From Monologue to Dialogue?:
U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Post-9/11 Era

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STATEMENT OF ACADEMIC INTEGRITY

I certify that the thesis presented by me in 2007 for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the University of London is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others, and that the extent of any work carried out jointly by myself and any other person is clearly identified in it.

Signed

[Signature]

John Robert Kelley
3 August 2007
ABSTRACT

In comparing a considerable amount of the reportage, analysis and candor preceding this study, there is one conclusion that virtually all evaluations on United States public diplomacy after September 2001 would agree on: the consolidated efforts of the U.S. government to inform, influence and engage with foreign publics in pursuit of its national interest are deeply flawed. This gloomy outlook is borne out by identified deficiencies in strategy, coordination and organization, which have furthermore attracted intense scrutiny in response to opinion polls showing consistently low favorability towards the United States by foreign populations. A wide range of observers has drawn attention to various aspects of the overall diagnosis, and consequently formed an active segment of the general scholarship on public diplomacy.

What enriches the discussion on the U.S. case is when the focus turns to positing solutions, as the ensuing debate invokes historical, theoretical and futuristic perspectives on the processes, roles, and activities considered within public diplomacy’s scope. This study isolates two broad explanations for the failure of post-9/11 U.S. public diplomacy. The advocacy model represents the American public diplomacy ‘tradition’ of campaign style, one-way information flows, while the advisory model represents a two-way, ‘dialogic’ mode that has been championed by proponents of the ‘new’ public diplomacy. This study views American public diplomacy as situated at a crossroads as it solves the riddles of its failures – to further embrace tradition or adopt a new path.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Statement of Academic Integrity .............................................................................................2
Abstract ................................................................................................................................3
Table of Contents ...................................................................................................................4
List of Tables .........................................................................................................................5
Acknowledgments ..................................................................................................................6
Introduction ............................................................................................................................10
Research Structure ................................................................................................................15

CHAPTER 1: A New Era for U.S. Public Diplomacy .............................................................21
1.1 Foreign Policy and the Public ....................................................................................23
1.2 The Information Catalyst .........................................................................................24
1.3 Conversations with the World ...................................................................................25
1.4 A New Era for U.S. Public Diplomacy ....................................................................27
1.5 Post 9-11 Criticisms of U.S. Public Diplomacy .......................................................31
1.6 Foreign Policy and Public Opinion .........................................................................34
1.7 Theory of Soft Power: Attraction over Coercion ......................................................39
1.8 Between the Tradition and the Future of U.S. Public Diplomacy ............................43
1.9 Toward a Theory of Public Diplomacy and Foreign Policy .......................................47

CHAPTER 2: Understanding Public Diplomacy ...................................................................50
2.1 Models and Approaches ...........................................................................................52
2.2 Public Diplomacy Dimensions ................................................................................61
2.3 U.S. Public Diplomacy Institutions ..........................................................................73

3.1 Power Transitions and Changes in the American Foreign Affairs Institutions ..........84
3.2 Anatomy of a Decline ...............................................................................................89
3.3 Fighting for Survival, 1991 to 1995 .......................................................................93
3.4 The Final Years of USIA, 1996-1998 .....................................................................102
3.5 Relocation into the State Department, 1999-2001 ................................................110
3.6 To 9/11 and After ....................................................................................................114

CHAPTER 4: Rediscovery in the Post-9/11 Era ..................................................................115
4.1 Birth of a ‘Battle’ ......................................................................................................116
4.2 An Old Formula for a New Era ...............................................................................119
4.3 Charlotte Beers and ‘Brand America’ ....................................................................123
4.4 Losing Ground in the ‘Battle for Hearts and Minds’ ...............................................133
4.5 Between Beers and Hughes: Instability and Uncertainty .......................................143
4.6 Karen Hughes’ Rapid Response .............................................................................147

CHAPTER 5: Keeping with Tradition: U.S. Public Diplomacy and the Cold War ..........160
5.1 Benchmarking the Cold War ....................................................................................161
5.2 The Making of a Success Story? ..............................................................................163
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Much of the primary source material on public diplomacy presented here derives from countless hours of interviews with several individuals whom I consider to be leading authorities on the American practice. These individuals include Harold C. Pachios, former Chairman of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Barry Zorthian, who oversaw the mission critical Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office in Vietnam, and Walter Roberts, whose encyclopedic knowledge of the history of U.S. public diplomacy is nearly as impressive as his career in the field spanning eight decades. I am most grateful to Bruce Gregory of the Public Diplomacy Institute at The George Washington University for managing one of the few operational hubs of the growing network of practitioners and scholars worldwide, and for his tireless commitment to the field; and to John H. Brown, a former member of the U.S. Senior Foreign Service, for
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*Edgecliff*
*August 2007*
For Emi
INTRODUCTION

"To be successful in its foreign and domestic policies alike...[a government] must recognize that the conflict between the requirements of good foreign policy and the preferences of public opinion is in the nature of things and hence, unavoidable...."

- Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations

One of the central issues that has preoccupied both scholars of international history as well as students of International Relations (IR) are the deeper reasons that lead great powers to rise, mature and ultimately decline. Empires such as those of Rome and Britain have been the subject of many well-known studies, and aside from the explicit reasons they offer for how great powers become vulnerable, often there is also implicit guidance for rising and current powers to heed. Around the time of the fall of communism in the late 1980’s, this attention turned to the United States. Historian Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (1987) presented both a detailed chronicle of fallen empires as well as a tacit warning to contemporary powers to understand the errors that led to their forebears’ demise. Kennedy predicted the United States, beset by its own immense but imperfect might, would overextend its resources and give way to the would-be successors to global primacy. Soon thereafter, IR scholar Joseph Nye would issue his dissent in the form of Bound to Lead (1990), a strong

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affirmation that the pre-eminent position of the United States was indeed secure, assuming it could transition its military power and what Nye termed ‘co-optive’ or ‘soft’ power so that it could respond to future challenges.4

In the years since the United States sustained attacks by terrorists on 11 September 2001 (hereafter referred to as ‘9/11’), there is no doubt which nation retains the world’s most formidable military, which has been showcased in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, America’s powers of attraction, its allure and credibility – all those aspects that would determine its image and reputation in the world – have declined considerably. In 2003, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) took notice of the increasingly antagonistic relationship between the United States and the rest of the world. In its report the CFR found that “there is a growing cultural gulf between the United States and much of the world. These two groups view the world through vastly different cultural lenses that impose conflicting sets of values.”5 Respondents to a series of foreign public opinion surveys taken after 2001 have expressed rising distrust of America’s role in the world, increasing dismay over its post-9/11 assertiveness in the global war on terror and other theatres, and accumulating disapproval of American foreign policy.

While some dismiss outright the importance of foreign populations understanding, if not approving, America’s international intentions, there has been broad concern across the political spectrum in the United States and elsewhere about its fractured relations overseas. Some are mainly concerned with leveraging these relations to gain foreign acquiescence as a means to achieve policy ends. Others are troubled by the damage done

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11
to America's image and reputation, and lament the improbable belief of some populations that the United States may be unleashing more harm upon the world than good.

At the epicenter of these concerns lies a catalyst of change in the form of public diplomacy. A scholar or practitioner of public diplomacy would doubtless agree with the above prescription by Morgenthau, since his premise conceives public opinion as an essential factor in the setting and execution of policies be they foreign or domestic. Because this study presumes public diplomacy to be an act of political communication occurring between a government or non-governmental organization and members of a foreign rather than domestic public, problems with public diplomacy often surround conflicts over foreign policy. More to the point of this study, in the post-9/11 era the United States has been engulfed in Morgenthau's dilemma with its foreign policy on one side and the opposing preferences of many foreign populations on the other. Consequently, the American practice during this time has become the most observed and studied example of public diplomacy in the world not for being a model of success, but because it has done so little to assist with the many conflicts the United States is dealing with.

For this study, there are four main observations from developments in international affairs noted for their connections to these conflicts. They are: (1) an acute proliferation of anti-Americanism shown to be positively correlated with post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy, (2) the inability of U.S. public diplomacy to control anti-American sentiment and international criticisms of American foreign policy, (3) changes in the global communications dynamic that are leading to well informed and more empowered citizens worldwide as they challenge the international agenda of the United States, and (4) a dearth of scholarship and relevant literature that would otherwise be useful for learning more about the nuances of public diplomacy, and how – if at all – it may illuminate ways
in which the American practice can be reconsidered to function effectively in this new era. Exploring all of these themes, it is hoped, will provide more information about why U.S. public diplomacy since 9/11 is widely recognized as having failed in its objectives, a point on which nearly all observers agree to be a fact that must be redressed.

Further enriching the discussion on the U.S. case is when the focus turns to positing solutions. Ideas for solutions often invoke historical, theoretical and futuristic perspectives on the definition, process, roles and activities considered to be within the scope of public diplomacy. Joseph Nye has attempted this by portraying the debate on public diplomacy as a soft power discourse and weaving together a theory on state behavior with the globalization of international communications technologies (ICT’s).6 Diplomatic, foreign policy analysis and international communications scholars also point out that the increasing relevance of non-state actors in international relations is changing traditional uni-directional information flows from states to non-states into one that resembles a ‘dialogic’ mode, which has been captured under the rubric of the ‘new’ public diplomacy. Whatever the utility of these arguments, they have helped to compel a steady inquiry into the contemporary and future state of public diplomacy in the United States, and stimulated new thinking on the study and practice of public diplomacy globally. Therefore, the majority of analysis in this study will survey the solutions discourses, preceded by these main questions: Why has American public diplomacy on the post-9/11 era failed? How might it be transformed to respond to the demands of the era, in which America is a superpower in an increasingly anti-American atmosphere? What strategic and organizational factors are inhibiting the public diplomacy process in the United States from maximizing its effectiveness? How might the behaviors of

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American public diplomats and their policymaking superiors be altered to make this possible?

In 1968, James Rosenau issued the bold observation that “politics everywhere” were becoming “related to politics everywhere else.” One way of reading this statement may underscore the frequency with which powerful nations insert themselves into the internal political debates of another country when those debates are seen to hold ramifications extending beyond that country’s borders. A more recent view of Rosenau’s observation may devolve such linkages beyond the role of mere nation-states down to the general public, thus rephrasing the original statement to read “politics everywhere matter to publics everywhere else.” This poses a radical new way to view the connection between foreign policy and public opinion since most prior studies in this area presume foreign policy discourses to be a domestic negotiation between decisionmakers and the domestic public. The theory put forth in this study contends that the foreign policy discourses of one nation are more penetrable by foreign publics who are not merely interested in outcomes, but also are becoming more capable of influencing foreign policy debates occurring internally.

American public diplomacy lies at a crossroads at present since it has not yet committed to a course that acknowledges the enhanced communicative powers held by foreign publics. In the ensuing analysis, the roots of failure for post-9/11 U.S. public diplomacy and the continued debate over solutions shall be portrayed as a product of two

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competing models - 'advocacy' and 'advisory' - and their three related approaches - 'information' and 'influence' for the former, and 'engagement' for the latter. As should be expected of a rigorous analysis of an isolated period, this study frequently contextualizes U.S. public diplomacy’s contemporary problems as a product of preceding events. That the advisory and advocacy models remain to be reconciled is a precedent that first came to light in American Cold War-era public diplomacy. The most extensive historical analyses to take place here date from the end of the Cold War and after a lengthy period of advocacy model, information- and influence-driven public diplomacy. This will help the reader not only to understand conditions of the post-9/11 era as strongly influenced by events of the prior decade, but also to note a trend in which certain conditions suggest the advisory model, engagement-driven approach may be on the rise. In truth, determinations are inconclusive as to which model the United States may adopt for the future. A case study on the advocacy model strategy of the Cold War revisits its legacy as a success, but notes the challenges of adopting that model for the present and future. At the same time, there is an emerging undercurrent of scholarship extolling the advisory model, which also faces significant barriers at organizational and coordinating levels to dominate at this time. Conclusions shall elaborate on the critical questions to be answered in order for a clear and effective strategy to be realized and speculate on how the future of this problem may unfold.

**Research Structure**

This study consists of eight chapters divided across four generally assigned purposes: definition, historical background (with some analysis), concepts and analysis, and conclusions. Chapter One sets out the research problematic in detail and begins dealing with main questions giving rise to this study. It will be useful here to find public
diplomacy’s practical evolution paralleling a theoretical evolution as well. Communications scholars have worked over many years to prove a correlation between foreign policymaking and public opinion. Their works dealt almost exclusively with policymaking in the domestic arena, but by the 1990’s Joseph Nye’s ‘soft power’ thesis would probe new territory in speculating a correlation between foreign policymaking and foreign public opinion. The first chapter shall frame the American public diplomacy problem in the evolution of a potentially new way of interpreting the impact of foreign public opinion on states and organizations, and the nature of their communications. Before proceeding further into the American case, Chapter Two will attempt to establish a basis of understanding for terms and concepts that will appear throughout the forthcoming pages. The meaning and nuance of public diplomacy are the subjects of regular debate amongst the scholar and practitioner communities. It is not the intention of the chapter to articulate a concise, all-encompassing definition, but rather to explore the range of how public diplomacy has appeared in practice. The following two chapters comprise the historical section that will focus on recent periods of transformation in the American pursuit of international affairs, and the resulting impact on American approaches to public diplomacy. Starting with the fall of communism, Chapter Three traces the present-day structural and organizational weaknesses of U.S. public diplomacy by way of shifts in the global power dynamic occurring between the end of the Cold War and leading up to the events of 9/11. Certain seminal events of that period along with their repercussions determined to a large extent American domestic regard for public diplomacy and, as it turns out, facilitated its decade-long decline. This chapter sets out three objectives: to provide a backdrop for interpreting this decline as a result of shifts in the post-Cold War power dynamic and subsequent reshuffling of U.S. foreign policy priorities; to give an account of events directly related to the dispersal and debilitation of U.S. public
diplomacy; and linking the combination of these effects to the weakened public
diplomacy apparatus in place at the outset of the post-9/11 era. Because these effects are
produced by sources both endogenous and exogenous to the United States, considerations
of foreign public opinion and its ability to influence U.S. foreign policy start to form.

Chapter Four extends the historical survey through the next transformational
period, the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The declared global
war on terror heralded a bold projection of American power, complete with a provocative
security doctrine and ambitious grand strategy. After a prolonged period of decline, U.S.
public diplomacy assumed a central role in bolstering the new American agenda and
persuading world publics, particularly those of the Arab-Muslim world, of its necessity.
Yet in the process of its reawakening, it was discovered that public diplomacy offered
virtually no resistance to the swelling tide of resentment towards the United States from
the wider world. Upon viewing this failure, American political figures and public
intellectuals called into question the readiness of public diplomacy and its apparent
ineffectiveness in changing foreign public opinion. A host of investigative reports, many
issued by the U.S. Government Accountability Office revealed vast deficiencies in
operations of public diplomacy and the lack of an integrated strategy.

While it is not surprising that the revival of interest in U.S. public diplomacy
comes at a time of its greatest need, most intriguing are the many vigorous debates about
expanding on the unsatisfactory state of the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus since 9/11
and what should be done about it. These debates have proved stimulating for scholarship,
if not immediate useful for practice, since they shed new light on how to define public
diplomacy, what exists within its scope, and how its roles apply to the predicament faced
by the United States. But the U.S. case has also caused a ripple effect of igniting new
interest in public diplomacy from IR scholars, diplomatic historians, and communications
specialists. For the first time, public diplomacy is being construed in the empirical sense as possessing an orderly range of activities. This has helped to create a context for what is happening to American public diplomacy at present and raises the possibility that it may be poised for a transformation into what has become known as the 'new' public diplomacy. Chapters Five and Six are studies in the contrast between the American public diplomacy 'tradition', represented by the advocacy model, and a possible future represented by the advisory model. Chapter Five examines the period regarded as the golden era of U.S. public diplomacy - the Cold War. It probes into a thread of logic that yearns for the restoration of public diplomacy's Cold War-era standing. This logic holds that the spread of liberal democracy behind the Berlin Wall owes a debt to the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe; that cultural exchanges with influential members of Soviet society helped create the groundswell that undermined the Communist regime; and that public diplomats made these outcomes possible by being equipped with the necessary tools and support. The fall of the Soviet Union is used to promote to their notion that public diplomacy of this period was a success, and furthermore, that the problems of today would be remedied by adopting lessons from the past.

The historical memory and lessons of Cold War-era public diplomacy both loom large in the defense of the advocacy model. This chapter tests such a defense by filtering claims of success in how public diplomacy approaches of information, influence and engagement were performed. By subdividing public diplomacy activities in these ways, determining the merits of public diplomacy during this time become more precise.

Chapter Six introduces the concept of the 'new' public diplomacy and its own claim to a sounder model and approach for communicating and policymaking within an ever-changing international system. The point of departure here will be to first establish its self-ascribed strengths, most notably in managing the proliferation in ICT's; blurring
divisions between citizen and diplomat; and making policy with awareness of the interests
of target populations. A recurring theme within new public diplomacy logic is the idea of
‘listening’ and the contention that, just as two people perform a dialogue, states have it
within their means to ‘listen’ and in so doing somehow confer a sense of
acknowledgement to the ‘speaking’ party. The notion lies at the heart of a distinction
drawn between the ‘self-help’ system professed by the realist school of thought and the
‘complex interdependence’ ideal set forth by liberal internationalists, since it suggests that
states will readily sacrifice of their own self-interest to satisfy the demands of external
parties. Nye’s ‘soft power’ thesis will be seen to capture well the idealistic nature of new
public diplomacy thinking and work to disavow ‘self-help’ inclinations that have
historically justified advocacy public diplomacy. However, it will also be seen that Nye’s
conception of public diplomacy as a form of power does not resonate completely with the
collaborative emphasis to be found in new public diplomacy thinking.

Chapter Seven draws the vision laid out by ‘new public diplomacy’ theorists in
the previous chapter back into the case of the United States, where it is seen that a number
of constraints obstruct the potential for advisory model public diplomacy from assuming
the dominant position above the advocacy model in its the overall strategic direction. The
argument outlaying the obstacles in place is ordered on the past and current relationship
between the US public diplomacy organization and strategy. From a structural point of
view, the case will first be made that dysfunction in US public diplomacy organizations in
the post 9/11 era rests on a long legacy of unsettled issues. Chief among them is the as
yet resolved matter of how close public diplomacy practitioners should be to the
c policymaking process. The behavior of successive administrations will show that
marginalization from the process represented the normal approach to this question. The
second structural weakness deals with inconsistent coordination efforts, an indirect
consequence of instability in organization but also reflective of sporadic interest exhibited by the chief executive. As a consequence of these structural inadequacies, public diplomacy strategy remains ineffective as well as an anachronism in light of contemporary challenges.

The study moves to conclusion in Chapter Eight by first summarizing the chief points made in the previous chapters. It follows on the themes of Chapter Seven that discussed practical obstacles standing in the way of organizational and strategic change. It will elaborate on reasons to believe that regardless of whatever organizational and strategic perfections may come, there will remain limits on what public diplomacy can achieve on its own. This is caused by two factors: the notion that American foreign policy undercuts its own public diplomacy efforts, and that American political culture is given to underutilizing public diplomacy. A differentiation is made between limits and limitations since public diplomacy seems to inherently possess the latter in ways its effects can be measured and that they often require patience to materialize. Ultimately, this study will submit that change to post-9/11 U.S. public diplomacy will not occur from within because the limits of foreign policy and culture are too intractable. They will instead come from outside, and certain catalysts of change will be mentioned to support this point. The study then closes with some thoughts on future directions for public diplomacy research building on the findings described here.

It is with the key insights on the American case fully clarified that the study's concluding ideas illuminate directions for the future study of public diplomacy. Points for consideration shall revolve around the International Relations-International Communications relationship in seeking further elaboration on eroding barriers between domestic and foreign interests with respect to foreign policy, a re-evaluation of the state's role in the 'information society', and future prospect of non-state diplomats.
CHAPTER 1: A NEW ERA FOR U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

This chapter opens the study by placing the post-9/11 state of U.S. public diplomacy within what is being viewed as a major shift in the way governments and the public communicate with each other. The shift is amplified at this time not only by the deteriorating relations the United States shares with the foreign public, but also by the increased assertiveness with which non-governmental organizations and individuals are impacting political processes on an international scale. The combination of these forces lends weight to the argument of many experts knowledgeable in diplomatic affairs along with a concerned group of communications scholars that the problems of America’s standing in the post-9/11 world can be traced in some way to the poor planning and ineffective execution of its public diplomacy. An introduction of this argument and the wide-ranging search for solutions shall appear in the forthcoming pages. It must be made clear first and foremost that the changing dynamics in which public diplomacy is pursued is not limited to the American problem to be discussed at length here, but the case of the United States does present a timely opportunity of exploring how even the world’s most powerful country is coming to grips with this complex international communications environment. Such a claim raises the prospect of a new theory about the linkages between policymaking and the public interest, a theory which may be poised to expand current research on such linkages from the exclusively domestic realm to the foreign.

It was not always the case that a powerful country had to contend with the intervention of foreign publics in its internal affairs. There was a time when the division of labor in maintaining a sovereign state appeared relatively straightforward. A portrait
by Clausewitz described a neatly divided dynamic shared by the state, its armed forces, and its general public. It might have appeared as follows: A state establishes its legitimacy by holding a monopoly on the use of force over a defined territory. The monopoly on force is abetted by the state's armed forces, and these two bodies protect and rely on each other in that the army safeguards the interests of the state at home and abroad while the state devotes its treasure to financing it. Both the army and the state depend on a third party in the network, the public, to consent to their activities while the public enjoys the protective power of the army and welfare provided by the state. Foreign affairs were conducted by a close-knit and exclusive group which assumed sole responsibility for all negotiations dealing with such matters as the waging of wars and other projections of military power, the establishment of treaties, covenants and other regimes, and agreements governing international commerce and the flow of goods.

If the general public really retained such limited bargaining power over the actions of the state and the army domestically, no such power existed for the public at the negotiating table in matters of diplomacy. According to Nicolson, in the modern diplomatic system prior to the First World War participation in the diplomatic process amounted to the dealings of public servants anointed by sovereign states to conduct negotiations under secretive conditions.

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1.1 Foreign Policy and the Public

A turning point arrived when Wilsonian liberal internationalism established itself during and after the war as a new means for managing the international system. The notions of "open covenants openly arrived at" and governance conducted transparently for public view came into consideration. Emerging from this sense of openness the practice of publishing treaties became widespread for the purpose of share products of negotiations with members of the public. Polities could watch their leaders commiserate with other leaders at summits. But the more impressive changes during this time of openness derive from the polities themselves. For instance, public participation in the pursuit of international affairs has increased dramatically during the 20th century. One explanation for this may be the astounding proliferation throughout the twentieth century of universal suffrage, which Freedom House contends rose from zero percent of all nations in 1900 to 62 percent by the 1990's. Polities could express their opinions on domestic and foreign interests with unprecedented vigor via the ballot box. But how has it come about that the expressed views of such group have come to impinge on the affairs of another country or shape events occurring far away? At the start of the new century, it has become evident that foreign publics, spearheaded by sectors of civil society, businesses and non-official elites, are seeking to (and often do) influence political activities within other states more frequently than ever before. Conversely, states are placing a higher premium on the opinions of foreign populations in addition to their own to advance national interests.

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Much could be said to explain the causes of these changes and indeed already has. A burgeoning catalogue of literature on globalization includes numerous investigations on the continuing transformation of public participation in international politics, and thereby validating Rosenau's early notion on the interrelated nature of international politics. Two leading causes for this blurring of borders stand apart, and it is not coincidental that they are interconnected. One lies in patterns of social activity that have gradually escalated issues of human concern from a state-centric to transnational level, a theory supported by an expanding number of transnational issues that supersede the responsibility of any one state. The growing legions of stakeholders concerned with state of global ecology, international trade and finance, population migrations, organized crime and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are all prime examples of such issues.

1.2 The Information Catalyst

Enabling the flows of ideas, money, goods and people is a robust infrastructure of information communication technologies (ICT’s), and it is arguably this aspect above all that is reshaping societies and allowing transnational social activity to thrive.\(^2\) By unleashing a new opportunity for populations to profoundly impact the world at large, information technology is to international political participation as suffrage was to the proliferation of democracies – a conduit between public expression and political change. No nation understands the power of this transformation better than the United States, which boasts the greatest number of internet users of any single country, the world’s richest companies, active segments of civil society in development and humanitarian

causes, and influential media and entertainment industries exporting messages and images from the United States across the globe.

In the political arena, the dynamism of information resources has forever altered the way publics participate in elections, policy debates, lobbying campaigns and decisions involving military interventions. The internet unleashed new avenues for campaign fundraising and other forms of political action. From the first broadcast battles in Vietnam to the ‘CNN effect’, television has narrowed the proximity between audiences and events in faraway places, with images so stark that they have impacted the public mood time and again to astonishing effect. Public displays of political expression are in themselves newsworthy and happen to influence publics elsewhere.

Due to the fact that information technologies have aided in elevating social activity to the transnational level and conferred broader powers of political participation to the general public, it has therefore become apparent that governments in general and particularly the United States must not only engage with a complex domestic constituency, but an increasingly potent foreign constituency as well.

1.3 Conversations with the World

To do this, states employ a set of political communications tools broadly known as “public diplomacy.” According to the Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy, it “deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies.”

"It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the processes of inter-

25
cultural communications. Central to public diplomacy is the transnational flow of information and ideas.⁴

Officially, the United States has been practicing public diplomacy since before World War Two, although it was during that war that public diplomacy truly assumed an important role in communicating with foreign audiences through radio, starting in 1942 with the first overseas transmissions of Voice of America. The ensuing Cold War heralded the golden years of American public diplomacy. Driven by the United States Information Agency (USIA), Presidents from Eisenhower to Reagan relied on public diplomacy officials to inform citizens of the Communist bloc countries about world events, to embed the influences of democracy and capitalism into the popular discourse, and to conduct a multitude of exchanges between Americans and foreign counterparts. With the capacity to project image-enhancing content and influence populations in a variety of ways, the United States could afford to think of public diplomacy as a monologue directed at publics abroad. ‘Soft power’ thinking resembled more of a prolonged election campaign in the imagination of policymakers, and the attraction of America, distinguished by the Soviet alternative, could almost be relied upon to sell itself.

However, changes in the international system since the end of the Cold War and more significantly since 9/11 have cast increased relevance upon the dynamic relationship between the United States, a vast and dynamic foreign constituency, and the complex channels that bridge their communications. Rather than making public diplomacy easier, the information catalyst has made it much harder for the United States to employ its traditional practices, and this has created an uncertain future for the ways it projects its

image and maintains its credibility with world populations. Also unclear is how much merit remains in monologue-style communication, and whether expanding communications towards a dialogic format may assume a larger role. The merits and prospects of both shall be discussed in the pages ahead.

For the moment, this chapter shall attempt to explain why the time has arrived to deal with questions facing U.S. public diplomacy. The events surrounding 9/11 happened to converge with an initiative by the incoming administration of George W. Bush to invigorate its public diplomacy apparatus to aid in the pursuit of a new American foreign policy agenda. Chapter Three describes some of the initiative's and their impact, but it is important to first understand the connection between American foreign policy, its public diplomacy, and foreign public opinion. Within IR discourses, this connection served as a timely platform for the advancement of the ‘soft power’ thesis, and this study with further introduce new lines of thought inspired by the U.S. case.

1.4 A New Era for U.S. Public Diplomacy

On March 15, 2001 Secretary of State Colin Powell, barely two months into his post with the new administration of President George W. Bush, appeared before the House Budget Committee of the United States Congress to present his department’s budget for the coming fiscal year. To a question about the Department of State’s weakened diplomatic infrastructure, Powell responded with an enthusiastic and ambitious vision. “I am going to be bringing people into the public diplomacy function of the Department who are going to change from just selling us in the old USIA way to really branding foreign policy,” Powel announced. “Branding the Department, marketing the
Department, marketing American values to the world.” At this time, no one could have foreseen how crucial public diplomacy would soon become, but it would be remembered as signaling the beginning of new era for U.S. public diplomacy. Progress on Powell’s vision was slow. His nomination of former advertising executive Charlotte Beers for Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs languished in Congress for over five months. But the decimating decline of public diplomacy in the post-Cold War years contrasted sharply with the frenzied wartime atmosphere to emerge after 9/11. The new mood accompanied sudden changes in the prioritization of America foreign policy and injected a sense of immediacy about improving public diplomacy. It took less than three weeks to complete Beers’ confirmation. She would subsequently enter into unparalleled trials facing the American image abroad. The immediate period following the attacks found worldwide sentiment strongly behind the United States. Almost without exception, world leaders publicly condemned the act and offered condolences. Even detractors of the United States, including Moammar al-Qaddafi of Libya, responded with sympathies and pledges of assistance. In Iran, President Mohammed Khatami expressed deep sorrow for all Americans and issued a strong condemnation: "Terrorism is denounced," he said, "and the international community must identify it and take fundamental steps for rooting it out." The headline of 12 September 2001 issue of Le Monde, the Parisian daily often critical of the United States read, “Nous sommes tous Américains” (“We are all Americans”).

What was undoubtedly one of the darkest hours in the history of the United States consequently shaped up to be a vivid moment of solidarity for the international

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community. Rarely had one event elicited such an outpouring of unified feeling, at once an expression of sympathy toward the United States and a willful international denouncement of terrorism. The member nations of NATO, for instance, invoked the mutual defense clause of its founding treaty the first time in its 49-year history, affirming that an attack against the United States warranted a response from all members. In an article to the New York Times, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan called for building “a universal coalition [to] ensure global legitimacy for the long-term response to terrorism.” Up to this point, answering the question of how to confront a landless and faceless enemy (the case against al-Qaeda was still gathering momentum) remained unclear, but the objective of eradicating the world of terrorism forged an impressive, if fleeting, coalition based on principle.

But it would not last. Starting within mere weeks after the attacks, concerns rose over plummeting levels of favorability around the globe toward the United States. These premonitions later materialized in the widely-circulated findings of the Pew Global Attitudes Project released in June of 2003, when tensions were at a fever pitch over the waging of the Iraq War. The survey confirmed most speculations of deepening disapproval amongst Arab-Muslim nations toward the United States. The percentage of those who viewed the United States favorably in Jordan, Pakistan, Turkey, and Lebanon scored no higher than 15 percent of those surveyed in all cases. From 2000 onward, Turkish favor towards the U.S. had fallen by 37 percent; in Morocco, by 50 percent.

News of this kind, though troubling for some, was less of a surprise for those who had been studying such trends over a long period of time. Results for other areas of the world raised concerns to a higher level. The same Pew report documented how South Korea’s approval of the United States dipped from 58 to 46 percent between 2000 and 2003, Brazil’s figure tumbled from 56 to 34 percent, and Indonesia’s from 75 to 15 percent. Meanwhile France and Germany, two of the most vocal opponents of the Iraq War, exhibited huge drops in their favorability ratings by 19 and 33 percentage points respectively. Even Great Britain showed a decline of 13 percentage points towards its “closest ally in the war on terror”. Clearly, the results of the Pew study revealed a downward trend in attitudes on a wider basis than those of one region alone.

In addition to the widespread nature of this sentiment, the low figures also have proven resilient over time, underscoring the depth and prolonged concern for U.S. actions and intentions. A BBC World Service Poll released in January of 2005, two and a half years after the Pew report, found that majorities polled in Great Britain, France, Germany, Canada, Turkey, Chile, Brazil, Australia, Russia, Mexico, Indonesia and Argentina all characterized the United States’ influence in the world as ‘mainly negative’

There are important insights to be gained from these figures. The most prominent of those would be the extent to which the repercussions of American foreign policy affected the level of foreign favorability toward the United States. Reinforcing an assertion about American power made by Joseph Nye, the Pew data depicted evidence of

18 I am referring mostly to American-based area experts on the Middle East, the so-called “Arabists” such as Fouad Ajami, who once quipped at a Washington Institute symposium, “I know that it’s fashionable these days to quote the Pew Survey, that the bottom has fallen out of support for America in the Muslim world. That’s news to me -- I always thought it was bottomless to begin with!”
an inverse relationship between the two variables, whereas the greater levels of aggression in foreign policy stimulate stronger negative reactions from abroad.\textsuperscript{21} The implications of low favorability could therefore be construed as threatening to the realization of foreign policy goals.\textsuperscript{22}

\subsection*{1.5 Post 9-11 Criticisms of U.S. Public Diplomacy}

Another insight is that as these numbers became harder to ignore, U.S. public diplomacy became the object of more intense scrutiny since it had been incumbent upon public diplomats to counter foreign resentment with acts of persuasion and goodwill. Since 9/11 well over thirty research efforts have been undertaken to address the complex questions of what is wrong with U.S. public diplomacy and what can be done to repair it. From within the U.S. government, a series of scathing reports from the Government Accounting Office (GAO) bore down on the Department of State, which currently houses most official public diplomacy activities, for lacking an integrated strategy, failing to lead interagency efforts, misallocating human and financial resources to programs, undermining international broadcasting in mission-critical regions, and being deficient in measurable objectives for success.\textsuperscript{23} In a 2004 report, the Defense Science Board went so far to conclude that current U.S. public diplomacy in is a state of crisis.\textsuperscript{24} A widely-circulated report from The Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and


\textsuperscript{22} See for example Newt Gingrich, "Rogue State Department" \textit{Foreign Policy} 137 (July/August 2003): 42-48.

\textsuperscript{23} These reports evaluate the activities within the Department of State as well as the quasi-independent and closely affiliated Broadcasting Board of Governors. See Bibliography for a complete list of these reports.

Muslim World in 2003, headed by former ambassador Edward P. Djerejian, echoed some of these arguments to prompt new thinking for public diplomacy activities in regions of the world where post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy encounters the greatest resistance. With a mandate to steer clear of local reactions to U.S. foreign policies, however, the Commission limited its attention to organizational restructuring and new modes for disseminating messages.

Observers from outside the government spared little in the way of criticism, which is captured in the substantial offerings of the Heritage Foundation, Center for the Study of the Presidency, RAND Corporation, Aspen Institute, Brookings Institution, and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). And whilst there are variances in the conclusions they reach to address the matters at hand, most embody a noteworthy formula of firstly lamenting the state of public diplomacy at the time of research, and secondly laying out propositions aiming towards a sort of revival, which suggests the existence of a benchmark against which all subsequent initiatives are appraised. A 2003 Heritage Foundation brief, among others, points to the pivotal decision in 1999 to abolish the USIA and fold it into the Department of State, the effects of which had yet to stabilize by the occurrence of the 9/11 attacks. Whereas this report stresses organizational lapses (eight of its ten recommendations deal explicitly with structural issues), a notable 2003 CFR report levels its criticisms on strategic flaws: the isolation of public diplomats from policymakers, the previously cited “push-down” style of communicating foreign policy to

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audiences abroad, ignoring the voices of moderate elites and journalists in target societies, disabling cultural exchange programs and undervaluing outreach efforts by local U.S. Embassy officers.\textsuperscript{27}

A common denominator that often appears in the many diagnoses of U.S. public diplomacy ailments can best be classified as “political will” – the support of members of Congress expressed by budget allocations, and the support of the White House indicated by level of interest in coordination and proximity to pursuing foreign policy initiatives. A 2005 CRS review of recommendations from 29 reports dating between 1999 and 2005 revealed that 15 proposed increasing human and/or financial resources.\textsuperscript{28} Joseph Nye has emerged as a strong advocate of raising the public diplomacy budget, pointing out the wide disparity in comparison to the U.S. defense budget (under one-third of one percent) and that this disparity far outweighs the comparative investments of other leading power such as France, the United Kingdom and Germany.\textsuperscript{29} With respect to structure, the same CRS report showed that 10 studies favored reorganization of public diplomacy directed from the White House and 11 encouraged better coordination. The 2003 Djerejian Report argued that there could be “no success without the seriousness of purpose and interagency coordination provided at the direction of the President of the United States.”\textsuperscript{30}

The perception that political will has been consistently weak in these aspects raises a valid question worth asking: why is public diplomacy so important? One answer came in the passages of the 2003 CFR report. “Why should the United States care if it is well liked or not?” they asked. “Because at this moment of our greatest strength, we are

\textsuperscript{27} CFR Report.
\textsuperscript{30} Djerejian Report, 59.
uniquely vulnerable. Anti-Americanism is endangering our national security and compromising the effectiveness of our diplomacy."

Provided one is convinced by the near unanimity of these reports, it seems clear that public diplomacy as it is practiced by the United States is currently primed for a period of significant change. However, as the beginning of this chapter points out the forces of the international system have not always been receptive to the will of the general population. The linkage between national reputation and national security has evolved into being far more consequential than it might have been prior to 1914 and the advent of liberal internationalism. It was after that time and starting with Walter Lippmann in the 1920's that scholars began to seriously observe the behavior of the general public and how it influenced that of political leaders. The gradual development of this interest over the 20th century into a full-fledged academic niche has led to theories that will elucidate how public diplomacy came to be valued by the United States and other countries, and why it has increased in importance since 2001.

1.6 Foreign Policy and Public Opinion

Public diplomacy, at the heart of its practice, is a transnational form of communication occurring between international actors. It is 'public' insofar as the populations in question are solely comprised of non-official representatives usually but not always from a state, and it is 'diplomacy' in that its agency involves representational, envoy-like activities that are internationally focused. To draw an adaptation from Watson, diplomacy itself is an act of negotiation between independent political entities.

31 CFR Report, 3.
Diplomacy becomes ‘public’ when one of those entities is not sovereign, but influential enough to be dealt with directly and apart from the sovereign power under which it may reside. But why should it matter to policymakers what the public thinks about foreign policy? One view holds that the general public is largely “uninformed about either the specific foreign policy issues or foreign affairs in general,” and that when the public is momentarily gripped by a foreign policy issue its mood can be characterized as volatile and superficial. In a testament to the traditional wisdom that “all politics are local,” policymakers have operated under the assumption that in addition to its volatile mood, publics possess relatively little knowledge about foreign policy and security issues, and attach low salience to these issues in comparison with more pressing domestic concerns. This argument is not without its merits. Polls taken by Gallup in the United States during presidential elections years between 1972 and 2004 found that the salience of economic issues loomed over foreign and security concerns by sometimes significant ratios, peaking in 1992 during a time of economic recession at a staggering 18 to 1. The low salience of foreign policy concerns suggests that public opinion can be easily manipulated to support policy initiatives, which in turn provides influential policy elites the power to lead, rather than take cues from their publics.

Another view finds publics to wield more checking power on policymakers than the first view implies. Contrary to a generally permissive attitude, publics can exert

constraints either through domestic structures, such as the electoral process, or through more ‘substantive’ democratic means, such as interest groups or coalitions, who are well-informed and maintain constant pressure on policymakers to adhere to the public will.  

For a number of reasons, it is challenging to ascertain the causal and moreover the directional link between public will and policy outcomes. Identifying and measuring something as intangible as influence (a problem that will recur throughout this study) is an inexact science. But it remains fair to say that most scholars probing the veracity of this link agree that the public impact on foreign policy and decision-making processes can be significant.  

Not long after Morgenthau advised governments to heed national as well as international public opinion in the building of sound policies, V.O. Key developed the standard metaphor illustrating how states shape public preferences to build support for policy initiatives. Key viewed public opinion as a system of dikes controlling the flow of public policy and moving it towards desired directions. He defined public opinion as “those opinions held by private persons which governments find it prudent to heed.” In democratic societies, the largest and most direct expression of public opinion comes in the form of elections where the public can use the vote to express, retrospectively, their support or displeasure with foreign policy. The public is generally limited in its ability


38 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 164.


to set or even steer policy in a direct manner. What some have found is that the public is more disposed to exerting indirect control of policymaking behavior, as Key’s metaphor depicts.41

The truest testament to the claim that public opinion sets limits on foreign policy choices is most evident in the policy decision-making process. Opinion researchers use the objective criteria of ‘congruence’ to determine the degree to which policy decisions correspond with public opinion.42 One can try, as Page and Shapiro have done, to work around this potentially complicated task by comparing shifts in public opinion regarding a policy to the policy outcomes themselves, and identifying how frequently opinion matches the policy decision.43 It would be a simple test if not for the fact that foreign policy grows out of a highly complex and usually hidden deliberation phase. It is a process where making decisions occurs last in a sequence of phases after which decision-makers accumulated as much information on the subject as they could in order to reach their conclusions. How those decisions are reached resembles a kind of ‘black box’ approach because information arrives from a multiplicity of sources and naturally represents conflicting views.44 It is difficult to tell based solely on outcomes if it was the informed policy advisor, the antagonistic media, the will of the people, or none of the above that figured into the final decision. One former Department of State official wrote how observers of the decision-making process “assume that what we call ‘decisions’ are in fact decisions – discrete acts, with recognizable beginnings, and sharp, decisive

41 Ibid., 25; Risse-Kappen, “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies,” 510.
43 Page and Shapiro, “Effects of Public Opinion on Policy”.
endings...The reality, of course, is quite different. The difficulty of pinpointing the precise causal relationship between public opinion and foreign policy outcomes results in frequent debates on how much public opinion matters, and on the perpetual conundrum of who is actually leading opinion and who is following.

Virtually all scholarship of this kind is concentrated on the domestic relationship between publics and policymakers. Public diplomacy adds a twist to the prevailing research paradigm because the public and policymakers in this instance are not confined to the domestic sphere— they are, in fact, foreign counterparts. This relationship casts the usual determining factors in a whole new light. Compared to the multi-dimensional frame of reference developed by Shiraev to deal with domestic public opinion-policy linkages, the international version of this relationship precludes policymakers and the public from sharing in the same political system. This means that chances are greater that the social values and norms of each group would relate to each other less well than if cohabitated in the same cultural setting. Pressure on policymakers from international media and interest groups raises the likelihood that foreign populations will become more engaged in the surrounding debate. The low of information becomes more diffuse and harder to manage. So to address the initial question of why foreign public opinion should matter to the makers of foreign policy, one response might point to the increasingly blurred distinction between domestic and international issues, and the

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formation of “shared constituencies” across borders to deal with them.47 Etzioni, for instance, has written of a “communitarian” response to transnational threats on safety and security—global epidemics, poverty, control and protection of environmental resources, disaster management, organized crime, weapons of mass destruction and the privatization of war enumerate the most pressing of these threats.48 A more practicable suggestion to be drawn from the case of flagging foreign favorability towards the United States in the post-9/11 era is that foreign public opinion may obstruct a state’s foreign policy and therefore undermine its security agenda. It is by neglecting its own cache of soft power that the CFR believes the United States has made itself more vulnerable.

1.7 **Theory of Soft Power: Attraction over Coercion**

By elevating the public opinion-policy relationship to the international realm, the theory of “soft power” reflects how political communication and the participation of publics globally is becoming more important in the international system of the 21st century. Although it had been first introduced by the prominent IR theoretician Joseph Nye in the early 1980’s, soft power did not become part of the established discourse on power until at least 1990, when Nye published his book *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. As the subtitle suggests, the impetus for his argument stemmed from forces impinging on American power during the time of writing -- the collapse of the Soviet Union, the economic threat posed by Japan, and the prospect of European unification. Nye’s thesis expanded over the following years as new challenges


to U.S. preponderance arose. Soft power later enveloped how information technologies were proliferating to create a new class of international actors, the rapidly growing responsibilities of the United States in global governance, and the impact of globalization on the distribution of global power. What Nye attempted to do was construct a new notion of power by taking account of traditionally underestimated factors, such as the spread of multinational firms, the appeal of culture and the inherent powers of information. However, even with soft power's expansion the basic message Nye developed remained unchanged: American power cannot subsist on 'hard power'—military and economic inducements and threats -- alone, and therefore it must transform itself, to better shape and influence the preferences of other states through the power of attraction. In Nye's words, soft power is:

"the ability to achieve desired outcomes in international affairs through attraction rather than coercion. It works by convincing others to follow, or getting them to agree to, norms and institutions that produce the desired behavior. Soft power can rest on the appeal of one's ideas or the ability to set the agenda through standards and institutions that shape the preferences of others."

To be clear, it is not Nye's position that soft power should replace hard power as the premier method of choice for the United States to advance its international agenda, as some critics have suggested. Instead, Nye has prescribed a prudent synthesis of military, economic and soft power in the image of a 'three dimensional chess game' to respond to his belief that United States will need an effective strategy in each contest to

maintain its preponderance in the years ahead. All of this led to Nye’s conclusion that the United States would be better served by appealing to its international counterparts for cooperation in some circumstances rather than coercing them into compliance. And the realization of this goal means incorporating the cooperative involvement of large states, small states and non-state actors. One common response is that relying too much on soft power would be akin to basing foreign policy decisions on popularity with other world leaders. This notion is essentially antithetical to the realist school and more recently the ‘unilateralist’ groundswell articulated best by Charles Krauthammer and other American neoconservative thinkers. From the opposite end of the spectrum, there are those who have challenged the basic interpretation of public diplomacy as a form of power. This view belongs to some proponents of the ‘new’ public diplomacy, and will be explored at greater length in Chapter Six.

The rise of the soft power research program to greater prominence may not have proved so stimulating amongst IR thinkers and American policy planners had it not been for its timeliness. At its core, the concept injects a relevant and viable approach for the preservation of American power during a turbulent time in its history. In the wake of 9/11, for instance, Nye tapped into a vein of concern for the future path of the American foreign relations by warning against “a foreign policy that combines unilateralism, arrogance and parochialism.” Prior to this, Nye co-authored a Foreign Affairs article in 1996 titled, “America’s Information Edge”, in which he warned against American unilateral military action to secure the peace, and drew attention to the democratizing

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52 Nye, Soft Power.
(and by extension, peace-inducing) power of information. From his perspective, the genesis and subsequent development of the soft power concept represented both an ideal and a prescription for action in the real world. Having been built upon idealist IR thought soft power is idealistic in its encouragement of interdependence among diverse international actors, and it also provides a realistic portrait of an increasingly interconnected world. Nye’s enduring challenge to the predominant powers is that they must decide what the quality of those connections shall be and how they plan to engage in the emerging network.

Gradually over the last two decades, Nye has turned his attention to public diplomacy, which slowly migrated from the periphery of his treatment of soft power towards the center. Although he would later draw a clear relationship between aspects of a complex interdependent world and the capabilities of public diplomacy, Nye’s early forays into the persuasive powers of states mainly dealt with soft power resources of culture, leadership in international regimes, or science and technology, and less with mediums for projecting the power of those resources. By 1996 Nye had redirected his focus to exploring resources for the channeling of American soft power. He lobbied for an expanded role for the USIA in democracy promotion, international broadcasting and exploitation of new information technologies. In the post-9/11 era, Nye openly criticized the abolition of USIA by saying it had “reduced the effectiveness of one of our government’s important instruments of soft power.” Such a statement would presage the incorporation of public diplomacy as a cornerstone of 2004’s Soft Power. By this

56 Nye, Bound to Lead.
57 Nye and Owens, “America’s Information Edge,” 36.
time, the act of ‘wielding’ soft power would become intertwined with public diplomacy, which became renowned for its association with a widely recognizable IR concept. The combination of falling foreign favorability towards the United States with its noticeable weak public diplomacy apparatus strengthened Nye’s claims to the costs of ignoring soft power, which he has argued to be threatening the international standing and national security of the United States.

1.8 Between the Tradition and the Future of U.S. Public Diplomacy

As theories applying to public diplomacy have evolved to account for changes in the international system, practice is also susceptible to change. For example, an active segment of the overall discourse on diplomacy’s evolving role in international affairs has witnessed periodic interest in what some have called the ‘new diplomacy’. However, the ease with which change permeates the practice of public diplomacy requires the consent of practitioners and policy elites who may or may not be prepared to embrace change. In this isolated moment where changes for public diplomacy may lurk on the horizon, this study finds there to be a contest between two competing models of public diplomacy. The argument that American public diplomacy should adjust to new conditions in the international system draws its inspiration from evidence of a multitude


of ICT's at the disposal of a growing number of international actors. Proponents of change include not only scholars such as Nye, but some practitioner advocates such as Daryl Copeland of Foreign Affairs Canada, and Shaun Riordan, formerly of H.M. Diplomatic Service in the United Kingdom, both of whom speak of the importance of "two-way" or "dialogue-based" public diplomacy. Such proponents posit these new conditions behoove the states to embrace the advisory model of public diplomacy – to communicate transparently with other actors to preserve its credibility, to concentrate on building relationships for the long-term, and to engage public diplomacy specialists and foreign population in policy-related discussions.

On the other side of the argument, there is a strong and established lobby in favor of curing the ills of U.S. public diplomacy with more aggressive approaches information dissemination and management. These approaches are representative of the advocacy model of public diplomacy. Proponents of this viewpoint to the case of public diplomacy during Cold War-era, usually with an eye towards the USIA of the 1980's, as a model of success worth emulating. In one well-known example, 9/11 Commission Chairman Thomas Kean invoked the legacy of that period when he remarked, "just as we did in the Cold War, we need to defend our ideals abroad and we've got to defend them vigorously." Such a statement thrives on the assumption of a positive correlation between the outcome of the Cold War and the public diplomacy strategy of that time.

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The spirit of Cold War public diplomacy materialized in the form of a massive campaign to embolden repressed societies with the tools they needed to defeat communism. Much of the same is being said in the post-9/11 era with respect to tyranny and terrorism, and it is on this ground that “battle for hearts and minds” is being waged.63

Beneath this overarching struggle between the tradition and the future of U.S. public diplomacy, there is a parallel debate ongoing with respect to roles and responsibilities of its practitioners. Edward R. Murrow, the legendary broadcaster and one-time lead figure for American public diplomacy as the director of the USIA, famously illustrated the distinction between ‘advisors’, those who were present at the ‘take offs’ or genesis of policy, and ‘advocates’, who sometimes performed damage control when policies failed, or at moments of ‘crash landings’. In the post-9/11 era, the American practitioner is overwhelmingly assigned the duties of the advocate – mixture of "telling America’s story to the world" and building support for policy overseas – while advisory functions have been traditionally shunned. One of the pressure points in the overarching debate between traditional and ‘new’ public diplomacy thinking is whether to rearrange the two roles to give ‘advisors’ greater influence.64

Other aspects of the debate on the future of U.S. public diplomacy exist as well, and they shed new light on such long-standing issues as the American regard for government-sponsored communications and exchange programs. All proponents for a more effective public diplomacy apparatus lament the lack of domestic public support for increasing human and financial resources, and this is directly related to the fact that no domestic constituency for public diplomacy exists in the United States. The reason for

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this is a piece of legislation known as Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, which bans all forms of public diplomacy domestically. This prohibits, for example, domestic radio broadcasts of Voice of America, and also explains the organizational and functional divides that persist within U.S. public diplomacy institutions. Some have argued that the Act to be obsolete with the advent of the internet, thus rendering the Act an anachronism dating back to a period when American lawmakers were stridently protecting the public from government propaganda. But the technological landscape and its associated norms have changed, and the abolishment of the Act is seen as an acknowledgement of the new information environment as well as removing a barrier to increasing domestic support for U.S. public diplomacy.

However, there is also reason to doubt that stability and longevity of domestic support may materialize due to Americans’ mercurial relationship with public diplomacy and foreign policy. Gregory has said it is commonplace for nations to “discover” public diplomacy during wartime, and it is not a coincidence that strategists take greater stock of programs with the capacity to influence in order to win the psychological dimension of wars, helped along, ostensibly, by a more consenting domestic constituency galvanized by nationalism. One need only look to the highly orchestrated, but short-lived activities of the Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda in Nazi Germany, or the extensive psychological contretemps between the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War to prove this point. But the 1990’s demonstrated when a polity decides to withdraw from foreign affairs, and American public diplomacy flagged once the strategic imperatives of the Cold War had faded behind the triumph of liberalism. The wartime

65 United States Code Title 22, Chapter 18, Subchapter V, § 1461.
atmosphere engulfing the United States after 9/11 provoked a "rediscovery" of public diplomacy in particular and foreign affairs in general.

1.9 Toward a Theory of Public Diplomacy and Foreign Policy

For the benefit of public diplomacy scholarship, the case of the United States after 9/11 captures the frustrations of a system widely regarded as deeply flawed, and this leaves many choices to consider for it to succeed in the international systems of the present and future. Despite considerable restructuring, the process and overarching strategic approach of American public diplomacy remain largely unchanged from the Cold War era, a system that relied heavily on the advocacy model to control and disseminate information to populations that were information poor. The extent to which foreign populations were believed to participate in the public diplomacy process has been restricted to compliant recipients of foreign policy guidance that has been prepared for mass public consumption. In the American tradition of public diplomacy, practitioners have served as image and message bearers -- the advocates of foreign policy.

Theories of public opinion and foreign policy apply mainly to dynamics in the domestic realm. They suppose that decision-makers and the foreign policymaking process in general are most responsive to domestic public opinion. But changes in the international system that challenge established notions of sovereignty – the multiplication of transnational issues, expansion of democracies, the proliferation of international norms, and the availability of information technologies to once deprived populations – warrant enlarging the scope of potential influences on domestic discourses.
dealing with foreign policy to include external factors.\footnote{Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno, eds., \textit{Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention} (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Susan Strange, "The Westphillian System," \textit{Review of International Studies} 25 (1999): 345-54; Daniel Philpott, "Usurping the Sovereignty of Sovereignty," \textit{World Politics} 53, no. 2, (January 2001): 297-324.} Joseph Nye astutely noted that prior to the most recent generation of information technologies, a state's underlying assumption about using information was that its target otherwise lacked access to that information. New information technologies have undermined this belief, and new challenge for states is to overcome not their targets' scarcity of access, but of attention.\footnote{Nye, \textit{Soft Power}, 105-107.}

Castells has written of the infinite potential of non-state actors to build information networks that need not rely on state sponsorship to shape opinion or grant access to political participation in other states.\footnote{Manuel Castells, \textit{End of Millennium}, vol. 3 of \textit{The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2000).} By this estimate, the line between domestic and international political constituencies is increasingly blurry. Public diplomacy provides a means to accessing these networks by acting as an intermediary between external interests and policymakers. RAND analysts Arquilla and Ronfeldt propose that public diplomacy serves as a conduit linking global civil society with states so that they can better assess foreign opinion with respect to particular foreign policies. When global civil society is sufficiently opposed to a certain policy, Arquilla and Ronfeldt recommend that states reconsider them so as to bring them closer in line with the preferences of civil society.\footnote{John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt. \textit{The Emergence of Noopolitik: Toward and American Information Strategy} (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999), 65-66.} There are limitations to this logic; the wisdom of states crafting foreign policy out of avoidance of being disliked is questionable indeed. But many feel it is nevertheless important to show consideration of foreign public opinion in the policymaking process. "We are not in the business of getting the world to love us, but to understand us," said Harold C. Pachios, chairman of the U.S. Advisory Commission on
Public Diplomacy. "Prior to 9/11, the public diplomacy apparatus of the U.S. government was essentially dismantled because no one believed it was necessary, no one believed we had to worry about the opinion of foreign publics."71 One of the purposes of this research will be to elaborate on the strain of recent research pointing to a revised relationship between public diplomacy and foreign policy. In an about-face from the Cold War system, the new relationship opens up the prospect of foreign publics using their own forms of public diplomacy to influence the policymaking process.

The theories of foreign policy and public opinion and soft power provide the observer with a foundation for understanding why public diplomacy has become relevant in the contemporary international environment. Yet in the course of its evolution as a tool of American statecraft the question is often revisited as to what are the constituent features and activities of public diplomacy, and it is vital to this study that a working definition be established at this time.

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CHAPTER 2 : UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

To find a disciplinary home for public diplomacy is a difficult task. For instance, with International Relation (IR) public diplomacy is seen to cross over several sub-fields, including diplomatic studies, international peace studies, conflict resolution, foreign policy analysis, and ongoing discourses on power, specifically ‘soft power’. Alternatively, public diplomacy also presents itself as an act of international communications (IC) insofar as it is preoccupied with the management of images and messages, and maximizing the utility they may provide for influencing public opinion. Complementary to the substance of communications there is also the issue of mode -- the technologies that enable the transmission of images and messages. It shall be seen how the spread of these ICT’s has streamlined and accelerated the way in which communications reach their targets, and, in coming full circle to IR, shifted a source of power away from state-sponsored information providers to non-state information consumers.

Public diplomacy scholarship has rarely attempted to view its subject from a universal perspective. Most literature chooses to do so from a case perspective, although some notable exceptions do exist.1 With recent offerings emerging from diplomatic studies, international history, international relations and international communications, this demonstrates public diplomacy’s interdisciplinary appeal, and yields the benefits

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more detail about what the act of public diplomacy truly entails. Rather than attempt an abstract definition here, this chapter draws from the many fields with an interest in public diplomacy practices and practitioners and builds its meaning from an amalgamation of instances. Using them for purposes of comparison, the instances to be presented reveal patterns to public diplomacy that lend themselves to distinguishing the practices of one actor from another. Looking closely at these activities also presents an opportunity, one that has seldom been seized, to classify them in a particular order. It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to first embark on a detailed description of public diplomacy models and approaches that are seen to be representative of current theory and practice. A further examination of public diplomacy sub-traits attaches cases to several international actors, but there will be a noticeable emphasis on informing the practice of the United States from regularly delving into history. After discussing these generally applicable features at some length, the chapter gradually reduces its focus exclusively to the United States. The aim of elaborating on the previously established models and approaches provides a backdrop on the specific interpretation and direction the United States has chosen in the execution of its public diplomacy. The reader may wish to consider the latter part of this chapter a character study on how the United States has traditionally conducted it.

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2.1 Models and Approaches

A good place to begin drawing out the primary features of public diplomacy is in distinguishing them by what they are not. For example, it is regarded as distinct from the kind of diplomacy which, in its modern form, follows Nicolson's criteria of managing "the relations between independent states by process of negotiation," customarily performed by accredited representatives of a sovereign state in a setting usually hidden from the public eye.3 Contrary to this practice known by comparison as 'traditional' diplomacy, public diplomacy occurs when one such representative interacts with civilians or non-governmental groups from another part of the world, especially when the opinions of these individuals or groups become instrumental to fulfilling policy.4 Strictly speaking, the distinction between the two is not really an issue of which practice is current or outdated, or which is effective or ineffective, but it is instead, as U.S. Ambassador Christopher Ross explains, a matter of using different forms of diplomacy for targeting the right audience in order to support the national interest.5 Although the development of public diplomacy as a field of scholarship and as a practice is not intended to obviate the more traditional purposes of diplomacy, it cannot be denied that its evolution has been spurred by inadequacies realized in traditional diplomacy. Two interrelated reasons may vouch for this. The first concerns global trends of openness and transparency in political processes, or the "open covenants openly arrived at."6 The proliferation of summitry in the postwar period and the new practice of publishing

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4 Ibid., 41-54. An early distinction between the two (although preceding these labels) is captured well by Nicolson in his chapter on "democratic diplomacy", where he faults the crafters of the Treaty of Versailles for neglecting 'open diplomacy' and in turn 'the will of the sovereign people.'
5 Christopher Ross, "Public Diplomacy Comes of Age," The Washington Quarterly 25 (Spring 2002): 75.
treaties, for example, effectively brought diplomatic negotiations and their outcomes into public view with greater regularity than ever before. In truth, the movement toward transparency in diplomatic practice, and the resultant rise of public diplomacy may be seen as a direct result of enhanced information systems and communication technologies. As far back as 1939, Nicolson, in discussing the changing nature of diplomacy at the time, acknowledged that the increasing importance of print media had prompted embassies to create a new position, the press attaché, to manage and direct publicity.\(^7\) Therefore, the growing ease by which information was transmitted through various media resulted both in polities being more informed and able to hold their leaders to unprecedented accountability, and contrariwise, in enabling leaders to steer public opinion to serve their own purposes.

Alternatively, one could develop an understanding of public diplomacy by its looking at its constituent activities, thereby concentrating not on what it is or is not, but rather on the question of what it is that practitioners do. The term 'public diplomacy' traces back to Edmund Gullion of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, who was said to have coined it in 1965 to divorce a transparent set of communication and exchange activities from propaganda. Prior iterations of the term have been convincingly argued, but the Gullion coinage is nevertheless commonly cited as the origin.\(^8\) Some would have it that public diplomacy is actually a sanitized substitute for propaganda because information and influence approaches common to both suggest manipulation and control of foreign audiences is done more aggressively in the case of the latter.\(^9\) This line of

\(^7\) Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 167.


thinking traces back to the Second World War, when the American government sanctioned propaganda (for both information and disinformation), influenced the production of Hollywood films, and co-opted advertising executives to aid in the war effort. Acceptable for the parlance of the period, propaganda now invokes a sense of unease and distrust from which public diplomacy is not immune. The former Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Charlotte Beers captured this sentiment in 2004 when she remarked: "I think public diplomacy has kind of had a diminishing in terms of the people's perception of what it means, not only in our own press but in our government and maybe in our country. It has a connotation of propaganda which in this country sometimes is very negative."

Nowadays, those close to managing and observing American public diplomacy try to steer clear of such a connotation, trying instead to use it strictly for deriding "enemy" information sources. In addition, much care has been taken in the United States to separate acknowledged propaganda techniques, such as psychological operations or "psyops", which are a tactical form of information warfare used in military operations, from public diplomacy. Defenders of public diplomacy have tried to portray their area of expertise as the embodiment of trust and credibility, and conducted in the spirit of a free and transparent press.

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13 I shall be referring regularly to the many enduring statements made by the legendary American newsmen and former USIA director under President Kennedy Edward R. Murrow. One of these enduring statements dates back to 28 March 1963, when Murrow remarked before the House Subcommittee on International Organization and Movements, "American traditions and the American ethic require us to be truthful, but the
Scholars have long grappled with a concise definition of public diplomacy. Much debate could have been averted had the majority accepted the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy's early definition of the term some believe to have been coined in 1965 by its dean, Edmund Gullion. But the Fletcher definition proved to be only the first of a litany of attempts, and even reaching consensus on a clear definition has beguiled both scholars and practitioners for so long that a recent Wilton Park conference concluded that "public diplomacy has entered the lexicon of 21st century diplomacy without clear definition of what it is or how the tools it offers might best be used." For example, no one can dispute the fact that the conduct of public diplomacy includes at its core a communications component, but there remains some confusion over whether this communication takes place in a purely domestic or foreign sphere. While some interpret the former to be the case, others such as Melissen assert that public diplomacy is: "aimed at foreign publics, and strategies for dealing with such publics should be distinguished from the domestic socialization of diplomacy." Another point of contention exists in the role public diplomacy should play within governments; this centers on the question of whether it is purely distinct from, or simply a support

most important reason is that truth is the best propaganda and lies are the worst. To be persuasive we must be believable; to be believable we must be credible; to be credible we must be truthful. It is as simple as that." (Edward R. Murrow, Testimony before the House Subcommittee on International Organization and Movements, 28 March 1963.)

According to the Fletcher definition, public diplomacy "deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the processes of inter-cultural communications...Central to public diplomacy is the transnational flow of information and ideas. Edward R Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy, brochure, http://fletcher.tufts.edu/murrow/public-diplomacy.html (accessed 20 February 2005).


mechanism beneath more traditional forms of diplomacy. In the United Kingdom, public diplomacy is regarded as “part of a wider strategy to break down communication barriers both at home and abroad.” Other countries, such as Norway and Canada, have been seen to regard public diplomacy as highly as other diplomatic activities. And these representations refer only to state-level actors. Information communications technologies have helped endow private citizens more diplomat-like powers, thus eroding the distinction between members of the public and diplomats. Non-state actors are challenging the pre-existing monopoly of governments on public diplomacy institutions and activities.

In the context of such debates, it remains evident that prevailing conceptualizations laid out by both scholars and practitioners, if not perfect reflections of one another, do share considerable common ground. For instance, refer to the following interpretations. In the first, Nye divides the purposes of public diplomacy into three distinct dimensions “...[requiring] different relative proportions of direct government information and long-term cultural relationships.

“The first and most immediate dimension is daily communications, which involves explaining the context of domestic and foreign policy decisions...The day-to-day dimension must also involve preparation for dealing with crises and countering attacks...The second dimension is strategic communication, in which a set of simple themes is developed, much like what occurs in a public campaign...The third dimension of public diplomacy is the development of having relationships with key individuals over many years through scholarships, exchanges, training.

18 Lane, Report on Wilton Park Conference, 2.
19 Alan Henriksen, “Niche Diplomacy in the Public Arena: Canada and Norway,” in The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, ed. Jan Melissen (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 67-87. For example, Foreign Affairs Canada terms public diplomacy its ‘third pillar’ in pursuing Canadian foreign policy, the other two being “the promotion of prosperity and employment” and “the protection of [Canadian] security, within a stable global framework.”
seminars, conferences, and access to media channels... Each of these three dimensions of public diplomacy plays an important role in helping to create an attractive image of a country and this can improve its prospects for obtaining its desired outcomes.  

Ambassador Christopher Ross, a career diplomat in the American foreign service, draws a very similar picture to the one described by Nye, distinguished mainly by a reduction from three dimensions to two by virtue of the consolidation of communication activities:

"The first is the communication of policy. Whereas the task is ongoing, intensive, and fraught with difficulties, public diplomacy is basically a short-term effort with a simple goal: to articulate U.S. policy clearly in as many media and languages as are necessary to ensure that the message is received... As demanding as articulating U.S. policy to foreign publics is, it is only half of public diplomacy's responsibility. The other half is a longer-term effort to develop an overseas understanding and appreciation of U.S. society - the people and values of the United States... Success on the information front can be measured. In contrast, gauging the success of exchange programs is more intangible and requires time and patience... Throughout the Cold War, public diplomacy efforts ran essentially one way. Programs and activities were pushed out to target audiences. In today's world, the United States is more likely to meet with success if it structures activities in ways that encourage dialogue."

While it is true that Ross operates from his American frame of reference, British scholar Mark Leonard offers a more generalized definition, done in such a way that strongly resonates with the preceding ones:

"In fact, public diplomacy is about building relationships: understanding the needs of other countries, cultures and peoples; communicating our points of view; correcting misperceptions; looking for areas where we can

22 Christopher Ross, "Public Diplomacy Comes of Age," The Washington Quarterly 25, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 77-82.
find common cause...One way of conceptualising public diplomacy is as a grid of three rows and columns. On one axis are the spheres on which it is played out: political/military, economic and societal/cultural. In each of these spheres, we can characterize three dimensions of public diplomacy activities: (1) reacting to news events as they occur in a way that tallies with our strategic goals; (2) proactively creating a news agenda through activities and events which are designed to reinforce core messages and influence perceptions; (3) building long-term relationships with populations to win recognition of our values and assets and to learn from theirs. Each of these dimensions operates according to a different timescale. 23

Reading over these three separate attempts to give shape to public diplomacy, which by no means represent a full spectrum, one finds there to be more agreement than not over its core elements. Figuring prominently on one side is communication, which largely consists of ‘strategic communications’ or messages specially crafted to support policy initiatives by eliciting a desired response from target audiences. 24 On the other, the three authors also mention the need to build relationships with individuals or groups abroad in hopes that the resulting goodwill will enhance a country’s image and increase the likelihood that the ‘desired outcomes’ of that country’s foreign policies will be met.

One important divergence worth noting here, since it shall be explored later, is the notion of the ‘population’ or ‘public’ understood to be the recipient or interlocutor in a typical ‘relationship’. The significance this grouping is often generalized, as seen in the samples from Ross and Leonard, to the point of ambiguity, thus making it difficult to qualify what exactly constitutes the ‘public’ beyond sometimes amorphous constituencies whose commonalities change depending on context. In contrast, Nye asserts concentrating relationship-building on ‘key individuals’, which begs the question of

whether public diplomacy is as ‘public’ as the name implies. Hocking has noted that explaining what is meant by the ‘public’ in clearer terms is a priority for contemporary analysis, as this divide over a seemingly basic assumption simply illustrates.25

Being closely associated with the art of propaganda, public diplomacy possesses two traditionally dominant approaches that appear regularly in the discourses on practice. One is information and the other is influence, and they are often mentioned simultaneously since the former is used to perform the latter. As it happens, there are some questions as to who should be influenced by whom, and to what end the information should be used. The U.S. practice, for one, reveals a dichotomous relationship between pure communications activities on the one hand and relationship-building on the other. Communicators use information for either the passive objective of education or the more aggressive goal of persuasion. Alternatively, the relationship-building component is less concerned with informing or persuading than creating understanding. Some scholars have interpreted this divide as the difference between ‘one-way’ (monologic) and ‘two-way’ (dialogic) public diplomacy.26 It would seem that the practitioner, then, is beholden to two similar activities that relate to target audiences in different – and conflicting – ways. The communications components dictate the role of an advocate, who is charged with conveying a message, portraying an image, and acting as a spokesperson for the party generating the communication. In the relationship-building mode the practitioner

assumes instead the part of mediator transferring information from interlocutors which he then uses to advisee each one about the other.

By virtue of the cyclical exchange of information and influence, a third currency of public diplomacy thus emerges: engagement. The term itself not only acknowledges two-way information flows but also exhibits in practice other qualitative differences, and that is why many detailed definitions of public diplomacy tend to separate engagement functions from those that perform information and influence. Since the concept of the practitioner in public diplomacy is conventionally linked to state-unit behavior, notably in the realm of foreign policy and the extant communications to foreign populations, practitioners-as-mediators are regarded as advisors who, when thrust into the advisory role, deal in the negotiable tender of interests and positions. When acting as advisors, public diplomacy practitioners are not unlike intelligence analysts or regional experts; they may have access to privileged information that might inform the judgment of policymakers and hence be valuable resources at the point of policy formulation. Conversely, practitioners assuming the role of the advocate perform exclusively in the aftermath of policymaking discussions and on explicit instructions for how to deliver communications that build support for policy. Quite apart from notions of information/influence-driven approaches where the target audience alone stands to be impacted in the relatively near-term by communications, the engagement approach to public diplomacy resembles "the cause and effect of public attitudes and opinions which influence the formulation and execution of foreign policies" with impacts drawn out over the longer-term.27

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2.2 Public Diplomacy Dimensions

One of the benefits of exploring the case of U.S. public diplomacy since 9/11 is that it is helping scholars and practitioners alike work towards settling fundamental questions about the empirical nature of public diplomacy. Here it is promising to find that the viewpoints of both scholars and practitioners, if not perfect reflections of one another, do share considerable common ground from time to time. It can be surmised from witnessing the application of public diplomacy approaches during the Cold War that the United States permitted engagement activities to operate beneath the dominant approaches of information and influence. Thus, there appears to be a fluid relationship shared amongst the primary approaches of public diplomacy in a hierarchical sense: although they seem to coexist, one approach assumes dominance over, but not to the exclusion of others. With the following, it is suggested that each set presents two counterpart qualities that are in fact intricately connected and demonstrate more or less intensity in relation to its opposite part depending on situational factors. The first set deals with patterns in communication styles ranging from propagandistic to fully transparent vis-à-vis the goal of conveying messages designed to support policy initiatives. The second involves timeframes -- public diplomacy operating either a short-term or long-term track. Lastly, the third set of parameters discusses from which communications emerge, sometimes the product of a planned campaign centered on certain themes, and other times provoked by unplanned events or statements. They will be referred to as reactive and proactive communication postures.

Propagandistic and Transparent Communication Styles. Among scholars and practitioners, one of the longest-running debates about public diplomacy involves to what extent it should employ propagandistic techniques to influence foreign public opinion, or
more broadly whether propaganda should be related to public diplomacy at all. Some would submit that propaganda and public diplomacy are mutually exclusive styles, as Zaharna does by contrasting the “secrecy, deception and coercion” of the former with the “open public communication” of the latter.28 To be sure, prevailing norms since the start the postwar period reinforce negative connotations associated with propaganda, and Cull’s recent etymological history of the term confirms its gradual recession in favor of the more benign “public diplomacy” coming into fashion by 1965.29 Others maintain the fading of propaganda in name only and minimize the shift in norms to think of it as interchangeable with public diplomacy.30 Some American officials have reinforced this notion in their public statements. U.S. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke wrote in 2001, “call it public diplomacy, or public affairs, or psychological warfare, or – if you really want to be blunt – propaganda.”31 A more positive explanation offered up by another American FSO called public diplomacy, “the finest form of propaganda”.32 This owes to the fact that even after years of expansion in government-sponsored communications activities and the accompanying sanitization in terminology, the propagandistic style never disappeared but instead became incorporated into the array of continued U.S. public diplomacy approaches. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) funded Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in the 1950’s and 60’s, and operated covert “disinformation” media projects involving the publishing of books, magazines and newspapers until these

30 See for example remarks of Nancy Snow, interview by Jerome McDonnell, Worldview, 27 November 2006: “There’s an ongoing debate amongst scholars as to whether or not the two can be used interchangeably. I tend to use them interchangeably because I view propaganda as a process of mass persuasion that is inherently value neutral. It really comes down to how it’s used.”
projects were exposed in 1977. Well past the anointed cleansing years of the 1960’s, the propagandistic tendencies of public diplomacy occasionally reappeared more publicly as a way to further foreign policy imperatives even in the 1980’s to support anti-communist maneuvers in Central America and, in a more recent case in 2002, when the secret Office of Strategic Influence run by the Department of Defense was exposed by the New York Times and subsequently disbanded. All of this has occurred notwithstanding the U.S. military’s tactical use of its own broadcasting, leaflet-dropping and other psychological operations.

In fact, influence-related activities that sometimes draw on propagandistic communication seem to have a natural home in the idiom of “strategic” public diplomacy. According to Manheim, strategic public diplomacy is “public diplomacy practiced less as an art than as an applied transnational science of human behavior. It is...the practice of propaganda in the earliest sense of the term, but enlightened by half a century of empirical research into human motivation and behavior.” This re-conceptualization of public diplomacy to include a ‘science’ of political manipulation in fact reveals not a mutual exclusion between public diplomacy and propaganda, nor perfect substitution of one term for another, but the incorporation of an “enlightened” and propagandistic communication style into the public diplomacy domain.

Conversely, there is an alternative technique that does not rest on the disinformation and manipulation associated with propaganda, but rather on the credibility

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of transparent communication. Adherents to this style may share a revulsion to propaganda (although it arguably helped raise the profile of public diplomacy in the first place) and prefer instead to project trustworthy and credible communications via free and fair media channels. This was a guiding principle first espoused by the late journalist and former USIA Director Edward R. Murrow, reiterated in the findings of a 1975 blue-ribbon panel led by Frank Stanton on the reorganization U.S. public diplomacy, and has to a large extent governed the style and content of U.S. government sponsored broadcasting. Moral arguments surrounding ‘tough-minded’ and ‘tender-minded’ factions notwithstanding, many recognize the necessity of transparency in an age when “citizens can see quite graphically the effects of their leaders’ foreign policy decision and how diplomats cope with them on the ground.” Recognition of this reality has yielded strong assertions from leading diplomats, scholars and journalists that the credibility of governments must be fiercely protected since the proliferation of ICT’s has made it easier to expose discrepancies between word and deed.

**Short-term and Long-term Timeframes.** Public diplomacy characteristically reinforces policies that are impermanent. Therefore, as Nye mentions above, it is often

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36 Panel on International Information, Education and Cultural Relations, “International Information, Education and Cultural Relations: Recommendations for the Future,” *CSIS Special Report Number Fifteen* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1975), 12: “The program must recognize that the communications revolution has educated the world to a greater skepticism concerning things governments say about their societies. Hence, there is a great need today for credibility...”


short-term by design. Rosenau has generally described foreign policy action, the very action public diplomacy is called upon to support, as "constantly unfolding" and susceptible to event sequences in the international realm.\(^{39}\) A typical example of the relationship between events, foreign policy and public diplomacy can be seen in the way the United States lobbied against Soviet resistance over the NATO-sanctioned deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Western Europe in 1983 to counter a mid-1970's upgrading of Soviet missiles to the new SS-20, which at that time established relative parity between Western and Soviet nuclear capabilities in Europe. At the onset of the deployment, political tensions between the two superpowers ran high after negotiations to reduce INF in Europe broke down.\(^{40}\) Publicly, however, the dispute touched off numerous protests by Europeans opposed to any accelerations in the arms race, which the Soviet government was quick to exploit in support of its own position. The United States countered with what Reagan National Security Council (NSC) staffer Carnes Lord called a public diplomacy "effort of unprecedented intensity and degree of coordination throughout the U.S. government".\(^{41}\) Lord cites a propagandistic arms control and public diplomacy campaign to have been critical for raising European suspicions over Soviet security motives in the region and exposing "the record of Soviet misbehavior under existing arms control regimes."\(^{42}\) With the European public outcry over American intentions somewhat muted as a result, the deployment proceeded as planned. George Shultz recalled afterwards, "I don't think we could have pulled it off if it hadn't been for a


very active program of public diplomacy."\(^{43}\) (As a preface to the next section it is worth mentioning that the American response to European protestors and Soviet opposition to the buildup constitutes a reactive posture.)

Aside from its propagandistic style, it is important to note that the timeframe of the INF campaign represented an instance of public diplomacy being used to build public support for an immediate dividend. Although one could argue the relevance of the long-running international debate pertaining to nuclear buildups during the Cold War, the INF campaign did not seek to settle larger questions dealing with arms control and disarmament. It can be better characterized as the outgrowth of imperatives laid out in President Reagan’s National Security Decision Directive 77, in which he deemed public diplomacy “to generate support for our national security objectives” and therefore ordered the creation of a short-lived “special planning group” (SPG) to operate within the NSC and coordinate interagency strategic communication efforts.\(^{44}\) Most noted for organizing responses to the INF situation and the Soviet downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007, the SPG also orchestrated support for the contras in Nicaragua. Equally notable may be how swiftly the importance of the SPG declined after such policy imperatives faded.

Echoing earlier statements that public diplomacy is essentially a short-term effort, it seems plausible to suggest that the limited shelf-life of policy initiatives makes it easier for practitioners to pursue simple and immediate goals, and these goals are consequently made simpler yet should practitioners concentrate their focus on a narrow timeframe,


thereby eliminating a complex and cumbersome set of long-term concerns. From a planning perspective, short-term initiatives allow easier accounting for available resources, full concentration on situations at hand and immediate returns from performance assessment. Alternatively, long-term initiatives bring forth greater complexity in that available human and financial resources are harder to maintain, concentration wanders to other pressing matters, and successes, if any, take longer to materialize and prove with measurable indicators. Nevertheless, long-term initiatives represent a staple in the public diplomacy strategies of many states and organizations, albeit they are almost always subjugated in favor of short-term interests. The language associated with the long-term often involves terms like “development”, “incubating” and “transformation”, and justifiably so since long-term challenges require a sustained commitment to create change. Exchange programs assume an important place in the arsenal of long-term tactics, emphasizing niche areas such as the arts and sciences, and promoting the cultures of sponsoring countries. Seldom known is the fact that the United States and Soviet Union engaged in a long-running cultural exchange program that remained in place for nearly the entire duration of the Cold War. Other prestigious programs include Britain’s Rhodes Scholarship and the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Program, both of which provide a unique opportunity for highly-qualified foreign scholars to pursue academic and professional endeavors.

In the promotion of cultural identities, the foreign ministries of France, Germany, and more recently China dedicate globally-operating organizations and centers to extend to foreign populations the heritage of their respective languages, cultures and political values. France’s General Directorate for International Cooperation and Development focuses on extending awareness of French culture through the Alliance Françaises, and Germany utilizes its vast network of Goethe-Instituts to actively spread German language
and culture in attempts to foster a positive image of German politics and society in nearly 90 countries. The Chinese Ministry of Education opened up its first Confucius Institute in August 2006 to foster interest in Chinese language and culture and support teachers of the Chinese language overseas. By 2010, the Ministry plans to have 100 such Institutes in operation.45

It must not be overlooked that while exchanges over the long-term create continued opportunities for personal contact, the media also play an important role in communicating messages that sustain the underlying ideas and values of sponsoring countries. Media outlets can be the differential in the marathon race to deliver information to international audiences and it is incumbent upon the media to build and maintain their credibility in part to reflect positively on the societies they represent. For state-owned media this means maintaining an appearance of distance from government interests, and some say it is chiefly for this reason the BBC World Service enjoys a larger audience than all US international broadcasting services combined, despite a smaller annual budget.46 At the same time, media outlets also represent the worldview of their home cultures, and this affords media the sometimes unwitting ability to cultivate positive associations for or draw hostility to their sponsoring country. This helps explain the controversy that resulted in Denmark and more broadly within Western societies when in September 2005 a Danish newspaper editor ran cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammad in a negative light only to invite a firestorm of criticism from Muslim

countries.\textsuperscript{47} This has caused long-term damage to the Danish image, and it is in the wake of the crisis that the government has decided to prepare for such crises by investing more public diplomacy.

\textit{Reactive and Proactive Postures.} As with the case of Denmark, sometimes a nation or organization finds itself having to answer to charges that place at risk its reputation with particular populations. To salvage the public trust during a crisis situation, it may employ the tactic of reactive public diplomacy, which can be useful for bypassing layers of media and local political interference and explaining positions directly to publics, and also in allowing for a quick response mechanism to prevent allegations from spinning wildly out of control. Others have termed this notion as ‘crisis’ public diplomacy\textsuperscript{48}, or ‘surge capability’\textsuperscript{49} – a temporary recourse distinguishable from the longer-term, ‘proactive’ campaigns intended to steer public opinion into a favorable mood. Reactive public diplomacy does not pretend that winning favor is realistic although it may be desirable. Its main purpose is “damage control”, or to ensure that public opinion is minimally impacted in relation to conditions prior to the event that caused the crisis.

A rudimentary look at some American security and political crises during the twentieth century and beyond shows how the United States has relied on reactive public diplomacy in a time of crisis. At the outset of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, the ad hoc “Ex Com” assembled to deal with the matter first did not include the fledgling

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\item \textsuperscript{48} Siobhan McEvoy-Levy, American Exceptionalism and US Foreign Policy: \textit{Public Diplomacy} at the End of the Cold War, 154-156.
\item \textsuperscript{49} Leonard, \textit{Public Diplomacy}, 32-38.
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USIA in its meetings, but this changed once it was realized that communications would play a significant part in its resolution.\textsuperscript{50} It would be the USIA Deputy Director Donald Wilson who suggested integrating photographs into the famous speech by Adlai Stevenson before the UN Security Council on 25 October 1962 in which he effectively indicted the Soviet Union for deploying nuclear warheads into Cuba.\textsuperscript{51} Returning to a prior example, President Reagan’s NSDD 77 specified the need for response-oriented strategies to counter “aggressive political action moves” of the Soviet Union, which he delegated to a sub-committee of the aforementioned SPG.\textsuperscript{52}

More recent response mechanisms include the Coalition Information Centers (CIC) shared by the American and British governments, which they jointly created in October 2001 upon the launching of the Afghan military campaign. Emulating the domestic political campaign cultures of both countries, and acknowledging the positive impact of a similar arrangement used by NATO in Kosovo, CIC operations utilized branch offices in Washington, London and Islamabad to remain engaged at all hours of the news cycle. Created foremost “to reinforce the message that the war is against terrorism, not Islam” on the international front, domestically it compelled an array of government agencies dealing with the press and general public to coordinate messages.\textsuperscript{53} The champion of the CIC on the American side, then-White House counselor Karen Hughes, would subsequently adapt its purposes to form the Rapid Response Unit (RRU) at the Department of State in early 2006. Along with the reproduction of the command

\textsuperscript{50} Dizard, \textit{Inventing Public Diplomacy}, 88.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid, and corroborated by Walter Roberts in an interview with the author, Washington, DC, 14 December 2006.
\textsuperscript{52} President, \textit{National Security Decision Directive} 77, 2.
\textsuperscript{53} Stephen Fidler, “War of words goes hand in hand with war on the ground: Bitter winter nears, and George W. Bush knows he will need to feel the warmth of his close allies”, \textit{Financial Times}, 8 November 2001; \textit{Defense Science Board Report}, 2004, 21.
center for constant monitoring of international media, the RRU issues daily guidance complete with talking points for American embassies and consulates to respond to emergent matters in the media. In addition, the coordination of talking points creates an "echo chamber" effect by repeating and reinforcing messages originating in Washington.54

As is typical of crisis situations, however, it is rather uncommon to find an apparatus like the CIC or RRU in place to anticipate crises before they happen; crises are usually short-lived, as are the temporary offices created to deal with them. Thus practitioners recognize the need to maintain, alongside the response-oriented capacity, a proactive public diplomacy posture that retains far more control of agenda setting, amasses and maintains a stable level of resources to pursue both short- and longer-term agenda items, and permits the practitioner to do so for however long or short the situation requires. In a non-state example, an organization such as the International Committee of the Red Cross prepares for the unpredictable by staffing disaster relief centers and logistical crews standing ready to be called into action, but it also sustains a constant level of activity in what it calls "humanitarian diplomacy" to advance an agenda against what it regards as humanitarian threats and advocates implementation of international humanitarian laws.55

With respect to the agenda-setting capabilities of public diplomacy, the insights of the communications discipline shed light on the relationship between agendas their potential effects on public perceptions, and further towards the shaping of what Walter

Lippmann called the “world outside and pictures in our heads”.$^{56}$ In this sense, political communications figures try to co-opt international media outlets into telling public not what to think, but what to think about.$^{57}$ Manheim has discussed examples where international actors have successfully steered their agendas for political gains.$^{58}$ He raises the instance of a visit to the United States by former prime minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto, whose chief concern was to reverse the declining American interest in Pakistan after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989.$^{59}$ With the aid of an American political consultant, Bhutto approached her visit much like a political campaign and centered her agenda on the theme of a U.S.-Pakistan democratic partnership as a way to remain relevant to U.S. interests in South Asia. By shifting attention away from the geostrategic developments that may have caused the United States to become less interested in Pakistan and placing a spotlight on political partnership, Bhutto won rave reviews in the American media and, as Manheim notes, succeeded in elevating Pakistan’s profile among American opinion leaders.

Moreover, with her visit having transpired solely within the month of June 1989, Bhutto’s coup over American public opinion shows that proactive public diplomacy may be conducted on a relatively short timescale, and yet the larger portion of public diplomacy scholarship in this area has been devoted to longer term models.$^{60}$ For example, Leonard offers a case study depicting Norway’s concentration of public

$^{58}$ Manheim, *Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy*, 127-128.
$^{59}$ Ibid., 84-91.
diplomacy resources to cast it as a force for peace and conflict resolution worldwide.\footnote{Leonard, Public Diplomacy, 168-175.} Rather than take months, Norway has held to this line for years, and Leonard notes its integral participation in the Middle East peace process (1993 Oslo Accords), extended mediation efforts in the Sri Lankan internal dispute, and even its fortuitous association with the Nobel Peace Prize, which originated in Oslo. What helps in clarifying the general regard for proactive public diplomacy as a long-term effort has to do with defining objectives. While both reactive and proactive forms deal in the currency of messages, the proactive form is more appropriate to the tasks of image and relationship building (or repair), which are invariably time-intensive endeavors.

2.3 U.S. Public Diplomacy Institutions

The previous section has shown that public diplomacy activity, usually the product of states, is highly dependent on circumstances that a state faces in the world. At the same time, it is also true that a state can arrange its public diplomacy apparatus to pursue particular objectives, such as growing a national brand, as in the case of Norway, or to spread cultural values, as in the cases of China, France and Germany. Some states complement their cultural and public diplomacy offices with state-sponsored international broadcasting to present their perspective to the world, as the United Kingdom does with the British Broadcasting Corporation and Germany with Deutsche Welle, and France with France 24. When trying to understand a state’s disposition towards public diplomacy, it is helpful to take stock of these organizations.
The United States, for its part, does not need to worry about cultural or political irrelevance given its enormous influence in contemporary international affairs. On the contrary, the main challenges facing American public diplomacy in the post-9/11 era are tied to its relevance in areas spanning the politics, military forces, economics and culture. Whether the issue has to do with human rights in China, military bases in Central Asia or democracy promotion in Cuba, the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus must somehow integrate these efforts, along with countless others, into its operations. As for its brand, "nation branding" expert Simon Anholt has said that the United States may be too complex a subject to reduce to a single association. Likewise, American public diplomacy is not limited to one office or agency, or even one branch of government, but rather the concomitant actions of several entities.

As will soon become apparent, definitive resources on the inner workings of U.S. public diplomacy depict a poorly organized structure, but most accounts identify a select group of actors as integral to its operations. Based on their proximity to the crafting of a cohesive public diplomacy strategy, as well as their ranking relevance in informing, influencing or engaging with foreign populations, they can be grouped into two tiers. The first tier consists of actors historically charged with strategy formulation who rank high in these three given criteria:

*The Department of State.* Secretary of State Colin Powell wrote in May 2003, "Every man and woman in the State Department is America's face to the world." Of the thousands of Foreign Service Officers dispatched by the Department around the world, there are, as of 31 March 2007, approximately 700 completely dedicated to the public...
diplomacy cone. As a matter of practice, public diplomacy officers usually perform the frontline duties of face-to-face interactions with foreign nationals, appear in local media, and are charged with collecting input on climates of public opinion with respect to the United States. The Foreign Service Institute (FSI) trains all of these officers in area studies, local language skills and how to deal with the foreign media within roughly twenty weeks of courses. 

Historically, some institutions integral to public diplomacy have always existed within the Department, but from 1953 to 1999 most programs, coordination and strategy for all public diplomacy efforts took place within the USIA. Shifting foreign affairs priorities and significant budget cuts after the end of the Cold War eventually forced a merger of the agency into the Department. The two principal public diplomacy bureaus consist of the Office of International Information Programs (IIP), which produces and distributes information to reach key audiences, and the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA), which manages government-sponsored exchange programs targeting foreign and domestic students, business leaders, and political figures.

*Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG).* In addition to information and exchange, a third major component of public diplomacy exists in the form of international broadcasting. Upon its inception in 1998, the BBG filled the need of the U.S. government to create a firewall protecting the independence of its international broadcasting services. These are the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia, Radio and TV Marti, and Worldnet Television. More recently, the BBG

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65 According to 2006-07 Foreign Service Institute Course Catalogue.
launched Radio Sawa, an Arabic-speaking service, Radio Farda, in Persian, and Al Hurra, an Arabic-language satellite television network. The BBG defines itself as an autonomous entity tasked with protecting "the open exchange of accurate and objective news" in regions where the reportage of media outlets is compromised. In support of the services of the BBG, the U.S. government spent $645 million dollars on international broadcasting in fiscal year 2006.\textsuperscript{66}

\textit{The White House.} As the officers of the Department of State put forth the face of the United States Government, the President of the United States is regarded as the voice. The President and his staff deliver messages in high-visibility contexts, and the course for how to conduct public diplomacy has been traditionally set by executive offices such as the National Security Council, or by groups created by presidential directive. Attempts have been made at establishing several offices in the White House charged with the task of coordinating the diverse public diplomacy activities occurring across agencies. The Office of Global Communications, created by an executive order in January of 2003, brought together executives from several agencies "to coordinate strategic communications from the U.S government to overseas audiences."\textsuperscript{67} President Bush also created the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) in 2002, co-chaired by the State Department and the National Security Council, to ensure interagency cooperation in spreading the American message worldwide. Neither of these efforts would exist for very long, adding to the list of false starts another PCC created in 2004 to craft an integrated public diplomacy strategy for dealing with Muslim countries. In April 2006, the Bush administration launched another PCC for establishing interagency strategy

\textsuperscript{66} GAO 2007, 5.
chairled by Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Karen Hughes. The strategy was released in June 2007.

The second tier consists of actors not historically recognized for their role in public diplomacy, yet recently have assumed a more active role in strategy formulation and execution:

**Congress.** The reviewing of budgets and appropriating of funds to public diplomacy programs fall under the powers of Congress, primarily through the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee. Congress provides primary public diplomacy resources at the State Department and BBG with a combined budget of nearly $1.5 billion (as of FY 2006) divided almost evenly between the two entities. As such, Congress also has a hand in dictating the emphasis of public diplomacy efforts by showing favor to certain types of programs or personnel in the budget approval process. One source at the State Department explained that Congress tends to support policy-relevant functions that yield measurable success in the short term. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducts regular non-partisan reviews of public diplomacy institutions by evaluating the effectiveness of public overall diplomacy strategy and application of resources.

**The Department of Defense.** Recently, the role of this agency in public diplomacy has become more salient in the course of post-9/11 military campaigns. Historically, the Department is more well-known for its combat operations dealing in information. Psychological operations are a port of this, and they usually deal with military forces utilizing resources such as radio broadcasts and leaflet dropping to influence a target population into behaving in certain ways. There is also the tool of
military public affairs used during times of war on domestic audiences. The U.S. military may also participate more directly in public diplomacy in joint operations with other armed forces, disaster relief and rescue operations. Yet the Department is not normally considered to be a central piece of the public diplomacy apparatus, and evidence suggests it is only recently that public diplomacy is assuming its own organization. It launched a small planning staff in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy called the Office of Support Public Diplomacy to become more involved in public diplomacy in an organized manner.

Beyond this "official" set of actors, there are additional classifications that warrant consideration not necessarily for their contributions towards strategy — they are "unofficial" by comparison — but for their profound impact on the way others view the United States. These information channels demonstrate an incidental route to becoming a part of the public diplomacy process. Firstly, there are a myriad of private organizations acquiring abilities to conduct public diplomacy on their own. Being the fact that information communication technologies are impacting the way public diplomacy is done around the world, it's should come as no surprise that many of these private organizations in question are derived from the mass media, such as worldwide 24-hour news networks like CNN and internet-based media. Aside from the obvious impact of the media, the United States also possesses many agile foreign opinion polling organizations, such as the Pew Center for the People and the Press and GlobeScan. There are also influential groups comprised of business leaders such as Business for Diplomatic Action and PR Coalition.

Secondly, there are the social ramifications of private individuals, who commit an act or make a statement that influences foreign public opinion. A 2004 report from the RAND Corporation suggests a linkage between public diplomacy and the power of
individuals to purvey a public good. Well-known non-governmental international figures, such as former presidents, may participate in a calculated campaign in part to reflect well on the character of American citizens. Interestingly, the opposite also applies to controversial figures whose act or statement negatively impacts foreign public sentiment towards the United States, thus inducing the “official” public diplomacy apparatus to swing into the mode of ‘rapid response’ or crisis-management and restore the consistency of its message for the sake of the national interest.

What this expansion on the public diplomacy concept and brief glimpse into the American apparatus show is that the unique position of the United States in international affairs amplifies the complexity of an already nuanced and situation-dependent form of political communication. Like other nations, the United States uses public diplomacy to preserve its standing in the world and further its national interest because there is a proven value in its application. And like other nations, the United States can choose from a selection of strategies and tactics and assign actors to conduct a form of public diplomacy befitting of its global position. However, as the preeminent global power the United States is faced with the paradox of having to solicit the aid of other less-powerful states to protect its own interests. But American power has not always needed to persuade other international actors in this manner, nor has its public diplomacy always embraced a conciliatory tone. During the Cold War the United States could afford to be

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69 Harold Pachios, interview by the author, Portland, ME, 29 April 2005. Pachios, the former Commissioner of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, suggested that the George H.W. Bush-Bill Clinton goodwill tour of areas ravaged by the Asian Tsunami of late 2004 was an act of public diplomacy.
70 Thomas E. Ricks, “Briefing Depicted Saudis as Enemies: Ultimatum Urged to Pentagon Board,” Washington Post, 6 August 2002. This story exposed the rather embarrassing incident of when a RAND analyst named Laurent Murawiec gave a highly inflammatory presentation to the DOD Defense Policy Board suggesting a massive mobilization of U.S. power against Saudi Arabia. The Saudi outrage that resulted forced U.S. officials to immediately disassociate themselves from the report.
aggressive in its worldwide campaign against communism, and it was in the wake of the
fall of communism that murmurs of American unilateralism took form. This latter period
also happens to usher in American public diplomacy’s most serious decline.

In summarizing the general level of attention devoted to the welfare of public diplomacy, Harold Pachios, former Chairman of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy and a Commissioner throughout the 1990’s said simply, “Nobody cared about public diplomacy in the 1990’s. It was only after 9/11 that people started to pay attention.” Peering into the recent history of U.S. public diplomacy between the end of the Cold War and 9/11 one may find the precursor for the weakened structure and piecemeal strategy that would soon draw intense scrutiny. The warning signs were far less consequential at that time, and the primary goal of this chapter will be to revisit what was happening to American public diplomacy during the post-Cold War years to not simply recall the seminal events that transpired, but also to create a context within which one can correlate a series of fateful decisions that compromised public diplomacy institutions. The redistribution of international power prompted by the end of Cold War is instructive here, as is the early-1990’s discourse surrounding the assessment of American power, which fuelled a debate between the so-called declinists and revivalists and propelled the influential conclusion that the United States had achieved unchallengeable primacy with respect to other nations. This chapter starts out by calling for a clear account of correlating factors, not least of which includes a distinct lack of focus or sense of purpose to fill the void left by the absence of the communist threat. Parallel to this development there was an intensive movement shared by the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government to reduce the federal budget, which in

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1 Harold C. Pachios, interview by the author, Portland, USA, 19 December 2005.
turn, starting with the 1993 National Performance Review, fixed crosshairs on foreign affairs institutions that were regarded by some as having outlived their usefulness. The ensuing debate that raged between the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Clinton administration during the mid-1990's underscored the unique circumstances surrounding the most dramatic consolidation of U.S. public diplomacy activities and institutions in nearly 50 years.

Framing the decline of public diplomacy in this context serves as the second task of this chapter. However striking these changes appeared in their moments of occurrence, it is undeniable that without a change in the international system as massive as the end of the Cold War, none of these subsequent events would have occurred. For one, careful consideration of the impact of that seminal event sheds light on noticeable changes in the way the USIA was appraised in the early 1990's. The desire of political leaders to roll back foreign affairs organizations did not elude the USIA, which embarked on a desperate search for relevance and reinvention. Before too long, the political environment in the United States would become so enmeshed in the budget-cutting surge of foreign affairs that by 1997 a merger of the USIA and Department of State would be preordained.

At its very essence, the public diplomacy apparatus that existed in the United States from the early 1950's up until the late 1990's is best understood as a product of the Cold War. This is true in that it was motivated by the foreign policy imperatives of that period, namely to confront and counter the expansion of communism by applying one of several solutions tailor-made for the tasks at hand. The imperatives, while susceptible to fluctuations based on the tone of U.S.-Soviet relations at any given time, remained generally consistent throughout, at least as far as public diplomacy's contributions were concerned. A telegram from the U.S. mission in Tehran dating back to 1950 stated one of its goals in the execution of information and educational programs to be, "to
demonstrate through all media the weaknesses and fallacies of the communist system.\textsuperscript{2}

Compare this to thirty years later, when President Ronald Reagan would announce before the British Parliament plans for what would become the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) as part of a reinvigorated public diplomacy campaign, and it was explicitly this contest of ideas with the Soviet Union that defined the Cold War, with public diplomacy firmly situated at the front lines.\textsuperscript{3}

With the end of the Cold War, however, justifications for many of these projects would inexorably change to meet new foreign policy challenges and political realities, as would be the case in the instance of the NED. Agencies such as the USIA would find themselves too closely associated with the singular purpose of defeating communism and evaporate altogether. Even though the fall of communism had opened up new front for democracy promotion (the liberation of Eastern Europe and the reunification of Germany stand out as examples here) a sort of complacency followed the collapse of America's greatest threat and a comprehensive re-evaluation of U.S. foreign policy interests came thereafter.

What some American leaders and public intellectuals saw was that the United States stood to be the prime beneficiary of a new unipolar international system, and unchallenged in its path to primacy. Indeed, the gradual demise of the Soviet Union precipitated a redistribution of global military, economic and political power that swung in America's favor. Following on this was the imminent arrival of new sources of power to be found in information communications technology wielded by non-state entities in many parts of the world. These prevailing conditions are fundamental to understanding

\textsuperscript{2} U.S. Embassy Tehran, \textit{Circular Airgram of April 5, 1950}.

the U.S. foreign policymaking elite as their actions led to the resulting steady decline of U.S. public diplomacy. The chronicle detailed in this and the following chapters begins with recalling the events that led to U.S. public diplomacy becoming dispersed and debilitated. This shall present the context in which the decline occurred.

3.1 Power Transitions and Changes in the American Foreign Affairs Institutions

The relationship between U.S. foreign policy and its public diplomacy was and remains one of cause and effect; without being buttressed by a just and policy-relevant cause, there is little to warrant a wide-reaching effect. During the Cold War, U.S. public diplomacy derived its purpose from the power dynamics between the United States and the rest of the world. By and large, the priority of dealing with the Soviet Union created for the United States not only a prism through which all of its security interests passed, but also the precedent for response-oriented manner in which public diplomacy was historically used. The USIA, the lead agency for U.S. public diplomacy from 1953 to 1999, played the part of an advocate for foreign policy, taking up the final determinations of policymakers so that it could “define, explain, and advocate” them to audiences abroad.4

One prime example from its history involves the calculated U.S. response to Soviet-backed suppression of the Solidarity movement in Poland in late 1981. As the Soviet Union applied the last vestiges of the “Brezhnev Doctrine” through Polish martial law, the Reagan White House seized on this event as an opportunity to expose the

severity of the clampdown. Members of the Reagan administration drew on the broadcasting powers of the USIA, whose director, Charles Z. Wick, masterminded the 90-minute television special, “Let Poland Be Poland”, which reportedly reached more than 184 million people in 30 countries. The broadcast had the full support of the U.S. policymaking elite behind it, and a star-studded line-up of performers aided in communicating a unified rejection of the Soviet action.

Alternatively, periods of thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations had the opposite effect of setting a softer tone. Whereas a marked reduction in tension would often temper the need for provocative measures, questions would also abound as to the need for strong public diplomacy. During the détente period of the early 1970’s, and yet again in the early 1990’s after the disintegration of the Soviet Union the venerable radio institutions of Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty confronted threats of budget cuts by inquisitive members of the U.S. Congress.

When the communist threat disintegrated this relationship between U.S. foreign policy and public diplomacy would enter a phase of its most radical rethinking since the early postwar period. It soon became apparent that with the pendulum of global primacy swinging towards the United States, many wondered why public diplomacy continued to be necessary. The post-Cold War appraisal of public diplomacy also grew out of the way in which the United States viewed itself within the global power dynamic. Merely a decade earlier, the Reagan administration took control of a country reeling from an

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internal sense of weakness and consequently invested in public diplomacy to reassert American power.\(^7\) With the United States left standing at the end of the Cold War, the resulting confidence had the opposite effect.

Explanations as to why this was the case greatly inform public diplomacy pursuits in the 1990’s, and it will be argued in the forthcoming pages how the loss of value in public diplomacy caused it to be greatly diminished by decade’s end. Around this time there ran a lively debate amongst scholars within the United States, the latest within a sort of recurrent stock-taking exercises regarding the question of how much real power the United States wielded in the world.\(^8\) Before the Soviet collapse in the early 1990’s, speculation over the stock of power held by the United States was fueled by an overwhelming suspicion that it might have been diminishing. Labeled by implication as “declinist”, these prognostications, whether they intended to or not, thrived on timely circumstances that could be perceived as eroding American power in some way. Samuel P. Huntington, for one, conceived of this erosion as cyclical ‘waves’ of declinism instigated by momentary mutations in the power of the United States relative to other countries.

Paul Kennedy’s *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, published in 1988, likewise arrived on the heels of the crippling U.S. stock market crash in October 1987 and growing fears of another economic recession. That same year, the Japanese per capita gross national product exceeded that of the United States for the first time, thus delivering the reality of a challenger to U.S. economic primacy.\(^9\) In Kennedy’s view, though

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certainly not his alone, Japan exemplified a country on the rise and approaching its readiness to take advantage of a United States buckling under the overextension of its power.\textsuperscript{10} The 'overstretch' that Kennedy spoke of served as the centerpiece of his thesis as to why great powers rise and fall, and he further drew from America's dramatic military expansion and growing deficits produced by the Reagan administration to support his case. Standing firmly on the side of history, Kennedy predicted yet another wave of declinism that saw the United States, like Britain, France and Spain before it, collapsing under its own weight.

As it happened, the future did not play out as Kennedy and others had foretold. The crumbling of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the Soviet Union soon to follow left the United States with the sole claim to superpower status. In light of these developments and the dramatically changed perception of U.S. power in relation to the rest of the world, the declinist discussion was joined by an opposing but no less influential view about the future of the United States. Kennedy himself would come to identify this school of thought with those who "believe either that the talk of America's 'decline' has gone too far, or that, while things are indeed wrong, they can be corrected."\textsuperscript{11} The "revivalists" as they came to be known, included a fairly diverse group of commentators, from sociologist Peter Berger, to journalist Robert Bartley, to U.S. government alumni-turned-academics Joseph Nye, and Henry Nau.\textsuperscript{12} The most notorious of the last grouping includes Francis Fukuyama, who famously postulated "liberal democracy as the final


form of human government” in his “end of history” thesis. Both momentous and controversial, Fukuyama’s work appeared a mere two years after Kennedy’s opposing forecast and it demonstrated a remarkable contrast between Cold War and post-Cold War readings of how much power the United States possessed. It was a dramatic differential. In a world without the apparent balance of power constraints, the United States could be free to project its power in new and unprecedented ways, and public diplomacy, like other modes of projection, would inexorably mutate from its Cold War purposes in areas of both strategy and organization.

There are valuable insights to be taken from a rough summary on the discourse about American power in the period between Kennedy and Fukuyama. Within a matter of a few short years, it would be the revivalist argument wielding the upper hand, which was affirmed by America’s unparalleled preponderance of power and roaring economic growth throughout the 1990’s. “American power,” wrote Michael Cox in 2001, “is now more complete than it was back in 1941 or even 1945,” the nascent years of Henry Luce’s “American Century” wave of revivalism. While history could do more to support these claims by the end of the century, American foreign policy figures of the early 1990’s put their trust in unfolding events in international system that appeared to working in their favor. Already the signs that a withdrawal of interest in foreign affairs was imminent, which typified the confidence of the period.

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“Leaders and nations do not choose strategies \textit{de novo},” notes Bracken, even if their future ramifications are yet to be known.\textsuperscript{16} In a poignant example supporting Bracken’s argument, Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor under President George H.W. Bush, revealed this in a National War College address:

\begin{quote}
\textit{In the first decade after the Cold War, we just coasted and took a breather after the tensions of the Cold War. After all, Fukuyama was arguing the “end of history” and that everyone was on the road to becoming open, free-market, democratic societies.} \textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

The reformation of the international system and encouragement brought on by revivalism set the context in which American leaders opted to weaken the USIA, Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and other areas of public diplomacy in the decade after the Cold War. The widespread acceptance of the revivalist view committed U.S. public diplomacy institutions and foreign policy in general to a lower profile. When considering the context, it is of little surprise that the conduct of foreign affairs and the expression of American power would move in this direction between 1991 and 2001.

\subsection*{3.2 Anatomy of a Decline}

Setting the parameters of time in this way is useful for focusing on the relationship between U.S. public diplomacy and the unique set of circumstances prevailing in the 1990’s. Aside from being useful, it is also instructive when attempting to isolate the ambiguous notion of the decline of U.S. public diplomacy in this context, as one could argue that its decline had been an uneasy constant for a long time. It is true, for example

\textsuperscript{16} Paul Bracken, “The Structure of the Second Nuclear Age,” \textit{Orbis} 47, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 399.
that USIA suffered from a diminishing number of employees from its peak of over 12,000 in 1967 to fewer than 7,000 in the late 1990's.\textsuperscript{18} In addition to organizational decline, there has also existed a fluctuating rise and decline of influence, or a varying degree of closeness which public diplomats could communicate with their superiors. There have been perilous encounters with powerful chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as in the cases of Senator J. William Fulbright in the early 1970's and Senator Jesse Helms in the mid-to-late 1990's, with scant backing from the White House, interspersed with 'comebacks' (though not in the case of Helms) characterized by closer ties with the White House.\textsuperscript{19} Arndt, on the other hand, considers the period between 1981 and 2001 as the "two decades of decline" – a period in which cultural diplomacy, a dimension of public diplomacy relating to educational and cultural exchange, was eschewed by realist-leaning leadership at USIA in favor of more aggressive anti-Soviet campaigns in the 1980's.\textsuperscript{20}

While compelling cases can be made to show that periods of retrenchment have been a constant companion to public diplomacy, what sets apart the period between 1991 and 2001 from others can be distilled into two principal factors. In the first, it is undeniable that the public diplomacy apparatus in place for nearly four decades faced a renewed attempt at marginalization starting shortly after the end of the Cold War. Much of what constituted public diplomacy for the United States at this time emerged necessarily from the Cold War and consequently derived purpose and focus from the

\textsuperscript{19}\textit{Frank Ninkovich, "U.S. Information Policy and Cultural Diplomacy,\textit{ Foreign Policy Association Headline Series 308 (Fall 1996) 32.}}
policy aims its programs were created to support.\textsuperscript{21} Parts of the infrastructure operating at one time or another within the USIA included educational exchanges, cultural centers and international broadcasting, and all had been formed early in the postwar period to encourage democratic development as a way to ward off communism.\textsuperscript{22} Without the backdrop of the Cold War, public diplomacy wholly took on the ominous appearance of a fish out of water, an "expensive anachronism" that the U.S. government no longer needed in its arsenal.\textsuperscript{23}

Having become vulnerable in this way, public diplomacy institutions met with adversity from detractors devoted to the business of dismantling it, and this is the second factor distinguishing the latest period of its from others. All those figures who were instrumental in diminishing public diplomacy shared in the "budget-cutting zeal" that arrived with the Clinton administration in 1993.\textsuperscript{24} Between 1990 and 2001, the budget for public diplomacy allotted by the U.S. Congress declined by nearly 33 percent in constant dollars.\textsuperscript{25} The cuts struck deep into the organization: over 2,000 positions at USIA were eliminated between 1990 and 1999, a reduction of over 20 percent. The number would have been higher still had the proposed extinction of RFE/RL in the Clinton administration's 1993 federal deficit-reduction plan seen its way through to completion.\textsuperscript{26}


\textsuperscript{22} United States General Accounting Office, \textit{USIA: Options for Addressing Possible Budget Reductions}, September 1996, 2.

\textsuperscript{23} Antony J. Blinken, "Winning the War of Ideas", \textit{Washington Quarterly} 25, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 105.

\textsuperscript{24} James Critchlow, "Public Diplomacy during the Cold War: The Record and Its Implications," \textit{Journal of Cold War Studies} 6, no. 1 (Winter 2004): 84.

\textsuperscript{25} In 1990 dollars. See Appendix C for graphic representation.

Meanwhile, after educational exchanges experienced a slight windfall in Eastern Europe in the early 1990's, between 1995 and 2001 the number of annual educational and cultural exchanges fell from 45,000 to 29,000.\textsuperscript{27}

It should be clarified that as a matter of principle no one had categorically dismissed public diplomacy as a form of statecraft, but interpretations of it as a temporary rather than a permanent fixture in foreign affairs prevailed at this time. "They did yeoman service during a time when they were required," the head of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy said of RFE/RL in 1993. "But the world has turned."\textsuperscript{28}

In addition to an absence of institutional support at the official level, there also lacked any broad and sustained domestic constituency to keep public diplomacy programs afloat. Pragmatically speaking, those familiar with public diplomacy viewed it as a form of weaponry, or "something that happens during wartime" that could be decommissioned as one would a military base.\textsuperscript{29} As with other areas of the wartime infrastructure, writes R.S. Zaharna, "the extensive wartime information apparatus is dismantled" once the campaign draws to a close.\textsuperscript{30}

The task of remaking American foreign affairs agencies entered into its planning phase in 1993, and soon thereafter lawmakers took up proposals in Congress that included drawing down public diplomacy. The man who sought to execute this portion of the plan in an expedient fashion was Senator Jesse Helms, the chairman of the Senate Foreign

\begin{footnotes}
\item \textsuperscript{29} Bruce Gregory, telephone interview by the author, 1 February 2006.
\end{footnotes}
Relations Committee. Helms laid bare his feelings for the USIA on the floor of the U.S. Senate in 1998:

"With the full support of the administration, this legislation shuts down two Federal Agencies – the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the U.S. Information Agency. I say "now"."

The statement was made in reference to the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, the law did eventually shut down those two agencies, folding the USIA into the Department of State and placing all U.S. government broadcasting under the responsibility of a quasi-independent agency called the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). With that, Helms would secure his place in crafting the conduct of U.S. public diplomacy, and foreign policy in general, for years to come.

In effect, what the preceding suggests is that in order to redress the question of how U.S. public diplomacy staggered between the end of the Cold War and 9/11, one must take into consideration the changed international system as well as domestic political forces. With these arguments in place, the next part of this chapter shall briefly discuss the series of events, in three segments, that resulted in the weak structure and ineffective strategy in place prior to 9/11.

### 3.3 Fighting for Survival, 1991 to 1995

The story behind the organizations once responsible for “telling America’s story” suffers remarkably from a relatively sparse and antiquated representation in the literature. Many sophisticated efforts of this kind that are publicly available often pre-date the fall of

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communism, although there are some notable releases in the years since that time.\textsuperscript{32}


Considering that there are some capably written accounts on the subject matter, it is striking that most of these sources have very little to say about the decline of U.S. public diplomacy in the 1990's. One possibility may be that these retiree authors were not comfortable expanding on issues and events occurring after their tenures. Dizard and Critchlow, for example, both retired from their respective government posts in 1980 and

\textsuperscript{32} The most complete list of topical references would include the thorough dissection of the USIA in Allen C. Hansen, \textit{USIA: Public Diplomacy in the Computer Age}, an earlier version of the same in John W. Henderson, \textit{The United States Information Agency} (New York: Praeger, 1969). On broadcasting, Alan Heil, Jr., \textit{Voice of America: A History} (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), and for educational and cultural exchange, Richmond, \textit{Cultural Exchange and the Cold War}.


\textsuperscript{34} Richmond, op. cit.; Arndt, op. cit.

94
1985, respectively, and thus may have had few insights to offer thereafter. Another possible reason that remarks on the 1990’s may be in rather short supply is, by contrast to the fond memories of some authors, the story from the end of the Cold War onward was not a good one to tell.

Whatever the case may be, it might be believed that the inherent limitations of organization insiders to write a full account of what happened in the 1990’s could be compensated by other means. In 1991 approximately 9,000 people remained in public diplomacy-related positions, and with well over a third of this total based overseas there exists are sizeable population to comment of events during that time. Re-evaluation of public diplomacy institutions was well underway by 1993 and plans for integrating some of them within the Department of State had already been proposed by early 1995, so evidence is strong that the reduction of public diplomacy was clearly more consequential than existing accounts suggest. The only explanation for these inconsistencies is the perceived notion that public diplomacy is “an academic and policy orphan,” an outgrowth of the dearth of public diplomacy scholarship identified first in the late 1980’s that proceeded to become more visible in the following decade. In the absence of any substantial contributions in the academic discourse, a lack of primary source material, and

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35 Critchlow, Radio Hole-in-the-Head, 177; Dizard, op. cit., 255.
36 Snyder devoted less than seven pages to it, but enough, however, to reveal that USIA insiders knew President Clinton “could not have cared less about public diplomacy.” Snyder also acknowledges the need for the U.S. government to cease international broadcasting operation. Of his 556 pages, Arndt used all of six to cover the 1990’s and say that “foreign affairs took a back seat to the economy,” leaving the USIA with “unfocused leadership” preoccupied with organizational self-preservation.
38 The Clinton administration’s goal of balancing the federal budget from the earliest days in its first term led to the aforementioned proposal to eliminate RFE/RL by 1995. More advanced plans for downsizing and consolidation arrived in early 1995 based on recommendations by Vice President Gore’s National Performance Review (1994).

95
little more than periodic reports from the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public
Diplomacy, it has only been since 9/11 that questions concerning U.S. public diplomacy
have been revisited with regularity, in turn prompting more attempts to understand the
historical implications of the preceding decade.40

The story itself begins most appropriately in 1991, when the collapse of the Soviet
Union provided the symbolic end of the Cold War and subsequently set in motion the
main drivers of a pronounced devaluation in U.S. public diplomacy. Though the collapse
seemed a "joyless victory" for some, the result did herald a marked shift in American
public mood that desired more attention to domestic issues and less toward foreign
affairs.41 The 1992 presidential campaign of Bill Clinton would exploit this to its full
advantage, while carefully allowing a necessary reappraisal of foreign policy tools to
support a new American position in a profoundly different security environment. Work
was well underway late in the administration of George H.W. Bush to "find solid footing
in a country dissolving into chaos."42 Chief among the issues at stake were arms control
and the re-targeting of missiles, formalizing relations with the newly independent states
(NIS), and assisting in stabilizing them by way of democracy promotion and free market
reforms.43 The last two of these issues found a natural residence within the USIA, which
in suddenly uncertain times embraced the new assignments like a company venturing into
an untapped market. The Freedom Support Act of October 1992 provided an assistance

40 For a more dedicated historical review of this nature, see Stephen Johnson and Helle Dale, "How to
Foundation, 2003), 2-4.
41 Donald E. Nuechterlein, America Recommitted: A Superpower Assesses Its Role in a Turbulent World
(Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2001), 215-17; David Gergen, "Adopting U.S. Foreign
Policy Making to Changing Domestic Circumstances," in Beyond the Beltway: Engaging the Public in U.S.
Foreign Policy, ed. Daniel Yankelovich and I.M. Destler (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994),
78-93.
42 James Baker, quoted in Nuechterlein, America Recommitted, 214.
43 Nuechterlein, America Recommitted, 216.
package for Russia and the NIS which substantially raised financial support for
democratic institutions. Among them was the “America Houses” initiative – a self-styled
‘home base’ for American public and private sector workers stationed abroad to aid in
carrying out their assistance programs. The Act also offered increased funding for a large
segment of students within the NIS wishing to study in the United States, with the goal of
providing the opportunity to hundreds of undergraduate and graduate students, and
thousands of high-school students.\(^4\)

In total, USIA’s fiscal year 1993 budget for work in the NIS had doubled from the
previous fiscal year to over $97 million. The budget composition stressed exchange
programs ($64.65 million), followed by broadcasting ($14.74 million), salaries and
expenses ($14.5 million), and USIA publications ($3.5 million).\(^5\) These figures reflected
two trends that appeared to dominate early in the post-Cold War reallocation of resources.
First, there was a clear imperative to fill the vacuum opened up by the departure of
communism into areas with a previously nonexistent American presence. Second
educational and cultural exchange programs were chosen to spearhead U.S. involvement
in these politically fragile areas, and in turn these programs enjoyed a welcome, though
brief, windfall. Between 1991 and 1994 the combined budget for educational and cultural
exchanges more than doubled (from $163 million to $351 million). This sharp increase
may be traced not only to democracy promotion in former communist countries such as
the NIS, but also to a broader attempt in the early to mid-1990’s to use exchange as a
method to encourage free markets. One notable case involves the role of exchanges in
laying the groundwork for the passage of the North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA)

\(^4\) USIA European Wireless File, “USIA Programs and Initiatives in NIS,” 5 April 1993, 4-9.
\(^5\) Ibid., 1.
in 1993. According to Nancy Snow, the USIA’s International Visitor Program “brought key Mexicans to the U.S. and key U.S. citizens to Mexico to meet with pro-NAFTA sectors.” Snow also adds that “in a six-week period during October and November 1993, USIS-Mexico received six congressional delegations.”

By comparison, what came to be viewed as boom years for the engagement side of public diplomacy proved equally decimating for the information side in that U.S. international broadcasting and its costly infrastructure yielded to free markets and technological advancement, the very things its programs promised to listeners during the Cold War:. In a stroke of irony, it appeared that these stations had so succeeded in doing their jobs that they had made themselves expendable. Audiences once loyal to VOA and RFE/RL gravitated to new homegrown radio and television stations. Meanwhile, by the mid-1990’s the Russian listenership of VOA shortwave broadcasts, now free from signal jamming, dropped to 5 percent, as opposed to 13 percent during the Cold War when it was routinely being jammed. Private television outlets, on the other hand, garnered an increasingly high proportion of the global audience as demonstrated by the “CNN effect” during the 1991 Gulf War. Between 1992 and 1995, VOA absorbed a 25 percent reduction in staff, suffered a cut in direct broadcast hours from 1,080 to 850 hours weekly, and cancelled numerous language services. However, an even more damaging illustration of government-sponsored international broadcasting appears shortly after the inauguration of President Clinton, whose first federal budget proposed the termination of

48 Snyder, Warriors of Disinformation, 270.
RFE/RL by 1996 at a reported savings of $210 million per year. The move elicited a furious lobbying campaign to save the stations, including an intervention on the part of Czech President Vaclav Havel, who convinced President Clinton to accept moving RFE/RL's headquarters in 1995 from Munich to Prague, where it now resides. Budget tightening also motivated the passage of the U.S. International Broadcasting Act of 1994, whereby consolidation of government-sponsored international broadcasting under a single board. The Broadcasting Board of Governors aimed to eliminate duplicate language services and increase strategic focus.

What this comparison demonstrates is not unlike many other such fluctuations endured by public diplomacy institutions in prior decades, where a fixed amount of resources is pooled into one area at the cost of another. Meanwhile, the net figures for budget and staffing sank. From 1990 to 1996 the USIA opened 26 new posts, most in the former Soviet Union, but elsewhere closed 28 and cut total staffing by 19 percent. In fact, a closer look at public diplomacy between 1991 and 1995 gradually reveals more of its unstable footing as time wore on. The aggregate downward trend of all public diplomacy programs was compounded by the decisive development of the National Performance Review (NPR), a project launched in the first months of the Clinton administration that aimed to "redesign, to reinvent, to reinvigorate the entire national government". Over the duration of the Clinton presidency it is believed that the NPR, headed by Vice President Al Gore motivated the reduction of the U.S. government workforce by approximately 426,000, shrinking in size thirteen of fourteen targeted

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50 Snyder, *Warriors of Disinformation*, 269.
agencies. One of its purposes meant to slim down the practice of public diplomacy, first
with the consolidation of international broadcasting as described above, but also in the
replacement of overseas USIS posts. This measure involved transferring USIS library
contents to the local libraries of host countries and, when possible, relocating resources to
the nascent internet.

These tasks were underway in 1994 when the Department of State, responding to
the objectives set out in the NPR, produced its own restructuring plan titled the Strategic
Management Initiative (SMI) in October of that year. The SMI led to the landmark
proposal by Secretary of State Warren Christopher in January 1995 for the Department to
assume control of the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, and USIA. In a strange turn of events the SMI was rejected by the
White House, which preferred an alternative strategy to trimming the budgets of these
agencies while maintaining their independence. It was instead embraced by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, which in March 1995 promptly introduced legislation — the
Foreign Relations Revitalization Act — to abolish the three agencies. Unlike previous
attempts at restructuring, when specific components of the American public diplomacy
apparatus were targeted, this marked the first time since its inception in 1953 that the
USIA faced the very real threat of complete abolition. There had been one other occasion
remotely of this kind — in 1974, when a panel at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies produced a set of recommendations on updating public diplomacy institutions that
temporarily transformed the USIA into the U.S. International Communication Agency

The remarkable aspects of using legislation to redistribute public diplomacy institutions rests first and foremost on a similar desire to adapt public diplomacy to a changed world. In the opinion of Senator Olympia Snowe, one of the Act's initial co-sponsors, this new environment called for integrating public diplomacy:

"...into our basic foreign policymaking institutions. The world has changed dramatically in the last decade and, with it, the demands on our foreign policy structure. Gone is the cold war and the certainty of a single opposing force in our foreign relations. Gone, too, is the highly focused foreign policy we once waged against an expansionist and authoritarian Soviet Union and its satellites."

Yet this primary interest in adaptation was overridden by a domestic imperative to slash costs. Snowe continued:

"In the 1990's we face a new imperative: To maintain a strong, aggressive foreign policy, but to streamline our operations, achieve cost savings, and meet the new criteria of a changing world. State Department consolidation is an idea whose time has come."

This caveat to the adaptation argument effectively set in motion the political machinery which would ultimately abolish the USIA. It is only due to an high-profile struggle over foreign affairs reforms between President Clinton and Senator Helms that the process took three years to complete.

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Having already sustained heavy losses in the first part of the 1990’s and poised to lose more, U.S. public diplomacy institutions appeared inextricably enmeshed in the general devaluation of foreign affairs by the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government. Despite the momentum of this trend and the underpinning political forces at play, its potentially negative effects on the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs did not go unnoticed. The overriding goal of budget reduction, as Muravchik pointed out in 1996, dealt too severely with foreign policy pursuits, and as a share of GDP foreign policy spending had diminished by one-third from the end of the Cold War up to 1996. It dealt too severely, he added, because marginalizing foreign policy amounted to paying off the budget deficit at the expense of foreign policy, as if to ignore that the U.S. economy actually did possess the financial resources to shoulder a stronger foreign policy. Indeed, by 1996 the U.S. economy had entered a period of remarkable growth as GDP would increase by 3.7 percent over 1995. Budget-reducing measures caused a steady decline in the federal deficit, and within two years it would move into surplus for the first time since 1969. Why seek reductions from the one percent of the federal budget allotted to foreign affairs, Muravchik asked. Moreover, it could not be proved that the end of the Cold War necessarily eliminated all potential threats to American security. Contrary to “End of History” assertions, uncertainty still very much hovered over the liberal democracies of the former Soviet Union, and civil war raged in former

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Yugoslavia. In areas such as the Middle East, Afghanistan and North Korea regimes hostile to the United States remained at large, and the economic rise of China also left a number of global security issues unresolved.

Along these lines, new and compelling ideas arguing in favor of a stronger and more nimble public diplomacy architecture emerged to stave off debilitating reforms and cuts. Mobilization of these ideas centered on a firm belief that information technology would define the conduct of foreign relations in the coming future, and that more rather than less of an investment in public diplomacy would be required to meet this demand. At the time of Muravchik's writing, Joseph Nye and Admiral William Owens helped stimulate this discourse by building on the soft power thesis in conceiving of and "information edge" for the United States, whose advantages, among others, lay in engaging undemocratic states, facilitating democratic transitions, and preventing and resolving conflicts.\(^6\)\(^0\) To take advantage of this would rely heavily on a robust delivery of information programs from the USIA, not only in the form of radio programs as in the Cold War but other newer forms of media including the internet. Nye and Owens found the proposal to eliminate the USIA, "ironic...just when its potential is greatly expanding," and urged Congress to protect it with adequate funding.\(^6\)\(^1\) The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy strongly opposed plans that would weaken public diplomacy further and had already argued against a merger between the USIA and Department of State the previous year.\(^6\)\(^2\) It repeatedly cautioned against slashing the USIA budget and, when the final decision came in 1997 for USIA's eventual elimination, it turned its attention towards the future. Inspired by the Nye/Owens article, the Advisory

\(^6\)\(^1\) Ibid., 30-36.
Commission took the intriguing step of reframing public diplomacy activities in the context of the 'information age' -- a future in which power resources would be derived increasingly from the ability to gather, process and share information for military, social, economic and political aims. The future-oriented view of the Advisory Commission held that traditional tools of diplomacy, particularly those treating the opinions of foreign publics as an afterthought, were giving way to a 'new diplomacy' comprised of tools and skills to meet the challenges of a more informed and complex web of actors on the international scene and a growing number of transnational issues such as immigration, the environment and organized crime. The New Diplomacy equated to vast increases of three resources: investment in interactive digital technologies enabling voice, video, print and data communication with U.S. missions abroad, foreign audiences and non-governmental organizations; shifting of international broadcasting resources away from radio and into television and toward the internet; and embracing distance learning capabilities using digitized reference services and libraries. In short, the Commission assented to the need for a rethinking in public diplomacy already underway, but in a manner more mindful of new opportunities in a changed world. Contrary to the legislations being considered in Congress, the Commission's plan advocated for halting budget reductions, increasing capital investments, and enhancing public diplomacy's policy advisory role, but above all maintaining organizational independence.

Meanwhile, any real powers retained by public diplomacy institutions continued to erode as budgets fell further from 1996 onward. Educational and cultural exchanges that had seen a brief surge in funding as a consequence of higher participation in the

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64 U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, A New Diplomacy for the Information Age, November 1996.
65 Ibid.
former Soviet Union now sustained drastic cuts across the board. The federal appropriation for the Fulbright Program was reduced by one-third between FY 1995 and FY 1996. Efforts were underway to raise contributions from partner nations and the private sector, but these alternate sources could muster only 63 cents for every dollar spent by the U.S. government. The budget of the famed International Visitor Program, which organized travel programs for foreign professional to gain exposure to American culture, and was known for famous alumni such as Margaret Thatcher, Anwar Sadat and Indira Gandhi, also fell by 20 percent in one year. Between 1996 to 1998, the total budget for educational and cultural exchanges would fall by 22 percent in constant dollars. International broadcasting would witness a drop in its own budget from $487 million in 1994 to $350 million by the end of 1996, trimming approximately 1,500 staff in the process. The consolidation of RFE/RL and VOA settled under the new Broadcasting Board of Governors, which absorbed Cuba-focused Radio and TV Martí and somehow launched Radio Free Asia in late September of 1996.

In spite of all this, any lasting hopes that these adjustments would prevent the restructuring under consideration in the Senate were soon dashed by an announcement on 18 April 1997 that the Clinton administration would reverse its original objection of the SMI and support a comprehensive reorganization of foreign affairs agencies. This reversal can be explained in part by the efforts of Senator Jesse Helms, a long-serving Republican senator from North Carolina. As Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1994, he had established a reputation for himself as the bête noir to many foreign affairs initiatives promoted by the Clinton administration, and displayed a

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special disdain for USAID, ACDA, and USIA. The basis of his sentiment derived from an unwavering view that certain government agencies were meant to have terminal existences, as expressed in the following:

"...Back in the middle of the 20th century—and when I say that I sound like I’m talking about a long time ago—Congress created a number of temporary, independent federal agencies. I think it was a bad mistake. If I had been here, I would not have voted to do that, having the hindsight that I have."

To be sure, the conservative Senator Helms echoed an ideological suspicion that keeping so-called “temporary” federal agencies in operation would lead to the expansion of government. Helms illustrated his own reservations of some agencies’ tendencies to outlive their usefulness by quoting Ronald Reagan: “There is nothing so near eternal life,” he said, “as a temporary Federal agency.” Helms exhibited his hostility toward foreign affairs institutions in other ways; he lobbied vigorously for reform at the United Nations through his blockage of nearly $1 billion in arrearages owed by the United States, thwarted a series of ambassadorial nominations, and was successful in obstructing important international treaties from Senate ratification. One of the treaties targeted by Helms was the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), an international pledge by which its nation-signatories would agree never "to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone." Signed in January 1993 by President George H.W. Bush, it had been awaiting ratification from Congress for over three and a half years, and with six months remaining

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69 Ibid.
until going into force with or without the United States as a signatory. The first session of the 105th Congress (1997) would determine the fate of the CWC.

In demonstrating a willingness to negotiate the treaty toward its ratification, the Clinton administration assigned new Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright to front a conciliatory campaign in order to win over the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. At her confirmation hearing Albright assented to keeping an open mind about the pending reorganization of foreign affairs agencies, and served notice to Senator Helms of the bargaining to come. In the ensuing months Albright would work to forge a constructive relationship with Helms, which included a famous appearance together, hand-in-hand, for a joint lecture with Helms in North Carolina on 25 March 1997. The strategy proved remarkably effective. Only two weeks prior in Washington, Helms warned that the treaty “would not leave my committee”; in North Carolina with Albright, Helms announced “there’s a very good chance that there could be a treaty.”

However, it is widely speculated that Helms’ change in tone was less related to such political theatre than the imminent revelation of the backing of the restructuring plan by the administration, an issue that Albright and Helms had been discussing privately, and this in turn fuelled the theory that Helms’ tacit concession on the CWC, which passed

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71 Helms clarified his opposition to the treaty, in an open letter to Senator Trent Lott on 29 January 1997, with concerns about 1) elimination of chemical weapons in Russia and in other countries of concern; 2) high confidence in the CWC’s verifiability; 3) US responses to noncompliance with the CWC; 4) the primacy of the US Constitution vis-à-vis the CWC; and 5) protection of confidential business data.
73 Of this event, Thomas Lippman wrote: “the two flattered each other, praised each other, and promised to cooperate when they could and disagree respectfully when necessary. Helms, sitting at a front-row desk, beamed like an infatuated schoolboy as Albright discussed world affairs...” In Thomas W. Lippman, Madeleine Albright and the New American Diplomacy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), 43.
the Senate by a margin of 3-to-1 on 24 April 1997, depended on the reinvigorated restructuring plan endorsed by Clinton a week earlier. Though Clinton initially denied any bargaining of this sort had occurred, an array of sources spoke to the contrary, including two members of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy from that time. Clinton himself would later admit in his 2004 autobiography that an exchange of the USIA and ACDA for the ratification of the CWC had indeed taken place. A report from the Henry L. Stimson Center cites an anonymous Albright staffer who reasoned that the quid pro quo allowed Helms “to lose with dignity”, implying special attention given to preserving the senator’s position in the wake of defeat.

With the path now cleared of the greatest obstacles, legislators proceeded over the next eighteen months to fine-tune the bill, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, that would put into law unprecedented changes for public diplomacy. As expected, political wrangling persisted throughout the period, notably on the issues of U.N. debt repayment and the notorious “Mexico City policy” involving government support for foreign family planning agencies believed to be performing abortions. On a separate track, a task force formed to plan the consolidation to USIA into the Department of State. Resigned to the fate of being dismantled, the primary goal of each division within the USIA was to find a way to remain relatively intact and yet integrate into the Department. The interagency task force agreed that the Education and Cultural Affairs

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75 Harold C. Pachios, interview by the author, Portland, USA, 19 December 2005, and Bruce Gregory, telephone interview by the author, 1 February 2006.
76 Bill Clinton. My Life (New York: Random House, 2004), 753: “I spent most of the month [April 1997] in an intense effort to convince the Senate to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention: calling and meeting with members of Congress; agreeing with Jesse Helms to move the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the U.S. Information Agency into the State Department in return for his allowing a vote on the CWC, which he opposed…”
division (ECA), home to the Fulbright Program and Humphrey Fellowship, would be left largely unchanged and be overseen by a new Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The USIA’s Bureau of Information, also known as the “I-Bureau”, which oversaw “rapid response” implementations of public diplomacy strategies, including for specific requests of U.S. missions abroad, crisis situations and national security initiatives, transformed into the new Office of International Information Programs (IIP). The Bureau of Research and Media Reaction, responsible for measuring the effectiveness of public diplomacy programs through polling and analysis of foreign media, merged with the Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. USIS libraries would cease to exist after the merger and functionally resume as Information Resource Centers, managed by the new Bureau of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. A relatively long struggle ensued in Congress over the placement of international broadcasting out of concern over budgetary oversight, which a large agency could perform, and the matter of journalistic integrity that an agency affiliation might put at risk. Ultimately, the latter argument won out in the Senate and the VOA, surrogate home stations, and television broadcasting unit came under the control of the Broadcasting Board of Governors with conditional and organizational ties to the Department.

On 1 October 1999 these changes went into effect and the USIA disappeared after forty-six years in operation. In effect, public diplomacy became the shared responsibility of the Department of State and the BBG. Having been shed of their organizational

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79 Heil, Voice of America, 362-3. The Act included requirements, for instance, to “require the inclusion of U.S. government editorials in VOA programming” and a stipulation to “support United States foreign policy objectives during crises abroad”. Organizationally, the Secretary of State would come to hold a permanent ex-officio role on the BBG Board.
independence, the component parts of public diplomacy became dispersed across both agencies. The capacity to engage with foreign audiences through exchanges resided in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs while the Office of International Information Programs supervised information-gathering and dissemination, with neither able to coordinate or easily provide guidance to the other. The two years preceding 9/11 would yield mixed reviews on how well the new arrangement would deliver on these imperatives, not only projecting outwards to foreign audiences, but also working and communicating at the core of its organization.

3.5 Relocation into the State Department, 1999-2001

Under new management, U.S. public diplomacy would proceed into a new chapter of its existence remade as an operation within the Department of State. In essence, the merger took the form of a crude marriage done in such a way as to force two misshapen pieces into fitting together. In an auspicious moment prior to the completion of the merger, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 68 (PDD 68) calling for cooperation between senior officials from the Defense, Commerce, State, Justice, Commerce and Treasury Departments, along with the Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Intelligence, to establish an International Public Information (IPI) Core Group to "influence foreign audiences in support of US foreign policy and to counteract propaganda by enemies of the United States." Aiming to respond to an immediate need for one agency to develop information/influence strategies in engagements in Kosovo and Haiti, it was issued in secret and top aides at both the USIA and State Department were

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decidedly left out of the picture.81 One year after the merger, it soon became apparent through reports that in spite of assurances from Secretary Albright, it had not been as successful as hoped.82 The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy reported a range of divisive structural issues obstructing a smooth transition. In its October 2000 report, the Commission observed how "getting things done in the public diplomacy field has proven to be much more difficult since consolidation."83 Navigating the complex bureaucratic organization within the State Department proved frustrating for former USIA officers in that the policy orientation of the Department did not mesh well with the program orientation of USIA. The State Department, the report noted, "does policy, not programs. USIA was all about programs."84

While some functional programs such as the "I-Bureau" and ECA remained mostly intact, the integration spread many public diplomacy programs and specialists among the Department’s many annexes. Once accustomed to working beneath one roof, former USIA employees soon found themselves physically dispersed and out of regular contact. They also encountered bias in selections for senior positions based on their backgrounds in public diplomacy, and many mid-level staff performing public diplomacy duties discovered a wide gulf separating them from policy-relevant matters, hence

81 Ben Barber, "Group Will Battle Propaganda Abroad," Washington Times, 28 July 1999. The IPI has continued under the Bush administration, known colloquially as the “Fusion Team”. However, it is difficult to ascertain the relevance of the IPI alongside newer initiatives such as the Office of Global Communication, created to establish consistency of messages among principal agencies dealing in foreign affairs, and the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee, orchestrated by the National Security Council also for the purpose of increasing interagency cooperation.
82 House Committee on International Relations, International Affairs Budget Request; Budget Views and Estimates, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 16 February 2000. Albright testified that “the Department’s integration with ACDA and USIA has been successful.”
83 U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Consolidation of the USIA into the State Department, 7.
84 Ibid., 8.
challenging one of the very arguments for the merger in the first place. Overall, it was concluded that the State Department had thus far not embraced, nor had it allocated ample attention to its new public diplomacy responsibilities. Incumbents at the Department were prone to regarding the practice as a "waste of time" and subordinate to more pressing policy matters.

The period of transition under the newly-elected Bush administration in early 2001 did little to resolve these ongoing issues, with the exception of new ideas proposed by the incoming Secretary of State Colin Powell. Foremost among them was the nomination of a former advertising executive, Charlotte Beers to be his Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Beers’ nomination represented an intriguing choice for the job. An advertising industry legend, Beers first made a name for herself in the 1960’s managing the account of Uncle Ben’s, a brand of instant rice, for the venerable J. Walter Thompson advertising firm, for whom in the 1970’s she helped steer the fortunes of companies such as Sears, and, in her heralded reprise at the firm two decades later, IBM. The branding of America would be her next assignment.

With Beers’ pedigree, Powell’s gambit showed promise and, at the very least, suggested a genuine interest on the part of the new administration in revitalizing public diplomacy in a post-USIA era. However, as the months in anticipation of her confirmation dragged on through the summer, much doubt remained about the prospect of a clear public diplomacy vision for the 21st century, put at risk not merely by the fractured relationship between ex-USIA officers and the Department of State, but also by fears that the sluggish State bureaucracy hampered the ability of public diplomats to keep sharp, as

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85 U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, *Consolidation of the USIA into the State Department.*
86 Blinken, "Winning the War of Ideas," 105.
Nye and Owens had advocated in 1996 and the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 1998, an information edge in communicating with the rest of the world. As one close observer had concluded around that time, “In the nearly two years since reorganization... no new vision has been put forward for American diplomacy, and not nearly enough has been done to bring State's mission into the information age.” The Internet, for instance, continued to be underexploited at State, where, contrary to USIA employees who benefited from agency-wide access, providing a similar outlet for officers remained years away.

In the field, with new forms of media such as satellite television and high-speed Internet service rapidly proliferating in areas of high geopolitical importance, an upgrade from the Cold War mainstay of analog radio transmission appeared long overdue. However, the plans for such an upgrade remained unfinished as the modernization of Voice of America had been ongoing since 1995, and resources for broadcasting of news outlets via the Internet were noticeably absent from the BBG’s FY 2001 plan. Lacking in these and other information technologies, with operations clearly in flux, and a new Under Secretary waiting in the wings, U.S. public diplomacy approached 9/11 with what best characterized as a severely weakened organization and no clear strategic vision. Knowing this, of course, makes it less surprising to the keen observer that it would not perform up to the enormous task soon to be set out.

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88 The rollout of the OpenNet Plus, a system providing agency-wide and unlimited Internet access, was not completed until early 2003.
3.6 To 9/11 and After

The period of 1991 to 2001 informs understanding post-9/11 public diplomacy in two significant ways. First is the way in which the end of the Cold War altered America's pursuit of relations with the rest of the world, and the second involves domestic desires for an overhaul of the 'anachronistic' public diplomacy system that persisted into the post-Cold War era. However, one must take into account both the changing dynamic of power in the international system between 1989 and 1991 as well as the way leading scholars were interpreting the impact of the events of those years. Their interpretations weighed heavily on the minds of policymaking elites in the United States and the triumph of the American revivalists influenced the employment of public diplomacy for the next decade. Persuaded by the vindicated revivalist argument that the standing of the United States after the Cold War rested on firm ground, American policy elites and legislators determined that the 'peace dividend' afforded the downgrading of public diplomacy in forthcoming years. Ironically, it was the apparent revival in American power that facilitated the decline of its public diplomacy.

While the first two years of the USIA-State merger suffered from a host of challenges, this would not be enough to command the full attention of political leadership until well into the post-9/11 period, to which this study now turns.
CHAPTER 4 : REDISCOVERY IN THE POST-9/11 ERA

Thus far, the recent history of American foreign affairs up to 2001 depicts among other things a diminishing regard for public diplomacy among influential political elites. These attitudes shifted virtually overnight after 9/11, but only enough to rekindle interest levels that had waned over the course of ten years. Organizationally, much had changed with the phasing out of the USIA and merging of public diplomacy institutions into the Department of State. Substantively, however, little had been done to transform public diplomacy into a 21st century operation. In the 9/11-inspired “battle for hearts and minds” U.S. public diplomacy would prove more of a non-entity than an asset to American foreign policymakers and to the United States itself. In the course of tracing the post-9/11 history of U.S. public diplomacy, this chapter raises a number of factors, including domestic wrangling over strategy and organization and the climate of public opinion abroad, to yield this conclusion. These are but a few of the leading causes for why U.S. public diplomacy could not rise to meet the challenges laid out before it in the post-9/11 era, and in the following pages their development will be tracked over the tenures of four Under Secretaries of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Their approaches and responses to the public diplomacy conundrum continuing into this time period will be presented to parallel the period’s history and the emergence of several key developments affecting the international standing of the United States – the inclination towards unilateralism in dealing with problems of international security and order, attempting to advance a bold agenda for democratization in the Middle East, and sustaining a barrage of international criticism in its dealing with both matters.
The United States during this period is seen to assert itself in some ways that its superpower status can afford and other ways it could not. It unleashed its vast military capabilities on the suspected forces that aided in realizing the 9/11 attacks, but did not do so without angering adversarial as well as allied populations. The American successes in its brief and efficient confrontations with other armies contrast sharply with the protracted and as yet unresolved 'battles' with global public opinion. The unforeseen consequences of the latter grew out of challenges reflecting the changing nature by which governments and foreign populations communicate with each other and the rising relevance of 'soft' qualities such as image and credibility. It has remained unresolved as to whether hearts and minds may be properly viewed as a commodity to be won, won without compromise, and if so, to what ends. The years after 9/11 chart the slow progress of the United States recognizing the salience of these non-military challenges and the ways in which it has confronted them.

4.1 Birth of a ‘Battle’

Of the new terminology burned into the parlance of many Americans in the sobering aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, none captured the new national mood any better than those pertaining to war. The sense of invasion invoked a search for placing the event's magnitude in context with those the past, drawing comparisons with the infamous 1941 Japanese invasion of Pearl Harbor that signaled the entry of the United States into World War Two. With solemn acquiescence, Americans shored up their

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support for the wartime presidency of George W. Bush, who in the days that followed characterized the national response succinctly as the ‘war on terror’. An endless stream of special news broadcasts and published reports catapulted the phrase into immediate circulation, and national attention soon gravitated towards how such a war would be waged, who would be targeted, and how to define the war’s scope and dimensions. Preparing the public for these questions, Bush offered foresight into the unique nature of what lay ahead:

>This war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war above Kosovo two years ago...Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen.3

Fighting an elusive enemy characterized only by its proclivity to cause ‘terror’ also provoked declarations of this being a ‘new’ or ‘different’ kind of war, and commentators, under no illusions it would be over immediately, soon grappled with its long-term ramifications. Within a week of the attacks, the online version of The Economist released an article discussing the commencement of parallel war, “the battle for hearts and minds”. Of this struggle, the article boldly asserted that the United States was already losing foreign support barely a week into its war on terror. Displeasure of Arabs toward the American campaign was “rising fast”, and, more surprisingly, its

2 ‘War against terror’ first used publicly in 9/11 address to country and South Lawn address on September 16, 2001. First indications of a strategy to pursue the ‘war on terror’ began to emerge in Bush’s address to the Joint Session of Congress on September 20, 2001.
authors also sensed rumblings of European discontent on the upswing. Winning the battle would require the United States to convince the world, and to a large degree the Arab-Muslim world, of its political and moral justifications for prosecuting the new war.

From an etymological perspective, it is worth pointing out that language of the 'hearts and minds' variety re-emerged, in a sense, after a conspicuous absence. Not since the Cold War had Americans viewed themselves in the midst of an ideological struggle, only this "noxious mix of religious cant and anti-Western demagoguery" propagated by Osama bin Laden and others of the extremist ilk of Islam seemed vastly more complex and in some respects more unsettling than the erstwhile communist threat. During the Cold War, for example, the functional epicenter of the communist movement in and around the Soviet Union facilitated the concentration of most American-led containment activities. Intelligence in the wake of the 9/11 attacks estimated over 50 clandestine al-Qaeda cells in existence worldwide, thus illustrating the enemy's elusive and surreptitious nature. As with the Cold War, fighting the war on terror would require a multi-faceted approach which would not only disarm the aggressors, but also delegitimize their purposes in the minds of would-be sympathizers. To some, the United States had fought and won a "war of ideas" before, and to do so again would call for an approach that was seen to prevail in the past: to pursue an aggressive campaign to persuade misinformed and, in some cases, uninformed audiences of the sincerity of American intentions and the moral clarity of its values.

4.2  *An Old Formula for a New Era*

The clearest and most concise language articulating the post-9/11 thrust of U.S. public diplomacy is found steeped in the provisions of its 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS), which contends for promoting "the free flow of information and ideas to kindle the hopes and aspirations of freedom of those in societies ruled by the sponsors of global terrorism." In a similar fashion, the 2006 version of the NSS urged public diplomats to "advocate the policies and values of the United States in a clear, accurate, and persuasive way to a watching and listening world." When put into practice, these amounted to an expansion in the scope of broadcasting capabilities, including new shortwave radio stations in the Middle East – Radio Sawa (Arabic) and Radio Farda (Farsi) – and an Arabic-langauge satellite network, Al Hurra, launched in February 2004. The ill-fated Shared Values Initiative, a multimedia campaign launched in 2001 to impress upon Arab-Muslims the contentment of fellow Muslims residing in the United States, ran aground when many other Arabic-language media chose to not cooperate in the project. Another education initiative included the establishment of "American Corners" -- overseas information centers specifically targeting younger audiences to expose them to "diverse and representative views of American life, and U.S. foreign policies". From 2002 through 2005, nearly 260 American Corners were opened worldwide. In fact, from this picture one could argue the United States pursues public diplomacy in the post-9/11 era as it did during the Cold War era – an uncompromising promotional campaign of the U.S.

role in the world, a high reliance on dissemination of value-laden messages, and a worldwide cultivation of positive associations with the United States, especially among a new generation of youth.

If the overarching strategy of U.S. public diplomacy after 9/11 seemed merely to repackage old messages to deal with a new set of problems, its institutions proved equally if not more unsuitable to the tasks at hand. Of 25 reports released in the post-9/11 period containing suggested improvements in the conduct of public diplomacy, a vast majority of recommendations focused on organization: reorganizing public diplomacy at the White House, creating a new public diplomacy agency, redefining the role of the under secretary, increasing embassy involvement, “coordinating better”, increasing private sector involvement, and increasing financial and/or human resources. Most of the criticism herein has been leveled at the U.S. Department of State, which after absorbing the merger of the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1999 proceeded to systematically disperse its components amongst the Department’s many bureaus. The net result produced the Bureau of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, which in the aftermath of 9/11 has seen at the helm four different under secretaries -- a job made no less challenging by continuous devolution and interagency turf wars during this time.  

For instance, it was disclosed in February 2002 that the U.S. Department of Defense had set up within two months of the 9/11 attack its own clandestine communications bureau, the Office of Strategic Influence (OSI) to purvey news items, including false ones, to foreign audiences. In June 2002 the White House, at the urging of then-Counselor to the President Karen Hughes, launched the Office of Global Communications (OGC) with


the goal of consolidating strategic communications from the U.S government into consistent messages for overseas audiences. Meanwhile, three months later the National Security Council established another similar entity, the Strategic Communications Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) to "coordinate interagency activities, to ensure that all agencies work together and with the White House to develop and disseminate the President's messages across the globe." \(^{12}\)

They were not to last, however, as each would be rendered either inactive or ineffective within two years. The public outcry over the OSI forced Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to dissolve it one week after its disclosure; by late 2004 the OGC would be deemed a "second-tier organization" with no involvement whatsoever in strategic matters; and the PCC met several times with "marginal impact" over the course of its brief history − it would disband in 2003.\(^{13}\) From these and other false starts, it becomes understandable why observers would devote so much attention to the reorganization of public diplomacy agencies, but no less important are the consequences of these miscues as they reverberate into the pursuit of strategy. Countering negative foreign sentiment over foreign policy may depend on deft persuasion (if not a changes in the policies themselves), but such disarray severely diminishes the likelihood that persuasive arguments may emerge at all.

To be fair, most observers recognize that post-9/11 failures experienced by the United States are not limited to domestic mishandling of strategy and organization. There


are also the overriding challenges of practicing public diplomacy in the ‘information age.’ Much has changed since the days of the Cold War, when “public diplomacy efforts ran essentially one way” and “programs and activities were pushed out to target audiences”.14 In those years, the main challenges of public diplomacy amounted to perfecting the means to reach populations with limited information about the world within and beyond their borders, and, as a result, deprived to some degree of their political participation. But by a proliferation of information and communications technologies (ICT’s) it has become far more difficult for governments to control information flows as was once possible. Whereas the Soviet Union could at one time filter information by jamming the shortwave radio signals of the BBC and Voice of America with some success during the Cold War, internet usage in the 21st century has skyrocketed in Russia and former Warsaw Pact countries. In the period between 2000 and 2006, Russia’s internet usage increased by over 660 percent to include 23.7 million users, or over 16 percent of its population.15 In almost the same period, worldwide mobile phone usage doubled from one to two billion users, and as services multiply and diversified, mobile phones allowed information to travel across a staggering range at lightning speed.16 Satellite television broadcasting world events in real time to all parts of the world and far surpass the pace, versatility and news-gathering resources of government-operated information channels. With all these developments benefiting the consumer, the information problematic of the post-9/11 era has not revolved around access, as it had in the past but rather the increasingly scarce commodity of attention.

14 Christopher Ross, “Public Diplomacy Comes of Age,” The Washington Quarterly 25 (Spring 2002): 82.
To Joseph Nye this arrangement has resulted in a trend he has called a ‘paradox of plenty’. It is a situation where information is so abundant that overwhelmed audiences seek to “distinguish the valuable information from background clutter” in order to be better informed than their would-be adversaries. Nye views the proliferation of ICT’s as a kind of large-scale power distribution mechanism, a function of his assertion that “information is power” and that ICT’s enable larger segments of the world’s population to gain access to that power. In consequence, the decentralization of information control by governments combined with the spread of ICT’s allows smaller nations, sub-national groups, private organizations, and even foreign publics en masse to wield soft power to their advantage and sometimes with damaging impact to the soft power cache of more powerful states.\(^{17}\) One of the stark lessons to be gained from observing U.S. public diplomacy in practice during these years is how other international actors have used their own soft power caches to exploit worldwide negative perceptions of the United States. Therefore, the forthcoming chapter intends to discuss the consequences of new information technology landscape and the ‘paradox of plenty’ that constrains the ability of the United States to counter these negative perceptions.

### 4.3 Charlotte Beers and ‘Brand America’

On 15 March 2001 Secretary of State Colin Powell, barely two months into his post with the newly elected Bush administration, appeared before the House Budget Committee of the United States Congress to present his department’s budget for the coming fiscal year. Questions were asked about the Department of State’s seemingly

endless problem areas, including those of its reputedly weak organizational infrastructure dependant on outdated tools of diplomacy. On this point, Powell countered with an optimistic and ambitious plan to deal with these problems, drawing special attention to one new initiative: “I am going to be bringing people into the public diplomacy function of the Department who are going to change from just selling us in the old USIA (United States Information Agency) way to really branding foreign policy.” In short, Powell saw the potential of moving the Department of State beyond simply managing the foreign relations of the United States by transforming it into a world-class marketing machine. “Branding the Department, marketing the Department, marketing American values to the world,” he summarized.18

Though it seemed a minor footnote in a much broader vision for American preponderance, the comment indicated a fresh start was forthcoming for U.S. public diplomacy and, for those who had lamented its diminishing status for most of the 1990’s, the potential for revitalization. By 2001, some may have seen in Powell the opportunity of breathing new life into public diplomacy, but for all the talk of technology and virtual embassies it became evident Powell’s primary interests laid elsewhere. For while the Advisory Commission, Nye, Barry Fulton19 and others spent a good deal of the late 1990’s heralding the coming of the New Diplomacy, another thread of public diplomacy research interpreted its main challenges to be centered around the problem of public relations. Nobody could dispute the unparalleled advantage held by the United States in its capacity to develop and harness new technologies to exchange information, but there were also untapped benefits to be reaped by promoting to the world American values such

as liberal democracy, free markets and religious diversity. The principal question thus went: could nations like the United States gain from developing their values into a more concerted national image carrying persuasive messages? Much like a company crafts an image to persuade consumers to buy its products, only now the consumers would be foreign publics and the product the nation itself. It was the application of branding techniques to enhance the image of an entire country that gave rise to the concept of ‘nation-branding’ and an alternate form of soft power emphasizing image and reputation in addition to the powers of communication. “Soft power,” wrote nation-branding pioneer Simon Anholt, “is making people want to do what you want them to do, which is fundamental to the idea of branding and fundamental to the idea of America.” The consonance of the two ideas certainly appeared to strike a chord with Powell, who after recent stints on the boards of Gulfstream Aerospace and AOL may have been inspired to inject innovative private-sector wisdom into the outmoded ways of the State Department.

Two weeks after his March testimony to the House Budget Committee, Powell selected Charlotte L. Beers to be his Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The nomination of Beers, with whom Powell shared board membership at Gulfstream, resonated perfectly with the nation-branding vision, not to mention the Bush administration’s desire to “run government like a business.” A long-time advertising executive, Beers skillfully presided over three well-known agencies including the venerable J. Walter Thompson, where she built her own sterling reputation. She first made a name for herself at Thompson in the 1960’s as an upstart account manager for Uncle Ben’s, an American brand of instant rice. Her initial success at Thompson marked

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the first of many more to come, and in the 1970’s she helped steer the fortunes of companies such as Sears, and, in her heralded reprise at the firm two decades later, IBM. Even with the enormous task of branding America touted as her next assignment – her “most sophisticated” she would later remark – the nomination had gone largely unnoticed beyond a few footnotes in advertising industry publications and languished for the next several months in the congressional committees.

Meanwhile, public diplomacy remained low on the foreign relations agenda of the Bush administration during the first eight months of 2001 as did general concern for the national image. Leading up to the Bush victory in 2000, it had long been felt by conservative theorists of American foreign policy that the United States was too constrained by the rising number of international laws and treaties created throughout the Cold War and in the years thereafter. Now settled in the White House and emboldened by ideas intricately associated with ‘neoconservatives’, the foreign policy hawks of the Bush administration set about releasing itself from these commitments with the goal of freeing its hand in the management of foreign affairs. It did not occur without raising vociferous objections. In 2001, the United States withdrew from five international treaties, including the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty, and levied strong opposition to a host of others, such as the International Criminal Court and Kyoto Protocol, both of which had been negotiated under the Clinton administration. Responding to the new American position on Kyoto, the French minister for the environment deemed it “completely provocative and irresponsible” while then-EU Commission president Romano Prodi argued, “if one wants to be a world leader, one must know how to look after the entire

earth and not only American industry. In a defiant gesture to its predecessors, the Bush team also seemed to systematically extricate itself from preceding engagements in North Korea and the Middle East despite contradicting previous statements made by Powell that the U.S. would remain engaged. For his part, Powell would go on to be one of the least-traveled Secretaries of State in 30 years, mostly out of a disdain for flying, and in effect subordinating Murrow’s cardinal rule of bridging “the last three feet” between oneself and one’s interlocutor to accomplish effective public diplomacy.

Contrast this with the jarring effect of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, which among other outcomes produced the kind of interest in public diplomacy not seen among American policymakers and opinion leaders since the 1980’s. At that time, Charles Z. Wick presided over a relatively robust USIA for eight years and preserved its relevance in the Cold War effort in part through his close relationship with President Ronald Reagan. With war again on the horizon after 9/11, political leaders and policymakers ‘rediscovered’ public diplomacy only to find a much weaker organization, and a vacant post atop the muddled public diplomacy organizational chart at the Department of State. Within three weeks of the attacks, Congress accelerated Beers confirmation and rapidly approved her for the Under Secretary position. Here at the outset of the new “battle for hearts and minds” the radical new direction advocated by Powell, and reflected in Beers’ appointment in particular, assumed a level of relevance to American foreign policy that could not have been foreseen under pre-war circumstances. Beers did not waste time capitalizing on the sudden spike in political will and set out to package and sell American

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24 Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2005), 64.
values to skeptical audiences around the world. At her Senate confirmation hearing, she promised to seize "opportunities to put the legitimate emotional context of who the American people are and their messages in all channels of distribution."\(^{26}\)

However, with the attention also came scrutiny. Many questioned the wisdom of tapping an advertising executive, albeit an accomplished one, to assume such a suddenly vital role. There was a certain uneasiness with the new 'nation-branding' approach, and that the proposed packaging of the United States into a more digestible commodity for populations abroad would amount to a naïve folly. From a pragmatic standpoint some felt the United States presented too complex a subject for branding purposes. Said Wally Olins, one of the world's foremost practitioners in the branding of nations, "The US is outstanding in the sense that it is the only country in the world which is so well known that you can guarantee people from all other countries will have a view on it."\(^{27}\) The overall international perception of post-9/11 United States presented myriad viewpoints that various populations expressed in admiring and hostile tones; often times these associations contradicted themselves. Unlike starting from scratch with a new and unknown product, much of Beers' plan would involve challenging existing negative perceptions of the United States held by foreign populations, and in some cases reconciling variable strands of American identity into a consonant message. Marketing strategies aside, it did not escape observers that Beers crucially lacked any real foreign policy experience. "I'm not sure what an ad person brings to public diplomacy in a time of war," remarked William J. Drake of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "I just find the notion that you can sell Uncle Sam like Uncle Ben's highly problematic."\(^{28}\)


A Wall Street Journal column suggested that Beers was unfamiliar with the challenges presented by the Middle East: 

"[Beers] recently talked about using the Internet to get out the American message. That'd reach only the 1% of the Arab world that's wired."  

In spite of these deficiencies, Powell nevertheless stood by his choice: "She got me to buy Uncle Ben's rice. And so there is nothing wrong with getting somebody who knows how to sell something."

Under Beers' direction, the Department of State concentrated on improving relations with Arab-Muslim populations by churning out a series of brochures, books and multilingual television spots, which sought on one hand to explain who American people were, while denouncing the 9/11 attacks on the other. Ambitious projects such as one titled "American Rooms", involving multimedia kiosks strategically placed in non-Embassy partnering institutions worldwide exemplified part of the future-oriented vision, a desire to somehow endear the United States to "the 11-year old mind", that Beers wished to convert. While Bush confidant Karen Hughes coordinated day-to-day 'rapid response' functions from the White House so that government agencies could uniformly refute accusations emerging in the international media (a technique Hughes would later employ as Under Secretary), Beers sought to promote positive impressions of the United States using the Internet to launch two new pamphlet projects. The first, titled The Network of Terrorism, attempted to lay out a startling portrait of the newest global contagion while the second, Muslim Life in America, aimed to convince Muslim populations around the world that the two entities need not exist in a state of mutual

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exclusivity. Subtly articulated and decorated with gloss and human interest, each contained a singular message; the first inferred terrorism to be not merely inimical to the United States, but to humanity as well, while the second intended to establish commonalities between the Arab-Muslim world and the West. Working to bridge the cultural gaps by using a long-term communication plan driven by advertising techniques became a hallmark of the Beers public diplomacy strategy. Yet, in the same way that Uncle Ben’s and IBM cemented her golden reputation in the private sector, it would be another campaign known as the “Shared Values Initiative” that would establish her legacy at the State Department.

From the outset of 2002, the phrase “shared values” acquired a buzzword-like significance amongst public diplomacy practitioners, buttressed by the logic, in the words of one senior public affairs official, of “those who don’t like America don’t know America.” In April, as Beers canvassed lawmakers on Capitol Hill for increased funding of public diplomacy activities, signs of a bold new approach to communicating to foreign populations began to emerge, namely the acquisition of air time on foreign broadcast media outlets to run U.S. government-sponsored documentaries. Traditionally, U.S. government broadcasters transmitted material over their own outlets, such as VOA and the Worldnet television network, and thereby exercised full control over dissemination. In fact, parallel to this new approach the Broadcasting Board of Governors was months away from launching Radio Sawa, a new 24-hour, Arabic-

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32 Miranda Green, “Washington focuses on propaganda war: The White House is trying to make its PR as slick as its military in the battle to win hearts and minds,” Financial Times, 13 March 2002.
language radio service geared for younger audiences. Beers opted to embed her campaign within mainstream information sources as with the creation of the youth-oriented, Arabic-language glossy magazine *Hi* to fill a noticeable absence of favorable news and images of the United States in Arab-Muslim print media coverage. But Beers also stressed the comparative advantage of using local media to relay messages, evidenced by a speech to the National Defense University in September 2002 when she remarked, "Messages delivered by an independent third party will often carry an authenticity and credibility that government pronouncements cannot." With the help of the public relations firm McCann-Erickson, Beers applied a budget of $15 million to the production of a number of television spots to be broadcast on state-run television and satellite stations in the Middle East. The footage would portray a cross-section of Muslim Americans cheerfully describing their lifestyles with the purpose of debunking claims of American hostility towards Islam. As it happened, only four Muslim countries — Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan and Kuwait -- agreed to run the spots, while historically friendly countries such as Egypt and Lebanon surprisingly rejected the proposal. The popular pan-Arab satellite station al-Jazeera first agreed to broadcast but negotiations with the Department of State later collapsed over the matter of money. Sensing the Ramadan season as the ideal period for broadcasting, the Department pushed forward to run the spots from late October 2002 to early December 2003.34

36 Extended runs of the spots proceeded in Africa and Central Asia after the Middle Eastern campaign ended in January 2003, according to a briefing on 16 January 2003 by Department of State Spokesman Richard Boucher.
However, the completion of the broader campaign in Arab-Muslim countries—and very little to show for it—sparked a wave of domestic criticism signaling that it had failed in its objectives. In mid-January 2003, the Wall Street Journal circulated news that the indefinite suspension of the television campaign came about when State Department officials decided to “emphasize public relations rather than print ads”, although this reason was immediately rejected by Beers and Spokesman Richard Boucher. Other reasons for the rumored suspension drew on the fact that several countries refused to air the spots in the first place, which suggested a critical overestimation of foreign cooperation with what some states considered abetting foreign propaganda. More common critiques echoed the widely held view that Madison Avenue salesmanship had much to learn about U.S. foreign relations. “Simply showing that Muslims are happily integrated into American society isn’t even a good step towards tackling the real worries of Muslims abroad,” wrote Anholt of the Shares Values Initiative.

As it happened, the true concerns of the campaign’s would-be audiences had less to do with Muslim life inside the United States than the impact of American foreign policy on Muslim life outside. According to Youssef Ibrahim of the Council on Foreign Relations, the spots “failed because they weren’t credible in the first place” and that Beers was ill-suited to “put a gloss on policy” that curried no favor in the Arab-Muslim world. To be sure, the campaign faced an uphill battle in attempting to win over Arab nations just as the United States was gathering momentum to wage war upon one, Iraq, by March of that year. On the other hand, it seems the Beers approach also drew fire from those expecting some form of policy advocacy to be included in the overarching public

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38 Anholt and Hildreth, Brand America, 142.
diplomacy strategy.\textsuperscript{40} In fact, Beers steadfastly maintained that the Shared Values Initiative was not intended as a policy communication, but an attempt to seek a dialogue occurring beyond the parameters of policy.\textsuperscript{41} In eschewing the policy debate in favor of long-term inculcation of common values themes like faith and family, Beers made the mistake of implementing a long-term strategy for both long-term and short-term needs. Reporters and pundits regularly questioned the wisdom of her approach.\textsuperscript{42} More than that, it became evident that the gulf between public diplomacy and policy goals revealed an insurmountable caveat for her glittering product. As the Iraq War loomed in early 2003, Beers found herself mired in the contradictions of two campaigns – the public relations one that she championed and the impending military one, as she explained to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 27 February, “The gap between who we are and how we wish to be seen and how we are in fact seen, is frighteningly wide.”\textsuperscript{43} In four days time, Beers would tender her resignation.

\subsection*{4.4 Losing Ground in the ‘Battle for Hearts and Minds’}

In retrospect of Beers’ seventeen-month tenure in public service, one would be hard-pressed to draw any positive conclusions from her accomplishments. Part of the reason for this may be attributed to Beers’ inability to placate critics about her past.\textsuperscript{44} Her advertising experience, seen by Powell as a huge asset, in fact remained a liability from

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{41} Charlotte L. Beers, interview by Aaron Brown, NewsNight with Aaron Brown, CNN, 16 January 2003; Beers, Speech at the National Press Club, Washington, DC, 18 December 2002.
\item \textsuperscript{42} Nancy Snow asks, “Can you sell Uncle Sam the way you sell Uncle Ben?” in Propaganda, Inc.: Selling America's Culture to the World. New York: Seven Stories Press, 2002.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Senate Foreign Relations Committee, America and the Islamic World, 108\textsuperscript{th} Cong., 1\textsuperscript{st} sess., 27 February 2003.
\item \textsuperscript{44} “Distorted Image Muslims Rebuff U.S. Outreach Efforts,” Sacramento Bee, 6 March 2003.
\end{itemize}
start to finish and was viewed by some as tainted by the assumption that “if only the United States clearly articulated its message...the rest of the world would jump on the American bandwagon.” To be sure, the interpretation that the problem of U.S. foreign relations in the Middle East were rooted in communication dominated public diplomacy under Beers -- these communication problems were narrowly defined (e.g. clarifying American values and way of life), and this may have taken for granted the significance of context, both in being able to communicate messages in a broader context of the representative society, and in the tailoring of messages that might resonate in the broader context of the receiving society. Thus by keeping to a simple set of messages -- slogans, perhaps, in the advertising industry -- and no noticeable impact to show for their transmissions, it cleared the way for some critics to marginalize those things that Beers aspired to do as Under Secretary.

However, it should also be known that a great portion of criticism over Beers dealt not with what she aspired to do, but what she had ignored. The policy discourses beneath her public diplomacy strategy were never accepted by Beers as a legitimate point of contention. “The problem is not our brand,” wrote conservative scholar Joshua Muravchik, “it is their buying habits.” By playing down the role of policy in the steadily rising anti-American tide abroad, Beers had unknowingly aided in exacerbating two increasingly troublesome trends impeding U.S. public diplomacy. In the first instance, it became evident that the ability of American Foreign Service Officers (FSO’s)

to advocate policy had been compromised. A 2003 survey of Public Affairs Officers (PAO’s) posted in American embassies abroad found that, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, opposition to U.S. foreign policy had become a moderate, major, or very major impediment for nearly 62 percent of respondents aiming to achieve public diplomacy objectives in their host countries. More tellingly, the survey found that approximately 71 percent of PAO’s had received some/little or no consultation from the Office of the Under Secretary or other State Department or administration leadership regarding the nature or implementation of policy initiatives prior to their release.* A public relations-style plan led by Washington had the unintended effect of cutting out the FSO from the public diplomacy process.

In the second instance, marginalizing policy discourses from public diplomacy meant that Beers had overlooked the most paramount of causes for this grim reality, thereby obstructing the very ‘dialogue’ she was attempting to promote. The one indicator that area scholars, pollsters, and analysts cite repeatedly as the primary cause of Arab resentment toward the United States is American foreign policy. Not to be divorced from a general character assessment of the United States, the two are often grouped together to support arguments that Americans are motivated to dominate the Arab world and wage war against Islam. Thus it becomes clear as to why, for example, Osama bin Laden, an Islamist, and Saddam Hussein, a secularist, would champion the Palestinian cause as well

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*United States Government Accounting Office, “U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges,” Report to the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 2003). Based on responses from 118 PAO’s, except in *, which denotes that 118 PAO’s received some/little or no guidance from the Office of the Under Secretary while 117 received some/little or no guidance from other State Department or administration offices.
as their own at the same time.\textsuperscript{49} Both of these figures recognized what studies of Arab
people also show, which is that citizens from around the Arab world, in spite of their
many differences, share in each other's disaffection with the American international
agenda as it pertains to their region and extant activities. Of these primary policy
disputes, the Israel-Palestine issue consistently ranks as the leading grievance over U.S.
policy, according to another Zogby poll published in September 2002, titled, "What
Arabs Think." When confronted with the question of what the United States should do to
improve its relations with the Arab world, most respondents in each of eight Arab-
Muslim countries surveyed responded that the U.S. should first and foremost change its
position on Israel.\textsuperscript{50}

Yet more damage to the credibility of the United States accumulated by way of
issues surrounding the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the resulting hostility extended
from Muslims to more traditional Western allies. For those who disapproved of
prosecuting the Iraq War, the American decision to proceed in the face of resistance
further widened the gulf between the United States and a host of other nations. These
were the conclusions of a seminal report released in June 2003 by the Pew Global
Attitudes Project titled, \textit{Views of A Changing World}, and by virtue of its broad scope of
worldwide public opinion on a variety of issues (including data from more than 66,000
people in 49 countries), it swiftly became the definitive source on how foreign publics felt
about not only the policies, but the underlying values of the United States. Contrary to
Beers presumption, the Pew report concluded that a majority of surveyed participants in
fact accept many of the espoused American ideals, such as democracy and the free market

\textsuperscript{49} Fred Halliday, \textit{Two Hours That Shook The World: September 11, 2001: Causes and Consequences}

\textsuperscript{50} James Zogby, \textit{What Arabs Think: Values, Beliefs and Concerns} (Utica, NY: Zogby International/The
Arab Thought Foundation, September 2002), 83-91.
In fourteen countries where the populations are predominantly Muslim or contain a significant Muslim population, a majority of respondents expressed support for political and religious freedoms along with affirming the importance of a free press. This is not meant to overstate any similarities between the American value system and those of its counterparts, but that it may illuminate the point about where the true wedge issues lie, not so much in ideals and values, but rather in the preponderance of American power vis-à-vis its foreign policy.

Meanwhile, new evidence gathered by a consortium of public policy institutions suggested that American foreign policy was to a great extent heightening tensions with Europe as well. A project led by The German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Italian Compagnia di San Paolo produced the inaugural issue of a survey titled Transatlantic Trends in September 2003. Analysis of the gathered data, which included responses from 8,000 Americans and Europeans, showed a deepening apprehension of American power and portrayed the European view of U.S. unilateralism as a "possible threat" to international security by 2013. European publics were largely united in their opposition to the Iraq War, which helped steer the outcomes of national elections in France and Germany in 2003 and later in Spain in 2004. Likewise, the survey captured trends in Europeans' decreasing favorability towards the United States, general disapproval of the foreign policy of the Bush administration, and lack of confidence in the United States exerting strong global leadership.

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52 Ibid., 33-41.
53 German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di Sao Paolo, Transatlantic Trends 2003, 10.
54 Ibid., 4-6.
In other words, the substance of American foreign policy could not be neatly separated from the resultant damage inflicted upon its own image, as Beers attempted to do. Firstly, the underperformance of post-9/11 American foreign policy seemed to be caused by the international disenchantment the policy itself had created. Secondly, polling figures from that time suggest that the acute rise in anti-Americanism in the post-9/11 era had more to do with American foreign policy than any other single issue. As it will be seen in Chapter Eight, these claims can be questioned on the integrity of their correlations, but should one accept that taken together these points pose an intriguing dilemma for scholars and practitioners of U.S. public diplomacy. To the extent that American foreign policy has been maligned by foreign publics, how would a public diplomacy strategy best be conceived to combat the problems America has faced since 9/11? By early 2003, it had become a matter of recognition and some debate that the widespread unpopularity of American foreign policy that overall negative impressions of the United States abroad were undermining foreign policy. There was on one view held by hawkish American public intellectuals that public diplomacy should be used as the selling mechanism for foreign policy, and the public diplomats of the Department of State had summarily failed in their ascribed mission to communicate abroad the intended policy messages and build sympathy for America's grand strategy.55 A less vociferous and alternative view wondered if placing too much blame on public diplomacy equated to shooting the messenger. This argued that the distaste bred by American foreign policy might have exceeded the persuasive powers of any campaign, no matter how skilled the

sales force. Had American public diplomacy been tasked with the objective of defending the indefensible?

In the wake of these high profile struggles and subsequent exit of Charlotte Beers, an increased amount of research was undertaken to wrestle with this question and elaborate further on the troubling state of U.S. public diplomacy. Of the important studies to emerge in 2003, some included the government-sponsored analysis of the U.S. Government Accounting Office, which in September released the first of a number of reports highlighting the strategic shortcomings of post-9/11 public diplomacy, and the Advisory Commission offering suggestions on how to maximize communication with cost-effective tools and resources.\(^5\) But public policy institutions also showed more interest, which thus presented opportunities to grapple more critically with the relationship between foreign policy and public diplomacy. A paper published by the Heritage Foundation in April, for example, adopted the commonplace notion that public diplomacy should serve primarily as the mouthpiece for foreign policy.\(^6\) Hence, its suggestions presupposed the declining global image of the United States resting on public diplomacy’s poorly executed support of America’s international efforts. In essence, the Heritage authors’ explanations for the ongoing disputes between the United States and the rest of the world were not a function of ineffective policies, but poor policy advocacy.\(^7\)


\(^7\) On this note, it is instructive to point out likenesses between the Heritage paper and Mr. Gingrich’s *Foreign Policy* article published soon thereafter. In the area of policy advocacy, Johnson and Dale (the Heritage paper authors) follow on the themes of the paper in an article published on 14 May 2003 arguing, “While foreign support for U.S. policies may not always be possible, or expected, understanding should be a constant goal.” Similarly Gingrich opines, “The world does not have to love us, but it must be able to predict us.” Put together, the logic echoes a Machiavellian view on the expression of power, or in the words of Caligula, “Oderint dum metuant” (Let them hate as long as they fear).
By stressing advocacy in the aftermath of the formulation of policy, the Heritage paper embodies one of two philosophies about the role of public diplomacy.

Alternatively, some reports suggest that public diplomacy should be integrated into the policy formulation stage, a proposition that surfaced, albeit with little success, in past administrations.\(^5\)\(^9\) A Council on Foreign Relations task force introduced for the first time since the attacks of 9/11 the possibility that American foreign policy was a liability beyond that which any public diplomacy effort could successfully defend. A majority of panel members reasoned that "the concerns of public diplomacy -- how U.S. actions and words impact the rest of the world and the outcomes these actions provoke -- have not been incorporated into the foundations of the U.S. foreign policy process."\(^6\)\(^0\)

Accordingly, the recommendations that emerged from this study concentrated above all on making public diplomacy an integral part in the process of formulating foreign policy. Instead of relegating public diplomacy strictly to a peripheral advocacy role it would reside closer to the core, placed in close proximity to the president and apprising decision makers of the likely reaction of foreign publics prior to policy implementation. The study also attempted to raise the recent lack of preparedness shown by U.S. public diplomacy institutions in the aftermath of 9/11 to impress upon Congress that maintaining a nimble and well-equipped organization at all times, not merely in times of war, served the best interests of the country.\(^6\)\(^1\)

\(^{59}\) The Kennedy administration expressed intentions to make USIA Director Edward Murrow a fixture at policy meetings. The Carter administration reorganized USIA into the short-lived USICA to boost its engagement activities. See Chapter Seven for more detail on these attempts.


\(^{61}\) Ibid., 8-16.
Of course, amongst the steadily rising scholarship devoted to public diplomacy, virtually all studies and commentaries stressed the need for structural improvements both within the State Department and at the interagency level. The common threads to this effect included bolstering the public diplomacy competencies of FSO’s, increasing funds for educational and cultural exchanges, streamlining and updating government broadcasting, improving communication between agencies to ensure consistency in efforts, placing greater emphasis on opinion polling, and engaging the best practices of the private sector. (Avoiding duplication of efforts is also a common suggestion. The redundancies of U.S. international broadcasting are a prime example of this.)

The study that arguably gained the most attention in 2003 was that produced by an advisory group led by Edward P. Djerejian, a former U.S. ambassador to Syria under Presidents Reagan and George W. Bush and Israel under President Clinton. After being called upon by Powell to head the study, Djerejian assembled a fourteen-member group eventually named the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World. The Advisory Group was comprised of current and former ambassadors, public intellectuals, journalists, and experts on Arab and Muslim countries all tasked with proposing new ideas and future directions for conducting public diplomacy in those parts of the world. The resulting recommendations in its report, Changing Minds, Winning Peace, were not groundbreaking in the sense that they further identified public diplomacy limitations in areas of strategic direction, organizational structure, interagency cooperation, funding, cultural and linguistic deficiencies of FSO’s posted in Arab and Muslim countries, augmenting prioritization in the executive branch, and achieving a
sophisticated use of ICT's. What made this study unique was the fact that unlike reports from the Government Accounting Office or the Congressional Research Service, which address the interests of Congressional committees, or studies from public policy institutions released for the general public, the Djerejian report was commissioned from the highest levels of government, thereby inviting the very real possibility of effecting change there. However, this potential was usurped by the mandate that established the scope of the report. Djerejian himself was fond of characterizing Arab-Muslim resistance to the U.S. as “80 percent policy and 20 percent communication” and curiously, these figures are out of proportion with the contents of the report, save for a few paragraphs on the subject of policy it is almost exclusively devoted to the task of communication.

“Our mandate was to address public diplomacy, not to advise the administration on policies,” Djerejian maintained. But this critical imbalance would leave a lackluster impression, and some sources familiar with the report agree that it was a missed opportunity for public diplomacy experts to be more candid with the Bush administration on policy. In the end, Changing Minds, Winning Peace was decidedly more profound for the areas it ignored as opposed to those that it covered.

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63 Edward P. Djerejian, telephone interview by the author, 10 December 2003.
66 Harold Pachios, telephone interview by the author, 29 April 2005; Bruce Gregory, telephone interview by the author, 1 February 2006.
4.5 Between Beers and Hughes: Instability and Uncertainty

At the same time, one could debate whether or not a more candid assessment from Djerejian’s group might have affected the course of American foreign policy at this time or, for that matter, the deteriorating state of its public diplomacy. The vacancy created by the March departure of Beers fell to Patricia Harrison, already serving as Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs and now assuming the role of Acting Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. This would be the first of two occasions that Harrison would serve in this surrogate capacity. The first stint lasted until December 2003, at which time the Senate confirmed her replacement, Margaret B. Tutwiler, a former Special Advisor for Communications to President George W. Bush and more recently ambassador to Morocco. At a glance, Tutwiler seemed a good fit for the job, bringing to it an appropriate combination of public relations experience from the private sector, service under three administrations largely from within the Department of State, and valuable insights from her exposure to the Arab-Muslim world. In her prepared testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, she appeared to understand the enormity of the task before her: “There is not one magic bullet, magic program or magic solution. It does not exist. What does exist is a recognition that we did not get into this situation overnight, and we will certainly not get out of it overnight.” But any indication of a personal willingness for long-term dedication would be belied by what amounted to a very short tenure. Tutwiler made her first public appearance in early February, but within three months – and after reported

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67 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Confirmation Hearing of Margaret D. Tutwiler, 108th Cong., 1st sess., 29 October 2003. In one of the only notable moments to come out of Tutwiler’s six months at the helm of public diplomacy, Senator Richard Lugar famously remarked at her confirmation hearing, “We’ve asked in various ways how the United States can be so often all thumbs at public diplomacy when we are so expert at the strategy and tactics of public relations, marketing and advertising.”

68 Ibid.
frustration with the new job – she announced on 29 April 2004 that she would step down to become an executive vice president at the New York Stock Exchange. The sudden change would once again leave the Department’s dysfunctional public diplomacy apparatus under Harrison’s improvised command for nearly another year.

However, with this indictment of faltering leadership at the Department of State in plain view, it is important to recognize the myriad developments impacting U.S. public diplomacy both from movements within the government itself and by events occurring in the wider world. The findings of the 9/11 Commission, released on 22 July 2004 bore important implications for a number of U.S. government agencies and responsibilities. Those concerned with public diplomacy and international broadcasting took note of one particular passage, which stressed that in order for the U.S. to win the war on terror, it needed to apply “all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense.” The report went on to say that if any one of these elements took precedence over another, “we leave ourselves vulnerable and weaken our national effort.” Specifically, the Commission called upon the need to revive scholarship, exchange and library programs, in part to underscore their roles in preventing an enormous Islamic youth demographic from gravitating towards terrorism. The primacy of security was further reinforced by effective communications when the Commission voiced its staunch support for international radio and television broadcasting. The Commission also

62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., 377.
recommended increasing the Broadcasting Board of Governors' (BBG) budget for operating in the Middle East, a request that was ultimately approved.\textsuperscript{73} Such a high-profile forum as that provided by the Commission and its related testimonies lent a much-needed vote of confidence for public diplomacy at an uncertain time for its strategic and organizational underpinnings.

To even greater effect did the Commission reinforce the work of the BBG, which had since 9/11 expanded its radio broadcasting arsenal to include new or revitalized services in Afghanistan and Iran along with the new Radio Sawa service for the Arab-speaking world. The BBG's most ambitious project of the period represented the pan-Arab satellite television station al-Hurra, or "the free one". The brainchild of BBG member and broadcasting executive Norman J. Pattiz, al-Hurra was launched in February 2004 at the cost of $102 million targeting audiences in 22 Arabic-speaking countries.\textsuperscript{74} As a 24-hour commercial-free network, news would constitute most of its programming alongside features on other subjects including sport, leisure and entertainment. This would place the new channel in direct competition with homegrown channels al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya as it aimed to dull the impact of the latter's perceived anti-American slant with a countervailing pro-American news source. Early reviews of al-Hurra from independent sources indicated low viewership due to the strong competition from roughly


170 satellite stations broadcasting in the region, inviting criticism and checking the optimism often expressed by BBG members.\textsuperscript{75}

The BBG dedicated 40 percent of the al-Hurra 2004 fiscal year budget to broadcasting in Iraq and made the channel available to Iraqis via public access to boost support for the American mission there. It was badly needed. Mounting evidence from opinions polls identified Iraq as a catalyst for negative views of the United States, and an unusually candid April 2005 report of the Government Accounting Office showed highly unfavorable ratings -- not only among surveyed Muslim nations, but also in Western countries -- sustained for more than a year after the U.S. invasion in March 2003.\textsuperscript{76} In April 2004 American forces tallied nearly 140 fatalities, the single most deadly month to date (later surpassed by the toll in November).\textsuperscript{77} A Gallup poll taken in late April 2004 showed an unprecedented number of American respondents, 49 percent, conceding that the war had not been a mistake, a 24 percent increase since the war began over a year earlier.\textsuperscript{78} With rising anti-American sentiment abroad, disturbing numbers from Iraq and eroding domestic support, not to mention the Coalition Provisional Authority being poised to handover political control of Iraq on 30 June 2004, the situation could ill afford another setback.

\textsuperscript{78} Based on findings from a Gallup poll conducted over the weekend of 29 April – 1 May 2004. Analysis accessed at http://www.publicagenda.org/specials/terrorism/terror_pubopinion6.htm (accessed on 30 November 2006).
But the ongoing campaign to put a positive face on Iraq, and the image of the United States, suffered a serious blow in late April 2004 with the revelation that American soldiers had abused Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib prison. Reactions were immediate and deeply accusatory of the United States in that it had betrayed its own values to succumb to the very inhumane acts that characterized the reigns of tyrants. Even as top administration officials set the gears of crisis management in motion, the groundswell of international condemnation marshaled all available public affairs resources to the fore. One anonymous State Department official was quoted as saying, "We're now realizing that we can't expect the Pentagon to handle all of these criticisms and requests to focus on the public affairs disaster this has caused...We're frantically working this issue and trying to come up with a strategy."79 As for public diplomacy, Middle East scholar Shibley Telhami summarized the effect of the scandal thus: "One single picture like the one we have seen outweighs the millions of dollars that we spend in public diplomacy."80 Once burned into the collective memory of foreign publics, the images of Abu Ghraib served as a harsh reminder that even long-term and well-financed public diplomacy could be undone virtually overnight, and furthermore established the limits of what it could and could not control.

4.6 Karen Hughes’ Rapid Response

After nearly four tumultuous years as Secretary of State, Colin Powell would resign on 15 November 2004 shortly after the re-election of George W. Bush. Conservative columnist Max Boot authored an obituary in which he traced Powell’s

80 Nightly News, NBC, 5 May 2006.
demise to being “not very good at selling the administration’s policies”, among other shortcomings.\(^8^1\) Boot also portrayed Powell as a victim of circumstances beyond his control, calling U.S. public diplomacy “neutered since the cold war”, and suggested that Bush administration do more to placate criticism from abroad.\(^8^2\) When National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice received the nomination to succeed Powell, some interpreted this as an effort by Bush to close ranks on the foreign policy front, possibly indicating a shrewd change in the way the international aims of the United States were communicated. Rice clarified her intentions in the opening statement of her confirmation hearing on 18 January 2005, saying pointedly, “the time for diplomacy is now...If I am confirmed, public diplomacy will be a top priority for me and for the professionals I lead.”\(^8^3\)

The nomination of Rice could also be interpreted as a signal of the increased seriousness with which the White House would deal with escalating anti-American sentiments abroad. On 14 March 2005, Bush put forth the selections of Dina H. Powell, the Assistant to the President for Presidential Personnel, to head the Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, and former White House communications advisor Karen Hughes to fill the vacant post of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The appointment of Hughes, known as a loyal and long-standing figure throughout Bush’s political career, was seen to significantly increase the likelihood that public diplomacy concerns would be heard at the highest levels.\(^8^4\) Hughes was also regarded as a catalyst of organizational change – in October 2001 she oversaw the creation of the Coalition Information Centers (CIC’s), with hubs in Washington, London

\(^8^2\) Ibid.
\(^8^3\) Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Confirmation Hearing of Condoleezza Rice, 109\(^{th}\) Cong., 1\(^{st}\) sess., 18 January 2005.
and Islamabad, to orchestrate immediate American responses to stories emerging in the 24-hour international news cycle. Hughes is also believed to have originated the idea of the OGC, expanding on the CIC's to develop integrated public diplomacy strategy and provide guidance to field officers from the White House.

Having been persuaded to return to the administration after a nearly three-year absence, Hughes' nomination was warmly received excepting the fact that she had virtually no foreign affairs experience and faced questions over how she planned to apply her domestic campaigning successes to interactions with foreign audiences. During her confirmation hearing in July 2005, Hughes affirmed that "the mission of public diplomacy is to engage, inform, and help others (i.e. foreign populations) understand our policies, actions and values." "But," she continued, "I am mindful that before we seek to be understood, we must first work to understand...I recognize that the job ahead will be difficult. Perceptions do not change quickly or easily." Hughes leaned on these principles when embarking on her publicized first foray into the Middle East in September 2005. Billed as a 'listening tour' through Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, the audiences she encountered were often cordial but also brought on hard questions about the war in Iraq, American democracy promotion efforts and a universalist notion of women's rights. A female Saudi student challenged Hughes' assumption that Saudi women suffered

tolerable social injustice, and insisted "we're all pretty happy" to resounding applause.\textsuperscript{88} “It's a huge challenge, it's confirmed," Hughes conceded afterwards.\textsuperscript{89}

Claiming to have read many of the oft-cited reports proposing improvements for U.S. public diplomacy, Hughes spearheaded attempts to enhance domestic understanding of public diplomacy, develop an integrated strategy and streamline the communications process. Mentions of public diplomacy’s “four pillars”, also known as the catchier “four E’s” – engagement, education, exchange and empowerment – arose repeatedly in her early public speeches.\textsuperscript{90} Hughes would revive the Strategic Communications PCC three years after it faltered in 2003 to resume the task of establishing the elusive integrated public diplomacy strategy.\textsuperscript{91} Yet the greatest strength Hughes would bring to the position rested in her ideas to shape and lead public opinion as she had done for a number of electoral and domestic issues campaigns. In November 2005 she would recreate the function of the CIC’s in the guise of the new Rapid Response Unit (RRU). Designed as before to ensure cabinet offices stayed on message in dealing with emerging news items on U.S. foreign engagements, the daily impact of the RRU on the operation of American missions overseas came in the form of briefs containing a short summary of leading international news items matched with talking points employing the strict language of


\textsuperscript{91} Karen Hughes, “Transformational Public Diplomacy”.
administration positions. During this time, Hughes would also begin actively 
excouraging U.S. ambassadors to address local media with greater frequency and develop 
guidance, in a memo titled “Karen’s Rules”, on how to achieve greater exposure beyond 
the usual clearance constraints endemic to the Department of State.

Undaunted by the challenges presented in her initial tour, Hughes has remained a 
highly visible in relation to her recent predecessors, visiting the Middle East and 
Southeast Asia on several occasions in addition to South Asia, Central America, South 
America, Europe and Africa. Yet the immediate returns on her investments in new 
communications operations and personal outreach efforts showed a world still generally 
hostile to American intentions. The 2006 Pew Global Attitudes Project indicated that 
between 2005 and 2006 favorability towards the United States again suffered downturns 
amongst its most trusted allies as well as the very skeptics Hughes sought to win over.

The news did not improve at home either. In May 2006, the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) cited several deep fissures in the current public diplomacy strategy, and 
that the frameworks of the Hughes team could not be implemented by a Foreign Service 
corps unclear on how to conduct public diplomacy. It stated that “U.S. embassies face 
multiple challenges in implementing their public diplomacy programs, including the need 
to balance security with public outreach and concerns related to staff numbers, time, and

Sample of RRU guidance can be accessed at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/graphics/ 
rapidresponse.doc. 
93 Elizabeth Williamson, “Karen’s Rules on Diplomacy: Talk to the Media – If You Dare,” Washington 
Post, 6 November 2006; Karen Hughes, “Empowering, Not Muzzling, Our Ambassadors,” Washington 
Post, 16 November 2006.
94 Pew Global Attitudes Project, “America's Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran, 
language capabilities. The GAO further reiterated these deficiencies in a subsequent report released in April 2007.

But Hughes had never been under the illusion that hardened negative attitudes toward the United States would instantly change, sometimes referring to the job of public diplomacy as a “long-term endeavor” that would take years to yield results. As of early 2007, Hughes has claimed progress on such long-term necessities as a new integrated strategy put forth by the PCC on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication (not yet implemented), and on the expectation that the several new programs and offices created under her watch would serve as a foundation for the future. A January 2007 hosting of the Private Sector Summit on Public Diplomacy signaled a genuine interest in summoning the cooperation and the best practices of influential private sector actors. In these ways, Hughes fulfilled the promise made upon her appointment that she would inject new ideas into a static public diplomacy apparatus.

On the notion that Hughes’ close proximity to Bush might impact policy pursuits, the outcome is less conclusive. On the one hand, she has maintained that no single act of hers would be sufficient to change an established policy position, maintaining that the policymaking process is deliberated and decided over many pieces of advice. On the
other hand, there is evidence to suggest that Hughes input has been influential in shaping recent messages and statements by the administration, at one point reportedly persuading President Bush to drop the term "Islamic fascism" from speeches, for its inflammatory and negative connotations. Hughes has also been reported as saying she would or did deliver reactions from audiences in Morocco and Indonesia back to Washington for Bush's consideration.

4.7 Approaching the Present: Whither U.S. Public Diplomacy?

In the prolonged wave of interest in public diplomacy that has followed the events of 9/11, there are occasions when, in the regular course of debate, attention returns to the question of funding. Proponents of a higher valued public diplomacy apparatus frequently point out the enormous disparity that exists between defense and public diplomacy budgets. (To clarify this point, as of 2006 public diplomacy receives an allotment one-third of a percent of the Department of Defense budget.) When the U.S. government turned to its public diplomacy institutions to prosecute the new "battle for hearts and minds", what it found was a loose conglomeration of offices in search of a new identity, purpose and shape, in addition to being underfunded. In short, it was a shell of its Cold War predecessor having been depleted by years of obscurity. As Secretary of State, Colin Powell tried to change this by rebuilding public diplomacy in the image of a private sector public relations department. This failed, and moreover produced what the

Wall Street Journal called “the near-collapse of U.S. public diplomacy” by attempting to sell the United States as a manufacturer does with its products. “But the U.S. can't be sold as a "brand", the article firmly stated. “What America has to ‘sell’ is freedom and democracy.”103 With hindsight, it is now clear to see the odds stacked against this scheme from succeeding. Returning to the point about funding, for instance, it worth noting that the Department of State at this time spearheaded a new “branding” campaign in a vastly more complex geopolitical landscape, with greatly increased political participation of foreign publics enabled in large part by the proliferation of ICT’s such as the Internet, satellite television and mobile phones, and all this with a budget left virtually unchanged in constant dollars since 1980.104 The challenges facing down U.S. public diplomacy since 9/11 extend well beyond funding, but little foresight has gone into making it a viable option for 21st century statecraft as well.

The fall of Charlotte Beers emerged by way of a revived and ongoing dilemma regarding the purposes of American public diplomacy, which are often at odds with the messages conveyed by its own foreign policy. This became clear in the unfolding momentous debates, especially on the international stage, over the correctness of the American foreign policy response to the 9/11 attacks. A more traditional view, and indeed one that prevailed at time during the Cold War, holds that public diplomacy should do no more that advocate policy; the case of the implementation of American foreign policies in the Middle East reveals an unrequited persistence to do so until the realities of a questionable policy have more recently become too great to ignore. Between advocating for or advising on policy, Under Secretary Beers chose neither; instead she

104 See Appendix B.
pursued more profound linkages between the aims of American foreign policy and its high-minded values. Beers once pointed out the distinction in one of her few public interviews as Under Secretary: "In addition to what our policies are, what we haven't felt the need to communicate is what is the value system" of this country, Beers said. "What are our beliefs? What do the words 'freedom' and 'tolerance' mean?" These questions, while hardly irrelevant, plotted a very long course in a moment calling for immediate results.

It took nearly two years for Powell to recognize that public diplomacy, for a litany of reasons, was not up to the task at hand, and it required the very compelling evidence of the Pew Global Attitudes Project, Zogby International and the German Marshall Fund to make this point. By then, however, foreign public opinion of the United States had dropped precipitously in a vocal rejection of American unilateralism, then in strong opposition to the Iraq invasion, and later in outrage over the Abu Ghraib scandal and other revelations. Various studies since 2001 have examined the question of why U.S. public diplomacy has failed so miserably, and many of their conclusions attained salience in the confusion that prevailed in 2003 and 2004. Their diagnoses followed similar paths; their prescriptive measures included bolstering the public diplomacy competencies of FSO's, increasing funds for educational and cultural exchanges, streamlining and updating government broadcasting, improving communication between agencies to ensure consistency in efforts, placing greater emphasis on opinion polling, and engaging the best practices of the private sector. While many of these suggestions have been

heard, few have been implemented, and virtually none of them address the ongoing
dilemma of public diplomacy’s identity crisis: to advocate or to advise?

It was the conclusion of the 9/11 Commission that it should stress policy advocacy
as evidenced by its statement that public diplomacy should “explain the civic principles
and system of [American] government contained in our founding documents, and to
portray the American way of life factually.”106 The same holds true for analysts at the
Heritage Foundation as well as high-profile and influential public figures such as former
Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich, Representative Frank Wolf (R-Virginia), and a host of current and former government broadcasting officials.107 Other
studies saw the value of placing public diplomacy in an advisory role; the independent
task force behind the CFR report opined that the communication of policy could no
longer be expressed in a ‘push-down’ style, meaning a center-periphery relationship
where policy messages emanate in one direction, from governments to target
constituencies, without prior consultation with the latter.108 Public diplomacy perforce
serves a dual capacity that echoes the sentiments of the late journalist and USIA director
Edward R. Murrow, when he argued public diplomacy must be present at “the take offs”
at the formulation of policy, as well as the “crash landings”, or more literally, the policy
feedback from abroad. At its heart, this debate implies a choice between ‘one-way’ and
‘two-way’ policy communication, with ramifications for the relationship between public
diplomats and policymakers.

Frank Wolf, “Engaging the Arab/Islamic World—Next Steps for U.S. Public Diplomacy,” (panel discussion,
George Washington University, Washington, DC, 27 February 2003); Sanford J. Ungar, “Pitch Imperfect,”
Foreign Affairs 84, no. 3 (May/June 2005): 7-13.
108 CFR Report, 34.
Yet beyond the immediate scope of this debate lie other fundamental questions always omnipresent in the strategizing and conduct of public diplomacy. One area of note is the consideration of time; some activities, such as cultural and educational exchanges invariably require more time to bear fruit than with more the immediate nature of news broadcasting, for example. How best to arrange the time orientation of U.S. public diplomacy activities will be crucial to the establishment of a sustainable strategy.

Another matter is the posturing associated with public diplomacy; some programs require a long-term, or proactive posture orientation seen more clearly in public relations campaigns, while in other occasions a reactive posture orientation is required to deal with crisis situations, as with the Abu Ghraib scandal. Weighing the balance between these functions will have implications on what kind of organizations public diplomacy shall incorporate to be successful in the future. A further recurring problem to re-emerge during the post-9/11 era begs the question of how to evaluate public diplomacy. For example, most evaluation techniques utilized by the State Department and BBG rest on the amount of instances a particular program or broadcast is exposed to target audiences. While it may be impressive to say, as members of the BBG have, that al-Hurra reaches an estimated 20 million people per week, some say the chief indicator of success is more accurately traced to the nature of the effect these programs and broadcasts are having.\textsuperscript{109}

This is an important question because the necessity for lawmakers to see instant rewards from public diplomacy often conflicts with the full perspective one must adhere to when considering new ideas and directions.

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Moving forward, the forthcoming chapters will capitalize on the material presented in the previous two chapters, which sought to illustrate the recent history of U.S. public diplomacy with an ample portrayal of causes for its most recent challenges, and in a broader sense its complex and integrated nature. It may be agreed that American public diplomats, given the context in which they must perform, possess on the one hand a unique capability to explain and advocate the foreign policies of the United States to populations overseas, while on the other hand a largely untapped potential to deliver feedback from those populations for the benefit of American foreign policymakers, and ultimately the target areas in which they are applied.

It is the view of this study that the conflict between these two roles encapsulates the debate over the future course of U.S. public diplomacy. It is an ongoing debate, and among the various ideas and strands of thought in circulation two movements appear to be coalescing and advancing distinct models to solve the myriad problems at hand. The juxtaposition of the two camps can be characterized as a crossroads between public diplomacy’s past and the future. The past invokes the legacy of Cold War public diplomacy activities, and admirers of this legacy stake a bold claim to it having succeeded to some degree in defeating communism through a state-of-the-art communications initiative buttressed by long-term cultivation of dissident views through educational and cultural exchanges. They also argue that heeding the lessons of Cold War public diplomacy will be useful in creating a “revival” of its effectiveness. Alternately, the latter group mandates a public diplomacy strategy and organization that is radically transformed from its Cold War precursor to deal with an equally transformed international relations environment. Key to this argument is the application of ICT’s to reach target audiences more rapidly and on a broader scale, but by this same token there
is also some attention granted to the changed distribution of power since the end of the Cold War and the widening political involvement of non-state actors (largely made possible by ICT’s). It is perceived that each of these two groups own a large stake in deciding the future of U.S. public diplomacy, however it is also arguable that each brings to the table certain merits and some drawbacks. In the chapters to come, this study will closely examine what these merits and drawbacks consist of and this examination shall first turn to the Cold War-inspired advocacy model.
CHAPTER 5: KEEPING WITH TRADITION: 
U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND THE COLD WAR

By now, it should be clear from the preceding chapters that the state of post-9/11 U.S. public diplomacy has more to do with events and decisions made years before this period than those of the more recent time. In certain instances, moments in the history of U.S. public diplomacy prior to 1991 add background for what may have transpired further on, but it is arguably the years between 1991 and 2001 that observers can unlock the most pivotal, and most damaging, events to impact public diplomacy institutions at any time in their history. Hence, the post-Cold War period is valuable for its explanatory power in illuminating the causes for public diplomacy’s weaknesses and imbued regard for irrelevance.

At this point, the study now shifts from explaining what has transpired in the past to analyzing the impact of past events on U.S. public diplomacy’s possible futures. This chapter moves from the initial research question of why U.S. public diplomacy has failed in its attempt to protect America’s standing in the post-9/11 era to the next logical question: what should be done about it? There is no shortage of commentary on this matter and the compendium of ideas hails from sources both domestic and foreign to the United States, so it is incumbent upon scholarship to describe ongoing discussions in a lucid and structured way. The following two chapters shall attempt this by consolidating the multitude of ideas into two contrasting models that appear to be at play – advocacy and advisory. Starting with the former model, this chapter first delves into the Cold War years of U.S. public diplomacy, not only regarded by many as its ‘golden era’ but also it is during this time that that the tradition of advocacy came into full acceptance as the dominant mode of pursuing political communications. Some attention in this and the
following chapters will be devoted to assessing the viability of the two models as bases for addressing the challenges facing U.S. public diplomacy at this time.

In light of the record of recent struggles, the consensus of observers is that U.S public diplomacy in the post-9/11 era has fallen well short of expectations at a time of great need. One belief holds that it is in a state of crisis. This was the conclusion reached by the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication (DSB), an advisory committee operating within the United States Department of Defense after an extensive two-part assessment of U.S. strategic communications activities conducted in 2001 and 2004.¹ A cacophony of criticism, mostly motivated by an unanswered spike in anti-Americanism around the world, and accompanied by a laundry list of strategic miscues and organizational failings, echoed the consensus captured by the DSB. “Our public diplomacy,” remarked the Brookings Institute’s Shibley Telhami, “is broken.”²

5.1 Benchmarking the Cold War

Since 2001 over thirty research efforts, produced by both governmental and non-governmental bodies, have been undertaken to address the complex questions of what is wrong with U.S. public diplomacy and what can be done to repair it. Interestingly, what they share is a select use of language to call for “revitalization” and “reinvigoration” of


public diplomacy in attempts to invoke what is regarded in certain quarters as a prime example of its effectiveness -- the Cold War era.

Considering the outcome of the Cold War, and more precisely the perception of some that the end of the Cold War represented an ideological victory for the United States, it would be sensible to extend due credit to those people, programs and institutions who helped proliferate the ideas that hastened the collapse of the Soviet Union. At forefront of these efforts, it follows that the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus at that time—which included the USIA, international broadcasting outlets such as Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), the Peace Corps, and individual participants in exchange programs such as the Fulbright and Humphrey fellowships -- should claim a substantial portion of that credit. Crucially, this would hold true insofar as one accepts what in International Relations theoretical terms is known as the "constructivist" explanation of what brought on the end of the Cold War, in which ideational determinants figure prominently.\(^3\) Opposing, or "rationalist" arguments rooted in realist thinking would summarily rule out, or at least discourage the existence of such a relationship by disregarding or downplaying ideational causes and other internal workings of the state.\(^4\) In lieu of such causes, the rationalist might suggest it is better to examine more material causes for Soviet demise, such as an imploding economy or overstretched military. In light of this example one must ask that if, by accepting the former view, there exists a fundamental challenge to the impact of public diplomacy even from a broad theoretical perspective, then perhaps the impetus to bring back the sensibilities of the Cold War-era public diplomacy strategy require more qualification than meets the eye.


For the constructivist this point may hardly warrant searching. In one well-known example, 9/11 Commission Chairman Thomas Kean invoked the legacy of that period when he remarked, “just as we did in the Cold War, we need to defend our ideals abroad and we've got to defend them vigorously.”\(^5\) Such a statement would not be so poignant without realizing its implications: a positive correlation between the outcome of the Cold War and the public diplomacy strategy of the time, made by a figure with enormous policy influence. Could it be that prevailing analyses of this correlation are clouded by the benefits of history and rose-tinted hindsight? If possible, then it merits questioning whether those public diplomacy programs can be termed a success and, in turn, use their legacies to serve as a model for emulation. This in turn inspires the main question to be explored in this paper: can U.S. public diplomacy during the Cold War be deemed a success?

### 5.2 The Making of a Success Story?

For a moment, let us explore some of the appeal behind the “success story” narrative. As with the aforementioned example, the invocation of the Cold War model delivers a potent and symbolic benchmark, without much conjecture or detail necessary, for two implied but nonetheless overriding reasons.\(^6\) The first reason lies in the power of


\(^6\) Some reports, such as the Brookings Institution’s “The Need to Communicate”, liken the present-day imperative of dealing with the Islamic world to the ideological struggle of Cold War by using sweeping statements such as, “[Exchange programs] should be expanded and retargeted towards the Islamic world—as they were focused on key Cold War battlefields pre-1989 and in Eastern Europe in the post-Cold War era.” See Hady Amr, “The Need to Communicate: How to Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Islamic World,” *The Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Towards the Islamic World Analysis Paper 6* (January 2004).
contrast. The simple passage of time over the post-Cold War period, and in turn the increasing distance between the present and the apparent halcyon days of public diplomacy has the ability to amplify the amount of deterioration American public diplomacy institutions has suffered. Instrumental to the benchmarking of the Cold War, the contrast offers a compelling explanation of just how far the standard has plummeted in the years since. Theories to this effect generally employ one of two assertions. In the first instance, “budget-cutting zeal” among lawmakers and “End of History” acolytes prevalent during the early years of the Clinton Administration systematically dismembered public diplomacy institutions and programs by sharing in the notion that the close of the Cold War made them no longer vital to foreign relations. The second assertion holds the Bush Administration accountable for policies driving foreign favorability of the United States to new lows combined with backfired experiments in management and interagency coordination in the aftermath of 9/11. Adherents to this latter view cite figures unearthed in the Pew Global Attitudes Project’s “View of a Changing World, June 2003”, which revealed dramatic declines in favorability towards the United States among Middle Eastern states as well as traditional Western European allies, most acutely since 2001. They also point to the tenure of advertising whiz Charlotte Beers as Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, whose controversial “Shared Values” branding campaign targeting the Arab-Muslim world drew widespread cynicism.

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The second main reason for establishing the Cold War-era as the public diplomacy benchmark for effectiveness lies in justifying the investment of new ideas, money and people to address contemporary challenges in the international environment. Here, historical memory correlates vital public diplomacy contributions of broadcasting and educational and cultural exchanges to the Cold War triumph of liberal democracy over communism, in turn analogizing this to the incipient battle for hearts and minds taking place within the war on terror. The ideological struggle assumes center-stage at moments, for example, when the CFR report warned, “As with the Cold War, the United States is facing a long and protracted challenge over a way of life.”9 It was during the former period that “the nation developed the political will for efforts that...played a critical role in ending the Cold War,” concludes the DSB report. “We cannot succeed again without comparable vision and commitment.”10 By capitalizing on an enduring legacy of ideological contributions to the demise of Soviet Union, this appeal carries with it an inherent justification for “reinvigorating” public diplomacy.

By benchmarking the Cold War, it enables a compelling contrast and ample justification that otherwise be benign if not for its narrow view of history, fused with overtones of patriotism, and blithely dismissive of alternate perspectives on events and their outcomes. Despite impulses to overlook them, alternate perspectives put forth several plausible reasons why a closer look at the ‘success story’ is worth pursuing. First, it is clear from the example of the rationalist approach above that there are counterclaims

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9 CFR Report, 27.
to the notion that ideational causes chiefly contributed the fall of the Soviet Union, in which case the accomplishments of American public diplomacy would have less redeeming value than its advocates would believe. Consequently, it does not automatically hold – without establishing a strong causal relationship-- that in such theatres as Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Baltic States or the Soviet Union it was the promotion of human rights and democratic ideals that made the difference, nor can it be traced undisputedly to U.S public diplomacy, for reasons to be discussed in the forthcoming pages.

But for the moment, consider the ramifications of presuming the affirmative to this question, that it was indeed a success. Historical memory to this end would judge the performance of U.S. public diplomacy by the evidence that the outcome of the Cold War was favorable to the values and beliefs of the United States, thereby cementing the case that its influence was undeniably positive. Moreover, as the insights of that period become instructive in dealing with contemporary problems, historical memory of this selective account is bolstered and gains broader acceptance as the ideal to be emulated for a future “revitalization”. In other words, a prevailing account of what caused the end of the Cold War and the concomitant positive attributions given to U.S. public diplomacy towards that end now have the potential, as witnessed in the aforementioned reports and testimonies, to shape the way public diplomacy is performed in a markedly different world.

Some of the most vocal proponents of this logic, however, are not necessarily the institutions behind the reports or even highly visible politicians, but quite often the veterans of the Cold War-era USIA and international broadcasting programs, overseers of exchange programs, or other high-ranking U.S. government officials with compelling first-person narratives who speak most authentically on the subject. Examples of USIA alumni include William A. Rugh, James Critchlow and Alvin Snyder, each contributing to the discourse on the future of public diplomacy by drawing on their experiences over the course of the Cold War. Among American broadcasters, Sanford Ungar, VOA Director from 1999 to 2001, and S. Enders Wimbush, Director of Radio Liberty from 1987 to 1993, point to a simpler and more effective organization, influential programming and respected news coverage as reasons why broadcasting outlets enjoyed higher listenership and deserved credit for shaping the political environment behind the Berlin Wall. With respect to exchange programs, Yale Richmond draws from his thirty years in the American Foreign Service and, notably, his work in U.S.-Soviet exchanges to show how these encounters exposed countless Soviet political and intellectual elites to “new thinking” via Western ideas of democracy and human rights, as well as through the performing arts, the natural and social sciences, and literature. Finally, there is Carnes Lord’s account as a staffer on national security affairs to Presidents Reagan and George

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H.W. Bush attributing a commitment of the Reagan Administration to public diplomacy as being instrumental in winning “the ideological struggle”.¹⁵

Backed up by years of experience, these accounts go much further than the mere sweeping claim of success of Cold War public diplomacy. Almost strictly anecdotal by nature, their stories deliver credence through the use of corroborating evidence from symbolic events and from the experiences of their counterparts in the Soviet government who witnessed this ostensible sweep of ideas from the other end. There has been some interpretation of the evolution in the thinking of Aleksander Yakovlev, a close confidant of Mikhail Gorbachev and holder of chairmanships during the 1980’s of the Central Committee’s Department of Propaganda and later the Commission on International Policy. As one of the staunchest supporters of glasnost and democratic change, Yakovlev, after 10 years of “exile” as an ambassador to Canada, reportedly drew on his extensive exposure to the ideas of the West to influence policy and act as a catalyst for the “new thinking”. A radical thinker in his youth, Yakovlev spent one year of study, in 1958-59, in the United States, where he was able to experience American people and society first-hand. Suggesting that Yakovlev’s experience bears witness to the value of academic exchange, Richmond notes that Yakovlev was “deeply influenced” by his year abroad; exposed to the writings of American scholars and others he could not have found in the Soviet Union, he would years later instruct his staffers within the Soviet Academy of Sciences to read the works of John Kenneth Galbraith and Daniel Bell.¹⁶

There is also the story of Boris Yeltsin and his indebtedness to Radio Liberty for backing him in his rise to become the first Russian president of the post-Soviet era.

Yeltsin rewarded the U.S.-funded Russian language radio broadcaster by issuing a decree on 27 August 1991, just days after the collapse of the Soviet Union, allowing it to open an office in Moscow and to operate in Russia unhindered.\textsuperscript{17} On the occasion of Radio Liberty's fortieth anniversary in 1993, Yeltsin proclaimed, "It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of your contribution to the destruction of the totalitarian (Soviet) regime."\textsuperscript{18} Perhaps less recognized are the diplomatic chess matches in which public diplomacy played an integral part. Illustrating the importance of such engagements, Lord recalls a struggle for Western European public opinion over the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe in the 1980's. Sensing some European discomfort over the prospect, the Soviet government channeled its own displeasure through disarmament and arms control groups in Europe, and organized campaigns by involving journalists, high ranking officials, academics and diplomats to denounce the deployment. In response, the U.S. government, through the Department of State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, launched a counter-offensive exposing years of alleged Soviet violations of arms agreements, forcing the argument to be framed by who Europe could trust more. The historical memory of American participants in this contest identifies this effort as pivotal in overcoming the Soviet case and enabling the INF plan to proceed.\textsuperscript{19}

Yet another account recalls linkages between the penetration of RFE/RL broadcasts into the Soviet bloc and the proliferation of opposition movements to the Communist regime from the early 1980's. Surveys taken by the former Bureau for

\textsuperscript{17} Wimbush, interview by the author, op. cit.; Andrew Zolotov, Jr., "Radio Liberty Stripped of Former Special Status," \textit{St. Petersburg Times}, 8 October 2002.


\textsuperscript{19} Lord, 62-64; George P. Shultz, "Public Diplomacy in the Information Age" (speech given before the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Washington, DC, 15 September 1987).
International Broadcasting (now known as the Broadcasting Board of Governors) in the early 1980’s revealed large portions of the Polish population listening to RFE during the rise of the Solidarity movement, despite jamming efforts. Famously, Lech Walesa was reported to have been listening to RFE as his wife accepted the 1983 Nobel Peace Prize on his behalf since he was not permitted to receive it himself. Former Czech Republic President Vaclav Havel found in RFE one of the only media outlets that would broadcast the essays he penned as the dissident leader of the Czech human rights group Charter 77. Finally, one should not neglect the view of prolific East German spy Marcus Wolf, who in his memoirs considered Radio Free Europe one of the “most effective” tools for mobilizing public opinion against the Communist establishment.

From the famous to the obscure, this is but a small representation of the many anecdotes that speak to the impact of U.S. public diplomacy efforts in the Soviet Union and neighboring countries. In some cases strong evidence exists that they may have been directly responsible for seismic shifts in an era-defining ideological struggle by motivating figures who would later become instrumental in the outcome of the Cold War. In others it may have acted as a channel of information carrying messages and ideas to masses of people. In this sense, the impact of public diplomacy is undeniable, but one could also conclude that the public diplomacy programs of the Cold War cultivated much of this reputation for success not from their exemplary design and delivery, but from a fortuitous turn of events.

20 Lord, 62.
23 A. Ross Johnson and R. Eugene Parta, “Cold War Broadcasting: Lessons Learned” (paper presented to seminar on Communicating with the Islamic World, Annenberg Foundation Trust, Rancho Mirage, CA, 5 February 2005.)
In moving forward, two questions of the claim of outright success shall be explored. Firstly, does Cold War public diplomacy meet a given definition of success by the achievement of its stated objectives? And secondly, by what measure was it successful and what evidence points to the conclusion that success was attained?

5.3 Defining “Success”

What exactly is success? Does it bear some sort of objectivity or absolute standard in the positivist sense, or would it be more useful to adopt a normative idea of the concept, as if to say that success, to borrow Wendt’s famous title, is ‘what one makes of it’?24 In the case of U.S. public diplomacy, a normative approach to defining success works well because a brief glimpse into its history reflects constantly changing standards of success in relation to social conventions and the accepted conduct of statecraft by way of certain practices. For example, some of the earliest iterations of public diplomacy institutions that served a significant function during the Cold War in fact trace their roots to the Second World War, when short-term information and disinformation campaigns were part of an overarching propaganda machine. The Office of Wartime Information, a precursor to the USIA, enlisted Hollywood producers to craft films to be used in these campaigns.25 It was during this time, in 1942, that the VOA was launched to compliment the effort, and to immediate effect, but it would not be long until the end of the war would force a philosophical divide consisting of two camps: the “tough-minded” advocates of a propaganda approach characterized by an aggressive, often manipulative style, and

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“tender-minded” proponents who favored a style of persuasion by attraction, and incremental attitudinal change over the longer term. Critchlow reports what he viewed as a sea change in the public tolerance for propaganda, revealing that during the 1950’s that Communist audiences reserved far more suspicion for “anything that smacked of propaganda” from foreign media sources resembling in any way their own state-run outlets.

Yet it must also be emphasized that the competing norms that emerged from these traditions did not necessarily lead to the survival of one and the elimination of the other. In fact, there is strong evidence to suggest that the positive embodiments of what became public diplomacy and the negative connotations of propaganda found natural homes where they continue to reside; the notion of public diplomacy put forth a well-meaning social norm so that its content could maintain the confidence of ‘friends’, while propaganda assumed more of an institutional norm, largely within the military sphere, reserved to thwart ‘enemies’. Looking at the relationship in this way helps to show that these two sources of state-sponsored indeed coexist, but represent two extremes of the strategic communications spectrum. In addition, it brings to the foreground the perennial debate facing communication strategists of how aggressively public diplomacy should be pursued, a paradox that forced important choices to be made in light of the ever-changing relationship between the Cold War superpowers.

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27 Critchlow, 81.
29 See “Get the Message Out,” *Washington Post*, 28 October 2001. The blurring of lines separating these terms was once demonstrated by Richard Holbrooke, President Clinton’s Ambassador to the United Nations, when he wrote in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, “Call it public diplomacy, or public affairs, or psychological warfare, or -- if you really want to be blunt -- propaganda.”
With détente approaching in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the USIA entered into a period of stability, and scholarship dealing in the linkage between foreign policy and foreign public opinion gained greater visibility within the foreign policy discourses. It was also becoming more apparent that a pure concept of what comprised public diplomacy was beginning to take the form of a tripartite set of approaches, which included, firstly, informing foreign publics of U.S. foreign policy objectives, secondly, influencing attitudinal and behavioral changes amongst publics for the purpose of advancing those objectives, and engaging in protracted dialogues with members of foreign publics to build sustainable support of the United States over the long term. In practice, however, these aims naturally assume two primary components with information and influence on the one hand, as they share common space in the creation and delivery of certain messages targeted to foreign audiences through international broadcasting and print media, and engagement on the other hand, focused more on time-consuming cultivation of interpersonal relations and one-to-one or group dialogue.

Taking cues from these elements one gains a reasonably clear view of what it means to employ successful public diplomacy. The means of information, influence and engagement underlie strategies that seek to create qualitatively and visibly positive changes towards the end of fostering understanding and support for U.S. foreign policy initiatives. With some essential contextualizing in place, we return to the initial question of whether Cold War efforts undisputedly accomplished these aims.

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30 A point perhaps best reinforced by the 1965 opening of The Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, but also in new studies to emerge in the coming years by Arthur Hoffman, John Henderson and Glen Fisher.

31 This is a combination of two separate definitions. Information and influence components are derived from U.S. Department of State, Dictionary of International Relations Terms (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1987), 85; and the engagement component from Christopher Ross, “Public Diplomacy Comes of Age,” The Washington Quarterly 25 (Spring 2002): 75.
On the matter of information and influence, the discussion would necessarily revolve around information (and disinformation) campaigns orchestrated by USIA, which peaked first in the early years of the Cold War, and again in the 1980's under the Reagan Administration. The so-called “tools of the trade” for carrying out these activities historically involved various forms of media, including the press, publication of magazines (up to 14 titles in 16 languages at one point), film, television and later, videotaped footage. But the truest test of the impact of these campaigns inexorably lies in judging the outcomes produced by broadcast media, chiefly the radio stations of Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and Voice of America.

The fact that three stations spearheaded the overall information effort owes partly to their evolution and partly to the complexity of it targets. VOA evolved from its wartime purpose into a resource projecting the American worldview, striving to be objective and balanced in the spirit of its first utterance in 1942, “We shall speak to you about America and the war,” it was said. “The news may be good or bad. We shall tell you the truth.” Whilst VOA functioned as an international shortwave broadcast for a global audience, RFE and RL (often regarded as one in the same due to their close operational relationship, and later their merging in 1975) were launched in the early 1950’s funded principally by the CIA and each dedicated to specific localities – “surrogate home services” as they came to be called – with RFE broadcasting in Eastern European, and RL in the Soviet Union. But despite the concentration of stations in the Communist bloc, with VOA alone reaching an estimated 70 million listeners in those countries alone, they nevertheless competed fiercely for the attention of these audiences.

against formidable Soviet counterparts such as Radio Moscow, once the world’s largest international broadcaster, and Radio Peace and Progress. Radio Moscow, at its height, alone enjoyed a budget estimated at over 3.5 times that of VOA and RFE/RL combined, which afforded superior transmitting equipment and offerings in nearly twice as many languages.\textsuperscript{34} From the West, the United Kingdom operated the influential external service of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and West Germany contributed newscasts via Deutsche Welle. With several services operating in the area, the ability to use these resources to inform and influence was not a question of supply, but of accessibility. The Soviet Union employed a complex jamming scheme to thwart Western broadcasts for stretches throughout the Cold War. One CIA study in the early 1980’s estimated an average of $250 million spent annually by the Soviets on jamming, which, as it happened, exceeded the annual cost borne by the United States of supporting its stations in the first place.\textsuperscript{35} Beginning in 1948 the BBC and VOA were first blocked under orders from Josef Stalin, and it was not until June 1963 in the thaw after the Cuban Missile Crisis that the jamming ceased temporarily. The strategy reemerged in the wake of the Warsaw Pact clampdown on Czechoslovakia in 1968, was shelved again in 1973 under détente, and appeared once more in 1981, this time brought on by events in Poland. It would not be until 1987 when Mikhail Gorbachev would phase out jamming once and for all. Jamming of RFE/RL, however, remained continuous from its launch in 1953 until November 1988.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{34} Hansen, \textit{USIA}, 168-9.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 113.
\textsuperscript{36} Hoover Institution and the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, \textit{Report from Conference on Cold War Broadcasting Impact} (Stanford University, Palo Alto, USA, 13-16 October 2004), 15. Dates of jamming vary for Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia.
Exorbitant costs and strength of resistance notwithstanding, this electromagnetic defense system was far from airtight, and the vigor with which it was pursued points to the certitude that VOA, RFE/RL and other sources successfully informed audiences behind the Iron Curtain. A collection of findings to be presented from both American and Soviet sources in the next section also offers clear (but somewhat controvertible) evidence to support this conclusion. What is less clear is the degree to which some kind of influence occurred in the process or aftermath of the information, and this is an important question to consider if there is to be some determination, as seems to be the case presently, that the influence of these programs was generally positive. However, the evidence to support this claim is not forthcoming. It is highly doubtful that any reliable statistical data on changes in attitudes toward the West, and the United States in particular, could have been collected in the Soviet Union. Alternatively, if forced to rely on anecdotal evidence one need not look far to find dissenting opinions about broadcasting to offset the accolades.37 Furthermore, as a former head of the BBC Polish Service points out, it is important not to presume the influential success of radio broadcasting for the fact that in some countries the level of suspicion for RFE nearly matched that for state-run media; listeners tended to place the truth somewhere in between the two views.38

Finally, one can return to the problem that has proved an elusive task for many retrospectives on the Cold War, which often wrestle with the question of what truly

37 Central Committee member Georgi Arbatov is quoted as saying in an interview in the late 1980's: “By the way, during a recent vacation I listened to some of the Russian-language broadcasts from abroad. They are absolutely counterproductive. They offend a great many Soviet people and appeal to only a very small intellectual opposition.” From Stephen F. Cohen and Katrina Vanden Heuvel, Voices of Glasnost: Interviews with Gorbachev's Reformers (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1989), 319.
38 Eugeniusz Smolar, former head of BBC Polish Service, in Report from Conference on Cold War Broadcasting Impact, 10.
contributed to the fall of Communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As explained earlier, there is a continuing debate within IR consisting of rational (realist) and ideational (constructivist) positions. Yet, even siding with the constructivist view on this question — that ideas profoundly contributed to the demise of Communism — leaves one with a riddle of variables to consider. The basis for this lies in the problem of multivariation — a term closely associated with statistics describing a situation where a dependent variable (in this case the end of the Cold War) is susceptible to the influence of a number of independent variables. The problem here involves identifying which of these independent variables (i.e. events, programs, individuals, etc) caused the attitudinal changes and behaviors that helped bring about the end of the Cold War, and the extent to which they did so. The search for clues arouses such questions as: just where exactly did these ideas that generated the ‘new thinking’ originate? Were they a product of thinking external to Communist societies, as the merits of international broadcasting would suggest? Or did purely domestic sources, such as intelligentsia or political figures, generate ‘new thinking’ without interference from abroad, and in turn foster a purely organic brand leadership that ultimately led to the collapse of the Soviet Union? And if evidence to the latter is strong, would it not be so that U.S. public diplomacy activities hastened an already-existing chain of events, instead of creating them from scratch? These are the questions that historians and theorists have been grappling with for years, and from the sizeable production of analysis it remains to be seen if a definitive conclusion to this “hard case” will ever come to pass.39 Far more can be said about this niche of study, but the general point here is to shed light on the questions over the origin

of ideas, or even whether these ideas mattered at all in the final outcome. Such suggestions certainly infuse ambiguity into the premise that international broadcasting was instrumental to this end, and consequently poses a challenge to the assumption of success in influencing masses or elites.

Further complicating this assumption is Risse-Kappen’s insight that “ideas do not float freely,” which underscores the interplay of “several, often contradictory” concepts ruminating in the minds of decision makers and alludes to a multitude of information sources affecting their opinions and actions.40 International broadcasters such as RFE/RL, VOA, the BBC and Deutsche Welle did not provide the only channels to external ideas; seminal events also participated in the development of international norms. One such event worth examining is the impact of the Helsinki Final Act from the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which marked the occasion when the Soviet Union and other members of the Warsaw Pact accepted the inclusion of human rights as one of the universal bases for European identity. Thomas treats this event with some significance in the sense that it was a catalyst for change in the Soviet social and political agenda, ushering in greater acceptance of dissident thinking and a desire for peaceful coexistence with the rest of Europe.41 To reinforce this point, there is the recollection of Former Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze on how in 1985, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, “by making universal human values a priority, we obtained a fresh outlook on the world. In this connection the

41 Thomas, 117-126.
philosophy of peaceful coexistence as a universal principle of international relations took on different meaning."\(^{42}\)

Multivariation, however, does not inject so much nebulousness into the most direct form of public diplomacy practiced by the United States in its engagement strategy. The "cultural exchange" or "engagement" side of U.S. public diplomacy that currently resides in the U.S. Department of State in the form of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Exchange (ECA), has historically sought to foster "mutual understanding between the United States and other countries through international educational and training programs."\(^{43}\) The place from which ECA functions has endured some significant changes over the years. In 1978, a restructuring resulted in the merger of ECA with then-independent USIA, which for four brief years took the name United States International Communication Agency to reflect the union. ECA would return to the Department of State along with the USIA in the 1999 consolidation, but despite periods of political haggling it has preserved its primary functions throughout. One is the prestigious International Visitor Leadership Program (formerly the International Visitor Program), which by the mid-1980's was extending invitations to between 1,500 and 2,000 foreign leaders and specialists to visit the United States and exchange views and ideas.\(^{44}\) An impressive alumni list includes Margaret Thatcher (1967), Anwar Sadat (1966), Helmut Schmidt (1956), Valery Giscard D'Estaing (1956), and Indira Gandhi (1961).\(^{45}\) Another is the Fulbright Program, an academic exchange program named for the U.S. senator who

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\(^{44}\) Hansen, 139.

created it in 1946, and since then it has funded over 267,000 exchanges for American and foreign students.46

During the Cold War, however, few participants made the journey beyond the Iron Curtain under these programs. Instead, a special arrangement between the United States and Soviet Union, known as the Lacy-Zarubin Agreement, laid out the terms for exchange between the two parties in what evolved into shorthand as the “cultural agreement” renewable every two to three years.47 The wide range of activities under the agreement, which, in addition to academia, included science and technology and the visual and performance arts, created a variety of opportunities to engage with counterparts, and this proved highly advantageous for the United States in such instances as traveling exhibits within the Soviet Union to promote American life.48 One of the strongest testimonies to the success of engagement public diplomacy can be found in the longevity of this agreement. Traditionally regarded as long-range activities, forms of engagement were well-suited to sustain periodic fluctuations in the bilateral relationship. This bears evidence in the preservation, without any sort of hiatus, of the “cultural agreement” until the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a result, even during the most tumultuous phases of the Cold War— the Cuban Missile Crisis and the early 1980's, for example— the two parties could reliably fall back on this vital connection.

47 Richmond, 15-16.
48 Critchlow, 77.
5.4 Measuring Success

Imagine a broadcast media outlet delivering programming to an audience whose numbers are unknown and listening habits remain a perennial mystery. Or a publisher producing massive amounts of literature to a readership without any hope of customer feedback or data on reading tastes and habits. An unlikely formula for any business hoping to succeed in these industries, indeed, but then again accurate measures of performance never came easy to the USIA, RFE/RL, VOA and other U.S. public diplomacy programs operating in the Communist bloc. James Critchlow captures this frustration based on experiences at RL in the 1960’s, where resignation to the harsh realities of the operating environment frequently undermined RL’s objectives: “it would be nice to have a neat random sample, but with the KGB on the other side that was a pipe dream.”

In another example, Donald Browne reports from interviews conducted during twenty-five years’ research on international radio broadcasting. His findings revealed that personnel from audience research units of the BBC, Deutsche Welle and VOA/USIA, interviewed between 1967 and 1982, acknowledge “the extreme difficulty of conducting such research,” and consistently expressed doubts of accuracy.

In fact, to this day measuring performance remains a chronic weakness in the American public diplomacy apparatus, but for reasons markedly different from similar attempts made during the Cold War years. Whereas contemporary problems for mining data on performance revolve around inadequate organizational and financial commitments inside the U.S. government, Cold War public diplomacy suffered the trials of extracting data from “closed” societies, although it cannot be said that countermeasures

Methodologies employed to gain insights on audience response and quality of programming drew on a range of qualitative media industry practices, advanced in quantitative analyses, and in some cases covert operations to gather and analyze data. In earlier research efforts, VOA, RFE and RL utilized panels comprised of locally-situated "experts" who could speak to the level of quality in programming through their familiarity with local language and culture. These expert panels proved informative for enabling receptiveness of broadcast and well as for keeping up with changing tastes and recent developments in language. Faced with no access to its principal audiences, RL employed the risky strategy of interviewing so-called "average" Soviet citizens by dispatching informant-style proxy interviewers to gather response data, which, if found out by Soviet authorities, could have wrought severe consequences on all parties involved. In the end, it was a risk worth taking: by 1982 these interview samples had accumulated to over ten-thousand. Also, both RFE and RL took advantage of the increasing number of Central and Eastern Europeans traveling in Western Europe for scientific and cultural conferences and prime them for critical listenership data. From these citizens, the station was able to collect some 50,000 entries between 1972 and 1990, upon which it could shape and enhance its programming.

Mining these data for clues into listening behavior took a step forward in the mid to late 1960's, most notably from a partnership between RL and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), whose researchers produced a computerized simulation...
methodology to approximate number of listeners, breakdown demographics, and establish patterns for a variety of listening habits.\(^5\) Results notwithstanding, one could easily raise questions of scientific rigor based on compromised not entirely unadulterated data sets to carry out this kind work. Data sampling methods appear selective rather than purely random, and it is not clear whether the data collection process ensured respondents could be candid with their remarks. Furthermore, it can be questioned if Soviets traveling outside the country could represent an evenly distributed sample of their society. These criticisms aside, it was intriguing (and surely vindicating to researchers) for analysts to later discover after the Soviet collapse, when foreign investigators could move about freely, that the USSR Academy of Sciences had undertaken its own study of the impact of Western radio and that the results of the MIT project actually resembled those of other studies.\(^6\)

What is more, it is with qualified confidence that such metrics can help to verify how well U.S. radio broadcasts informed audiences in Communist countries, thus addressing one of the chief objectives of U.S. public diplomacy strategy. To put this in context, consider the fact that U.S. radio stations concentrated programming around news and information, for which VOA and RFE/RL devoting approximately two-thirds of their airtime (the rest being devoted to entertainment and education).\(^7\) It follows that when audiences did tune in to any of the stations, they were highly likely to discover a report on current events; a general inclination toward this kind of programming is reflected in listener preferences reported in both MIT and Soviet studies. The MIT study concludes listeners were drawn to information, particularly during times of crisis when

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\(^5\) Ibid., 15-6.

\(^6\) Critchlow (1995), 110; Report from Conference on Cold War Broadcasting Impact, 16-18; corroborated by remarks from Wimbush, interview by the author, op. cit.

\(^7\) Browne, 111 and 140, respectively.
unadulterated information was unavailable through the Soviet media. One such case involves the downing of a Korean Air Lines flight by Soviet fighters on 31 August 1983, killing 269 passengers and thrusting a human rights debacle onto the Soviet Union. According to the study, more Soviets received their news from Western radio than Soviet radio (45 to 44 percent), an outcome likely influenced by VOA’s daily 17-hour coverage of the event and ongoing commentary.58 The Soviet study confirms the credibility of Western media sources in the minds of Soviet audiences, with 37 percent admitting to “somewhat trusting” Western programming as opposed to 32 percent who did not find it trustworthy at all. In examining the appeal of Western broadcasts, the Soviet study found audiences regarding them as timely information sources, including programs of interest to listeners and viewpoints different from those of government officials.59 To put all of this in context, the MIT study determined that between 1978 and 1990, VOA’s daily Soviet audience commanded the highest proportion of Western broadcast audiences averaging 3,750,000 whilst Radio Liberty -- in spite of jamming -- reached between 1,250,000 and 2,500,000 on a daily basis.60

Though radio undisputedly served as the cornerstone to information efforts, it is important to include collaborating forms of media, the most notable of which are publications. Recognized as the most potent of those produced by USIA, Central and Eastern Europe publications included titles such as the Life-like and WWII-inspired Ameryka magazine, which later changed its name to America Illustrated, and the small-

58 This case study represents the significant role VOA played in some of the broader public diplomacy campaigns targeting the Soviet Union. The Reagan Administration, with coordination from USIA, the Department of State, VOA and the National Security Council’s Special Planning Group on Public Diplomacy spearheaded a massive effort to exploit human tragedy aspects and “raise grave doubts about the place of the Soviet Union in the community of civilized nations.” See Laurien Alexandre, The Voice of America: From Detente to the Reagan Doctrine (Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1988), 115-119.
59 Report from Conference on Cold War Broadcasting Impact, 18.
60 Ibid., 15.
circulation journal *Problems of Communism*. In particular, it is alleged that in spite of carefully controlled circulation in the Soviet Union, copies of *America Illustrated* often passed through the hands of several readers before becoming unreadable.

Thus, for the purposes of information there appear to be compelling indicators to support the claim that U.S. public diplomacy achieved reasonable success in the face of tight controls and occasions of outright resistance. But to return to the question at hand, to what extent did this information campaign succeed? This brings us back to the matter of influence which was examined in the prior section, and once again there remains, due to multivariation, much uncertainty over whether U.S. public diplomacy verifiably caused a change in attitudes or behaviors of ordinary citizens and their leaders. To do so would court determinism, if not to accept an overestimation of the many, and admittedly redeeming anecdotes offered by figures pivotal in the collapse of Communism in Eastern and Central Europe. That said, it is possible there may be some utility in measuring the success of public diplomacy programs if not for its direct influence, then perhaps the perception that it *could* have wielded great influence, as seen by Soviet attempts to control and thwart Western media over the course of the Cold War. Reframing the question in this way suggests an alternative approach to a very puzzling question, which would view, for instance, the huge Soviet investment into a complex radio jamming infrastructure as a measurable change in state-level behavior (at the expense of $250 million per annum), brought on by the potential consequences of U.S. radio programming penetrating the Soviet populace on a grander scale.

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62 Ibid.
Moving finally to measuring the success of engagement strategy, the task of performance measurement here invites the face-value metric approach of somehow quantifying the extent of success, as in our earlier assessment of information strategies. At the same time there exists some uncertainty over causation, as typified by the aforementioned appraisal of influence. Briefly, one could refer to available data to assess engagement strategies by frequency of occurrence, thus high frequency is viewed positively due to the assumed increase in the likelihood of positive change in attitudes and behaviors. However, it does not follow that the exchange bears a positive outcome for the United States due to problems in ascertaining attitudinal or behavioral changes. Returning to a previous example, there would be no way to presage the conflicted exchange experience of Alexander Yakovlev, one that he explained "pushed me toward more conservative attitudes. This was not a matter of intelligence or reason, it was just a matter of emotions. It caused negative emotions."63

Yet on the face of things there is at least one strong indicator of successful engagement to be found in a correlation between information and engagement forms of public diplomacy. Richmond calls attention to an intriguing inverse relationship between the information and engagement — a pattern whereby periods of intensification of information activities mirrored period of demise in engagement activities, and vice versa.64 That they could not enjoy success at the same time may be intricately linked to the prevailing mood of the moment in the bilateral relationship as well as political imperative, which could be perceived as both a cause and an effect of the mood. During the détente period of the early 1970's, for example, the "cultural agreement" was seen to

64 Richmond, 20.
be flourishing from increased cooperation in education, science and technology. Meanwhile, information outlets such as VOA were locked into fights for their survival against political leaders like Senator J. William Fulbright, who called for the dissolution of VOA, RFE and RL by deeming them "relics of the old Cold War."\(^{65}\) Fortunes were reversed in the early 1980's as tensions mounted over Poland and the Reagan Administration injected new life into information campaigns. Budgets were boosted for VOA and RFE/RL while those of U.S. government funded exchanges plummeted to a fraction of what they had been during the watershed détente years.\(^{66}\)

5.5 **Debating the Advocacy Tradition of U.S. Public Diplomacy**

The notion of the Cold War era as a benchmark introduced at the beginning of this chapter derives from wistfulness about an international system that was seemingly easier to manage. Mearsheimer was among the first to predict that the post-Cold War international order would be harder to stabilize, and his predictions of violent outbursts in Eastern Europe were partially realized in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990's.\(^{67}\) The feeling amongst some Americans that the strength of the United States was both respected and revered during the Cold War has assumed new meaning in the post-9/11 era, since it appears that reverence has declined considerably in the new age. The public diplomacy models and approaches that are believed to have forged that reverence in the past have been idealized in light of their associations with the apparent Cold War victory. Advocacy

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\(^{65}\) Browne, 142.

\(^{66}\) For figures on early 1980's decline in budgets for exchanges, see Adelman, "Speaking of America: Public Diplomacy in Our Time," 926. However, it merits pointing out that there was such a revolt from the U.S. Congress and civil groups over this decline that in the end exchanges were also massively expanded after 1983-84. I am indebted to Giles Scott-Smith for bringing this fact to my attention.

public diplomacy and the approaches of information and influence dominated those years, and they remained unchallenged in the aftermath.

This chapter explored at some length the reasons how this order came to be, and, rather than accept historical memory at face value, proceeded to analyze the accuracy of the claim that the Cold War tradition of public diplomacy earned its legacy as a success. It would seem there is much to be gained from the accomplishments of Cold War-era public diplomacy, but in the final analysis, can it be deemed a success to the extent that it might serve as a model for future activities? Upon examining public diplomacy by way of a methodology dividing its activities into the three constituent approaches of information, influence and engagement, it is apparent the answer is not a straightforward one, and yet certain compelling aspects come into sharp relief. What they indicate above all is that in the philosophical struggle between aggressive and moderate camps, American strategic communications (which incorporates the distinct practices of public diplomacy and propaganda) was at its best during the Cold War when prizing credibility and transparency over subliminal persuasion and manipulation. In the informational dimension, it appears public diplomacy enjoyed relative success in reaching a broad swath of the Communist bloc. In concentrating three radio stations on this region, the United States utilized the ideal technological, yet limited human resources to penetrate audiences with customized programming based on content analysis. More importantly, the radios demonstrated impressive resilience to Soviet countermeasures and resourcefulness in attempting to understand its audience.

On the matter of influence, it is hard to ignore the reasonable doubts that may lead to a marginalization or complete disavowal of public diplomacy’s ability to change attitudes and behaviors. The problem of multivariation in isolating causal ideational variables obscures clear conclusions of just why and how the Cold War ended in the way
that it did. Furthermore, the overriding tension between rationalist and constructivist interpretation of that same event puts at risk any explanations rooted in ideational causes. Ultimately, there may be too many compelling anecdotes to suggest that U.S. public diplomacy did succeed in influencing its audiences to the effect of changed attitudes and behaviors in favor of the United States, but this cannot be confirmed by objective qualitative or quantitative evidence existing at present.

Finally, with respect to engagement strategies it is possible that a combination of the prior two assessments is instructive here. As with radio programming, some compelling evidence for the success of engagement exists in the vast quantity of exchanges and exhibits that took place throughout the Cold War period; this rationalizes that the high frequency of encounters over a sustained period of time would incrementally increase the likelihood of successful exposure to members of the counterpart societies and possibly the exchange of ideas. However, in the attempt to measure the quality of engagement outcomes there remains the problem, as with measuring influence, of confirming success due to the lack of supporting data. In absence of this data, what remains is an abundance of anecdotes to speak to the merits of this and other forms of public diplomacy. As compelling as they may be, it is important to recognize that anecdotes alone are insufficient for the incontrovertible defining and measuring of the success of public diplomacy: the facts and judgments which contain the most objective determinations of success -- and the Cold War experience has many of these to offer -- will undoubtedly be most indispensable for plotting future developments that lead to future success.
CHAPTER 6 : MOVING TOWARDS DIALOGUE?
‘LISTENING’, SOFT POWER, AND THE ‘NEW’ PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Barring a full dependence on the advocacy public diplomacy that rose to prominence during the Cold War, what is the alternative? Another view that has gained an increased amount of attention in public diplomacy scholarship has argued for shaping strategies and activities not in emulation of the past, but in response to conditions set out by the present international system and the forms they will likely take in the future. In an attempt to distinguish itself from tradition, this view has come to be known as the ‘new’ public diplomacy, and this chapter will describe and assess the validity of this and other vanguard ideas currently under consideration.

Of the American grand strategy of containment during the Cold War, John Lewis Gaddis has said that it in addition to serving its main purpose of restricting Soviet movements, the strategy itself provided a “a kind of ballast” or a “center of gravity” upon which successive administrations could base their actions.1 To a lesser degree, the same could be said of the American communications approach of that era. The previous chapter found that the United States relied on another center of gravity to wage the ideological contest of the Cold War. It was an approach founded upon the judicious and concentrated use of information as the root principle for the conduct of its public diplomacy. Pursuing an approach dominated by the goals of information and influence spurred on the proliferation of U.S.-subsidized media operations, including radio broadcasts, publications, and later, television. Put together, this constituted a multifaceted advocacy machine for transmitting images and messages into closed societies, sometimes more or

less aggressively depending on the threat perception felt by the United States at any given period.\textsuperscript{2} It was believed that in the maintenance of these qualities, the United States would stand the greatest chance of influencing general publics behind the Berlin Wall to reject communism and ultimately demand of their leaders the adoption of the liberal democratic socioeconomic model.

Whether or not this strategy worked is disputable for a number of given reasons, many of which are to be found in more recent treatments of U.S. public diplomacy. And while the dominant part of recent discourse has been focusing on remarkable changes in the milieu of world politics and portents for practicing public diplomacy, the principal interpretation of public diplomacy by American practitioners holds that it is chiefly for the purveyance of information and for swaying foreign support towards the international objectives of the United States.\textsuperscript{3} This position bears a striking resemblance to how public diplomacy was applied during the Cold War, and proof positive that although the Soviet Union is gone, public diplomacy’s tradition of advocacy remains a compelling force well into post-9/11 era. The traditional lineage reveals a striking consistency hearkening back to the beginning of the modern age of American public diplomacy. Public rhetoric has long evoked an image of American ideals in a contest with a competing set laden with falsehoods. One can trace this line of rhetoric to President Truman’s ‘Campaign of Truth’\textsuperscript{4} (“...to promote the cause of freedom against the propaganda of slavery”), through

\textsuperscript{3} Senate Foreign Relations Committee, \textit{Nomination of Karen Hughes to be to be Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy}, 109\textsuperscript{th} Cong., 1\textsuperscript{st} sess., 22 July 2005; Carnes Lord, \textit{Losing Hearts and Minds?} (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006).
the 1980’s with President Reagan’s ‘Project Truth’\textsuperscript{5} (to “underline the American commitment to peace”), and up to 2005, when Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Karen Hughes expressed her conviction that “the way to prevail...is through the power of our ideals; for they speak to all of us, every people in every land on every continent. Given a fair hearing, I am sure they will prevail.”\textsuperscript{6}

This study maintains that the advisory model and engagement approach to public diplomacy assumed a subordinate role to the principal modes of information and influence. One aspect of the engagement approach discussed in the prior chapter deals with the pursuit of exchange programs, seeking not to achieve mutual understanding in the reciprocal sense, but rather an outcome where exchange participants could establish a level of comfort regarding American international objectives. It was a testament to the long-term orientation of these limited engagement activities during the Cold War that the United States arguably did achieve a measure of success in maintaining open dialogue with Soviet counterparts. Furthermore engagement public diplomacy facilitated the development of a cadre of world leaders sympathetic to the position of United States on issues pertaining to governance, economic development and security— a benefit that the United States continues to enjoy to the present day.

Prior to 9/11, there had been several occasions when ideas expanding beyond the dominant interpretations of public diplomacy appeared, although never to any real transformational effect. In 1968, Arthur Hoffman assembled a group of journalists, anthropologists, psychologists and other social scientists to venture an early forecast of


\textsuperscript{6} Nomination of Karen Hughes, op. cit.
‘new diplomacy’.\(^7\) In this volume, several contributors wrote of the rapidly changing relationship between governments and foreign publics proposing, among other things, to factor foreign public opinion into the framing of foreign policies.\(^8\) Discussions over the increasing sophistication of information and communication technologies (ICTs) occupied the minds of high-ranking American officials in 1987, when then-Secretary of State George Shultz recognized how they would impact public diplomacy’s future. “The need for instantaneous, reliable communications links around the globe is perhaps the most obvious and immediate demand we must continue to meet,” he urged.\(^9\) It was in 1994 when Manheim wrote the first integrated analysis on public diplomacy as an industry, complete with both public and private actors, multidirectional flows of information, and the systematic tools by which foreign public opinion may enter the domestic policy discourse.\(^10\) In the wake of the equally seminal Nye/Owens *Foreign Affairs* article “America’s Information Edge” in 1996, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) subsequently produced a 1998 study on the “reinvention” of diplomacy, recommending a “collaborative relationship” with foreign publics that may more directly channel their opinions to factor in to policy formulations of American decision-makers. Other key ideas to emerge in the report advocated closer interagency cooperation on public diplomacy initiatives, upgrading information technology capabilities, and drawing more commercial and other non-official interests into the


In 2003, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy put forth a plan for the modernization of communication technologies at U.S. embassies and consulates and proposed diversifying information resources to reach a broader audience worldwide.

The recurring ideas of soliciting views from foreign populations, modernizing communication tools with the integration of ICTs and recognizing the potential of non-state actors to efficiently convey images and messages at last gathered together in a niche at the crossroads of International Relations and International Communications. To distinguish from traditional ideas about public diplomacy, the new thinking summarily became known as the ‘new public diplomacy’, the tenets of which are neatly captured in Jan Melissen’s 2005 volume of the same name. Melissen elaborates on three defining features of the new public diplomacy as it diverges from traditional interpretations: the expansion of actors beyond the state to include supra- and subnational players, complex political communication in an age of increased ‘interconnectedness’, and international ‘dialogue’ as a replacement for more traditional aims of state-sponsored information programs. The overarching themes are largely construed as consequences of blurring lines between state and non-state actors, domestic and international publics, and, as a result, the mobilization of two-way information flows.

In the previous chapter, Nye and Zaharna asserted that the international arena after 9/11 contrasts sharply with that of the Cold War, noting advances and proliferation in

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11 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 9 October 1998), 11-12.
new information technologies, the greatly expanded opportunities for encounters between cultures; and the evolving distribution of power occurring amongst states and, with increasing relevance, non-state actors at the beginning of the 21st century. Their arguments uphold a contesting view that the American proclivity to cling to traditional forms of public diplomacy may vastly underestimate the complexity of communicating in a political environment laden with instantaneous transmissions of information and a growing number of non-state actors involved in foreign policy debates.\textsuperscript{14} Transformations in the way the United States interacts with other entities in world affairs raises the possibility that even diplomacy, and public diplomacy in particular, are embarking on this 'new' phase that Melissen and others speak of.\textsuperscript{15}

Despite the increased prevalence of ideas captured under the rubric of the new public diplomacy, they have had little impact thus far on refining the purposes, strategies and organizations dealing with public diplomacy, most notably in the case of the United States. But as the post-9/11 era has heralded the rekindling of scholarly interest in the field of public diplomacy and the attention of practitioners observing the U.S. case with great intrigue, and new ways of looking at the practice of public diplomacy are a function of the future-oriented view of its post-9/11 discourses. Thus, as the previous chapter delved into the notion of advocacy as the traditional model of U.S. public diplomacy, this chapter weighs an alternate future by exploring vanguard concepts led by considerations of how public diplomacy as a form of political communication will adapt to an ever-changing international environment. To give an example of the contrast in traditional and

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new forms of thinking in the United States, one roundtable discussion held by the Aspen Institute in 2005 concluded that the new public diplomacy, "however defined, cannot simply mimic the approaches of the past...[R]egardless of the form it takes, [it] must reflect post-Cold War realities." One roundtable participant, an American ambassador, developed the following chart to illustrate the necessary changes that he felt were in order for public diplomacy to succeed in the present and foreseeable future.

Table 1: Old versus New Forms of Public Diplomacy.\(^\text{17}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Old Forms of Public Diplomacy</th>
<th>New Forms of Public Diplomacy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monologue</td>
<td>Dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission-driven</td>
<td>Mission-driven, market-savvy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About ‘us’</td>
<td>About ‘them’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>Bi- and multilateral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managing images</td>
<td>Building relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stovepiped</td>
<td>Coordinated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactive</td>
<td>Proactive</td>
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</tbody>
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From a strategic standpoint, what this proposes is a movement away from a one-way communication style, a restricted view of the number of stakeholders, primary concern for image management and short-term, reaction oriented tactics. Supplanting them are a two-way or dialogic communication style, an expanded scope of stakeholders to make room for non-state actors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and a long-term, proactive posture emphasizing collaboration with foreign counterparts. Contrary to the advisory model favoring engagement, the advocacy model gave priority to information and influence during the U.S. public diplomacy campaigns of the Cold War. New thinking on public diplomacy, and how to improve U.S. public diplomacy in


\(^{17}\) Ibid.
particular, eschews modeling solutions upon the past. And if indeed challengers to the U.S. revitalization of Cold War approaches are correct in saying it has become an anachronism in the face of contemporary challenges, then the logical implication is to turn attention to alternatives more befitting of the tasks and conditions presented by the international environment. This, they would maintain, is cause for the United States to consider engagement public diplomacy and the advisory model as foundations for practice in the post-9/11 era.

6.1 Problems of the New Public Diplomacy

But whereas the U.S. case has been proven thus far to possess a substantial history and wealth of detail on how strategies of information and influence appear in practice given its long-held interpretation of public diplomacy for advocacy purposes (without which a case study on American activities during the Cold War would not be possible), it is difficult to visualize a viable alternative to take its place. New thinking on public diplomacy concentrates on two frequently cited areas: (1) the practicability of dialogic communication between governmental and non-governmental parties – this has come to be known informally as ‘listening’, and (2) the soft power thesis. It is the aim of this chapter to take adherents of the advisory model and ‘new’ public diplomacy thinkers to task on their ideas. In the first instance, this chapter will address the themes of ‘dialogue’ and ‘listening’ that recur in the literature advocating an alternative to U.S. public diplomacy. When commentators and researchers on the state of American foreign relations remark that the United States needs to ‘listen better’, what does that mean? How does a nation demonstrate listening, and why is public diplomacy integral to that behavior? The same problem of personifying communication techniques to the real
world hampers the notion of ‘dialogue’ as well – how does a nation participate in dialogue?

In the second, the question must be asked: is new thinking on public diplomacy anathema to soft power? At first glance, applied soft power appears if anything wholly consistent with the new public diplomacy, and Nye has argued that improved public diplomacy practiced by the United States requires “a greater understanding of how our policies appear to others.” On the other hand, soft power is still a form of power and Nye built his thesis on the supposition that the United States, above others, should possess sufficient soft power to maintain its pre-eminent position in the world and preserve its preferred form of international order.

The tasks of this chapter will be to elaborate to the strengths and weaknesses of these ideas at length. The problematic underlying the forthcoming analysis is one where the vanguard segment of scholarship on public diplomacy contains stimulating ideas but has yet to mature to the point of making a strong case for a practical alternative to the hitherto dominant approach employed by the United States.

6.2 ‘Listening’ and Dialogic Communication

In their 2003 report on U.S. public diplomacy, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) concluded that the United States is viewed by the world as “too seldom ‘listening’

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to the world while...defining [its] interests and defending them abroad. It is instructive that the authors of the report should refer to listening in the figurative sense, recognizing that the term personifies a national behavior of responsiveness to opinions expressed from the international realm. Others are more precise about who should be doing the listening on the American end of the transnational conversation. While some place the burden on America public diplomacy officers and administration officials, it is more frequent that the demand encompasses Americans as a whole. Nye, for one, contests that in order to communicate better overseas, “Americans need to listen.” One member of Business for Diplomatic Action, a leading private-sector proponent of engagement public diplomacy, commented that “for Americans in general, it is very hard to step back and listen.” It became evident that the calls for listening rose to the level of public diplomacy strategic planning when Secretary Condoleezza Rice, upon the nomination of Karen Hughes to oversee public diplomacy activities, remarked that “to be successful we must listen” and that this would be central to reforming an ineffective system. In keeping with her superior’s comments, Hughes first order of business on the job would be to embark on a ‘listening tour’ of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey.

But behind the rhetoric some fundamental problems lurk. A brief discourse analysis shows that there are various perspectives on what exactly listening as a national behavior consists of, and to what end. These questions might not be so important but for the fact that listening and the notion of dialogue stand out as an important means to

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21 Ibid; Critchlow, 84.
applying new thinking on public diplomacy, and more precisely the realization of improvement for the U.S. system. One could start by asking a very basic question: how do states listen? The responsiveness of leadership in democracies is enabled by a system of governance making leaders accountable to their constituents, who wield the power of the vote.\textsuperscript{25} In an anarchic international system, responsiveness works differently. The CFR report suggests listening can actuated through opinion polling, and the results of these polls, in a perfect arrangement, are meant to create substantially more awareness to cultural and political realities of targets than would otherwise be possible.\textsuperscript{26} However it is more likely that states will strive to avoid a scenario in which listening is on order. As a result, foreign publics are sometimes inclined to force a reaction by making themselves heard, and they do this through the international media, public protests, pressure groups and other forms of political expression. Failing these, states will be left to speculate that local understanding of foreign objectives is relatively uninformed and shall use proactive public diplomacy tools such as information dissemination and cultural centers abroad riding the assumption that foreign populations will construct positive associations of sponsoring states by these methods.\textsuperscript{27} In this way, states attempt to steer foreign opinion proactively rather than the converse.

To some, listening is code for clarifying. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, known less formally as the 9/11 Commission, devoted attention in its final report to the spread of anti-Americanism in the Arab-Muslim world, and in response to falling levels of favorability to the United States made available by the Pew Global Attitudes Project and others it advocated a strong course of "defin[ing] what

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{26} CFR Report, 35.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Mark Leonard, \textit{Public Diplomacy} (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2002), 46.
\end{itemize}
[U.S.] message is, what it stands for."\(^{28}\) A host of other studies have followed suit in reasoning the sharp decline of the American image as an outcome of poor communication, and to respond with a more robust information campaign.\(^{29}\) In an example from practice, in her dealings with audiences skeptical of the U.S. role in the Israel-Palestine conflict, Under Secretary Karen Hughes has regularly responded to charges of American heavy-handedness against Palestinians by stating President Bush’s proposal for a two-state solution to bring about its end.\(^{30}\)

It is of course necessary at times for states to issue clarifications to respond to false accusations, but new thinking on public diplomacy argues that this is more often done for political expediency and to appear resolved on a policy position.\(^{31}\) What this calls for is additional restraint to be shown prior to responding. For example, retired American FSO John H. Brown offers the following view to illuminate the point:

*Americans should listen more -- but then so should the rest of the world. We are not unique in our inability to hear -- and consider -- what others have to say. More than many other countries, however, the U.S. prefers to pretend that it is unaffected with what goes on overseas. This is a parochial viewpoint that we can ill afford.*\(^{32}\)


\(^{31}\) Leonard, *Public Diplomacy*.

\(^{32}\) John H. Brown, e-mail interview by the author, 31 December 2006.
Here Brown is suggesting two things about the form and function of listening. First, in lacking the sufficient capacity or will to listen there is a prohibitive price to pay for ignoring foreign public sentiment, and second, that listening is a two-part exercise consisting of ‘hearing’ and ‘considering’, the latter of which putatively produces a signal to publics abroad that they have been listened to. Generally, these signals reflect substantive changes in foreign policy or the implementation of a new policy as a form of concession. The problem with this metaphor is that ‘consideration’ as a step in the policy formulation or review process intercedes in deliberations usually hidden from view. Unlike the Cuban Missile Crisis, where the two superpowers negotiated monumental policy shifts over two tense weeks of well-publicized standoff, the path to policy change is often protracted and complex, and the notion of consideration may overstate the ease with which change happens. The closest that new public diplomacy thinking has come to confronting this reality when a meeting of scholars and practitioners generated the idea of the ‘feedback loop’, a borrowed business technique in which policymakers consult with stakeholders to explain which of their suggestions influenced change and why other ideas are rejected. It was reported that the Canadian government has used the Internet in this way to open policy debates up for public comment.33

In such moments when the international system operates less anarchically in the idiom of self-interest and more democratically to the extent that foreign populations impact the domestic policy discourse, it is, as would be if the discourse were limited to a domestic constituency, politically unwise to base decisions regarding policy based on their popularity. That is why new public diplomacy endorses an abstract form of

international negotiation to work out disagreements referred to as ‘two-way’ communication, or simply ‘dialogue’.

Like listening, dialogue is also a figurative term used to describe an aspect of transnational communication resembling that of an interpersonal conversation. It highlights the fact that communication is not terminal after listening and extends further to a point where two or more parties are ‘talking’ as well as listening. As Kiehl points out, dialogue implies an exchange of views where participants share in the two complementary activities. In the context of public diplomacy some have opined that the process has yet to mature to a point where dialogue is the norm. Practitioners from the diplomatic community, including Daryl Copeland of Foreign Affairs Canada and Shaun Riordan, formerly of H.M. Diplomatic Service in the United Kingdom, have spoken of a necessary shift in political communication flows to depart from the classical emphasis on information dissemination and to embrace “two-way” or “dialogue-based” public diplomacy. Dialogue is also reinforced by deeds: the Brookings Institute adds that the lessons to be learned from such discussions and the resulting policy recommendations must somehow feed back into the policymaking process, which underscores an implicit tone of compromise.

The association of dialogue with the new public diplomacy infers the breaking of ground in interstate political communication. In fact, the instance of dialogue between states by way of public diplomacy is not entirely unprecedented. A classic Cold War-era

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example of expeditious engagement-style public diplomacy with an emphasis on the objective of near-term tension reduction, illustrated in the so-called “Kennedy Experiment” conducted over the period of four months in 1963. The dialogue in this case consisted of a series of reciprocated acts between the United States and Soviet Union that resulted in a short-lived détente until President Kennedy’s death later that year. It began with a June 1963 speech delivered by Kennedy titled “A Strategy for Peace”, in which it is believed USIA director Edward Murrow gave input. Seeking to improve U.S.-Soviet relations after the Cuban Missile Crisis the previous fall, Kennedy initiated a conciliatory mood by calling the Soviet Union a “great society” proposing “constructive changes” within the Soviet Union to affirm interest in a “genuine peace,” and challenging Americans to “re-examine” Cold War perceptions. What followed was a volley of mostly symbolic yet favorable moves by both parties in areas of trade, the reciprocated release of spies, space exploration, and test-bans of nuclear weapons. Each act typified the generally symbolic nature of the thaw, the last one, in fact, a rehash of an already existing agreement between the two sides to not orbit nuclear weapons in space. Such agreements may be reminiscent of the traditional kind of diplomacy between states, but the evidence suggests otherwise: Kennedy’s June speech appeared in full in Soviet-controlled print media and Soviet radio jammers allowed Voice of America to broadcast the speech unobstructed. Even in the United States, some worried that popular vigilance against Communism would suffer from the unfolding détente. Indeed, the full
participation of political elites engaging the media and public opinion on both sides played a vital role in the "experiment."

The dialogue was innovative to the degree that the rhetoric of each side aimed to influence the mood of the other's constituency when in fact the real substantive exchange occurred strictly at the state level. In the purview of the new public diplomacy, dialogue occurs on a broader scale than this. The post-9/11 international security paradigm demands that states look past co-opting foreign populations to gain leverage in their negotiations with foreign ministries. The proliferation of information flows bestows formidable bargaining powers upon an ever-growing collection of non-state actors. By these estimations, the new public diplomacy assumes changes in the rules of transnational dialogue due to transformations in agency: traditional diplomats are ceding ground to a 'new' class of diplomats who are emerging from the ranks of the 'traditional' public, for example. Instead of presuming bilateral or even multilateral dialogues, states must learn to converse with NGO's, suprastate and substate organizations, civil society organizations and other non-state actors. This argument corresponds with Nye's aforementioned "paradox of plenty," and the realization that unprecedented and widespread access to information enables a vast number of stakeholders to participate in transnational dialogue and do so with considerable effect. The covenants of Wilsonian diplomacy thus become openly negotiated to the extent that openness is less of an ideal, but more a consequence

of the diminishing ability of states to control information and manipulate audiences. “Who gets attention,” Nye asserts, “depends on credibility.”

Credibility is a key characteristic in the dialogue of the new public diplomacy because it is construed to be a necessary quality in the quest for states to be persuasive. On an interpersonal level, it is the amount of trust one can place in another as a source of information. As it pertains to states, it is the level of consistency between the claims of a state and their accordance with reality. Credibility for states, as with people, is earned by developing a reputation for dealing in accurate information. This implies that building a reputation for being credible is not taken for granted, but it is in fact a time-intensive process, and accuracy in information has not only to deal with one state’s reporting on events, but also the fulfillment of one’s own promises and deliverance on expectations.

Without a long-term timeframe and attention to one’s own reliability, a state is undermined in its ability to participate in the dialogue of the new public diplomacy. As one German diplomat explained, “public diplomacy can only make a substantial difference if it is devised in a long-term manner and if it enjoys credibility.” More importantly, this brand of dialogue which thrives on credibility extends beyond the realm of states into that of non-state agents, who by their own abilities to access accurate information, have become credible players in the new political communications

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environment. Yet as states realize their loosened grip on information dissemination and gradually turn to non-governmental partners to participate in dialogue, in effect structuring public diplomacy processes in a collaborative rather than competitive manner, they invariably compromise their own national interest to a degree, ceding not only their total power, but soft power as well.

While the soft power capabilities of other actors are increasing, the United States has simultaneously undermined its own, and this much to do with credibility as a determining factor in the success of U.S. public diplomacy. Such thinking about credibility is not new; Socrates once counseled “the way to achieve a good reputation is to endeavor to be what you desire to appear.” In the early 1960’s then-USIA Director Edward R. Murrow famously told a congressional committee, “To be persuasive we must be believable; to be believable we must be credible; to be credible we must be truthful.” However it is apparent from recent polls of foreign public opinion that international perceptions of foreign policy endeavors of the United States do not match the desired portrait of credibility conveyed by its public diplomacy. Again, ICT’s serve as a force multiplier in the foreign vocalizations of discontent towards the United States, and since 9/11 and more recently the Iraq War, judgments emerging from the American reaction to these events, alongside revelations of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo have further undercut U.S. efforts at image enhancement. Far more than in the past, U.S. public diplomacy in the post-9/11 era faces a number of vulnerabilities in its ability to persuade more discerning audiences of the credibility of its messages.

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48 Riordan, “Dialogue-based Public Diplomacy”.
6.3 Soft Power Incompatibility

Arguably no other scholar has done more to make public diplomacy relevant to International Relations than Joseph Nye. The trajectory of his discourses on soft power, and specifically the contention of information being a source of soft power gathered momentum at a time when the general public diplomacy research project had ebbed significantly. Nye’s early forays into the persuasive powers of states dealt mainly with state resources of ‘co-optive’ power, such as culture, leadership in international regimes, or science and technology, and less with state-based mediums for projecting those powers.\(^1\) By 1996 Nye would narrow his focus to diplomatic resources of channeling American soft power, lobbying for an expanded role for the USIA in democracy promotion, international broadcasting and exploitation of new information technologies.\(^2\)

It is at this point where Nye turns his attention to public diplomacy, which over time has slowly migrated from the periphery of his treatments on soft power towards the center. Starting with *The Paradox of American Power* in the post-9/11 era, Nye openly criticized the abolition of USIA, saying it had “reduced the effectiveness of one of our government’s important instruments of soft power.”\(^3\) Such a statement would presage the incorporation of public diplomacy into one of the central tenets of 2004’s *Soft Power*. Now tantamount to the act of ‘wielding’ soft power, public diplomacy became renown for its association with a widely recognizable IR discourse and gained visibility as a tool for winning ‘hearts and minds’ abroad.\(^4\) The combination of falling foreign favorability towards the United States with its noticeable weak public diplomacy apparatus

\(^{1}\) Nye, *Bound to Lead*.
\(^{2}\) Nye and Owens, 36.
strengthened Nye’s claims of the costs of ignoring soft power, which he argues has placed
the international standing and national security of the United States at considerable risk.

Prior to this, Nye warned against American unilateral military action to secure the
peace, and asserted the democratizing (and by extension the peace-inducing) power of
information. It followed that his generalizations of state behavior, while professing to
be empirical in nature, found their primary catalyst in the United States. From Bound to
Lead onward, Nye has been mainly occupied with how the United States will maintain its
primacy as the world’s only superpower, preserving its comparative advantages in
information technology and military supremacy by applying what he now calls a ‘smart’
combination of hard and soft power, and supporting multilateral approaches for dealing
with transnational issues. In light of this, the principles of the soft power concept in one
sense accept Realism’s view of the world — that soft power, like any other form of power,
is distributed unevenly within an anarchic international system and the United States,
above all, must regard its own cache judiciously to preserve its position. It is also an
ideal. Soft power is an outgrowth of Idealist IR on complex interdependence among
diverse international actors and it is also portends an increasingly interconnected world
where the predominant powers must decide what the quality of those connections shall be
and how they can collectively deal with problems arising in the international
environment. The futurist prescription for soft power goes that it may “change
perceptions of self-interest” and, in turn, the way international actors use hard power as

55 Joseph S. Nye and William A. Owens, “America’s Information Edge” Foreign Affairs (March/April
1996).
56 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,”
International Organization 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 393.
57 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Power and Interdependence in the Information Age,” Foreign
Affairs 77, no. 2 (September/October 1998).
well. As for how this impacts the future behavior of states, the implication that those who embrace soft power to enhance their overall standing among other nations suggests that states who ignore soft power do so at their own peril.

Essentially, soft power, for all its nuances and emphasis on cooperation, remains a form of power. Mattern points out that while there is a distinction to be made between attractive and coercive forms of power, attraction requires the representational, if not physical, force to be found in coercion in order to be effective. "In this way," she contends, "soft power is not so soft after all." Because power is both intrinsically relative and competitive (i.e. one must have less power in order for one to have more), and because of Nye's preoccupations with the primacy of the United States, it undermines a core component of the new public diplomacy in that it professes to be purely collaborative. "Even authors like Joseph Nye treat 'soft power' as an exercise in winning the battle of ideas," writes Shaun Riordan. The notion held by many that the United States is indeed engulfed in an ideological battle belies the appearance that soft power is a common denominator connecting various aspects of the revived scholarship on U.S. public diplomacy. To be sure, Nye's singling out of public diplomacy as an application of soft power serves many purposes that have been undeniably integral to all recent public diplomacy discourses. It has shed new light on the need for non-military expressions of state behavior, the potency information and its centrality to contemporary international relations, and the desirability of states having the capacity to 'listen' to other states. Without broad agreement that each of these subjects is important, unquestionably far less thought would be devoted to public diplomacy. The fact that the new public diplomacy

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58 Ibid., 94.
60 Riordan in Melissen, op. cit., 188.
discourages competition raises the question of whether this risks drawing general public diplomacy scholarship away from its theoretical home. Alternatively, when looking at it from the reverse perspective perhaps the new public diplomacy exposes the innate tension in the soft power thesis of states having to balance self-interest with the common good.

The feeling that soft power does not accurately represent certain quarters of the new thinking on public diplomacy has much to do with the trade-offs of power. In the case of the United States, Nye attempts to ameliorate this apparent balance by asserting that the American international agenda can strive for objectives that bestow benefits for not only the American good, but the common good as well. On the other hand, Henrikson has referred to public diplomacy and an “equalizer — even a negator — of power”, which in his view points to an inherent demand for compromise with other and often less powerful international actors. But of course there are many cases where states, including but not limited to the United States, have and continue to use public diplomacy for the paramount purpose of securitizing its power, be it for accumulation or preservation. As the new public diplomacy weighs its relationship to state power, soft or otherwise, its acceptance as a viable form of statecraft will be decided on its ability to conform to state interests.

6.4 ‘Traditional’ and ‘New’ Public Diplomacy: Moving towards Dialogue?

In this section, an effort will be made to synthesize the points of the last two chapters while re-examining the question of how the United States might proceed in

addressing the problems surrounding its public diplomacy. In one of the first studies dealing principally with American public diplomacy, Glen Fisher, an American FSO, made an early attempt to characterize it as not only an act, but a process as well, calling it "the cause and effect of public attitudes and opinions which influence the formulation and execution of foreign policies". Coming from a behavioral sciences perspective, Fisher’s characterization is noteworthy not only in the way it conceives the relationship between foreign publics and the domestic policy discourse but also by its suggestion that public attitudes and opinions influence policymakers rather than simply the converse. A number of studies have been undertaken to explore the questions surrounding a possible causal relationship between publics and decisionmakers of foreign policy in the strictly domestic content, and their findings, while not irrefutably conclusive, are strongly suggestive of the public’s power to steer outcomes of foreign policy formulation. However, unlike these studies’ concentration on domestic behavior, Fisher casts a large net in his composition of the public to include both domestic and foreign constituents, and over time it has proven yet more vital for states to seek and act on inputs emerging from the international environment. This truism is yet more compelling in the post-9/11 era: public participation in the policy discourses surrounding international affairs has increased dramatically. According to Hill, contemporary foreign policy must consequently demonstrate the flexibility to “cope with not just an increased public interest in external

policy but also an increasingly direct participation by citizens in international relations...”

He explains that world citizenry partakes in international relations

“...fuelled by the knowledge that legitimate ‘domestic’ concerns are to some extent dependent on international and transnational contexts. This heightens the responsibilities of foreign policymakers as well as making more complex the technical, managerial tasks they face.”

The heightened capability of citizens to migrate from domestic to foreign spheres combined with sophisticated means of participating directly in political matters means that the critical mass of stakeholders in policy outcomes assumes a form unlike any other seen in the history of international affairs. Even the realist perspective of Hans Morgenthau had to be refined to account for the intensifying conflict between ‘good foreign policy’ and ‘the preferences of public opinion’ to acknowledge the breaking down of barriers separating the domestic concerns from foreign ones, and not deny the dynamism of communications techniques possessed by members of civil society, the private sector, and other non-state and sub-state actors.

The new public diplomacy is partially a product of capitalizing on such transformations in the ways policymakers and publics domestic and foreign interact with each other; however it should also be mentioned the broad agreement that exists in recognizing the impact of new media from those who would represent more traditional perspectives. The influential 2003 report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World considered ICT’s to be the “lifeblood of global communications outreach and impact” and “essential to a public diplomacy with

67 Ibid.
consistent strategic direction." Ross, in addition to acknowledging these realities, notes how the number of actors in public diplomacy has "mushroomed" over many years to include representatives from NGO's, and the higher visibility of supra- and sub-state organizations. Due to the fact that information technologies have aided in dispersing political participation and enabling informed judgments by the general public, governments must not only engage with a more complex domestic constituency, but an emerging foreign constituency as well. As a point of intersection between recognizing both the proliferation of ICT's and the shrinking distinctions between domestic and foreign audiences, some have suggested that U.S. lawmakers repeal the 1948 Smith-Mundt Act – the law that prohibits government-sponsored media from broadcasting to domestic audiences – since its broadcasting outlets are now fully accessible over the internet. In the political arena, most agree that the dynamism of information resources has significantly altered the way publics participate in elections, policy debates, lobbying campaigns and decisions involving military interventions, and public diplomacy must adapt accordingly.

It is learned from the example of Cold War public diplomacy that for the better part of the 20th century, ICT resources of the public and other non-state actors qualitatively inferior to those of governments, public diplomacy practitioners in the official capacity could presume large segments of the population to be deficient in information relative to governments, and it was therefore appropriate for countries like the United States, Soviet Union, France, Germany and United Kingdom to pursue

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68 Djerejian Report, 40.
69 Ross, op. cit, 76.
information-driven public diplomacy strategies. But the prediction of James Rosenau has become a reality: politics everywhere are gradually becoming more related to politics everywhere else, and thinking about how public diplomacy may be effective in the 21st century is dictated first by highly knowledgeable and informed audiences. The main differences in the approaches between traditional and new public diplomacy lies in how communications with these audiences will happen. Will they be a monologue or dialogue?

If 20th century public diplomacy showed a predilection for 'push-down' short-term and sometimes propagandistic tactics befitting information and influence approaches, the new public diplomacy of the 21st century envisages multidirectional flows of shared information and reciprocated influence within a network atmosphere. The challenge then posed to scholars and practitioners of the new public diplomacy is to implement strategies that correspond to public behavior and implement them judiciously. As the lines that once separated domestic from foreign constituents become less defined and civil society asserts more bargaining power in the public interest through its enhanced access to information, new public diplomacy conceives a modified view of the 'public.'

With foreign populations, civil society, NGO’s and the private sector all poised to gain significantly in the new public diplomacy process, where does this leave the state? All of this creates a scenario where states are confronted with a choice of whether to proceed with their public diplomacy activities under the advocacy model or adopt a new course under the advisory model. The circumstances surrounding this choice reveal a spectrum of issues ranging from relatively minor tactical ones all the way to re-evaluating

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foreign policy traditions and grand strategy. The post-9/11 era has witnessed the United States, with the release of the National Security Strategy of 2002, shifting into a new grand strategy to deal in the age of terrorist threats. But it is also clear from the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission that the support structure to complement the new strategy will take time to coalesce. This fact extends to U.S. public diplomacy as well, where a largely pre-9/11 structure supports an advocacy model of diplomacy constructed with Cold War-era conditions impacting its development and orienting its goals. If the United States should make the decision to redefine its international communications within an advisory model, as new public diplomacy architects suggest, the next chapter shall show the degree to which the present public diplomacy organization and coordination complicates the process.
CHAPTER 7: DISORDER FROM ORDER:
ORGANIZATIONAL OBSTACLES TO DIALOGUE

Up to this point, the study has devoted most of its attention to the strategic
dimension of U.S. public diplomacy and the question of shifting approaches to allow for
new ideas in application and analysis. In this chapter, attention turns to the structural by
exploring the layers underlying strategy to further elaborate on challenges for engaging
publics abroad. These layers consist of organization and coordination, and it shall be
discussed here how both are strewn with obstacles that would pose difficulties for the
United States should it decide to shift emphasis to engagement.

The argument for employing the advisory model and engagement approach as the
dominant practice of public diplomacy over the information and influence-driven
programs of the past appears with increased frequency and in various forms. The revived
research project in public diplomacy, sparked in no small way by 9/11 but attempting to
be empirical in its implications, calls on states to modify their practices in recognition of a
rapidly changing global communications environment altering the international system to
some degree by expanding the number of policy-relevant actors and the communications
channels that link them together. That is why the ‘new’ public diplomacy represents the
elevation of responsibilities shared by the non-state actor, privileges peer-to-peer and
network-based relationships over hierarchical or ‘push-down’ ones, and favors dialogic
over uni-directional communication. In the American discourse, keen observers flog the
idea of ‘listening’ and place the burden of proof on policymaking elites to demonstrate
that the concerns of target populations abroad have been heard. This position suggests
that policy aims should be pursued with thoughtful consideration about the sorts of
messages they will ultimately convey. All of this constitutes a significant reorientation
and re-conceptualization of structural elements underlying strategy, and this chapter shall
discuss the many barriers to achieving those ends.

The process flow of public diplomacy as practiced in the United States
traditionally occurred in such a way that messages in fact conformed to policy aims.
Direction was highly centralized and centripetal in design, with one of the starkest
examples to be found in the management style of Charles Z. Wick, director of the USIA
from 1981-89. A Reagan loyalist, Wick synergized the agency to the administration’s
aggressive stance toward the Soviet Union, and it has been argued that this constituted the
most successful coordination with the White House in the agency’s history. Wick also
exerted tight control over U.S. Information Service (USIS) posts abroad, visiting them
more than any previous director. Wick’s reign at the USIA has long since passed, as has
the USIA itself, but it is worth noting how this instance compares and contrasts with
contemporary U.S. public diplomacy. Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public
Affairs Karen Hughes has issued strict guidance for American Foreign Service Officer’s
(FSOs) who deal with local media. Hughes also initiated in early 2006 the Rapid
Response Unit the aim of generating and circulating daily talking points and positions to
the diplomatic and consular corps. While the models set forth by Wick and Hughes may
reflect a tightly coordinated public relations machine, some wonder if centripetal
management makes sense in the post-9/11 era. Barry Fulton of the Public Diplomacy
Institute asserts the need to “map” public diplomacy apparatus to meet present and future
challenges posed by the international environment. By noting the new balance

1 Wilson P. Dizard, Jr., Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the U.S. Information Agency (Boulder,
2 Ibid., 201.
3 Elizabeth Williamson, “Karen’s Rules on Diplomacy: Talk to the Media – if You Dare,” Washington Post,
6 November 2006.
organizations must strike between distribution and concentration in relation to contemporary information sharing capabilities, Fulton argues it is wiser to delegate more responsibility away from the center to the periphery, where field units can leverage their comparative advantage in possessing local knowledge and respond quickly to new developments.4

Strategy is a putative product of coordination and organization, and it thus follows that proposals for strategic changes are correlated with concomitant changes in the support structure. A Congressional Research Service report extracted the main points from the major studies during the previous five years and condensed them into a simple matrix comprised of fourteen proposed solutions. One criterium alone dealt with strategy ("define overall strategy"); five addressed coordination and the remaining eight covered the litany of organizational problems. Of the 117 concrete suggestions made by the sum of these reports, 42 were targeted for coordination while organization commanded 65 recommendations – nearly half of the sum total.5 The most cited points in the CRS report centered on two organizational weaknesses: raising the number of exchanges and libraries (both engagement activities), and the adding significantly to the overall public diplomacy budget, which has held steady at slightly over $1 billion throughout the Bush presidency.6 Some authors propose boosting the budget anywhere from four to seven times this level, accompanied by large increases in staffing of up to three-times that of 2005.7

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6 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, International Relations Budget, 110th Cong., 1st sess., 7 February 2007. Virtually the entire annual public diplomacy budget is shared by the Broadcasting Board of Governors and the Department of State. For fiscal year 2008, their combine budget requests totaled $1.154 billion according to a statement by Secretary Condoleezza Rice.
Almost invariably such ideas come packaged with a proposed major reorganization of public diplomacy institutions, including compelling calls for the reconstitution of the USIA or the creation of a new stand-alone agency, and it is widely believed that only by virtue of such drastic changes that public diplomacy under one lead institution will consolidate its responsibilities, streamline coordination with other U.S. government agencies and liaisons abroad, and realize the clear strategic direction it has lacked since the end of the Cold War. But consolidation of this sort did not necessarily maximize efficiency or effectiveness during the Cold War years, and it is important to recognize the numerous instances where ostensible coordination and direction did not necessarily constitute a well-oiled machine, but rather caused repeated problems of how administrators would best allocate the information, influence and engagement resources at their disposal. For all the commotion surrounding the numerous studies accumulated since 2001, one must also recognize the roughly 30 government-sanctioned reorganization plans occurring throughout a large portion of the Cold War and dealing strictly with information and cultural programs.\(^8\)

From the USIA’s incarnation in 1953, it spearheaded information programs while educational and cultural exchange operated from the Bureau of International Cultural Relations in the Department of State (hereafter sometimes referred to by the shortened moniker “State”). Starting with the Eisenhower administration, each subsequent executive would return to the question of how best to organize these institutions.\(^9\) In the...

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1960's during US involvement in Vietnam, a disproportionate concentration of USIA resources in that part of the world deprived activities in other critical areas. During the 1970's a panel chaired by former CBS executive Frank Stanton prepared one of the most anticipated reorganization plans affecting public diplomacy institutions. Informally referred to as the Stanton Report, it inspired consolidation of cultural and educational exchanges from State into a revamped agency, also integrating information programs and international broadcasting and known for a time as the U.S. International Communications Agency (USICA). Later, panel members would assert this was not the outcome the report had intended: the resulting marriage was regarded by some informed observers as “a monster far worse than what [USIA] had before.” It furthermore failed to redress certain ‘philosophical’ concerns that would remain years later pieces of a puzzle for the would-be architects of the new public diplomacy organization to work out: its relationship to policy formulation and execution, balancing the twin aims of advocacy and credibility in carrying out international broadcasting, and exploring a gainful relationship with the private sector, to name a few.

After the 1999 merger of the USIA into State, long-standing concerns were joined by a new set of problems regarding organization and coordination. The merger required the reassignment of nearly 7,000 staff into the existing State structure as well as the creation of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) and the International Information Programs Office (IIP). A new public diplomacy “cone” was added to the

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Foreign Service and all USIS libraries overseas closed and folded into nearby embassies and consulates as Information Resource Centers. But, as Chapter Three explains, the low regard for public diplomacy in the State organizational culture meant greater distance from policy-relevant discussions, a marginal consideration in the training of FSO’s and an overall diluted version of what had previously passed as public diplomacy in the field. Adding to this the performance hazards of dealing in a dramatically changed global information landscape, visualizing a new class of non-state actors modifying the pursuit and execution of American foreign policy, containing the unabated spread of anti-Americanism, and countering an acute dearth of institutional knowledge of mission-critical areas and populations, then how might U.S. public diplomacy be organized and coordinated to confront such challenges? If Sun Tzu is right by saying “disorder coming from order is a matter of organization”, then the point of departure for this inquiry should begin there.

7.1 The Right Skills?

The definition of public diplomacy used in this study presents a concise arrangement of three main activities: information, influence and engagement. This closely resembles the Department of State’s own definition, which considers it to be “programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries.” The Department’s Foreign Service Institute (FSI) offers a specialized curriculum for officers assuming information, public affairs and cultural affairs posts, and courses range from policy advocacy through media to local outreach. Despite this, there remain some

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contradictions in how these abstract activities translate into practice. One important problem is that the amount of preparation invested in public diplomacy officers often belies their ability to conduct public diplomacy with any realistic hope of accomplishment. Public Diplomacy Officer Dan Sreebny has written that “understanding the host country helps [officers] effectively carry out their duties in that specific environment.”

A survey conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office found there to be “significant challenges” restricting the ability of public diplomacy officers in the field from doing their jobs effectively. Based on responses from 118 heads of public affairs sections in U.S. embassies, consulates and missions to international organizations obtained between March and May of 2003, more than 40 percent reported having devoted an insufficient amount of time to public diplomacy activities. Respondents note some of the causes for this to be a function of inefficient distribution of resources: more than 50 percent felt the number of staff devoted to public diplomacy duties to be insufficient. In addition, those officers making good faith attempts to deliver on information or outreach programs found insuperable the administrative tasks associated with gaining approval for projects, acquiring supplies and planning logistics. A further complication hindering dedication of time to public diplomacy activities may be related to the institutional practice of assigning FSO’s to posts abroad in cycles of two to three years. Defenders of this system maintain its necessity in preventing American diplomats from sympathizing too strongly with their

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15 Ibid., 26.
host country, known informally as “going native.” At the same time the frequent recycling of staff, as some respondents reported, inhibited their ability to build relationships in such places where they might require a long time to develop.\textsuperscript{16}

Further complications in outreach can be found in the paradox it shares with security. Some high-risk postings require of embassy or consular staff, when venturing out to make appearances or participate in meetings, to travel in heavily armed convoys.\textsuperscript{17} Public affairs officials could conceivably work around this problem during the days of overseas USIA posts, the USIS libraries, which in the 1990’s numbered at approximately 200 and spanned over 140 countries.\textsuperscript{18} This may have increased the occupational hazards of public diplomacy fieldwork, but when the dismantling of the posts relocated libraries within embassy compounds, along with it came the numerous security checkpoints, escorts and scheduling entanglements that would act as deterrents to many well-intentioned local patrons as well as those who might wish harm to U.S. overseas missions.

Another explanation for public diplomacy officers’ difficulties functioning in their specific locales relates to training. The GAO survey revealed that 58 percent of respondents felt their preparation to perform public diplomacy duties was insufficient.\textsuperscript{19} Up until mid-2003, the FSI’s public diplomacy training curriculum amounted to a paltry three weeks. The FSI subsequently retooled and expanded its course offerings in public diplomacy to 19 weeks in tandem with Secretary Colin Powell’s Diplomatic Readiness Initiative, which mandated significant staffing increases in the Foreign Service. In so

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 28.
\textsuperscript{17} Raymond Cohen, interview by the author, Boston, 3 December 2003.
\textsuperscript{18} “United States Information Agency” (archived) http://statefan.lib.uic.edu/usia/usiahome/factshe.htm (accessed 18 March 2007).
\textsuperscript{19} GAO Report, September 2003, 29.
doing, the Department of State sought to allow veteran diplomats extra time for training by way of using the new hires to fill vacancies that would otherwise keep capable personnel away from the training room. But a 2005 report by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy found residual problems in staffing with 15 percent of newly-established overseas public diplomacy posts that year remaining vacant. The report therefore underscored “the need to fill a post quickly often prevents public diplomacy officers from receiving their full training.”

One of the skills intrinsically important to performing public diplomacy yet often neglected is foreign language proficiency. Returning to Sreebny, he also stresses the importance of public diplomacy specialists to be fluent in foreign languages; “a diplomat’s conversations will have a greater impact” by allowing local interlocutors to speak more honestly and thereby draw diplomats closer to the heart of local concerns. Language provides a window into the worldviews of cultural groups. Notable studies on the linkages between perception and communication by Benjamin Lee Whorf, Edward Sapir, and Edmund Glenn raise convincing arguments to conclude that language is “the manifestation of the perceptions, attitudes, values, [and] beliefs...that a group holds.”

But FSO’s arguably suffered for lack of training here more than any other area in the public diplomacy curriculum. The 2003 GAO survey reported 21 percent of overseas public diplomacy officers possessing insufficient language skills to do their jobs effectively; by 2005 this number increased to 24 percent and rises further to 36 percent

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when considering only those officers posted in Arabic-speaking countries.\textsuperscript{23} Department of State officials added that even more members of this latter group feel they do not possess the necessary speaking skills to appear on local Arabic-language television programs or engage in public debate.\textsuperscript{24} One career diplomat with extensive experience in the Arab world estimated the American Foreign Service in 2003 to have between fifty and sixty officers fluent enough to hold casual conversation, but only five fluent enough to intelligently debate on Arab media.\textsuperscript{25} In 2004, officers by and large received a total of two years of area and language training. By contrast, a Soviet diplomat posted to the Arab world in the 60’s and 70’s received six.\textsuperscript{26}

In light of evidence that many FSO’s were unprepared or untrained the State Department responded with vigor to rectify the problems. In advance of her confirmation as Secretary of State in early 2005, Condoleezza Rice renewed calls for a more effective public diplomacy embracing of the engagement ideal, stating in her confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “If our public diplomacy efforts are to succeed, we cannot close ourselves off from the world. And if I am confirmed, public diplomacy will be a top priority for me and for the professionals I lead.”\textsuperscript{27} In effect, State redoubled its efforts in staffing and skill-building. The closure of the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative upon Powell’s departure made way for Secretary Rice to implement her “transformational diplomacy” restructuring plan, which introduced intentions to


\textsuperscript{24} GAO Report, May 2006, 37.

\textsuperscript{25} Harold Pachios, interview by the author, Portland, USA, 19 December 2005.

\textsuperscript{26} Peter Bechtold, telephone interview by the author, 11 December 2003.

\textsuperscript{27} Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Confirmation Hearing of Condoleezza Rice, 109th Cong., 1st sess., 18 January 2005.
reposition the diplomatic corps into “critical emerging areas” over the course of many years, and to shift training away from a centralized to localized model so that learning could take place in a “hands-on” fashion. In response to language deficiencies, in January 2005 the FSI announced the creation of the Language Continuum, “a career-long approach to language learning and use” utilizing post language programs, distance-learning over the Internet, and immersion training in overseas field schools. As a form of incentive, it became a requirement for officers to speak two foreign languages fluently in order to be promoted into the Senior Foreign Service.

The cumulative effect of these most recent countermeasures to strengthen public diplomacy activities remains unknown at the time of writing. But for the sake of argument an important question must be posed: Assuming the transformational diplomacy reorganization meets its objectives where “the right people have the right skills in the right place at the right time”, and with time American FSO’s acquire the requisite language skills to communicate with local populations and media – does this result in optimum public diplomacy? Unless the organization first sets out clear roles and projects a defined scope of responsibilities for the conduct of public diplomacy, it casts doubt on expectations that coordination and execution of a clear strategy will follow. It is one thing to equip officers with the means and requisite skills to perform their duties, but quite another to see that they are being applied towards meaningful ends.

Dealing with the curious question of who lays claim to the role of public diplomat is at once straightforward and enormously complicated because it juxtaposes a strict

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30 Michael Lemmon, “Meeting the Need for World Languages,” (speech given at States Institute on International Education in the Schools, 16 November 2004).
organizational order against often vague and abstract notions of role ownership. For example, within the public diplomacy ‘cone’ at State there are five positions: (1) Public Affairs Officer, (2) Cultural Affairs Officer, (3) Information Officer, (4) Information Resource Officer, and (5) Regional English Language Officer. In 2006, a total of 1,980 State staff could consider themselves public diplomacy officers by their responsibility to one of these areas. However, the public statements of political leadership suggest that public diplomacy is the responsibility of a multitude of figures starting with top administration officials through to ambassadors and moving down the chain of command. To complicate matters further, there have been an increasing number of pronouncements on roles played by non-official parties; Secretary Rice has spoken of public diplomacy being “the job of all Americans, not just government specialists.” In addition, Hughes presided over a January 2007 summit inviting the prospect of private sector “foreign service officers.” In effect, some may visualize the upkeep of the national image and management of communication channels to be the province of every citizen, public or private, which would be an idealistic perspective if not for the gulf between those whose actions indirectly affect the pursuit of American public diplomacy and those whose main purpose is to pursue it. In actuality, the current organization is built to employ and sustain the very limited numbers of the latter, including State staff listed above as well as the approximately 3,200 (2005 estimate) working for media outlets

overseen by the Broadcasting Board of Governors.\textsuperscript{34} (One may also deem worthy the inclusion of the Department of Defense’s new Office of Support Public Diplomacy, or any number of periodic and short-lived offices to emerge from the White House). By incorporating a myriad other actors from a non-official capacity, then how can a centralized structure guarantee the mastery of a select requisite skills or any form of institutional learning for proper engagement in the field? How can responsible agencies aspire to “coordinate better” while simultaneously expanding the pie of stakeholders? And most importantly, how can a strategy maintain its integrity in the face of such diverse activities?

These questions are reflective of an organization torn between the desires of consolidating some areas of its public diplomacy apparatus while on the other hand devolving other responsibilities to non-official parties. Indeed, the suggestions presented in several of the post-9/11 studies on U.S. public diplomacy advocate increases in training and tightening of standards in areas such as language proficiency, and at the same time urge closer partnership with the private sector. “Collaboration between government and the considerable benefit of private sector thinking and skills should be encouraged,” asserts a 2004 report of the Defense Science Board on Strategic Communication.\textsuperscript{35} Meanwhile, the report cautions against relinquishing government oversight: “appropriate controls and risk assessment will be needed...private organizations represent particular interests.”\textsuperscript{36} Echoing the often dualistic characterizations of public diplomacy (as discussed in Chapter Two), the American organization, according to Nicholas Cull, must

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 32
balance the 'specialist pursuit' with being 'everyone's business.'³⁷ By this estimation, it is possible American public diplomacy institutions are in the process of migrating to the engagement approach, finding a way, as it were, to integrate non-official actors into a traditionally centralized system.

Expanding the number of stakeholders poses immediate challenges to coordination and strategy, which shall be discussed momentarily. Before doing so, however, it is important to discuss to some degree the present tension in the responsibilities of public diplomacy officers to foreign policy makers. This tension, one of the most persistent and complicated obstacles to engagement public diplomacy, holds implications for the arrangement of relevant organizations as well as coordination mechanisms. Those dealing with organization shall be discussed first.

7.2 Public Diplomacy Organizations and Proximity to Policy

As it has been discussed in Chapter Three, the post-9/11 era of U.S. public diplomacy draws into sharp relief the ongoing conflict over determining an appropriate relationship with foreign policymaking and proximity to its inner workings. Because public diplomacy is multi-faceted by nature, it is too simplistic to suggest a categorical solution for this. Advocates for cultural and educational exchange prefer considerable distance from policymakers to ward off charges of political tampering. International broadcasters demand independence to protect their journalistic integrity. By contrast, the Bureau of International Information Programs, which crafts and articulates policy advocacy messages for foreign audiences, is ideally situated close to the policymaking

process in order to reconcile messages with policy intentions. In fact, such were the principal suggestions of the Stanton Report, which sought to move exchanges to the USIA, spin off the Voice of America (VOA) under an independent, quasi-governmental board of directors, and relocate information and advisory programs within the Department of State. These suggestions were never fully implemented and moreover became moot in the aftermath of the merger between the USIA and State, which was motivated in large part by a perceived need to integrate public diplomacy into basic policymaking institutions.

But the subsequent trials stemming from the 1999 merger indicate that it did not settle the debate over public diplomacy’s proximity to policy continues. Several recent studies on the subject have proposed creating a new independent agency to oversee public diplomacy activities in an attempt to increase its influence, and raise its profile at the White House via presidential directive. Meanwhile, international broadcasters both present and past now grapple with the question of credibility exhibited in U.S. government-sponsored outlets, constantly revisiting how strongly it should advocate views favorable to the Bush administration. The tenure of Charlotte Beers as Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs from 2001 to 2003 reinforces the

40 See Appendix B. Of the ten reports proposing a Presidential Directive or reorganization of public diplomacy at the White House, seven also propose a new independent agency.
The functional tension between policy advisory and policy advocacy roles that public diplomats are urged to provide.

The question of what is the appropriate proximity to policymaking unearths a history of a rather nuanced and qualified arrangement that seldom achieves unanimous satisfaction amongst its participants. In fact, the debate is a long-running one stretching back to the earliest days of the USIA, when the executive branch added public diplomats to its lengthening list of advisors. The Eisenhower administration, like the Truman administration before, exhibited a keen interest in psychological warfare stemming from the president's experience in effectively using propaganda to achieve political and military goals during the Second World War. The 'P factor', as Eisenhower called it, represented the need for a close-knit relationship between public opinion and foreign policy, and the extensive propaganda campaigns carried out abroad and domestically in cooperation with the Departments of State and Defense as well as the CIA reinforced this view. But the demonstrated embrace of propaganda by using overt and covert information programs did not necessarily extend to all public diplomacy activities and despite the administration's oversight of the launch of the USIA in 1953, its influence was kept at a distance from policymaking. The first director of the agency did not have a personal relationship with Eisenhower and their correspondence was limited to monthly progress reports. Anti-communist investigations led by Senator Joseph McCarthy expanded to charges of subversion by USIS libraries overseas, and though unsubstantiated the stigma reverberated into USIA's relationship with the fledgling National Security Council (NSC). One NSC official, upon being asked to share classified

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reports with the agency, replied he did not trust USIA officials.\textsuperscript{45} Successive administrations would establish their own arrangement on whether, and if so, how the USIA would liaise with NSC, but the relationship never normalized during the agency’s lifetime, and this constantly called into question its policy relevance.

When the Kennedy administration tapped Edward R. Murrow, the legendary American broadcaster, to be USIA director in early 1961, with it came encouragement from the president for Murrow to participate in policy discussions “when appropriate.”\textsuperscript{46} This included providing Murrow a seat on the NSC and access to all its meetings, thereby giving the USIA unprecedented access to policymaking. According to Walter Roberts, former associate director of the USIA, Edward Murrow was the only director in the history of the agency “to try to change foreign policy from an information point of view.”

\begin{quote}
"Murrow dispatched now and then little memoranda to John F. Kennedy on little foreign policy matters...None of the [directors of the USIA], to the best of my knowledge ever suggested to the President of the United States, whoever he was, that certain foreign policy actions might or might not be taken."\textsuperscript{47}
\end{quote}

But by April of that year, and in the wake of the failed gambit at the Bay of Pigs – a maneuver that had taken place unbeknownst to Murrow – the recurrence of isolation from policymaking was captured by his famous retort: “If they want me in on the crash landings, I’d better damn well be in on the take-offs.”\textsuperscript{48} By the end of his involvement with the USIA in late 1963, Murrow had arrived at the conclusion that he had “never made it into the inner circles of the administration, for all the committees and task forces

\textsuperscript{45} Dizard, 67.
\textsuperscript{47} Roberts, interview with the author, op. cit.
or his own seat on the NSC; it wasn’t the NSC where Kennedy’s policies were formulated...Above all the crash landings were outnumbering the takeoffs.”49 Although the Kennedy administration originates the idea of using public diplomacy powers to advocate as well as advise on policy matters, implementation of that aspect would continue to plague the USIA for successive administrations.50

By contrast, in the late 1960’s President Nixon and his powerful National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger would concentrate all foreign policymaking power into a newly reinvigorated NSC system and limit meeting participants to a highly selective group. Incidentally, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, then the chief oversight mechanism for the USIA, produced annual reports during that time in which it posed questions such as, “Should [the USIA] be more than an arm of foreign policy?” and “Should it play a role in the influence of policy as well as in its execution?”51 In February 1969, the Commission sent a letter to President Nixon requesting that the USIA Director Frank Shakespeare be invited to attend all NSC meetings. The request was denied, with the exception of meetings in which “matters of particular concern to USIA [were] under discussion.”52 Eventually, Shakespeare was granted his wish to attend all Cabinet and NSC meetings as part of a deal to assuage his threats to resign. However, the terms of the deal reflect a resistance on the part of the White House to normalize the USIA-NSC relationship, not to mention to impact of personalities on the regard for public diplomacy at the highest level of policymaking: the invitation would not extend to future directors.

49 Sperber, Murrow, 677.

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Outside of the NSC, the Department of State offered a viable route to policy relevance for public diplomats who sought to take their policy-related concerns through the Office of the Secretary in order to reach the cabinet level of the administration. The existence of an independent agency dealing in information of programs had long been scrutinized up until this time, and to many it appeared that State remained best suited to the task of overseeing all aspects of foreign affairs, including information. The creation of the USIA itself depended on a significant diversion of State resources, including the redeployment of over 40 percent of its personnel and the semi-autonomous U.S. International Information Administration, formerly State's lead office on overseas policy information strategies.53 A number of concurrent studies preceding the launch of the USIA wrestled with the notion of separating policy information programs from State.54 Perhaps the most influential of this series of reports was that of a committee led by former CIA deputy director William H. Jackson, which favored a plan to keep information activities within State if not for the lack of enthusiasm then-Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.55 In acquiescence with Dulles' wishes, information programs resided in the new USIA and for the next two decades proceeded to ward off several attempts at being returned to State.56

53 Roth, Public Diplomacy and the Past, 365.
54 U.S. Congress, Report of the Subcommittee on Overseas Information Programs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1953 (Fulbright/Hickenlooper Committee); U.S. President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization, Foreign Affairs Organization, Memorandum 14, Washington, 1953. (Rockefeller Committee); U.S. President's Committee on International Information Activities, International Information Activities, Washington, 1953. (Jackson Committee).
55 Malone, 16; Roth, 362.
56 Roth cites several attempts by the Senate in 1955 and 1956 to move USIA back into the State Department. At the end of the Eisenhower administration, the Brookings Institution by invitation of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and industrialist Mansfield Sprague at the behest of the president argued for consolidation of all foreign affairs activities within State. Another committee headed by Graham Martin reached a similar conclusion in late 1967.
The Stanton Report constituted a mediated solution between the two sometimes indistinguishable information programs of political information and cultural information, and it proposed restoring the former to State and appropriating the latter from State to operate in the still-independent USIA. Most relevant to questions at hand, the logic of the Stanton Report asserted the need to “link policy formulation to articulation...ensuring that foreign public opinion was taken into account as policy was developed.”57 But in the final outcome the more things changed, the more they stayed the same. The new Carter administration issued a reorganization plan (#2, 1978) creating an entirely new agency, USICA, comprised of both political and information programs, administration of educational and cultural exchanges, and directorship of international broadcasting. With respect to the agency’s policy advisory function, the USICA director would continue to filter guidance through the Secretary of State as before.

The arrival of the Reagan administration opened yet another chapter in the application of public diplomacy for policy objectives. A far more aggressive stance on the communist threat, sparked by unfolding events in Eastern Europe and Central America, fuelled an equally more aggressive use of relevant agencies, and by 1982 the USICA was once again reformed into the USIA, only this time much more concentrated on the singular task of enhancing the profile of the President and promoting American foreign policy overseas. All but forgotten were the stipulations laid out in the Carter administration’s reorganization of the old USIA, notably the language calling for the new USICA “to help insure that our government adequately understands foreign public opinion and culture for policy-making purposes.”58 In its place, the Reagan

57 Malone, 37.
administration conceived its public diplomacy strictly as "those actions of the U.S. Government designed to generate support for our national security objectives." While the promises of USICA never lived up to their billing, the USIA of the 1980's aroused no expectations beyond carrying out the expressed will of the administration. The USIA director of that time, Charles Z. Wick, came to his post through a personal relationship with Reagan and threw his now-legendary zeal behind building a modernized broadcasting component of global proportions, with which the agency could "tell America's story to the world." The full commitment to policy advocacy under the aegis of undermining communism, in addition to his personal connection, afforded Wick the ability to sharply increase the agency's budget, which doubled over the course of his eight-year directorship. But with all resources pouring into broadcasting, other functions suffered: educational and cultural exchanges waned until into Reagan's second term. Meanwhile, policy advisory functions remained diminished and largely beyond Reagan's public diplomacy purview. One former ambassador remarked in 1984 that "the public aspects of policy are usually an afterthought." The 1986 annual report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy found the agency "still not asked to advise routinely on the public diplomacy impact of proposed policy options and new policies as they are being developed." It was also revealed by the Commission's chairman that in the year leading up to July 1986, the director of the USIA had attended

60 Malone, 64.
61 Dizard, op. cit., 200.
only two NSC meetings. For his part, Wick had neither the interest nor the expertise to weigh in on policy matters (which may have facilitated his absences from NSC meetings).

Without a true connection by which to carry out the policy advisory role, public diplomacy through the 1970’s and 1980’s vacillated between emphasizing the qualities of an engagement approach in the former period and an information approach stressing policy advocacy in the latter. In both cases, one approach emerged at the relative discounting of the other, and the problem of allowing foreign opinion to somehow impact policy at the formulation stage continued without resolution. The end of the Cold War ushered in a period of re-evaluating the role of foreign policy institutions, coupled with a sharp drop in funding that was emblematic of the increased indifference felt by American lawmakers regarding international affairs early in the post-Soviet era. By way of a motion first put before Congress in January 1995 by the Clinton administration’s first Secretary of State Warren Christopher, the very realistic option of merging USIA with the Department of State re-entered the picture after more than three decades, and it gained further momentum under the watchful eye of Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Jesse Helms. Unlike previous attempts, advocates for the new plan raised two reasons – cost and function – as sound responses to changes in the international environment since the end of the Cold War. There should be no mistaking that cost came before function; Clinton’s March 1993 announcement of its ambitious National Performance Review proposed vast reductions in various U.S. government agencies, in turn making good on a campaign promise to cut the costs of running the federal

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65 Roberts, interview by the author, op. cit.
government. But Secretary Christopher's reorganization plan seized a moment in which he could make a strong case for all foreign affairs agencies to streamline operations. Legislation introduced in the months and years to follow agreed that the leadership of the Secretary of State should be strengthened through the consolidation of foreign affairs agencies and closing ranks in the hierarchy by assigning former directors of those agencies the title of Under Secretary. However, the changes that ultimately culminated into the 1999 merger and subsequent transition demonstrated that public diplomacy had become no more effective than before. In fact, in the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy's 2000 report on the status of the merger found that the transferred responsibilities were "not seen as integral to the Department [of State], rather, peripheral." Quite apart from the substantive work of advising to or advocating on behalf of policymakers, the first Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs attended primarily to the purely administrative matter of facilitating the transfer into the State structure.

The administration of George W. Bush would be the latest to view public diplomacy strategy in zero-sum terms, and it proceeded to shape new and existing organizations around an information approach reminiscent of the Wick USIA in that strong messages defending the administration's policies and expansive broadcasting schemes, such as the new Arabic-language satellite television channel al-Hurra, played important roles. The brief but eventful tenure of Charlotte Beers demonstrated how the

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66 William J. Clinton, "Announcing the Initiative to Streamline Government" (speech given at Washington, DC, 3 March 1993.)
68 U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Consolidation of the USIA Into the State Department: An Assessment After One Year (Washington, DC: Department of State, October 2000), 8.
office of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs had consequently accepted isolation from substantive policy discussions and did so at Beers' staunch defense -- a gesture of complicity with the new modus operandi.\textsuperscript{69} That her information-driven approach to conducting public diplomacy failed mightily not only fuelled criticism of her unusual qualifications to rise to the challenge, but also re-opened investigations on the purposes and roles of public diplomacy, questioning the wisdom of using it as a means for public relations elevated to an international scale and rethinking an organizational structure bent on communications instead of weighing in on the substance of those communications.

\subsection*{7.3 Coordination Challenges}

Despite the consolidation of most foreign affairs agencies within the Department of State it is a well-established fact that the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs extends to other agency-level actors within its government, such as the Department of Defense, NSC, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and on a separate track such quasi-independent organizations as the National Endowment for Democracy and the Broadcasting Board of Governors. In the post-9/11 era, U.S. public diplomacy is an interagency activity, and although not all lay claim to its professional niche as does State, their primary concerns with public diplomacy involve interfacing with publics and the systematic transmission of certain images and messages internationally. It has therefore been the challenge of administrations to ensure that the disparate actions and messages of

various agencies do not conflict with one another, as such conflicts can undermine overall foreign policy objectives. Some administrations have exercised more vigilance than others, usually motivated by wartime circumstances and the need for a firmly ‘proactive’ posture in swaying foreign public opinion. In one example from the Vietnam era, the Johnson administration instituted the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) to replace USIS Vietnam from 1965 to 1972. Above the usual activities of a USIS branch, JUSPAO incorporated USIA, the Department of Defense and the Department of State representatives to conduct a domestic public affairs campaign within Vietnam and public diplomacy to brandish the image of the United States.

In another example consider President Reagan’s National Security Decision Directive 77 (NSDD 77), which came into effect in January 1983 and aimed to coordinate “various aspects of public diplomacy...relative to national security.” The directive convened an interagency “special planning group” as the bedrock for the new arrangement; members included secretaries from the State and Defense Departments as well as directors from USIA and USAID. In addition, it created four interagency standing committees focused on public affairs, international information, international politics and international broadcasting. This format remained in place, albeit dormant for many years from the mid-1980’s, until April 1999 when President Clinton replaced NSDD 77 with Presidential Decision Directive 68 (PDD 68), also recognized by its subtitle International Public Information (IPI), “to synchronize the informational objectives, themes and messages that will be projected overseas . . . and to influence foreign audiences in ways favorable to the achievement of U.S. foreign policy objectives.”

70 NSDD 77, op. cit.
Core Group included secretaries from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Commerce, Treasury, as well as the directors of the CIA and FBI. It is not clear how well this directive was implemented or if the Core Group ever convened, but the succeeding administration demonstrated little interest in holding over the new structure, and in early 2001 the NSC terminated PDD 68 and relegated the public diplomacy component to a policy coordinating committee within its organization where it gained little notice.\textsuperscript{72}

Coordination efforts for public diplomacy lagged until they assumed a higher priority in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The Bush administration launched two separate entities in the Office of Global Communications (OGC) and the Strategic Communications Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) in 2002. While the latter set out to establish a clear direction for public diplomacy, the OGC's primary objective rested in the integration of the messaging capabilities of the various agencies involved in the promotion of American interests abroad.\textsuperscript{73} In order to achieve this, the OGC would collaborate with the policy and communications offices of agencies, sometimes assembling temporary interagency teams on topical matters, to ensure the overall consistency and efficacy of communications abroad. Final clearances for communications would pass through high-level officials at the Departments of State and Defense as well as the National Security Advisor.

But these attempts at coordination again proved fleeting as expectations of strategic clarity succumbed to underachievement. The GAO reported that the OGC focused too much on tactical level activities, such as the daily "Global Messenger" one-page brief containing talking points and other short-term solutions, when a

\textsuperscript{72} DSB Report, 24.
comprehensive strategy remained elusive to practitioners. For its part, the PCC fell far short of crafting this important piece and after less than a year in existence the group dissolved when co-chair Charlotte Beers resigned from her post as the Department of State’s lead figure on public diplomacy. However, this would not spell the complete end of coordination committees. In 2004, the NSC created the Muslim World Outreach Policy Coordinating Committee to draft an outreach strategy for posts abroad to forge ties with moderate Muslims whilst marginalizing extremists. The strategy was submitted to the NSC in early 2005 as planned, but ultimately was not released for posts. Meanwhile, in April 2006 the Bush administration launched a new version of the PCC, which would again be charged with the task of establishing an interagency strategy, and this time under the direction of Under Secretary Karen Hughes.

It is challenging to identify patterned reasons explaining why coordination efforts within the U.S. government repeatedly lack for staying power. In some cases it may appear as if limits to purpose or changes in American foreign policy render some of them obsolete, as with the diminishing American involvement in Vietnam. The issuance of NSDD 77 was closely associated with increased attention devoted to communist maneuvering in Central America and the calculated American-led propaganda campaign organized to defend against it. In other cases, it may be attributed to inevitable changes in administrations and concomitant shifts in policy positions as in the 2001 transition between the Clinton and Bush presidencies, or more precisely a rotation of individuals

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who serve as de facto champions for their own coordination teams. What is clear is that the lack of coordination contributes to the creation of a strategic straw man where myriad agencies continually fail to galvanize disparate information and communication approaches into clear direction. As a result, post-9/11 observations spotting this trend, such as the 2003 Djerejian Report, logically argue for a systematized interagency process with a strategy that stresses accountability and measurement, and possesses the ability to address short and long-term interests.  

However, the soundness of this solution may be undermined in two ways. First, should one accept the notion that public diplomacy can be pursued over short and long timeframes, as the Djerejian Report and others imply, then the stability of a coordination mechanism becomes crucial for bridging immediate needs with broader goals, not to mention establishing consistency of process. The mercurial history of efforts coordinating the varied public diplomacy programs of the U.S. government illustrates the post-9/11 institutional incapacity to develop and sustain a coordinated information and communication strategy with any success. While it is no less important to improve on this by enlisting political will from the highest levels and close participation from relevant agencies, most observers fail to recognize the unresolved issue of how to maintain these efforts for the longer term. Second, it is often overlooked how the public domain of U.S. public diplomacy should function in tandem with the cooperative involvement of the private sector. On the one hand, official collaboration with the private sector is encouraged by virtue of the latter’s abilities to innovate, operate with fewer constraints than government, and develop and share best practices. Alternatively, there is an overriding risk to government in devolving some control of information and

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77 Djerejian Report, 58.
communications to non-official entities, be they private firms or civil society groups, in that such collaboration may pose threats to message consistency, and systems of accountability and measurement. For example, a dissenting view of a 2003 Council on Foreign Relations study points out that in spite of their comparative advantages, private organizations also remain beholden to their own interests, which may conflict with those of their public counterparts.⁷⁸

One compromising solution would protect the interests of the public sector by allowing it to assert leadership over the public diplomacy process whilst at the same time embodying an ‘open culture’ where public-private collaborations can flourish.⁷⁹ Whereas this imagery offers room for adjustment, it is apparent that the public sector has grown irretrievably weak in another coordination aspect: the international information programs and broadcasting components of the U.S. government tend to compete directly with private American media outlets with international reach.⁸⁰ The latter also must respond to own interests and, as the DSB report asserts, cannot be relied upon to faithfully and accurately communicate foreign policy.⁸¹ National values and national security, therefore, become at odds with one another as private media espouse plurality, which often breeds criticism of policy, and government-sponsored media are urged to communicate in unanimous defense of policy. Leaders of public diplomacy coordination efforts continue to wrestle with the balance of somehow maximizing the benefits of private participation

⁸⁰ For example, in 2005 the BBG reported the total number of employees of the its seven broadcasting outlets numbers around 3,200, CNN alone boasts nearly 4,000.
⁸¹ DSB Report, 94.
without the drawbacks of relinquishing control over tactical and strategic outputs.\textsuperscript{82} In January 2007, Under Secretary Hughes held a summit inviting key representatives from the private sector and public relations to discuss ways in which they can better support U.S. public diplomacy initiatives.\textsuperscript{83} In effect, it was an attempt by the Department of State to somehow integrate the best practices of the private sector, but doing so in a controlled way.

The fact that the aforementioned challenges have remained so significant is a testament to the unsettled nature of coordination in the interagency process. Each administration confronts the question of its willingness to engage this process and some have proven more effective than others. However it is also clear that regardless of the strengths or weaknesses present in any of the various coordination efforts, none have established themselves in a sustained manner and this is reflected in the constant reinvention of the process.

### 7.4 Effects upon Strategy

Looking back again at the brief existence of USICA, Malone notes that its downfall represented a case where the underlying structure did not suit the more balanced public diplomacy strategy that the Carter administration intended to pursue.\textsuperscript{84} Although promising an elevated advisory function in addition to the traditional advocacy role more associated with past public diplomacy strategies, it eschewed some of the most critical


\textsuperscript{84} Malone, \textit{Political Advocacy and Cultural Communication}, 56-7.
proposals contained within the Stanton Report that were focused on this very outcome.\textsuperscript{85} Merging cultural and information programs in fact blurred the line between the dual functions Carter sought to balance, failed to support the overriding strategy he endorsed, and both the organization and strategy were shortly thereafter exposed for their flaws and overhauled immediately upon the arrival of the next administration.

Such an example simply reinforces the pivotal role that organization can play in the realization of a particular strategy and the importance of establishing consonance between the two. While this lesson is certainly not exclusive to public diplomacy or even the workings of government, it remains no less evident in this case that organizational and coordinating deficiencies have given rise to strategic stasis. Some have suggested the U.S. government lacks a clear strategy when it comes to public diplomacy and must do a better job integrating relevant players and clarifying goals.\textsuperscript{86} This is correct insofar as the quality of the strategy remains clouded by serious questions as to its roles and purposes, and is moreover challenged by the development of a firm plan to deal with circumstances of the post-9/11 environment. But it is wholly incorrect to suggest a lack of strategy altogether. If the stated mission of U.S. public diplomacy vis-à-vis the Department of State is to influence, inform and engage, the strategic imperative has always rested with information. Not long before her departure, Beers confirmed this to be true when she

said before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: “Our job is to both inform and engage. But I must tell you, inform is really the first job.”

With information serving as the basis for action, the underlying organizational dynamics forecast some of the ways in which planning takes place and tactics are pursued. When the White House exerts tighter control over the public diplomacy process, information tends to be more propagandistic and influence tactics more aggressive and concentrated. Greater executive control also parallels with wartime scenarios, as with the Johnson administration’s JUSPAO in Vietnam and the Reagan administration’s NSDD 77 “special planning group”. Reagan’s public diplomacy apparatus arguably constituted the most focused of any administration with a forceful USIA director in Charles Wick, an active public diplomacy office under the NSC, and covert propaganda program known as Project Democracy buried deep within the bureaucracy of the Department of State. Alternatively, looser executive control does allow for greater transparency to occur. Broadcasters incur less political pressure to tilt the news more favorably toward the policies of the incumbent administration. The more pervasive effect, however, is that loosened control of an information-dominated strategy indicates poor coordination, deficient executive oversight of public diplomacy agencies, and information programs operating at cross-purposes.

Critics of post-9/11 US public diplomacy often evoke these precedents and their outcomes to explain the causes for more recent failures. The attempt to retain the core components of an information-dominant approach, motivated largely by the Cold War

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88 Parry and Kornbluh, op. cit.
tradition, has been challenged in recent years by a loose and inconsistent support structure, as evidenced by short-lived coordination efforts, a lack of mission-critical training and skills hampering public diplomacy officials' ability to inform, and fluctuating levels of commitment and interest from the White House. In searching for the root causes of failings in organization and coordination structures, these instrumental weaknesses rest upon two deep-seated tendencies still at the core of strategic planning efforts. One is the noted anachronism of having held over outmoded public diplomacy tactics from the Cold War, and it has been suggested this is symptomatic of a broader legacy not only found in strategic communications, but also reflected in the government-wide ability to respond to security challenges.90 The mainstays of this legacy include the 'push-down', centripetal technique to problem-solving, which correctly characterizes the principle of policy advocacy at the heart of contemporary public diplomacy strategy.91 Foresight is largely limited to the short-term in the way information efforts are designed to address immediate needs (e.g. Under Secretary Hughes' new Rapid Response Unit) and the culture of measurement demands instant results.

It follows, then, there is a second tendency undermining post-9/11 strategy, and that is keeping focus on short-term problems leading to a myopic view of long-term trends. Gregory notes this as instrumental to unstable and ineffective coordination efforts, evidence of which is borne out in earlier examples.92 The resulting 'stove-pipe'

91 A recent position and strong endorsement of policy advocacy has been articulated in National Security Council, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: White House, 2006), 45.
92 Bruce Gregory, "Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Cultures, Firewalls, and Imported Norms" (paper presented at the American Political Science Association Conference on International Communication and Conflict, Washington, DC, 31 August 2005). Gregory asks the critical question of
coordination model that has persisted since the Cold War period undermines the interagency process, otherwise engaged periodically as political pressures dictate. Strategic communications planners and outside observers therefore continue in the repetitive practice of proposing and launching new coordination efforts, but doing so without a plan to sustain such efforts over time.

7.5 **Catalysts for Change**

What this chapter has attempted to show is that an engagement approach to public diplomacy, or any approach for that matter, is more than simply a strategic orientation; beneath the strategy there must be an enabling support structure to help realize its ultimate objectives. The ensuing analysis responded to calls for the general approach to shift towards engagement by illustrating the barriers to that shift, and institutionally these are traceable to characteristics revealed at the organization and coordination levels. Some of the many studies conducted on US public diplomacy in recent years give the impression these obstacles are easier to overcome than they might realistically be. A 2003 Heritage Foundation study proposed that policymaking elites “recognize that public diplomacy is a strategic, long-term effort that requires constant application.”

Contrast this with those forces aimed at keeping public diplomacy a primarily a tactical short-term pursuit – advocacy of contemporaneous policy matters, a focus on immediate responses to current events, pressures by the culture of measurement to deliver immediate results, and sporadic oversight and coordination. Given this tension, existing literature has

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“whether [post-9/11 political leaders] will create flexible, adaptive [public diplomacy coordination] structure grounded in legislation that will last over time...” (30)

actively worked toward a resolution by discussing possibilities for improving aspects of
diplomacy organization and coordination in ways that may enable engagement.
Two examples – the creation of a new organization and enhancing opinion polling
capabilities – appear with regularity.

Eight studies included in the 2006 CRS overview, along with a number of USIA
alumni and public diplomacy scholars, have recommended that U.S. public diplomacy
would be best served by a new organization devoted strictly to oversight and operations
aspects. Many have lamented the decision to dismantle the USIA and consequently
argued for another autonomous agency to take its place. The summary of this argument
is that merging public diplomacy into the Department of State did not result in its
integration into the policymaking process as hoped and became more diluted over the
Department’s many bureaus. An autonomous agency, therefore, would be more agile and
cohesive in its strategic planning, respond more quickly to changing needs and dynamics
abroad, and yet remain closely involved in policy matters. Others have suggested the less
radical option of reshuffling public diplomacy offices to remain in the Department, but
with broader powers and stronger central coordination. This view aspires to extract
certain functions regarded as effective within the former USIA, such as media and public
opinion analysis, foreign press offices and regional bureaus, and provide direction that is
almost semi-autonomous in nature. Broadcasting should remains independent, but
information programs and exchanges should operate in close proximity to policy.

94 Philip Taylor, interview by the author, Leeds, UK, 18 October 2006; CFR Report, 37-29; The Public
January 2005, 11-12.
95 Johnson and Dale, 11-13; Barry Zorthian, interview by the author, Washington, 15 December 2006; Fred
A. Coffey, Jr., Stan Silverman, and William Maurer, “Making Public Diplomacy Effective, State
Department Public Diplomacy Must Be Realigned,” 13 March 2003.
Proponents of engagement effectively point out the anachronisms present in post-9/11 public diplomacy and stress changes that may lead to a more dialogic communications approach. However, there are some tools that have never been used to their potential – opinion polling is a prime example in this regard. As early as the late 1960’s it was already being expressed that the US government was not doing enough to systematically use public opinion data in the framing of foreign policies. The issue remained salient in the 2003 GAO report in which it was revealed that the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the US government office responsible for opinion polling overseas, was devoting approximately $3.5 million annually to the task. When the large portion of researchers and observers suggests ways in which a government can ‘listen’ better, opinion polling is the universal method of choice. Yet it is clear that opinion polling programs are both vastly underfunded and, based on what limited data is available, also underused. This is hugely surprising given the fact that opinion polling remains one of the few reliable forms of evaluating the success of public diplomacy programs; it explains why the establishment of baseline standards to measure results constitutes a critical challenge for public diplomacy organizations to tout successes.

Although there are strong cases to make in raising the profile of public diplomacy through reorganization and empowering its listening capacity through enhanced opinion polling, less has been said about resolving the inconsistency of coordination efforts.

99 Ibid.
Fortunately, the Department of State contains one model of coordination among public diplomacy activities in the form of the Interagency Working Group on US Government-Sponsored International Exchanges and Training (IAWG). IAWG resides within the ECA and can claim the membership of over 25 departments and agencies; in 2005 its members oversaw 239 exchange programs with 900,000 participants at a total US government expenditure of $1.2 billion. It has been noted the value IAWG provides for all agencies involved in exchanges since it takes an annual inventory of programs and performs the task of assessing whether any of them duplicate another existing programme.\(^{101}\) Its uniform approach to dealing with all exchange programs means that government resources can be channelled in the most efficient way possible. It is the primary office responsible for the collection and analysis of performance data for exchanges as well as a clearinghouse for sharing regional reports and facilitations between the public and private sectors. Most noteworthy is that IAWG was launched in 1997 by an executive order from President Clinton, and although its mandate has changed over time it remains a compelling case of what can be achieved with a sustained coordination effort.

These examples demonstrate that avenues do indeed exist for the increased efficiency of organizing and coordinating public diplomacy at the government level. There remain opportunities, such as the augmentation of official opinion polling programs, to enhance ‘listening’ capabilities and thereby allowing engagement, in some small way, to offer a more viable resource for soliciting views from abroad. Yet there is much more to be done to elevate engagement to the strategic level. An historical

perspective of public diplomacy organizations reveals an uneasy tension between advocacy and advisory roles accorded to public diplomacy officers. The long legacy and dominance of the information approach, moving through the virtual entirety of the Cold War and beyond, has supported the pre-eminence of the advocacy role and the preference of successive administrations to keep public diplomacy considerations off the policy formulation agenda. Coordination efforts have historically shown to be sporadic and short-lived, and as these patterns continue well into the post-9/11 era strategic planning, measurement and policy relevance are further undermined. Strategy, as a result, has suffered from stasis and perpetual near-term foresight.

And so, even at the official level realizing the engagement approach to public diplomacy must overcome significant obstacles. However, this is not the only obvious constraint; American political culture and other domestic forces beyond government pose serious threats to any changes that may be desired, and the final chapter opens with these considerations in mind.
CONCLUSION:
THE LIMITS AND LIMITATIONS OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

As this study nears its end, this chapter shall attempt to synthesize the points raised in the preceding pages in order to address the research questions set out at the start. Above all others, there is the question of why U.S. public diplomacy has failed in the post-9/11 era. There is hardly any doubt amongst observers and even American political leaders that the claim of failure is a legitimate one, and so it must be that such an assumption, which forms the basis of the preceding analysis, is not a new contribution to public diplomacy scholarship. However, where there is ample room for interpretation is in debating the many possible causes for failure. Commentators have used this space to the fullest, and among the leading explanations is the view that operations have been ill-prepared strategically, organizationally and financially to meet the demands of the post-9/11 environment the United States now faces. Not long after the attacks, the 2003 Council on Foreign Relations report found that “the promise of America’s public diplomacy has not been realized due a lack of political will, the absence of an overall strategy, a deficit of trained professionals, cultural constraints, structural shortcomings and a scarcity of resources.”

The massive post-9/11 outpouring of studies on the failings of U.S. public diplomacy might leave one with the false impression that these problems emerged rather suddenly. Often overlooked is the fact that U.S. public diplomacy embarked on its declining path long before 9/11. It is crucial to understanding the present situation by

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looking, as this study has done, at events dating from the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. It was during this time that the pursuit of foreign affairs by the United States underwent a dramatic transformation that resulted, among other things, in the downgrading of public diplomacy from an independent agency to a far less consequential cog in the American foreign affairs machinery. By 2001, its organization scarcely resembled that of its Cold War precursor and it was the acute rise in negativity towards the United States after 9/11 that exposed the full extent of its weaknesses for all to behold. But even if the complete apparatus that existed throughout the Cold War, which is widely considered the period of U.S. public diplomacy's greatest success, had remained intact up to the present time would the image and reputation, and furthermore the foreign policy of the United States be better off? The organizational and strategic histories presented here cast doubt on the likelihood of this happening. From an organizational point of view, the suggestion that U.S. public diplomacy maintained a higher level of stability and consistency in its operations and displayed greater efficiency in its coordination during the Cold War is questionable at best. The USIA fought for survival from the very beginning of its existence, endured countless attempts at reorganization that never resulted in a stable and ideal structure.² One is hard-pressed to cite a public diplomacy coordination effort that did not succumb to political apathy, purposeful exclusion, or shortsightedness in its aims. This history in particular seems largely forgotten amidst virtually all new proposals for coordination. All are forceful on inclusiveness and interagency cooperation, but as yet none have examined the problem of how to make such efforts sustainable over time.

Substantively, the programs of the Cold War era established what has become the ‘tradition’ of U.S. public diplomacy, and this continues to the present day. Evolving in the wake of the robust propaganda displayed by warring powers during World War II, the USIA and state-sponsored broadcasting outlets were built to use information to America’s benefit. Zaharna has said of this period, “American public diplomacy rightly defined its strategic goals as promoting American interests, increasing volume, segmenting audiences, and controlling information.”3 It was also during this period, as Malone has discussed, that the United States established its dominant approaches to public diplomacy, opting for information and influence over the far less visible ‘advisory function’ that made a brief and unsuccessful run to change the status quo in the late 1970’s during the short existence of the USICA. It is therefore ironic that in the post-9/11 era, clarion calls for bringing back the halcyon days of U.S. public diplomacy suggest the benchmarking of the Cold War archetype, buttressed by the belief that the best practices of the past were lost. With the elimination of the USIA in 1999, the American public diplomacy architecture has indeed changed considerably, but the dominant model of advocacy and leading approaches of information and influence remain firmly in place long after the Cold War’s end.

The structural and substantive problems with U.S. public diplomacy would not be so great if events following on the 9/11 attacks had not illuminated their effects and imbued them with a sense of urgency in their rectification. That is, the post-Cold War history shows the problems to be not necessarily new. The post-9/11 concentration on public diplomacy by scholars, practitioners and political elites in the United States owes

less to domestic forces than changes imposed by the world outside. It took undeniable expressions of resistance to American foreign policy to demonstrate how the lack of international confidence in America’s role in the world could obstruct those policies from success. It took an enormous increase in anti-Americanism in various parts of the world to provoke a national discussion as to whether or not it was important for America’s standing to be viewed in a more positive light. Finally, it took the globalization of information communication technologies to show that the credibility of the United States could be tested as never before.

The amount of commentary lamenting those factors that may have caused U.S. public diplomacy to fail is exceeded only by the amount that deals with fixing them. It was not one of the intentions of this study to add to an already exhaustive list of possible remedies accumulating since shortly after 9/11, but to make sense of the underlying assumptions about what public diplomacy is and the overall messages about what the United States should do about its own ongoing problems. Along these lines, this study finds there to be two competing points of view in the forms of the advocacy model and the advisory model. Those who argue in favor of advocacy invoke the information and influence-driven traditions that were regarded as effective in the past. The bulk of the history of U.S. public diplomacy, even up to the present day, overwhelmingly finds this model favorable to the ‘advisory function’ that Malone spoke of. But advisory model supporters submit that public diplomacy used primarily for advocacy purposes has been not only ineffective but also damaging to the United States. They claim that advocacy public diplomacy in the post-9/11 era has fuelled international opinion that the United States is not only not credible, but unapologetically indignant as well. ‘New’ public diplomacy thinkers, who comprise the most outspoken and articulate supporters of the advisory model, view the future of public diplomacy as engagement-driven -- a mode for
processing feedback solicited from publics abroad and harmonizing policy goals with local opinion.

At the heart of this debate on the merits of advocacy and advisory models is a contrast in views over public diplomacy's place in the making of U.S. foreign policy. In other words, the two sides fundamentally disagree over the proper time at which public diplomacy should enter the foreign policy process. Proponents of the advocacy model perceive the import of public diplomacy only after policy has been determined, while those of the advisory model see a place in the policy formulation stage. This too is a tension that long preceded the present state of affairs, but one must wonder, as this study does, whether the American public diplomacy tradition of pursuing monologues with foreign counterparts is more susceptible than ever to a move to dialogue. The reader may arrive at the conclusion that two of the main rationales for this research – acute anti-Americanism since 9/11 and the widely perceived failure of key post-9/11 U.S. foreign policies – set up an inquiry pointing to better public diplomacy as a grand solution, otherwise referred to derisively as the 'magic bullet'.4 This echoes the lofty expectation that effective public diplomacy, by itself, can transform the way the world views the United States. It would be correct to say this study agrees with the idea that public diplomacy, when backed by credible and transparent messages and a long-term commitment, may improve image and reputation to a certain degree. To distill the image woes of the United States into the serviceable problem of public diplomacy makes way for a “technical fix” that leaves underlying influences unscathed.5 But it is important to

see that public diplomacy, even at its most effective, is not a wholesale solution. It does have limits, and two variables lead the long list of why this may be so.

The first constraints to be considered are those created by policy. In the U.S. case, many have argued that discussion about improving public diplomacy, although worthwhile, does not address more fundamental problems the United States faces in elevating its image internationally. "Better image management alone, however, will not allow the United States to exercise its power without provoking opposition abroad," write Edelstein and Krebs. "It is substance that is at issue, not style: lasting change in image will come only with meaningful and difficult changes in the way that the United States conducts itself." The substance they refer to is foreign policy, and the fact that foreign populations since 9/11 have been so outspoken in their opposition to it presents both a policy problem and a public diplomacy problem. It is a problem of policy to the extent that public opposition undermines the international cooperation needed for policies to succeed. Several foreign opinion polls, including those of the Pew Global Attitudes Project, Zogby International and German Marshall Fund, consistently report declining foreign favorability towards the United States. Some would excuse the inadequacies of U.S public diplomacy officials with the claim that they are mere messengers delivering policy communications they themselves did not create, or even more apologetically, that they have been restrained by a set of tools too limited and antiquated to "tell America's story" in a far-reaching and compelling manner. For whatever reason, such excuses

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6 Ibid., 91-92.
sidestep the constraining effect the United States has caused for itself by pursuing a post-9/11 policy agenda deeply unpopular in many areas of the world. The damage, of course, is most perilous in the Middle East, of which Peter van Ham has written, “the proof of the pudding is in the eating, and for many Arabs U.S. foreign policy just does not taste good.” With almost uncritical support for Israel and the occupation of Iraq heading the list of grievances, many on the “Arab street” treat with suspicion American efforts at democratic reform in the region, ridicule its bickering with Iran, Syria, Hizbollah and Hamas, and still seethe over images of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib. A 2005 Pew survey of the U.S. image abroad revealed that even a majority of those living in moderate Middle Eastern nations worried that the United States would take military action against them in the future. Also worrisome are negative impressions about the United States by European nations. Results from a Eurobarometer poll published in the June 2006 recognized the United States as largely detrimental to peace in the world and negatively contributing to the war on terror – a harsh indictment from countries traditionally regarded as friendlier than most to the American foreign policy agenda. As of yet, the ongoing debate within the United States over what is wrong with its public diplomacy apparatus has not produced any official response serious enough to tackle the foreign


Pew Global Attitudes Project, American Character Gets Mixed Reviews: U.S. Image Up Slightly, But Still Negative, The Pew Global Attitudes Project (2005), 31. Figures include Turkey (65%), Jordan (67%) and Lebanon (59%).

policy dilemma. It then becomes a public diplomacy problem of addressing the grievances of those publics, leaving policymakers with the choice of selecting an approach that stands the greatest chance of resolving such conflicts.

But the American tradition of public diplomacy has generally eschewed reconciliation through substantive policy change. The image that the advocacy model conjures in practice has been described here as a ‘push-down’ movement or ‘one-way’ flow of information, and this assumption underlies two common recourses used by American foreign policy elites to avert calls for policy change. It has been seen that when opposition to foreign policy forms, American policymakers’ first recourse is to refine messages. Motives used to justify this course of action in recent times include the correcting of what is seen to be flawed message distribution, and the determination that not enough information channels are being exploited to articulate and defend policy positions.11 This justification is attuned to the complex realities of global news cycles and the contemporary information technology paradigm, and assumes that higher saturation of media with preferred messages will lead to greater understanding and, therefore, compliance. But while quantity underlies the management of this problem, there are also quality concerns. For example, another motive arises from the general sense of American policymakers that messages supportive of their policies are being misinterpreted or distorted (usually by international media), or wrongfully contradicted, and this adversely impacts foreign public opinion. This solution presumes that better articulation of positions will lead to greater understanding and compliance, and American officials have effectively sanctioned this tactic within the ‘battle for hearts and minds’.

11 Djerejian Report.
"This struggle of ideas will span generations," Karen Hughes has said. "But I am confident our ideals will prevail."\(^{12}\)

Alternatively, the second known recourse or tradition to deal with international opposition to American foreign policy is policy adjustment. But as the brief chronicle in Chapter Seven revealed, the making of foreign policy in the U.S. tradition tends to occur virtually exclusive of any involvement by public diplomacy officials. The separation has ensured that policy debates have always remained beyond the scope of public diplomacy, save for the occasional expansion of its powers in the event foreign public opinion poses a significant enough threat to the successful implementation of policies, as with Vietnam in the 1960's and Europe and Central America in the 1980's. During the Cold War, foreign disenchantment with American foreign policy could be offset by reminding populations of the Soviet alternative, as the United States did with Western Europe over the INF debate in the early 1980's.\(^{13}\) The salience of public diplomacy also increases when American actions in the international realm encounter a crisis or failure scenario, one of which – the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961 – fostered Edward Murrow's 'take off's and crash landings' phrase. Historically, public diplomacy has entered the fray only after substantive policy discussions have taken place.

In the post-9/11 era, there is a question of how much longer these traditions will remain practical ones for makers of American foreign policy. On the surface level of the debate, one must decide if it is policy that is actually sabotaging public diplomacy rather than the reverse. Those who answer affirmatively would side with soft power adherents and nation-branding experts who warn, as Simon Anholt has, that the problem of

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international hostility is attributed not so much to "the pervasiveness of the message as the credibility of the messenger."\textsuperscript{14} The task therefore becomes one of conforming substance to message, as it would seem that policy substance belies the messages communicated through public diplomacy. Foreign public opinion polls, such as the ones presented in the beginning of this study, reinforce this conclusion by suggesting a strong relationship between levels of international favorability expressed about the United States and the direction of American foreign policy. But is policy chiefly to blame? Keohane, Katzenstein and others have recently concluded from an extensive study that the reasons for increased international hostility towards the United States are varied and, moreover, difficult to measure. Among the areas of ambiguity is the connection between anti-American sentiments in response to unpopular foreign policy.\textsuperscript{15} They find that although some regions of the world, such as the Arab Middle East, may demonstrate strong opposition to the policy aims of the United States in that part of the world, other dimensions of the American image, such as those linked to business and tourism do not suffer in this way, and may in fact be viewed positively.\textsuperscript{16} This appears to contradict a basic assumption of soft power adherents concerned about the standing of the United States, as well as the extrapolations of foreign opinion pollsters, who make the case that American actions in the post-9/11 era share a positive relationship with its international image troubles.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 273-277.
8.1 Cultural Constraints

Another factor that may be imposing limits on public diplomacy is culture. In an attempt to generalize what is already a convoluted and vastly representational term, 'culture' in this case refers mainly to political culture, although the prevalence of certain cultural norms and cross-cutting aspects of American identity also are at play. American public diplomacy, as Adelman rightfully pointed out nearly three decades ago, holds no domestic constituency "in part because it conjures up Orwellian images of a 'Ministry of Truth'". This speaks to the postwar American cultural norm of shunning all forms of propaganda, especially those generated by the U.S. government. In accord with the changed mood, the 1948 Smith-Mundt Act prohibited government sponsored overseas information programs and international broadcasting from domestic consumption. Because most Americans do not experience the products of public diplomacy programs first-hand, it has been difficult for lawmakers to sustain the political will and adequate financing needed for such programs to stand any chance of being effective. Chapter Three explains how this was never more acute than during the foreign affairs restructuring years of the 1990's - a prime example of how political culture can determine the fate of public diplomacy. In particular, the trials of the Voice of America (VOA) over several decades reflect the ebb and flow of the permissiveness with which it may advocate American positions to the wider world. Dismissed as a "relic" in the early 1970's, VOA re-established itself as a bulwark of American advocacy during the Reagan administration, only to once again be fighting for its survival by the mid-1990's.

In the post 9/11-era, the question is not whether to have VOA but how to best allocate its resources, which is evident in the scaling back of English-language services in favor of local language services.\textsuperscript{18} The fact that aspects of VOA are again fighting for their survival at this time demonstrates one important caveat about the American tolerance for public diplomacy, and especially the propagandistic kind. As Bruce Gregory points out, Americans are apt to “discover” public diplomacy in times of war.\textsuperscript{19} In effect, it has been reintroduced during this time both as a potent tool of statecraft and subject of intrigue in the public discourse, both domestically and internationally. (This is not to say that international scholarship was entirely inconsequential prior to 9/11, but the event-driven reawakening of interest in public diplomacy in the United States has unquestionably stimulated not only new thinking on the subject but also new ideas for conducting it.) As much as renewed interest in public diplomacy can be attributed to 9/11, the wartime scenario that emerged thereafter effectively casts public diplomacy as a means for victory in the ‘battle for hearts and minds’, and so it becomes tolerable to Americans to advocate policies, with what Muravchik has called “unapologetic directness”, in a way that most would frown upon during peacetime.\textsuperscript{20}

The United States is certainly not the first state to turn to a propagandistic style of public diplomacy during wartime. Sharp increases in nationalism are common, fuelling a widespread sense of righteousness in support of the cause. Yet there is something distinctive about American preponderance of power that lends itself to advocacy model, and consequently also diminishes prospects for transparent, relationship-oriented and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{18} "Budget Proposal Cuts English-Language Broadcasts," \textit{All Things Considered}, NPR, 13 February 2006.
\end{itemize}
engagement-style public diplomacy approaches. A probable reason for this may be found in American exceptionalism. According to Lipset, exceptionalism refers to a perceived uniqueness of values and ideals, and strength in conviction, so much so that it is not only "qualitatively different" from other cultures, but believed to be of a higher quality.21 Micklethwait and Wooldridge posit that American exceptionalism permeates foreign policy through the elements of power, population and patriotism.22 The messianic current of American foreign policy traces back at least before the days of Woodrow Wilson to the Spanish-American War, and beneath it a strong undercurrent of patriotism that conceives of the United States as a redeemer nation. As for the influence of American population on the expression of its nation's power, Holsti and others argue that the American public's impact on foreign policy is limited, but there is also growing evidence that the 'attentive' public, which is typically well informed or even politically connected, exerts significant influence.23 Dean Acheson once remarked that Americans are given to a "Narcissus psychosis", where they stare "like Narcissus at [their] image in the pool of what [they] believe to be world opinion.24 Ethnocentrism, then, feeds off this form of self-aggrandizement, because being exceptional in the international sense justifies behavior ranging from propagandist to hypocritical.

8.2 Revisiting Foreign Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy

The limits imposed on public diplomacy by the American policymaking process and certain aspects of American culture are well established, and have been so for most of the last sixty years. By calling them limits the implication is that there are external forces imposing constraints on acts of public diplomacy, and therefore limiting their potential to be effective. These forces came to life with the exploration of the tension between public diplomacy and policymaking in Chapter Seven. Moreover, Chapter Three delved into the shifting tides in American political culture after the end of the Cold War, and Chapter Five the fickleness of American attitudes toward aspects of public diplomacy, such as propaganda. However, there are limits and then there are limitations, and the general practice of public diplomacy also bears its share of the latter. Relationship building is a time intensive pursuit for which political leaders and the public may not have the patience, and this has been historically viewed as a limitation of the engagement approach. In light of this, the relatively faster returns of information and influence approaches garnered more appeal in the eyes of policy-relevant figures. Lawmakers, public diplomacy officials, and scholars also have probed endlessly for ways to measure the effects of public diplomacy. But there has been little progress in the establishment of performance indicators and benchmarks, and this remains an obstacle to cultivating public support and political will, not to mention the virtually perennial requests for budget increases.25 As an institution, U.S. public diplomacy perpetuates some of its own limitations by dispatching officers into the field without sufficient local knowledge or language skills.

As many recent critical reports suggest, there lies hope in knowing that there is much the United States can do to deal with internally-placed limits and limitations. But if there is anything to be gained from examining the limits as well as the limitations of U.S. public diplomacy, it is in the way they have expanded from the domestic to the international realm. As ‘new’ public diplomacy thinkers argue, the world around United States has changed, and this should significantly alter the way it thinks about and pursues public diplomacy in the post-9/11 era. There are four external factors raised throughout the study that might help explain the limits of U.S. public diplomacy. First, foreign populations have unprecedented access to information and a broad selection of sources from which they can gather content. The old public diplomacy conundrum of funneling information to deprived populations is fast becoming an anachronism. In turn, the new public diplomacy conundrum is how to capture the attention of populations inundated by competing sources. Because information proliferation makes it easier for audiences to distinguish fact from fiction, it behooves government-sponsored information providers to eschew propaganda in favor of transparency, and place a priority on credibility. As Steven Livingston has advised diplomats:

"The world may be awash in data, but credible information and certainly wisdom will remain in short supply. This offers the professional diplomat a clear opportunity and an equally clear challenge. The diplomat has the opportunity to become – to remain – a trusted source of clarity in a world too given to producing overwhelming complexities."

Second, foreign populations are showing an increased capability to use that information to affect policy discourses and outcomes. The factors that may affect the

course of a policy have until now remained confined to the domestic realm. With the globalization of ICT’s, it is far easier for individuals to educate themselves on the policy-related discourses of other countries, organize political action, or enter the news cycle by broadcasting views and opinions. Third, public empowerment in determining the course of foreign policy means that civilians are undertaking roles that were once exclusive to diplomats. Non-state actors have exhibited the ability to steer agendas, communicate on a worldwide scale, and draw segments of societies to their causes. Both nations and firms are employing public relations techniques borrowed from the private sector to build representational ‘brands’ to positively project image and reputation. Fourth, the changing nature of the way foreign publics interface with governments means that, by definition, public diplomacy is being transformed. Preceding conventional wisdom about public diplomacy held that the flow of communications would travel from state officials to foreign populations and do so terminally, primarily for the tasks of informing and influencing them to think and behave in ways consistent with the aims of the protagonist government. As the actors involved in public diplomacy expand to incorporate a greater number of empowered counterparts bearing a non-official status, the flow of communication becomes more symmetrical. As the information disparity narrows, it becomes more advantageous for parties to cooperate rather than compete, as Lord Triesman recently concluded in the aftermath of an extensive study on British public diplomacy:

"The new public diplomacy relies as much on alliances and cooperation as classic diplomacy. But these alliances are not just with Governments but with pressure groups, charities, business, human rights organisations, community and religious groups, the media and countless others who want

27 Anholt and Hildreth, Brand America.
8.3 Future Directions and Future Scholarship

With the years of the Cold War gradually fading into the distance, American public diplomacy institutions are undoubtedly situated at a crossroads. Hanging in the balance are decisions that will shape and guide the purpose of those institutions for the years ahead, and given the complexity of the vastly changed and complex environment in which they must operate it is no surprise the debate over the future of public diplomacy is fraught with a cacophony of ideas, but no clear consensus over how to proceed. Some of the more forward-thinking propositions to enter the fray genuinely reflect the dynamics of a new geopolitical environment. These consist of proposals for new approaches to public diplomacy in accordance one or more of the following schools of thought: first, the greatly accelerated flow of information due to advances in international communications technologies; second, the increasing relevance of culture over ideology as a basis for transmitting messages among foreign populations; and third, a starkly different position of power held by the United States in the post-Cold War era than before. In the first instance, we see a reaction to changes in the way people obtain and share information, heralded by the arrival of the “information age” and such extant developments in the form of the Internet and the “CNN factor” of global and instantly accessible newscasts. With so many information channels available to average people on a regular basis, this explosion in technological innovation has resulted in what Joseph Nye calls a “paradox of

plenty”. No longer subject to controls of limited time and limited access, which has abetted the United States in the ability to contain and manage information, the future success of public diplomacy rests in part on an ability to keep pace. “Patience,” says former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry wistfully, “was the last lesson of the Cold War.”

The second characteristic posits a general statement about dynamics in the international arena – cultural differences, rather than nationalism, more frequently account for miscommunications between peoples. This dimension goes so far to say that past struggles over nationality and ideology have given way to struggles of identity, in effect somewhat paralyzing the comparative simplicity of targeting public diplomacy to a sovereign state with a distinct polity and hierarchy of leadership. Consequently, without a base of cultural knowledge from which initiatives can be developed, tailoring content to suit tastes and habits becomes for more complex than during the Cold War.

The third characteristic involves yet another Nye paradox, not of ‘plenty’ but of ‘power’, which draws attention to changes in global distribution of power from a bipolar to unipolar one, and thereby implying a parallel adjustment in the exercise of public diplomacy – an adjustment that aid in the preservation of U.S. dominance through the use of soft power.

What kind of paths these ideas will open for future public diplomacy activities remains uncertain, and it is probable that another plethora of reports may generate yet

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more ideas for agents of change to ruminate over. Until that time, how well can the 'broken' apparatus of U.S. public diplomacy sustain itself? Some, such as Bruce Gregory at George Washington University's Public Diplomacy Institute, lament the imbalance between far-reaching reporting efforts and the underwhelming evidence that new ideas are being implemented into new approaches to public diplomacy. At the very least, it is undeniable that all points are searching for responses to world dramatically changed since the Cold War. For public diplomacy to move forward, as such forward-thinking approaches suggest, it must respond to changes in the international system by developing practices most suited to the dynamics in which they must operate rather than rely too heavily on "relics" of the past.

One thing that can be said for the post-9/11 period is that the state of scholarship on public diplomacy, both on the U.S. and in general, appears more robust than during the prior decade, and perhaps more diversified than ever before. In 2006, Melissen proclaimed public diplomacy to be "beyond any doubt one of the hottest topics under discussion in the world's diplomatic services." Meanwhile, Gregory submits the attack of 9/11 turned the preceding "analytical trickle" of public diplomacy research into "a fire hose of reports, articles, and opinion columns." The greater attention concentrated on the U.S. case also has paralleled a surge of interest in the way other nations go about conducting public diplomacy. Canada and Norway are two frequently cited cases of

states investing more heavily in their own public diplomacy capabilities.\textsuperscript{35} Western powers such as Germany, France and the United Kingdom are looking at new ways of expanding existing programs, while an emerging China now includes a public diplomacy component within its foreign affairs agenda. As scholars collect and analyze the experiences of states with their public diplomacy programs, more is learned about the breadth and depth of public diplomacy activities, which adds an empirical dimension to a hitherto understudied and highly specialized state behavior. To a significant degree, U.S. public diplomacy engenders facets of agency, structure and behavior that are common to other international actors. One of the goals of this study has been to establish a global context for public diplomacy practice, if only to demonstrate that the American emphasis on a particular hierarchy of approaches and primary reliance on one model is but one interpretation of a broader notion of public diplomacy activities.

But this should not obscure the fact that United States does face unique challenges in repairing its public diplomacy. The United States is now confronted with how to garner more domestic support for a dimension of foreign policy implementation traditionally hidden from public view. It suffers from dysfunction in its organization and short-lived coordination efforts. It has yet to adapt its practices from the Cold War assumption that foreign audiences are information-poor to a new information paradigm where publics are deficient in attention, information-rich, and, in concurrence with Nye, more powerful as a result. It is the conclusion of this thesis that future research should

concentrate on resolving these areas if U.S. public diplomacy is to increase its effectiveness.
APPENDIX A: LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACDA  Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
BBG  Broadcasting Board of Governors
CIC  Coalition Information Center
CWC  Chemical Weapons Convention
ECA  Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs
FSO  American Foreign Service Officer
GAO  Government Accountability Office
   (General Accounting Office until July 2004)
IIP  International Information Programs
JUSPAO  Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office
NAFTA  North American Free Trade Agreement
NED  National Endowment for Democracy
NIS  Newly Independent States
NPR  National Performance Review
PAO  Public Affairs Officer (American Foreign Service)
RFE  Radio Free Europe
RL  Radio Liberty
RRU  Rapid Response Unit
SMI  Strategic Management Initiative
VOA  Voice of America
USAID  U.S. Agency for International Development
USIA  U.S. Information Agency
USICA  U.S. International Communication Agency
USIS  U.S. Information Service
### APPENDIX B: SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS OF CRS REPORTS, 1999-2005


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<th>Study</th>
<th>Define Overall Strategy</th>
<th>Pres. Directive/Reorg PD at White House</th>
<th>Create New Agency</th>
<th>Redefine Role of Under Sec of PD</th>
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298
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