In fact, these principles were strengthened.

The absolute state was not a nation-state, but what Paikiasothy Saravamuttu (1989: 3) calls ‘state-nations’. While the absolute state aimed at stripping power away from rivals that lived within the boundaries of its territory, augmenting its authority over the country, it dedicated little attention to define the integral components of the political community or the identity of its subjects. The new “enlightened state” had to build nations to support its state-building project (Seth 1995: 49-51). The by-product of this reality is nationalism or the doctrine, which ‘pretends to supply the criterion for the determination of the unit of population proper to enjoy a government exclusively its own, for the legitimate exercise of power in the state...’ (Kedourie 1994: 1). Hence, nationalism was supposed to allow individuals to participate in the nation-state and achieve the individual self-determination promised by liberalism, one of the strongest and most influential political philosophies of the nineteenth century.

As it turned out, the state did not only define political space according to territoriality, but it also started to identify who could participate in society’s political processes. Generally, the state constructed political identities, often reflecting those of a stronger ethnic group or an elite class, which were to be imposed on the rest of society. The goal was the creation of a homogeneous society, where difference could be eradicated. The existence of heterogeneity was seen as a threat to the state’s control of
society, because those individuals or groups that desired to resist these homogenizing mechanisms could potentially challenge the state and its state-building project. How did the state conduct this homogenising or hegemonic project? Using "enlightened" administrative practices, the state apparatus grew by building legal systems based on positive law that would enforce its rules and values on its subjects (Knutsen 1992: 117). In addition, public schools were created and language was standardised and competing dialects were pushed out from the public sphere into the private sphere, where they eventually died. Police departments were assembled and national militaries were equally engendered. These new armed forces did not rely on mercenaries, but on regular citizens. Thus, the state permeated all social spheres and promoted its ideals and values as unquestioned truths.

Nation-building mechanisms were established to create a more homogeneous society that would be easier to rule. The aim was to forcefully create a social consensus that endorsed the state's ideological project (Nagengast 1994: 117). As Stuart Hall argues (1988: 44): 'Ruling ideas may dominate other conceptions of the social world by setting the limit to what will appear as rational, reasonable, credible, indeed sayable or thinkable, within the given vocabularies of motive and action available...’ to society’s members. Nation-building strategies enabled the state to not only convince individuals that their interests and needs were actually taken into consideration, but more important that these initiatives satisfied the search for individual and collective self-determination. In the end, many individuals believed that the state’s actions resulted from the nation’s will.

The state has utilised these discourses to also satisfy individuals' psychological need of being part of a community, while also assimilating them into a fabricated identity that would support the state’s agenda. Nation-building mechanisms also allowed the state to find ways to meet the material needs of society's members. In fact, capitalism could not survive without these state-building and nation-building projects, as these set the foundations of a national economy. While it was expected that the state should not interfere in the workings of the market economy, the state had a role in establishing the superstructure to nurture capitalism, promote investment, and encourage industrialisation (Wicker 1997: 8). In other instances, the state employed protectionist economic policies to deter other national economies from taking advantage of any possible weakness in
local markets or from undermining the development of key industries (Hobsbawn 1992: 131-32).

Ellen Meiksins Wood has clearly described the nexus between the development of the nation-state and capitalism. She notes that the state became ‘a major player’ in this process (1999: 7). Even more provocative, her research suggests that ‘capitalism has spread not by erasing national boundaries but by reproducing its national organisation, creating a number of national economies and nation-states.’ (1999: 8). Thus, capitalism and the nation-state need each other. This can be contrasted with the old economic practices of mercantilism and bullionism. Leonard Tivey (1981: 62) maintains that these pre-capitalist types of economic organisation, practiced by the absolute state, did not support the state-building enterprise. These two economic doctrines supported fragmented economic spaces, hindering the state from gaining full control over its territory and its material and human resources. The creation of a national economy weakened the economic foundations of different regions and its leaders, strengthening the position of state institutions and the individuals that supported such state-building programmes.

The only problem for the state was that capitalism created more societal problems than solutions to old ones. Class conflict grew sharper, alienation of social groups grew more acute, and the increasing division of labour made it difficult for the state to keep society working as a single unit. Hence nation-building projects were a way of bringing dissatisfied groupings within the framework of the state, gaining their support, while assuring their role in economic production. This is one of the reasons that Karl Marx argued that nationalism was a by-product of the development of capitalism.

While nation-building projects were a way to protect the state and its state-building enterprise, the survival of the state was dependent on its ability to promote material equality or to better the material conditions of society’s members. Many nation-states employed socialism and communism as a framework to order their economies and societies. Others decided to enable the masses to participate in political processes through mass democracy, while in the early twentieth century the democratic Western state, armed with Keynesian economic theory, started to not only interfere in the workings of market economies, but it actually saved the capitalist project from self-destruction by
creating the foundations of mixed economies and put in place the foundations of the welfare state (Franck 1996: 363). In all, the state has taken more responsibilities in economic and related social matters (e.g. health care) in order to upgrade its ability to control society and hinder revolutionary forces from overthrowing the establish regime.

What is the result of these state-building projects? More specifically, how do these projects interfere in the social and manipulate cultural and economic matters? As Hans-Rudolf Wicker (1997: 9) observes, ‘the nation thus inserted itself between the individual and humanity; and by unifying state and capital, it ushered in the concept of totality.’ Meaning that the state becomes the protagonist of this project, setting its basis and allowing for its reproduction by fabricating an ideology or a ‘civil religion’ to support its enterprise. The goal was not only to alter society, but to also transform the way people understood themselves (Eisenstadt 2000: 19). The importance was to build a historical consciousness that all people could relate to in order for these individuals to support the state and its societal project. The aim of this shared sense of consciousness is necessary for ideological purposes, because its strips individuals from their autonomy. Individual self-determination can only be achieved by way of collective self-determination, which needs to be translated via state-building mechanisms. In the end, this reconstructed understanding of the self, as an integral part of a political community, ushers a new understanding of society. As Björn Wittrock observes (2000: 46), this ‘entails a decisive shift from an agential – some would say voluntaristic – view of society to one that emphasizes structural conditions.’

Consequently, these historical changes and ideological reconstruction have converted the state into a social institution that is responsible in establishing the boundaries of the political, while defending the nation from endogenous and exogenous forces. In doing so, it constructs a vision of how society should be organised, while institutionalising social structures to achieve this vision. To assure that this project is achieved, the state creates social narratives, national sentiments, and in extreme cases it uses force to persuade individuals to accept this form of social organisation. Due to this

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10 Habermas (1987: 77-111) also employs a similar usage of the term in his analysis of Emile Durkheim’s work on the ‘sacred.’
reality, the state has ‘the capacity to shape and control the lives of individuals in a way no other institution can’ (Chandhoke 1995: 46).

Although the state has been developing different strategies to cope with challenges to its rule and authority, the evolving post-1989 system has demonstrated that the state is in a moment of transition (Rengger 1997: 256-57). Will the state regain control or will it whither and give way to new strategies of societal integration that enables human beings to directly influence the organization of society? How does ethno-nationalism reinforce or transform this historical progression? If ethno-nationalism is such a threatening force, can the international community find new ways of addressing this challenge and find a way to prevent secessionist armed struggles or resolving existing ethnic conflicts.

B. Peacebuilding as State-Building

Are peacebuilding missions similar to state-building projects? In order to answer this question, it is important to first identify the common features of war-torn societies. Nicole Ball’s research (1996a: 17-24; and 1996b: 608-10) presents four main characteristics:

1. **Institutional weakness.** This refers to both to the vulnerability of state structures and the legal system in the first months of peacebuilding and to the lack of legitimacy these have in the eyes of certain individuals or groups.

2. **A fragmented and destroyed economic base.** War destroys the economic, communication, and transportation infrastructures of society. This not only means that peacebuilding must address economic issues, but that the lack of a working economy will present obstacles to the normalisation of social relations.

3. **The lack of security.** This reality is prompted by the existence of different military organisations, a lack of neutral police forces, the general accessibility of small weapons, and the widespread existence of landmines. The lack of a secure environments puts undo pressure on new government structures, strengthens social fragmentation, and makes economic recovery difficult; it also supports the work of organised crime, discourages inter-ethnic cooperation, fuels corruption and inhibits foreign investment.

4. **Contextual factors.** These are unique to each case. In cases of war torn, multiethnic societies, the contextual factors are usually fragmented social orders, where trust and a shared sense of commonality among society’s members is low.
As a consequence, traditional peacebuilding operations equal state-building programmes for two important reasons. First, peacebuilding missions contend with the same issues state-building programmes face. Second, and more important, peacebuilding missions, as Barbara Walter’s (1999: 133) research argues, underscore the importance of state institutions: ‘resolving a civil war requires more than reaching a bargain and than instituting a ceasefire. To be successful, a civil war peace settlement must consolidate previously warring factions into a single state, create a new government capable of accommodating their interests, and a new national, non-partisan military force.’ Consequently, the existence of a single state is necessary because it can implement the provisions of negotiated peace agreements and address the more immediate socio-economic challenges faced by war-torn societies.

While the formation of state institutions is seen as an important pre-requisite for the successful integration of society, it is important to remember that most ethnic conflicts are usually fuelled by a dissatisfied group’s decision to transform social institutions according to their needs and interests. Consequently, peacemakers need to create a new, inclusive state in which the main warring factions participate in its decision-making processes, while distributing political power in ways that produce co-operative behaviour. For this reason, peacemakers endorse the separation of warring parties in the short term, while also instituting mechanisms to integrate society in the long term. The separation of warring parties is not only related to the physical separation of each party’s military, but also to the re-organisation of the country according to federalist principles. As Donald Horowitz demonstrates (1985: 623), the division of the country into different territorial units, each dominated by an ethnic group and having its own political structures and functions, provides an obstacle to parties that attempt to undo the peace agreement and take control of the political process. More important, the creation of these units presents an important incentive for the leaders of warring factions to keep implementing the peace agreement, as they would probably have control of these political units in the short-term.

Many scholars criticise these arrangements because they empower ethno-national leaders and create territorial units that can lead to the future partition of multiethnic
societies (Kumar 1997: 1-37). However, peacemakers contend that the initial levels of separation experienced by war-torn societies can be reduced by an open and inclusive political system that permits the leaders of each ethno-national group to participate in the new central state. By including power-sharing mechanisms, offices and positions in the state’s political institutions can be proportionally divided between each community’s leaders. This proportionality can be reached by carefully, engineered electoral systems that can guarantee the representation of all ethno-national groups in decision-making institutions and constitutional provisions that secure the distribution of these offices.

While there are different types of power-sharing mechanisms, it is important to notice that the objective is to create an inclusive government that can create economic, political, and social policies that are beneficial for the entire country. In this way, the central state is seen as a mechanism that re-arranges the political organisation of society in order to push through important economic and social reforms. Building on modernisation theory and the effects of state-building programs in the Western political history, these reforms will increase overall living standards and foster more contacts between members of each ethno-national groups in order to create a sense of security that will breed economic interdependence and weaken existing ethno-national identities and give life to new identities centred around the new state (Hodson, Sekulić and Masey 1994: 1535-37).

Paradoxically, even though this important objective is at the centre of peacebuilding operations, the process that produced the peace agreement challenges it. Peacemakers’ decision to negotiate the peace agreements’ provision with the political leaders that started the war legitimates their positions. More significant, peacemakers’ determination to end the war forces them to sideline moderate leaders that can safeguard the long-term success of peacemaking activities. As noted in the previous chapter, these moderate leaders are not invited to official negotiation processes because they do not have control over armed forces and because these leaders threaten the political positions of ethno-national leaders. This is an important observation because research has demonstrated that ethno-national leaders are not only more prone to stop implementing the peace agreement, but they also are more willing to re-start the war (Kamarotos 1995; Moravschik 1996; Stedman 1997; and Walters 1999).
But, without their participation a settlement cannot be reached. It is for this reason that peacemakers make sure that the new country includes strong democratic mechanisms, human rights regimes, and confidence-building mechanism that weaken the position of extreme ethno-national leaders and their parties' structures, at least in the long term. In theory, the holdings of regular elections, even if these are organised according to the principles of proportionality, will force politicians to compete for votes and tone down their rhetoric, producing a political environment for political movements that are not centred around strict ethno-national issues, but on issues of concern to the entire country. Human rights regimes are included for two important reasons. First, these can help rectify the human rights abuses conducted during the war, bringing to justice those that perpetrated these crimes or discrediting those politicians that permitted these criminals to carry out these wanton acts (Akhavan 1996: 259-61). Second, and equally important, peacemakers tend to include strong human rights provisions in negotiated peace agreements in order to promote the rights of citizens, empower them to participate in the political process, and support society’s democratisation process (Kamaratos 1995: 502-05; and Hampson 1996b: 545-47).

Confidence-building mechanisms tend to occur at different levels. The most important sets of confidence-building measures are usually conducted between the different military organisations that waged the war. The objective of these programmes is to encourage military and paramilitary organisations to demobilise their troops, to start disarmament, and commence the re-structuring of the armed forces so these are in line with the peace settlement’s provisions (Hampson 1996b: 542). While disarmament and de-mobilisation can increase confidence in both sides, the fear that one side will not carry its commitments necessitates the creation of special bodies that can monitor these two processes. These bodies are usually set-up by the international community and they include members of each of the warring parties (Walter 1999: 135-37).

Two other important confidence-building measures are the restructuring of the country’s police forces and the stationing of peacekeepers. During prolonged civil wars, police forces become directly involved in the war, rather than offering protection to all civilians and up-holding the rule of law (von Hippel 2000: 194; and Stanley and Call 1997: 107-34). Maintaining the old police force, ‘many of whom were part of the
problem rather than the solution, undercuts the credibility of the new order and could threaten the ability of the new government to manage the transition from war to peace (Kritz 1996: 592). Peacekeepers can play many roles in post-conflict situations, but their main function is to establish a secure environment that is conducive to inter-ethnic cooperation, while supporting international civilian missions established to oversee and enforce negotiated peace agreements.

Each of these tools attempts to strengthen the new legal order and the political institutions established by the negotiated peace in order to weaken the position of extreme ethno-national leaders and groups that prefer not to implement the settlement. As Eva Betram's research notes, peacebuilding is 'nothing less than the reallocation of political power; it is not a neutral act.' Thus, peacebuilding operations 'inevitably favor some groups and disadvantage others; like wars, they have losers as well as winners' (Bertram 1995: 394). This reality suggests that the transition from war to peace is not a smooth process; it actually is one that is unstable and prone to resumption of ethno-national violence.

For this reason, peacemakers remain directly involved in peacebuilding efforts. The most successful transitions from civil war are those in which the international community helps the parties establish the new state, select a new government, and prevent ethno-national leaders from re-starting the war. By sending military peacekeepers, police forces, and a civilian mission to monitor and assist local leaders in the implementation of the agreement, the international community monitors the parties' willingness to enforce the negotiated settlement. In the more extreme cases, the international community assumes full responsibility over the implementation process. Under these circumstances, international agents, authorized by the United Nations' Security Council, set-up a proxy government, where by the basic functions of the state, including security responsibilities, are performed by peacekeepers, international tribunals and civilian missions (Hampson 1996b: 547). The objective of this work is to strengthen state authority and to start the state-building process so the new state can take control over the peacebuilding process.

This point demonstrate the magnitude of international interests and the significance of state-building enterprises in the context of making self-sustaining peace in
war-torn, multiethnic societies a reality. As peacebuilding missions tend to be founded on the tenets of the strategic approach, peacemakers’ interests defined these efforts, while sometimes sidelining those of the people peacebuilding efforts are supposedly helping. In order to understand how peacemakers’ interests guide these efforts, it is important to recognise that the implementation of a peace agreement is not pursued by an unchanging peacebuilding strategy. On the contrary, the strategy is adjusted so it can address the unforeseen challenges that obstruct the full implementation of negotiated settlements (Walter 1999). In other words, the means change, but not the end. The objective is still the institution of a new state that can create a variety of economic and social programmes that can successfully weaken ethno-national or communitarian structures that promote separation in order to integrate society and re-establish the social foundations of a viable nation-state. Hence, strategic conceptions of peacebuilding are not only similar to state-building projects, but the intended goal of both enterprises is the same.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
According to instrumental explanations of ethnic conflict, state institutions have the ability of manipulating the organisation of society in order to manage social conflicts and even create a “nation” that supports its vision of social organisation. Thus, these explanations argue that state-building projects can manage ethnic conflicts and provide social stability. In this way, there is a strong correlation between ethnic war and state failure. This observation is important because many scholars and decision-makers argue that building state institutions, implementing economic modernization programmes and executing nation-building initiatives can reconstruct multiethnic societies wrecked by war.

As defined in this chapter, peacebuilding missions and state-building programmes are similar in nature, because they attempt to achieve social order. However, social order does not necessarily lead to the institution of a self-sustaining peace. It is essential to return to the questions posed in the previous chapter: does social order equate self-sustaining peace? Or, are supporters of this type of peacemaking practices ignoring other elements that can make negotiated peace agreements self-sustaining? These are important questions that must be answered, as the constructivist challenge suggests that other
elements affect inter-ethnic relations and the stability of society. Indeed, the constructivist critique of mainstream theories of ethnic conflicts suggests that instrumental explanations are too simplistic because they fail to capture how the social context and changing social circumstances affect the patterns of inter-ethnic relations.

In many ways, the constructivist critique enables the critique of state-centred peacebuilding. Taking note of chapter’s one conceptualisation of communicative forms of peacemaking, the next chapter provides the theoretical foundations of society-centred peacebuilding practices, based on Habermas’s critical theory. As stated in the beginning of this chapter, this alternative form of peacebuilding suggests that state-centred practices are not conducive to a self-sustaining peace. In addition, chapter three also presents a set of propositions that will be used to test the argument that the Dayton peace initiative was crafted according to the tenets of the strategic approach to peacemaking.
CHAPTER THREE
Society-Centred Peacebuilding: Defining the Theoretical Foundations of Alternative Practices

INTRODUCTION
Historically speaking, state-building projects are supposed to solve the problem of social integration in multi-ethnic societies; meaning that a unitary conception of society dominated by the state can impose universal values and principles to bring ethnic particularianism, that is to say communitarianism, in line with the community's universal interests. The new state generated by peacemaking efforts embodies international recognised principles of social organisation. Consequently, the state becomes a road to democracy, market economics and the basis of a self-sustaining peace. While state-building initiatives are an integral part of mainstream peacebuilding practices, a growing literature has criticised this conception of peacebuilding. The overall failure of this form of peacebuilding has led Krishna Kumar to argue that (1997: 33-34):

those charged with designing and implementing political rehabilitation interventions lack appropriate conceptual frameworks, intervention models, concepts, policy instruments, and methodologies for assistance programs to rebuild civil society, establish and nurture democratic institutions, promote a culture favourable to the protection of human rights, reconstruct law enforcement systems, or facilitate ethnic reconciliation in highly unstable political and social environments.

In this sense, there is a need to create alternative understandings of peacebuilding. This chapter argues that such mechanisms must move away from traditional initiatives that embrace state-building programmes to new ones that stress the importance of rebuilding society as a whole. It is important to notice that a society-centred approach does not invalidate the central state or the international community's role to institute a self-sustaining peace. On the contrary, state institutions and the international community should also play an important role in peacebuilding processes, but this thesis strongly argues that international interests should give way to the interests of the people affected by the war.

81
Building on the characteristics of communicative approach to peacemaking, developed in chapter one, this chapter provides the theoretical foundation of society-centred practices. It is divided into three parts. Part one presents a critique of strategic peacebuilding. Part two presents Habermas's society-centred social theory. This serves as a theoretical foundation to construct a society-centred peacebuilding programme for post-Dayton Bosnia. Part three reflects on the examinations conducted in this and previous chapters and presents a number of questions and issues researchers must keep in mind as they examine the long-term viability of the Dayton peace initiative.

I. CRITICISING STATE-CENTRED PEACEBUILDING

At the most basic level, state-centred and society-centred understandings of peacebuilding differ on each approach's adherence to a specific paradigm of social integration in post-settlement situations. State-centred approaches to peacebuilding emphasise that the creation of a state can manage and settle social conflict, while assuring order and stability. This view is in line with the tenets of the strategic approach. The twin objectives of order and stability can permit the state to expand its activity and create a new political culture based on state dependence. Thus, it becomes important for social groups to participate in the process of state-building as their work and co-operation with other groups will assure them a degree of influence over the state's policy-making mechanisms. However, the danger that minority groups might be discriminated by more powerful groups always raises concerns about the long-term viability of the project.

In fact, a growing number of critical studies in the discipline of international relations and the field conflict analysis have found that state-building processes contradict democratic values and their emphasis on peaceful multicultural existence and tolerance (Jabri 1996: 157-59; Linklater 1998: 27-34; Smith 1997: 93-96; and Lawson 1995: 116-36). The success of state-building process requires the state to control social processes and transform society according to its interests. From a socio-cultural perspective, state-building initiatives must legitimate the state's actions by generating new national identities that tie the will of the people with that of the state. This nation-building process not only presents a single identity that is to be shared by society's members. More significant, the constitutive traits of this identity impel the transformation
of other “traditional” identities. This is not to say that the national identity displaces other social identities, though this is possible, but existing social identities are brought into line with the state’s functional identity.

It is important to also notice that this understanding of peacebuilding does not directly deal with issues relating to the problem of inter-communal reconciliation. Proponents of state-centred theories of peacebuilding argue that reconciliation is a by-product of state-building. This is so for two reasons. First, influenced by the instrumental explanations of ethnic conflicts, proponents of state-centred peacebuilding believe that establishing co-operative relations between each community’s leaders at the state level sets an example for the rest of society. These instrumentalist explanations argue that identity and the preservation of a particular way of life is not the driving force of ethnic conflicts. In this sense, ethnic identity becomes a tool of political change, employed by social elites’ who want to organise society in a way that favours their own ambitions. Thus, peacebuilding is an elite driven processes, by which peacemakers concentrate their efforts at satisfying the needs and interests of these elites in order to create a new state where all elites can satisfy their self-interests. If co-operation between leaders is possible, then co-operation between individuals at the communal level can be a reality as well because the elites will want to decrease the amount of conflict, so society can work efficiently.

Second, the legal system set by the state can institutionalise reconciliatory mechanisms. By prosecuting those individuals indicted for war crimes, the state starts to enable human beings to increase contact across communal lines (Colleta and Nezam 1999: 4). The establishment of the rule of law, the protection of private property and the creation of new security apparatus, enable businessmen to open stores, cafés, and other enterprises that hire people and move individuals from thinking in terms of physical security and survival to the satisfaction of material needs. In many ways, this concern with economic development and the creation of a market economy are guided by the belief that individuals’ are motivated to satisfy material needs and interests, thus offering a incentive to increase contact among individuals of the different communities.

More important, many studies show that economic progress is a way of weakening the position of ethno-nationalism, as leaders of these movements have a
harder time mobilising their members. However, William Easterly (2000) finds that societies divided along ethnic lines generally experience economic growth if there are strong state institutions that can enforce the law and create effective economic policies. Hence, building or strengthening existing state structures is seen as way of establishing the basis of a market economy, while also assisting in the integration of society. Thus, economic development should not only increase contact between groups, but also attract foreign investors and even set the foundations of civil society.

This state-centred understanding of peacebuilding is basically a trickle-down or a top-down social integration strategy. Not surprising, the international community attempts to dominate the implementation process by constructing a new state, so this can become a caretaker of the process once international agents exit these war-torn societies. In many ways, this paradigm of social integration equals this thesis’s understanding of strategic peacemaking. Francis Kofi Abiew and Tom Keating (1999-2000: 85) find that ‘peacebuilding reflect an interest on the parts of governments to maintain stability, or to gain influence in particular countries, in order to protect or advance the interests of the intervening government.’ The prevalence of this model of peacebuilding has been captured by Roland Paris’s (1997) study, a report written by Nat Colleta, Michelle Cullen, and Johanna Mendelson Forman (1998) of the World Bank’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit, and by Francis Abiew and Keating’s (1999-2000) review of peacebuilding practices in Haiti. However, these studies also capture the need to develop new conceptions of peacebuilding.

Colleta, Cullen and Mendelson Forman (1998: 8) argue that post-war reconstruction has been mostly ‘focused on rebuilding infrastructure; it is easier to rebuild roads and bridges than it is to reconstruct institutions and strengthen the fabric of society.’ In essence, their report notes that reconstructing the fabric of society should be conducted by increasing citizens’ participation in the process and by building the organs of a strong civil society. In a reflexive tone, they also argue that designing such strategies must be aware of the challenges to their effectiveness: ‘Yet to do so effectively, development agencies need to better understand how to define and bolster civil society in a post-conflict setting; that is, to be aware of how conflict affects civil society, what factors increase group cohesion under adverse conditions and which issues are most
critical for civil society (human rights, health and others)' (1998: 8). While this is an important observation, they fail to answer what values and principles should motivate their work in post-conflict situations.

In his criticisms of this traditional paradigm of peacebuilding, Ronald Paris (1997: 56) notes that it ‘involves transplanting Western models of social, political, and economic organization into war shattered states in order to control civil conflict…’. Paris strong normative critique leads him to introduce an alternative strategy he calls: ‘Strategic Liberalization’ (1997: 81). Even though this strategy has interesting elements, such as the exclusion of extremists in the political process and funding social initiatives to increase ‘social capital’, this paradigm still argues for the imposition of Western models of societal organisation to other parts of the world. Paris is correct to point out the deficiencies with this traditional strategy, but he does not consider the probability that his strategy’s elements may actually contradict the needs and interests of the people it attempts to assist. In addition, this strategy is problematic because it is still caught within the boundaries of state-building paradigms of social integration, as social order is still the study’s main concern.

Abiew and Keating (1999-2000: 105) agree with Paris, but their concern with the ethics of intervention argue that this type of peacebuilding has to be questioned, as outsiders might actually ‘become part of the problem rather than the solution.’ For this reason, they do not only argue for new peacebuilding strategies, but they strongly argue that ‘outsiders adopt a simple but significant guiding principle when considering intervention…. That principle is: do no harm’ (1999-2000: 105). They also argue that the creation of new strategies must view peacebuilding as an internal matter ‘in which the primary role of outside agents should be directed, first and foremost, at not impeding local activities and toward supporting processes and institutions that emerge within societies’ (1999-2000: 106).

Building on these works, this thesis presents the theoretical foundations of a new paradigm of societal integration in post-conflict situations. This paradigm is influenced by Habermas’s investigation on social integration and the research conducted in the field of conflict transformation. Whereas the state-centred paradigm focuses on the creation and the strengthening of state structures, the society-centred paradigm sees society as a
space where three social sectors interact and coexist: state, civil society and the market. If the former paradigm argues that the state has the ability to define the boundaries of the social, while establishing norms and values that regulate individuals and the work conducted by the other two sectors, the society-centred paradigm argues that such functions are not the state’s responsibility, but those of civil society. Hence, civil society becomes the prime social sphere as it empowers individuals and groups to create and challenge existing norms and values that give legitimacy to state actions and those of the market.

It is important to underscore that this paradigm does support the creation of state institutions and market mechanisms, as these provide a legal framework that regulates individual actions and provide mechanisms to satisfy material needs and interests. However, influenced by the communicative approach to peacemaking, as presented in chapter one, a society-centred paradigm of social integration finds that communicative processes ingrained in civil society can affect how society is organised by clearly influencing the state’s legislative branch and the overall decision-making process. Thus, implicit in this understanding of social integration is the belief that Habermas’s deliberative democracy can integrate society according to the needs and interests of individuals and groups participating in civil society’s communicative processes.

Consequently, the importance here is the building of a strong civil society. Of course, the problem with this view is that a strong civil society cannot exist if society is deeply divided. Thus, a peacebuilding programme based on this paradigm of social integration has to clearly transform the conflicting relations and build a new political culture, where all individuals regardless of their ethnic background can meet in civil society’s informal structure to discuss issues of importance.

II. HABERMAS’S SOCIETY-CENTRED SOCIAL THEORY

A constructivist approach to ethno-national conflict suggests that social structures play an important role in determining the intensity of these types of conflict. Such an approach embraces both primordial and instrumental explanations of ethnic conflict, which means that group members see themselves in essentialist terms, because leaders have changed society’s structures to breed and nurture such views. But, these are not static identities,
but ones that have been invented and reproduced by different mechanisms; specifically by the way society is organised. In this sense, leaders mobilise ethnic groups to attain certain material objectives and the preservation of cultural traditions. In divided societies, the strategy is to gain control over state structures to define accepted social processes and curb the interests and needs of other groups that are competing for control of the same state apparatus. In this competitive environment, conflict is prone to turn violent and the divisions of society tend to fracture society’s communicative structures along communal lines.

In Habermas’s view, these communication structures are crucial in creating a ‘lifeworld’ or Lebenswelt, which serves as a steering mechanism for the integration of society into a single working unit. In this sense, the lifeworld encompasses a background of shared knowledge and convictions that are understood by individuals as non-disputable. The significance of this concept is that it emphasises that communication and social interaction happens in the horizon of this lifeworld (Habermas 1984: 70). More significantly, this background of shared knowledge provides the structures of a symbolic world that enables the formation and reproduction of identities. In this way, personal identity is tied to the collective identity of the communication community at hand. This in turns means that societies divided along communal lines do not share a lifeworld. Instead each one has its own lifeworld contexts. Under these situations, each group objectifies the other and dehumanises it in order to present it as an enemy that must be controlled or exterminated. Accordingly, the challenge of peacebuilding is to re-build the communication structures of society in order to give way to new understandings of given a conflict situation and generate new lifeworld contexts that permit the transformation of divided societies in order to support inter-communal co-operation and the construction of new social orders reflective of the needs and interests of all citizens.

Because this society-centred understanding of peacebuilding is built on the theoretical tenets of the communicative approach to peacemaking, it is important to grasp how Habermas’s theory of communicative action, as presented in the first chapter, can be translated at a macro-sociological level and illustrate how it can induce a new inter-subjective politics of emancipation.

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A. Communicative Action: Micro-Macro Linkages

Habermas argues that society is divided into the system and the lifeworld. The system can be separated into two subsystems: the state or the administrative apparatus and the market. These are supposed to operate within the symbolic structures of the lifeworld. In macro-sociological terms, the lifeworld is not only a background knowledge that makes communication and action co-ordination possible, but more important it also serves as the glue that holds society together. Moreover this view of society sees society divided into private and public spheres. The lifeworld is divided along these two spheres, while the market subsystem lies within the private, and the state in the public. Where does civil society fall? While this sector was not part of his early analyses, Habermas has placed it within the lifeworld, connecting both of its private and public spheres and influencing the work of the other two sub-systems (1996a: 366-67).

In many ways, this description of society is important because it enables Habermas to address the structure-agency debate. Some theorists argue that social structures shape the agent and its behaviour, paying little attention to how social actors can shape or transform social structures. Other theorists, in the other hand, argue that social actors have a key role in constructing and influencing social processes that affect the composition of society. Habermas’s stance is a synthesis of both perspectives. As Bernstein contends, ‘we cannot understand the character of the lifeworld unless we understand the social systems that shape it, and we cannot understand the social unless we see how they arise out of activities of social agents’ (Bernstein 1985: 22). In fact, Habermas’s model is not too different from the state-society model provided by Migdal in the previous chapter. The only difference, as it will be seen below, is that whereas Migdal’s analysis favours the state as a mechanism of social integration, Habermas tends to support the informal communicative processes of the lifeworld.

The second volume of the Theory of Communicative Action starts with an analysis of George Herbert Mead’s social-psychology and Émile Durkheim’s sociology. Both these writers, Habermas contends, are instrumental in understanding the function of the lifeworld at a macro-sociological level. Mead’s research attempts to understand the
development of the self in society. His theory of symbolic mediated interaction establishes that the self is a product of social interactions, where an individual takes the role of the other in such a way that an individual internalises the attitudes and convictions of others. To put it more simply, 'I' is in constant relation with 'Me.' 'Me' represents the ideals, norms, values, and attitudes of the social group that 'I' or the self belongs to. This role-playing becomes so customary in the behaviour of the self that the self internalises these norms and values. Role-playing is in itself a form of reflection that enables the self to produce and present these symbols (e.g. values, norms, ideals, etc.), serving as a 'Me' for other individuals to copy. Mead emphasises that the employment of language and symbolic communication frees human action from the natural determinism inherent in evolutionary theory.

In addition to this, Mead informs Habermas's theory of discourse ethics (Outhwaite 1994: 84). This theory argues that individuals can join dialogical processes to validate, question or establish new moral criteria, responsible in guiding individual behaviour, and 'to define aspects of the "good life"' (Outhwaite 1994: 54). This presupposes that individuals that participate in such processes of argumentation are part of what Mead called, an 'ideal communication community.' Individuals in this community are induced to partake on any issues (moral or ethical) that affect their lives. These issues retain a universalistic quality, which Habermas has called the principle of universalisation (U) (Habermas 1996b: 57-76). The aim of this process is twofold. First, argumentation enables the sociation of individuals. In argumentation, while new norms might be introduced and old ones might be re-established as legitimate, argumentation for it to be successful relies on the competence of speakers to validate their claims in order to reach consensus. In all, this process enables the collective will-formation of society, which becomes necessary to legitimise established social institutions. Related to this, the second objective demonstrates how argumentation processes induce the spread of democratic ideals. 'To the extent that normative validity claims become dependent on confirmation through communicatively achieved consensus, principles of democratic will-formation and universalistic principles of law are established in the modern state' (Habermas 1987: 96).
In all, Mead's theory fits within Habermas's framework of analysis because it supports the significance of his theory of communicative action. It is important to notice that Mead contends that the development of the self, and the evolution of society, does not take place on the basis of a solitary subject confronting an object in a physical world, but on the level of subject-subject relations in a common lifeworld.

Durkheim is important for Habermas's theory because his theory shows how in traditional societies religion renders a symbolic representation of society, where the beliefs and norms of the 'sacred' re-affirm the values of the community. More important, Habermas is interested on how the transition from traditional to modern social structures secularises the sacred, but replaces it with a 'collective consciousness' that serves the same role religion plays in traditional society. This collective consciousness is similar to Habermas's description of lifeworld processes that give meaning and purpose to individuals' lives. What is important to notice is that Durkheim, and Habermas agrees with this claim, believed that society could not function if all citizens behaved strategically in order to satisfy their own needs and interests at the expense of others. The 'healthy' evolution of society is therefore dependent on the existence of collective norms that guide an individual's behaviour.

Like Habermas, Durkheim saw the paradoxical role the state could play in providing this new religion. This has been pointed out by Montseratt Guibemau's essay, 'Marx and Durkheim on Nationalism.' Her analysis shows that the reproduction of society is dependent on the moralisation, e.g. socialisation, of its individuals, so they can act according to established norms. While Durkheim disputed that the state is a social actor, which's chief role is to expand justice within society, he also argued that it 'needs to be restrained by the totality of secondary forces that are subordinate to it but without which like any unrestrained organism, it develops excessively and becomes tyrannical and forceful.' (Cited in Guibemau 1997: 81). The solution then rests on his 'secondary forces' that lie between the individual and the state, thus pointing to civil society where individuals meet to regulate the actions of the state. This last point reflects Habermas's sociological and political objective, as developed in Between Facts and Norms.

In this way, Mead and Durkheim 'provide a kind of theoretical bridge to a fully developed theory of communicative action.' (Rasmussen 1990: 34). Both these writers'
individual investigations permit Habermas to use their work to expand his micro-
sociological analysis into a macro-sociological one. Consequently, the lifeworld has to
be comprehended as more than a ‘horizon’ or background were action geared at
achieving understanding takes place. Now, the lifeworld is also a steering mechanism
that reproduces the symbolic structures of society via mechanisms of social integration.
As demonstrated in Mead’s and Durkheim’s analyses, these symbolic structures are
significant in the evolution of society, in the socialisation of individuals into a set of
inter-subjectively endorsed norms, and in the enhancement of an individual’s capacity to
learn new ways of inter-subjectively relating and communicating with other individuals.
According to this interpretation, the lifeworld is responsible in producing meaning by
way of establishing cultural values, norms and ideals of justice and individual and
collective identities. In doing so, the lifeworld enhances human freedom by establishing
procedures for individuals to change the composition of the lifeworld through processes
of argumentation in practical, moral and ethical discourses. As a result, communicative
processes, ingrained in lifeworld contexts, become a steering mechanism that guides the
actions of the ‘system.’

In contrast to the lifeworld, the system refers to a social sphere in which processes
reproduce the material conditions of society. While the lifeworld-system model seems to
suggest that the lifeworld and the system ‘lie parallel to one another, they are
interconnected: system mechanisms have to be anchored in the lifeworld, that is,
institutionalised’ (McCarthy 1984: xxx). Conceiving society in this way allows
Habermas’ to transcend the Frankfurt School’s analysis of reification in modern social
systems. ‘What is needed,’ Habermas maintains, ‘is not just a critique of instrumental
reason such as Horkheimer and Adorno developed, but rather a “critique of functionalist
reason,” which can be obtained only when a systems perspective is integrated with a
communicative model of action’ (White 1989: 104). By functional rationality, Habermas
means the type of rationality that increases the complexity and the capacity of the system
to take on driving functions in society. In essence, the augmenting complexity of the
system enables the ‘uncoupling of the sub-systems of the economy and administrative
activity from the lifeworld’ (Cooke 1994: 6).
Empowering these two sub-systems, in the task of stripping the lifeworld from integrating society through the medium of communication, are the mediums of money and administrative power. In many ways, the sub-systems use their respective mediums to colonise and distort the composition of the lifeworld so they can achieve their particular interests. Because the co-ordination of action in the lifeworld is not conducted via communicative action, but by the functional integration of the system through money and power, society as a whole is deformed, reducing the ability of individuals to co-ordinate their actions and to restructure society according to their visions. The consequence of this is the three-fold increases of alienation, reification and anomie, which accompany the loss of meaning and freedom and lead to the fragmentation of society. While these three outcomes seem to question the suitability and credibility of developing strategies of political emancipation, Habermas provides insights for the transformation of these social pathologies.

**B. Deliberative Democracy**

In a recent interview, Habemas was asked by Mikael Carleheden and René Gabriels to compare two of his models of political activism to stop the encroaching power of the state and the market and organise society according to the needs and interests of society's citizens expressed via communicative action mechanisms. In the first model, developed in the second volume of the *Theory of Communicative Action*, Habermas argues that 'citizens must besiege the political processes of judgement and decision-making without intending actually to take it over' (1997: 148). In the other model, introduced in *Between Facts and Norms*, Habermas maintains that 'citizens must influence the center, that is parliament, the courts and the administration, the communication of influences has to pass from the periphery through the sluices of democratic and constitutional procedures' (1997: 148). The former can be called the 'siege model' and the latter the 'sluice model' or deliberative democracy.

The difference between these two models is that Habermas's first model was supposed to stop both the market and state's attempts to colonise or re-programme the lifeworld. In this way, social movements, especially those struggling for environmental protection, gender equality and international peace, were supposed to go head on against
this system forces. Habermas admits that this was an idealistic model because it did not specify how to protect the composition of the lifeworld and how to prevent this from re-occurring (1997: 148-49).

Habermas does not believe that these social forces, ingrained in the lifeworld’s public sphere, should overtake the state and the market. For Habermas, the state and market play important roles in society. However, he strongly points out that the state and the market have become detached from the lifeworld. This not only means that they act independent of individuals’ wishes, but more important they start colonising the lifeworld’s structures as means to achieve their own strategic ends. Habermas believes that this is dangerous because society then becomes a mechanisms to support the state’s or market’s own teleological projects, while minimising the ability of individuals to challenge such processes (Blaug 1999: 26).

As a result, the sluice model is introduced because Habermas wants to show practical ways social movements can change society’s legal and constitutional systems. Not surprising, the analysis is mostly directed at influencing the state’s administrative capacity and less on ways to restrict the encroachment of market forces. The emphasis is placed on civil society organisations and how they can participate in processes of political opinion- and will-formation so they change legal statutes that empower the work of the state and market forces. Habermas’s emphasis on the law is not accidental. Laws serve as a connection between the system and the lifeworld. In fact, he argues that laws are mechanisms system institutions employ to interfere in the workings of the lifeworld and rationalise it according to its strategic interests. Even though legal discourses can affect the composition of the lifeworld, it is crucial to stress the dual character of these discourses. Laws do not only empower the work of the state or make possible the efficient operation of market mechanisms, but more important they legitimate the actions of civil society organisations. To put it simply, the dual character of legal procedures affords state institutions with administrative power and civil society with communicative power. The former authorizes state institutions to enforce and use coercion to implement laws in order to safeguard the basis of social order and protect established social procedures, while the latter form of power grants individuals the freedom to come
together with other individuals to address matters of mutual concern and to de-limit the power of state institutions.

In a democratic system, laws are enacted by the state, but it receives its legitimacy from its citizens. While the legal statute is neutral, in the way that it is factual and valid once it is employed, the act of writing and enforcing legal norms is a normative process that cannot rest solely in the hands of the state. The less legitimacy a legal order enjoys in the eyes of society's citizens, the more coercion or repression of freedom is needed to enforce the rule of law. In this manner, Habermas believes that social integration can be either driven by 'circumscribing communicative mechanisms' that question the validity of established orders or by 'giving these mechanisms unhindered play' (Habermas 1996a: 36). The first goes against the democratic ideal, while the latter is consistent with it. Faced with this dilemma, Habermas contends that it is important to institutionalise communicative mechanisms to keep in check administrative power, while permitting civil society processes ingrained in lifeworld contexts to reaffirm or transform society's structures (Habermas 1996a: 147). Thus, he argues that: 'Through a practice of self-determination that requires citizens to make public the use of their communicative freedoms the law draws its socially integrating force from the source of social solidarity.'

In The Inclusion of the Other, Habermas starts addressing issues closely related to societies that have been divided by ethno-national conflicts. While his work does not necessarily specify a peacebuilding agenda or mechanisms of conflict transformation, a review of these essays, when combined with his political project, as found in The Theory of Communicative Action and Between Facts and Norms, do point to interesting ways of integrating society, which inform this thesis.

Habermas establishes that contending parties must come together to re-establish the legal foundations of society in order to activate public communication mechanisms, ingrained in civil society and to construct new definitions of political community. Habermas argues that laws serve as the fabric that connects the lifeworld with the system and its two sub-systems: the state and the market. It is not surprising that Habermas gives preference to the lifeworld over the other two sub-systems, as it is includes civil society institutions, which empower participants to freely come and question or reaffirm the validity and the facticity of established norms, values, and laws (Habermas 1996a: 366-
Hence laws, as norms and values, are only factual and legitimate, if they reflect the needs and interests of society; that is to say if they are ‘able to prove their worth against any future objections that might be raised’ (Habermas 1996b: 35).

More importantly, the legal framework, which as noted above reflects the needs and interests of civil society, limits state actions and the behaviour of market forces by clearly defining their social responsibilities. In a multicultural society, civil society is characterised by an arena of competing interests, where no one group dominates policymaking or implements policies that go against the needs and interests of any other groups. But in order for such notions to be effective, they must be made part of a political constitution that grants the necessary rights to ensure the equal participation of all citizens, regardless of their cultural or political affiliations, in all public processes (Habermas 1998: 221). The existence of a multicultural society is dependent on the system of rights that its constitution provides to its citizens. These rights empower citizens to participate in public networks, and allow for assemblages to contest the actions of those individuals or groups that attempt to dominate the political process and impose their will on the rest of society.

Consequently, Habermas challenges the notion that successful social integration, the ability to define the boundaries of the political community and create policies to solve societal problems, can be achieved through the mechanism of the state. He goes a step further, proposing that proceedings ingrained in civil society should be directing the social integration process, rather than the state and market forces. Even though the possibilities offered by Habermas are boundless, his political project does not spell out what are the final products of this political programme. It can be argued that communicative processes could fail to integrate society because in politics there has to be some kind of shared identity in order to truly secure the operation of legal and political mechanisms. This is an important observation as the notion of creating a shared identity might be the impetus to persuade groups, who are struggling for separation-based recognition, to engage alternatively in a reformulation of the nature of an existing political community.

In his more recent work, Habermas argues that his ideal society does not have a ‘thick’ conception of national identity. Instead, he argues for ‘thin’ conceptions of civic
or *post-national* identity, where citizens do not necessarily share cultural traits, but they share a faith in the democratic principles that make communicative action possible. Therefore, this identity is thus the product of a common political culture in which citizens recognise themselves as members of their polity (Habermas 1998: 225 and 2001: 60-63).

Because such an identity is directly connected to communicative processes it is always in flux and re-adapting to new situations and contexts. In Habermas's society-centred model, civil society is the sphere of progress because it creates and re-fashions the boundaries of the political and the social, according to changing circumstances and evolving problems. No one person holds access to the 'truth' and no 'truth' can be endorsed until the political community has affirmed its validity through communicative mechanisms.

The strength of Habermas political project is its ability to re-align the particular interests of society, as expressed in the discourses of the lifeworld, with the universal requirements needed to have open democratic processes. This conception of deliberative politics points to the possibility of building a multicultural system that affords individuals, via legal statutes and constitutional mechanisms, the ability to participate in processes of political will formation regardless of their ethnic, economic, or ideological background. This envisioned society is not founded on an activist state that dominates and shape the boundaries of the social and political, but a decentred society where the state and market forces are being directed by discourses and interactions that occur in the context of the lifeworld; meaning that the conception of a unitary society dominated by a state or a fragmented society along communitarian lines fighting for the state can be displaced by a society that permits the satisfaction of individuals' needs and interests via the communicative structures ingrained in the lifeworld's civil society.

III. EXAMINING PEACEMAKING INITIATIVES

Having proposed the theoretical foundations of society-centred forms of peacebuilding practices, it is important to keep in mind that these have had little impact on peacemaking processes in the Balkans and other parts of the world. This is not to say that alternative peacebuilding practices have not being designed or implemented in post-conflict situations. Exceptions do exist. But, for the most part, the international community has
ignored these alternative peacemaking practices. Is this also the case concerning the Dayton peace initiative?

This is an important question, but only in the context of another more critical question, what factors determine the success of a peacemaking initiative? As noted in chapter one, a successful initiative is one that establishes the foundations of a self-sustaining peace, which can be defined by a ex-combatants willingness to work with each other to implement the provisions of a negotiated agreement and address possible conflicts associated this agreement's implementation non-violently. Another element of a successful initiative is characterised by the outside actors ability to reduce its presence in post-settlement environment, allowing ex-combatants to assume control over their future.

Examining the success of see peacemaking activities is a complex matter because so many factors and challenges affect the peace process at different stages. For this reason, this thesis argues that peacemaking activities have to be analysis in a systemically. In other words, the success of any peace initiative can only be measured by its ability to achieve key objectives in its three constitutive stages: pre-settlement activities, settlement-making, and post-conflict peacebuilding. The first stage involves the political process that enables the international community to convince contending parties to stop fighting and meet to negotiate an end to their conflict. The settlement-making stage implies that contending actors, with the assistance of outside interveners, will negotiate the terms of a peace agreement that can settle the conflict and make the long-term resolution of the conflict possible. The dilemma is to whether 'first address the core issues in the conflict, which tend to be the most difficult, or to concentrate on peripheral issues in the hope of making early agreements and establishing momentum' (Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse 1999: 164). Of course, which path is taken affects peacebuilding efforts, which are usually guided by outside interveners in order to secure the full implementation of a peace agreement and develop new mechanisms that can institute the foundations of a self-sustaining peace.

In this manner, peacemaking initiatives can only be successful if they address the following challenges at three different levels of analysis. At the international level, peacemaking initiatives will succeed, if a peacemaker or set of peacemakers can create a strong consensus of what has to be done in order to move contending parties closer to
peace. This observation builds on the fact that many peacemaking initiatives are not
driven by a single peacemaker, but by a host of third party interveners that often have
their own interests. If not conducted in unison, these interveners’ particular initiatives
may actually impede other peacemakers’ work. A first step towards creating a successful
peace process entails the production of a single initiative that allows international actors
to speak in one single voice. This is not only important in pre-settlement and settlement-
making stages, but also in the peacebuilding stage, as research suggests that settlements
that can stop the fighting will not necessarily establish a self-sustaining peace (Walter
1999). Thus, international consensus must also prevail in peacebuilding efforts.

At the regional level, intrastate conflict, which is what is being analysed in this
thesis, is not only a product of internal events. Regional actors, especially if they have a
stake on the final outcome of the conflict, can play constructive or damaging roles.
Peacemakers must be aware of these dynamics and create the proper mechanisms to
either harness their resources or limit their role to ensure the success of their initiatives.

At the domestic level, because intrastate conflict is primarily driven by groups
that are struggling for the transformation of established social structures or for the
creation of new nation-states, the success of a peacemaking initiative needs to generate
new social structures and co-ordination mechanisms that permit these groups to co-exist.
Hence, it is important to understand the causes of the conflict to make sure that the
peacemaking initiative does not establish a political order that re-ignites dissatisfied
group grievances and allow each group’s political leader to mobilise its constituents
against newly established structures (Stedman 1997). More important, a peace initiative
must include mechanisms that integrate society and de-legitimise those political leaders
that believe violence is the best tool to achieve their particular objectives. The success of
a peace initiative is dependent on its ability to create and sustain the growth of a new
constituency that supports non-violent mechanisms to solve issues of contention, while
equally building new and re-adapting existing social structures to meet the needs and
interests of all concerned parties in order to establish a self-sustaining peace. In addition,
and as demonstrated by Lederach’s (1997) work, the domestic level is influenced by the
dynamics of individuals working at three levels: grassroots, middle, and top.
Breaking down the challenges peacemakers face into three levels is a useful analytic tool that allows researchers to examining if a peacemaking initiative is a failure or a success. However, it is important to re-state that this framework does not approximate Kenneth Waltz’s framework of analysis presented in *Man, the State and War* (1959). This thesis does not favour one level over the others. Instead, it specifies that a successful peacemaking initiative must address each level’s problems and challenges. This implies that peacemaking is a systemic process; where by a peacemaker’s work at one level can either have negative or positive consequences on overall peacemaking efforts. It also captures the complexity of issues, interests, and actors at play in conflict and post-conflict situations.

While this framework of analysis can assist research’s examination of peace process, there are still a number of unanswered questions that can help researchers evaluate the success of a particular peace initiative. It is important to notice that some of these questions have been raised in the burgeoning literature on peacemaking, but so far there is no consensus on whether these factors are necessary for successful peacemaking or if these are challenges to the establishment of a self-sustaining peace.

Noting that consensus between outside parties intervening in conflict situations may be the first step in stopping the fighting, start negotiations, finalize a peace agreement, and start post-conflict peacebuilding, is the presence of the United States or another great power necessary to secure an end to hostilities? More important, what mechanisms should outside interveners use to stop the fighting and start negotiations? Should outside parties use coercion, compellence, or non-violent mechanisms? I. William Zartman’s (2003) research shows that it is possible for non-violent practices to break the impasse, but only when contending parties perceive they are in a mutually hurting stalemate. As a result, they understand that continuing the fighting would not allow them to achieve victory, so they are willing to meet with their counterparts and third-parties to consider ways to settle the conflict. Zartman argues that at this stage the conflict is ripe for settlement, but he warns that mutually hurting stalemates do not hold for long and that peacemakers must quickly act, for if not contending parties would find new ways of achieving their interests violently.
Other researchers have recognized the value of Zartman’s ripeness model, but raise normative questions concerning the timing of the intervention (Salla 1997). Should outside actors wait for a mutually hurting stalemate to develop, even though this may take several months or years and claim the lives of many innocent civilians? Some researchers believe that outside interveners can use their resources to drive contending parties to a mutual hurting stalemate (Rubin 1991: 239-41). But, should peaceful methods be used to create this condition or should coercion be employed? Violence can be used, but international pressure through United Nations mechanisms (e.g. sanctions) and public opinion campaigns can also be important factors affecting the willingness of outside actors to intervene in a given conflict situation.

Thus, some researchers argue that the context is not the deciding factor of whether third party interveners can successfully end the fighting and start negotiations that can lead to peacebuilding. Outside actors’s willingness to intervene in a conflict can also be a crucial factor (Kleibor 1994 and Lederach 2003). Even though most researchers disagree on this issue, they do agree that outside players are important elements of peacemaking efforts, for it is highly unlikely that contending factions will solve their disagreements peacefully.

Even though third-party interveners are necessary, the literature captures another important dilemma: should the peace process be driven by the interest of outside interveners or of combatants (Mitchell 2003: 81)? To connect with the first chapter’s analysis of peacemaking, outside actors that behave according to strategic definitions of peacemaking would intervene according to their own interests. It is not clear, however, if their actions would necessarily override the interests of the contending parties or of the people directly affected by the fighting. Consequently, different actors would probably behave differently. A strong third-party, representing the interests of a powerful country, like the United States, may be a necessity in the peace process, but there is always the danger that its interests would be driving the process, sideling the interests or concerns of other outside parties or even those directly affected by the conflict. A weaker third party, representing smaller countries, influential non-governmental organizations, or intergovernmental organizations, may be more willing to construct a peace process driven by the concerns of contending factions, but this will not secure an end to hostilities, as
this type of third party may not have the resources to force the factions to stop fighting or prevent them from breaking a negotiated cease-fire (Du Toit 2003: 67-68 and Guelke 2003: 60).

Who should outside actors invite to negotiate an end to the conflict? Usually, representatives of warring factions play an important role in settlement-making activities. But, should representatives from other political groups not involved in the fighting, but who could play an important role in peacebuilding, be invited to the negotiations? It seems that the decision of whether who gets invited to the talks is determined by the context of the situation. One argument is that outsiders meet with those that can assure and end to the hostilities and who are willing to start the peacebuilding process. In some cases, extremists are not invited at all, even though they can become spoilers of settlement-making and peacebuilding mechanisms. Stephen John Stedman's (2003: 111-12) research on peace spoilers suggests that it is important to think of ways to reduce the potential of failure and secure the success of a peace agreement by paying more attention to who is representing the interests of those involved in the conflict.

As noted in chapter one, outside parties tend to engage the factions that started the fighting because they are the ones that can stop the fighting. In exchange for their cooperation, their views are legitimated and they are given a chance to negotiate the future of that society, which they have attempted to forcibly reform or destroy. Because their participation is necessary and because outsiders want to see an end to the fighting, negotiations may produce a peace agreement that does not tackle all issues of contention. Outside parties may attempt to push the parties to consider ways to transform their societies according to new ideals and values, but fear that the parties would boycott the negotiations or not endorse the peace agreement provides a strong incentive to get an "incomplete" peace agreement and address other important issues of contention in the peacebuilding phase.

This raises questions regarding the role of outsiders in peacebuilding. As noted at the beginning of chapter two, this phase is the most important because a negotiated peace can only be viable if the parties are willing to put their weapons aside and work together to create new institutions that can secure the establishment of a self-sustaining peace. Because outside parties do not want to see a resumption of hostilities, they need to play a
key role in post-settlement efforts. But, what should their role be? Should they administer the country, monitor the implementation of the peace agreement, or use their resources to force the parties to live up to their commitments? Outsiders’ role also raises questions regarding peacebuilding missions. Should these missions implement the peace agreement, even if some of people feel its provisions are illegitimate, or should these missions attempt to find a resolution to the conflict by transforming society?

From a theoretical standpoint, strategic forms of peacemaking would be informed by a need to settle the conflict. Nevertheless, a settlement can break down and fighting could start once again. The failure of peace settlements in Rwanda in 1994 and in Cambodia in 1997 serves as a reminder that a settled conflict is not necessarily resolved. In light of the questions and dilemmas raised above, how can peacemaking initiatives best secure the long-term viability of a peace agreement? Is resolution of a conflict the only way peace can become self-sustaining? Consequently, are the strategic and communicative approaches to peacemaking polar opposites or can they be complimentary in the process of transforming a negotiated settlement into a self-sustaining peace?

Keeping this framework of analysis and the many factors and dilemmas that complicate the establishment of a self-sustaining peace in mind, it is necessary to examine whether the Dayton peace initiative is a success or failure. If it is a success, lessons need to be extracted to guide researchers working in other conflict situations, but if it is deemed a failure it is important to consider how it can be reformed to guarantee the long-term viability of the peace agreement. As noted earlier, an answer to this question will also shed light on an important theoretical issue: whether strategic and communicative approaches are opposites or complementary. This thesis’s concluding chapter will revisit these questions and issues once again.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
One of the most complicated challenges the international community faces is not only the prevention or the resolution of ethnic-based conflicts, but also the reconstruction of these societies once the parties agree to end the fighting. Because the reconstruction of these societies starts in the realm of theory, chapter two presented three paradigms employed by international relations scholars and practitioners to understand the nature of ethnic-
based conflict and to device practices that can lead to the successful reconstruction of these societies after prolonged periods of violence. Note the significance of Robert Cox’s (1996: 87) oft-quoted assertion that: ‘Theory is for someone and for some purpose’; meaning that those individuals that explicate the causes of ethnic-based conflict via the lenses of one of these paradigms are more likely to create peacebuilding practices that closely resemble the insights of these explanations.

In this respect, peacemakers that examine the dynamics of ethnic conflicts through the lenses of the primordialism would intervene to partition society. As ethnic conflict is inevitable the possibility of peace can only be secure by separating the parties or allow them to fight until the strongest party eradicates the existence of the weaker other. Because primordialism tends to nullify the assertion that peacebuilding exercises can integrate society, this thesis does not address this any further.

On the other hand, peacemakers that believe that the instrumentalist paradigm best explains the origins of ethno-national conflict believe that peacemaking efforts must deal with political entrepreneurs responsible for the conflict so they can come together to create the foundations of a new society that enables these entrepreneurs to meet their needs and interests. Instrumentalism’s emphasis that identity is malleable suggest that if elites are willing to co-operate in order to build state institutions that can guarantee the elite’s access to power and material resources, then social relations will normalise as well. The fact that the conflict was started by political entrepreneurs ability of mobilising the masses equally means that they can de-mobilise them and foster new peaceful relations. Instrumentalists tend to advocate the importance of state-centred peacebuilding projects. Thus, it is based on the tenets of the strategic approach to peacemaking.

If the constructivist paradigm presents a more complicated picture of society, in which ethnic based conflicts are a product of the interplay between changing social circumstances and how these shape ethnic identity, then the motivation for human action may not only be about controlling another ethnic group, but also by a genuine concern to come to understanding of a given social situation with other individuals. This perspective finds that ethnic-based conflict results from the way society is organised. Consequently, peacemakers employing a constructivist analysis tend to employ the insights of the communicative approach to intervene in conflict situations. By focusing on how state
structures and inter-ethnic competition can destroy the fabric that holds society together, these peacemakers tend to emphasise that a self-sustaining peace must give way to new social relations that permit individuals to work together in constructing a new society that is representative of all forms of life and tolerant to difference. While this chapter demonstrates the importance of society-centred understandings of social order and deliberative forms of democracy, it is important to note that this model does not invalidate the existence of state structures or the work of international organisations in post-conflict situations. Habermasian understandings emphasise that the proceedings of civil society, when grounded on open communicative processes, can serve as a steering mechanism to integrate society. Hence, the international community and state institutions should enhance the work of civil society organisations by providing a set of laws that enhances their work and their ability of influencing the administrative organs of society.

Having made clear the connections of these explanations of ethnic conflict and understandings of peacebuilding it is important to also stress the importance of the analyses conducted in part one of this thesis in the context of those investigations conducted in part two, which reviews the processes and events that shaped the creation and implementation of the Dayton peace initiative. Chapter one conducted a comparative analysis between the strategic and communicative approach to peacemaking. While it presented a framework that explained peacemakers’ motivation to intervene in conflict situations, it did not address the problem of social integration in divided societies. This problem was addressed in chapter two and in parts one and two of this chapter. Chapter two demonstrated how traditional conceptions of peacebuilding were analogous to state-building programmes. This chapter presented the theoretical foundations of a society-centred peacebuilding programme and provided framework analysis researchers can use to judge the success of peacemaking initiatives.

Part two of this thesis conducts an in-depth investigation of the events that led to the creation of the Dayton peace initiative and to its implementation in Bosnia. In doing so, it attempts to answer two important questions. First, has the Dayton peace initiative been a success or a failure? Second, are communicative and strategic understandings of peacemaking complimentary or just different techniques of addressing conflict situations?
PART TWO:

THE DAYTON PEACE INITIATIVE
CHAPTER FOUR

The Bosnian War, International Quarrels, and the Motivation for
American Action

INTRODUCTION

Part one introduced the theoretical debates and questions guiding this doctoral thesis
assessment of the Dayton peace initiative. It argues that the strategic approach to
peacemaking influenced the decision-making process that generated this peace initiative.
It also contends that this peace initiative has been unable to realise a self-sustaining peace
in Bosnia. Hence, this critical assessment attempts to answer the following question: Has
the Dayton peace initiative succeeded or failed to institute a self-sustaining peace in
Bosnia?

The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, it provides a short review of the social
dynamics that provoked the Bosnian war in the spring of 1992. This review introduces
the domestic actors responsible for starting the war and demonstrates how Croatia and
Serbia encouraged the conflict. Second, this chapter examines the interests that motivated
the Clinton administration to take control and assume the leadership of international
peacemaking efforts in Bosnia. This analysis gives weight to the proposition that the
success or the failure of a particular peace initiative depends on a peacemaker’s ability to
create a consensus among international actors of what must be done to move the
contending parties closer to the negotiation table. This chapter is divided into two parts.
Part one reviews the causes of the Bosnian war in the context of Yugoslavia’s violent
dissolution. Part two explains the development of the Clinton administration’s response
to Bosnia from 1993 to the summer of 1995.

I. THE BOSNIAN WAR IN THE CONTEXT OF YUGOSLAVIA’S UNMAKING

The national elections of 1990 secured an end to Yugoslavia and its state-building
programme; a process that started with Josip Broz Tito’s death in 1980 (Hayden 1996:
790). Under Tito, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) had successfully
managed Yugoslavia’s historical inter-ethnic rivalries and had painstakingly coerced
ethno-national leaders from challenging the integrity of Yugoslavia. Ivo Banac (1992) writes that the unity of Yugoslavia did not only depend on the unity of its leadership, but also on the LCY’s ability to prevent ethno-nationalist leaders from challenging the LCY’s “official” historiography. Indeed, the LCY’s reconstruction of Yugoslavia’s history, specially the Partisan struggle during the Second World War, was not only necessary to forge new bonds between the ethno-national groups, but it also served as a mechanism to engineer a new supranational Yugoslav identity. In many ways, Tito’s famous slogan, ‘Brotherhood and Unity’, encapsulated the meaning of this fabricated identity: historical brothers united for the same cause – the unity of Yugoslavia (Godina 1998: 417).

Even though Tito vigorously campaigned for the creation of a strong unitary society organised around a strong state, Yugoslavia’s republics, especially Slovenia and Croatia, resisted such attempts. To the outsider, Yugoslavia seemed to be a federal system headed by a central state, but in reality it was a confederation of different republics held together by the LCY and the Yugoslav People’s Army. As in most communist societies, political and economic power resided in the LCY’s internal organs. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia was deeply divided along ethno-communal lines. It is important to note that the conflict between the centre and periphery was compounded by intra-republic tensions. While each republic, to a certain extent, attempted to preserve its own national identity and way of life, this identity and culture contradicted the identity and culture of minority groupings. This is not to say that all individuals refused to accept the Yugoslav identity. In fact, Steven Burg and Michael Berbaum’s research (1989) shows how the acceptance of a Yugoslav identity grew from 1.3 percent of the total population in 1971 to 5.4 percent by 1981.

For Yugoslavia, the problem was that the state never achieved the full integration of society, because the republics resisted such programmes. There was an inherent contradiction in the political system, that is to say an institutionalised struggle between the unitarians and the communitarians; the former campaigned for a strong central state, the latter struggled for its exact opposite. This is one of the reasons why Yugoslavia re-wrote and amended its constitutions so many times (Ramet 1984). This fault line and ethno-communal struggle was reproduced in Bosnia, as it was a republic with not a single constituent nation, but with three recognised nations. The Bosnian Muslims were actually
officially recognised as a constituent nation in the mid-1960s, which’s decision angered the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs, especially the latter as they controlled Bosnia’s political system (Bougarel 1996: 93).

Shortly after Tito’s death, an economic crisis started to set in, communist ideology started to be questioned, the easing of the Cold War meant that international assistance decreased, and a new wave of liberalisation questioned the position of the LCY (Woodward 1995). Not only did the republics get more power, but also there was a revival of nationalism that started with historians’ re-interpretations of Yugoslavia’s “official” history (Denich 1994). Indeed, politicians would use these re-interpretations as fuel to mobilise the masses. For instance, Slobodan Milošević’s move to power was aided by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts’ Memorandum that stipulated that ‘too many Serbian national interests had been ceded in exchange for bargains that were not longer being kept by the leaders of other republics’ (Denich 1994: 371). Serbian intellectuals started to propagate similar ideas, showing how they were the victims of many historical injustices. What happened in Serbia was soon to take place in the other republics, especially in Croatia. Denich (1993) argues that the rise of nationalism had served as an attack on the communist system. Instead of containing disputes within the organs of the LCY, each community’s leaders would appeal to their particular publics to support their struggle in order to put pressure on the other republics and the central state to change the political organisation of society.

Amidst all these controversies, the League of Communist of Bosnia (LCB) attempted to stabilise the republic’s political process by re-affirming its support of Titoism. Being the most divided of the republics, the LCB attempted to use all its power to hold everything together, but to no avail. This is not to say that the individuals in Bosnia did not believe in multi-ethnicity. Research clearly shows that Bosnia enjoyed one of the highest levels of inter-ethnic tolerance in Yugoslavia (Hodson, Sekulić and Massey 1994). Even more important, Bosnia had the highest percentage of mixed marriages in Yugoslavia, which sociologist argue is an indicator of tolerance and commonality in divided communities (Weine 1999: 19-20; Hodson, Sekulić and Massey 1994; and Bringa 1993). Moreover, Anthony Oberschall’s (2000: 992) ‘content analysis of new stories published in Oslobdjenje for 1990 indicates that municipalities, youth and
veterans' organizations and trade unions repeatedly protested against ethnic polarization and hatreds.' Even more critical, as Mary Kaldor demonstrates, it was in Bosnia where YUTEL, the Yugoslav television network that served as mechanism to spread and reproduce the Yugoslav values, 'was most popular' (1999: 41).

By September 1990, after the failed attempt to reconvene the XIV Congress of the LCY, Bosnia had three dominant political parties, mostly based along ethno-national lines. The Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), associated to the HDZ in Croatia, the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), closely associated to Milošević's party organisation, and the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) competed with other 38 parties in the republic's first democratic elections since the end of the Second World War. These took place on 18 November 1990, a couple months since the creation of a multiparty system in Bosnia. The results confirmed the communitarian nature of Bosnian politics. The SDA received 30.4% of the vote; the SDS received 25.2% and the HDZ 15.5%, while the rest was divided among the rest of the non-national, civic parties.

In light of the large quantity of data that supports the thesis that people in Bosnia supported cosmopolitanism, why did people in Bosnia vote along ethno-national lines? At least two reasons explicate this phenomenon. Xavier Bougarel (1996: 97) makes an excellent point.

Over a period of forty years, in the absence of political pluralism, the only chance the inhabitants of Yugoslavia had to express a free and individual choice was [...] in the census. These were held regularly, so that every individual had a regular opportunity to declare his nationality — or to declare no nationality. This fed the rivalries and clientism of the competing political elites, in that the results of the census served as a base for the distribution of top posts, according to the principle of the 'nationality key' (proportional representation of the various national communities)

In addition, Susan Woodward (1995: 124) argues that:

In a world of competing symbols and personalities, at a point of political transition, nationalism has a particular advantage. The message is simple, relies on the familiar, takes little resources, does not have to develop new political language to develop and explain the complexities of democratic institutions and market economy... nationalist appeals thus provide the
easiest route to politics for politicians without established constituencies and party organizations.

Both opinions are accurate and may explain why individuals in Bosnia, which had shown support to the ideas of multi-ethnicity and tolerance, had voted for nationalist parties. An analysis of the results, demonstrates that the strongest 'support for the nationalist parties was particularly strong in economically underdeveloped areas, in ethnically homogeneous areas, among the rural and neo-urban population, and among the lower and less educated socioprofessional groups' (Bougarel 1996: 97).

In this way, the nationalist parties were successful because they represented a portion of the population that feared the possibility of being deprived of a better life, if a new government was created or dominated by one single group. Oberschall (2000: 995) notes that the nationalist parties had no trouble persuading people from their respective ethno-national community to support them because they made it clear that to vote for non-nationalist, civic minded parties would be detrimental to their community's overall position, as the other communities would vote for nationalist representatives.

Nevertheless, 28.9 percent of voters supported non-nationalist civic-minded parties. These supporters compromised Bosnia's individuals that had benefited from Yugoslavia's self-management socialism. Members of trade unions, urban intellectuals, and working-class individuals that resided in the wealthiest areas of Bosnia strongly supported these parties. Even though the majority voted for the nationalist parties, it is important to also point out that most of these peoples were not nationalists. 'The politicians elected were more nationalists than their voters' (Oberschall 2000: 995).

While different identities existed, the existence of a cosmopolitan culture was still a reality. Even after the secession of Slovenia and Croatia and the rampant war that pitted Serbia against Croatia, the Bosnian government commissioned a demographic study in the spring of 1992 that concluded that 'over 10 percent of Sarajevo's population (56,473 people) [still] called themselves Yugoslavs' (Glenny 1993: 142). But things started to change for the worse once Yugoslavia started to violently dismember.

As Serbs and Croats fought each other in the Krajina, the Bosnian Serbs started to call themselves Serbs. Some sectors of the Bosnian Croats started to assert themselves as plain Croats. It was these simple semantic changes that commenced the division of
Bosnia’s cosmopolitan culture into different ethno-national pockets. These changes were mostly sparked by Slobodan Milošević’s and Franjo Tudjman’s territorial ambitions in Bosnia. Even though they were caught in a war, Tudjman and Milošević met in private and committed to the projects of Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia by working together to forcefully destroy Bosnia and divide its territory among them (Mahmutcehajic 1999: 222). This is known as the Karadjorjevo agreement and Bosnians that were committed to the unity of the territory impeded its actualisation.12

Since the beginning of the Yugoslav wars, the Bosnian Serb leadership was committed to the destruction of Bosnia, though the SDA had agreed, along with Bosnia’s other political parties, to preserve the integrity of its boundaries. In the summer of 1991, Radovan Karadžić, leader of the SDS, ‘began demanding the secession of large parts of northern and western Bosnia, which would then join with the [Serb populated] Croatian ‘Krajina’ to form a new republic’ part of Greater Serbia (Malcom 1994: 224). Spectres of a civil war were made even more visible in Bosnia during Yugoslavia’s last days, when the Yugoslav Federal Prime Minister Ante Marković, released evidence that Milošević and his colleagues were supplying arms to the Bosnian Serbs.

Although sectors of the Bosnian Croat population did support the destruction of Bosnia and its annexation to Croatia, the Bosnian branch of the HDZ, led by the moderate, Stjepan Kljuić, campaigned for the preservation of Bosnia. Bosnian Croats’ desire to maintain the unity of Bosnia was purely strategic however. As the smallest of the three ethnic groups, the Bosnian Croats made and informal alliance with the Bosniaks to fight for the conservation of Bosnia. It was argued that this alliance would counterbalance future Serbian aggression and prevent their incorporation into Serbia. In January 1992, Tudjman interfered in the workings of the HDZ and forced Kljuić out of power. Mate Boban, who shared Tudjman’s Greater Croatia, replaced the moderate leader (Sharp 1997-98: 108-09).

The Bosniaks, whom mostly supported the SDA, headed by Alija Izetbegović, did not only support the unity of Bosnia, but it also argued for its existence as a multi-cultural country. But even the SDA’s call for peaceful communal co-existent must be questioned,

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12 Susan Woodward shows evidence that Milošević and Tudjman had met in private several times before this meeting to talk about their plans to divide Bosnia (1995: 172).
as Izetbegović attempted to establish the strict ‘political organization [of Bosnia-Herzegovina] along communitarian lines’ (Kaldor 1999: 43). In this way, the SDA was committed to an ethno-national agenda that searched for the most practical means for Bosniaks to preserve their identity and the integrity of the country. Izetbegović’s strategy attempted to accomplish this through constitutional means. He knew that if the SDA tried to put into action this strategy via illegitimate means, Bosnia’s state system, which he was trying to preserve, would crumble. The survival of the Bosniak community could only be achieved by way of the continued existence of the state, which was equally what Tudjman and Milošević needed to destroy in order to annex parts of Bosnia (Mahmutcehajic 1999: 231-32).

Even though many social movements campaigned for the unity of Bosnia across the republic, these did not change the course of events. The nationalist parties had consolidated their power and through their control of media outlets and local government structures they started the mobilisation of their respective communities (Burg and Schoup 2000: 62). Pressure was put on those that refused to support nationalist programmes. For instance, Bosnian Serbs that did not support the SDS’s struggle were fired from jobs and completely marginalised. In a United Nations report, published in 1992, Tadeusz Mazowiecki (1992: 8-11) notes that those elected officials that attempted ‘to prevent acts of violence were dismissed or replaced by Serbian extremists.’

Because there was an absence of strong social structures that would protect the idea of cosmopolitanism or multi-culturalism, the nationalist parties were free to deconstruct the idea of unity and strengthen the divisions between the communities. The affirmation of separate ethno-national identities and competing political goals set the stage for one of the bloodiest and deadliest armed conflicts in recent European history. The communication structures that connected the three ethnic groups into a single society were destroyed months after Bosnia declared its independence in the spring of 1992. As a consequence the SDS proclaimed the creation of the Republika Sprska (RS). In July of the same year, Boban’s HDZ established the independent state of Herzeg-Bosna. The SDA for its part had to reaffirm the existence of a united Bosnia-Herzegovina and set up the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina to protect the interests of the state and attempt to forcefully integrate the renegade regions. This goal was not to take place at the outbreak
of hostilities, as the SDA, thanks in part to the arms embargo placed on the former Yugoslavia by the United Nations, had a tough time in arming its military. Their counterparts, the Croatian Defense Council (HOV) and the Republika Sprska Army (RSA), were being armed by Croatia and Serbia respectively.

After three years of war, the death of thousands of people, a clearly planned and carried out genocide by all conflicting parties, countless of broken cease-fires, and innumerable Western attempts to stop the fighting, the leaders of the three ethno-national groups were forced by the US and the members of the EU to stop the fighting and negotiate a settlement that would end this senseless war. The outcome of these negotiations was the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFA). With the cessation of hostilities, the international community faced a more difficult task: the reconstruction of Bosnia and the institution of a self-sustaining peace that would thwart each group’s aspiration of constructing an exclusive national community.

Why did the international community take so long to settle the war? Why did the United States’ Dayton initiative succeed at settling the war, when European ones failed? What were the motives and interests that influenced America’s foreign policy establishment to craft a response that eventually led to a settlement? Answers to these questions will be provided in part two of this doctoral thesis.

II. AMERICA’S DECISION TO INTERVENE

Campaigning against President George Bush’s domestic record, presidential candidate Bill Clinton’s rallying message was one of political change. In the summer of 1992 as the campaigns were getting ready for the party conventions, news networks and major newspapers were documenting the unfolding of the humanitarian catastrophe in Bosnia. With the assistance of Yugoslavia (Serbia, its provinces and Montenegro) and its military, the Bosnian Serbs forcibly gain control of 70% of Bosnian territory. Accompanying this military operation was one to cleanse the territory of non-Serb elements, including the destruction of cultural and religious sites.

At the behest of British Prime Minister John Major, official representatives of Bosnia’s ethno-national parties, Croatia, Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the United
Nations, the European Community and the United States met in London to discuss ways to settle the Bosnian war. It is important to notice that the conference was not a negotiation session. Instead, it was aimed at drafting a set of principles that were intended to guide the peacemaking process and create an International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), which’s objective was to set a number of working groups that would meet with the parties to bring the war to an end (Campbell 1998: 131). The ICFY would be co-chaired by the United Nations (UN), which was represented by Cyrus Vance, former US Secretary of State during the Carter administration, and European Community (EC), which was represented by Lord David Owen. The ICFY had an interesting division of labour. The EC would be responsible for the political processes to end the war and the UN for ground operations (von Hippel 2000: 142).

The significance of the London Conference was not only the creation of the ICFY, but the thirteen principles the ICFY had to follow in its peacemaking efforts. Among these principles, the most important was the one that called for the protection of Bosnia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. This principle clearly contradicted the provisions of the EC’s Conference on Yugoslavia’s Carrington Plan of November of 1991, which set the constitutional mechanisms to dissolve Yugoslavia non-violently, giving each republic its independence and its sovereignty (Campbell 1998: 128). In addition to this principle, and after experiencing the atrocious nature of the war in Bosnia, the international community instructed the ICFY to make sure that the peace process secured strong constitutional provisions that protected the rights of individuals and the collective rights of each ethno-national community.

Even though the Bush administration was one of the organisers of the London Conference, it decided not to intervene in Bosnia. It argued that Bosnia was Europe’s problem and should be solved by the newly created ICFY. As Secretary of State James Baker (1995: 651) noted in his memoirs, the administration had concluded that American interests had not been threaten enough to warrant a military mission against Yugoslavia and the Bosnian Serbs. This is not to say that the Bush administration ignored the unfolding events in Bosnia. It provided diplomatic support to the ICFY’s work and it even threaten the use of force against Yugoslavia if the Bosnian Serbs did not stop the siege on Sarajevo’s airport during the autumn of 1992 (Baker 1995: 648-49). Even
though the American threat of air strikes quickly impelled the Bosnian Serbs to open the airport, demonstrating the important role the US could have play in the early days of the war, the Bush administration argued that the war should by settled by EC and the UN.

Challenging Bush’s strong foreign policy record, candidate Clinton’s foreign policy consultants advised him to openly criticise the Bush administration’s stance on Bosnia. In fact, Clinton went even a step further; proposing that if he was elected president, he would support the use of air strikes to stop human suffering and lift the arms embargo, which was placed on the former Yugoslavia in 1991, so the Bosnian government could defend itself (Daalder 2000: 6-7). In this way, Clinton argued that his administration would conduct its foreign policy in a more humane manner, stating at the time that: ‘the cynical calculus of pure power politics is ill-suited to a new era’ (Cited in Walt 2000: 78).

In the end, the American people did not re-elect President Bush. The new administration, which had vowed to tackle domestic problems, had inherited a worsening international crisis. Acts of ethnic cleansing were becoming more prevalent; the war had displaced many people, forcing some two million individuals to flee to other countries; and the Bosnian Serb forces were quickly moving to consolidate their hold on conquered territory. Even though Clinton vehemently criticised the Bush administration’s stance on Bosnia, the new administration played a similar role, though it was not as supportive of the ICFY’s work. In fact, the Clinton administration’s policy towards Bosnia was motivated by the strategic approach to peacemaking. Once the Clinton administration perceived Bosnia as an obstruction to its foreign policy interests in Europe, it decided to become more involved in peacemaking efforts.

A. American Reluctance and the Failure of ICFY’s Peace Initiatives

As the Clinton administration settled in the White House in early 1993, one of Clinton’s many presidential directives ordered his foreign policy team to review the Bush administration’s policy towards Bosnia and set the foundations for a new response. In short, the Clinton administration advised the President to support a tougher stance on Bosnia. Although the review stated that the administration should strongly support the ICFY’s initiatives, including sending US troops to monitor or implement a peace
settlement, if the three warring parties agreed on one, it showed little support for the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP) (Daalder 2000: 10-11).

While the Bosnian parties had not agreed to the VOPP, it was the most detailed peace plan of its kind. It included clear provisions on constitutional matters, a map that clearly defined the territorial organisation of the country, and the inclusion of a human rights regime. It is worth listing some of the principles incorporated in the VOPP, as some these were included in the GFA (original text cited in Campbell 1998: 139-40).

Tripartite negotiations shall proceed on a continuous basis in Geneva, under the auspices of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, in order to finalise a Constitution for Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance to the following principles:

(1) Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be a decentralized State, the Constitution shall recognize three constituent peoples, as well as a group of others, with most governmental work carried out by its provinces.

(2) The provinces shall not have any international legal personality and may not enter into agreements with foreign States or with international organisations.

(3) Full freedom of movement shall be allowed throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, to be ensured in part by the maintenance of internationally controlled throughways.

(4) All matters of vital concern to any of the constituent peoples shall be regulated in the Constitution, which as to these points may be amended only by consensus or these constituent peoples; ordinary government business is not to be veto-able by any group.

(5) The provinces and the central Government shall have a democratically elected legislature and democratically chosen chief executives and an independent judiciary. The Presidency shall be composed of three elected representatives of each of the three constituent peoples. The initial elections are to be United Nations/European Community/Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe supervised.

(6) A Constitutional Court, with a member of each group and a majority of non-Bosnian members initially appointed by the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, shall resolve disputes between the central Government and any province, and among the organs of the former.
(7) Bosnia and Herzegovina is to be progressively demilitarized under United Nations/European Commission supervision.

(8) The highest level of internationally recognized human rights shall be provided for in the Constitution, which shall provide for the insurance of implementation through both domestic and international mechanisms.

(9) A number of international monitoring or control devices shall be provided for in the Constitution, to remain in place at least until the three constituent peoples by consensus agree to dispense with them.

Although the VOPP's provisions were based on the London Conference's principles, which the Clinton administration had demonstrated support for, Clinton did not support the plan. He argued that it rewarded Serbian aggression, legitimated ethnic-cleansing practices, and more important it felt that the VOPP did not provide any rewards to Bosniaks, which Clinton saw as the victims of the war. More important, Karen von Hippel (2000: 144) argues that the US did not support the plan because it was not ready to commit troops to Bosnia.

Because the ICFY was crafting a peace process that could have eventually forced the US to send soldiers to monitor a peace agreement and establish a political system that weaken the position of the Bosniaks, the Clinton administration decided to appoint an US envoy to the negotiations and argued that Russia be allowed to send its representative as well. As Susan Woodward (1995: 306) notes, the 'effect of this was to favor national interests and bilateral patron-client relations over multilateral initiatives and norm-based approach.' The US decision to fight for the interests of the Bosniaks and to allow Russia to protect the interests of the Bosnian Serbs undermined the work of the ICFY and the prospects that the VOPP would achieve its intended objectives (Owen 1995: 180-82).

It is important to note that the ICFY continued its negotiations with the Bosnian parties. While the Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks reluctantly signed the VOPP, the Bosnian Serbs were unwilling to give up their campaign to create a Greater Serbia or relinquish conquered territory (the VOPP states that Bosnian Serbs would control 43 percent of Bosnia's territory). More importantly, the ICFY was not willing to employ force to coerce the Bosnian Serbs to accept the peace plan. It did use a number of inducements to get the Bosnian Serbs to accept the agreement, including a promise to Milošević that the trade embargo on Yugoslavia would be lifted, if he could convince the Bosnian Serbs to
sign it. While Milošević’s tactics proved fruitful, General Ratko Mladić’s openly rejected the agreement, stating instead that his forces could win the war and make the dream of Greater Serbia a reality. This convinced Bosnian Serbs to vote against the measure in a referendum organised by the Bosnian Serb government on the VOPP.

In addition to the Clinton administration’s decision to thwart the work of the ICFY, the US government presented a new strategy to end the conflict in Bosnia. This strategy, known in policy circles as ‘Lift and Strike’, favoured the lifting of the arms embargo in order to arm the Bosniaks. Because of the Bosnian Serbs’s military superiority, the Clinton administration firmly claimed that it would use aerial bombardments to make sure that the Bosnian Serbs did not override Bosniak or Bosnian Croat positions after the lifting of the embargo. The strategy was not supported by the Europeans for fear that their troops, which were part of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia, would potentially be caught in the middle of an escalating war (Brune 1998: 99). Ironically, it was not European opposition to the proposal that weakened Clinton’s support for this response. It was the President’s new understanding of the conflict after reading Robert D. Kaplan’s Balkan Ghost: A Journey Through History (Drew 1994: 155-57; Holbrooke 1999: 2; and Daalder 2000: 17). In essence, this book argued that the conflict between the ethno-national groups could be traced to ancient times, establishing that outsiders could not solve this conflict until the groups basically finished themselves in the battlefield.

Even though Kaplan’s conclusions were influential, the Clinton administration did consider to unilaterally lifting the arms embargo, even though the Europeans did express their opposition to such a policy. In the end, the Clinton administration realised that implementing this policy could have had a negative impact on its domestic agenda, as Washington would have been solely responsible for the fate of Bosnia. This meant that it would have to actively promote the security of Bosniaks by arming and training them. More controversial, US military experts believed that for the Bosniaks ‘to effectively oppose the Serbs,’ it needed to purchase sophisticated weaponry systems that could cost around $1 billion. Apart from having to finance this venture, the US would also have had to either send military advisers to instruct Bosniaks to use this weapons or bring them to the US (Schild 1996: 28). In any case, this policy was rejected because of its financial
costs and because it would force the US to intervene in the conflict on behalf of the Bosniaks, if after being armed and trained they failed to defend themselves. The parallels between this policy proposal and the American response towards South Vietnam in the late 1950s and early 1960s reminded the Clinton administration of the dangers of such a course of action.

Without a clear international consensus on what should be done about Bosnia, Clinton was convinced that ending the war was impossible at this stage, so he asked his foreign policy team to find ways to reduce the human suffering and to actively search for diplomatic means to contain, to de-escalate and, if possible, to settle the war. In many ways, the administration faced a strong moral dilemma and a worsening humanitarian crisis as the Bosnian Serbs started to increase their attacks of Bosniak-held towns. To make matters worse, the informal cease-fire between Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks started to dwindle, as fighting increased between them in central-western Bosnia (Glenny 1993: 229-30). The Bosnian problem could not be ignored. Television images were constant reminders of the war and all its atrocious consequences. Nevertheless, the Clinton administration’s response was purely diplomatic.

While many would argue that American foreign policy to Bosnia during 1993 was influenced by humanitarian concerns, Susan Woodward (1995: 325) argues that this was ‘a false humanitarianism.’ She observes that: ‘Channeling moral concerns into humanitarian relief while refusing to confront the political causes of the conflict...was creating more war, more casualties, and more need for humanitarian assistance’ (Woodward 1995: 325). Indeed, the international community’s most significant policy responses during this year, such as the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the creation of safe havens, the institution of a no-fly zone, and the US’ air drops of relief supplies, did not stop the fighting or better the conditions of these people. Sadly, these policies enabled the US and the rest of the international community to argue that it was addressing the plight of innocent civilians, while at the same time ignoring the need to create a more comprehensive approach to end this war. In short, this feeble commitment was not motivated by humanitarian concerns, but by a lack of real threat to US security interests in the region.
B. A New Commitment?
Apart from Bosnia, the other major challenge the US faced in Europe was the restructuring of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), so it could address the new realities of the post-Cold War environment. In the Brussels Summit of January 1994, Clinton proposed a new vision of Europe, a vision of united and democratic continent (Clinton 1995). Hence, Clinton argued for the incorporation of the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe into Western European institutions. For this reason, Clinton unveiled his Partnership for Peace initiative, which aimed to increase cooperation between the militaries of these former enemies and the Western alliance, serving as a first step for these countries to enter the circles of European market-democracies.

Although the allies supported Clinton’s proposal, the focus of the summit turned away from Clinton’s vision of post-Cold War Europe to the correct approach to address the Bosnian problem. Undeniably, the alliance was divided over Bosnia and this was creating division between the strongest powers. In a speech to the leaders attending the summit, Tansu Ciller, the then Prime Minister of Turkey and supporter of a stronger response to the Bosnian war, argued that NATO needed to find a way to adequately address the challenges posed by Bosnia in order to find a new rationale for its existence (1994: 6-7). This proved to be an important moment as Clinton realised that Bosnia was more than just ‘an obscure country with little strategic value’; it was a wider problem that questioned American leadership and demonstrated the ‘feebleness of [Western] institutions, NATO first among them’ (Danner 1997: 4).

As a consequence, the US decided to take a stronger position on this issue. The Clinton administration was convinced that diplomacy had to be complemented by force, especially the use of air strikes conducted by NATO. The Bosnian Serbs’ attack on Sarajevo’s Markala marketplace in 5 February 1994 gave the US a moral justification to back its tough rhetoric with force. NATO fighter jets were mobilised and these started to police the skies, preventing Bosnian Serbs from violating the no-fly zone or attacking the safe-havens. Diplomatically, the White House sought to end the conflict between the Bosnian Croats and the Bosniaks. The result of this initiative was the Washington Agreement, which created the Croat-Bosniak Federation in Bosnia. Although this
agreement hindered any attempts to move the three groups towards a peace settlement (Freedman 1994-95: 67), the creation of the Federation shifted the balance of power on the ground. More important, the Federation closely worked with Croatia to secure weapons for Bosniak and Bosnian Croat forces (Woodward 1995: 315). While the US was aware of this reality, it decided to ignore it. The Clinton administration was convinced that this would change the military scenario, putting pressure on the Bosnian Serbs and moving the parties closer to a settlement, even though this decision permitted Iran to supply arms and to encourage Muhajedeens that fought in Afghanistan to settle in Bosnia.

The creation of the Croat-Bosniak Federation gave Croatia a great deal of power in Bosnia. In fact, the Washington Agreement established that the Federation was ‘itself incorporated into a confederation with Croatia’ (Glitman 1996-97: 74). By signing this agreement, Bosnia became part of Croatia’s sphere of influence. While this development was important because it re-aligned the region’s balance of power, the Bosniak controlled government was weary that the Washington Agreement could lead to the eventual annexation of Bosniak and Bosnian Croat held territories into Croatia. This as stated before was exactly what Milošević and Tudjman wanted before the Bosnian war started.

Consequently, the challenge confronting the US was to find a diplomatic formula that could force the Bosnian Serbs to relinquish parts of the 70 percent of the territory under their controlled. Shortly after the signing of the Washington Agreement, the Clinton administration had shown that ‘Europe’s hour had indeed come and gone’ (von Hippel 2000: 146). As a first step, the US sidelined the ICFY as the main Western policy forum, giving the Contact Group, originally established by Lord Owen during the failed talks on the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan, control of the peacemaking process. The Contact Group, which formally met for the first time in London on 26 April 1994, included representatives from the US, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Russia (Owen 1995: 298). In July 1994, the Contact Group presented its plan to the parties.

The Contact Group Plan (CGP) recognised the strong position of the Bosnian Serb by stating that territorial issues were more important than constitutional issues. As Momčilo Krajišnik, a Bosnian Serb leader had repeatedly stated during the ICFY’s efforts: ‘the constitution should be left to the end, as once the map was agreed,
everything else would fall into place” (cited in Campbell 1998: 152). Thus, the CGP, building on the territorial calculus of the European Union Action Plan of November of 1993, argued that the Republic Srpska (RS) would compromise 49 percent of the country’s territory, while the Federation would control the remaining 51 percent (Freedman 1994-95: 67). While territorial issues would have priority over constitutional ones, the CGP also made clear that a settlement must include provisions that would guarantee the unity of Bosnia, even though this union was described as the existence of two mini-states (e.g. the RS and the Federation), with broad functions, held together by a set of common state institutions (von Hippel 2000: 147). In order to secure the participation of the Bosnian Serbs, the CGP included a provision that guaranteed each of the constituent units the right to secede after the implementation of a settlement; a provision, which was originally part of the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace initiative of 1993.

In many ways, the Contact Group endorsed the Bosnian Serbs’ claim for territory and legitimized their government structures. As Ivo Daalder (2000: 28) points out this was basically ‘a compromise between justice and reality.’ But this proposal, though different from the VOPP, followed the same logic that complete justice could not be achieved. In the end, the Bosnian Serb leadership and the people via another referendum rejected the CGP. They did so, even though Milošević attempted to force the Bosnian Serb leadership to accept the plan. Because Yugoslavia was being affected by the Bosnian war and because it could not control the Bosnian Serb leadership, Milošević decided to close the border with the RS and isolate its economy from the rest of the world (von Hippel 2000: 147). Whereas the CGP failed to end the war, it had transformed the relationship between the Bosnian Serb leadership and Milošević, who was seen in Western capitals as the person responsible for the wars of the former Yugoslavia. With the signing of the Washington Agreement, Tudjman had become an influential figure in Bosnian affairs. Hence, the US and the Contact Group realised that a settlement of Bosnia’s war had to include the active participation of these two political figures.

C. Changing the Balance of Power on the Ground
The road to Dayton was a bumpy one. Increasing bickering between the United Nations (UN), the US, and the rest of the alliance furthered hampered the search for peace. The
US Congress, controlled by members of the Republican Party, sent the White House a bill ordering the unilateral lifting of the arms embargo. Clinton vetoed it, but members of the NATO alliance strongly criticised the US, which decided in the end to not enforce the arms embargo in order to appease the Republicans in the legislature. Having taken this decision, the Clinton administration permitted the Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats, with the assistance of Croatia, to upgrade their military capabilities. The objective of this decision was to affect the military balance of power on the ground, forcing the Bosnian Serbs to end the conflict and accept the settlement designed by the Contact Group.

The ceasefire, brokered by Jimmy Carter in December 1994, was falling apart, as the snow started to melt in the spring of 1995. The Bosnian Serbs stepped their attack on Sarajevo causing waves of international criticism, but military action was not conducted against them. The Bosnian Serbs, knowing that the Federation forces had upgraded their military capabilities during the winter, decided to seize their heavy armaments from UN arms depot. Strongly backed by the US, the UN authorised NATO to conduct air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions. The Bosnian Serbs retaliated by taking peacekeepers hostage. Much to the disappointment of the US, the UN called-off the air strikes.

The ineffectiveness of UNPROFOR troops created a series of debates in France and Britain. They argued that UNPROFOR could only fulfil its mandate if it was bolstered with heavy weapons. The French government proposed the deployment of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), similar to the force proposed by UN Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992 (Kumar 1997: 88). Along with France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands decided to supply most of the troops for this force. Moreover, the French government wanted the US to play a more active military role in Bosnia. It asked the US to provide a squadron of attack helicopters that would be used to provide cover for UNPROFOR in case it came under attack. Although Clinton ardently rejected the French's proposal to include a wider role for the US military, it also expressed its willingness to provide: (a) $50 million to finance the operation of the RRF (Kumar 1997: 88); and (b) intelligence and other logistical support (Daalder 2000: 45), including the stationing of an aircraft carrier and eight warships with 2,500 US Marines in the Adriatic Sea (Brune 1998: 104).
In a recent study, Daalder explains that Washington’s demonstration of support for the RRF plan served to hide the Clinton administration’s fear that the RRF was being deployed to enable the extraction of UNPROFOR (Daalder 2000: 51). Richard Hoolbroke, who headed the American team that crafted the Dayton peace initiative, comments in his memoirs that the extraction of UNPROFOR was unacceptable, as its withdrawal would have been organised and directed by NATO. In other words, US troops would have had to invade Bosnia in order to assist UNPROFOR’s withdrawal. While Clinton had publicly stated that it would assist its allies in the event that the UN decided to withdraw UNPROFOR, ‘he had never formally approved OpPlan 40-140’ (Hoolbroke 1999: 66); a planning document that included every facet of NATO’s task in supporting the removal of the UN from Bosnia.

While Clinton argued that he would “‘decide the troop issue if and when the times comes,’” (Cited in Holbrooke 1999: 66) NATO’s North Atlantic Council had already shown considerable support for OpPlan 40-140. By backing the planning document, the Clinton administration was in a very difficult position. On the one hand, if the mission had taken place, the US would have had to contribute 25,000 troops and due to NATO rules of engagement an American general would have commanded the mission (Holbrooke 1999: 65). On the other hand, the US public would not have been supportive of such an operation. However, in the event that the UN asked NATO to extract its forces, the US would have had to endorse this operation, because the consequences of not supporting it would have proven to be a disaster for America’s vision of Europe and would have furthered question the significance of NATO in the post-Cold War era.

There is a bit of controversy surrounding the North Atlantic Council’s view of the planning document. Holbrooke (1999: 65-68) argues that the plan was already endorsed, thus it had to be put in operation once the UN asked NATO for assistance. Daalder (2000: 56-61) argues that the Council had demonstrated its support for the initiative. In many ways, the US Department of Defense was instrumental in drafting the document, as it depended on US military assets in Western Europe. While this controversy is important to note, it is also important to mention that the US was forced to support the plan, as not backing it could challenge its position in NATO and question the raison d'etat of the organization.

In a private talk, Holbrooke told Carl Bildt, the EU’s representative in Dayton, that he believed that the Bosnian conflict could bring down the Clinton administration. Indeed, as the debates on NATO’s planning document were taking place, a US F-16 fighter jet, piloted by Captain Scott O’Graddy, monitoring the no-fly zone was shutdown by a Bosnian Serb SA-6 surface to air missile (Bildt 1998: 69). The American public was angered by the whole situation (Bildt 1998: 14; and Brune 1998: 104).
Even though American diplomacy was working hard to avoid the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, the fall of Srebrenica in early July 1995 and the massacre that shortly followed did not only question the role of the military mission, but it made many policy-makers in both sides of the Atlantic Ocean call for radical changes to the UN operation’s mandates and capabilities or its extraction. These cries became stronger as the safe haven of Žepa fell to Bosnian Serb forces. Trying to achieve a total victory, the Bosnian Serb forces started to threaten Goražde and Sarajevo.

Sensing growing discord among the allies, Prime Minister Major invited the members of the Contact Group to London for an emergency meeting. Due to President Jacques Chirac’s irritation with the alliance’s inability to stop the war or prevent the fall of Srebrenica, the French government expressed its willingness to organise a military operation that would re-capture Srebrenica and deter Bosnian Serb forces from attacking the remaining safe areas. While the Contact Group members did not support France’s proposal, the European members of the Contact Group, which had a substantial number of troops in Bosnia as part of UNPROFOR, agreed that they could not stand idle as genocide took place and the Bosnian Serbs conquered the rest of Bosnia.

As a result, the French government believed that it would be better to withdraw UNPROFOR and lift the arms embargo, if UNPROFOR could not take a stronger stance against the Bosnian Serbs (Bert 1997: 221). The British government argued for the status quo. Major did express his inclination to use artillery attacks and other forms of ground force in order to uphold UNPROFOR’s mandate, but he was reluctant to support air strikes (Bert 1997: 222), stating that these might push Bosnian Serbs to take hostage UNPROFOR troops once again.

Facing public pressure and the possibility of extracting UNPROFOR, the Clinton administration proposed the use of air strikes as means to stop Bosnian Serb forces from capturing Goražde and Sarajevo. US military experts maintained that air strikes would destroy the Bosnian Serb military’s air defence system, command and control facilities, communication hardware, and the infrastructure that supported its war-making capabilities. It also argued that modified rules of engagement and the termination of the
‘dual key’ approach was necessary in order to stop the Bosnian Serb offensive. More critically, the Clinton administration contended that once force was used it would not stop until the objectives were met, regardless if the Bosnian Serbs took UNPROFOR peacekeepers hostages (Gow 1997: 275; and Daalder 2000: 73).

After much debate, the Contact Group agreed to the following three policy prescriptions to deter the Bosnian Serbs’ offensive. First, the Contact Group modified the ‘dual key’ arrangement. The UN Secretary General Boutrous Ghali delegated his responsibility to authorise NATO air strikes to UNPROFOR military commanders soon after the end of the London Conference (Calic 1996: 129). Essentially, the UN’s political influence on the overall peacemaking process was reduced, as the US showed its willingness to take control of the situation and device a political framework to end the war. Second, the Contact Group agreed to modify the existing rules of military engagement so that UNPROFOR could employ ‘military force above and beyond pure and self-defence’ (Calic 1996: 129). Finally, the Contact Group delivered an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs, warning them of NATO air strikes if they attacked Goražde and Sarajevo.

Following the London Conference, representatives of Croatia and the Federation met in Split to form a military alliance against Bosnian Serbs and the Serbs that had proclaimed the Republic of the Krajina (Calic 1996: 128). This proved be an important diplomatic act as the Croats started their military campaign against the Krajina Serbs. With Bosnian Serb forces busy fighting Bosniak’s and Bosnian Croat’s militaries, they could not come to support the Krajina Serbs. In fact, Croatia reclaimed 95 percent of the Krajina in two days! Eastern Slavonia was the only piece of the territory left unconquered. Subsequently, Croat forces joined their Bosniak and Bosnian Croat counterparts in western Bosnia.

The victories of the Croat army convinced Washington that the time was ripe for a diplomatic solution to the Bosnian war and to other regional problems. Clinton ordered

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15 Prior to July 1995, NATO air strikes could only be conducted if the UN Secretary General Boutrous Ghali and NATO’s commander ordered the attack. The problem with this system is that it gave the UN power to dictate when military power was going to be used. This was unacceptable to the US.
his national security team to review the existing policy to Bosnia and devise a US-led peace initiative. Guiding this initiative were seven points.\(^{16}\)

1. A comprehensive peace settlement founded on Contact Group proposals and the creation of a united Bosnia based on the 49:51 calculus of the EU Action Plan and a federal state compromised of two entities. Although Bosnia was not to be partitioned into two or three countries, the US was willing to reconsider the Contact Group’s map so this could fit the realities of post-Srebrenica events. Moreover, Sarajevo was not to be divided.

2. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would recognise each other’s sovereignty.

3. Lifting of economic sanctions against Yugoslavia and an American-sponsored initiative to equip and train the Muslim-Croat Federation forces, if a settlement was attained.

4. The peaceful transfer of Eastern Slavonia from Yugoslavia to Croatia.

5. The need to reach a cease-fire and end all military operations in the region in order to start the peace talks.

6. A comprehensive regional economic plan to reconstruct the economies of this region and move them towards the path of regional integration and economic interdependence financed by the international community – a smaller version of the Marshall plan.

7. An outline of constitutional arrangements for Bosnia that would secure its unity, but at the same time permit the Croats and Serbs to form special parallel relationships with Bosnia’s entities. But this was not set in stone, as the US would be willing to discuss the possibility of holding a future referendum to determine Bosnia’s integrity.

After Clinton’s national security team drafted these points, he ordered Anthony Lake, his National Security Adviser, to travel to Europe and sell this plan to the members of the Contact Group and the rest of the allies. After a lengthy debate, the administration also

\(^{16}\) In their individual works, Bildt (1998: 83), Daalder (2000: 112-13), and Holbrooke (1999: 74) present these points. Each version of the negotiating framework’s points is different. My seven points merge these versions together.
decided that Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs at the time, was going to head the US negotiation team.

It is important to mention that the US was ready to support the extraction of UNPROFOR, the lifting of the arms embargo, the equipping and training of Bosniak forces, and the use of air power to assist the Bosniak’s war efforts if this approach failed (Daalder 2000: 113). At the time, the Clinton administration was under much pressure, as the failure of its initiative would have led to the escalation of hostilities, affecting the livelihoods of non-combatants and the stability of the region. While the Europeans questioned the willingness of the US to end the war, they were ready to abandon their peacemaking approach and embrace the US proposal. They knew that this would be the last attempt to secure a peace in Bosnia and while they did not agree with all the points presented by Lake, they were pleased with the increasing American commitments to end the war.

On 28 August 1995, Bosnian Serb forces tested American willingness and the unity of the Contact Group by attacking a marketplace in Sarajevo, claiming the lives of 30 civilians. After two days of diplomatic activity, NATO commanders were ordered to start Operation Deliberative Force, a massive air campaign directed against Bosnian Serb positions, which destroyed the Bosnian Serbs ability to wage war and enabled the Federation’s forces to strengthen their military offensive (Gow 1997: 278). Around two-third of all sorties were conducted by American planes (Bert 1997: 224). These air strikes enabled the Bosniak and Bosnian Croat forces to acquire more territory and systematically ‘cleanse’ this from Bosnian Serb elements. However, the US did not stop these cleansing campaigns, even though members of the Contact Group objected.

Although the US had earlier expressed its willingness to reach a cease-fire on the ground in order to start the peace process, US foreign policymakers argued that ‘for fruitful negotiations to take place, force must be applied’ (Bert 1997: 224). The air strikes were helping the Bosniak-Croat offensive, dramatically changing the balance of power on the ground. Even though the Bosnian Serbs were asking for a cease-fire, so they could re-organise their military units and safeguard their positions, and although the European members of the Contact Group had told the US that the aerial bombardment had gone too far and should be stopped, the US vehemently argued that it a was necessary step in the
search of peace. Because the 'American option' (Bert 1997: 225), which the Europeans had accepted during Lake's visit, was built on the conclusion of the London Conference, it can be said that American foreign policy-makers, especially Holbrooke and Secretary of State Warren Christopher, believed that force and diplomacy should complement each other in the interest of achieving a lasting settlement (Holbrooke 1999: 145).

Why did the US decide to take control of the peace negotiations, even though it had disregarded this role before the fall of Srebrenica? The answer to this question is twofold. First, Bosnia became, what Secretary of State Warren Christopher called the 'problem from hell' (Cited in Daalder 2000: 83). Bosnia was not only questioning the reputation of NATO and the UN, but after the fall of Srebrenica it was questioning 'U.S. credibility as a world leader, its credibility in NATO, in the United Nations, and at home' (Daalder 2000: 108) Second, the Clinton administration was anxious of the possibility to send American troops to extract UNPROFOR. The loss of American lives was a huge concern for the administration, especially after the death of servicemen in Somalia and the 1996 presidential elections (Bert 1997). An end to the conflict would mean that American troops, rather than extracting UNPROFOR, would go to Bosnia to implement a peace plan. This would have been not only more acceptable to the American public, but assisting the contending parties to settle their war would have enabled the US to regain its credibility, while allowing it to secure its national interests.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
The violent unraveling of Yugoslavia tested the resolve of the international community, its values, and the interests of its strongest actors. The Bosnian war demonstrated the general incapacity of Cold War regional and international security organisations in the post-Cold War era (Woodward 1995: 273). In doing so, the Bosnian war became what Secretary of State Warren Christopher called the 'problem of hell'. The war started at a time when the European Community was finalising the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union and the United States wanted to dedicate more time to its internal problems. Thus, the Europeans placed Maastricht before Sarajevo, even though the US was pressuring them to take a pro-active role in the former Yugoslavia. In the end, the
self-interests of the EC/EU prevented it from devising a peace initiative that could secure an end to the conflict or convince the US of the approach’s merits.

Indeed, Washington blamed the Europeans for failing to prevent the war, but it also hinder their ability to implement a peace plan, such as the one crafted by Vance and Owen in 1993, for fear that the possible settlement would hurt its interests. This changed in 1994 when the US started to play a more pro-active role in the peacemaking process.

The Clinton administration’s foreign policy to Bosnia, from February 1993 to August 1995, was motivated by self-interests. Even though some could say that it was influenced by humanitarian concerns, this was, as Woodward notes, a ‘false humanitarianism.’ Indeed, humanitarian action was conducted to ease international and domestic criticism of the administration’s unwillingness to end the war. Humanitarian ideals were repeatedly ignored in cases that favoured the US national interest. For instance, the ethnic cleansing campaigns that accompanied the Croat and Bosniak-Croat offensives were not criticised or stopped by the administration, even though most European governments raised serious questions about the US decision to ignore these acts.

The decision to condemn Bosnian Serbs for their war crimes, but ignoring the violations committed by the Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats and the Croatian government do reveal the strong nationalist interest guiding American foreign policy. Even when there were signs that a cease-fire could be signed to start the peace negotiations, hampering the Bosniak-Croat offensive from re-taking lost territories, Holbrooke (1999: 166) states in his memoirs that he encouraged the forces to keep reclaiming land as long as the offensive did not override Banja Luka. The rationale for this strategy was that this would make things easier in the negotiations to end the war.

In the end, the importance was not necessarily the welfare of these peoples caught in war. The motivation for action was directed by the fear that the Clinton administration would not fulfil its vision of Europe and by the fact that the Bosnian war was not only questioning NATO’s credibility, as it searched for a new role in the post-Cold War era, but also American leadership. As Madeline Albright argued in a June 1995 policy memorandum, titled Elements of a New Strategy: ‘reluctance to lead the effort to resolve a military crisis in the heart of Europe has placed at risk our leadership in the post-Cold
War world.' She continued by saying that: ‘Chirac’s statement that “the position of leader of the Free World is vacant” has been chilling my bones for weeks’ (Cited in Daalder 2000: 93). This view helped the Clinton administration realise the importance of leading military and diplomatic efforts to settle the war.
CHAPTER FIVE
America’s Dayton Peace Initiative: The False Promises of the Strategic Approach to Peacemaking

INTRODUCTION
On 21 November 1995, the parties to the conflict initialled the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFA). Eleven annexes complement the GFA. Each explains in detail how different aspects of the agreement are to be implemented by international agents and local institutions.

This agreement is unique in many ways. For instance, Paolo Gaeta (1996: 149), an international legal scholar, argues that this is one of the few treaties in the history of international law that entered into force once the parties initialled the document. Another interesting trait is that the parties to the Bosnian conflict were not given the right to interpret or re-negotiate the GFA’s provisions. This right was reversed to the Peace Implementation Council, the Contact Group and other international bodies working in the GFA’s execution.

The negotiations leading to the initialling of this document started in September 1995, shortly after the beginning of NATO’s Operation Deliberative Force. Many of the document’s principles and the strategies used by the United States (US) to secure this agreement were developed by the Contact Group’s work, conducted since it was set-up in March 1994. At the same time, this ad hoc body’s efforts were based on the peace initiatives of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY). Consequently, the Clinton administration’s peace plan shared many traits found in the ICFY’s peace plans (Szasz 1996: 302-03).

The diplomatic process that produced the Dayton peace initiative was orchestrated by the Clinton administration. The European members of the Contact Group, which had headed the workings of the ICFY, were sidelined. While this initiative is based on American interests, it is important to notice that the Clinton administration was divided on the initiative’s intended objectives. Whereas this debate affected Washignton’s
response, divisions within the Contact Group also affected the search for peace in the autumn of 1995. Thus, the GFA is a product of these debates and divisions.

The Clinton administration’s foreign policy team was divided into two camps: the minimalists and maximalists. The minimalists argued that the ‘immediate objective was to end the war and reduce the likelihood of it restarting’ (Daalder 2000: 144). Hence the motive for action was to separate each side’s military forces and create a balance of military power in the area to deter each group from renewing the armed struggle. The maximalists, on the other hand, maintained that the ‘immediate objective was to build a lasting peace in Bosnia, one that required not just an end to the war, but the construction of a multi-ethnic, democratic, and prosperous state’ (Daalder 2000: 144-45). The minimalist perspective argued that a balance of power in the region was important, but a settlement to the conflict would be difficult to achieve if the international community did not design a peacebuilding strategy that assisted the parties to reconstruct their shattered economy and society.

As said before, this debate was further complicated by conflict between the US and the Contact Group’s other members. The US did not only want to take leadership of the diplomatic process, but it also demanded to be in charge of the GFA’s implementation. This view was shared in Washington by maximalists and minimalists alike. Agreeing with maximalists in the Clinton administration, the Europeans required a broader peacebuilding mission. However, they also desired to organise and direct the peacebuilding mission. After all, Richard Holbrooke had already informed Carl Bildt that the US required the European Union (EU) to finance most of this mission (Bildt 1998: 115). This created much anger within the EU, fracturing the international consensus the US needed to successfully settle the conflict.

This chapter continues the investigation conducted in the previous chapter by explaining the impact the US had on peacemaking efforts. The Clinton administration’s desire to take control of the diplomatic process, while hailed by many European diplomats as a step in the right direction, created a series of new complications that forced Holbrooke to initially weaken the position of the maximalist clique within the Contact Group and strengthen the stance of minimalist supporters. In other words, if the
US was not to control the peacebuilding phase, then it was imperative to limit the role and influence of the other members by creating a less ambitious peacebuilding agenda.

Noticing the anger of European mediators, the US negotiation team was forced to broaden the scope of the proposed peacebuilding mission during the negotiations at Dayton. However, this enlargement was accepted as long as it furthered American interests in Europe. Whereas the US would continue to pursue a minimalist agenda, the agreement had the intentions of supporting an expanded peacebuilding mission that could be administered by agents of the international community, especially the European Union, if the minimalist project failed to make the peace in Bosnia self-sustaining. The peace process and the peace agreement was never intended to be administered by the conflicting parties in Bosnia (Gaeta 1996).

As a result, the peacemaking process and the agreement were a product of the Clinton administration's decision to employ the tenets of the strategic approach to peacemaking. Rather than instituting a peace that empowered Bosnia's conflicting parties to build a new society that re-captured the multi-ethnic character of its past, the peace seems to be, as Gaeta argues, a 'pax americana'. As he explains, even though European leaders were quick 'to appear as contributors to the peace process' it was really the product of American power (Emphasis added, Gaeta 1996: 150). For the Clinton administration, the agreement served to end the war and permit it to materialise its vision of Europe. The importance was not necessarily the political details of the agreement, but those details that addressed military matters that enabled the Contact Group to prevent the resumption of the armed conflict.

I. THE ROAD TO DAYTON

Once the Contact Group accepted the Clinton administration's use of coercive diplomacy, the US was free to direct the diplomatic process that eventually led the parties to sign the GFA. This process can be divided into two phases. The first phase was the participant's selection. The obvious strategy was to include the three warring factions, as previous efforts had done, but the Contact Group had other plans. Also important to notice was the division of labour in the Contact Group. While all Contact Group countries would send a
team of diplomats, the question was: which of its members were going to play a bigger role in the process? The second phase involved the organisation of a series of pre-negotiation sessions to produce a negotiation agenda, that is to say a ‘set text’ (Rubin 1995: 9), which would guide the peace talks at Dayton.

A. Phase One: Selecting the Participants

Building on the diplomatic work of US Envoy to the Contact Group, Robert Frasure, who, along with S. Nelson Drew and Joseph Kruzel, died in a tragic accident when their armored personnel carrier ‘bounced over the road’ (Emphasis in original, Holbrooke 1999: 11) on Mount Igman in mid-August 1995, the Contact Group decided that for meaningful peace negotiations to take place it was necessary to solely negotiate with Slobodan Milošević rather than with the Bosnian Serbs. The Contact Group had expressed their dissatisfaction with the Bosnian Serbs, as they did not support the Group’s plan or desired to consider any negotiation efforts that revolved around this plan (Holbrooke 105-06). Although Milošević demonstrated support for Frasure’s approach in the spring of 1995, primarily because he understood that his co-operation to negotiate a peace agreement was the only way the international community was going to lift the economic sanctions crippling his country’s economy (Glitman 1996-97: 75), the Bosnian Serbs were not ready to surrender their negotiating power to Belgrade.

The success of the Croat and Bosniak-Croat offensives had a dramatic psychological impact on the Bosnian Serb leadership. The leadership clearly started to understand that its decision to support the attacks on Srebrenica and Žepa were a big mistake. Instead of ending the war in their favour, as General Madlić argued, it energized the international community’s efforts to settle the conflict by employing military force against Bosnian Serb positions; a strategy that would only favour the Bosniak-Croat offensive and affect the Republika Sprska’s (RS) ability to defend their territory. Noting that something had to be done in order to protect the RS and its territory, James Gow (1997: 278) argues that the Bosnian Serb leadership ‘had little choice other than to accept Milosevic would represent them in the negotiations, short of facing further armed actions from either the international community or their foes in Bosnia.’ This is not to say that the Bosnian Serbs did not use force to try to challenge the international community’s
resolve. In fact, Bosnian Serb forces did target the “safe havens” and kept fighting against the Bosniak-Croat forces during this time. The only problem was that NATO air strikes had severely crippled their ability to organise an effective counter-offensive. In the end, the Bosnian Serb leadership agreed to give Milošević the authority to head the Serbian negotiation team and to even decide the fate of the RS, if the joint delegation of Bosnian Serbs and members of the Yugoslav government could not agree with the provisions of a draft peace agreement.

More critical, the Serb delegation was informed by the Contact Group that Radovan Karadžić and Mladić would not be able to join the delegation, as the International Tribunal on the Former Yugoslavia had indicted them for planning and executing crimes against humanity. This angered Milošević and the Bosnian Serb leadership, but the US repeatedly stated that they had to understand that if Mladić and Karadžić decided to come to the negotiations, they would be arrested and tried by the Tribunal at The Hague once they set foot in American or Western European soil. While Holbrooke knew that this decision was to create problems in the short term, he also knew that the negotiations would be much smoother if they did not participate.

Representing the Bosnian Croats and the Croatian government’s claim to Eastern Slavonia was a Croat delegation headed by Tudjman. Representing the Bosniaks and Bosnia was a delegation led by Izetbegović, who at the time was the president of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Tudjman participation was critical because the Bosnian Croats distrusted the Bosniaks and they thought that Tudjman was their best hope to secure their interests.

The Contact Group members were also an integral part of the negotiations. A delegation or a team of negotiators represented each member country. This is not to say that all of these teams had the same amount of power. In theory, Carl Bildt, the EU Special Negotiator, and the Russian Deputy Minister Igor Ivanov’s status were equal to that of Holbrooke, but this was not so in practice. As for the Western European negotiators, they would be subordinated under Bildt’s authority (Neville-Jones 1996-97: 48). The UN was not involved in this process, except in the delicate negotiations concerning Eastern Slavonia. While this angered some European governments, they
accepted the American plan. In all, Holbrooke and his team of negotiators and military experts directed the entire pre-settlement and settlement-making process.

**B. Phase Two: Setting the Agenda**

The negotiation agenda was based on the seven points initiative presented by Anthony Lake to the Contact Group in mid-August 1995. The problem was that these points were vague and mostly represented American interests. Even though the US wanted to dominate peacemaking efforts, the success of its initiatives depended on European participation during this process and for the duration of the implementation of a peace settlement. Consequently, the Clinton administration started to search for a strategy that would be directed by US national interests, but endorsed by the rest of the Contact Group.

Having determined the peace process's participants, the US negotiators, and Bildt’s team playing a supportive role, set out a series of discussions with leaders in Belgrade, Zagreb and Sarajevo, leading to the *Basic Agreed Principles*, signed in Geneva on 8 September 1995. This document proved to be a crucial phase in the process leading to Dayton. Endorsed by the Croatian Foreign Minister, Mate Granic, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Milan Milutinović, and the Bosnian Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbey, the document established three negotiation principles (OHR-D 1995e).17

1. It stated that ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue its legal functioning within the present borders and it will be internationally recognized’ as such.

2. It recognised that Bosnia and Herzegovina would be composed of two entities – the Federation founded by the Washington Agreement of 1994 and the RS. Based on the Contact Group, it was agreed that the former would hold 51 percent of the territory while the latter will hold the remaining 49 percent. The agreement also pointed that each entity would keep its constitution for the time being and that each could conduct special parallel relations with neighboring states, provided that these relationships did not threaten the ‘sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.’ Finally, this principle established that ‘either entity will take the reciprocal obligation’ to hold elections at all levels under the international community’s supervision and to adopt and respect human

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17 It is important to note that these are not being directly cited from the original document. They are a summation of these three principles.
rights and obligations, including the freedom of movements and the ability of dislocated individuals to reclaim their properties.

3. It maintained that the entities agreed to appoint the following: (a) a Commission for Dislocated Persons, (b) a Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina for Human Rights, and (c) a Commission for Conservation of National Monuments. In addition, it was agreed that public enterprises would be created and a system of arbitrage would be instituted to resolve any disputes between the entities.

Although the Geneva summit proved to be a success, many other issues were not addressed in this pre-negotiation session. As Holbrooke (1999: 141) argues, the 'major omission' of the agreement was 'the lack of any agreement on a central government' that would connect the two entities. Nevertheless, the document was a first step that showed that the parties were willing to address contending issues in order to settle the war. After all, the document's principles recognised Bosnia as an independent and sovereign state that included Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs. It is important to remember that this was an issue that led the leadership of both the Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb communities to see war as viable mechanism to secure their needs and interests (Bildt 1998: 100).

This document's acceptance was extremely controversial in Bosnia, especially in Sarajevo. The legal recognition of the RS and the country's new name, 'Bosnia and Herzegovina,' from the 'Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina' did not please many, including Izetbegović (Holbrooke 1999: 130-31). In Pale and Banja Luka, the controversy was the 51-49 calculus agreed by the parties, as well as the acknowledgment that the RS was part of a sovereign Bosnia (Holbrooke 1999: 177). Although many politicians in Bosnia were displeased with the Basic Agreed Principles, these were just a foundation for future peace negotiations. The vagueness of each principle allowed the contending parties to search for ways to secure more power, and in the case of the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat leaderships the partition of Bosnia via the negotiation process.

The Contact Group was aware of this dilemma and it decided to launch a new diplomatic initiative to secure Bosnia's integrity. After Holbrooke's and Bildt's tours of Sarajevo, Zagreb, Belgrade and even Pale, the parties met in New York on 26 September
1995 to strengthen the Basic Agreed Principles. Three issues tested the resolve of the Contact Group, almost ruining the summit and the entire peace process. These issues were the following: (a) the Bosnian delegation wanted assurances against the partition of the country; (b) the Serb delegation wanted to prevent the creation of strong central state structures; and (c) there were questions about the election process in itself and the presence of international monitors – the Bosnian delegation wanted a direct process monitored by international organisations, the Serb delegation preferred an indirect process without international supervision (Holbrooke 1999: 179-184; and Bildt 1998: 107-08).

In the end, the parties agreed to three new principles that were to be added to the Basic Agreed Principles. These were the following (OHR-D 1995c).18

4. Each entity ‘will honour the international obligations of Bosnia-Herzegovina,’ so long as ‘the obligation is not a financial obligation incurred by one entity without the consent of the other.’

5. Free and democratic elections are to be held in both entities ‘as soon as social conditions permit.’ For elections to take place, it is necessary for each entity: (a) to permit the freedom of movements, (b) to extend to dislocated persons the right to reclaim their property or receive ‘just compensation for it,’ (c) to safeguard and promote the freedom of speech and press, and (d) the protection of human rights. Including to this provision was the Organisation of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to monitor the compliance of each entity’s eagerness to create these social conditions and determine when the time is right to hold the elections. According to this principle, the elections would take place 30 days after the OSCE determined that the social conditions were conducive to hold free and democratic elections.

6. The following institutions would conduct Bosnia and Herzegovina’s affairs. First, a ‘parliamentary or assembly, two-thirds which would be elected by the territory of the Federation and one-third from the Republika Srpska. Second, a three-person Presidency. Individuals would elect two members from the Federation and residents of RS would elect the third member. Third, a cabinet was to be created, though there were not instructions on how big or small this should be. Finally, a Constitutional Court would be created and it would have jurisdiction over all matters dealing with the amended constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This principle also included a provision that stated that other issues such as the responsibility of

18 Again, this is a summation of the three principles, not a direct citation.
each institution and its operation was still to be negotiated. The only power these institutions would have was foreign policy.

Though not mentioned in this document, the Contact Group and the parties also declared in a Joint Statement that territorial issues, such as Eastern Slavonia and Bosnia’s map, and the future of foreign troops in Bosnia (e.g. the Yugoslav army, Muhajedeens, and Croatian forces) were extremely significant and that these would have to be addressed in future peace talks (OHR-D 1995d). As a result, the New York and the Geneva summits mostly addressed issues concerning the composition of Bosnia and its institutions, while leaving controversial territorial issues on the side.

The New York summit and the final document did not deal with three crucial issues of contention. For instance, addressing Bosniak’s fear of the country’s possible partition, Holbrooke asked Clinton to call Izetbegović to re-assure him that the US would not support any proposals that partitioned the country. In a speech later that day, Clinton also pointed out the importance of keeping Bosnia together. This served as a confidence-building mechanism, as Sarajevo trusted the US government’s intention to support the integrity of the country. Even though Clinton’s remarks persuaded the Bosnian delegation to accept the new principles, the Basic Agreed Principles did not include a clear statement that inhibits the RS or any other region to secede from Bosnia.

As seen on the fifth principle, the type of election process was not specified either. It proved to be too controversial. The Contact Group decided to keep the wording extremely vague, while gaining a crucial concession from the Serb delegation that the international community, via the organs of the OSCE, would monitor social conditions and determine when elections would take place. This proved to be an important step, as the Contact Group was actually showing sings that it wanted to set strong provisions to assure that international agencies would dominate, supervise, and administer the peace settlement’s implementation.

In addition, the agreement did not indicate how ‘thick’ or ‘thin’ was the tissue connecting the entities. In the same vein, it did not establish the actual responsibilities of these institutions. Nevertheless, the acceptance of the Serb delegation that foreign policy would be a matter related to the central institutions was a substantial step forward, as it basically showed the delegation’s acceptance that RS is an integral part of a Bosnian
state. Although other issues were not tackled, the New York summit proved to be an important event, as it did finally secure the basic principles that would set the tone and issues to be negotiated at peace talks.

The New York summit’s success should not be overstated, as both Holbrooke and Bildt privately expressed their concerns that securing a peace agreement was going to prove harder than they had originally expected. More important, there was another facet of the negotiations that were not addressed. This was the matter of who would be responsible for the implementation of an agreement and who would finance the reconstruction of Bosnia. While the US wanted Europe to finance these initiatives and let it control the implementation process, including the OSCE mission, the European Union rejected this proposal. Following the Geneva summit, the Bosniak-Croat offensive was winning major battles, increasing its overall percentage of territory. Noting the low morale of its troops and the onslaught of the offensive, the Bosnian Serbs asked for a cease-fire. At first, the US rejected this request because it favored its diplomatic initiative; the more land the Federation acquired, the easier the negotiations on the map would be. However, international pressures for a cease-fire started to grow after the New York summit and American intelligence reports argued that the Bosniak-Croat offensive was running out of steam, partially because Croat forces were unwilling to support Bosniak forces. Thus, Holbrooke believed that a cease-fire was needed to secure the offensive’s territorial acquisitions (Holbrooke 1999: 193-95), which amounted to 51.6 percent of the territory at the time (Bildt 1998: 112).

The Clinton administration’s support of a cease-fire angered the Bosnian government. Izetbegović and his commanders believed the offensive had been the most successful military operation, since the war’s start. Nevertheless, US officials convinced Izetbegović to sign the cease-fire, which was agreed to on 5 October 1995. The parties established that it would last for sixty days, giving enough time for the US to hold its peace negotiations. Shortly after the cease-fire was announced, President Clinton declared that it would host peace talks in the US and he extended an invitation to the Serb, Croat and Bosnian delegations, as long as they accepted three conditions (Holbrooke 1999: 199-200):
1. Each delegation should be headed by the Presidents of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and they should come with the 'full power to sign agreements, without further recourse to parliaments back home;'

2. They prepared 'to stay as long as necessary to reach agreement, without threatening to walk out.'

3. They did not 'talk to the press or other outsiders' during the talks.

Having agreed to these conditions and pledge to uphold the Basic Agreed Principles the parties met with the Contact Group at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio on 1 November 1995.

II. THE 'PROXIMITY' PEACE TALKS AND THE FINAL AGREEMENT

Reflecting on the Dayton peace talks, Pauline Neville-Jones, the chief British negotiator, stated that: 'The Dayton negotiations were complex in structure and agenda' (Neville-Jones 1996-97: 48). Building on the Basic Agreed Principles, finalised in New York, and the Joint Statement, written at this meeting, the 'proximity talks' addressed five major issues: (a) Eastern Slavonia; (b) the Federation; (d) territorial issues; (d) constitutional and legal issues concerning Bosnia; and (e) civilian and military implementation.19

Another important observation made by Neville-Jones was that these negotiations were controlled and directed by the US team (1996-97: 48). On the first day of the peace talks, as the leaders of each country arrived at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Warren Christopher met with the members of the Contact Group and told them that the US would conduct the "real negotiations." By this he meant that the members of the Contact Group’s role in the negotiation was to support the process when needed and approve it once an agreement was reached. Knowing that this would not please the European members, Christopher told them: 'Some of you might not be happy with every aspect of the negotiations, but we are all pursuing the same result together. Let us not loose sight of that' (Cited in Holbrooke 1999: 236).

While the American team argued that it was necessary for them to lead the negotiations, in order to minimise friction among the members of the Contact Group, this

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19 This list is a combination of Holbrooke’s (1999: 240) list of important issues and that presented by Neville-Jones (1996-97: 48-49).
was not always achieved. The European and Russian delegations did intervene in the process because they found that the process was not only hurting their interests, but, more importantly, because they also feared that the agreements being made would not solve Bosnia’s problems and cause them further problems in the future. Although they criticised the process, they eventually endorsed it. Consequently, the final agreement tends to reflect America’s peacemaking approach instead of the European approach.

Can this American approach be blamed for some of the problems the international community faces in the phase of post-settlement peacebuilding? There are not easy answers. The US cannot be completely blamed. European acquiescence during the peace talks to important issues and their continuance of the policies constructed and endorsed shortly after the signing of the peace agreement are also to blame. However, the fact is that Holbrooke’s decision to control the negotiating agenda and the nature of the talks are responsible for some of the peace process’s shortcomings. To further demonstrate the effect of American preponderance in this phase of the peace process, it is necessary to analyse the dynamics and interactions of the Contact Group negotiators and the delegations of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia at Dayton. The following sections will address the five major issues listed above, but these analyses are preceded by an examination of the negotiation agenda, explaining how the American team set the ‘proximity peace talks’ to their own advantage.

A. Setting the Negotiating Agenda

Holbrooke argues that the negotiations at Dayton could be best described by the term: ‘proximity talks.’ He argues that the term originated in the late 1940, when the United Nations held one of its first negotiation sessions on the Middle East’s conflicts. In ‘proximity talks,’ the negotiator shuttles between the parties, ‘who rarely meet one another face to face – a sort of “shuttle diplomacy by foot”’ (Holbrooke 1999: 207). President Jimmy Carter used this approach successfully during the negotiations that led to the Camp David Accords.

In fact, only one negotiation session was held with all the leaders and their delegations. Held the first day of the peace talks, the session proved the utility of the concept, as Tudjman, Izetbegović, and Milošević seem to disagree on all the issues. The
great distance between the delegations convinced Christopher that Holbrooke’s approach, though somewhat disorganised or complex, seemed to fit the circumstances. More important, the complexity of the approach in many ways benefited the American diplomats because they could assess the mood of conflicting attitudes among each delegation and develop strategies to deal with contentious issues and assure the peace talks’ success.

For instance, in the first session, which involved all parties, Christopher asked each President to make his priorities clear (Holbrooke 1999: 236). For Tudjman, it was Eastern Slavonia, though he also stated that strengthening the Federation was necessary, as this would enhance Croatia’s strategic position in the region. The lifting of economic sanctions against Yugoslavia was Milošević’s primary concern, whereas Izetbegović called for ‘peace with justice’, by which he meant a united Bosnia with strong central governmental institutions and a permanent peacekeeping force headed by NATO (Borden and Hedl 1996). With this information, the American team started to think of incentives that could be provided to speed-up the negotiation process and secure a settlement. Thus, Christopher told Milošević that the international community would start to suspend ‘sanctions upon initialling an agreement, instead of waiting for its formal signing’ (emphases in original, Holbrooke 1999: 236). It was hoped that this would give Milošević another reason to make important concessions, which American negotiators knew the Bosnian Serbs were unwilling to make.

Similar to Christopher’s tactic, the American team started to set an agenda to increase the incentives for each delegation, so they could agree on controversial issues. One of the European mediators told Anthony Borden and Drago Hedl (1996) that: ‘Each morning the Americans would bring the day’s schedule, with precise arrangements about which delegates would work together, who would speak, and for how long.’ For the American team, the importance was not necessarily the issues, but whom would deal with each issue and when would this take place. Consequently, the American team decided that before discussing Eastern Slavonia, it was necessary to first deal with the strengthening of the Federation. There was fear that an agreement on Eastern Slavonia would take away the incentive for Tudjman to pressure the Bosnian Croats in this phase of the talks.
It was argued that once the Federation was addressed then, it was time to not only deal with Eastern Slavonia, but also with territorial, constitutional and legal issues relating to Bosnia. The American team was obsessed with the negotiations relating to the map of Bosnia, while the Europeans stressed the importance of constitutional matters. This does not mean that the Europeans thought that the map was not a crucial aspect of the peace talks. Instead, they feared that once ‘the map was ready, the constitution would also be declared ready’ (Bildt 1998: 145). Lurking in the shadows of these negotiations was a fight of words among the Contact Group’s members on the particular details concerning the peace agreement and the peacebuilding agenda. While this debate started shortly after the New York summit, it became more pronounced at Dayton.

B. The Federation and Eastern Slavonia

Michael Steiner, German Deputy Representative to the Contact Group, and Chris Hill, Director of the US State Department’s Office of South-Central European Affairs, headed the negotiations on the deepening of the Federation’s structures. While Holbrooke considered the Federation an important element of the peace process, he did not become directly involved in this phase of the negotiations because he felt that the talks should secure a settlement, rather than becoming immerse in detailed political questions (Borden and Hedl 1996).

On the second day of the proximity talks, Steiner and Hill met with Tudjman, Izetbegović and Krešimir Zubak, the Federation’s president. It took eight days to negotiate an agreement that would give a new face to the Federation. The problem with the Federation was that it was mostly a fiction. The US created it in March 1994 to end the fighting between the Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks, to increase cooperation between Bosnia and Croatia, so the latter could arm the former, and to change the balance of power on the ground. While it did put the intended pressure on the Bosnian Serbs, the Federation never came into being. The Bosnian Croats, especially the more extreme nationalist elements, showed no desire to disband the structures of Herceg-Bosna (Holbrooke 1999: 241). Although this was a clear violation of the Washington Agreement, the Contact Group did not reprimand the Bosnian Croats for fears it would incite another round of fighting.
Even more problematic, Izetbegović did not trust Tudjman's intentions. Before the talks at Dayton, Clinton had to meet with Izetbegović and Tudjman in New York to ask them to put their differences aside and co-operate in the name of peace. Both Presidents agreed. However, this non-binding agreement did not make the negotiations concerning the Federation any easier. At the heart of the problem was this mistrust. While the Bosnian Croats and the Croatian government argued that the Federation should be very strong and Bosnia's central government very weak, this was unacceptable for the Bosniaks. The Bosniaks argued that yielding on this point would solidify the Bosnian Serbs' case for a weak central government. Their rationale for this attitude was that a weak central government would set the road to Bosnia's partition; the Federation falling under Croatia's sphere of influence and the RS under Milošević's tutelage (Borden and Hedl 1996). The fear was the materialisation of the infamous Karadjordevo agreement.

As a result, the negotiations on the Federation's structures started to spill into the constitutional and legal issues surrounding the central government proposed in the Basic Agreed Principles. In the end, German and American pressures moved the parties closer to an agreement, which was signed on 10 November. While some in the Contact Group saw this as a considerable step in the right direction, the Dayton Agreement, like the Washington Agreement, was a promissory note. Among its many provisions included the unification of Mostar, the establishment of a customs union with Croatia and the dissolution of the Republic of Herceg-Bosna (OHR-D 1995b). Eventually, Izetbegović gave into Bosnian Croats' view of a strong Federation and weak central government, angering Bosnia's Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić. Commenting on the agreement an European mediator told Borden and Hedl (1996) that: 'In the end they [the Bosniaks] had to recognise that the Federation was a prerequisite for Western policy, and they couldn't hold up the whole of Dayton for something they were expected to agree.'

Once the negotiations on the Federation were completed, the Croat delegation moved to work on Eastern Slavonia. While Eastern Slavonia was an important issue for Tudjman, the American negotiation team understood it as a pre-text to Bosnia's unresolved territorial issues. In fact, it seems that Tudjman and Milosevic had secretly agreed that Croatia would keep Eastern Slavonia, while the Bosnian Serbs would keep the disputed Posavina region in Northwest Bosnia, which was originally inhabited by
Bosnian Croats and cleansed by the Bosnian Serbs at the beginning of the war (Gow 1997: 283). This pact infuriated Bosnian Croat leaders because they considered their control of Posavina as one of their principal aims at Dayton.

In the end, Eastern Slavonia was not discussed or solved at Dayton. The UN’s representative to the ICFY, Thorvald Stoltenberg, and US Ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, flew from Dayton to Eastern Slavonia to negotiate with local Serb leaders a peaceful transfer of the territory. An agreement was eventually reached, where the UN would set up a transitional authority to oversee the transfer of the territory, to guarantee the rights of the Serbs living in this territory, to start the process of de-militarisation, and to commence the painful process of economic and social reconstruction. The Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium was signed in Erdut on 12 November and in Zagreb on 14 November. It is important to emphasise that this agreement is not part of GFA, the end product of the peace talks.

B. Constitutional and Legal Matters

This facet of the negotiation was very controversial. Not only because the parties to the talks were the RS’s representatives, the Federation, and the Republic of Bosnia, but because of the rift it caused within the ranks of the Contact Group, among the European representatives, including Bildt, and the American negotiators. For the Americans, especially for Holbrooke, the peace talks had to produce success. Failure was not accepted because it could hurt America’s credibility and hurt Clinton’s re-election campaign (Daalder 2000). For these reasons, the American negotiation approach was designed to maximise the opportunities for success by avoiding issues that could derail the peace talks. American negotiators understood that legal and constitutional matters could be an obstruction, as these negotiations were aimed at creating a single political community to enable all the groups and individuals to achieve their self-determination, while also limiting the claims of ethno-national leaders arguing for the partition of Bosnia. This section analyses two important controversies relating to the nature and the role of the elections in post-settlement Bosnia and other important constitutional issues.
I. The Elections

Linked to the talks addressing Bosnia’s constitutional structures were unanswered questions relating to the nature of the elections (e.g. direct v. indirect) and voter participation. It is important to remember that the former proved to be one of the issues that almost wrecked the New York summit. While the Contact Group won a major concession relating to the OSCE’s role from the Serbian delegation, the question relating to the direct or indirect nature of the elections were not adequately addressed.

It is not surprising that this was a divisive aspect of the negotiations. The growing discord between the parties at Dayton was becoming so pronounced that in one of the Contact Group meetings the American team expressed their disposition ‘to throw the towel on provisions for elections’ and create an electoral commission that would answer these questions after the signing of the peace agreement (Bildt 1998: 146). The German representative to the Contact Group, Wolfgang Ischinger, expressed his anger with the idea, stating that he had not seen any serious attempts to solve this important issue (Bildt 1998: 146). Holbrooke (1999: 275) believed that Ischinger’s anger was understandable, as Germany gave refugee at the time to over three hundred thousands Bosnian refugees. For the German diplomat, the negotiated settlement had to provide incentives for these people to return to their homes and elections were part of this envisioned incentive package.

Bildt had clearly articulated his concern that setting the elections debate aside for the time being was an error. He argued that if this issue were not addressed at Dayton, it would not be addressed after the agreement’s signing. The Bosnian Serbs wanted quick elections ‘based on where people were living at the time.’ The Bosniaks objected to this, insisting that ‘refugees [had to be] entitled to record their votes in the places from which they had been forced to flee.’ The debate, as Bildt rightly argued, ‘was not a purely “technical” question that could be referred to some commission. In fact, it was the core of the entire political conflict. Was ethnic cleansing to be accepted or not?’ (Bildt 1998: 147).

In the end, Annex 3 of the GFA, which addresses this issue, did not only create the electoral commission envisioned by American negotiators, but it also increased the
role of the OSCE. Rather than just monitoring social conditions to determine when the elections could be held, it was established that the OSCE would have the authority to assist the parties to create these social conditions (GFA 1995: Annex 3, Art.1.2) and to supervise and prepare the elections (GFA 1995: Annex 3, Art.II.2). The agreement also stated that the elections would take place ‘six months after [the agreement’s] entry into force... or if the OSCE determines a delay necessary, no later than nine months after entry into force’ (GFA 1995: Annex 3, Art.III.2). Increasing the OSCE’s responsibility in Bosnia proved to be another factor that divided the Contact Group. While the Europeans did support the monitoring of the elections, they believed that the OSCE should not organise them (Holbrooke 1999: 290).

The American team ignored the Europeans’ view on this matter because Clinton instructed Holbrooke to use the peace talks as means to increase the OSCE’s role in the post-Cold War era. Two important reasons justified this decision. First, Clinton’s vision of an undivided and democratic Europe included the expansion of the organisation’s responsibilities. Its work in Bosnia would set the stage for the organisation’s role in democratising the former communist countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Holbrooke 1999: 290-91). Second, and as demonstrated in more detailed below, the US military and the Department of Defense were arguing that it could meet its objectives in less than a year, having US troops back before Christmas 1996. Organising and holding the elections would create a legitimate government that could take over Bosnia’s affairs and permit US troops to exit the country before the 1996 US presidential elections. As a result, the Clinton administration insisted that an American should direct an OSCE mission in Bosnia, as this was the best insurance for the elections to take place before or on September 1996. This proved to be an area of controversy, as France expressed its intention to appoint the head of this mission.

Regarding the thorny debate of who could vote and where, a German proposal eventually resolved it. It was a very controversial issue, especially with the Bosnian Serbs because the Article covering this provision directly states that (GFA 1995: Annex 3, Art.IV.1):

20 Annex 3, Art. III creates a Provisional Election Commission, while Article V of the same Annex expresses the parties’ commitment to create a Permanent Election Commission.
Any citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina aged 18 or older whose name appears on the 1991 census for Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be eligible, in accordance with electoral rules and regulations, to vote. A citizen who no longer lives in the municipality in which he or she resided in 1991 shall, as a general rule, be expected to vote, in person or by absentee ballot, in that municipality, provided that the person is determined to have been registered in that municipality as confirmed by the local election commission and the Provisional Election Commission.

Such a citizen may, however, apply to the Commission to cast his or her ballot elsewhere. The exercise of a refugee’s right to vote shall be interpreted as confirmation of his or her intention to return to Bosnia and Herzegovina. By Election Day, the return of refugees should already be underway, thus allowing many to participate in person in elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Commission may provide in the electoral rules and regulations for citizens not listed in the 1991 census to vote.

Subsequently, this provision gave refugees the power to decide the political fate of the municipalities that had been cleansed by the Bosnian Serbs. While this is true, it is important to also recognise that the Bosnian Serbs also won a concession. Refugees and displaced persons can cast their ballots in new municipalities, as long as they registered with the Commission, alluded to above. The significance of this concession must be stressed because it gave those Bosnian Serbs, forced from their homes, now living in the RS, a say in local and entity elections.

Concerning the nature of elections, a compromise between the Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs was reached. It was agreed that the 42 members of the Parliamentary Assembly’s lower chamber, the House of Representatives, would be elected directly via a system of proportional representation that carefully guaranteed the equality of all ethnic groups (GFA 1995: Annex 4, Art.IV.2[a]). However, the upper chamber, the House of Peoples, would be elected indirectly; that is to say five of the 15 members would be elected by the RS’s National Assembly, while the remaining would be elected by the Federation’s House of Peoples. It is important to mention that Bosnian Croat members of the Federation’s House of Peoples would elect five Bosnian Croat members to the Parliamentary Assembly’s upper chamber, while the Bosniaks would vote for the remaining five members (GFA 1995: Annex 4, Art.IV.1[a]). The same held true for the election of the three-member Presidency. Each group would be able to vote directly for a presidential candidate.
For the Contact Group, the elections were significant because they would serve as a mechanism to advance 'other, more ambitious objectives: ousting suspected war criminals from power; defeating the nationalist parties; and laying the groundwork for an independent media, personal freedoms, and other requisites of civil society' (Schear 1996: 88). As Francine Friedman (2000: 22-25) argues, the elections would not only advance these important objectives, but these would also foster political stability, validate the peace agreement, and affirm Bosnia’s sovereignty. Therefore, the elections would provide a degree of legitimacy to the undemocratic nature of the GFA and its constitutional system (Yee 1996: 180), which is discussed in more depth in the next section.

2. The Constitution

Attempting to minimise any conflicts that could derail the peace talks, and some commentators also add because of the influence of the US constitutional model (Neville-Jones 1996-97: 49), the American team ‘proposed an extremely decentralised governmental structure creating hardly any effective central powers’ (Borden and Hedl 1996). While the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats quickly endorsed this proposal, the Bosniaks and the Europeans were outraged. A European mediator told Borden and Hedl (1996) that:

We were in favour of a stronger centralised power because we live on the same continent with these people, and we are going to have to deal with them over a long term. If the European Union is going to do any business with them – and they won't settle down until they do have relationships with the larger entities around them – then we've got to have institutions in the centre which can represent them to the outside world and can translate commitments that they make internationally into domestic policy.

In his memoirs, Bildt conveys his frustration with the proposal by recounting a story of a confrontation between him and an unnamed US negotiator (1998: 145): ‘I asked someone from the US team if he would like to live in a country with a constitution of the kind which was beginning to emerge. He just laughed. Clearly not!’ Bildt’s assertion, that the American team irresponsibly handled the issues surrounding the constitution, is correct. In their hands lied the fate of a country. However, the American team considered military
imperatives, the map of Bosnia and the exit strategy to be more important than constitutional matters or, for that matter, the interests of Bosnia’s citizens.

After much debate between the delegations and among members of the Contact Group, the new constitution secures the integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, its sovereignty and independence (GFA 1995: Annex 4, Art.I.1). Bosnia’s new central institutions were ‘defined as being the state of three constituent peoples [Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs] and others, and compromised of two entities, The Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska’ (Gow 1997: 288). According to Article III, the Bosnian state would have responsibility over the following areas: foreign policy; foreign trade policy; customs policy; monetary policy, which was clearly delineated in Article VII of the constitution; finances for the international obligations of the country; immigration, asylum and refuge policies; inter-entity criminal law-making and enforcement; inter-entity transportation policy; communication policy; and air traffic control (GFA 1995: Annex 4, Art. III.1). Other important policies, usually performed by a state, such as education, health, defence, tax, judicial, and fiscal, was the responsibility of each entity (Woodward 1999: 142). Even more important the constitution did not envision the combination of the entities’ military forces into a single force for the whole country. As a result, rather than creating the strong state the Europeans were lobbying during the negotiations; the end product is what Bildt described as ‘the most decentralised state in the world’ (Bildt 1996). Echoing this view, Susan Woodward (1999a: 142) argues that the constitutional framework ‘resembles more the European Union than most modern states.’

In fact, the institutional system created at Dayton could only operate if leaders of each party were willing to co-operate and arrive at all inter-entity decisions by way of consensus. The constitution establishes six government institutions: the Presidency; the Parliamentary Assembly; a Council of Ministers; a Constitutional Court; a Central Bank; and a Standing Committee on Joint Military Matters (GFA 1995: Annex 4, Art. IV, V, VI, and VII respectively). To safeguard each constituent people’s interests, the Bosnia’s state institutions were organised on the basis of a power-sharing arrangement that guaranteed the representations of these peoples by way of ethnic keys and provisions to protect ‘vital interests’ (Chandler 1999: 67). This arrangement, while securing the equal
participation of all the ethnic groups in these institutions, gives ‘each ethnic group the ultimate decision-making power in any matters it considers important to it. In this sense, each group enjoys sovereignty’ (Yee 1996: 187).

Supporting Woodward’s comparison between the EU’s constitutional system and Bosnia’s constitutional arrangement is the way citizenship is conferred to individuals. This is not only the responsibility of the central state, but of each entity as well. Article I.7 (GFA 1995: Annex 4) stipulates that: ‘There shall be a citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to be regulated by the Parliamentary Assembly, and a citizenship of each Entity, to be regulated by each Entity....’ The constitution also states that the entities have the power to issue passports. These provisions are not only strange, but they seem to cement the legal division of the Bosnian state.

In the same vein, the constitution grants the entities a degree of power in foreign affairs. According to Article II.2[d] (GFA 1995: Annex 4), the entities may enter into agreements with other states and organisations, as long as the Parliamentary Assembly endorses these agreements. This provision also states that ‘Parliamentary Assembly may provide by law that certain types of agreements do not require such consent.’ This provision is in addition to the one stating that each entity has ‘the right to establish special parallel relationships with neighbouring states consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.’ These relationships can be negotiated and agreed to without the consent of the Parliamentary Assembly or any other state institution.

Another interesting and unique feature of the constitution is its adherence to a number of international and regional human rights treaties (GFA 1995: Annex 4, Art.I). One of the most important human right treaties included to the constitution is the 1950 European Convention and Protocols. Although the countries that observe this treaty are members of the Council of Europe, Bosnia was not a member at the time. As Paul Szasz (1996: 306) notes, the Contact Group included this in the list of human right treaties Bosnia had to abide by because it was trying to move Bosnia closer to Europe. By observing and adhering to the 1950 European Convention and Protocols, the Contact Group started the process by which Bosnia could join the Council of Europe and eventually obtain membership in the EU.
It is important to notice that the constitution makes clear that these treaties have to be also observed by the entities (GFA 1995: Annex 4, Art. III.2[c]). In addition to these treaties’ provisions, the constitution also enumerates a number of human rights and fundamental freedoms all Bosnia’s citizens hold (see GFA 1995: Annex 4, Art. II.3[a-m]). Why did the negotiators list these, when these rights and freedoms are part of these treaties’ provisions? It seems that the negotiator’s intent was to clearly present these to Bosnia’s citizens, so they could be aware of their basic rights and freedoms, without having to consult with each of the treaties (Szasz 1996: 307). For instance, freedom of movement and the right to property were strongly underscored because the Contact Group wanted to send a clear signal that ethnic cleansing and a divided Bosnia were unacceptable. Nevertheless, the decision to list some of the rights seems to create a problem. Are these listed rights and freedoms more important than those listed in the international and regional human rights treaties annexed to, but not listed in the constitution? The fact that some are explicitly listed in the constitution and that others are implicitly stated in the document means that the former list has ‘higher value than those merely incorporated by reference to human rights instruments’ (Szasz 1996: 307).

Furthermore, because discrimination was an important tool used by the parties to divide society, the constitution makes it clear that all individuals regardless of their ‘sex, race, color, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status’ (GFA 1995: Annex 4, Art. II.4) will equally enjoy these rights and freedoms.

Ironically, this document, which repeatedly makes mention of the importance to guarantee individual rights and freedoms, establishes a political system that breeds discrimination. The best example is the issue of the requirements candidates must meet in order to hold certain offices in the Bosnian state. For instance, the constitution clearly stipulates that ‘the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist of three Members: one Bosniak and one Croat, each directly elected from the territory of the Federation, and one Serb directly elected from the territory of the Republika Srpska.’ (GFA 1995: Annex 4, Art. V). The same holds true for the members of the Parliamentary Assembly’s upper chamber, the House of Peoples (GFA 1995: Annex 4, Art. V.1). In this manner, a Bosniak or a Bosnian Croat living in Republika Srpska or Bosnian Serb living in the
Federation cannot represent his or her entity because his or her background does not mirror that of the entity. The discrimination is even more pronounced for those that do not think of themselves as belonging to one of the three ethno-national communities (e.g. a Romi or a Jew) (Woodward 1999: 143). What about those individuals that have a mix background? Are they eligible for these positions or do they have to ignore their background and declare one ethnic identity in order to run for a position?

This apartheid-like system seems to point to two inherent problems with the constitution crafted at Dayton. First, as Zoran Pajić (1998: 135) points out, the constitution, though with many safeguards to ensure the protection of individual rights and freedoms, 'does not favor the protection of individuals in their own right.' He (1998: 136) notes that the 'Preoccupation with the rights of ethnic groups reflects the transition from communist to nationalist collectivism, where the despotism of one and only ruling party is replaced by the despotism of group (ethnic) interests.' Second, the constitution, while uniting the two entities under a new central state, gives a number of responsibilities and powers to the entities that sub-state units usually do not have. It seems that the constitution enables both the partition and the unification of the country.

Consequently, the constitution resembles a compromise between realism and humanitarianism (Kaldor 1999; and Kaplan 2000). The realities of the war and the ethno-national leaders' interest to secure their power were more important than the humanitarian provisions of the constitution. Also important was the American team's desire to achieve success at all costs, even if this meant that it had to moderate the influence of these humanitarian ideals, which supposedly were guiding the Clinton administration's foreign policy. Although the constitution is a product of this compromise it is important to note that many hoped that with time the humanitarian provisions would override the realist tenets and construct the multi-ethnic democratic Bosnia envisioned in the constitution's pre-amble. This is something that has yet to be seen, but the international community believes that the constitution is a legal mechanism that can be used to unify Bosnia in the long-term.

155
C. Territorial Issues

Before departing for Dayton, Holbrooke was asked by an American journalist to explain what he thought was going to be the toughest aspect of the peace talks. Holbrooke replied that the map was going to be the most contentious issue (USDS-D 1995). As Borden and Hedl (1996) maintain, 'constitutions are just paper, and agreements just promises. But maps are land – the core issue of the war.' In many ways, territorial questions were not only the toughest phase of the negotiations, but also the disagreement on the map of Bosnia nearly ruined the peace talks. Indeed, an agreement on this matter was not reached until the last day of the talks – hours before they were supposed to conclude.

If at the time of the cease-fire, signed of 5 October 1995, the Federation controlled 51.6 percent of the territory, and the RS the remaining 48.4 percent, why were the negotiations on the map so conflict-ridden? The problem was that the parties had to be ready to swap territory in order to ensure each entity’s viability. Negotiations concerning the map started in earnest on the thirteenth day. They were controlled by the American team and it was one of the areas Holbrooke dedicated most of his energies. A displeased European mediator told Borden and Hedl (1996): 'The Europeans did not play a role when it came to negotiations over the maps. Holbrooke didn’t want it. He wanted it all to himself.'

There were four major issues of contention.²¹ The first was Sarajevo. At the time of the negotiations, it was divided between the Federation and the RS. Both sides laid claim to the city and the Contact Group emphasised that a final peace agreement had to secure its unity. To settle the conflict, the American team proposed that Sarajevo become a sort of District of Columbia, where it would not be part of either entity, but be a neutral city, controlled by all groups. The Bosniaks objected to this idea and Milošević argued that implementing this would prove to be too complicated. As a result, Milošević told Holbrooke to forget about the ‘D.C. model’ and let him deal with the situation, providing that Holbrooke or any member of his team did not inform the Bosnian Serbs of what he

²¹ Holbrooke (1999: 272-73) mentions six issues in his memoirs. Two will not be discussed here. These are Bosanski Novi and the fate of Srebrenica and Żepa. The latter towns were symbols of ethnic cleansing and the Bosniaks had expressed their desire to re-acquire them at Dayton. Although the delegation pressed Milošević for the cities, he did not cede them. Both cities are currently in the RS. Like the other two, Bosanski Novi remained within the jurisdiction of the RS, though the Croat delegation had expressed its desire for it to return to the Federation. Both issues were mostly used for leverage during the negotiations.
was doing (Holbrooke 1998: 291). In the end, Milošević agreed to give up Sarajevo, including the suburb of Grbavica, a predominantly Bosnian Serb area. The rationale for this decision was either because he wanted to weaken the political position of the Bosnian Serb leadership, or because he had a respect for Izetbegović’s courage during the war. Milošević told Izetbegović: ‘You deserve Sarajevo. You were living in holes while you were being shelled by those in the hills’ (cited in Borden and Hedl 1996). Whichever the reason, Milošević’s decision to cede Sarajevo signalled his disposition to finish the negotiations and finalise an agreement.

The second issue was Goražde. The city had been surrounded by Bosnian Serb territory. The Bosniaks wanted to connect the city with the rest of the Federation. General Wesley Clark proposed a corridor, more commonly known as the “Scotch Road” or the “Clark Corridor.” After having a couple of drinks with some US negotiators, Milošević agreed to cede a small sliver of land, where a road could be built to connect Goražde with the rest of the Federation (Borden and Hedl 1996; and Holbrooke 1998: 285). In order to secure the approval of the Bosnian delegation, NATO agreed to build a new road between Goražde and the Federation (GFA 1995: Annex 1-A, Art. IV.2[c]).

The third issue of contention was the Posavina pocket, a small sliver of land on Croatia’s Eastern Slavonia border, which includes Zubak’s hometown. This became a thorny issue as the American team had pushed Milošević so far that he accidentally gave the Federation 55 percent of the territory. Once he realised what happened, he asked Holbrooke to change this. Even though the American team was tempted not to do so, it agreed to stick to the 49-51 principle, because they feared this would result in the failure of the talks.

Believing that Silajdžić would be more flexible, Holbrooke asked him to meet with Milošević to re-negotiate a new formula that gave the RS more territory. Once this effort produced the 49-51 calculus, Izetbegović was asked to comment on the Milošević-Silajdžić arrangement. Although he supported the agreement, the American negotiators noticed their mistake of not having included members of the Croat delegation in this matter. When Mate Granić, Croatian Foreign Minister, learned of the arrangement, he became extremely angry because Silajdžić had given territories liberated by the Croat
army (Bildt 1998: 152; and Holbrooke 1999: 300). Instead of ending the talks successfully, the omission of a Croat representative almost derailed the entire process.

Even though Tudjman was angry he was ready to concede some of that territory in exchange for the Posavina pocket. Milošević agreed, but for the 49-51 calculus to be achieved, the Bosniaks had to concede one percent of ‘theoretical territory’; that is to say territory that they had received in the negotiations, not territory that had been militarily acquired or defended during the war. After much deliberation and American threats to end the talks and publicly blame the Bosniaks for the failure of Dayton, the Bosniak delegation proposed to give up the one percent with the condition that Milošević cede to the Federation the town of Brčko. Subsequently, Brčko and its strategic position became the fourth issue of contention in this facet of the negotiations.

Another condition was not what Holbrooke wanted to hear, so he decided to send the delegations a memorandum, which stated that the talks had failed and that a press conference would be held at eleven o’clock in the morning of 21 November 1995 to announce it to the world (Holbrooke 1999: 304-06), while reminding the Bosniaks that the US would not arm them if war re-started. The next morning, Milošević met with Holbrooke and Christopher. Noticing that he would have to return to Belgrade without the lifting of the sanctions, Milošević agreed to a proposal made by Granic that stated that the status of Brčko should be left to an arbitration commission, which could decide if the disputed town should be part of the RS or the Federation after the signing of the agreement (Borden and Hedl 1996).22 Tudjman agreed with Milošević’s offer. Holbrooke and Christopher then went to meet with Izetbegović, who under a lot of American pressure accepted the proposal, but he still emphasized that the agreement was not ‘a just peace’ (Cited in Holbrooke 1999: 309).

D. The Debate on Military and Civilian Implementation

Since the Clinton administration started to craft its peacemaking strategy, the administration envisioned a peacemaking process that would be completely directed by the US. American influence affected the nature and the mandate of the military and civilian aspects of the implementation provisions of the peace agreement. As Daalder

22 For more on the details of the arbitration, refer to: Annex 2, Art.V.
shows (2000: 144), two perspectives dominated this debate. First, the UN had to be sidelined. It should not play a leading role in the implementation of a peace agreement as it had previously enjoyed in Haiti or Somalia. While much of the Clinton administration’s position against the UN resulted from its debate with UN Secretary General Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali’s decision to limit the use of force against Bosnian Serb position in May 1995 and then in August 1995, another factor was the US Congress’s strong discontent with Boutrous-Ghali’s resistance to reform the UN according to American interests. For these reasons, officials in the Clinton administration, who feared that UN involvement could affect NATO’s mission, were also concerned that UN involvement could create more problems between the White House and Congress (Daalder 2000: 154).

Second, the Clinton administration, heavily influenced by the military establishment, wanted to limit the military mission to the separation of the forces and to establish a balance of power in Bosnia that prevented the war from re-starting. As a result, military commanders argued that negotiators needed to craft an agreement that clearly stated the mission’s objectives. In return, the military would provide a clear timetable to achieve these objectives, setting a clear exit date and a strategy to remove the troops out of Bosnia. As stated before, for this to materialise, senior military advisers wanted to make sure that the UN or any civilian body would not interfere with the military aspects of peace implementation. The US military asked for ‘A single chain of military command [that] lead from soldier on the ground to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General George Joulwan, who would report to North Atlantic Council only’ (Daalder 2000: 154).

This did no sit well with the Europeans. They envisioned a strong role for the UN, arguing that the UN’s experience in peacebuilding would play an important role in translating the peace agreement’s provisions into reality. After lengthy negotiations between the European and American members of the Contact Group, US officials agreed to a compromise that gave the UN a degree of power in the peacebuilding process, while creating a series of ad hoc bodies, supported by a web of regional, international, non-governmental organisations, to implement the civilian aspects of the peace agreement.

The UN would have a major role in the creation of an International Police Task Force (IPTF). The IPTF would basically ‘police the police’ forces of each entity
In this way, it would advise law enforcement agencies, train law enforcement personnel, facilitate the entities' 'law enforcement activities,' and assist 'the law enforcement personnel as they carry out their responsibilities' (GFA 1995: Annex 11, Art.III.1[a-g]). In addition to the IPTF, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was given the responsibility to design and implement, with the consultation of 'asylum countries and the Parties,' 'a repatriation plan that would allow for an early, peaceful, orderly and phased return of refugees and displaced persons...' to their homes (GFA 1995: Annex 7, Art.1.5). In both cases, the US team accepted a role for the UN due to its experience in these two areas.

If the UN was not heading civilian implementation, like it had done in previous situations, then what organisation was responsible for the overall implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace agreement? According to Annex 10 of the peace agreement, a High Representative would be responsible for these efforts. This is truly one of the most interesting aspects of the GFA. The High Representative’s mission, though authorised by a UN Security Council Resolution, is not responsible to the UN, but to an ad hoc body called the Peace Implementation Council.

Once the US informed the Europeans that the EU had to be ready to finance most of Bosnia’s reconstruction projects, the EU’s Council of Ministers instructed European negotiators to make sure that the High Representative was a European (Neville-Jones 1996-97: 50). In mid-October, Europeans negotiators informed Holbrooke that they had decided that Bildt would be the High Representative. Holbrooke (1999: 209) agreed, stating that: ‘To do otherwise would have opened a wide breach within the Contact Group.’ Interestingly, Holbrooke failed to inform Robert Gallucci, who drafted Annex 10’s first version, of his decision.

Believing that the High Representative was going to be an American, Gallucci originally drafted a strong mandate for the High Representative. He shared his draft with members of the Contact Group a couple of days prior to the start of the peace talks and received their strong support for his plan. When Gallucci learned that Holbrooke had already agreed to Bildt’s nomination, he and other individuals of the American team started to re-write the proposal in order to restrict the High Representative’s authority and responsibilities. The rationale behind this decision was the Clinton administration’s fear...
that 'a powerful person whom Washington could not control might fumble the
implementation effort or, worse still, interfere with the military effort' (Daalder 2000:
157). Consequently, the High Representative was provided little power. While he did
have the authority to monitor the agreement’s implementation and play an important role
in creating the conditions for elections to take place, the High Representative had no

Although the powers and responsibilities of the High Representative will be
discussed in more detail in the next chapters, it is important to emphasise that the debate
over the High Representative’s authority and his role in post-settlement Bosnia clearly
demonstrates the different perspectives European and American negotiators held. ‘For the
US, [the peacebuilding mission] was a military operation with some form of civilian
annexe, while the Europeans tended to see it the other way round, with the political issues
and perspectives in the centre, and the military measures supportive within this
framework’ (Bildt 1998: 131). Even European military leaders agreed with their civilian
counterparts that a viable peace was only possible, if the military aspects of the peace
agreement would support the civilian aspects. Although European military advisors met
with their American counterparts, they failed to convince the American team about the
need to strengthen the High Representative’s mandate (Bildt 1998: 132).

Consequently, the US perspective directly influenced the peace negotiations. The
GFA’s military provisions are extremely detailed, clearly explaining NATO’s
Implementation Force’s (IFOR) powers and the responsibility. The object was to create a
balance of military power that could deter each entity’s military forces from re-starting
the war. In order to achieve this objective, the US had proposed to ‘equip and train’ the
Federation’s forces. Although Izetbegović had expressed his interest in this programme,
serving as an incentive to sign the peace agreement, the allies believed that this was a bad
idea (Holbrooke 1999: 277).

The debate in the White House was even more pronounced. Like the allies, the
military leadership believed that equipping and training the Federation’s forces would
only heighten the situation. As a result, military advisors lobbied for the reduction of
armaments levels. This ‘build-down,’ as the Clinton administration called it, would not
only de-mobilise each entity’s militaries, but also provide a mechanism to weaken the
entities' war-making capabilities (Holbrooke 1999: 277). Clinton's position, which was heavily influenced by the views of Senators Robert Dole (MR-R), Joseph Lieberman (CT-D), and Joseph Bieden (DE-D), supported the 'equip and train' programme on the basis that the Federation's forces lacked heavy weaponry. With their virtual monopoly of heavy weapons, it was feared that a re-ignition of hostilities would permit the Bosnian Serbs to quickly overrun Federation positions. After all, many in the Clinton administration believed that many of the Federation's military gains were achieved with the assistance of the Croatian military. Arming and training Federation forces was the best chance to achieve a lasting peace on the ground.

Facing increased allied opposition to the plan, the White House reached a compromise. It would support both the ‘build-down’ of armament levels in Bosnia and the ‘equip and train’ programme. The latter was not part of the agreement. Instead it became a bilateral agreement between the Federation and the Clinton administration (Woodward 1999: 147). If the parties did not meet the provisions of the ‘build down’ initiative, which are described in detail in Annex 1-B of the GFA, then the US would increase its support for the Federation forces. If the reverse took place, the US would decrease the amount of equipment and training offered to the Federation (Holbrooke 1999: 278).

Annex 1-B also included other confidence-building measures in order to reduce the level of tensions between the Federation’s forces and the Army of Republika Sprska. The OSCE was given an important role ‘to enhance mutual confidence and reduce the risk of conflict, drawing fully upon the 1994 Vienna Document of the Negotiation on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures of the OCSE’ (GFA 1995: Annex 1-B, Art.II). For instance, the OSCE would assist the parties to establish military liaison missions between the leadership of both entities’ militaries. The OSCE would also ask the entities to identify armament manufacturing sites, to notify all concerned parties of all military activities, and to de-mobilise each side’s military (GFA 1995: Annex 1-B, Art.II.[a-I]).

Annex 1-A of the peace agreement sets out in much detail the mandate of IFOR and clearly spells out the entities’ responsibility and obligations regarding this operation. In essence, IFOR would have control of all military matters within Bosnia (GFA 1995: 162).
Annex 1-A, Art.VI.5). It would be present in both entities and it would have the authority to employ all necessary means, including the use of force, against those that threaten IFOR troops (GFA: Annex 1-A, Art. IV.4.[b]). IFOR would also be responsible for the supervision of the ‘Agreed Cease-Fire Line and its Zone of Separation, and the Inter-Entity Boundary Line and its Zone of Separation’ (GFA 1995: Annex 1-A, Art. IV.4.[c]) and for the de-mobilisation of each entity’s troop levels. In addition, IFOR was ordered by the North Atlantic Council (NAC): (a) to secure the movement of organisations conducting humanitarian work; (b) to assist UN High Commission for Refugees and its humanitarian mission; (c) to help create the conditions for free and fair elections; (d) to prevent the interference against the movement of refugees, displaced peoples, and civilian populations; and (e) to monitor the clearance of mines and other obstacles that may hamper the freedom of movement (e.g. checkpoints) (GFA 1995: Annex 1-A, Art. VI.3.[a-e]).

In order to further bolster his authority, the IFOR commander was ordered to create a Joint Military Commission (JMC). This military commission was not only supposed to increase co-operation between the IFOR commander and each entity’s military leaders, but it would also serve as a mechanism to carry out the IFOR commander’s decisions. The JMC would also include civilian personnel. The High Representative was authorised to attend its meetings and provide advice on politico-military matters (GFA 1995: Annex 1-A, Art.VIII). It is important to add that the IFOR commander was given the authority to implement this body’s decisions via all necessary means.

Although the NAC had the sole authority to give IFOR further duties and responsibilities to implement the military provisions of the peace agreement (GFA: Annex 1-A, Art. VI.4), the IFOR commander was given the power to be the final interpreter of these provisions (GFA 1995: Annex 1-A, Art. XII). This clause was important because it gave the IFOR commander the authority to decide when and what to do in cases the civilian and the military aspects of the peace agreement’s implementation became blurred. This clause satisfied the interests of maximalists and minimalists alike. The former argued that the IFOR Commander and the High Representative could work together to achieve a self-sustaining peace that secured the unity of Bosnia as a multi-
ethnic democracy. The latter argued that this would enable IFOR to prevent 'mission creep' and dedicate its energies to military matters, ignoring possible problems arising from the implementation of the agreement's civilian provisions. Under this provision, for instance, the IFOR commander could decide if to arrest or not those that had been indicted by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

US military advisors argued that the implementation of the military aspects of the peace agreement could be achieved in 12 months. The Clinton administration strongly argued that IFOR would start to withdraw no later than in December 1996. Although Holbrooke feared that this decision could weaken the implementation process, the Clinton administration had to agree to the one-year limit because Democratic and Republican senators strongly voiced their concerns to send troops without a clear exit strategy (Holbrooke 1999: 210-11). Even more important, 70 per cent of Americans were strongly opposed to the deployment of American troops in Bosnia. It is important to remember that the operation was to take place in the background of US presidential elections (Holbrooke 1999: 219).

The High Representative's mandate was expected to last until Bosnia's state institutions started to operate after the country's first elections. The agreement also stipulated that the High Representative would also participate in meetings regarding the economic reconstruction of the Bosnian economy. The World Bank, the European Union, other international financial institutions, and several nation-states earmarked $5 billion to achieve the rehabilitation and economic reconstruction of Bosnia. This sum of money would be allotted to Bosnia during a five-year period (Holbrooke 1999: 258). While it seems that the intention was to have the High Representative end its mission shortly after IFOR's exit, it was also argued that the High Representative had to assist the international donor community to disperse these funds. In this way, the peace agreement was not clear about the length of the High Representative's mandate.

The High Representative received its orders from the Peace Implementation Council and the Contact Group. He is also the final interpreter of the peace agreement's civilian provisions. Although there are some similarities between the IFOR commander and the High Representative, the main difference between these two individuals was that the IFOR commander had more power than the High Representative. Not only because
IFOR had more resources than the High Representative at his disposal, but because the military provisions of the agreement were clearly spelled out in the peace agreement. The High Representative's mandate was ambiguous. This ambiguity resulted from the combination of the American view of the peace process, which argued that it was primarily a military mission supported by civilian personnel, and the European view that it was the other way around.

In the end, the debate on the implementation of civilian and military provisions reflect American national interests. While it is true that the Europeans did influence these provisions, the provisions seem to confirm the American team's view of the peace process. More important, the wording of the provisions represents a compromise between minimalists and maximalists within the Clinton administration and the Contact Group. Was the international community supposed to conduct an expanded peacebuilding mission or a limited one? The answer to this important question was to be provided by the IFOR commander, the NAC, the High Representative and the Peace Implementation Council. These bodies would determine the nature of peace implementation once the agreement was signed.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
After 21 days of gruelling negotiations, the parties initialled the GFA. After Dayton, Milošević, Izetbegović, and Tudjman left for their respective countries and started to justify to their respective publics why they supported this peace agreement. For Milošević, the problem was getting the signatures of the Bosnian Serbs, who expressed their dismay once they learned of what he had negotiated on their behalf. During the peace talks, Milošević kept the Bosnian Serbs members of his delegation in the dark. He knew that they would not have ceded their territorial acquisitions. They could potentially derail the negotiations and cost Milošević his prize for co-operating with the Contact Group: the lifting of economic sanctions. Although Karadžić strongly disapproved with the provisions of the initialled agreement, Milošević coerced him to sign it.

For Tudjman, the negotiations had assured him Eastern Slavonia, while securing Croatia's geo-strategic position in the region by creating a stronger Federation and a weak Bosnian government. Tudjman had always believed that Bosnia was a mere fiction,
but his co-operation guaranteed him a special place within the Western alliance. Even though Tudjman had committed as many crimes against humanity as the Bosnian Serb and Serb leaderships, the West, especially the US, looked the other way and permitted him to ethnically cleanse the Krajina. If Tudjman faced any problems, it was to get the support of some Bosnian Croats that were angered with his decision to exchange the Posavina, which had a large Bosnian Croat population before the war, for Eastern Slavonia and for his support to permit the dissolution of Herceg-Bosna’s structures. Like Milošević, Tudjman forced the Bosnian Croats to sign the agreement.

For Izetbegović, the war was finally over, but the peace was not the just peace he wanted to achieve at Dayton. Although the Bosniaks secured the US sponsored ‘equip and train’ programme and Clinton’s commitment to prevent the partition of Bosnia, the peace agreement’s seemingly division of Bosnia created much anger within the Bosnian delegation. Some members repeatedly stated throughout the talks that the delegation should purposely derail the talks in order to open a new round of negotiations in Europe, sponsored by the European members of the Contact Group, where they could get a more comprehensive peace accord. Izetbegović seemed to support this position until it became evident that the US would blame him and the delegation he headed for the failure of the Dayton initiative, thus pushing the American to cut all economic and military aid to the Bosniaks. In many ways, Izetbegović signed the negotiated agreement as a way to secure the gains attained at Dayton, but within the delegation there was hope that the peace agreement could be modified in the future to address issues that threatened the sovereignty and integrity of Bosnia.

For the Contact Group, while the Europeans and Americans did disagree on many issues, the Europeans endorsed the peace agreement, arguing that it reflected European principles and proposals that actually built on previous European sponsored peace plans. Indeed, the French government, which hosted the signing ceremonies, strongly maintained that the agreement also reflected the European Union’s commitment for peace in the region (Holbrooke 1999: 318). More important, the European members of the Contact Group, though loosing their battle on the role of the OSCE, did make sure that a European would head the Office of the High Representative and direct the process of civilian implementation. Moreover, the vagueness of the peace agreement supported the
maximalist peacebuilding strategy favoured by the European members of the Contact Group.

While the Contact Group’s European members and the Russian government, could claim credit for the success of the peace talks, the final agreement is a product of American diplomacy and military prowess. Based heavily on the strategic approach to peacemaking, the American negotiation team tactically structured the talks according to its interests and needs. Consequently, the nature of the process and the wording of the peace agreement reflects the interplay between three variables: domestic constraints the Clinton administration faced, especially the Republican opposition in the Congress; the division within the administration (maximalists v. minimalists); and Clinton’s vision of a united and democratic Europe, which included an expanded role for NATO and an active OSCE.

It is important to notice that this list of variables does not include the parties’ needs or interests. Indeed, the losers are the individuals that lived in Bosnia and those that lived as refugees throughout the world. A review of the GFA’s constitution provisions’ suggests that multi-ethnicity and democracy were just rhetoric, as the document had virtually introduced an apartheid-like system, fuelling the nationalist parties’ non-inclusive agenda. Even more critical and due to America’s insistence of sticking to the strategic approach, the participants of the negotiations were the leaders responsible for the war. The peace process sidelined those individuals that campaigned against the war and wanted to build a Bosnia modelled on democratic and multi-ethnic values (Udovički and Štikovac 1997: 199). Would the inclusion of moderate voices arguing for the creation of a multi-ethnic democratic order have produced another peace agreement?

More interestingly, and supporting the claim that the peace agreement resembles a sort of pax americana, is that the ‘authentic’ interpretation of the agreement rests solely in the hands of the IFOR commander and the High Representative. As Gaeta (1996: 157) notes, most agreements of this nature are supposed to be interpreted by the signatories to the agreement. The international community clearly intended to control the peace implementation process to prevent the re-occurrence of the armed conflict. However, the fact that the parties do not have the ‘authentic’ right to interpret the agreement only underscores the fact that the agreement is a product of the strategic approach to
peacemaking. Hence, the process in itself has been undemocratic and more crucially the agreement strips individuals in Bosnia from re-fashioning the peacebuilding process so it can fit their needs and interests.

While there is no doubt that the initialling and signing of the GFA started a new chapter in Bosnia’s recent history, several questions surfaced in the first year of peace implementation. Did the new established social order face the same challenges Bosnia faced before the outbreak of hostilities: nationalist forces dominating the political agenda and carving Bosnia according to their self-interest? Would the international community allow this to happen once again, especially after it devoted so much time and resources to secure the peace agreement’s viability? Or, could the international community, via the GFA, actually solve Bosnia’s problems by directly addressing the causes that led the parties to war in 1992? All these questions will be answered in the next two chapters’ review of the work of the Office of the High Representative’s and its peacebuilding strategy.
CHAPTER SIX

From Military to Civilian Conceptions of Peacebuilding: The Rise of the Office of the High Representative

INTRODUCTION
While the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFA) seemed to introduce a new social order in Bosnia, it did not fix the problems inherent in the old system. In fact, post-Dayton Bosnia is very similar to Bosnia in 1990-92. The problem of communitarian politics still persists. Bosnia’s state institutions are weak. Corruption is rampant. The nationalist parties, which overwhelmingly won the first post-Dayton elections, are still undermining the peace process, though their ability to achieve their goals has been recently challenged by international community’s peacebuilding strategy.

A factor questioning the GFA’s validity is the high level of social distance among the individuals of each ethno-national group and the marginalisation of Bosnian citizens in the peacebuilding process. In all, Bosnia’s peace process is enormously dependent on the international community’s willingness to keep NATO’s presence and maintain high levels of economic and political assistance (Daalder and Froman 1999: 106; and ICG 1999). Hence, the political system crafted at Dayton works because the international community, through the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and other international bodies, has bullied the parties to ensure that the system operates.

In some ways, the GFA has failed. It has not introduced the self-sustaining peace the Contact Group members envisioned. Many leaders in the international community accept that the peace agreement’s implementation has not been conducted as swiftly as originally imagined. In an open letter to Bosnia’s citizens, the current High Representative, Wolfgang Petritsch, expressed his dissatisfaction with the process and has proposed to radicalise the strategy in order to achieve the objectives set out at Dayton (OHR-PS 1999). Since May 1997, the international community has decided to grant more power to the High Representative, so he can institute a state-building strategy that can
create a viable Bosnian state. By creating a strong state, the international community expects that its institutions can take ownership of the implementation process, address the country's many domestic challenges, reform the economy and integrate Bosnian society. Therefore, the international community is trying to weaken the communitarian nature of Bosnian politics.

The previous two chapters have delineated the main features of the peacemaking efforts that produced the GFA. Chapter three demonstrated how Woodward's 'false humanitarianism' constructed a response to Bosnia that furthered American interests. Chapter four re-emphasised this reality by showing how the US negotiators relied on the insights of the strategic approach to peacemaking to set the foundations of a peace agreement that not only favoured American national interests, but more important it created a political system that is not representative of the needs and interests Bosnia's citizens.

This chapter continues to show the strength of this claim, highlighting how the international community has had to assume further responsibility over the peace implementation process. The Contact Group's over-reliance on the strategic approach forced it to legitimate the nationalist parties that organised and conducted the war effort. Without their approval, the international community faced even greater challenges in its resolve to settle the war, forcing it to re-adjust its peacebuilding strategy.

Surprisingly, academics and practitioners have devoted little attention to the OHR's role in Bosnia. This gap in the literature is baffling, as the mandate and the actions taken by this organisation have been controversial. Because it is generally accepted that a bold state-building strategy may be the best hope to achieve the objectives set out at Dayton, it seems that the success or failure of current peace implementation efforts in the region rests, in part, on the shoulders of the High Representative and his organisation's ability to monitor and implement the GFA's civilian provisions.

This analysis is in two chapters. The objective of this chapter is twofold. First it explains the structure created by the international community to start the implementation of the GFA's civilian provisions. Second, it shows the reasons why the international community started to change its peace implementation strategy. Instead of being a military mission supported by civilian organisations, the peace implementation strategy
was transformed into a civilian mission backed by NATO forces in order to pursue maximalist goals. Why did this shift in strategy take place? It was motivated by the many challenges the international community faced during Carl Bildt's tenure as High Representative. Thus, part two of this chapter offers a detailed analysis of Bildt's work in Bosnia.

The next chapter continues this analysis, but it mostly explains the reasons behind the international community's decision to strengthen the mandate of the OHR and actively craft a state-building programme to integrate Bosnian society according to European standards. As a result, this chapter explains the rise of the OHR, while chapter seven assess the impact the OHR has had on the integration of Bosnian society, the implementation of the GFA's civilian provisions, and the possibility of instituting a self-sustaining peace in this war-torn country.

I. CIVILIAN PEACE IMPLEMENTING BODIES

The OHR is one of the most unique features of the GFA. Having decided to not authorise the United Nations as the lead organisation in the post-settlement peacebuilding phase, the Contact Group decided to create an *ad hoc* body that would direct civilian implementation efforts. While the United Nations' Security Council was asked to pass a resolution supporting the work of the High Representative, this position was to be nominated by another *ad hoc* body created for the purposes of carrying out the GFA's many provisions.

Created on 8 December 1995 in London, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) is an informal body that meets regularly to address issues concerning the GFA's implementation. Because it was created to take over the work of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), the PIC is composed of all the countries, international organisations, and agencies that attended the ICFY (OHR-D 1995: par. 21). It meets at the ministerial level. Apart from discussing issues related to the execution of the GFA, the PIC 'acts only through the mandates of its members. Once decisions have been reached, the organisation must then request the UN Security Council, the North Atlantic Council, the OSCE, World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other international institutions 'to agree to proposals for involvement' (Chandler 1999: 55-56).
The PIC is basically a “talk-shop”, as it cannot take any decisions without the support of the main international organs directing the overall implementation process.

The PIC also includes a Steering Board, which serves as the PIC’s executive arm. It meets on a regular basis at the level of political directors, though once a year the Steering Board meets at the ministerial level. The High Representative chairs its meetings. Its main functions are to offer the High Representative 'political guidance on peace implementation' and identify problems that the PIC and other international institutions must tackle in order to fully execute the provisions of the peace agreement. Apart from the High Representative, the Steering Board includes a representative from the following countries and organisations: the US, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Germany, Italy, Russia, Turkey – representing the Organisation of Islamic Countries, the European Union’s Presidency, and the European Commission. Depending on the issues being discussed in its monthly meetings, the Steering Board also invites concerned parties or institutions to its meetings. The OSCE and the UN, while not formal members of the Steering Board, are authorised to attend all meetings (OHR-D 1995: par. 21).

The PIC also elects the High Representative. As deemed necessary in Annex 10 of the GFA, a UN Security Council Resolution subsequently authorises the PIC’s decisions (GFA 1995: Annex 10, Art.1.2). The functions of the High Representative are the following: (a) to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement; (b) to certify that the parties completely comply with civilian aspects of the peace agreement; (c) to co-ordinate the activities of international and regional institutions in Bosnia in order to make sure that the civilian aspects of the peace agreement are implemented efficiently; (d) to 'facilitate... the resolution of any difficulties arising in connection with civilian implementation'; (e) to participate in meetings of international donor institutions; (f) to periodically report the progress of the implementation of the GFA to the UN, EU, US, Russian and other interested organizations and governments; and (g) to offer guidance and ‘receive reports’ of the Commissioner of the UN’s International Police Task Force (GFA 1995: Annex 10, Art.II.1[a-g]).

In addition to these functions, the High Representative also chaired the Joint Interim Commission and the Joint Civilian Commission. Both Commissions, which
included representatives from the Federation and Republika Srpska (RS), the IFOR commander and other representatives from other international and regional organizations, were transitory bodies that were replaced after the state institutions were established following the country's first elections. Their function was to establish communication networks and problem-solving mechanism, so their members could exchange ideas and inform each other of the progress or challenges the peace agreement’s implementation faced in the first months (Chandler 1999: 61-62).

At the request of the US, Annex 10 clearly maintains that the High Representative has ‘no authority over the IFOR’ and he cannot in ‘any way interfere in the conduct of military operations or the IFOR chain of command’ (GFA 1995: Annex 10, Art.II.9). In order to assure the highest level of co-operation between the IFOR commander and the High Representative, the agreement authorises these two individuals to create the necessary liaison arrangements ‘to facilitate the discharge of their respective responsibilities’ (GFA 1995: Annex 10, Art.II.5). The agreement also stipulates that the High Representative is a member of the Joint Military Commission and provides counsel on political-military matters to NATO forces in Bosnia (GFA 1995: Annex 10, Art.II.7).

The peace agreement does not specify how the OHR should be organise or how to fund its activities. While the High Representative has the authority to appoint his personnel, as he deems necessary (GFA 1995: Annex 10, Art.III.1), other crucial issues, such as the mechanisms to fund the OHR, are determined by the PIC. The GFA also specifies that the OHR is a diplomatic mission, treated as such by the contracting parties. Accordingly, the High Representative and the professional members of his ‘staff and their families [have the] same privileges and immunities as are enjoyed by diplomatic agents and their families...’ (GFA 1995: Annex 10, Art.III.4[a-b]). This is an important provision because it highlights that the OHR and the High Representative, like other diplomatic missions in Sarajevo, are working on behalf of the international community’s interests and not necessarily those of Bosnia’s citizens. Reinforcing this reality is Article V of Annex 10 that states that the ‘High Representative is the final authority in the theatre regarding interpretation of this Agreement on the civilian implementation of the peace

23 Also see: Art.II.6, which calls the High Representative and IFOR commander to exchange information on matters of concern (GFA 1995).
settlement' (GFA 1995). Consequently, the final interpretation of the peace agreement is not in the hands of the contracting parties, but on two individuals, and their organisations, that represent the international community, more specifically the trans-Atlantic alliance (Gaeta 1996).24

Originally, the High Representative’s mandate was for a year. It was expected that once the Bosnia’s new state institutions started operating, the Office of the High Representative could start to be disbanded (Chandler 2000: 273). It is important to mention that the international community believed that the negotiated peace agreement had established the foundations of a self-sustaining peace. Once it noticed that this was not the case, the PIC has allowed the OHR to expand its services and has allotted the High Representative more power to enhance his mandate in order to secure the full implementation of the peace agreement’s civilian provisions. Thus, post-Dayton challenges forced the international community, including the Clinton administration, to support a stronger High Representative.

While post-Dayton events demonstrated the need of a stronger mandate for the High Representative, Bildt had initially secured an important source of power in the first PIC meeting of 8-9 December 1995, a year before the international community started to accept the GFA’s inherent weaknesses. Due to the PIC’s structure, this body’s most powerful organ is the Steering Board. Bildt’s insistence that the High Representative chair the Steering Board was not a mere symbolic act to re-emphasise the importance of the High Representative. Instead, the High Representative’s ability to control the Steering Board’s agenda and demonstrate the important issues the PIC has to address in its meetings enable the High Representative to directly influence the PIC’s decision-making process. This is not to say that the High Representative has always obtained what he wants, but it has assured him an important role in shaping the nature and objectives of the peacebuilding strategy. While the subsequent strengthening of the High Representative’s mandate was not only a by-product of post-Dayton challenges in Bosnia, it was also an

24 Bertram (1995: 394) argues that to interpret agreements is in itself a source of political power. Her survey of nine UN peacebuilding missions demonstrates that one of the impediments to peace rests with the parties’ ability to re-interpret the provisions of a negotiated peace settlement so it can enhance their own particular agendas. The High Representative’s and the IFOR commander’s power to be the final interpreter of the GFA shows the international community’s intent to minimize bickering between the parties in order to secure their co-operation and the full implementation of the agreement.
objective that was being supported by maximalists, such as Bildt, since the position of the High Representative was proposed by the French government in the North Atlantic Council in late September 1995.

II. THE CONSOLIDATION OF POLITICAL & ECONOMIC POWER

The GFA proposed a confusing peacebuilding mission. For the Clinton administration, it was purely a military mission complemented by a civilian element that would work with the parties to establish a process that provided legitimacy to the peace agreement. For the Europeans, on the other hand, the mission was primarily a civilian undertaking, supported by the military. Thus, the latter view envisioned a process where the IFOR commander and the High Representative would co-operate in order to create the multi-ethnic democratic society captured in the *spirit* of the peace agreement. Which interpretation was most accurate?

The vagueness of the GFA gave credence to both interpretations. Supporting his preference for the latter interpretation, Bildt (1995a) argued at the first PIC meeting that:

> While military implementation is the key to stopping the war, it is civilian and political implementation that is the key to building a genuine peace. If the first were to succeed and the latter to fail, we would have achieved little more than the division of Bosnia, and we could be certain that the war was to restart sooner or later.

Bildt believed that the OHR had to do more than just monitor and provide political direction to the implementation of the GFA’s civilian components. It was necessary for the OHR to actively promote inter-ethnic reconciliation. Without reconciliation, he strongly argued that a ‘true peace’ would not be possible, Bosnia would remain divided and at risk of renewed hostilities (1995b). Although Bildt did not present a clear reconciliatory strategy, he pointed to how France and Germany put their historical differences aside in order to build a common future within the process of European economic and political integration (1995b).

Bildt was therefore convinced that co-operation between the leaders of each community in the Joint Interim Commission, the Joint Civilian Commission, and Bosnia’s state institutions could assist the process of reconciliation. Other mechanisms
that could assist this process were: (a) the holding of free and fair elections; (b) the promotion and protection of human rights, including the right of refugees and internally displaced persons to return to their homes: (c) the prosecution of war criminals, and (d) the re-construction of Bosnia’s war-torn economy (1995a). In his view, the OHR and the international community had the responsibility to provide economic and political incentives to assure that these four objectives were met. But, to achieve these, the OHR would not only require diplomatic support, but also the international community’s financial backing.

Bildt’s plea for financial resources set the tone for the first year of the peacebuilding mission. The PIC’s first meeting did not address this issue. For this reason, Bildt met with UN Secretary General Boutrouss Boutrouss-Ghali to see if he and his staff could use some of the UN’s resources until the PIC created the mechanisms to fund the OHR’s activities (Bildt 1998: 166). Even though the OHR is not under the UN system’s direct authority, it provided some support to Bildt and his staff. However, Bildt was told that UNPROFOR’s financial resources, assets, and office hardware were off-limits, as these were already designated to the IFOR commander (Bildt 1998: 172).

Without any resources, Bildt and his staff of five Professionals faced many obstacles to make ends meet. The Swedish Embassy lent him a car. For the first weeks, most communication was handle via Bildt’s personal mobile phone (Holbrooke 1999: 324). ‘[S]ince NATO had occupied [Sarajevo’s] few hotels [Bildt and his staff] had to sleep on the sofas and floors of the [Swedish] ambassador’s tiny apartment’ (Bildt 1998: 172). To make matters worse, the US and other countries were ignoring Bildt’s calls for financial support. ‘They all demanded a budget approved by the Steering Board and some influence over personnel decisions before they made any funds available’ (1998: 173).

This condition had been pressed by the Clinton administration, as Bildt informed the Contact Group that Jack Covey, who was in charge of the US consulate in Berlin, was not be appointed to the OHR’s number two position. While Covey had experience in conflict management, Bildt argued that he preferred Michael Steiner, the German diplomat that negotiated the Federation agreement at Dayton, for this position (Bildt 1997: 166-67). Although the US was angered by this decision, it could not do much as the GFA clearly states that: ‘The High Representative shall appoint staff, as he or she
deems necessary, to provide assistance in carrying out the tasks herein’ (GFA 1995: Annex 10, Art.III.1). The Clinton administration, which was obsessed with the GFA’s military provisions, worked hard to directly influence the work of the OHR by either appointing the organisation’s number two or by limiting its resource base, so it could not interfere with IFOR’s military mission. It is important to mention that Covey did become a member of the OHR, but he was not the Principal Deputy High Representative.

Ironically, each ethno-national grouping’s leaders did not present Bildt’s first obstacle. Instead, the conflict between the American vision and Europeans’ understanding of peace implementation hampered the first weeks of the civilian mission. It is not surprising that the OHR’s initial funding was provided by the European Union. The EU provided 300,000 German marks. With this money, Bildt was able to lease office space close to the Presidency Building.\(^\text{25}\) Having found an office, Bildt started to determine the OHR’s priorities for his tenure.

It is important to underscore that the OHR’s mandate was not only vague, but that it also had to work on more issues than those addressed by the IFOR commander. Military officials in the Clinton administration started to criticise the OHR in mid-January 1996 for not implementing important provision of the peace agreement (Sells 2000: 185). Not only did this anger Bildt, but also it complicated matters for the OHR. While IFOR had the resources to impose its will on the parties, Bildt lacked these resources or the mechanisms to force the parties to implement the peace agreement’s civilian provisions. The Clinton administration and the US military’s criticism of the OHR undermined its authority. In fact, the OHR and the IFOR commander, Admiral Leighton Smith, sometimes contradicted each other on important issues. These differences had a negative impact on the execution of the agreement’s civilian elements. While this conflicting relationship can be blamed for many developments that unfolded during the first year of peace implementation, most of the blame rests with the Contact Group and the United States’ over emphasis on the use of the strategic approach to peacemaking.

\(^{25}\) The rented office space was less than desirable, but it was the only thing that Bildt could afford at the time. He recalls in his memoirs that they needed to work with overcoats and gloves, as the building did not have any central heating. To make matters worse, the walls were full of bullet holes (Bildt, 1998: 173-174).
For instance, the Clinton administration's stressed that IFOR's mission should only last for a year. This idea deterred the parties from working with Bildt in the Joint Interim Commission and the Joint Civilian Commission or from amending the entities' constitutions so these were in line with the country's constitution, created at Dayton. This and other examples would be furthered discussed in the following sections, which detail the challenges the OHR faced during Bildt's tenure as High Representative from January 1996 to June 1997.

A. The Unification of Sarajevo
Remembering that Bildt believed that the OHR's mission had to bring the leaders of each ethno-national community together in order to integrate Bosnia, he informed his staff that Sarajevo was going to be the OHR's first priority (Bildt 1997: 175). The peace agreement stipulated that Sarajevo was to be Bosnia's capital city and be located within the Federation's jurisdiction. This meant that parts of the city under the RS's control had to be transferred to the Federation. According to the peace agreement, the transition had to be completed forty-five days 'after the Transfer of Authority from the UNPROFOR Commander to the IFOR Commander' (GFA 1995: Annex 2, Art. VI), thus the transfer process had to start by 3 February 1996. The 'exchange of civilian authority, including the police, was not due until' ninety days after IFOR Commander took control of the military mission (Bildt 1998: 180).

After meeting with leaders of the Bosnian Serb community in Sarajevo, Bildt started to realise that this transfer of territory and power could turn violent. While Milošević was ready to give up Sarajevo at the peace talks, the Bosnian Serb leadership in Pale expressed their disapproval with his decision. It argued that if Bosnian Serbs could not rule their city, they should be encouraged to move to the RS (OHR-R 1996d).

Fearing the reprisal of Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats and without any assurances that this would not occur, some Bosnian Serb leaders told Bildt that he should delay the transfer of the territory for one year or secure 'international financial support to build a new, Serbian Sarajevo, just across the Dayton boundary line' (Sells 2000: 186). While Bildt decided to dismiss these proposals, as they countered the GFA's promise of tolerance and multi-ethnicity and they undermined the agreement's provisions, he
promised Bosnian Serb leaders in Sarajevo and Pale that the OHR would work hard to create the proper measures to protect the rights and property of Serbs living in Sarajevo, while building a number of political mechanisms that assured them a role in the administration of these suburbs (Bildt 1998: 175-76).

After a lengthy process, the OHR and the concerned parties concluded an agreement that secured the unity and multi-ethnic character of Sarajevo. Its provisions granted the Bosnian Serb community four important measures. First, the agreement gave its political leaders a role in the administration of these neighbourhoods, while allowing the existing local assemblies to continue their work until the holding of local elections. Second, it guaranteed the Bosnian Serbs’ right to use the ‘Serb language and Cyrillic alphabet in local administration’ (Sells 2000: 190). Third, they were granted the right to use a Serbian curriculum in local schools. Lastly, it included a controversial provision that argued that although the territories would be under the jurisdiction of the Federation 45 days after the signing of the GFA (3 February 1996), the Bosnian Serb police force could remain in place until 90 days after signing of the agreement, when all Bosnian Serb territory in Sarajevo had to be transferred to the Federation (Bildt 1997: 187-188). In day 91, the Federation police force would take full control of these territories. As a confidence-building measure, the negotiated plan on Sarajevo included a set of provisions that stated that the Federation police would hire Serb police officers, not indicted by the International Tribunal on the Former Yugoslavia, to patrol these suburbs’ streets.

Although many politicians, in both sides of the divide, privately opposed the agreement, which was ‘approved in principle’ by Izetbegović and Momčilo Krajišnik, the agreement challenged by the IFOR Commander on legal grounds (Sells 2000: 190-91). IFOR lawyers opposed it they argued that the GFA clearly established that all Serb forces had to withdraw by 3 February 1996. IFOR decided to not distinguish between police and military forces. Because the IFOR Commander wanted to prevent “mission creep”, he also decided that IFOR troops would not police these suburbs (Holbrooke 1999: 328-29). This is not to say that he could not order his troops to do so, but he preferred to not take such actions. Louis Sells, who at the time worked for Bildt, argues that once news broke out that IFOR had its doubts about the OHR’s Sarajevo agreement, extreme nationalist
elements in both sides of the divide undermined its provisions and created a tense atmosphere (2000: 191).

Although the IPTF had to monitor Federation police forces once these areas came under Federation control, attempting to convince the Bosnian Serb population that they could trust the police, Bosnian Serb and Bosniak media outlets broadcasted a number of messages that called on Bosnian Serbs to leave their homes and move to the RS. As Bosnian Serbs left their homes and apartments, many set their apartments on fire. Those few thousands Bosnian Serbs that decided to stay were harassed by hard-line Bosnian Serb gangs, while Bosniak authorities did not lend them a helping hand. Even worse, IFOR forces did not stop these attacks from occurring or stop the looting of stores and factories (Sells 2000: 196; and Holbrooke 1999: 336). At the end of the crisis, around 100,000 people had fled these areas and re-located across the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) in the RS (Bildt 1997: 197).

IFOR cannot be completely blamed for this exodus. The Federation is also at fault because its politicians did not take the necessary steps to re-assure the Bosnian Serb community that their rights would be assured, if they had decided to stay in their homes and apartments. Blame can also be placed on the international community, especially the US, as it did not intervene, even though Bildt had told Warren Christopher, US Secretary of State, that the handover would turn violent.

In many ways, the Sarajevo crisis showed the peace process’s inherent weaknesses. First, the IFOR Commander’s decision to narrowly interpret his mandate and question the validity of the OHR’s agreement weakened the OHR’s political authority and permitted nationalist forces to dominate the political scene. It became evident to the parties that the OHR and IFOR were not in the same wavelength. This reality encouraged the parties to execute the GFA’s military provisions, but ignore its civilian provisions. As result, the strategy, especially for the Bosnian Serbs, was to comply with IFOR and once they left at the end of 1996, as originally envisioned by the US, it would move to secure the sovereignty of the RS, undermine the authority of Bosnia’s state structures, and probably unite the RS with Serb-controlled Yugoslavia.

Second, the exodus demonstrated the power nationalist political parties and their leaders had in their communities. This meant that reconciliation between the contending
parties would occur once the nationalist leaders’ authority could be weakened. More important, the strength of the nationalist parties proved that their defeat in the elections called by the GFA were probably was not to take place, hampering the creation of social movements and political parties calling for inter-ethnic co-operation and political unity. Third, and related to the former, the lack of independent media outlets allowed the nationalist parties to mobilise their respective communities and incite extreme elements within these neighbourhoods to create insecure environments that scared Bosnian Serbs from their homes. It also illustrated that the parties would exchange the barrel of the gun for control over media outlets in their struggle to achieve their wartime goals.

Finally, the international community, including the OHR and IFOR, did not put enough international pressure on the parties. The US could have forced the Bosniaks to moderate its strong nationalistic rhetoric, or ordered Admiral Smith, IFOR Commander, to take a more proactive role. Instead, Christopher, who was visiting Sarajevo in the first days of the crisis, decided not get involved (Bildt 1998: 187). In many ways, the Sarajevo crisis demonstrated the challenges peace implementation faced. The Clinton administration decision to ignore events in Bosnia and concentrate on other pressing issues, and IFOR’s intention to avoid any scenario that might put in danger the strict military timetables negotiated at Dayton, meant that the OHR’s already complicated task were to be even more difficult.

B. Establishing the Human Rights Mechanisms
The OHR’s second priority was to establish the commissions and human rights mechanisms negotiated at Dayton. Bildt (1996b) strongly argued that: ‘The history of the conflict in Bosnia - as well as in all of former Yugoslavia - is the history of the most flagrant violations of human rights we have seen in recent European history.’ For this reason, Bildt believed that establishing these institutions would create an atmosphere conducive to inter-ethnic reconciliation and enable refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes. While Bildt underscored the importance of setting up the human rights organisations called by the GFA, he also noted that international bodies in Bosnia had to make ‘people aware of their rights,’ and ‘inform them on how they can exercise
them' so this human rights regime could assist the democratisation process and the building of local civil society (1996b).

The Sarajevo crisis demonstrated the challenge the human rights regime faced. Bildt established the Human Rights Coordination Center (HRCC) as an integral element of the OHR. The HRCC's has three functions. First, it coordinates the activities of international bodies in order to guarantee that resources are used efficiently to set up and assist the work of the GFA's human rights institutions and eliminate duplication. Second, the HRCC has provided a forum to exchange information between local non-governmental organizations and these international bodies. This forum has not only strengthened indigenous non-governmental organisations' (NGOs) capacity to monitor local events, but it has also enabled Bosnia's human rights regime and concerned international agents to be informed of what is happening on the ground. Lastly, the HRCC has helped the OHR make its assessment of the human rights situation and make its findings public via the High Representative's periodic reports to the UN Secretary General (Bildt 1996e).

In the first year of peace implementation, Bildt's reports to the UN Secretary General confirmed the challenges the human rights regime faced. While the Human Rights Chamber, the Human Rights Ombudsman, and the Commission on Human Rights started to operate by early March, the parties committed themselves to respect and guarantee human rights, but only in word and not in deed. The Human Rights Chamber's 1996-97 Annual Report states that many of its decisions were not carried out by the parties, even though the GFA clearly specifies that the parties must comply with this institution's decision (HRC 1997). Most human rights violations during this period were related to attacks against refugees and internally displaced persons returning to their homes. Others were more serious, as human rights monitors described how local authorities, including the police, discriminated, both covertly and overtly, against minority populations (PIC. 1996b). In his last report of 1996, Bildt stated that discrimination, harassment, intimidation and so forth were prevalent in both entities (OHR-R 1996a: pars. 61-63).

In trying to explain why these violations were so common, Bildt argues that these can partially be blamed on the entities. Not only were they slow to transform their legal
structures or amend their constitutions according to GFA’s human rights provisions, but they also were reluctant to consider legislation that would ‘support local human rights institutions’ (OHR-R 1996a: par. 63). International bodies such as the OHR and the Council of Europe proposed most of these bills. One such area was property legislation that would protect the property of returnees and force individuals claiming the same property to either surrender it or contest the returnees’ claims in the court system (OHR-R 1996b: par. 53). Another area were the entities were not co-operating with the human rights regime was concerning the hand over of indicted war criminals to the International Tribunal on the Former Yugoslavia.

Like the Sarajevo crisis, the challenges faced in the creation and implementation of the human rights regime demonstrated the relative amount of power the parties had vis-à-vis international bodies implementing the GFA’s civilian provisions. Even though the PIC condemned these violations in its June meeting, the parties’ behaviour did not change. It is for this reason that Bildt called on the PIC in its December meeting to engender new mechanisms to force the parties to stop these violations and start complying with the human rights regime (1996a). While the first year of implementation had not really change the behaviour of the parties or drastically change the situation, it did establish a series of legal and political mechanisms to monitor and prevent human rights abuses. The OHR’s reports convinced the PIC of the need to re-adjust peacebuilding efforts to address these human rights challenges. These changes were executed in mid-1997.

C. The Reconstruction of Bosnia’s Economy

A third priority was the reconstruction of Bosnia’s war-torn economy. While the GFA does not make ‘any specific reference to economic assistance for re-construction’ (Väyrynen 1997: 162), these efforts were crucial, as these would secure the long-term survivability of Bosnia. Bildt argued that economic reconstruction was an instrument to increase co-operation between the ethno-national communities and their leaders and promote the unity of Bosnia (OHR-R 1996c). Although not mentioned in official speeches or reports, it was also expected that economic recovery and the promise of
prosperity would attract foreign investment and convince the refugees to return to Bosnia, especially those living in Western Europe.

Whereas the High Representative has had the authority to direct all civilian aspects of peace implementation, his function in the areas of economic reconstruction and rehabilitation were ‘not entirely clear’ (Bildt 1998: 242). It is for this reason that the High Representative works in conjunction with the international donors community, especially the World Bank and the European Commission. Although the former has more experienced in these areas, the latter had more influence because it has had to finance most of these projects. Once the GFA was signed, the PIC organised the first Donors’ Conference on 20 December 1995. This meeting was a success, as it secured pledges from different countries and international institutions totalling $550 million. These funds were to be used to repair ‘key infrastructure needs in the areas of power and electricity, telecommunications and road and rail links’ to enable the international bodies to start implementing the peace agreement in early 1996 (OHR-R 1996d: par. 41).

Because reconstruction and rehabilitation would involve many actors and a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements, the OHR decided to set up the Economic Task Force (ETF). It coordinates the activities of the donors and makes sure that the duplication of projects does not occur. Due to the many economic issues at play, the work of the ETF was carried by Sectoral Task Forces (STFs) (Bildt 1998: 247). While the STFs were designed to coordinate the activities of international donors, they have also provided assistance and expertise to Bosnian institutions in order to guarantee the highest level of efficiency. At the same time, the STFs have monitored these institutions’ activities and have ensured that economic assistance was meeting its intended targets. While this structure was put into place in mid 1996, it was not until the end of the year that this started to work smoothly (OHR-R 1996a: par. 72).

Bosnia faced many economic challenges at the end of the war. The war claimed 200,000 lives and divided the country into three communities. Each had its own currency, laws, financial institutions and control of working industries (Vukadinovic 1997). At least 80 percent of the population was dependent on humanitarian food aid, industrial output was five percent below 1990 figures and the annual income per capital decreased $500 (OHR-R 1996d). Even more crucial, about 60 percent of the ‘housing stock’ was
damaged, some of it irreparable (Bildt 1996d). To make matters even worse, ‘the rate of unemployment stood at nearly 70 percent’ (Väyrynen 1997: 174).

The OHR with the international donor community, including the World Bank and the European Commission, estimated that $1.8 billion was needed in 1996 to jump-start the economy and start the reconstruction of infrastructure. In April 12-13, the World Bank and the European Commission sponsored another Ministerial Donors’ Conference. Conference participants pledge to contribute the estimated $1.8 billion requested for 1996, despite the fact that this money was not completely disbursed in 1996. These funds were to be used to support three objectives: (a) post-conflict reconstruction, (b) implementation of the peace agreement, and (c) economic transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy (Hurtic, Sapcanin & Woodward 1999: 10).

From these three areas of economic assistance, Bildt argued after the April Donors’ Conference that funds should be targeted primarily to the reconstruction of key infrastructure needs, mentioned above. However, he also stated that it was important to fund other projects that increased co-operation between the parties and generated employment. Not only would these promote the integration of Bosnia, but it would also show the parties and Bosnia’s citizens that co-operation and implementing the peace agreement was the vehicle towards economic prosperity. This message was even more important in light of the upcoming elections, which’s success depended on the ability of the parties to co-operate and create an atmosphere conducive to dialogue and the non-violent exchange of opinions. While the intention of these projects was clear, economic assistance created a number of difficulties.

First, and foremost, the RS decided not to participate in the Ministerial Donors’ Conference. Karadžić, who was still president of the RS, probably played an important part in this decision. He had publicly expressed his decision to prevent any type of contact with the West. This is not to say that the RS did not receive any economic assistance, as Banja Luka received modest amounts. This city in northwestern Bosnia was the stronghold of moderate Bosnian Serb leaders. Their desire to co-operate in exchange for funds was seen by many in the West as a way of splitting the RS and strengthening the anti-Karadžić bloc. However, the RS received only two percent of all the money awarded to Bosnia during 1996. The Federation received 84 percent of total funds, while
14 percent was used to finance cross-entity projects (OHR-R 1996a: par. 74). Rather than fostering cross-entity and inter-ethnic co-operation, the unequal level of funding amplified the economic differences between the entities.

Second, the disbursement of funds hardened the positions of the nationalist parties. For instance, donor institutions' attempts to reconstruct housing in order to encourage refugees and internally displaced persons to return to their homes heighten the already precarious social situation in many towns and cities throughout the country. Motivated by nationalist leaders, gangs in each community started to destroy these reconstructed houses or made the lives of these people impossible. A European Stability Initiative (ESI) report also argues that 'local leaders benefited materially from the aid programme through control of local companies contracted for reconstruction work and through the supply of goods and rental premises to international agencies' (ESI 2000c). Rather than weakening existing power structures in order to support the development of new ones that encouraged inter-ethnic co-operation and the integration of Bosnia, economic assistance reinforced these structures (Vukadinovic 1997).

Third, the OHR learned the painful lesson that a pledge is only a commitment and does not necessarily guarantee that these funds will be disbursed. For instance, the Clinton administration offered $550 million for reconstruction efforts, but it did not give out these funds because of its budget battle with the US Congress. As a result, Bildt dedicated most of his time lobbying the international community for money in order to fund these projects. In fact, the OHR repeatedly asked the IFOR Commander to order its engineers to finish important infrastructure improvements. Bildt argued that this was a reasonable plea, as IFOR would use these roads and bridges and benefit from upgraded communication networks (Bildt 1998: 318). In all, the OHR spent an increasing amount of time making sure that international actors distribute the funds they had pledged.

These three problems were not the only ones. For instance, if money was not available for these projects, it was even more difficult to fund the de-mining programme. There were more than 3 million land mines in Bosnia. Needless to say, it was important to clear these as soon as possible. Throughout the first year of peace implementation, the OHR lobbied international donor agencies so they would also fund this programme, as it
would also help clear roads and promote the freedom of movement: two elements consistent with the international community’s economic objectives (OHR-R 1996d).

D. Establishing the Central State
The OHR’s fourth priority was to establish the country’s central state institutions and to assist the OSCE’s task of organising the elections. While the central institutions were to be set up after the elections, the OHR had to make sure that the parties to the agreement amended each entity’s constitution ‘to ensure conformity’ with the new, Dayton constitution (OHR-R 1996d: par. 85). While the parties had expressed their disposition to amend these, the process was slow and it was actually not completed by the elections. As noted before, the Joint Civilian Commissions and the Joint Interim Commissions handled public and foreign policy matters for the period between the signing of the peace agreement and the establishment of the common institutions. Foreshadowing the future gridlock of the country’s central state, both Commissions’ work was hampered by bickering between leaders of each ethno-national community and by political conflicts in both entities.

The growing conflict between the Bosnian Croats and the Bosniaks worried many in the West, as the Federation is a central element of the peace process (OHR-R 1996d). Throughout 1996, the leaders of the Party of Democratic Change (SDA) and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) prevented the full implementation of the Dayton Agreement in the Federation. There were many areas of disagreement, but three were probably the most important. First, the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) was unwilling to dissolve the para-state of Herceg-Bosna and merge these structures with the Federation’s structures. Second, the joint administration of the divided city of Mostar was contested by the HVO, as the city has been its political and economic stronghold since the 1990s (Bildt 1996c). Violent clashes between Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats were commonplace. Lastly, and related to the former, the merging of defence structures and the creation of a Federation police force were being postponed, if not completely ignored by both sides. Consequently, the OHR, with the assistance of Contact Group diplomats, dedicated a lot of time to secure the viability of the Federation. In 1996 alone, seven meetings were held by the international community to pressure the parties to implement the provisions of the
Dayton Agreement. While these negotiations produced a number of mechanisms to resolve these conflicts, these did not have much of an impact during Bildt’s tenure.

In the RS, the problem was Karadžić’s constant defiance of the peace agreement. The UN’s Security Council had granted the High Representative and the IFOR Commander the authority to request the Security Council to re-impose sanctions on Yugoslavia and the RS, if one of them consider that the Bosnian Serbs were violating the peace agreement. This was Bildt’s source of “real” power. Although the GFA clearly states that indicted war criminals could not hold public office, Karadžić remained as President of the RS. Even though Bildt had repeatedly raised his concerns that the RS was violating the GFA with Slobodan Milošević, the Serb president dismissed these objections, arguing that Bildt had no power in this area (Bildt 1998: 209).

Enraged by constant Serb challenges to his authority and the implementation of the peace agreement, Bildt decided to construct a strategy that would secure the ousting of Karadžić from power, while giving more power to moderate forces within the RS, mostly located in Banja Luka. The proposed strategy would not only limit Karadžić’s influence, but also guarantee the RS’s co-operation in peace implementation matters. His strategy was to be implemented in three phases. First, Bildt decided to open a branch office in Banja Luka and indicated that economic assistance would be given to those that co-operated and were willing to implement the peace agreement. This assured him political allies in the moderate wing of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), which had publicly expressed their displeasure with Karadžić’s attempt to completely isolate the RS from the rest of the world (Bildt 1998: 214).

Second, Bildt, expecting a challenge by Karadžić’s forces, concentrated around the town of Pale, decided to pressure the SDS leadership by threatening Milošević with the re-imposition of economic sanctions on the RS and Yugoslavia. This forced Milošević to force Karadžić and his colleagues to accept two important conditions: Karadžić’s resignation as President of the RS and of the SDS, and his disappearance from public life; which meant that the SDS could not put up Karadžić’s pictures in public places, permit him to attend government and parliamentary meetings, and guarantee that he would not run for public office (Bildt 1998: 225). In the end, Milošević forced
Karadžić to resign, giving Biljana Plavšić, who was one of RS’s two Vice Presidents and a moderate who was willing to co-operate with the West, all presidential powers.

Finally, Bildt knew that Karadžić’s departure from public life did not mean that he would not have influence over the political system. Consequently, he asked the IFOR Commander to limit his movement within the entity by sending more of its assets to the streets of Pale. Although Smith expressed his disposition to not get involved in Bildt’s political strategy, the OHR started to inform the Contact Group and the PIC of IFOR’s unwillingness to play an active role in the GFA’s implementation.

As Bildt demonstrates in his memoirs, he ordered the OHR to keep a record that compared IFOR activities in the Sarajevo area and in the Pale area (Bildt 1998: 226). Not only did the OHR demonstrate the absence of IFOR in Pale, but it also started to mobilise support within NATO’s North Atlantic Council to order IFOR to take a more pro-active role. As a result, the presence of IFOR troops in the Pale area forced Karadžić underground, minimised his influence over the political system in the RS, and allowed more moderate forces in Banja Luka to govern the territory, increasing co-operation with the OHR and other bodies to implement important provisions of the peace agreement. While Bildt’s strategy ousted Karadžić from power, it was not until the summer of 1997 that these moderate forces actually took control of the entity’s political and economic structures.

More controversial than the entities’ political conflicts was the holding of elections. During the peace talks, the Contact Group argued that these would create new government structures that could administer Bosnia, starting the international community’s departure. For the US, the establishment of these structures could permit American troops to return home before the Christmas holidays, bolstering President Clinton’s foreign policy credentials during his re-election campaign. This was even more important in light of the challenger’s, Senator Robert Dole, strong record on Bosnia. It is for this reason that the Clinton administration made it clear that an American was to head the OSCE’s Bosnia mission and organise the elections. Thus, ‘control over the OSCE mission for Washington meant control over its own “exit strategy”’ (Bildt 1998: 256).

Although Ambassador Robert Frowick, head of the OSCE’s Bosnia mission, was directly responsible for the elections, the peace agreement gave the High Representative a
seat in the Provisional Election Commission (PEC), which was in charge of the whole election process: from setting the rules of the game to the certification of the official results once the elections took place. Because the PEC faced an enormous task, the peace agreement stipulates that its Chairman, Frowick, can take binding decisions, when the parties could not agree on election related issues. Bildt rarely attended this body’s meetings, appointing Eugene Hutchinson, an Irish diplomat, as his representative to the PEC (Bildt 1998: 256).

Organising the elections was plagued by controversial decisions. Most of these, such as the rules that specified who could vote and where and those that specified the standards political parties had to follow to participate in the elections, were taken by Frowick without the consent of local parties. As contentious as these decisions were, the main obstacle to the holding of the elections was a contradiction within the peace agreement.

The GFA clearly stipulates that the elections are to take place six months after the agreement takes force, or no later than nine months if the OSCE decides a delay is necessary (GFA 1995: Annex 3, Art.II.4). But, the agreement also states that (GFA 1995: Annex 3, Art.I.1):

The Parties shall ensure that conditions exist for the organization of free and fair elections, in particular a politically neutral environment; shall protect and enforce the right to vote in secret without fear or intimidation; shall ensure freedom of expression and of the press; shall allow and encourage freedom of the association (including of political parties); and shall ensure freedom of movement.

While it was generally accepted that the OSCE could not hold elections in June, deferring them until 14 September, Flavio Cotti, the OSCE’s Chairman in Office, informed Bildt about the possibility of postponing the elections to a later date because the conditions for fair and free elections could not be guaranteed for the proposed September date.

Bildt publicly argued that this was an error because ‘to delay the elections [was] to delay the setting up of the common institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (Bildt 1996b), which would in turn signal the international community’s approval of Bosnia’s eventual partition and legitimate the nationalist parties’ political programmes. He also noted that it was ridiculous to expect the country’s first post-war elections to be
completely fair and free (OHR-R 1996c). Bildt (1996b) also reminded the OSCE that post-Dayton conditions were better than those that existed during the war. To support his views, Bildt proposed a political strategy that would enable Cotti to certify the holding of elections on 14 September, while enabling the OHR to mobilise international money to create and fund a series of mechanisms to weaken the nationalist parties and enable moderate, civic-minded political parties to influence the country’s decision-making processes.

Learning from the Sarajevo crisis and understanding the power of the media, especially the role of television, the OHR, with the PIC’s consent, decided to create a network of independent television stations, IN-TV or what is more commonly known as the Open Broadcast Network (OBN), and radio stations, Radio FERN (Free Elections Radio Network), to oppose the HDZ TV, SDA TV, and SDS TV. With the financial assistance of the US, the Soros Foundation and the European Commission, the OBN started its broadcast on 7 September, a week before elections day.

While the OHR wanted the OBN to start broadcasting sooner, the Sarajevo authorities, controlled by the SDA, denied the OBN the necessary permits to start its operations. The OHR took the matter to the PEC, which ruled that Bosnia’s political authorities had to grant the necessary licenses and permits to the OBN (Chandler 1999: 128-29). In Banja Luka, the network’s transmitters were under the control of IFOR, so the OHR and the OSCE argued that the RS had no authority on the matter (Bildt 1998: 261). Even though the OBN went on air a week before the elections, it had little impact on the electoral process. In many ways, the nationalist parties successfully blocked the OHR’s attempts to weaken their position.

In reaction to these challenges, the OSCE and the OHR encouraged the creation of opposition, multiethnic, civic-minded political parties. In the RS, some opposition parties, including the Union for Peace and Progress, which enjoyed Milošević’s support, challenged the SDS. These opposition parties, while better than the hard-line SDS, were not exactly what the OHR and the OSCE considered to be civic-minded. However, these were willing to co-operate with the international community and even implement aspects of the GFA as long as the RS could receive international aid to finance the reconstruction of their shattered economy and social infrastructure.
In the Bosnian-Croat areas, the HDZ ran virtually unopposed. The HDZ, an arm of Tudjman's HDZ, had access to funds and propaganda resources from the Zagreb-based party. The opposition parties in these areas, as Bildt notes, were even more extreme than the HDZ's brand of ethno-nationalism (1998: 265-66). In the Bosniac-controlled areas of the Federation, several multi-ethnic, civic-minded parties, including Haris Silajdžić's Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Zlatko Lagumdžija's Social Democratic Party, challenged Izetbegović's SDA. Concerned with Silajdžić's decision to oppose the ruling party, SDA operatives made sure that it would win the elections at all costs. It used intimidation and government resources to get its message across. SDA supporters also beat Silajdžić nearly to death, while the SDA used police forces to paint 'SDA symbol along all the streets and roads in [Sarajevo]' (Bildt 1998: 265).

The widespread use of intimidation tactics and manipulation of electoral rules to benefit the nationalist parties in the RS and in the Federation, especially in the Bosniak-dominated areas, forced Frowick to postpone the municipal elections until the spring of 1997. This decision angered the Clinton administration, as the postponement meant that the international community's presence, especially that of NATO, would have to be extended until the holding of these elections.

The national elections were held on 14 September, as the PIC pressured the OSCE to do so in its Florence meeting in June 1996. These were not free or fair. The nationalist parties successfully hindered 'the opposition parties from gaining access to the media' (ICG 1999: 13) and intimidation and attacks against opposition figures were pervasive all across the country. The end result was the victory of the main nationalist parties.

Even more problematic, the International Crisis Group finds that 'widespread fraud resulted in a voter turnout of 105% of the eligible electorate' (IGC 1999: 13). The OSCE's Elections Appeal Sub-Commission (EASC) studied complaints from international agents and domestic groups that questioned the validity of the results. While the EASC did recommend a re-count of all votes, the PEC, under the chairmanship of Frowick reversed this position stating that 'it was “neither practical nor a necessary response to the concerns reported”' (Riley 1997: 1210). In his memoirs, Bildt agrees with Frowick's decision, stating that: 'the nationalist parties had won the elections across the
board, and the margins of victory were overall of such a magnitude that even major corrections of the elections figures would be unlikely to change much' (Bildt 1998: 270).

Following the PEC's reversal of the EASC's recommendation, it ordered the destruction of all cast ballots a week after the elections results were certified. The rationale behind this decision was to prevent outside groups from investigating these results and questioning the legitimacy of the democratic process put in place by the OSCE (ICG 1999: 12-13). Christopher Riley also argues that it was important for Frowick to take these controversial and seemingly anti-democratic actions for practical reasons. A re-count could have 'cost Izetbegović the chairmanship of the presidency. In such a case, Krajišnik would assume the chairmanship, a situation some American and European policymakers described as a "nightmare"' (Riley 1997: 1211). Thus, the OSCE decided to certify an election process marred by voter fraud and intimidation, giving the 'stamp of approval of "democratic" legitimacy to many of those who had led [Bosnia] into the war, and whose wartime behaviour left many of them with the reputation of gangsters, ethnic cleansers and war criminals' (ICG 1999: 13).

With the election results certified, the OHR met with elected officials and the three members of the Presidency and international institutions to establish the common state institutions, designed at Dayton. For instance, the European Court of Human Rights appointed the international members of the Constitutional Court. The International Monetary Fund also selected the head of the country's Central Bank. The Parliamentary Assembly faced some obstacles, as the Bosnian Serb members prevented it from holding regular sessions until early January 1997 (OHR-R 1996a: par. 29). While Bildt had held a number of meetings, prior to the elections and pushed for changes in each entity's constitution so they would be in line with Bosnia's new constitution, Bildt faced many challenges from the three members of the Presidency: Izetbegović, Krajišnik and Krešimir Zubak.

The major challenge was the Presidency's establishment of the Council of Ministers (OHR-R 1996a: par. 28). While the OHR had argued that a Bosnian Serb should head the Council, so this person could 'feel an affinity with the state' and work to secure the unity of Bosnia (Bildt 1998: 294), the Bosniaks vehemently opposed this plan. The OHR, with the assistance of the Contact Group, crafted an agreement that allowed
for a Bosnian Serb to serve as Prime Minister, while allowing a Bosniak to serve as co-Chair of the Council of Ministers and a Bosnian Croat to serve as a vice-Chair. Although Bildt did not like this arrangement, he decided to approve it for two important reasons. First, the deal was acceptable to the Parliamentary Assembly, which has the power to certify the Presidency’s nominees to the Council. Second, and more significantly, this arrangement assured a working government that could start the next stage of the peace implementation: the consolidation of the peace, which’s main objective was to establish a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia (OHR-R 1996a: par. 94)

CONCLUDING REMARKS
The OHR’s work in the first 18 months of peace implementation showed mixed results. The OHR’s role was that of a crisis-manager rather than the envisioned chief protagonist in matters related to the implementation of the GFA’s civilian provisions. In many ways, Bildt played the same role he had played before the agreement’s signing. The only difference was that while Bildt worked side by side the US, which was willing to use military force to coerce the parties to carry through their commitments, Bildt had no support from the IFOR commander or the US once he was High Representative. While IFOR had repeatedly questioned the OHR’s political authority during the first year of peace implementation, the changing circumstances in Bosnia would force NATO members, the Contact Group and the PIC to reconsider the peace implementation strategy and allow the PIC’s Steering Board, chaired by Bildt, to craft a new peace implementation strategy.

At the centre of the new strategy was NATO’s decision to stay in Bosnia until the summer of 1998, albeit at a decreased size. The OSCE’s decision to postpone the municipal elections until mid-1997 meant that IFOR could not entirely leave Bosnia. The force was supposed to leave by 20 December 1996. Instead, NATO commanders decided to downgrade the force from 32 to 24 battalions and reduce the number of heavy equipment. The military mission was re-named the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) and was headed by General William Crouch of the U.S. Army.

More importantly and illustrating the dissatisfaction with the implementation of civilian matters, one of General Crouch’s first acts was to establish stronger relations
with the OHR (OHR-R 1996a: par. 86). In many ways, the international community, mainly influenced by Bildt’s assessment of the first months of peace implementation, realised that the most important aspect of the peacebuilding process was the implementation of the GFA’s civilian provisions. In the end, it was Bosnia’s citizens and its institutions that would make the agreement’s full implementation a reality (Bildt 1997). Thus, increased co-operation between SFOR and the OHR would increase the OHR’s credibility, while assisting it to persuade the contracting parties to carry through their commitments in times of crises.

Having established the Bosnian state institutions and having strengthened relations with SFOR, the OHR drafted the Quick Start Package, a legislative package that the Parliamentary Assembly, the Presidency, and the Council of Ministers had to consider in order to kick-start economic growth, attract foreign investment, and reform the country’s economy according to market principles (OHR-R 1996a: par. 76). It also included a set of proposals to better social conditions and enable the flourishing of civil society. The OHR’s intent was to ensure the operability of Bosnia’s state institutions, as these would not only secure the unity of Bosnia, but would also integrate the two entities (OHR-R 1997c: par. 132). It is important to remember that among Bildt’s biggest worries was that the peace agreement had created a weak central government that favoured nationalist parties, which vigorously campaigned against the GFA’s full implementation.

Consequently, Bildt dedicated his efforts to undermine nationalist parties’ efforts by continuing his previous strategy, creating the necessary social conditions to hold free and fair municipal elections, which the OSCE decided to hold on 14-15 September 1997. The OHR, with the assistance of the OSCE, continued its drive to strengthen the OBN and increase the power of opposition parties, while further weakening nationalist parties sources of power. For instance, Bildt complained that the parties had not disbanded social structures that contradicted the GFA’s constitution or terminate relations with neighbouring countries that questioned the unity of Bosnia (OHR-R 1997c: par. 154-156). Clear examples of these structures were nationalist parties’ control of payment bureaus, which were a relic of the communist years. ‘In each area, the payment bureau holds a monopoly on all financial transfers, and collects and distributes taxes’ (ESI 1999). Not surprising, these bureaus funded nationalist parties’ illegal activities and
assured that businesses did not contradict the political and economic goals of each party. They also hindered market reforms favoured by the international community, directly challenging the OHR's work.

Bildt's last months as High Representative was influenced by his desire to weaken nationalist parties' control of political processes and strengthen the OHR's authority so it could fully implement the GFA's civilian provisions. Bildt's views shaped the PIC's Sintra Communiqué of 30 May 1997. Based on events in Bosnia, the PIC, meeting in Sintra, Portugal, granted the High Representative the power 'to curtail or suspend any media network or programme whose output is in persistent and blatant contravention of either the spirit or letter' of the GFA (PIC 1997b: par. 70). While this power was offered to the OHR in hopes that it would deter the nationalist parties' media outlets from dominating the airwaves, it represents the international community's support for a maximalist mission, where the OHR would take a leading role in assuring the viability of Bosnia and the GFA.

In addition, the PIC also declared that economic assistance would be conditional; the parties would receive financial resources if these were willing to fully co-operate with the peace agreement's execution. Hence, the international community made it clear that it was moving away from humanitarian assistance and the reconstruction of essential infrastructure to the creation of a market economy, nurtured by a burgeoning Bosnian state. While this gave the World Bank and the European Commission a considerable amount of power, the OHR was the one institution that benefited the most from this decision. Its ability to collect information and track the process of peace implementation, and the High Representative's important role as Chairman of the PIC's Steering Board meant that the OHR had the economic power to coerce the parties to implement the GFA's more controversial provisions.

Although Bildt has to be credited with the transformation of the peacebuilding mission from a military operation supported by civilian agencies to a civilian one backed by military personnel, he did not directly benefit from these decisions (Hedges 1998). After more than two years of work on Bosnian peace, Bildt decided to retire. At the PIC's Sintra meeting, Carlos Westendorp, a senior Spanish diplomat, was appointed to continue Bildt's work.
Bildt’s tenure is a controversial one. Many have criticised him for his efforts, while others have praised him for creating a series of mechanisms that secured the GFA’s initial implementation. Although he was concerned with inter-ethnic reconciliation and while he arduously worked for the unity of Bosnia, when he left office Bosnia was still divided along political and social lines. The challenges that his successor faced were as challenging as the ones Bildt faced. The only difference between them was that Westendorp enjoyed more diplomatic support, enabling him to further strengthen the mandate of the OHR and move the peace implementation process forward.

The support the OHR received after Bildt’s departure transformed the peacebuilding operation from a military mission supported by a civilian component to a civilian operation supported by NATO peacekeepers. The failure of the American peacebuilding strategy allowed the PIC’s European members to take control over peace implementation matters and design a new set of projects to establish a self-sustaining peace in post-Dayton Bosnia. Was this new peacebuilding programme founded on the tenets of the strategic approach to peacemaking? It will be argued in the next chapter that it was. However, Wolfgang Petritsch’s, the third High Representative, ‘ownership approach’ questions aspects of these peacemaking efforts, suggesting that communicative forms of peacemaking may be needed to make peace in Bosnia self-sustaining.
CHAPTER SEVEN

Strengthening the Office of the High Representative’s Mandate:
Peacebuilding as State-Building

INTRODUCTION

From July 1997 to August 1999, the streets of Sarajevo were filled with the music of Julio Iglesias. Carlos Westendorp, a experienced Spanish diplomat and the second High Representative, not only took a little bit of his culture to Bosnia, he also brought a diplomatic style that mixed strong rhetoric and great negotiating skills that helped him to get his way in Bosnia and within the structures of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC). In choosing Westendorp, the PIC was clearly signalling its intention to change the course of civilian peace implementation. While Bosnia would not become a protectorate, as some Bosnian politicians contended during his term as High Representative, Westendorp became the de facto viceroy of the country (The Economist 1998).

Wolfgang Petritsch, an experienced Austrian diplomat, became the third High Representative in August 1999. Petritsch has also opposed the idea of turning Bosnia into an international protectorate. However, he admits that the international community, especially the Office of the High Representative (OHR), is too involved in Bosnia’s internal affairs. If Westendorp behaved as a viceroy, his successor has attempted to behave more like a political counsellor. Although Petritsch has argued that he wants Bosnia’s citizens and officials to take more control over the administration of their own affairs, nationalist politicians and their repeated obstructions to the implementation of the peace agreement have strongly hindered him from putting into practice his “ownership approach”. But, Petritsch has used the powers granted to the position of High Representative in December 1997 more than Westendorp did. Indeed, many people have compared Petritsch and his work with that performed by Austro-Hungarian administrators sent to Bosnia during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Ljiljan 2000).

This chapter continues the analysis conducted in the previous chapter. It demonstrates the changing internal and external dynamics that forced the international
community to strengthen the OHR’s mandate, while clearly demonstrating this decision’s
effects on the OHR’s ability to implement the peace agreement during Westendorp’s and
Petritsch’s tenures. More important, it delineates the evolution of the international
community’s state-building strategy and its attempts to correct some of the General
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s (GFA) errors, including
the agreement’s creation of a weak central state. The chapter is divided into two parts.
The first covers developments under Westendorp’s term in office (June 1996 to July
1999), while the second part covers events during Petritsch’s tenure.

I. STRENGTHENING THE OHR’S MANDATE
Thanks in part to the changes Carl Bildt had secured in his last months as High
Representative, Westendorp quickly showed the parties that he was not going to play his
predecessor’s role of crisis-manager. Instead, the OHR acted to ensure that nationalist
political parties and their supporters collaborated with international agents and
implemented the international community’s favoured peacebuilding strategy. NATO’s
Stabilisation Force’s (SFOR) willingness to play an active role in peace enforcement and
implementation translated into the arrest of war criminals, the demolition of illegal
checkpoints in the inter-entity boundary line (IEBL), and the protection of those that
desired to return to their homes, enhancing the OHR’s political activities. The SFOR-
OHR relationship was an important part of the peace implementation programme charted
by the PIC after the country’s first elections.

While the OHR’s priorities during Westendorp’s term were the same ones tackled
by Bildt’s team, that is to say the creation of a strong state, Westendorp’s no-nonsense
style, coupled with the PIC’s dissatisfaction with the peace implementation process and
General Wesley Clarke’s, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, understanding
of the importance of civilian implementation, enabled the OHR to clarify its mandate and
set out a clear strategy that gave the OHR more power to enforce the GFA’s full
implementation of its civilian provisions. The overall objective of Westendorp’s OHR
was to move Bosnia past the consolidation period to the institutionalisation of a self-
sustaining peace that could allow the international community to exit Bosnia and dedicate
their resources to other areas of international concerns.
A. Reasons for a Stronger Mandate

While Bildt had established Bosnia's state institutions, according to the provisions of the GFA, these were not operating to full capacity. Many in the international community, especially in the European Union, were concerned that a weak state could not undertake the economic reforms needed to promote self-sustaining economic growth. Because the international community had faith that economic development could successfully integrate the divided country and even serve as a tool of inter-ethnic reconciliation, Westendorp was instructed to strengthen the state's structures. Such a state-building project, as argued in chapter two, meant that Westendorp was ordered to weaken the position of nationalist political parties and their local structures of power, while also finding a way to persuade and even coerce the parties to co-operate in order to strengthen the existing state institutions.

Like his predecessor, Westendorp was quickly challenged by hardliners in the Republika Sprska (RS). As Bildt was finishing his tenure, Karadžić attempted to strengthen his position within the SDS's (Serbian Democratic Party) ranks. In his last report to the UN Secretary General, Bildt pointed out that Karadžić was starting to openly challenge the GFA. More worrying, the RS was establishing political and economic links with Serbia that contradicted the Bosnian constitution and the GFA’s provisions (OHR-R 1997c: par. 62-68). Empowered by the conclusions of the PIC’s meeting in Sintra, the OHR started to cut economic assistance to the Serb entity. The OHR’s repeated criticisms and the threat of decreasing economic assistance created a rift within the SDS between its Banja Luka faction, headed by President Biljana Plavšić, and its Pale faction, headed by Karadžić and his colleagues (Cohen 1998: 106).

President Plavšić decided to challenge Karadžić’s supporters in order to move the entity’s centre of political power from Pale to Banja Luka, which was already the RS’s centre of economic activity. The international community supported such a move. Indeed, the Clinton administration had proposed making Banja Luka the entity’s capital during the Dayton in order to limit Karadžić’s base of power (Holbrooke 1999: 293). In a brilliant political move that strengthened her position in the RS, Plavšić did not challenge
the SDS's nationalist ideology, which many Bosnian Serbs were fond of. Instead, she made the case of political change on the basis that Pale loyalists were corrupt and were squabbling money that could be used to improve Bosnian Serbs' living conditions (Holbrooke 1999: 349). Her populist rhetoric was embraced by people in the RS, forcing Karadžić and his supporters to find ways of deposing her from power. For its part, the international community, especially the Clinton administration, saw an opportunity to change the anti-Dayton SDS leadership. Consequently, SFOR was ordered to assure Plavšić's security and to disband police forces loyal to Karadžić. More surprising, British SFOR personnel started to arrest war criminals in the RS (OHR-R 1997a: par. 53-57).

The OHR started to counter Karadžić loyalists by opposing the content of SDS controlled media outlets, which were attempting to mobilise Bosnian Serbs against Plavšić through misinformation and inflammatory rhetoric. Even more critical were SDS TV's call on Bosnian Serbs to attack UN and NATO personnel in the divided town of Brčko. With the situation worsening, Westendorp requested SFOR to intervene and shutdown these media outlets. In an emergency meeting, the North Atlantic Council accepted Westendorp's request and SFOR was ordered to take control of these transmitters. With the support of SFOR, Westendorp's office started to restructure the RS's media organisations leading to the signing of the Udrigovo Agreement (OHR-SFOR-PS 1997).

Although OHR-SFOR co-operation did strengthen the OHR's ability to restructure the Bosnian Serb media, it did not push Karadžić's supporters out of power. Nevertheless, the SDS was weakened as Plavšić decided to break ranks and form the Serb Popular Party (SPP). At the entity level, the SDS agreed to a new round of elections for the entity's National Assembly. These were administered and supervised by the OSCE and were held on 15 November 1997. In many ways, OHR-SFOR co-operation did send an important message to the parties that the international community was willing to employ all necessary mechanisms to implement the GFA's provisions and that the OHR was to play the leading role in the peace implementation process. Hence, the OHR's authority and respect quickly increased in Bosnia (ESI 2000b).

The OHR's participation in the RS's power struggle was not the only act it took against the SDS or other nationalist parties. Learning from the 1996 elections the OHR
and the OSCE decided to cut funding to political campaigns of nationalist parties and started to give financial support to ‘select opposition parties’ in the RS and the Federation. This strategy failed in both entities, as the nationalist parties won 129 out of Bosnia’s 136 municipalities in the municipal elections of 13-14 of September 1997 (ICG 1999: 15). In the RS, the OHR-SFOR’s intervention in the entity’s politics, its decision to regulate the RS’s media outlets, and its open support of Plavšić angered many Bosnian Serbs, leading them to cast their votes for the SDS as a protest against the GFA and the international community’s actions against Bosnian Serb sovereignty. In the Federation, the votes for nationalist parties were cast as a protest to the international community’s policy that allowed refugees and internally displaced persons to return to their homes. In short, the municipal elections were another setback for the international community’s peacebuilding efforts.

At the national level, Bildt’s Quick Start Package was passed during the summer, but work on other important legislation, such as citizenship and passport laws, was slow. Part of the problem was the RS’s determination to block important bills and delaying the enactment of key legislation. This commitment to derail the policy-making process forced the OHR to ask the European Union (EU) to not accept the passports of senior Bosnian Serb public figures. While the EU did approve this request, it had little impact on the overall process.

Enraged by an ineffective system of government and increasing cases of corruption, Westendorp started informing the PIC that he wanted to take a stronger stance on critical issues affecting the GFA’s implementation (Slobodna Bosna 1997). Thus, Westendorp started to publicly campaign for the extension of his mandate, so he could fulfil his duties and responsibilities.

In a unanimous decision, supporting Westendorp’s request (Klarin 1997), the PIC, meeting in Bonn in December 1997, decided to extend the OHR’s mandate by conferring the High Representative two new powers. First, he had the power to take decisions when the Bosnian state did not or could not do so. According to this power, the High Representative could also re-write existing laws so these could be in line with the spirit

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26 Plavšić’s SPP could not participate in the elections because it was created after the Provisional Elections Commission’s date to register new parties.
of the GFA. Second, the PIC authorised the High Representative to dismiss public officials that obstructed the peace agreement’s execution or carry out the OHR’s decisions (PIC 1997b: Art. XI.2b-c). In addition, the PIC’s Bonn Conclusions emphasised that SFOR would actively support the work of the OHR (PIC 1997b: Art. IX.1.e), and enforce its decisions.

The fact that the High Representative’s mandate was extended unanimously showed the international community’s acceptance that peace in Bosnia is a long-term development that needs to be directed by international bodies. The minimalist position backed by the Clinton administration at Dayton was ignored, thus encouraging increased co-operation between the OHR and SFOR. In many ways, the PIC’s Bonn Conclusions reflect the international community’s frustration with the slow pace of peace implementation and low levels of inter-ethnic co-operation. It is for this reason that the PIC instructed Westendorp to propose a new approach, if months following the Bonn meeting the social conditions in Bosnia had not changed for the best (Klarin 1996). As a result, the international community reinstated its support for the GFA and confirmed its trust in the High Representative as the final arbiter of the peace agreement in civilian matters, while also conveying to the parties that SFOR was to actively support the OHR’s work. As repeatedly stated by Westendorp and his colleagues at the OHR in several interviews after the Bonn meeting, the PIC’s Bonn Conclusions was a turning point in the nature of peace implementation in post-Dayton Bosnia.

B. The Effects of the Bonn Powers

The PIC’s Bonn Conclusions were pronounced in the backdrop of two important debates: the Bosnian national elections, to be held in September 1998; and SFOR’s scheduled exit in June 1998, which never took place as the US and its European allies decide to keep the troops for an undetermined amount of time. During 1998, the OHR dedicated its resources at passing key legislation that would strengthen the Bosnian state and enhance the integration of the two entities into a single cohesive unit. For this reason, Westendorp asked the common state institutions to adopt: (a) a new flag; (b) currency; (c) common license plates; (d) citizenship laws; (e) a new passport; and (f) a permanent law on customs. The OHR also wanted the state to consider the following legislative projects: (a)
foreign investment laws in order to encourage further investment; (b) property laws that enabled refugees and internally displaced persons to return to their homes; and (c) an election law to organise and hold elections following the 1998 national elections (OHR-D 1998d: pars. 17-28). For its part, the OHR expressed its intention to curtail corruption at the state, entity, and municipal levels, while vowing to undermining nationalist parties’ power base by encouraging new non-ethnic, civic-minded political parties that could serve as the basis of a dynamic and a healthy civil society (Westendorp 1997a). The OHR, pressured by European nation-states, also started to consult with other international organisations to promote the return of many refugees and better Bosnia’s dire human rights situation.

The common state institutions did meet in order to discuss the proposed legislative package, but the members of these institutions failed to reach a decision, prompting Westendorp to use his Bonn powers. In the end, the High Representative decided to impose the entire legislative package. Although Westendorp repeatedly stated that he preferred if the country’s institutions took these important decisions, he also expressed a sense of satisfaction, knowing that his interventions guaranteed progress in the peace agreement’s implementation.

The first half of 1998, as expressed by Westendorp in a speech delivered at the PIC’s Ministerial Meeting in Luxembourg, held on 9 June 1998, produced many positive results. The most important result was the institution of a moderate government in the RS, headed by President Plavšić and Prime Minister Milorad Dodik, a pro-Western Bosnian Serb politician. As one of its first acts, the National Assembly decided to move the entity’s capital from Pale to Banja Luka, indicating the RS’s resolve to co-operate with the OHR and implement the peace agreement. In exchange, the international donors community started to finance economic reconstruction projects across the entity and awarded an emergency instalment of $29 million to the government to finance its non-military budgetary obligations. Even more significant, the National Assembly elected its first Bosniak to the position of Vice-Speaker (OHR-R 1998b: par. 58).

The increased plurality of the RS’s political scene improved its relations with the OHR and the rest of the international community. However, Bosnian Serb authorities still obstructed the GFA’s full implementation, especially the property laws that would have
enabled refugees and internally displaced persons to return to their homes. Although the National Assembly had elected a Bosniak Vice Speaker, this did not mean that multi-ethnicity was a principle the Bosnian Serb authorities wanted to translate into reality. It seems that the RS was willing to co-operate with the international community in matters were it would have benefited its economic welfare, whereas in areas where international policies could have affected the RS’s high degree of political autonomy or the demographic composition of its town and cities, the Bosnian Serb entity vigorously resisted the international community and the OHR’s work.

Events in the Federation challenged the peace agreement’s execution as well. In his report to the UN Secretary General, Westendorp complained that the structures of ‘Herceg-Bosna’ were still in operation (OHR-R 1998c: par. 22). Conflicts between the Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats also continued, weakening the Federation’s institutions. More appalling were the numerous attacks against returning refugees and displaced persons and their homes. In Drvar, returning Bosnia Serbs found their reconstructed house completely destroyed, while individuals that opposed these returns attacked international organisations’ offices, including the OHR’s office in the town. Two Bosnian Serbs were also murdered and the Serb mayor of the town was attacked. Consequently, the OHR asked SFOR to intervene and secure the environment (OHR-R 1998b: par. 53-55). Westendorp also used his Bonn powers to dismiss public officials that opposed the return of refugees and displaced persons.

Economically, Bosnia’s entities were doing better. The launch of the Konvertible Marka symbolised the first step towards the creation of a single economic space. In mid-1998, Westendorp believed that Bosnia was entering a new stage in its economic development. To make this reality, he argued that the international donors community should start to support projects and fund initiatives that enabled the harmonisation of tax systems, the closing of payment bureaus, the privatisation of state assets, and the strengthening of state institutions (Westendorp 1998b), especially those responsible for managing the country’s economic agenda and those responsible for the oversight of justice (Westendorp 1998a). In many ways, Westendorp believed that the international community was driving Bosnia’s economic improvements. The rise in productivity, declining unemployment, and higher living standards was made possible by foreign aid.
For this reason, Westendorp stressed the importance of pushing market reforms so Bosnia could attract foreign investments, strengthen local businesses and foster new firms that could secure the foundations of a self-sustaining economy (OHR-R 1998d: pars. 103-110), which would in turn support activities attempting to institute a self-sustaining peace (Woodward 1999: 148-49).

Even though economic developments had dramatically improved the lives of Bosnia’s citizens and though the international community increased financial and logistical aid to non-nationalist, civic-minded parties, while also denying funds to nationalist parties, nationalist parties won the 1998 national elections. The result of the elections was a clear indication that economic progress was not going to break Bosnia’s social divisions. In the RS, Plavšić lost the elections to Nikolas Poplasen, who was an active leader of a paramilitary organisation during the war, member of the Radical Party and staunch opponent of the GFA (ICG 1999: 15). While Poplasen’s victory signalled the strength of nationalist sentiment, the OHR argued that the 1998 elections had also weakened the nationalist parties’ and strengthened non-nationalist civic-minded parties, such as the Social Democratic Party (OHR-R 1998a: par. 52-53). Nevertheless, the victory of Poplasen, as well as the easy victories of the SDA and the HDZ, meant that a majority of Bosnia’s citizenry did not support the peace agreement’s implementation.

While not openly admitting so, the elections had not produced the breakthrough the international community was hoping for. Consequently, the PIC’s meeting in Madrid clearly set out a new programme for 1999. Apart from continuing projects in economic development, the enforcement of human rights provisions, democratisation, the return of refugees and displaced persons, and so forth, the PIC argued that meeting these objectives could only be done by way of stronger state institutions. Even though this call was not new, the PIC clearly called for a departure from the past strategy. If the international community could not weaken the nationalist parties via democratic process, then it had to do so by destroying the nationalist parties’ sources of political and economic power. In other words, it was not only necessary for the OHR to impose legislation on the parties or dismiss officials that blocked the peace agreement’s implementation; it was also necessary to carry through the following changes.
1. *The reform of the country's militaries.* The international community wanted to limit the ties between the country's military forces and each nationalist party and merge these into a single cohesive army under the control of the Bosnian state. There was evidence that military forces, especially Bosniak and Croat forces, were being deployed to intimidate voters (OHR-R 1999d: par. 103), thus the importance of reforming military structures and placing these under the complete authority of the state, the OHR and SFOR.

2. *The creation of an apolitical civil service.* The PIC wanted the members of the civil service to be chosen according to professional competence rather than their loyalty to the platforms of nationalist parties. Many of the individuals that served in the burgeoning state bureaucracy were not working on behalf of Bosnia, but in the interest of these parties (PIC 1998: III.3).

3. *The destruction of parallel structures* (PIC 1998: III.7). Examples of these are pension systems (OHR-R 1998a: par. 43), police and paramilitary organisations not endorsed by the GFA (ESI 1999), and payment bureaus that funded the nationalist parties' illegal activities (OHR-R 1999b: par. 76).

4. *The enforcement of the rule of law and the creation an independent judiciary.* The existing judicial structures could not adequately combat corruption and other criminal activities, which supported nationalists' efforts. One of the reasons for this was the influence nationalist parties have in staffing these positions. Hence, an independent judiciary could expose the connections between criminal activities and nationalist parties. For instance, SFOR has documented how illegal Bosnian Croat 'intelligence services were engaged in criminal activities, including child pornography, for the purposes of raising revenues' (ESI 2000d: A.3). Other research shows the connection between criminal organisations and political parties in both the RS and the Federation (ESI 1999: V.b).

5. *Pushing the privatisation of publicly owned industries and utilities.* In the Federation, the SDA had retained 'control over the selection of personnel' and continued 'to exercise political direction' over their activities. Even more important, these publicly owned utilities financed the activities of the SDA backed Agency for Information and Documentation, which were being used to block certain aspects of the peace agreement (ESI 1999: V.c).

6. *The institution of an independent civil society.* The rationale for the creation of this sector is to encourage moderate voices to influence the organisation of society. The OHR wanted to encourage the creation of new local NGOs by asking the country's Council of Minister with the advise from existing NGOs and international experts to draft a Law on Associations and Foundations (OHR 1999d: par. 73).

7. *The creation of a new election law that establishes the Permanent Election Commission.* The OHR, the OSCE and the Council of Europe believed that
Bosnia needed a new election law that would make clear the process by which the people can elect the members of the Presidency and the Parliamentary Assembly. For this reason, Westendorp selected seven individuals to create an independent committee to draft such a law (OHR 1998a: par. 54).

8. The creation of new mechanism to fund the activities of the Bosnian state. The OHR, under Westendorp’s administration, repeatedly complained that the entities were not funding the state’s work. This was a way of blocking its work and hampering the peace agreement’s implementation (PIC 1998 III.3).

While many of these activities were started by the OHR during Westendorp’s tenure, they started to materialise under Petritsch’s term as High Representative. At least two reasons explain why the Madrid Declaration’s objectives were not instituted in early 1999. First, political developments in each entity compromised these institutions’ ability to address these issues. In the RS, Poplasen opposed the candidacy of Milorad Dodik for the post of RS Prime Minister, as Dodik was willing to co-operate with the international community. He also refused to sign important bills approved by the National Assembly, and repeatedly challenged the High Representative’s and SFOR’s authority. For this reason, Westendorp decided to dismiss him on 5 March 1999 (OHR-D 1999), the day Brčko was proclaimed a district administered by both entities.

The decision on Brčko and the political vacuum left by Poplasen created an environment that hampered the international community’s capacity to implement the PIC’s objectives. In the Federation, Bosnian Croat organisations started to question the legitimacy of the Federation and started to campaign for the creation of a third entity within Bosnia. The HDZ also voiced its concerns that the Bosnian Croats were being treated unfairly by Bosniaks. Even more critical, the Deputy Interior Minister Jozo Leutar of the HDZ was assassinated (OHR-R 1999c: pars. 32-34). While there is no evidence that shows that the assassination was a reaction to Bosnian Croats’ complaints, HDZ hard-liners used this as an excuse to take a non-co-operative stance vis-à-vis their Bosniaks counterparts and hamper the work of the Federation’s House of Peoples. Hence, political instabilities within each entity barred international agents from carrying out its agenda (OHR-R 1999b: par. 14).

Second, NATO’s military operation against Yugoslavia over Kosovo not only furthered anger Bosnian Serbs, but the heightened regional situation also threw
international agents off message. Actually, the offensive prompted mobs of Bosnian Serbs to attack the offices and vehicles of international agencies in Banja Luka. Even though these attacks were not intense or frequent, as many Bosnian Serbs expressed their dissatisfaction non-violently, Westendorp made the following statement in his report to the UN Secretary General that during the Kosovo crisis: ‘it has been a turbulent few months for BiH [Bosnia]. Recent events beyond our control may have slowed the pace of peace implementation.’ While the OHR did not reduce the scope of its activities, NATO’s military offensive and the changing strategic regional dynamics challenged the OHR’s ability to carry out its duties and responsibilities.

C. A Stronger OHR and Peace Implementation: On the Right Track?
While many have argued that Westendorp’s tenure was more successful than that of Bildt, it is important to note that both administrations were unable to fully implement the GFA’s civilian aspects. While it is true that international agents accomplished more under Westendorp’s term, it the international community, fearing a resumption of hostilities if it pre-maturely exited Bosnia or worried by the possibility of its long-term presence, decided to take on a more maximalist approach. The increased ability of the OHR to implement key parts of the GFA was dependent on the international community’s realisation that the minimalist position championed by the Clinton administration was not going to mend Bosnia’s fractured relations. For this reason, the PIC decided to enhance the High Representative’s powers and set out a clear state-building agenda.

By the time of his departure, Westendorp had imposed or re-written 45 pieces of legislations that strengthened the state institutions, creating the foundations of a state identity (e.g. imposition of a flag, coat of arms, anthem, licences plates, the design of the Konvertible Marka, citizenship laws, passports and so forth) and starting important economic reforms. Nevertheless, international agents were unable to foster inter-ethnic reconciliation or weaken the position of nationalist parties, though he removed 16 public officials from power (Westendorp 1999). For all these actions, the OHR just reinforced the importance of the international community and the inability of local actors to control and administer their own affairs (Hayden 1998 and 1999).
In many ways, the problem with the GFA’s implementation, the PIC repeatedly argued, was not the agreement’s provisions, but the parties that resisted the implementation of the peace accords. While this is one of the reasons that impelled the PIC to widen the OHR’s mandate, the problem with the Bonn powers was that it contradicted the democratic ideals that supposedly inspired the GFA. The imposition of laws drafted by the OHR or other international agents meant that the activities of the state and entity structures did not directly represent the interests of Bosnia’s citizens, but rather those of the international community. International rhetoric argued that Bosnia’s officials, especially those of the main nationalist parties, worked against the interest of Bosnia. While there might be some truth to this argument, these officials were elected to their post and many in Bosnia do not hold the negotiated agreement in the highest regard. This even holds true with moderate politicians that have openly criticised the peace process.

Furthermore, the repeated dismissals of public officials that resist the GFA’s implementation or speak against its execution raised questions about the democratic and open nature of Bosnian society. The European Stability Initiative has accurately demonstrated this problem by documenting Dragan Cavić’s legal challenge to Westendorp’s decision to dismiss him from his position in the RS’s National Assembly for making a speech that maintained that NATO’s intervention in Kosovo could incite violence against SFOR in the RS. Cavić took his appeal to the Human Rights Chamber on the grounds that his right to freedom of speech was violated, but this body found that it had no jurisdiction to review decisions of the High Representative (ESI 2000d: D.2). Indeed, Izetbegović’s remarks linking these dismissals to Josip Broz Tito’s oppressive tactics to assure social stability are not only telling, but these also showed the two-facedness of international engagement in Bosnia.

‘[R]emember the communist times: they would arrest a Chetnik or an Ustasha and with them they would throw in some Muslim, not because [they were] guilty but for the sake of peace in the house... In Sarajevo they remove a man, label him as dishonest, [did] not present any proof of this and then they [the international community] talk to us about human rights... They want us to take their word for it’ (Cited in ESI 2000d: D.2).

Had the OHR overstepped its boundaries or did the implementation of the peace agreement become an end that was more important than the liberal democratic values and
humanitarian ideals that supposedly inspirited the peace process? While many in the international community have praised Westendorp’s efforts, the fact is that the peacebuilding process contradicts the political system crafted at Dayton. As David Chandler (2000: 274) notes in his insightful analysis of post-Dayton Bosnia:

The constantly expanding role of the multitude of international organisations has inevitably restricted the capacity of Bosnian people to discuss, develop and decide on vital questions of concern. At state level, the Bosnian Muslim, Croat and Serb representatives can discuss international policy proposals under the guidance of the OHR, but, at most, can make minor amendments or delay the implementation of externally prepared rules and regulations. Even this limited accountability has been diminished by the High Representative, who has viewed democratic consensus-building in Bosnia’s state bodies such as the tripartite Presidency, Council of Ministers and State Parliament as an unnecessary delay to imposing international policy.

Instead of building the necessary political culture so the parties can start administering their own affairs, international agents are creating a system of more dependence in both economic and political fields (Bugajski 2000). The greatest challenge has been the creation of a new formula that gives the parties more participation without limiting the power or the influence of the OHR. This was exactly the task that Westendorp left to his successor, the Austrian diplomat, Wolfgang Petritsch.

II. CHARTING A NEW DIRECTION?
Petritsch is probably the most qualified of the High Representatives. He holds a doctoral degree in Southeastern European history. He was born in a small village near the Austrian-Slovenian border. He speaks the language fluently and understands the cultural dynamics of the region and Petritsch emphasises he also was educated in multi-cultural schools (Lovrenovic 2000). Prior to his post at the OHR, he was the European Union’s Special Envoy to Kosovo and its chief negotiator at the Rambouillet and Paris peace talks. In essence, Petritsch’s nomination can be understood as the international community’s attempt to correct some of its past mistakes and start its disengagement from Bosnian affairs. The PIC’s Madrid Declaration, as seen above, had to still be implemented. Petritsch however was asked to design a new peace implementation
approach that secured the foundations of a self-sustaining peace, while also continuing with Westendorp’s efforts.

Westendorp’s agenda was influenced by the tenets of the strategic approach. The international community, as explained above, came to the conclusion that if the parties were not going to implement the peace agreement, then it was the responsibility of international agents to impose its provisions; hence the PIC’s decision to make international financial assistance conditional on the support of the peace process, and the augmentation of the High Representative’s power to assure the GFA’s full implementation. It is important to remember that it was originally envisioned that the international community was to play a dominant role in Bosnia for a year, until Bosnia’s citizens elected the members of Bosnia’s central institution (Chandler 2000: 273). While the PIC did not explicitly state that its strategies had deviated from the original intention of negotiators at Dayton, Petritsch’s first article as High Representative argued that the international community needed to create a new approach based on the concept of ‘ownership’ (Petritsch 1999). As noted by the PIC’s Steering Board’s Communiqué after the New York meeting on 22 September 1999, ownership meant that the process had to make Bosnia’s citizens and officials ‘owners of their progress in implementation of the Dayton/Paris Accords and the eventual entry of Bosnia-Herzegovina into European institutions’ (PIC 1999).

This did not mean that the international community was to go back on its policy of conditionality, as set out in the PIC’s Sintra meeting, held in 1997. Conditionality was enlarged to include other areas outside international assistance. For instance, the PIC’s Steering Board’s New York Communiqué established the significance of setting a course where Bosnia could join the process of European integration. The entry into Europe’s institutions was dependent on Bosnia’s commitment to fully implement the GFA’s provisions. Broadening this approach in order to include the entry of Bosnia in these institutions was also necessary, as the international community started to decrease its financial commitments. With less financial assistance, the international community needed to offer other incentives in order to enhance co-operation between the parties, strengthen the state institutions, and implement needed economic and political reforms.
While conditionality, as a peace implementation approach, was enlarged, Petritsch’s ownership approach was a way of radicalising the existing policy in order to achieve the PIC’s objectives, as set out in the Madrid Declaration. Consequently, Petritsch vowed to continue the work of his predecessor and use the Bonn powers when necessary. The only difference was that his approach was a way to convey to Bosnia’s citizens that the implementation of the peace agreement was not only in their interest, but that it could also be affected by their participation. If the OHR and other international agents were being criticised for implementing the provisions of an agreement that many perceived as unfair, then Petritsch argued that pushing through the reforms started by Westendorp was not enough. Instead he believed that it was necessary to foster a change of attitude that would increase popular support for peace implementation. Only if this could take place, he argued, the citizens of Bosnia would start supporting moderate non-nationalist parties and open the doors to economic prosperity, integration into Europe, and a self-sustaining peace (Petritsch 2000c).

In many ways, Petritsch’s peace implementation strategy, while controversial, was accepted because it strongly endorsed past strategies, while seemingly correcting their errors. In other words, if the state-building agenda pushed by Westendorp increased the dependency of Bosnia and questioned the strength of liberal-democratic values and humanitarian ideals that supposedly influenced the making of the peace agreement, then the concept of ownership was to continue the agenda, but via what seemed to be more democratic means. More important, the emphasis on ownership was supposed to start the disengagement of the international community, which had repeatedly expressed its dissatisfaction with the peace implementation process and the amount of resources lost trying to institute a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia.

Even though Petritsch’s ownership approach is currently guiding the international community’s re-organisation of its presence in Bosnia, this approach was downplayed in 2001, strengthening the PIC’s state-building programme. Petritsch’s term as High Representative has seen setbacks and breakthroughs. This has affected the PIC’s recommendations and the OHR’s actions. It is necessary to analyse the feasibility of the approach in the context of the PIC’s decision to present a bolder state-building programme, which echoed the Madrid Declaration’s agenda. It is important to emphasise
that this chapter’s examination of Petritsch’s work is until 1 January 2002, when the international community started to voice strong support for Petritsch’s proposals to realise a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia by the end of 2007.

A. Ownership: A Failed Approach?

Like his predecessors, Petritsch inherited a country that was divided along social, political, and economic lines. While many non-governmental organisations had been operating in Bosnia, trying to foster reconciliation, Bosnia’s communities still did not trust each other. At the time, the World Bank published a study that found that the level of social distance was still very high (Dani, et. al. 1999). These social divisions toughened the position of nationalist parties and undermined the international community’s efforts to strengthen non-nationalist, civic-minded political parties.

At the economic level, individuals in the Federation were in a stronger economic footing than their counterparts in the RS. This was determined by the higher levels of international assistance the Federation had received and by Kosovo war’s impact on the RS’s economy, which was dependent on Yugoslav markets. Even though individuals in both entities had prospered since the signing of the GFA, they strongly supported nationalist parties, questioning the international community’s peacebuilding strategy. On a positive note, the World Bank study found that although individuals from different groups distrusted each other, it also showed that they were willing to work alongside members of other ethno-national backgrounds.

The political divisions were even stronger within each entity. In the Federation, the Bosnian Croats kept blocking the work of Federation institutions, while contending relations between Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks in Mostar intensified. Attempting to preserve its power, the HDZ did not dissolve Herceg-Bosna’s structures, as Westendorp and other agents of the international community demanded. In Drvar, returnees, mostly Bosnian Serb, faced strong opposition from local authorities. Except for the signing of the Special Relations Agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the Federation, the latter half of 1999 was characterised by political turmoil, hampering the work of the Federation and the GFA’s implementation (OHR-R 1999a: pars. 24-28). These violations forced Petritsch to dismiss the deputy mayor of Drvar, a Bosnian Croat, and suspend
Radio Mostar’s broadcasting license for three months for calling war veterans to prevent SFOR’s Operation Westar. This operation was carried in order to crackdown on illegal Bosnian Croat and Croatian military intelligence organisations that were spying on international officials and administering criminal networks, used to finance the operations of Herceg-Bosna’s structures (ESI 2000e: A.3).

In the RS, even though Westendorp dismissed Poplasen, he still was an important political force, trying to undermine the work of Dodik’s caretaker government. A constitutional battle had also challenged Dodik’s government, as Poplasen was not replaced. The Vice President, Mirko Sarović, of the SDS, wanted to assume the presidency, but the international community repeatedly prevented him from doing so by threatening to cut all aid to the RS. Furthermore, the OSCE and the OHR did not certify Poplasen’s SRS and the SSRS in the April municipal elections, as they had failed to take the necessary steps to meet the criteria for certification. Both parties threatened to further disrupt the political process in the RS (OHR-R 1999a: par. 35).

At the national level, the work of the Council of Ministers was affected by a ruling from the Constitutional Court that found that ‘the current system within the Council of Ministers that established a co-chair and vice-chair’ unconstitutional (OHR-R 1999a: par. 20). The Presidency’s operation was also disrupted by the Serb member’s invocation of the “vital interest” clause in the constitution, which assigns each community the ability of stopping any Presidency decision from taking place. While this created some problems for a time, the Presidency ‘continued to carry out its planned joint activities’ (OHR-R 1999a: par. 17), signalling the amount of success the international community’s state-building programme had achieved. The biggest obstacle in the country’s Parliamentary Assembly was the disposition of the RS political parties to vote as a bloc in order to obstruct legislation that would have given more power to state institutions, undermining ‘the very concept of a unitary sovereign state’ (OHR-R 1999a: par. 15).

More surprising, criticism against the GFA’s implementation started to be voiced by moderate politicians in the Federation. Haris Silajdžić (1999-2000) and Krešimir Zubak, both present at the Dayton peace talks, were asking the international community to reconsider its position regarding the GFA. In addition, a group of journalist from the
influential Bosnian magazine, Dani, asked Petritsh to declare Bosnia an international protectorate for a year so the OHR and other international organisations could push through the necessary economic and political reforms to make peace in Bosnia self-sustaining (Lovrenovic 2000). While Petritsch recognised these political leaders' criticisms and these journalists' proposal, he argued against them by re-emphasising the importance of 'ownership' as an approach to influence the nature of peace implementation.

In reaction to all these developments, and complementing SFOR's Operation Westar, Petritsch decided to use his Bonn powers to dismiss 22 officials for obstructing the implementation of the peace agreement (1999a) and he imposed a package of property and housing laws in order to harmonise the laws of each entity and allow returnees to reclaim their properties (1999c). While these decisions might seem to contradict Petritsch's approach, it is important to note that he believed that these were an integral part of it. In a speech to the UN Security Council, he explained that these decisions were necessary to create 'a “level playing field,” before stepping back and letting the players get on with the game' (1999b).

Other draft laws were prepared by the OHR with the assistance of international agents, local groups, and representatives of the major political parties. The most important of these were: (a) the Election Law, (b) the Rule of Law and Judicial Reform, and (c) the Border Service Law. This last draft was not part of the PIC's Madrid programme; it was an outcome of the negotiations that led to the New York Declaration of 15 November 1999, which was signed by the members of Bosnia's Presidency. By signing the document, the members of the Presidency re-affirmed their commitment to work with the international community and to fully carry out the GFA's provisions. In addition, the document strongly criticised those public officials that resisted these efforts (OHR-D 1999).

While the Presidency agreed to create a Border Service, the country's Parliamentary Assembly voted against the bill. Petritsch was forced to impose it on 13 January 2000 (OHR-D 2000). Another set back for the international community was the Parliament's decision to vote down the Electoral Law (OHR-R 2000b: par. 3). Instead of imposing the Electoral Law, Petritsch decided that the parties should continue to work on
the draft with interested parties (2000b). Hence, the April municipal elections and the November national elections were to be organised according to the provisional electoral law, which was amended, so its provisions could approximate those of the draft Electoral Law presented to the Parliamentary Assembly (OHR-R 2000b: par. 7).

In the economic field, the entities' legislature and the central state structures were hampering privatisation efforts and blocking important economic reforms. While this angered Petritsch, he decided not to impose any decisions and asked the OHR's Economic Task Force to meet with local officials in order to break the impasse.

Petritsch also decided to let the Presidency decide how to reform the Council of Ministers, so this operated according to Constitutional Court's decision, which found that its organisation was unconstitutional. It seems that Petritsch's decision was controversial, as he had to defend it before the UN Security Council (2000a):

In the affair of the Council of Ministers, I have deliberately kept out of the fray, stressing the strong desirability of a solution arrived at by purely domestic consensus. The results are, I freely admit, a little depressing at the first sight – although I believe that the policy of insisting on Ownership is still the right one. Bosnia and Herzegovina is – and must always remain – their country.

While the Presidency met to consider this issue, its first proposals were unacceptable because it still attempted to appoint ministers according to principles of 'ethnic parity rather than by the efficient running of Government' (OHR-R 2000b: par. 5). Meaning that the creation of the three new ministries – Human Rights, European Integration and Stability Pact and Treasury for State Institutions – were created in order to assure that each community had an equal amount of members in the Council of Ministers. While this was not entirely unacceptable, as Petritsch and other officials welcomed the creation of the new ministries, the Presidency's arrangement, which also included the rotation of the Chair every eight months, demonstrated the difficulties of breaking nationalist parties' hold on power.

Because of all these difficulties, the concept of ownership came under attack at the international level. The results of the municipal elections held on 8 April 2000 finally forced the international community to reconsider Petritsch's original strategy and institute
a new state-building programme, closely based on the PIC’s Madrid Declaration’s conclusions.

B. Re-Committing to the State-Building Programme

While the concept of ownership called on Bosnia’s political leadership to start assuming responsibility for peace implementation and the administration of their country, it also called on Bosnia’s citizenry to affect the process by actively campaigning for a new political environment that fostered openness, tolerance, and multi-ethnicity. Even though the OHR assembled a number of working groups to draft legislation on the Law on Associations and Foundations, these were not completed until autumn 2000. This is not to say that indigenous non-governmental organisations and other groups did not operate at the local level. Their work however was hampered by nationalist parties and by the lack of a legal framework that protected their activities.

Shortly before the 2000 municipal elections, Petritsch called on the country’s citizenry to take control of the peace process by supporting moderate, civic-minded parties. He believed that the death of Franjo Tudjman and the victory of the opposition party in Croatia could show Bosnia’s citizens the possibility of moving away from nationalism to democracy. These requests did not materialise as the nationalist parties won the elections, securing their powerful positions. While the OHR repeatedly argued that the elections results point to the weakening of the nationalist parties, this conclusion was exaggerated.

The SDP did increase its overall share of the vote in the Federation, but it only weakened the SDA’s position, as the majority of its supporters are Bosniaks in urban areas. The HDZ however convincingly won Croat controlled regions of the Federation. In addition, the OHR argued that the elections produced more pluralism in the RS. Although this is true, these parties were all pro-Serb and while they differed on their views on peace implementation, they were strong advocates of a weak central state. Even more critical, the SDS regained control of most municipalities, while Dodik’s Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) made very small gains (OHR-R 2000a: pars. 10-12).
The disappointing election results, plus the events that hampered the execution of the PIC's Madrid programme, forced the PIC to reconsider Petritsch's strategy at the PIC Ministerial Meeting held in Brussels on 23-24 May 2000. In many ways, the Brussels Declaration calls for a more robust state-building programme. While the document expressed its satisfaction with the strengthening of Bosnia's state institutions, the increasing number of refugee returns, and the end of the reconstruction of economic infrastructure, it equally emphasised that 'these achievements [were] largely the result of intensive international efforts' (PIC 2000a). Firmly articulating its 'dissatisfaction with the slow pace of domestic peace implementation since its Madrid meeting in 1998,' the PIC blamed Bosnia's nationalist political parties for the repeated obstructions and urged the High Representative 'to use his authority in accordance with his mandate to ensure full and accelerated implementation in all sectors of civilian implementation, including removing obstacles that stand in the way of economic reform' (PIC 2000a).

The PIC, in many ways, expressed its impatience with Petritsch's 'ownership' approach, though it endorsed his 'efforts to streamline co-ordination of the international community in [Bosnia] and accelerate peace implementation for the good of Bosnia's citizens (PIC 2000a). However, the Brussels Declaration makes no mention of Petritsch's 'ownership' approach. Instead, it clearly delineates, what the PIC (2000a) called an 'accelerated phase of peace implementation', which was to end with the 2002 elections for the Presidency of Bosnia. In this way, the document affirms 'the growing concern that international resources will not be available at their current levels for much longer' (ESI 2000a), thus emphasising the importance of its state-building agenda in a 'accelerated phase of peace implementation.'

This agenda was divided into three interdependent policy areas.

1. **Economic reform.** The PIC expected the OHR to play an active role: to create an integrated Bosnian economy; to craft and implement measures to enable market sector growth; to develop mechanisms to fight corruption; and to increase the pace of privatisation (PIC 2000a).

2. **Return of refugees and displaced persons.** It called for the full implementation of all property laws. To streamline the return process and minimise the conflicts this have caused, the PIC called on the parties, with the assistance of the OHR, to set up the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees at the national level (PIC
2000b). It also called on international agents to combine their efforts to construct and re-build housing in order to accommodate returning refugees or displaced persons (PIC 2000a).

3. Strengthening the state's capabilities. The PIC re-stressed the importance of creating an apolitical civil service, reforming local government structures in both entities, and engendering mechanisms to fund the work of the Bosnian state structures. It also called on the Parliamentary Assembly to accept the Electoral Law, the Law on Associations and Foundations, and the Law on the State Court, which aimed to create a new judicial mechanism to address criminal and civil disputes at the national level (PIC 2000c).

While these requirements reflect those demanded by the PIC’s Madrid Declaration and its objectives, it is important to note some important differences. First, the PIC set deadlines for the implementation of certain policies. For instance, it stated that the payment bureaus had to be dismantled by December 2000, while ordering the Parliamentary Assembly to adopt the Law on Civil Service and the Law of the State Court by September 2000 (PIC 2000b). Second, the PIC called on the international community to channel all international financial assistance through the organs of the state, that is to say via the newly created Ministry of the Treasury. The intent was not only to increase the scope of state institutions, but also to create a dependency between state structures and the different regions of Bosnia, which would in turn enhance efforts to construct a single economic space.

Third, and following the same integrationist logic, the PIC ordered the drafting of initiatives that transformed ‘the Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM) into a State defence structure.’ The PIC argued that the integration of defence policy was necessary in order to guarantee Bosnia’s entry into European structures (PIC 2000a):

[Bosnia] now must think about its place in wider European security. If the authorities are to make progress towards their objective of Euro-Atlantic integration, there must be fundamental changes, the current high levels of defence spending cannot be sustained. [Bosnia] needs to have armed forces with a unified command and control capable of joint deployment and action under international and regional security organisations. The Council urges [Bosnian] authorities to put intelligence services under democratic control and to consolidate them.
Fourth, the PIC instructed the High Representative to create a Public Broadcasting System (PBS). This body was not to affect the OBN, as this was a private corporation. While the PIC noted that increased competition between the PBS and ‘private viable competitors’ would ensure the public’s right to know and stimulate vigorous public debate and a culture where public opinion serves as a check and balance on institutions’ (PIC 2000a), many studies had showed that most people did not watch the OBN’s programmes, but those owned and operated by nationalist parties (Chandler 1999). These systems were not only preventing the OBN from increasing its market share, but more important these were transmitting information that contradicted the international community’s peace implementation programme. In order to assure the objectivity of the PBS, the nature of its programming was to decided by a ‘Telecommunications Regulatory Agency for Bosnia’ (OHR-R 2000a: par. 57).

Lastly, but equally important, the PIC asked Bosnia’s state authorities to start submitting detailed reports on the implementation of this agenda to the Steering Board every six months (2000a). The PIC did not explain the rationale behind this last request, but it seems that Petritsch’s ownership approach had some influence after all. Echoing his call for Bosnia’s politicians to be more accountable, the reports forced them to continue to fully execute the peace agreement’s provisions.

For the most part, the Brussels programme’s legislative package was not approved or considered by Bosnia’s legislative bodies during the summer and fall of 2000. One of the main reasons was that nationalist parties were preoccupied with the general elections, which took place on 11 November 2000. In light of political changes that had occurred in Croatia after Tudjman’s death and the democratic revolution that led to Milošević’s downfall in September, nationalist parties in Bosnia devoted their energies and resources to strengthen their positions and secure their hold of power. With Tudjman’s HDZ out of power, the Bosnian Croat HDZ enjoyed less financial support. The same held true for Bosnian Serb parties. The general weakness of the new democratic government in Serbia and the Serbs desire to dedicate more time to their growing domestic problems meant that these parties could not rely on Belgrade’s support. As for the SDA, the challenge it faced was not only Izetbegović’s retirement and his resignation as member of Bosnia’s
presidency, but also the increasing evidence that linked the SDA to a number of corruption charges (Domi 2000).

The shifting political landscape were seen by many officials in the international community as an opportunity to finally undermine nationalist parties’ agendas (Domi 2000; ICG 2000a; and Kovac 2000). Dissatisfaction with these parties and their inability to address economic and social issues had made people in Bosnia question their legitimacy. Indeed, the high level of unemployment, coupled by corruption at all levels of government, budget deficits, cuts in pension plans, decreasing production outputs, and a diminishing amount of foreign aid and investment was causing people in both entities to consider switching their support to other political parties (Kovac 2000). It seemed that material concerns were overriding other non-material interests, such as fear of assimilation into a majority culture, domination of other ethno-nationalist groups, or demographic changes in towns and cities prompted by the return of refugees or displaced persons. In fact, the summer months saw the highest rate of refugee return since the GFA’s signing. While these refugees did cause some unrest in deeply divided towns, these individuals were strongly wanted Bosnia’s authorities to pay more attention to the worsening economic situation (Komsic 2001).

As a result, the OSCE and the OHR started to increase assistance to moderate political parties and to directly lobby Bosnia’s electorate to support these younger and more progressive politicians. The OHR and the OSCE organized a public information campaign that linked corruption charges and other economic and social problems to nationalist politicians. Officials from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the European Union joined the OHR and OSCE’s campaign and declared that future levels of financial support for Bosnia would be dependent on the election results. Conveying the message weeks before the elections took place, Petritsch informed Bosnia that: “We are nearing the end in many ways. What we are talking about is that the international community might eventually move out of Bosnia. Many parts have already moved out intellectually and politically because they consider Bosnian politicians simply so irresponsible they cannot go on helping” (cited in Becirevic and Buturovic 2000).

Another important reason why the Brussels programme was ignored by Bosnia’s political bodies was related to the controversies produced by the Constitutional Court’s
ruling on the 'constituent peoples' case. After months of deliberation, Bosnia’s highest
court established that 'no ethnic group constituent on the territory of [Bosnia] shall be
excluded from exercising his rights in the Entities' (OHR-R 2000a: par 10). It also
affirmed that Bosnia’s constitution is the country’s supreme law and that the
Constitutional Court is not only the country’s highest judicial body, but also that its
authority must be observed by both entities. This ruling required the entities to amend
their constitutions, so their provisions are in line with Bosnia’s constitution, stressing that
Bosnia is a single political body, with a single legal system and led by central state
institutions.

The opinion, which was made public in early July 2000, was not published until
14 September. More contentious, the ruling was strongly opposed by the two Bosnian
Croat and Bosnian Serb judges. The two Bosniak judges and the three international judges
backed the ruling (OHR-R 2000a: par. 10-11). The Court’s division is not surprising as
Izetbegović brought the case to its attention, while the interests of the other two ethno-
national communities were threaten by this decision. Similarly, the international judges
wanted to rectify some of the issues that were not adequately addressed at Dayton.

The OHR formed two constitutional commissions. Composed of representatives
from each community, plus a group of individuals representing ‘Others’, these
commissions’ mandate is to discuss and to amend the entities constitution according to
new principles of equality and multi-ethnicity. However, the Bosnia Croat and Bosnian
Serb nationalist parties undermined these commissions’ work, as the ruling challenge
their ability of fulfilling their objectives. It is important to remember the Bosniaks
supported the ruling, as it enabled Bosniaks in the RS to have more say in its political
affairs and it could diminish the HDZ’s objective of further weakening the Federation
structures.

Although the ruling and the organisation of elections obstructed the Brussels
programme’s execution, the Constitutional Court’s decision also allowed international
agents to conduct a bolder strategy to convince Bosnia’s citizens to vote for moderate
political parties. Consequently, the OSCE’s Provisional Elections Committee (PEC)
decided in October 2000 to use the Draft Electoral Law, called by the Brussels
programme and rejected by Bosnia’s legislature during the summer of 2000, to organise
the November general elections (Hasovic 2000). These new rules and regulations, as Nedžida Salihović, the Provisional Elections Commission's (PEC) Legal Counsel noted, were supposed to severely weaken nationalist parties' hold on power and help moderate parties win the elections (OSCE-I 2000).

While the new rules were supposed to affect all nationalist parties, it seems that the OSCE wanted to put more pressure on the SDA and the HDZ than their Bosnian Serb counterparts. The OSCE altered the way people were to be elected in the Federation's bodies. Rather than just representing an equal number of Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats, the new rules stipulated that the House of Peoples would also represent a number of 'Others'. Thus, Bosnian Serbs living in the Federation could directly affect the political process by electing their own representatives. Lacking strong nationalist parties and wanting to diminish the power of the SDA and the HDZ, the new rules gave Bosnian Serbs and people from other minority groupings a strong incentive to vote for moderate, non-nationalist parties. While these new rules were in line with the Constitutional Court's decision, the OSCE did not apply its provisions to the RS. The RS still had a political system that discriminated against non-Serbs (Hasovic 2000). This decision angered non-nationalist politicians, because they strongly believed that the OSCE should have equally applied the ruling on both entities.

The combination of the OHR and OSCE's public campaigns, the international community's threat that funding would be scaled if nationalists won a majority in the elections, the anger many voters expressed about nationalist politicians inability to deal with Bosnia's mounting social and economic problems, and the OSCE's imposition of new electoral rules should have produced a victory for non-nationalist parties. This however was not entirely the case. The general elections did produce a coalition of non-

27 The Electoral law included a number of electoral mechanisms (e.g. preferential voting system, which was to be used in the election of the President and Vice President of the RS, a proportional system for multimember constituencies, and a use of open list systems) in order to secure a more proportional representation of political parties in all institutions. Moreover, the new rules also ordered political parties to report their finances in order to make sure that the funding used to finance their campaign activities were in accordance with legal standards. In addition to this, the PEC required that all candidates must not posses another person's property. Those that were found in violation of this rule could not hold any political position. In order to ensure the independence of economy from the intervention of the political parties, the PEC also instituted a rule that stipulated that elected officials could not be members of a state-owned enterprise's Steering Board. In all, the new rules were designed to break the nationalist political parties' hold on power and permit civic-minded political parties to take control of the political process.
nationalist parties, named the Alliance for Change, to run the country's central government and the Federation. In the RS, Mladen Ivanic's Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) entered a coalition with the SDS, which received the majority of the vote, which meant that the SDS had to tone down its nationalist rhetoric.

Even though these results have been seen as encouraging signs, the international community was stunned by the nationalist political parties' performance. A spokesman for the Council of Europe stated days after the election results were publicised: “We are disappointed and mystified that people want a better life and financial support from the West, and yet they are not prepared to vote for the parties, which could have made it happen” (cited in Cvijanovic 2000) At this time, it was not sure if a non-nationalist or moderate government could be established in Bosnia. It took the OHR, with the assistance of the US and British ambassadors to Bosnia, almost two months of difficult negotiations to put together the SDP-led Alliance for Change.

Why did people support nationalist parties when people had expressed their dissatisfaction with their performance? Ozren Kebo (2000), a Sarajevo based political analyst, argues that the international community's active interference in the process drove many to cast their votes for these parties. The International Crisis Group (2000a) concurs with this view. Both studies emphasise that the OSCE's decision to change election procedures in the Federation, while not doing so in the RS, enabled the HDZ to mount a strong nationalist campaign that called on the international community to create a third entity within Bosnia. A referendum on the creation of such an entity was also held on 11 November 2000, even though it violated OSCE's election procedures and the GFA's provisions.

Different public opinions polls, conducted prior to election day, found that the SDS was increasing its support. It is important to keep in mind that the OHR, in an effort to weaken the anti-GFA SDS and other extreme nationalist parties, decided to back Prime Minister Dodik's SNSD. Even though Dodik was more willing to support GFA's implementation, his government had failed to adequately address the entity's social and economic difficulties. While the international community has admitted that it was an error to support Dodik, this strategy enabled the SDS to increase its popularity. As Zejliko
Cvijanovic (2000b) states, ‘Instead of banging the nationalist drum, it [the SDS] devoted much of its time to accusing Dodik’s government of corruption and incompetence.’

Further strengthening the SDS’s position, Richard Holbrooke went to Bosnia to ask the OSCE and the OHR to ban the party. While his request might have been influenced by the SDS’s re-invigoration, Holbrooke made the case that the it was a ‘criminal organisation’ that harboured war criminals (ICG 2000a). The OSCE and the OHR dismissed his request, fearing that the controversy could lead to civil and political unrest in the RS, but Holbrooke’s appeal angered many Bosnian Serbs. More important, Holbrooke’s comments probably convinced supporters of the banned Serb Radical Party to participate in the elections and cast their votes for the SDS. In all, the SDS did better than expected, though it still had to share power with the Ivanic’s PDP.

Keeping in mind that the SDP had achieved huge gains in the municipal elections of April 2000, many experts had predicted a weak showing for the SDA in the November elections. With help from the OHR and the OSCE’s public information campaign, many newspapers in Sarajevo, Dnevni Avaz being the most influential, printed a number of scandals that clearly demonstrated that the SDA politicians’ ‘misuse of funds and corrupt practices, bore significant responsibility for the poor economy, non-payment of pensions, lack of assistance for war invalids, the squandering of international assistance, and the abuse of the privatisation process, all to the detriment of ordinary Bosnians’ (ICG 2000a). But these accusations made the SDA even more determined to stay alive. With opinion polls showing that the majority of Bosnian Serbs would support the SDS and Bosnian Croats the HDZ, the SDA built their campaign around the following slogan: “Each has selected his own: What about you?” The SDA also compared the SPD to the communist party that allowed Bosnian Serbs to control Bosnia’s political structures (ICG 2000a). In the end, the SDA won by a small margin most Bosniak votes, but the SDP emerged as one of the strongest parties because it garnered votes from Bosnia’s diverse citizenry.

Non-nationalist and moderate parties, such as the SPD, Silajdžić’s Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Ivanić’s PDP in the RS, won sizeable parts of the electorate, but not as much as experts had predicted. However, for the first time in Bosnia’s short history, nationalist parties had garnered less than 50 percent of the vote (Kovac 2001). Although these moderate parties’ increasing strength was seen as a
positive sign, the elections also demonstrated that nationalist parties’ support remained strong. Even more troubling is the fact that these moderate parties acquired more strength in Bosniak-controlled areas of the Federation. As seen during the April 2000 municipal elections, Bosniaks have been more inclined to support non-nationalist parties, than Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs.

Once the OSCE confirmed the election results in late November, one question had to still be answered. What parties would administer Bosnia’s central government and its entities political system? As noted before, after several weeks of tense negotiations, the OHR did produce a coalition government led by the SDP, called the Alliance for Change, in the Federation and at the national level. These coalitions held a slim majority over nationalist parties. Hence, the coalitions face many challenges from nationalist parties (Komsic 2001) and within its members, as each party has different objectives and visions of Bosnian society (Kovac 2001). For this reason, Petritsch called on the international community not too pressure these fragile coalitions (OHR-R 2001c):

The election results have resulted in legislatures at the State and Entity levels where majorities are extremely fragile. It is essential that this situation is not abused for narrow political interests to destabilise democratically elected governments faced with fundamental and difficult reforms. For [Bosnia] to move forward, the country needs a high degree of political consensus. The onus is not only on the newly elected governments, but also on those parties now in opposition to prove their maturity.

Hence, Petritsch announced his intention to help strengthen these coalitions, while also fully implementing the Brussels programme’s package of reforms. This is in line with the international community’s state-building strategy, as the original intention of the peace implementation programme was the establishment of a government that would support the implementation of the GFA’s civilian provisions. For this reason, Petritsch used his Bonn powers and imposed most of the Brussels programme, while asking the international community to stay engaged in Bosnia (2001c), especially when the newly elected US president, George W. Bush, was calling for a decreased role for US troops in the Balkans.
Sensing the international community’s impatience and the uncertainties created by the aftermath of the general elections, the OHR started to play a stronger role. Petritsch imposed over 20 laws to ensure that economic reforms continued in Bosnia and another series of human rights protection and property laws to further weaken the power of nationalist parties. With American calls to restrict its responsibilities in the Balkans and donor fatigue setting-in, Petritsch felt that Bosnia had to do more to fulfil the requirements of the ‘EU Road Map’, negotiated between EU officials and Bosnia in the spring of 2000. The EU’s requirements were essentially the same to those found in the Brussels programme. Shortly after the elections took place, Bosnian officials met with EU representatives in Zagreb to discuss the implementation of the ‘Road Map’. It was agreed that Bosnia’s fulfilment of these requirements would start the Stabilisation and Association process, which would be the first step in Bosnia’s drive to become a EU member, and Bosnia’s membership in the Council of Europe (OHR-R 2000c).

Another reason that forced Petritsch to take a stronger role in Bosnia was the challenges the new Alliance for Change faced from the HDZ and the new government in the RS. Both felt threatened by the new coalition. Even though Ivanić’s government pledged to support the Alliance for Change, he obstructed the work of the Council of Ministers because he felt that its ‘legislative agenda [invaded] the RS’s competencies’ (OHR-R 2001c: pars. 1-2). As it turns out, he was also strongly against the strengthening of Bosnia’s state institutions. This led Petritsch to impose more laws that strengthened the state, while threatening the RS for its lack of co-operation.

The HDZ challenge was more serious. Even though the HDZ did not accept the outcome of the general elections, because it felt that the OSCE’s imposition of new procedures was an illegitimate act, its decision to boycott the work of the Federation’s bodies and Bosnia’s central government frustrated the international community’s efforts. When the international community ordered the HDZ to participate in these institutions, the HDZ’s leadership chose to create a third entity in Bosnia. This prompted the OHR and SFOR to take action. With strong support from the US, the EU, and the UN, the OHR decided to dismiss Ante Jelavić, the presidency’s Croat member, and other HDZ officials throughout the Federation (Kebo 2001). The decision also barred them from holding any public office or party post (OHR-PS 2001i). In addition, SFOR troops raided
Hercegovacka Banka, as this institution was financing the operation of illegal Bosnian Croat structures. While the raid was a success, many people got hurt as extreme Bosnian Croat nationalists called on the people to stop SFOR troops from entering the bank (OHR-PS 2001h).

Whereas the OHR and SFOR contained the HDZ challenge, it also prompted many in Bosnia to question the credibility of the GFA as a tool of peacemaking. In fact, during the crisis, Jelavić had written to President Bush to ask him to organise a new conference ‘to hammer out a “new order” in Bosnia’ (Kebo 2001) Even though the US and the international community supported the OHR’s and SFOR’s actions, the PIC called on the OHR to work with the new government to strengthen Bosnia’s state institutions and weaken nationalist movements (PIC 2001c) and organise a series of meetings with Bosnian Croat officials to address their issues of concern.

The same message was conveyed once again in 10 May 2001 (PIC 2001b, following the outbreak of violence in Banja Luka and Trebinje. Both incidents were sparked by the international community’s commitment to re-build the Ferhadija Mosque in Banja Luka and the Osman Pasha Mosque in Trebinje (OHR-PS 2001g; and OHR-PS 2001f). The attacks started during the ceremonies commemorating the reconstruction of these holy sites. These had to be cancelled, as a mob started to attack international officials participating in the event. Although the ceremonies were finally held on 18 June 2001 and organised by the RS authorities, the outbreak of organised violence indicated that high-ranking Bosnian Serb officials were not willing to support the peace process, almost six years after the signing of the peace agreement.

Consequently, Petritsch had no choice but to employ the Bonn powers to execute the Brussels programme and continue dismissing individuals that obstructed the process of peace implementation. The enforcement of the Brussels programme maintained afloat the international community’s objective of strengthening Bosnia’s central state. Nonetheless, its execution has not reconstructed Bosnia’s fractured social relations. The international community’s dissatisfaction with the pace of peace implementation and the constant challenges posed by nationalist leaders impelled it to also work for the reduction of its support to this country. At the PIC’s behest, Petritsch was asked in 21 June 2001 to draft a plan that sets ‘the stage for the final phase of peace implementation’ (Petritsch
What were the objectives of this plan? Did it include provisions to make Petritsch’s ownership approach into reality?

C. Recommitting to the Ownership Approach?
For the second half of 2001, Petritsch drafted a plan to streamline the presence of the international community in Bosnia and start its disengagement. After lengthy discussions in the PIC and between the OHR, the OSCE, the UN and the EU, it was decided that the international community would stay in Bosnia until 2007. Different scenarios had been presented to the PIC, including plans that required the international community to be directly involved in Bosnia for periods of seven to eight years or twelve to fifteen years. On 13 September 2001, the PIC supported a plan that would allow international organs to start withdrawing from Bosnia in 2005, ending the mission in 2007.

According to this proposal, the objectives of the international community for this period were: (a) institution building, (b) refugee return, (c) economic reform, and (d) strengthening the rule of law (PIC 2001a). These were basically the same objectives the international community declared when the Brussels programme was unveiled on 24 May 2000. The only difference between the PIC’s Brussels Communiqué of 13 September 2001 and the Brussels programme was that it backed Petritsch’s ‘ownership approach’, while strongly supporting the execution of these reforms in order to meet the requirements set by the EU Road Map. It is important to remember that the Brussels programme did not make mention of the ‘ownership approach’. Why did the PIC decide to support Petritsch’s approach once again?

The PIC’s approval or disapproval of Petritsch’s approach had been related to political developments in Bosnia. If the Brussels programme did not make mention of this approach, it was because nationalist political parties had won the April 2000 municipal elections. This was seen as a setback to international efforts in Bosnia. Thus, the Brussels programme asked Petritsch to take a stronger stance against nationalist parties and to make use of his Bonn powers to translate the Brussels programme into reality. The Brussels Communiqué, however, was proclaimed in the backdrop of one of the greatest accomplishments of 2001. Bosnia’s Parliamentary Assembly approved an Election Law in 23 August 2001, similar to the one the OSCE used to organise the 11
November 2000 general elections. This enabled the creation of a Permanent Elections Commission to organise and monitor election proceedings at both national and entity levels, while also scaling-back some of the OSCE’s responsibility in Bosnia. The Alliance for Change had demonstrated that it could address issues of international concern (PIC 2001a). As the International Crisis Group observed, the international community ‘has come out of “war mode” and now stresses its commitment to “partnership” with the Bosnian authorities: communicating, negotiating, and bargaining rather than conspiring, commanding or imposing’ (ICG 2001a).

Not to say that nationalist parties and their politicians did not obstruct the process of peace implementation or that Petritsch did not rely on the Bonn powers to enforce the objectives of the Brussels Communiqué. Indeed, the passing of the election law was supposed to be shortly followed by the creation of the Permanent Elections Commission and the funding of this body. Petritsch appointed the ‘four national members of the seven member Election Commission’, as the parties had failed to fulfil this task (OHR-PS: 200Id). In addition, Petritsch continued to impose laws in the fields of refugee return (mostly concerning private property legislation), judicial reform, and economic reform. However, he did not dismiss any individuals for obstruction in the period between 1 July 2001 and 1 January 2002.

Petritsch also started to translate his ownership approach into a number of informal structures, designed to increase Bosnia’s citizens’ and government officials’ participation and to aligning international and local interests. He first established the Partnership Consultative Forum. Having complimented for this informal body, Petritsch created the Civic Forum, which brought together civic leaders and international officials to talk about the peace agreement and its implementation. These fora will be further discussed in more detail in the next chapter. But, their formation did not mean that international support for the state-building strategy decreased. In an open letter to Bosnia’s citizens, Petritsch emphasised the central state’s importance. It also reminded the RS that a strong central state is not an enemy, but a structure from which the [RS] will benefit because, via the State, it will enter Europe’ (Petritsch 2001c).

The message also called on all Bosnian Croats to join other people in the country to address issues of common concern. He also argued that the Bosnian state is the only
instrument that could provide for the protection and advancement of their culture and interests. To strengthen the Bosnian state and to emphasise the importance of its existence, the High Representative asked the country’s Parliamentary Assembly to pass a law on Bosnian Holidays, to commemorate important dates such as the GFA’s signing. From this perspective, the international community was still in the business of state-building, though the task was simpler as there was a new government that was willing to execute, with the help of the OHR, the necessary reforms to make Bosnia a viable state. More importantly, Petritsch’s fora sent a clear message that state-building agenda could also be affected by the active participation of Bosnia’s civic leaders and government officials. Will conditions in Bosnia change and prompt these Bosnian leaders to question this strategy and call for new ones that are not in line with the GFA’s provisions or the PIC’s objectives?

Even though the latter part of 2001 had produced great achievements, the challenges to establishing a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia are still enormous. In the economic field, the Parliamentary Assembly did not consider many laws. The judicial process has been under-funded, while the Bosnian state does not have the ability to finance its activities without the contributions of each entity. Inter-group relations are still precarious. Many Bosnian Croats are still dissatisfied with the current state of affairs; elements in the RS have increased their opposition to the return of non-Serbs; and to complicate matters more, the arrest of suspected Islamic fundamentalists in Bosnia for possible connections to the 11 September 2001 terrorists attacks on the US have had detrimental consequences on inter-communal relations. In addition, the entities have not imposed or upheld important laws. For instance they did not fund the Permanent Election Commission and they failed to nominate three of its non-nationalist members.

In the end, Petritsch’s willingness to combine the PIC’s state-building strategy and his ownership approach created a peacebuilding programme that was more democratic, than those executed in the past. Nevertheless, this programme put a heavier premium on the strengthening of the state’s structures. A strategic approach to peacemaking has been widely used in Bosnia since the GFA’s signing, even though Petritsch’s approach included some mechanisms that are in line with this investigation’s conception of communicative peacemaking. Therefore, the international community’s
performance in post-Dayton Bosnia is mixed. On the one hand, it settled the conflict, but, on the other hand, it has not been able to establish a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia. The time might be right to consider what the communicative approach to peacemaking can offer, especially now, as the PIC seems to be more receptive to new ideas that can help it achieve its objectives.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The OHR has evolved from an organisation compromised of five officials and a small budget with an office in Sarajevo and Brussels to a complex institution that currently hires 701 people – 203 international personnel and 498 local staff, supported by a budget totalling 25 million euros. Since the signing of the GFA, the OHR has opened ‘three regional offices - in Banja Luka, Mostar and Brcko, eight field offices and Special Envoy offices in seven municipalities’ (OHR-I 2002). Also important is the list of powers the OHR has received since its inception, such as the power to impose and re-write existing legislation and the authority to remove public officials that obstruct the implementation of the peace agreement.

Since December 1997, the High Representative has imposed or rewritten over 100 laws and remove over 75 individuals from public office. While the PIC made these powers available to Westendorp, he hardly used them. The main reason was because the international community’s programme was not as extensive as the one the PIC drafted in its Madrid meeting in December 1998. In fact, Westendorp, while using the Bonn powers throughout 1998, started to heavily rely on them in his last six months as High Representative. Petritsch, who had to implement the Madrid programme, continued to use the Bonn powers when he felt it would complement his ownership strategy. Nonetheless, the general failure of his ‘ownership’ approach and the Madrid programme’s slow execution, coupled with international agents’ frustration with the process, forced the PIC to draft the Brussels programme and order Petritsch to make use of the Bonn Powers.

It is ironic that the international community’s has failed to fully implement the peace agreement’s provisions or the PIC’s programmes, which have been designed to correct the GFA’s deficiencies. Over $5 billion has been spent, financing economic reconstruction programmes. Even more has been spent on the NATO force. Although
many foreign policy-makers have openly expressed their frustration with this phase of the peacemaking process, the international community has stated that it will stay involved in Bosnia until at least November 2007, though it will re-calibrate its organisational structure to streamline the process of peace implementation and fulfil all the objectives in this time period.

The PIC unveiled its plan to restructure the international community’s presence in Bosnia in March 2002. The OHR, modelled on its Economic Task Force, and copying the international presence in Kosovo will create a number of ‘policy coordination task forces’ to address issues in the following policy areas: ‘the Rule of Law, Institution Building, Economic Policy, and Return and Reconstruction’. Like in Kosovo, a specific international body will lead each of these task forces. For instance, the OSCE has been designated as the lead agency in matters relating to ‘Rule of Law,’ while the OHR is responsible for strategies in the area of ‘Institution Building’ (PIC 2001a).

The High Representative will coordinate the work of these task forces to ensure that each achieves its objectives. While the envisioned structure will help the international community achieve its objectives in a more efficient and cost-effective manner, the powers of the High Representative’s will not be diluted by these reforms. If anything, the High Representative’s power serve as a guarantee that the objectives set out by the Brussels Communiqué will be realised. In fact, the role of the High Representative is so important that the PIC and the EU seem to have decided to send Lord Paddy Ashdown, former leader of the Liberal Democratic Party in the United Kingdom, to Sarajevo as the next and probably last High Representative. This is the first time the PIC selects an individual from one of the Contact Group countries. Indeed, Ashdown’s no-nonsense style and strong character may prove to be important traits, if the current peacebuilding strategy fails. Thus, the new strategy seems to be based on past lessons as state-building is still an important part of this strategy, while the OHR is expected to play the dominant role in the process of peace implementation.

Since the beginning of the peace implementation process, the OHR has attempted to correct an important deficiency in the GFA. The GFA left in power the nationalist political parties that started the war and opposed the integration of Bosnian society. Even more important, the central state institutions crafted at Dayton were extremely weak, so
they could not carry out the integration of society, as other states have been able to do so in Europe’s history. For this reason, the PIC decided to strengthen the mandate of the High Representative, ordered NATO forces to support the OHR’s operations, and created a set of state-building programmes to establish a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia.

Not only was it important to fully implement the peace agreement, but also it was necessary to build a strong state that could administer Bosnia’s affairs, integrate society, create a national identity (though a thin conception of one), and conduct important economic reforms. Noticing that elections did not break the monopoly of nationalist political parties, but reinforced them, the PIC ordered the High Representative to become the unofficial ruler of the country. While this new strategy has enabled the High Representative to enact and enforce important legislation, this rule by international decree completely contradicts the liberal-democratic principles that supposedly inspirit Bosnia’s new constitution. Even worse, the international community’s strategies have not been able to integrate Bosnian society. Will the new strategy, as outlined in the PIC’s Brussels Communiqué, finally achieve this important objective? If not, what should the international community do next?

It is argued in this thesis that instead of enforcing the current strategy, the international community should craft a new approach to peacebuilding. Many have noted how the GFA cannot guarantee the future unity of Bosnia. The PIC’s decision to strengthen the High Representative’s and the many programmes it has developed to solve Bosnia’s problems affirm this reality. If the state-building strategy, with its nation-building and economic modernisation elements, has failed then it might be necessary to create new strategies that include communicative forms of peacemaking. The next chapter provides a review of some communicative inspired peacebuilding projects executed in Bosnia since 1996.
CHAPTER EIGHT
Specters of Society-Centred Peacebuilding in Bosnia

INTRODUCTION
The previous two chapters have documented how the international community has pursued a state-building strategy in Bosnia. This strategy stresses that building strong state institutions and introducing market reforms can serve as mechanism to establish a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia. In some ways, the international community has faith that a “top-down” peacebuilding strategy will not only create a viable state, but it will also restore an ethos of multiethnicity, promote democracy, and champion human rights. This strategy closely follows the tenets of the strategic approach to peacemaking, as described in chapters one and two.

Even though the international community has spent more resources on this strategy, it has also funded “bottom-up” peacebuilding projects and under Wolfgang Petritsch’s tenure it has experimented with an “ownership” approach to peace implementation. Two reasons explain the international community’s interest in fostering civil society and ownership, which as seen in the previous chapter became an important objective for the Office of the High Representative (OHR) following the PIC’s meeting in Madrid in December 1998. First, since the GFA’s signing, many governments and international organizations have called on Bosnia’s citizens to support the international community’s peacebuilding strategy by electing non-nationalists political parties and by putting aside their differences in order to create a new Bosnian society. For this reason, civil society organizations could counter nationalist parties and allow the OHR to continue its peace implementation programme.

Second, the expansion of civil society organisations would also support the international community’s economic reforms. The creation of a single economic space for Bosnia and the transition from a war economy to a peace economy requires interethnic cooperation, communal reconciliation, and further steps toward democratisation. Moreover, international donors’ reduction of aid to Bosnia has forced international administrators to look for ways to increase the level of foreign direct
investment to finance the country’s frail economy. But, the levels of foreign investment are quite low. Not only has increasing cases of corruption and cronyism kept investors away (Singer 2000: 33-34), but also visible lines of divisions in Bosnia have forced many investors to question the country’s long-term stability (Civilitas 2002).

In addition, because Bosnia’s economic reforms are in line with neo-liberal ideology, the international community is restricting the entities’ ability to provide social services. Even though the international community wants the central state to assume more responsibility for the administration of Bosnian society, it has also ‘insisted on public sector contraction, reductions in welfare spending, the stripping of socially-owned assets and the privatisation of essential services’ (Pugh 2001: 8). Consequently, the international community has attempted to reduce economic hardships by funding international and indigenous non-governmental organizations (NGOs), so these can provide basic social services (Belloni 2001: 173). The international community has also attempted to empower the local population, via civil society development strategies (Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2001: 88; and Chandler 1999: 111), so they can pressure politicians and make sure they execute important reforms.

To this effect, the international community has supported the work of international NGOs, indigenous NGOs, and intergovernmental organizations attempting to foster interethnic reconciliation, promote civic activities and deepen democratization and economic development efforts. But not all these efforts will establish a self-sustaining in Bosnia. David Chandler’s work (1998 and 1999) shows how civil society programmes are not achieving their intended objectives, but allowing the international community to use the rhetoric of civil society promotion to assume more control over Bosnian affairs. Robert Belloni (2001), building on this research, concludes that the international community has funded activities that have not increased civic participation or interethnic reconciliation. He argues that the following three reasons may account for this reality:

1. Bosnia’s growing civic sector represents the interests of the international community, rather than those of its citizens’. He argues that civil society has been transformed ‘into a set of regulatory agencies that implement donors’ changing priorities’ (Belloni 2001: 176). Thus, the international community lacks a long-
term approach; as its priorities changes, so does its funding for different initiatives.

2. Even though ‘NGOs are usually praised and valued for their connections with local and grass-root communities, decisions about who can participate and be empowered are made through a top-down approach, where local communities lie at the receiving end of the process’ (Belloni 2001: 174). In many ways, this approach ‘places the international community’, not Bosnian citizens, ‘squarely at the center of the development process’ (Belloni 2001: 175).

3. Many people in Bosnia question the need for advocacy networks, interest groups, and other types of political pressure groups. Most decisions are eventually taken by the OHR and other international agencies in Bosnia, not by Bosnia’s authorities. Because these international bodies are not accountable to the people, many are not interested to join these types of social mechanisms.

Consequently, most of the work the international community labels as ‘bottom-up’, is not necessarily in line with the ideals of the communicative approach, as developed in chapters one and three of this thesis.

A quick glance of the International Council of Voluntary Agencies’ Directory of Humanitarian and Development Agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina demonstrates the large number of local and international NGOs conducting peacebuilding projects. Many of these organizations’ projects are influenced by the ideals of conflict resolution, conflict transformation, and participatory theories of development. These projects tend to be in line with the tenets of communicative peacemaking. This chapter provides a review of some of these projects. Its review is organized according to John Paul Lederach’s pyramid model, which explains how different peacebuilding practices, targeted at different societal levels, affects peacebuilding processes. It is important to remember that Lederach argues that society can be divided into three levels: top, middle, and grassroots. The first level represents the top of the pyramid and the third its base. The review of these peacebuilding practices is conducted in part two of this chapter and it evaluates different programmes at each of these societal levels. Part one re-introduces some of the communicative approach’s elements.
I. ELEMENTS OF SOCIETY-CENTRED PEACEBUILDING EFFORTS

Chapters one and three presented the theoretical underpinnings of the communicative approach to peacemaking. As stated earlier, communicative peacemaking has had little impact on peacemaking processes. In the case of the Dayton peace initiative, the General Framework Agreement (GFA) did not include any specific provisions to support 'bottom-up' approaches to peacemaking, though its provisions did not prohibit outside agents to experiment with these practices. While these practices were not at the centre of the Dayton peace initiative, the international community's many setbacks in the first years of peace implementation forced them to consider the values of this approach to peacebuilding.

Habermasian insights, as reviewed in chapters one and three, are important elements of communicative peacemaking. Conflict resolution and conflict transformation intervention mechanisms are also fundamental to this approach. The basic premise of this approach is that Bosnia's integration will not be achieved by 'functional reason,' the use of money and the state's administrative power to bring about a false sense of social unity that is dependent on the strategic interaction of individuals, but on a communicative model that reconstructs lifeworld contexts, making social integration possible in an non-strategic way. For this reason, communicative peacebuilding practices rely on three, but interdependent efforts: (a) reconciliatory mechanisms of conflict transformation; (b) process of political will-formation; and (c) the institution of reflexive structures of governance.

Before reviewing some examples of 'bottom-up' peacebuilding programmes in Bosnia, it is necessary to first specify how these three efforts may promote non-strategic social integration. In many ways, chapter three's review of Habermas's society-centred theory provides an intellectual foundation to these peacebuilding programmes, his theory does not explain how to integrate an ethnically divided post-war society. It is important to link his society-centred theory with practitioners' experiences using conflict transformation and conflict resolution mechanisms in different conflict situations. While the importance of these mechanisms were review in chapter one, it is essential to keep in mind that the success of these conflict intervention mechanisms is in their ability to translate any success achieved at the micro-sociological level, that is to say between
individuals in a group setting, at a macro-sociological level, affecting the overall structure of society. Influenced by constructivist understandings of ethnic conflict, dialogical engagements, supported by changing social circumstances, can provide an incentive for individuals from competing communities to question their conflict's dynamics and build new understandings that can promote interethnic reconciliation and social change.

A. Reconciliation: A First Step in Social Integration

The integration of Bosnia's society is one of the many objectives the international community has pursued since the signing of the GFA. As presented in chapter two, traditional peacebuilding missions have attempted to integrate war-torn societies via state-building programmes. Heavily influenced by instrumental explanations of ethnic conflict, peacemakers argue that if wars are started by ethno-national leaders' desire to fragment an established social order as means to mobilise its community to struggle for the transformation of existing state structures or the creation of a new nation-state, then peace must be instituted by increased co-operation between ethno-national leaders at the top level of society and by state structures, based on power-sharing principles. Only a state can push through important political and economic reforms that support the execution of a negotiated peace agreement. More importantly, co-operation in a society's elite sector will trickle-down to the rest of society, creating new social environments where interaction among former combatants is possible. However popular these notions are, the peacebuilding experience in Bosnia, as documented in the previous two chapters, proves that this is not enough.

The OHR and the PIC have recently recognized the limitations of state-building strategies. In many ways, Petritsh's ownership strategy attempts to bring the PIC's peace implementation plan closer in line with the communicative approach's ideals. However, while this strategy has been revised, it is still strongly influenced by strategic values. Not only did the PIC embrace the High Representative's ownership strategy once Bosnia's citizens elected a non-nationalist government into power, but the new programme attempts to fulfill Bosnia's social integration via functional reason.

This is troubling, as many studies, including two critical World Bank reports (Dani, et al 1999 and Poggi et al 2002), document the deep social divisions in Bosnia. In
Bosnia's cities, the studies note that pre-war social networks that made multi-cultural existence possible have not been rehabilitated in the post-Dayton period. Participants in focus groups repeatedly said that a 'low level of interpersonal trust' has led to 'a decline in socialization and mutual help' (Puggi et al 2002: 8). Hence, one of the biggest casualties of the war has been the country's low level of social capital. Noting these trends, how can social integration be achieved?

Much social psychological research demonstrates how perceptions influence human behaviour. Influenced by constructivist explanations of ethnic conflict, it is necessary to de-construct the images that inhibit peace and find ways of constructing and nurturing new attitudes that foster inter-communal dialogue and co-operation. It is therefore maintained that attitudes and political identities are mutable. Just as each ethno-communal leader supported the creation of negative images of 'other' groups, so can conflict transformation processes break these images and foment a culture based on tolerance, co-operation, and empathy (Eckhardt 1991). This is what Benjamin Broome's (1993: 111) research on 'relational empathy' identifies as a 'third culture'.

Outside actors have organized a number of dialogical mechanisms in order to construct and nurture this 'third culture'. These include: problem-solving workshops, conflict resolution training programs, truth and reconciliation commissions, youth programs, trauma relief efforts, and so forth. These efforts are targeted at any social level: grassroots, middle, or top (Lederach 1997: 41-42). However, as Lederach demonstrates, those directed at middle-level leaders seem to be most fruitful 'because they are knowledgeable about the conflict and because they have access to the top policymakers' and are more willing to support reconciliatory and peacebuilding efforts at the grassroots level (Lederach 1997: 48).

In attempting to de-construct the negative images and the ethnic identities that divide Bosnia, the organisers and facilitators of these dialogical mechanisms should not only be selective of the people that they include in these processes, but they must also employ Lederach's elicitive approach (1995: 68), where the participants are encouraged to use their cultural context as resources to craft their own solutions to their problems. Organisers of these mechanisms must understand that even though violence has affected the pattern of pre-war inter-communal relations, there are still discourses, ideas, and
institutions that these communities share that may provide a first step to reconciliation
and to long-term social integration (Pouligny 2000: 25).

Internationally-backed norms and values cannot be forced on participants of
these conflict resolution mechanisms, as the purpose of these exercises is not only de­
constructing identities that have fostered social separation, but to also provide an
environment where participants can critically reflect on their own social condition, so
they can create their own mechanisms of social change. This is not to say that outside
conveners cannot propose ways of achieving social change. In fact, a healthy discussion
of the shortcomings and potentials of proposed strategies can be a way of inciting
participants to judge the viability of these proposed practices, or to create new measures
that might support the search for peace.

In short, a transformation of public consciousness will encourage people to
interact with members of other communities. The potential of these mechanisms is that
they can build new communication networks by transforming negative attitudes into a
culture of trust and co-operation. Inviting middle-range level leaders of each community
to take part in these reconciliatory mechanisms will create the foundations of a ‘third
culture’ (Broome 1993: 111) that will enable a new peace constituency to work together
and start the process of integrating the groups into a new lifeworld context.

B. Political Will-Formation: Micro-Macro Linkages
Once the foundations of a shared or multi-ethnic lifeworld commence to develop and
individuals from each community, especially at the middle-range and grassroots levels,
begin to communicate, then the foundations of civil society will start taking hold in
Bosnia. In many ways, the biggest challenge that reconciliatory mechanisms face is to
translate their achievements in macro-sociological terms. Just because individuals in
small group settings vow to co-operate does not mean that they will be able to do so.
Social structures may inhibit social change from occurring.

An integrated civil society will not only evolve, but it will also dismantle
nationalist and separatist movements by de-constructing the political identities that fuel
these struggles. As noted above, reconciliatory mechanisms can break these images and
foster new ones based on shared histories and values. These mechanisms must be
connected to programmes designed to support and strengthen a civic sector. To this extent, civil society empowers people to voice new political identities and enables them to create new social movements to shape society according to their needs and interests. As a consequence, new non-ethnic political parties will evolve and ones in power will have to change their stance to get the electorate’s support. Economic organisations, non-governmental organisations, community groups, women groups, and interest-based groups, to name some, will also emanate from civil society’s proceedings, influencing the work of municipal, entity, national authorities in Bosnia.

Civil society will permit the creation of a cohesive political community based on dialogue and co-operation, leading to the institution of a new social order that its citizens can feel part of. Establishing ‘a legal order,’ Carla Hesse and Robert Post (1999: 20) argue, ‘requires the prior existence of a community cohesive enough to justify the law’s claim to speak, within its jurisdiction, in accents that are authoritative and universal.’ While the GFA established a legal order in Bosnia, this does not reflect the needs or interests of the people. As documented in chapter five, the peace plan follows the interests of a group of nationalist politicians and members of the international community.

An active civil society serves as tool to strengthen the ‘third culture’ that results from reconciliatory processes and permits people to come together to express their opinions, to voice their hopes for a better future, and to influence the way society is organised. Civil society’s mechanisms of political will-formation should have an important effect in Bosnia. These new social movements will force political leaders to change their actions or quit their positions of power. In all, the organs of civil society delimit government prerogatives, allows the formation of political groupings, trains future political leaders, and, most important, they counter and de-legitimise the political identities, social narratives, and political discourses constructed by the institutions of the state or the international community.

C. Instituting Deliberative Structures
The last phase of this programme will materialise once the forces of civil society institute new social structures of governance that reflect the needs, interests and values of
Bosnia’s citizens. This should usher a true deliberative democracy and establish an open social system. The present state-building strategy practiced in Bosnia has produced a closed social system, where people, other than through elections, cannot effectively affect the way society is organised. The danger of a closed system is that it is vulnerable to political and economic crises and outbreaks of political violence because it lacks any ‘safety valves’ (Väyrynen 1991: 12).

In essence, the institution of a deliberative democracy where Bosnia’s citizens, regardless of their ethnic lineage or religious beliefs, can influence the way society is organised is consistent with the task of establishing a self-sustaining peace. It is important to remember that the cause of the conflict that divided Bosnia along ethnic lines and led its constituents to war was a product of the manipulation of political identities according to the interests of each community’s nationalist leaders. Manipulating these identities and de-humanising the ‘other’ was accomplished with relative ease due to the decay of political institutions that had averted opportunists from challenging the established order during the communist era. The success of these mobilisation strategies was consequently dependent on the destruction of the structures that held ethno-communal groups together, and in the fabrication and spread of enemy images. While moderates leaders attempted to stop these dehumanisation projects, they could not voice their messages because chauvinists and nationalists controlled Bosnia’s social structures and media outlets (Snyder and Ballentine 1996: 28-29). In essence, there was not a civil society that could enable moderates to challenge these projects. More importantly, media outlets, such as television, radio, newspapers and magazines, were mostly controlled by people that adhered to these views (Milošević 1997: 108-29). In all, the war in Bosnia can be partially blamed on the closed nature of the society, which inhibited moderates from repudiating these false images and from challenging the construction of competing ethnic identities that first led to the disintegration of Bosnia’s multicultural ethos and then to war (Burg and Shoup 2000: 11-13).

Fostering a strong and vibrant civil society requires more than just that capacity-building efforts. It also requires for the international community and Bosnia’s central state institutions to accept an expanded role for Bosnia’s citizens to shape how society is structured. If building civil society means ‘getting people to communicate in a
constructive way and believe that change is possible’, then they must also be allowed to
be ‘responsible for making change’ (McMahon 2001: 21). Once people in Bosnia
understand that their opinion matters, they will not only support peacebuilding processes,
but they will also be willing to actively participate in them.

In light of this reality, preventing the recurrence of interethnic violence will take
place once Bosnia’s citizens, through the organs of civil society, can establish a social
order that reflects their various needs and interests and not those of a self-appointed
minority. The institution of reflexive structures of governance, often legalised by re­
writing or amending the constitution, or in the case of Bosnia, by transforming the
structures set-up by the GFA, serves as a conflict prevention procedure that will assure
that co-operation between ethnic groups actually takes place. Nonetheless, attaining this
social condition and increasing co-operation between leaders of each community is
dependent on the success of reconciliatory mechanisms, the spread of a “third,” civic-
based culture, and the flourishing of civil society.

Part two of this analysis will review some “bottom-up” peacebuilding efforts that
approximate the communicative approach’s ideals. Before conducting this review, it is
important to keep in mind a central aspect of Habermas’s society-centred theory. Even
though his theory values the ‘lifeworld’ over the ‘system’, Habermas also emphasizes
that the system, composed of state and market structures, can play an important role in
society. Without a state and its legal system, civil society, which is ingrained in the
lifeworld, could not exist. The market creates mechanisms that allow people to meet their
material needs. More importantly, the state provides a secure environment where the
market and civil society can operate. Habermas’s research stresses society’s integration
should not be led by system imperatives, but by citizens’ active participation in civil
society. Habermas’s other contribution is his work on democracy and legal systems. He
points out that while the state use laws to organize and regulate society, laws also
regulate the actions of the state. In a democracy, the legitimacy of laws is connected to
the deliberative process that gives life to them. In this manner, civil society can regulate
state actions by playing an active role in the legislative process. Political legitimacy, in
turn, is a product of civil society interaction with state institutions and their ability to
work together to construct laws that regulate society, while also establishing communication structures that give meaning to social action.

In light of Habermas's findings, the Bosnian state and the international community’s support of these dialogical mechanisms is crucial for their success. They can provide security and prevent groups from using violence to resolve issues of contention. Only then can people engage with others in processes of interethnic reconciliation. The state and the international community can also finance the work of civic organizations and promote similar initiatives. The international community should also monitor the work of state institutions to make sure that it is attempting to limit political movements in civil society.

II. EXAMPLES OF SOCIETY-CENTRED PEACEBUILDING IN BOSNIA

A number of international NGOs and intergovernmental organisations have partnered with local NGOs and other groups to organize and implement ‘bottom-up’ peacebuilding programmes in Bosnia. Many of these efforts are in line with the communicative approach’s ideals, in the vein of this doctoral thesis’s understanding of society-centred peacebuilding.

Due to length restrictions, it is impossible to review all these programmes. However, a sample of these initiatives will be presented below. Although some of these have been directed at society’s different levels (e.g. top, middle and grassroots), they all employ the elements of society-centred peacebuilding discussed in part one of this chapter. Therefore, these initiatives stress the importance of reconciliation, social empowerment, and civic deliberation as means to achieve social change and establish the foundations of self-sustaining peace.

A. Grassroots-Level Efforts

Grassroots initiatives stress the importance of working with average people that have been directly affected by the conflict. Their primary aim is to achieve social change at the local level, rather than at the national level, via reconciliation mechanisms. It is important to stress that these initiatives can indirectly influence peacebuilding efforts conducted at other social levels. As a secondary aim, these initiatives try to empower people so they
can create social groups that can address political, economic, or social issues in their communities. In so doing, these initiatives provide basic social and humanitarian services that the state or local governments cannot provide. In many ways, an important aspect of the work conducted by these intergovernmental and non-governmental agencies is training community leaders in building the capacities to establish non-governmental organizations and other social groups that can have a direct impact on their communities.

Three grassroots projects will be reviewed in this section. They are: the Gomji Vakuf Project in the Federation and the work of the Youth Center; Conflict Resolution Catalysts’ Neighborhood Facilitators Program and the Youth Community Center in Banja Luka, Republika Srpska (RS); and Projekt Dijakom organized by the Karuna Peacebuilding Center and Foundation for Community Encouragement in Prijedor in the RS and Sanki Most in the Federation.

1. The Gomji Vakuf Project and the Youth Center

Even though the United States forced Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks to end their war in 1994, pressuring them into an alliance to limit and turn back Serbian power, the conflict between these two communities is very pronounced. As noted in the previous chapters, most of the conflict centres in Mostar, which many Bosnian Croat nationalist describe as the capital of ‘Herceg-Bosna.’ Research on Mostar’s divisions and attempts to build a peace between Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats is well documented. For this reason, it is important to review the Gomji Vakuf Project, started by the United Nations Office in Vienna in the summer of 1995.

The town of Gomji Vakuf in Central Bosnia experienced some of the most intense fighting in the Bosniak-Bosnian Croat war of 1993-1994. Before the war, Bosniaks made up 53 percent of its population, while the Bosnian Croats compromised 43 percent. By summer 1995, the Bosniak population increased by 12 percentage points to 65 percent, while Bosnian Croats decreased by nine points. Most Bosniaks live in one side of the town, while Bosnian Croats live in the other. Apart from Mostar, Gomji Vakuf is “one the few divided towns of the Federation” (Felleisen 1997).

The Gomji Vakuf Project was initially started by the United Nations Office in Vienna (UNOV) as an ‘experiment in peace-building.’ Building on the lessons of UNOV’s Volunteer Social Reconstruction Project in Pakrac, Croatia, the UNOV partnered with several international NGOs and indigenous organization to develop a new peacebuilding programme that combined different development and conflict resolution practices to foster economic reconstruction, reconciliation, and social empowerment (Wilson 2001). In this manner, although the UNOV played an important part in organizing these efforts, it only funded half of its work. The other half was raised by the Project’s administrators, which included eight outsiders, experienced in the field of peacebuilding, and 17 local volunteers. Many international relief organizations, charity trusts, and governmental agencies funded its efforts, including: OXFAM, U.S. Agency for International Development, British Quaker Peace and Service, Komitee fuer Grundrechte und Demokratie, and the Austrian government, among many others (Felleisen 1997).

During the first months, the Project provided basic humanitarian aid and then it started to focus on the reconstruction of housing. It established a training program that taught participants, from both ethnic groups, how to lay bricks and to install and repair plumbing. In exchange, the participants had to agree to work together and reconstruct the houses of ‘10 especially vulnerable individuals’ (Felleisen 1997). The Project also offered them funds to buy material to reconstruct their own houses.

As part of its social empowerment and reconciliation strategy, the Project established a number of programmes, with the intention that this would become ‘independent NGOs’ (Felleisen 1997), administered by local community leaders. These include: the Youth Center, Youth Club 96 and Federalna Zena, a women’s NGO. While this section will pay close attention to the work conducted by the Youth Center, it is important to briefly describe the other two’s efforts.

The Project created Youth Club 96 for older individuals from the ages of 16 to 30. Noting that young adults were probably the most affected by the war, Youth Club 96 offers training in some fields and encourages young adults to attend conflict resolution seminars to promote interethnic reconciliation. This organization is still in operation and
while offering these services, it also organises social events, such as concerts, to foster contact between Gornji Vakuf's young adults.

Similarly, the Project also started a group composed of women from both communities. Even though Federalna Zena increased contact between women, they have also devoted much of their time in training individuals in 'business skills, management, marketing, accounting for small business, tax-laws and fund-raising as well as on participatory leadership, conflict management, and group building.' Federalna Zena also addressed important women health issues. They even had a 'mobile gynecological clinic at the cease-fire line' (Felleisen 1997). The group also empowered women by setting up income generating schemes (Mertens 1997) and providing English, agriculture, and computer courses. Since 1997, the UNHCR has been funding this organisation's work (UNHCR 1999).

Finally, the Project established a Youth Centre (YC), on the ceasefire line that divides the two communities. It became an independent NGO in 1997. One of the reasons that this section reviews the work of this NGO in depth is because the YC is one of the most inclusive NGOs in the area. Although its target audience is children between 5-18 years old, its activities also allow parents and teachers to come together and address issues of concern. Also, because the war destroyed the town's library and its collection, the YC's library has attracted other people to its building, becoming familiarized with its programmes (Lippman 2000).

Like the other two groups discussed above, the YC works to increase contact between the communities, to foster interethnic reconciliation, and to empower people to directly address issues of mutual interests. Because the war created segregated school systems, with different curricula, the Youth Center's original intent was to bring children together so they could share their experiences in a secure setting. With the help of the United Methodists Committee on Relief, the YC's administrators contacted teachers in both communities to encourage them to participate in its activities and to encourage their students to enrol in the YC's courses (Felleisen 1997).

Currently, the YC offers courses in: English, German, computers and music. In the first months of operation, Bosniak teachers would only teach Bosniak students and Bosnian Croats teacher Bosnian Croat students. But, the classes were integrated once
students and teachers felt that the environment was conducive to learning and open dialogue (Lippman 2000). Enrollment figures show that 60 percent of students are Bosniaks, while the rest are Bosnian Croats (OC 2001a).

The YC also provided a secure environment where children can play and establish new friendships. It organizes a number of informal activities, such as a mountaineering club, the organization of plays and recitals, and the holding of art and crafts workshops. Teenagers are also encouraged to participate in writing and preparing YC's newsletter to the community (OC 2001a). Another core component of the YC's programme is its 'Youth Initiative', which include a number of weekend workshops where young people learn conflict resolution skills, building trust among participants so they can jointly address questions of fear, power and prejudice in their community. Some of these participants also were part of an UNDP sponsored programme on Trust Building, where they worked for several days with young people from all over Bosnia.

YC's 'Youth Initiative' also provides participants with the skills to carry out their own projects. For instance, 10 participants conducted surveys of young people's attitudes to drugs and other teen's issues in the town's high schools. One of these surveys addressed questions concerning 'joint education' or a de-segregated school system for the town of Gornji Vakuf. The findings showed the level of social divisions in the town among young people. The survey, which was conducted in schools in both communities, finds that: 47 percent of students do not want to be taught by a teacher from a different nationality; 31 percent would feel uncomfortable in 'joint schools'; and 54 percent are against going to school with people from other 'nationalities' (OC 2001b). One could question the validity of the findings, as the document does not reveal the size of those interviewed or the methods used to obtain this information, but it does show that while the YC has made some positive changes, these have not yet impacted interethnic tensions in the town.

In an attempt to make their mark, young people decided to design and carry out project 'Fontana'. 'This concerned the rebuilding of the town fountain as a symbol of unity in the town, which was inaugurated amongst great celebration and to which people from both communities came' (OC 2001a). Moreover, teenagers that have participated in the Youth Initiative programme held a number of workshops in primary schools on
peacebuilding in the community, attracting more people to YC’s activities. Similarly, the YC has been offering training to teachers, from both communities, on non-violent communication and in conflict resolution, so they can teach their students how to address issues of contention with people of different ‘nationalities’ peacefully (Lippman 2000).

It is difficult to say if these projects have had any impact on interethnic tensions in the town. In fact, Jasminka Drino-Kirlic expressed her frustration with interethnic problems outside of the center: “We take a step forward, and then politics sets us back.” She believes that (in Lipmman 2000):

The Croat and Muslim parties want [to] separate municipalities. When we try to make something happen between the two communities, it’s very hard. Our best success is when people go out of town to seminars – especially for women’s projects and youth projects. The basic thing restraining reconciliation is politics. The politicians can’t agree, nor do they want to. Now, people feel safest with others of their own ethnicity. The politicians make use of that feeling and we all loose.

In many ways, the YC has been able to construct an enabling environment where participants feel they can address controversial issues. Nevertheless, YC administrators do note that it is difficult to measure how much progress they have made since the organisation was founded, but they are quick to point out that children’s willingness to openly interact with each other suggests that the YC has met their objectives (OC 2001). But, these objectives have been accomplished within the YC’s walls. Even though the YC has attempted to transform the conflict that separates the town, it has found the same obstacles other intergovernmental agencies and NGOs have encountered in Gornji Vakuf and the rest of Bosnia.

2. Conflict Resolution Catalysts and the Youth Communication Centre
Based in Montpelier, Vermont, Conflict Resolution Catalysts (CRC) established two youth centers in Bosnia, one in Banja Luka and the other in Ilidza, a suburb of Sarajevo. This section reviews CRC’s work in Banja Luka, as the chapter already analyzed grassroots efforts in the Federation. In addition, poor management has affected the Ilidza program. While this program became an independent NGO called Danas za Bolje Sutra in 1998, its staff has had problems securing funding for its programmes.
CRC founded the Ilidzija centre in July 1994 and the one in Banja Luka in January 1995. It was one of the first international NGOs working in the Federation and the RS (CRC 2003). The Banja Luka centre is located in one of the city’s remaining multiethnic neighborhoods, not too far from NATO’s regional headquarters. While Banja Luka did not experience major fighting, its minority populations were cleansed and the physical structures that pointed to their existence, such as the Ferhadija Mosque and Catholic churches, were destroyed. Indeed, before the war 30 percent of the population described itself as Bosnian Croat or Bosniak. After the war ended, only 4 percent of this population remained (Stubbs 2001). Yet, Banja Luka, as covered in previous chapters, is the seat of the RS’s moderate nationalist politicians and the entity’s economic centre.

Paul Stubbs (1997), who has assessed the Banja Luka centre and other grassroots initiatives in the past years, has described CRC’s work as ‘pioneering in the field of peace building and community development’. He argues that ‘rather than looking for quick, technical, solutions to problems,’ CRC uses a flexible, but non-traditional approach that emphasizes the importance of social empowerment, capacity-building, and interethnic dialogue. Gary Shapiro (1999), CRC’s founder and Director, argues that the programme, which he calls the Neighborhood Facilitators Project (NFP):

sought primarily to engage people in understanding and dealing with conflict and problems in a more empowered way. This meant work with them to see their responsibility for their role in the conflict (including that of total victims), providing resources and connections to help them solve it, rather than seeing themselves as helpless with nothing they can do.

Even though CRC was tempted to provide technical expertise to help people in Bosnia address contending issues and to build democracy, its international staff noticed that people in Bosnia ‘didn’t care about that at all. They weren’t trying to change the system or society, although many agreed it was needed’ (Shapiro 1999). In fact, what could have produced an end to CRC’s project, as donors wanted the NFP to address these questions, provided CRC’s staff in Banja Luka an opportunity to understand why these attitudes prevailed and to adjust the NPF’s original mechanisms to achieve CRC’s objectives. This was not a smooth process, as there were strong disagreements between CRC staff in Banja Luka and Vermont and between local volunteers and participants
(CDR Associates 1998). The fact that arguments did take place and that CRC had to readjust their own approach suggests that they valued the opinion of the participants and the local staff, who would eventually administer the programme once CRC left.

Many of these volunteers and participants, were young adults, though the centre was open to anyone. Rather than facilitating mediation seminars between participants to search for ways to solve the conflict, CRC staff employed an indirect approach, where they would attempt to achieve reconciliation by providing a "meeting ground" or a "bridge" between participants. Like the YC in Sanski Most, the Banja Luka Centre offered English and computer classes, provided by volunteers, who were working for other international NGOs or for intergovernmental agencies, including NATO's SFOR (Stubbs 1997). It also helped young adults in Banja Luka establish an independent radio station and a student newspaper, attracting teenagers from all ethnic groups (CDR Associates 1998) and giving voice to new social meanings that challenged established definitions provided by nationalist politicians in the Serb entity (Stubbs 1997).

Unlike other NGOs in Bosnia, CRC worked 'with other institutions of social welfare rather than to set up parallel projects' (Stubbs 1997). CRC staff encouraged participants to spend some time in the local orphanage and with refugee children living in and outside Banja Luka. This experience taught participants of the importance of social participation and it also allowed them to reflect on the war, encouraging them to work with participants of other ethnicities in rebuilding a common future.

As said before, NFP attempted to achieve its original objectives via indirect mechanisms. CRC did not conduct work in 'teaching democratic values, citizen advocacy and participation, communication, problem solving, diversity appreciation, or conflict resolution.' But, while this is true, a professor at a university in Banja Luka, told a team of evaluators that CRC's indirect approach is the key reason it has so much respect in the local community and it may be a factor that explain why it was able to promote interethnic dialogue (cited in CDR Associates 1998):

UNHCR and many of the internationals have had problems because of their lack of cultural sensitivity. They try to make people cooperate at the local government level who were responsible for the problem to begin with. CRC focused locally – not on 'political stuff.' CRC said in effect
we want help the people of Banja Luka not 'we want to establish multicultural cooperation', and then they helped the people.

Gary Shapiro emphasizes that many people in Bosnia were reluctant to attend conflict resolution workshops or any facilitated exercises. CRC was forced to listen to the participants' needs and interests and achieve its interests indirectly, even if this meant angering the Charles Steward Mott Foundation, which funded the initiative, or other potential donors (Shapiro 1999).

In many ways, Gary Shapiro's objectives are slowly being materialized. As part of its original strategy, the NFP gave birth to the Youth Communication Centre (YCC), one of the most active and respected NGOs in Banja Luka. The YCC became an independent NGO in February 1997. By August 2000, the YCC expanded its activities, which include the following programmes (Stubbs 2001).

1. **Media Development.** It still operates an independent radio station, but the student newspaper, because of a lack of funds and because some of its staff left to 'pursue formal training and/or journalistic careers', is no longer being published.

2. **Psycho-Social Support.** It expands on CRC's insistence that the centre engage with the local orphanage and refugees' children by also dealing on how to integrate these children into society. While it has partnered with other international and local NGOs to achieve this programme's objective, many of the people administering it are psychology university students.

3. **Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding.** As stated before, work in this area was pursued indirectly. YCC has 15 conflict resolution trainers, recognized by the UN Development Programme as an important resource in the community. 'The team has been willing and able to take risks and push difficult issues, in multi-ethnic groups, which much other training, less intensive, avoid.' Apart from offering training seminars in conflict resolution and non-violence, the programme also has two very active projects: 'High School Student Council Development' and the 'Advocacy Youth Training Experience'. The former works with high school students and professors to give students an opportunity to influence the school's decisions. Similarly, the latter project encourages young people to organize groups to lobby local and entity authorities on different issues. It also has created an 'Observation Parliament' were young adults are given the opportunity to attend sessions of the RS's Parliament, as observers.

4. **Educational Programme.** With the support of the RS's Ministry of Education, the YCC offers courses in English, computer applications, and radio administration. It also provides education on democracy and human rights. Other projects include:
organizing of theatre productions, art exhibits and other extracurricular activities. It also hosts a number of seminars on the importance of volunteerism.

5. Global Partnership. The YCC has made contacts with youth organization all around the world and has actively participated in youth conferences in Europe. It has used these networks to seek funding for their initiatives and to learn new approaches in conflict resolution, peacebuilding, volunteerism, and social empowerment.

The European Union, the UN Development Programme, the Aspen Institute, the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, the Council of Europe, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and many other charity and foundations have financially supported its work.

As seen above, Gary Shapiro’s vision of a NGO training in conflict resolution and democracy building is possible, but only in the long run. CRC’s work was mostly in bridging young people from different ethnic backgrounds in the city. While Shapiro and CRC’s staff in Banja Luka expressed their frustration with the Centre, since it became an independent group, it has closely realized CRC’s original objectives. CRC’s success in this strategy, however, is not only its willingness to adjust its approach to peacebuilding to meet local needs and interests. In addition, CRC’s local staff, which still administers the YCC, has remained loyal to CRC’s values and ideals, while still addressing issues of contention in Banja Luka and adjacent towns.

3. Projekt Dijakom

In early 1997, Emsuda Mujagic, a survivor of the Tmopolje concentration camp, asked Paula Green of the Karuna Center of Peacebuilding to come to Bosnia and facilitate a series of healing and empowerment seminars in Sanki Most (Green 1997). Before the war, Sanki Most was a mixed town of Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs. It lies close to the inter-entity boundary line. During the war, many Bosnian Serbs were pushed from their homes, while most Bosniaks from Prijedor in the RS settled in Sanki Most.

Green teamed with Anne Hoewing of the Foundation for Community Encouragement, based in Seattle, Washington, to organize and conduct these seminars. These seminars were held in Sanki Most and participants were Bosniak women. After several trauma relief sessions, it was decided to offer seminars on ‘skill development in local organizing with women NGO leaders’ (Green 2000: 442). After three visits to Sanki

255
Most, Green and Hoewing were approached by some of the participants to see if they could help them contact Bosnian Serb women in Prijedor and other villages in the RS. The Bosniak participants explained that they wished to ‘reconnect with their neighbors as a cautious first step’ toward their return to their old homes (Green 2000: 442).

Even though Green and Hoewing expressed their reservations of trying to connect Bosniak and Bosnian Serb women, they decided to travel to Prijedor to find out if there was any possibility of starting interethnic dialogue. Although very few Bosnian Serb women met with Green and Hoewing and less welcomed the idea of engaging with Bosniak women, a few did decide ‘to travel to Sanki Most for a five-day dialogue group’ (Green 2002: 443). The meeting was extremely emotional and after much talk the women agreed that Green and Hoewing develop a new programme to increase dialogue between Bosniak and Bosnian Serb educators, as they felt that the success of repatriation and reintegration initiatives depended on their views and behaviour (Green 2000: 444).

This initiative was created in 1998 and has been called Projekt Dijakom. Green and Hoewing have facilitated more than 5 inter-ethnic educators’ seminars in the last years. Each ‘dialogue seminar lasts 3-5 days and welcomes 20 participants in a mix of Serbs and Muslims from both cities, including teachers, school counsellors, principals and administrators, some new to the seminars others returning participants’. These seminars teach participants ‘theories and skills of communication and peacebuilding’. Hence, the objective has been to help schoolteachers and administrators in Prijedor, Sanki Most and surrounding villages how to provide an open, non-discriminatory environment where students from different ethnic backgrounds can feel at ease and are free to interact with others (Green 2000: 448).

Green and Hoewing have encountered a number of challenges. Green argues that after several seminars, participants still hold to their ‘ethnic alliance and identity’. The translators have informed the conveners of ‘the accusations, blame and regressive arguments that have emerged during the breaks and also about moments of compassion and connection’ (Green 2000: 448). At some moments, the conveners feel that while some progress has been made, they have not been able to see a transformation in some participants. While they are more open to considering new ideas and to accept the validity of others’ stories, they still feel that they did not commit acts of violence. This
kind of behaviour has been apparent in members of both communities, though Green
does show that it is stronger in the Bosnian Serb side, especially in Prijedor, where
58,000 Bosniaks were expelled from their homes and some where sent to concentration
camps (Green 2003).

Nevertheless, some of Projekt Dijakom’s Bosniak and Bosnian Serb graduates
have decided to meet one month in either Sanki Most or Prijedor ‘with students of the
host community’ to train them in cross cultural communication and conflict resolution
skills. Other participants have started to offer workshops on tolerance and community
building to adolescents (Green 2000: 449). Participants’ willingness to start their own
mechanisms to try to deal with the high level of social separation is in line with Green’s
belief that people have to play a leading role in peacebuilding. But, she is not blind to the
many challenges Projekt Dijakom and other interethnic reconciliation mechanisms face,
or the limitations of theories and skills developed outside Bosnia.

In fact, Green and Hoewing changed tactics. Rather than teaching participants
skills, they decided to provide an informal setting were participants could hear stories and
experiences of ‘second generation survivors of the Holocaust or people whose parents
were engaged in the Third Reich’ (Green 2003). This seminar proved to be extremely
productive as it was the first seminar where Bosniak and Bosnian Serb participants
acknowledge wrongdoing and recognised the suffering each other has faced since the war
started. It seems that for the first time, participants were not listening to outsiders, but to
themselves. Can this transformation of attitudes lead to social transformation? It is too
early to tell, but it must be recognised that Projekt Dijakom has slowly transformed the
relations of Bosniak and Bosnian Serb educators in northwestern Bosnia and that these
people will play an important role in interethnic reconciliation and trust-building for the
next years. So, this is just one step in the larger process of transforming Bosnian society
according to the ideals of society-centred peacebuilding.

B. Tapping on the Resources of Middle-Level Leaders
In his peacebuilding model, Lederach argues that these leaders make up society’s most
critical. In 1997, he argued that ‘a literature on middle-range peacebuilding as such has
not yet been developed’ (1997: 46). He does argue that a series of practices define this
level of peacebuilding. These include: problem-solving workshops, peace commissions, and conflict resolution training. As seen before, some of these practices are also part of grassroots efforts. As a result, the difference between the grassroots and the middle-level are the people that are invited to join these processes. Academics, leaders in the education field, humanitarian organizations, business leaders, members of respected professions, and religious leaders, to name a few, have a 'determinant location in the conflict, who if integrated properly, might provide the key to creating an infrastructure for achieving and sustaining peace' (Lederach 1997: 46).

Although Lederach argues that the above-mentioned activities are the ones that define this level of peacebuilding, this doctoral thesis argues that civil society programmes are important elements of this approach. In many ways, Lederach's work attempts to find ways of transforming relations between groups as a step in the transformation of society and the establishment of self-sustaining peace. The difficulty is to translate breakthroughs at the group level at the societal level. Of course, this is also the problem at the grassroots level, but this type of efforts often attempt to incite change at the local level, not necessarily at the national level. Middle-level programmes attempt to promote change either at the national or grassroots level. Due to this definition, civil society groups must be included in these middle-level efforts for they attempt to translate strategies devised at the micro-sociological level at a national or grassroots level.

This section reviews four initiatives: the Institute for Resource and Security Studies' (IRSS) Health Bridges for Peace; the Project in Times of Transition's problem-solving workshops and reconciliation initiatives; the Center for Civic Initiative's work on civil society promotion; and the OHR's Civic Forum. The first three are in line with Lederach's understanding of middle-level peacebuilding efforts, while the last two approximate this thesis's expanded understanding of this type of peacebuilding.

1. Health Bridges for Peace
In 1997, Paula Gutlove of the IRSS in Cambridge, Massachusetts, facilitated the first of a series of problem-solving workshops in Gracanica, a small town on the inter-entity boundary line in northeast Bosnia. The town is surrounded by a number of Bosniak, Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Serb towns and villages. Having been one of the country's

258
most mixed regions, the fighting during the war was very intense, thus the levels of social separation, psychosocial trauma, and physical destruction are very high.

To tackle these three problems, Gutlove conceived the Health Bridges for Peace (HBP) program. She describes her approach as 'integrated action'; meaning that she deliberately combines ‘conflict management with other social functions, such as the delivery of health care, education, humanitarian assistance, and policing’ as a means to encourage social interaction, reconciliation, and peacebuilding (Gutlove 2002a). While HBP started to work with middle-level health professionals, mostly physicians, social workers, psychologists, nurses and so on, it has had an impact at the grassroots and the top-level. In this way, the first phase of the programme was the facilitation of a number of training seminars in trauma recovery for 15 health professionals from different ethnic backgrounds from Gracanica and surrounding towns and villages. Although they were being offered training in a functional area, the seminars provided an opportunity for the participants to interact with each other and build trust to create an integrated health system for the town and the region.

It is important to note that Gutlove choose to work with health professionals because their original training taught them that they must offer assistance to anyone, regardless of their background (1997). Of course, the war did have a direct impact on the participants, but Gutlove felt that they could put some of those feeling asides to create an integrated health system. After these training seminars, the participants decided to establish support groups for ‘mothers of war-injured children, for bereaved parents, for teenagers’ (Gutlove 2002a). With time people in the community joined these participants to repair the building, where these support groups were meeting, and the community, with Gutlove’s assistance, decided to turn the initiative into a local NGO called Osmijeh (Gutlove 2002b).

Shortly after, women from the area decided to start a day-care centre for children with disabilities. Mothers were now free to do other things. Some of them actually ‘went out and found the abandoned elderly, and set up a meals-on-wheels program for the grandmothers and grandfathers who had been left behind when people evacuated during the war’ (2002a). Men from different backgrounds eventually became involved in Osmijeh. Most of them were unemployed. They paired with teenagers and repaired
Osmijeh’s daycare centre and then they decided to also go to surrounding villages and rebuild school buildings, which doubled as community centres in the afternoon. In short, HBP’s desire to build an integrated health system for Gracanica and its surrounding villages had an impact at the grassroots, encouraging people to interact with people of different backgrounds and work to build a better community for all individuals.

As stated before, HBP also had an impact at the top-level. The Bosnian government has recognized the value of Gutlove’s work and has been searching for ways of reproducing the experiment in other parts of the country. Intergovernmental organizations have also expressed interest in Gutlove’s work. The World Health Organisation has asked Gutlove and IRSS to develop a programme that can be integrated into its activities. IRSS has also established the Medical Network, a region-wide peacebuilding NGO, with a diverse governing council, which facilitates training seminars, similar to those held in Gracanica in 1997, for health professionals in the former Yugoslavia. The Network was established in 1999, shortly after NATO’s intervention in Kosovo. Since then, the Network’s volunteers throughout the region have increased from 800 to 8,000 in 2002.

2. The Project on Justice in Times of Transition’s Problem-Solving Workshops
Based at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, the Project on Justice in Times of Transition (PJTT) has been active in post-Dayton Bosnia. It has organized five problem-solving workshops. The first two workshops, one held in London in November 1996 and the other in Bosnia in August 1997, addressed the topic of multiethnic reconciliation. The third conference, which was held in Budapest in December 1997, was commissioned by the International Commission on Missing Persons to start a process to account for those people missing during the war. The fourth workshop, held in June 1998 in Budapest was a continuation of the first two workshops mentioned above. A year later and building on the last workshop’s recommendations, PJTT organized a seminar that explored ways to strengthen the role of women in Bosnian politics.

This subsection reviews PJTT’s work in promoting interethnic reconciliation. Noting that most reconciliation programmes practiced in Bosnia since the GFA’s signing
have employed 'methodology advanced by Westerners with little or no first-hand experience in post-conflict situations,' PJTT, with the assistance of the British Association for Central and Eastern Europe (BACEE), decided to convene in November 1996 leaders of Bosnia's three national communities with leaders 'from other countries that have recently faced similar obstacles in the aftermath of a violent civil conflict.' By learning of others' experience in post-war peacebuilding efforts, the facilitators hoped that leaders from Bosnia would start to talk of ways to support peacebuilding efforts and make reconciliation a reality. Even though the participants talked about issues of contention, they agreed that another workshop was needed to help them understand how to build trust between Bosnia's communities (PJTT 2003).

From 31 July to 7 August 1997, PJTT and BACEE organized five workshops on multiethnic trust-building and reconciliation in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Banja Luka, and Mostar. A total of 61 participants from Bosnia's three communities participated in at least one of these workshops. These participants 'represented many sectors of society' and included middle-level political leaders, respected journalists, retired politicians and judges, university professors, leaders of influential Bosnian NGOs, members of nationalist and non-nationalist political parties and religious figures (PJTT 1997). At the request of participants in the 1996 workshop on reconciliation, the PJTT and BACEE invited speakers from other post-war situations that could talk about 'practical matters' and that could suggest programs that could promote trust-building and reconciliation in Bosnia's communities (PJTT 2003). The workshops' conveners invited Naomi Chazan, a member of the Israel Knesset, Palestinian official Zahira Kamal, and Salvadorian former guerrilla Salvador Sanabria to talk about their experiences on the following issues: the prosecution of war criminals, and the roles of politicians, the media and religious institutions in post-war peacebuilding. Although the participants found the presentations 'thought-provoking and helpful' (PJTT 2003), the workshop did not produce a plan of action. But, they did ask the conveners to conduct a third program on this issue.

The last of these workshops was held at the British Embassy in Budapest, Hungary on 4-6 June 1998. U.S. Ambassador to Slovakia, Ralph Johnson, moderated it. This workshop included 17 middle-level leaders of the Bosniak and Bosnian Serb communities. While Bosnian Croat leaders were also extended an invitation and some of
them accepted it, 'for various reasons at the last minute they did not travel to Budapest' (PJTT 1998). Although the participants were surprised by their absence, they agreed that the workshop could still be 'productive' (PJTT 1998).

As seen in previous workshops, the conveners invited five speakers from other post-war societies to share their experiences with participants. They were: Naomi Chazan, who participated in the workshops held in 1997; David Ervine, spokesperson for the Northern Irish Progressive Unionist Party; Joseph Reilly, an active trade unionist and member of Sinn Fein's National Executive committee; Piotr Staskinski, who was active in the Solidarity movement in Poland and edited Wola, an underground newspaper, during the 1980s; and Joaquin Villalobos, former leader of El Salvador's Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (PJTT 1998). They talked about the following topics: 'changing mindsets to transform conflict'; 'reconciling political and community leadership'; 'creating mechanisms for rebuilding trust'; and 'developing a free and independent media' (PJTT 1998).

Each presentation was followed by participants' questions and debate about how speakers' experiences could be applied to the situation in Bosnia. This workshop also included a number of informal events, where speakers and participants were encouraged to interact and explore ways of building new relationships (PJTT 1998). After three days, the participants were ready to offer three concrete proposals to move Bosnia closer to a self-sustaining peace (PJTT 1998):

1. Develop political leadership skills for women;
2. Encourage municipal cooperation on the return of refugees; and
3. Create a journalistic code of conduct.

The PJTT decided to organize a conference in 1999 on the first issue. The BACEE took the lead on the second issue (PJTT 1998). While the conveners have not directly addressed the third proposal, it is important to note that the Charles Stewart Foundation and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, which provided funding for the Budapest initiative, have been actively supporting programmes that foster media independence and training for journalists. One such example is the Centre for Civic
Cooperation's programme in this area, which has been funded since 1999 by both donors (CCC 2001).

While the level of trust in Bosnia is not very high, as noted in the World Bank’s reports at the beginning of this chapter, these workshops have been able to establish links between Bosnia’s communities and leaders. In fact, the PJTT’s methodology has helped participants understand that their problems are ones that have been faced and met by people in other war-torn societies. The workshops allowed middle-level leaders to meet with one another and to consider ways to promote reconciliation and peace in their communities. Work on the three proposals listed above has started, and while it is difficult to judge the overall success of these initiatives, it is important to stress that this type of work would not have been possible in the first years after the GFA’s signing. But, dialogue and reconciliation at the micro-level is slowly having an impact at the macro-societal level.

3. The Centers for Civic Initiatives

The Centers for Civic Initiatives (CCI) is one of the few national NGOs in Bosnia, with offices in: Tuzla, Mostar, Sarajevo, Zenica, Doboj, Brčko, Livno, Višgrade, and Bihać. A group of people that worked for the U.S.-based National Democratic Institute for International Affairs established it in 1998. CCI has three core objectives: public awareness campaigns; development of local advocacy groups; and development of advocacy networks (CCI 2003a). While several projects have been conceived to meet these goals, this subsection reviews CCI’s civil society development programme.

The CCI’s civil society programme starts with the conviction that civil society development and strengthening of existing groups could not take place in the first years after the GFA’s signing. Most of Bosnia’s citizens were ‘dealing with their daily existential problems failing to be more actively involved in the decision-making processes at different levels of authority’ (CCI 2003b). As an indigenous NGO, CCI’s civil society programme attempts to educate citizens about their rights and it encourages them to think of themselves as active members of society by either joining advocacy groups, establishing new groups, or just holding accountable elected representatives.

263
CCI is also working with established advocacy groups and it has been offering training so these groups can put pressure on Bosnia's authorities and influence the legislative process. While CCI's work does not address issues pertaining interethnic reconciliation, it does give assistance to civic organizations that are trying to strengthen the process of democratization and the establishment of a self-sustaining peace. Because CCI has offices throughout Bosnia and employs people from different backgrounds, it represents a microcosm of a future multiethnic society.

In many ways, CCI's work is mentioned in this chapter because it represents a local organization that is giving civic organizations, than tend to support moderate, non-nationalist interests, the necessary training to organize public opinion campaigns in a emerging democratic environment. As seen before, grassroots initiatives have been doing this with adolescents and at the local level, but CCI has the resources, the experience, and the infrastructure to carry out its work at the national level. The importance, in the context of this thesis, is that this type of work can support the work of NGOs and other interest groups that emanate from middle-level or grassroots conflict resolution initiatives. CCI's work shows ways of connecting social transformation at the group level into the macro-sociological level.

4. The Office of High Representative's Civic Forum

High Representative's Wolfgang Petritsch's desire to enhance the international community's peacebuilding approach, by including new mechanisms to increase Bosnia's ownership of these efforts, led him to conceive the Civic Forum. Petritsch announced the creation of this body in a speech before the UN Security Council. Its objective is to 'promote active citizenship' and increase the ability of civil society groups to play 'a more active role in the public policy discourse' (Petritsch 2001b) of the country, as he felt that this has been 'dominated by the agendas of political parties, elected officials, and representatives of the international communities' (OHR-PS 2001e). Indeed, an OHR press release stated the Petritsch would not only hear the concerns and proposals of those civic leaders invited to the meetings, but also 'follow up on some of them with policy initiatives' (OHR-PS 2001e).
Five meetings were held under Petritsch. The first meeting was on 12 October 2001, held at Petritsch’s residence in Sarajevo. Most of the participants worked in the Federation. A second session, also made up of people that worked in the Federation and held at Petritsch’s residence, was held on 22 November 2001. The topic on the agenda was the importance of economic reforms (OHR-PS 2001b). Also invited were representatives of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

The third meeting, held in Banja Luka on 21 December 2001, was one of the most important. Petritsch met with members of the RS’s civic sphere. They talked about many issues, ranging from the importance of economic reform to the ‘humiliating circumstances experienced by returnees and displaced persons’ (OHR-PS 2001a). The importance of this meeting can be further understood by analysing Petritsch’s reactions to the proceedings: ‘The issues you have raised are the same as those I have heard in Sarajevo […] There is less division between the people of the two Entities than a first glance – or politicians – would suggest. This encourages me to be tougher on people who preach division’ (cited in OHR-PS 2001a). In addition, this last meeting also confirmed that Bosnia’s politicians and citizens shared a ‘lack of enthusiasm for Bosnia’s integration in Europe’ (OHR-PS 2001a). This is problematic because the path towards union with Europe is one of the incentives the international community is using to implement the peace agreement and strengthen the Bosnian state.

The fourth meeting, held in Mostar on 2 February 2002, provided a more optimistic view of Bosnia, though invited civic leaders complained that more had to be done to desegregate Bosnia’s education system and to strengthen Bosnia’s nascent civil society institutions. At the end of the meeting, the High Representative vowed to help them, but he also asked them to continue putting pressure to local authorities obstructing the peace implementation process: ‘When you see that something doesn’t work, then try to change it. Take fate of this city in your hands. It is possible. Just don’t give up’ (Petritsch in OHR-PS 2002b).

The last of these meetings was held in the OHR’s main office in Sarajevo on 19 May 2002. Like the other meetings, Petritsch invited a number of civic leaders to talk about constitutional amendments needed to support the peace implementation process and to make Bosnia into a strong state. In their conservations, Petritsch reaffirmed his
support for the political structures established by the GFA, but he also talked of the importance of changing the political culture of bitter interethnic quarrel to reform Bosnia according to European standards. Concrete proposals were not presented, but the participants agreed that pressuring Bosnian authorities to adapt their constitutions was necessary as at first step to entry into the European Union and the strengthening of civil society. In regards to the bitter ethnic divisions that still affect Bosnia, the participants and Petritsch considered ways of desegregating the country’s education systems (OHR-PS 2002a).

As noted in the previous chapter, the Civic Forum provided a mechanism were middle-level, civic leaders could meet with the High Representative and other international officials to talk about different issues affecting Bosnia and the establishment of a self-sustaining peace. The meetings were organized a key theme, but other issues were also discussed. Debate took place and Petritsch often remarked that he had a better understanding of concerns people had with the GFA’s implementation. Fora provided an environment conducive to dialogue and trust building. Many have seen this as a step in the right direction. Bosnian citizens should directly influence the international community’s work, and these middle-level leaders provided the High Representative their opinions on important topics. Also, the meetings have given legitimacy to certain individuals and the organisations they represent. Because most of these individuals oppose nationalist leaders’ projects, they started to give voice to new visions of Bosnian society, motivating debate on important topic among civic leaders, government officials, and diplomats.

C. Top-Level Programmes

For Lederach, top-level programmes are those that target ‘principal high-level leaders in the conflict’ (1997: 43). The Dayton peace initiative is mostly a product of these efforts. Lederach’s description of these efforts is similar to this doctoral thesis’s understanding of strategic peacemaking and state-centred peacebuilding. Nevertheless, there are exceptions. Some top-level efforts can be in line with the ideals of the communicative approach.
A case in point is the OHR's Consultative Partnership Forum, which was developed by Petritsch in 2001. This informal body was not supposed to 'replace existing mechanisms of government' (Petritsch 2001b). Its objective was to bring together members of Bosnia's Council of Minister and the High Representative's aids 'to discuss and resolve urgent issues, mainly related to the agenda' set by the PIC (OHR-R 2001a). While the Forum intended to create dialogue between the OHR and the Council of Ministers, the OHR expressed its commitment to invite leaders from other governmental bodies or from the international community, if it deemed necessary. The creation of this Forum sent an important signal to Bosnia's citizens. Rather than just imposing an agenda on Bosnia, the Forum suggested that the international community would like to coordinate its policies with local institutions in order to make peace self-sustaining.

As noted in the previous chapter, even though several meetings were held, disagreement between international officials and Bosnian officials forced the High Representative to use his Bonn powers to get important legislation through. Nevertheless, the creation of the Forum and the holding of these meetings were positively received in Bosnian society. Alexander Stiglmaier (2001) noted that this informal mechanism demonstrated that Petritsch really cared for Bosnian concerns and that he welcomed their input in key legislation and in aspects of the PIC's peace implementation strategy.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

As documented in the previous two chapters, state-centred forms of peacebuilding have dominated post-Dayton Bosnia. However, the international community through trial and error has realized that these efforts may not be able to establish a self-sustaining peace in the next couple of years. Not all 'bottom-up' peacebuilding mechanisms have been effective in Bosnia, as Chandler's and Belloni's research demonstrate. As a consequence, this chapter reviewed a number of initiatives that are closely aligned to the communicative approach's ideals.

As demonstrated in this chapter, the communicative approach questions whether state-building can promote reconciliation, processes of political will-formation, and the institution of reflexive structures of governance. While society-centred peacebuilding strategies place Bosnia's citizens at the centre of peacebuilding efforts, the Bosnian state
and the international community still have an important role to play. Building on Habermas's research, administrative power must be complemented by communicative power. To put in another way, the people, acting via civil society organisations at national or local levels, must delimit and legitimise the activities of the state, and in the case of Bosnia, the international community.

This chapter shows a number of grassroots, middle-level, and top-level mechanisms that attempted to transfer more power to the people in peacebuilding. These efforts show that reconciliation is not something that can be achieved overnight. In fact, some conflict resolution experts working in Bosnia have had to reconsider their own strategies and adapt them to convince people to join different mechanisms that can bring people from contending factions closer together. Grassroots efforts demonstrate how outsiders had to experiment with different mechanisms to achieve and sustain dialogue between participants. However, once people from different communities have the confidence to work together, they can transform the social, economic, and political environment that supports and breeds inter-ethnic conflict. But, changing these social structures is not simple. People must create social organisations and networks to campaign and press for these changes.

How can this be achieved? Conflict resolution trainers and NGO workers could train individuals in capacity-building techniques, but it seems that inviting leaders from other war-torn societies is more beneficial. Participants can learn from people that have experienced similar challenges and they can see how different strategies of social change may apply to their own situation. This is not to say that conflict resolution training or civil society training may not be beneficial. Instead, individuals must understand how these tools fit within their own social context and seminars that include leaders from other war-torn societies seems to be a good mechanism to incite local actors to think of how to transform their own social conditions.

Accountability is another important issue. Even though the international community has funded different civil society training projects, many of them have not convinced people to create social organisations or to join established social networks. As noted above, many individuals in Bosnia feel that they cannot affect the way society is organised. Things have been changing, as more people are realising that they can put
pressure on Bosnia’s authorities at different levels via elections and other procedures of deliberation. Another important element has been the willingness of the international community to draft their strategies with the input of Bosnia’s civic sector and politicians. Petritsch’s ownership approach has led to new developments that have strengthened Bosnia’s civic sector, giving an incentive for people of different backgrounds to work together to transform Bosnia according to their varied needs and interests.

It is important to stress that society-centred peacebuilding is used here to describe a set of practices that if integrated may promote social change at different societal levels. Having differentiated between these society-centred peacebuilding and state-centred peacebuilding practices and having reviewed some examples of the former, an important question remains unanswered: why are these not at the centre of the international community’s peacebuilding strategy? This important question will be answered in the next chapter, which concludes this thesis’s assessment of the making and the implementation of the Dayton peace initiative.
CONCLUSION

Critical Reflections for Self-Sustaining Peace in Bosnia

INTRODUCTION
In the discipline of international relations, the critical approach has been sternly criticized for lacking a ‘research program’ that can guide foreign policy-making or, in the case of this thesis, peacemaking. A ‘research program’ must not be dogmatic, attempting to establish an ideology of how the world works. Rather it must assist investigators ‘[discover] new facts and [develop] insightful interpretations’ to allow them to test existing theories or strategies and develop new ones by means of empirical studies. Do critical theories meet these general criteria?

Critics of critical approaches find that they are better are pinpointing what is missing in mainstream theories, rather than providing a credible theory that can inform practice (Keohane 1988: 393). Randall Schweller (1999: 14) captures this position in his scathing critique of Andrew Linklater’s Transformation of Political Community (1999):

Practitioners of international politics, however, understand foreign policy is too serious a business to entertain utopian ideas about dramatically reconstructed social relations; confronted by weighty foreign policy decisions, they do not enjoy the luxury of retreating into a fantasy world of their own creation, but instead must act under real-world constraints, knowing that bad judgment can lead to the subjugation or extinction of the state and its citizens.

While these views do stress critical theories’ main limitation, it is important to emphasise that critical theory does have the ability to show weaknesses in established theories or practices, forcing researchers to consider their efficacy and viability. In this way, critical theorising is a practical endeavour that can potentially affect how people understand, explain, and address social events. But, its vantage point is ipso facto, reducing critical theories’ influence in the policy world.

This debate has influenced this thesis’s investigation of the Dayton peace initiative. It accepts critical theories weaknesses, but it also emphasises that it can serve as a tool to demonstrate why policies, and the theories that influence them, have not
achieved its intended objectives. In doing so, it explains why the international community must develop new strategies to establish a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia, while also revealing some observations that must guide new research in international relations and conflict analysis. This thesis started by raising the following question: ‘has the Dayton peace initiative been success?’ Having examined the international, regional, and domestic dynamics that led to the negotiation of The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFA) and the many challenges and strategies employed to translate its provision into a self-sustaining peace, it is important to also answer the following questions. Why was the Contact Group successful at settling the conflict? Why has establishing a self-sustaining peace being harder than originally expected? Have the changes introduced by the Peace Implementation Council and the High Representative’s many state-centred strategies move Bosnia closer to a self-sustaining peace? If not, why? Can society-centred efforts and other strategies influenced by the communicative approach’s tenets translate the negotiated settlement into a self-sustaining peace? At the more theoretical level, are strategic and communicative approaches contradictory or can they be complementary in the establishment of a self-sustaining peace? This last question is answered in part two of this concluding chapter, while the rest of the questions, listed in above, will be considered in part one.

I. THE DAYTON PEACE INITIATIVE: A SUCCESSFUL FAILURE?

The Dayton peace initiative can be best described as a successful failure. While peacemaking efforts were successful at settling the war, they have equally failed to resolve the conflict that impelled the parties to go to war and establish a self-sustaining peace. As presented in chapter one and three, the making of a successful peacemaking initiative must address various challenges at three different levels of analysis: (1) the international, (2) the regional, and (3) the domestic.

The main problem confronted by peacemakers at the international level is that the international community is often divided about the best strategy to end a war. International actors intervene in intrastate conflicts, when these affect their self-interests. Even though these actors might conduct peacemaking activities via the organs of
international or regional organisations, a peacemaking initiative tends to reflect the interests of the United States or other great powers. Without their consent, peacemaking initiatives will fail to settle the war, as powerful actors will discredit these initiatives and present new ones that reflect their more immediate concerns. It is important to remember that the international community's peacemaking efforts to end the Bosnian war from the summer of 1992 to the spring of 1995 were marred by international disagreement on how to best settle the conflict. Although the United States initially believed that peacemaking efforts should be directed by the United Nations and the European Community/European Union, via the organs of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), its peace initiatives, especially the Vance-Owen Peace Plan and the Vance-Stoltenberg Peace Plan, were opposed by the Clinton administration, even though many of their provisions were included in the GFA. The Clinton administration's opposition to these peace plans questioned the authority of the ICFY, compelling the warring parties to continue their war efforts (Gow 1997: 223-53).

While intrastate wars are mostly internal in nature, they are also affected by regional dynamics. This is especially true in the case of Bosnia, as the war was a product of Yugoslavia's violent dissolution and the Croat-Serb rivalry. Thus, the problem that peacemakers face at the regional level is that they failed to recognise the important role regional actors can play in a conflict's settlement. The ICFY's peace plans included the participation of Croatia and Yugoslavia, but the plans did not give them enough incentives to force their allies in Bosnia to end the war and accept these peace plans. Instead, both Croatia and Yugoslavia kept supporting their respective allies in Bosnia until a better peace plan was reached or their side won the war.

At the domestic level, peacemaking initiatives must offer incentives to contending parties to put down their weapons and start reconstructing the social, political, and economic fabrics of society. Although peacemakers must assist the parties during this phase of peacebuilding, it is important to emphasise that peacebuilding activities must promote the participation of local actors in these processes. It can not be said enough, peace initiatives can only be considered a success if they establish a self-sustaining peace, where former enemies work together to construct a new social order, keep implementing the negotiated peace agreement, and device non-violent mechanisms to address existing
conflicts and if necessary to re-negotiate accepted peace agreements. This suggests that the international community's peacebuilding strategy must think of new ways of transforming enemy relationships, foster interethnic reconciliation, and create a constituency that supports the implementation of peace processes as a means to re-integrate society.

Seen from this perspective, the Dayton initiative was successful at ending the war because the Contact Group recognised the significance of regional dynamics. By offering Croatia and Yugoslavia incentives to end the fighting in Bosnia, Milošević and Tudjman decided to coerce the Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb leaders to accept the GFA, even though the agreement's provisions clearly contradicted these two groups. While the inclusion of regional powers was an important factor, the Clinton administration's effort to convince other international actors to accept its peacemaking strategy as their own is an outstanding feature of the Dayton peace initiative. America's partners in the Contact Group often questioned this approach's use of military force to coerce the parties to join peacemaking efforts. However, the Clinton administration was able to keep the Contact Group unified, at least in the public's eye.

The failure of the Dayton initiative, as seen in chapters six and seven, is the inability of the international community to establish a self-sustaining peace. Rather than detaching from Bosnia after the first post-Dayton elections, as originally planned, the international community had to intensify its peacebuilding activities. The OHR's mandate was strengthened, while NATO forces were ordered to assist the work of the High Representative. Whereas the international community has acknowledged that it must reduce the scope of its activities and allow local institutions to take control of peace implementation efforts, it has been unable to do so because many international experts feel that Bosnia's state institutions cannot carry out the GFA's provisions. Accordingly, the PIC has created a number of programmes to give more authority for international agencies to fully implement the peace agreement by creating and strengthening Bosnia's state institutions and undermine nationalist politicians' ability to obstruct the peace process. Will an internationally backed state-building programme move Bosnia down the path of a self-sustaining peace?
High Representative’s Wolfgang Petritsch’s “ownership” strategy accepted the limitations of the state-building programme, but international pressures prevented him from creating the proper mechanisms to establish a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia. As noted in chapter seven, the PIC forced Petritsch to explain his actions, and at times he to defend his decisions before the U.N. Security Council. His ownership strategy started to become a reality once he assembled the new non-nationalist government, convincing the international community that Bosnians were ready to assume more control over their affairs. Although new government passed a number of key reforms, nationalists at different levels of government were stalling decision-making procedures. More importantly, differences between the many non-nationalist parties that formed the new government disagreed on many issues. For this reason, Petritsch created the Consultative Partnership Forum to minimise these disputes and to keep the legislative process afloat. His strategies, however, favoured state-building objectives, because the PIC was not willing to consider ways of moving too far from a its state-building programme, though it did welcome some of Petritsch’s modifications.

Can this modified state-building programme integrate Bosnia and translate the GFA’s provisions into a self-sustaining peace? A recent World Bank report finds that Bosnia’s social fabric is very weak and that interethnic distrust is a constant obstruction in trying to reconstruct multicultural networks that can make a multiethnic democracy a reality (Poggi 2002). Critics of mainstream theories of peacebuilding note that rebuilding institutions will not necessarily create reconciliatory processes that will unify divided societies and empower people to get together and actively participate in civic organisations. It is for this reason that the international community has funded so many ‘bottom-up’ peacebuilding activities. While chapter eight reviews some of these activities, it is important to remember that they are not at the centre of the PIC’s peacebuilding strategies. Why is this the case?

The preponderance of the strategic approach in the making of the Dayton initiative can explain this failure. As explained in chapter one, the strategic peacemaking efforts are aimed at the imposition of social order as means to keep intact the structures of the international system. As a result, strategic forms of peacemaking are led by state actors that perceive that a given conflict situation threatens their ability of conducting
their foreign policies. Because outside actors tend to be stronger than the parties to the conflict, they utilise all available resources to impose a peace agreement that reflect their needs and interests, while marginalising the needs and interests of those people directly affected by the conflict. Consequently, the U.S.-led Contact Group decided not to invite ‘moderate forces standing for multiethnicity and democracy’ (Udovicki and Stikovac 1997: 199) because these leaders would not have been able to stop the fighting. Instead, it allowed Bosnia’s nationalists parties to represent their communities’ interests and in exchange for their co-operation, the Contact Group legitimated their position in post-Dayton Bosnia, though the parties did not achieve all of their objectives at Dayton.

Even though the Contact Group’s decision was motivated by its desire to end the war as quickly as possible, American and European negotiators thought that the elections would produce new leaders that supported the full implementation of the peace agreement. Of course, this did not take place. By early 1997, the PIC decided that it was necessary to weaken nationalist parties’ base of support by supporting non-nationalist parties and trying to strengthen central state institutions to block any attempts that the Republika Sprska or parts of Herzegovina would decide to unite with Yugoslavia and Croatia. Based on instrumental understandings of ethnic conflict and on state-building’s reliance on the integrative forces of ‘functional reason’, the PIC argued that a stronger central state could manage the conflict, while economic reforms would provide an incentive for leaders to co-operate, weakening ethno-national identities and nationalist political parties.

The international community has been partly successful. Today, Bosnia’s central state has gained more political and financial authority over the country’s affairs, while the OHR has been able to bring the entities’ constitutions in line with Bosnia’s constitution, written at Dayton. But, the nationalist parties still play a dominant role. Even though the non-nationalist coalition government won the election, the Socialist Democratic Party and other smaller parties have not made significant inroads in non-Bosniak communities. The Croatian Democratic Union’s struggle to establish a new third entity, Bosnian Croats unwillingness to dismantle parallel institutions, and the riots that ensued during the ceremonies to rebuild the Fehadija and the Osman Pasha Mosques are clear examples of Bosnia’s divisions.
In hindsight, could the Contact Group been successful in the pre-settlement and post-settlement phases have it built its Dayton peace initiative on the tenets of the communicative approach? It is doubtful, as the present international context is based on Westphalian ideals, which still emphasise the importance of international order, the sanctity of the nation-state, and negative peace. Even though neo-liberal ideals and new interpretations of security have been playing a more influential role in international policy circles, these, as explained in chapter one, are in line with the tenets of the strategic approach to peacemaking. Oliver Richmond (2002: 187) shows that peacemakers 'are reluctant to admit their roles and the impact of their actions are not just about making peace, but are also about exporting order, possibly unwittingly, via the value systems, economic, political, social, cultural models that have shape their own development.' Again, the belief is that social integration can take still place via what Habermas's calls the mechanisms of ‘functional reason’.

While the communicative approach to peacemaking presents a critique of the Dayton peace initiative and strategic forms of peacemaking that confirms Richmond's observations. But, is this the only contribution of the communicative approach? Chapter eight reviews of various ‘bottom-up’ or society-centred peacebuilding projects suggest that this approach has the potential of transforming enemy relations and building peace constituencies that can positively alter how society is organized, supporting mechanisms of deliberation. While most of the reviewed projects had positive impacts at the micro-level, their effect at the macro-sociological level is in question. It is important to recognise this limitation, because peacemakers and international bodies working in war-torn societies are more concerned with the accomplishment of their interests and meeting the requirements of an exit strategy, than the long-term needs of the people that have been affected by the conflict (Richmond 2002: 190). For this reason, they modify existing post-settlement peacebuilding strategies in ways that can meet these two goals.

Noting both the potential and limitations of society-centred peacebuilding activities and the failure of state-centred peacebuilding in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina, are there ways the international community can establish a self-sustaining peace or will the Dayton peace initiative be part of the ever-growing list of failed peace agreements? Are communicative and strategic forms of peacemaking polar opposites or
II. TOWARDS NEW SYNTHESIS

Jürgen Habermas's research divided society into the lifeworld and the system to show how functional reason, the mechanisms of administrative power and economic integration, were colonising the lifeworld and organising society according to system imperatives. In this way, Habermas showed how Max Weber's 'iron cage' was materialising in modern life. Rather than succumbing to these system imperatives, Habermas developed a theory of communicative rationality that could empower to break with these processes and affect how society is organised. Through trial and error, and many years of research, he became convinced that individuals' active participation in civil society could break with these system imperatives by directly influencing the works of government and the legislative system. For Habermas the law serves as a fabric that connects lifeworld and system, granting the system administrative power and the lifeworld communicative power. The former authorizes state institutions to enforce and use coercion to implement laws in order to safeguard the basis of social order and protect established procedures, while the latter form of power grants individuals the freedom to come together with other like-minded individuals to address matters of mutual concern and to delimit the power of state institutions.

In short, Habermas's theory favors civil society networks over the state and strongly argues that social integration should be led by communicative power. This is not to say that he campaigns for a society free of functional reason, administrative power, legitimate use of violence, or state institutions. Habermas's work is strongly influenced by a sense of pragmatism that attempts to preserve social order, but enabling civil society networks alter social structures according to the citizenry's changing norms and values. Consequently, Habermas does not advocate for the lifeworld's colonization of the market or the state, but for their co-existence, though the boundaries and the powers of these system elements is regulated by mechanisms ingrained in the lifeworld.

Habermas's application of his theories in the real world is difficult. His research is aimed at explaining developments in advanced democratic countries, especially Germany
and the United States. Many critics have expressed doubts whether his findings can be applied to other Western countries and to the non-Western world. While this doctoral thesis shares these same concerns, it is important to keep in mind Andrew Parkin's (1996: 440) characterisation of Habermas's as a research programme that 'aims to contribute to the struggles of the disempowered by offering understanding of the processes and tendencies that reproduce social relations power.' In this sense, Habermas's theories have influenced this doctoral thesis at both the theoretical and practical levels.

Like Habermas's reconstruction of reason, this thesis reconstructs mainstream theories of peacemaking to support the existence and the significance of a communicative approach that can guide decision-makers' attempts to establish a self-sustaining peace. In line with Habermas's work, this thesis does not necessarily argue that strategic forms of peacemaking are irrelevant and that they should be dismissed at all costs. In an ideal world, social relations should only be structured via communicative power, but this is not possible in the real world. Administrative power is necessary because it can safeguard the basis of order. In this way, a new synthesis is needed, where communicative and strategic forms of peacemaking are combined to end conflicts and establish the foundations of a self-sustaining peace.

While the communicative approach was presented as a distinct way of explaining and addressing conflicts, it needs to be connected to the mainstream strategic peacemaking efforts, because many cases show that coercive diplomacy is a fast way of stopping the fighting and forcing the parties to negotiate an end to their conflict. Even though humanitarian interests may not always influence foreign intervention, a cessation of hostilities, for whatever reason, is better than genocide or acts of ethnic cleansing. The question is: how to best integrate former combatants and create a society that best represents their interests?

A conscious synthesis of both approaches to peacemaking may help the international community design and execute new strategies that can stop the fighting, but lead to the long-term resolution of the conflict. In the case of Bosnia, it is too late to think of what the international community may have done to include moderate, non-nationalist leaders in the negotiations, held at Dayton. Today, a new strategy must replace the PIC's state-building program with a society-building program. Such a strategy does not have to
ignore elements of the PIC’s state-building programme. But, a society-building program should emphasise the importance of promoting reconciliatory mechanisms, building civic networks, and allowing civic leaders to have more influence over the central state’s and the international community’s decisions. In many ways, it would look like Petritsch’s ‘ownership’ strategy, but it would dedicate more time and resources to reconciliatory mechanisms in order to increase interethnic trust and the creation of new civic bodies that represent Bosnia’s diverse interests.

A synthesis of both approaches would also challenge the international community’s belief that the GFA is the only vehicle towards self-sustaining peace. The PIC and the High Representative have corrected many of the faults ingrained in Bosnia’s constitution, which is part of the peace agreement. The international community has strengthened the central state at the expense of the entities’ authorities; it has pushed for constitutional amendments that protect the rights of Bosnia’s citizens regardless of where they live or their background. Why then is it that Bosnia’s citizens cannot re-negotiate the peace agreement’s provisions? The PIC fears that Bosnia’s leaders and authorities would partition Bosnia. This is a possibility, but the inclusion of non-nationalist leaders may provide new ideas that can modify current peacebuilding strategies according to the same Western ideals the international community is trying to push on Bosnia.

Combining these two approaches would also require building new bodies that can allow civic organizations directly affect the process of peace implementation and even scrutinize international agencies’ work. The Civic Forum was a good idea, but it was not used to its full potential. Petritsch repeatedly stated that the meetings helped appreciate people’s problems and opinions concerning the peace process. But, he rarely acted on participants’ recommendations. Petritsch should have followed up on their recommendations because it would have sent a clear message to Bosnia’s citizens: their participation in civic networks could affect how society operated. The Civic Forum should have also brought together these civic leaders and government officials.

Civic leaders and government officials should also be invited to the PIC’s meetings. Its decisions directly affect Bosnia, and the PIC should be informed of Bosnian views and interests before instructing the High Representative to carry out its strategies. In fact, this is a real problem that has been hardly studied in the peacebuilding literature.
The clash between international and local interests has engendered an environment defined by a struggle to enforce or obstruct the process of peace implementation. It is important to find ways of including local actors in decision-making procedures at the level of the international community. New mechanisms that increase local actors' influence will encourage a sense of partnership that will enhance peacebuilding efforts. This does not mean that local actors should have a veto power over international treaties, but dialogue can lead to more effective peacebuilding strategies, aligning Bosnia's many interests with those of the international community.

A synthesis of communicative and strategic approaches can lead to an infinite number of peacemaking strategies. Nevertheless, what is important to note is that strategic approaches tend to demonstrate how conflicts can be successfully settled, while communicative approaches show how to integrate a fractured society and how to establish a self-sustaining peace. What the synthesis does not explain is how long it takes to transform negotiate agreements into a self-sustaining peace. Even though it is difficult to estimate how long it would take or how much resources it would take, these shortcomings could force the international community to exit war-torn societies prematurely, allowing former combatants to continue the fighting. Will this be the fate of Bosnia?

CONCLUDING REMARKS
Chapter one posed the following question: has the Dayton peace initiative been a success? The review of the making, the implementation, and the subsequent revisions of this initiative, in the context of the theoretical debate between strategic and communicative approaches to peacemaking, proposes that it has been a successful failure. As said earlier in this concluding chapter, even though the initiative settled the war, it has not been able to make peace self-sustaining in Bosnia. From a critical-theoretical perspective, the problem is not only the policies designed and implemented by the international community, but also the theoretical positions that have consciously or unconsciously guided decision-makers in the international community to support such peacemaking practices.
The evidence presented in chapter two demonstrates how strategic conceptions of peacemaking drove the Bosnian peace process. Even though a self-sustaining peace is something the international community desires, so it can decrease the amount of assistance it offers Bosnia, decision-makers have failed to understand the reasons why the strategic approach will not create the necessary mechanism to achieve this objective. As explained in chapter one and illustrated in part two, strategic conceptions of peacemaking are adequate if the aims are the settlement of conflicts, the imposition of political order, and the stabilisation of social relations. The resolution or transformation of conflicts is not part of this agenda. Although the international community has forced Bosnia’s citizens to accept the political structures set by the GFA, this will not integrate society, because many individuals in Bosnia believe that these are not legitimate. Although the international community believed, during the Dayton peace talks that elections would provide these structures the necessary legitimacy to fix Bosnia’s many problems and integrate its divided society, evidence suggests that this is not the case.

Today, Bosnia is still dependent on foreign aid and on the work of international or regional political bodies, which intervene in its political process when Bosnia’s politicians fail to create the necessary policies to reform the country’s economy and to rehabilitate its social fabric. While Bosnia non-nationalist’s parties have been gaining more influence, they do not have the influence their nationalist counterparts have had at the local level, where most of the problems between each ethno-national community still occur. Of course, the fact that non-nationalist politicians are playing a larger role in the country’s decision-making process should be seen as a positive element. However, these politicians tend to represent the interests of moderate Bosniaks and lack strong support in the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat communities. From these communities’ perspectives, the government is being administered by the Bosniaks. This could fuel the conflict in the near future.

As the international community considers its next steps in Bosnia, it must take into consideration that instituting a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia cannot be accomplished solely via the tenets of the strategic approach to peacemaking. A self-sustaining peace entails that Bosnia’s citizens engage each other in reconciliatory processes. A new culture of peace must flow from these processes, so the foundations of
civil society can be put into place. Such a culture would support the projects espoused by moderate political forces and pressure nationalist political parties to re-consider their ideas and policies in favour of new ones, if they are going to keep hold of their seats in government. For this reason, the international community should support a new version of Petritsch’s ownership approach; one in which society-centred peacebuilding strategies are used to integrate Bosnia’s fractured social fabric and to motivate people to join social movements that can alter the way society is organized.

But, a reconsideration of current strategies cannot take place until decision-makers recognise that strategic approaches are not the best means to establish a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia. This is why this doctoral thesis ‘problematises’ peacemaking processes by showing the existence of two theoretical approaches, which seem to be competing, but are actually complimentary. Normative concerns do raise questions regarding the morality of strategic peacemaking efforts; these practices cannot be abandoned all together. What is needed is a conversation between these two approaches to construct more effective peacemaking strategies and in the case of Bosnia a movement from strategic to communicative forms of peacemaking.
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301


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309


310


