Re-Building amongst Ruins:  

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Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
at
The London School of Economics and Political Science

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March 2006
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Acknowledgements

Life unfurls as a collection of indebtedness. Everything one attempts, and certainly achieves, flows from the generosity of others who are willing to invest in one’s growth, learning, pleasure and evolution into more chiselled forms. Invariably, at the end of the PhD journey one cannot but be overwhelmed by how these numerous parcels of gratitude stack up, impervious to adequate or comprehensive description. Nevertheless, I must and will attempt my very special litany of thank you’s that I treasure with great reverence and humility.

It takes a lot of resources to undertake a PhD in London. I am grateful to the various institutions that supported my studies at various points: The Chevening Scholarship Fund of British Council; The Commonwealth Scholarship Fund; the Ernest Oppenheimer Memorial Trust bursary; and the Social Policy Department of the LSE. Institutionally, the Social Policy Department, Convened by Prof. Le Grand during my time, was also supportive in terms of infrastructure for its students. The Goodenough College provided ideal accommodation for both of the periods I lived in London with my partner. This made a significant difference in easing me back into student life.

LSE is a uniquely diverse institution. During my two sojourns at the university I got to know an amazing number of students who were going about their journeys in other ways to me but offered a wonderful sense of belonging and searching. I am particularly reminded of the “Cities Group” that Professor Max Steuer convened in 2001 that provided an insight into the many ways in which cities can be lived and understood. During my second stint in London I participated in a voluntary study group that drew together people from various departments working on urban issues. This was an equally interesting and meaningful experience. I also drew a lot of learning and stimulation from my fellow social policy students in the class of 2000/2001 and later years when my paths crossed with those.

However, the university is only part of the story. Life and engagements outside of the university is as important to making the time meaningful. Friends like Rafael Marks, Sarah Thurman, Nicholas Miles, Jennifer Robinson, Steve Pile, Colin Marx and the ‘Latino contingent’ at DPU made it possible to feel like one has a second home in London. Special friends linked through the pains of the PhD trek, made London even more of a home with all of its complexities and hues. In this sense I need to express my lifelong indebtedness to Monica Barasso, Katja Rohrbach, Kirsten Harrison, Joabe Cavalcante, Samantha Yates and especially Barbara Lipietz for comradeship and love.

During my PhD I was lucky enough to work on various parallel intellectual projects that greatly enriched my PhD research, due to the networks that I established through those projects. Here I am referring to the scholars and activists involved in the local government book project (2000/1), and especially, the brave souls who contributed to the Voices of the Transition book (2003/4). The scholars who came together for the symposium on ‘Theorising City Spaces and Urban Development from Southern Africa’, at Open University’s Geography Department, 1-3 October 2003 left an indelible mark that has certainly shaped the outcome of the thesis. In this context I am particularly thankful
towards Jenny Robinson who allowed me to conspire with her to pull off that event but also be a steadying hand when my insecurities got the better of me.

In South Africa I am also privileged to know that I can always count on the personal and intellectual support and engagement of a number of valued friends and colleagues that are as intriguing by the obstinacy of the (post-apartheid) city. These friends are Firoz Khan, Mark Swilling, Eve Annecke, Graeme Gotz, Frank Meintjies, Dominique Wooldridge, Christa Kuljian, David Schmidt, Mokena Makeka, Luyanda Mphaphlwa, Zayd Minty, Kopano Ratele, Andrew Boraine, Sophie Oldfield, Owen Crankshaw, Alan Mabin (thank you for the meticulous feedback and encouragement—and especially, Sue Parnell. Sue in particular has been a tremendous source of encouragement and companionship when the road just seemed too long and convoluted. Further, a big shout-out to Maliq Simone as an intellectual and personal constant in my life who operates like an inner voice (for good and ill). Somebody who falls into the category friend and teacher is my supervisor, Jo Beall. Jo’s rigour, generosity, insight, friendship and warmth have made all the difference; thank you!

Since the thesis focused on issues and places in Cape Town that I have also worked on before the PhD, I invariably relied heavily on a number of professional/personal contacts to facilitate access and understanding. Some of the particularly generous people I must mention are: Stephen Boshoff, Barbara Southworth, Nico McLachlan, Andre Olivier, Peter de Tolly. Mr Fezi, Ahmedi Vawda, Kim van Deventer, Saliem Mowser and Alan Roberts. I am deeply appreciative of the trust they placed in me by sharing openly during interviews and by pointing me to the most useful data sources; all of which allowed me to gain deep insights into their work and perspectives. I hope the trust remain in tact after they read the sense I made of it all...

Lastly, the demands and pressures of a PhD necessitate ‘family’ as support structure, cheer leader, back-stopper, therapist and enduring source of warmth. I’m lucky to come from a large and very supportive home where my Father instilled a profound sense of the importance of learning and thinking independently and my Mother did everything else to allow us to live out our ambitions. In part, I devote this thesis in their honour for God alone knows how they could raise all of us to be what we are today.

My life-long friends, Rosieda Shabodien and Ebrahim Rasool (plus Tahrir and Tanwir of course), are the family that has been by my side through this process; keeping me grounded and nourished on the simplicity of unconditional love. However, the person that should share co-ownership of the degree for all her sacrifices, critical feedback, unwavering belief, grammar checks, keeping house and limp together and just being a general smarty-pants, is my life companion, Mirjam van Donk. I know the biggest thank you is getting this “thing” done, but nevertheless, THANK YOU for being there and being you.

I dedicate the thesis, firstly, to my son, Rafael Zukile Pieterse, who already has managed to teach me more than a PhD can ever do in just a quarter of the time! Finally, I also dedicate it to Mr Fezi, the leader of the Ndabeni Claimant community, who passed away before he could experience the fruits of his tireless struggles against the arbitrary cruelty of the state disconnected from its own Constitutional principles.
Abstract

Re-Building amongst Ruins: The Pursuit of Urban Integration in South Africa
(1994-2001)

The 'apartheid city' was synonymous with extreme racial segregation and inequality. After the first democratic elections in April 1994, a range of new urban development policies were developed to deconstruct and re-build the apartheid city. These efforts unfolded under a policy discourse of urban integration. Spatial planning featured large in the urban development policy matrix of the South African state at a time when spatial planning was declining in influence in the international context. The thesis focuses on the relevance of spatial planning for addressing three intractable and inter-related features of the apartheid city: racial segregation, land-use fragmentation and inequality. The research sought to explain why by 2001, the urban development agenda was not dismantling the apartheid city, but rather reinforcing its spatial patterns.

The theoretical contribution of the research is to show how the policy ideal of urban integration corresponds very closely to planning ideas contained in theories associated with the Compact City and New Urbanism, while procedural aspects are akin to the arguments of Communicative Planning theory. The thesis identifies a hybridised South African approach that found support across a wide spectrum of urban development policies - housing, development planning, transport, local government, environmental management. However, political and institutional frictions between national departments and spheres of government made it virtually impossible to harness the potential synergy that could arise from such policy confluence. The research explored two policy frameworks in close detail: 1) the Urban Development Framework driven by the national Department of Housing; and 2) the Municipal Spatial Development Framework (Muni-SDF) of the City of Cape Town Municipality. The latter policy was explored in terms of its broader institutional setting and through a micro-level study focussed on a land-use dispute. The case study of post-apartheid urban policy was researched through a combination of qualitative methods such as in-depth interviews, archival documentary reviews and an analysis of secondary literature.

The thesis argues that the normative planning theories employed need to be articulated in a way that accounts for the specificity of the South African postcolonial experience. It is concluded that the policy tenets of urban integration need to be recast in a way that takes explicit account of specific contextual and institutional dynamics and power that shape the contested political dialogue about how best to advance urban integration so that policies can better reduce the urban fragmentation, segregation and inequality that continue to mark and haunt South African cities.
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<td>City of Cape Town</td>
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<td>CMA</td>
<td>Cape Metropolitan Area</td>
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<td>Community based organisation</td>
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<td>City Development Strategy</td>
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<td>COMDEV</td>
<td>Community Development Directorate</td>
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<td>DA</td>
<td>Democratic Alliance</td>
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<td>DBSA</td>
<td>Development Bank of Southern Africa</td>
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<td>DCD</td>
<td>Department of Constitutional Development and Provincial Affairs</td>
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<td>DP</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
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<td>DPC</td>
<td>Development Planning Commission</td>
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<td>Executive Director</td>
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<td>Land Claims Commissioner</td>
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<td>MEC</td>
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<td>MRF</td>
<td>Metropolitan Restructuring Forum</td>
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<td>Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework</td>
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<td>Muni-SDF</td>
<td>Municipal Spatial Development Framework</td>
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<td>NCPT</td>
<td>Ndabeni Communal Property Trust</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>NHF</td>
<td>National Housing Forum</td>
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<td>Negotiating Forum</td>
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<td>New National Party</td>
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<td>NSDP</td>
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<td>RDP</td>
<td>Development Programme</td>
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<td>SACN</td>
<td>South African Cities Network</td>
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<td>SAMWU</td>
<td>South African Municipal Workers Union</td>
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<td>SANCO</td>
<td>South African National Civic Organisation</td>
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<td>Special Integrated Presidential Projects</td>
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<td>WLAs</td>
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To live amidst the invisible ruins of cultural memory does not mean we ourselves are ruined or lost. Rather it is these ruins which preserve, which constitute, our identities... There is a large difference between living among ruins and being ruined oneself. To live among ruin is to live on the margins; it is not necessarily to be marginal. 

(Teshome Gabriel, 1993: 214)

"Set out to explore every coast, and seek this city,” the Khan says to Marco. “Then come back and tell me if my dream corresponds to reality.”

(Italo Calvino, 1974: 55)

On the hill up here above it
There's little more to say;
David's scarf beats in the wind,
a limp tongue attempting speech.
Our eyes fall like circling birds,
water in a drain, to the scene below.

Yoked to the city's ruin, he'll find
his own in cool departures, separate customs,
eyes moving to new places like twin hammers,
resonant, sustaining.

(James Sallis, 2000: 32)
Chapter 1

Introduction and Overview

The eventual passing of apartheid in South Africa, as a formal system of political domination of a minority over the majority, arrived both unexpectedly and too slowly. For those of us who lived the arbitrary cruelty of apartheid's quotidian totality it was never really possible to believe that the struggle for freedom would ever be over, despite our espousing ideology to the contrary. At the same time, our insatiable yearning for social meaning and political freedom made it impossible to endure the constant deferral of apartheid's demise. Thus, the first non-racial democratic election in April 1994 came and went for us in something of a daze because the sweet taste of freedom was so intense. However, it also proved to be bittersweet, for everything seemingly remained the same. Thinking and writing in the post-apartheid era has been laced with this contradictory alchemy of incredulity and disappointment. The many challenges of reconstructing a deeply divided society such as South Africa inevitably need to be accompanied by an exercise of sense-making.

This thesis is an attempt to make sense of the disconnects between intent and outcomes in the field of urban development policy in post-apartheid South Africa. It is premised on the fact that contemporary South African cities are concrete emblems of the social, economic and political relations of apartheid. At the same time they contain within them the ingredients for the attainment of true freedom. Against this background the thesis seeks to explain why South African cities became even more segregated, fragmented and unequal following political democratisation in 1994 than they were before, particularly when post-apartheid urban development policy explicitly set out to reverse racial, class and spatial divisions.

1.1 FOCUS OF THESIS: URBAN POLICY DISCONNECTS

Urban development policy in South Africa, at least over the past fifteen years, has been focussed on overcoming the engraved features and dynamics of the apartheid city. The latter has been marked by extreme segregation and fragmentation in service of racial dominance and White capitalist interests. The over-riding characteristic of the apartheid
city was (and remains) profound class inequality that was manifest in stark racial terms through spatial segregation. Whites were by and large well off and enjoyed extremely high standards of public services, whilst the vast majority of Blacks\(^1\) were poor and disconnected from essential services and economic opportunities. Understandably, with the onset of political negotiations in 1990 towards democratic elections in 1994, urban policy focussed on how a more integrated post-apartheid city could be brought to life.

Urban integration was not an ambition confined to the post-1994 era. A body of thought was incubated at a Planning School of the University of Cape Town under the tutelage of David Dewar and Roelof Uytenbogaard from the late 1970s, which achieved a distinctive prominence as the primary informant for urban policy. It aimed at rebuilding the apartheid city into its antithesis: the integrated city. At the core of this school of thought was the belief in a new type of urban planning (akin to new urbanism and compact city models in the North), that could refashion the structure of South African cities so that they would become more integrated and environmentally attuned.

Two major policy forums were established in the early 1990s to deal with the challenges of the apartheid city: the National Housing Forum (NHF) and the National Local Government Negotiation Forum (NLGNF). Policy actors and networks in both of these forums found common cause in the urban development principles/guidelines that Dewar and Uytenbogaardt had set out in their seminal *Manifesto for South African Cities*. In this book they advocated for: (i) compacting the city through implosion of growth; (ii) integrating urban activities and land uses; (iii) promoting continuity of urban development along transport corridors, which in turn should (iv) anchor intensive commercial and public service activities; and (v) promoting “collective spaces and places as the building blocks of urban systems, rather than focussing exclusively on the individual housing unit” (Dewar and Uytenbogaardt 1991: 88).

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\(^1\) Statistics South Africa continue to classify people in terms of four population groups: Black African, Coloured, Asian or Indian and White in order to monitor progress in moving away from the apartheid-based discrimination of the past. In this thesis I also use these four population group designations but use the term 'Black' to refer inclusively to all so-called non-White population groups who suffered as a result of the institutionalized system of racial oppression and exploitation prevalent in South Africa until 1994. The usages of these terms are merely instrumental for I do not subscribe to the biological possibility of race.
At the core of this work was a deep belief in the power of planning. However, the early 1990s also marked the moment when the role and relevance of urban planning was called into broader question in the international literature, following systematic critique of the efficacy of blueprint models since the 1970s. For example, Nick Devas and Caroline Rakodi argued, around the same time as the appearance of the *Manifesto for South Africa Cities*, that:

The world’s urban population is growing at a phenomenal rate [...] This poses a huge challenge to those responsible for the management of urban development and the provision of services. Unfortunately, all evidence suggests that city planners and managers have failed to meet this challenge (Devas and Rakodi 1993: 1).

This perspective presented an irony for South Africa. At the moment when planning was largely being called into question, the urban policy community found the ‘solution’ to the challenges of the apartheid city in a particular blueprint planning discourse. This irony provides the theoretical and practical planning backdrop to which I now turn.

First, allow me to fast forward to ten years after democratisation, 2004. A new policy network between the nine largest municipalities in South Africa, the South African Cities Network (SACN), observed in their inaugural *State of the South African Cities Report* that “...the apartheid city remains today with many core features intact” (SACN 2004: 170). Moreover, government accepted this observation. In a new human settlement policy statement issued the same year, *Breaking New Ground*, the government acknowledged that its own primary urban development intervention – the provision of low-cost housing – had not shifted apartheid spatial geographies:

Over the last 10 years, state-assisted housing investment of some R29,5 Bn has provided 1.6 million housing opportunities and has allowed 500,000 families the opportunity to secure titles of old public housing stock. The lack of affordable well located land for low cost housing resulted in the housing programme largely extending existing areas, often on the urban periphery and achieving limited integration. Post-1994 extensions to settlements have generally lacked the qualities necessary to enable a decent quality of life (Department of Housing 2004: 4).

The recent academic literature on the South African city reinforces these conclusions but in starker terms (see Beall et al. 2002; Freund 2005; Hafferburg and Oßenbrügge 2003;
Harrison et al. 2003; Khan and Thring 2003; Pieterse 2004; Todes 2003, forthcoming; Tomlinson et al. 2003; Turok 2001). Accordingly, what emerges is a storyline in which there was seemingly widespread policy agreement on the relevance of compact city planning principles as the approach to remake the apartheid city. Nevertheless, there was broad agreement a decade later that these principles had not translated into effective policies and practices to achieve the desired outcomes. In other words, we are left with a major disconnect between the policy desire to dismantle the apartheid city and the reality of a virulent continuation of the apartheid city. This thesis seeks to understand the reasons for the disconnect, especially when there was such confidence in the veracity of the policy model only a decade ago.

1.2 RESEARCH APPROACH

The research endeavour is grounded in a thorough review of debates in urban policy and planning about the reasons for the disconnect, as well as fine-grained empirical research on policy and planning processes at national, metropolitan and local level. Do the reasons for the disconnect lie at a theoretical level in terms of the informing theories that underpin the policy responses? Or, do the reasons lie at a policy level in terms of the frameworks and tools employed? Or, do the reasons for the disconnect lie at an institutional level in terms of the difficulty of policy implementation? Or, do the reasons for policy failure lie with individuals who were meant to implement perfectly sound policies? Or, is it a combination of these factors, and if so, what specific combination?

A significant body of recent South African urban literature address some of these questions (Beall et al. 2002; Hafferburg and Oßenbrügge 2003; Harrison et al. 2003; Khan and Thring 2003; Pieterse 2004; Todes 2003; Tomlinson et al. 2003; Turok 2001; Watson 1998; 2002a). This literature proposes many reasons for the persistence of urban apartheid despite the extensive raft of policies and legislation that the government has introduced since 1994 to deal with the apartheid city. The most salient can be summarised along the following lines. First, is the issue of **institutional overload** during a time when local government structures were perpetually being made and remade as the legislative timetable moved local government from a pre-interim (1994-1995/1996), to an interim (1996-2000), to a permanent phase (post 2000) of existence (see Parnell et al. 2002). The
argument advanced is that the highly complex and conflictual processes of organisational unbundling and amalgamation that accompanied the institutional dismantling of apartheid, along with shifting boundaries of service delivery, caused deep organisational trauma. This in turn made it near impossible for these agents to successfully implement complex policies.

Second, the contradictory and sometimes competing implications of sectoral policy initiatives (e.g. transport, housing, primary health care, economic development) were driven by powerful national government departments employing the rationale that municipalities were merely the 'hands and feet' (as opposed to the thinking head) of government. Because the structure and responsibility of local government and administration was left unresolved at the historic moment of political democratisation in 1994, new policy ideas with far reaching implications for municipalities were formulated without the direct and active participation of local government (Harrison 2001a; Parnell and Pieterse 1999). More importantly, the municipal dispensation was conceptualised without a deep understanding of the actual and potential workings of local government compared to provincial or national government departments. This lacuna persisted even after the normalisation of local government in December 2000. These two factors speak to significant institutional incapacity at municipal level.

The third issue relates to the political pressures to deliver services to formerly disadvantaged populations and areas. This has given rise to the chasing of numerical targets to demonstrate delivery in line with commitments in the government's Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). Many observers routinely point out that the fixation on numerical targets—most famously, one million houses by 2000—shaped the priorities and imperatives of local government whilst they reorganised. This focus effectively skewed multi-dimensional transformation objectives towards the exigencies of delivery of physical infrastructure for housing (Khan 2003; Huchzermeyer

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2 Local government was racially fragmented until the 1995/6 municipal elections. Local authorities with jurisdiction over White residential areas had a large tax base, cross-subsidised by Black areas and industry, and as a result provided high quality services to White areas. Local authorities in African and Coloured areas had fewer powers and were not democratically elected leading to chronic under-investment in basic services and public infrastructure.
2003a), with the net effect of reinforcing and exacerbating the spatial form of the apartheid city. This was because the only affordable land that was amenable to the large-scale, private sector-driven construction that was required to achieve economies of scale, was on the periphery of cities (Royston 2003).

The matter of affordability constitutes a fourth reason for the perpetuation of urban fragmentation, viz., the lack of understanding and engagement with urban economic processes and actors. It is argued by various scholars that the disengagement by the state with land and property markets made it impossible to reverse spatial patterns (Turok 2001). In the absence of understanding the structuring effects of private and public markets, it was unlikely that policy measures premised on reconfiguring such markets would be successful (Harrison 2003).

A fifth factor in the disconnect between policy rhetoric and reality pertains to the politics of urban development policy formulation and implementation. Most key government policies dealing with the pursuit of integrated urban development are premised on a consensual model of politics (Pieterse 2004). Consensual models of political interaction obscure the inevitable contradictions between competing interests and classes in contexts of limited resources and high levels of inequality (Mouffe 2000). Thus, decisions that will lead to a loss of power or require behavioural change by the powerful in favour of expanding the resources and opportunities of subaltern classes are simply avoided through policy platitudes that insist on consensus-based decision-making.

These five inter-related factors offer a partial account for the disjuncture between urban policy intent (greater integration) and outcomes (deeper fragmentation) in post-apartheid South Africa. The existing literature on the South African city tends to focus on specific cities, specific sectors or one episode in time over the course of the past decade. Not readily available in the existing literature but provided by the present research is a systematic review of: (i) the original policy ideas that informed the urban development approach of the democratic South African government from 1994; (ii) the codification of these policy ideas into sectoral (e.g. transport, housing, planning) White Papers and legislation; (iii) the implementation and effects of these policy ideas through the actions
of various agencies of government; and (iv) the refinement of ideas through the learning mill of practice. Such a systematic review is overdue.

In summary, the thesis captures and analyses the policy processes and evolving content of the South African government’s urban development agenda to achieve urban integration after democratisation in 1994. This is explored at both national and local levels of government policy making and practice in order to offer as comprehensive an account as possible. While the present focus on South African urban policy advances knowledge in a specific context, the location of the empirical study in a grounded theory approach means it also stands to inform and possibly advance understanding in the broader international field of normative urban planning and interrogate its continued relevance for addressing urban segregation and inequality. The thesis, therefore, uses the literature on normative planning theories as an entry point for addressing the following over-arching proposition:

Urban development policies and planning discourses promoting spatial integration in South Africa are likely to mark a departure from the governance and planning of the apartheid past. However, these discourses are unlikely to lead to transformative interventions that reduce urban segregation, fragmentation and inequality if they are not built on and responsive to an understanding of the factors that reproduce and embed these features in the post-apartheid city.

This proposition opens up four general questions:

1. Why have the salient features of the apartheid city remained largely intact despite considerable policy interventions to achieve a different configuration of urban space?
2. Was the perpetuation of the apartheid city inevitable given the limited purchase of planning-based approaches to intervene in urban space?
3. Does urban planning in general, and the compact city models in particular, have any relevance for dismantling and rebuilding the (post-)apartheid city?
4. What are effective policy tools to stem and reverse the tide of entrenched segregation and inequality in South African cities?
To address these questions in a systematic fashion the research is further organised to answer the following more specific questions:

1. How are the issues of urban segregation, fragmentation and inequality defined in discourses of the state at national and local levels?
2. What are the broader informants of such discourses?
3. How are these discourses received and engaged with? Is there unquestioning acceptance or are there points of resistance? Does the dominant discourse crowd out other conceptualisations of the problem?
4. How are these discourses mediated institutionally, particularly at local government level, where the leading actions have to be taken to address problems?
5. What is the scope for planners inside local government to give substantive content to these discourses?
6. When planners formulate concrete arguments and policies to deal with the challenges of segregation, fragmentation and inequality, what is the nature of their arguments—are they reformist or transformative? Are they spatial-form oriented or more expansive? Are they implementable or not?
7. What has been the impact of the policy agenda/approach of planners in terms of the envisaged outcomes? Did it materially reduce segregation, fragmentation and inequality?
8. What were the (unforeseen) consequences inside local government and the larger polity as their policies were implemented?

1.3 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS

Chapter One spells out the topicality of the research and the relevance of the study. A motivation is provided for the importance of addressing the disconnect between the policy aim of advancing urban integration in democratic South Africa, and the policy outcome of increasing urban segregation, fragmentation and inequality. The motivation leads to the framing proposition of the research and the broad research questions that are pursued by this study. A series of more detailed research questions is also presented, which sets up the logic for the organisation of the eight chapters of the thesis. The
structure of the thesis and content of each chapter are also presented along with the contribution and limitations of the study.

Chapter Two explores contemporary debates in normative planning theory. The chapter is structured to address two main questions: How are urban segregation, fragmentation and inequality produced in general terms? What can planning do to address these complex and intertwined problems when grounded in particular planning theories? The chapter explores four planning theory streams: (i) urban (spatial-form) systems theories; (ii) communicative planning; (iii) post-Marxist political-economy; and (iv) postmodern planning theories. The purpose of this exploration is to uncover the theoretical and conceptual roots of the dominant planning approach in South Africa in the post 1994 period. The principal finding is that the primary planning discourse informing South African policies can be traced back to neo-systems planning approaches such as New Urbanism and the linked approach of compact city models. The tenets of these approaches are interwoven with the procedural principles for good planning processes that emanate from the Communicative Planning school of thought. However, I demonstrate that planning theory remains a highly contested terrain in South Africa as elsewhere.

Since much of the planning literature pertains to first world contexts and cities, it was necessary to explore how these theories have been received and reworked in the postcolonial context of South Africa. This is the focus of Chapter Three, which explores the engagement of South African planning theorists with debates in the North. This allows me to bring to the surface and clarify what the existing literature says about the role of planning in unmaking and remaking the South African city. At the heart of these debates is one main faultline. On the one side of the faultline is the perspective, from a neo-systems planning approach, that optimal relations between particular elements in space exist, which ineluctably lead to the need at least for comprehensive spatial frameworks, if not plans. On the other side are those who argue against what they regard as 'spatial determinism' for a more localised, project-based approach to realise achievable (i.e. realistic) transformations in the space-economy of cities and settlements. Through an examination of this debate the thesis finds the entry point to explore the conceptual
foundations for the disjuncture between the policy intent to integrate cities and the material outcome of more segregated and unequal cities. In the second part of Chapter Three the overall research strategy and methodology is set out.

In order to fully contextualise the challenges of urban integration, Chapter Four delves into historical and contemporary drivers of urban development in South Africa. The first part of the chapter provides a synoptic overview of the origins of urbanisation in order to demonstrate how racial segregation and inequality were always dominant factors in the management of urban growth. The second part of the chapter then sets out current levels of urban poverty and inequality to make clear the consequences of deliberate state efforts over a century to engineer urban segregation. These two sections provide the reader with an insight into the scale and dimensions of the urban integration challenges and an appreciation of what the new policies were up against. The last part of the chapter catalogues the new urban development policies introduced by the democratically elected government over the period 1994-2001. In this section the remarkable degree of consistency of policy thinking across a range of urban policies is highlighted. This sets up the central question: if there was such widespread consensus on the policy approach to advance urban integration, why has the outcome been so disappointing? In the light of this question, and the centrality of local government as the lead agency in implementing various urban development policies, the last part of Chapter Four discusses the significance of the new policies in local government.

Three empirical chapters follow tracing the implementation of the new urban policies from the national sphere of government down to the local sphere. Chapter Five is the first of three consecutive chapters that capture the findings of the field research for the thesis. Chapter Five homes in on the main urban development policy of the period under review: *The Urban Development Framework* (UDF), which was adopted by Cabinet in August 1997. The chapter is split into two main components. The first part provides a detailed reconstruction of how the UDF came into being and the institutional dynamics

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3 The study stops at 2001 because the *White Paper on Spatial Planning and Land Use Management* was published in July 2001 by the South African Government. Furthermore, I commenced research on the topic in 2001 and to avoid a situation of studying a moving target, I decided to use that year as the cut-off point to structure my data collection and analysis.
that were at play in its formulation. This is the first time that this history has been documented. The material is drawn from interviews with key role players at the time, grey material found in various government archives, and the personal records of individuals who were involved in the drafting process. This section reveals how contested urban policy development processes were and the myriad discourses that informed processes at the time. The main finding as demonstrated in the chapter is that despite the importance of the UDF as the first formal policy statement on urban development and integration, its drafting and finalisation were accorded very little political priority. It is suggested, therefore, that the commitment to integrated urban development was never elevated beyond the level of rhetoric. Instead, the real political focus was on achieving specific urban outcomes: large scale delivery of low-income housing and associated infrastructure even if at the expense of reversing the apartheid legacy of urban segregation and economic marginalisation of the poor.

The second part of Chapter Five provides a detailed textual analysis of the concept of urban integration as employed in the UDF, in response to the research questions listed in Section 1.2 above. Four notions of urban integration in the UDF are uncovered and analysed. These are, urban integration as: (i) a high-level policy rationale and outcome; (ii) an object of spatial planning; (iii) the glue for social investments; and (iv) an institutional approach of coordination and partnership. Through this deconstructionist analysis it becomes clear how the drafters of the UDF adopted a weak conceptual understanding of urban integration, manifested in the policy assumption that urban integration is a shared common good in the city. The policy simply could not engage with the fact that unequal and segregated cities are inherently conflictual because they only work for some at the expense of the many. If this is to be remedied, powerful interests in the city have to give up control and power. The story of the UDF's genesis and weak content is revealing in itself but also provides evidence that local government was given very little policy direction in driving urban integration at the local sphere.

In light of this finding, Chapters Six and Seven focus on the efforts of the City of Cape Town municipality (CCT) to achieve urban integration, its first stated priority out of seven objectives set for its term of office from May 1996 – December 2000. Specifically,
Chapter Six examines the agenda and interventions of the CCT to promote urban integration in its political, economic and institutional contexts. Throughout the chapter the analytical focus is predominantly on the role of planning ideas about the pursuit of urban integration, in order to explore empirically the conceptual issues raised in Chapters Two and Three. It is particularly relevant to consider the role of planning because David Dewar, who was such a central force in shaping the tenets of various national policies (see Chapter Four), was centrally involved in drafting the spatial planning framework of the CCT. However, what is also significant about the case study is the fact that the Planning Department and its draft spatial planning framework – the Municipal Spatial Development Framework (Muni-SDF) – was largely marginalised by the other departments and units of the municipality. The reasons for this marginalisation are teased out because they speak directly to the failure of advancing urban integration in Cape Town during this period.

Chapter Seven explores in greater depth how the broad trends identified and analysed in Chapter Six played out in micro-level social contexts when governmental actions of the municipality came into direct conflict with a group of citizens in the city. A specific neighbourhood is investigated in relation to land-use decisions that could effect urban integration. By combining these two levels of analysis the thesis sheds light on the politics of municipal governance and planning when it is trained on the pursuit of urban integration at the local level. As such, Chapter Seven effectively provides an insight into the everyday practices of planners in the CCT in relation to an issue that pertained directly to urban integration. My findings suggest that the planners were trapped in a rigid conception of planning and procedures which set them on a collision course with a community that was previously dispossessed of land and had lost income opportunities in the city. The chapter also shows how the rigidity of the planners was reinforced by the spatial planning approach of the Muni-SDF, which rested on spatial-form principles. The analysis of a micro-level incident between the planners of the CCT and a community that wanted to push for urban integration on strategically located land in the city, enables me to address the research questions above about the transformative role planners and their arguments in the pursuit of urban integration.
The final chapter draws together key findings and implications of the research for theory and policy application. The first part of Chapter Eight provides an analytical overview and synthesis of the preceding seven chapters. This review lays the ground to explore the theoretical and policy implications of the thesis. The second part of the chapter extrapolates the theoretical implications of the research findings. In particular it is argued that the primary debate in the South African planning literature between those who favour a spatial-form approach versus those who argue for a more provisional/contingent approach to planning is a debate constructed on false premises. The weakness of both sets of arguments is an insufficient account of the political context and relations within which planning is situated, premised in turn on limited political theorisation. A case is made that overcomes this conceptual weakness and constitutes a modest attempt to move the debate forward. This leads onto the third section, which is focussed on the policy implications of the research. In this section I also seek to move the debate forward by offering a fresh conceptual framework that captures the multiple dimensions of urban integration. The chapter concludes that it is only by locating planning ideas and processes within such a framework that the relevance of a transformative planning can be recognised and pursued in practice and that the potential can be realised for overcoming the disconnect between policy intentions and outcomes in urban development processes in democratic South Africa. Lastly, new research areas are identified to address this disconnect and improve theoretical and policy efforts at advancing substantive urban transformation.

1.4 CONTRIBUTION OF THE RESEARCH

In addition to new empirical case study research, a number of features of the study make it original. It is the first time that normative planning theories have been assessed in relation to one of the big value-based questions about cities in South Africa, namely, reversing urban segregation and inequality towards urban integration. It is the first time that the urban policy ideal of 'integration' has been assessed in terms of its policy content and concomitant programmes at two scales of government in South Africa. This addresses a gap in the current literature on postcolonial cities, which is necessary given that spatial fragmentation and rising inequality seem to be challenges confronting most cities in the world and particularly cities in the South (Friedmann 2002). Lastly, the policy implications that flow from the study offer one of the first attempts in South African
urban scholarship to map out a foundational framework for thinking holistically about
the various dimensions of urban integration. This framework also provides a broader
backdrop for understanding the inter-dependent role of planning with other urban
development policy processes in achieving urban transformation more generally.

1.5 LIMITATIONS
As a contextual study the research is far from definitive. Given the exploratory focus of
the case study, some of the conceptual and policy related analysis remains at a rather
general level despite being concretised empirically. For example, the issues addressed in
the thesis are time-bound and would additionally take on a different hue if located in
another urban policy rather than the UDF, or if the focus was on another city/town
during the same period. Furthermore, given the short timeframe that has elapsed since
the policies were formulated and the long time cycles over which structural urban change
comes about, it is impossible to be definitive about the impact of policy or
implementation. It may just be too soon to expect certain changes to have occurred.

A related point is the fact that the topic covers a very large canvas. Throughout the thesis
there is an attempt to balance treatment of the numerous elements that make up the
macro-level environment within which urban development policies unfold, with the
complexities and nuances of micro-level actions by the local actors who implement
policies in day-to-day urban environments. As a context-specific case study the thesis
does not seek to make definitive claims about urban planning or policy impacts for
postcolonial cities everywhere. Instead, the study offers an account of a specific national
policy and the broad trends in its attempted implementation by one urban municipality
in Cape Town during the period under review. While the findings are only interpretative
of a very specific time and place, the research may nevertheless provide a conceptual
platform for further investigation of the urban context in South Africa and beyond.
Lastly, the research is constrained by the fact that some of the key political actors were
not accessible for interviews due to their demanding work pressures. I have little doubt
that some of the findings and interpretations would have had a different inflection if
those interviews had been possible.
Chapter 2
Planning Perspectives on the Elusiveness of Urban Integration

2.1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to map different planning perspectives on the problematics of urban segregation, fragmentation and inequality. The contextual references about urban South Africa presented in the previous chapter serves as a backdrop. The first section provides some clarification on how best to categorise urban planning theories. Different typological approaches have been proposed over the past three decades (Allmendinger 2002a; 2002b; Faludi 1973; Friedmann 1987; Taylor 1998; Yiftachel 1989). I will make clear which of these approaches makes most sense in the context of this thesis. These framing moves allow me to get into the substance of the chapter, which explores contending theories of urban planning in relation to urban segregation, fragmentation and inequality.4 Thereafter the chapter concludes with a section on how the role of the planner is defined in terms of various planning theories. This is an integral part of the planning theory literature and is of direct relevance to the case study discussion in Chapters Six and Seven.

2.2 TYPOLOGY OF PLANNING THEORIES
Phillip Allmendinger (2001; 20002a; 2002b; 2002c) has played a prodigious role in the past few years to bring greater systematisation to planning theory, in the wake of a veritable explosion of positions after the demise of scientific rationalism. Before presenting his typological approach, which informs this whole study (especially Chapter Three), it is important to give some background to the question of categorisation in planning theory.

Thirty years ago, Andreas Faludi (1973) provided a typological framework for planning theory based on the distinction between procedural and substantive aspects of theory.

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4 Hereafter, as a form of shorthand I may simply refer to one or two of these problems but would usually denote all three aspects because they are fundamentally inter-related in the South African context as elaborated in Chapter Four.
Faludi argued at the time that the main business of planning was developing procedures or means. Towards the end of the 1980s, Oren Yiftachel (1989) provided a qualitatively deeper typological approach to planning theories following the postmodern turn. His approach rested on three questions: what is urban planning? (the analytical debate); what is a good urban plan? (the urban form debate); and what is a good planning process? (the procedural debate) (Yiftachel 1989). This approach reinforced the fundamental distinction introduced by Faludi between substantive and procedural dimensions in planning theory, with the first two questions pertaining to substance, and the latter to process. The novel aspect of Yiftachel's typology was his focus, not only on the procedural-substantive distinction, but also on the explanatory-prescriptive axis. Furthermore, he asserted that previous theoretical approaches failed to distinguish between phenomena that could fall in the realm of any of the earlier categories. In effect, Yiftachel argued, most planning theorists were not setting clear enough boundaries for the field of planning inquiry. This caused confusion. In substantiating his approach, Yiftachel developed a teleological timeline from 1900 until 1980 to demonstrate how fields of knowledge have evolved in response to the three questions of his typology. Yiftachel's framework provided a captivating overview of a proliferating field, albeit not without its own problems.

Philip Allmendinger (2002a) acknowledges the influential and useful nature of Yiftachel's intervention, but remains critical of it in two respects based on his acceptance that post-positivism has come to dominate the social sciences. Post-positivism refers to the rejection of scientific rationalism as an acceptable epistemology for the social sciences. The first dimension of Allmendinger's critique of Yiftachel's approach refers to the teleological depiction of theoretical development. A post-positivist perspective dispenses with the idea that theories unfold through a linear process of iterative development.

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5 I am skating over a much more extensive field here. In the wake of the neo-Marxist surge in urban studies in the 1970s (Castells 1977; Harvey 1973) and the emergence of other critical traditions, vigorous debates unfolded about the most appropriate way to organize a rapidly changing and growing field. A magisterial overview was provided by John Friedmann (1987) in his opus, Planning in the Public Domain.

6 "Post-positivism is characterized by: a rejection of positivist understandings and methodologies (including naturalism) and an embracing instead of approaches that contextualize theories and disciplines in larger social and historical contexts; normative criteria for deciding between competing theories; the ubiquity of variance in explanations and theories; [and] an understanding of individuals as self-interpreting, autonomous subjects" (Allmendinger 2002c: 7).
Allmendinger insists that there "is now a much more eclectic 'pick and mix' basis to theory development and planning practice that is better seen as relating to issues, time and space in a linear and non-linear manner" (Allmendinger 2002a: 84, emphasis in original). The second dimension of the critique is equally damaging, not just of Yiftachel's model, but of the general distinction in planning theory between procedural and substantive theories established in the original argument of Faludi. A post-positivist perspective cannot accept the dualism between substance and procedure because both are in fact sutured with normative positions. Any of the current substantive planning theories would carry within them, implications for planning practice. Moving on from this critique, I will turn to the alternative typology proposed by Allmendinger and why it serves my analytical purposes in the thesis.

Given the multi-dimensional nature of Allmendinger's typology, it is usefully approached in a diagrammatic form (see Figure 2.1). The model is premised on recognising four distinct categories of theory which informs a fifth, viz. planning theory. The four categories of theory are: framing theory, social theory, exogenous theory and social scientific philosophical understandings. Briefly, the five categories refer to the following:

1. Framing theory refers to the overarching theoretical approach that arises from one's epistemology (theory of knowledge). It is typically made up of various theoretical strands, but in the context of planning, can broadly be categorised as modernism, postmodernism or reflexive modernism (an intermediate position between the two). To this, I would add postcolonialism, because it provides a similar function as reflexive modernism, but with an explicit rooting in the experiences and location of the colonised and their diaspora (Ashcroft 2001). Framing theory fulfils a central function in "mediating or filtering exogenous theory, social theory and social scientific philosophical understandings" (Allmendinger 2002a: 90).

2. Social theory denotes broad sociological theories that seek to capture the functioning of society. Two streams dominated social scientific research during the modern period: structuralist and interpretivist streams. The former refers to
conceptual models that emphasize the structuring forces that impact on and shape the behaviour and habitats of individuals, e.g. functionalism, structuralism and Marxism. The latter refers to approaches that are more bottom-up and seek to capture the reflective nature of individuals and their ability to choose, e.g. symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, and phenomenology. Since the 1970s there have been efforts, spearheaded by Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens, to develop a more dialectical conception of the mutually-shaping nature of structure and agency within social systems, namely the concepts of habitus and structuration theory respectively (Bourdieu 1994; Giddens 1984; cf. Hay 2002, ch.3).

3. Social scientific philosophical understandings refer to the deeper assumptions of social theories that are usually not made very explicit. These theories "come under the broad categories of, for example, positivism, falsification, realism, idealism, etc." (Allmendinger 2002a: 91). In other words, they deal with questions of ontology, that is, the nature of reality. The value of recognising this domain of theory is that it helps one towards a nuanced understanding of differences between authors who may seem to hold onto similar exogenous or social theories but arrive at diverse conclusions about the role of planning in effecting social change. This is important for present purposes in disassembling what on the surface appear to be similar exogenous theories.

4. Exogenous theory refers to the host of middle-range theories that planners draw on to explain social phenomenon in terms of (urban) space, policy processes and governance dynamics. These are background theories that inform understandings of planning and space that are conceptualised more directly in indigenous planning theories. For example, in recent years debates in democratic theory (between associative, deliberative and agonistic theorists) have been particularly influential in shaping the debates between interpretative planning theorists (see Gabardi 2001; Hillier 2002a; Nash 2000, Ch 5).
5. Indigenous planning theory refers to theorising that is planning specific. The conventional list of schools of thought in planning theory include: Marxist, rational comprehensive, systems, new right (or neo-liberal), pragmatism, advocacy planning, postmodern, collaborative, amongst others (Greed 2000; Sandercock 1998; Taylor 1998). These theories can be deconstructed in terms of elements in the previous four categories of theory on which they draw. In other words, planning is inherently a cross-disciplinary field and it is not possible to establish definite boundaries as in many base disciplines. The vital innovation of this typological model is that indigenous planning theories must also be seen as a product of other variables. “Space, time, the institutional and government context and other important influences also play an important role in the formulation of indigenous theory” (Allmendinger 2002a: 92). This recognition begins to address the relevance (for postcolonial contexts) of the questions that I posed in Chapter One.

![Figure 2.1: Post-positivist planning typology](image)

(Sources: Allmendinger 2002a)

Even a cursory look at the planning theory literature will reveal that 95% of the debates are in reference to European and American contexts (Harrison 2005). This is a particularly acute problem since planning theory is fundamentally about spatial
interventions in particular contexts. Across the board, planning theorists from almost every persuasion will support the idea that theory must resonate with context. Allmendinger's emphasis on the importance of time and space as mediating factors in the development and application of theory, provides the opportunity to rethink and assess the relevance of planning theory to deal with the particularities of the post-apartheid (and postcolonial) paradox of planning discussed in Chapter One. Some planning theorists have already taken up this challenge and perspectives are emerging that inflect the main theoretical approaches with a South African/postcolonial sensibility (e.g. Harrison 2001b, 2002a; Oranje 2002; Watson 2002a). I return to these planning theorists in the next chapter.

The next section briefly introduces four schools of thought in urban planning: (i) systems theory and a recent derivative: new urbanism; (ii) communicative theory (especially its expression as collaborative planning); (iii) post-Marxist political economy, with a focus on the just city approach; and (iv) postmodern theories. This is clearly not an exhaustive account of planning theories. The choice of these four schools of thought is informed by two considerations. Firstly, these schools of thought reflect theoretical ideas that have found resonance in South African planning debates and urban policy as summarised in the framing questions in the introduction. Secondly, the focus here is on normative planning approaches with insights and understanding for dealing with the crises of urban segregation, fragmentation and inequality; either explicitly, or implicitly via underlying theories of urban (re)production.

2.3 PLANNING THEORIES AND THE PROBLEMS OF URBAN SEGREGATION, FRAGMENTATION AND INEQUALITY

This section of the chapter provides a synoptic overview of four schools of thought in planning theory. After presenting the main tenets of each approach, the focus will shift to the question of how each theory deals with the problems of urban segregation, fragmentation and inequality. It is difficult to step into the powerful flow of contested meanings that arise from the ongoing engagement (usually very spirited) between planning theorists, especially since debates are complex and have been raging for some time. There is a constant danger of doing this richness a grave injustice by oversimplifying individual positions through crude taxonomies, partial recapitulation and
failure to engage with the full dimensions of each approach. Nevertheless, this section will endeavour to reflect the gist of each theoretical framework and extrapolate, albeit at the expense of completeness, only the salient issues as pertaining to the central research questions presented in Chapter One.

This section forms the heart of this chapter. Because the theoretical landscape is so vast, I review the literature through the lens of three questions: (1) How is urban segregation, fragmentation and inequality (re)produced?; (2) What can planning do to address or solve the problems of segregation, fragmentation and inequality?; (3) What are the implications of answers to the former questions for the role of the planner as purposeful actor working to advance effective responses? By working through these questions I hope to get an analytical purchase on the policy discourses circulating in South Africa at a national and local level in processes of urban development and planning; themes which I take up again in the chapters drawing more directly on the field research (Chapters Four-Seven).

On the (re)production of urban segregation, fragmentation and inequality
At the outset it is worth pointing out that all planning theories discussed here consider planning as a normative and interventionist process with ethical objectives and, in broad terms, one that is in favour of advancing 'the public interest'. Even postmodern planners such as Philip Allmendinger (2001) go to great theoretical lengths to justify an ethical basis for planning. In fact, a large part of planners' work involves mediating conflicts and making choices "as they try to reconcile the goals of economic development, social justice, and environmental protection" (Campbell and Fainstein 2003: 8). The planning theories discussed here would all support the ideals of less discriminatory segregation, less fragmentation of the kind that causes inequitable access to urban opportunities, and less inequality between social groups. Of course, there are great differences between planning theorists about what kind of planning and urban development interventions would be adequate to realise such ideals. Those fissures will be elaborated on at a later stage. This section summarises contemporary understandings in urban studies on how segregation, fragmentation and inequality can be understood and the causes of its (re)production, through an exploration of how different planning theories address these problems.
In general terms, urban segregation can be seen as an outcome of urban inequality, especially in capitalist cities, which is reinforced by urban management and planning ideas that valorise the ordered fragmentation of urban space. Iris Marion Young provides a useful working definition of segregation and its general causes:

...segregation consists in an enforced separation of groups that confines members of some groups to specific areas, or excludes members of a group from specific spaces, institutions, or activities, or regulates the movements of members of segregated groups [...] group based residential segregation is common in modern democracies with self-consciously differentiated groups. Where it exists, it is the product of class and income differentials combined with a variety of discriminatory actions and policies of individuals, private institutions, and government (Young 2000: 206 & 207).

This coincides with the perspective of Savage et al. (2003) that regards segregation as the spatial expression of inequality. Inequality can be mapped in terms of differential access to economic resources (wages, land and knowledge) and collective consumption goods and services (i.e. education, health service provision, town planning and transport), social standing (i.e. status), and political power (Stevenson 2003; Tajbakhsh 2001). Capitalism (in all its variants) is fundamentally an economic, social and political system that produces and exploits inequalities in society. In this light, it is clear that inequality is always multi-dimensional and the various elements tend to operate in a mutually reinforcing manner, linked to (but not fully determined by) the political-economic reproduction of society. It is this character of inequality that makes it a particularly intractable problem. Furthermore, it is impossible to understand the reproduction of inequality outside of an appreciation of how group identities and subjectivities are reproduced in the city, in specific neighbourhoods or enclaves.

Initially, in classical functionalist and structural (Weberian and Marxist) approaches to urban studies, identities were seen in static and deterministic ways. In other words, it was assumed that economic and political forces (e.g. racism) determined the subject position of people, i.e. as working class or black working class. These ascriptions of identity, linked to people's relation to the means of production, were seen as adequate to explain subjectivity. Furthermore, "[s]ocial divisions were thus predominantly seen as deriving from economic forces and organized around class" (Bridge and Watson 2000a: 253). This
approach was uprooted during the 1980s with the introduction of the notion of 'difference' by feminist, psychoanalytical and post-structural theorisations in social theory more generally, and urban studies more specifically (Eade and Mele 2002). As a result, there was "a move away from thinking about identity and subjectivity as static, essential categories, to seeing them as shifting, decentred and multiply located" (Stevenson 2003: 40). In addition to regarding identity as multiple and hyphenated, it is also necessary to recognise that "...identities are also 'hybrid', that is, overdetermined, and structured by the unconscious desires in a relation of alterity to the other and the self" (Tajbakhsh 2001: 28). For this reason, it is impossible to tease out specific dimensions of identity, e.g. gender, or race, or nationality, in pure forms. On the contrary, the various dimensions of hybrid identities are mutually constitutive and shaped by various spatialised experiences—locality (home, street, neighbourhood, city), nation and trans-national territories (Smith 2001). Lastly, identities are also fluid, always under construction and fundamentally open-ended (Clifford 2000). The multiple spatialities in the city provide the raw material for the incessant work of making identity in particular places (Massey 1999). This theoretical position makes it impossible to read off from a person's residence (for example in a ghetto or gated community) or job description (for example in a factory, office or as a home-worker), their political and economic interests. Also, it makes it impossible to assume the 'cultural character' of a neighbourhood, based on the class profile of the inhabitants.

Such a nuanced conceptual approach to identity and subjectivity invariably complicates our understanding of the reproduction of segregation and inequality, because there is always a margin of complicity in the functioning of regimes of difference; for power works through difference to reproduce inequality. With the intensification of awareness of, and attention to, multiplying differences in postmodern societies, urban inequalities—manifested in various forms of segregation—are intensifying.

Cities, therefore, are becoming places where far from encountering difference, people actively contrive to avoid it. Different social classes, increasingly, are forced to follow different trajectories through space, they inhabit different zones for work and leisure, and rarely, if ever, do they unexpectedly encounter the 'other'. The ideal urban environments are places of control rather than disorder. This city of difference is not a place where diversity is celebrated on the ground. It is a place of
watchfulness and suspicion – of enclaves of homogeneity, perhaps even community – a place where mingling with strangers is to be avoided (Stevenson 2003: 47).

There are many forces and factors that contribute to urban fragmentation and divisions: the operation and functioning of land and housing markets; planning aimed at social control and modernist functionalism; consumer preferences of particularly the middle-classes, who seek safety and exclusivity; symbolic and psychic attachments to particular places; the physical form of the city and how it actively prevents certain categories of people (e.g. those with disabilities, or women or children) to move around or access services and goods (Bridge and Watson 2000a: 257-259; Marcuse 2000). It is vital to relate these more structural factors to questions of identity and power. “Different marginalities, such as race, gender, or sexuality, or other forms of exclusion, interrelate to concentrate sites of power disadvantage and are not simply a question of special needs or lifestyle but are embedded in power relations, whether these be symbolic or real (Bridge and Watson 2000a: 257).

In other words, whilst accepting the validity of a difference perspective, which foregrounds the complexity of subjectivity and the relationship between place and identity construction, it is also possible to be clear that unequal power relations operate through spatial differentiation to concentrate a lack of access to bases of power. Such a perspective is exemplified in British scholarship, for example, in the work of Stuart Hall (1986) and the Birmingham Cultural Studies Group with respect to race and the socialist feminist position articulated by the subordination of women group (Barrett 1992). Where such contributions fell short, however, was in relation to the appropriate role of public policy in addressing power disadvantage, including as reproduced through the segregation and fragmentation of urban space, leaving deepening inequality in its wake.

This brings the discussion to the issue of fragmentation, which has not yet been defined. The focus of this study is not only on segregation as it relates to inequality but also on processes of urban fragmentation that result from the implementation of urban policies and plans, premised on modernist conceptions of urban management. Modernist conceptions of urban management tend to function on the “reductionist assumption that cities and places can be considered unproblematically as single, integrated, unitary,
material objects, to be addressed by planning instruments" (Graham and Healey 1999: 624). This conception flowed naturally from the scientific rationalism of the 1960s, whereby universal social progress could be achieved through directed and planned social change. Interventions aimed at achieving directional change (i.e. progress) were based on the application of scientific analytical procedures which were thought to yield sound knowledge about the nature of the problem and how best to solve it. Part of this modernist schema of knowledge was a belief that there was a single optimal design and lay-out of urban functions and uses – for example, for different kinds of economic activity, for residential, educational and recreational needs – that could be achieved through the consistent application of regulatory criteria to fix the use of particular spaces. In this way, it was thought that the urban totality would come into its own through the harmonious co-existence of land-uses and effortless movement between these functionally defined spaces. This modernist conceit led to the relentless fragmentation of urban areas to make urban space fit with the theoretical ideal. In a context of profound urban inequality, marked in part by racialised and class-based segregation, this ideology of fragmented specialisation reinforced uneven development across urban territories (Taylor 1998). In the case of South Africa, the racist apartheid ideology dovetailed neatly with this kind of modernist thinking in planning and effectively accelerated processes of segregation and reinforced inequality (Mabin 1995; Maylam 1995). Having clarified this, attention can shift to the main focus of the chapter: the perspective of various planning theories on dealing with the interrelated problems of segregation, fragmentation and inequality.

2.4 THE SCOPE OF PLANNING TO REMAKE URBAN SPACE
The epistemological crisis that beset planning with the rise of the post-Marxist and post-structural critiques of instrumental rationality, has been compounded by critical perspectives that expose planning as essentially reformist and complicit with unequal urban development processes, i.e. politically compromised. Andrew Blowers and Kathy Pain (1999), in their exploration of the potential of using planning as a framework to advance more sustainable forms of urban development, arrive at a sobering assessment of planning practice (in the UK). This forms a useful starting point for discussion. First, planners have a more limited remit of control than the issues they seek to address.
Second, planning is too blunt an instrument to realise complex social purposes. As a result, planning objectives and practices are often guilty of crude spatial or environmental determinism, i.e. assuming that form and design can alter behaviour. Third, in a capitalist economy planner’s relative power, through the planning system, is very limited, in relation for example to developers (public and private). Invariably, plans tend to be pragmatic and reactive (also see Campbell and Fainstein 2003). Fourth, planning is usually chronically under-funded. This undermines the prospect of a planning system with resources to undertake necessary investments to enable control of development in accordance with development objectives. Fifth, it remains uncertain whether planning departments and planners have the skills, insights, resources, and institutional wherewithal to define and defend ‘a public interest’ in a sea of conflicting interests with different bases of power. The idea of a single public interest is in any case thoroughly undermined by postmodern planning critiques, which raises the thorny question about the basis of defining any kind of interest in postmodern/postcolonial societies (Allmendinger 2001). Sixth, given the constrained nature of planning as elaborated before, it is poorly positioned to link and articulate discrete localised interventions in urban space towards a larger spatial agenda of transformation (Blowers and Pain 1999). As a consequence, Michael Dear (2000: 124) arrives at the pessimistic conclusion that “planning practice had devolved into a ritualized choreography of routines.”

It is for these reasons that debates in planning theory have been obsessed with exploring the transformative potential of planning “in developing the good city and region within the constraints of a capitalist political economy and a democratic political system” (Campbell and Fainstein 2003: 1, original emphasis removed). Planning theorists approach this vexing question in very different ways. Post-structuralists such as Bent Flyvbjerg and Oren Yiftachel turn to Foucauldian deconstruction to foreground the disciplinary essence of planning, thereby effectively confirming the ‘inherent’ oppressive dimensions of planning that should be expected and not leave one surprised when it is encountered in practice. In contradistinction, planners who work in the communicative school of thought focus on the constitutive open-endedness and complexity of urban development institutions and politics to show how a planning practice, which is firmly rooted in democratic values, can play a significant role to advance social equity concerns
(Forester 1999; Healey 1997). Others argue that planning must be returned to its core competency, which is the shaping of urban space through land-use regulations, and desist from engaging in elaborate philosophical and political theory debates (Faludi 1996). For this perspective, a compelling argument on an optimal urban form must drive planning along and keep it focused. Such an argument could, for instance, be consistent with principles of environmental sustainability (Ellis 2002). Lastly, there are those who argue for a pragmatic approach to what planning can and cannot do. Typically, these authors opt for a non-deterministic political-economy analysis of the balance of power in particular cities in relation to larger forces as the starting point. From there, a series of broadly acceptable, yet progressive, policies are deployed to incrementally move the city in more democratic and equitable directions (Fainstein 2000; Harrison 2002). These different perspectives are not necessarily conflictual or opposite (although elements of arguments are), but rather contiguous because they emerge from different theoretical informants (see Figure 2.1). Each of these perspectives is explored below to tease out how it deals with the issue of what planning can do to shift spatial patterns of segregation, fragmentation and inequality.

(Neo-)Systems planning perspectives (New Urbanism)

Systems planning theory emerged in the 1960s as a direct counter to the predominant approach of Lewis Keeble in the post-World War II period, design-centred town planning theory. Systems theory emerged in tandem with the rational-process view of planning, epitomised in the classic book of Andreas Faludi: Planning Theory; published in 1973. Nigel Taylor (1998: 60) argues that it is vital to pay close attention to the content and widespread influence of both 'systems' and 'process' planning theories because, "taken together, [they] represented a kind of high water-mark of modernist optimism in the post-war era." Notably, both proved particularly enduring with the South African planning fraternity into the 21st century (Dewar 2000; Mabin and Smit 1997). This section presents a brief summary of the main features of systems planning theory, after which it moves onto more recent incantations of the approach—New Urbanism. I label this neo-systems theory, because it does not retain the empiricism of systems theory, whilst also fusing some elements of design theory into the mix. It is this mixture that is particularly pronounced in the South African context during the transition period (1990-present).
Classic systems theory drew inspiration from ecological system theories in botany. It also echoed the much earlier pioneering ideas of Patrick Geddes who conceived of cities and their outlying regions as analogous to living organisms (Taylor 1998). Fundamentally, a system is something composed of interconnected parts. In combination, the constitutive parts make a 'whole' system. Also, the different parts can affect all the other parts in the system, which denotes the constitutive inter-dependency. Furthermore, a system is dynamic—change happens "through the competitive behaviour of those involved who act in an optimising way" (Allmendinger 2002b: 44). The dynamic nature of a system makes it adaptive and evolutionary. These tenets made system theory amenable to computer-aided mathematical modelling, which was on the ascendancy during the late 1960s (exercising a profound influence in adjacent geographical sciences as well). Modelling allows system theory to explore possible urban trajectories of change if certain changes are introduced into the functioning of the city. Interestingly, this led systems planners to reject the blueprint planning approach – predominant at the time – to advocate for an approach that suggested how the city should evolve in small incremental steps. The assumption was that in complex evolving systems, change is always somewhat unpredictable and needs to be carefully monitored and objectives redefined. The primary difference between systems theory and the design-based approaches that it sought to upend was a view that planning had to first engage in deep analysis to understand the system before change could be proposed. Design planners were trapped in acontextual ('scientific') design-optimisation models that were simply imposed on urban space with scant regard for what was there or how to accentuate what exists. However, as will become clearer below, systems theory also ran into a similar problem of abstracting optimal spatial relations, to the point of essentialism, inside a systems model.
New Urbanism

The New Urbanism is concerned with both the pieces and the whole (Calthorpe 1994: xi).

New Urbanism is the most concrete of planning theories discussed in this chapter. It encapsulates a series of interlocked and inter-dependent design principles that apply at all scales of the city—the street, the block, the neighbourhood, the region and the connectivity corridors that string these together. The driving impetus of the theory is to use design and planning to imagine and build beautiful, visually arresting, equitable, efficient, environmentally benign and fluid cities that are user-friendly to pedestrians. This goal, it is believed, will go a long way to remedy the atomised, homogenous, car-dependent, ecologically disastrous and profoundly unequal cities bequeathed by modernist planning and architecture (Ellis 2002; Katz 1994). This animating ambition of New Urbanism is translated into a series of interlinked design principles which are usefully summarised by one of the founding theorists and leading practitioners:

Seen as a whole, the ... metropolis should be designed with much the same attitude as we design the neighbourhood: There should be defined edges (i.e., Urban Growth Boundaries), the circulation system should function for the pedestrian (i.e., supported by regional transit system), public space should be formative rather than residual (i.e., preservation of major open-space networks), civic and private domains should form a complementary hierarchy (i.e., related cultural centers, commercial districts and residential neighborhoods) and population and use should be diverse (i.e., created by adequate affordable housing and a jobs/housing balance). Developing such an architecture of the region creates the context for a healthy urbanism in neighborhoods, districts and at the city center (Calthorpe 1994: xi-x).

To fully appreciate the dimensions of the approach beyond these guiding principles, it is useful to turn to the critics of New Urbanism, who have articulated a number of criticisms. Firstly, there is concern that the strong emphasis on urban design principles is

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7 In this section I focus on New Urbanism as one increasingly influential variant of spatial-form theories with roots in systems approaches, married to some extent with design theories. Another very important variant is Compact City theory, which derives more strongly from environmental systems theories. The Compact City approach also tends to be more predominant in Europe and the developing world, whilst New Urbanism is more common in the US context. Moreover, the Compact City approach is more expansive than New Urbanism but can certainly be regarded as incorporating almost all tenets of the latter. In South African the debates have centered on Compact City theory but the planning model influential in Cape Town, which I examine in Chapters Six and Seven, is almost identical to New Urbanism as discussed here.
Chapter 2: Planning Perspectives on Urban Integration

premised on a variant of environmental/spatial determinism—in other words, the belief that better designed environments can address deep social problems such as segregation, discrimination and oppression based on identity, status and economic inequality. For instance, Harvey (1997: 2) asks: "does it [New Urbanism] not perpetuate the idea that the shaping of spatial order is or can be the foundation for a new moral and aesthetic order?"

However, in my reading, the approach of New Urbanists is not as strident as the criticisms imply. Cliff Ellis, for instance, is very clear that the design of the built environment is only one element of the equation. "It can always be overridden by social, economic or cultural variables. But this does not mean there is no connection between urban design and the sense of community. [...] what the New Urbanism can do successfully is increase one critical aspect of community: social interaction in public and semi-public places" (Ellis 2002: 277). The point is that "good design can support and encourage social interaction" (Ellis 2002: 278). It is impossible to disagree with this and the argument does not necessarily require a spatial-determinist position.

The second criticism levelled against New Urbanism is that it tends to adopt a problematic valorisation of 'community', which informs an approach whereby the restoration of 'authentic' communities will lead to the resolution of social, economic and other urban ills (Harvey 1997). Both Harvey and Fainstein (2000) point to communitarian political theory as the source of this approach, which in turn is inflected by a neo-traditionalism design aesthetic that harks back to a 'simple' form of community and sociality before it was blown apart by the alienation forces of modernism. For this reason, it is suggested that New Urbanism adopts a conservative approach to community, which potentially leads to the suppression of difference and diversity, otherwise deemed as good by New Urbanism. Fainstein (2000) substantiates her critique by pointing to residential developments built on New Urbanist principles that are in fact only marginally less homogenous and exclusive than the suburbs they criticise. In any case, she is sceptical

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8 Communitarianism refers to the ideas of, Amitai Etzioni and Benjamin Barger, amongst others, and is a major American social and political movement for moral and civic regeneration. It is a humanist moral philosophy, which suggests that a shared human nature provides the basis for common moral values. At the core of human nature is a need to be part of social communities. Furthermore, "[t]he primary site of the democratic experience is not government or the market, but communities, beginning with families and neighborhoods and extending to towns, cities, and nations, which fit together like Russian nesting dolls" (Gabardi 2001: 107).
that community diversity can be planned and engineered through planning and design. She therefore asks rhetorically: "Is planned communities an oxymoron?" (Fainstein 2000: 464). Put differently, can profound social divisions be remedied through spatial engineering? This criticism sticks, which will be further taken up below in exploring the position of New Urbanism on the question of addressing urban segregation and inequality.

Flowing on from the critique about the use of community in New Urbanism is a third criticism, which suggests that New Urbanists take an instrumental and simplistic view of community participation in planning processes. It is true that New Urbanists value community participation and envisage a healthy balance between professional expertise and community input. In addition, because of the design focus, they offer innovative ways of drawing communities into practical debates about how best to accommodate their (diverse) interests in a balanced approach and consistent with the over-arching design principles of new urbanism. This is akin to the large literature in development studies on visual techniques as tools for improved community participation in project design and assessments (e.g. Chambers 1997). The prescription of New Urbanists that their design principles must form the starting point for community input and engagement would fall foul of the procedural norms of communicative planners as will become evident below (e.g. Innes 1995).

The fourth criticism focuses on the predisposition of New Urbanism to seek acceptance for their ideas and approach within the parameters of market demand and sentiments. As such it is compatible not only with the focus on participation in contemporary planning practice but also that on partnership. New Urbanists are indeed very clear that their approach must find favour with a critical mass of opinion in the marketplace, otherwise it will not be mainstreamed and achieve the kinds societal objectives it wishes for. This pragmatism is rooted in the material fact that the vast majority of new building in the American context is undertaken by the private sector and not the state. Ellis explains and justifies their approach in the following terms:

New Urbanism is practice based, not a purely theoretical or academic enterprise. The focus is on building exemplars and changing obstructive policies. Academics
may wish to argue for structural changes in the capitalist system [à la Harvey], or conversely for even more unleashing of the market’s creative destruction, but as practicing urban designers New Urbanists must tack more toward the political centre, where at least some high-quality projects can be completed. The alternative is to become mired in the swamp of unbuildable paper architecture and theorizing unconnected with implementation (Ellis 2002: 273).

On this note, the next section shifts attention to the perspective of New Urbanism on the problems of urban segregation, fragmentation and inequality.

**Addressing Urban Segregation, Fragmentation and Inequality**

Consistent with its neo-systems roots, New Urbanism treats the city as an inter-related system. It is vital to understand how the central elements of the system work together (or do not) to create the kinds of urban outcomes that we experience on a day-to-day basis. With this in mind, New Urbanism holds a strong explanation about the wrongs of contemporary American cities marked by bland architecture, sprawling suburbs and bulbous trunks of concrete for private cars that separate communities and related urban services. The explanation traces the source of urban blithe to indiscriminate application of modernist functionalism, along with a love affair with the private car. The most effective antidote is an alternative design model that can ameliorate the worst excesses of the current system and incrementally, through demonstration projects, showcase how an alternative will work and what it will look like. This approach is not ideal, but at least superior to alternatives that entertain highfalutin critical theorising, yet without putting anything concrete on the table; an argument eloquently advanced by Ellis:

No movements in architecture and planning have solved the problems of racial and class segregation in the American city (Massey & Denton, 1993; Thomas, 1997). Its roots extend far beyond urban design and physical planning. Yet design can play a role in improving the prospects for a just city [...] Deconstructionism has no serious answers. Analytical texts by geographers and urbanists on the spatial inequities of the modern city have illuminated these issues, but they offer few buildable alternatives, and tend to operate at a high level of abstraction (Harvey, 1997). In light of this New Urbanism is doing a decent job of using urban design strategies to break down barriers between social groups (Ellis 2002: 281).

Clearly, New Urbanism is of direct relevance for the problems of segregation and fragmentation, because it advocates for “infill development, mixing of people of different
incomes groups within the same communities, and providing dignified affordable housing that looks like normal housing" (Ellis 2002: 279). However, critics of New Urbanism accuse it of achieving the opposite and point to upper class neighbourhoods that they have built. Ellis counters this as being a selective reading and points to many other examples where they are advancing this infill and mixing in poor inner-city areas in the US. What this throws up is how New Urbanists, with their concern with market acceptance and viability, will reshape market preferences for homogenous income residential development in order to maintain standards and accommodate NIMBYism.9 This is not yet fully addressed in New Urbanist thinking. In fact, the flexible pragmatism of New Urbanism may explain why radical critics are so sceptical. On the issue of New Urbanism's contribution to sprawl versus infill development in a market context where "95% of current building is occurring in the suburbs" (of America), Ellis is clear that they should make a contribution where they can. The rationalisation is that "[w]hile New Urbanists favour infill development, they have no power to stop growth on the fringe or force draconian recentralization of housing investment back into the cities." Therefore, "the constructive route is to make sure that new suburban growth mixes uses, provides a wide range of housing types, contains walkable streets and is more transit friendly" (Ellis 2002: 280).

The value of New Urbanism and Compact City approaches is that they give planners inside the bureaucracy a tangible design-based ideological framework to counter mainstream market tendencies in terms of sprawling suburban developments. Many of the other critical planning theories are immensely abstract and without any specific spatial form dimensions. The problem with systems-based spatial-form theories, though, is that they are often weak on questions of power and how detrimental urban forms are reproduced and how they can be changed. In my assessment, it seems sensible to locate these theories epistemologically with critical postmodern urban planning theories, because of their critical analytical faculties to explain what is going on in terms of systems of power. But in thinking through concrete alternatives, it makes sense to explore design-based theories about how one can build more beautiful, just, accessible, equitable,

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9 NIMBY refers to 'not-in-backyard'; an increasingly common attitude amongst home-owning tenants expressed in opposition to the settlement of lower-income groups in close proximity, ostensibly out of fear that property values will be negatively affected.
sustainable and creative cities and neighbourhoods. In other words, New Urbanism does not provide a theoretically compelling argument about the causes of segregation or inequality. Nonetheless, it may have insightful ideas about how to fix aspects of the problematics.

Compact City frameworks (e.g. Jenks 2000) in particular, along with neighbourhood models of sustainable planning and design (Barton et al. 2003), hold tremendous potential. The practical sensibility that will hold these orientations together is probably an approach akin to the idea of 'phronesis'—practical judgement—as advocated by Flyvbjerg (2001), Gunder (2003) and Hillier (2002a). This involves a broader theoretical approach to urban studies that Eade and Mele (2002) describe as the intersection between political economy and cultural studies. Chapter Eight will return to this provisional conclusion and explore its theoretical and policy veracity with the benefit of the findings of the empirical material discussed in Chapters Four to Seven. Here, the focus is on the next category of planning theory: communicative planning.

Communicative Planning

After the devastating critiques of rationalist systems of planning that emerged from the Marxist and poststructural flanks in the 1970s-1980s, it fell upon communicative rationality (as opposed to scientific rationality), drawn from Habermasian philosophy, to come to the rescue of planning's continued relevance. The main proponent of this theoretical school is Patsy Healey (1993; 1997; 2000a; 2000b; 2003), who labels her approach 'collaborative planning' instead of communicative planning as other writers inside this camp tend to do. This section draws heavily on Patsy Healey's formulations, which seem the most developed and useful, whilst also referring to other theorists who work within this approach.

At its core, Patsy Healey (1997: 65) reminds us, "...planning is an interactive process, undertaken in a social context, rather than a purely technical process of design, analysis and management." With this assertion, Healey immediately sets her approach apart from the acontextual and technocratic preoccupations of rationalist traditions mentioned before. The anchor of Healey's theoretical framework is the concept of 'communicative
rationality' drawn from Habermas, which she characterises and appropriates in the following way:

Habermas argues that far from giving up on reason as an informing principle for contemporary societies, we should shift perspective from an individualized, subject-object conception of reason to reasoning formed within intersubjective communication. Such reasoning is required where 'living together but differently' in shared space and time drives us to search for ways of finding agreement on how to address our collective concerns. Habermas's communicative rationality has parallels within conceptions of practical reasoning, implying an expansion from the notion of reason as pure logic and scientific empiricism to encompass all the ways we came to understand and know things and use that knowledge in acting. Habermas argues that without some concept of reasoning, we have no way out of fundamentalism and nihilism. For him, the notion of the self-conscious autonomous individual, refining his or her knowledge against principles of logic and science, can be replaced by a notion of reason and intersubjective mutual understanding arrived at by particular people in particular times and places; that is, reason is historically situated (Healey 1993: 237).

Most of the tenets of collaborative planning are embedded in this prescient summary. Planning is a process that is driven along by inter-subjective processes of communication. Mediated communication within planning processes potentially lead to new knowledge and forms of understanding as participating actors are exposed to other points of view and rationalities than their own—this produces shifts in systems of meaning. When such a shift in systems of meaning happens, altering the frame of reference of participants, it becomes possible to realise collaborative efforts towards now shared/collaborative goals for the planning process and outcome. Such communicative processes are not free of power. On the contrary, Healey regards power differentials and inequality as not merely reflected in material differences, but also embedded in everyday, taken-for-granted assumptions and practices. The communicative process is an indispensable social process for uncovering how unequal power is reproduced. However, there are clear procedural standards of communication that need to be adhered to. Judith Innes explains that this includes "assuring representation of major points of view, equalizing information among group members, and creating conditions within the group so that the force of argument can be the deciding factor rather than an individual's power outside the group" (1995: 187, emphasis added). This conception reflects the aspiration of 'ideal speech conditions'
advocated by Habermas as a precondition for genuine democratic processes and outcomes.

Significantly, Healey and other communicative theorists such as John Forester do not see the social processes of communicative engagement as unfolding in a vacuum. On the contrary, they stress the importance of context and normative frameworks in their theoretical models. The idea is that systems of meaning-making will be established in relation to particular problems and adopting specific values in deliberations to find solutions for those problems. It is therefore vital to appreciate that "...collaborative planning may be identified as intimately concerned with issues of context (the nature of particular places and systems of governance) and structure (institutional organisation). In addition, the model of collaborative planning attends to issues of the manifestation of power relations and, most importantly, adopts an explicitly normative agenda of developing better (read 'more democratic') planning practices" (Harris 2002: 33-34).

This expansive conceptual framework leads Healey (1997; 2000a) to borrow from theoretical frameworks in political science (urban regime theory), social theory (structuration theory of Giddens) and geography (regulation theory), in combination with a constructivist epistemology and explicit normative values such as democracy, social justice and environmental sustainability (also see Graham and Healey 1999). Vitally, in this approach there is a relationship between the advancement of these normative values and the (dialogical) quality of the planning process. If the planning process is not fundamentally democratic, equal, tolerant of multiple voices and perspectives, and geared towards forging new systems of meaning, it is unlikely to produce outcomes that are consistent with the guiding values. It is also clear that these same values are entry points in analysing and describing the context and institutional structures within which planning processes occur. Therefore, in the work of John Forester (2000) there is no doubt that the role of planning is about advancing primarily the interests and power of marginalised groups in the city. This multi-dimensional framework puts collaborative planning theory in a strong position to analyse and address the intractable and pervasive problems of urban segregation, fragmentation and inequality.
Addressing urban segregation, fragmentation and inequality

There is no academic reflection by any of the collaborative planning theorists on the question of urban segregation, fragmentation and inequality specifically. However, it is possible to extrapolate a planning response that would be consistent with the central tenets of this school of thought along with recent work on the establishment of ‘multiplex cities’. The following ideas within collaborative planning will aid our understanding: the power-geometry of place, stakeholder politics and strategy-making for urban futures premised on normative horizons.

In the first instance, it is vital to have in place effective communicative governance and planning systems and procedures. Through communicative processes the “dilemmas as regards co-existence in shared spaces” can be surfaced and addressed (Healey 1997: 284). Given what was mentioned before about diverse social actors who participate in such processes, the dilemmas are deep, complex and not amenable to easy resolution. In this context, what is required of the collaborative planner and communicative planning process is an approach that rests on:

...a dynamic relational view of urban life. Its focus is on relations and processes, not objects. It emphasizes dynamics not statics, and the complex interactions between local continuities and ‘social capital’ and the innovative potential. It ‘sees’ multiple relations transecting the space of the city, each ‘driven’ and ‘shaped’ by different forces, interacting with each other in different ways, bypassing, conflicting, coordinating in complex trajectories. It recognizes that these social relationships, although shaped by powerful forces, often outside the space of a particular urban areas, are actively socially constructed. In the social processes of defining meanings and identities and in the routine ways of living in the city, people make the multiples times and places, its differentiations, cohesions and exclusions, and its power dynamics (Healey 2000a: 526).

The central point is that places (the object of planning) and their definitions in policy discourses and social practices are constructed and amenable to change. The constructed meanings which accept urban inequalities must be stripped bare and exposed as constructions and not givens that cannot be altered. Once this is effectively achieved, in part through the strategic mediation of the planner, the various stakeholders involved in the process must, through mediated deliberation, identify new meanings that they want to construct and bring to life in the city. Presumably, these would involve a city that is
more socially just, equitable and sustainable. In the perspective of Healey, it is not possible to shift the oppositional interests of diverse stakeholders in the city without transforming the subjective understandings of these stakeholders about their interests. Ideally, one suspects, Healey envisages that democratic dialogical processes of debate will lead to new understandings about how particular sectional interests can be realised in ways that do not have to be at the expense of other interests and identities. Once such an understanding emerges, a new consensus about an alternative, more equitable and just approach will be in place, or at least an explicit horizon for urban policy and planning will be set. The implication of this approach is that it is not possible to arrive at legitimate, situated agreements without some measure of shared values which, ideally, can be expressed through a shared vision about the future. It is here that the notions of strategy-making and normative concerns come into the picture.

The primary way in which different interests and perspectives are reconciled is through debate about how diverse and divergent interests will co-exist and co-evolve into the future. In this sense, the future focuses the mind on what matters most and how best to realise it in practical terms (through urban policy and programmes). The act of strategy formulation towards a more viable and sustainable urban future is in fact the catalyst to identify all external and internal factors that undermine equity and justice, and subsequently to construct a shared understanding about the causes and potential solutions to these issues in the way outlined before. In this way, communicative planning does not shy away from incisive critical perspectives about the political-economy of urban development (see Graham and Healey 1999), as some critics suggest. This conception, which incorporates considerations about the political-economy of development, reflects the shift in European and American planning processes during the past fifteen years towards strategic planning and away from traditional blueprint planning (Borja and Castells 1997). More recently, in many developing countries, it is reflected in the rise of city development strategies as a form of multi-stakeholder strategic planning for the city-region to contend with increasing global integration (and vulnerability) and internal social differentiation (Stren 2001).
In summary, Patsy Healey (1997) is confident that in a participatory democratic framework, forums for dialogue are the most effective approach to address structural inequalities in the city, precisely because such forums operate at the edge of what is politically achievable in policy terms and create, through the creation of new understanding and new cultures, a stepping stone for attempting more ambitious and risky political interventions. Planning forums for dialogue are essentially processes that engender social learning through direct experience in confronting difference and commonality with 'the other'. One dimension of such political practices is the scope for the production of new, more empowering policy discourses. Since the communicative approach rests on continuous dialogue and reflection about successes and failures, greater confidence is socially constructed to always cut deeper into problems to get to the structural bone of issues. In this sense, it is a deeply intimate and strategic politics that works through continual critique and reformulation of dominant discourses by interrogating those discourses and revealing their assumptions and technologies and supplanting them with more empowering ones.

Critics of communicative planning are less optimistic about the feasibility of this approach in the current political climate, dominated by neo-liberal ideas about urban governance and management (see Tewdr-Jones and Allmendinger 2002). More fundamentally, Harris (2002: 16) acutely observes the tension or, possibly, ambiguity in collaborative planning between its explicit normative agenda (e.g. social justice, equity and environmental sustainability) and its normative proceduralism (about a good planning process), which effectively allows actors in the process to identify criteria for judging spatial plans in terms of content and process. In terms of procedural criteria that would be deemed legitimate, these actors may very well choose criteria that rule out transformative interventions from the start. This issue runs up against the question about the mediating/framing role of planner, which is addressed in a separate section after the review of the four schools of thought. The next section looks at political economy perspectives on planning.
(Post-Marxist) Political Economy Planning Perspectives

...there is a tendency in some of the communicative literature to privilege communication at the expense of its wider social and economic contexts (Huxley and Yiftachel 2000: 333).

This quote goes to the heart of the distinction between communicative planners discussed above, and political economy perspectives. The primary task of this latter approach is to bring structural and discursive power back into the frame as a way of contextualising the implicated position of planning ambitions, agencies and actors. The thorough critique of Blowers and Pain (1999) presented at the beginning of this section is a good illustration of the expository role that this political economy school of thought plays in relation to the oppressive outcomes of actual planning practices (also see: Flyvbjerg 1998) and conceptions of planning in other planning schools of thought (see Fainstein 2000). It is possible to distinguish two different intellectual projects within post-Marxist perspectives: (i) the constructivist political economy approach of Campbell and Fainstein, labelled the just-city approach; and (ii) the Foucauldian (power/knowledge) interpretive approach of Flyvbjerg, Huxley and Yiftachel, who theorise the 'dark-side of planning' as practice. Both strands offer valuable insights, yet address the question of planning's role and potential in very different ways. Both approaches are briefly explored here, after which attention will be given to their respective insights into the role of planning in addressing urban segregation, fragmentation and inequality.

The Just City planning theory has an explicit normative stance which informs the analytical thrust of the approach. According to Fainstein (1996: 19), planning must ideally work towards the realisation of social justice which incorporates the norms of "equality, diversity, and democracy." However, this is easier said than done because "[w]ithin society at large the values of democracy, equality, and efficiency often clash. These conflicts are reflected in the choice planners must make as they try and reconcile the goals of economic development, social justice, and environmental protection" (Campbell and Fainstein 2003: 8). These tensions are particularly pernicious given the intransigent reality of capitalist economic and social structures, which tend to thrive through differentiation in the city, and in turn, produce numerous lines of stratification and inequality as demonstrated before. Planning aimed at realising the (provisional)
reconciliation of economic, social and environmental goals must accept a number of
givens that will frame its scope to effect change.

For instance, the ideological hegemony of capitalist norms and institutional preferences,
which are geared to minimise risk and uncertainty whilst maximising accumulation
opportunities, imposes real constraints on what can be proposed in the way of social
reforms. Planners and plans need to be realistic in what they propose and how they
engage with culturally embedded values. This is because (conservative) middle-class
values tend to use democratic processes to their advantage. People have the option to
choose unjust and discriminatory policies, even if they are exposed to compelling counter
arguments in the public sphere. Here is the divergence with communicative planning,
for: "[d]emocratic pluralism, with its emphasis on group process and compromise, offers
little likelihood of escape from dominance by those groups with greatest access to
organizational and financial resources. Democratic rule can deprive minorities of their
livelihood, freedom, or self-expression" (Fainstein 2000: 469).

This is the inescapable paradox of democracy that Fainstein feels is not always
acknowledged or engaged with in normative planning ideas in communicative and
postmodern schools of thought. Drawing on the American experience, and echoing Frug
(1999), Fainstein believes that planning strategies will be more effective if utopian hopes
that somehow transformative change will arise without the active support (or at least
inactive opposition) of middle-classes are abandoned. Many advocacy planners, such as
Friedmann (1992) and Sandercock (1998), emphasise the importance of mobilising
marginalised and poor sectors at the edges of society as a countervailing power to bring
about transformative social change. These authors could read Fainstein’s pragmatic
emphasis as potentially reactionary. However, this pragmatic emphasis does not lead
Fainstein away from the idea of transformative agendas. On the contrary, she develops a
detailed account of how planning can achieve transformative objectives and advance
greater social justice.
The priority is to achieve greater redistribution in society, which implies a strong state with effective regulatory powers, particularly in the framework of a capitalist economy. Redistribution is most likely to be realised on the back of concrete, achievable political programmes. Furthermore, such programmes must demonstrate how the outcomes of specific interventions will advance distributive justice. It is on this point that she disagrees most strongly with the collaborative school with their emphasis on good process. In Fainstein's argument, it is futile to stake all one's ambitions for social change on the quality of a process saddled with diverse interests, always in tension and, to a certain extent, irreconcilable. Instead, policy processes must be used to secure agreement on concrete programmes with explicit outcomes and not rely on the emergent, shared agreement that flows from a sound deliberative planning process. Fainstein's recent writings (1996; 1999; 2000) are replete with examples of such programmes, which cannot be entertained here due to space constraints. Suffice to stress, that in terms of the just city approach, the role of planning is to support redistributive programmes that have acquired widespread legitimacy in the society through the effective use of democratic forums and, vitally, state action.

The most sustained and penetrating criticisms of collaborative planning has come from scholars who work with a Foucauldian conception of power and the power-laden nature of discursive mediation of society. The works of Bent Flyvbjerg, Margo Huxley and Oren Yiftachel stand out as examples of this oeuvre. The aim of this approach is to draw attention to "the underlying material and political processes which shape cities and regions" (Yiftachel and Huxley 2000a: 907). How is this achieved? According to Flyvbjerg (1998), the first step is to move away from Habermasian conceptions of democracy, because such conceptions obscure or remove power from the analytical frame. A power conscious approach would be better placed to expose underlying material and political processes at play. Practically, this would imply not valorising communicative processes, as communicative planners do, but rather, focusing on "...those mechanisms by which communication and consensus breaks down or are distorted by power and rhetoric, and the consequences of such breakdowns and distortions" (Flyvbjerg 1998: 197). Such an orientation by force takes the theorist into the realms of Reapolitik and Reaprealrationalität. The best theoretical resource for this undertaking is Foucault, as will be explored in more
Huxley (2000), in turn, problematises conceptions of the relationship between the state and the public sphere in communicative planning theory, which is also premised on Habermasian theory. Yiftachel and Huxley (2000a) further worry that collaborative planning theory and description, tend to blur critical analysis and prescription in their valorisation of consensus-based decision making about planning aimed at shaping urban space. In combination, these different lines of critique aim to upend the assumption that planning is "an intrinsically progressive public endeavour" (Yiftachel and Huxley 2000a: 910).

It is difficult to fully appreciate the force and intent of this argument without clarifying the Foucauldian assumptions of the disciplinary society, technologies of power and further arguments about the spatialisation of disciplinary power. In a Foucauldian schema, 'government' is key in the regulation of society. Government refers to "a complex array of normative social technologies, networks, strategies, and tactics coordinated by the state, which regulated self-identity and social conduct" (Gabardi 2001: 67). This is expressed in all manner of societal norms about what is normal, appropriate behaviour, the right way of doing things or necessary social hierarchies—in other words, the accepted everyday assumptions that dominate social life. A vital strategy in maintaining this fiction is 'convincing' people through systematic socialisation efforts (in the family, the school, religious bodies, the media, etc.) to unquestioningly accept these norms by internalising them as personal values and standards. Public morality and values play a vital role in normalising and stabilising these internalised assumptions through the circulation of everyday discourses. It is this transference of 'control' from openly coercive strategies by the state to the individual as a voluntary accomplice in their own control/regulation that constitutes the 'magic' of modern governmentality. At the heart of this account is the observation that "'thought' and 'experience' are the products of historically shaped regimes of power" (Gabardi 2001: 67). However, for these regimes to be most effective they must be rendered invisible, i.e. natural. As a result, other ways of knowing or imagining, which could destabilise the regimes of power, are beyond the realm of invention and contemplation; that is, if the regimes are successful. Regimes of truth are not always successful and complete, for all disciplinary discourses carry within
them possibilities of resistance and reversal. In other words, "[w]hile power is omnipresent, it is not omnipotent" (Gabardi 2001: 74).

For Foucauldian planning theorists, it is this subterranean understanding of the state and its disciplinary nature in modern times that needs to be brought to bear on studying the practices of planning, whatever the substantive (e.g. environment, transport, or health) content may be. In this sense, Neil Harris is correct in pointing out "...that Foucauldian analyses of planning can have a powerful 'sobering effect'" (2002: 31). Adopting this approach implies that the stated objectives or normative values of planning, however noble these may be, are in fact often complicit in the larger state project of exercising disciplinary power over society.

A vital consequence of this theoretical framework is that planning as a spatial practice must be defined in relation to the state. This involves treating "planning as a specifically spatial practice that is related to the state and the production of space. Under this view, planning can be theorized in abstraction from the activities, organizations and substantive objects being 'planned'" (Yiftachel and Huxley 2000a: 910). The point here is that any discrete planning intervention never stands on its own. It is always part of a much larger matrix of governmentality—"the arts and rationalities of governing, where the conduct of conduct is the key activity" (Bratich et al. 2003: 4). As a consequence of this theoretical approach, much of what is described and expectantly anticipated as progressive outcomes from democratic deliberative forums is considered as hopelessly naïve. As a remedy, Yiftachel and Huxley (2000a: 911) propose, "to ask questions about the genealogy of the practices and the power/knowledge discourses generated under the heading of 'planning', and ... understand the role of planning as a state sanctioned strategy for the creation and regulation of space, populations and development." Through deploying this genealogical method, Bent Flyvbjerg (1998) has gone to great lengths to demonstrate the disjuncture between the espoused values of democratic participation, transparency, environmental justice, and so on, in the city of Aalborg in Sweden and the real working of power beneath the surface of performative rhetoric. His conclusion was that planning is more likely than not to work in function of Realpolitik and Realrationalität, which is why it requires planning theorists to be less fixated with planning processes, and rather to seek
to understand the actual practice of planning and the discursive systems of power in which they are embedded.

The response of deliberative planner John Forester to this line of critique has been to impatiently brush away the argument by equating it to insights realised at the end of the 1970s that 'planning is political'. Forester laments that "[w]e know that quite well by now. We really need less often to keep rediscovering politics and 'power', and more often to carefully assess forms of power and their specific vulnerabilities (Forester 2000: 915, emphasis in original)." For Forester, it is only when such vulnerabilities are identified through a close-up (ethnographic) analysis of everyday planning practices and discourses that solutions to the excess of power can be identified. There is some merit in this argument, but the rebuttal is misplaced. Forester focuses only on the everyday institutional working environment of planners, whereas Yiftachel and Huxley are more focussed on the discourses circulated through and beyond these environments. These discourses typically do not originate in planning contexts, but in other domains of power with an interest in reproducing unequal material relations. Thus, for Yiftachel and Huxley the point is less to fix the legitimacy and political commitment of planning, but rather to continuously stress the reasons why planning is almost always likely to be complicit with domineering regimes of power, despite the possible good intentions of particular planners. Healey finds this abstracted, de-linked approach unhelpful as reflected in the following quote:

They are afraid that, by getting too close, they may become contaminated by the frames of reference they come across, the cutting edge of their critique thus blunted. Their agenda does not seem to consider how practice might be changed and how change comes about. [...] Maybe Yiftachel and Huxley can draw on their own empirical work to tell us more about how their material-critical contribution enriches the imaginative resources available to political communities seeking to challenge and change the conditions of their places (Healey 2000a: 920).

This underscores the question whether Foucauldian critiques add up to a theory of planning, or whether it is merely a comprehensive critique of other schools of thought (as suggested by Harris 2002), with little in the way of offering alternative ways out of the problems identified by the critique. This leads into the discussion concerning the main
focus of investigation from the perspective of this broadly critical planning school of thought.

**Addressing urban segregation, fragmentation and inequality**

What can we take away from this engagement about understanding the potential of planning to address urban integration in terms of the approach of (post-Marxist) political economy discussed here? Firstly, it is vital to adopt a rigorous critical analytical approach to understanding urban and spatial change to assess what types of redistributive discourses and associated programmes may be viable. Importantly, such programmes may or may not hold a role for planning, because genealogical research may demonstrate that planning institutions and technologies are irredeemably implicated in the neo-liberal nexus of power that shape spatial structures. In those cases, progressives interested in advancing a redistributive and social justice agenda may look to other sites of struggle to achieve their aims. In essence, the value of 'dark-side' perspectives is that they raise questions about the ideal-type end-states of normative theories and specifically question "whether such end-states are achieved or indeed achievable" (Harris 2002: 30).

Given Fainstein's emphasis on the constant political trade-offs that are made in urban politics and planning, the challenge of addressing urban integration can be seen as the concrete answer to this question: "what combination of democracy, individual rights and redistribution results in equity and diversity?" (Fainstein 2000: 887). Fainstein is clearly less pessimistic than Flyvbjerg or Yifachel and sees a role for planning to buttress and advance a concrete programme, which makes sense in a specific context, aimed at achieving tangible outcomes consistent with distributive justice goals. However, in more recent work with a colleague, she points out that the goals of planners “often have low priority within the overall political agenda. Thus, despite the planning ideal of a holistic, proactive vision, planners are frequently restricted to play frustrating reactive, regulatory roles” (Campbell and Fainstein 2003: 8). In her work she does not deal with the problems of segregation and inequality in the South African or other postcolonial contexts, so it is difficult to project what kinds of programmes she would advance. It is fair to say though that her proposals are by and large not easily adaptable to most postcolonial contexts,
because her political horizon is explicitly Eurocentric and assumes some form of matured welfare state within a liberal-democratic institutional framework (Watson 2002b).

Fainstein believes that the state is the only actor that can deliver more integrated residential areas: “Only a publicly funded effort to combine social groups through mixing differently priced housing with substantial subsidies [the redistributive aspect] for the low-income component can produce such a result” (Fainstein 2000: 465). Beyond Fainstein’s tangible programmatic ideas lies the more expansive and thoroughgoing vision of David Harvey, which he summarises brilliantly in his engagement with New Urbanism:

A more proper antidote to the underlying spatial determinism of both modernism and the new urbanism is not to abandon all talk of the city (or even the possibility of utopia) as a whole, but to understand urbanization as a group of fluid processes in a dialectical relation to the spatial forms to which they give rise and which in turn contain them. A utopianism of process looks very different from a utopianism of urban form. The problem is then to enlist in the struggle to advance a more socially just, politically emancipatory, and ecologically sane mix of spatio-temporal production processes rather than to acquiesce to those imposed by uncontrolled capital accumulation, backed by class privilege and gross inequalities of political-economic power. Building something called community coupled with the politics of place can provide some sort of empowering basis for such a struggle (Harvey 1997: 3).

However, Fainstein along with other post-Marxists would be sceptical as to whether a classical Marxist focus on (new) production processes is in fact a realistic and viable focus for planning to address. Many of the questions and criticisms thrown up in New Urbanism, communicative planning and political economy approaches are taken further and recast by postmodern planning theorists; the focus of the next section.

**Postmodern Planning Perspectives**

By definition, it is almost impossible to talk of a postmodern perspective given the ontological commitment by its proponents to multiple perspectives and experiences of ‘truth’. Nevertheless, in the planning theory field there is a growing tendency to talk of a postmodern planning school of thought (Allmendiger 2001; Goodchild 1990; cf. Harper and Stein 1996). From a certain angle, it is possible to group communicative and ‘power’
planners in this category as well, since they all share a constructivist epistemology and are post-foundationalist in the sense that they reject the possibility of attaining universal truth or ‘closure’ on a matter (Barker 2000). However, as the field is emerging, the basis of categorisation has been more the philosophical sources of inspiration than strictly speaking the epistemologies of various theoretical positions. In my reading, the postmodern category seems to denote the space where advancements and cross-pollinations are worked out in the border-zone between the theoretical schools discussed before. For example, Jean Hillier can be categorised in the communicative school, although at the core of her intellectual project is reconciling a Foucauldian conception of power with the communicative proceduralism of Healey, via a Lacanian conception of ‘The Real’. (More on her ideas will follow shortly.) The other leading voice in this school of thought is Philip Allmendinger, who sets out to draw on the strengths of many traditions and locate them within a postmodern sensibility, yet with a strong normative focus, not usually associated with postmodernism. Lastly, pragmatist planners like Philip Harrison and Charles Hoch also work in this terrain. Again, as with earlier schools of thought, the postmodern field is expansive, which compels one to hone in on a few issues of most relevance in moving forward an understanding of planning theory in relation to the questions surrounding urban inequality.10

The work of Jean Hillier is instructive in how best to address some of the criticisms that have been levelled against communicative theory. By taking on board the critique and method of Foucauldian planning theorists (such as Flyvbjerg), Hillier sets out to refine communicative planning to rid it of its reliance on the Habermasian ideal of consensus. Echoing Flyvbjerg, Hillier comes to the conclusion that the search for consensus as the Holy Grail of good planning processes (and by extension, outcomes) is simply inappropriate and conceptually limited. It is inappropriate, because “in many circumstances consensus will not be possible, and that the best we can do is make

10 Postmodern planning theory echoes prior debates in philosophy and social theory about the nature of modernism and modernity/postmodernism and postmodernity and the differences between these, if they can be said to exist (see Best and Kellner 1991; Rosenau 1991). In the main planning theorists tend to side with what one can label, critical postmodernists such as Zygmunt Bauman (2000 [1992]) who regards uncertainty, ambivalence and ambiguity as unavoidable aspects of the postmodern condition. However, these conditions "open up the possibility of grasping contingency as destiny, by which we may create our own futures", premised on solidarity and social justice (Barker 2000: 149).
disagreements between stakeholders less intense, less divisive and less harmful" (Hillier 2002a: 15). It is conceptually limited, because it fails to appreciate the Lacanian insight that 'the Real' is dogged by its constitutive outside, which is its impossibility. In other words:

Real information, Real meaning and Real consensus are but unrecoverable presences, fantasies of our desire. We function through believing and acting as if they are grounded, but traumatic realisation of the lack (l'objet petit a) eventuates [...] Truth or consensus cannot be achieved through either language or communication. There is always the constitutive Other of conflict (Hillier 2002a: 15).

This conclusion leads Hillier to explore democratic theory which accommodates the constitutive nature of conflict in urban governance and planning, which in turn leads towards the political philosophy of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau—agonistic democracy. Within this theoretical house, it may be possible to rebuild the planning imperative of communicative interaction, but crucially without the baggage of 'reaching consensus'. In the new model, communicative action is more disaggregated and more nuanced. For example, Hillier draws a distinction between two possible outcomes of deliberative communication: compromise and consensus. Getting to either of these usually involves some combination of arguing, bargaining and voting. Arguing refers to attempts to convince others of one's view. Bargaining involves agreement to solve conflicting differences rooted in self-interest; a form of enlightened self-interest. Thus, "[c]ompromise is reached through a transaction or through bargaining. Consensus is reached through argument or deliberation. Both have elements of agreement and differences of viewpoints and values" (Hillier 2002b: 124, emphasis in original). This is a qualitatively different approach to the nature and value of deliberative processes in the political and planning process, which advances analytical purchase. Furthermore, beyond this variegated approach to possible outcomes of deliberative communication, Hillier extends the argument to include political strategies that are located outside of such forums and prefer to adopt direct action as a means of influencing political priorities and decisions. For Hillier, "[t]he logic of direct action is to discursively gain decision-makers' attention and make them consider alternative arguments and options rather than to seize power" (Hillier 2002b: 118).
The value of this approach is that it removes the sense of dismissal that arises from the strident criticisms of Flyvbjerg (1998), Yiftachel and Huxley (2000a; 2000b) about the implicit authoritarian tendencies of communicative planning's insistence on 'good' deliberative procedures aimed at improving the quality of planning decisions and outcomes. Hillier's approach makes it possible to hang on to a belief in the value of well designed and effective procedures without expecting it to deliver simply a partial answer to complex planning problems. In this sense, it reinforces an awareness to locate planning processes within a larger matrix of governmental intention and action, which invariably shape the direction and parameters within which discrete planning problems are meant to be solved. It is in this regard that the reliance of Stephen Graham and Patsy Healey (1999) on institutional theory can be appreciated. Also, it confirms the importance of drawing on democratic theory to analyse political power and accountability dimensions.

The key theorist in the postmodern school is Philip Allmendinger. His work is more comprehensive in that he works to identify concrete principles and values for postmodern planning. Allmendinger (2001) has undertaken many on-site studies to explore the everyday circumstances and working discourses that planners negotiate in order to get at the practical utility planning theory needs to speak to. Based on this research he is dismissive of crude ascriptions that all government planners and planning situations are irredeemably modern in the authoritarian sense depicted by Sandercock (1998). On the contrary, in his view there is an ongoing practice of improvisation and moving between rational and pragmatic criteria to make sense of how to act in the heat of everyday encounters. It is this practical sensibility that Allmendinger brings to his version of postmodern planning. However, he is a rather reluctant champion of the postmodern tradition, mainly because he recognises that extreme versions of postmodernism would regard planning as a contradiction in terms. Yet, he also suggests that the critical postmodern tributary offers a viable way forward, because it offers powerful tools for critical analysis of social inequalities in society and provides starting points for thinking about alternatives. Working off this branch, Allmendinger identifies a series of principles that could form the bedrock of a postmodern planning theory and practice:
• Since ‘narratives’ are always open to multiple perspectives, one could argue that plans always offer only one way of looking at the world and can never be definitive.

• Following on from this, all a plan can ever be is a temporary alignment of interests, not a final agreement, that is the best possible understanding that arises from a communicative process.

• In respect of this acknowledgement, planning processes must be open to multiple points of view, right up to the moment of decision. This raises the challenge for planners to ensure such openness, which is contrary to traditional notions of planning expertise.

• More important than the attitude of the planner is the requirement for formal systemic checks to ensure that there is constant reflection on multiple interpretations and possible responses.

• The approach to the planning process and usage of checks need to be embedded in a “fluid framework of rules” (p. 221), which in turn are subject to regular assessment and amendment.

• “A suite of explicit rights that encourage a radical and challenging attitude on behalf of citizens will be required to engender an attitude to challenge and allow procedures and processes to be legally and legitimately challenged” (p. 223).

• The rights-based framework that guarantees citizenship is not enough but must be complemented by further initiatives to strengthen representative democracy measures that link elected politicians and citizens.

• Prevailing systems of power must be exposed and challenged. This is best achieved through reflective mechanisms mentioned before and ensuring optimal accountability and transparency by decision-makers and the planning process.

• Finally, planners have a key role to ensure that the planning process is indeed fluid and open to multiple perspectives, which raises the reflexivity threshold as they are meant to be weary of how they may perpetuate unequal power relations (Allmendinger 2002b: 222-223).

A roving glance at this menu of principles reveals ideas from different planning schools, e.g., a central focus on equitable proceduralism drawn from communicative planners; a focus on a rights-based framing discourse to strengthen the political claims of the
oppressed as promoted by advocacy planners such as John Friedmann (2002); notions of the pragmatic/visionary planners as postulated by pragmatist planners (Harrison 2001b). Recognising, after Yiftachel and Huxley (2000a), that the "state and planning is part of a wider process of spatial production including wealth, inequality, power and regulation", Allmendinger envisages stronger and more effective regulatory institutions that have power to shape market forces into less oppressive and exploitative directions. By adding up these principles, it becomes clear that postmodern planning seeks to strike a balance between critique and proposition. Is this enough to illuminate the relationship between planning and the problems of segregation, fragmentation and inequality?

**Addressing urban segregation, fragmentation and inequality**

What follows is an interpretative account of how postmodern theorists like Hillier and Allmendinger would address the issue. In the first instance, postmodernists would on political principle and moral bases deplore injustice in the forms of segregation and inequality. They would also be critical of fragmentation in as far as it stems from modernist preoccupations with boundaries, delineations and (mono-)functional use or specialisation. Postmodern theorists would consequently put shoulder to the planning wheel to address these challenges, whilst recognising that planning in itself would be incapable of solving the problems because these stem from larger structural factors. In the second instance, the normative value that would inform their response would be to encourage difference and multiplicity in as far as these do not perpetuate group-based autonomy as a justification for segregation. However, to arrive at a social agreement on how best to address the complex problems, it would be essential to encourage vigorous debate in multiple public spheres in order to mobilise passions on all sides of the issue. This will create a climate of agonistic engagement, which may or may not produce agreement on how best to move forward. However, in these debates, the norms of realising everyone's rights would be used as an arbiter in mediating the conflicts. Of course, this does not provide concrete policy solutions or formulas because of the abstract nature of rights and the inevitable fact that rights are realised over time and not delivered immediately. Nonetheless, the rights discourse does allow civil society organisations championing the interests of the poor, marginalised and discriminated against (i.e. insurgent interests) to formulate claims and mobilise around them. Crucially, for debates
in the public sphere to flourish democratically, it is foreseeable that insurgent interests would employ performative repertoires of direct action. Such repertoires do not seek to establish a communicative dialogue, but rather intend to shape agendas and discursive parameters of how the problematic is defined in the public sphere.

In this conception, much depends on the role of the planners and their values. It is assumed that planners would position themselves as interlocutors between different, 'friendly-antagonistic' interests, whilst holding onto clear values and moral biases to address the root causes of social injustice. This requires a finely honed capacity for moving communicative processes (inside and beyond the formal public sphere) towards some resolution on how to act, which would ideally be consensus based, but would more probably constitute a compromise premised on bargaining. The skill of the planner is acting with practical wisdom without compromising procedural principles.

In summary, postmodern planners would clearly identify the problem(s) and its multivalent causes, the relevant stakeholders or interest groups with a stake in the issue, encouraging them to bring their perspective and demands to the table. Also, those most affected would be further supported to mobilise for their interest on the issue. After this, the postmodern planner would leave it to the pressures and checks of participatory democracy (in an agonistic-radical or deliberative-associative version) to find practical and broadly supported responses. There is much to support in this approach, but also some serious shortcomings, which are exposed in the interpolation and synthesis sections below.

Agency: Normative Planning the Roles of the Planner

The implications that flow from the four schools of planning theory discussed above are little short of overwhelming for the veritable 'planner'. It surely conjures up an image of the planner as an embattled figure. From the communicative direction, the planner is expected to strive for and live up to a very high standard of professional practice, which includes professional disassociation to identify with the interests and needs of oppressed groups. At the same time, Foucauldian theorists suggest that planners are likely to be caught up in institutional webs of power/knowledge discourses which makes planning
part of "a state sanctioned strategy for the creation and regulation of space, populations and development" (Yiftachel and Huxley 2000a: 911). Presumably, such regulation serves to perpetuate the status quo at the expense of the oppressed. In this situation, the role of the planner is to stand 'apart' from the discourses, recognise the complicity of planning and participate in "searching for presently unthought possibilities for action and resistance beyond the confines of 'planning' (however defined)" (Yiftachel and Huxley 2000b: 923). To be fair, the authors make this point in relation to the task of planning theory but still one would imagine the same injunction applies to planners inside institutions seeking emancipatory outcomes. However, it does not stop there. The perspectives outlined above also demand of progressive planners to possess critical analytical faculties to understand the larger contextual processes underway, particularly as economic and governmental imperatives shift to reflect neoliberal ideological precepts. These skills are essential to draw meaningful conclusions about whether a specific policy or plan will in fact make the urban system more or less socially just. For ideally, planners should "counteract ... uses and abuses of power [and instead, respond effectively] in the face of racism, bureaucratic politics, and economic power" (Forester 1999: 184). The source of such bravery and tenacity is a professional and personal commitment to moral values such as equity, difference and social justice (Allmeninger 2002a). This stylised composition of the envisaged role of the planner figure in the theoretical programmes of post-positivists discussed in this chapter is clearly a caricature. However, it is worthwhile underscoring that it is consistent with the different perspectives discussed and therefore indicative of the threshold being constructed (implicitly?) in the literature for an 'ideal' planner.

Most theorists would recognise that it is highly unlikely for this heroic figure to ever arise in a governmental planning bureaucracy. In fact, Yiftachel and Huxley (2000a: 909) argue that the most productive approach is to thoroughly dispense of prescriptive ideals and instead stay focussed on "why things are as they are." Forester, in turn, suggests that explanations about why things are as they are require an up-close-and-personal examination of the everyday institutional contexts and working discourses of planners. However, he is adamant that this cannot merely be deconstructive and critical, but also has to help identify the vulnerabilities of power so that these can be exploited by
progressive planners. In this sense, there is an important place to have some yardstick for how planners should, ideally, act without succumbing to the temptation of reifying such standards beyond their heuristic value. His Foucauldian critics simply do not buy this line of argument. Hillier takes a different approach to the issue:

"Decisions are aporetic: undecidable choices made between contradictory values, raising questions and exclusions, without necessarily providing answers. Planning practitioners are often forced to make political trade-offs to seek settlements of compromise rather than resolutions of consensus in a world where interests and 'identities preclude attainment of the urban imaginary' (Body-Gendrot and Beauregard, 1999:17) (Hillier 2002a: 291)."

Recognising the pressurised world of planners, her work seeks to explore how planners can locate themselves effectively in a system of accountability checks (norms and standards) and support so as to ensure that their actions and practical judgement (phronesis) are based on good information that enjoys the benefits of effective communicative forums. This is a realistic approach that can accommodate communicative planners on procedural standards that planners should seek to achieve and the awareness of operating in a power-laden institutional context which shape discursive parameters (Hillier 2002a). Similar to ideas of Frank Fisher (2003), Hillier makes a useful argument about the importance of knowledge of policy networks in which planners could position themselves. This refers to an interested group of actors inside government, civil society, the media, universities, the private sector, and so on, that contribute to the generation of ideas about how to address a particular policy problem or opportunity (e.g. legal requirements to give effect to socio-economic rights or environmental reporting standards). In this way, the burden of expertise, fortitude and ethical commitment is lightened because the social pressure and support of a larger knowledge community makes it easier to act in an informed and consistent manner in relation to particular issues. This accommodates the perspective that planning is best understood through its effects, rather than through normative aspirations about what it can achieve in the abstract.

In this light, Robert Beauregard's (2001) perspective on the multiplicity of planning is particularly instructive. He suggests that we consider that planners must always draw on
different knowledge sets in the course of their (analytical and applied) work: (i) the sciences with their belief in analysis and causality; (ii) the humanities which provide an understanding of social relations; and (iii) aesthetic concerns that reside in the design professions. Following on from this observation, Beauregard argues for seeing planning as both science and craft, embedded in ideology, which implies invariably the presence of prescriptive judgements and normative visions.

The resultant political differences make the identity of planners problematic ... Internal fragmentation and disagreements are endemic, and multiple conversations abound ... Arguing about the facts, however, is the least of the problems that planners face. If it were only a clash of interests (for example, whether housing or economic development should rule neighbourhood planning), a search for consensus might make some sense. But, it is not. Disagreements are anchored in political ideologies—albeit within a narrow liberal range—and thus in visions of how society is and should be organized (Beauregard 2001: 438-439).

A close reading of this passage reveals that Beauregard is cleverly commenting on the problem of solving the question about the 'role' of the planner, as well as on the lack of agreement between planning theorists about the role of the planner. This is a good moment to conclude this discussion. As a final comment, the question of agency (foregrounded by Forester and Healey) is indeed vital, along with an understanding of institutional and broader, political-economic contexts (à la Fainstein, Yiftachel and Huxley). Thus, it is about the discursive and policy networks within which planners insert themselves, consciously (following Hillier and Fischer) and unknowingly. Clearly, the potential role of planners can only be explored in situ. The viability of progressive discourse can then be discerned based on an analysis of situated practices and strategies of particular planners and planning agencies, seen against the backdrop of the political-economic, social and cultural contexts.

2.5 CONCLUSION
The introductory chapter set out the planning paradox that faces South African planners in the post-1994 era of political democracy. The paradox involves the imperative for interventionist action by the state to address the apartheid (and modernist) legacy of urban segregation, fragmentation and inequality at a broader intellectual time when planning's ambition and confidence to alter space in line with explicit normative values,
was undermined by postmodern theory and neo-liberal ideology. The latter impedes the legitimacy and capacity of the state to undertake interventionist actions. Against this backdrop, this chapter explored contemporary debates in planning theory to get a purchase on how this paradox can be resolved, if at all, so as to understand what the scope and potential for normative planning policy and practice is in South Africa.

In particular, I emphasised the role of planning to advance the normative ideal of urban integration, contextually defined as: a significant reduction in racial and class segregation, more integrative land-use patterns to maximise the opportunities for particularly poor urban residents to access urban services and employment opportunities, and finally, a reduction in the levels of economic and social inequality across the urban region. There is a further assumption that these three dimensions of urban integration are closely interlinked, which suggest that viable planning responses will also address how to advance these normative ambitions in tandem. An underlying assumption is that if it is possible to theoretically understand the potential of normative planning, it is possible to meaningfully investigate and analyse the data collected about frustrated national and local government efforts (between 1994-2001) to use urban development policy and planning to address urban segregation, fragmentation and inequality.

As a starting point, it was necessary to explain the field of planning theory and how it is segmented. A case was made to adopt the typological model of Allmendinger because it is compelling and conceptually rich, but also because it provides a useful prism to map out my own emerging approach to planning. In the next chapter this task is advanced by clarifying the 'framing theory' adopted in this study, along with the epistemological and ontological standpoints. Because it is simply unfeasible to address the full spectrum of planning theories in the confines of one chapter, this chapter has introduced Allmendinger's model to specify which theories are focussed on and why. Thereafter, I moved, to the substance of the chapter, which is organised around addressing two main questions: How is urban segregation, fragmentation and inequality produced in general terms? And what can planning do to address these complex and intertwined problems from the perspective of planning theories? The chapter explored four planning theory
streams: (i) urban (spatial-form) systems theories; (ii) communicative planning; (iii) post-Marxist political-economy; and, (iv) postmodern planning theories.

Following the review of these four schools of thought, the discussion turned to conceptualisation of agency, or the role of the planner, in advancing the respective approaches to planning. Prescient is the fact that all the theories harbour an implicit understanding about the capability and political predisposition of planners which cannot be divorced from the planning approach precisely because all of the approaches are profoundly normative. This aspect of the debate is critical because it points directly to the importance of agency, which in turn is critical for constructing my research focus and questions.

The objective of this chapter was to understand the respective approaches of various normative planning theories to the question of how to deal with urban segregation, fragmentation and inequality. This survey of the literature has now put me in a position to explore more closely how these debates and planning tenets have shaped planning concepts and discourses in South Africa. The next chapter therefore, explores the South Africa planning literature and its engagement with these theories rooted in Northern contexts.
CHAPTER 3
Interpolations from South Africa & Research Methodology

3.1 INTRODUCTION
The review of core tenets and contradictions between various normative planning schools of thought in the previous chapter provides a platform to explore the central research question about the tenacity of the apartheid city in democratic South Africa. However, the arguments surveyed in Chapter Two are largely abstracted and arise mainly from Northern contexts. There is a need to explore the relevance of these debates as they pertain to the South African context specifically. This flows from Allmendinger’s typology of planning theory (as illustrated in Figure 2.1), which suggests that it is vital to bring considerations of time and space (i.e. geo-historical context) into the picture. For, “[s]pace, time, the institutional and government context and other important influences make up key factors that determine the specific understanding and utility of planning theory in given situations” (Allmendinger 2001: 39).

The emergent South African planning system that came into being post 1994 included elements of collaborative planning principles that gave rise to the statutory introduction of integrated development plans (IDPs) at municipal level (Harrison 2001a). Additionally, IDPs also reflected a commitment to strategic planning methodologies as opposed to prior spatial planning of the structure planning variety. Yet, the strategic plan had to be informed by a spatial plan. Government policy regarding spatial planning for land-use purposes was informed by principles of the compact city systems model of land-use planning. For example, spatial planning had to engender post-apartheid settlements through the promotion of infill development, transport corridor-based development and greater mixed-use development. In other words, it is possible to discern a lot of the tenets and elements of communicative planning alongside tenets of new urbanism and a generalised commitment to redistributive policies akin to proposals of the Just City approach. This melange of planning elements in the post-apartheid dispensation makes for fascinating engagement between South African planning theorists that may also have

11 In the following chapter the various policy statements that gave rise to this complex post-apartheid planning edifice are explicated in greater detail.
relevance for broader debates in planning theory. In the next section I want to explore the theoretical contributions of various South African planners as a build-up to my research questions and strategy.

3.2 INTERPOLATIONS FROM THE SOUTH: PLANNING DEBATES IN SOUTH AFRICA

The most direct evaluative engagement with planning theories discussed in Chapter Two to date has been by Vanessa Watson (2002b) in her essay, 'The Usefulness of Normative Planning Theories in the Context of Sub-Saharan Africa'. This section draws heavily on her penetrating engagement with normative planning theories. Watson welcomes the emphasis of all three normative planning theories (communicative planning, the Just City approach and multicultural planning) on the importance of civil society participation—in all its diversity and pluralism—in planning processes along with the shared emphasis on the political nature of planning. Furthermore, she regards the overt emphasis on distributive effects and outcomes of planning in Fainstein's Just City model as laudable and appropriate in the African context, marked as it is by extreme inequalities. (Another South African planning theorist, Mark Oranje (2002), comes to the same conclusion.) The way the Just City model leads to a focus on the city as a whole as opposed to localised projects is also seen as highly relevant by her. Lastly, Watson regards as apt the destabilisation of modernist assumptions about predestined progress that flows from the application of scientific rationality, so central to mainstream planning models, particularly in a context where modern development is largely in ruins across the African continent (Abrahamsen 2003).

In a more critical vein, Watson (2002b) takes issue with the assumptions in all three strands of planning theory about the nature and role of civil society in planning processes. Her concern is that the perspective on civil society's democratic and progressive functioning to make the state more accountable and responsive in planning processes is simply unrealistic in most African contexts where civil society is largely dysfunctional and state actors ill-prepared for civic engagement. In other words, there is not a strong enough appreciation of the conflictual and unequal power relations that mark civil society.

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12 This is a complex issue given the widely diverse nature of civil societies in various African contexts (see Kasfir 1998; Lewis 2002). It can be said that Watson's point applies more in most African countries outside of South Africa.
society, particularly in circumstances of “scarcity and instability”, which is reflected in a constant struggle for limited resources (Watson 2002b: 43). By drawing on the trenchant critique of Nancy Fraser (2000) of (postmodern) identity politics, Watson expresses disquiet about the over-emphasis on identity politics, for example in Sandercock’s (1998) strand of postmodern planning. The argument follows that in the African context, identity markers tend to be exploited in the service of ‘strong-men’ politics and, furthermore, ethnic labels often serve as a convenient cover for serious intra-group abuses. A more appropriate approach, according to Watson (2002b), for a relevant planning theory may be to link questions of identity with the redistributive imperative of distributive justice. If planning is to have currency in the African context it must squarely address the grotesque distribution of wealth and resources within these societies.

A third line of critique by Watson is the valorisation of, and emphasis on, ‘the local’. Communicative planners in particular valorise the importance of local groups and the fostering of social capital through processes of joint ‘meaning creation’. Just City perspectives emphasise greater equity at the city scale, as another version of the local. Watson (2002b) argues that both connotations are inappropriate in an African context. Localities are simply not bounded in the same way as is assumed in the perspectives of Northern scholars, since livelihood strategies in African cities are much more fluid and tend to span great distances, often between rural and urban areas or between numerous national territories (Simone 2001; 2004; Spiegel et al. 1996). Dramatic deterritorialisation have been compounded by the intensifying impoverishment that set in during the past two decades of structural adjustment and economic crises in most of Africa (Rakodi 2002a). Linked to this, it does not make sense to think of redistribution merely at the city scale when the shaping factors of urban fortunes are mainly operative at other scales of power and control (national and international). These critical observations, amongst others, lead Watson (2002b: 46) to conclude with regard to South Africa that “Fainstein’s Just City idea remains an ideal worth striving for, but [it] also seems to be increasingly unrealizable in a context such as this one.” In other words, Watson suggests that a more concrete and specific approach than the general redistributive programme of Fainstein is required. The critical question of course is, how does one arrive at such a concrete
approach? I will return to this theme below when I discuss what I regard as the central faultline between South African planning theorists.

Philip Harrison (2001b; 2002a; 2002b) concurs with the importance of a planning approach that deals with planning problems in a contextual manner. Working in the pragmatist philosophical tradition, he eschews the search for universal ethical principles (such as the ones of communicative planning critiqued by Watson) that can be transferred from context to context as a viable 'solution'. Significantly, Harrison (2002a) accepts the need and desirability of communicative mechanisms or procedures, but these should rely on 'practical reasoning' (as opposed to communicative rationality) to find appropriate and workable responses to concrete manifestations of the broader problems of segregation and inequality. However, it remains unclear in Harrison's work at what scale planning problems are best defined and addressed through such processes of practical reasoning. What is useful in Harrison's reading of the pragmatist approach is the emphasis on thinking creatively and acting experimentally in the face of complexity. This posture echoes the view taken by Beauregard (2001) on the role of the planner discussed in Chapter Two.

Working from within a pragmatist philosophical tradition, Harrison (2001b) is able to adopt a refreshing position that combines a sober analytical acknowledgement of the tendency in planning to produce unintended consequences (due to blinding modernist faith in spatial deterministic solutions) with a sense of hopefulness about the potential value of planning in the contemporary world. This is contrary to the so-called dark side planning theorists such as Flyvbjerg, Yiftachel and Huxley, discussed at considerable length in the previous chapter. Harrison's position does not throw the planning baby out with the modernist bathwater. In other words, dismissing planning as part of the institutional matrix of the state, and therefore irredeemably corrupted due to the exploitative economic, political and social structures that capitalist states uphold. Harrison suggestively opts for an analytical approach that poeticises society in the vein of literary texts—holding the epic and tragic dimensions of social life in creative tension. In this approach, the planner is cast as a tragic visionary with an irrepressible capacity to appreciate the negative and positive in all situations; being "able to continue dreaming
despite peering into the abyss" (Harrison 2001b: 82). Crucially, this is not some detached idealism, but rather a hard-nosed tenacity born out of a willingness to engage in the search for practical solutions in specific circumstances, irrespective how bleak it may be. This posture holds great relevance in a context like South Africa with its fantastic opportunities to effect material improvements at a large scale and institutional systems steeped in oppressive modernist ideologies that produce fragmented and one-size-fit-all answers for the complex problems facing society, especially the urban poor. There is an intuitive appeal to this contextualised praxis but it remains unclear what the basis of practical judgement is, beyond the imperative of utility; i.e. what works pragmatically.

In a different vein, Mark Oranje (2002; 2003) addresses the problem of planning institutions of the state. He is concerned about the capacity of traditional state planning bureaucracies to absorb the rhetoric of communicative planning through an acceptance of new legislation that demands more participatory and strategic planning, without fundamentally changing their reliance on spatial determinism. He captures the potential and divergent reality of the new planning system in South Africa – rooted in communicative planning principles – presciently:

Integrated development plans ... are meant to be issue-based, multi-sectoral, holistic plans, focussed on addressing the needs of the poor and on transforming the apartheid cityscape, society and local government institutions. [...] While the intention with participation is to establish a highly communicative way of planning, and of building alliances and partnerships in the preparation of the Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) for each municipality, the outcome is still a very linear process with participation at pre-determined points in the process. This tends to perpetuate the view of the city as an entity consisting of atomistic bits, be they communities or individuals, that come together at 'events to produce plans' only to depart and go their own ways again. Participation sadly does not become a process of crafting joint narratives about and for delivery, as the country so urgently requires (Oranje 2003: 181).

This extract illustrates that part of the new South African planning framework – the IDP planning system – reflects key features of both the communicative and Just City approaches to planning: participatory planning along with a search for holistic responses to social justice problems of poverty, segregation and responsive government. However, implementation and unfolding of the new system clearly does not correlate with the
anticipated benefits of the foundational perspectives underpinning it. Oranje argues that the main reason for this disjuncture is the pervasive undertow of modernist assumptions about the necessity and possibility of planning "to regulate and manipulate settlements and what happens in them" (Oranje 2003: 181). In other words, according to Oranje there is a mismatch between the bureaucratic practices and attitudes, which are steeped in traditional modernist planning assumptions, and what the new IDP approach demands. In this sense Oranje's work reinforces the critique of Fainstein that it is foolhardy to stake ones ambitions for social change on dialogical processes made of stakeholders with differential power and opposing interests. However, Oranje does not draw these links explicitly in his own writings. He is more focussed on uncovering the potential compatibility between communicative planning's procedural requirements and the perpetuation of traditional values and attitudes within planning bureaucracies, even though they pay lip service to inclusive and participatory planning processes.

David Dewar (1975; 1992; 2000) is one of the most influential planning theorists in South Africa and one of the earliest and most consistent advocates of spatial form planning theories. His work consistently demonstrates that the (comfortable) confluence of modernist and apartheid ideologies produced grotesque urban forms marked by, inter alia, extreme racial discrimination embedded in sprawling residential developments with the poorest at the periphery of the city, inappropriate residential scaling and transportation networks designed for the private car, even though the majority of urban residents are pedestrians or rely on public transport. For Dewar (2000: 211), the easy marriage between modernism and apartheid "resulted in the three spatial characteristics of low density, fragmentation and separation, which fundamentally describe South African towns and cities." Because of the central role of spatial models of planning in the creation of the apartheid city with its many perversities, Dewar believes it is vital to supplant it with an alternative spatial imaginary and system. Part of the answer lies in urban compaction. "However, compaction is not a sufficient condition – it needs to be accompanied by substantial urban restructuring" (Dewar 2000: 209). Much of Dewar's work in the post-1994 period has been to explicate what he means by urban restructuring. Essentially, he adopts a spatial form model that is almost identical to New Urbanism, but with some
variation to account for South African specificities. In fact, this model is central to the planning/land development conflict explored in Chapter Seven.

Significantly, this embracing of spatial form planning theories is not without criticism in the South African debate. Vanessa Watson (2003) is wary about this planning approach that tends to work backwards from ideal-types of spatial form, because it distracts attention away from the messy realities of the present. Instead, a more immediate, contextual focus allows for strategic opportunities to be identified and built upon in moving towards less (spatially) fixed, but normatively anchored alternative arrangements. There is certainly a danger that spatial form frameworks can ignore context and formulate responses in isolation of murky, politically sutured, material realities. At the same time, however, these frameworks hold powerful imaginative and iconic ideas that can animate political debates about how to remake the city, which can inform the direction of urban change and the role of planning in support of it. Significantly, Watson (2002b) found in her major study of Cape Town that spatial form models can inform debate about what is wrong with the apartheid city, how to address it (i.e. where to start, how to sequence interventions, how to balance investments) and how to know when the problems have been addressed (i.e. a horizon to work towards).

Central Faultline

Interestingly, many of the South African scholars do not really engage with each other's different theoretical approaches, but rather explore their own positionalities in relation to Northern theories like the ones discussed in Chapter Two. However, there seems to be one major fault-line that is increasingly being recognised and accentuated. On the one side of the fault-line are theorists like Dewar that remain committed to a neo-systems approach premised on assumptions about optimal relations between particular elements in space. On the other side are theorists like Watson who argue against what they regard as spatial determinism for a more localised, project-based approach to realise achievable transformations in the space-economy of cities and settlements. Since my central research question is how the ruins of the apartheid city can be expunged and replaced with a more just and equitable alternative, it is appropriate to dwell on this fault-line and explore its implications for my research study.
In her book length case study of the Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework (MSDF) Vanessa Watson (2002a: 15) concludes that

Planning has to be far less ambitious in relation to the economic and spatial restructuring of the city as a whole, and far more ambitious in relation to the implementation of shorter-term and more localized projects, which can gradually, over time, have an impact on the space economy of the city.

This conclusion stems from a political economy reading that cities in developing countries are increasingly vulnerable to investment, consumption and perception-based decisions of actors outside the local territory, with profound consequences for the shape of economic and spatial dynamics in these cities. In such contexts of vulnerability, it is foolhardy and a waste of scarce resources to embark on grandiose planning schemes that are unlikely to come to pass because of limited leverage over powerful actors beyond the regulatory reach of local planning agencies.

Despite this reading, Watson does not give up on the idea that planning can still fulfil vital transformative roles. But for her it depends on making a shift in focus away from interventions premised on spatial determinism – “the assumption that spatial interventions can direct society and economy” (Watson 2002a: 149) – in favour of shorter-term and action-focussed planning interventions. She then proceeds to draw on the strategic planning approach of Borja and Castells (1997) and invokes the notion of “urban transformation projects”, which are initially public-led but also designed to draw in actors in those economic sectors with growth potential; interestingly, in both the formal and informal domains of the economy (Watson 2002b: 150). A further criterion is that these urban transformations should ideally be targeted “within the interstitial areas between the wealthier and the poorer parts of the city, recognizing the fact that private investment will not commit to the areas of deep poverty. Over time, and building on what has been learnt from earlier projects, the potential to shift such initiatives into the poorer parts of the city can be explored” (Watson 2002: 151). The book goes on to identify a number of other land-use elements that need to be incorporated into these sites of urban transformation that will, over time, integrate the city. Lastly, Watson envisaged that these projects cannot be predetermined in the way Dewar’s (2000) spatial-form
model identifies centres across space in the city. (Further examples of this approach are detailed in Chapters Six and Seven.) Instead, Watson falls back on communicative processes that are both city-wide and locality-based to serve as the forums for identification of transformation projects. Unfortunately, she does not elaborate on the qualitative and democratic elements of such communicative processes given the potential of such mechanisms to be captured by elites (Edmunds and Wollenburgh 2002), as her own analyses of earlier planning processes in Cape Town shows.

Watson's critique is important because it provides a possible future for planning beyond the disappointing effects of spatial-form planning models that were hegemonic in policy and legislative terms since the early 1990s. By contrast, David Dewar (2000: 209) argues that in the absence of "substantial urban restructuring" it is improbable that compaction efforts will lead to more sustainable urban development in South Africa. In other words, as alluded to earlier, for Dewar the challenge is to simultaneously pursue a clear restructuring agenda but it must be consistent with a broader spatial-form planning approach. In this manner the role of planning is to demonstrate how such substantial restructuring can be achieved. In reflecting on the limited impact of compact city spatial planning ideas, Dewar (2000: 216-217) identifies the following obstacles: 1) a lack of will on the part of planning authorities to stem further sprawl by invoking land-use instruments, in part because it means cutting off potential revenue in a context of scarce resources; 2) the absence of policy and political commitment to intervene in land markets by writing down the cost of better located land to ensure access for the urban poor; 3) pressure to express quasi-rural cultural needs such as "slaughtering live-stock, initiation rites, the practice of traditional medicine, a desire to work the land—all of which tend to underpin a land-extensive mindset"; 4) lack of investor confidence to inject capital into "high-quality special places" in resource-poor parts of the city; and 5) the limited value of the housing subsidy which, by default, drives a process of sprawl and green-field development. Dewar (2000: 217) remains optimistic that these obstacles can be overcome if political will is marshalled and "a powerful political champion for compaction" comes to the fore. He argues that this is most likely to emerge if the sector-based organisation of national government is replaced by "an integrated urban ministry to consider urban development holistically" (Ibid.). In other words, what we have here is a strong
commitment to spatial-form planning models but with the proviso that there need to be sufficient political will to implement the model consistently. Thus, the problem does not lie with spatial-form ideas as intimated by Watson, but rather in the inability or unwillingness of the state to implement its own policies.

Thus, the fault-line in planning theory in South African can be said to run between those who argue for a more modest, project-based approach to urban restructuring towards compaction and integration and those who retain a belief in the pursuit of dramatic restructuring in order to create a more integrated urban form premised on a coherent spatial argument about optimal relations between urban elements. Both approaches recognise the importance of political agency and focus to achieve this, but provide almost no insight into how such a political project can come about. Both camps also endorse the strong emphasis on participatory procedural approaches to planning. Significantly, both continue to endorse the necessity of further compaction, and the valid role of planning to advance it, even though they stand in opposition on the means to achieve it.

At this point I want to draw the interpolation with Northern planning theory debates in Chapter Two to a close and move on to my research questions and research strategy to address the questions. This section demonstrated that there is considerable engagement with Northern planning theories and a tendency towards eclecticism. This reflects the dynamic reality of transitional South Africa where elements of various policy perspectives have been woven together to give expression to a new planning system that is simultaneously more inclusive in terms of democratic processes and profoundly focussed on redressing the racialised spatial wrongs of the past as an expression of a normative commitment to social justice. Given the dramatic spatial legacy of racial and class segregation left by the Apartheid planning legacy, there is little concern for the existential planning debates in the North about whether planning has any role to play at all in postmodern times. However, there is an acute awareness of the oppressive and instrumentalist dangers of traditional blueprint master-planning. This is manifested in the whole-hearted embrace of participatory strategic planning linked to land-use planning premised on new political values that is expressed through compact city planning principles.
3.3 RESEARCH FOCUS AND AIMS

The question that arises is whether the eclectic policy programme discussed above is robust enough to ensure the move away from the ruins of the apartheid city? As elucidated in the background discussion in Chapter One, it seems the answer is no. To understand why this is the case I have formulated the following proposition to anchor the thesis:

Urban development policies and planning discourses promoting spatial integration in South Africa are likely to mark a departure from the governance and planning of the apartheid past. However, these are unlikely to lead to transformative interventions that reduce urban segregation, fragmentation and inequality if these are not built on an understanding of the factors that reproduce and embed these features in the post-apartheid city.

This proposition opens up four general questions:

1. Why have the salient features of the apartheid city remained largely intact despite considerable policy interventions to achieve a different configuration of urban space?
2. Was the perpetuation of the apartheid city inevitable given the limited purchase of planning-based approaches to intervene in urban space?
3. Does urban planning in general, and the compact city models in particular, have any relevance for dismantling and rebuilding the (post-)apartheid city?
4. What are effective policy tools to stem and reverse the tide of increasing segregation and inequality in South African cities?

To address these questions in a systematic fashion the research is further structured to answer the following more specific questions:

1. How are the issues of urban segregation, fragmentation and inequality defined in urban policy and planning discourses of the state at national and local levels?
2. What are the broader informants of such discourses?
3. How are these policy and planning discourses received and engaged with? Is there unquestioning acceptance or are there points of resistance, because the dominant discourse crowds out other conceptualisations of the problem?

4. How are these discourses mediated institutionally, particularly at local government level, where the primary actions will have to be taken to act on the problems of segregation, fragmentation and inequality?

5. What is the scope for planners inside local government to give substantive content to these discourses?

6. If said planners are able to formulate concrete arguments and policies to deal with the challenges of segregation, fragmentation and inequality, what is the nature of the arguments—are they reformist or transformative; are they spatial-form oriented or more expansive; are they implementable or not?

7. What has been the impact of acting on the policy agenda/approach of the planners in terms of the envisaged outcomes?

8. What were the (unforeseen) consequences inside local government and the larger polity as their policies were implemented? Did it materially reduce segregation, fragmentation and inequality?

Questions 1-3 are addressed in Chapters Four and Five and questions 4-8 are addressed in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight.

These questions are relatively broad because of the exploratory nature of the research. At the time of writing, there was no comprehensive scholarly review of the evolution of urban development and planning policy in South Africa in terms of its effectiveness to realise one of its core objectives: urban integration. As a consequence, this study covers a lot of general issues in order to the lay the foundation for more in-depth inquiries in the future. The exploratory nature of the thesis informs the research strategy and is reflected in the following aims of the research:

- To identify how urban integration is identified in government policies;
- To explore the role of planning in the larger policy matrix pertaining to integrated urban development;
• To explore the material effects of (post 1994) urban development policies in relation to the objectives of such policies;
• To identify the reasons for the limited impact of urban development policies aimed at re-making the apartheid city through up-close institutional assessments at national and local levels of government;
• To explore the theoretical and policy implications of my research findings.

In order to substantiate my research approach, it is appropriate to briefly explain my underlying theoretical positioning in line with the typological argument of Allmendinger elaborated in Chapter Two.

3.4 SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH
Allmendinger (2002a) argues that one can best navigate between various planning theories by disentangling the informing theories that various authors use. Allmendinger distinguishes between: framing theory, social theory, social scientific philosophical understandings and exogenous theories. As elaborated in Chapter Two, the last three classes of theory shape the framing theory of theorists. Having decided to rely heavily on this typological framework through the course of the literature review, it seemed appropriate to briefly set out my epistemological starting point in this study. This is also important because it shapes my approach to collecting and analysing the data.

In terms of ontology, I locate my research approach in the tradition of critical realism as propounded in the work of Andrew Sayer (2000). I accept the basic premise of critical realism that there are 'real' social structures beyond discourse (Flyvbjerg 2001; Sayer 2000; Smith 1998), but I also accept that we can only talk about these realities through discursive systems (as defined by research communities and in meaning systems of everyday life), and therefore concede that reality can never be fully known (rejecting the claims of empiricism). However, one can endeavour to interpret and represent 'reality' with the knowledge that such interpretation and representations are partial, incomplete and constitutively unstable (Charmaz 2000). This is consistent with Ritzer and Smart's (2001: 7) assertion that "we can never know reality only obtain more probably explanations of it." This ontological approach rests on a relativist epistemology.
A relativist epistemology rests on the recognition that knowledge is always socially situated and produced, and one's own subjectivity profoundly shapes its construction. A relativist epistemology abandons any 'objectivist' ambitions and revels in the dialogical quality of all social inquiry. It concurs that "objectivity is a chimera: a mythological creature that never existed, save in the imaginations of those who believe that knowing can be separated from the knower" (Lincoln and Guba 2000: 181). In other words, subjectivity becomes integral to the meticulous practice of data construction and interpretation. Indeed, subjectivity cannot be wished or willed away; it is a constitutive part of the research inquiry and "a positive learning experience, practical, embodied, gendered, and emotive" (Lincoln and Guba 2000: 181, emphasis added). It therefore follows that "knowledge is not disinterested, apolitical, and exclusive of affective and embodied aspects of human experience, but is in some sense ideological, political, and permeated with values" (Schwandt 2000: 198). Furthermore, a relativist epistemology allows one to "acknowledge the complexity and uncertainty characteristic of social relations, institutions and processes" (Smith 1998: 310) and effectively represents the embracing of post-foundational social inquiry.

Post-foundationalism is a view about social knowledge that states that we always theorize or do research from a socially situated point of view, that social interests and values shape our ideas, that our social understandings are also part of the shaping of social life. Accordingly, post-foundationalism is not a rejection of grand theory or rigorous social analysis but a position that defends a more complex, multidimensional type of argumentation. Instead of speaking of hard and fast truths, post-foundationalists may speak of credible or persuasive arguments; instead of speaking of research testing theory, they would be apt to speak of how social analysis involves a multi-levelled type of argumentation that moves between analytical reasoning, empirical data, normative clarification and remains reflective about its own social implications (Siedman and Alexander 2001: 2).

Significantly, with the arrival of post-foundationalism, moral and political philosophies have become the main guiding frameworks for, especially qualitative, social inquiry. In other words, social research is informed by, and responds to various philosophical debates about normative questions. Interestingly, it is precisely different approaches to philosophical debates about normative questions that serves as the dividing lines between
various planning theorists discussed in Chapters Two and Three. The normative and philosophical turn that necessarily underpins a relativist epistemology raises questions about objectivity and validity in social inquiry.

From a relativist epistemological standpoint, validity is not about replicability, but rather about methodological rigour—following ontological and epistemological principles of inquiry, being thorough, reflective and keeping a record of decisions. In other words, the idea that if another social inquirer follows the same steps they will arrive at the same conclusions is discarded. By definition this is impossible because all social research involves interpretation which is invariably socially constructed in particular social, historical and spatial settings that cannot be revisited in exactly the same way. This broad discussion about my underlying epistemology allows me to explore in more concrete terms the research methodology that informs the inquiry into urban policy processes, practices and outcomes in post-apartheid South Africa.

3.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Since the thesis is fundamentally concerned with the widening wedge between (urban) policy intent and outcome, I focus on establishing an in-depth understanding of the policy itself and the institutional relations that framed its formulation and that continue to frame its implementation. The research is rooted in an approach that regards public policy as a process, which seeks "to explain the actions of public institutions, governmental and non-governmental, and their effects, as outcomes of social processes" (Macintosh 1993: 3). By institutions I mean complexes of norms, rules and behaviours that serve a collective purpose (Chataway et al. 1999). These are distinguishable from organisations, which denote purposeful, structured, role-bound social units comprised of individual agents (Ibid.).

Development policy processes are almost always executed through multiple intra- and inter-organisational relationships by social actors endowed with agency and capacity for meaning construction (Long 2000). Policy change through multiple intra- and inter-
organisational relationships has become more complex in an era of greater decentralisation of state power to lower tiers of government, a stronger emphasis on partnership-based service delivery arrangements, and commitment to participatory political and development processes (Turner and Hulme 1997; Manor 1999). All three of these conditions apply in South Africa and underscore the importance of focussing on intra- and inter-organisational relationships in policy development and implementation. It is considered analytically productive to adopt an actor-centred approach along with institutional systems analysis to understand and explain policy change (Flood 1999; Long 2000). The rationale for this becomes more evident once I define my research assumptions, based on a review of the policy research literature (e.g. Burton 2001; Flyvbjerg 2001; John 1998; Potter and Subrahmanian 1998; Sayyid and Zac 1998), which in turn informs the choice of methods in addressing the proposition and questions defined above.

Research Assumptions

• Policies are iterative and dynamic as opposed to a linear progression from conceptualisation to implementation and then outcomes (Potter and Subrahmanian 1998).

• Public policies can be meaningfully analysed as policy discourses, which stress that policy meanings, interpretations and practices are inextricably linked (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000). In other words, policy discourses must be located in variable institutional and organisational contexts to understand how different social actors, with different degrees of power, determine the meanings and applications of a policy.

• Policies and institutional relations mutually shape each other (Chataway et al. 1999). Put differently, policies are adapted and reformulated to fit within the institutional boundary of acceptable behaviour or values, which in turn reflects distinctive power relations. Policies induce institutional change by reformulating the purpose and performance criteria of the institution.

• Organisations are always in the process of organising and therefore constitute a dynamic context characterised by ongoing contestation and accommodation between competing interests and discourses (Flood 1999). Organisations are therefore prone to be amenable to certain policy discourses and not others, and at different times.
Consequently they enhance or undermine the original intent of policies that they are charged with implementing. This dynamic requires in depth analysis of organisational processes, structure and power relations.

- Policy interpretation and implementation are profoundly contested processes, shaped by internal and external fields of power that can be discussed through critical political economy analysis (Kincheloe and McLaren 2000). Therefore, contestation around policy can only be fully understood by relating discourse conflicts to wider fields of power.

**Research Strategy**

My research strategy was to analyse a single national policy—the UDF—that pertains to urban development through a case study research approach. The research methodology was from the outset exclusively qualitative because the research objective is explanatory, seeking to explain relationships and processes. However, the context setting aspects of the inquiry drew on available statistical data about the urban development problems that the policy seeks to address. The research was designed in line with the research proposition to illuminate the ‘connects’ and ‘disconnects’ between policy intention/formulation and implementation around integrated urban development. Consequently, research questions pertain to the interpretation (meaning construction) and implementation of the UDF by national and local government organisations and the understanding and experience of potential beneficiaries of the policy, at a local scale within one municipality in Cape Town. Since organisations are comprised of active social agents who perform roles and functions in a system of processes and procedures, data collection was done in relation to both these aspects, following the approach of Flood (1999).

Thus, the first part of the inquiry focuses on the UDF which derives from the national scale of government. The second part of the inquiry is trained on municipal government and policy change processes in Cape Town, which is one site where the UDF is ostensibly being implemented. The micro-case within the larger case study of the UDF in South Africa, was approached in two ways: (i) an analysis of city-wide policies aimed to give effect to the principle of urban integration, which is central to the UDF; and (ii) a specific episode of policy conflict around one locality (Wingfield) in the jurisdiction of the City of
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Cape Town municipality that lent itself to the pursuit of urban integration by bringing poor (Black) people closer to urban opportunities for work, mobility and decent housing. The Wingfield episode entailed a substantial tract of (largely) vacant state owned land that represented one of the most opportune sites to provide new housing and commercial opportunities for black citizens who had been discriminated against in the past. Furthermore, the location of the land within the city afforded the political and policy opportunity of addressing racial barriers between Coloured and African (working class) communities that remain a palpable social reality despite the abolition of apartheid urban policy and legislation almost fifteen years ago.

This dual focus (on city-wide strategies and policies pertaining to the Wingfield location) enabled me to develop a nuanced understanding of how the municipality defined urban integration and what was prioritised as strategies to realise this policy objective. However, since I conducted a qualitative investigation into the interpretations and experiences of social actors, the findings do not allow me to draw generalisable conclusions about the outcome of the UDF policy in terms of intra-urban equity. This would require more extensive quantitative investigation, focussed on economic, social, service and political opportunities of various populations in the Cape metropolitan area. Not only is such a focus well beyond the scope of this study, it would constitute an impact assessment rather than an exploration of processes and relationships across a period of time. Nonetheless, the investigation does enable me to revisit current thinking in academic literature about the policy content of government strategies to address urban segregation and fragmentation that reinforces inequality, and provide new insights based on the emerging South African experience. Thus, without making any claims about generalisability, the study does draw some tentative theoretical and policy conclusions to add to the available body of knowledge about equitable urban development and planning in contexts of heightened spatial inequality.

Methods of Data Collection

The case study research approach required the use of multiple qualitative research methods, viz., document analysis, semi-structured interviews, focus group, observation and reviews of relevant secondary literature. In keeping with the constructivist
epistemology that underpins the inquiry, detailed content analysis of the primary policies was a critical aspect of the thesis. The content analysis did not follow the intricate steps of established textual analysis techniques of methodologies such as discourse theory (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000), critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 2001), and genealogical analysis (Carabine 2001; Kendall and Wickham 1999). Instead, I opted for a more pragmatic approach to extrapolating the content meanings of particular discourses about urban integration. I then compared these to the established meanings set out in existing academic and policy texts in circulation in South Africa. These meanings were then organised thematically to capture the critical elements of the policies. The prevalent discourses were therefore identified and situated in a context setting chapter (Four) to lay the groundwork for this analysis. Furthermore, the policy texts were also firmly located within the institutional passages that they followed to come into being. This provided further insight into the origins and significances of the discourses – set out in relation to the actors involved in these processes – prevalent in the two policies that I consider in depth in the thesis. The textual analysis was supported by collecting and analysing grey documents that reflected the meetings and deliberations that informed the drafting of the policies under review.\(^{14}\)

The second method of data collection was through the use of semi-structured interviews with different actors involved in the policy processes, to ascertain their respective experiences as well as their perspectives on the process, content and outcomes of the relevant policies. The national aspect of the case study required interviews with officials in the Department of Housing who were centrally involved in the drafting and implementation of the policy. However, since the origins of the UDF went back to another department of government – the Reconstruction and Development Programme Office – it was critical to also target respondents who were involved in earlier phases of the policy’s genesis. This also led me to concentrate on key consultants who played a central role at the time in policy formulation in government. Consultants were instrumental because the new government did not have the in-house expertise to undertake policy development at the level of intensity that was required by the new

\(^{14}\) Grey documents include minutes of meetings, internal memoranda, internal organisational policy directives and internal evaluations (O’Laughlin 1998).
government. In addition, it was also appropriate to target respondents from non-governmental organisations, think tanks and academics, who interfaced with the policy development processes. All of these categories are addressed in my list of interviewees (see Annexure A).

The meso-level case study of Cape Town required a different approach. To fully appreciate the institutional location and socio-political context of the key policy under review, the Municipal Spatial Development Framework (Muni-SDF), it was critical to explore the perspectives of both senior management and politicians in the CCT municipality. As a consequence I targeted the entire Top Management Team, a number of key Councillors and members of the planning department responsible for the Muni-SDF. These informants were complemented by further interviews targeting the key trade unionists in the municipality and actors from the community organisation involved in the dispute under review in Chapter Seven. This set of interviews provided a treasure chest of data, although together they do not constitute a representative random sample. My focus was more purposive and concerned to create as complete and nuanced a picture as possible on the issues underpinning my framing questions listed above.

The third method of data collection was the use of focus group discussions done on a limited basis when individual interviews were not possible or feasible or as a feedback mechanism in the spirit of dialogic research. For example, with respect to the national aspect of the research I was planning to convene a focus group of a number of the informants I interviewed on an individual basis. The aim was to feed back my findings and to create an opportunity for the respondents to develop their own perspectives on the basis of, or in dialogue with my analysis and an interaction with other interpretations of events. However, due to the high profile nature of the respondents (senior public servants and well established consultants) it proved impossible to find a convenient time for everyone. After three failed attempts, I abandoned the idea. It was possible to assemble a focus group in Cape Town among some of the key respondents. However, even here the turn-out was not satisfactory. Nevertheless, the discussion between four of the respondents was of great value in testing the veracity of some of my findings and interpretations. The data that emerged from the focus group and secondary literature
review was used in a supplementary fashion to triangulate the findings that emerged from the textual analysis and interviews.\textsuperscript{15}

The fourth source of data generation was observation of key actors in their institutional setting when they were engaging about the issues under investigation. This was applied, for example, to deepen my understanding of the contradictory discourses between the officials from the CCT and the members of the community group that they were in disagreement with about the site of land called Wingfield. I attended two meetings between these groups as a silent observer, with the right to take notes but not to participate in the discussion. The main purpose of this process was to get a firsthand sense of the opposing groups when they expressed their positions in the presence of the other and what kinds of repertoires of justification they drew on to make their respective cases. This proved incredibly useful to make more nuanced my understanding of the semi-structured interviews and especially the minutes and records that I found in the project files of the CCT municipality. However, since I only managed to attend two of these meetings, which were not always convenient or regular and sometimes failed to materialise even if scheduled, I did not use this source of data as a primary one.

The fifth and final source data collection was documentary review. The institutional and conceptual trajectories of policy processes are partially captured in the official records of the state. At both levels of government, I devoted a lot of time to trawling through the filing systems to identify and study all of the grey material pertaining to the two policies that I could find. This also proved invaluable in identifying the appropriate candidates to interview. Most importantly, the official records enabled me to understand the institutional complexities that surrounded the process of policy development and who was included and who was not. The historical reconstruction that was possible through the documentary review and analysis also served to improve the quality and focus of the lines of questioning that was pursued in the semi-structured interviews.

\textsuperscript{15} Triangulation refers to a process of using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, allowing for verification of the repeatability of an observation or interpretation (Stake 2000).
These five sources of data offered up a rich body of information to work with and to address the research questions listed above. One of the challenges was to sift through the volumes of data which sometimes proved overwhelming because there were so many factors at play in both the development and interpretation of the policies under review. The critical challenge was to sort and interpret the data in a structured manner. In this respect I found the following framework of Robert Flood (1999) particularly instructive, especially set against the research assumptions listed above, which I adopted from the outset.

**Approach to Data Analysis**

Informed by a broad critical political economy approach, the research rests on the assumption that policy discourse can be meaningfully understood and interpreted by considering the systemic inter-relationship between four institutional dimensions (Flood 1999: 94-122):

- Institutional systems of processes: the efficiency and reliability (stability) of the policy implementing institutions to execute, assess and adapt a given policy or policy component;
- Institutional systems of structure: effectiveness of the implementing agency to structure itself appropriately for the interpretation, execution, continuous assessment and adaptation of a given policy or policy component;
- Institutional systems of meaning: denotes the (political) interpretative processes and capability of the implementing agency to substantiate policy intent and translate it into digestible policy guidelines and procedures for further consumption and adaptation by the systems of processes and structure. In the case of public policy this assumes a (majoritarian) political agreement based on a shared understanding of the meaning of the policy intent and envisaged outcome, and possibly even the policy means to attain it;
- Institutional systems of power-knowledge: refer to intrinsic power to name and define valid knowledge due to a social position of power. For example, dominated subjectivities can be relating to race, class, sexuality, culture, age, ability, expertise or position in the management hierarchy. It is crucial to elucidate how power-knowledge relationships shape the design and outcome of the political processes to
establish shared meanings about the policy agenda, content, means and ideal outcomes. In other words, power-knowledge relations are instrumental in shaping the other three institutional dimensions.

Separately, each of these analytical windows provides a partial picture, but if articulated, it could supply meaningful purchase on the reasons for the wedge between policy intent and outcome. Furthermore, it is vital to recognise that porous boundaries separate policy institutions from their structural contexts, while meanings flow effortlessly between the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, animating and subverting the interpretative task. Lastly, these institutional dimensions must be located within a broader political economy framework—larger ideological, political and economic forces that circumscribe but do not determine ‘local’ actions and processes—to appreciate the location of policy institutions in macro-level structures of control, complexity and power. It is for this reason that within a multiple method case study approach, significant attention was paid to primary and secondary sources that could shed light on the broader political economy frame.

In summary, my analytical approach involved sorting and analysing the data to achieve a clear understanding of the following aspects:

- Policy intent: The underlying concepts promoted, the content the policy change and discourses these are embedded in;
- Context of policy change, in terms of the environment within which the concerned UDF and the Muni-SDF were designed, as well as the complex realities in which these policies sought to intervene;
- Institutional passageways of relevant policies, which include an understanding of the four elements in Flood’s framework above: systems of process, systems of structure, systems of meaning and systems of power/knowledge; and lastly,
- The experiences of policy change of those who are the intended beneficiaries of the policy. (I only applied this to the local level of my study because the national policy has had negligible impact, even according to the architects of the policy.)

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16 Later in the text I make it clear that I am not investigating outcomes per se but rather the reasons for the widening gap between policy intention and implementation.
Having ordered and analysed the data through this conceptual schema, I then present my findings as a coherent narrative about how the relevant policy came into being, what happened to them in the processes of implementation and the consequent impact in as far as the data allowed me to come to conclusions about that. Throughout, my approach is to opt for thick contextual description because I am clearly offering a perspective on what the data intimates and trust it is persuasive and credible because of the rigour of my methodological practice. Furthermore, context is important in terms of the over-arching political economy concerns that ground my interpretations. At the end of Chapter Seven, after I have presented all the data from the fieldwork research, I use the narratives across Chapters Five to Seven, framed by the contextualisation in Chapter Four, to offer considered reflections on my research questions. This analysis also leads to me to make a few modest claims about the theoretical and policy implications of the research in the final analytical chapter.

**Political and Ethical Considerations**

Urban development policy is not uncontroversial in South Africa, especially in the wake of public acknowledgement that the outcomes of the first decade of public policy have not had the desired effect of reversing the spatial patterns of the apartheid city (Department of Housing 2004). For example, in 1999 the Office of the (then) Deputy President commissioned an extensive study on the spatial dimensions and impact of all national development policies since 1994, which resulted in a policy entitled: the National Spatial Development Perspective (NSDP). The NSDP was tabled in Cabinet in early 2000 and was summarily returned to a “vault” for three years because it was perceived to communicate a pro-urban and anti-rural message about where government should prioritise its investments. This relegation happened despite the fact that the President accepted the key findings of the report. I narrate this one incident to underscore that public policy related to urban development issues is a sensitive matter for the ruling party, so that efforts to deconstruct and critique it can be misinterpreted as anti-government propaganda. Furthermore, I have been active in non-governmental organisations dealing with urban policy and local democratisation issues since the late 1980s and remained involved until commencing my PhD research. Having participated
various urban policy debates (through meetings and publications) about the efficacy and quality of various urban policies at national and metropolitan levels in South Africa, I am a 'known' entity to most of the respondents in the research. At one level this facilitated easier access to senior government officials, but on another level, it also meant that I ran the risk that informants responded to me on the basis of prior knowledge of my ideas about various policy matters. However, respondents who were willing to be interviewed equally needed reassurance that I would not abuse the data from the interviews for purposes beyond the confines of the thesis, e.g. in an advocacy campaign of the NGO to which I was affiliated.

I remained profoundly conscious of these potentially difficult situations and took great care to explain the academic focus of my research and my commitment to confidentiality about issues some respondents may have felt could be politically compromising. I also gave respondents the option of conducting the interviews without a tape recorder but none of the respondents made use of this possibility. In two instances respondents who are senior managers in the CCT municipality preferred to remain anonymous because they wanted to have the freedom to be honest and critical in the interviews. This request is honoured in the text where I draw on their perspectives. In the final instance I am certain that the handling of the interview situations and the methodological approach discussed above has enabled me to avoid any political or ethical transgressions despite the potentially sensitive nature of my research.

Limitations of the Study
As intimated in the introductory chapter, the study is a long way from being definitive. It has thrown up a range of further questions and issues that remain under-developed. Given the exploratory focus of the research, the findings and contextualisation remain at a rather general level, even though I have tried to concretise it as much as possible in order to address the framing questions. There are additional limitations of a time-bound study. For example, I am certain that the issues highlighted and explored in the thesis would be different or take on a different hue if they were located in another urban policy rather than the UDF, or if the focus was on another city/town during this period, or the same city at another period. For example, as will be clear in the next chapter, it would
have been possible to explore the trajectory of urban policy in South Africa through the prism of the national public housing policy. Furthermore, given the short time that has elapsed between when the various urban policies at national and local levels were formulated and implemented, compared to the long time cycles over which structural urban change comes about, it is impossible to be definitive about the findings. It may simply be too soon to expect certain structural changes.

A related point is the fact that the topic covers a very large canvass indeed. Throughout the thesis there is an attempt to balance the numerous elements that make up the macro environment within which urban development policies unfold, on the one hand, and on the other, the micro actions of actors who implement policies in day-to-day environments that are in turn marked by their own complexities. In light of this the study does not seek to make any grand claims about urban planning or policy impacts for postcolonial cities everywhere. Instead, it merely offers an account of a specific national policy and the broad trends of one urban municipality in Cape Town during the period under review. Clearly, further research will be required before the findings can be deemed more than indicative and interpretative of very specific contexts in South Africa. Lastly, the research was also constrained by the fact that some of the key political actors were not accessible for interviews due to their demanding work pressures. I have little doubt that some of the findings and interpretations would have had a different inflection if those interviews had been possible.
Chapter 4
Context of Urban Development Policy and Planning in South Africa

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The function of this chapter is to provide contextual background for orienting and interpreting the three empirical chapters that follow. One dimension of the context is the historical origins of urban development policy in South Africa. Specifically, the chapter explores the informants of governmental ambitions to entrench racial segregation which served to ensure favourable accumulation and political power for European colonisers and successive (post)colonial White authorities. Segregation goes back to the formation of urban settlements in the early nineteenth century. Since then successive urban policies and laws worked to further entrench segregation, which eventually consolidated into apartheid ideology and policy. The apartheid city, marked by strict racialised residential segregation and racially-warped modernist planning principles, was the outcome of these policies. The historical dimension of the discussion is vital because it points up the depth (and normalisation) of the inter-linked problems of segregation, fragmentation and inequality. In order to fully grasp the inheritance of apartheid urban policies – the ruins of the democratic era – the second section of the chapter provides a brief overview of current levels of urban poverty and inequality and their link with the prevalence of urban segregation and fragmentation. This is a vital bridge into the third, and main, section that focuses on the new urban development policies introduced by the first democratically elected government (1994-2001). These policies were explicitly aimed at undoing the apartheid city through the realisation of urban integration.

Section three recounts what happened on the cusp of political liberation in the early 1990s and describes efforts to construct an alternative conception of urban development policy. Thinking at this time was heavily influenced by a seminal book, South African Cities: A Manifesto for Change, which put forward an alternative imaginary to replace the apartheid city (Dewar and Uyttenbogaardt 1991). The book was a crystallisation of almost two decades of planning theory developed at the (liberal) Planning School of the University of Cape Town. In retrospect it is clear that the planning approach and ideas
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...put forward in the book were almost identical to the core tenets of New Urbanism discussed in Chapter Two. Furthermore, these ideas also proved highly influential in Cape Town's metropolitan and sub-metropolitan planning frameworks that are considered in closer detail in Chapters Six and Seven. The core ideas of Dewar and Uytenbogaardt (1991) revolved around the manipulation of urban space to achieve greater (residential and social) compaction, more green spaces, better connectivity through transport routes or corridors, and more effective participatory urban management. As I will demonstrate below, these core ideas have proven immensely influential across a plethora of urban development policy in the post-1994 era.

However, despite the widespread take-up of these ideas and a remarkable degree of policy consensus about the ends to which urban development and governance institutions need to be reformed to achieve urban integration, the outcome of urban development interventions by the state has seen little change in the geography of the apartheid city (Huchzermeyer 2003a). In Section Four I capture the impact of the new policies on local government, the lead actor in addressing the apartheid city and the challenges of integrated urban development. By pointing to the contextual dynamics that frame the emergent policy architecture, it is suggested that the expectations placed on local government are unrealistic. By extension, the role of spatial planning, ostensibly driven by local government, is probably unfeasible. These issues are explored at greater depth in the following three chapters, which deal with findings from field research investigating urban development policies and planning practices.

4.2 ORIGINS OF THE APARTHEID CITY

From the beginnings of urbanisation, the colonial state engaged in deliberate policy interventions to establish residential segregation between Africans and Whites. After the abolition of slavery in 1834 there was a considerable influx of Africans into colonial towns. In response, the first form of separate settlement – a 'location' for Africans isolated from the town – was introduced in Port Elizabeth by the London Missionary Society (Christopher 2001a). This would become the basic template for a 'separate location' policy for the next 150 years, sedimenting racial segregation. In the early parts of the twentieth century, the practice was entrenched as a response to the bubonic plague in 1901 and the
influenza outbreak in 1918. In both cases, and around other 'health panics', Whites mobilised for the removal of Africans from the inner-city to far-flung, separate settlements (Swanson 1995).

Minerals were discovered in the middle of the nineteenth century in Kimberley (diamonds), followed by gold seams across the Witwatersrand in the Transvaal Province. The mining industries that proliferated from these discoveries shaped urban settlement patterns profoundly. The mining companies provided segregated compounds to house single African migrant workers. The practice originated on the Kimberley diamond mines to guarantee effective surveillance to prevent smuggling (Mabin 1991). This form of segregated housing also became a permanent feature of urban settlement patterns in South Africa until the end of Apartheid 1994. By the end of the 19th century racially segregated residential areas were the norm in the Free State and Transvaal – the two Boer republics. In Natal, segregation had its origins in patterns of indirect rule introduced during the mid-19th Century (Welsh 1971). There was also greater reliance in this province on a system of influx control which sought to regulate the number of Africans coming into towns in relation to labour demands (Christopher 2001a). Alongside racial segregation, influx control would become one of the key pillars of movement regulation policies by the government throughout the twentieth century.

A third form of urban segregation that characterised the colonial era was more explicitly commercial and also originated in Natal. White traders and merchants were determined to prevent Indian merchants from establishing businesses (i.e. owning and operating) in so-called White areas and pushed for political measures to expel Indians from such settlements. As a consequence, provisions were enacted in Natal Province for separate trading 'bazaars' for Indians on the periphery of urban areas (Maylam 1995). This zoning measure was also taken up in other parts of the country, especially in Johannesburg. It is worth noting that none of these measures were implemented consistently or without resistance. State capacity to control and regulate totally was rather limited and there was a constant problem of ensuring compliance. This was fuelled in part by the complicated colonial politics between the British who controlled the Cape and Natal provinces versus the Boer republics of Free State and Transvaal, controlled by Afrikaans speaking White
settlers. The conflict between them spilled over into civil war (1899-1902) with the British emerging as victors. However, by 1910 the Union of South Africa was established through the unification of the then, four British colonies. "Control of the new British dominion was vested in a government elected by parliament. Parliament itself was controlled by the White population, through the exclusion of virtually all the remainder of the population from the franchise" (Christopher 2001a: 27).17

A key faultline running through the Union government was the conflict between Afrikaners and English speaking Whites, especially with the horrors of the Anglo-Boer war conflict still fresh in the memories of everyone. The Afrikaners were mainly tied to agricultural interests whereas the British controlled the urban-based mining and manufacturing economic interests. However, the Afrikaners outnumbered the British and effectively controlled significant chunks of the political machinery as evidenced by the fact that all Prime Ministers of the Union were Afrikaners. Against this political backdrop, a strong political imperative emerged to regulate the settlement and movement of Africans in both rural and urban areas.

The Natives Land Act of 1913 was the first legislative attempt to give legal effect to divisions between White and African groups. The Natives Land Act designated that Africans could only own land inside so-called Native Reserves, which amounted to 8.9 million hectares (13% of the total land area of the Union). In terms of the Act, Africans could not purchase land outside the designated reserves except for the Cape Province where the number of Africans was low, dating back to demographic patterns in pre-colonial times. It is crucial to bear in mind that ownership (rights) of land is at the core of perpetuating or dismantling segregation (Orum and Cheng 2003). This division of land would essentially remain in force for most of the 20th Century. Shortly after the promulgation of the Natives Land Act, a government commission of inquiry argued for an expansion of the reserves based on the de facto demographic fact that many Africans were living and farming outside of these areas (Lester 1998). These recommendations were

17 Significantly, each province retained the form of franchise it enjoyed in the late colonial period, which reflected marked differences between the provinces but without undermining effective White control (Christopher 2001a). Thus, to fully appreciate the specificities of urban planning and land-use in each city, one must be cognisant of the political nuances in each town and province.
only adopted through legislation twenty years later with the promulgation of the Native
Trust Land Act of 1936. In-between these Acts, a number of legislative measures
regulating urban land-use and movement were introduced.

The most important of these was the Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923. It required
municipalities to establish separate locations for Africans and to ensure the effective
regulation of African migration to towns. Even though there was some reluctance on the
part of certain municipalities to establish separate locations because of the expense
involved, by "1948 the system of physically separate African locations was firmly in place
throughout the country" (Christopher 2001a: 36). Maylam (1995) suggests that the Native
(Urban Areas) Act was the overt side of entrenching urban segregation and need to be
placed alongside various covert urban reforms in the domains of public health, housing
and planning which may have done even more to ensure thoroughgoing racial
segregation in all domains of life. This viewpoint is confirmed by the studies into the
origins of segregation by Mabin (1991; 1992), Parnell and Pirie (1991) and Robinson
(1996), as well as being addressed in a collection by Beinart and Dubow (1995).

Despite the comprehensive nature of regulatory interventions by the state to achieve total
segregation, the system was always vulnerable to seepage and transgression. Thus, by the
end of the 1940s, "large numbers of urban Africans lived elsewhere [than designated
locations] in the towns and cities, either in African freehold properties, or as tenants in
backyards. [Also,] the continued housing of domestic servants throughout the White
suburbs constituted a major feature of most towns" (Christopher 2001a: 36). So it came to
be that against this partially successful system of urban segregation, the National Party
with its ideology and political programme of 'Apartheid' (separateness), came to power in
1948; ushering in the era of the search for total racial segregation on the back of an overt
agenda of white supremacy (Posel 1995). The vital point to bear in mind here, is that by
this stage the ground was thoroughly prepared for racialised urban segregation. Contrary
to liberal historiography, apartheid urban policies from 1948 – 1991 were spectacularly
successful because they represented a continuity with what had gone before for, for at
least a century (Maylam 1995; Posel 1995). In other words, political democratisation in
1994 may have ruined the formal system of racial segregation, but the effects would prove enduring given its deep history.

The two central pillars of the apartheid government's urban segregation programme were the Group Areas Act of 1950 and the regulation of African movement into cities and towns through 'influx control' policies. Both these measures were premised on the Population Registration Act of 1950, which provided for the compulsory classification of everyone into distinct racial groups: White, African and Coloured (which initially included Indians). The Group Areas Act aimed to achieve the total segregation of people on the basis of racial groups identified in the Population Registration Act. Practically, urban areas would be zoned into residential and business areas but with an unambiguous racial label. Anyone who resided in the area from a different racial group would be forcibly removed to a 'group area' where they 'belonged'. Important in the framework of this study is that planning and planners played a central role in the designation of areas into group areas, with a guaranteed benefit for Whites (Mabin and Smit 1997). Also, group areas had to be delimited and segregated through panoply of urban land-use measures such as buffer strips, transport routes, access points, green field areas and so forth. Planning was therefore central to the practical realisation of the aims of the apartheid state.

The Group Areas Act must be considered and understood in relation to the government's larger conception of the 'place' of Africans in South Africa. In a sense there was no such place. Africans were deemed to belong to a number of ethnic 'nations' which had their own territories (Homelands) inside the reserve areas designated by the Land Act of 1913 (and its various amendments). In other words, Africans were not meant to belong inside 'South African' towns and cities but merely sojourned through them as temporary migrant labourers. Indeed, many Africans were displaced giving rise to what Colin Murray (1995: 234) has called 'displaced urbanization' in his description of 'South Africa's

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18 Influx control regulations required all Africans in South African territories to carry a pass book which was an identity document that proved the person had employment and a residential dwelling for the duration of the employment. These had to be obtained at labour bureaux inside the Homeland territories (Posel 1992). Africans anywhere in South African territories without this document were deemed illegal and could summarily be deported back to their so-called homeland territory even if they were born and raised in urban areas (Hindson 1987).
rural slums'. Nevertheless, influx control measures consistently failed to acknowledge the presence of large numbers of Africans who lived and worked in urban areas, invariably in horribly overcrowded conditions. This was because the state did not invest in housing provision since that would have represented an acknowledgement of their right to live and work in the city.

It took the apartheid government the better part of a decade to gear-up its administrative capacity to implement the Group Areas Act (Posel 1991). Thus, from the 1960s onwards a wave of forced removals and re-zoning set in leading to massive and violent resettlement processes of Coloureds, Indians and Africans. As a consequence, Coloured and Indians were re-settled on small and peripheral locations in urban areas and Africans were relentlessly deported to Homelands or allowed to settle on overcrowded squatter settlements on the periphery of the towns and cities. Whites were granted access to the most profitable and convenient tracks of land along with extremely high levels of municipal services, which further enhanced the economic value of their land. Municipal services for Whites were cross-subsidised by Blacks through property taxes and the rates account because all commercial and industrial areas were deemed as White group areas (Cameron 1999). In these senses, racial segregation was closely intertwined with the perpetuation of economic inequality.

The urban impact of apartheid policies was hugely successful in terms of realising racial segregation and maintaining white (economic, social and political) supremacy. Christopher intimates that:

The administrators of apartheid planning consequently had achieved virtually total segregation in residential patterns in most South African cities by the 1980s. Indeed, segregation levels by the 1970 census indicate that in the majority of cities implementation of segregation was nearly complete [...] This suggests that by the early 1990s remarkably few urban dwellers had lived even a part of their adult lives in racially or ethnically integrated conditions (Christopher 2001a: 128).

This dubious achievement suggests that land-use planning and regulation may currently be regarded as an anachronistic or moribund practice but until very recently it played a central role in the successful creation and maintenance of racial and class segregation in
South Africa. Now that it is clear how deep the historical roots of urban segregation go, it is appropriate to capture their significance for the (re)production of urban poverty and inequality.

4.3 KEY INDICATORS OF URBAN PROBLEMS IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA

This section sketches briefly the nature and extent of poverty and inequality, with special emphasis on urban manifestations of these conditions. Current trends are intimately entwined with the development of South African cities, built over the last century through systematic efforts by the state to ensure racial and class segregation, and white supremacy by exploiting locational advantage and ‘erasing’ the physical and political presence of African citizens. These efforts have left indelible scars on the urban fabric, not least in the enduring power to reproduce inequality of opportunity and condition in the city.

The latest census (2001) reports that South Africa has a population of just under 45 million of which 53.7% are now effectively urbanised and racially stratified as follows: Africans (35 416 166 [79%]), Coloureds (3 994 505 [8.9%]), Indians (1 115 467 [2.5%]), and White (4 293 640 [9.6%]) - (SSA 2003a). Predictably, the two most urbanised provinces (Gauteng and Western Cape) account for almost 50% of the GDP (see Table 4.1). The population pyramid is severely bloated in age groups between 0-24, with 32% younger than 15 years, 52.7% younger than twenty-five years, and 69% below thirty-five years of age (Ibid.). This is significant because the group most at risk of contracting HIV/AIDS is in this band, peaking at 25 years. This demographic profile alludes to the massive potential impact of the pandemic on the population. Furthermore, unemployment is highest in this band.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces:</th>
<th>% Urban Population</th>
<th>GDP per Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% contribution (2003 prices)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free-State</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu Natal</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Poverty & Unemployment

The Taylor Committee\textsuperscript{19} highlighted that, depending on which poverty line is used, between 20-28 million South Africans are living in poverty. This means that between 45-55\% of the population lives in poverty. This reflects an increase both in absolute numbers and as a ratio of the total population compared to 1994. The Taylor Committee further noted that racial, gender and spatial differentials remain stark. According to UNDP's South Africa Human Development Report (UNDP 2000), 61\% of Africans are poor compared with 1\% of Whites. Likewise, three out of five female-headed households are poor, compared to one out of three male-headed households. Other indicators of poverty endorse the assertion that poverty remains a serious challenge facing the government. For example, 14 million South Africans do not have food security and 2.5 million people are malnourished. Nearly 20\% of children between 0-9 years old are affected by stunting, which is indicative of nutritional disorder. In 1999, more than one in five households reported going hungry due to an inability to buy food (Committee of Inquiry 2002).

Lack of income is a major contributor to poverty due to land ownership patterns and Homeland policies of the successive apartheid regimes (and their precursors), which made it virtually impossible to make a subsistence living off the land (May 2000). Unemployment is therefore a major contributor to poverty. In September 2002, the official unemployment rate was 31\%, or 4.8 million people. Using the expanded definition of unemployment, which includes those people that have become discouraged to look for work, the number of unemployed people increases to 7.9 million, amounting to 42\% of the population of working age (SSA 2003a: 54). Even if the narrow definition is

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{lcc}
\hline
Region & Poverty Rate & Unemployment Rate \\
\hline
Eastern Cape & 38.2 & 8.2 \\
North-west & 43.5 & 7.3 \\
Limpopo & 11.5 & 6.5 \\
South Africa & 55.1 & 100 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

(Sources: SSA 2003b: 8; SSA 2002)

\textsuperscript{19} The Taylor Committee is the designation for the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa, which was established in 2000 under the leadership of Chairperson, Dr Vivienne Taylor. It was tasked to review options for the objectives, strategies and viability of a social security system for South Africa (Committee of Inquiry 2002). The Taylor Committee submitted its report to Parliament in 2002.
adopted, it is clear that unemployment has increased, from 20% in 1996 to just over 30% in 2002 (Nicol 2003: 41). Two-thirds of the unemployed are 'long-term unemployed' and have been looking for work for more than a year. However, of the 11 million South Africans that are employed, one in five (or 2.2 million) work in the informal sector, which tends to offer very low income jobs with little employment security.

Race, gender and spatial disparities remain significant in understanding the spread of unemployment. Depending on what definition of unemployment is used, unemployment among Africans is between 39-49%, compared to 14-19% for the rest of the population. Unemployment among Africans has increased steadily since February 2000, whereas unemployment among other population groups has remained more or less stable. Men have a lower unemployment rate (27-36%) compared to women (35-48%). The highest levels of unemployment are recorded among African women, varying between 41-56% (see SSA 2005; UNDP-SA 2003). These figures hint at the gendered and racialised nature of inequality in South African society.

**Levels and Patterns of Inequality**

The Taylor Committee notes that the distribution of income seems to have become more unequal between 1991 and 1996 (Committee of Inquiry 2002). Whilst the income of the top decile increased from 52% to 53%, the income of the poorest 40% dropped from almost 4% to just over 3% (Ibid.). As a result, the GINI coefficient\(^{20}\) has risen from 0.68 to 0.69 between 1991 and 1996. This is much higher than the average of 0.43 for industrialised countries. Whereas inter-racial inequalities have declined, intra-racial inequalities have become starker. As Figure 4.1 shows, the income of the richest 10% of African households rose by 17%, whilst the income of the poorest 40% of African households fell by 21%. This trend is reflected in the fact that the GINI coefficient for the African population increased from 0.62 to 0.66 (Committee of Inquiry 2002: 26, 27).

\(^{20}\) The Gini Index is a commonly used measure for socio-economic inequality within a society. It is measured between the value 0 (indicating perfect income equality) and 1 (indicating perfect income inequality).
The shift from inter-race to intra-race inequality is significant. For example, between 1975 and 1996, the share of total income received by Africans rose from 20 to 36 percent (Natass and Seekings 2001). Obviously, it remains criminally low given the population share (close to 75% in 1996) of the African community. What is significant is that this growth has been accompanied by a widening gap within the African (and Coloured and Indian) community, which is illustrated in part by the dramatic share increase of Africans (and Coloured and Indians) in the top decile (see Figure 4.2). The gravity of this shift can best be appreciated in the light of the fact that the top decile commands almost half of the total income in South Africa, whereas the bottom decile accounts for only 1.4% and the bottom two deciles account for merely 5.8% of total income (see Figure 4.3).
These inequalities are carried through into the realms of access to basic services that can improve the living conditions of the poor in South Africa. To illustrate inequalities between population groups (due to the racial apartheid legacy explained earlier), it is instructive to explore educational levels, residential dwelling types and access to water and sanitation services. Table 4.2 demonstrates the advantage held by White South Africans in terms of education levels, which make access to economic opportunities much better especially in an economic period where knowledge-based and skills-based requirements are becoming more and more important.
Table 4.2: Distribution of those 20 and above in each population group by highest education level of education:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of education:</th>
<th>African %</th>
<th>Coloured %</th>
<th>White %</th>
<th>Indian %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No schooling</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some primary</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed primary</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some secondary</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 12</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: SSA 2003a: 48)

An important consequence of apartheid urbanisation policies is the lack of access to formal housing amongst the African population. The levels of access are depicted numerically in Table 4.3 and in parentage terms in Figure 4.4. I have extrapolated percentages between African and White population groups to demonstrate the scale of inequality in terms of access to housing opportunities.

Table 4.3: Type of dwelling by population group of the household head in 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of dwelling</th>
<th>African</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>House or brick structure on a separate stand or yard</td>
<td>4 369 893</td>
<td>1 031 298</td>
<td>649 503</td>
<td>187 769</td>
<td>6 238 462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional dwelling/hut/structure made of traditional materials</td>
<td>1 610 402</td>
<td>15 424</td>
<td>24 967</td>
<td>3 993</td>
<td>1 654 787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flat in block of flats</td>
<td>324 362</td>
<td>165 594</td>
<td>59 310</td>
<td>39 843</td>
<td>589 108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town/cluster/semi-detached house (simplex, duplex)</td>
<td>89 365</td>
<td>143 427</td>
<td>52 302</td>
<td>34 774</td>
<td>319 868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House/flat/room in backyard</td>
<td>343 604</td>
<td>30 948</td>
<td>26 748</td>
<td>11 074</td>
<td>412 374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal dwelling/shack in backyard</td>
<td>425 719</td>
<td>2 351</td>
<td>30 529</td>
<td>927</td>
<td>459 526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal dwelling/shack in NOT in backyard</td>
<td>1 334 691</td>
<td>4 596</td>
<td>35 304</td>
<td>2 114</td>
<td>1 376 706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Room/flatlet not in backyard but on shared a property</td>
<td>101 390</td>
<td>11 054</td>
<td>6 350</td>
<td>1 814</td>
<td>120 609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caravan or tent</td>
<td>22 818</td>
<td>4 533</td>
<td>2 732</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>30 610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private ship/boat</td>
<td>2 806</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>3 656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8 625 050</td>
<td>1 409 689</td>
<td>888 036</td>
<td>282 930</td>
<td>11 205 705</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Excluding all collective living quarters)

(Source: SSA 2003a: 68)

It is important to bear in mind that by the time of the 2001 census over one million housing structures had been delivered, primarily to African people. Thus, the figure of 4
369,893 would include most of those households. To fully grasp the depth of inequality it is instructive to compare the relative access within the African and White population groups (see figure 4.4).

![Figure 4.4: Distribution of dwelling types for Africans and Whites](Source: SSA 2003a: 68)

Figure 4.4 makes it clear that almost 99% of Whites live in a properly built dwelling whereas almost 40% of Africans live in non-formal or traditional dwellings. If we consider the numerical size of the African population group (35,416,166), in relation to educational levels and poverty, the scale of the housing problem becomes much clearer.

In addition to access to housing, it is also important to consider access to basic services such as water and sanitation. In terms of sanitation, only 40% of the African population has access to a flush toilet compared to 99% of the White population group (SSA 2003a). In fact, 17% of African households (i.e. 1,457,122) have no sanitation facilities (Ibid.) with particularly ill-effects when they are in urban areas. A similar picture of inter-population group inequality is in evidence with regard to main water supply of households: Only 18% of Africans have piped water in their dwellings, compared to 87% of Whites (plus a further 8% who have water inside their yard) (Ibid.). These inter-related statistical representations of inter-racial inequality lay bare the material consequences of apartheid and segregationist policies. It was against these monumental challenges that at the end of apartheid a door was opened up to seek effective responses to undo this legacy. In the
next section the focus shifts to urban development policies that emerged during the transition to advance a non-racial and integrated post-apartheid city (ANC 1994).

4.4 TAPESTRY OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT POLICY POST-1994

Urban development policy in democratic South Africa is spread across various pieces of legislation and informing policies. All of these take their cue from the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) that argued for "...the need to break down apartheid geography through land reform, more compact cities, decent public transport, and the development of industries and services that use local resources and/or meet local needs" (ANC 1994: 83). Concretely, the RDP commitment gave rise to a plethora of sectoral and institutional policy frameworks aimed at effecting urban development processes that dismantled the apartheid city and facilitated the emergence of increasingly integrated development patterns. In this section I explore the most important policies and accompanying legislation in order to tease out how urban integration was defined and the function/role of planning in the realisation of integration. The legislation and policies I consider include: the White Paper on Housing (WPH); the Development Facilitation Act (DFA); the Urban Development Strategy (UDS) and its successor, the Urban Development Framework (UDF); the White Paper on National Transport Policy; the White Paper on Local Government; and vitally, the White Paper on Spatial Planning and Land-use Management. The approach is to discuss these policies in rough chronological order because it reveals something about how urban development policy thinking evolved and the problems of institutional coordination between these policy streams.

As the chapter unfolds it becomes clear that there is a remarkable consistency in policy ideas across these various policy frameworks, which suggests a commonality of purpose and approach that should improve the chances of policy success. There was discursive coherence, yet, after six years of policy formulation and implementation, the government came to the conclusion that "...many of the [spatial] challenges faced by the government in 1994 remain despite good intentions and sophisticated interventions. It has also become increasingly clear that the spatial patterns and physical forms of many human settlement types change only very slowly" (Department of Housing 2000: 4). Many scholars have come to a similar conclusion that urban development policies aimed at
advancing urban integration are meeting with limited success (Abbott 2000; Huchzermeyer 2003a; Khan 2003; Royston 2003; Turok 2001; Turok and Watson 2001). Crucial to understand is the background context which offers some clues about what went wrong. The starting point of this discussion is the conceptual policy commonalities across the various policy streams in order to demonstrate discursive coherence. From there the chapter explores the political vicissitudes of policy implementation and how this created contradictory pressures which took many of the policy interventions away from their founding principles and intentions. Throughout I rely on the available secondary literature on these issues, along with grey material from government archives.

Urban Policy on the Cusp of Democracy

The most influential urban policy arenas in the immediate run-up to April 1994 were the National Housing Forum (NHF) and the Local Government Negotiating Forum (LGNF). Both bodies were transitional mechanisms that brought together interest groups inside the liberation movements, e.g. civic associations affiliated to the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) and the ANC, the apartheid government and particular private sector interests. The aim of these negotiating institutions was to formulate interim arrangements, premised on shared policy principles, to dismantle the apartheid government institutions and facilitate movement towards a set of new arrangements. However, it was acknowledged that the incoming democratically elected government would have the right to formulate its own policies. Considering this, the NHF and LGNF worked to formulate interim arrangements to ensure that governmental systems and services did not collapse. Essentially, these bodies formulated 'bridging policies' from the apartheid era to the democratic, non-racial epoch. It is crucial to bear in mind that this period (1990 – 1994) was overshadowed by the imperative to forge and maintain 'national unity' in order to avoid a civil war and the scuppering of the negotiations to transfer

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21 The NHF was launched on 31 August 1992 with a mandate to negotiate an interim housing policy framework. It brought together representatives of the government, three parastatals, political opposition groups, private stakeholders (financial, insurance and construction) in the housing sector and two non-governmental organisations (Urban Foundation and Kagiso Trust) (see Rust and Rubenstein 1996). The LGNF was established on 22 March 1993 with the mandate to deal with the democratization of local government along with the ongoing rent and service charge boycotts (see Cameron 1999, Chapter Three, pp84). The LGNF was comprised of 60 members; 30 of which were nominated by statutory local government bodies and the other 30 by non-statutory bodies involved in local government affairs.
power (via elections) to a democratically elected government. As a result, the liberation movements and the entrenched apartheid state had to make significant comprises to keep the process stable, on track and credible. What this meant was that agreements made in transitional forums such as the NHF carried a lot of weight because it was seen as test-sites for cooperative decision-making between opposing forces. As a consequence the policy ideas hatched in the NHF and the LGNF became very influential in the first wave of urban development policy formulation after April 1994.

Of importance to this thesis are the policy agreements arrived at in the NHF on restructuring the built environment. One of the main input reports of the NHF captures the prevalent understanding succinctly:

There appears to be an emerging consensus as to the most desirable nature and direction of urban restructuring in South Africa. The following points have been put forward as general principle: […] Reorientation of urban growth away from the urban periphery, or at least slowed lateral spread. The acceptance of higher density development in new areas, and areas where land is inefficiently used. Reintegration of fragmented parts of the city, primarily through the planning of lines and nodes of commercial/industrial and higher density residential development, focused on public transport systems. [Furthermore, the] use of vacant and under used, well located land parcels for lower income settlement. Achievement of a higher degree of mix of land uses. A focus on public transport (Hindson et al. 1993: 7-8, original emphasis removed).

This policy approach was informed by the work of a private sector think tank, the Urban Foundation, the long-standing planning and design ideas of the Urban Problems Research Unit (UPRU) at the University of Cape Town, and the work of leftwing service organisations such as Planact that worked closely with grassroots organisations in black townships affiliated to liberation movements (A. Mabin, Interviewed on 26 April 2002). Despite these diverse informants, a remarkable consensus emerged about the core urban planning ideas which are most developed in the longstanding ideas of David Dewar, based at UPRU. This consensus informed the battery of post 1994 urban policies. In reviewing these policies it is clear that the tenets of Dewar's work have proved enduring. What is particularly interesting in terms of this study is that Dewar has also been the main intellectual resource for informing spatial planning in Cape Town during the transition and especially during the 1996-2000 term of office of the City of Cape Town (discussed in
Chapters Six and Seven). In the interest of focus and relative depth, here I home in on his work because of its reach in scholarly circles and policy processes; it is the veritable core of dominant discourses in South Africa about how urban segregation and fragmentation had to be understood and remedied.

Dewar (1992) defines the primary characteristics of the apartheid city around three spatial patterns. Firstly, largely unmanaged low-density sprawl is in evidence. This pattern is fuelled by a residential development approach for the middle- and upper-classes through speculative development economies. Sprawl is further enhanced by 'crisis-driven' low-cost housing schemes of the government, which are informed by the imperatives of using cheap land and materials and racial separation. The squatting practices of those without houses also reinforces sprawl because a consideration in (peripheral) locations is the avoidance of harassment by authorities. Secondly, a pattern of fragmentation is distinguishable whereby "development occurs in relatively discrete pockets or cells, frequently bounded by freeways and buffers of open space" (Dewar 1992: 244). This approach is premised on the planning belief in introverted, self-contained neighbourhoods wherein community facilities are located at the geographical centres of these areas. A simplified movement hierarchy accompanies this conception. The movement hierarchy is scaled to the neighbourhood and links between areas are primarily via freeway (/motorway) systems, which obviously presuppose access to private cars (Ibid.). Thirdly, the apartheid city is marked by a pattern of separation of land uses, urban elements, races and income groups; "all separated to the greatest degree possible" (Ibid., p.245). These separations were enforced through strict planning regulation and the inevitable settlement patterns that take place at the margins of the city where the fastest urban growth, fuelled by poor migrants from rural areas and homelands, takes place.22

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22 Significantly, Dewar is very clear that this apartheid inheritance is firmly embedded in Anglo-American urban management and planning ideas: "Structurally, [South African] housing estates reflect the conventional planning wisdoms which were imported from Europe and the United States of America: introverted neighbourhoods; the superblock; arithmetically organized community facilities; and everything scales to the car" (Dewar 1992: 245). In this sense, his critique can be read as a critique of modernist planning principles mentioned in Chapter Two.
Initial Urban Policies post-1994

Dewar's spatial depiction and critique of the apartheid city proved immensely influential. The 'consensus' that emerged at the NHF about how to undo and remake the apartheid city, can be seen as a direct response to the apartheid features identified by Dewar.23 The ideas of the NHF are carried forward into the democratic era and can be observed in the new government's election manifesto, the RDP. It also informs the first two pieces of urban policy released within less than a year after the elections in April 1994: the White Paper on Housing and the White Paper on Water Supply. It is particularly the former that is of most relevance here. The vision of the White Paper on Housing states:

Government strives for the establishment of viable, socially and economically integrated communities, situated in areas allowing convenient access to economic opportunities as well as health, educational and social amenities, within which all South Africa's people will have access on a progressive basis, to: A permanent residential structure with secure tenure, ensuring privacy and providing adequate protection against the elements; and portable water, adequate sanitary facilities including waste disposal and domestic electricity supply (Department of Housing 1994: 4.2).

Flowing from this vision, the priority of the Department of Housing was to put in place institutional mechanisms to make good the political promise to deliver one million houses by 2000 as defined in the RDP, and crucially, "within the shortest possible time frame" (Ibid.). The White Paper on Housing clearly recognised that the housing programme could get off the ground without a revamped land development policy and system. In light of this it anticipated the promulgation of the Development Facilitation Act (RSA 1995).24 Furthermore, there is a strong emphasis in the White Paper on Housing on financing formulas and institutional reforms to create an enabling environment for the rapid delivery of housing programmes. This component of the policy opened up the door to the private sector to join the government in meeting its delivery ambitions. To make such partnerships work, the government was compelled to adopt particular kinds of financial and institutional approaches that were not necessarily compatible with the developmental and redistributive thrust of the RDP and the vision of the White Paper on

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23 In fact, the report prepared by Hindson et al. (1993) for the NHF explicitly refers to Dewar's work throughout. Dewar's influence was also confirmed by one of the authors of the report (personal correspondence with Alan Mabin, 16 September 2003).

24 More detail on the DFA follows below in this chapter.
Housing (Khan 2003).25 The tension between developmental imperatives and reliance on private sector institutional and financial delivery capacities was a problem that was not unique to housing but one that emerged in other areas of urban development policy as well.

Of particular significance for this discussion is the explicit reliance on the Development Facilitation Act (DFA) of 1995, as is made clear in the following argument: "The effectiveness of land delivery has a fundamental impact upon: [...] the potential for housing supply to contribute to the racial, economic and spatial integration of South Africa" (Department of Housing 1994: 5.7). Thus, from the outset the reform of land-use and the associated planning system, was fundamental to the success of the housing agenda, which aimed to "provide integrated communities", on strategically located land in order to enhance urban integration. This policy aim shines through clearly in the section entitled, 'Effective and Integrated Development' in the White Paper of Housing, which explicitly endorses holistic development as a foundational dimension of integration; along with urban/rural balance and mutual support; close proximity between residential and economic opportunities; mixed land uses; anti-sprawl actions; greater compaction; correction of racialised distortion of spatial patterns; and the promotion of environmentally sustainable development (Department of Housing 1994: 5.7.1.3). In light of this envisaged link between addressing housing backlogs and land-use management, I will now turn to the key ideas in the DFA.

Land-use Management and Urban Integration

The Development Facilitation Act was a vital piece of legislation to establish the normative basis for spatial planning and land development and to bring to life new institutional mechanisms to radically speed up land management processes. This was vital in order to expedite delivery on the new priorities of the democratic government. The normative orientation of the Act is set out in a series of principles that are meant to

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25 While multi-sector partnerships and the trade-offs associated with private sector involvement in service delivery were not necessarily explicitly part of the ideas that informed the RDP, they were more compatible with the Growth, Employment and Reconstruction (GEAR) framework that swiftly came to replace it in importance. Also, it should be acknowledged that the possibility of partnerships were implicit in the RDP (Blumenfeld 1997).
"guide the administration of any physical plan, transport plan, guide plan, structure plan, zoning scheme" carried out by competent state authorities (RSA 1995a: Ch 1, 2(b)). The principles include explicit reference to the importance of promoting efficient and integrated land development. This involves adherence to the following guidelines to:

i) promote the integration of the social, economic, institutional and physical aspects of land development;
ii) promote integrated land development in rural and urban areas in support of each other;
iii) promote the availability of residential and employment opportunities in close proximity to or integrated with each other;
iv) optimise the use of existing resources including such resources relating to agriculture, land, minerals, bulk infrastructure, roads, transportation and social facilities;
v) promote a diverse combination of land uses, also at the level of individual erven or subdivisions of land;
vi) discourage the phenomenon of 'urban sprawl' in urban areas and contribute to the development of more compact towns and cities;
vii) contribute to the correction of the historically distorted spatial patterns of settlement in the Republic and to the optimum use of existing infrastructure in excess of current needs; and
viii) encourage environmentally sustainable land development practices and processes (RSA 1995a: 3.1(c)).

Significantly, this list is virtually identical to the reform agenda proposed by David Dewar on numerous occasions (Dewar 1992; Dewar 1995; Dewar and Uytenbogaardt 1991), which underscores the discursive continuity of ideas between the agreements reached at the NHF and post-1995 policies. In terms of the DFA, these land development principles had to be reflected in the Land Development Objectives (LDOs) of local authorities. Through LDOs, it was assumed, local authorities would be compelled to redirect their resources towards un- and under-serviced residents in their jurisdiction. In effect LDOs would ensure the redistribution of municipal resources (capital investments, services and staff) away from the privileged White minority to the discriminated Black majority. Such redistribution would also address the imperatives of more integrated forms of urban development. The LDOs would ensure that planning decisions would be made on the basis of the principles quoted above and not the maintenance of White, middle-class

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26 There are a number of other principles that are also set out in this section of the Act but they are less germane to the focus of this study.
privileges. The DFA further sets out an institutional mechanism – Development Tribunals – to speed up land development decisions. This provision must be understood against the backdrop of the immensely confusing and expansive (apartheid era) planning decision-making provisions that were still in force at the time. The racially-defined local government system of the apartheid era and the various movement and land regulatory policies aimed at enforcing racial segregation created a dense and slow institutional system of land release and development. The DFA reflected the new government’s realisation that an immediate and rapid circumvention of these laws was required to expedite the ambitious development agenda of the state (Turok 1994a; 1994b). It was clear that it would take considerable time to investigate, repeal and replace the thick institutional web of apartheid land-use and management policies. In the meantime the Development Tribunals would review land-use applications – ostensibly aimed at providing new housing and other infrastructure for the poor – to ensure that delivery would start almost immediately.

The new planning and land-use system would be investigated and developed by a special Development Planning Commission (DPC), established in terms of Chapter Two of the DFA. The task of the DPC was to formulate a detailed land development and planning policy framework in line with the principles of the DFA and the RDP in order to replace the apartheid policies that were still in force. In other words, the DPC would do the detailed transformation work whilst the development tribunals would use their powers to expedite appropriate land development processes (Berrisford 1998). It took the DPC three years to complete their work which resulted in a Green Paper on Spatial Planning, released in 1999. The Green Paper in turn served as the foundation for the production of a White Paper on Spatial Planning and Land-use Management, which was released in 2001 and discussed in greater detail below.

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27 Development Tribunals are established by provincial governments to review and approve land development proposals that are consistent with the principles of the DFA. The Tribunals are meant to expedite development applications in line with government RDP priorities that may get bogged down in the slow approval processes of local authorities. However, according to Royston (2003), in practice the Tribunal route was equally slow and expensive for developers. Consequently it failed to achieve its objectives as envisaged in the DFA.
Lauren Royston (2002; 2003), one of the foremost scholars on land-use management and spatial planning in South Africa, argues that the DFA principles represented a move away from a rules-bound planning approval system to one that was normatively based. This was a difficult shift for municipal officials to make. Officials did not know how to apply the principles which required a fair amount of discretion and could result in contested and controversial decisions. Furthermore, the LDOs had to reflect urban development priorities, but instead turned out to be more 'wish lists' than real priorities based on political agreements made on the basis of requisite trade-offs. Consequently, LDOs were generally "lacking coherence or strategic focus and divorced from the reality of resources available for delivery" (Royston 2003: 236). As a consequence, the DFA had minimal impact on the location of new subsidised housing schemes and the direction of private sector investments more generally (Ibid.). In other words, the imperatives of housing delivery outpaced the government's planning and regulatory institutions that were meant to ensure that new housing complied with the vision of integrated development that sought a reversal of segregation and infill, mixed-use land development patterns. In fact the housing delivery programme became the dominant determinant of urban development processes and spatial patterning until well after the target of one million 'housing opportunities' were delivered in 2000. But this observation is to race ahead of how the urban development policy processes unfolded during the latter half of the 1990s.

Urban Development Strategy

In order to entrench the developmental orientation of the new government, a special Ministry was established to oversee the implementation of the RDP (hereafter the RDP Ministry). The RDP Ministry was located in the Office of the President and it was broadly modelled on the development planning ministries adopted in South-East Asian countries like Malaysia and Singapore. It was recognised by the ANC that the developmental objectives in the RDP required much greater coordination and cooperation between sectoral departments of the state. At that time the ANC was heavily influenced by potentially radical development discourses of the late 1980s/early 1990s, for example, participatory development, good governance, sustainable development (Munslow et al. 1995; Fitzgerald 1995). All these discourses are clearly in evidence in the language of the RDP and became the ground of ideological and political alignment and contestation.
within government and between the state and civil society in the early democratic period (Blumenfeld 1997). However, the RDP was also laced with references to fiscal responsibility and continuity in order to avoid alienating potential investors and market sentiments (Marais 2001). Urban development and rural development were seen as priorities that could not be located in any single department but had to be tackled at the intersection of various departmental efforts. For this reason, the RDP Ministry took the responsibility of formulating the Urban Development Strategy (RSA 1995b) and the Rural Development Strategy.28

The Urban Development Strategy (UDS) clearly reflected the thinking that informed the DFA and the White Paper on Housing. What is significant about the UDS was the assumption of the government about how urban restructuring would unfold in ways that represented a step away from the apartheid city towards urban integration. The UDS also confirmed that the government understood the three primary informants of urban integration to involve: planning and land-use management; effective transport systems to provide increased density and linkages; and environmental management towards greater sustainability. The UDS made it clear that the first of five priority areas in urban development was “integrating cities and towns and managing urban growth” (RSA 1995b: 6.1). It is appropriate to briefly reflect on the first and last issues flagged here.

The UDS put forward an approach whereby the urban development agenda was to be addressed in a three-stage approach. The first stage was stabilisation, which denoted a focus on “critical backlogs, the restoration of infrastructure and the formation of core institutional capacities” (Ibid., 5.3). Institutional capacities referred to the role of municipalities as the leading agents in carrying out the work of infrastructure provision and addressing backlogs. The radical overhaul of the local government system – which

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28 In addition to the formulation of these two strategies, the RDP Ministry also launched 13 pilot projects – called Special Integrated Presidential Projects (SIPPs) – that experimented with area-based interventions to address urban development challenges in a more holistic fashion. The SIPPs were seen as a fast-track measure to expedite delivery and an opportunity to demonstrate how government departments could work in a more coordinated fashion to achieve better developmental outcomes. In a sense it explored more practically how ‘urban integration’ could be advanced. Due to space constraints I cannot delve into its effectiveness but suffice to say that in my interviews it became clear that hardly any cross-fertilisation of ideas and insights happened between the SIPPs processes and policy development in the Department of Housing that took on urban development policy after the closure of the RDP Ministry.
was left under-specified during the CODESA negotiations – was seen as a top priority to resolve the problem of institutional capacity. The second stage envisaged by the UDS was *consolidation*. This involved “cementing an integrated package of policies and programmes, [inter alia:] various land development, planning, transportation, and environmental management policies and programmes; ... the housing programme; investment in urban infrastructure; urban economic development initiatives; urban social policy; [and] strategies to ensure better safety and security in urban areas” (RSA 1995b: 5.3). Here it is clear that the government recognised from the outset the importance of coordinating sectoral policy streams. This presented a challenge in public management the scale of which was not fully appreciated at the time. It is clear though that the location of the RDP Office at the apex of the government system reflected the necessity of coordination, integration and alignment; themes that recur over and over again in government policies throughout the democratic era. The third stage was *managing urban growth and development*. The UDS foresaw that the first two stages would be completed within five years and then a sound platform would exist for policy programmes to unfold towards the vision of the UDS – a state of normalisation. These assumptions turned out to be wildly optimistic and most importantly, the housing programme envisaged as a core component of stage two, sped ahead of processes in stage one and came to dominate the urban development landscape during the period 1996-2003. This was a development that produced the widespread transgression of the principles in the DFA aimed at advancing urban integration (Royston 2003).

In political terms the UDS was undermined by the abrupt closure of the RDP Ministry in 1996 on the verge of the government’s shift in priorities to macro-economic stability and establishing an export-led growth path. The new priorities were encapsulated in the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy – a highly conventional neo-liberal macro-economic policy framework (RSA 1996a; cf. Marais 2001). With the

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29 I explore the local reform agenda in greater detail below.
30 Officially, the government argued that the RDP Office was closed because the RDP would be 'mainstreamed' into the normal functioning of line departments. In other words, the government did not abandon the redistributive thrust of the RDP in favour of neo-liberal development path as its critics suggested. This argument was a difficult one to sustain because line departments were still trying to find their feet, let alone manage to successfully integrate complex multi-sectoral policy instruments as demanded by the RDP approach (Swartz 1999).
closure of the RDP Office, an institutional vacuum was created and for almost a year it was unclear which line department was responsible for taking the implementation of the UDS forward (Interview: Diet van Broemsen, 2002). Eventually the Department of Housing was given the responsibility and in 1997 the Department released the successor to the UDS, the Urban Development Framework (Department of Housing 1997), which became the final policy framework for urban development in the post-apartheid period. However, during this period of confusion and displacement of the UDS, a number of other critical policy frameworks promoted by the UDS saw the light of day: transport, local government and environmental management. Nevertheless, by 1997 the UDS was replaced by the UDF. Before an exploration of the UDF, some observations about transport and local government policy reforms during the same period need to be made.

**Transport and Urban Integration**

Reviewing the White Paper on National Transport Policy (RSA 1996b) is relevant because it reflects the policy continuity with approaches to urban integration established during the NHF and carried forward in the RDP, the DFA and especially the UDS. Furthermore, it illustrates the complexity of sequencing inter-related policy reforms when the policies are driven forward by various line/sectoral departments. The transport White Paper marked a fundamental break with apartheid policies in three distinct ways. First, the 'supply-side' approach whereby transport infrastructure was extended to meet anticipated demand, was to be replaced with an approach that emphasised a differentiated 'customer base' and financing models premised on full cost recovery as far as possible and within a framework of 'regulated competition' between operators. This emphasis was in line with the increasing purchase of new public management concerns with cost recovery and improved efficiencies. Second, the system of modally fragmented planning and management of transport systems would be replaced with an 'integrated cross-modal' transport planning, which would be undertaken in close cooperation with land-use planning processes, as envisaged in the DFA. In fact, the policy worked on the assumption that integrated town planning should take its cue from transport corridors and interchange points; incidentally, reflecting how sectoral lenses can approach integrated planning from their own vantage point. Third, there was a firm move away from prioritisation of the needs of private transport uses to an explicit commitment to putting
public transport first. This emphasis echoed loudly the planning argument of Dewar (1995), the understandings of more integrative planning in the DFA principles and, of course, environmental management concerns.

Significantly, the policy articulated very clear ideas about the focus of spatial planning and the position of transport within that. Reflecting the predominant thinking at the time, the transport White Paper provided an impressively comprehensive summary:

Policy actions necessary to provide for urban restructuring (densification) and efficient land use/transport interaction which will be promoted by Government include:

- establishment of structures (all tiers of government) which facilitate integrated planning of infrastructure, operations and land use in a co-ordinated manner;
- regulation of land use development at local level so that development approval is subject to conformity with integrated land use/transport plans;
- land use frameworks, guidelines and policies to channel development, particularly employment activities, into public transport corridors and nodes;
- development priority will be given to infilling, densification, mixed land use and the promotion of development corridors and nodes;
- containment of urban sprawl and suburbanisation beyond the urban limits will be addressed through provincial spatial development plans;
- decentralisation which disperses employment activities must be discouraged, except in specific cases where it is favourable in terms of decreasing total transport costs and travel times on the basis of an integrated land use plan;
- unrestrained car usage and subsidised car parking will be contained through the application of policy instruments which could include strict parking policies, access restrictions for private cars, higher licence fees, road pricing or area licensing. Restraint on private car usage will however not be implemented independently of improvements in the quality of public transport (RSA 1996b: 23).

However, despite the close correlation between these tenets and the principles in the DFA and the UDS, the policy also assumed that transport would provide the lead, in that "land use development proposals must be subject to a land use/transport policy framework within an agreed development planning process" (Ibid., emphasis added). This kind of sectoral 'chauvinism' is typical of all urban development policies that stem from a disciplinary or professional body of knowledge. Nevertheless, it is striking how close the conceptual alignment is with other policies discussed above.
Another important dimension of the policy approach was to put economic integration of far-flung (poor and Black) areas and more informalised practices on the agenda. Transport corridors were seen as key instruments to intensify commercial density along strategic routes and to make access to the townships (and economic centres for township residents) easier.31 Notably, compared to the other urban development policy frameworks, the transport policy was most overtly influenced by new public management principles as evidenced in the imperatives of cost-recovery, efficiency improvement and private sector involvement. These policy imperatives meant that the long-term (expensive) financial model would be heavily reliant on following market principles that would lead to a reduction in subsidies for the poor in favour of recouping payment. This imperative would further squeeze the poor, who suffer expensive reproductive costs due to the long-run effects of apartheid spatial marginalisation. In a context where poverty remains an enduring feature in society, this approach effectively militates against redistribution.

Such policy emphases became more pronounced after the release of GEAR in March 1996 but were there since the deliberations of the NHF and the LGNF (Bond 2003). It remains uncertain whether the redistributive and equity imperatives of the transport policy framework can be realised within a broader financing model that hopes to leverage large volumes of private sector capital for the reasons mentioned above. This is one tension that could potentially gravitate against the determined pursuit of urban integration. The same tensions were also in evidence in the government's second policy attempt at articulating a comprehensive urban development vision and policy programme – the UDF.

**Urban Development Framework**

There was a marked difference in tone and scope between the UDF (Department of Housing 1997) and the UDS (RSA 1995b) that went before. The UDF was a lot less definitive and prescriptive than the UDS. The name change from 'strategy' to 'framework' denotes the downgrading in political importance of the UDF. In one respect this reflected

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31 The national department of Transport organised a number of transport corridor pilot projects to test these ideas. For example, the pilot in Cape Town was undertaken by the City of Cape Town municipality and dubbed the Landsdown Corridor and became one of the most important spatial interventions aimed at improving urban integration (Watson 2001). I return to discuss the experiment in Chapter Six.
the relatively low status of the Department of Housing, which sponsored the UDF, compared to other line departments such as the Department of Constitutional Development, Transport, and Finance. It also reflected a growing sense of caution about the scope of government to compel line departments to do anything that was beyond their sectoral 'delivery' concerns. By 1997 most of the line departments had learnt bitter lessons about the institutional complexity that had to be navigated to reorient an apartheid civil service towards more developmental imperatives. This challenge was compounded by the fact that the transitional negotiations included a 'sunset clause' which forced the new government to retain the civil servants from the apartheid order. However, the problem was not merely a matter of inappropriately trained civil servants. The very institutional rules, norms, systems and concomitant behavioural patterns were rooted in a top-down, unquestioning culture that reinforced silo-based thinking and behaviour. New policy imperatives that required fundamental change in staff attitudes and skills were actively resisted in explicit and subterranean ways (Stewart 1999; Swartz 1999). Another dynamic was the introduction of a strong fiscal squeeze across government departments as the requirements of GEAR started to come into force. It was against this institutional and political backdrop that the UDF offered a relatively uncontested vision for urban development, along with five policy priorities and four key programmes for implementation.

Predictably the vision of the UDF envisaged future urban settlements that would be fully integrated, free of racial and gender discrimination, free of segregation and that were fundamentally enabling. Hence, economic and social opportunities would be in abundance, undergirded by "democratic, efficient, sustainable and accountable metropolitan and local governments [that work] in close cooperation with civil society and geared towards innovative community-led development" (Department of Housing 1997: 8). The vision, expressed in six goals, was further related to five so-called priority interventions: establishing new patterns of engagement between local government and civil society; overcoming the separation between economic and spatial planning; ensuring that integrated planning determined future development interventions and budgets; ensuring successful land reform; and clarifying inter-governmental relationships so that the role of municipalities was clarified amidst increased decentralisation (Ibid.). However,
further into the policy it becomes clear that the Department of Housing did not envisage any special measures to address these priorities. Instead, the message was that existing policies of various line departments (e.g. housing, environment, health, water, transport) that impact on urban development must be made more consistent. The task of the UDF was to gently steer departments in that direction: “The aim of this framework is therefore to promote a consistent urban development policy approach for effective urban reconstruction and development, to guide development policies, strategies and actions of all stakeholders in the urban development process and steer them towards the achievement of a collective vision” (Department of Housing 1997: 1, emphasis added). Clearly the authors of the UDF were hoping at a minimum, to influence the thinking of relevant line departments and to get them to recast their existing initiatives, over which they guarded their control jealously, towards larger urban development imperatives. As a result, the UDF basically provided a catalogue of existing or planned initiatives in various line departments and asserted that their co-existence and coordination would ipso facto lead to the progressive realisation of the UDF vision. It is not my intention to discuss this approach in any more detail here.\(^{32}\) I merely want to highlight that by 1997, sectoral efforts and ideas of line departments were in full steam, generating intense inter-departmental frictions and rivalries which effectively undermined the hopeful objectives of the UDS, the DFA and other policies aimed at enhancing cooperation towards integrated development outcomes. It was against these institutional processes, along with a growing realisation that ‘delivery’ on scale was immensely difficult due to capacity problems and shrinking budgets, that there was a hopeful turn to the role of local government in reconstruction and development.

White Paper on Local Government

When the negotiations between the ANC and the White political establishment (under the leadership of the National Party) were concluded with the acceptance of the Interim Constitution in 1993, the roles, powers and functions of local government were left much more vague than provisions for the establishment of national and provisional government. In Chapter 10 of the Interim Constitution (RSA 1993) a three-phase

\(^{32}\) Since Chapter Five is devoted to an in-depth analysis of the UDF I am restricting my treatment here.
framework for normalisation (i.e. full democratisation) was set out: (i) the pre-interim phase which commenced with the passing of the Local Government Transition Act in February 1994 and was in effect until the first municipal elections in November 1995; (ii) the interim phase which lasted between the first (partially democratic) municipal elections in 1995/6 and the second fully democratic elections in December 2000; (iii) the final phase which came into effect with the second municipal elections and reflected new municipal boundaries, power and functions and municipal types as defined in the suite of local government legislation promulgated between 1996-2000. This framework envisaged that during the pre-interim and interim phases, detailed policy frameworks for democratic local government (after 2000) would be formulated. The movement between each phase involved dramatic reorganisation of municipal structures as (formerly) racially-specific local authorities were amalgamated. For example, in Cape Town the number of municipalities shrunk from almost sixty to seven during 1993 - 1999 (see Table 4.4). The organisational trauma caused by the rapid processes of amalgamation is almost incalculable. Each round of consolidation came with its own political priorities, distinctive consultant remedies to effect 'cultural change', conflicts with unions about unequal conditions of service and salary scales between staff from formerly separate municipalities, and so forth (Cameron 1999; 2000). In such contexts it was virtually impossible to focus the attention of politicians, managers and staff on higher-order development objectives such as urban integration.

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<td>Number &amp; types of local authorities in the Cape Metropolitan Area:</td>
<td>19 White Local Authorities</td>
<td>40 Appointed Councils, comprised of 50% statutory councillors and 50% non-statutory councillors</td>
<td>1 Metropolitan Council (weak powers)</td>
<td>1 Unicity Council Number sub-councils (weak policy and fiscal powers) to be defined</td>
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<td>29 Management Committees</td>
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<td>5 Black Local Authorities</td>
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(Source: authors data)

In March 1998, the government released *The White Paper on Local Government*. This document spells out the formal policy direction and vision for a future local government system. At the heart of the new policy framework is the notion of developmental local government. It is defined as "local government committed to working with citizens and
groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and material needs and improve the quality of their lives" (RSA 1998: 31). The outcomes of developmental local government put forward in *The White Paper on Local Government* are:

- The provision of basic household infrastructure and services. In line with the Constitution, municipalities must prioritise the delivery of basic services to everyone in their area.
- The creation of liveable, integrated cities, towns and rural areas. Apartheid planning has resulted in divided cities, towns and rural areas. Spatial integration is encouraged to reduce the costs of transport and service provision, and enable social integration.
- Promoting local economic development. Municipalities are urged to proactively enhance the economic potential of their areas.
- Community empowerment and redistribution (from wealthy areas to impoverished and un-serviced areas) (RSA 1998a: 31-39).^{33}

According to the *White Paper on Local Government*, developmental local government would be realised through the implementation of integrated development plans (IDPs), which in turn were defined in greater detail in follow-up legislation in 2000.

Having established the purpose of municipalities and local governance, the *White Paper on Local Government* paved the way for the promulgation of: the Demarcation Act (RSA 1998b), The Municipal Structures Act (RSA 1998c), the Municipal Finance Management Bill (RSA 2000a) and, just before the last municipal election, the Municipal Systems Act (RSA 2000b). Of particular interest to this discussion is the Municipal Systems Act. It defines the core processes to achieve developmental local government as participatory

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^{33} This formulation is consistent with the Constitutional (1996) obligations on local government which define the objects of local government as follows: (a) to provide democratic and accountable government for local communities; (b) to ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner; (c) to promote social and economic development; (d) to promote a safe and healthy environment; and (e) to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matter of local government. In this formulation is obvious how tenets of participatory development, good governance and sustainable human development infused official policies and legislative discourses (Parnell and Pieterse 1999).
governance, integrated development planning, performance management and reporting, resource allocation and organisational change (RSA 2000b).

Arguably, at the heart of the new local government system is the IDP, which provides the primary modality for community interface, a starting point for driving internal institutional reform and the key to inter-governmental coordination and alignment (Parnell and Pieterse 1999). In terms of the Municipal Systems Act, every municipal council must adopt a single, inclusive plan for the development of its municipal area. This IDP must reflect:

a) the municipal council's vision for the long term development of the municipality with special emphasis on the municipality's most critical development and internal transformation needs;

b) an assessment of the existing level of development in the municipality, which must include identification of communities which do not have access to basic municipal services;

c) the council's development priorities and objectives for its elected term, including its local economic development aims and its internal transformation needs;

d) the council's development strategies which must be aligned with any national or provincial sectoral plans and planning requirements binding on the municipality in terms of legislation;

e) a spatial development framework which must include the provision of basic guidelines for a land use management system for the municipality;

f) the council's operational strategies;

g) applicable disaster management plans;

h) a financial plan, which must include a budget projection for at least the next three years; and

i) the key performance indicators and performance targets (RSA 2000b: Ch 5, Part 2: 26(a-i), emphasis added).

This framework represents a potentially far-reaching transformation of the role of local government in South Africa. It embodies a highly sophisticated and nimble conception of the inter-relationships between developmental intentions, institutional design, inter-governmental (sectoral and financial) alignment and spatial underpinnings of development strategy, amongst other features. Furthermore, the redistributive concern with service backlogs and inequalities are catered for. There is a particularly strong institutional awareness in the framework as the reference to medium-term financial planning and performance-based management principles illustrates. These proclivities in
the IDP framework reflect some of the lessons learnt about the difficulties of operationalising a developmental approach in the public sector. It also seals in the government's broader commitment to decentralised service delivery but inside a unitary and inter-dependent inter-governmental system. The Act makes it clear that the entire IDP process must rest on a meaningful and multi-level participation process to ensure that citizens have a direct say about its outcome. Moreover, it also becomes an important tool to enable citizens and interest groups to monitor and assess the performance of the municipality, based on specific targets for development, which are linked to budgets. Finally, what is particularly significant here is the modest role ascribed to spatial planning whilst strategic planning is mainstreamed. It is defined in a subsidiary role to the IDP (or strategic planning) and it is merely meant to offer guidelines for land-use management as opposed to informing the development priorities of the municipality as a strong emphasis on compact city or new urbanism principles may have suggested. To make sense of this approach in relation to the larger scheme of government policy evolution, it is necessary to discuss the *White Paper on Spatial Planning and Land-Use Management* (hereafter, Planning White Paper) (RSA 2001a).

**The New Face of Planning**

The Planning White Paper is premised on five inter-related principles: sustainability, equality, efficiency, integration and good governance (RSA 2001a: 10-12). These are the principles that are closely aligned with the other urban development policy frameworks discussed up to this point. Of particular interest for the present discussion is the approach spelled out under the principle of integration:

The principle of integration reflects the need to integrate systems, policies and approaches in land use planning and development. This principle finds particular expression in two areas. Firstly it requires that the *planning process* is integrated, taking into account the often disparate sectoral concerns, policies and laws and their requirements, and reaching conclusions that are efficient and sustainable from a management and governance point of view. Secondly it requires an integrated 'on the ground' outcome, one that breaks down not only the racial and socio-economic segregation that characterise our country but which also look at spatial integration of different land uses, places of living with places of working and shopping and relaxing (RSA 2001a: 9).
The conception of integration as an 'on the ground' outcome is very close to the understanding of urban integration that was presented in Chapter Two. There it was concluded that urban integration must be understood as leading to significant reduction in racial and class segregation, more integrative land-use patterns to maximise the opportunities for particularly poor urban residents to access urban services and employment opportunities, and finally, a reduction in the levels of economic and social inequality across the urban region. Furthermore, it was suggested that these three dimensions of urban integration are closely interlinked and inter-dependent, which in turn suggests that viable planning responses will also address how these normative ambitions might be advanced in tandem. The latter concern is addressed in the focus on an integrated planning process. However, the substantive concerns in my own approach to urban integration are more significantly addressed in another section of the planning White Paper that sets out the spatial planning and land development norms based on the principle of urban integration:

- Land use planning and development decisions should take account of and relate to the sectoral policies of other spheres and departments of government;
- Land use and development should promote efficient, functional and integrated settlements;
- Land use and development should be determined by the availability of appropriate services and infrastructure, including transportation infrastructure;
- Land use and development should promote racial integration;
- Land use and development should promote mixed use development (RSA 2001a: 9-10).

These norms clearly extend beyond a focus on integrating those discriminated against on the basis of race and class into opportunity circuits in the city. The norms also extend to institutional prerequisites (i.e. relating to sectoral policies of other spheres of government and greater efficiency) and constraints (i.e. availability). Moreover, what is distinctive about the planning White Paper is that it demonstrates a decidedly more cautious and flexible approach compared to the DFA and the UDS. For example, the planning White paper stresses that:

The principles and norms do not prescribe black and white, yes-or-no outcomes, but serve to ensure that decisions are made with reference to a uniform and coherent set of desired policy outcomes. It is important, however, to emphasize that the interpretation and application of the principles and norms is context specific as
conditions upon which principles and norms have to be applied are not uniform throughout the country (RSA 2001a: 8, emphasis added).

This assertion opens the door to *localised* planning frameworks and processes that are tailored to fit local conditions. In a sense it is a distinctive move away from earlier conceptions of the Department of Provincial and Local Government (formerly the Department of Constitutional Development) that tried to codify the IDP process into a manual that had to be followed, step by procedural step, by all municipalities (see Harrison 2003).

Even though there is greater emphasis on local specificity and adaptation, the planning White Paper also identifies the reliance on broad principles as problematic. This echoes the criticism of Royston (2003) about the difficulties encountered in operationalising the DFA principles. The planning White Paper acknowledges that the former reliance on principles alone, i.e. that they would be self-executing, "have been too idealistic. It is clear that it must be incumbent on authorities concerned with spatial planning and land-use management to apply the principles and norms effectively. Structures, institutions and processes must be designed to ensure that the principles and norms are actualised" (RSA 2001a: 10). To address this challenge, the planning White Paper promotes the establishment of land-use regulators. Furthermore, it is envisaged that each municipality will adopt two primary spatial planning and land-use instruments: "an *indicative plan* showing desired patterns of land use, directions of growth, urban edges, special development areas and conservation-worthy areas as well as a *scheme* recording land-use and development rights and restrictions applicable to each erf in the municipality" (RSA 2001a: 13, emphasis added). The 'indicative plan' is the same as the spatial development framework stipulated in the Municipal System Act as a subset of the IDP. The 'scheme' is the 'land-use management system' envisaged in the Systems Act. The former is seen as a flexible framework that guides development (planning) processes and the latter has a binding effect on land development and management (RSA 2001a). It is uncertain whether these refinements of the approach first defined in the DFA will be enough to address the problems of operationalisation that the DFA encountered. What is clear is that the new policy direction has entrenched the subservient position of spatial planning in relation to strategic planning, along with the belief that development planning must
lead the way in fulfilling the normative ambition of urban integration. This sets up a potential conflict between spatial and development planning, as I demonstrate below.

4.5 DISTILLING PATTERNS IN THE TAPESTRY OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT POLICIES
If we reflect on the inter-relationships between the collection of new urban policies in the post-1994 era, a number of patterns present themselves, which relate to the analytical aims of this study. Firstly, the role of spatial planning became obscured and undermined in the period 1994-2000, as national departments rushed to formulate policy and legislation so that they could get on with 'delivery' in order to meet the targets established in the RDP. Planning became obscured by this escalated effort because the guiding piece of legislation – the DFA – proved to be fraught with problems of implementation. Specifically, the main object of the Act, to speed up land release and development in favour of the disadvantaged and towards redistribution, was frustratingly elusive. Approvals took a very long time despite the intention for rapid decision-making. Also, because a number of other planning regulations remained in force, developers exploited any avenue for land release approval in order to follow their own (profit-driven) imperatives and not those of integrated development as set out in the principles of the DFA. This effectively rendered the DFA impotent, causing in part the decline in the importance accorded to spatial planning. In addition, the Development Planning Commission established by the DFA, was undermined by limited budgets and lack of status in relation to the overall government hierarchy.

Secondly, local government emerged as the pivotal actor responsible for the realisation of integrated settlements through strategic planning embedded in the IDP, which in turn was underpinned by spatial plans amongst other informants such as sectoral plans. Central to the IDP was the conception of integrated development which was comprised of three dimensions: (i) integrated development as equivalent to holistic development – the simultaneous and integrated realisation of environmental, economic, social and political objectives in deliberate development processes; (ii) integrated development as a form of institutional functioning, i.e. the co-ordination and alignment of governmental strategies and intervention between spheres of government and across sectoral streams at each level of government; and (iii) integrated development as a process of participation by
all relevant stakeholders in the formulation of development priorities and concomitant responses, which are in fact preconditions for the realisation of holistic development as an eventual outcome.

Thirdly, it became clear that local government was singularly incapable of fulfilling this ambitious mandate during the period (1994-2001) under consideration for three main reasons. First, the dramatic processes of institutional reorganisation that lead to successive rounds of amalgamation - with the attendant inwardly focussed skirmishes - made it virtually impossible for these bodies to muster the wherewithal to undertake complex and politically conflictual strategic planning processes. Second, the pressures that emanated from national and provincial governments, which were driving forward demanding sectoral programmes, created a cacophony of contradictory pressures that lead to municipalities remaining in a reactive, fire fighting mode, if not frozen into a state of panic or being overwhelmed. Third, the mixed messages that flowed from the contradictions between fiscal austerity and new public management imperatives to improve efficiencies on the one hand, and greater redistributive actions on the other, created a political climate of uncertainty and caution. This climate actively undermined a politics of robust democratic engagement that might formulate clear priorities based on the tough trade-offs that these contradictions implied. Evaluation studies of numerous IDPs during this period demonstrate that municipalities tended to formulate extended shopping lists of needs instead of clearly justified strategic priorities, anchored in democratic political deliberation (Harrison 2003).

Lastly and notwithstanding these patterns, it is possible to discern an 'ideal-type' framework of urban development strategies and plans and the location of spatial planning within all of this (see Figure 4.5).
A key point to be made is that the plethora of national and provincial government legislation, policies and strategies – some of which are discussed in this chapter – place obligations on municipal governments to formulate various municipal sectoral plans, e.g. transport, housing, water, health, in line with national prescripts. In addition, the developmental local government mandate requires municipalities to carry out a series of new functions that are inherently multi-sectoral, e.g. local agenda 21 plans, local economic development and poverty reduction strategies. Municipal sectoral and multi-sectoral plans are compelled to reflect national government programmes even if it may undermine local priorities because the legislation gives primacy to national government.

Both sectoral and multi-sectoral plans are disaggregated to reflect planning processes and outcomes at neighbourhood, ward and city-regional scales. This involves complex and multi-layered participatory processes, which are compulsory in terms of local government legislation. Spatial plans in turn are meant to translate sectoral and multi-sectoral plans into land-use frameworks. At the same time spatial legislative and policy frameworks (i.e. DFA principles until the planning White Paper comes into force) are meant to inform sectoral and multi-sectoral plans. This two-way relationship between spatial planning and
(multi-)sectoral planning is difficult to establish and sustain given the financial and delivery pressures that propel sectoral programmes. The IDP is meant to reflect all of these plans in a single strategic plan. In other words, the IDP represents an aggregation that is more than the sum of the parts. However, in terms of the Municipal Systems Act, the IDP processes are also meant to (politically) define strategic priorities for the municipal area and see how existing resources and inputs can be re-aligned to ensure that the priorities are addressed. Logically this may mean that sectoral (largely shaped by national and provincial requirements) and multi-sectoral plans could be redefined to ensure an alignment with the IDP priorities. Such redefinition will not be conflict-free because it inevitably means stepping on professional and organisational toes. In the current legal context, given political and institutional arrangements and the balance of power between spheres of government, this seems highly unlikely.

A particularly pernicious problem for the emergence of development planning processes that will lead to more integrative land-use patterns, is the different informing logics that underpin development planning and spatial planning. According to Coetzee (2002), one of the leading advisors of the South African government on IDPs, the distinctive strength of IDPs is that they are issue-driven. This means that once a municipality has decided, through a participatory political process, what the top priorities for (sustainable) development are, then sectoral expertise is brought to bear on the issue. In other words, the actions and budgets of municipalities are no longer driven by the internal imperatives of sectors (e.g. health, water, transport) but by the contribution a sector makes to the realisation of the priorities of the council. This may mean that a sector that is used to receiving the lion's share of a municipal budget may be radically slashed if its contribution is not deemed key in addressing a relevant priority. In an institutional context where municipal departments represent sectoral specialisations driven by internal preoccupations, this is a dramatic departure. In the case of planning, it means that spatial plans do not set the tone for where investments should go or not, or how municipal resources need to be deployed, or to give effect to a particular spatial vision that arises from a given spatial philosophy (e.g. Dewar's (1992; 1995) model). Instead, spatial development frameworks need to reflect the spatial dimensions of addressing (or not) the development priorities identified in the IDP. Of course, since spatial plans count as an
input amongst others into the IDP process it may prove influential, but this is by no means guaranteed. These tensions point to possible contradictions between the planning White Paper and the Municipal Systems Act and IDP regulations promulgated in 2001 (RSA 2001b).

4.6 CONCLUSION
The government itself and urban scholars are in agreement that the array of new urban development policies have not achieved their own objectives. More worryingly still, implementation of urban development programmes flowing from these policies has possibly worsened the apartheid geography of segregation, fragmentation and inequality. This raises difficult questions about why this is happening and what the implications are for the function of planning in urban development efforts aimed at greater urban integration. In Chapter Two, urban integration is defined as a significant reduction in racial and class segregation, more integrative land-use patterns to maximise the opportunities for particularly poor urban residents to access urban services and employment opportunities, and finally, a reduction in the levels of economic and social inequality across the urban region.

In this chapter I have described the various government policies that spawned the principles that favoured urban integration. The tone was set during deliberations at the NHF. The ideas that emerged there were clearly carried through into the White Paper on Housing (in 1994), the Development Facilitation Act (in 1995) and the Urban Development Strategy (1995). Significantly, these principles were shot through with references to development discourses such as sustainable development (as crystallised in Local Agenda 21), participatory development (IDP processes) and good governance. These discourses comfortably accommodated the political tensions of the time between the urge towards aggressive redistribution to address the economic, social and political needs of the previously excluded Black majority – the political constitution of the ANC – and adopting a more cautious approach whereby the property, economic assets and cultural autonomy of the White minority would not be targeted for redistribution or reforms to effect social justice. The pressures for caution stemmed from (local and international) private sector interests which were determined to stave off economic crises that could
ensue from negative market perceptions, especially at a time when South Africa wanted to re-enter the global economy after almost two decades of sanctions. In other words, development discourses could be deployed to embrace a more inclusive future horizon whilst not tackling the immediate causes that reproduced uneven development. This approach made it possible to placate the left who wanted explicit commitments to transformative change and the liberal right who wanted assurances that nothing would be done that may undermine economic stability and continuity in monetary policy. The RDP managed to embody the skilful negotiation of these tensions, which extended into the design of all urban development policies in the post-1994 era.
"My department and I are committed to ensuring that the Habitat Agenda and our own Urban Development Framework, which represents our vision for sustainable urban development, do not become ‘empty’ policy statements.”

Sankie Mthembi-Mahanyele, former Minister of Housing

5.1 INTRODUCTION
Regrettably, the Minister’s commitment, indicated in the quotation above, came to naught. The only explicit urban development policy of the South African government – the Urban Development Framework (UDF) – was still-born in August 1997. In this chapter I document how the UDF came into being, and immediately disappeared off the radar screen of all government departments, including its champion, the Department of Housing. It is a telling narrative of policy failure in its most extreme form. However, the purpose here is less to dwell on the fact of failure and more to explore the ideas that were encapsulated in the UDF and what these tell us about understandings of ‘urban integration’ and its realisation at the time in South Africa. Alongside other contiguous policy processes that impact on urban development – catalogued in Chapter Four – urban integration emerged as the central theme in the UDF. Guidelines for the realisation of urban integration stipulated in the UDF, echoed the accepted wisdom at the time about the efficacy of compaction and spatial planning. This is significant to hold in mind in the context of the thesis.

The chapter is largely based on open-ended interviews conducted with key government officials who steered the drafting of the UDF and its eventual adoption by Cabinet. These interviews are complemented by interviews conducted with other stakeholders who participated in the policy processes at the time, either as consultants, or academics, or as representatives of NGOs who monitored and made inputs into these processes. The

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34 Extracted from the Minister’s presentation of the Urban Development Framework to Cabinet on 25 August 1997 when it was adopted as official government policy.
Interviews are supplemented by an examination of governmental records of the deliberations that fed into the production of the UDF. These two primary sources are in turn cross-referenced with available published material reflecting on this period of urban policy formulation in democratic South Africa. The first section of the chapter is devoted to a brief account of how the UDF came to life. It is vital to appreciate the governmental, political and discursive contexts that surrounded the birth of the UDF in order to appreciate why the implementation of the policy was such a spectacular failure. The second section, which forms the bulk of the chapter, is a detailed textual reading of the UDF. This allows me to demonstrate how urban integration was defined, along with what the thinking in government was about how best to realise it in practice. In the final and concluding section, key findings are extrapolated and linked to the next chapter of the thesis – city-level efforts to achieve urban integration in Cape Town.

5.2 Bringing the UDF to Life

In Chapter Four it was shown how the UDF emerged under uncertain circumstances and how it floated adrift in the wake of the closure of the Ministry for the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) – its original sponsor. The UDF was a second incarnation of the Urban Development Strategy (UDS) that was released in 1995 with the status of being a government White Paper. Between the release of the UDS (November 1995) and the UDF (August 1997), significant shifts in government thinking on development policy occurred, with a direct bearing on the nature and slant of the UDF. Most significantly, the President closed the RDP Ministry in April 1996 and shortly thereafter announced for South Africa a new macro-economic policy – the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy – which some argue became the de facto national development strategy (Habib and Padayachee 2000). GEAR was a classical structural adjustment programme and represented the intentions of the state to integrate the South African economy into the global economy as rapidly as possible, complying as it did to the letter of numerous obligations that are attached to multilateral economic and trade institutional arrangements.35 Most importantly, in the domestic context it sent out the signal that in balancing the imperatives of economic growth, efficiency and productivity

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35 These processes have been carefully documented by various scholars, but the work of Habib and Padayachee (2000) and Marais (2001) are particularly incisive.
on the one hand, and greater social equality through redistribution on the other, the former took precedence. This increasingly neo-liberal orientation had significant impacts on the configuration of actors and interests in the maelstrom of urban development policy formulation at the time. The UDF was forged in this context. To fully appreciate how these factors played out, it is vital to understand the intra- and inter-departmental dynamics that took place in the drafting of UDF.

The forerunner to the UDF, the UDS, had been a very ambitious and assertive policy statement that reflected the clout at the time of the RDP Ministry, which held a senior position in the government hierarchy, located as it was in the Office of the President. The UDS was inter-sectoral in design and aimed to corral the activities of various line departments in line with its vision and agenda for dismantling the apartheid city and systematically replacing it with a post-apartheid vision: integrated cities and towns. The UDF, by contrast, was sponsored by the Department of Housing and not the Presidency and was decidedly meek, merely reflecting what various sectoral national departments were doing or planning already, without making any real demands on them. It is worthwhile exploring some of the developments around these shifts.

**Inter-departmental Dynamics**

During the time of the RDP Ministry, the official responsible for the UDS was Dr. Chippie Olver who was Chief Director, Development Planning Branch and worked with Minister Jay Naidoo, who in turn came from the trade union movement. Olver came from the NGO sector that was actively involved in policy formulation on behalf of the ANC and other liberation movements in the transition period (late 1980s – 1994). He was very well versed in the debates on social housing, local government, community development, and so on, that were playing out in the transitional period in structures like the National Housing Forum and the National Local Government Negotiation Forum. Consequently, Olver was in a strong position to see and argue for the inter-relatedness of various development policy streams. This made him well equipped for his role in driving the formulation of the UDS. In fact, he did involve a very large number of departments and
even outside stakeholders in deliberations on the UDS.\textsuperscript{36} The UDS was drafted simultaneously with the Rural Development Strategy, which also emanated from the RDP Office. Olver's rural counterpart, Dr Tanya Abrahamse, who headed up the Rural Development Strategy policy process, would later be in charge of driving the formulation of the UDF when she was a Chief Director in the Department of Housing. Various informants made it clear that these two had a strained relationship from their time in the RDP Office and it carried through to the period when the UDF was under construction.\textsuperscript{37}

The UDS was essentially drafted by two consultants on secondment from the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), Chris Heymans and Robin Bloch, working under the 'hands-on' supervision of Chippie Olver and reporting to the Urban Development Task Team (UDTT) and the Forum for Effective Planning. The UDTT was an inter-departmental committee made up of senior officials and the Forum for Effective Planning was an inter-governmental political body that sought to rationalise and coordinate planning across the different spheres of government and between national line departments (Harrison 2003). It was much larger, met less frequently and was not conducive to in-depth deliberations. The UDTT was more nimble and even reached out to local government in its deliberations, which was uncommon for such bodies.\textsuperscript{38}

The UDTT's work was heavily influenced by contiguous policy debates on municipal infrastructure. This focus took attention away from the imperatives of radical urban reform and towards more pragmatic questions about the installation of affordable infrastructure to ensure the provision of municipal services. In 1992 and 1993 the World Bank undertook a number of urban study missions in South Africa to review infrastructure levels and needs along with appropriate urban management and financing models to deal with those needs. According to former DBSA policy analyst, Chris Heymans (interviewed on 10 April 2002), one of the main findings that emerged from the

\textsuperscript{36} For example, the minutes and attendance lists of workshops held on the 19 October 1994 and 23 February 1995 on 'Urban Development Policy Issues' show participation by a large number of government departments, parastatals, municipalities, provincial government officials, non-governmental representations, trade union representatives, municipal representative organisations, amongst others. File reference no: M3/1/1.

\textsuperscript{37} This point surfaced in three interviews but all respondents insisted they could not be quoted on this. The relevance of this conflict will become clearer below.

\textsuperscript{38} For example, see: Minutes of meeting between UDTT and City Managers, 23 February 1995.
World Bank study was that the considerable investments made in the dormitory townships for Africans had to be regarded as an asset that could be capitalised on. This was potentially controversial at the time since progressive opinion was united in the view that South African cities and towns had to be integrated through infill, mixed-income and mixed-use development and the gradual depopulation of the townships, which were in any case badly over-crowded. Consequently, if existing township areas were to be upgraded, it had to be in order to "humanise" them through "more mixed use and activity centred elements."\(^{39}\) Significantly, the policy work on municipal infrastructure was carried out in the RDP Ministry by a sub-committee that also reported to the UDTT. This committee was advised by the World Bank and followed the Bank's thinking on municipal infrastructure finance models (R. Tomlinson, interviewed on 15 April 2002).

These factors are of relevance because Chippie Olver became highly focussed on the importance of 'rationalising' municipal government to ensure that the governmental capacity existed to implement more effective urban and rural development policies, aimed in part at addressing the crippling service backlogs. Rationalising municipal government meant, first and foremost, establishing democratic non-racial municipalities.\(^{40}\) Secondly, it meant ensuring that these municipalities were financially viable through reform of taxation instruments and the establishment of an appropriate inter-governmental financial system for addressing the vast infrastructure backlogs. This entailed in part, the eventual establishment of a municipal bond market to generate sufficient capital domestically and abroad to finance the huge infrastructure projects that would be required. These policy orientations were strongly endorsed and supported by the DBSA and the Department of Finance. From this vantage point the emphasis of the World Bank on upgrading and building onto the existing African townships on the periphery of urban areas made sense. It was the most cost-effective and efficient thing to do. This policy position meant that the ideal of urban integration, involving residential mixing, started to recede into the background. It was increasingly seen as 'nice-to-have' but not a fundamental prerequisite.


\(^{40}\) The basis of this was established with the first Local Government Transition Act of 1993.
The municipal finance preoccupation also led to another *de facto* policy position, namely, not to intervene in urban land markets that may undermine property values. Since much of local government's revenue depended on property taxes (the rates account) and a special business levy, it was seen as vital not to undermine property markets or alienate business interests. According to Chris Heymans (interview), one of the lead drafters of the UDS, these factors weighed heavily in the deliberations of the UDTT. This was confirmed by Richard Tomlinson (interview), who also participated in UDTT deliberations and worked on drafting policies for the RDP Office, related to municipal infrastructure finance. Tomlinson recalls that Chippie Olver and Roland White (from the Department of Finance) were obsessed with municipal financial viability and economic growth. Other factors such as creating conditions for urban integration, took a secondary position to this (Ibid.). These orientations were strengthened by the active efforts to involve private sector think tanks and spokespersons to address the UDTT on the role of cities in economic development. For example, at a workshop on urban development policy issues held in October 1994, Ms. Ann Bernstein from the Urban Foundation and Mr. J. Bihl from Anglo American Properties were invited to address the question of the urban economy and job creation. The minutes reveal that the only perspectives entertained on these pivotal issues came from these constituencies. There was no discussion on the informal economy nor on the problem of worsening inequalities that tend to characterise conventional local economic development strategies aimed at achieving urban competitiveness (Rogerson 1999).

In the wake of these dynamics, the UDS tried to balance new imperatives for municipal financial viability along with creating favourable economic climates for established business to remain profitable and potentially expand their enterprises and markets. Urban development policy had to be responsive to these issues. Significantly, the rhetoric of compact cities was not dropped but as Chris Heymans explained, they were no longer "going to compact the city at any cost" (interview). The principle was maintained but it

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41 The business levy is called the Regional Services Council (RSC) Levy, which is comprised of an Establishment Levy (on turnover) and the Service Levy (on number of employees) (Cameron 1999: 238).

42 Source: Draft minutes of Workshop on the urban development policy issues for South Africa held on 19 October 1994. File reference no: M3/1/1. The Urban Foundation was a business-sponsored think-tank that advanced development agendas that protected the interests of established businesses and middle-class suburbs but actively engaged with the arguments of left-leaning civil society organisations.
was now subject to a viability consideration given the more important concerns of achieving stable municipal systems and stable environments for economic growth, which were seen as mainly generated in urban areas. A year later, when the integrated development planning (IDP) policy agenda for municipal government began to take shape, the same considerations would dominate it as well, a fact that is unsurprising given that the primary drivers of local government policy in 1996 were Chippie Olver and officials in the Department of Finance.

It was against this policy and institutional canvass that the UDS was Gazetted on the 12 October 1995 (RSA 1995b). It was intended to be a policy statement that would be debated widely and then finalised as an “Urban Strategy” sometime after its promulgation. However, when the RDP Ministry was abruptly closed in April 1996 it took some time for the various programmes (and staff) to be transferred to different line departments. The responsibility for taking the UDS forward, ostensibly on the basis of comments that had been received in response to it, fell onto the Department of Housing. This was to be expected since the Department was meant to be the co-sponsor of the UDS along with the RDP Ministry. However, a good few months lapsed between the closure of the RDP Ministry and the allocation of the responsibility to the Department of Housing. In this break the urban agenda cooled off considerably.

Drafting and Launching the UDF

The Department of Housing contracted a team of international consultants to redraft the UDS. The team embarked upon an ambitious series of consultations across the country over a three-week period to get inputs from a range of stakeholders about what should be addressed by an urban development strategy. The UDS was meant to serve as a starting point for their deliberations but they did not pay explicit attention to it. They submitted their initial report at the end of July 1996. A short while thereafter Patricia McCarney and Mohamed Halfani returned to South Africa for an intensive period of writing. After

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43 The consultants – Mohammed Halfani, «GreetingLine», Enid Slack and Richard Stren – were attached to the Centre for Urban and Community Research at the University of Toronto. Their participation was funded by the Canadian International Development Agency. Chippie Olver originally engaged the team when he was still in the RDP Office. Since the negotiations were concluded before the closure of the RDP Ministry, the consultants were used by the Department of Housing (D. van Broemsen, interviewed on 14 March 2002).
their visit a year lapsed before the publication of the final UDF. One of the consultants stressed that during this period, “[w]e definitely were not kept ‘in the loop’ while [...] revisions were undertaken…” (R. Stren, personal correspondence on 31 October 2003).

In late 1996, a new and relatively junior policy officer in the Department of Housing, Susan Carey, was assigned the responsibility to rework the weighty draft of the foreign consultants’ report into the UDF. The Chief Director in the Department of Housing responsible for the process was Tanya Abrahamse, formerly a colleague of Chippie Olver in the RDP Ministry, where she had been responsible for the rural development strategy. The Director was Diet van Broemson and his Deputy was Sharon Lewis. Susan Carey reported to van Broemsen but would often communicate directly with her Chief Director since the policy team was relatively small. My interview with Susan Carey (24 April 2002) revealed that she was ill-equipped for the task being straight out of a town planning degree and with no prior policy drafting experience. As she acknowledged:

I was young and naïve; it was my first real job; it was just... get on and do it, kind of thing... but also, I mean, there was very limited capacity in those days and you would be a little town planner who knows little... I mean, writing a document like that; there is no way I should have been given a responsibility like that (S. Carey, interview).

Nevertheless, she worked single-handedly to reformulate the report produced by the consultants. In the interview she acknowledged that the conceptual weaknesses in the document were attributable to her lack of experience at the time. Her brief was to summarise the document, make it reader-friendly, possible to implement and consistent with the Habitat Agenda. The latter consideration is significant for at the Habitat II conference in Istanbul in June 1996, South Africa was thrust into limelight by advocating strongly for the recognition of access to shelter as a right. This position was opposed by the United States and others but it nevertheless won the day, albeit in a watered down form, whereby individual governments were not obliged to satisfy this right. This

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44 Carey’s lack of experience was compounded by the fact that the quality of engagement with the draft UDF from other departments, municipalities and NGOs was not very challenging. Furthermore, she recalls, “people were apathetic” (Carey, interview).

45 The Habitat Agenda resulted from the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements II held in Istanbul, Turkey, on 3-14 June 1996.
experience raised the importance of international thinking and policy discourses on urban
development inside South Africa. The significance of this will become clearer in the next
section, which offers an in-depth reading of the contents of the UDF.

Another factor is worth highlighting here. It was not merely the Chief Director (Tanya
Abrahamse) and Susan Carey who were new in their respective jobs but also the Minister
of Housing who replaced the first Minister of Housing, Joe Slovo, who passed away in
1995. Minister Mthembu-Mahanyele was fixated on addressing the serious lag in delivery
in the housing programme because it was considered a more urgent political priority in
contrast to refining a more general urban development strategy that could transform
South African cities and towns.46 Minister Mthembu-Mahanyele was also completely new
to the field and it would take her some time to get on top of the portfolio. These
contingent factors made it possible for a relatively junior official to be left with the task of
writing the UDF, largely without explicit and clear political and policy direction. These
factors made the UDF vulnerable to devastating critique as will be demonstrated below.

In this period (mid-1996 to mid-1997) the Department of Housing also lost much of its
clout and stature relative to other departments. It is vital to appreciate the importance of
this because for an urban development strategy to be effective, it needs a driver with
sufficient political weight to be able to lean on the various line departments who impinge
directly or indirectly on broader urban development processes. One crucial policy tussle
between the Department of Constitutional Development and Provincial Affairs (DCD)
and the Department of Housing occurred around different categories of infrastructure
grants to municipalities. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to go into the full details
around the dispute, but suffice to point out that the DCD managed to strip the
Department of Housing of the function and simply took it over. This particular turf
scuffle demonstrated very clearly the weak position of the Department of Housing in the
larger governmental hierarchy (C. Heymans, interview).47 There can be little doubt that

46 The other linked priority that the Minister had to engage with was convincing the financial (mortgage)
sector to get into the lower end of the housing market by holding them accountable to The Record of
Understanding of 1994 that they signed with her predecessor; an engagement that delivered almost nothing
in terms of mortgage finance to this section of the population even five years later (Khan 2003).
47 Significantly, this move was engineered by Chippie Olver who became a Deputy Director-General in the
DCD after the closure of the RDP Office.
the absence of powerful political champions did not help matters. Neither did the pivotal role of international consultants because it is often easy to dismiss such inputs because it is not seen as indigenous knowledge or relevant to interests.

Inevitably the UDF was a lot less bold and assertive a policy framework than the UDS and it adopted a more cautious tone in expressing how sectoral departments needed to work together towards a shared vision of urban development. In other words, in the interest of political viability in a context of competing interests, the tone of the UDF was suggestive and voluntary, running the risk of course, that no one would take any notice of it at all. This indeed is just what happened. The UDF was officially adopted by Cabinet in August 1997 and disappeared off the radar screen of departments almost immediately thereafter. For example, in an interview with the City Manager of Cape Town Municipality (1996-2000), he had no recollection of the UDF or that it was ever discussed in his municipality (A. Boraine, interviewed on 13 June 2002). Significantly, before Boraine was City Manager in Cape Town, he was the Deputy Director General in the DCD. Respondents from the Department of Land Affairs (responsible for land-use planning) and the Department of Finance acknowledged awareness but could not recall that the UDF was ever used in their deliberations on urban development issues (S. Berrisford, interviewed on 28 March 2002; T. Manual, interviewed on 16 April 2002). Interviews with (former) policy activists who worked for urban development NGOs at the time reflect a similar lack of awareness of the contents of the UDF and its relevance (K. Chetty, interviewed on 3 August 2002; D. Savage, interviewed on 18 April 2002).

This may in part be explained by the fact that once the UDF was unveiled, virtually nothing was done to ensure its implementation. An implementation strategy was drawn up but not implemented. Indeed, what was happening was that the various programmes catalogued in the UDF were already being implemented by various line departments but, of course, without any coordination in terms of ensuring that it transformed urban spaces in South Africa. In my interview with two of the policy officers responsible, they suggested that the reasons for the inability to implement the implementation strategy

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were the lack of capacity, resources and time (D. van Broemsen and S. Lewis, interviewed on 14 March 2002). By the end of 1997, the Department of Housing was finally getting the delivery of housing on stream and this overtook all other priorities because of its political importance for the ANC government. The housing programme was the measure by which the Department would ultimately be judged, something confirmed by the literature cataloguing the evolution of the housing programme during this period (Khan and Thring 2003; Huchzermeyer 2001). Consequently, in strict policy implementation terms, the UDF was clearly still-born and essentially a massive failure. It proved irrelevant in shaping political priorities and institutional norms inside government on urban development policy aimed at integrating cities and towns. Thus, the need to crystallise an explicit urban development agenda that could demonstrate how sectoral investment could be more than the sum of the parts and advance transformation, was lost.

Nonetheless, the UDF is instructive in terms of its content; i.e., how urban integration was defined and envisaged at that historical moment, characterised by a veritable maelstrom of competing and overlapping policy formulation processes driven by the political imperatives of rapid delivery, fiscal constraint and achieving social equity – outlined in Chapter Four. For this reason, the next section shifts register and provides an in-depth textual reading of the UDF to delineate the multiple meanings of urban integration contained within it, on the grounds that such an exercise unveils the various dimensions of the hegemonic ‘urban integration’ discourse and its contextual informants that prevailed at the time.

5.3 DETAILED TEXTUAL READING OF THE UDF

Urban integration is burdened with multiple meanings and connotations and is therefore profoundly contested. Through a fine-grained textual reading, this section explores the different connotations of urban integration in the UDF. The first part of the section summarises the central features of the UDF. The second part presents four notions of urban integration developed in the UDF as follows: (i) as a high-level policy rationale and outcome; (ii) as a object of spatial planning; (iii) as the glue for social investments; and (iv) as an institutional rationale.
Central Features of the Urban Development Framework

The UDF echoed the trend of most mainstream development policies by establishing an ideal future – Vision 2020 – that it sought to realize within the medium-to-long term (20 years). The vision was a predictably ‘feel-good’ mixture of no less than eight ambitious outcomes that would be a material reality by 2020. Outcomes ranged from changing behavioural attitudes and developing spatial systems that did not discriminate on the basis of race or gender, to promoting a participatory democratic local government system that was both financially sound and committed to community empowerment through partnerships. Simultaneously, cities and towns would become environmentally sustainable and fully integrated in terms of the appropriate balance achieved between the built environment and open space on the one hand, and land-use on the other—manifested in integrated industrial, commercial, residential, information and educational centres (Department of Housing 1997). In short, it was a recipe for an urban utopia with which no one could possibly disagree but that few could implement either. The vision relied on the confidence of deliberative planning through consensual, partnership-based institutional systems consistent with decentralisation governance theories (Manor 1999). These were thin on the ground or nascent in form in South Africa at that time.

The policy framework proceeded to make a gesture towards realism by specifying concrete ‘development goals’ to guide the pursuit of ‘Vision 2020’. These goals were defined as the means to realise the vision and were to: (i) create more efficient and productive cities and towns through the growth and development of local economies; (ii) reduce disparities by providing infrastructure and facilities to disadvantaged communities; (iii) provide access to better housing and shelter and greater security of tenure for urban residents; (iv) tackle spatial inefficiencies which give rise to long travelling distances and times which negatively impact on the accessibility of work and other opportunities by promoting urban densification in conjunction with more efficient public transportation; (v) improve the overall quality of the urban environment by better integrating environmental concerns in development planning and urban management; and (vi) transform municipalities into effective and accountable institutions through capacity building programmes which also promote the active interaction of civil society with municipalities (Department of Housing 1997: 9). The message was clear: prioritise
economic growth whilst simultaneously gearing up municipal government to tackle the massive backlogs that characterised urban conditions for (poor) Black citizens. There was also a strong recognition that creating the conditions for greater economic efficiency coincided with political objectives to break down apartheid walls of residential segregation, captured by the aspiration for greater urban densification. The linchpin that held all of these policy pieces together and transported the ideals from objectives to policy directives that could lead to implementation, was *integrated planning*.

Surprisingly, integrated planning was never clearly defined in the UDF. This points to a deeper absence of conceptual clarity that befuddled the policy coherence of the Framework, especially with regard to reconciling a series of contradictory policy aims. Integrated planning and urban integration (as the converse of apartheid segregation) was used in a self-evident manner throughout the policy framework and this clearly contributed to the sense of under-achievement expressed by the Department of Housing in the following quote:

> ...it is clear that many lessons have been learnt and that the next cycle of government interventions have already been set in motion and that they are responsive to evidence of the impact of the first policies. However, many of the challenges faced by the government in 1994 remain despite good intentions and sophisticated interventions. It has also become increasingly clear that the spatial patterns and physical forms of many human settlement types change only very slowly (Department of Housing, 2000: 4, emphasis added).

As mentioned earlier, four different connotations of integration can be discerned in the UDF: (i) integration as an ideal development policy outcome, linking economic, political, social and environmental objectives; (ii) integration as a spatial strategy; (iii) integration as theme to link sectoral interventions in the city; and (iv) integration of the institutional architecture within municipal government and the broader governance system in the city. The following analysis makes it clear that the concept of ‘integrated urban development’ is profoundly elastic, especially when equated with ‘sustainable urban development’, and unless grounded more rigorously, it is unlikely to produce consistent policy implementation and outcomes.
Four Connotations of Integration Implicit in the UDF

Integration as Policy Rationale and Outcome

Government accepts that cities and towns are shaped by a variety of socio-economic forces and that Government, at all levels, can through its policies and programmes only guide the transformation process which must be supported by all the stakeholders. The Urban Development Framework therefore, contains Government's vision for sustainable urban settlements, as well as guidelines and programmes for the achievement of the vision (Foreword in: Department of Housing, 1997, emphasis added).

The UDF was steeped in mainstream policy discourses about the virtues of 'sustainable development' as defined and promoted by almost all development actors across the ideological spectrum (see Barraclough 2001). This is clear in the vision statement and the six general urban development goals set out in the UDF. The vision statement, in particular, combined the Brundtland Commission's definition that turns on inter-generational equity, with World Bank concerns regarding financial sustainability, alongside more South African specific concerns, such as overcoming spatial and socio-economic divisions (Department of Housing 1997: 8-9). In the goal statement, the UDF made it clear that sustainable urban development could be attained through "better integrating environmental concerns with development planning and urban management" (Ibid., p.9). The problem with the approach in the UDF with regard to its pursuit of 'sustainable urban development' is that there was no attempt to define or explore the contradictions involved in giving expression to this stretched notion. By failing to signal such contradictions and the contested nature of the policy ideal (sustainable urban development), the UDF steered around the inevitable political conflicts underpinning urban development processes that are transformative and redistributive, challenging power and promoting the subaltern classes (Atkinson 2000).

In the development studies literature, there has been an interesting and highly relevant refinement of arguments in the wake of mainstreaming concerns about poverty, the environment and gender equality in the thinking of the World Bank and other multilateral agencies (see Preston 1996). In this context, Barraclough (2001) provides a sobering analysis of how these concerns are merely adapted to serve dominant interests
and political expediency, without conceding ground to the more radical implications of the sustainable development argument more specifically:

Many who use the term [sustainable development], however, fail to recognize that reversing environmental degradation requires a reduction in social inequities. There seems to be wide rhetorical agreement among agencies that improved equity is not possible between generations, or even between different social groups within the present one, if essential life support systems provided by the natural environment are not protected. There is no consensus, however, about what this implies for different 'stakeholders'—about what reforms are needed and who is capable and willing to bring them into effect or about how costs and benefits should be shared or even about what they would be. Participation is often interpreted to mean acquiescence and voluntary contributions of labour and resources by low-income 'beneficiaries' who have no real influence on a project's goals and design or in establishing the rules within which it must operate (Barraclough 2001: 9-10).

In other words, over the last two decades there has been a tendency among agencies representing the interests of the North and elites in the South to incorporate social and environmental concerns into their conceptual frameworks, without shifting their fundamental neo-liberal premises about the primacy of economic growth and efficiency as the prerequisite for social development and environmental actions. In the urban development literature, this tendency manifests itself in equally problematic policy aspirations and discourses. Adrian Atkinson (2000) recently undertook a useful survey of various discourses about urban sustainability. His main findings confirm the general criticism of Barraclough that the structural context—rapid urbanisation and the dominance of neo-liberal economic and social policies in the case of third world urban areas—is not adequately addressed in the policy frameworks of multilateral agencies and governments that promote urban sustainability. Atkinson (2000) further illustrates that accelerated policy processes of devolution and democratisation in third world cities are not calibrated to address the imperatives of urban sustainability. Other studies have come to the same conclusion (e.g., Ravetz 2000; Satterthwaite 1999; Werna 2001).

In line with this international critique, the UDF is also marked by conceptual superficiality and an avoidance of tackling in progressive ways issues such as urban sustainability. In fact, the blatant disregard of the contradictions between the ideological
thrust of the RDP and GEAR in the introductory section of the UDF alerts the reader to
the ensuing consensual tone that infuses the document. Put differently, it is clear that the
UDF offers a voluntaristic and depoliticised approach to urban development and these
flaws are at the heart of the poor track record of implementation characterising the policy
five years after its lacklustre launch.

The UDF reflected the prevailing urban development discourse of the 1990s and was
essentially consistent with various international agreements and frameworks, such as the
Brundtland Commission Report (1987), Local Agenda 21 (1992) and the Habitat Agenda
(1996), in promoting "a voluntaristic approach to achieving sustainable development
where each stakeholder group should find its own path and make a contribution in its
own way" (Atkinson 2000: 3). As a result, the following logic can be discerned at various
points in the UDF. Politics was cast as an exercise of achieving consensus on shared
principles, such as environmental sustainability, economic growth and poverty reduction.
Once consensus is achieved, it is possible to harness the distinctive resources and so-
called 'value-added' to make development initiatives a success. Eschewing the possibility
of contestation or conflict, the UDF asserted that groups with divergent interests could be
convinced to voluntarily alter their behaviour and act in a more sustainable manner by
participating in partnership-based governance structures that operate on shared principles
and values. As both Barraclough (2001) and Atkinson (2000) have demonstrated, neo-
liberal appropriations of development concepts, such as sustainable development or even
integrated development, tend to assume that people and groups will voluntarily change
behaviour once they accept values and principles such as sustainability, democracy,
tolerance, and so on. Rational choice theorists would simply argue for stimulating
voluntarism through 'appropriate' incentives and institutional arrangements (Hay 2002).
In the case of the UDF, the invocation of sustainable urban development appears as little
more than a recitation of international principles rather than as a strategy or framework
for implementation by any route or means.

Another particularly problematic conceptual assumption in the UDF, related to the
understanding of communities and local democratic politics. Specifically, the UDF
displayed a romanticised perspective on 'communities', an uncritical celebration of
partnerships and an over-optimistic approach as to what integrated planning could achieve. It consequently asserted that "[p]rogrammes must be designed to ensure that development is planned and implemented in a participatory, integrated and environmentally sustainable manner so as to bring about better living and working environments for all" (Department of Housing 1997: 11). This would be a bold policy move if it was not so derivative of toothless international policy 'talking shops' and was backed up with some serious exploration of the factors that would advance or, alternatively, undermine the realisation of such an approach to participatory governance. Furthermore, in a context of severe unequal access to urban resources, as demonstrated in Chapter Four, it is unlikely that everyone could benefit from the ideals the UDF advanced. In fact, it has been argued that a necessary and politically essential feature of 'integrated and environmentally sustainable' development must be a reduction of multiple inequalities - effectively reducing the 'quality of life' and 'convenience' of the wealthy and over-consumers (Sachs 2000). It is unlikely that such a situation would arise in the absence of fierce political contestation. Thus, it becomes a policy imperative to put forward an argument that accommodates democratic political contestation to identify the contradictions and conflicts that might arise when existing power relations are scrutinised and shifted in favour of subaltern classes and identities (Barnard and Armstrong 1998). In the absence of such political realism and grounding in the UDF, the following aspiration stands out as glaringly naive and, essentially, wishful thinking:

There is also a real sense in our cities and towns that everyone's lives are interconnected. [...] Different stakeholders also found more common ground in the forums that have become such an important part of the decision-making process over the last few years. Most key stakeholders now understand that townships cannot be insulated from higher-income suburbs, as in the past. There is also recognition that the various urban and rural interest groups can and must work together to remake the cities and towns (Department of Housing 1997: 6-7, emphasis added).

To be fair, it is important to highlight that there was one instance in the policy where a more sober understanding of urban politics came to the fore:

As governance structures, involving both formal institutions of municipalities and role players in civil society, become a more prominent feature of the urban landscape, the strength and resilience of the associational fabric will play a key role
in the formulation of urban policy and ultimately, delivery. As full consensuses are rarely attainable, elected representatives must therefore accept the responsibility of making decisions in terms of determining policies and priorities after consultation (Department of Housing 1997: 6).

In this formulation, there seems to be a clear recognition that consensus would be elusive and that provisional agreements would be required to move forward with policy formulation and implementation. However, the argument seems to have stopped at simply invoking the importance of keeping community-based organisation (CBO) representatives accountable to agreements made in negotiations. No consideration was given of other strategies that could be pursued to ensure that CBOs and communities were sufficiently engaged to buy into provisional agreements and consensus. Here, and in other sections where community development forums were posited as the most useful participatory planning vehicles, what emerges is an uncomplicated view—free of power relations—of everyday life and collective practices in these areas (Ibid., p.36). Given the available data and knowledge about the deep lines of stratification and inequality within poor areas themselves, let alone within socially differentiated cities and towns, it was untenable to propose a traditional model of collective community participation (see Cherry et al. 2000; Crankshaw et al. 2000; Everatt 1999; Spiegel et al. 1996). Such an approach failed to deal with the imperative of defining and promoting special measures to surface and transcend the problems of local elites and gate-keeping that characterise development interventions.

In summary, the first and highest level of integration that was envisaged in the UDF was the pursuit of sustainable urban development, which was understood to denote the integration of economic, social, environmental and political empowerment imperatives. However, the UDF followed the pattern of numerous international treaties and policies that tend to invoke the apparent virtue of doing this, without grounding it in a deep analysis about the structural factors that inhibit the emergence of sustainable policies and practices. Due to this conceptual failure, the policy became unrealistic and naïve in its postulates about how political and planning processes would be used to advance the formulation of policies that could contribute to substantive integration. Conceptually, this was achieved by drawing on a consensual model of political interaction between different classes and interest groups that could easily lead to consensual outcomes. This was
possible because the UDF operated on the assumption that behavioural and attitudinal change in favour of practices that were more sustainable would be entered into voluntarily; that is, without interventionist measures to ensure, for example, “reforms of international trade and finance, property rights, rich country production-consumption patterns, the reduction of glaring inequalities of all kinds in access to natural resources, wealth and knowledge as well as respect for universal human rights” (Barraclough 2001: 35, fn 35). These are some of the fundamental structural prerequisites to establish more sustainable economic, social and environmental practices.

Integration as an Object of Spatial Planning

Undoing the Apartheid City will focus on: linking the component parts of the city through high-density activity corridors; township upgrading; urban infill; development and integration of apartheid developed 'buffer zones'; inner city redevelopment; development and provision of adequate open spaces for recreational purposes; and land reform programmes (restitution, redistribution and tenure reform). This transformation includes augmenting and diversifying urban functions, upgrading existing urban settlements and constructing new housing, restoring and extending infrastructure services, promoting investment and economic activities, alleviating environmental health hazards and including women in decision-making processes (Department of Housing 1997:13).

One could argue that referring to the policy ideal of realising 'sustainable urban development' was an understandable obfuscation in the UDF, because the real thrust of the policy was to promote integrated planning, which refers to spatial planning interventions that create a regulatory framework to transcend the evils of apartheid-style segregationist planning. The problem with this line of argument is that the UDF was not much clearer on what integrated planning meant and how specifically it would lead to desegregated cities and towns, given the political and economic sensitivities that are to be respected in pursuing integrated planning in a broader context of a negotiated political settlement. In one instance, the UDF suggested that integrated planning was the combination of economic, social and environmental planning (p.11). In other instances, as the quote above illustrates, integrated planning seemed to refer to thinking in spatial planning to 'compact' cities through a variety of measures organised around stimulating spatial corridors and nodes (a body of planning thought discussed in Chapters Two, Three and Four). In yet another instance, the UDF suggested that the planning ideas that flowed
from the Local Agenda 21 framework advanced at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1992, should be adopted (p. 17). This plurality of terminological usage lead to confusion and certainly undermined the prospects of concerted action flowing from the policy. In light of the planning thread established in previous chapters, I focus in particular on this aspect of the UDF and overlook the lack of specification around what economic, social and environmental planning may have been thought to mean in the document. Some of the lack of detail is undoubtedly related to the broader conceptual muddle uncovered above.

Most urban commentators suggest that the problems of segregation, lack of access to opportunities for the urban poor, urban sprawl and fragmented development programmes continued unabated despite the UDF, the Development Facilitation Act and other policies aimed at transcending the apartheid city (Dewar 1998; Huchzermeyer 2001; Todes 2000). In exploring the ideas put forward in the UDF around spatial integration, I turn to three recent case studies in the literature on Cape Town (Dewar 2000), Pretoria (Schoonraad 2000) and Durban (Todes et al. 2000) and extrapolate the factors that undermined the potency of spatial planning to foster urban integration and compaction. The purpose of this brief detour via specific examples is yet again to highlight the conceptual under-specification evident in the UDF.

The most frequently cited reason in various analyses on the perpetuation of segregation and fragmentation is the inability of planning frameworks and strategies to shift or even bend land markets that reinforce patterns of segregation and sprawl. Land markets are further reinforced by the patterns of urbanisation at work at both ends of the income spectrum. As Schoonraad points out, "[t]he sprawl of low income neighbourhoods are matched by the spatial decentralisation of high-income groups" (2000: 221). This is further compounded by a lack of political will to address "land cost and availability, competing claims to land, and resistance by adjacent communities" (Todes 2000: 619). At a social and cultural level, patterns of urbanisation are reinforced by the ever-rising imperatives of safety and security that drive the development of security complexes for middle- and upper-income residential areas. In lower income communities, attitudes towards space and living in freestanding dwellings on individual stands remain
predominant (Dewar 2000; Schoonraad 2000). These trends are observed across various urban areas in South Africa.

In cities and towns with progressive municipal councils that are committed to urban integration, the pressure has been to redirect services to un-serviced and under-serviced areas on the periphery of the city, effectively entrenching the apartheid urban form. However, the institutional challenges associated with the establishment of new non-racial local government administrations in a context of fiscal restraint and massive service backlogs meant that political attention was squarely fixed on getting more and better basic services to communities on the periphery (Williams 2000). The added dilemma was that many of the policy frameworks that inform the delivery of basic services do not necessarily advance integration or compaction. The biggest culprit in this regard has been housing policy itself, especially the financial value of the subsidy and the prescriptions about the size of the top structure and the land. This confluence of factors effectively produced an outcome whereby available land was only found at the edges of the city and medium-density options were prohibitively expensive, even if cultural resonance with potential beneficiaries existed (Mabin 2000; Schoonraad 2000; Todes et al. 2000).

These densely inter-related (economic, political, socio-cultural) factors that undermine the policy ideal of fostering urban integration and compaction through spatial planning tools, as reflected in the quote above, have lead to a series of new questions about the 'realism' and 'feasibility' of holding on to this ideal. Alison Todes and her colleagues paint a fascinating picture of the Spatial Development Plan (SDP) in Durban and how it has sought to manage the tensions between infill-compacting initiatives and redirecting expenditure and investment to the periphery where the need is greatest (Todes et al. 2000). By holding on to the basic spatial notion of corridors and nodes, the SDP provided a framework for more bottom-up planning that could be need-responsive. It sought to locate this within a larger spatial framework to allow various interest groups to see and explore the wider spatial-developmental impacts of their local plans. Through this dialogical process, agreements could be arrived at using the parameters of the corridors and nodes as a guideline. It is too soon to say whether this will indeed begin to reverse
apartheid-style segregation and fragmentation. However, it does provide a glimpse into what a more socially situated approach towards integration might look like.

Maria Schoonraad (2000) in her empirically-based argument about the attitudes and preferences of residents in Mamelodi, on the periphery of Pretoria, using quantitative and qualitative data sources, provides another more grounded consideration of the implementation challenges of integration. She essentially argued that the livelihood imperatives of the urban poor on the periphery made the periphery not such a bad place to be. This was especially the case if you have access to a reasonably sized plot of land that lends itself to additional revenue opportunities through renting space for backyard shacks and informal businesses. In cost-benefit terms, these locations are more favourable as long as formal jobs and affordable transportation remain out of reach. This does not negate the imperative of promoting higher densities, with mixed-uses at central locales. However, it does bring to the fore the importance of making sure that policy measures that seek to advance integration are based on a sound empirical understanding of the livelihood strategies of those who need to be given equitable access to urban opportunities.

This brief detour of some of the issues involved in using spatial planning as the lead instrument in fostering urban integration underscores the inadequacy of the discussion in the UDF. Nor is it simply a question of hindsight. Most of the issues mentioned here surfaced during planning debates that fed into the National Housing Forum deliberations (A. Mabin, interviewed on 26 April 2002). Similarly, one can argue that the responses that were elicited by the UDF precursor, the Urban Development Strategy, also raised most of these issues albeit from very particular ideological standpoints (see CDE 1996; cf. Bond et al. 1996). Evidently, none of the insights gained from these sources were explored in the UDF. As a minimum, one would expect that the UDF would have provided clearer frameworks to explore which factors might advance or undermine urban integration through spatial planning, embedded in a broader regulatory framework to ensure democratic control of city development.

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What remains unclear in Schoonraad's analysis is whether her findings also pertain to the backyard squatters who are arguably more vulnerable and excluded than their landlords.
A key challenge for spatial planning in the South African context, as elsewhere, is to operate on the basis of sound data about the actual livelihood strategies of the poor, middle classes and the elites, and their spatial dimensions. Establishing such data and analysis can lead to more creative approaches to strategically intervene in land markets in ways that will continue to ensure the overall (economic) viability of the urban area whilst also breaking through the obstacles of land prices as the primary determinant about where the poor are to be settled and housed. In view of this approach, the task of a policy framework such as the UDF is arguably to recognise and tackle head on, the fundamental contradiction between the pursuit of urban integration and a reluctance to intervene in land markets. The UDF could then spell out a suitable process to get opposing interest groups to enter into a democratic dialogue, to find socially situated compromises that go some way to resolve these kinds of contradictions. It is only on the basis of such an explicit treatment of contradictions that specific policy instruments, such as those described by Todes, et al (2000), might be operationalised. Over time, broader policy prescriptions and processes might be renegotiated, depending on the political balance of forces (see Barnard and Armstrong 1998; Edmunds and Wollenberg 2001; Roe 1998). Any dialogue should be informed by a series of agreed principles and values that are consistent with the Constitution and relevant legislation. However, by relying on politically correct rhetoric, which is effectively unviable in political and economic terms, the status quo can be expected to remain firmly in place. According to various informed respondents, this is largely what has happened since the release of the UDF (A. Mabin, interviewed on 26 April 2002; S. Berrisford, interviewed on 28 March 2002; M. Narsoo, interviewed on 4 March 2002).

Integration as the Glue for Sectoral Investments

Worldwide experience has shown that well-directed human settlement policies cannot be based solely on economic and physical development plans. Unless there is investment in the public environment (schools, clinics, parks, police stations etc.) which contribute to positive perceptions of a neighbourhood, individuals are unlikely to invest in their own environments (Department of Housing 1997: 31).

This point came through very strongly in my interview with «GreetingLine» who was the Chief Director for Spatial Planning in the Department of Land Affairs (1995-1999). He has an intimate understanding of the relationship between land markets and effective restitution in terms of the prevailing legal frameworks in both urban and rural areas.
Chapter 5: Advancing Urban Integration through the UDF

The third manner in which integration is approached and referred to in the UDF is as the coordination and integration of sectoral investments in cities to ensure that, amongst other things, economic and spatial planning come together and reinforce social development. In one sense, this is a crucial assertion given the entrenched legacy of sectoral (and disciplinary) specialisation in the history of urban development policies in South Africa (Mabin and Smit 1997). Scholars analysing government policies endorse the importance of foregrounding the need to link, coordinate and integrate numerous sectoral policies and investments to advance the development of more equitable and liveable urban settlements (Harrison et al. 2003; Williams 2000). However, it is important to reflect on the conceptual limitations of the presentation of the issue in the UDF. The problems are twofold and inter-related.

First, the UDF tended to present the plethora of sectoral policies that impact on urban settlements as a shopping list, without any critical reflection on the nature of these policies and their potential (in)compatibility. For example, in section 3.2.4.2 (p.32) on safety and security, an argument was made that social and economic regeneration should follow the improvement of basic services, education and employment. In another section on social development (section 3.2.4, pp.31-32), an argument was made for a coordinated approach towards crucial social infrastructure such as health services, educational facilities and recreational spaces. However, these arguments were simply asserted, without referring to critical questions, such as: What precursors of this level of coordination exist to build on? Should the departments of education, health or local governments coordinate their investment with that of the housing delivery system? Who should lead? What comes first? How do these multiple investments ensure that higher-order urban development objectives and outcomes are consistently achieved? The UDF clearly sought to avoid any critical interpretation of established sectoral policies, to ensure buy-in from the various line departments and to avoid conflict between the promoting departments and Ministers (D. van Broemsen, interview). Given the timing of the UDF, this may have been an understandable political consideration. Yet, it was highly unsatisfactory policy formulation to propound institutional models that were simply not
problematised or anchored in clear rules to anticipate and manage the inevitable conflicts and contradictions that would arise in the cauldron of implementation.

The second, interconnected problem was the lack of reflection in the UDF on the fact that most sectoral policies were developed before the new local government dispensation was resolved in policy terms. By definition, therefore, these policies reflected a limited understanding of the (new) roles of local government. The problem of unfunded mandates being devolved to local government was already becoming evident by then, not to speak of the contradictory development priorities assumed by different sectoral policies. Given that the UDF argued for local government as the lead actor in constructing appropriate sectoral coordination and integration at the local level, this oversight is noteworthy (see quote below). With hindsight, this conceptual blind spot in the UDF has proven to be particularly significant, given the undermining impact national sectoral policies have had on local government’s capacity to carry out integrated development (see Harrison 2003; Parnell and Pieterse 1999).

**Integration as Institutional Rationale**

Successful integration and regeneration of South Africa’s urban settlements will require the support of both the private and public sectors. Within such partnerships the public sector has an important role to play. Successful urban development also requires coordination among the various spheres of government. Initiatives to develop urban management capacity must be supported by provincial and national government, but the management of the urban areas themselves can best be carried out at a local level where decision-makers are in touch with local needs and conditions (Department of Housing 1997: 37).

Coordination between the various responsible line functions is vital to ensure integrated and sustainable urban development. In order to ensure equity, existing institutions will initially provide these services. In time, certain private providers may become accredited to do likewise. To overcome these backlogs, partnership arrangements with the private sector are also essential (Ibid., p.32).

These quotes reflect the institutional matrix that was envisaged in the UDF to ensure the advancement of integrated planning and development (the three dimensions discussed before), under the leadership role of local government. It was clearly ensconced in a
discourse of partnerships, as had become routine in almost all post-1994 policies of the government. Municipalities were seen as the lead actors that would knit together sectoral investments and plans through integrated development plans (and land development objectives) that would find further expression in spatial frameworks. In governance terms, it all rested on a strong system of inter-governmental coordination and partnerships with the private sector and civil society. I have already dealt with the problematic assumptions in the UDF about civil society organisations and 'beneficiary' communities and the system of inter-governmental relations. In this final section, I therefore restrict my focus to the unproblematised approach the policy took with regard to the private sector and private markets.

A general feature of the UDF was to echo neo-liberal preoccupations in urban policy to treat 'urban productivity' and 'competitiveness' (following the World Bank 1991; 2000) as the key determinants of urban vitality. This conceptual bias fed into a number of implicit arguments in favour of greater private sector participation in urban development initiatives through public-private partnerships. These ideas were linked to assumptions that unfettering land and housing markets was vital for market efficiencies to come into their own and to effect urban productivity and competitiveness. Central tenets of mainstream urban policy advocated by the World Bank (1991) were unmistakable, for example, to promote favourable conditions for housing and land markets to operate effectively, to improve revenue capacity at city level and to remove market distortions (Jones and Ward 1994). International evidence demonstrates that it is a short step from making an argument for unfettered markets and prioritising urban competitiveness, to reducing the directive and interventionist role of the state (Burgess et al. 1997). The UDF seemed to guard against such slippage. However, discursive references to 'the need and the ability of consumers to pay' (p.18) and 'investing in infrastructure and housing improves the capacity of our urban areas to achieve growth and competitiveness while also addressing the problem of urban poverty' (p.18) suggest that the fundamental assumptions of neo-liberal urban policy were accepted. This may in part be explained by the World Bank informed approach to municipal financing that were being driven by the DCD and DBSA at the time, as elucidated earlier in the chapter.
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to tease out this problematic in its full dimensions, given the coterminous emphasis in the UDF on equity and addressing urban poverty. Suffice to point out that in a context where the conceptual mooring of 'urban sustainability' was as weak and confused as demonstrated earlier, it is unlikely that the neo-liberal interests in the state, civil society and private sector could be counteracted effectively. In fact, recent research on municipal reform and service provision (Bond 1999; Pape and McDonald 2003), security of tenure (Royston 2002; Huchzermeyer 2001; 2003b) and housing policy and implementation (Khan 2003) suggest that neo-liberal policy discourses are on the ascendancy, even if not uncontested. Part of the reason for this development is the apolitical and ambiguous nature of policy discourses that deal with public-private partnerships and promote the centrality of competitiveness as a precondition for addressing poverty and inequality. The UDF is one clear example of this tendency in post-apartheid policy production.

5.4 CONCLUSION
The short legacy (1997-2001) of the UDF is not inspiring. It has clearly become little more than an 'empty policy statement' despite the good intentions of the Minister of Housing and her department at the moment of its unveiling. A number of practical failures in implementing the UDF, suggest that a much more rigorous policy steer is required to address the entrenched legacies and power practices of apartheid urban development. A number of factors conspired against the successful rolling out of the UDF but equally there were problems intrinsic to the framework itself. One stark exogenous failure was the limited inter-governmental and inter-departmental coordination as envisaged in the UDF (Bornstein 2000). Another failure, beyond the remit of the Department of Housing, was the limited policy and programme capacity at local government level to facilitate the participatory conceptualisation and execution of so-called integrated programmes, as was envisaged. The absence of meaningful spatial reordering in any South African city through spatial planning instruments is another instance of failure in terms of the objectives of the UDF. The lack of follow-up through appropriate monitoring and support systems by the Department of Housing is a further example of complete policy failure. All of these factors were revealed in the first section of the chapter, which used responses from key informants and governmental records to reconstruct the processes leading up to
the UDF and its eventual adoption by the Executive of the state as South African's urban development guiding policy.

However, my argument has been that these outcome failures need to be seen against the deeper problem of the weak conceptual anchoring of the policy objectives and instruments in the UDF. Conceptually, the central problem in the UDF was that it failed to engage with divergent and conflictual interests in the city. It operated on the assumption that 'urban integration' as a shared common-good could be defined and pursued. This political approach was particularly problematic in the face of the partisan interventions – in the interest of the urban poor and marginalised – that were required to address the legacy and systems of power that reproduce the apartheid city, with its inequitable land and housing markets and skewed distribution of resources and opportunities, embedded in more than a century of deliberate uneven development (see Chapter Four). However, what I have demonstrated is that this problem was partly attributable to the fact that the main drafter of the policy was an inexperienced policy officer who had to draft the document with minimal technical and political guidance. With hindsight, it is astounding that such a crucial policy plank of the government – addressing the legacy of the apartheid city – could be dealt with in such a careless fashion.

In the light of this story of how the UDF came into being and its weak policy agenda for realising urban integration, one is left with this question: what have municipalities at the urban coalface done to dismantle the apartheid city and advance urban integration? The question is particularly pertinent since municipalities obviously had limited guidance from national government considering the failure of the UDF. In the following two chapters I address this question by looking closely at the initiatives of the City of Cape Town municipality which held as their number one political priority – integrating the city.
Chapter 6

The Pursuit of Urban Integration by the City of Cape Town

6.1 INTRODUCTION

In the new political dispensation in South Africa, municipalities have pride of place in dealing with the challenges of development and social integration. Municipalities are empowered with a raft of legislation that enables them to pursue an explicit rights-based development agenda defined in the Constitution. In this endeavour municipalities are expected to work with other spheres of government to implement the urban development policies catalogued and analysed in Chapter Four. The Urban Development Framework (UDF) was meant to serve as a policy framework to guide municipalities about how to relate and sequence the various policy streams that impact on the nature and direction of urban development that will reverse the legacy of segregation and inequality. Unfortunately, as was demonstrated in Chapter Five, the UDF was never up the task. It was singularly ineffectual in shaping the urban development agenda in South Africa. As a consequence municipalities were largely left to their own devices to figure out how best to address the many intractable challenges of rapid and uneven urbanisation in the context of the apartheid city. In this chapter I explore the efforts of the City of Cape Town Municipality during its existence from May 1996 – December 2000.

The CCT is a particularly appropriate case study because the municipality identified right at the outset that urban integration was one of its seven priorities for the term of office. Furthermore, the CCT had a large and experienced staff, a capable and progressive management team, substantial capital and operating financial resources, and an established planning department steeped in the tradition of compact city principles. In other words, many preconditions were in place to aggressively drive a development agenda of integration and equity in line with national policy ideas contained in the UDF. Another factor made the CCT well placed to advance a strong redistribution and social

51 Some of the managers were actively involved in shaping many of the national development policies discussed in Chapter Four. One can therefore assume that they understood the imperative to align local policies and strategies with national frameworks as well as being thoroughly versed in the development theory that underpinned national policies.
agenda. The African National Congress was the ruling political party of the CCT in contradistinction to all the other six municipalities in the larger Cape Town metropolitan area. The ANC's electoral constituency – largely Black working and middle classes – stood the most to benefit from interventions to achieve rapid integration and a reversal of apartheid-based segregation. Yet, over the course of the CCT's existence a shift occurred whereby the imperative for residential, and by extension, racial integration was eclipsed by the delivery of municipal services. In Chapter Four, I demonstrated how the pursuit of low-cost housing came to dominate the national government's urban development agenda at the expense of other ambitions such as reversing racially-based segregation. A similar dynamic was at work in Cape Town. Politicians and senior managers were determined to deliver tangible services and new housing to the urban poor as rapidly as possible. This proved such a gargantuan task on its own that other, equally challenging and linked considerations, such as spatial integration, was put on the back burner. This 'real-life' process raise vital questions about the pursuit of urban integration—what is feasible and what is not, and what is the role of planning within those parameters?

There are at least two levels of investigation that must be undertaken to address these questions. Firstly, it is necessary to locate the agenda and interventions of the CCT in its political-economic, institutional and political context. This is addressed in this chapter. Secondly, it is crucial to explore in greater depth how the broad trends identified and analysed in this chapter played out in micro social contexts when governmental actions of the municipality came into direct contact with the citizens of the city in a specific neighbourhood around land-use that could effect urban integration. This is the focus of the next chapter that will explore one significant land-use management and planning dispute between the CCT and residents who were historically marginalised in the city and demanded land restitution. By combining these two levels of analysis I endeavour to shed light on the politics of municipal governance and planning when it is trained on the pursuit of urban integration.

This chapter starts with a brief contextual snapshot to clarify what the political-economic and institutional imperatives were when the CCT came into being with regard to addressing the challenges of racial segregation, fragmentation and inequality. These
factors profoundly shaped how urban integration was defined and what was deemed possible and not so. Thereafter the chapter explores the twin political priorities of urban integration and equity that was the hallmark of the council. This section delves into the change management agenda of the municipality because organisational and financial reorganisation was defined as a prerequisite for achieving higher-order development objectives. Again, it is crucial to understand what was done in this regard because it directly shaped how the tension between spatial integration and service equity played out in the municipality. Against this overview, the chapter moves on to explore integration thrusts advanced by the planning, housing and community development, and organisational development and training departments. In this section the focus will be on how complementary, or not, these three areas of intervention were. It is assumed that reinforcement between these thrusts is a prerequisite for the successful realisation of the political priority of urban integration (see 6 et al. 2002). This build-up allows me to conclude the chapter with a series of findings in relation to the framing questions set out in Chapter One.

6.2 LOCAL GOVERNMENT TRANSITIONS IN THE CAPE
Local government elections in the Western Cape province took place six months later than the rest of the country (except for Kwa-Zulu Natal province) in May 1996. This was due to a protracted dispute about municipal boundaries between the political parties (detailed in Cameron 1999: 114-130). This dispute was symptomatic of a more volatile and confrontational inter-party political culture in the Western Cape where the division of political support was differently balanced than in other parts of the country. In the 1994 Cape provincial elections, the ANC lost to the former (White) ruling party, the National Party (NP), by collecting 33% of the votes compared to 53.3%. Consequently, the Member of the Executive Committee (MEC) for Local Government in the provincial government was a NP politician who was determined to use the new municipal demarcations (ostensibly to effect non-racial municipal boundaries) to bolster the electoral prospects of the NP. This was vehemently opposed by the ANC as blatant

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52 The ANC won comfortably the national elections in 1994, gaining 64% of the vote and similarly displayed in dominance in seven out of the nine provincial governments.
gerrymandering and the matter eventually ended up in the Constitutional Court. Once the dispute was settled, elections could take place. The election result put the ANC in power in only one of the six (amalgamated) Metropolitan Sub-Councils in the Cape Metropolitan Area (see Figure 6.1). However, the ANC did win control of the largest and most established municipality—the CCT. This proved to be both a blessing and a curse because it meant that the CCT inherited a large administration (16 000+ staff) with significant financial resources; but it also meant that this old administrative machine was steeped in well-established patterns of work and associated attitudes that would be hard to transform. Unsurprisingly, institutional and organisational transformation would prove amongst the most critical challenges for the ANC council during its the term of office as will become clearer below.

The 1996 municipal elections in the CMA involved the amalgamation of 40 councils

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53 It is relevant to point out that much of the political conflict between the ANC, the NP and the Democratic Party (DP) was intensely racialised. The ANC's electoral base was largely African whereas the NP had a significant Coloured and White electoral base and used racist negative campaigning to mobilise support. Crude race-based politics is more or less a permanent feature of the political environment in the Cape Metropolitan Area (CMA). This is important to bear in mind in terms of the imperative and challenge of promoting racial integration through residential mixing through, for example, compaction and increased densities as prescribed in the post-apartheid urban policy framework.

54 In the Cape Metropolitan Area (CMA) a plethora of racially-defined municipal authorities existed throughout the 20th century. After the 1988 municipal elections, there were 19 white local authorities (WLAs), each with their own administration (Wilkinson 2000). Five black local authorities (BLAs) covered the African group areas although they were totally dependent on the Regional Services Council (RSC) and some of the WLAs to provide services on their behalf. Only one Management Board in the Coloured areas had municipal status out of a total of 29 such committees. Management Boards secured services from the WLAs and the RSC. To complicate matters further, a number of ‘non-status’ areas existed in the CMA, mainly informal settlements, and these were serviced in part by the Provincial Administration (Cameron 1999). It is important to appreciate that the 19 WLAs were of very different size and capacity. The largest WLA was the City of Cape Town, which had a staff complement in excess of 15 000 and fulfilled a metropolitan-wide service delivery role with respect to certain services. It was responsible for transport planning given that the central business district and most of industrial areas fell within its jurisdiction. It also provided bulk services such as water, wastewater treatment and electricity on a metropolitan scale (Sewell 1998). The other significant actor in the CMA was the Regional Services Council, which became the core of the Cape Metropolitan Council (CMC), itself established with the commencement of the pre-interim phase (discussed in Chapter Four).
and 19 separate administrations, each with distinctive conditions of service for their staff, unique salary structures and grades, distinctive management and organisational systems, diverse assets and liabilities and so on (Pieterse 2002). Moreover, the BLAs faced a different order of problems. BLA staff members were hardly required to work full days due to poor management oversight and most of the politicians were involved because of the patronage resources it gave them access to. These councils were deemed to be politically corrupt and administratively moribund, which also meant that service delivery backlogs were particularly acute in the areas under their jurisdiction (Cameron 1999). Unsurprisingly, the BLAs were financially bankrupt and in debt. It proved an immensely complex, volatile and slow process to figure out how best to amalgamate all these differences in a broader context of financial constraint and rapid legislative reforms (detailed in Chapter Four); all of which implied new demands for municipalities. Detailed and cumbersome negotiations informed the processes of institutional unbundling and amalgamation. The negotiations took place in the Metropolitan Negotiations Forum during the pre-interim phase (1994-1996). After the elections, the Metropolitan Restructuring Forum (MRF) was established to fulfil this function. The MRF was comprised of Executive Committee Chairpersons and Chief Executive Officers from each of the seven municipalities (illustrated in Figure 6.1).

Immediately after the elections, the CCT appointed a consultant, Nico McLachlan, to serve as a change management facilitator for the council until a CEO or City Manager could be appointed. In an interview (26 June 2002), McLachlan explained that his task was to assist the Executive Committee (Exco) and the senior management to formulate a short-term action plan to create the new, amalgamated municipal organisation bringing together the former CCT, Crossroads BLA, iKapa BLA, and Pinelands WLA. Practically this entailed the design of the ‘macro organisational structure’ (i.e. number of

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5 A compounding problem was the lack of a tax base and other financial resources in the BLA which could be used for effective service provision.

56 The MNF managed to establish a unique political culture of tolerance and openness because decision-making was based on consensus. According to MNF chairperson, David Schmidt (interviewed on 27 June 2002), the MNF was marked by “an ethos of respect” [and] “politics went beyond individual self-interest.” This would rapidly evaporate in the MRF era (1996 onwards) when relations between the ANC controlled CCT and the other municipalities in the CMA became marked by fierce rivalry, incessant scheming and open hostility. This atmosphere made it impossible to establish mutually beneficial governance arrangements and moreover, distracted senior managers and politicians away from their developmental priorities (McLachlan, interviewed on 26 June 2002).
departments and structure of management); an appointment procedure to ensure that new – politically acceptable – top management was installed as quickly as possible; and assisting the politicians and senior management to identify their political and managerial priorities. McLachlan facilitated a workshop for the ANC councillors shortly after the elections where they identified the vision and strategic priorities for the ANC during their term of office. Seven strategic priorities emerged from this workshop, which remained in place throughout the five years of government. The ANC’s priorities were to:

1. integrate the city, both from a planning perspective and bringing the divided people and communities together
2. achieve equity and redistribution
3. tackle poverty and social problems in communities
4. address the housing shortage, homeless and land for development
5. promote economic development and job creation
6. improve community safety, and
7. develop special projects to give effect to these goals (CCT 2000: 6).

The council agreed that the City Manager had to be appointed as soon as possible so that s/he could be part of hiring the top management team that would run the various departments (CCT 1996). It was seen as essential that managers be appointed that were politically untainted by the apartheid legacy of local government. There was an explicit recognition that the council would struggle to implement its priorities if the administration did not have new managerial leadership that were committed to priorities identified by the council (N. McLachlan, interview). Once the top management team was in place, they would develop more detailed (delivery) strategies and on the basis of those strategies, the ‘micro organisational design’ would be completed. The new City Manager, Andrew Boraine, was appointed in December 1996, seven months after the elections.

Andrew Boraine was an inspired choice because he was in part the architect of the new national local government dispensation in his former capacity as Deputy Director General for Local Government in the (former) Department of Constitutional Development.

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57 This staged approach meant that staff at lower levels (middle-level downwards) was left uncertain about their position in the organisation in a context of rumours that massive lay-offs would be conducted to rationalise the amalgamated municipal organisations. This uncertainty fuelled resistance amongst staff to implement new directives from the Executive Management Team (interviews with S. Sibisi and A. Boraine) irrespective whether they would lead to staff redundancies or not.
Boraine also had impeccable political credibility because he was a long-standing activist and intellectual in the ANC-led liberation movement. He was seen as possessing the needed mixture of managerial experience to transform and manage a large recalcitrant administration, as well as a political commitment to see the full realisation of developmental local government as defined in ANC policy. Boraine moved rapidly to recruit a top management team that was largely from outside of the old CCT administration and fitting similar profiles to himself. However, his appointment did invoke concern and nervousness amongst the established interests in the administration and pressure was exerted to also appoint some of the so-called old guard into the top management team (McLachlan, interview). As a consequence Mike Marsden was appointed Executive Director (ED) for municipal services and Dave Daniels was appointed ED for planning and economic development. The full Executive Management Team (EMT) was seen as a good mixture of experience and progressives with sound training in development theory and planning (D. Schmidt, interviewed on 27 June 2002). Criticisms were raised about the absence of Africans and women in the EMT. This was perceived as politically unacceptable for an ANC council (L. Lecontry, interviewed on 8 July 2003). Despite criticisms and rumblings from within the old vestiges of the administration, the media was favourably disposed to Andrew Boraine and his EMT, as can be seen in two editorials of the main Cape Town daily newspaper during the first quarter of the administration (see Plate 6.1).58

58 Towards the middle of 1997, Ms Nene Molefe was appointed to the EMT in charge of Institutional Transformation. She served for less than a year and was replaced by Ms Sinazo Sibisi as Head of the Organisational Development and Transformation Department and a member of the EMT. Significantly, Sibisi was first a councillor for the ANC and knew the CCT administration from that perspective. It also meant she had good, probably better, access to political leaders compared to the other EDs.
To mark a clear difference to the style and culture of the old CCT administration, Boraine and his team embarked upon a listening process to hear the views, expectation and anxieties of staff about the new, amalgamated CCT. This process was complemented by public open days and a road show to various neighbourhoods to introduce the new council and EMT (CCT 2000). This exercise was meant to demonstrate a more open, transparent, responsive and modern local government. These initiatives were effective in part because the CCT managed to get the liberal Cape Town press behind them and effectively promoting their new image (see Plate 6.1). In this same period the seven strategic priorities that the ANC caucus developed shortly after the election were
confirmed and bedded down by the new administrative leadership. The managerial priority then was to ensure that more detailed strategies were developed to realise the political priorities, especially the imperatives of urban integration and equity.

6.3 COMING TO TERMS WITH THE PRECONDITIONS FOR THE PURSUIT OF URBAN INTEGRATION AND EQUITY

As soon as Andrew Boraine came into office as City Manager, the realisation dawned that it would be a formidable task to turn such a large, complex and old administration as the CCT bureaucracy, into a vehicle for development. Especially, since the entire CCT administrative and financial system was geared to the perpetuation of the inequitable delivery of municipal services to the benefit of mainly (White) middle and upper classes in the city, along with formal businesses of course. This challenge was compounded by the voluminous administrative details that had to be resolved in merging four different administrations (and shedding parts of the old CCT) into one bureaucracy with consolidated salary scales, pension schemes, conditions of service, job grading's, and so forth—a veritable human resources minefield that was exploited by the various trade unions to ensure the most beneficial settlements for their members. All of this unfolded against a backdrop of a serious financial crisis fuelled in part by new responsibilities placed on municipal government and the consequences of a racially fragmented tax base. Once the rest of the EMT was installed by mid 1997, it was clear that radical administrative and financial system reform was needed to create the preconditions for the advancement of the political priorities of urban integration and equity.

The reform agenda involved getting accurate data about what the bureaucracy was doing—structures, organisation cultures and systems—and how resources were deployed between various categories of service users. Once that picture was drawn, the challenge was to bring stability, confidence and growth to the financial resources that had to underpin the development strategy of the CCT. Moreover, because of the limited time

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59 For example, the Parks and Forest Department that maintained green spaces and trimmed hedges in mainly White areas had a budget twice the size of the primary health-care programme (Vawda, interview).
60 These matters could only be resolved in a forum between the seven municipalities in the CMA. Negotiations and planning took place in a special forum called the Metropolitan Restructuring Forum (MRF) which in turn was the successor to the Metropolitan Negotiations Forums (MNF) which existed in the pre-interim period (1994-1996).
frame to the next election, it was critical to act with speed and focus. The City Manager in close consultation with the ED for Finance (Philip van Ryneveld), pushed very strongly for a performance-based, outcomes oriented approach that would allow for a system of using the budget to penalise outmoded priorities and programmes and reward those who acted in support of the new political priorities of the city. The financial system became a tool for strategic, forward planning and squeezing improved productivity or performance out of complacent and under-achieving divisions within the administration (P. van Ryneveld, interviewed on 11 March 2003). In summary, according to Boraine (interview), by the middle to end of 1997, when they had a reasonable sense of the state of the administration and the scale of the development challenges in the city, it was clear that they had to combine numerous interventions into a determined change management strategy that involved: forging strong political and administrative leadership through close cooperation between Exco and the EMT; achieving financial savings and stability through painful adjustment measures; building an effective, performance oriented organisational system and culture; driving racial and gender equity in the organisation as part of building the new kind of organisation; managing public opinion and attitudes of key stakeholders and rate payers in the city; and adopting a much stronger developmental approach to cut into the problems of poverty and exclusion (McKenzie 1999).

This was a formidable agenda, especially since most of the organisation remained as before with only the top 0.05% being new incumbents and entrusted with implementing the political priorities of the ANC council. The biggest danger that loomed on the horizon was that the leadership would get bogged down in endless negotiations with various stakeholders inside the organisation aimed at achieving agreement or buy-in to the various reform measures, but by default allow the status quo, in terms of the everyday functioning of the organisation, to continue untouched. Exco members were determined not to see that happen. There was a very strong push from the political leaders to address the service delivery and housing challenges with urgency and determination because it impacted most directly on their political constituency (S. Mowser, interviewed on 30

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61 This involved a selective adoption of some strains of New Public Management policy (see Lowndes 1997), expressed most clearly in the emphasis on performance management, outcomes-based planning and dividing municipal functions between core and non-core categories.
August 2002; Lecontry, interview). And there was without a doubt great expectations and hope that a new deal in municipal service provision would be delivered to the large numbers of residents without adequate basic services such as access to portable water, sewage systems, refuse collection, electricity and so forth.

The Municipal Services (engineering) department, under the leadership of Mike Marsden, rapidly positioned itself to reorient their staff and budgets to address the vast service backlogs in Black areas. A dual track approach was developed, which also fitted neatly with the strategic approach of the finance department. On the one hand, Marsden's department focussed on getting as accurate a picture as possible of different levels of service to different (racial) communities, differential tariffs for services since unique arrangements existed in each of the local authorities that were amalgamated into the CCT, diverse rates levies, etc. On the other hand, Marsden focussed on the engineering challenge of extending services as rapidly as possible to under-serviced areas, whilst avoiding a collapse of service provision in the established areas of the city (Smith and Vawda 2003: 37-42). Part of Marsden's agenda was a campaign to foster appreciation for the risks associated with allowing 'asset stripping' of trunk municipal infrastructure to occur.

Addressing these diverse challenges meant that, professionally, it was an exciting time to be an engineer. Also, the idea that different types of services could neatly be sub-divided into different levels of service to diverse 'market segments' of service users at differential prices of course, proved to be key for the finance department in figuring out how cross-subsidisation can be institutionalised in the tariff system of the council. Put differently, as the engineers responded to the service delivery extension challenge, a picture emerged in which wealthier consumers could continue to enjoy similar (high) levels of services but at adjusted prices and if they also subsidise some of the usage of services by the indigent in the city. Step-tariffs were progressively introduced to ensure that poor people could at least access a minimum level of service. This approach appealed to the ANC politically because it meant that they could deliver something to their natural constituency, whilst challenging the White ratepayers in the city to do their bit for post-apartheid South Africa, and effectively keep the discourse of redistribution alive. In fact, very soon into
the ANC's term of office they seized onto the fact that the rates valuation roll was hopelessly out of date, which meant that poorer residents were effectively subsidising the wealthy residents of the city (S. Mowser, interview). Achieving an equitable rates valuation role became one of the central planks of the ANC redistributive focus during their term of office.62

This scenario meant that the ANC council was heavily dependent on the engineering core of the administration to deliver services to its political constituency and do so in a manner that would not alienate the traditional beneficiaries in the city. However, engineering departments were always the most powerful and well-resourced departments in the hierarchical and silo-based administrative system of South African municipalities (Respondent X, interviewed on 26 July 2002). Invariably, engineering-based departments stand the most to loose from more integrated and coordinated ways of working that are prerequisites for achieving comprehensive development outcomes, as opposed to quantitative targets of infrastructure programmes. For this reason, a dangerous dynamic emerged from the outset whereby the ANC council had to rely heavily on an administrative base that had the least incentive to transform its nature and functioning. This is important because engineering-based, municipal service departments consume the largest chunk of both the capital and operating sides of the municipal budget. In other words, if their budgets are left un-touched, it leaves a lot less over to be deployed for other elements of the municipalities' development strategy.

This is precisely what incensed the ED for Health, Housing and Community Development, Ahmedi Vawda (interviewed on 15 August 2002). According to Vawda, the engineers actively lobbied the politicians and City Manager to not be restructured dramatically and in return they would deliver on the ambitious target of extending basic services to the under-serviced, mainly Black, areas of the city.63 Vawda waged a fierce

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62 The rates equity campaign was successful even though it only came into effect after December 2000 when the CCT was dissolved into the Cape Town Unicity.

63 Interviews with other officials in the CCT who were also in the prior administration confirm this perception (Respondent X, interviewed on 26 July 2002; Respondent Y, interviewed on 20 March 2003). They corroborate that the engineers saw their interest best served if they could be allowed to embark on large capital investment programmes to extend basic services, whilst also maintaining the infrastructure in the advantaged areas to avoid asset-stripping.
battle inside the EMT to reallocate scarce financial resources away from the municipal services department in favour of health, community facilities and housing priorities because he anticipated the problems that may arise from a narrow basic service strategy. (I will return to this theme below.) It was only towards the end of the CCT tenure that Vawda's argument made some headway but by then the pattern of resource allocation between departments was already established.

To fully appreciate the dynamics and issues at play in this conflict it is necessary to explore what was happening in other parts of the CCT administration that had a direct bearing on the realisation of urban integration and equity. I will now explore the three most salient dimensions: planning, housing and community development, and organisational change and transformation. In light of the theoretical framing of the thesis, the remainder of the chapter will concentrate on the planning dimension and merely touch on the other two aspects.

6.4 LEAD INTEGRATION EFFORTS OF THE CCT

Planning

Minutes of Exco meetings and numerous interviews underscore that at the outset in 1996 and 1997, the political and administrative leadership of the CCT was determined to address spatial fragmentation and segregation. There was an expectation that the planning department would deliver a spatial framework, consistent with the Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework (MSDF), to demonstrate how urban integration could be effected. According to interviews with Andrew Boraine, Sinazo Sibisi, Les Lecontry and Saliem Mowser, the planning department simply never responded to this request during the first two years in office. Consequently, at an Exco-EMT workshop on 20 January 1998, it was reiterated that “...the Planning Directorate will be responsible for preparing...”

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64 The MSDF was a spatial development framework for the Cape Metropolitan Region that was the outcome of a long and relatively inclusive consultative process since 1991. According to the MSDF, its main purpose “is to guide the form and location of physical development” (CMC 1996: ix). It is furthermore “based on a defined vision of a well managed, integrated, metropolitan region in which development is intensified, integrated and sprawl-contained” (CMC 1996: ix). Most significantly, the ANC fully endorsed it and pushed for it to be formal guiding policy when they came to power in the CCT in 1996, according to Exco member, Les Lecontry (interview).
a spatial framework for the municipal area, which will be a more detailed elaboration of
the MSDF and will indicate priority areas for integration projects..." (CCT 1998a: 9,
emphasis added). According to Councillor Mowser (interview), at this stage they had
been calling for a spatial framework since they came into office in 1996. Even though this
task was reiterated at the Exco/EMT workshop in January 1998, most of the political and
administrative leadership had given up hope that much would be forthcoming. In any
case, the other transition strategies spearheaded by the Municipal Services department to
address imperatives for equity in access to basic services were already well on track and
unlikely to be influenced by the content of a future spatial development framework
before the next election that would see the collapse of the CCT into a metropolitan
government.

There seem to be two reasons for the inability of the Planning Directorate to have
produced a document earlier than August 1999 when the Municipal Spatial Development
Framework (Muni-SDF) was unveiled. One, many of the staff of the old planning
department of the former CCT administration were absorbed into the Olympic Bid
Company to draw up the technical reports that accompanied South Africa's bid to host
the 2004 Olympic Games. This created a vacuum in this section of the organisation that
led to the marginalisation of planning as the processes of reorganisation unfolded during
the pre-interim negotiation period (1994-1996). As a consequence, the Planning
Department was forced to reduce its number of professional staff, which in turn lead to
bitter and almost debilitating conflicts in the planning section (Boshoff, interview). A
second problem was the issue of capacity. One of the most talented planners, Stephen
Boshoff, was on sabbatical in the United States during 1997 and was only available to
drive the spatial development framework after his return in 1998. A political dimension
that compounded these aspects, according the Dave Daniels, the ED for Planning, was the
fact that a NP politician as opposed to an ANC councillor, chaired the Planning
Committee. This meant, according to Daniels (interview) that many of the decisions
taken by the committee were not prioritised by the ANC Exco. It is difficult to weight the
validity of this claim since ANC respondents reject this notion. However, all my
interviews confirm that the political culture was deeply divided and antagonistic, which
lends credence to Daniel's claim. Yet, this does not explain the long lapse in time before
work got underway on the Muni-SDF. Another, more plausible factor was the fact that 98% of the Planning Committee's agenda, time and energy was devoted to land-use reviews and approvals.\textsuperscript{65} This was tedious, time consuming and almost completely un-strategic work according to the Chairperson of Committee (R. Fox, interviewed on 12 March 2003). And, most dangerously, it left no time to debate higher-order strategic spatial planning and development issues. As a consequence, the Planning Committee did not apply enough pressure to ensure work got underway to produce a spatial development framework that would indicate urban integration could best be achieved.

\textit{The Muni-SDF}

The concept of broadly \textit{equitable access} is central to making a spatially more equitable and integrated city ... Equity means that all people should have easy access to a broadly similar range of opportunities, facilities, special places and events... This is precisely the characteristic that is currently lacking in Cape Town. (CCT 1999: 20, emphasis added).

Despite the delayed response from the Planning Department, it is worthwhile to explore the content and significance of the Muni-SDF after it was released in 1999. It speaks directly to the interpolation between planning theorists in the South and the North explored in Chapter 3.\textsuperscript{66}

The Muni-SDF is undoubtedly the most sophisticated expression yet in South Africa about the practical application of New Urbanism (with an admixture of compact city ideas) planning theory. It therefore raises the question, whether it is successful – at least at a conceptual level since there was not enough time to assess implementation – to address the problems of fragmentation, segregation and inequality. In Chapter Two an idealised argument was put forward for how New Urbanism would deal with fragmentation, segregation and inequality. Those points are echoed in the core arguments of the Muni-SDF. The Muni-SDF is an expansive, multi-layered and elegantly written

\textsuperscript{65} I verified this by reviewing all the agendas and minutes of the Planning Committee during 1996-2000. Through this trawling exercise it became apparent that the Committee was totally consumed by zoning applications.

\textsuperscript{66} The full implications of this will not be drawn out in this chapter but rather in Chapter 8.
and presented planning framework. It is not possible to do the document justice in the confines of this section of the thesis. At best, I can outline the main tenets and identify how the framework speaks to the role of planning in addressing urban integration.

The Muni-SDF defines spatial planning as having a pro-active and regulatory function. The pro-active dimension is about specifying "desirable directions, actions and outcomes in relation to the spatial dimensions of the city" (CCT 1999: 2). The regulatory dimension is about controlling and steering land use, development and management in a manner that balances individual and group rights. (This balance between disadvantaged groups and more wealthy groups is at the heart of the planning dispute considered in the next chapter.) According to the Muni-SDF, Cape Town is fraught with urban problems because there has historically been an absence of pro-active planning in the city. The pro-active planning that did take place was in service of a narrow modernism and apartheid ideology, which promoted control-obsessed and highly fragmented urban spaces. To make that agenda work, planning was essentially in a re-active and control seeking mode, according to the Muni-SDF (CCT 1999). There is an obvious contradiction in the argument of the Muni-SDF. The problems of urban fragmentation and inequality in contemporary Cape Town are defined as both a result of too little and too much planning. This is a slightly caricatured analysis because the authors of the Muni-SDF are bound to argue that there was too little of the right kind of planning and too much of the wrong (apartheid modernism) planning in the history of Cape Town. Underlying such an argument is of course the assumption that there is a 'right' kind of planning. The policy framework devotes considerable space and thought to outlining what the right kind of planning entails.

A vision drives the spatial arguments in the Muni-SDF. The vision conjures a future where the natural environment permeates all aspects of life in the city; everyone will enjoy ease of access to urban opportunities and public resources; small businesses will be given the spaces and infrastructural support to thrive as a route out of poverty for the large numbers of unemployed in the city; good public spaces will be plentiful and engender a sense of pride in place at neighbourhood and city levels; and cultural pluralism, rooted in grassroots institutions, will be the order of the day (CCT 1999: 9-12).
However, the document is careful to build a bridge between the realisation of this vision and the existing policy context. For this reason, national policy frameworks (discussed in Chapter Four), the MSDF, and the seven strategic priorities of the council are used as starting points. Upfront it is stressed that the "Draft Muni-SDF specifically addresses the first of these [priorities], which is aimed at achieving greater spatial, social and sectoral integration of a highly fragmented city" (CCT 1999: 15).

The spatial syntax and theoretical references points that the Muni-SDF draws on to translate this focus into programmatic interventions are a mixture of systems planning theory and the inter-dependent design principles of New Urbanism. Two quotes from the document capture this effectively:

"Central to moving towards a city that works for all are the issues of integration, equity, redistribution and quality of life. The Draft Muni-SDF is an exploration into the spatial implications of these concepts. A fundamental recognition guiding this exploration is that for the city as a whole to work optimally, its individual components cannot be made to function maximally to the exclusion of others. The planning and management of the city should be directed by the performance of the overall system – how the different parts relate to each other – rather than the performance of any specific part (CCT 1999: 15, emphasis added)."

The actual spatial elements of the framework are premised on the imperative of achieving equity in the city. A virtually identical spatial palette as in the work of New Urbanism is proposed as the structuring system of the spatial framework:

"The framework is driven by a core concept of remaking the city over time to achieve greater equity and integration ... This concept relates to allowing people much more equitable access to the benefits of the city, broadly defined as the natural resource base and the urban resource base ... The core concept is then translated into specific concepts and proposals for spatial organisation of elements that make up the city's public investment structure. These elements are green space, movement, public space and places, social facilities, economic infrastructure, publicly-assisted housing, utility services and emergency services. The integrative concept of centres [is] where many of the elements of the spatial framework come together (CCT 1999: 20)."

The elements are knitted together with concepts such as clustering, agglomerations, thresholds in centres and spatial symmetry. The ideal spatial system will reflect a city-
wide distribution of a hierarchy of centres with different degrees of agglomeration and connected to lower-level centres via transport corridors to ensure everyone in the city has easy access to a variety of urban resources and opportunities. The priority is to ensure that the inequitable distribution of resources is consciously and incrementally altered to achieve a more equitable distribution. In this way, the city will become less inequitable and progressively more integrated. The advantage of this approach is that the spatial principles deployed provide a “logical argument” that everyone can follow and in the process avoid duplication, contradictory investments, and departmental rivalries in the administration. The Muni-SDF further displays an interesting conception of social change.

As the opening quote to this section suggests, the spatial framework will advance equitable access in order to create a more integrated city over time. Equitable access has a literal spatial meaning that “all people should have easy access [for the person on foot] to a broadly similar range of opportunities, facilities, special places and events” (CCT 1999: 20). This can only be achieved if the built environment is mapped and sliced into equal blocks, and within each block, everyone should have easy access to a defined set of opportunities (see Figure 6.2: Muni-SDF grid of interchanges, CCT 1999: 25). If those facilities do not exist, then those areas without must be prioritised for intervention. However, the intervention must be careful to reinforce the kind of spatial relations between various necessary elements (specified above) and not simply be imposed from above. This sensitivity flows from the underlying “philosophy of minimalism” (CCT 1999: 17). This philosophy keeps public authorities and planners modest for it recognises that “Cities primarily grow and develop through the energies, ingenuity, creativity and resources of the private sector, broadly defined” (CCT 1999: 17). The challenge is therefore to release latent energy and allow for freedom of action. This constitutive openness of the city also makes it inherently complex which, according to the Muni-SDF, is the life source of positive urban environments. These considerations in combination with the pragmatic acceptance that public investment resources are always limited suggest for a minimalist and highly strategic approach in fostering change towards urban integration and equity.
Interestingly, in the propositional section of the Muni-SDF the framework does call for intervention in land markets because of the “large numbers of people who are unable to participate in a market-driven housing delivery system” (CCT 1999: 61). The report further addresses the silent contradiction in the national housing and urban development system — whereby the housing subsidy drives new housing developments to be on the periphery of cities and effectively extending the apartheid spatial form — that remains the biggest obstacle to more integrated urban development. The Muni-SDF suggests that the transport subsidies that keep this unviable process afloat must be redirected to the purchase of more strategically located land, that can facilitate greater compaction, for the provision of new social housing. It is on such land that housing can “move toward more mixed-use developments [and] ... support a more efficient public transportation system, better use of land, existing facilities and services” (CCT 1999: 61). The report suggests the principle of “land cost write-downs” to facilitate such access (CCT 1999: 62). This means a form of state subsidy to make unaffordable land available to the urban poor. However, the report is also quick to point out that such interventions “should not be applied to the extent that it prevents the emergence of a vigorous land market” (CCT 1999: 62).
element of the Muni-SDF is very important because it suggests a large area of policy agreement with the Health, Housing and Community Development department (COMDEV) that also wanted to effect greater compaction and densification. Yet, these two departments struggled to see eye to eye on policy and a huge rift existed between them for a combination of personal, professional and ideological reasons (G. Nevin, interviewed on 20 March 2003). I will return to this theme below when I explore the inter-relationships between key departments in the CCT that could have contributed significantly to greater urban integration. First, it is necessary to conclude the treatment of the Muni-SDF with an assessment of its problems and strengths.

**Problems and Strengths of the Muni-SDF**

The crippling weakness of the Muni-SDF is its shallow understanding of the political-economy of the city. As a consequence, the starting point of the document is fraught. It offers an analysis about the causes of the inter-linked problems of urban fragmentation and inequality that are limited and poorly thought through. The approach is too narrow for it focuses merely on the contributing role of planning to the apartheid city form and even this focus is treated in a problematic way. The Muni-SDF's focus on the legacy of planning steeped in an alchemy of modernism and apartheid echoes the long-standing arguments of David Dewar (1991; 1992; 1995; 1998) about the determinants of the spatial form of the apartheid city as outlined in Chapter Four. However, this framework does not provide a sufficiently robust analytical purchase on how economic forces are shaping cities, especially in the more recent past as the country's economy became more and more implicated by its intensifying integration into globalising circuits of capital. In other words, the nature and structure of land and property markets that actively reproduce urban segregation is not merely an issue of spatial planning and regulation as implied by the conceptual vantage points of the Muni-SDF.

As argued in earlier chapters, addressing segregation in favour of urban integration requires more integrative land-use patterns to maximise the opportunities for the urban poor to enable them to access urban services and employment opportunities as well as a

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67 The respondent straddled the departments of planning and housing, but worked mainly on low-cost housing projects in COMDEV.

68 This is not surprising since David Dewar was the lead consultant used to draft the Muni-SDF.
reduction in the levels of economic and social inequality across the urban region. These imperatives will only be addressed through determined political agency aimed at curbing and redirecting the preferences of powerful (economic) interests in the city. This implies understanding under what conditions powerful private interests can be engaged and persuaded or compelled to act differently. It also implies understanding under what conditions political interests can be cohered to acknowledge the need for such interventions and acting on it even if it implies, potentially, political suicide. This is particularly the case in a neo-liberal context where the state is supposed to take a back-seat and "enable" market and civil society actors to get on with what they do best. As demonstrated earlier in the contextual chapter, neo-liberal conceptions of the state has made significant inroads in South Africa and clearly militates against an interventionist state willing to tackle the fundamentals of a free-market economy, i.e. tampering with individual property rights in favour of social justice for the poor. At the same time, there are sufficient political constituencies that can be aligned to reinforce such a political agenda.

The analytical question is, under what conditions would such forces cohere and what can public policy do to facilitate such manoeuvres? These are some of the issues that a problem statement must grapple with in setting up the argument for a spatial development framework that will be contextually grounded in a robust causal theory on the (re)production of urban fragmentation and inequality. The approach to analysing the prevailing urban situation in the Muni-SDF is therefore wholly inadequate in reading the context in a way that can lead to the identification of appropriate interventions to shift the structural forces that drive the perpetuation of fragmentation, segregation and inequality. As a result, recommendations in the Muni-SDF pertain to abstracted spatial opportunities to reinforce the spatial system that can best ensure equity. Such an approach is unlikely to ignite concerted political action.

Due to the modernism/apartheid planning starting point of the Muni-SDF, the framework slides into a form of spatial determinism as a response. In other words, the framework operates on the assumption that the 'right' spatial relationship can be established between the various parts of the spatial kit. Once this is gradually achieved as manifested in more
clustering in the right centres, then the problems of today – urban segregation and fragmentation – will disappear. Such a conception is spatially determinist because it erases the unforeseen dynamics of people and social processes, steeped in power dynamics, that can give meaning to spatial relations in ways completely unforeseen by the planner or designer. This perspective is arguably the essence of the just city and postmodern planning critiques presented in Chapter Two. All planning interventions are imbued with power and conflict and are open to multiple interpretations and use. It is politically naive to assume that the use of a space or corridor can be predicted with any great certainty. The only certainty that can be predicted is conflict and contestation, and plans are invariably ensnared in it. The combination of these two problems in the Muni-SDF creates an approach in which “physical plans are pre-determined and not formulated in response to individual, community or household need” (Khan 2002: 17). This is precisely the same reason why rational-comprehensive or blueprint planning became discredited in the 1970s (Rakodi 1993).

The last problem I want to explore is more related to how the Muni-SDF was introduced into the maelstrom of institutional change in the CCT. The refined nature of the spatial argument and approach of the Muni-SDF gave it a very closed gloss. Since every piece in the system of the argument hangs together so perfectly (and wonderfully illustrated), it was very difficult to criticise one part and hold onto another. This applied to critics but also the champions of the framework. The champions adopted an attitude that unless critics could engage on the merits of the argument within the (spatial) logic of argument, or with a superior logic, then they were not prepared to take the comments too seriously (S. Boshoff, interviewed on 27 June 2002; Dewar, interviewed 14 June 2004). This approach is written into the text of the document. Such a puritanical stance came across as an unwillingness to engage and a form of elitism (Respondent X, interview). This was compounded by the fact that the planning department did not identify one or two key interventions to illustrate the value of the approach in relation to existing initiatives in the council. In particular, the experiments in area-based poverty reduction strategies in pockets of the city, come to mind. Also, the few land parcels (such as Wingfield) that could become lead initiatives in demonstrating the benefits of compaction and integration were not pursued with a degree of vigour so as to shake up the status quo in land
development processes. In this regard the next chapter will demonstrate how the purist nature of the Muni-SDF became a stumbling block for fast-tracking the location of African citizens on one such site of state owned land in a very strategic part of the city. In the context of that discussion I will return to some of the other problems of the Muni-SDF in terms of the unintended consequences it set loose once in the hands of officials in the CCT.

Despite these problems there were important strengths in the Muni-SDF. Firstly, the framework is an elegant and finely crafted manifesto for the power of imaginative spatial planning. It was presented in an accomplished fashion from a presentation and design point of view. Secondly, the framework is stuffed with innovative ideas that do hold great potential if it is to be located in a more explicit and materialist political reading of the context. Thirdly, the Muni-SDF proposes a useful framework to think in a disaggregated manner about different types of public investments and how these need to be balanced in relation to the broader system and the overall political goals of the council. The public investment framework is potentially useful to stimulate meaningful and focussed political debate. Fourthly, the Muni-SDF does a good job in demonstrating the inter-relationships between various urban development factors, which in turn strengthens the case for inter-departmental co-ordination and collaboration. Fifthly, the Muni-SDF makes a compelling case for revisiting the implications of primarily focussing public resources on household formation and growth (e.g. through the housing subsidy system), as opposed to public facilities that can potentially benefit more people and foster multiple forms of associational actions. Finally, the emphasis on land is a useful corrective in a context of urban development policy where the issue is skirted or ignored altogether. It is a pity that the Muni-SDF offers such a limited perspective on how to maximise the use of land in advancing integration and greater intra-urban equity.

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69 The Muni-SDF proposes that any city administration face four types of investment imperatives: productive investment that leads to the formation of new assets and augment existing ones; remedial investment targeting the mistakes of the past to ensure immediate and rapid improvement for those who were oppressed before; basic needs investment to improve basic levels of service in an equitable way; and spare or floating investment capacity that can respond rapidly to new opportunities especially that can arise from strategic partnerships (CCT 1999: 15-16).
Health, Housing and Community Development

Whilst the planning department was struggling to produce a spatial framework for the city, the other departments of the CCT proceeded apace to formulate their respective visions, programmes and interventions to fulfil their mandates in terms of the seven strategic priorities of the Council and national policy obligations. In the new organisational structure, a new department was created – COMDEV – that brought together the health, housing and community services departments. This department engaged in far-reaching experiments to translate the ‘developmental local government’ mandate of the council into a practical programme of action. In essence, COMDEV fleshed out the parameters and tenets of urban integration at the neighbourhood scale, firmly rooted in a development framework akin to the livelihoods model advanced by scholars such as Beall (2004) and Rakodi (2002). In pursuing this development agenda, COMDEV came into persistent and deep conflict with other departments in the council, especially finance, engineering services and planning. These conflicts undermined the overall efforts of the CCT in advancing urban integration across the area of jurisdiction of the council.

The starting point of COMDEV was that the biggest development challenge facing the city and its inhabitants was poverty. One of the first actions COMDEV took was to carefully survey all neighbourhoods in the jurisdictions of the CCT by cross-referencing 103 databases (Smith and Vawda 2003). Through this process, areas with the highest incidence of poverty was spatially mapped and targeted for priority intervention. These areas were labelled ‘zones of poverty.’ Moving on from the diagnostic phase, COMDEV worked on a holistic model of intervention that would address the causes of poverty and social dislocation, as well as provide pathways out of the situation. Ahmedi Vawda, the ED for COMDEV, had a strong background in development theory and practice with his tenure at Planact (a leading urban development NGOs operative in Johannesburg since the late 1980s) and the formulation of the Development Facilitation Act when he was stationed in the Department of Land Affairs after 1994. His activist training in the trade union movements also made him particularly aware of the importance of accountability to politicians and fostering agency amongst the urban poor so that they would seize and
drive opportunities for development. These influences led Vawda to push for a development model that turned on three primary axes:

- health as a base to the City’s development approach;
- housing as the socio-economic driver;
- community facilities and programmes as an instrument for social development and cohesion (drawn from Chipkin 2003: 77)

The development logic was as follows: Health provided a very comprehensive approach to understanding and dealing with the multiple causes of poverty. Consequently, health indicators became the main criteria to assess quality of life and monitor the developmental impact of public investments in the zones of poverty. Logically, health clinics became important pivots for the council in engaging with the community and leading a more holistic approach to community development. However, focusing on quality of life was not enough. It was as important to recognise that the lack of employment and absence of assets kept poor households trapped in poverty and all the social conditions associated with it.

Housing needed to be redefined as a crucial economic asset that could unlock access to other resources to improve the overall asset base – as in the livelihoods model – of poor households (Vawda, interview). The means to enhance the (potential) value of social housing investments was the establishment of savings incentives and housing associations. COMDEV recognised that the national housing subsidy was wholly inadequate to build a dwelling that was fit for healthy living. To enhance the value of the subsidy, potential beneficiaries of the national subsidy had to undertake a systematic process of saving, which in turn was augmented by the CCT through a so-called top-up subsidy. However, this was only available if beneficiaries saved. In fact, COMDEV went as far as to make the habit of saving compulsory. Consequently, households who did not save out of choice or necessity could not partake in the housing programme. To manage this strategy, the CCT created the Cape Town Housing Company. (I will say more on this institution below.) The logic behind this approach was to get poor households focussed on the systematic accumulation of assets so that they could become members of the market economy and progressively improve their share in the economy. In other words, the
problem identified by COMDEV that needed to be overcome was the disconnect of these households from the formal economy, following a similar line of argument as Peruvian economist, Hernando de Soto (2000).

If the health and housing interventions earmarked poor *households*, the third aspect of COMDEV's portfolio pertained to community level social infrastructure such as libraries, parks, sport facilities and community halls. COMDEV was determined to transform these spaces and institutions into vibrant hubs of sociality and skills development where a sense of community and cohesion could be re-established, as well as gear youth up for economic participation in the increasingly skills-driven economy of the city. Central to COMDEV's thinking was an obsession to break the power and influence of criminal gangs in the zones of poverty. Gangs were indeed pervasive in these neighbourhoods, particularly the Coloured areas such as Hanover Park, Manenberg, Bonteheuwel and so on (Chipkin 2003; Kinnes 2000; Robins 2003). These gangs were essentially the *de facto* governance forces in these areas, including the allocation of public resources such as rental housing (Robins 2003). In a context of high levels of unemployment, the dependency on the illicit economies driven by the gangs was extremely high (Standing 2004). This fact made it difficult to convince households to break their dependency and instead opt for state programmes to address their livelihood needs. The problem was intractable because gang culture was effectively a way of life and often the only frame of reference, especially for young men in these communities (Chipkin 2003). Community services as well as taking back control of the housing allocation process became crucial symbolic interventions to break the control of the gangs and re-establish the authority of the state in these areas.

At a higher level of abstraction, Vawda articulated this three pronged strategy as a matter of fostering citizenship. Citizenship involved “granting all South Africans basic human rights” (Smith and Vawda 2003: 29), and depended on the establishment of good governance, participatory democracy and access to economic opportunities (Vawda, interview). The rights aspect was vital because it informed the meanings of governance, democracy and socio-economic rights. The rights discourse also foregrounded the importance of political agency and voice on the part of the poor to assert their rights and
claim state entitlements (Ibid.). This conceptual approach to the development challenge in the zones of poverty set Vawda and his team on a collision course with the other departments of the CCT. Vawda was extremely critical of the apolitical approach that was being followed by the Municipal Services and Finance departments whereby the development challenges was being defined as primarily a lack basic services amongst the poor in the city. According to Vawda this was too technocratic and instrumentalist and led to a situation whereby they asked the engineers to ensure delivery of basic services.

As a consequence, according to Vawda,

...the line the engineers were saying was: keep the politicians out. And Andrew [the City Manager] took that line. That means how do we kind of minimise political risk? But my sense was you can't [because] it is a political programme... This is why I said in the beginning [of the interview] that the officials-politicians stand-off was not a healthy one. Andrew was saying, mobilise the administration and we will deliver on the political agenda, and we'll manage that and that will satisfy [politicians] and we'll get to redistribution in that way. I was arguing: 'no, this is a political programme, draw them [the politicians] in and the issue of citizenship will create the conditions in which you shift the resources. Make it accessible, make the knowledge [freely available], provide the politicians with the capability of steering this and build a new institutional arrangement between politicians and officials and allow the officials to use the political mandate to restructure and redefine the agenda. [However,] the approach was to design an administrative machine that will keep the politicians at bay. And Philip [ED for Finance] essentially said: 'top-slice it [the budget] and keep the politicians satisfied while we try and restructure.' And I think we didn't restructure anything. And we missed a major opportunity... And that for me is the difference [between their and my approach.] The question then was: how do we, in building the citizen, in letting people who never participated in government, never had access to the decision-making abilities, be citizens? And they demanded that... There was a demand to define a place for themselves... (Vawda, interview)

Later in the interview, Vawda restates the problem even more strongly:

... because we didn't focus on the notion of citizenship building and the engagement with real people and structuring the relationship between political representation and community, and then the relationship between that and building democracy, we avoided the critical questions of citizenship, democracy and governance by saying "that will come if we get the administrative regime right around the distributional questions." And I think that we fudged the political questions. That was the big disjuncture (Vawda, interview).
The backdrop to these strident views is the uneven distribution of the municipal budget between the various departments. The Municipal Services department consumed almost 60% of the total budget whereas the remainder had to be divided by all the other departments. Vawda was outraged that the Parks and Forestry division in the Municipal Services Department consumed twice the health budget (Vawda, interview). This was not being addressed because the Municipal Services department was virtually untouchable because they were delivering the 'hard' or tangible infrastructure to the urban poor. Beyond the financial inequity, Vawda was particularly incensed about the absence of a debate about the developmental implications of this approach, which he also ascribes, in part, to the lack of civil society engagement with the council:

*I think there was no discussion and debate ever on what we really trying to do. There was not a sufficiently rigorous debate and that is why I say, where were all the progressives in trying to help us, interpret this and say: “what is this we trying to do and how can we do it.” And there was a silence. I don’t know why. I can't explain why it happened. But there wasn’t a debate and discussion going on... And that absence meant we had to struggle through this ourselves and there wasn’t the space to read, write, debate, understand and manage this huge beast that we were dealing with* (Vawda, interview).

In addition to these inter-departmental conflicts, COMDEV was also struggling to construct and grow the institutions (i.e. organisations, norms and rules) that had to implement the new approach. The health strategy led to the formulation of area-based teams that were made up of various professionals and service staff geared to tackle interlinked development problems through coordinated interventions. These interventions had to also be formulated through participatory processes with community-based organisations. Area Coordinating Teams (ACTs) were established to fulfil this function (Khan and Thurman 2000). The ACTs were made up of council staff, representatives of local organisations and politicians responsible for the area and had to fulfil ambitious aims.\(^7\) This coordinated approach was radical in a context where the administrative system and culture was essentially silo-based. The ACTs struggled to fulfil their aims

\(^7\) The aims of the ACTs were to: "coordinate council services in the area; area integrated development plans for the short and long-term; monitor and coordinate local projects; consolidate operational services and special projects in the area; develop public-private and public-community partnerships; facilitate community empowerment; decentralize problem solving to the neighbourhood level as a starting point for dealing with complaints in the area" (Smith and Vawda 2003: 46).
because they were essentially coordinating bodies without decision-making powers (Khan and Thurman 2000: 7). Issues raised by ACTs had to be acted upon by the relevant Branch or Cluster manager, which created a gap between the wishes of the ACT and the actions of council managers who were informed by the exigencies of the bureaucracy. One indicator of the complexity of this division of labour is the fact that housing matters were removed from the agenda of the Hanover Park ACT because it proved too contentious and divisive (Khan and Thurman 2000: 22). In general terms, all of the ACTs experienced profound conflict and there was not sufficient capacity to undertake effective conflict mediation. Furthermore, there was not always sufficient support and commitment from council staff to support and be responsive towards the ACTs (Khan and Thurman 2000).

The impending process of municipal amalgamation in December 2000 also instilled a sense of uncertainty into the deliberations of the ACTs. These teething problems meant that the ACTs were not fulfilling all its aims but did represent a very significant experiment in advancing a more integrated approach to community-level development.

The housing side of COMDEV’s work faced a different order of problems. The political ambition of the council was to deliver 5000 housing units per annum (Nevin, interviewed on 20 March 2003). This ideal proved frustratingly elusive for a number of reasons. First, even though the Housing Company idea was particularly novel and innovative, it was an immensely complex institutional animal to design and establish. As a consequence, the CCT under-estimated the level of initial capitalisation that was required to make it viable (Nevin, interview). Furthermore, the skills required by its staff were not fully understood which lead to a problem of skills-mismatch exacerbated by too few staff. Second, the national housing subsidy system translated into very long lead times for housing developments. Put more simply, it could take up to 4 years between committing resources to build houses and actually going on site to lay foundations. This meant that housing administered by the council in, for example, 1998 was already approved in 1994 even before the current policy regime was in place! This made it difficult to re-direct housing infrastructure investments to the areas where COMDEV wanted it to go. Third, because of the financial and capacity constraints, the housing company had very little leverage over private developers who were in fact building the actual houses. These developers were determined to maximise their profit margins and therefore insisted on building on
green-field sites as opposed to infill areas that would lead to greater compaction (Nevin, interview). Because the politicians were so desperate to achieve the delivery of houses, the developers were allowed to dictate the location of new housing, as long as new housing was being provided. This pragmatic imperative further undermined the possibility of robust debate about the politics and interventions of achieving urban integration as required in terms of the number one over-arching strategic priority of the council.

This is a highly truncated overview of a very complex and multi-layered set of processes that unfolded between 1997 - 2000 in COMDEV branches, and between it and other departments of the CCT. The main point that needs to be stressed is that COMDEV embarked on highly innovative and risky processes to realise a holistic development intervention because it defined poverty reduction through the strengthening of political citizenship as the most urgent task in delivering urban integration. Some critics have branded this effort as hopelessly naïve and moralistic (Chipkin 2003). Others have suggested that COMDEV was not that interested in community empowerment but rather sought to impose an external agenda without fully understanding the depth of dependency on the gang economy (Robins 2003). This is not the place to interrogate these arguments, which I regard as misplaced, but it is important to recognise how contested the strategy was. What is of interest is the fact that COMDEV went further than any other department in the CCT to grapple with the operational implications of urban integration at the neighbourhood scale. If the Muni-SDF had ambitions to define the elements of urban integration, COMDEV fleshed out the informants of integration at a local scale. Significantly, due to the conflicts between COMDEV and the Planning branch, these two equally important pieces of the integration puzzle was never explicitly articulated which represent a huge missed opportunity. It also explains in part the absence of political and policy debate about the multiple dimensions of integration and how it can be advanced in a properly sequenced and coordinated manner. This takes me to question of institutional reform to support the pursuit of urban integration.
Organisational Alignment to Achieve Urban Integration

At the very outset of the CCT's establishment in 1996 there was an awareness that extensive organisational restructuring would have to be undertaken to enable the bureaucracy to function in a more developmental manner (CCT 1996; Mowser, interview). However, despite this awareness, both political and administrative managers could not foresee just how difficult the task would be, as intimated earlier. In this section I want to briefly focus on the approach of the CCT to organisational restructuring in terms of the broader aim to achieve greater urban integration in the city. It is a vital dimension of the overall picture of what happened between 1996 – 2000 as the CCT figured out through practice how best to effect its seven strategic priorities.

The aims of the organisational transformation strategy was to achieve “greater teamwork and greater coordination” (Sibisi, interview) within and between the silo-based departments. Improved coordination and more teamwork were seen as prerequisites for the advancement of urban integration and a more development oriented bureaucracy. There was also the cost-saving imperative of achieving greater efficiency from the existing human resources in the organisation. This priority was pursued through an expansive business improvement reform process, driven by IBM Management Consulting. Affirmative action was a third priority that informed the design and focus of the organisational transformation programme of the CCT. These three informants added up to a highly complex and difficult reform agenda. The person charged with leading the process was Sinazo Sibisi who was initially an ANC Councillor. This history gave Sibisi unique insight into the political perspective of Exco and the Council, as well as easy access to central actors on Exco. Sibisi was also the only Black woman on the EMT.

The impact of this organisational transformation programme was limited and this directly influenced the success of the CCT in realising its first strategic priority – integrating the city. Sibisi (interview) argued that “the lack of institutional integration in terms of our operations is a major factor in our failure to integrate the city more broadly.” She proceeds to offer four primary reasons for the limited success of the change management programme of her department. First, the so-called old guard (management staff that were in the organisation for decades) actively resisted change and undermined organisational
change interventions. This group was large, knew how to use bureaucratic rules and procedures and had an arsenal of foot-dragging instruments at their disposal. Sibisi's department was simply too small and thinly spread to fully understand how this power-bloc operated, let alone neutralise them. Second, the power of silo-based operations could not be broken. This was reflected in the inability to establish multi-disciplinary teams, which were seen as vital to get the organisation to work in a more coordinated and inter-linked fashion. The one exception mentioned by Sibisi is the area-based management system introduced by COMDEV (discussed above). Third, the “EMT failed to drive the [transformation] agenda coherently” (Sibisi, interview). In other words, the various interventions and programmes of the different departments were not consistent and mutually reinforcing. This analysis is borne out by the perspective of Ahmedi Vawda (interview) who actively opposed the narrow basic needs agenda of the Municipal Services department, as discussed above. A fourth and related reason proffered by Sibisi is the constant contestations between some members of the EMT (particularly between planning and COMDEV) and between the EMT and Exco. The friction between the EMT and Exco emerged as a strong theme in other interviews as well (for example, with councillors L. Lecontry, S. Mowser, F. de Vries). In fact, towards the end of the CCT tenure, Councillor Mowser launched this stinging attack on the administration:

I am also very concerned to hear reports of officials talking about slippages and not being able to complete projects on time or of projects [not] being implemented at all. This is unacceptable. Time after time, we ask for progress reports and we are told things are on track, and the wool gets pulled over Councillor's eyes. But you can't pull the wool over the eyes of the community and they see when things aren't getting done and that promises made are not kept (Mowser, Presentation to Exco/Emt on 9 December 1999, pp.3-4).

This statement confirms that there was considerable conflict about the speed of implementation. It is worth pointing out though that at this stage, the politicians knew an election was coming up in a year's time and the ANC's delivery track record on basic services and housing would be the primary yardstick to assess their performance, and not ephemeral, nice-sounding sentiments about greater 'team work' and 'coordination'. This contradiction between doing the painstaking back-room work to create an organisation that can work in more developmental ways, and using the existing administration to deliver on tangible goods for the urban poor and others, is the faultline that runs through
the efforts of the CCT to transform the organisation. The results were indeed, as Sinazo Sibisi acknowledges, far from successful in terms of integrating the city.

Before I conclude the chapter, it is necessary to briefly mention a last category of interventions of the CCT aimed at fostering urban integration. These were clustered as special initiatives over and above the normal operation of the council, aimed at fast-tracking and linking the first six strategic priorities of the council. These special initiatives were funded through the savings accrued from the cut in all departmental budgets mentioned earlier.

**Special initiatives of CCT**

There were a number of so-called special initiatives. In fact, in December 1999 the Exco Chairperson, Saliem Mowser mentioned eighteen of these. I am not intending to explore all of these but want to rather hone in on two that are of particular relevance to the focus of the chapter.

**Cultural interventions**

The Mayor championed a cultural strategy in the form of an annual event, *The One City Many Cultures Festival*. This festival was done in conjunction with one of the daily newspapers and sought to "unite Capetonians" and "bridge historic divides" (CCT 2000: 6). It was a largely symbolic event that aimed to provide ordinary people from all parts of the city an opportunity to mix and enjoy cultural displays in the main CBD area. It symbolised free access for all to all parts of the city and also an opportunity to celebrate the right to do so. It was intended to be the space where those who have been excluded - through forced removals and racial segregation - from the mainstream opportunities of

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71 Mowser mentions the following special projects: the convention centre; the canal project linking the V&A Waterfront to the CBD; the Fedure Phillip development; the Athlone stadium and precinct development; Wingfield; District six; the Wetton-Landsdowne corridor project; the Waterfront phase II; the BOE development at the Waterfront; The Marina residential development; St John's Estate; the Carousal development in Sea Point; the Mitchell's Plain textile factory; tourism development; the headquarters of the Mediterranean Shipping company on the Foreshore; the CBD strategy with Cape Town partnership and the CCTV programme; and the Kudu Gas Project (Mowser, Presentation to Exco/Emt on 9 December 1999, pp.6-7). The significance of this inventory is that most of these special projects are about creating a conducive investment and operational climate for private business. This preoccupation reinforced the undifferentiated financial management approach of the Finance Department, which sought to achieve savings and efficiency at virtually any cost.
the city, could reclaim their right to be in those spaces. Of course, it was a temporary intervention and hardly affected the course of property markets and inequalities that made it impossible for those at the receiving end of segregation to reclaim what they have lost. For this reason, some respondents (Lecontry, interview; Sibisi, interview) argued that this intervention took attention away from the structural interventions that were required to alter the causes of urban segregation and fragmentation. Also, some scholars (Pillay 2001) argued that the festival celebrated a very uncritical notion of multiculturalism and failed to interrogate and expose the enduring power of racism. Thus, the festival was not without its critics but nevertheless reflects an awareness that urban integration was not merely about spatial integration and equitable service delivery; it had to connect culturally with the social practices of residents in the city.

**Lansdowne-Wetton Corridor**

Earlier in Chapter Four, I demonstrated how the national Department of Transport advanced an approach to urban integration based on the concept of transport corridors that would act as movement corridors and activity spines for a wide mix of residential, reproductive and productive activities. In order to test this approach, the Department of Transport initiated a series of pilot projects across South Africa in 1995. Cape Town nominated the Lansdowne-Wetton Corridor, as identified in the MSDF, as a suitable site for the pilot. This fell in the jurisdiction of the CCT when it came into being in May 1996. The pilot was thereafter located in the CCT. The project was funded by national government and a team of six planning professionals were appointed to conceptualise and implement the pilot. This team was set up in the Spatial Planning department of the CCT but functioned as a largely autonomous unit. The programme was officially launched in May 1996 and almost immediately a number of lead projects were identified. By November 1996, the first public event took place to solicit community involvement and raise awareness. Feasibility investigations and planning proceeded apace and by May 1997 a draft spatial plan was distributed for comment (Watson 2001). (Note that at this stage there was still no movement on producing a general spatial plan for the city as requested by Exco from the outset.)
The approach of the Lansdowne-Wetton Corridor team was to establish demonstration projects from the outset so that the various stakeholders and beneficiaries could immediately see the benefit of the initiative. The demonstration projects in turn served as a learning laboratory and informed the next cycle of planning and implementation. This dynamic and fluid approach meant that the team could point to new investments and concrete deliverables within a very short period of time. For example, by 1998 a number of lead projects were well on their way to completion. As these projects came on-stream, another cycle of projects were put in play. Moreover, the combination of these projects reflected an ability of the Corridor team to get different departments of the CCT to make their contributions in a coordinated fashion. A feat that tended to escape other sections of the organisation, with the possible exception of COMDEV. In this sense, the Lansdowne-Wetton Corridor pilot initiative demonstrated a different form of area-based development that was distinct from the traditional sectoral approach to planning or transport development.

Watson (2001) ascribes the relative success of this initiative to a number of factors. One, the team had a unique financial stream and significant autonomy to use their discretion to allocate the interest that accrued from the national funds. Two, the financial cushion afforded by the arrangements around the interest accrued allowed the team to leverage other departments to make their contribution to the project without necessarily adding to their financial woes in a broader context of financial pressure. Three, the team was led by a good manager that was adept at unlocking the energy and skills of his team. Four, the team worked extremely well as a unit, in part, because as planners, they shared a professional vocabulary and set of reference points. Watson (2001) concludes from this that if the team was made up of professionals from different backgrounds they would probably not have achieved the degree of unity and effectiveness. Such a conclusion negates much of the conventional wisdom of inter-disciplinary teams and area-based interventions. Nevertheless, the Lansdowne-Wetton Corridor pilot does underscore the

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72 These projects were: the Wynberg public transport interchange; landscaping and creation of public walkways of Lotus River Canal; the upgrade of bus shelters, embayments, taxi rank and informal markets at the Zwelitsha Drive area in Nyanga; a cluster development - long-haul transport interchange, new railway station, fresh-produce market and residential stock - in Phillipi at Stock Road; and the Ikwesi Community Centre (Watson 2001: 6).
potential effectiveness of a spatially-concentrated or area-based approach to the pursuit of integrated development processes.

It is in this light that it is interesting to observe that the rest of the Planning Department did not approve of the Corridor team's separateness and their work. By 1999 an effort was made by the head of Spatial Planning to disband the team and incorporate the work on the Corridor into the mainstream work of the department. And it is certainly noteworthy and telling that the lessons from the Lansdowne-Wetton Corridor does not seem to have informed the drafting of the Muni-SDF. In a related vein, it is also telling that the contiguous learning processes around area-based development interventions of the ACTs were not related to the learning from the Corridor pilot. Trends that suggest that the few pockets of innovation and experimentation on how to concretise more holistic development interventions towards urban integration, were not engaging with each other. In such a fragmented situation it is unlikely that the strategic vision and developmental ambitions of the Council would materialise. The cost of this is made clear in terms of the failed impact on the overall spatial economy of the city.

6.5 IMPACT OF CCT ON THE SPATIAL ECONOMY OF CAPE TOWN

Ivan Turok (2001) explains in detail how the perpetuation of the apartheid city manifested in four spatial trends that individually and collectively reproduced urban segregation and fragmentation in Cape Town between 1994-2001. The four trends are:

• Decentralisation: a net shift in economic activity away from the main central business district towards suburban centres in higher income areas as opposed to the poorer south-east sector of Cape Town;

• Deconcentration: a net shift in economic activity away from established centres towards a more dispersed pattern of development, which produces a more spatially fragmented pattern of lower-density and car-oriented culture in affluent areas;

• Northern-drift: a steady shift in the centre of economic gravity of the city northwards, mainly through new property development investments that attract jobs and resources to the north, away from the impoverished south-east; and
• **Differentiation:** the growing tendency for economic centres in the city to specialise in different market segments, which have encouraged further social segregation and spatial separation (Turok 2001: 2358-2361).^{73}

The obvious point to make is that these trends are directly opposite to the patterns envisaged in the MSDF and similar policies such as the Muni-SDF. The local state and planning in particular had virtually no impact on the behaviour and attitudes of private developers in the city. The CCT's primary agenda to ensure the extension of basic services to under- and un-serviced areas where the Black majority lived – largely on the urban peripheries and inside established townships – left private sector driven property development markets untouched and unchallenged. Clearly, given the organisational and financial challenges that the CCT faced, very little attention was focused on other, equally important, interventions to ensure that the urban poor could find access to housing opportunities on strategically located parcels of land and not on the periphery. Such interventions would have begun to shift the four patterns of exclusion and fragmentation identified by Turok. In the next chapter, I want to explore how one such site, Wingfield, was not seized upon to effect spatial integration even though it was recognised early on in the tenure of the CCT as a highly strategic area for housing and other development opportunities. But first, it is appropriate to summarise my main findings with regard to the efforts and performance of the CCT between 1996 – 2000 to bring greater urban integration to life.

### 6.6 MAIN FINDINGS

At the outset of the CCT's tenure period there was a vague conception of urban integration amongst both politicians and administrative managers. The three dominant associations of urban integration were:

- racial integration through residential mixing and infill strategies, which would be clarified in a spatial planning framework;
- greater equity in terms of access to services and assets (especially housing) and improved mobility through (public) transport improvements;

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^{73} Ivan Turok's analysis refers to the entire metropolitan region that is larger than the jurisdiction of the CCT. Nonetheless, given that the CCT had the largest planning department and was the largest municipal agency in the metropolitan region, it can be held accountable for much of the regulation of the spatial economy.
• social mixing through cultural exposure, e.g. through the One City Many Cultures festivals.

These understandings were in play more implicitly than explicitly. As a result, even though urban integration was one of the seven strategic priorities defined early on, it was never clearly defined in any policy of the CCT.

There was a widespread belief amongst the political and administrative leaders that a spatial plan/framework was needed to point the way in terms of how urban integration could be effected. A window of opportunity for a robust political debate on the tenets and drivers of urban integration was lost after the first 12-18 months. By the end of 1997 everyday organisational crises eclipsed the search for a grounded strategic pathway to urban integration that was also spatially anchored.

Sectoral and departmental programmes and plans were conceptualised outside of a spatial planning framework that addressed the micro, meso and macro scales of the city. Sectoral priorities and lenses were reinforced by the parochial departmental preoccupations that were put in train and intensified, especially, in the wake of the pressures of financial adjustment, organisational restructuring and service delivery. As a result it became very difficult to break the deeply entrenched silo-based organisational culture and structure of departments in the CCT.

The complexity and scale of the organisational transformation dimension of the transition process was under-estimated or unimaginable for new municipal managers who served on the EMT. The intractability of vested interests sucked-out much of the energy of the strategic management team, leaving little time for strategic analysis and steering. This was compounded by the political strategy of South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU) (and other trade unions) that focussed on delaying substantive restructuring, ostensibly until an IDP was in place.74 The slow pace of organisational transformation

74 Due to space constraints I have not explored the impact of industrial relations on the efforts of the EMT and Exco to realise the strategic aims of the CCT. Essentially the unions took a position that the interests of their members had to be protected and improved throughout the processes of amalgamation of various councils (M. Abrahams, interviewed on 17 July 2002). This proved extremely conflictual because staff from different, racially-specific, councils had widely different conditions of service and benefits. The unions predictably pushed for an upward (i.e. to the highest level) adjustment across the board so that everyone enjoyed the
made it very difficult to implement new, more developmental, programmes. There was a significant mismatch between the development objectives of the municipality and the institutional culture and norms that remained dominant in the organisation.

The financial restructuring and adjustment process also added to the pressure on departments and especially middle and senior managers. The pressure of cost-cutting at a fixed rate irrespective of function and history of a department or service, created a lot of stress and conflict within and between departments. Managers in newer functions felt that it was un-strategic and inappropriate to experience an indiscriminate adjustment requirement even before the service was fully developed or reorganised. There is an acknowledgement that the cost cutting exercise did produce important savings and efficiencies that freed up some resources to pursue new priorities. The criticism was that the fixed-rate cut for all was too blunt an instrument to advance the seven strategic priorities of the council.

Inter-council (especially with the CMC) and inter-governmental conflicts were endemic and profoundly damaging for all concerned. The factionalised nature of all political parties (inflected by race dynamics) exacerbated the problem. For instance, ANC priorities and agendas of the CCT would be undermined by councillors from the same party that served on the CMC. Significant waste and lost opportunities were the result. This, seemingly ingrained, dynamic is critical because every aspect of the urban integration gamut relies on a degree of inter-governmental coordination and alignment.

The political urgency of housing and basic services eclipsed other elements of a more comprehensive approach to urban integration. As a consequence the criteria for success shifted from ‘just and equitable outcomes’ to ‘equitable opportunities’ for all wherever they may find themselves in the city. This discursive shift created the risk of failing to recognise and address historically engraved patterns of injustice and exclusion. To be sure,
the CCT had an impressive track record in terms of reallocating both the capital and operating budgets to ensure greater equity in terms of service delivery. This is clearly the council's biggest achievement during their term of office. (Arguably, this can serve as a firm foundation for a more comprehensive approach to urban integration in the future.)

Internal communication breakdowns between departments due to conflicts and diverse (divergent) conceptual frameworks produced fragmentation instead of collaboration and synergy. In terms of developing a robust policy framework for urban integration this is particularly evident in the lack of connection between the Muni-SDF and the area-based models of COMDEV and to some extent, the Lansdowne-Wetton Corridor experiment even though the latter was in the same department as the planners who formulated the Muni-SDF.

There was a failure to engage directly enough with land and property markets due to a limited engagement with the private sector, particularly interests representing the property development and related sectors. This was linked to a larger blind spot: analysing and understanding the regional economy and particularly the economic significance of the council's operations. This de facto disengagement from the regional economy and its influential actors undermined the pursuit of more risky or innovative strategies. Such strategies could have involved high profile symbolic actions aimed at triggering investment climate changes that opened the way for interventions to shift attitudes, behaviours and investment patterns. For example, the infill opportunities in Culemborg, Wingfield, Ysterplaat, Moulli Point golf course, District Six, Salt River, Woodstock, the CBD, etc. were simply not seized upon with the requisite political attention. Engagements with the private sector were restricted to creating favourable investment climates (e.g. Central Improvement Districts) and little beyond that. The spatial economy remained intact, and if anything, solidified prior patterns of racial segregation, exclusion and inequality.

6.7 CONCLUSION
The striking feature of the CCT is the fact that a shift occurred in how urban integration was understood and justified from the time the ANC came into power until the end of its
term when the CCT dissolved into the Cape Town Unicity. In May 1996, urban integration denoted spatial integration of people and communities to reverse apartheid social engineering rooted in racism. But, by December 2000, integration denoted the need to give everyone in the city, irrespective of their spatial location, equitable access to urban opportunities defined primarily as municipal services. This is a profound shift in meaning reflects in part the political-economic and institutional complexity of spatial reorganisation when land values and markets are at stake. It also reflects the political imperative to claim victories and paint success when an election is at stake. The ANC did indeed make laudable progress on the service equity front and it made sense for them to show those achievements to the electorate in seeking re-election. However, the worrying trend is that ANC and progressive activists seeking urban integration based on spatial justice, believed their own slight of hand. In other words, it became commonplace and accepted to believe the recast idea that urban integration merely involves equitable access to urban opportunities, particularly municipal services.

Significantly, planning had limited impact on this situation. The Muni-SDF was so encrusted in formalistic planning terminology and reified concepts that it could not create an opening for planners to shift the general direction and practices of the CCT departments so that they may pay attention to the structural dimensions of urban segregation and fragmentation. This is mainly because the planners and planning framework failed to adopt a sufficiently nuanced understanding of politics and power in the organisation, and especially, the city at large. In the absence of such an understanding planning was largely irrelevant and potentially reactionary when it did guide land-use decisions, as the next chapter demonstrates.
CHAPTER 7
Planning Conflicts and the Search for Urban Integration: The Case of Wingfield

7.1 INTRODUCTION
A central feature of the imaginary about the post-apartheid city was the idea that racially divided and excluded groups would be provided with access to strategic locations within the city in order to better access urban opportunities and effect residential desegregation. This imaginary applied at a national and local level and found its way into numerous policies and legislation as demonstrated in Chapters Five and Six. However, in the process of forging the post-apartheid city through new policy and governance arrangements and the pursuit of rapid service delivery, this imaginary shifted. Instead of thinking about urban integration as the physical desegregation of the city through infill and residential compaction, urban integration became more a matter of ensuring equitable access to services for everyone in the city. As a consequence of this shift, planning became ineffectual in shaping the political and policy priorities of the City of Cape Town (CCT). The primary reason was the fact that the planning department of the CCT took too long to produce a spatial development framework that set out how urban integration and the other strategic priorities of the City could be realised. A related reason is the fact that when the planning department eventually tabled a draft municipal spatial development framework (Muni-SDF), it was of such a purist nature in planning terms that it failed to provide a sufficiently grounded response to the development challenges that faced the other departments in the CCT. In other words, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, the Muni-SDF was perceived by the other departments as a hifalutin planning discourse that was of little practical help in solving their immediate problems.

In this chapter I want to explore the impact of the Muni-SDF on the behaviour of the planning department in dealing with land management and development opportunities that could have accelerated urban integration and compaction by relocating African residents of the city onto a highly strategic parcel of land called Wingfield. The purpose of this exploration is to demonstrate how the planning approach (i.e. admixture of new urbanism and compact city principles) embedded in the Muni-SDF translated into
everyday policy action, which perversely led to a situation where the CCT opposed the struggles of African residents to stake a land claim on one of the most important infill sites in Cape Town. The issue is more complex. The planning department and relevant political committee did not oppose the land restitution claim of a group of African citizens, but rather opposed the quantum of their claim on the grounds that granting them the claim would jeopardise the scope of the CCT to use the land for urban integration purposes for a much larger group of people than was represented by the claimants. This assertion was justified on the basis of the land development principles of the spatial development framework. In the context of conflicting political and economic interests in the city, the claim of the CCT to act consistent with its planning framework was not convincing for the claimants and the Land Claims Commissioner who was a central actor in the drama. As a consequence a stand-off arose whereby the CCT opposed the quantum of the land claim and the claimants mobilised politically to secure the demand for land on the Wingfield site. In the end the claimants outsmarted the planners but could not capitalise on their victory because of inter-governmental fragmentation and conflict. This micro-case study allows me to explore in greater detail the everyday dimensions of planning (discourses) in relation to the larger urban development policy objective of urban integration. On the basis of this episode, and the two empirical chapters before, I will be able to draw conclusions about the role, function and potential of planning in overcoming segregation, fragmentation and urban inequality.

The chapter is divided into five parts. First, I provide some context about the Wingfield site and why it represented one of the most ideal opportunities to catalyse greater urban integration. The first part will demonstrate what was at stake in the potential redevelopment of the site, located within a discussion about how the CCT understood the function of Wingfield as set out in the Muni-SDF. The second part sketches the various actors involved in the land-use dispute. With that background, the third part delves into the detail of the land-use dispute between the Ndabeni Communal Property Trust (NCPT) and the CCT, amongst others. The dispute raises the question: urban integration on whose terms? In exploring the answer to this question in the fourth part, it becomes clear that the planning imaginary and discursive framework of the planners in the CCT effectively blinded them to the underlying political factors that were at play and highly
relevant for a contingent and non-dogmatic approach to land-use and development that could lead to more integrative outcomes. Part five extrapolates the implications of the case study for the role of planning in advancing infill residential and mixed-use development, which constitutes one of the main planks of the compact city planning approach. Lastly, the conclusion summarises the main findings of the chapter and links it back to the preceding chapters. By covering this ground, I intend to demonstrate the operational dynamics of the Muni-SDF and how progressive values in compact city approaches can be turned on its head and block redistributive processes if applied in a purist manner, i.e. oblivious to complex and messy political dynamics. This raises profound questions about the role of planning ideas and the role of the planners who seek to give effect to these concepts in the development of the city; either challenging or reinforcing the status quo.

**Plate 7.1: Wingfield site in relation to the Central Business District**

7.2 **WINGFIELD: SITE OF OPPORTUNITY AND CONFLICT**

The entire Wingfield site measures some 326ha, of which the state owns 281ha and a parastatal, Propnet, owns a further 45ha. Wingfield was Cape Town’s first airfield, established in the 1920s. Until 1955, when a proper commercial airfield was opened
(where Cape Town International Airport is today), Wingfield served as both a military and commercial airfield. After that it became a military base and with its origins as an airfield, it "has always been known for its vast tracts of vacant and under-utilised land" (MBH Architects, 2002:1). The site is also highly strategically located in terms of access to road and rail infrastructure, flourishing industrial areas and retail malls and strips (See Figure 7.1). For these reasons (holding vacant tracts of land and being in close proximity to numerous urban resources, especially economic), the site has been the focus of alternative development ambitions for some time. The site is owned by the Department of Public Works (DPW), but is occupied by buildings (mainly storage facilities) of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). As mentioned earlier, a portion of the land is also owned by Propnet, the property management company owned exclusively by the transport parastatal, Transnet.

Wingfield formed the heart of Cape Town's 2004 Olympic Bid, which specified that the main stadium and residential village would be constructed there. A key part of the Bid proposals were post-bid scenarios, which "incorporated high density residential areas, parklands, recreation areas and mixed use activity along Voortrekker Road" (MBH Architects 2002:1). Significantly, the Olympic bid proposals were clearly influenced by compact city planning ideas (P. de Tolly, interview on 16 July 2002). South Africa lost the Bid to Athens and along with it, seemingly the political will to pursue policies that would ensure the construction of mixed-use developments earmarked for the historically marginalized groups in the city. An important aspect of this saga was agreement by various government departments (defence, public works, land affairs, housing and transport) that had a stake in the site to relinquish ownership and supply subsidies to ensure that the Olympic plans would materialise. Such commitments were essential because investment guarantees are vital for the credibility of Olympic Bid proposals (Hiller 2000). Given the general urban development policy orientation of the CCT outlined in Chapter Six, one would assume that the CCT would have been able to secure similar commitments from national government departments to pursue mixed-use integrative development even after the Olympic Bid failed. But, as will become clearer below, this was not at all the case. Before I present the dynamics of the case study, it is crucial to point out that as part of the Olympic Bid proposal agreements were established
with the Ndabeni claimants (see below for an elaboration) that their land restitution claim could be incorporated into the Olympic planning frameworks. Significantly, the Bid Company was anxious that this should not consume too much of the available land.\(^7\) This was in contradistinction to the view of the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) that settling the Ndabeni land claim on the site would jeopardise the Bid (Interview with NCPT Executive, 25 June 2003).

Figure 7.1: Economic activity surrounding Wingfield site

(Source: Setplan in MBH Architects 2002)

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\(^7\) Drawn from correspondence by Peter de Tolly to the Director General of the DPW on 6 October 1997.
Once the Olympic Bid collapsed when Cape Town was not selected as the host city for the 2004 Olympic Games, the situation changed dramatically. All planning work for the land seized, the DPW regarded itself as the sole owner and the SANDF gave up on the idea of moving their facilities and consolidating their installations on a much smaller parcel of land. Crucially though, the Ndabeni land claimants saw an opportunity to reassert their claim on a significant portion of the Wingfield land especially since they managed to get a foot in the door in the planning processes that surrounded the Olympic Bid. However, their battle for land would prove to be protracted, highly conflictual and fated for perpetual deferral. To fully appreciate why, especially since their claim can be regarded as an ideal opportunity for urban integration, it is vital to step back and understand what was at stake and who the key actors were.

Figure 7.2: Wingfield site in relation to existing public and private investments

(Source: CCT 2004)
The stakes
One of the most important symbolic aspects of post-apartheid reconstruction and
development is land restitution, which typically "involves returning land lost because of
racially discriminatory laws, although it can also be effected through compensation" (GCIS 2001: 400). The heightened symbolic importance stems, in part, from the culturally embedded significance of land ownership and, in part, from its 'demonstration-value' that a reversal of the segregationist essence of apartheid spatiality can (potentially) be achieved. Yet, land restitution and reform has been one of the most ineffectual policy areas of the ANC government, in large part because the legal framework has lead to complex and administratively slow processes of redress (Lahiff and Rugege 2002). Also, there has been systematic marketisation-creep in the evolving policy framework. Unsurprisingly, this is a source of great frustration for many poor and disadvantaged citizens, who look to land restitution as a means of getting hold of a productive asset. At another level, the physical form of most settlements in South Africa has remained more or less intact despite the legal disappearance of racial segregation policies, as demonstrated in Chapter Five. In other words, due to the price of centrally located land, poor South Africans who are by and large also Black, tend to settle or be housed on peripheral land that is cheap. Well located land for people with low or no incomes is virtually non-existent. For this reason, opportunities to use state owned land to visibly alter the physical features of the city by settling poorer Black people there are of immeasurable political and symbolic importance, especially for ANC-led local authorities. This was even more acute for the CCT because it was surrounded by New National Party and Democratic Party controlled councils, who opposed large scale land redistribution.

The Wingfield site in Cape Town, along with District Six, Culemborg and Athlone Golf Course, represented a dual opportunity for addressing land restitution claims—vital for realising historical social justice in the city—and ensuring access for (poorer) Black citizens to strategic locations in the city. Given the intensely segregated nature of Cape Town, these opportunities are so few that their symbolic and economic significances are hard to over-estimate. However, as we will see, these opportunities were not seized by the leadership of the CCT. To understand why this did not happen and, by extension, why realising urban integration through infill projects is so vexed, we need to first understand who the different actors were in the drama. Secondly, we need to know what
the main fissures of contestation and conflict between these actors were between the time when the Olympic Bid collapsed and when a settlement was reached about the use of the Wingfield site, just before the municipal elections in December 2000. In particular, I want to focus on the planning ideas that informed the municipal planners who were central to the dispute.

The Key Actors

The Ndabeni Communal Property Trust (NCPT) was a key actor, representing 723 claimants (and their families) who were forcibly removed from their properties in Ndabeni in the 1920s and 1930s to make space for new industrial developments. In total, about 1000 people were removed but not all of them were signed-up members of the NCPT. Other potential claimants had the option of pursuing restitution as individuals. With the forced removals from Ndabeni, people were scattered to different locations in the city but settled mainly in Langa, the first dormitory township for Africans. When they were removed, they were occupying public housing and did not own the land. However, in staking their claim at Wingfield it was for the same amount of land that was lost, i.e. 54.8ha, with a clear recognition that the remainder of the site could be used for commercial and further residential development.

The leading respondent to the claim was the Planning Department of the CCT, under the leadership of Peter de Tolly who also happened to be the Director of Planning for the Olympic Bid Company. Due to his prior role with the Bid Company, de Tolly was intimately familiar with the Ndabeni claimants and their agenda. Towards the end of 1999, a formal Land Restitution Unit was established under the tutelage of Mr de Tolly in the Planning Department of the CCT to deal with the various land restitution issues across the jurisdiction of the CCT. The Planning Department reported to the Planning Committee, which was chaired by a National Party Councillor, Mr. Justice.

The owner of the Wingfield land was the DPW, except for an adjacent site of 45ha that was owned by Propnet. The Wingfield site was not a major priority for the DPW because of many other competing agendas that vie for its attention. This was compounded by the fact that Cape Town politics and challenges were regarded as a special case by the ANC
and, by extension, many of the national government departments that have their headquarters in Pretoria. The main reason why Cape Town issues are less visible on the national political radar screen was because the electorate is largely conservative and tends to support former White political parties, such as the New National Party and the Democratic Party (since 2000, the Democratic Alliance) (Nijzink and Jacobs 2000). This is exacerbated by the fact that, historically, Cape Town has enjoyed disproportionate state investment combined with violent exclusionary measures to keep Africans from settling in the city. These factors have produced social conditions that make the Cape Town region and surrounding province generate the best development indicators in the country relative to other provinces. Consequently, the ANC government has developed financial formulas that actively disadvantage the provincial and local governments relative to other regions, which will remain in force until inter-provincial equity is established. This intergovernmental dynamic plays itself out even though the CCT was ANC-controlled because the officials were seen as the real actors with power (A. Roberts, interviewed on 2 August 2002).

The SANDF is an important actor, because it owns and utilises most of the buildings scattered across the site. Any mixed-use, high intensity development requires the Defence Department to agree to relocate its activities. Furthermore, military-type installations can dampen other forms of development, because of the perceived risks and the security measures that need to be put in place to isolate buildings from civilian penetration. The administrative culture is usually one of secrecy and lack of communication. All of these dynamics came into play in the conflict about the most ‘developmental’ use of the Wingfield site. It must be pointed out, though, that the defence department’s agreement to surrender 98ha of the land for mixed-used development was a vital catalyst for the process to move ahead.

In terms of the land reform institutional architecture in South Africa, a special Land Claims Court was established to adjudicate land restitution and redistribution claims. In the case of Wingfield, Judge Moloto was the presiding magistrate and played a key role in fostering agreement between the contending parties surrounding the claim of the NCLT. The Land Claims Court, in turn, relies on the Office of the Land Claims Commissioner
(LCC) to do the investigative work before a case reaches court. The LCC is a key actor in clarifying, framing and mediating land claims. The LCC responsible for Cape Town was Alan Roberts, a veteran trade unionist, closely connected to the ANC establishment within and outside of government. More importantly, he considered himself charged with the same political mandate that he held when he was a trade union and community activist in the trenches of the anti-apartheid struggle (Roberts, interview). This orientation proved vital in how the dispute around land restitution at Wingfield was eventually settled. On this note, it is appropriate to move onto a discussion about the central land-use conflict that animates the case study.

**Land-use Dispute: Urban Integration on Whose Terms?**

Once the Olympic Bid failed, the Ndabeni community proceeded with its restitution claim, but failed to get much response from the various authorities involved. As a strategy to force reaction to their land claim they decided, with support from the LCC, to take the matter to the Land Claims Court. A notice of a pre-trial conference to address the claim was issued on 30 September 1998 and the CCT responded with an affidavit setting out its position on 13 October 1998. This set off a chain of events that produced intense political heat about the future of the site. The CCT did not oppose the land claim in principle, but contested the quantum of land that was targeted for restitution. Its opposition was based on a spatial planning argument that too much land will be gobbled up by the claim, leaving too little for mixed-use development as envisioned in the Muni-SDF. Essentially, the CCT planners marshalled a series of arguments based on compact city planning ideas that regarded mixed-use developments for the benefit of the largest number of people—and for the broader environment—as more developmental than addressing the specific historical claim of the Ndabeni community.

To appreciate the basis of the disagreement between the CCT and the claimants, it is crucial to unpack the key tenets and vision of the Muni-SDF, because the contestation turns on different interpretations of equity and justice—principles adopted in the Muni-SDF. The planners arguably worked with an abstracted notion of equity and justice whereas the claimants pushed for a historically-grounded definition of equity and justice. (I will return to this discussion below.) In Chapter Six, I explored the main tenets of the
Muni-SDF in relation to its argument about the role of planning in addressing urban integration, or conversely, urban fragmentation and segregation. With that backdrop in mind, it is relevant to extract the perspective of the Muni-SDF about the Wingfield site because it informed the stance of the planners in the Wingfield land-use dispute.

As demonstrated before, the vision of the Muni-SDF was for the gradual emergence of "a cohesive system of nodes (urban centres and parks) and an interconnected network of linear elements (green space and activity corridors)... bringing with it much greater integration and equity as well as convenience, greater choice and wider range of opportunities" for everyone in the city, especially those denied such access during the apartheid era (CCT 1999: 27). The nodes in this spatial system function in a hierarchy of importance, with the level 1 node representing the most intense agglomeration of opportunities and services; level 2 slightly less; and level 3 being the least intense but also significant in terms of the opportunities clustered there. Activity corridors further link these nodes of agglomeration which also provide the spines around which increasingly mixed and diverse developments are nurtured in terms of a clearly defined set of land-use principles. In the Muni-SDF three level 2 nodes are identified: Wingfield, Hanover Park/Manenberg and Claremont (see CCT 1999: 45).

According to the Muni-SDF, a centre or node

...should consist of a publicly-provided 'kit of parts' which includes the following components:

- A public transportation modal interchange, with close linkages to one or more pedestrian routes.
- A market square which is also a major multi-functional urban public space, tied into a high-quality integrated pedestrian network.
- A multi-functional urban park and associated recreational, productive and sporting facilities.
- A full range of social facility clusters of an order appropriate to the level of interchange with which the centre is associated (for example, tertiary facilities at level 1 interchanges, secondary facilities at level 2 interchanges).
- A substantial amount of dense publicly-provided housing. These should take the form of 'walk-ups'. Social housing initiatives should focus on the proposed centres.
- Publicly-provided economic infrastructure, which, in addition to the market squares, should take the form of hives and other manufacturing and selling
spaces for small businesses (CCT 1999: 67, emphasis removed from original text).

The Muni-SDF goes on to qualify that "the form of these will vary with context" (p.67) but then sets out another list of 'design guidelines' that should be followed as these centres are progressively consolidated (pp.67-8).

These planning and land-use ideas are of course at the level of generality and as a result the Muni-SDF argues for more detailed plans in the development of these centres:

Special planning and design studies [should be] undertaken by interdisciplinary and multi-cultural professional teams, in a conscious attempt to break down the 'tunnel-vision' of a single discipline and to promote a common vision. These plans should contain at least four products:

- A land plan, identifying land for public acquisition.
- A public framework determining the spatial 'fixes', public spaces and facilities, and a framework of public expenditure.
- A process plan which will identify issues relating to the allocation of rights, phasing and development levers [...]
- An institutional plan which identifies the roles of, and relations between, key actors (p.67, emphasis removed from original text).

It is vital to understand that this conceptualisation profoundly structured the perspectives and institutional approach of the CCT officials in the Wingfield dispute. For them, proceeding with the land claim of the Ndabeni claimants without resolving the planning requirements was simply inconceivable and wrong in professional terms. Thus, much of their engagement with other stakeholders involved in the process was about getting a commitment from national government departments and Propnet to combine forces in order to do joint planning.

During my interview with Peter de Tolly he commented on how he spent most of his time during the dispute trying to persuade the other government and parastatal actors that they first needed to conduct planning before the land settlement matter could be addressed. He recalls his engagement with the DPW in the following manner:

_Wingfield: How much land should be awarded for public gain? Number one, I wrote [in correspondence with DPW]: The need for proper planning to act as the_
context to any award of land.' This was the refrain that went on and on. Even my political masters like Saliem [Mowser] accepted that that was the case... The DFA was cited, higher dwelling densities, the MSDF, our Muni-SDF; I quoted Vanessa [Watson](P. de Tolly, interview).

In looking back over the stuttering processes of land-use planning after the land claim was settled in October 2001, de Tolly proudly asserts that: "We kept to our appropriate purpose [throughout the process]. We've still been fighting for the appropriate planning of the land. We then undertook the comprehensive planning of the land" (Ibid.) (In fact, the contextual framework and related development plan that was drawn up by the CCT Unicity in 2002, closely resembled many of the elements promoted by the Muni-SDF.) The significant issue here is that throughout this process, Peter de Tolly and his team saw themselves and their role as that of planners who had a professional obligation to ensure that development could only take place on the site if the necessary planning work was undertaken.

In reviewing the records of the CCT pertaining to the Wingfield land-use dispute, it is clear that the Muni-SDF was the primary reference point for the CCT in opposing the quantum of the land claim of the NCPT. (It also helps to explain some of the differences that emerged later on between the politicians of the CCT and the planners that worked for them. But I am getting ahead of the story.) As indicated earlier, the NCPT decided to opt for a legal strategy to secure access to 54.8ha of the Wingfield site that they felt historically entitled to. The response of the CCT to this land claim is clearly rooted in the arguments of the Muni-SDF:

Wingfield sits firmly as one of the Council's Business Highlights, with the potential to help achieve City Strategic Priorities Numbers 1 (integration of the city), 3 (Zones of poverty and/or social disintegration), 4 (Housing), 5 (Economic development and job creation), and 7 (special high-impact projects). Properly planned and developed, it would provide a critical anchor for the City's [CCT] spatial development framework. The overarching City Goal, therefore, has to be to achieve the development of Wingfield as a Strategic Site for intensive mixed-use development, including the creation of the new Major Multi-purpose Urban park. A range of socio-income groups can be housed there, the site lends itself locationally to commercial/light-industrial development and could be a significant job creator assisting the adjacent communities of Factreton, Kensington and Maitland, as well as the new community that will be resident there. The future population of the City and the metro will need well located public places and parks
and will need new sporting facilities capable of housing major events; for these too, the site is excellently located (CCT 1999: 2-3, emphasis added).

Given this vantage point, the Planning Department of the CCT felt that it would be premature to award a claim of that size without locating the settlement within an overarching development plan that would specify the optimal position for a low-income social housing settlement. More presciently, the CCT argued that it would be iniquitous towards other disadvantaged communities if the Ndabeni claimants were able to secure more than their 'fair share' of the land, since only 98ha were available for development after the Department of Defence consolidated its facilities on the site.

This aspect of the argument provoked anger and political passion from the claimants and the LCC, Alan Roberts. To comprehend this response, it is important to recall the unique racial demographics and history of Cape Town, alluded to earlier. Essentially, Africans were prevented from settling in Cape Town due to the Coloured Labour Preference policy introduced in 1955, which functioned until 1984 (Humphries 1989). The purpose of this policy was to strictly regulate the influx of Africans into urban areas, especially Cape Town, to ensure that Whites and Coloureds had preferential access to the labour market. This policy, along with the Group Areas Act (of 1952), ensured an African minority population in the city and strict residential segregation between Whites, Coloureds and Africans — a pattern that was firmly etched in space by highways, the road system, railway lines and many buffer strips of vacant land (Donaldson and van der Merwe 2000; Wilkinson 2000). Invariably, it produced urban spaces and an underlying system of network infrastructures that are profoundly unequal and allows for the continued, systematic exclusion and discrimination of, especially, African people. It is an exemplary reproduction of exclusion, reinforced over five decades, which demanded bold and catalytic actions to be arrested and reversed.

However, the snail pace of land restitution and redistribution had largely left the urban fabric intact, leaving especially African and Coloured families in dismal settlements, often on the periphery of the city. Also, new public housing initiatives had resulted in more settlements on the urban edge or on vulnerable sites, because of land prices in more strategic parts of the city. In this context, the LCC felt very strongly about the political,
symbolic and social justice importance of the Ndabeni claim for 54.8ha of the Wingfield site:

The history of the Western Cape is one of coloured labour preference; Africans being viewed as temporary sojourners within the province, and being forced into the apartheid spatial pattern which forced them, the most indigent, onto the far outskirts of the City with severely limited infrastructure, services and employment... This pattern is still visible today as little has been done to alter the apartheid city. Thus by allowing Africans to gain access to a land parcel, which is close to the City, employment, services and transport routes, the face of Cape Town will be radically altered. Furthermore the land parcel [Wingfield] has enormous developmental potential, whether used for residential, industrial, commercial or entertainment purposes. It was agreed that it is fitting that such an opportunity be afforded the claimants, as it will put into effect the vision held by both Central and Local Government – that of an integrated city (Correspondence by Alan Roberts, LLC to Mayor of CCT, Nomaindia Mfeketo, 19 July 2000).

In other words, what was at stake for the LCC was the historical urgency of demonstrating that African people are allowed to re-settle in strategic areas of the city and moreover, African and Coloured communities can, once again, live together. It was clear to him that (White) professionals who talk urban integration tend to use the rational planning discourse as a smokescreen to maintain the status quo (Roberts, interview).

Furthermore, Roberts argued that compact city planning principles hardly translate into practice because of all manner of constraints, i.e. financial, sufficient data, person-power, and so on. His reading was supported by the fact that the MSDF hardly had any integrative impact as the academic reviews of Ivan Turok (2001) and Vanessa Watson (2002a; 2003) demonstrates. This disjuncture between policy intent and outcome signalled for the LCC the need for explicit political intervention to ensure that the most marginalised in the city – especially Africans – are provided with opportunities to gain a foothold in more strategic parts of the city.

From the perspective of the LCC, if development planning was undertaken before the land claim was settled, as insisted on by the CCT, it would have resulted in a scenario

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76 The assumption of Alan Roberts (interview) was that Coloured families would settle on the rest of the Wingfield site and the Ndabeni claimants would also interweave with the adjacent Coloured townships of Factreton and Kensington (see Plate 7.2).
where some or the other 'rational reason' would have been 'invented' to prevent the African community of the Ndabeni claim from settling there (Roberts, interview). In their negotiations with the council, the Ndabeni claimants made it clear that they believed that an agenda to settle them somewhere else, closer to or in existing Black townships, was behind the opposing arguments of the CCT planners (Interview with NCPT Executive Committee members on 22 June 2003). This suspicion persisted despite the fact that the CCT supported the claim for restitution but not its quantum. In other words, they refused to engage with the detailed tenets of the Muni-SDF planning arguments but simply asserted that by blocking their demands, the CCT was standing in the way of racial desegregation. For, what better way was there to rapidly advance racial desegregation than to address the land dispossession claims of one of the first groups of disposed in the city? (Interview with NCPT Executive Committee members) Tellingly, the more the planners reverted back to their comprehensive planning arguments, the more it confirmed to the claimants their opposition to the settlement of their claim.

In addition, the question of money and financial gain really muddied the waters. Essentially, the CCT argued that if the full 54.8ha would be allotted to the claimants it would be excessive, because of the size of the claim and because of the inherent value of the land.\textsuperscript{7} It was recognised that the strategic location of the land meant that the value of the area would increase exponentially once services are installed and other types of developments are undertaken. This was merely observed in CCT documentation, but never drawn out to its logical conclusion, which could be read that they felt that the land-gain would be too much for one community who happened to have lost their houses (as opposed to land and housing) before. What about all the other families who were also dispossessed but cannot be compensated with such valuable and strategically located land? The way to address this, in the CCT's logic, was to use a modest portion of land (approximately 25ha as opposed to 54ha), which would then allow for more disadvantaged people to settle there and benefits to be distributed more widely. This point was repeatedly made by referring to the CCT's responsibility towards the entire

\textsuperscript{7} The value of the land was a really tricky issue because the land remains largely un-serviced. Since the servicing cost of the land will fall on the developer it will be a major determinant of what kind of development will indeed be profitable or viable. Inter-governmental agreements on servicing the land for the Ndabeni claimants have not been honoured at the time of writing.
population of the city in their jurisdiction. There was no doubt a genuine deep concern for the housing crisis in the city on the part of Peter de Tolly and his colleagues (Interview on 10 June 2004).

Thus, a stand-off arose between the CCT on the one hand and the Ndabeni claimants, supported by the LCC, on the other hand. The dispute dragged on throughout 1999 and well into 2000. Eventually the LCC decided to draw on his extensive political networks to force a resolution. In the meantime, the claimants also adopted more aggressive rhetoric, which suggested that the CCT was opposed to their claim because they did not want Africans to settle on well-located land. This position, they argued, was in direct contradiction to the political strategic priorities of the Council and the manifesto of the ANC. The claimants then attempted to drive a wedge between the planning officials and the politicians of the CCT by insinuating that the planners were not representing the views of their political masters, even though the planners have been very careful to get formal endorsement from the Executive Committee, the Planning Committee, the Restitution Committee and the full Council for their various arguments.\footnote{An important part of the political ownership equation was the fact that the Planning Committee was not chaired by an ANC Councillor. This made it more difficult for the Committee to secure appropriate political support from the Executive Committee. However, how much of a factor it was is hard to assess.} The NCPT also adopted direct action and staged protests inside the offices of the CCT. The direct action and robust rhetoric of the claimants dovetailed appropriately with the political legwork of the LCC, who lobbied the Ministers of Public Works and Land Affairs to make a deal with the political leadership of the CCT in favour of the NCPT. In the context of an upcoming municipal election towards the end of 2000, the strategy paid off. There was a real possibility that the ANC would not be returned to power in the new Unicity metropolitan authority. The threat of loosing political power created an incentive to settle the matter before the election.

\textit{(Temporary) Resolution of the Conflict}

In July 2000 a political agreement was struck, whereby the CCT dropped its opposition to the quantum of the claim in return for an agreement that joint planning (with DPW and
Propnet) for the land will happen in terms of the principles of the Muni-SDF. This agreement made a Land Claims Court ruling on the matter obsolete. It was not up to the parties to negotiate the terms of the settlement, which had to be embodied in a Section 42D Settlement Agreement in terms of the Land Restitution Act. From this point onward, it took another 15 months to finalise the agreement, resulting in the awarding of the land on the 13 October 2001. Specifically, the award of 54.8ha consisted of three portions of land at Wingfield of which two portions were located along Voortrekker Road. The largest portion (erf 21204) was in the middle of the site (see Plate 7.2, indicated by blue arrows). In the mean time local government elections took place in December 2000, which brought a new local government system – single metropolitan authorities – into being and saw the ANC loose power in Cape Town to the Democratic Alliance.

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According to Peter de Tolly (interview) the dispute was discussed in the national Cabinet and thereafter the Mayor and Executive Committee were instructed to settle the matter in accordance with the demand of the NCPT. The fact that the issue reached the highest levels of government in attributable to the political networks and lobbying ability of the LCC.
The signatories to the Section 42D Agreement excluded the CCT Unicity but included a number of national government departments – DPW, Department of Land Affairs, SANDF, and the Department of Provincial and Local Government – along with the NCPT. Vitally, the Settlement Agreement committed the State (national government) to fund the bulk infrastructure and road access, along with a security wall to fence of the installations of the SANDF. The Settlement Agreement stated: "In order to facilitate implementation of this Agreement, it is hereby stipulated and agreed that the State will
make available the requisite financial and other resources necessary to procure the establishment of Basic Services to the Designated Land to facilitate its occupation and use by the Ndabeni Community” (quoted in Correspondence from P. de Tolly to S. Molepo of the Regional Land Claims Commission, 7 April 2004). This commitment was significant because negotiations between the CCT and State departments since 1998 could not resolve who will pay for the servicing of the site to make it viable for redevelopment. The funding of the bulk infrastructure would prove to be the Achilles heel of the settlement because none of the State departments budgeted for the R145.88 million (US$22.5m)\(^80\) that would be required (CCT Unicity 2003). (I deal more closely with this in the Postscript below.) At the time of writing (June 2005), the financing of the land restitution remains unclear. In other words, ironically, the NCPT has won the right to be settled on 54.8ha of Wingfield land as demanded, but they cannot move onto the site because of the absence of financing to service the land and construct affordable housing. This cruel irony speaks to the complexity of addressing social justice in the city in the context of unaltered land markets, competing policy objectives, neoliberal financial rules and inter-governmental conflict of jurisdictions. Significantly, these are also the kinds of constraints that are hardly addressed in the spatial planning frameworks such as the Muni-SDF and the MSDF.

### 7.3 IMPLICATIONS OF THE WINGFIELD LAND-USE DISPUTE FOR THE ROLE OF PLANNING IN FOSTERING URBAN INTEGRATION

In this section I want to explore the implications of this micro-case study for the role of planning in advancing urban integration, using the theoretical review in Chapters Two and Three as a backdrop. A number of implications come to the fore. One, the CCT planners under-estimated the political and symbolic importance of re-settling a substantial group of African residents on a highly strategic infill site. In fact, the planners resisted to treat the claimants in racial terms but rather treated them as previously disadvantaged citizens who qualified for land restitution in terms of the relevant legislation but felt that such a process had to be subjected to proper planning processes. This was a naïve oversight given the unique exclusion that Africans faced in the city in the wake of social engineering through the Coloured Labour Preference policy. Clearly,

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\(^80\) The conversion is based on exchange rates on 1 June 2004.
this race-blind approach that failed to distinguish between the urban marginalisation of Africans compared to Coloureds stemmed from the impeccable professionalism of the planners – a professionalism rooted in a belief in the ‘objectivity’ of professionals and maintaining a healthy distance from messy ‘politics’.

Two, as a result of this stance, the planners could not recognise the limits of their professional approach in order to marshal other actors to advance a more contingent planning approach that could both advance the principles of urban compaction and resolve the dispute in a manner that resulted in a measure of historically informed social justice. By this I mean to argue that in the absence of any significant re-settlement of Africans on more strategic or White (group) areas of the city, it should have been recognised by the planners that a few symbolic catalytic interventions were required to get the process going, even if it meant contravening strict planning doctrines. Wingfield could have been approached in such terms which could have produced a very different policy approach to the issue than the one recounted above. However, this would clearly have required the planners to recast their professional doctrines to opt for a more contingent approach to urban restructuring; an approach that is arguably more responsive to insurgent opportunities in the city in a context where property markets actively militate against the desegregation of the city in favour of affording the black urban poor access to strategic urban land (see Turok 2001).

Three, the planners clearly failed to appreciate the wider catalytic potential of this social struggle for strategic urban land. The plans, or more accurately, planning approach put forward by the CCT in terms of the broader logic of the Muni-SDF remained largely circumscribed by the physical site and its location within movement corridors. It failed to adequately address how the site could be used to unlock a series of other equally important parcels of infill land – for example, District Six, Culemborg, Ysterplaat, Moulli Point golf course – that were also central to giving the urban poor access to the urban

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81 This argument is in line with the position of Vanessa Watson (2002a: 150-151) who argues for planners to engage in both system-wide planning (transport, environmental, etc.) and immediate implementable actions. The latter are highly opportunistic interventions at the interface of spatial and economic considerations that will improve the quality of life of the poor and marginalised in the city. (I will return to these issues in the next chapter.)
economy and residential markets. Such an approach would have been much more compelling in political terms as it would have foregrounded the relational impact of the site. Again, it could be argued that the narrow spatial formalism of the Muni-SDF blinded the planning imaginary to the political importance of promoting a few, politically achievable interventions that could unlock a torrent of urban integration processes, even if it did not strictly comply with the planning proceduralism of the Muni-SDF.

Four, linked to this blind spot, the planners could not recast their thinking in non-spatial planning terms so that the Wingfield development could resonate with other competing agendas such as improved economic efficiency in the urban system, job creation, easing transport pressures, relieving needs for basic municipal services, etc. If one considers the priorities that dominated the bulk of the development agenda of the CCT during its term of office as elaborated in Chapter Six, it is clear that if the planners were to be effective in making an impact on the political agenda of the Council, they needed to recast their work in terms of the dominant issues that preoccupied the politicians and other more powerful departments in the CCT. The planners were simply incapable of doing this, which may be related to their reluctance to over-step their professional roles as well as their dogged insistence that other actors had to engage with the Wingfield issue on their (planning) terms. It is also a consequence of the profound silo-based, fragmented operations of departments in the organisation as elaborated in Chapter Six.

Five, the planners also failed to air the land-use dispute in the public sphere as a means of opening it up to wider democratic input. It is true that the planners undertook community consultation events in the adjacent communities to Wingfield, but this did not emerge from a wider practice to invite civil society engagement with the issues at the core of the Wingfield dispute, as argued for by communicative planners such as Healey and Sandercock. Such public engagements could have contributed to a broader (political) process whereby the dilemmas implicit in land redistribution towards urban integration could have been embedded in larger progressive political communities in the city. It is arguably almost impossible to advance redistributive measures without a broader political receptiveness in the market, civil society and the political sphere. This awareness about the importance of democratic embeddedness was clearly missed by the planners in the
CCT. That said, I am conscious that engagement with the public sphere does not necessarily lead to a situation where progressive interests engage with the matter; it could just as easily provide fodder for conservative interests to project their agendas for the public sphere is always a contested and contingent domain.

These factors manifested in an institutional approach on the part of the CCT whereby they were incapable of compromising on planning proceduralism – undertake proper planning before anything else; and linked to this, planning-based spatial conceptions of the site which lead to the stalemate discussed above. Paradoxically, it was a stalemate in which the planners were the ones with the least power and most exposed to the vagaries of national government departments and the effective political networks of the claimants. These findings suggest that the spatial-form answer to the inter-locked problems of urban segregation, fragmentation and inequality on its own is singularly inadequate to address the root causes of the problems. In fact, a narrow spatial-form approach could reinforce the status quo because it fails to galvanise and focus progressive political interests around transformation interventions that could shift the underlying forces of urban inequality, rooted in the political economy of the city’s uneven development patterns.

7.4 CONCLUSION: LINKING THE FINDINGS OF THE CASE STUDY TO FRAMING QUESTIONS
The last two chapters dealt with the politics of planning for urban integration in Cape Town between 1996-2001. Through this exploration I attempted to answer the framing questions set out in Chapter Two: How are broader discourses about urban integration mediated institutionally inside local government? What was the scope of planners inside local government to give substantive content to these discourses in the process of shaping them towards the political priorities of the CCT? Did these discourses about urban integration delve into the structural causes of urban fragmentation, segregation and inequality? If so, did they lead to arguments and programmes about how best to tackle such causes? Were these programmes reformist or transformative; limited to spatial-form issues or more expansive; ideal-type or pragmatic? If they acted on these programmes, what were the outcomes; did it materially reduce segregation, fragmentation and inequality or at least hold that promise if the time-frames were too short?
Urban integration was mediated at the highest level through the over-arching strategic priorities of the CCT as defined by the Executive Committee, the Council, the ANC Caucus and the administrative leadership. However, this discourse was broad and allowed sufficient space for actors inside the various (traditional) departments of the CCT to continue with their work in much the same way as before May 1996, even though they paid extensive lip-service to the new discourse of integration and equity. The political and administrative leaders immediately realised this potential for slippage and prioritised institutional transformation as the means to force the staff of the CCT to change their attitudes, behaviour and work practices in order to deliver on the new political mandate of the council. However, due to the size and historical depth of the administration, institutional transformation would prove immensely complex and intractable. There was not necessarily the time or resources to deal with this institutional complexity with a great amount of finesse. Instead, the dire financial situation of the council provided an ideal opportunity to force institutional change through budget cuts, as demonstrated in Chapter Six. However, this blunt instrument tended to punish both progressive and conservative elements in the organisation and did not help to promote the elements of a transformation agenda in different parts of the organisation. As a result, those who were keen to promote a new development agenda that could result in fundamental urban transformation had to fight on many fronts—inside their departments, with the finance department and also with other progressives who were vying for limited new resources earmarked for new initiatives. Along the way, substantial political pressure was mounting that service delivery was not being redirected quickly enough to the former under- and un-serviced Black settlements in the city. This pressure became the driving force over the course of the five years of the CCT’s urban integration agenda.

In the midst of these institutional frictions, planning became increasingly marginalised institutionally and politically for two reasons. One, when the City’s leadership called for a spatial development framework to inform and guide the implementation of the seven strategic priorities, the planning department was not in a position to respond immediately and decisively due to staff constraints. Two, when the planning department eventually produced a spatial development framework in the form of the Muni-SDF four years later, the document was of such an abstracted and comprehensive nature that the politicians
felt it did not provide them with a useful tool to know where and how to act to unlock the power of "transformation projects". The Muni-SDF was perceived by other departments and politicians to be a hifalutin planning treatise with limited purchase on the immediate challenges that obstructed some measure of greater urban integration. This perception is questioned by the planners who drove the Muni-SDF because they made a conscious effort to ensure that the policy framework provided decision-makers with a tool to assess the spatial implications of municipal decisions across a variety of fronts. There is validity in the response of the planners but at the same time it is clear that they were not able to communicate the immediate relevance of the Muni-SDF, which no doubt was aided by the comprehensive spatial-form discourse that pervades the framework. More fundamentally, this spatial-form discourse was also premised on an inadequate analysis of the structural forces that reproduced uneven development in the city. Instead, the Muni-SDF argued that the historical confluence of modernist functionalism and apartheid imperatives of racial segregation was at the root of the fragmented, segregated city. This starting point failed to contextualise the contemporary forces in the nature of the urban economy, land markets and social-cultural systems, which reproduce uneven development and social exclusion in the city (see Section 2.3 in Chapter Two). This is not an uncommon oversight in spatial-form planning approaches (Fainstein 2000; Healey and Graham 1999).

Of particular significance is the influence of the Muni-SDF on the everyday practices of the planners in the city when they were confronted with political demands to expedite the settlement of poor(er) African citizens on infill land in the city. As I have demonstrated in this chapter, the planners were trapped in a rigid conception that 'proper planning' had to precede any intervention in land markets even if it meant the delay of political demands for land restitution on an infill site in the city. Proper planning in turn was informed by the ideal-type spatial-form conception of what the content of the proper plan should be, which served as a necessary context for the settlement of the claim. In the process, the planners failed to appreciate the political and symbolic significance that could arise from expediting the land claim because it could potentially galvanise a much larger, invariably political, process of land restitution on infill sites. In other words, the spatial formalism of the planners, reinforced by the comprehensive arguments of the
Muni-SDF, obscured a more politically astute and contingent perspective on the issue. As a consequence, the transformative potential of the Wingfield land claim was lost and during the tenure of the CCT there was not one significant (re)settlement of poor citizens on strategic infill land despite the abundance of such opportunities. In reaching this conclusion, I am not ascribing blame only on the planners and their conceptual frameworks, for there was certainly a number of other contributing factors, but I am trying to demonstrate how the nature of the planning discourse and attendant practices failed to identify and capitalise on real opportunities for urban integration.

POSTSCRIPT

As mentioned above, after the CCT dropped its opposition to the quantum of the land claim in mid 2000, it took more than a year for the various parties involved to finalise the land award. The settlement agreement was between the Land Claims Commissioner, various State departments and the NCPT but not the CCT. However, since the land is within the jurisdiction of the CCT, it remained an important actor because zoning for land-use was within the prerogative of the municipality, except for military areas. After the claim was awarded in October 2001, the CCT planners became close allies of the NCPT and worked around the clock to support their settlement on the site within a proper development planning framework. Despite the animosity that existed between the CCT and the NCPT between 1998 and mid-2000, the NCPT recognised this and deeply valued the support of the Land Restitution Office of the CCT (Interview with NCPT executive members). The CCT remained a highly pro-active actor in the Wingfield process despite its exclusion from the Settlement Agreement.

The one issue the CCT planners pushed for was that the Military Base Co-conversion Study of the Wingfield military base that was being undertaken by DPW be aborted in favour of joint planning with the CCT, in order to produce a spatial development framework for the site. This request was ignored by the DPW and they proceeded to conduct their study without the input from the CCT. Significantly, this study found that the portion of defence installations on the west of the Site, south of erf 21204 (see Plate 7.2), was not necessary for the functioning of the department. It could potentially be
freed up for redevelopment along with the area awarded to the NCPT and the remainder of the 98ha area. However, after the co-conversion study was produced nothing much flowed from it.

At the same time, the SANDF was planning to build a security wall through the middle of the site to seal off their installations from the rest of the site. This was strongly opposed by the CCT on numerous planning grounds: On the western side of the site, the security wall "would sterilise the remaining land, denying the people of Factreton and Kensington economic opportunities." Furthermore, on the eastern side the security wall "prevents the proposed extension of Milton Road across Wingfield" (Personal correspondence from P. de Tolly, 17 July 2003). However, the CCT was on weak grounds because the need for the wall was written into the Settlement Agreement. When the wall was eventually built in 2002-2003, it sealed off even more than was initially envisaged. It even gobbled up a portion of the claimants' land on the South-Eastern side. It is unquestionable that the nature of the wall would severely undermine an open, mixed-use development pattern across the site. It will certainly escalate the costs of such a development to accommodate the compensatory interventions that would be required to improve access and freedom of movement. What is of relevance though is the fact that the SANDF had absolutely no interest in joining a discussion about the most appropriate development of the site from a compact city principles perspective. For them, the only informing issue was the interest of their staff and facilities. This attests to the profound difficulties of inter-departmental coordination and integration.

By 2002, the CCT proceeded to undertake a contextual analysis of the Wingfield site with a view of formulating a development planning framework that could accommodate the land restitution claim and promote mixed-use development of the entire 98ha of the site. This framework had to be reworked numerous times to accommodate the actions of the SANDF after they simply proceeded to build the security wall; and also after the South African Railways Commuter Organisation developed its own plans for a heavy rail line

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82 I received correspondence (12 September 2002) from the Minister of Defence on the matter of the security wall in which he states that: "The dilemma the DOD is facing lies in the fact that if more land and facilities at SAS WINGFIELD is surrendered for development purposes, the DOD would be negatively affected in its endeavour to fulfil its constitutional obligations."
through the centre of the Wingfield site despite petitions from the CCT to stick with light rail options in order to maximise the mixed-use potential of the development. Again, the CCT proved ineffectual and at the time of writing it is likely that the heavy-rail option will proceed.

Finally, the efforts on the part of the CCT to persuade the DPW to surrender development rights of the remainder of the 98ha site (after the allocation of the 54.8 of the claimants) to enable them to do holistic planning had failed. Instead, the DPW is determined to put the remainder out to tender even though the servicing issues of the land – which requires dealing with the entire site as one entity – remains outstanding. This issue, along with rejecting the call for joint planning, and the persistent unwillingness of the DPW to substantively engage the CCT on its development proposals throughout the process (1998-2004), attests to the lack of leverage on the part of the CCT in relation to national government departments. The upshot of these events since the awarding of the land is that the date of occupation of affordable housing on the site has come and gone with no clear indication how the absence of state funding will be resolved. In the end, the settlement of this community of citizens who were forcibly disposed of their homes in the 1920s, remains ensnared in the cruel arbitrariness of inter-governmental fragmentation and contradiction. For the former residents of Ndabeni and their off-spring, urban integration is little more than a cruel mirage.
CHAPTER 8
Analysis: Recasting Urban Integration

8.1 INTRODUCTION
Having travelled through seven years of post apartheid urban policy processes (1994-2001) in the preceding four chapters, it is evident that the ruins of the apartheid city continue to dominate South African cityscapes. The dreams of a compacted and integrated post-apartheid city continue to haunt the plans of the South African state as it struggles to move beyond the ruins of the past. The last three chapters have opened up a window on the complexities of urban development policy and planning at both national and local levels of government, comprehensively addressing the specific research questions en route. This final chapter extrapolates the main findings of the research, locating them theoretically and drawing out key conceptual and policy implications in relation to the overall research proposition. It is my modest hope that the study can assist the progressive urban policy community (and activists) towards being a little more adept at working imaginatively with the ruins of the apartheid city, so that dreams of social justice can progressively become concretised as lived material and social realities. Despite the policy disappointments of the period under review in this thesis, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that it is still possible to achieve more just outcomes. This assertion is unpacked in the last section of this concluding chapter, which focuses on policy implications. The principal theoretical conclusion framing the policy analysis is that we cannot attain dreams for the just and integrated city without confronting the continual power relations that not only rest in the ruins of our past, but are also manifest in our present.

8.2 CRITICAL FINDINGS
The thesis wrestles with the question as to why South African cities became even more segregated, fragmented and unequal following democratisation in 1994, when urban development policy explicitly set out to reverse the apartheid legacy of racial and class divisions. I explored this conundrum through a review of planning theory because the policy tenets of urban development in post 1994 South Africa rested heavily on planning
concepts, and particularly the model of David Dewar and his colleagues who espoused a very specific planning vision for reintegrating the apartheid city. Dewar’s work had found widespread acceptance and adoption across a variety of urban policy areas such as transport, housing, environmental management, development planning and especially spatial planning, as practiced by municipal governments. In a sense, Dewar's particular compact city planning approach became the dominant discourse amongst policy networks about how the apartheid city would be integrated. This widespread adoption of a particular discourse further deepened the puzzle about the disconnect between urban policy intentions and outcomes in democratic South Africa. Differently put, the question thrown up was how does one explain the limited success of the Dewarian policy approach when just about everyone involved in urban policy and planning bought into it?

In view of this conundrum I decided to locate the thesis firmly within planning theory debates, in order to locate the origins and theoretical lineages of the Dewarian planning model. Thus, Chapter Two delved into a systematic discussion of four planning schools of thought with an eye on elucidating how each of these schools would address my central concern: reversing urban segregation, fragmentation and inequality. The literature review enabled me to locate the theoretical informants of this dominant planning model in South Africa. The choice of theories explored was furthermore informed by two criteria. Firstly, I focussed on theories that had a normative orientation and directed their concerns to issues such as segregation and inequality. Secondly, I wanted to focus on theories that had some currency in South African planning and urban development debates. The four schools of thought I identified, drawing heavily on the typological framework developed by Phillip Allmendinger, were: (i) New Urbanism as an example of a neo-systems planning perspective; (ii) Communicative Planning, which sees planning as a socially contextualised process; (iii) the Just City approach as an example of a political economy perspective on planning; and (iv) Postmodern Planning, which recognises that plans are open to multiple perspectives and cannot be definitive.

Since none of these planning theories provided an explicit window on my main concerns – segregation, fragmentation and inequality – I drew on urban sociology debates to crystallise how I would define the converse, urban integration, when reviewing the
respective contribution of these theories. The resultant working definition of urban integration adopted for the thesis was the following: a significant reduction in racial and class segregation; more integrative land-use patterns to maximise the opportunities for particularly poor urban residents to access urban services and employment opportunities; and finally, a reduction in the levels of economic and social inequality across an urban region. There is a further assumption that these three dimensions of urban integration are closely interlinked, which suggests that viable planning responses will also address how to advance these normative ambitions in tandem.

**Divergent Prescripts of Normative Planning Theories**

Chapter Two revealed a significant convergence of ideas across various normative concerns between planning schools of thought. This convergence belies a series of subtle, even if profound, differences between the various approaches that can only fully be understood if these theories are related to specific issues and/or their philosophical informants. Thus, Chapter Two painstakingly teased out the areas of commonality and divergence between the various planning approaches, revealing that none of the approaches on their own provide an obvious or satisfactory answer to the intractable problems of urban segregation, fragmentation and inequality.

For instance, New Urbanism argues for an approach premised on physically building demonstration projects that can illustrate alternative ways of structuring neighbourhoods that are consistent with New Urbanism precepts. On the back of these examples, the market must be persuaded that the New Urbanism is viable at an urban scale especially if there is broad-based popular support for the model. Given that the state is largely incidental to urban development in the US, New Urbanism locates its programme firmly within the private domain. As a consequence it is difficult to ascertain how New Urbanism could solve the *systemic* causes of urban segregation and inequality. At best New Urbanism can facilitate the erosion of certain race barriers but that is if you can afford to purchase a property in what are largely expensive private estates.

In contrast, the Just City model of Susan Fainstein and others argues for planning to work in service of specific redistribution programmes to ensure the systematic extension of
urban services and opportunities to the vulnerable and excluded in the city. However, these theories offer little in the way of guidance as to how such a political alignment of interests could be achieved given the fact that while planning agencies are always firmly embedded in larger governmentality (i.e. regulatory and disciplining) efforts of the state, they usually do not operate completely autonomously from other interests.

The Communicative school of thought attempts to address the question of how social justice planning principles can best be imbued in the state and society at large. As elucidated in Chapter Two, these theorists argue for effective and inclusive planning processes that allow planners and activists the opportunity to persuade powerful interests through dialogue that more redistributive policies are needed to achieve greater urban justice. Furthermore, these planning processes are embedded in broader governance relations that ensure the translation of planning agreements into institutional practices of both the state and civil society actors. However, communicative planners offer very little in terms of spatial ideas to concretely reconfigure urban spaces to reflect greater inclusivity and justice at a citywide level.

The final school of planning thought that I reviewed was the Postmodernist school. This is a loose and eclectic group that shares a lot of overlap particularly with the communicative school of thought and post-structural planners who focus on the disciplinary effects of planning processes and discourses. The contribution of the Postmodern planning school remains too vague and generalised to offer specific criteria to assess whether particular planning concepts and processes may or may not lead to a reversal of apartheid(-like) cities.

The frustrating aspect of the literature review was the fact that almost all of the physical references in this body of knowledge are in relation to cities in the North. As a consequence, many of the prescripts and policy suggestions that arise from these theories are simply not viable or appropriate to cities with very different levels of economic development, more extreme levels of inequality and vastly different social-cultural and political dynamics. This problem is closely related to the broader trend in academic urban studies that Anthony King (2000; 2003) and Jennifer Robinson (2002) critique whereby
urban theory seems to stem from and pertain to the North, while urban policy and pragmatics are deemed adequate or more appropriate for dealing with the pathologies of cities in the South. In light of this critique, with which I concur, alongside my own frustrations about the reference points of the theories reviewed in Chapter Two, I set out to explore the relevance of normative planning theories in relation to the (postcolonial) South African context. Since there are a handful of scholars who engage in planning theory debates from a South African standpoint, I devoted a further literature review in Chapter Three to what I termed 'interpolations from the South'. This was an essential move to unpick the theoretical informants of planning ideas that dominated South Africa during the transition period.

Planning in Postcolonial Contexts

Delving deeper into the theoretical issues in Chapter Three proved rewarding. South African scholars were found to have worked in a more flexible and eclectic manner across these theories, reflecting the intricate and more extreme urban policy context to which they were responding and shaping. For example, everyone embraced the importance of participatory processes that enrol civil society actors into the planning process in order to make it more legitimate and responsive to local needs. In this sense there is a generalised acceptance of the principles of communicative planning processes. Furthermore, there is a broad-based acceptance of the imperative for social justice, as argued for by Just City planning precepts, although South African theorists like Vanessa Watson are less convinced about the viability of Fainstein’s redistribution programmes in the South African context, especially since the level of inequality is extreme and the available economic resources to potentially deal with it so limited.

The one major faultline in the South African planning literature, against the position of Watson, is the approach of David Dewar for the adoption of spatial-form planning models, as in neo-systems theories, as the means to transform the apartheid city. Watson stands sceptical of spatial models and in favour of more localised transformation projects that can make a tangible difference to the urban fabric, over time achieving a snowball effect. This primary conceptual divide in the South African debates provided a platform
from which to address my research interest. From this vantage point the empirical focus became clear.

From Planning Theory to Context
The emergent planning system in South Africa was being driven from the national government level, through a vigorous urban development policy reform agenda underpinned by a political imperative to reverse the legacy of the apartheid city, deepen democratic systems and achieve effective governance. Given the unitary state framework that was established in terms of the 1993 Interim Constitution, local governments were expected to act strictly in terms of national policy guidelines and formulate concrete policies to implement national frameworks. In response to this, the research was designed to investigate the impact and relevance of Dewar's planning ideas at a national and local level, with particular emphasis on the local. I chose this focus because Dewar's ideas informed state discourses about the nature of the apartheid city and how to rebuild it in a more integrated fashion as well as actual city planning frameworks in Cape Town.

The policies for research at both scales of government suggested themselves. At a national level the Department of Housing unveiled the *Urban Development Framework* in August 1997, which outlined how urban integration was going to be achieved by 2020. At a local level the City of Cape Town municipality (CCT), which came into being in May 1996, identified as its first priority the integration of Cape Town. Furthermore, the CCT prioritised the formulation of a spatial development framework to specify how the ideal of urban integration was going to be realised through "transformation projects". Significantly, Prof. David Dewar was hired as the lead consultant to produce the spatial development framework for the CCT. This coincidence allowed me to closely link the theoretical ideas of Dewar, explored in Chapters Three and Four, with his own application manifested in the draft Municipal Spatial Development Framework (Muni-SDF) of the CCT, explored in Chapters Six and Seven.

Despite the broad scope of my investigation, as it turned out it was possible to nest the different scales of empirical investigation easily because of the continuity of the dominant discourse on urban integration across different spheres of government. At the theoretical
end, the thesis demonstrated how the planning approach of Dewar was the dominant approach at the cusp of political democratisation in 1994. In the urban policy domain, it is shown how Dewar’s ideas also resurfaced as the main reference point across a plethora of legislation and national policy frameworks. Lastly, at the most local scale, Dewar also emerged as the lead drafter of the planning framework that was meant to deliver on the CCT’s political priority of achieving urban integration. The fuller trajectory of my research is captured in the second part of Chapter Three where I also spell out my methods and epistemological standpoint — (postcolonial) constructivism.

A powerful theme that emerged in Chapter Two, which served to frame the empirical investigation, was the structural causes over time of urban segregation, fragmentation and inequality. In light of this analysis, Chapter Four explored two primary issues as part of setting the context for the three ‘empirical’ chapters. Firstly, the origins and roots of the apartheid city were explored through a critical reviewing of the secondary literature on the topic. In this discussion it became obvious that the dominant features of the apartheid city were put in place at the very onset of modern urbanisation in the early part of the 19th Century. Successive waves of urban policy reform on governance and management institutions served to entrench these features in the interest of White dominance of politics, the economy and especially space. Most insidiously, urban injustice became an integral part of the mode of accumulation which made it virtually impossible to resist, let alone reverse. In order to reveal the consequences of 150 years-plus of reproducing urban inequality and injustice, Chapter Four also catalogued the main indicators of segregation and its consequences in South African cities eight years after formal democratisation. Through this inventory of inequality, the sheer scale of the post-apartheid urban integration challenge came to the fore, underscoring the postcolonial specificity of the South African city. Furthermore, the statistics on urban inequality introduced a sensitivity to questions of temporality; in other words, the time it will take to arrest and reverse levels of inequality as acute as those in the South African context. This issue has taken on a particularly ominous character in a global context of rising inequality within and between nations and cities (UNCHS 2001).
Secondly, Chapter Four provided an overview of the key pieces of urban policy that came into effect between 1994 and 2001. These policies are further contextualised by a brief discussion of the pre-1994 urban policy debates between the liberation movements and the apartheid state as part of defining the nature and content of the negotiated settlement on how full democracy was to be introduced. What transpired through this review is that the post-1994 policies were largely consistent with the agreements on housing and urban settlements at the time of the transition. This was in large part because these debates were unambiguously informed by the urban planning work on compaction and corridors that emanated from the Dewarian school of thought. As a consequence of this remarkable conceptual hegemony during this period of 1990 to 2001, the research inevitably questioned the radical divergence between policy intent and outcome. The statistics reflected in Chapter Four make it abundantly clear that urban segregation and inequality in 2001 had been entrenched since 1994, coinciding with a worsening gini-coefficient over this period.

**National Urban Policies**

In order to fully grasp this barbed outcome, Chapter Five explored the origins, development and effects of the UDF; South Africa's first official national urban development policy. The chapter was informed by in-depth semi-structured interviews with the relevant officials in the Department of Housing who were responsible for drafting and implementing the policy. These interviews were complemented by additional interviews with key stakeholders in the field who had some relationship with the policy processes leading up to the release of the UDF. I also examined all the files at the Department of Housing pertaining to both the UDS and UDF, in order to get a comprehensive insight into the manner in which the policy was actually drafted. The investigation was revealing because it uncovered a tragic narrative about policy failure in the extreme. The substantive drafting had largely been left in the hands of an international team of consultants with impeccable credentials, but inevitably at an arms-length understanding of the South African context and debates. In the final instance, an inexperienced and relatively junior official was left with the task of summarising their work into a 'user-friendly' policy. In the process the policy was poorly crafted and
effectively died as soon as it saw the light of day when the Cabinet formally adopted it in August 1997.

The conclusions drawn from these findings are as follows. First, urban policy was not a serious national priority amongst the leadership of the government. Second, there was no centre at national level that could engage with powerful line ministries who were pursuing sectoral interests, often unintentionally, at the expense of an 'integration' agenda. It goes almost without saying that there was also no policy centre to engage meaningfully with private (sector) interests. The effects of their investment decisions on the quality of the urban environment in terms of integration imperatives went unchallenged. In the absence of such a centre, the sectoral interests and priorities of line departments continued to dominate and define urban development policy and processes. This explained in part why the low-cost housing agenda of the government to deliver one million units by 2000 became the *de facto* urban development policy of the state, with devastating consequences for the spatial form of cities and towns; essentially further reinforcing apartheid patterns of racialised sprawl whereby the (Black) urban poor ended up on the margins of the city, several steps removed from various urban opportunities, especially jobs.

The material trends of urban segregation and inequality raised the following question: How could sectoral policies and programmes such as housing, transport and so on, which were all steeped in the same discourse of urban integration, so easily reinforce the apartheid spatial form? The documentary review of various urban policies in Chapter Four points to a number of dynamics that were at play. Sectoral policies such as transport or environmental management defined themselves as the starting point of urban integration. In other words, other inputs into urban integration had to redefine themselves in terms of the professional reference points of transport, for instance. This example illustrates that urban integration in practice meant very different things to different sectors even though everyone spoke the (neo-systems) language of 'infill, compaction, mixed land-use and corridors'. Furthermore, all of the policies were marked by a tension between achieving equity and access on the one hand, and ensuring financial viability on the other. In a context with such high levels of poverty and unemployment as
South Africa, it was unlikely that services could be extended to the urban poor on the basis of cost recovery principles. However, because government policies tended to occlude areas of contradiction and conflict, these divergent policy aims were typically asserted without any reference to how inevitable conflicts and tensions between equity and cost recovery imperatives could be resolved in practice. The screening out of contradictory policy objectives tends to ensure that policy implementation tilts towards cost recovery and efficiency imperatives. Differently put, if there is a contradiction between financial imperatives and redistribution objectives and no guidelines on how such contradictions are to be resolved or managed, then the *de facto* response will be consistent with the financial bottom-line. This tendency was reinforced by a larger context of fiscal conservatism as embodied in the GEAR policy and pressure on the fiscus.

Lastly, Chapter Four demonstrated how spatial planning became subservient to strategic planning, also referred to as development planning as embodied by the Integrated Development Plan. This shift in emphasis rendered spatial planning principles as secondary to development priorities identified through participatory planning processes. These factors produced a situation whereby the everyday imperatives of service delivery (to reach numerical targets) overshadowed higher-order imperatives to ensure that the impact of service delivery contributed to a transformed built environment and patterns of social relations between divided social groups. The complex inter-governmental system of governance and development planning did not help matters either. Furthermore, the slowly changing nature of the bureaucracy meant that new political priorities were not that quickly accepted and implemented by civil servants who were schooled in very different approaches to government and service delivery.

**Local Urban Policies**

In order to understand in greater depth the perpetuation of the apartheid spatial form by national line ministries, I moved down in scale and explored in Chapter Six a large urban municipality. As suggested before, the CCT was explicitly focussed on realising urban integration and had significant institutional and financial capacity to successfully implement urban policies and programmes. This was confirmed by my field level research, which included in-depth semi-structured interviews with the leaders (both
politicians and managers) and stakeholders of the municipality. The interviews were complemented with extensive archival reviews of minutes of the Planning Standing Committee and Executive Committee, along with the private notes of key informants who performed professional services for the leadership. Through the volumes of data a clear picture emerged about how urban integration was (not) defined and pursued by the CCT.

Chapter Six demonstrated that urban integration was informed by a strong spatial imagination amongst the political leadership because the ruling party, the ANC, had adopted the MSDF as their planning model. However, the ANC controlled Executive Committee requested a more concrete spatial development plan to give expression to its intent in the context of the areas of Cape Town under their jurisdiction. The idea was that such a plan would specify how urban integration would be progressively realised through specific interventions. This clear political intent became the victim of contingent circumstances. The planning department was not in a position to deliver on the expectations for a spatial development plan for reasons detailed extensively in Chapter Six. Furthermore, the council was under enormous pressure to accelerate the pace of service delivery, especially to previously marginalised areas where the majority of poor Black residents lived. However, this imperative was undermined by two threats: (i) limited financial resources even though the CCT was relatively well endowed; and (ii) a recalcitrant bureaucracy that was 16,000 strong, heavily unionised and reluctant to accept any changes in job description. By default, solving these two challenges overshadowed everything the CCT did between 1996 and 2000.

However, the situation was more complex than the impact of these two pressures. There were a number of actors who attempted to introduce radical reforms to make the organisation more developmental (as opposed to technocratic in the pursuit of service delivery) and multi-disciplinary in its functioning. What emerged in Chapter Six was a picture of a highly complex institutional environment that was broadly characterised by five poles of differential influence and power: (i) the Finance Department, driven by a narrow cost-savings imperative and that subjected all divisions of the organisation to a one-size-fits-all austerity programme; (ii) the Engineering Department, driven by a quest
to extend municipal services to previously un- or under-serviced Black areas with limited understanding of how to effect holistic developmental outcomes; (iii) the Community Development and Housing Department, driven by a highly sophisticated integrated community development model, targeted on particular zones of poverty but severely under-resourced and unable to persuade others of their model; (iv) a Planning Department steeped in Dewarian planning ideas and committed to a comprehensive planning response to the challenges of the apartheid city, but devoid of any influence over anybody in the organisation; and lastly, (v) the Organisational Development Department that focussed on business process re-engineering, to create an organisation culture and way of working that was conducive to achieving integrated development outcomes. However, this unit was also very small, under-resourced and marginal to the functioning of the organisation as a whole.

The outcome of this contradictory and inevitably tension-filled organisational architecture was the effective marginalisation of nuanced responses to the complex external challenges that faced the CCT. Instead, those who could offer visible and relatively quick solutions to the vast political pressure on the Council to deliver basic services to the under-serviced parts of the city, were favoured and allowed to set the agenda. As a result, the same pattern that emerged at a national level, whereby the housing building programme became the *de facto* urban development strategy despite its detrimental effects on achieving urban integration, played itself out in Cape Town. However, there was one difference. It was not only housing per se that was provided but also municipal services to informal areas in order to effect upgrading and extension of higher levels of service to built-up parts of the Black areas. This was of course a lot more politically palatable than vague arguments about holistic development or urban compaction. The net effect of this confluence of factors was that the CCT shifted its discourse about what urban integration meant, in order to fit with their achievements. At the outset, the CCT defined urban integration as 'just and equitable outcomes' in terms of racial integration at residential, economic and social levels. At the end of its term of office the definition had shifted to 'equitable opportunities for all' wherever they may find themselves in the city. In this way it could be argued by the CCT leadership that
politically, the extension of municipal services was in fact consistent with achieving urban integration.

Local Planning Efforts towards Integration

The thesis also explored the dynamics around the role of planning in the CCT and found that the Planning Department produced the most advanced articulation of how spatial planning could facilitate urban integration in their belated spatial development framework called the Muni-SDF. Thus, analysis of the content and impact of the Muni-SDF became the pivot of Chapter Six and provided the platform for the more in-depth exploration into its effects in Chapter Seven. In Chapter Six it became apparent that as an interest group, the Planning Department was marginal to the governmental practices of the CCT during its five years of operation. This was as a result of timid leadership at an administrative and political level, compounded by the fact that the Planning Committee was chaired by a National Party politician. Most fundamentally, the department was ineffectual because its workload was dominated by unstrategic matters pertaining to the processing of (re)zoning applications. This was an institutional hang-over of the entrenched system of apartheid town planning and land-use control. Lastly, the Planning Department had no allies in the administration and operated in a small zone of autonomy that afforded space to do path-breaking policy work but ironically, with limited power to impact on the overall functioning of the CCT.

Up until the discussion in Chapter Six, the thesis identified the key tenets of the Muni-SDF and traced its institutional marginalisation in the CCT relative to other power centres. However, a conflict between the CCT planning department and a CBO over a strategic parcel of public land in Cape Town, allowed for the investigation in greater depth of the operational significance of the planning approach encapsulated in the Muni-SDF. Through this micro-level case study I was able to explore the meaning of the Muni-SDF principles for the planners when they were unencumbered by the manoeuvres of other departments in the CCT. Chapter Seven demonstrated clearly how the planners missed a critical political opportunity to commence with land restitution driven resettlement of Black (especially African) citizens in the city, on strategic infill land. The reason the opportunity was missed was because the planners were too blinkered by their
professional norms and discourses to see the larger political significance of the claim made by the Ndabeni Communal Property Trust. Furthermore, the rigid spatial logic of the Muni-SDF reinforced the intransigent position of the planners who were keen for ‘proper’ planning processes to be followed. This Wingfield episode revealed the manner in which the tight spatial logic of the Muni-SDF became a rigid template for planning processes and decision-making to the detriment of more politically astute strategic interventions to open up interstitial opportunities to change the space economy of the city.

In summary, planning models postulated by Dewar and his colleagues achieved profound policy hegemony in setting the agenda for remaking the apartheid city. Yet, despite this widespread impact on urban policy frameworks, the practices of government at national and local levels were in direct contradiction to the policy precepts of compact city planning. The trends raise major questions about the operational veracity of the Dewarian planning concepts and approach, especially given the nature of the state. Put differently, was the problem weak theory or a lack of effective implementation of the theory? Was the state simply too weak, incompetent or uncommitted to remain faithful to its own policies and planning principles? In answering these questions I have to return to what was described as the central faultline in South African planning debates in Chapter Three.

8.3 THEORETICAL INTIMATIONS

The empirical findings of the thesis allow me to re-engage with what I described in Chapter Three as the central faultline in planning debates in South Africa. On the one side of the faultline is David Dewar with his commitment to a comprehensive spatial model that must guide the role and function of planning to achieve the post-apartheid city. On the other side is Vanessa Watson who argues against comprehensive models in favour of more modest and strategically targeted transformation projects that enjoy the political support of municipal leaders. According to Watson, end-state spatial models draw attention away from the (market) vicissitudes of urban reproduction in the present, and as a consequence, create space for the status quo to be maintained. This scenario can unfold in a context where much policy lip-service is paid to transforming the city in line
Chapter 8: Analysis: Recasting Urban Integration

with the principles of the spatial planning model, but little is done by way of interventions to achieve it.

Watson argues, by contrast, that focussed transformation projects can make a specific contribution to changing power relations in the city, by intervening through specific projects that alter the economic opportunity structure for at least some urban citizens who are poor and marginalised. In response to Watson's approach, Dewar's likely rejoinder would be that a focus on high profile transformation projects prevents a more widespread package of interventions from emerging and that this can alter the nature of spatial relations between people and strategic sites in the city. In other words, following the spatial precepts of his model, planning can identify how existing municipal budgets can be re-directed to ensure the emergence of a number of critical public facilities and resources, such as transport interchanges clustered with multiple service points, dignified public spaces and more accessible parks. This approach, he would argue, is more likely to effect transformation than arbitrary interventions that operate on an opportunistic logic.

My research findings bring a number of issues to the fore that help adjudicate between these positions. Firstly, planning notions or ideas like urban integration can be under-specified, leading to multiple meanings and interpretations, as was the case with the UDF. This in itself can lead to no action or a perpetuation of the status quo because various interest groups can extract a definition that suits their needs. Secondly, the mere establishment or codification of planning principles in policy documents does not guarantee implementation or a lack of political interference in processes of public policy operationalisation. Again, the UDF experience demonstrates that despite official political endorsement of the policy by Cabinet, the policy remained unimplemented because urban development was not high on the national government's priority list. Also, the department responsible for the implementation of the UDF simply did not have the staff and capacity to operationalise programmes implied by the UDF. Furthermore, the political clout of the sponsoring department was limited in the overall balance of forces between various national departments that were implicated in the policy. Thirdly, the state is riddled with institutional complexity, which makes it very difficult to operationalise policy intentions. Again, the UDF process demonstrates how the lack of
power and influence of the Department of Housing meant that other national
government departments and spheres of government simply ignored the UDF, or at best,
paid lip service to it. Fourthly, the UDF was developed with limited regard for the power
of market forces that would have to be engaged with if its precepts were to be
implemented. Neither the policy text nor the implementing department reflected an
understanding of the functioning of land and property markets that structure urban space.

Tellingly, almost identical lessons transpire in relation to the Muni-SDF in the case of the
CCT. Institutionally, the planning department in the CCT was considered junior and as a
result it had no clout with regard to the other power blocs in the administration. This was
compounded by the rigid, and what was perceived to be impenetrable planning discourse
of the Muni-SDF. Politically the planning agenda of the Muni-SDF was poorly driven.
Economically, the Muni-SDF offered no perspective or political muscle to engage with
prevailing market forces in Cape Town. These features of both national and local
government urban policy processes intimate that one overlooks institutional, political and
economic dynamics in the planning process at one’s conceptual peril. These findings
suggest that planning frameworks and urban development policies aimed at remaking the
city must be attuned to political, economic and institutional dynamics. These elements
are under-theorised in the South African literature but are reasonably well developed in
the work of planning theorists such as Healey (2002; 2004) and especially Hillier (2002a;
2002b).

Recalibrating Planning to Politics

Healey (1997; 2000; 2003) continuously draws attention to the network of governance
relations that circumscribe planning processes. The multi-actor nature of urban politics
and policy is of course not that novel and is broadly accepted by scholars of many hues
(see Cars et al. 2002). The critical question is, how does one privilege the voice and
influence of the poor and marginalised in such networks to ensure a greater likelihood of
more transformative decisions and outcomes? The rich vein of thought of Hillier is
helpful in this respect.
Hillier (2002a; 2002b) takes Healey’s work on network governance further in her exploration of the kind of politics that is conducive to the emergence of redistributive discourses. The focus on multi-stakeholder planning processes in formal decision-making arenas features in the work of most collaborative planners as demonstrated in Chapter Two. This focus tends to ignore or discount political practices outside of deliberative forums that may impact on urban planning decisions and outcomes. Hillier (2002a) argues that the only way for redistributive agendas to emerge is when the marginalised and politically excluded enforce their agendas and interests on the formal political agenda through direct action and other forms of non-participation in stakeholder policy and/or planning forums. In Chapter Seven, I recounted how the Ndabeni Communal Property Trust engaged in direct action at the CCT premises to advance their claims and effectively embarrass the political leadership. This tactic worked in that they managed to draw attention to their demands even though the planners thought it was unreasonable of them to embark on high profile demonstrations whilst negotiations were also underway. This experience supports the argument of Hillier that more is needed than effectively mediated multi-stakeholder forums to advance the claims of marginalised groups in planning processes. This position does not imply that there is no room for deliberative forums, but rather that such forums are more likely to produce transformative outcomes if they are appropriately influenced and destabilised by external political pressures in the form of community mobilisation and direct action (Ibid.).

It is clear that both arguments – Healey’s focus on network governance relations and Hillier’s incorporation of informal direct action – could greatly enhance our understanding about the disjunctures between policy intent and outcomes in the South African case. However, in thinking through the implications for the South African context, particularly of Hillier’s work, there is an opportunity to make a contribution to the emergent planning thinking on how to promote more transformative outcomes that help ensure a systematic erasure of the apartheid city.

It is vital to foreground the inextricable link between planning and politics. This is widely recognised in most of the literature but the issue remains under-specified. For example, Dewar (1998) asserts that the obstacles to compact city development processes lie in the
absence of "political will", which can potentially be remedied through the establishment of a national urban ministry. However, he never defines political will, nor does he explain how the existence of a dedicated urban ministry will overcome the kinds of institutional dynamics that bedevilled the UDF. On the other side of the planning faultline Vanessa Watson’s work remains unclear as to how political groups and interests in the city can be cohered or aligned to effectively promote “transformation projects” that will incrementally infuse and re-integrate the city. Watson call for this mode of intervention without fully elucidating how such transformation projects can come into being.

In light of this critique I would argue, following Hillier, that the first step is to formulate a more comprehensive understanding of the relational web of urban politics and the potential role of planning discourses to advance more transformative ideas within such a terrain. However, Hillier’s framework does not go far enough. As we saw in the case of Cape Town and Wingfield, the NCPT adopted a multi-pronged strategy. They engaged in ongoing negotiations with the planners to secure their tract of the land and explore where they would best be settled on it; simultaneously, they also engaged Councillors and political parties directly to shape opinion in their favour. They found receptiveness for their perspective, in contrast to that of the CCT planners, with a key state actor, the Land Claims Commissioner (LCC), who was willing to do political advocacy and lobbying on their behalf. The LCC had direct access to national Ministers who had an influence over the Mayor and issues at hand. In short, the NCPT played the field across many fronts which combined negotiations with other agenda-setting actions. This 'both-and' political approach reflected a fluid and dynamic approach to political engagement, which is at odds with Hillier’s conception that suggests either formal participatory processes in policy or planning, or social mobilisation efforts outside of the formal institutions. The Wingfield findings suggest that that the two-dimensional approach of Hillier can be extended to better approximate the various inter-linked domains of political practice in the (South African) city.

Thus, conceptually and derived from the empirical findings at national, city and micro-levels, it is possible to delineate at least five domains of political engagement between the state, the private sector and civil society at various scales, ranging from the (inter)national
to the local: (1) representative political forums; (2) neo-corporatist political forums that are comprised of representative organisations, typically the government, the private sector, trade unions and community-based organisations; (3) direct action or mobilisation against state policies or to advance specific political demands; (4) the politics of development practice, especially at the grassroots; and (5) symbolic political contestation as expressed through discursive contestation in the public sphere. Figure 8.1 below depicts graphically these five political domains in addition to distinctions between the political and public spheres that are continuously (re)constructed through engagement in each of these five spheres and their interfaces. Again, the approach and practices of the NCPT is instructive to understand this categorisation.

The NCPT addressed many of their political demands for full land restitution at the same quantum as they were disposed of to the political leaders of the elected Council of the CCT, in particular the Executive Committee (domain 1). At the same time, the NCPT also engaged the planners about the possible land-uses of the site to ensure an appropriate mix and balance (domain 4). Furthermore, when the NCPT read the situation and found that the planners were not listening to their demands, and also found the elected politicians unresponsive, they engaged in direct action by staging vocal protests at the council head
quarters (domain 3). Lastly, the NCPT also made use of the media to advance their claim, which spoke to mobilising broader public opinion behind their claims against that of the planners (domain 5). This line of political action was the least successful in part because the public sphere was dominated by discourses that were anti-land redistribution. My findings suggest that the NCPT was successful in their struggles with the planners because they were able to engage in multiple domains of political practice that were mutually reinforcing. The planners in turn were a lot more one-dimensional and simply focussed on the technical merits of their position in domain 3 – development practice at neighbourhood scale.

In summary, my own research supports the argument that it is only possible to project a transformative role for planning if it is embedded in a conceptual framework about the multi-dimensional nature of urban politics as captured in this model of relational politics. This perspective can enrich policy formulations, resulting in frameworks that are more open about constitutive contradictions in the contemporary era marked simultaneously by impulses for neo-liberal fiscal conservatism and social democratic equality. Relational politics can also enrich planning proposals, processes and interventions aimed at strengthening the hand of the poor in the city if interests in support of the poor are calibrated across the five domains of practice and especially at their interfaces. A platform for a pro-poor planning framework is advanced in the South African political terrain through the guarantee of the progressive realisation of socio-economic rights in the Constitution. Obviously, the realisation of socio-economic rights depends on effective mobilisation around such rights and the vigorous expression of citizenship by exercising full rights to the city. In moments where political agency is focussed in such a manner and stretched across the five domains of political practice, transformational political discourses and outcomes become possible without being gauranteed.

A relational understanding of urban politics suggests that contestation is a normal and to be expected part of urban policy and planning. It reinforces why achieving urban integration and reducing inequality is such a difficult undertaking. For instance, even though the NCPT had a very strong political and moral case for comprehensive land restitution, they ran into barrier after barrier to having their claim translated into
material gain for their members. Clearly, if they were not able to mobilise political pressure on the administrative and political leadership they would not have won their demand for a 54.8ha settlement on Wingfield. However, their political influence only extended to local politicians. They had no influence over national politicians or bureaucrats who had control over the priorities and operational decisions of the Department of Public Works and the SANDF. Consequently, the NCPT could not capitalise on their initial victory to gain ownership of the land. Without funding and a willingness by these departments to service the land of the NCPT with bulk infrastructure, they were unable to move onto the land and transform it into a meaningful asset. These findings suggest that given the multiple interests and power relations at play in urban policy or planning processes, one's approach to planning theory must address the numerous layers and scales of power and politics. The conceptual model presented here (see Figure 8.1) is an attempt to do so.

On the back of this conceptualisation of relational urban politics, I would argue that a transformative role for planning can be projected, which could, ultimately, lead to the diminution of the apartheid city. Firstly, planning can provide a compelling normative horizon to anchor urban political discourses and debate. Planning concepts and ambitions that pertain to social integration, sustainability and social justice can animate social dialogues about: what the city should look like; the obstacles that block the realisation of the vision; and the tools to remove the obstacles, without succumbing to a conception of space that suggests it can be constructed in strict accordance with planning ambitions. In other words, it is possible to hold onto indicative horizons of possibility and deploy the instrumental value of planning concepts and methodologies. Secondly, planning frameworks akin to compact city models and the like can point to meaningful intervention points to shift the political economy of access to resources, assets and opportunities in urban space in favour of subaltern classes and groups. However, prospective intervention projects will be derived from a strategic assessment of fertile opportunities in the city, and not merely where the 'logical' points of spatial intervention are on a map.
Chapter 8: Analysis: Recasting Urban Integration

Thirdly, spatial planning models can offer tools for critique in terms of economic, social, environmental and aesthetic impacts of urban processes on the poor. In other words, as long as political forces are unfavourably aligned by serving mainly the (accumulation) interests of the dominant classes, planning theory and actors can utilise their conceptual tools to insert criticisms into the public sphere about the causes and effects of urban fragmentation and inequality. This, of course, assumes that progressive planners see themselves in activist political terms akin to the advocacy planning of John Friedmann (2002). This was clearly not the case in the Wingfield dispute where the planners of the CCT saw themselves predominantly as the custodians of the integrity of compact city planning principles. Chapter Seven demonstrated how the planners opposed the NCPT's claims because they contradicted the need for higher densities in the planning framework of the planners. However, the planners also saw themselves as speaking on behalf of other poor people who could potentially benefit from the favourable location of Wingfield if the Ndabeni claimants would only reduce the quantum of their claim. This reading by the planners revealed an abstracted sense of urban politics and social justice which pitted them against the historically informed claim for social justice by the Ndabeni claimants. In this dispute, I believe one can discern an important lesson about effective normative planning; it must be historically grounded and not abstract. The neo-systems planning approach of the CCT planners led them to follow an abstract conception of distributive justice which disallowed them to recognise the political potential of the NCPT claim. In my reading of the context at the time, if the planners supported the NCPT claim at the outset, it could have opened the door for a number of other similar claims across the city, which could dramatically have advanced the potential of land restitution as a primary lever to alter land ownership and location patterns in Cape Town. The seeming divergence from compact-city planning precepts was a red herring that would have been obvious had the planners taken on a more advocacy-oriented position, on the lookout for contingent opportunities for transformation and redistribution.

Lastly, in keeping with the approach of Robert Riddell (2004) and Yvonne Rydin (2003), I think planning frameworks can, and must, inform land-use control tools that structure the regulatory environment of (land and property) development processes in the city. In many contexts this aspect of the planning system remains the most effective tool in
curbing market excesses and facilitating a measure of protection for the poor and marginalised. However, with our obsession over the past decade with planning processes, we may have neglected the importance of these regulatory tools that do their work, or not, under the guise of everyday bureaucratic functioning. What we saw in Chapter Six was a situation where 95% of the focus of the CCT Planning Committee's work was on approving (re)zoning applications of individual sites. This division of labour made it impossible for the politicians in charge of planning to deliberate how various planning instruments could be best redeployed to advance greater integration and equity in the city. The logic of deliberation was driven by the objectives of the site plans that came before the committee and not a higher order policy framework that could locate individual sites in a broader framework of urban transformation. However, if such linkages could have been made, then the power of planning regulatory instruments could have been harnessed to achieve more transformative outcomes consistent with the political desire to integrate Cape Town.

Before I create an impression that the future and relevance of planning is beyond dispute, I need to add a caveat. If we think of planning in these transformative terms, then clearly, we need to locate the practice and content of planning beyond its own traditional confines. Planning can only be mobilised in these more expansive terms if it is embedded in a larger network of policy actors and institutional domains (Fischer 2002). Planners need to recognise the pivotal role of other actors in various institutional settings across the urban terrain that can form part of a policy network committed to transformative outcomes. Such a policy network can give expression to specific planning and policy discourses about how the urban territory can be restructured to reflect more socially, culturally and economically integrated and equitable opportunities and experiences for everyone, especially the urban poor. This suggests that planners accept that their power does not reside in their institutional setting and control, but rather in the networks in which they are embedded. In the case of the CCT, the planners could not even form effective policy networks with key allies in other departments in the administration, let alone with strategic actors outside of the CCT. In fact, the planning department was divided internally, which manifested in the opposition to the role and functioning of the Landsdowne-Wetton Corridor team, as recounted in Chapter Six. This opposition was
Despite the fact that the team was experimenting with an approach to area-based development to achieve greater compaction, efficiency and integration as also called for by the planning department. My findings underscore the idea that progressive planners can only succeed by working with other actors with convergence interests, which will require a softening of planning prescripts and perspectives.

**Bridging the Faultline**

Against this recasting of planning, I think it is possible to move the debate around South African planning studies forward. The evidence marshalled in this thesis suggests that the dichotomy between Dewar and Watson is both unnecessary and unproductive. A close analysis of Watson's work makes apparent that she endorses many of the spatial-form arguments in Dewar's model:

Physically, urban transformation projects [...] need to be positioned, initially, within the interstitial areas between the wealthier and poorer parts of the city, recognizing the fact that private investment will not commit to the areas of deep poverty [...] Urban areas also need to consciously integrate surrounding areas, spatially and economically. This requires location in relation to the metropolitan public transport system and vehicle access systems, and the building of physical connections between previously physically separated townships. Urban transformation projects need to pay particular attention to the quality of public urban environment. Such projects are mixed-use and contain important social facilities; there is a constant surveillance and there are public spaces and markets which accommodate small traders (Watson 2002a: 151).

Watson's (2002a: 151) main gripe is that Dewarian planners fall into the trap whereby they use the planning precepts as a "blueprint", which is problematic because "the exact form and nature of such [transformation] projects are not predictable." Based on my interview with Dewar, and of a close reading of his work over time, Dewar would wholeheartedly agree with this position. His issue is that even though planners need to be opportunistic and strategic by responding to the actual context, they still need to be guided by a coherent theory about optimal spatial relations, so that at a minimum, the interventions they suggest do not worsen fragmentation and inequality in the city. The problem with both accounts is that they do not link their work to an explicit argument about the kinds of politics that are conducive to the emergence of favourable policy
discourses and governmental practices that can create space for the effective implementation of "transformation projects", to ensure the building of the post-apartheid city. Both scholars under-specify their informing exogenous theory about the nature of urban politics that shape the role and impact of planning.

Dewar is simply silent on politics and his superficial invocation of 'political will' reveals his shallow political theory. Watson is more alert to politics and endorses the general philosophical position of Nancy Fraser who seeks a political project that links questions of recognition and distributional justice. Nonetheless, Watson also fails to translate her political reference point into a practicable lens on the South African urban context. It is this failure of theory in their respective positions that sets up the artificial dichotomy but also leads to the limited purchase in South African planning literature on why the apartheid city has persisted and what to do about it. My modest claim is that the findings of the present research demonstrate that a relational approach to urban politics provides a more textured canvas on which to paint the practices and possibilities of planning in post-apartheid South Africa. This is explored within the context a) of the immediate post-apartheid decade; and b) particularly as it played itself out in one city and a micro-level case study. This is a significant limitation of this study. However, this research and its influence on my reading of the planning debates may at least open a door onto a fresh research agenda. More immediately, the theoretical analysis offered here is inextricably linked to the policy implications of my thesis. It is to this focus that I now turn as the study draws to a close.

8.4 POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR ADVANCING URBAN INTEGRATION

Flowing from this theoretical approach, it is possible to map out the different dimensions of urban integration (in the South African context) and the position of spatial planning in relation to these dimensions. This lays the basis for a concluding argument for the re-centring of spatial planning, after its discreditation in the 1990s, but on completely different terms than in the past, and without ignoring the durability of apartheid ruins, which thwarted the ambitions of planning as demonstrated in this thesis. The argument that follows also reinforces the earlier point that planning can only have relevance for transformation if embedded in a larger matrix of governance processes and interactions.
In section 4.5 of Chapter Four, I offered a bird-eye perspective of the relationship between planning and other urban development policy inputs as they evolved up to 2001. There it was made clear that spatial planning was defined as being in a subservient relationship to the IDP (essentially a strategic planning document), which came to be the most important policy instrument at the municipal level. In this model the function of the spatial plan is to express the spatial implications of actively pursuing a limited number of strategic development priorities over a medium-term horizon. Furthermore, sectoral and multi-sectoral plans must define how various municipal services and goods will be deployed, or how they can be used as leverage to contribute to the realisation of concrete IDP priorities and goals. The IDP is informed in turn by sectoral plans, multi-sectoral plans and a spatial plan or development framework. The objective, therefore, is for scarce municipal resources to be used in the most cost-effective and resource-optimising manner so that transformative programmes can be realised. This approach effectively removes the power of spatial planning to determine where lead interventions will take place in the city because spatial planning no longer sets the agenda; rather, the drivers are the dialogical processes that produce the IDP priorities. This is a clear example of where the procedural emphasis of communicative planning approaches trumps the spatial-form emphasis of neo-systems planning approaches. The policy question this gives rise to is whether this urban development institutional and policy architecture is sufficient to achieve urban integration that represents a substantive departure from the economic and social relations of the apartheid city.

This post-apartheid architecture is indeed a good foundation for social struggles to progressively inform and achieve urban integration, but in my view only if premised on the pursuit of transformative politics as elaborated above. In this instance, it is necessary to recognise that urban integration is most likely to be realised if local government assumes the lead role in using its resources and power to shape the urban system.83 National policy frameworks, such as the UDF, are simply too far removed from the

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83 I am aware that a number of radical scholars would make a case for transformative politics to arise from civil society and that local government is more likely to be a hindrance rather than a lead actor. I hold the view that local government is indispensable in the current conjuncture in South Africa and is integral to the broader theoretical understanding of transformational politics, a point I have elaborated elsewhere (Pieterse 2005).
regulatory instruments and processes that shape urban processes and spaces. Municipal regulatory instruments in respect of infrastructure provision, housing provision, land-use planning and zoning, transport infrastructures and so forth, are more conducive to shaping urban dynamics, either in favour of greater urban integration and equity or not, as demonstrated with respect to Cape Town in Chapters Six and Seven.

Moving from this vantage point, the legislative obligation on municipalities to formulate IDPs through participatory democratic means constitutes a useful starting point in thinking through the practicalities of advancing greater urban integration. It is worthwhile restating that IDPs are essentially strategic planning frameworks that allow municipalities to establish a holistic but prioritised development plan for the territory under its jurisdiction. IDPs are meant to provide a roadmap for how municipalities intend to address the social, political, livelihood and cultural needs of citizens and businesses residing in their ambit. IDPs therefore reflect situated political agreements about which urban challenges and needs are most urgent and how best to address them in the context of limited resources and competing needs. It is a given that IDPs must be consistent with the Bill of Rights in the Constitution and therefore contribute to the realisation of citizen's socio-economic rights, especially subaltern groups that are systematically denied these. In other words, in the South African context, marked as it is with striking levels of poverty and inequality, the priorities of municipalities should reflect a bias towards realising socio-economic rights of those who are vulnerable and consistently marginalised.

In more practical terms, the potential value of IDPs is that they provide a framework within which micro-level transformative projects, such as the Wingfield site, can be linked with metropolitan-level planning processes. Put differently, an IDP could be the institutional mechanism to translate 'transformation projects' (à la Watson) into a pilot to establish a precedent to pursue similar interventions across the city, which could collectively add up to significant transformation of the opportunities available to the urban poor and excluded. However, IDPs may hold this potential but must be seen in the context of the numerous political interests that will invariably block substantive transformation, as well as the institutional barriers that present formidable obstacles. The
thesis demonstrates that an IDP focussed on advancing urban integration is likely to encounter market resistance and institutional dysfunctionality. Furthermore, it is likely to be subverted or thwarted through the actions and omissions of key actors in the municipality who exercise a determining influence at various moments in the policy implementation cycle. Yet, despite these constraints, IDPs can be recast so that they at least become a terrain where divergent interests and agendas can be clearly identified and pitted against one another in the struggle to determine control of dominant discourses about urban development priorities, and the practice of urban governance and management.

However, to realise this potential of IDPs as an institutional expression of strategic planning, one must clarify how it relates to the various governmental practices of a given municipality. This demands disaggregating the different parts of urban management with an eye on how these elements come together in an IDP. In the traditional approach to local government, different parts of urban management were kept discrete. This approach made it impossible to understand the necessary inter-related actions and investments across sectors and disciplines if one is to identify and implement transformation projects in the city that could lead to greater integration. One can call such a shift an institutional move away from the 'traditional' role of local government to a more 'dynamic' one, which animates diverse actors in the city (including progressive planners) working towards transformative or insurgent political projects (also see Friedmann 2002; Harvey 2000; Hillier 2002b). This resonates with the policy objectives of developmental local government put forward in *The Local Government White Paper* (RSA 1998).

Institutionally, the traditional functions of local government were always exercised through hierarchical bureaucracies with departments acting in silos in order to deliver in terms of the functions (e.g. water, electricity, housing, etc.), which are categorised as sectoral in Table 8.1. Chapters Five and Six demonstrated how the pervasive 'silo-culture' at national and local levels of government militated against programmes that can have greater integration outcomes. Thus, the challenge of urban integration involves, in part, moving from sectoral efforts to effective multi-sectoral actions on the basis of clearly defined spatial objectives that are consistent with the stated political priorities of the
municipality. Such reforms imply political-institutional support systems to facilitate multi-sectoral (or 'joined-up') practice and budgets that are consistent with political priorities. To further clarify the argument, I briefly explore each of these dimensions of urban government, which provides a sharper perspective on where spatial planning fits into the larger urban development processes required for progressively realising integration from the local state's point of view.

Table 8.1: Dimensions of Urban Integration Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectoral</th>
<th>Multi-Sectoral</th>
<th>Spatial</th>
<th>Political-Institutional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housing &amp; land</td>
<td>Local Agenda 21 (environmental)</td>
<td>Compact city model (sustainability focus)</td>
<td>Integrated development plan (IDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure: water, sewerage &amp; electricity</td>
<td>Local economic development</td>
<td>Planning and spatial design models on:</td>
<td>City Development strategy (CDS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>nodes, corridors, urban edges and open-space systems</td>
<td>Municipal partnership framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Service delivery strategy</td>
<td>Strategic planning: linking scales of land-use planning and sectoral planning and using dialogical processes</td>
<td>Human resource development strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>Spatial planning framework</td>
<td></td>
<td>Work process re-engineering (including ICT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community services: libraries, parks, open spaces, recreational &amp; civic spaces</td>
<td>Social development planning framework</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic development.</td>
<td>Poverty reduction strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Area-based plans).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

'Traditional' 'Simple' 'Dynamic' 'Complex'

(Note: These categories are not iron-clad. For instance, IDP, CDS and spatial plans could be regarded as multi-sectoral plans or frameworks.)

(Source: author)

**Sectoral Interventions**

The fundamental building block of municipal government is the provision of services to address basic needs such as access to water, sewerage, sanitation, housing and electricity (see Table 8.1). Access to these basic services, or resisting their disconnection, remains one the most fundamental political projects that animate social movements of the insurgent poor. In the South African context it is vital that basic services are provided in the most effective, efficient and affordable manner as possible with appropriate subsidies for the poor so that everyone enjoys access to a minimum level of service in line with Constitutional obligations. In my view, in the absence of effective mechanisms to provide these goods and services, the best prospect for laying the foundation for urban integration is ensuring that such services are indeed delivered to the urban poor in ways that strengthen their individual, household and collective capabilities.

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84 It is appropriate to refer back to the working definition of urban integration put forward in Chapter Two and restated earlier in the beginning of this chapter.
This imperative was clearly recognised in the South African context at both a national and local level. In fact, nationally the sectoral focus on the provision of formal housing with associated services completely dominated the urban agenda during the first decade of democratisation. This trend, as reflected in Chapters Four and Five, made it difficult to recognise the unintended consequences of only focussing on numerical targets for housing delivery whilst neglecting vital qualitative issues about the quality of the urban environments produced. In Cape Town we saw a similar trend. The CCT municipality was fixated on extending basic services to where the urban poor and under-serviced lived at the expense of investing in areas that could facilitate greater urban integration across the metropolitan area. Clearly, the provision of basic services in urban areas is a precondition for integration but not a sufficient condition. Critically, developmental impact multiplies when the state is able to calibrate its investments and baskets of services so that the household and community reproductive systems are enhanced and rendered more resilient (Hamdi 2004; Rakodi 1999). In other words, it is vital to coordinate and inter-link sectoral strategies through multi-sectoral policy frameworks.

Multi-sectoral interventions

It is particularly at the neighbourhood level that the importance of effective coordination and inter-linkage between sectoral investments and interventions are felt most acutely in terms of the exigencies of everyday life of the urban poor. In addition, at larger scales of aggregation in the city-region there are also compelling economies of scale that reinforce the importance of coordination. This is even more acute in the context of profound technological transformations that reconfigure the inputs and mechanisms of ‘networked infrastructures’ (see Marvin and Graham 2001). It is well established in the literature that complex and intractable problems such as poverty, social exclusion, gender inequality, HIV/AIDS, crime, social violence and the like, which always embody multiple causes, cannot be addressed satisfactorily with sectoral responses. Instead, such problems require multi-dimensional responses, which mirror the inter-related dimensions of everyday life (6 et al. 2002; Rakodi 2002). This is evidenced in the rise of numerous multi-sectoral urban development policy frameworks since the 1980s in particular: Local Agenda 21 plans that operate on environmental criteria (Carley and Christie 2000); local economic development (LED) strategy (Wilson 1995; Rogerson 1999); holistic safety and security
strategy (UNCHS 2000); comprehensive HIV/Aids models (van Donk 2003); and others (Beall 2000). The movement towards multi-sectoral strategies has also reinforced the importance of 'area-based' intervention models, which enable municipalities to practically pool their resources and staff and provide easy one-stop access points for communities and citizens (Smith and Vawda 2002).

However, because the history of municipal government is steeped in hierarchical and fragmented organisational models, it not easy to reorient staff, managers, politicians and the community to work in more horizontal, networked ways as many of these frameworks demand. For example, the departmental conflicts in the CCT, described in some detail in Chapter Six, gives one some sense of just how complex and difficult these issues can be. As I demonstrated in Chapter Six, the poverty reduction model of the COMDEV Department operated on an area-based model of multi-sectoral delivery to the residents who lived in the so-called zones of poverty. However, the larger municipal organisation was institutionally at odds with this approach which meant that it did not receive the necessary resources or support to work effectively. Furthermore, the area-based planning intervention along the Landsdowne-Wetton Corridor in Cape Town was also terminated by the Planning Department of the CCT when they had the first chance to do so. These findings are critical because both 'transformation projects' and city-scale planning approaches demand more cross-sectoral planning and implementation actions from components of local government. Manifestly, if planning frameworks and processes do not pay more attention to the ways in which the (local) state is organised and incentivised, they are unlikely to be effective. Conversely, planning imperatives can potentially reinforce the importance of institutional transformation of municipalities to prepare them for more complex delivery approaches that can function at various scales in the city.

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85 Another important driver of multi-sectoral approaches to the reduction of urban poverty is the rise of asset-based intervention frameworks as reflected in the livelihoods approach, which seeks to accentuate latent assets as opposed to merely responding to (perceived) needs of the urban poor (Beall 2004; Rakodi 2002).
Spatial frameworks

Borja and Castells (1997) suggest that spatial planning is best seen as a tool to inform political processes of strategic assessment and planning, aimed at shaping the future growth trajectory of a given city. This is akin to the conception of the IDP and, in my view, underplays the power of spatial planning to draw attention to the unique and ever-shifting spatialities of the city (Healey 2000; Massey 1999). Echoing my earlier argument, I want to reiterate the continued relevance of spatial planning frameworks like the normative models currently in play across South Africa (e.g. compact city models, urban design approaches) because of their powerful diagnostic and purposive capacities (Dewar 2000). Spatial planning is useful as a diagnostic to read and understand the spatial relations (i.e. proximity, distance, intensity and flows) between numerous actors and facilities that co-exist in the territory. Contra Dewar (1998; 2000), it is not necessarily useful as a tool to transform spatial relations because its built-in vocabulary tends to lose sight of the mobility of dominating and symbolic power in the city. Also, as demonstrated in Chapter Seven, it is largely incapable of grasping and accentuating (messy) insurgent practices in the city. Consequently, as I have illustrated throughout the thesis, spatial planning has proved less useful in guiding and shaping investment and business decisions, especially those of private actors, resulting in wasteful and uncontrolled processes of suburbanisation and sprawl. However, in combination with other diagnostic and regulatory instruments, and embedded in an explicit transformative political programme across all political domains in the city (see Figure 8.1), spatial plans can potentially play a vital role in remaking patterns of urban fragmentation and segregation.

Put more concretely, spatial plans hold the potential to offer democratic talking points to explore the balance of resources and services as these are spread across the city and to animate more integrated community and city development, in much the same way as, for example, participatory budgeting instruments are said to have done in many Brazilian cities (Abers 2000; Santos 1999). By using the diagnostic mapping power of spatial plans it is possible to have much more informed and concrete debates about the distribution of essential resources, services and opportunities across cities and towns. The apartheid geography of great disparities between rich and poor, black and white, 'north' and 'south' means one can plot through spatial representations how well (or badly) the city is doing
in achieving redistribution and equity across the full urban terrain, over time by layering maps. Also, difficult political problems of relative unequal access between adjacent poor communities can be clarified, even if not resolved, through spatial modelling and engagement.

Most importantly, spatial maps and illustrations of the city can also be linked to the budgetary allocations (both capital and operating) of the municipality to demonstrate year on year where resources are flowing to, or not. This is potentially an empowering political moment for insurgent interests, which creates the vital opening in the public sphere to ask questions about 'why' and 'how come'. Such questions demand of transformative planning to be rooted in theories of power, identity and difference that correspond with our brutal and exclusionary times, as statistically marked out in Chapter Four and conceptually pre-empted in Chapter Two. Such critical questions, backed up by a multi-pronged political campaign, can become the tipping point where vested interests are rendered vulnerable and forced to comply with more muscular redistributive policies. However, in the final instance spatial planning cannot offer ready-made recipes for social engineering through formula-based spatial organisation of urban elements. Such efforts will always be doomed to miserable failure. If a measure of success is achieved, it will pay for it by making concessions to oppressive social control.

Institutional effectiveness and delivery capability

A profoundly complex aspect of urban integration is the fact that both sectoral and multi-sectoral interventions must ideally occur simultaneously at various scales in the city, ranging from the street in a neighbourhood up to the urban region. Furthermore, the interventions at these various scales must also be consistent and enhance greater synergy across the whole urban system whilst accommodating the requirements of national government departments. This requires immensely sophisticated institutional systems to ensure appropriate information flows and organisational alignment between municipal departments (intra-relations), between local and other spheres of government, between government and civil society organisations, and of course between government and private sector actors and initiatives. The immense difficulty of this challenge was observed at a national level where the Department of Housing found it impossible to
persuade other national departments impacting on the urban domain to support and implement the UDF. Similarly, in the City of Cape Town, the over-riding feature of its identity was the conflicts between the various departments in the organisation in pursuance of shared over-arching objectives.

Spatial planning frameworks can potentially ease the challenge of cohering sophisticated institutional systems by providing an accessible and graphic 'language' to talk about sequencing, co-ordination and integration of disparate efforts.\textsuperscript{86} Crucial though is the imperative that sectoral, multi-sectoral and spatial plans cohere in the IDP, or some form of flexible strategic plan, which is regularly renewed and recalibrated. In this sense, the IDP can also be seen as an aggregate framework that provides a consistent and politically situated rationale for how numerous development efforts hang together and move the city in the direction of less fragmentation and more integration. However, for the IDP to come into its own in this way, what is needed is a razor sharp understanding of politics, political accountability frameworks and the underlying issue of institutional effectiveness, articulated across and between the five domains of political practice in and acting on the city. This perspective suggests a challenging role for planning and especially planning practitioners who operate within and outside the state.\textsuperscript{87}

\textbf{Aggregate urban development frameworks}

The primary instrument of democratic accountability is the IDP. As explained before, the IDP processes provide unique opportunities for progressive civil society actors to place urban integration centre-stage on the political agenda. This is because urban integration is more likely to address the systemic problems of urban inequality than the current pattern of fragmented and uneven development. The power of the IDP is that it reflects the sum-total of sectoral and multi-sectoral strategies and, more importantly, the \textit{argument} for how these strategies address the priorities of the city, as defined through participatory

\textsuperscript{86} The Muni-SDF makes a valiant attempt to identify the institutional coordination implications of its planning proposals in a series of Annexures that spell out which components in the CCT must come together to implement the proposals.

\textsuperscript{87} This argument may seem like an impossibly tall order for the proverbial planner, and I would concur with such a view. However, planners are inserted in larger policy networks that stretch across various sectors inside the state and, crucially, reach out to include actors in civil society, academia and business (see Fischer 2002; Pieterse 2006).
democratic processes. Of course, if democratic institutions and forums are weak it is highly unlikely that the IDP will indeed be a force for realising urban integration. What this implies is that the champions of radical democracy and social justice in civil society and the state need to hold a comprehensive understanding of the various elements that comprise urban integration (spatially, infrastructurally, economically, ecologically and socially) and how they need to be related and aligned in the specific circumstances of the city in which they find themselves. Based on such an understanding, the challenge is to ensure that the IDP priorities, which inform the allocation of resources, are consistent with their analysis. To be sure, such a progressive coalition will have to actively mobilise to make its vision and understanding of urban integration hegemonic. Such mobilisation is likely to be tough and protracted given the predominance of neoliberal urban development thinking in a great deal of mainstream policy. Also, usually the greatest obstacle faced by progressive forces is not the absence of ideas or operating space, but the chronic fragmentation of dissenting voices in society. In this regard the lament of Ahmed Vawda, captured in Chapter Six, comes to mind. He believed that the only way the CCT could have been kept accountable to a transformative agenda was if progressive civil society organisations actively mobilised to ensure that enough resources were allocated to drive urban integration and equity; but this was singularly lacking in Cape Town. This brings me to my final aspect of envisioning and fostering urban integration: keeping politics alive in the heart of planning.

Political accountability frameworks
The biggest danger for discourses in favour of urban integration is to slip into a technocratic mode, fixated on co-ordination, alignment, indicators, reporting, and the like. As the discussion in this section demonstrates, there are so many variables at play in the pursuit of urban integration that one must rely on technical, planning and managerial tools to retain an overview. However, it would be a grave error to ignore that the struggle for urban integration is fundamentally about altering the balance of power between opposing interests in the city in favour of subaltern groups. For this reason, if urban integration is reduced to a particular multi-sectoral (e.g. Local Agenda 21), area-based or spatial planning model (e.g. compact city), it will have missed the point and the political bus. The central political challenge is to empower insurgent interests in the city to claim
their rights, entitlements and interests through the available participatory democratic forums and beyond. The strategic knack is to ensure that their demands and claims are framed in terms of the benefits of urban integration for them and the city at large. Seen from this angle, the transformative potential of the IDP, spatial planning and other inter-related urban governance instruments come to the fore more clearly.

Thus, I would argue that even though the UDF was stillborn, as demonstrated in this thesis, such policy frameworks are of great importance. They provide a basis for making claims and cohering interests. However, national and local policy framework need to be less naïve about the reality of unequal power relations in society and the fact that it is impossible to achieve consensus between opposing interests about urban development objectives that will lead to transformative interventions and outcomes. The function of (national) policy frameworks is to link local imperatives for social justice to international discourses that secure the socio-economic rights of all people in the city. Furthermore, national policy frameworks should ideally create the space and opportunity for local states and citizens to forge their own, locally specific, policy agreements on how to translate principles into concrete interventions. In this respect planners can offer a number of useful tools and instruments to animate policy discourses and to pinpoint the most strategic intervention points. This will require a spatial register that can define the inter-relationships between various elements across the entire urban territory, but also, politically informed suggestions about where best to intervene on a scale to fundamentally shift the structures of opportunities and possibility for the urban poor—the excluded majorities that are forced to build the city with little more than tenacity and ingenuity. This is clearly not the approach or sensibility that was employed in South Africa during the period under review in this thesis. On the contrary, planners and urban development professionals in general were far too sanguine about the potential of urban integration discourses to deliver on the promises of planning.

In summary, this section suggests that the disaggregating of the urban integration policy matrix presented here offers a more nuanced and practical framework to both assess and plot urban integration interventions. In this sense, it captures in part the confusion about different meanings of urban integration as demonstrated to be prevalent in the UDF (see
Chapter Five). However, this policy lens also makes it easier to identify the continued relevance of spatial planning in ordering or focussing political debate about appropriate interventions to address the causal drivers of urban segregation, fragmentation and inequality. It is clear that spatial planning is indispensable, but on its own terms, delinked from broader politically defined processes, it will remain largely irrelevant or complicit with the status quo.

8.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter served to draw together the empirical findings of the thesis in relation to the framing questions set out in the Introduction. The first section provided an analytical summary of the main findings of each preceding chapter in relation to specific research questions fleshed out in Chapter Three. The second section explored the implications of these findings for debates in planning theory with particular reference to a key faultline in South African planning debates between those who seek surety in spatial-form planning models and those who prefer a more contingent approach to remaking urban relations and space based on strategic interventions. In this section I argued that the opposition between these positions are too stark and that it is in fact possible to take current debates forward by exploring the overlaps and agreements between these scholars. The section further revealed that both camps suffered from a deficiency of political theory in their conceptualisation of planning in a post-apartheid context. In response, the chapter sets out a brief overview of what such a political theory could entail. The third section explores the policy implications of the thesis if a more effective response to the ruins of the apartheid city is to be developed. On the foundation of this exploration it is now possible to finally return to my original proposition and explore its significance.

At the outset of the thesis the following proposition set the course for this study:

Urban development policies and planning discourses promoting spatial integration in South Africa are likely to mark a departure from the governance and planning of the apartheid past. However, these discourses are unlikely to lead to transformative interventions that reduce urban segregation, fragmentation and inequality if they
are not built on and responsive to an understanding of the factors that reproduce and embed these features in the post-apartheid city.

The proposition has been borne out by the findings of this thesis. There has indeed been the emergence of a hegemonic new urban development discourse that called for a break from apartheid policies of racial segregation and exclusion of Black people from urban services and opportunities. This new discourse was rooted in planning concepts consistent with the oeuvre of a reputed planning academic, Professor David Dewar, who has consistently called for the implementation of a new urban planning paradigm that is akin to features of New Urbanism and Compact City planning frameworks but with a South African twist. However, as demonstrated at great length in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight, Dewar's planning framework was simply insufficiently theorised to account for the structural political, economic and institutional factors that animate the ruins of the apartheid city, and these factors continue to overdetermine most governmental urban policies and interventions. In particular, Dewar's planning model — and the various official government policies informed by it — does not account for historicity, institutional complexity, agonistic political contestation as urban space is reconfigured, the structuring influence of market forces and the circumscribed role of planning in a context of networked governance. It is therefore not surprising, even if despiriting, that the ruins of the apartheid city continue to mark and haunt South African cities. Transformation of the apartheid city remains a mirage stoked by the misplaced confidence in planning divorced from politics and power.


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### Annexure A: Interview Respondents

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position during 1996-2001 and/or at time of interview</th>
<th>Interview Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>Majdi Abrahams</td>
<td>SAMWU Office Bearer responsible for the CCT</td>
<td>15 March 2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stephen Berrisford</td>
<td>Chief Director: Department of Land Affairs</td>
<td>28 March 2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Andrew Boraine</td>
<td>City Manager, City of Cape Town &amp; CEO: Cape Town Partnership</td>
<td>13 June 2002</td>
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<td>Stephen Boshoff</td>
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<td>Diet von Broemsen</td>
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<td>Kam Chetty</td>
<td>City Manager: Cape Winelands District</td>
<td>3 August 2002</td>
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<td>David Daniels</td>
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<td>11 March 2003</td>
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<td>Kim van Deventer</td>
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<td>David Dewar</td>
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<td>Richard Dyantyi</td>
<td>ANC Secretary for Khayalitsha region; Manager in Social Development Department of CCT</td>
<td>2 July 2002</td>
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<td>Tony Ehrenreich</td>
<td>General Secretary of COSATU Western Cape</td>
<td>29 July 2002</td>
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<td>Faldiela de Fries</td>
<td>ANC Ward Councillor for Manenberg</td>
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<td>Graeme Gotz</td>
<td>Independent Consultant</td>
<td>17 April 2002, 20 October 2004</td>
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<td>43. Tanya Zack</td>
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<td>44. Respondent X</td>
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<tr>
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<td>45. Respondent Y</td>
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<td>46. Mr G. Fezi, Mr M. Nongaula, Mr V. Qunta</td>
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<td>Mr G. Fezi, Mr M. Nongaula, Mr V. Qunta</td>
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<td>Representatives of the Ndabeni Communal Property Trust (NCPT) Executive Committee</td>
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<td>26 July 2002</td>
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Note: Respondents X and Y asked that their identities be kept confidential.