

War, Power, and the Media:

NATO Press and Information activities in the Balkans

Carsten F. Rønnfeldt

London School of Economics

PhD thesis

UMI Number: U615653

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



UMI U615653

Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.



ProQuest LLC
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

I declare that the work presented in this thesis is my own.

Carsten F. Rønnfeldt

In accordance with the University of London's 'Regulations for the Degrees of Mphil and PhD' with effect from September 2001, this thesis is in copyright. The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without the prior consent of the author.

THESES

F

8694



1 1 1 9 9 0 0

Abstract

This thesis emerges from a general interest in how actors in the field of international affairs use the media as a means of power in politics and war. It examines the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO) use of its Press and Information (PI) function in three peace support missions in the Balkans, and specifically studies how the officers in charge of this function strove to achieve the alliance's political and military ends.

Departing from six illustrative cases the thesis demonstrates how PI operated to enhance NATO member countries' public support to the alliance as well as its presence and use of physical force in the Balkans. Further, it examines how NATO used PI in an effort to influence the general behaviour and specific actions of ordinary people and warring parties in the Balkans without having to resort to such force.

The thesis does not evaluate whether the PI activities actually influenced people in the Balkans and elsewhere, but it provides a conceptual framework to appreciate the kinds of influence PI sought to exercise on them. Robert A. Dahl's notion of power may further the understanding of PI's mode of operation to influence the parties' specific actions. To this end, PI holds the potential of being a non-lethal enforcement measure. Michel Foucault's notion of power adds another dimension by clarifying in a theoretical sense how PI may enhance public understanding and support and influence people's general behaviour. Used in this manner, PI may ultimately be a government technique applied as a concentration of knowledge in a discursive battlefield.

Contents

Abstract	3
List of tables	7
List of abbreviations.....	8
List of key terms.....	9
Acknowledgements	14
1. Introduction	19
1.1 War and the media	20
1.1.1 Empirical question and thesis.....	30
1.2 Power	31
1.2.1 Theoretical question and thesis	34
1.3 The relation to propaganda.....	37
1.4 Methodology	45
1.4.1 Methodological concerns on the empirical dimension of the thesis	45
1.4.2 Methodological concerns on the theoretical dimension of the thesis	58
1.4.3 Limitation of scope	65
1.5 Literature review	68
1.5.1 The specific empirical topic	69
1.5.2 The general empirical interest.....	75
1.5.3 The three notions of power	86
2. NATO Press and Information activities in the Balkans	90
2.1 Six illustrative cases.....	93
2.1.1 Case 1: IFOR – The PI mission.....	94
2.1.2 Case 2: IFOR – Bosnia’s national elections.....	100
2.1.3 Case 3: KFOR 1 – KFOR is in control	104
2.1.4 Case 4: KFOR 1 – Show of force.....	114
2.1.5 Case 5: KFOR 5 – Presevo valley	116
2.1.6 Case 6: KFOR 5 – Border control.....	122

2.2 Press and Information's mode of operation	125
2.2.1 Press and Information goals	127
2.2.2 Commander's intentions	134
2.2.3 Message strategy	136
2.2.4 Unity of effort	142
2.2.5 Maintain credible relations with the press	156
2.3 Content analysis of NATO press briefings	165
2.3.1 Master messages in IFOR's initial press briefings.....	166
2.3.2 Master messages in KFOR's initial press briefings	174
2.4 Summary	183
3. Three notions of power applied to NATO Press and Information activities	187
3.1 The three notions of power	188
3.1.1 Robert A. Dahl – compulsory power	188
3.1.2 Steven Lukes – structural power	190
3.1.3 Michel Foucault – productive power	193
3.2 Conceptual differences.....	197
3.2.1 Conceptual features of Dahl's notion of power	199
3.2.2 Conceptual features of Lukes' notion of power.....	200
3.2.3 Conceptual features of Foucault's notion of power	202
3.3 Methodological differences.....	208
3.3.1 Dahl's methodological approach – Behaviouralism	209
3.3.2 Lukes' methodological approach – Structuralism.....	210
3.3.3 Foucault's methodological approach – Genealogy	214
3.4 Analysis.....	218
3.4.1 Dahl's notion of power applied to NATO PI activities.....	219
3.4.2 Lukes' notion of power applied to NATO PI activities	231
3.4.3 Foucault's notion of power applied to NATO PI activities	244

4. Conclusion.....293

4.1 Empirical thesis..... 295

4.2 Theoretical thesis 296

4.3 The relation between compulsory power and productive power 307

Final thoughts..... 315

Bibliography 332

Primary Sources 332

 Official Documents 332

 NATO Press Briefings 333

 Interviews..... 335

Secondary Sources 336

 Works 336

 Articles 342

 Electronic sources 351

List of tables

Table 1: Dahl's and Lukes' versus Foucault's notions of power.

List of abbreviations

ARRC	Allied Rapid Reaction Corps
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation
COMIFOR	Force Commander IFOR
COMKFOR	Force Commander KFOR
CPIC	Coalition Press and Information Centre
CPIO	Chief Press and Information Officer
EAAG	Ethnic Albanian Armed Groups
IFOR	Implementation Force
KFOR	Kosovo Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PI	Public Information
PIC	Press and Information Centre
PIO	Press and Information Officer
PsyOps	Psychological Operations
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force

List of key terms

Chief Press and Information Officer (CPIO)

A Chief Press and Information Officer is an officer in charge of co-ordinating all Press and Information (see below) activities in a NATO military mission.

Compulsory power

‘Compulsory power’ is applied to encapsulate Robert A. Dahl’s (1957: 203) conception of power defined as ‘*A* has power over *B* to the extent that he can get *B* to do something that *B* would not otherwise do’ (see further 3.1.1 and 3.2.1).

Discursive force

I shall use the term ‘discursive force’ to refer to dynamic and immaterial elements in Foucault’s analytics of power. Discourses consists of discursive forces (see 3.1.3 and 3.2.3). It should be distinguished from physical force (see below).

Industrial war

Rupert Smith (2005: 16) defines the concept of ‘industrial war’ as ‘conflict between states, the manoeuvre of forces en masse, and the total support of the state’s manpower and industrial base, at the expense of all other interests, for the purpose of an absolute victory’. Arguably this conception compares to how war was largely understood during the Cold War, among other places in the field of International Relations (see further 1.1 and 1.2 respectively). The thesis adopts this term to avoid confusing the broader term ‘war’ with this particular conception of it.

Information

The term 'information' is here apprehended from the perspective provided by Briggs and Burke (2002: 188), who point out that originally in English and French the verb inform meant 'forming the mind'. Unless otherwise specified, it does not refer to digital data or other non-processed pieces of information. Rather, information refers to data that are organised in a form that makes them understandable to subjects and that subjects may consider as forming part of their knowledge. This study deals with the cognitive dimension of information that involves perception, sense-making, and the understanding of data.

The media

'The media' is used as a broad tag implying means of mass communication, primarily television, newspaper and radio. It is used interchangeably with the term 'the press' and those who produce stories to the media, that is, journalists and reporters. It does not mean advertisement or entertainment.

Peace support operation

'Peace support operation' should be understood along NATO's (2006:131) definition: 'An operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and/or humanitarian operations.'

People

The term 'people' should be construed as the mass adult populations and is used interchangeably with the terms 'public' and 'electorates'. Unless otherwise specified

these terms are used in a global sense, but often they refer to the mass adult populations in NATO member states and in the Balkans. Frequently, the thesis refers to these people by adapting the CPIOs' more technical term 'target groups'. In this context 'strategic targets' are the electorates in NATO member states and 'local targets' are the populations in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Physical force

'Physical force' refers to the traditional military capability to apply armed, kinetic force to human bodies and material objects. This type of force is potentially lethal and destructive (see 1.2).

Power

'Power' is conceived in a broad generic sense interchangeable with the term influence. It refers to a social relational phenomenon that changes actors' thoughts and behaviour primarily by means of what is also called coercion, persuasion, and authority. Thus, physical force (see above) is one of several means of power. It is not a synonym of the much broader term power, however. Human communication, by means of words and images used to explain, to persuade, or to dissuade others is also a means of power.

Press and Information (PI)

In this study, 'Press and Information' refers to a function within NATO in charge of releasing public information as defined below.

Press and Information Officer (PIO)

A PIO is an officer in charge of conducting Press and Information activities.

Productive power

‘Productive power’ is here conceived as an ability actors may possess to exploit dominating discursive strategies to their advantage in Foucault’s local centres of power-knowledge. It is a development from and is compatible with Foucault’s analytical framework of power (see the section ‘Productive power and government’ in 3.4.3).

Public information

NATO’s (2006:137) definition of ‘public information’ is used here: ‘Information, which is released or published for the primary purpose of keeping the public fully informed, thereby gaining their understanding and support’.

Public opinion

In this study ‘public opinion’ refers to the interests and ideas of electorates. Some make a distinction between media opinion and public opinion, where the former is confined to ideas and interests as they are projected in the media (Campbell 1999). Such a distinction is not necessary here. Note, however, that NATO primarily seeks the support of the people. The media is merely a channel to communicate with people.

Structural power

‘Structural power’ is here construed as the third dimension of Steven Lukes’ conception of power (see 3.1.2 and 3.2.2). Elaborating on Dahl’s (1957) and Bachrach and Baratz’s (1962) conceptions Steven Lukes (1974: 23) defines it as: ‘*A* may exercise power over *B* by getting him to do what he does not want to do but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants’.

War amongst the people

The notion 'war amongst the people' is used in line with Smith who applies it to conceptualise contemporary wars on terms that are different from 'industrial wars'. The former describes a kind of war 'in which the people in the streets and houses and fields – all the people, anywhere – are the battlefield. Military engagements can take place anywhere: in the presence of civilians, against civilians, in defence of civilians. Civilians are the targets, objectives to be won, as much as an opposing force' (Smith 2005: 3).

Acknowledgements

In 2001, in an ordinary administrative meeting at the Norwegian Military Academy, my immediate superior, Ola Johan Berntsen, took us by surprise when he informed that funds had been allocated to our section for those of us prepared to undertake a part-time course of study for a PhD degree. What had proven so difficult to achieve through ordinary departmental channels during the years I worked for the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, was now offered just like that. I immediately came forward. Not only did it offer an opportunity to undertake research over an extensive period in a stimulating academic environment, it also gave our family – Anne Stine and I both working and with two kids of one and three years old – periods during the year with a much valued flexibility that allowed us to combine family life and jobs. I am therefore grateful to the Military Academy who generously allocated 50 per cent of my full-time lecturing position to study at home during a five-year period.

Like most others who complete a thesis, I have a great deal of gratitude to express. The financial support of the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence has been much appreciated since it covered my fees at London School of Economics (LSE) and a major part of study-related travel expenses.

Academically, my supervisor Christopher Coker has been invaluable. Not only did he provide the critique, inspiration, suggestions and encouragement that one would expect from a tutor. He also introduced me to a scholarly approach that is different from the Scandinavian tradition that I have been trained in. In general terms, I used to apply theories on empirical cases either to present findings that emerged from such analyses

or simply in order to test the theories. In contrast, Coker encouraged me to depart empirically and to develop a conceptual understanding of the findings. This, one may say more practical, approach produced insights that could not have been reached from a theoretical point of departure, and has changed my outlook on academic work. Besides, I will always treasure the evenings we spent together in his club in Pall Mall in the atmosphere of an era I thought no longer existed, and which I am grateful to have been introduced to.

I want also to thank my peers with whom I met on a regular basis in the classes of Christopher Hill and Mark Hoffman during the first year at the School. Their ideas, questions and comments helped shape the present research design. In subsequent phases of the study, I relied increasingly on other colleagues and friends. I am very grateful to a number of people who read and commented extensively on multiple draft chapters, particularly to Richard Blücher, Tor-Erik Hanssen, Morten Haveraaen, Sven-Åke Lindgren, Iver B. Neumann, Niels Henrik Rønnfeldt, and Anders Sæther. Moreover, I wish to recognise the benefit I derived from giving lectures on this topic and from the proceeding discussions with both military personnel and civilians.

I would also like to thank my many colleagues in the Norwegian Armed Forces and NATO who gave of their time to discuss the empirical topic of concern with me and responded to my requests for information in a most helpful manner. They provided me with a general understanding of the issue which cannot be retrieved from NATO policy documents or scholarly work. Many of these colleagues spoke to me on condition that they provided background information and were not to be mentioned in this study. Others had no such reservations but I have elected not to list any of them, for fear of leaving some others out.

Yet, four persons who have made a particularly important contribution to this study must be mentioned. I should like to thank the Director of the NATO Office of Information and Press from 1994 to 1997, Chris Prebensen, who at the initial stage of the study organised for me to meet with a range of centrally placed individuals working with information activities in NATO headquarters and in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). Moreover, I owe a special debt to Mark Van Dyke, Robin Clifford, and Tore Idsøe. They held the position of Chief Press and Information Officer in the three cases upon which this study is based, and have generously granted me several extensive interviews. They provided this study with a general insight and factual details that otherwise is only available by firsthand experience. Without their contribution, this would have been a very different study.

Many thanks also to the Military Academy's librarians – Rita Hansen, Bjørg Hjulseth, Turid Steinagard – who have provided a most skilful and patient assistance in seeing to that I always had the ordered articles and works at hand. Their assistance saved me so much time. I am also indebted to Merete Ruud, who in the final phase has put a tremendous, speedy and highly professional effort into proof-reading and correcting my English. As it has become customary to state: while I have received much help from the above-mentioned individuals, I alone am responsible for the final result.

This is also a golden opportunity to thank my friends in the neighbourhood. First of all, thanks to Bjørn and Christine who lent me their study in the garden. Their gesture provided the necessary silence to read during the first years. Thanks to Lars who frequently joins me in evening walks, who (himself an experienced professor in microbiology) repeatedly challenged my methodological approach and who inspired me to 'go deductive' after the conclusion, freeing myself from prudent academic considerations and taking a few hypothetical propositions as far as possible to see

where that would bring us. Thanks also to all those who from time to time gave me a little more time to work by taking and bringing the kids to the kindergarten and school, or looked after them in the afternoons. Finally, thanks to those neighbours where I was always made to feel welcome for a night-cap.

Throughout the years of study I relied heavily on my family. I have much appreciated Lærke, Sandy, Simon, Trine and their families' invitations to stay at their places when studying at LSE. This certainly added a pleasant dimension to the entire undertaking. Thanks also to my Norwegian family for lending me their holiday resort in Odalen when a self-imposed dead-line of mine was approaching. It offered a hide-away where I could focus on nothing but delivering a draft chapter in time. I am particularly indebted to my parents, Anna Grete and Jørgen, and my partner's mother, Anne Lise, who always took the time to come and assist Anne Stine and me, when our schedules collided and we needed a 'butler' or a 'nanny' to keep the kids happy and the household sane.

And finally, a very special thanks to the three persons who shared with me the turbulence and intensity of doing a PhD – my partner Anne Stine and our daughters Anne Sofie and Christine. Thanks particularly to Anne Stine, whose role in this project went beyond the 'supportive spouse'. The study has benefited much from her inputs with almost 20 years experience as a journalist in a major Norwegian newspaper. While this study gave us more flexibility in long periods, I apologise for the times when I was – if not completely absent – fairly inaccessible, particularly during the last six months.

I will never forget a small tripartite situation that unfolded as I had wrapped the final draft of the thesis in paper and placed it on the dining table a few days before X-mas. Our oldest daughter said: 'This is the best X-mas present I have ever got'. Anne Stine

suspiciously asked whether this was really the final version, which of course it was – almost, at least. Christine, now turned six, wondered how others could read ‘the story’ – as the girls called it – if only this one existed. ‘Well I can just make some more’, I answered, beginning to imagine a pile of copies. The pleasant thought was immediately interrupted. ‘No way! Leave that to others’, she replied stamping her foot on the floor anticipating how that would prevent us from being together for another extensive period.

Yet, the ‘story’ has come to an end. Here it is.

Fjordvangen, December 2006.

Carsten F. Rønnfeldt

Chapter 1

Introduction

Over the past 44 months, war has left 200,000 people dead or missing, and 2 million more homeless. Now, 60,000 NATO troops are beginning to fan out across Bosnia to enforce a peace plan . . . Of the three warring parties, NATO is expecting most trouble from the Serbs, who during the war shot down NATO planes and took UN peacekeepers hostage . . . But even in Sarajevo, there was no resistance as French troops bulldozed Serb checkpoints on approaches to the west of the city. French troops were seen sharing beer and plum brandy with the Serbs on the front-line Brotherhood and Unity Bridge. 'There should be more of them. Then we wouldn't have to worry,' said Djure Rosic, a man in his 50s (Tony Smith, Associated Press, 24 December 1995).

Nearly 100 suspected Albanian guerrillas gave themselves up to NATO-led peacekeepers in Kosovo yesterday in response to an amnesty offer. NATO's senior commander in Kosovo, Gen Thorstein Skiaker of Norway, offered the deal to rebels fighting Serb forces in disputed Presevo valley in southern Serbia. Under the terms of the amnesty, those who cross back into Kosovo unarmed will be screened and freed if they have not been guilty of any serious crime. Gen Skiaker said: 'I appeal to their leaders to avoid bloodshed and loss of life. There is no dishonour in seeking peace' (Christian Jennings, Telegraph, 17 May 2001).

Media reports like these have been informed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Press and Information (PI) activities in the Balkans. This study explores how, and for what purposes, PI operated to have the alliance's version of events broadcasted in the media. The thesis is that NATO used its PI function as a means of power to achieve political and military ends. The study presents PI Officers' (PIO) mode of operation and applies theoretical notions of power to conceptualise the types of influence it sought to exert.

This research emerges from a general interest in how actors in the field of international affairs use the media as a means of power in politics and war. Before embarking on the study it is therefore clarifying to specify the empirical concern by situating it in the context of war and the media. It is also useful to present the relevance of analysing the findings with different notions of power and to explicate how this study relates to the infamous term propaganda. Finally, the introduction will illuminate central methodological considerations and provide a review of how the specific, as well as the general, topic have been scrutinised in the scholarly literature.

1.1 War and the media

The idea that warring parties use the media for military and political purposes is not new.¹ Yet reflecting on the declining utility of physical force in contemporary international affairs, the British General Sir Rupert Smith argues that the media has become an increasingly important means to achieve strategic objectives. It has become ‘the other manner in which we fight’ (Smith 2005: 284). The primary reason is that the phenomenon of war has changed. The kind of war he spent most of his 40-year career preparing to fight did not match the armed conflicts he was tasked to deal with towards the end – as Force Commander in United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter simply Bosnia) in 1995, then as General Officer Commanding in Northern Ireland, and last as NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied

¹ For other studies that approach this media–foreign policy nexus from the government’s perspective see the section on propaganda (ie section 1.3) and the literature review (ie 1.5). Prominent works that enter the interface from the other side notably include the work of Hudson and Stanier (1999), McLaughlin (2002), and Knightly (2003).

Commander Europe during the military campaigns against Serbia in 1999 and Afghanistan from 2001.

With a stimulating conceptual take, Smith (2005: 371-72) calls for nothing less than a revolution in our thinking about war, arguing that Western armed forces no longer fight *industrial war* but *war amongst the people*.² This has strategic implications.³ The traditional concern to destroy the adversary's capacity to wage war has been replaced by the overriding aim *to win the will of the people* (Smith 2005: 372, 379). This refers partly to people in the West who influence their government's approach to armed conflicts worldwide and who may undermine political will to sustain a military campaign.⁴ It also refers to people directly affected by contemporary conflicts and

² These terms are explained in the list of definitions. Throughout the text central empirical or theoretical formulations and terms will be emphasised in italics the first time they are used. When the formulations and terms reoccur in the text they are not emphasised but shall be conceived in the way they were introduced.

³ Western political leaders support the view that the kind of war they joined arms to prevent during the Cold War no longer exists. For instance, in NATO's Strategic Concept of 1991 they stipulate: 'The threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO's European fronts has effectively been removed' (NATO 1991: paragraph 7).

⁴ According to Taylor (2003: 176) it was during the First World War that 'sustaining morale became just as essential for both sides as sustaining the military effort'. Handel (2001: 11-13) notes that public support constituted one of six conditions in Secretary of Defence, Caspar Weinberger's, Doctrine of 1984 to be met before the US should launch a military campaign abroad. In the post-Cold War era this aspect of warfare has gained renewed interest. Many writers have taken notice of governments' difficulties to establish and maintain the electorates' political support deemed so crucial for the successful conduct of their military campaigns abroad (eg Strobel 1997: 225; Lehmann 1999: 1-2). With reference to the engagements where 18 American soldiers, among many others, were killed in Mogadishu on 3-4 October 1993, Avruch et al. (1999: 14) note: 'After Somalia, the "hearts and minds" to be won over in mounting these [peace] operations . . . included, perhaps predominantly, [those] of the American people and Congress'. It also became a cardinal concern during Operation Allied Force, NATO's air campaign over Kosovo in the spring of 1999, as it appeared that the adversary's strategy aimed to undermine the cohesion of the alliance by using international media to divide its various publics (Freedman 2000: 356-7; Posen 2000: 39; Vickers 2000: 58). NATO eventually discovered this and used, among others, its PI function to counter Serbia's strategy (Campbell 1999: 36; Ignatieff 2000: 194; Shea 2001: 209-10; Vickers 2000: 55; Clark 2001: 441-43; Brown 2003c: 50; Dixon 2003). With a Clausewitzian term, Collins (2000a: 191-93) calls public support Western military campaigns' 'centre of gravity'. Such considerations relate to a phenomenon referred to as the *Vietnam syndrome* (Sobel 1998: 251; Skoco and Woodger 2000: 79). That is the idea that war abroad can be lost on the TV screens at home, regardless of military performance in the battlefield (Thrall 2000: 28-29, 51-2; Nacos et al. 2000b: 2). Hallin (1986)

whose support must be obtained to reduce the adversary's political significance (Smith 2005: 278-79, 289-91).⁵ This aspect is increasingly important, since Western forces now confront diffuse opponents who seek concealment amongst people. The new adversaries pose a different challenge from the relatively definable and identifiable national armed forces of the industrial war era.

Smith also advocates a conceptual change as to the utility of traditional military power; that is, the capability to apply physical force. This trademark of Western military forces that was quintessential to win industrial wars can no longer deliver the strategic objectives of our times. Capturing the will of the people is a political task that primarily requires diplomatic, economic and political measures. Armed force is still useful, however. It can create a condition that will permit the other levers of power to operate efficiently. Yet the military task has become sub-strategic. It is no longer strategic.

The General grants the media a key role in achieving contemporary strategic objectives. It is primarily through the media that people form their ideas of what a particular war is about; who is involved; what the parties want; what happens; and on this basis ultimately develop their allegiance to one side or the other. In the military sphere, he holds that 'commanders and leaders alike need the media in order to . . . explain their

famously opposes that thesis by showing that it was not media reports from Vietnam that undermined public support, but a split in the US political elite on how to deal with war. It was this political division the media projected, and which then undermined public support. Powlick and Katz (1998) echo Hallin's argument with a review on more updated studies on the relation between US foreign policy and public opinion. While the Vietnam syndrome has been established as common sense among many practitioners in the field of international security, Hallin's counter-position is generally accepted in the academic debate (see, for example, Badsey 2000b: xix; Stewart 2000; P. Taylor 2000b: 177-79; Brown 2003a: 166).

⁵ This carries associations with *hearts and minds* approaches from counter-insurgency operations as presented in works like Carruthers (1995) and notably Thompson (1966). Smith (2005: 277-8) emphasises that it is different, however, arguing that hearts and minds campaigns have a more local focus and is a means to defeat the main targets – the insurgents. In war amongst the people, people's will is not a means but an end. People are the strategic targets.

own version of events. To this extent, the media is a crucially useful element in modern conflict for attaining the political objective of winning the will of the people' (Smith 2005: 286).⁶ While he considers this primarily a political task, he maintains that the force commander in theatre must act in support of this strategic endeavour (Smith 2005: 391).

A development that, according to Smith, has increased the significance of the media in war is innovations in information and communication technology.⁷ These have transformed the battlefield from a tactical and local sphere to a strategic and global one: 'We fight in every living room in the world as well as on the streets and fields of a conflict zone' (Smith 2005: 17).⁸ Paraphrasing the famous media scholar Marshall McLuhan, the General remarks: 'This is not so much the global village as the global theatre of war, with audience participation' (Smith 2005: 289).⁹

⁶ The point that the media plays an increasingly important role for political and military leaders in contemporary conflicts is supported by many scholars (see 1.5).

⁷ Many authors arrive at similar conclusions and stress in particular the speed with which information can now be disseminated – the so-called 'real time' quality, at least potentially, of contemporary mass media. Such views are found among military ranks (eg Stech 1994; Clifford and Wilton 2000: 17; Duncan 2000: 118. See further 1.5.2); among journalists (eg Strobel 1997: 76-88; Gowing 2000a: 216-17; McLaughlin 2002: 24-45); and within the broad discipline of International Relations (eg Hitchcock 1988; Headrick 1991; Toffler 1993; Adams 1996; deCaro 1996; Gow et al. 1996b: 2-3; Keohane and Nye 1998: 81-85; Waltz 1998: 1-10; Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1999: 7; Campen and Dearth 2000; Handel 2001: 128; Brown 2002a: 266-67. See further 1.5.2).

⁸ The same view is reflected in the British Prime Minister Tony Blair's statement during Operation Allied Force: 'When you fight an action like this in modern politics, in our modern media world, you're fighting it on television' (cited in Vickers 2000: 60). In the ranks of military commanders similar ideas are voiced by, among others, Cordingly (2000) and Rose (2000: 4-5).

⁹ The idea that the media plays a role in the foreign policy process, particularly with regard to armed conflicts, is now generally accepted, although the more specific relation is disputed. A central and controversial notion in this debate is the thesis of a *CNN effect*, which is often described as 'elite decision makers' loss of policy control to news media' (Livingston and Eachus 1995: 413). In the initial stage of the debate, it concerned the extent to which the media influenced policy, and as such approach the media-policy nexus from the opposite side of what this thesis aims to do. It is therefore beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, one can hardly examine how the media forms part of contemporary conflicts without presenting the debate on the CNN effect. Hence, this brief overview. In its extreme form the CNN effect

From a different professional perspective, the senior British diplomat Robert Cooper arrives at similar conclusions: war is changing and media-relations are a key to succeed. His thought-provoking conceptualisation of watersheds and cross-currents in contemporary international affairs may represent an unofficial account of his government's foreign policy rationale. As a member of Prime Minister Tony Blair's Cabinet Office, Cooper helped the government shape a new foreign policy. After the end of the Cold War, he claims, the world became divided in three eras: a premodern, a modern, and a postmodern – and points to the EU as the example of the latter. Where

this thesis claims an almost causal relation where political decision makers merely react to the focus and bias of media coverage (Adams 1996: 115). Freedman (2000: 337-41) saw the CNN effect at work in the run-up to Operation Allied Force in 1999. Hudson and Stanier (1999: 317) made the same observation in the case of British military deployments to the UN mission in Bosnia in 1992. Avruch et al. (1999: 158) argue that negative media coverage – culminating with the massacre in Srebrenica July 1995 – was the major reason Western political leaders found that the same mission had reached the end of the line and eventually decided to replace it with the NATO-led IFOR. Such a causal understanding of media reports' impact on foreign policy has been accepted by many practitioners. Among others, it has entered the rationale of the US army as reflected in the introduction of their Field Manual 100-5: 'Dramatic visual presentations can rapidly influence public – and therefore political – opinion so that the political underpinnings of war and operations other than war may suddenly change with no prior indication in the field' (cited in Duncan 2000: 125). The idea of a CNN effect is also reflected in British commanders' experiences from the 1991 Gulf War (Cordingley: 2000: 171-73; Duncan 2000: 120), and in a less deterministic manner in Rose's (2000: 4, 7) reflections as Force Commander of UNPROFOR in 1994-95. Generally, these scholars and practitioners argue that in the 1990s the media has entered the decisionmaking cycles of the operational military commanders, and hence the conduct of military operations to an extent unknown during the Cold War. Adams (1996: 112) and P. Taylor (2000b: 177) ascribe a similar appreciation of this phenomenon to statesmen like John Major, Henry Kissinger, and Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Hardly surprisingly, many journalists find the CNN-thesis exaggerated and regard the media's power to influence policy-makers as limited. Reporters like Bell (1995: 147) and Strobel (1997: 90) share Gowing's (1996: 83) view: 'Real-time pictures . . . shape the policy agenda but do not dictate responses'. They recognise, however, that the media may be more influential when it highlights a particular case on which a government has no policy. Many scholars have examined the validity of the CNN effect thesis. Some hold that the media's impact on policy is low when the executive branch policy is firm but acknowledge that influence may be high when policy is in flux. They point to the lack of studies that have found a convincing link between media reports and policy behaviour, and note that studies rather tend to reveal just how resistant policymakers can be to following the lead of the media when responding to international crisis (eg Badsey 1996; Strobel 1997; Avruch 1999: 16; Carruthers 2000: 208-18; Robinson 2002; Western 2002; Gilboa 2005). P. Taylor (2000b: 198) suggests that to the extent the CNN effect has an impact on foreign policy, it is as a self-fulfilling prophecy: it works only in cases where the political elites believe in it. That is, they react because they assume that the media reflects a demand from their electorates to 'do something'. Herman and Peterson (2000), Stewart (2000), and Thussu (2000b) have proposed the antithesis that politicians influence the content of media reports. This overview serves to illustrate that the content and significance of the CNN effect is contested. We may gather from this, however, that scholars apprehend media reporting as part of the foreign policy process, but rather than dictating policy responses the media may shape them, particularly when policy has not been established on an issue.

war is a way of life in the former, a means of policy in the next, it has become something to be avoided in the last (Cooper 2004: 85, 158). These three attitudes to war co-exist in the contemporary world; and although they are localised in different regions they are also interconnected through globalization.

The challenge for postmodern governments is to know how to operate expediently in this strategic landscape. Like Smith, Cooper (2004: 53, 73-4) advises governments to pursue their political goals by opting for people's support. Foreign policy has become a function of domestic politics, since people are the source of policy. So any effort to have an impact on other postmodern states' foreign policy has 'to get under the domestic skin' (Cooper 2004: 86). In the management of conflicts in the non-Western world, the postmodern strategic objective is also to win the will of the people. As Cooper (2004: 84) lucidly remarks: 'Soldiers and diplomats are, in the end, trying to do the same thing: to change other people's minds'. They do that by persuading other communities to co-opt the postmodern political culture, based on non-violent conflict-resolution. The postmodern approach to external threats is to establish what Cooper terms *voluntary empire* (Cooper 2004: 70-9). To this end, he finds words superior to the principal alternatives: money and physical force (Cooper 2004: 115-16). Hence, the importance of media-relations.

These two prominent practitioners – the soldier and the diplomat – are not alone in their view that war is changing and that the media has moved to the centre stage in contemporary confrontations. Several scholars from the academic discipline of

International Relations concur.¹⁰ Among the first to draw attention to this phenomenon was the American Professor John Mueller (1989).¹¹ In *The Remnants of War* he asserts that ‘the institution of war is clearly in decline’ (Mueller 2004: 1). In 1991 as the Gulf War unfolded, the controversial Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld further proclaimed that conventional war had come to ‘its last gasp’ and would transform itself into low-intensity conflicts (van Creveld 1991: 2, 20-2, 205-07). Moreover, in *New & Old Wars* Professor Mary Kaldor provides a conceptualisation of the changing nature of war.¹² The term *new wars* comprises a mix of war, organised crime, and large-scale violations of human rights, and exists all over the world, although less manifest in the West (Kaldor 1999: 1-2).¹³

Whether they attach the tag industrial, modern, conventional, or old to the notion of war, the practitioners and scholars elaborate on largely identical conceptions of armed conflicts closely connected to the evolution of the Westphalian system of modern states emerging in Europe three to five centuries ago. Moreover, they agree that this form of war has ceased to dominate international security at least since the end of the Cold War. They perceive wars of the past era in terms coined by the Prussian officer Carl von Clausewitz and argue that his concept is at odds with contemporary forms of large-scale socially organised violence. Moreover, they share Smith’s most important point that

¹⁰ Initial capitals are used when referring to names of academic disciplines, theories and methods, such as ‘International Relations’, ‘Realism’ and ‘Behaviouralism’.

¹¹ Mueller’s centrality in the debate about the changing nature of war is reflected in other prominent scholars’ often critical reference to his works. Those include Lawrence Freedman (1998) and Michael Mandelbaum (1998-99).

¹² Shaw (2000b) considers her ‘the foremost authority’ on contemporary wars.

¹³ The view that the ends and means of war is changing is held by several other scholars including Keegan (1994: 58-60), Gray (1997), Freedman (1998-99; 2001), Wheeler (2000), Coker (2001; 2005), and Frantzen (2005).

while the practice of war has changed, our conception of war has not followed suit.¹⁴ It is against this background they offer their respective analyses of current and future wars. Smith (2005: 2-3, 16-8), van Creveld (1991: 207), and Kaldor (1999: 31) even describe their contribution in Kuhnian paradigmatic terms.

The scholars also concur with Smith's view that people's will has become the strategic objective of our times. People's support is arguably the objective in van Creveld's *future wars*, as he advocates that political communities mobilise the people 'under the banner of some great and powerful idea' (van Creveld 1991: 214).¹⁵ More explicitly, Mueller points to people's support as an imperative to succeed in *policing war*. Western governments will remain reluctant to halt 'criminal' war in conflict-ridden areas of the world, if they are not supported by their electorates throughout the duration of such a police-military campaign (Mueller 2004: 128, 149-51). People's support is also imperative for Kaldor's central term *cosmopolitan law-enforcement*. She argues that new wars can be stopped only by 'a strategy of capturing "hearts and minds"', and continues 'what is needed is a new form of cosmopolitan political mobilization' (Kaldor 1999: 114). This involves people's support to a cosmopolitan community defined not by territorial but by political boundaries and united in opposition to particularist values that divide and antagonise people. Kaldor (1999: 147) dissolves the global/local divide by

¹⁴ Whether Mueller would support this view may be questioned. Surely, he sees only the remnants of war but at the same time Mueller (2004: 141-160) promotes what he calls 'policing wars'.

¹⁵ Van Creveld does not elaborate on the significance of public support. All the same, he wants to prepare modern states for the challenges posed by low-intensity conflicts and reasons along the lines of a Hobbesian social contract where the people will remain loyal to their political community only if this in turn provides for their security (van Creveld 1991: 2, 198). It follows that a state must suppress low-intensity conflicts to maintain the people's support or cease to exist.

pointing to new social relations ‘based on an alliance . . . between islands of civility . . . and transnational institutions’.

Which other means are more expedient than the media for van Creveld’s effort to rally people under a powerful idea, for Mueller’s call for domestic support to policing war and for Kaldor’s cosmopolitan political mobilization on a global scale than the media? While these scholars do not elaborate on the media’s role, Kaldor (1999: 38-40) argues that contemporary warring leaders use the media to mobilise people to carry out, among other things, campaigns of ethnic cleansing. Moreover, she credits the sustained media attention to these atrocities for the ‘very significant innovation in international practice’ in dealing with such conflicts since 1991 (Kaldor 1999: 62). Hence, the five major works presented above arguably sustain the idea that political and military leaders need to cooperate with the media to achieve their strategic objectives.¹⁶

Neither of the five practitioners and scholars elaborates on the implications for Western governments of their dependence on the media to succeed, however. They do not consider, how Western governments, through the media, can communicate their policy convincingly to the public at large in order to win their support in armed conflicts; in

¹⁶ This view is supported by others. For instance, in the case of the Yugoslav wars of secession Gow and Tilsley (1996: 110) hold that Serbia’s main adversaries, notably Slovenia, understood that ‘rather than actually winning a war on the battlefield, what counted was to be seen and understood to be conducting a successful campaign.’ In Bosnia, General Rose (2000: 5), UNPROFOR’s Force Commander, experienced that negative press coverage undermined the entire operation (see also Avruch et al. 1999: 41, 158). Moreover, in the case of NATO’s war against Serbia in 1999, several scholars argue that it was in the media rather than on the conventional military battlefield, that NATO eventually won (Ignatieff 2000: 110; Vickers 2000: 69; Dixon: 2003; Brown 2003c: 50). Others are more critical to NATO’s achievements in this campaign but use it to sustain the general claim that states must ensure that their military campaigns are expediently represented in the media in order to achieve foreign policy goals (Campbell 1999: 32; Collins 2000a: 191; Driscoll 2000: 173; Skoco and Woodger 2000).

other words, how governments produce meaning about events in and, indeed, the field of international affairs itself. This is the broad object of study for the present thesis.

It is a subject that in the context of the post-Cold War remains under-explored in the literature,¹⁷ and an operational asset whose potential tends to have been undervalued and, at times, almost ignored.¹⁸ At the same time, evidence also exists to suggest that

¹⁷ See 1.5.2. Moreover, the utility of studies from the Cold War to understand the subject in our times is questionable. Some academic works suggest that the context in which contemporary governments endeavour to win the support of their electorates is very different from the past era. Beside technological innovations on which many militarily biased studies have focused, others emphasise the changed political context (see 1.5.2). They argue that the perceived existential threat from the Soviet Union framed Western political space and foreign policy priorities during the Cold War. Political divergences were largely confined to domestic issues, while politicians, the press and the public largely accorded in the area of defence. The Realist School in International Relations offered a way to conceptualise a frame of reference that became generally accepted. As the Soviet Union disappeared, this frame lost its ability to rally people around the central notion 'national interest'. No other frame has managed to gain comparable political support since. Without such normative boundaries, Western political debates extended from the domestic to the international realm, which has opened for the media to play an increasingly important role also in the field of international politics (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1999; Entman 2000: 11-12; Shaw 2000a: 35; P. Taylor 2000b: 199; Nye and Owens 1996: 22; Brown 2004: 18). International Relations has still to account adequately for this new dynamic, according to these scholars who are supported by, among others, Lord (1998) and Armistead (2004). Shaw (2000a: 27) for one argues that 'in so far as [I]nternational [R]elations fails to understand the media, it also fails to grasp the new shape of world politics.'

¹⁸ The US government's failure to value the importance of the media as a foreign policy tool was voiced in a series of congressional hearings held in response to the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. In one of those, the chairman of the US Congress Committee on International Relations (2001) opened the hearing by stating: 'It is by now obvious to most observers that the role of public diplomacy in our foreign policy has been too long neglected'. Rather amazingly, Armistead (2004: 134) from the US Joint Forces Staff College claims that the government initially left it to a private company, the Rendon Group, to conduct a strategic media campaign in the wake of the attacks. The alleged reason was that the government itself was unable to perform. In contrast to the findings of this thesis, there is evidence to suggest that NATO, too, generally underestimates the role of the media in their military missions. For instance, in late 1995 as IFOR prepared its deployment, NATO PI policies and doctrines were adapted to a Cold War scenario. Although revisions were in progress, IFOR PI staff had little NATO guidance when they developed their plans (Siegel 1997: 170). And while Gowing (1997) believed that IFOR's media campaign would make precedent in future wars, NATO's attention to PI soon appeared to decrease (Clifford and Wilton 2000; Coward 2000: 137; Dearth 2000a: 160; Williamson 2000: 182; Thompson and Price 2003: 184). This seems also to have been the case when the war against Serbia began in 1999. Allegedly, NATO had planned to win it within two to three days and largely by means of conventional military force. This turned out to be a gross miscalculation. The air-campaign lasted 78 days. A media plan for the campaign did not exist from the outset and it took a month before a plan came into effect. The plan was essential to defend NATO's centre of gravity (Campbell 1999: 32; Collins 2000a: 194, 197-8; Vickers 2000: 56-7, 62; Williamson 2000: 183; and Brown 2002b: 44. See also footnote 4). One of the lessons Shea (cited in Skoco and Woodger 2000: 85) draws from this campaign is that 'the all-intrusive nature of press-relations to an alliance conflict is still underplayed and under-exploited in Nato's crisis

governments and international organisations have come to appreciate the political significance of their press and information activities and to reinforce this asset.¹⁹

1.1.1 Empirical question and thesis

The more limited ambition of this thesis is to explore how three PIOs, centrally positioned in a NATO operational context, perceive the purpose of their function and their mode of operation to achieve it. Thus, the specific object of study is their ideas about how PI is practiced, exemplified by their work in NATO peace support operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. Both conflicts are referred to by the above mentioned authors as typical examples of contemporary wars (for considerations as to the choice of cases see 1.4.1).²⁰ Against this background and within the methodological limitations stipulated below (see 1.4.1 and 1.4.3) the thesis' *empirical question* is:

How, and for what purposes, has NATO used its Press and Information function in its peace support operations in the Balkans?

management exercises.' The UN has also been criticised for failing to deal adequately with the media in its peacekeeping operations in the 1990s, with the exception of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia and the UN Transition Assistant Group in Namibia (Strobel 1997: 231; Lehmann 1999: 11; Lindley 2004), a piece of criticism the UN acknowledges (UN 2000: 25). With the exception of NATO, most of the other major international organisations had no media strategy when they embarked on the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord (Avruch et al. 1999: 43; Thompson and Price 2003: 184. See also 2).

¹⁹ A case in point is US President Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive 68, entitled *International Public Information* and signed in April 1999, which aimed to co-ordinate the efforts of the relevant governmental departments and agencies (Brown 2002b: 43; Armistead 2004: 5). Moreover, in the summer of 2002, the White House established the Office of Global Communication with the aim of ensuring on a daily basis that the so-called 'War on Terror' was expediently fought in the press (Van Ham 2003: 436. See also 1.5.2).

²⁰ '1.4.1' refers to the section 1.4.1 in this thesis. This system of referencing to sections in this study will be applied throughout the text.

The *empirical thesis* stipulates:

NATO used PI as a means of power to achieve political and military ends. PI's mode of operation was guided by a PI policy, stipulating goals and intentions, and based on three components: a message strategy, a unity of effort and a resolution to maintain credible relations with the press.²¹

In other words, this study will show how NATO used PI in an effort to win the will of the people. This is, according to the above presented authors, the strategic objective of the contemporary era.

1.2 Power

Returning for a moment to how war is being transformed, the same practitioners and scholars from the field of international affairs are in agreement that traditional armed force – physical force targeting human bodies and material objects – is an insufficient lever of power to win the will of people. ‘The business of the military in war’ is no longer as the military historian Professor Geoffrey Parker (1994: 44) has claimed ‘killing people and breaking things’. This simply does not deliver. Nor can we rely on the *concentration of force* and *decisive military victories* that Clausewitz taught us were the principal means and objectives to achieve political ends in war. Since the Second World War (WW II), experiences from counter-insurgencies have proven this politico-

²¹ In this particular formulation of the empirical question and thesis, the term NATO is applied as a shorthand to refer to how three NATO PI practitioners at the executive level, within the limitations of this study, used this function (see 1.4). This choice of words is only applied to facilitate reading and should not be perceived as an endeavour to make a general claim on the NATO PI function.

military mindset to be self-defeating time and again. The general lesson is that overwhelming force creates resentment and fear.

None of the five authors write off the utility of physical force but they would not find comfort in the poet Hilaire Belloc's jingle that 'Whatever happens, we have got / The Maxim gun and they have not'.²² Postmodern states have come to conceive 'the use of force [as] a failure of policy rather than an instrument of policy' (Cooper 2004: 85). When used, physical force should be applied in a manner that supports the overall endeavour to win the will of people. That is, its application should be considered legitimate by the people concerned.²³ To this end the principle of *minimum necessary force* is instructive.²⁴

From this perspective, the form of power that NATO PI seeks to exert appears more adequate to reach strategic objectives in contemporary conflicts, than does traditional military force. The empirical findings establish that PI aimed to mobilise legitimacy worldwide for NATO's activities in the Balkans and to persuade people in the region to behave in accordance with internationally endorsed peace agreements. In other words, PI sought to influence the human dimension in the international peacebuilding efforts in a psychological manner and on a geographical scope that the application of physical force simply cannot achieve.

²² van Creveld (1991: 24-30, 205-08), Kaldor (1999: 128-29), Cooper (2004: 75-80, 115-20), Mueller (2004: 175-76), and Smith (2005: 1-10, 270-71).

²³ See Kaldor (1999: 114-15, 126-31, 147-50), Cooper (2004: 119-24), Mueller (2004: 174-81), and Smith (2005: 378-83).

²⁴ A recent British peacekeeping manual defines the term as 'the measured application of violence or coercion, sufficient only to achieve a specific end, demonstrably reasonable, proportionate and appropriate; and confined in effect to the specific and legitimate target intended' (cited in Kaldor 1999: 128-29).

Still, however, it is unclear which kinds of power may underpin PI's endeavours. There is evidence indicating that PI had an impact on their target groups – that is, different groups of people whom NATO wanted to influence in a variety of ways and with different effects – but what notions of power can account for such influence? It is not clear, whether these different results can be explained by one understanding of power.

Can, for example, PI create favourable public relations by the same kind of power that it applies to influence people's actions? The answer is not obvious. Public relations activities seek to influence people's perceptions – how they *think*. Clarifying a force commander's resolve to people in theatre, for instance what he will not tolerate, aims to influence their behaviour – what they *do*. While these effects are not necessarily disconnected, there are significant differences. The former relates to people's political identities and loyalties, the latter to their actions. Moreover, the relationship between PI and their targets is different. Most people in Bosnia and Kosovo have a social proximity, a direct contact, a firsthand experience with NATO troops. The opposite is true for global public opinion, which has a more distant relation, an indirect contact, a mediated experience with NATO. What does that imply for the kind of results PI can expect to achieve? PI may be able to have a direct almost mechanistic impact on the actions of some people in the Balkans. PI may, for example, deter armed groups from doing something by the threat that if they try, NATO will stop them by means of physical force. Such stimuli–effect notions of power are not suitable to describe PI's impact on the public worldwide. Understanding this requires a concept that comprises political and opinion forming dimensions.

1.2.1 Theoretical question and thesis

To clarify our understanding of the different conceptual forms of influence PI seeks to exercise, it is useful to consult academic work on power. Thus, the theoretical dimension of this thesis is to scrutinise how different theories on power can enhance our understanding of PI's efforts to implement NATO's policy.

For reasons stipulated in the methodological section (see 1.4.2), three seminal scholars' theoretical notions of power form the analytical framework with which this part of the study is conducted. Noting that centrally placed PIOs assume that PI's mode of operation influence its target groups, the *theoretical question* of this thesis is:

How can Robert A. Dahl's, Steven Lukes', and Michel Foucault's respective notions of power enhance our theoretical understanding of the way the NATO PI function may exercise power to achieve political and military ends?

The *theoretical thesis* is:

Foucault's notion of power can conceptualise the type of influence NATO PI's mode of operation seeks to exert in order to enhance public understanding and support and to influence the general behaviour of the public. Dahl's notion of power can elucidate PI's mode of operation to influence people's specific actions. Lukes' notion of power cannot account for PI's mode of operation.

Thus, the purpose of the theoretical chapter is not to prove that NATO PI had an effect on its target groups, that is, on people, be they specific parties or more general public opinion. The purpose is, rather, to show the theoretical possibility of the effort and to clarify how theoretical notions can account for the way PI aims to influence people.

If the initial proposition – that war is changing, the utility of physical force is declining, and the use of the media is becoming increasingly important – is accepted, then the thesis' findings are important beyond the present case. The study shows how a major military actor aims to use the media as a means of power in international affairs. It casts light on a military function and its methods, which are different from conventional use of armed forces and conceptualises how social communication may serve as a means of power in politics and war.

This focus on power makes the thesis relevant for the academic field of International Relations. As pointed out by Edward Baldwin (1979: 161): 'From Niccolo Machiavelli and David Hume to E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau, power has been an important (some would say too important) variable in international political theorizing'. Within this scholarly conversation, however, the notion of power has predominantly been conceived in traditional military terms supporting Clausewitz's idea, that in war armed force is the decisive means. This is particularly so in Realism, the dominant school of the discipline. This branch of International Relations has limited faith in the communicative dimensions of power. True, Edward Hallett Carr (1946: 132-45) elaborated on this aspect but its importance was toned down by Hans J. Morgenthau two years later, and almost disappeared in the works of two later prominent Realist scholars Kenneth Waltz and more recently John J. Mearsheimer.²⁵ While Liberalism's normative

²⁵ This is not to suggest that Realism ignores the communicative dimensions of power. Morgenthau (1960: 28), indeed, defines power as 'man's control over the minds and actions of other men' and devotes considerable space to discussing the value of diplomacy and propaganda. Yet he concludes that the efficiency of, among others, such methods to prevent war 'presuppose[s] the existence of an integrated international society, which actually does not exist' (Morgenthau 1960: 568). Social communication is further marginalised as a form of power in Waltz' (1979: 131-32, 192) understanding of the latter concept as capabilities conceived largely in material terms and also by Mearsheimer (1990: 6) who reasons based

approach to International Relations emphasises the importance of ideas, and implicitly therefore communication, as a powerful dynamic in international affairs, it has done so largely at a general level. David Held (1995) and Stephen D. Krasner (1983) are cases in point that arguably represent different liberal directions that may be called Idealism and Regime theory respectively. Moreover, in the 1980s when information was reintroduced to International Relations with a linguistic turn induced to the discipline by Critical Theorists, Post-Modernists, and Social Constructivists it was in a general discursive sense.²⁶ However, information used in the intentional manner to mobilise people for a common cause, such as Carr (1946) had in mind, was given much less attention.²⁷

There has been an emerging empirical and theoretical interest on this broad topic since the mid-1990s (see 1.5). A seminal notion in this endeavour is Joseph S. Nye's *soft power*, although the theoretical findings of this thesis suggest that the term does not bear scrutiny (see 1.4.2, 1.5.3, and 4.2).

Proposing a different conceptual framework to appreciate the way a major military actor uses the media as a means of power, this thesis aims to contribute to this emerging

on the assumption that 'the distribution and character of military power are the root causes of war and peace'. Arguably, these influential Realist scholars ultimately conceive power as a capacity to use or threaten to use physical force.

²⁶ Representatives of the three theoretical perspectives include respectively Robert Cox (1986), James Der Derian (1987), and Alexander Wendt (1999).

²⁷ See Armistead (2004: 10, 14) and Brown (2005: 57-59). Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1999: 27-34) also point to the shortcomings of Realism and Liberalism but believe that social constructivism offers a useful theoretical approach. Exceptions to this general shortcoming include, in addition to the four authors just mentioned, notably the writings of Nye (1990, 2004), Barnett (1998), Keck and Sikkink (1998), Risse et al. (1999), Brown (2002a), and Barnett and Duval (2005).

academic effort. It offers new perspectives to a key question in International Relations: what are the capabilities of the warring parties?

1.3 The relation to propaganda

The subject of this thesis carries associations to propaganda; a concept stained with connotations to Nazi Germany's propaganda minister Josef Goebbels and novelist George Orwell's classical *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Both represent nightmare versions of political communities, where political leaders manipulate the minds of their citizens in order to control their behaviour. My object of study is not to consider whether NATO has conducted propaganda. Since this is not an explicit part of the discussion, it appears prudent from the outset to briefly clarify my stand on how PI and propaganda relate, and where they differ.

Western political and military leaders distance their information activities, including PI, from the infamous notion of propaganda. They insist that they inform people, that they do not propagandise.²⁸ Others disagree. In the academic debate, for example, there is a multi-disciplinary literature characterising the communication between authorities and

²⁸ Most government administrations will agree that their relations to the media are guided by a political agenda. They do not leave it to chance or adversaries' ability to influence how media portray their government and its policies. Governments would insist, however, that their aim is not to 'muscle' the press or propagandise the public but to ensure that the government's policy is conveyed to the public in a coherent and persuasive manner (Campbell 1999; Muirhead 1999: 38; Beer 2000: 190; Leonard 2002: 8-9). Indeed, opinion-forming leadership is a condition for democracy. In the US, the concern not to be associated with propaganda derives partly from law that forbids the government to propagandise its own population and partly from concerns for legitimacy (Armistead 2004: 132). The influential Stanton report from the 1970s stressed the importance of legitimacy and to this end pointed to the need for distinguishing between broadcasts disseminated for political purposes and those that had no specific political objectives. This distinction aimed to safeguard the credibility of news programmes (Lord 1998). The continued relevance of the legal and legitimate aspects of information activities can be found in Pentagon's decision to close its Office of Strategic Influence in February 2002 after the press projected it as an instrument to manipulate public opinion (Brown 2002b: 40; Van Ham 2003: 435; Armistead 2004: 135-7).

members of political communities as propaganda.²⁹ Some have also attached the label propaganda to NATO PI activities.³⁰

A good remedy against prejudice and against tainted biases to the notion of propaganda is Phillip Taylor's (2003) *Munitions of the Mind: a history of propaganda from the ancient world to the present day*. Propaganda is, as his title conveys, as old as war itself. Information can be broadcasted for 'good' and 'bad' ends – or somewhere in between – and is used by all parties in conflict, including the West.³¹ To examine whether or not

²⁹ With regard to the Balkans, see 1.5.1. For comprehensive accounts, see the annotated bibliography in Lasswell et al. (1969) and the bibliographic essay in Taylor (2003: 325-31). More specific studies include, for instance, a vivid monograph by Koppes and Black (1987) holding that the Roosevelt administration used Hollywood for domestic propaganda purposes during WW II. Further, Bernhard (1999), Parry Giles (1996), and Pratkanis and Aronson (1992) argue that, despite claims to the contrary, subsequent US administrations expanded this effort to include the US national news media. Lord (1998), who served the National Security Council and other high-level decisionmaking bodies during the Reagan and Bush administrations on issues related to international broadcasting, presents Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty as CIA's propaganda instruments targeting foreign audiences since 1945. In a British context, Mackenzie (1984) and Carruthers (1995) unfold how the government used media for political ends throughout its Empire. More thought-provoking, Pratkanis and Aronson (1992: 47) inform us that the novelist George Orwell served the British government by writing 'pro-British propaganda for broadcast to India' during WW II.

³⁰ Hardly surprising, Serbian authorities denounced NATO PI activities as propaganda during Operation Allied Force, while NATO made equivalent claims regarding Serbia's relation to the media. More interestingly, perhaps, Gocic (2000: 90) and Phillips (1999: 47) also use the term propaganda to describe the same NATO PI effort, and Goff (1999b: 14) claims that the NATO 'briefings were sprinkled with lies or incorrect information'. Others are equally critical to the same enterprise, although they do not use the term propaganda. For example, the international NGO Reporters Sans Frontiers, which promotes independent media, finds that the validity of NATO PI was only 'scarcely better' than Serbia's (cited in Collins 2000a: 194-95). US Lt.Col. Collins (2000b: 38), who later served as chief of SHAPE's unit for Psychological Operations, characterises NATO PI efforts as attempts to 'manipulate the regional and international perception of the struggle'. Finally, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000: 217), financed primarily by the Swedish Government and composed by widely recognised scholars, finds that NATO 'mised' NATO's electorates and that 'even if the distortions of truth were not intentional, they have left a bad aftertaste, raising doubts, *ex post facto*, about the legitimacy of NATO's media operation'.

³¹ See 1.5. Many would approve of Allied use of propaganda as a means to de-Nazify the German nation and reintegrate it into Western Europe after WW II (see Taylor 2003: 249). Some would also support the British government's use of information to induce stability in its colonies after WW II (see Carruthers 1995). Moreover, Western attempts of managing armed conflicts during the 1990s inspired several authors to consider the potential of information campaigns as a means to terminate these conflicts and promote peace (Allard 1996; Cloughly 1996; Nye and Owens 1996: 31-32; Siegel 1997, 1998; Lehmann 1999; Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1999: xii; Avruch et al. 1999; Curtis 2000; Maureen Taylor 2000; Kiehl

NATO PI activities in the selected cases were propaganda is beyond the present scope – and the conclusion would, I believe, largely be influenced by the analyst’s political predispositions.

It is largely a matter of definition, whether NATO’s public information, which PI is tasked to disseminate, qualifies for the term propaganda. It is therefore useful to commence by stipulating the alliance’s own definition of the term public information: ‘Information, which is released or published for the primary purpose of keeping the public fully *informed*, thereby *gaining their understanding and support*’ (NATO 2006: 137. Italics added). Compare this with NATO’s (2006: 137) propaganda definition: ‘Any information, ideas, doctrines, or special appeals disseminated to *influence* the opinion, emotions, attitudes, or behaviour of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor either directly or indirectly’ (italics added).

Thus, NATO distinguishes between public information and propaganda by the purpose: the former aims to inform, the latter to influence. The validity of this distinction is debatable. It is instructive to refer to Briggs and Burke’s (2002: 188) note that originally in English and French the verb inform meant ‘forming the mind’. There are also more practical reasons to argue that a distinction between information and influence is artificial as most deliberate efforts to inform contain at least an implicit intention to influence the recipients. Why else would one inform? Moreover, part of NATO’s explicit rationale to inform the public is to gain its support, as expressed in the definition above, which indicates a desire to influence people’s opinion and behaviour

2001; Merlingen and Mujic 2003). Metzl (1997) and Price and Thompson (2002) employ the term *peace broadcasting* to denote such endeavours, which might be construed as an euphemism for propaganda.

(see further 2.2.1). For all practical purposes, therefore, NATO's distinction appears semantic and most difficult to maintain in operational activities.

Partly as a consequence of such difficulties to distinguish between influencing and informing, most students of propaganda approach their topic in a morally neutral sense, analysing it as a persuasive technique in common use (Badsey 2000b: xx-xxi; Driscoll 2000: 174). Any organisation's public relations efforts, whether this be called 'public information' or 'press/media relations', is propaganda, according to Taylor (2003: 6). Some scholars go further, stipulating that hardly any social communication is completely value-free: information influences people. In his much referenced work *Propaganda: The formations of men's attitudes* Jacques Ellul (1966) argues that political societies, particularly democratic ones, and their citizens need propaganda to function. He conceives propaganda as an all-encompassing social phenomenon that forms part of politics, religion and education, and as such forms people's identity and facilitates their co-ordinated action.³²

Other scholars use the term in a narrower sense, focusing particularly on an actor's deliberate efforts to persuade specific social groups. In an early and seminal work on the topic, Harold D. Lasswell (1927: 9) suggested: '[Propaganda] refers solely to the control of opinion . . . by social communication'. That the ability to control the opinion of others is a defining feature of propaganda has remained potent in popular imagination, although many later studies take issue with the claims that public opinion

³² In the same vein, Avruch et al. (1999: 20-1) argue that that some children's TV shows may well be compared with PsyOps, notably those that aim to change children's attitudes and behaviour such as Sesame Street, for instance. This view finds support in Pratkanis and Aronson (1992) who from a psychological perspective claim that we live in a world of propaganda.

can be dictated with any certainty (see for example Morrison 1992; Entman 2000: 19-23; Shaw 2000a: 36).

In the academic debate, the feature of control was toned down by Alfred McClung Lee and Elizabeth Birant Lee. Their monograph from 1939 focuses on the communicator's intentions and defines propaganda as an 'expression of opinion or action by individuals or groups deliberately designed to influence opinions or actions of other individuals or groups with reference to predetermined ends' (Lee and Lee 1979: 15). This view is adopted in many later definitions on the topic.³³ If one can accept the point previously made, that the difference between informing and influencing is difficult to maintain, then Lee and Lee's definition would categorise NATO PI as a propaganda activity, since the latter's task is to release public information which by definition aims to gain public support.

A normative aspect of such an assertion is whether that makes PI undesirable or unethical. This debate is beyond the present scope. It is, however, only right to make my position clear: I conceive of PI as an integral part of politics, and as such desirable and not unethical. PI is a means to implement policy by clarifying political messages and communicating them efficiently. Therefore, the ethical judgement should primarily be directed towards the ends of that policy, not the means.

This is not to suggest that the methods PI applies and the policies that guide and limit a PI activity are always desirable and ethically acceptable. Notably PI activities' relation to 'truth' can be subject to ethical debates. It is precisely on this potential aspect of

³³ See for example Jowett and O'Donnell (1999: 6) and Taylor (2003: 6). The definition is also reflected in NATO's definition above.

propaganda that much opposition to the undertaking rests, and particularly Goebbels' 'big lie'-technique to mislead the public by developing and repeating falsehoods.³⁴

While this aspect is also beyond the present scope, it is appropriate to emphasise that during this research I have not discovered examples of lies, big or small, or other deceptive techniques. None of the present findings suggest that NATO deliberately provided journalists with false information, or that they controlled the thoughts of specific journalists or public opinion at large.

Since this issue is at the heart of popular conceptions of propaganda, it deserves some further clarification. One may compare NATO PI activities with Lee and Lee's (1979: 15) idea of propaganda:

The propagandist tries to 'put something across,' good or bad. The scientist does not try to put anything across; he devotes his life to the discovery of new facts and principles. The propagandist seldom wants careful scrutiny and criticism; his object is to bring about a specific action. The scientist, on the other hand, is always prepared for and wants the most careful scrutiny and criticism of his facts and ideas. Science flourishes on criticism. Dangerous propaganda crumbles before it.

The PIOs in the present field of inquiry are different from both these professions. Most information that PI conveys relates to NATO's policy and intentions, for example communicating its responsibilities under the Dayton Peace Accord (see 2). Such normative information differs from that of facts conveyed by scientists in the field of natural science. But this does not imply that information about policy is more or less

³⁴ Ideas similar to the latter technique may be found in Plato's cave analogy, in which the shadows on the wall are the 'noble myths' by which ordinary people live. The myths are disconnected from 'reality' and created by rulers to maintain society (Bloom 1988: 279; Strauss 1988: 221-22).

truthful. Moreover, when NATO disseminates information about what they refer to as *facts on the ground*, the alliance's PI policy instructs its personnel 'to provide accurate, complete, and timely information' (see 2.2.1). Thus, when PIOs inform the press about, for example, the physical circumstances related to an attack on a tram in Sarajevo carried out by unknown people, they are only authorised to do so in an accurate, complete, and timely manner.³⁵ As such the PIOs' code of conduct compares to the one Lee and Lee attach to the scientist. The PIOs are different from the propagandist who crumbles before scrutiny, and who therefore does not want any of it. In the empirical scope of this study, NATO's activities were subject to careful scrutiny and criticism from the press but this was seen to enhance PI's credibility which again increased the efficiency with which it could communicate with reporters (see 2.2.5). So, like science properly conducted PI flourishes on criticism.

Still, one may rightly question whether it is ethically defensible to use the media as a means of power. Before effectively excluding this dimension from the scope of this study, it is useful to illustrate the difficulties involved in taking a stand on these normative issues. The idea of independent media as a 'watch-dog' that checks the government is strong in democratic cultures and forms part of international law.³⁶ Yet, this notion raises the question of what the term 'independent media' actually means? Is it to be understood in, for instance, economic, editorial, or political terms? In societies where a host of commercial, civil, political, and maybe violent interest groups try to influence media reports, does the idea of independent media imply that the political

³⁵ Details about such an attack figures in a NATO (10/1/1996) press briefing.

³⁶ It emerged from political philosophy in the 18th century and found its initial constitutional expression in the first clause of the 1791 US Bill of Rights (Badsey 2000a:xx-xxii).

authorities should refrain from presenting their case persuasively to the press? Is that desirable? Is that to govern? Would this not infringe on most democratic governments' constitutional obligation to inform the public about their activities?

Such considerations relate to the earlier addressed question about how we may distinguish between informing and influencing. From the perspective of this thesis such distinctions come across as flawed (see 3.4.3). Moreover, in extreme cases, for instance when national security is endangered, to what extent do we want the press to be independent from governmental influence? These thoughts are not forwarded to engage a debate, only to stimulate reflections among those who may hasten to denounce the use of social communication as a means of power in politics and war.

Hence, I consider NATO's overall role in the selected cases politically good, as its military missions operated to implement a mandate given by the United Nations Security Council and as PI, to the best of my knowledge, did not deceive its target audiences.³⁷

Further considerations as to whether or not NATO PI is propaganda is excluded from this thesis. Rather, the study should be seen as a broader effort to enhance our understanding of the ways in which capable actors may exert power by means of the media to shape the societies in which we live.

³⁷ UN Security Council resolutions 1031 and 1244.

1.4 Methodology

It is necessary to clarify some of the major methodological considerations and assumptions upon which this study is based. We shall commence by highlighting those that address the empirical research, and then proceed to considerations involved in undertaking the theoretical analysis, before limiting the scope of the thesis.

1.4.1 Methodological concerns on the empirical dimension of the thesis

The empirical question of this study is, as will be recalled, to explore how, and for what purposes, NATO has used its PI function in its peace support operations in the Balkans. ‘How’ is, as Foucault (1982: 786) remarks, ‘the little question . . . flat and empirical’.

This question is addressed in the next chapter. Departing from the empirical is different from most International Relations-theses, which often aim to disprove or improve existing theories. To do this, they usually commence with a theoretical part that establishes a perspective guiding the proceeding empirical research. The present purpose is different, and consequently so is the method. From the outset of this investigation I was interested in how an actor may use the media as a means of power in armed conflicts. For reasons stipulated in the next section, the cases examined here appeared appropriate to this end. While not permitted, a presentation of NATO’s PI-documents could have presented general policies and doctrines but not how these were practiced. Yet, I wanted to learn how NATO conducts PI at the tactical level to achieve broader objectives; that is, neither how PI practitioners *should* operate, nor how they behave or what they achieve, but which ideas inform their practice. This was an empirical task, however, not a theoretical.

Since the object of study is ideas, a hermeneutic method was required using interviews as primary sources to gather information. I interviewed centrally positioned PI practitioners to learn how they perceived their tasks and sought to implement them in an actual operation. For reasons soon to be presented, the Chief Press and Information Officer (CPIO) – that is, *the* officer in charge of co-ordinating all Press and Information activities in a NATO military mission – appeared the most relevant practitioners to approach. Departing from the simple questions: ‘how do you do PI?’, and ‘for what purpose do you do PI?’, they answered by referring to illustrative cases of their own choosing. The CPIOs’ accounts provided insights into their daily routines and allowed the identification of common purposes, means and methods. Comparing these with existing literature (see 1.5.1) provided grounds for formulating hypotheses about PI’s mode of operation – propositions the CPIOs qualified during follow-up interviews.

In order to preserve this unique empirical account in this final presentation, I decided to commence with an empirical chapter. Beginning with a theoretical perspective would have imposed a theoretical straightjacket that would necessarily reduce the breadth of the empirical outline.

This methodology is different from comparative empirical studies aiming at identifying policy or behavioural change. They often commence by establishing a base-line case and compare additional cases against this in order to elucidate differences. My research interest, however, was never to argue that NATO PI has changed. It has been to identify PI’s mode of operation to understand how PI may serve as a means of power.

Some may devalue the methodological choice to use interviews as offering little more than anecdotes. I do not agree. The research proceeded along this methodological path to explore what cannot be understood by mere observation and the study of policy

documents. It did so in the spirit of the verse by an anonymous, and slightly annoyed, poet:

In modern thought, (if not in fact)
Nothing is that doesn't act,
So that is reckoned wisdom which
Describes the scratch but not the itch.³⁸

In this study, the effort to present the ideas that informed the practice of PI is an effort to describe the 'itch'. It does so 'not in the hope of proving anything but rather in the hope of learning something', which Eysenck holds should be the attitude scholars in the social sciences adopt when conducting research.³⁹ Based on this fundamental understanding, the thesis scrutinises commonalities and varieties in the CPIOs' accounts about PI's purposes and methods. Used in this manner, in-depth interviews provide more than anecdotes. They allow a conceptualisation of an aspect of warfare that is still scarcely accounted for in the field of International Relations, namely, how information is used as a means of power at the tactical level embedded in a broader strategic effort (see 1.5).

Hermeneutic approaches are by necessity subjective.⁴⁰ The aim of this thesis, however, was never to provide an 'objective' account of NATO PI activities, which, I believe, is not possible. Nor was the purpose to provide a 'balanced' presentation of the topic, which could have been attempted by drawing from a broad scope of non-NATO sources, such as governments outside the alliance, journalists, and scholars. Rather, the

³⁸ Cited in McLuhan (2001:10).

³⁹ Cited in Flyvbjerg (1992: 144).

⁴⁰ See, for instance, Hollis and Smith (1990: 71-3).

object of study is to approach NATO's institutionalised ideas about the practice of PI. That is, not the PI policies and manuals but the practice of these policies and manuals. The hermeneutic approach to three CPIOs allows this. It provides an inter-subjective understanding of the purposes and methods of the NATO PI function. The method purports to examine the alliance's PI mindset or, one may say, to give an 'inside' view.

Three persons may appear as a very limited scope of primary sources. It is a cardinal assumption of this study, however, that this is a valid methodological choice. Important measures and reservations have been taken to sustain this assumption.

First, the study does not explore the ideas that informed the practice of any PIO, but of CPIOs. These primary sources were involved at the highest executive level in their respective military missions. They were, as mentioned, in charge of co-ordinating all mission-relevant PI activities and directly linked in the chain of command to their respective force commanders. The position they held represented NATO's overall PI endeavour in the actual military operation in the Balkans. Thus, they are extra-ordinarily well-informed about NATO's rationale for using PI and its mode of operation in those particular missions (further considerations on this topic are presented in the next section). Second, the CPIO's accounts have been evaluated against other primary NATO sources on the topic. This includes the few publicly accessible NATO documents on its PI function and numerous transcripts from its press briefings in the relevant cases (see the section 'Sources' below). Third, the CPIOs' information is compared with that of works and articles produced on the topic of this thesis (see 1.5.1). Scholars' points of view appear in footnotes throughout the thesis, when corresponding or diverging from those of the CPIOs. The three just mentioned measures aim to strengthen the validity of the conclusions and to move the presentation beyond a mere anecdotal level.

Still, basing the study primarily on interviews with three persons provides no ground for general conclusions about NATO's media relations in the Balkans and not even in the three examined military missions. The thesis does not claim, therefore, that the views of the three CPIOs are shared by all other PIOs in the missions, not to mention by NATO. The method simply does not allow for such generalisation. On the other hand, if a criterion of general validity were to determine whether a study is academically valid, then it would be futile to conduct qualitative research. We would not gain, and certainly not be able to use, such insights to improve the academic field's understanding of a broad scope of issues in international affairs. With respect to the present topic, we would not be able learn how a major military actor aims to use in actual practice the media as a means to achieve military and political ends.

Cases

The empirical study comprises three military missions, in order to allow comparison and extend the validity of the thesis beyond a single case. As the point of departure was an empirical interest, the cases were not chosen from theoretically deduced criteria. They emerged out of practical considerations.

Trying to establish my considerations retrospectively, it should be mentioned that I wanted the cases to be representative of the post-Cold War era. In the autumn of 2001 when the research commenced, the terrorist attacks in the United States of America (US) on 11 September were so recent that their significance for the international security agenda remained uncertain. Therefore, it seemed prudent to opt for cases that defined the field during the 1990s. A second criterion was that the cases should represent the PI activities of a major international military actor, thus excluding minor military powers like Norway and otherwise relevant resistance movements like the

Zapatistas in Mexico. A third criterion was that the cases should provide new empirical findings on the practice of PI, therefore primary sources had to be accessible and valuable. I doubted the extent to which advanced actors in the area of concern, in particular the US and the United Kingdom, would facilitate access to relevant sources for an outsider.

NATO, however, fulfils these criteria. As an employee of the Norwegian Armed Forces, it seemed likely that I would be able to access relevant individuals. During the 1990s, NATO was the major military alliance, second to none. It had been involved in dozens of major PI tasks, from long-term public information efforts *vis-à-vis* its member nations' populations, political missions such as the Russia-NATO cooperation and more acute crisis management as in Macedonia in 2001.⁴¹ To make the research task manageable, it was deemed prudent to explore only a few cases.

The choice was NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) and Kosovo Force (KFOR) missions, that is, its peace support operation in Bosnia and Kosovo, respectively. The reason is that these compare to conventional military operations more than most alternatives – Operation Allied Force and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) being the exceptions. The armed conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo are generally considered defining cases of the 1990s international security agenda and, as such, have shaped institutional responses in the foreseeable future.⁴² Moreover, the value of the

⁴¹ Other NATO PI activities are related to, among others, the alliance's enlargement process, Partnership for Peace, and the Mediterranean Dialogue.

⁴² Among others, the authors' presented in the introduction share this view. Smith (2005: 332-70) points to the international military involvement in Bosnia since 1992 and Kosovo since 1999 as examples of his new paradigm: war amongst the people. In fact, Bosnia constitutes his prime example. Cooper (2004: 59, 66, 71) refers to the international community's politico-military engagement in Bosnia, Kosovo and the

Bosnian case in the present context is suggested by former BBC reporter Martin Bell's (1995: 137) comment that 'no other war – not even the Gulf War, which took on the character of a made-for-television CNN special event – has been fought so much in public, under the eye of the camera'. James Gow et al. (1996b: 3) concur, describing the Bosnian conflict as 'the most comprehensively media-documented war ever. This made it the first true television war'.

In the Kosovo case, KFOR is arguably more relevant to the present inquiry than NATO's preceding air campaign. The reason is not only that of the two, KFOR compares more to IFOR since the two were both peace support operations. PI was conducted at a tactical level in KFOR, but at a headquarters level and with much interference from NATO member governments in the air campaign. It is also questionable how representative NATO PI activities during the latter campaign were for that function in general. Many, including PI staff who were directly involved, claim that within the broader politico-military crisis, NATO PI activities were in themselves a crisis to be managed (see footnote 18). Thus, IFOR and KFOR provide representative and more comparable cases.

NATO's peace support operations in Bosnia and Kosovo consist of several consecutive military missions of six to 12 months duration. The first contingents to each operation have been examined here because the first mission constitutes the critical PI phase. In this initial phase, the politico-military situation is often volatile, and NATO's ability to

Balkans at large, as an example of his concepts of postmodern war and voluntary empire. Kaldor (1999: 31, 154) points to Bosnia and Kosovo as 'the archetypal example' of her new war concept. Further, Mueller (2004: 88-94, 145-48) elaborates on the Bosnia conflict as his crown example of what he calls the remnants of war. Even van Creveld (1991: 224), who wrote before large-scale violence erupted in Bosnia, refers to Southeastern Europe as one of three potential regions from where his future wars would spread to the Western world.

impose stability is still to be proved. The alliance's role and utility in the specific context remains undefined to people both in the conflict zone and worldwide. As the conflict de-escalates, media attention will often wane, and public understanding of NATO's contribution tends to remain stable. This is likely to remain the case until something extra-ordinary catches the attention of reporters. In addition, the fifth contingent in KFOR is explored because it is instructive to see how PI's mode of operation adapts to a situation that already has all the major features NATO PI strove to achieve from the outset.

Since the research explores the ideas that inform how PI is practiced, the narrow object of study is the practitioners of PI. Having chosen a hermeneutic approach with in-depth interviews of a few persons, it was necessary to interview NATO PI practitioners that had been directly involved in the aforementioned cases. To permit in-depth studies of the overall principles in a PI campaign and avoid balancing multiple accounts of how PI 'actually' operated in specific situations, I chose to interview a small rather than a large amount of sources. In addition, the sources had to be representative for the broad PI endeavour in order to extend the validity of the empirical propositions (see the section above). For these reasons, the person in charge of the respective PI functions in each case – that is, the CPIO – has been interviewed.

The CPIO is the most senior PI position at the tactical level. In the military chain of command he has direct access to the force commander, who is the highest commanding officer in theatre. On PI matters, the CPIO is the NATO headquarters' and capitals' point of contact in theatre and gives instructions and guidance to the PIOs further down the level of command. The CPIO is on the ground at the level where most events projected in the media actually occur. He meets the press daily. At the same time, he is the linchpin between PIOs who conduct PI activities, the operational commanders,

and the guidance from NATO PI policies and operational doctrines. An analysis of the practice of PI at a higher level in the organisation would have excluded the hands-on experiences of dealing with journalists covering facts on the ground in a military mission, while an analysis at a lower level more possibly would be disconnected from the strategic dimensions of the activity. Moreover, since the PIOs at lower levels in the specific cases formed part of the national contingents to the peace support operations, their professional mindset are more likely to reflect national modes of operations, than the CPIOs who operated at headquarters level in theatre and therefore were embedded in NATO's mode of operation. Further, the CPIOs are often more experienced than lower-level PIOs and therefore more disposed to reflect the alliance's institutionalised PI mindset. Against this background, I find the CPIO the most relevant level within NATO at which to explore the thesis' empirical question.

At first sight, the number of cases may appear confusing. The study departs from the PI activity of one organisation – NATO; in two peace support operation – IFOR and KFOR; of which three contingents are examined – IFOR, the first Kosovo Force mission (KFOR 1) and the fifth mission (KFOR 5). In addition, the study provides six illustrative cases. It is clarifying to conceive the research as based on three cases, since the narrow object of study is how three CPIOs conceive the PI endeavour in three respective contingents. Less correct I also refer to them in a general sense as one case by the term NATO PI – among other places, in the research questions and theses (see 1.1.1 and 1.2.1). This formulation is only applied to facilitate reading and should not be perceived as an endeavour to conduct a general inquiry or to make a general claim.

Content analysis of press briefings

Section 2.3 presents two content analyses of NATO press briefings during the first 40 days of IFOR and KFOR 1 respectively.⁴³ It is necessary to clarify the methodological considerations upon which these analyses rest. The purpose of that section is to consider to what extent the accounts of the CPIOs, notably with regard to the use of master messages (see 2.2.3), are reflected in the transcripts from this central arena for NATO's relation with the press.

There are many ways to conduct content analysis.⁴⁴ I have chosen a simple method since my primary purpose is limited to the identification of NATO's most profiled messages. The examined texts are transcripts from press briefing as they appear on NATO's website.⁴⁵ The sample of briefings included in this analysis is from the first 40 days of each mission. Compared to the 365 days that IFOR lasted, a sample of 40 days is reasonable in terms of time available to finalise the study. The first 40 days, rather than a random period, is a valuable sample based on the assumption that it is primarily in the early phase of a mission that public perception is being shaped. The press briefings were undertaken daily. Not all transcripts are available on the website, however. In IFOR 23 and in KFOR 24 transcripts exist from respectively 20 December

⁴³ NATO's terminology on this activity is not consistent. Here, we shall use the term 'press briefing' by which it is normally referred. At other times, however, the same activity is called 'morning briefing', 'press conference', 'press statement', or 'news conference'. All refer to a situation where NATO PI personnel have invited the press for to bring across information about current events and to answer questions from the journalist. The briefing may be conducted by either NATO PIOs, commanders or, occasionally by the Secretary General. In IFOR and KFOR 1, these were normally held in the CPIC and undertaken on a daily basis. During KFOR 5 press briefings occurred only bi-weekly. 'News updates' are not included in the sample since they are often concerned with a single issue and do not involve an instant dialogue between PIOs and reporters.

⁴⁴ See, for example, Bauer's (2000) presentation of a variety of analytical approaches in this domain.

⁴⁵ <http://www.nato.int>.

1995 to 30 January 1996 and 12 June to 21 July 1999. In the case of KFOR, three days present transcripts from two different press briefings. On 18 June, for example, NATO headquarters' Office of Information and Press holds its last recorded morning briefing in the sample. The same day, KFOR 1 holds its first recorded press briefing from Pristina. Both transcripts from the days with two press briefings are included here since both disseminate messages to the press corps.

The transcripts can be interpreted in many ways, which leads to an element of judgement in the actual research. From the outset, I allowed the CPIO's formulated master messages to establish the kind of messages – the codes – to be identified in the content analysis. These gave only initial directions, however. Along the guidelines provided by Bauer (2000), recurring themes in the actual transcripts eventually defined the coding frame. Deciding what constitutes a recurring theme is no straight-forward task, however. IFOR's master message – 'IFOR is the new Nato working with new partners for noble ends' – can be found in every transcript depending on how one defines the code. One may argue that it encompasses all the codes in the frame. This is hardly surprising considering that the messages are developed to sustain each other in a strategy (see 2.2.3). To make the messages distinguishable, however, I chose to define the message in question more narrowly as comprising information about 'new partners', such as Russia and civilian organisations, and about 'noble ends' understood in abstract terms like 'human rights'. In the respective summaries, consideration is then given to whether and how the identified messages correspond to those stipulated by the CPIOs. So while the CPIOs' information on messages offered guidance, and sometimes were found to be useful codes, they did not overduely bias the findings. Alternative codes were explored.

Once established, the coding frame served as a measure to reduce the amount of interpretations and the level of judgement. At this stage the task was primarily to quantify the number of days in which each message was stated.

As a point of clarification, it should be mentioned that the messages are retrieved from NATO personnel's statements in the entire transcript of a briefing, which includes both introductory remarks and answers to reporters' questions. Moreover, a message is only counted once a day, irrespective of whether it is mentioned one single time or many more times during a briefing.

Sources

The empirical question is explored almost exclusively by means of primary NATO sources. These fall into three categories: interviews with and written accounts by three NATO CPIOs involved at the executive level in military missions; the limited declassified NATO information that exists on its PI activity; and publicly accessible transcripts from relevant NATO press briefings. It is only right to introduce the three CPIOs.

Captain Mark A. Van Dyke, from the US Navy, was IFOR's CPIO throughout its 12-month duration. Van Dyke has operated as a PIO since 1980, among others positions as the CPIO at the US Strategic Command and at Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH).

Colonel Robin L. C. Clifford was KFOR 1's CPIO. He is a British Army officer and during several years the CPIO in the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), including

deployments to IFOR, to Macedonia from March to 11 June 1999, and to the first KFOR mission.⁴⁶

Lieutenant Colonel Tore Idsøe was the CPIO in KFOR 5. Idsøe, a Norwegian Army officer, inherited the PI campaign initiated by Clifford and at the time established for two years. He has extensive PI experience, among others as the CPIO at NATO's North Joint Headquarters, and was in charge of the rear Press and Information Centre (PIC) in Macedonia, when KFOR 1 entered Kosovo.

The value of a thesis based to a large extent on interviews of three individuals may be questioned. Besides the possibility that the interviewed persons have deliberately misled me – which I consider highly unlikely – they may have done so unintentionally. First, there is a time-span of from one to nine years from the interviews were conducted to the activity in question. How correct can the account be? Not only may the persons have forgotten essential information, they may also reinterpret the information and their decisions in light of the outcome, rather than as they appeared when the activities were conducted. To reduce such risks, I conducted the interviews separately and was able to confirm the information retrieved against relevant non-classified NATO documents, including transcripts from press briefings of the time. Moreover, the CPIOs' accounts are compared to secondary sources, as mentioned in the introductory methodological concerns above.

⁴⁶ While the internationally recognised name is the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, often abbreviated to FYROM, this study shall refer to the state as Macedonia. This solely because the latter term reads more facile in the text.

1.4.2 Methodological concerns on the theoretical dimension of the thesis

Having clarified the major methodological considerations related to the empirical part of this research, we may move the focus to the theoretical task, which is to conceptualise the forms of power PI sought to exert on people. More specifically, the theoretical question is: how can Robert A. Dahl's, Steven Lukes', and Michel Foucault's respective notions of power enhance our theoretical understanding of the way the NATO PI function may exercise power to achieve political and military ends?

Chapter 3 departs from the understanding established at that point in the thesis that the CPIOs try to influence the way people perceive NATO's role in the Balkans. Their task is to enhance public support to NATO. The forms of influence they apparently exercise vary, however. The relationships between PI and their targets are different, as are the contexts, the objectives, the forms of interactions, the PI tactics and the means applied. Moreover, the CPIOs refer to their task in a variety of broad terms, such as *enhance understanding*, *gain public support*, and *deter*. Clearly, they see the PI function as an additional means of power available to a force commander to reach his objectives, but the kinds of power that the officers try to exercise appear diverse and are difficult to grasp.

The purpose of chapter 3 is partly to apply theoretical notions to clarify this aspect. In addition, this theoretical chapter aims to further the understanding of the empirical findings beyond what has been possible by the methodology applied in the previous chapter.

To this end, the empirical findings will be scrutinised by means of three different notions on power. This compares to Graham Allison's (1971) methodology in his

seminal study on the Cuban Missile Crisis, in the sense that he applies different theories to extract different stories from the same case. While his purpose was to make a theoretical point, mine is primarily to improve the conceptual understanding of PI's modes of influence. In broad terms, this research seeks to enhance the understanding of the forms of power that military operations may set in motion and can make expedient use of. Moreover, while Allison used different theoretical approaches to explain why the Cuban missile crisis developed as it did, I provide no such 'evidence'. This thesis does not claim that PI managed to influence its audiences but it does hold that different theoretical concepts of power can provide different answers to how PI may have exerted influence.

This methodological approach makes it possible to identify the CPIOs' assumptions about their influence, and consider whether theoretical work can account for these assumptions. It clarifies constraints but also theoretical connections that validate their ideas. Importantly, this method indicates for which ends and in which ways PI is likely to be a useful means of power in military operations.

Criteria for power theories

Power is, indeed, an 'essentially contested concept' as W.B. Gallie (1962) has famously argued. It comes in many guises and is conceived in multiple ways, not all of which suit the present purpose. The notions of power applied here were selected partly by a concern to make the research task manageable, and partly along criteria imposed by the cases. With regard to the former, I decided to limit myself to three theoretical concepts – a number that sufficed to fulfil the theoretical purpose while permitting in-depth elaboration. With regard to the latter, the decision was based on the following criteria:

First, the notions of power must accommodate subjects. The empirical study departs from an actor – the CPIO and his staff who seek to influence a number of targets. Thus, the theoretical notion must approach power as a social phenomenon intentionally exercised by actors. This excludes, for example, Louis Althusser's (1965) structural as well as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's (1985) semantic approaches to power in which respectively structural forces and discourses deal with social groups as objects of power, not as subjects.

Second, the notions of power must comprise targets of power. The CPIOs want to influence a variety of social groups. Thus, the concepts must be able to deal with at least some of these, from specific armed groups to more diffuse targets like world public opinion. Third, the notions must be able to accommodate information as a means of power, since the CPIOs' relations to their targets are primarily communicative. A final and more general concern was that the notions should form part of the mainstream theoretical debate within the field of Political Science. This, because I wanted to place the study in the broader scholarly conversation on power.

From these criteria I have selected the works of Yale-professor Robert A. Dahl, Professor Steven Lukes from New York University, and Collège de France-professor Michel Foucault. Commencing with the fourth criterion, these are arguably the most seminal authors in the debate and represent three of what Peter Digeser (1992) has called the *four faces of power*.⁴⁷ This is a categorisation of dominant approaches to

⁴⁷ The 'face' excluded from this study is that provided by Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz (1962) in their influential article 'Two Faces of Power'. Their contribution to the debate is to point to that power may be exercised as non-decisionmaking (Bachrach and Baratz 1963: 632). Their focus is primarily on decisionmaking processes within well-established organisations and political communities, which is why

social power that with various labels have gained general acceptance in the academic debate.⁴⁸ This omits other relevant approaches to power, such as those provided by Elmer E. Schattschneider (1960) and Jürgen Habermas (1986), and those who contemplate the concept in the specific context of International Relations such as Baldwin (1971; 1979).

Dahl's notion of power certainly fulfils the first case criterion. As the main title of his major work on power illustrates, *Who Governs?*, he assumes that someone has power. This locus of power is referred to as *A* in his definition. The latter also stipulates a *B*, that is a target of power, and therefore satisfies my second criterion.⁴⁹ As for the last criterion, some may argue that information is not comprised in the Dahlian notion, thus stressing his emphasis on the physical dimensions of power. I disagree. Dahl's notion has a communicative aspect. He regards the material dimension of power, such as 'the war potential of nations', as inert in itself. Its impact is conditioned by the communication of, for example, threats to activate this material dimension. To him, such communication is a means of power (Dahl 1957: 203).

Lukes too, fulfils the first and second criterion. Like Dahl, he identifies power in situations where *A* affects *B*. Although he takes a structural approach to the social sciences, he refers to *A* as subjects that have the '*power to act differently*' (Lukes 1974: 55, emphasis in original). Compared to Dahl, Lukes is more apt to deal with public opinion as *B*, since his area of concern is how an elite manipulates the majority to

it is inappropriate in an armed conflict, where such socio-political ties are more diffuse and volatile. Hence, my decision to exclude their notion.

⁴⁸ See, for instance, Hay (1997), Hayward (2000), and Barnett and Duvall (2005). Clegg (1989) implicitly support this view, although at the time Digeser (1992) was still to nominate Foucault as the fourth face.

⁴⁹ Throughout this study, when *A* and *B* is typed in italics they refer to an actor (see 3.1).

believe that the extant states of affairs is in the latter's interest. Perceiving power as, among other things, thought control exercised through the media, Lukes (1974: 23) has no difficulties passing the third criterion. His notion seems particularly suited to account for propaganda efforts of the infamous kind. As I have sought to distance NATO PI activities from such endeavours (see 1.3), some may question why this theoretical perspective forms part of the study. It is included, however, to shed light on the analytical difficulties involved in classifying information activities as thought control and to highlight the dubious assumptions that such contempt of PI efforts rest upon.

To include Foucault in this study is more debatable. Some may find it ironic that he is used to represent an influential conception of power, since he explicitly rejects that he has developed a theory of power. Nonetheless, he also acknowledges that he 'became quite involved with the question of power' (Foucault 1982: 777-78) and his work has been seminal, indeed, in the social science debate on this particular phenomenon. Others may forward that he does not fulfil the first case criterion. True, in one of his four central methodological prescriptions for a case study he explicitly discourages the search for a locus of power (Foucault 1998: 99). His point of view is, however, that power cannot adequately be understood as a one-way causal relation between two subjects. Foucault (1998: 93) explains: 'Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere'. This does not prevent people from being a source of power in his analytical framework. Actors' influence are surely much more indirect and diffuse than the one Dahl ascribes to *A*, but Foucault's micropolitical understanding of power certainly accommodates individuals: 'Power comes from below; . . . the machinery of production, in families, limited groups, and institutions, are the basis for wide-ranging effects . . . Major dominations are the hegemonic effects that are sustained by all these confrontations' (Foucault 1998: 94). Thus, Foucault's

notion does conform to the first criterion. Equally, it conforms to the second. Not only does power influence people's behaviour, it creates them as subjects (Foucault 1982: 781). The third criterion makes Foucault's concept particularly relevant to this study, since he links power to knowledge (see 3.1.3 and 3.2.3).

Thus, Dahl's, Lukes', and Foucault's notions of power fulfil the four established criteria. The scholars are prominent in the debate, their notions can account for different forms of power that are exercised by a subject, such as NATO, over another, such as NATO's targets; and they conceive information as a means of power (see further 3.1-3.3).

It is useful to highlight an earlier point, because it clarifies the purpose of this research. Dahl and Lukes use their notions of power for different ends than the present. Their aim is to develop a theoretical notion allowing researchers to find out 'who has power' in a given context (see 3.1.1 and 3.2.2).

This research does not purport to 'prove' such *A-B* relations. The theoretical inquiry addresses *A*'s perception about such relations. That is, it does not aim to find out whether the CPIOs have power over their targets, but rather to clarify the different ways in which the CPIOs may theoretically have influenced their targets. In other words, the study identifies theoretical notions of power that may shed new light on PI's mode of operation. This difference in theoretical purpose does not imply that Dahl and Lukes are inapplicable to this study, however. Their notions hold promise to be useful analytical instruments to address the theoretical concern of this thesis.

It is necessary from the outset to spell out why I do not intend to use a concept of power that has become widely accepted to describe precisely the forms of dynamics this thesis

aims to conceptualise.⁵⁰ This is the already mentioned notion of soft power introduced by Nye in 1990 (see 1.2) and defined as:

The ability to achieve desired outcomes in international affairs through attraction rather than coercion. It works by convincing others to follow, or getting them to agree to norms and institutions that produce the desired behaviour. Soft power can rest on the appeal of one's ideas or the ability to set the agenda in ways that shape the preferences of others. If a state can make its power legitimate in the perception of others and establish international institutions that encourage them to channel or limit their activities, it may not need to expend as many of its costly traditional economic or military resources (Nye and Owens 1996: 21).

The utility of soft power is that the notion is easy to grasp, a quality that is useful for practitioners. The difficulty is that besides the differentiation from *hard power*, understood as economic and military coercion (Nye 2004: 5-6), it is uncertain what one has grasped. This is a conceptual quality that is problematic for scholars. Nye (2004: 5) explicitly bases his notion on the theoretical work of Bachrach and Baratz. With reference to the definition above, however, Robin Brown has shown how soft power casually but effectively incorporates at least two different theoretical ideas: one which involves 'the ability to structure decision making processes in a way that produces the desired outcomes'; and one that concerns the restructuring of other actors' ideas 'in ways that make them share American preferences and values' (Brown 2004: 23). These are the notions that derives from respectively Bachrach and Baratz (1962) and Lukes (1974) and that the present study finds inadequate to account for the forms of influence

⁵⁰ Soft power is used in some policy circles (see Brown 2004: 22; Cooper 2004: 180) and among scholars such as Dearth (2000a: 158-9), Herd (2000: 77), Leonard (2002: 4), Taylor (2002: 322-23), Van Ham (2003: 441), Armistead (2004: 11, 125) to the extent that it figures in the title of his work, Vickers (2004: 184) and Fukuyama (2006: 149-54).

NATO's information activities seek to exert in international conflicts. Moreover, Brown (2004: 23) criticises Nye for failing to explain 'how and why' soft power works. The present findings suggest that the notion is unable to do this because Nye has constructed it on untenable grounds. I shall argue that Dahl and Foucault can provide the conceptual and theoretical understanding of how and why information is power to put it simply at this initial stage.⁵¹

1.4.3 Limitation of scope

The scope of this research has already been limited in the considerations related to methodology (see 1.4-1.4.2) and propaganda (see 1.3). It is appropriate, however, to make explicit some of the more important limitations.

Three cases

This study analyses the operational mind-sets of three CPIOs in three NATO peace support operation missions: IFOR from 20 December 1995 to 19 December 1996; KFOR 1 from 12 June 1999 to 8 October 1999; and KFOR 5 from 6 April 2001 to 3 October 2001.⁵² Six illustrative cases illuminate the three CPIOs' understanding of their mode of operation.

⁵¹ It shall be mentioned that Brown's (2002a; 2004) adaptations of Schattschneider's conception of power to the broad theoretical concern of this thesis appears a fruitful analytical approach. To the same end, he suggests that the analytical avenues provided by Thomas Risse, Frank Schimmelfenig, and Alastair Ian Johnson can be useful. The primary reason neither of these is applied in the present study is that their conceptions of power are arguably less prominent in the theoretical debate than the three selected for this study.

⁵² In this thesis, these three missions shall sometimes be referred to simply as NATO. This is a shorthand to facilitate reading. For two reasons this use of terms is not entirely correct. First, NATO has undertaken multiple PI campaigns (see methodology 1.4.1). The study and its conclusion, however, are limited to a mode of operation within the three above mentioned cases. Second, both IFOR and KFOR are multi-national forces with troop contributions also from non-NATO members. Referring to the mission by the common term NATO can be justified, however, since the three missions were NATO-led, and all other

PI – not Information Operations

The study exclusively addresses the NATO PI function. Other NATO communication assets do not form part of this thesis. Notably Information Operations, which comprises, among others functions, Psychological Operations (PsyOps), Electronic Warfare, and Computer Network Operations, is beyond the present scope, although they are mentioned in discussions of PI's relations to these assets.⁵³ This excludes much literature on the technical aspects of information that often conceived information as data, not as social communication which is what PI deals with – although obviously the two understandings of information are related (see footnote 65). Information operations are primarily confined to a conventional military realm, while PI is also directed to the broader and changing political context of war.

The practice – not the effect – of PI

The study presents the ideas that informed the practice of PI primarily as perceived by CPIOs within a NATO operational framework. It does not examine PI's impact. This has several implications. The study explores and conceptualises the types of influence the CPIOs endeavoured to exert on their targets, but it does not evaluate the extent to which the CPIOs succeeded to this end. Moreover, the study applies a simple content analysis on NATO press briefings to identify the messages PI sought to promote, but makes no similar examination of media reports, since it is beyond the present scope to

national contingents, episodically with Russia as an exception, formed an integral part of NATO's command structures.

⁵³ The US Armed Forces defines Information Operations as 'those actions taken to affect an adversary's information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems' (cited in Armistead 2004: 17). NATO (2006: 137) defines PsyOps as: 'Planned psychological activities designed to influence attitudes and behaviour affecting the achievement of political and military objectives'.

analyse how NATO PI activities were projected in the media.⁵⁴ Nor is it within the present area of concern to learn how PI's targets have been influenced for example by means of opinion polls.⁵⁵

The practice – not the ethics – of PI

Ethical, moral, and legal considerations on NATO PI activities lie beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather, the study purports to deal with PI on neutral terms, as a mode of operation. This is not to suggest that the study is value-free, which is why my normative position is already stated in section 1.3.

The television, radio and newspaper media – not the internet

This study explores how the CPIOs relate to journalists and photographers from television, newspapers and radio. The CPIOs regarded these media representatives as their immediate targets since they were their most important points of contact to the media, their major channels to reach their primary target groups, which were both the general public and specific groups such as the parties in the conflicts.

Some argue that the dominant role of the traditional broadcasting institutions is challenged by innovations in information and communication technology, notably by the internet, which can accumulate and disseminate information from personal computers, mobile telephones, digital cameras, and other low-cost and widely available equipment (eg Gowing 2000b). Indeed, the air campaign over Kosovo in 1999 is often

⁵⁴ Numerous content analyses of how Western media reported the Yugoslav wars of secession are provided in the edited volumes of Gow et al. (1996a), Goff (1999a), Hammond and Herman (2000), and a special issue of *European Journal of Communication* volume 15 number 3.

⁵⁵ Sobel (1998) is an example of a study that applies this approach.

highlighted as an example of the significance of the internet in times of war. Brigitte L. Nacos et al. (2000b: 2), for example, has called it the 'first Internet war' (see also Collins 2000a: 193; Denning 1999: 102).

Nonetheless, P. Taylor's (2000a: 297) and Brown's (2004: 18) argument that traditional media, such as television, remain the principal channel to reach the public is welcomed as a justification for eliminating the internet from the present scope. Another, but more locally confined, reason for excluding such cutting-edge technological communication platforms is that PI only paid marginal attention to them in the cases. Lt.Col. Tore Idsøe (26/3/2004), who was CPIO in KFOR 5, holds that by and large, his major target audience, the Kosovars, did not have access to the internet in 2001.⁵⁶

1.5 Literature review

Before we return to the particular argument of this study, it is enlightening to take a look at how the present topic of concern has been dealt with in the academic literature in order to clarify in which way and to what extent this research makes a distinct contribution to Anglophone and Scandinavian scholarship.⁵⁷ The review primarily

⁵⁶ This referencing system will be used throughout the thesis to refer to information gathered by means of interviews. In the text the name of the CPIO and the date he was interviewed is stipulated – in this case it refers to an interview I conducted with Idsøe on 26 March 2004. In the bibliography, information is added on how and where the CPIOs were interviewed.

⁵⁷ The broad issues are addressed in other languages as well. See Thompson's (1999: 343-53) presentation of some ten relevant works in Serbo-Croatian. Searches on library databases have identified works on the general topic in German and also, though less numerous, in French. Due to my linguistic shortcomings these bodies of research do not form part of this review. Moreover, the review does not cover the vast amount of unpublished reports and papers that circulates in the military establishment on these issues.

addresses literature in the field of International Relations, not media studies, although on this topic the two academic disciplines inevitably cross-fertilise.

While it may appear slightly long, the review sets out to convey that the specific empirical and theoretical questions of this thesis have, with few important exceptions, hardly received academic attention. Moreover, the broader empirical concern has largely been dealt with in a relatively general and policy-oriented manner and there are only embryonic efforts to enhance the broader theoretical understanding this study directs itself to elucidate.

1.5.1 The specific empirical topic

The present study's empirical concern is to explore how, and for what purposes, NATO has used its PI function in IFOR and KFOR (see 1.1.1). Hence, the first task of this review is to present academic studies that have addressed this particular topic.⁵⁸

Because this addresses NATO PI's mode of operation, a first distinction to be made is between studies primarily based on NATO sources, ie those concerned with NATO's ideas about its PI activities, and studies that approach the activity from different perspectives. The latter encompasses works that primarily draw from other than NATO sources, for example media reports. This thesis belongs to the first methodological category.

⁵⁸ This limitation of the review's scope to NATO's media relations excludes scholarship that scrutinises the way political parties in the Balkans have used the media in their conflicts during the 1990s. Some of the most cited works on how the political and warring parties, notably Serbia and Croatia, have used the media for their own purposes prior to and during the break-up of the former federal state of Yugoslavia include Thompson (1999), an anthology edited by Gow et al. (1996a), and MacDonald (2002). On the same subject but less influential are articles by Jacobsen (1993), Radojkovic (1994), Zupanov (1995), Oberschall (2000), and Byford and Billig (2001). Particularly Serbian, but also Croatian, efforts to influence public perception via the media of the international community's role in Balkan wars have been examined by Malesic (1998), Hrvatin and Trampuz (2000), deCaro (2000), and Gocic (2000).

On the present empirical concern, only a handful of studies explore NATO PI's rationale and mode of operation. Among those, by far the most important work has been undertaken by Pascale Combelles Siegel, who conducted two observation missions in Bosnia in October 1996 and March-April 1997. As member of a NATO Joint Analysis Team, she interviewed almost 100 key international press and information staff from IFOR, the Stabilization Force (SFOR), the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), and civilian international organisations such as the Office of the High Representative, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Her findings are presented in an excellent monograph (Siegel 1998) and as chapters in two separate works. The first is a chapter in Larry K. Wentz (1997a). The other appears in a co-authored work where she, together with Kevin Avruch, is credited as the primary authors on the chapter that covers NATO's information campaign in Bosnia (Avruch et al. 1999: 100).

With respect to the present concern, the most relevant is her 1998 work which elaborates on the utility, co-ordination, and effectiveness of IFOR and SFOR's information campaigns implemented by means of NATO's three communication functions, that is PI, PsyOps, and Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) (Siegel 1998).⁵⁹ These findings are also presented in her 1997 chapter (Siegel 1997). In the 1999-chapter she expands the scope and presents the information campaign conducted by the broader

⁵⁹ NATO (2006: 59) defines CIMIC as: 'The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between NATO commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.'

international community in Bosnia and considers its relevance in the general field of peace operations (Avruch et al. 1999: 31-108).

The value of Siegel's work notwithstanding it has a broader scope than the present thesis in several senses. First, Siegel (1997; 1998) explores three communication functions, while I exclusively examine PI. Second, Siegel's 1999-chapter covers PI activities conducted by a broad scope of actors including NATO, the United Nations (UN), the OSCE, and NGOs, while I focus exclusively on the first of these. Third, she discusses the effectiveness of NATO's three communication functions and their broader application in the general field of peace support operations (Avruch 1999: 31-108), aspects that are both beyond the scope of the present thesis (see 1.4.3). Siegel's broader scope prevents her from elaborating at length on the specific empirical question of this thesis. In fact, only some 26 pages in her major work are devoted to this particular topic.⁶⁰ Moreover, in terms of cases Siegel's scope is also different. She has examined only one of the three cases examined here; that is IFOR.

Another useful article that addresses a research question closely related to the present is Robin Clifford and T.J. Wilton (2000). The former was the CPIO in KFOR 1 and is one of the primary sources here. The article deals with their experiences in IFOR, where both co-authors were centrally positioned PIOs and have firsthand experiences from that mission as well. They present how IFOR's land component, the ARRC, operated *vis-à-vis* the media to gain public support in Bosnia and in NATO member countries. While the article highlights critical PI issues, its scope, in terms of cases, and their elaborations

⁶⁰ Siegel (1998: 40-66). Largely the same findings occur in Siegel (1997) and some in Avruch et al. (1999: 41-43).

on the matters at hand is necessarily more limited than those of this thesis. In addition, another of my primary source has also produced a most relevant academic paper. Mark Van Dyke (2003) applies a rhetorical method to examine how IFOR PI changed NATO's identity. This basic argument forms part of the present thesis, in which it is presented in a broader context from a different theoretical perspective.

Moreover, Mark Thompson and Dan De Luce (2002) outline the political and legal context in which IFOR PI was conducted, but at the level of implementation they focus on SFOR. In addition, the British G.R. Coward (2000) compares his experiences as a Military Spokesman in UNPROFOR from 1994-95 with IFOR PI activities in an anecdotal 'lessons learned' approach.

No other academic work has addressed the present empirical question with regard to KFOR 1 and 5. The most closely related study is authored by Julie Mertus and Mark Thompson (2002). They do not examine NATO PI's mode of operation, however, but present the broader international endeavour to regulate Kosovo's media space in the post-conflict peacebuilding effort, and identify the concerns and in-fighting between United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the OSCE, and NATO on this matter.

Hence, it may be concluded that very few authors have addressed the specific empirical questions of this thesis based on NATO sources and that these have done so in a manner different from mine. While some, notably Siegel, have explored the IFOR PI function, no comparable study exists with regard to KFOR 1 and 5. Against this background, it is useful to extend the scope of the review beyond the limitations of this study and present literature that based on NATO-sources addresses related NATO-activities in the

Balkans. This includes different PI activities and other communication functions, notably PsyOps.

Related NATO activities in the Balkans

Compared to the present cases, much more scholarly attention has been devoted to NATO PI activities during Operation Allied Force. Among those who portray NATO's information campaign based on practical experiences working within its PI function are Alastair Campbell (1999), who was Prime Minister Blair's Press Secretary and was sent to NATO headquarters to bolster its Office of Press and Information; Director of that office Jamie Shea (2001); and Steven Collins (2000a; 2000b), a US Lt.Col. with extensive NATO PsyOps experience. Three scholars, Rhiannon Vickers (2000), Kristina Riegert (2002) and Brown (2003a; 2003c), have similarly elaborated on this concern with reference to NATO sources. They address a number of features that are central also in this thesis, for instance the vital importance of public support, credibility and coordination.

Beyond mere PI activities, NATO applied a broader scope of communication assets – such as Information Operations and PsyOps (see 2.2.1 and 2.2.4) – in the three relevant cases. Their use has also been presented in the academic literature. Three authors who were actively engaged in NATO's Information Operations in IFOR are US Col. Allard (1996; 1997) who addresses general issues facing the implementation of such activities at division level; Collins (1999) who presents the general PsyOps endeavour; and Jacobsen (1997) who exemplifies how IFOR PsyOps operated at his tactical level with the US Armored Division. In the same vein but out of scope in terms of cases, Dearth (2000a: 158-9) presents how PsyOps, civil affairs, media campaigns and political intervention was applied in an effort to achieve SFOR's mission objectives. Based

primarily on NATO sources, Taylor (2002) also mentions some of KFOR's PsyOps activities. Collins (2000a) and Dixon (2003) assess NATO's use of PsyOps during Operation Allied Force. Thomas (2000) and Armistead (2004: 201-07) from the US Joint Staff College assess the broader information operations in the same campaign. Moreover, a US Department of State employee, Kiehl (2001), as well as Lindley (2004), present several examples from the UN and NATO's general information campaign in the Balkans. The two latter are not academic studies, however, but advocacies for strengthening the Information Operations capability in the US and the UN.

Thus, other studies exist that based on NATO sources and firsthand experiences elaborate on how NATO conducts information campaigns. These and the literature mentioned in the previous section have been instructive throughout the present study in formulating hypotheses. Their positions when corresponding or diverging from those made here are presented in footnotes.

Related research

Other scholars have used different methodological approaches to explore concerns related to the empirical topic of this thesis. A primary difference is that they do not rely on NATO sources. Instead, many explore how the media portrayed NATO's activities in the Balkans. Most attention has been devoted to Operation Allied Force, while media representations of IFOR and of KFOR 1 and 5 are yet to be surveyed.

A high-profiled example is Noam Chomsky's (1999: 79) linguistic approach to undercut the media's portrayal of Operation Allied Force as a humanitarian intervention: "the new interventionism" is simply "the old interventionism". In the same spirit more than 20 authors have gathered in *Degraded capability: the media and the Kosovo crisis* edited by Hammond and Herman (2000) to cast a critical light on NATO's and its

member states' media relations during the same air campaign. Using media content analysis, Herman and Peterson (2000: 120), for example, argue that CNN 'served as Nato's *de facto* public information arm'. Goff (1999a) collects reflections on the media coverage of the air campaign from more than 70 journalists and scholars. Other studies of Western media's portrayal of Operation Allied Force appear in a 2000-issue of the *European Journal of Communication*.⁶¹

Summing up, scholarly literature on this thesis' specific empirical question is scarce. What exists has informed the present research and those studies that remain relevant to this final version appear throughout the text wherever it is deemed appropriate.

1.5.2 The general empirical interest

As mentioned on the very first pages, the thesis' specific empirical question is embedded in a broader academic concern about how Western political authorities in the field of international affairs use the media as a means of power in politics and war. It is with ambiguity that I now cast the net wider in this review. Doing so is useful because it positions the thesis *vis-à-vis* existing scholarship on the general empirical interest and shows how the present findings may contribute to this field of inquiry. My reservations derive from the immense task of presenting the extensive literature in the field, compared to the time available to finalise this study.

Balancing these considerations, it is deemed prudent to present only studies that I have come across, sketching out how they have approached the area of concern by

⁶¹ Volume 15 number 3, the title of this special issue is 'The media and the Kosovo conflict'. On the same topic see also Nohrstedt et al. (2002), Ottosen (2002), and Riegert (2003).

highlighting some of their common concerns and concepts and by identifying the main authors they refer to. Thus, this review makes no pretension of being exhaustive. In addition, the particular contributions of the authors mentioned are not given justice in this brief review. They are grouped in bulks to remain at a general level and to reserve space for the primary purposes of this thesis.

With these cautious remarks in mind, the review suggests that while academic work on the general topic is vast, it largely examines the issues and dynamics at a general level. Relatively limited scholarly attention has been directed to the question the present thesis engages with: how actors actually use the media as a means of power in the conduct of war and foreign policy. Moreover, with a few exceptions the literature offers few analytical tools to conceptualise and study the dynamic processes involved in this field of inquiry.

Extensive literature exists on the interface between the media and political authorities. Much of it approaches the issues either from the media's side of the interface (eg Hudson and Stainer 1999; McLaughlin 2002; Knightly 2003) or from a more general perspective (eg McLuhan 2001; Briggs and Burke 2002). The interest of this review is different. It aims to sketch out research on how governments deal with the media.

Governments have at their disposal a variety of means to communicate with their audiences. These they use, among other things, to define what international affairs is all about, how particular events should be understood, and to mobilise support for the government's official policy line. Former US peace broker in the Balkans and ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke, makes the point. Joining the debate about a politic US' grand strategic response to the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, he claims:

Call it public diplomacy, or public affairs, or psychological ware, or – if you really want to be blunt – propaganda. But whatever it is called, defining what this war is really about in the minds of the 1 billion Muslims in the world will be of decisive and historical importance.⁶²

To conceptualise such activities John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt from the RAND corporation have proposed the term *Noopolitik*. This is another relatively well-established term in the academic debate and has profiled itself in opposition to Realpolitik which is commonly acknowledged to have dominated the Cold War period. Where the latter's primary concern was whose armed forces would win, to put it simply, 'noopolitik may ultimately be about whose story wins' (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1999: 53). Noopolitik aims to influence, or to shape, the noosphere, described as a 'global-girdling realm of the mind', by means of ideas, values, and norms.⁶³

The major advantage of the concept noopolitik is that, like soft power (see 1.4.2), both communicate well to lay audiences. One of their disadvantages is that they are loosely defined terms that tend to ignore existing scholarship on how governments have used and use the media as a means of power, and present the concern as novel. This is far from the case.

In order to convey how the literature has treated this general issue it is useful to apply Brown's (2003b) categorisation of governments' 'communications armoury' as they

⁶² Holbrooke cited in Van Ham (2003: 427). The statement figured in *The Washington Post* on 28 October 2001.

⁶³ Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1999: 4). They define noosphere as encompassing 'cyberspace and the infosphere and has its own technological, organizational, and ideational levels. It relates to an organizational theme that has constantly figured in our own work about the information revolution: the rise of network forms of organization that strengthen civil-society actors' (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1999: 14).

unfold in different professions: the military, the diplomatic and the political establishments. This is not to suggest that scholars necessarily study information activities within one or the other profession. Still, the division along professions provides a useful starting point to approach the general concern, and research tends to analyse and explore it with distinctive concepts in each realm. The outline that follows will treat scholarship in the military realm more extensively – not repeating the contributions from already mentioned authors – while the overviews of the diplomatic and political spheres are mere sketches. We shall commence with the military establishment.

The military establishment's media relations

A major part of the early literature on how armed forces dealt with the media examines policies and practices, notably with respect to the US and Britain. Badsey (2000a) is an edited volume addressing challenges in the military–media interface in the late 1990s. Prior to that the Glasgow University Media Group has made important contributions to the field on British media policy during the Falklands' war (eg Broadbent et al. 1985). Magnusson (1996) and, more interestingly, Thrall (2000) present how US armed forces' press policies have been applied in different wars since Vietnam, Siegel (1996) since Grenada, while Katz (1992) and Taylor (1992) focus on the 1991 Gulf War. A common issue in these works is the tension between military censorship and many publics' constitutional right to be informed about their government's undertakings. Few studies explore the empirical concern from the perspective of this thesis, however, which is

how military press and information officers actually operated – although exceptions exist.⁶⁴

Military press and information activities form part of a broader academic concern about the role information plays in armed conflicts. This involves both technological and perceptual aspects. Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1999: x) propose that we conceive these aspects as two poles – ‘opposite ends of a spectrum of security concerns’ – around which information strategies in conflict and war emerge.

In the first years after the end of the 1991 Gulf War, analytical work primarily evolved around the technical pole. These technically biased studies explored ways to achieve information dominance over the enemy in a conventional battle in order to increase the enemy’s ‘fog of war’, while reducing one’s own level of uncertainty. Such studies often conceived information as data not as social communication, which is what PI deals with.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Thompson (1966) and Hughes (1992) are cases in point.

⁶⁵ Particularly in the US, civilian and military research communities such as the RAND corporation, the Joint Forces Staff College, and the National Defence University generated a host of competing coinages, such as information warfare, cyber war, information operation, etc. These terms were used to explore and conceptualise the development of computer-based surveillance and guiding technologies, and refinements of command and control warfare which was ascribed a major role in the overwhelming Allied military victory over Iraq in 1991. It inspired many in these analytical communities when the Tofflers (1993) argued that Western society was moving from an industrial to an information age, in which information and communication technology was becoming vitally important to sustain the civilian and governmental infrastructure of a nation. Information technology came to be seen as an increasingly important means and target in war (see Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1993, 1997; Libicki 1995, 1996, 1998). Schwartau (1994) and Adams (1998) outline popularised scenarios of how such wars may unfold. More academic accounts are the two first in a series of three volumes edited by Campen et al. (1996; 1998) which gather contributions from many of the key authors on the issues. Other analytical contributions are found in the works of Alberts (1996), Waltz (1998), Denning (1999), and the reports of respectively Molander et al. (1996; 1998), Stein and Szafranski (1996), and Khalilzad et al. (1999). In addition, the debate involves a host of articles, including those of Berkowitz (1995; 2000), Devost et al. (1997), Bosch (2000), Thayer (2000), and Rawnsley (2005).

Hence, in the context of this thesis, it is clearly the perceptual pole that is the most relevant, which is why more technically biased studies will not be presented any further here. The perceptual pole refers to a variety of endeavours – in the span between propaganda and press and information activities – applied to influence the hearts and minds of people, its ultimate aim being to protect one's own and undermine the enemy's will to fight. While it is controversial, indeed, in the practice of PI to group this function among the broad scope of apparently related activities, this is not the case in the academic literature.

A commonly addressed issue is the politically delicate co-ordination between PI and PsyOps (see 2.2.1, 2.2.4 and footnote 53). The latter is an old and well-established military measure that aims to influence the perceptions of others. It can be applied at the tactical level against enemy forces on the battlefield, for example, or at the strategic level where it interacts with the political realm. The major part of the academic literature explores the latter level and often refers to it as propaganda (see 1.3).

A full account of this field is beyond the present purpose. But at the level of implementation, Thompson (1966) is particularly interesting due to his key role in Britain's PsyOps campaign during the Malayan Emergency, generally considered to be one of the most successful hearts and minds campaigns in recent history. At a more general level, Carruthers (1995) describes this and three other hearts and minds campaigns in British colonies from 1944-60. With clear parallels to these campaigns, several scholars have examined the UN's use of information to achieve its objectives in a number of its 1990s peacekeeping missions. This includes Lehmann (1995; 1999), who for several years worked with UN press and information activities in peacekeeping operations in the field and from the Secretariat in New York. Heining (1994),

Maureen Taylor (2000), Curtis (2000), Wimhurst (2002), and Thompson and Price (2003) study the same UN function.

Since the mid-1990s scholars have stressed that innovations in information and communication technology create new opportunities to influence the perceptions of other people (see footnote 7). A term that has gained currency in this debate is perception management.⁶⁶ Its role in international conflict is elaborated on by, among others, Dearth (2000a) and Driscoll (2000). The latter is a psychologist working with intelligence-related matters in the British Ministry of Defence. Col. Williamson (2000), who had a life-long career with the US Air Force and worked among others at Pentagon, presents perception management as a tool that may be applied to a variety of target audiences including allies in order to promote the national interest. As defined by the US armed forces perception management bears clear resemblance to PsyOps, although the former involves a broader scope of government agencies.

The literature on perception management partly emerges from and has merged with the study of technological aspects of information in armed conflicts.⁶⁷ While the early 1990s technology-dominated studies focused on the role of information in the conduct of operations during war, later studies have embraced more long-term strategies that includes crisis and even periods of peace and involves cooperation with civilian

⁶⁶ The US Armed Forces' *Dictionary of Military Terms* defines perception management as: 'Actions to convey and/or deny selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives and objective reasoning; and to intelligence systems and leaders at all levels to influence official estimates, ultimately resulting in foreign behaviors and official actions favorable to the originator's objective' (cited in Dearth 2000a: 153). Scholars that study along this notion include, in addition to those mentioned in the body text, Denning (1999: 101-123), Collins (2000a; 2000b), Brown (2002b), Nincic (2003), and Armistead (2004).

⁶⁷ See, for example, Baumard (1996), Kuehl (1996), Nye and Owens (1996: 23-28), Petersen (1996), Denning (1999), Campen and Dearth (2000), Der Derian (2001), and Taylor (2002).

counterparts. Information Operations has emerged as a term to describe such endeavours and as a name of the function within NATO responsible for conducting such tasks.⁶⁸

Hence, much research exist on the military establishment's media relations. Scholars often refer to these efforts with terms like propaganda, censorship, and more recently perception management and information operations. The vast majority of these studies have addressed general political and conceptual issues, while few have explored how those policies and concepts are actually implemented.

The diplomatic establishment's media relations

In the diplomatic realm, the communication activities that deal with the media is often called public diplomacy. Apparently the term was introduced in the early 1960s by Edward Murrow, Director of US Information Agency (Leonard et al. 2002: 1; Brown 2004: 15). While it has been used to describe numerous activities between governments and between people, Manheim (1994) reserves the term for government-to-people contact. In the same vein, the US State Department defines public diplomacy as 'government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries; its chief instruments are publications, motion pictures, cultural

⁶⁸ A milestone in this process is the publication of the US Armed Forces' Joint Doctrine on Information Operations in 1998. A forerunner is found in the US Army Field Manual 100-6 1996. In the academic literature the term has been embraced by Rathmell (2000), Siegel (1998), Price (2000), Thomas (2000), Brown (2002b), and Armistead (2004). Thomas (1997; 1998) and Herd (2000; 2002) add a Russian dimension to this topic, while McKinney (2002) and Lindley (2004) elaborate on information operations in a UN context.

exchanges, radio and television'.⁶⁹ While its purpose compares to that of the NATO PI function, its means of communication are different. Public diplomacy partly owns its channels of communications with the public, notably the broadcasting media. PI does not. In this sense, public diplomacy compares to military PsyOps.

Hitchcock (1988), among others, points to early post-WW II activities in the field of information that served public diplomacy purposes. Taylor (2003: 256-62) tags Hollywood's role in this endeavour as a 'Marshall plan of ideas' that aimed to homogenise global values along American standards. It included Fulbright programmes to win the understanding of future leaders, and radio-stations, as the Voice of America, to disseminate US policy and biased coverage of current events.

According to Lord (1998), public diplomacy, as a political tool and as an academic concern, has had its ebbs and flows. It formed part of a psychological war against communist governments up until the Hungarian uprising and again during the Reagan administration's ideological attacks on the Soviet Union.⁷⁰ In between and since the late 1980s, public diplomacy received less political and financial support (Laquer 1994). 11 September 2001 changed this. The potentials of public diplomacy, compared to military force, as a means to combat terrorism gained new political and academic interest.⁷¹

At least since 1956, with the failed Hungarian revolt, a political divergence has existed in the US between those favouring public diplomacy as an instrument to promote

⁶⁹ US Department of State's *Dictionary of International Relations Terms* (cited in Edelstein and Krebs 2005: 101).

⁷⁰ On the early endeavours see Soley (1989), Parry Giles (1996), and Nelson and Walesa (1997).

⁷¹ See, for example, Leonard et al. (2002: 2), Peterson (2002), Ross (2002), Brown (2003b), Snow (2004), Van Ham (2003), Nelles (2004), and Edelstein and Krebs (2005).

specific foreign policy objectives, and those who see it as a more long-term endeavour to promote national interests abroad by creating a favourable image of the US (Lord 1998; Smyth 2001). Such differences appear less pertinent now. Brown (2004) and Vickers (2004) argue that a 'new public diplomacy' has emerged that tends to blur distinctions between traditional public diplomacy endeavours and spin, between international and domestic information activities, and between public and traditional diplomacy.

This account suggests that scholarship on public diplomacy largely explores the conceptual and political levels and use examples from actual undertakings primarily to sustain their broader claims. Although some authors, such as Lord (1998) and Snow (2004), have worked as public diplomacy employees, and Hitchcock (1988) as Associated Director of the US Information Agency, I have not come across studies that scrutinise the actual practice of public diplomacy at the level of implementation.

The political establishment's media relations

Finally, we shall see how some research has addressed the way politicians deal with the media. Since the First World War social scientists became increasingly interested in the role the media could play in political leaders' relations to their electorates. Their field of inquiry was often referred to as propaganda (see 1.3), 'political communication' (Chaffee and Hochheimer 1982), 'news management' (Cook 1998), or 'spin' (Maltese 1992).

The term spin is often exemplified with explicit reference to President Clinton's and Prime Minister Blair's respective media relations (Jones 1995; Kurtz 1998). Brown (2003a: 156) describes spin as 'the process by which [political] agents struggle to define the meaning of reality for others'. It is different from earlier forms of political

communication because societal and technological changes have given the media an increasingly important role in the relation between political leaders and their national and, more recently, international target audiences.⁷²

With respect to this thesis, few have shed light on how governments conducted spin in relation to IFOR and KFOR although illustrative examples can be found in Jones (1999: 294-5, 301-12) and Smith (2005: 392). More lengthy studies exist on how NATO's member states used spin during the Kosovo air campaign in 1999. Because these endeavours were closely connected to the military PI activity they have already been presented (see footnote 30). The importance many scholars attach to such activities is captured by Ignatieff's (2000: 196) statement that 'Virtual war is won by being spun'.

In sum, this review has given a general, but far from complete, description of the academic literature on how the media has been used to promote aims of policy by respectively the military, the diplomatic and the political communities. It shows that while these concerns are not new, contemporary scholars also argue that technological, political and societal developments have altered the role and implications of press and information activities in international affairs. This suggests that earlier studies may not be fully useful to understand the role of information as a means of power in contemporary international affairs.

In addition, the review has placed the present thesis in a broader context, which suggests that the study's methodological approach to investigate how PI is actually practised is different from most other studies. Hence, it may therefore be of value also

⁷² Hitchcock (1988), Rosenau (1990), Gowing (2000b), Vickers (2004: 183-84), and Shaw (2000a).

beyond the particular empirical topic. While the review does not comprise all relevant literature, it indicates that previous research has largely focused on general dynamics and political and conceptual issues. With a few exceptions, mentioned above, I am not aware of other studies that systematically uncover the mode of operations that have informed and the techniques that have been used in the military, diplomatic or political establishments' public relations activities to influence actors in the international realm.

Moreover, it seems that also the theoretical concern of this thesis has received little scholarly attention (see 1.4.2 and 1.5.3). While controversies exist as to how the media influences international politics, it is generally accepted that the media can influence politics and war (see CNN effect footnote 9). Many of the above-mentioned scholars would subscribe to Nye's (1999: 22) claim that 'an information revolution has transformed the nature of power'. Hence, power constitutes a cardinal assumption in this broad empirical area of concern. Nevertheless, only few scholars have analysed this assumption in a theoretical sense. Those who have will now be introduced.

1.5.3 The three notions of power

The theoretical part of this thesis holds that Dahl's and Foucault's theoretical works can conceptualise different forms of power PI may have exercised. The utility of Lukes' notion of power to this end is also considered but declined. Interestingly, the literature has barely applied these cardinal notions of power to the broad empirical concern of this study, although exceptions exist.

Dahl's notion of power is explicitly mentioned by Nye (1990: 26; 2004: 2) as a theoretical basis for his term hard power that stands in contrast to his key concept soft power (see 1.4.2). Others, it may be argued, implicitly draw from Dahl when they along similar lines of reasoning explain how coercive measures are different from

information as a means of power.⁷³ Armistead (2004: 10), for instance, paraphrases Dahl when he defines power as ‘the ability of *A* to get *B* to do something that *B* would not otherwise do’ (italics added). By remaining confined to this understanding of power, however, the present study would suggest that these scholars prevent themselves from discovering other more important modes of influence inherent in information activities. Although these authors refer to Dahl’s concept, they do not exploit its potentials to clarify in an elaborate theoretical sense how information may be used by political leaders, foreign offices or armed forces as a means of compulsion in international affairs. The present research aims to do that.

I am not aware of studies that explicitly explore the theoretical utility, or indeed validity, of Lukes’ notion of power on our broad empirical concern. Arguably his notion forms part of soft power (see 1.4.2) and also underpins much of the above mentioned literature that conceive press relations, perception management, public diplomacy, spin and related terms, as manipulation of other people’s minds.⁷⁴ From Lukes’ theoretical perspective such governmental communication endeavours tend to come across as dishonourable and illegitimate. The epistemological and ethical assumptions upon which such views are based are questioned when this study attempts to apply Lukes’ notion in an actual analysis.

⁷³ Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1999: 27-32, 47), Herd (2000: 77), Leonard (2002: 4), and Vickers (2004: 184) are cases in point.

⁷⁴ In broad sweeping terms this includes Koppes and Black (1987), Herman and Chomsky (1988), Jowett and O’Donnell (1999), Pratkanis and Aronson (1992), Jacobsen (1993), Kurtz (1998), Bernhard (1999), Chomsky (1999), Pinsdorf (1999), and several authors in the anthology edited by Hammond and Herman (2000), Nohrstedt et al. (2000), Herd (2002), Nelles (2004), Altheide and Grimes (2005), and Western (2005). See also 1.3 and 1.5.1.

Some scholars have applied Foucault's notion of power to explain how the media influences the international realm. Generally, these studies examine global normative structures arguing that they create relations of domination and define what is to be conceived legitimate and illegitimate international practice.⁷⁵ Others who apply Foucault's theoretical perspective enter the theoretical concern from the perspective of actors, but they do not use it to explore how an actor *practices* information activities to exert power in the realm of international affairs.⁷⁶

Milliken (1999) has criticised discursive studies in International Relations on this particular point. In an article widely noticed among scholars in this field she encourages research to move beyond this structural focus. She maps out unexplored potentials in the discursive approach and specifically calls for studies at the level of implementation. In other words, rather than continue to identify and examine the implications of normative structures, ie of 'common sense' as it exists in international life, research should scrutinise how such structures are produced (Milliken 1999: 238). With a direct reference to Foucault she argues: 'Analysing how policies are implemented (and not just formulated) means studying the operationalization of discursive categories in the activities of governments and international organizations . . . Discourse studies which include the implementation of policy practices can . . . expose readers to the "micro-physics of power" in International Relations' (Milliken 1999: 241). The present thesis purports to do this.

⁷⁵ For example, Gray (1997), Luke and Otuathail (1997: 724), Larner and Walters (2004), Lipschutz's (2005), and Zanotti (2005).

⁷⁶ Sending and Neumann (2006), for example, examine how evidence of governmentality in world politics can be found in new forms of cooperation between governments and NGOs. They do not examine how these actors actually manoeuvred to pursue their ends.

This review finds that only few scholars have explored the utility of Dahl's, Lukes' and Foucault's respective notions of power to enhance the theoretical understanding of the kinds of influence actors exert, or rather assume they exert, when they use the media to influence international affairs. Further, the scholars, who do apply these concepts, do so in a more general manner, than does this study.

In addition, to the best of my knowledge few studies have presented other analytical or conceptual frameworks that allow us to understand the dynamic processes assumed in the general empirical area of interest (see 1.4.2). That this observation may characterise the general field is suggested by Arquilla and Ronfeldt's (1999: 3) call for a concept of power that can be used 'as a basis for information strategy' and to deal with a variety of information activities 'as a coherent whole'.⁷⁷ They offer their elaborations on soft power in the context of *noopolitik* as a contribution to this end. This thesis holds that the respective notions of Dahl and Foucault are more useful in this respect.

Having stipulated the present empirical and theoretical questions, clarified how these are situated in the interface between the phenomena of war, power, and the media, and presented how the questions have received relatively scarce attention in the academic literature, we can now embark on the arguments.

⁷⁷ Driscoll (2000: 171) and Brown (2004; 2005) point to the same shortcoming in the literature.

Chapter 2

NATO Press and Information activities in the Balkans

This chapter addresses the thesis' empirical question. It examines how, and for what purposes, NATO has used its PI function in its peace support operations in the Balkans (for methodological considerations, see 1.4.1). It shall be argued that the alliance used PI as a means of power to achieve NATO's political and military objectives.

First, the practice of PI is demonstrated (see 2.1) before the operational framework (see 2.2), the goals (see 2.2.1), and intentions (see 2.2.2) that guided PI's mode of operation are presented. Then the chapter explicates PI's mode of operation to promote a few messages to relevant audiences through the media (see 2.2.3); to co-ordinate NATO assets that explicitly or implicitly disseminated messages in order to achieve a unity of effort (see 2.2.4); and to maintain credible relations with the media (see 2.2.5). It is only when these findings are analysed from the perspective of the three notions of power (see 3), however, that the utility of PI as means to influence the field of international affairs may be fully appreciated.

Before addressing these issues it necessary to sketch out the context in which the PI activities were conducted. For this reason, the section below will give a general account of the political background and objectives of the relevant military missions.

The IFOR and KFOR missions

The PI campaigns were conducted as part of NATO's peace support operations within broader internationally endorsed peace and reconciliation efforts under the auspices of the UN. The NATO PI function aimed to support the alliance's strategic goals and to help the force commanders achieve their missions.

In Bosnia, the international community transferred the authority of the international military presence from UNPROFOR to IFOR on 20 December 1995. NATO provided the core of this force's 60,000 troops and led the operation that lasted a year until SFOR took over the responsibility. IFOR's presence and mandate in Bosnia was based on the Dayton Peace Accord signed by the former warring parties and representatives of the international community on 10 November 1995.⁷⁸ The military mission's legality and international legitimacy is supported by the UN Security Council resolution 1031 of 15 December the same year. IFOR formed part of a larger international endeavour to oversee the implementation of this peace agreement, and cooperated primarily with the UN, the OSCE, and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to this end.⁷⁹ The international community's overall political goal was and remains a Bosnia that is peaceful, democratic and integrated into Euro-Atlantic political structures, but IFOR's immediate objectives were to bring the hostilities to an end and separate the warring factions (UN Security Council resolution 1031; NATO 2000). In this broad

⁷⁸ Legally, it is more correct to refer to the General Framework Agreement for Peace signed in Paris on 14 December (see, for instance, UN Security Council resolution 1031). Nonetheless, in order to facilitate reading this study shall refer to it as the Dayton Peace Accord, since it is by this term this Bosnian political settlement is known in public parlance.

⁷⁹ On further details of IFOR PI political and legal context see Wentz (1997b: 9-34), Siegel (1998: 9-34), and Thompson and De Luce (2002).

context, the number of PI billets allocated to IFOR's own staff was less than 200. In addition, some national contingents brought their own PIOs.

On 12 June 1999, KFOR entered the Serbian province of Kosovo, after the conclusion of NATO's air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereafter simply Yugoslavia or Serbia). KFOR's presence was based on the Military Technical Agreement between Yugoslav and NATO Commanders on 9 June and UN Security Council Resolution 1244 the following day. NATO provided the major part of the 46,000 KFOR troops and was in charge of the mission. KFOR formed part of a broader international reconciliation effort led by the UN and tasked to facilitate a process that is to determine Kosovo's political future – basically how politically independent the province shall be *vis-à-vis* Yugoslavia. Until that is settled, KFOR's primary objective is to establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo (UN Security Council resolution 1244).⁸⁰ In 2001, KFOR PI staff amounted to approximately 100 (Idsøe 18/2/2004).

IFOR and KFOR are thus NATO's primary means to contribute to the accomplishment of international goals in Bosnia and Kosovo respectively. These military missions are under the command of a force commander. IFOR's Force Commander (COMIFOR) was first the American Admiral Leighton Smith and later Admiral Lopez. The Force Commander in the first KFOR mission (COMKFOR 1) was the British General Jackson, while the Norwegian Lieutenant General Torstein Skiaker held the position as COMKFOR 5.

⁸⁰ On the legal and inter-organisational context of KFOR PI activities see Mertus and Thompson (2002).

To carry out their tasks force commanders have a variety of functions. Generally, the most important military functions are seen to be the land, air and sea operations.⁸¹ In addition, they possess a broad variety of assets, including PI. The subsequent six illustrative cases aim to demonstrate how NATO used PI in the Balkans. These will serve as a source of empirical examples used for analytical purposes in the remainder of the study.

2.1 Six illustrative cases

The presentation commences with two cases from IFOR – one is IFOR’s general PI mission, the other is a specific PI campaign in the run-up to Bosnia’s national elections. Then follow two PI undertakings during KFOR 1. The first occurs during a chaotic entry phase, the second is a measure to deter Serbia and reassure Kosovars. Finally, two cases from KFOR 5 show how PI was used respectively to facilitate Serbia’s peaceful re-entry into the Presevo valley and to convince Macedonia’s public that KFOR allowed no armed groups to enter their country.

It follows from the cases that PI operated in a common operational framework and applied similar methods to achieve their objectives. This common mode of operation is explored afterwards. At the cost of slowing the flow of the presentation initially but with the benefit of clarifying points made and reducing repetitions at a later stage,

⁸¹ In this thesis, these assets will be referred to by the common term Operations. This is spelled with initial capital to indicate that it is the appellation of a military function and not to be confused with the more common use of the term referring to an activity. Following the same logic, all other NATO functions, for instance PsyOps, and job titles, for instance Political Advisor, will have initial capitals.

reference is made in the text to relevant issues that are elaborated on below. We can now embark on the first case.

2.1.1 Case 1: IFOR – The PI mission

According to Van Dyke, who was IFOR's CPIO, this NATO missions' operational plan (see 2.2) to influence the Bosnian peace process was divided into five phases:

1. Preparation.
2. Entry.
3. Implementation.
4. Transition to peace.
5. Exit.

The PI plan was synchronised to these phases and aimed at reinforcing the desired force posture in each of them (Van Dyke 2003: 17). For instance, in the initial preparatory phase NATO was concerned that the populations of all member states should favour IFOR's deployment to Bosnia. Since this was meant to be a NATO-led coalition force and since NATO's decisionmaking process is based on consensus, it was of crucial importance to ensure that all allied governments supported the operation. Otherwise, NATO would be unable to lead IFOR.

Early in the planning, IFOR PI therefore identified states where public support could not be taken for granted. Van Dyke recalls, for instance, that in late 1995 'many people in the US didn't see what was in the national interest of the US to deploy' (Van Dyke 13/4/2004).⁸² So PI considered how they could contribute to the US public's

⁸² Sobel (1998) disagrees on this point, arguing that it was the media, not the US public, that was generally reluctant to deploy US troops to Bosnia. He points to opinion polls suggesting that the American people approved President Clinton's policy to send troops to IFOR. This concern is directly

understanding of its administration's Bosnia policy.⁸³ Much more controversial, however, was Germany's deployment to IFOR. The country had not engaged its military forces abroad since WW II:

So the political leaders in Germany with the help of NATO had to inform the German citizens of what that mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina was about and how the German nation would contribute. And hopefully make them understand, which would then result in support and cooperation (Van Dyke 13/4/2004).

The reluctance of some NATO member governments to deploy troops derived from fear that they might become a party in the conflict.

So they wanted to portray us as a peaceful force. We are helpers. We are not the enemy. We are not an occupation force. We are leaders in that we have a leading part in this operation. We are helping them reconstructing their nation but only helping. We are not rebuilding the nation for them (Van Dyke 13/4/2004).

With this political guidance COMIFOR entered the second phase, that is, the deployment phase. He did not want to use physical force unless absolutely necessary. Rather, he wanted to deter violence by demonstrating IFOR's military capabilities and his willingness to use them if need be to ensure the provision of the Dayton Peace Accord. So COMIFOR set out to shape the operational environment, among other things, by making the Bosnian population as receptive to IFOR as possible. He wanted

connected to Western governments' alleged sensitivity to a so-called Vietnam syndrome and to safeguard that they have the political support of their electorates to conduct military campaigns to a successful end-state (see footnote 4).

⁸³ Strobel (1997: 214-16) describes President Clinton's general efforts to mobilise public support for this issue.

to reduce the risk that the warring parties or the local population should challenge IFOR based on misunderstandings of the latter's intentions and mission.

To this end, Dayton was cardinal. This peace agreement formed an ethical and political framework for Bosnia's reconstruction and assigned legal roles to international organisations such as NATO. It was only when the agreement was properly understood by the people concerned, however, that international bodies could use it as a point of reference to achieve people's cooperation and compliance (Van Dyke 13/4/2004).

COMIFOR did not leave it to the various Bosnian parties to inform others about their achievements at Dayton but made it a task for his PI function. He used PI as a pedagogical tool in an overall strategy with the specific goal to make good relations with the public. 'We had to inform them [the local population] about who IFOR was and what the peace agreement was all about, so we would teach them by communicating through the news media to the publics' (Van Dyke 30/3/04). Thus, PI spelled out that Balkan's political leaders had given NATO the task of ensuring the implementation of the military provisions of the agreement, by which, for example, certain types of weapons had to be put into NATO-supervised storage. Moreover, within the first days of the second phase, PI had the agreement translated into the local languages and distributed throughout Bosnia (Van Dyke 13/4/2004).

Further, as a measure of deterrence COMIFOR wanted the parties to perceive the incoming troops as extra-ordinarily forceful compared to the previous international military presence in the country – UNPROFOR. This UN peacekeeping force had a reputation of being weak and inefficient, 'so we had to do things that turned that around

to show that NATO was a different force, it was the right force for the future, and for that kind of operation' (Van Dyke 30/3/04).⁸⁴

Although the war had reached a diplomatic end when IFOR deployed, peace had not returned to Bosnia. Criminal and violent acts were still committed by all parties. So during the entry phase, IFOR did a variety of things 'to ensure compliance' with the Dayton Peace Accord as stipulated in the UN Security Council resolution 1031 (see 2). PI used these opportunities to convince the parties that IFOR was an overwhelming force. This included dividing the former warring factions, disarming them, dismantling checkpoints to provide freedom of movement, and a broad range of other activities that aimed to send the message that IFOR was different from UNPROFOR (Van Dyke 17/3/04).

At this early stage PI was basically trying to multiply the effect of Operations' undertakings by exposing them in the media. It did not possess the detailed PI-planning that characterised later undertakings. The destruction of checkpoint Sierra is a case in point. As Van Dyke (30/3/04) explains:

We realised checkpoint Sierra was a problem and within a day or two we realised that we needed to knock this down; and let's invite the journalist to come and cover it. So this was not a long-range plan. It was one of the fairly spontaneous things that we did to demonstrate IFOR's capability.

This is not to suggest that the PI effort was arbitrary. It is to stress, however, that it was not yet formalised. The CPIO had, in his own words, 'a fairly good idea' about what PI should do. Prior to deployment he and COMIFOR had identified certain symbols of

⁸⁴ Avruch et al. (1999: 43) make the same point.

power that the former warring parties had used to incite conflict such as politically controlled media, police forces, checkpoints, etc. Allegedly, it was a dream of many a Bosnian Serb boy to get a checkpoint. IFOR wanted to eliminate such symbols of war and replace them with symbols of peace to show people that the conflict was a past stage and that now they could rebuild their country.

PI addressed the problem of politically controlled journalists by opening IFOR PICs around the country, and by bringing in journalists to workshops teaching them Western style journalism. The International Police Task Force trained the local police forces in the conduct of democratic policing. By bulldozing checkpoints IFOR troops showed in actual practice, on the ground, that the general public now enjoyed freedom of movement. The task of PI in all this was primarily to expose this multitude of endeavours in the media, to reinforce their impact beyond those directly experiencing IFOR's activities (Van Dyke 30/3/04). As IFOR gained *de facto* control in Bosnia the entry phase reached its end.

The next phase – the implementation phase – addressed the provisions of the long-term elements in the peace agreement. That is, the establishment of peaceful and democratic political institutions. This was a civilian rather than a military task. IFOR's role was to prevent violent groups from undermining this democratic process, while the responsibility of international civilian agencies was to assist Bosnians in building their own democratic structures. Consequently, the Office of the High Representative, the UN and the OSCE took charge of the overall responsibility for the international effort to bring peace to Bosnia. PI sought to convey this strategic change by directing the media's attention to the civilian agencies and by toning down IFOR's role in the peace process.

In practice, this was reflected, to take one example, in the conduct of the daily press briefings. Since the very early stage PI proposed that the major international organisations should hold common briefings to signal broad unity in the peacebuilding effort. The organisations agreed. Initially, IFOR hosted and chaired these meetings with the press. As they entered this third phase the civilian organisations took the chair, conveying the subliminal message that now the civilian reconstruction was in focus and that from now on they were spearheading the international effort in Bosnia. IFOR's spokesperson consequently took a subordinate role (Van Dyke 17/3/04).

Thus, the PI campaign targeted three audiences – NATO's publics, the Bosnian population and the warring parties – with three overall objectives. First, PI should use IFOR as a show case to make the international publics appreciate that NATO had adapted to the new security context emerging after the end of the Cold War. Quoting NATO's planning documents, Van Dyke (2003: 18) holds that PI should project IFOR as 'the political personification of "NATO's new attributes"' – that is with "effective, functional" and adaptive capabilities' – and as a new NATO working 'with new "partners for noble ends"'.⁸⁵ Second, the PI campaign should distinguish IFOR from failed peace missions of the past and present IFOR as 'the right instrument' to give peace a chance in Bosnia (Van Dyke 2003: 18). This required balancing IFOR's identity between two potentially conflicting characteristics: peaceful and forceful. Third, PI should project IFOR as a 'helper and a leader'. It should help the parties to establish a democratic state and it should lead when they failed (Van Dyke 2003: 19).

⁸⁵ In broad terms these ideas can be found in NATO's (1991) Strategic Concept. See also Cooper (2004: 57) and Frantzen (2005: 58-82). Further, Sandberg and Windmar (1998: 4) present IFOR as an element in a broader strategic effort to create a new identity for NATO and emphasise the significance of NATO's cooperation with Russia to the general state of international affairs.

To achieve this PI engaged the rhetorical constraints of the term ‘military’, that according to Van Dyke is biased in public perception by connotations to authoritarian bureaucracies, untrustworthy and averse to publicity. This had to be changed to achieve IFOR’s objectives in Bosnia, so ‘NATO sought to construct the image of a large military force that would cooperate with civilian institutions, allow their activities to be seen and reported publicly, and strive to earn public trust and confidence’ (Van Dyke 2003: 17).

Sustaining his point with elements from the operational plan and press briefings from the time, Van Dyke holds that PI succeeded in this task: ‘The news media contributed to the construction of a credible IFOR. However, NATO records demonstrate that IFOR employed a carefully planned public information strategy to influence this construction’ (Van Dyke 2003: 14).⁸⁶

2.1.2 Case 2: IFOR – Bosnia’s national elections

The next case demonstrates PI activities prior to Bosnia’s national elections, which took place in IFOR’s fourth phase (see 2.1.1). It shows a slightly different PI approach from the previous case. The overall purpose remained the same, but experiences gained allowed PI to refine its mode of operation. Notably, PI’s synchronisation with other IFOR functions became more standardised (see 2.2.1). Van Dyke (30/3/04) remarks: ‘We kind of invented something as we went along’.

⁸⁶ Siegel (1998: 144) and Badsey (2000b: xxv) have also characterised IFOR’s information campaign as successful. Note that several elements from IFOR’s PI plan were broadcasted in the media report that figures in the introduction’s initial paragraph (see 1).

IFOR realised early on that the national elections would be a very significant milestone in the peace process. It was the first parliamentary elections ever for this young and conflict-ridden state. The OSCE, on behalf of the international community, was in charge of preparing the conduct of the actual election process, but IFOR was responsible for providing a secure environment in which the election could take place. Many, including the media, questioned whether the force could deliver security. Would people dare travel to the ballot boxes? Would armed groups try to jeopardise the elections? In response, IFOR launched a PI campaign to facilitate the election process.

IFOR troops were confident they could secure the physical safety of the political candidates, the voters, the voting places and the main roads leading to the voting places. This confidence, however, would not automatically make people *feel* secure. Hence, people had to be convinced that it was safe to vote if this political milestone event was to be achieved. From this understanding, COMIFOR gave his operational assets the task of providing safety and PI the task of ensuring that the Bosnians actually felt secure.

Van Dyke (17/3/04) recalls:

We needed to convey a sense across the country that it was safe for the people to come to the polling places. And we needed to convey another message to the different audiences that no one should try to interfere with the democratic process. So there were literally two approaches. One was to dissuade any activist from obstructing the process; the other to persuade people to come out to vote.

Two to three months in advance of Election Day, PI began preparations to shape the civilian environment in a favourable manner. It developed a plan spelling out the objectives of the operational undertaking and the tactics to achieve the objective. This comprised a matrix that stipulated the messages PI should stress, and the activities to communicate them. The purpose, content and timing of these activities were

synchronised with Operations and with IFOR's other information outlets through the Joint Information Co-ordinating Committee (Van Dyke 17/3/04. See further 2.2.1 and 2.2.4).

This specific undertaking had three phases: the deployment phase, Election Day, and post-election coverage. The first phase commenced two weeks prior to Election Day. Normally, IFOR had its forces consolidated in certain regions. Two weeks prior to elections, that is during the first phase in this limited campaign, IFOR spread its troops to a much wider territory. The task of providing a secure environment throughout Bosnia demanded IFOR's presence also in remote areas. In the same period PIOs from around the theatre deployed to ground units as well as to headquarters. Their task was to organise media opportunities (see 2.2.5) where reporters gained firsthand experiences from these operational activities to be convinced of the 'message that IFOR would provide a safe, secure environment but at the same time we also send a message that local authorities were responsible for maintaining the civilian law and order' (Van Dyke 17/3/04). For instance, PI invited the media to cover IFOR troops patrolling the roads, transporting ballot boxes, and manning traffic checkpoints. Reporters met a very robust and well-armed force. Soldiers and commanders were available for interviews and the media got an opportunity to spend time with them, much in line with what has been labelled an 'embedded' approach in the 2003 Gulf War (Van Dyke 17/3/04).

The second phase of this campaign was Election Day. As the conduct of the actual elections was the responsibility of civilian agencies, PI's task was to give IFOR a less visible role than the civilians and to project the military force more as a 'helper' than a 'leader'. Now it was the High Representative, the Head of the OSCE mission and other civilian agencies that moved to the forefront, chaired the press briefings and had the primary initiative *vis-à-vis* the press (Van Dyke 17/3/04). A new round of media

opportunities was created to visit the voting places, and IFOR helicopters serving as aerial observation posts offered reporters a seat to get an overview of the situation on the ground. The media could also visit the inter-agency command centre established in Sarajevo for the specific purpose of facilitating a successful outcome of that particular day. This centre gathered representatives from the civilian agencies and IFOR to monitor, co-ordinate and provide guidance to their organisations on a theatre-wide and minute-by-minute basis. These media opportunities aimed to spread the message that the situation was calm and that people could vote in safety.

As Election Day was well over, with practically no occurrences of violent incidents and with a higher voter turnout than anticipated, the second phase was concluded.⁸⁷ The final phase was partly a contingency plan for how to deal with violent episodes, should they occur, and partly a plan for the expected successful outcome. Thus, the latter plan was adopted, which basically consisted in handing the responsibility for post-election coverage to the civilian agencies. From then on it was the head of the OSCE and the High Representative that featured in the media to inform the public about election results and what they meant for the future of Bosnia, and elaborate on other relevant aspects of the outcome (Van Dyke 17/3/04).

PI conducted a media content analysis of 500 international and local media's coverage of the Bosnian election. The study commenced well in advance of Election Day and ended some days after. The purpose was to identify changes in the media's bias both towards IFOR and towards whether elections would be conducted as intended by

⁸⁷ Thompson and De Luce (2002: 207) criticise the election process. They do not mention the security dimension of the undertaking, however, but hold that the OSCE should have shaped the content of the political campaigning prior to elections to avoid that nationalist parties would win.

Bosnian and international authorities. The analysis showed that in the weeks running up to elections there was a marked increase in positive stories both about elections and NATO. Remarkably, the change correlated with the beginning of the IFOR PI campaign (Van Dyke 17/3/04).

2.1.3 Case 3: KFOR 1 – KFOR is in control

KFOR entered Kosovo on 12 June 1999 after the conclusion of NATO's air campaign against Yugoslavia. KFOR's first phase lasted a week and aimed at supervising the separation of Yugoslav armed forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) inside Kosovo and ensuring that all the former's forces withdrew to the Serbian side of the zone of separation.⁸⁸ Once that was achieved and KFOR had *de facto* control in Kosovo, it would hand over the overall responsibility for the international endeavour to UNMIK and move to phase two. The present case outlines how KFOR's PI mission supported COMKFOR to achieve this.

As in IFOR, also the KFOR PI function generally followed the mission's overall phases. Consequently, while COMKFOR instructed his operational assets to ensure *de facto* control in Kosovo, he gave Clifford, his CPIO and personal spokesman, the main responsibility to convey exactly that message. Thus, during the first week PI's task was to convince people that KFOR controlled the security situation in Kosovo and that NATO was subordinated to the UN mission in the province. Clifford (27/4/2004)

⁸⁸ The Military Technical Agreement article I.3.e. denotes this as the Ground Safety Zone. Referring to the same geographical space this study applies the term the zone of separation since it better conveys the zone's function. This was a five kilometres wide demilitarised strip of land separating the Province of Kosovo from the rest of Serbia and installed to reduce the risk of clashes between the armed forces of Yugoslavia and KFOR. It was part of the agreement that Serbian authorities would regain *de facto* control over the zone once the North Atlantic Council deemed this feasible.

explicitly presents KFOR's master messages during this initial phase as 'KFOR is not an invader; KFOR is not a liberator', 'KFOR is in control', and 'KFOR is subordinated to UNMIK'.⁸⁹

KFOR's PI plan focused primarily on gaining the support of the Kosovo Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians, including the refugees, but aimed at the populations in Macedonia and Serbia as well. The CPIO identifies the publics of NATO nations and troop-contributing countries as the strategic targets but sees the task of enhancing their understanding and support as belonging to the NATO nations themselves and its Office of Information and Press in NATO headquarters. Positioned at theatre level, he considered this task beyond his domain. Rather, KFOR operated with the tacit understanding that strategic success would be most difficult to achieve without success at the tactical level. This demanded the cooperation of the people in Kosovo, an achievement to which PI was a key, according to the CPIO. So although KFOR PI's primary attention was towards the local population in Kosovo, it always approached these targets in a manner that would sustain, not undermine, efforts at the strategic level of NATO (Clifford 27/4/2004).

Prior to entering Kosovo, one of the major challenges PI faced was how it could dominate media reports to the extent NATO had done throughout the air campaign. In the previous months the media's access to the province had been severely limited and their reports relied to a large extent on NATO sources. This would change once KFOR entered Kosovo since it would be joined by the thousands of international reporters who

⁸⁹ Prior to 12 June, the message had been: 'Serbs troop out; NATO troops in; refugees back' according to Campbell (1999: 31), Shea (2001: 202), and Clifford (27/4/2004) who were all key figures in this endeavour. See also Halberstam (2002: 476).

would see for themselves and report their firsthand experiences to a worldwide audience. In this situation the task for KFOR's CPIO was in his own words to 'regain the initiative' (Clifford 27/4/2004).

KFOR's PI plan identified primarily reporters from the independent media as conveyors of the messages to NATO's target audiences. In order to regain the initiative with regard to how international news portrayed KFOR's role in Kosovo, the plan envisaged, among others, the following undertakings: hourly updates in the Skopje PIC, free and open access to Kosovo to all journalists, PIOs in media focal points, CPIO-updates to the Skopje PIC, COMKFOR press conference at Pristina airport on 12 June, KFOR/UN press conference in Pristina press centre on 14 June, and a formal hand-over from KFOR to UNMIK as soon as possible (Clifford 27/4/2004). The next paragraphs outline the implementation of each of the envisaged tasks stipulated above.

Hourly updates in Skopje PIC

On 11 June 1999, some 3,500 international journalists had registered with NATO to enter Kosovo. However, PI preferred these journalists to remain in Skopje for a few days to allow KFOR to enter Kosovo alone. PI tried to achieve this by running KFOR's primary media updates from Skopje. KFOR did not know what they would face when entering the war zone but thought that being accompanied by various categories of civilian international actors could complicate matters. Although the Military Technical Agreement was signed and Serbian forces were withdrawing from Kosovo, they were still in the province and their tensions with KLA remained. Moreover, there is only one main road from Macedonia into Kosovo. Moving KFOR together with journalists and other international actors to Pristina on that same road and at the same time was expected to add to the logistical difficulties.

Hence, PI planned for and informed reporters that most of the initial briefings was going to be conducted in Skopje. Moving into Kosovo the CPIO would on a regular basis telephonically update the Skopje PIC. He would tell them, for example, whether the plan of disengaging KLA and Serbian forces was running according to schedule, and how the Serbs were managing their withdrawal. This idea did not work. According to the CPIO (Clifford 27/4/2004), no one wanted to remain in Skopje: 'All the journalists wanted to be where the action was'.

Free and open access to Kosovo to all journalists with no constraints apart from information that could put in jeopardy troop safety and operational security

In line with the 4th and 5th PI goal the media had free access to Kosovo (see 2.2.1).

There were no NATO pooling system of journalists – with one exception, which will be mentioned in the quote below. However, nations were free to offer pools and journalists were free to accept the offer.

Combining this policy with the desire to reduce logistical obstacles, KFOR included in their military movement plan the broad scope of international actors with interests in Kosovo – from KFOR, to international organisations, NGOs and the media. This did not produce the desired result. According to the CPIO (Clifford 27/4/2004):

Trying to explain this to journalists who are by nature anarchic was impossible. I said: 'Look, if you turn up there at these four road junctions, as the package moves forward there will be a place for you to slot in behind'. Of course it all fell to pieces. They all tried to be in the same place, which was in the front, at the same time. They were all fighting each other. And I remember there was one interview being done with a chap who had been sitting at the Belacevac crossroad for about six hours saying: 'We have still got nowhere further forward. There has obviously been a hold-up and the whole advance has stalled'. Which of course was absolutely rubbish. It just meant that there was a traffic jam at Belacevac up

country . . . One thing we did do was having small media pools specifically for this event where journalists couldn't get there themselves. And we flew them in by helicopter to front line troops, or as far as we could get to the front line troops bearing in mind that we still weren't sure we were going to be caught up in somebody else's battle. So we flew people up, which helped. So the people at the front said: 'No it is all going very well'.

PIOs in media focal points

The PI plan envisaged the positioning of PIOs in places of media focus. National spokespersons for each of the troop-contributing nations should be allocated at the Skopje PIC to answer questions from their national media or questions with regard to their troops. The major reason was that national contingents should be responsible for their national journalists. KFOR PIOs could speak only on KFOR's behalf, not on behalf of other nations. In the same vein, the plan stipulated that each national contingent going into Kosovo should have their own PIOs. In addition, to have someone to speak for NATO in each of the four multinational brigades that constituted its mission in Kosovo KFOR should have its own PI team in each brigade. This arrangement was supposed to allow a journalist following the French company coming in from Kumanovo, for example, to speak not only with France but also with NATO.

This plan did not work, however, because PI resources were not allocated in time. The reason was primarily political. Presenting those difficulties gives a sense of the context in which such military missions are conducted.

In legal terms, KFOR only existed as of 10 June 1999. That is two days prior to its arrival in Kosovo. The international military presence in Macedonia deployed for the situation in Kosovo was not in a formal sense a NATO force. Rather, it was a group of various contingents from NATO nations each with a bilateral arrangement with the

host government. This was a result of NATO restrictions on establishing a force without authorisation from the North Atlantic Council by means of an activation order. The North Atlantic Council was not willing to give that order prior to a UN Security Council resolution. The UN Security Council in turn could not agree on a resolution without consent from the Yugoslav government, and that consent, in a legal sense, only came with the Military Technical Agreement on 9 June. The bottom line for PI was that they got resources from NATO only right before KFOR moved into the Kosovo.

This was too late, however, to allow arriving PIOs to catch up with the task and be of much use in KFOR's initial phase. So for all practical purposes, KFOR's PI staff consisted of seven officers from the ARRC, which were the CPIO, three majors and three senior staff. The various national PIOs that had supported PI during the months in Macedonia left to run their own national media campaigns as soon as KFOR was to enter Kosovo. So personnel were not available to fill the positions stipulated in the PI plan.

Trying to ensure that the various KFOR contingents disseminated similar messages, the CPIO gave the national PIOs a set of master messages and talking points (see 2.2.3). He could only urge them to include the messages in their national PI plans, since he was in no position to give them instructions. The nations had beforehand refused to submit their PI campaigns to NATO command. The result was that some PIOs used the messages while, in Clifford's (27/4/2004) own words, 'others completely ignored it and some [communicated] almost contradictory'.

CPIO should provide continual telephone updates and interviews

The PI plan envisaged to keep journalists in Skopje constantly updated via telephone by the CPIO in Kosovo. As a result of NATO's above-mentioned inability to provide

resources PI did not have the necessary equipment to keep themselves informed, which severely hampered their efforts to keep others informed. During the first phase, the CPIO and his small staff lived in tents in a bombed-out factory just south of Pristina with only one telephone link to NATO headquarters. Clifford (27/4/2004) recalls the first days of the phase:

I was completely blind from when we ‘pulled the cork out of the bottle’ and they all went off. I had no idea what was going on. I had no communications. The only thing I saw, I had one television set . . . it was rather like . . . rugby. You tie the ball up. You make all your preparations. You know where you are trying to make it land. You take into account the wind, the rain, other factors, low flying birds, and you kick it. Once you have kicked it you have no further control of where it is going to land. It was rather like the same thing. Once we had gone, I had absolutely no control for about 48 hours as to what was happening. I just hoped that people knew what to say and do. And then we would try and make some sense of it.

The master messages of this first phase was: ‘KFOR is in control’. But PI made no attempt to deny that difficulties and incidents occurred throughout the phase. Often, however, they were not informed. So when approached by journalists with specific questions the CPIO would simply refer them to the relevant PICs. Still, he tried to reassure reporters that KFOR was in charge. Although at this very early stage unable to prevent incidents, the CPIO could convey a sense of KFOR dealing with events as they arose.

COMKFOR press conference at Pristina airport

In order to establish credibility around the master message ‘KFOR is in control’, PI had announced in advance that COMKFOR should hold a Press Conference at Pristina

Airport the same day as KFOR moved into the province. The intention was to communicate: 'We are here. We are in charge. That's it' (Clifford 27/4/2004).

The CPIO ordered an American major to go to Pristina airport with a small PI team and organise COMKFOR's press conference:

And I don't know how he did it. He was in the front in his little white car with his pistol and his loudspeaker system, and his press stuff, with a . . . broadcast van that we had commandeered because we said: 'Look we will get you to these three places'. It was a hub so all the journalists could plug into this. The idea was that while the PI-team organised the conference, the van should provide the technical facilities allowing journalist to send their story back home.

KFOR had not reckoned with Russian forces taking over control of Pristina airport the day prior to KFOR's arrival, however. Yet, Russia exploited a window of opportunity that arose, when NATO accepted Yugoslavia's demand not to enter Kosovo the first 24 hours after the signing of the Military Technical Agreement.⁹⁰ The Russian contingent was part of NATO's SFOR mission in Bosnia and simply painted the letter K over the S on all labels on their vehicles before entering Kosovo through the Bosnian entity Rpublica Srbska. This created initial confusion and tension between NATO and Russia.

From a PI perspective it was a challenge to efficiently communicate on the one hand that NATO did not want Russia to go it alone in Kosovo, while on the other hand emphasising that NATO wanted Russia to be part of KFOR. At the tactical level the

⁹⁰ It is questionable how co-ordinated the decision to take control over Pristina airport was within the Russian government. Levitin (2000: 138), who is a research fellow at the Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, and who worked with Balkan-related issues within the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1990 to 1999, argues that the decision was taken by the military general staff without consulting the foreign ministry.

unexpected Russian presence at the airport created an immediate problem for the American PI major and his team. They had to get through, not only the Serbian but also the Russian military lines to carry out their assigned task. By means unknown to the CPIO they managed.

Other factors added to the difficulties of conveying the master message. Although the PI team was now in the airport the Russians did not support the idea of COMKFOR's press conference taking place in an area they claimed to control. For this reason the Russians prevented journalists from entering the airport. So most of the attending journalists had been helicoptered in by KFOR. Those who were present, however, had a hard time hearing COMKFOR since the Russians were driving their vehicles at full speed to drown every word he pronounced. Moreover, essential PI press conference equipment, such as the loud speaker system, could not be used because the generator did not work. Even the weather worked against KFOR. It was a rainstorm and freezing cold.

Considering the content of the master message PI aimed to convey, the CPIO concludes displeased: 'We did it, but it was not a success. It didn't come over quite that, unfortunately'.

KFOR/UN press conference in Pristina press centre

The other master message PI was tasked to convey was that 'KFOR is subordinated to UNMIK'. The tactics applied to accomplish this was to stage a full press conference with COMKFOR and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Pristina on KFOR's third day in Kosovo. The purpose was to show a rapid and complete integration between the international military and civilian authorities in the province. A formal hand-over from KFOR to UNMIK was scheduled to take place

within a few days, so this press conference was a first step to project the subliminal message that in a democracy the military is subordinated to civilian authority.

Again the CPIO had delegated to one of his staff to carry out this event. The first task was to set up a proper press centre with power, lights, the kind of equipment journalist and photographers need to operate and to be connected with their editorial desks in the national capitals. The idea, according to the CPIO, was that KFOR/UNMIK's press conference should send the subliminal message that 'We are here. We are in control. We are in charge. It is a properly joint-up, integrated operation'. He continues: 'There are times . . . [when you do your press conferences] being rugged, covered in camouflage, sitting in a bunker, in a bush, and there are times to be doing it properly' (Clifford 27/4/2004). This was one of the latter occasions.

The PIO in charge of this undertaking drove by car to Pristina with another small team. Assisted by the owners of the Continental Hotel in Skopje, the PIO hired the best place they found in Pristina – a location at the Grand Hotel. With scarce resources PI installed the necessary facilities, including a NATO 'backdrop' behind the podium.⁹¹ All was ready to invite reporters and convince them that the security forces, KFOR, and the nation-rebuilding infrastructure, UNMIK, operated jointly from the very beginning.

Just before the journalists arrived the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Sergio de Mello, who was in charge of UNMIK, entered the room. His first comment was: 'I can't sit there. The UN cannot sit under NATO flag'. With no time left to change the backdrop, COMKFOR had to meet the press alone. After the conference

⁹¹ Backdrop is a term the CPIOs use to describe the background that figures behind the persons or objects portrayed in media images either on the television screen or a still photo.

PI hurriedly changed the backdrop to two flags – the UN's and NATO's side by side.

On this podium KFOR and UNMIK undertook many later press conferences.

As mentioned, KFOR's major task in this phase remained to ensure the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo. Once that was verified, COMKFOR reported up his chain of command that the military phase of the operation was concluded and that the civilian organisations could take over. That same message PI conveyed to reporters, hoping to establish a broad understanding that KFOR was not setting up a military dictatorship.

This concluded KFOR's first phase and called off the air campaign. The second phase began, with UNMIK taking over the responsibility of the international endeavour in Kosovo.

2.1.4 Case 4: KFOR 1 – Show of force

KFOR 1's third milestone event was scheduled to September 1999. That was the transformation of KLA to the Kosovo Protection Corps. The international community demanded that the military organisation KLA be disbanded. Kosovars, particularly those within or sympathising with KLA, opposed this position. In this delicate political situation, Serbia increased the military activity on its side of the zone of separation and Serbian hardliners uttered their wish to reinvade Kosovo. Anxiety rose among the Kosovo Albanians about Serbia's intentions. Kosovo Albanian hardliners exploited this feeling as an argument to reinforce, rather than disband, the KLA as Kosovo's Army.

To forestall an escalation of the situation, KFOR organised a military exercise on the Kosovo side of the zone of separation. This was a show of physical force that had two purposes. It should deter Serbian authorities from any attempt to re-enter Kosovo;

and it should reassure Kosovars that NATO protected them. Thus, Kosovo needed no proper army. To achieve this, PI identified two compatible messages, one to each target group. To the Serbs the message was 'Don't do it'. To the Kosovars it was 'You are safe'.

In an effort to reach the Serbian audiences, PI organised a series of media opportunities on NATO's side of the zone of separation hoping that media reports would reach the targets. KFOR communicated its messages to journalists by giving them first hand experiences with NATO troops training and tanks manoeuvring along the boundary line.

This also served to convince the local population in Kosovo of KFOR's messages and to reassure those along the boundary line that what they were now experiencing in their neighbourhood was a military exercise, not war mobilisation. The major part of such communications with local population was undertaken by PsyOps who have their own means and methods to inform people (see 2.2.4).

One reason for this joint approach was that at the time PI had no reliable means to broadcast messages to the wider parts of Kosovo, since NATO's air campaign had taken out all radio transmitters and television stations a few months earlier. The state of Kosovo's media was still too feeble to be counted on as a channel of message delivery. NATO had begun to re-establish newspapers and broadcasters some of which belonged to the PsyOps troops and PI used them to disseminate their messages. PI would simply tape press conferences or statements from COMKFOR and other relevant officials, fly the tape to PsyOps radio-stations throughout Kosovo and ask them to play it (Clifford 27/4/2004).

The show of physical force happened to coincide with NATO fighter planes flying into Kosovo for the first time since the air campaign. This was a long scheduled exercise to train KFOR troops in target identification. Since the two exercises were conducted simultaneously, and because the fighter planes only reinforced KFOR's messages, PI drew reporters' attention to both (Clifford 27/4/2004).

Although not evidence that PI made the difference, it can be noted that Serbia did not invade Kosovo and that KFOR and KLA's leadership reached the compromise to disarm the KLA and transform it into a civilian organisation named the Kosovo Protection Corps. So in that sense, PI's objectives were achieved.

2.1.5 Case 5: KFOR 5 – Presevo valley

In April 2001, as COMKFOR 5, Lt.Gen. Skiaker, arrived in Kosovo a major issue awaited him on KFOR's agenda: to facilitate Serbian armed forces' return to the Presevo valley. This officially de-militarised valley was used as a safe haven for armed groups. Violent clashes were expected between these and Serbian forces once the latter would enter. Idsøe (18/2/2004), who served as his CPIO, informs that COMKFOR used PI as means to solve that task.

The Presevo valley was situated within the zone of separation. The zone was divided in several sectors. In agreement with the North Atlantic Council, Serbian forces had already entered most of these sectors. But two remained. The most controversial was the Presevo valley. Many Kosovo Albanians lived in this sector, which was also occupied by Ethnic Albanian Armed Groups (EAAGs) who had commenced violent assaults inside Serbia.

COMKFOR initiated the planning process to facilitate the Serbian take-over which he wanted to carry through in a non-violent manner. This posed a double challenge. The most immediate concern was that the EAAGs should refuse to leave and choose to defend themselves with arms. A more general concern was how the broader Kosovo Albanian population would react. COMKFOR had only a vague idea about the extent of popular support the EAAGs enjoyed and wanted to prevent massive demonstrations. The Force Commander considered PI his most relevant asset both to coerce the EAAGs to leave voluntarily and to achieve public acceptance to Serbia's redeployment to the zone of separation (Idsøe 18/3/2004). His four main objectives with the undertaking were to coerce the EAAGs to leave the Presevo valley without resistance; to enhance the Kosovo Albanian public's understanding of KFOR's policy on this matter; to communicate KFOR's resolve; and to deter attacks on KFOR troops.

In line with KFOR's overall PI message (see 2.2.3) and in cooperation with COMKFOR and his command group, PI developed subordinate messages designed to achieve these tactical objectives. PI chose an active policy (see 2.2.2). The immediate task was to inform the parties directly concerned. So the target groups were primarily the EAAGs and the Kosovo Albanian population. The international public remained important but only as a secondary target.

PI synchronised its activities with Operations, which envisioned dealing with the task in three phases. These will be presented in turn, but very briefly, the first aimed to prepare the primary target groups as to what was going to take place, when and why. The second phase concerned the EAAGs' vacation of the sector, and the final phase should transfer authority over the sector to the Serbs and deal with any incidents that might arise as a consequence. The plan focused its resources on activities needed to achieve

the result, but also planned for eventualities in an effort to avoid having the situation develop in undesired directions.

Within this framework, PI's task was to reinforce the effect of each phase by highlighting to reporters KFOR's intentions. PI developed the messages that underscored the idea of the operation and the planned activities. It timed the dissemination of these messages with the planned phases (Idsøe 18/3/2004). To fulfil this task, PI used a variety of techniques including media opportunities, background briefings conducted by high-level commanders, and press statements by COMKFOR (see further 2.2.5).

The first phase commenced with PI disseminating a news release to Kosovo Albanian and international media. The intention was to use the media as a channel to inform the target groups about what was going to happen in the next days ahead. Particularly important was to send the EAAGs two messages: 'Demobilise and leave the Presevo valley as free men' and 'If not, you will be imprisoned' (Idsøe 18/3/2004).

To ensure that reporters properly understood KFOR's intentions with the undertaking before these were disseminated in the media, PI invited reporters to attend background briefings. Journalist were informed that they could use the information but neither quote nor refer to their sources. Here, COMKFOR's deputy and Political Advisor explained to journalist in detail what was going to happen, why it should happen, and which agreements regulated the North Atlantic Council's decision to allow Serbian authorities to re-enter Presevo valley. Moreover, they emphasised the general interests of the Kosovo Albanians in this arrangement (Idsøe 18/2/2004).

It so happened that President Milosevic had been dethroned as Head of State in Yugoslavia just weeks prior to this operation. The new political situation allowed

NATO to liaise with Serbian authorities for the first time since they had terminated the war on 9 June 1999. On 20 May 2001 COMKFOR could therefore meet his Serbian counterpart, Lt.Gen. Krstic, in a tent on the border between Kosovo and Serbia to discuss, among other things, Yugoslavia's takeover of the remaining sectors of the zone of separation (NATO 21/5/2001). After the meeting they issued a joint press statement.⁹² The mere fact that they were able to convene and even issue a joint announcement sent a message not only to the EAAGs and the Kosovars but to the entire international community that the political situation in the region had significantly changed.

Another way to get KFOR's messages into the media was to organise media opportunities. Part of the plan for this undertaking entailed building reception camps for those of the EAAGs that would leave the sector voluntarily, and prisons for anyone arrested after COMKFOR's deadline. PI invited the press to see the construction of those sites and the crossing points where KFOR wanted the EAAGs to enter Kosovo. Reporters saw the places where the former combatants would be received and screened for weapons and uniforms and were reminded of COMKFOR's promise that the EAAGs could leave as free men once they had signed an agreement that they would refrain from taking up arms again. The media also inspected the prisons constructed for this specific operation (Idsøe 18/3/2004). In this way PI strove to have reporters project KFOR's two messages in their respective media, hoping that these would reach the EAAGs in one way or another.

⁹² It was joint in the sense that COMKFOR and Lt.Gen. Krstic agreed on a press statement but they did not arrange a joint press conference. When the Serb General delivered the statement to Yugoslav media, he left out some sentences, whereas COMKFOR presented it in its entirety.

The most important element of the PI campaign was COMKFOR's statement that concluded the first phase. It was drafted by his Military Assistant and Political Advisor and carefully adjusted by a number of staff members including PI, PsyOps, and Information Operations. Some days before it was to be delivered the draft statement was sent up the chain of command for comments. So much importance was attached to the statement that NATO's regional headquarters in Naples called the CPIO as COMKFOR was going down the stairs to meet the press and instructed him to make some revisions. Receiving Naples' inputs, the CPIO replied: 'We do not stop this because you want to change three words. If this is refusal to follow orders, so be it' (Idsøe 18/2/2004).

Beyond the words, the images were also carefully selected. Against which backdrop should COMKFOR appear on the TV screens? The press centre or any other rooms were deemed too dull. The CPIO wanted the circumstances to communicate resolve. He concluded that a determined COMKFOR, in combat uniform, in a hurry, in front of two helicopters, and outside KFOR's headquarters would give the statement the desired weight and bias (Idsøe 18/2/2004).

Thus, COMKFOR met 40-50 reporters next to the headquarters' helicopter site. He opened by saying that he only had a few minutes but wanted to address the media on the matter of the Presevo valley. He acknowledged that the implementation of this part of the Military Technical Agreement might be difficult to understand for the Albanians, before he placed the decision in a broader perspective and explained why Serbia had to re-enter the sector. He moved on to deterring anyone from opposing what was going to happen anyway, and warned that should anyone threaten the safety of his soldiers they were instructed to respond with overwhelming physical force. He concluded the statement by giving the EAAGs the two previously stressed options. They could leave the valley as free men, if they voluntarily came to KFOR's reception centres,

demobilised and signed an agreement with KFOR. Alternatively they would be arrested (NATO 16/5/2001).

After this statement, COMKFOR made himself available for no more than three questions from the press. In a normal press conference, he would answer practically any question that might come, but this press gathering intended to convey the Force Commander's impatience to fulfil the task. The three questions were prepared, in the sense that PI had told three capable journalists that they would get COMKFOR's attention if they had a question for him. The CPIO stresses, however, that the journalists formulated their questions themselves (Idsøe 18/2/2004). Having replied, COMKFOR left by helicopters offering cameramen good images. The media broadcasted parts of his four minutes speech worldwide and presented it as an ultimatum to the EAAGs. This terminated the first phase (Idsøe 18/2/2004).

The second phase lasted for three days and aimed at receiving those EAAGs that were willing to lay down arms. Some 550 arrived in the reception centres, which was just a bit over the expected number. They were screened for military equipment, some arrived with truckloads of arms, handed in their uniforms, signed the agreement that they would refrain from fighting in the future, and were released. Again, PI used this as a media opportunity to convey to the EAAGs still in the sector, to Kosovars and to the broader public that COMKFOR kept his promise. PI hoped this would encourage remaining EAAGs to leave voluntarily. Journalists covered how the EAAGs were well received and allowed to leave. They also projected images of piles of weapons and uniforms being burned (Idsøe 18/3/2004).

The third phase, which commenced after the issued deadline, was designed to deal with potential uprisings inside Presevo valley and more widely in Kosovo. This became

superfluous since practically all the EAAGs had left and Serbian forces entered the sector. One EAAG leader had been killed but allegedly by mistake. Hence, this PI activity was concluded by stories broadcasted worldwide of Albanian guerrillas that gave themselves up and images of their burning weapons, as illustrated by one of the media reports that opened this thesis (see 1). They aimed to convey to the Kosovars and the international community that KFOR remained determined to and capable of promoting peace and reconciliation in Kosovo and in the region in general. Moreover, KFOR had achieved this particular tactical result without firing a single shot (Idsøe 18/3/2004).

2.1.6 Case 6: KFOR 5 – Border control

The last illustrative case to be presented here occurred simultaneously with KFOR's handling of the EAAGs in the zone of separation. It was a response to an escalating rebellion within Macedonia and their authorities' accusations that KFOR allowed Albanian resistance groups to cross the border with military supplies to the rebels. Although KFOR had deployed substantial troops to avoid such and other illegal border crossings, this effort remained unknown to Macedonia's politicians and public. So KFOR's PI function organised a campaign to spread the message that 'KFOR controls the border' and eventually managed to deflate the criticism.

This campaign was more improvised than case 5 above. When KFOR Operations developed their military plans to patrol the border it foresaw no particular PI involvement. It was the Political Advisor that brought to COMKFOR's attention the need to alter Macedonia's increasingly negative perception of KFOR.

In an effort to change this negative trend PI designed a plan with the objective to project KFOR's actual undertakings along the border. The primary target group was

Macedonia's politicians and public, and the secondary target was people in Kosovo and worldwide. The plan was not synthesised with Operations in the same manner as had been the case of the Presevo valley, since their plans were already in effect. Catching up with Operations, PI simply aimed to show what KFOR's border patrols were already doing.

Hence, PI organised media opportunities along the border for reporters from Skopje, Macedonia's capital, and the press corps in Pristina to allow them to see for themselves what KFOR was actually doing. This, however, did not suffice to change the negative KFOR-bias in Macedonia's media.

The Political Advisor suggested that a high-level press statement, like the one COMKFOR delivered in case 5, might be more efficient. Trying this approach, PI developed a statement that should convey KFOR's message. They also prepared several pages of questions and answers for any possible question PI imagined reporters might ask. Under normal circumstances, COMKFOR would have delivered such a statement. His schedule prohibited this, however, and his deputy, Maj.Gen. Filiberto Cecchi received the task. He, on the other hand, was uncomfortable with meeting the press. Therefore, starting a week in advance, people with background in the media prepared him on how to argue KFOR's case convincingly.

Again, the CPIO wanted to find a suitable place for delivering such a statement; a spot conveying the message. A wall would not do as background image on the TV screens. So the press conference room was out of the question. He deemed that in order to convince the audience, the statement had to be delivered where the action was, where border patrols were undertaken. The CPIO took four days to find a satisfactory spot. It was a 1000 meter hill just on the Kosovo side of the border to Macedonia. On a

clear day, reporters would be able to see the Macedonian town of Tetovo, the centre of upheaval, in the southwestern direction. At the bottom of the hill, they would see the border and the border-crossing station on the main road leading from Kosovo to Tetovo. On Macedonia's hillsides, they would see several military positions overlooking the border.

PI organised a media opportunity on that hill. It invited the same press corps and facilitated their transport by bus and 4-wheel drive vehicles. The height was in the area of responsibility of KFOR's Polish battalion, who had manned their position there for that particular day. As reporters arrived, the Poles served them food and beverage. It was a bright day with a beautiful view of the places PI had hoped reporters should be able to see. Looking down they saw by chance several of KFOR's patrols and a helicopter doing reconnaissance. The CPIO insists that except for the Polish troop on the hill, no other tactical undertakings were conducted upon PI's request. All were part of daily routines.

Once the press corps was well installed, PI called Deputy COMKFOR who arrived by helicopter within 10 minutes. His touchdown just 30-40 meter behind the cameramen gave them good images. He delivered his statement that included the message: 'I appeal to those who have chosen the road of violence: it is a road which leads nowhere, the use of violence must end' (NATO 8/6/2001). Thereafter, he made himself available for three questions but only got one. Having answered that he took off and returned to headquarters. The Commander of the Polish battalion then gave the press corps a briefing about the way his battalion controlled the border.

The following morning, PI's media analysis section found a change from earlier weeks in Macedonia's media reports on KFOR. Journalists now commenced to present the

message PI strove to disseminate and turned the trend of negative bias towards KFOR in a more positive direction (Idsøe 18/2/2004; 18/3/2004).

The PI campaign continued. It arranged a background briefing conducted by Deputy COMKFOR, who provided reporters with in-depth and off-the-record information about KFOR's operational activities along the border to Macedonia. Further, PI invited reporters to additional media opportunities with the border patrols. This time, journalists experienced KFOR's night operations and were, for instance, introduced to its night-vision equipment and light rockets. Journalists also witnessed KFOR arresting and confiscating weapons from people trying to cross the border illegally (Idsøe 18/2/2004). By mid-June 2001, that is two weeks after this PI campaign began, criticism of KFOR subsided in Macedonia's media (Idsøe 18/3/2004).

2.2 Press and Information's mode of operation

These six illustrative cases serve to demonstrate the actual practice of PI in NATO missions. Among other things, this empirical account has shown that PI pursued a variety of political and military ends. At one end of the scale it sought to alter NATO's image in the eyes of people worldwide (see case 1), at the other extreme PI was used to demobilise a small armed group (see case 5). We shall now present NATO's mode of operation to fulfil these objectives. First, the plan work that gave PIOs their overall instructions is introduced. This was guided in a general sense by a set of PI goals (see 2.2.1) and intentions (see 2.2.2). The CPIOs' mode of operation also shares other common features. All CPIOs were concerned to have consistent messages (see 2.2.3) and to create unity of effort among troops and international organisations in order to achieve common objectives (see 2.2.4). In addition, they used largely identical ways to

maintain credible relations with the media (see 2.2.5). In Idsøe's (26/3/2004) formulation: 'Everything we do is guided by a plan. It tells you what to do'. This chapter presents the general features of such plans.

Operational plan

NATO refers to these as operational plans. Idsøe (18/3/2004) describes them as script-books, while Van Dyke (13/4/2004) sees them more as organisational manuals. Both agree, however, that at a mission level an operational plan presents the mission, its goals, and, among others, the strategies, phases and tactics to deliver the desired results. It assigns responsibilities to the mission's various assets. That is notably the traditional military functions such as air, ground and sea operations. These *line functions* form the core of a broader category of assets and are traditionally seen as the force commander's instrument to apply lethal force (see 1.1). Moreover, the plan gives guidance to, what is termed, *support functions* such as logistics and medical assistance (see further 2.2.4). PI is generally regarded as a support function, a view the study at hand challenges.

Van Dyke (13/4/2004) adds that an operational plan is also a legal document. It gives a military organisation authority to conduct a mission and stipulates the rules of engagement, which limit the mission's scope and clarify, among many other things, restrictions on the use of physical force.

Within such overall plans IFOR and KFOR had more specific PI plans that identified the audiences whose support NATO desired, the messages it wanted the audiences to understand, the media channels to reach these audiences, and potential problems as well as milestones along the way to public support. Van Dyke (2003: 8) describes these subordinated plans as 'carefully coordinated strategic information plan[s]' to achieve mission objectives.

The plans were guided in a general sense by PI goals and the commanders' intentions with his PI asset. These two features of the military plan work shall now be brought to the forth.

2.2.1 Press and Information goals

The CPIOs present PI's mode of operation as guided by eight PI goals (Idsøe 26/3/2004; Van Dyke 13/4/2004; Clifford 27/4/2004). Some have already been referred to above and we shall return to these goals throughout the thesis. Here, each is briefly presented and its rationale explained.

1st PI Goal: Enhance public understanding of and support to NATO's policies

PI's primary goal was to enhance public understanding of and support to NATO's policies. It therefore holds a cardinal position in the present study that aims to explore the purpose of PI. It may be seen as PI's *raison d'être*, deriving from NATO's idea that:

All NATO governments recognise both the democratic right of their peoples to be informed about the international structures which provide the basis for their security, and the importance of *maintaining public understanding and support* for their countries' security policies (NATO 2001: 164. Italics added).

From this point of departure, NATO stipulates:

The overall objectives of the Alliance's press and information policies are to contribute to public knowledge of the facts relating to security and to promote public involvement in a well informed and constructive debate on the security issues of the day as well as the objectives of future policy (NATO 2001: 165).

Thus, PI's primary goal is to inform the public partly because people have a right to know and partly because this shall enhance public support which NATO considers vital.

The latter task points to an overall aim for the PI function that is expressed by

former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Gen. Joulwan: 'NATO is exceptionally dependent upon positive public opinion. Political will to perform any task can never be expected unless the publics are clearly informed and sympathetic to our endeavours' (cited in Clifford and Wilton 2000: 11). In other words, NATO's activities, if not its existence, is conditioned by the support of the electorates within the alliance. From this understanding, PI's primary task becomes to enhance the support of these peoples. As will be shown, this idea formed the rationale of the three CPIOs mode of operation.⁹³

At times, their lines of reasoning follow a logic based on social causation: PI's task was to influence media reports, because media reports influence public opinion, which influences political will to sustain a NATO mission (Clifford and Wilton 2000: 13, 20; Idsøe 26/3/2004; Van Dyke 13/4/2004). This understanding of the PI function's purpose has bearings on the CNN-effect (see footnote 9), which is clearly expressed in Idsøe's (26/3/2004) formulation that 'it is their [the media's] projections that enter people's minds'. He continues: 'If it hadn't been for the media, NATO would probably never have been in Bosnia and Kosovo. It was the way it portrayed the wars and the horrible images that influenced politicians to decide to deploy NATO forces' (Idsøe 26/3/2004).⁹⁴ Van Dyke (13/4/2004) adds:

It is logical to assume that in order for a nation to supply the deployment of its military forces the public has to support whatever policies the political leaderships have adopted. Otherwise you can undermine a nation's will to deploy those military troops.

⁹³ Siegel (1998: 2) accords with reference to the cases of IFOR and its proceeding mission. More generally, the importance of public support for Western governments' ability to sustain military campaigns is widely supported in the academic literature (see footnote 4 and 1.5).

⁹⁴ Conversely, Vickers (2000: 56) and Collins (2000b: 42) argue that policy-makers used such images to mobilise public support for the bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999.

In the same vein, Clifford asserts:

The aim of [NATO's] information campaign was to seize and maintain the initiative by imparting timely and effective information . . . It was based on the principle that information was a major lever . . . and that it was to defend IFOR's "centre of gravity", which was deemed to be world opinion and the outcome of the IFOR mission (Clifford and Wilton 2000: 14).

This idea of public opinion as NATO's 'centre of gravity' is further reflected in Idsøe's (26/3/2004) statement: 'PI must show what NATO does. A few years ago, some argued that NATO should adapt to the new challenges or cease to exist'.

The other important audience is the public in theatre - the local targets, as they are termed in this thesis. These were deemed capable of affecting operational success or failure on the ground, which again could have a spill-over to the strategic level. Clifford (27/4/2004) explains:

Tactical success or failure is the people on the ground – the locals, the insurgents. We want people to work with us not against us . . . Occupying armies throughout history has wasted huge amounts of manpower against the local population. We needed to work with the local populations. They wouldn't blow apart bridges. They wouldn't put roadblocks in front of our gates. They wouldn't put parcel bombs or car bombs . . . We didn't want that to happen. So the key target audience was the local ones, at my level.

In other words, the 1st PI goal did not only refer to people in NATO member states, although these were PI's strategic concern. It encompassed the local peoples in the Balkans whose support to, or at least compliance with, the missions was an equally important concern in PI's daily duties. Keeping them on NATO's side was a necessity to ensure the force commanders' freedom of action in their area of responsibility (Clifford and Wilton 2000: 20).

Based on this understanding, PI aimed to make these targets understand and support the military missions' legitimacy and purpose (Clifford and Wilton 2000: 11; Idsøe 26/3/2004; Van Dyke 13/4/2004). This included endeavours to alter media portrayals that ran counter to NATO's messages (see case 6).

2nd PI goal: Provide accurate, complete, and timely information

This goal basically instructs PI to be truthful and is seen as a condition to establish and maintain credible relations with the press (Idsøe 8/6/2004. See 2.2.5).⁹⁵ Van Dyke (13/4/2004) adds 'we had to maintain our credibility with the press, otherwise we would lose that channel of communication and then it would become much more difficult to communicate with the audiences'. In other words, PI could not achieve its 1st goal without having the trust of reporters. The importance of being truthful is reflected in Clifford's (27/4/2004) statement with regard to NATO's PsyOps function: 'If they are caught with lying then their messages loses credibility. So we are all conveyers of information – not disinformation'.

3rd PI Goal: Co-ordinate with PsyOps and CIMIC

NATO had three functions which primarily used information to communicate with its targets: PI, PsyOps, and CIMIC. In order to have NATO speaking with one voice and avoid that its various assets disseminated different or, even worse, contradictory information, this goal envisaged a co-ordination of the three activities (Van Dyke 13/4/2004; Clifford 27/4/2004; Idsøe 26/3/2004. See further 2.2.4).⁹⁶

⁹⁵ Siegel (1997: 170) confirms the importance NATO attaches to this goal. More generally, the crucial significance of this goal is supported by Pickup (2000: 160) and Armistead (2004: 203).

⁹⁶ Again, the validity of this goal in NATO's mode of operation is confirmed by Siegel (1998: 115-142).

While agreeing on the need of co-ordinating an operation's information assets, the three CPIOs disagree on the level of co-ordination. Practical demands of efficient communication spur Clifford (27/4/2004) to favour a close co-ordination between the three functions' outlets of information. Idsøe (26/3/2004) and Van Dyke (13/4/2004) are cautious that this not compromise the 2nd PI goal. They argue that in public imagination PsyOps connotes manipulation and deception, and if PI is not clearly separated from PsyOps they believe, reporters would increasingly seek information from other sources. As a consequence, a force commander would lose his most important means to achieve the 1st PI goal.

4th PI goal: Establish a free and open press reporting policy; use press pools only when necessary

The 4th goal that guided PI's activities aims to maintain credible relations with the press, deemed of cardinal importance to accomplish the 1st goal. It is an invitation to allow the media to evaluate without restrictions the missions' achievements; to show that NATO had no hidden agenda in the Balkans and worked, as it said, to create a safe environment for people in Bosnia and Kosovo (Idsøe 8/6/2004).

All CPIOs refer to the open media policy as a result of the lessons learned from the 1991 Gulf War, and particularly the controversial media pools.⁹⁷ Moreover, a restrictive

⁹⁷ The policy on media pools generally limited journalists' freedom of movement, demanding that they be accompanied by military escorts, and sustained a stereotypical perception of military organisations as secret and manipulative. Van Dyke, who himself was involved in censoring reporters' pool products during the 1991 Gulf War, explains: 'It is part of the right to belong to a pool, that you have to submit your pool products to a military officer for review. And after we had reviewed the products we would determine if there was anything classified that might be reported. If so, then it had to go through a process of remission, where you had to try to convince the reporter to take the stuff out of the story. If media disagreed we needed to refer the issue to the US Department of Defence, so they would make a decision about what to release. And again this was all viewed by the media as just a way to control and to censor

media policy would stand out in contrast to the democratic ideals the international community strove to promote in the Balkans (Van Dyke 13/4/2004).

5th PI goal: Grant the media access to all operational activities and release all information, within the limits of operational security and troop safety

The 5th goal is closely linked to the one just presented and likewise aimed to create credible relations with the press. However, it added one restriction, the policy should not put into jeopardy the security of the troops or the conduct of future operations (Van Dyke 17/3/04; Idsøe 8/6/2004).

6th PI goal: Exert no control/censorship over press; adopt a policy of 'security at the source'

In the same vein, the 6th goal aimed at protecting the troops and the operation in the context of the free and open media policy. This goal did not refer to the dissemination of information, however, but to preventing reporters from getting access to classified information. This so-called 'security at the source'-policy aimed to eliminate the need for the kind of censorship the media often associate with and dislike about military operations.

their products. So it was not a popular tactic' (Van Dyke 13/4/2004, Idsøe 8/6/2004). Not all officers convey similar negative experiences with the media with regard to the pool policy in the 1991 Gulf War (Duncan 2000: 128-9). Scholars from media studies, on the other hand, generally accord that the policy was unpopular among reporters (Ottosen 1994: 25-34; Knightley 2003: 490-93). Adding to this view, Strobel (1997: 44) holds that contrary to the press corps' attitudes the pool policy generally enjoyed popular support. P. Taylor (2000b: 187-89) accepts that the media was critical to pools, but notes that for all practical purposes most reporters went along with the policy. With regard to the present empirical scope, it was only on exceptional occasions that NATO organised media pools, and then as a facilitative rather than a restrictive measure. For example, when IFOR and KFOR conducted operations in remote areas and the press had difficulties getting there by their own means or in time, NATO could designate, for instance, a helicopter to the press (Van Dyke 13/4/2004; Clifford 27/4/2004; Idsøe 8/6/2004).

In practice, the three CPIOs applied the 4th, 5th, and 6th PI goal by encouraging troops to talk to reporters but without revealing classified information. PI trained everyone from the highest to the lowest level to deal with the media. Among other things, each soldier received a pocket-card stipulating that they could talk within their area of responsibility with reporters, but that they should not speculate, not talk about future operations, not give classified information, nor specific locations of troops (Clifford and Wilton 2000: 27-28; Idsøe 26/3/2004; Van Dyke 13/4/2004).

7th PI goal: Use internal information to inform troops

This goal aimed to qualify ordinary troops to be ‘unofficial spokespersons’ and to keep them motivated, capable and efficient (Van Dyke 13/4/2004; Idsøe 8/6/2004).

8th PI goal: Synchronise and harmonise PI with Operations, Intelligence, Logistics, PsyOps, Political Advisor, etc.

The 3rd PI goal was to co-ordinate with PsyOps and CIMIC. But the 8th PI goal extends co-ordination to include a range of other assets available to a force commander, notably Operations.⁹⁸ The three CPIOs characterise this as an operational innovation, and refer to IFOR as the first time it was applied, at least in a NATO context. Van Dyke (30/3/2004) holds that this idea turned PI into an operational function readily available to force commanders to influence conflicts and as such constituted a revolution in the field of PI. Clifford calls it a ‘turning-point in military-media relationships, [that] sparked a radical rethink of PI and operational media handling in NATO and in many of its member nations’ (Clifford and Wilton 2000: 13). In the same vein, Idsøe (26/3/2004)

⁹⁸ Siegel (1998: 118-22) concurs. Vickers (2000: 62) and Brown (2002b: 43) show how diplomatic and political establishments also direct themselves to co-ordinate their PI campaigns.

asserts that these experiences later became part of NATO's doctrines and henceforth formed part of all PI-planning.

2.2.2 Commander's intentions

The above-mentioned eight goals provided general guidance to the PI function within NATO. In addition, the CPIOs refer to more mission-specific PI instructions from their superior. In the present cases, the directions to the CPIOs were largely identical. Two intentions from their force commanders are particularly relevant here.

Commander's 1st intention: Develop a proactive PI campaign

NATO basically used two PI policies on the dissemination of information an active and a passive.⁹⁹ When PI was active it should do its utmost to get reporters' attention and convince them of NATO's message (Idsøe 18/3/2004). According to Van Dyke (30/3/2004), this proactive policy entailed that: 'We set our public agenda, instead of waiting for someone else to set the agenda for us and force us to react in a defensive manner to the press corps. We needed these active information efforts to promote the public understanding and achieve the broad public support required by NATO'. The proactive policy was also a way to implement the 2nd PI goal of providing reporters with timely information. It facilitated that authority to release information to a large extent was delegated to the local PI and avoided unnecessary delays in processing information to the media. In both operations the PI policy was generally active, as Idsøe (26/3/2004) notes: 'In KFOR 5 we were active, very active, to get our messages out'.

⁹⁹ Siegel (1998: 40-2) confirms this position. From a more general perspective the experienced reporter Strobel (1997: 228-29) strongly recommends that military campaigns should be proactive 'not just defensive. Once on the defensive, it is exponentially more difficult for commanders (or anyone else) to make their case'.

A passive policy implied that PI held a low profile. The posture was more reactive and restricted to answering questions when asked. To ensure consistency of message PI prepared lists with questions and answers in advance. So 'passive' does not reflect the level of activity but describes PI's level of initiative in its relation with the press (Idsøe 18/3/2004).

Commander's 2nd intention: Maintain credible relations with the press

Presenting the 2nd PI goal, emphasis was given to the cardinal importance attached to maintain credible relations with the press (see 2.2.1).¹⁰⁰ The CPIOs perceive this as PI's Achilles' heel. PI could not use the media as a channel to reach its final targets, and thus to accomplish its 1st PI goal, if it did not maintain credible relations with the press.

Idsøe (26/3/2004) asserts: 'If you lose your credibility, you may just as well return home. The media will not believe you and choose other sources of information'.

Journalists that covered the war in Bosnia had multiple sources, often with competing objectives and agendas, on which the journalists could base their stories.¹⁰¹ IFOR could not take for granted that the media would turn to their troops for information. Nor could NATO take for granted that journalists would believe the alliance's version of events.

Van Dyke (13/4/2004) elaborates:

[Credibility] is . . . the most important aspect of communication in today's modern age. Because we have so many channels of communication, people can select from different channels of communication. They can get on the Internet and have endless sources of information to choose from.

¹⁰⁰ Siegel (1997: 170) sustains this assertion and Avruch et al. (1999: 43) point to the high priority force commanders gave this matter.

¹⁰¹ Strobel (1997: 227-30) and Gow et al. (1996b: 7) support this view.

Studies have shown people generally gather news and information from the sources that they trust and deem to be most credible. So if we want to have our information used; if we want to have people to receive information and to use information, the information has to be credible. Once we lose credibility, then our audiences would go to other sources . . . on information about what we are doing. And those sources of information may not be as trustworthy, they may be antagonist, they may be critical, let's say, about the policy to deploy troops to a country. So we have to maintain credible relations with the press. Credibility is vital . . . because if you lose credibility then you can't communicate.

In sum, together with the eight PI goals (see 2.2.1), the commander's intentions defined PI's political and operational framework. Above, the six cases have showed in a general sense how these policies were practised in actual operational activities (see 2.1). Now follows an examination of how these guidelines influenced PI's mode of operation.

The primordial importance the CPIOs attach to the commander's 2nd intention warrants a more detailed presentation of how they performed to maintain credible relations with the press, thus this is explored at length in a separate section (see 2.2.5). The CPIOs' modes of operation also share other features. As will be shown, it was guided by the just outlined policies and intentions (see 2.2.1 and 2.2.2) to have consistent messages (see 2.2.3) and a unity of effort among troops and international organisations to achieve NATO's political and military ends (see 2.2.4).

2.2.3 Message strategy

In order to achieve the vital 1st PI goal (see 2.2.1) NATO formulated a few cardinal messages and gave PI the task of ensuring that relevant target groups understood and supported their content. As the cases illustrate, PI disseminated a myriad of messages adapted to the accomplishment of specific operational tasks, yet these were co-

ordinated in a message strategy that promoted NATO's overall policy.¹⁰² This section addresses how PI organised messages to keep them consistent, in an effort to enhance public understanding of NATO's information and policy.

The CPIOs apply the term *message* to stipulate what NATO wanted the media to convey about an issue. Although NATO had no formal structure for their message (Van Dyke 13/4/2004), the CPIOs refer to the structure in comparable manners but using slightly different terms. Idsøe's three categories of messages are useful to clarify this structure; this shows how the messages were divided and delimits areas of responsibility.¹⁰³ The first category was *master messages*. These derived from the North Atlantic Council and were of a general and relatively long-term nature. The overall master message stipulated the political visions of the missions and reflected how decision-makers wanted to portray the alliance (Van Dyke 13/4/2004). An example is 'KFOR provides a secure and safe environment for all the people in Kosovo' (Idsøe 26/3/2004). Another category of messages was the *subordinate messages*. They supported the content of the visions but addressed more specific military issues. To take one example, case 5 illustrates how COMKFOR dealt with armed groups that challenged the master messages. He wanted the relevant EAAGs to understand two

¹⁰² The importance of disseminating coherent messages is emphasised by a number of practitioners and scholars. With regard to the IFOR case, Siegel (1998: 115) makes this point although she primarily elaborates on the co-ordinating activities necessary to achieve it. The centrality of messages in NATO PI campaign during Operation Allied Force features in Campbell (1999: 31-2), Muirhead (1999), Shea (2001: 202), and Vickers (2000: 61-2). Beyond a NATO context, Leonard et al. (2002: 14-18) and Brown (2004: 21) present the importance diplomatic communities attach to message strategies in their PI campaigns.

¹⁰³ Van Dyke (13/4/2004) follows a similar logic but applies a slightly different categorisation. He uses the term 'theme' much like Idsøe uses master messages, describing a broader issue-area that contains several subordinated messages. To Van Dyke, messages can be directly presented to the media. Idsøe refers to such formulations as talking points. Idsøe's categorisation will be used here.

messages: a) ‘Demobilise and leave the Presevo valley as free men’ and b) ‘if not, you will be imprisoned’. It was the responsibility of the CPIOs to formulate such subordinated messages. At the lowest level in the message strategies were the so-called *talking points*. They aimed to promote the higher-ranking but rather general messages and were specifically formulated to be directly used in interviews, press statements and conversations (Idsøe 18/02/2003; 26/3/2004).

The messages from these three categories formed part of a message strategy that with a variety of formulations promoted a few fundamental ideas. Master messages, subordinate messages and talking points were connected in a system, much like the roots of a tree, all coming together to support one overall master message, one may say – with the risk of taking the analogy too far – to give ‘the tree’s trunk’ extensive support. In sum, this provided NATO troops with a pool of talking points, a common platform from which they could project messages that were consistent and conveyed resolution. In short, it allowed NATO to speak with one voice. The categories – master messages, messages, and talking points – will now be described in more detail.

IFOR had more than a dozen master messages. Van Dyke (2003: 17-19) presents the most important ones as:

- NATO works with new partners for noble ends.
- IFOR is the right instrument to support the Bosnian peace process.
- IFOR is a helper and a leader.¹⁰⁴

KFOR’s master message has already been introduced. Clifford (27/4/2004) presents the very initial messages in the following terms:

¹⁰⁴ NATO (2000) also projects these messages.

- KFOR is not an invader; KFOR is not a liberator.
- KFOR is in control.¹⁰⁵
- KFOR is subordinated to UNMIK.

These eventually developed, and at the time when Idsøe (26/3/2004) was KFOR's CPIO the master messages were:

- KFOR provides a secure and safe environment for all the people in Kosovo.
- Violence has significantly decreased since KFOR has arrived.¹⁰⁶

Although the CPIOs present their master messages in different ways, they basically communicate the same message: IFOR and KFOR provide a safe environment in their area of responsibility. The main difference relates to the different political visions for the peace operations. In Bosnia, NATO's political objective is a democratic state; in Kosovo this issue is not addressed. The reason is that the international community, represented by the UN Security Council, remained undetermined about Kosovo's political status. Legally Kosovo remains a province in Yugoslavia, although most Kosovo Albanians hope it eventually shall gain status as a sovereign state.¹⁰⁷ PI had to balance its messages to maintain the local population's support without supporting their demand of a 'free and sovereign state of Kosovo' (Clifford 27/4/2004).

The concern to portray NATO in a consistent manner did not stop at the point of disseminating messages. PI had media analysis groups that evaluated all local and opinion leading international media. In KFOR 5, this team consisted of 10 people that

¹⁰⁵ This master message was supported by, among others messages, 'KFOR is militarily capable but non-offensive'.

¹⁰⁶ NATO (2005) confirms these two messages.

¹⁰⁷ On this matter see the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000: 259-79).

daily evaluated whether PI's messages were projected in the media as intended. Based on their analysis the CPIOs would decide whether these projections were satisfactory. If not, new efforts – possibly with slightly refined talking points or with different tactics – would be carried out. This undertaking would be routinely repeated for as long as need be (Idsøe 26/3/2004).

Further, it is interesting to note that the CPIOs did not only convey messages in a verbal manner. Non-verbal communication was equally important. The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General's reluctance in case 3 to sit under a NATO banner illustrates the importance skilled communicators attach to what Clifford (27/4/2004) consistently refers to as *subliminal messages*. By this he means information conveyed to an audience in a manner that the latter does not pay conscious attention to.

The CPIOs provide several examples of how they used this feature of social communication. Van Dyke (17/3/2004), for example, explains the choice of IFOR's Coalition Press and Information Centre (CPIC) in the casino of Sarajevo's major hotel – the Holiday Inn – with the interest in having a 'first rate press centre' to communicate the high quality of IFOR and promote the idea that the situation in Bosnia was returning to normalcy. Clifford argues in an identical manner for the choice of the Grand Hotel in Pristina as KFOR's CPIC (see case 3).

Based on the same assumptions, Idsøe took pains to find convenient spots to conduct press conferences: 'It is *so* important where it is said' (18/3/2004. His verbal emphasis). Important meetings with the press were organised to take place in a physical context that conveyed NATO's message. For example, it was no coincidence in case 5 that the CPIO arranged for his Force Commander to be 'on his way' as he delivered a quick statement outside the headquarters before taking off in one of two helicopters placed

just behind him. The undertaking aimed to portray COMKFOR 5's resolution and capability in the eyes of reporters. He explicitly opened his statement by informing the crowd that he only had a few minutes with the press before he had to go on. To cameramen the helicopters provided, according to Idsøe, an irresistible backdrop to the image of COMKFOR giving a forceful statement. Idsøe explains that the same statement in a conference room would have been less convincing. Obviously photographers could have avoided the helicopters in their image but the CPIO explains that cameramen want such backgrounds in their images, simply because it helps them deliver a 'good' story to their editorial desk. After answering three questions COMKFOR went right to the helicopter and left in order 'to give a little extra show' in the words of Idsøe (26/3/2004). It was all arranged by PI for the sole purpose of reinforcing KFOR's message to the armed groups and Kosovo's population.

In this manner the message strategy organised numerous explicit and subliminal messages in a unified and consistent strategy to promote a few master messages that supported NATO's political goals. Moreover, the strategy endeavoured to clarify the alliance's policy, to establish *facts* as NATO troops saw them, and to ensure that the media perceived certain basics and the general situations in the same way as NATO did.¹⁰⁸ This included countering disinformation.¹⁰⁹ These messages were then disseminated from multiple NATO sources in a co-ordinated manner. PI's mode of

¹⁰⁸ The term facts is emphasised here to underline that it shall be used in a subjective, rather than an objective, sense in the remainder of the thesis.

¹⁰⁹ For instance, at some point a local newspaper published a trailer stipulating that next day's edition would reveal KFOR's plans to construct a wall at the bridge in the town of Mitrovica in Kosovo. The bridge was a sensitive political issue at the time. COMKFOR 5's immediate public announcement stating: 'I have no intention to build a wall' deflated the 'news' before the story was ever published (Idsøe 26/3/2004).

operation to co-ordinate its information activities in order to achieve a unity of effort is the topic of the next section.¹¹⁰

2.2.4 Unity of effort

Here, the first part shall address PI's rationale for and form of co-ordination with other NATO-assets and external actors – that is PI's horizontal co-ordination. Then follows a presentation of PI's vertical co-ordination among PI staff down the chain of communication to the brigades, as well as up to NATO headquarters and relevant ministries of defence.

Horizontal co-ordination

The horizontal co-ordination derives directly from the 3rd and 8th PI goals' instruction to synchronise PI with other functions. The CPIOs regard this as a novelty introduced to NATO during IFOR (see 2.2.1).

Previously, PI was seen as a support function along with logistics and administrative assistance. In general terms, this delimited PI's task to informing journalists about what

¹¹⁰ Unity of effort is a NATO term, according to Siegel (1998: 127). In the field of UN peacekeeping the assumption that co-ordination at the highest level is a condition for an expedient PI campaign is similarly shared in the major evaluation of such operations during the 1990s (UN 2000: 25). Cloughly (1996: 59) and Kiehl (2001: 136) echo this view. Pointing to the experience from NATO's Operation Allied Force, Campbell (1999: 33) and Brown (2002b: 44) convey the same point. Referring to the same operation Freedman (2000: 340) comments: 'A situation in which every military move must first be checked with a focus group is a caricature but not so much that it can readily be dismissed'. Did Freedman know that PI staff was involved in choosing the bombing targets, as Vickers (2000) observes? Extending the scope of PI activities to the realm of public diplomacy mentioned in the literature review, Lord (1998) identifies the lack of co-ordination as a major challenge for practitioners. Brown (2003b) comments that a sustained effort to co-ordinate PI activities in a military coalition at the political level of coalition members' capitals, was new when Alastair Campbell introduced it in the War on Terror in 2001. Nonetheless, it resembles endeavours undertaken during IFOR and KFOR. Further, an ambitious co-ordination initiative is found in the 1999 US Presidential Decision Directive 68 that established the International Public Information Co-ordinating Group to ensure unity of effort in the PI activities of the National Security Council, Pentagon, US Information Agency, the US Agency for International Development, and related governmental agencies (Brown 2002b: 43; Armistead 2004: 5).

other functions were doing. In the present cases, however, all three Force Commanders used PI as a line function. They moved PI from the ‘tail’ to the ‘teeth’ to use the army command of language – or in more correct military terms to the line functions; that is, to the operational capacities with which armed forces traditionally have delivered strategic results and which has been regarded as the exclusive domain of those who apply lethal force (see 1.1). With this new operational take, the Force Commanders included PI in the Command group, that is, in the circles of the operational decision-makers, and used PI along with traditional line functions to achieve operational objectives (Idsøe 26/3/2004; Clifford 27/4/2004; Van Dyke 30/3/04).¹¹¹

To illustrate this point, Van Dyke quotes a media report on a staff meeting chaired by Commander of IFOR’s Multi-National Division North, Major General Bill Nash:

Immediately behind Nash are two rows of staff officers. In wartime, the first row would be operational staff providing instant updates on fire support, air support, armour movements, intelligence, and logistics. But this isn’t war . . . Sitting behind Nash instead is a staff more familiar to a big-city mayor: a POLAD [Political Advisor], an expert on civilian relations, representatives of two joint commissions, a public affairs specialist, and a staff lawyer. Traditional war fighters are relegated to the back bench.¹¹²

PI was also closely co-ordinated with Operations in KFOR (Idsøe 26/3/04). Clifford (27/4/2004) points out that at times the two assets were synchronised to the extent that

¹¹¹ Siegel (1997: 180-82) supports this view.

¹¹² Cited in Siegel (1998: 48).

they should be conceived as *perception operations*, by which he means the coherent application of words, images and action to influence target groups' perceptions.¹¹³

In practice, the actual synchronisation of activities was implemented in a variety of ways. As Clifford (27/4/2004) remarks: 'It is difficult to template it. You could have a template on what you ought to try to achieve but how you actually gonna do that differs in time and space and with different personalities'. Still, the three CPIOs share a common understanding of the way they co-ordinated with others. The most important features of this understanding are now set forth, including PI's controversial co-ordination with PsyOps.

The cardinal role of a force commander in a military operation made the CPIOs' relation to him particularly important for the way PI was used in the overall missions. All three CPIOs describe this particular relation in professional and cordial terms. They had free access to their respective force commanders throughout the day but made use of somewhat different routines to ensure that their function sustained his endeavours.

Idsøe's and Van Dyke's arrangements were largely similar. The former's description of the routines is instructive. It commenced each morning with a 15-30 minutes 'COMKFOR's media meeting' that gathered COMKFOR, the CPIO, the spokesperson and the Political Advisor. The standard agenda was a brief on media reports followed by the CPIO's proposals for talking points of the day. These were discussed and decided upon. The meetings helped COMKFOR to prepare his talking points, which he would use when meeting with people throughout the day. It also gave PI directions, which the

¹¹³ This resembles what in the literature is referred to as perception management (see footnote 66).

CPIO would incorporate in the day's PI guidance as 'fresh' talking points. This guidance would then be distributed to other PIOs up and down the chain of communication (see next section). The guidance would also go to other high-level officers in different headquarters functions who frequently used the talking points when carrying out their respective duties (Idsøe 26/3/2004).¹¹⁴

In addition, PI co-ordinated horizontally with various other functions, notably with Operations and Intelligence. At the highest level this was done in the Command Group. It was here that approaches to up-coming tasks were decided upon. Case 2, 4 and 5 show how the CPIOs were involved in discussions on how to achieve the best tactical results. It allowed PI to ensure that Commanders considered how their operational activities might be perceived by different target groups and to suggest how PI might contribute to deliver the desired outcome.

The other dimension of the horizontal co-ordination went beyond the planning process and continued into the actual implementation. The cases show how PI reinforced other functions' impact on targets and achieved tactical results without the application of physical force. In the two first cases, for example, PI and Operations deterred the warring parties from challenging IFOR's troops and the democratic process by clarifying COMIFOR's intentions and exposing his military capability and, if need be, readiness to use it. PI invited reporters to cover, for instance, how Operations dismantled checkpoint Sierra (case 1) and ensured public security prior to Election Day (case 2). In case 4, COMKFOR 1 used PI to deter Serbia from reinvading Kosovo by

¹¹⁴ Van Dyke (30/3/2004) had a largely similar arrangement with his Force Commander, while Clifford (27/4/2004) used informal exchanges of views when the need arose.

ensuring that the media covered NATO's robust military exercise in Serbia's vicinity. Further, COMKFOR 5 used PI to convey NATO's decision to allow Serbian forces to re-enter the Presevo valley and his resolve to suppress any resistance to that decision (case 5). Allegedly, the Force Commanders achieved these objectives by efficient use of their PI function. Since potentially lethal force was not applied to targets in these cases, we may say that PI operated as a *non-lethal enforcement measure*.¹¹⁵

This feature of PI was particularly useful in IFOR and KFOR that were tasked to facilitate peace processes. Had NATO relied on traditional military means, ie physical force, to achieve its military objectives, they could have undermined the overall international effort to build peace in Bosnia and Kosovo that is based on the idea that political struggles shall be fought by non-violent means. As case 1 suggests, NATO governments' reluctance to apply physical force in Bosnia limited the Force Commander's room of manoeuvre. It restricted commanders from using their weapons directly to achieve operational tasks and spurred them to use information instead. This led to a situation where IFOR's ground forces were, in Clifford's (27/4/2004) formulation, not given 'the rules of engagement to use any of its tanks or its guns or its bullets. So the only tool really that the Force Commander had was information'. Van Dyke adds that nor could leaders of former warring factions who sought international acceptance use physical force. As a consequence, they often chose press events over military force to achieve their objectives.

¹¹⁵ Note that others have described information activities as non-lethal weapons. This includes Kuehl (1996: 185), Schwartau (1996: 244), and Siegel (1998: 146-49).

Another novel aspect of PI's role at the level of implementation was that in all three missions PI had a desk in the Joint Operations Centre. This may be seen as the operational 'nerve centre' that receives information from all forces in theatre and is, within certain limitations, authorised to react immediately upon it. The PI desk was manned around the clock with two representatives and gave PI access to the most 'accurate, correct, and timely information' available within IFOR, which facilitated the accomplishment of the 2nd PI goal subject to the security of the troops and future operations (see 2.2.1).

The third aspect of the horizontal co-ordination to be mentioned here relates to a force commander's three primary means of communication with audiences outside his chain of command, namely PI, CIMIC, and Information Operations. The latter function comprises PsyOps.

CIMIC is a function NATO uses to liaise with civilians in theatre. CIMIC is involved in a multitude of projects to help the local population rebuild their countries, for example, by restoring essential public services such as water, power and public transport. IFOR and KFOR regarded these undertakings as a source of potential goodwill that could help NATO accomplish its 1st PI goal. Thus, PI drew reporters' attention to CIMIC-activities as means to disseminate NATO's messages (Van Dyke 13/4/2004; Idsøe 18/2/2004).

It is PI's relation to PsyOps which is a prominent source of controversies.¹¹⁶ The latter term is an ancient military asset which by means of social communication, including

¹¹⁶ Traditionally, NATO distinguishes between PsyOps and PI, in that the former can be authorised to disseminate false information, while the latter may only release truthful information. Moreover, the former's targets are limited to within the theatre and often to very specific groups, while the latter aims at

deception and manipulation, aims at undermining the will of an enemy. It has increasingly been used to influence the attitudes and loyalties of a broader scope of actors that may influence the outcome of a military operation.¹¹⁷ The CPIOs concur that there are obvious advantages of close co-ordination between PI and PsyOps, since it enhances the consistency of messages and the unity of effort. Their approach to this cooperation differed, however. Clifford (27/4/2004) took the integration furthest to what he characterises as the ‘melting of PsyOps, CIMIC and PI’, while both Idsøe (26/3/2004) and Van Dyke (13/4/2004) advocate the functions be kept clearly separated. Their concern is that in some missions PsyOps may for operational imperatives be authorised to disseminate less than truthful, if not directly false, information, which is likely to jeopardise the credibility they deem vital to achieve the 1st PI goal (see 2.2.1). In none of the three relevant missions, however, did the CPIOs find this to be the case. Both functions were open and transparent and used the same political-military guidance and messages. In other words, also PsyOps was truthful (Van Dyke 13/4/2004; Idsøe 26/3/2004; Clifford 27/4/2004).¹¹⁸

informing the general public in theatre and worldwide. In addition, PsyOps communicates to its targets through channels it controls, like hand bill programs, PsyOps radio-stations, and advertisements in television and newspapers. PI does not own such channels but communicates through the independent press over which PI exerts no control (Clifford 27/4/2004). This distinction is increasingly blurred, since PI targets specific groups when used as a line function. Moreover, the validity of the idea that PI does not control its channels of communication can be questioned when many local media uncritically disseminated PI’s information from weekly columns in major local newspapers to unedited transmission of PI video cassettes on Kosovo’s TV-stations. In addition, the same idea is challenged when PI increasingly uses the internet as a direct platform of communication to its targets. It even created a situation whereby many Kosovo Albanian newspapers would take KFOR’s daily updates from the internet and publish them unedited (Idsøe 18/2/2004; Clifford 27/4/2004).

¹¹⁷ Many believe such measures are highly relevant in the War on Terror (see 1.5.2). Seen from the adversary’s perspective, Armistead (2004: 3), among others, suggests that the attacks in the US on 11 September 2001 are best understood as a strategic PsyOps campaign.

¹¹⁸ The notion that IFOR’s PsyOps function disseminated accurate information concurs with Siegel’s (1997: 169) findings during two extensive field trips to the mission in Bosnia.

Clifford is convinced that the concern about disseminating accurate information is higher within than outside military ranks. He observes that civilian organisations do not distinguish between their means of communication. Where NATO operates with three different functions, civilians, like UNHCR, basket them in one task and give the overall responsibility to one person. Clifford (27/4/2004) argues: 'Every big corporation and every government does it. So why should we be any different? . . . The OSCE don't see any difficulties with all of this and they simply don't see any difference. They think we are barking mad to try and differentiate'.¹¹⁹

IFOR took a different approach. It kept the functions separate and instituted the Joint Information Co-ordinating Committee to ensure unity of effort. This was a weekly meeting that synchronised the three functions' messages and did matrix planning to decide who would disseminate what and when. This committee played a crucial role in information campaigns, among other activities, during case 2 (Van Dyke 17/3/04).

KFOR 5's co-ordination of its means of communication was much more limited. It was reduced to PI passing its messages to Information Operations and took place only at a general level, more specifically in the forum of the Joint Operation Planning Group comprising a broader scope of operational functions (Idsøe 26/3/2004).

Horizontal co-ordination was important not only to achieve specific objectives but also to enhance NATO's credibility and avoid uncertainty about its intentions. It was a daily challenge to ensure consistent and unequivocal messages. Still, it occasionally happened that troops unknowingly disseminated divergent information to reporters leaving the

¹¹⁹ Avruch et al. (1999: 10) support this point.

latter to question whether NATO had control, or whether it tried to withhold information or mislead the public (Clifford and Wilton 2000: 22-23).

An incident related to case 5 demonstrates this point. Despite all PI staff acting with the best of intentions the result was negative. During its first phase a PI spokesperson called local journalists and told them that two Russian soldiers had been killed in the Presevo valley. At the same time a KFOR staffer working inside the valley informed Serbian media that 'someone' had killed one KFOR-soldier. The stories were projected in the media and journalists called the CPIC for clarification: how many KFOR soldiers had been killed? And who had killed them? The PIOs did not know for sure and had prepared no talking points. It turned out that it was one Russian soldier whose body had been counted twice, first at the American hospital where he was initially brought, then at the Russian hospital where his body was transferred after he died. The two NATO staff that initially released the information had paid tribute to the 2nd PI goal's stipulation that journalists should have *timely* information. They failed to deliver *accurate* information as the same goal also instructs. As a result, the PI staff that now insisted on giving accurate information was unable to do so at a pace that satisfied journalists. The press raised questions about whether NATO was trying to withhold information and created a situation that negatively affected the mission's credibility (Idsøe 26/3/2004).

The CPIOs' struggle to establish unity of effort extended well beyond NATO's own ranks and aimed to establish the perception of a united international effort to the peace

processes in Bosnia and Kosovo.¹²⁰ Their main vehicle to this end became the daily press briefings at the CPIC. Van Dyke (17/3/04) elaborates: 'I found it strange that IFOR would do their briefing, then the UN would do theirs, then the High Representative would do his. I proposed early on that we would do a joint briefing. We could get authority with a joint approach to this'. The major civilian organisations agreed. So spokespersons from the major international organisations shared the briefing stage and in turn presented their statements and answered questions from the floor.

The briefings were not only a valuable source of information for reporters. During the official exchange of questions and answers and in less formal conversations PI also learned what was on the minds and agendas of the media and civilian agencies. This information was collected and communicated to NATO's political and military leaders.¹²¹

PI's co-ordination with international organisations' went beyond sharing the stage during the daily press briefings. It included the harmonisation of messages. Throughout IFOR's existence the respective spokespersons met for a 30-minute pre-briefing meeting. Here they exchanged the messages they planned to convey to reporters that day and identified possible disagreements and conflicting messages.

¹²⁰ Siegel (1998: 176) confirms this point with respect to IFOR's external co-ordination with other international organisation in Bosnia, such as OSCE, Office of the High Representative, UNHCR, and the World Bank. Williamson (2000: 182-83) holds that NATO member countries cooperated at a strategic level on the PI tasks related to IFOR. Moreover, PI in NATO headquarters co-ordinate with member countries' governments, embassies, policy and research institutions, NGO's etc. (NATO Handbook 2001: 166-7).

¹²¹ Van Dyke (13/4/2004). KFOR 1 used a similar arrangement (Clifford 27/4/2004). At the time Idsøe (26/3/2004) was CPIO, however, media interest had waned, which reduced the press briefings to a bi-weekly event and with much reduced KFOR participation simply because it had little information that would interest reporters.

The pre-briefing meetings aimed at harmonising the views of the international organisations, but acknowledging that their mandates and structures for funding were different, IFOR could not and would not oppose the projection of divergent messages. IFOR's mandate was to provide peace and stability, while UNHCR's mandate, for instance, was to solve the problems related to millions of refugees and internally displaced persons. While IFOR's contingents were financially sustained directly by the troop-contributing ministries of defence, UNHCR funding was much less predictable relying on voluntary contributions from governments and private donors. Hence, UNHCR needed to appeal in an emotional way to contributors in order to accomplish its task in Bosnia. Often, the result was conflicting messages. Van Dyke (17/3/04) recalls: 'So we might be out there one day saying "everything is peaceful" or it is not as bad as media say. And then the UNHCR Spokesperson would say: "Everything is terrible. We are at the verge of chaos".'

For such reasons, PI did not always succeed in harmonising its messages with the other international actors. Yet, they would agree to disagree. This approach still maintained a sense of unity of effort and enhanced each organisation's credibility. The daily press briefings served to signal a joint international approach to the peace process in the Balkans and to give the missions some time to adjust its own messages in light of those of the other international organisations.

Vertical co-ordination

PI's mode of operation to accomplish a unity of effort with other NATO functions and non-NATO actors has been described above. This section will depict how PI worked to achieve the same goal within their own function among the PIOs up and down, what

Clifford calls, the *chain of communication*. He makes the point, when recalling the initial days of KFOR's existence:

I was speaking on my mobile telephone with Jamie Shea, Alastair Campbell, and the other people in the United States, and their equivalents in other capitals. We were trying to work out, what was the message. We were going to make sure that the messages were being co-ordinated. And there was simply not enough time to go down the torturous military chain of command. And so one of the things that it shows was that you have to have a parallel chain of communication. You got to have a chain of command but also a parallel chain of communication (Clifford 27/4/2004).

All CPIOs used such a two-way line of communication up and down the PI levels, from NATO headquarters to the battalion PIOs.¹²² Moreover, both Clifford and Van Dyke (30/3/2004) operated in close contact with their PI colleagues in NATO members' capitals in the early days of KFOR and IFOR, respectively. At the time of KFOR 5 such contact was unusual (Idsøe 26/3/2004).

For all practical purposes, the linchpin of NATO PI activities in the three missions was the CPIO position (see 1.4.1). That is true for target groups in the Balkans and beyond. The CPIOs was at the highest PI command level in theatre and ideally best positioned to be informed about the situation in Bosnia and Kosovo and also about how force commanders wanted to deal with it. That information was available neither in the missions' brigades nor in NATO's member states. In other words, crucial information for tactical and strategic success was gathered from the theatre level. How the CPIOs

¹²² Siegel (1998: 49-55) refers to this as the 'information chain'.

co-ordinated vertically in the organisation varied slightly but IFOR's procedures are illustrative.

The above mentioned daily CPIC press briefings undertaken in cooperation with other major international actors was normally the major daily PI event (see also 2.2.5).

Preparing for that, the CPIO would call SHAPE's PI desk to synchronise the daily messages facilitating that Brussels and Sarajevo spoke with one voice. Following up on yesterday's PI report, the CPIO would give SHAPE the main findings from the morning's media analysis and if need be inform SHAPE about recent incidents. SHAPE on their side would give IFOR a summary of decisions and views aired during their morning staff meeting. SHAPE's and IFOR's PIOs would then co-ordinate their messages, and IFOR would incorporate that information in the planning of the daily press briefing (Van Dyke 30/3/04).

After the press briefings PI began to prepare for the PI report to be finalised and disseminated by the evening. So they recollected the questions journalists had posed, and continued to analyse media reports to see which issues were projected. In addition, PI was in contact with SHAPE and NATO headquarters by phone or email throughout the day and received their guidance. The media analysis section provided PI with evaluations of how and to which extent IFOR's messages were being disseminated. This assisted the CPIO in his effort to formulate relevant PI guidance for the next day. In addition, the analysis served to identify emerging strategic issues and allowed PI to meet them in an expedient manner. PI's conclusions were then presented in the evening report and disseminated up and down the chain of communication. As a result, every

level shared the same strategic PI guidance and was able to speak with the same voice (Van Dyke 30/3/04).¹²³

IFOR's PI had, as one would expect, no authority to instruct PI personnel outside of its own ranks. But NATO headquarters had established a mechanism that offered a possibility to ensure consistency in messages from IFOR and the national ministries of defence with contingents in the mission. IFOR PI used this channel to keep ministries informed in a timely manner (Van Dyke 13/4/2004).¹²⁴

Obviously, the idea of disseminating guidance was that the PIOs, at least down the chain of command, would follow it. But as case 3 clearly illustrates the command and control that COMKFOR enjoyed over the coalition forces varied. He did not have the direct and sole control over KFOR's contingents that an ideal type command-structure stipulates.¹²⁵ As a consequence, the PICs were largely under the control of different national contingents. In some brigades the PIOs had to refer back to their national authorities, while in others they were authorised to make decisions on their own. So the CPIO had to reconcile the different PI approaches from the national contingents with that of NATO and he could only urge the PIOs to follow his guidance. Two years into KFOR's existence the brigades still worked rather autonomously. Initially, their PIOs disseminated their own messages rather than those of KFOR. This practice caused the

¹²³ Idsøe (18/2/2004; 26/3/2004) co-ordinated vertically in largely the same manner, the major difference being that he disseminated two reports a day – a PI situation report in the evening and guidance in the morning. Clifford's (27/4/2004) mode of co-ordination compares to the two others but appears slightly more autonomous since he operated more independently from his Force Commander and co-ordinated directly with the Director of the NATO Office of Information and Press, who holds the highest position within the NATO PI function.

¹²⁴ The efficiency with which this arrangement worked is questioned by Kiehl (2001: 140).

¹²⁵ Kiehl (2001: 142) takes notice that US PIOs in KFOR, to take one example, were linked to their national PI efforts but not to those of KFOR or to other nations' contingents in the mission.

dissemination of *inconsistent* messages that threatened to hamper KFOR's credibility (Idsøe 18/2/2004; Clifford 27/4/2004).

2.2.5 Maintain credible relations with the press

The study has now outlined PI's message strategy (see 2.2.3) and its efforts to promote a unity of effort in the information activities (see 2.2.4) but as Idsøe (18/3/2004) remarks: 'It does not suffice to formulate messages. You have to get them into the media'. Presenting the CPIOs' mode of operation to accomplish the latter task is the purpose of this section.

To this end, the Commander's 2nd PI intention – maintain credible relations with the press – is instructive. CPIOs' understanding that credibility is PI's Achilles' heel illustrates the primordial importance they ascribe to this guideline (see 2.2.2). The present section shall explain how the CPIOs proceeded to reach this desired state of affairs, by addressing in turn each of the intention's components. First, it presents the press, that is, the channels available to the CPIOs to enhance public understanding and support. Second, it elaborates on the PIOs' relations with the press, before the section concludes by describing the way the CPIOs strove to maintain its credibility *vis-à-vis* the press.

The press

In an actual mission, the press as a term refers to a broad category of reporters all engaged in projecting stories to a wider audience through the media. In the three missions journalists were employed either directly by newspapers, TV- or radio stations, or at a press agency such as Reuters. Others were so-called 'stringers', meaning freelancers and often locals with limited experience and variable connections in the

industry. Among the journalists were highly qualified senior defence correspondents from agenda-setting media, like the BBC, CNN, and Sky, as well as reporters with little relevant background knowledge.

The press corps with which PI worked varied greatly both in quantity and quality according to the general media interest in the missions. It was high when IFOR arrived in December 1995. 1,100 international and domestic journalists were in Bosnia to cover this deployment, which was particularly controversial in the US and Germany (see case 1). This rapidly changed when IFOR's arrival met no significant resistance and seemed to achieve its designated task. Then, the media's interest waned. After some months often only a handful of reporters would attend the CPIC press briefings (Van Dyke 13/4/2004). Similarly, in KFOR 3,500 reporters were accredited to cover the entry into Kosovo (see case 1). Four months later most international reporters had left the province and were replaced by the just mentioned stringers. One and a half years later the press corps in Kosovo totalled some 40-50 reporters. Except for one BBC reporter, they were all Albanians (Idsøe 18/02/03; 26/3/2004).¹²⁶

Media interests may soon increase, however. On the day of Bosnia's national elections in September 1996, for example, some 400 journalists were crowded in the CPIC briefing room, the highest number ever during IFOR (Van Dyke 13/4/2004). Although outside the scope of the present study, it is informative to draw attention to an incident that suddenly created renewed media interest in KFOR. By mid-March 2004 escalating

¹²⁶ An important reason for this phenomenon may be found in the high-profiled BBC correspondent Kate Adie's (2000: 55) assertion that 'television news is fascinated by war'. Successful peace support operations and slowly progressing nation-building efforts rarely provide the kind of stories that attracts editorial desks' attention. See also Gowing (2000a: 213-15).

tensions between different groups particularly around the town of Mitrovica led international media to question NATO's well-established message that 'KFOR provides a secure and safe environment for all the people in Kosovo'. Among other incidents, a Norwegian soldier killed a Kosovo Albanian that tried to break through a line of separation and NATO sent reinforcements to KFOR. After years of low media interest, the situation in Kosovo re-emerged as a main story in international media. Idsøe, now serving as the CPIO at NATO's North Joint Headquarters, was on the telephone for 48 hours and at least 4 Norwegian reporters flew to Kosovo to cover the situation (Idsøe 26/3/2004).

Relations

PI's relation with the media can be mutually beneficial. PI is interested in reporters as a channel to convey their messages to the public. Journalists, on their side, are interested in PI as a means to get the kind of stories they can sell.¹²⁷ This section elaborates on three different techniques PI used to deliver information to reporters, which are called meeting points, press availabilities and media opportunities. The 2nd, 4th, 5th, and 6th PI goals (see 2.2.1) and the commander's 1st intentions (see 2.2.2) guided these activities.

All CPIOs facilitated a continuous relation with the press by establishing permanent *meeting points* – the so-called PICs. Initially, IFOR had 10 PICs in Bosnia, Croatia and Hungary. The largest was the CPIC established in Sarajevo on the very first day IFOR assumed responsibility for Bosnia's overall security situation. It was here that IFOR conducted the by now well-known daily briefings (see 2.2.4). In the same vein, one of

¹²⁷ An interest which is voiced from the side of the media in Hudson and Stainer (1999: xii), Adie (2000: 52), Gowing (2000a: 212-13), and Knightley (2003: 44).

Clifford's priorities was to establish a CPIC in Pristina within KFOR's very first days of existence (see case 3). Other PICs were soon installed in each of KFOR's four multinational brigades in addition to one in Albania and the one established in Skopje during NATO's air campaign (Clifford 27/4/2004). These PICs facilitated the achievement of the 2nd PI goal as well as access to the press.

When media interest is low meeting points is an insufficient technique to achieve the 1st PI goal, however. The missions' active policy (see 2.2.2) spurred PI to apply other techniques to disseminate messages. The challenge was to identify stories sufficiently interesting to attract reporters' attention; stories that could serve as 'a parcel' to deliver PI's messages to target groups. The CPIOs used two major techniques to get the media's attention: press availability and media opportunity.

Generally, journalists are interested in basing their stories on high-level military sources but do not enjoy free access to these. So the CPIOs organised settings that made commanders available to the press, such as receptions where they could mingle with reporters. These so-called *press availabilities* might also take the form of an exclusive interview with the Force Commander (Idsøe 18/2/2004). Prior to such interviews, the CPIO would normally brief COMKFOR about the reporter, her area of interests and her take on stories, and propose the kind of talking points that he could communicate (Idsøe 26/3/2004).

Media opportunities were another PI technique to increase reporters' interest in the missions and to, in Idsøe's (18/2/2004) term, 'sell' messages. The technique sustained the 5th PI goal by inviting journalists to a situation, often in the field, that potentially constituted a story to be disseminated in the media while at the same time conveying some of NATO's messages. Their advantage, compared to press briefings and press

availabilities, was that journalists got first hand impressions of the story (Idsøe 26/3/2004).

All CPIOs frequently used media opportunities as the cases illustrate. To convince the electorates in case 2 that it was safe to vote, for example, PI invited the press to see for itself a broad variety of robust IFOR-activities to ensure public security. It strove to reassure reporters that IFOR was ubiquitous and capable of enforcing the military provisions of the Dayton Peace Accord. Moreover, to deter Yugoslav armed forces from invading Kosovo and reassure Kosovars that they were safe, case 4 describes how PI organised media opportunities at spectacular NATO exercises in order to convince reporters that KFOR troops were lethal and ready but non-offensive. Idsøe (18/2/2004) provides additional examples of more ordinary media opportunities to enhance public support to NATO's activities. He could, to take one example, invite reporters to cover a CIMIC-promoted disarmament project and tell them that COMKFOR would throw the first weapon into ovens installed to destroy the superfluous amount of small arms circulating in Kosovo. In the same vein, he would invite reporters to the official openings of KFOR-sponsored bridges. He found that this technique generally generated more NATO-favourable media reports than those based on briefings.

Clifford (27/4/2004) adds that media opportunities were a pedagogical tool: 'We spent a lot of time educating the journalists'. Defence correspondents were often in shortage, so it became a PI task to ensure that newcomers to the field of military affairs understood not only the stories but also the context in a manner that NATO conceived as correct.

The same technique was useful also when experienced and high profiled correspondents came to the missions, since it allowed them to become more familiar with the specific circumstances on the ground in theatre.

Credibility

Finally, this section shall address credibility, which was a vital aspect of PI's mode of operation. For no matter what PI does, the press is unlikely to project PI's messages if it does not believe in them. We shall now turn how the CPIOs' related to reporters in order to establish credibility.

Van Dyke's (17/3/04) policy was to be available, open, honest, and cooperative.

Coupled with consistent messages (see 2.2.3) and unity of effort (see 2.2.4) this, he believes, increased PI's credibility (Van Dyke 13/4/2004). Clifford stresses that the

PIOs should always be truthful, open, and factual and provide information in real time.

Prior to entering Kosovo he informed the press corps: 'The policy here is open access to everyone . . . We are entirely transparent to everyone' (Clifford 27/4/2004). Idsøe

(26/3/2004) concurs: 'It is important to release information, be frank and tell the truth'.

He underlines that establishing credibility is a long-term project but when reporters repeatedly experience that NATO's information is trustworthy they increasingly rely on NATO as a source. Case 5 illustrates this point. PI conducted background briefings informing journalists why Serbia had to enter the Presevo valley; why the EAAGs had to leave; and how KFOR would ensure that this happened. PI organised media opportunities at the reception centres where the EAAGs were going to be screened and released. When the operation commenced, journalists were again invited to see for themselves as events unfolded. Idsøe (26/3/2004) felt that KFOR's credibility in the eyes of the journalists was reinforced when the operation went exactly as PI had informed them it would.

The open press policy entailed a readiness to be frank about mistakes, which Van Dyke believes contributed to journalists' confidence in NATO. Although information

unfavourable to the mission could cast a negative light over NATO, this would only be short-term if released immediately. On the contrary, efforts to withhold information that reporters were likely to get anyway could have a long-term negative impact, not because of the story but because NATO would have been less than truthful. Van Dyke concludes: 'We needed to be able to release the good news with the bad news. And that, hopefully, would also enhance our credibility' (Van Dyke 17/3/04).

The CPIOs used a variety of techniques to enhance credibility. One was simply to make themselves available to journalists; for example, at the above mentioned meeting points, press availabilities, and media opportunities (see 2.2.5). Idsøe (18/2/2004) used them as an opportunity for informal talks irrespective of whether he had particular messages to deliver, and Clifford saw them as useful occasions for journalists to become familiar with KFOR (Clifford and Wilton 2000: 21).

Beyond simple contact, the CPIOs tried to create affinity with journalists by helping them along. The night before KFOR entered Kosovo, for example, PI invited the media to a briefing in one of the cinema halls in Macedonia's capital. The hall was packed with journalists. Rather than an ordinary brief about the political situation and restrictions, the PIOs stressed the reporters' personal safety, informed them about mine danger and told them how they could reduce their personal risks upon entry (Idsøe 26/3/2004). Further, PI in advance facilitated the press' return to Macedonia. KFOR foresaw that once in Kosovo journalists could face difficulties when trying to return home via Macedonia. To prevent this PI issued them with NATO-'passports'. Such undertakings impressed reporters and improved PI's relations with them (Idsøe 18/2/2004).

A third technique to enhance credibility was to establish personal contact between the press and high-level officials. Both Idsøe (26/3/2004) and Van Dyke prepared informal gatherings adapted to suit the character of the officials in question. Admiral Smith, for instance, who was IFOR's first Force Commander, was animated and at ease with the press. So PI facilitated the contact simply by frequently inviting half a dozen journalists to meet COMIFOR at his headquarters – to so-called press availabilities (see 2.2.5). They would sit down and exchange views over a cup of coffee and some donuts. The second Force Commander, Admiral Lopez, had a different personality, subtler and initially less comfortable with the media. To establish trust PI organised off-the-record meetings – often a meal at the headquarters with Force Commander and one or three journalists. As he experienced that journalists respected off-the-record restrictions, he became increasingly comfortable about sharing his thoughts with them. Van Dyke (17/3/04) summaries: 'So we used a variety of these techniques to again establish close relations with the press. Let them know what was on our mind. Tell them the good with the bad.'

Background briefings was another, more formal, method the CPIOs generally used to enhance their credibility among journalists (see case 2 and 6). It was also a useful manner to communicate NATO's views on delicate issues. When need be the CPIOs would approach authoritative members of the press corps and share sensitive information with them although this could threaten operational security. The transformation of the KLA to the Kosovo Protection Corps, which occurred simultaneously with case 4, serves as an example. This milestone event in Kosovo's peace process caused problems in the capitals of NATO's member states and in international organisations since media reports were largely influenced by Albanian sources who wanted to maintain KLA and establish it as Kosovo's armed forces.

Balancing the risks with the potential benefits, the CPIO chose to release sensitive information in an effort to change the media's portrayal of KLA's transformation. He identified three key journalists – one American, one French, and one British – whom he had not dealt with prior to KFOR:

I got them on the side and I said 'Look guys, if I tell you what is going on. That will help me because you will be able to write from a position of knowledge. But I will need your confidence, that you will not either quote me or report on the detail of all of this. Just use it as background information. And we could then work that up to our mutual advantage. You'll get the proper story and I will make sure you are writing about the right things. But break that and all is off, and I will never talk to you again about anything'. And they said: 'Yes' (Clifford 27/4/2004).

On this basis Clifford gave the three journalists a series of detailed background briefings. He maintains that he achieved the desired result.

Finally, the CPIOs used subliminal techniques to establish credibility. Clifford saw to that he was always near COMKFOR when the latter appeared in public. This, he believes, combined with the fact that he had been Gen. Jackson's personal spokesman for several years, sent the subliminal message that if reporters could not get information from COMKFOR himself, their next best choice would be the CPIO who they assumed was well informed and spoke with the Commander's authority. In addition, the CPIOs were cautious to have CPICs that conveyed the subliminal messages to reporters that IFOR and KFOR were professional and high-quality forces. Both CPICs, in Sarajevo and Pristina, were most fashionable considering the general context in which they were situated. The standard of the technicalities reporters need – that is, power, sockets for

their plugs, satellite links to their desks, etc. – should also reinforce reporters’ credibility to NATO.¹²⁸

These considerations conclude the presentation of PI’s mode of operation, which we shall summarise below. Before concluding the empirical chapter, however, it is illuminating to present the practice of PI in the sense of how the PIOs communicate their messages to reporters. The section below purports to do this in the form of two simple content analysis of IFOR’s and KFOR’s official and initial press briefings.

2.3 Content analysis of NATO press briefings

Beginning with a content analysis of available transcripts from NATO press briefings in IFOR during the first 40 days – that is, from 20 December 1995 to 30 January 1996 – this section outlines the content of the four most recurrent messages conveyed by the PIOs to reporters. Then follows a similar account on the case of KFOR (for methodological considerations see 1.4.1).

Besides identifying the most frequently disseminated messages, the purpose is also to exemplify how messages are conveyed and to evaluate the validity of the information obtained from the three primary sources upon which this empirical account have largely drawn. The quotations transmit a ‘hands-on’ feeling of the general topic of concern. In this spirit, and to be accurate, spelling mistakes that occur in the transcripts shall not be corrected.

¹²⁸ Van Dyke (13/4/2004) and Clifford (27/04/05). See also case 1 and 3.

2.3.1 Master messages in IFOR's initial press briefings

In the 23 publicly accessible transcripts from the 40-day sample period, NATO's personnel convey the message 'IFOR improves the situation in Bosnia' in 21 briefings, 'IFOR is robust' in 20, 'The parties comply' in 12, and 'NATO cooperates with new partners for noble ends' in nine briefings. The content of these four messages will now be described in turn.

IFOR improves the situation in Bosnia

The most repeated message in the examined period is that the overall security situation in Bosnia has significantly improved since IFOR arrived. Except for two days in the sample the PIOs who briefed reporters point to *facts on the ground* indicating that the war in Bosnia has ceased and that peace is returning.¹²⁹ Often IFOR is mentioned as a major cause of those improvements. This reflects the importance PI attaches to portraying IFOR as a guarantor of peace in Bosnia.

The first available transcript conveys that message. The PIO, Lt.Col. Rayner, states: 'Everyone here has reported for the last two weeks how much freedom of movement there has been, how many more people are travelling around the country, and how great the feeling of security is now' (NATO 1/1/1996). The phrase 'a quiet day' figures in 14 of 23 transcripts and frequently in the opening statement of the press briefings. This is the case on 5 January, to take one example, where it is followed up by the second most important message: 'Good morning ladies and gentlemen. It was generally a quiet day

¹²⁹ The two exceptions are NATO (9/1/1996; 23/1/1996). The formulation 'facts on the ground' appears in italics here to draw attention to its subjective use in the remainder of the thesis.

across the area. The force is continuing to flow in and routine patrolling and liaison is progressing well at all levels' (NATO 5/1/1996).

The PIOs present IFOR as a major cause of the improved security situation: 'NATO is removing all military threat from this country, and that is going extremely well' (NATO 8/1/1996). When a reporter questions whether there are any differences between the achievements of IFOR and UNPROFOR – the peacekeeping force that preceded IFOR and that had a reputation of being incapable of halting atrocities – the PIO replies:

To see the difference go along the zones of separation, see the forces, see brigades moving out of the zone of separation, see tanks and guns returning to their barracks, see mine fields being cleared, being marked. You will see . . . a huge difference between the previous operation and the IFOR operation. There is still some crime and shooting going on in Sarajevo. There is no doubt about that. But the difference between what is happening now and what has been happening in the last 3 or 4 years is enormous (NATO 10/1/1996).

Later, PI presents the same message in different wording:

We are providing the military security in which the authorities and the parties , can carry out their job . . . i think that is very apparent. The fact that people are driving around so much at the moment , the fact that you see so much happening in this city at the moment, it think we have witnessed to what has been achieved at the moment. I think it gets better every day. We continue to provide that security (NATO 19/1/1996).

As a further sign of Bosnia's demilitarisation, the PIOs commence informing reporters that IFOR is destroying the parties' ammunition stocks.¹³⁰ To stress the message PI

¹³⁰ NATO (24/1996; 26/1/1996; 27/1/1996; 28/1/1996; 29/1/1996).

invites reporters to media opportunities facilitating that they experience the actual destruction themselves.

IFOR is robust

That IFOR is an overwhelming and lethal force against whom the parties will stand no chance in a military confrontation, is the second most re-occurring message that the PIOs convey to reporters during this period. In 20 briefings do the PIOs portray IFOR as 'well-led, well-trained, and well-equipped to respond to any challenge', as Van Dyke (13/4/2004) holds.¹³¹

PIOs project IFOR as fully capable of ensuring the implementation of the military aspects of Dayton. During 12 briefings they reinforce the message that IFOR is well-equipped, for instance by referring to the continual deployment of forces. The first recorded press briefing refers to IFOR's forces crossing the river between Bosnia and Croatia in the following manner: 'The pontoon bridge across the Sava river was completed yesterday during the morning, and was open all day, allowing approximately 150 [IFOR] vehicles to cross. The crossing will continue today' (NATO 1/1/1996). The PIOs generally refer to the deployment as the 'flow of forces': 'The flow of forces across river Sava continues . . . Challenger tanks will arrive in Kupres today' (NATO 10/1/1996).¹³² The idea of an overwhelming force is emphasised when they inform the press that 32,500 troops are deployed to IFOR's land component on 14 January. The number increases to 41,500 within the next week (NATO 21/1/1996).

¹³¹ The exceptions are NATO (9/1/1996; 13/1/1996; 29/1/1996).

¹³² See also NATO (5/1/1996; 7/1/1996; 8/1/1996).

The PIOs also portray IFOR as well-led. As Lt.Col. Rayner formulates it: ‘We have a very clear chain of command. Our orders come from IFOR, from SHAPE and NATO from the North Atlantic Council. That’s the beauty and strength of NATO’ (NATO 10/1/1996).¹³³ In a major press briefing evaluating IFOR’s first 30 days in Bosnia, COMIFOR sums up:

This organisation [IFOR] . . . consists of a lot of forces from a lot of countries . . . And I want to publicly tell you that M.Walker [Commander of IFOR’s land component] and M.Ryan [Commander of IFOR’s air component] and the others involved in this, have been extraordinary talented in making, pulling all of this together. Just think about what has happened in the first 30 days. It is pretty impressive (NATO 20/1/1996).

In the almost 200 pages of transcripts in the sample, only one sentence from a NATO PIO may be interpreted as contradicting this master message. The anomaly follows an announcement of four IFOR casualties caused by mines and traffic accidents: ‘All of these incidents remind us of what a dangerous and unpredictable place this is, and what a challenging task we have ahead to work together to bring about a lasting peace’ (NATO 29/1/1996). However, neither the rest of that particular briefing nor any other briefing leaves any doubt that NATO is capable of providing military security and prevent anyone from derailing the peace process.

The parties comply

Sustaining the first message, the third most important message is that the parties comply with the part of the peace agreement for which IFOR is responsible, that is, military security as outlined in Annex 1 (see 2). In 12 of the 23 transcripts the PIOs stress that

¹³³ See also NATO (7/1/1996).

the parties have ceased fire and are withdrawing their armed forces and heavy weapons from the zones of separation agreed upon at Dayton. Further, they are moving certain categories of weapons into IFOR-recognised sites. This endeavour shall be finalised prior to 19 January, which is a month after IFOR's arrival.

From the first recorded briefing the PIOs mobilise support to that message: 'There continues to be encouraging signs of compliance within the peace agreement on both sides of the border' (NATO 1/1/1996). It takes another week before the same point is made: 'It was reported yesterday that the 1st Krajina corps are moving troops back . . . This compliance by the erstwhile warring factions is common throughout the area and is a very encouraging indication of progress in the military aspects of the peace agreement' (NATO 8/1/1996). From 11 January and till deadline this message is intensified. Now the PIOs daily announce that the parties are complying. As of 14 January, reporters are informed that at least 70 percent of the parties' forces have been withdrawn from the zone of separation.

After the deadline 35 heavy weapons remain in that zone. IFOR downplays this information, maintaining that the parties have substantially complied (NATO 20/1/1996). On 27 January, the PIOs inform that IFOR has commenced destroying the remaining heavy weapons and three days later that there are no more heavy weapons in the zone of separation (NATO 30/1/1996).

NATO cooperates with new partners for noble ends

Van Dyke (2003) points out that NATO strove to portray IFOR as working with new partners for noble ends. The press briefings sustain this point. In the present coding it figures as the fourth most important message.¹³⁴ In nine transcripts the PIOs present IFOR as a force deployed not for reasons of Realpolitik but to help others implement their own peace agreement.¹³⁵ Its deployment is projected as being in the interest of civilian Bosnians and of human dignity, rather than in the interest of NATO. It is presented as a force that helps humanitarian organisations to get on with their jobs. IFOR is not in charge. It works alongside the parties and international agencies to see the agreements from Dayton materialise on the ground in Bosnia. The collective effort is projected as a ‘joint endeavour’, which is indeed the name of the military mission.

NATO’s history taken into account, as a bulwark against Soviet military might, it is remarkable when the PIO in the first briefing from the sample is able to announce: ‘We expect that the lead elements of the Russian force contribution will arrive around about the 16th of January, and will be fully operational by the end of the month’ (NATO 1/1/1996). Two weeks later the PIOs inform that the Russian contingents has arrived and have started to conduct reconnaissance (NATO 15/1/1996; 19/1/1996).

In addition, the PIOs stress the close cooperation with the civilian agencies. The cooperative atmosphere is reflected in the already mentioned fact that IFOR and

¹³⁴ The message is coded in a narrow sense to encompass only references to new operational partners, such as former Warsaw Pact members and civilian agencies, and abstract humanitarian ends (see 1.4.1).

¹³⁵ For example: ‘The IFOR was not driving the Peace Agreement, the Peace Agreement was established at Dayton and was signed by all parties, and IFOR has obligations under the military parts of the Peace Agreement’ (NATO 5/1/1996). The other transcripts are NATO (1/1/1996; 9/1/1996; 13/1/1996; 14/1/1996; 22/1/1996; 23/1/1996; 26/1/1996; and 27/1/1996).

civilians meet the press together every day (see 2.2.4). Further, the PIOs emphasise the cordial relations between, for example, COMIFOR and the High Representative Mr Bildt (NATO 13/1/1996) and between COMIFOR and ICTY's Justice Goldstone (NATO 20/1/1996). Generally, the PIOs portray IFOR as helping the international agencies: 'We are here to provide the overall secure environment in terms of military forces to allow the civilian infrastructure to get on with the job' (NATO 3/1/1996). There are also very practical examples of cooperation as when a PIO stipulates: 'An arrangement has been made whereby the UNHCR can use the bridge over the river Sava forthwith to bring in humanitarian supplies' (NATO 10/1/1996). Moreover, an atmosphere of a joint endeavour is subliminally conveyed when the CPIO, Van Dyke, announces: 'This week we have a couple of special features coming up. Wednesday the World Bank will be briefing on some of their reconstruction loans and re-building programs' (NATO 23/1/1996).

Reviewing the first month in Bosnia, the COMIFOR conveys all four above mentioned messages in his introductory comments:

In the first 30 days of our operation for this Peace Agreement . . . the parties have shown the spirit of compliance and cooperation that we had only dreamed of and not fully expected but we're glad we saw. There has been no resumption of full-scale fighting in this country. The military forces have been separated along the lines and along the Zones set by the agreement, and they are honouring that. Our troops have had total freedom of movement, and I will tell you that dozens, more like hundreds of convoys have moved through this country and I have been told, though I don't have specific figures to prove it for you today that in fact, more humanitarian aid has been distributed subsequent to IFOR's arrival than prior. Now that is not a slap at UNPROFOR but I must tell you that we were concerned that with the amount of road traffic that would be involved in bringing this force that we would disrupt the flow of

humanitarian aid. The fact is that I understand it is going even better. There have been hundreds of flights into and out of Sarajevo, Tuzla and now Mostar's up and flowing so we will see more traffic out of there (NATO 20/1/1996).

IFOR's master messages – a summary

Van Dyke holds that the overall purpose of IFOR's PI campaign was to show that NATO had adapted to the post-Cold War era. It should do so by portraying IFOR as a NATO mission working with 'new partners for noble ends'; as 'the right instrument' to give the Bosnian peace process a chance; and as a 'helper and a leader' (see case 1 and 2.2.3).

The most frequently pronounced messages found in this content analysis support Van Dyke's description of IFOR's message strategy. The reliability of this analysis should not be overestimated as little more than half of the potential transcripts are accessible. Still, the findings do suggest that the three most re-occurring messages sustain the idea that IFOR is 'the right instrument'. In fact, they address different sides of the balance between being peaceful and forceful at the same time, which Van Dyke (2003: 18) argues was crucial for this message to be accepted by the public. 'IFOR improves the situation in Bosnia' and 'The parties comply' convey that IFOR has brought peace to Bosnia. 'IFOR is robust' presents it as capable of suppressing any opponent. Moreover, even in the narrow coding of the message 'NATO cooperates with new partners for noble ends' it appears among the frequently disseminated messages.¹³⁶ Had a broader

¹³⁶ The fact that this message only figures as the fourth most important is due to the narrow definition I used on this code (see 1.4.1). One may well argue that 'noble ends' should include 'Better with IFOR'. Such a broad definition would lift it from the fourth to the first most repeated message.

coding frame been adopted, the same message could have featured as the most projected message (see 1.4.1).

2.3.2 Master messages in KFOR's initial press briefings

The content analysis of press briefings from KFOR's first 40 days – from 12 June to 20 August 1999 – is based on 24 transcripts. The mission's four most frequently mentioned messages are almost similar to IFOR's. The highest ranking is 'KFOR improves the situation in Kosovo'; then follows 'KFOR is robust', which is mentioned in 19 briefings; 'The parties comply' in 16; and 'KFOR works with civilian organisations', which figures in 11 transcripts. Below, the content of these messages is elaborated on.

KFOR improves the situation in Kosovo

Except in one of the available transcripts the PIOs convey to reporters that 'KFOR improves the situation in Kosovo'.¹³⁷ The PIOs repeatedly assert that KFOR makes an actual and desired difference in the area of security and humanitarian assistance in Kosovo.

The provision of security is strongly presented for the first time the day after the Serbian forces have left Kosovo on 21 June: 'KFOR is now the security presence here in Kosovo and it is now time for us to look forward to the safe return of the refugees of all ethnic groups and to build a better future for all the inhabitants of Kosovo' (NATO

¹³⁷ The exception is NATO (19/6/1999).

22/6/1999).¹³⁸ This message is aired in 19 of the 24 transcripts. The PIOs highlight facts on the ground as evidence that KFOR protects people and their properties: 'You all have seen Kfo vehicles and soldiers on the ground and helicopters in the air throughout the province. Kfor forces are stepping up their street patrols . . . providing a visible reminder and a physical guarantee of our extensive security presence' (NATO 18/6/1999b).

In the same vein, quantitative results of KFOR's police endeavours in terms of arrests are announced. 2 July appears as a particularly busy day:

In Vitina, 13 people were arrested by members of MNB [Multi National Brigade] east after a US apache helicopter filmed them looting. Another 15 civilians were also arrested by 9 parachute sqn re in Lipljan for looting. Around midnight last night, in MNB [Multi National Brigade] South, a Dutch patrol in Orahovac, arrested 6 Serbs who were in possession of weapons and computer equipment . . . In a raid in Dakovica, Ital MPs [Military Police] arrested 3 former KLA members in uniform and confiscated a number of weapons. Others were arrested under suspicion of arson (NATO 2/7/1999).¹³⁹

On 9 July, the PIOs announce that KFOR has arrested over 250 people. The PIOs also point to cases where KFOR stops assaults on the spot: 'Yesterday, a patrol detained 6 personnel suspected of kidnapping and assault, after investigating suspicious activity at a house in Urosevac. The quick reactions of this patrol undoubtedly stopped further suffering for the nine victims that were also in the building' (NATO 9/7/1999). Beyond

¹³⁸ This message is obviously sustained by information that Serbian forces comply and that the KLA will be demilitarised. But evidence of this message is dealt with in a separate section below, see 'The parties comply'.

¹³⁹ Similar examples can be found in NATO (22/6/1999; 12/7/1999; 14/7/1999; 22/7/1999).

police work, KFOR is also portrayed as generally caring for people, as when journalists are informed that a platoon saved an elderly couple from a burning house in Pec (NATO 2/7/1999).

The other aspect of the message that 'KFOR improves the situation in Kosovo' addresses humanitarian issues beyond mere survival. The very day KFOR enters the province, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Clark, informs the press that: 'KFOR are going to do everything they can when they arrive to help provide and meet urgent humanitarian needs both for food, medical assistance and that sort of thing and they are well-equipped and well-prepared to do that' (NATO 12/7/1999a).

The next day Jamie Shea, NATO's much-profiled Spokesperson who also ran KFOR's initial press briefings, underscores this messages by pointing to media reports: 'You saw the images in Pristina yesterday of people emerging, going back to cafes where they hadn't dared go to show their face for many months now, normal life returning, people breathing the air of freedom for a long, long time. And believe me that I believe is what we have achieved so far' (NATO 14/6/1999).

Further, KFOR's contribution to the humanitarian assistance is projected from the very first day (NATO 12/6/1999a). Two days later the PIO tells the press that 'NATO forces . . . are already allowing humanitarian relief to get in [to Kosovo]' (NATO 14/6/1999b). Every day the first week, the PIOs reinforce the message that KFOR has a positive humanitarian impact. On the fourth day, for example, the PIO states that there is 'still about half a million internally-displaced persons inside Kosovo . . . the aid continues to flow now that there is a force on the ground. A second UNHCR humanitarian aid convoy arrived in Pristina yesterday, two more are scheduled for today' (NATO 15/6/1999). Two days later he announces that the figure of refugees in the neighbouring countries is going down (NATO 17/6/1999).

NATO's Secretary General, Mr Solana, boosts the message on his first visit to KFOR:

'Let me tell you the operation on the ground has already been a tremendous success.

NATO's member countries have responded to the challenge to bring peace and stability to Kosovo' (NATO 24/6/1999). He then gives the message a human face:

I am today . . . delighted to be here after having been in the camps with refugees and seeing the faces of the people suffering, to meet them here on the streets, some of them that I met in the camps are here already, to see them crying really when they saw me here (NATO 24/6/1999).

Later, in a brief review, a PIO draws KFOR's contribution to the region in equally positive terms:

Only three weeks ago KFOR had entered a turbulent situation in Kosovo. Looking at the situation now, the Yugoslav forces have withdrawn, the KLA is demilitarising and its members are gradually returning to work in their homes and villages. And, hundreds of thousands of refugees have returned to their home (NATO 7/7/1999).

The same master message is also promoted with reference to KFOR's participation in the civil reconstruction. Within the first week of KFOR's entry into Kosovo, a PIO states: 'Yesterday British military engineers restored the water supply to Prisitna' (NATO 18/6/1999a). Another PIO picks up on the same note: 'KFOR engineers continue to help local staff get vital utilities back up and running. Members of 21 engineer regiment are helping at both Kosovo A and B power stations, where 40 local workers have been employed' (NATO 2/7/1999). A week later they can announce that one of the power stations is operational (NATO 9/7/1999). Assistance in coal production and freshwater supplies are also presented as 'just one example of how KFOR soldiers are improving the infrastructure of Kosovo, and thus quality of live for every one' (NATO 12/7/1999).

KFOR is robust

KFOR PI's second most repeated message is that 'KFOR is robust'. In 19 of the 23 transcripts the PIOs portray KFOR as a militarily capable force that will project overwhelming power against any military challenge.

KFOR, like IFOR, is pictured as a well-led, well-trained and well-equipped force. From the outset the PIO set the tone. Having mentioned that 20,500 troops including French and British have been deployed so far, he adds: 'This is a simultaneous . . . deployment of the German heavy armoured units into south-west Kosovo and US and Italian forces also crossing the border into Kosovo' (NATO 12/6/1999a). Two days later he reinforces that image: 'This is an operation which is going ahead of schedule, NATO forces are pouring in, they are assuming full control of Kosovo . . . The main story is that every hour 100-200 more NATO forces go in and get on with the job' (NATO 14/6/1999a). Continuous updates underline that troops are 'pouring in'. On the third day, the figure is 14,300 increasing to 29,000 by 5 July and with a total of 55,000 scheduled to arrive (24/6/1999). Four days into the operation, the PIO reassures: 'As the deployment goes on and as we establish a robust, effective security presence throughout Kosovo, let there be no doubt there will not be any "No Go" areas, KFOR will be in charge and will have all of the means to assert its authority if need be'.¹⁴⁰

Once KFOR is established, the conduct of NATO's official KFOR press briefings is transferred to Kosovo. Here the CPIO, Lt.Col. Clifford, follows up on the established message in his first briefing: 'Kfor is advancing as the Yugoslavs are withdrawing and

¹⁴⁰ NATO (15/6/1999). The same point is made in NATO (13/6/1999).

we are ahead of schedule' (NATO 18/6/1999b). 21 June is the Military Technical Agreement's deadline for Yugoslav armed forces to withdraw from Kosovo. The day before, the PIO projects KFOR's self-confidence as the unrivalled military force in the area by warning that any armed groups 'who remain in Kosovo after midnight tonight will be subject to robust KFOR enforcement' (NATO 20/6/1999).

On 22 June, when Serbian forces were out of Kosovo, the first phase concluded and the next 'Entry into Force' began. KFOR was now the *de facto* security presence in Kosovo. From that point in time, the PIOs increasingly profile KFOR not only as a traditional military force but also as a capable police force. In this respect, KFOR's Provost Marshal stipulates: 'KFOR is absolutely determined that irrespective of ethnic background our response to criminal activity will be prompt, firm but always fair' (NATO 20/6/1999). Later the PIOs reinforce that message with reference to IFOR's patrols: 'The soldiers on the street are working extremely hard in our efforts to provide a secure and stable environment. These soldiers will continue to patrol their areas 24 hours a day, 7 days a week' (NATO 9/7/1999).

Only in half a sentence in the examined period do the PIOs deviate slightly from that message, that is, on the day KFOR entered Kosovo: 'We have had one or two hiccups which is inevitable in any military operation', but then he returns to the master message: 'The deployments are on schedule and operations are continuing smoothly' (NATO 13/6/1999). Thereafter, KFOR briefers remain on the message that KFOR is a robust force capable of providing military security and establish law and order.

The parties comply

The third most profiled PI message is that the parties are complying with the provisions of the Military Technical Agreement. Serbs are withdrawing as agreed upon and the

KLA leadership fulfils the demands of the relevant UN Security Council resolution.

This is projected in 16 available transcripts of the press briefings in the sample.

A quick series of announcements made during the initial 10 days shows an impressive record on the 'Serbs are complying'-message. On KFOR's first day, the PIO comments: 'We are pleased to note that the pace of the Serb withdrawal is gathering momentum . . . about 10,000 Serb personnel were assessed to have left Kosovo into Serbia together with tanks, surface-to-air missile systems and other heavy equipment; at the same time, 11 MiG-21s left Pristina airfield for Batanica just outside Belgrade' (NATO 12/6/1999a). Six days later, the PIO informs: 'The Yugoslavs are withdrawing . . . by midnight on 20 June that is Sunday, the Yugoslav forces will be gone' (NATO 18/6/1999b). As the deadline approaches, the PIO concludes: 'The withdrawal of the uniformed Yugoslav personnel has been completed approximately 12 hours ahead of the schedule set in the military-technical agreement' (NATO 20/6/1999). Issue settled.

The message on the demilitarisation of KLA is not as clear-cut. One of the reasons may be that no plan for this existed when KFOR deployed. The UN Security Council had demanded that KLA demilitarise but how and on which conditions KLA was to conform with this decree was a pending matter (NATO 21/6/1999). In other words, where KFOR's relation to Yugoslav authorities was guided by the Military Technical Agreement, KFOR had no equivalent agreement with the KLA. The first indication of a message in this regard is rather vague but sets an optimistic tone: 'The demilitarisation of Kosovo is moving ahead at the same time. As the Serb forces withdraw from Kosovo, the KLA is handing over their weapons' (NATO 18/6/1999b). Four days later the message has developed a step further: 'The KLA has undertaken to renounce the use of force' (NATO 22/6/1999). NATO's Secretary General consolidates this two days later: 'An important milestone in the process of building peace was the signing early

on Monday morning by Mr Taci, Commander in Chief of the KLA, of an undertaking to demilitarise and to cooperate fully with NATO forces . . . I met with Mr Taci just a few moments ago and he assured me of his commitment to demilitarise the KLA' (NATO 24/6/1999). And after three weeks in Kosovo, the PIOs can point to KLA honouring in practical terms the demands of the UN Security Council resolution 1244: 'There has been broad compliance throughout Kosovo by the KLA. In one area seven truckloads of weapons have been collected from the KLA. At Orahovac, 136 more weapons were handed in yesterday with the local KLA commander claiming that 100% of KLA weapons in that area are in KFOR hands' (NATO 2/7/1999). Some days later the PIOs follow up: 'The success of the demilitarisation is the absence of the KLA members on the streets, in uniform and carrying weapons' (NATO 7/7/1999).

KFOR works with civilian organisations

Figuring in 11 out of 24 transcripts the message that 'KFOR works with civilian organisations' becomes the fourth most pronounced. This is interwoven with the humanitarian aspect of the second most voiced message that 'KFOR improves the situation in Kosovo' but refers specifically to practical cooperation. On 14 June, for example: 'Yesterday a 52 vehicle humanitarian convoy . . . was able to arrive in Pristina . . . the Fourth Brigade of the U.K. Army in Pristina is providing assistance to the UNHCR in storing that food'. The message is reinforced the following day when the PIO informs, that liaison mechanisms between KFOR, civilian counterparts and the NGOs are now being established in Pristina (NATO 15/6/1999).

It may be noted that KFOR's cooperation with UNMIK is communicated subliminally by the UN's Special Representative of the Secretary General and COMKFOR meeting reporters together during the press briefing on 21 June (see case 3). Moreover,

UNMIK's and KFOR's spokespersons appear together on the podium during subsequent press briefings.

KFOR's master messages – a summary

The most frequently repeated KFOR messages identified in this sample from the mission's first 40 days are largely identical to those of IFOR.¹⁴¹ They deviate partly from those KFOR 1 CPIO puts forward as the master messages, while they correspond fully with KFOR 5 CPIO's information (see 2.2.3). The reliability of this conclusion must be weighed against the fact that transcripts are available from only about half of the press briefings. On the other hand, one may assume that NATO would disseminate high-ranking messages as early as possible. Yet, two of the messages conveyed by the CPIO of KFOR 1 during the interviews in the present research do not appear in the records from the first 11 days' press briefings, which are all accessible.

It is difficult to interpret the sample of transcripts as communicating that 'KFOR is not an invader; KFOR is not a liberator', as the CPIO stipulates. True, in seven briefings the PIOs do mention the Military Technical Agreement, which in technical legal terms invites NATO to enter Kosovo.¹⁴² It is not this aspect of the agreement the PIOs convey, however. Rather, they use it to communicate that Serbia complies with the

¹⁴¹ The reason that 'new partners' is not included in the fourth KFOR message is that cooperating with civilian organisations and former Warsaw Pact countries cannot be called 'new' after three years of cooperation in Bosnia. In addition, initial uncertainty existed about whether Russia was cooperating with NATO until a formal agreement was settled on 18 June. Thereafter, Russian contingents formed part of KFOR.

¹⁴² NATO (12/6/1999a; 13/6/1999; 14/6/1999; 15/6/1999; 16/6/1999; 18/6/1999a; 18/6/1999b).

terms in the agreement.¹⁴³ No mention is made of NATO not being a liberator in the sample.

Nor do the PIOs explicitly pronounce that 'KFOR is subordinated to UNMIK'. KFOR's relation to UNMIK or the UN organisation above the level of specialised agencies is mentioned only in five press briefings and reflected in common UN-NATO press briefings at least since early July.¹⁴⁴ On these occasions the relation appears more as a cooperation with than a subordination to UNMIK.¹⁴⁵

Ample evidence exists, however, to sustain the last master message presented by the CPIO that 'KFOR is in control'. This corresponds to the two highest ranking messages identified in the content analysis. It may also be noted that the messages put forward by KFOR 5's CPIO compares with the three highest ranking messages from the present analysis (see 2.2.3).

2.4 Summary

Against this background, it can be concluded that NATO used PI as a means of power to achieve political and military ends. PI's mode of operation was guided by a PI policy, stipulating goals and intentions, and based on three components: a message strategy, a unity of effort and a resolution to maintain credible relations with the press.

¹⁴³ For example: '[The Serbs] are making a serious effort to comply with the Military Technical Agreement' (NATO 16/6/1999).

¹⁴⁴ A relation is mentioned in NATO (15/6/1999; 20/6/1999; 21/6/1999; 24/6/1999; 7/7/1999).

¹⁴⁵ The closest indication in the sample of KFOR's subordination to UNMIK presents itself on 21 June. Sharing the press briefing podium with the UN Secretary General Special Representative in charge of UNMIK, COMKFOR states: 'Senor de Mello and myself will continue to co-operate closely as required by the Security Council resolution as we pass from this first phase of KFOR's operation to the next' (NATO 21/6/1999).

The six illustrative cases, the elaborations on PI's mode of operations and the content analysis show that NATO's political and military leaders applied their PI function to enhance member countries' public support to, and thereby political legitimacy for, the alliance's *raison d'être* as well as its presence and use of physical force in the Balkans. Further, NATO used PI in an effort to achieve specific military objectives in the Balkans, particularly to influence the parties' and people's general behaviour and specific actions without having to resort to physical force. PI provided NATO with a non-lethal means of power which allegedly often sufficed to promote stability, deter crises and resolve conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Van Dyke (30/7/2004), for example, appreciates PI as one of four main elements of power used by the international community to influence the Bosnian peace process – the other elements being political, economic, and military. Idsøe (26/3/2004) agrees with the qualification that information was also involved when the other three elements of power were applied. Clifford sees PI as a means and argues that with rules of engagement based on the use of minimum necessary force 'the only tool really that the Force Commander had was information' (Clifford 27/4/2004. See further footnote 24 and section 2.2). In the same vein Idsøe (26/3/2004) stipulates: 'I consider PI a tool, just like Operations'. Acknowledging that his view was not necessarily shared by other functions, Idsøe (18/2/2004) holds that PI was conceived in such terms at the executive level: 'I will claim, as does Skiaker [COMKFOR 5] that the way we dealt with the media, was the way we solved the conflict'.

PI operated strategically and in co-ordination with principal NATO assets to influence the media's projections of the alliance and its activities. PI assisted the highest level of command in developing operational plans and was used to implement the same plans.

PI communicated NATO's intentions, stressed its resolve and sought to multiply the parties' and people's perceptions of NATO's might.

To function as a means of power the CPIOs had a largely common approach. Their mode of operation was guided by a policy framework giving their function general direction and, among other things, prohibiting it from being untruthful. Their final target groups were generally a variety of publics which they tried to influence through the media. It was a condition, then, that reporters relied on PI as a trustworthy source for their media stories, which is why the CPIOs strove to maintain credible relations with the press. Further, they developed a message strategy promoting, as the content analysis reflects, a few messages they wanted the publics to support. In an effort to increase the consistency of NATO's messages and avoid public uncertainty about its intentions, the CPIOs strove to support a sense of unity of effort in the dissemination of messages. They co-ordinated both vertically, that is, within the PI function from the lowest to the highest level of command, and horizontally with other functions with respect to both planning and implementation.

The latter, the CPIOs claim, was a novelty within NATO. PI assisted the Command Group in identifying appropriate responses to up-coming events and, at times, PI was used as a line function to implement the same plans. In this role PI served along with traditional operational functions, such as air power and artillery. NATO governments' unwillingness to use physical force in the peace processes, the rules of engagement's restrictions on the missions to use only minimum necessary force, and the non-lethal feature of PI, spurred the force commanders to rely increasingly on PI. In this context the CPIOs communicated their respective Force Commander's intentions, his lethal capabilities to achieve them, and his resolve to use them against violent opposition. PI

was used as an enforcement measure, well short of lethal force, to deter and coerce targets into a desired course of action.

At least 14 relations between PI and its target groups can be identified from the cases. The findings suggest that PI influenced its targets in several ways that may be classified in three main categories: PI coerced the EAAGs to take the course of action NATO had set out for them (see case 5); it deterred the warring parties (see case 1 and 2) and Serbia (see case 4) from taking a course of action against NATO's interest; and it shaped the understanding and opinions of the publics in NATO member states (see case 1, 3, and 5) as well as in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia (see all cases).

From these findings an important question emerges: what kind of influence does PI exercise? The CPIOs' views on this matter remain vague. Yet, the question is valid. It can further our understanding not only of the way the CPIOs assume they influenced their targets but more broadly of the forms of power international actors may exert to direct events in the field of international affairs.

The answers are still unclear, however. Did PI use the same form of power when it changed its targets' minds at gun point (see case 4), as when it informed the Kosovars why the EAAGS had to leave the Presevo valley (case 5), or persuaded NATO's public that supporting IFOR was a worthy cause (case 1)? Moreover, is it an exercise of power to inform the publics, for example, about the content of their peace agreement (case 1), to counter disinformation, and to establish the facts as one sees them (eg case 6)?

One's answers to such questions clearly depend, on the definition of power along which one reasons. Hence, the value of scrutinising the empirical findings from different theoretical perspectives in the following chapter.

Chapter 3

Three notions of power applied to NATO Press and Information activities

This chapter explores the thesis' theoretical question: How can Robert A. Dahl's, Steven Lukes', and Michel Foucault's respective notions of power enhance our theoretical understanding of the way the NATO PI function may exercise power to achieve political and military ends?

Chapter 2 argued that NATO used PI as a means of power to influence people's specific actions and general behaviour and to enhance public support to NATO, that is, to win what in broad terms are the strategic objectives of our times (see 1.1). Against this background, chapter 3 aims to conceptualise the type of influence PI activities may exert when pursuing these goals. It applies different theoretical perspectives to identify different forms of power in the CPIOs' explanations of the way they influence their targets. Chapter 3 does not aim to prove that PI exercised one or the other form of power. Rather, it aims to further our appreciation of the PI–target relations and the dynamics of power involved. Of more general interest, this endeavour provides a conceptual framework that can further our understanding of how actors can exploit social communication as a means of power in politics and war (methodological considerations have been presented in 1.4.2).

3.1 The three notions of power

The chapter commences with an introduction to the three selected notions of power before applying them in an analysis. Each of the three theories is elaborated on in three turns: first, their respective unique features are introduced, which represent one of four faces of power in the academic debate (see 1.4.2); second, their conceptual differences are highlighted; and third, their different methodological approaches to the study of social power are outlined. It is useful to begin with the concept that appeals to common sense.

3.1.1 Robert A. Dahl – compulsory power

When Robert A. Dahl (1957: 202-03) first stipulated that ‘*A* has power over *B* to the extent that he can get *B* to do something that *B* would not otherwise do’, he framed debates on the notion of power for decades.¹⁴⁶ Arguably, that sentence remains the predominant definition of this cardinal social phenomenon in the academic fields of Political Science and International Relations.¹⁴⁷ Despite numerous critiques of Dahl’s concept and theoretical efforts to move the debate beyond this definition, it remains an

¹⁴⁶ This definition derives from his first most cited article on power – ‘The Concept of Power’ from 1957. Dahl’s reference to the theoretical actors in italics and capital letters – *A* and *B* – will be adopted in the remainder of this thesis. Dahl has written extensively on power. In addition to the works and articles used in this study his ideas figure notably in *Modern Political Analysis* (Dahl 1964) and his article from 1965 entitled ‘Cause and Effect in the Study of Politics’. The two later writings do not add to the present analysis, however, which is why they are not included here.

¹⁴⁷ For its influence in the field of International Relations see for example works of references in the discipline such as Griffiths and O’Callaghan (2002: 253) and Evans and Newnham (1998: 447-8). Dahl’s notion is compatible with the conception of power that sustains the work of key authors in what has been called the Realist school of International Relations (see 1.2.1). For instance, Waltz (1979: 192) sails close into the winds of Dahl when the former adopts the view that ‘an agent is powerful to the extent that he affects others more than they affect him’ and adds that this conception compares to a ‘common American definition of power’. Specific reference to Dahl’s notion is made in the works of Baldwin (1971: 20), Rothgrev (1993: 98), Nye (2004: 2), and Barnett and Duvall (2005: 49-51).

almost indispensable point of reference in the work of any scholar who wants to be taken seriously on this academic exchange of views. Until the late 1970s, mainstream studies of power offered different approaches to answering Dahl's questions: 'what is power?' and 'who has power?' Still, it was from his questions they departed.¹⁴⁸

Dahl perceives the notion of power as including a broad range of human relations, which may also be described by terms like influence, compulsion, and force.¹⁴⁹ He often uses the words interchangeably but in his classical study on power *Who governs? Democracy and Power in an American City* from 1961, he generally uses the term 'influence' rather than 'power'.¹⁵⁰

Here, Dahl sets out to learn who has power in the east coast city of New Haven. At the time, the dominant scholarly view was that a power-elite controlled American politics.¹⁵¹ In contrast, Dahl (1961: 86) finds that, in the course of two centuries 'an elite no longer rules New Haven'. Different people have power in different sectors, and the professional politicians are sensitive to their electorates' interests. Hence, a pluralist political community has replaced the oligarchs.

Dahl (1968: 407) elaborates on power primarily in terms of compulsion but does mention that persuasion and inducement also form part of his conception. Power is

¹⁴⁸ Hayward (2000: 11, 17-19). Lukes (1974: 11, 23) and Baldwin (1971: 19, 23) are among the scholars in this field of inquiry that accept Dahl's general perspective.

¹⁴⁹ The latter term should be conceived in the sense of what the present thesis refers to as physical force.

¹⁵⁰ Dahl's 1961 work is divided into six books of which two apply the term 'influence' in their titles. In the index he makes no reference to the term 'power' but nine references to 'influence', and four to 'legitimacy'. In other works he uses the words interchangeably, see for example Dahl (1957: 202; 1968: 407).

¹⁵¹ Notably among so-called 'Elitist' such as Laswell and Kaplan (1950).

intentionally exercised. It has to do with who can impose one's will, and who is confined to accepting that will.¹⁵² Along this line of reasoning Dahl's notion of power shall be referred to as *compulsory power* in the present thesis.¹⁵³

This concept is clearly relevant in the field of International Relations and war, and thus for the broad concern of the present study.¹⁵⁴ Compulsory power's focus on behaviour – 'get *B* to do' – makes it particularly relevant to explain the kind of tasks that armed forces have traditionally performed. In the introduction Cooper tags such traditional conceptions of war as modern, and the power of conventional armed forces was characterised by its potential ability to, as Parker laconically puts it, kill people and break things (see 1.2). At the same time, however, the notion does not hold sufficient explanatory power to account for the majority of the relations between the NATO PI function and its targets, which aimed to influence the latter's' perceptions. To this end, the third face of power appears more useful.

3.1.2 Steven Lukes – structural power

Steven Lukes offers a conception of power that essentially pulls Dahl's notion to its limits, a feature he conveys in the title of his primary work on the topic – *Power: a*

¹⁵² Thus, Dahl (1968: 406) subscribes to a Weberian conception of the term and notes that so does Morgenthau (1960).

¹⁵³ This term derives from Barnett and Duvall's (2005: 49) framework to categorise the four faces of power. When Lukes' notion is later labelled structural power and Foucault's productive power these terms derive from the same source.

¹⁵⁴ There is a striking similarity between Dahl's conception of power and Clausewitz's (1976: 75) definition of war as 'an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will'.

radical view.¹⁵⁵ Lukes (1974: 23) holds: ‘*A* may exercise power over *B* by getting him to do what he does not want to do but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants’.

Lukes expands the notion to encompass manipulative forms of power, including subtle kinds of thought control that are exercised possibly without the deceived ever noticing.

As pointed out by Lukes (1974: 23):

Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have – that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires? One does not have to go to the lengths of talking about *Brave new World*, or the world of B. F. Skinner, to see this: thought control takes many less total and more mundane forms, through the control of information, through the mass media and through the processes of socialisation.¹⁵⁶

Where Dahl individualises power and focuses on observable conflicts of interests, Lukes draws attention to the hegemonic social structures that influence ordinary people’s lives without necessarily being questioned. Sometimes the structures are not even realised. As this may well be the most effective use of power, he proposes a ‘three-dimensional view’ of power to account for the multiple covert and often unconscious ways in which such latent conflicts are suppressed within society (Lukes 1974: 21-25).

¹⁵⁵ Lukes’ academic work on power is not extensive. Beside this title, his ideas on the topic figure in a volume with several other contributions and a very brief reply to a critic (respectively Lukes 1986; 1976). From the point of view of the present thesis, his third dimension of power does not become clearer in his late writings that are often left out when his perspective is presented, see for instance Barnett and Duvall (2005).

¹⁵⁶ Lukes’ notion of power thus appears suitable to conceptualise Morgenthau’s (1960: 28) earlier mentioned understanding of power as ‘man’s control over the minds and actions of other men’ (see 1.2.1).

Referring to Antonio Gramsci and Althusser, among others, Lukes (1974: 47, 52) argues that third-dimensional power allows political systems to control the political agenda and to prevent the interests of *B* from becoming political issues. His theoretical leanings inspire to dub Lukes' concept *structural power*. As examples of such relations he points to the capitalist class' influence over ordinary people and the Soviet Union's influence over Eastern Europe during the Cold War (Lukes 1974: 45, 48).

The political inclination aside, Lukes' view is considered radical because it extends the scope of power relations into the diffuse. His concept aims to account for power not only in overt and covert conflicts, as do the first and second dimension of power respectively, but also in latent conflicts, which is the third dimension he adds (Lukes 1974: 32). In this thesis, however, it is only the latter dimension of Lukes' concept which is considered, when reference is made to his work, this in order to distinguish it from Dahl's elaboration on the first dimension.

Lukes sees latent conflicts in social relations where subjects' *real interests* are thwarted without the suppressed being aware of it or with them giving higher priority to interests that are not genuinely theirs. For as he argues: 'men's wants may themselves be a product of a system which works against their interests, and, in such cases, relates the latter to what they would want and prefer, were they able to make the choice' (Lukes 1974: 34). By assuming that real interests exist Lukes introduces a contested assumption to the academic debate on power (Bradshaw 1976).

Illustrating his concept at work, Lukes points to a study by Matthew Crenson (1971) on air pollution in US cities showing that this health hazard was hardly raised as a political issue in cities where industrial and political power was centralised. In contrast, in cities where power was more diversified, air pollution was dealt with politically. Lukes

(1974: 41-45) concludes that in the former cases structural power successfully excluded citizens' real interests from the political agenda.

In the context of this study, Lukes' idea of structural power offers a notion that aims to expand the scope of analysis from Dahl's narrow focus on behaviour to including perceptions. It thus holds promise to conceptualise how PI may influence public understanding (see 1st PI goal in 2.2.1). In addition, the notion's features of manipulation and thought control make it suitable, it would seem, to account for propaganda efforts, and arguably informs the understanding of influence that underlies much of the criticism raised against PI (see 1.3 and footnote 74). While the latter is outside the scope of this study, the considerations with respect to Lukes' applicability in the present context still question the grounds on which propaganda accusations against NATO is based.

3.1.3 Michel Foucault – productive power

Michel Foucault offers a different approach to explore how people's perceptions and behaviour are influenced.¹⁵⁷ He approaches the phenomenon of power in a more historical and less positivistic manner than the two other scholars. He accepts with Dahl that power influences people's behaviour by means of sanctioning them. Yet theorising within the framework of states he argues that this form of power, which he refers to as a *Right of Death*, was dominant only in premodern times before it was transformed into a

¹⁵⁷ A philosopher of profession, Foucault's scholarship extends to multiple academic disciplines including linguistics and sociology. Foucault (1982: 777) considers power an implicit theme in some of his earlier works but the particular notion of power which co-exists with knowledge, here termed productive power, was first presented in *Discipline and Punish: the birth of the prison* (Foucault 1979) from 1975 and was developed in *The Will to Knowledge. The History of Sexuality: 1* (Foucault 1998) a year later. See further Lindgren (2003: 327, 334).

Power over Life sometime between the 17th and 18th century (Foucault 1998: 131-59).

In the former period sovereigns maintained internal cohesion of political communities by enforcing law, but otherwise did not interfere in people's life. People were objects of power.

This changed when demands of industrialisation and modern society along with an emerging scientific concern for the performance of the body linked power to knowledge. Power began to manage life. Power shaped life to meet demands of the time. People became subjects of power. To this end, knowledge was useful. The title of Foucault's 1976 [1998] work, *The Will to Knowledge*, subtly conveys his thesis that knowledge linked up with 'The will to power' that Nietzsche had explored a century earlier. A whole range of human affairs hitherto confined to the private sphere and existing primarily in a material sense, as for example illness and human reproduction, began to exist in a discursive form as well, as respectively health and sexuality. Authoritative understandings of such aspects of life emerged in scientific disciplines, as medicine and psychology. Knowledge objectified features of human existence by dividing information about reality in terms of binary opposition, that is in conceptual pairs such as sound/ill and normal/abnormal (Foucault 1979: 199).

Crucially, this organisation of information, this 'scientificity' as he calls it, constructed *systems of legitimate knowledge* (Foucault 1998: 72), which in turn created the formation of special knowledge (Foucault 1998: 106). It established the norms that shaped people's perceptions of what was and what was not, for instance, sound and normal. It was a technique that induced *dividing practices*, as Foucault (1982: 777-78) labels them, by which 'the subject is either divided inside himself or divided from others'. From this perspective, knowledge became a means to standardise, to homogenise, people's mindsets and behaviour. Knowledge exerts a 'power of

normalization, in the arrangement of a power-knowledge over individuals' (Foucault 1979: 296). People's inclination to be on the generally accepted side of dividing normative lines disciplines people to fit the norm.¹⁵⁸ 'A normalizing society is the historical outcome of a technology of power centered on life' (Foucault 1998: 144). This form of power did not primarily express itself in legal terms but in a broader normative sense:

Law cannot help but be armed, and its arm, *par excellence*, is death . . .
The law always refers to the sword. But a power whose task is to take charge of life needs continuous regulatory and corrective mechanisms. It is no longer a matter of bringing death into play in the field of sovereignty but of distributing the living in the domain of value and utility . . . it effects distribution around the norm (Foucault 1998: 144).

From this perspective the most pervasive form of power is discursive, in which power joins arms with knowledge, a phenomenon he generally refers to with the notion *power-knowledge*. This discursive form of power has penetrated practically all aspects of people's existence and continues to shape our way of perceiving, of making sense, of thinking, and therefore of behaving (Foucault 1998: 142-3; 1982: 781). Foucault (1998: 97) explains:

It is in this sphere of force relations that we must try to analyze the mechanisms of power. In this way we will escape from the system of Law-and-Sovereign which has captivated political thought for such a long time. And if it is true that Machiavelli was among the few – and this no doubt was the scandal of his 'cynicism' – who conceived the power of the Prince in terms of force relationships, perhaps we need to go one step

¹⁵⁸ Foucault (1998: 143-44) refers to this dimension of power-knowledge as 'bio-power'. Although this is a central term in his perspective, bio-power is not presented here for fear that it may confuse, rather than clarify the use of Foucault in this study.

further, do without the persona of the Prince, and decipher power mechanisms on the basis of a strategy that is immanent in force relationships.¹⁵⁹

From this discursive approach to power – or, analytical framework of power – the present study shall apply an interpretation of power-knowledge departing from Foucault's (1998: 94) idea that 'power comes from below', that is, from subjects. It shall be referred to as *productive power* which can briefly be described as an ability subjects apply when they exploit the Foucauldian power mechanisms inherent in discursive strategies (see 3.4.3).

Foucault is primarily interested in the productive effects of power. He offers an example from a child's upbringing to illustrate this dimension of power-knowledge at work. Discourses on sexuality influence and is being influenced, he argues, by 'the body of the child, under surveillance, surrounded in his cradle, his bed, or his room by an entire watch-crew of parents, nurses, servants, educators, and doctors, all attentive to the least manifestations of his sex' (Foucault 1998: 98). The ideas and behaviour of this 'watch-crew' is produced by discursive strategies on sexuality, that is, by systems of legitimate knowledge, by a particular medico-sexual regime (Foucault 1998: 42). The relatives and professionals influence the child, and each other. But they also add value to, and thereby influence, the discursive systems of meaning and signification. They reinforce or produce variations to already existing themes. In other words, the subjects that relate to the child are influenced by dominant discourses but they also, in ever so minor ways,

¹⁵⁹ Note that Foucault uses the term 'force' in a discursive sense, often by referring to it as 'force relations' or 'field of forces'. This term we shall dub *discursive force* in order to distinguish it from what elsewhere in the thesis is called 'physical force'. The latter refers to force as a conventional military capacity to apply armed force that is potentially lethal.

change the identity of the same discourses, and this with implications for future discursive effects.

This serves to introduce the productive dimensions of Foucault's concept, which will soon be elaborated on. But for now it suffices to note that his work offers to the present study a notion of power that allows us to understand how PI may have influenced the ideas and behaviour of target groups so distant and diffuse as NATO's publics.¹⁶⁰

3.2 Conceptual differences

After this brief introduction to each of the three prominent notions of power, it is useful to compare them in order to decipher their dissimilarities more explicitly. This will clarify their particular utility in the following analysis. The examination shall first shed light on their conceptual differences and in a proceeding section emphasise their distinctive methodological approaches. For the former purpose the main differences may be summarised in this table:

¹⁶⁰ It may be noticed that the contribution of Foucault's understanding of power to this broad area of concern resembles approaches in communication studies, such as 'indexing' (eg Benet 1990) and 'issue framing' (eg Entman 1993). The latter explicates, for example, 'to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation' (Entman 1993:52). Among others, Myers et al. (1996) use such an approach to argue that different media frames resulted in different international responses to the civil wars in Bosnia and Rwanda.

	<i>Dahl and Lukes</i>	<i>Foucault</i>
<i>Power comes from</i>	someone, somewhere	everywhere
<i>Power is</i>	negative, it sanctions	positive, it produces
<i>Power as</i>	possessional, a capacity	exercised, an ability *
<i>Power influences</i>	causally	mutually
<i>Power must be</i>	explained	interpreted
<i>Truth and moral</i>	has an essence	is produced by power

Table 1: Dahl's and Lukes' versus Foucault's notions of power. The table is inspired by Stewart Cleeg (1989: 182).

*) Foucault does not present the mechanisms of power as an ability but as an analytical framework. Presenting power as an ability is a methodological take specifically developed for the purpose of the present thesis, which is labelled productive power. This notion is compatible with the dynamics of Foucault's analytical framework but specifically enters the framework from the perspective of subjects.

It may appear peculiar that Dahl's and Lukes' notions of power are grouped together in the left column of table 1, given the dissimilarities presented in the previous section (see 3.1). Notably, the former concept does not share the latter's focus on structural power that operates in latent conflicts. Further investigation into the theoretical constructions will reveal, however, that Lukes' notion at a more profound level shares Dahl's assumptions about how we are to understand social power. Foucault's approach to the same phenomenon, on the other hand, differs radically from the two others' understanding.

Each of the notions will now be scrutinised in turn to briefly elucidate the major conceptual cleavages between Dahl/Lukes and Foucault, as well as the internal resemblances and differences between Dahl's and Lukes' respective notions.

3.2.1 Conceptual features of Dahl's notion of power

The title of Dahl's major work, *Who Governs?*, projects his central assumption that someone has power. Power has a locus. Consequently, Dahl's research task becomes to find out who has power in New Haven. Power has several sources, however. In line with ideas sustaining a pluralist political community, different people have power in different sectors and the political stratum is accountable to its electorates. Still, within a given sector and on a specific issue area it is possible to find out who is the most powerful, according to Dahl (1961: 336).

Moreover, he conceives power in negative terms. Dahl's (1957: 203) definition that *A* 'can get *B* to do something that *B* would not otherwise do' clearly shows that he sees power as restricting the free will of others to act, or conversely limiting one's own actions. Power may be a means to sanction others.

This compulsory power is conceived in possessional terms, as a capacity that *A* has more or less of in comparison to *B*, which leads Dahl to an instrumental conception of power. Power is a means to influence others. Power is a capacity an actor possesses and applies in his relations to others. It 'consists of all the resources – opportunities, acts, objects – that he can exploit in order to affect the behaviour of another' (Dahl 1957: 203). This is what Dahl (1957: 203) refers to as the *base* of power and which could be studied as 'the war potential of nations'. The base itself is inert. *A* only has power if he demonstrates his willingness to use it:

The base . . . must be exploited in some fashion if the behaviour of others is to be altered. The *means* or instruments of such exploitation are numerous; often they involve threats or promises to employ the base in some way and they may involve actual use of the base . . . Thus the means is a mediating activity by *A* between *A*'s base and *B*'s responses (Dahl 1957: 203, emphasis in original).

It follows from this that Dahl regards power as intentionally exercised. Power is a deliberate action to affect another actor. This intentional and instrumental feature of compulsory power will be particularly useful in the analysis to advance the understanding of PI's mode of operation to influence its targets.

Another characteristic feature is that Dahl understands the phenomenon of social power in terms of 'power over' someone; as a relation between two actors where *A* makes *B* do. This is a causal perception of social relations where power goes one way: from *A* to *B*. Against this background, Dahl's compulsory power may be described as a capacity that someone can exploit to compel others to do something.

3.2.2 Conceptual features of Lukes' notion of power

It has already been shown how Lukes' notion of power differs from Dahl's by extending the scope of analysis to include not only how power may influence behaviour but also perceptions (see 3.1.3). Lukes thus offers a conception that purports to identify relations of power that are not only sustained by means of compulsion but also of manipulation. A feature that appears useful in the present context.

In many other respects, however, Lukes continues along the conceptual road that Dahl has pointed out. First of all both scholars conceive power as a relation between two actors. Power derives from a source. As Lukes (1974: 56) metaphorically explains, it 'flow[s] from the action, or inaction, of certain specifiable agents'. Although he takes a broader view on who may constitute *A*, expanding the actor to collective forces and social hegemonies, he maintains the idea that power has a locus (Lukes 1974: 22).

Lukes is also concerned with the negative and prohibitory dimension of power. His research task is 'to find out what the exercise of power prevents people from doing,

and sometimes even thinking' (Lukes 1974: 48). Moreover, Lukes (1974: 34), like Dahl, explicitly describes *A*'s relation to *B* as power over. He criticises Hannah Arendt and Talcott Parsons for conceiving power as an ability, rather than a relation between agents. Lukes explains that their 'power to' approach is mistaken because 'the conflictual aspect of power – the fact that it is exercised *over* people – disappears altogether from this understanding. And along with it disappears the central interest in studying power relations in the first place – an interest in the (attempted or successful) securing of people's compliance by overcoming or averting their opposition' (Lukes 1974: 31).

Further, while Lukes offers a very new answer to Dahl's basic question: 'who has power?', he still departs from that question and thus automatically adopts Dahl's assumption about social causality. Power goes one way, from *A* to *B*, a relational assumption that Lukes (1974: 26) spells out: 'The absolutely basic common core to . . . all talk of power is the notion that *A* in some way affects *B*'. One of the major methodological challenges which he contemplates is how to empirically identify the mechanism of an exercise of structural power. He remains optimistic, however: 'There seems to be no impossibility in principle of establishing a causal nexus here' (Lukes 1974: 51). The purpose of Lukes' conception of power is to develop an analytical tool to prove that someone suppresses the majority.

Where Dahl (1968: 406) claims to explore the phenomenon of power in a normative neutral manner, Lukes (1974: 24) takes an essentialist stand on the moral aspects of power. Real and false interests exist exterior to subjects' conscience. Consensus can be false or manipulated. He recognises that this position is ethically controversial but shares Crenson's view that problematising such aspects in cases involving the degradation of public health ultimately rests on 'the opinion of the observer

concerning the value of human life'.¹⁶¹ Against this background Cleeg (1989: 182) has termed Lukes' approach 'an ethics of power'.

Lukes' stand to analyse fair and square from the perspective of basic human rights is contestable. Nonetheless, it serves as a privileged ethical position from which one can choose to conduct research. Given that ethical considerations are beyond the scope of the present thesis, this matter shall not be investigated further at this stage (see 1.4.3). Later and for practical purposes related to the conduct of analysis from the perspective of structural power, the validity of Lukes' moral stand as a methodological assumption will be critically assessed.

This should suffice to show that despite clearly different features in their notions of power mentioned above and methodological disputes (see 3.3.1 and 3.3.2), Lukes and Dahl share common ground. Moreover and crucially for the present purpose, this limits their explanatory power. Foucault's notion of power is useful to cast light on modes of influence that are inaccessible to Lukes and Dahl.

3.2.3 Conceptual features of Foucault's notion of power

Without making a direct reference to the two other scholars, Foucault discourages approaching power in the way they have proposed. Summarizing his understanding of power he stipulates:

¹⁶¹ Crenson cited in Lukes (1974: 46).

In short, it is a question of orienting ourselves to a conception of power which replaces the privilege of the law with the viewpoint of the objective, the privilege of prohibition with the viewpoint of tactical efficacy, the privilege of sovereignty with the analysis of a multiple and mobile field of force relations, wherein far-reaching but never completely stable, effects of domination are produced. The strategical model, rather than the model based on law (Foucault 1998: 102).

Dahl and Lukes' idea that power has a source, a locus, is therefore mistaken, according to Foucault.¹⁶² Rather, we should appreciate that 'power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything but because it comes from everywhere', as Foucault (1998: 93) is widely cited for. This idea that nobody is in control does not exclude people and their activities as sources of power. On the contrary, people exercise power with, in Foucault's (1998: 95) formulation, 'a series of aims and objectives. But this does not mean that it [power] results from the choice or decisions of an individual subject; let us not look for the headquarters that presides over its rationality'. Thus, at the level of subjects, he subscribes to the intentional feature of power that Dahl promotes (see 3.2.1), but while Foucault regards subjects as having an impact also at the level of society, he does not attach particular intentions to influence at this level.

Foucault's idea is that when people act they also create discursive effects. In a context, or realm, that he terms the 'multiple and mobile field of force relations' these effects meet the effects of innumerable other activities of people and discursive forces. Here the effects integrate in force relations that are transformed into broader discursive strategies, and at this stage 'it is often the case that no one is there to have invented them [the

¹⁶² With a hint to Dahl Foucault (1998: 99) asserts: 'We must not look for who has power . . .' Nor is the question, as Lukes will have it, to find out 'what over-all domination was served' (Foucault 1998: 97).

strategies], and few who can be said to have formulated them' (Foucault 1998: 95). In other words, although power has a discursive form, it derives from and is changed by people's actions but crucially with an effect that is not the intended result of any subjects in particular. Power takes the form of discursive strategies without strategists, as Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (1986: 109) remark.

Foucault highlights the positive and productive dimension of power, as a contrast to the negative and prohibitory conception that Dahl and his followers emphasise. Therefore Foucault (1979: 194) famously asserts:

We must cease once and for all to describe the effect of power in negative terms: it 'excludes', it 'represses', it 'censors', it 'abstracts', it 'masks', it 'conceals'. In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth.

More generally, in his research on madness, crime and sexuality Foucault's thesis has been that power-knowledge produces relations of domination and social hegemonies. More than that power-knowledge creates people as subjects. The state, for instance, is more adequately understood as a product of power-knowledge, than a producer of it. He shows how knowledge, meaning and norms are historical contingent. The terms along which we evaluate what qualifies as, for example, right or wrong, are historical constructs (Foucault 1998: 105).

This outlook deserves elaboration since it is particularly relevant in the broad context of this thesis. Foucault's stand contradicts the normative assumption of Lukes' conception. When meaning is historical contingent people cannot have the kind of real interests that Lukes seeks to reveal, since this would suppose that interests and truth have a core, an essence, that exists exterior to the social context. Foucault cannot accept this point of

view. Rather, morality should be understood as a product of power-knowledge and therefore as changing in time and space. He clarifies:

By truth I do not mean the ‘ensemble of truths which are to be discovered and accepted’ but rather ‘the ensemble of rules according to which the true and false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true’, it being understood also that it’s not a matter of a battle ‘on behalf of the truth but a battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays’.¹⁶³

Although this quote has much broader application than truth in the sphere of interests, it conveys Foucault’s ontological position. Truth does not exist a priori, it is a social construction. Thus, he refuses to accept the positivist grounds upon which Dahl and Lukes theorise. It is from this perspective Foucault’s (1998: 93) well-known understanding of power should be comprehended: ‘One needs to be nominalistic, no doubt: power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society’.

Further, Foucault cannot accept Dahl’s and Lukes’ possessional conceptions. Power cannot, to any significant extent, be possessed, because the dynamic forces in society are beyond the control of subjects – beyond an *A*. Therefore Foucault (1979: 26) claims that ‘power is exercised rather than possessed’.

That view does not prevent him from sharing Dahl’s view that people exercise power in an intentional manner. According to Foucault (1998: 95) such tactics have a logic, and objectives can be identified. In a broader sense, however, Foucault’s notion of power is

¹⁶³ Interview with Foucault in Gordon (1980: 132).

better understood as discursive strategies. Rather than following Dahl's lead, asking 'who has power?' and proving who that 'someone' is, Foucault wants to understand how the power mechanisms operate (see 3.1.3).

It follows from this reasoning that Foucault is at odds with the causal relation between subjects which the two other scholars assume. Power is not a question about whether *A* has power over *B*. It is a question of how discursive strategies influence *A* and *B*, how the two latter influence each other, and how that engagement in turn influences the discursive strategies. Influence is mutual. Power relations are reciprocal, as his example from a child's upbringing illustrates (see 3.1.3).

In the context of the present study, it is particularly stimulating to draw attention to a distinctive feature of power in Foucault's theoretical universe, which becomes clearer in his late explorations on the topic. This is a form of power which he refers to as *government* and related terms like *govern*, *governmentality*, the *art of government*, and *government techniques* (Foucault 1982; 1991).¹⁶⁴ To apprehend his use of these terms it is beneficial to quote him at length:

Government is defined as a right manner of disposing things so as to lead not to the form of the common good, as the jurists' texts would have said, but to an end which is 'convenient' for each of the things that are to be governed. This implies a plurality of specific aims: for instance, government will have to ensure that the greatest possible quantity of wealth is produced, that the people are provided with sufficient means of

¹⁶⁴ These terms are presented in italics to draw attention to Foucault's distinctive use of them. They do not refer to the conventional understanding of the term 'government', which is a narrower notion referring to a state's executive political branch. In the remainder of the text these terms will be used in the Foucauldian sense unless mention is made of the contrary.

subsistence, that the population is enabled to multiply, etc. (Foucault 1991: 95).

Government has implication for his conception of power:

Basically power is less a confrontation between two adversaries or the linking of one to the other than a question of government. This word must be allowed the very broad meaning which it had in the sixteenth century. 'Government' did not refer only to political structures or to the management of states; rather, it designated the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed: the government of children, of souls, of communities, of families, of the sick . . . modes of actions . . . destined to act upon the possibilities of action of other people. To govern, in this sense, is *to structure the possible field of action of others* (Foucault 1982: 789-90. Italics added).

Further, government is '*guiding the possibility of conduct and putting order in the possible outcome*' (Foucault 1982: 789. Italics added). The art of government is thus a question of how people are directed towards particular ends. With the Enlightenment a certain form of mentality developed in thoughts about how to govern, which eventually consolidated in what Foucault refers to with his new term governmentality.

This emerging rationality of the state resulted in a variety of techniques and practices which Foucault (1991: 92) encapsulates in his particular use of the term *police* whose overall aim it was to make people content in order to strengthen the power of the state and its ability to exercise power.¹⁶⁵ Such a form of power does not influence people's behaviour by violent means of sanctions but by shaping and constructing people's

¹⁶⁵ Gordon (1991: 10) clarifies that this term should not be confused with its conventional use but refers to policy, or *polizeiwissenschaft*, which is a government technique particular to the state.

rationality (Foucault 2000: 321-24). Government doesn't only act on people; it also acts in them, and through them. It creates them as subjects (Foucault 1982: 781).

In the analysis, Foucault's ideas – that influence is mutual, that power has a discursive form and that it operates in the multiple and mobile field of force relations – prove useful to advance our understanding of the context in which PI operates. Moreover, his positive approach to power allows us to see how PI influences its targets by producing meaning and norms that structure people's possible field of action.

3.3 Methodological differences

The introduction established that the three notions of power fulfil criteria that make them potentially useful to the theoretical purpose of this thesis, that is, to enhance our understanding of PI's mode of operation to achieve NATO's ends (see 1.4.2). Whether the notion's methodological requirements can be met in an actual analysis is another matter, however. Or, to phrase it differently, it is still to be shown that the empirical findings can provide the kinds of warrant the concepts prescribe to characterise PI's mode of operation as an exercise of power.

To permit such considerations in the analytical stage (ie 3.4), the last round of theoretical clarification aims to highlight the notions' different methodological approaches to the study of social power. The presentation sheds light on the notions' respective utilities and constraints as conceptual aids to improve our understanding of how PI may influence its targets, and indicates to which ends and in which ways PI is likely to be a useful means of power in military operations. Again, Dahl is first out.

3.3.1 Dahl's methodological approach – Behaviouralism

A cardinal concern in Dahl's project is to develop a solid method that allows scholars to give evidence to claim that someone, in a given case, is the most powerful. His methodological approach is influenced by the methods of Behaviouralism, which was the dominant scientific approach in Political Science at the time he developed his concept.¹⁶⁶ With direct reference to principles borrowed from the physicist Isaac Newton and the field of Economics, Dahl (1957: 205-09; 1968: 413-14) applies this positivistic approach to measure and compare actors' compulsory power.

As mentioned, he conceives power as a causal relation between two actors (see 3.2.1). *B* is the dependent variable. *A* is the independent. These actors can be individuals, groups, governments (here in the conventional sense of the term), or other human aggregates (Dahl 1957: 203). In *Who Governs?* Dahl (1961) focuses on decisionmaking among a rather small group of influential individuals – the political stratum – in New Haven. He assumes that the actual power relations can be uncovered by analysing overt conflicts between these actors over important political issues. By identifying who made proposals for decisions, which of these proposals were adopted, and which were turned down, Dahl (1961: 336) concludes: 'The participants with the greatest proportion of successes out of the total number of successes were then considered to be the most influential'.

Nonetheless, Dahl (1961: 89) cautiously remarks: 'to ignore indirect influence in analysis of the distribution of influence would be to exclude what might well prove to

¹⁶⁶ Hollis and Smith's (1990: 28-32) understanding of this methodological approach in International Relations, and more broadly in the social sciences, is adopted here.

be a highly significant process of control in a pluralistic democracy'. Methodological concerns for empirical precision in measuring actors' relative power spur him to reduce the amount of variables in play, however. He deliberately individualises power and excludes diffuse ties between the actors in question and the context in which they interact. Justifying this methodological prescription, Dahl (1957: 204) asserts: 'there is no "action at a distance." Unless there is some "connection" between *A* and [*B*], then no power relation can be said to exist . . . [this] enables one to screen out many possible relations quite early in an inquiry' (italics in original). He deliberately leaves the term 'connection' undefined, however.

The analysis on the CPIOs' conception of power shall depart from the understanding that to qualify as a case of compulsory power there must be specific actors, overt conflicts of interests and an observable outcome (see 3.4.1).

3.3.2 Lukes' methodological approach – Structuralism

Lukes accepts both Dahl's assumptions that power should be conceived as causal relations between actors and that the research task is to find out who has power. Yet, by applying a theoretical outlook influenced by Structuralism, an influential approach in the social sciences of the 1970s, Lukes offers very different answers to Dahl's question and expands the scope of power relations to be analysed. At a more profound level, however, this structural approach leads him to share with Dahl a positivistic ideal. In Cleeg's (1989: 30) choice of words, Lukes strives to explain the phenomenon of power with 'neat, tight and precise' concepts that can incorporate empirically observable and measurable data to prove the existence of power relations.

Structuralism's Marxist legacy inspires Lukes to exchange Dahl's specific actors with more diffuse structural forces. Specific actors are not unimportant. Political systems,

capitalist classes and air-polluted people are made up by individuals, but the power they exercise, or are influenced by, cannot be understood only by focusing on them as individual actors. Structural forces beyond their control are in play: 'The bias of the system can be mobilised, recreated and reinforced in ways that are neither consciously chosen nor the intended result of particular individuals' choices' (Lukes 1974: 21). It is these power relations that Lukes' notion directs itself to decipher. He is cautious not to expand structural power into structural determinism, because 'within a system characterised by total structural determinism, there would be no place for power' (Lukes 1974: 54-5). He continues: 'to identify a given process as an "exercise of power", rather than as a case of structural determination, is to assume that it is *in the exerciser's or exercisers' power* to act differently' (Lukes 1974: 55, emphasis in original).

Lukes accepts Dahl's assumption that power relations exist only where there are conflicts of interests, but disagrees with him that these conflicts need to be observable. In the same vein, Lukes takes issue with Bachrach and Baratz who sought to expand Dahl's notion of observable conflicts to encompass not only overt but also covert conflicts: 'To assume that the absence of grievance equals genuine consensus is simply to rule out the possibility of false or manipulated consensus by definitional fiat' (Lukes 1974: 24).

A may create *false consensus* when he succeeds in manipulating the ideas of *B* against their real interests.¹⁶⁷ It is such practice that Lukes denominates as an exercise of structural power and which creates latent conflicts of interests. But Lukes'

¹⁶⁷ This is another central notion in Lukes' methodological approach. When reference is made to false consensus it is therefore in his sense of term it is used.

methodological prescriptions to find evidence supporting a claim that *B*'s real interests are thwarted are problematic. In fact, his most elaborated discussions concern how to establish an objective parameter, a baseline, against which the authenticity of *B*'s formulated interests can be measured. Lukes presents two major methods: critical cases and comparative studies, which are now presented.

Lukes' technique to scrutinise *critical cases* implies that research focuses on rare challenges to consensus on a specific issue or in a specific field; challenges that may reveal issues that *A* hitherto has prevented from appearing on the political agenda. These are the exceptions, the critical cases that may lead the attentive researcher to reveal cases of false consensus. Lukes points to a study on the Indian caste system and argues that what appears to be 'genuine consensus over different values' is in fact false consensus imposed on the lower caste. Lukes (1974: 49) concludes:

The evidence suggests that there is a significant difference between the caste system as it exists in the 'popular conception' and as it actually operates. What to the outside observer may appear as a value consensus which sanctifies an extreme, elaborately precise and stable hierarchy actually conceals the fact that perceived opportunities of lower castes to rise within the system are very often, if not invariably, seized.

In other words, investigating what actors do when they find a way out of the grips of hegemonic control may reveal that structural power is at work. On this note, the following analysis will identify situations in which PI targets acted in defiance with the situation NATO have aimed to establish, and consider whether these are cases of PI thwarting real interests of the targets, the *Bs* (see 3.4.2).

Comparative studies is the other method he proposes to unlock evidence of structural power that 'prevents people from doing, and sometimes even thinking' (Lukes 1974: 48. See further 3.2.2). As an example of this method applied to a case Lukes points

to Crenson's briefly mentioned work *The Un-Politics of Air Pollution: a study of non-decision making in the cities*. Crenson wonders why two cities with comparable levels of air pollution have different policies on a major threat to public health and why in one city the problem is not even raised. Crenson presumes that air pollution cannot be in the real interests of the citizens, the *B*'s, since it reduces their life expectancy. Lukes (1974: 45) pointedly adds: 'there is good reason to expect that, other things being equal, people would rather not be poisoned'. Aware that the notion of interests is highly normative, Lukes (1974: 46) argues that the moral and political dimensions involved becomes clear on an issue that shortens life.

Having established air pollution as not in *B*'s real interest, the research task is to find an *A* and explain how that *A* controls the political agenda. This is a challenge, for as Lukes (1974: 38) ponders: 'How can one study, let alone explain, what does not happen?' Identifying latent conflicts involves the dubious effort to justify counterfactuals. Lukes (1974: 41) acknowledges this but maintains that it can be done:

We must provide other, indirect, grounds for asserting that if *A* had not acted (or failed to act) in a certain way . . . then *B* would have thought and acted differently from the way he does actually think and act . . . we need to justify our expectation that *B* would have thought or acted differently.

Crenson deals with this task by means of a comparative methodological approach. He compares the American cities Gary and East Chicago. In the former he finds that air pollution was not a political issue, while it was in the latter. He explains this by presenting evidence to argue that Gary's political life was controlled by a strong industrial actor and party organisation in a manner and to an extent that prevented its citizens from voicing their interests. In contrast, East Chicago that made air pollution a political issue had several industrial actors and no strong party organisations. In this way a comparative study may challenge what at first glance appears to be

commonly accepted – in this case that air pollution is acceptable. Lukes (1974: 45) proposes this method to furnish the kind of counterfactual evidence he seeks. He asserts:

Hard evidence is given of the ways in which institutions, specifically US Steel, largely through inaction, prevented the citizens' interest in not being poisoned from being acted on . . . Thus both the relevant counterfactual and the identification of a power mechanism are justified.

From this perspective, structural power will have explanatory power for NATO PI activities, only if the analysis can identify latent conflicts of interests. The analysis in 3.4.2 shall follow Lukes' prescriptions to identify critical and comparative cases in an effort to provide evidence to prove that PI thwarted its target groups' real interests.

3.3.3 Foucault's methodological approach – Genealogy

Presenting Foucault's methods to explore the phenomenon of power is no easy task. One reason for this may be that power was an implicit feature of his work (see 1.4.2). In addition, he is less explicit in his definition and methodological prescriptions than are Dahl and Lukes. Foucault's theoretical ideas are certainly not neat and tight, as the two other scholars' approaches have been called (see 3.2.2). Nor does he seek to forward proof of the solid kind that Dahl and Lukes' positivistic leanings aim for. Foucault's scientific approach is generally described as post-positivistic, or post-structuralist, although he did not subscribe to the idea that such labels be attached to his work.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁸ See, for example, Cleeg (1989: 150-3), Milliken (1999), Hayward (2000: 5), Sandmo (1999: 83-4), Neumann (2001: 36), Lindgren (2003: 326), and Barnett and Duvall (2005: 48).

True, his methodological approach, generally referred to as Genealogy, is thoroughly empirical, but he relates this to a discursive practice where reality is socially constructed, rather than a given as the positivists assume.¹⁶⁹ It is from the latter perspective that Dahl and Lukes strive to establish general theories on power and elaborate at length on methodological considerations and obstacles to this end. Foucault has no such theoretical ambitions. Power, he holds, does not exist in a universal form on which one can theorise in general terms. Power exists in specific contexts and takes different forms in these, which is why he studies the phenomena in such concrete contexts. He provides an analytical perspective to, rather than a theory of, power (Foucault 1998: 82). Yet, his perspective appears like a continuous ‘work in progress’ and his methodological approach largely exists implicit in his historical analyses and metaphorical abstractions. This gives room for different interpretations – a tendency that is reinforced by the fact that his theoretical elaborations are difficult to understand. Those who conduct case studies within Foucault’s scientific ideal are left with few explicit guidelines from his hand. They can interpret the methods implicitly applied in Foucault’s impressive production or rely on other’s interpretations of the same.

The few explicit directions Foucault offers for the conduct of research unfold most clearly in his four ‘cautionary prescriptions’, as he calls them, presented on a few pages in his central work on power (Foucault 1998: 92-102). He stresses, however, that these should not to be considered methodological imperatives. The prescriptions provide inspiration more than practical guidance. Still, they do give a sense of direction. To

¹⁶⁹ Lindgren (2003: 338) describes Genealogy as a research method that elucidates relations between phenomena, their genesis and their transformations.

remain close to the primary source, the present study will base itself on Foucault's own accounts of his method. The four prescriptions will therefore be addressed in turn.

It is in his first prescription 'rules of immanence' that he discourages any effort to look for the source of power (Foucault 1998: 98). Power should be regarded in discursive terms, as immanent in knowledge: 'Between techniques of knowledge and strategies of power, there is no exteriority' (Foucault 1998: 98). Power and knowledge are two sides of the same coin. This idea directs attention to how information, or rather subjects' use of it, is deeply embedded in the domain of power. In this way Foucault moves the study of power from Dahl's observable and primarily material context perceived in positivistic terms – that in the latter's own example can be a state's war potential (see 3.2.1) – to a normative and primarily discursive context perceived in post-positivistic terms. This is a methodological take that allows the study of power to become firmly embedded in the realm of perceptions.

In addition, this prescription suggests that power mechanisms should be examined in 'what might be called "*local centers*" of power-knowledge: for example, the relations that obtain between penitents and confessors' (Foucault 1998: 98. Italics added). Thus, Foucault's methodological approach is empirical. Although he conceives power in broader discursive terms he stresses that a study on discourse, its sources and effects, must depart from 'the most immediate, the most local power relations at work' (Foucault 1998: 97). His example with the child surrounded by a watch-crew illustrates this point (see 3.1.3).

In the second prescription, 'rules of continual variations', Foucault's post-positivist stand is illuminated. He directs research to uncover how the understanding of a specific field and the effects that follow from this have changed over time: 'We must seek

rather the pattern of the modifications which the relationships of force imply . . .

Relations of power-knowledge are not static forms of distribution, they are “matrices of transformation” (Foucault 1998: 99). His explorations of the phenomena madness, crime and sexuality illustrate how a historical empirical method can highlight such ‘matrices of transformation’ in different contexts. That is, how discursive strategies vary with time and space.

His third prescription is the ‘rule of double conditioning’, which concerns the relation between subjects and discourse. He recommends that we see the subjects in local centres of power-knowledge as part of an overall discursive strategy that is beyond the subjects’ direct influence. Their tactics, however, are neither subordinated to the strategy nor are they superior to it. Rather, we should see tactics from such local centres of power-knowledge and strategy as conditioning each other (Foucault 1998: 100). It is in this way that Foucault links the subjects and discourses. Their relation should be appreciated as reciprocal, as a relation of mutually constituting components. This intimacy allows the continual variations and matrices of transformation presented above as his second cautionary prescription.

The last precautionary prescription is the ‘rule of the tactical polyvalence of discourse’. He warns the researcher against understanding discourses in terms of dominant and subordinated discourses. Rather, we should conceive the multiple and mobile field of force relations as occupied by multiple discourses operating simultaneously in complex and fluid constellations. It is in this realm where force relations clash, change, and create synergies that the mechanisms of power operate. Power is the support these force relations find in each other by establishing chains or systems. Conversely, when force relations are separated and isolated, they lose power. ‘There can exist different and even contradictory discourses within the same strategy; they can, on the contrary,

circulate without changing their form from one strategy to another, opposing strategy' (Foucault 1998: 102). So discourse may sometimes support the reigning discursive strategies, sometimes undermine them.

Hence, Foucault's notion of power can be applied in the present context if his four cautionary prescriptions are compatible with PI's mode of operation. In addition, this clarification of Foucault's methodology has served to show that although different in most other respects, he shares Dahl's insistence on empiricism and the focus on specific subjects. As the third prescription illustrates, Foucault's analytical framework comprises both Dahl's methodological concern to study power in the relation between specific actors, and also Lukes' (1974: 21) focus on 'the bias of the system'. This, as we shall see, is valuable for the present purpose.

This review of the three prominent faces of power has explicated their respective distinctions, commonalities and methodological requirements in the context of the present study. These features constitute the conceptual framework that shall now be applied to enhance our theoretical appreciation of the kinds of influence identified in the empirical chapter. The three notions of power will be instrumental as analytical tools to scrutinise and conceptualise the forms of influence that PI's mode of operation sought to exert in order to achieve NATO's political and military ends. In other words, the analysis will substantiate the theoretical thesis of this study (see 1.2.1).

3.4 Analysis

The analysis commences by considering whether the empirical findings are compatible with each of the scholars' methodological approaches, as presented in 3.3. It is on this ground that Lukes' concept is deemed inappropriate. PI's endeavours do correspond

with Dahl's and Foucault's respective theoretical outlooks, however. Hence, the two latter's conceptual features (see 3.1 and 3.2) are used to guide the exploration of how PI may influence its targets to enhance public understanding of and support to NATO and to influence specific actions and general behaviour of people.

3.4.1 Dahl's notion of power applied to NATO PI activities

The primary question of this chapter, which is also the overall theoretical question of this thesis (see 1.2.1), can now be directed to Dahl: how can compulsory power enhance our theoretical understanding of the way PI may exercise power to achieve NATO's political and military ends? It shall be argued that his notion of power can clarify PI's mode of operation to influence people's specific actions.

Behaviouralism's applicability

The utility of Dahl's compulsory power in the present context is conditioned by its applicability to the form of influence PI strives to exert. To qualify as an exercise of power in Dahl's conceptualisation of the term there must be a relation between specific actors, in a conflict of interest, where one imposes his will on others (see 3.3.1). Some PI-target relations comply with these three methodological requirements. These will now be identified by consulting each of them in turn.

Specific actors

In the present context, NATO PI compares with Dahl's *A*. On the other hand, the specificity with which actor *B* can be identified varies. Some *B*s are as diffuse as the populations in NATO's member states and even worldwide. If Dahl were to accept any of this study's *B*s, it would be PI's target groups in theatre, the observable groups at the tactical level, in the Balkans. Again, it varies how specific these target groups were.

The most specific *B*s are Serbia's and Macedonia's political authorities in case 4 and 6 respectively. Rather specific are also the EAAGs in case 5. But the warring parties in cases 1 and 2 are less specific again. Here, PI and the stipulated targets in theatre are considered sufficiently specific to be considered as respectively *A* and *B* in Dahl's theoretical framework.

Yet other PI targets fall outside Dahl's conception of *B*. Those include the publics in NATO countries, Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia that to different extents form part of the first five cases.

Overt conflicts

Dahl narrowed the scope of analysis to observable and overt conflicts, which limits its utility for the present analysis. Generally, the relations between PI and its targets identified in this study were distant and diffuse. Moreover, PI was often used as an outlet for a continuous flow of mission relevant information, rather than a party in 'overt conflicts'. Four situations stand out as potentially fulfilling Dahl's criterion, however. When IFOR deployed to Bosnia PI made a particular effort to project the force as overwhelming and determined to respond to any challenges, in order to deter the warring parties from attacking the incoming IFOR troops (see case 1). In the same vein, IFOR deterred armed groups from obstructing the election process (see case 2). KFOR 1 deterred Serbian hardliners from reinvading Kosovo (see case 4) and KFOR 5 coerced the EAAGs to leave the Presevo valley (see case 5). Other cases present different conflicts with no such compulsory element. Rather, they were about different perceptions of a political situation, as we shall return to in the sections of Lukes and Foucault (ie 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 respectively).

It is stressed that the methodological approach of this thesis – which focuses entirely on *A*'s accounts (see 1.4.1) – excludes *B*'s intentions from the analysis. The study does not investigate whether PI's targets did 'something that [they] would not otherwise do' as Dahl's definition demands. The analysis rests on *A*'s claims that he achieved what he wanted. To be specific, we do not know whether Serbia intended to reinvade Kosovo in case 4, for instance. Crucially, however, in principle it would be possible to find out whether there was a conflict of interest.

Hence, Dahl's notion is still useful even though such empirical evidence is not presented here. As will be recalled, the concern of this thesis is not to prove that PI influenced its targets but to throw light on the forms of influence PI directs itself to exercise. This refers to the CPIOs' own understanding of their activities and whether that can be conceived in Dahl's terms (see 1.4.2). In this context, it is therefore irrelevant what the intentions of PI's targets might have been.

Decisionmaking

The last criterion to qualify for a case to be studied as a relation of power along Dahl's prescriptions is that the connection must involve a choice. *B* should be able to change his behaviour. The four PI–target relations that fulfilled the two criteria above also comply with this last one. The warring parties could choose whether or not to obstruct IFOR's arrival (see case 1) as well as Bosnia's national election (see case 2). The Serbian authorities could choose whether or not to reinvade Kosovo (see case 4), and the EAAGs could choose whether or not to leave the Presevo valley without resistance (see case 5).

Consequently, Dahl's notion of power can be used to further our understanding of the form of influence the CPIOs strove to exercise in the four just mentioned cases.

Here, PI was used as a means to either deter or coerce its targets. It was used as a means of compulsory power. Against this background the next section aims to elaborate on the way PI influences its targets along Dahl's notion.

PI's intentionality

Dahl's conception of power as a capacity that is used intentionally and instrumentally (see 3.2.1) to achieve specific objectives appears particularly useful to illuminate some features that may sustain PI's endeavours. Intentionality and instrumentality are closely related but where the former focuses on ends and the expediency with which actors plan to accomplish them, the latter emphasises how means are applied to achieve the ends. Therefore they will be addressed separately.

In a strict methodological sense, it would be necessary to look into only the four PI–target relations identified above. Nevertheless, the analysis will draw from a broader scope of relations since the issue at hand is relevant also in the context of Foucault's notion of power (see 3.2.3). As the latter conception can encompass these other PI–target relations, they are included at this stage rather than repeated in section 3.4.3.

The intentional aspects of PI's mode of operation highlight a strategic dimension that integrates PI in a broader plan; a dimension that can be found in all of the present cases, and that underpins various aspects of the function. At a general level, for example, both IFOR and KFOR were guided by a vision stipulating what they should achieve within several years. In the case of IFOR, its vision was to create a secure environment in Bosnia in which democratic institutions could arise. This overarching idea guided the mission and gave direction to its activities, including PI. To achieve the idea IFOR had goals, objectives, and tactics. The goals were more interim. They were milestones on the way to the vision. Subordinated to the goals were the objectives, again as more

immediate milestones on the way to achieve the goals. The tactics would then describe the adequate type of activities to achieve the objectives. The idea was that the sum of these activities guided by this overall operational framework would lead the alliance to its vision. As the following paragraphs will show, ‘it all ties together in a very strategic plan’, as Van Dyke (13/4/2004) phrases it (see further ‘Operational plan’ in 2.2).

In this broad context, PI’s specific mode of operation was strategic in two ways. It was included at the highest level of command and contributed to the shaping of approaches that were intended to allow the missions to achieve their ends. In addition, PI operated as a means – as a line function – to implement these strategies. PI assisted the Command Group in designing strategies that were to project the missions’ goals and objectives in the respective operations. They identified the audiences whose support they desired, and to this end the messages they wanted the audiences to accept, the media and other channels to reach these audiences, potential problems, and milestones along the way to achieve the overall strategic tasks. Their considerations were presented in the plan work that gave overall guidance as well as specific guidance to the short-term operational activities (see 2.2.4).

The fifth case illustrates this point. PI was not simply informing the media about KFOR’s activities in the Presevo valley. From the early stage PI was involved in preparing the operation and discussing alternative ways to achieve the desired end-state. In addition, PI participated in the actual implementation and applied a variety of tactics to achieve the military objectives. One approach, for example, could be an interview to disseminate a specific message. This would be conducted to achieve a certain public understanding, which would then be an interim objective. This objective would then be a measure to enhance broader public understanding and support, which was the primary PI goal (see 2.2.1). In order to learn whether the tactics succeeded in achieving the

objectives, PI had analysis units that scrutinised media reports. Based on these evaluations, the respective CPIO decided whether a new round of tactical endeavours was necessary to better establish the desired messages in the media (Idsøe 26/3/2004).

Another strategic characteristic of NATO's mode of operation is the way its missions divide operational activities in phases. All mission functions adapted their posture to achieve the objectives of each phase. For instance, PI and Operations followed identical timetables to project different force postures as the implementation proceeded. This may be done at the level of an entire mission, as case 1 shows, or in short-term operations as the one of case 5. In the latter example, the objective of the first phase was to prepare the target groups as to why and how COMKFOR 5 was going to facilitate Serbia's re-entry into the Presevo valley. PI's task was to ensure the dissemination of that message. So as KFOR's engineers set up reception camps and prisons for the armed groups residing in the valley, PI explained reporters why the facilities were being established and communicated COMKFOR's offer to the EAAGs. As the operation moved to its second phase, PI showed how COMKFOR kept his promise to permit the EAAGs to leave as free, yet demobilised, men. And the third phase concluded with stories of rebels giving themselves in and images of their burning weapons portraying a successful end to KFOR's undertaking. PI's mode of operation was strategic because it underscored COMKFOR's efforts in each of the phases allowing him to attain the operational objective (Idsøe 18/3/2004).

An additional strategic dimension was the synchronisation of NATO's functions to create synergy effects. All cases show how PI was closely co-ordinated with other

functions to achieve NATO's visions. This mode of operation, here referred to as unity of effort (see 2.2.4) served to multiply the tactical effects created by, among others, NATO's traditional line functions. In this context, PI acted as a *force multiplier*.¹⁷⁰ To this end, PI participated in various coordinating fora to synchronise with other NATO assets and external organisations. Tailored for each major operational activity, PI did matrix planning with other functions to co-ordinate who was to do what, when and with what desired effect.

The last intentional aspect of PI's mode of operation to be mentioned here is the proactive PI policy (see 2.2.2). According to Van Dyke (30/3/04) this policy entailed that 'we were trying to set a certain agenda. We wanted the media to focus on our key strategic messages and themes. As, again, part of a strategy to help the overall operation to succeed.' Idsøe (26/3/2004) and Clifford (27/4/2004) concur. A diversity of actors had expectations to the missions but with limited resources and, in the case of IFOR, only a year to achieve these goals, PI selectively promoted the key issues identified by the North Atlantic Council. In this way PI applied itself to mobilise general attention and support to NATO's key concerns in order to avoid having the media divert attention to a host of other topics. The assumption was that a focus on NATO's messages would allow the force commanders to accomplish their mission's objectives. Hence, it was a strategic feature of PI's mode of operation to keep the media focused on what NATO considered to be the pertinent issues in the peace processes.

¹⁷⁰ The term force multiplier is commonly used. See, for instance, Avruch et al. (1999: 11), the UN (2000: 25), Taylor (2002: 314), and Armistead (2004: 232).

PI's instrumentality

Likewise, Dahl's instrumental conception of power forms part of PI's mode of operation. PI was generally used as a means of power in the sense that it offered NATO's political and military leaders a non-lethal enforcement measure to promote stability and resolve conflicts. It was considered an operational asset readily available to the commanders to deal with upcoming tasks and conflicts of interests. Moreover, PI was often the force commanders' preferred instrument to achieve their objectives.

Again, to forestall repetition of the instrumental dimension of PI's endeavours in Foucault's part of the analysis it is helpful in this section to go beyond the four PI-target relations categorised as compulsory power. All six cases furnish examples that can bolster an instrumental understanding of PI's mode of operation. In the first case PI was used as a means to expose IFOR's capacity to move Bosnia from a situation of war to one of peace. This included efforts to have media attention directed towards IFOR dismantling infamous checkpoints and reorganising feared police forces, for instance. In the second case PI was instrumentally used to spread a sense of safety among the Bosnians, it undertook a variety of carefully planned activities to reassure the electorates that they could vote without fearing for their safety and to deter any warring parties from obstructing the elections. In the third case PI was tasked to establish the general understanding that 'KFOR is in control' as it entered Kosovo. In the fourth case PI was used to communicate deterrence to Serbia and reassurance to Kosovars. In the fifth case COMKFOR 5 used PI as his primary means to coerce the EAAGs to leave the Presevo valley. Finally, in case 6 PI was applied as a means to change Macedonia's understanding of KFOR's border control.

All the CPIOs conceive of PI in instrumental terms and refer to it as a ‘tool’ in the hands of the force commander (see 2.4). Van Dyke (17/3/04) elaborates: ‘It wasn’t just PI. It was PI in concert with the [other functions] working at the same time . . . this threat of the use of military force communicated through PI became an effective means for achieving our goals’.

The CPIOs describe PI’s mode of operation as what Dahl defines as a means of power in the sense of being a mediating activity. This is thus different from his term base, which in the present case ultimately refers to NATO’s lethal force (see 3.2.1). Idsøe (26/3/2004) makes this point when he presents PI as an integral part of the military, political and economic means of power available to political and military decisionmakers. From this perspective, PI is adequately understood as a means of compulsory power. PI can be regarded as an operational asset to achieve force commanders’ objectives, an asset that referred to the base but was applied to avoid activating it.

This aspect of PI’s mode of operation may be entitled a *megaphone* function.¹⁷¹ This to convey that PI informed targets about NATO’s intentions and resolve to use, if necessary, the base of compulsory power to carry through the intentions irrespective of the targets’ interests. Case 2 illustrates this feature. Here, PI communicated COMIFOR’s intention to permit safe electoral participation in the national elections and his resolve to suppress with military means any attempt to interfere with this democratic process. PI also operated as a megaphone to communicate COMKFOR’s intention and

¹⁷¹ This term is taken from Towle (2000).

resolve to prevent Serbia from re-entering Kosovo with the 'You are safe'-message to the Kosovars and the 'Don't do it'-message to the Serbian authorities (see case 4).

A related instrumental dimension of PI's mode of operation has been called a force multiplier and encapsulates PI's activities to multiply the targets' perception of NATO's physical force, of its base in Dahl's mode of expression. So, while the megaphone feature deals with perceptions of NATO's will, the force multiplier feature directs itself to influence perceptions of NATO's capacities. This ability of PI presents itself in the just mentioned cases. Prior to the Bosnian election PI invited the media to cover, for instance, robust IFOR troops patrolling the roads, transporting ballot boxes, and manning traffic checkpoints (see case 2). In the same vein, PI invited the media to cover robust KFOR-exercises involving fighter jets, tanks and considerable troops along the Kosovo side of the boundary line to Serbia. The idea was that images from these undertakings would convince the Serbian authorities that, in Clifford's (27/4/2004) style: '[KFOR] got more tanks, better tanks up here that you know what to do with, and you will face a tough fight. So don't do it' (see case 4). In this way PI deterred its targets by multiplying NATO's capabilities in the minds of its targets. Others may characterise the same endeavour as an effort to remind the Serbs about NATO's capabilities.

All three force commanders exploited this instrumental feature of PI because it held the advantage that they could enforce stability and regulate their targets' actions without having to apply physical force. The utility of PI in peace support operations, as compared to traditional wars, is that the former are likely to be conducted under tighter political control with rules of engagement that restrict the force commanders' use of their lethal operational capabilities (see also 1.1). Impeded from such direct approaches, both COMIFOR and COMKFOR turned towards more indirect approaches,

particularly the use of information as a tool to shape the operational environment (see 2.2.4). Van Dyke (17/03/04) clarifies that since IFOR's mission was to facilitate a peace process COMIFOR did not want to use physical force unless absolutely necessary. Rather, he wanted to deter violence by demonstrating IFOR's military capabilities and its willingness to use them, if necessary.

PI as compulsory power – a summary

Compulsory power can elucidate PI's mode of operation to exert influence in four of the 14 PI–target relations identified above (see 2.4); that is, when PI was used to make its targets 'do something that *B* [the targets] would not otherwise do' (Dahl 1957: 202-03).

Dahl's Behaviouralist approach identifies PI's endeavours to influence specific and relatively proximate targets, where their relation is direct and causal. That is, where PI seeks to influence the targets in an almost mechanistic, stimulus–response, 'get *B* to do'-manner. In addition, his emphasis on the intentional feature of power clarifies the strategic dimension in PI's mode of operation that exists not only in the message strategy and unity of effort but also in the operational plan to implement NATO's vision in the Balkans and in the West. The use of operational phases, the functional synchronisation that created synergetic effects, and the active PI policy also underline the strategic dimension of PI's mode of operation. Moreover, Dahl's conception of power, as a capacity that the powerful possess and can use to sanction undesired behaviour among the powerless, compares to NATO's use of PI as an enforcement measure. That is, when PI was applied to limit the room of manoeuvre of specific parties or people in general.

Dahl's notion of power can conceptualise PI's mode of operation when it functions as a mediating activity between NATO's conventional line functions such as air, land,

and sea power to coerce and deter NATO's targets. In this function, PI features as, what may be termed, a megaphone that communicated the Force Commanders' intentions and resolve to armed groups and the local populations. PI also operated as a force multiplier, that is, it strove to multiply, or at least clarify, NATO's capacity to project lethal force in the minds of target groups. In this way, PI provided the Force Commanders with a non-lethal enforcement measure to achieve their tasks.

All three Force Commanders exploited this dimension of PI because it held the advantage of being able to enforce stability and regulate their targets' actions without having to apply brute force. This contradicts conventional military logic along which the application of the base of compulsory power is the principal military means to achieve the strategic objective apprehended as a 'decisive military victory' (see 1.1). The conventional logic was not compatible with NATO's objectives in the peace support operations, however, since these were to support peace and reconciliation efforts under the auspices of the UN. Although the Force Commanders had to undertake conventional military tasks, such as coercion and deterrence, they operated in a political context and with objectives that were different from conventional war. Had the Force Commanders applied compulsory power in the conventional manner they had probably gained territorial control but at the cost of death and destruction. This would most likely create antagonism to NATO's role in the Balkans and possibly undermine the broader peace processes. Hence, conventional military thinking risked being counterproductive to NATO's political objective in the peace support operation. Along such lines of reasoning, the missions' rules of engagement were based on the principle to use minimum necessary force (see footnote 24 and section 2.2).

Used as compulsory power, PI contributed to the mission's most immediate task in the peace support operations, which was to enforce law and order. PI operated as an

instrument for a Hobbesian Leviathan with power over its subjects in the sense that it could sanction those who broke the law; a power applied to create a security situation in which the peace and reconciliation process could move forward. It created a physical space in which a non-violent struggle to shape the future could take place. PI was a means of the monopoly of violence to deter others from undercutting these political processes with violent means. Hence, Dahl's notion of power can clarify PI's mode of operation to influence people's specific actions.

3.4.2 Lukes' notion of power applied to NATO PI activities

It remains unclear, however, which forms of influence PI exercises to achieve its 1st goal, that is, to enhance public understanding and support. This section will examine whether Lukes' notion of power can further our theoretical understanding to this end. The thesis is that structural power cannot.

To start with the most promising aspect of Lukes' conception of power, his endeavours to incorporate diffuse and distant *Bs* in the analysis seem to facilitate the study of PI's influence on its general PI targets like the publics in NATO member countries. In addition, his attention to 'the bias of the system . . .' and the 'mundane forms [of influence], through the control of information, through the mass media and through the processes of socialisation' appears valuable to account for the indirect power relations between PI and its targets.¹⁷²

From the perspective of efficiency, one should imagine that the ideal for the CPIOs, and any one else involved in creating favourable public relations, is to be able to exercise

¹⁷² The quotations derive from respectively Lukes (1974: 21, 23).

the kind of power that Lukes (1974: 23) describes as thought control. That is, the ability to manipulate a target group's interests. Indeed such a 'supreme exercise of power', as Lukes (1974: 23) calls it, would be expedient to any PI staff tasked with establishing perceptions conducive to one's organisation in the minds of an important audience. Inspired by Lukes' definition of power one is inclined to ask whether it is not in fact the CPIOs' primary task to make the public 'want' NATO.

The CPIOs themselves do not perceive their activities as manipulation (see 2.2.4 and 3.4.3). They characterise their enterprise as efforts to influence. The CPIOs assist NATO in achieving its objectives but they insist that they do not mislead or deceive their targets; that they do not exercise thought control.

Nonetheless, there are grounds for arguing that the CPIOs' own understanding of their ability to influence public imagination resembles that of structural power. For instance, what is the difference between Lukes' manipulative notion and Van Dyke's (2003: 8) explicit statement that 'NATO created the image of IFOR largely through a carefully coordinated strategic information plan'. An image which he, referring to NATO's plan work, describes as 'professional, properly equipped, prepared and trained' and which shall be created to bolster 'national and local support and acceptance' (Van Dyke 2003: 16). Clifford goes further in that direction when he argues that a military information campaign, in which he comprises PI, is 'an all pervasive and major lever which can be used to shape the environment, perceptions and opinion' (Clifford and Wilton 2000: 17). Moreover, he dubs such endeavours in IFOR perception operations (see 2.2.4). These views clearly carry associations to manipulation.

At first glance this manipulative dimension of structural power appears capable of explaining the way PI in ten instances sought to change people's perceptions about

the existent state of affairs. Specifically, PI strove to convince local and international targets that the situation in Bosnia was peaceful rather than conflict-ridden (see case 1), that it was safe to vote (see case 2), that Serbia posed no danger (see case 4) and that KFOR's border controls were efficient (see case 6). Structural power may also have been at work when the CPIOs persuaded their targets, either in theatre or at home, to support IFOR and KFOR (see case 1, 3 and 5) and more generally NATO (see case 1).

Comparing these PI-target relations with those sustained by compulsory power (see 3.4.1) illustrates how PI sought to influence its targets in different ways. PI exercised different forms of power. It applied Dahl's notion of power, when it communicated 'carrot and sticks', in the respective form of amnesty and imprisonment, to the EAAGs in the Presevo valley, for example. But PI could not coerce Macedonia's population to think that KFOR controlled their border. In this case, PI used a different mode of power that resembled the one Lukes proposes. PI strove to alter its target group's perception of a situation. It sought, some may argue, to manipulate their thoughts. Either way, structural power appears a plausible candidate to explain how PI may achieve its 1st goal.

There are, however, reasons to devalue Lukes notion's explanatory power in this context. Beside the CPIOs' insistence that they do not manipulate their targets, there are also methodological reasons to question whether structural power is applicable not only in the present context but also more generally. The considerations that follow question whether Lukes' notion is, in fact, flawed. His methodological prescriptions to identify his definitional relations where '*A* affects *B*' and the ethical assumptions underlying his notion of real interests are not, I shall argue, tenable. Consequently, Lukes' notion of power cannot account for the form of influence that PI aimed to exert in order to enhance public understanding and support.

Structuralism's inapplicability

The methodological difficulties are primarily related to Lukes' prescription that research shall reveal latent conflicts of interest between PI and their targets to identify cases of structural power. Hence, this aspect shall be thoroughly discussed.

Not all the just mentioned efforts to enhance public understanding appear to be cases of latent conflicts. To take one example, IFOR's PI assistance to the US and German political authorities *vis-à-vis* their respective populations is a case of *overtly* conflictual PI-target relations (see case 1). Allegedly, these administrations had difficulties in convincing their electorates that sending contingents to IFOR was in their interest, and the CPIO in charge believed that NATO contributed to change that public attitude. He stresses that PI was not manipulating the information: 'We are being honest. We are not spinning the news. We are not doing PsyOps on people. We are saying: "This is a humanitarian effort of enormous proportions, and we need to deploy these troops to secure the peace and prevent further civilian casualties"' (Van Dyke 13/4/2004).

Arguably, most relations between PI and its targets appear non-conflictual, however, and not cases of structural power. In several situations PI and its targets presumably agreed on how the situation ought to be, while their disagreement concerned its current nature. Since such disagreements involved different perceptions of reality, rather than different interests, logically these were not conflicts of interest. PI-target relations that fall into this category include, for instance, PI's undertakings to persuade the Bosnians that peace was returning to their country (see case 1). Based on the assumption that this was in the majority's interest PI did not exercise structural power. The election case can be conceived along the same line of reasoning (see case 2). Here, the media projected anxiety as to whether it was safe for Bosnians to go to the ballot boxes. PI, on the

other hand, widely declared that the electorates could safely go to the same boxes. Presumably, the vast majority of the local population had no grievances with elections being successfully conducted. In other words, this disagreement concerned whether or not it was safe to vote. In the same vein, it can be argued that KFOR 1's reassurance to anxious Kosovars, that they were safe despite Serbian 'sable-rattling' in the summer of 1999, is not a case of structural power (see case 4). Further, when Macedonia's authorities and public harshly criticised KFOR's border control and PI projected the same controls as efficient, this was not a result of conflicting interests. It had to do with different perceptions as to how far these interests were safeguarded (see case 6).

Along similar lines of reasoning one may exclude a number of additional PI activities as instances where structural power was exercised. This includes PI's efforts to convince the distant and diffuse targets that 'KFOR is in control' (see case 3), and PI's indirect confirmation to the local and international audiences that KFOR 5 continued to provide stability in the Balkans (see case 5). Presumably PI and its targets had the same objectives. Although in the latter case some Kosovars may have supported the EAAGs, it could still be argued that stability was in their overall interest. From this point of view, these relations were not cases of different interests, not even of different perceptions. Rather, PI's relations to its targets present themselves as a general effort to make it clear for everyone, to reassure PI's targets, that NATO's involvement in the Balkans was in the interests of all who valued peace.

For this reason, Lukes' delimitation of power to a phenomenon that occurs only in latent conflicts of interest reduces its utility in the present study. It seems to eliminate its relevance as a concept to explain any of the ten identified PI undertakings to influence its targets' perceptions (see the previous section).

Real interests and false consensus

Lukes would not applaud such haste in narrowing the scope of power relations. He would explore indications that relations portrayed as non-conflictual above were in fact cases of latent conflicts. If this can be proved, PI's relations to its targets would indeed be cases of structural power.

The methodological difficulties become apparent when the analysis is conducted on that note. As the difficulties begin, the validity of Lukes' notion increasingly comes in for questioning. Lukes is certainly aware of the problematic aspects of his three-dimensional view on power and devotes relatively much space to elaborating on how these obstacles should be dealt with (see 3.3.2). Nevertheless, his advice to overcome them is not convincing. He has not solved the problems that occur when his concept is applied on the present PI-target relations. In order to sustain this argument, this section shall apply Lukes' methodological prescriptions to sketch out avenues for studying the present concern and to demonstrate the difficulties such research is likely to confront.

Explorations of whether PI exercised structural power on its targets have to commence at the mission level since PI was merely an instrument to promote IFOR and KFOR's objectives. Along Lukes' methodological reasoning the relevant question then becomes: is there evidence to suggest that IFOR and KFOR's overall roles in Bosnia and Kosovo were not in the real interests of PI's targets? Or, more simply: is NATO's presence in the Balkans against these peoples' real interests? It is beyond the scope of this study to answer this question (see 1.4.3). Still, in order to scrutinise the utility of the concept of structural power in the present context, we may note that it is reasonable to assume that the large majority of people surviving in a context of gross violation of human rights would welcome a peace support operation of the kind IFOR and KFOR provided (see

2). Certainly such an international force will create manifest or latent conflicts with some of the armed groups.¹⁷³ But to the large majority of Bosnia's and Kosovo's population, and to Western public, one may expect that NATO's presence was not against the PI targets' real interests. From Lukes' perspective, therefore, the missions cannot be characterised as cases of false consensus, and therefore cannot be regarded as cases of latent conflicts. Against this conclusion, it may be argued that this position amounts to little more than assumptions. This spurs the question of which analytical routes exist to establish potential affirmative answers to the question of whether NATO exercises structural power. Lukes suggests two such routes: critical cases and comparative studies (see 3.3.2). These shall now be considered.

Critical cases

According to Lukes, cases of latent conflicts can be revealed by exploring what happens when actors see an opportunity to follow their real interests rather than those imposed by the powerful. Such opportunities may be found in what NATO termed incidents.

Incidents unfolded on the periphery of NATO's sphere of control. In KFOR it involved, among other things, 'hit and run'-operations such as masked men beating up a Kosovo Serb couple (NATO 7/7/1999); people being killed by snipers; and explosive attacks on Kosovo Serb monasteries (NATO 5/7/1999). The research question becomes whether such examples challenge the position that NATO's presence is in the Kosovars' real interest? Methodologically, these acts compare to the opportunities seized by lower

¹⁷³ Stedman (1997), Berdal (2000: 9-14), Wheeler (2000: 189-99), and Smith (2005: 340-44, 350-52), among many others, elaborate on such violent resistance (see also 1.1).

castes, in the sense that masked men also challenge 'what to the outside observer may appear as a value consensus' (Lukes 1974: 49).

Peace and stability may be seen as values that are generally held in high esteem. These values can also be found in the peace agreements legitimising NATO's presence in the Balkans (see 2). Yet, in principle an analyst could by means of a case study find that people have different conceptions of peace, or rather of the terms on which a specific peace shall be built. While KFOR, for example, promoted peace based on the respect of the principles on human rights, the incidents could be interpreted as efforts to achieve a peace based on the contradicting policy of ethnic cleansing.¹⁷⁴ That is, peace obtained by a policy excluding the Kosovo Serb minority; a Kosovo for the Kosovo Albanians. The cases mentioned here, and many other observable and also overtly formulated grievances, could be presented as evidence for such conclusions.

Moreover, Lukes is not explicit on how large a proportion of the population has to be manipulated in order for a political community to qualify as a case of structural power. A democratic principle could suggest that the majority, or at least a substantial amount, of the population should have its real interests thwarted for Lukes' notion to apply. Along such considerations, one research task would be to find out how representative such incidents are for the values of the population at large. A possible conclusion is that a policy of ethnic cleansing enjoyed only marginal support. In this case, it is difficult to provide convincing evidence that this is a case of a general latent conflict. Even if the policy enjoyed broad public support, it is still questionable whether this qualifies as

¹⁷⁴ On this policy see Kaldor (1999: 84-9).

evidence that excluding the Kosovo Serb minority was indeed in the majority's real interests.

The issues comprise obvious ethical aspects. An affirmative answer implicitly accepts violations of human rights and arguably condones stability. On the other hand, a negative answer would share the moral ground upon which NATO's CPIOs operate. That is, the idea that peace and respect for human rights is desirable. The above mentioned assumption that PI, as a means of KFOR, did not impose a false consensus over the large majority of Kosovars should thus be considered biased towards NATO's moral stand, rather than towards those segments of the population that continued to conduct ethnic cleansing. Thus, analytical efforts to find out whether NATO thwarted the Bosnians' and Kosovars' real interests are problematic. It arrives at conclusions determined by the underlying values of the analysis.

Lukes' (1974: 46) stand on this methodological obstacle was that such conclusions ultimately rest on 'the opinion of the observer concerning the value of human life' (see 3.2.2). Following this prescription Lukes' ethical leaning would bias research to conclude that promoting human rights was indeed in the real interests of Bosnians and Kosovars and possibly present NATO as a suitable guarantor for the protection of such norms.

For this reason, studies of such critical cases are likely to conclude that NATO does not thwart the local populations' real interests. Along this line of reasoning PI does *not* exercise structural power. This, however, would be a conclusion based on moral imperatives rather than those of a positivistic scientific ideal, which Lukes also, although less explicitly, subscribes to (see 3.3.2). As the first analytical route is

unsuitable to reveal cases of latent conflicts in the present context, we shall turn to Lukes' second methodological proposal.

Comparative studies

Lukes suggests that a study may also reveal real interests by comparing one's primary case with other cases. Following this methodological piece of advice, therefore, we should identify comparative cases to those studied here.

Above it was assumed that the large majority of people in Bosnia and Kosovo welcomed IFOR and KFOR. This may, however, be a result of a successful PI exercise of structural power. Thus, the research task becomes to find out whether, for example, citizens in similar situations, but where NATO has not intervened, 'thought or acted differently', as Lukes formulation goes, from people in the present cases. In other words, the study should analyse a case comparable to that of Bosnia prior to NATO's deployment; a case where citizens should have experienced three and a half years of civil war in which as a result 260,000 people had died and two-thirds of the population had been displaced.¹⁷⁵ It appears unlikely that such a study could provide convincing evidence, as Lukes (1974: 41) calls for, to 'justify our expectation that *B* [a war-torn population] would have thought or acted differently' from Bosnians had they had a chance. Nonetheless, we would have to present such cases to conclude that NATO PI exerted structural power.

In addition, a comparative study would have to deal convincingly with the question of proportionality. Among other considerations, how large a segment of the population did

¹⁷⁵ These figures derive from Kaldor (1999: 31).

actually suffer in the conflicts? Further, how large a proportion of the population thought they would be better off with an international presence? In principle, a study may provide such figures at least to some extent. Still, Lukes' ethical stand would oppose a conclusion that violation of a minority's human rights was in the majority's interests (see 3.3.2).

Thus, PI-target relations in theatre cannot be characterised as latent conflicts of interest. NATO's presence, it is assumed, was generally in the interest of the Bosnians and Kosovars. In other words, considerations as to how Lukes' second methodological proposal can be applied in the present context lead to the same conclusion as those on his first proposal. Convincing evidence cannot be compiled that PI exercised structural power over the populations in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Attention may now turn to NATO's public, whom PI also targeted. Can a study by means of comparative cases afford proof of latent conflicts in these relations? Answering that question along Lukes' prescriptions could be done, for example, by identifying a comparative case of humanitarian disaster where NATO or NATO member states considered, or were involved in, implementing a UN Security Council resolution but were prevented by their electorates. Somalia after 1993 and Rwanda after the 1994 genocide are both potential cases. This begs another question about whether in these cases electorates actually influenced their political leadership or, conversely, were influenced? Such reflections hinge on a broad academic discussion, often termed the CNN-effect, that is beyond the present scope (see footnote 9).

Moreover, regardless of the conclusions that may be drawn from such empirical analyses, would they provide what Lukes (1974: 41) terms 'indirect grounds for asserting that' deploying to IFOR and KFOR was not in the real interests of

NATO's public? This is certainly debatable and fraught with ethical dilemmas. A major research problem involved is to deal with potentially contradicting values such as communitarian versus cosmopolitan values.¹⁷⁶ But this time the conclusions do not boil down as easily to 'the opinion of the observer concerning the value of human life', upon which Lukes' (1974: 46) analytical approach is founded (see 3.2.2). There is also a question of 'whose life?' The lives of the targets' compatriots within a national community, or those of their fellows in a broader universal community of mankind? In the present context, these considerations suffice to emphasise that identifying latent conflicts by means of comparative studies is controversial.

Structural power's inapplicability – a summary

In the Political Science debate on power Lukes is regarded as the foremost representative of the third of its four faces (see 1.4.2). At first glance his wide-ranging concept appeared useful to account for relations between PI and its targets that Dahl's compulsory power could not explain. While structural power directs attention to propaganda – an area of concern beyond the scope of this thesis (see 1.3) – its utility in the present context has been considered in technical, theoretical terms.

While the CPIOs reject the idea that they manipulate or propagandise their targets, they acknowledge that they apply PI to influence the perceptions and attitudes of the publics in the Balkans and in the West. Structural power holds promise to account for such indirect and subtle influence on targets that are diffuse and distant, because Lukes extends Dahl's research agenda in three important ways. First, where Dahl focuses on

¹⁷⁶ The debate on these normative terms is thoroughly elaborated on in Brown (1992).

relations between specific actors, Lukes extends the scope to include relations between broader societal groups, such as classes. Second, where Dahl focuses on overt observable conflicts, Lukes extends the scope to include latent conflicts. Third, where Dahl focuses on concrete outcomes of conflicts, Lukes extends the scope to include control over the political agenda.

Chapter 2 described 14 situations in which PI aimed to influence its targets (see 2.4). At first glance structural power appeared capable of explaining the dynamics that could substantiate PI's endeavours in the majority of these relations. Yet, Lukes' definition and methodological requirements exclude these from the scope of structural power.

One reason for this is that many PI–target relations are better understood as conflicts of perceptions rather than, as the definition of structural power requires, latent conflicts of interests (see cases 2, 3, 4, and 6). Moreover, denominating any of the PI–target relations as cases of structural power would involve methodological assumptions that are untenable in this study. Lukes' notion takes for granted that people have real interests and establishes human rights as an ethical ground from which such interests can be measured. But such normative grounds cannot provide the kind of solid empirical evidence Lukes calls for. His two methodological suggestions to overcome this obstacle do not carry conviction. They imply, among others, explicit normative judgements regarding both different actors' real interests, myopic versus long-term interests, and communitarian versus cosmopolitan values. It is a form of analysis that raises more questions than it answers. Conclusions based on Lukes' methodological prescriptions would reflect political judgements rather than the 'objective' analytical findings that he aims to present.

Structural power is inapplicable in the present context because any conclusion would be more controversial than it would be convincing. Lukes' positivistic approach to the normative realm of perceptions does not work. These critical observations would appear to apply also to cases other than the present one and therefore question the general validity of the concept. Against this background, I conclude that Lukes' notion of power cannot account for PI's mode of operation to influence its target groups.

3.4.3 Foucault's notion of power applied to NATO PI activities

Attention shall now be directed to explore how a very different notion of power can further our theoretical understanding of the way PI may achieve NATO's political and military ends. This section will show that Foucault's notion (see 3.1.3 and 3.2.3) can conceptualise the type of influence PI's mode of operation seeks to exert in order to enhance public understanding and support and to influence the general behaviour of the public. This is a dimension of PI's task that escapes Dahl's notion of power and that Lukes' notion has just failed to explain convincingly.

Productive power's ability to do this derives from Foucault's radically different assumptions about the social phenomenon of power and how it may be studied. Like Lukes, Foucault extends the scope of subjects – the *Bs* as Lukes and Dahl call them – that may be influenced. Foucault also extends the analytical considerations to include indirect power relations and to include perceptions as the kind of effects power may have. More important, Foucault conceives power from an ontological and epistemological perspective that is different from both of the two other scholars. His post-positivistic position does not expect research to forward the kind of evidence that Dahl's and Lukes' positivistic ideal demands. Instead, Foucault offers an alternative

analytical framework based on which scholars can interpret power relations (see 3.3.3).

The present conception of Foucault's analytics of power has already been clarified but shall be further elucidated, in order to elaborate on an analytical framework that others may find useful in their research and to facilitate criticism of this same framework.

Nonetheless, this very effort to explicate and adapt his analytical framework and then apply it in an analysis may come across as an undue demand for precision and clarity from a perspective that has no such scientific aspirations. It must therefore be stressed that Foucault's appreciation of power is broader and much more ambiguous than the one presented here. Still, it is the contention of this study that the present adaptation and use of Foucault's theoretical work is valid and a useful approach to explore power relations from the perspective of a subject.

Two notes of clarification

Before embarking on the main argument of this sub-chapter it is important to clarify how the discussions involve two related yet different notions of power within Foucault's analytical approach. Moreover, it is necessary to clarify how this study comprehends the relation between Foucault's local centres and discourses. These two features are addressed in each of the two subsequent sections respectively.

Productive power and government

Foucault's understanding of power is broad and evolves throughout his production. He adds new terms, not replacing earlier concepts but developing them within the same general analytical approach to the social phenomenon. In *The Will to Knowledge* Foucault (1998) primarily explores these social dynamics through the application of the term power-knowledge, and his primary concern is to study how non-subjective

discursive strategies produce reality and, among other things, create people as subjects. At the same time, he conceives these strategies as being produced and reproduced by subjects' acts. Increasingly in his later writings, power is treated as government. Both approaches to power are relevant to answer the question of this thesis, thus the first understanding will dominate the first part of this analysis, while the latter understanding of power shall guide the last part.

Foucault's analytics of power does not explicate how subjects exert influence and needs adaptation to suit the present purpose. The reason these adaptations are only introduced at this stage in the thesis is to avoid unnecessarily confusing the present use of Foucault's approach to power, as encapsulated by the term productive power, with his broader analytical framework presented in 3.1.3, 3.2.3, and 3.3.3.

As a result of these adaptations his conception of power will be portrayed in more unambiguous terms than his own approach purports to do. While Foucault aims to study specific situations to identify how subjects are produced by and reproduce discursive strategies, the present concern is different. It examines how a subject influences other subjects by, as I shall argue, means of discourses.

Applying Foucault's analytics of power in this manner involves the risk that NATO comes across as a pre-social subject that can influence discourses, and thereby its targets, to further the alliance's political and military ends. This would be a gross misinterpretation of the present adaptation of his perspective. Rather, Foucault spurs one to apprehend NATO itself as a product of power, with an identity and political impact determined by the dominant discursive strategies. Thus, NATO emerges from and exists within a discursive context it cannot control; a context that produces NATO's objectives and the conditions under which its staffs must try to fulfil them.

Yet, this is the present analysis' theoretical point of departure. Conceiving discursive dynamics from within these contextual features this study seeks to understand how a subject may exploit these conditions in order to influence others as well as the discursive context in which we live. To be more specific, it seeks to examine whether Foucault's analytics of power can further our understanding of how PI may directly and indirectly influence public perception about NATO's role in the Balkans. Due to this particular use of Foucault, the present study applies the term productive power, suggested by Barnett and Duval (2005), as a form of Foucauldian power which is different from but not incompatible with his own analytical perspective (see also 3.1.3).

Against this background, we should conceive productive power not as a capacity in the material sense, not as a capacity that someone possesses like a Dahlian base of power (see 3.2.1). The term shall be seen as an ability subjects exercise from local centres of power-knowledge by exploiting reigning discursive strategies to win tactical engagements and create effects that influence discursive strategies.

Thus, while Foucault's approach is broader and encompasses discursive dynamics with potentially broad societal impact, the present study applies a narrower definition to clarify a form of influence that can be identified in the practice of PI from the analytical perspective Foucault provides. It elucidates the PIOs' ability to influence the knowledge dimension of their targets, wherever they may engage them, to NATO's advantage. That is, their ability to define reality for others, to establish what counts as valid knowledge, as common sense.

Another important Foucauldian term in this context is government (see 3.2.3). This forms part of this analysis because PI aims to influence targets beyond its local centres through what is here entitled the discursive battlefield (see the section below). To

understand this dynamic, his analytical framework in *The Will to Knowledge* is of little avail and actually opposes the idea that actors can influence this realm in a subjective manner. His later writings more explicitly explore the way the state has held a privileged, though not a hegemonic, position by giving effect to and shaping discursive strategies. The analysis along the concept of government will further our understanding of the indirect forms of influence PI applied on its ultimate targets – people in NATO member states (see the section ‘Enhancing public understanding and support by government’ below).

Local and discursive realms of power

Further, it is conducive to the present argument to clarify how a central feature of Foucault’s analytical framework will be apprehended here. It rarely follows from the elaborations in his major works, *Discipline and Punish* and *The Will to Knowledge*, in which context he scrutinises power relations. At times he is excessively empirical analysing ‘the most immediate, the most local power relations at work’ (Foucault 1998: 97) as dialogues with and about a child between relatives and professionals (Foucault 1998) and as specific methods to discipline prisoners (Foucault 1979). At other times he presents power as a ‘complex strategical situation in a particular society’ (Foucault 1998: 93) and power relations as non-subjective mechanisms with ‘wide-ranging effects of cleavage that run through the social body as a whole’ (Foucault 1998: 94).

It is useful to distinguish between Foucault’s understanding of power in empirical terms and in analytical terms. In empirical terms there is no separation between subjects and discourses. Subjects are discursively produced. There are no pre-social subjects. Yet in analytical terms he operates with two different contexts. For the sake of clarity, we shall make a distinction between these since the mechanisms of power are different in the

two.

In the local context subjects act. For example, relatives and professionals discuss the child's behaviour and routines discipline the prisoner. In the discursive context there are no subjects, only their effects along with other non-subjective discursive forces. While Foucault does not define his use of the term 'force', he explains that discourses comprise power and knowledge and that they are 'tactical elements or blocks' linked together in 'chains or systems' establishing discursive strategies (respectively Foucault 1998: 101, 92). I conceive discursive forces as the components that constitute such discourses; they make up the tactical elements. These discursive blocks relate to each other in complex and fluid relations and may sometimes support and sometimes oppose the same strategy.

Foucault shifts easily from one context to the other, arguing that they should be seen as closely integrated, yet somehow separated from each other. The relation between the two remains ambiguous, however. The most clarifying paragraph on this matter presents itself in the rule of double conditioning where Foucault (1998: 99-100) stipulates:

No 'local center,' no 'pattern of transformation' could function if . . . it did not eventually enter into an over-all strategy . . . There is no discontinuity between them, as if one were dealing with two different levels (one microscopic and the other macroscopic); but neither is there homogeneity (as if the one were only the enlarged projection or the miniaturization of the other); rather, one must conceive of the double conditioning of a strategy by the specificity of possible tactics, and of tactics by the strategic envelope that makes them work.

Still, he leaves room for uncertainty, for example when only two pages further he operates with two such levels.¹⁷⁷ Leaving this ambiguity unattended would pose difficulties when his notion is later applied to the present case. To avoid this, it will be clarified how the present analysis aims to apply Foucault's analytics of power as operating with two related, yet separate, realms. Using his terminology, these may well be labelled respectively the *local* and the *discursive realms*.

It is in the local realm that subjects act influenced by and influencing, among others, discursive strategies. Discursive forces reside in the discursive realm, or what Foucault sometimes refers to as the sphere of force relations and sometimes as the multiple and mobile field of force relations (respectively Foucault 1998: 97, 102). Here, subjects have only an indirect influence, however, through the discursive effects of their acts in the local realms.

The present differentiation between a local and a discursive realm has parallels to the understanding of 'two different levels (one microscopic and the other macroscopic)' from which he distances himself in the quote above. Still, the two realms can be conceived in a manner that is congruent with his primary point in that same paragraph, which is that we should consider the 'local' and the 'overall [discursive] strategy' in somehow separate yet mutually constituting terms. In analytical terms the mechanisms of power are different in the two realms. Distinguishing between them allows us to

¹⁷⁷ To be specific, Foucault (1998: 102) points out: 'We must question them [the discourses on sex] on the two levels of their tactical productivity (what reciprocal effects of power and knowledge they ensure) and their strategical integration (what conjunction and what force relationship make their utilization necessary in a given episode of the various confrontations that occur)'.

elaborate on the mechanisms in a separate and therefore more consistent manner before we consider how the effects from one realm have implications on the other.

This distinction is compatible with Foucault's analytical framework. Although he does not explicitly establish a similar distinction, a large part of his scholarly project has been to show how generally accepted knowledge shapes the way people go on living. He presents knowledge as historically contingent conceptions of reality – the above mentioned patterns of transformation – produced by scientific discourses that manifest themselves in terms of positive knowledge, as in *scientia sexualis* (Foucault 1998: 51-73) or criminology (Foucault 1979: 135-228). This knowledge, which constitutes one part of the power-knowledge nexus, exists within historical periods and operates in a different, but crucially not separate, realm from the child or the prisoner in the examples above.

It is due to the cardinal importance Foucault attaches to knowledge that the term discursive realm is applied in this study. The term local realm derives more directly from his idea of local centres of power-knowledge (Foucault 1998: 98).

Based on this distinction, it is further prudent to clarify the present use of the terms tactics and strategy in Foucault's analytical framework. To him tactics are at work in both realms while strategy, although having effects in the local realm, belongs to and takes its form in the discursive realm (Foucault 1998: 95-7). To avoid misunderstandings, in the conduct of analysis within Foucault's frame of reference the use of the term tactics shall be restricted to the local realm and strategy to the discursive realm.

With these conceptual clarifications the analysis can proceed. First, we shall examine,

however, whether Foucault's methodological approach is applicable in the context of this thesis.

Genealogy's applicability

This section shall argue that PI's mode of operation can be studied within Foucault's analytical framework as presented in his four cautionary prescriptions (see 3.3.3). The intention is not to prepare the ground for a full-fledged analysis along the lines of Genealogy but rather to consider whether his approach is compatible with the main concern of this thesis. In addition, these methodological considerations sketch out analytical lines of investigations to ameliorate our conceptualisation of how PI may enhance public understanding and support. The applicability of each of the four prescriptions shall now be considered in turn.

Foucault's first cautionary prescription, rules of immanence, is particularly relevant to the present study. It allows us to conceive PI's activities in discursive rather than in material terms and to regard PI – along with the force commander's two other primary means of communication (see 2.2.4) – as operating in a battlefield with discursive features that is very different from the traditional battlefield. In the remainder of this analysis, this perspective shall be utilised to further the understanding of this context and the kind of influence PI may exercise within it.

Moreover, inscribing knowledge, and thereby social communication, in the dynamics of power Foucault provides a view to appreciate PI's mode of operation as an exercise of power that does not ultimately rest on physical force, as does Dahl's notion (see 3.2.1). Productive power provides PI with a normative brand of power, which in some respects makes its influence autonomous from NATO's traditional military capability. From this perspective productive power can elucidate PI's mode of operation to influence its

targets during the day-to-day dissemination of information. PI may influence its targets' understanding and gain their support simply by informing them. This may at first glance be a relatively immediate and superficial influence of specific targets like many other kinds of engagements between subjects in local centres of power-knowledge. Below, this theoretical insight is used to further the understanding of PI's mode of operation in the local realm.

Beyond such influence, however, the first prescription is primarily directed to the more stable forms of knowledge; the legitimate knowledge inscribed in the discursive realm that conditions subjects' activities in the local realm. We shall use Foucault's term government to consider whether and how PI's mode of operation may engage and influence these discursive strategies, since this would allow PI to meet its 1st goal (see 2.2.1) at a much more profound level, indirectly influencing not only specific but also more diffuse targets (see the section 'Enhancing public understanding and support by government' below).

The discourses that are relevant to the present study are influenced by the effects from innumerable local centres, but few other activities in the local realm aim at the knowledge dimension of power-knowledge so deliberately and expediently as PI (see the section 'Tactical efficacy in local centres of power-knowledge' below). PI's primary task is to communicate with targets to influence their understanding and thus directly aims to produce the kinds of knowledge effects in the local realm that Foucault (1998: 140), although from a much more general perspective, holds have been a cardinal component of the 19th century's power mechanisms (see 3.1.3). So the first methodological prescription is not only compatible with PI's mode of operation, it makes the latter appear highly relevant to the exercise of productive power and government.

Foucault's idea that subjects produce effects with implications beyond the local realm is particularly relevant to the present study because it lifts the social phenomenon of concern above the subjects. There need not be, as Dahl insists, a social proximity between *A* and *B* to qualify as a relation of power (see 3.3.1). Subjects need not be in direct contact to influence each other. To Foucault such a relation may well be indirect and distant. Subjects are in direct contact in the local centres of power-knowledge but indirect relations between subjects are also in play through the discursive realm in which these local centres are embedded. Productive power establishes a theoretical relation between PI and all its targets, including more diffuse targets such as the electorates of NATO's member countries.

In the first cautionary prescription Foucault also advises students of power to scrutinise the content of power-knowledge discourses in local centres. Since this does not serve the present purpose, this advice will not be pursued further. Still, it is important to note that it could be done. A study could, for example, interpret the content of human rights discourses by investigating how they are reflected when PI meets the press in the local centres. So Foucault's first methodological prescription can be applied in this context.

The present study will use such local centres differently, however. They shall be used as points of departure to explore how PI may have influenced reporters and how this NATO function exploited the existing power-knowledge discourse to this end. Such PI-target relations are dubbed *tactical engagements*. Along this line of reasoning, *tactical victory* shall refer to situations where media reports projected NATO's version of events as a result of tactical engagements. This use of the terms local centres, tactical engagement and tactical victory is not incongruous with Foucault's analytical framework.

In the same vein, his three remaining methodological prescriptions are compatible with, although not directly applicable to, the present study. His second prescription – rules of continual variations – directs research to map out discursive matrices of transformation over several centuries. The thesis at hand covers a very brief historical period with no regard to broader discursive alterations. The empirical findings match Foucault's theoretical concern, however. To use the same example as above, they could be used in a broader historical study to identify transformations in the discourses on human rights as these unfold in military campaigns throughout different historical periods.

The third prescription – the rule of double conditioning – is important, since it gives PI access to the discursive realm and thus opens for the possibility that PI may influence its targets in an indirect but much more profound way than through the immediate information to its targets that occurs primarily in the local realm. The prescription relates to Foucault's view that power is decentred, which is applied in the proceeding section. This is also the case with his last prescription.

It is in this rule of the tactical polyvalence of discourse that Foucault recommends scholars to conceive the discursive realm as a complex and fluid constellations of force relations, where discourses are elements that can form part of different strategies. This spurs us to conceive developments in the social field as indeterminate, driven by mechanisms primarily, but not exclusively, in the discursive realm, and is a cautious note against exaggerating the influence of subjects in this realm.

These methodological considerations along Foucault's four prescriptions have served to show that PI's mode of operation is in accord with important features of Foucault's analytics of power and to indicate in which ways his perspective can further our understanding of the context and ways in which PI influenced its targets. Against

this background, his theoretical outlook will now be used to describe the discursive context in which PI operates; thereafter to refine the understanding of how PI's mode of operation may influence reporters in the local realm; and finally to regard PI's mode of operation as a government technique to fulfil the 1st PI goal, that is to enhance public understanding and support.

The discursive battlefield

As briefly suggested above, it is informative to apply Foucault's perspective on the context in which PI operates, since his analytics of power highlights dynamics that cannot be identified with Dahl's and Lukes' approaches. It proposes that the field in which PI operates is conceived in discursive terms. We may call it the *discursive battlefield*.¹⁷⁸ Here, physical force is of limited utility – and potentially counter-productive (see the section 'Engaging discourses' below). PI, on the other hand, appears useful to reach NATO's political and military ends in this context. It is a kind of battlefield that cannot be controlled and where Foucault, as mentioned, advises us to

¹⁷⁸ I coin the term 'discursive battlefield' inspired by Foucault's (1998: 101-02) term 'the field of force relations' in which the latter is discursive. The term discursive battlefield is different from what elsewhere in the text is referred to simply as 'the battlefield' by which is meant the combat zone as that term has generally been conceived during the era of industrial wars (see intro 1.1). Shea (2001: 213), makes an apparently related distinction when he differentiates between 'the virtual' and 'the real' war. In the same vein Taylor (2000b: 184) differentiates between 'real war' and 'media war', while Herd (2000: 59) separates 'the actual military campaign' from 'the information war'. Other scholars support the idea that information operates in a separate realm from physical force and apply a variety of labels to specify this different sphere: The term 'information war' is widely used (see 1.5.2), Ignatieff (2000: 161-75) elaborates on 'virtual war', and Thompson (1999) uses 'media war'. Other terms that aim to encapsulate some of the same phenomena include 'noosphere' (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1999; Purcell 2005), 'informational battle-space' (Brown 2002b: 44), 'information space' (Denning 1999: 101; Dearth 2000a) and 'media space' (Price and Thompson 2002). This variety of notions serves to illustrate that many scholars refer to such normative realms, as distinct from material realms. Yet little substantive work exists on the theoretical features of these normative realms. Rather than adopting any of the terms mentioned above and trying to adapt them to Foucault's theoretical approach, it is here deemed prudent to establish a new term firmly rooted in his terminology and analytical framework.

approach the idea of influence not from ‘the privilege of prohibition’ but from ‘the viewpoint of tactical efficacy’ (Foucault 1998: 102).

This perspective is particularly relevant in peace support operations, such as IFOR and KFOR. These are different from combat operations in several aspects. In a combat operation, in the industrial war sense of the term, a military contingent has an enemy it shall defeat. But IFOR, as a third party between the former warring Bosnian parties, did not consider the latter such enemies. IFOR’s military task was to establish a non-violent situation. It should avoid armed clashes between the parties and to de-escalate situations that could result in violence. Nor did KFOR perceive the parties as enemies. KFOR should ensure respect for the agreements upon which its presence was based and maintain stability in Kosovo.

Moreover, in peace support operations the struggle is primarily political, since the parties are no longer willing or able to use physical force as a means to achieve their objectives. Their struggle has changed from a violent to a perceptual conflict. It has become a conflict about different political projects, different visions for the future.¹⁷⁹ The advantage of PI in this context is that it specifically deals with perceptions.

Using Foucault’s theoretical frame of reference to further our understanding of the discursive battlefield in which for instance IFOR operated, it may be noted that alterations occurred in discursive strategies of relevance to the conflicts in the Balkans throughout 1995. As a result, the international approach to Bosnia changed from

¹⁷⁹ See for example Siegel (1998: 1-7), Avruch et al. (1999: 14-15), Curtis (2000), M. Taylor (2000), Kiehl (2001: 143-44), Marston (2002), Des Forges (2002), and Wimbhurst (2002).

peacekeeping to peace enforcement.¹⁸⁰ The effect in Bosnia was that in contrast to conditions reigning in the previous discursive situation, now the use of lethal military power resources became an increasingly counterproductive currency. Leaders of former warring factions who sought international acceptance could not use physical force without putting whatever international support they enjoyed in jeopardy. In the same vein, NATO commanders tasked to support the internationally assisted peacebuilding effort in Bosnia used military force primarily for deterrence purposes while their ordinary activities were based on the principle to use minimum necessary force. Thus, by late 1995 discursive strategies were transformed from a situation where the parties would use lethal violence as a means to reach objectives, to a situation where they would not.

In Bosnia, these discursive strategies oriented mindsets away from war and towards peace, transforming the conflict from a military setting to a political one. The conflict IFOR was tasked to deal with became, in Van Dyke's (17/3/2004) formulation, 'more a war of words than words of war. Battlefields were replaced by confrontations over freedom of movement, civil unrest, resettlement of refugees, installation of governments and, of course, persons indicted for war crimes'.¹⁸¹ It had become a struggle fought by political means, although the latent risk that a party should relapse to pursuing its objectives by use of violence was certainly present.

In this political conflict, the discursive strategy promoted by the international community was always challenged by other discursive forces. Nonetheless, the major

¹⁸⁰ *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace's* use of these terms is applied here (UN 1995).

¹⁸¹ In this quotation the term government should be conceived in its conventional use.

discursive alteration spurred people to orient themselves in directions beyond mere survival and towards different visions for the future, different political projects. In this context a major mission task became to reassure people that they should not fear a resumption of war. The conflict increasingly became perceptual and as such well-suited to interpretation within Foucault's analytical framework of power.

Foucault's (1998: 93) stand that power comes from everywhere and three of his cautionary methodological prescriptions suggest that PI operated in a context it did not control. At first glance, this view may appear to contradict the thesis that NATO PI was a means of power. Crucially, this does not imply that PI assumed that it controlled events, however. Even though the 1st PI goal may be seen to suggest that PI's mode of operation was partly based on an idea of social causation, one may well perceive this as an objective rather than an assumption.

True, when the CPIOs in more abstract terms present their relation to targets, they sometimes do so with a logic based on social causation (see 2.2.1). This is a form of influence that Foucault does not pay much attention to but presumably would restrict to local centres.

Generally, however the CPIOs do not present their relation to targets as if they had power over the latter. The empirical findings provide more evidence to sustain Foucault's theoretical idea that power comes from everywhere. For one, PI engaged with a host of other actors and dynamics when it tried to influence its targets' ideas and behaviour. Sometimes the CPIOs felt they failed, as in case 3. From the first day PI was tasked to convey the message 'KFOR is in control'. The Russian obstruction of COMKFOR's first press briefing inside Kosovo initially undermined the credibility of that message, however. The Kosovo Albanian refugees also returned home rather

immediately after the Serbian withdrawal despite PI's advice that they wait a few days (Clifford 27/4/2004). In the same vein, PI's initial engagements with Macedonia's press corps allegedly failed to change its negative KFOR-bias (see case 6). On the other hand, in the same case PI apparently succeeded after a few weeks of operation. Although it does not form part of this thesis to learn whether PI actually influenced its targets (see 1.2.1), we can nevertheless take notice of the CPIOs' own accounts. They experienced that they generally succeeded in influencing the media reports in a desired direction (see 2.1 and 2.4).

This does not imply, however, that the CPIOs perceive NATO as a locus of power. On the contrary, their mode of operation was based on the understanding that the reporters – that is, PI's almost exclusive channel to its targets – could produce stories based on a host of non-NATO sources, be that the reporters' firsthand experiences, other international actors, the local parties, interest groups, or ordinary people (see 2.2.2). Often, these sources had objectives contradicting those of NATO. Against this background, PI's mode of operation to maintain credible relations with the press (see 2.2.5) may be seen as an acknowledgement that PI operated in a discursive battlefield it could not control, and as a conscious effort to mitigate the consequences of this situation.

An additional decentred feature of the discursive battlefield is that the relations between PI and its targets were reciprocal. The relations cannot be captured by a one-way conception of influence flowing from a Dahlian *A* to a *B*. Influence went both ways since the targets could always choose to, and did, reject NATO's information. PI adjusted the messages accordingly (Idsøe 26/3/2004). Van Dyke also perceives PI's relation to its targets in such reciprocal terms in which meaning was negotiated. More specifically, when the operational commanders planned a particular undertaking,

PI's task was not only to suggest how the specific objectives could be achieved and how PI could contribute to that. The task was also to consider public reaction to NATO's undertaking. 'The organisation must consider in fact what the consequences of this operation are on its publics. And we must consider how the public might influence the operation, and then make strategic decisions based on that' (Van Dyke 30/3/04).

Moreover, power was decentred within PI's own ranks. The CPIOs had no authority to instruct NATO PI staff up the chain of communication, but more surprisingly, all three CPIOs experienced limited authority to instruct PIOs down the chain as well. In addition, PI often found itself at odds with PI personnel outside NATO's chain of command (see 2.2.4).

Having made the point that power relations in the discursive battlefield were decentred, it is emphasised that the CPIOs do not conceive of NATO as a victim of arbitrary discursive forces. The CPIOs were certainly aware of dynamics that were critical or directly hostile to NATO, as illustrated particularly in case 2 and 6, and fought what may be termed *discursive battles* to consolidate the credibility of NATO's version of events. PI did not take NATO-positive media bias for granted, and worked explicitly to gain general acceptance of NATO's views. This was a continual struggle. PI could not control the messages neither in the media nor in the minds of its targets. Instead PI applied a strategic mode of operation to convince reporters that the information they received from NATO was valuable and reliable (see 3.4.1).

Thus, PI was engaged in perceptual conflicts that could not be won by compulsory power and decisive victories as in conventional wars in geographical battlefields.

Foucault's approach to power spurs us to perceive the conflicts in discursive terms and allows us to see PI's mode of operation as an effort to achieve tactical efficacy in a

discursive battlefield where control was an impossibility. The battle was fought indirectly with a host of diffuse actors where PI's efficacy may be appreciated in terms of its ability to define in public imagination an understanding of the situation in the Balkans that was congruent with NATO's messages. This is a political conflict indeed.

Tactical efficacy in local centres of power-knowledge

With these clarifications of and adaptations to Foucault's theoretical perspective, the primary question of this sub-chapter can now be addressed: how can Foucault's notion of power enhance our theoretical understanding of the way PI may exercise power to achieve NATO's political and military ends?

It follows from the above that this question should be addressed in what Foucault calls local centres of power-knowledge (see the section 'Genealogy's applicability' above). Doing this requires some methodological considerations, to establish which of PI's relations qualify as a local centre. The two most likely candidates are PI's relations to its targets and to the press. Hence, each of these will be briefly considered for their appropriateness to the present purpose.

The 1st PI goal identifies the public as PI's target and refers primarily to the public in NATO member countries but also in theatre (see 2.2.1). Such relations are not 'the most immediate, the most local power relations at work' (Foucault 1998: 97), however, and cannot therefore be considered a local centre in Foucault's analytical framework.

More compatible with Foucault's conception of local centres is PI's relations with reporters, as illustrated in the CPIOs' idea of social causation. It was with reporters that PIOs had direct contact. Reporters were the PI's channel to influence public opinion that influences political will to sustain a NATO mission (see 2.2.1, 2.2.2, and 2.2.5).

This suggests that the analysis be limited to such PI–reporter engagements. The inadequateness of that approach is that in practice the CPIOs do not distinguish between their relations to the media and those to the public (see 2.1.1-2.1.6). A too strict interpretation of what qualifies as relevant information, in the sense of referring specifically to PI–reporter relations, would therefore exclude much relevant information. Based on these considerations, the analysis explores the main question departing from PI–reporter relations but allows the CPIOs’ elaborations about their relations to targets to form part of the analysis.

Productive power in PI–reporter relations

It is at this point, that the notion of productive power will be applied as an interpretation of Foucault’s notion of power, which is different from but compatible with his concept of power-knowledge (see 3.1.3). As will be recalled, productive power refers to a subject’s ability to exploit discursive strategies to win tactical engagements in local centres of power-knowledge and create effects that influence discursive strategies (see the section ‘Productive power and government’ above). From this theoretical point of view, PI’s ability to disseminate, through the media, NATO’s messages worldwide within hours is extra-ordinary compared to the options of ordinary people. In Foucault’s (1998: 94) early works, however, he holds that the discursive effects are non-subjective. In other words, they are beyond the control of subjects, which in the present context means beyond the control of PI.

In spite of Foucault’s reservations, the first task of this analysis is to show how it is possible to conceive PI’s mode of operation as an exercise of productive power in local centres to win tactical engagements; that is, to have the media project NATO’s messages. Like Foucault’s description of subjects’ tactics, PI’s mode of operation is

also intentional, exercised in pursuance of ‘a series of aims and objectives’ (Foucault 1998: 94-5). This expedient dimension of PI’s mode of operation is important but shall not be reconsidered here, since it has already been elaborated on (see 3.4.1).

Instead, attention is directed to exploring how PI seeks to influence reporters in what qualifies as local centres. Some commonly applied methods PI used to engage reporters have already been presented in the empirical chapter (see 2.2.5). These methods shall now be revisited from the analytical view of productive power to advance our understanding of the way PI sought to convince reporters that NATO’s views were credible and reasonable.

The four methods are meeting points, media opportunities, press availabilities and background briefings. The next sections review each of these in turn before showing how PI exploited discursive strategies to win such tactical engagements.

Meeting points

A prominent method in PI’s mode of operation was the installation of meeting points with the press, the so-called PICs and CPICs, from which journalists could inquire information and where PI disseminated information in a written or oral form during, for instance, regular press briefings. Foucault’s perspective inspires one to comprehend PI’s use of these meeting points as an exercise of productive power because PI intentionally employed information to establish and maintain among reporters a common understanding of the situation in the Balkans conducive to NATO’s ends. That entailed convincing reporters about what was, and what was not, a fact, the issues, the challenges and NATO’s reasons and intentions.

Journalists arriving in the Balkans could come to such meeting points and be introduced

to the peacebuilding efforts and NATO's contribution to those. This was largely a pedagogical task but well suited to influence reporters' understanding of NATO's version of specific incidents as well as of more general issues involved. From the perspective of productive power such tactical engagements appear opportune to influence the information projected in the immediate media reports that follow. Moreover, educating uninformed reporters may also have a deeper and formative impact on their fundamental understanding of the issues at stake and of NATO's role in the conflicts. This is an impact that is likely to bias not only a particular media report but many subsequent reports from the journalists in question. Such basic introductions to the theatre may thus have prepared the ground for future tactical victories in the discursive battlefield.

The press briefings were another meeting point. One of their purposes was to inform reporters about recent incidents. From Foucault's perspective, this would mean to establish NATO's version of facts on the ground and their significance as valid knowledge, thereby reducing the impact of other versions, such as those the CPIOs denounce as 'rumours' or 'disinformation'. In this way press briefings purported to establish the facts and their meaning.¹⁸²

Case 3, for example, shows how PI disseminated information widely in order to establish as common sense that 'KFOR is in control'. Already on KFOR's third day in

¹⁸² PI's attention to this matter is illustrated in Campbell's (1999: 34) reflections: 'Facts do not always speak for themselves. What is an interesting "fact" in the morning gets analysed to death on live TV, and so has to become something different on the evening's bulletins, and in the next day's paper, by a press bored with a "fact" already subject to so much commentary'. Further, with regard to NATO fighter planes' fatal attack on a Kosovo Albanian refugee convoy in Djakovica on 14 April 1999, he reasons: 'The problem with the convoy accident was not that it happened but that different things were said in different parts of the operation, as we speculated and thought aloud before the facts were known. The resulting confusion was damaging' (Campbell 1999: 33).

Kosovo NATO Spokesman, Shea, portrayed the situation as generally under control when he sent a deterrence message in the daily press briefing:

As you know, there were a number of incidents that took place yesterday, unfortunate incidents but incidents nonetheless . . . But the very robust way in which the Kfor forces have responded immediately to anybody threatening their lives, according to their rules of engagement, is I hope a signal which will be heeded very clearly by any other armed assailants on the ground who may adopt any kind of threatening behaviour (NATO 14/6/1999).

This may be seen as an effort to exercise productive power since it aims to convince reporters of a NATO message's credibility. Clifford's belief, that this message did not carry conviction in the very first days, may be seen as the result of engagements in other local centres – particularly the Russian arrival to Pristina Airport a day prior to KFOR. The message soon became more credible and attention focused on relatively minor issues. For instance, three weeks later a journalist questioned KFOR's ability to prevent incidents of burning houses. The PI briefer, Major Joonsten, responded:

We of course condemn any criminal acts. If investigations point to arson then we will do our best to apprehend the culprits. However, not all fires are houses, and not all hoarse fires are suspicious. Unfortunately, as in all countries, there are sometimes fires resulting from accidents or acts of God. In Orahovac 3 houses were set alight by lightening hitting a power line (NATO 2/7/1999).

Here Major Joonsten gets across that generally speaking 'KFOR is in control', and hence sustains the message. Moreover, he also offers an alternative and less confrontational interpretation of the facts on the ground.

It could be questioned whether the two PI briefers in this way manipulate reporters' understanding of the situation in Kosovo. The CPIOs' answer to such allegations is, as

already mentioned, that PI was factual and always truthful (see 2.2.1 and 2.2.4). Yet, Clifford clarifies that one can be this in different ways and as a PIO he would always try to put in the best of light a military campaign's role and achievements. On the 'KFOR is in control' message he elaborates:

Now there will be occasions in small isolated incidents where we are not [in control], because we just simply don't have the troops to go everywhere. Now what I really do is either report if we have the information before the journalists have got it, or discuss and admit if the case is correct and there has been an incident. There has happened so and so. And yes, that is damaging. But the point is that overall we are in firm control of the security situation. We have troops. We can't be everywhere all over the place. We have to expect a certain amount of willingness on behalf of the Kosovo Albanians and the Kosovo Serbs to try to live together in peace. We know there is going to be difficulties. It is early days. Now that is putting a positive spin on a particular incident. Is that propaganda? . . . Is that PsyOps? It is a standard way every press officer is taught how to answer a question (Clifford 27/4/2004).

In other words, PI adds meaning to facts on the ground by putting them in a context where they promote, or do the least damage to, NATO's messages. From Lukes' perspective this may be described as manipulation, while from the point of view of productive power it presents itself as an effort to link facts on the ground to discursive strategies that allows the facts to be 'correctly' understood – or rather, what NATO finds to be an accurate interpretation of facts in a given situation. To the extent PI succeeded in persuading reporters that 'KFOR is in control', PI exercised productive power.

Another purpose of the press briefings was to inform reporters about NATO's policy and intentions in the conflicts. This may be seen as an employment of productive power to establish a frame of reference that would influence reporters' interpretation of

future facts on the ground. While this clearly aimed to have intentional effects beyond a particular local centre, PI first had to operate with tactical efficacy to create the effect from such local centres.

Having the media portray NATO's version of events was among other things important to improve the local targets' understanding of the general situation and gain their support. Although not NATO's public, and therefore not PI's strategic targets, the local population could create situations that might undermine NATO's strategic effort.

Foucault inspires us to see this as a potential the local targets held to create effects in other local centres that could spill over into the discursive battlefield and here undermine strategies favourable to NATO.

Case 1, to take an example, illustrates how PI operated to avoid this. Here, IFOR informed reporters about the Dayton Peace Accord. This formed a legal frame of reference for the country's political reconstruction. Yet, it was only when this agreement was properly understood and generally accepted by the civilians and the former warring parties in Bosnia that NATO could exploit this peace settlement to legitimise its operational activities (Van Dyke 13/4/2004). An IFOR spokesman's statement shows how PI strove to achieve this. During an early press briefing Lt.Col.

Rayner informs:

NATO is doing all it is supposed to be doing under the peace agreement. NATO is removing all military threat from this country, and that is going extremely well. NATO is providing the overall security in areas like Mostar where civilian authorities can undertake their obligations to which they have fully signed up under the peace agreement. That's what NATO is doing (NATO 8/1/1996).

This may be seen as an application of productive power to establish among reporters the idea that the war is over, that a new code of conduct reigns in Bosnia, and more generally the value and utility of NATO's presence in Bosnia.

Media opportunities

Media opportunities were another much used PI method. It may be seen as an exercise of productive power because this mode of operation aspires to establish in the minds of reporters an understanding of the situation in theatre that is congruent with NATO's messages. The main difference between this method and meeting points is the means. With the latter method, PI operated by means of words to convince reporters. In the former method, PI primarily facilitated that reporters gained firsthand experiences and emotional impressions. Through images, sounds and smells in a PI-selected context reporters received NATO's messages in a subliminal manner that allegedly is more persuasive than words (see 2.2.5).

In the first phase of case 5, for instance, PI invited reporters to the boundary line in the Presevo valley. Here, they should see for themselves the reception centres that KFOR had constructed to receive the EAAGs who wanted amnesty and the prisons for those who did not. PI's intention was to convey to reporters COMKFOR 5's resolve to remove the EAAGs from the valley. In the second phase, PI organised a new round of media opportunities to allow reporters to cover the arrival of the EAAGs to the reception centre. The messages aimed at the EAAGs still in the sector and the Kosovars in general to convince them that COMKFOR kept his promises, also with respect to the amnesty. As the deadline arrived reporters were informed that all EAAGs, except one, had left peacefully. Reporters saw EAAGs giving themselves in and Serbian forces enter the valley as planned. So to the extent these firsthand experiences carried

conviction, PI exerted productive power gaining acceptance for the idea that KFOR remained determined to and capable of promoting peace and reconciliation in Kosovo and in the region as a whole.

Along the same line of reasoning, productive power may also be seen to form part of media opportunities in all the other cases. For instance, when PI invited the press to cover how IFOR physically destroyed the former warring parties' symbols of power such as checkpoints, it contributed to convincing reporters, and eventually a broader audience, that facts on the ground were changing from war to peace (see case 1). Note also case 4, where PI organised a series of media opportunities on NATO's side of the boundary line to let journalists experience for themselves a show of physical force where KFOR's fighter jets were in the air in a joint exercise with its tanks and troops manoeuvring on the ground. Drawing reporters' attention to such facts on the ground aimed not only to send a deterrence message to the Serbs but also to reassure Kosovars that they were safe from Serbian forces. Again, PI employed productive power.

Finally, productive power also formed part of media opportunities organised to convince critical reporters that NATO's version of facts on the ground was trustworthy. The uncertainty about and critique of KFOR's function along the border between Macedonia and Kosovo illustrates this point (see case 6). According to the CPIO in charge, reporters' firsthand experiences with KFOR's border control increased the credibility of NATO's message among the press corps and changed Macedonia's media bias in favour of KFOR.

Press-availabilities and background briefings

A third major method in PI's mode of operation was the press availabilities (see 2.2.5). This method can be seen as an attempt to employ productive power because it aims

to influence journalists' knowledge about the peacebuilding endeavours and NATO's part in them. That entails primarily gaining and maintaining acceptance among the press corps of NATO's understanding of what facts on the ground signify, how important they are, and why NATO's approach to a particular situation is reasonable and legitimate. To accomplish this, PI's method was to familiarise journalists with high-level commanders' reasoning about, for instance, the peace processes and the tasks at hand, thus giving them deeper insights into and supposedly more convincing explanations for NATO's policies than they would receive in ordinary press briefing.

A commonly used variant of such press availabilities was the background briefing.

Productive power clearly sustains this mode of operation because background briefings normally aimed to prepare reporters to portray a future operational undertaking in a manner conducive to NATO's ends. To achieve this, the briefings aimed to persuade reporters to understand a particular situation and the necessity to deal with it in the same way as the force commanders did. Foucault allows us to apprehend this method as a way of establishing a frame of reference in the minds of reporters, in an effort to influence, as events unfold, reporters' perceptions of the missions' handling of the situation in a manner advantageous to NATO's end.

The transformation of the KLA into the Kosovo Protection Corps provides a showpiece of how productive power underlies this PI method. It was an event to which NATO had attached great importance as it signified that KFOR would be the only security presence in Kosovo. According to Clifford, Kosovo Albanian sources had for some time been providing journalists with 'rumours' undermining NATO's messages. As a result the media covered the undertaking in a manner that disturbed NATO's political authorities and international organisations. PI engaged the discursive battle to change the content of media reports in NATO's favour. To this end, Clifford conducted a series of detailed

background briefings to get NATO's version of events across to three key journalists (see 2.2.5). He explained to them what NATO was trying to achieve, what KFOR would do and how it would do it. All of which was very sensitive at that particular time:

They wrote the story, but they wrote it from a position of knowledge rather than from a position of ignorance. And because they were the three key opinion formers in Britain, the US and France, the other journalists followed suit. So we started now to have a shift in the way it [the transformation of the KLA] was being reported. We got much more back to our message now. You can argue whether that is underhand or overhand but people give background briefings to journalists every day of the week. And that worked (Clifford 27/4/2004).

In sum, PI activities conducted by means of meeting points, media opportunities, press availabilities and background briefings can be conceived as exercises of productive power simply because PIOs acted in such local centres. In addition, this mode of operation appears particularly relevant as a means of productive power because it specifically addressed the knowledge dimension in Foucault's analytical framework. The methods did so because they were directed towards influencing reporters' perceptions in the productive sense of shaping their understanding about the situation in and future scenarios for the Balkans. To achieve this, PI often linked information to discursive strategies to add meaning to it, to have reporters understand facts on the ground, NATO's policy, and scenarios for the future from the alliance's perspective. PI applied itself to create and maintain among reporters a common understanding conducive to NATO's ends. In short, to define the content of common sense.

Engaging discourses

PI's use of discursive strategies to convince reporters that NATO's role and activities in the Balkans was legitimate and desirable may be seen as discursive battles. To enhance

its credibility, and thereby its tactical efficacy, PI presented facts and policies in a context that reporters already supported. Foucault allows us to comprehend this context as consisting of discursive strategies. It may be seen as a frame of reference PI could profit from by adding meaning to facts. In this way, PI sought to have reporters understand a situation in the same way as NATO did.

This dimension of PI's mode of operation was ensured by the message strategy. The latter incorporated broad discursive strategies such as the notions of peace, human rights and prosperity, as reflected, for example, in one of IFOR's master messages stipulating: 'IFOR is the right instrument to support the Bosnian peace process' (see 2.2.3). The same discursive strategies were reflected in KFOR's messages, as illustrated during one of the first KFOR press briefings when the CPIO, Lt.Col. Clifford, informed reporters:

And this is what KFOR is about. It is an international security force with a single effective command structure that will establish and maintain peace and stability for all people of Kosovo, and I will stress once again we mean all peoples of Kosovo – the Serbs, Albanians, Muslims and Christians. KFOR is here to look after everybody (NATO 19/6/1999).

At the same time, discursive strategies also limited NATO's military room of manoeuvre. Foucault's theoretical outlook spurs us to see, for instance, NATO's reluctance to use physical force as a result of what may be specified as a 'non-use of force'-discourse. This reluctance is at odds with the conventional military mind that regards physical force as NATO's foremost advantage. Yet, had NATO used its lethal capabilities to stabilise the conventional battlefield in the Balkans it may well have achieved that, at least for some time. The likely cost, however, would have been to undermine its struggle in the discursive battlefield. Had NATO lost the latter battle, it would have lost the support of its member states' electorates and possibly been instructed

to withdraw from the Balkans. From this understanding, political restrictions on the use of physical force make sense (see also 1.1 and 2.2.4).

We may thus consider this discursive opposition to the use of physical force a major reason the Force Commanders in IFOR and KFOR applied alternative means to achieve their political and military ends. Among other things, the ‘non-use of force’-discourse turned PI into a particularly useful operational function since this could apply compulsory power in a non-lethal manner that often sufficed to achieve mission objectives (see 3.4.1). PI exploited the same discourse when it exercised productive power to establish a common understanding among the Bosnians and Kosovars that NATO’s presence in the region was in their interest; it was a presence they ought to support. The Force Commanders did not abolish the use of physical force, however, but saved it as a means of last resort. The impact of a ‘non-use of force’-discourse in a local centre is reflected during an IFOR press briefing. When journalists warranted a more robust IFOR response to violent episodes, the IFOR Spokesman, Lt.Col. Rayner, answered:

The ability exist still and it’s developing all the time to respond more than that but if it’s not appropriate to do so then it shouldn’t be done. I mean it’s there, and will be used if appropriate. We don’t want to have to shoot to people. We’ve come here to help bring peace to this place which you don’t do overreacting and shooting if it’s not necessary. The capability is there if we need it. We hope we don’t have to use it (NATO 7/1/1996).

PI’s sensitivity to the advantages provided and restrictions imposed by discursive strategies can also be found in its strategic mode of operation (see 3.4.1). More specifically, when the operational commanders planned a particular undertaking, PI did not assume that influence went one way only – from NATO to targets. Van Dyke (30/4/2004) clarifies:

We should also inform operational commanders about what is happening within the environment that we operate in, address the strategic goals of the organisations, how PI can influence the public, and how the public can influence the organisation. It should be two way. It shouldn't just be one way. And the organisation must consider in fact the consequences of this operation on its publics. And we must consider how the public might influence the operation, and then make strategic decisions based on that.

Thus, it was equally important to anticipate how the publics might interpret the operational activities; in Foucault's terms, how discursive strategies would shape public understanding of NATO's actions.

None of the examples above, which all address how PI influenced reporters' understanding of the situation in the Balkans and NATO's contribution to this, would qualify as an exercise of power in Dahl's conception. Yet, in Foucault's analytical framework these PI-reporter engagements are indeed relations of power. From his perspective PI's activities formed part of the dynamics of power simply because PI interacted with other subjects in local centres and as such created effects with discursive implications. Beyond this, however, the examples illustrate the way PI sought to exploit, and NATO acted in accordance with, existing discursive strategies to operate with tactical efficacy in discursive battles. That means to have media reports if not convey NATO's stories, then at least include the alliance's version of events. This dimension of PI's mode of operation is elaborated on below as a government technique.

From this we infer that productive power can elucidate PI's mode of operation to influence specific reporters in local centres. It is still unclear, however, how PI may have influenced its ultimate and more diffuse targets which comprise both the public in theatre, and the public in NATO member states, the latter being PI's strategic targets.

To this end, Foucault's (1998) conception of power-knowledge as it appears in *The*

Will to Knowledge is of limited avail. Suggesting a causal relation between two local centres from PI to reporters and from reporters to PI's ultimate targets is hardly satisfactory. It is at this stage the later Foucault's elaboration on his analytical framework is useful.

Enhancing public understanding and support by government

We shall return to the primary question of this chapter but treat it from the theoretical perspective Foucault constructs with the term government (see 3.2.3 and the section 'Productive power and government' above). Conceiving PI's direct and indirect influence on specific and diffuse targets as a government technique provides an understanding of how PI may have achieved its 1st goal.

In a brief recapitulation, Foucault's (1982: 789-90) concept of government should be understood as 'guiding the possibility of conduct', as 'putting order in the possible outcome', and as a technique 'to structure the possible field of action of others'. In other words, government refers to the dynamics that use and shape discursive strategies to direct people's minds and delimit their behaviour; that is use and shape normative boundaries to frame how people think and behave by encouraging some actions while discouraging others. From this perspective, power is exercised as an 'action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future' (Foucault 1982: 789).

His reference to future effects of actions clearly shows that government is situated in the discursive realm and resembles his earlier definition of power as a complex strategical situation in a particular society (Foucault 1998: 93). In 1982, however, this 'situation' has become more subjective than he previously allowed for. With reference to the

present case, government may have a much deeper impact on people, than the individual media reports people receive from the Balkans.

As mentioned, the term government is not subjective to the extent of it denoting ‘the headquarters’ of power (see 3.2.3). It is broader. A host of actors can govern in a variety of contexts. The state apparatus nevertheless holds a cardinal position in the term, not because all other power relations should be seen as subordinated to it but because they increasingly refer to this central authority when they govern. NATO PI can be seen as a function of such a central political authority, of the primary executive political branch, with regard to PI’s targets in Bosnia, Kosovo and NATO member states. The alliance was the primary security provider of the, for all practical purposes, two international protectorates in the Balkans (see 2). Hence, from Foucault’s perspective PI arguably held a privileged position with regard to the discursive realms of relevance to the local targets – the Bosnians and the Kosovars. This is not to suggest that NATO controlled these discursive realms. Rather, it is to suggest that NATO had relatively much influence on discursive strategies on the Balkans compared to that of most other actors, be they armed groups or human rights organisations. In the same vein, PI can be regarded as affiliated to the allied states’ political authorities and therefore relatively influential in discursive realms of relevance to its strategic targets – people in NATO member states.

Understanding PI’s mode of operation to achieve the 1st PI goal from the perspective of government implies that PI should be seen as a technique to direct people, not primarily by instrumental violence but by governmentality. That is, PI should be seen as structuring the possible field of action of others by shaping and exploiting discursive strategies to induce a particular form of rationality, of mentality, among its targets; a mentality that makes the governed accept to be governed. To the extent PI achieved

this, it has governmentalised power relations by gaining popular acceptance of existent institutions, objectives, means and systems of differentiations (Foucault 1982: 792).

Unfortunately, Foucault only presents his idea of government techniques in general terms. His primary concern is to uncover the history of governmentality and part of this entails the study of how the techniques differ in time and space. He does present them, however, as composed of ‘power relations, relationships of communication, and objective capacities’ (Foucault 1982: 786). Although in his late writings Foucault rarely uses the term power-knowledge, it is compatible with the overlapping and reciprocal relation he describes between ‘power relations’ and ‘relationship of communication’. Compared to his earlier works ‘objective capacities’ takes a more prominent role at this stage, a component described in terms that compare with what Dahl denotes the base of power (see 3.2.1). As the latter’s relation to PI has already been scrutinised in 3.4.1 and since it only indirectly forms part of PI’s mode of operation, the next section will therefore not elaborate further on this component but rather focus on knowledge.

PI as a government technique

PI’s mode of operation appears suitable as a technique of government because knowledge is a cardinal and intentionally applied component in both. The major difference is that while government rests on a *régime de savoir* (Foucault 1982: 780-81), PI’s task with respect to the local targets was largely to establish such a *régime*. IFOR and KFOR entered the theatres after the termination of wars and were tasked to contribute to peacebuilding efforts towards creating new political structures. In other words, PI should establish NATO’s understanding of the issues involved as generally accepted knowledge, as common sense among the Bosnians and Kosovars.

From this scene, all above-mentioned methods in PI's mode of operation to achieve tactical victories in the local centres of power-knowledge may be seen as forming part of NATO's government techniques. Notably PI's use of a message strategy, which linked multiple messages in a manner that supported a few master messages, seems helpful to define and defend what counts as knowledge. Although PI continuously engaged reporters from multiple outlets and with a variety of methods message strategies were used in an effort to portray the situations, NATO's role, and the issues at stake in a uniform and unequivocal manner. This is not to suggest that PI manipulated information, as already addressed (see 2.2.4 and 3.4.3). The intention is rather to draw attention to PI's struggle to establish and maintain in the minds of reporters one common understanding of NATO's rationale for being involved in the Balkans and to present facts on the ground from that perspective; an effort to have the media convey worldwide NATO's version of what was, and what was not, 'facts', 'desirable', and 'feasible'.

This mode of operation may serve to govern PI's targets by means of dividing practices that produce reality, establish normative boundaries and spur people to be on the generally accepted side, thereby guiding the possibility of conduct and putting order in the possible outcome of the targets' way of life. It is enlightening to consider PI's mode of operation in more detail from these three considerations.

PI's message strategy may be interpreted as a government technique to influence the discursive strategies that produce reality; as a means to direct all PI activities to induce NATO's bias on existing discursive strategies, in other words to maintain or alter established knowledge on a particular topic in order to enhance public understanding and support to NATO's ends (see the section 'Engaging discourses' above). Should we then allow ourselves to be inspired by Clausewitz' (1976: 204-09) widely cited

principle of ‘concentration of force’ on the battlefield and appreciate PI’s government technique as oriented towards a *concentration of knowledge* in the discursive battlefield?

Such a principle may be found, for instance, in PI’s above presented efforts to operate with tactical efficacy to send one message to targets, for example, ‘don’t do it’ to the Serbs in case 4. Case 1, 2, 5, and 6 represent similar co-ordinated efforts between PI and traditional operational capabilities to unify NATO’s messages.

It is interesting to see the application of the principle of concentration of knowledge in a broader context. We may find it, for example, in Van Dyke’s proposition that IFOR’s three master messages – found in the content analysis (see 2.3.1) – were directed to transform NATO’s identity to suit the post-Cold War era (see case 1).

At the risk of being too repetitive but in the interest of reviewing the message-strategy (see 2.2.3) from the point of view of this principle, IFOR’s first message aimed to overcome historical and contextual barriers both with respect to the international and the Bosnian public. People worldwide should understand that NATO had adapted to the new international security context; in Van Dyke’s words, that IFOR had become ‘the political personification of “NATO’s new attributes”’ and that NATO was working with new ‘partners for noble ends’ (Van Dyke 2003: 18).

Second, the PI campaign presented IFOR as ‘the right instrument’ for giving the peace process a chance. The PI challenge upon deploying to Bosnia was to stand out as very different from UNPROFOR (see case 1). Thus, PI strove to create an identity for IFOR, preferably as a peacekeeper, but as a warrior if need be; a white knight that entered the conflict and stopped the fight.

Third, PI should project IFOR as a helper and a leader. It should help the parties establish a democratic state and it should lead when they failed. Through these three master messages, topping a message strategy that co-ordinated a myriad of messages and talking points, PI sought to concentrate knowledge about NATO's adaptation to and utility in the post-Cold War era. We may say that PI strove to give NATO a useful and worthy role in the new *régime de savoir* being produced in the field of international security throughout the 1990s.

From Foucault's outlook, this concentration of knowledge may thus be seen as a government technique to engage the dynamic forces in the discursive battlefield in an expedient manner. This perspective can advance our theoretical understanding of the way PI's mode of operation may influence public understanding and support to NATO's policy. As briefly summarised above, power-knowledge produces reality by dividing knowledge in terms of binary oppositions. It establishes power relations by dividing, for example, the legal from the illegal, thereby exercising power because some activities are labelled valuable and others valueless (see 3.1.3).

It is interesting to note that PI's formulation of messages is compatible with this discursive dynamic. The just mentioned key messages illustrate this point. Van Dyke puts forward that to establish the first message, that is to portray NATO as working with new partners for noble ends, PI had to engage the concept – the brand, in Foucault's mode of expression – of 'military bureaucracy'. This was a brand that, according to Van Dyke, generally was perceived as authoritarian, averse to publicity, and untrustworthy. It may be added that the brand 'military' can be conceived in binary discursive opposition to the brand 'civilian'. This brand and this binary division posed an obstacle for NATO's participation in the peacebuilding process, so 'NATO sought to construct the image of a large military force that would cooperate with civilian institutions,

allow their activities to be seen and reported publicly, and strive to earn public trust and confidence' (Van Dyke 2003: 17).

Arguably KFOR was portrayed in a similar manner. For instance, during an early KFOR Press Conference in the Pristina CPIC NATO's Secretary General, Mr Javier Solana, stated:

Now KFOR's role is to create a secure environment for the rebuilding of Kosovo, for the re-establishment of law and order, for the safe return of all refugees to their homes, for social and economic reconstruction and for the full investigation of all war crimes and atrocities. The representatives from the United Nations, the OSCE, the Non-Governmental Organisations, have inclusive responsibility and NATO will do all it can to support them (NATO 24/6/1999).

This suggests that, NATO dealt with this potentially problematic discursive division between the terms military and civilian by subordinating NATO to the international civilian authority, as Clifford (27/4/2004) stipulates, although this point is not supported by the content analysis (see 2.3.2). He adds that the message aimed to project the subliminal message that in a democracy the military is subordinated to civilian authority; in other words, that NATO served the generally accepted side of the binary division. After the brief entry phase had concluded, both IFOR and KFOR conveyed that message, among others, in a visual manner by giving the chair of the joint press briefings to the civilian organisation (see case 1 and 3).

The same quote also communicates the 'noble' aspects of NATO's involvements in the Balkans by exploiting binary brandings to situate NATO's function on the 'right' side of dominant discursive divisions. KFOR created a 'secure' environment, with a subliminal reference to the binary contrast of the 'insecure' environment that characterised the situation six months earlier. Moreover, KFOR re-established the

rule of 'law' (thus preventing a contrasting rule of 'physical force') and promoted 'human rights' (thus preventing 'atrocities').

This mode of operation may be interpreted as a government technique to exploit existent discursive strategies, not only to enhance public understanding of NATO's role in the Balkans but to gain public support by presenting NATO as desirable and efficient. It may be seen as an effort to governmentalise power relations. By broadcasting a particular and delimited understanding of NATO in opposition to, and as a bulwark against, unacceptable norms, PI portrayed NATO as generally desirable with the expectation that this would enhance its public support. The same exercise of power is reflected with respect to the PI campaign's second message.

PI did not use Foucault's terminology but operated with comparable conceptual pairs to portray IFOR as 'the right instrument' (see case 1 and 2.3.1). This included pairs such as 'war' versus 'peace', 'lethal' versus 'non-violent', and 'warriors' versus 'peacekeepers'. The importance PI put on the 'non-use of force'-discourse may be interpreted as a reflection of NATO member states' fear that their electorates would oppose the first concept in these pairs, for instance 'war', while they would support the second, here 'peace'. Force, here in its physical sense, connotes war, lethal and warriors – all arguably on the illegitimate side of the dominant dividing normative lines in the 1990s. From this perspective the incorporation of, for instance, the principle of minimum necessary force in IFOR's and KFOR's rules of engagement (see 2.2 and 2.2.4) can be interpreted as an effort to distance these missions from such unpopular terms and to situate IFOR within generally supported normative boundaries (see 1.1).

In 1995, NATO's problem was that its member states' electorates generally perceived the alliance in terms of war, lethal, and warrior, hence PI's task became to transform

NATO's identity in the eyes of the public. Van Dyke (2003: 18) argues that to this end, PI had to build 'rhetorical bridges' between the two concepts in each of the pairs, in order to allow NATO to cross over in the public imagination, for example, from being useful in war to being useful also in peace. In order to gain public support, PI also had to strike the right balance between the brands 'lethal' and 'non-violent' – or as Clifford terms them with respect to KFOR 'militarily capable' and 'non-offensive' (see 2.2.3) – when it portrayed the military missions. It had to be 'militarily capable' to deter the warring parties and 'non-offensive' to be seen as legitimate by NATO members' electorates. To achieve this, PI had to give NATO room of manoeuvre to operate on both sides of the normative boundaries. Consequently, PI framed NATO's activities with expedient discursive strategies according to the objectives they aimed to achieve. In this way Foucault's notion of power allows us to understand PI's mode of operation as a concentration of knowledge to produce reality by exploiting dividing normative lines in the discursive battlefield.

In addition, Foucault's work may further our conception of how PI tried to govern its targets, not by physical sanctions, but by inducing a particular form of rationality in them. That is, a governmentality that by means of normative pressures spurs people to think and behave in desirable ways and within certain normative boundaries (see 3.2.3). A few examples illustrate these endeavours.

To reduce the level of unauthorised shooting, for instance, PI strove to legitimise IFOR's stand on this topic by linking it to the 'non-use of force'-discourse. Determined to strengthen discursive strategies that structure the possible field of actions of others, PI sought to promote the idea and consolidate the norm that unauthorised use of physical force was not desirable. Such efforts can be found in Brig. Cumming's statement opening an IFOR press briefing three weeks after deployment:

Over the last few days there has been a reduction of the incidents of firing at aircraft. I know we went through last weekend the Serbian Christmas and indeed I suppose we have to be aware that tonight is their New Year's eve but nevertheless in the intervening period there has been a considerable reduction in the number of incidents. That has to a very large extent been because of the pressure applied at the number of levels to the people to advise them that we do not considerate it celebratory, we considerate it undisciplined and we are trying to persuade them to see it as undisciplined as well (NATO 13/1/1996).

PI's endeavours to exploit and support discursive strategies to guide its targets' 'possibility of conduct', in Foucault's (1982: 789) formulation, can also be found in IFOR's resolution to encourage the local targets to solve their differences by political means and denying them to use their armed force. Again, a statement from a press briefing illustrates this point. Just over a month into IFOR's existence spokesman Lt.Col. Rayner opens the proceedings:

Another very quiet day in which IFOR Experienced no obstruction of freedom of movement. The presence of IFOR Troops over the last month has resulted in the separation of military forces along the former front lines. No tanks, heavy guns or advancing troops threaten the peace that began with last year's cease-fire. The way is now clear for the political leaders of all 3 parties to engage in serious negotiations and move the peace process ahead by diplomacy and compromise (NATO 24/1/1996).

By such techniques PI may have transformed the Bosnians' and Kosovars' mindsets from war to peace; and thus, Foucault suggests, changed them as subjects in a manner furthering their support to NATO. Moreover, this would have facilitated that they

reoriented their daily activities in a manner contributing to the reconstructing of peaceful communities.¹⁸³

With these examples of how PI sought to govern the Balkan publics, we shall now direct attention to how PI operated to influence its strategic targets' understanding of the situation in the Balkans. With reference to the issues just elaborated on in the case above, PI's efforts to establish NATO's version of its achievements in media reports may have influenced discursive strategies that could influence the publics in NATO member countries. In IFOR's early days, PI assisted national capitals to mobilise their electorates' support to the idea that NATO should deploy in a peace support operation 'out-of-area' by linking the mission to human rights discourses. Moreover, when PI appealed to people's moral duty to escalate with military means their assistance to other people in urgent need (see case 1), it revived a fading 'use of force'-discourse by linking it with the human rights discourses.

More generally, PI's mode of operation can be seen as an effort to governmentalise these power relations between NATO and its strategic targets. Foucault's perspective induces us to speculate that this may have established a strategic situation in the discursive battlefield that gave the alliance, along with other international actors, a necessary and legitimate role as custodians of the newly won peace in Bosnia and

¹⁸³ Indeed, the three CPIOs themselves arrive at this empirical conclusion about the effects of their PI activities, as the presentation of the cases reflects (see 2.1.1 – 2.1.6 and 2.4). The validity of their impact on the Bosnians is supported by Siegel (1998: 143-51), Avruch et al. (1999: 42), and Coward (2000), and on the general improvements in Bosnia after the Dayton Peace Accord by Hudson and Stanier (1999: 298) and Sandberg and Windmar (1998). Thompson and de Luce (2002: 206-08) are more critical, not to the general political achievements, however, but to IFOR's unwillingness to marginalise Bosnian leaders who sought to undermine this peace agreement. In addition but in a different context, positive experiences with the UN's information achievements in its peacekeeping operation in Cambodia 1992-93 have been provided by Heininger (1994), Lehmann (1999: 51-83), Marston (2002), and Lindley (2004: 608-11).

Kosovo. In other words, PI's mode of operation may be seen as an exercise of power to create a political situation in the Balkans and beyond where NATO's presence and policy in that region was generally desired.

It may have changed the understanding of electorates in NATO member states about the field of international affairs and their sense of contributing to global stability. It may have transformed their mindsets away from an idea that had reigned during the Cold War and to a new rationale for the use of armed forces, extending the idea that the most relevant purpose of armed force is national defence and arriving at the idea that armed force could and should be used in defence of human rights at a global scale as well.¹⁸⁴ It may have induced in them a new sense of the 'white man's burden'. NATO's Secretary General, Mr Javier Solana, strikes this cord in a KFOR Press Conference during his early visit to Kosovo:

Let me tell you the operation on the ground has already been a tremendous success. NATO's member countries have responded to the challenge to bring peace and stability to Kosovo by deploying already 30,000 troops in a fully integrated and effective peace keeping force. This reflects NATO's shared determination to uphold the values which our Alliance has successfully defended for 50 years - democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law (NATO 24/6/1999).

Such messages could have discursive effects beyond the region, since the international endeavours to manage the Bosnian and Kosovo crisis were examples of a kind of global

¹⁸⁴ Senghaas (1993) and Wheeler (2000). Coker (2001: 12) presents these normative developments as a revaluation of war: 'We have not, of course, gone out of the business of war. Instead, we have been forced to re-market it, to fight in a different fashion. We now fight humanitarian wars, and we try to fight them more humanely.' See also Shaw (1996), Taylor, P (2000a: 294), and Thussu (2000a; 2000b). An empirical account of how the Western *régime de savoir* has changed with respect to the notion of war throughout the 20th century can be found in Coker (1994) that from a different methodological approach identifies alterations in Western literature's depiction of the phenomenon.

order envisioned in NATO's strategic concepts of 1991 and 1999, where countries in the Euro-Atlantic region take measure to protect their stability from risks that may come from the periphery. In this way the strategic concepts establish binary brands – the 'Euro-Atlantic region' versus the 'periphery', and 'stability' versus 'risks' – that create dividing normative lines.¹⁸⁵ Thus, Foucault's notion of governmentality is clearly relevant not only at the level of the state, which was his focus, but also at the global level (see also 1.5.3).

From this perspective, PI's mode of operation may have contributed, as Van Dyke (2003) holds, to give NATO a new identity and to establish the alliance as the West's foremost and legitimate instrument to preserve international peace and security. Indeed, NATO's Secretary General, Mr Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, uses IFOR to portray NATO's role in current history in such terms. On 11 November 2004, in a speech to the UN Security Council he stipulates:

This decision to go 'out of area' in the Balkans was a historical decision for the Alliance . . . it represented the birth of UN-NATO cooperation . . . NATO is now playing a major role, under the Security Council mandate, in Afghanistan . . . In Iraq, under the terms of the United Nations' Security Council resolution 1546 . . . NATO is providing assistance and training and equipping the Iraqi security forces' (NATO 2004).

To the extent this version of the past becomes common sense, Foucault would suggest that it changes the identities of people in NATO member states from potential victims in a nuclear holocaust to guardians of a global peace.

¹⁸⁵ See NATO (1991: paragraph 11; 1999: 3, 20). Empirical evidence and implications of such discursive effects are presented in Myers et al. (1996) and Carruthers (2000: 45).

PI as productive power – a summary

The theoretical speculations about PI's discursive effects make no claim to being empirically valid. They serve to demonstrate, however, that productive power and government can conceptualise the kind of influence PI's mode of operation seeks to exert in order to achieve the alliance's political and military ends. Foucault's conception of power can improve our understanding of how PI may enhance public understanding and support and influence the general behaviour of the public, in reciprocal PI–target relations that are direct or indirect, and towards targets that are specific or diffuse.

Before summarising the value of Foucault's analytics of power in the present context, it is timely to reiterate his reservations against subjective influence in the discursive realm: power comes from everywhere; no one is in control (see 3.2.3). Although he moderates this view in his later writings, Foucault also stresses that the ability to govern does not reside in the state apparatus. This cautious note warns us against exaggerating the impact of PI's activities and encourages us to regard PI's influence in the context of and in the engagement with a host of other effects, a tendency that is reinforced by the politico-military context in which NATO operated. Although part of an embryonic central authority in the two theatres, NATO's relations with the local populations were not fully governmentalised. Rather, PI formed part of a broader discursive battle and was up against not only other subjects but also multiple and powerful discourses.

In addition, Foucault does not provide a theory that can prove, in positivistic terms, the existence of power relations, but an analytical perspective from which the phenomenon of power can be interpreted. He moves the object of study from Dahl's and Lukes' material realm to one that is discursive. This frame of reference does not present PI as primarily a means of power that mediated between NATO's traditional military

capabilities and its targets' responses, as Dahl permits us to see. Foucault suggests that PI exercised power by referring to and influencing the knowledge of its targets. Power-knowledge forms people's perceptions and opinions, and thereby their behaviour.

Foucault's perspective discloses PI as a means NATO used to govern people indirectly. PI sought to influence its final targets through reporters who had an extraordinarily broad and quick access to the public worldwide. Each PI engagement with reporters may be seen as a local centre where the former by use of a variety of techniques, such as meeting points, media opportunities, press availabilities and background briefings, strove to establish NATO's version of the situation in the Balkans in media reports.

Foucault's analytical framework inspires us to conceive PI as operating in a discursive battlefield it could not control. The latter point is important because it underlines why Foucault's notion of power cannot sustain ideas of cunning propaganda endeavours that manipulate entire societies. Having stressed this, it is equally important to emphasise that PI strove to influence the dynamics in this discursive battle. PI acted in an expedient manner to influence its targets' understanding of facts on the ground and the meaning of such facts, to clear up confusion, to counter disinformation, and to convey NATO's policy and intentions in a convincing manner. It was, according to Van Dyke (17/3/2004) and Idsøe (26/3/2004), a war of words, a broad perceptual conflict in which PI engaged multiple and powerful actors and discourses to produce reality. PI could not, and did not, expect to have a desired impact but struggled to influence the content of common sense by winning as many discursive battles as possible. Its mode of operation was to engage reporters from a variety of outlets, potentially as broad as the PI personnel in all allied capitals at the top and down the level of command to NATO's platoons. Crucially, PI's mode of operation was based on the idea that NATO troops and political authorities promoted the same few messages.

In this strategic manner PI strove to establish and maintain in the minds of reporters one common understanding of NATO's rationale for being involved in the Balkans and to present facts on the ground within that discursive frame of reference. This as an effort to have the media convey NATO's version of what was 'facts', 'true', 'acceptable' and 'desirable'.

From Foucault's perspective, PI's mode of operation cannot be depicted simply as a measure to inform the publics about the situation in the Balkans. PI exerted power. Potentially, the function influenced its targets in a profound and penetrating manner. Notably, PI's message strategy and unity of effort can be seen as an effort to concentrate knowledge to operate with tactical efficacy in and influence the discursive battlefield. This mode of operation appears particularly suited to influence the *régime de savoir* that conditions governmentality; that governs people and makes governance acceptable to people.

In this light, PI's mode of operation presents itself as a government technique that engaged the discursive strategies which produced reality and established normative boundaries with regard to the Balkans. PI's messages were formulated in a manner compatible with the binary brands and divisions that structure Foucault's discursive strategies and were deliberately aimed to situate NATO on the generally accepted side of these normative boundaries. The purpose was to portray NATO as desirable and efficient with the expectation that this would enhance its public support.

More generally, PI's endeavours may be seen as an effort to governmentalise power relations making NATO's goals legitimate and generally desired. PI linked facts on the ground, NATO's policy, and future political scenarios to discursive strategies in ways compatible with Foucault's government techniques that spur people to think and

behave in a desirable manner and within normative boundaries. In this universe of discourse, PI governed by 'guiding the possibility of conduct and putting order in the possible outcome' of the targets' way of living (Foucault 1982: 789). To the extent PI actually succeeded in this endeavour, it may not only have de-escalated what to the conventional military mind is the conflict but also exercised what Foucault terms the art of government.

Chapter 4

Conclusion

How, and for what purposes, has NATO used its Press and Information function in its peace support operations in the Balkans? This was the empirical question this study set out to answer. The question is important. It addresses a general activity that is arguably a precondition for reaching Western strategic objectives in contemporary armed conflicts. Nonetheless, how armed forces actually conduct such tasks has received limited scholarly attention. Though interest in the topic has increased in recent years it has primarily been in the general sense of how the media is used to influence international affairs.

Before reaching a conclusion on this thesis it is prudent to return to some methodological limitations upon which these findings are based. Then follows considerations on the relation between Dahl and Foucault's respective notions of power. Finally, the broader implication of the present findings in the field of international politics and war will be reflected upon.

The validity of the findings rests on a set of assumptions already presented in the methodological chapter. These shall not be re-elaborated on here but I want to draw attention to them as a cautionary note. Three crucial limitations of this study demand a brief repetition, however.

First, the thesis makes no claim that it has general validity in terms of how NATO applies PI. The object of study is NATO's institutionalised ideas about the practice of PI as expressed by three centrally placed PI officers. The thesis does not even hold that

the empirical findings are supported by all other NATO PI staff in the six illustrative cases. These findings are primarily based on three individuals' accounts, although their validity is checked against other sources and a content analysis of relevant NATO press briefings. The study does not provide evidence to verify whether the CPIOs' ideas correspond to NATO PI policy and doctrines, however, since such information is largely classified. Moreover, even if it were permitted to present these documents such a method would reflect only policy but not the ideas that informed the actual implementation of policy in the cases. It is the latter, the practice of PI, which is the present topic of concern. As a consequence, how representative the study is for NATO's general PI activity rests largely on the CPIOs' competence and honesty.

Second, notwithstanding the CPIOs' own accounts, this thesis does not claim that PI actually influenced their target groups. This has not been the present purpose. Rather, this study aims to conceptualise the forms of influence NATO PI's mode of operation seeks to exert in order to influence its target groups. In other words, the theoretical elaborations do not try to prove relations of power between PI and their targets, but rather to elucidate PI's assumptions about those relations.

Third, the broader context in which this study is presented – that war is changing, the utility of physical force is declining, and the use of the media is becoming increasingly important – rests primarily on the authority of five authors, although reference is made to sources that elaborate on related issues. While this has no significant effect on the validity of the thesis it is important for the wider implications of the findings. The value of the subsequent speculations about what the present findings may signify in the field of International Relations depends, among others, on how well-founded the five authors' analyses are.

4.1 Empirical thesis

Within the methodological limitations of this study (see 1.4), it may be concluded that NATO used PI as a means of power to achieve political and military ends. PI's mode of operation was guided by a PI policy, stipulating goals and intentions, and based on three components: a message strategy, a unity of effort and a resolution to maintain credible relations with the press.

NATO's political and military leaders applied PI to enhance member countries' public support to the alliance's *raison d'être* as well as its presence and use of physical force in the Balkans. Further, NATO used PI to achieve military objectives in the Balkans, particularly to influence the parties' and people's general behaviour and specific actions. PI offered NATO a non-lethal means to promote stability, deter crises and resolve conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo.

PI's mode of operation was strategic. It was guided by a policy framework. The 1st goal stipulated that PI should enhance public understanding and support. To this end, PI operated to influence the media's projections of the alliance and its activities. As the content analyses point out, PI projected NATO's presence and activities in the Balkans in a few master messages. These were sustained by a message strategy. In addition, PI strove to achieve a unity of effort. It co-ordinated vertically, up and down a chain of communication between NATO PI staff. At the various levels in the ordinary chain of command PI co-ordinated horizontally with the other NATO functions. At the missions' command levels the CPIOs assisted in identifying appropriate responses to up-coming tasks and, at times, PI was used as a non-lethal compulsory measure to implement the same plans. In this function PI served along with traditional operational functions, such as air power and artillery. PI operated as a megaphone function disseminating the

force commanders' intentions and stressing their resolve to carry them out. PI also operated as a force multiplier amplifying public imagination of a force commanders' military capacity to apply lethal sanctions.

These empirical findings offer new perspectives on the question: what are the capabilities of the warring parties? This is a key questions in the field of International Relations as initially observed (see 1.2.1). The study casts light on the functions and methods of military operational means that are different from and often more expedient than conventional armed force to reach contemporary strategic objectives.

4.2 Theoretical thesis

The theoretical dimension of this study is to conceptualise an implicit assumption in the empirical findings, namely the forms of influence that PI may exercise. Based on three seminal theoretical perspectives on power, the research question was: How can Robert A. Dahl's, Steven Lukes', and Michel Foucault's respective notions of power enhance our theoretical understanding of the way NATO's PI function may exercise power to achieve political and military ends?

At first sight Lukes' far-reaching notion of structural power appeared useful to consider whether PI manipulated the minds of the publics in the Balkans and in NATO member countries. Further investigations concluded, however, that the concept is based on assumptions that make it inapplicable to the present study. Notably, the exercise of structural power is conditioned by latent conflicts in which a powerful actor succeeds in thwarting the real interests of, and impose false consensus on, the less powerful.

Analytical considerations along Lukes' methodological prescriptions led to the conclusion that it would not be possible to provide convincing evidence to sustain a

claim that PI had manipulated their targets' interests and imposed false consensus upon them.

It is timely to question the value of presenting and elaborating on a theoretical concept only to diminish it. The reason the analytical discussion of structural power remains in this final version is that it questions cardinal assumptions of the idea that manipulating others against their real interests is a major feature in the field of international security. This is important for three reasons. The present study provides a critical case that questions the validity of Lukes' concept of power. Second, the study does not, nor did it ever aim to, invalidate criticism that NATO has used PI as a means to mislead others (see 1.3). Nonetheless, structural power's inapplicability in the present analysis questions the assumptions on which such criticism is based. Third, Lukes' understanding of power forms part of a generally accepted way to conceptualise the power of social communication in the field of International Relations – that is, Nye's notion of soft power (see 1.4.2). For this reason, the critique of Lukes also applies to Nye.

In contrast, Dahl's notion of power proved useful to further our theoretical understanding of how PI may influence the specific actions of the parties and people in the Balkans. PI operated as a means of compulsory power when intentionally used to make its targets 'do something that *B* [ie the targets] would not otherwise do', as Dahl's seminal definition goes.

In military campaigns compulsory power has arguably been conceived in terms of physical force. This idea can be found, for example, in NATO's deterrence logic during the Cold War, which spurred strategists to think of influence in terms of the potential to apply lethal force (see 1.1). The present study shows that the ability to coerce and

deter opponents also resides in PI – not in PI alone but when used in close coordination with conventional operational functions. PI was used as a megaphone and force multiplier to mediate between NATO’s lethal capacity and the targets’ responses. All three force commanders exploited this dimension of PI because it held the advantage of allowing them to enforce stability and regulate their targets’ actions without having to employ their lethal capacity. Using PI as a non-lethal enforcement measure dramatically reduced the political risks involved in traditional means of compulsion.

On the other hand, Dahl’s compulsory conception of power cannot explain PI’s mode of operation to enhance public understanding and support. This was the 1st PI goal and compatible with what is arguably the strategic objective in contemporary conflicts: to win the will of the people (see 1.1). To this end Foucault’s notion is useful. Conveying the conceptual difference in broad-sweeping terms, we may say that where Dahl regards power as physical force, Foucault conceives knowledge as power. More correctly, the Foucauldian notion of productive power operates in a discursive realm in which techniques of knowledge and strategies of power are intimately linked.

Before continuing, it is prudent to recall how the term productive power is applied in the context of this thesis. Where Foucault (1976: 93) conceives power in discursive terms and defines it as ‘the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society’, the present study applies the more delimited term productive power. This notion is based on his analytical framework and refers to subjects’ ability to exploit a given discursive situation to their own advantage in their relations with others (see 3.4.3).

When PI informed its targets about NATO’s policies and intentions, and about facts on the ground, it disseminated information which to varying degrees influenced

people's knowledge. Crucially, this process can be appreciated as an exercise of productive power. It corresponds to a dynamic which Foucault refers to as power-knowledge. NATO influenced others simply because it engaged in social communication.

Beyond this, PI's activity had discursive effects that to some extent, and according to Foucault in uncertain ways, will have influenced the discursive patterns of domination. These patterns have a much deeper impact on people since they establish binary-normative categories for information like war/peace, abnormal/normal, and bad/good. Such categories shape the *régime de savoir* that envelopes human societies and defines social interaction. This is a *régime* that organises people's reception of information about reality by organising knowledge and therefore their perception of reality; that defines what counts as facts and what they signify; that forms people's understanding of what is, and what is not, peace, normal and good; and that moulds the content of common sense. This in turn influences what people will render their support to and disciplines their general behaviour.

From this perspective, productive power refers to the PIOs' ability to influence the knowledge dimension of their targets, wherever they may engage them, to NATO's advantage. That is, their ability to define reality for others; to establish what counts as valid knowledge. Productive power is a competence soldiers may use to exploit the discursive context in which they fight; the context in which their targets make sense of their situation and that of international affairs. It is the competence to use, make and disseminate information in order to gain targets' support to one's visions for the future; the ability to present facts on the ground by relating them to existing discourses in a way that puts one's endeavours in the best possible light; and as such a competence subjects may possess to a larger or lesser degree.

Along Foucault's conception of power, therefore, when in the present study PI operated to have the media project NATO's version of facts on the ground or the terms of a peace agreement, PI engaged with multiple actors and powerful discourses in a perceptual conflict. The objective was to influence the *régime de savoir* in the Balkans – the local peoples' perception of reality.

In this context, a primary PI objective was to change the populations' mindsets from war to peace. To the extent that PI succeeded, it contributed to changing people's general behaviour and to bringing peace and stability to the Balkans. It governed, in Foucault's (1982: 789) use of the term, the targets' way of living by guiding the possibility of conduct and putting order in the possible outcome. PI established order in the way its targets made sense of their situation. PI aimed to influence if not the features of the dividing normative boundaries, then on which side of the boundaries NATO was positioned in public imagination and how NATO was portrayed to its targets within the dominant *régime de savoir*. To the extent that NATO's goals became generally accepted among the various peoples in the Balkans, PI participated in governmentalising power relations in the region. In addition, NATO's achievements to this end will in turn have influenced a broader international *régime de savoir* about, for example, the alliance's utility in the Balkans.

In the same vein, PI exercised productive power, and potentially governed, when it set out to directly inform distant and diffuse targets such as NATO's public. In these undertakings, PI engaged a broader scope of – possibly more powerful – actors. Here, PI's objective was to convince its targets about NATO's version, not only of facts on the ground in the Balkans and the meaning of such facts, but of the broader state of international affairs, of NATO's role, and indeed its value in this wider context. Again, to the extent PI succeeded it will have affected discourses and thereby a more global

régime de savoir in a way that turned out favourable to NATO. This will have influenced common sense among NATO's targets and may have contributed to the transformation of Western mindsets from a concern about, for instance, defending our Euro-Atlantic region to guarding international peace and security. NATO's primary PI goal, which was to enhance public understanding and support, may be considered as fulfilled once power relations were governmentalised in NATO's favour.

To these theoretical considerations, Foucault would insist that discursive effects are beyond the control of subjects. Discourses are non-intentional. PI cannot control the discursive battlefield. It cannot exercise power in an expedient manner above the, in a theoretical sense, tactical level. Yet, Foucault's empirical claim is contrasted by the CPIOs' actual experiences. Although the validity of their conviction has not been assessed in this study, it is observed that the CPIOs insist that they influenced their targets. Among others things, they support their claims by pointing to the findings from their permanent teams that evaluated the daily content of media reports¹⁸⁶.

Thus, a difference of understanding exists between Foucault's position and the CPIOs' own idea about the expediency with which they can influence their targets. This does not invalidate the applicability of Foucault's notion of power in this context, however. He would accept the possibility that the CPIOs influence their targets. What he would question is the efficiency with which they can do it.

It follows that this thesis potentially offers a critical case that could challenge the limited influence Foucault ascribes to subjects. It is possible that further research could

¹⁸⁶ See 2.1 and 2.4. In the case of IFOR, this view is supported by Siegel (1998: 144) and Badsey (2000b: xxv).

show that PI has exercised intentional discursive effect. A study might evaluate whether a PI campaign was efficient. It could simply compare, for example, PI's objectives in a specific situation with opinion polls and media content analysis prior to and after the campaign. Extending the period of analysis would increase the value of such findings.

Beyond these theoretical findings, Foucault's notion of power spurs us to understand NATO's PI function – along with other assets in states' 'communications armoury' (see 1.5.2) – as operating in a battlefield that is different from the one used by the alliance's traditional operational assets. It is a battlefield defined by discourses rather than, as in industrial wars, by mountains and oceans. It is a battlefield crowded with allied and rivalling ideas rather than armed forces. It is an immaterial, non-spatial battlefield rather than a material and geographical one.

This discursive battlefield, as it has been termed here, is constituted by knowledge (see 3.4.3). It is shaped by the way information is organised in binary-normative categories that produce meaning and define reality for subjects. There are no subjects in the discursive battlefield, only discursive formations created by the discursive effects that subjects produce.

Normally, the discursive battlefield is dominated by a *régime de savoir* defined by the content of its discursive strategies. These lay down dividing normative boundaries that spur people to think and behave within certain codes of conduct. In other words, discursive strategies govern. Crucially, however, it is a battlefield that no one controls. Power comes from everywhere. The discursive battlefield is decentred, because it is constituted by never-stable chains of discursive elements that form discursive strategies. These are perpetually challenged by other discursive forces. Ideas can be suppressed but

never eliminated. There is always a possibility for marginalised discursive elements to gain momentum and challenge the existing, but always fluid, *régime de savoir*.

From NATO's point of view the interesting question is how the strategic situation, the *régime*, in the discursive battlefield may be exploited, or maybe even changed, to the alliance's advantage. Although Foucault, as noted, would oppose the idea that any subject could influence this realm in an intentional manner, not to mention control it, he does perceive discursive strategies as being produced and reproduced by discursive effects created by subjects in local centres. This provides NATO's PI function with a theoretical opening, with an immaterial entry point into the discursive battlefield, an entry that takes the form of the discursive effects PI may induce into this realm.

Understanding PI's mode of operation in this light is clarifying. It may be seen as an endeavour to create effects in the discursive battlefield that would shape relevant discursive strategies to NATO's advantage. It is interesting to note that NATO approached its task in the Balkans with implicit acceptance of the defining conditions of the discursive battlefield; for example, that it could not be controlled. For instance, in the interest of establishing and maintaining public support, NATO's political authorities provided its force commanders with rules of engagement that significantly reduced the option to apply physical force. To the conventional military mind, this must appear an odd limitation imposed on a military commander, but in the post-Cold War's discursive battlefield it makes good sense. The Force Commanders' sensitivity to the discursive effects of their activities is also reflected in their integration of PI in the Command Group. Among other things, PI was here tasked to judge which alternative ways of solving operational tasks would come across most advantageously in the eyes of people.

Moreover, PI operated in a manner that conforms to Foucault's (1976: 102) understanding of power that 'replaces the privilege of the law with the viewpoint of the objective, the privilege of prohibition with the viewpoint of tactical efficacy'. For instance, PI made no effort to deny the media access to NATO's activities, nor to censor media products (see 4th, 5th, and 6th PI goal in 2.2.1). PI operated on the understanding that reporters were its primary channel to the discursive battlefield; that they produced stories based on a host of non-NATO sources, most of which had interests different from NATO's; and that efforts to censor the media would most likely be counterproductive. Nor did PI try to force its messages upon its target groups. It did not, in Foucault's terms, impose law. Rather, PI made every effort to operate with tactical efficacy to persuade them to accept NATO's objectives in the Balkans. In addition, the reciprocal relation the CPIO's experienced with its targets can be seen as a logical consequence of the discursive battlefield's decentred features.

Under such conditions, PI participated in a discursive battle that produced reality. PI's task was to establish a situation in the discursive battlefield conducive to NATO's ends, to establish a general understanding and support among people of NATO's role in the Balkans. In other words, it was tasked with convincing its target groups that NATO's involvement was desirable and efficient.

PI's mode of operation may be seen as a deliberate effort to have a desired impact in the discursive battlefield. It is illuminating to conceive PI's activities as guided by a principle of concentration of knowledge. The three primary components of PI's mode of operation – message strategy, unity of effort and the resolve to maintain credible relations with the press – can be interpreted as a conscious effort to induce the same set of coherent discursive effects from multiple local centres into the discursive battlefield. PI directed itself to access this realm's immaterial entry points by repeating the

same coherent messages from many sources in a manner people would believe. All tactical PI engagements in a wide spectrum of local centres aimed to disseminate, with one voice, NATO's version of facts on the ground and of the issues involved. Accepting that PI could not directly mould the constellation of discursive strategies, one may suspect, however, that a concerted effort conducted along the principle of concentration of knowledge to influence such strategies may be more expedient than a diffuse one. Put bluntly, it is likely that few ideas from many people will have greater impact on public imagination than many ideas from few people.

PI's mode of operation to concentrate knowledge focused on reporters. It was primarily their ideas about the current situation in and future scenarios for the Balkans that were widely disseminated in the discursive battlefield. To this end, PI applied a number of methods, among others establishing well-known meeting points with reporters, creating opportunities for the media to get interesting stories, making commanders available for the press, and giving reporters detailed background briefings about up-coming operational undertakings. PI strove to influence reporters in the productive sense of shaping their understanding of facts on the ground and the meaning of such facts, in order to clear up confusion, counter disinformation, and convey NATO's policy and intentions in a convincing manner. To this end PI exploited the reigning *régime de savoir* to add meaning to NATO's messages, to put them in a beneficial light. In other words, PI strove to establish NATO's version of the situation in the Balkans as common sense among the press corps, hoping that this would bias public understanding and mobilise support for NATO.

Given the features of the discursive battlefield, PI did not expect to have a desired, and certainly not a lasting, impact but continuously struggled to influence the content of media reports by winning as many discursive battles as possible. Decisive victories

belonged to a different battlefield, in the discursive one PI could only strive to operate with tactical efficacy.

Thus, understanding the power of NATO's PI function from the perspectives of Dahl's and Foucault's theoretical work has been clarifying. Foucault's notion of power can conceptualise the type of influence NATO PI's mode of operation seeks to exert in order to enhance public understanding and support and to influence the general behaviour of the public. Dahl's notion of power can elucidate PI's mode of operation to influence people's specific actions.

In order to facilitate reading in the remainder of the thesis, I shall henceforth use the term productive power in a broad sense that comprises government. Against this background the notions of compulsory and productive power appear useful to the broader academic debate presented in the introduction about how we can conceptualise the influence of states' efforts to pursue their interest in the post-Cold War era by means of social communication. Together these two notions constitute a conceptual framework that allows us to understand why the way armed forces use the media is now 'the other manner in which we fight', as Smith (2005: 284) asserts.

Productive power may also be useful in other ways: It can add credibility to Cooper's (2004: 115-16) central claim that words are superior to physical force in the postmodern world; and it points to dynamics political leaders might engage with to rally people under a 'powerful idea', which van Creveld (1991: 214) finds crucially important in his low-intensity conflicts. Productive power also seems to be required both to mobilise domestic support to policing war, which Mueller (2004: 149-55) identifies as a major impediment to his project, and to create a cosmopolitan community sufficiently powerful to uphold cosmopolitan law-enforcement mechanisms world wide, as

Kaldor (1999: 114) calls for (see 1.1). It is beyond the present scope to show how Foucault's analytical framework could be useful to further research on these issues. We shall rest on the observation that it appears a promising avenue.

4.3 The relation between compulsory power and productive power

Dahl's and Foucault's respective notions of power can conceptualise different types of influence the NATO PI function seeks to exert. The former elucidates how PI may influence people's actions to ends that compare to those armed forces have traditionally pursued, yet that PI may achieve short of the actual application of physical force.

Foucault's notion can primarily further our appreciation of how PI may enhance public understanding and support, which is essentially a political task. In other words, the study clarifies that PI deals with two different, yet obviously connected, conflicts: one military and one political. In empirical terms this distinction has become increasingly untenable. Still, it is useful to maintain it for analytical purposes to refine the apprehension of how these two struggles relate. Are they contradictory? Mutually reinforcing? Where are the pitfalls and synergies in their relations? Should one be subordinated to the other? Answers to these questions lie implicitly in the analytical parts of the thesis. They shall now be made explicit.¹⁸⁷

The basis for understanding the relations between Dahl's and Foucault's notions of power is that they dominate different realms. Compulsory power and productive power

¹⁸⁷ Others, notably Weber (1978) and Arendt (1979), have elaborated on the basic thoughts put forward here. They do so from different approaches to the phenomenon of social power, however.

both co-exist in local centres, to use Foucault's parlance, or in the material space, to use a more commonly used term (see 3.4.3), but here compulsory power can trump productive power. Foucault excludes productive power from the realm of war – in the sense of what here is termed industrial war.¹⁸⁸ When compulsory power takes its extreme form on the battlefield, productive power ceases to operate.

In addition, productive power operates in the discursive space. Here, dynamics are partly influenced by effects created in local centres by subjects in tactical engagements, and partly by internal clashes among discourses in their exclusive space. Crucially, a feed-back system exists whereby discursive patterns of domination return to the material world by influencing people's perceptions of reality.

The productive power dimension of PI's mode of operation offers NATO a possibility to influence the human dimension in international peacebuilding efforts in a psychological manner and on a geographical scope that NATO's compulsory power, that is its conventional capability, cannot hope to reach. This does not imply that NATO's productive power is superior to its compulsory power, only that its influence on targets is different. The relation between the two forms of power is best understood as interdependent.

While compulsory power dominates on the traditional battlefield, the importance of productive power increases between such wars. Then, productive power operates on the discursive battlefield, whose defining features are largely defined by the outcome of the last conventional battle. In the absence of full-fledged industrial wars, however,

¹⁸⁸ Cited in Bertani et al. eds. 2003: 16.

productive power can undermine compulsory power's political efficiency, since the former validates the latter. Productive power provides the normative foundation upon which the legitimacy to apply compulsory power is based.

In a peace support operation, the strategic objective is public support to a particular vision of the future – not armies defeated, as in industrial wars. In the former context, compulsory power can enforce sanctions, as for instance in case 3 against the EAAGs, but the broader impact of such activities depends on the legitimacy that the application of this compulsory power enjoys. With reference to the same case, the fact that Kosovo's population did not revolt against KFOR when the latter coerced the EAAGs to leave the Presevo valley may be seen as a reflection of KFOR's productive power to mobilise general public support and to bias public understanding in NATO's favour on this particular conflict. This suggests that NATO had governmentalised power relations in Kosovo. Moreover, NATO's own publics also supported KFOR's enforcement measures. Had they not done so, but rather questioned KFOR's activities or even its very presence in Kosovo, it is likely that this would have created a political situation that reduced the effect of KFOR's compulsory power *vis-à-vis* the parties. It might even have instigated the withdrawal of the force. This basic idea informed the rationale upon which PI's mode of operation was based in the Balkans, and it appears, continues to do so in Afghanistan as I shall briefly return to.

From this perspective, for NATO's capacity to apply compulsory power one of the most important values of the alliance's productive power assets is that they may influence the *régime de savoir* that defines what is and what is not legitimate targets; in other words, whether a person subjected to NATO's compulsory power is generally seen as an 'innocent victim' or an 'adversary'. In the present context, to the extent the discursive battlefield is biased in favour of NATO, those who threaten the discursive strategies

automatically turn themselves into adversaries and thus legitimate targets. Armed groups and states that oppose NATO, and who depends on popular support to achieve their goals, would first have to succeed in the discursive battlefield before any of their endeavours to project compulsory power would be likely to have the desired political effects.¹⁸⁹

This points to intimate bonds between compulsory and productive power. In a peace support operation – conducted in situations short of industrial war – the discursive battle defines the political effect of compulsory power. In other words, states' employment of compulsory power will be politically opportune with respect to their electorates only if the legitimacy to use it is already established by productive power. Conversely, illegitimate use of compulsory power may lead to defeat in the discursive battlefield. In this light NATO's reluctance to use physical force unless absolutely necessary, which in the introduction was presented as the principle of minimum necessary force (see 1.2), makes good sense.

Along this line of reasoning political authorities' ability to influence international security is determined not on traditional geographical battlefields but in the discursive battlefield, not by facts on the ground but by the effects such facts create in the discursive space and the feedback effects they produce in terms of meaning in the next round of tactical engagements. This does not reduce the value of compulsory power but it spurs one to consider its utility in a different way from the predominant role it plays in industrial wars (see 1.1). In line with Smith's (2005) idea about the utility of armed

¹⁸⁹ This phenomenon has been studied in much academic work but is largely assessed on empirical grounds (see footnote 17 and section 1.5.2).

force in contemporary war amongst the people, these theoretical considerations suggest that compulsory power's expediency is determined in the discursive battlefield; that is, by the discourses NATO uses its PI function to shape.

To decipher this point, it is useful to return to case 5. KFOR's productive power alone was unlikely to convince the EAAGs to lay down arms and leave the Presevo valley. Left unattended, the EAAGs could have destabilised the region, which might have changed people's understanding of the situation in the Balkans, of NATO's role in the region, and of the alliance's more general utility in the post-Cold War era. In the discursive battlefield such developments would have altered the patterns of domination with the possible outcome that public support to NATO would have been hampered in the Balkans and at home.

To avoid such developments, KFOR first used productive power to shape the discursive battlefield in NATO's favour. Once that was achieved, it used compulsory power to coerce the EAAGs to vacate the Presevo valley. As a result, NATO achieved not only its military operational objective but – more importantly – furthered the strategic political goal of reinforcing existing discursive patterns of domination. Thus, NATO used compulsory power in a discursive battle to enhance the already existing public understanding that NATO ensured stability in the Balkans. It follows from this reasoning that the utility of compulsory power in Foucault's treatment of power is to put into practice in local centres the discursive patterns of domination that productive power seeks to consolidate.

In addition, when COMKFOR used PI to spearhead his compulsory power in the same case, he achieved the desired 'end-state' of the operation in a non-lethal manner. This clearly indicates that KFOR had governmentalised power relations in Kosovo.

Moreover, the approach sustained NATO's political efforts to reduce the use of violence to accomplish its goals in the Balkans, and as such reinforced the broader peace and reconciliation endeavour. In a discursive sense, this policy may have reinforced the norm of seeking peaceful solutions to political differences, hence increasing both NATO's legitimacy and the moral and political costs for those who might consider deviating from this norm. Again, compulsory power reinforced the patterns of domination NATO aimed to establish in the discursive battlefield.

It is interesting briefly to compare these findings with NATO's use of compulsory and productive power in Afghanistan. Here, PI still aims to enhance public support in NATO member countries. *Vis-à-vis* the local audiences, however, NATO has chosen to exert productive power by means of its PsyOps rather than its PI function, primarily to safeguard the latter's credibility. Moreover, compared with NATO in the Balkans, the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) productive power seems to be relatively weak. It has not been able to influence the discursive patterns of domination in Afghan societies to NATO's advantage. Instead, this military mission, compared to IFOR and KFOR, relies relatively much on compulsory power to survive and maintain some sort of order, mainly in the capital and its surroundings areas.

The broader academic debate about the increasing role of the media as a means of power in the conduct of politics, diplomacy and war is not new (see 1.5). Within this largely empirical debate, however, there is only limited theoretical considerations as to how we may conceptualise the dynamics of power at work. Since the late 1990s, scholars have increasingly engaged in this debate and primarily along Nye's (1990) notions of hard and soft power (see 1.4.2). The present findings generally question the theoretical validity of the latter term. It is diffuse and rests on two notions of power – Bachrach and Baratz' and Lukes' – that are respectively of little relevance in the

present context and untenable. Instead, this thesis holds that Dahl's and Foucault's respective notions of power offer coherent concepts to account for the dynamics at the heart of these scholarly exchanges of views.

The conceptual framework developed here provides a useful analytical tool with which to examine the compulsory and normative processes that influence the kind of wars Western armed forces primarily have been tasked to deal with in the post-Cold War era and more broadly states' influence in international affairs. Today, where physical force appears insufficient to pursue aims of national policy, the framework is more relevant than during the Cold War. In the latter era states' monopoly of violence, their trademark throughout the modern era, still defined the realm of international politics, as suggested by Realists' control of the high-ground in the academic debate on international affairs. Within this school of thought key figures assumed a conception of power that compares to Dahl's compulsory notion.

The normative dimensions of international politics, with which this thesis is primarily concerned, have been extensively studied by Liberal scholars. They have done so primarily at a general or structural level, however. This study argues that Foucault's theoretical approach, which accommodates the normative concern, can provide the analytical means to appreciate how subjects actually use social communication as a means of power in their conduct of foreign policy. The theoretical findings address a shortcoming that has been observed within the field of discourse theory (see 1.5.3).

While scholars have elaborated on how discourses produce common sense 'exploration of the production of common sense has been relatively limited' (Milliken 1999: 238).

PI's mode of operation along a principle of concentration of knowledge appears as one way such common sense may be produced. This is an understanding of power that

escapes Dahl's notion, and also seminal Realist scholars' understanding of how national interests are efficiently pursued.

If the strategic objective of our times is, as Smith's and others have argued, to win the will of the people, then the present study would suggest that we appreciate the dynamic forces in international security primarily as productive power. Or, in Foucault's language, less in terms of Right of Death and more as Power over Life.

Final thoughts

It is not difficult to sympathise with Oscar Wilde's statement that he could resist anything but temptations. As my work progressed it was tempting, at times, to change the course of research to a broader reconsideration of the phenomenon of war from the perspective of productive power. I resisted. Having completed the thesis I can no longer resist but shall present some considerations in the form of hypothetical propositions. To this end, Foucault offers a suitable spring-board when he twists Clausewitz's catchphrase and stipulates 'that politics is the continuation of war by other means'.¹⁹⁰

It is quite obvious that conventional conceptions of war assume an understanding of its dynamic forces that is compatible with compulsory power. Where Clausewitz (1976: 75) describes war as 'an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will', Dahl's (1957: 202-03) notion comprises this understanding when he defines power as 'A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do'. On the remaining pages, I shall therefore term such Clausewitzian wars *compulsory war*. This concept would include what in this thesis is referred to as industrial war.

If we accept the introductory claim that the strategic objective in contemporary wars is to win the will of the people and the present argument that productive power is better suited than compulsory power to conceptualise the dynamics leading to the fulfilment of such objectives, then we may further term contemporary wars *productive war*. The latter notion aims to seize the dynamics comprised in the Foucauldian notion productive

¹⁹⁰ Cited in Bertani et al. eds. 2003: 15.

power to describe the form of confrontations and conflicts, which arguably dominate the post-Cold War era (see 1.1).

Indeed, this gambit with two uncommon terms may appear odd since it leaves unattended their relation to more ordinary conceptual pairs in the field such as ‘wars of necessity’ versus ‘wars of choice’, ‘high-intensity wars’ versus ‘low-intensity wars’, or simply ‘wars’ versus ‘operations other than war’.¹⁹¹ Yet, the temptation spurring these final thoughts is to continue the line of reasoning from Dahl’s and Foucault’s notions of power and see where that takes our understanding of the phenomenon of war.

Imagine a war fought by means of productive power, what would that imply for the way actors pursue their ends in the field of international affairs? The theoretical dimension of this study suggests that productive war would be radically different from war as we know it, ie from compulsory war. But how? What could the term productive war mean? How would it affect the armed forces’ mode of operation? It seems worthwhile to reflect on the contours of a productive war.

We should commence by comprehending productive war as primarily political struggles; struggles unworthy of the term war, to the conventional military mind grown up with Clausewitz’ (1976: 149) idea that ‘war is a clash between major interests, which is resolved by bloodshed’ and that this is ‘the only way in which it [war] differs from other conflicts’. On the contrary, productive war is fought in ordinary social relations and may well, but not necessarily, involve military, economic, and other conflicts. The latter will, however, always be subordinated to political concerns. Productive war is a

¹⁹¹ In fact, I am not aware of others who have proposed the term productive war.

de-securitised form of war, often politicised but most pervasive when conducted at the non-politicised level.¹⁹² While the logic of productive power should make it applicable to practically all sectors of human societies, as diverse as agricultural techniques and international security, it shall in the context of the present speculations be delimited to the latter and based on the assumption that the state plays a cardinal role in the field.

The battlefield of productive war is discursive and driven by social communication, rather than material and conducted by means of violence as in compulsory war. Where the latter have often been contained in the spatial sense and seek end-states in the form of decisive victories, productive war blurs such approaches to time and space.

Conventional terms like war, crisis and peace make no sense in productive war, which is a more permanent state of affairs. Further, productive war is influenced by the discursive effects of wars fought several centuries ago. This point was illustrated in the winter of 2003, for instance, when the discursive effects of the religious wars in the 16th and 17th century, notably the principle of non-intervention as inscribed in public international law, influenced the productive war about whether or not it was right to intervene in Iraq.¹⁹³ Further, its discursive character makes productive war omnipresent. At a macro level, it is fought in what Smith (2005: 289) calls the ‘global theatre of war’ and at the micro-level it emerges within a person as a question of which side he is on.

Productive war primarily affects people’s minds, and their bodies only through their minds, or through the minds and consequent acts of others. Where the immediate effects of compulsory war are death and destruction, in productive war they are knowledge;

¹⁹² Wæver’s (1995) definition of these terms used here.

¹⁹³ On the function of this legal principle in the field of international affairs see Bull (1977).

that is, the meaning of information accumulated from a wide range of acts conducted in the material world. Productive war organises the way we perceive reality. They determine what counts as facts, what the facts signify, whether that is a desirable state of affairs, and how we shall proceed to defend, or counter, current developments. So, productive war is not fought to control territory but to establish systems of legitimate knowledge. They do not primarily aim to control others' behaviour but to define the 'others' – and therefore 'ourselves'.

Because knowledge shapes our perceptions of reality, and therefore reality as it exists in social contexts, productive war determines reality. Discourses establish normative structures by dividing reality into a system of binary conceptual relations. The general reference to the majority of states by terms such as 'developing countries' or 'third world' are cases in point, and establishes them as inferior to the 'developed countries' and 'first world'. Binary conceptual relations distinguish 'them' from 'us', 'friend' from 'foe', the 'free world' from 'communist regimes' during the Cold War, the 'civilised' from 'terrorists' today. Such normative divisions influence subjects' understanding and produce social hegemonies, they govern by structuring the possible field of actions of others, as Foucault (1982: 790) would say. Productive war spurs people to get on the 'right' side of dividing normative boundaries. The 'will to knowledge' influences the 'will of the people'. The US President's announcement of the Gulf War in 1991 illustrates this point. In a TV-transmitted speech President Bush Sr. declared: 'We're called upon to define who we are and what we believe'.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹⁴ Cited in Gray (1997: 47).

Although productive war is fought in a discursive realm, the war is not alien to the material world. On the contrary, it is deeply embedded in the material world. Productive war influences and is influenced by people's acts. Productive war legitimises social hegemonies, with their political institutions, procedures and enforcement measures. Moreover, productive war defines which acts of death and destruction are legitimate and which are not.

Victory, in conventional parlance, may be described as defeating the enemy's armed forces in a decisive battle after a long military campaign.¹⁹⁵ In contrast, victory in productive war happens all the time and takes the form of discursive patterns of domination that are relatively stable but always in flux.¹⁹⁶ It may materialise in a local centre such as, for instance, the existing state of affairs in the Balkans or in international society.

Accordingly, and in contrast to compulsory war, productive war creates win-win situations, where normative pressures induce subjects to join the victorious hegemony and act within the limits of its ordering normative boundaries. The losers are those who feel uncomfortable within or marginalised from extant patterns of domination. They are subjects who feel excluded from society by the way dividing normative lines either ignore them or turn them into legitimate targets for sanctions.

Often, such subjects have a standing invitation to join the hegemonic structures. The West's invitation to former Warsaw Pact states to join Western organisations such as

¹⁹⁵ See, for example, Clausewitz (1976: 194-95, 204).

¹⁹⁶ Others have argued that victory as we know it from WW II and the 1991 Gulf War can no longer be expected in contemporary wars, eg Coker (2005:17-19) and Spiller (2005:357).

the EU and NATO is a case in point. Provided that certain criteria are met in, among others, the field of political constitutions, democratic control, and economic structures, Eastern European states have been invited to join Western structures. Their citizens have been free to go to West Europe, even to settle and make a living. That is, if they could adapt. Given their history within the last decade, Serbia's recent efforts to become a member of NATO, is a striking example of the same dynamic. In this sense, productive war matches Cooper's (2004: 70-79) postmodern societies' multi-sectoral endeavours to create voluntary empires. Victory in productive war is thus very different from the win-lose situations compulsory power aims for; less noisy; hardly noticed.

Soldiers fight compulsory war, but who fights productive war? If we follow Foucault's idea that subjects' access is limited to the tactical levels of productive power, then discourses fight the wars at the strategic level. Non-subjective and therefore non-intentional discourses reign the discursive battlefield but always influencing and influenced by subjects' manoeuvres in the tactical realm. Subjects partake in the battle but never control it.

If we confine ourselves to the scope of subjects, then all who produce information used in social communication are to be considered soldiers in productive war. But clearly some produce more influential information than others. How some subjects manage to achieve such comparative advantages in the battle is an interesting question. Should we see the 'heavy weapons' in the discursive battlefield as subjects who speak from the high grounds of authority? Such high grounds would be the result of an earlier productive war. They could be seen as high grounds that, once conquered, provide subjects with an authority that gives them a relatively widely-noticed and influential voice, and thus endows them with more productive power.

‘Head of state’ constitutes one such privileged position. Heads of states exercise more productive power than ordinary citizens, not only because they possess the compulsory power to enforce their ideas but also because they represent larger human collectives. Some may support their ideas, others may oppose them, but few can ignore them. Other examples of potent, yet very different, soldiers in productive war would be experts in the field of international security. These are soldiers who depart from a higher ground in the public debate within their field of expertise and may increase their productive power to the extent people consider them competent and credible; soldiers who by means of auxiliary concepts may succeed in defining what counts as legitimate knowledge in the discursive field. Such fixation of meaning will express itself in new normative lines of division, as for instance NATO’s 1991 strategic concept where risks replaced threats as the binary opposition to stability, or in the idea that culture has replaced ideology as the dominant source of violent conflicts (Huntington 1993).

Powerful or not, no one escapes productive war, and this irrespective of whether or not we are aware of it. We all engage in social communication. We are all combatants and as such both targets and targeters. We wage ‘war by other means’, in Foucault’s coinage, pursuing our ends by means primarily of words, rather than swords. These means are congruent with those in Cooper’s (2004: 116-26) postmodern foreign policy carried out by persuasion rather than bribing or coercion.

Strategic thinking in productive war is different from that in compulsory war. Where in the latter strategies are made by military planners, in the former they are the result of clashes and relations between discursive forces in the discursive battlefield. Since subjects exercise no intentional influence at this level, the ‘fog of war’ is even thicker here than in compulsory war. Therefore, strategic thinking in productive war is not a question of planning the road to victory like in compulsory war. The former boils

down to the formulation and dissemination of a purpose or vision most people will support.

The mode of operation for implementing the strategies may in compulsory war be described as centrally controlled with industrial organisation and efficiency, a tremendous war-machine, hierarchically driven with superiors pushing subordinates to achieve objectives along the lines of detailed military plans. The productive war's mode of operation is also centralised, but primarily at the level of ideas. It is most efficiently fought along a principle of concentration of knowledge. That is, when a party in the confrontation shares a relatively common purpose, which differentiates them from other parties, and a common set of assumptions about the dynamics of productive power to fulfil the group's purposes. At the level of implementation, however, combatants in productive war need not operate in a centralised manner. They need not be conceived as subordinates awaiting their superior's command. Often, they are better understood as salesmen on the marketplace of values and visions, self-propelled and driven by conviction, trying to win other people over to their side in the struggle.

Within this mode of operation the role of leaders changes. Direct command as in compulsory war is no longer expedient. Leaders in productive war are the patterns of dominations' representation in the material world; the personification of a discursive strategy. They are icons of an idea, of a common purpose. Al-Qaeda's leader Bin Laden, the Zapatista's Subcomandante Marcos, and in some respects the current President Bush would be cases in point. Promoting a similar view Kaldor (1999: 73-4) compares leaders in her concept of new wars with executives of large corporations, who driven by expediency no longer direct their industries by means of direct control, but by inspiring and facilitating the work of their employees.

Productive war is fought at the tactical level, in a theoretical sense of the term, of productive power. Here, combatants may reach their objectives by efficiently targeting the meaning dimension in politics and war. True, this competence is put in practice on an ethically slippery slope that commences by informing and goes through convincing and persuading to misleading targets. This clearly carries associations to tainted notions of propaganda, which political and military establishments want to eschew (see 1.3). Yet it is equally clear that this is the skill applied in time-honoured human activities by politicians, diplomats, businessmen, and other successful communicators. Where the line is and should be drawn between legitimate and illegitimate techniques of social communication is debatable – and always somehow defined by productive war.

If productive war is fought by means familiar from the field of diplomacy and business, where does that leave the military? Is there a role for the armed forces to play in productive war? How would they operate differently from the way they proceed in compulsory war?

Armed forces do play an important role in productive war. But it is a role that is primarily political. Since productive war is essentially a politicised form of war, armed forces are further integrated into the political realm than is the case with compulsory war. In productive war the armed forces are an integral part of the political realm and are used as political instruments delivering political results. In other words, compared to compulsory war productive war stresses the political dimension for which wars are fought. Bluntly put, when the West considered how to deal with Iraq in 1991 and Serbia in 1999, the logic of compulsory war would direct military strategists to plan for the most efficient way to defeat the adversary's armed forces. The logic of productive war, however, would spur the same people to achieve similar objectives but guided by an

overall concern for how their military campaigns would affect public support and ultimately the legitimacy of Western hegemony in the post-Cold War era.

In addition, Jominian 'levels of war' collapse in productive war. Military debates on this topic often centres around the notion of the 'strategic corporal' and deals with when and to what extent the lowest level of command holds a potentially strategic impact. The political effect of the images showing US troops sexually harassing Iraqi inmates in the Abu Ghraib prisons in the autumn of 2003 and the corpse of a US Ranger being pulled through the streets of Mogadishu on 3 October 1993 are both cases in point. Nations unprepared for productive war are particularly vulnerable to such information. Yet, only the conventional military mind will share Adams' (1996: 110) astonishment when he comments on the US withdrawal from Somalia in the following manner: 'That the world's single most important military and political power should have its foreign policy dictated by a television image of a single dead American is extraordinary'.

In productive war armed forces operate on the assumption that military campaigns and tactics are politicised, that the battle space is discursive, worldwide and that the objective is to enhance public understanding and support. Adopting the armed forces' mode of operation to the logic of productive war addresses fundamental questions and involves several pitfalls. I shall address a few.

When physical force is trumped by meaning as the primary dynamic in war, how should armed forces apply the skill that has been their *raison d'être* for centuries, the capability around which their entire organisation centres, and which distinguishes them from all other social institutions – that is, the capability to apply physical force?

The application of armed force remains useful also in productive war but only to the extent it sustains political rather than conventional military objectives. The

immediate targets of such force remain by necessity material but the objectives must be expedient discursive effects. Tactical results are useful beyond their immediate consequences only to the extent that they create discursive effects and maybe even manage to influence discursive patterns of domination. In other words, compulsory power has to be applied within the logic of productive war. Moreover, armed forces can play a more symbolic role in productive war. They are useful also short of employment of physical force. Non-lethal acts, such as the mere mentioning of deploying forces, actual deployment, and relief work, all in their own way produce discursive effects that may result in normative biases conducive to foreign policy goals.

It is timely to consider how the application of physical force may change when used primarily to create discursive, rather than material, effects. In the latter situation, physical force may be used to deter a military invasion. In the former, compulsory power may for all practical purposes be applied in much the same way. Crucially, however, the primary purpose would be to send messages. With examples from the present study, when KFOR deters Serbia (case 4) with the message 'Don't do it', they simultaneously reassure Kosovars that they are safe. The discursive effect of such use of compulsory power is to reinforce the idea that KFOR promotes stability in the Balkans, that its deployed forces are a bulwark against aggression.

In addition, the priority of sending messages may equally spur armed forces to operate in a manner different from the logic of compulsory war. For example, when Russians were about to take control over Pristina Airport one day prior to the arrival of KFOR, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe ordered KFOR to block the runways, that is, to use compulsory power, in an effort to prevent possible Russian planes from using the airport. COMKFOR strongly disagreed to escalate the confrontation and opted for a diplomatic approach to the conflict (Clark 2001: 390-94). In this heated situation,

not only politically but also weather-wise with temperatures going up to 37 degrees Celsius, PI disseminated information that KFOR troops provided the Russians with 16,000 litres of freshwater (NATO 16/6/1999). This may be seen as a military tactical manoeuvre that does not deserve this name from the perspective of compulsory war but which is expedient from the perspective of productive war. Maybe it was a coincidence. In any case the manoeuvre to give water to the antagonist of the day, and who only a decade earlier had been the primary Cold-War adversary, sent a strong message of peace and reconciliation, a message that was congruent with NATO's political objective in the Balkans and which may be seen as a small contribution to a broader effort to establish a particular social hegemony in the region.

In the same vein, Lt.Col. Stech argues that US forces should develop CNN tactics. By that he means tactics in the conflict zone which produce images and stories for the media to disseminate worldwide. He reasons: 'if our policies fail to reflect a human face, if the cold calculations of our leaders envision no compelling stories of human values, then in a world of CNN war the force of public support . . . for those policies will be questionable at best' (Stech 1994: 10). Obviously, there is a fine line delimiting such productive war tactics from manipulation.

Further, the logic of productive war suggests that the organisation of armed forces should be adapted to the general decentralised mode of operation sketched out above in such wars. The incentive to do this must be balanced, however, with the need to avoid the pitfall of undermining one's legitimacy. Since credibility, and therefore legitimacy, is essential to pursue political goals in productive war, and since the use of physical force compared to most other means holds significant potential to undermine this legitimacy, good political reasons remain to maintain central control over armed forces. The fact that members of armed forces both possess significant compulsory power

and represent their states, involves a risk that their use of such power may have negative consequences for their states' reputations. It is likely that this risk will increase if armed forces operate as decentralised as other combatants engaged in productive wars. From this point of view central control over states' means of violence appears sensible.

Conducting efficient military campaigns is not easy in compulsory war and the stakes are high. Yet proper conduct of productive war appears more complicated although the effects generally come across as less dramatic. Not only need armed forces balance a variety of concerns, for example, between operational efficiency in the material world and discursive constraints, but they operate in a discursive battlefield defined by conflicting discourses in pursuance of potentially conflicting political objectives, and with uncontrollable discursive effects. Expediency is difficult to plan for, but the accumulated effects of a massive amount of successful tactical engagements conducted along a principle of concentration of knowledge appear to be the best recipe to achieve the desired strategic situation in the discursive battlefield and therefore in the material world.

I do not launch the notion of productive war to devalue compulsory war altogether. The latter's strategic thinking remains vital in armed conflicts that involve the question of national survival. As Freedman (1998: 764) inveighs against proponents of the 'declining utility of force'-thesis, to act as if physical force has no role to play in politics is to live at the mercy of those who believe it has. Countering a conventional military invasion with productive power alone is unlikely to succeed.

Still, the concept of productive war appears useful to confine the logic of compulsory war to a context in which it is arguably most useful, that is to symmetrical wars fought by compulsory power. This would allow the logic of productive war to take a more

prominent role in conflicts where this would be beneficial, for instance, in asymmetrical wars or symmetric wars fought by productive power.¹⁹⁷

The utility of distinguishing between compulsory war and productive war appears when we apply the terms on the so-called 'War on Terror'. This is a war in which the West's adversaries have insignificant compulsory power, at least compared to that of our primary adversary during the Cold War. Still terrorists – to use the term by which they are defined and commonly referred to in Western discourse – possess significant productive power. If we conceive this war as a productive war, then the battle space – the place where victory is determined – is discursive. The discursive effects of the terrorists' tactical engagements with the West, however limited in the material sense, have partly been to arouse significant fear in Western societies and to spread a sense of insecurity to the point where citizens have begun to question the value of their Hobbesian contract with their political authorities. An additional effect has been to mobilise understanding for and sometimes support among large segments of the world's population to counter Western influence in international affairs.

From this perspective, the strategic use of information and the ability to concentrate knowledge – in short, productive power – can be seen as the terrorists' foremost weapon to undermine the political expediency of the West's overwhelming compulsory power. The productive war is asymmetrical, however, only to the extent the West operates within the logic of compulsory war. Those who chose to rely on the latter are likely to fight a losing battle, since they will have random, and most likely limited, productive

¹⁹⁷ Freedman's (2001: 64-65) definition of the terms symmetrical and asymmetrical wars is used here. From this understanding, had the 'Cold' War turned 'hot' it would have been a symmetric war, while an example of an asymmetrical war could be the War on Terror.

effect in the discursive battlefield that defines the political effect of their war efforts. It may even undermine electorates' support to their political leaderships' foreign policy.

The notion of productive war suggests that terrorists' ability to win tactical engagements, in the discursive sense of the term, will be reduced if the West meet them with a form of power that matches their, that is, with productive power. Western endeavours in the field of public diplomacy, trade, development assistance and the like can be seen as such efforts. If, on the other hand, we approach the War on Terror from the logic of compulsory war we risk confronting the same difficulties as Callwell identified in the British Empire's endeavours to use compulsory power in their small wars: where do you direct your troops 'when there is no king to conquer, no capital to seize, no organized army to overthrow, and when there are no celebrated strongholds to capture . . . ?'¹⁹⁸ Compulsory power is surely useful to limit terrorists' physical room of manoeuvre but they do not suffice to reduce terrorists' ability to excite some and frighten others.

Compulsory war and productive war do not denote new forms of warfare. The examples used to clarify the arguments above clearly illustrate this point. What these hypothetical propositions offer, however, is a conceptualisation of such forms of warfare, initial considerations as to the function of armed forces in productive war, and a glimpse of the utility and pitfalls of physical force in this context. This may be useful.

If we choose to approach international affairs from the perspective of compulsory war, we conceive the field primarily from Foucault's (1998) Right of Death-perspective and

¹⁹⁸ Cited in Frantzen (2005: 24).

our task is to maximise the kind of power that allow us to say 'No'. The thesis at hand argues that such power will not deliver what presumably is the strategic objective of our time. Moreover, a focus on compulsory war, rather than productive war, will hamper the opportunities of productive power to reach the objectives. We will fail to understand the dynamics of our most manifest conflicts. We will lose of sight the opportunities inherent in McLuhan's (2001) 'age of information' and the utility of adapting the conduct of foreign policy and military campaigns to this strategic environment. We will not consider improving international forms of government, in Foucault's sense of the term, that may help us desecuritising international confrontations. Most importantly, we may lose an opportunity to engage consciously and expediently with the dynamics to exert Power over Life – in this case international life.

Closing these speculations and with them the present study, I should like to address a final question: what is productive war *not*?

The ubiquitous character of productive war in time, space and even in the realm of discourses runs the risk of *de*-conceptualising, rather than *re*-conceptualising, the phenomenon of war. In the opening paragraphs of these final thoughts, compulsory war was confined to the application of lethal compulsory power in inter-state relations. This definition delimits the phenomenon from other social relations where there is no major Clausewitzian 'clash' between states or where such clashes and other confrontations between peoples are solved short of using physical force. A political situation often referred to by the broad term 'peace'.

Along this line of reasoning, coming to terms with the meaning of peace in productive war may be a way to delimit the latter notion. This raises another question: what would peace mean from the perspective of productive war? The non-application of

knowledge in international affairs, is hardly a satisfactory answer. Foucault offers a better answer when he argues that productive power ceases to exist in Clausewitzian wars.¹⁹⁹ We may then conceive productive war as any relation between major actors short of compulsory war, in other words, as what in the logic of the latter is called peace.

So, where do all these conceptual explorations lead? Do they add a new meaning to Orwell's newspeak that 'war is peace'?

¹⁹⁹ Cited in Bertani et al. eds. 2003: 16.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Official Documents

- Committee on International Relations (2001) *The Message is America: rethinking US public diplomacy*. Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventh Congress, first session, November 14, 2001. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.
- Dayton Peace Agreement* – also, the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia, signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. Retrieved 21/3/2003, from <http://www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-summ.htm>.
- Military Technical Agreement: Between the International Security Force ('KFOR') and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, signed on 9 June 1999*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/kosovo.htm>.
- NATO (1991) *Strategic Concept*. Retrieved 2/9/2005, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c9111107a.htm>.
- (1999) *Strategic Concept*. Retrieved 2/9/2005, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm>.
- (2000) *NATO's Role in Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/role-bih.htm>.
- (2001) *Handbook*. Brussels: NATO's Office of Information and Press.
- (2004) *Speech by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, at the Meeting of the United Nations Security Council 11 November 2004*. Retrieved 2/9/2005, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s0411111a.htm>
- (2005) *KFOR Objectives/Mission*. Retrieved 28/4/2005, from <http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/objectives.htm>.
- (2006) *Standardisation Agreement: AAP-6*. Retrieved 26/10/2006, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/stanag/aap006/AAP-6-2006.pdf>.
- UN (1995) *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations*. A/50/60 – S/1995/1. New York: United Nations.
- (2000) *Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects*. A/55/305 – S/2000/809. New York: United Nations.
- UN Security Council (1995) *Resolution 1031*. Adopted by the Security Council at its 3607th meeting on 15 December 1995. New York: United Nations.
- (1999) *Resolution 1244*. Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting on 10 June 1999. New York: United Nations.

US Armed Forces (1998) *Joint Doctrine: the joint publication 3-13 – Information Operations*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

US Army (1996) *Field Manual 100-6*. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army.

NATO Press Briefings

- NATO (1/1/1996) *Transcript of Press Briefing held on 01 January 1996*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/ifor/trans/t960101a.htm>.
- (3/1/1996) *Transcript of Press Briefing held on 03 January 1996*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/ifor/trans/t960103a.htm>.
- (4/1/1996) *Transcript of Press Briefing held on 04 January 1996*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/ifor/trans/t960104a.htm>.
- (5/1/1996) *Transcript of Press Briefing held on 05 January 1996*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/ifor/trans/t960105a.htm>.
- (7/1/1996) *Transcript of Press Briefing held on 07 January 1996*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/ifor/trans/t960107a.htm>.
- (8/1/1996) *Transcript of Press Briefing held on 08 January 1996*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/ifor/trans/t960108a.htm>.
- (9/1/1996) *Transcript of Press Briefing held on 09 January 1996*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/ifor/trans/t960109a.htm>.
- (10/1/1996) *Transcript of Press Briefing held on 10 January 1996*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/ifor/trans/t960110a.htm>.
- (11/1/1996) *Transcript of Press Briefing held on 11 January 1996*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/ifor/trans/t960111a.htm>.
- (13/1/1996) *Transcript of Press Briefing held on 13 January 1996*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/ifor/trans/t960113a.htm>.
- (14/1/1996) *Transcript of Press Briefing held on 14 January 1996*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/ifor/trans/t960114a.htm>.
- (15/1/1996) *Transcript of Press Briefing held on 15 January 1996*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/ifor/trans/t960115a.htm>.
- (19/1/1996) *Transcript of Press Briefing held on 19 January 1996*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/ifor/trans/t960119a.htm>.
- (20/1/1996) *Transcript of Press Conference held on 20 January 1996 by the IFOR Commander, Adm. Leighton Smith and by COMARRC, Lt. Gen Sir Michal Walker*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/ifor/trans/t960120a.htm>.
- (21/1/1996) *Transcript of Press Briefing held on 21 January 1996*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/ifor/trans/t960121a.htm>.
- (22/1/1996) *Transcript of Press Briefing held on 22 January 1996*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/ifor/trans/t960122a.htm>.
- (23/1/1996) *Transcript of Press Briefing held on 23 January 1996*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/ifor/trans/t960123a.htm>.
- (24/1/1996) *Transcript of Press Briefing held on 24 January 1996*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/ifor/trans/t960124a.htm>.
- (26/1/1996) *Transcript of Press Briefing held on 26 January 1996*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/ifor/trans/t960126a.htm>.
- (27/1/1996) *Transcript of Press Briefing held on 27 January 1996*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/ifor/trans/t960127a.htm>.

- (28/1/1996) *Transcript of Press Briefing held on 28 January 1996*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/ifor/trans/t960128a.htm>.
- (29/1/1996) *Transcript of Press Briefing held on 29 January 1996*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/ifor/trans/t960129a.htm>.
- (30/1/1996) *Transcript of Press Briefing held on 30 January 1996*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/ifor/trans/t960130a.htm>.
- (12/6/1999a) *Morning Briefing – 12 June 1999*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/1999/b990612m.htm>.
- (12/6/1999b) *Press Conference by SACEUR, General Wesley K. Clark – 12 June 1999*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/1999/b990612p.htm>.
- (13/6/1999) *Morning Briefing – 13 June 1999*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/1999/b990613m.htm>.
- (14/6/1999a) *Morning Briefing – 14 June 1999*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/1999/b990614m.htm>.
- (14/6/1999b) *Morning Conference by Mr Jamie Shea, NATO Spokesman and Lt. Col. Andrew Williams in Kukes – 14 June 1999*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/1999/b990614p.htm>.
- (15/6/1999) *Morning Briefing – 15 June 1999*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/1999/b990615m.htm>.
- (16/6/1999) *Morning Briefing – 16 June 1999*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/1999/b990616m.htm>.
- (17/6/1999) *Morning Briefing – 17 June 1999*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/1999/b990617m.htm>.
- (18/6/1999a) *Morning Briefing – 18 June 1999*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/1999/b990618m.htm>.
- (18/6/1999b) *Transcript of Press Conference – 18 June 1999*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/1999/b990618p.htm>.
- (19/6/1999) *Transcript of Press Conference – 19 June 1999*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/1999/b990619p.htm>.
- (20/6/1999) *KFOR News Conference – 20 June 1999*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/1999/b990620p.htm>.
- (21/6/1999) *KFOR Press Conference by General Sir Mike Jackson – 21 June 1999*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/1999/b990621p.htm>.
- (22/6/1999) *KFOR News Conference – 22 June 1999*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/1999/b990622p.htm>.
- (24/6/1999) *KFOR Press Conference by NATO Secretary General, Mr Javier Solana, General Wesley Clark and General Sir Mike Jackson – 24 June 1999*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/1999/b990624p.htm>.
- (2/7/1999) *KFOR Press Statement – 2 July 1999*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/1999/k990702a.htm>.
- (5/7/1999) *KFOR Press Statement – 5 July 1999*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/1999/k990705a.htm>.
- (7/7/1999) *KFOR Press Statement – 7 July 1999*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/1999/k990707a.htm>.
- (9/7/1999) *KFOR Press Statement – 9 July 1999*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/1999/k990709a.htm>.
- (12/7/1999) *KFOR Press Statement – 12 July 1999*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/1999/k990712a.htm>.

- (14/7/1999) *KFOR Press Statement – 14 July 1999*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/1999/k990714a.htm>.
- (16/7/1999) *KFOR Press Statement – 16 July 1999*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/1999/k990716a.htm>.
- (17/7/1999) *KFOR Press Statement – 17 July 1999*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/1999/k990717a.htm>.
- (21/7/1999) *KFOR Press Statement – 21 July 1999*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/1999/k990721a.htm>.
- (22/7/1999) *KFOR Press Statement – 22 July 1999*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/1999/k990722a.htm>.
- (23/7/1999) *KFOR Press Statement – 23 July 1999*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/1999/k990723a.htm>.
- (27/7/1999) *KFOR Press Statement – 27 July 1999*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/1999/k990727a.htm>.
- (28/7/1999) *KFOR Press Statement – 28 July 1999*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/1999/k990728a.htm>.
- (29/7/1999) *KFOR Press Statement – 29 July 1999*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/1999/k990729a.htm>.
- (21/5/2001) *KFOR News Release, Pristina – 21 May 2001*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from http://www.nato.int/kfor/press/pr/releases/2001/nrel_010521.htm.
- (8/6/2001) *KFOR News Release, Pristina – 8 June 2001*. Retrieved 21/3/2004, from http://www.nato.int/kfor/press/pr/releases/2001/nrel_010608.htm.

Interviews

- Clifford, R.C.L. (27/4/2004) Recorded interview. London, 27 April 2004.
- Idsøe, T. (18/2/2004) Recorded interview. Stavanger, Norway, 18 February 2004.
- (18/3/2004) Recorded interview. Lillestrøm, Norway, 18 March 2004.
- (26/3/2004) Recorded interview by videoconference. Stavanger/Oslo, Norway, 26 March 2004.
- (8/6/2004) Recorded interview. Hammer, Norway, 8 June 2004.
- Van Dyke, M. (13/4/2004) Recorded interview by telephone. Maryland/Oslo, 13 April 2004.
- (17/3/2004) Recorded interview by telephone. Maryland/Oslo, 17 March 2004.
- (30/3/2004) Recorded interview by telephone. Maryland/Oslo, 30 March 2004.

Secondary Sources

Works

- Adams, J. (1998) *The Next World War: the warriors and weapons of the new battlefields in cyberspace*. London: Random House.
- Alberts, D.S. (1996) *Defensive Information Warfare*. Washington, DC: National Defense University.
- Allison, G. (1971) *Essence of Decision: explaining the Cuban missile crisis*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Althusser, L. and É. Balibar (1970) *Reading Capital*. Translated by B. Brewster. Paris: Maspero – original title ‘Lire le Capital’ 1968.
- Arendt, H. (1979) *Reflections on Violence*. London: Harcourt, Brace and Company.
- Armistead, L. (2004) *Information Operations Warfare and the Hard Reality of Soft Power*. Washington, DC: Brassey’s Inc.
- Arquilla, J. and D.F. Ronfeldt (1997) *In Athena’s Camp: preparing for conflict in the information age*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
- (1999) *The emergence of noopolitik: toward an American information strategy*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
- Avruch, K., J.L. Narel et al. (1999) *Information Campaigns for Peace Operations*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, C4ISR Cooperative Research Program Publication Series.
- Badsey, S., ed. (2000a) *The Media and International Security*. London: Frank Cass.
- Barnett, M. (1998) *Dialogues in Arab Politics: negotiations in regional order*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Bell, M. (1995) *In Harm’s Way: reflections of a war zone thug*. London: Hamish Hamilton.
- Bernhard, N.E. (1999) *US Television News and Cold War Propaganda, 1947-1960*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bertani, M., A. Fontana et al., eds. (2003) *Michel Foucault Society Must be Defended: lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76*. New York: Picador.
- Bloom, A. (1988) *The Closing of the American Mind: how higher education has failed democracy*. New York: Touchstone.
- Briggs, A. and P. Burke (2002) *A Social History of the Media: from Gutenberg to the internet*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Broadbent, L., J. Eldridge et al. (1985) *War and Peace News*. Philadelphia: Open University Press.
- Brown, C. (1992) *International Relations Theory: new normative approaches*. Hemel Hamstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Bull, Hedley (1977) *The Anarchical Society: a study of order in world politics*. London: MacMillan.
- Burchell, G., C. Gordon et al., eds. (1991) *The Foucault Effect: studies in governmentality with two lectures by and an interview with Michel Foucault*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Campan, A.D., D.H. Dearth et al., eds. (1996) *Cyberwar: security, strategy, and conflict in the information age*. Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press.

- Campen, A.D. and D.H. Dearth, eds. (1998) *Cyberwar 2.0: myths, mysteries and reality*. Fairfax, VA: Armed Force Communications and Electronics Association.
- (2000) *Cyberwar 3.0: human factors in information operations and future conflict*. Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press.
- Carr, E.H. (1946) *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-39: an introduction to the study of International Relations*. 2nd edn. London: MacMillan & Co Ltd.
- Carruthers, S.L. (1995) *Winning Hearts and Minds: British governments, the media, and colonial counter-insurgency, 1944-1960*. London: Leicester University Press.
- (2000) *The Media at War: communication and conflict in the twentieth century*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Chomsky, N. (1999) *The New Military Humanism: lessons from Kosovo*. London: Pluto Press.
- Clark, W.K. (2001) *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the future of combat*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Clausewitz, C.v. (1976) *On War*. Translated by M. Howard et al. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press - original title 'Vom Kriege', 1832.
- Clegg, S. (1989) *Frameworks of Power*. London: Sage Publications.
- Coker, C. (1994) *War and the 20th Century: a study of war and modern consciousness*. London: Brassey's.
- (2001) *Humane Warfare*. London: Routledge.
- Cook, T.E. (1998) *Governing With the News: the news media as a political institution*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Cooper, R. (2004) *The Breaking of Nations: order and chaos in the twenty-first century*. 2nd edn. London: Atlantic Books.
- Daalder, I.H. and M.E. O'Hanlon (2000) *Winning Ugly: NATO's war to save Kosovo*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Dahl, R.A. (1961) *Who Governs?: democracy and power in an American city*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- (1964) *Modern Political Analysis*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Denning, D. and E. Robling (1999) *Information Warfare and Security*. New York: ACM Press.
- Der Derian, J. (1987) *On Diplomacy: a genealogy of western estrangement*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- (2001) *Virtuous War: mapping the military-industrial-media-entertainment network*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Dreyfus, H. and P. Rabinow (1986) *Michel Foucault: beyond structuralism and hermenutics. With an afterword by Michel Foucault*. Brighton: The Harvester Press.
- Edwards, G.C. (1983) *The Public Presidency: the pursuit of popular support*. New York: St Martin's.
- Ellul, J. (1966) *Propaganda: the formation of men's attitudes*. Translated by K. Kellen et al. New York: Random House – original title 'Propagandes' 1962.
- Evans, G. and J. Newnham (1998) *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*. London: Penguin Books.
- Faubion, J.D., ed. (2000) *Michel Foucault: power - the essential works of Foucault 1954-84*. London: The Penguin Group.
- Flyvbjerg, B. (1992) *Rationalitet og Magt: det konkrertes videnskab*. København: Akademisk Forlag.

- (1998) *Rationality and Power: democracy in practice*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Foucault, M. (1979) *Discipline and Punish: the birth of the prison*. Translated by A. Sheridan. London: Penguin Books – original title ‘Surveiller et Punir: naissance de la prison’, 1975.
- (1998) *The Will to Knowledge: the history of sexuality, volume 1*. Translated by R. Hurley. London: Penguin Books – original title ‘La Volonté de Savoir’, 1976.
- (2002) *Forelesninger om regjering og styringskunst*. Translated by I.B. Neumann. Oslo: Cappelen Akademisk.
- Frantzen, H.A. (2005) *NATO and Peace Support Operations, 1991-1999: policies and doctrines*. London: Frank Cass.
- Fukuyama, F. (2006) *After the Neocons: America at the crossroads*. London: Profile Books.
- Goff, P., ed. (1999a) *The Kosovo News and Propaganda War*. Vienna: International Press Institute.
- Gordon, C., ed. (1980) *Power/knowledge: selected interviews and other writings 1972-1977 Michel Foucault*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Gow, J., R. Paterson et al. (1996a) *Bosnia by television*. London: British Film Institute.
- Gray, C.H. (1997) *Postmodern War: the new politics of conflict*. London: Routledge.
- Griffiths, M. and T. O’Callaghan (2002) *International Relations: the key concepts*. London: Routledge.
- Grossmann, M.B. and M.J. Kumar (1981) *Portraying the President: the White House and the news media*. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press.
- Habermas, J. (1986) *The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1: reason and rationalization of society*. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.
- Halberstam, D. (2002) *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the generals*. New York: Scribner.
- Hallin, D.C. (1986) *The ‘Uncensored War’: the media and Vietnam*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hammond, P. and E.S. Herman, eds. (2000) *Degraded Capability: the media and the Kosovo crisis*. London: Pluto Press.
- Handel, M.I. (2001) *Masters of War: classical strategic thought*. 3rd edn. London: Frank Cass
- Hayward, C.R. (2000) *De-facing Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Headrick, D.R. (1991) *The Invisible Weapon: telecommunications and international politics, 1851-1945*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Heininger, J.E. (1994) *Peacekeeping in Transition: the United Nations in Cambodia*. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press.
- Held, D. (1995) *Democracy and the Global Order: from the modern state to cosmopolitan governance*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Herman, E.S. and N. Chomsky (1988) *Manufacturing Consent: the political economy of the mass media*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Hollis, M. and S. Smith (1990) *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Hudson, M. and J. Stanier (1999) *War and the Media: a random searchlight*. 2nd edn. Bodmin: Alan Sutton.
- Ignatieff, M. (2000) *Virtual War: Kosovo and beyond*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Jones, N. (1995) *Soundbites and Spin Doctors: how politicians manipulate the media - and vice versa*. London: Cassell.

- (1999) *Sultans of Spin: The media and the new labour government*. London: Victor Gollancz.
- Jowett, G. and V. O'Donnell (1999) *Propaganda and Persuasion*. 3rd edn. London: Sage.
- Kaldor, M. (1999) *New and Old Wars: organized violence in a global era*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Keck, M. and K. Sikkink (1998) *Activists Beyond Borders: advocacy networks in international politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Keegan, J. (1994) *A History of Warfare*. New York: Vintage.
- Khalilzad, Z.M. and J.P. White (1999) *The Changing Role of Information in Warfare*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
- Knightley, P. (2003) *The First Casualty: the war correspondent as hero, propagandist and myth-maker from the Crimea to Iraq*. 3rd edn. London: Carlton Publishing Group.
- Koppes, C.R. and G.D. Black (1987) *Hollywood Goes to War: how politics, profits, and propaganda shaped World War II movies*. New York: Free Press.
- Krasner, S.D., ed. (1983) *International Regimes*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Kurtz, H. (1998) *Spin Cycle: inside the Clinton propaganda machine*. New York: Free Press.
- Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1985) *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: towards a radical democratic politics*. London: Verso.
- Lasswell, H.D. (1927) *Propaganda Technique in the World War*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd.
- Lasswell, H.D. and A. Kaplan (1950) *Power and Society*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Lasswell, H.D., R.D. Casey et al. (1969) *Propaganda and Promotional Activities: an annotated bibliography*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lee, A.M. and E.B. Lee (1979) *The Fine Art of Propaganda: prepared for the Institute for Propaganda Analysis*. Second print New York: Octagon Books – originally published in 1939.
- Lehmann, I.A. (1999) *Peacekeeping and Public Information: caught in the crossfire*. London: Frank Cass.
- Leonard, M., C. Stead et al. (2002) *Public Diplomacy*. London: Foreign Policy Centre.
- Libicki, M.C. (1995) *What is Information Warfare?* Washington, DC: Center for Advanced Concepts and Technology Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.
- Lipschutz, R.D. and J.K. Rowe (2005) *Globalization, Governmentality and Global Politics: regulation for the rest of us?* London: Routledge.
- Lukes, S. (1974) *Power: a radical view*. London: MacMillan Press.
- , ed. (1986) *Power*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- MacDonald, D.B. (2002) *Balkan Holocausts? Serbian and Croatian victim-centred propaganda and the war in Yugoslavia*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Mackenzie, J. (1984) *Propaganda and Empire: manipulation of British public opinion, 1880-1960*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Magnusson, T. (1996) *From Saigon to Sarajevo: mass media in times of war*. Stockholm: Swedish Council.
- Maltese, J.A. (1992) *Spin Control: The White House Office of Communications and the management of presidential news*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

- Manheim, J.B. (1994) *Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: the evolution of influence*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- McLaughlin, G. (2002) *The War Correspondent*. London: Pluto Press.
- McLuhan, M. (2001) *Understanding Media: the extensions of man*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Molander, R.C., A.S. Riddile et al. (1996) *Strategic Information Warfare: a new face of war*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
- Molander, R.C. (1998) *Strategic Information Warfare Rising*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
- Morgenthau, H.J. (1960) *Politics Among Nations: the struggle for power and peace*. 3rd edn. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Morrison, D. (1992) *Television and the Gulf War*. London: John Libbey.
- Mueller, J.E. (2004) *The Remnants of War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Nacos, B.L., R.Y. Shapiro et al., eds. (2000a) *Decisionmaking in a Glass House: mass media, public opinion, and American and European foreign policy in the 21st century*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Nelson, M. and L. Walesa (1997) *War of the Black Heavens: the battles of Western broadcasting in the Cold War*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Neumann, I.B. (2001) *Mening, materialitet, makt: en innføring i diskursanalyse*. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.
- Norhrstedt, S.A., B. Hoijer et al. (2002) *Kosovokonflikten, medierna, och medlidanhet*. Stockholm: Styrelsen för psykologiskt försvar.
- Nye, J.S. (1990) *Bound to Lead: the changing nature of American power*. New York: Basic Books.
- (2004) *Soft Power: the means to success in world politics*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Ottosen, R. (1994) *Mediestrategier og Fiendebilder i Internasjonale Konflikter: norske medier i skyggen av Pentagon*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
- Pratkanis, A.R. and E. Aronson (1992) *Age of Propaganda: the everyday use and abuse of persuasion*. New York: W.H. Freeman.
- Price, M.E. and M. Thompson, eds. (2002) *Forging Peace: intervention, human rights and the management of media space*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Riegert, K. (2002) *Kampen om det Kommunikativa Rummet*. Stockholm: Styrelsen för psykologiskt försvar.
- (2003) *The Image War: NATO's battle for Kosovo in the British media*. Stockholm: Styrelsen för psykologiskt försvar.
- Risse, T., S. Ropp et al., eds. (1999) *The Power of Human Rights*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Robinson, P. (2002) *The CNN Effect: the myth of news, foreign policy and intervention*. London: Routledge.
- Rosenau, J. (1990) *Turbulence in World Politics: a theory of change and continuity*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Rothgreb, J.M. (1993) *Defining Power: influence and force in the contemporary international system*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Schattschneider, E.E. (1960) *The Semisovereign People: a realist's view of democracy in America*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Schwartz, W. (1994) *Information Warfare: chaos on the electronic superhighway*. New York: Thunder's Mouth Press.
- Shaw, M. (1996) *Civil Society and Media in Global Crises: representing distant violence*. London: Pinter.

- Siegel, P.C. (1996) *The Troubled Path to the Pentagon's Rules on Media Access to the Battlefield: Grenada to today*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College.
- (1998) *Target Bosnia: integrating information activities in peace operations - NATO-led operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, December 1995-1997*. Washington, DC: National Defense University.
- Smith, R. (2005) *The Utility of Force: the art of war in the modern world*. London: Allen Lane.
- Soley, L.C. (1989) *Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA subversive propaganda*. New York: Praeger.
- Spiller, Roger (2005) *An Instinct for War*. Harvard University Press.
- Stein, G.J. and R. Szafranski (1996) *US Information Warfare*. Alexandria, VA: Jane's Information Group.
- Strauss, L. (1988) *What is Political Philosophy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Strobel, W.P. (1997) *Late-Breaking Foreign Policy: the media's influence on peace operations*. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press.
- Taylor, P.M. (1992) *War and the Media: propaganda and persuasion in the Gulf War*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Taylor, P.M. (2003) *Munitions of the Mind: a history of propaganda from the ancient world to the present day*. 3rd edn. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- The Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000) *The Kosovo Report: conflict, international response and lessons learned*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Thompson, R. (1966) *Defeating Communist Insurgency: experiences from Malaya and Vietnam*. London: Chatto and Windus.
- Thompson, M. (1999) *Forging war: the media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina*. 2nd edn. Luton: University of Luton Press.
- Thrall, A.T. (2000) *War in the Media Age*. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.
- Toffler, A. and H. (1993) *War and Anti-War: survival at the dawn of the twenty-first century*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
- van Creveld, M. (1991) *On Future War*. London: Brassey's.
- Waltz, E. (1998) *Information Warfare: principles and operations*. Boston: Artech House.
- Waltz, K. (1979) *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.
- Weber, M. (1978) *Economy and Society: an outline of interpretative Sociology*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Wendt, A. (1999) *Social Theory and International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wheeler, N.J. (2000) *Saving Strangers: humanitarian intervention in international society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Articles

- Ackerman, S. and J. Naureckas (2000) Following Washington's Script: the United States media and Kosovo. In *Degraded Capability: the media and the Kosovo crisis*, edited by P. Hammond et al. London: Pluto Press, pp. 97-110.
- Adams, J. (1996) The Role of the Media. In *Cyberwar: security, strategy, and conflict in the information age*, edited by A.D. Campen et al. Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, pp. 107-18.
- Adie, K. (2000) The Media Portrayal of the Military. In *The Media and International Security*, edited by S. Badsey. London: Frank Cass, pp. 51-63.
- Allard, C.K. (1997) Information Operations in Bosnia: a soldier's perspective. In *Lessons From Bosnia: the IFOR experience*, edited by L. Wentz. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Command and Control Research Programme, pp. 255-72.
- Altheide, D.L. and J.N. Grimes (2005) War Programming: the propaganda project and the Iraq war. *Sociological Quarterly* 46 (4), pp. 617-44.
- Arquilla, J. and D.F. Ronfeldt (1993) Cyberwar Is Coming. *Comparative Strategy* 12 (2), pp. 141-65.
- Bachrach, P. and M. Baratz (1962) Two Faces of Power. *American Political Science Review* 56, pp. 947-52.
- Badsey, S. (1996) The Influence of the Media on Recent British Military Operations. In *War, Culture and the Media: representations of the military in the 20th century Britain*, edited by I. Stewart et al. Trowbridge: Flicks Books, pp. 5-21.
- (1997) The Media and UN 'Peacekeeping' since the Gulf War. *Journal of Conflict Studies* 17 (1), pp. 7-27.
- (2000b) Introduction. In *The Media and International Security*, edited by S. Badsey. London: Frank Cass, pp. xvii-xxxii.
- (2000c) The Media, The Military and Public Opinion. In *The Media and International Security*, edited by S. Badsey. London: Frank Cass, pp. 238-52.
- Baldwin, D.A. (1971) The Power of Positive Sanctions. *World Politics* 24 (1), pp. 19-38.
- (1979) Power Analysis and World Politics: new trends versus old tendencies. *World Politics* 31 (2), pp. 161-94.
- Barnett, M. and R. Duvall (2005) Power in International Politics. *International Organization* 59 (Winter), pp. 39-75.
- Bauer, M.W. (2000) Classical Content Analysis: a review. In *Qualitative Researching with Text, Image and Sound: a practical handbook*, edited by M.W. Bauer et al. London: SAGE Publications, pp. 131-51.
- Baumard, P. (1996) From InfoWar to Knowledge Warfare: preparing for the paradigm shift. In *Cyberwar: security, strategy, and conflict in the information age*, edited by A.D. Campen et al. Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, pp. 147-60.
- Beer, J. (2000) Perception Management and 'Media Operations'. In *Cyberwar 3.0: human factors in information operations and future conflict*, edited by A.D. Campen et al. Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, pp. 185-90.

- Bennett, L. (1990) Toward a Theory of Press State Relations in the United States. *Journal of Communication* 40 (2), pp. 103-25.
- Berdal, M.R. (2000) Lessons not Learned: the use of force in peace operations in the 1990s. In *Forsvarsstudier No. 4*. Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies.
- Berkowitz, B.D. (1995) Warfare in the Information Age. *Issues in Science and Technology* 12 (1), pp. 59-66.
- (2000) War Logs On: girding America for computer combat. *Foreign Affairs* 79 (3), pp. 8-12.
- Bosch, J.M.J. (2000) Information Operations: challenges or frustrations? *Military Technology* 24 (5), pp. 86-89.
- Bradshaw, A. (1976) A Critique of Steven Lukes' 'Power: a radical view'. *Sociology* 10 (1), pp. 121-28.
- Brown, M.L. (1996) The Revolution in Military Affairs: The information dimension. In *Cyberwar: security, strategy, and conflict in the information age*, edited by A.D. Campen et al. Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, pp. 31-52.
- Brown, R. (2001) From an Answer to a Question: globalization in the information age. In *Access denied in the information age*, edited by S. Lax. Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp. 218-33.
- (2002a) The Contagiousness of Conflict: E.E. Schattschneider as a theorist of the information society. *Information, Communication & Society* 5 (2), pp. 258-75.
- (2002b) Information Operations, Public Diplomacy and Spin: The US and the politics of perception management. *Journal of Information Warfare* 1 (3), pp. 40-50.
- (2002c) Negotiation in Three Dimensions: managing the public face of international negotiation. In *Negotiation in International Conflict: understanding persuasion*, edited by D. Goodwin. London: Frank Cass, pp. 17-30.
- (2003a) Spinning the World: spin doctors, mediation, and foreign policy. In *Rituals of Mediation: international politics and social meaning*, edited by F. Debrix et al. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 154-72.
- (2003b) Spinning the War: political communications, information operations and public diplomacy in the war on terrorism. In *War and the media: reporting conflict 24/7*, edited by D. Freedman et al. London: Sage, pp. 87-100.
- (2003c) Clausewitz in the Age of CNN: rethinking the military-media relationship. In *Framing Terrorism: the news media, the government and the public*, edited by P. Norris et al. New York: Routledge, pp. 43-58.
- (2004) Information Technology and the Transformation of Diplomacy. *Knowledge, Technology & Policy* 18 (2), pp. 14-29.
- (2005) Getting to War: communications and mobilization in the 2002-03 Iraq crisis. In *Media and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century*, edited by P. Seib. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 57-81.
- Brown, W.J. and R.C. Vincent (1995) Trading Arms for Hostages: how the government and print media spin portrayals of the United States policy toward Iran. *Political Communication* 12 (1), pp. 65-79.

- Byford, J. and M. Billig (2001) The Emergence of Antisemitic Conspiracy Theories in Yugoslavia during the War with NATO. *Patterns of Prejudice* 35 (4), pp. 50-63.
- Campbell, A. (1999) Communications Lessons for Nato, the Military and Media. *RUSI Journal* (August), pp. 31-36.
- Chaffee, S.H. and J.L. Hochheimer (1982) The Beginnings of Political Communication Research in the United States: origins of the 'limited effects' model. In *The Media Revolution in America and Western Europe*, edited by E.M. Rogers et al. Norwood, NJ: Ablex, pp. 263-83.
- Clifford, R.C.L. and T.J. Wilton (2000) Media Operations and the ARRC. In *The Media and International Security*, edited by S. Badsey. London: Frank Cass, pp. 11-33.
- Cloughley, B. (1996) Peace in Mind: will the UN give psyops a chance? *Jane's International Defense Review* (3), pp. 59-61.
- Coker, C. (2002) Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the management of risk. *Adelphi Papers* no. 345.
- Collins, S. (1999) Army PSYOPS in Bosnia: capabilities and constraints. *Parameters* (Summer), pp. 57-73.
- (2000a) Perception Conflict in the 'Modern' Balkan Wars. In *Cyberwar 3.0: human factors in information operations and future conflict*, edited by A.D. Campen et al. Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, pp. 191-202.
- (2000b) Shaping Perceptions During the Latest Balkans Imbroglio. *European Security* 9 (3), pp. 38-61.
- Cooper, A.H. (2002) Media Framing and Social Movement Mobilization: German peace protest against INF missiles, the Gulf War, and NATO peace enforcement in Bosnia. *European Journal of Political Research* 41 (1), pp. 37-80.
- Cordingly, P. (2000) Future Commanders Be Warned!: a brigade commander's view of the media and the Gulf War. In *The Media and International Security*, edited by S. Badsey. London: Frank Cass, pp. 169-76.
- Coward, G.R. (2000) Lessons Learnd: a personal view of military-media relations on peacekeeping operations. In *The Media and International Security*, edited by S. Badsey. London: Frank Cass, pp. 135-45.
- Cox, R.W. (1986) Social Forces, States and World Orders: beyond International Relations theory. In *Neorealism and Its Critics*, edited by R.O. Keohane. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 204-54.
- Curtis, D.E.A. (2000) Broadcasting Peace: an analysis of local media post-conflict peacebuilding projects in Rwanda and Bosnia. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies* 21 (1), pp. 141-66.
- Dahl, R.A. (1957) The Concept of Power. *Behavioral Science* 2 (July), pp. 201-15.
- (1958) A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model. *The American Political Science Review* 52 (June), pp. 463-69.
- (1965) Cause and Effect in the Study of Politics. In *Cause and Effect*, edited by D. Lerner. New York: The Free Press, pp. 75-90.
- (1968) Power. In *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, edited by D.L. Sills. New York: Crowell Collier and MacMillan, pp. 405-15.
- Dearth, D.H. (2000a) Shaping the 'Information Space': perception management in peace, crisis and war. In *Cyberwar 3.0: human factors in information operations and future conflict*, edited by A.D. Campen et al. Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, pp. 153-64.

- deCaro, C. (1996) Softwar. In *Cyberwar: security, strategy, and conflict in the information age*, edited by A.D. Campen et al. Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, pp. 203-18.
- (2000) Softwar & Grand Strategy: Liddell-Hart updated. In *Cyberwar 3.0: human factors in information operations and future conflict*, edited by A.D. Campen et al. Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, pp. 87-95.
- Denning, D.E. (2000) Cyberterrorism: the logic bomb versus the truck bomb. *Global Dialogue* 2 (4), pp. 29-37.
- Des Forges, A. (2002) Silencing the Voices of Hate in Rwanda. In *Forging Peace: intervention, human rights and the management of media space*, edited by M.E. Price et al. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 236-58.
- Devost, M.G., B.K. Houghton et al. (1997) Information Terrorism: political violence in the information age. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9 (1), pp. 72-97.
- Digeser, P. (1992) The Fourth Face of Power. *Journal of Politics* 54 (4), pp. 977-1007.
- Dixon, P. (2003) Victory by Spin? Britain, the US and the propaganda war over Kosovo. *Civil Wars* 6 (4), pp. 83-106.
- Driscoll, S.C. (2000) Mediation, Interpretation & Meaning: the psychology of perception management. In *Cyberwar 3.0: human factors in information operations and future conflict*, edited by A.D. Campen et al. Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, pp. 165-76.
- Duncan, A.M.A. (2000) Mixing with the Media. In *The Media and International Security*, edited by S. Badsey. London: Frank Cass, pp. 117-34.
- Edelstein, D.M. and R.R. Krebs (2005) Washington's Troubling Obsession With Public Diplomacy. *Survival* 47 (1), pp. 89-104.
- Entman, R.M. (1993) Framing: toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. *Journal of Communication* 43 (4), pp. 51-58.
- (2000) Declarations of Independence: the growth of media power after the Cold War. In *Decisionmaking in a Glass House: mass media, public opinion, and American and European foreign policy in the 21st century*, edited by B.L. Nacos et al. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, pp. 11-16.
- Foucault, M. (1982) The Subject and Power. *Critical Inquiry* 8 (Summer), pp. 777-95.
- (1991) Governmentality. In *The Foucault Effect: studies in governmentality with two Lectures and an interview with Michel Foucault*, edited by G. Burchell et al. London: Harvester and Wheatsheaf, pp. 87-104.
- (2000) Omnes et Singulatim: toward a critique of political reason. In *Michel Foucault: Power*, edited by J.D. Faubion. London: The Penguin Group, pp. 298-325.
- Freedman, L. (1998) Military Power and Political Influence. *International Affairs* 74 (4), pp. 762-79.
- (1998-99) The Changing Forms of Military Conflict. *Survival* 40 (4), pp. 39-56.
- (2000) Victims and Victors: reflections on the Kosovo war. *Review of International Studies* 26, pp. 335-58.
- (2001) The Third World War? *Survival* 43 (4), pp. 61-87.
- Gallie, W.B. (1962) Essentially Contested Concepts. In *The Importance of Language*, edited by M. Black. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, pp. 121-46.
- Gilboa, E. (2005) The CNN effect: the search for a communication theory of international relations. *Political Communication* 22 (1), pp. 27-44.
- Gocic, G. (2000) Symbolic Warfare: NATO versus the Serbian media. In *Degraded Capability: the media and the Kosovo crisis*, edited by P. Hammond et al. London: Pluto Press, pp. 88-96.

- Goff, P. (1999b) Introduction. In *The Kosovo News and Propaganda War*, edited by P. Goff. Vienna: International Press Institute, pp. 13-34.
- Gordon, C. (1991) Governmental Rationality: an introduction. In *The Foucault Effect: studies in governmentality with two lectures and an interview with Michel Foucault*, edited by G. Burchell et al. London: Harvester and Wheatsheaf, pp. 1-52.
- Gow, J., R. Paterson et al. (1996b) Introduction. In *Bosnia by television*, edited by J. Gow et al. London: British Film Institute, pp. 1-8.
- Gow, J. and J. Tilsley (1996) The Strategic Imperative for Media Management. In *Bosnia by Television*, edited by J. Gow et al. London: British Film Institute, pp. 103-11.
- Gowing, N. (1996) Real-Time TV Coverage From War: does it make or break government policy? In *Bosnia by Television*, edited by J. Gow et al. London: BFI Publishing, pp. 81-91.
- (1997) Conflict, the Military and the Media: a new optimism? *The Officer* 7 (3), pp. 24-26.
- (2000a) Media Coverage: help or hindrance in conflict prevention? In *The Media and International Security*, edited by S. Badsey. London: Frank Cass, pp. 203-26.
- Gunaratne, S.A. (2005) Public Diplomacy, Global Communication and World Order: an analysis based on theory of living systems. *Current Sociology* 53 (5), pp. 749-72.
- Hay, C. (1997) Divided by a Common Language: political theory and the concept of power. *Politics* 17 (1), pp. 45-52.
- Herd, G.P. (2000) The 'Counter-Terrorist Operation' in Chechnya: 'information warfare' aspects. *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 13 (4), pp. 57-83.
- (2002) The Russo-Chechen Information Warfare and 9/11: Al-Qaeda through the south Caucasus looking glass? *European Security* 11 (4), pp. 110-30.
- Herman, E.S. and D. Peterson (2000) CNN: selling NATO's war globally. In *Degraded Capability: the media and the Kosovo crisis*, edited by P. Hammond et al. London: Pluto Press, pp. 111-22.
- Hindell, K. (1995) The Influence of the Media on Foreign Policy. *International Relations* 12 (4), pp. 73-83.
- Hitchcock, D.I. (1988) US public diplomacy. In *Significant Issues Series, vol. 10, no. 17*. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.
- Hrvatín, S.B. and M. Trampuz (2000) Enjoy Your Enemy or How the Kosovo (Media) War Broke Out. *Javnost-the Public* 7 (3), pp. 77-85.
- Hughes, M. (1992) Words at War: reflections of a Marine public affairs officer in the Persian Gulf. *Government Information Quarterly* 9 (4), pp. 431-71.
- Hume, M. (2000) Nazifying the Serbs: from Bosnia to Kosovo. In *Degraded Capability: the media and the Kosovo crisis*, edited by P. Hammond et al. London: Pluto Press, pp. 70-78.
- Huntington, S.P. (1993) The Clash of Civilizations? *Foreign Affairs* (summer), pp. 22-49.
- Jacobsen, C.G. (1993) War Crimes in the Balkans: media manipulations, historical amnesia and subjective morality. *Coexistence* 30 (4), pp. 313-25.
- Jones, S.H. and D.B. Clarke (2006) Waging Terror: the geopolitics of the real. *Political Geography* 25 (3), pp. 298-314.
- Katz, S.L. (1992) Ground Zero: the information war in the Persian Gulf. *Government Information Quarterly* 9 (4), pp. 375-408.

- Keohane, R.O. and J.S. Nye (1998) Power and Interdependence in the Information Age. *Foreign Affairs* 77 (5), pp. 81-94.
- Kiehl, W.P. (2001) Peacekeeper or Occupier? US experience with information operations in the Balkans. *International Peacekeeping* 8 (4), pp. 136-46.
- Kuehl, D.T. (1996) Strategic Information Warfare and Comprehensive Situational Awareness. In *Cyberwar: security, strategy, and conflict in the information age*, edited by A.D. Campen et al. Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, pp. 185-95.
- Laqueur, W. (1994) Save Public Diplomacy. *Foreign Affairs* 73 (5), pp. 19-24.
- Larner, W. and W. Walters (2004) Globalization as Governmentality. *Alternatives* 29, pp. 495-514.
- Lehmann, I.A. (1995) Public Perception of UN Peacekeeping: a factor in the resolution of international conflicts. *Fletcher Forum World Affairs* 19 (1), pp. 109-19.
- Levitin, O. (2000) Inside Moscow's Kosovo Muddle. *Survival* 42 (1), pp. 130-40.
- Libicki, M.C. (1996) Protecting the United States in Cyberspace. In *Cyberwar: security, strategy, and conflict in the information age*, edited by A.D. Campen et al. Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, pp. 91-106.
- (1998) Information War, Information Peace. *Journal of International Affairs* 51 (2), pp. 411-28.
- Lindgren, S.Å. (2003) Michel Foucault. In *Klassisk og Moderne Samfundsteori*, edited by H. Andersen et al. 2nd edn. København: Hans Reitzels Forlag, pp. 326-41.
- Lindley, D. (2004) Untapped Power?: the status of UN information operations. *International Peacekeeping* 11 (4), pp. 608-24.
- Livingston, S. and T. Eachus (1995) Humanitarian Crisis and US Foreign Policy: Somalia and the CNN effect reconsidered. *Political Communication* 12, pp. 413-29.
- Lord, C. (1998) The Past and Future of Public Diplomacy. *Orbis* 42 (1), pp. 49-74.
- Luke, T.W. and G. Otuthail (1997) On Videocameralistics: the geopolitics of failed states, the CNN international and (UN)governmentality. *Review of International Political Economy* 4 (4), pp. 709-33.
- Lukes, S. (1976) Reply to Bradshaw. *Sociology* 10 (1), pp. 129-32.
- Malesic, M. (1998) International Peacekeeping: an object of propaganda in former Yugoslavia. *International Peacekeeping* 5 (2), pp. 82-102.
- Mandelbaum, M. (1998-99) Is Major War Obsolete? *Survival* 40 (4), pp. 20-38.
- Manheim, J.B. The War of Images: strategic communication in the Gulf conflict. In *The Political Psychology of the Gulf-War: leaders, publics, and the process of conflict*, edited by S.A. Renshon. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 155-71.
- Marston, J. (2002) Neutrality and the Negotiation of an Information Order in Cambodia. In *Forging Peace: intervention, human rights and the management of media space*, edited by M.E. Price et al. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 177-200.
- McKinney, T. (2002) Radio Jamming: the disarmament of radio propaganda. *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 13 (3), pp. 111-44.
- Mearsheimer, J.J. (1990) Back to the Future: instability in Europe after the Cold War. *International Security* 15 (1), pp. 5-56.
- Merlingen, M. and Z. Mujic (2003) Public Diplomacy and the OSCE in the Age of Post-international Politics: the case of the field mission in Croatia. *Security Dialogue* 34 (3), pp. 269-84.

- Mertus, J. and M. Thompson (2002) The Learning Curve: media development in Kosovo. In *Forging Peace: intervention, human rights and the management of media space*, edited by M.E. Price et al. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 259-86.
- Metzl, J.F. (1997) Information Intervention: when switching channels isn't enough. *Foreign Affairs* 76 (6), pp. 15-20.
- (1999) Popular diplomacy. *Daedalus* 128 (2), pp. 177-92.
- Milliken, J. (1999) The Study of Discourse in International Relations: a critique of research and methods. *European Journal of International Relations* 5 (2), pp. 225-54.
- Muirhead, O. (1999) My Job: at the sharp end of the media operation. *RUSI Journal* (August), pp. 37-43.
- Myers, G., T. Klak et al. (1996) The Inscription of Difference: news coverage of the conflicts in Rwanda and Bosnia. *Political Geography* 15 (1), pp. 21-46.
- Nacos, B.L., R.Y. Shapiro et al. (2000b) Old or New Ball Game?: mass media, public opinion, and foreign policy in the post-Cold War world. In *Decisionmaking in a Glass House: mass media, public opinion, and American and European foreign policy in the 21st century*, edited by B.L. Nacos et al. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, pp. 1-10.
- Nelles, W. (2004) American Public Diplomacy as Pseudo-education: a problematic national security and counter-terrorism instrument. *International Politics* 41 (1), pp. 65-94.
- Nincic, M. (2003) Information Warfare and Democratic Accountability. *Contemporary Security Policy* 24 (1), pp. 140-60.
- Nohrstedt, S.A., S. Kaitatzi-Whitlock et al. (2000) From the Persian Gulf to Kosovo: war journalism and propaganda. *European Journal of Communication* 15 (3), pp. 383-404.
- Nye, J.S. (1999) Redefining the National Interest. *Foreign Affairs* 78 (4), pp. 22-34.
- Nye, J.S. and W.A. Owens (1996) America's Information Edge. *Foreign Affairs* 75 (2), pp. 20-35.
- Oberschall, A. (2000) The Manipulation of Ethnicity: from ethnic cooperation to violence and war in Yugoslavia. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 23 (6), pp. 982-1001.
- Ottosen, R. (2002) Avisbildet av NATO's Krigføring på Balkan. *HiO-rapport*. Oslo: Høgskolen i Oslo.
- Parry Giles, S.J. (1996) 'Camouflaged' Propaganda: The Truman and Eisenhower administrations' covert manipulation of news. *Western Journal of Communication* 60 (2), pp. 146-67.
- Petersen, J.L. (1996) Information Warfare: the future. In *Cyberwar: security, strategy, and conflict in the information age*, edited by A.D. Campen et al. Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, pp. 219-26.
- Peterson, P.G. (2002) Public Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism. *Foreign Affairs* 81 (5), pp. 74-94.
- Phillips, P. (1999) Untold Stories of US/NATO's War and US Media Complacency. *Social Policy* 30 (1), pp. 47-49.
- Pickup, D.J. (2000) The Media and the Minder: the Royal Navy's perspective. In *The Media and International Security*, edited by S. Badsey. London: Frank Cass, pp. 146-68.
- Pinsdorf, M.K. (1999) Woodrow Wilson's Public Relations: wag the hun. *Public Relations Review* 25 (3), pp. 309-30.

- Posen, B.R. (2000) The War for Kosovo: Serbia's political-military strategy. *International Security* 24 (4), pp. 39-84.
- Powlick, P. and A.Z. Katz (1998) Defining the American Public Opinion Foreign Policy Nexus. *International Studies Quarterly* 42, pp. 29-61.
- Price, M.E. (2000) Information Intervention: Bosnia, the Dayton Accords, and the seizure of broadcasting transmitters. *Cornell International Law Journal* 33 (1), pp. 67-112.
- Purcell, D. (2005) The Military in the Noosphere: ICT adoption and website development in the Slovenian Ministry of Defense. *Information, Communication & Society* 8 (2), pp. 194-216.
- Radojkovic, M. (1994) Mass-media Between State Monopoly and Individual Freedom: media restructuring and restriction in Former Yugoslavia. *European Journal of Communication* 9 (2), pp. 137-48.
- Rathmell, A. (2000) Information Operations: coming of age? *Jane's Intelligence Review* 12 (5), pp. 52-55.
- Rawnsley, G.D. (2005) Old Wine in New Bottles: China-Taiwan computer-based 'information warfare' and propaganda. *International Affairs* 81 (5), pp. 1061-78.
- Rose, M. (2000) The Media and International Security. In *The Media and International Security*, edited by S. Badsey. London: Frank Cass, pp. 3-10.
- Ross, C. (2002) Public Diplomacy Comes of Age. *Washington Quarterly* 25 (2), pp. 75-84.
- Sandberg, M. and E. Windmar (1998) Bosnien tre år efter Dayton. In *Världspolitikens Dagsfrågor*. Stockholm: The Swedish Institute of International Affairs.
- Sandmo, E. (1999) Michel Foucault som maktteoretiker. In *Om Makt: teori og kritikk*, edited by F. Engelstad. Oslo: Ad Notam Gyldendal, pp. 79-96.
- Schwartau, W. (1996) Ethical Conundra of Information Warfare. In *Cyberwar: security, strategy, and conflict in the information age*, edited by A.D. Campen et al. Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, pp. 243-250.
- Sending, O.J. and I.B. Neumann (2006) Governance to Governmentality: analyzing NGOs, states, and power. *International Studies Quarterly* 50 (3), pp. 651-72.
- Senghaas, D. (1993) Global Governance: how could it be conceived? *Security Dialogue* 24 (3), pp. 247-56.
- Shaw, M. (2000a) Media and Public Sphere without Borders?: news coverage and power from Kurdistan to Kosovo. In *Decisionmaking in a Glass House: mass media, public opinion, and American and European foreign policy in the 21st century*, edited by B.L. Nacos et al. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, pp. 27-40.
- (2000b) Book review. *Review of International Political Economy* 7 (1), pp. 171-80.
- Shea, J. (2001) Modern Conflicts, the Media and Public opinion: the Kosovo example. In *From Manoeuvre Warfare to Kosovo*, edited by J.A. Olsen. Trondheim: Luftkrigsskolen, pp. 199-220.
- Siegel, P.C. (1997) Information Activities. In *Lessons From Bosnia: the IFOR experience*, edited by L. Wentz. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Command and Control Research Programme, pp. 167-88.
- Skoco, M. and W. Woodger (2000) The Military and the Media. In *Degraded Capability: the media and the Kosovo crisis*, edited by P. Hammond et al. London: Pluto Press, pp. 79-87.

- Smyth, R. (2001) Mapping US Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century. *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 55 (3), pp. 421-44.
- Snow, N. (2004) From Bombs and Bullets to Hearts and Minds: US public diplomacy in an age of propaganda. In *War, Media, and Propaganda: a global perspective*, edited by Y.R. Kamalipour et al. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 17-24.
- Sobel, R. (1998) Trends: United States intervention in Bosnia. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 62 (2), pp. 250-78.
- Sorenson, J. and A. Matsuoka (2001) Phantom Wars and Cyberwars: Abyssinian fundamentalism and catastrophe in Eritrea. *Dialectical Anthropology* 26 (1), pp. 37-63.
- Stewart, I. (2000) Reporting Conflict: who calls the shots? In *The Media and International Security*, edited by S. Badsey. London: Frank Cass, pp. 64-76.
- Taylor, M. (2000) Media Relations in Bosnia: a role for public relations in building civil society. *Public Relations Review* 26 (1), pp. 1-14.
- Taylor, P.M. (2000a) Introduction. *European Journal of Communication* 15 (3), pp. 293-97.
- (2000b) The Military and the Media: past, present and future. In *The Media and International Security*, edited by S. Badsey. London: Frank Cass, pp. 177-202.
- (2002) Information Warfare and Information Intervention. In *Forging Peace: intervention, human rights and the management of media space*, edited by M.E. Price et al. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 313-28.
- Thayer, B.A. (2000) The Political Effects of Information Warfare: why new military capabilities cause old political dangers. *Security Studies* 10 (1), pp. 43-85.
- Thomas, T.L. (1997) Russian Information Warfare. *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement* 6 (1), pp. 205-15.
- (1998) Information War: dialectical versus empirical thinking - ten key elements of the Russian understanding of information operations. *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 11 (1), pp. 40-62.
- (2000) Kosovo and the Current Myth of Information Superiority. *Parameters* 30, pp. 13-29.
- Thompson, M. and D.D. Luce (2002) Escalating to Success?: the media intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In *Forging Peace: intervention, human rights and the management of media space*, edited by M.E. Price et al. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 201-35.
- Thompson, M. and M.E. Price (2003) Intervention, Media and Human Rights. *Survival* 45 (1), pp. 183-202.
- Thussu, D.K. (2000a) Legitimizing 'Humanitarian Intervention?': CNN, NATO and the Kosovo crisis. *European Journal of Communication* 15 (3), pp. 345-61.
- (2000b) Media Wars and Public Diplomacy. *Javnost-the Public* 7 (3), pp. 5-17.
- Towle, P. (2000) The Media, Megaphone Diplomacy and Disarmament. In *The Media and International Security*, edited by S. Badsey. London: Frank Cass, pp. 227-37.
- van Dyke, M. (2003) Absence of War, Construction of Peace: a historical-critical perspective of NATO Public Relations strategy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995-96. Unpublished paper presented at the *Annual Convention of the National Communication Association*. Miami Beach, Fl.

- van Ham, P. (2003) War, Lies, and Videotape: public diplomacy and the USA's war on terrorism. *Security Dialogue* 34 (4), pp. 427-44.
- Vickers, R. (2000) Blair's Kosovo Campaign Political Communications, The Battle for Public Opinion and Foreign Policy. *Civil Wars* 3 (1), pp. 55-77.
- (2004) The New Public Diplomacy: Britain and Canada compared. *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 6 (2), pp. 182-94.
- Wæver, O. (1995) Securitization and Desecuritization. In *On Security*, edited by R.D. Lipschutz. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 46-86.
- Western, J. (2002) Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: beliefs, information, and advocacy in the US decisions on Somalia and Bosnia. *International Security* 26 (4), pp. 112-42.
- (2005) The War over Iraq: selling war to the American public. *Security Studies* 14 (1), pp. 99-130.
- Williamson, C.A. (2000) Perception Management and Conflict Transition: shaping the information environment in peace, crisis and conflict. In *Cyberwar 3.0: human factors in information operations and future conflict*, edited by A.D. Campen et al. Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, pp. 177-84.
- Wimhurst, D. (2002) Preparing a Plebiscite under Fire: the United Nations and public information in East Timor. In *Forging Peace: intervention, human rights and the management of media space*, edited by M.E. Price et al. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 287-309.
- Zanotti, L. (2005) Governmentalizing the Post-Cold War International Regime: the UN debate on democratization and good governance. *Alternatives* 30 (2), pp. 461-87.
- Zupanov, J. (1995) Mass Media and Collective Violence. *Javnost-the Public* 2 (2), pp. 77-84.

Electronic sources

- Allard, C.K. (1996) *Information Operations in Bosnia: a preliminary assessment*. National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies. Retrieved 26/6/2000, from <http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/strforum/forum91.html>.
- Coker, C. (2005) *Cultural Ruthlessness and the War against Terror*. Retrieved 16/12/2006, from http://www.defense.gov.au/army/lwsc/Publications/journal/AAJ_Summer_05_06/Coker_culture_AAJ_Summer_05_06.pdf
- Gowing, N. (2000b) *Information in Conflict: who really commands the high ground?* Retrieved 9/12/2005, from www.kcl.ac.uk/lhcma/info/lec00.htm.
- Jennings, C. (2001) Guerillas surrender after NATO amnesty. *Telegraph*, 17 May 2001. Retrieved 18/12/2006, from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2001/05/17/wkos17.xml>.
- Smith, T. (1995) Among Serbs, Soldiers and Civilians, Old and Young Differ on NATO. *Associated Press*, 24 December 1995, Retrieved 18/12/2006, from <http://global.lexisnexis.com/about.aspx>
- Stech, F.J. (1994) *Winning CNN wars*. Retrieved 30/11/2006, from <http://carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/1994/stech>.