Social capital in poor communities. A case study from Rural Northern Peru.

Carlos Alberto Torres Vitolas

Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

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This thesis examines the prospective value of social capital for developmental purposes. It contends that the role that social relationships play in poor actors’ efforts to cope with and move out of poverty needs to be assessed under a dual understanding of social structure, as both the medium and outcome of social action. The study adopts Bourdieu’s ‘theory of practice’ as its main theoretical approach. Actors’ investments in and uses of relationships were analysed in relation to their objective conditions—stocks of capital—and associated practices and strategies. Social capital was operationalised as both social networks (local, external, and vertical) and social resources (mediated access to assets of local economic relevance).

This approach was empirically examined via a two-year longitudinal study that followed the experiences of residents of two poor rural villages located in the Department of Lambayeque, in Northern Peru, with regard to their quotidian practices and involvement in a participatory development intervention that conducted basic infrastructure, productive, and informational investments. The study used a mixed-method approach comprising in-depth and unstructured interviews with residents and project staff; household surveys (three waves); and participatory observation.

The evidence obtained showed that residents make extensive use of their relationships for economic purposes. Most valuable social resources and connections, however, were unequally accessed by residents according to their levels of poverty. This unequal (re)production of social capital was found to be related to actors’ material conditions and quotidian practices. This social dynamic tended to be reproduced within the participatory intervention examined, leading to an unequal expansion of social capital and related benefits among its beneficiaries. The study concludes that the structural conditionality of the processes of using and building social capital makes it intimately associated with socioeconomic inequalities. The theoretical and practical implications of this work are discussed in the concluding chapter.
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1. Social capital: an unfulfilled promise

The concept of ‘social capital’ has achieved remarkable prominence in policy and development debates in the last decade. Developed by diverse authors working under different academic traditions—Loury (1976, 1981), from an economic analysis of human capital; Coleman (1988, 1990), from a rational–choice sociological framework; Bourdieu (1980, 1986), from a class–centred understanding of actors’ practices; and Putnam (1993a, 1993b), from a communitarian approach within political science—social capital has served, in broad terms, to highlight the importance of features of sociability such as networks or social organisations in increasing the (economic and non–economic) returns of social actions (Foley & Edwards, 1999; Halpern, 2005; Portes, 1998; Woolcock, 1998; Woolcock & Nayaran, 2000).

Indeed, after the popularisation of the concept by Putnam (1993a, 1993b, 1995a), the bulk of the early literature on the subject identified a series of positive relationships between social capital—defined under various (often interchangeable) guises such as networks, associational activity, or impersonal trust—and a wide array of development–related issues, such as economic growth (Knack & Keefer, 1997), households’ material welfare (Grootaert, 1999; Narayan & Pritchett, 1997), educational performance (Teachman, Paasch, & Carver, 1996; Sun, 1999), crime and violence (Kennedy, Kawachi, Prothrow–Stith, Lochner, & Gupta, 1998; Sampson, Raundenbushm, & Earls 1997), health and well–being (Kawachi, Kennedy, & Glass, 1998; Rose 1999), and good governance (Couto & Guthrie, 1999).

In an international context of debate about the roles of the state and civil society in the promotion of economic development and democracy, the newly–found benefits of some expressions of sociability, particularly community organisation and civic engagement, produced a positive response from many politicians, economists, and policy–makers. By the first half of the twenty–first century, the term had become recurrent in the discourse of key international institutions, such as the World Bank (World Bank, 1998, 2001), the Inter–American Development Bank (IADB, 2003a, 2003b, 2006), the Asian Development Bank (ADB, 1999, 2004), and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2001). Moreover, social capital has typically been presented as a contributing factor to processes of social and economic development:

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Different governments have also adopted the concept in their operations. For instance, a series of public initiatives have been launched to monitor changes in social capital through household surveys in the United States of America (U.S. Census Bureau, 2008), the United Kingdom (Green & Fletcher, 2003), Canada (Franke 2005), and Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2004).
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Developing human and social capital increases political stability, raises productivity, and enhances international competitiveness, leading to faster growth. (ADB, 1999, p. 7)

[The] development of social capital for the promotion of social inclusion and the reduction of social problems ... prevents economic losses and provides incentives to productive activity and investment. (IADB, 2003a, p. 16)

Social norms and networks are a key form of capital that people can use to move out of poverty. (World Bank, 2001, p. 10)

... Social capital is important for well-being, health, and job search activities and ... [there is] evidence regarding its potential role in supporting economic growth. (OECD, 2001, p. 67)

The consolidation of the concept in the development and policy literature, albeit with different emphases, and the increasing acceptance of the proposition that it can be considered a strategic component for development processes were accompanied by different proposals recommending its adoption into intervention strategies, which aimed at using community capabilities to promote sustainable growth and poverty alleviation. As part of this debate, participatory approaches to development, which propose an operative framework that increases economic and non-economic support for community organisations, and advocate the involvement of organised beneficiaries in the design and execution of development interventions, have been considered by various scholars and practitioners as adequate to ‘use’ and ‘build’ social capital for development purposes (ADB, 1999, 2004; Brown & Ashman, 1996; Dongier, van Domelen, Ostrom, Rizvi, Wakeman, & Bebbington, 2002; IADB 2003a, 2003b, 2006; Uphoff, 1999, 2004;).

Despite the widespread use of the concept in academic and empirical works, there is still uncertainty among scholars and practitioners regarding the actual capability of external agencies to effectively ‘use’ and ‘build’ social capital for development purposes and, moreover, that such efforts favour the most impoverished sectors of a society or community. Different assessments of project portfolios of key development agencies, such as the World Bank (Fox & Gershman, 2006; Mansuri & Rao, 2004; van Domelen, 2006; World Bank, 2005), the IADB (Dahl-Østergaard, Moore, Ramirez, Wenner, & Bonde, 2003), and the ADB (ADB, 2006) have found no conclusive evidence that participatory or community-centred operative frameworks have indeed built social capital—understood as mutually supportive networks, legitimate norms of cooperation, or generalised trust—nor have they been able to determine whether the social capital features promoted had positive impacts on the material well-being of the poor. Various critical assessments of the concept, in addition, have warned against unreserved generalisations of the positive associations observed between social capital and human development indicators. They highlight that the initial emphasis placed on community attributes tends to be conducted under an ‘apolitical’ understanding of social capital, one which isolated social networks, associational activity, and trustworthiness from the wider political economy surrounding communities and individuals, whilst overlooking the unequal systems of relations and forms of organisation that are constitutive parts of societies and...
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This thesis argues that the uncertainty surrounding the concept derives from the predominance of two essentialist conceptualisations of social capital, each of them built upon different understandings of actors and social actions. On the one hand, closer to the work of James Coleman (1988, 1990), one branch of economic and sociological analyses of social capital privileges a rational–choice approach centred on actors’ capacity to profit from their networks and memberships (Burt, 2005; Fafchamps & Minten, 2002a, 2002b; Lin, 2001). This body of work stresses actors’ capacity for agency irrespective of their material conditions, whilst perceiving features of sociability as straightforward means for achieving one’s objectives (e.g., ‘connections’ replace ‘relationships’ and are usually presented as granting automatic access to resources). On the other hand, closer to Putnam’s understanding of the concept (1993a, 2001), a second perspective emphasises the capacity of cultural and normative structures to shape actors’ actions, particularly their disposition to cooperate for the generation and management of public goods (Uphoff, 1999, 2004; Fukuyama, 1995a, 2004). This branch of the literature, in turn, hides away local inequalities and power struggles, whilst optimistically stressing the capacity of social associations and civic participation to overcome poverty and promote economic growth.

The divergence of these predominant understandings makes it very difficult to integrate the different features of social capital described in the ever–expanding literature on the subject, which range from personal feelings (Robinson, Siles, & Schmid, 2004) to a government’s legal systems (Collier & Gunning, 2001). This scenario, in turn, has direct negative methodological implications for the evaluation of development interventions with regards to their actual capacity to use social capital for development purposes. At present there are no validated instruments to ‘measure’ social capital, clarity with regards as to how many dimensions and levels of analysis may be included in the concept, what processes lead to its development, or whether social capital may be measured similarly across different settings so as to make clear–cut policy recommendations on the subject. In addition, the predominance of project evaluations centred on assessing participatory interventions’ success in improving actors’ material well–being, rather than on their capacity to build or mobilise social capital, has further obscured the evidence on this matter (Bebbington, Guggenheim, & Woolcock, 2006; World Bank, 2005).

The debates surrounding the concept of social capital are of actual relevance for a developing country like Peru. In the last decade, there has been a growing agreement among policy–makers, politicians, and practitioners that the participation of civil society in policy–making and development programmes is crucial for their success and sustainability. This emerging consensus, helped by the promotion of such an approach by international development agencies and the
political reaction against a centralised form of government by the authoritarian regime of Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000), has resulted in the ample dominance of participatory strategies among publicly and privately funded development interventions (Tanaka & Trivelli, 2002; Ballón, 2003). As part of this trend, for instance, the central government launched a new administrative framework in 2002 that formalised a series of spaces within local and regional governments for the involvement of civil society representatives in policy–making processes. Among the most important changes, this reform established that all municipal and regional governments have to conduct an annual participatory budgeting process and transferred to these bodies of local government the management of nation–wide food–alleviation programs (beneficiary representatives are included in the administrative bodies created). However, the extent to which the prescriptive adoption of such strategies has indeed generated a more efficient management of resources and greater democratic and inclusive governance remains unclear. It has been pointed out that these strategies used some unrealistic assumptions: (i) that there are ‘communities’ of people living in an identifiable territory who share the same objectives and are willing to cooperate with each other; (ii) that the different organisations that spring from these communities have compatible and harmonious objectives; (iii) that local leaders are legitimate representatives of the population; and (iv) that leaders, regular members, and non–members of grass–root organisations show no major discontinuities in their of socioeconomic profiles or interests (Tanaka, 2000, 2001; Tanaka & Trivelli, 2002)

The nascent literature on social capital in Peru has yet to fully explore the political and economic factors shaping local processes of social organisation and their repercussion over poor actors' livelihoods. Rather than looking into the internal social dynamics taking place within communities, grass–root organisations, and project interventions, or the processes of negotiation and struggle that shape the poor’s relations with the non–poor, prior work on the subject has, instead, privileged over–encompassing notions of social capital at the community level—associational activity, trust, and collective action (Drumm, Díaz, Ramirez–Johnson, & Arevalo, 2001; Díaz, 2007; Prokopy & Torsten 2008)—or highlighted the positive effects of connections with external sources of support over communities’ living conditions (Bebbington & Carrol, 2000; Bury, 2004). As a result, there is a noticeable absence in the Peruvian literature of empirical assessments of the effects of building social capital efforts on issues of socioeconomic inequality and stratification processes within poor communities.

2. The research

This thesis aims to critically examine mainstream social capital literature, as adopted in the discourse of key international development agencies, on the potential role social capital to promote social mobility among the poor as well as a more inclusive and equitable community. The main objectives of this thesis are two–fold: first, to contribute to the development of a critical framework
for the empirical analysis of social capital as integral part of poor people’s economic practices and strategies and, second, to use this framework to identify the limits and potential of ‘building’ and ‘using’ social capital efforts by participatory development interventions for addressing issues of inequality and social stratification. To these ends, three specific lines of enquiry are pursued:

i. How does the mobilisation of social resources (material and non–material resources accessed through one’s relationships) contribute to actors’ economic practices and livelihoods? To what extent do actors’ material conditions shape these processes?

ii. What kinds of relationships and memberships do actors form and strengthen in order to access valuable resources? How are these processes conditioned by actors’ material circumstances?

iii. To what extent is a participatory development intervention able to effectively use and build social capital? Do these efforts enhance or transform the socioeconomic dynamics conditioning the use of social capital as an integral part of actors’ economic practices?

In order to answer these research objectives whilst dealing with the structure–agency debates surrounding the predominant notions of social capital, this thesis considers Bourdieu’s ‘theory of practice’ (1977, 1984, 1990; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) as a more suitable theoretical framework for the study of social capital. This approach, first, avoids assuming actors as either rational with similar capacities of agency or as obedient followers of community norms; instead it postulates that actors’ practices and strategies are shaped by their objective conditions (i.e., endowments of economic and non–economic forms of capital) vis–à–vis associated interests and dispositions (‘habitus’). Second, rather than assuming that ‘communities’, ‘societies’, ‘markets’, or even ‘the state’ constitute coherent and homogenous systems of relationships with uniform normative structures, Bourdieu’s theory of practice points out that actors’ efforts for survival or social mobility take place within relatively differentiated systems of relations, or ‘fields’, each with particular sets of rules (e.g., diverse valuations of economic capital in the cultural as compared to political field). Third, rather than assuming that relationships or organisations constitute unproblematic features of sociability, Bourdieu’s approach highlights power struggles. It emphasises that the rules that govern a field are historically structured around the interests of dominant actors and that actors’ possibilities for profiting from capital in its diverse forms are conditioned by the position they assume within a particular field (dominant, subordinated, or intermediate) and the kind of relationships they are able to establish with others according to their respective location in a ‘field of forces’. This approach, hence, emphasises the importance of the wider political economy alongside local social dynamics of power struggles in shaping processes of capital accumulation and distribution.

Within this framework, the present study adopted the following definition of social capital:
The totality of resources (financial capital and also information, etc.) activated through a more or less extended, more or less mobilisable, network of relations which procures a competitive advantage by providing higher returns on investment ... [that] depend first and foremost on the position these agents occupy in those structured microcosms that are economic fields. (Bourdieu, 2005, pp. 194–195)

Under this definition, social capital is presented as the result of two interacting factors: (i) actor' social relations and (ii) the resources mobilised through them or 'social resources' (Lin, 2001). The overall 'volume' of social capital possessed by a given actor is thus related to the size or extension of the network of relations that actors can rely upon in order to access certain sources and the volumes of capital—in its different forms—that are accessible through them. This dual understanding of the concept is thus central to a more critical understanding of the potential benefits that the poor could obtain through their relations and diverse forms of organisation. It serves to underscore that the material returns that one can expect from social capital depend not only on the quantity and quality of resources that actors may access but also on the kind of relations into which such exchanges are embedded.

On the basis of this framework, this thesis argues that the potential contribution of social capital to enhance actors’ efforts for social mobility could be better assessed if its constitutive processes—building and strengthening relationships and mobilising them to access valuable resources—are understood as integral to class–based ‘strategies’—implemented through quotidian (un)conscious practices—that are historically developed in order to preserve or improve their position within a particular ‘field’ of action (systems of relation of exchange aimed at accumulating different species of capital that are considered of value and the objective foundations for acquiring a position of domination, such as cultural capital in the academic field, which leads to academic authority). This assessment, however, does not imply an understanding of processes of social stratification exclusively in terms of roles played within economic relations of production; the term ‘class’ alludes instead to the interaction between both economic and non–economic forms of classification and domination (e.g., race, gender, religion) that favours certain groups of actors instead of others that, ultimately, is translated into relatively similar material conditions and systems of classification, evaluation, and dispositions or ‘habitus’ (e.g., historically excluded groups on non–economic grounds are expected to play the most subordinated roles in the existing relations of production that operate in a social space) (Bourdieu, 1984, 1985).

This understanding of social capital demands, first, the recognition that its empirical features and significance are contingent on the particular field of action in which actors participate (an involvement that, in turn, results from both actors’ material conditions and needs alongside their associated dispositions and systems of classifications). The field–dependency of social capital features occurs because the mechanisms of capital accumulation and transformation vary from one system of relations of exchange to another. Actors’ relationships or memberships (e.g., religious
organisations or political parties) and the resources they grant access to (e.g., technical knowledge, preferential treatment by public agencies, or loans) can be considered social capital only insofar as they are functional to the operations of a particular field (e.g., if it helps accumulating economic capital when applied in the economic field or cultural capital in the artistic one). This form of contextualisation is relevant to assessing the economic benefits of social capital for the poor because, although there is consistent evidence that residents of deprived settings conduct different livelihood strategies according to their specific degree of poverty, the prevalent view in the mainstream social capital literature is that all features of sociability could equally serve to power up the poor’s livelihoods irrespective of the particular activities for which they are intended to be mobilised. For instance, memberships and network connections are usually aggregated to indicate greater ‘stocks of social capital’, regardless of whether they are expected to enhance the economic returns of landless farm labourers or agricultural traders living in the same town (e.g., Grootaert & Narayan, 2001; Grootaert, Oh, & Swammy, 2002; Narayan, 1999).

A class–centred analysis of social capital also recognises that actors’ capacity to rely on their relationships and memberships to access resources is affected by the position they assume (e.g., subordinated, dominant, or intermediate) in those fields of action in which they participate. Actors in the most subordinated position, for instance, would have limited chances to establish agreeable relation of exchange with actors endowed by large stocks of capital since on the one hand, they lack the resources necessary to invest in generating and strengthening such connections (e.g., investing time and resources in conducting a rich and eventful social life), and on the other, they lack the necessary bargaining capabilities to push forward for favourable deals. Their dissimilar quotidian practices, in addition, make it more difficult to cement connections through shared concerns and lifestyles. This position–oriented assessment of social capital thus highlights two interrelated factors obscured by the mainstream social capital literature, which assumes that all actors possess a similar capacity to profit from their memberships and relationships and that ‘inclusion’—either with markets or political authorities—constitutes by definition a positive process (Grootaert & van Bastelaer, 2002; Krishna, 2002; Woolcock, 1998; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). It helps to uncover that actors’ material conditions not only affect the extent and quality of connections they possess (e.g., actors’ differentiated capacity to form bonds with economic agents operating in major urban markets through fictive kinship or co–parenthood) but also the terms of inclusion upon which such relationships are based (e.g., commercial agreements between friends or relatives may still be embedded in patron–client relations) (Cleaver, 2005; Mosse, 2005).

It follows that social capital cannot be labelled as an exclusive or typical asset of the subordinated classes—“the capital of the poor” (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000, p. 240)—insofar as it can be used and mobilised by different groups according to their respective class–based ‘interests’. Dominant actors may use social capital to preserve their position by developing close ties with
others in the same position so as to secure the circulation of the most valuable forms of capital among their peers and by establishing favourable relations of exchange with worse–off actors so as to secure the continuous appropriation of significant volumes of resources (e.g., obligations associated to patron–client relationships). Therefore, in those fields where social capital plays a functional role, it is likely to constitute one of the bases upon which better–off actors secure their privileged condition (e.g., nobiliary titles or large business associations) (Bourdieu, 1980, 1986).

Access to and uses of social capital are thus shaped by the power struggles that take place within fields, as different classes use it to gather those forms of capital necessary to maintain or improve their respective positions. Its ‘benefits’, hence, should be assessed in relational terms; that is, according to the implications for both sides involved in a given exchange (i.e., positive outcomes for one actor may take place at the expense of the material conditions of another). This constitutes a key factor for the empirical study of social capital among the poor insofar as the material contributions usually associated with the mobilisation of one’s relationships or memberships (e.g., loans, short–term employment, or collections of money for emergencies) are typically presented in the literature as isolated events in actors’ economic trajectories, thereby obscuring the fact that on many occasions those favours demand costly obligations that perpetuate poverty (e.g., accessing short–term loans or food from better–off landowners may imply a form of bondage for the rural poor, who repay those benefits by means of badly–remunerated manual work) (Cleaver, 2005; Mosse, 2005, 2010).

Emerging empirical critical assessments of social capital have tended to focus on the disadvantageous exchanges of the extreme rural poor, either landless farm workers (Das, 2004) or those labelled as ‘chronic poor’ (Cleaver, 2005; du Toit, Skuse & Cousins, 2007; Mosse, 2005). An unintended result of this body of work, however, is that it provides only a partial view of the exchanges taking place in a local social space, giving the impression that relatively better–off actors are in a dominant position across most fields of action even though they are usually very small players in the wider political economy. This thesis contends that a field–centred approach could better contextualise local exchanges (equal and unequal) by showing that local actors’ uses of their relationships and social resources are conditioned by the relations of exchange they in turn have with external ones, customarily in a more dominant position, and by the rules of capital accumulation and transformation that the most important players in a field impose over them indirectly by means of chains of exchanges (e.g., wholesale livestock traders operating in major urban markets shape the actions of minor traders working in small towns who, in turn, deal with small farmers) or the objective conditions they impose (e.g., the absence of highly productive labour in an rural setting may respond to the attractive wages paid by large agricultural businesses operating in other areas).
In this regard, it is necessary to point out that, despite their socioeconomic differences, actors cohabiting in the same deprived village or neighbourhood are likely to have various points of coincidence with each other in terms of material conditions, interests, and quotidian practices. Socioeconomic differences in the local social space may be translated into similar, dissimilar but not opposing, or conflicting interests depending on the positions that actors occupy in a given field, in turn conditioned by the relevance of their respective endowments of capital (e.g., despite salient material differences, the similarly limited formal education of most village residents implies that any of them would equally assume a subordinated position in an academic or scientific field). This does not preclude the fact that socioeconomic differences may turn into opposing interests (e.g., relatively large landowners will attempt to pay very low wages to farm labourers, who are in turn interested in higher remunerations); however, they should not be presumed to cover all fields of action. Instead, they should be empirically assessed according to actors’ positions in wider systems of exchange (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

It should be noted, in addition, that actors’ ‘investments’ in social relations and their mobilisation so as to access resources do not comprise a clear-cut ‘strategy’, understood in utility-maximising terms. Instead, they constitute messy processes, often ambiguous, and with no clear aim in sight. Investments in and uses of social capital usually occur as part of actors’ everyday practices, conducted without much conscious planning or evaluation. They appear as class-based strategies insofar as actors’ lines of action are usually objectively oriented; that is, actors’ similar material conditions generate rather compatible systems of dispositions, classification, and interests (habitus) expressed through common lifestyles. Correspondingly, one cannot necessarily infer the presence of ‘class consciousness’ in investments in relationships by actors sharing similar socioeconomic conditions, nor in their efforts of organisation and mutual support conscious acts of resistance or challenge against others’ in a more favourable position (Bourdieu, 1985; Lamaison & Bourdieu, 1986).

It is thus not possible to presume first-hand whether features of social capital among actors of a certain social class constitute a strategy either for survival or for challenging the dominant groups of a given social space. First, as mentioned previously, social capital can be instrumental to the interests and strategies of all classes, not only to the most impoverished. Second, one cannot attribute a particular aim to a feature of sociability that may be used in different ways by different constitutive groups (or individuals) of the same class. Similar features of social organisation among the poor (e.g., informal forms of social insurance, farmers’ associations, or even poverty alleviation initiatives such as community kitchens) could equally serve to prevent the worsening of their material living conditions or managing their local scarce resources; to search for autonomous paths of development without challenging the state or dominant economic agents (e.g., by developing local business initiatives that respect the rules of the market economy); or to challenge the rules that
govern transactions within a field as well as the dominant position of certain actors (e.g., by pressing forward for price controls, limits to property accumulation, or the expropriation of private businesses). Although class–based habitus may shape actors’ dispositions toward certain uses of their network of relationships and social resources, it is still up to them to choose what particular course of action to follow: “players can play [in a field] to increase or conserve their capital… but they can also get in it to transform, partially or completely, the immanent rules of the game” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 99). That is, actors from the same class may choose to become part of the dominant class (e.g., a micro–farmer who aims to become a traditional big landowner) or to help their particular class to assume a more dominant position (e.g., by limiting the political authority of big landowners). Both forms of action can coexist among fellow class members.

In this respect, it becomes necessary to place the local observable uses of social capital within the dynamics of the fields in which it is mobilised (e.g., scientific, political, or bureaucratic) and, critically, the historical trajectory of the power relations in which it is embedded. This is because the state of the struggles around the rules that govern the circulation, transformation, and distribution of capital shape class relations and the capacity of specific classes to access valuable resources through them (Bourdieu, 1989, 1990; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). In different stages and circumstances social capital would be shaped by different social and political dynamics, ranging from open conflict, when a non–dominant class—not necessarily the most subordinated—is in the position to assume a dominant position by virtue of its gradual acquisition of endowment of capital comparable to those of previously dominant sectors, to self–sustaining dynamics of absolute domination, when the subordinated groups have almost no capacity to offer any serious resistance because of their objective and symbolic acquiescence to the status quo.

In summary, the present research opts to study the process of social capital mobilisation and formation as part of actors’ class–based quotidian practices. That is, it aims to place both the specific observable material contributions of social capital and the diverse expressions of sociability upon which it is built in direct dialogue with the structure of positions that actors occupy in the social space and fields by virtue of their respective endowments of capital as well as with the diverse sets of strategies and power relations that result from that state of capital distribution. This thesis argues that such an approach would make it possible to conduct a non–reductionist study of social capital that would directly link actors’ social interactions and the resources attained through them with their surrounding socioeconomic structure, thus turning the focus of attention of social capital analyses to the production and reproduction of power relations. It extends the empirical assessment of the contribution of social capital to the lives of the poor beyond episodes of successful collective action or the acquisition of particular material benefits into how everyday interactions and negotiations, in the aggregate, shape hierarchical social structures at the local level. It is considered that social capital under this approach may provide some leverage for critical debate; particularly by
highlighting the roots of poverty in a relational manner, through people’s adverse incorporation into economic and power relations that are (re)produced on a daily basis.

In this manner, this thesis contributes to the emerging critical empirical literature on social capital (Cleaver, 2005; Das, 2005; Mosse, 2005; du Toit, Skuse & Cousins, 2007), which aims to put the concept and related policies in direct dialogue with inequality issues. However, in contrast to these works, which privilege the portrayal of the disadvantageous conditions faced by the ‘chronic poor’ in their daily lives, this research intends to assess the systems of relationships that actors of different socioeconomic positions—cohabiting in the same deprived setting—are engaged in, including their mechanisms of insertion into the wider economic and political exchanges (i.e., beyond their localities). Also in contrast to those studies, this research investigated villagers’ daily economic interactions and forms of social organisations alongside their involvement in a participatory development intervention in an ideal position, according to the recommendations in the mainstream literature, to ‘use’ and ‘build’ social capital in favour of the poor (Durston, 2004; Uphoff, 2004; Woolcock, 1998; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). To this effect, a careful selection process took place. The development intervention studied was chosen on the conditions that it constituted a fully participatory project (at its conception and execution stages) that, in addition, operated in a receptive institutional and economic environment (opportunities for developing links with public agencies and for farm–based commercial initiatives). The specific beneficiary villages on which the study would be located, in turn, were chosen because they possessed potential positive features of social capital, such as operative social organisations and collective action experiences. The combination of all these factors, hence, was expected to best serve to substantiate and problematise the propositions of the mainstream literature (George & Bennet, 2005; Yin, 2003a, 2003b).

This study follows the experiences of the residents of two beneficiary villages of a participatory development intervention in the province of Lambayeque, Department of Lambayeque, in Northern Peru, within and beyond the project context, for a period of two and a half years (August 2005 to January 2008). The main objective of this intervention was to improve local living conditions using an agroecological approach, which contemplated the expansion of livestock resources in the area accompanied by the recuperation of local forest resources, the introduction of related economic practices (e.g., productive use of forest resources), as well as other environment–friendly investments, such as energy–efficient kitchens and training in health practices. The project used a comprehensive participatory framework that included the execution of participatory socioeconomic diagnostics, the organisation of beneficiaries in local committees, the creation of a federation of committees, regular communal work activities with beneficiaries, and the active involvement of beneficiaries’ representatives in the management of the project and meetings with public officials. The villages studied, in turn, possessed various active organisations and
identifiable local leaders, did not present any form of open conflict or discrimination, and residents were used to conducting communal work activities.

The study used a mixed-methods approach to data collection in order to achieve greater validity of findings. Data were elicited through household surveys, (un)structured interviews with residents (beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries) and key informants, including NGO staff, and participatory observation exercises. The research process was divided into three stages, each having specific objectives. First, a preliminary community assessment was developed on the basis of participatory observation and informal conversations with residents. This information also served to build trust with residents and NGO staff as well as to develop more detailed data-collection instruments. Second, a detailed community assessment was developed on the basis of participatory observation, a survey administered to a representative sample of households, and informal and in-depth interviews conducted with key informants and residents. This second phase served to build a comprehensive depiction of the quotidian lives of the poor, with emphasis on their quotidian relations, the inner dynamics of their local social organisations, and the differentiated use of relations and memberships as part of actors’ economic practices and strategies. Finally, the process of project implementation examined how residents’ took advantage of the different networking opportunities brought in by the project and the circulation of new social resources in the area of study so as to improve their material conditions. This set of issues were explored via two additional waves of household surveys and (un)structured interviews for comparison purposes, including detailed narratives accounting for the approaches of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries to the project in general as well as its different components (e.g., training sessions, technical assistance, and assemblies).

An additional contribution from the present study and the research design followed is of an empirical nature. To the best knowledge of the author, up to now there have been no longitudinal studies purposively designed to study the process of social capital formation and its potential subsequent effects on actors’ livelihoods. The few studies that have explored this process have either concentrated on the formation of social networks rather than on access to social resources and adaptations to livelihoods (Glaeser, 2001; Glaeser, Laibson, & Sacerdote, 2002) or have used over-encompassing notions of social capital that combine features of associational activity, trust, and political participation altogether (Durston, 1999; Krishna, 2007; Uphoff & Wijayaratna, 2000), which resulted in the absence of discussions of socioeconomic and power inequalities as constitutive component of both individual relationships and social organisations. Furthermore, similar studies are noticeably absent in the empirical literature on participatory development interventions. Evaluations of international agencies’ project portfolios, for example, made use of post-hoc evaluation designs based on self-assessments of changes rather than pre-post intervention data comparisons (World Bank, 2005; van Domelen, 2006). As important, to the best of my knowledge,
until now there have been no empirical studies relying on indicators specifically designed to assess the effects of participatory interventions on the expansion of beneficiaries’ supportive relations and their ability to access social resources.\(^2\)

3. **Thesis overview**

The present text is divided into four parts and a total of ten chapters. Part I comprises Chapters 1 to 3, containing the literature review, theoretical framework, and research design, respectively. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 comprise Part II, providing a comprehensive assessment of living conditions in the area of study, the manner in which residents make use of their relationships as part of their economic practices, and the factors that condition their investments in local, external, and vertical connections. This initial evidence sets the scene for the examination of the quantitative and qualitative findings with regard to how residents determined their involvement in the participatory project followed (Chapter 6), their involvement in the networking opportunities generated by the main project components (Chapter 7), and changes in their access to social resources that could be attributed to project activities (Chapter 8). The final section (Chapter 10) presents the main conclusions of the study.

Chapter 1 traces back the theoretical basis upon which the current mainstream social capital literature is built—James Coleman (1988, 1990) and Robert Putnam (1993)—and it identifies the manner in which these and subsequent contributions have been adopted by development agencies, practitioners, and researchers (social networks and livelihoods at the micro–level, social organisations and collective production of public goods at the meso–level, and institutional factors at the macro–level). Next, the text reviews the rationale behind the hypothesised beneficial impacts of social capital on the poor’s material welfare and recommended good practice for its mobilisation and enhancement through participatory approaches. The chapter finishes with a review of the social capital literature on Peru, identifying both its methodological limitations and restricted contribution to explaining bottom–up development efforts.

Chapter 2 addresses the theoretical concerns and debates surrounding the different uses of social capital within the context of traditional structure–agency debates. Next, Bourdieu’s understanding of social capital as part of his ‘theory of practice’ (Bourdieu, 1980, 1984, 1986; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1989) is presented as an adequate approach to elucidate this debate. Next, this approach is placed in dialogue with the mainstream development literature so as to explore its potential contribution in order to clarify the actual contribution of social capital to local development efforts. Finally, in virtue of the lack of previous empirical implementations of

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\(^2\) It is particularly significant that despite the design of lengthy questionnaires by the World Bank staff to investigate social capital (Krisha & Shrader, 2002; Grootaert et al, 2004), there are no empirical studies that have made full use of those data collection methods to evaluate development project effects, the World Bank has not made use of those instruments to assess the efficiency of its participatory development projects’ portfolio (World Bank, 2005).
Bourdieu’s approach in the context of social capital assessments within development interventions, the chapter closes with a discussion about the operationalisation of the concept via social network methodologies.

Chapter 3 presents the research design used for the present work—a longitudinal embedded case study—and its theoretical foundations. The chapter includes a comprehensive description of the phases of the research (preliminary community assessment; detailed community assessment; and project implementation); the two–phase case selection process (selection of a suitable participatory project intervention located in a favourable socioeconomic and institutional context, first, and working with organised villages, next); techniques and instruments used for data collection (participatory observation, semi–structured interviews with key informants as well as heads of households and partners, and three waves of household surveys), as well as the main data analysis techniques implemented.

In Part II, Chapter 4 introduces the two villages studied: San Mateo and San Luis. First, it provides a comprehensive account of these villages’ historical trajectories, social organisations, and political dynamics in relation to the wider socioeconomic and political context. Next, it assesses households’ stocks of different types of capital (land, livestock, farm equipment, ratio of dependents per members of working age, and the average education of this group) according to their material well–being (expenditure levels). The last section of this chapter depicts the most common economic practices conducted in the area differentiated according to households’ material conditions. Chapter 5, in turn, explores the manner and extent to which local actors use those material and non–material resources accessed through social connections (i.e., social resources) as integral part of their economic practices. Making use of survey data, the chapter first estimates the capacity of households to access social resources of economic significance (emergency support, productive assets, financial resources, bureaucratic support, and technical information). The results showed unequal access to financial and bureaucratic resources in favour of better–off residents, limited mediated access to productive assets and technical information, and rather similar reliance on friends and families to cope with emergencies. Qualitative and quantitative data, next, highlighted three conditioning factors for this scenario. First, the subordinated position of the villages within the wider regional political economy and associated material conditions conditioned the circulation and value of certain forms of capital (e.g., predominance of labour–intensive economic practices in the region and lack of financial support resulted in limited access and economic impact of technical information). Second, households’ differentiated economic practices and interests according to their material conditions implied they attempted to access different kinds of resources through their relationships and memberships. Third, the position of actors in the economic fields in which they participate shaped their bargaining capacity to establish favourable agreements (e.g., repayment
capacity of loans) and their command over resources (e.g., women usually reared and commercialised only minor forms of livestock).

Chapter 6 delves into the analysis of the development and mobilisation of social relations as part of actors’ economic practices. Based on social network data gathered via surveys, the chapter first identifies the distribution of different types of connections—within village, beyond village, and with district-level authorities—according to households’ material conditions. The evidence indicated that worse-off households lacked all three types of connections whilst better-off ones had significant better access to external and vertical connections. Qualitative data, next, identified the following factors shaping this process. First, the costs (explicit and implicit) of building and maintaining relationships, which tend to increase according to their geographical and social reach, limited the capacity of worse-off residents to enjoy a rich and fruitful social life. Second, actors’ participation in differentiated systems of relations according to their position-related interests (e.g., landless residents as compared to medium-farmers and men compared to women); which implied dissimilar ‘investments’ in connections (intended and non-intended, the latter related to actors’ distinct life-trajectories and lifestyles). Third, actors’ positions in different spheres of action shaped their capacity to build different kinds of connections (e.g., leaders’ responsibilities facilitated their access to the district elites); such positions, in turn, were observed to be affected by actors’ material conditions and habitus (e.g., some considered themselves unbefitting a leading role). The chapter, finally, highlights looking beyond mere connections and to explore the nature of relationships in depth insofar as a kinship or friendship bonds may still render exploitative terms of exchange.

Part III focuses on the implementation of the development intervention and its effects on actors’ access to social resources and social networks. Chapter 7 examined the extent to which the residents’ material conditions, associated practices, and (non)economic interests conditioned local involvement in the project. The evidence gathered showed that their decision to participate in the project did not respond exclusively either to the collective decision making process implemented by the NGO or to the material needs of the local population, despite villages’ customary use of collective work initiatives, involvement of established local leaders, openness of the NGO, and the suitability of the proposed project benefits. The data, instead, showed that actors approached the intervention not only from a cost–benefit analysis but also in relation to their class-based customary practices and interests (e.g., lack of knowledge about livestock management) as well as life expectations (e.g., some landless residents had no stable residency). Correspondingly, the criteria followed by local leaders so as to decide their involvement in the intervention were noticeably different from those of the rest of the beneficiaries. In addition, it was observed that the local customs of organisation and mobilisation came into effect mediated by the extension of personal connections and the authority (symbolic capital) of local leaders.
Chapter 8 focuses on the process of network formation associated to the intervention followed. First, social network data from additional waves of household surveys showed that project beneficiaries reported an increase in network measures for external and vertical connections. A detailed assessment, however, revealed that this increase was concentrated among relatively better-off beneficiaries. In this respect, the chapter proposed understanding the intervention as a sub-field of action to which actors approach and position themselves in according to their objective conditions and class-based habitus. Qualitative data showed, first, that the relative higher costs of participation for the poorest residents as compared to more established farmers and leaders limited their capacity to constantly participate in project-related networking opportunities. In addition, actors' interest in different project activities according to their particular social position conditioned the kind of actors they would interact with. Inadvertently, the intervention fomented different types of networking opportunities for actors sharing similar lifestyles and pursuing rather similar livelihoods (mainly micro- and small-established farmers). These factors, alongside some features of symbolic violence favouring acquiescence to the status quo, were also observed to limit the participation of new actors in leading organisational roles. As a result, although there was no evidence of open forms of discrimination, it was those traditional leaders who more easily expanded their connections with external actors and public authorities. Finally, it was observed that the NGO's efforts to develop functional links between the organised beneficiaries and public authorities were conditioned by the leader's awareness of the wider political context (bureaucratic field), characterised by the continuous transformations of shaky political alliances and clientelistic agreements. At an initial stage, hence, it was observed those preferred to follow an autonomous path for development whilst gradually jockeying for a more favourable position.

Chapter 9 examines the manner in and extent to which the (non)economic benefits provided by the project were integrated, mobilised, or expanded by residents through their respective systems of relations, thereby improving their access to social resources. Quantitative data from household surveys showed, first, that access to technical information had expanded among most beneficiaries; however, the increase in the most valuable resources—bureaucratic, and financial resources—had congregated only among the better-off. Qualitative data, next, indicated that this was associated, first, to the differentiated process of network expansion described in Chapter 8. Second, although the villages appeared to have improved their living-conditions during the period of study, the local social standings of households were observed to have remained largely similar across time; as a result, the kind of relations and the terms of exchange that actors established so as to access valuable resources were still operating more in favour of the better-off. Third, actors' initial material conditioned were observed to have interacted with the project's 'building' social capital efforts, thereby generating greater economic opportunities to those households that already possessed larger endowments of capital than most. This meant they were in a better position to
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establish rather favourable terms of exchange with external economic agents as well as with their neighbours (including the expansion of exploitative agreements).

Finally, in Part IV, chapter 10 summarises the key research findings of the study and provides an overall and theoretically driven discussion of social capital and its implications for the understanding of poverty and social mobility efforts. The chapter, first, proposes a critical framework for the study of social capital centred on three elements: the objective conditionality of features of sociability in relation to both actors’ material well-being and class-based lifestyles and habitus. Second, the dual nature of social capital as the interaction between actors’ network of relations and the social resources accrued through them; which implies differentiated returns according to the terms of exchange established with one’s relationships and one’s initial endowments of capital. Third, it is highlighted the need to place local social dynamics within the wider political economy; particularly in relation to the impact of the practices of dominant political and economic agents operating from beyond the villages studied on local processes of capital accumulation and exchange. The chapter, next, evaluates the impacts of the participatory development strategy followed through the three evaluation criteria aforementioned. The main conclusion on this subject is that, although the project appeared to have achieved its objectives and generated certain expansion of actors’ networks, the identifiable increase actors’ social capital and associated economic returns were mostly congregated around better-off beneficiaries. The chapter closes with a discussion regarding the potential policy implications of the reported empirical findings and future lines of investigation on the subject.
PART I

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
CHAPTER 1
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND DEVELOPMENT

The present chapter reviews the dominant theory and policy debates surrounding the concept of social capital in the development literature. It first outlines the major conceptualisations that shaped its adoption into the discourses of development agencies and its implications for development and poverty alleviation efforts. Next, the chapter reviews previous attempts to integrate the concept into the operative programmes of community-based and participatory approaches to development, and the challenges practitioners and researchers face to ascertain the benefits of building and using social capital. The closing section includes a summary review of the related literature for Peru and a general discussion about the gaps existing in the current Peruvian and global literature.

1.1. What is social capital?

Despite its popularity in the academic literature and established position in the discourse of international development agencies, there is still no agreed definition and theory of social capital. What researchers accept (or reject) as ‘social capital’ varies continually. The relevant literature offers a wide array of conceptualisations that cut across different levels of analysis—from the individual to entire nations—that are examined empirically with an equal variety of indicators—from personal feelings to a country’s legal framework—and methodological tools.

A first factor that contributed to this scenario is that social capital was developed within different academic traditions to address different research questions. For example, Bourdieu (1980, 1986) used the term to account for actors’ mediated access to valuable resources that contribute to defining their position in society alongside other forms of capital (economic, cultural and symbolic). Loury (1976, 1981) used the term to account for the unequal capacity of individuals from different racial backgrounds to access valuable resources from public and private agencies so as to optimise returns from human capital investments. Coleman (1988, 1990) employed the concept within a rational choice framework in order to account for the effect of social organisations on an individual’s pursuit of utility maximisation. In addition, Putnam (1993a, 1993b, 2001) presented the concept from a communitarian perspective that emphasised the role that civic engagement plays in solving collective action dilemmas and generating public goods.

Second, the rapid increase in the use of the term across different disciplines (graph 1.1), ranging from economics and political science to arts and information technology, generated
different emphases on certain dimensions and understandings of social capital (Frosman, 2005; Halpern, 2005). For instance, social capital studies in management and organisational research usually focus on individual networks (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Borgatti & Foster, 2003) whereas political science studies tend to centre on civil society and their interaction with formal political institutions (Jackman & Miller, 1998; Paxton, 2002; Halpern, 2005).

**Graph 1.1 Academic publications on social capital by discipline (1985–2008)**

*The graph includes publications in academic journals and books. Source: ISI – Web of Knowledge.*

This assorted literature has made social capital a contested concept. Researchers are split in their assessments of the soundness of its theoretical foundations and its usefulness as a research tool. Edwards (2006) categorised scholars’ views into three groups: **enthusiasts**, **tacticians** and **sceptics**. The latter group of scholars rebuff social capital on various grounds. Some reject it because they consider it no more than an over–encompassing umbrella term for other theoretical constructs, such as networks or institutions, that provide sounder socioeconomic analyses (Long, 2001; Meagher, 2006). Other sceptics contend that it is not strictly comparable to other forms of capital, such as financial and physical capital, and so it is unsuited for economic analysis (Arrow, 1999; Solow; 1999). Others, in turn, consider social capital a ‘Trojan horse’ that leads to the ascendency of mainstream economics—centred around the individual and the market—in social sciences’ theoretical frameworks, as well as of a neoliberal agenda in development debates (Fine, 1999, 2001; Harriss & De Renzio, 1998; Harriss, 2002). Enthusiasts, on the other hand, embrace the concept as the ‘missing link’ that helps to explain why countries and communities prosper, alongside economic, physical, and human capital (Grootaert, 1998) or speak of a social capital ‘paradigm’ that contributes to the understanding of poverty and to the design of adequate strategies to combat it (Robinson, Siles & Schmid, 2004).
Tacticians, in turn, consider social capital a useful notion that serves to better understand processes of economic development, design more efficient and sustainable interventions, and promote interdisciplinary debates on those subjects. However, they also recognise that such efforts still constitute a work in progress and that social capital is still under-theorised (Bebbington, 1999, 2002, 2004; Bebbington, Guggenheim & Woolcock, 2006; Durston, 2004; Krishna, 1999, 2002, 2008; Woolcock, 1998, 2001; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000).

In light of this complex scenario, the present literature review does not intend to examine all existing theories of social capital. Instead, it examines, first, those definitions that shaped the initial academic and policy development debates on the subject and, next, reviews which conceptualisations and approaches have been more commonly adopted in the discourses of development agencies.

1.1.1. Social capital: its origins

Social capital has a long and complex conceptual history. As a term, it can be traced back many decades to the work of Hanifan (1916, 1920), who highlighted the importance of social cohesion to improve school performance in rural communities in the USA. As a notion, it can be related to the work of different classic scholars, such as de Tocqueville, Durkheim, Weber or Marx, among others (Farr, 2004; Halpern, 2005; Putnam, 2001; Woolcock, 1998). In addition, its different modern developers—Loury (1976, 1981), Bourdieu (1980, 1986), Coleman (1988, 1990), and Putnam (1993a, 1993b)—worked under different definitions and academic traditions. Different literature reviews, however, have pointed out that the introduction of the concept into current policy debates and discourses of development derived principally from the work of American scholars James Coleman and Robert Putnam (Adam & Roncevic, 2003; Halpern, 2005; Fulkerson & Thompson, 2008; Swain, 2003).

Coleman developed the concept to explain how social organisations affect individual actions under the assumptions of rational-choice theory (1988,1990). Under his ‘individual-level theory of action’, it is proposed that all social systems (e.g., systems of norms, trust, and authority) emerge from interactions between individuals who purposively engage with each other in order to access the resources they lack and that are of interest to them. Hence, all

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3 Hanifan defined social capital as follows: “I make no reference to the usual acceptance of the term capital, except in a figurative sense. I do not refer to real estate, or to personal property or to cold cash, but rather to that in life which tends to make these tangible substances count for most in the daily lives of a people, namely, good-will, fellowship, mutual sympathy and social intercourse among a group of individuals and families who make up a social unit, the rural community” (1916, p. 130).

4 Coleman credited Loury as the initial developer of the concept. Loury defined social capital as follows: “An individual’s social origin has an obvious and important effect on the amount of resources which area ultimately invested in his development. It may thus be useful to employ a concept of ‘social capital’ to represent the consequences of social position in facilitating individual acquisition of (say) the standard human capital characteristics. (...) this idea has the advantage of forcing the analyst to consider the extent to which individual earnings are accounted for by social forces outside the individual’s control.” (Loury, 1976, p. 46).
structural properties of any group or society are understood to constitute by—products of an actor’s continuing pursuit of utility maximisation.

Coleman, nevertheless, rejected under-socialised characterisations of actors as individuals with goals independently arrived at and acting separately from each other, and recognised the need to account for the role social context plays in influencing individual actions. To this effect, he took on board the proposals of neo-institutional economics (Williamson, 1985), which highlights that societies’ normative structures condition the transaction costs that shape exchanges between economic agents, and Granovetter’s hypothesis that economic transactions do not take place abstract rational and impersonal markets but rather are ‘embedded’ in social relations (1985). As a result, Coleman proposed that features of social organisation (e.g., trustworthiness or information networks) could be considered resources that actors use instrumentally to achieve their aims (Coleman 1988, 1990). Social context, hence, was perceived to influence actors’ actions by affecting the cost–benefit balance upon which they operate, by “facilitating the achievement of goals that could not be achieved in its absence or could be achieved only at a higher cost” (Coleman, 1990, p. 304). These resources were labelled ‘social capital’:

Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity but a variety of different entities with two elements in common: They all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors—whether persons or corporate actors—within the structure. Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible. (Coleman, 1988, p. S98)

The notion that social relations constitute a form of capital alluded to the additional utility that actors could extract from them in relation to the structural properties of the groups in which they operate. This definition, in consequence, is very flexible insofar as social capital only becomes evident by the benefits it generates, ‘just as the concept ‘chair’ identifies certain physical objects by their function, despite differences in form, appearance, and construction” (Coleman, 1988, p. S101). By the same token, the forms of social capital discussed by Coleman at that time—trustworthiness, obligations of mutual support, information sharing, and norms against malfeasance—represented only a few expressions of an uncertain variety of social relations that could be considered ‘capital’ as long as they added value to individuals’ actions. The emphasis Coleman placed on such properties responded mainly to the fact that they were associated with a certain type of network structure: close, dense connections or ‘closure’.3

Closure of the social structure is important not only for the existence of effective norms but also for another form of social capital: the trustworthiness of social structures that allows the proliferation of obligations and expectations . . . Reputation cannot arise in an open

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3 In consequence, social capital can also be observed in systems without closure. For instance, memberships to social organisations (whether compulsory or voluntary) could be considered social capital because of their capacity to overcome the lack of extensive close connections by linking people in more than one context, allowing the resources of one relationship to be appropriated for use in others (e.g., parents may cover for the inefficient information provided by a Parent School Association because they and the school staff belong to the same religious organisation) (Coleman, 1990).
structure and collective sanctions that would ensure trustworthiness cannot be applied.
(Coleman, 1988, pp. S107–108)

Because of its structural nature, social capital can also be seen as a public good, as it constitutes a resource available to all those operating within that particular system of relations. This circumstance, however, makes the long—term sustainability of social capital problematic, as the individuals who invest their resources in the formation of useful social structures (e.g., those who dedicate time and money to organise a neighbourhood association) tend not to be the ones who benefit the most from them, but rather those who take advantage of them for other purposes (e.g., those who use the association to enquire about job opportunities). This fact leads to under—investments in social capital, which “arises and disappears without anyone willing it into or out of being” (Coleman, 1988, p. S118).

Coleman’s work about the loss of social capital of educational value in the USA—the households and neighbourhoods that contain the norms, social networks, and relationships of value for a child’s growing up (Coleman, 1987)—illustrates that dynamic. Because of the importance of the household and the neighbourhood in the first half of the 20th century for income generation (e.g., farming), commercialisation (e.g., local family—owned businesses), and entertainment purposes (e.g., local fairs and family parties), adults used to spend significant amounts of time and resources in those organisations, hence being closer to their children and more able to contribute to their education. However, with the progressive descentralisation of work settings, emergence of a service economy, and the proliferation of mass forms of entertainment (e.g., TV), those spaces became less profitable to adults, thus leading to a progressive loss of this form of social capital (Coleman, 1987, 1987–1988, 1994). Based on this reasoning, Coleman argued that policy measures for the creation of social capital for education would require economic incentives, such as tax and legal reforms that subsidise the presence of dependent age groups in the workplace or give firms and schools a financial stake in children’s education (1987–1988, 1994).

Initially, Coleman’s work on social capital rarely transcended the fields of sociology or education (graph 1.1). The popularisation of the concept came about when Putnam used it for his analysis of the institutional performance of Italian regional governments (1993a), and proceeded to relate it to US policy issues (1993b, 1995a, 1995b). Although Putnam explicitly referred to Coleman’s work to introduce the concept, he redefined social capital under a communitarian perspective. More specifically, he used it to explain how traditions of civic engagement—operationalised as associational activity, electoral turnout, use of preferential voting and newspaper readership—flourished in certain regions of Italy and became

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6 A thematic list of publications citing Coleman’s seminal article Social Capital in the creation of Human Capital (1988) between 1988 and 1993, as obtained from the ISI — Web of Knowledge bibliographic database, rendered a total of 52 publications, of which 22 were in sociology, 10 in education (educational research and educational psychology), and 8 in economics.

7 This refers to voters’ preferences for a specific candidate rather than a political party. Putnam understood the use of this electoral tool as an indicator of patron–client relationships (1993a).
institutionalised over time, leading to the development of more efficient political and economic institutions:

*Voluntary cooperation is easier in a community that has inherited a substantial stock of social capital. Social capital here refers to features of social organisation, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.* (Putnam, 1993a, p. 167)

Cooperation for mutual benefit and collective generation of public goods, hence, were hypothesised to emerge more easily in those settings where networks, norms and trust interact harmoniously to continuously strengthen social cohesion and generate incentives that facilitate collective action initiatives. Two causal pathways were hypothesised for such an outcome. The first refers to the progressive reinforcement of norms that control individuals’ exchanges to prevent negative externalities among group or community members, which contributes to the generation of dense networks of reciprocal (conditional) exchange. The second refers to the presence of extensive horizontal networks of communication and exchange which, particularly in the form of civic engagement, favours the expansion of generalised (unconditional) reciprocity (Putnam, 1993a, 1993b, 1995a). Social capital, hence, is presented as the dynamic equilibrium between those diverse expressions of community cohesion and organisation:

*Stocks of social capital, such as trust, norms, and networks, tend to be self-reinforcing and cumulative. Virtuous circles result in social equilibria with high levels of cooperation, trust, reciprocity, civic engagement, and collective well-being.* (Putnam, 1993a, p. 177)

A central implication of Putnam’s argument is that the beneficial effects of social capital on economic and political development are not direct; they are instead mediated by social capital’s direct outcome: civic vitality. In other words, collective initiatives for the public good are assumed to have major positive repercussions on the performance of economic and political systems when they take place in communities’ and societies’ with a variety of inter-related social structures—norms, organisations, trust, etc.—that encourage and support those actions. In this regard, at least for Italy, the empirical data showed that regional processes of socioeconomic development and institutional performance were historically preceded by positive trends of participation in community affairs, indicating that “The social capital embodied in norms and networks of civic engagement seems to be a pre-condition for economic development, as well as for effective government” (Putnam, 1993b, p. 38).

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8 Insofar as Putnam uses social capital to explain successful civic collaboration, he rejected the idea that vertical networks could lead to social capital formation because vertical network, no matter how dense and no matter how important to its participants, cannot sustain social trust and cooperation (Putnam, 1993a: p. 174).

9 Institutional performance was measured for regional governments as follows: number of regional cabinets installed between 1975 and 1985; length of time spent to approve the annual budget (1979–1985); adequacy of information and statistical services; index of comprehensiveness, coherence and creativeness of legal reforms (1978–1984); length of time new laws required to be formally implemented; number of regionally supported day-care centres and family clinics in operation; presence of industrial policy instruments; agricultural spending capacity; local health units expenditure; fraction of funds approved by the central government in favour of regional governments; and an index of bureaucratic responsiveness. Socioeconomic development, in turn, was assessed via the following measures: shares of workforce that work in the agricultural and industrial sectors; and infant mortality.
Putnam’s conceptualisation, however, changed over time. In *Bowling Alone* (2001), he modified his definition of social capital to “connections among individuals—social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them” (p. 19). This allowed him to first insert the individual into his analytical framework, so that social capital not only encompassed public but also private beneficial properties (i.e., individual benefits reaped from personal connections). Moreover, it was networks in general and not only networks of civic engagement or horizontal relationships that came to be considered the most basic sources of social capital. Nevertheless, ego–centred networks were presented as a minor expression of it, ultimately subordinated to its societal features, since “a well–connected individual in a poorly connected society is not as productive as a well–connected individual in a well–connected society” (p. 20). In a similar direction, Putnam also emphasised that for social capital to generate public goods it was necessary, once again, that networks of civic engagement take a preeminent position: “Networks ... are not interesting as mere 'contacts'. [It is] Networks of community engagement [that] foster norms of reciprocity” (p. 21).

The ambiguity surrounding Putnam’s conceptualisation of social capital was deepened by two inconsistencies in his proposals over time: (i) While social capital was first presented as a historically rooted process characterised by a stable and self–reinforcing equilibrium between networks, norms, and trust that could last for centuries (1993a), Putnam’s main hypothesis in *Bowling Alone* was that social capital in the USA decreased rapidly, affected chiefly by changes in domestic practices (growth in time spent watching television) (1995b, 2001). (ii) There was no explanation of why the rapid decline of social capital in the USA was not accompanied by major political and economic upheavals, as could be anticipated by the causal relationship proposed in *Making Democracy Work* (1993a, 1993b).10

Coleman’s and Putnam’s conceptualisations shared three key features that would later affect the emerging debates on the subject. First, both approaches lacked a clear–cut definition of social capital. Coleman’s functional definition made it unclear whether social capital referred to the social structures that individuals participate in (e.g., trustable relationships or cohesive communities.) or the benefits that flow through those structures (e.g., loans or technical information) (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993; Portes, 1998; Edwards & Foley, 1997). In addition, its individualistic foundations meant that any system of relations could be considered ‘capital’ insofar as it provided some added value to a particular action. Hence, the empirical referents of social capital could vary continuously according to settings, actions, and actors’

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10 In fact, no empirical data supporting the presence of a relationship between economic prosperity and social capital was presented in Putnam’s analysis of social capital in the USA (2001). Moreover, the levels of social capital estimated for each US state indicated that the most developed areas—the West and East coasts—reportedly possessed low levels of social capital.
utility functions. In turn, Putnam’s understanding of reciprocity norms, trust, networks of civic engagement, and social organisations as closely related to each other and as mutually reinforcing equally blurred the distinction between them, which on occasions were treated as exchangeable (Portes, 1998; Portes & Landolt, 2000; Edwards & Foley, 1998; Foley & Edwards, 1999).

A second issue was that social capital was initially presented in a positive light. Under Coleman, social capital referred to those features of organisations that help individuals achieve their ends so that his analysis focused on what social capital permitted individuals to do rather than on what it may prevent them from doing. As a result, the negative externalities associated with network’s closure (e.g., social exclusion or criminal collusion) were never analysed (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993; Portes, 1998). A similar scenario emerged under Puntam’s approach, which understood social capital as a community property whose defining characteristic was to facilitate “action and cooperation for mutual benefit” (1993b, p. 35). As a result, communities could be considered blessed if they possessed substantial stocks of social capital (1993b, 1995a), while those without it would tend to endure “Defection, distrust, shirking, exploitation, isolation, disorder, and stagnation [that] intensify one another in a suffocating miasma of vicious circles” (Putnam, 1993a, p. 177).

The third issue surrounding both Coleman’s and Putnam’s approaches to the concept was the lack of clarity between the levels of analysis in which social capital operate: a structural property of groups appropriated individually for Coleman (1988, 1990), and a feature of communities and societies that shape the performance and trajectories of economic and political institutions for Putnam (1993a, 1993b, 2001).

This lack of clarity generated an open space for a rapid succession of alternative interpretations of the concept. Portes (1998; Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993), for instance, rejected multi–level definitions of social capital and pressed forward for a conceptualisation more firmly rooted at the micro–level, redefining it as “the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of memberships in social networks or other social structures” (1998, p. 6). This implied that social capital was not an inherently beneficial trait emerging from group cohesion, but a context–dependent resource that could render positive or negative outcomes according to the presence of certain structures, such as internalised norms of obligation to other members,

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11 It is significant that due to the flexibility of the concept, Coleman recognised that its use in pure quantitative studies was uncertain; instead, he recommended it for qualitative analyses of social systems and for those quantitative studies that employ qualitative indicators (Coleman, 1990).

12 Putnam later recognised that social capital may be used for actions detrimental to society. However, instead of analysing this phenomenon, he proceeded to reject any criticisms of community building initiatives via a basic bivariate analysis of US data, conclusively asserting that civic engagement promotes greater openness and equality: “The empirical evidence on recent trends is unambiguous. No. Community and equality are mutually reinforcing, not mutually incompatible” (2001, p. 358). By his own recognition, however, that data was unable to sustain any claim of causality: “First, social capital may help produce equality ... it is also possible that the causal arrow points from equality toward civic engagement and social capital. A third view is that social connectedness and equality are fostered by the same external forces” (p. 359).
bounded solidarity, simple reciprocity and enforceable trust. In contrast, Fukuyama presented a conceptualisation of social capital as a property of entire societies, rooted in their respective cultural traditions: “a capability [to form social groups] that arises from the prevalence of trust in a society or in certain parts of it ... usually created and transmitted through cultural mechanisms like religion, tradition, or historical habit” (1995a, p. 26). Under this definition, Fukuyama presents the effects of social capital at the societal level, with large-scale organisations, such as corporations and firms, more likely to emerge in societies with high levels of generalised (impersonal) trust and small family firms more common in low-trust societies where business relations operate in small circles of close connections (Fukuyama, 1995a, 1995b).

1.1.2. Conceptual divergences in the development literature

The uncertain multidimensionality of the concept, variety of empirical referents and unclear level of analysis, coupled with its rapid popularisation, favoured the emergence of a wide spectrum of interpretations. In the development literature, this diversity of conceptualisations transit between two overarching levels of analyses: one centred on individual relationships and networks, and another on societies’ (in)formal institutions (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Halpern, 2005; Fulkerson & Thompson, 2008; Portes, 2000; Portes & Landolt, 2000; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000):

a. Micro-level approaches:

The first group of social capital definitions at this level are similar to that presented by Portes (1998; 2000; Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993; Portes & Landolt 2000), which equated social capital with those resources accessed through social relationships, or ‘social resources’ (Lin, 1995, 2001). Under this conceptualisation, labelled as ‘resource social capital’ by Fulkerson and Thompson (2008), the value of social capital is understood in relation to the volume, quality and type of resources that actors can access through their relationships, whether with individuals or groups, embedded in commitments of cooperation, reciprocity and trust.

This particular understanding of social capital is observed in the discourse of various development institutions, such as the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD, 2002), the Development Fund for International Development (DFID, 1999), and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO, 1999), as well as well-known international

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13 Critically, such analysis leaves the State out of the equation to promote an efficient economic system via building social capital. Despite their best efforts, public businesses are not expected to cover for the lack of trust in society, as large organisations operating in a distrustful environment are likely to underperform. Moreover, an increase in government interventions aimed at regulating social relations to promote coordination and trust would weaken civil society, and so a society’s endowments of social capital (Fukuyama 1995a, 1995b). According to Fukuyama, the State should limit itself to acting in an indirect manner, via the expansion of education and the protection of property rights (Fukuyama, 1999).
NGOs, such as CARE (Frankenberger, Drinkwater & Maxwell, 2000) and OXFAM (Neefjes, 2000) by virtue of their use of a sustainable livelihoods approach (SLA) framework. SLA moves away from monetary conceptualisations of poverty to look instead at how individuals’ assets allow them to reach different levels of functioning for the implementation of livelihood strategies. That is, it examines their capacity to effectively access, mobilise and combine both tangible (e.g., stores of cash and food, land, livestock) and intangible (e.g., access rights, education, privileged productive information) resources (DFID, 1999; Ellis, 2000). Under this analytical framework, social capital is usually defined “as the social resources upon which people draw in pursuit of their livelihood objectives” (DFID, 1999, p. 9), or “the social networks and associations in which people participate, and from which they can derive support that contributes to their livelihoods” (Ellis, 2000, p. 8).14

Many development economists broadly agree with such a conceptualisation, albeit whilst placing greater emphasis on the notion of networks. In this regard, social capital is mainly understood as those externalities (e.g., economic information, credit, or favourable commercial agreements) generated by a system of interpersonal relationships (Dasgupta, 2000, 2003), which some prefer to identify as ‘social network capital’ (Fafchamps & Minten, 2002a, 2002b) or ‘individual social capital’ (Glaeser, Laibson & Sacerdote, 2002).

Finally, some authors argue that actors’ feelings and values favouring cooperation can be considered as social capital. Uphoff (1999), for example, speaks of a ‘cognitive’ form of social capital: “mental processes and resulting ideas, reinforced by culture and ideology, specifically norms, values, attitudes and beliefs that contribute cooperative behaviour” (p. 218); also known as ‘relational’ social capital (Krishna, 1999). Following the same argument, Robinson, Siles and Schmidt (2004) define social capital as “sympathetic feelings for another person or group” (p. 55). These views, however, are little reflected in the discourse of major development agencies.

b. Meso–level approaches:

Conceptualisations of social capital at a meso–level are close to Putnam’s communitarian approach (1993a, 2001) and Coleman’s notion of ‘closure’ (1988, 1990). They tend to understand it as a collective feature that emerges from social cohesion and civic engagement, which facilitates the generation of mutually beneficial collective action. Presented under various labels—‘community social capital’ (Durston, 1999, 2002), ‘structural social capital’ (Uphoff, 1999), ‘institutional social capital’ (Krishna, 1999) or

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14 In the multiple adaptations of SLA, social capital may be defined in more encompassing terms. Helmore and Singh’s handbook on sustainable livelihoods, for instance, defined it as Governance structures, decision-making power, community institutions, culture, participatory processes (p. xi). Most salient SLA approaches, however, emphasise social resources as the core feature of social capital.
‘normative social capital’ (Fulkerson & Thompson, 2008)—social capital definitions at this level place great emphasis on the presence of mechanisms of social organisation and normative structures that promote cooperative actions in a given community or society. As a result, the empirical referents in such approaches usually take the form of cultural traditions of collective action, forms of group identity, or institutionalised forms of social organisation (Halpern, 2005; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000).

This understanding of social capital is recurrent in the discourse of diverse international development agencies, albeit without denying the value of personal networks. The IADB, for instance, equates the process of developing social capital, at both local and national levels, with that of fostering social inclusion by removing any (in)formal barriers that impede impoverished and excluded groups from accessing the productive sectors of society (2003a, 2003b, 2006). Likewise, the ADB considers that “strengthening the social capital of the poor largely means increasing their opportunities for participation in the workings of society” (1999, p. 11).

c. **Macro–level approaches:**

This perspective presents social capital as inherently linked to features of the political system that enable norms to develop and shape social structures, such as political regimes, the rule of law, and recognised civil and political liberties (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000; Halpern, 2005). A first approach to this matter understands political institutions themselves as social capital. Collier (1998), for instance, speaks of ‘government social capital’, which reflects the capacity of public institutions to solve the problems of collective action for the public good, “most notably through taxation, enabling the delivery of public goods and the management of common pool resources, … education … [and] commercial and criminal law” (p. 15). Therefore, empirical analyses of this form of social capital proceeded to operationalise it via indicators of rule of law (e.g., the extent to which property rights are protected in a country) (Knack, 1999) or the capacity of a State to rule efficiently (issues of corruption, quality of bureaucracy, enforceability of contracts and presence of civil war) (Collier & Gunning, 1999).

A different take on the relationship between formal institutions and social capital focuses on those expressions described at the meso– and micro–levels. This approach problematises the causal relationship initially presented by Putnam (1993a, 1993b)—that social capital leads to the generation of efficient economic and political institutions—to state instead that social capital is not only unable to exist independently of politics or governments, but that, in fact, it is developed, channelled and heavily shaped by the policies, laws, public bodies and programmes, and bureaucratic proceedings (Edwards &
Foley, 1997; Hooghe & Stolle, 2003; Tarrow, 1996). In relation to this debate, the notion of 'synergy' was proposed to highlight that the developmental capability of social capital is affected by the presence of effective collaborative State–society relations (Evans, 1996). This is perceived specifically, in terms of ‘complementarity’ (mutually supportive relations between public and private actors (e.g., legal frameworks that protect rights of association) and ‘embeddedness’ (i.e., the nature and extent of the ties connecting citizens and public officials outside formal instances of action).

This approach has been adhered to by most development agencies in order to explore the capacity of public policies to generate and enhance desirable forms of social capital at community and individual levels. The World Bank, for example, highlighted the need for institutional reforms to make the State more responsive and accountable to the poor via the decentralisation of public agencies and the adoption of community–based and participatory strategies in development programmes (World Bank, 2001). In the same direction, the OECD (2001), the IADB (2003a, 2003b, 2006), and the ADB (1999, 2004) spoke in general terms of the need to adopt inclusive decision–making processes in governmental institutions and development programmes, as well as of providing material support—directly (e.g., public funding) or indirectly (e.g., tax reductions)—to community organisations.

Another macro–level conceptualisation of social capital equates it to societies’ historically developed levels of generalised trust (Fukuyama, 1995a, 1995b). Based on this view, social capital is linked to cultural traditions: “not all norms and values, and hence not all cultures, are created equal with respect to their ability to foster economic growth. ... not all societies have equal stocks of social capital” (Fukuyama, 2004, p.37). Proponents of similar interpretations have therefore focused on estimating the association between economic growth and levels of impersonal trust in entire nations (Knack & Keefer, 1997; La Porta, Lopez–de–Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishnny, 1997; Zack & Knack, 2001) and regions (Dincer & Uslaner, 2010).

How best to enhance trust to promote a more open and inclusive culture remains unclear (Uslaner, 2008; Fukuyama, 1999, 2004). Nevertheless, diverse development institutions and governments have discussed the need to implement policy measures of a cultural nature, such as educational reforms aimed at addressing cultural diversity, the promotion of local skills so as to revalidate local knowledge and empower minorities, or affirmative action policies intended to speed up value changes (ADB, 1999, 2004; IADB, 2003b, 2006; World Bank, 2001).
To what extent and via which mechanisms those different understandings of social capital could be considered features of the same concept is still uncertain. Across the literature, there are several descriptions of social capital as a multi-dimensional concept, but there is little agreement on how to integrate all existing conceptualisations. Uphoff (1999) and Krishna (1999), for example, considered that ‘cognitive’ and ‘structural’ forms of social capital are constitutive properties of the same concept, hence aggregating meso- and micro- definitions. Others use more encompassing approaches. For instance, Ostrom and Ahn (2003, 2009) identify trustworthiness, networks, and institutions as constitutive parts of social capital; likewise the World Bank states on its official website:

*Social capital refers to the institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society's social interactions (…) Social capital is not just the sum of the institutions which underpin a society – it is the glue that holds them together.* (World Bank, 2010)

Among the different efforts to build a multi-dimensional conceptualisation of social capital, Woolcock's differentiation between ‘bonding’, ‘bridging’ and 'linking' (Szreter & Woolcock, 2004; Woolcock, 2001, 2002) is particularly salient in the literature. This classification articulated the notions of 'bonding' and 'bridging', developed by Gittel and Vidal (1998) and popularised by Putnam (2001), which accounted for the capacity of social organisations to connect individuals within and beyond their communities, and of ‘synergy’, which pointed out how social capital returns were conditioned by the interaction between different forms of community capacity and state functioning (Evans, 1996; Woolcock, 1998; Narayan, 1999; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). As a result, Woolcock’s three-dimensional classification related personal relationships with structural conditions: (i) ‘bonding’ represented those trusting and cooperative relations between members of a network who see themselves as being similar in virtue of their sharing a similar social identity; (ii) ‘bridging’ alluded to those relations of respect and mutual support between people who know they are not alike in socio-demographic terms (e.g., age, ethnicity, area of residence) but are similar in terms of political authority; and (c) ‘linking’ referred to those trusting relationships and interactions between actors who possess unequal (in)formal levels of authority and power.

In spite of those theoretical efforts and the increasing popularity of the bonding/bridging/linking classification, conceptualisations of social capital commonly vary in relation to the research questions scholars address: status attainment or livelihood strategies (micro), collective action or common management of resources (meso), or economic growth (macro) (Fulkerson & Thompson, 2008; Krishna, 2008). The presented literature review, however, indicates that the focus of the development literature, including the discourse of international agencies, leans towards the micro- and meso-level conceptualisations of social capital, whilst assuming institutions as influential external factors.
1.2. Social capital, economic welfare, and poverty

The economic implications of social capital have been presented in the development literature, with different emphases according to the levels of analyses in which its various features are assumed to operate. At the micro-level, economic accounts of social capital focus on the economic externalities of personal networks. Two main sets of benefits are regularly mentioned in this regard. The first one refers to information spillovers via network channels, which are expected to help generate more efficient economic decisions and exchanges between economic agents, increasing their endowments of human capital, as well as reducing transaction costs. This results from the flow of two kinds of information: behavioural (e.g., actors’ trajectories of respecting or defaulting on economic commitments) and non–behavioural (e.g., job and business opportunities, or technological or managerial innovations). They both allow agents to make better allocation decisions on their investments as they would know how best to use their assets (e.g., via access to information about technical innovations), where to direct them (e.g., by identifying profitable market niches), and who to trust in order to make business deals (e.g., to whom to give credit) (Collier, 1998; Dasgupta, 2000, 2003; Fafchamps & Minten, 2002a, 2002b). In addition, non–behavioural information spillovers help to develop human capital, as agents would be able to learn new technical or managerial skills that enhance their economic activities (Dasgupta, 2000; van Staveren & Knorringa, 2007), whilst the constant flow of behavioural information generates incentives for network members to maintain their reputations—hence lowering the dangers of opportunistic behaviour (Collier, 1998).

A second group of externalities related to personal networks refers to the usefulness of close connections to generate agreements of mutual obligation and support between economic agents who, in this manner, would be able to access each other’s assets in beneficial terms of exchange. These agreements, on the one hand, allow agents to complement their initial stocks of working assets (e.g., cash, machinery, or technical information) to expand their operations; and, on the other, to access other peoples’ resources in order to smooth the impact of different economic shocks, such as health emergencies or natural disasters (Collier, 1998; Woolcock, 2001, 2002; Sorensen, 2000).

Diverse empirical studies have provided evidence that these economic expressions of social capital are relevant to the impoverished. Studies of rural villages in developing countries using cross–sectional—Bolivia (Grootaert & Narayan, 2001), Indonesia (Grootaert, 1999), Burkina Faso (Grootaert, Oh & Swamy, 2002) and Tanzania (Narayan & Pritchett, 1997; Narayan, 1997)—and longitudinal—South Africa (Maluccio, Haddad, & May, 1998) and

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15 There are discrepancies in the literature about how to explain the emergence of trustworthiness. For some it results from intimate values and inner dispositions developed through socialisation (Robinson, Siles & Schmidt, 2004; Francois, 2002), while for those following classic network and game theories (Axelrod, 1984; Granovetter, 1985) and rational–choice assumptions, it emerges from continuously successful exchanges between economic agents (Dasgupta, 2000, 2003; Collier, 1998).
Indonesia (Wetterberg, 2007) — data have all reported that households with more extended community networks tend to enjoy higher levels of material wellbeing than isolated families. Fafchamps and Minten (2002a, 2002b) and Lyon (2000) found that agriculture traders who possessed extensive trustful relationships with other traders, providers and loaners tended to benefit from greater sales and gross margins in Madagascar and Ghana, respectively. Furthermore, the literature on ‘risk sharing’ has shown that the rural poor usually smooth their consumption levels when affected by emergencies via informal forms of social insurance (e.g., in cash or livestock) through friendship– and kinship–based networks (de Weerdt, 2005; Fafchamps & Lund, 2003; Park, 2006; Murgai, Winters, Sadoulet & de Janvry, 2002; Sorensen, 2000).

Conceptualisations of social capital as a feature of groups and communities (meso–level), in turn, emphasise the economic benefits of social cohesion, which come from its capacity to generate an economic environment characterised by: (i) few information asymmetries, (ii) low transaction costs, and (iii) favouring the development of collective initiatives that efficiently pool and manage common resources for the generation of public goods (Collier, 1998; Friesen, 2003; Ostrom, 2000; Ostrom & Ahn, 2003, 2009; Putnam, 1993a, 2001).

In this regard, as well–connected groups are expected to facilitate the rapid flow of information to all members, social cohesion has the potential to reduce the incidence of market failures resulting from incomplete or asymmetric information, thereby increasing the efficiency of markets, and thus of economic systems (Friesen, 2003; Halpern, 2005). For instance, job–seekers would be more easily informed of the existence of positions that suit their skills, since businesses could not conceal information and so collude to form monopolies or oligopolies, and diverse local industries would be more able to identify both the most suitable providers and clients. In addition, learning spillovers would be extensively distributed in a cohesive group, allowing all members to have an equal chance of improving their skills or learning about new techniques (van Staveren & Knorringa, 2007).

In the same direction, cohesive groups may further expand the incentives for actors to behave in a trustworthy manner. First, in a well–connected network system individuals could apply to multiple sources to confirm initial behavioural information and update it on a regular basis. Second, while in disconnected networks, the outcome of a bad transaction would be the breakdown of a particular relationship; in a cohesive collective it would mean breaking–up with the entire group, raising the costs of contract infringements. Third, social cohesion allows all group members to jointly agree on, impose, and monitor specific sanctions against malfeasance by virtue of their close knowledge of and reliance on each other (Coleman, 1988, 1990; Ostrom, 2000; Ostrom & Ahn, 2003, 2009).
In addition, social cohesion may solve collective action dilemmas by facilitating the institutionalisation of practices, norms and decision-making mechanisms that regulate cooperative behaviour, with different economic implications. First, such a normative structure may help members of a community to effectively and efficiently manage the exploitation of limited common resources, such as forests or water sources. Moreover, the simultaneous presence of a formal body that regulates agents’ access to those resources, of (in)formal sanctions against over-exploitation or hidden practices, and of a vigilant community that enforces them, could ensure the sustainability of the resources and related productive activities (Ostrom, 1992, 2000; Ostrom & Ahn, 2003, 2009; Uphoff, 1999). Second, the presence of extensive reciprocity arrangements in a collective, and the low chances of malfeasance, facilitate the development of extended (in)formal cooperative arrangements that use economies of scale to make up for market or State failures by pooling local resources (Collier, 1998). Finally, social cohesion is also hypothesised to reduce the chances of free-riding, and generate a strong sense of common identity among community members, which encourages collective investments in public goods (Collier, 1998; Ostrom, 1994, 2000; Ostrom & Ahn, 2003, 2009; Putnam, 1993a, 2001).

There is evidence that those collective expressions of social capital are relevant to the lives of the poor. Diverse studies, for instance, have shown that, even in conditions of scarcity, farmers in developing countries can develop self-organised irrigation systems with specific sets of norms, roles and decision-making instances that efficiently regulate the access to water, promote infrastructure investments, and reduce the chances of violent conflict or substantive community break-up (Ostrom, 1992, 2000; Uphoff & Wijayaratna, 2000). In addition, it has been documented that the poor usually rely on diverse informal cooperative arrangements to cope with their materially deprived conditions. They may be able to access cash via rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), which operate on the basis of social pressure, or organise themselves in grass-root organisations that pool local resources to use economies of scale to cover basic needs, such as community kitchens, or family emergencies, as in the case of burial societies (Narayan, Chambers, Shah, & Petesch 2000a; Narayan, Walton, Koch-Schulte, Patel, Rademacher, & Schafft, 2000b; Sorensen, 2000; van Bastelaer, 2000).

Conceptualisations of social capital at the societal or country level have proposed that social capital can create a favourable business climate on the basis of generalised trust, which smoothes economic exchanges and favours large economic operations (Fukuyama, 1995a, 1995b; Knack & Keefer, 1997; Zack & Knack, 2001). Correspondingly, empirical analyses have recurrently found a positive association between the levels of impersonal trust present in a country (Knack & Keefer, 1997; Knack, 1999) or region (Dincer & Uslaner, 2009) and economic growth. Likewise, tracing the effects of the lack of social capital, Collier and Gunning (1999) found that those African countries characterised by their ethnic fragmentation suffered slow growth.
Despite the extensive literature highlighting the potential economic benefits related to social capital, there are clear limitations to its capacity to promote social mobility among the poor. In terms of networks, it has been observed that the poor tend to lack the necessary connections with well-informed and endowed individuals that grant access to information spillovers that promote productivity and human capital or generate favourable terms of exchange that could significantly improve their living conditions (Collier, 1998; Narayan et al., 2000a, 2000b; Woolcock, 2001, 2002). Empirical studies of ‘risk sharing’ practices among the rural poor, for example, have regularly reported that the material support obtained from close relatives and friends rarely compensates fully for the losses of economic shocks (Fafchamps & Lund, 2003; Park, 2006; Murgai et al., 2002). Moreover, the strong reliance on close connections among the poor may lead to ‘amoral familism’, by which relatives and friends may make constant strenuous demands on each other, thereby preventing capital accumulation (Woolcock 2001, 2002). Fafchamps and Mitten (2002a, 200b), for example, reported that the use of family members as a workforce for agricultural businesses in Madagascar negatively affected gross returns.

The deprived material conditions of the poor may also limit the benefits of social capital at the group or community level. For instance, studies of ROSCAs operating in Kenya reported that these services mainly help poor households to partially cope with economic shocks or gradually save up for the purchase of durable goods, rather than to make significant productive investments (Anderson & Baland, 2002; Gugerty, 2007; Mayoux, 2001). In turn, studies of community kitchen operations in Peru, which are only partly subsidised by the State, found they are unable to fulfil the nutritional requirements of their consumers (Instituto Cuanto, 1997; Lavado–Padilla & Grande–Wong, 2004).

The topics addressed by institutional accounts of social capital, in turn, underscore the institutional challenges that limit the poor’s ability to benefit from social capital. On the one hand, cross–country comparisons have shown that poverty is more extended in those societies characterised by an extended culture of limited impersonal trust (Knack & Keefer, 1997; Knack, 1999); on the other, those historically rooted limitations are further worsened by the presence of entrenched malpractices in poor countries’ political regimes, characterised by extensive corruption and disregard for democratic principles of government (Collier, 1998; Collier & Gunning, 1999)

How best to take advantage of the different expressions of social capital observed among the poor and remedy the limitations they face in using it for social mobility purposes is a matter still open for discussion and debate. Nevertheless, the related policy debates aiming at getting the social relations right (Woolcock, 1998, p. 187) tend to broadly agree on the following general starting point: private and public development agencies should support expressions of
Community organisation and civic vitality among the poor, and try to integrate them into their operations rather than privileging top-down strategies, particularly with the aim to develop effective synergies with the State and civil society. Such an integration is expected to expand the networks and social resources available to the poor, foment social cohesion, empower the poor and the excluded to exercise their citizenship, and establish more extensive mechanisms of control against corruption and malpractices in the State (ADB, 1999, 2004; Carroll, 2001; Grootaert & van Bastelaer, 2001, 2002; IADB, 2003a, 2003b, 2006; Robinson, Siles & Schmid, 2004; Woolcock, 1998, 2001; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000; World Bank, 2001).

1.3. Participatory development and social capital

The initial proposals of the developmental value of social capital landed in a receptive terrain. By the time the concept was more widely discussed by major development institutions (the early 2000s), 'participatory development' approaches, which advocate for a revalidation of local knowledge and beneficiaries' involvement in the running of development projects to empower them and promote sustainable interventions, had achieved—under various labels and guises—a central position in the discourses and operations of development agencies (Cooke & Khotari, 2001; ADB, 2006; Hickey & Mohan, 2004), including the working frameworks of key multilateral organisations, such as the IADB (1998), the ADB (1996), and the World Bank (1995).

However, 'participatory development' does not constitute a homogeneous and single clear-cut development strategy; instead, it is characterised by the presence of diverse approaches and empirical implementations. First, in operative terms, there are different visions regarding the necessary level of engagement required from beneficiaries. At its most basic level, participatory interventions may promote only consultative activities, which aim to integrate the views and practices of the local population into project designs and frameworks, but leave the project under the authority of the intervening agency. At the other end of the spectrum, interventions allow and actively support beneficiaries' taking part in the decision-making process running an intervention and interacting with political and economic stakeholders. Second, from a political perspective, participatory approaches may have different interpretations of beneficiaries as citizens. While some agencies may envision beneficiaries as neighbours engaged in community affairs, others pursue a vision of beneficiaries as political actors actively involved in both local and national political affairs, including ideological debates and political contests. Third, there are also different views regarding the type of social change that ought to be pursued through the organisation and mobilisation of the poor, from improvements in basic local living conditions to structural changes in a society via collective challenges to institutionalised forms of subordination and exclusion (Dahl–Østergaard et al., 2003; Leeuwis, 2000; Hickey & Mohan, 2004).
Despite the variety of participatory approaches to development, the claims of social capital advocates that community networks, institutionalised collective practices, legitimate norms of cooperation, and local organisations could be instrumental for development purposes, provided a common ground for their integration. Hickey and Mohan (2004), for instance, consider the introduction of social capital in the discourse of development agencies as the emergence of a new participatory approach, centred on community engagement, as both an exercise of democratic citizenship and a tool for economic development. Indeed, various researchers have explicitly related the use of participatory development strategies with social capital:

... active participation in intersectional problem solving and implementation by NGOs and grassroots organizations can generate social capital that fosters future problem solving, which will generate social capital ... and so on. (Brown & Ashman, 1996, p. 1477)

Control over decisions and resources [of a project] can also give communities the opportunity to build social capital ... by expanding the depth and range of their networks. Development strategies that strengthen CBOs [community–based organisations] and build social capital can also strengthen the safety net for poor people and reduce their exposure to risk. (Dongier, et al., 2002, p. 8)

... beneficiary participation offers the potential for the design and implementation of interventions that more closely reflect the preferences of the population that they are designed to serve. However ... where trust and/or social capital are weak, there is a risk that community participation may result in the capture of benefits by local elites to the detriment of the poor. (Hodinott, 2002, p.148)

The relationship between social capital and participatory development, however, has been presented differently according to the conceptualisation of social capital used. On the one hand, an understanding of social capital as rooted in historically developed cultural and social institutions has led to a perception of social capital mainly as a pre–condition for the success of participatory interventions, as only in high–trust and socially cohesive communities would local actors be more likely to organise themselves and cooperate effectively (Dahl–Østergaard et al., 2003; Hodinott, 2002). In contrast, on the basis of a conceptualisation of social capital as individual and community networks strengthened by expressions of civic engagement, other researchers postulated that social capital could be built purposively via participatory strategies. As a result, although a pre–existing high level of trust and cooperation within a community is desirable, the emphasis is placed on ‘community building’ (Brown & Ashman, 1996; Dongier et al., 2002; Durston, 1999, 2004; Uphoff, 1999, 2004).

Inevitably, recommendations on how best to use participatory approaches to build and mobilise social capital are not homogenous. They vary in accordance with the various manifestations of participatory development as well as understandings of social capital. The most common in the related literature centre on the following issues:
• The use of participatory data-collection methods prior to any intervention, so as to attain a clear and rich description of how social capital operates locally and to what extent a project can rely on it to conduct its activities (Durston, 1999, 2004; Grootaert & Van Bastelaer, 2001, 2002; Narayan, 1997; Wilson, 1997).

• The implementation of a continuous process of consultation, informational exchange and mutual learning with beneficiaries—a process akin to the proposals of participatory action research—throughout a project's lifespan, which allows external agencies to develop a deeper understanding of local social capital, promotes a discourse that highlights the value of social cohesion and cooperation among beneficiaries, and facilitates the practical integration of diverse social capital manifestations into project activities (Durston, 1999, 2004; Krishna 1999, 2002; Robinson, Siles & Schmid, 2004; Uphoff, 1999, 2004; Wilson, 1997).

• The integration of local traditional rules and collective practices as part of a project’s mechanisms of cooperation, participation and decision-making in order to enhance the legitimacy of the intervention, efficiently mobilise local beneficiaries and foment a wider acceptance and commitment of beneficiaries to project activities (Uphoff, 1999, 2004; Durston, 1999, 2004; Pantoja, 2000; Krishna, 1999, 2002; Grootaert & Van Bastelaer, 2001, 2002).

• The provision of material (assets and financial help) and non-material (information and technical skills) forms of support to existing and emerging local organisations that promote social cohesion and collective action for the public good. Such a strategy would enhance the existing social capital in the community by tightening, expanding, and strengthening local relationships as well as facilitate cooperation with external actors, from civil society and the state, so as to scale-up local development efforts (Dongier et al., 2002; Durston, 1999, 2004; Grootaert & van Bastelaer, 2001, 2002; Krishna, 1999; Narayan & Woolcock, 2000; Pantoja, 2000).

• The granting of control over the decision-making process and the management of the resources invested by an intervention to the beneficiaries. Consequently, information, productive assets and other resources would be expected to flow more easily and evenly within the beneficiary community, as well as more effectively in relation to the priorities of the local population (Dongier et al., 2002; Durston, 1999, 2004; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000).

• The promotion of functional cooperative links between community organisations and federations of organisations, other expressions of civil society, development agencies and public institution, in order to access greater volumes of resources, empower beneficiaries by giving them greater political leverage, scale-up the scope of their organisations’ activities and generate an enabling environment for policy and institutional reform (e.g.,
At present, however, it is not possible to state with certainty the actual effectiveness of these different intervention strategies to effectively use and build social capital with positive developmental impacts. Different reviews of the project portfolios of major development agencies that explicitly attempted or had the potential to use and build social capital via participatory strategies have depicted an inconclusive scenario. Although most of those reviews by the World Bank (Mansuri & Rao, 2004; Fox & Gershman, 2006; van Domelen, 2006; World Bank, 2005), the IADB (Dahl–Østergaard, et al., 2003) and the ADB (ADB, 2006) broadly agree that the pre–existence of a cohesive, inclusive and well–organised community constitutes an important asset that favours the successful implementation of development participatory projects and the achievement of its objectives, there is still little evidence that backs a direct causal link between both factors, that the use of participatory strategies actually favours the development of social capital, or that those expressions of social capital generated are indeed favourable to a community. This scenario is summarised by the World Bank assessment of community–based development (CBD) and community–driven development (CDD) interventions:

... it appears that participatory interventions are ‘users’ of existing social capital rather than producers of it .... this study finds that CBD/CDD projects can enhance [existing] social capital and foster empowerment, but the link between CBD/CDD and social capital and community empowerment is weak. (World Bank, 2005, p.22)

The literature on social capital has identified a series of challenges that have prevented an adequate assessment of its developmental effects. One limitation derives from the lack of theoretical clarity surrounding the concept, particularly in relation to its excessive multidimensionality (Mansuri & Rao, 2004; van Domelen, 2006). Different expressions of social capital could generate contradictory findings. As recognised by Putnam (2001), ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ social capital, for instance, could be contradictory since strengthening local connections may generate strong local loyalties and forms of identity that foster ‘parochialism’, which deters actors from developing connections of similar quality beyond the local arena. By the same token, developing extended connections with external agents may challenge local social cohesion and identity (Carroll, 2001; Edwards & Foley, 1998; 1999; Portes & Landolt, 2000). Fostering strong norms of collaboration and mutual support, in addition, may exacerbate problems of ‘amoral familism’ by expanding the rights of neighbours and relatives over each other’s resources (Carroll, 2001; Woolcock, 1998). Furthermore, existing and newly formed expressions of social capital may be used by actors to conduct activities that undermine development, such as criminal organisations or social exclusion (Portes, 1998; Portes & Landolt, 2000).
A second limitation, shared by some applications of participatory development, refers to the lack of differentiation between communities, organisations, and individuals. Communities cannot be understood as culturally and politically homogenous social systems since they tend to be integrated by individual and collective actors with different objectives, neither can they be equated to social organisations, considering that the latter have different, if not opposing interests (e.g., religious organisations may oppose progressive women’s associations) (Dahl–Østergaard et al., 2003; Bebbington, Dani, de Haan, & Walton, 2004; Leeuwis, 2000; Mansuri & Rao, 2004; Portes & Landolt, 2000; World Bank, 2005; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). Moreover, investments in local organisations may in fact generate competition between local groups and actors, leading to a recomposition of the profiles of their members. Diverse studies of funding for community–based organisations, such as those of Gugerty and Kremer (2002) in Kenya; Rao and Ibañez (2005) in Jamaica, Dasgupta and Beard (2007) and Fritzen (2007) in Indonesia, and Schady (2001) in Peru, all found, for example, that participatory projects were dominated by local socioeconomic elites, who were in the position to capture the resources provided by development agencies and favour their political or economic interests.

The literature has equally highlighted that the wider cultural, economic, and political context may affect the process of using and building social capital via participatory strategies, rendering it difficult to make any clear–cut generalisations regarding its beneficial effects on project implementation and developmental returns. Formal and informal institutional arrangements condition people’s rights, opportunities and ownerships, ultimately shaping their capacity to organise themselves as well to successfully use their networks to access valuable resources (ADB, 2006; Evans, 1996; Fox & Gershman, 2006; Mansuri & Rao, 2004; Pantoja, 2000; World Bank, 2005; Woolcock, 1998).

With regard to formal institutions, Fox’s study of Mexican indigenous organisations (1996), for example, has showed that the trajectories of civil society initiatives follow different pathways in relation to the structure of opportunities provided by the state: (i) co–production between state reformists and local societal groups willing and able to take advantage of openings from above; (ii) local–outsider collaboration, when non–governmental actors (e.g., church or human rights groups) provided support to local and regional organising efforts; and (iii) independent societal scaling–up, through autonomous local social, civic or political initiatives in the absence of external support. In relation to informal institutions, in turn, various gender assessments of social capital have highlighted the different capacities of men and women to build and reap material benefits from their relationships due to their different domestic and economic roles and the differing expressions of masculine domination operating in society (e.g., men’s access to women’s finances) (Mayoux, 2001; Molyneux, 2002; Rankin, 2002; Silvey & Elmhurst, 2008).
There are also important methodological challenges associated to the theoretical debates surrounding the concept. The use of over–encompassing definitions that cut across different levels of analysis and include a variety of features, such as norms, networks, trust and values tend to blur differences between causes and effects and leave minimal room for alternative possible explanations to be contrasted with (i.e., social capital’s hypothesised effects cannot be easily falsified) (Lin, 2001; Harris, 2002). By the same token, the lack of differentiation between its different features carries the risk of circular reasoning. For example, it becomes self–evident that “cities where everyone cooperates in maintaining good government are well governed” (Portes, 1998, p. 20) and that communities where most people actively participate in voluntary associations are more likely to report high levels of engagement in collective action initiatives (Edwards & Foley, 1999). Moreover, the uncertainty with regard to the nature of social capital as an exogenous or an endogenous variable conditioned by socioeconomic factors (e.g., the costs of building relationships may explain the lack of extended networks rather than the other way around) leaves it unclear as to whether the lack of social capital constitutes a characteristic or a cause of poverty (Harriss, 2001; Durlauf, 2002).

Finally, the use of aggregated data to account for higher levels of analysis is equally problematic, especially when considering that the relationship between the different levels of analysis associated with the concept have not been properly theorised. Social capital as a community property is usually measured by adding up and averaging individuals’ or households’ responses, although both levels are qualitatively different. For example, generalised (unconditional) trust is not the same as the sum of an individual’s trust in their neighbours (Edwards & Foley, 1998; Foley & Edwards, 1999). Similarly, aggregated data on people’s memberships indicates little about organisations’ objectives, organisational dynamics, or members’ networks (Harriss, 2002; Pantoja, 2000; Portes, 1998).

1.4. Social capital and poverty in Peru

The role civil society in Perú has played to cope with and seek ways out of poverty has changed significantly in recent decades. In the 1980s—amid high levels of inflation (which reached a

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16 The Integrated Questionnaire for the measurement of social capital (Grootaert, Narayan, Jones, & Woolcock, 2004), for example, assessed the following social capital dimensions: (i) groups and networks, (ii) trust and solidarity, (iii) collective action and cooperation, (iv) information and communication, (v) social cohesion and inclusion, and (vi) empowerment and political action. The World Bank’s Social Capital Assessment Tool (Krishna & Shrader, 2002), in turn integrates seven different social capital features: (a) structural social capital: (i) organisational density, (ii) networks and mutual support organisations, (iii) exclusion, and (iv) collective action; and (b) cognitive social capital: (i) solidarity, (ii) trust and cooperation, and (iii) conflict resolution.

17 Some authors have used instrumental variable estimations to deal with reverse causality issues. These studies replaced social capital estimates based on associational activity indicators (e.g., number of memberships, frequency of attendance, or contributions in cash or work) with measures of trust in strangers and public officials (Narayan, 1997; Narayan & Pritchett, 1997); generalised trust, trend of membership and length of residency (Grootaert, Oh, & Swamy, 2002); and village ethnic and religious diversity, density of local organisations, and community involvement in the procurement of public services (Grootaert, 1999; Grootaert & Narayan, 2001). The use of these measures as valid replacements for associational activity indicators as well as the validity of those measures as indicators of social capital as a whole, however, is uncertain due to the theoretical uncertainty surrounding the concept. In addition, those replacements could themselves be questioned due to endogeneity issues (e.g., trust in public officials may be affected by the performance of public services and levels of poverty) (Grootaert, Oh, & Swamy, 2002; Durlauf, 2002).
3000% annual rate in 1989) and monetary devaluation (Peru replaced its currency twice in the 1980s), increasing political violence from the Shining Path and Revolutionary Movement Tupc Amaru, particularly in rural settings, and insufficient urban services in the face of a rapid expansion of cities—diverse grass roots initiatives emerged in both urban (e.g., associations of informal urban residents pooled their resources to finance investments in public infrastructure) and rural areas (e.g., peasants organisations or rondas campesinas that intended to control the rising levels of violence in areas with no state presence). In addition, these and other social organisations, such as labour unions, peasants federations and agricultural cooperatives, and women’s groups, acquired great presence in the public scenario in alliance with existing political parties (particularly, but not solely, from the left) with whom they pressed forward for policy changes based on a continuous process of mobilisation and confrontation with the State. This socio–political dynamics, however, changed drastically in the 1990s due to a series of concomitant factors (Arce, 2005; Tanaka, 2002; Hunefeldt, 1997; Ballon, 2003):

- The collapse of the traditional political party system, delegitimised by the ever–worsening living conditions, which paved the way for the emergence of ephemeral ‘independent’ political groups with unclear structure and no ideological alignment. This lack of established political organisations was worsened during Fujimori’s government (1990 – 2000), which organised a ‘competitive authoritarian’ regime (Tanaka, 2002), characterised by regular elections under a climate of political repression and surveillance.
- The liberalisation of the economy in the 1990s, which deregulated the labour market and drastically reduced State participation in the economy (e.g., privatisation of telephone and electricity services, airlines and railways) and promoted private investments in agriculture by reducing the limits of landholding, allowing the corporative acquisition or liquidation of rural cooperatives, and providing tax incentives to investments in the mining and energy sectors. All changes that reduced the political leverage of workers and peasants unions.
- The adoption of centralised populist practices by the State during Fujimori’s regime (e.g., expansion of food–alleviation programmes funded by government agencies as a form to establish patron–client relations between the government and the poor) which reduced the autonomy of many grass–root organisations.
- The state initiatives to formalise informal urban settlements to promote the property market and the privatisation of certain public services that favoured new investments in public infrastructure, which reduced the mobilisation of residents’ associations by covering their primary demands.

These changes have been followed in recent years by the idea that participation of civil society in policy–making and development programmes is key for their transparency, efficiency and sustainability among public and private agencies (Tanaka, 2000, 2001; Ballon, 2003).

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18 Law No. 17716 (Law of Land Reform) from 1969; Legislative Decree No. 653 (Law for the Promotion of Investments in the Agrarian Sector) from 1991.
Moreover, since 2002 Peru has produced a series of new laws that enacted different formal spaces for the involvement of civil society representatives (e.g., community organisations, NGOs, religious institutions and business associations) in the policy-making processes at local and regional levels (e.g., Board for the Fight Against Poverty, a coordination body that discusses policy priorities and accountability issues with local authorities; the Concerted Development Plan and Participatory Budgeting committees, in charge of outlining the municipalities’ and regional governments’ annual executive plans and budgets).19

Nevertheless, in a similar fashion to the debates surrounding social capital and participatory development, it has been noted that the prescriptive adoption of such strategies into the operative framework of public and private agencies tends to be based on some unrealistic assumptions (Tanaka, 2000, 2001): (i) that there are indeed communities of people living in an identifiable territory that share the same objectives and are willing to cooperate with each other; (ii) that the different organisations that sprung from these communities have compatible and harmonious objectives; (iii) that these organisations and their leaders are legitimate representatives of those collective interests; and (iv) that leaders, regular members and non-members show no major discontinuities in terms of socioeconomic profiles or personal interests. Indeed, various case studies have reported that local organisations operating in community-based participatory programmes and policy-making arenas are characterised by power struggles and incongruous interests by which presumed concerted actions and decisions tend to reproduce instead the views and interests of local elites (Tanaka, 2000, 2001; Melendez, 2005; Panfichi & Dammert, 2005; Salinas–Lanaos, 2007).

The contribution of the literature on social capital in Peru to the national debate regarding participatory frameworks has been limited. Although one of the reasons for this circumstance is the small number of works produced on the subject, it is also apparent that the reviewed theoretical and methodological shortcomings associated with the concept have hampered such contributions. In some analyses, the non-critical use of the concept is salient. Drumm, Diaz, Ramirez-Johson and Arevalo (2001), Diaz, Drumm, Ramirez-Johnson and Oidjarv (2002), and Diaz (2007), all working with the same data from beneficiaries of a food-security program of the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), aggregated indistinctively the respondents’ participation in local organisations, proactivity in their communities, feelings of trust and safety, neighbourhood connections, family and friends connections, tolerance of diversity, value of life and work connections to construct a scale of households’ endowments of social capital. Their findings indicated that the ADRA’s intervention was associated with greater levels of social capital compared with non-beneficiaries

acting as a control group, and that households with greater endowments of social capital were more likely to participate for lengthier periods of time in project activities and believe their economic condition had improved over time. However, no detailed accounts of this process were provided, nor any clear explanation of the relationship between the project dynamics and social capital. Likewise, Prokopy and Torsten (2008), working in the Cuzco region, developed a scale of ‘internal’ social capital, based on the number of friendships in town, participation in local associations and trust in neighbours, and a scale of ‘external’ social capital, based on indicators of trust in people from other villages and public officials. Their findings indicated, as it would be expected, that households with more friendships and memberships in town were more likely to attend meetings and participate in the decision–making process of local public and private development projects. In addition, Tuesta (2003), using the Peruvian National Household Survey (ENAHO) to construct two indicators of social capital in rural areas: social capital ‘for survival’ (households’ involvement in poverty–alleviation programmes) and social capital ‘for progress’ (memberships to residents, sports, cultural and religious associations), reported that poverty was associated with social capital ‘for survival’.

The analysis of social capital in Peru in relation to households’ livelihoods has produced a more fruitful body of work but with different implications regarding the potential of social capital for development purposes. Swinton and Quiroz (2003) analysed a sample of rural households from the Lake Titicaca basin using separated indicators of social capital—memberships in organisations, whether the household head held an official position in the community, if the village had communal land where rules of crop–rotation had to be followed and if village families used communal pastures—reporting that the presence of traditional forms of land management systems imposed on farmers using communal land had positive effects on the adoption of sustainable farming practices (e.g., crop rotation and reforestation). Wiig (2005), however, found that community cohesion does not necessarily lead to positive economic returns. In his analysis of a sample of rural communities in the Ayacucho region, he found that mechanisms of cooperation—measured via days spent working on another farmer’s land—rendered initial improvements in income and farm productivity, but only up to a certain point, after which burdensome demands of cooperation were associated instead with economic losses.

Other studies, in turn, focused on the impact of relationships with external actors on local livelihoods. Bury’s study (2004) on the impact of transnational mining operations on rural livelihoods in Northern Peru (Cajamarca) showed the opposing nature of some social capital features. He pointed out that the loss in social cohesion because of the unclear operations of the company in terms of hiring labour for their social programmes and land purchasing practices, increased distrust, social differentiation and conflict among local households but simultaneously

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20 Objective measures of income changes presented no association with social capital.
21 External social capital measures rendered no significant results.
opened the possibility of accessing new social resources, as households and community organisations resisting the operations of the company started to develop an array of political relationships with supra–communal actors (e.g., international NGOs). In a similar direction, Bebbington and Carroll (2000) reported that a federation of coffee–growers in the Cuzco region generated an ‘island of sustainability’, based on its capacity to foster alliances at the regional level and strategic forms of collective action that helped farmers to access markets and natural resources as well as public agencies. Their capacity to achieve such success, however, depended not only on the federations’ internal relations (extensive and inclusive local networks and inter–community networks) but also on wider policy factors (technical and material support from public or private development agencies), as well as market issues (stability of international demand and commodity prices).22

In summary, the literature on social capital in Peru has yet to properly address two key areas: (i) although there is evidence that social capital is indeed constitutive to households’ livelihoods, there is little discussion about the internal social, economic, and political dynamics of communities and organisations upon which those valuable relationships are established and mobilised; and (ii) the specific process of building and using social capital within a participatory development frameworks have not yet been addressed in detail.

1.5. Concluding remarks

The present review of the development literature on social capital has shown that, despite the popularisation of the concept and its established position within the discourse of major international development agencies, there are still different areas of contention regarding both its theoretical soundness and policy implications. Three interrelated factors are salient. First, although social capital discussions have progressively narrowed their levels of analysis to individual and community features, there is still an open debate regarding the defining characteristics of social capital—impersonal trust, networks, associational activity, institutionalised norms and regulations, or even feelings and values—and how they can be fully integrated into a single definition and theoretical framework. Furthermore, such a task has been observed to be particularly challenging because of the underlying principles of action upon which different conceptualisations of social capital are developed. Whilst community–centred approaches emphasise social cohesion and normative structures rooted in tradition and culture that externally condition actors’ decisions to participate and collaborate for the public good,

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22 An indirectly related work from Bebbington (2008) reviewed the Peruvian case of environmental conflicts to understand how the social capital framework may help to understand how civil society and the State may co–produce public policy. It was sustained through this that the process of social conflict triggered by the expansion of mining operations (with the support of the ruling government) was effectively sustained by networks of activists and local organisations (reaching out to the international arena) so that they conditioned how the negotiations within the State, between networks of public agencies and authorities, took place, leading to policy changes in favour of the agenda pressed forward by Ombudsman’s office regarding the need for an independent environmental authority, the Ministry of Environment.
network–centred approaches tend to emphasise, instead, the competitive advantage of exclusive relationships and the pursuit of personal interests (i.e., individual agency).

Second, this lack of theoretical clarity has generated a similar challenge to assess the potential beneficial effects of social capital mobilisation and its use for developmental purposes, insofar as its different interpretations could lead to conflicting outcomes (e.g., stringent norms of cooperation may lead to decapitalisation, strategic control of valuable connections may lead to increasing socioeconomic inequalities, while the rapid expansion of external connections may undermine social cohesion). The use of excessive multidimensional definitions and measures of social capital, hence, face the risk of falling into significant circular reasoning issues.

Third, proposals regarding the purposive mobilisation and formation of social capital for development purposes, particularly following participatory frameworks, have yet to be fully qualified because of the flexible interpretations of what constitutes ‘social capital’. In this respect, important elements of discussion, such as the relationship between community and grass–root organisations, the legitimacy of organisation representatives to speak for a community, the social and political dynamics that define the formation of organisational objectives and actions, and the actual effects of memberships and participation in the formation of personal relationships according to actor’s socioeconomic conditions, are still limited in the empirical literature on social capital, including the emerging related studies on Peru.
CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The present chapter introduces the theoretical framework used for the present study. It first examines the limitations of social capital conceptualisations at the meso– and micro–levels in relation to the structure–agency debates, highlighting the need for an integrated conceptualisation of social capital that links both levels of analysis in direct relation to the socioeconomic structure that surrounds both individual and collective actors. The following section introduces Bourdieu’s theory of practice as an analytical framework that contributes to elucidate this debate. It examines how the ‘theory of practice’ he developed helps to conceptualise social capital as related to both the objective structure in which actors are inscribed and the set of practices they conduct according to their different objective condition (i.e., endowments of capital) as well as how it may be applied to the empirical analysis of social capital in relation to the debates observed within the development literature. The chapter closes with discussion about the operationalisation of the concept for empirical observation via social networks approaches.

2.1. The problem of integration

As discussed in Chapter 1, although the development literature on social capital has progressively narrowed down the focus of its work towards micro– and meso–perspectives, there is still an unclear panorama regarding the benefits of using or building social capital. This resulted to a large extent from the existing discrepancies regarding the level of analysis in which social capital is assumed to manifest (individuals or communities), empirical referents (networks as compared to trust, norms, and associations), and rationales of action (for social advancement as opposed to for the public good), in addition to its complex relationship with the institutional framework. This section contends that this problem results from the unsatisfactory manner in which mainstream conceptualisations of social capital deal with the problem of structure and agency. On the one hand, it is possible to observe that micro–sociological definitions of social capital, centred on networks, emphasise actors’ agency to purposefully use social relationships for personal profit. On the other, communitarian approaches tend to subscribe individual action to locally institutionalised normative structures, underscoring the capacity of social systems—of norms, trust and organisation—to regulate actors’ actions (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000; Fulkerson & Thompson, 2008; Ishihara & Pascual, 2009).

In this respect, community centred accounts of social capital risk presenting a rather over–socialised understanding of actors, as social capital appears as an exogenous factor that
moulds individuals into adopting collaborative practices for the public good (Ishihara & Pascual, 2009; Cleaver, 1999, 2001, 2002; DeFilippis, 2001). Under these conceptualisations, the different structures that compose social capital tend to appear as fixed structures rather than as dynamic processes built upon social relations, as the social ‘cement’ or ‘glue’ which makes collaborative arrangements invariable through time (Putnam, 1993a, 1993b). Agency and social interaction, hence, are relegated in favour of collective units of analysis such as communities or societies that possess stocks of social capital, a shift that faces clear theoretical difficulties:

_A community cannot possess anything ... communities are products of complicated sets of social, political, cultural, and economic relationships ... Communities are outcomes, not actors ... Communities unquestionably matter, but they are not actors that exhibit any form of agency._ (DeFilippis, 2001, p. 789)

A central limitation of this perspective is that by shifting the emphasis from individuals to communities, the latter tend to be presented as homogenous, harmonious social units. Assessments of social capital using this conceptualisation, hence, produce limited information about issues of power and social and economic differences present within the areas of intervention. Moreover, they produce limited information about the processes of negotiation (or conflict) taking place between actors that, ultimately, make possible both collective initiatives and organisation emerge and reproduce over time (Mansuri & Rao, 2004; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000; Lewis & Siddiqui, 2006; Krishna, 2002, 2008; Cleaver, 2001, 2005).

Furthermore, social capital stops being a component of the individuals’ economic functions, by which they access and reproduce other forms of capital, to become instead a function of institutional capabilities present in a given community. Social capital, hence, appears as a contextual factor, developed on the basis of specific historical and cultural trajectories but rather alien to economic trajectories or processes, thereby making it difficult to put social capital in direct dialogue with other forms of capital (Portes, 2000; Portes & Landolt, 2000; Durlauf, 2002). This, in turn, limits the introduction of the broad political economy into the analysis of social capital, thereby decontextualised and depoliticised. Understood mainly as norms and traditions of cooperation, the promotion of social capital focuses on issues of civic engagement rather than on issues of socioeconomic inequality, political negotiation, and state intervention (Edwards & Foley, 1998; Foley & Edwards, 1999; Portes & Landolt, 2000; Harriss, 2002; Harriss & De Renzio, 1998; Fine, 2001).

In front of these difficulties, some scholars have pointed out that micro–level empirical accounts of social capital could provide a series of theoretical and methodological advantages over collectivist conceptualisations. Their focus on networks and social resources rather than on unclear notions such as trust, norms, or civic vitality, provides clearer empirical referents for examination. In addition, as observed in Chapter 1, most of the economic returns associated with social capital have been theorized on the basis of network externalities. Moreover, such an
approach would address more directly what building social capital efforts are more likely to affect (i.e., the expansion of beneficiaries’ connections locally and with the broader society) (Dasgupta, 2002; Portes 1998; Portes & Landolt, 2000; Lin, 2001; Burt, 2001, 2005).

Despite those advantages, micro-social understandings of social capital may still reproduce the limitations of communitarian approaches by reproducing also an essentialist or universal understanding of social action, albeit on the under-socialised side. Economicist interpretations of social capital as network externalities, which emphasises the instrumental use of relationships (seen as ‘investments’), attribute a single form of rationality for social interactions across all dimensions of social life: economic calculation. This makes it rather difficult to explain how actors are able to understand and acknowledge each other so as to forge a mutually supportive relationship or why expressions of solidarity and cooperation acquire different shapes and meanings. As a result, the relationship between social capital and the institutional structure is seen mainly in terms of economic incentives (e.g., transaction costs, economic returns, or sanctions), leaving aside other factors such as ethnicity, gender, religion, or class (Cleaver, 2001, 2002; Ishihara and Pascual, 2009; Holt, 2008).

More generally, micro-sociological definitions of social capital, irrespective of their explicit use of rational-choice assumptions, risk placing too much emphasis on human agency. Network-centred accounts of social capital may mask inequality and power issues as much as communitarian approaches if they do not integrate the broader context in which actors build and mobilise their relationships. It is the location of network structures in particular socioeconomic and political contexts that affects the volume and type of resources actors can access, the manner in which network systems are structured and how access to resources is granted (Foley & Edwards, 1999; Edwards & Foley, 1997; Portes & Landolt, 2000; Meagher, 2005). The ‘bonding’, ‘bridging’, and ‘linking’ classification (Woolcock, 2001, 2002; Szreter & Woolcock, 2004), for instance, highlights this concern; the capacity of individuals to effectively benefit from their relationships does not depend solely on their number of connections but also on their capacity to interact with actors different than themselves, particularly with those in a higher socioeconomic condition and with greater political authority (linkage).

Network approaches, in this manner, tend to be useful tools to characterise actors’ potential endowments of social capital at a given moment in time (i.e., whether they have many or few rich-resource connections) but tend to insufficiently provide an adequate account of how structural factors affect the capacity of individuals to access valuable connections. As various scholars have pointed out, networks are not structured in an empty space; actors’ capacity to build extensive relationships, organise themselves, and mobilise their networks is affected by wider socioeconomic and political context, such as the rule of law (e.g., the political right of freedom of association); political opportunities (e.g., the decentralisation of public programmes
may promote a greater interaction between civil society representatives and government officials; the economic system (e.g., unregulated labour markets open to exploitative practices); and historically developed and sanctioned (in)formal organisational arrangements (e.g., caste systems or religion-based legal systems) (Evans, 1996; Fox, 1996; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000; Pantoja, 2000; Foley & Edwards, 1999).

To be poor is not individually to lack social networks (though they are under-resourced), but to be part of others' social capital, and to engage in social life on adverse terms ... It is the terms of participation in social networks that is important. (Mosse, 2007, p. 4)

The empirical literature attempting to integrate, not aggregate, individual and community features of social capital alongside institutional factors in the context of development interventions is still limited and has yet to fully address the issues raised in previous paragraphs. A consistent effort on this subject comes from Krishna (1999, 2002, 2007, 2008), who underscores the need to interact coalescing community features with both human agency and institutional factors to understand more comprehensively the developmental role of social capital:

High social capital is good for development performance, but this positive impact is made considerably larger when agency capacity is also high. ... even when communities have a strong propensity to act together collectively for mutual benefit, they may not be able to connect efficaciously with the opportunities that exist in their external environments ... Without the support of capable agents who help make fruitful connections for villagers, it is not clear to what ends they should target their collective efforts and what strategies they should adopt. (Krishna, 2008, p. 456)

On this subject, Krishna (2002) found in rural India that the effects of social capital—measured via villages' average scores on an index combining structural and cognitive features of social capital—on development performance—livelihood stabilization, poverty assistance, employment provision, and quality of basic services—and political participation—voting, campaigning, contacting authorities and protesting—were conditioned by the presence of new local political entrepreneurs among the educated but unemployed youth willing to build networks across castes. Likewise, in a seven-year follow-up study of the same region, Krishna (2007) reported that increments in individual social capital scores were more likely to take place in those settings where such local leaders operate.

Nevertheless, this recognition of the role key individual actors play in making social capital at the community level work and grow, also mentioned but not analytically integrated in other accounts of building social capital processes (Uphoff, 1999; Uphoff & Wijayaratna, 2000; Durston, 1999), has not been accompanied by a detailed assessment of the position of local leaders within the local community dynamics. Those accounts say very little about the socioeconomic foundations upon which those actors were able to obtain such a strategic and authoritative position in their communities, the resources they possess that allow them to coordinate with and mobilise most community members, the types of relationships they
establish with public officials, or how the presence of such strategically positioned mediators may condition the distribution of external resources among community residents. The emerging literature on 'local development brokers', for instance, has highlighted that local actors who effectively mediate between beneficiaries and NGOs have a certain degree of specialisation, a career trajectory that implies the possession of extended networks at the local and external level as well as some form of working experience in non-rural or non-poor settings (e.g., in politics, educational systems, salary jobs in urban settings) (Lewis and Mosse, 2006; Bierschenk et al., 2000). All features that diverse empirical assessments of the poor have identified as scarce among the chronic poor (Crehan, 1992; Narayan et al., 2000a, 2000b).

A rather similar scenario emerges in relation to the integration of institutional context in social capital assessments within development interventions. Although part of the early social capital literature pointed out that its developmental effects were conditioned on the interdependency of structural factors (e.g., ethnic fragmentation, gender issues, market development; state presence) (Bebbinton, 1999; Bebbington & Carroll, 2000; Pantoja, 2000; Collier & Gunning, 1999) and that synergistic analyses of social capital emphasised the notion of 'embeddedness' of society–state relationships (Evans, 1996; Woolcock, 1998) (i.e., the day–to–day public–private interactions between public officials and citizens), empirical assessments of social capital usually focus on formal institutions—the state and its policies—and formal spaces of interaction between public officials and civil society representatives (e.g., decentralisation policies and new spaces of dialogue with public officials such as participatory budgeting initiatives) (Dahl–Østergaard, et al., 2003; Mansuri & Rao, 2004; ADB, 2006; World Bank, 2005). This scenario is summarised by the World Bank evaluation of CBD/CDD interventions:

* A review of project documents and evidence from community studies shows that in Bank projects, the focus is primarily on formal organisations and manifestations of collective action, such as the creation of group or committees and the holding of their meetings ... customs and conventions that could be specific to a particular community and are important in determining collective activities have received inadequate attention. (World Bank, 2005, p. 40)

This situation is certainly problematic, as it provides an incomplete assessment of the process of social capital development and mobilisation as it assumes that the latter only takes place within formal settings, such as local associations, political parties, or formal assemblies, instead of being constantly manifested and (re)produced in daily interactions as a constitutive part of people's lives (Cleaver, 1999, 2001; DeFilippis, 2001; Mosse, 2001, 2007). By the same token, it overlooks the continuous interaction between informal institutions and formal policies and structures, which are continuously adapted and re–interpreted by local actors according to both their local practices and material needs (Bebbington et al., 2004; Cleaver, 2001; Platteau and Abraham, 2002).
2.2. Bourdieu and Social Capital

Despite being one of its initial developers, Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of social capital has had little direct influence on the popularisation of the concept and initial policy debates (Adam & Roncevic, 2003; Bebbington, 2007; Fine, 2001; Fulkerson & Thompson, 2008). Since the beginning of the debates regarding the benefits of social capital, however, different scholars have recommended using this approach in order to reduce social structure from an external contextual factor into the individual level and so address both power and inequality issues as constitutive features of social relationships (DeFilippis, 2001; Foley & Edwards, 1999; Harris, 2002; Rankin, 2002; Mansuri & Rao, 2004).

2.2.1. The objective reality of capital in its diverse forms

For Bourdieu, social capital does not constitute a variable that independently affects collective action or economic performance. Instead, he views it as part of a broader theorisation of social reality consisting of a relational system of objective conditions—people’s endowments of capital—and subjective positions—schemes of perception and action developed in relation to an actor’s material reality (Bourdieu, 1984, 1990; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). In this regard, this theoretical framework constitutes an explicit answer to the structure–agency debate that integrates both structuralist and constructivist modes of knowledge. It recognises, first, the importance of objectivist (or structuralist) approaches to uncover the presence of certain regularities in an actor’s practices (e.g., income and electoral preferences), but it rejects any mechanistic explanation of those associations, which present structures as determinant of people’s practices and, moreover, tend to reify structural features of a society. Simultaneously, Bourdieu’s approach takes into consideration the observations of subjectivist analyses regarding the role quotidian knowledge, subjective meaning, and practical competency play in the (re)production of social reality. However, it moves away from any understanding of social structures as the spontaneous product of individual decisions, actions, and cognitions, insofar as this approach can account neither for the emergence and sustainability of social structures nor for the regularities observed in individual daily practices in relation to certain structural factors. Bourdieu, instead, proposes a ‘theory of practice’ that ...

... has no other aim than to make possible a science of the dialectical relations between the objective structures to which the objectivist mode of knowledge gives access and the structured dispositions within which those structures are actualized and which tend to reproduce. (Bourdieu, 1977, pp. 3–4)

Under this approach, social reality is characterised by a double objectivity. An objectivity of ‘first order’ is observed in the distribution of socially scarce goods and values—material and non–material species of capital (e.g., professional qualifications)—whist a ‘second order’ of...
objectivity, in turn, could be observed in actors’ different systems of classification, which broadly follow the state of relations between actors with different or similar sets of resources as a template for their practical activities (e.g., sense of taste and modes of speaking) (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). This dialectic understanding of reality assumes, hence, that “Social facts are objects which are also the object of knowledge” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 7); that the objective reality is present both outside of the individuals and within themselves.

The central role played by the actors’ objective conditions, however, does not imply an economist conceptualisation of social reality or of capital itself, which would lead to a reductionist analysis of society to a single dimension, that of the relations of economic production, and to a single principle of action, that of rational calculation. Capital, instead, is presented in both economic and non-economic forms: as economic, cultural, social, and symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1980, 1986).

Economic capital represents financial resources and those that are directly convertible into money by virtue of institutionalised forms of property rights (e.g., land and livestock). Cultural capital, or informational capital (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 119), refers to those forms of knowledge, habits, and dispositions that can generate profit. In an ‘embodied’ state, cultural capital represents a persons’ competence or mastery over certain cultural expressions that, in a particular context, are regarded as valuable (e.g., playing a classic musical instrument). In an ‘objectified’ form, cultural capital appears as those goods which are the realisation of those valuable cultural expressions (e.g., paintings or books). In an ‘institutionalised’ state, cultural capital appears in the form of legally sanctioned and formally ranked credentials or qualifications, which produce different returns, particularly in the labour market (e.g., unqualified as compared to qualified jobs) (Bourdieu, 1986). Symbolic capital refers to the capacity of certain actors to make use of their reputation of competence and an image of respectability and honourability, or even popularity, to access other forms of capital (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990). Social capital, in turn, is defined as:

... the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition — or in other words, to membership in a group — which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectively-owned capital, a credential which entitles them to credit in the various senses of the world. (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 249)

... the totality of resources (financial capital and also information, etc.) activated through a more or less extended, more or less mobilisable, network of relations which procures a competitive advantage by providing higher returns on investment. (Bourdieu, 2005, pp. 194–195)

Social capital, in consequence, does not have single defining feature; instead, it is presented as composed of two interacting factors: (i) actors’ social relations and (ii) the resources
mobilised through them, what other scholars denominate ‘social resources’ (Lin, 2001). The overall ‘volume’ of social capital possessed by a given actor is thus related to the size or extension of his/her network of relations and the volumes of capital—in its different forms—that are accessible through them. This duality is critical; although it is indeed possible to assert that social capital exists within relationships, and so it is irreducible to the other forms of capital, it is never completely independent from them insofar as its returns depend ultimately on the volume and quality of resources accessible and their respective interaction with actors’ own initial endowments of capital (Bourdieu, 1980, 1986, 2005).

This conception of social capital differs from the definitions which have subsequently been given in American sociology and economics in that it takes into account not only network of relations, characterised as regards its extent and availability, but also the volume of capital of different species which it enables to be mobilised by proxy (and, at the same time, the various profits it can procure: promotion, participation in projects, opportunities for participation in important decisions, chances to make financial or other investments). (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 246)

In consequence, as other forms of capital, social capital is not only expected to be unequally distributed in a society but also unequally (re)produced. On the one hand, the mutual acknowledgement between actors on which social capital is realised indicates a certain degree of objective homogeneity between them, as actors are more likely to engage with each other in durable relationships insofar as they share a similar material reality and rather similar sets of practices and dispositions. On the other, insofar as the main role social capital plays is that of a multiplier that acts on the initial stocks of other forms of capital possessed by actors, it is likely that it helps to increase existing objective differences (Bourdieu, 1980, 1986).

This convertibility of capital is possible because the accumulation of all different forms of capital implies certain costs that can only be afforded by actors in relation to their initial objective conditions, particularly in terms of labour-time (e.g., acquiring institutionalised cultural capital implies that actors can afford the time required to regularly attend school or university) and related material costs (e.g., tuition fees and materials). This is also because their mobilisation generates profits, directly in the form of economic capital or in terms of other forms of capital (e.g., academic specialisation may lead to well-rewarded jobs in the labour market) (Bourdieu, 1980, 1986).

2.2.2. The subjective appropriation of the objective reality

The objective order of the different forms of capital that actors produce, distribute, and accumulate, however, is not seen as external to them. It is, instead, assumed to be embodied in actors’ views of the world and practices. This objectivity of second order is considered to emerge as a result of the cumulative exposure of actors to specific objective conditions, which imprint in them an ensemble of durable dispositions that internalise the necessities of the material reality
they experience (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). The notion of ‘habitus’ is then developed to express this embodiment of the objectivity of first order:

*The structures constitutive of a particular environment ... produce habitus, a system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be objectively "regulated" and "regular" without in any way being the product of obedience to rules ... and, being all this, collectively orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor. (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 72)*

In this respect, Bourdieu’s rejection of structuralist approaches comes hand in hand with a rejection of constructivist ones inasmuch as the habitus does not enjoy total creative freedom to ascribe any meaning to the practices it produces. Actors’ practices, instead, can only be accounted for by relating them to the objective conditions that gave habitus form in the past via socialisation (e.g., familiarisation with verbal products, local principles of action, explicit transmission of precepts and prescriptions, and the actual objective conjuncture in which it is mobilised) (Bourdieu, 1977). This continuous mobilisation of a system of dispositions developed in relation to a past objective reality in order to confront a current one makes habitus a thoughtless principle of action, an *intentionless invention of regulated improvisation* (Bourdieu, 1977, p.79). Socially reality, then, is (re)produced as a matter of routine, without explicit reference to a body of codified knowledge, and without any explicit reason or signifying intent; however, such process is not either entirely spontaneous, as habitus reacts in a roughly coherent manner to the specific material reality in which actors operate (Bourdieu, 1977; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

One of the fundamental effects of this intimate relationship between objective and subjective realities is the production of a common sense of the world shared by actors in a rather similar condition. This emerges as actors tend to harmonise their habitus in relation to their similar experiences of the world and the reinforcements that they provide each other via their common practices (e.g., shared rituals, daily schedules, working places, and linguistic expressions), thereby generating a ‘class habitus’:\(^{24}\)

*The objective homogenising of group or class habitus which results from the homogeneity of the conditions of existence is what enables practices to be objectively harmonised ... it is because they are the product of dispositions which, being the internalization of the same objective structures, are objectively concerted that the practices of the members of the same group, or in a differentiated society, the same class are endowed with an objective meaning that is at once unitary and systematic... (Bourdieu, 1977, pp. 80–81)*

The correspondence between objective and mental structures to define classes and regulate their interaction gives actors’ modes of knowledge crucial political functions. Symbolic

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\(^{24}\) For Bourdieu, a class of agents was not defined exclusively by their position in the relations of production (e.g., economic occupation or income level) but by the structure of all pertinent forms of capital that give job categories, and other categories, their respective value (e.g., cultural capital, physical strength, in turn associated to certain age and sex, etc.). In addition, to become a class, a homogenous objective reality should be associated with also a rather congruous system of dispositions capable of generating similar practices among actors (habitus) (Bourdieu, 1984).
systems (e.g., an ordained structure of what constitutes high culture, proper language, elegant clothing, manners) can be seen as instruments of domination, as they tend to reproduce an arbitrary order, that of the unequal distribution of the diverse forms of capital. The instruments of knowledge of the social world contribute, then, to the perpetuation of a social reality by producing immediate adherence to the world, which is seen as self-evident and undisputed in virtue of the quasi–perfect correspondence between the objective order and the subjective principles of organisation that give sense to it (‘doxa’). The acceptance of the objective reality into actors’ habitus, as a result, gives dominated groups a role in the reproduction of their own condition via the development of a form of ‘logical conformity’:

Dominated agents who assess the value of their position and their characteristics by applying a system of schemes of perception and appreciation which is the embodiment of the objective laws whereby their value is objectively constituted, tend to attribute themselves what the distribution attributes to them, refusing what they are refused (‘That’s not for the likes of us’), adjusting their expectations to their chances, defining themselves as the established order defines them, reproducing in their verdict on themselves the verdict the economy pronounces on them. (Bourdieu, 1984, p.471)

It is necessary to specify, however, that habitus does not represent a different form of structural determinism, a common accusation to Bourdieu’s approach (Jenkins, 1992); instead, it constitutes an open system of dispositions that is constantly subjected to experiences, and so constantly affected by them in a way that either reinforces or modifies its structures. Although it tends to be durable, as it reflects the limits of the objective structure in which classes have developed historically, at the same time, it is creative and inventive. The practices it generates do not have the regularity expected of a deterministic principle; it tells us instead that it is only probable that they will resemble—in different degrees—the expected expression of actors’ objective reality. Habitus contains a limited but effective spontaneity, as it is social agents who are ultimately responsible for following these socially and historically constituted categories of perception and appreciation. Moreover, habitus tends to reinvent itself continuously as the struggles over capital render different forms of objective structures over time (Bourdieu, 1984, 2005; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

2.2.3. Fields, strategies, and power struggles

The objective reality that imprints its structure over actors’ systems of classifications and dispositions is not determined by a single system of objective relations, such as that of income distribution or positions in the system of production preferred by economist understandings of social systems. Bourdieu’s theory of practice rejects any uni-dimensional understanding of ‘society’ (and hence of ‘community’) as a seamless totality integrated by systemic functions, common culture, or universal normative and authority systems. Instead, it assumes that the ‘social space’ in which actors live and interact is formed by an ensemble of relatively autonomous spheres of action that cannot be entirely reduced to a single overall societal logic.
The observable expressions of the habitus (practices) appear in relation to actors’ positions in a specific system of objective relations, which sets the limits of its spontaneity; a ‘field’:

... a network or a configuration of objective relations between positions. These positions are objectively defined (...) by their present and potential situation in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relation to other positions (domination, subordination, homology, etc.). (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 97)

In principle, a field is defined as the system of objective relations between actors according to their actual possession of certain relevant forms of capital (e.g., cultural capital in the academic field, cash or productive assets in the economic field, etc.). Nevertheless, a field is not a static system of classification or organisation; instead, it is (re)produced by means of actors’ constant forms of competition, negotiation, and struggles aimed to preserve or improve their objective position by accumulating those forms of capital considered most valuable (Bourdieu, 1984, 1989; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). In this regard, a field is intimately linked to habitus; its very existence emerges not from the objective distribution of capital but from the disposition of actors to compete over the possession of certain forms of capital and the implementation of different practices to such effect.

Actors’ involvements in a field, and so the very existence of the latter, are the product of a dialectic relationship between objective and subjective factors. First, because of their progressively imprinted habitus, actors possess a ‘practical knowledge’ or ‘sense’ of a field. This is particularly evident in those settings where actors have a doxic experience; without any conscious planning or rational calculation, they have a generic sense of the game, what is at stake and how it is played. In virtue of this knowledge, in turn, actors are aware of the costs that a field imposes over those who intend to participate in it, an objective barrier that excludes some actors from participating and conditions the chances of success of those competing (e.g., the costs of high-quality education, a pre-requisite to attain academic authority). Actors’ involvement in a field, however, depends not only on their objective condition but also on their respective ‘interest’ (or ‘illusio’), a notion rather than expressing self-interest or selfishness refers to the degree of motivation that actors possess to participate in a given field because of their learned sensitivity to different dimensions of social life through their class habitus (e.g., individuals highly endowed in cultural capital since their childhood are less likely to be interested in participating in business, although they might be aware of the potential economic rewards involved) (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

The mutual dependency between fields and habitus is more directly expressed in relation to actors’ attempts to preserve or improve their position in a field via different ‘practices’ and ‘strategies’ adapted to their objective reality. Correspondingly, these are not necessarily calculated actions; they mainly designate the deployment of certain lines of action adapted to an
objective position by virtue of class habitus which, hence, may appear as natural (e.g., obtaining a university degree appears a natural step towards insertion in the job market to most upper-middle-class individuals. However, such a strategy may appear as extraordinary to the poorest sectors of society). This does not discard that strategies may also respond to their traditional understanding of rational action: “The immediate fit between habitus and field is only one modality of action, ... the lines of action suggested by habitus may very well be accompanied by a strategic calculation of costs and benefits, which tends to carry out at a conscious level the operation” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 131).

A central consequence of this theoretical framework is that norms or rules are not considered simply as neutral external factors governing social action. Within the context of a field, those norms are seen as historically developed strategies that are internalised by actors and so translated into specific practices aimed at the accumulation or preservation of certain forms of capital (Bourdieu, 1977; Lamaison & Bourdieu, 1986; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). In this regard, the struggles over the control of certain valuable resources include not only the accumulation of capital as an objective end product but also the power to decree the rules that govern a field, to regulate the value of certain forms of capital accumulation or the mechanisms of conversion of one capital into another (Bourdieu, 1984, 1990, 2005).

Nevertheless, this static reality, which leads to the constitution of symbolic systems of domination, is rarely realised. Although those who dominate a field are in the position to make it function to their advantage, usually they have to contend with the tacit resistance, contention, protest, or even open subversion of the dominated. It is this continuous struggle that makes a field change shape according to the success of different actors’ strategies over time (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p.102).

2.2.4. Social capital within the theory of practice

Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of social capital as the interaction between actors’ networks of relations and the social resources mobilisable through them as part of the objective order of the field (circulation, (re)production, and accumulation of diverse forms of capital that lead to power struggles) has several implications for the predominant theoretical approaches to the concept (§ 1.1.1. and 1.1.2.). The dual understanding of social capital serves, first, to problematise the notion that networks or associations can be considered social capital per se. Social capital cannot refer simply to the possession of different types of linkages, as in the ‘bonding’, ‘bridging’, ‘linking’ classification (Woolcock, 2001; Szreter & Woolcock, 2004) or to the presence of a certain degree of closure or social cohesion within local social systems (Coleman, 1988, 1990; Putnam, 1993a, 2000). These network indicators do not express whether those connections indeed grant access to resources or not, nor they help to identify the particular conditions upon which those resources are granted or the volume and quality of resources they grant access to. By
Alluding to social relations, Bourdieu thus transfers the analysis of social capital from nominal (or official) depictions of linkages (e.g., numbers of ‘friends’, ‘relatives’, or ‘memberships’) to a ‘practical’ understanding of them; that is, as “relationships continuously practised, kept up, and cultivated” (Bourdieu, 1977, p.37), “the product of the history of economic and symbolic exchanges [between actors]” (p.207). Although social capital is indeed built upon actors’ networks, the proposed definition centres on the transformation of such connections into useful relations, those that could be depended upon in order to access diverse forms of capital with a certain degree of regularity. Actors’ ‘relations’, hence, need to be assessed in relation to the quotidian and continuous processes of negotiation, competition, and conflict that characterise actors’ exchanges as they strive for maintaining or improving their standings in the social space and fields of action (Bourdieu, 1984; Lamaison & Bourdieu, 1986; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

Under the aforementioned definition, the second constitutive dimension of social capital congregates the stocks of resources that are accessible through actors’ relations or associational initiatives. Differently from the mainstream literature, which typically portrays social resources as ‘capital’ according to whether they satisfy individual needs (Coleman, 1990; Lin, 2001) or constitute public goods (Putnam, 1993a, 2001), under Bourdieu’s approach the capacity of social resources to improve one’s objective condition and social position is not taken for granted. Instead, the value of social resources is presented as contingent to the systems of exchange in which actors are inscribed; specifically, to the particular forms of capital accumulation and transformation that shape the dynamics of a given field of action. That is, social resources lead to the accumulation of ‘social capital’ only to the extent that they are or can be converted into those species of capital over which actors compete and struggle so as to assume a dominant position (e.g., cultural or economic capital in the artistic and economic fields respectively) that allows them to norms of capital exchange operating within those fields (e.g., if dominant agents in the economic field apply hiring policies that overlook formal education, making use of one’s relations to access formal education does not lead to a higher income since institutionalised cultural capital is not convertible into economic capital). Correspondingly, since “a capital does not exist and function but except in relation to a field” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 101), behavioural information about neighbours, favourable treatment from public officials, or collectively produced public goods like schools or roads, to mention a few examples from the mainstream literature, could constitute part of one’s social capital only if they are functional to the operations of a given field (e.g., if they facilitate the accumulation of economic capital within economic fields).

Both dimensions of social capital—social relations and social resources—are inextricably linked with each other. First, social capital is built upon actors’ ‘investments’ in relationships and associations in both material (e.g., gifts) and non-material terms (e.g., time spent visiting
friends and relatives). The continuity of actors’ interactions and exchanges, in turn, is more likely to be sustained through time in as much as they provide or are expected to provide a ‘return’ in the form of obligations and favours that carry with them access to valuable forms of capital: “The profits which accrue from membership in a group are the basis of the solidarity which makes them possible” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 249). This statement, however, does not necessarily imply rational or instrumental use of features of sociability; it underscores, instead, that if certain kinds of relations and associations are instrumental to processes of capital accumulation in a particular or various fields, they are likely to be continuously used by actors as integral part of their (un)conscious strategies. This is particularly salient in cases where useful relations acquire an institutionalised form by assuming the form of a ritual or tradition, which masks the practical implications subjacent to them. In the Latin American context, for instance, this has been noted in relation to the notion of compadrazgo, which constitutes a ritual form of kinship that fixes child, parents, and godparents in a continuing relationship of obligations of mutual support and exchange, which carry with them patriarchal and hierarchical patterns of authority. As a result, these forms of social bonds constitute integral part of peasants’ livelihoods (Crehan, 1992; Long, 2001; Narayan et al., 2000b). As Bourdieu asserts:

*The existence of a network of connections is not a natural given, or even a social given ... the network of relationships is the product of investment strategies, individual or collective, consciously or unconsciously aimed at establishing or reproducing social relationships that are directly usable ... [of] transforming contingent relations, such as those of neighbourhood, the workplace, or even kinship, into relationships that are at once necessary and elective, implying durable obligations subjectively felt (feelings of gratitude, respect, friendship, etc.) or institutionally guaranteed (rights) (Bourdieu, 1986, p.249).*

Second, actors’ class-based positions in a given field are partly shaped by their access to valuable social resources, which in turn shape the extension and nature of relations they may invest in (numerous or scarce connections embedded in relations of domination or subordination). Actors’ endowments of capital can be complemented or enhanced by social resources if they are relevant to the forms of capital exchange operating in a field, thereby helping them to maintain or improve their existing position (e.g., small farmers that possess continuous access to informal loans in favourable terms to finance their agricultural campaign). Mediated access to valuable forms of capital, hence, affect, on the one hand, the volumes of capital that actors have at their disposition to invest in their relations (e.g., conducting a richer social life) and the positions from which they develop their relationships with actors in a more dominant position (e.g., integrating associations of richer or more established farmers) or more subordinated position (e.g., develop patron-client relations with poorer friends or neighbours). In the same direction, access to social resources equally contributes to congregate actors’ relations around a particular class-based position. This occurs because it is more likely that relations are forged between actors that possess a certain degree of objective homogeneity (i.e., material conditions and needs) and share relatively similar sets of practices and dispositions (Bourdieu, 1980, 1986; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).
Third, the impact of actors’ social resources on their attempts to preserve or improve their objective conditions and social standings is shaped by the nature of the relations of exchange that actors establish with each other. This results from the essential ambiguity of economic exchanges—which do not necessarily operate through automatic and logical equivalent conversions of capital; that is, by virtue of ‘social embeddedness’ of transactions in continuous relations of competition, negotiation, and conflict. The circulation of relevant forms of capital in a given field and its convertibility into other forms of capital are shaped by the state of power relations and the implementation of differentiated class-based strategies operating in a field (Bourdieu, 1980, 1986, 2005). In this manner, it is expected that dominant actors attempt to monopolise the circulation of those most valuable forms of capital among those of their same class whilst establishing advantageous rates of exchange or relations of obligations with those in a more subordinated position (e.g., informal loans of significant volumes of cash or productive equipment may be given with more stringent obligations of repayment to those worse-off neighbours than to those in a better condition, not only because of the different risks of default involved but also because better-off borrowers are more likely to be familiarised with lenders and to be in the position to return such favour):

…”the economic act is not the effect of a quasi-mechanical necessity working itself through agents who might be replaced by machines; it can be accomplished only by assuming a particular social form, which is bound up with social particularities of agents engaged in the exchange and, most particularly, with the effects of trusting closeness or hostile aloofness that ensue from it (Bourdieu, 2005, p.175).”

The examination of social capital under a Bourdieusian approach, therefore, should simultaneously focus on the dynamics of field and the class-based position that actors assume. That is, it implies to recognise that actors’ interests in accumulating certain forms of capital through their relationships and memberships and in investing on certain features of sociability are shaped by the modes of production, transformation, and distribution of capital enforced within a field and the particular positions they occupy within such dynamics. The significance of social resources and social relations respond, on the one hand, to the rates of conversion of capital that dominant private and public actors impose over the rest of field ‘players’ (e.g., technical information is less valuable in those settings where dominant economic agents implement labour intensive modes of production) and the kind of relations they establish in order to preserve that position (e.g., institutionalisation exclusionary practices may imply that certain kind of affiliations, such as religious, political or even academic, are pre-requisites for conducting different types of transactions). On the other hand, actors’ strategic uses of social capital are expected to vary according to the particular position they assume within a field insofar as different or opposing class-based interests guide them (e.g., information about temporary manual jobs are of much less interest to better positioned economic agents than to subordinated ones, whilst the dismissal of exclusionary social barriers for economic transactions
are more likely to be pushed forward by the groups negatively affected by such practice rather than by those who benefit from them).

It is important to highlight, in addition, that the nature of the interaction between actors’ relations and social resources implies that social capital is historically and biographically situated. Social capital, under this conceptualisation, is not fixed in time but instead is continuously changing and evolving. First, the value of certain empirical expressions of social capital is expected to vary according to the historical evolution of the struggles taking place in a field and, second, to the different positions actors may assume during their respective life trajectories and career paths. As various classes struggle over the accumulation of capital and defining the rules that govern their conversion and distribution, over time changes in the composition of the dominant classes imply that certain expressions of social capital may lose their value and significance for actors’ efforts of social mobility (e.g., nobiliary titles are nowadays less convertible into economic or political capital as compared to centuries ago). In the same direction, the productive uses that actors make of—(un)consciously developed—relationships and the social resources they provide are expected to change as actors are more or less successful in preserving or improving their particular position in a field (e.g., small farmers’ use of blood and ritual kinship relations to secure farm labour may change over time if they are able to expand their operations and become medium farmers with access to mechanised farm equipment).

2.2.3. Social capital a la Bourdieu and existing debates in the development literature

The present section details the implications of Bourdieu’s approach for the study of social capital and the manner in which it addresses key current debates on the subject.

a. Communities, social spaces, and fields:

Bourdieu’s theory of practice does not speak of single and clearly delimited ‘societies’ or ‘communities’ within which all systems of action (cultural, economic, political, etc.) operate as part of a single structure; instead, he presents the concepts of ‘social space’ and ‘fields’ as a more suited understanding of social systems. As mentioned in previous sections, the first one speaks of the social world as an open space, a rather irregular landscape with ill-delimited boundaries where actors cohabit in groups more or less distanced from each other—in some cases geographically (e.g., gated neighbourhoods) but mainly in terms of quotidian interaction and (in)formal forms of association—as a reflection, not necessarily as a consciously delimited separation, of their possession of different stocks and forms of capital and the different sets of practices associated to it (‘habitus’). Actors, however, are assumed to mobilise their capital endowments
differently according to those dimensions of social life that they participate in (‘fields’), which have their own rules of capital accumulation and (re)production and where specific systems of relations operate marked by both negotiations and struggles over the dominant forms of capital that define them (Bourdieu, 1984, 1985).

A first implication of this differentiation for social capital research is that essentialist understandings of both communities and societies, that characterise much of the mainstream social capital literature, are set aside. Instead, social capital analysis is expected to be studied in context, in relation to the dynamics of the field in which it is mobilised insofar as “a capital does not exist and function but except in relation to a field” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 101). This entails that rather than a historical constant with similar empirical referents across different dimensions of social life or societies and communities, as implied, for example, in Putnam’s historical analysis of social capital for Italy (1993a, 1993b) and the US (2001) as well as in his use of similar measures of it to analyse different phenomena such as criminality, education, or health (2001), social capital would need to be empirically defined taking into consideration the particular historical period, location, material reality, and the type of capital accumulation over which a field is structured (Bourdieu, 1984, 2005; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). In this respect, for example, not only the importance of social capital and its empirical expressions are assumed to be different between the academic and economic field, as they centre their functioning on different forms of capital accumulation, but also academic fields in different places are expected to possess dissimilar mechanisms of conversion of social capital into cultural capital (e.g., personal endorsements from other academics may cover up for the lack of qualifications in some settings or it may as well be that a Doctoral degree does not carry with it a greater capacity to obtain better jobs compared to a Masters degree). Likewise, the rules of the game that define a field cannot be assumed to be everlasting insofar as the dynamics of a field are continuously changing in relation to changes in the dynamics of capital accumulation and reproduction taking place within (e.g., centuries ago, there was not institutional cultural capital, as degrees were not legally sanctioned; social capital in the form of personal endorsements, hence, had greater value in order to transform cultural into economic capital by conditioning access to education–related paid positions).

A second consideration from a field–centred assessment of social capital is that it entails a relational analysis of social systems. Social capital, in this manner, does not refer simply to the possession of different connections or the types of connections possessed, as in the ‘bonding’, ‘bridging’, ‘linking’ classification (Woolcock, 2001; Szreter & Woolcock, 2004), nor to the presence of a certain degree of closure or social cohesion within local social systems (Coleman, 1988, 1990; Putnam, 1993a, 2000), insofar as a connection does
not imply automatic access to resources (Cleaver, 2005; Foley & Edwards, 1999; Mosse, 2007; Pantoja, 2000). Social capital, hence, is expected to be embedded in those processes of negotiation, competition, and struggle that characterise fields' dynamics. This results from the own value of social capital, as actors would attempt to accumulate it and mobilise it so as to preserve or improve their existing material conditions, for which they mobilise those resources at their disposition (i.e., initial endowments of capital). The objective differences between actors as well as in terms of practices and interests, hence, imply that social capital would be accumulated differently by actors according to their position in the social space and in different degrees according to their negotiation capabilities (Bourdieu, 1984; Lamaison & Bourdieu, 1986; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

This approach equally problematises the relation between social capital and 'culture' by evidencing that it is not possible to represent and generalise the practices and values of a collective as if these follow a single clearly structured and ordered cultural system that governs individual actions in a rather prescriptive manner, as a repertoire of rules or norms. The concept of 'habitus', in this respect, serves to highlight that actors' forms of appreciation, perception, and practice (even to implement similar rituals such as marriage and religious ceremonies) tend to vary according to their objective conditions and with a certain degree of spontaneity and flexibility (habitus implies only a propensity or possibility) (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Lamaison & Bourdieu, 1986. Collective norms, rules, and traditions of cooperation and organisation, hence, are expected to be interpreted and implemented differently by actors according to their positions in the social space; which to a certain extent help to explain the presence of distinguishable organisations and systems of cooperation specific to the poor (Narayan et al., 2000a, 2000b).

A second element is in the context of a field, norms, rules, and established practices are not neutral or passive external factors but also part of the struggles between actors attempting to occupy a dominant position in it (Bourdieu, 1989). Actors' struggles over the possession of capital, then, may carry with them symbolic struggles over the classificatory schemes and meanings that order a social space alongside those over the capacity to dictate the rules and norms that govern a field. At its maximum expression, the predominance of certain groups in the accumulation of capital in its diverse forms is then associated with the emergence of a symbolic system that reinforces and legitimises the arbitrary material order, generating a 'doxic' experience. (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

These observations, hence, place the generation and implementation of norms and traditions that legitimises certain forms of cooperation and mutual support into the realm
of cultural politics, an issue that has received little attention in mainstream social capital assessments. Bebbington et al. (2004) highlighted, for instance, that the attempts by community-driven and decentralized development programmes to establish local governance arrangements in rural Indonesia were affected by culturally charged struggles for power as well as culturally motivated efforts to gain access to power, with different actors appealing to different forms of traditional legitimacy or collective practices to favour their particular demands. Moreover, gender-centred social capital assessments have consistently pointed out that the ideological structures that sustain unequal male–female relationships leads to unequal returns from one’s networks, further reproducing existing material inequalities (Molyneaux, 2002; Mayoux, 2001; Rankin, 2002; Silvey and Elmhirst, 2008).

b. Social capital as capital:

A distinctive feature of Bourdieu’s understanding of social capital is that the latter is not presented as an exogenous factor imposed over individuals or that it is contained solely in relationships. Social capital, instead, is presented as directly immersed into the processes of capital accumulation and distribution of capital; social relationships, then, are considered ‘capital’ insofar as they grant access to other forms of capital (e.g., economic, cultural, etc.), which in turn affect the capacity of actors to implement different strategies to improve their existing objective conditions.

The intimate relationship between social capital and other forms of capital allows this approach to address inequality issues. First, as any other form of capital, social capital is expected to be unequally distributed among actors according to their position in a field and social space because actors’ endowments of capital condition their capacity to afford the costs of building relationships (e.g., financing political parties or candidates to obtain political connections). Indeed, various USA–based analyses of network formation (Glaeser, 2002; Glaeser, Laibson, & Sacerdote, 2002; Hofferth, Boisjoly, & Duncan, 1999), found that individuals with high levels of formal education and in good economic conditions were more likely to be heavier investors in social connections and to enjoy more expanded networks that worse-off individuals. Second, under the same reasoning, the returns associated with the mobilisation of relationships are expected to be unequal because of the differences in volume and quality of resources that actors can obtain from their connections according to the latters’ position in a field.

... profits in one area are necessarily paid for by costs in another ... It has been seen, for example, that the transformation of economic capital into social capital presupposes a specific labour, i.e., an apparently gratuitous expenditure of time, attention, care, concern which ... has the effect of transfiguring the purely monetary import of the exchange and, by the same token, the very meaning of the exchange. From a narrowly economic standpoint, this effort is bound to be seen as pure wastage, but in the terms of the logic of social
Under the present approach, hence, a social capital assessment would require to relate it to the processes of transformation of capital operating in a field. It would require to empirically establish if relationships are indeed instrumental to access valuable forms of capital valuable (e.g., cultural capital in the academic fields, economic capital in the economic fields, and so forth) or other forms of capital that could subsequently be transformed into that one (e.g., if relationships are instrumental to obtain a professional qualifications, they could be seen as a form of social capital in the economic field if they grant access to well-paid jobs), and what the specific capital investments are required to such effect (Bourdieu, 1984, 2005).

In consequence, the use of a field-centred conceptualisation of social capital puts social capital in relation to the broad political economy, a recurrent but scarcely attended demand in the literature (Edwards & Foley, 1997; Foley & Edwards, 1999; Harriss & De Renzio, 1998; Harris, 2001; Portes & Landolt, 2000). If social capital is constitutive part of the dynamic of a field, it follows that social capital formation and mobilisation is embedded in the different processes of capital production, accumulation, and distribution taking place in it. As a result, to account for the lack of social capital among the most economically deprived actors, it becomes necessary to look further at those processes that condition their unfavorable access to capital in relation to the dominant systems of (re)production of capital (e.g., the nature of relations that labour workers possess in comparison to managers both working in the same organisation or industry or those usually posessed and mobilised by students as compared to that of professors both working within the academic field or even in the same institution) (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

A subsequent implication of this process is that social capital, hence, becomes one of the criteria that define actors’ objective positions in a field as much as their possession of economic capital or cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1984, 2005). Moreover, because of their value to access resources, relationships and memberships themselves can be considered to constitute markers of one’s position in a particular field, transforming social capital into symbolic capital (e.g., a famous family name or affiliation to a prestigious society may allow actors to enjoy diverse forms of preferential treatment such as access to credit) (Bourdieu, 1980, 1986).

c. Organisations as sub-fields:

Bourdieu’s solution to the structure-agency problem has various implications for the analysis of groups and (in)formal associations. Rather than assuming a single over-
encompassing normative structure or ‘culture’ that govern actors’ disposition to participate or a single rationale of action, that of economic calculation (which in addition reduces institutions to transaction costs), the ‘theory of practice’ proposes that actors tend to organise themselves and act collectively in relation to two elements: (i) their class habitus; that is, their rather compatible systems of appreciation, perception, and action that allows them to coordinate their actions and (ii) their common objective condition (i.e., similar material needs) coordinate (Bourdieu, 1977, 1984).

In this respect, the formal and informal associations that emerge within a social space are expected to be shaped by the various interests, strategies, and practices as well as resources that actors could direct in relation to their objective condition. In consequence, as pointed out previously by various scholars (Portes, 1998; Portes & Landolt, 1999; Edwards & Foley, 1998), the aggregation of memberships to organisations in order assess actors’ or communities’ stocks of social capital becomes problematic insofar as they may aggregate organisations with different, if not conflictive objectives (e.g., businessmen associations and labour unions or even religious organisations affiliated to progressive religious views compared to conservative ones). It does not follow, however, that every single form of association would be clearly marked by economic barriers as the relevance of differences of economic capital are likely to vary from one field to another (e.g., male patrons and employees may have opposing interests within the economic field but they both may have the same interest in preserving the barriers that prevent women from accessing the political field) the same as their interests, even if they have a rather similar position in the social space (e.g., peasants and mining workers unions are both integrated by those in the most subordinated positions within their respective industries, but their interests are, in many occasions, opposite, as they both struggle over the exploitation of natural resources) (Bourdieu, 1984, 1985).

Organisations, as collective actors, also take part of the dynamic that govern a field. They tend to reflect the objective conditions and interests that characterise their members and, correspondingly, tend to be part of the systems of relations—negotiations competition and struggles—in which their members are inscribed (e.g., labour unions as compared to business associations, academic associations specialised on a subject of study of little acceptance and limited funding as compared to mainstream ones) (Bourdieu, 1977, 2005). The returns that memberships may provide to actors, hence, would depend not only on the volume of resources that actors pool collectively (Bourdieu, 1980, 1986) but also from their collective position within a particularly system of relations of production, which renders different capabilities to shape the rules of the game that govern a field (e.g., the capacity of a small labour union to lobby for changes in the rights of workers as compared
to that of business associations or of small academic associations to change the priorities of big funding institutions) (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

Organisations, however, cannot be given a single, clear rationale, which carries the risk of reification as well as of homogenisation of their members. Collective actors, instead, can be considered sub–fields (Bourdieu, 2005) insofar as their internal dynamics are equally dominated by a system of relation of forces. Members’ positions within an organisation are associated with various endowments of capital, which hence involve different degrees of influence over its functioning (e.g., CEOs as compared to workers); as Bourdieu stated with regard to commercial firms:

... the firm is not a homogeneous entity that can be treated as a rational subject—the 'entrepreneur' or the 'management'—oriented towards a single unified objective. It is determined (or guided) in its 'choices' not only by its position in the structure of the field of production, but also by its internal structure ... the 'subject' of what is sometimes called 'company policy' is quite simply the field of the firm or, to put it more precisely, the structure of the relation of force between the different agents that belong to the firm ... (Bourdieu, 2005, p.69)

This observation resonates with the evidence presented by the literature on ‘capture’ of the organisations of the poor by the non–poor (Dasgupta & Beard, 2007; Fritzen, 2007; Platteau & Abraham, 2002; Rao & Ibañez, 2005) and on ‘local development brokers’ (Lewis & Mosse, 2006; Bierschenk, Chaveau, & de Sardan, 2000), both of which have found that local elites—marked either by a better economic condition or education—tend to reproduce and reinforce their social standings in their respective communities by running or controlling the organisations and decision–making mechanisms of organisations established by development interventions, despite the adoption of participatory strategies and democratic procedures or whether there has been misappropriation of resources or not.

d. The state and policy–making:

The use of field–centred framework serves to problematise both the analysis of public–private relations, which in the social capital literature transit through various positions: from the view that the state cannot effectively promote social capital (Fukuyama, 1995a, 1999) to that which puts the developmental state as a preeminent actor over community efforts (Fine, 1999, 2001; Harriss, 2002; Rankin, 2002), passing by the synergistic approach which favours the development of different encounters between the state and civil society (Evans, 1996; Woolcock, 1998, Woolcock & Narayan, 2000).

In this respect, the 'theory of practice' highlights that policy–making constitutes a different kind of ‘game’; that is, a different field—a bureaucratic field—with its own rules and players. This implies, first, that not all social actors likely to participate due to the
presence of both formal and informal barriers to participation which actors are able and willing to overcome in relation to their positions in the social space (i.e., capital endowments and habitus). Alongside explicit forms of exclusion (e.g., lack of recognition to actors’ political rights or open forms of repression) there are also some informal objective restrictions that filter out which actors can participate (e.g., costs of active political involvement; costs of formalization of social organizations and of funding public campaigns; or the required levels of education, legal expertise, and bureaucratic knowledge from organisations’ representatives). In addition, actors’ positions in the social space are likely to be related to different ‘interests’ in participating in such a field. These, on the one hand, may reflect actors’ dispositions to participation learned through socialisation, as in the case of some women who, by choice, also are less inclined to be involved in politics or those impoverished actors which place priority to their material needs to the exercise of their political rights, or their calculation with regard to their chances of success in achieving their objectives through participation, as in the case of organisations that opt to for an independent path of development because of mistrust towards the public agencies and the power of competing lobbying organisations (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Lamaison & Bourdieu, 1986).

A second consideration from a field–centred analysis of policy–making is that neither ‘the state’ nor ‘civil society’ could be easily opposed to each other insofar as both sectors are assumed to be constituted by myriad of actors pushing forward for different agendas, each of them from different positions and with different interests according to their respective positions. Neither all public agencies nor social organisations (in)formally engaged in a bureaucratic field to shape policy–making do so as monolithic bodies or on equal grounds; capital, in its diverse forms, becomes as important in this context as it is in the economic or academic fields. For example, economic capital, in the form of public organisms’ budgets or non–governmental organisations’ budgets for lobbying purposes; physical capital, in the form of the presence of well–equipped offices from a public agency or civil organisation across a country; informational capital, in the form of access and control over technical, legal proceedings, and administrative information; or even symbolic capital (e.g., in the case of France, Bourdieu speaks of the prestige carried by bureaucrats graduated from the system of grandes écoles), all define the capacity of both public and private actors to affect the end result of this particular game. The contrast between the capacity of workers’ unions as compared to that of associations of big business owners to lobby in favour of their interests or between the weight of the official position of the Ministry of Economy on an economic issue as compared to that of a regional public agency illustrate such differences (Bourdieu, 2005; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).
This alternative presupposes that the state is a well-defined, clearly bounded and unitary reality which stands in a relation of externality with outside forces that are themselves clearly identified and defined... In fact, what we encounter concretely is an ensemble of administrative or bureaucratic fields... within which agents and categories of agents, governmental and nongovernmental, struggle over this peculiar form of authority consisting of the power to rule via legislation, regulations, administrative measures (subsidies, authorizations, restrictions, etc.), in short, everything that we normally put under the rubric of state policy... (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 111)

In this respect private and public alliances constitute, in fact, a recurrent feature of bureaucratic fields insofar as ‘the state’ is the only capable of imposing a set of coercive norms across most dimensions of social life, constituting a sort of meta-field in which different struggles convey from the hand of private organisations, such as those of large investors in the mining, energy, agriculture, construction, and banking sectors as well as of unions of workers from those different industries or related businesses associations (e.g., providers of inputs or specialised labour services) (Bourdieu, 2005; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

Those observations are highly relevant to the analysis of social capital as a potential development tool. Fox’s study on how civil society thicken in Mexico showed that the presence of formal opportunities for interaction between public and private agencies facilitated the development of such alliances only if leading figures on both sides were willing to take advantage of those structural opportunities. Bebbington’s work on the state–society co–production of environmental policies in Peru (2008) showed, in turn, that (i) that society–interactions and the development of trustful or collaborative relationships do not take place evenly across the state as some public agencies may resist openness more strongly than others and that (ii) the development of synergistic relationships that effectively lead to changes in policy–making constitutes a complex and indeterminate process which involves alliances, convergences, as well as resistance, in which different positions on both sides appeal to their corresponding networks and resources, within and beyond official spaces, to prevail. This need to understand the implementation of policies as a field characterized by diverse positions of public and private agents, each of them with their corresponding alliances across sectors, was equally highlighted by Fox and Gershman’s (2006) analysis of World Bank funded projects in Mexico and the Philippines who reported that:

In all projects that actually underwent implementation, the key institutional obstacles/opportunities were located in powerful state–society coalitions that opposed power sharing with poor people’s organizations, particularly indigenous people’s groups. These coalitions were found to be well entrenched in provincial governments but were also embedded within the national agencies led by pro–participation reformists. (pp. 225–226).
2.2.4. The network connection:

The implementation of Bourdieu’s approach to social capital in the context of development interventions constitutes a methodological challenge. Although the concept is explicitly mentioned and discussed in different works—as in his studies of taste (Bourdieu, 1984) and the housing market (Bourdieu, 2005) in France—he did not make use of the concept for a detailed empirical analysis. In addition, the use of categorical data centred on occupational categories (e.g., farmers and semi-skilled workers as opposed to executives) to account for actors’ volumes of cultural and economic capital render unclear information about the networks or social resources at their disposition and, moreover, it is hardly applicable in underdeveloped areas, where occupational categories are ambiguous due to economic informality, job insecurity, and use of multiple income sources (Ellis, 2000; Crehan, 1992).

In this respect, diverse scholars have made use of modern network methodologies as a more flexible, ground-based, approach so as to discern the influence of relationships and affiliations in actors’ objective positions within a field. Erickson’s study of private security workers in Canada (1996), for instance, examined actors’ network diversity—connections across classes—to account for their cultural knowledge (e.g., arts and music). In turn, Anheier, Gerhards and Romo (1995) examined the proximity between writers in Germany—awareness of each other’s works, friendship, assistance, and invitations to dinner—to map the structures operating in that particular literary field. In addition, de Nooy (2002, 2003) mapped academics’ and artists’ direct and indirect affiliations to academic institutions and publishing organisations to explain their respective positions, or prestige, in those fields.

The integration of network methodologies and Bourdieu’s theory of practice, however, is not automatic, as this branch of the literature has its own sets of assumptions and theoretical frameworks upon which social capital is defined and analysed. In this regard, it is possible to distinguish between two different network approaches to social capital (Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Adler & Kwon, 2002): a ‘relational’ approach, which assumes an agent’s performance is a function of the quality and quantity of his/her contacts’ resources (Lin, 1995, 2001, 2000; Lin and Erickson, 2008), and a ‘positional’ approach, which focuses its analysis on distinguishing the advantage that agents obtain in relation to their position in a particular network structure (Burt, 1992, 2001, 2005).

The positional approach, hence, analyses the potential value of network structures and positions within them. On this subject, Burt (1992, 2001, 2005) specified the returns associated to both Coleman’s notion of ‘closure’ (1988, 1990) and Granovetter’s hypothesised ‘strength of weak ties’ (1973, 1983). He agrees with the first one regarding the importance of closed systems to facilitate the circulation of information and promote trustworthiness; however, he pointed out
that those benefits are rather limited, as such structures only facilitate the circulation of redundant resources and information whilst promoting social isolation. The presence of ‘structural holes’ in a network system (i.e., isolated network systems), hence, generate brokerage opportunities of greater value for those that can bridge between them. Actors who take advantage of such a strategic position, hence, would be able to profit the most from their relationships, as they would not only be able to access local resources as well as non-redundant information and locally scarce assets but also be in a position to regulate the flow of resources between isolated groups. By the same token, the weakness of a connection, then, is not valuable per se but only as a reflection of a connection between actors who have little in common, who belong to groups different from each other. In such a framework, social capital is defined as follows:

The social capital metaphor is that people who do better are somehow better connected … Holding a certain position in the structure of these exchanges can be an asset in its own right. That asset is social capital, in essence, a concept of location effects in differentiated markets. (Burt, 2001, p. 32)

Such a definition, however, presents key challenges, particularly in relation to the analysis of poor settings. It overlooks the fact that the existence of a relationship does not constitute a guarantee of access to resources (Foley & Edwards, 1999) and, furthermore, the network structure from which actors benefit appears as a spontaneous phenomenon, free from broader institutional and material restrictions (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). The processes through which actors achieved those positions and their capacity to exploit them as well as the conditioning factors that led to the isolation or closeness of those systems of relations are excluded from the analysis and, furthermore, social capital is isolated from other forms of capital and actors’, a view explicitly rejected by Bourdieu:

Though there is no question here of denying the economic efficacy of ‘networks’ (or better, of social capital) in the functioning of the economic field, the fact remains that the economic practices of agents and the very potency of their ‘networks’ … depend, first and foremost, on the positions these agents occupy in those structural microcosms that are economic fields. (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 199)

The ‘relational’ approach, in turn, defines social capital as “resources embedded in a social structure that are accessed and/or mobilised in purposive actions” (Lin, 2001: 29). Such a view allows the integration of the socioeconomic structure into the analysis of social networks (Lin, 1995, 2000, 2001) as the return of actors’ networks depend on their position in a rank-ordered structure based on actors’ stocks of resources (economic wealth, political power, and social prestige), and their capacity to access those actors in higher up positions, very much like Woolcock’s bonding, bridging, and linking classification (2001, 2002). This approach specifies,

25 Those two mechanisms, however, are not mutually exclusive; the profits that actors may obtain from brokering between structural holes would depend on their capacity of accessing most of the resources and information produced in their respective groups, which are better extracted from closed systems. Moreover, if those groups lack closure, it is likely they have poor communication and coordination, so reducing what a broker may be able to offer to external agents.
however, that establishing connections across different socioeconomic groups is rather difficult. On the one hand, actors are objectively constrained to interact with each other according to their location in the social hierarchy, as it is far more difficult for those at the bottom to interact with the elite than those in middle positions (e.g., they are likely to live in different neighbourhoods and to attend different schools) and assume the costs of such relationships (e.g., costs of memberships to exclusive clubs or attending similar restaurants). On the other, because of the principle of ‘homophily’ (Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1964; McPherson, Smith–Lovin & Cook 2001) it is expected that actors have a greater affinity with others of a similar socioeconomic profile. Inequality, hence, is seen as an intrinsic component of social capital mobilisation and formation (Lin, 2000, 2001).

Two central assumptions, however, separate Bourdieu’s theory of practice and the ‘relational’ network approach to social capital. First, the latter assumes that “actions are rational and are motivated to maintain or gain valued resources in order to survive and persist” (Lin, 2001, p. 45); economic calculation, hence, is seen as the basis for both expressive (expressions of sociability such as regular friendly meetings), intended to preserve the resources of a group, and instrumental actions, conducted to appropriate valuable resources of higher–ups groups. A second point of contention comes from the understanding of social structure as a single type of hierarchy (Lin, 2001), a view that denies the specific logic of each field as proposed by Bourdieu (1984, 2005; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

In order to overcome the observed points of divergence between both approaches, it becomes necessary to subordinate network analysis to the assumptions upon which Bourdieu’s ‘theory of practice’ is developed, turning the first one into a mere methodological tool. To this effect, both phenomena analysed in the network literature, actors’ network extension and position in a network of relations as well as their access to and mobilisation of social resources will be analysed in relation to actors’ objective position in the social space and fields (i.e., endowments of capital) and associated modes of practice (Anheier, Gerhards, and Romo, 1995; DeNooy, 2003). In this regard, the theoretical primacy of Bourdieu’s implies a series of adaptations with regard to certain principles of network analysis:

- In response to Bourdieu’s definition of social capital as “the totality of resources (...) activated through a more or less extended, more or less mobilizable, network of relations” (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 194), it follows that its study needs to assess simultaneously both networks and social resources. These two dimensions are intimately related. Networks by themselves have little value if not in their capacity to facilitate the accumulation of those

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26 Lazarsfeld & Merton (1964) differentiated between value and status homophily. The first one refers to actors’ tendency to associate with others who think in similar ways, regardless of differences in status; status homophily, in turn, means that individuals with similar socioeconomic characteristics are more likely to associate with each other.
forms of capital relevant to a field, whilst access to social resources needs to be explained in relation to the set of connections that an actor enjoys in a field (e.g., number and reach).

- As recognised by Bourdieu (1980, 1986) and other structure–minded network approaches to social capital (Lin, 1995, 2001; Woolcock, 1998, 2001), different sets of relationships are likely to generate different social capital returns according to the volume and quality of resources they may mobilise. In consequence, it is considered that the relationships that generate greater returns are those connect actors to non–redundant or high quality resources. However, the value of different sets of relationships (e.g., with political authorities as compared to local farmers) and resources (e.g., information as compared to cash) as well as the very same condition of actors as better– or worse– off, need to be understood in relation to the dynamic of a particular field; according to the different systems of relations of accumulation, production and distribution of capital in which actors are inscribed (e.g., bureaucratic fields, economic fields, or cultural fields) and those relevant forms of capital that define actors’ positions (e.g., cultural or economic capital).

- Actors’ positions in a network structure (as bridges between groups or isolated from other actors) and related access to social resources need to be explained in relation to actors’ objective conditions and associated practices. On the one hand, this means to consider that the unequal capacity of actors to ‘invest’ in their relationships according to their endowments of capital (Bourdieu, 1980, 1986; Lin, 2001). On the other, it equally requires to consider that the capacity of the different groups to interact and bond with each other in relation to their different systems of dispositions and classification (e.g., sense of taste) as well as practices, which tend to make difficult for actors of different classes to meaningfully interact with each other (Bourdieu, 1977, 1984), as reported by the principle of ‘homophily’ (Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1964; McPherson, Smith–Lovin & Cook 2001). These observations, however, do not exclude rational calculation. Because of actors’ general understandings of the game played in a field, it is expected that they can recognise the strategic value of certain connections, albeit not necessarily consciously (e.g., formal community authority may be appreciated primarily by the honour and prestige that it conveys rather than for any economic brokerage opportunity it may provide), and so mobilise their respective forces and endowments of capital to struggle over attaining them (Bourdieu, 1977, 1986).

- A final consideration comes in relation to existing debate regarding the value of ‘weak’ as compared to ‘strong’ ties. On this subject the present study will grant greater value to the latter. There are three theoretically and empirically driven considerations for such preference. First, Bourdieu’s definition centres “on a durable network of more less institutionalized relationships” (1986, p. 249), so that such features matches more closely this conceptualization. Second, as Burt specified, it is not the weakness of a connection but the capacity to bridge between groups which gave weak connections their value (Burt, 2001; 2005). Third, various empirical assessments of networks and social resources have highlighted that it is close connections, based on kinship–based ties, which are more...
2.3. Concluding Remarks

The present chapter has reviewed existing criticisms surrounding social capital definitions and applications in relation to the traditional structure–agency debates and the degree of structural embeddedness of social action (under– or over– socialised conceptualisations of actors). In light of this challenge, Bourdieu’s theory of practice is presented as a potential solution for an integrated analysis of social capital that relates the formation and mobilisation of social relationships with the overall socioeconomic structure whilst placing individual actors at the centre of the analysis so as to avoid any risk of reification.

The implications from this theoretical framework centred around the objective structure, which defines the social standing of actors within the social space and field and conditions the set of dispositions and strategies they pursue to improve such condition (habitus) has several implications for the study of social capital that would permit a more comprehensive assessment of its process of mobilisation and development as compared to network and community–centred perspectives: i) it avoids making universalistic assumptions of individual actions, as emphasised by perspectives that highlight normative structures within communities as stable prescriptive regulators of social action and by perspectives built around economic calculation as the single rationale of action among different actors and across all dimensions of social life; ii) the same as it avoids making universalistic assumptions of social capital mobilisation and returns, assumed to be measurable and comparable across social settings and dimensions; instead it presents social capital inscribed in a particular social field, with its own rules and logic of conversation of capital and objective differentiation; social capital, then, needs to be empirically defined in relation to the social dimension in which relationships are mobilised and the specific returns that different actors may be able to attain in relation to their position in a field; (iii) it equally avoids making generalizations about social organisations, the state, or state–society relationships, which, considered within the logic of field dynamics, appear as fields of forces in which different actors, individual and collective, constantly negotiate the direction of their activities; (iv) it puts social capital in direct relationship with other forms of capital—economic, physical, cultural, and symbolic—so that it simultaneously addresses both the socioeconomic structure that surrounds individual actions as well as existing socioeconomic inequalities among actors; (v) social capital is presented in a relational form; that is, relationships and memberships are presented as mere connections, assumed to grant immediate access to resources and generate important benefits but as interactions open to diverse forms of negotiation and struggles (domination, exploitation, exclusion, etc.) resulting from the dynamics of the field in which social capital is inscribed.
To what extent and in what manner this theoretical approach contributes to elucidate and advance the understanding of social capital mobilisation and development in the context of poor rural livelihoods and participatory development interventions is the main subject of the present study. To this effect, Bourdieu’s theory of practice will be examined on the basis of empirical evidence, operationalised via network methodologies, and put in dialogue with the existing social capital literature. The theoretical and policy implications of this dialogue will be addressed in the last chapter of the text.
CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

This chapter provides a detailed account of the research design and the data collection strategies implemented in the present study. It describes the research process from its design in relation to the theoretical framework adopted in this investigation and the methodological challenges identified in the existing social capital literature; the rationale pursued for the selection of cases; the data collection process; and the methodological techniques used in addition to the main forms of analysis used for interpreting the data.

3.1. Research objectives

The present thesis aims to critically examine the contentions of the mainstream social capital literature, as adopted in the discourse of key international development agencies, regarding the potential role of ‘using’ and ‘building’ social capital to promote social mobility among the poor as well as a more inclusive and equitable community or society. The main objectives of this thesis are two-fold: first, to contribute to the development of a critical framework for the empirical analysis of social capital and, second, to identify the limits and potentials of participatory development interventions trying to address issues of inequality whilst implementing social capital ‘building’ efforts. To this ends, three specific lines of enquiry are pursued:

i. How does the mobilisation of social resources (material and non-material resources accessed through one’s relationships) contribute to actors’ economic practices and livelihoods? To what extent do actors’ material conditions shape these processes?

ii. What kinds of relationships and memberships do actors form and strengthen in order to access valuable resources? How are these processes conditioned by actors’ material circumstances?

iii. To what extent is a participatory development intervention able to effectively use and build social capital? Do these efforts enhance or transform the socioeconomic dynamics conditioning the use of social capital as an integral part of actors’ economic practices?

3.2. Research design

3.2.1. The case for case studies

The research design adopted consisted of a longitudinal case study which, using a triangulation of methods (household surveys, un- and semi- structured interviews, and participant
observation). The study followed for two years the experiences of residents of two neighbouring villages located in Northern Peru, in the Department of Lambayeque, province of Lambayeque. The rationale behind this approach emerges from the combination of two sets of considerations, one referring to the theoretical basis upon which this research was structured, and another alluding to the challenges identified in the empirical literature on social capital.

a. **The theory of practice:**

As discussed in the previous chapter, Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of social reality refers to a dialectical relationship between actors’ objective conditions—capital endowments—and their associated subjective structure—‘class habitus’—which condition their interests, practices, and strategies. The implementation of this approach, in consequence, requires identifying first the objective order that prevails in a given social space. That is, the material reality in which actors operate, which are assumed to define their possibilities of action (Bourdieu, 1977). This means to examine the empirical expressions of certain forms of capital that are dominant in a particular setting (e.g., artistic expressions of objectified cultural capital or objects that constitute physical assets for economic production) and their distribution in a given social space, which makes it possible to identify the extent to which actors could be considered proximate or distanced on the basis of their different endowments of capital, including social capital (e.g., if those financially deprived are also characterised by their social isolation). Such an assessment is considered to be more easily answered by quantitative methods (Bourdieu, 1984, 2005).

A transitional stage in this analysis involves uncovering the presence of a relationship between the field of forces (i.e., the distribution of capital) and that of practices conducted by actors (Bourdieu, 1984, 2005). In other words, to identify those ‘social facts’, or statistical regularities that show that actors with different capital endowments conduct different sets of practices aimed to accumulate social capital, along other forms of capital, either as social resources (e.g., which sectors of the population are more likely to apply for loans to friends and relatives for commercial purposes and which ones for consumption aims only) or social networks (e.g., which groups of the population are more likely to invest in political connections).

The final stage of this approach, in turn, demands to relate those observed associations to actors’ schemes of perception, appreciation, and action or ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu, 1977; Lamaison & Bourdieu, 1986; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). This last line of enquiry, however, surpasses the scope of the present study, as it can only be fully accounted for after reviewing various systems of action that cut across different dimensions of social life (e.g., politics, business, religiosity, etc.). For the present work, which centres on the examination of economic practices and related benefits, habitus is only indirectly
observed through the examination of actors’ ‘strategies’ and ‘practices’. That is, those forms of action actors of different socioeconomic backgrounds conduct in order to maintain or increase their objective conditions and their position in a given social space. This more refined analysis of actors’ practices, in turn, is likely to be better developed via qualitative methodologies (Lamaison & Bourdieu, 1986; Bourdieu, 1977).

b. **Methodological challenges for empirical studies:**

The literature review conducted in Chapter 1 permitted the identification of a series of limitations recurrent among empirical assessments of social capital. The most salient were the following:

i. The variety of effects associated with the presence and mobilisation of social capital in different dimensions of social life (e.g., education, health, security, or farming) and social and physical settings (from modern organisations to rural villages) indicate not only that social capital effects and uses are context specific but also that its operationalisation cannot be conducted automatically on the basis of standard indicators (e.g., associational activity indicators). It appears necessary, hence, to analyse social capital in direct relation to the specific social, economic, and political circumstances surrounding the unit of analysis in question and the particular dimensions of action to be studied (e.g., economic activities, production of cultural goods, or political mobilisation).

ii. The use of exceedingly multidimensional definitions of social capital and aggregated measures cutting across different levels of analysis—individual, community, and societal—constitute a problematic methodological exercise, particularly in consideration that there is still a lack of theoretical clarity regarding the compatibility of different features of sociability (e.g., associational activity, trust, norms, networks, or feelings of friendship). In consequence, as a cautionary as well as more informative approach, it appears necessary to compare and complement instead different sets of information related to the topic of social capital (e.g., individual networks alongside community network structures). This approach would serve, in addition, to avoid the assumption that organisations, communities, and societies constitute cohesive homogenous units of analysis.

iii. The recurrent issues regarding the risks of circular reasoning and reverse causality would be better addressed by using longitudinal rather than cross-sectional data.

In response to both sets of considerations, it was concluded that a case study design would be the most suitable to address the research questions proposed. As discussed by Yin (2003a),
such an approach is recommended when a research “investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real–life context, especially when … the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (p. 13). This research framework provided clear advantages compared to other possible strategies as it permitted, first, to approach the subject of study—social capital—in direct relation to observable practices and events (and so in context); to preserve the complexity inherent to the concept by attaining a deep understanding of the internal structure of a ‘community’ and the structure of the relationships of its individual members; to explore the different forms in which context and material living conditions affect different actors’ practices and interactions; to follow through time the presence of observable differences in actors’ economic trajectories in direct relation to their different economic strategies and their engagement into an intervening external element (a development project); and, to attain a greater level of validity in reported findings by relying on multiple sources of evidence (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003a, 2003b).

Given the different levels of analysis in which social capital operates and it is formed, the study followed an ‘embedded case design’ (Yin, 2003a), which specifically distinguishes the different instances in which relationships are built or mobilised through time: beneficiary and non–beneficiary families, local organisations, and village networks as a whole. The rationale behind using such an approach was to avoid making over encompassing assumptions regarding the unity and homogeneity of the specific sites in which the research would take place. In addition, although the research took place in two neighbouring villages, and hence formally it could be considered a two–case study, the customary interaction between residents of the two villages (e.g., public buildings of one village were used by residents of the other one) and their similarities in terms of material living conditions and practices indicated that treating both sites as clearly different units was not adequate for analytical purposes.

**Figure 3.1** Embedded case study design

![Figure 3.1 Embedded case study design](image)
3.2.2. The case selection process

As discussed previously (§ 3.1), the overarching objective of this thesis is to critically examine the prevailing propositions in the discourse of key international development agencies regarding the usefulness of ‘using’ and ‘building’ social capital for the promotion of pro–poor social mobility. Heeding this general aim, the case selection process was shaped by the following three criteria:

i. The cases were expected to provide the ‘ideal conditions’ (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003a, 2003b) for the generation of positive economic returns through the expansion and mobilisation of social relationships via a participatory intervention. This criterion was considered central to this study since “relying on a case meeting all or most of the conditions recommended by a theory can confirm, challenge, or extend it. It can be used to determine whether its propositions are correct or whether some alternatives sets of explanations might be more relevant.” (Yin, 2003b, p. 47).

ii. The case selection process also followed a ‘typicality’ criterion (Yin, 2003a, 2003b). That is, rather than working in ‘unusual’ or ‘extreme’ settings (e.g., war zones or newly discovered indigenous populations), the cases to be selected were expected to be rather comparable to those rural settings typically reported in the mainstream empirical literature on social capital (Narayan et al., 2000a, 2000b; Sorensen, 2000; van Bastelaer, 2000). This condition would permit, first, to put the study’s findings in dialogue—either for validation or problematisation—with the core of the existing literature. Second, satisfying this condition would facilitate pre–planning a comprehensive examination and assessment of social capital and its multiple manifestations.

iii. The third criterion followed was that of ‘feasibility’ (Stake, 1995; Yin 2003a, 2003b). The cases to be chosen were expected to allow for an adequate implementation of the research design proposed; that is, of a longitudinal embedded case study design that made use of a triangulation of methods. The cases had thus to fit adequately the time frame of the study, to facilitate conducting reliable data gathering, to grant a relatively high level of internal validity (i.e., limited external intervening factors aside from the project studied), and to facilitate an optimum use of the resources available to the researcher (i.e., time along financial and material resources).

Given the multiple factors associated with the successful conduction of participatory development efforts, as proposed by the mainstream social capital literature, the aforementioned selection criteria were applied around three dimensions of analysis: a) participatory development intervention, b) socioeconomic and institutional context, and c) rural villages. The selection process was implemented in a two–stage manner. First, the development project to be followed
was selected not only according to its compliance with existing social capital guidelines but also in direct relation to the socioeconomic and institutional environment in which it was located. Second, once the general setting in which the study would be conducted had been selected, those three criteria were applied at the village level to select the individual villages from which the data would be collected.

With regards to development interventions, considering the ‘ideal conditions’ criterion, potential cases were expected to possess a participatory design that would fulfil most of the conditions recommended for ‘using’ and ‘building’ social capital in the literature. That is, they should be demand–driven, co–designed with beneficiaries, followed–up and assessed through participatory diagnostics and evaluations, implemented through the organised mobilisation of beneficiaries, co–managed with elected community representatives, and aimed at linking them up with public agencies and external developmental actors (Brown & Ashman, 1996; Dongier et al., 2002; Grootaert & van Bastelaer, 2002; Uphoff, 2004).

Two central factors were pondered in response to the ‘typicality’ criterion for the project–selection stage. First, it was decided to exclude those interventions with heavy state involvement. The reasoning behind this decision was that the positive effects of social capital building discussed in the literature customarily allude to the capacity of the organised population and their representatives to gain access to and develop functional links with public agencies (Evans, 1996; Fox, 1996; World Bank, 2001). It was in the interest of the present study, hence, to examine this process as a bottom–up negotiated and progressive transition rather than a top–down intervention. Second, it was feared that significant state participation would imply a degree of political manoeuvring that could affect the march of the project during the planned time–frame, whilst adding some form of political negotiation to its operations, as it has been previously observed in several state sponsored community–based programmes in Peru (Arce, 2005; Schady 1999; World Bank, 2007). Such circumstance in addition, was expected to be expressed in a limited access to both project staff and population in general.

The ‘feasibility’ criterion, in turn, implied that the participatory intervention to be selected had to suit the timeframe proposed by the research (from mid 2005 to the start of 2008) and, that the hosting institution would facilitate unrestricted access to their operations, staff, and beneficiary villages.

In order to identify the most suitable socioeconomic and institutional context the selection criteria were applied as following. First, the context in which the development intervention would operate was expected to favour the mobilisation and expansion of social relationships with positive economic returns. This implied, on the one hand, to prioritise areas

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27 This was of particular relevance given that general elections would take place in Peru in the first trimester of 2006.
that showed a favourable economic environment, where poor economic agents could be able to access and significantly benefit, in material terms, from developing relationships with new (external) economic agents because of their capacity to either grant access to expanding markets or to valuable resources (e.g., technical information, productive assets, means of transport) (Bebbington & Carrol, 2000; Fafchamps & Minten, 2002a, 2002b; Sorensen, 2000). On the other hand, the ‘ideal conditions’ criterion required that the intervention was embedded in a formal institutional context characterised by the presence of public and private developmental actors open to cooperation with grass-root organisations (Narayan, 1999; Woolcock, 1998; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000).

Following the ‘typicality’ criterion, next, settings going through some kind of emergency were excluded from the selection process. Areas in the Southern Peruvian Andes, for example, that had experienced high levels of political violence in recent decades (1980s and 1990s) presented major on-going social processes affecting their local economic and political dynamics that would prevent a clear assessment of social capital building efforts (e.g., forced migration, state-sponsored returning migration, re-building efforts of infrastructure, extended litigations over land ownership, or on-going judicial processes due to human rights violations). Likewise some areas in the jungle were affected by the operations of drug cartels. Aside from security concerns, a central limitation in these areas was that the presence of the state was mainly expressed in police or military terms. In addition, it was considered important to place the present research in areas with a well-established and predominant monetarised economy. This responds to the fact that, although rarely recognised, the presence of a market economy constitutes a basic assumption upon which most of the mainstream social capital literature relies upon (Fine, 2001; Mosse, 2005). Working in such settings (as compared to rural settings where exchange is as predominant as money transactions) would guarantee placing this thesis’ findings in dialogue with the most common empirical findings in the literature.

The feasibility criterion, finally, demanded that the settings in which this study would take place were physically ‘connected’ to the wider region. This constituted an important consideration insofar as geographically isolated areas are unlikely to develop extended social relationships with external actors and to materially benefit from them in the short-term because of the physical impracticality of interacting with external actors on regular basis and the associated high transportation costs (unless for significant infrastructure investments). A geographically isolated location, in addition, would make it difficult to visit the area of study on a regular basis and on a short-notice (in case of any eventuality). Settings that would demand more than a 3-day journey from the capital of the country were thus excluded from the selection process.
The considerations listed for the identification of a suitable development intervention and favourable socioeconomic and institutional context interplayed with each other during the first stage of the case selection process. First, through personal contacts in two development funding institutions in Peru I obtained information about participatory development projects that had just started or were about to begin in mid-2005. Development interventions with a participatory design and a time scale matching that of the thesis project were identified in seven different regions of Peru. These were: Lambayeque, Cajamarca, and Ancash, in Northern Peru; Ayacucho, Huancavelica and Puno in the Southern Peruvian Andes, and one in Loreto, in the Amazon basin. After careful consideration, which included direct talks with representatives of the potential hosting institutions, I opted to work with a regional NGO working in the Department of Lambayeque, which as of 2005 had sixteen years of experience working exclusively with participatory development projects in rural areas of the department. The project chosen was named \textit{Integral sustainable development of families and farmers from the dry forests of Lambayeque.} 

The reasons behind this selection were various. First, the project design was developed through a process of consultation and coordination with residents and local authorities, which included NGO representatives attending open community assemblies and organising participatory socioeconomic diagnostics with the local population so as to identify the main needs of the areas of intervention. In addition, beneficiaries were expected to co-manage the project at two different levels: in each village, beneficiaries would be organised in local committees, whose democratically elected representatives would be in charge of supervising the project activities locally; next, a federation of committees integrated by representatives of the beneficiary villages would be established with its respective elected authorities. This federation constituted the highest administrative authority in the project and it was in charge of designing and supervising the fulfilment of the project’s annual operative plans, deciding the allocation of material resources, solving any conflicts that may arise, and receiving the project assets at the end of the intervention. Furthermore, the project promoted the active involvement of beneficiaries in its diverse activities: access to the material benefits of the project were conditioned on beneficiaries’ participation in communal work activities and assemblies; village-committees as well as the federation of committees would hold monthly assemblies; and the project sponsored meetings between beneficiary representatives and public officers (e.g., representatives of the town hall and public health services).

The socioeconomic context in which the project would take place, the province of Lambayeque, was considered favourable for the generation of positive material outcomes through a process of network formation and social organisation. The area was characterised by

\footnote{Due to confidentiality and anonymity issues, the ONG investigated will remain anonymous. Throughout the rest of the text it will be identified simply as “the NGO”.
}
the presence of poor rural communities located close to expanding urban markets; a scenario
where far reaching relationships constitute a valuable asset that may facilitate social mobility
(Crehan, 1992; Bebbington, 1998; Elllis, 2000). As of 2005, the province possessed
approximately 65% of its population living under the regional poverty line according to the
annual National Household Survey (ENAHO).29 Moreover, around one quarter of children
between six and nine suffered of malnourishment and the majority of its residents had no access
to public services: 50% of the population had no electricity, 85% had no access to processed
water, and 60% had no access to equipped health centres (FONCODES, 2006). However, at the
same time there was evidence that the area had a potentially favourable economic environment
in which social capital could play a significant economic role. The capital of the department, for
instance, constitutes the largest commercial market in Northern Peru: the city of Chiclayo, with
approximately 1.2 million residents. In addition, although the capital of Peru—Lima—usually
constitutes a magnet for migrants, Chiclayo reported a net population growth of 1.3% per
annum. Furthermore, the average annual economic growth in the area between 2000 and 2005
had been of 3.7% (INEI, 2006). It is important to highlight as well that, in contrast to other rural
areas in Peru (e.g., Cajamarca, Ancash or Huancavelica) where economic growth had been
driven by large investments in low–labour intensive mining operations (INEI, 2005; Bury,
2004), Lambayeque’s economic expansion was concentrated on the agricultural, commerce, and
personal services sectors (INEI, 2006). This organisation of the local economy was considered
rather receptive to the economic practices of small landholders and rural dwellers.

Figure 3.2 The Department of Lambayeque

The political institutional environment of the department was also considered
encouraging for the development of functional links between local development initiatives and

public agencies. Although still far from the most ideal scenario, as described in the previous paragraph, the Peruvian office of the United Nations Development Program ranked the department of Lambayeque sixth in the list of 25 regions sorted according to their index of state presence (UNDP, 2007). Similarly to the economic dynamics of the department, it was observed that very deprived rural areas coexisted with nearby urban areas with relatively important presence of public services. The three capitals of province: Ferreñafe, Lambayeque and Chiclayo, possessed relatively well-endowed public hospitals, equipped police stations, and administrative offices of the Ministry of Agriculture. In addition, there was a widespread presence of public schools in the area—82% of children of schooling age had access to education (FONCODES, 2006)—and the main public food–security programmes implemented by the State—Glass of Milk and Popular Cook programmes—were reported to be present in all the districts of the department (National Registry of Municipalities and Towns, 2005).

The political context, in addition, was rather stable. Municipal elections have been held uninterruptedly throughout the last three decades despite the prevailing political violence of the 1980s and no political authorities have been toppled either through public manifestations or legal challenges, as it had recently happened in some areas of Peru (Ancash, Huancavelica, Puno, and Cajamarca). It is important to highlight as well that the area only had no cases of human rights violations associated to the period of political violence during the 1980s and there was no extraordinary military presence in the area since neither the remnants of the guerrillas nor drug cartels have local presence. This was considered a positive feature since those circumstances have negatively shaped the kind of relationship the state and the civil population have in other regions of the country.

Critically, the political stability of the region meant that Lambayeque was one of the departments of Peru in which the participatory reform initiated by the central government in 2002 had been most rapidly adapted. As of 2005, the central government had transferred the administration of approximately half of organisms contemplated by the decentralization reform to Lambayeque’s local and regional governments at a time when the national average was of one third (Presidency of the Council of Ministers, 2006). As part of these reforms, district and provincial municipalities were transferred the administration of the food–alleviation programmes Glass of Milk and Popular Cook whilst installing beneficiary representatives in local decision–making instances. Simultaneously, municipalities and regional governments were

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30 Some areas in Peru are characterised by their political volatility. Between 2004 and 2005, 16 new elections were called to remove district mayors in Cajamarca (14% of all districts); 26 in Ancash (16% of all districts); and 20 in Huancavelica (21% of all districts). During the same period, only three similar processes were conducted in Lambayeque (8% of all districts) (National Office of Electoral Processes, 2010). Although during the same period in Puno there were only 9 new elections to revoke district mayors (8% of districts), the area was politically convulsed. Riots erupted in 2004 in different districts of the department, which resulted in the lynching of the mayor of the district of Ilave, two forced resignations of mayors and major military, and police operations to control the population.

demanded to open formal spaces for the involvement of civil society representatives in policy-making processes (e.g., Board for the Fight Against Poverty, a coordination body that discusses policy priorities and accountability issues, and Concerted Development Plan and Participatory Budgeting committees, in charge of outlining the municipalities’ and regional governments’ annual executive plans and budgets). The rapid adoption of participatory initiatives was particularly enhanced by the presence of a regional government ruled by the left-leaning Humanist party, which since it came to power in 2002 was characterised by its progressivism, thereby making constant use public consultations for policy issues and of participatory decision-making methods.32

The area of intervention, in addition, was considered accessible. It was located approximately 50Km. from the capital of department. The latter, in turn, could be accessed by a 1.5 hour journey by plane or a 12-hour bus ride from the capital of Peru (Lima). The area was rather accessible in cultural terms as well, most residents spoke Spanish, thereby shortening the time required to understand the local social dynamics as compared to dealing with isolated indigenous populations. Finally, the NGO approached was very cooperative and interested in the topic of study. It was not found to be protective or secretive with regard to their areas of intervention or organisational practices, and moreover, its authorities provided all the guarantees to conduct the present study (e.g., open access to staff and beneficiaries and total research freedom).

The second stage of the case selection process was conducted at the village level, which implied to assess the socioeconomic conditions of the eight different villages in the province of Lambayeque in which the selected intervention would take place. The three selection criteria followed previously—ideal conditions, typicality, and feasibility—were applied as following. First, following the recommendations in the social capital literature (Dongier et al., 2002; Durston, 2004; Krishna, 2002; Uphoff, 1999, 2004), it was considered that the successful implementation of a participatory intervention required that the villages to be intervened already possessed a ‘minimum stock’ of social capital that could be mobilised and enhanced. That is, it was desired they possessed a set of functioning social organisations, prior experiences of collective action initiatives, and a recognisable group of legitimate leaders. In order to comply with the ‘typicality’ criterion, in turn, none of those conditions were pursued to the extreme. The villages to be selected were expected to be organised and rather socially cohesive but not tightly regulated and controlled by traditional normative and authority structures or detached from the region’s economic, political, or cultural systems. These conditions were expected to facilitate developing close relationships with outsiders, to allow for individual entrepreneurship, and to avoid issues of strenuous demands by neighbours, relatives, or community organisations (Halpern, 20005; Portes & Landolt, 2000; Woolcock, 1998).

32 It governed until 2007.
In terms of ‘feasibility’, the areas of study were supposed to constitute relatively well-demarcated settlements so as to facilitate the differentiation between local and external networks; relatively close to major markets and industries, which could facilitate the generation of observable positive economic changes through the expansion of actors’ networks; of relative easy access (geographically isolated populations face physical impediments to expand and strengthen their external connections); and with a population that was neither too sparse nor too large so that it would be possible to comprehensively investigate most of its inhabitants with the time and material resources available.

After visiting all potential villages in August 2005, I decided to restrict my study to the villages of San Mateo and San Luis located in the province of Lambayeque. These were small rural settlements, totalling around 160 families between them both (i.e., approx 1000 inhabitants), that primarily lived off agricultural-related activities and were characterised by their poverty: none of them had access to any basic services (electricity, water, or sewage) and, except for a public school in San Mateo, no other public institution had presence in the area; their agricultural productivity tended to be poor because of dry environmental conditions and limited public investments in irrigation infrastructure (agricultural output was limited to a single annual harvest); and dwellings’ construction materials were rudimentary (mostly mud bricks—*adobe*—or reeds strengthened with dry mud—*quincha*).

Despite these conditions, the area was considered to have economic potential because of their conditions to exploit their unused forest resources either for processing derived products or rearing minor livestock. In addition, although their communication with major urban markets was limited by the poverty of the residents (lack of access to means of transport) and their reliance on a single dirt track to access major towns and roads, San Mateo and San Luis were still
rather close to important economic centres. The estimated travel time using local means of
transport to access the city of Chiclayo, for instance, was of approximately 2.5 hours.

Finally, these settings had a variety of social organisations, including productive (water
users association), poverty–alleviation programmes (food alleviation programmes Glass of Milk
and Popular Cook), and cultural associations (e.g., religious and sports organisations).
Furthermore, both settings had a history of collective action for the generation of public goods.
They had cooperated to build, expand, and maintain their local public school as well as to face
natural emergencies (floods originated by El Niño events of 1983 and 1998). By the same token,
both sites possessed a pool of established leaders.

The two settings were chosen because of their comparability (shared historical
trajectories, ecological conditions, and rather similar economic practices), which would help to
maximise the obtainable information on social capital building and mobilisation and, hence,
secure a greater degree of validity of findings. This strategy responded to the observations of
social geographical accounts of social capital, which manifested against the use of uniform
methodological approaches and tools to assess social capital in different socioeconomic contexts
and physical locations given that the manner in and extent to which features of sociability are
integrated into local livelihoods are context–dependent, responding to geographical, historical,
and cultural particularities. (Bebbington et al., 2004; Holt, 2008; Radcliffe, 2004).

Despite their similarities, the selection of San Mateo and San Luis were also expected to
highlight the implications of certain differences in the initial conditions upon with which the
participatory intervention was established as highlighted in the social capital literature: (i) the
degree of deprivation the poor face (e.g., extreme poor as compared to poor), which affects
actors' ‘investment’ capacity in new features of sociability and the volume and quality of
resources they may access through their relations (Cleaver, 2005; Collier, 1998; Fafchamps,
2006), and (ii) their differentiated integration into the workings of public officials and political
leaders, which simultaneously affects the flow of significant external resources into the area and
the enhancement of local development efforts by means of ‘synergistic’ relations with the state

In this respect, San Mateo and San Luis differed, first, in terms of material living
conditions, being the latter poorer than San Mateo: local dwellings were observed to be built
more commonly with precarious materials, there were fewer non–farm commercial initiatives,
and local farmers were observed to have more basic equipment than their San Mateo as well as
limited livestock. Secondly, and related to the first difference, San Luis' rudimentary access road
was in worse conditions that in the second town and no public infrastructure investments had
taken place in the area for the last 15 years (e.g., residents attended school and church in San
The lack of political connections was further reflected by the fact that in the previous two municipal elections, despite various candidacies, no San Luis resident was elected for the town-hall council.

During the case selection process, following an ecological criterion was not considered a suitable option for the purposes of this study. It was considered that the adoption of this variable would have constituted a difficult and uncertain endeavour given the current state of social capital theory. The use of comparative case study designs requires to carefully select different cases on the basis that they are expected to render “contrasting results for anticipable reasons (a theoretical replication)” (Yin, 2003a, p. 54). Although human geography discussions on social capital have pointed out the inextricable link between location and actors’ sociability, these assessments have equally highlighted that such relationship is still theoretically underdeveloped (Holt, 2008; Mohan & Mohan, 2002; Radcliffe, 2004). The empirical literature on social capital has generally focused on how trust, social organisations, and norms and traditional practices of collective action facilitate the management of natural resources (Ostrom, 2000; Pretty & Ward, 2001; Uphoff & Wijayaratna, 2000) but the inverse relationship (i.e., how particular ecological features affect social capital expressions and their associated material returns) is yet to be fully explored. Correspondingly, it remained unclear what would have been the specific implications of ecological differences over the analysis of local processes of social capital building. In addition, deciding on which specific ecological features to use as selecting criteria would have been an ambiguous process (e.g., altitude, precipitation levels, local fauna or vegetation) with limited theoretical grounds.

In summary, the main rationale behind these criteria was to work in areas where the project would be more likely to succeed in organising the local population and expanding their networks; where networks could be differentiated between local and external (i.e., villages had clear geographical delimitations) so that reliable network measures could be generated; where there was no risk of other intervening factors (e.g., operations from other NGOs) disturbing the local social dynamics so as to secure a high level of internal validity, where the historical, economic, and cultural trajectories of settings would make cases comparable; and where the formation of extended social relations could generate important positive economic returns in a relative short period of time.

3.2.3. The development intervention

The project was developed from an agroecological approach, aiming to improve poor residents’ quality of life by allowing them to develop sustainable subsistence strategies. Its specific objectives were the following:
• To diversify households’ productive activities in order to generate a sustainable increase in families’ incomes.
• To improve households’ and communities’ material living conditions in order to promote to a healthier environment.
• To reduce the recurrence of diseases and nutrition problems among children.
• To strengthen local civil society, promoting a sustainable management of resources and the pursuit of community initiatives.

The following activities were conducted in relation to those project objectives:

a. **Productive activities:**

Three main lines of actions were conducted. First, the project made available to beneficiaries two different sets of livestock modules: woolless sheep (two males and four females) and ducks (two males and six females), which could be accessed on the condition of active involvement in communal work sessions aimed at recuperating forest areas surrounding the villages. Beneficiaries, in turn, were expected to ‘return’ those assets to the committees with the resulting offspring of those animals throughout the lifespan of the project, thereby creating a bank of resources that local committees could continue manage after the project formally ended. The project also provided material resources necessary to build related basic infrastructure: coops, fences, and fodder stores as well as a kit containing vaccines and medicines administered by the local committee. Technical assistance was also provided in the form of monthly visits by a veterinarian.

A second set of benefits related to training on forest management aimed to help residents to sustainably exploit and expand forestry resources, either to supply fodder for the expanding livestock or to generate new economic activities from processed forest products (e.g., algarrobina syrup, marmalade of fruits, etc.). Technical assistance on those matters took the form of monthly visits from an agronomist.

An indirectly related activity came in the form of specialised training of local promoters among young adults (under twenty-five years of age). These consisted of a group of beneficiaries who received more in depth instruction in two areas: livestock management and domestic infrastructure (construction of latrines and energy–efficient kitchens). Two promoters were trained for each of those two areas. It was expected that these skills would help them to obtain extra income from offering their services to local farmers as well as benefit the community by preserving and replicating the knowledge generated through the intervention.
b. Material living conditions:

This objective was pursued mainly via two different sets of activities. First, the project financed, conditioned on beneficiaries’ active participation in communal work sessions, two sets of domestic infrastructures: energy-efficient kitchens, designed to require smaller amounts of combustible, produce a greater concentration of heat, and to better direct the fumes outside the house compared to traditional stoves; and ventilated pit latrines, aimed to improve local standards of sanitation. A second strategy came in the form of weekly communal work activities (two sessions of two-hours per week) aimed to preserve, recuperate, and improve local natural resources. These concentrated on recuperating deforested areas by planting new trees suitable to the local conditions and cleaning existing ones. Local committees, however, could opt to also dedicate time to other public goods (e.g., cleaning the access road or giving maintenance to communal wells). Those activities were agreed upon and programmed by the local committee in coordination with the project staff under the condition that they were aligned to the general objectives of the intervention.

c. Nutrition and health:

The project conducted a series of training and informational activities on preventive medicine and nutrition. These included educational campaigns with mothers and children on hygienic issues so as to encourage local families to adopt healthier domestic practices (e.g., washing hands, protecting cookware and tableware from insects, separating animals from domestic areas, among others), which were complemented with periodical visits to beneficiaries’ residences so as to supervise the application of those recommendations and an annual competition to identify the healthiest dwelling in each village. Informative talks were also provided for families regarding how to address the most recurrent diseases in the area: respiratory and digestive problems. This line of activity was direct by a trained nurse. In addition, although not initially programmed, the project obtained funding to provide a basic medical and first-aid kit to local committees.

Additional training was provided on the management of vegetable gardens to complement family diets, including information on the nutritional value of local products. This activity was led by an agronomist.

d. Community organisation:

As stated previously, the project was implemented in the ground jointly with local committees of beneficiaries. Committee authorities (president, vice-president, secretary, and vocal) were elected in an assembly via secret ballot and were supposed to be ratified,
or replaced, on an annual basis during the lifespan of the project following the same procedure. These committees were responsible, in coordination with project staff, for monitoring the conduction of project activities, informing about any particular problems or requests from beneficiaries (e.g. demands for non–programmed training events), and distributing the material benefits to local beneficiaries. To this effect, elected committee representatives received training on the management of project activities. Committee assemblies were expected to take place once a month.

In turn, the federation of all village–committees taking part in the project and their elected authorities, formally known as a district Intersectoral Committee, which constituted the highest decision–maker in the project. Their democratically elected authorities were responsible for the overall implementation of the annual operative plan and management of the material resources in coordination with the project officer. They met monthly to receive the reports from each committee president, discuss any problems and resolve any conflicts that may have appeared during the intervention. As part of their activities, the NGO coordinated meetings between committee representatives and those of diverse public agencies of relevance to local development efforts (e.g., the town hall, local public health services, the regional government, poverty–alleviation programmes) so as to inform leaders about their mechanisms of support and consultation with the population. Lastly, this entity formally received the management of the assets generated by the project after the latter ended so as to continue its operations in an independent fashion.

3.2.4. The research procedure: a multi–stage process

The present study was implemented in three different interconnected stages: (i) preliminary community assessments, based on unstructured qualitative data, (ii) detailed socioeconomic assessment, based on household surveys and in–depth interviews, and (iii) an analysis of residents’ participation in the development intervention based a new round of surveys and in–depth interviews. Each of those stages intended to provide specific information related to the studies’ research questions presented as well as to complement each other to validate findings at each stage:

a. Preliminary community assessment:

This stage of the study was conducted in two one–month visits to the areas of study in August and December 2005. At the time of the first visit to the area, the project studied was in its first month and its activities were mainly of an administrative character (formation of local committees, training for elected leaders in the management of the project, agreement on the annual working plan, and preparations for a baseline survey). The objectives of this stage of the research were: first, to select the villages where the
study would take place; second, to develop a general assessment of local living conditions and the main economic activities conducted in the areas; and finally, to familiarise myself with local residents so as to secure access to a variety of local informants, irrespective of their direct involvement in the project.

These objectives were pursued simultaneously, as the initial social assessment of the villages selected was conducted via informal conversations and participatory observation strategies. Initially with the mediation of local promoters working with the NGO and, shortly after, independently, I established contact with a series of local actors, including village authorities, regular residents, and the few public functionaries operating in the area (lieutenant governors and the school principal). In addition, I placed great emphasis on making my presence regular in the area by visiting the villages on the occasion of any public activities (e.g., fundraising activities of the local parent school association or football matches), and by making myself a regular customer of the few shops operating in area. These activities were more methodically pursued during a second visit to the area in between December 2005 and January 2006, particularly via direct participation in local festivities on the occasion of Christmas and New Year.

b. Detailed community assessment:

The second stage of the research was also conducted in two different one-month visits to the area in March and July–August 2006. The objective pursued in this phase of the enquiry was to obtain a detailed and representative depiction of local material conditions in the area, the quotidian practices conducted by local residents in order to make a living, and the form in which relationships are mobilised to such effect.

In order to achieve this aim, I made use of the preliminary findings attained from the first stage of the study in order to develop a set of indicators that were integrated into a detailed household survey. These covered socioeconomic and demographic information as well as a set of items on social capital–related topics. This survey was in a representative sample of households. At that time, the project had just started providing material benefits to some beneficiaries so that the survey results were assumed to provide a fair representation of living conditions pre–intervention. In August of the same year, in turn, semi–structured interviews were conducted with heads of households, and in some cases with their partners, in order to obtain a more detailed account of local practices, particularly about how they use their relationships for economic purposes and on what foundations such relationships are developed. Aside from their accessibility, the households selected were chosen on the basis of their socioeconomic condition and participation in the project. This procedure was expected to allow me to obtain a fairly
comprehensive variety of perspectives on the villages’ social and economic dynamics as well as the reception towards the intervention.

c. **Project implementation and social capital mobilisation:**

This phase of the research partly overlapped with the previous stage, as part of relevant data was initially collected through structured interviews with key informants on March 2006, regarding residents’ initial reception to the project. The core of relevant information, however, was obtained in three different instances: June, October and December 2007. The main objective of this phase of the research was to obtain a detailed account of the process of project implementation, the formation and mobilisation of new connections of potential economic value, access to and mobilisation of resources due to these new contacts, and observed changes in local forms of association and cooperation among families.

Qualitative information was obtained through a series of in–depth interviews with key informants including residents, village authorities, and the NGO staff. Two rounds of interviews with these informants took place in March 2006 and December 2007. The first set of interviews discussed the initial process of project implementation, the response of the local population, and the organisational dynamics implemented by the local committees in the ground. The second one took place in December 2007 and aimed to account for any observable changes in the manner in which local beneficiaries have adopted the project benefits and whether the working dynamics implemented had some effects on the village social and organisational dynamics. These lines of enquiry were equally pursued by means of a second round of interviews in June–July 2007 with heads of households and partners that had participated in the previous data–collection stage (interviews from July 2006).

**Figure 3.4 The Research Process**

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<td><strong>Preliminary Community Assessment</strong>&lt;br&gt;• Participatory Observation.&lt;br&gt;• Unstructured Interviews: key informants.</td>
<td><strong>Detailed Community Assessment</strong>&lt;br&gt;• Household Surveys (First wave).&lt;br&gt;• Semi–structured Interviews: key informants, head of households and partners.&lt;br&gt;• Unstructured Interviews: key informants.&lt;br&gt;• Participatory Observation.</td>
<td><strong>Project Implementation Social Capital Mobilisation</strong>&lt;br&gt;• Quantitative social capital measures (2- and 3-waves).&lt;br&gt;• Semi-structured Interviews: key informants, head of households and partners, and NGO staff.&lt;br&gt;• Unstructured Interviews: key informants.&lt;br&gt;• Participatory Observation.</td>
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Quantitative data to assess changes in households’ social capital measures and related village-level characteristics was obtained by means of additional waves of household surveys implemented in October 2007 and in June 2008. Due to time and resource restrictions, these surveys included only the social capital survey components.

3.2.5. Subjectivity issues

The researcher does not constitute, or operate as, an isolated and autonomous entity within the context of an investigative process. Instead, the researcher and the researched object are engaged in a continuous dialogue, a relationship in which both influence each other. Investigating ‘the other’, hence, requires a process of ‘reflexivity’, through which the researcher moves away from monological discourses of inclusion, integration, and interpretation of testimonies and observations to a more dialogical one that takes into consideration the subjectivities of both researcher’s and the researched (Finlay, 1998; Parker, 2005; Farr & Anderson, 1983).

This practice was followed in the present study in order to adequately resolve the tension in my interactions with both villagers and NGO staff, which aimed to be simultaneously rather detached from the local socio-cultural dynamics—so as to adequately and critically examine actors’ practices—as well as actively immersed in it—in order to better comprehend the rationale behind actors’ actions (Finlay, 1998; Parker, 2005). Furthermore, this strategy is considered an indicator of the quality of the research practice (Gaskell & Bauer, 2000) and of an ethical attitude with the researched actors (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Parker, 2005).

A reflective process demanded, first, that I made explicit to myself the assumptions and taken-for-granted practices I usually employ in my quotidian interactions, the result of my personal formation and social background, which could approach or distance me from local informants. Correspondingly, I took notice of my background as an urban middle-class adult male doctoral student, which contrasted with that of most local actors. They were in their ample majority born and raised in deprived rural settings and possessed limited formal education. Those differences could be noticed in terms of forms of speech (accent and vocabulary), clothes, mannerisms, domestic practices (e.g., eating fruits directly from trees), general sense of time (e.g., different understandings of ‘night’ or ‘morning’), and topics of conversation. Such a profile, however, was less problematic in my interactions with the NGO staff, as most of them were raised in an urban setting and had a middle class background, including university levels of education. In addition, my professional trajectory, mostly spent in the development sector, helped me as well to relate more closely to local practitioners.

A second step included to identify actors’ (un)intended positioning within the research context by virtue of the expectations and assumptions they had of both me and the study (Farr
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& Anderson, 1983; Parker, 2005). Researched actors’ positioning was observed in relation to different dimensions. Some residents, for instance, had some qualms related to my expectations of and reactions to their material conditions. Some would attempt to present themselves in the best condition possible when I visited them (e.g., they would apologize for receiving me in working clothes) or expected me be reluctant to certain local consumption patterns and practices (e.g., on occasions, some excused themselves for not providing me cutlery when eating or assumed I would not be used to eating certain local dishes). Gender gaps were also perceptible. Adult women, for example, tended to initially assume I was not willing to share those domestic spaces or practices traditionally linked to women (e.g., talking in the kitchen or accompanying them to carry wood or water). In a similar direction, single female family members only talked to me when another family member was present.

My condition of an adult student aiming to write a doctoral dissertation and studying abroad equally led to certain forms of positioning by local informants. Some villagers, for example, would initially use a rather formal vocabulary when talking to me. Many also faced difficulties in understanding my own position. Three elements combined to such effect: their lack of knowledge about doctoral studies, my age (many expected me to be married and in full-time employment), and their lack of experience with academic research since only previous socioeconomic assessments were conducted only by promoters of public programmes or NGO staff. As a result, most residents initially assumed I was working for the NGO or for an external agency overlooking the project, carrying the risk of biased testimonies. In turn, it was also observable a certain degree of positioning among the NGO staff. Initially, some practitioners saw me as a kind of external evaluator who responded directly to the institution’s director or to the funding institution. Such an impression made it initially challenging to have a candid conversation about the march of the project with them.

A third type of considerations confronted referred to the identification of any bias in the data–collection and analysis processes due to personal standpoints of a theoretical or political nature (Finlay, 1998; Parker, 2005). In this respect, I continuously struggled to prevent that the thesis’ critical view of the mainstream conceptualisation of social capital would not govern the study. Although my personal interests might be focused on the (un)intended reproduction of social inequalities, I was aware I should not overlook other forms of social organisation (e.g., expressions of altruism and voluntarism). In a similar direction, although both my personal interest and concern focused on the poorest residents and my political leanings are close to a ‘social democratic’ position, I intended to give equal opportunity to express their interests to all local actors without (pre)judging those practices upon which their socioeconomic positions were based, which on many occasions relied on forms of labour exploitation.
Different measures were taken in order to deal with those three sets of challenges—personal assumptions, actors’ positioning, and personal standpoints—so as to develop the necessary ‘detached empathy’ to the researched. First, I relied on my professional expertise as a research consultant who had previously conducted extended periods of fieldwork in rural communities in Peru so as to adapt myself as soon as possible to local practices. This included taking notice and making use of local slang and idiomatic expressions, showing myself eating local food during social visits and in local food stalls, and adapting my schedule to local routines (e.g., social visits were made after lunch time as villagers normally do). This process of adaptation was facilitated by relying on unstructured interviews and ethnographically informed methods as the first forms of the data–collection during the first–stage of the research (preliminary community assessment). It was principally during this period of time that I was able to self–reflect upon the dynamics of differences and similarities that existed within the research relationship.

A second measure consisted of making explicit and observable to local actors that I was not assuming any hierarchical position in my interactions with them based either on educational, technical, or economic grounds. I placed great emphasis in my genuine interest in learning about their quotidian practices, interests, and expectations. I literally asked them to ‘teach me’ about farming, livestock rearing, cooking, among other features of actors’ lifestyles. Furthermore, whenever possible I accompanied farmers to their work and helped them with little farming and domestic tasks such as making adobe bricks for their houses, helping women and teenagers to carry water or wood for cooking, or accompanying women whilst cooking for their families. Through these forms of involvement I aimed to be able to move beyond my perspective as an ‘outsider’ and gain some experiential insight into peoples’ lives and villages’ social dynamics. In a similar direction, although grounded on a more professional attitude, I took care in emphasising my similarities with the NGO’s staff. This involved, on the one hand, sharing professional experiences of previous work in other rural settings and showing my understanding of the logic of a development project (e.g., knowledge of logical frameworks, MS Project software, or participatory methods). On the other, I stressed that I was still a student who went there to learn from them, that I was there ‘to understand, not to test’ either their performance or that of the project.

A third measure referred to my need to overcome both villagers’ and NGO staff’s understanding of my position as that of an external evaluator. First, I made explicit to all actors involved that I was not there to assess the success of the project or to supervise the implementation of project’s operations. To this effect, I usually visited the villages on my own rather than accompanied by any members of the staff. In a similar direction, I tried to minimise my familiarity with the NGO director whilst in their headquarters. This process of trust gaining, however, was only achieved over time. Since formal types of enquiry—recorded
interviews and household surveys—begun after I had already visited the area on regular basis (two 1–month visits, which covered Christmas and New Year’s celebrations), met a significant portion of its residents, and informally interviewed them as well as the project staff, it was possible for them to certify that any kind of disclosure remained within the context of the study and did not travel to another neighbour, village leader, or the staff member. Consequently, it was noticeable that by the second year of the data–collection I could have candid conversations, either in the context of a recorded interview or an informal one, about the march of the project and local politics with both the staff and villagers.

A final measure implemented referred to the use of a triangulation of methods, which increases the credibility of data–collection, analysis, and interpretation of findings (Bauer & Gaskell, 2000; Flick, 1992). As stated by Bauer and Gaskell (2000), “the triangulation of methods is a way of institutionalising the process of reflection in the research project ... [it] may demonstrate that social phenomena look different as they are approached from different angles” (p. 345). The combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, in this regard, was useful to overcome some of the challenges listed in previous paragraphs. The application of a household survey in a representative sample of households in the villages studied, for example, helped to limit potential biases in the selection of local informants. In addition, it helped to provide standardised measures local socioeconomic conditions as compared to working only with subjective assessments of material well–being. The use of ethnographic methods, in turn, served to complement the information formally gathered through in–depth interviews and surveys as it provided an opportunity to give voices to those actors who were not directly involved in the study due to their domestic roles (e.g., children and teenagers) or economic circumstances (e.g., limited time availability due to short–term migration). Furthermore, the application of a longitudinal research design allowed comparing and scrutinising actors’ testimonies over time.

3.2.6. Ethical considerations

The present study had to consider diverse ethical issues involved in the research process. As the British Sociological Association’s code of ethics states, sociologists “have a responsibility both to safeguard the proper interests of those involved in or affected by their work ... [they] have a responsibility to ensure that the physical, social, and psychological well–being of research participants is not adversely affected by the research. They should strive to protect the rights of those they study, their interests, sensitivities and privacy” (BSA, 2002, p.2). Such a statement had particular resonance in the present study, which worked with a variety of actors, each of them—beneficiary and non–beneficiary villagers, village leaders, NGO staff and authorities—with different (sometimes conflicting) interests, private thoughts, and experiences. The following ethical implications were given special consideration: informed consent,
confidentiality and anonymity, privacy, and clarity of obligations (BSA, 2002; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Parker, 2005).

Informed consent was attained through the detailed disclosure of the research objectives pursued, the parts involved in this study, and the final use of the information to be gathered. The information was presented and explained to each participant at the first point of contact and at the beginning of any formal kind of enquiry (i.e., semi-structured interviews and surveys). Careful thinking was given to explaining those details in terms that were accessible to local informants. For informants without prior contact to academic research and very limited formal education, for example, I explained I was a student who had to do an extended form of ‘homework’ that I had to complete in order to achieve my degree and that it would be examined by a group of ‘professors’ who cared only on my ability to understand how villagers help each other and how the intervention affected their daily lives rather than on the success of the project.

In addition, explicit permission to record the interviews was sought and granted at the beginning of each individual meeting. Similar permission was asked to take notes during an informal conversation. At each stage the research participants were reminded of their right to refuse participation whenever or for whatever reason they wished. For all informants, informed consent was obtained verbally as it was apparent the risk of misunderstanding was small and that there was a widespread reluctance among residents to sign any forms (they feared a potential misuse of their signature because of prior experiences of litigation over property or because of their very limited formal education).

Because the relationship between the participants would continue long after the present study was completed, measures were taken so as not to compromise existing relationships in the research setting. Personal information concerning informants was kept confidential. Interviewee’s names were changed and the names of their relatives replaced by the relevant description (e.g., ‘participant’s son’ instead of his name). Those informants who possessed a combination of attributes that made them identifiable (e.g., village authorities), in turn, were reminded that their identities could not be entirely disguised without introducing unacceptable large distortions of the data. The original names of the villages, however, were modified so as to grant them a greater chance of anonymity. All informants, in addition, were reassured that no information containing names, detailed testimonies, or personal descriptions would be provided to the NGO staff. All information provided to the hosting institution, accordingly, referred broadly to informants presented according to their encompassing roles (e.g., ‘beneficiaries’, ‘non–beneficiaries’, ‘local leaders’, or ‘staff’).

Villagers, village authorities, and authorities of the hosting NGO were informed about the confidentiality and privacy terms the research would provide to all its participants. It was also made clear to the NGO authorities that none of the raw data gathered through any of the
data–collection methods applied would be at their disposal and that, aside from general recommendations about how to approach the population and their views on the data–collection instruments, it was expected that the NGO would not interfere with the research project.

3.2.7. Research challenges

Having designed the present research as a ‘critical’ longitudinal embedded case study, aimed at testing the specific propositions of the mainstream social capital literature, the planning and execution of this research project had their own intrinsic limitations. The most central concern with regards to research design implemented refers to the issue of the generalisability of its findings. As discussed in a previous section (§ 3.2.2), the rationale behind the case selection process was theoretically driven; it selected two beneficiary villages of a participatory project operating in a socioeconomic and institutional context to examine anticipatable outcomes from the propositions of the mainstream social capital literature (i.e., that pro–poor social mobility and social inclusion could be enhanced by building social capital efforts in socially organised poor settings through a fully–participatory intervention operating in receptive economic and political institutional context). In this regard, although I am aware that the exploration of other settings and variables (e.g., population size, water availability, indigenous mores) could have provided more comprehensive information on the subject of social capital, it should be noted that I am not claiming here to be making generalisations at a statistical level or that my findings and conclusions are applicable to poor populations in general. Rather, the findings and conclusions of this study should be framed within the specific research objectives of this work—to test and problematise the theoretical propositions of the mainstream social capital literature for critical examination—and the parameters established for each of the case selection units (development intervention, socioeconomic and institutional context, and villages). As stated by George & Bennet (2005), “case study researchers generally sacrifice the parsimony and broad applicability of their theories to develop cumulatively contingent generalizations that apply to well–defined types or subtypes of cases with a high degree of explanatory richness” (p.31). Correspondingly, this case study should be seen as a contribution towards a critical framework for the empirical assessment of social capital that could benefit from further explorations and replications rather than a well–structured generalisable theory.

It must be recognised, in addition, that despite adopting a longitudinal research design that followed the lives and experiences of San Mateo and San Luis residents for a period of two–and–a–half years, the structural nature of the issues addressed in the present study could demand for a longer period of observation. Class–based relations, lifestyles, and strategies tend to evolve continuously but at a slow pace, with many forms of categorical inequality lasting centuries (e.g., gender or race). Conclusive results on these matters, hence, require to assess the historical trajectories of the objective conditions of subordinated actors, their attempts for
upward mobility, and the evolution of the (in)direct relations of power they are engaged in with actors in a more (material and symbolic) dominant position (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Tilly, 1998). Correspondingly, despite the best efforts of this work, the nature of the research—a PhD thesis project—and the resources at hand—time and financial—framed this study within a specific length of time that provides only a glimpse into how those long-term processes may develop at the local level. In this regard, I am aware that the enduring impacts of the intervention studied were not fully addressed (e.g., residents’ use of the first and second tier organisations left by the NGO after project completion). Nevertheless, I believe that the research design implemented provides a comprehensive and detailed examination of how development interventions may constitute the starting point for the modification or reaffirmation of class-based relations at the local level. Furthermore, it allowed for the examination of those initial changes beyond the project context, looking into the systematic integration of its purported networking and material benefits into poor people’s daily lives and quotidian economic relationships. As such, the study could serve as a ‘baseline’ for further research on similar settings. Subsequent empirical works with similar lines of enquiry could, in addition, render more insightful and comprehensive assessments of those long-term processes than I addressed on this occasion given the time and resources available.

I am also conscious that data-collection strategies different than the ones used—participant observation, semi-structured interviews with residents and NGO staff, as well as household surveys—could have been used to address the research questions proposed by this thesis (§ 1 and 3.1). In particular, I consider that two or more lengthy stays in the ground centred on ethnographic data collection methods may have gathered more fine-grained data as well as richer accounts of the poor’s experiences and reflexions of their daily lives and organisational commitments. However, given that the research objectives focused on the material implications of social capital mobilisation and building efforts rather than on the subjective and cognitive processes subjacent to them, I judge that the triangulation of methods used adequately targeted the kind of information necessary for this thesis, including objective indicators of actors’ material conditions and network structures across the different sectors of the population. In addition, although they were not pursued in an orthodox manner, within the constraints of a small-scale doctoral thesis, the present work was not oblivious to the need of ethnographically informed data elicitation techniques (§ 3.2). The research placed emphasis on trust building through participant observation and informal interviews with both villagers and NGO staff during significant periods of fieldwork. The total time spent in the area of study during the lifespan of this research amounted to five-and-a-half months—distributed across six different trips from the UK. The first stage of the present research in particular, preliminary community assessment, was conducted eminently through ethnographic driven methods applied in two one-month visits to the area and each of the two subsequent stages of the research (detailed community assessment and project implementation) were equally accompanied by one-month
fieldwork stays. On this subject, it is necessary to observe as well that previous researches making use of multi-phase data-collection strategies have successfully provided rich accounts of the lives of the poor and insightful theoretical contributions (Ellis, 2000; Cleaver & Toner, 2006; Mosse, 2005).

With regards to data analysis, the decision to use households—individuals who live together under the same roof and share the principal meals of the day (INEI, 2005)—as the study’s most constitutive unit of information and analysis (Figure 3.1), in turn, is not free from certain drawbacks. First, households tend to attribute diverse economic responsibilities to its members according to different criteria such as gender, age, and health condition that usually render an unequal access to economic resources and allocation of household assets in favour of the main bread-winners (typically healthy male adults). Second, those differentiated domestic roles and unequal access to resources have important consequences on issues of power, decision making, and negotiation within households (Crehan, 1992; Deaton, 1997; Ellis, 2000). Despite these issues, the decision to centre the analysis on households responded to two considerations: (i) the beneficiary units of the development intervention studied were defined as households so that all activities and forms of participation were organised at this level; (ii) rural households constitute tight productive units due to their dependency on free labour for agricultural, farm and forestry production, so that individual data were very likely to produce redundant information whilst adding further complexity to the analysis. It was expected, in addition, that the use of participant observation and informal interviews alongside the application of in depth interviews with partners of some heads of households, in addition to the information obtained from key informants, would help to minimise the risk of obtaining and generating biased data.

In summary, I am confident that the research design used for the present study provides a fruitful insight into the short-term effects of building social capital efforts—through a participatory intervention—on the manner in which poor actors’ features of sociability are integrated into their economic strategies and on the terms of inclusion that allow them to access and benefit from social resources vis-à-vis the class-based power relations in which those processes take place at the local and regional levels. Despite that the study’s findings and conclusions should be related to the specific geographical, socioeconomic, and historical settings in which this work has been conducted, I consider that the proposed dialogue between the mainstream social capital literature and critical theoretical approaches enriches the existing debates surrounding the concept of social capital. In this respect, the present research study could serve for—and benefit from—further replicability and more comprehensive explorations of additional intervening factors (e.g., cultural traditions, ecological features, or population sizes and demographic compositions). In addition, the study could be considered as a starting point or ‘baseline’ for further research following a lengthier historical scope or using ethnographic and
more in-depth qualitative methods that look more in detail into the subjective and cognitive processes behind actors’ investments in relationships and uses of social resources.

3.3. Data collection methods

3.3.1. Household surveys

Surveys were implemented to obtain information on households’ material living conditions, access to social resources, and networks of relationships of economic significance. An initial plan to census the local population was discarded due to the time demands of such an enterprise, particularly considering that temporary migration was a recurrent phenomenon in the area. This study worked instead with a representative sample. The design followed consisted of a stratified sampling design using as a criterion of homogeneity whether household units owned plots of land that were actively exploited for commercial purposes. The sampling framework was obtained from the participatory socioeconomic diagnostic report developed by the project. The number of sampling units was confirmed by a personal inspection of the area (complete maps in Appendix I). In total, the two villages studied comprised 153 households distributed in the following manner:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Total (n)</th>
<th>Landholders cultivating cash crops (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>San Mateo</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>78.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Luis</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>83.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>79.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The final sample size consisted of ninety-six households, on the basis of a 95% confidence level and a 5% margin of error for the criterion variable (See Appendix II for sample size calculations). Assuming an optimum allocation system (proportional to size and to standard deviation), fifty-four cases were assigned to San Mateo and forty-two to San Luis. The cases were randomly selected from a map of each village. The head of the household, identified as the main income earner, was the primary respondent of the survey (except for the food expenditure component which was applied to the person in charge of preparing family meals). If respondents were absent, they were replaced only if their absence prolonged over a two-week period of time so as to avoid using too many replacements. A total of eight replacements were drawn randomly in the third week of polling during the first wave of surveys (March 2006).

The second wave of household surveys, in turn, was applied in October 2007. The application period was longer than in the previous data collection process (four weeks) as it was

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33 This constitutes a criterion of poverty as landless residents and those smallholders cultivating solely for self-consumption are expected to be more deprived than more established farmers. Economic practices are also likely to differ as the first ones tend to obtain most of their income through work as wage labour (Ellis, 2000; Crehan, 1992).
intended to interview all initial cases and informants from the first wave of surveys. By the end of the fourth week of operations, ninety-five households were re-interviewed; one family moved out of town. The last surveys were implemented in June 2008. This one only partly replicated the initial survey. The components applied in the aforementioned two waves of household surveys consisted solely of social capital items. The level of attrition was higher in this last round of surveys, with eighty-nine of the initial cases re-interviewed (three rejections and four absences).

The questionnaire was elaborated on the basis of information obtained through unstructured interviews with local leaders and key informants as well as direct observations of local practices during the first stage of the study (preliminary community assessment). A first draft of the questionnaire was sent in advance to the project’s staff in order to attain face validity for the instrument. Next, a pilot test was conducted with six residents from other beneficiary villages in order to avoid losing potential respondents from the villages of interest. A cognitive interview procedure (Willis, 2005) was carried out during this process. This involved a retrospective assessment of the proposed questions by the pilot test participants, who reviewed their own responses and explained the meaning of their answers whilst identifying any specific difficulties with regard to the items proposed and the phrasing of the questions. The final version of the instrument required between 1.5 to 2 hours to be completed and was applied by two fieldwork assistants after a half–a–day training session.

The questionnaire was divided in two main sections, one centred on demographic characteristics of household members, their living conditions, productive activities, and expenditure levels, and a second section centred specifically on social capital. (See Appendix III for the final version of the survey):

a. **Socioeconomic characteristics:**

This first section adapted the standard questions used by the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI) for its Annual National Household Survey (ENAHO) (INEI, 2005). The following sets of indicators were measured:

- Material living conditions: construction materials of residences, number of rooms, sources of water for human consumption, and presence of latrines.
- Socio-demographic data of household members: gender, age, and occupation.
- Education: literacy, registration in school, and level of education achieved.
- Health: recurrent diseases, cases of hospitalization, births, and access to medical treatment.
- Agricultural production: Land extension, crops cultivated, use of crops, and related income and expenses.
- Livestock: Types of cattle, livestock size, disposition of livestock, and related income and expenses.
- Forest resources: Forest resources used, disposition of end-products, and related income and expenses.
- Non-farm income: income generating activities conducted and payment received.
- Additional income: loans and perceived rents.
- Household and farm equipment.
- Migration (temporary and permanent): destinations and reasons for migration.
- Estimated household expenditure for food, education, health, transportation and communication, clothing, house maintenance, durable goods, and entertainment.

b. **Social capital:**

Relevant indicators were developed around Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of social capital as integrated by social resources and social networks (Bourdieu, 1980, 1986, 2005):

- Information about the variety of resources of potential economic value that local actors could have access to was obtained by means of an adapted ‘Resource Generator Tool’ (van der Gaag & Snijders, 2004, 2005; Franke, 2005). This consisted of a survey instrument designed to identify agents’ access to a fixed list of resources, each of them with the potential of producing favourable economic returns by increasing an agent’s economic capital or resources instrumental for income generation activities, or by lowering living costs. In order to ascertain the ease of access to those social resources, the closeness of the sources of support to the family in question was assessed according to the nature of their relationships: acquaintances, friends or relatives.

An important advantage of this instrument compared to other social capital instruments is that it does not intend to be a standardised measure of the concept; it constitutes instead a data collection strategy that is ultimately defined in empirical terms, according to the socioeconomic context in which agents operate. The design of a resource generator tool, in this respect, is not prescriptive but rather flexible, requiring both a theory-driven as well as an empirical knowledge of the context in which actors operate. In this respect, the final items included in the instrument resulted from a mix of Bourdieu’s capital classification and the information obtained in the first data collection stage phase. As a result, they considered the following sets of resources: economic (access to cash), physical (access to productive assets), cultural (academic or technical information),
bureaucratic (access to public agencies),[34] and material support in case of emergencies. The list totalled twenty-five items randomly ordered:

**Table 3.2 Resource generator items**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>Accommodation in cases of emergency (e.g., El Niño or fire).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>Information about how to care for or improve your livestock (e.g., preventing and treating diseases).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>Personal care in case of health emergencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>Help to obtain jobs in nearby farms or contratas in sugar or cotton plantations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.</td>
<td>Information about health issues (e.g., diagnosing and treating common diseases: respiratory infections, stomach problems).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f.</td>
<td>Material support (e.g., food or clothing,) in case of emergencies (e.g., El Nino, fire, or robbery).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g.</td>
<td>Free labour during the harvest season.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h.</td>
<td>Help to conduct bureaucratic procedures in the town hall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i.</td>
<td>Lending of vehicles to transport farm production for free.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j.</td>
<td>Lending of draft animals and related equipment (e.g., ploughs or carts).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k.</td>
<td>Help to obtain jobs in urban centres (e.g., Chiclayo, Lima).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l.</td>
<td>Lending of farming tools during the planting or harvest season.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m.</td>
<td>Selling of improved seeds, fertilizers, or new farm equipment on credit or instalments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n.</td>
<td>Legal advice (e.g., declaration of inheritance, formalisation of land ownership, etc.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o.</td>
<td>Looking after your house and children if absent for long periods of time (over 1 week).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p.</td>
<td>Teaching children a trade for non-farm work (e.g., to work in construction, doing mechanical work, etc.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q.</td>
<td>Periodic remittances of goods or money.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r.</td>
<td>Helping children with their school tasks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s.</td>
<td>Help to commercialise farming output (crops or livestock) in Lambayeque or Chiclayo markets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t.</td>
<td>Help to deal with local public services (e.g., obtaining quick attention at health centre, dealing with the police, etc.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>u.</td>
<td>Information about local and national political affairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v.</td>
<td>Loans to fund economic activities (e.g., to buy or rent land, buy farm equipment or livestock) with no or very low interest rates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w.</td>
<td>Information about how to care for or improve your crops (e.g., deal with plagues or fertilizers to use).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x.</td>
<td>Help to conduct bureaucratic procedures in the city hall in Chiclayo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>y.</td>
<td>Selling of medicines on credit.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second dimension of social capital referred specifically to the set of relationships to which actors could appeal in order to access those social resources mentioned. To this effect, three different sets of relationships were distinguished: (i) local relationships, within each village; (ii) those that bridge beyond the local area,[35] and (iii) those that reach up to political authorities and leading figures (Lin, 2001; Lin & Erickson, 2008), a differentiation akin to the ‘bonding’, ‘bridging’ and ‘linking’ social capital classification (Woolcock, 2001, 2002).

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[34] This is associated to Bourdieu’s definition of ‘bureaucratic capital’, which refers to the possession of knowledge about the regulations that dominate proceedings within the State acquired either via personal experience or specialised learning (2005).

[35] This referred to the local neighbouring villages San Mateo, San Luis, San Felipe, and San Juan.
The sets of supportive relationships within the village and beyond the local area were identified by means of a 'name generator tool', a survey instrument that maps ego-centred networks. In this case, however, the intention was not to map all existing actors’ relationships, as it is common in many social capital assessments (Franke, 2005); instead, as the study focused on mediated access to economic capital and those forms of capital that could be transformed into the latter, and for compatibility purposes with the resource generator tool, each name generating question applied referred to the same sets of benefits discussed previously: economic, physical, informational, and bureaucratic resources as well as material support for emergencies:

**Table 3.3 Name generating items (local and external networks)**

| a. | Help to find employment in local or urban areas. |
| b. | Loans or credit for over 100 S/. (23.5 UK£) with no interests |
| c. | Technical information about farming activities. |
| d. | Provision of major productive assets (e.g., ploughs, draft animals, carts) if required. |
| e. | Help to access or deal with public officials and services. |
| f. | Provision of material support during emergencies. |

Closeness to those potential sources of support, next, was assessed according to the type of relationship: acquaintance, friend, or relative. Finally, vertical networks were assessed via a subcomponent of the resource generator tool. Following other similar empirical assessments in the network literature centred on social prestige (Lin, 2001; Lin & Erickson, 2008; van der Gaag & Snijders, 2004, 2005), I enquired about whether heads of households or their partners had direct or mediated access to public officials and leading local figures:

**Table 3.4 Vertical networks items**

| a. | President of the water users’ commission (district) |
| b. | President of the board of water users (La Leche valley) |
| c. | The school principal |
| d. | The parish priest |
| e. | The chief of police |
| f. | The chief doctor of the health centre |
| g. | District governor |
| h. | The mayor of the district. |

An additional set of social capital related items were included to the questionnaire. These were derived from the Integrated *Questionnaire for the Measurement of Social Capital* (Grootaert et al., 2003) and were related exclusively to have a broad

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36 Other two items were initially considered: years of acquaintanceship and frequency of visits per week. They were later discarded after the pilot-test exercise because of being too time consuming and some respondents considered it too intrusive.
assessments of social cohesion by means of the following indicators: (i) participation in local social organisations, (ii) trust in neighbours, (iii) opinions regarding presence of local forms of exclusion, and (iv) experience of conducting communal work activities in the past 12 months.

3.3.2. Unstructured interviews

This technique was an integral part of the data collection process, and it was implemented throughout the different stages of the study. Unstructured interviews were conducted via informal conversations held with local residents (beneficiaries and non–beneficiaries), village authorities, and project staff in conjunction with on–site observational techniques. They were not tape recorded; information, instead, was written down as part of the field notes.

This approach provided three key advantages (Patton, 2002; Esterberg, 2002): first, it allowed to flexibly pursue information in any direction considered relevant in direct response to a specific scenario (e.g., when walking with women to collect water or with men working on their farm), thus accessing a wide breadth of information. Second, the spontaneity and informality surrounding these conversations facilitated generating rapport with local residents. Finally, it permitted approaching other sources of information (e.g., the elderly, the local youth, or women) rather than merely the heads of household.

Although unstructured interviews were not pre–planned, the issues raised when interacting with local residents tended to follow the objectives traced for each of the stages of the data collection process. During the first and second stages of the study, hence, conversations centred around material living conditions and economic practices, forms of engagement in local organisations, local political dynamics, and general use of relationships. The issues explored, in no particular order, addressed the following topics:

Table 3.5 Topics pursued during unstructured interviews – (1st and 2nd stages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>i. Village trajectory:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Initial living conditions and changes in public and private infrastructure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Critical events (e.g., El Niño events).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Prior interventions of development agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. Associational activity:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Trajectories of local associations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Traditional forms of collaboration, and cooperation according to organisational roles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Decision–making mechanisms within local associations, forms of election and frequency of changes in leadership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii. Economic aspects:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Understanding of poverty and wealth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Income generation activities: farm production, commerce, temporary work, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Forms of economic cooperation: job search, shared assets, collective work, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv. Politics:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Presence of political parties and forms of political participation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Opinion on public authorities, community leaders and district political movements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
v. Perceptions of the project:
   - Accounts of how the project was brought to the area and of the initial reception.
   - Expectations of the project.
   - Reasons for (non) involvement.

In subsequent phases of the research, these conversations shifted their focus from local practices towards issues related to the march of the project, participation of residents, and main changes observed in town. In addition, they also aimed to make me aware of any events, such as political campaigns, environmental problems, actions of public agencies, among others, that may have affected the local social dynamics alongside the project intervention. The most recurrent topics discussed informally during the second half of the data collection process were the following:

**Table 3.6 Topics pursued in unstructured interviews (3rd stage)**

i. Associational activity:
   - Activities conducted by local associations.
   - Activities conducted in coordination with public authorities or development agencies.

ii. Politics:
   - Activities of political parties and involvement of the local population or authorities.
   - Activities conducted by the town hall and recent public investments in the area.
   - Information on candidates and electoral promises.

iii. Economic trajectories:
   - Accounts of the last agricultural campaign.
   - Self-assessment of changes in households’ economic condition and reasons.
   - Implementation of new income generation activities in the area.
   - Perception of changes in the overall economic condition of the area.

iv. Project implementation:
   - Activities conducted in the previous months.
   - General assessments of participation from the local population.
   - Problems or conflicts observed.

v. Project effects:
   - Main forms of use of material benefits provided by the project.
   - Main forms of use of training and technical assistance in local economic practices.
   - Development of new economic partnerships within or outside the village.
   - Identification of changes in residents’ participation in village organisations.
   - Assessments of relationships between public figures, local authorities, and residents.

### 3.3.3. Semi-structured interviews

These interviews, also known as in depth interviews, were conducted with a variety of informants, including heads of households, partners, village leaders, and project staff. This data collection technique was implemented in relation to two main objectives (Patton, 2002; Esterberg, 2002): on the one hand, it allowed a detailed description and examination of the different elements of analysis included in the present research, such as residents’ life stories, living conditions, quotidian (non)economic practices, organisational dynamics of social associations and beneficiary committees, and forms of use of project benefits; on the other, it
permitted to explore and record actors’ points of view and interpretations of events and practices in their own terms, thereby generating a deeper understanding of their reasoning for actions, as demanded by the theoretical framework implemented in this study.

Topic guides used in this data collection technique emerged from a preliminary analysis of the information obtained through informal conversations and personal observation techniques. They ensure that the same basic lines of enquiry were pursued with each informant for comparison and integration purposes. The structure of all the interviews was open-ended, but they followed a semi-structured format with predetermined motivating questions. Subsequent subtopics to be followed up after each motivating question were also previously established but flexibly implemented according to the flow of the interview. In addition, neither motivating questions nor subtopics were introduced in a specific order or were necessarily introduced in the conversation verbatim; instead, transitions between topics were approached in a flexible manner so as to create a ‘natural conversation’ context (Patton, 2002). Two different sets of semi-structured interviews were conducted:

a. **Households:**

In order to attain a wide scope of perspectives in social and economic terms, cases were selected on the basis of the information obtained from the first wave of household surveys; in relation to whether they were beneficiaries or not of the project and their economic conditions, being able to include informants from all different socioeconomic groups—landless or nearly landless residents, micro-farmers (up to one ha of land), micro and small farmers (over one ha. to five has of land), and medium farmers (over five has of land). Information about a total of twenty-eight households was obtained in this manner: fourteen in San Luis and thirteen in San Mateo. In addition, in order to reduce the risk of gender-bias, some partners of those heads of households were also interviewed (equally covering different socioeconomic profiles). In total, ten women were interviewed in addition to heads of households: six in San Luis and four in San Mateo. (A detailed socioeconomic profile of informants can be found in Appendix IV).

The first round of interviews took place in July–August 2006. The main two lines of enquiry pursued at this stage followed the initial understanding of social capital as both social resources and social networks: interviews served, first, to identify and examine the economic practices that local residents implement in order to make a living and the role that social relationships play in that matter and, second, to explore how residents’ engagement in different (non)economic spheres of action permitted them to forge different networks of relationships within and beyond the local area. The central topics addressed in those interviews are reported below. (For complete topic guides see Appendix V.)
Table 3.7 Topics addressed in interviews with head of households and partners: community assessment

1. Head of household’s past and household’s recent economic trajectory.
2. Main economic activities conducted by household members and relevance of social relationships to their activities.
3. Use of social relationships to complement stocks of physical capital.
4. Access to loans and credit through relationships.
5. Recent experiences of out-migration, support received from friends and relatives as well as from migrants.
6. Forms of support from social relationships in cases of economic shocks.
7. Personal assessment of closeness between residents of the village and main forms of mutual support and collective work.
8. Experiences of associational activity, indirect benefits obtained, and roles played in the organisation.
10. Reasons for participating in the project.

The second round of interviews conducted in June–July 2007 as part of the third stage of the research pursued both lines of enquiry—social resources and social networks—but in direct relation to the project implementation and its wider impact in the local area, thereby addressing any potential effects on beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries’ practices. The main topics addressed at the time were presented in the following manner:

Table 3.8 Topics addressed in interviews with head of households and partners: project implementation

1. Perceived changes (2005–2007) in household’s material condition. Influence of the project in reported changes.
2. Changes in the manner economic activities are conducted. Perceived influence of the project in changes.
4. Development of new connections or collaborative agreements for economic purposes. Influence of the project in changes.
5. Perceived changes in mediated access to productive assets. Influence of the project in changes.
6. Perceived changes in access to loans and credit for commercial purposes and during emergencies. Influence of the project in changes.
7. Perceived changes in access to authorities and public agencies. Influence of the project in changes.
   [FOR BENEFICIARIES ONLY]
8. Project benefits most appealing to them.
9. Evaluation about the participatory dynamic of the project and forms of involvement
10. Meeting of new contacts through the project within and beyond the local area and with authorities.
   [FOR EVERYONE]
11. Perception of changes in the village (infrastructure, economy, organisation, and presence of public agencies). Influence of the project in perceived changes.
12. Expectations for household’s and village’s development
b. **Key Informants:**

These interviewees were selected in order to obtain a wider understanding of how the project was implemented in the area and particularly the form its activities interconnected with the most regular common practices—economic and non-economic—in the area, thereby potentially affecting the local socioeconomic dynamics. Three sets of informants were selected to this effect: (i) village authorities with a long-standing leading role in the area of study; (ii) regular beneficiaries who have been involved in the project since an early stage and have been living in the area for a rather prolonged period of time (before 1990); and (iii) project staff that had direct participation in project activities: a veterinarian, an agronomist, a nurse, the project officer, and the project promoters working in each village. All key informants were selected after the first stage of the data collection process, and hence, had already been proven to be rich, reliable, and accessible sources of information; three key conditions necessary for the successful use of this strategy (Marshall, 1996; Patton, 2002). In total, nine village authorities (four in San Luis and five in San Mateo); nine regular beneficiaries (four in San Luis and five in San Mateo); and the six members of the NGO staff involved in the project were interviewed.

This approach aimed to obtain, first, a more detailed description of the implementation of the development intervention taking into consideration the points of view of both individuals directly involved in this process and those who were at the receiving end of those actions as well as a whether or not project activities projected their most direct impact beyond the group of beneficiaries involved. The first round of interviews on the matter took place in March 2006, and lasted around forty minutes. The leading topics discussed are listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.9 Main topics addressed with key informants: project implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Initial contact between villagers and authorities with the NGO. Expectations and opposition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Preliminary organisation of residents to bring the project to the area. Participation of village leaders and residents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Initial participation of residents in the project. Reasons for refusing to participate and expectations of change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. General assessment of the participatory style of work of the project and commitment of beneficiaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Relationship between beneficiaries and leaders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Beneficiaries’ preferences for project’s material benefits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Perceived and expected effects of politics in the marching of the project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Suggestions for improving the march of the project.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The final set of interviews with key informants was conducted in December 2007 and lasted, on average, one hour and aimed to attain a general evaluation of the process the villages and local households studied went through due to the development intervention.
in economic, organizational, and political terms. In this respect, these interviews did not attempt to assess whether the intervention was successful or not in improving local living conditions. Instead, the questions aimed to examine what use the local population made of the benefits provided by the project, what factors conditioned residents’ participation in the project and other collective-action initiatives, what were its main effects over the village in general, and whether it facilitated a better access to public authorities and officials. The main topics addressed on those issues are listed below.

**Table 3.10 Main topics addressed with key informants: changes and impacts.**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Change in memberships to the project committee. Reasons for changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Effects of project benefits on beneficiaries' and non-beneficiaries' economic activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Effects of the participatory style of work of the project. Assessment of beneficiaries’ participation in project activities, relationships with leaders, and development of collaborative agreements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Perceived and expected effects of politics in the running of the project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>General assessment of the project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Expected future changes in the village associated to the intervention.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**3.3.4. Participant observation**

Data collection via participant observation was conducted in two different ways. During the first and second stages of the research, it was used as a broad descriptive method which placed greater emphasis on variety rather than on detail. This involved, hence, registering the various economic practices and quotidian routines followed by local residents, such as cooking, harvesting, and walking with children to the school, among others. Such an approach benefited the study by generating a rich, albeit rather superficial, depiction of local practices whilst simultaneously facilitating building useful connections with residents of different socioeconomic backgrounds, including access to their domestic dynamics in certain cases (e.g., attending birthday parties, school celebrations, or baptisms).

Once access to local families had been secured, and there were already in place various pieces of information from in depth interviews and surveys providing a wider depiction of local living conditions and practices, observations were narrowed to more specific processes directly related to the research questions proposed. In this regard, in the last stage of the study two main areas of interest were pursued: (i) how residents adapted the project benefits into their economic practices and daily routines and to what extent their connections with other families changed in the process; and (ii) the organisational dynamics operating within the project, both among non-leading residents and committee authorities. On this last subject, direct access to diverse project activities, including committees' meetings, collective work activities, training sessions with
authorities and local promoters, as well as to the monthly sessions of committee leaders and special events with public officers were of special importance.

Fieldwork notes were registered on a regular basis after each visit to the fieldwork sites. It is necessary to highlight, however, that this technique played only a secondary role in the present study; it served primarily to contextualise and complement the information obtained through other sources as well as to design topic guides for interviews and the most suitable items for household surveys.

3.4. Data analysis

Given the research design followed for the present study, the data analysis process did not begin only at the final stage of the research, instead it was part of an iterative process in which data analyses from different sources of information were interrelated. The data analysis process, hence, proceeded in the following manner:

- The information obtained through participant observation and unstructured interviews, registered in field notes, served first to orient the lines of enquiry to be followed through other data collection methods—surveys and in depth interviews—and, hence, to contextualise and enrich the data obtained by these means, particularly by specifying observable practices associated to certain topics (e.g., relationship between gender–based domestic roles and economic practices). The dispersed information gathered by means of those strategies, hence, was grouped and reduced following the main topics of discussion around which other forms of data collection were structured (i.e., following the main themes and sub–themes that emerged from interviews). Consequently, besides enriching certain areas of discussion, field notes served to validate the findings obtained from other information sources.

- Household surveys were codified and processed using SPSS statistical software (Norusis, 2007). Chi–square (\(X^2\)) tests were used for comparisons of categorical data (Fischer’s exact test was used when sample size rendered too few cases for analysis). \(t\)–tests, in turn, were used to compare means between interval–ratio variables that acted as socioeconomic or social capital indicators in order to ascertain differences between the villages studied. Analysis of the distribution of relevant social capital indicators within each village, according to socioeconomic conditions, was conducted by means of one–way ANOVA tests (or \(F\)–tests).\(^{37}\) Comparisons between matched pairs of cases to assess overall changes over time in social capital indicators were conducted by means of Wilcoxon’s non–

\(^{37}\) The absence of multivariate modelling techniques responds a theoretically–driven decision. These statistical approaches attempt to model social actions under the assumption that there are independent variables (e.g., sex, age, education) that predict a specific single dependent one (e.g., income). However, such an assumption tends to conceal the whole network of relations in which these different features of social life interact with each other, thereby presenting instead a simplified interpretation of the social dynamics in which actors operate (Bourdieu, 1984, 2005).

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parametric tests ($W$–test) due to the small number of cases for sub–samples (Gibbons, 1993).38

- Semi–structured interviews were transcribed verbatim as the research study progressed through its different stages making use of the following basic transcription notation conventions (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘…’</td>
<td>truncated word</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘( )’</td>
<td>short pause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘...’</td>
<td>omissions of text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘[ ]’</td>
<td>observations from researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘[ ]’</td>
<td>start of overlap between peoples’ discourses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘]’</td>
<td>end of overlap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>underscore</td>
<td>emphasis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPS</td>
<td>loud noise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thematic analysis was used to examine the transcripts (Esterberg, 2002). Interviews were catalogued according to the phase of the research in which they were conducted and the socioeconomic background of the interviewees and engagement in the project (non–beneficiaries, regular beneficiaries, and committee authorities). First, the data was examined for individual participants and then across participants following the aforementioned classifications. An open–coding process ensued after this first review, and so transcripts were segmented using a series of codes developed on the basis of the topics arising from the answers to the motivating questions.

Table 3.11 Coding book: social capital and social resources (sample)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research issue</th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Sub–themes (codes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOCIAL RESOURCES</td>
<td>Financial resources</td>
<td>• Economic information – Jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Behavioural information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Agricultural trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Out–migration and remittances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Local commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Loans and credit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informational resources</td>
<td>• Technical information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Formal education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Apprenticeship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Physical resources</td>
<td>• Minor farm equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Major farm equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Labour sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political resources</td>
<td>• Access public services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Economic information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Employment in public agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informal insurance</td>
<td>• Collections of money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Fund–raising activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Personal economic support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Personal material support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

38 Results from the name generator for local networks (within villages) were initially processed making use of specialised social network analysis software Ucinet (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002). After out–strength measures were calculated for each household, the data was transferred to SPSS datasets.
Initial codes were subsequently examined in detail by collating the different interview extracts around the established codes, and then searching for recurrent patterns that permitted sorting those codes into potential themes. The latter, however, were not defined in a complete flexible manner (as it would be expected from grounded theory approaches) but structured around the theoretical considerations guiding this study: the duality of social capital as social resources and social networks and the double conditionality of the structure: capital in its diverse forms and associated (non)economic practices (Bourdieu, 1984, 1986, 1989). Lastly, codified transcript extracts were collated according to the identified themes and sub–themes so as to detail what aspects of the data each of them captured. The data analysis software Atlas ti (Muhr, 2004) was used throughout this process. An example regarding the organisation of themes and sub–themes is presented below (§ Appendix VI for full coding book).

3.5. Concluding remarks

The present study proposes a case study framework that follows up two rural villages that take part in a participatory development intervention. The value of this approach relates to the richness of the data to be obtained from the area of study via multiple sources of information, including quantitative (household surveys) and qualitative (participant observation, informal conversations and semi–structured interviews) methods which complement each other. The results obtained, hence, are expected to present a set of detailed and well contextualised accounts of the effects of social relationships on economic practices, and vice–versa, according to actors’ objective conditions which increases their validity. By the same token, it allows differentiating, on the one hand, social networks from the benefits they generate, and on the other, villages from their constituent components: individuals and households.

In addition, the selection of two relatively isolated sites in which no parallel interventions took place, whether by other NGOs or the state, relatively close to urban markets provided a suitable arena first, to distinguish among different sets of networks—local, external, and vertical—which tend to be more diffused in other settings; and second, to assess the developmental effects of the efforts of a participatory intervention to organise people to work collectively and interconnect them with other external actors. Finally, the use of longitudinal data is expected to facilitate the minimization of the risk of reverse causality problems.
PART II
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND THE LOCAL OBJECTIVE ORDER
CHAPTER 4
SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILE OF SAN MATEO AND SAN LUIS

The present chapter provides a general depiction of the historical trajectory of San Mateo and San Luis, the prevailing material conditions of its inhabitants, and the main sources of income that dominate local households’ livelihoods. Drawing on Bourdieu’s theoretical framework (Bourdieu, 1985, 1994, 2005; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), the aims of this section are two. First, the evidence to be presented will serve to detail the objective conditions of those actors co–habiting in the local social space on the basis of their endowments of capital—in its diverse forms—and to trace the objective differences that characterise residents’ belonging to different local socioeconomic groups (i.e., what stocks of capital serve to differentiate the poorest from the relatively well–off). Second, Chapter 4 will serve as well to relate local actors’ economic practices to the regions’ political economy. That is, to set the observed local economic activities in correspondence to the predominant state of the mechanisms of (re)production of capital (e.g., the conditions of the local labour market, commercialisation opportunities for farm produce, or the productive application of technical knowledge and superior education) as well as to the state of power relations between actors (e.g., large plantations, local government agencies, or central government programmes). The results will serve instead to contextualise the analyses of social capital, as social resources and networks, in subsequent chapters.

The data to be used in this chapter was obtained between August 2005 and March 2006 by means of informal conversations with residents from San Mateo and San Luis, participant observation, review of the participatory socioeconomic diagnostic developed by villagers and the NGO, and the baseline household survey. The latter took place in March 2006; at that time, the project had just started to provide some of the programmed material benefits to local beneficiaries (e.g., kitchens and livestock modules), so the data gathered was expected to produce a fair portrayal of the villages studied before the intervention.

The chapter is structured in the following manner: first, it presents a general account of the historical trajectory of the villages studied, presence of the state and local politics, and local forms of organisation. Next, the objective condition of local households is assessed by estimating their endowments of physical and human capital. The chapter closes with a description of the dominant economic practices conducted by the local residents.
4.1. General Context

4.1.1. Local topography and historical background

San Mateo and San Luis are neighbouring villages located in the province of Lambayeque, department of Lambayeque, approximately 50 km to the north of the city of Chiclayo, capital of the department. The closest urban settings to these two villages are the towns of Pacora and Illimo, to which they are connected by a dirt road (Figure 4.1). San Mateo is located approximately 4 km from those towns, whilst San Luis around 2 km farther.

Weather conditions in the area are warm and dry; the National Service of Meteorology and Hydrology (SENHAMI, 2008) estimates that temperatures range between 32°C and 24°C during summer (December–February) and between 24 °C and 18°C in winter (June–August). The topography is predominantly clay–based soil plains with a few small elevations; the average altitude of the province is approximately 32 metres above sea level (SENHAMI, 2008).
Precipitation in the area is very limited, consisting mainly of short periods of light rain during winter. Water for agricultural purposes is primarily available during summer from rain that falls in the mountainous sector of the department (eastern section), increasing the volume of water transported by the local river *La Leche*, which feeds the local irrigation system. However, water availability remains very limited, as the *La Leche* river is a seasonal one that stays predominantly dry except during summer. These conditions vary dramatically when the phenomenon of *El Niño* brings heavy rains in the summer season, resulting in extensive floods and subsequent property and economic losses. In recent decades, the most destructive *El Niño* episodes took place in 1972, 1983, and 1998. Despite the dry conditions, extensive areas are covered by various species of vegetation; above all, carob (*algarrobos*), *faigue*, and *vichayo* trees. Mango and plum trees are also common in the area.

The villages of San Mateo and San Luis were part of the same *hacienda* (i.e., grand rural state) in the first half of the twentieth century. Local accounts of residents from that time reported they lived in the area as tenants. In 1969, however, circumstances changed because the landowner decided to partition the hacienda and sell it to existing tenants or any interested buyer. Reportedly, this was done as a pre-emptive measure against the prospect of expropriation by the left-wing military government of General Velasco Alvarado (1968–1974), who, in June 1969, launched an ambitious land reform programme affecting any coastal landholding of more than 150 ha. The landowner’s decision had important consequences for the future development of San Mateo and San Luis. The land reform programme initiated in June 1969 did not advocate the partition of grand rural estates; rather, it encouraged the formation of agricultural cooperatives (*Cooperativas Agrarias de Producción – CAPs*) in northern Peru, in which all worker-residents took over the administration and exploitation of the *haciendas*. By the 1980s, due to the lack of access to credit, an adverse economic environment (high inflation and devaluation of the national currency), and a lack of technical support and training, among the most salient factors, most of these cooperatives faced serious economic problems. The neoliberal reforms of the 1990s, implemented by the government of Alberto Fujimori (1990–2001), facilitated the corporate acquisition of these cooperatives by private investors or their liquidation via a process of land partition among CAP members (Hunefeldt, 1997). In contrast, the villages of San Mateo and San Luis evolved into a group of small farmers who were individual legal owners of their farms (*chacras*) and had no traditional system of community government.

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39 Only one of five local informants that were residents at that time reported a sharecropping agreement; the rest reported paying the rent in cash.
Formally speaking, the villages of San Mateo and San Luis only came into existence in 1986. Until then, they were both part of a single administrative unit (*centro poblado*) integrated by two other nearby villages: San Felipe and San Mateo.\(^{42}\) According to local informants, this change came about as a result of a significant administrative reorganisation of the region during the second half of the 1980s, when the Maoist guerrillas of the Shining Path started to build a presence in the area. This reorganisation involved the formal recognition of new villages in the area and the appointment of lieutenant governors. These public authorities are representatives of the state appointed by the Ministry of the Interior as part of its system of political authorities (prefects for departments, sub–prefects for provinces, governors for districts and lieutenant governors for small towns and villages).\(^ {43}\) They have the responsibility of informing Ministry representatives (i.e., governors, (sub)prefects, and the police force) about political, social and economic events taking place in their respective villages, coordinating security actions in the local area and organising governmental responses to natural disasters. San Mateo and San Luis have had lieutenant governors since 1987 and 1989 respectively.

Despite their similar origins, San Mateo offers a more concentrated distribution of residences than San Luis, with approximately two–fifths of all houses built around the few public buildings existing in the area—such as the local school and church—and along the main access road. In San Luis, residences instead are more scattered across the area and located next to residents’ plots of land (Figures 4.3 and 4.4).\(^ {44}\) Local accounts of the progressive emergence of these dissimilarities alluded to two interrelated processes. First, San Mateo has benefitted more from public investments than San Luis, which gave the former a more ordered arrangement of the space with a clear ‘centre’, as all public buildings have clustered around the plot of land

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\(^{42}\) Names are invented so as to preserve the anonymity of the region.

\(^{43}\) The figures of prefects and sub–prefects have been removed since 2008 (Supreme Decree No. 006–2008–IN). Governors and lieutenant governors, however, still remain as legal representatives of the Ministry of Interior.

\(^{44}\) Complete updated maps are in Appendix V.
donated by San Mateo residents in the 1970s for the construction of a primary school (1973),
including a Catholic church (2001), a pre–school centre (2004), and a health post (between 1994
and 1998). Second, according to some informants, the floods caused by the *El Niño* in 1983 and
1998 apparently motivated some San Mateo families to build their houses around the school, as
this area was located on a slightly higher ground as compared to the rest of the village.

Figure 4.3 Partial aerial view – San Luis

[Image of San Luis]


Figure 4.4 Partial aerial view – San Mateo

[Image of San Mateo]


4.1.2. Public investments and local politics

The villages studied did not have access to many public services. Neither San Mateo nor San
Luis had access to electricity or processed water, no health centre of any kind operated in the
area at the time, and there was no direct police presence. The few public investments by the
central government or the town hall had concentrated in San Mateo (San Luis residents,
however, have access to most of them). They include:
The public school, which includes both primary and secondary levels of education. Originally built in 1973 with only four classrooms, covering up to 4th grade of primary, today it consists of 11 classrooms that receive approximately 250 students.\footnote{Peruvian education system is structured in the following manner: primary, 6 years of education; secondary, 5 years of education. University degrees are usually obtained after 5 years of education.} The school has been expanded with resources from the central government as well as contributions from other sources such as the Parent School Association (PSA), the town hall, and some private businesses. Built in varying circumstances, the classrooms differed in their construction materials (e.g., four classrooms were made of mud bricks instead of concrete).

- A pre-school centre built from wood prefabricated parts in 2004 by the Ministry of Education, with a capacity for 40 children.
- Two wind-powered water pumps built by the National Fund for Social Compensation and Development (FONCODES) in 1999.
- A health post that functioned between 1994 and 1998 built by the Ministry of Health. Attended by a local health promoter, it provided basic attention for most recurrent illnesses (respiratory and stomach infections). The building collapsed during the \textit{El Niño} event of 1998 and since then it has not been rebuilt.
- A Catholic church made of concrete built by the town hall in 2001 with a capacity for approximately 200 people.

Other major governmental investments reported in the area consisted of preventive works conducted by the Ministry of Transport before the \textit{El Niño} event of 1998. These works included diverting the nearby river \textit{La Leche} and the reinforcement of local irrigation canals. These public works also constituted a source of income for some residents who were hired as construction workers at the time, a practice also used by the town hall for the construction of the local Catholic church. Interventions from NGOs, in turn, have been minimal; the only account obtained about a prior project in the area concerned the construction of a concrete well in 1996 by a regional NGO named \textit{Solidarity}, which is still serves as the main source of water for human consumption in San Mateo.\footnote{The complete name is \textit{Centre of Social Studies Solidarity}, which operates in Chiclayo.}

The benefits of some of those public investments, however, are unclear. The wind-powered water pumps, for example, were unusable at the time the study began. One of them had not been in operation since 2001, due to a malfunction that had not been repaired by FONCODES, in spite of the different requests presented by the village leaders, whilst the remaining one failed to provide drinkable water because the subterranean water source used turned brackish after a few months of operations. Local opinions about the benefits from the diversion of the \textit{La Leche} river are mixed. Although many residents recognised that the damages incurred by the \textit{El Niño} event of 1998 were less severe compared to those suffered previously,
they complained that re-directing the river significantly reduced the amount of water available in the area. In addition, the use of heavy machinery appeared to have significantly damaged the access road to both sites.

Most of those public investments are intertwined with national political dynamics and economic situation. On the one hand, the presence of a public school in the area since the 1970s constitutes a reflection of a major wave of public investments conducted by the progressive ruling military regime during that decade, which substantively expanded the presence of public education and health services across the country. For example, the main public university in the region—National University Pedro Ruiz Gallo—opened its doors in 1977, whilst Chiclayo’s main hospital—Hospital Las Mercedes—opened its first haemodialysis service in 1976. Due to the economic crisis and political violence of the 1980s, public investments contracted drastically in that decade (e.g., net public expenditure diminished in 25% between years 1983–1984 and 1988–1989) (Mendoza & Melgarejo, 2008). In the decade 2000, thanks to the recovery of the economy and particularly to the privatisation of major public services (e.g., electricity and telephone companies) and enterprises (e.g., state owned mining companies and airlines) as well as the elimination of food subsidies (e.g., of bread, rice, sugar, and milk), the government counted again with the funds to invest in basic public services (e.g., expansion of school and hospital infrastructure) and particularly in food–alleviation programmes (e.g., free breakfasts for public school students). (Mendoza & Melgarejo, 2008; Arce, 2005).

The diverse public investments observed in the area, in addition, could also be related to the diverse attempts of political leaders and authorities—at the local and national levels—to establish patron–client relationships with the local population. For example, the wind–powered water pumps were built by FONCODES in 1999, when the government of Alberto Fujimori was seeking to be elected for a third mandate in 2000 after 10 years in power. This political regime was characterised by its political repression, control of the media, and ample corruption, as well as by its populist practices, which significantly expanded the number of public works across the country for political reasons, a process with FONCODES as its main agent (Schady, 1999; Arce, 2005).47 The construction of the local church in San Mateo by the town hall also indicates the primacy of political criteria to direct some public investments. This one was not only a public project incompatible with town hall formal responsibilities but also of little, if any, practical relevance, as the parish priest lives and works in the capital of the district. As a result, the church is only used by a local religious association on Friday evenings, whilst masses in San Mateo are celebrated only on some special occasions (e.g., Saint Anthony of Padua festivity on June 13 each year).

47 The statistics provided by Arce (2005) on this subject are very revealing: [FONCODES] Funding for both demand-driven and special projects varied according to the electoral calendar .... the approval of demand-driven projects was temporarily suspended after the April 1995 re-election of Fujimori .... In 2000 .... overall investments declined by about 70 percent compared with funding in 1999. (pp. 112–113)
This clientelistic style of politics is usually accompanied by populist pledges of support by local political figures. For instance, during a personal visit to the area during August 2006, two months before municipal elections, I encountered staff from the town hall taking measurements with a theodolite at the entrance of San Mateo; when queried about it, they stated that such activity was part of a project to asphalt the access road to the local villages (a version repeated by local informants). However, this project never materialised, and after the ruling major candidate failed to be re–elected, no personnel from the town hall returned to the area for this purpose. In a similar vein, in the municipal elections of 2006, a recurrent electoral promise among candidates referred to the provision of electricity and processed water which, as the campaign progressed, were pledged to be delivered in unrealistic periods of time (within one to six months at the latest). Likewise, although I could not observe such practice directly, I received information from different sources that in the previous electoral contention of 2003, small packs of food were distributed by candidates in the days prior to election day. This practice was not unknown to the Peruvian political scenario, having been used nation–wide by the state during Fujimori’s regime in the form of food and clothing donations (Arce, 2005).

The lack of stable political institutions at the local and national level contributes to the generation of such practices. Although the district has less than 3,500 registered voters, in the municipal elections of November 2006, a total of eight political groups ran for the town hall, of which only three belonged to a national organisation, whilst the rest were part of local political movements. Furthermore, none of these local political movements existed at the time of the previous municipal election in 2003 (which also included eight competing candidates, five from national political parties and three from local ones). In a clear indication of the state of national politics, three national parties that presented candidates in 2003 no longer had presence in the area by 2006 and one ceased to exist altogether between those years. The evidence obtained indicated that these organisations typically function in a disorderly fashion, centred on personalities rather than on programmatic or ideological alignments. For example, local informants reported that many candidates for mayors and council members have run for similar political positions on various occasions with different political organisations. In addition, the precariousness with which those parties usually operate was reflected by the fact that some village leaders from San Mateo and San Luis who at some point were invited to run for a position in the town hall council were asked to make significant economic contributions to the campaign, which appeared to have been funded predominantly by candidates’ own money.

Informal interviews with both residents and village leaders indicated that a rather pragmatic, or contractual, understanding of politics is predominant among the local population.

48 In 2006 the following parties participated: Todos por Lambayeque – Manos Limpias, Amistad Solidaria Independiente, Partido Renacimiento Andino (winner), Agrupación Independiente Sí Cumple, Alianza para el Progreso, Unidad Nacional and Partido Aprista Peruano. In 2003, the candidates belonged to the following: Movimiento Independiente Huererque, Movimiento Independiente Fuerza P***, Partido Aprista Peruano, Unidad Nacional, Alianza para el Progreso (winner), Perú Posible, Acción Popular and Partido Democrático Sí mismo Perú.
Two interrelated indicators pointed in that direction. First, national, district, and even village authorities, tend to be evaluated by residents according to the material benefits they provided to the population (in a common local expression, whether or not these authorities “have left work behind them”), such as a new classroom for the school, a new water canal, or the introduction of a public programme that generates temporary jobs. Correspondingly, for instance, despite the authoritarian characteristics of his political regime, many residents still have a very positive view of ex–president Fujimori because of the work conducted in the area by different public agencies in the 1990s, which included the expansion of welfare benefits in the form of free health insurance for public school students (since 1997) and the introduction of food alleviation programmes in the area (the Glass of Milk and Popular Cook programmes, to be discussed in the next section). Second, residents and village leaders manifested they were open to work with any political actor as long as he/she provides benefits for the local population. As Mr. Rodrigo, member of the town hall council, stated: “if it is ‘aprista’, ‘fujimorista’, or anything else it doesn’t matter, what matters is that they support us”. This scenario coincides with that described by recent studies in Peru, which found that most Peruvians consider the rule of law and democratic principles of government secondary to their material needs (Arce, 2005; PNUD, 2006).

This pragmatic approach does not imply, however, that residents are satisfied with the state of affairs. Informal conversations with local residents and village authorities indicated that the population is well aware of the political game by which public investments and pledges of support are established. Common complaints on this subject are that local politicians only approach the area during electoral campaigns but rarely return once in office, that most electoral promises are unlikely to be fulfilled or under the same terms as presented during the campaign, and that there is little accountability of public officials and their activities. Correspondingly, it was found that there was an ample mistrust toward most authorities and institutions, except for the Church and those that provide specific services such as education and health.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local institutions and authorities</th>
<th>San Mateo (n=54)</th>
<th>San Luis (n=42)</th>
<th>Total (n=96)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional Government</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Municipality</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town Hall</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Governor</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Force</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health services</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.1.3. Associational activity

San Mateo and San Luis have a variety of active social organisations. Moreover, almost every household in the area reported at least one membership as of 2006 (Table 4.2). It is possible to notice that there is some variation in the characteristics of associational activity for each village: there is a slightly greater number of households affiliated with the water users’ commission in San Luis than in San Mateo (albeit not at statistically significant levels) whilst in the former there is no Popular Cook committee (soup kitchen).

### Table 4.2 Participation in local social organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social organisations</th>
<th>San Mateo (n=54)</th>
<th>San Luis (n=42)</th>
<th>Total (n=96)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water Users’ Commission a/</td>
<td>74.1%</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
<td>78.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glass of Milk b/</td>
<td>74.1%</td>
<td>81.0%</td>
<td>77.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent School Association c/</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Organisation d/</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports Association</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Cook</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None e/</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( \chi^2 = 1.19, p=0.27 \)
\( \chi^2 = 0.63, p=0.43 \)
\( \chi^2 = 0.15, p=0.70 \)
\( \chi^2 < 0.10, p=0.89 \) (Fischer’s exact test)
\( \chi^2 < 0.10, p>0.80 \) (Fischer’s exact test)

The most important local associations, however, cannot be considered typical grass-root organisations. Instead, most of them are directly or indirectly associated to the policies and programmes of the state. For example, Water Users’ Organisations were established and are regulated by the Ministry of Agriculture; the Glass of Milk and Popular Cook committees belong to the nationwide food-alleviation programmes of the same name. The Parent School Association, in turn, would not exist in the area if not by the establishment of a public school in San Mateo since 1973.

The objectives of these organisations, the forms of participation that they demand from their members and their trajectories vary from one association to another. In order to understand in more detail their potential relevance to local households’ economic wellbeing and to what extent they may constitute expressions of social cohesion it is necessary, therefore, to detail their trajectories and main features:

a. **Water Users’ Organisations:**

These organisations were established at the beginning of the 1970s as a result of the process of land reform launched by the military government in 1969, which enforced state ownership over all natural resources and established a shared system of administration over water resources alongside individual farmers, rural enterprises, and rural
Socioeconomic Profile of San Mateo and San Luis

Water users’ organisations are structured in different ways. First, all farmers that share a canal system for the distribution of water for agricultural purposes are legally bound to form a water users’ commission (*Comisión de regantes*); San Mateo and San Luis belong to the same commission (*Comisión de regantes*). Water users’ commissions that belong to the main water basin are represented by the board of water users (*Junta de usuarios*); San Mateo and San Luis are represented by the board of water users of the *La Leche* valley (integrating eight different commissions), which constitutes an irrigation sub-district named after the river of the same name. Commissions’ authorities are elected in general assembly for a three-year period. Representatives to the board of water users are not elected directly; the commission’s authorities elect two delegates from among themselves to represent them in the board of water users. Finally, the latter, coordinate the technical and administrative supervision of water resources with a technical officer of the Ministry of Agriculture, organised around the office of technical administration of irrigation districts; in this particular case, the irrigation district of Motupe–Olmos–La Leche.

Membership in a water users’ association, therefore, implies significantly different responsibilities according to the instance of participation and the role assumed by a farmer. In its most basic form, active members—those who are up-to-date with commission’s established fees and are registered in the corresponding technical administration office—are expected to look after the irrigation canal around their plot of land, prevent any robbery of water during its distribution, pay the corresponding tariffs for water consumption (established as hourly rates: 7 soles (S/.) or 1.6 UK£\(^{50}\) per hour as of 2006) and any other payments established by the water users’ board for infrastructure investments, and attend general assemblies to elect its authorities and approve the commission’s annual budget and working programme for the upcoming agricultural campaign (assemblies are held usually three times a year). Participation as a commission authority or as a delegate to the board of water users demands significantly greater investments in time. They are responsible for gathering information about the prospective crops to be cultivated by local farmers, supervising the implementation of the water distribution programme in the area, supervising the maintenance of the main water distribution system, and overseeing the tasks and obligations of the water users, as well as defining the corresponding sanctions against non-compliers. To these ends, they hold meetings once a month in the capital of the district and, using funding received from the board of water users, they hire an operative for the main water supply system (*sectorista*) and various workers responsible for the distribution of water through secondary canals.

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50 As of 2010 the exchange rate is 4.3 S/. per 1 UK£. All conversions in the text use the same exchange rate.
Delegates to the board of water users (*Junta de usuarios*), in turn, coordinate with the corresponding technical administrator from the Ministry of Agriculture to define which crops are acceptable in the area, the order of distribution considering the volume of water available and number of users, and set up the corresponding water tariffs to be collected in the commissions’ district offices. Members hold assemblies three times a year. As of 2006, local informants did not report conducting other activities through the water users’ associations, such as technical assistance, productive training or accessing other benefits such as loans.

Finally, it was observed that these associations were mainly male-oriented. Although informants reported that women attend general assemblies on some occasions, they constitute a significant minority and, moreover, there were no accounts of women being elected as authorities of any water users’ organisation.

### b. Food alleviation organisations:

These are the *Glass of Milk* committees present in San Mateo and San Luis and the *Popular Cook* committee in San Mateo. These are women’s organisations that belong to nationwide public programmes. The *Glass of Milk* committee receives powdered milk and oats or cereals from the town hall on a monthly basis, acquired with funds transferred from the central government, which are distributed among all registered families that have children younger than six years of age, lactating mothers or pregnant women, or members over 65 years of age. The *Popular Cook* committee is only partly funded by the state. This organisation receives basic food supplies from the National Program for Food Assistance (PRONAA)—rice, beans, oil, and oats—distributed through the town hall and complement them with those ingredients their members can collect among themselves to prepare low-cost meals for their families or for sale to other residents to finance their activities.

These two women’s organisations are widely prevalent across Peru because of the important resources the state invests to finance these food alleviation programmes, particularly since the 1990s, when the government of Alberto Fujimori significantly increased the funds intended for both programmes whilst centralising their administration around PRONAA for political reasons (World Bank, 2007). The trajectories of the committees of San Mateo and San Luis, in this regard, can be broadly inscribed in this political process. The *Glass of Milk* committees first appeared in the area

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51 Access to water depends on whether farmers own ‘licenses’ or ‘permits’. The first one guarantees priority access to water for irrigation purposes, the latter only grant access to water if the irrigation needs of the first group have been satisfied. In San Mateo and San Luis very few residents own licenses; during fieldwork only six farmers were identified to own licenses (4 medium farmers and 2 small ones).

52 As of 2006, the Peruvian state spent approximately 130 million US$ in those two programs (World Bank 2007).
in 1994 whilst the Popular Cook committee was formed in 1996. None of these organisations emerged as pure grassroots organisations; rather, according to the accounts of founding members, they emerged in direct response to the prospect of financial and material support from PRONAA once they initiated operations in the district.

The organisational dynamics and activities of these two organisations differ. The Glass of Milk committees operate mainly as distribution centres for the powdered milk and cereals; affiliated women gather on a monthly basis to receive the food, which they prepare at home. The Popular Cook committee of San Mateo, instead, has a weekly rota of affiliated women, usually two or three members at a time, who meet and cook the corresponding meals together. Authorities of these two organisations are elected in general assembly for two–year periods. They are in charge of receiving, storing, and administering the food supplies distributed through the town hall each month. There were no reports of other activities conducted by these organisations.53

c. **Parent School Association (PSA):**

This organisation gathers all the residents whose children attend the school located in San Mateo. According to local reports, it started to operate informally in the mid 1970s. Its emergence responded not only to the interest of parents in their children’s education but mainly to the lack of funding from the Ministry of Education on the maintenance and improvement of the school infrastructure, particularly during the profound economic crisis of the 1980s. In this respect, through the PSA, local families work collectively to maintain and improve the school facilities. They usually pool local resources (money and material contributions) and labour, and appeal for material and financial support from public and private agencies (e.g., the school obtained material to set up a chemistry laboratory via equipment donated by a local agro–industry firm in 2004 whilst the town hall provided the construction materials to build a concrete surrounding wall, which was raised with local labour). The PSA elect its authorities on a bi–annual basis in a general assembly and by secret vote at the beginning of the academic year; ordinary assemblies, are usually held each month with the participation of the school principal.54

Personal observation and local accounts indicate that participation in general assemblies is usually high. Traditional gender–based relations, however, were observed to affect PSA

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53 As part of the decentralization process initiated in 2002—Law 27731 (Law that Regulates the Participation of Mothers’ Clubs and Popular Cooks in Food Support Programmes)—representatives of the Popular Cook and Glass of Milk committees are entitled to be part of the corresponding administrative boards that operate in the town hall to implement these programmes. Committees’ representatives were first invited to participate in those instances in 2007; however, neither representatives from San Mateo or San Luis have occupied those positions.

54 Since 2005 the Peruvian government established a legal framework to regulate all PSAs across the country (Law 28628 – Law Governing Parents’ Associations in Public Educational Centres). This established local educational councils (CONEIs) to be integrated by school (vice)principals and teachers' and PSAs’ representatives, and responsible for supervising the evaluation of personnel, the implementation of the annual educational programmes, and the administration of school resources. A CONEI was not established in San Mateo but until 2007.
activities. Although, there were men and women on the board of authorities throughout the study, other spaces were clearly divided: monthly assemblies were predominantly attended by women whilst men were mainly present during those activities that involved labour contributions.

d. Religious Organisations:

The main religious organisation in the area is the fraternity of Saint Anthony of Padua, which is located in San Mateo and meets each Friday evening in the local Catholic church to pray, discuss religious issues, and teach the catechism to children intending to make their first communion. Aside from their weekly faith-related activities, they also conduct fund-raising activities on certain occasions, mainly in the form of raffles, to prepare for their main annual festivity, Saint Anthony of Padua’s day on June 13. The festival involves a small procession and the celebration of mass in San Mateo by the parish priest. Members of this organisation were observed to be mainly mature women.

e. Sports Clubs:

Each village has a small sport club—Sport Club Municipal from San Luis and Sport Club Sport Boys from San Mateo—that consists of young male residents who gather on weekly basis to play football and, for a short period of time (from two to three months), play in a football tournament that takes place in the district capital.

4.2. Households’ Material Condition

4.2.1. Human capital

According to the estimates obtained from the household surveys, more than 900 individuals lived in San Mateo and San Luis as of 2006; more specifically, it was estimated that the first town totalled approximately 556 residents (95% CI: 522–590) distributed among 85 households; whereas in San Luis, the survey provided an estimate of approximately 416 individuals (95% CI: 398–428) distributed among 68 households. On average, households were composed of approximately six individuals in both sites, in a similar proportion of males and females. However, the sample distribution of household members according to age (Graph 4.1), indicates that those rural sites were facing a significant process of emigration among the local youth, as evidenced by the significant number of minors and elderly residents as compared to young adults.
The presence of the school in San Mateo appears to have facilitated access to education in the area; it was found that approximately 98% of children of school age (5 to 15 years) from both villages that took part in the survey were registered in school. The local adult population, however, is still characterised by limited education. Adult illiteracy was 11.8% (42 cases) and most of them have only basic primary education (Table 4.3). Albeit not statistically significant, it was observed that adult women in both sites were more likely to have no formal education or to fail reaching the secondary level of education as compared to men.

Table 4.3 Highest level of education obtained by adults (≥ 18) by village and sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of education completed</th>
<th>San Mateo</th>
<th>San Luis</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n=102)</td>
<td>(n=99)</td>
<td>(n=78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No education</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Incomplete</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Complete</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Incomplete</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Complete</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superior */</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[X^2 = 3.56; p=0.61\]
\[X^2 = 3.01; p=0.69\]
\[X^2 = 6.26; p=0.28\]

Superior education includes any technical or university programme

4.2.2. Physical capital

Most residences in San Mateo and San Luis have a simple structure: an earthen floor, *adobe* (mud bricks) or *quincha* (wood and reeds covered with mud) walls, and roofs made of thatch or calamine (corrugated steel sheets). Local accounts indicate that most houses are built by local labour; on many occasions, by their own inhabitants. The comparison between the two sites
(table 4.4) revealed that San Luis has a slightly greater proportion of households built with the most rudimentary construction materials (i.e., quincha for walls and thatch for roofs).

**Figure 4.5 Local house – San Luis**

Local residences tend to present a common structure in both villages: a living room next to the entrance, bedrooms at the back, a kitchen separated from the main living area with an open roof, and a latrine (made of adobe or calamine) in the backyard or on the side.
Information about the most important forms of physical capital in an agricultural economy—land and livestock—indicates that most households are in an unfavourable condition. First, information about the plots of land owned by San Mateo and San Luis residents showed that the area is characterised by the presence of ‘micro farmers’. That is, those that possesses 1 ha. or less of land.

### Table 4.5 Land and livestock by village

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Physical capital</th>
<th>San Mateo (n=54)</th>
<th>San Luis (n=42)</th>
<th>Total (n=96)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Land extension (owned) a/</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No land</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Ha. or less</td>
<td>40.7%</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
<td>40.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 1 ha. to 3 has.</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 3 has to 5 has.</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 5 has to 10 has.</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 10 has.</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Land cultivated (owned or rented)b/</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No land</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Ha. or less</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
<td>52.4%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 1 ha. to 3 has.</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 3 has to 5 has.</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 5 has to 10 has.</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 10 has.</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Types of livestock</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poultry c/</td>
<td>79.6%</td>
<td>85.7%</td>
<td>82.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep / Goats d/</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
<td>52.4%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pigs e/</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cows f/</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ a/** X^2 = 1.1, p=0.96; \]
\[ b/** X^2 = 3.37, p=0.64; \]
\[ c/** X^2 = 0.98, p=0.32; \]
\[ d/** X^2 = 0.17, p=0.68; \]
\[ e/** X^2 = 0.98, p=0.32; \]
\[ f/** X^2 <0.05, p>0.90; \]
In addition, only minor forms of livestock were widely reared in the area: poultry, sheep, and goats. More valuable forms of livestock, such as cows and pigs, were owned only by a minority of families. A detailed analysis regarding the average number of animals possessed by residents highlighted the lack of significant livestock among most farmers: those who at the time reported possessing sheep had, on average, small herds of approximately five animals (4.8 in San Mateo and 5.5 in San Luis); those that had pigs reported owning about three animals (3.6 in San Luis and 2.9 in San Mateo); whilst those with cows possessed approximately two of them (1.8 in San Mateo and 2.4 in San Luis).

A review of local households’ ownership of valuable farm equipment and related durable goods also showed that only a small minority of families have the necessary equipment to exploit their respective farms most efficiently. Of all households surveyed, only two in each town possessed diesel water pumps; only five had an operative van or truck that could help them to transport their products to urban markets (three in San Mateo and two in San Luis); the possession of motorbikes was equally limited (six families: four in San Mateo and two in San Luis); and even elemental assets such as draft animals—horses and donkeys—were absent in one third of households (32 cases). A common characteristic among all farmers was the lack of any heavy machinery for farming purposes.

4.2.3. Poverty and the local objective order

Estimates for households’ monthly expenditure per capita were established to assess the overall material condition of the local population. This constitutes a fairly common measure of economic well being as it tends to be more robust than income data, which is affected by fluctuations through time; in contrast, routine expenditures tend to remain relatively constant along time as households save and spend as needed to smooth consumption patterns throughout the year (Deaton, 1997; Crehan, 1992; Ellis, 2000). Moreover, this measure has been considered relevant to the Peruvian rural context not only in response to seasonal variations but also due to prevalence of informal economic transactions (Chong, Hentschel & Saavedra, 2007).

The baseline questionnaire enquired about household expenses along the following consumption dimensions: food, house maintenance, education, health, transport, entertainment, and recent acquisitions of durable goods.55 As mentioned in Chapter 3, these assessments were developed on the basis of the expenditure items enquired about by the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI) as part of the National Household Survey (ENAHO). The resulting average level of monthly expenditure per capita was rather similar for both villages (San Mateo=107.2 S/. or 24.9 UK£, San Luis=97.9 S/. or 22.8 UK£; t=0.47,

55 Expenditure estimates included families’ monetary expenses as well as the value of their farm output destined to self-consumption and of donations received by relatives or development agencies. Equivalent prices were self-assessed by respondents except for food items. For the latter, the INEI’s official regional prices were applied.
In order to validate these results, they were compared with the monthly per capita expenditure estimates obtained from the ENAHO 2005 survey for rural households in the department of Lambayeque.\textsuperscript{56} The comparison showed that although the estimates for the area of study were slightly lower than those obtained from the ENAHO 2005, they were comparable: 121.1 S/., or 28.2 UK£, (95% CI: 110.7–131.4) for the department’s rural households and 106.0 S/., or 24.7 UK£, (95% CI: 95.5–116.5) for the area of study.

Mean estimates, however, could be misleading as they are usually affected by those few households that are much better off than most of the local population. In order to obtain a better representation of households’ economic welfare, therefore, the sample was divided into expenditure quartiles (four equal parts). The resulting distribution (Graph 4.2) shows that half of the surveyed households reported a monthly expenditure per capita of less than 90 S/ (20.9 UK£).

These results strengthen the depiction of San Mateo and San Luis as poor. Taking as reference the poverty line established at 171 S/ by the INEI for rural areas in northern Peru (39.8 UK£), only seven of all those households surveyed (7.3%) could be considered, formally speaking, as not poor. Moreover, around 60% of them could be labelled as extremely poor; in other words, in formal terms, their expenditure levels were not expected to allow access to sufficient food to fulfill minimum official nutrition needs as established by the INEI.

These estimates, however, are mainly referential. Monetary estimates of poverty inadequately represent rural economies as they are only partly monetised; in addition, official poverty lines are not likely to adequately consider specific local living costs and consumption

\textsuperscript{56} Estimates were calculated by the author using the dataset containing the aggregated annual results for the ENAHO 2005.
patterns (Ellis, 2000). Despite those limitations, monthly expenditure estimates allow us to generate a basic rank of households’ material condition that could be complemented with previous assessments of their endowments of capital in its diverse forms. To this effect, households’ levels of physical and human capital were contrasted according to their level of economic well being, measured via expenditure quartiles for each village and the entire area of study (quartile 1 contains households with the lowest expenditure levels and quartile 4 with the highest). Physical assets were measured by the area of cultivable land owned by a household, their livestock—measured in sheep equivalent units, which standardise animals according to their grazing demands (Escobal, Saavedra & Torero, 1999)—and a farm equipment scale, whilst human capital was measured via the ratio of household members of working age (from 15 to 65) per household members of less than 15 or over 65 years of age and the years of formal education completed by household members of working age (15 to 65 years of age).

The results indicate that better off households are characterised by their possession of larger plots of land, more farm equipment, larger volumes of livestock, and a larger number of members of working age in relation to dependants (children of less than 15 years of age or adults older than 65). An apparently counterintuitive result from this comparison is the lack of any association between the average years of education attained by household members of working age and the household’s economic welfare. This institutionalised form of cultural capital, however, is unlikely to constitute an economic factor in a rural area where farmers make very little use of technology. Consequently, it is likely that household members of working age that pursue superior forms of education have migrated to urban areas.

Table 4.6. Households’ assets and economic well being by village

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exp. Quar-</th>
<th>Land extension (Has.)</th>
<th>Farm equipment scale (over 10 pt.)</th>
<th>Livestock (sheep equivalent units)</th>
<th>Years of education (65≥HH members ≥ 15)</th>
<th>HH members ratio [15 , 65] / [1, 15[ + ]65 , ∞]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>San Mateo</td>
<td>San Luis</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>San Mateo</td>
<td>San Luis</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>2.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>5.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>6.30</td>
<td>6.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-test</td>
<td>2.73**</td>
<td>2.21*</td>
<td>3.05**</td>
<td>2.87**</td>
<td>3.18**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance: *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01%

57 Equivalences are the following: 1 sheep = 0.6; 1 cow = 5; 1 goat = 1.5; 1 pig = 1.8.
58 It was estimated according to the possession (or not) of the following items: shovel, pickaxe, machete, manual sprayer, wood plough, iron plough, wheelbarrow, pulled cart, motorised cart or rickshaw, van or truck.
59 There were also differences in terms of material living conditions. While 5 residences from households in the top expenditure quartile had their floors made of concrete and 6 had their walls made of the same material, only 1 household from the poorest groups had a concrete floor and none walls built in the same manner.
These results largely coincided with the self-assessments of poverty obtained through informal conversations with local informants and those reported in the project’s participatory socioeconomic diagnostic. Indeed, residents could distinguish among different degrees of poverty on the basis of a combination of factors: the ‘very poor’, on the one hand, were identified as those landless families who cultivated rented land, survived mainly working as day labourers (jornaleros), had only poultry as livestock for self-consumption, and lived in houses built primarily with quincha; on the other, ‘wealth’ was associated with the possession of extensive plots of land, valuable forms of livestock (e.g., pigs or cows), assets such as diesel water pumps and motorised vehicles, owning houses built of concrete and bricks, and commercialising large volumes of farm produce in urban markets. The reasoning behind those local definitions of poverty is reflected in one informant’s words “poverty is not even having 1 sol to buy a fish for today’s meal” (Mrs. Filipa, micro farmer, San Mateo); in the local context, poverty is understood in relation to the residents’ limited capacity to secure a stable source of income. In the context of the local precarious domestic economy, then, very poor households are seen as those most exposed to economic instability as they rely solely on temporary jobs to obtain their income, and have no assets they could rely on in order to cope with health, environmental, or other emergencies (e.g., a robbery).

4.3. Participation in the local economy

The present section explores the main practices that local actors conduct in order to engage in different systems of production and distribution of economic capital operating in the region, either by directly accessing cash or those other forms of capital that are convertible into the former (e.g., land or livestock). Following Bourdieu’s theoretical framework (1984, 2005; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), the following description will serve to characterise local socioeconomic groups in terms of capital endowments but equally in relation to practices and strategies, thereby serving as a reflection of their ‘class habitus’. In addition, those practices will be contextualised in relation to the dominating practices conducted by the major players of those systems of production (e.g., major enterprises and forms of intervention of public agencies) in which actors engage themselves.

4.3.1. Income generation activities

Rural households usually conduct multiple income-generating activities in which most of their members participate (Crehan, 1992; Ellis, 2000). In order to attain a general view of the main economic practices conducted in the area, the survey obtained information about the kind of economic activities household members of working age (15 – 65) have conducted in the month of February 2005, including non-remunerated work on the family farm. The results obtained indicate that indeed, most household members of working age (approximately three in four: 72% in San Mateo and 76% in San Luis) contribute to the family budget in some way. Taking into
consideration the most important economic activities listed, it can be observed that San Luis and San Mateo are heavily dependent on farm–related activities, either by exploiting their own or rented land or by working as hired farm labourers (Graph 4.3).

Graph 4.3 Economic activities conducted by economically active population (previous month: February 2006) a/

It is necessary to state, however, that these statistical results are mainly referential. First, rural residents’ economic activities are continuously changing; they are characterised by responding flexibly to the demands and opportunities provided by the agricultural cycle and nearby local labour markets. Second, the results presented above have some formal parameters (working age), so it is likely they underestimate the economic contribution of children, who are also known to contribute to rural households’ budgets (Crehan, 1992; Ellis, 2000). Despite its limitations, however, these introductory results provide a general depiction of the most common economic activities conducted in the local area to be presented more in detail next.

a. Farming:

Local agricultural production focuses primarily on the following crops: maize and legumes (chileno, a form of butter bean, moquegua, a kind of green beans, and lentils). Most farmers do not specialise in a single crop but tend to diversify their production. When asked about the crops cultivated in the previous campaign, 80% of all interviewed farmers reported having cultivated maize, 50% chileno, and 35% lentils and 23% moquegua.

This crop pattern distinguishes the area of study from other rural regions of the department, which centre their production on sugar, rice, and cotton crops, products that as of 2004 accounted for over three-quarters of the department’s agriculture production (Gobierno Regional de Lambayeque, 2005). The main factor for this regional difference
is the limited availability of water for agricultural purposes due to the limited caudal of the *La Leche* river as well as due to the lack of investment by the State in irrigation projects in that particular area. The local irrigation sub-district constitutes a ‘non-regulated’ irrigation system due to the lack of major water reservoirs. This contrasts heavily with the valley of the *Chancay* valley, to the South of the *La Leche* valley, where the medium sized dam of *Tinajones* benefits the main sugar plantations operating around the capital of the department. The lack of interest of the State in benefiting the large groups of micro and small farmers in the area of study is further reflected in the large funding provided to the irrigation project *Olmos* in the Northern part of the department, which has been in process of implementation since the 1980s. In process of culmination this decade, the state plans to recuperate approximately 40,000 Has. of non-cultivated land to be sold to private investors via public bidding. The areas of land on sale are only available to relatively large investors, insofar as the minimum plots of land for would be from 250Has. up to 1,000 Has., which could be bought individually or in group. Furthermore, the project contemplates a self-sustaining business plan, with future private users assuming the responsibility of the maintenance and improvement of the irrigation infrastructure.

The main result of the lack of water in the area of study is that the annual cultivation and irrigation plans developed by the local board of water users only grant permissions for low water-demanding crops, such as those cultivated in San Mateo and San Luis. This also implies that there is only one agricultural campaign in the area, as compared to areas with better irrigation infrastructure that have a second one—‘small’ campaign—concentrated on beans (dry grain), sweet potatoes, and small varieties of maize. The harvest of these crops takes place mainly in November–December.

Households’ agricultural practices varied according to their overall capital endowments. First, it was found that those that used the crops of their last agricultural campaign only for self-consumption purposes were predominantly micro farmers (seven out of nine cases). In addition, the poorest local farmers—micro farmers (n=39) and landless resident renting plots of land (n=7)—were found to have a limited use of fertilizers (approximately two-fifths of them reported not having used fertilizers at all in the last agricultural campaign: 21 cases) or improved seeds (three-fifths of these farmers exclusively used those obtained from the crops of their last campaign: 30 cases). In addition, they usually relied on their family workforce to cultivate their land (approximately three-quarters of these farmers reported not having hired anyone in the last agricultural campaign: 35 cases). On the other side of the spectrum, the small group of medium farmers located in the area (over 5 has. of land) were more able to overcome those limitations because of

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60 Water requirements of maize and bean crops are two to three times smaller than those of sugar cane and rice crops. *Vos* (2005) study of the efficiency of the nearby *Chancay-Lambayeque* irrigation district estimated that whilst rice demanded 10,004 m$^3$ of water per ha$^{-1}$ and sugar canes 19,500 m$^3$ / ha$^{-1}$, the water demands per season for maize and bean crops was 5200 m$^3$ / ha$^{-1}$ and 3890 m$^3$ / ha$^{-1}$ respectively.
their greater assets. They all reported (n=9) having hired day labourers, bought improved seeds, and used fertilizers in the last campaign.

**Graph 4.4  Agricultural calendar: peaks of activity of most common crops**

The poverty of most local farmers, the absence of means of public transport that directly connect San Mateo and San Luis in addition to the deteriorated state of the main access road crossing both villages conditioned the forms of commercialisation available to local farmers. The most common form of commercialisation, particularly among micro– and small–farmers without access to means of transport, is conducted through intermediaries (*acopiadores*) who visit the area during the harvest season in their trucks to acquire local produce directly from local farms. Some of those farmers, in addition, also sell part of their production to agricultural traders operating in the towns of Illimo or Pacora. They usually sell parts of their production outside the harvest season in order to access cash. In order to arrive to such places, local farmers normally rent a *moto–taxi* to transport their sacks of maize, beans, or lentils. Relatively well–off farmers, in turn, either hire some form of transport to commercialise part of their production or use their own means of transport to such effect. In this manner, they are able to access the wholesale markets of Lambayeque or Chiclayo.

The implementation of different forms of agricultural production and commercialisation was equally observed to affect how households implement gender–based divisions of economic roles. Informal conversations and personal observation indicated that among the poorer families, both male and female members continuously contributed to the

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exploitation of the family farm, particularly during the planting and harvesting seasons. Among the relatively well-off families, women were less involved into those activities, tending instead to dedicate more time to traditional domestic roles (e.g., looking after children) or conducting economic activities at home (e.g., attending to family businesses).

Another observed practice in the area referred to small and medium farmers’ renting out part of their plots of lands to landless residents or local farmers that intend to intensify their production (of the 14 households identified in the baseline survey that implemented this practice, 12 came from those kinds of farmers). The income obtained from this practice was rather limited. Rents could usually varied between 600 S/. to 800 S/. per ha. for the entire campaign (139.5 UK£ to 186 UK£), depending on the characteristics of the plot in question (e.g., quality of terrain, presence of a well, and location).

Livestock exploitation varied according to the types of animals raised and the household’s material condition. Informal conversations with residents highlighted that major forms of livestock—pigs and cows—constituted mainly a form of personal investment or saving rather than a regular commercial activity, as these animals were reared by the unit to be sold for a profit when mature, or maintained in case residents need an important sum of money quickly. These forms of livestock were observed to be concentrated among small farmers (over 1 up to 5 has. of land): 13 out of the 18 households that owned pigs and nine out of the 15 families that reported owning cows were small farmers. For those small and medium farmers that raise sheep and goats (19 out of 34 and 4 out of 9, respectively), these forms of livestock fulfil a more commercial role as they are raised and commercialised in larger quantities, albeit still in rather small numbers (average herd sizes were 8.9 and 12.4, respectively). Farmers with small herds raise and sell their sheep and goats by the unit in a rather sporadic manner.

There were two main forms of commercialisation for livestock. Most commonly, local farmers sell them to livestock traders operating in nearby towns—the nearby capitals of nearby districts: Pacora, Illimo, or Jayanca. The practice of transporting them to the livestock market of Chiclayo, the most important in the area, is more common among those small and medium farmers who possessed larger herds. In addition, gender-based divisions of roles conditioned how households raised their livestock as it was mainly male household members—heads of household or sons—who were charge of raising and grazing those animals. No clear differences were observed on this subject between households of different economic condition.

Households from both sites equally reported exploiting resources from the forest in order to obtain extra income. The main form of income obtained in this manner was derived from the collection of fruits, mainly plums and mangoes, during summer, an activity
conducted by approximately one-fourth of all households (26 cases: 10 from San Mateo and 16 from San Luis). These products, however, are not properly cultivated and no planning or forestry management activities for fruit production were reported among informants; instead, farmers usually pick those fruits from the trees present in their plots of land as well as from isolated patches of forest once they are ripe. These activities were most common among small farmers (16 cases out of the 26). Their commercialisation was also accomplished mainly via *acopiadores* that come to the area during summer.

Finally, albeit not registered in the survey, it has been noted that some residents cut down trees from isolated patches of forest in order to be sold as raw material for the production of charcoal or produced this end product (e.g., remnants of an artisanal oven for the production of charcoal, *huayronas*, were found in the outskirts of San Luis during a personal visit and trucks loaded with logs were observed leaving the area on various occasions). This constitutes a common but illegal trade in the region, which suffers from increasing desertification. Logging should be done only under license granted by the National Institute of Natural Resources (INRENA).

b. **Farm labour:**

This activity involves predominantly temporary work on other people’s farms during the harvest and planting seasons (Graph 4.4). The location of these jobs vary considerably, from small and medium farms in the same village to areas near the borders of the department, such as the valleys of Olmos and Zaña, in the Northern and Southern bordering parts of the department, respectively, as well as in the Chancay valley, eastward from Chiclayo, where some of the biggest sugar plantations in the department operate: Tumán, Pomalca, Cayaltí, and Pucalá. Work as farm labour varies with the agriculture cycle; the peak of demand occurs during the harvest season of both local and external crops (July–September).

Despite their greater extensions and larger volumes of production, most rice and sugar plantations are characterised by their intensive use of labour rather than of technology. This is related to their historical trajectory, related to the failure of the cooperatives established by the military regimen of the 1970s. Most of these cooperatives were heavily indebted to the state and their own workers, lacked of any revolving capital to invest in new equipment, and possessed an unsustainable cost structure by the end of the 1980s. The neoliberal reform of the 1990s, which eliminated price controls, subsidies, and protectionist measures in favour of the local rice and sugar industries, only served to increase the financial crises of those production units. In such a context, some

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62 Since 2008, this organism has been transferred to the National Service of Protected Areas, an agency of the newly created Ministry of the Environment.
cooperatives opted for the partition of their land among its associated workers to pay off their debts. However, these changes were not accompanied by a credit programme from the state that could help the new landowners to access an adequate working capital to invest in their new assets. On the contrary, the state renounces to any financial role in the agricultural sector as part of the structural reforms initiated in that decade (Hunefeldt, 1997). At the same time, the government offered various economic incentives in order to facilitate the conversion of cooperatives into private businesses. Nevertheless, the associated workers of some of the main local sugar plantations—Tumán, Pomaleca, and Cayaltí—resisted the change. At present, these sugar plantations are managed by private administrators but, despite recovering their annual profitability, they still owe 862 million soles (£200 million) to the state, workers, and suppliers from previous years. It is only thanks to a special law protecting those cooperatives’ assets that they are not liquidated (Mendez & Salcedo, 2004).

Farm jobs are physically demanding, particularly because workers are paid by piecework at low rates. As of 2006, activities such as pan de algodón, which consists of picking cotton bolls and extracting the seeds, paid the equivalent of 2.3 UK£ to 3.5 UK£ per sack of clean cotton (approximately 50 kg); cutting sugar canes with machetes reportedly paid between 2.3£ to 3.5£ per metric ton of cane collected, whilst filing a 7 kg–can of lentils paid around 0.6 UK£ to 0.9 UK£. The length of the job contract and the amount paid usually depended on the farm in question. Farms from the same irrigation have limited labour requirements and their payments tend to be smaller as compared to farms linked to the industrial production for the national or international markets, located in more productive valleys, which tend to pay a little more and require labour for lengthier periods of time. The farm labour market is predominantly informal and, according to local reports, no health insurance or social benefits are covered by any employer. The mode of access to those jobs equally vary; jobs around the local area are usually based on direct connections with farm owners, whereas work in large states is mediated by labour contractors (contratistas), who are in charge of filling specific labour quotas for the companies or individual owners of large estates.

Due to the instability of the local agriculture production, this kind of work is recurrent among most local households, including landless, micro and small farmers. The main difference observed among these households, however, refers to how they combine their work as day labourers with local farming activities. Among small farmers, day labour is conducted mainly by male household members—adults and teenagers—while female household members and children look after the house and the family farm. Among landless residents and micro farmers, this kind of work has a relatively greater economic

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63 Legislative Decree No. 802 (Law for the Economic and Financial Sanitation of Sugar Enterprises, March 1996).
64 Law No. 28027 (Law of the business activity of the sugar industry, June 2003).
relevance, with both male and female household members equally involved in day labour activities. Traditional gender–based division of domestic roles, however, affect their form of involvement: jobs involving travelling outside the village for various days are usually taken on by male household members; women, on the other hand, work predominantly in nearby farms as they are also expected to look after the house, children, and the family farm.

Related temporary migration to other departments was reported only by a small minority of households (5 cases). Informal conversations with residents revealed that temporary migration more commonly takes place within the department (31 cases), principally to those valleys that have better irrigation system (e.g., Chancay and Zaña, towards the South), which benefit from a small campaign and where sugar plantations, to a lesser degree, continue their operations during summer.

c. Non–farm work:

The most common expressions of this kind of work among local residents take place in the construction and transport sectors. Work in the first sector involves exclusively male adults, who seek for job opportunities by helping in the construction or fixing of local dwellings in nearby rural villages, neighbouring capitals of district, and in some cases in the cities of Chiclayo or Lambayeque. Establishing a specific average income for these activities is difficult as payments vary according to the work in question and the setting, with wages again being rather lower in the local area. According to local informants, working full–time during a week in a building project could generate an income between 80 to 150 S/. (18.3 UK£ to 34.9 UK£), depending on whether it involved working in a dwelling made of adobe or concrete and the location (rural or urban setting), and the skills of the worker. These jobs are all informal. A related temporary occupation comes in the form of work in public projects of the town hall (e.g., fixing roads or building new school classrooms). Although these are carried out by private companies, it was reported that they usually hire local labour, who were relatively well remunerated, as workers were paid the legal minimum wage of 500 S/. per month (116.3 UK£).

Work in the transport sector referred primarily to young male adults driving motorised rickshaws (moto–taxis) in the nearby towns of Pacora, Illimo, and Jayanca, connecting rural villages to those minor urban centres as, by law, moto–taxis are not allowed to circulate in the main motorways that cross the department. This occupation is predominantly informal; conversations with some residents engaged in these activities revealed that many of them were not properly licensed to transport passengers, nor were they insured. These circumstances usually put them at odds with members of the local police force, to whom in many occasions they bribe to avoid being fined.
There are two mechanisms by which residents participated in this sector. The small minority of residents that owned *moto–taxis* (four in San Mateo and two in San Luis), gave them to their young male members to drive in nearby areas and rent them out. These vehicles are very expensive for local living standards—prices reported vary from 1500 S/. or 349 UK£, to 5000 S/. 1162.8UK£ depending on the condition of the rickshaw—and are owned only by relatively better off families (the six of them belonged to the top two local expenditure quartiles). Rent tariffs varied according to the period of time a person committed to work with the vehicle, ranging from half a day, 10 S/. or 2.3 UK£, to an entire week, from 60 to 80 S/. or 14.0 to 18.6 UK£. Driving *moto–taxis* appears to generate little additional income. According to local informants, a driver may expect a daily profit of 20 S./ (4.7 UK£) on a ‘good day’ (mainly on weekends, when many rural families go to the nearby town markets), considering only fuel costs. Moto–taxi owners indicated, however, that despite its small returns, these vehicles constituted a valuable asset as it was a source of cash relatively independent of the agricultural cycle and, moreover, it could be used to transport small volumes of farm production.

### d. Local businesses

Of the two villages studied, San Mateo has more local shops, including a grocery shop, a liquor store, a snack/sweets stall operating within the school, and a supplier of agricultural inputs (e.g., seeds, pesticides, fodder, tools, etc.) that also operates as an agricultural trader. In San Luis it was only possible to identify one liquor store and a grocery shop. The variety of products offered by these stores was very limited: grocery shops mainly sold unpacked staple food such as rice, pasta, and flour, which are not produced locally, as well as some basic snacks or school equipment; the liquor stores sold unlabeled beer and locally fermented maize (*chicha*); the snack/food stall sold cheap meals...
to the school staff as well as sweets to the students; the farm supplier traded mainly seeds and fodder in addition to pesticides and fertilisers, albeit in small quantities.

These commercial establishments are relatively recent in the area. The oldest one (San Mateo’s liquor store) appeared around eleven years prior to the study and the newest one (San Luis’s grocery shop) had been operating for just two years as of 2005. Local business owners reported that the main reason for this scenario was the instability of prices during the 1980s until mid 1990s. Because of high levels of inflation (e.g., over 100% of inflation as of 1987), local businesses would have required a constant circulation of capital—acquisition and consumption of products—which could not be attained in an area where the agricultural cycle and lack of water limited residents’ access to cash.

Figure 4.8 Snack / food stall within local school – San Mateo

![Snack / food stall within local school – San Mateo](source: the author)

Figure 4.8 Grocery shop – San Luis

![Grocery shop – San Luis](source: the author)

It was observed that local businesses were usually managed by women (the head of the household’s partner), who could then look after the family business as well as their houses.
and children. In addition, those commercial activities were mainly conducted by relatively better off households (five owners of local businesses were surveyed, all of them belonged to the top two expenditure quartiles).

4.3.2. Permanent migration and remittances

The poor economic conditions predominant in the area have led many residents to search for better job opportunities outside town. As implied by the sampling distribution according to age (Graph 4.1), permanent migration is an important feature in the area; approximately one-fifth of the households that took part in the baseline survey (20.3% and 23.8% from San Mateo and San Luis) reported that at least one of its members had left the town permanently in the previous year. Local out-migration initiatives predominantly imply moving to urban areas and are inserted in a context of constant urban expansion (e.g., the national rural population has diminished from 30% in 1993 to 25% in 2005). Their main destinations were the cities of Lima (half of all permanent migrants travelled there) and Chiclayo (one-fourth); two urban centres that lead this process of urbanisation (annual growth rate of 1.3% and 2.1% as of 2005). As for international migration, only one case reported a former household member travelling abroad, to Ecuador. It was observed, however, that not all households reported similar rates of migration, as of the total 21 reported cases of permanent migration only two came from households in the lowest expenditure as compared to eight and six cases among households from the top two expenditure quartiles.

Out-migration initiatives do not imply a total detachment of the agrarian activities of remaining relatives (Ellis, 2000; Mosse, 2005). Migration and cultivation, instead, are interdependent as many families rely on remittances to finance their productive activities. Correspondingly, approximately one of every two households surveyed reported receiving money transfers from relatives. It was observed, however, that a statistically significant greater proportion of households from San Luis received those benefits: 66.7% of San Luis households (n=28) compared to 42.6% of San Mateo households (n=23) ($\chi^2=5.6$, p=0.02). Despite those differences, the amount of money received as transfers was rather similar in both villages: around 80 S/.per month (18.6 UK£). It was found, in addition, that only a small minority of the poorest households had access to money transfers (three in San Mateo and five in San Luis).

4.4. Concluding remarks

The findings of the present chapter show that the local social space is cohabited predominantly by poor families, who not only live in poor material conditions and are unable to benefit from their agricultural production due to both lack of productive assets and environmental conditions but also lack of access to basic public services—aside from education—that could help them have a more fulfilling live. This scenario coincides with that described by other social
assessments of poor rural settings across the world (Narayan et al., 2000a, 2000b; World Bank, 2001).

The predominance of poor living conditions in the area of study, however, does not allow easy generalisations with regard to the condition of ‘the poor’ or of ‘poor communities’. The evidence obtained showed instead that in the area there are different interests and practices among the local population. For example, local organisations have different trajectories, objectives, organisational dynamics, and different types of members, which makes it difficult to aggregate all forms of participation into a single form of civic culture (Portes, 1998; Portes & Landolt, 2000; Foley and Edwards, 1999; DeFillipis, 2001). Moreover, ‘poverty’ encompass different expressions. As recognised by residents themselves, as well as diverse characterisations of poverty in the literature (Crehan, 1992; Ellis, 2000; Narayan et al., 2000b; Narayan, 1997), poverty has different degrees even among the poor according to their possession of different resources such as land and livestock, available workforce, or farm equipment, among the most salient expressions. In addition, as the literature on rural livelihoods has continuously pointed out (DFID, 1999; Bebbington, 1999; Ellis, 2000; Neefjes, 2000; Narayan et al., 2000a) and as Bourdieu’s theoretical approach emphasised (1977, 1984), actors’ objective condition (i.e., endowments of capital) is associated with different sets of economic practices. For example, the poorest residents, landless or nearly landless families with no or only minor livestock, tend to be more strongly dependent on work as wage labour (jornaleros) than other residents, an activity in which both men and women are strongly involved, whilst business ownership is concentrated in the hands of relatively well–off farmers.

Following Bourdieu’s ‘theory of practice’ framework (1977, 2005; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) there are two central issues to highlight. First, it was observed that the different economic activities implemented by local actors according to their objective condition implied immersing themselves in different systems of relations of production. For jornaleros, an activity of less relevance to relatively well–off households, this activity involved being employed by local farmers that cultivate for commercial purposes and by contratistas that mediate between the local workforce and big cotton, rice, or sugar plantations in other regions of the department; farmers without the means for transporting their agricultural production had to deal with acopiadores; whilst business links were relevant only to a small group of better off households that had a few commercial interests in the area.

A second element to underscore is that the dynamics of the local economic fields are not solely determined by traditional economic factors. In addition to the reported use of kinship and friendship relations to conduct diverse economic activities (to be examined in detail in the next chapter), two other forms of ‘embeddedness’ are salient in the area (Granovetter, 1985). An initial factor is politics, which is characterised by a clientelistic style of rule as well as populist
practices. This has direct implications for the economic trajectories of both San Mateo and San Luis residents in relation to public infrastructure investments, as in the case of the precariousness of their access roads or effectiveness of protective measures against *El Niño* events, and the associated job opportunities related to those projects, as in the case of building the local church or during the deviation of the local river and reinforcement of water canals conducted in 1998. In an indirect manner, the material needs that residents need to cover are, to a certain extent, affected by the presence of state–funded poverty alleviation programmes such as the *Popular Cook* and *Glass of Milk* committees, established in the 90s in relation to a process of expansion of similar public programmes strongly linked to the political interests of the Fujimori regime.

A second form of embeddedness refers to traditional gender–based division of roles by which woman’s economic contribution tends to be subordinated to their domestic responsibilities. In this respect, it has been observed that the form economic practices are implemented by local actors are recurrently shaped by this factor across different socioeconomic groups. Women participation as waged labour, for instance, tends to be more restricted to the local area insofar as they are expected to look after the house and children; by the same token, a recurrent contribution of theirs refer to provide workforce to cultivate the family farm whilst male household members travel to other areas to work. Likewise, local forms of association tend to reproduce in the public sphere women’s domestic roles insofar as the food–security programmes constitute female–exclusive organisations whilst PSA meetings are attended mostly by women.

In summary, the findings reported showed that despite the dominant poverty characterising most actors in the local social space, local actors could be differentiated by the possession of different forms of capital, economic and non–economic, which in turn is broadly associated with different kinds of economic practices and participation in different systems of relations. Finally, there is indication that actors’ capacity to access economic capital is directly or indirectly affected by non–economic factors such as politics and gender.
CHAPTER 5
THE ECONOMIC RELEVANCE OF SOCIAL RELATIONS

The present chapter aims to explore the economic relevance of social capital mobilisation in the area of study. Following Bourdieu’s ‘theory of practice’ approach (1984, 2005; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), this assessment will examine in detail the manner in which local actors make use of their social relationships in order to access and accumulate economic capital, or those forms of capital easily transformable into the latter, according to their objective conditions (i.e., capital endowments) and associated practices. To this effect, this section delves into the qualitative and quantitative information obtained during the second stage of data collection through two one-month visits to the area in March and July-August 2006. First, the results from the baseline household survey will provide a general assessment of whether actors of different socioeconomic conditions are equally able to access the same kind of valuable social resources. Next, qualitative data is used to specify the conditions under which actors are able to access them and the manner in which they are integrated into their economic practices and strategies.

As discussed in the first part of the present study, this detailed examination of social capital is expected to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the economic contribution of social relationships. On the one hand, it would avoid unproblematic generalisations of social capital benefits, which tend to privilege the figure of a homogeneous community and to subsume actors’ practices into normative structures, and, on the other, it would put actors’ practices and relationships at the centre of the analysis without being oblivious to the broad socioeconomic structure, which are two of the most recurrent concerns in the literature (Foley & Edwards, 1999; Ishihara & Pascual, 2009; Portes & Landolt, 2000; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000).

5.1. Social resources and actors’ objective position

The volume and quality of resources that actors can access through their social relationships are expected to contribute to define their position in the local social space and fields alongside productive assets or cash (Bourdieu, 1989, 2005; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). This scenario would result from two interrelated factors: first, if social capital is of value, actors would try to accumulate it by investing their resources in its acquisition according to their possibilities (i.e., stocks of capital); second, given that social capital is instrumental to access valuable resources, it follows that those who occupy a dominant position in the local social space had achieved it partly because they were able to benefit the most from their respective relationships.
In order to examine this relation between social capital and other forms of capital in the area of study, Van Der Gaag and Snijders’ (2004, 2005) resource generator tool was adapted to the local economic dynamic. This survey instrument measured actors’ access to a list of valuable resources according to the expected stability of this form of support (i.e., degree of closeness between the head of households and his/her partner with their respective sources of support). This was estimated according to the following categories of proximity: acquaintances, friends, and relatives, including in-laws and fictive kinship relations in the form of co-parenthood or *compadrazgo*. *Compadrazgo* was included as an indicator of closeness as, in the Latin American context, “peasants becoming godparents to a child at the time of his or her baptism, confirmation or marriage ... makes them 'co-parents' of the child’s parents. Child, parents, and godparents are then fixed in a continuing relationship which is seen as entailing the same highly patriarchal and hierarchical pattern of authority as biological kinship” (Crehan, 1992, p. 126).

As explained in Chapter 3, this survey instrument does not intend to constitute a standardised measure of social capital; its development, instead, is context dependent. The list of resources explored was developed on the basis of the qualitative information collected via informal conversations and participatory observation during the first stage of data collection (August – December 2005). The survey initially presented a total of 25 items ordered in a random manner. Following standard scale development procedures (DeVellis, 2003), two items were eliminated because the number of positive responses was too few for meaningful interpretation. Next, exploratory factor analysis was conducted to assert the presence of an internal structure in the responses provided by local informants (see Appendix VIII). On the basis of the statistical analysis conducted, which rendered a generally interpretable structure and Bourdieu’s proposed forms of capital (1980, 1986), the items were structured in five different subcollections of resources, each of them potentially instrumental in preserving or improving a household’s material condition (Table 5.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Resource</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Acquaintance</th>
<th>Friend</th>
<th>Relative Compadre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Personal support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation in cases of emergency (e.g., El Niño or fire).</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
<td>56.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material support (e.g., food or clothing) in case of emergencies (e.g., El Nino, fire, or robbery).</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>63.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looking after house and children if absent for long periods of time (over 1 week).</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>39.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal care in case of health emergencies.</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
<td>61.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

65 Each of them had less than 10 positive answers: (i) if head of household or partner knew someone who could help them to conduct some bureaucratic procedure in the city hall (Chiclayo), and (ii) if head of household or partner knew of someone who could sell them medicines on credit.

66 Factor analysis did not render a clear-cut simple structure as a few items were associated with more than one dimension. Final interpretation of results, hence, was derived from the theoretical framework proposed in the text.
## B. Financial resources

- Loans to fund economic activities (e.g., to buy or rent land, buy farm equipment or livestock) with no or very low interest rates.  
  - 19.8%  
  - 13.5%  
  - 27.1%  
  - 39.6%

- Periodic remittances of goods or money.  
  - 38.5%  
  - -  
  - 8.3%  
  - 53.1%

- Help to commercialise farming output (crops or livestock) in Lambayeque or Chiclayo markets.  
  - 42.7%  
  - 11.5%  
  - 16.7%  
  - 29.2%

- Help to obtain jobs in nearby farms or contratas in sugar or cotton plantations.  
  - 11.5%  
  - 12.5%  
  - 34.4%  
  - 41.7%

- Help to obtain jobs in urban centres (e.g., Chiclayo, Lima).  
  - 27.1%  
  - 10.4%  
  - 25.0%  
  - 37.5%

## C. Physical resources

- Provision of free labour during the harvest season.  
  - 57.3%  
  - 2.1%  
  - 11.5%  
  - 29.2%

- Lending of motorised vehicles to transport farm production for free.  
  - 69.8%  
  - 3.1%  
  - 9.4%  
  - 17.7%

- Lending of draft animals and related equipment (e.g., ploughs or carts).  
  - 71.9%  
  - 1.0%  
  - 10.4%  
  - 16.7%

- Lending of farming tools during the planting or harvest season.  
  - 19.8%  
  - 11.5%  
  - 29.2%  
  - 39.6%

- Selling of improved seeds, fertilizers, or new farm equipment on credit or instalments.  
  - 37.5%  
  - 8.3%  
  - 16.7%  
  - 37.5%

## D. Informational resources

- Information about how to care for or improve your crops (e.g., deal with plagues or fertilizers to use).  
  - 14.6%  
  - 14.6%  
  - 32.3%  
  - 38.5%

- Information about how to care for or improve your livestock (e.g., preventing and treating diseases).  
  - 30.2%  
  - 10.4%  
  - 27.1%  
  - 32.3%

- Information about health issues (e.g., diagnosing and treating common diseases: respiratory infections, stomach problems).  
  - 31.3%  
  - 12.5%  
  - 21.9%  
  - 34.4%

- Teaching children a trade for non-farm work (e.g., to work in construction, doing mechanical work, etc.).  
  - 25.0%  
  - 9.4%  
  - 28.1%  
  - 37.5%

- Helping children with their school tasks.  
  - 50.0%  
  - 9.4%  
  - 17.7%  
  - 22.9%

## E. Bureaucratic resources

- Help to conduct bureaucratic procedures in the town hall.  
  - 36.5%  
  - 28.1%  
  - 18.8%  
  - 16.7%

- Help to deal with local public services (e.g., obtaining quick attention at health centre, dealing with the police, etc.).  
  - 38.5%  
  - 31.3%  
  - 15.6%  
  - 14.6%

- Provision of legal advice (e.g., declaration of inheritance, formalisation of land ownership, etc.).  
  - 21.9%  
  - 25.0%  
  - 30.2%  
  - 22.9%

- Information about local and national political affairs.  
  - 12.5%  
  - 21.9%  
  - 38.5%  
  - 27.1%

The internal consistency of the resulting sub-scales was verified via Cronbach’s alpha test, which assesses the degree of inter-correlation between respondents’ scores for those items assumed to measure the same construct. The results obtained were above the minimum result considered as satisfactory ($\alpha = 0.6$) (DeVellis, 2003):

- Personal support (emergencies): 0.78
- Financial resources: 0.66
- Physical resources: 0.88
- Informational resources: 0.68
- Bureaucratic resources: 0.81

Scale scores for each subset of resources were estimated on the basis of an actor’s access to the items listed and the strength of the connection with the corresponding closest source of support: (1) acquaintance, (2) friend, and (3) relatives or compadres. If respondent had more than one source of support, the closest source was chosen for calculation purposes. Overall scores were rescaled over a maximum total of 10 points (when a head of household or his/her partner could rely on blood relatives or compadres to access all items listed in a subset of resources). The results obtained (Table 5.2) indicate that, overall, the most common type of social resources that...
residents reported being able to access in both San Mateo and San Luis, as listed in the resource
generator tool, was personal support (e.g., accommodation, clothing, or food in case of
emergencies), whilst mediated access to productive assets (e.g., borrowed farming tools or free
labour) and bureaucratic resources (e.g., help in conducting bureaucratic procedures in the town
hall) appeared as the least commonly available.

Table 5.2 Sub-collection of social resources by village

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local institutions and authorities</th>
<th>San Mateo (n=54)</th>
<th>San Luis (n=42)</th>
<th>Total (n=96)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal support $^a$</td>
<td>7.27</td>
<td>7.16</td>
<td>7.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial resources $^b$</td>
<td>5.63</td>
<td>5.86</td>
<td>5.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical resources $^c$</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>3.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informational resources $^d$</td>
<td>5.15</td>
<td>5.28</td>
<td>5.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic resources $^e$</td>
<td>4.90</td>
<td>4.45</td>
<td>4.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$t=0.25, p=0.81;\;t=0.82, p=0.42;\;t=0.36, p=0.72;\;t=0.21, p=0.84;\;t=2.03, p=0.05.$

The distribution of those different sets of resources according to households’ material
condition is analysed next. Following the same procedure conducted in the previous chapter
(Table 4.7), households’ scores for each subscale are contrasted according to their different
expenditure quartiles. The results (Table 5.3) indicate that only two sets of social resources
appeared to be distributed differently according to actors’ objective condition: economic and
bureaucratic resources. In this respect, it is possible to observe that households that are able to
access a greater variety of economic and bureaucratic resources through close connections are
characterised by being materially better off than most local families. Access to physical
resources, personal support, and informational resources, in turn, tend to be more
homogeneously distributed across households of different material conditions.

Table 5.3 Social resources according to households’ economic condition by village

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exp. Quart.</th>
<th>Personal support (over 10)</th>
<th>Financial resources (over 10)</th>
<th>Physical resources (over 10)</th>
<th>Inform. resources (over 10)</th>
<th>Bur. resources (over 10)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>San Mateo</td>
<td>San Luis</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>San Mateo</td>
<td>San Luis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>6.81</td>
<td>6.47</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>5.09</td>
<td>5.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2</td>
<td>7.15</td>
<td>7.09</td>
<td>7.13</td>
<td>5.61</td>
<td>5.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3</td>
<td>7.54</td>
<td>7.46</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>6.22</td>
<td>6.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4</td>
<td>7.65</td>
<td>7.56</td>
<td>7.60</td>
<td>5.65</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$F$-test: 0.41 0.44 0.86 1.47 1.72** 3.24** 0.20 0.02 0.10 0.36 0.59 0.92 3.54** 4.10*** 6.68***

$n$ 54 42 96 54 42 96 54 42 96 54 42 96

Significance: * $p \leq 0.1$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; ***$p \leq 0.01$.

These results indicate that some, but not all, expressions of social capital benefits help to
classify actors’ objective condition. In this respect, those that are economically better off
(households from the top two expenditure quartiles) appear to be characterised not only by
possessing greater extensions of land, larger volumes of livestock, a greater variety of farming tools, as well as a greater ratio of household members of working age to dependents (children and elderly) (Table 4.6), but also by enjoying an easier mediated access to temporary jobs, commercialisation opportunities, and loans or credit (financial resources) as well as to the town hall and public agencies and legal or political information (bureaucratic resources).

Those results, however, have only descriptive purposes and require further examination since the presence of a statistical association between different sets of resources and households’ material condition do not express a direct causal relationship between social capital and poverty or wealth. Following Bourdieu’s framework (1977, 1984), the evidence presented constitute mere ‘social facts’ that indicate the presence of an objective order that links certain social capital features with other forms of capital. Next, it becomes necessary to interpret the presence, or absence, of such associations empirically in terms of observable practices and strategies and the different systems of relations of production in which actors operate (fields). Therefore, the next sections will delve into the qualitative data obtained via in-depth and informal interviews, as well as from participant observation to help explain and understand the scenario portrayed in this initial statistical analysis.

5.2. Social capital as social resources

The present section examines the main economic benefits that local residents are able to obtain from the mobilisation of their relationships, as identified through personal observation as well as from informal and in-depth interviews with residents. According to the study’s theoretical framework, the present assessment proceeds to examine these returns in relation to whether they facilitate direct access to economic capital (i.e., cash) or to other assets that can subsequently be transformed into it (e.g., livestock).

5.2.1. Mediated access to financial resources

Regular access to cash is a continuous struggle among poor rural households; income fluctuations associated with the agricultural seasons, the low profitability of most local farms, their dependency on temporary jobs to complement their income, and the absence of formal credit institutions in the area (public and private), among the most salient factors, jointly limit their capacity to achieve that objective (Ellis, 2000; Crehan, 1992; Narayan, 1997). In this context, the qualitative data gathered indicate that social relationships may facilitate local households’ access to economic capital via four different mechanisms: (a) by facilitating reliable commercial agreements; (b) by providing access to information about job opportunities or securing employment; (c) by lowering migration costs and facilitating migrants’ insertion into urban labour markets; and (d) by facilitating access to personal loans and trade credit.
a. Commercialisation of farm production:

As the existing social capital literature has regularly pointed out (Collier, 1998; Dasgupta, 2003; Fafchamps & Minten, 2002a, 2002b), trustworthy relationships with economic agents are central to the success of commercial transactions. It is apparent, however, that the kinds of connections most relevant to this effect are not the same for all local families but, instead, tend to vary according to their objective conditions and related economic practices. Local farmers who lack the means to directly commercialise their production in urban markets, for instance, deal primarily with local acopiadores, who either visit the area during the harvest season to acquire the products directly from farms or operate in nearby towns of Pacora or Illimo. For micro and small farmers, hence, having a trustworthy relationship with these actors is central to profit from their agricultural production, particularly as they are vulnerable to different forms of malfeasance:

Most try to be too smart (.) they scare you out saying that the price is going down and that you better sell quickly (.) others pay you in advance but give you very little or even change the price in the end (.) others tell you that your maize is no good and so on (.) one has to fight with them all the time ... (Mr Abraham, small farmer, San Mateo)

... the main problem with that people ((intermediaries)) is that they pay very little (.) what is worse many try to take advantage of the people cheating with the weight or giving advanced payments that are always much lower than the real price. (Mr Sandro, small farmer, San Luis)

In the face of these challenges, social relationships were observed to help local farmers dealing with those actors through two mechanisms. First, local farmers make constant appeals to their local and external connections to share and access information about acopiadores’ practices, either with regard to their trustworthiness or the prices they offer. Moreover, it was observed and reported that there is a constant flow of information on the subject through word-of-mouth across close and weak connections (i.e., from acquaintances to relatives), which take place in an ample variety of situations, from informal visits between neighbours to informal encounters with farmers from other villages passing by the area.

A second mechanism that makes social relationships important for commercial dealings refers to the development of a close connection between farmers and acopiadores, particularly in the form of compadrazgo relationships. As Mr Sandro indicates next, this appears to constitute the safest way of dealing with intermediaries:

L.: ... the worst thing you can do is to deal with different acopiadores all the time.
Res.: Why?
L.: Because you don’t know whether things will turn out for the better or for the worse each time (.) with a regular one you may have some issues but at least you know what to expect and how to deal with them (.) besides it’s not easy to find a good one
Those sets of connections, in turn, appeared as less relevant to well-off farmers. First, local word-of-mouth circuits of information are largely unrelated to their circuits of commercialisation as they usually sell their production in the city markets of Lambayeque or Chiclayo. For example, Mr. Máximo (medium farmer, San Mateo), reported appealing to his son that lives in Chiclayo to pass on information he collects through direct contact with traders operating in city markets to keep him updated about prices and market conditions whilst Mr. Rodrigo (medium farmer, San Luis), reported he usually calls his cousin, who has a stand nearby Moshokeke (wholesale market in Chiclayo), to inform him about current prices. By the same token, rather than establishing or relying on close connections with local acopiadores, they operate along long-established commercial partnerships with agricultural traders operating in city markets. Nevertheless, a common feature between them and the rest of farmers is that both groups prefer to work along kinship or compadrazgo relations, which serve them to attain greater guarantees of a fair deal:

… my cousin has a store in Moshoqueque (wholesale market in Chiclayo)) so I sell most of my harvest to her. (Mr. Luis, medium farmer, San Luis).

I work with my compadre Juan (.) he works at La Matanza ((market in Lambayeque)) so I take my maize and lentils to him (.) he pays ok and I do not have to haggle with him or anyone (.) besides we have been working like this for years already so we know each other well. (Mr. Máximo, medium farmer, San Mateo)

The form of commercialisation of livestock was also observed to differ among local actors according to their objective condition. Most commonly, residents sell their animals to livestock traders operating in the nearby towns of Pacora or Illimo. As they mainly sell their minor forms of livestock, mainly sheep or goats, by the unit, they transport their animals to those towns in motorised rickshaws they hired for that purpose. The operational networks of small and medium farmers with larger or more valuable forms of livestock, in turn, tend to have a greater reach, selling their animals to livestock traders operating in the markets of Lambayeque or Chiclayo. Nevertheless, in all cases encountered local informants reported their preference for selling to established clients in those markets with whom they have made deals in the past and, in principle, offer greater guarantees of fair prices and lower chances of malfeasance (e.g., tampering with balances to check the weight of the animal). This practice, however, constitutes as much a strategy as a necessity among farmers who, as explained by Mr. Abraham below, have very limited options for negotiation with livestock traders unless they possess reliable connections:
You have to know where you are going (to sell) otherwise it will not work out... if someone offers you 70 soles (16.7 UK£) and you say ‘I will come back’ (.) if you come back they know they offered higher than others so they lower the price and if it is too low and then you go back to the second best place it will be the same (.) that’s how those work (.) they even do that next to each other and in less than 5 minutes you either take offers of 50 soles (11.6 UK£) 40 soles (9.3 UK£) or just go away with nothing. (Mr. Abraham, small farmer, San Mateo)

One final element to consider is that the benefits that farmers could obtain from their relationships with farm traders are ultimately conditioned on their volume of production and negotiating position. Micro and small farmers, for example, reported that despite their long-standing deals with certain acopiadores, they had little saying in the final price of crops. Interviewed medium farmers, in turn, indicated that when they deal with these actors, they tended to be more able to negotiate the because of their threat of selling their relatively large volumes of production to other acopiadores or to contacts in urban markets.

It is always different (.) to us they say ‘ because you are my friend compadre or something else it is that much’ but in the end it is always less than they pay to those that product more... (Mr. Ladislao, micro farmer, San Luis)

Sometimes I sell my maize to my compadre Pedro (acopiador) but not always (.) it depends on what he offers right? (.) he knows I do not accept an offer easily so I usually get good deals from him but if it is too low I just go somewhere else ... (Mr. Ezequiel, medium farmer, San Mateo)

b. Job opportunities:

The social capital literature has highlighted that social relationships can be instrumental in improving actors’ chances of obtaining well-paid jobs either by bridging between the local space and better off social milieus so as to access non-redundant information and better wages (Collier, 1998; Burt, 1992, 2005; Granovetter, 1973, 1983; Lin, 2001; Woolcock, 2001, 2002) or by reducing information asymmetries through social cohesion, which would make it easier for employers and employees to meet and establish labour agreements (Halpern, 2005; Van Staveren & Knorringa, 2007).

A first element to consider on this subject is that the relevance of these potential effects of social capital depends on the systems of labour relations in which actors participate. Testimonies from local informants and residents made apparent that there is a degree of labour market segmentation in the area. In general, it was observed that it was mainly the poorer residents—landless or nearly landless residents—who tended to work more regularly as day labourers (jornaleros) and used to work for local farmers—within their villages or nearby ones—whilst temporary work in rice, sugar and cotton plantations, or in urban centres tended to be a practice more spread across different local socioeconomic groups, with exception of the few relatively well-off households. This privileged
minority, in turn, was more characterised by hiring labour than by their members’ seeking such job opportunities. As the testimonies below show, the economic returns from work as wage labour in the local area tend to be very small so that better off farmers tend to prioritise the cultivation of their own farms, work in other areas, and the education of their children:

... sometimes here people work for nothing (.) one entire day in the field and what do you get? 5 soles ((1.2 UK£)) 8 soles ((1.9 UK£)) (.) what can you do with that? (Mr. Abraham, small farmer, San Mateo)

... here I only just work in my own farm if I need to get something extra I go out to Jayanca or in Lambayeque where there is more work (.) here you just work 1 day or 2 and then you have to start searching again (.) here ... ((son, 15 years of age)) is the one who sometimes work around here when on holidays to earn a little extra money but that is all. (Mr. Sandro, small farmer, San Luis)

At the local level, it was observed that social relationships affect the manner in which jobs are accessed in two forms. First, there is the relatively good knowledge that residents have of one another, which allows job seekers and potential employers to be broadly aware of their economic and labour needs. In this regard, both small and medium famers who hire labourers and nearly landless and landless residents who continuously work as wage labour referred to this awareness of one another’s circumstances as a useful resource for implementing their corresponding economic strategies:

... you always know more less who needs people (.) there are some who are more regular ((in hiring workers)) (.) here and in San Felipe there are around ten neighbours who always look for extra hands (.) so from that you more less know where to look around for work... (Mr. Javier, micro farmer, San Mateo)

I have done it for many years ((work for local farmers)) so I know who needs people and for how long (.) for example for the harvest I know that with don Idelfonso it will be between 3 and 5 days while with don Martin it will be around a week at least (.) besides just from walking around you can see how much are people cultivating; (Mr. Lorenzo, landless resident, San Luis)

Here we know each other well so if you need a bit of extra help you know where to turn around right? (.) then you just go and pass the voice to the people and tell them if they would like to come and work for a few days (Mr. Prudencio, small farmer, San Luis)

A second way in which relationships affect the local labour dynamics is that many agreements between local farmers and jornaleros are developed around close connections of blood and fictive kinship. The benefits to be obtained from mobilising close connections to this effect, however, were observed to vary according the role assumed by resident as either employer or employee. From the perspective of the latter, this kind of connection implied both a certain degree of security over those sources of income and, moreover, a contribution towards a stronger connection with better off relatives who could help them access other benefits such as advanced payments for future work, personal loans or information about job opportunities in other farms or urban areas. This
kind of labour agreements, hence, in many cases had a greater value than the mere wages received at the end of the day, particularly considering that local wages tend to be very low, that workers on occasions have to bring their own farm equipment, or that the demands for labour occur at very short notice, interrupting hired relatives’ own farming activities.

The case of Mrs. Filipa and Mr. Gabriel, a couple of micro farmers from San Mateo who also own a small grocery shop, illustrates this scenario. They usually work as hired labour for her uncle, a medium landowner (16 ha. of land) who lives in a nearby village. However, their relationship goes far beyond their work as wage labour. They started working for him when they were a married couple with no land back in 1992; years later, however, they managed to acquire a small plot of land of 0.75 ha. from this person, who reportedly sold it to them at a good price and allowed them to pay in instalments. Later on, in 2002, when Mrs. Filipa fell ill and lost the capacity to walk for a couple of months and required specialised medical treatment, they obtained an important loan from this relative which was partly covered by selling to him most of their livestock. As of 2006, it is Mrs. Filipa and her sons (aged 12 and 14) who continue working with him when asked to.

Some of the small and medium farmers interviewed, in turn, indicated that the main benefit from relying on close connections for labour purposes referred to securing access over inexpensive but productive labour. As described in Chapter 4, local agricultural production is labour intensive so that, when the harvest of external crops, including sugar, rice, and cotton, are at their peak (August-September), local farmers have to compete with better off farmers and large plantations to hire young male adults, who typically higher wages and lengthier contracts. Working with residents somewhat related to them, hence, helps them to exploit their farms more effectively:

... *when you need them the most ((workers)) they are not around (.) they go out to work to Lambayeque Ferreñafe around there ((Chancay valley)) and the ones that remain are the old people ... nowadays I work with my nephews may be one or two extra at most but that is all (.) since I also give them some extra work during the year they always come.* (Mr. Máximo, medium farmer, San Mateo)

... *with people you don’t know it is more difficult (.) in many occasions they have left me waiting if they got something else to do for a little extra money ...* (Mr. Luis, medium farmer, San Luis)

Work outside the local area, in urban areas (e.g., as construction workers) and principally in rice, cotton, and sugar plantations (*contratas*), is usually affected by actors’ social relationships alongside the same dimensions observed in the local space: access to information and securing a certain degree of job stability. Regarding the first factor, the
evidence obtained indicates that information about those job opportunities does not flow fluidly among local residents. Instead, informal and in-depth conversations with informants made it apparent that it tends to circulate tightly among close connections based on friendship and kinship. For example, when discussing this topic with some local informants on two occasions, I was asked to keep confidential the specific details of prospective job opportunities. This control of information among close connections constitutes a feature of which many residents are aware, as the following testimonies show:

... people don’t say much about those jobs (.) only after they have finished you find out where they have been to (Mr. Prudencio, small farmer, San Luis)

The one who tells me about it ((contratas)) is my compadre Juan (.) he has a cousin who always take people to Lambayeque ... here? hm in a couple of occasions it was my son who was told about contratas but that was it.(Mr. Marco, small farmer, San Luis)

It is my compadre Lucho who hires my son from time to time (.) he works as a bricklayer in Chiclayo so wherever he knows about a big project he tells us ... the others? ((neighbours working in construction)) hm I assume they have their own contacts right?. (Mr. Samuel, small farmer, San Mateo)

As reflected in those testimonies, close connections with potential employers, particularly with labour contractors (contratistas), constitute an essential factor for securing a regular access to those jobs. As highlighted by previous assessments of rural livelihoods (Long, 2001; Sorensen, 2000), it is apparent that weak connections as sources of information are insufficient to grant access to those sources of income; instead, it was noted that most residents tend to participate in similar jobs outside the area in clusters of closely connected residents, through relations of friendship and kinship, relatively apart from one another:

... they ((contratistas)) only hire their own people (.) sometimes you don’t even know when they came (.) when you hear about it some people had already left to the contrata. (Mrs. Filipa, micro farmer, San Mateo)

... most of them work with people they know (.) their friends or relatives (.) here in San Mateo for example the son of don Pedro is a contratista and only works with his cousins and one or two friends (.) the ... ((another family)) the same ... (Mr. Javier, micro farmer, San Mateo)

c. Permanent migration and remittances

Permanent migration to urban centres is a common strategy among rural households that allows them to access remittances of money and goods (Crehan, 1992; Bebbington, 1999; Ellis, 2000) in which social relationships, particularly relatives, typically play a central role to lower the costs of migration and integrate migrants into their new urban
environments and labour markets (Sorensen, 2000; Portes, 1998; Portes & Landolt, 2000).

Out-migration is a common feature of the local area, where approximately one in four households reported that one of their members left the village on a permanent basis in the previous year and approximately half of them receive remittances (Chapter 4, section 4.3.2.). This strategy, however, was observed to be implemented differently according to the objective condition of the family of origin, ultimately affecting the role social relationships play to integrate migrants into their new urban settings and the benefits from remittances. A first factor to consider in this regard is that the reasons for migration tend to differ between the relatively well off as compared to those of most other residents. Accounts from this second group have migrants leaving the village to conduct unskilled jobs, such as driving small vans for public transportation (combis), helping in informal mechanic workshops, commercialising products in informal urban markets or on the street, or working as maids for middle-class urban families. In contrast, migrants from relatively well-off families are more likely to leave the area in order to pursue some sort of superior education, particularly of the technical kind (e.g., electric, nursing, or veterinary technician).

This differentiated insertion into urban labour markets has two key implications. One is that the amount of cash transferred through remittances tends to be higher among those who receive remittances from relatives with superior education (between 100 and 200 S/. or 23.3 UK£ and 46.5 UK£ per month, according to the accounts of three direct beneficiaries interviewed) than among those who receive remittances from relatives working at unskilled jobs (most commonly less than 100 S/. or 23.1 UK£ per month, according to 11 interviewed beneficiaries with this profile). A second implication refers to the precariousness that characterises the occupations of the poorer migrants. Accounts from families indicated that they tended to face significant fluctuations in their income as their jobs (e.g., bus conductors, informal drivers, or street or market sellers) rarely involve a fixed monthly payment. Moreover, as poor migrants mainly work in the informal sector, they lack access to a regular income and to social security so that they are vulnerable to economic shocks (e.g., health emergencies). The different experiences of the families of Mr. Javier and Mrs. Flor, both micro farmers from San Luis, in comparison to Mr. Máximo’s family, medium farmers from San Mateo, illustrate these different dynamics:

67 Although living outside the area for educational purposes usually involves returning home during summer (December – March), it is considered permanent migration insofar as (i) for the most part of the year these individuals are living in other areas and (ii) after finishing their education no cases were found of any trained individual returning to the local area. It is important to highlight that technical education was preferred over university degrees because of the costs involved (vocational training can be finished in two to three years at most, compared to the average five years of university education).
In most cases of migration described by informants, independently of whether they leave the area to study or to work, the presence of relatives at the migrants’ destination is very important, as it is they who receive migrants in their homes, at least during the first months of their re-settlement, which substantially lowers migration costs. Their mediation to help migrants participate in urban labour markets, however, varies according to the condition of the migrant in question. Their mediation is clearly more decisive for poorer migrants who look for unqualified jobs. In those cases, urban relatives commonly place migrants into their own businesses or into others’ they have connections with. The accounts from Mrs. Flor and Mr. Javier coincided on this subject; Mrs. Flor’s eldest daughter travelled to Lima when she was 16 because a cousin of hers managed to place her as maid in a local urban family; after two years in that position, this girl managed to place her 14-year-old sister in a similar position for a family connected to her employers in the same district. Mr Javier’s son obtained a job in a workshop in Trujillo because his brother had his own informal workshop over there. On the other hand, relatives of migrants who intend to pursue some form of superior education play a more limited role in that area as the labour markets they aim for have more institutionalised barriers in the form of legally recognised qualifications.

It is necessary to point out that not all cases of migration have a clear-cut division between migration for work and studies. Some residents reported a combination of those strategies, whether by deferring migrating in order to save the necessary economic surplus to finance educational projects, re-directing remittances from migrants already inserted in urban labour markets to finance those initiatives, or by asking migrants to partly fund their education by searching part-time employment. This was observed to be more common among families in an intermediate economic condition. Three factors were identified in relation to this tendency: the costs that education investments involve, the
corresponding monetary loss from remittances when studies are prioritised over work, and the more limited education of the poorest residents:

... ((son)) finished school two years ago (;) nowadays he is working in a workshop in Chiclayo but if things go well (.) with our savings and his help we are thinking of help him to go to an institute ... (Mr. Samuel, small farmer, San Mateo)

... (((son, 15))) says he would like to study but it is difficult since we do not have the money (.) besides ... (((younger son, 8))) is still too young to help us so that makes things more difficult (...) we were thinking that he could stay with us and help us save and in a couple of years and then he could go to study ... (Mr. Marco, small farmer, San Luis)

d. Loans and credit:

The social capital literature has noted that in those poor areas where formal financial institutions have no presence, residents rely upon personal relationships to access much-needed cash through a series of informal arrangements based on mutual knowledge and trust, such as ROSCAs, burial societies, or personal loans (van Bastelaer, 2000; Sorensen, 2000; Narayan, et al., 2000a, 2000b; Guggerty, 2007). Some of those mechanisms of financial support have been found in the area. For example, the baseline survey found that residents mainly make use of personal loans to borrow money rather than other means: half of households interviewed—43 out of 96 cases—obtained loans through friends and relatives in the previous year, only nine reported appealing to moneylenders, one to a rural financial institution (cajas rurales de ahorro y crédito), and none obtained a loan from a bank.

The conditions upon which personal loans and credit are obtained, the reasons for obtaining them, and the profile of beneficiaries for each of those different financial tools were observed to vary according to the objective condition of residents. A first conditioning factor on that subject was that although personal loans are usually embedded in trustworthy relationships between close friends and relatives, it was reported that there are certain limits to the amount of financial support borrowers can access, usually related to their material condition. In this respect, the baseline survey found that access to personal loans was more limited among the poorest residents (of the 43 personal loans reported, only 7 came from households cases from the lowest expenditure quartile, who on average received 124.3S/., or 28.8UK£, as compared to 14 cases reported from households in top expenditure quartile, which received on average 432.5S/. or 100.6UK£). Indeed, informal conversations and in-depth interviews with

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68 The poorer the migrant the more likely their education would be more limited. Data from the baseline survey showed that of the 7 residents between 14 to 16 years of age who had not completed primary education, 6 came from households in the two poorer expenditure quartiles and of the 6 residents between 17 and 19 years of age who had not completed secondary education, 5 came from the poorer half of respondents.

69 Their offices of both banks and cajas rurales are only located in Lambayeque or Chiclayo.
residents showed that they make use of their knowledge of their friends’ and relatives’ repayment capabilities to decide whether or not to provide the amount requested:

... it’s not always (.) with loans one has to be very careful because you may want to help your brothers or your sisters but in the end you also have to care about your own family ... when I do it is only with those I know they can pay me back. (Mr. Prudencio, small farmer, San Luis)

…my sister asked me for a loan because of the new school year ((daughter)) (.) it was not much so I gave it to her besides I knew her son was in Lima so that as soon as he sent her the money she would pay me back … (Mr. Samuel, small farmer, San Mateo)

The conditions upon which personal loans are provided usually vary in relation to the sums of money involved. Personal loans that involve small sums of money, used predominantly for consumption purposes, are mostly provided without any specific conditions (i.e., interest rates, signed contracts, or collaterals). The evidence obtained indicates that this kind of financial help is most common among those relatives already engaged in various quotidian forms of support, such as by complementing one another’s food ingredients, borrowing and lending farm equipment, or looking after one another’s houses or children when absent. Moreover, in those relationships there are little distinctions between the positions of the borrower or lender, insofar as those roles tend to alternate between actors.

... there with my compadres and my sisters we help each other like that (.) one day my compadre asks me for 20 soles and if I have the money I give it to him (.) then another day I may ask him the same and so on (.) according to the situation of course because it is not as if we have much to spare either. (Mr. Abraham, small farmer, San Mateo)

... if I needed him let’s say 40 S/. or 50 S/. ((4.7 UK£ or 7.0 UK£)) I know I can go with ... ((neighbouring siblings)) to get it and it’s the same for them (.) they know if I have it I wouldn’t say no since we have helped each other many times. (Mr. Prudencio, small farmer, San Luis)

In cases when residents want to borrow relatively large sums of money both the terms under which loans are provided and the lender tend to differ. In the case of the poorer residents who request a large loan, these are commonly provided as ‘advanced payments’ for future labour or commercial agreements even among relatives. Access to cash, hence, imply for them obligations in terms of labour or crop-sharing which may negatively affect their interests, insofar as they are not free to pursue other job opportunities or negotiate better prices for their products.

In other circumstances, lending practices between friends and relatives can also operate under more formal conditions, including interest rates and signed contracts. In those cases encountered during fieldwork (four in total), loans involved substantial amounts of money for local standards, ranging from 500 S/. (116.3 UK£) to as high as 3000 S/.
(697.7 UK£), with annual aggregated interest rates ranging from 15% to 30%. The same as with most of other local lending practices, social relationships are instrumental for these transactions to take place, as they are made between residents that know one another well and are aware of their economic circumstances.

I had some money saved and did not know what to do with it (.) then my compadre Pedro came and told me he had a pending business (.) he is a beekeeper and told me he had just got a contract to supply a mini-market in Chiclayo and he needed some extra money for his business to produce more right? ... yes we signed a simple contract because it would take a while before he payed me back and it was a heavy sum ((1500S/. or 348.8UK£)) (.) we agreed on 20% ((annual rate)) (Mr. Sandro, small farmer, San Luis)

The only ROSCA identified in the area of study operated in San Mateo and consisted of a group of eight women from better off families (small and medium farmers, three of whom, in addition, were local business owners) and a non-resident, one of the teachers from the local school, who had been meeting on a monthly basis for approximately three years as of 2006. The amount of money they gathered was rather small, 320S/. (74.4 UK£) all together, which they allotted randomly at the beginning of each round unless a member requested a specific turn. Reports from some of its members indicate that the main use for the money received was for family consumption purposes (e.g., acquiring food, clothes for children, or to cover some school-related expenses). In addition, although there were no formal barriers to belonging to the group except for requiring a personal invitation from group members, as reported by part of the literature (van Bastelaer, 2000; Rankin, 2002; Mayoux, 2001), different testimonies indicate that there was a certain degree of self-selection between members on the basis of the knowledge of their differentiated material condition, expecting that other residents would be unable to afford the monthly monetary contributions.

it's a bit difficult because not many can contribute to the fund (.) before we tried to invite other people but they didn't last long and anyway we never were more than 12 (.) now we are fewer but we know each other well and have no problems (.) no one says this month I can't or something like that ... (Mrs. Felícita, small farmer, San Mateo)

I do not think most can do it ((become members)) (.) if you see around many have problems to make a living so asking them to contribute to the fund every month would be problematic for them and for the group. (Mrs. Frescia, small farmer, San Mateo)

The economic trajectory of the local ROSCA, in addition, appears to have unintentionally contributed to enlarging the material barrier between group members and other residents. Local accounts suggested that the group initially operated with a total of 10 members, each of them contributing 20 S/. (4.7 UK£). As time passed, most regular members of the group decided to increase the amount of the contributions to the current

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70 These interest rates appeared to be substantially smaller than those established by local moneylenders, who, reportedly, charge annual interest rates between 30% up to 50%.

71 If two of them aimed for the same turn, the allocation was done by drawing lots)
40 S/. (7 UK£) in order “to make it more attractive (.) otherwise it was too little money” (Mrs. Frescia, small farmer, San Mateo).

The presence of a few businesses in the area, mostly in the hands of small and medium farmers, adds another dynamic to the role of personal relationships in residents’ economic practices. The data collected coincides with other empirical examinations of credit practices of agricultural traders in Madagascar (Fafchamps and Minten, 2002a, 2002b) and central Peru (Long, 2001), indicating that the success of such commercial initiatives is largely conditional on traders’ efficient use of credit agreements established on the basis of personal knowledge and trust with clients and providers. Considering the deprived economic condition of most customers and the small markets in which those business initiatives operate, local merchants are well aware that maintaining a regular volume of sales based solely on cash transactions is not feasible, particularly during the slack season. Therefore, to continue operating throughout the year, all of them have developed informal credit systems, with credit limits set on the basis of their personal knowledge of customers’ economic situation, general reputation, and history of transactions. This system, in consequence, implies a differentiation of clients according to their material condition, by which it becomes easier for more established farmers to obtain larger quantities of products on credit in comparison to the poorest ones, as explicitly recognised by some interviewees:

.... hm everybody knows how things are going for each of us (.) who is doing well and who is doing bad so one takes that into consideration because otherwise you lose money. (Mrs. Filipa, micro farmer and grocery shop owner, San Mateo)

Res.: do you give any credit to your clients?
C.: it depends.
Res.: on what?
C.: on the person (.) to the people we know do not have much but always pay back we give a little and to those who have more then we give them a little more ... (Mrs. Fortunata, medium farmer and owner of local agricultural trade business, San Mateo).

The limited cash flow that these dynamics imply may negatively affect the capacity of those businesses to renew their stocks. Because of such limitations, it is difficult to imagine that these businesses could be sustainable in the long term without the pre-arranged agreements that local business owners have with providers from nearby towns—Pacora, Illimo, and Jayanca—or from Chiclayo, who allow them to partially refill their stocks on credit. The presence of a close connection with providers, either by blood or compadrazgo, appears as fundamental to these agreements:

When I set up my business it was with the beer I got from my sister’s store in Lambayeque (.) I asked her to give me a few boxes on credit and (.) fortunately (.) things went well ...
when I need more (.) I pay a small deposit for it and get the rest on credit ... (Mr. Eric, medium farmer, San Mateo).

... the rice and pasta I got from my brother’s business in Lambayeque (.) I don’t sell much so on most occasions I just pay him according to my sales ... I go there once a month at the same time I visit my mother ... (Mrs. Filipa, micro farmer San Mateo).

5.2.2. Informational resources

Social relationships might contribute to the performance of economic agents by facilitating the dissemination of specialised information that allows them to administer their resources more efficiently and by encouraging different learning processes that allow actors to develop new and more profitable skills (Collier, 1998; Van Staveren & Knorringa, 2007). In the local area, however, this potentiality is only minimally realised. One restriction in this respect is that, aside from veterinarians operating in nearby towns, no other specialised services for farmers are offered in the area. A second consideration is that given the material condition of most residents, only a minority can access and effectively make use of such information. This is in response to the different economic practices that actors implement and the volumes of capital they mobilise through them. For example, contact with veterinarians was reported to be more common among the minority of families who raise major forms of livestock—pigs and cows—than among those with small herds of goats or sheep (17 out of the 20 families that raised those animals reported having hired a veterinarian in the previous year, as compared with only 10 out of the 23 farmers that had herds of fewer than 6 goats). Likewise, the few families that were found to have direct regular contact with individuals with some form of technical education on agriculture production were those medium farmers whose sons had pursued some form of superior education in Chiclayo.

In this scenario, personal observation and interviews with micro and small farmers revealed that the local population mostly exchange different pieces of technical information through quotidian interactions with farmers expected to be well-informed on the subject (e.g., those that have large herds of animals or whose sons have some technical education) or who had experimented with new techniques (e.g., new fertilisers, pesticides, or medicines for livestock). Nevertheless, there are two facts that limit the potential beneficial effects of this widespread circuit of information. One relates to the costs associated with the implementation of technical recommendations, as some recommended fertilisers or medicines could be considered more efficient but more expensive as well. A second factor is that this flow of information usually comes from unqualified sources so that there is a high risk that informal technical recommendations are not useful, requiring a form of trial and error that may carry important costs and economic losses with it.

All of the sudden they all got sick ((livestock)) so I asked don Idelfonso because he knows more about it ((medium farmer that raises minor and major livestock)) (.) he had a
look at them and told me it was just worms and recommended some pills he said were good for that (.) so I went to town and bought them but in the end it was something else and I lost two of my animals (Mr. Cipriano, small farmer, San Luis)

Residents’ relationships may further affect their economic condition by mediating the process of cultural capital formation in its embodied and institutionalised forms (Bourdieu, 1980, 1984, 1986). As mentioned previously, relatives in urban areas are instrumental for migrants to access some superior form of education as the reduction in migration costs allow them to obtain those formal credentials that allow them to access qualified jobs. Social relationships, in turn, play a more significant role for the poorer migrants, insofar as they help migrants to learn a new trade suitable to their new urban environment. As the personal trajectories of the sons of two local residents show, it is through those personal connections that migrants are able to start out on and climb a certain kind of career ladder:

Pedro ((son)) used to work as a moto-taxi driver here (.) when my brother took him to Chiclayo he made him start working as the fare collector in his 'combis' ((vans used for public transportation)) but in very little time he learnt how to drive them and got his professional license ... with time he also learnt from the mechanics and now he helps his uncle to give maintenance to his cars (.) he is not just a simple driver anymore... (Mr. Cipriano, small farmer, San Luis)

My compadre ((agricultural trader)) needed someone to help him with his truck because his son moved out of town to study and he wanted someone reliable ... when he bought another truck he left my son in charge of driving one of them and so he started to work in this on a more regular basis ... now he works with a company of interprovincial transport in Piura ... (Mr. David, micro farmer, San Mateo)

5.2.3. Productive resources

Social capital has also been associated with mutual collaborative arrangements between actors who, in this manner, are able to access one another’s resources to cope with their own limited stocks of physical capital (Collier, 1998; Soresen, 2000; Woolcock, 2001, 2002). The evidence obtained indicates that indeed there are widespread forms of material collaboration between neighbours, friends, and relatives residing in San Mateo and San Luis. These, however, are mainly limited to borrowing and sharing minor assets such as basic farm equipment (e.g., pickaxes, machetes, or shovels) in small numbers. This practice can be related to the objective condition of local residents: most residents have very limited stocks of physical capital so that they cannot spare them easily either because they are in use (e.g., requests for borrowing farm equipment were reported to be more common during the harvest seasons) or their scarcity and relative important economic value make people less open to lending them on a regular basis (e.g., very few farmers indicated being willing to share their ploughs).

It depends (.) if I know they want to work hard with them I do not lend them ((farm equipment)) (.) even if it’s just a machete or a shovel it costs money and you never know if people have the money to pay for it right away ... (Mr. Armando, micro farmer, San Luis)
... one thing is if your neighbour asks for a machete and another if he asks for your cart with your horse included. Here we like to collaborate but it is better to avoid problems. If something happened to it I end up with no cart and my neighbour indebted so it is not convenient for anyone... (Mr. Marco, small farmer, San Luis)

Borrowing or sharing productive resources as an intensive practice, however, was observed only among a handful of family units. These consisted of households that were related to one another at the first degree of consanguinity (i.e., their heads of household or their partners were brothers or sisters), who had been living close to one another for a considerable period of time (some of them were born in the village), and were engaged in regular daily interactions, including other forms of basic support, such as walking their children to school, looking after one another’s houses when absent, borrowing petty cash or cooking utensils from one another. In other words, these mainly consisted of residents who were originally part of the same household, lived for most of their lives in the area, and now live next to one another with their respective families in virtue of the inheritance they received from their parents. A particular case in San Luis referred to an extended family unit (the Chunga family), which consisted of three related households that jointly cultivated the lands of the original parents.

Two interrelated forms of productive collaboration were observed in those cases. First, these households in many occasions pooled their productive assets and share both minor and major productive assets, such as ploughs, carts, and in one case, even a truck for the common transportation of farm production. Second, these families also helped one another by pooling their family workforce during the planting and harvest seasons, allowing them to reduce the costs of hiring labour and to free some of their members to go out of town to work in contratas. The overall benefits of such practices, however, are not easy to discern. For instance, some interviewees from those families mentioned that their assets tend to be overused and that, on occasions, they lost some farm equipment or draft animals because of that reason. In addition, their sharing of family workforce was not considered very efficient, insofar as local families mainly mobilise women, children, and elderly family members, with the corresponding costs in time, quality of work, and food (hosting families usually provide the meals for those relatives coming over to help).

5.2.4. The economic value of political relationships

The development of connections with actors and organisations in positions of political authority has been considered to be valuable so as to enhance and scale-up local development efforts (Evans, 1996; Woolcock, 1998, 2001, 2002; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). The value of such connections, however, cannot be understood solely in terms of the resources social organisations and communities may access. As the social network literature has highlighted (Lin, 1995, 2000, 2001; Burt, 1992, 2005) as well as that on ‘local development brokers’ (Platteau & Abraham, 2002; Bierschenk, Chaveau, & de Sardan, 2000; Lewis & Mosse, 2006), forging strong
relationships with public officials and political figures carry with them a series of benefits for those strategically located actors who mediate between local and external actors.

The most ostensible benefit local actors may obtain from their political relationships is access to employment in the public sector. Residents that are invited to participate in local political alliances that compete for the town hall may, if successful, obtain a remunerated position in that office, which not only provides a relatively high income but also a fixed one, a rarity in the local area. As of 2007, for example, as a member of the town hall council, Mr. Rodrigo (medium farmer, San Luis) received 500 S/. or 116.3 UK£ per council session, which by law had to take place at least twice a month.72 There was also evidence that those who participated in a political campaign with the winning political party could also aspire to a position in the local bureaucracy, as in the cases of Mrs. Frescia (small farmer, San Mateo), who obtained a job in the town hall after the elections of 2003, securing a monthly income of 700 S/. (162.8 UK£), and of Mr. Idelfonso (medium farmer, San Luis) who managed to obtain a position for his son as driver for the town hall after the elections of 2000:

I was short of votes ((to be elected to the town hall council)) so the mayor told me ‘why don’t you help us with the Glass of Milk? you have experience with that’ (.) so he assigned me to the programme and I have been working there since then. (Mrs. Frescia, small farmer, San Mateo)

I.: No (.) I came short from a few votes (.) it was very competitive but did they offer you something?
Res.: but I had to annoy a few people but in the end they did (.) the mayor told me that the only option available was as a driver for the town hall and since I don’t drive I told him that may be my son could do it ... it didn’t pay much ((400S/. a month at the time)) but it was not hard work either so we were happy with that. (Mr. Idelfonso, medium farmer, San Luis)

Another economic benefit accessible via political connections involves the preferential access to information regarding temporary work for public projects executed either by the state or the town hall. The latter, in particular, constitutes a rich information source about infrastructure and development projects taking place in the area, as the town hall constitutes the most important investor in public infrastructure in the area (e.g., the expansion of electric lines for residential use is implemented directly by the district town hall, after approval of their technical project by the Ministry of Energy, and the maintenance and expansion of asphalted roads within town is directly managed by the town hall) and public agencies that intend to do the same coordinate their activities with municipal authorities (e.g., to obtain updated maps, verify urban expansion plans, identify intangible areas, or contact local authorities). This scenario, hence, puts local leaders in the position to regulate residents’ access to the economic capital mobilised by public institutions. Moreover, local testimonies indicated that, on some

occasions, these leaders appeared to have used that access to benefit themselves or their close relations. Towards the end of the 1990s, for example, it was reported that access to the temporary jobs generated by FONCODES’ local infrastructure projects and by the Ministry of Transport’s preventive works for El Niño event of 1998 were regulated by the existing lieutenant governors, benefitting primarily their extended family. In addition, through informal conversations, Mrs. Frescia revealed that her eldest son (18) had previously worked in two jobs for the maintenance of roads conducted by the town hall and that she has also helped two of her godsons to obtain similar temporary jobs.

An indirect benefit from political connections concerns their ability to connect local actors with leading figures from other villages as well as from the capital of the district, who are characterised by having a rather advantageous material condition (e.g., medium farmers and local businessmen). As a result, well-connected residents might benefit from accessing information on job and business opportunities or pursuing some form of economic agreement with those leading figures operating beyond the local area:

*I know my compadre since the campaign from 2000 (.) he had always worked in that ((livestock trader)) and he convinced and guided me to invest more on it ((livestock)) (.) now I don’t work with him anymore but with his son who inherited the business ... (Mr. Idelfonso, medium farmer, San Luis)*

*... after the campaign I started him to work for our mayor (.) well (.) for our candidate to mayor (.) he had just opened a small pharmacy in town and since I was a health promoter ((in charge of the health post of San Mateo between 1994 to 1998)) he asked me to work with him but unfortunately the business didn’t last for long. (Mr. Prudencio, small farmer, San Luis)*

Another indirect benefit for those politically-connected actors refers to preferential access to the few public services operating in the district. For example, local informants suggested that the best way to receive proper medical attention in the health post operating in Pacora—particularly when it came to the possibility of obtaining free medicines or not being asked to wait for prolonged periods of time—is to show up in the company of an official from the town hall. Likewise, having the police force come to the area in cases of robbery or other crimes is also more likely to take place if a town hall official or a lieutenant governor mediates the matter, as police agents usually do not enter rural settings and, if they do, on many occasions ask farmers to cover for the costs in petrol of travelling to their farms or even request some other contributions for their services. Likewise, it was reported that some moto-taxi drivers were able to deal with fines or detention from the police with the help of political figures.

Finally, it was observed that well-connected village leaders also benefitted, albeit modestly, through the local credit they enjoy in relation to the prestige or ‘symbolic capital’ associated to their strategic position (Bourdieu, 1980, 1986). This was personally observed in different instances: moto-taxi drivers, for example, would take those leaders from their villages to
town with them as unique passengers although their customary practice is to wait for other passengers to fill all available sits; they have no need of cash when attending local stores as they have open credit; and when sitting in a local liquor they would receive priority treatment by the owners.

5.2.5. Social resources as an informal insurance mechanism

In a context of prevailing poverty, as observed in San Mateo and San Luis, families are vulnerable to emergencies, as they usually lack any economic surpluses that could help them to smooth their detrimental effects, to which it is necessary to add their limited access to public welfare and the inefficiency with which they operate. In this respect, a recurrent theme within the social capital literature is that the poor usually resort to their relationships in order to cope with economic shocks by virtue of different forms of mutually supportive agreements at the individual and collective levels (Narayan et al., 2000b; Rose, 2000; Sorensen, 2000; Wetterberg, 2007; Woolcock, 1998). The data obtained on this subject indicate that local mechanisms of support could involve access to cash or other forms of capital.

a. Financial support:

Local households are able to access economic capital to cope with emergencies mainly through three different non-exclusive mechanisms: via village-level collections of money and fund-raising activities organised by the affected households. The types of relationships and the form in which they are mobilised differ in each case. Money collections are village-level activities managed by the lieutenant governor alongside other recognised village leaders (e.g., town hall officials). These collections are customarily organised in cases of a death in a family. On those occasions, neighbours contribute with small amount of money to help the affected family with the costs of the funeral. Not all local families, however, could expect to be beneficiaries of these efforts; different local accounts made evident that such collective practices are primarily intended to support the poorest residents:

If one family does not have ([money]) that’s when we enter the scene ([money]) some people here don’t have relatives or are very poor so the collection is organised and neighbours contribute to help covering the costs of the funeral. (Mr Teófilo, lieutenant governor, San Mateo)

... most of us are in the same situation and don’t have much money ([money]) but if a family can afford it ([money]) then there is no need ([money]) right? (Mr. Rodrigo, town hall council member, San Luis)

The organising role that local leaders play puts them in a delicate situation, as they are responsible for assessing the situation of a particular family and decide when to call for a money collection and how much of the costs of the emergency could be transferred to
other villagers. As Mr. Teófilo, the Lieutenant Governor of San Mateo as of 2006 explained succinctly but clearly: “we cannot ask people to stop eating for a day just to save others’ livestock”. This conditioned support opens this practice, particularly when the emergencies do not involve a death in a family, to subtle forms of negotiation. On some occasions, for example, affected families have to describe to local authorities the severity of their situation and so their need for monetary help. This process could be rather lengthy, much to the anguish of those families who progressively lose their assets. Those were the experiences of Mr. Gabriel from San Mateo and Mr. Rolando from San Luis, who met their respective village authorities on different occasions due to the prolonged illness of their wives (the first one temporarily lost her ability to walk whilst the second was diagnosed with breast cancer and needed to travel to Lima for treatment) before any village-level support was provided:

... We sold most of our cattle to go to hospital but things weren’t getting any better ... probably because he ((Lieutenant Governor)) saw we still had a few animals he kept telling me they would ask for support from the health centre or the town hall (.) in the end doña Frescia ((neighbour and former member of the town hall council)) saw the problems we had and so they decided to help us with a collection. (Mr. Gabriel, micro farmer, San Mateo).

I visited don Idelfonso ((Lieutenant Governor)) a couple of times and Rodrigo too ((town hall council member)) to explain our situation and see if they could help us (.) they asked for help from the health centre in town but besides some medicines we didn’t receive more help (.) we were like this for a while (.) my father also talked to them until they finally decided to ask the neighbours for a contribution. (Mr. Rolando, micro farmer, San Luis)

The amount of money mobilised in this form, however, provides only small sums of money; interviewed beneficiaries and leaders reported that the money raised through such activities rarely surpass 300 S/. (69.8 UK£). Moreover, these constitute one-off events that are rarely repeated in favour of any family. In the face of such limitations some families also organise their own fund-raising events, which rely directly on their personal relationships. For these events, friends, acquaintances, and relatives (independent of their area of residence) are invited to attend a party in which meals and alcoholic drinks are sold. There are two key factors, however, that limit the recurrence of such practices in the area. The first one is that they require the mobilisation of significant volumes of capital in different forms, such as acquiring meal ingredients or the corresponding alcoholic drinks, a kind of material investment that the poorest families facing an emergency cannot afford. A second consideration is that the success of these events is not guaranteed; diverse factors could affect the net gain obtained from those parties, such as an adequate estimation of costs, favourable negotiation with suppliers, and a fair forecast of attendance. Furthermore, the agricultural cycle indirectly affects the conduction of such events, as during the slack season many families face cash shortages.
No (.) that wasn’t possible (.) first we needed money and we didn’t have it (.) besides considering the expenses to be covered it would have been difficult for us to get the money needed. (Mr. Rolando, micro farmer, San Luis)

We know many people because of our shop ((grocery shop)) so with the guinea pigs we had left ((of family livestock)) we thought about organising a ‘cuyada’ ((roasted guinea pigs)) but changed our minds because it was unlikely we would make a profit (.) it was November ((slack season)) so most people had no money and many were trying their luck outside town. (Mr. Gabriel, micro farmer, San Mateo)

An additional form of obtaining some financial relief takes the form of personal loans between close friends and relatives that are managed informally and operate on the basis of personal knowledge and trust. As regularly reported in the risk-sharing literature (Fafchamps & Lund, 2003; Park, 2006; Murgai et al., 2002), however, local informants indicated that these loans rarely covered for the full costs residents had incurred in. Moreover, as described previously, the dominant economic condition of most villagers tend to restrict the amount of money they can expect. The same as with other loans, it was observed that there was a certain degree of economic evaluation, as potential lenders usually ponder on the increasingly limited repayment capabilities of borrowers:

I didn’t give them as much as they wanted (.) my wife told me that it was better to be careful because my sister told her they were asking everybody and were already in arrears with a neighbour. (Mr. Abraham, small farmer, San Mateo).

We were lucky to have our animals (.) otherwise I do not know how we could have done without them (.) people do not lend you easily when you are like that and if you go moneylenders you end up even worse (.) I understand because people don’t have money but anyway it makes you feel desperate. (Mrs. Filipa, micro farmer, San Mateo)

b. Non-economic support:

The same as with the reported limited practice of sharing of productive assets, the most recurrent form of material support obtained in cases of emergency involved minor resources such as food, clothes, or personal attention (e.g., help attending children or preparing meals), mainly from relatives, compadres, and friends. According to local informants, this kind of support tends to be rather basic because of the prevailing economic conditions of most families, which tend to lack the required surplus of assets to share with those facing an emergency without upsetting their own economic condition.

In this respect, it is mainly in those few families that have extended collaborative productive agreements on the basis of a long-standing kinship-based relationship that also reported accessing more significant forms of material support in cases of emergency. These were manifested in different circumstances. For example, during the El Niño event of 1998, these families tended to help one another to reinforce their houses and pooled their food supplies to cope with the emergency. Furthermore, some also pooled their
productive assets (e.g., draft animals) for the upcoming agricultural campaign to cope with their losses. Likewise, one of those families reported that after losing their livestock due to a robbery, their relatives provided them with three animals to start anew, on the condition that they return them after a year with their offspring.

Finally, village leaders may also play a significant role in providing some form of material support to those facing an emergency. Thanks to their roles, these agents tend to be well connected and are able to act as leverage and mediators with public officials and authorities so that they can access certain help for the affected neighbours:

... this persons' son had just died and didn't have enough money to pay for the burial ... aside from the money-collection I also talked to the major to exempt them from paying for a niche in the cemetery (.) luckily he approved ... (Mrs. Frescia, former candidate to the town hall council, San Mateo)

... as soon as I heard about it ((robbery)) I went to contact the police (.) I was lucky because my friend was there otherwise it would have been more difficult (.) so we took a patrol car and went around to see if the thieves were still in the area (.) fortunately we managed to recover a couple of the animals ... (Mr. Oliver, former lieutenant governor, San Mateo)

5.3. Concluding remarks

The findings reported in the present chapter largely reproduce the various valuable expressions of social capital highlighted in the development literature. In this respect, to mention a few examples, it was found that in San Mateo and San Luis, local residents make use of their relationships to access jobs; that they rely on trustful connections with traders to commercialise their products so as to prevent malfeasance and preferential terms of exchange; that friends and relatives are the main sources of loans; that local businesses make extensive use of trade credit to sustain their operations; that the implementation of migration strategies largely rely on the support of relatives to reduce migration costs; that the main forms of informal insurance comes from residents’ close connections; and that the mediation of strategically located actors—village leaders—is central for residents’ dealings with public agencies and officials, particularly in a context where the rule of law is weak (Bebbington, 1999; Carrol, 2001; Fafchamps & Minten 2000a, 2000b; Narayan et al., 2000a, 2000b; Narayan, 1997; van Bastelaer, 2000; Sorensen, 2000; World Bank, 2001).

The specific form those social resources take and the kinds of relationships they were access through, however, are not common across all actors co-habiting the local social space. As systematically described, actors’ endowments of capital and associated economic practices insert them into different systems of relations of production—fields in Bourdieu’s terms—each of them involving dealings with different economic agents. For example, very poor families that mainly survive as jornaleros mostly deal with local farmers and contratistas in order to obtain work
as wage labour; micro and small farmers that cultivate cash crops deal additionally with local acopiadores and livestock traders; whilst the few relatively well-off households deal more commonly with agricultural and livestock traders in the main urban markets of Chiclayo and Lambayeque rather than with the local economic agents most other residents interact with. Likewise reasons for out-migration (i.e., to work or to study), the returns of this practice (i.e., value of remittances), and the role relationships play to implement them vary between residents according to their objective condition (i.e., needs of being taught a trade or simply help with accommodation). A central implication of this scenario is that sharing a similar social space does not imply either accessing similar endowments of social resources or mobilising them in a similar manner. Access to valuable resources and the mobilisation of relationships to such effect, instead, tend to vary according to actors’ objective condition (e.g., access to land), practices (e.g., time dedicated to work as a jornalero), and position within the specific systems of relations in which those actions take place (e.g., as jornalero or as a local farmer hiring them; as a micro or as a medium farmer). Such a scenario can also be observed in relation to certain expressions of collective action, where the only active ROSCA in town tended to self-select its members among better off households or that the communal collections of money in case of emergencies, which targeted the poorest families and hence was largely extraneous to the lives of the least-poor.

By the same token, it becomes apparent that residents’ lives and, more importantly for development purposes, economic practices are not dominated by a single well-defined structure of relations. Neither community relations, family relations, nor organisation relations, each of them per se can fully account for actors’ use of social capital, who instead make various uses of their different sets of connections according to their particular needs. They are not over encompassing or determinant insofar as people’s lives are unlikely to be totally defined by their belonging to a particular group (except for very controlling and rather isolated ones such as religious cults or interns of a prison). For example, not because all actors reside in the similar village, community relations are particularly relevant to their economic practices, as in the case of relatively well-off farmers, whose interests are more far-reaching than that of the poorer ones. Likewise, actors may take advantage of the word-of-mouth circuits of information facilitated by quotidian regular interactions between neighbours to access information about acopiadores and the price of crops, but not because this extensive system of connections facilitates that flow of information all information would flow through it, as observed in the case of information about contratas, which instead circulates tightly along friendship and kinship relations.

As various authors have highlighted, either to criticise the optimistic discourse of social capital regarding the capacity of community initiatives to promote social mobility (Cleaver, 1999, 2001; DeFillipis, 2001; Fine, 1999) or to add a social dimension to poverty assessments by emphasising the lack of valuable of connections among the poor (Narayan et al., 2000a, 2000b; Robinson, Siles & Schmidt, 2004; Durston, 2004; Woolcock, 2001, 2002; World Bank, 2001),
there are clear material limits to the contribution of social relationships. Whether a person is able to obtain steady temporary jobs at the local level or in *contratas* in rice, sugar, and cotton plantations through their relationships, it is clear that those forms of employment are poorly remunerated and that are open to exploitation; likewise, as consistently reported by the risk-sharing literature (Fafchamps & Lund, 2003; Park, 2006; Murgai et al., 2002), none of the forms of informal insurance practiced in the area were reported to fully protect residents from economic shocks.

Finally, it is apparent that access to social resources is not automatic but instead it constitutes a dynamic and continuously negotiated process (Cleaver, 2001; Evans, 1996; Fox & Gershman, 2006 Edwards & Foley, 1997; Foley & Edwards, 1999; Mosse, 2007; Pantoja, 2000). As observed in the text, support and cooperation is not attained automatically either because actors are related to each other by blood or because they live in the same area and participate in the same organisations. Rather than static, the terms under which some support is provided and the social relationships mobilised to access relevant social resources are likely to change over time according to the particular objective trajectories of actors (e.g., if a landless resident becomes a established medium-farmer over time) (Long, 2001; Lin, 2000, 2001).

This information, however, still requires further substantiation. Although social resources permit us to identify the direct contribution of social capital to the economic field, they do not allow us to distinguish the process through which local residents are able to count on such forms of support or economic partnerships. To this effect, the study proceeds in the following chapter to analyse how households build those relationships of economic value in direct relation to their objective condition and economic strategies.
CHAPTER 6
BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS IN SAN MATEO AND SAN LUIS

A central contribution of the social capital literature to the development debates has been to problematise prior conceptualisations of poverty by highlighting that it has a social dimension, particularly in the form of a lack of connections with resource-rich actors (Narayan et al., 2000a, 2000b; Robinson, Siles, & Schmid, 2004; Woolcock, 2001, 2002). As described by Woolcock, the poor “typically have a close-knit and intensive stock of bonding social capital that they leverage to ‘get by’ ... a modest endowment of ... bridging social capital, typically deployed by the non-poor to ‘get ahead’ and almost no linking social capital enabling them to gain sustained access to formal institutions” (2002, pp. 23-24). A concern regarding this use of the concept, however, refers to the tendency in the literature to depict the social dimensions of poverty in a rather static manner, leaving aside the processes through which actors (re)produce such a differentiated network structure and the effects of the broad political economy on such process (Cleaver, 2001, 2005; DeFillipis, 2001; Foley & Edwards, 1999; Mosse, 2007; Rankin, 2002).

In this regard, the following chapter examines to what extent and in what manner actors’ objective conditions and associated practices affect their capacity to establish relationships of potential economic significance within and beyond the area of study. The data used for this analysis was gathered during the second stage of data collection—detailed community assessment—through informal conversations, in-depth interviews, and household surveys conducted in two one-month visits (March and July-August 2006). Those different pieces of information are used in a complementary manner. First, data from the first wave of household surveys are used to identify whether the connections of heads of households and partners—within the village, beyond the village, and with district authorities—are unequally distributed according to local levels of welfare. Next, qualitative data is used to understand how actors’ objective conditions (un)intentionally affect the development of durable supportive relationships.

6.1. The unequal distribution of connections

This section examines the quantitative data gathered through the baseline household survey. It examines the distributions of actors’ access to connections of potential economic relevance within the village, beyond the local area, and with local authorities, according to their levels of economic welfare. It, hence, tests both mainstream social capital characterisations of poverty (Woolcock, 2001, 2002; World Bank, 2001) as well as Bourdieu’s understanding of sociability as shaped by the duality of the structure (i.e., actors’ material resources, which condition
investments in relationships, and practices and dispositions, which brings together those of a similar social extraction (1977, 1980).

Following the social network characterisations of social capital (Lin, 2001; Woolcock, 2001, 2002), three types of connections are distinguished: connections within the village, outside the local area—beyond San Mateo and San Luis and immediate neighbouring villages (San Juan and San Felipe)—and relationships with public authorities and district leaders. These different sets of social ties are operationalised in the following manner:

- **Local networks:** This indicator estimates the number of connections within the village that heads of households (and partners) reported as being able to apply to for at least one of the following forms of support: access to productive assets; temporary jobs; loans (over 100S/.); farm-related technical information; significant material support during emergencies; or help to deal with public agencies (e.g., health centre or the police force). This indicator is expected to reflect the scope of local connections that could be instrumental for actors’ ability to amass economic capital.

  The extension of actors’ local networks was assessed according to the number and strength of the connections reported as sources of support, distinguishing between (1) acquaintances, (2) friends, and (3) relatives or compadres. This constitutes an ‘out-strength’ measure (Wasserman et al., 1994; Hanneman & Riddle 2005), which adds the number of potential sources of support weighting their degree of closeness; rendering greater scores for those than could rely on various local close connections compared to those that rely only on a few weak ones. For presentation purposes, final scores were standardised (households’ scores are divided by the standard deviation of the number of connections per village) and rescaled over 10 points (assuming a normal distribution, the top score was equivalent to three times the village’s standard deviation).

- **External networks:** This referred to residents’ relationships who live outside the local area (San Mateo or San Luis and neighbouring villages San Juan and San Felipe) with whom they interact on a regular basis (once a month on average) with regard to either of the following actions: to find employment or commercialise their farm production; to obtain remittances; to access productive assets; to obtain technical information; to deal with public officials or services; or to receive material support during emergencies. This information was complemented, first, by specifying the location of those connections and kind of relationship with residents (acquaintanceship, friendship, or kinship). The reasoning behind taking into consideration the location of the potential source of support

73 The raw data matrix provided the following results:
- San Mateo: mean out-strength centrality score = 10.31, standard deviation = 10.45.
- San Luis: mean out-strength centrality score = 6.77, standard deviation = 6.77.
refers to the expectation that those connections that bridge the local villages with settings richer in resources would be more likely to grant access to greater volumes of resources or resources of better quality (Lin, 2001; Woolcock, 2001, 2002; Burt, 1992, 2005).

The external networks measure was, hence, calculated through the sum of head of households’ and partners’ external connections weighted according to closeness: (1) acquaintance, (2) friend, and (3), relative or compadre; and location: (1) other rural locations, (2), Intermediate towns (capitals of districts and provinces), (3) Intermediate cities (capitals of department) and (4) Lima or foreign country. The resulting scale, hence, produced high scores for households that have many contacts with relatives in developed urban areas and very low scores for those that only interact with weak connections living in other rural settings. For presentation purposes final scores were standardised on the basis of village-level standard deviations, and rescaled over 10 points (assuming a normal distribution, the top score was equivalent to three times the village standard deviation).

- **Vertical networks**: This set of connections was estimated on the basis of a subcomponent of the resource generator tool (Van der Gaag & Snijders, 2004, 2005) which asked if the head of household or his/her partner were friends or knew someone who was a friend of the following local leading figures:

  a. President of the water users’ commission (district).
  b. President of the board of water users (La Leche valley).
  c. The school principal.
  d. The parish priest.
  e. The chief of police.
  f. The chief doctor of the health centre.
  g. District governor.
  h. The major of the district.

  Each affirmative answer was weighted according to the level of proximity to the contacts in question: acquaintance (1), friend (2), relative or compadre (3) and if they knew these authorities personally (4). Similarly to the previous two scales, overall results were transformed to a scale over 10 points; in this case, taking as reference the maximum score possible given the fixed number of items listed (32 points).

Taking into consideration the scores for each subscale, it was observed that San Luis residents, on average, tend to report more extended external connections than their San Mateo residents.

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74 The initial results were the following:
- San Mateo: mean external networks score = 14.56, standard deviation=13.98
- San Luis: mean external networks score = 18.62, standard deviation = 17.81

75 The initial results were the following:
- San Mateo: mean vertical networks score = 12.67, standard deviation=5.01
- San Luis: mean vertical networks score = 11.68, standard deviation = 4.83
counterparts, which coincides with the reported greater proportion of households in the first setting receiving remittances from migrants (§ 4.3.3.). Differences regarding residents’ local and vertical networks are not statistically significant.

The subsequent comparisons of households’ access to different sets of connections according to their material condition shows that social networks are not equally distributed across the local population (Table 6.2). It does not follow, however, that networks are distributed monotonically, so that they increase in an orderly manner according to increments in households’ expenditure levels; instead, it is observed that each network measure presents a rather different kind of distribution. Local networks scores tend to be smaller among the poorest and least poor of the local residents compared to those of households in an intermediate objective condition. External connections of economic value appear to be more concentrated among the top two expenditure quartiles, whilst the poorest sectors of the population apparently have a more limited number of similar connections. Finally, it is only vertical networks which present a rather orderly unequal distribution, with access to district authorities increasing progressively according to households’ level of economic welfare. Despite these differences, a common feature in each village is that the poorest households report the lowest scores in each of the three network dimensions analysed.
favour. These initial findings, however, are only of a descriptive nature. The apparent objective order upon which networks are structured still needs further clarification; specifically, with regard as to whether this conditionality is related only to material restrictions (e.g., costs of travelling to urban areas on a regular basis) or if an actor's practices affect how they relate to one another either intentionally (calculated investments in key connections) or unintentionally (commonality of practices, tastes, or interests). To this end, the qualitative data gathered via informal and in-depth interviews as well as personal observation will be examined to clarify this process.

6.2. Network formation in San Mateo and San Luis

Within the literature there are several propositions regarding potential factors that affect the development of extended networks of relationships in a given community or society. From communitarian perspectives, the emphasis is placed on diverse forms of civic engagement or actors' common history and culture (Putnam, 1993a, 2001; Gittel & Vidal, 1998; Durston, 2002, 2004). Approaches centred on individual networks, in turn, emphasise instead actors' socio-demographic characteristics, such as age, sex, education, and income (Glaeser, 2001; Glaeser, Laibson, & Sacerdote, 2002; Hoffer, Boisjoly, & Duncan, 1999; Lin, 2000, 2001). In the face of this variety of potential explanations, the present qualitative assessment of the process of network formation in San Mateo and San Luis, does not intend to provide an exhaustive examination of each of those hypothesised factors, but rather to assess to what extent those most salient factors identified through qualitative methods, interact with the actors' material conditions and associated practices to develop the objective conditionality that the previous statistical analyses made apparent.

6.2.1. Material restrictions and economic calculation

The most ostensible form in which actors' material condition their access to an extensive network of relationships refers to their capacity to afford the costs of preserving and strengthening a relationship (Bourdieu, 1980, 1986). On this subject, the evidence obtained in the area of study indicates that household members of the most deprived families have rather sporadic direct contact with relatives living in more developed areas compared to better off residents as they lack the necessary spare cash to cover the necessary transport costs or the time to visit relatives residing in urban settings (e.g., a return trip to Chiclayo or Lambayeque from San Mateo or San Luis costs in total 5 S/. or 1.2 UK£, each trip lasting approximately 1.5 hours in motorised vehicles).

He is the one who visits us ((brother in Lima)) the last time I went was like six years ago but now with the family is more difficult we all have to work and hm there is just not enough money we have not seen ... ((son in Trujillo)) either since he left three years ago. (Mr Javier, micro farmer, San Mateo)
I have relatives there in Piura (northern department) because I am from Morropón (southern province) but I have not seen them for a while hm I think like five years already (last visit) (as you can see we do not have much and it is difficult since one always have to work ... (Mr. Nicolás, landless resident, San Mateo)

No I have not (visited daughters in Lima) it is too expensive besides my daughters do not have where to receive me ... no I have never been there (Lima). (Mrs. Flor, micro farmer, San Luis)

The observed economic challenges for building and preserving relationships beyond the local arena are further observed in relation to out-migration practices. As described in Chapter 4 (§ 4.3.3.), the baseline survey results showed that the rates of permanent migration were lower among the poorest residents than among better off households (only two of 21 reported cases of permanent migration came from households in the lowest expenditure quartile). This differentiated pattern of migration appears to be affected by two economic considerations. First, some of the poorest residents interviewed indicated that the levels of investment necessary to send their family members to developed urban areas made it difficult for them to implement this strategy, particularly considering that, despite the help of relatives, local families still have to provide for migrant’s maintenance, such as clothing, food, and transportation, especially at the beginning of their resettlement (e.g., according to the INEI, the basic consumer basket estimated for Lima costs approximately 35% higher than that expected for the capital of the department, Chiclayo, and approximately 55% higher than that estimated for rural settings in the department).76 Second, because of their economic condition, the poorest families face more limited options to obtain the necessary funding to cover migration costs, insofar as they not only lack the spare assets or cash necessary to cover for migration costs but also have a more limited access to loans and credit (§ 5.2.1.d.). For example, in the previously reported case of Mrs. Flor’s eldest daughter, who work as a maid in Lima, she reported being able to obtain a loan to cover for the migration process because her daughters had a guaranteed job and the amount requested was rather small as they were expected to live with her employer. By the same token, the story of Mr. Lorenzo, a resident from San Luis who rents a small plot of land from his in-laws, illustrates how those economic considerations may result in family members staying in the local area:

we wanted but couldn’t (my brother sent me word once (three years prior to the interview)) that in the factory where he works in Lima needed people so that he could help us to get ... (son, 17) a job the problem was that because he had just had just his second child and his house was very small he couldn’t receive him at his place we tried to get a loan here but it was very difficult and considering the interest rates that moneylenders wanted to put the whole thing didn’t add up then my wife got ill and our savings went there ... he lives now with a girl from San Miguel (nearby village) and works a plot of land her father gave them as an advanced part of her inheritance. (Mr. Lorenzo, landless resident, San Luis)

76 Obtained from the comparisons between the regional poverty lines established by the INEI in the ENAHO 2005.
There is also evidence that indicates the poorest households face material restrictions to developing more extended relationships in the local area because of their more limited opportunities to socialise with neighbours by organising celebrations, joining them in local liquor stores, or attending certain celebrations. The expenditure estimates obtained from the baseline survey indeed showed that of the 21 households that reported spending some money for entertainment purposes in the month of February 2006, only three came from those households belonging to the lowest expenditure quartile. The qualitative data gathered through interviews coincided with those results:

*I would like to do the same as the others who go drinking or make big parties for their birthdays and baptisms but with what money?* (Mr. Isaias, landless resident, San Mateo)

*No (...) we just celebrate ((birthday parties)) among ourselves (...) we kill a little chicken and with that we make a meal for the family* (Mrs. Flor, micro farmer, San Luis)

These material restrictions are also apparent with regard to actors’ capacity to generate political connections by participating directly in political campaigns. This is in response to the demands of financial and material contributions by local political parties, which are to a large extent funded by their own candidates. As the testimonies below indicate, these could be very onerous to the family budget:

*... my ‘Mrs.’ told me there were a few people looking for me that night from the ‘Humanist Movement’ (...) I guess that because I had been the village’s lieutenant governor and also worked with the PSA they invited me to participate ... I was thinking whether to accept or not when they told me I would have to put 2000 soles for the campaign ((465.1 UK£)) but where I was supposed to get that money from? ...* (Mr. Prudencio, small farmer, San Luis)

*Yes one always have to put money for it (...) even us ((APRA party, one of the oldest in the country)) who have been here for ages have to put our own money for the campaign then you can imagine how is with the others ... at that time ((2000 elections)) I did not spend much (...) it would have been 500 S/. at most ((116.7 UK£))* (Mr. Idelfonso, medium farmer, San Luis)

It is important to highlight, however, that local residents do not act passively in the face of those material limitations. Most are aware of the potential benefits associated from the development of key connections (§ Chapter 5), which introduces an element of economic calculation to the process of network formation, through which actors purposively ‘invest’ in certain relationships despite the relative heavy costs involved, albeit within the limits of their own possibilities and in relation to the interests associated to their corresponding objective condition (Bourdieu, 2005; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). In this regard, despite facing important material restrictions to maintaining family relations beyond the local area, some of the poorest residents selectively forged and strengthened certain relationships. For example, Mr. Armando, a micro farmer from San Luis, expressed that although he had no major contact with his relatives, he normally stopped by Jayanca, a nearby town, to visit his brother-in-law
whenever he was around the area since “has his own business ((as an agricultural trader)) and usually knows where there might be some work available”. Likewise, Mrs. Teresa’s husband (Mr. Ladislao), a micro farmer from San Luis who cultivates mainly for self-consumption, reportedly among all his relatives he “only visits his brother in Chiclayo from time to time since they get along well and sometimes he also gets him work in the market”.

The most noticeable form in which this instrumental approach toward relationships is expressed, as documented on various examinations of rural livelihoods in Latin America (Crehan, 1992; Long, 2001; Durston, 2004), refers to the establishment of compadrazgo relationships. These, as described in Chapter 5, tended to differ according to the systems of relations of production in which residents participate; for example, micro and small farmers usually reported having compadres among local acopiadores and contratistas, a kind of relationship which well-off residents did not share. This interested request to strategic actors to become godfathers or godmothers of a child (most commonly for baptisms) could also be related to the development of vertical connections. The experiences of Mrs. Frescia and Mr. Prudencio, two village leaders who had connections in the town hall and had worked for the state, serve as examples in that respect:

I have been named godmother for quite a few children in town especially since I became a member of the town hall council (.) there could have been more because I rejected many petitions. (Mrs. Frescia, small farmer, San Mateo)

... outside my family I generally do not accept becoming the godfather of anyone ... people come to me for that but it costs money and I know they expect me to help them somehow and honestly I don’t have the resources to do that... (Mr. Prudencio, small farmer, San Luis)

6.2.2. Economic practices and commonality of interests

Despite the presence of extended weak connections among residents and their use for economic purposes (e.g., word-of-mouth circuits of information on acopiadores practices), it was noted that residents’ different sets of economic practices and corresponding participation in different systems of relations of production contribute to generate a network structure following the objective differences between actors. In the case of the poorest residents, for instance, their relationships with neighbours are on occasions marked by the different economic agreements they establish with one another, which implies an underlying hierarchy in which one is the employee, the borrower, or the tenant, and the other the boss, the lender, and the landlord (sometimes all of them at the same time), which contributes to distance between both sets of actors despite sharing the same social space:

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77 This strategy has even affected me personally, as I have been targeted regularly by local families to become the godfather of newborn children during my different visits to the area.
... well (.) it is not that we are close friends or something like that (with main employers) (.) we talk to each other on the street but mainly when I work for them that is all. (Mr. David, micro farmer, San Mateo)

J.: the 'misters' sometimes hire my husband for his chacras (.) he is the one who knows them.
Res.: but have you ever visited them to talk or spend some time together?
J.: no I haven't (.) I have been to their places sometimes to help my husband but not to visit them (Mrs. Marcela, landless resident, San Mateo)

In addition, the strong reliance on temporary work by these residents can equally affect their capacity to consistently interact with their neighbours. This is in response to their customary practice of engaging most of their family members into income-generating activities, so that heads of household, partners, and even children are frequently on the move, working for various farmers in different locations so as to maximise their income. In contrast, better off households, principally small farmers that cultivate cash crops make greater investments in time and resources on their family farms and hence spend more time in the area and report a greater engagement in community affairs (e.g., only four out of the 22 households that had a member in the religious association came from the lowest expenditure quartile, whilst only 2 of the 14 cases memberships to local sport clubs came from this group of residents). By the same token, temporary migration was found to be less recurrent among that group of more established farmers residents, who, instead, tended to prefer using their family workforce to cultivate their farms, help raising their livestock, or supervise some local family businesses (of the 32 households that had at least one of its members migrating temporarily for working reasons—at least for two weeks—in the previous year, 14 came from households belonging to the lowest two expenditure quartiles). Correspondingly, informal and in-depth interviews as well as personal observation indicate that not-so-poor residents tend to interact more regularly with one another as part of their quotidian routines:

... I sometimes go to my chacra (farm) with Prudencio and Rodrigo (.) theirs are nearby so if there is the chance we walk there together ... (Mr. Edgard, small farmer, San Luis)

No (.) our chacras are not close but we visit each other sometimes at the end of the day we ((local farmers)) usually come back home in the afternoon around four or five so there is always the chance to meet after lunch while resting in the front yard ... (Mr. Armando, micro farmer, San Mateo)

J.: Yes we visit each other (.) may be not every day but it is a custom towards the afternoon after coming back from the chacra and taking a nap right?
Res.: Is it the same for everybody? What about the jornaleros?
J.: Well (.) yes (.) but it depends right? (.) if they work nearby yes if not they arrive much later because some of them travel too (.) sometimes is more difficult to find them in town (Mr. Cipriano, small farmer, San Luis).

By the same token, it was observed that there was an important social distance between successful medium farmers and the rest of the local population. A conjunction of circumstances shaped this scenario. First, given their endowments of capital, they cultivate their lands differently from most local farmers; some have more than one parcel of land, which on occasions...
are cultivated by hired local labour, thus spending less time directly cultivating their farms but instead supervising their exploitation. In addition, on occasions they rent their land to other farmers to dedicate to other activities and, furthermore, because they possess the necessary means of transport to commercialise their production and trade greater volumes of livestock, their radius of economic operations tends to be broader than most farmers, as they are able to access urban markets in a direct manner, which implies dealing with agricultural and livestock traders operating in the cities of Chiclayo or Lambayeque rather than with local acopiadores and contratistas, as is the case for most local farmers. Such distinctive sets of practice, and associated distance from other residents, can be perceived in the testimonies of some informants:

*The ‘mister’ does not spend much time in town (.) a cousin of his currently looks after his livestock so we know him better besides his sons have moved to Lambayeque so they come and go from there (.) some do business with him because he requires labour and also buys crops but I haven’t seen him lately ...* (Mr. Prudencio, small farmer, San Luis).

*No (.) they ((the Flores family, with 20 has. of terrain)) are in a different league as they say and never had much to do with us (.) I only knew the father because he always visited his chacra to check how things were going ...* (Mr. Javier, micro farmer, San Mateo)

### 6.2.3. Associational Activity

Participation in local organisations constitutes a recurrent theme within the social capital literature. Putman (1993a, 1993b, 2001) has constantly emphasised that memberships in social organisations expresses and reinforces social cohesion and a participative civic culture. Under the same reasoning, diverse authors have recommended promoting and supporting community organisations in order to ‘build’ social capital (Uphoff, 1999, 2004; Dongier et al., 2002; Grootaert & van Bastelaer, 2001, 2002). A key challenge of such recommendations, however, is that organisations differ in their activities, objectives, organisational dynamics, and social inclusiveness, making it difficult to make any easy generalisations about the claimed benefits of associational activity (Foley & Edwards, 1999; Portes & Landolt, 2000).

In this regard, an examination of the Glass of Milk committees, one of the most important local organisations in terms of memberships (§ Table 4.2), indicated that participation was associated to households’ economic welfare, as it was the better off residents those less likely to take part of the organisation (16 out of the 22 non-beneficiaries registered by the baseline survey came from households in the top two expenditure quartiles). Moreover, none of the existing committees in San Mateo or San Luis were able to jointly mobilise local women on a regular basis. The committees of San Mateo and San Luis mainly operated as distribution centres for the ingredients provided by the town hall. Affiliated women, therefore, only met once a month at the house of the president of the committee to receive the ingredients, a practice documented in other Peruvian rural areas (World Bank, 2007; Wiig, 2005). According to the committee leaders interviewed, this responds partly to logistical challenges: first, it was difficult to agree
collectively on a fixed regular schedule with so many participants because many of them had to work either on their farms or as wage labour; second, it would have been a challenging task to prepare all the required rations on-site on a daily basis, considering the important number of beneficiaries (94 and 76 in San Mateo and San Luis, respectively) and the insufficient cooking utensils residents have access to. In addition, informal conversations and direct observation indicated that many women preferred this rather loose working dynamic, because it allowed them to freely administer the milk and oats within the household so that, contrary to the aims of the programme, they could also benefit other family members irrespective of their age.

Participation in the Popular Cook committee of San Mateo, a food-alleviation programme partly funded by the State via monthly food donations (rice, beans, and oil) also appears as partly shaped by objective conditions. The baseline survey found that this organisation is characterised by the poverty of its members: of the eleven members surveyed, eight belonged to the lowest two expenditure quartiles (five of them were landless residents). Interviews with beneficiaries indicated that this lack of physical resources motivated those women to participate actively in the committee despite its costs (women take daily rota s to cook together the corresponding meals, for which they have to pay 1 S/. or 0.23 UK£ per ration) as they could not rely on their farm production to obtain food ingredients and, as they depended mainly on monetary wages, acquiring cheap meals through the committee helped them to maximise their acquisition power.

... we did not have anything not even where to put a small vegetable garden (.) when I saw the possibility of participating I told my husband about it (.) at the beginning he was not sure about it because we both had to work but I convinced him ... nowadays I only have to work there once every two weeks so it is not bad ... (Mrs. Marcela, landless resident, San Mateo)

... many people cannot feed their families with the money they earn (.) jornaleros for example have no stable jobs and for a day of work they get at most 10 soles ((2.3 UK£)) so they come here (.) you can say this ((Popular Cook)) is for those who have nowhere else to turn for food. (Mrs. Frescia, small farmer, former committee president, San Mateo)

The information regarding the organisational dynamics of the local water users’ associations, which gathers approximately four in five local households, indicated that they equally faced important limitations in promoting strong connections among residents. First, to be active these organisations depend on the presence of water for irrigation purposes, which is rather limited given that the La Leche river is a shallow, seasonal one. As a result, its members are more active during the only planting season they have, cleaning irrigation canals, attending the commission offices to pay fees, controlling the distribution of water, and making sure there are no robberies. Aside from its authorities, therefore, most members reported an inconstant engagement in these organisations’ activities since, aside from supervising the final distribution
of water (when available), their participation was limited mainly to attending those assemblies called by the board of authorities, usually three times a year.78

_Hm we just go to know how much we have to pay and when it might be likely we would receive the water._ (Mr. Sandro, small farmer, San Luis)

_... to be honest we do not do much (.) only when there is water people start cleaning and making sure the system works well ..._ (Mr. Prudencio, small farmer, San Luis)

In addition, the norms that regulate the operations of these associations has contributed to generating clear socioeconomic differences among affiliated farmers. First, membership in the water users’ commission is conditional on being up-to-date with the corresponding payments for the right of accessing water. Consequently, those nearly landless residents that are unable to cultivate their lands on regular basis have only sporadic involvement in those organisations. Besides, by definition, this organisation includes only active farmers; landless residents who decided not to—or could not—rent any land for agricultural purposes do not participate in them. Moreover, the formal decision-making procedure operating within the organisation, sanctioned by law,79 prevents the poorest farmers from having a decisive role in the conduction of these organisations: in the assembly of the water users’ commission, all associates possess one vote per hectare of irrigated land until they have more than 20 ha., whilst micro farmers possess only one vote (bigger farmers with landholdings of 20 up to 100 ha. of land have 0.4 votes per hectare).

In the case of the Parent School Association, those socioeconomic differences between members are less tangible insofar as most residents send their children to the local school. It is important to point out, however, that a small group of relatively well off households send their children to study in the town of Pacora or Illimo (during fieldwork only three families were identified to do so). The main conditioning factor for its capacity to generate strong local bonds of potential economic value referred instead to traditional gender-based division of domestic roles. Monthly assemblies are overwhelmingly attended by women, who traditionally have a limited authority over households’ productive resources. As a result, local accounts of PSA authorities and residents coincided in reporting that the demands and commitments of the local population to contribute material resources or labour are not entirely decided during those meetings. These, instead, usually take the form of informative events, as most women tend to say little during their interventions (a tendency personally observed after attending one session) and on many occasions they delay committing themselves to any material contributions until

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78 To be informed about the irrigation schedules and tariffs to be paid, report their cultivation plans for the upcoming campaign, and to elect its authorities).

79 Supreme Decree No. 057-2000-AG (Rules for the Administrative Organisation of Water).
their husbands are consulted. Men, for their part, are mainly present in those activities that
involve contributions of labour (e.g., repairing the surrounding wall or fixing a roof).80

An important feature of these different organisations is that those residents who are
authorities of one association usually have a comparable position in other local organisations. To
mention a few examples, Mrs. Frescia (small farmer, San Mateo), was elected in 2007 as
secretary for the PSA and had previously occupied the position of president of the Popular Cook
(2002-2003) and the Glass of Milk committees (2001-2002); Mrs. Filipa (micro farmer) from
San Mateo, was the president of the Popular Cook committee and vice-president of the Glass of
Milk committee at the time the study began, having worked in the same boards presided by
Mrs. Frescia. Mr. Rodrigo (medium farmer) from San Luis, had served as a member of the
board of the district water users’ commission as well as a delegate to the board of water users for
the irrigation sub-district La Leche (2004-2006) and later in 2006, was elected as president of the
PSA; Mr. Prudencio (small farmer), a former lieutenant governor from San Luis (1996-2000),
had also been a president of the PSA (2001-2002) alongside Mr. Rodrigo (secretary at that time).
In this respect, it can be asserted that those different forms of association were mostly led by a
distinctive group of residents, as described next, characterised by a different objective condition
as compared to most residents:

- Economic and physical capital: The data collected indicates that most local leaders tended
to be better off than most of the population. The baseline survey, for instance, gathered
information on 16 residents that had a leading position in local organisations; the
resulting socioeconomic profile from these leaders showed that most of them came from
better off households: 12 of them belonged to the top two expenditure quartiles. This
scenario could also be appreciated by the list of leaders presented in the previous
paragraph, as most of them were small or medium farmers; to which it is possible to add
that those local actors that performed the role of lieutenant governor at the time of the
study had also a relatively satisfactory economic condition: Mr. Idelfonso (9 ha. of land)
in San Mateo and Mr. Teófilo (12 ha. of land) in San Luis.

The responsibilities of these local leaders indeed indicate that assuming such positions
involve important costs in terms of time and resources that not many residents can afford.
For example, leaders of the water users’ commission not only hold monthly meetings,
four times as many as simple members, but depending on their responsibilities, they have
to mobilise constantly out of their respective villages (to the towns of Pacora and Illimo
where the water users’ commission and the board of water users have their respective
offices) whilst those members of the PSA board have to attend the monthly assemblies in

80 Those activities are also characterised by gender-based divisions of roles; for instance, it is overwhelmingly women who
participate in cleaning events.
addition to monthly meetings with the school principal, as well as to supervise the implementation of any agreed activities. On this subject, it is symptomatic that in the case of the Popular Cook committee, the one most characterised by the poverty of its members, their governing president (who in addition to supervising the daily activities of the organisation in the area has to attend monthly meetings in the capital of district as well as collect the food supplies from the town hall) was Mrs. Filipa, a micro farmer who ran a grocery shop and, at the time, was ranked in the third expenditure quartile (i.e., top 50% of local expenditure levels).

In the case of the water users’ associations this pattern of unequal distribution of roles is sanctioned in the legal norms that regulate their election of authorities. There, only those who own a minimum plot of 1.5 ha. have the right to run for a leading position in the water users’ commission, a barrier that excludes 44% of all local farmers. In addition, candidates have to be up-to-date with their payments for the use of water for three consecutive years, which sets aside many micro farmers who alternate between production for self-consumption and commercial purposes. Those factors, in addition to the voting structure described previously, means that the leaders of this association tend to come predominantly from the better off farmers in the area.

- **Cultural capital:** The possession of a basic level of education is important for assuming a leading role in most local organisations. Organisations’ authorities have to conduct a series of administrative tasks that tend to discourage the participation of the less educated individuals, such as filling in administrative forms to report their activities and requests of food and milk or oats, in the case of the Glass of Milk and Popular Cook committees, collecting and managing the financial resources of their respective organisations as in the case of the Popular Cook and PSA and issuing constant petitions for external support to diverse institutions, such as donations of cooking implements, teaching material for the school or the students, and additional food for specific celebrations (e.g., Christmas). The water users’ associations, again, even have formal barriers that prevent any person without complete primary education to be elected as an authority of the district commission and any person without complete secondary education to be nominated as a delegate to the board of water users of the valley. Either because of informal or formal restrictions, therefore, less educated individuals face significant limitations to assuming leading roles in their villages:

  “... I stopped cooperating with the board because it was too much work (.) you have to run here and there all the time filling in forms preparing petitions and then travelling to present them somewhere besides checking the inventory and the money ... some try to help but many just do not know how to do things (.) sometimes they cannot even write correctly ...” (Mrs. Felícita, ex-authority of the Popular Cook committee, San Mateo)
Another factor identified that discourages some beneficiaries from assuming a more active role in their respective organisations refers to their need to have an adequate knowledge of bureaucratic procedures to be followed in different instances. Either because of their corresponding administrative duties or because organisations’ authorities are also expected to regularly request some form of material support from external agencies (e.g., food donations for Christmas celebrations in the Glass of Milk committees, cooking implements for the local food-alleviation programmes, or teaching materials for the school), local leaders not only have to have the basic numeracy and literacy skills to face those challenges, but also an adequate knowledge of how to formulate those petitions, the bureaucratic instances where they can present them, and which agencies are more likely to answer to such requests. Elements to which some residents are not used to:

J.: ... doña Filipa is the one who organises things with the town hall (.) with PRONAA and with other institutions there in Pacora.
Res.: Have you ever helped with those procedures in the committee?
J.: Not much.
Res.: Why not?
J.: Because I don’t know how those things are done hm it looks difficult.
Res.: Which parts of the job?
J.: hm making the reports or dealing with the people from the town hall those things.
Res.: And (.) besides the committee (.) have you personally conducted any procedures in the town hall?
J.: no I have not. (Mrs. Marcela, landless resident, San Mateo)

I would love to do more but we don’t have the time (.) it’s not easy either you have to deal with many people the administrators the people from other committees even politicians …
(Mrs. Flor, micro farmer, San Luis)

- Social capital: Actors’ endowments of social capital can be considered a contributing factor that favours the reproduction of local leaderships. This very much responds to the pragmatic form in which residents, as described in Chapter 4 (section 4.1.2.), evaluate and support their leaders and political figures: because of their capacity to channel resources into the local arena. Given the clientelist style of politics dominant in the area, leaders with important political leverage because of their personal relationships are then expected to be more likely to succeed in their search for support from the town hall, other local public agencies, and from private institutions, limiting the chances of entirely ‘new’ leaders to emerge.

A clear example in that respect was found in relation to the elections for the board of the PSA in 2007. After two years in which the previous group of authorities had failed to obtain any major investments for the school, some parents coordinated to form a ‘strong’ list which consisted of Mr. Rodrigo (medium farmer, San Luis) as president, after being elected as member for the town hall council in 2006; Mr. Teófilo (medium farmer, San Mateo), the former lieutenant governor of San Mateo, as vice-president; and Mrs. Frescia (small farmer, San Mateo) as secretary, after she just finished working for the town hall.
The support for this group of leaders was overwhelming, winning the elections by a landslide on 2007 (reportedly with around three quarters of the votes).

The observed reproduction of leaderships among better off actors, albeit not necessarily well-off, has significant consequences with relation to actors’ capacity to forge relationships beyond the local arena, in particular with political figures and public officials. Given that public services and programmes have a very limited presence in the area, residents’ opportunities for quotidian interaction with public officials is very limited—in Evans’ (1996) terms, state-society relationships present little ‘embeddedness’ in the area of study. As a result, those who are more likely to interact with them are those village leaders as part of their responsibilities. The only person in the area, for example, that reported knowing personally the technical administrator of the water irrigation system from the Ministry of Agriculture was Mr. Rodrigo from San Luis, by virtue of his position as delegate to the board of water users. In contrast, when discussing with other farmers what members of the staff from the water users’ commission they knew, they mostly referred to operative personnel such as sectoristas and canaleros, who are in charge of distributing the water to its end users. Likewise, when discussing informally with non-leading beneficiaries of the Popular Cook and Glass of Milk committees whether they knew the town hall officials in charge of the programme or PRONAA officers, it was Mrs. Frescia and Mrs. Filipa those that could identify various officials by their first name.

The possibility of residents to forge political relationships by participating in political campaigns is also affected by this scenario. This is because political parties operating in the area are not ideologically structured but tend to constitute rather unstable alliances of village leaders alongside some ‘notable’ personalities (e.g., successful businessmen) who jointly run for the town hall. As discussed in the previous chapter, a customary practice of those movements is to invite village leaders with a long trajectory to joint their corresponding movements, thereby indirectly reproducing the same objective filters listed that restrain many residents from assuming a leading role in their villages (to which it is added the economic contributions to run a political campaign). This is more easily perceived by identifying those actors who had previously ran for a position in the town hall council: Mrs. Frescia (small farmer, San Mateo), who in 2003 unsuccessfully competed for a position in the town hall council; the lieutenant governor of San Luis, Mr. Idelfonso (medium farmer), who competed for a position in the town hall council in the 2000 elections at a time when he was member of the board of the district water users’ commission (1998-2000); Mr. Rodrigo (medium farmer) from San Luis, a successful candidate elected after assuming the position of delegate to the board of water users; and Mr. Prudencio (small farmer), a former lieutenant governor from San Luis (1996-2000) and

81 The involvement of women in town hall elections needs to be related to changes in the legal framework since 1997, which established that 30% of the candidates to the town hall council presented by a party were supposed to be from a different sex (Law N° 26864 – Law of Municipal Elections).
former president of the PSA (2001-2002), who had equally ran for a position in the town hall in 2003, albeit unsuccessfully.

6.2.4. Common trajectory

Sharing a common past has been underscored by both network-centred and communitarian approaches of social capital as an important factor that contributes to the development of close connections insofar as, on the one hand, actors would have had more chances to interact with one another and so test their trustworthiness (Collier, 1998; Lin, 2001) and, on the other, actors could generate a strong attachment to their community, thereby intertwining personal and place identity and favouring a general disposition to collaborate for the public good (Putnam, 1993a; Halpern, 2005; Durston, 1999, 2002). Indeed, residents’ testimonies collected during the study indicated that bonds between them tended to strengthen in relation to their common experiences of different past events that marked both residents’ and villages’ trajectories. Three particular situations were recurrent in the narratives of local informants on the subject:

- Local informants indicated that during the second half of the 1980s and the first one half of the 1990s, there was a widespread sense of insecurity in the area because of the increasing presence of the Maoist guerrilla group Shining Path in the area. Although the level of violence described in the area never reached those of isolated areas in the Andes, where entire rural communities were forced to migrate due to constant human rights violations, its presence could be felt in different forms: various armed strikes that interrupted the normal conduction of economic activities, graffiti in local towns supporting armed uprisings, a couple of bombings taking place against the town hall of Pacora and another against the police station at Illimo, and the assassinations of one member of the local police force and one candidate for mayor in 1988. An associated consequence of this conflict was that the police force rarely ventured to patrol the area, which led to an important increase in cases of rustling in both San Mateo and San Luis.

  In the face of these circumstances, different forms of collaboration to provide some sort of security were reported among local informants. For example, close-by neighbours (usually related by kinship) would accompany one another when travelling beyond the limits of their villages, neighbours in both settings acquired whistles to notify one another rapidly if any robbery was taking place in the area, and between 1991 and 1994, some farmers from San Mateo, San Luis, and the neighbouring villages of San Felipe and San Juan formed a ronda campesina, which basically consisted of a group of young men who patrolled the area in turns in order to prevent thefts and other criminal activities.

- The second half of the 1980s also constituted a period of significant economic turmoil because of the process of hyperinflation experienced between 1987 and 1991, which reached its peak in 1989 with an annual inflation of over 3000%. This greatly restricted
the economic value of local agricultural production as the bulk of the income obtained from the harvest would rapidly lose its acquisition power. Many residents thus limited their production for commercial purposes and reverted to self-consumption practices, appealing instead mainly to work as jornaleros to obtain their monetary income. In such a context, different forms of support attained great importance in families’ livelihoods. As the need for hard cash was constant, the regular provision of information through friends or relatives on job opportunities at the time was mentioned as an indicator of the closeness between certain contacts. In addition, temporary migration to urban settings for prolonged periods of time became more regular in the area so that some of the remaining household members, particularly women related by kinship, tended to establish some mechanisms of mutual support in the face of the absence of heads of household (e.g., cultivating together small plots of land).

- Natural emergencies such as the floods brought by the El Niño of 1983 and 1998, and for the oldest residents, the equally significant event of 1972, which destroyed much of the local infrastructure as well as crops, made residents look to their local and external contacts (mainly kinship based contacts) to access basic resources to survive. In consequence, a variety of forms of cooperation between closely connected households were developed to pool their resources, such as food or clothing, to cope with the destruction of residences and farms. Moreover, in some cases, those forms of cooperation extended beyond the period of emergency itself over the period of reconstruction. In this instance, some households would cooperate with one another to rebuild their houses via the co-production of building materials (e.g., adobe bricks) or the mutual provision of free labour. In addition, some residents also opted to pool their resources for the next agricultural season, sharing their productive assets, farming tools, and labour in order to cultivate their crops and so cope with their material losses.

Although those forms of cooperation took place mainly between families related to each other by kinship, it is not surprising that, given their poverty and the low agricultural productivity of their farms alongside those critical collective challenges, residents who could trace back their life in the area to many decades in the past, were proud of their resilience and expressed an important level of identification with their villages’ trajectories, especially in San Mateo:

> my parents came here when they heard there was some land for sale back in the 70s and I came with them (.) ah you should have seen the town then there was nothing (.) from that time only a few remain (.) when I meet doña Filipa ((neighbour)) we can talk for hours about how things have changed imagine now we will even have electricity. (Mr. Fernando, small farmer, San Mateo)

... it could be said we have progressed right? (.) little by little here we have done many things (.) the school for example the people here have always supported it in good spirit we started with four grades and a few children only and now we have complete secondary and
people come to study even from San Miguel ((a distant village)). (Mr. Oliver, small farmer and former lieutenant governor, San Mateo)

... things have changed here (.) when I was a child ((Mrs. Jacinta was born in San Luis)) we were isolated the road was in a terrible condition and nothing passed by except some carts the houses were made of quincha only and not many of us could finish school (.) now we are better our children can finish school in San Mateo and it appears the town hall will approve the project for electricity (.) let’s see if we can get water too ... (Mrs. Jacinta, small farmer, San Luis)

It is necessary to point out, however, that there was little evidence of a similar narrative among the poorest residents. Landless and nearly landless families tend to be late arrivals to the area, as many of them came as tenants or wage labourers for established farmers, so that their personal trajectories tended to differ from those from the oldest and more established residents. In this regard, data from the baseline survey showed that approximately two-thirds (15 out of 24) of the poorest households (lowest expenditure quartile) were living in the area for less than 15 years, (i.e., 1991) whilst most of the better off residents (top two expenditure quartiles) had been living in the area for more than 25 years (36 out of 48).82

6.2.5. Geographical location

Spatial contiguity is assumed to facilitate the interactions between agents, potentially fomenting community cohesion, particularly if people have been living in the same area for a long time (Halpern, 2005; Putnam, 2001; Durston, 2004), as well as the development of mutually supportive agreements between residents despite their socioeconomic differences (de Weerdt, 2005; Fafchamps & Lund, 2003; Sorensen, 2000). In this respect, it was noted that living in the outskirts of the villages studied tended to limit the capacity of certain residents to interact with one another on a quotidian basis:

hm (.) yes (.) there are some neighbours you can’t meet often because they live far from here ((centre of town)) at the entrance of town so I guess that since they are closer to the town ((capital of district)) and have their lands there they don’t come here often ... (Mrs Filipa, micro farmer, San Mateo)

... most of us know each other but there are some people who live a bit hidden from the rest right? (.) they live deeper inside the forest over there ((signalling to west)) so they use another road and we don’t meet them but once in a while... (Mr. Prudencio, San Luis)

Although from personal observation and informal conversations with residents it was possible to notice that indeed close by neighbours, particularly women, were more likely to exchange basic forms of support (e.g., sharing cooking tools or basic ingredients); the same as reported by other empirical assessments of mutual agreements of support in rural settings

82 The data was verified to discard the possibility that those differences simply reflected that the poorest households consisted mainly of young families. Taking into consideration only those households led by individuals of over 40 years of age, the estimated mean lengths of residence according to economic well being reflected the same tendency. Q1 (n=21): mean=17.0 (95% CI: 9.7 – 14.6); Q2 (n=17): mean = 26.7 (95% CI: 16.9-36.4); Q3 (n=17): mean = 29.3 (95% CI: 20.1-38.5); Q4 (n=18): mean = 33.6 (95% CI: 25.3-41.9).
BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS IN SAN MATEO AND SAN LUIS

(Fafchamps & Lund, 2003; de Weerdt, 2005), it was possible to observe that spatial proximity was related with major forms of mutual support (e.g., significant loans or crop and livestock sharing) when it was embedded in long-standing kinship-based relationships (§ 5.2.3.). These two factors tended to interact with each other. Spatial contiguity in the area, particularly in San Luis, is very much related to the partition of land between relatives as part of their inheritance. Because those families that founded the village were legal proprietors of their farms, with the past of time those original residents had further partitioned their property between their inheritors who, in turn, would build their houses next to their corresponding farm and so close to each other. In San Mateo, this process was intermingled with that of the arrangement of the local space around the school insofar it is mainly the oldest residents of the area and their descendants who could be located in the ‘centre’ of town. A key implication of this spatial disposition conditioned on length of residency is that some of the worst off households are unable interact routinely with other residents since, as described in the previous section, many of them are relatively recent residents that live in the outskirts of the village as established farmers’ tenants.

6.2.6. Gender

As highlighted by different social capital assessments (Molyneaux, 2002; Silve & Elmhirst, 2008; Rankin, 2002) as well as different examinations of the lives of the poor (Narayan et. al., 2000a, 2000b; Ellis, 2000; Crehan, 1992), women tend to mobilise a different set of networks than men. On this subject, it was possible to observe that it was local women who appeared to be more likely to interact on a regular basis with one another and report basic forms of mutual support with their neighbours. This scenario was reflected in different local practices such as going to collect water or wood in small groups; walking together small children to school; attending PSA meetings; sharing certain basic cooking implements or ingredients; or visiting one another to exchange news after having finished preparing the meal of the day.

In this respect, it is possible to notice that the greater interaction observed between women largely responded to the common practices and routines associated with their traditional domestic responsibilities as wives and mothers. Their domestic responsibilities imply rather similar daily schedules which provide greater opportunities for interaction. For example, it was observed that some—principally those with small children—collect water at similar hours of the day in relation to their cooking responsibilities (in the evening, around 4-5 pm, and in the morning, around 6-8 am). Moreover, women are much more strongly attached to the local area than their male counterparts because of those traditional roles so that their economic contributions are usually constrained to the local area. If they work as day labourers, for example, they more commonly do so in nearby farms rather than in farms located outside the district; men are the ones, instead, who migrate temporarily whilst women are in charge of
looking after the family farm; and, even among well established households, as previously reported, it is mainly women who attend the few businesses operating in the area.

In this manner, women’s objective condition affects their domestic routines and chances for interaction. First, although more attached to the local area, it was noted that the poorest women spend less time in their villages and have a less regular daily schedule (e.g., not fixed time to collect water or wood) than their better off counterparts as they dedicate more time to work as day labourers, for which they leave their villages more regularly than their female neighbours, who combine looking after the family farm or running a local business with their domestic chores. Second, their organisational experiences tend to be equally different since, as reported previously (§ 6.2.3.), better off women are less likely to take part of the Glass of Milk or Popular Cook committees. Furthermore, well-off families reported going more regularly to the nearby towns of Pacora or Illimo to acquire food supplies or house maintenance equipment as compared to their neighbours, who commented during informal conversations that they went to those sites only once or twice a month for the same purpose.

A final element to take into consideration is that despite the more extended network of connections that women have in the local area, the forms of support observed among them rarely comprised the mobilisation of major productive assets or money beyond petty cash. The evidence gathered through informal conversations and in-depth interviews indicated that, the same as described by various accounts of intra-household relations among the poor (Rankin, 2002; Molyneaux, 2002; Ellis, 2000), women have limited independent authority over the use and mobilisation of households’ productive assets as well as over the disposition of their personal income, which instead tends to be used to cover for the family consumption (e.g., buying food or clothing for children).

... I use the money ((from local ROSCA)) mainly for school or things the family always need right? (.) hm for example new curtains cooking pots clothes (.) ah shoes too because they never last for long here ... (Mrs. Felícita, small farmer, San Mateo)

No I don’t touch those things ((carts and ploughs)) (.) my husband is the one who uses them ... if someone comes and want to borrow them then I tell my husband when he comes home... (Mrs. Jacinta, small farmer, San Luis)

… it mostly goes to food for the family (.) one way or the other one always need to spend cash here to buy fish ((fishermen transit the area in bicycles)) or to cover for the pasta and rice we get from the shop ((grocery shop)) (.) then if there is any extra money we put it together with my husbands’ and then decide what to do with it ... No (.) if people want a loan they talk to my husband. (Mrs. Filipa, micro farmer, San Mateo)

6.3. Concluding remarks

The results reported in the present chapter coincide with different social capital centred characterisations of poverty, which highlighted that it involves the lack of connections with
resource-rich actors (Robinson, Siles, & Schmid, 2004; Durston, 2004; Woolcock, 2001, 2002; World Bank, 2001). It is important to highlight, however, that it is difficult to make any clear generalisations regarding the social capital of ‘the poor’ or of ‘poor communities’. As the statistical results obtained indicated, although most residents are poor (Chapter 4, section 4.2.3.), access to networks and forms of participation vary according to the degree of poverty among residents, so that the poorest ones are those who tend to lack of extensive connections in their respective villages and, critically, beyond the local area or with public authorities and political figures, the most valuable forms of connections according to the literature (Burt, 1992, 2005; Lin, 2000, 2001; Woolcock, 2001, 2002).

The accounts collected in the area in relation to how such network structures emerge over time lead to two major elements of consideration. First, the variety of factors that appear to condition the process of network formation in the area of study—which by any means can be considered exhaustive—show that it is very difficult to delineate a clear path that could lead towards a cohesive community that could serve as a prescriptive tool for building social capital in different contexts. As observed, there are not only multiple factors affecting this process, some of which are specific to area of study (e.g., types of organisations present in the area), but they tend to interact with each other and, crucially attain different significance over time rather than staying static, as in Putnam’s idea of ‘virtuous equilibrium’ (1993a, 1993b). For example, original residents and their direct inheritors are more likely to own land and have larger extensions of it than newcomers as they access the land before further generations partitioned it; inheritors of initial residents, in turn, are close by neighbours bonded by kinship who have been interacting with each other on regular basis for many decades and so are more likely to cooperate with each other; these actors, as small and medium farmers, in addition, spend more time in the area as compared with jornaleros (landless or nearly landless residents), which combined with their length of residency, generate an important attachment to their village and engagement in village affairs.

A second consideration is that the observed network structure which puts the poorest at a disadvantage responds to a combination of factors which include material conditions, rational calculation, as well as practices and interests associated to actors’ position in the social space rather than to a process of active exclusion or segregation, at least in the area of study (which has no ethnic minorities, for instance). As proposed by Bourdieu (1986, 2005), one of the reasons certain social relations can be considered capital is because their formation imply costs which cannot be equally afforded by all residents and, hence, put the poorest actors at a disadvantage (e.g., investments in out-migration practices, participation in political campaigns, money spent in entertainment, or capacity to afford constant travels outside the area to reach out to relatives living in developed urban centres).
Although, despite of those restrictions, it was observed that local actors invest in relationships, such ‘investments’ are not necessarily based on rational calculation or similar across all social positions. Rational investments in relationships are different according to actors’ positions in different systems of relations of production and so adapted to their particular material circumstances and practices; for example, for a jornalero it is better to have a contratista as compadre, than for medium farmers, whilst those valuable connections with whom the latter interact (urban livestock and agricultural traders, who mobilise greater volumes of capital than contratistas) are not relevant to the practices of landless residents. Moreover, ‘investments’ in time and resources on certain relationships more regularly come from the quotidian practices actors implement according to their position in the social space. For example, small farmers spend more time in their villages and hence are able to interact more regularly with each other than the poorest residents and share the same economic interests so that it is likely they develop overlapping relationships (e.g., with livestock and agricultural traders). This combination of factors is salient in relation to actors’ involvement in associational activity, a common indicator of social capital (Putnam, 1993a, 2001; Grootaert, 1999; Grootaert & Narayan, 2001; Narayan & Pritchett, 1997; Maluccion, Haddad & May, 1998). As reported, not only the poorest residents’ involvement in such organisations is more limited (as they tend to spend more time working in temporary jobs out of their respective villages), but there are also a series of objective barriers that make it even more challenging for them to assume a leading position in such organisations (e.g., physical capital and education); those that assume those positions, in turn, are in a better position to extend their external and vertical networks, as part of their respective responsibilities, which have the potential to render valuable economic returns (§ 5.2.4.).
PART III

BUILDING SOCIAL CAPITAL IN THE CONTEXT OF A PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT INTERVENTION
CHAPTER 7
WHO PARTICIPATES?

The present chapter examines the different factors that were found to affect residents’ decisions to participate in the development intervention studied. This subject is directly related to the social capital debate insofar as, since its popularisation, the concept has been with to the solution of collective actions dilemmas. Furthermore, for some scholars this is the defining nature of the concept: “the norms and networks that enable people to act collectively” (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000, p. 226). The explanations behind these views conflate different features of actors’ sociability such as the presence of cohesive networks that permit establishing sanctions against free-riding, of institutionalised norms that regulate collective action, of longstanding traditions of participation in collective activities that promotes a participative civic culture, as well as a general sense of trust among actors (Putnam 1993a, 1993b, 2001; Woolcock, 1998; Ostrom & Ahn, 2003, 2009). Consequently, it has been pointed out that the presence of social capital in a given community constitutes a prerequisite for the successful implementation of participatory development interventions, as it not only becomes easier to organise the beneficiary population but also it is expected that those organisations would tend to be less prone to social exclusion (Hodinott, 2002; Durston, 1999, 2004; Uphoff, 1999, 2004).

As discussed in the first part of this thesis, a particular concern regarding those approaches to social capital refers to the tendency to rely on homogenising principles of organisation, which tend to inscribe all individual actors to a single normative structure or culture that similarly dictate their actions, or of social action, commonly based on principles of rational choice (Cleaver, 2001, 2002; Ishihara & Pascual, 2009; Holt, 2008). In this regard, despite that the social capital literature commonly recognises that actors’ networks and forms of organisation assume different shapes and objectives according to actors’ socioeconomic characteristics (Narayan, 1997; Narayan et al., 2000a, 2000b; Woolcock, 1998, 2001), there is little recognition that ‘poor communities’ or ‘organisations of the poor’ do not necessarily constitute a clearly homogeneous group of actors with the same sets of interests, practices, or dispositions insofar as there are different levels of poverty as well as experiences of it (e.g., as a woman or a man) (Cleaver, 2002, 2005; Das, 2004; Mosse, 2007; Rankin, 2002).

In the phase of this debate, this chapter will make use of both quantitative and qualitative data gathered in the second and third stages of the research in order to empirically assess to what extent those proposed community features of social capital shape local actors’ participation in the project studied. Following Bourdieu’s theoretical framework, actors’ positions with regard to the intervention will be examined in relation to their objective conditions and associated
7.1. Reception to the project

One of the greatest risks for participatory development initiatives refers to the possibility of capture from better off actors. This could happen, first, if better off residents capture the design stage of a project so as to portray their needs as those of the community. Second, more affluent residents sometimes become attracted to the project because of their important investments in local organisations and proceed to take the place of beneficiaries and organisations’ authorities so as to appropriate from the material benefits initially intended for the most poor (Mansuri & Rao, 2004; Gugerty & Kremer, 2002; Rao & Ibañez, 2005; Schady, 2001). In the face of such a risk, social capital as a collective property that facilitates collective action has particular relevance: “in fractionalised communities, where trust is weak (perhaps because of little prior history of collective action), there is a risk that community participation may result in the capture of benefits by local elites” (Hodinott, 2002, p. 164).

The indicators of associational activity, participation in collective action initiatives, and of trust in San Mateo and San Luis would indicate that both sites enjoyed a rather favourable environment for the implementation of a participatory intervention, as recommended by social capital advocates (Hodinott, 2000; Uphoff, 2004; Durston, 2004; Krishna, 1999, 2002). First, as observed in Chapter 4, participation in local social organisations is commonplace in the area (Table 4.2). Second, as in the case of collections of money for funerals, there is evidence that some informal norms that facilitate collective actions are in place in the area. Third, there is a certain tradition of collective action for the public good, as exemplified by the constant expansion of the school, to which both residents from San Mateo and San Luis contributed in labour and materials as members of the PSA. Furthermore, the few items on trust and social cohesion adapted from the core questions of the Integrated Questionnaire for the Measurement of Social Capital (Grootaert et al., 2004) reported that a significant group of residents has done some communal work in the previous year (40.7% in San Mateo, n=22, and 33.3% in San Luis, n=14) and that, overall, residents tend to trust each other and believe there are no major divisions between themselves (Table 7.1):
**Table 7.1 Indicators of social cohesion by village (mean scores)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement with expressions</th>
<th>San Mateo (n=54)</th>
<th>San Luis (n=42)</th>
<th>Total (n=96)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most people in this village can be trusted(^b/^)</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most people in this village are willing to help if you need it(^c/^)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Here one has to be alert or someone is likely to take advantage of you(^d/^)</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In this village people are divided because of their wealth(^e/^)</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In this village people are divided because of their religion(^f/^)</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In this village people are divided because of their political affiliations(^g/^)</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a/^\) Opinions are assigned the following score: (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) agree, and (4) strongly agree.

\(^b/^\) t = 1.0, p = 0.30

\(^c/^\) t = 1.6, p = 0.13

\(^d/^\) t = 1.2, p = 0.22

\(^e/^\) t = 1.4, p = 0.18

\(^f/^\) t = 1.5, p = 0.15

\(^g/^\) t = 1.2, p = 0.21

Despite this encouraging initial scenario and considering that most of the population is poor, formal participation in the project (the number of local families registered as project beneficiaries) during the period of study was neither automatically high nor stable. According to project reports, at the time the intervention formally began its operations in July 2005, the number of families formally registered as beneficiaries was rather small: 34 families from San Mateo and 21 from San Luis. These numbers are particularly interesting if one takes into consideration that during the preliminary working sessions with the population to design the project, a total of 48 households from San Mateo and 33 from San Luis had initially put down their names as potential beneficiaries. The initial low level of participation, however, did not remain static; instead, it increased over time. By the end of the intervention (July 2008) the official target of 50% of local households was surpassed: 52 beneficiaries in San Mateo and 38 in San Luis.

The information obtained through the surveys applied in March 2006 and June 2008 allowed us to generate a basic economic profile of those beneficiaries who were part of the sample (based on their expenditure levels as of 2006). The information obtained (Graph 7.1) provides evidence that, at least in formal terms, the project managed to work mainly with the poorer sectors of the population (nearly three in five beneficiaries came from the lowest two expenditure quartiles). Nevertheless, it is equally noticeable that the core of beneficiaries throughout the period of study came from the intermediate socioeconomic groups of residents (quartiles two and three).
WHO PARTICIPATES?

Graph 7.1 Beneficiaries according to expenditure quartile (2006) a/

In the light of this composition of beneficiaries it is necessary to underscore that there is little evidence of a significant mismatch between the main benefits provided by the project and local material needs, commonly associated with a weak commitment from beneficiaries (Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Hickey & Mohan, 2004). Setting aside the recurrent demands among residents for electricity and water services as well as for a better supply of water for agricultural purposes, the detailed assessment of actors’ stocks of capital (Tables 4.4 to 4.6) indicated that the benefits proposed by the project, in principle, matched local material needs: livestock modules, better domestic infrastructure, and training on use of forest resources. In order to understand more comprehensively, hence, the limited ‘interest’ of certain residents, resulting in the observed socioeconomic profile of beneficiaries, the next section introduces the main themes that residents manifested having affected their decision to participate as identified through qualitative methods.

7.2. Conditions for participation

Assuming Bourdieu’s theory of practice has two specific implications with regard to the use of social capital as a variable of analysis to understand processes of social organisation. First, social capital is no longer placed at the centre of the explanation of actors’ decision to participate. The latter is not expected to result from a single rationale of action, either from a rational calculation of the value of the projects’ material benefits or from a civic culture that privileges public interests above individual ones, but to be related to the diversity of interests (as opposed to indifference) that individuals have by virtue of their systems of dispositions and practices—

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83 Such differences may be the result of the mechanical application of participatory appraisals, which may not really take into consideration beneficiaries’ opinions, used simply to validate an already existing project design, or fail to recognise local actors’ different interests, thereby generating a false image of group consensus (Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Mosse, 2001).
WHO PARTICIPATES?

‘habitus’—that developed in relation to their material conditions. Second, it follows that actors’ social capital endowments, alongside other forms of capital, would contribute to developing different interests from which actors approach a new organisation insofar as they all define actors’ position in the local social space (e.g., better material conditions accompanied by more extensive networks as well as access to valuable social resources) (Bourdieu, 1977, 1985; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). How both elements of analysis interplay with the material reality of San Mateo and San Luis residents and the specific process of implementation of the development project is explored next.

7.2.1. Economic practices and lifestyles

Residents’ objective conditions were observed to shape their disposition to participate in the project through the combined effect of their material needs and the associated livelihood strategies they implement. This implied a differentiated capacity among residents to face the costs of involvement that a participatory development intervention generates, particularly in terms of time. Previous studies have highlighted that such interventions could be very taxing among the poorest because of their constant reliance on their waged labour to make a living (Cleaver, 1999; 2001; Platteau & Abraham, 2002) and so it proved to be in the area of study. In this respect, it was possible to notice that there was some tension between the participatory model of the intervention and the economic practices implemented by the poorest families (landless and micro farmers that produce mainly for self-consumption), who rely heavily on temporary work either in local and external farms or in urban settings. Consequently, although some of these residents were aware of the potential benefits that the intervention, some were rather reluctant to commit themselves to participate actively in the different project activities because of the opportunity costs they would face:

No I did not manage to get involved ((in the project)) (...) I am always working in contratas or in my uncle’s chacra in Illimo ... my wife helps me too so there is no much time ...
(Mr. Nicolás, landless resident, San Mateo).

I.: ... we could not ((participate)) because we all work (...) my husband works in Jayanca ((labour worker)) and sometimes also drives a moto-taxi on weekends.
Res.: and you?
I.: I work too (...) I am here now but last week I got some work in the pana de algodón and it is always like that one day you are here the next you have to go somewhere else ((picking cotton balls and taking the seeds)) (Mrs. Teresa, micro farmer, San Luis).

It was noted, however, that it was not only the poorest residents’ working restrictions that conditioned their limited involvement in the project. From personal knowledge of those actors and through informal conversations with key informants it was observed that some of those families faced further economic pressure because of their family composition, which consisted of small children or elderly people. This restriction is of relevance to understand the socioeconomic
WHO PARTICIPATES?

profile of project beneficiaries if one takes into consideration that it is the poorest households who face a limited access to members of working age (Table 4.6). In the case of Mrs. Teresa and Mr. Nicolás, for example, both had children of less than 8 years of age and the first one, in addition, lived also with her father of 62. This scenario, hence, further restricted their time availability for project activities.

An important element to take into consideration is that the precarious material situation of the most deprived local families, in addition, was observed to be associated with an important degree of uncertainty regarding their future life trajectories, particular whether they would settle definitely in the area or, are instead, leave the area in search for better job opportunities. In this manner, the conditions established by the project, which required active involvement in communal work sessions to access material benefits and return the livestock modules with the offspring of the animals received, were difficult to accept by some residents in a very precarious condition:

.... it was not convenient for us because then we were thinking about going back to Ferreñafe (.) I only rent some land and it does not produce much so it was difficult for us with the work and everything else ... we have not decided yet ((to participate)) because we still do not know what will happen (.) if I get the animals now ((from the project)) it would be for nothing because I would have to return them if we move out next year right? (Mr. Horacio, landless resident, San Luis)

... she ((wife)) told me about the kitchen but our house is rented and we do not know yet if we are going to stay here for too long since there is not much work here (.) I am looking around if may be there are some plots available in Jayanca or Olmos or who knows? maybe we will move to Chiclayo (Mr. Nicolás, landless resident, San Mateo).

On the other side of the spectrum, the benefits provided by the project were of limited interest to the few relatively well-off residents, as they already possessed a higher level of productivity in their farms, better access to markets, and larger volumes of livestock than most local residents, in addition to houses built with modern construction materials. Furthermore, because of their more extended commercial networks, the demands of participation appeared as a constraint to some of these residents, who instead projected their economic practices and daily routines beyond the local space.

I was told about it but it did not convince me ... the benefits were small right? (.) if it had been years ago when things were going bad I would have participated but not now .... (Mr. Ezequiel, medium farmer, San Mateo).

... as you noticed I do not spend much time here I have two other plots of land to attend plus the cattle so it is difficult for me (.) besides my sons are in Lambayeque so I am always busy ... (Mr. Luis, medium farmer, San Luis).

The project benefits and activities, in this respect, tended to fit much better into both the material conditions and economic practices of those households in an intermediate economic
WHO PARTICIPATES?

condition, predominantly micro farmers and small farmers. A variety of reasons were observed to coalesce to such effect. The first one is that most had the necessary endowments of capital to complement the benefits provided by the project. For example, their houses were less precarious compared to those of the poorest residents, made of *quincha*, and, moreover, were legally theirs rather than rented. The project infrastructure investments, hence, could help them to complement their already significant personal infrastructure investments. In addition, some of them had patches of forest that tended to be under-exploited and so they considered of interest those project activities related to forest management whilst some of them already had some minimum livestock, which could then be further expanded by the livestock modules provided by the project. The provision of technical assistance and training events were of equal value to these farmers. A second element to consider is that those families spend more time in the area because of their emphasis on local agriculture production, so that the demands of participation were less onerous to these actors. Finally, related to this tendency, these residents constitute the core of the villagers, as most of them are well-established in the area, having been living there for lengthier periods of time as compared to the poorest residents (§ 6.2.4.); their prospects of development, hence, were more centred on the local area as compared to that of the poorest villagers.

*I only had a couple of animals so the benefits of the project seemed useful to me () then I saw it could also help me for my farm because over there ((forest area)) is dead to me we do not use it.* (Mr. Abraham, small farmer, San Mateo)

*We thought it would not be too much of a problem ((requests of participation)) () my wife could go or even my children could help us so it would not interrupt our work besides returning the animals in two or three years was not that difficult either since we have experience raising them ...* (Mr. Raimundo, micro-farmer, San Luis)

*... we had some animals but many died and all of a sudden so we ended up with only a few and we had to start all over again so when the project came it was really good for us () besides after what happened to us last time ((lack of access to medicines and veterinarian)) we thought it would help us to avoid that happening the same.* (Mr. Sandro, small farmer, San Luis)

It is important to point out as well that the project encountered some veiled resistance from a minor group of residents by virtue of their incompatible economic practices with those promoted by the project. They consisted of some households that obtained extra income by chopping down trees in remote forest areas and burning them to produce charcoal to feed the informal markets of Lambayeque or Chiclayo. As mentioned earlier in the text, this activity is illegal in Northern Peru unless the National Institute of Natural Resources (INRENA) grants special permission, which none of those families had received. These households feared that the project would denounce them with the police or the Ministry of Agriculture, incurring confiscations, fines, or legal proceedings, and so they remained distant from the project.
### 7.2.2. Gender

As discussed previously (§ 3.2.5), households are not homogeneous social units but are instead comprised of actors with different roles, degrees of authority, and interests (Crehan, 1992; Deaton, 1997; Ellis, 2000). In this respect, the information obtained from both residents and key informants made evident that the simultaneous provision of productive resources and infrastructure investments added a gender dimension to residents’ dispositions to participate in the project. This responded to their different interests in the project benefits according to traditional gender-based division of roles. Correspondingly, it was observed that whereas most men reported being interested in the livestock modules and related technical assistance, the most recurrent benefit mentioned among women was the energy efficient kitchen financed by the project. In fact, there was evidence that some households’ initial involvement in the project responded to women’s interest in obtaining this benefit.

*The one who told me about it was my wife because she was interested in the kitchen they offered (.) her friends told her about it and she was very interested later on we were informed there were other things involved and so I agreed to participate.* (Mr. Isaias, micro farmer, San Mateo)

*... most women ask for the kitchens that is their first request (.) many started to participate only just for that ...* (Mrs. Jacinta, small farmer, committee leader, San Luis)

*I was the one who got him ((husband)) involved (.) I started because Doña Luz told me I could get a new kitchen so I thought it was a good chance (.) it took me a while because I have to work but I got it now I’m planning to ask for sheep.* (Mrs. Marcela, landless resident)

Women’s material conditions, however, was observed to affect the extent to which this common interest among many was turned into active involvement in the project. Although most families could have benefitted from a new and more energy-efficient kitchen—which later on became the standard in the area—there were still important limitations for the poorest women. As Mrs. Marcela expressed in the previous paragraph, as well as the testimonies of Mrs. Teresa and Mr. Nicolás in the previous section, women of this group had to contribute regularly to the family budget so that their time constraints were tight. In contrast, relatively well-off residents had the resources to simply acquire them either from the local promoters trained by the NGO or by attempting to copy the design with their own economic resources:

*... asking around my wife found out she could buy the kitchen so that is what we did in the end.* (Mr. Ezequiel, medium farmer, San Mateo)

*I asked don Prudencio if they could install one here (.) he gave me the list of materials and then after some days he came and installed it everything is working well ...* (Mr. Luis, medium farmer, San Luis).
7.2.3. The legitimisation of local authority

For some local actors, the reasons for participation did not appear to be related to material considerations. This scenario was particularly salient in the case of certain village leaders who later became authorities of the project committees, as in the case of Mr. Rodrigo (delegate to the board of water users and member of the town hall council as well as president of the PSA since 2007) and Mr. Idelfonso (lieutenant governor since 2006 and former authority of the water users’ association) from San Luis, or Mr. Timoteo (president of the PSA as of 2006 and elected authority of the water users’ commission in 2007) from San Mateo as well as Mrs. Frescia, small farmer, who at the time was working for the town hall with a relatively high income of 700 S/. per month or 162.8 UK£. Furthermore, differently from the common fear of misappropriation of resources in cases of ‘capture’ of local organisations by better-off leaders (Mansuri & Rao, 2004; Platteau & Abraham, 2002; Rao & Ibañez, 2006), there was no evidence on that matter throughout the period of study.

The active involvement of those residents and other village leaders, instead, could be better understood in relation to the local political dynamics existing in the area. This one is characterised by two interrelated factors: First, neither San Mateo nor San Luis possessed a single legitimate governing body; as a result, established leaders had no formal titles but assumed a leading role in their respective villages through their activities as authorities of the various organisations operating in the area (the only formal authority present in the area is a non-elected governmental official: the Lieutenant Governor). Second, as previously described (§ 4.1.2.), local authorities are usually evaluated in contractual terms; that is, according to the material benefits they provide to local residents. In consequence, as highlighted by the literature on ‘local development brokers’ (Bierschenk, Chaveau & de Sardan, 2000; Platteau & Abraham, 2002; Lewis & Mosse, 2006), village leaders are able to preserve their local social standing and informal authority, which in addition carry access to valuable economic resources (§ 5.2.4.), on the basis of their capacity to channel external resources into their respective villages, such as temporary jobs and material donations.

Obtaining clear-cut evidence on this subject is rather difficult, as most committee leaders interviewed provided formulaic responses when enquired about their decision to assume a leading role in organising the population (e.g., “because it was good for the village”). The story of how the intervention was brought into the area, however, allows us to capture the essence of this local political dynamic as well as the role that rich personal networks play in the matter. In the case of San Mateo, the person who first obtained information about the NGO, organised the population in order to design the project, and later became the first president of the local project committee, was Mrs. Frescia, of whom we have talked about in previous chapters (a long-standing leader in female-based poverty alleviation committees and unsuccessful candidate to
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the town hall council but later employed by the town hall as part of the staff running the Glass of Milk programme). According to her own testimony, she heard about the NGO from a cousin of hers (Mrs. Marina) who had been trained as a local promoter in a previous project in the district of Jayanca. Her approach to the news, however, was rather cautious. Before initiating the process of contacting other village leaders or organising the population to sign a petition requesting for support from the NGO, she decided to first confirm by herself the ‘seriousness’ of the institution. To this end she visited Mrs. Marina’s village—Pampa de Lino—to verify whether the NGO indeed fulfilled its promises of material benefits, what were the conditions upon which these benefits were provided, and to confirm if there were any political interests involved.

An analogous path was observed for the case of San Luis. In this setting, the leader involved in bringing the project to the area was Mr. Prudencio, a small farmer who has a long trajectory occupying diverse positions of public responsibility in town such as lieutenant governor and president of the PSA board, besides having run for the town hall council in the elections of 2003. As part of his role as member of the PSA board (2003-2004) he was in regular contact with some leaders from San Mateo and thereby was able to access some information about the NGO. Strikingly similar to Mrs. Frescia’s account, he opted to obtain more information about the NGO and verify in the ground the benefits obtained by beneficiaries of a previous project conducted in the village of San Carranco, district of Jayanca, before deciding whether to engage himself in any activity leading to bringing the project to San Luis.

In this respect, Mrs. Frescia’s and Mr. Prudencio’s accounts showed that this procedure was pursued in relation to their fear of losing their earned prestige and authority:

... one can never be careful enough in these matters (.) as soon as you say there is a benefit involved most of the people in town will assume that you support that project and if it doesn’t work the one to blame is you even worse some would say one tried to get something out of it. (Mrs. Frescia, committee leader, San Mateo)

... as authority you can’t let yourself fall into that game ((of empty promises used for political purposes)) because the people will make you responsible so I wanted to be sure I would not get into troubles with the people here ... (Mr. Prudencio, committee leader, San Luis)

Furthermore, although both Mrs. Frescia and Mr. Prudencio later on appealed to the lieutenant governors of their villages to get residents to sign a petition formally requesting the NGO to come to the area, it cannot be stated that their interest in bringing the intervention to their villages prompted an open collaboration with all existing leaders in town. Different accounts made evident that those leaders that organised the initial events that led to the project being implemented in the area (formal petition requesting the presence of the NGO—between November and December 2004; participatory socioeconomic diagnostic—between January and February 2005, and general assembly to introduce the project designed on March 2005 and
formalised the agreement between residents and the NGO to implement it in the area), very much consisted of leaders close to Mrs. Frescia or Mr. Prudencio, through kinship and friendship relations based on previous collaborations in other organisations. In San Luis, for example, Mr. Prudencio reported organising those activities with Mr. Rodrigo, his cousin and with whom he had previously worked in the PSA (2003-2004), and Mrs. Jacinta, president of the Glass of Milk committee and Mr. Prudencio’s sister-in-law; all of whom, in addition, have lived in the area for over two decades. Likewise in San Mateo Mrs. Frescia worked alongside Mrs. Filipa and Mrs. Felicita, both of whom had previously worked with her in the boards of the Glass of Milk and Popular Cook committees.

The reasons expressed to make such a decision appeared, in principle, very sound. The leaders involved had cooperated in previous activities and had an established leading position in town, so they were in a good position to effectively mobilise the population; as Mrs. Frescia put it: “it is always better to start with a strong group of people that know how to work together and are respected in the village”. Simultaneously, however, this use of close dependable connections provided these leading actors with an important degree of control over the resources provided by the project and the public recognition that such an intermediary role provides, in detriment of other potential political competitors (e.g., two other candidates that competed against Mrs. Frescia in the municipal elections of 2003 were not invited to participate in those initial activities).

7.2.4. Disposition toward external actors and participation

There is evidence that the introduction of the project in the area challenged some local actors’ understanding of external support for ‘poverty alleviation’. As described in Part II of this study, although most local residents are members of different social organisations, they have no regular experience dealing either with NGOs or full participatory models of organisation (e.g., water users’ associations are mainly active during a limited period of time each year whilst local Glass of Milk committees operate mainly as distribution centres for the milk and oats provided by the town hall), particularly in consideration of the limited involvement of most residents in the running of those local organisations.

In this manner, the presence of an external actor that does not come from either the state, the town hall, or a political party that conditions the delivery of benefits on active participation in project activities, in Bourdieu’s terms, demanded that many residents changed their modes of practice with regard to their traditional organisational roles as well as their understanding of ‘the game’ behind an external poverty alleviation intervention (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Lamaison & Bourdieu, 1986). In this regard, three common interconnected concerns—related to the historical trajectory of the relationships between residents and the town hall or public agencies—appeared to be commonplace among residents, preventing their participation at least
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at the beginning of the intervention: (i) fears of political manipulation, (ii) fears of exploitation and discretionary exercise of authority by the NGO, and (iii) predominance among some residents of an assistencialist understanding of external support.

a. Political manipulation:

In most occasions, investments, development interventions, and material donations from public agencies in the local area are related to the attempts of political actors at the local and national level to develop a patron-client relationship with the local population. As mentioned in Chapter 4 (section 4.1.2.), the investments in wind-powered water pumps by FONCODES in 1999, for example, could be related to the well-documented political use of public programmes by the Fujimori regime in the 1990s (Schady, 1999; Arce, 2005). Likewise the constant attempts from town hall candidates to lure in voters to support them because of their populist promises (e.g., rapid installation of electricity and water services) and practices (e.g., distributing clothes and bags of food), as well as the political criteria followed by town hall investments (e.g., the inoperative Catholic church in San Mateo), all have taught to residents that there is a hidden political agenda behind such investments. Not surprisingly, then, the initial reaction of many residents to the news of the project indicated that some of them placed this more recent intervention along the same lines as those of those previous experiences:

... when I heard about the project I thought it was another promise of many we receive (...) the elections ((for the town hall)) were coming the next year so I thought maybe it was coming from one of the running parties ... (Mr. Isaias, micro farmer, San Mateo)

I remember that the first time I mentioned the project to a neighbour of mine he said: ‘whom are we supposed to support this time?’ (Mr. Prudencio, small farmer / committee leader, San Luis)

To be honest when I first met ... ((project officer)) I thought ‘here we go again (...) now what will they promise this time?’ (Mrs. Liliana, micro farmer, San Luis)

b. Discretional vertical authority:

Residents’ experiences of external support were mostly developed in the context of top-down frameworks in which the external actor, commonly a public agency, had the final word on how those initiatives would work and under what conditions. In this regard, a commonly reported fear among the local population was that the material benefits promised by the NGO would never materialise. This concern was understandable; as many pledges of political figures are not fulfilled (e.g., cases of the promises of the town hall to asphalt the access road or from political candidates to provide rapid access to electricity or water services, which as of June 2008 had yet to be fulfilled). Correspondingly, it was found that some local informants linked their suspicions about the project with their previous experiences in public development initiatives:
... some were thinking that it would be the same as always right? (.) when people come and promise the moon and the stars but in the end nothing happens or worse that they try to fool us (.) here in the committee ((Popular Cook)) for example they ((PRONAA)) have tried to pass spoiled food over us many times sometimes they even tried to cheat with the weight can you imagine that? (Mrs. Filipa, micro farmer, committee leader, San Mateo)

... some thought it was like with the promises of fixing the road (.) all talk but nothing in the end ... if someone you do not know comes and says you will get this and that would you believe him? (Mr. Javier, micro farmer, San Mateo)

A related concern observed in the accounts of some local informants referred to their belief that the terms under which the benefits are provided would not be the same as initially promised, either in terms of quality or of what was expected from residents. Given the project design, which required that beneficiaries conduct a determined number of collective work activities and expected them to return the livestock modules provided with the offspring of the animals received, some feared that in the end the population would not benefit effectively from those resources, ultimately making them work for free or ending up in debt:

... some of my neighbours told us we were a bunch of fools (for deciding to participate in the project)) they said 'you are wasting your time (.) in the end all the work will be for them to take pictures and they will not even thank you'. (Mr. Prudencio, small farmer, San Mateo)

... my husband told me ‘so, where are those animals?’ (livestock promised by the project)) 'how do we know they are not going to take them back in the end?’ (Mrs. Liliana, micro farmer, San Luis)

You know how rumours are (.) I even heard some people saying that we were asking people to sign contracts against their houses or their lands ... (Mr. Timoteo, medium farmer, committee leader, San Mateo)

c. Assistencialism:

The working model proposed by the intervention also constituted an important change with regard to the dominant presence of assistencialist model followed by most external interventions. Most of the population were used to being on the receiving end of diverse forms of support that, aside from implicit political commitments, demanded very little—if anything—from them. For example, as described in chapters 4 and 6, the Glass of Milk committees, of which most families in San Mateo and San Luis are members, provided milk and cereals to families without any conditions except for beneficiaries’ declaring they have children under six or elderly people at home. In addition, the most recurrent form of support diverse local organisations receive take the form of donations of diverse resources such as food, school materials, construction materials, or cash, either from public or private agencies. In this respect, some residents were expecting that the NGO would donate resources to the population or at least would provide them under very little demanding conditions.
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... they (neighbours) told me, “why do we have to work for them? why can’t they just give us something first?” ... some people are like that (.) they think that because they are poor they are supposed to receive things for free ... (Mrs. Jacinta, small farmer, committee leader, San Luis)

... some members did not realise that it was not like in the committee ((Glass of Milk)) (.) they thought they just had to sign somewhere to receive the benefits (.) they were not used to work like this ... (Mrs. Frescia, small farmer, committee leader, San Mateo)

This circumstance appears to have been further aggravated because some residents assumed the NGO constituted an organisation rich in resources that had little reason to make any demands from the population. As one local informant put it during an informal conversation: “just by selling one of their trucks we would have enough to get sheep for most neighbours” (Mr. Ladislao, micro farmer, San Luis). The project’s request for beneficiaries’ participation in communal work sessions, therefore, were not easily understood in view of the resources that the institution apparently had at its disposition, a factor that had not gone unnoticed to the project staff:

Sometimes it is difficult to explain things to the people (.) they see you visiting in different vans with your clean shirt and shoes and so they think we are not in bad shape right? that we have plenty of things to give away (.) I tell them clearly what we can and cannot do and what we have and what we don’t have but often they ask us things that are clearly beyond our means or have nothing to do with the project ... (Project officer).

To trace a specific socioeconomic profile of those residents most susceptible to have those views is difficult. First, rather comparable concerns were found in an important variety of informants, independently of their material condition. Second, key informants were not able to trace a clear-cut profile of residents who were reluctant to participate because of such views. There were two indications, however, that those considerations were of greater significance among the poorer residents. On the one hand, key informants indicated that those views were more common among those that had limited involvement in community affairs and social organisations besides being beneficiaries of the Glass of Milk or Popular Cook committees, which were predominantly very poor residents (Chapter 6, section 6.2.3.). On the other, the few cases of informants that explicitly recognised following a policy of ’wait and see’ to verify the veracity of the NGO’s promises came from very poor informants (two landless residents and one micro farmer). This potential association, however, was not possible to verify with the evidence at hand. As observed in Graph 7.1, had the poorest been conditioning their participation exclusively on the basis of those concerns, they would have significantly increased their presence in the local committees, which did not happen. Most likely, those considerations have to be understood in relation to the other interests identified among different sectors of the population.

The evidence collected in subsequent stages of the study showed that those concerns changed over time, as the project started to provide the first enlisted beneficiaries with the promised benefits (first deliveries began on February 2005). In this manner, it became apparent
to most residents that the promised benefits were provided in a timely fashion and, furthermore, that none of the project activities posed any major risk in terms of political manipulation, unexpected withdrawal from the institution, or hidden contractual demands.

... my friend saw there were people installing the kitchen and asked me about it. I explained it to her it came from my work with the project later she told me she discussed it with her husband and so came to join us (Mrs. Filipa, micro farmer / committee leader, San Mateo).

... first they saw the kitchens then the latrines and then the modules of sheep so little by little they stopped mocking us and we became more and more numerous (Mr. Prudencio, small farmer, committee leader, San Luis).

... some people lost interest because they thought it was easy but they returned later when they saw the benefits (Mrs. Timoteo, medium farmer, committee leader, San Mateo).

7.2.5. The mediating role of village authorities

Village leaders play a central role in the implementation of participatory development interventions as, despite the communitarian discourse of social capital that emphasises communities’ collective disposition to act and cooperate for the public good, it has been regularly observed that it is local leaders who effectively mobilise and organise the population to make community-based interventions possible (Dasgupta & Beard, 2007; Krishna, 2002, 2008; Mansuri & Rao, 2004; Platteau & Abraham, 2002). In the area of study, the role of local leaders was particularly important to make the project operate effectively in its initial months because of the observed mistrust of many residents toward the NGO and the mode of practice proposed; in this regard, the evidence obtained indicated that two social-capital-related factors were central to this process: (i) leaders’ personal networks and (ii) social capital as social prestige, or ‘symbolic capital’ (Bourdieu, 1986; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

With regard to leaders’ personal networks, the most important evidence obtained on the subject came from a detailed review of the first list of beneficiaries registered in the project. This indicated the same with that the core of residents that started off the project was composed of those households that had a close connection with local leaders, particularly as close friends, compadres, or relatives. It is not possible to assert, however, that this indicated a conscious stratagem aimed to exclude certain sectors of the population in order to monopolise project resources. Informal conversations with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, instead, coincided in pointing out that all residents were openly invited to participate in the initial activities leading to the intervention (petitions, participatory diagnostics and assemblies). Interviews with the founding beneficiaries of the project, instead, revealed that it was those residents close to the village leaders promoting the project who, first, were more easily mobilised to participate in all preliminary activities so that they were better informed about the project dynamics and had direct contact with the NGO staff. Secondly, their close relationship with village leaders, based
on previous collaborations in other local organisations or as neighbouring relatives through quotidian forms of support, assured them that the benefits promised by the NGO would indeed materialise.

Prudencio (brother) told me about the project and said it was a good opportunity. I had my doubts but he convinced me... (Mrs. Liliana, micro farmer, San Luis)

... my wife had heard about it (the NGO) from doña Jacinta in a committee meeting (Glass of Milk) and since my chacra is close to don Rodrigo’s I got more information about it when I met him at that time so it looked as something serious to us since it was a good opportunity my wife went to the first meetings and then we started off with the project then in 2005. (Mr. Armando, micro farmer, San Luis)

... it was doña Frescia who explained it to me (the project) and I thought it was a good opportunity... I know her from the Glass of Milk... we had worked together there many years before she went to the town hall... (Mrs. Marcela, landless resident, San Mateo)

In certain cases, residents’ decision to participate in the project was affected by leaders’ involvement without the presence of a direct relationship between them but because of the latter’s prestige. In this manner, their reputation as longstanding authorities with a proven record of positive results in channelling external resources for the benefit of the local population (e.g., mediation with public services or donations for the school) appeared to contribute to mitigating the initial mistrust of the project.

... for me it was a guarantee that doña Frescia was in the committee... she has always done good things for the town... it was when she was in the PSA that the school got the funding for the concrete fence... (Mr. Abraham, small farmer, San Mateo)

I talked with don Prudencio and the lieutenant governor and it looked to me a serious thing... They had a plan and everything seemed in order... once I worked with FONCODES because of don Prudencio so I know he is a serious person... (Mr. Armando, micro farmer, San Luis)

7.3. Concluding remarks

The findings reported in the present chapter lead to four considerations related to the existing debates on social capital discussed in Part I of the present study. In this manner, it is possible to observe the insufficiency of both oversocialised—that assume social capital as a historical and cultural grounded collective disposition to collective action (Putnam, 1993a, 1993b; Uphoff, 2004)—and undersocialised—which consider social capital can be built by appealing to actors’ self-interest for material benefits (Coleman, 1990; Ostrom & Ahn, 2003; 2009)—approaches to understand cooperation in community-based interventions. First, the results reported made evident the limitations of ‘community social capital’ to adequately account for participation in development initiatives. As reported in the text, actors’ dispositions to participate in the project were not homogenous across all households co-habiting the local social space; instead, within the same deprived area there were various interests. In this respect, neither the project was interpreted as a whole unit by local residents, who instead attributed different priorities to the
material and non-material resources (in)directly mobilised in this new space of action (e.g., village leaders had only marginal need of the material benefits provided by the project and women and men differed in which project benefits were more appealing to them whilst actors of different socioeconomic conditions related differently to the project). Although there is evidence that the presence of institutionalised norms, engagement in civic associations, and extended networks facilitate the process of organisation and mobilisation of actors (Durston 1999, 2002, 2004; Uphoff & Wijayaratna, 2000), it becomes apparent that subordinating actors’ actions to institutional features of communities and societies are insufficient to explain the variety of reasons that motivates their actions (DeFillips, 2001; Ishihara & Pascual, 2009).

This last assertion does not imply that local features of social organisation are irrelevant but that they cannot be presented at the cost of agency. The evidence, in this regard, coincides with Krishna’s propositions (2002, 2007, 2008) that structural features favouring social cohesion and cooperation need to be set in motion by individual actors. It is clear, however, that not all actors are equally capable of playing this role, at least in the area of study. As reported in this chapter, it is mainly those local leaders with a proven record of being successful at channelling external resources who were able to mobilise and organise the local population to bring the project into the area. However, as discussed in Chapter 6 (§ 6.2.3.), achieving a leading position in the local social space is ‘costly’, since the demands of those roles required from actors to have adequate stocks of diverse forms of capital: higher levels of physical capital, education, knowledge about bureaucratic procedures, and political connections. In addition, the form in which these actors could facilitate the implementation of the project was related mainly to the mobilisation of their personal relationships; specifically, external networks that provided reliable information about NGO, extended personal connections in the local so as to effectively mobilise residents alongside symbolic capital (the prestige that such mediating role provided to certain leaders), which contributed to convince actors to participate in the project despite their lack of direct knowledge about the NGO.

Third, actors’ different interests on the promised benefits of the intervention indicate as well that assuming a single mode of action for all actors centred on economic interests and calculations is insufficient (Cleaver, 2001, 2002; Ishihara & Pascual, 2009). Such an assessment, for example, does not provide a clear explanation for the differences observed between men’s and women’s interests in productive and domestic infrastructure investments, respectively, which are related to their positions in the household and learned practices and dispositions to action. This consideration is particularly useful with relation to understand leaders’ decisive involvement in leading a development intervention. Some scholars, for example, understand ‘capture’ of projects by local elites under a dichotomy between ‘traditional’ and ‘benevolent’ capture (Mansuri & Rao, 2004; Fritzen, 2007; Rao & Ibañez, 2005); that is, between those forms of participation of local elites which assume a leading position in an intervention so as to
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misappropriate the material resources provided by development agencies as opposed to those “when influential individuals ... push through a project and dominate its progress, but do this with communitarian motives” (Rao & Ibañez, 2005, p. 809). Such a basic differentiation, however, signifies that if there are no material interests involved, there are no other interests at stake (hence assuming altruistic behaviour).

Finally, it was observed that despite there being a certain tradition of collective work in the area, (e.g., expanding the local school or preserving irrigation canals), some residents had difficulty understanding the rationale behind the project’s actions, as these people tended to associate it with the assistencialist and politically motivated forms of support commonly received from public institutions and private actors. This shows that certain modes of practice in one dimension of social life—in Bourdieu’s terms, a ‘field’—are not always easily transposed into another one, particularly one without precedent. This responds not only to the fact that the nature of ‘the game’ is different from one field to another (e.g., forms of capital accumulation differ from the field of education as compared to economic fields) but also the ‘rules of the game’ or normative structures that regulate actors’ practices (e.g., formally institutionalised codes of practice implemented by a clear hierarchical authority systems in school as compared to those informally implemented in local farms) as well as actors’ interests and positions in them (e.g., a landless resident has no interest in water users’ organisations but if both have their children attending the same school, there is commonality of interests between them both) (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).
CHAPTER 8
PROJECT ACTIVITIES AND NETWORKING OPPORTUNITIES

The present chapter examines the process of network formation that took place in San Mateo and San Luis within the context of the participatory development project implemented in the area between 2005 and 2008. More specifically, following Bourdieu’s theoretical framework (1984, 1985, 1986), it examines how beneficiaries made use of the different spaces of interaction, and hence networking opportunities, generated by the project components in relation to their positions in the local space and associated practices, interests, and dispositions (‘habitus’).

The development literature highlighting the potential of participatory development frameworks to build social capital indicate that the organisation of beneficiaries, use of local normative structures, and placement of legitimate representatives of the population in positions of responsibility may foster stronger local relationships and expand connections beyond the local arena, reaching towards other civil society initiatives and the state (Brown & Ashman, 1996; Uphoff, 2001, 2004; Dongier et al., 2002; Carrol, 2001). Nevertheless, there is still uncertainty as to how this process evolves. Positive accounts of social capital building (Durston, 1999, 2002; Gittel & Vidal, 1998; Krishna, 2002; Uphoff, 2001; Uphoff & Wijayaratna, 2000) privilege communitarian conceptualisations and, hence, say little about how beneficiaries of different socioeconomic profiles indeed are able to build those desirable relationships (Lewis & Siddiqi, 2006; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). Furthermore, various empirical assessments of participatory interventions have regularly observed a tendency towards the reproduction of local social structures, reinforcing the authority of local elites (Dasgupta & Beard, 2007; Fritzen, 2007; Ibañez & Rao, 2005; Mansuri & Rao, 2004; Platteau & Abraham, 2002).

In order to address the subject of participation and networking opportunities in relation to actors’ objective conditions, the present chapter combines the results obtained from the different waves of household surveys applied during the period of study (March 2006; October, 2007; June 2008) alongside the qualitative data gathered through interviews with beneficiaries and key informants conducted in the last stage of the data-collection process (June 2007 and December 2007) with records of personal observations. The chapter is structured in two parts: first, it examines the changes in network measures for project beneficiaries and village residents as a whole, so as to examine whether the initial differences among different socioeconomic groups (§ 6.1) have changed over time. Next, the chapter provides a detailed qualitative account of how actors approached and use the spaces of interaction generated by the intervention and, hence, were able to expand their connections of potential economic value.
8.1. Changes in network structures

A first analysis of local households’ networks of economic value within the village, beyond the local area, and with public authorities and figures, rendered unequal distributions according to the actors’ material conditions (Table 6.2). It was found that the poorest heads of household and their partners tended to have fewer and weaker connections of economic value within their villages or beyond the local area—those that could provide access to loans, job opportunities, technical information, material support during emergencies, or help to deal with public officials—as well as more limited access to local public authorities and leading figures—president of the board of water users, school principal, director of health centre, major, parish priest, and chief of local police—than did better off households.

The present section examines whether that general structure of relations has significantly changed during the period of study, particularly if there is evidence that between 2005 and 2008 the project was able to facilitate an expansion of connections in a manner that pointed towards a more equitable scenario. To this end, beneficiary households’ initial scores for each of the network measures presented in Chapter 6 were compared with those reported in the subsequent surveys implemented in October 2007 and June 2008. Each of the scores were re-scaled over a maximum of 10 points, using the same base parameters applied in the first round of household surveys for comparison purposes (i.e., applying the same standard deviations obtained for each network measure as of March 2006 and re-scaling the results over a 10-point score on the basis of the same maximum score possible established for 2006 measures). Due to the reduced sample size for each of the sub-samples analysed, mean scores for matched pairs are analysed using the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test (Gibbons, 1993).

The comparisons between project beneficiaries’ network measures indicate that there has not been a widespread or homogeneous expansion of local, external, or vertical connections among them during the period of study (Table 8.1). The results obtained, first, provide no evidence that beneficiaries expanded their connections of economic value within their respective villages irrespectively of their material condition. Second, the poorest beneficiaries failed to report consistent, significant, positive changes in any of the network measures applied. Third, positive changes were instead observed more regularly among the not-so-poor beneficiaries in the case of external networks (expenditure quartiles 2 and 3) and the better off households in terms of connections with public authorities.

84 The non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was used to assess the comparability of the resulting distributions for 2007 and 2008 measures with the one obtained from the baseline survey. The test examines if the sample results can be considered as drawn from the same distribution (i.e., if both come from the same population). The comparisons between different waves rendered satisfactory results:
- Local Networks 06-07: K-S test: 0.57, p=0.91; Local Networks 07-08: K-S test: 0.72, p=0.67.
- External Networks 06-07: K-S test: 1.03, p=0.24; Local Networks 07-08: K-S test: 0.98, p=0.28.
- External Networks 06-07: K-S test: 0.49, p=0.97; Local Networks 07-08: K-S test: 0.54, p=0.93.
Next, the village-level distributions for each of the network measures applied through the different waves of surveys indicate that during the period of time the project operated in the area, the distributions of local, external, and vertical connections in the area had not changed substantially as compared to the order observed in March 2006: in all three indicators it is the poorest households that report the lowest network scores over time.

Table 8.1 Changes in beneficiaries’ network scores during the period of study by village

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exp. Quart.</th>
<th>SAN MATEO Δ06-07 W-test</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>SAN MATEO Δ06-08 W-test</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>SAN LUIS Δ06-07 W-test</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>SAN LUIS Δ06-08 W-test</th>
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<th>TOTAL Δ06-07 W-test</th>
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<th>TOTAL Δ06-08 W-test</th>
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<tr>
<td>Local Networks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q1-2006</td>
<td>2.4-2.5</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.4-2.4</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.4-2.2</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.4-2.6</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q2-2006</td>
<td>3.5-3.3</td>
<td>1.62*</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.5-3.5</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.1-3.3</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.0-3.2</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q3-2006</td>
<td>3.8-4.0</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.8-4.4</td>
<td>1.78*</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.9-4.2</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.9-3.8</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4-2006</td>
<td>3.0-3.3</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.0-3.4</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.9-4.0</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.0-3.4</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>4</td>
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| External Networks |
| Q1-2006 | 3.2-3.0 | 0.42 | 6 | 3.1-2.6 | 1.51 | 5 | 3.2-3.1 | 0.03 | 6 | 3.2-3.0 | 0.18 | 5 | 3.2-3.0 | 0.32 | 12 | 3.2-2.8 | 1.25 | 10 |
| Q2-2006 | 3.0-3.0 | 0.05 | 11 | 3.0-3.4 | 1.64* | 10 | 3.1-3.5 | 1.78* | 7 | 3.1-3.4 | 2.39** | 7 | 3.0-3.2 | 1.0 | 18 | 3.0-3.4 | 2.49** | 17 |
| Q3-2006 | 3.6-4.1 | 2.27*** | 9 | 3.6-4.0 | 1.73* | 9 | 4.1-4.5 | 2.27*** | 8 | 4.1-4.5 | 1.76* | 8 | 3.8-4.3 | 2.28*** | 17 | 3.9-4.2 | 2.45*** | 17 |
| Q4-2006 | 2.8-2.7 | 0.38 | 5 | 2.8-3.1 | 0.94 | 5 | 3.2-3.6 | 1.83* | 4 | 3.2-3.4 | 0.95 | 4 | 2.9-3.1 | 1.42 | 9 | 3.0-3.2 | 1.18 | 9 |

| Vertical Networks |
| Q1-2006 | 2.9-3.1 | 0.41 | 6 | 3.0-2.8 | 0.27 | 5 | 2.2-2.5 | 1.36 | 6 | 2.2-2.4 | 0.45 | 5 | 2.6-2.8 | 1.43 | 12 | 2.5-2.6 | 0.18 | 10 |
| Q2-2006 | 3.2-3.4 | 1.23 | 11 | 3.2-3.1 | 0.45 | 10 | 3.1-2.9 | 0.67 | 7 | 3.1-3.3 | 1.03 | 7 | 3.2-3.2 | 0.55 | 18 | 3.2-3.1 | 0.95 | 17 |
| Q3-2006 | 4.2-4.4 | 0.95 | 9 | 4.4-4.6 | 1.38 | 9 | 3.5-3.9 | 1.65* | 8 | 3.5-3.8 | 1.22 | 8 | 3.9-4.2 | 1.61* | 17 | 3.4-4.1 | 1.94** | 17 |
| Q4-2006 | 5.1-5.6 | 2.02*** | 5 | 5.1-5.9 | 1.68* | 5 | 4.7-5.2 | 1.45 | 4 | 4.6-5.5 | 1.46 | 4 | 4.9-5.5 | 2.21*** | 9 | 4.9-5.4 | 1.89* | 9 |

Significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 8.2 Distribution of network measures during the period of study according to material well-being and village

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Q1-2006</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>2.49</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q2-2006</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>3.38</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q3-2006</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>4.11</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4-2006</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>F-test</td>
<td>13.87***</td>
<td>5.62***</td>
<td>8.05</td>
<td>2.84**</td>
<td>3.61**</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>4.03**</td>
<td>8.66***</td>
<td>3.84**</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| External Networks |
| Q1-2006 | 2.43 | 2.98 | 2.56 | 2.68 | 3.13 | 2.96 | 2.53 | 3.06 | 2.76 |
| Q2-2006 | 2.73 | 2.72 | 3.12 | 3.10 | 3.57 | 3.44 | 2.91 | 3.09 | 3.26 |
| Q3-2006 | 3.53 | 4.11 | 4.04 | 3.86 | 4.55 | 4.50 | 3.74 | 4.30 | 4.24 |
| Q4-2006 | 3.11 | 2.98 | 3.37 | 3.45 | 3.62 | 3.40 | 3.25 | 3.26 | 3.38 |
| F-test | 3.20** | 3.75** | 2.79* | 2.17* | 1.96 | 2.64* | 5.53*** | 5.31*** | 4.08** |

| Vertical Networks |
| Q1-2006 | 2.84 | 3.12 | 2.88 | 2.66 | 2.53 | 2.37 | 2.76 | 2.83 | 2.63 |
| Q2-2006 | 3.45 | 3.41 | 3.08 | 3.25 | 2.84 | 3.30 | 3.37 | 3.19 | 3.16 |
| Q3-2006 | 4.47 | 4.43 | 4.62 | 3.76 | 3.9 | 3.78 | 4.15 | 4.18 | 4.23 |
| Q4-2006 | 5.10 | 5.62 | 5.88 | 4.79 | 4.98 | 5.38 | 5.01 | 4.49 | 5.71 |
| F-test | 4.27*** | 7.94*** | 8.83*** | 4.81*** | 6.19*** | 4.96*** | 12.91*** | 14.11*** | 13.38*** |

Significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
It is important to highlight that these results refer only to those connections that grant access to resources instrumental to local economic practices or those connect with political leaders and figures; they do not imply that no new relationships have been developed at all through participation in the project. In addition, it is necessary to indicate that other processes external to the project may be influencing these results (e.g., the political campaign for the town hall by the end of 2006 and the tendency among better off households to invest more in out-migration strategies than the poorest ones). In the face of the results observed, however, the quantitative data provides no evidence that during the period the project operated in the area there has been a significant change with regards to the unequal network structures observed among residents of San Mateo and San Luis. In order to explore in detail this scenario, qualitative data is presented next to delimit how the project attempted to promote different networking opportunities among different sectors of the population and how beneficiaries made use of them.

### 8.2. Conditions of participation

Development interventions do not provide beneficiaries with a single, well-defined space in which all household members are equally able (or disposed) to participate; instead, they consist of different components, each of them with particular characteristics regarding time demands, forms of engagement, networking opportunities, relevance to beneficiaries’ practices, and forms of interaction with the wider cultural, political, and economic context (Cleaver, 1999, 2001; Long, 2001; Gaventa, 2004). In order to better understand how beneficiaries’ practices and interests may have shaped the observed reproduction of the local network structures along actors’ objective conditions, it is necessary to first specify the main spaces of interaction between beneficiaries and between them with external actors (NGO staff or public officials). The most important networking opportunities generated by the intervention studied were the following:

- **2-hour sessions of communal work recuperating forestry areas twice a week.** Each session was supervised by a committee authority (president or vice-president) and an external promoter.

- **Monthly assemblies, with the participation of beneficiaries, committee authorities and external project promoters,** aimed at reviewing the progress of committees’ activities, discussing the programmed activities for the upcoming month, specifying the requests for material benefits by beneficiaries, and identifying any problems or potential conflicts in the area.

- **Monthly assemblies of the federation of committee leaders—commonly attended by the president and secretary—from each beneficiary village with the presence of project promoters, project officer, and NGO technical staff (if their presence was necessary to address specific queries from beneficiaries).** Their purpose was to discuss the progress of
activities at each site, programme the working plan for the upcoming month, assign the material resources to be distributed next to each committee, and solve any conflicts or problems identified in each village.

- Training programmes consisting of half-day training sessions every four months for a year on the following topics: (i) livestock management, (ii) vegetable gardens, (iii) forest management, and (iv) sanitation and health practices. These activities were in the charge of a veterinarian, agronomist, and nurse.

- Technical assistance provided via monthly visits by an agronomist, veterinarian and nurse so as to supervise the implementation on the ground of the lessons discussed in training sessions.

- Sessions of exchange of experiences every six months during the last two years of operations. These consisted of bringing leaders from beneficiary villages from other regions of the department (e.g., mountainous areas) or from other departments (e.g., Piura, La Libertad, or Cajamarca) that had worked with the NGO or the financing institution in similar interventions to discuss with committee authorities their experiences how they took advantage of their respective material benefits (and organisations) to improve their economic conditions.

- Trimestral informative sessions with representatives of public institutions (e.g., town hall and FONCODES representatives) during the last year of operations with regard to obtaining information about formal instances of cooperation and funding opportunities. Sessions took place in the main office of Chiclayo in the presence of committee leaders from each village.

8.2.1. Economic practices and participation

Local actors’ responses to the economic challenges and opportunities provided by the wider agricultural-based economy affected participation in project activities. Testimonies from all actors involved—committee leaders, beneficiaries, and NGO staff—coincided in reporting that attendance to project activities, particularly those that were intended to be conducted on a regular basis—monthly beneficiary assemblies and twice-a-week communal work activities—could vary significantly according to the season in question. In this respect, at the peak of the harvest season (July – August), the period of highest demand for labour, and in the last months of the year (November – December), when work in the area was very scarce, participation decreased significantly because residents were busy working in their family farms, for nearby farmers, or had to migrate temporarily to other areas. This seasonal variation, hence, limited the regularity of beneficiaries’ interactions:

\[ P: \quad \text{It depends on how busy people are.} \]

\(^{85}\) Two rounds of training programmes were run by the project (2006 and 2007).
Res.: And when are they the busiest?
P: Hm during the harvest everybody is working in their chacras or outside town so it is difficult to have good attendance. (Mr. Prudencio, small-farmer, committee leader, San Luis)

.... as you saw today at this time of the year ((December 2008)) is complicated because people are working outside town (.) in the summer during the planting season you would have seen more people because everybody is in town then. (Mr. Timoteo, medium farmer, committee leader, San Mateo).

As described in Chapters 4 through 6, local actors’ responses to seasonal variations tend to differ according to their objective condition, which in turn affected their level of engagement in project activities and, hence, the frequency of interactions with other beneficiaries. Insofar as the most deprived families rely heavily on working as wage labour to subsist, their involvement in project activities tended to become minimal for important periods of time, in particular during the harvest and slack seasons. In contrast, it was observed and reported that although the demands of farming activities could be equally burdensome to small farmers, because they spend more time in the area so as to look after their family farms, their levels of participation were reported to decrease but not at the same level as compared to those of the poorest beneficiaries.

Well it is those who have to work outside ((with more irregular attendance)) because many people are jornaleros ((day-labourers)) (.) they have to work in whatever they can get and many times are absent from town. (Mr. Prudencio, small farmer, committee leader, San Luis)

... most come (.) it is just that some have to work and cannot make it ... it is a shame because it is mostly those who need it the most but that is how things are here ... (Mrs. Filipa, micro farmer, committee leader, San Mateo)

... those that work as jornaleros have more problems to come (.) they are always working or looking for work even with their children so it is not easy for them but many make an effort and come more less regularly. (Mrs. Marina, project promoter, San Mateo)

In the face of the variable labour demands according to the agricultural season, households’ endowments of human capital were found to constitute an important factor in shaping their participation in project activities. In order to maximise the project returns, some households adopted a rotation strategy among their members, alternatively sending their eldest sons or partners to assemblies, communal work sessions and, in some cases, also to productive training events according to age- and gender-based division of domestic roles (e.g., teenage sons are commonly in charge of looking after livestock whilst teenage daughters collaborate in looking after poultry or families’ vegetable gardens as well as children and the house). In this manner, the activities of the main household income earners were not regularly interrupted and the family could benefit from accessing more rapidly the material benefits provided by the project as they could steadily accumulate the number of hours of work necessary to request them.
... it is my wife who attends the meetings because I'm working (...) if we both are busy it is my son the one who goes. (Mr. Cipriano, small farmer, San Luis)

The ones who are busy send their wives ((to communal work sessions)) (...) if their children are not little then they send their children too (...) here we all are used to work so it does not affect much our progress. (Mrs. Marina, project promoter, San Mateo)

This strategy, however, was implemented in a limited manner by the poorest families. This corresponded, first, to the observed practice among landless or nearly landless residents to use of most of their available family workforce for income generation activities, by which men and women and even minors tend to contribute economically to the household budget by working as wage labour in nearby farms (Chapters 4 to 5). A second limiting factor was that these families are in fact characterised by their relative lack of family workforce, reporting a lower ratio of members of working age (15 to 65) per children and elderly residents as compared to better off families (§ Table 4.6). As Mr. Eric and Mr. Lorenzo’s testimonies illustrate, both having small children only (less than 10 years of age), the poorest households that happen to also lack various members of working age faced important challenges to have a regular involvement in project activities:

... we stopped a little at the moment ((attending communal work sessions and assemblies)) because there is plenty of work to do now so my wife and I have to take advantage ... (Mr. Eric, landless resident, San Mateo)

... my wife and I work so we have problems to attend sometimes ((communal work sessions and assemblies)) (...) we try to go every week but we cannot (...) it is my wife the one who goes but also depending on whether she has got to work or not (...) she’s got to look after the children too it’s not easy for her. (Mr. Lorenzo, landless beneficiary, San Luis)

The observed predominant participation of the not-so-poor residents, who constituted the core of beneficiaries (Graph 7.1), in project activities had important implications for the potential capacity of the project to effectively foment new relationships among beneficiaries. This was because the project, albeit unintentionally, facilitated more regular interactions—a pre-requisite for forging cooperative relations (Collier, 1998; Lin, 2001)—among those groups of residents that already tended to report more extended supportive connections within their respective villages (Table 6.2).

The observed tension between the demands of participation and the need of beneficiaries to respond to the seasonal changes in the agricultural cycle had not gone unnoticed, either by the project staff or committee leaders. In order to deal with this limitation, these actors followed a rather flexible implementation of activities. In each monthly assembly, for example, committee leaders and promoters would usually conduct consultations with beneficiaries to decide which days of the week would be more suitable for beneficiaries to attend. There was also evidence that, on occasions, in San Luis those changes could also take place from one week to another. Nevertheless, it was clear to both local leaders and NGO staff that there was no perfect solution
to this problem and that, to a large extent, this constituted an external constraint regarding which they could only minimize its negative effects:

... it is difficult that everybody comes because there is always somebody working in their chacras in the contratas or in the towns ((nearby capitals of district)) so we cannot wait for all of them (;) we talk to the people to see when they can come but we cannot please everybody. (Mr. Prudencio, small farmer, committee leader, San Luis)

... it is complicated isn’t it? (;) we have to move forward with our working plan but people have to work too (;) we talk about which days are more suitable each month in the assembly but many would not know when they have to work but only until a few days in advance so there are always some absentees ... in the end it depends on the majority if most can then that is the day. (Mr. Manuel, project promoter, San Luis)

... we always tell them ((committee leaders)) to be flexible when necessary sometimes people are busy and that is understandable but we cannot stop working ... although some cannot participate all the time hopefully in time they will integrate better to the group ...

(Proposal officer)

8.2.2. Material needs and interests

As discussed in the previous chapter, local households approached the project benefits differently, according to their objective conditions. This circumstance affected, in turn, the possibility of beneficiaries of different socioeconomic profiles interacting with one another by conditioning which of the project events they would be more likely to join. Training events on forest management, for instance, were reported to gather members of those households that had the potential to better exploit those resources because they had patches of forest unexploited in their respective farms, which were mainly small and medium farmers (e.g., 31 out of the 38 households in the area that had patches of forest in their land were small- or medium- farmers); in comparison, landless residents and micro farmers reported a more limited participation in those events. Likewise, because of the relatively greater challenges faced by the poorest families to access the sheep modules (i.e., they could not easily accumulate the necessary number of hours participating in communal working sessions because of their irregular participation), they had a lesser involvement in related training activities.

... no (;) we have not((attended training sessions)) ... because they do not have much to do with us (;) we have only requested and a kitchen a latrine so far. (Mrs. Flor, microfarmer, San Luis)

S: ... those who usually work with animals go with ... ((veterinarian)) and those that have fruit trees they go with .... ((agronomist))
Res.: What about those that live here just on rented land?
S: Most just ask for their kitchens and latrines ... (Mr. Sandro, small farmer, committee leader, San Luis)

In addition, this differentiated use and approach to project benefits and related activities affected the possibility of beneficiaries interacting more regularly with the NGO staff. Those beneficiaries who demanded their livestock modules more rapidly because of their steady
involvement in communal work activities not only had greater involvement in productive training sessions but also received the visits of project staff on monthly basis, as a form of technical assistance. In this regard, the evidence collected indicates that it was those actors who were more likely to forge a closer relationship with the professionals in charge of conducting and supervising those activities: the veterinarian and the agronomist. Moreover, there is evidence that on many occasions these members of the staff tended to interact with these beneficiaries beyond the formal space of the project, for example, via informal encounters after training sessions or invitations to family celebrations:

L.: Yes. I have become friends with many people over there. Many used to invite me to their parties baptisms weddings and such.
Res.: Who?
L.: People I knew from the project those that came to training sessions and then I visited to inspect their animals or the committee leaders.
Res.: Can you describe me how this happened?
L.: Well hm after some events and meetings you meet people right? Then you talk with them over a jar of chicha or sometimes when you go to visit their places they offer you something and so you stay with them a bit longer and then you come to know people little by little. (Veterinarian)

you know how it is once the activity is over they invite you for a drink or a meal and sometimes you can’t say no er it is good because that way you learn more about how things are going than when you talk during the meetings ... (Agronomist)

The frequency of interaction between beneficiaries and project promoters—Mr. Manuel (San Luis) and Mrs. Marina (San Mateo)—was more recurrent and appeared to be much less conditioned by beneficiaries’ interests in certain project components, as their presence was constant in the area: in every communal work session and monthly assembly.

... the one I came to know best (from the project staff) was Doña Marina. She has been with us since the beginning of the project... (Mrs. Marcela, landless resident, San Mateo)

I would say that with don Manuel whenever we had a query he was always there and received us well. He was very kind and if he didn’t know about something he would get us an answer afterwards. (Mrs. Liliana, small farmer, San Luis)

Nevertheless, although beneficiaries were able to interact more commonly with promoters, there is evidence that some actors placed greater strategic value on the figures of the veterinarian and agronomist, who, as is customary in the area, were commonly requested to become the godparents of some children and, hence, some beneficiaries’ compadres:

L.: Yes. I had many requests to become godfather. I have always had more from people working with us than from my family but it is normal in my job.
Res.: And why do you think is that?
L.: Hm I guess because some think that I would be a good contact. I have a business in Jayanca so they know from that too. Some for example had approached me to discuss if I could sell their animals over there and-
Res.: What did you tell them?
L.: I did not accept because that is not what I sell there and moreover it would have complicated things with other beneficiaries ... (Veterinarian).
... talking to people and making friends is good (.) but sometimes is a bit problematic because in more than one occasion I have been asked to be the godfather of someone’s child and it is difficult to say no because they insist. (Agronomist)

8.2.3. Gender-based domestic roles

One of the central factors which conditioned the actual capacity of the project to facilitate a greater degree of interaction between local households came from the observed tendency among the latter to divide their participation in project components on the basis of traditional gender-based divisions of domestic roles. In this respect, it was observed and reported by key informants and beneficiaries that female and male beneficiaries opted to participate in different project activities according to their customary practices and interests (see also chapter 7, section 7.2.2.): female participation was predominant in those activities related to children and domestic issues, such as workshops on healthy practices and sanitation, as well as training events on the management of vegetable gardens. The presence of men in training events concentrated, instead, on those related to forest and livestock management. The only productive activity in which women’s involvement was high referred to two training sessions conducted for the development of derived products of forest resources, such as marmalades and syrups. The reason for this was that these activities involved processing food, which was clearly associated with female domestic roles. In a similar fashion, public activities such as health campaigns and Christmas celebrations, with heavy involvement of children, had a predominant female presence:

No I did not attend those ((training sessions on livestock management)) it was either … ((husband or son)) who went (.) the ones I attended were about making sweets from sapote ((local tree)) and algarrobina ((syrup)) … I found them very useful because of my business ((snack / food stall at the school)) … (Mrs. Felícita, small farmer, San Mateo)

Families participated but separately (.) men came for things for the farm and women for things for the house … (Mr. Prudencio, small farmer, committee leader, San Luis)

hm I liked the kitchen the meetings with my neighbours and the work we did with the children to teach them to wash their hands clean the house look after the animals and the trees er (.) those things. (Mrs. Marcela, landless resident, San Mateo)

This division of responsibilities also conditioned the working dynamics of the local committees of beneficiaries. As described previously (§ 6.2.6.), it is women who spend more time in town as compared to men (who are freer to leave town on a regular basis and for lengthier periods of time). In consequence, it was women who participated the most in those project activities that were conducted on a more regular basis: the communal work sessions conducted twice a week in 2-hour sessions per day and the monthly beneficiary assemblies.

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A central implication of this arrangement was that insofar as women were already the residents who most commonly interacted with one another in the local space, the project fomented a greater degree of interaction among actors who already possessed an important degree of familiarity with each other, particularly those who belonged to those households that showed greater engagement in project activities: micro and small farmers, given that they spend more time in town, looking after the family farm and the house.

L.: I go to with … ((committee leader and sister-in-law, to communal work sessions)) we meet up and she tells us where to go.

Res.: And through the assemblies communal work sessions and training activities have you managed to meet new people in town?

L.: I know most people here because I have been living here for many years so may be just one or two new neighbours but that’s all. I already knew most of them.

Res.: Considering those new people you met or of people you knew little about previously have you made new friendships in the committee?

L.: No. no more than the ones I already had. (Mrs. Liliana, micro farmer, San Luis)

I pass the voice in advance where we will meet and from here ((home)) I leave with … ((female neighbours)) if I have to stay behind with … ((project promoter)) they go back by themselves but usually we all go back together… (Mrs. Filipa, committee leader, San Mateo)

Most here know each other. they come in groups depending on where they live and if they are friends or relatives … I wouldn’t be able to say if the work would have made them closer to each other. (Mrs. Jacinta, committee leader, San Luis)
Another implication of this gender-biased form of participation is that, as various assessments of women’s access to resources and use of networks have reported (Ellis, 2000; Mayoux, 2001; Molyneux, 2002; Silvey & Elmhirst, 2008), it could be difficult to increase the flow of significant volumes of productive and financial resources in the local area on the basis of an expansion or strengthening of women’s networks insofar as they have a more limited authority over their use as compared to men (§ 6.2.6). Although the evidence at hand does not permit the establishment of a clear causal link that this limitation effectively prevented women from using their project-related networks for commercial purposes, the testimonies of beneficiaries and key informants indicate that some women had a rather limited control over the commercial use of the resources provided by the project:

L.: The one who sells them ((animals)) in the market is my husband.
Res.: But you do not participate at all in that?
L.: Yes sometimes I go to sell them but I still have to consult it with him. (Mrs. Liliana, microfarmer, San Luis)

I wanted to sell one or two for the school ((to buy materials)) but my husband said that better not (.) to wait a bit longer until they grow fatter and so we did. (Mrs. Felícita, small farmer, San Mateo)

S.: Families split things up (.) that’s how they work (.) men look after the sheep and women look after the ducks ((modules)) ... if they want to sell them ((livestock)) then they talk to each other and then they decide that [ is-
Res.: ] but who in the end decides whether they can sell them or not? men or women? As the saying goes who has the last word?
S.: Ah well usually the men but it varies (.) here at home my wife decides over the birds for example hm that’s her territory... (Mr. Sandro, small farmer, committee leader, San Luis)
The observed differentiated participation in project activities between men and women equally affected the potential development of external networks. Female beneficiaries tended to interact more regularly with the project’s nurse rather than with other technical staff, as the first one was in charge of conducting activities related to health and sanitation, including activities with children, as well as of visiting homes so as to supervise that most recommendations are indeed carried out in women’s homes. This person, hence, had to interact with women constantly to discuss domestic issues such as the manner in which they arrange their kitchens, the location of animals, the food they prepare, and their management of garbage at home, among other aspects. This inserted herself into their domestic dynamics but, at the same time, had little direct impact on the wider economic dynamics in which the women operated (i.e., indirectly influences husband’s domestic practices regarding health and sanitation issues but not the traditional gender-based division of economic roles).

... it was very informative and useful (.) participants asked many questions and were happy to arrange their things at home (.) they were proud to show ... ((nurse)) the changes they had made at home ... (Mrs. Filipa, microfarmer, committee leader, San Mateo)

Only women came with their children (.) sometimes it was difficult because they are always busy but most people participated and never had to suspend a programmed activity ... yes I made some friends here (.) I guess because I am also a woman and a bit younger than most so they treat me well (.) besides we have to talk how things go at home if their husbands are adopting the things we worked in the project for example so we talk a lot. (Nurse)

8.2.4. The reproduction of local leaderships

The constitution of the local committees and the election of their representatives were, in principle, a democratic procedure that included an open assembly and elections via secret voting. In practice, however, as described in the previous chapter, before the project officially started its operations, there was a visible group of village leaders already in charge of the intervention, as they were actively involved in bringing the NGO into town through organising the necessary preliminary activities (petitions, open community assembly, and participatory socioeconomic diagnostic). As a result, it was not surprising to find that the first authorities of the beneficiary committees of San Mateo and San Luis were elected from among those actors concentrated around the figures of Mrs. Frescia in San Mateo and Mr. Prudencio in San Luis. Correspondingly, the final structure of the board of authorities of each project committee relied almost exclusively on those who were playing, or had already played, similar leading roles in town.
Table 8.3 Trajectory of project committees’ authorities by village

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Committee position</th>
<th>Main positions of authority assumed in the last 10 years1/</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>San Mateo:</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| a. President (Mrs. Frescia): | • Former president of the Popular Cook committee (2002-2003).  
                          • Former president of Glass of Milk committee (2001-2002).  
                          • Candidate for a seat in the town hall council (2003).  
                          • Secretary of the PSA (2007 – 2008). |
| b. Vice-President (Mrs. Filipa): | • President of the Popular Cook (2004 – 2005).  
                          • Vice-president of the Glass of Milk committee (2005-2006). |
| c. Secretary (Mrs. Felícita): | • Vice-president of the religious association (2004-2006).  
                          • President of the Glass of Milk committee (2005-2006).  
                          • Storekeeper of the Popular Cook Committee (2004-2005). |
| d. Vocal (Mr. Teófilo): | • Lieutenant governor (2002-2006). |
| San Luis:          |                                                          |
| a. President (Mr. Prudencio): | • Former lieutenant governor of San Luis (1996-2000)  
                          • Former president of the PSA (2001-2002)  
                          • Candidate for a seat in the town hall council (2003). |
                          • President of the religious association (2001-2002) |
| c. Secretary (Mr. Rodrigo): | • Board member of the water users’ commission and delegate to the board of water users (2004-2006)  
                          • President of the PSA (2007-2008)  
                          • Member of the town hall council (2007-2010) |
| d. Vocal (Mr. Idelfonso) | • Lieutenant governor (2002-2006).  
                          • Board member of the water users’ commission (1998-2000)  
                          • Candidate to town hall council (2000) |

The reproduction of local leaderships in the project committees to a large extent took place with the acquiescence of most of the beneficiaries who, on the one hand, voted for them to occupy such positions and, on the other, never attempted to compete for such positions (i.e., in both locations neither Mrs. Frescia nor Mr. Prudencio were challenged by a rival candidate).

... after the meeting we were asked who wanted to be part of the board of committee authorities and nobody said anything so I proposed doña Frescia because she has been organising the project and she has experience doing these things (.) so I said let’s elect her ... (Mrs. Felicita, small farmer, San Mateo)

J.:  Well (.) I was asked to lead the committee.
Res.:  Who asked you to do so?
J.:  The people in the assembly (.) they said that since I was already involved in the project and since most people in town know me it would be better if I were the person in charge then the poll took place and I was elected. (Mr. Prudencio, small farmer, committee leader, San Luis)

R.:  We had elections but no candidates
Res.:  What do you mean?
R.:  People did not want to assume the responsibility (.) in the end Prudencio convinced me to help him because he knew I wouldn’t let him carry the project by himself since I worked with the Glass of Milk for many years already but it’s a bit tiring (.) it is always me Prudencio Rodrigo or the lieutenant governor the same people of always. (Mrs. Jacinta, small farmer, committee leader, San Luis)

Testimonies from residents indicate that this process was, first, related to the actors’ objective conditions and related practices, as many, particularly the poorest ones, considered
that assuming such positions was too onerous for their customary economic practices and so
decided to exclude themselves from those responsibilities:

I have got to go to work if not here then outside so I cannot (.) where would I get the time
for it? you have to be there all the time. (Mr. Javier, micro farmer, San Mateo)

No er it is difficult right? one always has to keep moving from one place to another to get a
job either here or somewhere else and besides you have to dedicate quite a lot of time to this
(.) it’s a lot of work. (Mr. Rolando, micro farmer, San Luis)

A.: … for most people is difficult because they have to work.
Res.: But Mr. Prudencio and Mr. Rodrigo for example also have to work right?
A.: yes but they do not have to move out as often as the others they spend more time in
their chacra ((farm)) (.) people like me instead have to go to Jayanca or
Lambayeque to work almost every week (Mr. Armando, micro farmer, San
Luis)

Those fears that the leading positions in local committees would be time-consuming were
not misplaced. For example, committee authorities customarily led the weekly communal work
activities in coordination with project promoters, thereby being expected to have a constant
presence in the area throughout the year, despite the important seasonal variations related to the
local agricultural-based economy. They, in addition, had to supervise the implementation of the
different training sessions held in each village. Furthermore, committee presidents were also
expected to attend monthly meetings of the federation of village committees and project officers
so as to jointly discuss and coordinate the march of the project, an activity that usually lasted
many hours (from personal observations from around 11am to 4pm) and involved travelling to
different settings (locations rotated among beneficiary villages).

Another objective barrier that operated in this process was that, because of their
administrative responsibilities, local leaders were required to be literate, a formal criterion that,
although it affected only a minority of heads of households and partners, tended to disfavour the
poorest residents, particularly female ones (as of March 2006, a total of 24 out of the 36 adults
who had such a limitation came from the two lowest expenditure quartiles, 15 of them were
women). As observable below, this constituted an important requisite for assuming a leading
position in the project, as administrative responsibilities were accompanied by their need to fill
in forms to report their activities on a regular basis and make basic calculations related to the
management and supervision of the project resources distributed among them.

Alongside those objective filters that limited the capacity of many beneficiaries for
assuming a leading position, it was also observed that that most leaders brandished an important
level of legitimate authority that residents were unwilling to challenge.

Don Prudencio has always done good things for the village (.) I think it its good for us
that he’s in charge … he’s a decent person. (Mr. Sandro, small farmer, San Luis)
I thought it was good if she (Mrs. Frescia) led the committee because she has always worked hard and made things work well in the Glass of Milk and Popular Cook (.) even in those years when the government did not give us much ... (Mrs. Marcela, landless resident, San Mateo)

Doña Frescia and doña Luz have always been working together since the time the committee ((Glass of Milk)) had just started (.) I thought it was good that they worked together again in the project ... (Mrs. Fortunata, medium farmer, San Mateo)

**Figures 8.3** Committee authorities reporting and filling in monthly reports

In some cases, it was noticeable that beneficiaries gave up on their right to take part in those instances of participation because they saw themselves as incapable of assuming those leading roles. Ultimately, “they ((village leaders)) know how to do those things (.) as the saying goes ‘shoemakers should stick to make shoes’” (Mrs Liliana, micro farmer, San Luis).

I don’t know (.) I don’t know how to do those things er like organising the people or filling in those papers talking with the authorities things like that I’ve never done them ... (Mrs. Flor, micro farmer, San Luis)

... I do not think it is easy (.) from what I saw it is a lot of work and you have to follow many rules and deal with many people ... I do not think I could do it (Mr. Isaias, micro farmer, San Mateo).

The combination of those different factors, objective and subjective, thus facilitated the permanence of those authorities in their positions. Although the committee’s authorities were assumed to be confirmed on an annual basis and, if there were other candidates, elections would be held in order to choose a new board, as of July 2008 almost all the initial leaders elected for those village committees preserved their roles. In fact, the sole three positions that changed during the period of study were due to resignations rather than to competitive elections. In San Luis the secretary (Mr. Rodrigo, medium farmer) and the vocal of the committee (Mr.
Idelfonso, medium farmer, the lieutenant governor) resigned because the first one, was decided to participate (successfully) in the elections for the town hall council in November 2006, whilst the vocal, wanted to dedicate more time to his economic activities. In San Mateo, Mrs. Frescia quit her position as president of the committee after deciding to participate in the municipal elections of 2006 as well, in which she failed to be elected. These leaders, in turn, were replaced by beneficiaries with a certain record as local leaders. In San Luis, Mr. Mateo, who in the past had been lieutenant governor of the town, assumed the position left by Mr. Rodrigo, whilst Mr. Timoteo, the exiting president of the PSA (2005-2006), became the new vice-president of the organisation, whilst the vacant presidency was occupied by Mrs. Filipa, president of the Glass of Milk committee at the time. The only exception was the person who became the new vocal of the committee in San Luis: Mr. Sandro (small farmer).

A central issue surrounding the observed reproduction of local leaderships was that the project reinforced their authority in their respective villages. As a result, although beneficiaries were more commonly in contact with them through the different project activities, their interactions on occasions were still marked by symbolic expressions of differences in terms of authority (e.g., customarily addressing them with the honorific term don or doña). A visual expression of this gap is portrayed in the photograph below (Figure 8.5), which was taken in a meeting of committee leaders from Pacora and Illimo. Then a beneficiary wanted to present a complaint about a livestock module in which a couple of animals turned ill and asked them to be replaced. At the moment of presenting his case, however, he took off his hat and put his hands behind him, a posture he maintained throughout the entire conversation.

![Figure 8.4 Beneficiary talking to the board of the federation of committees](image)

Source: The author.

The reproduction of leaderships had major implications for the process of network formation in the context of the development project. Because of their continuous involvement in different project activities and active role in its management, committee leaders were the ones among whom the intervention fomented principally the expansion of networks, more than
among any other beneficiary, particularly at the external level. This could be appreciated in

different circumstances. First, it was noted that committee leaders developed strong
relationships with project promoters, with whom they were in regular contact to implement the

diverse project activities. For example, project promoters usually took lunch with committee

leaders prior to the communal work sessions; in those social events to which I attended by

invitation of committee leaders, project promoters were also present; and, furthermore, on two

occasions it was found that although the project promoter failed to attend a communal work

session, the respective committee leaders did not report his absence to the project staff. Second,

the regular interactions between committee authorities and the technical project staff also

facilitated developing closer connections among them. A clear example in that respect was that

one of the few invitations to becoming a child’s godfather that the veterinarian accepted was that

for Mr. Prudencio’s granddaughter. Likewise, their continuous meetings with the authorities

from other beneficiary villages allowed them to link up with actors in a strategic position similar

to theirs.

This overall scenario was not entirely unfamiliar to the project staff because of similar

previous experiences. Furthermore, they were aware that the despite the leading principles of

open and extended participation of the project, the implementation of the latter was tied to the

mobilisation of well-respected and established leaders. In their view, hence, the reproduction of

leaderships was necessary in the short-term, so as to strengthen the position of the project in the

area, in the hope that new leaders would emerge progressively as beneficiaries got used to work

together:

... for a project to be successful you need a strong leadership and that can only be obtained

from tested and experience leaders (.) untested ones even with the best of intentions would

be at least half effective as the others ... it is not easy to organise and manage people even if

they are a few ... (veterinarian)

Not only the people need proven leaders but also NGOs (.) without a track record to prove

these people are going to be an asset to the project we know the project will face many
difficulties if it does not fail at all (.) the idea then is not to change things right now but to

engaging people little by little and training the new generations to assume a more active

role ((related to the project’s training for new promoters among the local youth)) (.)
of course making sure that no one takes advantage of their position. (Project officer).

8.2.5. The challenges of the political game

The evidence obtained through (un)structured interviews and participant observation indicated

that, during the period of study, committee leaders were struggling to come to terms with the

potential political implications of their new organisations. Because of their leading roles in their

respective villages and their personal experiences of participation in local political campaigns,

committee leaders were well aware of the terms under which politics is conducted in the area

(patron-client relationships accompanied by populist policies) and, correspondingly, feared that
linking up with public institutions or political figures would subject them to some form of political manipulation.

In this respect, the federation of committees established a policy to keep their organisations from interacting with public officials or allowing their members to participate in a political campaign whilst being part of the project. As the president of the federation put it, the aim was to be “as politics-free as possible”. Following Fox’s typology with regard to how civil society thickens (1996), the dynamic that initially emerged from the project, by conscious decision of local leaders, pointed towards a process of ‘social capital formation from below’ rather than ‘state-society convergence’—or ‘synergy’ in Evan’s terms (1996):

... the more we keep our distance the better (.) that people always promise you a lot but then you cannot be sure they will actually do something even worse they want you to write somewhere that it was the mayor ‘so and so’ who made this or that work and paint it with the colour of his party. (Mrs. Filipa, second committee president, San Mateo)

*We prefer to do our things quietly slowly but steadily (.) the less the politics the better we work (.) no interests no fights (.) that is the best way I think.* (Mr. Prudencio, committee president, San Luis)

*Politicians always try to take advantage of the people here so we thought that it would be better for us if we stay out of their way* (Mrs. Jacinta, small farmer, committee leader, San Luis)

It was this decision, for instance, that prompted the exits of Mr. Rodrigo and Mrs. Frescia from their respective positions in the project committees, as they were involved in the political campaign for the town hall during the last months of 2006. Another example of this rejection of interacting with the town hall came on the occasion of the celebrations for the anniversary of the district in December 2007. Then, the town hall invited the project committees from the district to march in the main square of the town. In symbolic terms this constituted a very important step forward for the organisation, as the town hall was giving public recognition to the project committees alongside other major district organisations such as the water users’ commissions or the district boards for the public programmes, *Glass of Milk* and *Popular Cook*. Nevertheless, the federation of committees rejected this invitation because of their fear of being politically used:

*Rodrigo ((at the time already a member of the town hall council)) assured me that there was nothing to fear that it was just an invitation the same as the town hall sends to other organisations but some feared that may be the mayor wanted to appropriate our work (.) him to make it look as if it was an initiative of the town hall so by majority it was decided better not to go.* (Mr. Prudencio, committee leader, San Luis)

This understanding of the ‘political game’, played in the area, was equally observed with relation to how some committee leaders tended to approach the spaces of dialogue generated by the project in the last year of operations. In this regard, it was possible to notice that some authorities reproduced the customary practice they follow as leaders of their local organisations.
centred on asking for material donations from external agencies. In those meetings with public officers organised by the NGO in which I could be present during the last stage of research (one included a representative of the district town hall and the director of the district health centre, in June 2007, and another included a representative from FONCODES and one from the office for social development from the Regional Government of Lambayeque, in December 2007), it was observed that after the presentation of their respective programmes for social development and instances of participation for civil society representatives (e.g., participatory budgeting in the town hall), the following questions sessions were to a large extent dominated by (in)direct requests for support.

Although the project officer was proactive in trying to broaden the discussion among participants, it became evident that many leaders tried to obtain a commitment of support from the public officers attending (e.g., when would FONCODES fix the windmills in San Mateo; whether it would be possible to build one for San Luis, and when; what happened to the project to asphalt the access road to both sites, among other examples). The reaction of some informants regarding the usefulness of those meetings with public officials is revealing in this respect:

"... it was difficult to get something from her ((health centre representative))... we asked first to rebuild the health centre that worked in the village until 1998 but she just said they will assess the situation (.) at least we got the commitment they would do a campaign and medicines but we will see ((the campaign took place in September 2007))." (Mrs. Filipa, micro farmer, committee leader, San Mateo)

"I think the meeting with Mr. Leoncio ((director of Social Promotion from University Saint Toribio)) was one of the best ones we had (.) he was very kind and receptive and although he said he could not promise any funding for books we got a decent amount of them donated for the school..."

"And what about the people from the town hall or FONCODES?"

"It was more difficult with them (.) they told us where we should go whom we should talk to and what things we need to get some funding (.) so we did not really manage to get them do anything but we will try and see..." (Mr. Prudencio, small farmer, committee leader, San Luis)

The position of the NGO in this process was rather neutral. Those meetings with public officials were accompanied by a training programme related to the formulation of projects as well as the distribution of information about opportunities of support from public and private institutions operating in the province. In consequence, it was expected that these manifestations would recede progressively, as leaders assumed a more pro-active role in the management of the resources to be received at the end of the project (livestock and bird modules) for the development of other collective initiatives in their villages without having to simply present petitions for support. Unfortunately, it was not possible to follow up this process, given the time framework for the present study. Nevertheless, there has been an indication that the federation of committees has been less closed to interacting with the town hall in recent times, as the committees finally marched in the town square alongside members of other social organisations.
in December 2009 and, moreover, some representatives of these organisations attended the participatory budgeting activities organised by the town hall for the fiscal year 2009-10. At present, however, it is not possible to assert what effects this change in committees’ mode of practice may have had in their organisational dynamics and the town hall’s policy-making process.

8.3. Concluding remarks

Following Bourdieu’s theoretical framework (1977, 1984, 2005; Lamaison & Bourdieu, 1986), the present chapter proceeded to examine the project intervention as a sub-field, to which residents approached and positioned in according to their endowments of capital and associated practices and interests. Such an approach, in turn, was complemented with an understanding of project interventions as consistent of different components (with different time demands, forms of engagement, networking opportunities, and relevance to beneficiaries’ practices) rather than a homogenous well-delimited space of action through which all household members uniformly passed (Cleaver, 1999, 2001; Long, 2001; Gaventa, 2004).

The evidence collected in the area showed that actors’ involvement in the project was dissimilar across the different spaces of interaction generated by the intervention. A first consideration on this subject was that, due to the different economic practices that actors implement to respond to the agricultural seasons in relation to their material conditions, not all actors were able to afford the costs of participation on a regular basis. As reported in other empirical assessments of the chronic poor (Cleaver, 2005; Das, 2004; Kumar & Corbridge, 2002), the demands of collective action affected more heavily the poorest sectors of the villages studied; in this case, the landless or nearly landless households who work mainly as jornaleros and had a limited family workforce.

In a similar fashion, the material benefits of the project and related project activities were of different interest to beneficiaries according to their material conditions. In this regard, it was observed that the diverse project activities matched more adequately the interests of actors in an intermediate socioeconomic condition insofar as they had minimum stocks of physical capital to enhance through the project benefits: land where to cultivate vegetable gardens, patches of forest unexploited, homeownership, and minor herds. The more regular involvement of those actors across different project activities, hence, allowed them to take better advantage of the networking opportunities provided by the project as compared with residents less involved in project activities (e.g., by forging relationships with technical staff rather than with project promoters only).

Practices and interests, however, were not entirely related to material resources. As observed, gender-based relations and roles significantly affected the organisational dynamic of
the project. It was women who were the most active participants of the intervention as their
domestic responsibilities implied spending more time in the local area. As a result, it was them
who more regularly attended the communal work activities and monthly assemblies.
Furthermore, women’s dispositions to participate in project activities centred on those spaces
related to their traditional practices, such as cooking and feeding the family (e.g., processing
forest resources to make sweets or cultivating vegetable gardens) and looking after children (e.g.,
educational events with children). This predominant participation of women in those activities
that were more likely to bring the community together had two major implications for the
promotion of networks of economic value: on the one hand, because of the time they spend in
the local area, it was women who already had more extended networks in the local arena so that
the project in fact tended to promote more frequent interactions between actors that already
knew each other. On the other, the impact of that greater frequency of interactions between
women faced the limitation that these actors have a more limited access to productive resources
(Ellis, 2000; Mayoux, 2001; Rankin, 2002; Silvey & Elmhirst, 2008).

This combination of actors’ objective conditions, customary modes of practice, and
dispositions to action were equally observed to be in motion with regard to the reproduction of
local leaderships. Despite the democratic design for the election of committee leaders, as
reported by some accounts of elite capture (Dasgupta & Beard, 2007; Fritzen, 2007),
beneficiaries customarily tended to vote for well-established leaders insofar as, first, they had the
material resources to afford the costs in time that those positions involve as well as the necessary
endowments of non-economic capital to successfully lead the committees—cultural capital
(education and knowledge about administrative and bureaucratic tasks), social capital (in the
form of extended networks in the village that allows them to mobilise important parts of the
population), and symbolic capital (or prestige)—and, second, regular members were
unaccustomed and unwilling to assume such positions. The end result of this scenario was the
unequal development of new relationships in favour of committee leaders; particularly those
types of connections that the literature has identified as the most valuable: connections with
relatively better off actors in strategic positions to bridge in between network systems (i.e., other
village leaders and the NGO staff) (Burt, 1992, 2005; Lin, 2001; Woolcock, 2001).

Finally, the evidence encountered in the area indicates that the recommended promotion
of state-society relationships (Evans, 1996; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000) requires a change in
actors’ modes of practice on both sides as much as the generation of new (in)formal spaces of
interaction between representatives of those two sectors. This is because the kind of political
‘game’ in which local actors may need to play in order to establish functional links with certain
public agencies and officers could be ultimately counterproductive to the formation of
transparent and efficient governance (e.g., if collaborative agreements are obtained through
corruption or clientelistic practices) (Durston, 2004). Following Bourdieu’s approach (Bourdieu
& Wacquant, 1992), it was observed that the NGO efforts to build such connections in the present intervention implied introducing beneficiary representatives into a different ‘game’ than the one played in the project; that of policy making or ‘bureaucratic’ field, with its own rules and dominant players. This was a game that village leaders were well acquainted with and which, in virtue of the new resources they had at their disposition, were unwilling to play so as to protect their autonomy, at least during the period of study. This acquaintanceship with the local political games was reflected in the modes of practice observed among leader when faced with the opportunity to directly interact with public officials, which tended to reproduce a behaviour associated with that of the clientelistic style of politics dominant in the area.
CHAPTER 9
PROJECT BENEFITS AND THE MOBILISATION OF RELATIONSHIPS

The initial examination of the economic benefits associated to the mobilisation of social relationships in the area of study (Chapter 5) has shown social capital returns as closely related to actors’ objective conditions. More specifically, their returns appeared as affected by a variety of material considerations, such as actors’ participation in different systems of relations of production according to their economic strategies (e.g., as a jornalero or as local businessman), the volumes of capital mobilised through actors’ connections in relation to their position in those systems (e.g., amount of cash obtained by micro farmers as compared to medium ones), and the final multiplicative effect of social resources over actors’ initial endowments of capital (e.g., loans obtained to finance commercial initiatives as compared those used to satisfy consumption needs) (Bourdieu, 1986; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

In consequence, a development intervention has the potential to increase the returns associated to social capital not only by promoting networking opportunities or new forms of organisation, but also by transferring various (non)economic resources to beneficiaries. These investments may help changing the objective condition of local actors and, hence, increase the volume and quality of resources that circulate through local networks. In addition, their greater endowments of capital may lead to the generation of new practices which insert them in new systems of relations (e.g., the acquisition of land or livestock insert actors in the commercialisation networks of crops and livestock) or allow them to improve the positions they initially occupied in such systems and so the returns obtained through them (e.g., when a micro farmer substantially increase his/her area of productive land also increase his/her negotiation capacity with acopiadores). This chapter, therefore, examines the manner in which beneficiaries and residents in general integrated the diverse benefits provided by the project into their respective economic practices and the form in which they interplayed with their prior endowments of social capital.

This chapter will examines how project benefits affected local actors’ use and mobilisation of social resources in two parts. First, comparisons between beneficiaries’ measures of endowments of social resources along time will serve to examine whether the project may have promoted a wider access to social resources among participating households and whether the village-level distributions of actors’ access to social resources has changed over time or not. The second part of this chapter will detail how project investments were mobilised in the area of study in direct relationship to the dominant economic practices conducted in the area and the
systems of relations that shape them. The data gathered to conduct this two-fold assessment were obtained from three waves of household surveys (March 2006, October 2007, and June 2008), and un- and semi-structured interviews with beneficiaries and key informants in the last stage of the research (June and December 2007). Records from personal observations were also used to better contextualise those two sets of information.

9.1. Access and mobilisation of social resources over time

This section examines the presence of significant changes in beneficiary households’ access to those sets of social resources previously analysed in Chapter 5 (§ 5.1)—economic, physical, informational, and bureaucratic resources as well as material support during emergencies—during the period of study. To this end, initial scores for each kind of resource, as of March 2006, were compared to those obtained in subsequent surveys—October 2007 and June 2008—among beneficiary households following the same methodology: scores were assigned according to whether heads households or partners had access to a randomly listed set of economically relevant forms of support or not and the degree of closeness with the closest source of support: (1) acquaintances, (2) friends, or (3) relatives, including compadres. Comparisons are ordered according to the socioeconomic condition of beneficiary households (i.e., expenditure quartiles). Because of the small number of cases for each sub-sample, the statistical significance of the reported changes is examined via the non-parametric Wilcoxon’s matched pairs test (Gibbons, 1993).86

Comparisons between baseline measures and those obtained subsequently among beneficiaries (Table 9.1) show no consistent significant changes over time for beneficiaries’ mediated access to personal support (e.g., food or clothing during emergencies) or to physical resources (e.g., farming tools, means of transport, or free labour). Access to informational resources, in turn, appeared to have increased significantly for most groups of beneficiaries, independently of whether they belonged to the poorest or the least poor groups. In turn, beneficiaries’ access to financial (e.g., mediated access to jobs and commercialisation of farm produce) and bureaucratic resources (e.g., help dealing with public services and officials) appeared to have increased unequally, tending to have expanded more consistently among better off socioeconomic groups.

86 Non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests indicate that the new waves of results can be considered as obtained from the same population as those from the baseline survey:
- Personal Support 2006-07: K-S test: 0.61, p=0.85; Personal Support 2006-08: K-S test: 0.66, p=0.79.
- Financial Resources 2006-07: K-S test: 0.59, p=0.89; Financial Resources 2006-08: K-S test: 0.81, p=0.53.
- Physical Resources 2006-07: K-S test: 0.66, p=0.79; Physical Resources 2006-08: K-S test: 0.89, p=0.46.
- Informational Resources 2006-07: K-S test: 1.03, p=0.24; Informational Resources 2006-08: K-S test: 1.26, p=0.12.
- Bureaucratic Resources 2006-07: K-Stest: 0.60, p=0.86; Bureaucratic Resources 2006-08: K-S test: 0.84, p=0.48.
Table 9.1 Changes in beneficiaries’ access to social resources by village and material well-being: 2006-08

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exp. Quart.</th>
<th>SAN MATEO</th>
<th>SAN LUIS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q4 2006</td>
<td>6.7-6.7</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>6  6.7-7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3 2006</td>
<td>7.2-7.5</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>11 7.3-7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2 2006</td>
<td>7.4-7.1</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>9  7.4-7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1 2006</td>
<td>7.8-7.8</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>5  7.8-7.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Personal Support:

Financial Resources:

Table 9.2, in turn, examines to what extent the village-level distributions of residents’ access to social resources according to their economic well being have changed over time. The results obtained indicate that these have tended to remain rather similar during the period of study. That is, reported mediated access to economic and bureaucratic resources have tended to remain concentrated in the hands of the better off residents whilst access to personal support, productive information, and productive assets, in turn, tends to be rather evenly distributed across local socioeconomic groups.

Those results provide preliminary evidence that, first, the development intervention could be associated at best, insofar as the relationship still requires to be proven, with improvements in beneficiaries’ access to only certain social resources: informational, bureaucratic, and financial. Second, that those social resources that characterised the objective condition of better off groups—financial and bureaucratic resources (Table 5.3)—increased unequally among beneficiaries, favouring those with initial privileged access to such resources. Third, that the village-level distributions of residents’ access to social resources have largely remained unchanged during the period of study. Furthermore, these three findings could be
considered as related with each other, indicating that pre-existing systems of distribution and access to social resources remained unchanged during the period of study.

Table 9.2 Residents’ access to social resources by village and material well-being: 2006-08

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exp.</th>
<th>SAN MATEO</th>
<th>SAN LUIS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal Support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1, 2006</td>
<td>6.81</td>
<td>6.91</td>
<td>7.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2, 2006</td>
<td>7.15</td>
<td>7.42</td>
<td>7.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3, 2006</td>
<td>7.54</td>
<td>7.29</td>
<td>7.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4, 2006</td>
<td>7.65</td>
<td>7.59</td>
<td>7.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-test</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1, 2006</td>
<td>5.09</td>
<td>5.06</td>
<td>5.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2, 2006</td>
<td>5.61</td>
<td>5.43</td>
<td>5.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3, 2006</td>
<td>6.22</td>
<td>6.52</td>
<td>6.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4, 2006</td>
<td>5.65</td>
<td>5.78</td>
<td>5.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-test</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>2.86**</td>
<td>2.17*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1, 2006</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>4.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2, 2006</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>3.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3, 2006</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>4.14</td>
<td>4.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4, 2006</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>4.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-test</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informational Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1, 2006</td>
<td>4.90</td>
<td>4.95</td>
<td>5.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2, 2006</td>
<td>5.21</td>
<td>5.37</td>
<td>5.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3, 2006</td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>5.23</td>
<td>5.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4, 2006</td>
<td>5.38</td>
<td>5.26</td>
<td>5.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-test</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1, 2006</td>
<td>4.34</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>4.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2, 2006</td>
<td>4.55</td>
<td>4.41</td>
<td>4.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3, 2006</td>
<td>5.18</td>
<td>5.51</td>
<td>5.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4, 2006</td>
<td>5.48</td>
<td>5.29</td>
<td>5.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-test</td>
<td>3.54**</td>
<td>7.01***</td>
<td>2.70*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance: * p ≤ 0.1; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01

In face of those results, the next section will make use of the qualitative data gathered in the last stage of research in order to understand in what manner project investments interacted with residents’ endowments of capital, including social capital, leading to the observed distributions of social resources.

9.2. Project benefits and social resources

In order to assess the potential effects of the project studied on the resources mobilised through local actors’ networks in relation to their involvement in different systems of relations, it is necessary to specify first the most important benefits project participants had the chance to access. These were the following:
• One module of sheep (two male and four female) as well as materials for building the necessary fences and fodder storages. These could be requested after the accumulation of 120 hours of work in communal work sessions. Beneficiaries were expected to ‘return’ their animals from the offspring of their modules to the committee during the lifespan of the project. By the end of the project, a total of 26 modules were distributed in San Mateo and 18 in San Luis. Common medicines and vaccines were at the disposition of beneficiaries; these were managed by the local committee in a rotating manner (i.e., the cost of medicines were repaid by beneficiaries during the lifespan of the project for further use by other beneficiaries).

• One livestock module of ducks (three males and six females) and basic materials for building required fences attainable after 60 hours of participation in communal work sessions. Beneficiaries were expected to ‘return’ their animals to the committee from the offspring of their modules during the lifespan of the project. Medicines were also available to beneficiaries as part of those stocks managed by the local committee. By the end of the project, a total of 32 modules had been distributed in San Mateo and 21 in San Luis.

• A ventilated pit latrine made of adobe and concrete, obtainable after 80 hours of work in communal sessions. As of June 2008, 32 latrines had been installed in San Mateo and 24 in San Luis.

• One energy-efficient kitchen made of concrete and adobe, obtainable after 120 hours of participation in communal work sessions. As of June 2008, 36 kitchens have been installed in San Mateo and 28 in San Luis.

• The project put at disposition of beneficiaries various types of trees—predominantly carob, sapote, and vichayo trees—to recover local deforested areas.

In addition, as described in Chapter 8, non-material benefits included different training sessions on livestock and forest management, the cultivation of vegetable gardens as well as on health and nutrition. Accompanying those different training activities, beneficiaries also received technical assistance in the form of monthly visits by technical staff to supervise the implementation of recommendations in the ground of those activities as well as to supervise the state the condition of the livestock provided.

9.2.1. Financial resources

The qualitative evidence gathered during the last stage of data-collection indicates that, during the period of study, the project affected local actors’ use of their relationships to access to economic capital mainly in two forms: (i) by increasing local trade in livestock, which augmented the value of trustworthy connections for commercial purposes, and (ii) by facilitating
the flow of economic information among certain beneficiaries.\footnote{Large extensions of deforested areas were recovered through the communal work sessions promoted by the project. Although some beneficiaries expressed their intention to make use of their recovered forest resources for commercial purposes, these initiatives were still in a preliminary stage when the study concluded as newly planted trees were still growing.} The same as reported previously, Chapter 5 (§ 5.2.1.) with relation to customary local economic practices, there were discernible differences between local actors according to their positions in the local social space (i.e., initial endowments of capital, including social capital).

With regard to the increasing commercialisation of livestock in the area, a first element to highlight is that not all beneficiaries were equally able to rapidly expand their livestock modules so as to insert themselves into this economic activity. This scenario resulted from a combination of material factors and practices. As described in Chapters 6 and 8, the not-so-poor residents of San Mateo and San Luis spend more time in the local area and hence were able to more rapidly access the livestock modules provided by the project because they ‘invested’ more time in communal work sessions. In this respect, of the 24 beneficiaries that had received a module of sheep as of October 2007, from a total of 55 beneficiaries that were part of the sample for the second wave of household surveys, only ten had been distributed among beneficiaries that belonged to the two lowest expenditure quartiles despite their constituting approximately 60% of the total number of beneficiaries (Graph 7.1).

Furthermore, beneficiaries’ initial objective condition was found to affect their capacity to effectively use the modules of livestock provided to participate in new circuits of commercialisation in different forms. First, interviews with beneficiaries and key informants highlighted that those with access to their own patches of forest and who regularly cultivated their land for commercial purposes, which leaves crop stover to be used as fodder during the dry season, could feed and sustain more easily their expanding stocks of animals than landless residents and micro farmers. Second, beneficiaries that possessed minimal stocks of sheep could more rapidly expand their provided livestock because they were able to increase the fertility rates of their animals and so more rapidly return the modules to the committee.

\begin{quote}
I had six ((sheep)) so with those of the project it was a good number (.) it was a good thing because in this manner I could sell a couple of them that year and still have some animals besides (.) two of them were female so I could replace them quickly ... (Mrs. Cipriano, small farmer, San Luis)
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
I already had a few so this one was a good chance to expand besides with the veterinarian coming to check on my animals plus the medicines provided by the project I thought it was a good opportunity and yes (.) my animals are much better and with the extra ones from the project I could sell a good amount at the time in Moshokeke. ((livestock market in Chiclayo)) (Mr. Leoncio, small farmer, San Mateo)
\end{quote}

Local actors’ endowments of social capital were also found to condition their capacity to insert themselves into those farm-related circuits of commerce. Farmers who had previously
commercialised livestock on regular basis also counted with established trustworthy connections (e.g., blood or compadrazgo relations) that could help them to commercialise their growing livestock by providing the guarantees to obtain a good price whilst also minimizing the risk of malfeasance (§ 5.2.1.d.). In comparison, some of the poorest beneficiaries who were starting to commercialise their animals were still uncertain about how best to profit from them. Most commonly, it was found that they decided to follow the same practice reported among local farmers with small herds: keep only a small amount of animals to be raised and dispose of by the unit as a form of supply of additional cash whilst preserving a core number of animals to keep reproducing their existing stocks and to be used in case of facing an economic shock:

*We don’t know yet … first we have to wait to make them strong and fit and then we will decide what to do with them* (Mrs. Liliana, micro farmer, San Luis)

*… I am still looking for a good place to sell them (…) I have been asking around but am not sure yet (…) most people in town want to buy them too cheap.* (Mr. Rolando, micro farmer, San Isidro)

*… the only ones I sold were for my friend who had a baptism … he asked me if I could sell him two and I thought it was a good idea because he has paid me well (…) since then I have been struggling to find a buyer that could pay me the same …* (Mr. Javier, micro farmer, San Mateo)

In this context, it was observed that those residents that could profit the most from the mobilisation of social relationships in relation to project investments were those that had both an adequate working capital to invest in the expansion in the livestock resources and reliable external as well as local connections. This is because for some of the poorest beneficiaries, who opted to sell their livestock by the unit, established commercial agreements with herders somehow connected to them (long-standing neighbours, friends, or relatives). As Mr. Armando (micro farmer, San Mateo) explains, trading animals by the unit was not necessarily a profitable activity unless done in large quantities in urban markets: “going to Chiclayo to sell just one animal is not good (…) it is lot of work and they will just give you whatever they want (…) it is not the same as if you go there with 10 or 20 if you know someone here or in the town ((nearby capitals of district)) who pays well it saves you many troubles”. Correspondingly, some existing medium herders were able to expand their operations so as to, in practice, act as local livestock traders even if they had not directly participated in the project:

*… I realised I could get many ((animals)) here at a good price (…) so instead of just selling mine I got some from a few of my neighbours and friends (…) then … ((son)) and I fixed a pack of animals and went to Chiclayo…* (Mr. Leocnio, small farmer, San Mateo)

*Some people approached me to sell their animals because they needed cash (…) I had a small herd but not a big one so I thought maybe buying two or three more would be good but then … ((son)) said that there was a good chance to make some money from this because he noticed many people were getting their modules (…) he approached a few families with cash in hand to buy their sheep and then went to Lambayeque because we have some relatives working in a market there (…) we made a good profit … now he is organising a third trip.* (Mr. Máximo, medium farmer, San Mateo)
An important element to highlight is that it was the committee leaders who were in the ideal position to profit the most from the project investments. First, because of their continuous presence in project activities, they were among the first beneficiaries who received the module of sheep so that they had more time than any other residents to return their animals to the committee and expand their stocks of animals. Furthermore, because of their organisational roles, they were had direct contact with the technical staff that could help them raise their animals properly. Second, as described in Chapter 6 (§ 6.2.3.), these leading actors were relatively better off than most local farmers and so had some basic endowments of physical capital that helped them to sustain and expand the livestock modules received from the project. Third, as described in Chapter 8, the networking opportunities provided by the project with external actors, particularly with strategic contacts such as project staff and leaders from other villages, provided them with a series of connections that could help them commercialise their growing physical assets:

... nowadays I sell them ((sheep)) to a friend of ... ((veterinarian)) who works in the market of Jayanca ((he sells there and in Chiclayo too so he always needs animals ... Luis introduced him to me some time ago one day we were around and he seemed a nice person so I tried with a couple of animals first ((it went ok with a decent price and not much of a haggle so now I mostly work with him... (Mr. Prudencio, small farmer, committee leader, San Luis)

... we are better in that respect ((we used to sell one or two at a time but now it is three or four ((we had to wait for a while until we returned the animals to the project but it did not take long ... fortunately my wife told me ((Mrs. Jacinta, committee leader)) that don Leoncio’s son ((president of the federation of committees)) was a trader and since he is a person of guarantee we thought it was a good option ... (Mr. Marco, small farmer, San Luis)

With regard to access to jobs, as discussed in Chapter 5 of the study, this is principally achieved by developing close connections either with medium farmers or with contratistas who hire workers for large cotton, rice, and sugar plantations. In this respect, the evidence obtained indicates that the few beneficiaries from San Mateo and San Luis who were able to expand their relationships with those key actors in direct relation to their involvement in project activities were the leaders of the committees and those close to them. This resulted from the external connections these actors were able to develop with other village leaders, who were mostly small and medium farmers and had an extensive network of economic connections in the area, as well as with the NGO staff. As a result, some committee authorities profited directly from those connections whilst benefitting their friends and relatives by acting as ‘bridges’ (Burt, 1993, 2005; Lin, 2001) between potential employers and related job-seekers:

... the brother of ((project promoter of San Luis)) is a contratista and because we are friends I came to know him ((I was lucky because Hector ((son, 17)) had just finished school so he went with him ((to work)) a couple of times... (Mr. Prudencio, small farmer, committee leader, San Luis)

... only once ((don Martin ((committee leader from another village))) told me he got permission from INRENA to chop down a patch of forest deep down in Illimo and that
they needed people so I passed the word to … ((husband)) and he went with them for a few days (Mrs. Filipa, micro farmer, committee leader, San Luis)

… sometimes only ((obtained information on jobs through contacts in the project)) because on occasions people discuss those things (.) this year (.) for example (.) a friend from the committee told me that they needed some construction workers for his home and I said know of someone reliable please tell him (.) so I told him about my nephews and so he met them and hired them ... (Mr. Timoteo, medium farmer, committee leader, San Mateo)

9.2.2. Informational resources

As discussed in Chapter 5, access to technical information was limited in the local area, as few local residents had connections with trained professionals. In this respect, the evidence obtained from interviews and direct observation coincided with the quantitative results of subsequent household surveys (Table 9.1) in showing that this constituted one of the main areas in which the project had a direct impact on San Mateo and San Luis. The different training and formative activities conducted by the project, in addition to the regular presence of project staff in the area via the weekly visits of trained promoters and the monthly visits of the agronomist, veterinarian, and nurse, contributed to this effect. A central element in this subject is that, as pointed out as well in Chapter 5, technical information passes through word-of-mouth circuits among most residents, without much constraint because of socioeconomic differences between households (except for few landless residents who do not cultivate cash crops). As a result, although the NGO staff tended to forge more stable relationships with small farmers (§ 8.2.2), there was no evidence that those differentiated relationships affected the flow of technical information in a significant manner. An important factor in this subject was the openness of the project staff to address questions from both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries during their visits to the area:

They ((residents)) know me well already (.) whenever I am around they say hi and many stop me to ask some questions. … some also visit my office in Jayanca when passing by. (Veterinarian)

Yes you talk to different people not only with beneficiaries (.) some approach you and ask questions about their farms or their animals (.) our policy is always to answer them and invite them to come to the project ... (Agronomist)

There is always someone from the project here every week so if there is any issue or problem it is easy to talk to them (.) even people who are not part of the project consult them ... (Mr. Javier, small farmer, San Mateo)

In addition, the presence of community-embedded NGO staff in the form of project promoters was particularly useful to overcome any potential bias in the matter. As also discussed in the previous chapter, most beneficiaries had regular contact with these actors, who visited the area on a weekly basis, and so were able to consult them regarding different issues of project-related productive activities (e.g., livestock management, maintenance of infrastructure, or cultivation of vegetable gardens). Furthermore, it was reported that even though on occasions they were unable to address the technical concerns of some residents they were able to transmit
any technical queries from beneficiaries to the professionals at the office in Chiclayo and, hence, facilitated the flow of technical information in the area.

The formation of local promoters among beneficiaries by the project so as to enhance this process requires a more detailed assessment. The project trained a total of four promoters per village, with the intention to further enhance the circulation of information in the respective areas and guarantee the sustainability of the knowledge and practices brought into the area. These promoters were trained in different key aspects addressed by the project: two on domestic infrastructure and two on livestock management. The project demanded that these beneficiaries be young residents from the village, at most 25 years of age, under the reasoning that they would promote these practices in the area for a prolonged period of time. To this effect, they attended in-depth training sessions every three months and, moreover, after the first year of training, they would accompany the project staff in their technical assistance and relevant training events to practice on the ground. In principle, the main appeal of this activity was that this training would help promoters to obtain some basic income in the future by charging for their services in their respective villages, as well as to improve their farm productivity in a sustainable manner.

Nevertheless, to a large extent this activity contributed to a concentration of technical information in better off households, particularly those of local leaders. Most of the young adults who received training as promoters came from families that had already made significant investments in the education of their sons and daughters (e.g., by prioritising education over temporary work activities) and considered these project activities as a form of investment in human capital. Most trained young promoters then had already completed secondary education, or were in the process of completing it, and had the prospect of pursuing some form of superior education rather than migrating solely to access non-qualified jobs:

"... had just finished school and we did not know well what to do next (.) I told him to participate in this because it would help him in the future ... he wants to study veterinary in the future so we thought it was a good idea so now he is being trained for that ((promoter)). (Mr. Prudencio, committee leader, San Luis)

... his father told him to go (son being trained to be a promoter) (.) we told him it would be useful for him and also for us (.) he finishes (school) this year but we do not have money to send him to study now so while we save for that he can study and help us on the farm (Mrs. Filipa, committee leader, San Mateo)

Despite the increasing widespread circulation of technical information in the area, it is important to highlight that the net benefit of this was conditioned on households' endowments of physical and economic capital, at least in the short-term. In this respect, testimonies from some micro and small farmers indicated that they faced some material restrictions to implementing the technical recommendations of the project staff, particularly in productive activities that were not directly addressed by the project and hence received no material support:
... ((agronomist)) told me about an insecticide to fight a plague I have here but I still haven’t bought it because I don’t have the money right now. (Mr. Armando, micro farmer, San Luis)

... he ((veterinarian)) also oriented us about how to raise our pigs because then some of our piglets were dying (,) he said we needed to change our pigpen to give them a better space and also to vaccinate them early ... we have tried to do that but have not done it completely yet since we do not have much space in our backyard ... yes we try to vaccinate them but depending on whether we have that cash for that ... (Mr. Isaias, micro farmer, San Mateo)

... we were thinking about producing algarrobina ((carob tree syrup)) but to make an income you need to produce a lot and we still don’t have the utensils (Mr. Cipriano, small farmer, San Luis)

A final element to take into consideration is that certain kind of information circulated through specific gender-oriented networks. In this regard, the observed presence of more locally extended networks among women (§ 6.2.6) appeared to have facilitated the dissemination of information related to the project activities in which they were most involved: cultivation of vegetable gardens, health practices, and sanitation issues (§ 8.2.5). In this regard, the observed tendency among women of spending more time in the area and interacting more regularly with each other, as compared to men, in relation to their common domestic responsibilities (e.g., cooking, looking after children, maintaining the house) appeared to have facilitated the adoption of certain hygienic practices taught by the project among many residents, irrespectively of whether they were direct beneficiaries of the project or not. From personal observation, for example, it was noted that many families implemented various recommended practices such as placing bottles of soaped water next to the entrances of latrines to wash hands, creating domestic landfills for waste disposal as compared to the common practice gathering and burning waste in the open air (regardless of the type of waste disposed of), disinfecting of fruits and vegetables before consumption, and the decreasing use of free-range methods to raise poultry.

This dynamic also appears to have contributed to facilitating the circulation of information regarding the design of energy efficient kitchens and ventilated pit latrines. Interviewees regularly reported that women tended to show each other the kitchens obtained through their participation in the project, which resulted in other households enquiring about the design, and attempting to reproduce it by themselves or hiring trained local promoters to build them for payment. Likewise, from simple observation it was possible to notice that the models of latrines and kitchens used by the project rapidly became the standard among most dwellings in San Mateo and San Luis.

… they ((non beneficiaries)) see the kitchens and the latrines and ask me how did we build them and some pay to get the same model (,) most people have a similar one now ... (Mr. Prudencio, committee leader, San Luis)
9.2.3. Productive assets

With regard to mediated access to productive assets, the qualitative data gathered provided no evidence that beneficiary families had generated new cooperative arrangements with neighbours, either beneficiaries or not, to pool their resources. A key factor that conditioned this process is that most mutually supportive relationships involving such assets were centred on long-lasting kinship-based and geographically-proximate relationships (§ 5.2.3.), each of them bonding factors that could not be directly affected by the project.

It was observed, however, that the few families that had very close connections and cooperated regularly to conduct different economic activities, including sharing major productive assets, benefitted from pooling their corresponding livestock modules, so as to jointly commercialise them with livestock traders operating in the area in order to get a suitable deal. Moreover, there is evidence that at least in one case an extended family decided to take their animals jointly to the livestock market of Chiclayo. The project, hence, may have facilitated the expansion of certain forms of collaboration between households already engaged in such practices; however, there is little information about recent ones that may have emerged during the period of study.

... as we always work together I said it would be better if we sell them in a group right? six or maybe eight ((animals)) at once that way one has more chances of getting a bit extra (.) so three of us went to Jayanca to my brother’s compadre and sold them to him for a good price ... (Mr. Sandro, small farmer, San Luis)

9.2.4. Residents, leaders, and linking with local authorities

As discussed in Chapter 5, residents’ access to bureaucratic resources is commonly mediated by village leaders, to whom they appeal for help in order to ask for advice or direct support when dealing with local public agencies and officials (e.g., help to deal with the police when a moto-taxi is impounded by the police or to receive adequate attention in the local health centre in case of emergencies). As described in the previous two chapters, this scenario has not been modified by the development intervention, insofar as the project did not lead to a significant change in the composition of local leaderships but instead cemented the leading roles of some long-established village leaders.

In this respect, if access to bureaucratic resources has improved in the area, it was in a mediated form, through the more extended connections that those village leaders were able to develop with actors in positions of authority through the project activities. The main path followed in that direction was achieved via the federation of beneficiary committees, which
gathered different village leaders with a rather similar profile (i.e., small or medium farmers who have been living in the area for lengthy periods of time and with experience in assuming similar leading roles in other local social organisations) and permitted them to interact with each other on a regular basis (e.g., monthly assemblies of committee authorities). As a result, committee authorities were able to interact with other actors in a position of authority at the village level, each of whom, in turn, had their own network of connections among public officials and political figures, which allowed them to exchange rich political information and provide access to key figures who would help them to channel external resources into their own villages:

... ((presidents of committees from other villages)) told me about their idea of building a concrete wall for their school ... ((local leader)) had just gotten elected to the district council so they asked me if I could put in a word for them... (Mr. Prudencio, small farmer, committee leader, San Luis)

... they ((other leaders)) consulted me ... about the best way to present petitions before him ((mayor)) or if I knew someone who could help them because as you know there are always many petitions going around... (Mrs. Frescia, committee leader, San Mateo)

... each of us have our own contacts and so we help each other when we can right? (.) I didn't have the chance to do it but for example the other time ... ((Glass of Milk committee leader from another village)) had problems because apparently some milk wasn't ok so she went to see doña Frescia so she could help her with it ... (Mrs. Filipa, committee leader, San Mateo)

Although there was no evidence that the project directly fomented a more direct and closer relationship between village leaders and public officials, the informative and networking events organised by the project with representatives of public and private development initiatives generated some positive outcomes that brought organisations to the area that had no recent local presence. For example, after conversations with the director of the office of social projects from the University of Saint Toribio, with participation of both project staff and authorities of the federation of project committees, project beneficiaries from each village had access to milk, chocolate, and toys to celebrate Christmas on December 2007, and San Mateo benefitted from book donations for the school. In September 2007, in coordination with the health centre in Pacora, a health campaign was organised in San Mateo, which included three days of free medical examinations to residents in general (including those of nearby villages). Moreover, with technical assistance from the project staff, it was reported that San Mateo leaders finally managed to get FONCODES to fix one of the windmills in the area (in January 2008) that had been inoperative since 2001.

A central implication of these forms of cooperation with other leaders and with development agencies, however, is that this more effective access to strategically located actors and external resources helped local leaders to fulfil their expected roles as providers of resources for the benefit of the population, thereby cementing their local authority and role as 'development brokers' (Bierschenk et al., 2000; Dasgupta & Beard, 2007; Lewis & Mosse, 2006;
Platteau & Abraham, 2006). This scenario further accentuated the process of reproduction of local leadership. Mrs. Filipa, for example, was elected president of the Glass of Milk committee for the period 2007-2008; Mr. Timoteo returned to the board of the PSA on 2009, but this time with Mrs. Frescia as president; whilst Mr. Prudencio was elected a member of the board of the water users’ commission for the period 2009-2010.

With regard to whether local leaders benefitted personally from the political opportunities provided by the project, the evidence indicates that they did not, at least during the period of study. As described in the previous chapter, the decision of the federation of committees to ask any committee authority to resign to their position in case they wanted to pursue a political career meant that it is not possible to establish such a link in a clear manner. Furthermore, there is no indication that participation in the project constituted a particularly useful political asset, as the two leaders who competed in the municipal elections of November 2006—Mr. Rodrigo and Mrs. Frescia—had different fortunes in this process (the first one got elected, but the second was not).

9.3. Concluding remarks

The present chapter has illustrated how social capital interacts with other forms of capital, acting as a multiplicative factor that tends to generate unequal returns according to actors’ initial objective conditions (Bourdieu, 1986, 2005; Collier, 1998). First, it was observed that those actors who profited the most from the resources provided by the intervention through the mobilisation of social relationships were those who were already in a rather advantageous position. Their initial endowments of physical capital (i.e., land and livestock) allowed them to increase the volumes of resources mobilised through them, whilst their access to commercial networks allowed them to act as bridges to actors had less experience in such activities and lacked adequate connections.

Second, it was observed that the important investments in time made by committee authorities, in combination with their initially relatively satisfactory objective conditions, allowed them to rapidly access and expand the benefits provided by the project in combination with their significant expansion of external contacts among NGO staff and authorities from other villages. These findings indicate that building social capital efforts may contribute to the reproduction of socioeconomic differences between leading elites and regular residents even if there is no misappropriation of resources; that is, even in cases of ‘benevolent capture’ (Mansuryi & Rao, 2004; Rao & Ibañez, 2005). Furthermore, their recently extended external and vertical connections reinforced leaders’ local authority associated to their position as mediators between residents and external resources, both at the individual (e.g., between job seekers and potential employers) and collective levels (e.g., school donations obtained through
their mediation). It is important to point out, however, that the forms of support accessed in the area were still characterised by their top-down and assistencialist approaches.
CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSIONS

The present chapter introduces the main conclusions of this thesis. The empirical findings reported previously (Chapters 5 to 9) are placed in dialogue with both Bourdieu’s ‘theory of practice’ and current social capital literature (mainstream and critical) in order to outline, first, three dimensions of analysis that are expected to contribute to a critical framework for the empirical assessment of social capital as integral part of people’s class-based strategies and lifestyles. Next, the analytical dimensions proposed are applied to examine the fully participatory intervention that took place in the villages of San Mateo and San Luis between 2005 and 2008. In response to the objectives of the study (§1 and 3.1), particular attention is paid to the extent to which local social structures and relations of power affected its efforts of social capital building and the material benefits associated to such process. The chapter closes with a brief review of potential policy implications.

10.1. Elements for a critical study of social capital

The present study aimed to critically examine the propositions of the mainstream social capital literature regarding the capacity of social relations to enhance the material living conditions of the poor and promote pro-poor development. On this subject it was contended that this body of work presented significant theoretical shortcomings that prevented an adequate examination of those processes. First, because of their privileging a particular understanding of social actors—as either rational individuals or as actors subjugated to collective norms and traditions—they were unable to satisfactorily integrate the different motivations of actors’ actions to form relationships, participate in organisations, and mobilise them to access valuable resources (DeFillippis, 2001; Holt, 2008; Ishihara & Pascual, 2009). Second, due to their preference for emphasising either essentialist understandings of social relations—networks or organisations—as capital (Putnam, 1993a, 2001a; Woolcock, 1998, 2001; Burt, 1999, 2005) or for analysing access to social resources as isolated events in the lives of specific economic actors (e.g., agricultural traders or farmers) (Fafchamps & Minten, 2000; Sorensen, 2000; van Domelen, 2000), those approaches tended to provide a partial representation of how social capital integrated into actors’ (un)conscious economic strategies developed in direct relation to their particular material conditions and the position they occupy in specific systems of relations of exchange. Third, the emphasis placed by the mainstream literature on social capital as a feature emerging essentially from the bottom-up as a coping or social mobility strategy, in turn, fails to take into consideration the conditioning effects of economic and political structures over actors’ economic uses of their diverse expressions of sociability (Bebbington, Guggenheim & Woolcock, 2006; Cleaver, 2005; Foley & Edwards, 1999; Mosse, 2005).
In order to address those issues, this thesis proposed using Bourdieu’s ‘theory of practice’ (1977, 1984, 1990) as a more suitable theoretical framework to understand the extent to and the manner in which social relations and the resources that circulate through them effectively contribute to actors’ efforts for social mobility. It was argued that such an approach would make it possible to conduct a non-reductionist study of social capital that would directly link both actors’ relationships and associational initiatives, as well as the benefits they attained through them (‘social resources’), with the surrounding socioeconomic structure. As such, the focus of attention would turn from episodes of successful collective action or the immediate benefits that actors attain through their relationships or memberships to the (re)production or modification of power relations over time, extending the analysis of social capital into how everyday interactions and negotiations, in the aggregate, shape social and economic structures. In this manner, it was expected that a Bourdieusian perspective of social capital would offer insights on the politics of social associations and their objective foundations as expressions of the broader political economy.

In this respect, Bourdieu’s understanding of the social space as a multi-layered reality composed of spaces of action, or ‘fields’—a relational configuration of forces shaped by the struggles between actors in different positions of power, according to their endowments of capital, over the command of certain forms of capital and the rules that govern their customary forms of accumulation and transformation (Bourdieu, 1994; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992)—serves for a more comprehensive examination of social capital. It highlights, first, that actors’ quotidian social and institutional engagements and uses of the resources circulating through them are simultaneously affected by their material conditions (i.e., capital endowments) and their associated systems of classification, dispositions, and interests (‘habitus’). Second, and critically, this understanding of social reality highlights that actors’ uses of social capital are shaped by the state of the relations of negotiation, competition, and struggles operating within the fields in which it is mobilised; that is, by the particular kinds of relations that actors in different positions (e.g., dominant, subordinated, or intermediate) establish with each other (e.g., exploitative or patron-client relations) and the species of capital (e.g., economic, physical, or cultural) they are interested in accumulating so as to improve or preserve their current social standing.

As part of this effort, this thesis contends that the process of social capital formation and mobilisation would be better understood if related to a Bourdieusian understanding of ‘class’, which is not exclusively defined by actors playing a particular role in the process of economic production but as “the set of agents who are placed in homogeneous conditions of existence … producing homogeneous systems of dispositions capable of generating similar practices” (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 101). Social capital, then, would not constitute a simple additional feature of actors’ material conditions, as portrayed in the mainstream literature where poverty is merely associated with the possession of strong local ‘bonds’ or the lack of access to rich-resource—‘bridging’ or ‘linking’—connections (Narayan, 1999; Robinson, Siles & Schmidt, 2004; Woolcock, 2001), but as the result of the objective and subjective relations (i.e., capital exchanges and the systems of perception and 

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classification that guide actors’ interactions) that actors establish on a quotidian basis by virtue of their (class-based) similar or dissimilar, even conflicting, sets of practices (i.e., lifestyles).

In this respect, it is necessary to specify that whilst material differences constitute a key indicator of actors’ class-based positions within a given field of action and the relations of power that operates within, not every classification criteria is reducible to economic factors. These interact with and respond to non-economic forms of domination equally entrenched in actors’ quotidian practices, systems of classification, and disposition of action, such as gender, religion, or race (Mosse, 2010; Tilly, 1998). In this particular study, this could be observed in relation to gender issues. In the villages studied, the organisational and institutional engagements, alongside quotidian practices (economic and non-economic), that shaped how residents interacted and associated with each other were constantly conditioned by a sexual division of labour. This resulted in a differentiated organisation of space and time between men and women as well as in unequal intra-household power relations, particularly in terms of command over resources and decision-making capacity regarding economic issues. In this manner, this thesis is aligned with the observation of gender-centred assessments of social capital (Mayoux, 2001; Molyneux, 2002; Silvey & Elmhirst, 2003), which point towards a differentiated process of formation of social relations and access to valuable social resources as a result of relations of power unfavourable towards women.

The proposed class-based analysis of social capital, as mentioned in previous paragraphs, cannot be discussed in relation to a single well-demarcated and over-encompassing social structure, either named ‘community’ or ‘society’. Instead, it needs to be placed within the dynamics of a particular field; that is, in relation to the rules of capital accumulation, conversion, and distribution that govern a particular system of relations of exchange (i.e., the forms of capital most sought after and the mechanisms of transformation that allow actors to accumulate it) and to the state of the relations of power that make those ‘rules of the game’ possible (i.e., the strategies that actors in different positions implement, particularly the dominant ones). A field-centred assessment of social capital would thus serve, on the one hand, to highlight that not all relationships or memberships and the resources that flow through them are functional to actors’ efforts of upward mobility. This helps to avoid overestimating the assets of the poor by means of simply aggregating their different features of sociability as ‘stocks of social capital’ since it is not possible to assert all of them grant access to those forms of capital relevant to the operations of a field (e.g., economic or cultural capital in economic and cultural fields, respectively). On the other hand, immersing the analysis of social capital within that of field dynamics underlines that actors’ capacity to improve their respective endowments of capital and social positions depends not only on their individual efforts but also on the strategies implemented by others (i.e., the non-poor) as they attempt to preserve or further improve their particular objective conditions and positions, which may as well be expressed in forms of open conflict and repression (e.g., associations of businessmen pressing for the de-legalization of the formation of workers’ unions).
In consequence, this thesis considers that a class- and field-centred approach to social capital may provide a foothold for critical engagement and therefore some leverage for critical debate with the mainstream literature on the subject. This could be attained, in particular, by highlighting the roots of poverty in a relational manner, through people’s adverse incorporation into unequal power relations and material exchanges that are (un)consciously (re)produced on a daily basis. In this manner, this thesis suggests that a more detailed assessment of the contribution of social capital to the material well-being of the poor and to their social mobility efforts could be achieved by means of an analytical framework centred on three dimensions of analysis:

i. Rather than fixed structures or flexible tools that individuals can manipulate to achieve their ends, the systems of social relations and associations in which actors participate need to be seen as ceaselessly created and recreated through time by means of a complex system of interactions that have observable objective foundations (class-based lifestyles and strategies). This interpretation would thus facilitate uncovering the multiple (often non-economic) channels through which people consciously and unconsciously build those social relationships that help them secure their livelihoods whilst (re)producing social and cultural norms that shape patterns of exclusion and inclusion.

ii. Given the objective foundations upon which features of sociability are founded, the capacity of social capital to contribute to actors’ efforts of social mobility could be better assessed if seen as embedded in those relations of power that characterise the exchanges and interactions between different classes. In this manner, it would be possible to recognise that the benefits that the poor may accrue through their relations and associations are constrained not only by the limited volume and quality of resources they have access to but also by their limited ability to shape relations of exchange in their favour.

iii. The relational foundations upon which the proposed approach is based, in turn, help to uncover the interdependency between subordinated actors’ use of social capital, as part of class-based ‘strategies’ to maintain or improve their current position, and the rules and modes of practice imposed over a field by dominant public and private actors. It shows, in this manner, that actors’ local practices are interlocked with wider relations of power operating from beyond the local social space.

Before discussing the empirical findings of this thesis in relation to the stated dimensions of analysis, it is necessary to point out that there are certain limits to the extent to which Bourdieu’s observations about the inherent antagonistic relations and interests of dominant and subordinated classes can be applied to the present case study. This is because, although I share his critical assessment of non-relational characterisations of poverty, there are observable limits to the degree of antagonism one may assume to shape the practices and relations of actors co-habiting in the same deprived rural village:
Most of those who carry out empirical research are often led to accept … a theory which reduces the classes to simple ranked but non-antagonistic strata … [ignoring] what is inscribed in every distribution. A distribution, in the statistical but also the political-economy sense, is the balance-sheet, at a given moment, of what has been won in previous battles and can be invested in subsequent battles; it expresses a state of the power relation between the classes … of the struggle for possession of rare goods and for the specifically political power over the distribution or redistribution of profit (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 245) [emphasise mine].

In this manner, although indeed Bourdieu’s ‘theory of practice’ can help to uncover issues of power relations within and beyond poor communities, it is necessary to place such statements in perspective. This is because Bourdieu’s discussions on class relations are related to his country-level assessments of different fields of action—academic, artistic, religious, and economic, among others—and the capacity of the best-endowed classes, predominantly in 20th century France, to dictate what constitute the most appreciable and valuable cultural or artistic expressions, what the most profitable forms of commercial exchange or economic organisation are, and what kinds of policies state agencies would implement, to mention a few examples (Bourdieu, 1984, 1988, 1990, 1993, 2005). The scope and setting of such analyses, consequently, do not directly match those of the present case-study.

There are three particular elements one thus needs to consider when discussing social capital as a class-based strategy mobilised in relation to those fields relevant to the residents of deprived rural settings. The first is that actors living in the same impoverished village or neighbourhood are more likely than not to have various points of coincidence with each other—in terms of interests and practices—despite their relative material differences (Bourdieu, 1989; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Wacquant, 1999). In this regard, although in the present study it was possible to make broad socioeconomic classifications among villagers (i.e., landless residents or micro farmers producing mainly for self-consumption, established micro and small farmers, and medium farmers with commercialisation networks routinely reaching out to urban markets), it has been equally pointed out that such material differences do not necessarily imply clear-cut dissimilar or conflicting interests or practices throughout each of the different fields of action in which villagers participate.

Furthermore, the fact that actors of relatively different material conditions live in the same physical space, characterised by its deprived conditions, expresses in itself that—to a certain extent—they are relatively closer to each other (in material and non-material terms) than to, for example, middle classes in the context of modern urban centres. On this subject it is pertinent to remind the reader that, in formal terms, less than 1 in 10 local households surveyed were found to survive with a monthly expenditure level over the regional rural poverty line and that only one of them marginally reported an expenditure level over the regional urban poverty line (§4.2.3.). In the same direction, the classification of farmers according to land ownership was done in relative terms since none of them possessed more than 16 Has. of land. These conditions do not preclude that socioeconomic differences may turn into opposing interests, as different socioeconomic groups attempt to protect or improve their position (e.g., medium—more than 5 Has.—and small farmers—1 to 5 Has.—will attempt to pay very low wages to farm labourers, particularly landless
residents, who are interested in higher remunerations). However, it was possible to identify the presence of certain common interests and practices resulting from their shared material limitations (e.g., neither landless residents nor micro or small farmers have the material resources to send their children to study elsewhere, so most of them heavily invest in supporting their local school; similarly, these actors as well as medium farmers have the same interest in pressing local authorities and public officials in order to obtain greater irrigation infrastructure investments).

Second, as discussed throughout the text, the study of towns, villages, or neighbourhoods should be placed in context as part of a wider political economy (unless those settings were socially and physically isolated). In this respect, Bourdieu’s notion of fields serves to highlight that, as members of the same deprived village, all local economic agents are in fact in a subordinated position with regards to those external actors shaping the terms and forms of exchange in a particular system of relations. For example, all local economic agents—wage labourers as well as micro, small, and medium farmers—are placed at the bottom end of the chain of commercial agreements shaping the regional field of agricultural production. The latter, instead, is mostly shaped by the operations of large private landholders operating in the richest valleys of the department, urban industries processing some kinds of agricultural produce for the international and national markets, and wholesale traders operating in the main urban markets.

Although indeed such a scenario implies that residents struggle over the management of very scarce local resources, simultaneously it generates a certain degree of common interests as well as similar sensation of dependency and vulnerability with regards to those dominant actors operating beyond their geographical, economic, social, and political reach. This is clearly reflected in relation to the capacity of local actors, irrespective of their socioeconomic condition, to significantly affect policy-making processes in their benefit. A major common interest among all sectors of the population, for instance, was their demands for large infrastructure investments from the local and central government, such as the construction of water reservoirs, asphalted roads, and installation of water and electricity services. All of them were continuous unfulfilled promises from elected officials and state representatives who have been observed, instead, to more quickly respond to the interests of large landholders and agribusinesses operating in richer settings.

Third, and in the same direction, it is important to emphasise that the introduction of a sub-field of action by external actors, such as that of a development intervention, does not necessarily results in the exact (re)production of opposing interests along socioeconomic lines. In a scenario as that of the area of study—with no prior experience of a fully participatory development project—where actors have no ‘practical mastery’ of the dynamics of this sub-field, their position-based interests may shape their decision to participate and the particular location they may adopt within such a space, but not necessarily in a conflictive manner. For example, leaders were seen to be interested in the success of the project so as to cement their legitimacy whilst increasing their social and symbolic capital; landless residents were interested, in turn, in accessing new economic reserves

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in terms of small herds of livestock; established farmers were more inclined to explore their potential introduction in new markets (livestock and derived forest products); whilst women were more interested in accessing assets for their homes and learning about health issues. It can be stressed as well that the involvement of actors in an emerging sub-field expresses, to a certain degree, a certain similarity of dispositions and interests on the basis of similar material conditions and needs (Bourdieu, 1977, 1984; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). In the present research, for instance, the project studied attracted mainly resident micro- and small- farmers and, to a lesser degree, landless residents. In contrast, the relatively well-off, mainly medium-farmers, constituted the smallest group of beneficiaries (§ 7.1.).

These circumstances do not deny the potentially conflictive nature of struggles over capital distribution and expansion resulting from the benefits provided by the intervention. In fact, class-based opposing interests may come into play once such benefits are mobilised for specific economic exchanges (e.g., once beneficiaries’ expanding livestock is commercialised). However, as indicated in the previous paragraphs, class-based interests do not necessarily imply opposing ones in every field of action in which neighbours participate, particularly one in which there is still a lack of clarity of what is at stake (forms of capital accumulation or transformation that could be implemented by means of one’s positioning within a development intervention).

10.1.1. Conditions of social organisation

The mainstream social capital literature has tended either to portray social actors as social entrepreneurs, consciously investing in relationships as well as organisational and normative arrangements in anticipation of concrete benefits (Burt, 2001, 2005; Ostrom & Ahn, 2003; van Bastelaer, 2000), or as members of coalesced groups characterised by their disciplined acquiescence to cultural and normative frameworks that foment the production of public goods (Krishna, 2002; Putnam, 1993a, 1993b, 2001; Uphoff & Wijayaratna, 2000). In this manner, they attribute all actors a single rationale for action, thereby failing to adequately capture the diversity of interests that are present in a social space, particularly across different socioeconomic groups and associated forms of inequality and exclusion (e.g., gender or race). Furthermore, these portrayals of processes of social organisation provide the illusion that all actors can effectively engage in social life and equally profit from their relationships and memberships.

The empirical findings reported in this text regarding the processes of network formation and social organisation in the villages of San Mateo and San Luis, however, reveal a far more complex reality than those models represented in the mainstream literature. It is argued, instead, that actors’ capacity to engage in processes of association that could work to their economic advantage is conditioned by inequitable social and economic structures and the institutions, in form of norms and values, through which differences in power relations are manifested. That is, the manifestations of power as the command over valuable resources and related processes of
accumulation, transformation, and distribution as well as the capacity to impose a particular
classificatory scheme and systems of representations and identity which guide actors’ daily practices
(Bourdieu, 1977, 1994; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). In this regard, the evidence presented in this
thesis, which coincides with that reported in other empirical critical assessments of social capital
(Cleaver, 2005; Das, 2004), shows that those actors in a subordinated—economic- and gender-based—position were less likely to adequately engage in the whole set of features of local social life and hence transform their eventual connections into social relations, continuously actualised and
cultivated interactions, that could be mobilised to their advantage.

It would be possible to highlight, in this manner, the dialectical nature of the relationship among actors’ objective conditions, the positions they occupy in social hierarchy operating in different spheres of action, and the daily practices that lead to the development of valuable relationships. It reverses the typical social capital question in the mainstream literature from how social relations and the resources that flow through them enhance poor actors’ material well-being to how the latter—and related lifestyles—generate different systems of relations that simultaneously enable certain forms of cooperation and organisation whilst, deliberately or unintentionally, preventing the development of an integrative social structure. On the basis of the empirical findings observed in San Mateo and San Luis as well as in the related empirical literature (Cleaver, 2005; Das, 2004; Mosse, 2005; du Toit, Skuse & Cousins, 2007; Silvey & Elmhirst, 2003), there are indications that the structural conditions shaping actors’ engagement in social relationships and organisational acts manifested in four interrelated factors: (i) their differentiated material capacity to afford the costs of conducting a rich and rewarding social life, (ii) the dissimilar sets of relations that they develop in relation to the class-based positions they assume in different fields, (iii) the differentiated capacity of actors from accessing and exchanging capital because of institutionalised norms of exclusion and unfavourable inclusion, and (iii) their relatively differentiated experiences of quotidian life.

a. The costs of sociability:

Building and maintaining useful relationships constitutes a costly activity that not all actors can afford evenly (Bourdieu, 1986; Cleaver, 2005). Two kinds of costs can be aggregated: (i) explicit, which refer to those that can be objectively accounted for such as the money spent in the organisation of celebrations, the acquisition of gifts, the travel costs one incurs in when visiting relatives and friends living outside the local area, or the material contributions required from a particular membership, and (ii) hidden costs, more difficult to calculate in economic terms since they usually involve non-material resources, such as the time spent—opportunity costs—in conducting social activities or in symbolic capital (in the form of honour and prestige), for instance, when one becomes affiliated to a political party.
On this particular subject there are three elements to highlight. First, the overall costs of developing and maintaining valuable relationships tend to increase significantly according to how far-reaching they are in positional (reaching out towards higher positions in the local social hierarchy) and geographical terms, which are often associated with each other. The interactions between these two aspects are particularly relevant to rural settings such as San Mateo and San Luis, whose material deprivation is accompanied by limited physical connectivity with major urban settlements (e.g., precarious access roads, sporadic public transport in the form of motorised rickshaws, and limited ownership of motorised vehicles among residents). Maintaining an eventful social life with friends and relatives living outside town, who are typically better-off, becomes thus a very costly practice. This is particularly salient when it refers to the development of close relations with the district political elite, in the form of district-level political leaders and public officers, which is usually conditioned on actors' assuming a leading role in a village organisation and being politically active. These two scenarios require the mobilisation of significant volumes of capital in its diverse forms—economic, cultural, symbolic, and social—that are far from the reach of most residents. Assuming a leading village role, on the one hand, implies regular access to petty cash to cover administrative and transportation costs as well as other membership dues, knowledge of bureaucratic procedures, a minimum level of education that helps in fulfilling those duties, time availability to attend various assemblies, useful relations with other local leaders, and prestige of honesty and trustworthiness. On the other hand, participation in politics adds further significant costs. Most salient of all, in the area of study, candidates were expected to provide significant financial and material contributions (e.g., vehicles to transport supporters to public events) to political campaigns.

Second, the overall costs of sociability should be understood in relative terms; that is, in relation to the particular objective condition of actors and their associated lifestyles. No matter how little the explicit and hidden costs of a membership or relationship may be, these will have a higher impact among the worst-off. This is because the proportion of actors' total endowments of capital required will be higher for those in a more subordinated position than for those in a more favourable one. This is not only because they have more limited resources to invest in their relations but also because their associated lifestyles are more likely to be adapted to continuously deal with their precarious material existence. In the area of study, for example, the demands of contributions in labour by the Parent School Association to maintain and improve the local school were felt to be more onerous by landless residents (men and women), who constantly had to seek menial jobs beyond their villages.

A third element to underscore is that investments in relationships are not short-term, particularly those that grant steady access to valuable resources and, hence, become an integral part of one's economic strategies and quotidian practices. Social bonds have to be periodically renewed and reconfirmed or else they tend to depreciate with the lack of use.
(Adler & Kwon, 2002; Glaeser, Laibson & Sacerdote, 2002). This resonates particularly for the systems of relations of rural settings where ‘weak ties’ are less important than ‘strong’ ones insofar as economic agreements are usually accompanied by intensive material and non-material quotidian exchanges based on blood and fictive kinship (Crehan, 1992; Long, 2001; Ellis, 2000). This necessity generates a particular challenge for the worst-off insofar as maintaining valuable connections demands continuous exchanges of resources and a certain degree of material security that those actors cannot afford. The landless residents of San Mateo and San Luis, for instance, not only lack spare resources to share with those in need under the expectation of future reciprocity but also, because of their economic instability, are on many occasions uncertain with regards to whether they will stay in the area or not in the long term.

b. Position-taking:

Despite sharing the same social space, actors tend to engage in different systems of relations by virtue of their particular objective conditions (i.e., capital endowments) and the associated interests and strategies deployed (Bourdieu, 1984; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). This contributes, in different degrees, to the separation or proximity among them according to whether or not they participate in similar fields of action, and furthermore, the extent to which they occupy rather similar, different, or opposed positions in them.

As extensively highlighted by the literature on sustainable rural livelihoods (Bebbington, 1998; DFID, 1999; Ellis, 2000; Neefjes, 2000), it was observed that the material conditions of San Mateo and San Luis residents were associated with the conduction of different economic practices and strategies. This implied that they were engaged in relatively different systems of economic relations along socioeconomic lines. In this regard, the path that opened to them to best profit from their relationships and memberships, either consciously or unconsciously, tended to vary across classes. For example, the poorest sectors of the population of San Mateo and San Luis either did not possess productive land or the means to make their farm output commercial (i.e., producing mostly for self-consumption); as a result, they usually made a living working as farm labourers (jornaleros). Their heavy involvement in such activity thus implied developing relationships with labour contractors (contratistas) serving large rural estates outside the district or with small and medium farmers from their villages or others nearby that could help them secure continuous employment and access to cash through advanced payments. Consequently, those actors are unlikely to develop close long-term connections with economic agents operating in a different system of exchanges, such as livestock traders visiting the area or operating in nearby urban markets. It was, instead, mainly small and medium farmers, able to rear enough livestock for commercialisation purposes, who were more concerned about developing such relationships.
Conclusions

An additional factor that helps generating a differentiated networks structure along socioeconomic lines is that even though local actors may participate in the same fields of action, the relationships they establish typically vary according to the class-based position they assume within those spaces. For example, due to their lack of means of transport, it is mainly micro and small farmers who showed a greater concern about developing trustable relationships with visiting agricultural intermediaries (*acopiadores*) and small agricultural traders operating in nearby towns so as to commercialise their farm output whilst better-off farmers, with access to trucks or means to hire one and larger volumes of production, in turn showed they were more focused in bonding with agricultural traders working in urban markets.

The objective conditionality affecting the development of social relations was further expressed in the class-based interests and material needs behind actors’ decisions to engage in different local organisations. For example, it was observed that the poorest residents—mainly landless residents and micro farmers with irregular agricultural production—were customarily more involved in San Mateo’s *Popular Cook* committee because of their limited capacity to secure food supplies throughout the year and their eminent monetary income from their work as *jornaleros*. By the same token, this group had little involvement in the local Water Users’ Association, which instead aggregated mainly established farmers (those customarily able to produce enough output for commercial purposes). A handful of relatively well-off households, in turn, had little involvement in the local Parent School Association because their children attended better-equipped schools located in the nearby capitals of district.

The positions that actors assumed in those organisations, in turn, implied the development of differentiated sets of relations. Although local leaders, for example, were not necessarily the most significant economic agents of their villages (most were small farmers), they tended to constitute a well-connected local elite. Since they assumed similar leading roles in more than one organisation and with a certain degree of regularity (most had been assuming leading organisational positions for many years) and since they were regularly sought after by local political alliances for municipal elections, this group of residents tended to possess a widespread networks not only within their respective localities but also reaching out to the leaders of other villages and, critically, to public officials and political authorities of their district. This scenario is exemplified by the cases of the food-alleviation program *Glass of Milk* and the Water Users Association. In the first organisation, whilst most beneficiaries only attended the monthly meetings for the distribution of powdered milk in their respective villages, the leaders of the local committee met more frequently with each other to fulfil administrative and forged relations with the leaders of other committees in nearby villages. Furthermore, by virtue of the decentralisation reform of 2002, the presidents of the committees had more opportunities to link up with municipal officials and political figures
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(e.g., a former president of the San Mateo committee ended up working for the town-hall as part of the district administration of the Glass of Milk program). In the case of the Water Users Association, direct contact with the technical administrator of the irrigation district, a representative of the Ministry of Agriculture, was only possible for delegates of the board of the association, integrated predominantly by medium-farmers. Non-leading members had only the chance to interact with the end operator of the irrigation system (sectorista), who is an employee of the association.

As discussed previously (§ 10.1.), actors’ objective conditions were observed to be interrelated with gender factors. This implied, simultaneously, the development of dissimilar sets of relations for women as compared to men as well as among women due to their differentiated involvement in fields of actions and the systematic subordinated positions that they tend to assume in those systems of relations. In this regard, although women of all local socioeconomic sectors tended to play a secondary economic role in their respective households, their economic practices differed along socioeconomic lines. The poorest women, for instance, usually worked as jornaleros the same as men; however, they rarely worked as temporary migrant workers. The not-so-poor women also tended to cooperate economically by looking after the family farm and rearing their livestock but they were rarely involved actively in the circuits of commercialisation of the farm output. Relatively well-off women, in turn, usually looked after some village-based commercial initiatives (e.g., grocery shops).

In a similar fashion, women’s forms of organisational engagement were mainly concentrated around traditional gender-based domestic roles projected into the public arena. It is so that the Popular Cook and Glass of Milk committees, which imply preparing meals for children and other family members, constitute eminently feminine organisations as compared to the Water Users’ Association, which is eminently masculine. Participation in those female organisations, however, was observed to follow certain socioeconomic conditions. Whilst participation in the Popular Cook gathered predominantly very poor families, the Glass of Milk committees encompassed a wider set of female residents except for a handful of relatively well-off ones.

c. Norms of exclusion and unfavourable inclusion:

Whilst actors’ objective (capital endowments) or subjective (interests and strategies) conditions affect their decision and capacity to participate in different fields of action and assume different positions within them, it cannot be assumed however that these processes are solely affected by their personal circumstances. Institutionalised norms may shape the capacity of actors to reach out to others and establish useful relations by establishing specific barriers to participation or conditions of inclusion. This is particularly relevant to the study of the poor since such rules tend to reflect the historical trajectory of power relations
operating in a given field; furthermore, they characteristically reflect the world views and interests of those actors in a dominant position. They help to reproduce the existing objective and social order in an impersonal manner, by dictating the capacity to and the manner in which actors are able to access the most valuable forms of capital circulating in a given field of exchanges (Bourdieu, 1984, 1986; Cleaver, 2001, 2002).

In this manner, institutionalised norms of exclusion—formal and informal—tend to prevent certain actors from engaging in certain fields, leading to a differentiated development of their networks of useful relations. The most salient case observed in the area of study corresponded to gender-based economic roles, which typically placed women away from significant involvement in the different economic fields identified in the area and, critically, from accessing significant financial resources. In this respect, despite their contribution to the cultivation of the family farm and to rearing livestock, many of the not-so-poor women were acting on the fringes of those associated economic fields. Commercial transactions of households’ farm output were mostly placed in the male realm since it was men who typically dealt with agricultural and livestock acopiadores and traders rather than women. In this manner, women’s labour contribution had very limited convertibility into cash within those systems of exchange. In the same direction, women’s capacity to transform their physical strength into financial resources in their respective settings was also more limited than men’s insofar as work in the transport and construction sectors constituted only male practices. Migration strategies equally tended to place men and women in different systems of relations. Whilst poor men usually migrated to work in the construction, transport, or commerce sectors, for many poor rural female youths migration implied assuming the positions of maids in the homes of urban middle and upper class families; a job that put most of them in a position of almost total subordination given that they customarily rely on their employers for food and accommodation whilst earning very little money that, in addition, does not fully remain in their hands (i.e., money transfers).

Women’s positions within economic fields were equally affected (usually for the worse) by traditional gender-based norms, thereby limiting their capacity to reach out to rich-resource relations. For example, it was observed in the poorest households that both men and women work as jornaleros; however, the domestic responsibilities of the latter imply that they have almost no involvement in better-paid jobs that require temporary migration. Women, instead, mainly worked in their respective village and its surroundings. As a result, aside from their neighbours, hence, the labour relations that the poorest women develop tended to concentrate around the local area, with small and medium farmers—mostly related through blood or ritual kinship—that employ them periodically.

The formal norms regulating the operations of the most important economic organisation of the area—the Water Users Association—were equally observed to serve to exclude some actors or to include them differently according to their socioeconomic profile, resulting in a
differentiated access to networking opportunities. In those organisations it is stipulated, by law,\textsuperscript{88} that only better-off farmers are able to assume a position of authority. There, only those who own a minimum plot of 1.5 Has. of land have the right to run for a leading position in the water users' commission, a barrier that excludes 4 in 10 farmers from San Mateo and San Luis. In addition, only farmers with complete primary education can be elected as an authority of the district commission and only those with secondary education can be nominated delegates to the board of water users of the valley, a norm that excludes one third and two thirds of the local population, respectively. The end result of this social order is that better-off farmers are able to secure better networking opportunities with public officers and medium farmers from other villages of the valley.

d.  \textit{Lifestyles and sociability:}

Class-based relations and forms of association are not constrained to the world of economic production but, instead, they tend to be projected to the social space through the generation of relatively differentiated—not entirely coherent or pre-deterministic—lifestyles (Lamaison & Bourdieu, 1986; Bourdieu, 1994). The varied integration of household members in local livelihood strategies and their dissimilar dedication to those activities in their lives (e.g., prioritisation of working over studying) according to actors' class condition imply that residents would tend to employ different notions of time and space, thereby leading to a relatively differentiated use and understanding of their social space (Bourdieu, 1977, 1985; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). For example, adult members of the poorest households spend less time in their villages by virtue of their constant work as jornaleros, which implies a constant displacement from the local area so as to work on other people's farms, including prolonged migration periods to other rural regions of the department or to urban areas. This contrasts with the experiences of 'community' of better-off residents—small farmers—who, in turn, spend more time in their respective towns because of their work in their family farms and their lesser reliance on wage labour income. The experiences of this group, in turn, differ from those of the few relatively well-off households which have more dispersed economic interests (e.g., supervision of plots of land within and beyond their village) and greater geographical mobility.

This material-based differentiated organisation of space and time, in turn, was observed to interact with those imposed by gender-based norms and values so as to produce different networking and bonding opportunities. As in other areas of the developing world characterised by their patriarchal social system (Crehan, 1992; Ellis, 2000; Narayan et al, 2000a, 2000b), the women of San Mateo and San Luis were observed to have a more restricted geographical mobility than men as well as different daily routines in relation to their traditional roles as housekeepers and mothers. Although the poorest women, for

\textsuperscript{88} Supreme Decree No. 057-2000-AG (\textit{Rules for the Administrative Organisation of Water}).
example, also cooperate economically by working as hired labour when the opportunity presents itself, they conduct such practice more commonly in the local area. Lengthy periods of temporary migration, in this regard, are also an almost exclusive domain of men. By the same token, the economic contribution of better-off women was usually centred on looking after the family farm, rearing livestock, or attending a home-based business. As a result, women were characterised by having extended local relations rather than external ones, particularly with other women. This scenario was facilitated by the rather similar routine among them irrespective of their class condition in relation to their daily routines (e.g., going to collect water from public wells twice a day or taking children to San Mateo’s school).

10.1.2. The profitability of social capital

This study assumed the following definition of social capital: “the totality of resources (...) activated through a more or less extended, more or less mobilisable network of relations which procures a competitive advantage” (Bourdieu, 2005, pp. 194-195). On the basis of this definition and the empirical evidence gathered in the villages of San Mateo and San Luis, the present thesis contends that the capacity of social capital to contribute to actors’ social mobility efforts depends on the interaction between the quality and quantity of social resources they may have access to through their relationships and memberships alongside the extension and nature of the relations through which those resources are obtained. As discussed previously (§ 10.1.), this process needs to be related to the respective class-based positions that actors occupy in a particular field of action; that is, according to the ‘strategies’ that subordinated, dominant, or intermediate actors implement in order to maintain or improve their position (in turn conditioned on their respective endowments of capital).

This approach is considered to provide a more complete depiction of the ‘benefits’ of social capital on the material well-being of the poor as compared to those portrayed in the mainstream literature. The latter usually presents those ‘benefits’ under two guises. First, under-socialised approaches customarily emphasise the volume of resources that the poor can attain through the purposive mobilisation of their connections and memberships (e.g., technical information, credit and loans, or jobs) (Fafchamps & Minten, 2002a, 2000b; Lin, 2001; Sorensen, 2000; van Domelen, 2006) whilst over-socialised—communitarian—approaches to the concept highlight the collective production of public goods (Putnam, 1993, 2001; Uphoff, 1999, 2004; van Staveren & Knorringa, 2006;). These two sets of positive outcomes, however, tend to isolate those benefits from the overall objective reality—capital endowments—that constitute both a pre-condition and a multiplicative factor for local processes of capital accumulation (i.e., degree of material needs and access to working capital to enhance social capital returns). In addition, they present actors’ connections as unaffected by processes of negotiation and struggle, which ultimately shape the terms of exchange under which actors are able to access those resources (i.e., the volume of resources they may obtain from their relations) (Bourdieu, 2005; Cleaver, 2005; Hickey & du Toit, 2007; Mosse, 2005, 2010).
10.1.2.1. The cost-benefit balance of social capital

The mainstream literature has traditionally presented the benefits of social capital as a rather isolated phenomenon from both the complex social dynamics surrounding actors’ exchanges and the wider processes of capital circulation and accumulation. This scenario is expressed in various forms. First, the emphasis on the actual sets of material or non-material resources that economic agents can access through their connections and organisations (e.g., information, loans, free labour) usually take features of sociability for granted. That is, relationships and organisations appear as non-problematic features of social life, free from conflicts as well as of costs, so that they are seen as easily accessible for the poor (Bebbington, 2007; Cleaver, 2005).

Second, the non-relational manner in which beneficial effects of social capital are presented limit such assessment to short-term examinations. Actors are typically presented as accessing certain valuable productive resources, but little is said about how the terms of engagement in relationships shape the long-term contribution of those social resources on actors’ material well-being. Third, the benefit from social resources is usually presented as unrelated to actors’ other endowments of capital. Some, like Putnam (1993a), for instance, have claimed that the value of social capital—expressed in associational activity and generalised trust—could be “more important than that of physical capital” (p. 183). Econometric analyses conducted by researchers of the World Bank, in turn, estimated that the contribution of social capital—as networks and memberships to local organisations—to households’ material well-being appeared to be greater than that of human capital (Grootaert, 1999; Grootaert, Oh & Swamy, 2002; Narayan & Pritchett, 1997). These attempts to identify the ‘independent’ returns of social capital, hence, tend to obscure the interdependence of capital in its diverse forms and the need of their interaction to promote a significant improvement in the living conditions of the poor.

In this regard, it is contended that a conceptualisation of social capital that altogether includes both social relationships and resources, framed in fields of positions according to actors’ objective conditions and habitus, could better serve to define its benefits, particularly for the poor. As discussed in a previous section (§ 10.1.1.), such an understanding of social capital makes apparent the costs associated with the expansion and enhancement of one’s relationships and memberships as well as the objective foundations that shape the relations actors have access to according to their involvement in different fields, the positions they occupy within them, the norms of inclusion/exclusion they face, and the lifestyles they conduct. As a result of the objective grounds upon which some sociability features are built, and as evidenced in the network assessments of San Mateo and San Luis households (§ 6.1, § 8.1), the poorest actors and women are more likely to have limited access to the few friends and relatives concentrated around their village as compared to well-off residents with extended contacts reaching out beyond the local arena.

Whilst the diverse expressions of the objective foundations of sociability—explicit and hidden costs, lifestyles, or class-based strategies—complicate any effort to estimate the profitability of social capital in typical economic terms, the fact that forming, maintaining, and strengthening relationships integral to one’s economic strategies are long-term ‘investments’ that demand rather
constant dedication makes that operation—for (rational) calculation purposes—even more unlikely. The empirical findings of this thesis show that support from friends or relatives cannot be taken for granted. Official or formal connections are only turned into ‘practical’ ones by regular interactions and exchanges in which actors reaffirm their mutual recognition on a regular basis; correspondingly, they are also continuously open to negotiation and erosion over time (Bourdieu, 1977). In a context of widespread poverty, where better-off residents could still be considered technically ‘poor’ (i.e., expenditure levels below regional urban poverty line) or living on the fringes of poverty (e.g., vulnerable to economic shocks), most actors were observed to avoid their own decapitalisation because of the support they provide to their relatives and friends. The direct consequence of this factor was that supportive relationships were often based on some sort of explicit or tacit exchange. Residents, hence, were not only expected to be amenable friends, neighbours, or relatives, but also reliable. It is so that material support offered to close relations in case of emergency (e.g., accommodation, loans, medicines, or food supplies) were provided usually to relations that have proven themselves in the past and were at present expected to be able to repay the favour either in the same form of capital (e.g., cash) or some other means (e.g., labour). Unconditional support was rather limited and under any circumstance it was found to cover the whole cost of an emergency, as reported by the rural risk-sharing literature (Fafchamps & Lund, 2003; Park, 2006).

A direct implication of this understanding of social capital is that its returns cannot be seen necessarily as part of a single instance of interaction or exchange. Supportive relationships, instead, appear as a result of actors’ long-standing trajectories of mutual exchange. This is particularly relevant in rural areas, where the physical proximity between residents and their lack of state support and private services, alongside their poverty, imply they usually recur to their mutual support on a quotidian basis (Crehan, 1992; Ellis, 2000). In the area of study, for example, access to free labour for the harvest or planting season was customarily the result of a long-standing agreement between households related by kinship that, in addition, cooperated with each other on daily basis in relation to domestic chores. Likewise, observed beneficial or reliable commercial deals between local farmers were not established overnight; they were usually the result of long-standing relationships that traditionally went beyond the commercial realm or physical proximity to be cemented by ritual kinship (co-parenthood or compadrazgo). Likewise, the full support of local associations or the ‘community’ was not observed to result merely because of their formal membership or place of residence but from their active participation in the functioning of these groups.

Adding a temporal dimension to the analysis of social capital returns, embedded in the presence of long-term relationships, as customary in rural areas (Crehan, 1992; Ellis, 2001; Long, 2001), serves in turn to assess more comprehensively its capacity to improve the material conditions and the social standing of actors in a subordinated position. This is because it highlights that the short-term benefits of the poor’s relationships with better-off actors—‘linking’ social capital—frequently imply long-term losses that contribute to the reproduction of their poverty and
subordination. Many of the most deprived actors of the area of study were observed to engage in inequitable terms of exchange through friendship- or kinship-based relations, which could be better described as exploitative or patron-client relations. This implied that the embedded costs of accessing and maintaining such relations of support tend to outstrip the ‘gross’ benefits attained through such connections. In other words, the momentary benefits of the poor’s social capital can well imply losses in the medium- and long-term. For example, the poorest residents who commit their labour to contratistas and small-farmers in exchange for advanced payments are usually paid the lowest wages (which even in normal circumstances tend to be low). Likewise, micro and small farmers that are hard-pressed for cash during the slack season on occasions recur to acopiadores or local agricultural traders, with whom they have a long-standing commercial relationship, and commit themselves to sell their future agricultural output at very low prices. Although the cash accessed may indeed be considered a ‘benefit’ that saves them from starving, the overall net contribution of ‘social capital’ appears as negative.

Finally, framing social capital returns within the dynamics of the relations of exchange that govern a particular field, in addition, serves to highlight that the benefits of mobilising one’s relationships should be understood according to how they are integrated into actors’ economic practices; particularly in relation to how they interact with other endowments of capital so as to indeed enhance their social mobility efforts (Collier, 1998; Das, 2004). Trade credit, technical information, or temporary jobs, for example, are by themselves unlikely to significantly improve actors’ material well-being unless combined with existing stocks of capital to generate more profitable economic practices, such as by means of acquiring more efficient machinery, implementing more efficient farming techniques, or providing enough cash to finance the first two activities. For the latter to take place, however, it is necessary for actors to possess a minimum stock of capital that social capital can interact with. It becomes apparent, hence, that the latter operates mainly as a multiplicative factor on economic agents’ production factors rather than a determinant ‘independent’ component for income generation.

10.1.2.2. The nature of relationships

Mainstream approaches to social capital have usually separated the analysis of relationships and organisations from the issues of power inequalities and struggles. Essentialist understandings of social networks and associations as capital, on the one hand, tend to detach those features of social life from the broad socioeconomic structure which shapes them, whilst on the other, they tend to obscure the fact that a connection or a membership does not imply immediate access to resources, thus from the distributional struggles—open or tacit—that take place within organisations and communities (Cleaver, 2005; Edwards & Foley, 1999; Foley & Edwards, 1999; Mosse, 2010; Pantoja, 2000). As a result, many positive accounts of social capital have usually overlooked that mutual assistance between actors in unequal positions may imply narrow and risky personalised dependencies. As reported in the empirical findings of this text, poverty is reflected not only
through the lack of connections but also through engaging in social life on adverse terms (Bourdieu, 1977, 1994; Cleaver, 2005; Mosse, 2005, 2010; Hickey & du Toit, 2007).

In this manner, assuming a relational approach to the analysis of social capital—which understands actors’ objective condition in a given field as partly the result of the relations they develop with actors in a different position, particularly with those in a relative position of power—becomes an important element in order to better understand the capacity of actors to benefit from their relations (Bourdieu, 2005; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). It means treating poverty, in its different levels, as arising from the operation of existing social relations; in particular as the result of adverse terms of inclusion in socioeconomic systems rather than as the exclusive product of explicit discrimination. The (re)production of unequal relationships observed in the area of the study could be related to three central factors: (i) exploitation and the development of unequal exchanges, (ii) dependence on brokerage and patron-client relations, and (iii) the consent of actors in subordinated positions of the status quo. These factors are discussed below:

a. Relations of exploitation:

As mentioned in the previous section of this chapter (§ 10.2.1.) and in the text (Chapters 5 and 6), the relations of exchange operating in the economic fields in which most local actors participate are characterised by the (re)production of diverse forms of exploitation, understood as the exclusion of some by others of the full value of their effort (Bourdieu, 1998; Tilly, 1998). For example, jornaleros are usually paid low wages and lack any health insurance; micro farmers on many occasions sell their farm production at low prices to acopiadores or local agricultural traders in return for advanced payments; and female migrants usually leave town to work as maids in urban middle class families, where they typically endure long working days and little freedom of movement in exchange for a salary lower than the legal minimum wage. The predominance of such practices as a constitutive part of the modes of production of the economic fields in which local actors are engaged affects their capacity to benefit from their relationships. This occurs because the material benefits that impoverished actors can obtain through their connections are on many occasions attained through the reproduction of relations of exploitation with better-off actors, who possess or have control over the resources the first ones aspire to (e.g., reserves of cash during the slack season) (Cleaver, 2005; Mosse; 2005, 2010).

Two of the most recurrent examples of the potential benefits of social capital in the literature—access to job opportunities and informal loans (Sorensen, 2000; van Domelen, 2000; World Bank, 2001)—are illustrative on this subject. It is mainly the poorest residents—landless and micro farmers—working as jornaleros those who attempt to develop a close connection with contratistas and local potential employers—small and medium farmers—so as to arrange cash advances and long-term work that would help them to meet their most basic consumption needs. The ‘benefits’ from investing in such relationships, however, have embedded costs that contribute to the reproduction of their poverty. The
poorest *jornaleros* usually migrate the farthest, for longest, and with the least reward. Even if they are paid in full, their low wages rarely compensate the harsh work, long hours, and poor working conditions. In addition, these relationships on many occasions imply long-term indebtedness that puts some residents in a new form of ‘bondage’ that forces them to endure such practices one year after the other (Crehan, 1992; Mosse, 2005). Furthermore, such practices put household members under significant health risks, which makes them likely to face some form of health emergency in the future as well as a chronic illness in the long term (e.g., back pains and muscular strains are recurrent complaints among mature adult villagers).

The almost inherent insertion of the most subordinated classes into relations of exploitation, however, does not imply that relatively better-off residents—the ‘not-so poor’—are exempt of them insofar as they are still small players in the regional economy. For example, the highly personalised form in which economic transactions take place in the urban markets of the department expose farmers to heavy losses unless they already have an established buyer they are well-acquainted with (e.g., uninformed providers usually face a downward spiral of low bids from wholesale traders with the aim of heavily reducing prices to bargain levels). In this manner, local small and medium farmers reported customarily selling their farm output to blood relatives and *compadres* operating in urban markets at prices that did not entirely fit with their cost structures or their expected profit margins for reinvestment. Their incapacity to maximise their selling profit, however, is considered to be compensated by the long-term security of having a reliable buyer.

**b. Brokerage and clientelism:**

The forms of political representations of the poor mostly rely on informal systems of representation and inclusion in order to access those resources in the hands of public agencies and private development institutions. These consist of informal systems of brokerage by which a certain group of politically active better-off actors—not necessarily well-off—establish a tacit agreement with the rest of the local population: they would invest their time and resources to access external resources in exchange for their political support, which in turn allows them to access the necessary political and symbolic capital alongside financial capital (e.g., public jobs) to sustain such a leading position (Bierscheck, Chaveau & de Sardan, 2000; Mosse, 2010).

This system by which the poor are represented and incorporated into political forms of organisation through the local elite of brokers could be related to the persistence of socioeconomic inequality and poverty. On the one hand, brokerage positions tend to be developed on the basis of specific capital endowments, such as time, ready access to cash, relatively high levels of education, and access to external networks (Bierscheck, Chaveau & de Sardan, 2000; Lewis & Mosse, 2006). As a result, as described previously (§ 10.1.1.), it is unlikely that the poorest actors are able to assume such leading roles. On the other hand,
although those clientelist systems tend to integrate most of the vulnerable members of organisations or communities, this form of inclusion of lower status groups is founded upon and reproduces their exclusion (Hickey & du Toit, 2007; Mosse, 2010).

Brokerage thus acts as a form of closure, whereby local political elites may secure the resources required to fuel their patronage that, in turn, allows them to maintain power in their corresponding organisations or communities. The most recurrent example on this subject refers to the ‘co-optation’ of external aid, by which legitimate leaders appropriate for themselves and those close to them a significant volume of resources provided by development agencies (Dasgupta & Beard, 2007; Fritzen, 2007; Mansuri & Rao, 2004; Rao & Ibañez, 2005). The continuous participation of local elites in existing social organisations that provide a safety net for some of the poor, or even the poorest, tends to reproduce those existing structures of power. As a result, it makes it possible for the local elites and those close to them to effectively benefit from ‘linking’ relations at the expense of the poorest residents.

Furthermore, the reproduction of patron-client relations on the basis of brokerage allows the ruling elite to regulate and, to a certain extent, dictate the norms of organised action that take place in a given social space so as to satisfy their particular needs or, at least, without taking into consideration those of the worse-off residents (Cleaver, 2005). This role of gate-keeping for collective action, for instance, could be observed in different instances in San Mateo and San Luis. Collections of money in favour of those facing an emergency, for instance, took place only after recognised community leaders gave a green light to those affected, which in some circumstances included supplicating actions. Similarly, events of collective work to clean or fix the school infrastructure usually fitted better to the working dynamics of the more established farmers rather than those of the poorest residents since the interests of the first ones had greater weight than those worse-off.

c. Symbolic violence:

One of the most important risks related to the limited capacity of local actors to challenge those aforementioned systems of relations (and so as to negotiate better terms of inclusion in both political and economic systems of relations) alludes to their progressive consent to the status quo. That is, the extent to which the existing systems of relations of power affect actors’ agency through conceding and adapting rather than questioning the relations of exploitation and patronage that contribute to the durability of their respective condition. This takes us to the notion of ‘symbolic violence’, “the violence which is exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity (…) [because of actors] taking the world as it is, and it finding natural because their mind is constructed according to the cognitive structures that are issued out of the very structures of the world” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 167-168). It is in this manner that the structural inequalities of power produce self-enforcing effects on individual
behaviour of subordinated people through the internalisation (or socialisation) of such inequalities.

As a result of this process, actors’ engagement in patron-client and exploitative relations over time may contribute to the generation of diverse forms of ‘cultural consent’ among the impoverished and marginalised that help reproduce their own position (Mosse, 2010). On the one hand, those in a dominated position are likely to lack the instruments of symbolic production needed to express their specific point of view and interests in the social space so as to challenge the representations upon which dominant actors legitimate the order prevailing in the social structure; on the other hand, they are also likely to lack the necessary resources and experiences to delineate strategies and interests that would lead to a different state of things (Bourdieu, 1985, 1989). In this respect, to a certain extent, the present study encountered examples of this scenario. Some of the poorest informants, particularly women, were not only aware of their objective limitations to assume a leading role in their corresponding villages but also considered themselves as uncomfortable and ‘unfit’ to play such roles in their communities. By the same token, many local residents did not have any objections in supporting certain political actors despite their proven history of corruption insofar as they were remembered by their successful provision of needed external resources.

10.1.3. The political economy of social capital

The mainstream literature tends to portray the developmental possibilities of social capital in direct relation to the inclusion of the impoverished and marginalised in the functioning of society. In this regard, a recurrent theme in the discourse of international development institutions refers to the need of promoting state-society relationships, or ‘synergy,’ through the establishment of diverse fora for state-society encounters across different levels of policy-making (e.g., participatory budgeting and community-based administration of public services) (Evans, 1996; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000; World Bank, 2001). In a related fashion, this body of work tends to recommend the implementation of public policies that would protect the organisational and property rights of individuals, eliminate existing forms of labour discrimination, and promote significant investments in transport and communications so as to favour the adequate integration of actors into the market (Collier, 1998; Collier & Gunning, 1999; OECD, 2001; World Bank, 2001).

These portrayals of the ideal conditions for social capital to promote pro-poor development, however, appear inadequate. On the one hand, neither the ‘state,’ ‘market,’ nor ‘society’ constitute separate entities, composed of a specific set of actors with an identifiable and homogenous rationale of action whose interests and working dynamics function in an independent manner. On the contrary, their operations are permanently interlocked since different sectors of society are engaged in relations of competition and struggle to impose their particular interests on either policy-making or market transactions (Bourdieu, 2005; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). On the other hand, portraying the developmental possibilities of social capital in terms of its capacity to overcome
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social exclusion overlooks the ways in which inclusion itself is problematic. Many poor individuals owe their deprived material conditions to their limited capacity to influence policy-making and to the disadvantageous terms of exchange in which they are included in the economic and political fields (Hickey & du Toit, 2007; Mosse, 2010). The risk of reification carried by mainstream approaches to the concept and the lack of integration of issues of power in their frameworks, hence, obscure the links between the relations of political and economic power operating in society with the practices and strategies developed by individual actors when engaged in various fields of action.

In this regard, this thesis argues that to adequately grasp the processes and dynamics that allow social capital to contribute to (or prevent) pro-poor mobility, it would be more adequate to re-connect actors’ uses of their relationships to access resources to enhance their livelihoods in relation to the state of power relations operating in the fields in which they were engaged. It is contended that the analysis of social capital should not focus only on the assessment of the state of community relations and local institutions or on the extension of actors’ networks but also upon the relations of power—mediated by public organisations and by private institutions—that shape them. A more critical understanding of the concept, hence, would serve to reveal how both state structures and policies alongside the practices of dominant economic actors play a decisive role in the processes of social organisation at the local level and their potential use in individual and collective processes of accumulation and transformation of capital (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Bourdieu, 2005; Wacquant, 1999).

In summary, these considerations underscore that the pathways opened to actors so as to benefit from social capital are shaped by the wider relations of power operating in society. A finer assessment of the possibilities of social capital to promote pro-poor development, hence, needs to make explicit the relationship between biography and history. That is, to underline that the productive uses that actors make of—(un)consciously developed—relationships through time and the social resources they provide are continuously evolving and being adapted vis-à-vis the strategies and practices of dominant actors, public and private. It highlights the interrelated nature of the social structure, in which actors’ power is not expressed in a direct observable manner but reflected through the mediation of others (e.g., contratistas as a reflection of labour practices of large sugar and rice plantations and the leniency of public agencies that fail to enforce jornaleros’ labour rights) and the historical struggles behind that state of affairs. This study suggests that three interrelated elements of analysis could serve to understand these processes: (i) the objective reality that poor actors face as a result of the state of capital distribution in a field, (ii) the rules of capital accumulation and distribution enforced, and (iii) the reproduction of practices through the chains of exchange taking place in a field.

The first element shows that the particular social resources that actors pursue through investments in relationships and memberships (i.e., strategic use of social relations in response to material needs and class-based interests) are shaped by an objective condition that reflects a particular state of capital distribution in which certain dominant actors’ interests are favoured. Just
as in other regions of the world (Sorensen, 2000; van Bastelaer, 2000; Narayan et al., 2000b), for example, one of the most important productive contributions of social capital observed in San Mateo and San Luis was expressed in the form of informal access to loans and credit for productive purposes. There, all farmers interviewed (micro, small, and medium) applied to friends, relatives, and compadres to access financial resources irrespective of the amount of money they intended to access. These ‘beneficial’ expressions of social capital, however, cannot be understood but in relation to the absence of banks and private credit institutions in the area as well as their establishment of borrowing conditions that only allow large landholders and agro-businesses to borrow money from them. To this one can add the absence of any state-owned promotional credit programmes in the area. This overall scenario, in turn, cannot be fully explained but in relation to the collapse of the Peruvian welfare state in the 1990s and the wave of neoliberal reforms that since then have been established in the country, which in turn liquidated most state-owned banks and public rural credit institutions.

The objective reality that the poor face, and hence their strategic use of social capital, can also be related to the alignment of the state and other forms of political power (e.g., town halls) with certain interests. The extended use of friends and relatives to access temporary jobs (farm and non-farm) among most sectors of the local population, for example, reflects not only the limited local farm productivity due to environmental dry conditions but also the lack of attention paid by the state to the continuous demands of farmers for significant investments in irrigation infrastructure (particularly in water reservoirs). In this respect, the sole annual harvest that villagers can attain from their farms heavily contrasts with the situation of other valleys of the department, such as that of the valley of the Chancay, to the south of San Mateo and San Luis, where the medium-sized dam of Tinajones benefits the main sugar plantations operating around the capital of the department. The lack of interest of the state in benefiting the large groups of micro and small farmers in the area of study is further reflected in the large investments provided to the irrigation project Olmos in the northern part of the department. In process of culmination this decade, the state plans to recuperate over 40,000 Has. of non-cultivated land to be sold to private investors via public bidding. The areas of land on sale are only available to relatively large investors, insofar as the minimum extension of land to be sold is 250 Has., which could be bought individually or in group. In a similar direction, albeit at more reduced scale, the continuous reliance of San Mateo and San Luis villagers on intermediaries—bonded by relations of friendship or compadrazgo—to sell their farm output partly responds to the deteriorated state of the access roads to the area (dirt tracks), which despite continuous promises from local authorities, has yet to be asphalted. In the same direction, the bonds that local small and medium farmers with worse-off relatives or friends so as to secure the necessary labour to cultivate or harvest their farms constitutes as much a customary tradition as well as a necessity, given that during the busiest periods of the agricultural calendar they have to compete with more important economic agents to access labour.
A second element to emphasise is that the capacity of social capital to favour the poor’s efforts of social mobility is conditioned by the rules of capital accumulation and distribution that dominant actors enforce in a given field. This could be observed initially in the processes of transformation of capital and the rates of conversion operating in a given field as a result of dominant actors’ practices. For instance, in an economic setting characterised by low investments in technology even by important sugar and rice plantations, as in the area surrounding the villages of San Mateo and San Luis, the kind of jobs that villagers can typically attain through their connections are limited to manual labour; that is, to the transformation of one’s physical strength into cash (i.e., work as jornaleros). By the same token, the acquisition of cultural capital through one’s relations (e.g., educated friends who teach one’s children) or memberships (e.g., belonging to study groups or cultural clubs) can rarely serve to acquire better paid work. Furthermore, these practices help translating gender-based forms of subordination into material differences, insofar as women are less likely to attain a similar income than male workers due their differences in physical strength.

The capacity of social capital to favour the poor could also be further constrained by means of state intervention. This refers not only to whether the government recognises citizens’ rights to organise themselves or not (Fox, 1996; Narayan, 1999; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000), but also to the formalisation of certain forms of capital conversion and distribution that favour the interests of dominant actors. In this respect, the state’s alignment with certain interests can strongly constrain the possibilities of social capital to work in favour of the most impoverished sectors of society even within spaces of collective action. For example, despite the evidence that the existing community-based administration of local water resources tends to efficiently manage this scarce resource (Vos, 2005), it appears evident that the rules governing its processes of decision-making (the number of votes attributed to each user is, by law, proportional to the extension of their property up to 20 Has. of land) and selection of authorities (micro farmers are not entitled to be elected as maximum authorities of those organisations and it is compulsory for them to have an above average level of formal education) tend to contribute to the reproduction of both socioeconomic inequalities in the area and relations of dependency between worse and better-off farmers. As discussed previously (§ 10.1.1.b and 10.1.1.c.) this social order not only secures better networking opportunities for medium farmers but, critically, gives them the capacity to shape the order of priority for irrigation purposes to certain areas, which typically are of their property or of those related to them. This, in turn, explains a local empirical expression of social capital by which some micro farmers appeal to better-off neighbours in order to access water directly from them and, hence, secure the necessary water for their crop year.

A third element to underscore is that the kind of relationships that actors establish and (re)produce as part of their ‘strategies’ to preserve or improve their position in a particular field are equally conditioned by the nature of the exchanges that dominant actors impose. The observed continuous reproduction of patron-client political relationships in San Mateo and San Luis, for instance, could be related to the modes of operation that characterise the Peruvian political system
as a whole, both in terms of policy-making and in relation to the ‘political game’ played at the regional and national levels during election periods. Although the *Popular Cook* and *Glass of Milk* committees operating in those villages, for example, rely on the organisation and collective work of women to help reduce the costs of food among the local population, to a large extent these organisations are dependent on the state for their sustainability, which provides them with free powdered milk and heavily subsidised staples. This was a condition that the government of Alberto Fujimori in the 1990s took advantage of. It was under his authoritarian regime that those food-security programmes expanded throughout the country as part of a process of building up a nationwide network of local clienteles for political purposes (Arce, 2005; World Bank, 2007); a process that resulted in the formation of beneficiary committees in the area of study. In a similar direction, the observed reproduction of local clientelistic relationships between village leaders and residents constitutes as much a strategy for personal political and economic advancement as a de facto norm regulating political practices at both the national and regional levels. In a context characterised by the absence of established parties with recognisable and loyal party members and a network of aligned grassroots organisations, the flimsy and constantly changeable alliances that political parties develop to compete in municipal, congressional, and presidential elections are based on the mobilisation of leaders, who are thus expected to make significant economic contributions whilst mobilising their corresponding network of clients (Arce, 2005; PNUD, 2006).

This scenario can also be transferred to the kind of economic relations predominant in the local area. Informality and relations of exploitation constitute common practices across all different sectors of the regional economy, including those of major regional economic agents, which in turn shape the kind of economic relations observed at the local level. For example, the need for local actors to establish close connections with *contrattistas* (even if based on exploitative terms) to secure jobs in large agricultural states located in other valleys of the department or to access advances in cash (in exchange for future work) reflects not only the extreme poverty of residents but also the modes of practice of the administrators of those privately owned estates who rely on those shady figures to access cheap labour. Finally, these practices would not be understood but in relation to the predominance of labour-intensive modes of production in the area (i.e., low levels of technification), even among the most important regional agricultural producers.

The interrelated nature of these three factors, in turn, reflects the inherent ambiguity of ‘social capital’ in order to promote social mobility. Social capital can contribute to actors’ economic well-being whilst reproducing those inequitable social structures that make necessary the mobilisation of one’s relationships to begin with. The need to maximise all expressions of social capital as a principle of action for government and development agencies is hence rather unclear. Poor actors’ reliance on their relationships to access loans, avoid malfeasance, and obtain short-term jobs, appears on many occasions as ‘second-best solutions’ when compared to accessing formal institutions such as promotional credit institutions, a well-functioning and independent judiciary system, monitoring public agencies, or formal employment.
10.2. Assessing ‘building’ social capital efforts through a participatory intervention

Mainstream recommendations for social capital building and mobilisation intend to craft the ‘right’ kinds of institutions and relations by means of institutional arrangements that, supposedly, create an incentive structure that encourages actors to align their personal interests with those of the community, hence cultivating a civic disposition to collaborate for the public good. In this manner, the formal inclusion of marginalised groups is expected to provide a democratic space to build valuable and mutually beneficial connections; democratic governance is supposed to give all community members a say in strategic decisions—thus generating a stronger sense of ownership and higher motivation of compliance—whilst effective monitoring and sanctioning of free-riding or malfeasance would mould people’s interactions and limit self-interested actions (Dongier et al., 2002; Ostrom & Ahn, 2003, 2009).

The evidence presented in this thesis, however, indicates that a participatory project closely following those recommendations for institutional crafting tends to inadequately capture the complexity of social reality. This study argues that this results from their problematic integration of essentialist understandings of actors and social actions. On the one hand, it vindicates the figure of a rational actor guided by the principle of maximisation of benefits, whose capacity to build and use his connections (instead of relationships) is unaffected by his material conditions. On the other hand, as members of a particular group or ‘community’, all actors are assumed to be guided by the same cost-benefit considerations. Once a particular incentive configuration is institutionalised, in turn, it is expected that the nascent normative structure is equally enforced across all the population in a rather automatic manner, independent from processes of negotiation and power relations.

Following the elements of critical analysis presented in the first part of this chapter (§ 10.1.), it is contended that the emphasis placed on formalising institutional arrangements (e.g., first- and second-tier organisations of beneficiaries) and promoting idealised forms of cooperation (e.g., public work sessions) pays insufficient attention to the manner in which class-based quotidian practices and dispositions to action shape beneficiaries’ patterns of inclusion and exclusion into the spaces of action opened by a development intervention. In the same direction, having adopted those idealistic types of actors and communities, the intervention framework that was implemented overlooked the political nature of the participatory space generated by the intervention. It is further argued that this kind of intervention not only runs the risk of preserving the pre-existing social hierarchy and power structure, as widely discussed in the development literature (Cook & Kothari, 2001; Hickey & Mohan, 2004; Lewis & Mosse, 2006; Mansuri & Rao, 2004; Mosse, 2005), but also of concentrating benefits of social capital building—in terms of a wider expansion of relationships and greater access to social resources—among the better-off. As a result, although the project itself appeared to have achieved most of its objectives of improving beneficiaries’ material well-being as well as of providing local social organisations with certain access to public agencies, the specific
conclusion that the contribution of the forms of social capital promoted during the intervention appeared to have enhanced socioeconomic inequalities whilst preserving the pre-existing social order.

10.2.1. The expansion of actors’ relations:

As highlighted by other works (Cleaver, 2001, 2002; Cook & Kothari, 2001; Mosse, 2005), the space generated by the project did not operate isolated from the socioeconomic and cultural dynamics that shape actors’ economic practices; instead, it was immersed in it. This implied that the participatory space did not appear to provide a level playing field for actors to expand their networks of relations that could grant access to valuable resources. The unequal distribution of economic and human resources and actors’ differently structured positioning in the local social hierarchy constrained their capacity for engaging in meaningful project participation. The end result of this scenario was that although the study found evidence that the project managed to expand beneficiaries’ connections, as compared to non-beneficiaries, at the same time it was observed that this process was neither widespread nor equitable (§ 8.1.). On the one hand, the expansion of beneficiaries’ external and vertical connections of economic value was concentrated among the better-off; on the other, the village-level network structures had not changed in favour of the worse-off, who were still characterised by their lack of supportive relationships within and beyond their villages. On this issue, the manner in which beneficiaries participated in the networking opportunities generated by the project did not significantly differ in San Mateo as compared to San Luis. To avoid an unnecessary repetition regarding the specific process of network expansion in both sites, hence, the corresponding findings from each town are subsumed in the sub-sections to follow.

Four interrelated elements appear to have led to this differentiated process of network expansion in both sites studied: (i) the inadequate consideration of the associated costs of full and active participation in the project, (ii) the differentiated involvement of beneficiaries in the spaces of participation generated by the project according to their class-based interests, (iii) the assumption of a single incentive structure to promote participation despite the presence of different quotidian practices and lifestyles, and (iv) the replication of local social norms within the formal normative framework proposed by the intervention.

a. Costs of participation:

Participatory interventions are characterised by imposing higher costs of participation to their beneficiaries as compared to top-down assistencialist approaches, particularly among those who assume leading positions in the newly created organisations for their implementation (Cleaver, 2001; Platteau & Abraham, 2002). This circumstance interacted with actors’ material conditions so as to, unwittingly, generate greater networking opportunities for better-off residents rather than for the poorest ones. In this regard, it was observed that households with very small stocks of physical (cultivable land) and human capital (few household members of working age) had a more limited involvement in the
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project. This occurred because they dedicated most of their time to work as jornaleros in other local or external farms, were not fully settled in the area (living as tenants of other farmers), and counted upon few household members to help them to participate in project activities. More established farmers, in contrast, did not recur as often to extended periods of economic migration and so were more able to invest a greater amount of time in the project.

In addition, just as in other local social organisations, objective barriers were observable in relation to beneficiaries’ capacity to assume a leading position in the project committees, which in turn would improve their access to the local elite, public officers, and developmental agencies operating beyond the district. On the one hand, most beneficiaries lacked the necessary economic stability to dedicate important periods of time to regularly supervise the programmed project activities (e.g., overseeing weekly public work sessions and attending monthly assemblies of the local committee and the federation of village committees). In addition, most residents also lacked the necessary useful relations beyond the local area and with other local leaders (social capital), local prestige and legitimate authority (symbolic capital), and formal education as well as knowledge of bureaucratic procedures (cultural capital) to organise and mobilise the population and efficiently lead those new organisations. The resulting scenario, hence, was one traditionally associated to ‘elite capture’ (Dasgupta & Beard, 2007; Fritzen, 2007; Mansuri & Rao, 2004; Rao & Ibañez, 2005) with the acquiescence of most beneficiaries.

b. Position-taking in beneficiary committees:

A core proposition of the mainstream social capital literature is that actors’ dispositions to cooperate could be shaped by the incentives, particularly of the material nature, provided by external organisations if integrated and mobilised through local institutional arrangements (Ostrom, 1992; Ostrom & Ahn, 2003). The findings reported in the empirical chapters, however, showed that it is difficult to assume a homogeneous rationale of action behind beneficiaries’ decision to participate in the project and, hence, to assume a single incentive structure that could promote widespread cooperative and supportive relations. Instead, it was observed that actors’ positions in the local social space, simultaneously based upon material and non-material factors (e.g., gender or symbolic capital), generated a mixed variety of considerations through which they evaluated their approach to and involvement in the intervention. In this manner, it was observed that actors’ initial position tended to shape the roles (positions) they would assume in the spaces generated by the project as well as the forms of interaction they would conduct within it. This resulted in a differentiated process or network expansion according to the particular positions that actors assumed within the intervention.

First of all, while economic motivation played a significant role in actors’ decision to participate in the project and the degree to which they did it, residents’ assessments of the productive benefits they could obtain from the project tended to be assessed differently by
residents according to their socioeconomic profile. The poorest residents, as compared to the not-so-poor, for instance, reported different material and training interests. They had little resources to sustain an expanding livestock and lacked access to significant patches of forest from where to derive other economic activities, so they reported greater interest and participation in those activities related to minor forms of livestock and household investments. By the same token, some of them saw the potential access to livestock more as a form of accessing an economic reserve rather than as an incentive for productive investments. In turn, the not-so-poor residents, particularly small farmers, appeared to be the ones who had a greater level of engagement in most project components and hence greater opportunities to expand or strengthen their local and external connections insofar as they shared a similar interest in participating in those activities aimed at the expansion of local livestock and the recuperation of forest resources. In consequence, it was observed that the spaces of participation generated by the project generated greater interaction among established micro and small farmers rather than among the entire socioeconomic groups of beneficiaries.

Second, gender constituted a mediating factor for the expression of beneficiary households’ material needs. In some cases, households’ involvement in the project was led by women who approached it in relation to their traditional domestic roles, thereby prioritising access to household infrastructure (energy-efficient kitchens and latrines). In addition, women expressed a greater involvement in activities associated with their traditional domestic responsibilities, such as training events on the cultivation of vegetable gardens, health and sanitation, and formative activities with children. This disposition to a certain kind of participation interacted with households’ material conditions. It was mainly not-so-poor women who expressed such interests insofar as they were already established residents of the villages studied, were homeowners (micro or small farmers), and had already invested significantly in their living conditions (e.g., well-structured houses of adobe). A lesser degree of involvement, in turn, was observed among the poorest female peasants—who possessed homes in very precarious conditions and in some cases lacked enough space to install the proposed benefits—and the relatively well-off, who already had at their disposal better-built houses or had the resources to realise such household investments on their own.

Third, it was observed that those residents in a position of authority in other local social organisations tended to reproduce those leading roles in the intervention studied. In fact their intervention was decisive for the success of the project. Since its conception, local leaders invested their multiple endowments of capital, including non-material forms such as symbolic (prestige and credit) as well as social (network of clientes) to make the planning of participatory events possible (e.g., participatory community assessment). In recognition to their efforts and as confirmation of their already de facto position of authority, they were elected as representatives of the beneficiaries in the corresponding project committees. The scenario of ‘elite capture’ observed in the area, however, did not result in acts of
mismanagement or misappropriation of resources, at least during the period of study. Furthermore, it was observed instead that established village leaders did not approach the project primarily in response to the material incentives it provided. These actors, mostly better-off residents (small farmers), instead appeared to have approached the project in consideration of their roles as mediators between external resources and residents, or as ‘development brokers’ (Bierschenk, Chaveau, & de Sardan, 2000; Lewis & Mosse, 2006; Platteau & Abraham, 2002). In this manner, they appeared to have participated in the space generated by the intervention primarily as part of their strategies to reinforce and sustain their local authority and status (symbolic capital).

c. **Lifestyle adaptations to project involvement:**

The establishment of a single framework of participation for project beneficiaries did not correspond with a local reality characterised not only by the presence of different levels and forms of material needs as well as of interests but also of associated lifestyles. The intervention, in this manner, demanded certain lifestyle adaptations that suited differently local households according to their material conditions.

The core issue on this subject referred to the demands of regular participation of beneficiaries in project activities; particularly in the form of weekly public work sessions (two sessions per week) and monthly assemblies. Access to the project material benefits was conditioned on participation in those public work sessions as a central mechanism to foster a sense of solidarity and public interest among beneficiaries whilst promoting a levelled field of interaction between beneficiaries and, indirectly, combating assistencialist practices. Continuous participation in those activities, however, assumed a regular presence in the village, which was not a reality for many of the poorest families who relied on work as *jornaleros* in areas outside their villages. In the same direction, it assumed that most families could spare some of their family labour for activities that had no immediate economic reward, which thereby failed to heed that households’ endowments of human capital and their respective needs of it as part of their economic strategies differed across the population; in particular according to the agriculture calendar.

As a result of these circumstances, it was observed that beneficiaries from all socioeconomic sectors decided to use those household members that spend more time in their villages and who are the least paid and sought after for work as *jornaleros* to participate in those regular project activities: women (partners and eldest daughters). Public work sessions and assemblies, hence, became essentially female spaces. In addition, it was observed that the degree of interaction among female beneficiaries in these activities tended to differ according to their socioeconomic condition. The poorest female beneficiaries were more irregular in their participation in public work sessions. Their greater involvement in the conduction of income generating activities and their limited human capital to spare (worse off households had fewer members of working age than better off ones) led to a more limited participation.
In comparison, female residents whose economic contribution to the family centred on looking after the family farm or rearing livestock had greater opportunities to participate in the project given the time they spend in their respective village.

In this regard, rather than facilitating the regular interaction among previously less well-integrated residents of the villages of San Mateo and San Luis, the project promoted new spaces of encounter among those who already tended to interact more regularly on a quotidian basis within those locations: not-so-poor women who attended the family farm, looked after their minor livestock, and remained regularly attached to the local area so as to look after their children and homes. In addition, it is important to highlight that such greater interaction among women was less likely to be translated into economic partnerships given that women have little command over productive resources and limited say in farmers’ financial investments. Furthermore, a subsequent implication of these different degrees of participation was that, since project benefits were provided in exchange for ‘accumulated labour’ in project activities, better-off beneficiaries acquired more rapidly the material benefits provided by the project than the worst-off.

d. Social norms and project rules:

Mainstream recommendations of building social capital customarily emphasise the importance of formalised norms that endorse democratic structures of authority, high levels of accountability through assemblies, inclusive norms of participation, and effective enforcement of rules that encourages collective action. All these measures are expected promote greater ‘community cohesion’ whilst empowering previously marginalised sectors of the population so as to participate in community governance (Uphoff & Wijayaratna, 2000; Uphoff, 2004; Dongier et al., 2002). Critical examinations of participatory methods, however, have pointed out that social norms could be as influential as, if not more than, formal normative frameworks. Furthermore, they have been observed to shape the manner in which those normative structures are effectively applied in practice; thereby highlighting the differentiated capacity of actors to exercise their agency to negotiate their way through those sanctioned opportunities and rewards so as to benefit from them (Cleaver 2001,2002; Kothari, 2001; Mosse, 2005). Aside from the particular material or political benefits that project participants may accrue from reshaping project rules, the empirical findings of this thesis have highlighted that social norms equally shape the extent to which actors may profit from the networking opportunities generated by a participatory intervention.

In this regard, despite the presence of democratic mechanisms for the selection of authorities, in a context where development brokers play a central role in bringing external agencies and where of patrimonlistic and clientelistic practices dominate local political relations, there were effective limitations to the capacity of beneficiaries to freely elect their representatives. It was so that in the villages of San Mateo and San Luis, the project already had visible heads...
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since its planning stages, a scenario that was accompanied by a relative sense of ownership attributed to leaders’ dedicated involvement in its initial conception (Bierschenk, Chaveau, & de Sardan, 2000; Mansuri & Rao, 2004). The formal election of authorities served mainly to formalise the authority brought in by village leaders. In the same direction, the elections that were held during the lifespan of the project constituted more ratification processes rather than competitive democratic elections. In this manner, not only the initially elected leaders maintained their positions in the committees but also the election of two new authorities during the project lifespan came from the same group of acquainted leaders, in one case even related by blood to the president of one committee. The mobilisation of leaders’ clientele and the reproduction of patron-client relations by virtue of the reinforced position of committee leaders as brokers between development agencies and the local population, therefore, served to reduce the possibilities of contesting leaders’ positions during the lifespan of the project (Fritzen, 2007). In consequence, the networking opportunities provided by the intervention to generate ‘bridges’ with economic agents from other regions and ‘links’ with political figures and public officials tended to concentrate among the established elite.

Some structural factors, in addition, served to limit the opportunities of beneficiaries, particularly the poorest ones, to develop more meaningful relations with the local elite. First of all, the costs of participation mentioned in the previous section affected their capacity to make regular their presence in the decision-making instances of the project. As described previously, the poorest residents tended to have more irregular participation in monthly assemblies, which reduced their opportunities to express their opinions. In turn, the overwhelming participation of women in those assemblies, mostly not-so-poor ones, limited the capacity of those spaces to indeed generate active and outspoken participation that could favour the inclusion of non-leading residents into the local political dynamics. This resulted from the rather passive role that many local women assumed in public events; in addition, they have some restrictions to commit their household resources to initiate a public act insofar as it was men who most commonly were the ultimate decision-makers within the household (Cleaver, 2005; Molyneux, 2002). In this manner, both leaders and many beneficiaries indicated that assemblies tended to constitute spaces for the dissemination of project-related information rather than for the generation of debates.

The social embeddedness of the intervention’s operative framework also implied that participation in the different spaces of interaction generated by the project were affected by the same rules of exclusion operating in the local social space. This was observed in the direct replication of the gender-based division of economic roles across the productive training activities developed. Despite their contributory role to rearing households’ livestock, for example, less than a handful of women were reported to have completed training courses on livestock management. In contrast, their involvement in those training sessions aimed at producing derived products of local forest resources (e.g., preparing organic syrups and marmalades) for commercial purposes, were attended exclusively by women. In the same
direction, only women were involved in those training sessions on nutrition, cultivation of vegetable gardens, and healthy domestic habits. The project, in this manner, favoured the interaction among residents of the same sex; men and women’s networking opportunities operated relatively apart from each other.

10.2.2. The returns of building social capital efforts

Successful accounts of building social capital efforts usually concentrate on either the capacity of development interventions to promote efficient social organisations for the generation or management of collective goods (Durston, 1999; Krishna, 2002; Uphoff & Wijayaratna, 2000) or on the capacity of the organised beneficiaries to access external forms of public or private support (Bebbington & Carrol, 2000). Although such accounts provide appealing evidence regarding the developmental potential of social capital, two core limitations prevent the optimism portrayed in the mainstream literature. First, they do not provide an adequate account of the terms of engagement of different sectors of a population into the relationships and organisations sponsored by development agencies. Second, those accounts of success usually overlook how the material benefits generated by those interventions interact with actors’ capital endowments and long-term economic relationships so as to be able to effectively improve their material well-being and promote social mobility.

In this regard, building on the framework presented in the first part of this chapter, this thesis argues that a more adequate assessment of the process of social capital building should simultaneously examine the nature of the relationships (re)produced in the spaces of participation generated by the intervention as well as the manner in which the newly available social resources interact with beneficiaries’ initial endowments of capital. In addition, this assessment needs to take into account the distributional processes—and struggles—taking place within both project committees and the overall local social space (village or neighbourhood) so as to effectively assess the capacity of social capital building efforts to promote pro-poor development.

The most basic foundation for positive social capital returns is that actors are able to expand their sets of connections upon which practical relations of mutual support could be developed. As described in the previous section (§ 10.2.1.), however, the evidence collected showed that the expansion of beneficiaries’ connections was more noticeable among the not-so-poor residents. It was they who were the main protagonists of the project’s efforts of strengthening and expanding connections by virtue of their capacity to cope with the costs of participation generated by the intervention as well as the greater compatibility between the activities and their lifestyles as well as with their (economic and non-economic) interests. In this respect, it was those beneficiaries who were homeowners and possessed patches of forest, minimum stocks of livestock, as well as access to family labour (household members of working age) at their disposal who reported a greater expansion of the most valuable—external and vertical—connections (§ 8.1.). Furthermore, it was principally the elected committee leaders around whom connections tended to expand in various directions, at the local, external, and vertical levels.
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This differentiated expansion of networks in favour of the better-off, in addition, was observed to reinforce unequal local social structures insofar as the intervention, during the period of study, did not change dramatically the nature of the relationships of exchange that were predominant in the area. As proposed in the mainstream literature, the project worked under the assumption that active participation of beneficiaries across all levels of decision-making would mechanically facilitate the process of social capital building by means of repeated interaction and greater involvement in the management of collective resources (Dongier et al., 2002; Uphoff, 2004). This vision that participation in associations, through inclusive norms and democratic procedures, would serve to generate the expansion of poor actors’ supportive relationships and favourable economic partnerships over time seemed optimistic. The emphasis on formal institutional arrangements and the enforcement of norms observed among the beneficiaries of San Mateo and San Luis, the same as in other areas of the world (Cleaver, 2002; Cook & Kothari, 2001; Mosse, 2005), left unaffected the relations of power operating within villages and social organisations. In this manner, it was observed that the residents who were more able to profit from the mobilisation and expansion of relations in the area of study were those who were already in a relatively dominant position and whose connections were embedded within exploitative or patron-client relationships that more often than not worked in their favour. Better-off farmers, for example, were more able to mobilise their local relations to establish commercial agreements with worse-off residents in order to acquire their expanding livestock (a project outcome) in advantageous terms. In this manner, their greater access to cash and the relationships of authority they had over some residents allowed them to accumulate greater herds for their commercialisation in urban markets.

The reproduction of existing leaderships further enhanced local socioeconomic differences by means of social capital building. First, because of their recurrent involvement in the different fora generated by the intervention, it was this group of actors who more visibly were able to develop useful relationships for economic purposes with external actors. Via their progressively closer relationships with the project staff, they had direct access to technical and commercial information from the personnel as well as with those economic agents associated with them (e.g., new livestock or agricultural traders in other urban areas with NGO presence). In addition, because of their continuous interactions with other villages’ political elites involved in the project and the common interests they shared due to their project responsibilities and their similar leading roles in their villages, San Mateo and San Luis representatives were observed to develop certain relationships of mutual support with them. Whilst these relationships on occasion were projected to the economic realm (e.g., to access temporary jobs), such relations critically served them to further enhance their mediating role (or brokerage) and hence the patron-client relationships with the local population (e.g., by means of exchanging information about bureaucratic procedures and mediating access to public officials or political figures).

On this particular subject, it should be noted that in the development literature there is a tendency to portray that elite dominance is only negative if they imply misappropriation of resources or open exclusion of deprived actors. Furthermore, some view that, instead of being
detrimental, elite domination may help interventions in reaching their developmental objectives since forms of ‘benevolent elite domination’, attributed to altruistic behaviour, have been observed to facilitate a more efficient and effective project whilst avoiding issues of corruption and exclusion (Rao & Ibañez, 2003; Mansuri & Rao, 2007; Dasgupta & Beard, 2007). By contrast, the analytical framework proposed in this study implies looking for the benefits of social capital building beyond the project context. In this manner, the evidence presented in this study showed that elite domination, either benevolent or not, involves the (un)planned capture of social capital benefits by the better-off; thereby reproducing material as well as social inequalities.

In addition, it becomes apparent that the reproduction of existing leadership, the constrained manner in which democratic and inclusive norms of participation were applied, and the gender-based forms of involvement in project activities did very little to challenge the existing forms of symbolic violence operating at the local level. On the one hand, women were observed to reproduce their traditional subordinated domestic and economic roles, leaving in the hands of men the exploitation and commercialisation of the most valuable project benefits acquired (i.e., livestock). On the other, the predominant involvement of women in monthly assemblies, less accustomed to speak in public and with lesser decision-making capacity regarding the use of household assets, the irregular participation of the poorest beneficiaries, as well as the position of authority from which local leaders controlled the implementation of the project since its initial stages, reduced the capacity of local subordinated groups to challenge the existing local political order to assume the control of the project.

As discussed previously (§ 10.1.2.1.), in turn, the resources that actors accrue through their relation interacts with actors’ initial endowments of capital, thereby rendering different returns according to actors’ material condition. Even if the poorest actors were able to expand their connections, they were observed to face several limitations to turn them into advantageous forms of cooperation or mutual support. Without resources, these forms of support are difficult to sustain in the long term insofar as they imply obligations from each part that not all actors are equally able to afford. For example, although some landless residents and very poor micro farmers may have become better acquainted with better-off neighbours, they were still unable to establish equal relations of exchange with them since their newly acquired small herds have not substantially changed their material conditions. Given their limited resources, the poorest beneficiaries typically used the provided livestock as an economic reserve (sold by the unit when cash-strapped), it did not prompt productive investments. At the same time, in cases when new amicable and supportive relations were established between beneficiaries and neighbours or external actors, it became apparent that the social resources the first ones now could access favoured better material conditions mostly among those who already possessed over-the-average endowments of capital. For example, agreements to share labour power imply that there is some form of physical capital over which human capital can be applied; however, that was not the case for most landless residents of San Mateo and San Luis.
In this manner, the main observable returns of social capital that could be directly related to project activities concentrated around the better-off. Their initial endowments of capital (e.g., patches of forest, landholdings, basic livestock) allowed them, first, to have a more active role in project activities and hence expand their networks of connections; next, to enter in relations of mutual obligations with other villagers or external actors; and, lastly, to expand more rapidly the benefits they received from the project (e.g., livestock resources, technical training, medicines on credit, basic productive infrastructure) to develop new commercial initiatives. The interaction of these factors was most salient in relation to the cases of some small farmers who were able to more rapidly expand their own livestock resources because of their initial possession of small herds, greater access to fodder, more frequent participation in public work sessions (i.e., more rapid access to project benefits), and greater involvement in training sessions and technical supervision provided by the project. This expansion of assets, in turn, was accompanied by the expansion of their connections due to their project involvement (either through other small farmers or project staff), which led to some initial exploration of commercial relations. With time, for example, this resulted in some initiatives of livestock trading, by which some small farmers appealed to their local relations with dependent worse-off residents to acquire their livestock at low prices and hence commercialise larger herds through those newly commercial relationships established in nearby towns. This dynamic contrasted heavily with that of the poorest beneficiaries. They not only had a more irregular involvement in project activities and, hence, a more limited capacity of expanding their connections, but also fewer assets with which to expand the livestock provided by the project. Their economic practices, in addition, were usually marred by relations of dependency with other economic agents in exchange for manual jobs or advanced payments. In those cases, the livestock provided by the project was used as an economic reserve to be sold when cash-strapped; however, the circuits of commercialisation for those animals were observed to usually follow the same relations of dependency in which they were already engaged (e.g., sold to farmers with whom they already had labour arrangements).

The extent to which these processes developed in the villages studied appeared to have been shaped by the material conditions and socioeconomic structure of each town. More specifically, the more extended poverty and inequality present in the village of San Luis seems to have rendered greater opportunities for mobilising and expanding small and medium farmers’ relations of unequal exchange with worse-off neighbours than those observed in San Mateo (around 70% of households reported an expenditure level below the rural extreme poverty line in San Luis compared to 55% of San Mateo households; in turn, in terms of monthly expenditure per capita, the households in the top quartile in San Luis reported spending 3.5 times as much as their counterparts in the lowest quartile whilst the same ratio was 2.2 in San Mateo) (Graph 4.2). The qualitative data obtained showed that the development of livestock trading initiatives and the mobilisation of better-off farmers’ relations of friendship or kinship with poorer neighbours so as to expand their volumes of trade were more extended in the poorer setting (eight cases as compared to four identified during the last year of data-collection). The greater degree of geographical isolation of San Luis in
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comparison to San Mateo, in turn, appears to have enhanced this process, given that worse-off residents from the second site revealed having more opportunities to commercialise their improved farm production in the nearby capitals of district or with regular visitors of the area than their San Luis counterparts (San Mateo constitutes a point of transit to access urban markets for five villages located deeper inside the rural parts of the province, including San Luis, as well as the destination for most children attending school in the area and for their parents). The evidence, hence, suggests that mainstream building social capital efforts through participatory methods in contexts of high levels of inequality—based on the presence of an extended class of very poor residents inserted in patron-client relations rather than on the presence of rich residents—may favour the expansion of local material inequalities by means of social capital mobilisation.

10.2.3. The state and linking social capital

A recurrent theme in the mainstream social capital literature is the need to establish functional links—‘synergy’—between the state and civil society and the expansion of vertical connections, or ‘linking’ social capital, with actors in a position of economic or political power so as to ‘scale-up’ local development efforts (Evans, 1996; Woolcock, 1998, 2001; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). The evidence presented in this study has highlighted, however, that rather than favouring pro-poor development, the prescriptive implementation of such connections can replicate or reinforce adverse terms of political engagement of the poor whilst neglecting one of the central aims of participatory approaches, that of empowering the poor through the exercise of citizenship under democratic principles of participation (Durston, 2004; Hickey & Mohan, 2004).

On this subject, this thesis considers that a more adequate assessment of the contribution of such efforts could be made once analysed within the dynamics of ‘fields’. Linking beneficiaries’ and residents’ representatives with public officers can be seen as inserting them into a different space of action, that of policy-making, or ‘bureaucratic field’ (Bourdieu, 2005), with its own systems of relations and modes of practice. There are three elements to underscore in this respect. First is that the organised poor are likely to assume a subordinated position in this field of action by virtue of their limited resources, material and non-material (e.g., bureaucratic ‘know-how’ or political alliances). As a result, they have almost no capacity to shape the norms that govern actors’ negotiations and exchanges within this field of action; at least not in the short-term. As new arrivals to the ‘game’, they are instead forced to adapt to this dynamic. In consequence, their capacity to establish favourable terms of exchange with other actors so as to access valuable forms of support is limited (e.g., to be granted major funds for infrastructure investments as compared to book donations). For example, in the present study it was observed that the connections and benefits that beneficiaries could obtain from their meeting with public agencies sponsored by the project kept them in the periphery of local policy-making instances. Their interactions were mainly with public officers representing the offices of social support of their respective agencies rather than with key political authorities. In turn, these meetings rendered, first of all, information about formal instances of social support and their selection criteria to approve requests from the population and,
second, small gestures in the form of school material donations or public health campaigns. Even after project completion (mid 2008), organised leaders had no prospects that any of their major interests (significant infrastructure investments in public services and irrigation) could be achieved any time soon.

Second, the forms in which beneficiaries are expected to exercise their citizenship within the context of a local project may not be functional to the dynamics operating in the bureaucratic field. The adverse inclusion of poor people’s organisations in bureaucratic processes may be further enhanced by the predominance of inadequate modes of practice, such as corruption, paternalism, authoritarianism, and clientelism, all of which are recurrently observed in the daily functioning of bureaucratic spaces in which the poor participate (Durston, 2004; Narayan, 1999). In other words, developing ‘functional links’ with state agencies does not automatically guarantee adequate terms of exchange. This can potentially lead to tensions with established public agencies and project officers as well as to different forms of repression or exclusion, on the one hand, or the adoption of undesirable practices among beneficiaries (e.g., in corrupt systems actors are forced to choose between accepting or actively participating in corrupt activities or else receiving no state support at all). There is the risk that in order to ‘get things done’, particularly to access external resources that could help leaders to preserve their local authority and prestige, local actors are forced to adopt and replicate practices that go against the principles of empowerment pursued by participatory interventions.

On this subject, a certain form of dissension was observed in the project studied. Despite the efforts of the project staff to pursue developing connections between local leaders and the town-hall, elected representatives opted instead to preserve their distance as much as possible from engaging in the activities of their local authorities. This initial decision for an ‘autonomous path to development’ (Fox, 1996) responded to two concomitant factors: first, committee representatives were aware of the customary political interests of village leaders and, hence, were afraid that political clashes could manifest within the project, thereby jeopardising their good relations with the NGO and, by the same token, their access to that external forms of support. Second, they were afraid that the potential politisation of their organisations could imply losing control of local committees in favour of the town-hall or other political actor.

Third, historical power relations tend to develop among actors a system of appreciation, classification, and dispositions to action that legitimise the existing order (Bourdieu, 1977; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). This factor has significant implications for the efforts of promoting state-society relations insofar as the poor may approach those bureaucratic and political spaces of action following schemes of thought that are not entirely compatible with those proposed by intervening agencies. In the area of study, for example, it was appreciated that much like non-leading residents, committee authorities approached the spaces of dialogue with public officers and development agencies under a clientelistic and assistencialist understanding of how external support is attained. In this manner, they privileged presenting requests for donations or diverse
unconditional forms of support rather than exploring formal spaces of dialogue or technical mechanisms of cooperation. This, despite that, at the time, these leaders had already attended several training sessions on how to formulate development projects or technical plans for submission to the town hall as well as on democratic procedures of governance for the operation of their respective committees.

Assuming organised beneficiaries' interactions with public agencies as a form of involvement in the bureaucratic field, in addition, helps to uncover the different starting positions that specific groups occupy in those systems of relations even though they may officially belong to the same over-encompassing association. In this respect, it was observed that the different initial positions that San Mateo and San Luis leaders occupied in the local bureaucratic field appeared to have, in turn, shaped the kind of returns they obtained during the period of study from the vertical links the project sponsored. As detailed previously (Chapter 4), San Mateo had benefitted from greater public investments than San Luis and enjoyed a greater degree of access to the town hall and associated public agencies. This was observable in the presence of a public school covering primary and secondary education, a public pre-school centre, and a catholic church built with town-hall funds. The better positioning of San Mateo was observed to be associated with greater access to public resources at the end of the intervention. For example, the free public health campaign that took place in the last year of the project was based in the local public school, San Mateo’s school benefitted from donations of school materials, and better accessibility to drinkable water was obtained after the National Fund for Social Compensation (FONCODES) finally heeded the requests of the villagers to repair a local wind-pump that had been inoperative for the previous 8 years. Although indeed some of those forms of support benefitted indirectly San Luis villagers, no observable direct investments setting took place there as of 2008. The short-term effect of this scenario was that San Mateo and San Luis differences in terms of public investments and material differences tended to increase.

10.3. Building social capital: considerations and challenges

This thesis has argued that the gap between the complexity of social reality and that presented in the mainstream social capital literature lies essentially in an inadequate conceptualisation of social actors, which usually transits between under-socialised and over-socialised approaches (Holt, 2008; Ishihara & Pascual, 2009). Under those assumptions, mainstream social capital building recommendations opt for re-engineering social relations by means of crafting inclusive institutional arrangements and incentive structures that reward collective action via contractual agreements and democratic governance so that, over time, norms favouring collective action for the public good are institutionalised in the local stage and actors learn to abide by those rules (Dongier et al., 2002; Ostrom & Ahn, 2003, 2009; Uphoff, 2000; 2004). As a result, there is a prevalent misrepresentation of the differentiated capacity of actors to exercise their agency to access and effectively profit from social capital due to their objective conditions and the positions they assume in the spaces for
participation opened by development interventions. In addition, the lack of neutrality of local institutions and social structures, which tend to mediate the prevalent relations of power operating in a social space, is equally overlooked; thereby failing to recognise that it is not only necessary to include the poor in the workings of organisations, markets, and public agencies but also to modify their terms of inclusion into those spaces (Cleaver, 2002; Mosse, 2005, 2010). The end result of this mismatch in the area of study was one in which although the participatory intervention indeed appeared to have facilitated the expansion of some beneficiaries’ networks of relations and facilitated the circulation of social resources previously absent in the area (e.g., technical information about farm management), those processes and their related benefits tended to concentrate among the better-off. Rather than enhancing the material well-being of the most vulnerable sectors of the population, the efforts of building social capital thus facilitated the reproduction of socioeconomic differences and pre-existing relations of power.

Given that this study was based on a specific intervention in a particular location, no matter how closely the first one had followed mainstream social capital recommendations and how typical were the limitations for social organisation encountered in San Mateo and San Luis, the analytical framework proposed for the empirical assessment of social capital is still tentative and, for the time being, valid only within the context of a fully-participatory interventions taking place in locations of similar socioeconomic and geographical characteristics as the ones studied. Correspondingly, it is difficult to propose a clear-cut policy framework for future development interventions aiming to build social capital. Nevertheless, putting this thesis’ findings in dialogue with that of the emerging critical empirical literature on social capital (Cleaver, 2005; Das, 2004; du Toit, Skuse & Cousins, 2007) as well as on participatory development interventions (Cleaver, 1999, 2002; Cook & Kothari, 2001; Hickey & Mohan, 2004; Mosse, 2005; Platteau & Abraham, 2002), it is possible to delineate certain considerations that future interventions aiming to build pro-poor social capital need to ponder over carefully.

A first consideration refers to the need of investing in deep—‘practical’—analyses of the existing socio-institutional environment both at the regional and local level before participatory interventions take place. At the local level, such an assessment implies to go beyond recommended social capital assessments in the mainstream literature, which focuses on formal indicators of associational activity, (im)personal trust, neighbourhood connections, experiences of collective action, and presence of norms for collective action as well as on ‘official’ depictions of organisations’ objectives, forms of selection of authorities, or types of bonds at the local level (e.g., compadrazgo) (Franke, 2005; Grootaert et al., 2004; Krishna & Schrader, 2002; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). Instead, it becomes necessary to look at how local institutional and organisational arrangements as well as social relations are ‘forged in practice’, through actors’ daily interactions and relations of exchange according to their objective conditions and their associated positions in those fields of action in which they operate. That is, to examine how actors’ routine social engagements reflect their differentiated positions in the social structures by virtue of their material condition and
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associated non-economic forms of discrimination (e.g., gender, race, or religion). In this manner, it would be more likely to identify the structural disadvantages that the most marginalised and poor actors face to exercise their agency in order to profit from the networking opportunities—with external and local actors—provided by a participatory intervention.

Such an approach implies, in addition, to look at the wider regional context not only in terms of market or state-society opportunities for partnerships or business opportunities but in terms of power relations operating in the economic and bureaucratic fields. This would help to identify the pathways available to actors in order to benefit from the expansions of their relationships and a better access to certain social resources in relation to the modes of production, transformation, and reproduction of capital that dominant actors’ impose. As discussed previously (§ 10.1.3.), this demands, first, to relate the material needs of residents of deprived settings and their strategic use of social relations to the dominant position of certain actors and their capacity to shape public and private investments (e.g., unequal distribution of infrastructure roads investments in a region). Second, to recognise that the capacity of social capital to play a major part in the poor’s efforts for social mobility is contingent on the rules of capital conversion and distribution—formal and informal—that govern the exchanges in a given field of action, particularly in relation to the operations of dominant actors (e.g., in a context where the state and dominant economic agents refuse to conduct collective negotiations with small agricultural producers, associational efforts may not play a significant economic role, at least in the short term). Third, it becomes also necessary to examine actors’ uses of social capital as integral part of their economic practices in direct relation to the practices implemented by more dominant actors (e.g., relations of exploitation at the local level may be actors’ response to the very little profit margins that dominant traders impose over local farmers).

More directly related to the operations of participatory interventions, it is equally advisable that agencies pay careful attention to the material basis of sociability; that is, the explicit and hidden capital investments associated with actors’ active involvement in project activities as well as with building and maintaining social relations. In particular, the different capacity of actors to afford them according to their degrees of poverty (Cleaver, 2005; Das, 2004; Mosse, 2005). As shown by this study, developing useful relations constitutes a costly process rather than an inexpensive feature of a given ‘community’. This is the case because building and maintaining such relationships requires considerable investments in both material and non-material resources over time and, second, actors’ access to valuable social resources is not granted automatically (even among relatives) but constantly negotiated on conditions that actors are able to reciprocate. In the face of those material barriers, therefore, it may be required that participatory interventions aiming at building social capital are preceded or accompanied by poverty alleviation interventions which focus on social welfare or income redistribution that aim to reduce vulnerability and extreme inequality, thereby reducing the degree to which the poor depend on exploitative or clientelistic relationships.
Whilst the material basis for the unequal (re)production of social capital constitutes an important consideration for interventions attempting to build it, it is equally evident that they should also seek for mechanisms to challenge the systems of classification and appreciation that the existing power relations impose over subordinated actors, who in this manner may internalise, in different degrees, the values, self-esteem, and identities that legitimise their position (i.e., symbolic violence). Part of poor people’s passivity in the presence of elite domination and even in cases of corruption may be attributed to a ruling system of social norms and values which tend to legitimate elite capture (Gaventa, 2004; Mosse, 2005; Platteau 2004). As a result, what external evaluators or practitioners may consider a hazardous scenario, may appear as normal to the eyes of local people who have internalised customary norms that have evolved to vindicate an asymmetrical social structure.

On many occasions, poor rural communities are dominated by patron-client and patriarchal relationships, that is, hierarchical, asymmetric, and highly personalised relations in which poor people’s deference and loyalty to the leader(s) is perceived as the best way of ensuring their day-to-day livelihood (Cleaver, 2005; Hickey & du Toit, 2007; Mansuri & Rao, 2004; Platteau & Abraham, 2002). In such a social setup, elite domination, benevolent or not, is allowed to subsist and replicate as long as actors can have their day-to-day subsistence guaranteed. Although this scenario may not be judged detrimental to the specific targets of an intervention and may not imply any misappropriation of resources, as seen in this thesis, it leads to an unequal distribution of the specific material returns of social capital building efforts in favour of local leaders. It would become valuable, then, to establish as a pre-condition for social capital building to incorporate active cultural mechanisms seeking to change the status quo. Without increasing awareness among beneficiaries and the population in general, so that actors possess a sense of their rights to voice their points of view, and without strong capacities for exercising countervailing power against the ‘rules of the game’ that entrenched the interests of dominant actors, new mechanisms for participatory governance may repeat the typical scenario of elite capture in the long-term beyond the project context.

By the same token, constant support is needed to help the poor in the spaces of participation opened by projects, not only to articulate their needs and assert their interests in front of the village elite but also to monitor the behaviour of the latter and to permit previously subordinated groups to take up leadership positions. Greater involvement from worse-off and marginalised beneficiaries would constitute an important factor in the generation of more inclusive networks and wider distribution of social resources. There is evidence, in this respect, that participatory spaces at first captured by existing elites may involve accountability mechanisms that in time provide opportunities to challenge those elites (Fritzen, 2007; Mansuri & Rao, 2004). However, this evidence equally indicates that the transformation of a social equilibrium, in which traditional systems of social organisation and classification serve the purposes of the entrenched elites, into a more inclusive one constitutes a gradual and slow process that requires long-term investments by
intervening agencies. In addition, the existing evidence on this matter have yet to clarify if those changes in the composition of local elites implied the ascension of the worst-off residents to a position of authority instead of those in a relative better condition (i.e., the not-so-poor) and if they were translated in actual improvements, in material and social terms, for those in the most subordinated condition instead of the replication of similar unequal relations of exchange. The latter is of particular relevance to the study of social capital since changes in the composition of a dominant class does not imply the modification of the kinds of relations of exchange that previously defined inter-class exchanges.

A final element to consider is that great attention should be place on the surrounding political dynamics in which project leaders are involved. In a context where relations with external actors are marked by the reproduction of clientelistic relationships, there might be the risk that new leaders simply assume such practices instead of changing them. In this respect, it would be prudent for development agencies to examine, first, the rules that govern this dimension of action before attempting to develop state-society connections, which may provide access to external resources but simultaneously reproduce disadvantageous political relations, as well as the particular positions that political actors—private and public—occupy in relation to policy-making spaces. As a result, it would be possible, first, to identify what are the potential risks involved in promoting connections between political and public actors with beneficiaries and, second, to estimate what are the prospects that organised beneficiaries or residents may effectively influence policy-making processes and where they would find potential allies or opponents. Intervening agencies aiming to generate state-society 'synergies', hence, should assess those efforts in political terms. On this subject three political lines of enquiry appear as potentially useful: (i) the extent to which it generated a process of political learning among the poor, (ii) how political relations are reshaped at the local level, and (iii) effects upon patterns of political representation and the language of claims and competition (Williams, 2004).

These careful field- and class-based assessments are necessary throughout the different stages of a participatory intervention. Given the complexity of social reality, interventions that attempt to make use of local institutional arrangements are particularly prone to overlook in its initial stages the finer details of how social structures are reproduced in daily practices (Cleaver, 2001, 2002; Mosse, 2005). It would be advisable, in this respect, that participatory interventions aiming to build social capital conduct constant careful evaluations of the manner in which actors’ local organisational and institutional engagements indeed promote a wider expansion of one’s connections and more equal conditions of access to social resources and the extent to which these processes are shaped by the wider political economy. In this respect, evaluations need to play a central part of the project design from the start and not merely a method to judge the effectiveness of projects after they are completed. As proposed by this study, it would be ideal to combine both qualitative and quantitative methods with differentiated and specific indicators of social capital features adapted to the local context. Comparisons of results and opinions across socioeconomic
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groups, and other criteria of social differentiation, over time would be an essential component of those monitoring initiatives. A reflective and iterative examination, potentially through action research methods, would be expected to better capture the complexities and nuances inherent to adapting and reshaping local social structures for developmental purposes, particularly how social systems change over time and the form in which actors (from different objective and subjective positions) participate and adapt to this process.

Part of the conceptual and methodological shift required to implement such assessment implies likewise to understand social capital in dynamic terms; that is, as a continuously evolving and being reshaped as actors change positions over time (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Glaeser, Laibson, & Sacerdote, 2002; Long, 2001). First, actors do not tend to remain fixed over time; as their objective conditions change, particularly if a development intervention is successful, it is likely they would modify their practices and strategies, inserting them into new systems of relations and thus making some expressions of social capital less relevant to their new activities (e.g., relationships and organisations useful to a farmer would be less relevant if (s)he invests in a local business). Second, individuals and organisation may redefine their positions along time in objective and subjective terms, thus modifying the sets of relationships and memberships that would be of greater interest to their new position; that is, when they acquire larger endowments of capital (e.g., if a landless resident becomes a small farmer) or when actors develop new understandings of the game (e.g., when women and female organisations attempt to transcend their traditional economic roles by claiming greater command over productive resources or autonomy over their income).

Third, the rules of the game played by actors may be changed from the outside, through new policies emerging from formal institutions (e.g., farmers’ unions might be banned or the collectively managed irrigation systems might be passed over to private administration), or from the inside, through the success of subordinated actors’ struggles for the control of certain forms of capital or the norms of capital conversion and distribution (e.g., land reform initiatives).

It is necessary to stress, however, that there is a series of challenges that are likely to problematise the extent to which NGOs can adopt more critical approaches and understandings of the concept into their operational frameworks and which, hence, place the applicability of the aforementioned considerations in perspective. First, assuming a more nuanced understanding of social capital and the structural conditions upon which it is built implies a conceptual and methodological shift that might not be functional to the current operations of NGOs. Although in the academic literature there is growing acknowledgement of the need to examine social capital as embedded in relations of power that shape social systems and institutions, thereby making the spaces of participation opened by NGOs into politicised fields of action (Bebbington et al., 2006; Hickey & Mohan, 2004; Mansuri & Rao, 2004), the discourse of key international development agencies has yet to endorse such a critical understanding and examination of social reality. It is noticeable, in this regard, that multilateral organisations’ assessments of building social capital efforts are more interested in examining whether there was any evidence that sponsoring social
organisations and forms of participation generated positive economic effects or a more efficient management of resources rather than on the production of equitable and inclusive social systems or fairer power relations (ADB, 2006; Dahl-Østergaard, et al., 2003; van Domelen, 2006; World Bank, 2005;). In the face of such a global institutional environment, it remains to be seen whether local NGOs, whose funds come generally from international cooperation agencies (which in turn impose technical and administrative methods of supervision as well as indicators of ‘success’), would be able to or interested in adopting such a critical approach (Mosse, 2005; Mosse & Lewis, 2006).

In addition, in seeking to redress the material limitations that prevent the most deprived sectors of society from developing and strengthening their social relations and to benefit from their access to social resources, there is the risk that some redistributive initiatives implemented by NGOs may fall into the logic of assistencialism, thereby failing to empower the poor to meaningfully engage in social life and exercise their citizenship. This challenge is of particular relevance since the very same concern of committed NGOs to protect vulnerable populations from the abuses of the state or private institutions on many occasions has led to the reproduction of a logic of patron-client relations that harm the effective expectations of poor communities to exercise their agency more effectively (Lewis & Mosse, 2006; Lewis & Siddiqui, 2006).

In the same direction, whilst seeking to empower the poorest and most marginalised sectors of a population, NGOs may face a trade-off between the specific poverty alleviation goals of an intervention and the broader considerations of equity and social justice. This is because elite domination in participatory interventions may constitute a valuable resource for the efficient administration of projects (Cleaver, 1999; Dasgupta & Beard, 2007; Fritzen, 2007; Mansuri & Rao, 2004). Interventions that give primary attention to breaking structural inequalities in social relations and to helping subject people to emancipate themselves from a culture of domination and poverty though mechanisms of collective empowerment (e.g., learning to debate, make decisions, keep records, or to design development projects) and individual advancement, should be aware that it may require initial greater involvement and supervision on their part.

Finally, given the various elements that NGOs may need to consider in order to build social capital in an equitable and inclusive manner, it becomes apparent that such a process would constitute a very costly one. Important volumes of material and non-material investments are required in light of the long-term horizon in which structural transformations take place (and so the capacity of the poorest actors to build and significantly benefit from social capital), the need for continuous monitoring and evaluation efforts within and beyond the project context, in addition to the transformative productive and cultural initiatives that NGOs may need to implement so as to empower beneficiaries. It remains to be explored to what extent, hence, building social capital would constitute a cost-effective strategy for NGOs to achieve the developmental goals they have for their specific interventions.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


BIBLIOGRAPHY


BIBLIOGRAPHY

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BIBLIOGRAPHY


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APPENDICES
APPENDIX I. Maps

I.A. SAN MATEO
APPENDIX II. Stratified sample design: sample size

A. Formula:

\[
    n = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{L} N_i^2 (p_i q_i)}{\left( N^2 \times \frac{E^2}{Z^2} \right) + \sum_{i=1}^{L} N_i p_i q_i}
\]

Where,

\( W_i: \) Proportion of cases assigned per stratum. The study followed optimum assignation (according to stratum variance and size) assuming similar costs:

\[
    W_i = \frac{N_i \sqrt{p_i q_i}}{\sum_{i=1}^{L} N_i \sqrt{p_i q_i}}
\]

and,

\( n: \) Sample size

\( L: \) Number of stratum (L=2)

\( N_i: \) Number of sampling units per stratum (N_1=85; N_2=68)

\( N: \) Total number of sampling units in the population (N=153)

\( p_i: \) Proportion of sampling units that posses criterion variable (percentage of households that own lands and cultivate them for commercial purposes) per stratum (p_1=0.78; p_2=0.83)

\( q_i: \) Proportion of sampling units that lack the criterion variable per stratum (q_1=0.22; q_2=0.17)

\( E: \) Estimation error (5%)

\( Z: \) Confidence level (95%; Z=1.96)

B. Total simple size:

\[
    n = \frac{1279.6 + 682.5}{0.56 + 0.43} \approx 96
\]

\[
    n = 95.4 \approx 96
\]

C. Sample size per stratum (n × W):

\[
    n_1 = 96 \times 0.56 = 53.8 \approx 54
\]

\[
    n_2 = 96 \times 0.44 = 42.2 \approx 42
\]
APPENDIX III. Household survey on living conditions and social networks

INSTRUCTIONS:

- Identify yourself and explain the aims of the survey.
- Provide introductory letter to informant and ask for verbal consent.
- Stress that all information is entirely confidential and that it will not be shared by any circumstance with any other resident, project staff, or public authority.
- Inform the interviewee that (s)he can stop the interview at any moment and that, if necessary, the survey could be continued in a different occasion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the interviewer</th>
<th>Date:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAMILY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of household:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Session 1:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Session 2:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILLAGE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAN MATEO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAN LUIS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I. LIVING CONDITIONS:

1. Predominant floor material:
   - □ Dirt
   - □ Concrete
   - □ Wood
   - □ Other (specify): _____________________

2. Predominant wall material:
   - □ Quincha
   - □ Adobe
   - □ Concrete
   - □ Other (specify): _____________________

3. Predominant roof material:
   - □ Quincha
   - □ Corrugated steel or Etermit
   - □ Wood
   - □ Concrete
   - □ Other (specify): _____________________

4. Water source for human consumption:
   - □ Family well
   - □ Neighbour’s well
   - □ Communal well
   - □ Other (specify): _____________________

5. Latrine material:
   - □ Does not possess one
   - □ Quincha and wood
   - □ Corrugated steel (calamine)
   - □ Adobe
   - □ Other (specify): __________

6. Number of rooms (do not include latrines):

7. Number of bedrooms in main residence

8. IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS, have you made any extensions or modifications to your house?
   - □ YES
   - □ NO (GO TO 10)

9. How much did you spend in the following items:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items:</th>
<th>Acquired (cost S/)</th>
<th>Donated (estimated value)</th>
<th>Self-provided* (estimated value)</th>
<th>Other: estimated value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Materials</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others: ______</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Use of unused materials (e.g. bricks from previous construction) and paid family labour
## II. HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS

<p>| | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10. Birthplace of head of household</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Head of household is the main income earner)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District:</td>
<td>Province</td>
<td>Department:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Since when has (s)he been living in town?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Since when have you been living in town as a HH?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Household composition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(HOUSEHOLD DEFINITION: All those who have been living under the same roof and share their meals on regular basis for the last 6 months)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Name</td>
<td>b. Sex</td>
<td>c.Age</td>
<td>d. Relationship with head of household</td>
<td></td>
<td>e. What do you consider to be your main occupation? (most time spent)</td>
<td>FOR HH MEMBERS ≥15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Head of household:</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Partner:</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Son Daught</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Son Daught</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Son Daught</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Son Daught</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Son Daught</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Son Daught</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Son Daught</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Son Daught</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Son Daught</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Son Daught</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) It includes helping in the farm, family business or with labour to process forest goods. Please specify activities (list them all)
### III. EDUCATION

**ONLY FOR HH MEMBERS ≥ 5**

|---------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|

#### 17. IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS, how much did you spend in the following items? (*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Bought (amount spent)</th>
<th>Donated (value of donation)</th>
<th>Self-provided (estimated value of end product)</th>
<th>Other (specify origin and estimated value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School uniforms (clothing)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School shoes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Books and notebooks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materials (backpacks, pens, pencils, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pension</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>APAFA (PSA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (specify):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (specify):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**USE THIS SPACE FOR CALCULATIONS IF NECESSARY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Do not include those items re-used from the previous academic year
## IV. HEALTH

### FOR ALL HH MEMBERS

18. IN THE LAST 3 MONTHS, has any of the HH members suffered of a health problem that required him or her to rest at least for 1 day at home?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID (From 10a)</th>
<th>a. Health problem</th>
<th>b. Where did you go to receive any medical attention?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□ Yes</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Health Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Health Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Health Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### FOR ALL HH MEMBERS

19. IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS, did any member of your HH required hospitalisation?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID (From 10a)</th>
<th>a. Reason</th>
<th>b. Where was (s)he hospitalised?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□ Yes</td>
<td>Health Centre</td>
<td>Pacora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Health Centre</td>
<td>Pacora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Health Centre</td>
<td>Pacora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### ONLY FOR FEMALE HH MEMBERS BETWEEN 12 TO 50 YEARS OF AGE:

20. IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS, did any female member of your HH give birth?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID (From 10a)</th>
<th>Where did she give birth?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□ Yes</td>
<td>Own House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Own House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Own House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21. How much did you spend in the following items?:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Bought (amount spent)</th>
<th>Donated (value of donation)</th>
<th>Self-provided (estimated value)</th>
<th>Social Security (estimated value)</th>
<th>Other (specify origin and estimated value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>LAST 3 MONTHS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical consultation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinical analyses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other examinations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LAST 12 MONTHS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitalisation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pregnancy controls</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

USE THIS SPACE FOR CALCULATIONS IF NECESSARY

| Item: |                       |                             |                               |                                   |                                            |
| Item: |                       |                             |                               |                                   |                                            |
| Item: |                       |                             |                               |                                   |                                            |
### V. FARM PRODUCTION

#### 22. Have you conducted a farming activity (agriculture, livestock, forestry) in the PREVIOUS 12 MONTHS?
- [ ] Yes
- [ ] No (GO TO QUESTION 46)

#### 23. What was the total extension of land you used to conduct such activities? (Include resting or fallow farmland).
- Owned: HAS.
- Rented: HAS.
- Donated: HAS.
- Other (specify): HAS.

#### 24. What is the area of unproductive land that you possess?
- [ ] Yes
- [ ] No (GO TO QUESTION 45)

### V.A. AGRICULTURE

#### 25. IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS, what was the area of land destined to agriculture?
- Owned: HAS.
- Rented: HAS.
- Donated: HAS.
- Other (specify): HAS.

#### 26. List the crops you cultivated IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS:

#### 27. Total volume of Production (last campaign)

#### 28. How was the volume of production distributed?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selling</th>
<th>Seeds</th>
<th>Self-consumption</th>
<th>Exchange</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 29. On average, how much were you paid for your crops (per unit of measure)? (for exchange, obtain estimated value)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Selling</th>
<th>Seeds</th>
<th>Self-consumption</th>
<th>Exchange</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>S/. per</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>S/. per</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>S/. per</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>S/. per</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>S/. per</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>S/. per</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### V.B. LIVESTOCK

30. **IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS, what was the area of land destined to sustain livestock?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Owned:</th>
<th>HAS.</th>
<th>Donated</th>
<th>HAS.</th>
<th>Rented</th>
<th>HAS.</th>
<th>Other (specify):</th>
<th>HAS.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

31. **IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS, what was the livestock you raise?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of animals</th>
<th>Currently raised</th>
<th>Disposed of (last 12 months)</th>
<th>Selling</th>
<th>Self-consumption</th>
<th>Exchange</th>
<th>Dead/Lost</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| A | Chickens | | | | | | |
| B | Ducks | | | | | | |
| C | Sheep: | | | | | | |
| D | Cows | | | | | | |
| E | Pigs: | | | | | | |
| F | Other (specify): | | | | | | |

32. **How was your livestock disposed?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Selling</th>
<th>Self-consumption</th>
<th>Exchange</th>
<th>Dead/Lost</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

33. **On average, how much were you paid for your animals? (in case of exchange, obtain estimated value)**

| A | Chickens | S/. per | N.A. (didn't sell/ex.) |
| B | Ducks | S/. per | N.A. (didn't sell/ex.) |
| C | Sheep: | S/. per | N.A. (didn't sell/ex.) |
| D | Cows | S/. per | N.A. (didn't sell/ex.) |
| E | Pigs: | S/. per | N.A. (didn't sell/ex.) |
| F | Other (specify): | S/. per | N.A. (didn't sell/ex.) |

### V.C. FORESTRY

35. **IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS, what was the area of forest used for economic activities?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Owned:</th>
<th>HAS.</th>
<th>Donated</th>
<th>HAS.</th>
<th>Rented</th>
<th>HAS.</th>
<th>Other (specify):</th>
<th>HAS.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

36. **List the forest products you exploited IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS such as wood, fruits, algarrobo seeds, or others:**

37. **Total volume of production (specify unit of measure):**

38. **How was the volume of production distributed?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selling</th>
<th>Self-consumption</th>
<th>Exchange</th>
<th>Expand forest</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

39. **On average, how much were you paid for your production? (for exchange, obtain estimated value)**

| A | | S/. per | N.A. (didn't sell/ex.) |
| B | | S/. per | N.A. (didn't sell/ex.) |
| C | | S/. per | N.A. (didn't sell/ex.) |
### V.D. Derived Farm Production

40. List the products you derived from your farming activities *IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS* (e.g. algarrobina, cornmeal, or cheese):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Selling</th>
<th>Self-consumption</th>
<th>Exchange</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>S/. per</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>S/. per</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>S/. per</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

41. Total volume of production (specify unit of measure)

42. How was the volume of production disposed of?

43. On average, how much were you paid for your production? (for exchange, obtain estimated value)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selling</th>
<th>Self-consumption</th>
<th>Exchange</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/. per</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### V.E. Farming Expenses

44. In the last 12 months, how much did you spend in the following items?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Paid by HH</th>
<th>Donated (estimated value)</th>
<th>Self-provided (estimated value)</th>
<th>Other Item (cont.)</th>
<th>Paid by HH</th>
<th>Donated (estimated value)</th>
<th>Self-provided (estimated value)</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Seeds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>h. Technical assistance (e.g. veterinarian)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Fertilizers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>i. Transport (rent, oil, petrol, repairs, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Pesticides, insecticides</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>j. Land rental</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Farmworkers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>k. Inputs for derived products</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Bags, baskets, etc (packaging)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>l. Water</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Acquisition of animals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>m. Heavy machinery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Fodder</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>n. Other (specify)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**USE THIS SPACE FOR CALCULATIONS IF NECESSARY:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### VI.A INCOME

**FOR HH MEMBERS ≥ 15 YEARS OF AGE**

45. **IN THE LAST MONTH**, what economic activities have you or any HH member conducted to generate income for the HH, whether paid or not? (including working in the family farm, looking over the livestock, or helping in the family business)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HH Member</th>
<th>46. Specific activity (e.g. picking lentils, cotton, etc.)</th>
<th>47. Hours per week</th>
<th>48. How much were you paid for this activity?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td></td>
<td>Non-remunerated worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### VI.B ADDITIONAL INCOME

49. In the last 12 months, have you or any HH member received any income, in money or goods, because of the following reasons?:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. Reason</th>
<th>b. Frequency (times a year)</th>
<th>c. Total amount</th>
<th>a. Reason (cont.)</th>
<th>b. Frequency (times a year)</th>
<th>c. Total amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Money transfers</td>
<td>□ NO □ YES →</td>
<td></td>
<td>Renting land</td>
<td>□ NO □ YES →</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfers of goods</td>
<td>□ NO □ YES →</td>
<td></td>
<td>Repayments of loans</td>
<td>□ NO □ YES →</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retirement pension</td>
<td>□ NO □ YES →</td>
<td></td>
<td>Other____________</td>
<td>□ NO □ YES →</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

50. In the last 12 months have you or any HH member obtained a cash loan?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friends / Relatives</td>
<td>□ YES →</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>□ Bank</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money lender</td>
<td>□ YES →</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>□ Other: ___________</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ NO □ YES →</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### VII. EQUIPMENT:

#### 51. DO YOU OR ANY HH MEMBER POSSESS ANY OF THE FOLLOWING ITEMS?

**HOUSE EQUIPMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>YES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Radio?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Sound system?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. TV Black &amp; White?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. TV Colour?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Kerosene stove?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Bicycle?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Motorbike?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Automobile?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FARM EQUIPMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>YES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>j. Machetes?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k. Pickaxes?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l. Shovels?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m. Sprayer?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n. Iron plough?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o. Wood plough?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p. Diesel water pump?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q. Pulled cart?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r. Wheelbarrow?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s. Motorised cart or rickshaw?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t. Truck or van?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### VIII. MIGRATION

#### 52. IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS, has any of HH member left temporarily the village (at least 2 weeks)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>53. Where did they travel to?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>54. Purpose of trip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 55. IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS, has someone from your HH left the village for good?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship with HH head</th>
<th>56. Where did they travel to?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>57. Purpose of trip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### IX.A. EXPENDITURE: FOOD

**FOR THE PERSON IN CHARGE OF COOKING THE HH MEALS**

58. IN THE LAST 2 WEEKS, did you or any HH member obtained, bought, consumed or was given any of the following products?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FOOD ITEMS</th>
<th>Average amount per week</th>
<th>Bought (amount spent)</th>
<th>Self-provided (volume)</th>
<th>Donated (volume)</th>
<th>Other: (volume)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VEGGIES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lentils</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green peas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lima beans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butter beans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green onions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomatoes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrots</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes (white)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes (yellow)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes (others: _______)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cassava</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweet potatoes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lettuce</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cilantro</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pickles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garlic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broccoli</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lemon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Others: _________________</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others: _________________</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEAT</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beef</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goat</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pork</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicken</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duck</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giblets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beef trifle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pork chitterlings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others: _________________</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FISH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish (jurel)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish (bonito)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fish (other)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuna</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mussels</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crabs</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others: _________________</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### FOOD ITEMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CEREALS</th>
<th>Average amount per week</th>
<th>Bought (amount spent)</th>
<th>Self-provided (volume)</th>
<th>Donated (volume)</th>
<th>Other: (volume)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bread</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpacked noodles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packed noodles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flour (wheat)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornstarch</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semolina</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAIRY PRODUCTS</th>
<th>Average amount per week</th>
<th>Bought (amount spent)</th>
<th>Self-provided (volume)</th>
<th>Donated (volume)</th>
<th>Other: (volume)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fresh Milk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaporated Milk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dry Milk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheese (cow)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheese (goat)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butter (packed)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butter (unpacked)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONDIMENTS</th>
<th>Average amount per week</th>
<th>Bought (amount spent)</th>
<th>Self-provided (volume)</th>
<th>Donated (volume)</th>
<th>Other: (volume)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Packed cooking oil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpacked cooking oil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar (white)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar (brown)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packed salt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpacked salt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aji (rocoto)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aji (yellow)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aji (panca)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peppers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sibarita</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRUITS:</th>
<th>Average amount per week</th>
<th>Bought (amount spent)</th>
<th>Self-provided (volume)</th>
<th>Donated (volume)</th>
<th>Other: (volume)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mangoes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oranges</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandarin orange</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bananas (white)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bananas (red)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plums</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apples</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watermelon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### FOOD ITEMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Average amount per week</th>
<th>Bought (amount spent)</th>
<th>Self-provided (volume)</th>
<th>Donated (volume)</th>
<th>Other: (volume)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>OTHER STAPLES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eggs (chicken)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eggs (others: ___________)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DRINKS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicha</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others: _________________</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

59. IN THE LAST 2 WEEKS, did you or any HH member obtained, bought, consumed or was provided prepared meals from any of the following programmes?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programmes</th>
<th>a. How many times a week?</th>
<th>b. No. of HH members benef.</th>
<th>c. Did you pay for it?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Popular Cook</td>
<td>□ NO □ YES →</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School breakfast</td>
<td>□ NO □ YES →</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>□ NO □ YES →</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### IX.B. EXPENDITURE: DWELLING MAINTENANCE

60. IN THE LAST MONTH, did you or any HH member obtained, bought, consumed or was given any of the following products?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Average amount per week</th>
<th>Bought (amount spent)</th>
<th>Self-provided (volume)</th>
<th>Donated (volume)</th>
<th>Other: (volume)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MAINTENANCE OF HOUSE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firewood</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerosene / Oil (cooking or</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>illumination)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Painting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other: _________________</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HOUSE CLEANING</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soap and detergents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insecticides and disinfectants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brooms or besoms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toilet paper</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other: _________________</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### IX.C. EXPENDITURE: CLOTHING

61. IN THE LAST 3 MONTHS, did you or any HH member obtained, bought, consumed or was given any of the following products?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Average amount per week</th>
<th>Bought (amount spent)</th>
<th>Self-provided (volume)</th>
<th>Donated (volume)</th>
<th>Other: (volume)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fabrics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothes for adults</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothes for children</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footwear for adults</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footwear for children</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (e.g. tailor, utensils,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>etc.):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### IX.D. EXPENDITURE: TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

**62. IN THE LAST MONTH, did you or any HH member obtained, bought, consumed or was given any of the following products?:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEMS</th>
<th>Average amount per week</th>
<th>Bought (amount spent)</th>
<th>Self-provided (volume)</th>
<th>Donated (volume)</th>
<th>Other (volume)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRANSPORT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reparation and maintenance of vehicle (e.g. oil change)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public transport (mototaxis / combis within Pacora)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public transport (buses / combis beyond Pacora)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journey to other departments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gasoline</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **COMMUNICATIONS** | | | | | |
| Public telephone | | | | | |
| Mobile phone | | | | | |
| Post Office | | | | | |
| Others: | | | | | |

### IX.E. EXPENDITURE: DURABLE GOODS

**63. IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS, did you or any HH member obtained, bought, consumed or was given any of the following products?:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEMS</th>
<th>Average amount per week</th>
<th>Bought (amount spent)</th>
<th>Self-provided (volume)</th>
<th>Donated (volume)</th>
<th>Other (volume)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Furniture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical appliances (e.g. radio, TV w/ batteries)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitchen tools</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle of transport (specify:________________)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### IX.F. EXPENDITURE: ENTERTAINMENT

**64. IN THE LAST MONTH, did you or any HH member obtained, bought, consumed or was given any of the following products?:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEMS</th>
<th>Average amount per week</th>
<th>Bought (amount spent)</th>
<th>Self-provided (volume)</th>
<th>Donated (volume)</th>
<th>Other (volume)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sports equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Going to fairs or town celebrations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drinking / eating with friends</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### IX. COMMUNITY AFFAIRS:

#### 65. Are you or any HH member affiliated to any of the following organisations?

| Organisations | How do you participate?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water Users' Association?</td>
<td>![Yes/No] N. A. Inactive / Irregular member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent School Association?</td>
<td>![Yes/No] N. A. Inactive / Irregular member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glass of Milk Committee?</td>
<td>![Yes/No] N. A. Inactive / Irregular member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Cook?</td>
<td>![Yes/No] N. A. Inactive / Irregular member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Organisation?</td>
<td>![Yes/No] N. A. Inactive / Irregular member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports Clubs?</td>
<td>![Yes/No] N. A. Inactive / Irregular member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Parties?</td>
<td>![Yes/No] N. A. Inactive / Irregular member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other: ______________?</td>
<td>![Yes/No] N. A. Inactive / Irregular member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 66. IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS, did you or anyone in your HH participate in a communal activity? (e.g., clean access roads, the school, or main water canals)

- ![Yes]
- ![No]

#### 67. In a scale from 1 to 10, where 10 indicates the most positive score. How much do you trust the following agencies?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional Government</td>
<td>![Don't Know]</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Municipality</td>
<td>![Don't Know]</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town Hall</td>
<td>![Don't Know]</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Governor</td>
<td>![Don't Know]</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Force</td>
<td>![Don't Know]</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>![Don't Know]</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church</td>
<td>![Don't Know]</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local health services</td>
<td>![Don't Know]</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School</td>
<td>![Don't Know]</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 68. In general, do you agree or disagree with the following expressions regarding the people from San Mateo / San Luis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expression</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Most people in this village can be trusted.</td>
<td>![Strongly disagree]</td>
<td>![Disagree]</td>
<td>![Agree]</td>
<td>![Strongly Agree]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Most people in this village are willing to help if you need it.</td>
<td>![Strongly disagree]</td>
<td>![Disagree]</td>
<td>![Agree]</td>
<td>![Strongly Agree]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Here one has to be alert or someone is likely to take advantage of you.</td>
<td>![Strongly disagree]</td>
<td>![Disagree]</td>
<td>![Agree]</td>
<td>![Strongly Agree]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. In this village people are divided because of their wealth.</td>
<td>![Strongly disagree]</td>
<td>![Disagree]</td>
<td>![Agree]</td>
<td>![Strongly Agree]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. In this village people are divided because of their religion.</td>
<td>![Strongly disagree]</td>
<td>![Disagree]</td>
<td>![Agree]</td>
<td>![Strongly Agree]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. In this village people are divided because of their political affiliations.</td>
<td>![Strongly disagree]</td>
<td>![Disagree]</td>
<td>![Agree]</td>
<td>![Strongly Agree]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## X. Social Resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Accommodation in cases of emergency (e.g., El Niño or fire).</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Acquaintance</th>
<th>Friend</th>
<th>Relative Compadre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>Information about how to care for or improve your livestock (e.g., preventing and treating diseases).</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative Compadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>Personal care in case of health emergencies.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative Compadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>Help to obtain jobs in nearby farms or contratas in sugar or cotton plantations.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative Compadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td>Information about health issues (e.g., diagnosing and treating common diseases: respiratory infections, stomach problems).</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative Compadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f</td>
<td>Material support (e.g., food or clothing,) in case of emergencies (e.g., El Nino, fire, or robbery).</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative Compadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g</td>
<td>Free labour during the harvest season.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative Compadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h</td>
<td>Help to conduct bureaucratic procedures in the town hall</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative Compadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td>Lending of vehicles to transport farm production for free.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative Compadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j</td>
<td>Lending of draft animals and related equipment (e.g., ploughs or carts).</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative Compadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k</td>
<td>Help to obtain jobs in urban centres (e.g., Chiclayo, Lima).</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative Compadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l</td>
<td>Lending of farming tools during the planting or harvest season.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative Compadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m</td>
<td>Selling of improved seeds, fertilizers, or new farm equipment on credit or instalments.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative Compadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>Legal advice (e.g., declaration of inheritance, formalisation of land ownership, etc.).</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative Compadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o</td>
<td>Looking after your house and children if absent for long periods of time (over 1 week).</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative Compadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td>Teaching children a trade for non-farm work (e.g., to work in construction, doing mechanical work, etc.).</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative Compadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q</td>
<td>Periodic remittances of goods or money.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative Compadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r</td>
<td>Helping children with their school tasks.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative Compadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s</td>
<td>Help to commercialise farming output (crops or livestock) in Lambayeque or Chiclayo markets.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative Compadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t</td>
<td>Help to deal with local public services (e.g., obtaining quick attention at health centre, dealing with the police, etc.).</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative Compadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>u</td>
<td>Information about local and national political affairs.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative Compadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v</td>
<td>Loans to fund economic activities (e.g., to buy or rent land, buy farm equipment or livestock) with no or very low interest rates.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative Compadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w</td>
<td>Information about how to care for or improve your crops (e.g., deal with plagues or fertilizers to use).</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative Compadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x</td>
<td>Help to conduct bureaucratic procedures in the city hall in Chiclayo.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative Compadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>y</td>
<td>Selling of medicines on credit.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative Compadre</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# XI.A. NETWORKS: LOCAL NETWORKS

## 70. Considering ONLY THE FAMILIES LIVING IN THIS VILLAGE, could you please give me the names (FAMILY NAMES OF HEAD OF HH AND PARTNER) of those that AT PRESENT could help you in the following situations....?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. In case you need to find a temporary job for you or a member of your HH, do you know someone in the village who could help you obtain it?</th>
<th>What is your relationship with these people?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□ Nobody (GO TO b)</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>b. In case you need an important sum of money (100 S/. or more), do you know someone in the village who could provide it to you with no interest?</th>
<th>What is your relationship with these people?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□ Nobody (GO TO c)</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>c. In case your livestock are suffering of a disease or your crops have a plague you don't know how to deal with, do you know someone in the village who could help you to deal with them with no charge?</th>
<th>What is your relationship with these people?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□ Nobody (GO TO d)</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>d. In case you need some major farm equipment (e.g., ploughs, carts, draft animals), is there a person in the village who could let you borrow them with no charge or acquire them on credit?</th>
<th>What is your relationship with these people?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□ Nobody (GO TO e)</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>e. If your family is facing an emergency (e.g., if someone is very ill or if you were victims of a robbery), is there a person in the village who could provide you some material support to deal with this emergency (e.g., medicines, transport, spare animals)?</th>
<th>What is your relationship with these people?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□ Nobody (GO TO f)</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>f. If you have to conduct a procedure in the town hall or deal with the police or the health centre, do you know someone in the village that could help you dealing with those public officers?</th>
<th>What is your relationship with these people?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nobody (GO TO q. 70)</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# XI.B. EXTERNAL NETWORKS

## 70. Considering ONLY PEOPLE YOU KNOW WHO LIVE IN PACORA OR OUTSIDE THE DISTRICT AND WITH WHOM YOU INTERACT ON A REGULAR BASIS (ONCE A MONTH), could you please give me the name of who that AT PRESENT could help you in the following situations....?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. In case you need to obtain job for you or a member of your HH in an urban centre, do you know someone who lives in Pacora or outside the district who could help you obtain it?</th>
<th>What is your relationship with these people?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□ Nobody (GO TO b)</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b. In case you need an important sum of money (100 S/. or more), do you know someone who lives in Pacora or outside the district that could provided it to you with no interests?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nobody (GO TO c)</th>
<th>Acquaintance</th>
<th>Friend</th>
<th>Relative/Compadre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative/Compadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative/Compadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative/Compadre</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. In case your livestock are suffering of a disease or your crops have a plague you do not know how to deal with, do you know someone who lives in Pacora or outside the district who could help you to deal with them with no charge?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nobody (GO TO d)</th>
<th>Acquaintance</th>
<th>Friend</th>
<th>Relative/Compadre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative/Compadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative/Compadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative/Compadre</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. In case you need some major farm equipment (e.g., ploughs, carts, draft animals), do you know someone who lives in Pacora or outside the district who would let you borrow them with no charge or acquire them on credit?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nobody (GO TO e)</th>
<th>Acquaintance</th>
<th>Friend</th>
<th>Relative/Compadre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative/Compadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative/Compadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative/Compadre</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

E. If your family is facing an emergency (e.g., if someone is very ill or if you were victims of a robbery), do you know someone who lives in Pacora or outside the district who could provide you some material support to deal with this (e.g., medicines, transport, spare animals)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nobody (GO TO f)</th>
<th>Acquaintance</th>
<th>Friend</th>
<th>Relative/Compadre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative/Compadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative/Compadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative/Compadre</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. If you have to conduct a procedure in the city hall, in the judicial power, or have to receive medical treatment Lima or Chiclayo, do you know someone who lives in Pacora or outside the district who could help you dealing with public agencies?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nobody (GO TO q. 71)</th>
<th>Acquaintance</th>
<th>Friend</th>
<th>Relative/Compadre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative/Compadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative/Compadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative/Compadre</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

XII.C VERTICAL NETWORKS

69. COULD YOU TELL ME IF, AT PRESENT, YOU OR YOUR PARTNER KNOW PERSONALLY ANY OF THE FOLLOWING AUTHORITIES OR KNOW SOMEONE WHO IS A FRIEND OF THEM?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. President of the water users’ commission (district).</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Acquaintance</th>
<th>Friend</th>
<th>Relative/Compadre</th>
<th>Know them personally</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b. President of the board of water users (La Leche valley).</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative/Compadre</td>
<td>Know them personally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. The school principal.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative/Compadre</td>
<td>Know them personally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. The parish priest.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative/Compadre</td>
<td>Know them personally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. The chief of police.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative/Compadre</td>
<td>Know them personally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. The chief doctor of the health centre.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative/Compadre</td>
<td>Know them personally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. District governor.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative/Compadre</td>
<td>Know them personally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. The mayor of the district.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Relative/Compadre</td>
<td>Know them personally</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX IV. List of Interviewees:

#### IV.A. San Mateo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HH ID</th>
<th>Interviewee(s)</th>
<th>Interview dates</th>
<th>HH members (relative to head of HH)</th>
<th>Assets (2006)</th>
<th>Main Income Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| SM-08 | Mr. Nicolás | HHI interviews: 16/07/06; 12/06/07. | • Head (27)  
• Partner (23)  
• Son 1 (6)  
• Son 2 (4)  
• Son 3 (1) | 1 ha. of agricultural land (rented).  
• Adobe / quincha house.  
• Poultry. | • Cash-crops maize and chileno.  
• Wage labour in local farms and rice/sugar plantations. |
| SM-16 | Mr. Eric  
Mrs. Marcela | HHI interviews: Mrs. Marcela 15/07/06; 24-25/06/07.  
Mr. Eric 17/07/06; 30/06/07. | • Head (37)  
• Partner (23)  
• Son 1 (14)  
• Son 2 (12)  
• Daughter (7)  
• Mother (61) | 0.5 ha. of agricultural land (rented).  
• Quincha house.  
• Poultry. | • Cash-crops maize.  
• Wage labour in local farms and rice/sugar / cotton plantations.  
• Construction work (sporadic).  
• Drives moto-taxi. |
| SM-31 | Mr. David | HHI interviews: 24/07/06  
10/06/07  
Key informants: 13/03/06  
14/12/07 | • Head (43)  
• Partner (39)  
• Son 1 (15)  
• Son 2 (13)  
• Son 3 (11)  
• Daughter (8) | 0.5 ha. of agricultural land.  
• Adobe / quincha house.  
• Poultry and sheep. | • Cash-crops maize and chileno.  
• Wage labour in local farms and rice/sugar / cotton plantations.  
• Construction worker (sporadic).  
• Remittances. |
| SM-05 | Mr. Javier | HHI interviews: 23/07/06  
29-30/06/07  
Key informants: 08/03/06  
21/12/07 | • Head (38)  
• Partner (36)  
• Son 1 (10)  
• Daughter 1 (8)  
• Father (57) | 1 ha. of agriculture land.  
• Adobe house.  
• Poultry. | • Cash crops maize, lentils, and chileno.  
• Wage labour in local farms and plantations.  
• Remittances. |
| SM-41 | Mr. Oliver | Key informants: 10/03/06.  
17/12/07. | • Head (49)  
• Partner (43)  
• Daughter 1 (15)  
• Daughter 2 (11)  
• Son (8) | 6 ha. of agricultural land.  
• Adobe house.  
• Poultry, Sheep (8). | • Cash-crops maize and lentils.  
• Livestock commerce.  
• Remittances. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HH ID</th>
<th>Interviewee(s)</th>
<th>Interview dates</th>
<th>HH members (relative to head of HH)</th>
<th>Assets (2006)</th>
<th>Main Income Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SM-11</td>
<td>Mr. Isaias</td>
<td>HH interviews</td>
<td>• Head (27) • Partner (23) • Son 1 (6) • Son 2 (4) • Sister (19) • Nephew (1)</td>
<td>• 1 ha. of agricultural land. • Adobe / quincha house. • Poultry.</td>
<td>Cash-crops: maize and chileno. Wage labour in local farms and rice/sugar/cotton plantations. Construction work (sporadic).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 03/08/06;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 05/07/07.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM-13</td>
<td>Mrs. Filipa Mr. Gabriel</td>
<td>HH interviews</td>
<td>• Head (41) • Partner (39) • Son 1 (15) • Son 2 (12) • Daughter 1 (9) • Daughter 2 (7)</td>
<td>• 0.75 ha. of agriculture land. • Adobe house • Poultry and guinea pigs.</td>
<td>Cash-crops: maize, lentils and chileno. Wage labour in local farms and plantations (parents and sons). Grocery shop (since 2004).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Mrs. Filipa: 23/07/06; 25/06/07;</td>
<td>• Mr. Gabriel: 24/07/06; 27/06/07; Key informants: • Mrs. Filipa: 12/03/06; 19/12/07;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM-36</td>
<td>Mr. Abraham</td>
<td>HH interviews</td>
<td>• Head (51) • Partner (46) • Daughter 1 (18) • Son 1 (15) • Daughter 2 (13) • Son 2 (10) • Mother in law (68)</td>
<td>• 3 ha. of agricultural land, 1 ha. of forest • Adobe house • Poultry, sheep (14) and cows (2)</td>
<td>Cash-crops: maize, chileno, and lentils. Rents land sporadically (up to 1 ha.). Livestock commerce. Remittances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 26/07/06;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 14/06/07.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM-58</td>
<td>Mr. Fernando Mrs. Felicita</td>
<td>HH interviews</td>
<td>• Head (54) • Partner (49) • Son 1 (18) • Son 2 (17) • Daughter (15) • Father in law (68)</td>
<td>• 4 ha. of agricultural land. • Adobe house. • Poultry and sheep (6)</td>
<td>Cash-crops: maize and lentils. Snack/food stall in the school Wage labour in plantations (sons). Livestock commerce. Remittances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Mr. Fernando: 26/07/06; 20/06/07;</td>
<td>• Mrs. Felicita: 25/07/06; 18/06/07.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH ID</td>
<td>Interviewee(s)</td>
<td>Interview dates</td>
<td>HH members (relative to head of HH)</td>
<td>Assets (2006)</td>
<td>Main Income Sources</td>
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<td>SM-61</td>
<td>Mr. Samuel</td>
<td>• 30/07/06; 28/06/07</td>
<td>• Head (41) • Partner (39) • Daughter 1 (18) • Daughter 2 (14) • Son 1 (11) • Grandson (4) • Granddaughter (2)</td>
<td>• 3 ha. of agricultural land. • Adobe house. • Poultry and sheep (4).</td>
<td>• Cash-crop maize, lentils and chileno. • Wage labour in plantations. • Livestock commerce. • Remittances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM-72</td>
<td>Mrs. Frescia</td>
<td>• 2/08/06; 12/07/07; 13/03/06; 23/12/07</td>
<td>• Head (43) • Partner (41) • Son 1 (17) • Daughter (15) • Son 2 (12) • Son 3 (10)</td>
<td>• 4 ha. of agricultural land. • Concrete house. • Poultry and sheep (6). • Moto-taxi</td>
<td>• Cash-crop maize and lentils. • Livestock commerce. • Moto-taxi (sporadic). • Remittances. • Work in town hall (partner).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM-25</td>
<td>Mr. Ezquiel</td>
<td>• 15-19/07/06; 11/06/07</td>
<td>• Head: Martin (48) • Partner: Francisca (42) • Sons/Daughters: Manuel (19) José (15) Félicita (12)</td>
<td>• 10 ha. of agriculture land, 2 ha. forest • Adobe / concrete house. • Poultry and sheep (16). • Truck.</td>
<td>• Cash crop maize and lentils. • Rents land (up to 2 ha. sporadic). • Work in rice / sugar / cotton plantations (son). • Livestock commerce. • Remittances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM-19</td>
<td>Mr. Timoteo</td>
<td>• Mr. Timoteo: 16/07/06; 24/06/07; 20/07/06; 26/06/07</td>
<td>• Head (37) • Partner (33) • Son 1 (14) • Son 2 (12) • Daughter 1 (9) • Daughter 2 (7) • Father (56) • Mother (54)</td>
<td>• 7 ha. of agricultural land, 0.5 forest areas. • Adobe house. • Truck. • Poultry, Sheep (8), cows (3) pigs (3)</td>
<td>• Cash crop maize and lentils. • Livestock commerce. • Farm tools and input store. • Agricultural traders.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HH ID</td>
<td>Interviewee(s)</td>
<td>Interview dates</td>
<td>HH members (relative to head of HH)</td>
<td>Assets (2006)</td>
<td>Main Income Sources</td>
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<tr>
<td>SM-38</td>
<td>Mr. Alvaro</td>
<td>HH interviews:</td>
<td>Head (50), Partner (48), Son 1 (24), Son 2 (21), Daughter-in-law (21), Grandson (4), Granddaughter (2)</td>
<td>8 ha. of agricultural land, 1.5 ha. of forest, Concrete house, Poultry, sheep (18), and cows (4)</td>
<td>Cash-crops: maize and lentils, Contractista (son), Livestock trade, Apiculture, Liquor store.</td>
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<td>13/06/07.</td>
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<td>SM-45</td>
<td>Head (45), Partner (39), Son 1 (19), Son 2 (15), Daughter 1 (13), Daughter 2 (11), Daughter 3 (9)</td>
<td>10 ha. of agricultural land, 2 ha. of forest areas, Adobe / concrete house, Poultry, Sheep (22), Cows (4)</td>
<td>Cash-crops: maize and lentils, Rents land (sporadically, up to 2 ha.), Livestock trade, Remittances.</td>
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<td>Mr. Máximo</td>
<td>HH interviews:</td>
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<td>19/06/07,</td>
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<td>16/03/06,</td>
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<td>19/12/07.</td>
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<td>SM-75</td>
<td>Head (54), Partner (50), Daughter 1 (22), Daughter 2 (14), Son (11), Grandson 1 (3), Grandson 2 (1), Son-in-law (24)</td>
<td>9.5 ha. of agricultural land, 2 ha. of forest areas, Concrete house, Poultry, Cows (8)</td>
<td>Cash-crops: maize and lentils, Rents land (up to 2 ha.), Livestock commerce, Remittances.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mr. Teófilo</td>
<td>Key informants:</td>
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<td>8/03/06,</td>
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<td>15/12/07.</td>
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### IV.B. San Luis

<table>
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<th>HH ID</th>
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<th>Interview dates</th>
<th>HH members</th>
<th>Assets (2006)</th>
<th>Main Income Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| SL-5  | Mr. Rolando    | HH interviews:  
- 28/07/06;  
- 18/06/07. | • Head (47)  
• Partner (44)  
• Son 1 (13)  
• Son 2 (11)  
• Daughter 1 (9)  
• Daughter 2 (6) | • 1 ha. of agricultural land.  
• Adobe house.  
• Poultry. | • Cash-crops: maize and chileno.  
• Wage labour in local farms and rice/sugar plantations. |
| SL-19 | Mr. Horacio  
Mrs. Carmela  
HH interviews  
- Mr. Horacio: 04/08/06,  
07/06/07.  
- Mrs. Carmela: 21/07/06  
12/06/07 | • Head (33)  
• Partner (29)  
• Daughter 1 (9)  
• Daughter 2 (7)  
• Son (3)  
• Daughter 3 (0.25) | • 0.5 ha. of agricultural land (rented).  
• Adobe house.  
• Poultry. | • Cash-crops: maize and chileno.  
• Wage labour in local farms and rice/sugar plantations. |
| SL-7  | Mr. Ladislao  
Mrs. Teresa  
HH interviews  
- Mr. Ladislao: 05/08/06,  
11/06/07.  
- Mrs. Teresa: 27/07/06  
05/06/07 | • Head (35)  
• Partner (27)  
• Son 1 (8)  
• Daughter 1 (7)  
• Daughter 2 (5)  
• Son 2 (3)  
• Father in law (62) | • 1 ha. of agricultural land.  
• Adobe / quincha house.  
• Poultry. | • Cash-crops: maize and moquegua.  
• Wage labour in local farms and rice/sugar plantations.  
• Drives moto-taxi (sporadic). |
| SL-57 | Mrs. Flore     | HH interviews:  
- 18/07/06,  
- 02/07/07.  
Key informant:  
- 16/03/06,  
- 20/12/07 | • Head (39)  
• Daughter (6)  
• Father (56) | • 1 ha. agricultural land.  
• Adobe / quincha house.  
• Poultry. | • Cash-crops: maize.  
• Wage labour local farms.  
• Remittances. |
| SL-33 | Mr. Sandro     | HH interviews:  
- 05/08/06,  
- 07/07/07.  
Key informant:  
- 13/03/06,  
- 14/12/07 | • Head (37)  
• Partner (33)  
• Son 1 (15)  
• Son 2 (13)  
• Daughter 1 (10)  
• Son 3 (7)  
• Son 4 (5) | • 2.5 ha. agricultural land, 0.5 forest area.  
• Adobe house.  
• Poultry, sheep (5), pigs (2). | • Cash-crops: maize, lentils and chileno.  
• Wage labour in local farms and cotton / rice/sugar plantations.  
• Remittances. |
<table>
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<tr>
<th>HH ID</th>
<th>Interviewee(s)</th>
<th>Interview dates</th>
<th>HH members</th>
<th>Assets (2006)</th>
<th>Main Income Sources</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SL-38</td>
<td>Mr. Armando</td>
<td>HH interviews</td>
<td>Head (53), Partner (39), Son 1 (20), Son 2 (16), Daughter (11), Son 3 (8)</td>
<td>1 ha. agricultural land, Adobe house, Poultry and sheep (6)</td>
<td>Cash-crop maize and lentils, Wage labour in local farms and cotton / rice / sugar plantations (sons), Remittances, Work as construction workers (son).</td>
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<td>12/07/06, 17/06/07, Key informants: 8/03/06, 12/12/07</td>
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<td>SL-30</td>
<td>Mr. Lorenzo</td>
<td>HH interviews</td>
<td>Head (42), Partner (32), Son 1 (14), Daughter 1 (11), Son 2 (7), Daughter 2 (4)</td>
<td>Quincha house, Poultry.</td>
<td>Work in local farms and rice / sugar / cotton plantations, Drives moto-taxi (sporadic), Construction worker (sporadic).</td>
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<td>11/07/06, 27/06/07</td>
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<tr>
<td>SL-25</td>
<td>Mr. Raimundo &amp; Mrs. Liliana</td>
<td>HH interviews</td>
<td>Head (53), Partner (47), Daughter 1 (19), Daughter 2 (16), Son 1 (14), Son 2 (10), Son-in-law (24), Granddaughter (1)</td>
<td>0.75 ha. of agricultural land, 0.25 ha. of forest area, Adobe house, Poultry and sheep (4)</td>
<td>Cash-crop maize, moquegua, and chileno, Wage labour in local farms and rice / sugar / cotton plantations, Remittances, Moto-taxi driver (son-in-law).</td>
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<td>SL-28</td>
<td>Mr. Cipriano</td>
<td>HH interviews</td>
<td>Head (45), Partner (44), Son 1 (17), Son 2 (14), Daughter (9)</td>
<td>2 ha. agricultural land, Adobe house, Poultry and sheep (6)</td>
<td>Cash-crop maize and lentils, Wage labour in local farms and cotton / rice / sugar plantations (sons), Remittances.</td>
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<td>04/08/06, 03/05/07/07, Key informants: 9/03/06, 15/12/07</td>
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<td>SL-02</td>
<td>Mr. Edgar</td>
<td>HH interviews</td>
<td>Head (37), Partner (33), Daughter 1 (15), Son 1 (11), Son 2 (9), Daughter 2 (4)</td>
<td>2 ha. agricultural land, 1 ha. forest area, Adobe house, Poultry and sheep (6), Hives, Van.</td>
<td>Cash-crop maize and chileno, Wage labour cotton / rice / sugar plantations, Livestock trade.</td>
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<td>06/08/06, 07/07/07</td>
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<td>SL-43</td>
<td>Mr. Luis</td>
<td>HH interviews</td>
<td>Head (55), Son 1 (23), Daughter (16), Son 2 (11), Daughter-in-law (19), Granddaughter (0.75)</td>
<td>8 ha. agricultural land, 1 ha. of forest area, Adobe house, Poultry, sheep (10), cows (4), Van.</td>
<td>Cash-crop maize and lentils, Rents land (sporadically, up to 2 ha.), Work in rice / sugar plantations (son), Livestock trade, Remittances.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HH ID</td>
<td>Interviewee(s)</td>
<td>Interview dates</td>
<td>HH members</td>
<td>Assets (2006)</td>
<td>Main Income Sources</td>
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<td>SL-16</td>
<td>Mr. Prudencio</td>
<td>HH interviews</td>
<td>Head (39)</td>
<td>3 ha. of agricultural land, 0.5 ha. of forest area.</td>
<td>Cash-crops: maize, lentils, chileno.</td>
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<td>27/07/06, 18/06/07</td>
<td>Partner (38)</td>
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<td>Wage labour in rice/sugar/cotton plantations.</td>
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<td>Rents moto-taxi (son).</td>
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<td>9/03/06, 20/12/07</td>
<td>Daughter 1 (14)</td>
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<td>Rents land (up to 1 ha., sporadic)</td>
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<td>Son 2 (12)</td>
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<td>Son 3 (9)</td>
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<td>Daughter 2 (6)</td>
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<td>SL-9</td>
<td>Mr. Marco, Mrs. Jacinta</td>
<td>HH interviews</td>
<td>Head (40)</td>
<td>2.5 ha. of agricultural land, 0.5 ha. of forest area.</td>
<td>Cash-crops: maize and lentils,</td>
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<td>29/07/06, 06/07/07</td>
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<td>Wage labour in rice/sugar/cotton plantations (son).</td>
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<td>25/07/06, 08/07/07</td>
<td>Daughter (17)</td>
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<td>Salesperson (sporadic work in urban areas).</td>
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<td>Key informants:</td>
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<td>Son 2 (7)</td>
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<td>Remittances.</td>
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<td>Son 3 (5)</td>
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<td>SL-21</td>
<td>Mr. Idelfonso</td>
<td>Key informant interviews</td>
<td>Head (32)</td>
<td>8.5 ha. of agricultural land, 0.5 ha. of forest area.</td>
<td>Cash crops: Maize, chileno, and lentils.</td>
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<td>Mother (72)</td>
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<td>SL-61</td>
<td>Mr. Mateo</td>
<td>Key informant interviews</td>
<td>Head (47)</td>
<td>4 ha. of agricultural land, 1 ha. of forest area.</td>
<td>Cash crops: Maize and lentils.</td>
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<td>28/03/06, 23/12/07</td>
<td>Partner (35)</td>
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<td>Collect fruits.</td>
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<td>Son 1 (15)</td>
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<td>Rents land (sporadic, up to 1 ha.).</td>
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<td>Daughter 2 (4)</td>
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<td>Mother (67)</td>
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<td>SL-49</td>
<td>Mr. Rodrigo</td>
<td>HH interviews</td>
<td>Head (41)</td>
<td>9 ha. of agricultural land, 1 ha. of forest area.</td>
<td>Cash crops: maize and maquisaga.</td>
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<td>01/08/06, 22/06/07</td>
<td>Partner (34)</td>
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<td>Livestock commercialisation.</td>
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<td>Key informants:</td>
<td>Son 1 (13)</td>
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<td>Rents land (1 ha. regularly, 1 ha. sporadically).</td>
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<td>11/03/06, 03/01/08</td>
<td>Son 2 (9)</td>
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<td>Remittances.</td>
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<td>Daughter (6)</td>
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<td>Income from town-hall (since 2007).</td>
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<td>Mother in law (65)</td>
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX V. Topic Guides

V.A. First interview with heads of households (and partners)

1. Can you tell me more about you and your family? How did you come to settle in San Mateo/San Luis?
   • Compared to that time (YEAR 1990 IF TOO LONG), overall, would you say you are better or worse off?

2. Most people here have to do many things to make a living. In the last year (2005), what were the main activities you and other members of your household conducted to earn money?
   • Would you say that having good connections are necessary to make [ACTIVITY] profitable? Which ones are the most important to you?
   • If you want to access information about [ACTIVITY]? Where do you turn to?
   • Do you help somehow your neighbours, friends, or relatives, in their respective economic activities?

3. Most people here lack many things, like trucks, water pumps, or draft animals. In your case, if you need some equipment or inputs for your farm production or business, could you borrow them from your neighbours, friends, or relatives?
   • Are they enough to satisfy your needs?
   • Do you provide a similar form of support to your neighbours, friends or relatives?

4. To whom do you recur if you want to borrow some money? Why?
   • What are the sums of money and conditions under which you usually obtain those loans?
   • What do you use that money for?
   • Do you lend money to neighbours, friends, or relatives? Under what circumstances?

5. Has any member of your household left the area permanently in recent years? Why?
   • Did you receive any help from your neighbours, friends, or relatives to this effect?
   • Do you provide a similar form of support to your neighbours, friends or relatives?

6. In cases of an emergency (e.g., serious illness of family member or robbery) would you expect / have you received some help from your neighbours, friends, or relatives?
   • What forms of support are the most common in those circumstances?
   • In the past, has this support been enough for you to cover your needs?

7. Overall, would you say that the residents in San Mateo/San Luis are close to and support one another?
   • Are there differences or conflicts between certain groups in the village? How did they emerge?
   • How easy or difficult is for the people to get together and cooperate for things like fixing the school or the church? And in case of emergencies such as death in the family?

8. What local social organisations do you or your household members participate in? [IF NONE: Why?]?
   • Do you think that [ORGANISATION] has been of any help to you and your household? How?
   • Would you say that through your participation in [ORGANISATION] have you been able to befriend people otherwise you would not have met?
   • What do you think of the way [ORGANISATION] is conducted? Has politics affected this?
   • Have you ever participated in the conduction of [ORGANISATION]? Why?

9. What do you think about the public authorities of your district?
   • Have you ever had any direct contact with them?
   • How do you know what is going on in the town hall, the regional government, or other public institutions operating in the area?
   • Have you ever participated in politics? In what manner?

10. Finally, what made you decide (not to) participate in the project from ECO?
    • Did you have any concerns about the project when it just began? Do you still have them?
    • What aspects of the project called your attention the most? Why?
    • Overall, what changes do you expect to see in your house because of the project? and in the village?
V.B. Second interview with heads of households (and partners)

1. Compared to the time when the project first started to operate in the area (2005), would you say you are better or worse off?
   - Has the project somehow affected these changes?

2. In that time, have you changed the manner in which you conduct your income generation activities such as [MENTION ACTIVITIES REPORTED IN LAST INTERVIEW]?
   - Has the project somehow led to these changes?

3. Compared to 2005, have you considered or have you implemented a new income generation activity?
   - Has the project somehow led you to consider these changes?

4. As part of those changes, have you developed new connections or collaborative agreements with your neighbours, friends, or relatives that helped you enhance your economic activities?
   - Has the project somehow facilitated establishing these new connections?

5. Do you consider that at present it is easier for you to borrow equipment or inputs for your farm production or business from your neighbours, friends, or relatives as compared to two years ago? What kind of assets in particular?
   - Has the project somehow facilitated this process? In what manner?

6. Do you consider that at present it is easier for you to borrow money or obtain things on credit from your neighbours, friends, or relatives as compared to 2005?
   - Are the sums of money and conditions under which you obtain loans or credit the same as then?
   - What about emergencies? Have you seen / received that residents can access greater economic support from neighbours, friends, or relatives as compared to two years ago?
   - Has the project somehow facilitated this process?

7. Have you found it easier to contact the public authorities of your district or dealing with public officers as compared to two years ago?
   - Are you more involved into politics than you used to be two years ago? Why?
   - Has the project somehow facilitated this process? In what manner?

[FOR BENEFICIARIES ONLY]
8. Regarding the project, what benefits from the project were the most appealing to you? Why?

9. What do you think of the form in which the project works (i.e., with weekly communal work sessions, monthly assemblies, and new organisations)? Why?
   - Did you have any problems with regard to the demands of participation from the project?
   - Which household members participated in project activities? Why?
   - Have you ever considered taking any leading role in the local project committee? Why?
   - Do you think that politics has somehow affected the way in which the project operated in the area?

10. Have you been able to meet new people (neighbours, authorities or professionals) through the project? Through which activities in particular?

[FOR EVERYONE]
11. Overall, what would you say were the main changes that took place in the village between 2005 and now...
   - In terms of local infrastructure development?
   - In terms of the economic condition of residents in general?
   - In terms of presence of public agencies?
   - In terms in which the people are organised or work collectively?
   - Has the project somehow affected those changes?

12. Finally, how do you picture the future of your family five years from now? And the village in general?
V.C. First interview with key informants

1. How did the people from San Mateo and San Luis come to know about the NGO?
   • What were the initial expectations from the residents regarding the help you could receive from ECO?
   • Could you notice any initial resistance to the NGO’s coming to the area? What were the reasons?

2. Was it difficult to organise the residents to participate in the initial activities required to bring the project to the area (e.g., petition, informative assemblies, and participatory diagnostic and design)?
   • Who were in charge of organising the people at that time?
   • Have you noticed if some groups of residents did not take place in those activities? What were the reasons?
   • Overall, do you believe the benefits proposed by the project match the needs of the poorer residents?

3. It appears that at the beginning not too many people actively participated in the project as it was expected, why do you think that happened?
   • Has this situation changed in the last months? Why?
   • Do you believe things will improve further in the upcoming months? Why?

4. The project has a special way of operating; they ask people to work together and attend meetings, and committee authorities are the ones administering the resources. What was the initial reaction from the people to this form of work?
   • Up to now, do you consider this form of work is going well? Why?
   • So far, has beneficiaries’ participation in project activities constant? What factors conditioned their regular participation?

5. The people in charge of the project committees appear to be established village leaders that have a long trajectory assuming similar positions, can you tell me how did this happen during the elections for committee authorities?
   • Why do you think that not many people wanted to assume such responsibilities?
   • Do you expect that beneficiaries would like to collaborate more in the running of the committee in the coming months? Why?

6. The project has just started to distribute some of the benefits promised to its beneficiaries. Which benefits have you noticed are the most requested by them? Why do you think is that?
   • Have you noticed some differences in beneficiaries” interests? Why do you think is that?

7. Up to now, do you believe that politics somehow affected the way the project is operating in the area?
   • Do you think that developing such connections with local authorities and public agencies would be a good thing for the committee and for the village? Why?

8. Finally, what things do you think would be necessary to work on more on so as to improve the project?
V.D. Second interview with key informants

1. Compared to its initial months, the number of residents that decided to participate in the project has increased significantly over time. What do you think convinced more people to come on board?
   - Could you notice if a particular group of people did not participate in the project? Why do you think that happened?

2. Considering all the benefits that the project provided to the beneficiaries, the livestock modules, the new kitchens, the training events, among others, which ones do you think have been of the most benefit to the population? Why?
   - Have these benefits provided by the project changed the way people make a living in the area?
   - Do you think that the economic activities of non-beneficiaries were affected by the project?

3. The project made people work collectively and participate in order to earn their benefits. Do you think that beneficiaries responded well to this style of work?
   - How do you evaluate people’s involvement in the project? Do you think it could have been better?
   - Would you say that beneficiaries and committee leaders interacted and cooperated on a regular basis or was there some distance between them?
   - Were there any particular elements that prevented some beneficiaries from participating more actively in the project?
   - Do you believe that this style of work has helped residents to get used to work collectively more often? Have you seen any expressions of that?
   - Have you noticed if beneficiaries have been able to develop new collaborative agreements with other beneficiaries from here or other areas for their economic activities?

4. The project organised a few meetings with public officials and authorities. What was your opinion about these activities?
   - For what you have heard or seen, how do you assess the results from those events? Why?
   - Do you think that the activities conducted through the project would facilitate developing stronger connections with public authorities and agencies?
   - Do you think that developing such connections with local authorities and public agencies would be a good thing for the committee and for the village? Why?
   - Have you seen that politics has affected somehow the running of the project?

5. Now that the project is finishing, do you believe there have been some areas in which things could have been done differently?

6. Finally, what are the main changes you expect would take place in the village in relation to the activities conducted by the project?
APPENDIX VI. Coding books
VI.A. Social Resources

Legend:
- Code
- Families
- Super-Families
VI.B. Networks of Relations

Legend:
- Code
- Families
- Super-Families
VI.C. Project participation

Legend:
- Code
- Families
- Super-Families
VI.D. Networking and participation project components

Legend:
- Code
- Families
- Super-Families
VI.E. Social capital and project benefits
APPENDIX VII. Additional views of San Mateo and San Luis

VII.A. Local agricultural trader – Pacora

Source: the author.

VII.C. Girl carrying water from communal well – San Luis

Source: the author.

VII.C. Transportation of local produce – San Mateo

Source: the author.
### APPENDIX VIII. Factor Loadings: Resource Generator Tool

Maximum Likelihood Extraction Method with Varimax Rotation  
(loadings over 0.40)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Resource</th>
<th>FACTORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loans to fund economic activities (e.g., to buy or rent land, buy farm equipment or livestock) with no or very low interest rates</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periodic remittances of goods or money.</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help to commercialise farming output (crops or livestock) in Lambayeque or Chiclayo markets.</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help to obtain jobs in nearby farms or contratas in sugar or cotton plantations.</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help to obtain jobs in urbanas (e.g., Chiclayo, Lima).</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information about local and national political affairs.</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal advice (e.g., declaration of inheritance, formalisation of land ownership, etc.).</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help to conduct bureaucratic procedures in the town hall</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help to deal with local public services (e.g., obtaining quick attention at health centre, dealing with the police, etc.).</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lending of farming tools during the planting or harvest season.</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selling of improved seeds, fertilizers, or new farm equipment on credit or instalments.</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lending of vehicles to transport farm production for free.</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free labour during the harvest season.</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lending of draft animals and related equipment (e.g., ploughs or carts).</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation in cases of emergency (e.g., El Niño or fire).</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal care in case of health emergencies.</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material support (e.g., food or clothing) in case of emergencies (e.g., El Niño, fire, or robbery).</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looking after your house and children if absent for long periods of time (over 1 week).</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information about how to care for or improve your livestock (e.g., preventing and treating diseases).</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information about how to care for or improve your crops (e.g., deal with plagues or fertilizers to use).</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching children a trade for non-farm work (e.g., to work in construction, doing mechanical work, etc.).</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information about health issues (e.g., diagnosing and treating common diseases: respiratory infections, stomach problems).</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helping children with their school tasks</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Factor loadings over 0.4 but discarded for interpretation purposes.

Total variance explained: 63%
APPENDIX IX. Glossary of terms

- **Acopiador:** Agricultural trader that acts as an intermediary; (s)he visits rural villages so as to acquire local produce directly from farms.

- **Adobe:** Mud bricks.

- **Compadre:** Co-parent of a child by virtue of becoming his / her godfather in baptism, first communion or confirmation ceremonies.

- **Contrata:** Labour contract, usually for large states cotton, sugar, and rice plantations.

- **Contratista:** Labour contractor.

- **Chacra:** Farm.

- **Chicha:** Alcoholic drink made of fermented maize.

- **Don / Doña:** Courtesy title of address (equivalent to Mr. or Madam) placed before a forename to indicate respect.

- **Enganche:** Advanced payment received by day labourers so as to commit them to work in a *contrata*.

- **Jornalero:** Day labourer.

- **Pana de algodón:** Farm work which consists of picking and cleaning cotton bolls as well as taking out the seeds inside.

- **Quincha:** Construction material made of reeds reinforced with mud.