THE ENGLISH BUILDING INDUSTRY IN LATE MODERNITY: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE DEFINITION, CONSTRUCTION AND MEANING OF PROFESSION

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Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

London School of Economics and Political Science

2009
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Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

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Abstract

This thesis describes the methods by which individuals and associations give meaning to the concept of profession within the English building industry in the late modern period. The hypothesis is that professional associations control occupations. Whilst this might be accepted in a wider literature, building professionals identify with a far bleaker, late modern, interpretation of profession. The literature portrays a ‘backwards’ industry without a determinant authority, characterised by fragmented and servile professional associations.

The thesis utilises Burrage’s (2006) four-goal-framework to structure its investigation through semi-structured interviews with professionals and their associations. This proposes that associations control admission and training, define and defend a jurisdiction, set up a system to govern their own members and seek to improve their corporate status. This work concludes that professionals and associations strategically engage with these issues.

There are problems facing professions, but their demise is not one of them. Indeed, rather than be defensive, associations are enhancing their controlling systems. This involves a looser coupling between associations and their membership, which creates some fracturing to the construction of identity. However, the result is new forms of occupational provision, in alliance with both clients and the state, that establish clear dialogues for identity and very specific types of service that are well separated from external ‘quacks’.

Faced with an environment that is ostensibly deeply sceptical, associations are selective in how they defend and enhance both their status and control systems. This has led, for example, to a withdrawal from controlling entry in the face of government demands to widen participation, to be replaced with strong regulatory schemes for members. This creates standardisation and practical guarantees of competency, a powerful executive in a quasi-judicial regulatory role, and clear rules of behaviour and permanent training through CPD. The result is ‘competent’, ‘safe’, ‘good’ and ‘ethical’ occupational jurisdiction.
Abstract

Acknowledgements

Firstly, I owe a debt of gratitude to all those participants who gave up their valuable time and agreed to be interviewed, providing me with such a rich vein of unique empirical data. Thank you.

I also owe a great deal to Andrew, to Monika and to Ben for their moral support through this process. Finally, I would like to thank my family for their encouragement during many difficult periods, and especially to my Mum for proofing.

Abbreviations

ABE: Associations of Building Engineers
ARB: Architects Registration Board
ARCUK: Architects Registration Council United Kingdom
ASI: Architecture and Surveying Institute
IBC: Institute of Building Control
BWF: British Woodworking Federation
CABE: Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment
CIAT: Chartered Institute of Architectural Technologists
CIC: Construction Industry Council
CIOB: Chartered Institute of Building
CPA: Construction Products Association
FMB: Federation of Master Builders
ICES: Institution of Civil Engineering Surveyors
IDE: Institute of Demolition Engineers
IHPE: Institute of Heating and Plumbing Engineering
IQS: Institute of Quantity Surveyors
NFRC: National Federation of Roofing Contractors
RIBA: Royal Institute of British Architects
RICS: Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors
TAF: Trade Association Forum
Chapter 1: Definitions

1.0 Introduction: Purpose and Boundaries of the Study

This thesis investigates the meaning of profession within the English building industry in late modernity. It examines professional associations and individual professionals in order to examine fissures within the collaborative conceptual agreement about this meaning. Central to this is the extent and form of occupational control. The industry has largely escaped the attention of sociologists, and the thesis offers a remedy through this original contribution to knowledge. The adoption of the boundary of ‘late modern’ adds another theme. There exists an implicit assumption in many sources, detailed in chapters 2, 3 and 4, that the concept of profession is in decline, generally distrusted and operates in a deeply sceptical environment; the term profession is replaced by expert or knowledge worker in a knowledge-based economy. Giddens’ (1990, 1991, 1994) high (late) modernity proposes the dominance of expert systems dominated by rules of procedure that replace the autonomy of the individual by making knowledge easily transferable, and thus removes occupational control from professional groups. He describes a world of uncertainty, powerlessness and where competing and transient authorities have replaced the determinant authority. This will be examined in what Sutherland and Dawson (2002) refer to as a sensemaking perspective, using interview data with individual professionals and their association executives to examine the dialogues between and the experiences within the professional community. A mixture of archival and interview empirical work will explore, triangulate and conclude upon these themes within the remit of the hypothesis (Denscombe 2007).

The hypothesis is:

*Professional associations in the English building industry exhibit strong occupational control.*

The rationale behind the hypothesis is that, as chapter 3 will show, this is not the perception within the building industry. Therefore, the hypothesis is posed as a means to disprove these myths about the nature of occupational control in this industry. Secondly, the nature of this control takes on some interesting new forms. As an ideal type, profession identifies with a
peer collective organised into an association, operating within an occupational jurisdiction on the basis of its recognised expertise. However, in creating controlling mechanisms, executive functions within this peer collective are becoming actively decoupled and are potentially creating a rift in the understanding of the meaning of profession between its members and those employed to manage the collective organisation.

Chapter 2 will examine theoretical debates later, but the concept of profession is generally associated with a community of equals establishing occupational control over the provision of an esoteric service with the collusion of the State. As chapter 3 will illustrate, some interesting themes within the study of the building industry professions revolve around the apparent lack of such control, formally, if not informally, and now, if not historically. Additionally, a complex cluster, if not a system, of associations represents separate groups within these occupations. Many of these specifically exclude the concept of 'profession' and prefer the identity of a trade association. More recently, a fissure appears to be growing between the peer collective of profession and the executive of their communal associations. In one case an ex-member of the executive even ran for the peer-appointed role of president (Alexander 2001). The work will focus on the professional association since it seems to act as both controlling mechanism and home to the peer group collective. In this way the thesis tests its identity as a community of networking equals against that of an executive-controlled quasi-judicial independent qualifying and regulating body.

Specific research objectives for this are:

1. The definition of the concept of profession, including problems of method, especially with regard to the English building industry. This includes an explanation of the building industry occupations.

2. The social context surrounding the creation of professions, together with their survival, or not, in the late modern era. This relates to the self-identity of both professions and professional associations, perhaps even different discourses within, and between, both.

3. The role of the professional association through both archival work and interviews with officers in order to establish how these communities identify themselves with the issue of occupational control. This establishes the executive identity of the association.
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4. The process by which individual professionals give meaning to the concept of profession, see their occupation and construct an identity of their peer community and associations.

5. Whether professional associations remain peer communities or are de-coupling regulatory aspects, possibly in alliance with client and/ or State requirements.

6. Discussion of the 'doomed' and 'defensive' manifestos concerning professions, and whether associations are actively engaged in creating control, jurisdiction and enhancing their status. Whilst associations might provide an identity, is it meaningful? In Giddens' terms, can associations still exhibit determinant authority? Does this cause a fracturing of the peer collective, a decoupling of executive regulatory powers from trade-related, 'club' activities?

1.0.1 Selection of Professions

Any a priori selection of certain occupations for study risks according them the status of profession by their very inclusion and prior to establishing any empirical or theoretical process. Carr-Saunders and Wilson (1964: 2) defend this as a necessary practical step when "no analysis or appraisement of professionalism has been attempted". They argue that the prime need is to establish a "position to examine and evaluate all that is characteristic of professionalism" that allows the researcher to "survey the established professions and those other vocations which for any reason throw light upon professional organization and activity" (Carr-Saunders and Wilson 1964: 3). This has since been heavily criticised (see for example Macdonald 1995), especially where much work on the study of the professions has now taken place. There is a general agreement that studies need to focus on the specific, in this case the English building industry, rather than the general. Gispen (1988) distrusts the notion of 'the professional' as a universal concept when it is advanced in predominantly American (and British) empirical studies, pointing out distinctions between German engineers and American social theory in his own study. Gispen (1989) also draws attention to the unique effects of Nazism (Sauer 1967) upon the profession within Germany. Landes (1949) offers a similar perspective upon French technical education and its effects upon the professions (though his own focus is on entrepreneurs), whilst Shinn's (1980) equivalent research concerns engineers. Torstendahl (1990:1) usefully contrasts the traditional adoption of "the hegemony of American social science after World War II" and the study of such
models "as ideal-types in Weber's sense", with the need to separate specific occupations and analyse their "specific behaviour". Furthermore, Torstendahl (1990: 1) reflects that "two professions, lawyers and doctors, have dominated" prior work about the professions, but these should not be taken as the only ones.

This work, then, is concerned with occupational control within the English building industry. However, it is equally clear that professional associations exist and that work is organised, to some extent, through 'professions'. Preliminary fieldwork must accept their existence. Roles such as quantity surveying and architecture, together with their associations, exist and are relevant to this study. Businesses use these nomenclatures and the UK Privy Council has formally endorsed the position. Indeed, it became clear, very quickly, that membership of associations, particularly Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) and Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS), dominates the industry. This work examines how participants actually construct meaning to these titles and where occupational boundaries are drawn, and how individuals and elements of (expert) labour fall between these. For example, what is a quantity surveyor, and when might a quantity surveyor be a building surveyor or a chartered builder? There is an intense interaction between professions in terms of the work that they do, and many individuals are jointly members of different, even competing, professional associations. Therefore, accepting the terminology does not undermine the intention of the study, which is to examine how these are given meaning within the workplace. This is why the idea of 'sensemaking', discussed above, is useful.

The focus of study falls within the purview of three occupational groups; building surveyor, quantity surveyor and architect. A fourth group of 'commercial developer professionals' has been instituted in order to consider those individuals excluded from these titles, for whatever reason. Other occupational groups are included or excluded for reasons that are explained later in the text. For example, no architectural technologists are directly considered since they are very few in number and their association refused to participate in this research. However, they are still considered when appropriate themes are discussed. In addition, architectural designers are included within the category of architect where they are serving the same function as an architect, even where they cannot adopt the title 'architect'. The architect is legally excluded from using this title and even expressing membership in his own
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professional association without first registering the right to the title with a statutory body, the Architects Registration Board (ARB). Chartered builders are also an important grouping, but all respondents interviewed were members of other associations and in roles that were more appropriate to those. This was usually the quantity surveyor. An outline of these occupational definitions and issues is provided in Appendix A.

The building industry a priori operates a particular division of expert labour. These occupations have been formalised by industrial work practices and endorsed by the Privy Council, which has officially designated them as professions. This means that they are deemed to work in the public interest and can demonstrate pre-eminence, stability and permanence in their particular field (Privy Council 2008). Since the desire is to examine the construction of meaning to the term profession within the building industry, these can be carefully accepted since they are a part of the industry's method of giving meaning. Appendix A offers explanations of these occupations, placed outside the main work for the reader unfamiliar with the terms. The next section offers an overview of the term building industry in order to continue this introduction to the scope of the thesis.

1.0.2 The Building Industry

The selection of the building industry as the focus of study, rather than of the construction industry might be seen as problematic. Today, the latter is the more usual form, probably because it is a class within the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) system. This provides a defined boundary rigorously created for collecting international data. However, the construction industry was deemed simply too large for this analysis and involved the study of two very different occupations. Building-orientated architects and chartered surveyors evolved, and are evolving, as very separate occupations compared with construction industry occupations that must inevitably add engineers to their occupational lists (see chapter 3 for a detailed discussion). Therefore, the selection of the building industry allows the research to focus upon the unique nature of those building industry occupations that are, or appear to be, professions. For this reason, the building industry is a discrete area of study and one that can trace a rich history.
Most studies of the industry are both by and for the industry, hence there is an assumption that definitions are unnecessary. However, the term ‘building industry’ is commonly used within older texts (see for example Percy 1935, Stone and Reiners 1954, Burn 1958, Higgin and Jessop 1965, and Bowley 1966) where it is applied to the constituent resources within the building process. Recent authors seem unclear on whether they accept a distinction between construction and building, and where any differences lie. Powell (1996:x) is an excellent example of current use, for in his thoroughly precise history of the building industry, he defines his area of study as simply "taken in a broad sense to embrace allied professions as well as firms and people engaged on site and in yard and workshop." Building is most easily defined as what it is not: civil engineering. This feature is stressed (inter alia) by Building and Civil Engineering EDCs (1985:4) commenting in their work that "the major differences between building and civil engineering mean that all parts of this report are not equally applicable to all construction activities." Summerson (1985) can offer no explanation for its use, but analyses the original Builder magazine (now Building) as a source of definition. He suggests that building world might be a more appropriate term than either building or construction, since it describes the field better.

Whilst the concept of a separate building industry might not have the same external recognition today, and its origins are unknown (Summerson 1985), it is widely used by members of the occupations working within it. When seeking interviews, all the participants understood the term perfectly and acknowledged that it drew a distinction between building-orientated occupations and construction-engineering orientated occupations. It is likely that it is a concept simply out of fashion in modern times, since it has a long pedigree. Percy (1935), Nisbet (1952), Stone and Reiners (1954), Burn (1958), Walters (1960), Higgin and Jessop (1965), Bowley (1966), and Tavistock Institute (1966) all refer to the ‘building industry’ as the subject of their work. The Building and Civil Engineering EDCs (1978a) refer to the ‘construction industry’, reinforcing the idea that ‘building industry’ is loosely understood to consist of the ‘construction industry’ minus its civil engineering components. Stone (1970) and Hillebrandt (1974) describe the same activities discussed as a part of the building industry by the earlier literature (such as house-building) as being part of the construction industry, a trend that is established within Hillebrandt (1984), Ball (1988) and Harvey and Ashworth (1993).
This work follows Hillebrandt (1984) in considering the building industry as consisting of those involved in the construction, alteration, extension, restoration, repair, demolition or dismantling of buildings, structures or works that form, or are to form, part of land, whether or not the buildings, structures or works are permanent. This includes installation in any building, structure or works of fittings forming, or to form, part of land, including heating, lighting, air-conditioning, ventilation, power supply, drainage, sanitation, water supply, fire protection, security and communications systems. It also includes any operation that is part of, is preparatory to, or is for rendering complete, such work, including site clearance, earth-moving, excavation, tunnelling and boring, the laying of foundations, the erection, maintenance or dismantling of scaffolding, the prefabrication of components to form part of any building, structure or works, whether carried out on-site or off-site, and the site restoration, landscaping and the provision of roadways and other access works.

The selection of the building industry as the focus for study provides the occupational and jurisdictional boundary that was sought. The term is organic and also offers a reasonable scale for the work.

1.0.3 Late Modernity

Reed (1996) adopts the term *late modernity* in his discussion of expert power. This reflects a general theme in the literature that discussion of profession should rather be about occupational control in both traditional professions (see for example Muzio 2004) or in new technology (see for example Rose 2002, Fincham 2006 on IT workers) and new ‘disciplines’ (see for example Fournier 1999, Mulher 2001). More generally, the rise of the knowledge-based economy and its new classes of worker are seen as a fundamentally new paradigm in social, political, economic and market contexts (see for example Evetts 2003a, 2003b). This creates a fundamental shift between groups concerning the creation and distribution of capital. The term itself is drawn from the work of Giddens (1990, 1991, 1994). He devised the concept to refer to the various ways in which a culture of radical scepticism and uncertainty has penetrated deep into the social fabric of everyday life in modern societies. Knowledge, underpinning many theories on the professions, becomes submissive, provisional and abstract, rather than a body of expertise. Late modernity is characterised by
uncertainty, powerlessness and the loss of dominating authority. “There are no authorities which span the diverse fields within which expertise is claimed – another way of repeating the point that everyone in modern systems is a lay person in virtually all aspects of social activity” (Giddens 1991: 195). Organisations permanently monitor and control all operations and the application of knowledge through a process of institutional reflexivity. From this others have created the concept of a ‘post-bureaucratic’ or neo-bureaucratic’ state (for example Farrell and Morris 2003), which further strengthens the view of the expert as a servile functionary.

Utilising late modern as a defining boundary of the thesis recognises that any study of the professions in 2008 faces, or at least appears to, very different contexts than previous generations. Late modern offers a label to illustrate this idea of imposed change. In addition, the data collected for this work, as will be discussed below, is predominantly concerned with the lifetime careers of existing professionals and representatives of associations. Therefore, it can only lay claim to validity for its evidence representing experiences of the last forty years, a timescale that approximates with the late modern themes. Giddens proposes that late modernity has particular application to the issue of self-identity. This raises the question of whether professional associations can provide purpose and identity within this uncertain environment, in which individuals are powerless. Can professions provide the authority that Giddens believes is lost within the progression of modernity. Using this boundary also allows this research to examine whether it is a useful idea and to question whether this interpretation of professions is a valid one.

Late modern, therefore, is used in this work to represent the erosion of traditional forms of respect together with growing scepticism to the idea of elite. It reflects the increasing orthodoxy towards a deprofessionalised and managerialised profession, of fundamental technical changes within occupations that undermine the control of expertise and which traditionally form the foundation for the social superiority of the concept of profession. Certainly, Giddens (1991) points to common themes of powerlessness, uncertainty and commodification within modernity, and these do seem to dominate discourse within professions. Late modern also correlates with the working lifetimes of the participants within
the research. At the same time, this research questions the reality of this perception and of
the concept itself.

Having established the boundaries to the study, the methodology used within the research
must be established, both in terms of its theoretical foundation and the more practical
empirical work. Whilst general research issues are recognised, the unique ability of sociology
to generate its own evidence and problems of inference derived from this are examined
below, together with nuances particular to the sociology of the professions.

1.1 The Research Paradigm

Kuhn (1962: viii) defines research paradigms as "universally recognised scientific
achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of
practitioners". The two main research philosophies can be defined as 'quantitative' and
'qualitative' (Creswell 1994) and choosing which paradigm to use is influenced primarily by
the nature of the topic under investigation. "The choice and adequacy of a method embodies
a variety of assumptions regarding the nature of knowledge and the methods through which
that knowledge can be obtained, as well as a set of root assumptions about the nature of the
phenomena to be investigated" (Morgan and Smircich 1980: 491).

The choice of a paradigm is predicated upon ontological assumptions concerning the nature
of reality, on assumptions concerning human nature and the relationship of man and
environment, and on epistemological assumptions concerning the nature of knowledge itself
(Burrell and Morgan 1979; Morgan and Smircich 1980). These four dimensions are situated
along a continuum from qualitative to quantitative. A researcher's position on this
continuum is governed by the nature of the phenomenon under investigation (Morgan and
Smircich 1980). This means that there is a linear relationship between ontology, assumptions
regarding human nature, epistemology and method (Burrell and Morgan 1979). However,
Bryman (1988: 88) argues that "while the apparent debate between quantitative and
qualitative methodology may have some meaning at the epistemological level, e.g. in terms
of casual adequacy as against adequacy at the level of meaning, in the context of research
practice there is no direct link between these precepts and particular techniques, since
research typically comprises both elements".
Thus a technique can be used in a variety of ways according to the orientation of the researcher (Morgan and Smircich 1980). There is no necessary causal link between ontology and epistemology, and the methods chosen for a particular piece of research. Rather, the ontological and epistemological stance of the researcher and the phenomenon under investigation could be construed as important determinants of the way in which particular methods are used. This research attaches primary importance to the views and experiences of professionals themselves in constructing their social world and to the way that their associations construct social reality. This implies an ontology and an epistemology towards the qualitative end of the continuum (Morgan and Smircich 1980), and is indicative of an action perspective, which assumes that people are social actors, creating, as well as being created by, their environment.

An additional consideration within a discussion of the research paradigm is the extent to which method creates the problem under consideration. The nature of empirical research and its bearing upon sociological theory is a problematic one. Merton (1968), for example, recognises the difficulties in assigning a simple function of empirical observation to that of testing or verifying hypotheses. Rather, he argues that "empirical research goes far beyond the passive role of verifying and testing theory: it does more than confirm or refute hypotheses. Research plays an active role: it performs at least four major functions which help shape the development of theory. It initiates, it reformulates, it deflects and it clarifies theory" (Merton 1968: 157).

Research into the sociology of the professions has fallen into something of a methodological dispute. Freidson (1983, 1994) argues that no theoretical foundation has yet been established, whilst Macdonald (1995) describes the field as an answer in search of the question. Freidson (2001: vii) appears much mellower in his views within his later work, accepting, even relishing, the probability that his work within the field will underline "my sense of inadequacy" and that studies in the field can never rise beyond the "imperfect". Accordingly, the most appropriate method for this thesis is one that permits direct appeal to the voices of the professional and, at the same time, allows patterns to emerge within historical and sociological contexts. This is achieved through the adoption of the interview as the primary
1 Definitions

method of data collection. Generating new and original evidence in this way follows Goldthorpe's (1991) preference in method. He argues that creating new data is superior to seeking out finite and incomplete 'relics' of historical data, and then attempting to infer findings from it. Bryant (1994), responding to this argument, countered that the ability of sociologists to generate evidence is limited by type and the danger of unrepresentative data. This can restrict the ability to infer general statements from evidence (see also Bryman 1988). It is therefore proposed to examine these interviews together with further published work in order to examine what professions are actually doing, in addition to what they say that they are doing.

This encourages theoretical triangulation (Easterby-Smith et al 1991) and follows the "distinct tradition in the literature on social science research methods that advocates the use of multiple methods and theories" (Jick 1979: 602). This method addresses Bryant's (1994) concerns about the unrepresentative nature of created data. This approach also satisfies Merton's (1968) concerns that a problem cannot be modelled prior to research, since empirical research shapes the development of theory.

Lieberson (1992) and Hart (1994) offer a final note of caution, also recognised in this work, concerning the temptation to over-emphasise particular findings or subject evidence that undermines the thesis, to more strenuous testing than that supporting it. Sociology has always found it difficult to determine how conclusively the evidence supports a theory, or which competing theory is best (Lieberson 1992). Ultimately, the aim of any research is to establish credibility through acknowledgement by peer review (Hart 1994), although Runeson and Loosemore (1999) have recorded the variability of peer review within the field of construction research.

Within this overview of problems of method, a specific basis for this work will now be established.

1.2 Methodology

Two types of data collection are undertaken in this research; by interview and through analysis of correlating archive material. Professions form a cohesive social group, and
Definitions

interviewing a selected sample obtains representative data for what Bosk (1979) names as a gestalt. Whilst individuals will present different experiences and backgrounds, their socialisation into, and membership of, professional institutions and other representative forms of association, will create a particular socially-constructed interpretation of reality (see for example Berger and Luckmann 1967). However one divides this group and whatever sample is selected, within normal sampling conventions, a certain uniformity of response can be expected. A carefully selected sampling to include for background variety will both enrich and prove that professions form a relatively cohesive gestalt, from whichever direction the gestalt is approached. This will then allow the central hypothesis to be researched, discussed and concluded. Interviewing professionals for their experiences is a respected method and has produced respected results (see for example Morison and Leith 1992). At the same time, the research recognises that the field sociologist's preference for created data needs to be balanced with proof of what has actually happened. The best clue to what professions are thinking is what they did and what they are actually doing (see for example Burrage 2006). Therefore, interview data is balanced with a thorough historical analysis of the professions. This gives rise to the duality of the work presented here, in that it examines professional associations as both the physical manifestation of the gestalt of the individual professionals who form it, but also that they are separate organisations, as legal entities, as employers of executive officers and as quasi-businesses. A valid explanation of how the concept of profession is created will be achieved by interrogation, balancing and comparison of the experiences of individual professionals through the careful analysis of interview data (Hycner 1985).

Since data is required concerning the ways in which individual professionals and executive officers within associations construct a meaning to the concept of profession, the interview method was chosen as the best method of obtaining this. Interviews allow for nuance within individual respondents, whilst establishing a representative sample for generalisation. An interview has been defined as an interaction between two people with the aim of eliciting information from the respondent (Denzin 1970). The interview method is particularly well suited to collecting subjective data. It enables more complex and less biased information regarding attitudes to be elicited than is possible by postal questionnaires, as the interviewer can use judicious probing to pursue avenues of interest and to encourage the interviewee to
provide further information (Hussey and Hussey 1997). Practically, it would also prove very
difficult to produce an equivalent open-ended questionnaire or survey, especially one that
might be completed within 30 minutes. In order to obtain a variety and mass of participants,
it was imperative that they should be required to contribute for only a clearly defined, and
relatively short, period of time. For these reasons, it was decided that the interview method
would be appropriate for this study.

There are a number of problems associated with the interview method. These include
problems concerning the need to phrase questions in a neutral manner that does not lead the
interviewee to a particular answer (Saunders et al 2000). Many of the problems concern
possible biases introduced by the interviewer (Smith 1990). An interview is a social
situation, and the co-operation of the interviewee depends, to a large degree, on the way the
interaction is handled by the interviewer. Interviewees will consider the benefit that they gain
from agreeing to be interviewed, and the search for access to representative sample by mass
and characteristics can prove difficult. Subjects are likely to be nervous and need putting at
ease, especially if they perceive the process as a formal one, which is to be recorded. This
might also engender a defensive response if not handled sensitively. Even unknowingly, the
interviewer can produce 'signals' of approval or disapproval of particular answers, thereby
influencing the interviewee. The way the interviewer is dressed, his age and social
background can also influence the responses given (Hyman et al 1978, Saunders et al 2000).
The validity of the responses given can also be affected by respondents providing answers
thought to be those preferred by the interviewer (Smith 1990). These problems were
recognised and addressed prior to the interview process. This included undertaking five pilot
interviews to detect and remedy possible problems (Denscombe 2007). The interviews were
approached with openness to whatever meanings emerged and with respect to both a sense
of the whole and to the research question (Hycner 1985).

Various types of structured and unstructured interviews have been advocated (Denzin 1970).
Since this work examines the construction of a concept of profession by individuals and how
they set boundaries, definitions and create a social reality to their occupations, the
unstructured interview method was selected. Since the interviews were to be held with
different professionals, with varying experiences and in different locations, it was felt that
this method would ensure the widest range of responses. Respondents would have complete freedom to express their opinions and offer an unbiased account of their understanding and experiences. Unstructured interviews minimise interaction between the participant and the researcher, and this avoids any tendency for the interviewer to prejudice the results. This approach also allows the interviewee to establish boundaries for the subject, an interesting observation in itself. Whilst unstructured interviews might be less accurate, the nature of this work is less about ‘accuracy’ and more about teasing out individual interpretation.

Unstructured interviews are less formal and allow the interviewee to pace the discourse, a definite benefit in obtaining agreement initially and in producing more accurate data (Hussey and Hussey 1997). The interviews were also monitored to identify the main themes being stated by the interviewee in order to keep the interview within its established boundaries, to look for inconsistencies and to be consistently on the look-out “for the kind of answer that is a ‘fob-off’” (Denscombe 2007: 194). As a part of the piloting procedure, structured and semi-structured interviews were tried out, and it was found that asking specific questions about the concept of profession produced little useful information, and often discouraged the individual to talk about their knowledge and experience.

By selecting the interview method, the work restricted the number of respondents that could be reasonably included within a valid timescale. Interviews were initially carried out within a six-month period, in order to minimise any extraneous variables. 61 interviews were carried out at this time. However, since the original thesis was returned for re-working, further interviews were carried out. These interviews served to further authenticate the data obtained. A further 4 interviews took place, making a total of 65 interviews. Appendix C provides an overview of the participants. A transcript was sent to each participant in order to confirm the validity of the interview. This is not a factual check, but rather an opportunity for the participant to clarify or amplify, even correct, points that they feel appropriate (Denscombe 2007). Very few took advantage of this, since they felt that the unstructured interview had allowed them to fully articulate their position. This confirmed the selection of the unstructured interview as the most appropriate method.

The socialised nature of professional groups (see for example Goode 1957, Elliott 1973, Bosk 1979, Fournier 2002), the fact that they create a common identity, allows the researcher
to obtain a representative sample size. Whilst it has been argued that other socialisation forces affect individual professionals and that they might become socialised in different manners, this applies more usually to disparate professions such as medicine where the general practitioner and the brain surgeon might be seen as operating in different occupations (see for example Bucher and Strauss 1961, Olesen and Whittaker 1970). This does not hold true within the building industry, where professionals operate in similar firms and carry out construction-related tasks along broadly similar social, technical and legal forms.

Within the work, two types of respondent were interviewed. In addition to traditional interviews with individual professionals, associations were requested to provide a representative to interview on behalf of their organisation. These interviews followed the same method, the only difference being that participants were reminded that they were discussing experiences as a representative of their association. Of course, there is the issue of who this executive is, and upon what basis he is speaking. As Burrage (2006: 20) tactfully puts it, “if the words of the spokesmen of professional associations reflected the concerns of their members” (my italics). However, Burrage (2006) does not refute the worth of these statements, rather that they be tested against actions.

The interviewer can do much to encourage the interviewee to provide accurate information (Denzin 1970, Denscombe 2007). Moser and Kalton (1971) refer to three elements necessary for a successful interview, all of which can be fostered by a good interviewer:

1. Accessibility of the required information to the respondent – this can be impaired by memory lapses.
2. Cognition on the part of the interviewee of what is required of them, together with an awareness of how much they should say.
3. Motivation of the interviewee to proceed with the interview and to answer correctly and accurately.

Bearing these points in mind, an abstract, ‘stimulus material’ (Denscombe 2007), was prepared for the interviewees. The abstract to individuals is provided in Appendix B. This provided them with an overview of the purpose of the research, established a theoretical
framework and included the main frame of reference. On balance, it was deemed more useful to have a successful interview than to overcompensate for bias by the interviewer.

A good 'fit' between interviewer and interviewee has been recommended (Denzin 1970) to produce the best results, although over-identification can be a hazard too. In this case, the researcher was a professional (inasmuch as he was a member of a number of relevant professional institutions), investigating the professions with other professionals. Certainly, this could create problems of professional solidarity, and there is a predisposition for the researcher to be sympathetic to the interviewee. This is reinforced by the need to empathise with the material being produced, which is so much easier where both parties have a common social background as professionals within the building industry. This was recognised as an issue early in the process of this PhD, and was the subject of a separate (unpublished) term paper (Eccles 1996). It is not a material issue that affects the work, not least because the researcher is a published academic experienced in dealing with such problems.

Each respondent was provided with a brief synopsis of the research problem to encourage reflection and facilitate the interview. As the interviews were unstructured, no specific questions were included within this document. The aim of the background paper was to allow the respondents to elaborate on areas of particular importance to them, rather than imposing a rigid format, and allowed the researcher to discover the issues that the interviewee believed relevant and important. This method was adopted to balance the needs of potential interviewees for clear information on expectations prior to agreement, and the methodological needs for this work in creating unbiased evidence. Whilst any form of written brief might introduce some level of bias, it is not feasible to expect potential participants to agree to interview without some explanation of the reason, purpose and subject of the interview. Appendix B provides a copy of this brief, which was emailed to participants prior to interview allowing them to prepare. Prototype interviews were held to test this hypothesis and work through any problems.

All the interviews began with an explanation of the nature and purpose of the research, and by thanking the respondent for agreeing to be interviewed. Confirmation was then sought for
the interview being recorded, it being explained that this was necessary to ensure that no points were missed and to allow the best use of the material. The previously agreed right to confidentiality and anonymity was reiterated by stating that nothing said by the respondent would be attributed personally. Whilst it was a concern that elite interviewees might balk at the recording or quoting of their interviews, this did not materialise as a major issue. Three participants refused to be recorded. Notes were taken by hand as an alternative. Before the substantive discussion got under way the interviewer outlined the way that he wished to conduct the meeting, provided the respondent with a further copy of the overview to the work, and confirmed the amount of time available.

As the respondent discussed a particular theme, the researcher, on occasion, politely asked a variety of open, probing and closed questions (Saunders et al 2000) in order to obtain further description, details and confirmation of facts relevant to the research topic. However, the researcher did not initiate any theme, and sought only to allow the respondent the opportunity to make clear exactly what they intended to say.

Four interviews were carried out on the telephone. This is not ideal, and limited the ability to reduce bias as discussed earlier. However, Sturges and Hanrahan (2004) argue that telephone interviews can offer productive qualitative data, and it was deemed better to undertake such interviews rather than lose the opportunity to collect the data from the particular source completely. This also allowed for a wider geographical reach than face-to-face interviews would have obtained. The principles behind the unstructured interview and the approach to the research remained the same.

On average, the interviews lasted around one hour, although the longest was 80 minutes and the shortest, only thirteen minutes. Care was taken when analysing what was said to avoid using unrepresentative information of a wider nature or taken from a different context to support a particular contention (Bryman 1988). It is obviously difficult to ascertain whether interviewees lied during the process, deliberately, through factual error or within a false consciousness. It is unlikely since the nature of this investigation does not warrant falsehood, and participants were volunteers, self-selected and who have no reason to lie. Professional associations might be deemed as having a cause to dissemble. However, the focus of this
research is to examine how the concept of profession is constructed, and what it means to the various parties. From this, it is evident that ‘lying’ is in itself simply part of this process of producing this meaning. In addition, all data collected via interview was supported, validated and compared with other available material as a check against this.

1.2.1 Individual Professionals

Selection of the interviewees was initiated on a representative basis across occupations. Architects and quantity surveyors are the most numerous occupational group and the evidence is balanced to reflect this. There was no practical means of obtaining random observations, and so a process was selected that balanced economy with a valid sample. The economic criteria (time and cost) ensured the largest practical sample, but resulted in a bias towards south-east England and London. Occupational lists were utilised in obtaining contacts, and were followed up through letter and telephone. These individual interviews were carried out over a six-month period.

Interviews are presented in accordance with the most appropriate occupational title, usually validated by a professional qualification. These are architect, building surveyor and quantity surveyor. Within the ‘architect’ write-ups, those not registered with ARB are recognised by the terminology ‘architectural professional’. One solicitor and one barrister, both specialising within the building industry, were also interviewed and these occupational distinctions retained. A second barrister was also interviewed, but since he is also an architect, this was given as his occupational classification. Whilst adopting this system is imperfect, it seems the clearest in terms of denoting participants. It is also the one that is accorded recognition both within and without the building industry, most notably through the endorsement of the Privy Council. Whilst some respondents were not working within traditional jobs of their notional professions, they still identified with them. The term ‘commercial-developer professional’ has been adopted to represent any other occupation, rather than fragment the remaining interviews across a range of titles.

The 47 interviews are titled in the order in which they were carried out within each occupational group. Thus Architect 1 was the first interview carried out upon the architectural
profession. No ranking is intended. The total number of interviews is broken down as follows:

Architect: 16
Barrister: 1
Building Surveyor: 8
Commercial-Developer Professionals: 6
Quantity Surveyor: 15
Solicitor: 1

1.2.2 Professional Associations

A number of authors have associated profession, professionals or professionalism with the professional institute (see for example Carr-Saunders and Wilson 1933) or with aspects of community (Goode 1957), ideology (Vollmer and Mills 1966) or association that are directly linked with the professional institute. Similarly, within the building industry, Nisbet (1952) and Thompson (1968), for surveyors, and Gotch (1934) and Bowley (1966), for architects (see also Briggs 1974), recognise the creation of the professional institute as a primary actor within the process of establishing, defending and expanding professions. The institutions also provide a physical home for documents, are a source of new material themselves and act as one collection of gatekeepers controlling access to additional empirical opportunities. For these reasons, the institutions make an ideal starting point for this research.

Representatives of professional associations were also interviewed under the same methodology. Obviously, a representative of an association does not equate to the association. Associations were asked to nominate a participant, who was usually the chief executive, but this varied with the association's legal and economic organisation. Where possible, additional members of the association executive were also interviewed. Literature review and archival research played an important part here, as an association’s published and unpublished material was utilised for comparison and validation. Finally, this can all be compared with the evidence of what associations actually did.
Every relevant professional association was invited to participate in the work. Some
associations refused to participate, the most notable being the Chartered Institute of
Architectural Technologists (CIAT). They explained that their small staff was heavily
involved in the process of obtaining a royal charter and (later) managing the successful
implementation and sealing of the successful award. Trade associations were chosen through
a representative sampling based upon the empirical work undertaken by the researcher as
initial background work. The following 18 interviews actually took place:

Association of Building Engineers (ABE): 1
Architects Registration Board (ARB): 1
British Woodworking Federation (BWF): 1
Chartered Institute of Building (CIOB): 1
Construction Products Association (CPA): 1
Federation of Master Builders (FMB): 1
Institute of Demolition Engineers (IDE): 1
Institute of Heating and Plumbing Engineers (IHPE): 1
National Federation of Roofing Contractors (NFRC): 1
Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA): 3
Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS): 4
Trade Association Forum (TAF): 2

1.2.3 The Professional Firm

Bloor and Dawson (1994) imply that professional culture must be studied within an
organisational context (see also Bacharach et al 1991, Blackler et al 1991). Others have also
accorded the employing firm a central role. Deetz (1992) regards the organisation as a
political system that controls disciplinary power. Hinings et al (1991) describe the firm as
a driver of professional change. However, the firm is not studied in this work. The reasons
for omission are partly pragmatic, and partly thematic.

Directly excluding firms from the study reflects the fact that professionals have opposed the
notion of ‘business’, traditionally excluding those of the same occupation working in
commercial firms. Whilst many professionals do now work in commercial organisations
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(Harries-Jenkins 1970, Elliott 1972, and Davies 1983), this is taken into account. The place of individual professionals within the organisation is examined, as is the nature of managerial activity towards them within the firm. Some respondents also owned or were directors of firms. Therefore, the place of the firm is considered in the work. The limited time and resources available to individual and independent work for a PhD award cannot be ignored either. Obtaining direct access to businesses at a level that would provide serious data is always going to be problematic. However, the primary rationale is that such work is not necessary. This analysis takes account of businesses through interviewing participants who work in them, manage them, own them, and work for them.

There is a literature that argues a study of the professions ought to centre on a study of the professional organisation (for example Hinings et al 1991, Bloor and Dawson 1994, Ackroyd 1996, Greenwood and Lachman 1996, Brock et al 1999, Pinnington and Morris 2002, Cohen et al 2003, Pinnington and Morris 2003). Professional firms may be members of professional bodies in their own right and are employers of the membership of professional associations. However, professional firms are only members through the membership of their owners or directors. For a firm to become a professional member of an association, the prerequisite is that its owners (for sole traders and partnerships) or directors (for limited liability companies) must be full members of the particular association involved. Most associations allow for this to be a simple or two-thirds majority, but might require those others to be members of similar associations. Firms have no voting rights. Therefore, it seems that firms have little involvement in the management or direction of the professional association. Indeed, in interview, RICS1 (a chartered surveyor on the RICS Governing Council) discussed the issue of membership subscription fees. There was a belief among the RICS hierarchy that some members had not involved themselves in the concerns of other members over massive fee increases since their fees were paid directly by their employers. As a means of improving involvement, it was being mooted that RICS should refuse to accept all corporate payments. However, this was the only influence that firms were seen to exert, and this was unintentional. Similarly, RIBA1 and RIBA2 were both clear that the firm, even a chartered practice, was simply “a business interface”. This said, RIBA recently launched a chartered practice registration scheme (RIBA 2007).
Additionally, it is rare to find professional firms that describe themselves as such, especially within the surveying, building and engineering practices under study. This reflects the contested nature of the definition and understanding of the concepts of the chartered builder, the building engineer, and even the chartered surveyor. Architectural practices were more likely to use the term, but, of course, this is not an issue concerning the professional association, but the statutory register maintained by the Architects Registration Board (ARB).

Within the building industry there has been some work on the professional firm, but the majority concern firm biographies (Barty-King 1975). Whilst there have been academic studies (see for example Blau and Lieben 1983, Larson et al 1983, Blau 1987, Winch and Schneider 1993a, Winch and Schneider 1993b, Symes et al 1995), these frequently focus on the employees working within them rather than the firms themselves. The architectural profession, in particular, is concerned with the theme of the architect operating in professional practice (for example Taylor 1956, Chappell 1987, Thompson 1999, Chappell and Willis 2000). Emphasis is placed upon the individual in practice who must compete for business and carry out his professional duties in a business, rather than professional, paradigm. The firm is simply seen as a necessary adjunct to the individual, necessary to allow him to practice, but often less important than the arrangement of his drawing table. The idea of the architect as artist and professional (for example Gans 1983, Gutman 1988, Crinson and Lubbock 1994) remains dominant. The individual professional architect is seen as the central focus, subject to marginal influences that the professional practice places upon them.

Thus this research explores the role of the firm, but only where it is directly relevant to the peer community.

1.3 Structure of the Thesis

This chapter introduced the boundaries of the study. It also described the foundations of the research, its methodology, and empirical approach. These issues are implemented in later chapters. The starting point of the work is that there exists a uniquely ambivalent identity to
the professions within the building industry. The concept of ‘late modern’ was used to formalise the general level of despondency that seems to pervade these professions. Chapter 4, especially, will review this position when it examines the arguments concerning the need to ‘modernise’ professional associations and to redefine the concept of profession along the lines of the submissive nature of expertise that late modern espouses. At the same time, there are many interpretations of the concept of profession. Chapter 2 examines the many interpretations of profession from within the sociology of the professions, whilst chapter 3 narrows these upon the building industry. These provide a stronger foundation to the work than the more immediate reflections of the professions themselves. The use of both field sociology and the analysis of relics and archival material will offer a balance. What emerges is both a host of contradictory experiences, and also a thread that the hypothesis seeks to test.

The intention here is to examine the social construction of identity; how the professions regard themselves. Because professions are peer collectives it is possible to collect representative data through interview sampling, but this is also correlated with other sources. Burrage’s actions, examined in chapter 2, describe what professions have historically done. This provides an excellent framework in order to examine what professions believe themselves to be, and how they construct reality. Thus chapters 2 and 3 will examine the rich literature surrounding professions, in order to identify potentially useful explanations for the evidence within Burrage’s framework. These will then be tested and discussed within later chapters. The structure of the thesis is as follows:

Chapter 2 provides a selected literature review of the sociology of the professions, in order to establish the work’s theoretical credentials and the competing approaches to the field. These will be used to organise the empirical observation within a four-point framework for what associations do.

Chapter 3 particularises the selected review of chapter 2 with an analysis of secondary material on the building industry professions. Together with chapter 4, this provides both an explanation for the goals of professional associations, together with generalised theorising and a localised ethnomethodology aimed at this one very particular subject.
Chapter 4 completes the secondary and archival review by examining two prior studies upon professional associations. This chapter completes the exercise of judgement in selecting a priori theoretical explanations for what professional associations are, how they were created and what they become. This leads to the application of this work’s archival, relic reconstruction and empirical evidence to present and interpret the construction of meaning to profession within the building industry.

Chapter 5 examines the first point within the proposed framework: to control admission and training.

Chapter 6 studies the second part of the proposed framework: to define and defend a jurisdiction.

Chapter 7 analyses the third section within the proposed framework: to regulate each other’s behaviour.

Chapter 8 offers an examination of the fourth point within the proposed framework: to defend and enhance their corporate status.

Chapter 9 concludes the work. In particular, it draws out the issues of occupational control and of loose coupling that are central to the point of the hypothesis. It analyses the late modern boundary to the work, and reviews the common contention within the building industry professions concerning decline, neglect and irrelevance.

Chapter 10 is the bibliography.

Chapter 11 contains the appendices to this work.

1.4 Conclusions

Both Collins (1990) and Larson (1990) argue that the demand for an uncontested theoretical foundation is unhelpful to the study of the professions. Rather, Collins (1990) proposes that explanation of social and cultural movement within professions can retrospectively and independently offer valuable insight, whilst Larson (1990) regards the study of the construction and social consequences of expert knowledge as the correct focus of studies in
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this field. Both these activities can validly take place within their own boundaries and contingent upon a later development of any such theoretical foundation. This work seeks to examine the social construction of expert knowledge within the English building industry using Burrage’s (2006) four-action framework. This provides a tested theoretical framework, but to other professions. Therefore, this thesis seeks to examine the identity of the building professions through the analysis of this framework.
Chapter 2: A Selected Literature Review

2.0 Introduction

The following selected literature review concentrates on those ideas that might shed some light on the social construction of a meaning to profession. As discussed in chapter 1, the issue here is with sensemaking, rather than historical sociology. Since this work is examining the views of professionals and their associations, and their interpretation, or, perhaps, multiple interpretations, it is necessary to examine what the concepts of theorists are in order to use them to understand the dialogue and ideas of professionals. The thesis can then analyse where these two correspond, and where they do not, their importance in the discourses and how they might explain the practical effects on the co-ordination of work and delivery of services to clients.

The debate concerning the sociology of the professions, its origins, and the theoretical mistakes that might have been made is not relevant to a piece of field sociology that seeks to understand how meaning is being given to the concept in this one particular context. Whilst earlier work on the sociology of the professions has been dismissed for its a priori assumptions, its methodological weakness and its extreme deference, Macdonald (1995: 29) states that "it should not therefore be assumed that such work may be dismissed as valueless. On the contrary, one of the joys of sociology is the richness of theoretical perspectives, which is stimulating in its own right as well as reminding us that it is rare that there is only one valid view of a social action or social phenomenon." The following review explains some of these interpretations in order to provide insight into the empirical material that follows.

2.1 Functionalism: what is a profession?

The central question behind the development of the sociology of the professions "concerned the extent to which professional occupations could be regarded as a unique product of the division of labour in society" (Johnson 1972: 10). Johnson believed this a mistake, since it accorded importance to economic issues over sociological ones. He argues that whether "the professions perform a special role in industrial society, economic, political or social" (op cit) is the more important question.
The problem for this work is that as a means of creating self-identity this approach offers a simple mechanism by which professions and professionals can engage with making sense of who they are, and how they act. Lists or descriptions of functions are pervasive in undergraduate literatures used by trainee professionals (see for example Collins-Allen undated, Waterhouse and Crook 1995, Fryer 2004) and the idea is easy to comprehend. Further, these works do describe the unique features involved. For example, Goode (1957) describes a *community of profession*. It excludes family and geographical locus, but rather resides within a shared sense of identity created through membership of a group that entails a continuing status that few members leave, and which has shared common values, clear definition of roles within its membership (by both members and non-members), a common language exclusive (at least in part) to members and community power over the individual. Goode (1957: 196) argues that socialisation and social control is a key characteristic of professions, due to the nature of the problems brought by clients. The client is reliant upon the professional’s expertise and "is not usually competent to judge if it was done properly". This requires "self-denial" against exploiting their clients, making professionals different from others. This ‘difference’ is reinforced by socialisation through training and maintaining strong social controls, which are formalised into codes of ethics.

This provides a strong sense of identity to any community, but it also reflects how professions operate, or how they attempt to do so. Bosk's (1979) study of medical professionals suggests that they are an exemplar of such social control of performance, where there exists shared patterns of explaining, understanding and neutralising failure. There is a professional construction of what an error is, which might (and does in this case) contrast with the officially defined rate of failure. A social process creates such non-official rates, their meaning being disseminated and understood only by those experts involved. Bosk (1979: 13) argues that these controls are real, “individual control or group pressure effectively constrains behaviour.” Bosk (1979:13) perceived underlying uniformity, "a unique gestalt", in views on mistakes despite vast differences in leadership styles and the types of (medical) services offered.

This sense of community pervades firms where professionals might be subject to additional control, possibly contradictory in nature. Goode expects professional
colonisation to take place; peers are expected to be in positions of authority. Colleagues can, therefore, either mitigate this control or colonise the organisation, dominating it and so perpetuate the community.

However, there are also issues concerning the practicalities of control. Unlike Bosk, Goode (1957) views self-regulation as a major cause of hostility within his community. He agrees that professionals, through their expertise and community, know more about the measurement of competence than the larger society. However, evaluation of colleagues is a very different matter than that of trainees, and critical evaluation and the creation of failure endangers the standing of the whole profession and also creates peer-to-peer conflict. This forms an interesting evolution within the literature, since in late modernity, others expect conflict between peers as a natural state (Gummesson 1978, Hite and Bellizzi 1986, Moncrief and Bush 1986, Stock and Zinszer 1987, Wheiler 1987, Bullard and Snizek 1988, Hill and Neeley 1988, Beltramini 1989, Hite et al 1990, Milliman et al 1991, Day and Barksdale 1992, Woodside et al 1992 and Hooks et al 1994). There is thus a pull against the push towards community when considering the issue of regulation and evaluating competence.

The problem here is with explanation, rather than description. Functionalism engages with lists of potential, even definitive, characteristics of professions (see for example Greenwood 1957). Yet its supporters cannot agree on a conspectus (Freidson 1983). Still, it does provide dialogues with which professionals can clothe themselves in identifying and making sense of their own occupations. Professions deliver esoteric services to clients who have been advised, or instructed, that a professional is the only legitimate source for that particular service (Hughes 1963). Professionals profess and derived from that premise is the principle that they must be trusted, in addition to which, as the controllers of a monopolised body of knowledge demanding high skill, their expertise expects trust in the professional's judgement and skill. Hughes (1963) first notes that there is a need for detachment, that a professional is without personal interest in a particular case whilst exhibiting deep interest in all cases of the kind.

Equally, it can show some insight into what associations claim as their unique features, and how occupations actively change their characteristics as part of a process of professionalisation. Vollmer and Mills (1966: vii-viii) define "the dynamic process
whereby many occupations can be observed to change certain crucial characteristics in the direction of a 'profession', even though some of these may not move very far in this direction. It follows that these crucial characteristics constitute specifiable criteria of professionalization." However, they are less sure of the need for universality in these features. Rather profession is an ideology, although Freidson (1988) argues that this still requires an end point to have been determined. The selection of this point requires some definition of profession in order to establish whether the process has been completed satisfactorily and / or professional status is achieved. Once again, there is the desire to explain which traits change through professionalisation. Goode (1957) lists control of admission, training and exacting a higher standard of behaviour than the legal minimum. In turn, this offers prestige, and because controlling admission and training monopolises supply of the service, it generates higher incomes and a disproportionate share of power within legislative bodies, technical committees, and business generally. He also recognises a possible fissure within the ideology of a developing community since "the elite of an occupation aspiring to professional status may prematurely lay claim to belonging to a community" (Goode (1957: 195). He illustrates this by reference to nursing, social work, librarianship, vocational counselling, teaching, administration and business management where ordinary practitioners are only vaguely aware of the transformation required within their occupational skills.

One aspect of community that does not seem to be recognised in the ideal of the creation of a meaning to profession, is the mechanic of exclusivity to those outside the profession. Others such as Johnson (1972) and Larson (1979) will present the need to create occupational expertise as central to the controlling nature of profession, but at this stage the community is still regarded positively. However, it is necessary to point out that communities excluding others as ‘different’ or as inexpert ‘quacks’ might not be doing so laudably or even competently. For example, Parssinen (1979) analyses the Victorian mesmerists and their violation of the boundaries of professional respectability in early Victorian Britain. He argues that Goode's arguments concerning the profession as community is limited since it fails to recognise that profession changes over time. Indeed, the medical profession, which the case study used, "is a community whose values and norms are constantly in flux; indeed, at any given time, the profession may encompass several distinct and possibly competing groups who are trying to define community
standards quite differently" (Parssinen 1979: 105). Parssinen (1979) recognises that what would have been unacceptable in the nineteenth century might be acceptable today, and suggests that deviancy is a useful heuristic device through which to examine the modern profession. Others have also noted the tendency of professions to support ideas of no merit simply to defend the profession, or their colleagues. Scully (2005) discusses the case of Dr Henry Cotton who believed that madness was caused by infection of the teeth, tonsils and colon and whose response was to remove them all. Despite the death of a third of his patients and the unimaginable suffering of the rest, objections were suppressed in order to avert a scandal that would damage the standing and status of the profession, and his work continued throughout the first quarter of the twentieth century. This compares neatly with, for example, Fournier (2002) on the 'professionalisation' of aromatherapy and Deverell and Sharma (2000) on the demonisation by the medical profession of homosexuality and HIV-Aids. This view on medicine compares interestingly with that of Abbott (1988) and his interpretation of the successful destruction of charlatans, discussed later.

Bucher and Strauss (1961) also stress the need to distrust any study claiming a unified ideology that ignores conflict and differences of interest within the profession. Whilst professions are organised, they are also varied. They clearly have a minimal structure including institutions, personnel, their own organisations, recruitment policies, standards and codes, political activities, and informal mechanisms of sociability and control. However, shared values amongst such diverse elements is unlikely, and even where these might be recognised in general, they may not be distinctive to professions. Bucher and Strauss (1961: 326) adopt medicine as an example, "considered the prototype profession", and reflect upon conflicts within the sense of mission, work activities, methodology and techniques, clients, colleagueship, interests and associations, and unity and public relations to the laity. Each one of these sees a struggle between what they term the different segments of the occupation. In their study of medicine as a profession, they variously discuss the differences between research missions and clinical practice, between physicians and pathologists, and between the variety of physicians ranging from the family doctor to the specialist consultant. They conclude that professions are like social movements, and the same questions can be asked of professional movements. "Professional identity may be thought of as analogous to the ideology of a political
movement" (Bucher and Strauss 1961: 332). Within this movement is "a loose amalgamation of segments" (op cit: 333) in "different phases of development and engaging in tactics appropriate to their position" (ibid). The idea that professional ideology might vary between individuals and across segments of an occupation is another explanation of how a meaning to the concept of profession is generated that will be developed later.

Most recently, there has been a reanalysis on the nature of the community. Reed (1996) differentiates between collegiate (Johnson 1972) and organisational professions. He points to the increasing importance of business owners in controlling occupations, or at least their long-term strategies. Similarly, Robinson (1999) argues that rather than a community of autonomous individuals, professional communities are regaining prestige by the very processes that threatened them. The very speed of change, and the increased complexity of tasks, is creating situations where networking and interdependence are mandatory, thus recreating the conditions for individuals to establish communities of expertise. Information technology, the need to standardise practices and the drive for accountability generate formal relationships within occupations. This is also reflected in a wider literature in which professionalisation is adopted as a term to describe changes within occupational modes of working, concerning issues of rational, formal, legitimate and accountable working practices. This is also referred to as legitimacy and managerialism (discussed later). A move from ad hoc and pragmatic procedures within jobs to what are described as more professional ones are evident within empirical analyses of how certain sectors evolve, or are found within the literature that claims particular fields of work must evolve. Fournier (2002) refers to this as a disciplining mechanism, discussed later, with the intention of producing 'better', more efficient, procedures through the formalisation (professionalisation) of traditional practices (see for example Turner et al 1995). These are often linked to client demands (see for example Maister 1997) for audit. One example in the building industry is the standardisation of measurement and valuation procedures orchestrated by the new RICS valuation manual, which enforces one approved method of operation within professional tasks. Robinson (1999), like Goode (1957), sees dissension within the community, although he refers to a developing hierarchy within the peer group, where some professionals become routinised
workers whilst others retain the prestigious intellectual work concerning judgement and 'ideas'.

2.2 Functionalism and Semi-Professionalism

As was discussed above, where profession is defined through certain traits, it follows that some occupations might fail to meet the required benchmark, and yet still engage upon the process of professionalism and/or exhibit pertinent characteristics. However, rather than regarding such associations as professionalising or as failed professions, Etzioni (1969: v) refers to these as semi-professions whose claim to the title professions "is neither fully established nor fully desired". Where profession is regarded as an ideal type construct, the real world is bound to throw up examples that are imperfect in their fit (Turner and Hodge 1970).

Etzioni (1969: v) defines a semi profession in the following terms. "Their training is shorter, their status is less legitimated, their right to privileged communication less established, there is less of a specialized body of knowledge, and they have less autonomy from supervision or societal control than 'the professions'". This offers one explanation for the situation in the English building industry. As illustrated in Appendix D, the sheer mass of associations within the industry is difficult to explain. Etzioni himself includes nurses, teachers, social workers and librarians, whilst Goode (1969: 267) includes "pharmacy, stockbroking, advertising, business management and others".

He also recognises the desire of these semi-professions to achieve "a full-fledged professional status and sustain a professional self-image, despite the fact that they themselves are often aware that they do not deserve such a status, and despite the fact that they objectively do not qualify" (Etzioni 1969: vi). This as an issue of status, since semi-professionals see themselves as superior to the alternative classifications of white-collar or blue-collar worker. "As semi-professionals see it, they obviously are 'more' than secretaries, salesgirls, or office clerks. Unable to find a niche between these white collar statuses and the professions, and not wishing to be identified with the lower status group, they cling to the higher aspiration of being a full professional" (Etzioni 1969: vi). This aspiration is costly to both semi-professions and professions, and a cause of tensions within society. The semi-professions operate within a feeling of inferiority and guilt,
seeking to trick, inveigle and beg their way into a higher status. In reacting to this, professions are regarded as defensive and remote as they pull up a drawbridge between the two.

Ultimately Etzioni believes that semi-professions should be recognised as a distinct group of occupations with their own status by forming a middle ground between white collar workers and professions and from which they can further develop their own identity and improved esteem. "The semi-professions will be able to be themselves" (Etzioni 1969: vii). Mallin (2000) revisited Etzioni's arguments in his discussion of social and community care. Here "the managerialist, employer-led approach" (Mallin 2000: 13) creating standardisation through a disciplining mechanism is better described as semi professional, since it does not generate any control for workers.

2.3 Functionalism: Conclusions

Johnson (1972) argues that neither a trait nor a functionalist approach offers any practical assistance with the definition problem. Other criticism of the functionalist approach increasingly centred upon its proposal of an ideal type divorced from its context (Hughes 1963, Merton 1968, Harries-Jenkins 1970, Rueschemeyer 1983). Sociologists worked towards examining this context.

2.4 Political Influence of Professions

Freidson introduced the "concept of the professions rooted in the social organization of occupational labor markets" and which enables analysis of the "professional spheres of control that result from the knowledge monopolies and gatekeeping activities of the professions" (Brint 1993: 260). In so doing, Freidson provides a "new perspective on the meaning and social consequences of applied knowledge" (op cit). Freidson also provides a reasoned and measured defence of profession against its many critics that have appeared.

Freidson advanced the now widely accepted meaning to profession by "establishing my choice of occupational control of work as the guiding concept for the theorizing, and then elaborating its implications" (Freidson 1994: 1). In addition, he discusses the "topical matter of evaluating the present position of professions in advanced industrial societies in
the light of recent shifts in public opinion and state policy" (op cit). He examines the issue of the declining status of professions, considered here by the use of late modernity as a boundary to this analysis. He then attempts a defence, arguing that "on balance, professionalism is preferable to alternative modes of organizing the work of professionals (and others) and suggest how its virtues can be reinforced" (op cit).

Freidson (1988) recognises the existence of traits as an important issue, arguing that the selection of wrong traits, or the errors within the approach of ignoring context, do not inherently make the approach worthless. He believes formal knowledge, particularly the institutionalisation of formal knowledge, is central to the concept of profession. From this can be drawn two inferences or areas of development. The first concerns the origins of this knowledge, and the second its future and the evolution, particularly the decline, of traditional information and the bastions which are built upon them. Concerning the issue of the origination of profession, Freidson recognises the duality of the concept of profession within pre-industrial England but prefers the notion of the status profession and the occupational profession (Elliott 1972, Freidson 1988). Freidson (2001) has difficulties with the concept of the division of labour, which he regards as riven with anomalies deriving from Smith's initial use of the word, for what would be described today as specialisation. It is this concept that defines, or at least gives meaning to, the notion of profession. Occupational control is the hallmark of modern professions, whilst pre-industrial groups reflect rather more interest in issues of status than of control. This places the body of knowledge, its creation and control, as central themes. This requires power.

Freidson (1988: 109) enjoys examining the argument that professions historically had power, but "are now sufficiently along the way to losing it that one can assert they are in decline." That this is an enticing theme is a primary motive for utilising the late modern typology as a boundary to this work. As was illustrated in chapter 1, it is a common explanation of the current identity of profession, both generally and within the building industry. For example, architects are described as viewing their profession as serving "by improving society through the application of their distinctive expertise" (Gans 1983: 303). Their ability to do this "through a benevolent 'professional imperialism'" (Gans 1983: 303) has been the subject of a number of movements, most notably that of the
1960s where students and young architects saw this improvement as requiring drastic, even revolutionary, change, and "rejected the traditional professional alliance with the elite" (Gans 1983: 304). Gans (1983) believes that the architectural profession is in decline precisely because this view that architecture can reconstruct society through design has so palpably failed and thus its political power is broken. This is seen, usually less dramatically, within other professions and so Freidson's is a persuasive viewpoint, and certainly reinforces the need to examine this context.

This idea of placing professions directly into political situations is another interesting theme, yet again reflecting the late modern idea of placing professions as a mediator within a continuum between the absolute scepticism of the late modern and the collective trust that society needs. This role can be quite complex. Crompton (1990) examines the professions within the context of government market-led reforms and views professions as a primary force opposed to them. Ironically, she also recognises that certain professions benefit from an emphasis on regulation by market forces. She selects lawyers and accountants, but quantity surveyors fit into this description as evidenced through the interviews in this work presented later. At this time (1990), she believes that professions are quite capable of winning this battle, primarily because of their ability to rouse moral forces to their defence. Despite increasing cynicism about professional ethics, the market-led alternative is likely to arouse even greater concern and resentment, particularly within fields such as healthcare. Others have also developed this idea to develop a mechanism and a dialogue with which to oppose the expansion of market forces (see for example Evetts 2003). Rydin (1998) examines the conflicted role of the planning profession in this context. Whilst Reed (1996) sees professions as finally reaping their deserved fate, others agree with Freidson that 'profession' offers a still meaningful alternative to the notion of the 'intellectual worker'.

2.5 Professions and Power: Professions, Economic Elites and the State

Johnson (1972) is intrigued by the claims concerning professionalism and service to the public good that permeate the functionalist writings. These reach almost religious fervour in a new moral order. He regards profession as a specialist occupational skill, and the process of professionalisation as the emergence of this skill through social and economic dependency and social distance. This involves the imposition upon consumers of some
level of control and creating an *esoteric* character of the knowledge supplied by the professional. This reflects the changing nature of technology, including a general rise in the levels of education, developments in skill, technological innovation and cultural shifts, but also the rise of new occupations in mass consumption societies. For example, he mentions the effects of the rise of computers on the role of the accountant and the changing nature of the priesthood within a secular society. The ability to respond to, and control, is reflected by the power held by professions. "A profession is not, then, an occupation, but a means of controlling an occupation" (Johnson 1972: 45).

Johnson refers to a number of approaches towards this power. *Collegiate control* exists where the producers define the needs of the consumer. Where consumers define their own needs, this is described as *oligarchic patronage*, or *corporate patronage*, and exists in most modern examples. His final class is *mediative*, where a third party mediates between consumer and producer. Capitalist entrepreneurs are one example of this (*capitalist mediatieve*), but the state is an alternative third party actor (*state mediation*).

Collegiate functions require the existence of a controlling guild or institution; both medicine and law are examples. Consumers define their own needs where instability in the professions creates new types of occupation derived from emerging consumer power. "Fully developed institutions of patronage arise where consumers have the capacity to define their own needs and the manner in which those needs are catered for" (Johnson 1972: 65). This originates where consumers are controlled by patronage of a small elite of landed aristocracy. The professional "is expected to be socially acceptable" (Johnson 1972: 67) and recruitment is based upon sponsorship; professionals are expected to be gentlemen. Camic (1983) describes one such elaborate allocation system in eighteenth century Scotland. Corporate patronage has evolved from this system. Indeed, Johnson regards corporations as run by a small elite of powerful businessmen who retain the idea of personality testing to ensure that practitioners are personally 'acceptable'. Matthews et al (1997: 427) describe this in the rise of the professional accountant in British management where they became, in effect, a part of this elite and recreated it in their own image.

State mediation concerns the creation of a guaranteed clientele for the professions. This is often enacted within the cause of serving the public good. One such example can be
found within Miller and Rose (1994: 127) where "UK welfarism of the post-war period would 'governmentalise' welfare and 'professionalise' social work" as part of an ideology of treating welfare as a political rationality and a governmental technology (see also Rose and Miller 1992). Social work is then transformed as a task into something different (professional) by this shift of state ideology, and in Johnson's terms is achieved through the mediation of the state between the producers and consumers of social work services.

State mediation reflects a diffusion of the consumer role, but also undermines existing social bases of recruitment. Education is seen as an essential requirement by the state to guarantee service standards, rather than traditional forms of social control of entry. Incorporation of professionals into government agencies also occurs, resulting in divergence of professional identities. This is reflected in a number of tensions between the needs of bureaucratic control and the demands of profession.

There has been considerable recent interest in revisiting Johnson's (1972) consideration of power. Particular focus has been directed towards profession as a disciplining mechanism and the concept of performativity within an occupation, rather than as means of controlling it by the professional (Fournier 1999, Fournier 2002, Hodgson 2002, Hodgson 2005). New systems of control adopt the language of professions to give legitimacy and present them as more than simply getting employees to work harder. Derived from this, is the examination of employees' simultaneous attraction, insecurity and apathy towards professionalisation (Hodgson 2005), and the potential for subversion (Hodgson 2005). Fournier (2002: 132) concludes that "the idea of professionalism acts as a resource in performing the legitimacy of a marginal health practice", in this case aromatherapy, and it "does its work of legitimation by conjuring up the figures of the quack and the amateur in terms calling for their replacement." Professions, businesses and government can each utilise the language of profession for their own ends, either in conflict with each other, or in alliance.

2.6 Professions, the Market and Class Relations

Larson (1977) argues that professions organise themselves to attain market power. She regards "professionalization as the process by which producers of special services sought to constitute and control a market for their expertise. Because marketable expertise is a
crucial element in the structure of modern inequality, professionalization appears also as a collective assertion of special social status and as a collective process of upward social mobility. In other words, the constitution of professional markets, which began in the nineteenth century inaugurated a new form of structural inequality: it was different from the earlier model of aristocratic patronage, and different also from the model of social inequality based on property and identified with capitalist entrepreneurship" (Larson (1977: vi-vii). This, therefore, distinguishes the Anglo-Saxon professions from European equivalents, and explains its more distinctive characteristics and relationship between professional privilege and the market. Larson compares this with France and Prussia, where professional formation was a result of state intervention and modelled upon state bureaucracies. Larson (1977) is often described as utilising a Marxist theoretical approach, but Freidson (1994) and Macdonald (1995) draw attention to the Weberian nature of her work, and her use of Weber's conceptualisation of class. It is Weber who defines the ability to command rewards in the marketplace as a function of both property and skill, and Weber who regards skill as a modern form of property (Gerth and Wright Mills 1991).

"Professionalization is thus an attempt to translate one order of scarce resources - special knowledge and skills - into another - social and economic rewards. To maintain scarcity implies a tendency to monopoly: monopoly of expertise in the market, monopoly of status in a system of stratification" Larson (1977: xvii).

Larson (1977) recognises a first phase of profession within the nineteenth century, specifically the establishment of nation-wide institutions. This is the result of historical circumstance: the rise of industrial capitalism, its early crises and consolidations and its evolution towards a corporate form. She then develops the idea of the professional project as the mobiliser of technological, economic and ideological resources into social division of labour. At this time, she recognises that social transformation was still very limited and so the project was incomplete "but nonetheless awesome" (Larson 1977: 8). The emergence of professional markets was the pre-requisite for the completion of the professional project. Profession was a collective effort to establish opportunities for earning income through the capture and control of markets. Profession was distinct from other early capitalist industries, since it was working to create new markets, rather than
competing with pre-capitalist modes of production. The professional project established small, monopolised markets which were intensely competitive in attempting to dominate, but separate and removed from traditional professional elites; such community-orientated societies, based upon aristocratic tradition, were no longer sufficient. However, the professional project ignored them since they served different needs. They avoided disintegration and revolutionary overthrow within England because they were "relatively unimportant in the organisation of work or community services but occupied a niche high in the system of social stratification" (Elliott 1972: 14). "Members of the learned professions regarded their employment not simply as a way of 'making a living' but as a vocation from God to be cheerfully and diligently fulfilled" (O'Day 2000: 11). In contrast, market-orientated societies "found credibility on a different, and much enlarged, monopolistic base - the claim to sole control of superior expertise ... professional work was becoming a full-time means of earning a livelihood, subject to the dictates of capitalist competition for income and profit" (Larson 1977: 13).

Professional work has two distinctions from normal commodities sold in a market. Like all labour it is a fictitious commodity, but it is also involved with the production of an intangible service, rather than a physical product for sale. This requires the producers themselves to be produced; professionals must be adequately trained or differentiated to be able to offer recognisably distinct services for exchange in the professional market. In the formative period of profession, markets had to be created. This required a standard and unified approach by professional entrepreneurs and a request for state protection and enforcement. At the same time clients had to be persuaded that they required the services of the new markets. Where services were already provided elsewhere, the new producers had to be presented as superior. Producing the producers requires education, involving economic and social sacrifices needing "at least a moderate guarantee that the recruits' educational investment would be protected" (Larson 1977: 15). This required that the state should allow some form of monopoly, or special protection, by public authorities. "The attitude of the state toward education and toward monopolies of competence is thus a crucial variable in the development of the professional project" (Larson 1977: 15). Control of the producers had first to be established, in order to define the cognitive basis for the profession, and upon which it could then claim cognitive exclusiveness and establish a teaching monopoly to maintain itself. The institutions were thus born, together
with their mechanisms for enforcing monopoly, which included the licence, the qualifying examination, the diploma and formal training to a common curriculum. In England middle class professional men led this process. The development of the professional project was not, however, complete. The creation of knowledge and the production of the producers can be entirely separate, and whilst the profession controls production and the market, it does not control new knowledge or researchers in scientific fields. To this end, the modern model of the university and university-based professions was developed to control the production of knowledge.

The modern profession is concerned with two separate features. Whilst professions did not originally control the markets, they achieved this transformation in the nineteenth century. Maintaining control is thus essential to them as producers. This is achieved through the standardisation of knowledge, which renders a professional commodity that is identified by its consumers. This requires coercive power to carry it through. Cohesion and scientific legitimacy assist this process, since this grants authority to the created dominating body of knowledge. Formal training reinforces both. A growing number of future practitioners become indoctrinated into the single view of the profession and its processes, minimising the place of the charismatic individual. Those outside the profession witness a demarcation of practice and theory, established by educators with independent credentials. Ironically, whilst this increasingly legitimates colleague sanction as a valid control system, it renders it less visible and narrower. Socialisation is reinforced, visible within the prevalence of professional-technical language and other examples of a particular subculture. There is some disagreement as to the extent of what Olesen and Whittaker (1970) refer to as *enculturation*. They argue that the idea is overstated and that a profession does not dominate its members. Not only are they capable of independence, but the existence of a pan-profession socialisation is very unlikely. Elliott (1972: 94-95) refers to the individual with "a cluster of expectations about the way he should behave inside and outside the work situation", and a group who "share common socio-economic origins, educational experiences and lifestyles, and a common, if confused, ideology of professionalism" (Elliott 1972: 143). Larson (1977) argues that professional *cognitive superiority* is created. At the same time, expansion broadens the previously small elite into a much larger mass of professionals and ex-professionals across disciplines with a perceived commonality that renders an active
defence to external claims of elitism. Certainly, Fournier's (2002) analysis of aromatherapy supports the argument that a profession creates a sense of self, and a sense of others, which it describes in terms of 'quackery' and 'amateurism' in contrast to "the disciplined and responsible conduct of the professional practitioner" (Fournier 2002: 117).

2.7 Division of Expert Labour: Jurisdiction

Abbott (1981, 1986, 1988) offers an exploration of profession based upon the link, *jurisdiction*, between an occupation and its work. For Abbot (1988: 2), the professions are an interdependent system, where "each profession has its activities under various kinds of jurisdiction. Sometimes it has full control, sometimes control subordinate to another group. Jurisdictional boundaries are perpetually in dispute, both in local practice and national claims. It is the history of jurisdictional disputes that is the real, the determining history of the professions. Jurisdictional claims furnish the impetus and the pattern to organizational developments. Thus an effective historical sociology of professions must begin with case studies of jurisdictions and jurisdiction disputes. It must then place these disputes in a larger context, considering the system of professions as a whole. It must study such evolving systems in several countries to assess exogenous factors shaping systems of professions. Only from such portraits can one derive an effective model for understanding and predicting professional development in modern societies generally."

Study of the professions concerns establishing jurisdictional claims. These have a number of alternative 'audiences'. These might be legal, which confers formal control of the work, or the public arena involving an appearance whereby "professions build images that pressure the legal system" (Abbott 1988: 59). The workplace is a forum where legal and image constructs interplay with practical working issues on a daily basis. The settlement of jurisdiction claims can take a number of forms, including full and final jurisdiction by the profession. Others might be part of a transition.

The establishment of jurisdiction and the process of assessing claims creates Abbott's (1988) *system of professions* ensuring that jurisdiction is allocated, granted or claimed by particular professions. From this Abbott (1988) derives a single feature of profession,
which is that it is *exclusive*. The social and cultural features discussed by other authors in the field as the classic hallmarks of a profession are pertinent, but not central. "The link of jurisdiction embodies both social and cultural control. The cultural control arises in work with the task and is legitimated by formal knowledge that is rooted in fundamental values" (Abbott 1988: 86). The concept of profession resides within the principle of jurisdiction, which is an exclusive and competitive control over knowledge and work. This requires competitors to recognise each other through a system of profession. "Since jurisdiction is exclusive, professions constitute an interdependent system" (Abbott 1988: 86). Jurisdiction is impermanent and boundaries change, but the whole consists of an exclusive system of professions. "Early theorists of professions did not emphasize their exclusive qualities, even in analyses of power" (Abbott 1988: 86). This is exemplified for Abbott by the medical profession's successful destruction of those it determined to be 'charlatans'.

This system of professions evolves through a number of mechanisms. Professions might be "carnivorous competitors" of "infinite jurisdiction" (Abbott 1988: 87), seeking to establish a system of two or three dominant groups; whilst this is not ultimately accepted by Abbott, he does find it a useful tool for studying medicine. More likely, the system operates through a "vacancy model" (Abbott 1988: 88), where professions move into vacancies left by others. This he represents as a series of 'bump chains'. "In summary, chains of events in the system of professions start in two general ways - by external forces opening or closing areas for jurisdiction and by existing or new professions seeking new ground" (Abbott 1988: 90). He thus refutes the notion that associations can 'professionalise' independently of each other. Given the nature of the UK Privy Council, and its unwillingness to engage in contentious decisions, this appears to have some validity as an observation, but might be explained as a political rather than a jurisdictional process. In the case of the Chartered Institute of Building's (CIOB) attempt at changing its name (Appendix A, section A6), this was never a jurisdictional issue in a technical sense, but one of status centring on the word "construction".

Abbott (1988) offers external and internal sources for changes to the system of professions. He describes four external sources. "Clientele settlement" occurs where a professional association ignores potential clients, and these are taken by another (either a
new or an existing institute). "Enclosure" occurs when an association claims jurisdiction over a task previously common to a different group. Intriguingly, Abbott (1988: 91) refers to "land agents, surveyors and auctioneers" as an example of enclosure, but then offers no references, explanation or defence for the statement. He concludes, "enclosure has indeed become less and less common in the American and British system of professions" (Abbott 1988: 95). New technologies and change within organisations complete the external sources.

Abbott's internal sources for change are less appropriate to the building industry, inasmuch as it is unclear whether it is apt to describe them as internal processes. His first is new knowledge or skill. Within building, this includes the rise of the project management function, new systems of procurement and production, materials technology and the wider costing skills (such as life cycle and environmental costing). However, the argument that they were created by a profession is problematic; indeed, it is difficult to regard any of these new skills as the jurisdiction of a single profession. Social structure is the second key internal source for system change. "One competing group raises its standards or organisational efficiency and thereby threatens the public and perhaps legal jurisdiction of its environing competitors" (Abbott 1988: 97).

Abbott (1988) compares the nineteenth century with its small and elite public and client bodies with today's broader spectrum of interested parties and market-focussed interests. For him, it is the competition for jurisdiction that is behind what others refer to as the 'decline' in the professions, the emergence of new occupations and institutes, and the competition between existing associations.

2.8 Comparative Approaches to Profession

Freidson (1994) describes comparative approaches to professions as the final trend within his review of the sociology of the professions' literature, pointing to its attempts to offer comparative studies between professions and cultural background. Freidson (1988) lays great store upon this specificity, arguing that profession is a product of individual and historical outcomes. Studies are biased towards Anglo-American observations, often without realising it and a correction is required (see for example Abel 1985, 1986).
Freidson (1994: 5-6) notes that the comparative approach is "critical of the way the process had been conceptualized by earlier Anglo-American writers and sought to distinguish the different paths of different professions in different nations with different cultural and political traditions." Macdonald (1995) places Burrage (Burrage 1988, Burrage 1989, Burrage and Torstendahl 1990, Torstendahl and Burrage 1990, Burrage 1999, Burrage 2006) at the centre of this development (see also Millard 1993). When Burrage (1988, 1989) reviews the issue of the approach to professions as traits, he comments that whilst traits certainly exist, there is no evidence that they are a defining characteristic, that such lists have varied greatly and that they are not permanent. He is equally critical of the idea that professions share common economic interests. However, his focus takes shape when recognising "specific historical cases"; in this example, French, American and English legal professions during the revolutionary period (Burrage 1989: 323). From this, the behaviour of the professions is "puzzling" (ibid: 324) when viewed from an economic perspective. Indeed, Burrage (1989: 324-325) is unusual in his honesty, admitting that "it seems unlikely that we will ever discover and demonstrate the motives or interests underlying lawyers' collective action". For Burrage (1988, 1989, 2006) the most appropriate method is to study what occupations have done, or have tried to do; that is, to observe their goals. These goals were to control admission to, and training for, legal practice, to demarcate and protect their jurisdiction within which they alone are entitled to practice, to impose their own rules of ethics and etiquette, and to defend and enhance their status. For Burrage (1988, 1989, 1999, 2006) the key variables are political, although in this case he sees this as "not especially controversial" (Burrage 1989: 325) given the importance of the state towards the practice of law.

Burrage (2006) also lays great stress upon the idea of community and the process of professionalisation within a particular group. He is of the opinion that professions and revolutions are associated concepts, placing the idea of the utopia as an important idea. Many communities were established either as settlers on 'virgin' territories, such as America, or ideologically 'clean' political infrastructures, such as post-Revolutionary France.

This comparative approach has also opened up a comparative discussion of state involvement with the professions within public sector organisations as European nations
have struggled to maintain their 'cradle to the grave' systems (Dent 1998) and more generally accepted the need to measure and inform on performance in these systems (see for example Neave 1998). European Union initiatives to regulate and recognise professional groups and occupational boundaries have provided further opportunities for comparative studies. The introduction of privatisation (Mulholland 1998), private finance initiatives and the wider and recent "governmental rethinking" (Dent 1998: 204) on welfare has impacted upon professional autonomy and organisation within these fields, particularly medicine (Freddi and Björkman 1989, Johnson et al 1995, Dent 1998). This in turn has expanded the evaluative state (Neave 1998) and manifested and established new devices for controlling professionals (Jary 2002, see also Power 1994, 1997) as part of a wider system of introducing mechanisms by which states evaluate what is done within the public sector.

2.9 The Professions within Business and Sociology for Business

There is a tension concerning the management literature within sociology generally, and the study of the professions in particular. Joseph (1989) argues that sociologists reject the "practicality" of business-orientated literature, defending the 'purity' of their discipline in describing and analysing the real world of people. This material should not be "put to the service of particularly powerful groups in society, such as employers" (Joseph 1989: 2). Sociologists are concerned over the lack of intellectual rigour within the field of business studies. However, an interesting literature has developed and one that does integrate with the more traditional sociological approaches.

Rather than view professionalism as a form of occupational control, Dent and Whitehead (2002: 10) describe the situation as one where "it was principally if not solely the (professional) producer who defined and policed the disciplinary systems... now there are new managerialist forms of audit that are now performed in the name of the client, customer, or patient." The issue of the relationship of professional to employer is not new. Scott (1966) highlights four areas of conflict: the professional's resistance to bureaucratic controls; the professional's rejection of bureaucratic standards; the professional's resistance to bureaucratic supervision; and the professional's conditional loyalty to the bureaucracy. However, empirical observation is less conclusive. For example, within the same socio-temporal setting Scott (1965) observes that professional
workers accepted supervision (c.f. Scott 1966), Prandy (1965: 124) finds very little conflict, and this is "of a mild sort", Hall (1967) finds that professionals enjoy a great deal of autonomy and are not restricted or compromised by bureaucratic structures, and Engel (1970) suggests that bureaucratic institutions provide the resources to reinforce professional behaviour. Key here is the externality of the bureaucracy, since the standardisation of knowledge and occupational procedures are usually seen as a tool of professions for exercising control. However, theirs is carried through either directly by the professional association or with its co-operation. Similarly, there is a differentiation within the literature between public sector and private sector organisations, whereby the former seem more susceptible to managerial control systems (Kitchener 2000, Farrell and Morris 2006).

The conceptual foundation to the more recently evolving body of work has been disciplinary power within the modern corporation. Creating identity and using this as a means of control is now the province of firms rather than more traditional sources of authority. Alvesson and Willmott (2002) consider identity regulation and the organisational production of ‘appropriate’ individuals as a means of control. The creation of a discourse to generate such an identity faces a number of obstacles, notably professional identity. "Education and professional affiliation are powerful media of identity construction" (Alvesson and Willmott: 630). This work was, in part, derived from Alvesson's (2000) work on social identity and its effects upon the loyalty of workers in knowledge-intensive companies. Wallace (1995), building upon Wallace (1993), examined the degree to which professionals in general, and lawyers in particular, are committed to their profession and the organisations which employ them. She argued that traditional arguments concerning contradictions did not have empirical support. Professionals within "nonprofessional organizations are significantly less committed to the profession than those working in professional organizations, even after structural characteristics and other factors are controlled" (Wallace 1995: 251). Alvesson (2000) finds the literature of the loyalty of professionals inconclusive. Whilst "there may be conflicts between professional (ideological) and bureaucratic modes of control" (Alvesson 2000: 1109), this did not mean that there were "strong conflicts" between the commitments to the two institutions. However, Alvesson (2000) offers two caveats. Professionals studied as knowledge workers do not belong to "the traditional professions"
and thus their obligation to their profession might be regarded as weaker than elsewhere. Equally, it is unclear as to what extent the organisations studied might actually demand commitments that a professional would find contradictory to his profession. Alvesson (2000) concludes that weaker ties to a company can still be expected from professionals because of their external regulation and identity. Similarly, May et al (2002) research the organisational and occupational commitment of knowledge workers in large corporations. They recognise three themes to the discussion of expertise and knowledge workers. These are the cognitive basis and the nature of knowledge, the strategies used by knowledge workers to protect these exclusionary claims, and management-employee relationships. Specifically, they are concerned with "the commitment of knowledge workers to the organization vis-à-vis their occupations" (May et al 2002: 776). Their findings were tentative, but suggested a commitment to peers rather than the organisation. The authors recognised that their study (of money market dealers and computer system developers in large corporations) did not include members of professional associations, and that this prevented general application of their argument until further work was done on such professionals (see also Connell et al 2005 on the general theme of 'intellectual workers'). Sitkin and Sutcliffe (1991) examined the importance of legal controls, concluding that legal sanctions aimed at the organisation had little effect, but individual-orientated legal sanctions significantly influenced behaviour. They identified professional sense of responsibility as a key factor, coupled with a concern for professional status, which was often impeded by organisational factors.

Worker identity is a development of the professional-manager dichotomy long recognised. The principle of professional autonomy and control of expertise is central to many understandings of the concept of professionalism (Rueschemeyer 1983). Professionals within a particular occupation or firm might find themselves under the control of managers that they deem technically inferior (see for example Vermaak and Weggeman 1999). This Conflict Theory, discussed above (Scott, 1966, Davies 1989), suggested an inherent conflict between bureaucrat and professional (see for example Bacharach et al 1991), and sometimes between professional, manager and worker (Whalley 1991). Allinson (1993) applied this to the role of project manager, pointing to contradictions and conflicts between architecture as an occupation and the demands of
project management. These included hierarchy versus participation, and their contrasting attitudes towards authority, corporatism and ethics. These were then reflected within their competing attitudes towards a project. Architects see a project as an opportunity to design, to create a building, offer a disinterested service and receive peer group accolades, whilst project managers prefer to routinise, seek to provide a financial asset, achieve corporate objectives and avoid risk. Such differences in approach also establish alien concepts of success. To project management, success is an objective reality that can be benchmarked, whilst architects prefer to socially construct success and failure. Dingle (1990: 39) refers to the public nature of the project manager's occupation, one that is judged by co-workers operating within the project. It is also worth noting that the US Project Management Institute actively engaged on PMBOK, a systematic attempt to create a unified and formal body of knowledge for the project management discipline (see for example Wideman 1988, Allen 1995). This will be discussed further in chapter 6.

Of course, management also tends to identify itself as a profession, and creates a separate occupational identity, ideology and discourse. Barley and Kunda (1992), for example, trace this through a series of normative and rational ideologies of control within managerial discourse. These stages are industrial betterment, scientific management, welfare capitalism (human relations), systems rationalism, and organisational culture. Such ideological discourse establishes and contradicts relationships within management as both an occupation and a profession. It establishes how the work should be carried out and fertilises the aspirations for professionalisation. In addition, the relationship between management and professional employees evolves. For example, Golden et al (2000) suggest that the relationship and discourse between professional and manager is more complex than a simple professional-manager dichotomy. Frequently, managers are also professionals (see also Freidson 1994) and whilst they found that such managers adopted interpretation and decision preferences similar to other professionals, rather than managers, they did not do so in accordance with expectations derived from earlier studies. Managers and professionals often did view issues differently, but did so in a multiple of different ways. Halford and Leonard (1999: 104) argue that the notion that managers are "self-interested, conventional and conformist" in comparison with the professional as "altruistic, independent and creative" relies upon the assumption that managers follow routines embedded in bureaucracy. This relies upon earlier work (see
for example Merton 1968), but they suggest that managers are individuals with different personalities, and make specific references to differences between men and women. Similarly, they are not convinced that professions are, in part, professional through a common identity. In particular, they consider different professions to have different identities, but they also prefer to concentrate upon the identities that are taken into the professions by members prior to their entry, drawing upon work undertaken on the outside lives of teachers to make their point. Deverell and Sharma (2000) further this argument, pointing to the fact that the medical profession historically criminalised homosexuality, defining it as a mental disorder. The result is that both homosexuals and those working in fields dealing with sex (for example HIV-prevention initiatives and treatments) are wary of defining themselves as professionals. Montgomery and Oliver (1996) also consider the theme of AIDS in their study of professional response to ambiguous environments and change as a theme within professional organisations. There also seems to be a distinction drawn between public and private sector workplaces, although Flynn (1999) suggests that this, too, is redundant and points to the quasi-markets of the UK public sector.

Exworthy and Halford (1999) doubt that the professional-manager dichotomy has much validity, based upon their analysis of changing UK public sector roles (see also Causer and Exworthy 1999, Halford and Leonard 1999). Rather, "creeping managerialism" is occurring (see for example Exworthy and Halford (eds) 1999, Lymbery 2000, Malin 2000). This involves a process similar to professionalisation, but one in which the traits of profession are taken over by management for their own efficiency or legitimacy requirements. This leads to questions concerning the distinction in identity between professionals and those operating under formalised ‘approved’ and systematic occupational regimes (Halford and Leonard 1999, Malin 2000). Whitley (1989) adds further insight, describing the particular characteristics of managerial skills and tasks and arguing that these activities have replaced others as the most important within the corporation. This feeds into the arguments concerning the decline of professions. Broadbent and Laughlin (2002), for example, describe these roles as a return to Classical management theories in which professionals find their autonomy reduced and their skills routinised; de-skilled in the terms of Braverman (1974). Fournier (2002) offers an alternative perspective, suggesting that in her experience of professionalisation within
aromatherapy, 'management' was central to the concept. Therefore, routinisation is not necessarily a managerially imposed constraint, but, rather, might be part of the discourse required by emerging professions.

Fournier (1999) also considered the paradoxical state of professionalisation within organisations. On the one hand, she points to the trends in organisational, economic and political thought threatening the professions, whilst on the other, she observes the widespread attempts at professionalisation by non-traditional occupations. If the former truly opposed the professions, why would they allow, encourage even, the latter? Rather than view the "casual generalisation of the notion of professionalism" (Fournier 1999: 281) as a simple marketing device to beguile consumers, she perceives it as an active mobilisation of a professional discourse to use as a disciplinary mechanism upon employees within the organisation. For Fournier (1999: 281-282), professionalism is a "disciplinary regime of autonomous professional labour ... Professionalism acts as a mode of government of autonomous labour, the autonomy of professional practice is predicated upon its government 'at a distance' (Miller and Rose 1990) through the articulation of 'professional competence'" (Fournier 1999: 281-282). Deliberate extension of professionalism into new occupational domains becomes a deliberate policy "to regulate the autonomous conduct of employees through the articulation of competence" (Fournier 1999: 282). Hodgson (2002) expanded this argument into the field of project management, extending Fournier's empirical work within a large privatised service company (Fournier 1999) and her experiences of aromatherapy (Fournier 2002). Hodgson (2002) offers an analysis of project management's development as a discipline through the development of a body of knowledge and thence into a discipline mechanism as it develops a cogent concept of competence. This is reinforced by indoctrination of project managers into a language and sense of self beyond that of their technical duties involved with their occupation, but into an entirely separate field of project management. Hodgson (2005) enriches this approach further by referring to performativity and subversion of the professional project. His argument herein is that professions are an identity, "a sense of 'citations', re-enacting previous performances to establish a certain identity" (Hodgson 2005: 55). This brings the professional into being, endorses competence, but simultaneously constrains professional conduct. However, Hodgson's (2005) later work draws upon a variety of responses to this identity, ranging from
attraction to the ideal, apathy and ambivalence to the reality, through to divergence and active subversion of the organisation's own discipline mechanism. Whilst senior management in Hodgson's studies (2002, 2005) see professionalisation as a means of control and discipline, employees have tended to recognise this spurious use of the professional concept and proved adaptable at utilising it to their own ends in return. This is a plausible explanation for the vast number of institutions observed within the building industry, and will be re-examined later. May and Buck (2000) suggest that subversion can also become outright objection in some cases. They offer a case study of one social service department in which the introduction of quasi-markets and the wider influences of managerialism established a resistance based, in part, upon established professional boundaries.

"Re-imagining labour as offering 'professional service' serves to construct an image of quality and reliability appealing to the allegedly increasingly discerning and demanding customer; it also opens up some imaginary space within which self-actualizing employees can strive for continuous fulfilment and improvement" (Fournier 1999: 299).

2.10 Professions and Organisational Theory

Weick (1976) describes the organisation as a loosely coupled system (see also Ouchi 1979), illustrating his proposal by reference to a football match, in which every player, the coaches, the spectators and the referee each have their own individual set of goals. Within the organisation, managers, employees, owners and clients have individual interests that are only loosely coupled to those of the company with "some evidence of its physical or logical separateness" Weick (1976: 3). They lack the same 'glue' that holds an organisation's imperatives together. They are impermanent.

Loose coupling can create both function and dysfunction by allowing portions of an organisation to exist, disregarding changes in the external environment. This can be a benefit in fostering perseverance, or a disadvantage in protecting the archaic. Loose coupling may provide a sensing mechanism by preserving independent systems that 'know' their external environment. Similarly, loosely coupled systems may be good for adapting locally or more quickly. By preserving an individual identity, a loosely coupled system can encourage mutation, novel solutions and innovation generally. It also
engenders human ingenuity through a smaller and autonomous unit. Should there be a breakdown within an organisation's systems, then a loosely coupled system can be sealed off and does not affect the whole. Finally, since it takes time and money to co-ordinate people, a loosely coupled system should be relatively inexpensive to operate.

The concept of loosely coupled systems in the context of professional associations offers an interesting tool for analysing the nature of the modern association. There is disquiet, as will also be discussed later, that the professional institution as a whole has become detached from the profession. The professional association is home to a peer community, a gestalt and the host to a body of technical knowledge. However, it is also a separate organisational entity with non-professional executive officers and a legal existence of its own.

Hopwood (1984) extends the concept of loose coupling into a legitimacy function. Legitimacy concerns the right of those with power to wield it, commonly an issue within political theory (see for example Beetham 1991). Hopwood (1984) argues that organisations are expected to behave in particular patterns and will adopt processes that appear, to the outside world, to conform to these norms to the outside world. In this case, professional associations are expected to have structures concerning entry into the profession, the behaviour of its members, education provision and quality control, continuing professional development and similar traits assumed to characterise a profession. These structures, however, might simply serve the function of legitimising the existence of the institution to the outside and/ or its own members, and be only loosely coupled to the organisation and its actual control and dealings with its membership. The manifestation of the professional association with appropriate symbols need not be directly coupled to organisational action (Meyer and Rowan 1977). This offers additional nuance to the principle.

The idea of a loose coupling of certain systems between the professional and their association is an intriguing one. Certainly, Watson (2002b: 99) in one interview with a representative of a professional association and one interview with a member found a wide difference in their "notions of professionalism". There is further support for the idea within the wider concept of agency theory. Whilst professions and their associations are not equivalent to shareholder-owners and the managers that they employ to operate their
businesses, there is well established literature upon the principle that executive agents
might exhibit their own interests and enact strategies independent of their employers (see
for example Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985 for an excellent overview).

2.11 Conclusions

This chapter establishes potentially interesting narratives that explain the concept of
profession. To what extent they reflect the dialogues taking place within the building
industry will need to be examined. However, other issues need also to be discussed. First,
there is a specific literature on the sociology of the building professions (chapter 3).
Second, there needs to be a deeper explanation of the nature of the professional
association. This will reinforce the selection of Burrage’s (2006) four-action framework.
Since it is empirically based upon the legal profession in England, France and the United
States, it makes an excellent structure for analysis here. It also places the professional
association at the centre of the study, since it is upon collective action that builds
meaning to the concept of profession. At the same time, he notes that collective actions
result from those of individuals. In this case, he proposes that a “fear of uncertainty and
disorder” (Burrage 2006: 17) encourages collectivisation, but there is a complex and
tiered series of motivations across time and place. It is with these individuals that this
thesis will also grapple. Burrage (2006: 22) also notes that it is “simple, compelling,
unavoidable” that those actions studied must be the public ones. This is not quite so
simple, since others (such as Hopwood 1984) suggest that public actions might serve
legitimacy functions and not represent what professions are actually doing. Chapter 4
will flesh out some of the contradictions between the public and the private spheres of
dialogue, with a view to teasing out experiences within the timescale of this work. There
is also a very interesting literature to develop. For whilst early professional associations
were the result of men sitting in a smoky public house (see for example Gotch 1934,
Thompson 1968) and revolved around powerful individuals (Carr-Saunders and Wilson
1933, Bowley 1966), modern associations are more likely to establish protocols,
committees and engage in ideological discourse and consultation (for example Watkins et

However, it is very clear that historically four goals have been central as a cause to these
deliberations, in whatever form they might take. These are:
1. Try to control admission and training
2. Define and defend a jurisdiction
3. Set up a system to govern their own members
4. Seek to improve their corporate status.

It is proposed that these four goals serve as a means to examine the current construction of identity within the building industry's professions, and each will form a separate chapter to structure each separate part of the study. At the same time, whilst these four themes might explain the (public) 'what', there is a need to examine the 'how' and the 'why' in order to understand the discourse that goes into the creation of the identity of profession in the late modern building industry. Some explanations also reflect occupational discourses in which there is also a tendency to rationalise (managerialise) and others to legitimise. These themes identified within this chapter can be drawn upon to enrich, illustrate, explain and analyse these goals within an environment that might, or might not, be very different from that in which the framework has been derived.

These aims can be tentatively drawn out as follows at this stage:

1. Profession consists of a community of equals with a common ideology, or at least creates a 'difference' between peers and outsiders (laity). This consists of two parts: some form of professionalisation to create such a community; and, a common professional identity that is created by the process and through socialisation into the community. Controlling admission is relatively straightforward; however there are a number of pertinent points. First, there is a need to persuade those within the occupation that there is a need to join. As will be shown in chapter 3, this can prove troublesome to the more individualistic occupations such as architecture. Second, entry creates a route to establishing social control over peers; some refer to this as creating an ideology or gestalt. Third, this is reinforced by establishing protocols for measuring competency. This constructs a social criterion for judging success, one which is often perceived as lacking objectivity by those outside the community. This, in turn, creates a dynamic to managerialise, to standardise procedures, to formalise and to create a benchmarking system capable of audit. Fourth, these processes create a body of knowledge, recognised by the profession and controlled by it. Again, this is
problematic in building, since knowledge is not always perceived within the remit of occupations to control.

2. Profession establishes an expertise and manufactures an esoteric service, which is then accepted (if not encouraged) by the state, clients or both. A concept of jurisdiction is evidenced here. This includes standardising methods and procedures, and which might take a number of different forms - such as ‘best practice’, managerialist protocols, statutory regulations and professional standards. Professions are presumed to award a licence to practice, with some statutory and economic monopoly of service. This causes issues for some, since monopoly of information is politically and economically contentious; late modern again is a useful idea, since it considers the provisional and prejudiced nature of knowledge and rejects the idea of information and information workers who are not submissive in the manner that professions are portrayed. The concept of loose coupling also becomes interesting here since the association might become decoupled from the peer collective in the practical implementation of jurisdictional issues. Control over the actual way in which work is carried out also becomes a tool that can be used by individuals, clients or the state; a disciplining mechanism.

3. Peers govern themselves, through the professional association. These have become legal entities in their own right with independent executive officers, and might be decoupling from the peer collective. Pressures are mounting upon the professional association to behave as a ‘modern’ business, and for professionals to conform to the identity dialogue of their employers. Competency is increasingly evaluated by business owners. Self-regulation is giving way to third party or market regulation, perhaps with some defensive measures in reaction from associations.

4. Within the late modern paradigm, improving corporate status has been replaced by defending it. However, whilst late modern as an idea might be persuasive, it is not conclusive. New occupations are continuing to ‘professionalise’ and more knowledge workers seek to join professional associations, which impinge upon status. Associations vary in status, which repeats the question of which are ‘professional’ and which are trade, occupational or quasi-professional. Whilst there seems to be a tendency from some to predict the death of professions, professionals (for example through the disciplining mechanism), third parties (through client patronage and state
mediation) and associations (through loose coupling and strategic dialogue over issues of identity) are enhancing the status of professions, perhaps to different ends.
Chapter 3: The Building Professions

3.0 Introduction

Chapter 1 laid stress on the individuality of the occupations under study, and this chapter will address that. Complementing chapter 2, this will complete the analysis of secondary literature. Chapter 1 explained the use of the concept of late modernity to explain a repeating theme within the following literature concerning a degeneration in the idea of profession and its associated characteristics, including status, skill, salary expectations and lack of power in the face of globalising clients and markets. The selection of the boundary becomes more evident in this chapter. Additionally, the unique nature of the building industry and its professions will also be examined. As the following literature will illustrate, there exists a belief that professions within the building industry are separate from other professions since they lack state, client or similar support to their creation and/or existence. The building industry has not been accorded patronage or state recognition, except in the most superficial manner such as Privy Council approval. As will be seen, this is often regarded as a rubber stamp rather than any serious award of monopoly control to a particular discipline. History also plays an interesting part, since it is used, especially by architects, to create a sense of current identity. Saint (1982, 1983) inter alia believes this a cause for current problems within the profession.

Therefore, the following chapter enriches the wider literature on the sociology of the professions, introduces the unique aspects of the building industry professions and examines the particularities of the late modern in this context.

3.1 History and the Building Professions

Dunckeld (1987) describes most construction history as "indirect approaches", since the history of construction tends to be researched only where it forms a part of some greater whole. There needs to be a rigorous analysis of construction history, divorced from architectural history, which currently tends to dominate discussion. Methodological and epistemological considerations also need rigorous development (Dunckeld 1998a, 1998b). More generally, Lawrence (1992) urges integrating architectural with social and housing
The origin of the architect is widely discussed. However, the field is more generally associated with the concept and historical interpretation of art and meaning within architecture, rather than of the term architect or the architectural profession (see for example Winters 1996). Architectural historians aspire to discuss the history of design. Briggs (1974: vii), for example, provides what is essentially a manifesto "to claim for the architect the position in history that is his due" and commences his study with Ancient Greece. However, he is referring to the tasks required in designing buildings, and the technical history of the occupation, rather than engaging in a discussion of it as a profession. Still, there is a desire to lay claim to ancient design; Kostof (1977: v) for example specifically refers to the designer in Egypt, Greece and Rome as the architect and that "its antiquity is not in doubt". He refers to architecture as a field of learning and the architect as an associate of the rich and powerful. This approach establishes the architect as "conceivers of buildings" (Kostof 1977: v). Jenkins (1961) similarly describes architects as sculptors of the environment. Whilst his work does not seek to examine their origins, his work begins with a presumption that architects exist in Tudor England. Whilst the word itself is indeed used, it is far less clear whether the actual occupation existed in a sense meaningful to a study of professions. Kaye (1960) attempts to distinguish between the artist-architect and the professional-architect as a means of removing issues of art and aesthetics from analysis of the architectural occupation. This was resisted by his reviewers (Whittick 1961, Collins 1962). Louw (2003) prefers to examine technological innovation as the creator of the architect. She offers a classification of proto-modern architectural inventor. These are the natural philosophers
Claude Perrault (1613-1688), Christopher Wren (1632-1723) and Robert Hooke (1635-1703). This offers an interesting comparison to the more usual view of the architect as artist rather than scientist. A third approach is that of the architect as evolved builder. Knoop and Jones (1967) refer to the "mason-architect" as a clear development from the medieval building process and the need for the master mason to estimate cost and quantities in addition to organising labourers and managing the project.

The relevance of these histories is disputed; there is no rigorous analysis of the 'modern' occupation as it was created in industrialising economies, or how it engaged with the existing modes of design. Saint (1982, 1983) regards histories of the architectural profession as polemics aimed at encouraging the current profession. The architects presented "appear to exist in a cultural vacuum, responsible to themselves alone" (Saint 1982: 3-10). Gotch's (1934) history of the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) on its centenary provides a perfect example of a eulogy rather than a history. Certainly the focus on this idealised form of artistic and inspirational agent to a patron is unconvincing in explaining the social organisation of the building process.

In a similar vein, published biographies within the field of the building industry professions appear to adopt a 'great men' approach to their studies, seeking to eulogise and dwell on the particulars of individual greatness. At least biographies and accounts of early professionals have been published (see for example Weir 1998, Woodley 1999), together with histories of the building industry. Cross-Rudkin (2000) believes that surveying and architecture has been well served in this field, compared with civil engineering. To what extent these can be regarded as representative of the general professional is problematic, and they are also reliant upon survival of records from earliest times (Cross-Rudkin 2000). Professional firm biographies (see for example Barty-King 1975, Spencer-Silver 1987 and Corfield 1987) suffer similar problems of corporate polemic and limited archaeological data.

Most construction histories dwell on the industry as a whole (see for example Salzman 1952, Clarke 1992 and Powell 1996) and firms in particular (see for example Jenkins 1980, Hinchcliffe 1985, Watson 1990, Steel and Cheetham 1993, Day 1997 and Powell 1999). It can be difficult to separate a history of a firm from that of the men who founded and managed it, particularly as many building and engineering firms did not long outlast
their creators (see for example Joby 1983). Summerson (1985) describes histories as predominantly in two categories: the history of structural design, and the history of building practice. The first is dominated by the history of technologies and innovation, particularly of material and materials cultures (see for example Hurst 2001, Louw 2001, Louw 2003). The second focuses on how buildings are erected as social and economic manufactures, either as an end or interest in itself (exemplified by the Construction History Society, their newsletter, annual journal and conferences) or as a means to aid in the commercial rehabilitation of old buildings (Johnson 1996). Neither suggests much of interest within the field of the sociology of the professions. Saint (1982: 3-11) requires histories to be placed into context and to recognise that professionals "were part of a team and were constrained by problems not unlike those we have today", rather than the radical individualists and great men of independence preferred by Jenkins (1961), Kostoff (1977) and their ilk. Dunkeld (1987) argues urban history and economic history both poorly serve the construction industry, and are themselves less rich as a result. This leaves history to the amateur, with varying results, and to the likes of the Bartlett International Summer School (BISS), who are primarily interested in socio-economic issues of construction and study history only where interesting economic case studies are developed. Furthermore, since BISS adopt "a Marxist theory of historical explanation, an approach to history that has been very influential since the 1950s" (Dunkeld 1987: 5), then construction history is written within this premise. This supposes that all societies contain both stabilising and disruptive elements, and that historical change only occurs when the latter erupt out of the existing order and, through a process of struggle, achieves a new framework. BISS papers analyse the contradictions between the forces of production in construction and the division of labour necessary for production. "The main drawback is that all historical data relating to construction is interpreted according to one level of reality; class conflict in the manner of production is seen as driving history in a forward direction. Whilst this can be a fertile approach in the hands of the best historians, it can also lead to a narrowness of approach and result in reductionist history by second rate scholars" (Dunkeld 1987: 6).
3.2 Origins of the Building Professions

The origin and development of the professions tends to focus on explaining the unique economic, social and political nature of the building industry from which the professions are perceived to be derived. Whilst this often conforms with the literature discussed within chapter 2, there is a preference for regarding the building industry as separate and unique. Both past and present, the industry's inefficiency and poor record on employment, profit, quality, speed, flexibility and mechanisation (see for example Emmerson 1962, Higgin and Jessop 1965, NEDO 1978, Ford et al 1983, Ball 1988, Gann 1989, Woudhuysen and Abley 2004) are perceived as characteristics describing an economic organisation unlike other sectors. Here there is neither government nor client involvement in the creation of the professions, nor are the resulting associations the same powerful institutions as those described elsewhere. This lends itself to the late modern theme, since it concurs with the idea of subject professions and conditional knowledge. The professions are assumed to exist in most studies, mirroring Carr-Saunders and Wilson (1933) in approach. Of more interest to the researchers is whether they are part of the industry's economic problems. Others prefer to utilise professional histories as part of an ideology in creating a false consciousness about the current position of professions (Saint 1982, 1983). Ball (1988) is a good example since his economic analysis of the building industry is well-regarded. He uses Marxist methodology to analyse the state of the industry, which renders his argument within the field criticised by Dunkeld (1987). Sadly, Ball (1988) barely mentions the professions, relying upon Bowley's (1966) historical development of the Contracting System (described below), to describe them as part of the 'development of class relations'. He even mistakes the RICS as the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors (Ball 1988: 61). Only more recently has the existence of the professions as a professional form come into wider debate, mostly as a response to economic pressures upon them. Again, the late modern theme portrays this perception perfectly.

Histories of the building industry and its professions have tended to study purely technological issues, without necessary reference to the contextual environment in which the industry has worked. These studies are of little methodological merit and concerned purely with actual practice and statements of existence. For example, Bowyer (1983) in
his history of building devotes an entire section to "the rise of professionalism", but simply analyses the process of building and the roles therein. He notes that the architect's name is derived from the Greek architekton and that this refers to a builder in chief and professionals "stemmed from the craft guilds of the Middle Ages" (Bowyer 1983: 224). Whilst perhaps valid arguments in principle (Abbott 1988), they look only to the technical building process, and not the wider social and economic developments within society. This idea that technical issues within a given domain are neutral and rational progressions within a particular paradigm, has long been accepted as invalid (see for example Berger and Luckmann 1967). Since he refers to the Federation of Master Builders as a professional institute and to RICS as the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors, the book must be judged with suspicion. However, it was a primary text for students in building, architecture and surveying in its time and thus offers evidence of the perception of the industry.

Similarly, Thompson (1968) begins his classic work upon the surveying profession with mention of the pyramids and the bible - albeit to stress the ludicrousness of such thinking. Architectural histories tend to be less reticent as previously discussed (for example, Kostof 1977). Still, Thompson traces the profession to the sixteenth century with the argument that one John Herbert wrote a book called Book of Husbandry and Book of Surveying published in 1523. Thompson believes that because the book proposed what might be referred to as a scientific approach to his subject, then this qualifies it as a serious book in the field rather than what had been referred to as surveying previously. This revolved around land management, frequently interviewing landed peasantry to determine traditional boundaries and measuring them out. From this 'new' and 'scientific' base, he argues that the profession is born. Whether Herbert's use of the title surveyor to describe himself and his rational study of occupational tasks of work is an acceptable origin story is not relevant here, since the study is of surveyors who operate in the building industry. However, it does mirror the issues discussed within both chapters 1 and 2 concerning the approaches to studying professions. A similar approach to the surveying profession is adopted by Carr-Saunders and Wilson (1933), who recognise the existence of building surveyors and quantity surveyors but place the formation of the profession and institutions with land surveyors. They point to the fact that the 1881 charter only refers to the art of determining the value of landed and house property, the
managing of estates and the science of delineating the earth's surface; that is, no mention was made of any building-related occupation. By 1933, they are described as members of the (then) Chartered Surveyors Institute (CSI) and, indeed, quantity surveyors are recognised as being different than other aspects of 'surveying' since they alone have no separate specialist institute in addition to the CSI.

Unlike Carr-Saunders and Wilson (1933), Thompson (1968) proceeds to birth each individual aspect of the profession. Land surveyors originate as civil engineers, from which they devolve for reasons not clearly explained. Of relevance here, quantity surveyors arise at a time when "professionalism was in the air in the later eighteenth century" (Thompson 1968: 64). There was a "stirring among the old professions of the law and medicine to modernize their archaic organizations, to set themselves standards of proficiency or to advance their knowledge, to pursue in gentlemanly fashion the trade union objectives of a closed shop and defined and enforceable job demarcations" (Thompson 1968: 64). Thompson, perhaps because he is writing a book for RICS, is less keen to accept the fundamental break between the old elite professions and the new occupational professionals discussed in chapter 2. However, the conceptual reconstruction of their work created a movement among the practitioners of these newer skills and services to establish clubs of association along similar lines to existing ones. In most cases, these took surveyors with them: canal makers took canal surveyors into civil engineering with them and road surveyors remained with highway engineers. However, the architects divested themselves of their measuring function and the measurer specialists leaving this group outside this process of professionalisation (Bowley 1966, Thompson 1968, Powell 1996). Ultimately, the measurer would join other lonely technicians as quantity surveyors to form the rather diverse surveying profession (Thompson 1968). Meanwhile architects progressed their now separate interests.

Bowley (1966: 340) traces the architectural profession to a "great efflorescence of building in this country during the later seventeenth century and the eighteenth century created unparalleled opportunities for professional architects. Fashionable architects ranked with fashionable artists." This follows Carr-Saunders and Wilson (1933) and is also recognised by Larson (1977: 5) as the "general circumstances which imprinted the first phase of professionalization". There is clearly an implicit assumption that architects
pre-dated this period, to then become fashionable, but for Bowley this is not relevant to any discussion of the modern industry. Carr-Saunders and Wilson (1933) recognise deep roots to the architect and this is accepted by Larson (1977), but not by Middlehurst and Kennie (1997). They utilise the work of Watkins et al (1992) to place the development of building professionals within the second stage of groupings, created by the industrial revolution with a nominal dating of 1800. This places them (according to this classification) with accountants, chemists and engineers. As discussed above, the extent to which professions seamlessly evolve from pre-modern times is a contentious issue.

Consideration of when the concept of the architect arose, and speculation upon the changing identity of the builder into builder, engineer, architect and/ or contractor, has certainly been undertaken (see for example Kostof 1977, Morley 1987). Once again these tend to refer back to Medieval or Renaissance craft divisions and attempts by these crafts to gain control over their work, prices, contracts and the enforcement of building regulations. Carr-Saunders and Wilson (1964: 176), on the other hand, provide a very clear start to the architect as "a profession whose technique is based upon study, and whose function is supervisory rather than executive". They place it with Inigo Jones (1573-1651) and his introduction of studying and designing to Palladian rules and method (as do Knoop and Jones 1967). This generates an architectural profession of a dual nature, where "some were dependants of noble families, while others were scarcely distinguishable from builders and contractors" Carr-Saunders and Wilson (1964: 177). It was this duality that retarded the process of association.

This duality probably best identifies the contradictions within the architectural histories. Studies of architecture as an occupation or a series of tasks concerned with designing a building point to the origins of the English word ‘architect’, its historic use, and the plain fact that someone had to carry out design roles. Alternatively, the idea of a particular occupation of the architect, as a recognised occupation and a community of peers, are more concerned with how these tasks coalesced into a single job of work. In addition, there is little agreement amongst either as when meaningful historic dates can be attached to either approach, especially in a direct causal relationship or chain with the modern English building industry.
According to Bowley (1966: 341) "by 1791 architects had become sufficiently self-conscious about their profession to form a club, and suggestions were being mooted for the registration of architects. Leading architects began to feel the need both for some organisation of the profession and for more specialised education." This is reiterated by Thompson (1968) who argues that architects determined to deal with their integrity and status (predominantly by excluding measurers) first, and only then to consider the nature of their professionalisation and the issue of competence. Carr-Saunders and Wilson (1933) recognise the role of fashion and the revolution in public taste, but also consider the commercialisation of building and the invention of new material, which was subject to proprietary ownership and patents, as an economic force to sever architects from the interests of builders. This resulted in a clear separation of architect from builder, a separation that was completed by the very select nature of the individuals who established the first association, the Architects Club in 1791. The root of the desire for such distinction is the origin of the architect with the mason. Knoop and Jones (1967: 176) describe a context where drawings "were not elaborate; many of the details were not written but were carried in the mind of the master mason and were decided either at his discretion or in accord with verbal, and perhaps very general, instructions from the employer." Indeed, drawing is described as the work of the surveyor. The Architects Club was followed by the creation of the London Architectural Society (1806), Architectural Society (1831) and the Institute of British Architects (1834), which became the Royal Institute of British Architects under charter in 1837.

The primary interest, according to Bowley (1966: 341-2), was that they be "fully trained professional men free from association with the building trades. Such association, it was felt at the time, undermined the confidence of clients. It was the intention to elevate architects from the position of agent to the client, to that of trusted adviser and friend. Such a position, it was considered, would be inconsistent with architects having any profit-making connection with the building industry and, therefore, it followed they must have no part in the actual organisation of building work." Marriott (1924) and Briggs (1974) *inter alia* reinforce this latter point. Such action was received with concern by builders. Clapham (1938) illustrates how builders responded to this change in role from equal and ally to economic opponent by requiring greater legal protection. This led to formalisation of the terms of contracts and relations with architects. Saint (1982, 1983)
argues that this origin has been denied ever since, to be replaced by a myth. Others (for example, Bowley 1966) regard this division as a fundamental cause of the industry's organisational problems. The design-build split, the distinction and separation of the designer and the process of design from the manufacturer, is unique in industrial organisation. It is a cause of design failures, excessive cost and the social distancing of architect and builder that results in a rush to litigation to resolve problems rather than teamwork and partnership (Woudhuysen and Abley 2004).

This principle of separation was incorporated into the 1887 supplemental charter of the RIBA, which required that no member of the Institute hold a profit-making position in the building industry. A member could only take part in the actual organisation of the building process in the subordinate position of an employee. Political moves were underway to establish a register of architects to police this requirement, even for non-members. This became official policy in 1909 and was successfully achieved within the Architects Registration Act 1931. Bowley points to one interesting development from this: builders who wished their sons to join them in the firm could no longer educate them as architects, but no such restriction was placed upon engineers. Thus, builders began to drift towards engineering as a profession and away from architecture.

Bowley (1966) asks why such a move by architects was deemed necessary. Whilst the need to ensure independence is self-evident, engineers were able to ensure that members had no financial interests within building firms, without recourse to such action. Equally, as he points out, two registers could have been maintained: one for 'purer' consultants, and one for those operating within building firms. To Bowley (1966), the question is central to his thesis concerning the efficiency (modernity) of the industry since this divorce of architecture from building led to a fundamental division between the processes of design and construction, with grave consequences. He traces the development of the 'traditional' procurement route, in which the architect and builder are placed in antagonistic roles, one as the agent of the client and the other as the manufacturer of the project. The primary problem with such a system is that not only does the builder have no contact with the client or input into the design, but actually has a vested financial interest in undermining the process. This is because the builder is required only to operate exactly as instructed, without use of initiative or expertise, on the basis that the
builder is simply a paid tool. Carr-Saunders and Wilson (1964: 177) suggest that the reason is related to the elites that determined to create an association and it is "Soane, to whom, more than any other man, the divorce of the architect from commercial entanglements is due." This view is repeated by Wilton-Ely (1977), who believes that the decision to divorce architecture from building was an obvious product of the rise of a purely commercial general contractor. As "a businessman with a purely financial relationship to design" (Wilton-Ely 1977: 193), the dangers to professional integrity are self-evident to him, and were to the profession at the time. Intriguingly, he also points out that this approach was of little relevance since RIBA "continued to regulate the conduct of only a fraction of the architectural profession throughout the nineteenth century" (Wilton-Ely 1977: 194). However, Bowley (1966) and others (including Wilton-Ely himself, who suggest that architect-builder liaisons continued until 1936) accord this decision as the issue that "profoundly affected the tripartite relationship between client, designer and craftsman" (Wilton-Ely 1977: 193) and produced the traditional procurement system, which is uniformly blamed for the building industry's many inefficiencies (see for example Ball 1988).

The final development of this process, for Bowley, was the creation of the quantity surveyor. This role is a direct requirement for the process of tendering through a bill of quantities (see also Higgin and Jessop 1965). Originally, builders tendering for work would draw up a list of quantities for their own use and price these in order to create a tender. With larger jobs, it became evident that it would be cheaper if they appointed a single individual to draw up this bill, and then each competing bidder would price it separately for their individual tenders. Certainly, RICS officially endorses the view that the quantity surveyor originated as the measurer, although they stress the 'professional' nature of the modern quantity surveyor rather than dwell upon the technical base of the measurer (see for example RICS 1970). Bowley states that the precise origin of the shift is unknown, but at some time the situation developed further so that this quantity surveyor was appointed directly by the client. At this stage the quantity surveyor "thus became an integral part of the general organisation. He also gradually built up a position as an independent expert consulted in cases of dispute" (Bowley 1966: 349). Nisbet (1952) offers a more disputatious version of this same basic evolution. He argues that architects were not well regarded by the industry due to the wide differences between the
architect's estimate and the final cost, and which entailed a deal of measurement as a check against the architect's errors. Whilst Nisbet (1952) recognises the same creation process of the measurer as Bowley (1966), he draws an economic division between the two, and accords the relationship as one of detestation. "The antipathy towards surveyors was so strong that if a builder were to mention to his employer that he was about to engage a surveyor to measure the work, he would immediately give offence. Some architects would not allow a builder to engage a surveyor and would insist that the measuring must be done by himself or his nominee, often a clerk or pupil in his office" (Nisbet 1952: 523).

Nisbet (1952) suggests that measurers (surveyors) were actively dishonest, since their payment was affected by how successful they were in fighting the economic interests of the builder. Ultimately, the evolution into the use of bills of quantities standardised prices and removed most of the opportunities for claims. Bowley (1966) also points to the gradual differentiation of these 'professional' quantity surveyors from those who carried out exactly the same tasks, but in the role of estimators for building firms. "At what stage the independent quantity surveyor came to regard himself as socially, and professionally, superior to his fellow experts employed by builders is not clear, but this attitude appears to have crystallised before the First World War. Unfortunately, this led to yet another barrier to the mutual exchange of professional knowledge connected with the building process" (Bowley 1966: 350). This latter statement, of course, is Bowley's point of interest: the development of the process and organisation of the building industry, and, more importantly, its unique and antagonistic form.

Since it is not necessary to Bowley's (1966) work, he is unclear on exactly who the architect was, or how he was created. With the establishment of RIBA, he points to the introduction of formal tests of proficiency in 1882 and powers enacted under the supplemental charter to arrange a systematic course of education for those entering the profession. However, architects prior to this are simply described as "well-established architects" (op cit: 341). Thompson (1968: 151) furthers this by drawing attention to the "upwards of 50 years shilly-shallying" within RIBA over whether to examine architects and the extent to which their artistic and aesthetic merit should be so routinely assessed. This he compares with RICS, which considered competence as the primary question for
the association to consider. He implies that the lack of traditional focus for the disparate groups forming association made this decision easier, and recognises that surveyors "had no awkward questions of individual taste" (Thompson 1968: 151) within their functions.

Elliott (1972) also refers only to the existence of architects in the nineteenth century. He links professionalism with RIBA, and to the stifling of their earlier individualistic creativity through routinisation in architectural style. Kaye (1960) also regards the creation of RIBA as the defining moment for a study of architecture as a profession, though his argument was refuted by his critics (Whittick 1961, Collins 1962). Again, he distinguishes between the artist and the professional. Crinson and Lubbock (1994: 38) also see the nineteenth century as "one of successive arguments and debates leading to the eventual triumph of a professionalised vision of the architect that was both narrowly focussed extraordinarily powerful." Saint (1982, 1983) recognises the economic process that created and evolved the profession within the period 1750-1900. He selects these dates since he believes that in these lay "the seeds of architecture's present predicament" (Saint 1982: 3-11). This is a dominant theme in the architectural literature. Architectural professionalism was a paradigm shift in the artistry of the function of architecture, whose result is still renounced in terms of the loss of flair, ingenuity and creativity. At the same time, it was irrelevant to the production of the vast majority of building and relegated to the peripheries of the industry, except where an inferior design process was being undertaken by working men. Prior to 1750 "architects were for the most part talented amateurs or higher building craftsmen. What shaped the profession as it emerged was economic growth, manifested through a steadily increasing demand for specialised buildings" (op cit). Those who formed the private associations described by Bowley (1966) and ultimately RIBA "were, to use modern jargon, specialists in the construction industry. Meanwhile housing of the traditional type went on being built without the overt intervention of architects, just as it is in the private market today" (Saint 1982: 3-11). To Saint (1982, 1983), RIBA was a product of declining demand for this specialist work or encroachment by competitors into the field. This mirrors the establishment a jurisdiction, though Saint sees it as a reaction to external events rather than an active project.

There remains this fundamental division between the issue of the architect as an occupation and as a profession. Architectural historians lay claim to the presence of
architects and the existence of graphic conventions of architectural practice as early as the seventh millennium BC (Kostof 1977). However, even within such works, the rise of a new 'professionalism' in the Renaissance is usually accepted as part of a very different project (Wilkinson 1977, Wilton-Ely 1977). Indeed, Wilton-Ely (1977: 183) refers very clearly to a very distinct concept of the architect "in the modern sense", contrasting sharply with the 'medieval' "gentleman-architect". Most usually, professionals in an English context are linked to the medieval craft and guild systems. The extent to which there is a split between these pre-capitalist modes of occupation and those engaged with the state and clients to create a profession is not well discussed. In addition, there is a second concern, caused by the inconclusive debate over the profession's origin. Which creation myth should the profession believe: the architect as artist-individual or the evolved craftsman? Saint (1982: 3-11) believes that the cause of a great deal of current identity crisis in the profession is the promulgation of "two illusions about itself". These were that "it believed itself responsible for its own success, and therefore powerful and indispensable. And it promulgated the idea that the architect is a specialist in art as applied to buildings - however that is interpreted" (op cit).

Saint (1983: 57) is the most convincing in explaining how architects arose out of a craft tradition, as master craftsmen faced with a demand for "more and bigger buildings, fashioned from varying materials and equipped with a new range of services" took on greater design roles. The earlier amateur architects simply could not cope “and remained few in number and economically insignificant” (op cit). The later progression of the architecture profession, then, is a source of irony for Saint (1983: 57) since “architects emerged almost imperceptibly from the building trades, having at least a family background in the craft skills”. Indeed, the period 1750-1900 simply did not create enough work for the pure designer. Victorian architectural practices “still consisted of tasks today allotted to other professions: arranging leases, assessing rents, measuring property, taking out quantities and so forth ... as fast as they could do so, architects shed less congenial tasks” (Saint 1983: 57-58), but it was a slow process. The architect-developer was finally destroyed by economic competition from the modern master builder, who took over development of speculative projects and even began to offer a design service to more distinguished clients. The early years of RIBA consisted of obtaining its charter and defending its members from this competition, not engaging with
grand theories on the nature of design; establishing and defending the occupation. Still, Saint (1983) draws evidence to show that the profession also began to create the identity of the ‘art-architect’ as a means of constructing a sense of self separate from others. This was enabled by the affluence of the 1850s, which encouraged the creation of architectural practices that might offer artistic solutions for rich clients. Herein, then, also lies the battle for the soul of the architect, between art and profession, and prestigious patrons and mundane clients.

However it comes about, architectural theory presents a professional architecture involving a state of mind, critical examination of problems, sense of control and revolution in architectural vision. This then creates the need for, and provides the answer to, systematic architectural training. Whilst this standardisation and rationalisation engenders a profound sense of loss within the profession towards the romanticised creative genius, the profession also exhibits a pragmatic acceptance that modernisation demanded establishing a central body that would ultimately control qualification and issues of competence. "This change towards greater academicism and towards centralisation of education went hand in hand with the development of architects as specialists in design and in certain other aspects of building production, working under legally binding contracts" (Crinson and Lubbock 1994: 42). Whilst this process is much clearer in RICS (Thompson 1968), it is evident that this also creates the peer community that Kaye (1960) also wishes to associate with the concept of profession. For Saint (1983), however, statutory involvement in the form of the newly introduced building regulations provided the stimulus towards standardisation. Since these set external standards, checked and approved by others, the profession was forced to interact with others and, ultimately, set its practices to conform to these requirements. Architects also began to seek employment in municipal and public offices, and to become involved with setting and approving building standards, and this also created a more technical and less individualistic approach towards building.

Architectural histories tend to ignore the existence of the engineer as designer, and yet Bowley (1966) points to many common functions. Engineers regarded construction as an engineering process. Architects should be relegated to subordinate positions on those few occasions where they might be necessary. There is little apparent acceptance by either of
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the other, a rather peculiar state of affairs. Gutman (1983) argues that the creation of the architectural profession was intended to legally exclude engineers from the building process. Even Bowley seems only able to achieve a satisfactory explanation of their working arrangement once the advances of technological development creates the need for aesthetic and complex buildings, requiring the two professions to work together, since neither provides the complete package of specialisms involved in such work. This creates the position seen today of two separate professions, with very different identities and interpretations of the industry. Within chapter 1, this was explained by comparing the terms building industry and construction industry. The point reinforces the position taken there with respect to the creation of a boundary to the study. In practice the two will co-operate, together with other necessary specialists, but the need for the architect to rely on the engineer reinforces the belief that the architectural profession is 'in decline', since it is no longer able to design and manage the entire project as sole professional. This will be discussed further below.

3.3 Consolidation of the Professions within the Building Industry

Since Bowley's work ends in 1966, it only develops his analysis from 1914 until the end of his research, a theme he refers to as consolidation. Saint (1983) prefers to see the inter-war period as one in which a continued tradition of regret was born amongst architects, that of the death of the 'gentleman architect', the individualist, and the artist. At the same time, there was a growth of the profession into the middle classes and into politics. More people were entering the profession, and the profession itself was politicising both through RIBA and in private political groupings, frequently left-leaning. Architects working in municipal departments worked within a widening social revolution, into planning and new towns, massive public work projects and a generally growing state. These were not the results of individuals, but of teams working in departments. Architects also became thinkers and writers, involved not only in the new political discussions, but also with the publication or more and wider technical and architectural journals.

The Architects Registration Acts (1931, 1938) formalised the move in power away from the individual and its "humane comfortable belief in small offices, intimate client-
relationships, and delegation of the mundaner tasks" (Saint 1983: 68). "Long fought for by the businessmen of the profession, the acts excluded amateurs and 'cowboys' from the title of architect, formalized the RIBA's control over whole areas of architectural administration and strengthened the hand of large firms and partnerships" (Saint 1983: 113). Still, the Act also enshrined those hierarchies of class within the industry that the gentleman architects had previously only been able to maintain through their attitude.

Nisbet (1952: 522) states that the quantity surveyor was also well established by this stage and had advanced his "status from that of an undesirable interloper to a highly skilled member of an independent profession" (see also Higgin and Jessop 1965, Bowley 1966). Nisbet (1952) is more effusive on the development and consolidation of the profession, pointing to the quantity surveyors admission into RICS as pivotal. He declares that "the seal was set however on nearly a century of progress, when in 1882 the Institution accepted quantity surveyors as a profession and amended their bye-laws to include the measurement and estimation of artificers' work. Quantity surveyors could now look forward to the future with confidence in themselves and in their profession" (Nisbet 1952: 528).

The development of the structural engineer as a specialism distinct from the civil engineer is regarded as a major development, and followed the earlier engineering route of allowing members to retain an interest in building firms. This period of consolidation is associated with the development of specialisation within existing professional groups in order to progress the interests of small groups once the initial recognition had been obtained. At the same time, a tendency towards the establishment of a single association for expertise was also taking place, diminishing the variety of professionals. Professional expertise within the building industry, compared with the wider engineer-involved construction industry, remained divorced from commercial and profit-driven activities. RICS absorbed the Quantity Surveyors' Association in 1922, thus ensuring that all professional quantity surveyors were prohibited from being in any way connected with building firms. Not until 1938 was this position altered when the Institute of Quantity Surveyors was formed and allowed members to be principals or employees of building companies. Bowley (1966: 393) points out that RICS "remained, however, the major professional association in this field." Architects maintained an even greater level of
consolidation, RIBA adopting universal codes of education and examination, and reinforced by the Architects Registration Act 1931. This provided statutory protection to the title architect, and mandatory standards of competence prior to acceptance on the new architects’ register.

Two new institutions were formed in 1924 and 1925. Interestingly, Bowley sees these as genuine attempts to improve communication between architects, builders and surveyors rather than simply a device of those excluded by RIBA to obtain status. The Faculty of Architects and Surveyors and the Incorporated Association of Architects and Surveyors accepted as members all fully qualified architects and surveyors, regardless of whether they were members of RICS or RIBA. At the same time, they did preclude those who worked as principals of building firms, but not, in the case of surveyors, those who were employees.

Bowley (1966: 394) sees consolidation in terms of completing the division between building professionals and the building firms. "However desirable the establishment of standards of conduct and qualifications in the building professions might be, the means adopted to secure this object had the unfortunate effect of discouraging the entry of highly qualified architects and surveyors into the building industry itself". Only by 1962 does he find evidence of admission to this problem (RIBA 1962), primarily related to evolution within building firms and procurement processes which threatened the managerial pre-eminence of the architect. The view expressed was (op cit: 421) that "if architects cannot or will not improve their efficiency the time has come to reconsider the whole set-up of relationships in the building process." This theme has been a continuous one, both in terms of criticism of the architect in particular, but also of the industry generally.

Consolidation within surveying focussed upon a move away from tasks regarded as suited to the technician and towards specialising "in all those matters concerning land, property and building which are not normally carried out by the lawyer and the architect" (RICS 1970: 7.3). This included a role as property adviser and the creation of a specialist building surveyor. At this time the quantity surveyor was increasingly regarded as a construction economist, intended to denote a rounded understanding of the building process rather than a simple preparer of bills of quantities (again, see for example RICS
This process continued and continues today, perhaps reaching its zenith with RICS (1995) which proposed chartered surveyors as management consultants.

### 3.4 Decline of the Professions within the Building Industry

The literature examines the decline of the professions through a number of approaches, but generally relies upon a mixture of analyses by professionals or researchers without direct examination of, or reference to, any theoretical foundation or establishment of the concept of what exactly a profession is, or was. A quite common view in modern works that explains some perspectives upon the decline of the professions, is the idealised, even polemical, interpretation upon professions (Parsons 1939, Macdonald 1995). Freidson (1988) offers an excellent review of the theoretical position in recent literature, including concepts of the profession as a new class, of professionals as superior employees, of the transformation of formal knowledge and of the effect that the Marxian nature of many theories bring to this particular topic. This was discussed within chapter 2.

In the building industry, professions are held in low esteem. Joseph Rowntree Foundation (1998), for example, found that the public and inexperienced clients equated building surveyors with cowboy builders. Ferry (1984: 93) argues that the low quality of building work is a result of poor professionals; "quality is simply the end-product of properly qualified people taking care." Such attitudes are endemic in construction, a vicious circle with no apparent serious will to change matters. The general morbidity in the literature, however, is clear; building professionals seem to be low paid, held in little regard, disorganised, and facing powerful enemies. As Ferry (1984: 94) summarises: "Many years ago the architect ... took a ... pride in achieving quality ... But the virtual collapse of the trade system has left him in a fairly impossible situation ... where he is required to state all his requirements in detail and check that they have been carried out by a builder who has little duty to do more than he is told, and who was appointed because he cut his price below that of his competitors."

Whilst Freidson, in particular, has executed a fighting defence and policy proposals for professions (see for example Freidson 2001) within a theoretical framework, albeit a work in progress, more generally arguments have rested upon the particularities of...
individual contexts. Variously, the market, clients or commercial imperatives are recognised as placing strains on what is perceived as a 'Victorian' model of gentleman-professional operatives. This pressures the professional to create profit rather than serve a public good within this new economic paradigm. However, many of these are evidenceless conjecture or opinion, a wailing and a gnashing of teeth about how much better things used to be. Some typical examples include Anstey (1992) and his concerns with "declining standards of ethical behaviour", Ayton's (1992) endemic malaise throughout society, Turner's (1993) 'professional prostitution', Innis (1998) and his view that professional qualifications seem to narrow vision, Wolstenholme (1999) on the "insufferable arrogance" and "slap-dash approach" of architects, Grant's (1999) belief that "the public and media just want to dislike us for trying to earn a living", and Martin's (2005) concerns of 'information overload' and red tape that undermines the ability to act professionally. Equally, the professional trade journals are very willing to weigh in with such views; see for example the issue of Harding's (1999b) regular column concerning architects' tendencies to specify inappropriate materials, to blame others for their mistakes, not accept budget constraints nor understand buildability. These reactions are both cyclical and endemic. At the same time, they must result from the experiences of the professional in current practice. There is undoubtedly continued concern within the profession concerning the future, but this is stoked up by specific events, such as economic recession or government policy. This mirrors the wider business community and literature. For example, Hutton (1996: xxviii) in an economics bestseller that raged against the market now embedded in British social values described "insecurity, low wages and wasted talent are widespread, and the problem touches professions and occupations once thought inviolable". In part, however, this is the fault of the professions since "the avarice of the professions has begun to weigh down the bodies politic and economic" (Hutton 1996: 7). Associations accept, or appear to, this scepticism about professions (see for example Andrews 2003) and respond to them. This is examined in chapter 4, but include offering commercial services and 'value for money' to members, fighting a political and economic rearguard against these attacks, and extending the contradicting commercial and public service interests of their occupational expertise. Intriguingly, alliance with both market and State has also been achieved.
It is perhaps understandable that the professions engaging in self-analysis are unable to see past their current concerns or their own life experiences. Given that they describe a situation that conforms with the late modern theme adopted for the thesis, they inevitably develop a concern for this 'decline' in profession, rather than the search for a theoretical foundation or wider historic context. Hopwood (1985) has referred to similar concerns within the field of management accounting as worrying and regards it as endemic to professional reaction to change. This tendency within the building industry is also linked to the literature described earlier. This describes the industry as slow, expensive, low quality, with a poor image and generally backward (see for example Higgin and Jessop 1965, NEDO 1978, Gann 1989, Baldry 1997, Ball 1988, Roy and Cochrane 1999, Moore 2001 and Woudhuysen and Abley 2004). Since the building industry is a frequent target for criticism, angst is to be expected. Indeed, sometimes the generally poor site conditions, minimal education, low quality of product and similar 'cowboy builder' characteristics, are placed firmly at the door of professions who ought to be able to resolve some of these (see for example Hollis 1998). Since the professions are regarded as either a cause or an effect of this inefficiency, it is expected that they are viewed as in decline or an obstacle. In turn, rebuttals are produced from within the profession (see for example Massey 1990). Others regard the industry as modernising and thereby resolving such criticisms (for example the work of Constructing Excellence and the Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment). Of course, such technical and management reorganisation of the process of building inevitably leads to changes in professional occupations. This continues the spiral of comparison with the past. Slightly more rationally, it also leads to some discussion of change rather than decline. Some argue that professions have shown a remarkable aptitude to evolve, change sides and find new allies (for example Krause 1996).

Architecture is particularly susceptible to negative connotations over this, since the architect was project manager and technically involved in the entire project prior to these moves. However, a new demand for wider architectural services, including post-occupancy studies, more detailed pricing, and maintenance and life cycle costing, has led to technical tasks that the profession is unable to provide, or has led to competition from other professions on the basis that no historic jurisdiction exists (Gutman 1983). Similarly, criticism of the technical abilities of architects has led other building
professionals to compete for these tasks, particularly managing the project. The quantity
surveying profession has certainly gained from this competition. In addition, architecture
has traditionally been in conflict with the engineering professions concerning the
structural mechanics of building (Bowley 1966), a conflict that has become harder for the
one profession to end decisively as buildings become ever more complex (Higgin and
Jessop 1965). Gutman (1983) also suggests that architects have been attacked by visual
artists on their aesthetic and design functions. Less is made of the specialisation of the
architectural profession to offer these additional services, or the gains for some
occupations through expansion into the traditional jurisdictional spheres of other
professional groups.

The economic structure of the building industry makes it very prone to recession. This
creates periods of greater immediacy for the peer group when viewing their profession;
for example, when they lose their job. Each recession is always worse than the last since
it is closer and its affects are felt now. That said, the abolition of fee scales that removed
the guarantee on fee income per element of work has magnified the economic
consequences (Ball 1988). It leads to massive fee competition during recessions and to
professional firms acting like cost-cutting non-professional economic actors. This has
fuelled those who propose the change over decline analysis. For example, Middlehurst
and Kennie (1997: 54) identify "general environmental changes ... over the past decade"
as the oversupply of professional services, increased role of PLC and international
business structures, the rise of the intelligent client and the introduction of 'consultancy'
over technical services. These are the result of recession over the period, but also the
more general "transformational influences which are reshaping the nature of the working
environment" especially "the growing impact of information technology" (op cit: 55).
The result is a change in professional life from 1985 to 1995. These include job
insecurity and increased rotation in jobs and employers, multi-skilling and greater
personal control over a career. Change needs to be embraced, rather than feared as a
decline.

This approach is allied to a defensive refutation of the 'market as king'. "Markets don't
necessarily encourage us to prepare for the future, long term security and prosperity.
They don't necessarily uphold professional standards and ethics, and they don't educate
or train us. I believe in the necessity for professional institutions, and for people who deliver a professional service to belong to a body which offers support and the collective knowledge of equals. Some see professional affiliations as an unholy alliance seeking to control markets, rather than a power for good helping to assure quality. Governments used to protect the public from the unqualified, now they seek to protect them from the qualified. Trust in experts has diminished" Mole (1998a).

That this is a new phenomenon is unlikely. Toren (1975) and Rothman (1984) trace similar issues in earlier decades. Associations are well versed in changing environments as is evidenced by reports discussed later; Crompton (1990) draws attention to the fact that contradictions within the concept of profession were noted even during their emergence. The future promises more of the same. Foxell (2003) proposes a series of alternative scenarios: regulatory, economic, technological, social, and managerial.

Toren (1975: 328) places the source of deprofessionalization within "the knowledge base and the service ideal", from which are derived the more visible effects in terms of "monopoly, autonomy, authority, exclusive jurisdiction, and high status". For Toren (1975: 329) technological innovation and specialisation attack the knowledge base, since as it becomes more "rational, precise, and specific, professional performance is susceptible to standardization and routinization." This certainly reflects the arguments within the quantity surveying literature (see for example Male 1990). Toren (1975) also draws upon the idea of a client revolution, through which they are becoming less reliant upon the professional and more independent and able to make rational determinations of their own needs. Within the building industry, this seems less applicable. Clients here have long been fellow professionals, rather than naïve consumers of an esoteric service.

Rothman (1984) perceives a further decade of such evolution, including encroachment from allied professions, and is uncertain where this might lead the professions. He sees a permanent need for the expert exercise of skill and judgement, but suspects that professions themselves will be rendered obsolete as the guilds were. Yet these cries never seem to occur. Crompton (1990) argues that certain professions will benefit from this shifting context, and that market-based and contract-led relationships require greater input within certain fields of expertise. Krause (1996) believes that professions are expert at finding these opportunities.
Saint (1982, 1983) examines how the decline of the architectural profession is based within its false consciousness. First, the profession refutes that its origins were economic and technical in nature, the result of particular social contexts. This has led it to believe in its own absolute power and control, leaving it poorly suited to face economic and social changes. Gans (1983) concurs suggesting that the political mission of architecture, to restructure society through design, has failed and that architecture is left rather bereft of its motivating core. The radical belief within the profession that revolutionary change can be brought forward through design failed in the 1960s, and the architectural profession has never recovered. Saint (1982, 1983) concludes that such high ideals and a mistaken mission resulted in the profession presenting an arrogant presumption of its own dominance that causes resentment within other professions, clients and builders. Too often the architect assumes the position of leader, rather than collaborator, co-ordinator or team member.

Secondly, architects regard themselves as artists rather than designers and managers of a building project, which seems an impractical and irrelevant claim within the majority of commercial work undertaken within the industry. Saint (1982: 3-12) believes that such an approach is only feasible during certain moments in history (such as that of the Arts and Crafts Movement) and within a "a smaller profession, in which imagination and artistic ability are more evenly balanced with technical and managerial knowledge, and in which collaboration with other specialists takes on a more realistic, less high-handed meaning."

Gutman (1983: 208) argues that whilst architectural professionals "model themselves on physicians and lawyers, the two most prestigious and influential professions", their relative power and status suffers from the fundamental problem that they do not possess a monopoly over the market for design services despite the protection of their title. This is a sore point. Professions within the building industry refute any suggestion that state or client support enabled them to form or protect them now. Changes to building procurement, design and construction practices has meant "that they share authority and responsibility with clients and users, probably represents the progressive model that most disciplines and professions will be forced to imitate in coming decades" (Gutman 1983: 220). Larson (1992) refers to this as heteronomy because she believes that it contrasts so sharply with the autonomy that she normally associates with professional work.
Quantity surveying has, perhaps, proven more ‘successful’ in reacting to this ‘decline’. The submissive, provisional and prejudiced characterisation of the late modern professional body of knowledge seems accepted. Similarly, the monitoring of professionals and control of their operations, institutional reflexivity, is accepted as a necessary evil. This will be developed later, but Matzdorf et al (2000: 93), in their examination of organisational learning in chartered surveying firms, place the institution over the individual: "in order to meet the demand for improved quality, the RICS increasingly exerts greater levels of control over the activities of its members, thereby reducing wide variations in the quality of services provided." Watkins et al (1992) point to the assertion by managers of new rights to control the work of professionals, coupled with new technology and wider social and political demands on the removal of traditional working practices, seen as restrictive. This already seems to have been undertaken by the surveying professional associations in alliance with managers and clients.

Male (1990) examined the emerging nature of the quantity surveying profession. His argument was predicated on the premise that quantity surveying was created when architects divested themselves of their measurer role, that its occupational development was thus separate from the wider surveying profession. He also asserts that knowledge is an important power base for professions. Since quantity surveying is vocationally a generalist occupation, based upon standardised and proceduralised methods of operation, then it does not fall into the definition of a profession. Male (1990) draws upon the functionalist approach of Carr-Saunders and Wilson (1933), but also incorporates Johnson (1972). However, the method approach of the paper is that of Montagna (1968), who argues that as professional practice is codified and formalised into rules and written procedures, professional knowledge passes from the intellectual to the mechanical technique. For Male (1990) the quantity surveying profession has been constantly evolving new business services for clients, as traditional services become standardised and computerised. This has resulted in less need for professional judgement and more for technical competence, with a resulting fall in income for easily reproduced technological functions; hence the search for new services, the caterwauls about ‘decline’, but also the pragmatic solutions to obtaining new business. This is, in turn, reflected by
organisational change, particularly adoption of LLP status and the creation of large, multi-disciplinary practices (Schaps and Goodman 2008).

3.5 Wider Considerations of Decline

Given the prominence of the issue of decline in the building industry, it is worth revisiting chapter 2 and placing these within a wider literature.

The construction of meaning to the concept of profession takes place within the context of how and where the individual professional is carrying out his work. The apparent decline in professions as a meaningful general concept, or of falling standards within individual professions, can be regarded as part of a wider context in which workers battle within their organisations for reward, improved conditions and better status and use professionalisation as one weapon in their armoury (Fournier 1999, Hodgson 2002, 2005). Scott (1982) widens this to the entire organisation, which will utilise the concept of profession to protect itself from external attacks. Indeed, Watson (2002a) sees the concepts of profession and professionalism being used purely to serve sectional interests, and suggests that institutional and individual perceptions on the nature of professions and their institutions are very different (Watson 2002b). Similarly, Sutherland and Dawson (2002: 51), in a study of doctors at work, examined the changes in behaviour of those studied where the "fundamental features of professionalism - autonomy, self-regulation, trustworthiness, assured competency - may contribute negatively - as well as positively, to quality of care and the respect given to the profession."

Care needs to be taken when accepting manifestos of decline. This is especially so when studying within a late modern paradigm where experts are presumed docile and submissive, and their expertise replicable and dominated by corporate concerns. The reality is that professions have continually worried (Hopwood 1985). This is a normal state, and not new. There has been a continual stream of description of decline including "deprofessionalization" (Toren 1975, Rothman 1984), "transition" (Curran 1986), "changing role" (Brint 1994), "reborn" (Freidson 1994), "revolution" (Perkin 1996), "death" (Krause 1996), and "the end" (Broadbent et al 1997a). New professions are still created and more individuals still join; rather at odds with the idea of a decline (Fournier
2000). Whilst terminology might have shifted towards so-called knowledge workers (see for example Blackler et al 1993, Alvesson 2000, May et al 2002), experts (see for example Reed 1996) and intellectual workers (see for example Connell et al 2005) in a new knowledge-based economy (see for example Ackroyd 1996), the issue is still about occupational control. However, there does seem to have been a shift towards a defensive strategy aimed solely at preservation (Muzio and Ackroyd 2005).

Professions are also seen as resilient. Professionals as a whole are "survivors", although different professional groups survive each "tournament" of "deep seated hostility" (Burrell 2002: 37). Abbott (1991) considers three modes of embodying expertise: in professions, in organisations; and in commodities (expert systems). Whilst expertise is shifting towards organisations, again a theme of late modern institutional reflexivity, he concludes that professions will "survive" the onslaught of organisations, albeit in modified form. This is because the professions "are highly effective inventors of expertise and manufacturers of experts. Production and reproduction are their speciality" (Abbott 1991: 28). Reed (1996) places the debates over decline within professions firmly in the context of Giddens' concept of late modernity, the period used as a boundary to this work. For Reed (1996) the issue concerns the expertise that professionals place in the hands of organisations, providing them with the cognitive and technical means to restructure social relationships. Equally, he considers power that the expert is granted as collaborator in this process. There is little doubt that experts "enjoyed increased material advantage and enhanced socio-cultural status to the extent that the control systems which their expertise made possible increased their functional indispensibility for the realization of longer-term corporate rationalization and capital accumulation within a much more volatile and unstable business environment" (Reed 1996: 577). Other expert groups outside of this alliance found their existence far more precarious. Professionals, Reed's (1996) liberal/independent occupational form, have found their basic power strategy of monopolising and abstracting knowledge under severe pressure from these political, economic and technological changes. However, whilst Reed's description of organisational professions appears to describe the technical basis of the building professions, his explanation lays emphasis upon business owners to determine long-term strategic occupational directions. Within the fragmented and backward building industry, this is very problematic.
Generally professional services are increasingly commodified, rationalised and deregulated. This has resulted in the undermining of their political and cultural authority as their wider contribution to social integrity and moral order has become redundant. Reed (1996: 592) finds it ironic that experts and professionals, having "made such a vital contribution to the underlying instability and uncertainty", suffer the same consequences of capitalist restructuring as "the rest of us".

3.6 Conclusions

This chapter concludes the analysis of both the general literature, and that directly concerning the building industry.

Within the context of the points summarised in chapter 2, the following useful framework is derived from the literature:

1. Profession consists of a far weaker community of equals than might be expected. Architects are still uncertain whether they are artists or engineers, whilst surveyors are a polyglot collection of leftovers. Any gestalt is spread over an array of associations. Occupational organisation is confused and expertise is subject to continuous criticism, centring around the idea that the industry is 'backwards'.

2. The establishment of expertise or domination of some jurisdiction appears weak, and probably missing. Standardising methods and procedures is problematic within architecture, but well developed within other professions. This points to a greater reliance upon corporate patronage rather than state mediation. Whilst this might reflect Reed's (1996) concept of organisational professions (see also Muzio et al 1998b), there is little evidence for business owners able to centrally organise either, and engage in the strategic decisions he envisages. Indeed, there is no analysis of why standardisation occurs, who drives it or why.

3. Giddens' (1991) late modern analysis is persuasive since professions seem unable to establish dominance of their expertise, but, rather, are subject to shifts in technology and the whims of their clients. This problem extends into the issue of improving corporate status. Some regard the professions as historically of low status, but many fear for the survival of the professions.
4. However, some do view professions as survivors. Change is a welcome process and some occupational groups will gain from it. There are also many associations. Whilst this points to cause and success, it equally suggests the lack of any successful determining authority.

5. Grand theory on the professions abounds, especially in the context of architects, but there is little detail on how the professions are actually created. Those such as Saint (1982, 1983) and Kaye (1960) are also deemed unacceptable. Similarly, Male (1990) argues that quantity surveyors were always generalists, poised on the next occupational collapse. Is profession simply smoke and mirrors, a lie parasitically clinging to other industry ideal types?

Having examined the concept of profession, and the nuances of the building industry, the thesis will now examine the professional association as a starting point for its empirical work. Chapter 4 will examine the literature and archival evidence on associations, in order to begin the empirical confrontation of the theory so far discussed.
Chapter 4: Professional Associations

4.0 Introduction

Chapters 2 and 3 examined the literature surrounding the sociology of the professions, both generally and in the context of the English building industry. The purpose of this chapter is to place the professional association within that literature. In order to examine self-identity within profession, it is proposed to examine both the experiences of individual professionals and professional associations. There seems to be an emphasis in the literature on the need to co-operate into communal action. This places association as a central tenet, and the thesis follows Burrage (2006) in placing this at the centre of study. Even those who prefer a less formal sense of community (Goode 1957), ideology (Vollmer and Mills 1966) or gestalt (Bosk 1979) accept that this ultimately involves a professional association. Yet work on the association itself is scarce, and what there is of variable quality. Both Carr-Saunders and Wilson (1933) and Burrage (2006), for example, discuss the historical development of associations. However, Burrage (2006: v) provides a far more analytical “study on the grand scale” whilst Carr-Saunders and Wilson (1933) present a functionalist catalogue of administrative developments within associations.

Therefore this chapter will take two studies that explain associations including those in the building industry. Chapters 5-8 will then analyse associations in greater empirical detail through Burrage’s (2006) framework. The rationale for this separation will become clear. Both Millerson (1964) and Watkins et al (1996) have problems in their approaches. However, what they do is complete the pre-evidence, the secondary analyses that propose a submissive profession within a domineering external environment.

Millerson (1964) offers the first and most coherent analysis of the professional association. He advances Carr-Saunders and Wilson’s (1933) straightforward description of associations and offers a categorisation. He defines four broad types of professional institute: the prestige association; the study association; the qualifying association; and the occupational association. In addition, he recognises the trade association, which is not professional. However, there is no reason given for this. All the professional institutions under study here
are, in his work, defined as qualifying associations, in that they hold their own examinations. This also renders his classification less useful. However, it also raises a subsidiary issue, in that most building industry professions have phased out their own direct examinations and devolved at least part of their qualification procedures to universities unlike other professions (see for example Roberts and Williamson 2005). This might be seen as a limitation to their classification as qualifying association, although it was done because university qualification was seen as of higher status and more systematic (see for example Chartered Surveyor 1969, RICS 1978). At the same time, cost was also an issue. Whether this was, in fact, an improvement remains a contentious issue (Griffith 1998, Construction Manager 2005c, Fleming 2005, QS Week 2007), even to the extent of whether universities really want to operate such courses (Howell 1999, Hampton 2000). Chapter 5 examines these arguments.

Watkins et al (1996) examine the future of the professional association in a hostile environment. It is tacitly accepted that a late modern environment of submissive associations predominates. Their interest is in the response of the professional associations. Again, there is no a priori examination of what they are investigating. Rather there is an acceptance that associations exist and attention is focussed on the context of their environment, one that dominates associations and forces them into ‘market’-orientated change. They use the term “modern” to describe these associations, in order to contrast them with relic associations unable to accommodate these ‘necessary’ changes. These presumptions mirror Giddens (1991) views on power in modernity. However, as was discussed earlier, the submissiveness of professions cannot be simply taken as a given. The concept of profession is used, and has been used, in a number of subversive contexts. Because Watkins et al (1996) rely upon what associations state in response to their questionnaires, methodological issues discussed earlier are also raised here. Burrage (2006) lays emphasis upon what associations do, and not what they say. Additionally, if late modern is so pervasive, professional associations do not so much ‘do’ as ‘accommodate’ these external factors. For these reasons, Watkins et al’s (1996) work will be examined first, since they claim to offer an analysis upon what professional associations are, and what they will, perhaps must, become.
4.1 The Future Professional Association

Watkins et al (1996) propose that professional associations must concentrate in providing their members commercial services and 'value for money'. Decline is evident through attacks by political, economic and social opponents, and associations can only bend to this new situation. Their intention is to discover the response of the professional associations to this through an analysis of five characteristics:

Running a professional association
Education and training of professionals
Continuing professional development
Maintaining standards and quality
Strategic direction

4.1.1 Running a Professional Association

Professional associations are focused upon "six key trends" (Watkins et al 1996: 15). These are strategic planning, a 'professionally' run and managed organisation, diversification of income generation, provision of focussed services, 'professional' marketing, and decentralised regional offices and revival of branch networks.

4.1.1.1 Strategic Planning

It is difficult to distinguish strategic planning from 'professional’ management (section 4.4.1.2) since the latter is often presumed to produce and enact the former (Mintzberg and Waters 1985) and well run organisations are expected to have plans (Hopwood 1984). Quite how planning differs from direction (section 4.1.5) is a further problem.

Certainly strategic plans and formalised strategic planning are endemic within building industry professional associations. In 1992 RICS began what has become a continuous stream of formal strategies when it launched what CSM (1992b: 5) described as a "dynamic strategy for a three-year campaign". It was aimed at "promotion of the profession" in four key areas: homes, commercial property, public interest issues and careers and to disseminate
"the benefits to be derived from engaging chartered surveyors who are highly trained, skilled and informed in their specialists fields and required to act with probity (with a back-stop of RICS consumer protection requirements)."

Similarly, ASI produced a series of working plans and reported formally on their results. For example, ASI (1997b: 7) reported:

- June to September 1994: IT study
- June 1995 to June 1996: Various working groups create formal strategy and cost centres
- June 1996: Partnering Agreement with CIOB signed
- July 1997: Internal reorganisation agreed, including move of premises

ASI offers a particular example of professional institution and corporate management, since it closed down during the course of this work, merging with the CIOB. It is quite obvious that plans do not guarantee success. However, formalised planning and reporting is taken to be 'modern' and associations must be seen to be doing it. A recent trend is quite definitely the extent to which associations make very clear to members what they have been doing (see for example CIOB 1998, RICS 2002, 2003a, RICS Business 2003).

There are, however, examples of where such management does reflect active engagement with the wider environment, although to what extent it might be seen as ameliorating damage rather than evading it is rather difficult to ascertain. For example, the introduction of compulsory professional indemnity insurance (PII) against quite strong peer opposition can be seen as a clever pre-emptive strategy to prevent statutory involvement, or it might be a passive admission to client demands and costly damage awards given in Court. Traditionally, it was generally accepted by professional associations that it was a commercial decision by each member. However, institutions now force their members to take out PI insurance. That said, each did enact the requirement very differently. Pragmatic ABE voted to enforce such insurance at a Council meeting on 5th February 2000. However, RIBA resisted such moves, arguing that it would be a cost burden for small practices, and initially only made it compulsory for firms wishing to appear in the RIBA directory of practices. However, ARB determined that "an architect should not undertake professional work without adequate and
appropriate professional indemnity insurance cover" (Building 1997d) and forced RIBA into compliance. Again, the detail in this objection is interesting, and argues against a passivity that Watkins et al (1996) would lead to expect. RIBA argues that PII was not inherently objectionable to RIBA. Rather, it required a sense of proportion and not “a heavy-handed approach”. “We strengthened our code last year to say that all architects should have appropriate professional indemnity insurance. Our disagreement comes over quantum … what's appropriate at the bottom end of the range for a small practice, the semi-retired, the returner to work. We have disagreement … over what we see as a heavy handed disciplinary approach that unless people fill in forms and so on and send them back to the ARB they’re being charged with professional misconduct. Now breaking the rules or not observing rules on procedure is not normally considered in any other profession as professional misconduct … The principle of PII, no we all share, people should be appropriately covered.” Certainly, Eade (1997) found that maintaining run-off cover on retirement proves very expensive to pensioners, and is often avoided by resignation from the association.

The issue of whether associations actively engage in this environment will be central to discussions in chapters 5-8. The point here is that ‘modern’ associations ‘plan’. However, whether they strategically plan or simply produce plans is not addressed. The implication is that ‘modern’ involves a legitimacy function (Hopwood 1984). Chambers (2004: 24) argues that the "RICS is one of the most influential professional bodies in the UK, making hundreds of submissions every year to national governments and European institutions at all levels, as well as organising innumerable meetings with ministers and officials. Exerting influence means, above all, being 'in the loop". This obviously requires strategic planning and it 'proves' relevance. Whether it actively achieves ‘the professional’ is another issue. Chambers (2004: 26) thinks that it does, and that it proves an association aware of its Charter. "RICS must primarily have regard to what it believes to be in the wider public interest, even where this conflicts with the interest of its own members. This is the epitome of professionalism … government looks to RICS to act as an 'honest broker'".

Strategic action also deals with enhancing status. Banbury (1997) describes the poor public perception of the term 'builder' as one reason for the attempted name change by the CIOB into the Chartered Institute of Construction, which is a clear strategic attempt by the
association to deal with the issue. The fact that it failed does not detract from this example of strategic planning. Strategic planning allows associations to prove themselves 'modern'. Heathfield (2001a) argues there "will always be an external perception of them as fundamentally conservative, protecting a tradition, dealing with an established curriculum, and not necessarily relevant to their particular sector in a modern society". Of course, he does not "believe that this criticism is appropriate to our Institute!" CIOB strategic planning seeks to engage with this negative viewpoint.

This has certainly borne out some results as will be discussed in more detail later. However, the idea of passive associations seems inconsistent with strategic planning. Even in issues of status, there have been successes. For example, Building Engineer (1997a) reports a trading standards officer after a successful prosecution of someone who claimed falsely to be a member of CIOB and ASI that "Members of the public rightly believe that by employing a person who is a member of a professional body ... they are ensuring extra protection for themselves." In addition, it is also an example of the 'professional' management of the associations, reminding their membership of this useful function that they are performing, and well.

### 4.1.1.2 ‘Professional’ Management

Carr-Saunders and Wilson (1933) refer to the historic process through which governance and management rules are created, often by a very small number of individuals meeting in a social environment such as a public house or private club. Gotch (1934) places the RIBA's inaugural council meeting in the Thatched House Tavern. Watkins et al (1996) view these as unacceptable in 'modern' associations, and regard 'professional management' as a prerequisite for 'future' associations operating as modern businesses. Institutions now operate in what Watkins et al (1996) perceive as bureaucratic structures with clear statements on duties. Efficiency requires clear constitutions, rather than informal agreements based upon precedence. Associations are employers of officers and other staff, and are required to operate the normal legal responsibilities of any organisation. These staff are also frequently not professionals, or at least not from their own discipline, and run the gamut of occupations...
from cleaner to chief executive. This creates a demand for institutional procedures for dealing with mundane staffing requirements.

Within the institutions, the issue of whether senior management ought to be relevant professionals is often mooted. At this time, most institutions seem to opt for 'business managers' as their chief executives and senior personnel rather than professionals from within the membership. In the case of RICS, for example, the current Chief Executive is ex-military and the Director of Education is a chemist by profession. In one case, a RIBA presidential election included a non-architect candidate, their ex-director-general (Alexander 2001). Respondents interviewed for this work also reflect the ‘business’ side of the executive (see Appendix C).

Watkins et al (1996) place particular emphasis upon the tendency of professional associations to use the language of business to appear well managed to their members. This is reflected in associations’ annual reports (see for example CIOB 2001b, 2003, 2004, 2008). They seek to gain legitimacy from their membership by promises of value for money from subscription income, raising capital from other business activities (such as conferences and publications), developing corporate strategies for future growth and similar activities. Professions utilise 'modern' business techniques. For example, RICS changed its logo and launched what Building (2001a) termed "a £40 000 brand image ... in an attempt to emphasise its international identity". Property Week (2001a) referred to a £100,000 cost to commission and introduce the logo, the change of the full title Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors to its acronym RICS "which it is hoped will help enhance its appeal to members in 120 countries".

CIOB (1997d: 4) explains this ‘professionalism’ as "greater emphasis on services which both support members and promote members". Cook (2001: 26) describes of a new chief executive, that "gone are the days when the organisation felt like the country cousin of a gentleman's club. Instead there is an air of professionalism that you don't often expect when visiting the offices of a professional institute." Examples include £500,000 profit for the year and the banning of alcohol on the premises. Similarly, ABE (2004) examines the progress made by the institution in regards of its facilities, including refurbishment, disability access
- even installation of double glazing. All this is seen as part of the 'professional' approach of ABE in dealing with its members and the wider community: "ABE has a headquarters building to be proud of" (op cit: 42).

Professional management also engages with the community in creating these 'modern' associations. Recent examples include RICS' Carsberg review (Carsberg 2005a, 2005b, Gould 2008, RICS 2008) and the CIOB Blue Book consultations (Construction Manager 2005b). It then reports on progress, primarily through annual reports. What is not discussed here is exactly how management engages with the membership. Formal consultations and reports do not necessarily equate to representative engagement.

One example, also discussed later, which throws into doubt the co-operation between management and membership, remains the issue of admission. Many of these 'professional' management actions involve strategising for increasing membership, at odds with the implicit assumption that entry is fiercely controlled to retain status and quality. ABE’s Annual Plan 1996 stated that one aim was to increase membership, specifically by 500 new members and 200 students; the Annual Plan 1997-98 stated a further 500 members and 350 student members. The 1998 Report and Summary Accounts praised this expansion as a main cause for reducing the projected deficit, whilst the 2000 Report and Summary Accounts pledged to continue the growth. Reddin (2001a) reports that the "Association's core business objectives should be to:

- increase the membership
- evolve a business culture
- expand its role as an umbrella organisation for the built environment."

This issue of expansion continues the theme of ‘professional’ management. More members brings in more income and a greater collective voice. Similarly, RICS is engaged upon a corporate merger/ take-over programme. Both ISVA (1999) and IBC (2000) were amalgamated with the RICS and effectively disappeared. Proposals have been mooted with ABE, in terms of what Building Engineer (2000a: 12) termed "talks about talks". Fiscal issues remain central to ‘modern’ management.
4.1.1.3 Diversification of Income Generation

Organisations survive primarily through generating profit. Associations also make profits to prove the 'modern' and 'professional' nature of their managers.

Estates Gazette (1996a) reports the RICS making post-tax profits of £1.23 million in 1994 and £205,000 in 1995. However, a projected deficit in 2004 of £2.4 million caused widespread dissatisfaction and implemented the Brooke review, discussed later (Mackenzie 2004d). CIOB (2003: 2) reported that "this year we achieved a surplus of £600,000, which will be re-invested into the Institute." It also stated that subscriptions had risen by less than 14% in five years, whilst total subscription income had risen by 60% through expansion; "our aim is to improve access to membership without reducing standards" (op cit: 6). A trading surplus obviously supports continued economic survival and underpins membership subscription (see for example CIOB 2003, ABE 2005). RIBA in their 1999-2003 development plan specifically required RIBA companies to increase profit by at least 4 per cent per annum (RIBA 1999a). ABE (2005: 35) argues that its very duty as a professional association requires that it take decisions where "a long-term view must be taken, the greatest and pre-eminent is the creation of economic stability", stating that "it is a measure of the Association's fiscal stability and strength that we have no debt. This has allowed us to plan for the future from a sound foundation."

4.1.1.4 Marketing

'Modern' associations engage in selling their members. CSM (1998b) reports that in the Members' Survey the most popular service was "promoting the core skills and expertise of the profession". CIOB (2005e) boasts of its raised profile in the national media; it quoted a 100% increase from 2002 to 2003 and a 37% increase from 2003 to 2004. However, associations have also moved beyond simple leaflets. "The marketing team work in many ways to promote RICS members as the most professional source of property advice" (Jones 2003: 28). They market to government (CSM 2001a), although later chapters will describe this as creating jurisdiction rather than marketing. ABE, for example, used the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 to launch an explanatory brochure, advising building owners of exactly which professionals (theirs, of course) could best advise them on the implications
of the legislation. Associations also operate ‘professional’ centres for marketing. Towell (2005) trumpets the work of the RICS Contact Centre, dealing with 600-700 calls per day, and providing contact details of "more than 2,500 members' details to the public each month". Jones (2003: 28) suggests that one referral by RICS to a member would repay the membership fee, and boasts that "a huge amount of work goes on 'behind the scenes' to make the work of RICS more relevant and of more benefit to members".

4.1.1.5 Provision of Services

Modern associations now offer their members commercial services to ‘add value’ to their membership. These are usually related to daily practice (signboards and indemnity insurance) and negotiated deals for services that might benefit them in practice (health insurance or cheaper advertising rates in the Yellow Pages).

4.1.2 Education and Training of Professionals

Watkins et al (1996) view the education of professionals as occurring as a series of trends, describing them in terms of flexibility and novelty (for example NVQs). These trends are: closer links with higher education and employers and accreditation of higher education courses; syllabus changes to meet new demands for transferable and generic skills; vocational and competence qualifications; and, opening the profession to wider entrants through accreditation of prior learning.

This simply presents a series of functions for the ‘modern’ association, bland and without context. Chapter 5 will offer far more rigorous analysis. The dynamic engagement between parties is simply not addressed. So, for example, in architectural education the public criticism by ARB of universities for failing the profession is not even considered (see for example Building Design 2001d, Building Design 2002g, Gates 2002b). The strategic position of universities in this ‘modern’ environment is similarly ignored (KPMG Management Consulting 1991, Griffith 1998), as is the disquiet of the peer community about quality – and of the associations themselves about the integrity of their own controls on these third parties (see for example Danaher 2001, Welsh 2001). Indeed, whether associations should continue to promote training at all is discussed by those pressing for inter-disciplinary...
education (see for example Economic Development Committee for Building 1985, CIC 1993, Gann and Salter 1998).

This view of ‘modern’ associations misreads actual dynamics by concentrating upon visible effects and not causes.

4.1.3 Continuing Professional Development

Watkins et al (1996) describe associations promoting the benefits of CPD, developing a structured strategy, linking career development and personal planning to CPD, and introducing compulsory CPD. For them, this is a key issue and has seen a big shift in both personal and organisational attitudes. What is less clear is why this should be so, but, again, it is viewed as correlating to the shift in attitudes towards professions associated with the late modern. Professionals are no longer trusted, and so are expected to prove their expertise, continuously, through CPD. As with education, this seems to be about the polemic of ‘modern’, rather than the evidence. Chapter 5 will examine how associations use CPD, both as an association and as individual workers, to create a sense of identity and control. CPD is rather more than a series of traits.

4.1.4 Maintaining Standards and Quality

‘Modern’ associations are seen as revising their codes of practice, revising their focus on maintaining a high standard of competence and integrity, effective complaints handling and disciplinary procedures, and proactive quality initiatives. This is in response to a sceptical environment. Again, this is unconvincing. As Burrage (2006) recognises, the issue of maintaining and improving corporate status is fundamental to all associations, and not simply the result of a recent shift in attitude.

4.1.4.1 Codes of Practice

There is no explanation by Watkins et al (1996) on the place of codes of practice within their construction of the concept of profession. It is rather assumed that associations have ethical codes, reflecting again their functionalist approach to describing what they find. Their
implicit presumption is illustrated by de Kretser’s example of a lecture he gave when
president of the RICS’ Quantity Surveying Branch. He expressed disquiet at the unethical
approach of the final year students he was talking to. Telling any manner of untruths was
regarded as acceptable to obtain a contract or increase a profit, views that he believed (de
Kretser 1994: 54) "have been gained partly from the society in which we all operate". He
stressed that "RICS promotes the ethical standards of its members as a market strength and
will punish cases where members fall short of the ethical standards laid down in the code of
conduct. We must be certain that rhetoric continues to be matched by reality" (de Kretser
1994: 54).

One issue with these ‘modern’ actions is to what extent they are endorsed by the peer
collective. ASI (1995a: 14) discussed the practical issues of changing itself. How democratic
should the process be? "Implementation of structural and procedural changes often requires
byelaw changes. In one sense these checks are good. They stop the administration and
management of the Institute being hi-jacked. However, in a fast changing competitive
environment we need to have some in-built flexibility that will allow changes to be
introduced and tried before changes to the byelaws are made. Such a system will need its
own checks." Jackson (2001: 22) compared the needs of "a more commercial approach to
the way in which we run our business. The Institute cannot be run as a genteel private
members club" and the consequent "thorough overhaul of our Articles of Association, Bye
Laws and Membership Regulations." This suggests that association executives feel the need
to act in the interests of the members, but without direct recourse to them; decoupling.

To Watkins et al (1996), professional codes are an exemplar of the modernisation of
associations. Previous, ‘Victorian’, codes are being rationalised in the name of modern
needs. However, the issue of self-regulation and standardisation seem more complicated than
simple ‘modern’ window-dressing. External regulation is also an issue. Interviewees for this
thesis stress “light touch” regulation (ARB1, RIBAI, RICSI, RICS2). This has also been
institutionalised now within RICS regulations (RICS 2008). The issue of who implements
these changes is also not as simple as Watkins et al want to make it. Certainly, there is some
membership disquiet about these changes, and there is some decoupling of a democratic
approval to the revisions. However, who determines what happens, and who carries the
authority is a muddle within this explanation. Watkins et al (1996) propose that the issue lends credence to the late modern idea, because, yet again, the idea of the changing needs of 'society' from professions is placed as central to changes within associations. They do not control their own future, but must respond to their new, subservient place. However, associations' well proven ability to adapt and survive seems far more likely an interpretation. This will be developed in chapters 5-8.

4.1.4.2 Maintaining a High Standard of Competence and Integrity

Again, what Watkins et al (1996) describe as an emergent feature, is something that Burrage (2006) refers to as a constant. And, also again, this seems to derive from the submissive nature of associations within the late modern paradigm. The issue here is that associations seek greater membership, since it brings in income and endorses the need for them to exist. At the same time this raises questions concerning the quality of the expanded membership, and the effect it has upon existing members and the market for their services. There are a range of implicit, and contradictory, factors at work here. Clients require their advisers to be members of professional associations, creating demand for more professionals, whilst, at the same time, no-one actually trusts professionals anymore. Professional associations produce more members, which tends to bring down the standards for new entrants.

4.1.4.3 Effective Complaints Handling and Disciplinary Procedures

Primary issues facing the professions are the need to be accountable to both members and public. Their systems have to operate within English law, that demands 'innocent until proven guilty' and a right to defend oneself within a rational procedure system. Equally, institutions are wary of the right of members who feel aggrieved at decisions to progress a case in Common Law against the institution in question, a process both expensive and harmful to said body. Balancing the need to be seen to be policing its self-regulation must be balanced with fairness and cost effectiveness.

There is evidence concerning the issue of 'modern' complaints and disciplinary issues. However, associations seem to be far more active than Watkins et al (1996) suggest. RICS is very particular that the development of the Carsberg review pre-empts a perceived
statutory sword of Damocles hanging over the professions on this issue (RICS 2008). Whilst the move away from peer judgement towards lay member representation upon disciplinary panels is seen as a central cause for concern and discussion, the evidence does not support this. The issue of self-regulation is discussed in chapter 7.

4.1.5 Strategic Direction for Professional Associations

New strategic directions for associations involve collaboration with other professional bodies, increasing diversity and specialisation, recognising the needs of the wider stakeholders to the association, and internationalising from their UK base.

This separation by Watkins et al (1996) of efficient management with corporate survival is odd, but many issues related to this are derived directly from section 4.1.1 concerning the 'professional' administration of associations. The survival of the professional institute decoupled from the future of the profession is a useful idea here. Institutes are increasingly recognising themselves as brands in their own right (see for example Pritchard 2003).

Whilst competence of the membership and ethical conduct are accepted as important parts of the role of the professional institute, it is also seen as necessary to raise its own profile to the general public, clients and (potential) members. To Watkins et al (1996) associations are at risk without strategic direction. There is certainly evidence to support the idea that members were unhappy at what their executives were doing. CRI (1996: 3) reported that RICS was out of touch "with the needs of its members and the modern business environment." This feeling has continued to concern the Institution and led it to a number of analyses concerning its future, resulting in reporting that the "organisation's professional standing has never been so high" (Andrews 2003: 12). This was rather optimistic given the need for the Brooke review (Barnard 2004a, 2004c, 2004d, 2004e, RICS 2004)), but confirms the intent of RICS. There is an inconsistency here in Watkins et al's (1996) study. If their environment is so powerful, what is the need for management action, except for managing the transition of professionals to every whim of the market?
Whilst there are some examples of collaboration, for example CIAT and RIBA, mergers have proven the more popular strategic direction in the building industry. RICS, of course, was created and has evolved through a series of mergers (Carr-Saunders and Wilson 1933, Thompson 1968). More recently the IQS was incorporated in 1983, when RICS decided to abolish their prohibition on members working for commercial firms (contractors). What is different, however, is the number and speed of recent agreements. Both ISVA and IBC recently agreed to merge with RICS. RICS Business (2004b) reports that the RICS is considering mergers with the Institute of Chartered Foresters (800 members) and the Institution of Civil Engineering Surveyors (2,700 members), but both associations rejected proposals. ICES voted not to pursue talks, although RICS did offer full membership to individual ICES members. ICF members voted in favour of a merger with 64% in support, but required 75% approval under their constitution. RICS has reached agreement on mutual recognition with the Australian Institute of Quantity Surveyors (RICS Business 2003a).

Strategic direction generally seems to be enacted through growth strategies, not entirely with the consent of existing members (discussed above). CIOB has consistently sought to generate extra membership, described as CIOB (1996b: 4) "must move with the times" (see also CIOB 1996a: 4-5, CIOB 1997b). For example, their Meeting The Challenge development was "doubling membership to 60,000 and increasing its profile within the industry and with society" (CIOB 1996b: 4). Despite the failure in name-change CIOB (1996b: 5) promised to "keep the momentum going" (see also CIOB 1996a: 4-5, CIOB 1997b). Equally, RIBA's development plan 1999-2003 targeted a rise in chartered members from 23,000 to 25,000, overseas membership from 5,000 to 8,000 and student membership from 4800 to 5000. Growth has also led to competition for new members, both in new and existing occupations. However, this is not seen as interesting; rather the strategic response is to merge or form alliances.

Collaboration seems more often to be a casualty to growth than this study expects. Associations compete strongly both for occupational control and for individual members as is discussed later.
There is plenty of evidence to concur with Watkins et al (1996) that strategic direction is important. However, yet again, there is no explanation of what is happening here. This contradiction between reacting to a dominant environment and creating a strategic direction, does not seem to go beyond the visible features of what associations are doing. The more fundamental question is why?

4.1.6 Conclusions

In their conclusions Watkins et al (1996: 99) state that it is a "body of knowledge and skill which underpins the profession" and that the function of the association is to ensure that this is created and continually developed, and applied ethically and competently for the public good. This is never clearly established as the basis for the development of the key tasks within their report, however. There is no explanation on the selection criteria for the institutions, although CIOB, RIBA and RICS are included in the sample, as is ISVA (now merged with RICS).

Their work suggests a creeping managerialism within associations, where wealth creation, public relations and the supply of services to its membership are of central concern. From the literature discussed within chapter 2, loose coupling of the executive functions of the association from the ideology of peer community also seems to fit. Watkins et al (1996) offer interesting evidence, but without a clear context. There is little or no explanation of what they find. This seems to confirm that they regard associations as randomly buffeted within the late modern environment, reactive to it but unable to enact control over the newly emerging occupations of the knowledge-based economy. Forced to abandon traditional modes of operation, professions seek to emulate trade associations. The report establishes the concept of the ‘modern’ association, or what Friedman and Mason (2004a) refer to as the professionalisation of the professional association. These associations are different than previously, having changed in response to their new environments. This includes issues of governance (Friedman et al 2002, Friedman and Phillips 2003) and wider ‘member relations’ issues (Friedman and Williams 2006).
The purpose of presenting and discussing the work in this chapter is precisely because it is eminently plausible and validates the late modern dating boundary to this thesis. The evidence when viewed as a description concurs fully with the presumptions. Professional associations are 'modern' and well managed. They are responding to the future as described. However, it does not provide explanation. One such that at least offers to systemise associations is that of Millerson (1964).

4.2 The System of Professional Organisation

Millerson's (1964) classification offers a more systematic analysis of what he describes as the system of professional organisation. Because of the incoherent mass of associations found within the building industry, any claim to describe a system is interesting. However, the theory simply does not fit the evidence, and only two types are found. However, it is incorporated here in order to introduce a third, the trade association. Later chapters will draw upon interviews with these, and some theoretical overview is important.

Millerson offers the following descriptions that might be applied to associations within the industry.

4.2.1 The Study Association

"These societies consist of individuals willing to further knowledge of a subject in a narrow field of inquiry" (Millerson 1964: 35). This certainly has a number of examples within the building industry, including the British Council for Offices (BCO) and the Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment (CABE), both extensively referred to by respondents. For this work, individuals referred to 'communities of interest', and these seem to serve as a focus for technical issues. However, Millerson (1964: 37) draws attention to the "possible abuse by some members" of this form, by their adoption of membership "to create prestige, or an air of intellectual status" by, for example, the adoption of designatory letters. Architect's refusal to join APM, is a good example of the feeling that qualification is better done elsewhere, and needs to be more rigorous. Certainly, CABE is a lot more formal than those communities described. Indeed, it is a political entity, supported by government.
Formality is seen as a variable here. What are looked for are freedom of entry and a focus on networking and free exchange of ideas. BCO and CABE inspire this creation of expertise within a wider, more political framework, and are respected because of this. At the same time, they cannot replace the simpler informal groups who self-select and meet to discuss very specialised technical subjects.

4.2.2 The Qualifying Association

"While the first two types were designed to improve knowledge of a subject, the Qualifying Association aims to examine and qualify individuals, wishing to practice in the subject. This additional object vastly expands the role of an association, giving it a key position in the system of professional organization" (Millerson 1964: 37-38). Within the building industry, professional institutes can all be described as qualifying associations. It is in their areas of professional jurisdiction where a distinction appears useful. Millerson (1964: 39) himself accepts that there has been a process for "those in other occupations to seek professional status, by adopting similar methods. Proliferation has developed overlapping, confusion for the public, feeble imitation and some consolidation." However, this does not assist a methodological approach to Millerson's claimed system of professional organisations. This might explain Watkins et al's (1996) omission to even reference Millerson within their own, more recent work. Whilst he does recognise the struggle over architectural qualification between RIBA and what is now ARB, he views this through the Society of Architects (Millerson 1964: 66-67), rather than as an issue over definition of qualification as an architect (see for example Lipsett 2004). This all makes his purported system rather unhelpful. Where it does provide a useful mechanism for discussing an interesting theme is in his explanation of the place of the trade association. Their quantity makes them a part of the professionalism puzzle within the building industry, and one that interviews and other data were collected to provide insight into.

4.2.3 Trade Associations

Later chapters will discuss empirical observations upon the nature of trade associations. There is very limited literature available otherwise, mostly concerning their effects as
pressure groups in democratic processes (Grant 1985, 1989, 1993, 1995). Trade associations are deliberately and overtly economic organisations, designed to represent a particular industry "at all levels of the legislative process" and "to meet the challenges from increasing world-wide competition" (DTI 1996: 1). Millerson (1964: 41) is blunt: "a trade association is not a professional association. However, trade associations' activities involve professionals."

They deserve consideration for their attempts to professionalise in its broadest sense by promoting best practice (DTI 1996). There is a visible trend within these groups to adopt a more formal code of commercial good practice that mirrors in one sense the principles of the professions, although is quite open about the business rationale for doing so. Many exhibit very similar traits, tasks and/or characteristics to professionals discussed earlier, but do so quite openly in order to market themselves and utilise a product differentiation over their competitors. Offering codes of ethics, standards of work, education and detailed expertise is simply regarded as sound commercial sense in the modern global business world (DTI 1996).

There is some evidence of the unreliability of these codes, but not necessarily either more in number or seriousness than the professional institutes. For example, Channel 4 Dispatches programme's annihilation of the NHBC guarantee (Holmes 1997) was no worse than similar criticisms by BBC Watchdog and Raising the Roof, and the Consumer Association of chartered surveyors' house surveys (see for example Which? 1997). There is inconclusive empirical evidence concerning practical enforcement by such associations (see for example Building 1999d). Howell (2002) is indicative of general commentators in being unimpressed. He refers to timber treatment guidelines issued by the government, stating that "this document is universally ignored by timber treatment firms, including those which belong to the trade association (BWPDA) and which claim their salesmen are qualified in the diagnosis and treatment of timber problems." He also notes that "the HSE, which licenses the chemicals for use, is strangely reluctant to investigate." At the same time, trade bodies claim to be striving to maintain and improve their standards (see for example Building 1997c concerning tighter membership criteria for the National Federation of Builders).
Ultimately, Millerson disappoints. There is something very important about the similarities in occupational authority of both professional and trade associations, which is not recognised. In practice, it is. For example, ASI (1999f) reports a successful case brought under the Trades Description Act 1968. An individual was fined £700 with £220 costs for claiming to be a member of the Glass and Glazing Federation. Membership was deemed to be of inherent value since there was no suggestion of inferior quality service. It is also interesting to compare this with a reported case of a surveyor who falsely claimed to be both MCIOB and MASI, and was fined less, at £600 with £245 costs (CIOB 1997d).

4.3 Conclusions

Watkins et al’s (1996) study looks at what associations do, relying upon a questionnaire. It does not understand why they do it. Building industry professional associations are ‘modern’ because they say they are, and they ‘do’ ‘modern’ things. But what does this actually mean?

Watkins et al (1996) provide no theory to explain this evidence, rather here is a functional list of service categories. Indeed, they offer no discussion whatsoever of their understanding of the term ‘professional association’, providing a single reference (Freidson 1988) as their acknowledgement to the literature, and so leave the reader to infer his own conceptualisation. Watkins et al (1996)’s paradigm concerns late modernity and this again provides a persuasive and plausible explanation of the submissive and servile associations that they find, and that are often described within the building industry. To this can be added the generally low esteem and apparent weakness of occupational groups within the building industry. Yet can this explain what they are doing? The problem seems to centre around the fact that associations are “splitting into businesses … with consequent loss of power” rather than working “to influence progress towards a fair and egalitarian society” (Watkins et al 1996: 100). Who said that this was ever their role?

Whilst Millerson's system is theoretically explicit, his own interpretation of it is frequently conjectural and unclear. To this can be added Etzioni’s (1969) approach towards a semi-profession. Whilst there is clearly a status issue between institutions, as identified by Millerson, this is not an identity that any association is prepared to accept for itself.
Millerson himself did accept the problem of classifying institutions through proliferation but his system had not resolved a solution to this. Millerson (1964: 278) anguishes over whether the Institute of Builders can be regarded as a qualifying association in 1834 or 1884, or any period in-between. Such arguments are not relevant here, where the CIOB clearly is a qualifying association. That said, it is difficult to understand Watkins et al’s decision to simply disregard it.

The evidence uncovers a wide commercialisation of professional associations as corporate entities as part of a process of facing the 'future'. Whilst this is seen as peculiarly modernist, Gotch (1934), for example, also refers to similar processes throughout the first century of RIBA, citing them simply as the natural result of a growing institute.

This chapter examines the nature of a professional association, utilising two key studies. Both tend to describe associations as a series of functions. However, there are a number of problems that are simply not answered here. Millerson (1964) seems to presume that professional associations will not survive, and yet they have spread and diversified. In part, Watkins et al (1996) point to the hardiness of the association, but there is little here to study what the peer community has made of it all. This means that there is no explanation for the large number of organisations that exist within the building industry. Whether this actually forms part of any meaning to the concept of profession must form part of any investigation.

Therefore, whilst it is possible to describe professional associations operating within a new paradigm, of future evolution and as practical, business-like entities through a series of functional traits, this needs to be put into a wider discussion. This includes what associations do, what they say, and what their peer membership reciprocally do and say. Additionally, simply representing a context as ‘late modern’ needs to be re-addressed. Finally, as was examined in chapter 3, the building industry suffers from low prestige, a market-orientated approach based upon the principle of lowest capital cost and a question over the value of their associations. However, this does not preclude the collective acting, thinking and generally ‘doing’ in a peer-constructed manner.
Therefore, the following four chapters will examine the professional association and its peer community within those four “actions that are common to all professions and therefore seem essential to their collective life” (Burrage 2006: 22). These points will be examined through the original empirical evidence of this work, and further illustrated and analysed through models discussed within chapter 2. In particular, the central question is whether it can be said that professionals do engage in direct collective action, or rather in a loosely coupled alliance with their regulatory body. Unlike Burrage (2006), this work is examining the concept of profession, its ideology and discourse, and thus what associations, the collective and individual professionals say as well as do, is of importance. This is because of the need to examine whether there has been some managerialist or non-legitimised withdrawal from a concept of profession within the working lives of the current collective, the period referred to here as late modern. From this chapter the principle of the ‘modern’ association can be taken forward, but how this fits into a peer collective engaged in occupational control remains to be uncovered.
Chapter 5: The Control of Admission and Training

5.0 Introduction

‘Controlling’ admission is a very contentious issue as shown within chapters 3 and 4. ‘Modern’ associations seek to balance a number of conflicting concerns. For example, they widen participation, so as not to exclude any particular sector of the community, whilst also claiming to maintain ‘quality’ standards. Therefore, the aims of these controls, in addition to their existence and strength, are of equal interest relative to the hypothesis. Widening membership both raises status, since ‘bigger’ associations are deemed to be more politically important, and brings in greater income, stabilising fee levels for existing members. At the same time, accepting more members risks diluting standards and weakening entry controls, and creating more competing professionals within the market to the existing peer community. This suggests that a decoupling of the association as an organisation from the peer community might result from these contrasts. Public media are then used as possible legitimacy devices to assuage concerns of the membership.

In addition, controlling training forms a primary part of the admission process, but also a separate one. Within the building industry, most associations have devolved the educational and training functions to universities. There is little obvious discussion of ‘how’ to train; universities seem to be accepted as the experts in this field (RICS 1978 for example). This is also a requirement by the Privy Council, who demand chartered associations operate degree-only entry processes (Privy Council 2008). Whether associations were forced into this or whether they determined that it provided a higher quality of admission is difficult to ascertain. It does seem that most regard it as of higher status (discussed in chapter 8). That said, some interviewees did lament the loss of the professional examination as a direct controlling mechanism by the association. These were older members, but unsurprisingly since younger members would have had no experience of the prior system. Again, this points to a loose coupling between the trainers (universities) and those evaluating competence (the associations), both from the expectations of the actual members (peers) and what they seek in their employees. There is also a wider literature on the issue of widening participation.
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programs and the provision of quality new professionals (see for example Muzio and Ackroyd 2005, 2008 concerning lawyers). In interview, the quality of potential new recruits was the focus of some rather perfunctory criticism, but there seemed little overall disenchantment in the quality of colleagues; though many respondents could offer individual cases (QS1, QS8, QS12, CDP1 for example). However, despite the involvement of universities in training, associations do control the final evaluation of competence in the form of a professional assessment once a period of professional practice has been successfully completed.

In principle, the ‘quality’ of this control process distinguishes ‘professional’ associations from others, such as trade associations. As discussed in chapter 1, the very number of associations within the building industry is an issue, so demarcation is potentially critical. Therefore, entry standards are very important. However, chapter 4 illustrated the problems that ‘modern’ professional associations face in enforcing controls. In addition, trade associations might be said to be professionalising, too. TAF1 discussed that far from being simple membership clubs, trade associations often require member companies to engage in a qualification process. There is also an evaluation and monitoring standard, with various penalties including exclusion. “The sources for the demand can be many”, but government regulating areas of health and safety and “consumer demand” are most likely. “The association, through operating a code in a grievance and an insurance policy, can offer the consumer some guarantee on the quality of work done.”

Therefore, there is the issue of membership of a professional association as a qualification in itself. Controlling entry sets the status of this qualification and enforcing this standard maintains the integrity of it.

There is also the question as to whether professions are even able to control admission. The ‘late modern’ paradigm suggests a servility that precludes the authority to create barriers to entry. This environment tends to consider ‘widening participation’ as a better signpost for associations than that of elitism or quality standards. Certainly, this seems to be the feeling of some participants who are concerned at falling standards within entry criteria (for example
QS1, QS12, RICS3). QS6 stated that the meaning of profession generally and RICS specifically are both 'not what they were':

“What that is worth these days in the market place is another matter. I think there's a feeling in the profession that the qualification has been somewhat diluted over the last 20-odd years with more and more members coming in through indirect routes, amalgamations, this, that and the other. It's not as select as it used to be.”

This is confirmed by a wider dissatisfaction with the quality of degrees (see for example QS Week 2007). However, the issue of quality is often unclear. For example, QS Week (2007) refers more to the relevance of what is being taught in university, rather than some 'purer' measure of quality. Taylor (2005: 13) extends this to post-degree pre-qualification training, when reporting that “while the value of the APC is not in dispute, the gap between what is taught and what is required by employers must be closed”. Therefore, it is difficult to distinguish exactly what is being complained about. What is clear is that there is little peer-controlled training evident here in the form of the pupillage system described by Barrister1. Where in-firm training does take place, it exists more as systemised training, rather than personal tuition. This, again, conforms to Giddens (1991) and his ideas on expert systems of transferable knowledge and institutional reflexivity, involving the routinisation of knowledge. At the same time, formalised training ensures that the association controls both the individual and the employer in how they approach the issue of training.

However, there is no clear agreement on the relative value of these systems. Across universities providing degrees, there is widespread disagreement about the absolute and relative worth of different awards (see 5.10.5 for example). But there is also a lack of clarity over the equivalence of different qualifications. To take RICS as an example, there is nothing in their educational material (discussed later) to suggest an interest in NVQs. Indeed, 'quality' seems to be their paramount concern. For example RICS (1999c: 10) is representative when it states that RICS “must raise its educational standards”. This is very noticeable compared with CIOB, who do discuss and promote widening participation (see for example CIOB 1989, CIOB 2006a, Fish 2008). Yet RICS created the RICS NVQ Centre. Thus, they conform to Burrage's (2006) analysis of 'what they did', and they established NVQs. And yet was this a deliberate policy of control? Or was it the reaction of a submissive
association pressured into this action by a government demanding an end to ‘elitism’? Certainly RICS (undated) is hardly exuberant as a leaflet selling the services of the Centre, nor is RICS as keen as CIOB to defend the quality of NVQs. There is also the issue whether creating a NVQ Centre is part of the entrenchment of a jurisdiction through establishing control of the RICS body of knowledge in further and higher education. This is discussed in chapter 6, where wider issues of occupational control can be viewed together.

The response of associations can also be viewed from a number of competing perspectives. Establishing working parties to examine ‘need’ might be providing informed research in order to direct action. Alternatively, they might be serving managerialist and/ or legitimacy functions, to be seen to be acting according to circumstances. They might be reporting either to refute concerns over loose coupling, or as decoupled systems that occasionally refer to the organisational hub. There is also the question, especially in the late modern context, of whether associations are pro-actively engaged or simply reacting to what their environment requires of them. A sample of RICS reports is reviewed in section 5.10, both to examine what the association said and did concerning these issues, but also to test the ‘why’ for producing these reports. The issue of establishing educational standards is, of course, not simply one of controlling entry, but might also be linked to raising status. Higher standards of entry correlate with the perception of increased status. Certainly, as will be discussed below, arguments concerning education in all its guises have been a central aspect of the creation of the identity of profession. Proposals concerning raising standards, such as to degree-only entry, contrast with visions back to a ‘golden age’ and recent dilution of entry controls and the admission of ‘masses’ of ill-qualified prospective peers. RICS (1999c) directly correlates educational excellence and entry standards with status and, in interview, CIOB discussed the formalisation of entry control as part of creating the CIOB into a ‘modern’ association, rather than its previously rather old-fashioned ‘club’ approach.

“Originally it was like a club. Then it came together and in the last eight years with a new Chief Executive ... It’s very much at the forefront of the industry. Professionalism was brought by setting standards of entry, rites of passages. Minimum standards have to be passed and then people are interviewed, vetted for professional purposes.”

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For CIOB, there is now a genuine desire within CIOB and amongst members to develop this exclusivity of community. This is achieved through its education policies in the first place, established to provide a well explained gateway to entry.

"An educational framework was produced after much consultation which decides the standard. The Royal Charter says it will have a minimum equivalence of an honours degree. That really sets down the ethos of the organisation."

This evolution was the result of a new chief executive, bringing CIOB into the late modern period. Note the specific comment that a peer member of the community was no longer acceptable as a chief executive, but there was a need for a 'professional' manager.

"A new Chief Executive brought into the twentieth century and then forward. They'd had problems with getting a Chief Executive for some time and they had a member who was temporarily acting as Chief Executive and it was a bit like a club."

Note how this reflects chapter 4 (for example Watkins et al 1996, Friedman and Mason 2006). The shift in emphasis was not in intention, but of “rigour” and confidence. CIOB has not changed its specific functions, but the manner in which it carries them out. Note again, CIOB is now specifically not a “members’ club”, despite the fact, of course, that it is an association of peers.

"It was very similar to what it’s doing now but not with the rigour. 1994 it had its first educational framework but the running of the whole thing was still like a member’s club. In 2003 I brought in the new education framework which really tightened everything up."

This issue of whether CIOB is, indeed, a “members’ club” was repeated. Again, note the distinction being made. The other interesting point from an entry quality issue is the defence of NVQ level 5, a very different attitude to RICS and discussed earlier.

"It is a membership association. Clubs are ‘come in for a drink old chap, we’ll have a natter’. Nowadays it is a professional body at the forefront of the industry in setting standards, in helping to develop standards, like with national vocational qualifications. They have been a very strong driver there. We’re the only professional body that actually would take NVQ 5 and allow somebody to just do the final interview to become fully corporate. In other words it recognised NVQ 5 for what it is, which is a very high level qualification.”
5.1 Controlling Admission

Both RICS and CIOT place controlling entry standards as central to their positions as professional associations, although in different ways.

Chapter 4 illustrated the formalisation of admission targets and the strategic engagement with ‘enlargement’ as a corporate policy. This, therefore, is immediately interesting as a possible area for investigating ‘loose coupling’ between corporate interests and the (traditional) interpretation of the concept of profession within the peer community. Certainly, participants expressed some disquiet about the apparent falling standards in RICS’ control policies (QS1, QS6, QS12). It also draws attention to the issue of the need for ‘modern’ associations to be seen to be acting, which links with issues of managerialism and legitimacy discussed within chapter 2. The extent to which strategic reports reflect actual action is always going to be problematic. Reports might simply reflect what has already happened or legitimise such actions after the fact. Equally, they might validate the executive to members; officers are busy and productive, proven by the number of ‘things’ they are doing. Burrage (2006) also relies upon what professions did, understandably, as discussed within chapter 2. However, this thesis is concerned with identity, and Hopwood’s (1984) concerns on legitimacy are cautionary. Therefore, it is also useful to examine what professions state and do, and also what they whisper and think; direct interview with professionals and association executives will allow some exploration of this. For Burrage’s (2006) historical analysis, the establishment of controls is one that can be examined in the round. Since this thesis is only interested in the last 50 years, entry controls are a given. The perceptions concerning these are less concrete, and both the actual and interpreted modifications to these entry systems is pertinent.

Within interviews, there was a general level of disinterest in the concept of the professional qualification, since this was seen as a historic part of self. The qualification was an important statement of starting competence, but, over the course of a career, successful projects weighed more heavily in clients’ minds (for example Architect4, BSI, CDP1, CDP4, QS5, QS7, QS10, QS13). An international dimension added credence to the qualification and greater weight across global markets where client-professional relationships were perhaps
less familiar and knowledge of previous work more difficult to obtain (BS6, QS3, RICS1). There were those, such as Architect10, who had little interest in their professional body and what it was up to.

“I’m not interested in the politics and bureaucracy. Maybe that says something about the nature of those institutions, the fact that I don’t really pay a lot of attention.”

This is reinforced by his experiences of clients, who have little interest in RIBA and ARB. However, this is because of a belief in the worth of his qualification. Whilst they might not be directly examining RIBA and ARB qualifications, they do implicitly assume that they mean ‘something’. It also “depends on the nature of the client”. He does “private work on the side with domestic clients”. Whilst “nobody has ever asked me for any evidence of my qualifications”, he presumes that they implicitly “just accept that I’m an architect” and all that implies. At work, his employer “send CVs to clients as part of our original bid”, but “I’ve no idea how much those are scrutinised”. Thus, there is an implicit trust that the associations ensure that the qualification has some value, and that this is replicated by the rest of the peer community, specifically firms. This demands that entry is strictly controlled since this ‘value’ is proportional to the entry control standard.

“My impression is that they just accept that by appointing a firm of architects with a reputation then the people employed will have a certain level of skill or ability to provide the service.”

ARB1 reinforced that point. He viewed the qualification as something only to be questioned when things went wrong. Until then, customers accepted that it ensured some level of competence, and had meaning.

For interviewees, whilst some participants were interested in the control of the entry of ‘others’ into the institution, it was not a central part of their identity to carrying out their occupation. It might affect one’s ability to employ new graduates (such as with QS6) or affect belief in oneself as part of a high status profession (QS1, QS12), but this was actively decoupled from a sense of self. Certain younger professionals, obviously, viewed this differently since qualification had just occurred and they had not the practical evidence to prove their competency (QS5, QS7). Architect4 also recognised that this had once been
pertinent, too. Again, this places the emphasis upon controlling entry in order to enhance the value of the professional association as a qualification in itself. Some did recognise wider problems with educational qualifications throughout the industry, and that professional associations might be a part of this. The very control of education as part of their defence of jurisdictions did not encourage efficient working practices. Architect12 believed that profession is about competence, the ability to provide a particular service, and the manner in which this is done in the client’s interests. There are no arbitrary boundaries to operating “a level of excellence about the way that you handle yourself and interface with your clients and the supply chain.” He recognises the worth of a professional qualification, but it is less about traditional boundaries and more about the value of education and the need to validate this.

“One of the problems with our industry is that it is under-qualified. We need much more education, more of things that follow on from education, like research. Those things through which you acquire knowledge and competence of how to handle and find knowledge. So it’s useful for any organisation to have as much intelligence and smartness as you can. Now some of those suffixes after your name don’t necessarily mean that. But, nonetheless, they’ve demonstrated that you’ve passed through a certain level of educational attainment. I think degrees are more important than professional qualifications.”

This final comment contradicts much of the literature where the argument has usually revolved around a fall in standards when universities become involved, and seems to split respondents in this work. It is also worth quoting BS4 here, who was honest enough to question the reality behind the claims towards the ‘quality’ of the profession, especially in the ‘good old days’, and reinforces the view of Architect12 on the general levels of qualification in the industry. BS4 describes his origins within the occupation, pointing out that he entered the profession since it was relatively easy, interesting and paid well. His own explanation describes a very complacent association and a profession with minimal entry standards, and not one that is described by others.

“I never thought about it as being a profession when I qualified as a chartered surveyor. When I got my economics degree, there were lots and lots of jobs around. I walked into a job with a firm of chartered accountants…and I found that for me to get through to be a fully qualified accountant, I had to do three sets of exams. Whereas to be a chartered surveyor, I only had to do one and that was the direct final - which I could pass in six months. So I thought I can get a professional qualification, not quite as good as accountancy, but okay. I
can get that within six months. Not only that, I can get a job where I can get out and about a lot, and not just sitting in an office. And it did take me about six months. The papers provided were lovely and easy. It was quite a simple thing to get into the RICS...but it was never really an incentive to be a professional. The incentive was to have a qualification...which I could sell to places. And, therefore, I could command a certain salary, and that salary would be likely to increase. Also the job itself was one where you could develop expertise in certain areas and be involved with things that came out of the ground and you could see, rather than just numbers. So for all those reasons I became a chartered surveyor. But not really because it was professional.”

This also questions the power that professional associations can wield. They must compete for the likes of BS4, but also between themselves within the same occupations. QS7 and QS10 were both good examples of professionals who shopped around for who they might join, and the majority of respondents admitted to multiple memberships. This represents a dynamic of the prospective member as a customer rather than a supplicant to a controlled entry process. Again, this points to a shifting dynamic, of power leaking away from associations. This includes, to QS7, that firms will look for a team to have pertinent qualifications, rather than each member of that team individually.

“I guess it’s looking for a qualification that will help develop my career further I would like to think this firm can view their employees holistically and say we don’t need them all to be chartered. They need you to have a certain number of qualifications, education but after that point say they’re doing the job, they know what they are doing.”

The issue of controlling admission of new members can thus be divided into a number of themes: why control; how well is it controlled; what is controlled; how is this done? These will then be analysed within the sense-making of the respondents. Similar questions can then be repeated for training, i.e. of qualified, existing members.

5.2 Why ‘control’ admission?

Controlling admission is central to the identity of professions, according to participants. ABE1 explained that profession is about expertise, and that professions essentially validate this. This expertise involves standards, standardisation and competence. Professionals

“should carry out their work to an agreed standard at all times. There is an expectation that professionals do work in a certain way which gives confidence to their clients ... Because
people are trained and educated and they maintain that level of currency through ongoing professional development I think it’s fed back from their clients that says these are professional people.”

This latter point implies that clients seek out professionals not because of the occupational process, “how they carry out their work”, but because it offers a validation. Professional qualifications add legitimacy but this requires them to control their admissions process. QS7 made exactly the same point, that he was examining qualifications to retrospectively legitimise his experience. However, his selection criteria was based upon the ‘value’ of the association, and this reflects the admissions procedure. ABE1 confirmed this; ABE offers confidence to clients and users of the particular occupational service. Thus, for ABE1, control of admission and training is essential in order to authenticate the value of what clients believe they are getting when they employ a member of an association.

“Professional bodies are there to give confidence, to give support to people using the services but also for those affected by the services. If one person is building an extension then they’re not only to control that, but also be protecting the adjoining owner.”

Controlling admission reflects this need for ethical conduct, albeit within very practical contexts. Because of the nature of the occupation, entry controls authenticate those able to deal with these wider interests, and inculcates this. Still, ABE1 states that associations “recognise individual’s capabilities” rather than create them. This places an onus on the qualifying role rather than the educating one. This evaluation structure is being used by the State to ensure conformity in new areas of technical expertise (examples are discussed within chapter 6 on establishing jurisdiction). This creates new roles for associations, perhaps even new professions and new associations. However, it also confirms that professional associations are a valuable means of raising and maintaining standards through their control of the entry process.

Interviewees are very clear that the professional association provides a qualification. For this reason it needs to be controlled, or protected. For example, Architect2 stated that professional associations will always play a role in the “education function”, as they are “accepted” and “reliable” qualification evaluators. His understanding of the concept of profession was predicated upon this validated competence and the qualification that provides
clients with their first “benchmark” to what is a professional standard. Where his uncertainty exists is in the specialisation of occupations, and whether traditional qualifying associations can keep pace, but more of that later. Architect 1 agreed pointing to the central place of client expectations within this. Clients demanded professional qualifications, and Architect 1 had to comply, despite her own disinterest. “I was only paying to put RIBA after my name for clients to understand that I was a qualified architect.”

Within architecture, there was additional discussion of the ARB and RIBA qualification. Generally, most respondents thought that clients did not understand the distinction, and were thereby forced to have both. Only in Architect 1’s case had this been a real issue because of economic constraints. Architect 4 is representative when he stated that he needs the title of architect “and the general public wouldn’t recognise ARB, but they recognise RIBA. I’m a member of RIBA as a token” so that he can “put the initials after” his name “because that’s what people think is a qualified architect.” He also adds a time dimension to the professional qualification, again alluded to by others. Architect 4 admits that neither probably have any effect on his career now, “clients now don’t select because of the initials RIBA or ARB”, and clients generally do not concern themselves over professional accreditation. They review previous work and this replaces qualification as a validation. “They select because they know the people and the quality of their work.” This was repeated by both Architect 3 and Architect 6, who were neither qualified, but had successful ‘architectural’ practices. However, “starting off as an architect”, Architect 4 believes the formal qualification matters because “people expect to see some security in having those initials”. There is also some validity to this, “more security now than perhaps there has been in the past, because people are obliged now to continually develop their skills”. QS 6 recognises business reasons for membership, that clients expect it. There is an external meaning to the concept of profession, and that a professional qualification proves competence. Hence, it requires control and its value as a qualification is correlated to the perceptions of that control.

Controlling admission ensures the creation of a recognised qualification, confirming an evaluated competence. However, this evaluation only works for a short duration of professional life, until one has proven experience directly to clients, and it runs into
difficulties with newer areas of expertise. Architect2 discussed his expert witness work in this regard.

"You can't do expert witness work without having a high degree of demonstrated professional competence. One way of demonstrating that is to be a member of your professional body."

Control takes identity as evaluation of competence. Thus the answer to ‘why’ is in the way others perceive the qualification, as much as its own community does. FMB1 discussed FMB’s own ‘professionalisation’ process (discussed in section 5.4) and how this had been recognised by the external world, especially government. FMB is now accepted as a peer community and expert group within its field and no longer has to defend itself as such. This obviously supports the use of controlling admission as embedding a jurisdiction, and getting it recognised by clients, the State and other groups.

“We have won the fight for representation such that on the vast majority of industry groupings where we would wish to serve, we are able to do so.”

Despite this move amongst trade associations, controlling admission creates one basic area of difference between trade associations and what will be called ‘communities of interest’, and professional associations. Both trade associations and communities of interest are, generally, open to anyone with an interest, expertise and occupation within a particular field. However, the process of judging this varies considerably. BWF1 offered a cogent explanation of who joins a trade association:

“The kind of company that is prepared to join a trade association has given some thought, however cursory, to what it does, how it does it and what it needs to continue to do it. Companies who join trade associations tend to have a commitment towards best practice. That may not be the reason why they join…but once they’re in, they are sent information and guidance pushing them in those directions. People who aren’t that bothered about quality, people who don’t take pride and care in what they do tend not to be prepared to put their hands in their pockets and pay…the subscription fees the trade associations want from them. So you’re more likely to get a better standard of service from a BWF member.”

Hence, controlling admission is the first part of establishing a qualification, but the quality of this control is also important. Trade associations also tend to engage with their members, and do not perceive admission as the final part of an evaluative process; rather it is the first step of a continuing process. Still, whilst FMB and BWF might control quality, they do so
in a very different way to RIBA or RICS. This introduces issues of both the quality of control, and exactly what is being evaluated.

5.3 Control and Quality

The answer to ‘why’ control admission concerns the quality of the qualification. It also reflects issue of status, discussed in chapter 8. Architect7 offers one concrete example. She described the quality of entry control as central to the identity of a professional group. For her, membership of the Association of Project Management (APM) was occupationally more useful than RIBA. Despite this, she was openly critical of the comparative value of APM membership. This is because it is too easy to join and she can prove her competence better through RIBA and the ‘architect’ title.

“I didn’t put member of the Association of Project Managers on my business card. I’d only do that if I didn’t have something better.”

The important issue, then, is the direct relevance to her job as seen through the eyes of others. Her evaluation by peers and clients of the qualification is critical. RIBA has been retained because it is a better qualification. It was harder to obtain, rather than simply write a cheque to APM, and thus worth more at validating her skills. She explains this with examples, ending with a very clear example of peer etiquette.

“It has been the best passport for wherever I wanted to get to. That’s partly because in property and construction there’s a slight mysticism about architects. Whenever we go to meetings with architects, when they see my business card and they notice that I’m an architect then that’s extremely useful. We quite often are turning up when the architects have been commissioned by somebody else and done some work. They regard the onslaught of my firm turning up as something of an irritation, lest we bring another architect or criticise their scheme. Invariably once they see that an architect is around as well from the other side, I find that the civilities are offered that might not otherwise be offered. There is this professional camaraderie which overrides the normal competition and suspicion amongst individuals. That’s very useful.”

Architect4 offered a similar analysis on the difference between architects and architectural technicians. He had originally intended to train as the latter, but “the salary” and status differential persuaded him to shift. Mostly interviewees ignored the issue of technicians; they are unimportant. This is similar to RIBA1’s endorsing CIAT’s development, since the two
were very different. RICS also include technicians as a junior, non-professional, member grade. Both endorse the idea that the quality of the entry procedure creates valuable occupational difference between competing professional groups. However, Architect 15 was less convinced. First, he believed that many architects were actually little different than technicians. Second, he respected technicians since they had technical knowledge that was sadly lacking within architecture.

Professional associations refer to ‘quality’ – though, as shown in chapter 4, also strategically engage with widening admission. The issue of how well professional associations control entry remains a contentious issue. RICS argued that RICS has reduced its entry criteria in order to expand its membership through “a policy of amalgamation with other learned societies”. “Initially they were compatible more or less with RICS” and amalgamation makes sense for many reasons, but increasingly “some of the supposed learned societies that have been amalgamated with have been very questionable”. As a community of peers, he might recognise certain individuals from these groups, but overall standards are lower and “some have not taken a professional qualification in their life.” He offers one particular example to illustrate his two criticisms; that expansion was taking place, and that it was poorly organised without any foresight. In this case, not only did RICS merge with a lesser institute, but also they allowed those members to join a division for which they had no qualifications.

“I went to inspect a house and the owner said her husband was a chartered building surveyor. I thought, here I am, a chartered quantity surveyor, doing a survey of a house of a chartered building surveyor and obviously I might be out of my depth. But at the same time I could see over her shoulder there was a very badly formed arch where somebody had made an opening through from the front room to the rear room. Well things went from bad to worse...so I phone up RICS thinking his wife had been telling me a fib. He was in business as a local builder so I dread to think what he was doing using his chartered designation to do. RICS said, ‘we amalgamated with the Licensed Victuallers Association and all his colleagues, they were given the choice of which division of the RICS they’d join. All opted to become valuation surveyors, but he opted to become a chartered building surveyor’”.

This, then, reduces RICS from a peer association to a business, seeking additional members in order to grow as an organisation. In addition, these new members do not perform to the standards expected within the community. Where members reject this policy, officers sometimes continue anyway and “have a nasty ploy” of using membership lists “offering
them a discounted back door membership simply to boost numbers." This, of course, is an issue of decoupling of the executive from the membership.

Quality is certainly claimed to be the driving force behind phasing out examination directly set by institutions and their replacement by university degree courses (RICS 1978, 1999). The last RICS final examination was sat in 1994, for example. However, the evidence is not quite so clear. There is a feeling among the profession, expressed by certain respondents, that cost was an issue: examinations run by the associations were becoming expensive to run. Unsurprisingly, there is no correlating archival evidence, but what there is might be simply legitimising a cost-cutting exercise (see sections 5.10 and 6.6.1 for example). Certainly, status is frequently cited. Professional associations believed prospective candidates were more likely to study for a degree than for professional examinations. Even associations retaining professional examinations describe their qualifications as degree-equivalent. ASI (1999d) informs that the institution's external examination "papers will be marked to honours degree standard and will help ensure that the achievement of obtaining corporate membership is adequately recognised not only by our members but also by others and in particular employers." It is less than clear exactly how 'honours standard' is to be defined, or compared with previous criteria. ASI (1999g) also reports that all candidates who actually sat the examination passed, at which the chief executive comments that "I have to admit that I thought the results were just too good, but I was reminded that these are mature students, some half way through their career, and holding down responsible jobs." ASI was a smaller association than RICS, but this view on the 'degree' does seem to be endemic; or, certainly used to be.

Accreditation schemes vary, and are beyond the remit of this work to examine in detail. The processes entailed have, however, evolved along similar lines. Initially, each course was individually inspected and ratified. For example, RICS originally relied upon its Surveying Courses Board, a sub-committee of the Education and Membership Committee. The Board had 30 members (60% academics and 40% practitioners) who determined accreditation for courses based upon documentation and a visit. Such approval was normally granted for five years. In 1994 RICS established Accredited Centres for surveying education, which would then be allowed to run accredited courses within the remit of their centre status. This is far
more usual. Again, cost seems to be a suspected motive, together with the difficulties entailed in arranging for so many visits. Within architecture, additional problems are caused by the needs of both RIBA and ARB to accredit courses.

However, the degree-only perspective has always been attacked by some associations as elitist, and this has widened into an attack on anyone questioning the educational manifesto on widening participation. CIOB (1997b) has long argued that widening access need not be seen as lowering standards and promotes various entry routes. The quality issue here, of course, is the link with numbers; CIOB's Meeting The Challenge programme stated its aim as to double membership. CIOB (1997b: 4) trumpets that 1995 to 1996 membership was up by 5.3% and "that's no mean feat, an achievement to be proud of and one which the Education and Membership Department has played a large part in". Much of this increase was at the student level, and thus slightly misleading. However, the direct entry route (DMX) saw applications rise from 958 (1994) to 1057 (1995) to 1137 (1996). This is linked to CIOB involvement in NVQs as well as revisions to their entry standards, which originally demanded a minimum age of 35. Shepherd (1999: 2) offered the following "performance indicators" of CIOB's entry controls:

- At least 1000 members registered on the Professional Development programme
- A 50% reduction in qualification time
- 10% of all new members to enter with NVQs (note this with earlier comments on NVQs)

To achieve these targets "a review" of entry procedures was to be undertaken. He directly attacked any concerns over increased entrance, however, when he said (op cit) that "I know there are some members who are concerned that we may reduce our standards to achieve this. Let me reassure them that we have no intention of reducing standards, quite the reverse. ... 'standards' are paramount to a professional institution and it is because we have retained and improved ours that we have been so successful." Bale (2001) reinforced this statement by declaring that CIOB has "no time for either educational elitism, or for growth at the expense of standards. We provide multiple routes to qualification, but those qualifications are never devalued." However, respondents in this thesis were less convinced in those associations who had committed to growth. BS8 did not join CIOB because they introduced DMX and he witnessed ill-qualified colleagues in the office "getting in". It is certainly true
that there is little evidence as to how associations can control the quality of many of these third party qualifications, but the creation of the RICS NVQ Centre points to direct control returning to this association once again, at least in qualifications of perceived low status. Similarly, RIBA has developed RIBA Skill. On the one hand, this seeks to encourage CPD through offering certification and qualification; on the other, it regains control over training, and its quality. Therefore, the evidence on quality is inconclusive. At face value, it is being reduced simply in the fact that associations are accepting greater numbers of new members, and are engaged in what seems to be almost a ‘numbers race’. However, at the same time, RICS NVQ Centre and RIBA Skill point to mechanisms for controlling training and establishing educational standards. Nor have associations simply surrendered control to universities. There has been a very prickly relationship between the two, as the professions seek to impede university expansion.

Respondents in this work frequently expressed concern at the quality standards that have been created by universities. The quality of education offered by universities and other higher and further education colleges remains contentious. For example, in 1997, the Joint Board of Quantity Surveyors Malaysia and Institution of Surveyors Malaysia visited UK universities concerned by the commercial decision of certain institutions to offer accelerated admission to Malaysian students as a means of increasing their market share of these students. The mission expressed dismay at the "twinning", 'advance entry schemes' and other bilateral and/or multi-lateral arrangements between private institutions or colleges in Malaysia and these universities. The Board is of the view that there is an urgent need to review some of these degrees which have been traditionally recognised by the Board" (Joint Board of Quantity Surveyors Malaysia and Institution of Surveyors Malaysia 1997: 1). Domestically, Welsh (2001) reported on the narrow victory of RICS at an EGM called to discuss and censure its education reforms, instigated because "surveying comes in the bottom 10 of 160 university subject areas by entry qualifications" (Danaher 2001). RICS believed that surveying education was seen by the universities as profitably cheap to run. This was reflected by a massive expansion in course sizes and lowering entry requirements (see for example sections 5.10.5-6).

All associations still retain direct control of their final examination, the test of professional competence. This is variably based upon work experience, interviews and a diary of
experience for a period of years after graduation. Once again, associations have ‘modernised’ the process by creating a more structured programme of competence achievement. For example, CIOB used to judge a prospective candidate upon their experience, a formal report and a professional interview by three existing members. From 1997, this was revised so that candidates receive a mentor and are assessed by independent registered contractors upon their ability to demonstrate competency in selected disciplines. In 1998, the Professional Development Programme (PDP) was launched, which requires that candidates undertake an employer-based vocational training arrangement or direct guidance from the CIOB or an approved CIOB third party. This is completed by a 2000 word written report and an interview. In 2001 an option of written answers to questions about their work was introduced as an alternative to the report. Once again, issues of quality have been raised through these evolutions, but there is a greater degree of formality, and also less direct involvement by peers. CIOB1 argues that this is an improvement, but once again control is removed from the community to ‘experts’ in the guise of standardising and improving quality.

RICS, however, retains peer involvement. The RICS had operated the Test of Professional Competence (TPC) until 1992. This consisted of completing a diary of work experience in order to prove that a wide range of appropriate standard work had been undertaken. Once complete, a practice problem was taken over a 48-hour period, policed by a member within the firm. This was replaced by the Assessment of Professional Competence (APC), linked to a structured training programme approved by the RICS. The diary was subsumed into this training and a supervisor was appointed to monitor the applicant. However, this mentor remains an RICS member and is a colleague at work. The final test was replaced by an interview. The TPC was seen as too narrowly technical and the APC was meant to test professional acumen and recognise the wider nature of the surveyor’s work experience. It also regains RICS control through standardising training and places the association as a judge of firms as well as potential members. RICS must approve a firm’s structured training program.

The APC did not necessarily resolve problems, although evidence is hard to obtain (see for example Taylor 2005). Two participants to this work are APC assessors, and both provided intriguing teasers to a wider problem. BS4 suggested that he frequently co-assessed with “old
duffers”, men (always men) who really ought to have retired, and their firms were thus very glad to be able to get them out of the office. This sometimes led to examples where they dozed off during presentations, and, even when at their best, had often an ‘old-fashioned’ view of the technical nature of the work. Whilst, quite clear guidelines are laid out to assessors, CDP3 offered another example, in that she stated that she simply could not bring herself to pass a candidate who had not reached a technical level that she deemed appropriate – regardless of the stated guidelines. These attitudes might be seen as the peer community selecting for itself, or proof of the need to rationalise and systemise (and decouple from peers) in the manner of CIOB.

5.4 What is being controlled?

What is being evaluated and what should be included within the syllabi of qualification? Should these be demand-led by clients, who will determine the value of the qualification through their acceptance, or not, of it? Or should the peer-community retain their own interpretation, based upon the perceived needs for joining the community.

Under discussion here is training for qualification to a particular professional association. However, this division of education within the building professions along professional demarcation is criticised for ignoring the need for inter-disciplinary working (see for example Economic Development Committee for Building 1985, CIC 1993, Gann and Salter 1998). Associations are too conservative in reacting to changes within education and the needs of employers (KPMG Management Consulting 1991, Griffith 1998). As an umbrella body for the professional institutes, the Construction Industry Council was concerned about such disparities and set out to overcome the innate traditional individuality of the disciplines (KPMG Management Consulting 1991, CIC 1993). This resulted in its Common Learning Outcomes designed to create new professionals better able to work together and solve the historic problems found within the construction industry. Degree courses within construction courses had to conform to a series of prescribed learning outcomes, which graduates should be deemed to have successfully understood and assimilated on the basis of having successfully completed their course. However, since these outcomes included “prepare and present a written report … engage in an activity requiring use of information technology …
control of admission and training

attain set goals whilst working in a group ... perform a task where the concept of value for money is illustrated" it is unclear how these might be expected to improve the situation. Still, these aspirations are based within an industry regarded as backwards (Ball 1988, Woudhuysen and Abley 2004).

This narrow focus is, of course, precisely necessary to establish individual identities. For example, CIOB's Education Strategy Working Party recognised the lack of distinction in the minds of students between a chartered builder and building in general. Therefore, it proposes that its own courses need to encourage such differentiation and make clear the 'what' of being a chartered builder (CIOB 1989).

Respondents were uncertain whether their professional qualification, indeed their association, reflected their actual occupation. Hence, was the content of their training useful? The most blatant example of this concerned the issue of one's employer. RIBA retains the ideal of the architect as self-employed agent, rather than employee. Whilst most were dismissive of this and regarded RIBA as out-dated in this regard (for example Architect13), Architect7 did face this as the employee of what might be regarded as 'the enemy', a contracting developer. She accepted the defining role of the professional qualification, that as a member "you have been authenticated as having the skill and the knowledge to deliver in that area." Unfortunately, her validating association is not really capable of authenticating her current work. "I'm working in an area slightly outside of the path that the RIBA has prescribed". The commercial aspect, working for a contractor, is all a little new to RIBA and different from the idea of private practice. "That makes me a bit of a quasi-professional really". Still, in principle, the evaluation confirms "that you have the skills and the knowledge to deliver effectively and efficiently." For her, membership provided a social tool, that architects she met as a representative of her firm, dealt with her very differently when they realised that she was 'one of us', a peer, and not a developer.

Participating professionals generally described the qualification as simply that: a qualification. It is not a licence to practice. It is not directly related to their business. This places the 'what' of training as a rather 'grey' area. Architectural respondents also noted the highly confused place of RIBA membership compared with ARB regulation. RICS4 was
quite unusual when she referred to the profession as a ‘licence to practice’ since respondents
recognised that membership actually offered no such thing. Thus, there was some resistance
to the idea of professions as a peer-controlled trade association. Rather it was often seen as
a ‘string of letters’ or a higher qualification, adding to a first degree. Control as a formal
evaluation of competence did not exist, rather it was entry to a peer community that validated
future potential. Some rejected the community (BS1, for example) and some simply did not
bother to interact with it (Architect10, for example). Others saw their peers in what they
termed communities of interest, reflecting occupational concerns rather than professional
ones (Architecture3, Architect12, QS11 for example) and it is these places where the useful
specifics of ‘what’ are discussed. Yet others drew this focus from their firms (QS5, QS7)
since this was the place that they daily carried out the ‘what’, although these were younger
professionals who had probably not discovered the wider community yet.

The ‘what’ also sometimes involved personal characteristics, reflecting a certain level of
personal patronage. Equally, this reflects the need for colleagues to work together, selection
criteria for any employee. Participants did discuss the need for someone to be ‘the right sort
of chap’, mostly disdainfully, but sometimes with nostalgia. However, CDP4 and QS7,
neither white males, both discussed the personal characteristics needed by their staff. QS6
also discussed one of the researcher’s latest graduates, specifically his personal life, as a
major part of his decision whether to employ the said graduate.

FMB1 certainly recognises a “cultural bias that says if you’ve been through an apprenticeship
you’re not in a profession, even though you may be professional in what you do.” There is
a sense of creating a community, of ‘us and them’. Whilst there are no examples to be found
here of socialising taking place equivalent to those of barristers (Barrister1, see for example
Morison and Leith 1992), those architects working in commercial practice did offer some
examples. Architect12 “decided that as a consultancy-based business, which quite often has
to interface with architects it might be quite useful if the Chairman was seen to be a member
of RIBA”. He refers to “certainly 10 years ago there was still a lot of that dismissiveness
about” firms like his, and, more generally, “arrogance from the design professions”. This
“still exists, but hopefully it’s diminishing a bit”. The qualification provided “an entry card
when you’re talking to these guys”, that he was ‘one of them’ and “that they didn’t think you
were just another contractor.” In this he repeats Architect7’s experiences. Similarly, QS5 explains that profession is “about the type of work I do” and “the manner in which I carry out my work”, validated by “the fact that I’m a member of RICS”. However, he lays great stress upon the approval of colleagues for the quality of his work. Thus, controlling entry does involve a social aspect to the qualification, but it seems to be weak and is sometimes seen as a bad thing. Peers are quite likely to be outside a profession, say one’s firm, as inside. Professionals, validated by a particular qualification, are not necessarily at home within that occupation.

There is difference between trade and professional associations here in what they include in training. In terms of a basic list of characteristics, differentiating between the two can be quite difficult. However, on the detail of these traits, the two differ. FMB1 does view FMB as ‘professionalising’ at certain levels, certainly changing the way it and its members were operating. Of the general principle,

“we’re making moves towards becoming more professional in terms of what we require of our members.”

These are part of a qualification process, which is reminiscent of professional associations except that they are of a practical level concerning trading issues. Hence what constitutes entry requirements can be very important. However, note also here that peer involvement in judging criterion is very important to trade as it is to professions.

“We now vet our members quite significantly. We ask for references from six clients. We ask for a professional reference, for example from a surveyor or an architect. We check their VAT status. We see their employers liability insurance. We do credit checks on the directors and on the corporate entity. We ask existing members in the local area to give their opinion as to whether a builder is good enough or not to be in membership. When we have all of that information together we then make a decision on whether an organisation can join.”

This is an on-going process to raise standards. “We are moving towards having an inspection regime for our members.”

Presumably because respondents are already qualified, there was no discussion as to what the basic knowledge base of the profession, the ‘what’, should consist of. The ability of a
professional to operate ethically were discussed. Architectural respondents universally referred to the need for ‘good architecture’, although detail was sparse. Surveyors were more likely to be equally woolly over ethical conduct as part of one’s education. This was one area with clear division between professional and trade associations, with the latter referring to technical issues of knowledge rather than abstract concepts. NFRC1 offered an example of the medical profession and its involvement with ethical issues of abortion, which were outside the technical area of carrying out operations. Trade associations would not do this. That said, he did offer examples throughout the interview where the association did so. He presented them as roofing issues. Sustainability concerns have led to increasing technical and specification issues for roofs. These are relevant and NFRC discusses new membranes, approves contractors for using them and the like. It is inferred that the association does not take a wider view on sustainability or global warming. A member would be expected to inform a ‘little old lady’ that her roofing problem was minor rather than lie by advising her to replace the entire roof, but they did this for their long-term business interests. In fact, NFRC1 said he had many letters on file from grateful people where this had happened.

“We would expect them to have scruples, but I think that’s in the belief that the good guys get more work “

Peers seem to produce a rather unclear discussion of the ‘what’. Whilst there is a distinction between trade and professional associations, this is less clear than might be expected. Rather, social characteristics are important, although not highly developed. Professions have also re-colonised ethical issues and built these into their services; ‘good architecture’ is an excellent example here.

5.5 Worth of the Professional Qualification

Controlling entry is important in order to retain the value of the professional association as a qualification. The standards of control are seen as determining the value of this qualification. However, chapter 4 places change as central to associations. In a high modern paradigm, associations must ‘modernise’ and this leads to the re-evaluation of the worth of these new approaches compared with the previous ones. How is the changing association viewed? QS9 articulated this change over his lifetime, describing it as moving professions
away from dealing with clients, to customers. This was certainly the attitude of ARB1, and of QS11 — but he was quite happy. For him, the trappings of a ‘client’ hid inefficiency and the profession now had become ‘shiny’ and modern, offering direct service rather than smoke and mirrors. Only QS1 truly lamented the losses of the past, which he saw as ethics, honesty and commitment. Younger participants certainly concurred with QS11 and believed they offered fully ‘professional’ services. But older interviewees had witnessed recession and economic hardship, and understood that the ‘shiny’ services of high modern professional offices, and especially the ideals of professionalism, did not survive in such environments (Architect8, Architect9, QS9).

To most participants, the issue of change concerned the relative worth today of the qualification itself, over which there was disagreement. What is happening to the associations’ hold over their controlling mechanisms? First, there was no agreement over what the qualification was actually worth in abstract. Some (Architecture3) believed that clients are informed and judge potential service providers in an articulate and well-judged manner. Others (for example Architect1, Architect8, IDE1) believe that clients are generally confused. QS6 suggested that clients feel comforted if someone with a professional qualification leads their project; Architect13 had similar experiences. The ARB/ RIBA distinction was a common example, to be discussed more fully in section 5.11. It is also true that there was a tendency for those operating in multi-disciplinary environments to be more optimistic about their clients’ selection abilities. Architect10 also pointed out that clients are frequently professionals, too. Architect9 actually employed other professionals on behalf of clients, and admitted that “there’s a lot of confusion”. He manages “lots of architectural designers doing architecture who aren’t architects at all”. This is the problem, despite ARB, because “people don’t realise the difference”. “Architects are a little bit undervalued, because there are lots of people who do the job cheaper”. This, then, is the core of profession, that they are “bound by standards” and some form of competence guarantee. “With a registered architect you would expect a certain standard and you’d be protected. With an unregistered ‘architectural’, you would have no protection.”

However, whilst control is paramount in maintaining this confidence, profession is more than just this initial qualification. Architect9’s own experiences reinforce this concept of
profession, that most architects follow similar ethical and ‘professional’ belief systems. So, whilst the value of the qualification matters, it is constantly validated in practice.

"Generally I think the standards are fairly consistent. There are one or two you despair of from time to time. But its not so much a lack of professionalism, its more personality. Certain things don’t get done and you have to do a lot of chasing and pressing. I have a party wall surveyor who needs a lot of chasing to get on with things. That reflects on me because you’re the architect. His not fulfilling your task for the client it’s all feeding back into the system of your own professionalism.”

He employs peers that he respects. He is less interested in their qualifications, than whether he is able to trust them to do their own job, and help him complete the project ‘professionally’. This is not something that associations can qualify or validate, because the specialist has to be qualified to be in the situation in the first place. Architect9 believes that everyone has to be qualified, although he himself might be perceived as less so, due to his leaving RIBA.

“We deal with the same people on different jobs because we know them. It goes without saying that if they are in a certain role they should have those professional qualifications. I don’t think we would be dealing with people who didn’t have professional qualifications because I don’t think our clients would be very happy. Everybody has to be qualified these days.”

The question of whether clients express the same interests is outside the scope of this thesis, although respondents did work for a variety of types of firms, including some ‘client’ organisations. Everyone recognised that the qualification was necessary, but whether this profundity of qualifications actually meant anything, or rather just legitimised appointments, was more problematic. As discussed here, the professional discourse was one of recognising the place of the qualification as a starting point, rather than an end one. One problem is undoubtedly the transformation of typical roles, which renders qualification less useful at proving competence within particular specialised fields of activity. When Architect9 qualified, the role of the architect was clearly defined, but many specialists have since begun to offer traditional architect services, especially leading and managing the project team.

“The architect has gone down to being just a member of a consultant’s team. We were all being trained to be gentlemen architects in charge of everything. We’re more team members. It’s all getting further away from the business of design which I think most of us who wanted
The idea of professional associations retrospectively endorsing qualifications is not one discussed by respondents, but is by the associations. They see existing practitioners with “a wealth of experience” as potential members, whilst those in the occupation welcome the opportunity to possess “an acclaimed professional qualification” (Fish 2008).

However, the idea that professional qualifications as a means of controlling entry are only a part of the creation of competence was well articulated. QS12 described himself as professional because he is “technically proficient, not just at original qualification, but having kept up to date with professional skills; dealing openly and honestly with clients and colleagues; giving unbiased advice, devoid of self interest; not straying beyond my area of expertise; subscribing to established standards laid down by my professional Institution; being free thinking and prepared to challenge perceived thinking by reasoned debate.”

It seems clear from this evidence that the loss of value to the qualification is less of a problem than might be suggested. What has happened is that the notion of competence has altered. No longer is a professional qualification a statement of competence. Rather, it is the start of a process of continued evaluation, both by peers and by clients. This is mitigated by the fact that many clients are also peers. Thus, the qualification has been devalued, inasmuch as it is not a licence to practice or a permanent evaluation of competence. Rather, competence needs to be continuously validated. Respondents here accept this position, and most regard it as normal practice. Their views on the value of the initial qualification have not yet followed this change, even though they recognise the shift in emphasis.

5.6 On what basis should control be administered?

Financial imperatives and an environment demanding wider participation encourage growth. Certainly, executive proposals seem to be creating a vision of continued growth, as was discussed in chapter 4. Is there, then, any true control of admission? Certainly one institutional participant was very critical of RICS entry controls. RICS 3 was elected to International Governing Council (IGC) on a reforming platform, that RICS is not
representing the members. RICS faces a “difficulty in maintaining original high standards, starting with education”. At issue is the control of entry into the profession. “The examinations when I qualified were very tough.” However, since then “standards have been relaxed.”

This was reinforced by some other RICS members in interview. At the same time, it does not seem to be an issue for others. RIBA members did not mention it. The evidence for other associations is probably unrepresentative, but CIOB members interviewed did not consider their associations’ avowed expansionist policies as problematic. Whilst, it is tempting to describe de-coupling of the executive and peer aspects of the professional association in this, only in RICS does it seem to be a concern. Still, two approaches towards the issue do seem plausible.

**The interpretation of the ‘Executive’.** The ‘executive’ is concerned with pragmatics, how the association actually works. They need to develop practical policy to some goal(s) and then implement it. There are two aspects to the issue of control within the executive of the associations. First, there are the mechanisms by which they establish control. Second, there is the wider environment in which they must also deal with their environments; in particular, associations must recognise the qualifications of schools, examining boards and other third parties. Within the English building industry, this is especially true since professional associations have done away with their own examinations in order to adopt a degree-only entry policy, although this has been variably enacted across associations.

**The expectations of the Membership.** Members have a less practical concern, but are more interested in maintaining or improving the quality of their qualification and/or association, and who they might wish to accept as peers. They are less interested in the question of ‘how’ membership is controlled, but more that it is controlled, and done ‘well’. At the same time, they also expect greater recognition and economic efficiency, which are the drivers for expansion. In terms of training, they certainly consider themselves as experts whose knowledge benchmarks need to be maintained by new entrants, but they tend to resent demands for training within the peer community. Continuing professional development remains a contentious issue, which raises the wider issues of controlling training, both for
new entrants and the existing professional community. Certainly, there seems to be a clear
distinction between controlling entry into the profession, and controlling training when it
related to continuing competence within the occupation.

5.7 Why Control Training?

Since associations no longer examine applicants, but establish standards through third party
qualifications, it is sensible to question whether and why associations train? There are
theoretical arguments within the literature (chapter 2) why they ought to, such as to retain
occupational jurisdiction and control the division of expert labour. Establishing training also
might improve status, although, ironically, associations have tended to co-operate with
universities and given up on training, primarily for status reasons. Controlling training in the
form of CPD is presented as an issue of status and reacting to external criticisms of
professional expertise, rather than as a strategic aspect of control (Friedman et al 2000). The
challenges of new knowledge forms and government and public criticism demand action on
training. Certainly, trade associations are moving into training because they regard this as
part of a process of ‘modernising’ themselves. CPA1 argued that training is important to the
concept of profession because

“... they are learned bodies. They’re there because they provide some form qualification,
which their members are proud to achieve. So they’re individual people linked to education
... So you have a combination of academic attainment...and a professional qualification.”

Training occurs, then, within trade associations, but the distinction is that they are not
qualifying associations. Trade association members qualify through operating successfully
within the given industry or specialism.

“They encourage craft training but don’t have a qualifying role ... It is generally for the
commercial benefits of those who belong, as companies and trade associations provide
services, ... information. A number of them now provide some form of status. You can
belong to a trade association if you are acting in that area of activity, almost irrespective of
your competence.”

CPA1 evolves his position. He recognises that trade associations may operate qualification
systems as a response to competition from non-members, especially ‘cowboys’. The
important character of the association remains that it is not a learned body. Education serves
a commercial interest.

“One or two trade associations, particularly in areas where they’re vulnerable to competition
from cowboy operators, will set up standards. You might belong to their guarantee scheme
so you then have to set yourself apart. That carries with it a status of competence as a
company because you’re trying to separate yourself out from people who don’t. You’re
hoping it gives you a commercial advantage. So some trade associations help their members
to set themselves apart by setting certain criteria.”

Having explained the differences, there was admission that these differences might be
eroding, that trade associations were professionalising, whilst professional institutes
commercialised. CPAI used to work for CIOB, and is himself an interesting aspect of this
moving closer. He set up the Chartered Building Company Scheme. He recognises that both
trade and professional associations are addressing “the same issue” and attempting to
establish “a certain status by asking them to do certain things”. However, “I don’t think
you’ll find a chartered institute doing the sort of things we do and we certainly wouldn’t be
doing the sort of things a chartered institute does.” Professional associations are identifying
that a chartered “practice can have a status because the people running it have a professional
qualification.” The difference remains.

“The primary role of professional institutes is in terms of the education side and making sure
the education is fine to qualify their people. Secondly to provide academic papers, practice
papers, seminars, conferences, events that will support them in their professional life.”

But, since trade associations are now training up members, there is a clear need for
professions to do the same, even where they relied upon third parties in the recent past as a
more ‘modern’ form of providing this. Also, as discussed in section 5.5, it is now accepted
that qualification does not stop at entry, but there is a need for continued evaluation, and so
continued training. Controlling a modern occupation requires proving competence, and CPD
formalises a principle of perpetual training. RICS also suggested that such CPD is
inherently profitable for associations, too.

There is also a further point, as discussed within chapter 3, that there is a tradition within the
building industry that disregards the need for qualifications, training or professional
associations. However, poor training has been seen as a primary cause for the other ills of
the industry, and governments and clients have created an environment where change has been both encouraged and required. This means that associations need to deal flexibly with what they regard as training, and how they achieve it. But it also means that training has to be carried out as a means of validating competence. This then creates status and enables professions to control occupations through creating a 'competent service'.

This also, of course, reflects upon the control of admissions. To what extent can ‘years served’ in an occupation equate to a formally evaluated qualification, such as a degree. The Institute of Demolition Engineers provided a useful examination of this issue, since demolition contracting has traditionally been a ‘trade’ rather than a ‘professional service’. Managerial and knowledge-based workers worked their way up from the ‘tools’. IDE is thus faced with a low formal qualification base pool of potential members and a resistance to formal education. Their strategy has been to recognise competence and engage with their membership with regard to education post-entry. This seems to be a mixture of peer-endorsed career progression, and ‘executive’ influence to improve status and develop aspirations of IDE to become better recognised. The result is that admission criteria are weaker, but training is actively promoted in order to further status and competence. This is identical to the trade associations interviewed, and contrasts with professional associations, where greater onus is placed upon controlling the initial admission. Executive functions are thus sharper in trade associations, and those like IDE, whereas RIBA and RICS have tended to a more peer-created view of professionals as already fully qualified.

IDE1 described IDE as professional compared to the National Federation of Demolition Contractors (NFDC). IDE is a members’ association, provides a status to its members and reflects the changing nature of the demolition business, especially the need for improved standards. Because it is not specifically linked to contractors, this establishes a wider peer group of interested parties, which in turn establishes a more cogent and thorough body of knowledge. Traditional demolition engineers are not suited to other associations, and IDE reflects the ‘less academic’ nature of these older members, whilst evolving the profession away from this and into a more formally educated system.
“Older members have come up through the tools, which has been the way in the past. They know the industry, know the way that they operate. But academically they may not be quite as good as a chartered civil engineer. But that shouldn’t deter from them being able to have membership if they’ve got the necessary competencies.”

Note the reference to competence, distinguished from formal prior training. IDE1 points to government regulations as a driving force for this process of encouraging professionalisation, particularly health and safety legislation. These demand ‘competent persons’, which requires a qualification process to ensure this ‘competency’. The creation of this construct, ‘the competent person’, relies upon third party qualifying associations to validate it because “one way of demonstrating that is if you’re a member of an institute.”

For IDE1, demolition is a very specialist area of work and the occupation requires its own complex set of skills and body of knowledge. A separate professional association needs to represent this, and create a home for its peer community.

“Demolition is an industry on its own. It’s not part of construction, it’s a specialism so should have a body of its own.”

IDE1 explains how the Institute’s evolution reflects this transformation of the industry and the profession. Formalised qualification procedures form a central part of this meaning to the concept of profession.

“We’ve evolved things. When I joined, you wrote a paper. We tried to streamline it and make it more credible. Now we’ve got an exam. So we’ve moved it into a more professional way of appointing members.”

This offers an interesting insight into the professionalisation process and the formalisation of a particular technical sector into a community of peers. Standardisation of a qualification route brings wider acceptance. However, this qualification is a work-in-progress, and controlled training ensures the development of the professional membership as an on-going evaluation of competence. Clients refer to NFDC when placing tenders because they are interested in dealing with a corporate body, a firm that actually carries out a trade process. It is also “the body that people appreciate … that everybody knows.” Government and clients expect professional qualifications as part of their judgement of competency, but historically
these have been judged by the standards firms have qualified to through NFDC. IDE has begun to complement that.

So, why control training? It is profitable, always an issue for ‘modern’ associations. It establishes new jurisdictions within evolving technically complex areas of expertise. This is both required by, and encourages, State recognition of professionals as ‘competent persons’ allying government’s goal of consumer protection with the profession’s desire to create a differentiated service. The control of competence becomes the quality measure for the qualification, rather than initial admission.

5.8 Who Controls Training?

By enforcing mandatory CPD, associations prove that they control training. However, whether this is done actively by professions or as a reaction to their late modern environment is a more problematic question. What does seem clear is that its introduction was pushed through by a decoupled executive against the wishes of members, or at least sections of the membership. Watson (1996) certainly recognises the general unrest that CPD caused to members when RICS introduced it. She summarised what she claimed were the two competing member viewpoints, that "it is essential for members of a professional organisation" and the other that it "is an insult to their professionalism" (Watson 1996: 20). Kennie (1993) refers to it as simply "clocking up the required number of hours … CPD has often been seen as an expensive, rather burdensome activity that does not help develop a business or organisation." In 2008, CPD is almost a non-issue. Professionals accept it as ‘natural’. Watson (1996: 20), has won the argument that "the expansion of the knowledge base" requires it. Indeed, as of 1996, the mandatory requirement for CIOB members to undertake CPD is compared favourably with that of RIBA, who required (at that time) no such undertaking. Since then associations have actively engaged with the idea for strategic reasons, and not simply passively accepted it. However, peer involvement has remained decoupled. Watson (1996) admits that monitoring is problematic, only the Institution of Structural Engineers at this time demanding proof of undertaking backed by penalties. CIOB (2001a) recorded that compliance with demands to submit annual self-certification reports "has been extremely poor". Indeed, RICS attempts to enforce a compulsory certificate of
management as a means of certifying CDP within a structured framework created a co-ordinated rejection by major firms (White 2003). Undoubtedly, however, over time CPD has been accepted, whether grudgingly or simply due to the death of older members who remember a world without it. RICS (CSM 1998a) reported that they "monitored the CPD compliance of 1,000 qualified members" for 1997 and found that 83% were successful submissions, whilst 15% required improvement or further action. Further, "in the tiny minority of cases where members will not comply with the regulations and will not accept the help on offer, action will be taken in conjunction with the professional conduct department." Traditionally, professional institutes have found it difficult to establish a unanimous endorsement on their promotion of CPD since it affects existing members, unlike educational entry regulations that affect non-voting and non-paying prospective members. Both RIBA and RICS accepted the principle many years before finally implementing policies, and enforcement has yet to be vigorously enforced. The 1,000 members quoted in CSM (1998a) are only 1% of the membership. The ASI (ASI 1998a) even found itself enticing members with the promise that CPD "leads to enhanced riches - personal and financial."

In participant interviews, a number of smaller associations discussed the problems of enforcing CPD, at the same time as trying to professionalise a reluctant peer community. This again might be seen to be loose coupling, as the ‘executive’ recognises the importance of such training within an environment when managerialist paradigms look towards formal certification of competence. IDEI referred to encouraging members as the first part of a strategic plan, discussed earlier. IPHEI discussed the failure of their system because of member obstruction.

"PD is all important to maintain professional competence. But how do you enforce that on a voluntary basis? We were one of the first practical disciplines to do it but couldn’t make it compulsory. People in engineering talked about that but they’ve shied away from it because they they’d lose an awful lot of members."

This is then reflected in IPHE’s functions for its members, balancing the needs to be a professional association with those more tangible benefits that obtain and keep members.
It is also difficult to gauge the success and quality of CPD, balanced against CPD as a managerialist exercise of collecting ‘hours’. Architect9 explained how one’s competence consistently has to be validated through CPD, still often of little value and close to useless.

“When I first went back to work there wasn’t anything about training. You were just there to do a job. Now it’s the pressure that’s expected, that’s required of you to do more training and updating of your knowledge.”

This was very different from an environment of peer learning, which tends to be informal and rather more laid back. Now it is a formalised evaluation programme enforced through learning objectives and auditing. He recognises the drawbacks of the earlier system. It was a socially elitist system and did not necessarily offer improvements to the body of knowledge. However, he doubts that CPD enforcement will either, but simply adds further stress, expense and encourages individuals to undergo the process for legitimacy purposes, rather than interest or the desire to establish a community of learned peers.

“I used to go to lectures at RIBA…but you do actually find that after working in the office it’s not always possible to go out.”

Therefore, at some level, the ‘who’ is the professional association, however badly and irrelevantly. More of that later. It is also clear that CPD is linked to the regulation of behaviour, discussed in chapter 7.

As has been discussed above, entry to an association is seen as a qualification by professionals, and one that validates membership, and competence. The withdrawal by institutes from actual examination has not necessarily led to a withdrawal of the institutions from the education process, but rather to one of defining syllabi, learning outcomes and the like and hence monitoring the ability of educational institutes to successfully offer appropriate courses. Indeed, the institutions retain very strong control over education at a pre-membership level through various course accreditation procedures and so remain part of the ‘who’. However, control is a balance between the associations and their third parties, usually universities. The provision of university education to pre-professionals is outside the remit of this work. Analysing how course content is actually determined, how it is delivered and how it is evaluated is a complex and contested field of study (see for example Levidow...
Certainly associations have implemented processes for monitoring their membership’s continuous training and enacted systems of continuing professional development (CPD). This has, again, been influenced by external consideration. The concept of lifelong learning (DfEE 1995) has been instrumental in creating a framework for training.

Professional training forms a coherent strategy within RICS, according to RICS and is used to reinforce recent organisational changes. Faculties control the issues that should be covered, what fields are appropriate to what discipline, and how these should be provided. RICS Regions then ensure that this training has complete geographical coverage. Both advertise the availability, and need, for CPD in their usual communications systems (newsletters, emails and the like). RICS also owns RICS Conferences as a business, together with CPD Clubs and other events. This ensures that RICS controls, and benefits from, professional development activities. It also establishes ‘core competencies’ to direct university syllabi.

Professions do not completely control the provision of training, but they do establish protocols of what is expected for third parties to follow. By establishing processes, they seek to control both process and outcome. The latter is directly examined by the association; any member can be required to submit their CPD, although IPHE did comment that associations have found it quite difficult to actually enforce this. Process is a bit more problematic. Architect stated that CPD is still frequently regarded as an exercise in collecting ‘CPD hours’. Thus, associations might be seen as embarking upon an exercise to legitimise lifelong learning and accede to the wider environment’s expectations on this, rather than genuinely look to maintain or improve standards. However, establishing these protocols certainly establishes the ‘who’, as to its control. It is perhaps also unfair too, given IDEI’s comments on engaging with members as well similar comments on the willingness to try by other trade association interviews (BWF, FMB and NFRC for example). Training seems a genuine desire from within the community, or at least parts of it. Of course, it is the association that drives this in order to formalise such training and reap the rewards derived from distinguishing the ‘modern’ association from the others. CIOB also developed a very deliberate policy of outcome-based CPD. This measures what has been learnt rather than
how long has been spent, as a means of avoiding the creeping managerialism paradigm to CPD (ICPD 2006). RIBA has created RIBA Skill, which essentially encourages CPD through awarding certification (including NVQs) for its successful completion. Thus, CPD and training are controlled directly by RIBA.

Training also seems to be accepted within the peer community, to the extent that many respondents are actively involved with communities of interest to improve their education without any formalised qualifying validation (*Architecture3, Architecture6, Architect12, QSI11* for example). This also widens the ‘who’ from the association as an organisation that validates CPD, rather to peers, colleagues and clients, operating within the same discipline. Respondents here strongly defended these communities as learning hubs, but there are some who argue that they are more about networking and drinking than genuine training (Broad 1998).

Arguably a more fundamental attack on the associations are third party interventions. NVQs were implemented as part of government policy. The CIC, whose common learning outcomes are discussed in section 5.4, was established by the Latham Report (Latham 1994, 1996). Were these externally imposed systems? Initially, perhaps. Smith (1995) refers to the “structural and ethical damage from the vocation vision”, undermining professional qualifications and “rendering existing professional qualifications obsolete and with them the professional institutes which award them”. Smith was an RIBA negotiator concerning NVQs. However, associations were members of CIC and established either their own NVQs (RICS) or partnerships with others (RIBA and CIOB). There is clearly a strategic attempt to engage with the government’s NVQ program in order to minimise its effects. Therefore, strategic action over the control of training in the face of government demands is quite clearly neither submissive nor unsuccessful.

5.9 Constructing Competence

The control of admission and training engages with a dialogue concerning the meaning of competence. However, this is not simply one between professional or occupational groups, but plays out to a wider audience. Competence is central to the meaning of profession in this
context rather than professional ethics, which is usually perceived as archaic restrictions upon competition (RICS 1970). Therefore, professions engage with the issue of competence in order to maintain occupational control, and are now very active in establishing controls as part of this. This is a far cry from Giddens' (1991) ideas concerning the replication and servility of knowledge. It also requires state and client endorsement. The ‘competent person’ is an excellent example of this. Government’s general approach towards the provision of professional services is of consumer protection (ARBI, TAF1, RICS2, CDP1, QS9) and this involves generating a benchmark for competence against which services can be measured. Engagement with the process by associations has resulted in the recognition of professional associations as the arbiters of this.

As government attempts to deregulate and privatise professional services, they need to establish a concept of the ‘competent person’ to protect consumers. For example, in their search to remove the need for local authority supervision of building work by building control officers, DETR (1997) envisaged an approved registration scheme of competent persons. DETR (1999a) defined the standards required. However, these were couched vaguely in generic language, demanding for example that Building Control Bodies (BCBs) "shall put in place suitable arrangements for Continuing Professional Development … have methods of collecting and monitoring evidence of its performance … incorporate quality management principles … shall observe the normal professional standards and business ethics expected of service providers" (DETR 1999a: 11). This is primarily seen as adopting ISO 9000 and the CIC’s Code of Conduct for Approved Inspectors. However, it is clearly assumed that competent persons will also be members of professional bodies as they should be "guided by the codes of conduct of the appropriate professional bodies" (DETR 1999a: 19). Competence then is clearly linked to education, in terms of entry qualification standards and CPD. CPD in Construction Group (1991) regarded CPD as central to the issue of competence. Control of both of these rests with professional associations.

Trade associations have also developed strong codes on competency and enforcement in the event of customer complaint. For example, Thisdell (2000) refers to the Federation of Master Builders' 'get tough' policy whereby it promises to expel firms for overcharging, treating customers unfairly, not putting defects right, not dealing with complaints effectively and not
responding to the FMB. The report continues that with 14,500 members, in 2000 there were 60 complaints, mostly resolved but with three expulsions. *NFRC1* and *FMB1* were especially forthright about their work in creating consumer protection systems, but all trade associations are doing this.

By engaging with this environment, competence provides a path to reinforce this control, and establish improved status and stronger jurisdiction. This is a virtuous circle. Whilst deferring to the principle of deregulation and consumer protection, associations can influence the implementation of these demands. Controlling admission and training within an occupation renders the association as the primary consultative body in that field for government, and the source of qualification and guarantee of competency looked for by clients. Trade associations provide a good example of this. Again, they are overtly pragmatic, seeking to gain extra work for their members, and mark out as what one might term a jurisdiction of evaluated competence within a trade. For example, *NFRC1* explains how NFRC provide evaluated competent roofing, rather than simply roofing. Whilst it is done in the commercial interest of their membership, the aim is to produce better regulation and better roofs. Commercial self-interest and the work of NFRC have succeeded in raising the quality of roofing. Their TrustMark is awarded to firms and serves a consumer protection function, by evaluating competence.

“We’ve had several false starts ... QualityMark ... Hallmark. TrustMark is going to change all that and is going to be a guarantee for people that they’ll get their money back. It will guarantee that the company doing the work should be a good one and secondly if they’re not they’re going to get their money back ... rather like ABTA ... All this is bringing a professional code of conduct.”

Here we have a very clear statement of intent. *NFRC1* is directly equating this consumer protection legislation supported by the association with a “professional” code of conduct. The fact that this is their third attempt shows a desire to transform their members into an evaluated set of companies, competent and regulated as such. NFRC is not interested in fighting the government drive for consumer protection, but, rather, to embrace this regulation. NFRC’s self-regulation might be driven by financial imperatives, because those firms continually requiring the insurance to step in will be quickly excluded, but it is still regulation of competence. Such ‘professionalisation’ will be extended automatically to all
their members. NFRC will undertake to evaluate and guarantee all members under this scheme, a shift in the approach of NFRC towards its membership and their regulation.

“We vet all our members when they join ... but we don’t do continual vetting at the moment. You could own a company, pass it down to your son and it would be the same company. With TrustMark we vet them every three years.”

Rigorous monitoring of members requires organisational shifts within NFRC in order to establish a regulatory framework, rather than one that simply reacts to complaints.

“That puts pressure on us. We will then say that every one of our members will be a TrustMark company. That’s a statement.”

This has financial implications for NFRC too, since they will be accepting the costs as an overhead borne out of general fee income. This requires the confidence in their membership to act according to the scheme and their own inspectors to accurately evaluate and validate their peers.

“We do really think we are quality. We’re happy to prove it or try and prove it. So that, if it works, will set us aside from others.”

Note again, the final sentence. This is a commercial process to create a separate identity for their membership, not an ethical stance about the quality of roofing. However, the result remains a transformed institute, measuring and regulating competence. NFRCI describes this as “pushing a dividing line in there.” TrustMark is establishing “some sort of professional standard” of ‘good’ roofing. The only other option is to compete on cheapness “and try and get away with it”.

The question then arises whether NFRC will simply validate firms that already comply to this standard, and so join this exclusive commercial peer group, or whether they educate potential members and train them up. The reality is that evaluation will be of practical issues, such as “do you carry insurance” and “do you have a health and safety policy”. NFRC “check their books” and they examine sites to study working practices and quality of work. Evaluation is of simple legislative requirements and checks to ensure fiscal probity, presumably required by their own insurers. However, he describes an evaluation process that
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involves a level of interpretation and negotiation that might be construed as similar to a professional association’s examination process.

“Now if there’s a debate, the biggest thing is we judge is ‘is this company willing to listen’? We’d put them on the right path. If they took that path then we will admit them and probably re-vet them.”

This is less formal than a qualification examination, rather more concrete and less esoteric. Indeed, it sounds rather ad hoc, but NFRC1 recognised this and pointed out that the process was being formalised.

“It sounds a bit hit and miss. We need to professionalise that. The guys doing this are roofers, been around for a long while, they instinctively know when they go on site whether this guy has got any idea of what he’s doing. If you were an independent body judging me, I’d say that the vetting wouldn’t meet professional terms. But it’s very effective. What we’re trying to do now is making that into a checklist so that its more standardised.”

The extent to which roofing might be considered a profession remains problematic, but NFRC1 was describing an association evidently undergoing some transformation process. Importantly, they are controlling it and training is a key part of that process. True, this is linked to a government standard of competence rather than a peer approved one. However, NFRC1 suggests that there is a peer community of sorts developing within each of NFRC’s regional branches centred on “technical seminars” and social networking events, such as horseracing and golf days. “People will give their problems or their answers to problems socially whereas they wouldn’t do it at a meeting because they’re frightened of the competitor.”

In addition to ‘professionalising’ their members, TrustMark will also differentiate NFRC from its competitors, because there are too many trade associations. Economic self-interest and standards are related, and associations are under pressure too. “I can’t see the number of trade associations continuing. It’s inconceivable that there will be the money to generate these.” Offering warranties will provide NFRC with a competitive edge. Trade associations might engage with quality, enforce a code of conduct and even engage in a process of ‘professionalisation’ but they do this to ensure that their members obtain more work and create a greater profit, and thence retain membership of the association.
“Ours is quite firmly business…and generation of work orientated. That means we’ve got to keep the public happy because they come back and order more things. A professional body may have morals on why they do something. I’m not saying we’re without morals! But it will be business that drives it.”

Thus, controlling this process creates both jurisdictional control and status, beating off potential competitors. It does this by controlling training to create a competency benchmark. NFRC offers traits and a process of professionalisation that are accorded with the concept of profession elsewhere, yet self-interest is made the central theme. NFRC describes itself as a ‘modern’, efficient organisation offering evaluation and competency guarantees over the technical service of roofing because this serves the commercial interests of members and distinguishes them from badge associations. However, this serves the ‘consumer protection’ approach that all associations are engaging with.

5.10 Published Sensemaking: RICS Educational Reviews

The following offers a synopsis of a number of RICS educational reviews, dating from 1960. This date conforms with the discussion in chapter 1 and is also the starting point for a number of related reports. This section establishes that RICS recognises the importance of education and training, at least through formal reviews. However, there is a tendency to be reacting to change, rather than predict and pro-actively engage with it. That might be the nature of any review, just as these reports might be seen to perform managerialist and legitimacy functions, an executive proving to its employing membership that it is ‘doing something’. Then again, members of the peer community, and not the executive, wrote these, and so there is a cooperation evident between at least some members of the community concerning the need for, and outcomes from, these.

5.10.1 Wells Report

The 1960 Wells Report essentially revised the examination scheme, and streamlined the eight examined sections into five. Millerson (1964: 293) reports that this reduced the number of separate papers from 300 to 150. The intention here is not to do away with examinations, rather to rationalise them; one might speculate about economic benefits to this although there
is no evidence within the report of this. However, it can be interpreted in retrospect as the ‘beginning of the end’ for the professional examination.

5.10.2 Eve Report

This 1967 report dealt with a number of issues in the context of government’s expanding of the higher education section via the introduction of polytechnics, recognising the likely expansion in this sector and the need for simplification and integration of existing Institution examinations and syllabi. There is a presumption that a dual entry system can be maintained. It was proposed to introduce a test of competence after the final examination to ensure parity, and in order to restrict election to membership to those with adequate experience. Here then is the first definite proposal of the profession establishing a ‘post-qualification’ assessment point as the ultimate evaluation benchmark for entering the profession. It conforms a strategy of maintaining control of admission, even where third party involvement was encroaching into professional training.

5.10.3 Review of Educational Policy (Brett-Jones Report)

This report was commissioned in 1977 to "review the implementation of educational policy" with reference to "entry standards, structure and general content of the professional examinations", the "relevance of degree and diploma courses", international arrangements and "the need and incentive to continue education after qualification" (RICS 1978: 3).

The report was the first to examine the situation since the government had radically altered education provision for the professional classes and following the earlier reports (see above) whose results were now being experienced. It proposed the retention of the status quo in most respects, happy with RICS being directly responsible for examination whilst at the same time recognising the need for sharing this role with "a limited number of academic institutions" (RICS 1978: 3). This seemed to be at least partly for financial purposes. Interestingly, the report "felt it important to remember that these courses are intended to educate rather than to train and we felt that much of the criticism had been misplaced through lack of appreciation of this fundamental point" (RICS 1978: 4). The report was, in general, supportive of education and training provision, though it did argue the need to
engage in post-qualification education. It recognised the unpopularity of such proposals but urged "the need for a more positive approach to post-qualification education and to recognise that there is no satisfactory alternative to compulsion" (RICS 1978: 16). Here, then, is the first formal statement that mandatory professional development is inevitable; a resigned air of inevitability rather than engaging with an ideal.

5.10.4 Marketing Surveying Education

This proposed the creation of centres of excellence in surveying education based upon published, objective criteria. This was rejected "on the grounds that it would create an elite educational tier" (Caplan 1998), although later exactly this was established. Here then is a complete shift from professional examinations with direct control over admission to devolved centres (universities) to be allowed to establish their own courses. RICS would audit the centres, but generally they were to be allowed to run pre-qualification education, the only control being the assessment of professional competence.

5.10.5 Agenda for Change

Recent educational discussion, to some extent influencing and acknowledged by the Agenda for Change, has revolved around two linked themes. University entry standards are deemed to be operating inadequately. Initially it was claimed that universities accept too many students onto courses with too low grades as building professional courses are seen as cheap to operate for the universities and undemanding of students (Askham 1996, Education News 1996, Estates Gazette 1997, Carpenter 1998b, Property Week 1998a, Bill 1999b, Knutt and Seidl 1999, Estates Gazette 2000a). However, due to the economic environment, fewer students decided to enter such courses over the following period, leading to too few students – though still of limited ability (Coppin 2000, Estates Gazette 2000b). This then leads to the second criticism that the resultant graduates are of low quality and less competent than during a perceived heyday of professional education; implied here is that standards were higher when the institute ran its own examinations. This alleged decline led to calls for the profession to consider accepting non-cognate graduates from higher quality courses and placing them on conversion (masters level) courses. At the same time, others pointed to low pay within the professions as a problem to recruiting these so-called 'high fliers' (Estates
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Gazette 1996c, Simpkins 1996) coupled with the low status of the industry (Williams 1997, Baldock 2000). Thus, opinion varied over which issue was the determinant and which the resultant (Lowe 1998, Venmore-Rowland 1998, Ross 2001). The result was the implementation of the Investing in Futures proposals.

5.10.6 Investing in Futures

Arising out of the situation described above, the report had three objectives. Concerning recruitment, the RICS determined to "encourage a range of routes into the profession with the aim of attracting new members from a wider spectrum of educational and professional backgrounds" (RICS 1999: 1). With reference to surveying education, to "realise the needs of the membership of 'a learned society for the 21st century', the RICS should continue to encourage excellence in surveying education internationally" (RICS 1999: 1). Professional competence demanded that to "meet the needs of our markets for highly competent professionals, the RICS should set and enforce high standards of continuing education and development" (RICS 1999: 2). The issue was that RICS had not been controlling entry or training; at least this was the perception acknowledged by the report.

The report recommended a new "fast track" route for entry into the profession be offered to non-cognate degree holders, in order to encourage 'high fliers' into the profession. This was to be supported by mounting a "targeted recruitment campaign in partnership with employers, aimed at able graduates in selected universities and particularly business schools" (RICS 1999: 3). It was also proposed to raise the status of technical membership, a measure intended to establish a duality within higher education, and was seen as the level at which many of the current providers, being 'new' universities, were capable of operating. "Those universities will adapt their courses, and maybe go for a more narrow-based course that will entitle people to technical membership" (Eade 2000).

The report's recommendations for education were fully implemented via a consultation process and discussion paper (RICS 1997b). Higher education institutions were required to enter into a partnership with the RICS and agree set entry at a CCC score at A-level for 75% of their first year intake, meet teaching quality standards assessed by the Quality Assurance Agency, and score at least five 3s, produce research recognised by the Research Assessment
Exercise as at least grade 2, and achieve employer requirements, to be measured by the fact that at least 75% must be in relevant employment.

The need to strengthen the final hurdle was also recommended, and the Assessment of Professional Competence (APC) broadened with the addition of new learning components. Employers were formally included in the process to ensure that candidates train under a formal programme approved by the Institution.

The change was heralded by RICS as having the objective "to raise standards and to ensure that the surveying profession is more attractive to high flyers" (Tovey 2000: 171), but did not impress the profession in its incisiveness (Minton 1999) or have reference to views of the membership (White 2001a). The reaction of the universities was less welcoming with most were unsure that raising entry standards by itself would improve quality (Venmore-Rowland 1998, Cavill 1999c, Jameson 1999, White 2001a) and struggled to meet the new standards (Eade 2000). Indeed, the imposition of the standards reached farcical proportions after RICS removed accreditation from fifteen institutions that failed the grade (Estates Gazette 2001a, Warner 2001, White 2001a), only to later reinstate the vast majority, who had decided to appeal and even threaten legal action (White 2001b). Criticism was also to be found for RICS within other institutes such as the CIOB and CIC. Reported by White (2000), the president of the CIOB said that "the industry is trying to work together through the Construction Industry Council - the RICS just went its own way."

One major issue for the universities was the principle of wider participation amongst minorities, which was why the RICS instituted the 75% admission rule. Even so, the image of the profession as white, middle class, privately educated and male remained a fact (Danaher 1999, Delargy 2000), and one that the universities believe was entrenched by this move.

5.10.7 And so?

These reports trace the evolution of RICS from running its own professional examinations to engaging universities to evaluate prospective members’ education. Only with the APC does RICS control the final gateway to admission. It is difficult to ascertain the ‘truth’
behind the words in these reports, or on whose behalf they were written. Did they validate and authenticate what had already been decided? Or were they genuine investigations to lead evidence-based policy? What is clear is that RICS had been engaging in a late modern environment for some time, that it was facing many claims upon its environment. For example, the establishment of Polytechnics was clearly outside RICS control, and something that they felt impinged upon previous systems of training. Polytechnics in awarding degrees then began to provide qualifications with a status independent of the association; a student could effectively obtain two awards with a degree, the degree itself and entry into the profession, whilst a professional examination offered only the one. Similarly, the cost of operating professional examinations is also alluded to, although it is impossible to independently ascertain the exact financial position now. Whether legitimising pre-agreed policy and whether these reports were sponsored by a focussed and loosely coupled executive, it is only in 1996 that clear evidence of contradictions emerge. Even here causality is problematic. The issues are long running, RICS seems to have been responding to pressure from within its community (albeit perhaps to its earlier executive policies), and whether the results were derived from poor executive policy or a festering wound is equally difficult to unpick. Indeed, the existence in 1996 of around a half dozen trade magazines, unlike in 1960, all too willing to fan the embers of dissension in order to meet weekly deadlines, might equally be to blame.

Analysis of the development of RICS’ control is further undermined by the lack of ‘reports’ from 1978 to 1996, although education is mentioned in some reports in later chapters. At this key period of phasing out of examination and dialogue with universities, what does this show: an inactive executive, an informally engaged one, or a decoupled association dealing with key issues away from the glare of peer scrutiny? Whichever, Agenda for Change shows member disquiet resulted.

5.11 The Construction of Control of the Architect: Registration, ARB and RIBA

Any discussion of controlling entry and competence within the architectural profession faces the dilemma of ARB and RIBA, and their dual approach to two very different concepts. ARB is a statutory body enacted to prescribe qualifications and practical experience for entry to
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its Register. The Register is a list of those able to refer to themselves as architects because they have proven themselves competent to standards laid out in the Architects Act 1997. RIBA is a professional association, 'the UK body for architecture and the architectural profession'.

Education has remained one particular area of contention (Building Design 2002a) whereby the ARB regarded education as part of its process of defining and regulating what is an architect, whilst RIBA does not. The question to be asked of architects is who is controlling what. The problem is that education, and thus entry standards themselves, are subject to two different criteria. The Architects Registration Act 1934 set up the Architects Registration Council UK (ARCUK) to maintain the roll, and this was reconstituted by the Architects Act 1997 as the Architects Registration Board (ARB), against widespread opposition and the conclusions of the official consultation (DoE 1993). ARB since 1997 has adopted a much wider view upon their remit, and one which has brought them into conflict over a number of issues. Booth (2002a) described the relationship between RIBA and ARB as a "fragile peace" when reporting that this peace was "shattered when Paul Hyett launched a heartfelt attack on ARB and declared that it had no right to regulate the profession." In interview for this thesis, Hyett \textit{(Architect 11)} remains vociferously opposed to ARB, whilst \textit{ARB1} and \textit{RIBAI} articulated a more co-operative picture.

Whilst controlling admission to RIBA might appear straightforward, ARB has effectively involved itself in this through the \textit{Baden-Hellard} case. Baden-Hellard was a member of RIBA practising primarily in dispute resolution. He did not claim to be an architect, but adopted the letters FRIBA after his name, as permitted to any Fellow of RIBA. However, ARB prosecuted him for so doing, arguing that by using the letters he was implying that he was an architect. ARB won the case, and at Appeal, thus preventing members of RIBA to portray their membership, unless they are also registered with ARB. Building Design (2002a) speculated that RIBA might "stop worrying about the protection of title altogether, thus putting ARB out of a meaningful job. Subsequently, any architect worth their salt will want 'RIBA' after their name as a badge of honour and clients would look to the institute as a guarantor of quality." Thus, the issue of control has been divisive between the two parties, partially ameliorated by the attitude of the elected president. However, controlling RIBA
admission is very difficult when members cannot represent their membership without ARB registration. Differentiating between architect and architecture is problematic. The distinction between RIBA and ARB amongst even sophisticated clients is woolly according to participants in this work; even one participant misunderstood it (BS2). Entry into the ‘architecture profession’ might thus be regarded as entry upon the statutory register as much as membership of RIBA. Both create peer groups, and both create a sense of self. ARB clearly has rules concerning entry, and its controls have statutory authority.

Whilst the trade literature presents a great deal of rancour between RIBA and ARB, this was not present within participant interviews. Both ARBI and RIBA admitted areas of disagreement, but both presented a co-operative interaction, rather than a disputatious one. Of course, two ‘modern’ organisations would be expected to display appropriately rational arguments and diplomatic demeanours. Across participants, there was a general level of ambivalence. Most saw RIBA as their peer group, but some had only joined the register for financial reasons; the title architect meant more than the RIBA qualification (Architect1, Architect9). Architect7’s description of “all the fuss ARB makes” is representative. Controlling ‘entry’ to the ‘profession’ is thus a duality of incoherence. That said, respondents, in practice, simply did both, whatever they felt the various merits.

In terms of the control of admission and training, ARBI explained how the Board, through its statutory authority, legally constructs a meaning to the concept of profession. There are two aspects, a quality of education recognised by qualification, and proven by appropriate experience and practice, coupled with a regulated code of conduct. Both education and competent practice are necessary for entry onto the register.

“They all hold qualifications approved by us as being of an appropriate standing and level to lead to registration. All our registrants have, as part of their training, common areas of practical experience.”

Education is a qualification requirement, necessary to establish a basis for recognition as a member of the profession, but is not sufficient in itself.
"The first thing that makes them professionals is their education background. That's an established body of knowledge and practice which flows into different areas as they proceed with their professional lives."

Hence, entry is controlled through the evaluation of qualifications. Note that this includes ‘practice-based’ evidence to confirm educational awards. However, maintenance on the register is controlled through the regulation of behaviour. This is discussed in chapter 7.

Perhaps because of the RIBA/ARB dichotomy, education seems to play a very important role in the creation of RIBA’s jurisdiction. Therefore, the widest possible influence on the education of designers is undertaken, and the control of training is seen as very important. This involves RIBA members, but also clients and the general public. Thus, controlling entry into RIBA and engaging with CPD both form a part of creating a concept of the jurisdiction of ‘good architecture’. Appropriate training is of paramount importance. RIBA1 describes the association as the home for a technical knowledge base, which is continuously updated. The importance placed upon CPD is an interesting development, given RIBA’s traditional opposition to it.

“There is a recognised body of knowledge and skill which requires serious time and study to acquire. That needs organisation in order that people can become part of that profession. And you need to maintain it through continuous professional development. And you need a code of conduct by which you operate as a safety net and for guidance.”

RIBA2 reinforces what he regards as the ‘outward facing’ view of RIBA, that it is concerned with architecture in the public environment, about a subject engaging with a wider audience, and about a public interest. So, architectural training is openly more than just about creating and maintaining a competent peer group, but of creating a socially constructed design expertise; “the eye” (Architect15). This requires control by the association, since straightforward technical training would be inaccurate; it is not just competence that RIBA judges, but articulation of the idea of ‘good architecture’.

There is difference between RIBA and other commentators upon architectural education. This reflects the role RIBA places upon training in establishing the dominance of its ‘eye’, and the wider preference to a more rational and co-ordinated approach. For example, the Economic Development Committee for Building (1984) argued for integrating professional
education between different professional disciplines. It also recognised the increased need for management training for architects, given their increasingly varied roles in ever changing building procurement paths. The Urban Taskforce Report, the government's Urban White Paper, calling for an urban renaissance, included the need for inter-professional education to forge the new multidisciplinary working relationships required. Lord Rogers maintained this offensive, reported by Spring (2000), stating that architects are the "natural leaders of the multidisciplinary team" but at the same time "needed more effective training to help create an urban renaissance". He said, "the structure of the profession cannot meet the present needs [of urban regeneration] without a big change."

This not to suggest that RIBA rejects the arguments of inter-disciplinary working. Hyett, then president of RIBA, supported the principles of the report and saw architects as a key part of the report (Building Design 2001a). Controlling ‘good architecture’ means controlling more disciplines. The later Egan Review maintained this theme. RIBA supported its findings in its Sustainable Communities: Quality with Quantity, and committed itself to participate actively in a new national centre for sustainable skills. It is quite possible that articulating the need to spread architecture across disciplines will undermine ARB, and its narrow focus on the ‘architect’. Forcing government to recognise contradictory themes within its own legislation would be an excellent strategy for attacking ARB. It certainly presents a clear example of RIBA engaging in controlling architectural education both within and without the association.

Respondents had little to add on the ‘what’ of architectural education. There was quite a lot of disquiet about the extent to which architectural training actually reflected what architects do in practice, and the various forms the occupation now takes – especially the commercial (Architect) and the inter-disciplinary (Architecture). However, there was also complaints about whether architects are actually trained to be technically competent; Architect was perhaps the most vocal in his complaints that RIBA was often failing in its engagement with government because it simply could not find any architect capable of understanding technical issues of construction. This certainly reflects a complaint in the literature that architectural schools are too ‘theoretical’ and are responsible “for a generation who don’t know how to make buildings stand up” (Fearn 2008: 38). The institutional response seems to be to
approve the separate chartering of CIAT because ‘good architecture’ is not technical architecture.

5.12 Conclusions

Most respondents adopted the functional approach to analysing professions, identifying a list of traits that professions exhibited. This included minimum standards of qualifications, competence and lifelong learning. Controlling admission and training was important, but how? Freidson (1988) placed the creation and ownership of a body of knowledge as determinant of the meaning of profession (see chapter 2, p 42). However, participants were less clear on this. Occupational knowledge was very diverse.

Professional associations have constructed tiers of control for admission and training, set at the levels of the universities, APC and CPD.

Respondents equally distinguished between qualifications and competence, and it is the latter that provided their controlling mechanism. Architect9 is representative when he distinguishes between the qualification and competence. Formal qualifications are less useful because of specialisation and are increasingly ‘pieces of paper’ that everyone has. It is the earned trust between peers, and the grapevine evaluation and audit reporting, that creates a profession. Thus, social evaluation controls competence, rather than the formality of APC or CPD. There is no evidence, however, of the social controls that Johnson (1972) discusses. Discussed in chapter 2 (p 45), he examines the role of the state in creating standardised educational standards for entry. However, respondents were far more concerned with the practical results of this, rather than the principle. That associations lack any controlling mechanism on educational standards was a problem, as was the issue of ‘widening participation’ within the education system. But this was seen in the context of undermining guarantees of standards, rather than being a problem in itself.

Membership of a professional association is regarded as a qualification. Hence, control of its quality is very important. Whilst most participants do not see it as a straightforward licence to practice, it is widely accepted that this is how it works through a system of
corporate and state mediated patronage. Clients expect professional qualifications. The State might ideologically articulate opposition; in practice it sees the professions as providing a valid qualification to ensure competence and protect consumers. Qualification confirms competence, albeit at the start of a career. Further problems are then found. First, there is the question of how well controlled training is post-qualification, and the extent to which continuing competence is evaluated. Second, professional associations do not reflect the actual organisation of occupations, and the many, and increasing, specialisations that are ‘required’. This suggests that professional associations do not control occupational organisation, although it does not suggest who does.

There is also an issue over the quality of the qualification, and a belief amongst some members that their community is being overthrown by an executive more interested in increasing membership numbers and acceding to government platitudes on widening participation, rather than defending standards. This adds immediacy since professions are entered through university degree courses, rather than examinations set and assessed by the professional bodies. Universities have their own strategic problems with similar demands on widening participation and reducing costs.

There is undoubtedly a tension between the membership and their associations. Peer communities still articulate a pre-modern authenticity over the meaning of profession reminiscent of an ideal type in which their associations have created a ‘gold standard’ qualification and rigorously enforced admission criteria. However, the extent to which this dialogue represents either reality or younger professionals is problematic. Associations have accepted the concept of performativity, as have many of the community. For example, CPD might once have been seen as externally enforced, but now it is articulated by most of the community, both as a legitimacy function to prove competence and as a means of obtaining resources from their employers or creating a means of limiting their workload (the disciplining mechanism). Some might even find it useful. In the context of the control of admission and training, then there is some loose coupling from the peer ‘dinosaur’, but even these tend to be far more practical about change than one might expect from the literature.

There is also the simple fact, too, that for all the discussion of educational quality and controlling admission, no respondent had actually met an incompetent peer. The reality is
that professions within the building industry are willing to engage with issues that Giddens (1991) portrays as their doom, and utilise them to create social distance within their occupations through the creation of areas of expertise and the control of training for it. Competence is central to creating occupational control. Whilst controlling entry has a part to play, it is with CPD and other collegiate ‘expert’ systems for organising work that quality is generated. Whilst some respondents still discuss the issue of controlling admission, most see regulating members as the real point of control. Controlling training, specifically CPD, is a core part of this.
Chapter 6: Define and Defend a Jurisdiction

6.0 Introduction

Within the building industry there is a more fundamental point concerning 'why a professional association' as much as what jurisdiction it might control. Estates Gazette (1993b) discovered that of companies purchasing, leasing and selling property "69% of those dealing with property matters within the companies have no formal property qualifications". No professional body within the building industry holds monopoly or statutory occupational control. Rather, professions are deemed irrelevant by government and construction firms. The Charter upon which many institutions were awarded their status offers no economic benefit to operating in the public interest.

Associations also face competition both from rival institutions with differing qualifications and from other professional bodies whose interests have extended from their normal field of interest. For example, RICS face competition for members from CIOB, IRRV, BIFM, APM, ABE and (together with the RIBA) CIAT. Indeed, ICE and RICS are competing against each other even for the membership of the most technically specific tasks of those quantity surveyors working on civil engineering projects. RICS has during the course of this work merged with ISVA, IBC and offered membership to ASI (although it merged with CIOB).

However, whilst occupational control might seem to be muddled and without third party mediation, this is exactly why jurisdiction is so important to associations. Not only does it establish expertise, but also the corporate and occupational identity that allows members to engage with clients and the wider environment, thus creating a sense of self.

6.1 How to Define a Jurisdiction?

Since the professions and occupations under study here have been in existence for at least two centuries, establishing a jurisdiction is less of an issue. Rather, associations need to undertake retrospective reinforcement of their place within the paradigms of creeping
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managerialism and legitimacy. In addition, there is the need to actively repel invaders to the existing jurisdiction, and to invade those of others, especially where newly created areas of knowledge have brought about changes to occupations. Alternatively, new associations do have to engage with established associations to create a place for themselves. Jurisdiction also ties in with what chapter 4 discussed as the need to ‘modernise’. Professional associations need to ‘prove’ themselves again, to find their place in a changing world, and to confirm themselves as ‘authentic’ professions. Thus they re-create a jurisdiction.

Various methods of defining a jurisdiction might be recognised. The most obvious, drawn from the functionalist approach, is to develop a body of knowledge, upon which expertise can be claimed. A good example of this is the US Project Management Institute’s PMBOK, in which they sought to establish the project management body of knowledge (Widerman 1988, Allen 1995). IPHE1 also describes a similar approach for IPHE, in which they established the association as a charity with a strong code of ethics, and enforcement of it. Indeed, IPHE1 was the only participant to openly express views about creating a jurisdiction, although this was part of a wider professionalisation process that the organisation had undertaken. This was because “we’re always fighting against the notion that we’re not professionals” (IPHE1). The issue revolves around what “the Establishment” accord to be a profession, and the wider issue that “anyone who earns their livelihood in a competent and committed way I would advocate is a professional and does a professional job”. Engineers “fought tooth and nail to become a profession” and plumbers face the same. The problem is “statutory backing” and whilst that does not grant “recognition per se … it does help.”

“We’re a professional body registered as an educational charity. Our prime object must be solely in the public interest. Any advantage that members get as a result of being members must be purely incidental. I suppose we’re a bit unique in that we’re dealing with a professional activity that is based upon practical activity. We constantly have a battle with our friends in the Engineering Council and the Construction Industry Council where professionals are largely regarded as being just Chartered people and anyone who’s not Chartered is second class … Snobishness.” (IPHE1)

IPHE provides a good example of establishing a jurisdiction, in which it relies rather on the ideas that it protects the public and is not a self-interested trade body rather than a more precise control of plumbing generally – which would not be feasible according to IPHE1.
"Our whole raison d'etre is to protect the public. We’re not a trade association, we’re not a trade union. A trade association is out to promote and protect its member firms. Trade unions do the same for individuals. We don’t do that."

Interestingly, it is not only other professionals who are confused, because “our members don’t understand that”, and “look to us to help promote and protect them.” However, IHPE “do what we do to protect the public” and member benefit “is purely incidental”. Central to this understanding is charitable status.

Professionalisation has been a long process from “an employer’s organisation”. The “crossover with trade association” goes back a long time. In 1957 it became the Institute of Plumbing, an “important turning point” in terms of “dealing with the technology rather than individuals”, repeated in its current name. This is an “important distinction” This move away from plumbing as a task or occupation, and into a technology, incorporating the design of heating systems, was an institutional evolution. Profession is identified with a body of knowledge, formalised in IHPE’s “registered educational charity” status, and which “put clear blue water between us and other organisations in the industry.” Creating a jurisdiction means establishing this ethical entity, but also the discipline of ‘plumbing engineering’.

Professionalisation is linked to the shift towards the technology (expertise) described above, but also the importance of what they do to the wider population. The public relies upon a plumber’s skills for their safe water similarly to how clients rely upon other professionals for services that are difficult to measure and complicated to provide. This is occupational control.

“We maintain the register of plumbers started by the Worshipful Company of Plumbers in July 1886 because of all the health scares and disease that was around. The requirement to be registered should be statutory, but governments do not believe we kill enough people! In gas, they do, and that’s why gas is regulated. Electrical work is still not regulated by law, although they’re bringing in definitions of competent persons. Governments are only interested in regulating things that affect people’s health and safety.”

IPHE centre upon government involvement in the area, and their variable, perhaps contradictory, attitude towards a free market and regulation. IPHE is “a voluntary organisation” and that is “another aspect of professionalism”. “People can be professional
without belonging, but a lot are not professional and don’t have to join anyone.” He is uncertain whether statutory licensing registration enhances status, but it does affect competence. IPHE believes that there is more regulation of tattoists than of plumbers due to issues of hygiene; these are statutory matters. Again, therefore, IPHE must build an equivalent identity.

To IPHE, jurisdiction involves engagement with an idea, in which clients and government accept the creation of a particular group within an occupation. This does relate to technical knowledge, but also to its ethical and non-economic employment. Government will not allow a monopoly of plumbing, but they will engage with a body that articulates consumer protection, ethics, water preservation and health within plumbing.

Contrast this creation of jurisdiction with that of an existing one, the case of BWF. BWF explained how the 1990s almost killed off BWF since its members, facing the need to cut costs, suddenly realised that BWF served no actual purpose.

“Before the crisis of the ‘90s, the organisation existed because it existed and nobody was quite sure anymore why it existed. After the crises of the 1990s the BWF existed for a very clear purpose and that was to promote the woodworking industry, to support its members, to help them maximise their sales and profitability.”

This, then, is the purpose of a trade association, to ‘represent’ its members. Defining a jurisdiction is to establish this. Thus, any small group that feels underrepresented can repeat this, and this creates many associations in the building industry. The industry is so technically diverse that there will always be specialists who feel left out of existing peer communities.

“There are areas where there is a trade association but a minority group feel that the association doesn’t represent them. They go off and form another organisation. If people are prepared to pay the money to fund it and they want a trade association, then why shouldn’t they have it?”

However, jurisdiction is a balancing act. Larger groups are preferred in government and are far more likely to achieve members’ interests in the medium to long term. “There is certainly a strong sense in government that it would be much easier for them if sectors would have a
single trade association with one voice”. Hence, jurisdiction needs a certain critical mass, as well as a sense of community, in order to exist functionally.

Similarly, FMB stated that members join FMB out of self-interest. Prospective members join for business reasons, but this in itself becomes a jurisdiction.

“We get them more work, we get them better quality work, we’ll give them an opportunity to meet and network with their fellow builders and they will benefit from FMB’s ability to fight their corner, be it locally or nationally.”

FMB views itself as ‘professionalising’, certainly changing the way it and its members were operating. The way in which it does this is to establish a particular type of construction, that of ‘master building’. “We’re making moves towards becoming more professional in terms of what we require of our members.” This is to create a differentiated product, one in which competence is guaranteed through FMB, differentiating master builders and their services from general, and especially cowboy, builders.

Equally, those associations that might be described as quasi-professions were very keen to examine what their jurisdictional control actually was. IDE recognises that prospective members join for benefits, commercial services of some pecuniary value. However, IDE also establishes a community of experts, operating within a specialist field of ‘demolition engineering’. Membership of IDE within contractors is also recognised by employers and individuals. It as an increasingly credible qualification, validating competence and engaging a peer group within this specialist field. Clients frequently request employee details; professional membership is part of the approval process.

“Clients ask for CVs of staff … It demonstrates that people are competent with them being a member of the institute.”

The greatest change over the last two decades had been within the trade, what IDE refers to as ‘hands on’. Planning, management, co-ordination, and health and safety have become more important within the industry. Government intervention through legislation has created the need for IDE to validate competence and engage in improving standards. Again, a specific jurisdiction of ‘demolition engineering’ is being created, rather than simple demolition.
"The hands-on side of it has gone. Machines do the majority of the work now. Akin to that are the safety issues. Health and safety has come a lot more to the forefront."

To a point, such processes are not dealing with establishing a jurisdiction. Certainly, respondents tend to regard their actions as inherently 'modern' (Watkins et al 1992, 1996, Friedman and Mason 2004a) and follow a late modern theme of branding and creating business identity rather than the "outdated concepts of professionalism and service" (Jaques 1998). However, jurisdiction is exactly about creating a unique service, differentiated from the competition, and engaging with state or clients, or both, to obtain acceptance. Certainly, there is a degree of passivity discussed by respondents, in that they tend to see themselves reacting to government legislation. However, they also discuss engaging with government both to help create legislation (thus entrenching jurisdictional boundaries), but also to evade the need for statutory enforcement through creating profession-sponsored voluntary codes. Herein lies the dichotomy, because associations can only do this if they are seen to be more than members-only clubs, but, rather, are validated and evaluated experts. This needs third party verification through their own, non-peer, executives. This looser coupling of regulation is discussed in chapter 7.

Within the well-established professions jurisdictional issues are similar. For RICS1, jurisdiction is about creating a 'statutory-plus situation' of proven competence that only members can validate a priori. This requires executive officers to drive policies through the peer collective in order to establish the independence that government requires prior to confirming this validation; or at least, that they appear to. Deliberate loose coupling of the association from its idea of a self-regulating community is necessary in order to create occupational control. She offered one particular example of this, the recent financial regulatory introduced by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) at the behest of government, but note that this was with peer agreement through the AGM.

"RICS took quite a large step at the AGM at which a decision was taken that we are moving to designated professional body with a status under FSA. That will enable the RICS to take a much stronger regulatory role in terms, not just of its actual members but of its membership firms. That mirrors developments in other professional bodies where they are evolving their regulatory role in a complimentary and delegatory way from government."
She also believes that professional associations provide the English building industry with a better regulatory framework than statutory provision achieves within other countries. She recognises that the UK situation is far from perfect, but argues that this simply means that the professions must continually engage both with the philosophical meaning of profession, and its practical, daily interface with the public. Peer communities are always going to face pragmatic issues about when and how to “take action against people they consider are falling short of acceptable standards” and when to allow state prosecutors to take over.

Overall, she has a balanced view on the professional association as a social body. There is a need to accept the role of executive officers who are experts in their own fields, and allow them to manage RICS. Associations “are easily subject to internal manipulation” and this adds to members’ understandable concerns. Here is the battle for the soul of an association, the “sometimes conflicting relationship between the officer and the member as to whether it’s an officer organisation or a member organisation.” Loose coupling of the organisational RICS and its membership can offer positive gains. A peer community would never have achieved recognition by FSA.

“There is no way that the members could have steered themselves to that position without strong officer support ... The officer in question ... he impresses me very much. He is responsible for bringing the ombudsman in. Sometimes members don’t like what officers do and don’t like the cost of officers.”

In addition to the general concern with self-regulating associations, communities do not have the membership available to drive a collegiate view and strategy.

“People have less time to be volunteers and gain expertise in what is required to drive institutions forward and that is a real, real problem.”

To her, it is the need to engage dynamically with these issues that leads to associations’ growth strategies. This retains subscription levels, whilst affording the officer experts that she perceives as necessary. And it is these officers that will define and, especially, defend jurisdictions.
6.2 Who Defines a Jurisdiction?

Establishing jurisdiction requires two complementary events: action by the association, and recognition by third parties. Respondents see government as the lead to jurisdiction, primarily as part of their drive towards competence and consumer protection. As both RICS and TAF made specific note of, however, this is balanced by government prohibition of monopoly. Hence, jurisdiction is something of a compromise between a number of different parties.

Government offers authentic jurisdiction through statutory provision and the Privy Council’s systemised award of the Charter. Statutory provision in creating authentic professions is missing in the building industry as discussed elsewhere; even ARB is concerned with a title, rather than actual occupational control. The Royal Charter award is a consensual affirmation of de facto occupational control, and it is tempting to recognise it as support for a system of professions (Abbott 1988). By accepting charters, associations mutually endorse each other, and new entrants. Equally, where disputes do occur, such as over CIOB’s attempt to establish itself as CIOC, this also recognises that occupations are already influenced, if not controlled, by existing associations. However, if control is genuinely being acted out, the charter given to BIAT does question the issue of architectural jurisdiction. After all, RIBA disputed with RICS within EU circles that building surveyors might carry out exactly such work (discussed below) when they argued that only architects should. Similarly, the number and diversity of associations within the building industry mitigate against the charter system representing any genuine control. Rather it perhaps portrays the illusion of a meaningful division of expert labour, and offers an ideological balm to the frightened and lost expert workers all at sea in the knowledge-based economy. This supports the ideas of creeping managerialism where professions serve to validate formalised processes by giving them respectability. However, this also involves loose coupling as the associations engage with this, whilst peers retain their own discourse in which they view these procedures as wasteful ‘red tape’. For example, associations might recognise that benchmarking exercises or QAA programmes are needed, whilst peers regard them as superfluous and irrelevant. Certainly, when asking ‘who’ defines jurisdiction, the peer community cannot be ignored. After all, it is they who define success and failure as a social exercise and they who recognise a body of knowledge and the
expertise to apply it. Of course, this is also ratified by clients and it is they who ultimately endorse profession by accepting the division of labour in this way, and employing said professionals. This corporate patronage might be offered for many reasons, including social status and the inculcation into the corporate body of fellow professionals. The idea of creeping managerialism and legitimacy functions also present a clear argument as to why professions exist. The primary need here is to substantiate qualifications and offer security guarantees. Blame cannot be levelled against any employee who follows the right procedure, and appoints a validated professional.

What follows is further analysis of the various parts to the ‘who’ in creating a jurisdiction.

6.2.1 Royal Charter

A Royal Charter is awarded by the Monarch (based upon the recommendation of the Privy Council) to the premier discipline within a given field of expertise. This suggests that there is, indeed, a system of establishing occupational jurisdiction. It is held by a Body Corporate, the professional organisation deemed to represent this discipline. There are four chartered bodies central to the area under discussion (awards in brackets): RIBA (1837), RICS (1881); CIOB (1980), CIAT (2005).

RIBA1, in discussing CIAT’s success, implied that granting a royal charter is confirmation to the success of a period of professionalisation, one might almost say ‘modernisation’. RIBA’s own supplemental charter is directly linked to the eventually successful resolution of the association's deliberations concerning competence and reflects the adoption of a formal educational and qualification system (Wilton-Ely 1977). There is very little discussion on the precise purpose of seeking the charter within architecture. Indeed, Gotch (1934: 14) places the movement of the association to "better rooms" as an equivalent event to obtaining their charter in 1837. Thompson (1968: 174) believes that RICS was, partly, "keeping up with the institutional Joneses" in applying, since others were being awarded within occupations that were deemed to be far less established. He also states that the charter made membership more attractive to those still refusing to join, and that it accorded a public status that clients would come to regard as a measure of competence. To this end, then, it
would appear that a Royal Charter is simply a mark of approval of a status rather than a mechanism for constructing or defining jurisdiction. Thompson (1968) implies that the charter is seen as a reflection of values upon those awarded the distinction. However, the Privy Council seems only to refuse proposals that are contentious, rather than engage in a serious analysis and debate of worth.

*CPA1* believes that the charter process creates a jurisdiction, generating distance between trade and professional associations. He described his own role in CPA and his own membership of RTPI.

“I’m a member of the Royal Town Planning Institute. It keeps you abreast of what’s happening in the planning profession. What we provide is information of an economic nature that’s of benefit to companies and we represent our industry as companies on government bodies. We meet government ministers to tell them about legislation and regulation that we think they’ve done wrong, or things that we’d like them to do that they’re not doing.”

Unfortunately, he describes very similar traits (services) of the two, albeit more visibly commercially self-interested in a trade association. To him, however, the primary difference arises in the defence of these jurisdictions. Professions are less likely to negotiate over areas of expertise, whilst his own association is proof that individual trade associations are prepared to co-operate because of their inherently pragmatic natures. CPA is a representative organisation. There are too many separate associations within the building industry fragmenting its representation and power to influence its environment. CPA provides focus.

“One of the problems is that they each jealousy guard their independence. To get your chartered status you’ve got to go down one of the prescribed routes, the civil engineering, structural engineering, chartered builder, architect and we all want that status because its gives us some credibility. And they’re all a bit nervous about devaluing, reducing the credibility of their bit.”

Royal Charters thus encourage fragmentation, but this is exactly what creates jurisdiction.

6.2.2 Statute

The creation of an architectural jurisdiction is problematic because of the existence of RIBA and ARB, discussed earlier. Whilst statutory regulation creates a clear focus upon the ‘who’,
it also shows other, competing interpretations. First, government itself decided to end registration. When the future of ARCUK went to consultation, many within the building industry voted to abolish it in their submissions. Rather than see it as an ideal that they themselves might hope to achieve, their response was to argue for its removal as an anachronism (DoE 1993: 13-14). Ironically, only the (then) Institute of Plumbing supported registration, since they were also lobbying for their own (DoE 1993: 14). Concluding, DoE (1993) believed that there was no satisfactory case for continuing the register.

Wilton-Ely (1977) places the Architect’s Registration Acts 1931 and 1938 as the end-note of a struggle to create a closed profession. Many architects had strongly resisted the need for association, arguing that artistic autonomy could not be regulated, and that the occupation consisted of imponderable skills incapable of qualitative assessment or legal regulation. In addition, the discipline was embroiled in a series of political movements opposing all modernising and industrialising forces, most notably that of the Arts and Crafts Movement. However, Wilton-Ely (1977: 203) refers to such convictions as "beginning to appear something of a luxury in an industrial society where the public had little protection against grave abuses and irregular standards among the less responsible members of the profession."

Increasing membership and successful closure of the education and qualifying competence issues shifted power against the "anti-professional" movement; government legislation ended the argument. Ironically, these same arguments concluded the official review into ARCUK, concluding that statutory registration served no purpose and was not necessary (DoE 1993). However, it was decided to renew the Act for political reasons. *IPHEI* offered the following explanation on this.

“I had quite a bit to do with the saving of ARB because Robin Dixon who was President of RIBA some time ago, he led the charge in saving what was ARCUK at the time. Maggie was out to kill him and ‘the lady’s not for turning.’ But she did. She was coming up for one of the elections and she suddenly thought, if I’m doing away with the architect’s registration I’m going to possibly lose 28,000 votes. And that’s true.”

Interviewees were generally woolly about ARB and its role in establishing jurisdiction. Most preferred to discuss RIBA’s ‘good architecture’ construct. ARB has a role, but it is generally more to do with maintaining confidence in what RIBA is seen to be doing. Section 6.5 discusses this later.
6.2.3 Association and Identity

Expert workers wish to join professional associations and create an identity of profession about their occupation. To this end they have established a large number of specialised associations within the building industry (see Appendix D). This does not seem to be reciprocated elsewhere. Whilst some are professional and others trade (DTI 1996), each presents a similar series of functions – status, representation, specialised expertise are perhaps the top of a long list of characteristics. Indeed, there is a tradition of debate within the industry as to why there are so many, and whether the industry is helped or hindered by such diversity (see for example Broad 1998, Benyon 1998a). Generally it is seen as a problem since the industry finds it difficult to unite in its discussions with government (Benyon 1998a, Benyon 1999, Cundell 1999, McKee 1999, Penfold 1999, Contract Journal 2000b, McKee 2000, Bill 2001, Clark 2001, Gummer 2001, Berry and Foster 2005) or its reactions to government proposals (Pearce 1996, Nelson 1999, Yarnold 1999, Cooper 2000, Gummer 2000, Ridout 2000). Government concurs. The National Audit Office reported that there are too many groups dealing with government for it to be efficient (Glackin 2000, Clark 2001).

Commentators perceive the problem as an inability to unify the industry. Those in the property industry tend to refer to the likes of BPF (Baldry 1996, Fletcher 1997a, Benyon 1998a, Property Week 1998b, Bill 2001) or even RICS (Yarnold 1999). Those within the construction industry prefer the Construction Confederation (Contract Journal 2000b) or the Construction Industry Council (Watts 2001), although RICS promotes itself as this voice (Berry and Foster 2005). Indeed, Goobey (2004) argues that RICS is best placed given its wide interests and improved governance (compare with Goobey 1997). The problem is that each of these, and others, clearly have different views upon 'the industry', memberships and mission statements. Indeed, they are frequently to be found in opposition over government proposals (see for example Nelson 1999, Cooper 2000) and even in internal disagreement (see for example Nash 1996).
Of course, this is precisely the point. Associations engage in creating difference. This is essential. These complaints prove that jurisdiction, albeit perhaps in a rather rudimentary form, is being generated. Additionally, RICS’ ability to engage in wider issues, if true, also shows a judicious use of jurisdiction as a weapon of expansion into other fields. Each association creates its own jurisdiction, a specialised area. Peers generate a common identity and dialogue, which is not found elsewhere. Thus, the building industry is fractured into specialised disciplines.

It is certainly possible to perceive the need for a new form of association as a failure in the old, as do a number of participants in this work (Architecture3, Architecture6, Architect12, QS1). These ‘communities of interest’, however, are also established as areas of expertise, perhaps nuclei for future jurisdiction, since they are motivated completely by the need to discuss expertise. Knutt (1998: 41) refers to these rather dismissively as producing "a personal rather than a professional" outcome, based as they are in pubs. However, it is worth noting that most institutions covered here originated in similar social gatherings (Carr-Saunders and Wilson 1933, Gotch 1934, Thompson 1968), and the relationship between professional associations and public taverns is a complex one.

These individual knowledge workers establish foci of expertise in order to advance areas of an occupation, and thus do they generate clusters of jurisdiction based upon pragmatic experiences of their working environment. It is these people who ultimately generate recognised jurisdictions as they evolve from their daily lives. Historically, such processes established professional associations. Today, they are seen as a response to the unresponsiveness of the associations. Identity is complex. None of these reject their professional identity. Rather, they add a technical specialism. Whilst this is an informal one, communities of interest are social networks that also contain clients and this adds some degree of patronage and recognition to the groups.

6.3 The Corporate Creation of a Jurisdiction: What is a Jurisdiction?

There has been a tendency for professional associations engaged in the ‘modernisation’ process discussed within chapter 4 to engage in the process of creating, or recreating, an
identity or purpose. This is not the same as establishing a jurisdiction. Reference has been made previously to the PMBOK project in US project management. Associations and members continually refer to what they regard as their perennial problem, which is the lack of statutory monopoly on the licensing of their services. They thus engage in expeditions to describe their expertise. RICS’ Agenda for Change strategy focussed on the need to intellectualise and regain recognition as a place of academic expertise in surveying - although this was far from universally accepted by the membership. This required them to examine what knowledge their occupation dominated, or controlled completely. QSI is not unusual in referring to this as “navel gazing” because it is seen by many members as irrelevant to their occupational lives. Equally, in its discussion of improving post-qualification education of professionals, CPD in Construction Group (1991: 5) differentiated "professional and technical duties" and the need to maintain "a monopoly of expertise" (ibid: 8).

The feature of this process is that it is retrospective, in that it is not part of the process of creating occupational control. Whilst this might be one purpose, it also serves other functions, such as generating legitimacy in a late modern environment opposed to professions. Equally, it rejuvenates the association for the purposes of promoting corporate status. This is not, therefore, an organic part of the creation process, but, rather, it is a decoupled process by the executive functions of the association to serve some strategic purpose.

Articulate discussions of what exactly their disciplines consist of, and how they might be distinguished from others, tend to influence marketing functions, albeit perhaps the development of new markets. The creation of a modern dialogue for the professional association through the creation of these self-examinations also serves the needs of governments and clients, also looking for certainty and security in this late modern environment. Both RICS and RIBA gain recognition because they can lay clam to firmer historical roots than, say, CIOB. Thus jurisdiction becomes a dialogue at a number of different levels, offering this sense of ‘safety’. This also creates a useful concept of self-identity to its own membership. For example, this loosely coupled idea of jurisdiction has been a driving force for the associations and their recreation of professional ethics. Faced with dissatisfaction at the old-fashioned ideals behind ethics, these have been recalibrated to modern governance
issues, and presented as extremely ‘modern’ (Charlesworth 2008, Hye 2008, RICS 2008). That said, a number of respondents view this ‘modernisation’ as watering down their historic code. At the same time, professions are also forcefully developing an ethical discourse within the current concerns over ‘greening’ the environment. These previously ‘old-fashioned’ notions of non-market judgements are now de rigueur. RIBA for example, has pushed the concept of ‘good architecture’ to persuade that they are engaged with the needs for sustainability and the future; discussed by most participants. Thus, strategic re-working jurisdiction is a tool of the executive of associations.

Equally, jurisdictional realignment is used by the associations to justify the merger of what are now recreated as similar institutions. RICS’ recent mergers with ISVA and IBC provide a good example. Many RICS members saw the other institutes as inferior and a merger was lowering standards; this reflected RICS’ own position for many years. Equally, other institutes were concerned at the moves as one of aggrandisement by the RICS. Of ISVA, ASI (2000a) was "saddened that a much respected specialist institute no longer exists", and of IBC, ASI (2000c) lamented that "it is a pity that IBC, with its clear identity and focus, and high professional standards, will cease to exist." Of course, the ASI itself became a merger statistic when the CIOB subsumed the smaller institute. However, the RICS executive successfully argued for the mergers on the grounds of jurisdictional compatibility and improved occupational control (Estates Gazette 1998a, 1998b).

Constructing jurisdiction appears to serve the purpose of creating identity and establishing ‘who are we’ in these turbulent late modern times. It also serves marketing purposes. However, these interpretations fail to take into account that there is real occupational control here. The executive officers are establishing very specific concepts of ‘good architecture’, ‘ethical surveying’ and ‘safe’ and ‘competent’ quack-free services. Because associations have been in existence for over a century, the establishment of a jurisdiction is rather assumed. However, chapters 3 and 4 showed how critical creating occupational control actually is today, and how it can be easily overlooked.
6.4 Defending the Jurisdiction

A primary problem troubling respondents was the difficulty in defending jurisdiction, or, as they presented the issue, the ease with which associations are established within the building industry. CDP1, for example, opposed mergers by RICS with other property bodies simply because any resulting occupational monopoly would be short-lived. Another would simply come along. All trade associations respondents also expressed the need to defend their jurisdiction through creating ‘better’ associations because of the ease with which a new association can be created. All accepted that if individuals wished to pay subscriptions to form a new body, this was their right. However, the point remains that the generally low skill base of the industry renders it open to the multiplication of associations. The number of associations points to this (see Appendix D). Creating a ‘better’ association differentiated members from the rest. Hence, defending jurisdiction can also relate to issues of status in addition to occupational control.

Professional associations need to defend their power from government, other associations and groups outside any professional system of agreements. The evolving nature of knowledge is often described as the biggest danger to professional knowledge, and certainly the participants frequently mentioned ‘communities of interest’ as where real control was becoming established. These reflected networking that generated actual, rather than legitimised, expertise. Giddens’ conception of late modernity, that is the globalisation of the traits of modernity, place a shifting worldview as a more serious threat to national jurisdiction (see also Freidson 1973, 2001). The European Union’s rising importance in regulating occupations is discussed later. Oddly, few respondents discussed this, although those that did placed globalisation of expertise as the most important issue facing their working lives (ABE1, BS6, QS3 for example).

ARB is certainly seen as the most visible defender of occupational control within the field of architecture. ARBI strongly defended this. This includes its attacks on other associations, such as forcing ASI to change its name (ASI 1998d, 1998e, 1998f, Matthews 1998). Its refusal to negotiate, or even allow ASI to distinguish between its architect and non-architect members created an antipathy amongst professionals towards ARB and a general reinforcing
6 Define and Defend a Jurisdiction

of their opposition to statutory regulation of the title (see for example Matthews 1998, Cater 1999, Fuller 1999, ASI 1999c; ASI 2001a). However, whether ARB can be said to be defending actual jurisdiction, rather than a simple title is perhaps more problematic. RIBA is the one engaged in discussion of ‘what’ to include in training, not ARB, as was discussed in chapter 5.

*NFRC1* argued that occupational jurisdiction originally arose out of client need. This need remains, albeit in a new form.

“Most of the construction trade associations came into prominence after the War because all kinds of people thought they could stick a few bricks and a few tiles together ... No real thought of the individual other than personal pride. So you wouldn’t need to have half a dozen letters after your name or anything like that. Everybody would know you were the craftsman, the man to employ. So it was more about companies at that stage.”

The search for a quality guarantee was specifically the result of the massive demand for roofing work post-war. Today, government regulation focuses on safety. Governments fixate on issues, and trade associations must respond to these, especially consumer protection, perceived by *NFRC1* as the current interest.

“It comes up to today with consumer protection coming taking the front, health and safety running a close second and then price fixing. Everything that the government says is bad for the consumer.”

The place of trade associations in this is to work with government in the interests of their members. “Our prime aim for our members is to get them more business.” They will assist their members to produce quality and safe roofing where this confirms with government intentions and creates more work. Thus the associations engage with government to create jurisdictions, in this case ‘safe roofing’. Whilst associations do not describe themselves as creating markets, this is exactly what they are doing, or at least allying with the State to do so. Additional legislation then adds a further purpose to the associations, and further encourages firms to join. Obtaining work is one thing, but the work itself is becoming more complicated to understand with increased UK and EU regulation. This complexity is precisely what helps defend jurisdiction. Associations are able to engage in the creation of these standards and also to keep members informed of the repercussions and new
requirements, but only if they themselves “become semi-professional” and organise to deal
in Brussels. Lobbying for the interests of members balances “laws are passed with the best
intentions” with the reality that “people that make rules aren’t always the most practical.”
Trade associations can engage in discussion and consultation over these issues, and provide
training and dissemination of the results. NFRC1 gave one specific example of how this is
working.

“We didn’t do much lobbying until about four years ago … It was the public liability
insurance … Guys, who were paying £10,000 annually, suddenly it went up to £80,000 …
One MP said to me “you lot are just a load of cowboys and fall off roofs”. We lobbied, we
got two DWP papers, a couple of debates in parliament and we raised awareness
tremendously. The reports compliment us in trying to raise standards.”

The association formalised this one event, recognising the need to continue with this work
on behalf of their members.

“More recently, we formed an all party parliamentary group for roofing which was a bit of
a coup. We didn’t think roofing would be sexy enough.”

The issue of jurisdictional monopoly can be problematic, since organisations cannot be seen
to collude or interfere with markets. TAF1 presented this as a very real concern for trade
associations, that they are specifically required not to operate as ‘closed shops’ and must
operate “very fair and open” membership criteria in order to satisfy consumer protection
requirements.

Trade associations have developed from three different historical bases, with the majority
formed around the end of the nineteenth century to engage in market domination, “their job
was market manipulation”. Gradually they became involved with what might be described
as education, but is normally presented as training and technical standards.

“After the Second World War there was a series of Department of Trade Commissions.
Trade associations were then faced with a dilemma about how, why they exist … Luckily
what saved them - lots of them went to the wall actually - were technical standards … and
Keynesian demand-side economics “

TAF1 offers an interesting paradox, since he argues that there is now a “third era after
Monetarism where associations have less influence”. “Companies don’t join them primarily
to receive representation ... its becoming services ... things that offer direct, tangible, financial benefit for the members". From this, direct jurisdiction through state mediation might be seen to be less available. However, despite a headline ideology to this, there seems to be continued alliance between the associations and the State to defend occupational expertise where safety is ‘created’.

This active defence of jurisdiction presents another example of corporate executive functions by professional associations that are not actively coupled to the identity of its membership. However, this decoupled defence of purpose is not something that is inherently new. For example, Thompson (1968: 148) describes "the fundamental function of a professional institution is to take an assortment of individuals who form an amorphous, inchoate, and half-perceived profession, and mould them by their own self-discipline into a self-respecting profession which commands the confidence of the public". He is clearly expecting a decoupling to occur.

That said, defending the association’s jurisdiction is part of a complex legitimacy function, in which many aspects are interlinked to present a coherent whole. Whilst some strongly defend the right of the associations to progress their members’ interests (for example Goobey 2004), associations tend to be more diffuse. For example, the Association of Building Engineers refers to the objectives of its creation as to promote and advance knowledge, study and practice in the planning, design, construction, maintenance and repair of the built environment (see for example ABE 1993). Similarly, the Architecture and Surveying Institute regarded its mission as bringing together architects and surveyors, reversing the occupational division that had occurred (ASI undated b). RIBA1 and RIBA2 both discussed a virtuous circle of good architecture, which resulted both in better buildings and more work for members. Still, associations, and not just trade associations, also need to promise to benefit their members. The ASI Memorandum of Association promises "to do all such things as from time to time may be necessary to increase the status and promote and encourage the furtherance of their interests as professions" (ASI undated a, section 3(a)). Whilst institutions do not necessarily laud their economic motives and power interests, they do admit a variety of economic characteristics and commercial motives, albeit perhaps for more rounded altruistic purposes. CIOB (1997d: 4) states in a newsletter to members that "our most
important role is to deliver support, recognition and representation of our members in all areas”.

A good example where the corporate executive of associations can be seen at work is within the European Union. *NFRCI* discussed this above. Two themes dominate EU thinking: the principle of professional recognition and harmonisation and the nature and restrictive of competition within professional fields between countries. These are linked inasmuch as the EU perceives individual countries refusing to recognise other qualifications as a means of protecting domestic professionals. This is, of course, exactly what they are trying to do.

Recognition of professionals has resulted in two distinct outcomes within the building industry. Initially, a series of individual sectoral Directives (fifteen in all) regulated and harmonised the professions across Europe. This created the architects' Directive, for example, which caused much argument across the professions. Within this, it was accepted that only architects were qualified to carry out building design work. Other institutes argued that qualified surveyors and engineers were also capable. In particular, UK building surveyors argued that they were "involved in statutory building control, who ensure and assure for the public good that buildings are designed properly and to satisfactory standards. To exclude them is blinkered" (RICS Business 2004a). An amendment to this effect, supported by "the majority of UK and Irish MEPs" (ibid) and backed by RICS (European Alert 2003), was voted down by the European Parliament. The single Directive is still under discussion. This shows a very thorough piece of organisation by RICS, engaging with anti-monopoly rhetoric to promote opening up the architectural occupation, together with a vehement defence of others in defending the established jurisdiction.

At the same time other particularly English issues have been ironed out. The DTI under Directive 89/48 EEC notified the EU member states that corporate membership of ISVA fulfilled the criteria for assessment since the ISVA training scheme was of an equal standard to that of RICS. The UK government recognised ISVA "as a competent authority to award a qualification for the purposes of recruitment of professional activities regulated by law and for the general purpose of engaging in the profession of surveyor and valuer in the UK" (Property Week 1996a). This might have prompted the RICS merger, since it technically
dispelled the argument that ISVA was inferior to RICS, at least from the perspective of the EU. RICS had previously tried to merge with ISVA, but had been thwarted by its own membership, who regarded ISVA members as inferior and ISVA easier to join (see for example Lewin 1997, Estates Gazette 1998a, 1998b). It is also a very good example of strategic action by RICS through incorporation of a smaller institute to retain its control over the judgement of competency in the field of valuation. The ‘executive’ repeatedly brought the issue to the membership, refining the argument and creating an environment where it might be acceptable. Little changed over the years, except the articulation of the argument, the engagement of the trade media in the idea (see for example Estates Gazette 1998b) and the involvement of wider EU factors.

In 2001, EU proposed a single Directive to cover all situations in all regulated professions, confirming that each Member State has the right to determine on their national territory the qualifications and other conditions laid down for undertaking a given profession. At the same time, it recognised that those requirements might be used to form barriers to protect indigenous professionals and work against the free movement of trade and workers. RICS has adopted the position that "recognition should be on the basis of competence and not on the basis of qualification, as a person qualified to perform a specific function in one Member State may have a different professional title and qualification from a person in another Member State qualified to carry out the same function" (European Alert 2002a: 1). RICS has consistently followed this line, setting out its programme to the European Commission when the principle of the blanket harmonisation process was developed (European Alert 2001). In practice, RICS has opposed national statutory monopolies for national bodies and argued against them on a case by case basis in Greece and Spain (European Alert 2001, 2002b), together with the architect issue described above. RICS has actively engaged in establishing surveying in Europe; for example the European Society of Chartered Surveyors (ECSC) to "achieve the truly European-wide profession that must be our aim" (Estates Gazette 1993a). Once again, this has been carried out by an executive only loosely coupled to its predominantly British-based peer collective. It has equally defended itself from those such as Plummer (1996: 17) arguing that EU registration "will change the chartered surveyor status" and weaken the power of a Charter relative to EU recognition. Similarly, they have
also engaged with the European Commission's ideological opposition to the restrictive practices of professional institutions on the basis that they prevent the delivery of benefits to consumers (European Alert 2004a, European Alert 2004b, Charlemagne 2005). Europe provides a good example in which RICS executive officers have engaged in a strategic campaign to create and defend the profession's jurisdiction.

6.5 The Case of Architecture

*RIBA* presented RIBA's vision of validated jurisdiction.

"We are a professional institute ... a membership body ... a learned society. That may sound grand but it covers the development of knowledge that we aspire to. It is a cultural and arts organisation, a charity, a campaigning organisation and it has a trading company too. We’re quite a range of things but that’s not unusual in a professional institute these days. Professions hold a duty to the public and clients that goes beyond minimum requirements of law which everybody operates from. To be a professional you should consider the impact of your work upon the public and your service to client above self."

*RIBA* reinforces what he regards as the ‘outward facing’ view of RIBA, that it is concerned with architecture in the public environment, about a subject engaging with a wider audience, and about a public interest.

"RIBA is very much outward facing. It’s about public good. The trouble with the word professional is it’s so loose. When people talk about professional standards, do they mean something written down and codified for a body of people to abide by or do they just mean high standards?"

Architecture here, then, is the creation of the concept of ‘good architecture’, the jurisdiction of RIBA since they can generate this in the public interest, as opposed to the commercial building of ugly square boxes on cheapest cost grounds. This is not to say that this is RIBA, or even ARB’s, original remit, but it has become their conceptual ideal to reclaim control over the design of buildings. ‘Good architecture’ requires architects, it is highly subjective but it is endorsed by government through CABE. It requires what *Architect* calls “the eye”. This is equivalent to NFRC1’s conceptualisation of ‘good roofing’. However, trade associations are essentially interested in ‘efficient’ roofing, rather than architecture’s socially created ‘good architecture’. NFRC roofs do not leak. RIBA architects design ‘well’ centring..."
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upon the profession as a service to the public good. RIBA1 and RIBA2 both see this as a key
distinction of a professional from a trade association. RIBA1 described those who speak of
profession as describing “standards” And it is here that architectural jurisdiction is
established. RIBA2 argues that this must include the public good.

“I wonder if all the people who call themselves professional would recognise that part of
what they do is supposed to be for the public good? I don’t think that is the case.”

He recognises that cynicism, a late modern theme, leads individuals to doubt the reality
behind this claim, preferring to believe that it is simply a means of promoting the profession
commercially.

“People consider with scepticism bodies’ claims to professionalism because setting standards
and doing the right thing can also be self-serving. Part of the reason we promote the value
of architecture is precisely because if good architecture is valued then that would mean
commissions for our members.”

RIBA1 believes that the creation of a genuine concept to profession was inherently positive
for its members, rather than a desired commercial outcome.

“We think there is a virtuous circle. By doing the right thing as a professional body we’re
also helping our members get the commissions which will enable them to run effective
businesses. You start with the altruism but it serves the members interests as well.”

This is an interesting theme. It describes commercial benefit as a repercussion, but does not
assign its cause as self-interest. Rather, the purpose is to create a group of individuals with
aspirations to profess about architecture, whose association enables them to create a social
organisation to carry out architecture as they wish, whilst providing a superior service to
society. This is the jurisdiction created and defended by modern RIBA, of ‘good
architecture’. It represents the gestalt of architects, whilst providing them with occupational
control and accrued economic benefits. By establishing this meaning to architecture, the
occupation of design becomes one that only RIBA members can produce, and only they can
measure success. RIBA1 accepts that in practice it is a balance of aspiration and reality.

“A profession is a grouping of people with those standards and aspirations and a professional
body that can help to make that circle work. RIBA aspires to that kind of body. We’ve got
33,000 members ... there’ll be some who’ll care only about the letters whether that helps business ... But that is what we’re seeking to achieve.”

Government endorses this interpretation because it recognises the improvements made by professions “in terms of standards and public service”. Government will always have issues with professions, “they don’t want us to be especially privileged”, but recognise their uses too. “They do want bodies who promote and uphold these kinds of standards.” RIBA2 agrees, pointing to the rather ironic position that the government was increasingly looking to a single point of representation to assist it to govern, and create better legislation, even where this meant that it had to create one. Jurisdictional control is thus endorsed by government. RIBA2 offered an example from his previous occupation, working in television post-production. DTI persuaded the UK Film Council to establish UK Post, a representative body. Interestingly, this also provides an example of the expertise and background of an association officer, external to their association’s occupation and a yet experienced within representative groups more widely. Here again is an example of non-peers within the community, authorised to enact association business on behalf of the association. However, government endorses jurisdiction only because of this loose coupling of experts at operating ‘virtuous circle’ associations from the experts at carrying out the occupation.

RIBA1 explained that creating jurisdiction involved a trade-off. In order to obtain government recognition and acceptance as a professional association, then RIBA must offer to serve the public interest. Government is concerned with the interests of consumers and the public, and will “bargain ... continued recognition, support and consultation” for an agreement to “serve the wider public interest and not just be a trade union.” RIBA must represent ‘architecture’ and not chartered architects. This means that RIBA has to “demonstrate that the small group of people” it represents “is indeed representative of the industry as a whole”. Part of this is proving “through democratic processes” that it is “a representative body” (RIBA2). RIBA1 confirms that at “any one time there may be 800 members involved” in association work. Since “in the course of people’s careers they will do that for a while and then they move on” a large part of the membership is involved during a typical career. This level of democracy is something that they admit has limits. Only about 20-25% of the membership vote in presidential elections, for example. Still, RIBA1 argues
that there is still a universal franchise, and that turnout is comparable with certain government elections. The association *did* operate completely democratically and so its jurisdictional control is one endorsed by the peer collective; note, however, that it is created by state-supported decoupled executive officers. *RIBA* recognises the contradictions implicit between an association serving the public interest, and one that is democratically run by, and for, its membership.

"If you are a representative body like that, can you genuinely claim to still put the public interest first? That’s an interesting balance that we sometimes tussle with. We generally find our way through ... and in the end the consultations ... and the council vote on these things follow what is understood to be the public interest.”

This is an important point. Can a democratic membership community serve an external group as its primary cause? Because the jurisdiction is carefully crafted as ‘good architecture’, then *RIBA* argues that public interest and long-term economic self-interest are not exclusive, but complementary. Members serve the public interest.

“I think it goes back to that virtuous circle. The long-term serving the public interest is also in the interest of an architect. There may be a short-term issue where it’s not, but you’ll probably see your way through it.”

Architectural jurisdiction is so well established that *RIBA* was “delighted” and “very glad” at BIAT’s charter success. “We gave our support.” In practice one finds “architects and technologists working side by side” and the associations have a formal alliance. There seems to exist a joint sense of meaning to the architectural occupations. Similarly, *RIBA* is positive about ARB, that both recognise the “uniquely” and “valued” expertise. Both organisations promote competent architects and architecture. Whilst tactical differences exist, these must be put into context with the greater areas of common interest and mutual support.

“We do find ourselves at odds with the Architect’s Registration Board on a number of issues. Not surprisingly, the rest of construction is puzzled and somewhat amused by this because they haven’t got such a body. It was intended to be a light touch minimalist body when parliament introduced it. We see it expanded its range of activities and we do not believe that’s in the public interest or in the profession’s interest. So we have been at odds on a number of things. Other areas we work very well with the ARB.”

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Jurisdiction is created through this ‘virtuous circle’ associated with good architecture. *RIBA* describes it as “in everybody’s interests”. It is the job of officers “to make sure that the virtuous circle is in place”, establishing the jurisdiction of ‘good’ architecture. *RIBA* breaks this down as “serving the public” and “develop your members”.

Architectural respondents were uniform in their interpretation of ‘good architecture’. Generally, they did not regard it as an occupational jurisdiction, but this is exactly what it is. It ensures that architects carry out building design, rather than, say, building surveyors or builders, who are not engaged with the concept. *Architect* explained how RIBA has failed in some of its duties in this regard, but also how ‘good architecture’ is about both architects and the wider public.

“It should be a voice for architecture. To promote the benefits of good design. What its tried to do in the past is just be a technical association for architects, trying to support the architects in their practice. But I think they can do that better themselves. What they can do is be a common voice, a lobbying voice, lobbying the government for change. That’s our view, internally. Clients still see RIBA like a qualification, as giving you authenticity.”

It is this authenticity in design, the concept of ‘good architecture’, which represents the occupational boundaries to the architectural profession. This becomes what *Architect* refers to as ‘the eye’ that architects have compared with others, a socially created concept of ‘good’ design, which is then validated by government as a client and through CABE.

### 6.6 The Case of Surveying

*RICS* argues that surveying has no occupational control, reflecting a widely held opinion. However, she describes a situation where RICS creates jurisdiction through its expression of surveying as a regulated profession. This means that the profession has to create a genuine peer community of individuals aspiring towards regulation. As an APC assessor, she explains what she looks for in aspiring candidates.

“You’re looking for people who have the right attitudes to that and that they know who they are acting for and why they are acting.”
It is this, which creates the occupational control of the varied surveying occupations. Central to this identity is the public good. RICS "is an assurance to the public of a set of standards of behaviour and expected behaviour, hence the "conduct befitting"" (RICS1). In this regard she follows all of the architectural respondents, but there is less tangibility in how this can be expressed within surveying. She also believes that this is an important international feature of RICS, that this construction of meaning has support from within other countries keen to import RICS and its ideas behind profession and the generation of this jurisdiction. "RICS represents a non-corrupt organisation" and clients trust this evaluation that members will be "fair in their dealings", "advanced in their thinking" and "impartial in their advice". This places the emphasis upon "a particular body of knowledge" enacted to "standards". This is qualified by an aside, "whether they're anachronistic is another matter." She believes that there is a very real need for association, perhaps ideally a single profession of the land, because of the demand for increased regulation. Associations provided a useful role for governments in rendering statutory involvement unnecessary by creating a competence-guaranteed jurisdiction. This is a very important point: government desire competent and safe services, and professions produce these within endorsed jurisdictions.

"I think it is important because otherwise you're looking to the state for regulation. One of the things professional bodies can do is to act in an advisory capacity to governments on the implications of legislation. They also have a strong role in self-regulation. A lot of legislation is a result of failure of self-regulation."

RICS1 believes that government creates jurisdiction opportunities for associations to engage with. RICS2 concurs. Surveying is an expertise because it requires "specialist knowledge that are carried out by individuals who take personal responsibility for that and behave in a professional manner." RICS2 describes his role as creating a brand "through our Royal Charter or through the bye-laws". This is necessary to establish a sense of meaning to "the level of technical knowledge" of a professional compared to "what's become known as delivery 'in a professional manner'". What matters, then, is RICS creates separation by its "body of knowledge and expertise that is taught in a structured way and involves a level of education and qualification through a recognised route." A professional has "been through a recognised educational route", which offers clients "a recognised quality assurance." This, then, is the occupational jurisdiction, controlled by a professional body, which is "essentially
the guardian of that corpus of knowledge” and “protector of the public” by ensuring that members “exercise quality control on a continuing basis.” Professional associations “manage the qualification” rather than their members’ “day to day practice”, and thus perpetuate this occupational control over expertise. Jurisdiction is thus the creation of a safe and competent service, differentiated from the quackery of non-members.

6.6.1 Quantity Surveying as a Professional Jurisdiction: the Formal Route

Much of this discussion has created a rather quite abstract notion of jurisdiction. This reflects the problems discussed in chapter 3 concerning the lack of an obvious monopoly. However, there has been a great deal of formalised institutional discussion about the nature of their technical subjects. The example taken here concerns quantity surveying. It is tempting to attribute the following reports to further action by ‘the executive’ to establish the profession, to create a jurisdiction. However, they might equally be produced as solace to a frightened profession, faced with the loss of their authority in the late modern world. For example, one primary source of attack is the computerisation of the quantity surveyor’s traditional duties and which conforms neatly to Giddens’ (1991) idea of expert systems. Finally, they might simply be there to legitimise executive officers and their salaries, offered as proof that ‘something’ is being done with members’ fees.

The quantity surveyor has existed as a separate discipline within the RICS since 1922 when the Institution amalgamated with a separate institute for quantity surveyors (RICS 1970). Until 1973, when building surveying became its own division, the building surveyor was seen as little more than a quantity surveyor, whilst the quantity surveyor was seen to have developed a very precise role as an expert on building costs, cost control, documentation and contracts (RICS 1970). The quantity surveying body of technical knowledge has been the source of a number of RICS studies and reports into the nature of expertise since it seems to have been regarded as continually at risk. This rather throws into doubt the idea that criticism of the professions is a particularly late modern characteristic. For example, Nisbet (1952) considers the history of the profession to be one of active dishonesty, whilst the RICS has continually recognised issues of trust and competence as concerns to clients (see for example Cost Research Panel 1959a, 1959b).
The following offer some analysis of reports concerning the jurisdiction of the chartered quantity surveyor that fall within the timescale of this work.

6.6.1.1 Evolving the Quantity Surveyor

Requested "to consider and recommend action necessary for the advancement of that knowledge which constitutes the profession and the giving assistance to members in its acquisition" (Quantity Surveyors' Research and Information Group 1967: 5), the paper did little more than state the tasks carried out by the quantity surveyor. It recognised that the quantity surveyor had evolved from an essentially post-contract discipline of the measurer to one of primarily pre-contract advice upon cost and design to a given budget. However, it does not seek to establish areas of dominant expertise. This is perhaps because the primary aspects of professional uncertainty, especially the computer, had yet to arrive.

6.6.1.2 The Future Role of the Quantity Surveyor

This report was concerned with "how we foresaw our own specialisation developing in the future, both as regards the range of work undertaken and the development of requisite skills and techniques" (Quantity Surveyors' Committee 1971: 7). It examined the socio-economic and political context together with technological shifts, the latter creating "a sharper distinction between those who handle concepts, develop the relationships, provide strategic advice, carry out important negotiations and those who deal with recurrent situations including data handling and measurement" (ibid: 9). This division does not seem to have remained a problem; respondents experience a roughly equal community and not a hierarchical one.

The report pointed to two current areas of increased work - mechanical and electrical services and civil engineering, and building contractors. The latter is important as the report pointed to the relaxation of the so-called Contractor Rule, which allowed members to work in non-consultancy firms (that is as employees of builders and developers), as a cause for future expansion although one that should be aimed at higher levels of managerial responsibility within those organisations. The report presented new areas of work for the profession in addition: project co-ordination, environmental economics and social
accounting, cost engineering and production and resources control. The clear message of the report is that the profession should expect to broaden out of a narrow and technical cost control function, and engage in wider management functions that impinge upon the costing function.

With reference to the state of the profession, the report finds that practices are likely to merge or engage in joint venture in order to offer clients a far more diverse and specialised service. The report was unhappy at the method in which quantity surveyors were appointed, depending upon "the constraints of patronage" (ibid: 11). It also compared the attitude of RICS with that of RIBA over local government reorganisation stating "we believe that the Institution has not done as much as it could to support the surveyor in the public service. References are frequently made by public officers to the strong line taken by the RIBA during the reorganisation of London government when they pressed for the chief architect posts in all Boroughs and achieved considerable success" (ibid: 11). This shows RIBA better at articulating the nature of architectural jurisdiction, in this case in the form of a need for borough architects.

The fee scale system was seen as essential to "emphasise the professional, as opposed to the technical, aspects of quantity surveying" (ibid: 12). More, the report urged the creation of a single 'all-in' fee scale to prevent clients buying partial services. This, it was argued, would force clients to realise the important role of the quantity surveyor in the wider areas of work mentioned in the report, a clear play in establishing jurisdiction. Whilst clients would effectively be forced to purchase additional services, they would receive greater influence in the design process and better overall construction process.

6.6.1.3 Quantity Surveying in the Public Service

This report argued that quantity surveyors had shown remarkable flexibility in carrying out varied duties for government and that the need for public cost control continued to ensure that the profession was necessary. However, this also reflects a lack of clear occupational boundaries, and, again, repeated concerns that the quantity surveyor was organisationally unimportant in terms of senior posts and authority; its role was primarily subservient to others.
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6.6.1.4 A Study of Quantity Surveying Practice

Published in 1974, the report was critical of the low qualification standards of the average quantity surveyor. It promoted broadening the profession away from a narrow technical base, which has obvious issues for its occupational dominance. This was only possible through education (specifically, entry into the profession through university degrees). This offers an interesting comparison to some respondents. Here, existing educational standards are stated as poor, and universities are proposed as the way around this. Fee scales were also regarded as appropriate, with little enthusiasm expressed for fee competition.

6.6.1.5 The Mason Report

The report arose out of concerns about the level of competence that graduate quantity surveyors were exhibiting, and expressed the arguments between practices who expected technical competence and the universities who did not want to see their courses as technician training. The concern was of "inexplicably differing standards of competence between graduates, and of some practices finding difficulty in employing graduates without the need for further basic technical training" (Quantity Surveyors Education and membership Committee 1982: 1). The report offered a statement of expectation of graduate competence in terms of syllabus and task ability. This is linked to a basic and collective understanding of the occupational meaning of the quantity surveyor. It is seeking to formalise a jurisdiction by establishing what quantity surveyors' ought to know. However, only a year later, there was a new report wondering about the future relevance of this.

6.6.1.6 The Future Role of the Chartered Quantity Surveyor

Published in 1983, this report focused upon the relationship between the quantity surveyor and the client, proposing a direct relationship and an independent attitude free from the constraints of patronage. There was a robust view of the ability of the quantity surveyor to offer valuable cost advice; this needed a division of responsibility and a move away from the architect's control. Peter Graham, president of the QS division, commented that "the architect must recognise ... that the man best qualified to advise the client on cost control and contract administration is the quantity surveyor. The quantity surveyor must therefore report direct
to the client; he must be independent and free to offer unfettered advice. No architect … would expect a quantity surveyor to interfere with advice on matters to do with design or aesthetics" (Davies 1984). This is a strong institutional statement about occupational expertise, and continues a tradition is trying to shift the quantity surveyor from a ‘technical’ to a ‘managerial’ position.

6.6.1.7 A Study of Quantity Surveying Practice and Client Demand

This report was undertaken to examine quantity surveying service providers, especially in the context of a decade of change since 6.6.1.6. Changes to the demand for quantity surveying work were reported. Key here is that this is less about control and more about reacting submissively to ‘the market’.

The report believed itself "particularly timely" (Quantity Surveyors Division 1984: 1) because of a number of background issues. These were the poor state of the UK economy, the impact of technological change and the successful unification of RICS and IQS, which united the profession. However, active control seemed to be giving way to passive reaction to the demands of this environment. Their reaction was to managerialise; the "age of 'the knowledge worker" made this "a priority" (Quantity Surveyors Division 1984: 1). Growth and diversification were recognised in a whole range of different fields, including engineering, taxation, 'general management services', 'consultancy', life cycle costing, project management, and in industries outside of construction. Clients were reported to be dissatisfied with the breadth of quantity surveying advice, the excessive fees relative to their value, appropriateness of services to particular projects, and the length of time taken. In summary, the report recognised the importance of information technology, particularly to cut costs, and wider opportunities for the quantity surveyor's costing and financial control skills.

Again, note that there is no dialogue about creating occupational control, rather there is simply a reaction to shifts in demand and the wider business environment.

6.6.1.8 The Promotion of the Chartered Quantity Surveyor

Here was the first direct effort to create occupational jurisdiction. There was inadequate awareness of the skills and services offered by the profession, but it also found that those
who had regular conduct with the profession found them professional and highly competent individuals offering fair-minded, value for money services. It proposed expansion of the profession; it was too narrowly focussed to be able to offer wider services as lead consultants in project management and similar multi-discipline roles.

6.6.1.9 Quantity Surveying 2000

This report centred on the premise that "the pace of change in the 1990s shows few signs of abating" (Quantity Surveyors Division 1991: 6); again, there is the presumption that the profession was being carried along by inevitability. This change included increased employment in "commercial and contracting organisations", new markets in Europe and USA, a broader "variety of pro-active client-orientated services which emphasise the concept of adding value to the capital project and to the client's business", computerisation of services, and "an enhanced reputation as a highly qualified, competent and indispensable participant in the property and construction industries" (Quantity Surveyors Division 1991: 50).

Ironically, they also pointed out that the economic environment put the profession in a position to prosper. Not only was cost advice specifically required, but this had also shifted procurement and construction contracting into new methods that favoured the quantity surveyors' role over those of others, particularly the architect. Emphasis on the managerial education of the quantity surveyor would further establish this trend. Competition from other professions was recognised, specifically from project managers traditionally working outside the construction industry. These would have to be firmly defended against; again, this tends to be reactive, rather than active control.

Increased graduate entry into the profession was welcomed, as was the computerisation of traditional technical duties. The report did sound a note of caution that it might lose these core aspects of its historical work. However, it assumed that a formalisation of what had traditionally been a two-tier system, whereby mundane technical tasks were carried out by unqualified staff, would occur. The report appears ambivalent to the loss, but did caution that "the profession needs to consider whether it may lose these functions and with them the skill
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base which was once at the core of professional practice" (Quantity Surveyors Division 1991: 30).

6.6.1.10 The Core Skills and Knowledge Base of the Quantity Surveyor

This report continued the tradition of a profession dominated by its environment. There has been little attempt (aside perhaps from RICS 1970) to place the profession at the centre, able to actively control. However here these environmental determinants do open up new opportunities for the evolving discipline. RICS (1992: section 3.3) summarises this as: "The extent to which the QS can continue to be an entirely independent adviser within the Construction Industry depends on how the role changes due to competition from others and the wider market in which the profession offers its products and expertise." Opportunities include international markets and in 'added value services'. Diversification is seen as a positive step forward, and the lack of any precise definition of the profession is an aid to the process. Quantity surveyors are seen as understanding the basics and being able to interpolate from this on behalf of clients. "The quantity surveyor's fundamental knowledge of design and construction from both technical and managerial aspects is at the root of the faith clients have in the professional services offered. 'Pragmatism and realism - 'common sense' - is the basis of what many clients value highly about Quantity Surveying services" (RICS 1992: section 2.3)

The key interface for ensuring occupational control was with clients, and the report recognises the need to keep clients engaged with RICS members. Personal client contact was imperative. "Clients expect the personal contact of their partner or their construction team" (ibid).

Competition for work was between quantity surveying firms, and contractors who were beginning to offer design, management and costing services as part of a 'one stop shopping' service. The danger from other professions was "overstated". This to some extent mirrored the findings of the government inquiry, *How Flexible is Construction?*, into the flexibility of the construction industry which found that "the apparent ability of the professionals to make substantial adjustments to their rate of working has enabled them to cope surprisingly well with some very marked changes in demand in the past. Partly, this has been at the
expense of technicians" (Building and Civil Engineering EDCs 1978a: 19). Of course, the difference noted here over 1978 is not simply an economic downturn (that is a reduction of workload) but a reduction in demand caused by a shift in the type of work demanded. Again, the report points to environmental shifts, but is light on how the profession might control these. It, again, reverts to the need for education, and proposes favouring wider, managerial, skills over traditional, technical, skills.

6.6.1.11 The Challenge of Change

An interesting report, more for what it excludes, than what is discusses. This is yet another analysis of the market, customers and projects that quantity surveyors might be expected to deal with in the future and an attempt to identify the relevant skills the profession needs to develop. However, the professional implications of these are either completely ignored or required to be removed. "Firms are looking for individuals who can deliver results. Whether they are members of a professional body is of decreasing significance" (Quantity Surveyors Division 1998: 19) and not one that the report wishes to oppose. Rather, RICS should "change from protectionism to the role of facilitator ... accept that it is the commercial world that is leading edge ... reflect the need for individuals to remain champions of propriety and fairness, and uphold the charter" (ibid).

6.6.1.12 The Egan Report

This is not a RICS report, but is included since it predicts the end for the quantity surveyor, who is deliberately excluded from the report. Later speeches by the report’s chairman specifically focus on removing him from the industry (see for example Building 1999a). Building (1999b) predicted "their cost-modelling is threatened by computers, their markets by management consultants, and their fee rates by general oversupply". Cavill (1999a: 48) reports "the profession's low status with clients" and that "some major clients are now prepared to pay more for a car mechanic than for a QS" (Cavill 1999b: 44).

6.6.1.13 The Nature of Formal Reports

In general, the passive nature of these reports is their overwhelming feature, mirroring late modern’s expectations of subjective expert systems operated by market-driven firms. These
are all peer-created efforts, inasmuch as the committee responsible for each is of the ‘great and the good’ of the profession at the time. Whether this is the essential nature of any report produced in this manner is difficult to determine. However, they do reflect a wider secondary literature that refers to the increased subjectivitiy of professions. However, since these reports are produced for dissemination, they might also serve a legitimacy function, pretending to acquiesce whilst practical action by an RICS executive decoupled from these continues to define, create and defend occupational control. It is also worth noting that the quantity surveyor also gains from a market-orientated environment since their primary occupation is concerned with establishing costs and legal documentation. Later reports actively seek to engage with these as a new jurisdictional area (for example Quantity Surveyors Division 1998).

6.6.2 Building Surveying versus Engineering as a Discipline

Quantity surveying is unusual inasmuch as it has created far more formal attention to its occupational situation than other professions within the building industry. This is perhaps because of its rather unclear role. It has also spawned other professions, notably building surveying which emerged from it only recently as a distinct division within RICS and was also regarded as being fragmented and without a clear identity (RICS 1970). The creation of the concept of the building engineer improved this through its link with a particular body, ABE, but also confused the discipline by using the ‘engineer’ terminology and being outside of ‘surveying’.

Formally, reports tend to follow the same pattern as those described for quantity surveying, in that they are passive. They analyse the markets available to building surveyors (Building Surveyors Division 1995) and the best way to educate individuals to serve them (Mole 1997). Mole (1998b: 3) argues that defending the building surveyor involves defending the association from those who "see professional affiliations as an unholy alliance seeking to control the market, rather than a power for good helping to assure quality." At the same time, he recognises these affiliations as "just the visible fabric of their 'membership'. A community of people who compete hard in the market place yet together assure quality for customers through professional development, professional standards and tough entrance policies. They
also promote their collective 'brands' of expertise whilst at the same time being, in a sense, independent of the market" (Mole 1998b: 3). Jurisdiction thus resides within the context of assured competency, and this creates the difference within the occupation, rather than discrete service per se. To Mole (1998b: 2) building surveyors are "professional people who deliver a professional service to belong to a professional body that offers support, wisdom and collective knowledge of equals."

ABEI also describes the building engineer occupation as one of collective and selfless interest in co-operation and mutual respect between peers. Again, there is less interest in defending traditional occupational boundaries and more of developing a quality of service; note the equivalence in the following with 'communities of interest'.

"The association was set up to bring together significant numbers of like-minded people ... They could look at things outside of their normal specialism, so they could discuss any problem, getting diverse views, a range of solutions and the opportunity to actually create a better environment."

To ABEI, occupational meaning is contingent and transitory, and externally determined – by government, by clients and by the general public. Individuals approach a professional association when in need of advice in a subject about which they have minimal knowledge, expect validated competence, and believe they can trust in the worth of that advice. Thus, creating and defending a jurisdiction revolves around trust in competence.

"What’s changed over time is the diversification, the response to government legislation, the response to public needs and also public expectations. People ... expect that problem to be resolved in a professional manner."

This requires peer-controlled entry and ethical codes of behaviour in order to create this ‘difference’.

"It is a club, a group of people with like minds, has strict entry criteria, academic criteria, that the individual has to be upstanding within the community."

Note the use of the word “club”, which was used by various respondents in this research. Some used the word positively and others negatively. However, there is a sense of the authentic profession here, an ideal that can provide a particular service, albeit across
Define and Defend a Jurisdiction

traditional occupational boundaries. Professions are rather like nomads, in that they shift their occupational location, but maintain that part of their expertise that will always be required by those who authenticate professions; government and clients. ABEI might be influenced here by the uniqueness of the building engineer occupation, that it is a title created by the association. However, he also argues that associations are only one part of a range of groups that professionals might join, and does not expect a member to be solely a building engineer. This places the concept of a jurisdiction in an interesting area: what is the ABE actually controlling, if it readily accepts the idea of multiple memberships? ABEI expects experts to join associations that reflect their interests and work. This may vary over time. There is a presumption of commercial interest to membership, “it’s how one looks at the added value as to whether you go with another body.” There is competition for membership, and the need to offer what he describes as a ‘professional’ service in itself. Officers had to be appropriately qualified, and in some cases professionals themselves in their relevant field. This mirrors chapter 4, but here it is an executive action based upon this idea of nomadic occupational jurisdiction.

This nomadism is generated by government, which constantly seeks to establish new occupational groups accredited to carry out certain tasks. The actual task is currently carried out by varied, or specific, expert workers, but government seeks to create a new occupational expert. Associations must thus engage to ensure that their members are respected in the process, and that the organisation representing the new group also integrates with ABE. ABEI discusses fire safety, where members are already working in the field. Thus, in one sense, it is an attack by government on ABE. However, ABE seeks to use this to raise the status of itself, and establish occupational jurisdiction, albeit in alliance with others.

“Regulatory Reform Order to do with fire safety, all businesses have to carry out a risk assessment in terms of fire safety. Now it is quite likely that we will see another group of people who might become professional, you know fire risk assessment - whatevers. They may already be doing the work. It’s going to be a new title for a new type of person who’s trained in a slightly changed area.”

This explains how associations operate, and why governments recognise them as occupational ‘residences’ for the competent person. Government recognises associations where they are seen to validate competence in areas that need either formalising for safety
reasons or opening up from public sector monopoly. This, then, is a primary reason that members join associations, since governments are sanctioning them as arbiters of competence on regulated tasks. There are other reasons, including

"the designatory letters, the journals, the publications, the training that is provided ... and the good old sense of belonging."

Professional associations thus create jurisdictions as agents of government. Associations are there for their membership, but this benefits both clients and the general public. Note the mention of health here, a theme ABE1 refers to a number of times.

"The association is there to support its members, to provide facilities for them to develop and to gain expertise. In effect the service to the clients is enhanced because they have knowledge. The way in which they carry out their function should create a much safer and better environment for the public at large."

Whilst this might not be jurisdiction in a traditional sense, what is being created is an idea of competent expertise, of a particular idealised sense of occupation. In this case, the key is a ‘safe’ occupation. This idea was repeated by respondents (for example BS1, BS3) who offered a similar example with party wall work; ABE1 also used this example. Here, others beside their client need safe work carrying out since the party wall is as much theirs as the client who is carrying out work upon it. Associations create occupational jurisdiction by providing this ‘safety’.

Intriguingly, membership might be transitory. Just as he recognises multiple memberships, ABE1 identifies membership as an impermanent need linked to occupation and career. This suggests that associations do not evolve into these new specialisms, but that new associations come into being. Jurisdiction thus has a certain concrete sense of meaning.

"Membership of professional bodies is always transitional. People join because they need to at that point in time. They could be a member for forever or they could...move on because they’ve moved into a different specialism."

Membership is expected by employers and clients, rather than necessarily actively sought out by the individual. Flowing from this is the inference that employers or clients determine which association is joined. Therefore, jurisdiction reflects client and government. ABE1
seems to accept a passive role for associations within their environment; for him, ABE needs to actively pursue a niche within these ‘great games’.

“A lot of people join because there is an expectation. Employers are looking to employ professional people and the qualifications, the designatory letters, are evidence of that.”

ABE also recognises that the peer collective do actively defend their jurisdiction by utilising the weight of their community. Associations are respected by government as knowledgeable bodies for consultation over complicated legislation and regulations. As membership organisations, they have clout due to the number of members, who are also voters and members of the public. However, they also use their professional judgement to enact legislation, to control behaviour and to police safety standards.

The occupational jurisdiction between RICS and ABE concerns how government and clients recognise ‘competence’ and ‘safety’ between the two, rather than recognising either as a dominant technical body of knowledge. Building surveying can perhaps rely upon its chartered status, whilst the ABE executive needs to more actively push its credentials to clients and government. However, ABE is more responsive to newly created occupational niches.

6.7 Conclusions

The surprising issue here is that there was little construction of any technical jurisdiction. In chapter 1 the question was posed as to how the occupation of quantity surveyor is constructed, for example. The answer from this evidence would appear to be that it is not. Rather, professional associations create a jurisdiction based upon membership and the guarantees that this offers in terms of competence. Thus, there is a well founded jurisdiction centring upon the abilities of a chartered surveyor or a chartered builder, for example, but no clear occupation for a quantity surveyor. There are two possible reasons for this. It is possible that since both respondent and researcher work in the industry, then the issue was presumed as too obvious to discuss in the interview. More likely, however, is the fact that since there is no statutory regulation, then the profession is more interested in creating its control in a different way, that of association brands. Trade associations tend to be more
practical, and NFRC's concept of 'good roofing' equates with technical issues, such as not leaking, long lasting and built to appropriate standards. The closest example to a technical jurisdiction within a professional association was the engagement of RIBA with the concept of 'good architecture'. This provides for an esoteric construction of the building product, which follows the expectations of the literature in creating occupational control through socially constructed ways of interpreting success or quality. This is a classic attempt to create an authentic 'ideal type' sense of jurisdiction against a context in which straightforward licence to practice is not present. This creates an identity, what might be termed a 'brand' in the modern sense, of profession, a unique service. Examples include 'competent' surveying, 'good architecture', 'master building' and the 'ethical' chartered professional. Whilst described in functionalist terms, IPHE offers an interesting narrative on the way that an ideal of 'safe plumbing' is created by government regulation and fears over safety, but is also built upon a wider concept of the move towards 'plumbing engineering'. Similarly, 'demolition engineering' is partly created through both client and government concerns over planning and safety issues. Both these do point to the important role that a body of knowledge plays in creating a jurisdiction, mirroring the PMBOK. Section 6.6.1 also shows how important it seems to be for quantity surveyors to establish a 'QSBOK'.

It is accepted that government wants experts, located in a single place so that it can obtain expert opinion in an orderly way, but also that it abhors monopoly. This fine line is reflected by the fact that competence and 'safety' appear to be key determinants in establishing, or re-establishing, occupational control. Certainly, all RICS respondents discussed the need to add to basic government regulation on competence and safety in order to create a 'statutory-plus surveying' construct, creating a stark contrast between the proven evaluated competence of a chartered surveyor and those 'quack-surveyors' outside the association. This generates a jurisdiction of 'competent surveying'. It also forces non-members to follow RICS standards and procedures, again establishing occupational control since the association now organises how work is done.

RIBA respondents did refer to their body of knowledge and wished to retain the idea that architecture was about certain technical expertise. However, most respondents preferred the idea of 'communities of interest' as places where this was found. They still retained their
professional identities, but found technical occupational jurisdictions weak and unhelpful in carrying out their work. The RICS reports in section 6.6.1 also show an almost embarrassing haste to dispose of technical work. This reinforces the idea that occupational control is thus found in the guarantees of competence, ethics, safety and the less tangible issues of quality generated by professions, and validated by government and clients, rather than the more obvious technical knowledge of architecture, surveying and the like.

It is also interesting to note the difference between the confident executive officers interviewed in this work, actively engaged in creating and defending jurisdictions, and the very much more passive reports produced by RICS 1960-2000. This endorses the idea of a vibrant executive, more able to strategically engage with government and clients than the peer collective can. At the same time, it mirrors Johnson (1972) and Miller and Rose (1994), discussed in chapter 2 page 45, and the power of government ideology in creating a particular context for occupational change. In that situation, the need to ‘professionalise’ social work created new opportunities; here, the creation of ‘good design’, safe and competent building services does the same. Whilst it can be argued that ‘good architecture’ establishes cognitive exclusiveness (as discussed in section 2.6), there seems to be greater state involvement than Larson expects within her concept of the professional project. It is not universities that create the knowledge here, rather the state and professions are collaborating in a dialogue on the creation of a superior service. There is also something of the concept of “images” and “image constructs” that Abbott (1988) refers to in this process.

Individual respondents universally reflected this sense of identity. Most discussed their backgrounds as entering an occupation, which they only later came to realise made them ‘professionals’. This reinforces the problems discussed earlier of the status of professions within the industry. There remains a distinction between the occupation and a profession. The result is this careful construction of new jurisdictions. ‘Good architecture’ requires an intense dialogue to create social meaning, which requires the creation of an understanding among the peer community in a way that those occupations not facing these problems do not have to worry about. It refutes the late modern ideas of subjectivity. Dentists know what they do. Surveyors have to be inculcated into the mysteries of ‘ethical’, ‘safe’ and ‘competent’ surveying, rather than the technical tasks of being a quantity surveyor. This generates very
strong occupational controls, which are recognised by, and reinforced, by both clients and
the State. Architects see themselves as designers of ‘good architecture’, and the jurisdiction
creates this identity. This in turn helps marketing and branding, central to the ‘modern’
association discussed in chapter 4. However, the primary role is in creating occupational
control.

Jurisdiction involves creating standard systems, both for training and carrying out duties.
Professional associations create these. They are seen to provide useful functions for the peer
group, not be required by ‘the outside’. They are not externally imposed, but they become
accepted by clients and the government. Or, where clients or the state, are requiring the
associations to act, such as with ARB and indemnity insurance, then professional
associations are taking this and using it to create ‘difference’ and distance from ‘the others’.
Chapter 2 discussed how such disciplining mechanisms might be seen as a cause of semi-
professionalisation (p 40), but here the professions are very much in control of the processes,
and they generate further jurisdictional claims to expertise and determining authority within
the occupation. The chartered architectural practice is managed to standards set by the
association, but confirms competency and quality assurance. Only RIBA firms can create this
validation of competency because only they can be chartered. Chartered surveyors are
branded as competent and safe and RICS establishes rules that create a “common and
consistent basis” (Benge 2008: 18) for the occupation. Government and clients can rely upon
these when employing chartered members in the certainty that they are crafted to reflect
safety and competence requirements. In this way, routinisation is not an attack upon
professions, but allows them to standardise how occupations are organised and ensures that
the professional association becomes the only recognised authority within that occupation.
Chapter 7: Regulate Each Other’s Behaviour

7.0 Introduction

There is a problem with the issue of self-regulation within building industry associations. They do not. Peer members in RICS accepted independent arbitration (McConnell 1998), rigorous self-regulation by an independent executive (Property Week 2001b) and, finally, an independent regulatory board consisting of non-members in a majority over members (Hye 2008). Architects are statutorily regulated under ARB, and, previously, ARCUK. ARBI reinforced the need for this independence in interview. Prior to this RICS had historically relied on the courts to regulate member behaviour (RICS1, RICS2). Self-regulation was difficult and expensive.

The peer community accepts the need to regulate in principle, and believes that self-regulation is a right of their professional status – especially those regulated by Royal Charter. However, professions also recognise that the reality of self-regulation and member behaviour does not always live up to the ideal. RICS (1992: section 2.3) admitted, "most interviewees confessed to a lack of intimate knowledge of the RICS Bye-laws and Codes of Conduct. Indeed many expressed a need to read the regulations ... possibly for the first time. However, all accepted the need to control the behaviour of members, and some felt that the governing force in business behaviour was personal integrity rather than the dictates of professional bodies". At the same time, the report also recognises that relaxation of what are accepted to be 'archaic' codes might be seen as lowering regulation standards. It proposed that disciplinary procedures should be made more visible and that enforcement should be improved; RICS "should more readily expel members who do not meet the required standards and not rely on the insurance industry to police their activities" (ibid).

Associations have always operated disciplinary boards in order to formally regulate behaviour. However, evidence on their practical use in self-regulation is weak. For example, ASI (2000d) reported that its Disciplinary Committee sat "for the first time in over three years" in which they "severely reprimanded" a member, who had earlier resigned. Hirst (1996b) reported that for RICS the "volume of cases going through the disciplinary process
has increased dramatically over the years. Currently there are around 230 cases a year going
to the professional conduct committee and just short of 100 cases being referred to
disciplinary and appeal boards." However, most of these involve fee arrears.

7.1 Peer Regulation: ‘each other’

Respondents did not comment upon self-regulation in any great detail. None had anything
concrete to say about how social control of each other is achieved. Only CDP4 directly
commented upon self-regulation. For him, it was not an issue of whether self-policing did
or did not work. He directly touches on the late modern theme, because “if you are
monitoring yourself nobody trusts you”. It is a perception issue. Professional associations
need to decouple themselves from their members, since external validation is all that counts.
“First of all you need the teeth. Then you have to exercise those powers.” Indeed, most
respondents viewed regulation as decoupled from the community by an executive drawn up
to fairly investigate behaviour. Those who did comment directly upon the issue approved of
third party and non-member involvement.

However, there was some discussion of how members viewed each other, and how they
enforced their own views of competence. This is primarily through a type of patronage.
Professionals will only choose to work with other professionals that they believe operate
‘professionally’. Others are left out in the cold. Many respondents discussed examples of
good and bad behaviour, and how they rewarded or penalised this when looking to create
their next design team (for example QS1, Architect9). Employers also felt the same (for
example Architecture3, CDP4, QS6). Even young professionals expected to be judged by
their peers in accordance with certain protocols (QS5, QS7). QS8 perhaps best articulates
this, when talking about a ‘properly trained’ surveyor.

“What I found dealing with SM is that when I was talking to him, there was an understanding
of what we were talking about and what I was expecting from him and vice versa. You’ve
then got the other contractor surveyors who are surveyors by experience and sometimes they
can have no scruples whatsoever. They can be quite obnoxious.”

Whilst participants did not directly discuss self-regulation, associations explained how they
encourage such informal sensemaking about how peers should operate. These they then use
to deflect external criticisms. For example, IDEI discussed how democratic IDE is, and how creating a collegial gestalt was so important. This particularly applied to those in ‘the executive’ interacting with the majority of the members through forums like regional meetings.

“We are still trying to raise the professionalism of the IDE, to try and increase the standard. We’re trying to make it as professional and recognised as we can. We’re trying all the time to increase the membership. There’s no point in us sitting there in an ivory tower and trying to push it on without taking the membership with us.”

Profession here revolves around the issue of competency, encouraged by government legislation concerning the dangerous nature of demolition. However, given its historic trade and manual basis, competency judged by peers is the focus of the association, although formal evaluation through qualification is evolving. Here then, self-regulation is very important as IDE constructs the idea of regulation through peer collegiality as a means of creating and establishing competence. By creating a coherent internalised view of success, then government will accept IDE as an expert opinion. IDEI’s comments, however, need to be balanced with Turner (2008) in which IDE’s president blasts the “apathy” of the membership in not attending such events. Constructing peer-concord in this way has been well developed as a means of engaging with member behaviour. For example, Dingle (1990) argues that CPD is a means of establishing ideas of success in expert services where objective interpretations of success and failure are difficult to construct. Thus, self-regulation equates to a self-constructed concept of competence in which peers judge each other informally as they work together, and then choose whether to select the same colleagues in future jobs.

IPHEI also covered this theme of creating peer involvement, and points towards the failure of IPHE’s initial attempts to create an objective test of competence. Essentially, he discusses a decoupled executive attempting to create what they determined to be a strategic action on regulation required by the general environment in plumbing.

“We had a scheme [of competent persons] but it failed because our members didn’t want it. They’ve recently introduced building regulations Part P. To become a competent person in electrical work you’ve got to go through all sorts of complicated tests. But of course a lot of people are ignoring it and local authorities are not prosecuting anybody for non-notification.
Government is prepared to use commercial organisations which they approve to deliver better standards. These don’t have the same robustness of appeals and mechanisms and entry requirements as we do. But they’re recognised by government.”

Governments need regulation and are prepared to accept self-regulation by third parties on the basis it is ‘free’, but only where it is shown to be effective. In this case, there is a need to seriously consider the future of water, its recycling and health issues, all of which will force government to acknowledge the need to regulate. “WHO is at last recognising the importance of plumbing in protecting the health of people.” IPHE argues that a peer-created process established by IPHE to regulate itself will establish the types of jurisdiction described within chapter 6. However, this needs the engagement of a non-peer executive capable of transcending the immediate self-interest of members forced to compete in an unregulated marketplace.

“We’re trying to do a professional job. We’re largely governed by the behaviour and the conduct of our members, some of whom let us down. As they would in anywhere else; you get bad eggs. They’re under tremendous pressure not to be professional, because the plumbing and heating industry is unregulated. They may do gas work and that is regulated under the law through HSE by Corgi. But Corgi are not interested in professional behaviour, they’re really only interested in whether the pipe has been put in properly and whether the products of the combustion that takes place satisfactorily. So gas work is regulated only in a limited way.”

RIBA describes a similar situation of a loosely coupled executive engaged in a form of independent regulation of the membership. In this case, peer colleagues generally engage in ‘good architecture’, but they are less interested in what might be described as their ancillary tasks, including contract administration and practice management. This is an example of regulation by systems, what Giddens (1991) refers to as expert systems. However, they are being developed and controlled by professional associations. This is a controlling mechanism, but one to create occupational control rather than lose power to a different ‘environment of action’ (Giddens 1991). It is self-regulation by the professional association as a corporate entity that creates a self-imposed disciplining mechanism, but one for its members’ ends rather than employers.

“We’re trying to raise standards of work by bringing in quality systems, risk systems and employment practices of a higher standard through this chartered practice scheme - which will also have a marketing advantage for our members. If we can demonstrate to clients that
if they go to one of our chartered practices they will get these various standards, then that can be a marketing tool for firms. This is not to raise the standards of design, because generally that’s not where things go wrong. It is in areas of contract administration, those areas where the mechanics of the business are done, where we’re seeking to raise standards.”

Yet again, jurisdiction is being created, here by the ‘chartered practice’ brand that offers an assurance of quality concerning the non-design elements of the architectural occupation. RIBA2 explains that “we have an enormous number of one person and very small practices and a lot of unincorporated sole practitioners.” This makes self-regulation slightly more problematic, since there is no community in the way there might be for colleagues at work. Thus, the professional association steps in and standardises in order to provide a formal self-regulatory discipline. Certainly, some respondents pointed to the individual practitioner as an area where self-regulation might be weaker (CDP4, QS5, QS7) and some architect interviews did discuss the loneliness of the private practitioner (for example Architect5). RIBA1 believes that RIBA is about “supporting people in their practices” and using RIBA’s corporate skills to advise on running a business. This will “help the smaller practices to punch above their weight” and concentrate more on those areas, knowing that business practice has been routinised to approved standards. Again, this proposes a loosely coupled executive engaging in creating formalised competencies in order to judge behaviour, as well as generating jurisdiction. This ‘judgement’ is formulated into a disciplining mechanism, a set of protocols on establishing occupational practices. However, professional associations, and not business owners, establish and control these. The ‘self-’ is the association in this case.

7.2 Executive Regulation: Non-Peers versus Peers

It seems clear that regulation has become decoupled from a pure form of peer self-regulation through informal controls, and that executives have engaged in actively creating a sense of behaviour, which is then formalised into benchmarking standards. This is part of the ‘modern’ mission of associations. ‘Modern’ associations also wish to create more visible and formal systems. Some, like IPHE and IDE, perceive this as part of constructing meaning to the concept of profession. Others, such as RICS, are strategically evading greater enforced
outside regulation (RICS2). Still others, like RIBA, are creating a ‘chartered practice’ brand (RIBA1, RIBA2).

Part of the problem with self-regulation is whether it happens. QS8 was one of the few to comment directly on the issue, and he did not believe that the profession did actually regulate its members.

“RICS doesn’t actually do much to monitor the quality of the professions … Yes I have to send my accounts in as a limited company, yes I have to send in details of my PI cover. I’d welcome a spot check from the RICS – can I see how you do your filing, what do you do with archive, do you still keep your stuff in archive for seven years, can you give me evidence? I know that I do it, but I also know that four out of five practices may not.”

However, BS2 had experienced regulation by the executive, and knew of others who had too.

There has been a perceived issue with ‘falling standards’ and how control structures were, or were not, regulating this. This is usually regarded as a consequence of environmental shifts, especially those linked with market-based performance changes. For example, the report ‘The Core Skills and Knowledge Base of the Quantity Surveyor’ stated that competition and the general fall in the level of fee income that has resulted were the major cause of falling standards. A contractor's quantity surveyor was reported as stating that since the abolition of fees, the client's quantity surveyor visited site less often, left far more work to him on valuations and final accounts than previously, and seemed generally uninterested towards the end of the project when fee income was effectively paid up. "I'm not saying that the PQS hasn't got integrity … far from it … but human nature being what it is … you've got to survive in a difficult world" (RICS 1992, section 3). This was reinforced by others accepting that commercialism and profitability were primary needs of a business and who "felt there to be potential conflict between this clear need and their professional standards" (ibid).

This all points to the need for formalisation of regulation, that peer regulation is too variable or completely absent. This is managed by executive officers, but to what extent are they ‘self’? Executive officers interviewed in this work were consistently not members of their associations. Rather they were employed as managers. Some discussed the evolution of a
new specialised occupation, the association manager (BWF1, FMB1). Some were members of other associations (for example CPA1, CIOBI) and others were not (for example RICS2).

CIOBI considered his own place as a non-member within a peer community.

“I'm not corporate because I never bothered to go for the finals. I joined with the intention of leaving RICS because I didn’t think it did anything for me. Then I got involved with the Environmental Faculty, so I felt it was better if I stayed. So I didn’t bother to progress to full corporate membership. But as a result of my being the Educational Manager I have made the path much simpler for a qualified chartered member from another body to become a chartered member of CIOB. Now it’s purely an interview with evidence of experience. Previously you had to do all sorts of things.”

Executive respondents were unanimous in that what mattered was that executive officers were good at managing the association, including regulating members, and not that they were members of the community. CIOBI, for example, discussed his chief executive, an accountant, and praised him for creating a ‘not-club’, a serious, ‘modern’ and ‘professional’ association.

Of course, this issue of non-peers can be exaggerated. First, RICS1, RICS3, RICS4 and RIBA3 were peer members. Secondly, a number of other respondents did do work for their association. RICS1 believes that RICS is served by disinterested members promoting a genuine meaning of profession from within the Institution.

“I’ve seen the operation of the organisation from an essentially local level through to an international level. The higher up you get, the more evident it is of a strongly professional attitude. There’s a real effort on the part of most people on IGC to stand aside from their personal perspective to take on what is in the interests of the professional perspective.”

Thirdly, there was contradictory opinion on whether executives were peers, or not. Most had some issue of grievance, but the executive impressed RICS1, and none of the others were critical of the abilities of executives; rather, the issue was of strategic direction. Also, other respondents generally were positive about the management of their association, especially with improvements within RICS (BS4, QS2, QS3, QS4). Still, RICS3, RICS4, RIBA3 were concerned about the lack of community within decision-making; indeed, a secretive and devious executive was described at times.
Finally, executives also believed that they did have common values with the peer group. *CIOB1* is exemplar.

“My knowledge of the industry was enough to drive it and to understand the differences. To all intents and purposes, I *was* a chartered member because I acted like one because I understood the process.”

*FMB1* expanded this, that executives need skills not found within the peer community.

“It would make no sense for my role to be carried out by a builder because builders know nothing about government. I’m a former civil servant from Whitehall ... worked for the European Commission and I’ve done public affairs for a FTSE 100 company.”

Only *RICS3* directly criticised executive officers, stating they are neither qualified nor competent in the technical areas that they are employed to police. They are certainly not peers, being “unqualified by experience of the surveying professional business.” *RICS* has “not got the appropriate staff ... and potentially the resource for self-regulation”. Since government is moving towards regulating professions that cannot prove that they are capable of self-regulation, this has potentially disastrous consequences. In this context, he also expressed surprise that the Privy Council has no interest in associations once they have awarded them their charters. It is also impossible to complain about *RICS* staff, which he finds unacceptable “double standards”.

### 7.3 Executive Regulation: Strategic Decoupling

The issue for executive officers is that they must manage, and this requires some level of independence. Continual involvement with the peer community would be expensive. Indeed, it is not actually required by most members. Therefore, strategic decoupling is about efficiency and commitment to excellence of the association as a modern business practice.

The issue for executive officers is the extent to which members are involved within this. For example, *CIOB1* stresses the involvement of members in his work. He also points to the withdrawal of this within *RICS*. In this case, he is referring to members of the community examining those third parties (the universities) that they have delegated to control initial
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entry into their association. Hence, this also qualifies the discussion in chapter 5 upon the relative power of universities.

“There’s no more than 100 staff and we’re managing 42,000 members internationally. The way it’s done is done, the way RICS used to be, using members on panels and committees. And those members, I’ve never seen such dedication. The accreditation panel for university courses are all volunteers. They all spend a minimum of five days a year for the institute looking at the various teaching institutions. Anybody tries to change methods of entry and they were there, hot on it.”

RICS1 considers increased executive control as necessary and desirable, since it is a tactic used to evade greater third party, State, regulation.

“It’s going to become more regulatory in terms of self-regulatory, probably with more officer power. I think clients demand professionalism of their advisors and the sales pitch is to prove that the particular profession is a guarantee of that.”

She admits that managerial action results in a formality that stultified the peer involvement and ‘fun’ in being a professional.

“It was very much a cottage industry and its now slick. The penalty for growth and going structured, focused and professional is that you lose member engagement. The role of the member and the expectation of the member has to be handled very carefully. People don’t want to have it as a club anymore.”

However, this is also a peer community interest, to have a well-run, value for money, association. “It must be an organisation which has a good efficient staff” (RICS1). Collegiality is giving way to a loose coupling in order to allow officers to manage the association as a profession. Knowledge, standards and the public good need rigorous regulation on peers by their appointed officers. This requires loose coupling of regulation from members according to RICS2. The current environment outright rejects self-regulation.

“From a professional body’s point of view its what we do to give meaning to those letters that delivers the continuing value to the profession. Because if the public lost respect in the letters RICS or in the professional body, there would be little reason for anyone to join.”

Thus, it is the duty of RICS to retain this meaning which underlies the more practical benefits that members seek. Officers have a duty to police individual members and create regulations for them to follow in line with their gestalt.
"We have to ensure that whatever we do advances the public interest and the profession. If you look at the Royal Charter for the RICS it is clearly set out, along the lines of 'the object of the institution is to secure the advancement and facilitate the acquisition of knowledge that constitutes the profession of a surveyor'" (RICS2).

He recognises that RICS is a profession partly due to its history and Victorian roots. This still affects thinking today. It is the task of the executive to manage this. RICS2 examines this in the following two quotes. First, he examines the role of RICS, and note the final sentence which implies the need to actively engage with government to manage any such redefinition.

"We have two functions. The first function is quite clear in the charter, which is a public interest function. The second function is to effectively advance the knowledge. The charter talks about ‘to maintain and promote the usefulness of the profession for the public advantage’. Over time the question about what is the function of a professional body has changed slightly. What’s happened since 1868 is that the concept concerning what the public advantage is, has been redefined by successive governments.”

Secondly, this creates a very practical requirement for executive officers to manage members and regulate them as a quasi-third-party.

"My role is to regulate members of the profession in the carrying out of their professional duties in the public interest. If we do it properly, they’ll do it properly. And if they do it properly, we have a virtuous circle. That is the purpose of regulation. The object of my role is to ensure that there aren’t any problems. My only concern is in terms of what I broadly define as our continuing quality control of our members. There is a fundamental difference between a professional body which has that quality control and regulatory role, and a membership association which is there in a representative and a trade association role. One is there as a public interest and the other is there to represent its members. The two are hugely different. Sometimes our members don’t fully understand that. A professional body, if it has a Royal Charter, has a public interest function. In certain circumstances the public interest function must override the trade association function in terms of public policy.”

RICS2 is very clear that even though it is a member association, there are situations in which the executive officers would feel obliged to work against their members’ self-interest. This is required both by the original Charter and the existing political environment that distrusts the ideal of self-regulation. Professions only exist because they are seen to be useful in regulating competence.
Again, there is a purpose here. RICS is aware of the need to modernise, to revise its rules so that they remain valid in the light of changes in statutory provisions. "RICS has acknowledged that its current rules of conduct are out of date in a modern commercial environment" (RICS2). However, most interestingly, this involves a shift in emphasis. Whilst the membership is made of individuals and it is "entirely appropriate for a professional body as a regulator to regulate individual members conduct", RICS believes that it can no longer regulate the members on that basis. "It is becoming increasingly difficult in a modern corporate environment to regulate the conduct of business through individuals". This is very interesting, because it is about regulating the occupation, and not those working within it. "We are now looking at ways to regulate members through their companies and to look much more closely at a corporate responsibility and individual control within that."

He also points to the increase in government regulation, and state involvement in regulating the functions of the surveying profession; for example, Home Inspectors with their own statutory and "different regulatory framework, qualification and entry standard." He is not impressed with government, suggesting that "when they consider there is a particular area they need to regulate, the government sets up something and lets the rest of us try to work out how we’re going to deal with it." This has involved RICS in negotiation with the government about how this might be devolved to themselves as a professional association, rather than directly sanctioned and qualified by government evaluation.

"From the point of view of our members, we’d like to offer them a full regulatory service for whatever function they might wish to carry out, be it RICS regulated or government regulated. We are therefore in negotiation with the government about whether we can pick up on behalf of the government certain regulatory functions. RICS is in the process of converting itself to a designated professional body under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to effectively regulate those members who want to do insurance mediation as an ancillary activity, rather than make them be regulated by the Financial Services Authority."

For this to be successful, members must accept that RICS is no longer simply a member association but that it is a qualifying association with divested government authority. This will substantially shift the relationship between the association and its members, and the members and the officers. At some level, the officers will become quasi-government inspectors, rather than simply servants of the membership. The members will, however, gain
relative autonomy from both direct regulation and independent scrutiny. “We’re heading to pick up more statutory regulations, so that members would have to deal with the government less” (RICS2).

RICS is quite prepared to evolve its “Victorian” bye-laws to serve these ends, in the interests of retaining its primary focus on competence and standards. This involves decoupling the peer collegiality of individuals into corporate regulation by officers separated from the community. “By the very nature the regulatory and the membership side of RICS are going to move further apart. The member is going to have to begin to understand much better than he or she does now that RICS regulation is not part of a trade association” (RICS2). Profession is an ideology, rather than a community, and it needs to be generated by executive officers quasi-independently. “It is a different sort of body that has certain statutory functions that it has to carry out whether or not the members like it.” RICS2 describes the future as two separate bodies, officer-entrusted “RICS regulation company” and the peer community “RICS representation company”. Government adopts a “consumerist approach” to regulation, expecting “a free independent redress mechanism is built in”. This requires a looser coupling of the two parts of RICS, if the members’ real interests in the quality of the qualification and the status earned through membership are to be retained.

However, peer involvement also has its place. Whilst the executive officers might ‘run’ regulation, it is the peer group that are actually able to judge issues of competence since they are the experts. FMB1 clearly illustrates that members are the best judges of the quality of work for other members facing complaints.

“We do use our members when its appropriate. If there was a complaint, then another member may go and review the work. That’s a job that they can do and I can’t because they obviously know what’s good work and I don’t.”

There is a principal here of independence in the process, even though the actual judgement is a peer-constructed view of competence. Executive officers manage a process, and establish benchmarks. Some of these are not peer-judged and can be quite obvious. The executive can check insurance and corporate registration, but subjective views upon the quality of work are taken from other members and professionals.
"We now vet our members quite significantly. We ask for references from six clients. We ask for a professional reference, for example from a surveyor or an architect. We check their VAT status. We see their employers liability insurance. We do credit checks on the directors and on the corporate entity. We ask existing members in the local area to give their opinion as to whether a builder is good enough or not to be in membership. When we have all of that information together we then make a decision on whether an organisation can join."

This is an on-going process to raise standards, but it involves a formal "inspection regime for our members." However, whilst members might have to transfer authority to their executive officers, this development has been recognised by the external world, especially government. FMB is now accepted as expert within its field and no longer has to defend itself as such. Thus, controlling and creating jurisdiction are very much part of the same process as developing regulatory mechanisms. This requires the executive to decouple and routinise enforcement of this from the woollier peer-established 'club' parts of FMB.

"We have won the fight for representation such that on the vast majority of industry groupings where we would wish to serve, we are able to do so."

Participants voiced a similar interpretation on the nature of profession. Most accepted the need for non-peer regulation. Indeed, they expect this to be done by their clients anyway. RICS members approve the governance changes. However, there are dissenters. RICS3 was elected to IGC on a reforming platform, that RICS is not representing the members. RICS faces a "difficulty in maintaining original high standards, starting with education". At issue is the control of entry into the profession. "The examinations when I qualified were very tough." However, since then "standards have been relaxed."

RICS is also diverging from its members' interests in their claim to serve the public good. Note RICS3 is completely at odds with RICS2 over the nature of the Charter. For RICS3, a professional’s sole duty is to his client. It cannot be elsewhere, and RICS is misleading everyone by claiming otherwise. RICS is a members’ organisation and therein lies its duty. Members will serve the common good since they are professionals; they do not need to be reminded of this.

"RICS was founded by seven Victoria surveyors, who recognised the need for co-ordination of the services they could deliver and the necessity for ethical values ... Part of the Royal
Charter is that you owe a duty to the public. They were professional people and a professional owed a duty to the public as to standards of behaviour and fairness, honesty, etc. Now RICS about two years ago were trying to promote themselves by saying that the duty to the public was greater than the duty to members. This was one of the early battles we had in reminding RICS of their founding charter and that it was a members’ organisation first and foremost, who, collectively by peer pressure and example, determined the rules. Duty to the public should never be operated to the detriment of the right to trade.”

This point returns his discussion to the central theme of how a meaning can be given to profession as a members’ organisation. The answer to the question is behaviour. Professionals are in a trade, they commercially sell their service and make a profit. However, they do it in a manner approved by their peers, ethical standards “you set yourself or agree to abide by as a member of a learned society”. Unfortunately, RICS3 is not convinced that this is true of RICS today, that it has allowed this code of behaviour to be over-written by the needs of expansion into new countries and new occupations. “My main criticism of RICS is that they have sold their soul to the devil for a quick profit.” Thus, he recognises the existence of the decoupling of executive control from members, and objects to it. He does not feel it is necessary, and it is at odds with the self-regulatory social controls that chartered surveyors recognise. He also sees a subsidiary purpose in the action: it creates a tyrannical, income generating domination of the peer collective, and removes any form of control over the executive from the membership. RICS3 is convinced that the central issue for RICS is income generation and the need to finance its existing infrastructure, that the organisation has a voracious appetite for ever more members and income. Discipline is a means of income generation; it is “part of the business plan”. Members are prosecuted in order to exact fines as a source of income. Plans “expect a certain revenue to be obtained from the imposition of conduct regulations.”

Most participants were not especially keen to be involved with their associations. That said, some were involved, enough to ensure that peer participation remains (RIBA3, Architect11, Architect16, QS3, QS4, QS11, QS12, RICS1, RICS3, RICS4 for example). Others thought they might become involved later in their career (BS6). Both RIBAI and RIBA2 admitted that voting turnout in presidential elections is low. RICS2 pointed to satisfaction surveys carried out by RICS that generally point to a satisfied membership, but also one rather uninterested in its running.
Associations also recognise that their own organisational structures can be problematic (discussed in chapter 4). ABE1 specifically talked about ABE’s new governance model, which reflected the difficulty of getting members to work within the association. Most members are too busy to involve themselves with the ABE’s management and governance. They had now formally devolved executive functions, preferring an auditing regime.

“I think the real change is the recognition that ... professional organisations are really businesses. The governance model is geared around the directors making strategic decisions and then leaving myself as Chief Executive and the staff to deliver on it. Which allows a far greater response.”

Architect13 also pointed out that since firms desire to become chartered practices, they had to encourage membership. The result was that many members have their fees paid by the firms, and thus have very little interest in the association or value for money in it.

“That means that practices want to be registered practices. The problem is that for a practice to be registered it has to have 80% of its architects as members. Most architects wouldn’t voluntarily do that because it’s too expensive, so the practices end up paying subscriptions for their architects to belong.”

QS6 made exactly the same point. RICS1 stated that RICS was aware of the problem and considering taking action against this in order to foster greater peer engagement. Self-regulation is likely to be very low on the list of priorities to such members, although RICS2’s point about regulating firms has particular implications to such members.

7.4 Third Party (State) Regulation: ARB

Architectural respondents were generally dismissive of ARB’s role, that it was confusing to clients to have two conflicting bodies. Whilst RIBA operates through self-regulation, ARB has a statutory code of conduct, defining the State’s minimum expectation of professional standards. ARBI describes his role as follows.

“Professional bodies obviously have codes of conduct but we as a statutory body have a code of conduct which we’re required under our statute to issue, which describes the basic standards needed by architects in order to be allowed to call themselves architects. We have an independent tribunal called a Profession Conduct Committee and would take a view of
whether you’d behaved badly or not. If you had it could fine you or reprimand you, suspend you or in the worst cases remove you from the register.”

There is, therefore, a State sanction to remove one from the peer community, or at least from the register. This decision is interpreted by ‘independents’. ARBI argues that the wider community needs to accept the process and quality of regulation. ARB, as a statutory body, adds credence since it was set up to protect clients, and not professions.

“And don’t actually place the emphasis where it should be, which is that they put the interests of their client first. Codes of professional bodies are sometimes attacked for being about themselves.”

ARB is constituted so that it can display independence from the community that it polices. Note also that the emphasis is placed upon serving the client “first”. The code is written “in the public interest” for the benefit of “clients”. This rather assumes that the two interests are identical. At the same time, this independence has ‘teeth’, because ARB actively prosecutes.

“Statutory registration … does mean that the title architect can only be used by people on our register. People who try to pass themselves off as one of our registrants can be prosecuted … You might end up with a criminal conviction. And that’s really helpful to consumers because it means that as long as they are using a registrant, the assurance is there as to education standards and probity and quality of service.”

ARB is the focus for external parties concerned with this issue of competence. To ARBI, ARB’s qualification is recognised as a better judge of competence and a more rigorous regulatory mechanism by clients than that of RIBA as a qualifying association. The collective view of the profession might presume competence, might even qualify it, but ultimately only a regulator can independently validate it. And, so it is to ARB that clients will refer.

“Clients often ring us to confirm that the person really is what they say they are … want to confirm that the person is registered and that they’ve done nothing inappropriate. And it’s to us they’ll come and not to a professional body.”

Clients validate service through ARB, but they also seek redress when their expectations are not met. When they refuse to accept peer-established judgement on competence, “they’ll make a complaint to us.”
*ARKI* also discusses the nature of regulation. ARCUK “was composed of people who were architects” unlike ARB.

“The majority are appointed through the Privy Council to represent the users of architectural services and the public interest. ARCUK was an independent statutory body but it was dominated by the profession. ARB is dominated by the public interest.”

*ARKI* respects the idea of peer-created success measurements, and points to the need of regulation to respect peer controls as well. ARB simply shifts the balance of power.

“I don’t want to overrate that because the board has seven architects elected by the profession and of course the board couldn’t operate within the field for which its responsible if the presence of architects and their contribution to the board wasn’t huge and formidable. The board may say what’s good practice, but it’s the architects who are going to tell us what good practice is.”

*ARKI* believes that government is, perhaps, uncertain itself of its regulatory versus deregulatory tendencies. Whilst much rhetoric remained about deregulation, reality suggests that regulation is taking place more frequently. *ARKI* hoped for ‘lighter touch’ regulation, a balance achieved in architecture.

“Government does have an appetite for regulation. However the rhetoric from government is deregulatory. They’re consulting at the moment, saying to regulators – for gods sake don’t take a sledge hammer to crack a nut. Be focused, be rational, deal with risks, don’t burden people with unnecessary stuff. We think we’ve got it exactly right. We don’t want to burden the profession but we do want to root out … problems.”

*ARKI* recognised that the government was ‘consumer focussed’ and would respond to those demands with immediacy. The building industry has a poor reputation, so it might be expected that government would step in “to tidy things up”.

Architecture respondents prefer the idea of a single point of regulation, because they find having two bodies confusing, and explained that clients find it bewildering. There does not appear to be a profound opposition to the principle of external regulation, rather with the duality. Most also believed that ARB protected the title ‘architect’, rather than provided effective regulation. *Architect 11*, who had direct experience of ARB through his presidency of RIBA, stated that “I loathe ARB” and it is a “menace” His arguments were that they had extended involvement beyond regulation, and that ARB is incompetent.
“They have sought to go beyond what the Act empowered them to do and have sought to become an institute. They deny it categorically now, but I happen to know because the Chair of that, Miss Cody, asked me once to meet her and told me that ARB were going to take over education, lock, stock and barrel, full stop and they will award the RIBA exam. To which I replied “over our dead bodies, there won’t be an RIBA exam if you do that”. Anyway we won that battle, but they have sought to expand their influence beyond what they should.”

His second complaint concerns their competence. Again, there is little to add by way of commentary.

“They’re incompetent at what they do. I’ve defended architects who’ve been put before ARB who have brought, not charges against them which I think were a reasonable affair, that’s another issue, that’s a subjective issue, but they brought charges incompetently. They have simply not known what they were talking about. I’d put it that strongly, staggering, mind-blowing, hopeless incompetence from an organisation that would say, if I put that on record, they’ll sue, they’ll take an action against me for libel or slander. Well its on record and they can take it. Mind-blowing incompetence and I’ve got the evidence of it, so they’re useless, so get them out for that reason as well.”

Certainly, RIBA’s engagement with ‘good architecture’ and the moves towards ‘safe’ and ‘ethical’ services (discussed in chapter 6) clash with this interpretation of regulation. However, given the earlier discussion, it is ARB that appears the less relevant to the regulation of competence and behaviour. Government engages with professions in ways that remove the need for the existence of ARB. Indeed, its own consultation confirmed this (DoE 1993). Still, ARB does provide a determining authority for the formalisation of behaviour, and it is a role that provides architecture with less of a need to decouple itself as a community from its role as a regulator.

7.5 RICS Engagement and Approved Decoupling

It is worth noting that RICS has recently agreed a new governance model (RICS 2008, Gould 2008) concluding a decade-long process of analysis of self-regulation. It is not possible at this early stage to examine what differences it might actually make, or how dialogues about meaning of profession will be altered.

RICS was involved with the London Society of Chartered Accountants' (1996) The Ethical Business in Britain report, which requests that the professions review existing codes of
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ethical practice, incorporate ethics into training and discipline violators of the code. "Trade associations and professional bodies should reassess the standards which their membership must unequivocally meet, provide mechanisms to assist compliance, punish deviance and provide redress" (LSCA 1996:16). RICS president McKendrick stated that "fair, efficient and effective disciplinary procedures are an essential feature of any credible profession. Our clients must have confidence in our ability to regulate our members' conduct in the public interest" (Seidl 1997: 52). CSM (1998c) described the principal behind this move in the following terms: "public trust is pivotal to the success of any professional body. Members of the public must have faith in the ability of organisations such as the RICS to regulate the conduct of their members and offer satisfactory complaints handling procedures. And if self-regulation is not seen to be an effective bar to misconduct then independent stewardship will be called for."

An EGM was held in 1997 to allow the peer collective to endorse new proposals resulting from a study into methods of investigating inadequate members (RICS 1994b), a practice group workshop (RICS 1994c) and working party proposals (RICS 1996a, RICS 1996b). RICS (1994c) determined the need to protect and promote the Charter, particularly within the context of that time where government was presenting various citizen charters on rights and service standards. It was agreed that through their membership, members agreed to abide by rules in order to protect the common good and thus also accepted the need to be regulated on these rules. As the report noted "there is no compulsion on anyone to be a Chartered Surveyor who wishes to practice the art and skill. Although the Profession does not have much outside interference, it is in its own interests in order to maintain the respect and standing of the Profession to police the profession voluntarily and effectively" (RICS 1994c: 3). The primary purpose of revision to disciplinary procedures was to make them transparent and show that complaints were dealt with seriously. This was linked with long term educational investment and an audit of members' competencies (RICS 1996a).

The working party expressed concern at the vague definition of complaints, given the split between monitoring and disciplinary enforcement. Of the 1968 complaints received in the twelve months ending September 1995, the causes varied from ethical - such as advertising (71), conflict of interest (89), solicitation (69) - to professional - criminal convictions (9),
negligence (722) - and a number of vague categories concerning estate agency (208) and managing agents (205). The essential proposals from the group were to rationalise and formalise the process, and their proposals were effected as described below. This need was also the basis of a second working group (RICS 1996b) which considered the process of complaints handling. Again, the needs were described as to:

- satisfy the public that the RICS "has effective measures in place to deal with complaints against its Members" (RICS 1996b: 3)
- provide a progressive set of procedures within firms
- "maintain and enhance the Institution's role as a self-regulating body" (ibid)
- provide a cost-effective system

The paper offers an interesting comparison between professional services and mundane goods and services who "are heavily regulated by legislation which provide remedies for customers" (RICS 1996b: 5). This suggests that RICS was already aware of the need to recognise consumer protection as a dominating theme. The 1996 position was heavily criticised in comparison to the voluntary arbitration schemes found in the travel industry, since RICS had no effective measures that could be taken against members under complaint. "The provision of professional services is no different from the provision of other services" (RICS 1996b: 5). This is a startling admission in itself, but also underlines the importance that the working group placed upon the need for reform. At the same time, it stressed the need to allow firms to handle complaints internally in the first instance. The creation of formal procedures for dealing with complaints was expected to resolve "some 90% of all complaints" (RICS 1996b: 16), with mediation and then compulsory arbitration resolving the remaining cases, roughly equally. The approval of the EGM led to the creation of a 'complaints handling' handbook for the profession (RICS 1998a and see CSM 2000x). This provides another example of systemisation, but, again, unlike Giddens (1991) themes of powerlessness and appropriation and of commodification, RICS regains control. Indeed, arguably, it obtains control for the first time.

Prior to the 1997 EGM, the RICS operated a two-tier system. The Institution's Monitoring and Investigation Committee determined whether there was a *prima facie* case to be heard,
and would then refer it to the Professional Conduct Committee. The member was allowed to be present at this hearing, which could determine that no action was required, offer a reprimand or a severe reprimand, or refer the case to the Disciplinary Board. Here the Institution's disciplinary solicitor prosecuted a case, and a member might be present (though this was not required). It had the same powers as the earlier committee, but might also expel or suspend a member. There was an appeal board against any decision.

Lay membership on disciplinary boards was approved at the same EGM by 13,796 votes to 2,993. Out of a membership of over 80,000 this suggests that self-regulation is not a burning issue. However, future president Richard Lay described accepting lay regulation as a "slippery slope" (Property Week 1997).

Complaints handling regulations were finally implemented on 24\textsuperscript{th} June 1998, and consisted of two parts (RICS 1998a). First, the regulations demanded that all firms operate a formal procedure to deal with all complaints. This includes employing a person to be responsible for operating the scheme, making this name known with a timescale within which problems will be dealt with. The procedure must include an automatic internal appeal system, mediation facility and ultimately automatic referral to the Surveyors and Valuers Arbitration Scheme. The second part of the publication offered advice upon the minimum acceptable requirements of setting up such a system. A handbook offering advice on involvement of insurance claims was also issued at the same time (RICS 1998b).

Since RICS requires its members to undertake Professional Indemnity Insurance (PII) in order to insure clients against incompetence, the introduction of these systems is, again, a deliberate attempt to gain further occupational control. Rather than leaving members powerless, they now have a unified regulatory protection from external groups. RICS expanded guidance to members in the public sector and those working in the private sector for non-chartered surveying firms (RICS 1989, RICS 1993, RICS 1997a). RICS accepts that firms uniformly insure employees against such claims, but requires members to ensure that such provision is adequate and maintained. Since 2003 it is mandatory to pay a small insurance charge included in the membership fees as cover against liability should an employer's provision prove inadequate. Whilst Giddens (1991) accepts that Modernity
provides attributes of unification and of authority, this is a very concrete example of how systemisation benefits the peer collective. Whilst ostensibly creating better and external regulation, it embeds this into professional indemnity guarantees to clients, cheaper insurance to members and recognition by state law enforcement agencies of the prima facie superiority of professional codes.

RICS continued this engagement through the latter stages of this thesis, notably with the Carsberg Review reporting for approval at an EGM in November 2005. This was established with the broadest remit to review the philosophy underpinning and the methods by which the RICS regulates its members. Jansen (2005) reports that central to the review is to "consider how the RICS can continue to regulate a profession increasingly dominated by large corporations rather than partnerships, whose directors may not be members." Carsberg compared surveying with his own profession, accounting, suggesting that surveying yet had to suffer a big scandal and that his aim was to keep it that way. RICS complies with current best practice, Simpkins (2004b: 16) quoting Stephen Gould, RICS' director of professional regulation and consumer protection, that "as a leading professional body, it behoves us to keep ahead of the game ... I think we would rather control the process ourselves, with an independent person making those judgements for us, than to have a review foisted upon us by government." These were formalised into new rules of conduct and regulation (RICS 2007, RICS Business 2007, Gould 2008) and corporate governance (RICS 2008).

7.6 Competency Enforcement: Losing Members versus Control

One final point of interest is the wider place of regulation within these 'modern' associations. Oddly, whilst chapters 4 and 5 both examined the issues of entry standards and increasing numbers of members, all executive officers interviewed were very clear that regulation was paramount, even if it meant losing members, and thus income. This suggests that there is a belief, at least within the executive, that the exclusivity and competence issues discussed within chapter 5 concerning admission criteria is better dealt with by efficient regulation. Behaviour and its regulation within the community is a better gauge of the quality of a profession than its entry procedures, especially when faced with wider environmental considerations such as widening participation. This is, of course, a similar position to that
made by trade associations, and what might be termed the semi-professions such as IDE. This does have certain issues. Controlling behaviour is much more expensive than setting entry standards.

“Inspection is prohibitively expensive but we do what we can within the limitations of the fee income. We investigate complaints from the public. We’re not shy in throwing people out if they don’t conform...we’re pretty vigilant” (IPHE1).

By IPHE1’s own admission membership was falling and ‘plumbing’ remained difficult to embed as a profession within the public domain. Education is key to the competence and knowledge standards set, but remained a serious problem with the “emergence of fast track plumbing training after which you can call yourself a plumber.” Colleges are no longer prepared to invest in expensive technical courses and the result is fewer courses, demotivated students, “bums on seats”, and courses that are far too short to offer rigorous training. But IPHE1 pledged to maintain regulation, even though it deters new members.

More bluntly, RICS2 argued that RICS as an organisation has an obligation to work in the long-term interests of the entire profession, regardless of the short-term problems that this might cause individual members. The institution is quite prepared to lose members if it has to, in order to maintain its integrity and follow the requirements of the Charter.

“If RICS was looking at a major policy issue and took a view...that was an anathema to 12,000 of its members, RICS would be obliged to publish that view.”

7.7 Conclusions

Respondents were generally uninterested in the issue of self-regulation. This is probably because few had any real experience of poor colleagues. A number did point to how informal networking points to good and bad people to work with. However, this information was not formalised and provided to the association. Generally, it seems to be felt that associations can be left to regulate, an accepted area for de-coupling. Equally, there is no serious opposition to external regulation. Architects are resigned to ARB, and regard it as mostly irrelevant. RICS members are impressed with their association’s modernisation, and accept its movement towards a decoupled quasi-judicial regulation. There is a general acceptance
of the need for regulation, audit and continual monitoring. Architectural respondents were happy that other professionals monitor their work. Clients frequently will not simply accept a design, but employ a second practice to validate it. Those working alongside or under the authority of others were similarly content for their work to be audited by colleagues and managers. There was no evidence that this regulation fractured the community as discussed earlier (p 36), although the sense of community is not as authentic as Goode (1957) might have expected. Professionals in the building industry do not have strong social conventions in the way that barristers might, as will be discussed in chapter 9. Most participants were trade-orientated pragmatists.

The identity of the ‘self’ in self-regulation is located in the executive of associations. As a means of strategic engagement, professions have accepted the general view of the need for third party, ‘independent’ regulation, but have constructed this within their own associations. By accepting the prevailing consumer protection dialogue, they have created a free regulatory system for customers. This is also formalised in order to grant it legitimacy and create a disciplining mechanism for all members. However, this also creates a benchmark to measure those outside the profession and identifies them as deviants. Hence, it creates occupational jurisdiction for associations. This divides the association into a representative peer community ‘club’ and a quasi-independent regulator. One issue is whether this also fractures the communal identity of profession. The suggestion here is that individuals accept the need to be controlled. That their professional associations are carrying it out provides benefits that generate their support for the project.

One key issue here is that business owners are not involved in regulation. Associations are controlling the regulation process. Indeed, both RIBA and RICS described how they are enacting regulatory regimes on businesses. CIOB operates a similar scheme. There is a suspicion from the secondary literature that firms are co-opting professions into creating new systems of controlling the workplace. The view of the associations is that it is they that are taking over this process to produce routines that they establish and control. The fragmented economic organisation of businesses gives the associations greater power in establishing these protocols. This then allows them to retain control, whilst providing clients and employee organisations the regulated workforce that they desire. Both IDE and IPHE are
examples where regulatory control is being constructed through a process of social construction by peers without any involvement at all of clients or employers.

Members might rue allowing the decoupling, of course. Giddens (1991) expects feelings of powerlessness within late modernity, and the individual peer member might find his daily life one of a routinised slog through process. As was discussed within chapter 3, professions have traditionally laid stress upon an individual’s professional judgement. Older respondents described how, having qualified, they were left to do their work as they saw fit. Now, members might find themselves continuously monitored. Most respondents accepted this, even welcomed its gains. After all, it provides benefits to them. However, the fact that more concern was expressed about controlling admission, sometimes vehemently, rather than in regulating colleagues, does suggest that respondents are yet to realise that whilst they described the need to be constantly validated, they have yet to realise the true meaning of this.

Government recognises professional associations as acceptable judges of competence and behaviour, recognising the decoupling of this quasi-judicial regulatory function from the trade-specific. This also suggests that associations are engaging with this as a means of dealing with the wider environmental pressures on education and membership. Rather than fight a difficult ideological battle on the issue of exclusivity, they are relying upon a discourse on competence and consumer protection to regulate behaviour and control membership. Thus, entry to a profession will become less the mark of a peer, but, rather, greater emphasis might be placed upon CPD, but will certainly be focussed upon behaviour and competence created through these new rules of procedure.
Chapter 8: Defend and Enhance Corporate Status

8.0 Introduction

It is probably unhelpful to distinguish between defending and enhancing corporate status in this thesis. As was discussed in chapters 3 and 4 status is frequently viewed as being low. Thompson (1968) regards RICS as something of a 'rump' of rejected occupations left behind by the association of others. RIBA's published history describes a tableau whose "foreground is filled with men of ability; some of them famous and many of them with a wide knowledge of learning, whilst the background is dimly peopled with others neither rich nor furnished with much ability and living peaceably in their habitations unstirred by the eloquence or wisdom of their more energetic brethren" (Grotch 1934: 2). Whatever their past, Watkins et al (1996: 1) place associations within "this era of widespread and rapid change". This creates their concept of the 'modern' association, required to engage with what Friedman and Mason (2004a) refer to as the professionalisation of their organisation, management and governance. This is less an issue of 'enhancing' status, more of a defensive rearguard action.

RICS provided a rather more positive view on the status of associations. Members join RICS not because it gives meaning to a concept of profession, nor because of its 'professionally' managed executive, but because of the qualification and the status that it affords.

"The member's survey suggests that most people join RICS because they believe that the badge provides them with both status and qualification. They value their RICS qualification which is a passport into the property marketplace ... They join because it's the world-leading body in property and construction"

Thus, enhancing status is central to associations. This involves a defensive discourse against critics of professions and creating strategies to maintain admission standards. However, it also requires the 'modern managers' of the associations to engage with the jurisdictional and regulatory issues discussed earlier. Professional associations are not simply peer groups, but include external regulation of their community by employed officers.
8.1 Modern

One theme that has appeared throughout the previous chapters is the need for associations, and professions generally, to appear ‘modern’. Chapter 4 places this as a pre-requisite for survival. Certainly, it seems that ‘being modern’ has been required to survive, and then used as a benchmark to confound critics.

_BWF_1 gave a very erudite explanation of how the recession of the 1990s had caused a radical shift in perspective at BWF. Many members were bankrupted and BWF, like many associations, suffered a lean time as membership income fell. This led to a more ‘modern’ approach. BWF became an organisation that was managed by its own experts and professionals on behalf of its members. This required new staff with their own areas of expertise within business disciplines.

“That leads to a very different kind of person with a very different kind of thought process. The first time I went to a member’s meeting, the members couldn’t quite understand why somebody who had no connection with the joinery industry wanted to come to the trade association. I think they can see the difference in what’s happened and that you bring a completely different perspective.”

The result is a federation that is better able to explain its purpose, reports annually to its members against public criteria and operates more commercially. This ties directly in with the issues of jurisdiction that _BWF_1 discussed in chapter 6. These are not presented as jurisdictional claims, but as having a “very clear purpose”.

_CPA_1 explained that trade associations are enhancing status and separating themselves from the ‘cowboys’ through what he described as professionalisation. The key problem for the building trades is that minimal legislative controls and easy access to customers encourages transient ‘cowboys’. Trade associations thus create different forms of service, as discussed within chapter 6, and also engage in defending their own corporate status. The decision to join a trade association implies some commitment to a standard, although whether prospective members undergo a transformation or are simply accrediting a standard they already carry out, is less clear.
Those who engage in trade associations within the contracting side will overall give a better service than those who don’t because those guys have chosen to be inclusive, they want to be recognised and they’ve thought it was worth their while to join a trade association. There could be people outside the trade associations who give a good service, but you can be pretty sure that the company that’s giving you a rotten service will probably not be part of a trade association.”

This creates a form of profession, a separation of a particular community that wished to restrict membership through a quality qualification and who regulated themselves. Clients receive a different service, although there is no guarantee. However, where quality falls below a standard there is a remedial service, arbitration, insurance and enforcement against the member. All of this creates a certain status for the association because consumers can rely on the quality guarantees; they are underwritten by practical, concrete resources, such as insurance guarantees.

“If you went to a company in a trade association who didn’t give you a quality service, the trade association should take an interest in that. Overall you’ll get a better service from people in the trade association because they are wanting to be seen as the reputable part of an industry.”

The jurisdictional creation of a quality service, such as ‘good roofing’ or ‘master building’ thus creates a particular product, differentiated from non-members, and creates status for the association, since it is seen as providing this service in a practical and visible manner.

Similarly, CIOB has followed a ‘modernisation’ route, driven through by a new chief executive. CIOB1 notes that a peer member of the community is no longer acceptable as a chief executive; there is a need for a ‘professional’ manager. Again, this enhances status by reinforcing the ‘modernness’ of the association.

“A new Chief Executive brought into the twentieth century and then forward. They’d had problems with getting a Chief Executive for some time and they had a member who was temporarily acting as Chief Executive and it was a bit like a club.”

The shift in emphasis was not in intention, but of “rigour” and confidence. CIOB has not changed its purpose, but the manner in which it carries it out. Note again, CIOB is now specifically not a “members’ club”, despite the fact, of course, that it is an association of peers.
"It was very similar to what it's doing now but not with the rigour. 1994 it had its first educational framework but the running of the whole thing was still like a member's club. In 2003 I brought in the new education framework which really tightened everything up."

This issue of whether CIOB is a “members’ club” was repeated. Again, note the distinction being made, but also that CIOB has not fundamentally shifted its purpose. Rather, it is building up its status.

“It is a membership association. Clubs are ‘come in for a drink old chap, we’ll have a natter’. Nowadays it is a professional body at the forefront of the industry in setting standards, in helping to develop standards.”

The move towards ‘modern’ does produce some divergent views within the peer community. Some, usually older, members regard it as a decline in quality. Others view it as a return to relevance. On balance, Architect7 is representative when she states that “RIBA do seem to be recognising that there is a world outside of professional practice”. Members respect associations that reflect their practical realities. They live in a ‘modern’ world, and this requires ‘modern’ associations. Giddens’ (1991) globalised modernity reflects a lot of daily experiences.

“RICS are by far and away the leading institution for chartered surveyors. There are other groups but those are networking type organisations. The difficulty that surveyors work on is that land law and market practice vary widely, internationally. Even just within Europe, there’s huge differences in the legislation, in market practice. That means that an international association is not one that can set meaningful professional standards” (BS6).

BS6 represents a small group of participants who work directly in this global environment, specifically for transnational firms. Status is central to his interests. His US parent company are not clear exactly what a UK professional is, but it offers “benefits in terms of stability and status”. “Principally” it involves validating his ability, his educational and business achievements and offers a public statement of his competence. “You have to have made the grade in terms of experience, in terms of academic qualifications and in terms of meeting certain standards that the institution has set down”. RICS offers what he describes as “stability”; it has been here since 1868 and established a reality for itself. Being a chartered surveyor, “does provide benefits over and above not being one”. It is, therefore, necessary for associations to engage in creating and enhancing this global status, whilst recognising
that their opportunities to do so are very limited. Participants recognised both RICS general improvements towards modern governance, but also their European and global expansion. This enhances status. At the same time, members in small practices did worry that too much time was spent on creating a brand, and too little on actually doing the daily grind (QS8).

8.2 Commercialisation

Giddens’ construction of Late Modernity stresses the power of commodification. This reflects what has been said about the ‘modern’ actions of associations in earlier chapters. Chapter 4 examined how associations reflect these necessities, which resulted in the apparent contradiction between expanding membership for commercial gain, and maintaining standards. Chapter 7 suggests that regulation is becoming the focus for controlling quality and membership behaviour, both through standardisation (disciplining mechanism) and decoupled quasi-judicial enforcement. Respondents generally approved of the decoupling of RICS into a trade association and a regulatory institution and the associated governance change (RICS 2008). The decoupled RICS-trade-association can now be far more commercial in providing services and representation to its members. This increases its value for money to them – and thus its status.

Associations accept the ‘economic realities’ of their environment. BWF1, for example, argues that trade associations are commercial organisations, established to represent their members’ interests. Whilst they might be regarded as professional in some sense, their place is to be relevant to, and serve the needs, of businesses that join them. Status is linked directly to whether members continue to see membership as value for money.

“A trade association has a future as long as it is relevant to what its members do and what they want. It’s about improving the standard of the industry so that the industry’s reputation improves, so that its products improve. It’s also about promoting that industry, using collective power that’s given to the association for the benefit of the entire sector.”

8.3 Playing with the ‘Big Boys’

One aspect discussed by the executives of the associations is that the general status of associations is not helped by the ease with which they can be created, and the large number
to be found within the industry. This was especially noted by trade associations. One primary motivation behind enhancing corporate status is the fear that associations are dividing into a major and minor league. Government is determined to centralise the networks that it is prepared to engage with. At the same time potential members are seeking value for money, and are highly selective in their choice of association. CPAI concludes that trade associations must offer value for money and foresees a future of fewer, better organisations. Again, the issue of 'clubs' is raised.

"We will have fewer because companies are being more careful in where they spend their money. I think if you go back 20 years, so far as trade associations are concerned, some of them were gentleman's clubs. In a highly competitive world where every bit of overhead is being looked at, people are genuinely saying where do we get value for money? The members of trade associations will be the ones who drive forward amalgamations because of the limited staff time they've got to input to these and the limited resource they want to put in financially."

Government is also in favour of this.

"Government has repeatedly said it's only going to deal with big bodies that represent large sectors."

TAF2 agrees. There are too many trade associations, and that they must in the future either merge or form strategic alliances. He describes these as operating on minimal turnovers with part-time staff, who only offer minimal services to their members.

"There's a lot of organisations scraping a turnover of the order of £100,000 with two staff and they simply can't provide any kind of membership services at all. It makes absolutely no sense to be part of an organisation where you may be paying £500 but getting nothing much for it, when you can pay a similar sum into another organisation and purchase discounted insurance, go on CPD events etc."

Status is thus linked to creating jurisdictional differences and about differentiating one association from its competitors. Government is also relying upon some associations to rise above the others. Defending status is not so much as protection from an uninterested environment, but as divorcing oneself from the morass of other, lesser, associations. However, each is trying to achieve the same.
8.4 Member Sensemaking of Self-status

There are two ways of understanding members' opinions on their associations. The first is from published data, the second is through direct interview. Both follow.

8.4.1 By Report

There is a dominant feeling that associations need to modernise (Watkins et al 1996) or professionalise (Friedman and Mason 2004a) in order to enhance their status. This requires modern governance structures (Friedman et al 2002, Friedman and Phillips 2003, Friedman and Williams 2006). The result is what this thesis has referred to as the decoupling of the executive from the peer community. At the same time, associations are aware of the need to enhance their status with their own members. Membership is seen as an economic activity, and one that requires membership benefits.

By their very nature, perhaps, institutions are run by a small number of the membership, variably elected or selected, and with employed officials to manage and enact. Involvement and communication with the membership is a consistent claim by the institutions, to ensure that this looser coupling accords with their general purpose and expectations. Each institution approaches the matter in a slightly different manner, but the premise is that members' opinions are important and that the 'leadership' of the institution is listening. The precise approach can involve election for posts, voting upon changes to the constitution or other serious matters, committees established by volunteering interested specialists, or even direct communication by letter and feedback columns in professional journals and information bulletins.

Whilst the status of association within their own membership remains high, it is falling. CRI (1996: 3) reported that in the Members Survey 1996 "nearly three quarters" consider RICS membership important in their working lives, but that the number who regarded it as "very important" had fallen from 60% in 1990 "to only one in three". CSM (1998b) reports a similar position in the 1998 Members' Survey where 74% of members "consider the RICS to be 'important in their own working life'". There was a split of those who thought it member friendly of 61% in favour and 38% against. However, serious disquiet was
expressed within the 2004 Brooke review (Cockram and Roberts 2003), discussed later. The RIBA development plan 1999-2003 required that at least 80% of the membership should describe themselves as "satisfied" with the performance of the RIBA and that a system to measure 'member involvement' should be instituted.

Enhancing status involves balancing the needs to be democratic with those of rational efficiency. Whilst RIBA run biennial presidential elections, the post of RICS president is normally allotted to "the senior vice-president from the existing vice-presidents through a secret nominations committee" (Mackenzie 2004b). However, in the aftermath that led to the Brooke review (see below), this tradition was broken as two candidates ran against the designated successor for the 2005 term and all three published manifestos - although only the General Council actually voted. The winner who would have been the youngest ever president, beat the favourite, who would have been the first female president. However, a disputed executive process selected a fourth candidate to the post (Fletcher 2005a, Fletcher 2005b). At the same time the last president elected under the old system ordered a review of the selection process in order to prevent any further elections (Mackenzie 2004c). This implies that the associations are not always able to ensure their own candidacies (see also Alexander 2001 on the failure of the RIBA's ex-director-general to become president), but that successful dissent is rare, and can result in associations tightening rules to prevent repeat occurrences. This is, perhaps, because such public washing of dirty laundry is not seen as improving status. Guest (1998) draws attention to the decision of the RICS to return the operation of its General Council to closed session. She acknowledges the generally mundane nature of the meetings where "young property reporters have been chucked the short straw and told to sit through motions, minutes and amendments on long, long afternoons in the council chamber." She also accepts that meetings since the press was left outside have been much better. "Opinions have been aired, unfettered by the fear that raw soundbites would be taken down out of context and reprinted in magazines the following week." However, her point is this: "Are RICS members not to know what happens at these meeting?" To her it is a simple comparison with the House of Commons and the workings of Parliament. "The RICS has every right to discuss what it wants to in private. But surely it doesn't have the right to keep those discussions from its members?"
Associations have certainly engaged in governance revisions in order to be seen to be ‘modernising’, and hence improving their status to members, to clients and to government. Palmer (1996: 13) refers to the CIOB *Meeting the Challenge* programme for 1996, developed "after extensive consultations with members" as a means to develop the institution as "leaders in the management of Construction by the year 2005". In 2001 the ABE established a *Governance Model* in order to develop better communications between itself and its membership. ABE (2004b: 31) reported that it is "proud of its links with both members and employers". *ABE1* refers to this earlier in the thesis. At the same time, member apathy is evident. Whether this means contentment with the association and its moves to enhance status, or reflects a wider late modern feeling of “powerlessness” (Giddens 1991) is unclear. RICS president Kolesar's asked how it could be accountable if "many of its members - who are the reason it exists - care so little that they take no part in its affairs" (Estates Gazette 1999e). This was derived from a report submitted to the RICS General Council (Roberts 1998) "suggesting widespread apathy". Even actual elections have faced similar problems. In RIBA, Ferguson was elected on a 11.7% turnout (Building Design 2002c) down from the previous 25% that voted in Hyett's election which in turn "together with the 1999 election, is the lowest turnout for a decade" (Rashleigh 2001b).

### 8.4.2 Respondents

To a major extent, the associations examined here do not need to enhance their status, at least compared with the many poorly regarded institutes that exist within the building industry. *QS8* discusses status as something that flows from maintaining entry controls, establishing jurisdictions that are accepted by clients and regulating the peer community.

“A lot of people joined the Association of Project Managers. It might sound like an old cliché but I actually know that I worked hard to get my TPC and that meant something, then. The pass rate was quite low, particularly for first timers. The Association of Project Managers is a cheque for £50 and you’re a member. You can put letters after your name, but if the criteria for entrance is a cheque then I don’t actually quite understand the professionalism in that.”
Status is important, of course, and encourages peers to join. QS13 wishes to transform his family business into a 'professional firm'. Status is key here.

"CIOB, that really stems from the fact that my whole career has gone into the building side of the industry as opposed to the professional side. Let's say the client-led side. The intention is that...we could become a chartered building company and the status of that is worth something, it gives you some sort of recognition."

This gives the family contracting business the opportunity to become a chartered builder, a very obvious desire for him. Again, this wish to be part of a peer group, to reflect the code of behaviour to construct his meaning of profession, is paramount here. This requires status. He admits that he is unsure what difference it might make commercially or to clients, but that is not the issue. The point is that he wishes to professionalise the business, to progress it and establish himself with his peers, and distinguish the business from the more ordinary and the 'cowboy' building firms. He wants status.

"I don't know how much of a difference it will make in the real world but to us, just for our own achievement I suppose on a personal level, its something which is quite good. There's too much talk of all these cowboy builders. We just want to really move away from that and be able to differentiate ourselves."

Concern with the professional association and its inability to enforce what QS8 believes to be its core functions is a repeated concern. This reduces status since associations are perceived to be failing. Chapter 3 discussed the generally poor status of the building industry generally, and its professions in particular. Giddens' (1991) late modern theme extends the idea of the submissive nature of professional knowledge. Chapter 4 examines this within what Watkins et al (1996) prefer to describe as 'modern' nature of associations, again as reactive businesses offering value for money rather than active engagers in professional projects and the creation of markets. Some respondents concurred with this model. For example QS1 traced a decline in the concept of profession over his long career.

"RICS preen themselves on being professional people. Always talking about professionalism and profession and professional man and so on - but don't define it! They don't seem to want to define it. RICS now is totally commercially orientated; all for the client, none for the builder. I don't know how builders/QSs get on in the RICS, I really don't. Except that they are now expected to be as ruthless as any old scurrilous builders used to be in the past."
8 Defend and Enhance Corporate Status

Here is the nub. The concept of profession has changed, eroded by pragmatic commercial interests. New members of the peer group will know nothing different. There is no status, no differentiation from other occupational groups.

“I think the young people who are going into the profession now think that all this wheeling and dealing, all this getting the most out for your particular interest, is part and parcel. Nobody talks to them about professionalism in a sense of the high moral tone that I have. They talk about professional conduct - that you mustn't steal the client's money; you must have a separate account for it; you must be insured for professional negligence and all that. That's not professionalism.”

What has this to do with status? For respondents of a similar age, there was a social distinction between a profession and a trade. Status is about maintaining this distinction. QS1 recognises the commercial imperative. “The pressures of commercialism were weighing upon firms. Competitive Fee-Tendering was a tremendous worry to most firms because there were the big firms who were losing money just to get work; they put in ridiculous below-cost fees that other firms couldn't possibly compete with and it is this kind of cut-throat business that's really set the profession back.” This then is the corruption of profession that QS1 has experienced, placing the root cause in the 1970s and a commercial recession. There is no status since professionals are no longer different. He offered a number of examples, including the following.

“An architect attended a reception at RICS. While the architect was there, a quantity surveyor who I shall call a BIG quantity surveyor, says: I've got some work I can put your way, to the delight of the architect, of course. Oh, thanks, he said. But there's a condition attached... that you give me such and such a job which was a job [originally] given to the small quantity surveyor. The architect was in a dilemma. He took the job from the small surveyor and gave it to the BIG surveyor who then gave him subsequently the other big job he had bribed him with. The small surveyor of course was livid. His friend, the architect was highly embarrassed but he said y'know what it's like getting work? Very sorry - and all the rest of it. So, the small surveyor... contacts the BIG surveyor over the phone and tells him what a lousy bastard he was and - well, sorry, mate but that's how it is in this cut-and-thrust era, or some words to that effect obviously. Well, the small surveyor wasn't having that. He said: I'm going to report you to the Professional Conduct Committee. "It won't do you any good" said the BIG surveyor. "Oh, and why not?" "I'm on the Professional Conduct Committee, and they won't believe a word you say; it's my word against yours".

This was mirrored by other older respondents (for example Architect8, QS11, QS12), though with less vehemence and slightly more contextual tolerance. For example, whilst QS9 also
bemoaned the losses, he recognised that change might also bring benefits; for example, a more equal, less 'white male' profession. He disagreed with QS11, however, who believed that change had removed waste and expense. QS8 and QS9 both believed that clients obtained 'better' services under earlier terms and conditions, whilst QS11 argued that they now got only what they needed and were able and willing to pay for. QS11 also queried whether profession had ever really meant anything, and was mirrored by a number of other respondents comparing themselves with plumbers, butchers and various trades (for example BS1, CDP1, QS9). Architect11 is typical.

"Is a professional a white collar person with a tie? No. A man came to repair my car. It went into the garage and I agreed with him £600 for a major service and new disc brakes in the front. He came back and told me that I needed new wheel bearings as well. I hadn't got a clue and I said thank you because I trusted that he was giving me advice which was competent, he's not lying to me about it and advice which is in my prime interest."

This suggests that status is less about social class, and more of competence and a 'meaningful' association, with well-controlled regulatory criteria. There is also a pragmatic acceptance that enhancing status in a time of economic difficulty is problematic. There was a clear distinction between those who had witnessed 'bad times' (QS1, Architect8, Architect9) and those younger professionals enthusiastically co-engaged in their firm and profession (CDP4, QS5, QS7). QS2 is typical in implicitly recognising the late modern description. "There's much debate at the moment about what is a professional and what does he actually do". More specifically, "there's a lot of commercial pressures on surveying at the moment". He places "the abolition of the fees in the 1980s" as the source. The profession has "become very competitive" and may "lose some of its professionalism as a result of that". This is a key issue for the concept of improving status, but there seems an admission that associations can do little about it.

However, respondents do believe that professional associations are responding. QS2 continued his point. "They are wanting the profession to remember that its got standards and codes of conduct." Again, it is RICS that creates the 'ethos' of profession by regulation. "They religiously stick to their codes of conduct and their guidelines. They do actually discipline the people who breach those guidelines, which I think is important." He is also
positive about RICS management. “There’s lots of reviews, there’s the Carsberg Review …

lots of talk about tackling negligence within the professions, which I think is very important
because the whole ethos of being a professional means you’ve reached a set standard of
competence.” More specifically, members believed that corporate status was on the rise,
especially in RICS. Interviewees were universally positive about recent changes. BS4 even
went so far as to state that he was no longer embarrassed to admit that he was a chartered
surveyor.

“Well before the Agenda for Change, I was embarrassed to call myself a chartered surveyor.
I would never want to be called a chartered surveyor because it conjured up an image in
people’s minds of some greasy estate agent. I think the Agenda for Change has made a
difference to RICS. The large firms of chartered surveyors [now] give a much more efficient
service because they have to compete. Now whether that is a more professional service, I
don’t know.”

The issue of self identity and status proved a little more problematic. Whilst RICS members
were pleased with the general evolution of RICS, it was recognised that there was still a way
to go. QS2 discussed his own experiences, reflecting that the association continues to absorb
a variety of occupations within the one group. These occupations, in his experience, do not
work well across disciplines even within their own association.

“One of the things I found very much with RICS is that it is not a sum of its parts. It’s being
broken into specialisms, and those specialisms are not encouraged to actually work towards
common goals. There does appear to be a total lack of common strategy in key areas.”

He has encountered similar issues within CIOB and RIBA on his limited experiences of
them. However, he admits that this involvement has changed his perspective on RICS,
despite the lack of coherence and organisational unity.

“I organised a Knowledge Management Conference, and quite a lot of other faculties actually
came to the conference and complained that they hadn’t been informed or told about the
conference, because they had similar interests, even though we had specifically asked our
faculty to share that information. Sometimes its not because there’s not a willingness, its just
it hasn’t been set up in such a way that people see the need to share or see the need to see if
there’s a common aim. These faculties have been structured in such a way that they are
individual empires.”
There remained a core of discontent, which had led to RICS’s election to IGC. QS6 was typical of those who believed that RICS’ status was declining.

“One marked example is the Institute of Quantity Surveyors. My understanding was that the entry criteria for that particular body was pretty low and a lot lower than the entry for the RICS. And then all of a sudden if you were a member you became a member of the RICS by default. So those of us who had to sweat and struggle thought that the qualification had been eroded somewhat or diluted.”

RICS members were also very keen on the idea of this ‘brave new world’ and its opportunities for the profession. An occupation able to offer global services was one that would be held in high esteem (BS6, QS3, RICS1). QS2 argued that change guarantees a future for professional associations. They reflect the knowledge and competency needs of a complicated service. He is particularly pleased with recent changes by RICS, which responded well to valid criticism. Globalisation and Europe are the future, and RICS expansion reflects this.

“What RICS is trying to do by globalising the profession is probably the right thing to do in the current circumstances of what’s actually going on worldwide.”

RICS is enhancing corporate status through its global aspirations, but it needs to keep these in touch with the needs of existing peers. Again, there is a division in perceptions, where some feel that RICS, in ‘going global’ has lost its local reputation.

“Standards are dropping in our opinion. We look at the individuals coming into the profession. These are individuals with degrees and their standard of narrative is absolutely appalling. Now I think unless the RICS raises the standards, they’re stuck between the devil and the deep blue sea. They’ve got to attract members into an organisation, they’ve got to attract new blood. But you don’t do that by lowering the standard and making it easier to get into, surely? You make it a more interesting profession to enter, make it a little bit more exciting, promote what the profession does” (QS6).

Architecture respondents were a little less effusive. Architect11 argued that professions were still grappling with their place in society, that their status was constantly being pressured.

“To whom should we be delivering a professional service? This one is absolutely critical because who has the money in society depends on the socio-economic political conditions of society. If we’re serving, for example, Hey Ho Developments wanting to building a 40 storey office block, if we serve that client’s stated aspirations in a fully professional way, we
do our best to achieve success against their objectives. Is that a professional service? Well you can say, yes, it is a professional service. But, at another level, you can say, it's also a disservice to the community in that it’s perhaps aesthetically damaged that site.”

Corporate status is a bit like a hydra, with competing stakeholders each interpreting the association in different ways. Professions remain unsure which to focus upon. Architect11 believes that professions generally acknowledge their role as guardians of the ‘greater good’, especially in the need to protect the natural environment. This enhances their status in the current environment, and provides something to focus upon in order to maintain this improving trend.

“We have a duty, and RICS has been very significant in their leadership here, through our institutions to a broader public and a future, as yet unborn, public.”

This ethical dialogue played into the hands of professions, allowing them to engage on a corporate dialogue in which their interests tie in with these new interests. The issue of ‘good architecture’ fits this picture neatly.

“There’s a tremendous generation of good urban design projects. The design professions and the building industry inevitably have a future and a big one.”

Again, ‘good architecture’ serves a jurisdictional function, but it also raises the status of the architect. Indeed, on the issue of the status of RIBA and the architect, there was little wailing about the relative decline of the status of architect, which might have been expected. Architect1 represents respondents who see themselves as a respected group, but one without any special status. “We don’t grant them the status they used to have.” She still regards profession as a “trustworthy group of individuals” who “provide advice and guidance”. There remain “some extremely well-behaved professionals not doing themselves any favours” as they act ethically “and how they feel they ought to act”, just as she has “seen others who couldn’t have given a damn, as long as it brought the jobs in.” She remains optimistic, recognising that associations provide a balance to the excesses of the free market. In the existing environment, professional association can hardly be regarded as a monopoly or serious threat to the economic system. Such domination, if it had ever existed, is not a current worry, and so professions can be seen as defenders of ideals that were worth holding
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onto. Ironically, this decline creates a new form of status, that of learned body rather than privileged elite. However, this recognition has limits.

"RIBA could become a influence for the good if it had the ear of government. There is a body of knowledge that’s worth listening to. So it’s a bit more than a talking shop, but is it much more than one of those charities or a protest group, a bit like Friends of the Earth?"

With regard to clients, CDP4 believed that professions still had some way to go before they could convince ‘the world of business’ that they were genuinely important. “They come with the right ideas but if you have no teeth then nobody would take notice”. Status is being recreated, but can associations actually produce what they are claiming? There is also a need for competent officers, “really well qualified industry leaders”, that will engender confidence. “There’s no point hiring some guy, a chemistry teacher, and putting him on board for example,” a sarcastic description of the RICS’ head of education, a chemist. QS5 repeated this thorny issue of whether self-regulation actually created status in the outside world. Profession should be about “protecting the public interests, making sure that people are trustworthy and adopting a code of conduct”, but do these happen?

“They like to think they do but maybe they don’t do so as much as they claim to. I mean there’s not a great deal of cases where surveyors are kicked out of the RICS for misconduct.”

Decoupling regulation into a quasi-judicial process operated through an arms-length regulatory organisation will therefore enhance status by proving that regulation works.

Others in practice believed that associations are important in business and that their status remained high (Architect7, Architect14, QS13). Architect12 believed that professional associations had improved their status by their careful response to the way that expertise broke down traditional boundaries. They were creating themselves as the home to expertise and using it to create occupational identity. For example, the traditional contractor versus architect paradigm has changed because “there’s been more specialisation” along trade lines. “You now get people who specialise in things like facades”. Because this is a specialised skill, then “that quite focused specialism is almost becoming a profession in its own right” and this impinges upon traditional explanations of profession. “And then you get changes within the established professions, like quantity surveyors who no longer really are needed
to punch numbers in cost plans and are converting themselves into credit managers”. The result is that “the contracting side of the industry has certainly in the last few decades demonstrated itself to be equally professional in its approach to clients and in terms of the quality of its business operations and more.” Associations deal with businesses and accept that they are about a trade, and generate further status by doing so.

Respondents were a little less convinced about the extent to which associations are controlling, or at least influencing, government and their wider environment. Respect here is less obvious. Their daily lives still point to the power of clients and ‘the market’. QS5, for example, recognises that RICS offers wider networking and political interests, which have witnessed improved status and recognition.

“They do involve themselves with lobbying government. I think they do have some level of influence over decisions that are made at a high level.”

For him, however, markets still led. Quantity surveyors evolved in response to change, they did not control it.

“Quantity surveying seems to have evolved quite well and changed to the marketplace … As long as professions change to suit the market they’re operating in, then they’ll succeed.”

Either way, QS5 was positive, unlike QS12, who believes that RICS have been fighting a reactive, and losing, battle to defend status. Status was irrevocably lost when ‘trade’ members were allowed entry. “That barrier was broken down in probably the early 60s and that’s gone across the board.” However, the repercussions were not managed well by the RICS. “RICS didn’t appreciate that if you were for letting in people who were essentially working for a trade organisation, accountable only to the shareholders, this would put tremendous pressure on the then accepted dividing line in terms of ethical conduct.” Financial imperatives would affect behaviour. “They amended the regulations to try and hold it in check, but inevitably things moved on and now the dividing between what is ethically acceptable and what is not ethically acceptable is very blurred.”

The small number of respondents referring to themselves as, or working for, chartered surveyors suggests another issue of status in a business context. Only QS8, a sole trader,
specifically referred to himself as a Chartered Quantity Surveying practice. This he thinks is linked to the low status of the chartered quantity surveyor in the minds of clients.

"Clients think that a chartered surveyor and a quantity surveyor are different. I think the RICS have failed the QS profession actually. It's only through the architect knowing the value of a quantity surveyor and pushing that you need one, that clients do it."

This lack of identity reflects a failure to establish a status for the profession in the eyes of clients. For QS8, this stems from a failure by RICS to establish service levels, although he recognises that this was, in part, forced upon them by government deregulation of fee scales. However, RICS has not enhanced the position of the quantity surveyor. This is not an issue of jurisdiction, so much as creating an identity of the chartered quantity surveyor as the de facto expert in the field of tender preparation. RICS is concentrating on ‘big issues’ and ignoring the defence of the reputation of its peer collective in the mundane, technical aspects of work. RICS has failed to create a corporate identity for the service package that should be offered; instead, firms are allowed to vary this. In this regard it weakens the corporate brand.

"The level of service given by various surveyors varies drastically. I speak to contractors all the time and I do a price document, and more often than not I do proper Bills of Quantities, on my projects. Most contractors say "oh we have to do those ourselves". The big boy [surveying] practices do not do tender documents. They rely on the contractor to do that and yet their fee levels are very similar to mine. I think that there is a value for money perception which I don’t think the RICS explains to clients what a QS does and what they should be paying. I think the abolition of fee scales is a good thing but a bad thing as well. The problem is the fee scales were set too high, which was why they were taken away. But if they were set at more competitive, realistic levels, then at least clients have a benchmark. What’s happening now is that you’re getting a mess. Other than membership of a professional organisation I’m not entirely sure what the value of the RICS offers to a quantity surveying practice of my size."

As discussed in chapter 4, improving status involves creating ‘modern’ associations and doing ‘new’ things. For QS8 this involves engaging with the problems of globalising modernity, but doing this overlooks practices like his.

"Fees have gone up and they’re becoming more and more remote. They’re more bothered about Europe and about the large practices than to my size of practice. It’s so irrelevant."
BSI also feels that professional associations tend towards 'giantism', where they become “unmanageable” with “a lot of offshoots”. These large organisations develop their own interests, rather than as a home to individual professionals like himself operating within the occupation of building surveying. “RICS has grown very large ... it has very high administrative costs ... does comparatively little for its members”. This, then, encourages peers to establish new, smaller associations “getting back to grassroots service all over again”. Expansion might increase corporate status, but it loses that attention to detail that small firms need. Status kills off informality, which appears as an important feature in a number of other interviews. Profession is an informal collegiality, which formality-led status-seeking ultimately destroys.

8.5 Organisational Sensemaking: Case of RICS

As with previous chapters, it is proposed to examine the association’s interpretation of its status through a selected examination of the archival evidence available. Once again, there is the issue of whether these are managerialist documents serving a legitimacy function, and whether they are simply reporting upon an environment that is regarded as dominant, or if they are the precursor to decisive action taken by the association. There certainly appears to be a rather defensive flavour to many of these, that they are seeking to prove, to someone, that professions are not ‘the bad guys’. Many of these offer a useful insight into the way in which RICS has given meaning to status. Overwhelmingly, they illustrate early attempts to engage with some of the issues discussed in this thesis, but ones that are hampered by a relatively weak executive directly coupled to the peer community.

8.5.1 Surveyors and their Future

This was a wide-ranging report examining the nature of the profession and its members' work, demographics, education and training, services offered by the Institution, its structure, administration and financing. The fact that this was necessary is instructive of the environment RICS perceived in 1970. It points to the increased complaints of those who object to the professions as constraints upon market economics. "Critics of the professions
accept the justification for rules that seek to maintain standards of technical performance, but condemn any of an ethical nature that operates to restrict competition" (RICS 1970: 4).

The report recognises that professions are not held in esteem, urging RICS to "uphold the concepts of professionalism and demonstrate that these are not restrictive in any sense that is repugnant to the public good ... ensure that the profession is beyond reproach in the standards it sets ... and, accordingly, resist any pressure to abandon the basic principles of its code of conduct that would undermine the quality of the services that the profession provides ... continue to play a prominent part in the leadership of the profession, in advancing its contribution to public affairs" (RICS 1970: 2). Here is 'modernisation', a proposal to establish a disciplining mechanism through routinisation. RICS is to "improve standards of practice and competence by publishing codes of good practice; maintaining rules of conduct in tune with modern requirements; promulgating scales of charges as a guide to reasonable payment for professional work" (RICS 1970: 3). However, this proposal is only for a voluntary 'code'.

The report does not propose creating a new jurisdiction through its ethical policies, as chapter 6 has suggested is now happening. The environment is very different. Instead, it advises that technical negligence and incompetence are different from ethical practice, and the two are policed differently. It expects the courts to judge primarily upon cases of negligence, which leaves ethical constraints upon "advertising, touting, fee-cutting or practising under limited liability" (RICS 1970: 4) increasingly under pressure.

The profession "should define its role more clearly" given the "very wide field that it covers, and the existence of a multiplicity of representative societies ... This diversity of skills, some of which are difficult to denominate, and the profusion of societies (bearing different names) bewilder the public and exacerbate the problem of projecting a clearly defined image of the profession to the man in the street" (RICS 1970: 4). This is not an active issue of jurisdiction, but presented here as one of identity. However, it does recognise the problems faced from competing associations and the lack of a determinant authority.
8.5.2 Surveying in the Eighties

Again, a "hostile" environment dominates the thinking of this report. It faces the "dichotomy" of the abolition of fee scales and increased competition, with the demands for high standards of professional conduct to protect consumers. Status is to be defended by the profession working harder at appearing 'modern'. RICS must "initiate change, whilst still retaining the fundamental principles of professionalism ... retaining their function of self-regulation ... Regulation by government would severely undermine the traditional relationship between the practitioner and his client. The RICS must therefore strive to retain and strengthen the powers conferred by its Royal Charter" (RICS 1980: 18).

Consumer protection was recognised as a driving issue for government. Whilst negligence was deemed the responsibility of the courts it was determined that the Institution had an obligation to ensure that members' work was of a satisfactory standard. Continuing professional development is unequivocally linked to competence and the scheme proposed by the Brett-Jones Report was endorsed. This allowed existing members to undertake CPD voluntarily, but made it a requirement for new members. Compulsory indemnity insurance was also proposed. Whilst these actions are to enhance status, again a directly coupled executive finds it difficult to force these through the collective.

8.5.3 Cubbon Report

This report addressed internal issues of status, such as reducing the number of representatives upon the General Council and to ensure that representatives selected by the local branches and others directly elected formed a majority. Cubbon argued (Barnett 1994: 53) that his "reforms will breathe democracy and flexibility into the general council which will give it a legitimacy and authority that, if used properly, will represent a big change." Once again, the search for ‘modern-ness’, especially democratic and accountability changes, enhances corporate status.
8.5.4 Structure and Designations Review

This report returns to uncertainty in its environment and sees little scope for action. "Government competition policy, leading the Director-General of Fair Trading to treat the maintenance of professional codes of conduct as potential restrictive trading practices," dominates concerns, promoting increased competition for work, and lower fees. These are reinforced by a second event outside RICS control, the "major changes in the financial services sector, given extra impetus by the City's 'Big bang'" (RICS 1987: 6).

8.5.5 Agenda for Change

The Agenda for Change was launched in Richard Lay's presidential address of 1998, supported by the three in-post vice-presidents who would fulfil the presidential position until July 2002. This was to provide continuity for the proposals, focused on enhancing status. It is also referred to directly by respondents in this thesis as doing exactly that. Again, 'modern-ness' was central to the ideas, especially recognising the international nature of occupations.

Central to enhancing status was the role of education, and the need to rejuvenate RICS as a learned institution. RICS Research Foundation was created (CSM 2000n). The report also recognised that there was a widely held view that since RICS gave up control of the examinations entry standards declined. Policies were aimed at broadening courses away from a technical and property specific focus towards more generalised degrees. Entry standards were raised. These were to be supported by a more intelligent use of media to construct an image of the profession by expanding press, lobbying and public relations expertise.

However, costs rose and membership disquiet led to the Brooke review (section 8.5.7). Education reforms were also badly handled (section 8.5.6). Towell (2004), a defeated candidate in RICS' presidential election, argued that too much energy was "wasted on what was previously a well-oiled organisation, established by more than 100 years of surveyors' hard work." The result was massive subscription increases to pay for irrelevant "navel-
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gazing”. Whilst undoubtedly creating a new “brand” status for RICS, it also generated issues within the peer community.

8.5.6 The New RICS (The Harris Report)

Armstrong, RICS chief executive, described this as a "clean sheet review … to help the Institution reach those parts of business, politics and academia on which it has failed to make an impression in the past" (CSM 2000p: 6). Enhancing corporate status was the central aim of its proposals. "Membership will become a matter of pride and aid members' own marketing of themselves and their organisations; it will raise the status of the profession" (CSM 2000r: 12). The dialogue of improving standards was made concrete through a complaints handling procedure (RICS 1998a, RICS 1998b, CSM 2000x). CSM (2000s) reported that the "new RICS is underway. The redesign of CSM symbolises a new spirit: modern, accessible, clear, responsive to members' needs". It continued with its eulogy promising "a better staff structure now in place to deliver services in a more efficient and integrated way". Whilst actual change was created, and RICS effected issues discussed elsewhere, both the rebuilding of corporate status, and making this known to the wider world, are evidently the intention. However, the standardisation of complaints handling establishes routines discussed in chapter 6 as part of creating a ‘competent-guarantee’ service differentiated from a ‘quack’ service outside the profession.

This change was not universally seen as enhancing status; some saw it as betraying the association. CSM (2000w) witnessing one of many complaints concerning the "increasing commercialisation of surveying - profit-driven business activities, ruthless competitive fee-bidding, loss of impartiality between all parties to a contract - is surveying any longer a profession?" which led to a reply from the RICS chief executive defining the new strategy as enshrining members "being honest, unbiased … not putting one's own interests before one's clients' or the public interest … adopting high ethical standards."

Status was also central to the more formal and united objection from RICS’ own quantity surveying division. Of concern to quantity surveyors was the abolition of their division, and its replacement with a more generic 'construction faculty'. The profession felt itself relegated
Defend and Enhance Corporate Status (CSM 2000q). In addition, the decoupling of executive from membership was also evidenced over the issue of internationalisation. Whilst the executive focussed upon developing a global brand as a strategy to create status, many members opposed it as irrelevant, and too costly. Fees rose 42% (Barnard 2004c). Barnard (2004a) reported expenditure on RICS International of £1.2million. 880 members (Barnard 2004b) signed a petition for an EGM to discuss the effects of the Agenda. The response was another review.

8.5.7 The Brooke review

This review was essentially a defensive action by then president Nick Brooke over membership disquiet. Certain members objected to inflated membership subscription rates and "a culture of secrecy" (Barnard 2004b: 106). "The members have reason to feel fed up. The leadership has been digging into reserves to pay for the Agenda for Change reforms started three years ago and now also faces a £2.25m drop in income from poorly performing investments and pension liabilities. It has alienated big firms in the property sector this year by a clumsy attempt to implement onerous business training; the construction members feel they have lost their voice since the old divisions were replaced by faculties. Most of all, grassroots members feel they don't get value for their subs and their complaints are not being listened to" (Cockram and Roberts 2003: 38). This was a corporate response to regain momentum in creating status when faced with such public dissent from within its own community (Barnard 2004b, 2004c, 2004d). It was also a practical tactic to defuse calls for an EGM, which it did (Mackenzie 2004d). A public presidential election was held for the first time in the RICS' history with a pledge from the incoming president, Barry Gilbertson, to improve transparency and re-connect with the grass roots (Simpkins 2004a, Gilbertson 2005). Status here is concerned with a ‘modern’ association, efficiently run on behalf of its membership. Unfortunately, some of this good reclaiming effort was undone by further controversy when the senior vice president, the candidate elected in the first ever vote, was not then, for the first time ever, selected as president (Thomas 2005). This issue has caused a great deal of debate and hyperbole (see for example Property Week 2005), but reflected the RICS executive’s global views on improving status; the new president was American. Again,
remedial work was done to defend the corporate reputation, including formalising the position of the senior vice president (Tarris 2005).

8.5.8 Carsberg review

Published as this work was being completed, Jansen (2005) described the proposals as "radical reforms for the RICS to help it safeguard the public image of surveyors and protect its own role as industry regulator." The review considered the principle and practice of self-governance and regulation, proposing a number of measures including a greater role for non-members, a greater focus on the firm as the focus of regulation and a cost-benefit test (Carsberg 2005a, 2005b, Gilbertson 2005). This completes what has been a strategic plan to enhance corporate status, but also to create jurisdictions on ethical surveying (discussed in chapter 6) and on regulation (chapter 7). However, it is more useful to regard the work of the last 30 years as either rebuilding or establishing corporate status. These reports describe an association adrift in a very hostile environment, and set out to create a new, 'modern' sense of identity in addition to enacting various strategies with regard to admission, training, jurisdiction and regulation of the profession.

8.6 Executive Sensemaking

As in previous chapters, the views and dialogues of current executives within associations offer additional insight to the reports discussed above. These also reflect an association acting directly to take control of its environment, rather than some of the earlier, more passive, reports and their uncompleted proposals.

RICS1 equates status with size, and reflects the 'international' view of RICS. To this she adds the need to create jurisdictional competence at home, and thinks this can only be achieved by incorporating everyone working in the occupation, and by merging with competing associations.

"Just as in the corporate sector, we are seeing an acquisition mode and a growth mode. Small professions are finding it very hard to cope. CIOB went on a huge push for growth, RICS has gone on a huge push for growth, partly for acquisition and partly through organic growth.
ISVA was a very nice little organisation but it was too small to develop the level of services that members required and became very vulnerable. We have some intermediate sized professional bodies within the built environment that are probably also at risk and I know RICS has a list of those” (RICS1).

TAF2 reflects this same importance on the globalisation of occupations. Promotion and representation of members to the public and government has reclaimed its importance with the globalisation of standards and the complexities of international legislation. This requires associations to generate status in order to be heard at this level. RICS1 also regards “influence” as a major practical feature of enhancing status.

“RICS can give you numerous examples of where they have actually managed to influence the political debate.”

This is a virtuous circle, since size brings status, and status generates more potential members and mergers. In turn, this allows associations to create their own environment, rather than simply respond to what is done to them.

As has been discussed earlier, there remains a divergent view, that RICS has eroded status in its ‘modernisation’ of its codes and corporate structure. RICS3 is an elected member of IGC, representing a body of opinion. He has profound respect for RICS as a peer community and his fear is that tottering inefficiencies will bring it crashing down. “RICS is no longer the valued professional organisation that I joined when I qualified in 1966.” It might appear to be, but “when push comes to shove, RICS will be found out.”

Outside of RICS, status is a central part of associations like IDE establishing themselves. Here, it is less a case of defending corporate status but rather creating one. To do this, they engage with government concerns, such as health and safety. By establishing a dialogue that equates IDE with ‘safe demolition’, this not only creates its own jurisdiction and manufactures distance from ‘quack-demolition’, but it also furthers government policy. Therefore, by supporting safety policies, government becomes an ally in reorganising the demolition occupation. This requires IDE to generate enough status to be regarded as a voice worth listening to, and be involved with drafting consultations.
"IDE are looking to develop a safer industry. There was a new code of practice for demolition that came out. IDE were involved in the Drafting Committee. So they were recognised. Civils, the Structures, the Contractors, but we’re in there. And they’re the areas that we are looking to try and raise the profile with” (IDE1)

IDE can thus moderate changes to its occupation and establish its own jurisdictional claims through enhancing its reputation as a useful and knowledgeable ally in pushing forward government reforms.

“The revisions to CDM that are coming out, we’ve been very proactive with that. We met with HSE and had a discussion. Once the draft document for consultation came out, we called regional meetings where we discussed with members their concerns, collated the comments and put a response back to HSE.”

IDE1 also reflects the pervasive need for ‘modern’ associations. The status of IDE is enhanced through its democratic nature. All officials are elected, and a half of the governing council is elected each year. Whilst there is still “a distance to travel”, IDE creates approval through being so ‘modern’ and well run.

Status is also a particular problem for trade associations. Many people regard trade associations as straightforwardly self-serving, whilst premier associations see themselves as very different from ‘badge’ associations. NFRC1 was at pains to establish NFRC as a ‘respectable’ association, differentiated from lesser institutions. “Anybody can call themselves a trade association” and there are a number that are simply “a chap in his back room” and which are “doing quite okay.” NFRC1 has no issue with companies spending their money and joining, but NFRC is very different, and so ‘trade association’ “is not the best description.” Status is very important here, because of the way that certain trade associations are ‘professionalising’ in ways discussed earlier. To some extent, both TAF and Department for Business, Enterprise & Regulatory Reform (BERR) recognise differences. TAF supports ‘excellence’ and BERR has developed a ‘model trade association’. NFRC1 describes the “badge association” as without merit because it brings no standards or guarantees.
NFRC have been in existence for some time. NFRC1 implies that this means they have established themselves as a competence association, interested in the quality of roofing. They have status.

“Our main aim was to bring together like-minded people who believed in quality ... to differentiate between the chap down the road who will come with a ladder and stick a few tiles on ... Because, of course, real roofing or real felt laying is different.”

The trade association came about with the breakdown in local reputations as companies become bigger after the Second World War. Competency was determined by personal reputation ‘in those days’. NFRC’s corporate status recreates this integrity, and establishes the idea of ‘good roofing’ distinct from ‘other roofing’ that creates work for members.

Overall, executive officers stress the need to be ‘modern’, to refute any suggestion that they are ‘clubs’ for the privileged. This creates a status, which allows associations then to enact their strategies discussed in previous chapters. RIBA1 also argues that associations are better able to take long term views than governments facing election headaches. This creates further status, because they can “ensure that you’ve got a strategy and sensible policies that accommodate the longer term priorities.”

8.7 RIBA and Status

Since RIBA directly elects its presidents, their electoral platforms might offer a final insight into the issue of corporate status. Like RICS, RIBA can be viewed as part of an uncertain and antagonistic late modern environment. Worse, the architect is often selected as a target for all of the ills of the industry (chapter 3). For example, Building and Civil Engineering EDCs (1978b: 7) requested that "RIBA and its fellow professional institutions should modify their restrictive codes of practice to promote the services of those members most capable of providing services to manufacturing industry."

Perhaps it is the nature of an election platform, but environmental uncertainty dominates manifestos. Francis Duffy's appointment, for example, is about recreating status for an occupation under attack by government in the guise of the Warne report’s recommendation to abolish statutory regulation. Duffy’s response was to create a more open RIBA. RIBA
headquarters would "become a place completely accessible to visitors ... including developers and surveyors, with whom he is keen to forge better relationships" (Sands 1993).

Like RICS, RIBA has created corporate chaos through reorganisation, done to create status through becoming 'modern'. Owen Luder generated a "storm of opposition" (Balock 1998) over proposed reorganisation proposals. RIBA director-general Alex Reid believed that the restructuring would be more "cost effective" (op cit), whilst Chris Palmer, director of Corporate Affairs, "argued that the current structure formalises political opposition between departments" (op cit). This is an interesting public admission.

But also like RICS, RIBA enhanced status as a means of advancing other aims. Marco Goldschmied established the idea that "the role of the RIBA is to promote architecture rather than the interests of its members. These are inextricably linked" but not synonymous (Alexander 2001). This ultimately allows the construction of 'good architecture' as a jurisdictional concept, but relies upon enhancing status for government and clients to acknowledge the new dialogue. Status remained a problem in this period, Meeting the Challenge, RIBA strategy 1999-2003, expressing a variety of such challenges. These include challenges from clients, the construction process, and technology. There were few actual proposals, but the status of both architecture and architects was in need of defence. Improving the competence and integrity of members and entrance standards of prospective members were seen here as status issues. Certainly, Paul Hyett continued Goldschmied's work in raising the status of architecture (Alexander 2001, Delargy 2001), but also reformed RIBA. As with RICS, this was unpopular with some sections of the membership (see for example Building Design 2001b, Building Design 2001c, Rashleigh 2001a, Rashleigh 2001b). Hyett was forceful in dispelling the myth that "architects are an overpaid and self-protecting cartel" and that "professional institutes have no role in the modern world" (Building Design 2001c) in a campaign to raise status. However, he did more than simply describe a 'modern' profession, but succeeded in modernising RIBA and practices (see for example Booth 2002b, Gates (2002a). This included the principle of non-architects sitting on RIBA's ruling body (Rashleigh 2001c).
The result of this program of enhancing the status of both profession and association was that Hyett successfully placed the RIBA back in the role as a key institute that government look to for advice and consultation (Booth 2003a). George Ferguson continued this theme of creating status through modernisation, promising to cut the size of the RIBA's "unwieldy" (Building Design 2002c) ruling council.

8.8 Conclusions

Enhancing corporate status is often difficult to divorce as an activity from controlling entry or establishing jurisdictions. However, generally, associations are accorded status by government, clients and peers. What might be seen as a decline in status in terms of privileged elite, has actually enhanced that status of associations. Now, they are recognised as centres of competence and learned societies and are listened to accordingly. Equally, they are bastions of non-market 'ethical' and 'sustainable' services, looking towards consumer protection and safety. In addition, to this, the 'modernisation' of associations has enhanced status.

Whilst the 'modernisation' argument discussed in chapter 4 does not provide the explanation that it claims, it is undoubtedly part of a process of enhancing status within what is seen as a hostile environment. RICS is seen as particularly effective in creating new governance structures. Executive officers interviewed are thoroughly 'modern', providing a respected front to the associations. True, there are divisions within the peer community. Some resent the commercialisation, perhaps even modernisation, of the associations. Others accept the powerlessness and uncertainty that late modernity creates, but recognise the hard work done by executive officers and fellow peers in maintaining entry standards and creating new regulatory controls and occupational jurisdiction. Trade and professional associations seem to be well regarded by government, reflecting the state's acceptance of their role in occupational expertise. Clients are also seen as engaged with the improving status of associations. There is an interesting comparison with chapter 6 especially. Whether professions control their occupations, many respondents do not believe that they do. They do not accept that their associations are of a status to do so. They also see their daily lives routinised by what they see as 'the market'. In addition, status is often seen as a function of
the economic environment. Professions might try and defend status in a recession, but they are doomed to lose. There is also an international dimension. Whilst RICS is seen as dealing well with a global market, no association is seen as having enough status to be seen as an international authority.

Status in some ways is the most contentious aspect of the work since it relies very heavily upon individual perceptions. These will be influenced by a host of factors. Certainly respondents' age affected this, but so too did business. Those in 'younger' businesses, such as consultancy, or in newer occupations, such as arbitration, saw far less status in their associations. However, this does not mean that the same controlling features discussed earlier are not at work. Certainly, the general feeling was of a much higher status than was expressed within chapter 3. Rather, divisions over the issue of status reflect the fissures in identity caused by the loose coupling of sections of the association.
9 Conclusions

Chapter 9: Conclusions

9.1 The Research Problem

Bosk (1979) can examine medical professionals with his verve because he can find them easily in their working environment in a fixed geographical location. They are to be found in hospital wards. And, in examining the social construction of failure, there is immediacy to the idea because he is dealing with death. Similarly, the most 'interesting' interview in this work was with Barrister 1 who might work in the building field, but was clearly removed from the other professionals studied. He tells stories of not carrying a briefcase (for fear of looking like a solicitor), never talking to 'clients' (because they are not) and the etiquette of shaking hands (or not). Morison and Leith’s (1992) examination of the barrister’s world is no more rigorous because of this, but it is much more exciting. The building industry professions are not this interesting, because they lack the ceremonial aspect to profession. They are also not so easily located. They work in a vast number of private firms across the country, and, increasingly, the world. Gaining access to these is far more difficult, and the key issue of representative sampling remains. Therefore, the focus of the work was on those aspects that could be examined; the professional associations and individual peers. Since profession is so clearly associated with a peer community and collegiate co-operative market action, then this provides a plausible proposal. The fact that the participants interviewed, despite working within different occupations and a range of private and public enterprises, presented a highly consistent explanation of self-identity endorses the proposal. The work uses the term authentic profession where it seems useful to distinguish between the ceremonial and social gestalt of some professions, and the more pragmatic aspects of occupational control that dominate this study. Indeed, unlike authentic professions such as medicine, there seems little of the sectionalising and segmenting of the meaning given to profession in the way that the literature suggests (Bucher and Strauss 1961, discussed p 38), although there is some conflict over whether current executive-implemented changes are appropriate. Both RIBA and RICS provide a strong central identity, which contradicts what Bucher and Strauss present as a professional identity split into segments of competing dialogues. This again suggests that problems with constructing a representative data sample are not an issue here.
The hypothesis under investigation posts the contention that building industry professions exhibit strong occupational control. The research questions how professionals in the building industry construct a meaning to the concept of profession, why these social structures still exist, why people still join them, and why new associations are continually formed. The selection of Giddens’ concept of late (high) modernity is a short-hand to represent the all-pervasive literature on the professions, especially within the building industry, expressing gloom for the future and a declining standard in professionalism. This reflects Giddens’ view on the routinisation of new knowledge into expert systems, which he argues concerns rules of procedure to remove the power of the individual and allow for easily transferable knowledge. This ensures that expertise becomes transitional and subject to institutions, rather than an inherently neutral, rational and powerful tool in itself. Giddens also describes a world of uncertainty, powerlessness and where there is no determinant authority. This, again, reflects a theme in parts of the literature, that building professions can only react to the whims of their external environment. Whether late modern is exactly what most authors are referring to, or is even a valid concept in itself, Reed (1996) shows that it is a useful descriptor to explain the phenomenon of environmental dominance over professions, and then allow for its testing.

The hypothesis allows the thesis to bring out two themes. Firstly, contrary to expectations from secondary sources and the late modern paradigm, there is control. Secondly, it is strongly held by dominant authorities. The thesis examines how this control is constructed and how it affects the self-identity of both individual professionals and their associations.

9.2 Summary

Hughes (2003: 84) stated that “the professions knew the game was up in the 1980s”, and follows a tradition in the literature predicated upon the nature of late modernity, where free market competition, especially through the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1982, and deep scepticism embedded within wider society removed the bases upon which professions had originally been allowed to develop. The reason for selecting the concept of ‘late modern’ as a time period for this study was that it covers the working lives of
respondents, but also reflects this deep scepticism concerning professions that seems prevalent in the literature and in the field. Estates Gazette (1993b) stated that surveying professionals "have been complacent ... credibility that is still perceived by many decision-makers at the highest level to be missing ... the client is entitled to, and pays for, the highest level of service and ... did not always get it."

This thesis has found that these arguments are simplistic. Many new groups continually seek to attain professional status, new associations are being formed, individuals continue to join professions and identify themselves with 'profession' and as 'professionals'. There is also strong evidence from the empirical observations in this research to refute a decline in the concept of profession. The 'end of the professions' manifestos have consistently been proven wrong, and this thesis sees no reason to doubt the continuation of this empirical refutation of theorised explanation and suggestion. Clients demand the existence of profession, the state requires and has enforced the principle in many ways, albeit not as positively as that single piece of negative 1982 grandstanding that has so swayed Hughes and others of his ilk. Professional associations continue to espouse wide and non-commercial functions, and many professionals endorse and demand this. However, they are also actively engaged in creating particularised services, whether this might be described in terms of social distance, fictional service, professional project, image constructs, or jurisdiction. The institutes participating in this thesis came across as well run, confident, positive, and aware of both their past and the future. Self-identified communities, networks and special interest groups reflect and further mould this confidence in the idea of profession.

Whilst the demise of profession has been greatly exaggerated there is no doubt that its meaning continues to evolve, and, from certain traditional positions, this might be regarded, with justification, as a fall from grace. Some respondents reported in this thesis expressed doubt of the worth of the professions and are unclear of the validity of their associations. However, this appears to originate in a genuine belief in the principle of profession, and a concern as to its future. Certainly, the majority of interviews undertaken for this thesis uncovered positive and vibrant professionals, confident in their abilities. This allows them to collaborate with new technologies, ideas and specialisms, and to engage in both the technical and leadership duties required by their occupations. What this data also provides is an interesting explanation on the nature of occupational
control within the building industry. This involves controlling entry to professional associations and regulating behaviour, establishing jurisdiction and establishing a dominant social status.

The architectural professionals interviewed provided the most positive interpretation upon their understanding of profession. This is, perhaps, an obvious consequence of the nature of their occupation. Those who design the built environment have always been part of wider socio-economic interests, and architects frequently dally with political movements as a consequence. Architect11 summarised their situation when he described it as a forward-thinking occupation continuously involved in developing and hypothesising about the new – ideas, technologies, designs and buildings. He compared this with the historic perceptions of many other professions, such as the law, accountancy and even medicine. This renders the architectural profession more amenable to claims of vocation, mirroring some of the earlier eulogies found within the literature. Caution must be sounded here and it is far too easy to overstate this case. Most architects do not build ‘great architecture’. Many are involved in renovation, in housing association and commercial housing projects, in mundane office blocks and work for commercial developers and building contractors. These are far removed from the prestigious projects more often associated with the profession. However, these projects, even if unrepresentative, do provide aspiration. This allows the peer community to engage in wider debates concerning the need for ‘good architecture’. It also ensures that aspirations are more likely to enter the community and provide this sense of identity.

Quantity and building surveying have less tangible examples to unify them behind such ideals. Again, this point may be overstated. Many participants were clearly highly motivated to provide what they described as a ‘professional service’ to their clients. However, there was less stated interest in wider goals of a profession, although a minority did particularly mention their support for peer approval and codes of behaviour. The primary difference, perhaps, is that the surveyor and developer professionals interviewed expressed similar beliefs to the architectural professionals, but in less expansive and more pragmatic ways. One obvious example is the Party Wall Surveyor, who must not only act for his client, but also for the other interested parties.

As a background, late modernity offered a very interesting theme. Whilst many professionals accepted the dominance of the market generally and clients in particular,
the globalisation of the building process, and the continuing impact of new technologies, they did not accept the accompanying description of a profession in decline faced by a sceptical environment. Rather, their experience was of clients and governments that encouraged professional associations as intermediaries in this arena. New disciplines were being created, standard processes were being developed and membership was a valued qualification. The language of participants was of change and evolution, rather than decline and death. However, executive officers are very evidently directly involved in shaping this environment on behalf of members. The idea that professions are passive is not true. Even the notion that they are defensive in some ways fails to accept their dynamic engagement with this environment. Professions exhibit strong control over their occupation; hypothesis proven.

9.3 What Professions Do

The empirical work was structured into four parts in order to explain how the meaning given to profession was utilised into creating occupational control. These four sections were selected utilising Burrage’s (2006) framework of what associations do. Within each of these, themes from the literature are used to explain and inform on the evidence. Whilst individual professionals tend to explain their outlook through issues of status, the disciplining mechanism and professional identity, the associations create their own interpretations rather more in terms of occupational control, through professionalisation, the professional project and jurisdiction. This suggests that there is a discrepancy between the two realities. This is partly a result of what the two groups engage with inside their occupation – one is strategically engaged with the entire profession, the other sells clients a particular service. At the same time, the concept of loose coupling becomes a useful one to explain a deliberate and tactical appropriation of a dialogue for the purposes of creating a differentiated service (a new project for associations) and establishing control over it (jurisdiction). The relationship between professionals and their association can thus be seen as a degree of decoupling. For example, do professionals and their associations both describe a disciplining mechanism, and do they regard it as serving a similar purpose? The answer is no. In this case, professionals believe in the functionalist view of their identity as evaluated competence, technical expertise and ethical obligations to a wider ‘public good’, and which provides a valid discourse in refusing employer-led occupational demands. Alternatively, associations
have utilised the same ideas to create a particular service of, say, ‘chartered architectural practice’ that clients and governments accept as a competence guarantee, differentiated from the ordinary ‘quack’ providers of ‘design services’.

9.3.1 Control Admission and Training

Controlling entry provides one interesting example of the differences in identity between professionals and their associations. Individuals are concerned at the increasing membership of their associations and perceive this as a fall in standards and a loss of control. Associations prefer to discuss this as part of a ‘modernisation’ process. At the same time, respondents found it difficult to give examples of actual lapses in standards, although some employers did discuss problems in their graduates. These are not, of course, actually members of the profession yet. There seems to be an acceptance that government proposals to ‘widen participation’, so-called supply-side issues, are not ones that professions can fight. Whilst this suggests the sort of passivity that late modernity expects, and that certain individuals believed, associations seem to be utilising other means. Both regulation and wider training, such as CPD, are regarded by the literature as further examples of a failure by professions. However, entry into the association is seen by the executive as a less useful means of controlling the profession. Rather, CPD and the need to continuously maintain qualifications is used as a far more rigorous enforcing mechanism. It is also reinforced by regulation and by pragmatic considerations, such as the need for professional indemnity insurance. Again, this is seen as a matter forced upon the profession by clients, and yet it is used to create a regulated and trained profession, which is evaluated as competent permanently, rather than at a single point of qualification. This not only controls admission and training, but it is then used to establish a jurisdiction, that of ‘safe’ architecture, surveying, roofing and the rest, and also to enhance status by clearly establishing a visible and auditable guarantee of competence from the membership.

One interesting example on the issue of training, and which was not mentioned by respondents, is the Construction Skills Certification Scheme (CSCS). This was established by government to prove site workers’ competence in an attempt to improve building standards and force ‘cowboys’ out of the industry. Professionals now require it as well (Adams 2008). Whilst professional qualifications and CPD, that is both admission and training, are accepted as satisfactory evaluation of competence, an
additional ‘test’ is also required. Professions point to the scheme’s acceptance of their qualifications for all but this last test as proof of their successful engagement with the scheme, but it does provide one example of government-sponsored evaluation by a third party, and provides an alternative route into the occupation on site. In other words, government introduced a third party competence evaluation system, again apparently undermining the evaluations systems of associations, and then, yet again, associations engaged with this system and used it to enhance their own recognition in the discipline. RICS members were immediately accepted by the scheme (Adams 2008), whilst IDE had to engage in a much more formal arrangement (Stroud 2008). However, in terms of qualifications establishing competency, the IDE recognition is more directly of value in establishing their occupational dominance, because of the traditionally ‘trade’ nature of demolition engineering. IDE’s competence controls are now formally recognised by government.

9.3.2 Define and Defend a Jurisdiction

It is difficult to get away from the simple issue that professions within the building industry have no occupational control. Even where ARB is statutorily created to protect the architect, this is rather more about a title than the actual process of prohibiting other occupational groups from designing buildings. At least, this was the perception of individual respondents. Yet, clients deliberately selected members of professional associations to provide their services in a manner established by those same occupational groups.

It is evident that professional associations are actively engaged in creating social distance between their service and those of ‘the others’, the quacks, the cowboys. Whilst the literature (see pp 37-8) offers examples of the way in which those outside the profession are described as charlatans, there is little evidence in the building industry of the quite so blatant, or successful, construction of an identity to the deviant worker outside the profession. Even the ‘cowboy’ builder does not quite fit into this, since professions are also keen to distance themselves from trade workers. Instead, associations have more carefully created new aspects to their occupation. RIBA has successfully allied itself with CABE to produce a government-sponsored and funded program of ‘good architecture’. This means that as planning authority, as client, as stakeholder, government is acting in
various ways to promote the idea that simply creating competent and safe designs is no longer enough. What is needed is 'good' design, and this requires 'the eye', artistic flair and the general vision of the architect. RICS has focussed upon the issue of competence, crafting a new regulatory regime to validate and enforce accurate, safe and trustworthy professional advice. It is also establishing standardised routines for performing work in order to establish the 'RICS-way' as the only rational one. In doing so, occupational control is created. RICS is also engaged with the late modern environment to press for the importance of the quantity surveying functions, of the importance of cost advice and the need for fiscal conservatism. In addition, it has also argued within EU debates for the recognition of the competence of the building surveyor in creating designs, and the need for 'cost-effective-and-safe architecture' rather than the more nebulous 'good architecture'. The fact that it failed proves both the success of RIBA's jurisdictional claims, and the construction of meaning to the chartered surveyor as a competent occupation. Both have also re-energised codes of conduct in order to create ethical occupations, capable of handling the sustainability agenda. Others have reciprocated, so that 'safe plumbing', 'ethical surveying' and the like are clearly delineated occupational arenas. Those non-market characteristics that have been the subject of so much late modern criticism are now driving features in occupational control, as professions can draw upon their charter obligations to work for 'the public good' as a mechanism for creating further distance between themselves and others. New jurisdictions are thus being created.

A similar process is taking place within trade associations. The primary difference is that professions are a little more reticent to discuss the trade aspect of this process. However, 'good roofing' and 'master building' provide equivalent examples of this drive to create a new service. Ethical codes are also driving through differences, although here they are focussed on rather more concrete guarantees such as indemnity insurance. The distinguishing feature between professional and trade associations is that the former are socially created, whilst the latter are more technical. 'Good roofing' tends to mean non-leaking, whilst 'good architecture' involves rather more than a 'safe' or 'nice' design, but involves judgement and 'the eye'. Professional associations are unclear quite how important technical knowledge is. Whilst, IDE and IPHE both laid great stress on establishing the disciplines of demolition engineering and plumbing engineering, both situated their controlling mechanisms in terms of safety, 'safe demolition' and 'safe
plumbing'. The rise of communities of interest points to a dissatisfaction within professions over their ability to help members in carrying out their complicated technical duties. However, it confirms that both individuals and associations see occupational control as elsewhere. That clients endorse these study groups suggests that they also concur.

Given the nature of the current environment, there needs to be some loose coupling of these actions. They cannot be seen simply as trade-orientated self-interest. Associations are keen to show how democratic they are, and open to new members. This reminds that it is possible to overstate the dominance of associations. They cannot create authority without the agreement of others, in this case predominantly the government. In the 1980s government concerns about consumer protection was predominantly with cost and competition, that they should obtain value for money through market forces. Associations could only accept the abolition of fee scales. Now that government’s preoccupation is with the quality of service, associations can create jurisdictional regimes in which they build consumer protection guarantees in the form of good architecture, good roofing, master building, safe plumbing and ethical surveying. Therefore, there are limits to the dominance of occupational authority. However, from the evidence here, association executives are negotiating successfully with various government representatives to reflect priorities of health and safety, competence and financial guarantees for it, and sustainability. In doing so they are creating occupational control. This is perhaps best described as the New Professional Project, since it is taking place so late in the existence of these professions. At the same time, whilst such control can be described as a jurisdiction, there is less evidence of the system that Abbott describes. Whilst agreement between associations is possible, such as evidenced in the behaviour of the Privy Council and the agreement by twenty three bodies to share the idea of the chartered environmentalist (Society for the Environment 2008), this does not prove the existence of a “system”. Ironically, government is perhaps looking to create such a system in its desire for a simple negotiating framework that it can utilise for its own practical ends in bringing about the informed legislation needed to carry through its own mission.

Jurisdiction serves to provide an identity and tradition that is appreciated in the uncertainty of late modernity. It also provides a marketing brand. However, associations
are very successfully creating new systems of occupational control, building on these traditions, but within issues of competent, safe, ethically sustainable and good, non-quack services.

9.3.3 Regulate Each other's Behaviour

Again, the initial discourse across all respondents is that the peer community no longer regulates itself. Indeed, many accepted that it had never really done so. This was used as a dialogue on 'modernisation' again, particularly with regard to regulating the expectations of clients, employers and governments. Individual respondents describe a narrative to protect or enhance their working environment, rather than one externally opposed onto them. This suggests that clients or employers do not externally impose the disciplining mechanism. That said, most recognised the fundamental principles of capitalist exploitation and of what might be termed the late modern working environment. Individuals recognised the corporate needs of their employers and clients and were fully integrated with them. The issues seemed to be of scale rather than principle.

One might have expected some degree of hierarchical division within the community. However, admission seems to centre upon joining a community of equals, and there is little appetite to judge peers on unequal terms. Evaluation seems to take place through working together, and there was no evidence of any distinction. Whilst some participants were directors or partners of companies, they expected their 'workers' to be equals in terms of integrity and ability. Only BS5, in what was a non-interview effectively, provided clear proof of a division between peers created by a domineering organisational hierarchy; the company was not British (Appendix C). Otherwise, whilst company directors might expect to be recognised as functional superiors, this followed a paternalistic attitude expected within ideal type or authentic descriptions of the professions. The boundaries to both collegiality and authority were well, if informally, recognised. Some architectural respondents did consider the ideological bias within the profession towards small practices and against developers, and some surveyors did suggest that larger practices dominate RICS. These then might create some hierarchical division within the community. The issue of regulation might also be seen as a force working to fracture the community. Discussed earlier (p 35), Goode (1957) argues that one equal judging another might create problems. Certainly there is a suspicion that self-
policing does not work for this reason, but professions in this study had already accepted the principle of external regulation.

Those interviewed did not really engage with the issue of self-regulation. They worked together and made some judgements about who they found ‘easy’ to work with, and occasionally found individuals who were less efficient than others. However, the concept of de-coupled regulation by their associations, and ARB, seemed a matter of fact. This decoupled executive, however, had a very clear sense of purpose in regulation. It was, in part, created to evade government regulation and retain some sense of self-regulation. Reflecting consumer protection interests, there also seems to be a clear move away from admission as the dominant controlling mechanism, and the use of various disciplining mechanisms to reorganise the occupation and the community. In this way, continuous validation of competence and standardisation, a self-imposed disciplining mechanism, are seen as more useful mechanisms for ensuing training and membership criteria are self-regulated and quality is maintained. This reflects the work of Fournier (1999) and Hodgson (2002), discussed on page 58, in the creation of a disciplining mechanism and a performativity dialogue in order to subvert external attempts to gain control of working practices, specifically those of business owners.

This places the ‘self’ of self-regulation outside of the peer community, but still within its occupational control. By decoupling an arms-length regulatory organisation, professions also improve their status by showing themselves to be ‘modern’, and responsive to the needs of client and government. Of course, they also retain control. The evidence here points very clearly to professional associations as the dominating authority. Firms and business owners are too fragmented to make this imposition. Whether the end result for the average professional will be any different is an issue, at least for the individual. Decoupling of the regulatory routines from peer control might have severe consequences at this level. However, creating the standards of behaviour and the routines for carrying out tasks allows professions to establish evaluated competence and expertise and distinguish ‘good practice’ of members from the ‘quacks’ outside the associations. It also forces non-members to operate according to the protocols established by the associations.

This requires an association capable of engaging with this process. There was some evidence that a very specific set of officer employees was evolving. Certainly, they are coming from more diverse backgrounds and bringing commercial skills to run the
associations. A few respondents questioned the abilities of their executive officers, although there was strong support from others. Interviews did portray coherent and aware executive officers exuding competence.

9.3.4 Defend and Enhance Corporate Status

There is an interesting distinction to draw between defending status, and the more positive aspect of enhancing it. The starting point of this work, found in much of the literature, is that professions were engaged upon a defensive discourse. Late modern describes an environment of deep scepticism, of highly contingent knowledge packets and the lack of any determinant authority. However, respondents did seem very confident in themselves and their professions and present a very different scene. Are they mistaken?

Many of the issues discussed above, concerning controlling entry, establishing occupational control and regulation of the profession can also be viewed as status issues. Associations discussed the principle of being ‘modern’, of engaging with clients and government in order to be respected. This then allows them to deal with issues of controlling entry, jurisdictions and regulation. Whether this is a defensive attitude is probably one of interpretation. There is certainly not the acquiescence that might be expected. Rather, associations are negotiating with government, and not surrendering. Similarly, professionals are bargaining with clients and employers rather than submitting to new modes of control, or what Giddens (1991) refers to as environments of action. The process of ‘modernisation’ in itself has certainly generated a great deal of positive response. Status is enhanced.

There are certainly issues undermining confident assertions of status. Respondents doubted that any association has the power to create a truly international reputation, though many thought RICS is getting close. Similarly, in certain newer occupations, the importance of professions was less visible. Those, older, respondents who had witnessed recession also related status as a function of the economic climate. More generally, many respondents did not perceive their occupations as controlled by their profession. This suggests an issue with status. They could not perceive of their associations as able to control the issues discussed elsewhere.
Associations are also aware of a ranking that is taking place. Government and certain client groups are prepared to grant patronage to only a select group of professions, and thus there is a scramble to be in this select group. This is perhaps less of a problem for professional associations, and more of one for trade associations. However, the need for the same competence and consumer protection guarantees in emerging occupations ensures that this is a constant battle for even the most secure.

9.4 Profession as an Identity

One of the results of investigating how professionals construct meaning to the concept of profession is that this provides insight into their self-identity. This identity then becomes a discourse that they use with peers, employers, clients and government. It is evident from the interviews that professionals within the building industry have a clear sense of identity. There is, however, little evidence to support their use of profession to oppose the business environment generally or personally as has been suggested in some of the literature. Rather, it forms a part of the creation of occupational control. There is a tension in the evidence between an individual’s view of self, and how that is aggregated by the peer community or loosely coupled association executive. For example, individuals discussed conduct and wider ethical issues, the needs of sustainability, for good architecture and similar aspirations, as part of a vocational aspiration. There is nothing to suggest that they do not believe this, even act upon it. At the same time, however, good architecture, ethical surveying, good roofing, master building and the like are all part of a process to create social distance, to generate a differentiated service and to obtain occupational control.

Newer professionals were very confident and identified strongly with their profession (BS6, BS7, BS8, CDP4, QS5, QS7, QS14). However, this identity resided within their firm, rather than their association. Whilst they acknowledged their profession, it was the occupational classification adopted by their employers that provided their sense of identity. For example, both QS5 and QS7 were ‘M&E’ specialists, whilst BS6 was a ‘property asset manager’. Architect2 pointed out that everyone in the office is a professional, and so it does not require any overt identity. A business’ commercial interests and the behaviour of its staff are both centred upon the client. The only conflict might be concerning the resources needed to service the client and its repercussions for
profitability. QSI offers particular testimony on what happens to profession within this focus. Architect9 also wished to place an identity differential between the architect and those engaged in architectural work. This perhaps also reflects the nature of their occupations. Thompson (1968) and others discussed in chapter 3 point to the traditional identity crisis of surveyors, whose association is really only created for those without a home elsewhere. The disciplining mechanism mechanic also points towards the technical occupations of the workplace being a focus of identity. Interviewees were motivated to provide a quality product in the provision of an esoteric service. Within the surveying and other non-architect professionals, subsuming of profession with quality and client focus was a normal, though by no means universal, foundation to their construction of profession. The argument in this thesis is that professional associations retain control of this over business owners. Within architectural interviewees, there was a more clearly enunciated wider conceptual framework to the meaning of profession. This distinction can be overstated. Participants rarely offered evidence where client interests actually contradicted ethics, good architecture or sustainability. Where they did, clients won out (Architecture1, QSI, QSI1). There was no overt discussion of the problematic identity of the architect discussed within chapter 3. Saint (1982), for example, believes that the architect-artist ideal corrupts the creation of a real-world occupational identity. Routinisation of work does not seem to cause the same problems for respondents as Whittick (1961), Collins (1962) and Elliott (1972) might expect. Indeed, both architects and their association described very ‘modern’ architectural practices, and not those that might be found in Taylor (1956), Chappell (1987) or even Chappell and Willis (2000).

Therefore, respondents focus on their occupation. However, they do recognise that their association plays a key part in defining and organising their roles. They also recognise the wider environment and the place of clients and economic pressures. One interesting feature was the experiences of those who had witnessed ‘Thatcherism’ and, separately, those suffering from the recession of the early 1990s. Both these groups recognised the distinction between an employer’s commercial interests and everything else. QSI and QSI9 placed the same themes a decade earlier. One can only speculate how the confidence of the younger participants might deal with a similar trauma.

In terms of a wider discourse upon identity, the focus seemed to be upon the individual and informal study associations. Senior professionals were more likely to question the
need for the associations generally, and their own membership particularly. However, many admitted that they were well enough established that the need for validation was no longer necessary. Their businesses or c.v.'s provided their identity, and a professional qualification earned 10-20 years ago was less of a central part of who they were. Some had become involved within associations to try and improve things, others admitted that perhaps they ought to. Either the firm or other social organisation had replaced the professional association in these cases, such that there still existed a great deal of peer interaction. Their professional association had provided the initial validation and status, but at some stage they had gained the confidence through experience to involve themselves in lower status groups relevant to their interests and the needs of their work, or found this requirement within their firm. These other organisations were usually specialist interest groups, with limited membership and focussed on very specific occupation-related areas of work. Older participants were also more likely to have only a single membership association. This seems to be because they have less need for validation, and that the single discipline reflects their traditional interpretation of their occupation. For IDE, members might not qualify for entry into other associations.

Architectural participants universally identified with 'architecture', and were more likely to recognise themselves as part of a socio-political context. However, the majority rejected any personal obligation to risk their own business or employment. Their associations as collegiate representative organisations were better placed to do this. Neither an individual nor a business could 'save the world', although they might try and 'do their bit'. Ultimately, they had to placate shareholders and partners, pay salaries and look after the families of their own staff, and this required compromise. Professional associations in representing an entire community, and no individual's economic survival, were better able to campaign for the public interest. Both RIBA and CABE were referred to in this regard by promoting good design. It is, of course, far more difficult for other professionals to subscribe to such aspirations since their work is usually far more mundane in its technical nature. At the same time, RICS was also recognised by some participants as playing its part in public interests. This suggests that in the building industry, this sense of professional identity as a defence mechanism against market forces and as a gestalt of how occupational duties ought to be carried out, lacks the ability to organise in individual businesses. Indeed, those participants in larger practices seemed to be the least interested in any such thing. However, associations as communities of peers...
are able to provide some sense of this identity. All the participants seemed buoyed by a general level of self-belief and confidence within their interpretations of profession. This became evident when wider attitudes were expressed. Rather than fear change, they welcomed it. The future was viewed positively. Participants were happy to engage with new technologies, keen to collaborate and engage in joint ventures and work in a multi-disciplinary form. However, this did not ignore the history or traditional identity of the professional form, but was rather predicated upon it, and this imbued individuals with the confidence to evolve and build upon this foundation. Profession was a central part of that identity, even where it had moved individuals across disciplines, into new areas of work and internationally.

9.5 Narrative Themes

The thesis has discussed the issue of identity and the dialogues that take place among professionals, and between them and others. For this reason it is worth describing some of these themes that might not fit cleanly into the primary analysis of this work. These dialogues are interesting in themselves and offer further insight into the nature of profession. They are each worth developing as separate analyses for potential later publication.

First, it needs to stated that the professions are in good heart. Doom-laden oracles do not reflect the professions interviewed for this work. Generally, associations are well managed by 'professional' managers. Chapter 4 places the building industry associations within a comparable position to other associations (Watkins et al 1996). Most members agree. Individuals seem confident within the late modern environment, welcoming change and taking on new work and roles within it. Professionals create and endorse standardisation. They do not see the need to use profession as an identity or ideology to fight the evils of capitalism.

Secondly, the rise of the expert association officer running a quasi-judicial regulator is a new occupational group worth investigating. The issue of strategic de-coupling by associations is well covered elsewhere in the thesis. However, the dialogue surrounding the transition from genuine self-collective government to a collectivity managed by
experts and specialists is interesting, especially as it is seen in terms of the club and the not-club.

The rise of the 'Study Group' is a third theme. Whilst Millerson (1964) identified them as a type, they seem remarkably absent from most studies of occupational expertise. Yet here, so-called communities of interest were popular with a number of respondents. The informality created a community of equals, reflecting a certain conception of the peer group as a profession. Pragmatically they reflected the concerns that professions, through their very successful enhancement of status, and generation of jurisdiction, are not reflecting the actual needs for expertise required daily on the building site. These groups also seem to reflect Giddens' (1991) idea that expertise is simply too arcane and diverse for any one authority to control in late modernity. They also offer evidence of the confidence of professionals in their abilities to control what they do. Professionals are looking to these groups as a source for validation and the creation of new types of knowledge and standardised procedures. Some of these are formalising. The Architects in Building Conservation was offered by some respondents as a good example of this. The history of ABE might also point to its origins in a similar vein, although it always seems to have been intended as a qualifying association.

It is also interesting to note the involvement and co-operation of clients within these groups. Peer communities are being generated incorporating clients and thus help professionals to colonise these new areas.

Fourthly, the trade association comparative to the professional association has intriguing potential. Trade associations are not 'professionalising' according to their executive officers, inasmuch as they are not seeking to compete with professions. At the same time, however, professional associations are also clearly, in part, trade orientated. There are certainly clear functional differences between the two: professions qualify, whilst trades validate; professions work for the public good, and trade associations for their own economic self-interest; professional associations are for individuals, and trade ones for firms; finally, professions provide esoteric services, and trade associations produce concrete products. However, behind these traits, the situation is far less clear. Professional associations do sell themselves and seek to offer 'value for money' to members, at least some of whom buy membership rather like a shampoo. The problem of self versus public interest in professional associations is a driving force behind the decoupling discussed in
this thesis. Similarly, firms do join professional associations and set themselves up as chartered practices, and professions are moving towards regulating firms rather than individuals. Similarly, trade associations do qualify their members, such as in the NFRC TrustMark scheme. Even in the issue of public interest, the purported defining trait of a profession, trade associations in interview describe doing good out of self-interest (the case of the old lady’s roofing) and professional associations do ‘good’ in order to create jurisdiction (good architecture, ethical surveying).

Fifthly, the welcome by professionals to standardisation and routinisation is another theme that demands further attention. As was discussed, it has the opportunity to help create professional control of work, distinguishing the regulated practitioner from the charlatan, but it might yet turn against professions and deskill and overthrow them. There is a great deal of competing theory over standardisation, and further work will establish whether it is done here to establish a fictitious commodity, as part of corporate patronage (clients are well organised in building), or as the disciplining mechanism. Respondents recognised routinisation as ‘efficient’ in the late modern environment, creating ‘best practice’. Where it goes from there will be an interesting study.

Finally, clients are worth investigating in themselves. The evidence here points to them being an elite group, but also professionals and part of the peer community. Additionally, unlike business owners, they are well organised. They engage with the professions in communities of interest. Despite the fragmentation within the building industry, clients are intelligent and powerful. This makes them an interesting study to shed further light upon the issue of corporate patronage. In particular, it might lend weight to whether there exists one final fling of the ‘patron’ and the ‘name’ architect within architecture.

9.6 Secondary Literature in Focus

Just as future work arises from certain interesting packets of data that came out of the work, it is equally worth re-examining the fit, and the lack of it, between the ideas of theorists and the way similar concepts are used by professionals in their daily practice.
9.6.1 Functionalism

For all the valid criticisms of functionalism, it served many respondents as an identifying template. Ideal-type-constructs benchmark the creation of meaning that individuals and communities give to profession. The thesis refers in places to the idea of an authentic profession. Burrage (2006) and Saint (1983) both refer to the role of myth. This seems to be an important ideology and mode of discourse for respondents. It also explains much of the angst within the industry, because their professions do not fit neatly into this ‘ideal type’ professional construct.

This idea of definition remains troublesome in places, and the issue of self-identity is one worth re-examining in further work. Whilst respondents were not concerned in their daily routines about titles, there remain some interesting issues. For example, the label ‘architect’ remains regulated by statute and out of the control of RIBA, but is also susceptible to confusion with a number of ‘architectural’ descriptions, most obviously the technologist. Similarly, the extent to which the building engineer is not a surveyor is potentially interesting. Functionalism offers no help in differentiating between these, just as it struggles to distinguish between trade and professional associations.

Respondents believed that a body of knowledge was paramount to their concept of profession, and one that was practised in an ethical manner towards some formal code of practice. Derived from this, professional associations educate, qualify and ensure competence, which they validate to clients through formal membership stages. However, it was sometimes unclear what this body of knowledge even was. Indeed, professional associations are often seen as conservatively reflecting traditional demarcations, rather than qualifying, validating or evaluating any useful meaning of expertise. RIBA’s training is also too long and expensive when students pay their own fees and presumes the trainee will be a small practice generalist. Both RICS and RIBA are seen as being unable to deal with new specialisms.

Ethics provide a good example of the problems of this approach since most respondents listed it as a core function. However, focus was placed upon the need to serve the wider public interest and operate for the public good. Everything flowed from this, and it caused angst where a minority questioned the truth in this (notably BS1 and QS11), whilst others, usually older members (Architect8, QS9, QS12), believed that what had
been true was probably true no more. However, regarded as a trait, it fails to recognise that ‘ethical’ service provision is a distinctive service used to differentiate the professional from the charlatan.

The award of a charter to CIAT was obviously a missed opportunity to examine the process of ‘professionalisation’, but others remain. Many respondents regard a key feature of profession as a peer-created community, but were unsure that the traditional associations provided this. In general, associations were seen as slow to respond to market and technology changes. Informal groups have stepped into this vacuum, called by respondents ‘communities of interest’. These peer groups are not interested in validation and formal functions, which are better done elsewhere. Still, clients and employees of client organisations are often part of these peer groups, and so informal approval networks are created. Indeed, Architect14 illustrated the Architects in Building Conservation study association that had been accorded an evaluative role by government. At the same time, informality was a very important part of these study associations. It was expected that they might professionalise, but this would defeat their true purpose to existing members, who would perforce establish alternative informal communities.

The way in which professionals create their identity, then, needs careful analysis in order to recognise the wider factors behind these traits. It is not the trait that is important, inasmuch as it is a signpost to other, illustrative identifying features of professions.

There was no discussion of the concept of a semi-profession. Architects, where they discussed architectural technologists, saw them as professionals, and chartered surveyors did not consider those in other institutes as in any form of half-way house. There was only one exception. Architect14 used the term “semi-profession” to describe architectural technicians. Indeed, he mirrored Etzioni’s analysis of the concept, describing a tendency of technical sub-interests to aspire to professional status. This he described as “snobbery”. BIAT ought to have been included within RIBA, but now have equal, separate, chartered status. Aside from this, no participant suggested any sort of ranking, though this can be implied because some individuals did doubt the worthiness of certain associations. This was based on the principle of ease of admission.

Where the issue was raised was in the nature of the occupation, such as that of building surveyors engaged in domestic work and who might be regarded as of lesser standing,
perhaps even not ‘genuine’ professionals. This reflects the meaning most universally accorded, that a profession concerns specialist knowledge and its application. Those engaged in this at a less complex level are consequently viewed accordingly. Where this is interesting is that it points to what might become a hierarchical division of the profession. At the moment, respondents regard each other as a community of equals, but the concept of the semi-profession offers another identity marker in which to watch whether there is a second fracture developing within the collective, that of authentic professionals, and of technical-professionals. Certainly, some architectural respondents did point to the technical nature of most architectural work, and that only one could lead a project. Similarly, a number of reports reviewed in this thesis do point towards the development of a managerial and a technician class of professional. In this latter case, this seems not to have developed, probably because technology did not develop as those reports foresaw.

Similarly, semi-profession offers a perspective on the interesting issue of the trade association. Trade associations made no claim to be professionalising or in any form of transitional semi-professional status, despite their adopting individual members, codes of practice and other similar functions that might appear to offer appropriate characteristics. Only the National Federation of Roofing Contractors came close to describing a transient ‘semi-professional’ state between trade associations that were evolving to meet government competency initiatives and the professional associations.

It does seem that traits such as a body of knowledge tend to follow action, rather than initiate it. This reflects Muzio et al’s (2008b: 22) position that “a formalised body of knowledge is a result and not a prerequisite of a professionalisation project.” Certainly, concepts discussed here such as ‘good architecture’ are less about a body of knowledge and more about creating occupational control. Traits attain an importance in dialogue and identity, but this follows rather than leads.

9.6.2 Power

The issue of ‘power’ was instructive, pointing to certain issues with methodology. There was agreement that associations were increasingly recognised by a centrist Labour government as important partners in the creation of new legislation. Both trade and professional associations referred to themselves as influencing government. Conservative
policies to foster a free market and deregulation within building control were seen as influential. However, individuals were unwilling to accept that professions exhibited such political power. Some still referred back to the collapse of the professions in the 1970s (Architect8, QS9) and the 1990s (Architect9, BS3) and found it difficult to conceive of anything but a servile set of professions. Younger professionals clearly knew no fear (CDP4, QS5, QS7), although others experienced their relative invisibility within a global market place (BS5, QS3).

The issue of regulation was central. Respondents disagreed upon whether the industry was facing deregulation or increased regulation. ARBI, as the only regulator interviewed, believed that government was increasing regulation, although was slowly accepting the principle of 'lighter touch' regulation. Within this idea of state mediation, government has moved to establish the idea of a 'competent person’. Initially this was intended to aid the abolition of the public sector monopoly on building control. However, the result was to accept professional associations as occupational authorities for judging qualification and competence. Indeed, no other means emerged. More recently, government has utilised this method in dealing with health and safety and ‘dangerous’ occupations. A new profession of planning supervisor evolved as companies sought to enact their safety obligations, whilst Part P of the Building Regulations requires a competent person to carry out or inspect electrical work. This demand for health and safety standards places the focus upon those with the technical knowledge and managerial skills to undertake ‘safe’ work. In this way a professional group is granted power to control specific occupations in return for the improvements that they will bring. Respondents seemed to concur with this perspective. Even those who believed that it was unnecessary accepted that it is happening. The Home Inspector offers a similar interpretation. Here there is no safety implication, but the rationale behind home inspection reports is that the process of selling a home is disorganised, lengthy and costly. A competent ‘home inspector’ will protect consumers through their competence and independence, which is evaluated and controlled by professional associations, though no single group retains sole jurisdiction.

The issue of creating the esoteric knowledge that distances profession and customer is a problem that interviewees had difficulty accepting. The routinisation of knowledge is regarded as a particular problem for quantity surveyors since it removes their occupational jurisdiction on a continual basis. All surveyors regarded themselves as
something of a harlequin profession; rather mute, something of a joke and wearing many
different colours in different parts of the industry and for different clients. This does not
lend weight to the idea of a profession able to engage in organised action against a
disparate and disorganised mass of customers. This was in clear contrast to the legal
profession respondents. Again, it offers insight into the way that self-identity was created
separately by the individual and the aggregated group in an association. The latter clearly
do believe that they control occupations, and the evidence supports them.

This difference is partly explained through the disciplining mechanism model.
Respondents recognised the routinisation of work and that this created a tool for control.
However, since most were on the receiving end, they only witnessed the increased in
expectations upon behaviour and workload. They regarded this as endemic to the late
modern business environment. At the same time, but as a separate thought stream, they
also recognised that their association created these, and that there were many practical
results. They obtained more work and non-professionals were increasingly excluded from
the market. In addition, they obtained cheaper insurance and better legal safeguards.

9.6.3 Professional Project

Again, there was little appetite from respondents to accept that their profession was
engaged on such a project. However, they would not be expected to. There was a clear
divide between professional associations and trade associations. Trade associations are
engaged on an economic project. However, respondents perceived their associations as
without a monopoly and with very little economic power, which has been one criticism
of them and accorded as a reason for their inevitable demise. Of course, they also pointed
to examples where government and clients required professional associations. In the case
of government, new ‘professions’ were being created (BS2, CDP1, RICS1, RICS2).

There was some admission that concurred with the professional project historically
(RICS1, RICS3). Others referred to a ‘virtuous circle’, acknowledging self-interest behind
the creation of the professions (RIBA1, RIBA2), but relegating it to a historic irrelevance.
Indeed, RICS1, RICS2 and IHPE1 were adamant that economics and self-interest are
subordinate to the ethical regulation that was the focus of their revitalised associations.
Both associations were prepared to lose members and fight their memberships over this.
This thesis argues that this in itself creates a jurisdiction, that of ‘ethical surveying’ or
'ethical plumbing'. Participants preferred to discuss ‘best practice’ rather than control. There was a strong thread of genuine economic disinterest running through discussions of study associations. ABE1 describes a group of surveyors and architects interested in working better together and with a common interest in producing better buildings, rather than a professional project. Many participants consider study associations as the future of profession. These reflect the increasing specialisation required by professionals (Architectural3, Architect5, Architect7, Architect12, Architect13, QS11). Informality required precludes any form of economic project.

The idea of cognitive exclusiveness is also an interesting one. One issue discussed in chapter 1 was whether interviewing a relatively small sample of the total number of professionals can be realistically described as representative. The answer here seems to be ‘yes’. Whilst some, such as Olesen and Walker (1970), have argued that enculturation has limits, these do not appear to affect the attitude towards the provision of professional services. Had respondents been asked for their political opinions, then there might have been great variety. However, in terms of the concept of profession, there was great unity in ideology. Where there was disagreement, this was more about how the current environment and/ or association might be measured against this. The idea of ‘self’ and ‘others’ is stronger than any divisions that might exist within the collective, at least within ‘normal’ contexts. Neither architecture nor surveying has had to deal with HIV, for example, or any similar fundamental break with routine.

9.6.4 Jurisdiction

Participants all identified with their area of work and specialist knowledge. However, again, they did not regard it as a form of occupational control. There certainly are problems with the model that Abbott (1988) presents, requiring exclusivity of jurisdiction. Respondents do not accept that this is present within the building industry. The corporate actions of RICS can reasonably be described within a conceptualisation in which they are seeking to obtain that jurisdiction. However, it is clear (Bowyer 1966, Thompson 1968) that RICS was created not through a jurisdictional claim, but a social process by which they were left as a rump when the architects and engineers 'professionalised'. It is equally evident that there are similar institutions operating within the same jurisdictional claims. Whilst some might be seen as part of a process of carnivorous competition, this is far from clear. ABE has been co-inhabiting with RICS
since their creation in 1925. The discipline of building engineer might be seen as emerging, and which allows a more temporary interpretation of events as ABE evolves into a building engineer jurisdiction, and RICS retains its rather convoluted notion of the surveyor. Even in estate agency where proposals to establish a universal ombudsman scheme are being supported to entrench what might be described as a jurisdiction (CDP1), the reality is that there exist two associations, RICS and NAEA.

The concept of enclosure offers a useful analysis of the growth of RICS through its claims for jurisdiction over tasks previously associated with institutions that dominated the work. It also reflects the literature developed by the institution as an explanation for its behaviour. A catalyst for change across all the professions was new technology, described by this model as a driving force within the system of the professions. Similarly, this driver explains the creation of new procurement systems, and the roles that have been developed, most notably project management. This would also explain the rise of the Chartered Builder, the construction manager now seen as central to building developments. Abbott’s clientele settlement also explains the demise of the architect’s predominance, in terms of that profession’s failure to meet the demands of clients, thus leaving a vacancy for others to full. The model might also explain the unwillingness of trade associations to ‘professionalise’ since they have agreed a ‘truce’ with the professions, and neither side wishes to engage upon internal warfare at this difficult time.

However, Abbott proposes a system of professions. This is far from evident. Many respondents had multiple memberships within associations, and most explained a situation where shifts within their own individual occupations were taking place so rapidly that the associations simply could not keep pace. Some also placed their firms as a driver of identity and technical jurisdiction, promoting the idea of multi-disciplinary practices. ‘Communities of interest’, these very specialist interest groupings, are outside any ‘system’ devised by the associations, and seen as a future driver for knowledge creation (Architecture3, Architect4, Architecture6, BS6, QS11). Many professionals identified what might be termed as jurisdiction as the portable commodity they as individuals offer. Specialisation creates each individual as a personal cluster of expertise. This is validated by experience and informal peer networking. Individuals certainly saw no evidence of any system. Associations also disagreed with this idea, accepting the impermanence of occupations and their own membership. A number of participants
(Architecture3, Architect6, Architect9, Architect12, BS4, CDP1, CDP4, QS7) had left or not joined associations.

9.6.5 Managerialism

The issue with the ‘managerialism’ literature is what it actually represents. Some seem to think of it as useless red tape, created simply to legitimise a given position. Others regard it as routinisation, in which processes get standardised for efficiency reasons. Giddens seems to prefer the latter, but the situation is less clear here.

Respondents certainly referred to the need for audit, evaluation and measurement. It was implied by some that clients seek to ‘cover their backs’ by employing only those with appropriate professional qualifications, since this provides them with a defence from any criticism within their own organisations. Interviewees were very willing to engage with this evaluative process, even encouraging it. For some it was a source of additional work, and for most it was an expression of self-confidence, rather than a slight on their professional judgement. There was little support from participants for any view on an internal ‘creeping managerialism’ within their own firms. There were very few who had been involved with public sector organisations, where much of the literature is based, but a sizeable proportion did work in large international companies where this might have been expected. However, it might be inferred that the standardisation referred to by BS6 and QS5 took this form. Certainly, IDE1 reflected upon changes within the demolition industry where, whilst standards had improved, many procedures had been developed to legitimise processes rather than improve them (see also Lane 2008). This was a similar opinion of CDP1. Only Architect14 offered a specific description of professional working methods being changed by the working methods of large corporations.

There is clear evidence of an increasingly standardised approach, which apparently conforms with the theory of managerialism. However, it is less clear where this originated. Professional associations and certain individuals presented the changes as sensible, pragmatic and efficient responses to a wide context of legal and economic forces, enacted by the professional associations as modern and practical forward thinking policies. This was very much part of the meaning of profession espoused by a number of surveyors (QS5, QS6, QS7) and who had the supreme confidence in their own skills and competencies which were qualified and validated by their associations, but which they
carried out at work. The argument in this thesis is that these routines create jurisdiction and establish the guarantees of competence required by clients and government, which are then used to establish occupational control.

By its very nature, legitimacy is difficult to prove. If processes can be so proven, then they no longer provide the legitimacy function. Whilst surveyors in the larger practices supported standardisation on the grounds of efficiency, other professionals within smaller practices doubted the value of this approach, and believed that it tended to increase costs, create work and protect individuals from blame.

There was clearly a shift in the manner in which the associations worked. Whether it was simply the result of the internet, desktop publishing and cheaper printing, a genuine move towards democracy or a clear case of legitimisation, all associations published far more corporate information, strategies and 'clear sky thinking' material in the last decade than ever before. This material was also uniformly of a high production quality, including glossy finishes and designer covers. In contrast, material until the early 1990s was almost always typed sheets with a single staple in the top left corner. Whilst an interesting development, it does not provide an answer over the problem of whether associations legitimise themselves or are engaging in democratic action on behalf of the peer group.

9.7 Final Conclusions

The hypothesis is proven. Professional associations do exhibit strong occupational control. However, the interesting themes are how they do this in what is usually seen as an opposed and dominant environment, and how this is rather more of a 'new' achievement rather than a longstanding one. They also enact control with far less ceremony than is seen in many other professions. The thesis was constructed around what might have been taken as a self-evident contention, but in the context of the building industry, is not. This allows the thesis to draw out issues of self-identity centred on the meaning given to the concept of profession and fractures that are appearing within the collective mind.

The concept of the looser coupling of a peer-controlled 'club' and an executive-controlled quasi-judicial regulator section of the professional association places emphasis upon the authority of professions to control their occupations. Issues of training and
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controlling admission are becoming less important parts of the executive gestalt, though still important to the community. What a professional education actually consists of is far less important, some might say almost irrelevant, to the status and quality of the qualification. Members train in fields that are relevant to their actual work. These might be undertaken at events held by associations or they might occur within communities of interest. What matters is that there is expertise and it is proven on a continuous basis. This brings the member into the orbit of the regulation part of the association. What this does is create a standardised routine of competence, through a number of systems. Behaviour is controlled, continual training is monitored, and tasks are routinised through 'best practice' handbooks and manuals. Professional associations dominate and control occupations. This reinforces the initial decision not to examine firms. It is with the association, and the membership, that issues of control and the resulting identities and dialogues flow.

Of course, this raises the interesting question as to where power lies within the association. It is quite possible that ordinary professionals will become 'knowledge workers' disciplined by a remote professional association. Indeed, it is possible that associations are being colonised by employers, both physically through their own membership and of their firms, and the inculcation of their ideas. At the same time, associations, however decoupled, do retain democratic systems of peer control. At this time, there is probably a balance as to how things will end up, since individuals have gained significantly from the success of their associations. RICS' move towards self-regulation as an agent of the State, policing itself effectively as a third party, is a good example of this. Members did not agree with it prior to it being enacted, it undermines a central tenet of peer evaluation, and yet they are substantially financially better off after the RICS success, £1300 according to RICS Business (2006), and have forestalled an attempt at government regulation of the profession.

Occupational power provides individual professionals with cheaper indemnity insurance, handbooks and practice manuals to establish how work should be done and peer-created standards. Professionals have certainty in their work and occupational protection from both their employers and clients. Clients and the government obtain competency guarantees backed up by arbitration and insurance systems. Consumers are protected. Professional associations have created new forms of service provision differentiated from
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the 'quack' and the un-modern. These are 'ethical', 'competent', 'good' and 'safe'. Late modernity serves as a useful boundary to reflect the time-specific nature of the data here, specifically the working lives of respondents, and it reflects the occupational powerlessness and uncertainty stated in much of the literature. However, it does not describe what is actually happening. Professions remain dominant authorities. Indeed, professions here are engaged in what might be termed a modern professional project. They are recreating occupational distance and establishing new forms of differentiated service.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Occupational Definitions

A1 Introduction

The following definitions are offered to give an overview of the occupations found within the building industry. The analysis deliberately relies upon literature produced by the professions. Since the construction of an identity of self is so important to this work, this seems reasonable. Like all professions, creating a jurisdiction, and then defending it, is a prime role of the association and their own literature and self-definitions reflect this. The UK Privy Council then endorses these. The intention here is to offer an introductory illustration of how these occupations construct their own identities.

Whilst these occupational groups do provide formalised explanations of who they are, many of these are not exclusive. Professionals can be seen to fall into dual classifications and hold dual memberships. As Dwyer (1998b), in his role as CIOB president, explained in regard of extending membership it would not "lead the CIOB into conflict with other construction industry professional institutions...there is plenty of scope for dual memberships of CIOB and other organisations, just as I am myself." Hughes (2000) actively promotes collaboration between associations. The benefit of such partnering is "simply bringing people, Institutes and ideas together", Bale (2001) suggesting that partnering of institutions is to assist them co-operate in areas of common interest, and individual dual membership is more a result of what is "appropriate to their career goals" rather than anything more formal.

A2 Architect

The simplest occupational definition is that an architect is a designer. Architects design new buildings, alterations to old buildings, spaces around buildings, layouts for groups of
buildings and most of the built environment. This extends beyond simple drawing, but includes aiding clients to decide exactly what is needed, studying similar buildings and surveying the prospective site and its surroundings. The design is then prepared considering how the building will be used, what it will look like, what it will cost, how it will be built and how all the services will work. When the design is agreed, working drawings and specifications are produced that show dimensions, materials and construction details. The architect then manages the tendering process whereby a builder is employed, and (traditionally) manages the construction process.

Others see the architect less as the person who carries out such a series of tasks, and more as the personification of a concept. Within the discipline are two competing paradigms. The first is that architects are servants of the people, artisans and craftsmen producing useful products to the betterment of society. St John Wilson (1992: 21) describes this as the architect as "servant of the day-to-day needs of Society". The alternative identity is the architect as artist, creator, individualist thinker and idealist. St John Wilson (1992: 21) refers to this as the view that "architecture is 'frozen music'". Architecture is thus pure art or pure pragmatism. St John Wilson (1992: viii) believes that "architecture is a public and practical art based upon a spoken pact with its society. We are required to engage in a dialogue with those for whom we build in order to discover what to build."

There has been a tension between the architect-builder and the architect-artist throughout the history of the profession (Kaye 1960). Architecture is often described more as a discourse of ideas, rather than an actual occupation producing a manufactured output. Designing concerns symbols and visualisation. In architecture, "'Thinking' and 'communication' are thus not nearly as closely related as in verbal language" (Brawne 1992: 14). This is often a source of confusion and irritation to other, more pragmatic, occupations within the industry who are less interested in such ephemeral ideas. This causes them to criticise the architect as too impractical. In turn, architects frequently react with disdain to such commentary, leading, for example, Brawne (1992: 21) to comment that "modern architecture (and the Architectural profession) is ... only weakly, if at all, defended by its practitioners". Thus, architects and other professionals have no language in common and very different interpretations of the design role.
However, more practical architects do exist and are engaged within the industry. For them, the architect is a team leader as much as a servant of society. For example, in outlining his thoughts on the relationship of design, cost, quality and profit, Cecil (1984: 90) states "speaking as an architect, it is perhaps predictable that I should lay claim to the voice that provides the most balanced advice. This is not mere professional arrogance, not yet a further petty blow in the battle for continuing leadership of the building team. It is securely based on the knowledge that ... only architects have an education that spans the generality of the building need ... the training to make decisions based on compromise and the experience to know the impact of those decisions." Cecil (1984: 83) also argues that the architect is an 'easy target' of criticism of a manufacturing process. "Whatever may be the perception of the architect's role in the building procurement process, it is the architect who is at the sharp end ... (and if problems arise) ... Wherever the main fault lies, one name will for certain appear on the writ - that of the architect."

The title architect is statutorily protected under the Architects Act 1997, and only those on the register maintained by the Architects Registration Board (ARB) are entitled to use the title. This Act replaced The Architects (Registration) Act 1931, The Architects Registration Act 1938, The Architects' Qualifications (EEC Recognition) Order 1987, The Architects' Qualifications (EC Recognition) Order 1988 and sections of The Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996. Protection has, therefore, existed for over 75 years, and extends to other uses of the word – including the letters RIBA. Members of RIBA can only use the suffix if they are also on the register.

Architecture's professional body, the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA), was founded in 1834. The purposes of the RIBA were expressed in the first Royal Charter granted in 1837 as "the general advancement of Civil Architecture and for promoting and facilitating the acquirement of the knowledge of the various Arts and Sciences connected therewith: it being an art esteemed and encouraged in all enlightened nations, as tending greatly to promote the domestic convenience of citizens and the public improvement and embellishment of towns and cities."
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A3 Architectural Technologist

The architectural technologist is a technician. However, the occupation offers an interesting study since it is, first, the direct result of the existence of the ARB and the legal protection of the term architect. Those not able to register as 'architects', were initially deemed to be in a technical role, divorced from the professional architect and RIBA. Unlike RICS, technicians were not regarded as ancillary members but excluded.

Secondly, this very particular title is the creation of a professional body, the British Institute of Architectural Technologists (BIAT) as a term of reference for their membership. BIAT itself was originally called the British Institute of Architectural Technicians. BIAT (1999: 1) describes the architectural technologist as working "in the field of architectural technology". In 2001 the term was carefully and formally defined by BIAT (Building Engineer 2001b: 8) in the following terms.

"The architectural technologist will be able to analyse, synthesise and evaluate design factors in order to produce design solutions which will satisfy performance, production and procurement criteria. This will be achieved through the design, selection and specification of material, components and assembly and the management, co-ordination, communication, presentation and monitoring of solutions which perform to the agreed brief and standards in terms of time, cost and quality."

Of particular interest is the fact that the architectural technologist, a full member of BIAT, is distinguished from the architectural technician, a part-member, who is also formally defined.

"The architectural technician will be able to establish the purpose, methods and techniques for preparing detailed design solutions. This will be achieved by the preparation, co-ordination and communication of technical information including drawings, graphical information, reports and schedules, contributing to meeting relevant statutory regulations and controlling projects by monitoring agreed quality standards and obtaining, recording and organising information."

BIAT obtained a Royal Charter as this research was being completed in 2005, becoming the Chartered Institute of Architectural Technologists (CIAT). CIOB was vocally supportive of the move, having an agreement with BIAT for closer working. RIBA also
expressed their pleasure at the achievement during interview for this thesis.

A4 Surveyor

FIG (1991:9) define the surveyor generally as

"a professional person with the academic qualifications and technical expertise to practice the science of measurement, to assemble and assess land and geographic-related information; to use that information for the purpose of planning and implementing the efficient administration of the land, the sea and structures thereon; and to instigate the advancement and development of such practices. In the application of the foregoing activities, surveyors take into account the relevant legal, economic, environmental and social aspects affecting each project".

The term surveyor is a difficult one to clearly identify, since, again, it is synonymous with the term chartered surveyor and its professional body, the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS). In the main body of the work, the profession is referred to as a ‘harlequin’ profession, and Thompson (1968) places the origin of the association and its use of the term ‘surveyor’ as the result of the membership being predominantly those excluded by the professionalisation of other occupations. RICS describes itself as the leading professional body in land, property and construction. According to RICS (1995) the institution has 90,000 members, of who over 72,000 are fully qualified.

Chartered surveyors are divided within their Institution into a number of specialisms. These used to be technical classifications involving general practice, rural practice, land surveying, quantity surveying and building surveying. However, RICS recently adopted a 'faculty' structure aimed at representing fields of study (see for example Murphy 2003 on a discussion of this). Within the scope of this work, quantity surveying (now located within the RICS' construction faculty) and building surveying (in its own faculty) will be the primary focus.

Two examples illustrate this identity problem that surveyors suffer. RICS (1972) offered the following areas of expertise as a description of the opportunities available to surveyors in the enlarged European Economic Community. These were property adviser, project leader, construction economist, rural land expert, and mapping and measurement
specialist. RICS (1998c) product leaflets classify the following as the work of the chartered surveyor: surveys and valuations of residential property; surveying the land and sea; rural estate management; resolving property disputes; rent reviews; planning advice; managing and maintaining residential property; life cycle costing of buildings; insolvency advice; fitting out and management of commercial property; equipment and machinery valuation; farm management; construction procurement; construction planning; construction contract management; building cost planning and management.

There is no requirement for surveyors to be chartered, nor any registration board. A number of other institutes include surveyors in their ranks, including the Association of Building Engineers and the Chartered Institute of Building. In these cases, they might not actually refer to themselves as surveyors. CIOB members would, of course, be chartered, but as builders rather than surveyors. Members of the ABE adopt the title Building Engineer whilst carrying out similar jobs.

A4.1 The Quantity Surveyor

The quantity surveyor is a difficult role to define, there having been modernisation of its tasks from a traditionally technical role as measurer and recorder to a diversified range of tasks. RICS (1970) prefers the term construction economist to compare the "fully professional man with first-class qualifications" (RICS 1970: 9.11) with the simple technician that is the measurer. The role of the modern quantity surveyor can probably be best defined as being the management of resources in the development, production and maintenance of the built environment. They are concerned with the time, cost and quality values associated with construction and are skilled in applying this knowledge at various levels of responsibility.

By definition, RICS (1995a:29) states that

"Chartered quantity surveyors are the financial managers of the construction team who add value by managing the functions of cost, time and quality. They provide effective cost management and cost control in building and engineering projects of any scale. Demand for their services is worldwide and chartered quantity surveyors work in over 100 countries."
As consultants, and in public authorities, the service provided is more comprehensive than that offered by any comparable profession. They influence every stage of construction, from initial feasibility to settlement of the final account. They produce estimates and cost plans; advise on contract methods and contractor selection; value work in progress; check accounts; analyse expenditure for tax and insurance; and advise on the running and maintenance costs of a building during its life cycle. Their knowledge of the industry enables chartered quantity surveyors to act as project managers on behalf of clients with responsibility for the selection, management and coordination of all the resources needed for the satisfactory completion of a construction project.

They have been quick to seize the advantages of modern information technology. Chartered quantity surveyors in the UK have access to the largest data bank of construction cost information in the world. They use the full resources of computing, knowledge based systems and microelectronics to extend and refine their professional expertise in the financial control of construction development.

Thompson (1968) traces the roots of quantity surveying as a distinct activity back to the seventeenth century and the Great Fire of London. Most of those who performed these duties in those early days were architect/surveyors who had risen up through the ranks of tradesmen to achieve their 'professional' status. They worked initially for trade craftsmen, then later for the architect and their function was largely as measurers, measuring what had been completed after construction in order to calculate payment. The need for change became evident as the volume of building work increased in such a way that the building owners became dissatisfied with this method of settling the cost of the work. The precedent of calculating the cost of the building before work was actually commenced became more widely accepted. This led to architects divesting themselves of the "surveying" functions since they were purely cost related.

The structure of the profession during the nineteenth century was divided between takers off and workers up, so-called pre-contract duties, and the measuring surveyor, a post-contract task. The concept of the bill of quantities as a pricing document to allow for price competition and clarity of final cost, became well established during the mid-nineteenth century; the preparation and administration of these bills being the focal job of the quantity surveyor for over a hundred years.

The role of the quantity surveyor has been the subject of discussion in recent times,
because of the highly technical and traditional nature of its role. Quantity surveyor roles could be easily computerised and were seen as of low status. Hemsley (1998) usefully summarises these concerns as being the result of computerisation, changing procurement practices and client requirements, and "turf wars" with other professions. Quantity surveyors have been described variously as being technologically backward (CSM 1999, Building 1999a), unhelpful to modern clients with new ideas (Hemsley 1998) and with an oversupply of firms for the services they offer (Building 1999b, Cavill 1999a). Cavill (1999b) reports poor profitability on quantity surveying functions, which reinforces the argument that the profession must evolve from its original duties and repel jurisdictional attacks from other professions (Minogue 1996, Building 1999b, Cavill 1999a). Radical solutions have been proposed, including the development of the profession into management consultancy (RICS 1995b, CSM 1996). Crowther (1993) points to the flexibility of the quantity surveying occupation, and its extension into the expert fields of cost consultancy, project management, construction management, taxation advice, and facilities management as each became a specialism valued by clients and recognised as pertinent to the building industry. He describes the profession as a "jack-of-most trades" (Crowther 1993), but warns that this will bring it into inevitable conflict with other professions, specifically lawyers and accountants.

The result of this self-analysis during the late 1980s and 1990s, led Sweet (2004) to report that quantity surveyors are now leading building projects and have re-branded themselves as cost consultants, primarily due to their understanding of building costs.

A4.2 The Building Surveyor

RICS (1995a:23) describes the building surveyor in the following terms:

"Chartered building surveyors offer professional advice on all aspects of construction, from the design of large modern structures to more modest adaptation and repair.

Their extensive training ensures that they are well grounded in building technology, the law, building contracts, costs (including running costs) and engineering services. Building surveyors' long established and appreciated skills include diagnosis and remedy of building faults, rehabilitation and extension of
buildings and detailed structural and performance surveys. They are also involved in design, contract administration and budget control, planned maintenance, project management building conservation and a surprising variety of property-related activities. Clients of all kinds have come to rely on them to represent them in building disputes and to untangle the complexities of planning and building controls.

The building surveyor as a separate professional is a relatively recent creation. RICS formally recognised the term in 1973, when a specific division was created to serve the interests of the specialism as it developed from what Fulford (1996a) describes as "the emerging specialisms of 20 to 30 years ago ... they successfully developed out of the GP division, once critical mass was achieved in terms of members' needs, interest and commitment". Again, a professional association is seen as central to creating a name for an evolving area of work within a more traditional occupation.

Ferry (1984: 98) quotes the building surveyor as a technological architect, and most necessary to the building process "unless the architectural profession is suddenly going to reverse the emphasis of its education" and embrace design technology before design aesthetics. To Ferry, the building surveyor with "proper training, professional structure and career prospects" (op cit) is a worthy professional, able to guarantee the quality of the design on completion. Fulford (1996a) shows the problems of definition, pointing to "four emerging specialisms" all part of building surveying, whilst also recognised as being separate. These are project management, the planning supervisor under the CDM regulations, risk assessment and other health and safety related skills. Fulford (1996b) also recognised the existence of separate "technically orientated" and "consultancy orientated" building surveyors.

Building Surveyors Division (1995) defined the profession in terms of its core skills. These are building technology, design, buildings in use, building pathology, building services, building contracts and procurement, building surveys, management principles and statutory regulations.

A5 Building Engineer

The Building Engineer is a product of membership of the Association of Building
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Engineers (ABE). The building engineer is often perceived as the building surveyor under a different title, and in a different institution. The ABE advertising literature describes itself as "the professional body for those specialising in the technology of building". "The activities of the building engineer are summarised as the technical and management processes by which buildings are designed, constructed, renewed and repaired in accordance with national legislation." Their expertise "includes knowledge of the economic and legal framework within which building projects are conceived" including project management and acting as expert witness.

A6 Chartered Builder

Like the building engineer, the Chartered Builder is also, at first glance, straightforward to define since their identity is linked to their membership of one particular institution, the Chartered Institute of Building (CIOB). The term is not known outside this institution, except for the mundane term 'builder'. CIOB defines itself as the "voice of professional managers in construction" and press releases carry the explanation that "it aims to promote the science and practice of construction for public benefit". CIOB (1993: 3) defines the institution as "the professional organisation for managers of the building process". CIOB (undated: 1) describes the institution slightly wider as "the leading professional body worldwide for managers in construction". Its members "work in all parts of construction - not just in contracting but in areas such as project management, quantity surveying, consultancy, facilities management, research and education - and are united by a common commitment to bring the highest possible professional standards to their work" (ibid: 1).

It should be noted that the term construction manager normally excludes the project manager, whose normal professional domicile is the Association of Project Managers (APM). The construction manager might act as a project manager, but the term construction manager defines the management solely of the construction process; that is, the management of the site on which construction occurs, and the process of creating the building. It excludes many of the planning, design, financial and leasing (or selling) issues that may be involved in project management. Whilst the chartered builder is in
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essence a construction manager, CIOB (1997a: 1) continues to stress a greater depth to members, who "play a pivotal role in the construction teams responsible for managing projects through from inception to completion."

Bale (2000: 2) described the professional Chartered Builder as "ours is not professionalism of the "brass plate" variety; it is a practical professionalism concerned with the promotion of excellence in the management of the construction process."

The term 'builder' has also given rise for concern within the CIOB and prompted an attempt to rename the Institute as the Chartered Institute of Construction and its membership as Chartered Constructors. Parsons (1996: 14) as the president who initiated the formal process stated that "Today is about Construction". Banbury (1997) argued for the change upon the basis that the Institute's membership were not all 'builders', that the traditional building firm now offered many non-building functions (particularly management ones), and that universities were moving towards the word construction, mirroring both international usage and the influential Latham Report that reported upon the state of the British construction industry. This followed the stance of the CIOB's leadership that the word 'builder' was not popular amongst members, and in fact turned away potential members. They embraced the diversity envisaged from the future of an industry wherein traditional boundaries and demarcations were no longer relevant. However, the change in name was by no means unanimous and caused lengthy discussion within the pages of the CIOB's official magazine Construction Manager. CM (October 1996) is representative with four supportive and three opposing letters. The primary support was best evidenced by a letter from the master of the Worshipful Company of Constructors, a City of London Livery Company. They had originally intended to term themselves 'builders' but had received advice to avoid inbreeding of prejudice and encourage diversity of membership. Opponents primarily pointed to tradition and the existing recognition of the Institute, coupled with the problem that 'constructor' or 'construction' was little better known than builder. The opponents managed to force a postal ballot of all members at the EGM to discuss the issue, and of the 62% who voted 74% were in favour. As described elsewhere, the Privy Council ultimately refused to
allow the name change in any event, but the CIOB remains uncertain of the efficacy of the term builder.

On the other hand, however, the then president of the CIOB, John Bale, appeared to regard this confusion as inevitable and was rather more concerned in educating "construction managers, architects, surveyors, town planners and engineers" (Hampton 2000) across traditional disciplines. He argued that the CIOB's area of expertise offers it the ability to do this.
Appendix B: Overview Brief Given to Individual Participants

INTERVIEWEE BRIEFING NOTE

Dear Colleague,

Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed as part of my PhD research project undertaken at the London School of Economics. Any information that you provide will remain confidential, and you will not be named within the work. I will also send you a summary of the work on its completion.

My thesis concerns what the concept of profession means to you as someone who is working in the English building industry. I have attempted to offer the following summary as a background to the study, and to give you a basis to start thinking from. However, it is my intention is to carry out an unstructured interview. The premise behind this is that I wish you to discuss what you believe is relevant and important.

There are a number of themes that I am looking to investigate. I would like to ask you about your thoughts on the idea of profession, the reality as you see it, why you became a professional (if indeed, you think you are), and how the profession has changed over your working life. I am hoping to use your experiences as employee, expert, director, partner, adviser, and member of professional association(s) to give me your thoughts on what you do, how you do it, and who and why you do it for. This involves the situation you experience now, how you have seen things evolve and how you might foresee the future.

With your permission I will record this interview in order to ensure that I have a complete record of it, and as proof of the work. The interview will, however, be completely anonymous, both for you personally and for any organisations mentioned during the interview. If you have any questions before we start, please do not hesitate to ask. Thank you.
THEMES OF POSSIBLE DISCUSSION

The following are for offer to provide you with some possible ideas around which we can discuss the themes. Please do not view them as exclusively all we can talk about. This is very important as a central part of my work consists of issues perceived by you as important. Please do not treat these as questions that have to be answered; think of them more as laying seeds to help you organise your own thoughts.

Background

1. Are you a "professional"?
2. How did you become a professional?
3. Why did you become a professional?
4. What makes you a professional?
5. Do you find that you identify as being a professional in wider contexts?

What is a Profession?

1. What does "profession" mean?
2. Can you give specific examples of how "professional" has made a difference to the way you carry out your tasks?
3. What is the purpose of a profession, either generally or within the industry?
4. Why does the profession exist? Should it continue to do so?
5. How do you think a profession comes to exist?

Experiences and Empirical Data

1. In your daily life, are there any examples of how being a professional affects you?
2. Do you find that professionals work differently compared with those who are not professionals?
3. If you run your own business, do you treat staff differently?
4. As an employee are you managed differently?
5. Does being a professional ever cause any conflicts of interest or arguments within the process of carrying out your occupation?

Professional Associations

1. Why did you join an association?
2. Have you joined more than one? Why?/ Why not?
3. Why do you think we have professional institutions?
4. Are they good or bad, both generally and specifically?
5. What are your experiences of your own institution/s (if applicable)
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6. What are your views/ experiences on other institutions
7. Do you think associations have political or other power?
8. Are associations being replaced by other forms? (I am specifically thinking of ARB v RIBA for architects here, but you might have other special interest or legal examples).
9. Is/are the institute/s representative of your views?
10. Do you involve yourself with the association/s in any way?

Future of the Professions

1. What is the future of the profession as a whole?
2. Do you find that your work has changed?
3. Has the way that you work been changed? By clients? By 'the market'? By the professional institution? By 'Management'?
4. Have the institutions changed in your working life? How?
5. If so, is this good or bad?
Appendix C: Schedule of Interviewees

Architects

Architect 1: Architect 1 is a 50 year old female, employed in London-based practices for the majority of her career.

Architect 2: Architect 2 is 40, and employed in a project management company, whose work is predominantly dispute resolution. He is registered with ARB, and a member of RIBA. However, he is also a barrister and a chartered arbitrator.

Architectural Professional 3: Architectural 3 is the founder of a ‘leading strategic design consultancy’ with offices worldwide. The firm employs architects, designers, project managers and researchers to offer the widest expertise on behalf of their clients. He is 60.

Architect 4: Architect 4 is the founder of a ‘small award winning firm, based in North London’, specialising in ‘designing high quality modern insertions in existing and historic settings’. The practice remained small ‘in order to maintain its high standards and the personal involvement of the participant ‘at all levels’.

Architect 5: Architect 5 is a director of a ‘leading architectural and engineering firm with international operations that confirm its ranking among the world’s top 20 such professional practices’.

Architectural Professional 6: Architecture 6 founded a ‘research and consulting practice’ in 1990 to work with designers, clients and developers on concept, design and occupancy elements of the building process. She is RTPI and is involved with a number of other associations.

Architect 7: Architect 7 works as a ‘development manager’ for a ‘leading project management and construction company’ with ‘over 7500 staff in 93 offices worldwide’. She is 50.

Architect 8: Architect 8 has been the sole partner in an architectural practice for the last 25 years. He is in the process of winding up his practice prior to retirement.

Architect 9: Architect 9 is a 40 year-old architect in a London-based architectural partnership.

Architect 10: Architect 10 is 45 and works for a LLP based in London, employing 22 architects.

Architect 11: Paul Hyett is ex-president of RIBA and chairman of RyderHKS, a practice established by the merger of Ryder (UK) and HKS (USA) ‘to create a unique force in the world of architecture’.
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**Architect 12:** Architect12 is chairman of ‘one of the largest and most diverse professional management companies in the construction and property sectors worldwide.’ It includes a facilities management subsidiary, a construction company and a ‘specialist joint venture education services provider’.

**Architect 13:** Architect13 is ‘technical manager’ with a firm “formed in 1968 and incorporated as a limited company in 1986”, though retaining the title ‘Associates’ and offering “services as architects, masterplanners, landscape architects and interior designers”.

**Architect 14:** Architect14 is chairman of “a multi-discipline practice of architects, designers and engineers, aiming to provide comprehensive, integrated design services for the built environment.” It has “over 900” UK employees and various ‘international partners’.

**Architect 15:** Architect15 is a site architect with a major commercial practice, and “is involved with the co-ordination of innovative services technologies into the structure and fabric of new development.”

**Architect 16:** Architect16 is a founding partner of a LLP, “a London-based architectural practice known for designing a diverse range of award winning buildings”.

**Building Surveyors**

**Building Surveyor 1:** BS1 is 50, and had been employed in local government for much of his career. He is currently in his own local practice, although still works with the public sector.

**Building Surveyor 2:** BS2 is 40 years of age, and a partner in a four-partner ‘chartered surveyors’ practice.

**Building Surveyor 3:** BS3 is aged 40 and works for a building materials company.

**Building Surveyor 4:** BS4 is aged 55. He is currently a director at a limited liability property development company.

**Building Surveyor 5:** BS5 is a junior in her early 20s at a building consultancy practice, which was taken over by a large multinational company. Within the week, the atmosphere in the company had changed completely from what she refers to as a “fairly tolerant” and “respecting” one to a strict hierarchy, officious personal management style and very controlling. She was so paranoid about losing her job and speaking out of turn that she cancelled the interview. The researcher was unable to successfully contact anyone else at the firm.
Building Surveyor 6: BS6 is employed as a “property asset manager” with “a leading global provider of integrated real estate and money management services.” The firm has “over 19,000 employees”.

Building Surveyor 7: BS7 is 42, a partner in a chartered surveying practice. Of the four partners, he is the only unqualified one, but is working towards both CIOB and RICS membership.

Building Surveyor 8: BS8 is 39, and works as a technical officer to a local authority ALMO. He deals with client-side issues.

Commercial-Developer Professionals

Commercial-Developer Professional 1: CDP1 is 65 and owns his own property company, together with three associates. His work is centred in England and the western coast of the USA. He is also a non-executive director of a local authority arms-length managing organisation (ALMO), managing its housing stock.

Commercial-Developer Professional 2: CDP2 works for a privatised ex-public sector company, and deals with regeneration projects. He is close to retirement, aged 63.

Commercial-Developer Professional 3: CDP3 is female, 55 years old and has worked in a number of commercial organisations.

Commercial-Developer Professional 4: CDP4 is ‘Head of UK Resource Management’ for a multinational management consultancy firm offering “creative solutions”.

Commercial-Developer Professional 5: CDP5 is retired, having worked for a building material producer.

Commercial-Developer Professional 6: CDP6 is aged 60 and works for a consultancy company.

Quantity Surveyors

Quantity Surveyor 1: QS1 is retiring, having worked in a number of private practices in Surrey.

Quantity Surveyor 2: QS2 is 37, having worked in a number of English private practices. He is a “a chartered quantity surveyor”.

Quantity Surveyor 3: QS3 is 42 and runs his own small consultancy company, having previously worked for a client organisation. He is MRICS. “I haven’t become a Fellow yet, because I haven’t bothered.”

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Quantity Surveyor 4: QS4 is a retired chartered surveyor.

Quantity Surveyor 5: QS5, 29, describes himself as a cost manager, originally in “M&E” (mechanical and engineering). He is completing a university degree part-time in order to qualify as a chartered surveyor. He works for a LLP partnership.

Quantity Surveyor 6: QS6 is director (one of three) of a professional services group. The firm has 40 UK offices and 2800 staff, and is a wholly owned division of a PLC whose mission is the provision of “integrated professional support service solutions”.

Quantity Surveyor 7: QS7 is a 30-year old M&E quantity surveyor, unusual in that he is a qualified engineer rather than a chartered surveyor. His employer recently converted to LLP legal status.

Quantity Surveyor 8: QS8 is the director of a sole trader, aged in his late 30s. His firm is the only one in this research using the description “chartered quantity surveyors”. The firm engages in traditional quantity surveying and as “construction cost managers” and “project managers”. He is MRICS, but not a member of any other bodies, either as an individual or business.

Quantity Surveyor 9: QS9 is 67 years old, and director of an international group of companies offering “a range of specialist, professional consultancy services”. The firm has 13 UK offices and is located in 24 other countries. It offers financial management and quantity surveying services, consultancy, project control, and management services to clients. He is FRICS.

Quantity Surveyor 10: QS10 is a chartered builder and a chartered quantity surveyor, but is an associate director of a dispute resolution consultancy by occupation. He is a member of the Academy of Experts for this reason, and is training part-time to obtain his LLB. He is 36.

Quantity Surveyor 11: QS11 is a senior partner at a “global business, committed to providing a bespoke range of management and consulting services, which reduce risk and increase value for clients investing in infrastructure, construction and property”. It has 85 offices worldwide and has LLP status.

Quantity Surveyor 12: QS12 is a senior consultant in a “multi disciplined management consultancy with its roots firmly embedded in construction, engineering and infrastructure”.

Quantity Surveyor 13: QS13 is a director of a building contractor, part of a family-owned group of companies. He is 39.

Quantity Surveyor 14: QS14 works for “a leading international construction consultancy firm offering tailored solutions to clients investing in construction, property
and infrastructure”. He is 42, having worked his way into a profession from his original job as a fabricator-welder.

**Quantity Surveyor 15:** QS15 is an Assistant Quantity Surveyor to one company, and a Cost Engineer to another. She is, however, self-employed, and “to me I'm a director of my own company working towards becoming fully qualified”.

**Others**

**Barrister1** is a practising barrister specialising in issues of construction law, as well as food safety. He is 55 and operates out of Chambers.

**Solicitor1** is female, aged 40 and now works for a business offering specialist information and advice in the property industry. Her firm “is the leading provider of know-how for business lawyers”. Prior to this, she worked in the City for a large private firm.

**Associations**

The following associations were interviewed:

- ABE: Associations of Building Engineers
- ARB: Architects Registration Board
- BWF: British Woodworking Federation
- CIOB: Chartered Institute of Building
- CPA: Construction Products Association
- FMB: Federation of Master Builders
- IDE: Institute of Demolition Engineers
- IHPE: Institute of Heating and Plumbing Engineering
- NFRC: National Federation of Roofing Contractors
- RIBA: Royal Institute of British Architects
- RICS: Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors
- TAF: Trade Association Forum

Where only a single interview with an association took place this was with the chief executive or equivalent senior executive official nominated by the association to represent them. Other participants are as follows:

**RIBA1** works is the senior executive at RIBA.

**RIBA2** also works in a senior executive role of RIBA.

**RIBA3** is a chartered architect who has worked on a number of executive committees.
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RICS1 is a chartered surveyor, and an elected member of RICS International Governing Council.

RICS2 works in a senior executive role of RICS.

RICS3 is a chartered surveyor, and an elected member of RICS International Governing Council.

RICS4 is a chartered surveyor elected onto and involved with RICS Divisional (now Faculty) committees.

TAF1 works in the executive of the Trade Associations Forum.

TAF2 works in the executive of a trade association, and is a non-executive board member of TAF.
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Appendix D: Selected List of Organisations within the English Building Industry

The following is not offered as a definitive list of associations within the building industry. It was developed initially as part of a background study to the nature of associations operating within the industry. It is offered here simply to support the discussions within the text about the mass of such associations that can be found operating.

The Academy of Construction Adjudicators

The Access Flooring Association

Aluminium Federation Ltd (ALFED)

Alliance of Construction Product Suppliers (ACPS)

Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union (AEEU)

APA - The Engineered Wood Society

Architects Registration Board (ARB)

Architectural and Specialist Door Manufacturers Association (ASDMA)

Architectural Cladding Association (ACA)

The Architecture and Surveying Institute (ASI)

Architecture Federation

Association for Environment-Conscious Building (AECB)

Association of British Roofing Felt Manufacturers (ABRFM)

Association of Builders Hardware Manufacturers (ABHM)

Association of Chief Estates Surveyors & Property Managers in Local Government (ACE)

The Association of Controls Manufacturers (TACMA)

The Association of Building Engineers (ABE)
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Association of Consultant Architects (ACA)
Association of Consulting Engineers (ACE)
Association of Geotechnical & Geoenvironmental Specialists (AGS)
Association of Insulation Manufacturers (AIM)
Association of Lighting Designers (ALD)
Association of Municipal Engineers
Association of Planning Supervisors (APS)
The Association of Project Management (APM)
Association of Property Bankers (APB)
Association of Property Unit Trusts (APUT)
Association of Residential Letting Agents (ARLA)
Association of Residential Managing Agents (ARMA)
Association of Rooflight Manufacturers (ARM)
Association of Specialist Underpinning Contractors (ASUC)
Association of Town Centre Management (ATCM)
Autoclaved Aerated Concrete Products Association Limited
Avesta Sheffield Technical Advisory Centre (ASTAC)
The Brick Cutting and Fabrication Association (BCFA)
Brick Development Association
British Aggregate Construction Materials Industries
British Association of Landscape Industries (BALI)
British Bathroom Council
British Carpet Manufacturers' Association (BCMA)
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British Ceramic Tile Council
British Cladding Council (BCC)
British Constructional Steelwork Association (BCSA)
The British Council for Offices (BCO)
British Council for Out-of-Town Retail (BCOTR)
British Council of Shopping Centres (BCSC)
British Decorators Association (BDA)
British Drilling Association (BDA)
British Fire Protection Systems Association Limited (BFPSA)
British Flat Roofing Council (BFRC)
British Flue and Chimney Manufacturers' Association (BFCMA)
British In-situ Concrete Paving Association (Britpave)
British Institute of Architectural Technologists (BIAT)
British Institute of Facilities Management (BIFM)
British Laminated Plastics Fabricators Association (BLF)
British Masonry Society
British Plastics Federation (BPF)
British Precast Concrete Federation
British Property Federation (BPF)
British Retail Consortium (BRC)
British Road Federation (BRF)
British Security Industry Association (BSIA)
British Stone
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British Urban Regeneration Association (BURA)
British Wood Preserving and Damp Proofing Association (BWPDA)
British Woodworking Federation (BWF)
Builders Merchants Federation
Buildings Energy Efficiency Confederation
Building Research Establishment (BRE)
Building Services Research and Information Association (BSRIA)
Business Compensation Forum
Business and Industrial Agents Society (BIAS)
Calcium Silicate Brick Association
Cathedrals Fabric Commission for England (CFCE)
Cavity Foam Bureau
Cement and Concrete Association (C & CA)
Central Heating Information Council (CHIC)
The Centre for Window and Cladding Technology (CWCT)
Change the Face of Construction
Chartered Institute of Building (CIOB)
Chartered Institute of Housing (CIH)
Chartered Institute of Marketing
Chartered Institution of Building Services Engineers (CIBSE)
The Chartered Society of Designers
City Property Association
Civil Engineering Contractors Association (CECA)
Combined Heating and Power Association (CHPA)
Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment (CABE)
Concrete Block Association
Concrete Society
Confederation of Association of Specialist Engineering Contractors
Confederation of Construction Clients (CCC)
Confederation of Construction Specialists (CCS)
Conservatory Association
Construction Clients Forum (CCF)
Construction Confederation
Construction Consultants Forum
Construction CPD Certification Scheme
The Construction Industry Board (CIB)
Construction Industry Computing Association (CICA)
Construction Industry Council (CIC)
Construction Industry Employers Council (CIEC)
Construction Industry Training Board (CITB)
Construction Marketing and Communication Group
Construction Plant-hire Association (CPA)
Construction Products Association
Construction Task Force
ConstructIT
Constructor's Liaison Group (CLG)
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Continuing Professional Development Foundation

Contract Flooring Association (CFA)

Council for Energy Efficiency Development (CEED)

Copper Development Association

Corrosion Prevention Association (CPA)

The Council for Aluminium in Building

The Council for Registered Gas Installers (CORGi)

Design in Construction Alliance (DCA)

Draught Proofing Advisory Association Limited (DPAA)

Electrical Contractors Association (ECA)

Electrochemical Treatment Association (ETA)

Energy Systems Trade Association (ESTA)

Engineering Construction Industry Training Board (ECITB)

English Heritage

European Construction Forum (ECF)

European Real Estate Society (ERES)

European Society of Chartered Surveyors (ESCS)

Export Group for Constructional Industries

Fabricated Access Covers Trade Association (FACTA)

Faculty of Party Wall Surveyors (FPWS)

Federation of Building Specialist Contractors (FBSC)

Federation of Civil Engineering Contractors (FCEC)

Federation of Environmental Trade Associations (FETA)
Federation of Independent Commercial Property Agents
Federation of Master Builders (FMB)
Federation of Piling Specialists (FPS)
Fire Protection Association (FPA)
Flat Roofing Alliance
Forest Industry Council of Great Britain (FICGB)
Forum for Construction Law Reform (FCLR)
Forum on Contamination in Land (FOCIL)
Galvanizers Association
Glass and Glazing Federation (GGF)
Guild of Architectural Ironmongers (GAI)
The Guild of Gas Fitting Operatives (GGFO)
Guild of Incorporated Surveyors (GIS)
Guild of Master Craftsmen
Heating and Ventilating Contractors Association (HVCA)
Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning Manufacturers Association (HEVAC)
House Builders Federation (HBF)
Housing Forum
Incorporated Society of Valuers and Auctioneers (ISVA)
Independent Surveyors Association (ISA)
Insulated Render and Cladding Association
Institute of Acoustics
Institute of Continuing Professional Development (ICPD)
Institute of Demolition Engineers (IDE)
Institute of Healthcare Engineering and Estate Management
Institute of Historic Building Conservation (IHBC)
The Institute of Lighting Engineers (ILE)
Institute of Plumbing, Heating and Engineering (IPHE)
Institute of Public Relations
Institute of Revenues Rating and Valuation (IRRV)
Institute of Roofing
Institute of Wood Preserving and Damp-proofing
Institution of Electrical Engineers (IEE)
Institution of Plant Engineers (I Plant E)
International Committee for the Development and Study of Tubular Structures (CIDECT)
International Concrete Brick Association
International Real Estate Federation (FIABCI)
International Waterproofing Association
In Veritate Lodge of Freemasons
Investment Property Forum (IPF)
Joint Contracts Tribunal (JCT)
Junior Liaison Organisation (JLO)
Landscape Institute
Lead Contractors Association (LCA)
Lead Sheet Association (LSA)
Leasehold Enfranchisement Association (LRA)
Leisure Property Forum (LPF)
Lift and Escalator Industry Association (LEIA)
Lighting Association
Lighting Industry Federation Limited (LIF)
Local Government Technical Advisers Group
London Office Review Panel (LORP)
LP Gas Association (LPGA)
Major Contractors Group (MCG)
Masonry Industry Alliance
Master Locksmiths Association (MLA)
The Mastic Asphalt Council (MAC)
The Metal Cladding and Roofing Manufacturers Association (MCRMA)
Mortar Producers Association
National Access and Scaffolding Confederation (NASC)
National Approval Council for Security Systems (NACOSS)
National Association of Shopfitters (NAS)
National Building Specification Services
National Contractors Federation (NCF)
National Federation of Builders (NFB)
National Federation of Demolition Contractors (NFDC)
National Federation of Painting and Decorating Contractors (NFPDC)
National Federation of Roofing Contractors (NFRC)
National GRP Federation (NGF)
National Heating Consultancy
National Home Improvement Council (NHIC)
National House-Building Council (NHBC)
National Home Improvement Council (NHIC)
National Housing Federation (NHF)
National Housing Forum
National Inspection Council for Electrical Installation Contracting (NICEIC)
National Prefabricated Building Association Limited (NPBA)
National Retail Planning Forum (NRPF)
National Specialist Contractors Council (NSCC)
National Housing and Town Planning Council (NHTPC)
Network Group for Composites in Construction (NGCC)
Office Furniture and Filing Manufacturers' Association (OFFMA)
Office Agents Society (OAS)
Out of Town Retail Agents Society (OTRAS)
Paint Research Association (PRA)
Planning Engineers Organisation (PEO)
Property Managers Association (PMA)
The Partitioning and Interiors Association (PIA)
Partners in Property
Pipeline Industries Guild (PIG)
Popular Housing Forum
The Prince of Wales' Foundation for Architecture and the Urban Environment
Property Advisors to the Civil Estate (PACE)
Property Advisory Group (PAG)
Property Consultants Society (PCS)
Property Industry Forum (PIF)
Property Industry Group (PIG)
Quarry Products Association (QPA)
Rail Freight Group
Refined Bitumen Association
Reinforced Concrete Council
Residential Estate Agency Training and Education Association (REATEA)
Roofing Industry Alliance (RIA)
The Royal Academy of Engineering
Royal Commission on the Historical Monuments of England (RCHME)
Royal Incorporation of Architects in Scotland (RIAS)
The Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA)
Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS)
Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI)
Shop Agents' Society
Single Ply Roofing Association (SPRA)
Society of Construction Arbitrators
Society of Professional Engineers
Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings (SPAB)
Society of Property Researchers (SPR)
Solid Fuel Association
Specialist Engineering Contractors Group
Steel Construction Institute (SCI)
Steel Window Association (SWA)
Stone Federation Great Britain
Suspended Ceiling Industries Association
Thermal Insulation Contractors Association (TICA)
Thermal Insulation Manufacturers and Suppliers Association (TIMSA)
Timber Research and Development Association (TRADA)
Training Organisation for Professions in Construction (TOPIC)
Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU)
UK Timber Frame Association (UKTFA)
Underfloor Heating Manufacturers' Association
Union of Construction A (UCATT)
Urban Design Alliance
Urban Design Group
Urban Task Force
Waterheater Manufacturers Association (WMA)
(The) Welding Institute (TWI)