The London School of Economics and Political Science

Explaining Change in Greek Policy on EU-Turkey Relations 1996-1999: The Prime Minister's Leadership Style and the Formulation of the Helsinki Strategy

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A thesis submitted to the European Institute of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, July 2009
Declaration

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Abstract

In December 1999 during the Helsinki European Council summit Greece consented to the Turkish candidacy for EU membership in what has been greeted as a remarkable shift in Greek policy towards Turkey. The argument of this thesis is that the so-called “Helsinki strategy” constituted the culmination of Greek Prime Minister Simitis’ attempts to pursue what he referred to as the “communitisation” of Greco-Turkish relations. Simitis believed that Greece should allow Turkey to develop its relations with the EU within a framework of EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece. According to the former Prime Minister, if Greece could establish such rules at the EU level, the EU would assume responsibility for ensuring Turkey’s compliance. The argument emphasises the causal significance of domestic sources of foreign policy and leadership style in particular. “Communitisation” was an internal, pre-conceived task, to the completion of which Simitis remained unequivocally committed throughout the period under investigation even in the face of severe constraints and evidence that challenged the necessity of the task. The argument was tested against three alternative explanations that incorporated all the explanatory variables discussed in the literature, including shifts in Greece’s relative power position, the increasing economic costs of Greek policy, an external shock that demonstrated policy failure and the establishment of relevant EU foreign policy practices. Empirical testing of the four alternative explanations was based on process-tracing their observable implications for three dimensions of the policy making process: the definition of the policy problem the Helsinki strategy was intended to address, the alternative courses of action Greek foreign policy makers considered and finally the manner in which they were assessed. The theoretical framework constructed to resolve this empirical puzzle can be fruitfully applied to the study of several EU member-states’ foreign policies, thus advancing the theoretically informed empirical study of foreign policy.
Acknowledgements

I wish to thank all those who contributed to the completion of this project and especially Kevin Featherstone, Uli Sedelmeier, Karen Smith, participants in the weekly EI research seminar, those who kindly agreed to be interviewed for this project and my family.

The better part of this research was funded by the Bodossaki Foundation.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

The puzzle and the research question

Relations with Turkey have occupied the top of the Greek foreign policy agenda during the better part of the past four decades. Between 1973 and 1975 bilateral problems between Greece and Turkey emerged, while the Cyprus question, which had been a source of tension between the two countries since the 1950s, entered a new phase after Turkey's military intervention in 1974. In the mid-1970s, Greece started to see Turkey as an international aggressor that constituted a threat to the territorial integrity of the Greek state. Addressing the Turkish threat became an issue of the utmost importance. The Greek government decided to apply for membership of the European Communities in the hope that Turkey would think twice before pursuing an aggressive policy towards a member-state of the Communities and that Greek membership would force Turkey to make concessions on Greco-Turkish relations in order to develop its own relations with the Communities. Once its accession was achieved, Greece assumed an uncompromising stance. According to the newly elected socialist government, since Greece was a status quo country and Turkey a revisionist one, Greece only stood to lose from bilateral negotiations with Turkey over territorial issues. Consequently, the government decided to terminate the negotiations its predecessor was conducting and stated that the latter would not resume, unless Turkey abandoned its claims on Greek territory, recognised that the only pending issue was the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Aegean and removed its troops from Cyprus. This policy had implications for Greece's stance on relations between Turkey and the European Community/European Union (EU).

2 Valinakis, op. cit. pp. 244-5. This idea remains popular to the present day; see T. A. Couloumbis – S. Dalis, "Greek Foreign Policy since 1974: From Dissent to Consensus" in D. G. Dimitrakopoulos – A. G. Passas (eds), Greece in the European Union, London, Routledge, 2004, pp. 82, 84
3 For the PASOK (Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement) governments’ policy towards Turkey see V. Coufoudakis, "Greco-Turkish Relations and the Greek Socialists: Ideology, Nationalism and Pragmatism", Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 1: 2, 1983. For the negotiations the ND (New Democracy) governments conducted between 1975 and 1981 see Heraclides, op. cit. pp. 105-16
When democratic rule was restored in Turkey and the Turkish government attempted to reactivate its Association Agreement with the Community, Greece insisted that progress in relations between Turkey and the Community should be prevented until Turkey had met the above conditions. This policy of conditionality was also adopted by the conservatives when they were returned to power and became standard practice for Greek policy towards Turkey.

In December 1999, at the Helsinki European Council summit, however, Greece consented to the most significant development in EU-Turkey relations since the 1963 Association Agreement: the EU upgraded Turkey to candidate country status. One might have thought that Turkey had met the conditions that Greece had imposed or at least some of them. Turkey, however, had met none. The Greek government allowed progress in EU-Turkey relations due to a complete reversal of national policy. Academic commentary has greeted the so-called "Helsinki strategy" as a "monumental decision" that constituted a "momentous shift" in Greek policy towards Turkey, thus inviting the question:

Why did the Greek government consent to the Turkish candidacy?

This shift becomes even more striking, when one takes into consideration the fact that Greco-Turkish relations are considered a "national issue" in Greece. In a volume where contributors were asked to discuss EU member-states' special interests and relationships, the editors concluded that the latter are organised in "rings of specialness" that form concentric circles. At the core of these rings of specialness lie what the editors referred to as the "domains privés" of EU member-states' foreign policies, that is to say issues that national governments are determined to keep separate or private from the EU context. Greek policy towards Turkey was identified as one such domain privé. Indeed, as Turkey

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4 For the ND government's policy towards Turkey see S. Rizas, From Crisis to Détente: Constantinos Mitsotakis and the Policy of Greco-Turkish Rapprochement (in Greek), Athens, Papazisis, 2003
5 J. Ker-Lindsay, "The Policies of Greece and Cyprus towards Turkey's EU Accession", Turkish Studies, 8: 1, 2007, p. 73
7 I. Manners - R. Whitman, "Conclusions" in I. Manners - R. G. Whitman (eds), The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2000, pp. 266-7
replaced the Soviet Union as the main threat to Greek security in 1974 (and officially in 1984), Greco-Turkish relations reached the top of the Greek foreign policy agenda and touched upon vital national interests, with regard to which autonomy ought to be maintained. Furthermore, as the socialist governments of the 1980s assumed an uncompromising stance on Greco-Turkish relations, it gradually became exceedingly difficult to move towards a more moderate stance or make decisions that involved loss of autonomy.

As has been pointed out, one implication of the classification of Greco-Turkish relations as a "national issue" is that "it is impossible...to advocate a policy different from the one that is accepted as national policy without a significant electoral cost or the fear of being criticised as a traitor". Indeed, the difficulties Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou faced in his attempts to improve Greco-Turkish relations in 1988 are instructive in this respect and in the aftermath of the 1996 Imia/Kardak crisis, which literally coincided with the formation of a new Greek government, the latter had to formulate a policy towards Turkey amidst the main opposition party leader's claims that it had committed "acts of treason" during the crisis. Given that the charismatic Papandreou had not managed to commit the public to rapprochement in the late 1980s, his successor - Prime Minister Costas Simitis - succeeding where Papandreou had failed was highly unlikely, since, while Papandreou exerted undisputable control over his party, Simitis' leadership was constantly being undermined by intra-party opposition. The Prime Minister had to reckon with dissenters (both Members of Parliament and Members of the Cabinet), who more often than not were found amongst those who had unsuccessfully claimed the party's leadership after Papandreou's resignation, identified themselves with Papandreou's policies and claimed that Simitis' policies were distorting PASOK's so-called "patriotic character". One analyst went so far as to argue

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10 K. Mardas, *Preambles to War* (in Greek), Athens, To Pontiki, 2005, p. 380
11 On intra-party opposition see E. Athanassopoulou, "Blessing in Disguise? The Imia Crisis and Turkish-Greek Relations", *Mediterranean Politics*, 2: 3, 1997, esp. pp. 79, 98; K. Featherstone,
that Simitis’ opponents appeared to consider him “a potential ‘retreatist’... regardless of his record” because they were uncertain about his true intentions12.

The fact that Greco-Turkish relations are perceived as a national issue also induces the involvement of non-governmental actors with intense preferences, such as the Church and the media13. As has been pointed out, the Greek Orthodox Church maintains a significant level of influence both on the political system and on society14. This influence was exceptionally felt during the tenure of Archbishop Christodoulos. Shortly after his election, Christodoulos announced that he was going to be making “interventions” on national issues and the government appeared to acknowledge the Archbishop’s “special role”15. The Archbishop’s interventions and the government’s policy, however, were pointing in opposite directions. While the government was reconsidering its policy towards Turkey, Christodoulos was arguing that Greece’s “so-called allies” were attempting its “shrinking” in the name of a “so-called peaceful coexistence”16.

Similarly, the media did not promote moderation either. As has been pointed out, the number of television networks is disproportionate to the size of the unregulated market and it has therefore driven the search for competitiveness to extremes, which in turn has produced a distinct type of coverage of national issues17. Especially since the Imia/Kardak crisis, coverage of national issues has

12 Kazamias, op. cit. p. 81
13 On the Church and the media as factors that constrained the government’s capacity to pursue reform see A. Agnantopoulos, “The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework and an Empirical Application in Greek-Turkish Relations”, Paper prepared for the 2nd LSE PhD Symposium on Modern Greece: “Current Social Science Research on Greece”, LSE, 10 June 2005
15 M. Vasilakis, The Wrath of God (in Greek), Athens, Gnoseis, 2006, pp. 42-4
16 Ibid. pp. 307-8; these statements were the follow-up to statements made shortly after the crisis, according to which “the real dilemma was and still is: peace or freedom”; see also “Greece’s Nationalist Archbishop”, Economist, 349: 8098, 12/12/98
17 D. Mitropoulos, “Foreign Policy and Greek Media: Subordination, Emancipation and Apathy” in P. I. Tsakonas (ed), Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy (in Greek), Athens, Sideris, 2003
assumed what has been referred to as an “ultra-nationalist” character. One analyst went as far as to argue that between 1996 and 1999 the media attempted to substitute for state authorities and became “an autonomous player in the foreign policy making process”\textsuperscript{18}.

The ability of these non-governmental actors to constrain the capacity of foreign policy makers to pursue reform is linked with public opinion. Since Greco-Turkish relations constitute a national issue, Greek policy towards Turkey has a uniform effect on the public/nation and different policy options do not entail different costs and benefits for different social/interest groups. One analyst went as far as to argue that “public opinion also becomes a foreign policy maker”\textsuperscript{19}. In contrast to what has been suggested in the literature, there is no evidence that the 1999 earthquakes and the feelings of solidarity amongst the Greeks and the Turks that they caused allowed the government to consent to Turkey’s candidacy\textsuperscript{20}. Eurobarometer surveys show that even though Greek people were amongst the most supportive of enlargement, that support did not extend to Turkey. All the earthquakes managed was to increase support from thirteen (13%) to twenty-three percent (23%) of those surveyed, while sixty-nine percent (69%) remained opposed to the prospect of Turkey becoming a part of the EU\textsuperscript{21}. The link between public opinion and domestic actors opposing reform was clearly manifested shortly before the Helsinki summit. During the last meeting of the Cabinet before the summit, certain Cabinet members opposed the strategy the Prime Minister seemed determined to pursue. As the next election was drawing near and opinion polls showed skepticism towards Turkey increasing amongst the public, several Cabinet members preferred to postpone the decision\textsuperscript{22}. In fact, it was reported in the press that several Cabinet and party members suggested that a Greek veto would create favourable circumstances for the ruling party to call for and win an early election\textsuperscript{23}. In this sense, the decision to consent to the Turkish candidacy

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid. pp. 292-3
\textsuperscript{19} Kavakas, op. cit. pp. 151-2
\textsuperscript{22} N. Marakis, “Two and a Half Lines for Helsinki”, \textit{To Vima}, 21 November 1999
\textsuperscript{23} G. Lakopoulos, “Electoral Surprise”, \textit{To Vima}, 28 November 1999
has been described as a “major gamble” in view of the forthcoming election because the government had to convince the public that consenting to upgrading Turkey to candidate country status “without a prior show of goodwill from Ankara did not represent a loss to Greek national interests.”

Finally, it should be noted that foreign policy change took place in the absence of epistemic communities that could have acted as agents of reform. As has recently been argued: “The dramatic shift in Greece’s foreign policy toward Turkey, which reached its climax at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, evolved in the virtual absence of any prior in-depth discussion in Greek academia! It could even be argued that Greece’s new strategy toward Turkey... was exclusively the result of decisions taken by politicians. It is truly remarkable that not only was this major shift in Greek foreign policy not ‘prepared’ by the Greek IR community, but it still has not even been studied through the application of the relevant IR theoretical tools.”

The far-reaching implications of the decision that Greece secured attribute the quality of a “substantively important” case of foreign policy change to the shift in Greek policy. Once the Greek government ceased to object to the Turkish candidacy, the road was cleared for the initiation of a process that could lead to Turkish accession. The large and inefficient agricultural sector, large regional inequalities, the size and demographic dynamics of the population, the multi-regional geopolitical roles, the predominantly Muslim character and the geographical position of Turkey have already began to challenge the policies and politics of the EU, the EU as a polity and the very concept of “Europe” and of being “European”. Unexpected change in Greek foreign policy has been an integral part of developments affecting all EU citizens.

24 Ker-Lindsay, op. cit. p. 73; see also K. Ifantis, “Greece’s Turkish Dilemmas: There and Back Again...”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 5: 3, 2005, p. 382
25 J. Ker-Lindsay, “Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: The Impact of Disaster Diplomacy?”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 14: 1, 2000, p. 226
27 For the term see J. Mahoney – G. Goertz, “A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research”, Political Analysis, 14: 3, 2006, pp. 242-3
The state of the art

While change in Greek policy towards Turkey was quite unexpected, numerous ideas that attempt to explain it have been put forward ex post facto. More often than not, these analyses are rather descriptive and not particularly parsimonious, as they usually identify long lists of developments that may have affected Greek policy. Several studies discuss the “Europeanisation” of Greek foreign policy and the evolution of Greek policy towards Turkey has been identified as “the clearest manifestation of the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy”. Indeed, it is widely held that foreign policy is the most successful – if not the only – area of Europeanisation in Greece. While initially, “there was no sign of Europeanisation in Greek foreign policy but, rather, ample evidence to the contrary”, with foreign policy being “the area of public policy over which Greece (had) fought most hard to preserve autonomy of action, in disregard to the consensus requirements of EPC”, the second half of the 1990s saw “the biggest surge of Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy”.

These studies constitute part of a remarkable growth of the literature on “Europeanisation” witnessed in the field of European Studies since 1999. The emphasis on Europeanisation reflects a research interest in the possible causal significance of the EU in processes of domestic change. Academic consensus,

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29 Economides, op. cit. p. 482; Stavridis and Tsardanidis acknowledged this as an interesting question, which “(could) not be considered in more detail”; see Tsardanidis – Stavridis, op. cit. p. 228
31 Tsardanidis – Stavridis, op. cit. p. 226
32 Ioakimidis, “Contradictions between…”, op. cit. p. 37
33 Economides, op. cit. p. 478
however, has not yet been reached regarding the precise meaning of the concept. As numerous meanings have been attributed to Europeanisation and most definitions of the concept have been used exclusively by the scholars that introduced them, the concept's usefulness for empirical research has come into question. Furthermore, while it has been shown that the EU effect has been greater on public policies than on national polities or domestic politics, it has also been argued that this effect varies across policy areas depending on the latter's nature and the relevant institutional set-up at the EU level. In the case of foreign policy, in particular, it has been suggested that the "unique nature" of the policy area and intergovernmental decision-making at the EU level render Europeanisation less likely or its effects weaker and, in any case, harder to trace.

Studies on the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy have failed to address these issues. Economides' study – which explicitly identified change in Greek policy towards Turkey as the outcome of Europeanisation – does not engage the debate on the precise meaning of the concept or the debate on the applicability of the concept to the study of foreign policy. A "minimalist" definition is adopted, according to which Europeanisation refers to "the impact of EU membership on a member-state". Based on this definition, the concept is used rather loosely. Europeanisation – in the case of Greek foreign policy – has assumed the form of "Westernisation", "modernisation", "normalisation, rehabilitation", "denationalisation" and "multilateralisation". Some of these outcomes are practically indistinguishable (denationalization – multilateralisation), others are

36 C. M. Radaelli, "Europeanisation: Solution or Problem?", European Integration OnLine Papers, Vol. 8 No. 16, 2004, p. 14
38 This appears to be a common problem in the literature on Europeanisation. As has been pointed out, the latter has hitherto exhibited limited awareness of the significance of concept formation and its implications for measurement; see T. Exadactylos – C. M. Radaelli, "Research Design in European Studies: The Case of Europeanisation", Journal of Common Market Studies, 47: 3, 2009, esp. p. 521
39 Economides, op. cit. p. 471
40 Ibid. pp. 472-3
explicitly considered as being synonymous (Westernisation – modernisation) and others (normalisation, rehabilitation) appear to be idiosyncratic and of relevance mainly - if not exclusively - to the Greek case.

This is characteristic of the literature on Europeanisation. Since the latter is understood as a concept that refers to the domestic impact of the EU, empirical research is often organised as a search for such an impact without defining the outcomes of Europeanisation with a sufficient degree of precision. As has been pointed out, due to the early stage of research on Europeanisation, researchers have shown preference for an analytical grid “broad enough as to accommodate a wide range of empirical observations that may have something to do with Europeanisation”. Our inability to specify this range, however, hinders our efforts to identify the puzzles relevant to Europeanisation. In other words, we are not certain what the empirical observations that would make us suspect that Europeanisation has occurred are. Indeed, it is not unusual for researchers to select a state’s accession to the EU or the establishment of cooperation in the field of foreign policy as a starting point and subsequently to try and find some sort of EU impact. It is often the case that either no change can be observed or that every observable change is *ex post facto* conceptualised as a form that Europeanisation assumed. If Europeanisation is a process, but we are not exactly sure what the outcomes of the process are, we are facing the exact same problem Haas identified approximately four decades ago: a dependent variable problem. At that time, it was unawareness of the possible outcomes of the integration process that hindered theorising, nowadays, it is a similar unawareness of the possible outcomes of the process of Europeanisation that poses a challenge for researchers.

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43 Economides, op cit

The numerous outcomes discussed above are considered forms of the "projection" of national interests onto the European foreign policy agenda. According to Economides, when Europeanisation assumes this particular form, member-states "project" their national interests onto the EU's agenda, as EU membership may offer the means to achieve national foreign policy goals more effectively, in which case the EU serves as a "vehicle" for national foreign policy. While it has indeed been suggested that EU membership has made new "assets" or "tools" available to Greek foreign policy makers, the literature has failed to specify which of the foreign policy instruments available at the EU level are relevant despite the fact that the analysis of EU foreign policy has made substantial progress in this respect. Specification and precision are fundamental properties of good causal arguments and "EU membership" as an explanatory variable is not sufficiently precise. More significantly, as has been pointed out within the context of the debate on the precise meaning of Europeanisation, identifying "projection" or "uploading" as a form or constituent element of Europeanisation implies a direction of causality (from the domestic to the EU level) that "properly equates" Europeanisation with (an aspect of) the concept of integration and brings its usefulness into question because the use of two different concepts for the same phenomenon contradicts "elementary logic".

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45 Economides, op. cit. pp. 472-3
Economides’ analysis of change in Greek policy towards Turkey reinforces this critique in the sense that the “projection” of Greek foreign policy goals onto the EU’s agenda is not considered to have been the outcome of an EU-generated process, but that of Prime Minister Simitis’ “intentions”. Drawing on Ioakimidis’ idiosyncratic distinction between “responsive” and “intended” Europeanisation – Economides identifies Europeanisation with “modernisation”51. According to Ioakimidis, while responsive Europeanisation is “spontaneous” and involves “no or little conscious effort” by political actors, intended Europeanisation entails “a strong intention and thus a purposefully framed scheme” to pursue policy change and it is synonymous with modernisation52. The analysis is to a large extent normative and the use of certain terms (modernisation, Europeanisation) both as analytical categories and as political mottos has resulted in considerable confusion. As Stavridis concluded, after interviewing Greek academics, most of them are biased in favour of Europeanisation: they consider it to be a “positive development”53. This is a result of viewing “Europe” as a panacea. In effect, Europeanisation is perceived as a goal that needs to be achieved. This understanding of Europeanisation has prevented a clear distinction between Europeanisation and other processes, such as modernisation, which are also considered to be positive developments, and a clear distinction between the process of Europeanisation, its causes and its outcomes.

While Economides concedes that the term “modernisation” is seldom applied to foreign policy54, he argues that Prime Minister Simitis’ programme of modernisation had “its complementary policy externally” and that his “intention was to embark on a parallel process of re-Europeanising Greek foreign policy while pursuing a modernising domestic reform programme”55. The argument fails to distinguish between the causal significance of the EU and that of the former Prime Minister’s “intentions”. Economides says more about what needed

51 Economides, op. cit. p. 475-7
52 P. Ioakimidis, “The Europeanisation of Greece: An Overall Assessment”, South European Society and Politics, 5: 2, 2000, pp. 74-5. Ioakimidis, however, considers modernisation to be a prerequisite for Europeanisation. He seems to be caught in some sort of circular thinking, where modernisation is considered to be a prerequisite for Europeanisation, a type of which stands for modernisation; see Ioakimidis, “Contradictions between...”, op. cit. p. 48
53 Stavridis, “Assessing the Views...”, op. cit. p. 7
54 Economides, op. cit. p. 475
55 Ibid. p. 481, emphasis added
to be done in order that “Europeanisation” could be achieved than about why it was pursued. Change in Greek policy towards Turkey is attributed to a key foreign policy maker’s “intentions” without empirical evidence of his considerations that resulted in the formulation of this strategy or a theoretically informed explanation of why his “intentions” were causally significant for policy change. In the field of economic policy the objective of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) entry constituted the link between Simitis’ modernisation programme and European integration and reform assumed the quality of a process of “catching-up” with “Europe”56. It remains unclear, however, whether this programme included a similar commitment to foreign policy reform, what that commitment entailed and what the relation between modernisation and European integration in the case of foreign policy was. Unless one can show that EU foreign policy norms and practices influenced the former Prime Minister’s “intentions” regarding Greek policy towards Turkey, one cannot establish the causal significance of the EU, in which case the use of the term “Europeanisation” would appear unjustified. The study of foreign policy is characterised by a multitude of explanatory factors spread over different levels of analysis57 and distinguishing the causal significance of the EU from that of other factors constitutes one of the key tasks that research on Europeanisation entails58.

The literature has indeed emphasised Costas Simitis’ election as Prime Minister in 1996 as a critical development59. The former Greek Prime Minister, it is argued, “symbolises ‘European normality’ as opposed to ‘Greek idiosyncrasy’”60. As a representative of the “modernisers” – as opposed to “ethno-centrists” – he believed that the improvement of Greco-Turkish relations was possible61. Since “the ideological acceptance of the objectives of European integration” is

58 Radaelli, “Europeanisation: Solution…”, op. cit. esp. p. 8
60 D. Keridis, “Foreign Policy and Political Culture: Greek Policy towards Turkey Today” in H. K. Yallouridis – P. I. Tsakonas (eds), *Greece and Turkey since the End of the Cold War* (in Greek), Athens, Sideris, 1999, p. 95
61 Ibid. pp. 95-7
considered "a vital precondition for the Europeanisation process to take hold"\textsuperscript{62}, the formation of a new government under Simitis, who "had always been identified with PASOK's pro-European and reformist wing"\textsuperscript{63}, is believed to have contributed to the "Europeanisation" of Greek foreign policy. This line of reasoning allows little room for the causal significance of the EU. Change in Greek policy towards Turkey appears to have been the result of the efforts of a policy maker with a considerable level of commitment to foreign policy reform and sufficiently well placed within the foreign policy making process to pursue it. This seems to justify concerns regarding the usefulness of the concept of Europeanisation. It remains unclear what the added value of conceptualising change in Greek policy as the outcome of a process of Europeanisation is. It would appear that a more traditional foreign policy analysis approach focused on the policy makers and their personal characteristics would have sufficed to explain policy change\textsuperscript{64}. The literature on foreign policy leadership styles in particular has identified responsiveness to the policy context as a key variable\textsuperscript{65}. In this sense, it is essential to establish how responsive to contextual variables Simitis was and whether he was driven by a commitment to a specific type of policy reform that he intended to pursue.

According to a different argument, change in Greek policy towards Turkey was neither the outcome of a process of Europeanisation, nor that of the former Prime Minister's attempts to pursue his own vision for reform, but a reconfiguration of the combination of internal and external balancing\textsuperscript{66}. Greco-Turkish relations

\textsuperscript{62} Ioakimidis, "Contradictions between...", op. cit. p. 36; See also K. Kouveliotis, "'Europeanisation' and Greece: The Impact of European Integration on the Diplomatic and Strategic Domains of Greece", Paper prepared for the 2nd LSE PhD Symposium on Modern Greece: "Current Social Science Research on Greece", LSE, 10 June 2005, p. 4

\textsuperscript{63} Pagoulatos, op. cit. p. 10; The faction of the party that supported Simitis - including those who were going to assume responsibility for foreign policy making - was also pro-European; see Featherstone, "Introduction: 'Modernisation'...", op. cit. p. 227

\textsuperscript{64} For this approach as a part of Foreign Policy Analysis see V. M. Hudson - C. S. Vore, "Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow", Mershon International Studies Review, 39: 2, 1995

\textsuperscript{65} For foreign policy leadership styles see M. G. Hermann et al., "Who Leads Matters: The Effects of Powerful Individuals", International Studies Review, 3: 2, 2001

\textsuperscript{66} While the use of inverted commas suggests unusual usage of the term, Ifantis has referred to the Helsinki strategy as a "highly sophisticated 'external balancing' strategy"; see Ifantis, "Greece's Turkish Dilemmas...", op. cit. p. 382. Tsakonas interchangeably refers to the Helsinki strategy as a balancing strategy and a socialisation - in the sense of structural realist international relations theory - strategy; see P. I. Tsakonas, "Socialising the Adversary: The Greek Strategy of Balancing against Turkey and Greco-Turkish Relations" in P. I. Tsakonas (ed), Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy (in Greek), Athens, Sideris, 2003, esp. p. 70 and P. Tsakonas, "Problems of
remained conflictual during the early post-Cold War era and Turkey was still considered the main threat to Greek security. The conflictual nature of Greco-Turkish relations was reflected in the arms race between the two countries. In the aftermath of the 1996 Imia/Kardak crisis in particular, Turkey announced a new armaments programme and a few months later so did the Greek government. Greece had to balance against Turkey in order to restore the balance of power in the Aegean.

At the same time, however, Greece had accepted the need to meet the Maastricht criteria and accede to EMU. One might add that the general shape of the economy was accentuating the problem. Indeed, at the start of the 1990s, Greece was experiencing “deep economic failure”. The stabilisation programme pursued by the Mitsotakis government failed. The revised programme presented by the Papandreou government produced only modest results. When the hospitalised Papandreou resigned, Simitis was elected Prime Minister and placed even greater emphasis on macroeconomic stabilisation, much like he had done as Finance Minister approximately a decade earlier, thus consolidating PASOK’s new economic policies. EMU entry in particular was turned into a “central national goal” and “shorthand” for the Prime Minister’s programme of “modernisation”. Economic policy failure and the Maastricht criteria were pointing in the same direction. It should also be noted that Greek policy makers

and Prospects for Greece’s ‘Socialisation Strategy’ vis-à-vis Turkey” in F. Aksu (ed), Proceedings of the International Conference on Turkish-Greek Relations: Issues, Solutions, Prospects, 9 March 2006, Istanbul, Istanbul, OBIV, 2007. Waltz has indeed argued that “socialisation” occurs in the international system; see K. N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, New York, Random House, 1979, pp. 74-7, 127-9. As Checkel has pointed out, however, the phenomenon Waltz refers to as socialisation is in fact little more than a process of emulatio of the behaviour of successful states in the system and it is therefore inconsistent with standard definitions of socialisation as a process of social interaction that results in the internalisation of behavioural norms; see J. T. Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialisation in Europe: Introduction and Framework”, International Organisation, 59: 4, 2005, p. 806


68 Featherstone, “Greece and EMU…”, op. cit. p. 925


decided that macroeconomic policy as opposed to structural reform should bear
the burden of stabilisation\textsuperscript{71}. Consequently, the immediate response to the crisis
(increasing defence expenditure in order to build up Greece’s military
capabilities) was not sustainable in the long run. Greece had to pursue external
balancing in order to be able to secure both foreign and economic policy goals.

When the Helsinki strategy is conceptualised as an “external balancing strategy”,
the term is used rather loosely. External balancing refers to alliance formation
and in its broadest sense the term “alliance” refers to formal or informal security
cooperation regardless of degree\textsuperscript{72}. The Helsinki decision, however, included no
such provisions. No obligation for EU member-states to coordinate their policies
on security issues related to Turkey stems from the agreement that the Greek
government secured in Helsinki. In this sense, it has been argued that, unless an
EU common defence policy is established, EU level arrangements do not
constitute sufficient guarantees of Greek security\textsuperscript{73}. Consequently, the economic
cost of internal balancing is acceptable compared with the cost of defeat in case
of a Greco-Turkish war\textsuperscript{74}.

Furthermore, change in Greek policy took place within the post-Cold War
international context. While Tsakonas’ fairly elaborate statement of the argument
explicitly draws on neo-realist international politics theory and its implications
for states’ foreign policies, it does not discuss the implications of the altered
structural context within which policy change was decided. Tsakonas has
acknowledged the significance of the role of the US in Greco-Turkish relations

\textsuperscript{71} P. Kazakos, \textit{Between the State and the Market: Economy and Economic Policy in Post-War
\textsuperscript{72} M. N. Barnett – J. S. Levy, “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of
\textsuperscript{73} T. P. Dokos – N. A. Protonotarios, \textit{Turkey’s Military Power: Challenge to Greek Security} (in
Greek), Athens, Tourikis, 1997, p. 209; T. Dokos, “Balancing Against the Turkish Threat: The
Military Dimension” in C. K. Yallouridis – P. I. Tsakonas (eds), \textit{Greece and Turkey after the End
of the Cold War} (in Greek), Athens, Sideris, 1999, p. 208; T. P. Dokos, “Greek National Security
Policy: The Linkage Between Defence and Foreign Policy” in P. I. Tsakonas (ed), \textit{Contemporary
Greek Foreign Policy: An Overall Approach, Athens} (in Greek), Sideris, 2003, p. 250
\textsuperscript{74} Dokos – Protonotarios, op. cit. p. 190; It should also be noted that econometric models have
shown that the economic benefits of reducing defence expenditure would only be “very small”
for Greece, but “rather substantial” for Turkey and they would therefore leave Greece worse-off
in terms of its relative power position vis-à-vis Turkey; see J. Brauer, “Greece and Turkey: A
Comprehensive, Critical Review of the Defence Economics Literature” in C. Kollias – G.
Gunluk-Senesen (eds), \textit{Greece and Turkey in the 21st Century: Conflict or Cooperation A
during both the Cold War and the post-Cold War era. Furthermore, it has been argued that Greek and American interests with regard to relations with Turkey diverge. It is surprising in this sense that the implications of the dominant position of the US for power relations between Greece and Turkey are discussed only in passing. On the other hand, it has been argued that, with regard to Greco-Turkish relations in particular, "no other country experienced (the end of the Cold War) less intensely than Greece." As a recent literature review concluded, whether change in Greek policy towards Turkey was the result of the end of the Cold War is a question that remains open.

Paradoxically enough, even though Tsakonas has conceptualised the Helsinki strategy as an external balancing strategy, he has argued that it was different from earlier Greek initiatives that also sought to engage the EU in "Greece's balancing policy" against Turkey. According to Tsakonas, Greek attempts to transform the EU into a "security provider" proved to be ill fated. As was mentioned above, Greek policy makers believed that accession to the Communities would suffice to guarantee Greek security and force Turkey to make concessions on Greco-Turkish relations in order to develop its own relations with the Communities further. In this sense, the Imia/Kardak crisis confirmed the EU's inability to provide security. Indeed, the formation of a new government in 1996 coincided with a severe foreign policy crisis that brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war. In the aftermath of the crisis Turkey was claiming sovereignty over numerous islets in the Aegean, which Greece considers its own territory, and it announced a costly armaments programme prompting Greece to respond with an armaments programme of its own. Even

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77 Tsakonas, "Socialising...", op. cit. p. 68
78 K. Ifantis, "Greece and the USA after the Cold War" in K. Featherstone – K. Ifantis (eds), Greece in a Changing Europe: Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration?, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1996, p. 153
79 Stavridis, "The Europeanisation...", op. cit. p. 22
80 Tsakonas – Tournikotis, op cit
81 Ibid. pp. 307-8
though the literature has identified external shocks that demonstrate policy failure as one of the most powerful factors that drive foreign policy change, a theoretically informed assessment of the implications of the 1996 crisis for change in Greek policy towards Turkey is still lacking.

The arguments in the literature that have attempted to explain change in Greek policy towards Turkey raise a series of questions that render the latter even more puzzling: Was change in Greek policy towards Turkey the outcome of a process of Europeanisation? If so, why was Greek policy Europeanised? Did the end of the Cold War necessitate change in Greek policy? What were the implications of US policy for Greek policy towards Turkey? Did the economic situation the government was facing have implications for its policy towards Turkey? Did the Prime Minister's modernisation programme include foreign policy reform? If so, how committed was Simitis to foreign policy reform? What were the implications of the 1996 Imia/Kardak crisis for Greek policy towards Turkey? Did these factors interact in producing foreign policy change? How is it possible to determine the relative causal significance of each of these factors? While the mere number of potential explanatory variables renders the case truly puzzling, a framework that incorporates all relevant explanatory variables, specifies the interactions between them and exploits their full explanatory potential to provide a convincing conclusion on these questions is still lacking. Similarly, a completed empirical study is also lacking and, more significantly, studies that list numerous variables that may have influenced Greek policy towards Turkey have failed to indicate what the observable implications that would allow researchers to confirm and/or refute their causal significance are.

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83 As Stavridis has pointed out, the analysis of change in Greek foreign policy as the outcome of Europeanisation and, therefore, the rather small part of the literature on Europeanisation that discusses foreign policy, would benefit from the study of a particular empirical case; see Stavridis, “Assessing the Views...”, op. cit. p. 32
The argument

The argument of this thesis is that *the Greek government’s decision to consent to the Turkish candidacy constituted the culmination of Prime Minister Simitis’ attempts to pursue what he referred to as the “communitisation” of Greco-Turkish relations*. According to this notion, Greece should allow Turkey to develop its relations with the EU further even if Turkey had not complied with Greek demands provided that rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece were established at the EU level. The logic underlying communitisation was fairly straightforward. *If Greece could have rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards it established at the EU level, the EU itself would see to it that its own rules were observed.* The argument draws on foreign policy analysis and the literature on foreign policy leadership styles in particular and emphasises the causal significance of a domestic source of foreign policy change. *Simitis’ leadership style was characterised by an orientation towards a preconceived, internally defined task – the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations – to the completion of which he remained unequivocally committed even in the face of severe constraints and evidence that challenged the task’s necessity.*

The argument was tested against three alternative explanations of change in Greek policy towards Turkey that incorporated *all the relevant explanatory variables* discussed above. Two of the alternative explanations conceptualise the Helsinki strategy as the outcome of Europeanisation, that is to say a process of incorporation of EU enlargement conditionality into Greek policy towards Turkey. According to the Europeanisation thesis, Greek foreign policy makers chose to incorporate enlargement conditionality into their policy towards Turkey because they calculated that it was utility maximising. While the argument of this thesis suggests that the purpose of the Helsinki strategy was to *establish rules that would make the EU responsible for ensuring Turkey’s compliance* with Greek demands, this explanation suggests that its purpose was to *offer Turkey a greater incentive to comply* with Greek demands. In contrast, *the socialisation*

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84 It should be noted that even though “the Europeanisation thesis” and “the socialisation thesis” are used as shorthand for these two explanations, both explanations conceptualise the Helsinki strategy as the outcome of Europeanisation.
thesis suggests that Greek foreign policy makers incorporated enlargement conditionality into their policy towards Turkey because they became convinced that it was the appropriate course of action for an EU member-state given the situation. The final explanation conceptualises the Helsinki strategy as an external balancing strategy. According to the balancing thesis, Greek foreign policy makers formulated the Helsinki strategy in order to improve their relative power position vis-à-vis Turkey without compromising the objective of entering EMU.

While all four explanations predict the same outcome, they predict very different pathways to the formulation of the Helsinki strategy. It was possible to empirically distinguish between the four explanations by process tracing their observable implications for three dimensions of the policy making process: the definition of the policy problem the Helsinki strategy was intended to address, the alternative courses of action Greek foreign policy makers considered and the manner in which the latter were assessed. The evidence drawn from process tracing showed that Simitis' unequivocal commitment to the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations constitutes the only convincing explanation of all three dimensions of the formulation of the Helsinki strategy.

Simitis had indeed selected communitisation as the optimal policy for Greece prior to his election as Prime Minister and he remained unequivocally committed to it during his Premiership. Despite the fact that the beginning of his Premiership literally coincided with the Imia/Kardak crisis, which constituted a traumatic shock that the literature suggests is often a most powerful factor that drives foreign policy change, Simitis had identified the failure of Greek policy towards Turkey to achieve its objectives prior to the crisis and the latter was interpreted as evidence that confirmed his beliefs. Simitis sought to reduce what he saw as an excessive responsiveness of Greek policy towards Turkey to external factors. Communitisation was intended to replace the practice of vetoing progress in EU-Turkey relations until Turkey complied with Greek demands and Greece was to pursue communitisation steadfastly.
Simitis' preference for communitisation began to affect Greek policy towards Turkey immediately after his election. Indeed, in retrospect, the Helsinki strategy does not appear entirely surprising. The shift in Greek policy towards Turkey had begun much earlier. Greece had already allowed EU-Turkey relations to progress in July 1996 despite the fact that Turkey had not complied with the conditions that Greece had set. Greece took this course of action on four separate occasions (15 July 1996, 29 April 1997, 1997 Luxembourg European Council, 1999 Helsinki European Council) during the period under investigation. *The explanation that emphasises the causal significance of Simitis' leadership style is the only one that is consistent with all four decisions.*

*The evidence showed that the formulation of the Helsinki strategy was not the outcome of Europeanisation.* Greek foreign policy makers did not identify the discrepancy between Greek policy towards Turkey and EU enlargement conditionality and they did not consider the latter an alternative course of action that might be more appropriate or more effective. In fact, Simitis had argued the necessity of communitisation prior to the establishment of enlargement conditionality at the EU level and therefore the latter could not have affected his calculations. Similarly, the evidence showed that the Helsinki strategy was not formulated as an external balancing strategy. Greek foreign policy makers did not consider the Helsinki strategy an alternative to defence expenditure and therefore the Helsinki strategy was not intended to address a "guns-or-butter" dilemma.

Simitis' internal belief that Greece should pursue the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations determined the definition of the policy problem, the alternative courses of action considered and the manner in which they were assessed. The fact that Greco-Turkish relations remained problematic was the result not only of Turkey's consistently revisionist policy, but also of Greece's lack of an effective policy. According to Simitis, Greece had to make a choice between continuing to prevent progress in EU-Turkey relations and allowing EU-Turkey relations to progress within a framework that would include EU rules for Turkey's behaviour towards Greece. While the first option had been pursued and it had failed to achieve its objectives, Simitis' preferred policy would attribute the role of
guarantor of Turkey's compliance with Greek demands to the EU, as the latter would see to it that its rules were observed.

The plan of the thesis

Chapter two will present the theoretical framework for this thesis and fully elaborate the four explanations mentioned above. While the argument of this thesis draws on foreign policy analysis and the literature on foreign policy leadership styles in particular and emphasises the causal significance of a domestic source of foreign policy change (the Prime Minister's leadership style), the three alternative explanations incorporate the external variables discussed above. Prior to elaborating on the explanations that conceptualise the Helsinki strategy as the outcome of Europeanisation, chapter two will address concerns regarding the usefulness of Europeanisation, present a useful definition of the concept and establish its applicability to the study of foreign policy. It will be shown that of the several "faces" of the concept discussed in the literature, only one raises questions that are both new and researchable: Europeanisation as a process of incorporation of EU norms, practices and procedures into the domestic level. Furthermore, Europeanisation can be applied to foreign policy provided that explanations of the phenomenon take its voluntary nature into account. It will be shown that the Helsinki strategy can be conceptualised as the outcome of a process of incorporation of EU enlargement conditionality into Greek policy towards Turkey. Greek foreign policy makers chose to incorporate enlargement conditionality into their policy towards Turkey either because they calculated that it was utility maximising in the face of policy failure demonstrated by the 1996 Imia/Kardak crisis or because they became convinced that it was the appropriate thing to do for an EU member-state given the situation. The final explanation draws on neo-realist international politics theory for baseline predictions for state behaviour and conceptualises the Helsinki strategy as an external balancing strategy, which was formulated in an attempt to secure both foreign (countering the Turkish threat) and economic (meeting EMU entry criteria) policy goals. This particular formulation of the balancing thesis incorporates the implications of both Turkish policy towards Greece and post-
Cold War US policy on Greco-Turkish relations and EU-Turkey relations for Greece's relative power position vis-à-vis Turkey.

Chapter three will show that it is possible to empirically distinguish between these four explanations by process tracing their observable implications for three dimensions of the foreign policy making process: the definition of the policy problem the Helsinki strategy was intended to address, the alternative courses of action Greek foreign policy makers considered and, finally, the manner in which the latter were assessed.

Chapter four will present a detailed historical narrative of Greek policy towards Turkey between January 1996 and December 1999. The period from January to September 1996 was marked by considerable uncertainty initially due to the fact that Simitis was Prime Minister, but not the leader of PASOK and subsequently due to the fact that Simitis lacked a mandate from the electorate. Despite the fact that he was severely constrained, Simitis began to pursue his vision for reform immediately and in July 1996 the first EU decision that communitised Greco-Turkish relations was secured. The period between October 1996 and December 1997 was marked by the initiative of the Dutch Presidency, which led to an unprecedented involvement of the EU in Greco-Turkish relations, and the Luxembourg European Council summit, where Greece achieved the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations at the highest political level for the first time. The period between January 1998 and June 1999 was marked by mounting pressure on Greece from Turkey, EU member-states and the US, while Greece remained adamant that the decision made in Luxembourg should not be revised. Finally, the remainder of the period under investigation began with the formulation of the Helsinki strategy in June 1999 in an attempt to pursue the further communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations and culminated in the Helsinki summit negotiations in December 1999.

Chapter five will establish how Greek foreign policy makers defined the policy problem the Helsinki strategy was intended to address. It will be shown that Prime Minister Simitis had identified policy failure prior to the Imia/Kardak crisis and that he had argued the need for a different policy towards Turkey —
which he referred to as “communitisation” – prior to the establishment of enlargement conditionality at the EU level. The crisis merely reinforced his belief in the necessity of communitisation. His commitment to the latter remained unequivocal during the period under investigation as he intended to reduce the responsiveness of Greek policy to external factors. In contrast to what the socialisation thesis predicts, Greek foreign policy makers did not begin to identify Turkish violations of substantive EU foreign policy norms for the first time during the period under investigation. In contrast to what the balancing thesis predicts, a guns-or-butter dilemma was not the problem the Helsinki strategy was intended to address.

Chapter six will establish the alternative courses of action Greek foreign policy makers considered. It will be shown that Prime Minister Simitis’ preference for communitisation determined these alternatives. In contrast to what the balancing thesis predicts, Greek foreign policy makers did not consider the Helsinki strategy an alternative to defence expenditure that would allow Greece to build up its military capabilities. In contrast to what both explanations that conceptualise change in Greek policy towards Turkey as the outcome of Europeanisation predict, Greek foreign policy makers did not identify enlargement conditionality as an established EU practice that could serve as an alternative to the policy previously pursued. On the contrary, Simitis, who personally pursued the implementation of communitisation immediately after his election, repeatedly stressed the need for the formulation of an EU policy on the matter. Greek foreign policy makers distinguished between the practice of vetoing progress in EU-Turkey relations until Turkey complied with Greek demands and the practice of allowing EU-Turkey relations to develop prior to Turkey’s compliance with Greek demands in exchange for EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece as Simitis’ notion of communitisation prescribed. Greece took this course of action on four separate occasions (15 July 1996, 29 April 1997, 1997 Luxembourg European Council, 1999 Helsinki European Council) during the period under investigation, even at a time when reducing defence expenditure was considered unthinkable and even when the EU decisions that Greece secured were not consistent with enlargement conditionality. The argument of this thesis is the only explanation that is
consistent with all four decisions. It will be shown that Simitis continued to insist on the necessity of communitisation even after the latter had failed to produce the desired results. In the aftermath of the Luxembourg decision, where EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece were established at the level of the European Council for the first time, Simitis was most unwilling to consider consenting to the Turkish candidacy without additional EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece, despite the fact that the communitisation achieved in Luxembourg had not produced the desired results.

Chapter seven will establish how Greek foreign policy makers assessed the alternative courses of action they considered. It will be shown that Prime Minister Simitis’ preference for communitisation determined this assessment. In contrast to what the socialisation thesis predicts, Greek foreign policy makers were particularly concerned about the costs and benefits of the alternatives they considered. There is no evidence that Greek foreign policy makers became convinced of the inappropriateness of the policy previously pursued. On the contrary, they systematically argued that it was their EU partners and the European Commission that had on certain occasions behaved inappropriately. In contrast to what the balancing thesis predicts, the benefits of the Helsinki strategy that Greek foreign policy makers calculated were not economic. The economic cost of policy towards Turkey was only one of the reasons why Greek foreign policy makers wished to resolve Greco-Turkish problems, not the reason why the Helsinki strategy was selected to resolve them. It was believed that EMU entry had been secured prior to the formulation of the Helsinki strategy and the latter would not affect defence expenditure already planned. While there is evidence that the Helsinki strategy was believed to offer Turkey an incentive to comply with Greek demands, this particular calculation was of secondary significance. Greece had made explicit that the status quo was preferable to an agreement that would grant Turkey candidate country status without establishing additional rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece even though such an agreement would offer Turkey greater incentive to comply with Greek demands. Furthermore, this calculation was not the outcome of an assessment of the discrepancy between Greek and EU policy and, thus, it cannot be attributed to the EU. The main benefit of the Helsinki strategy was the role of guarantor of the
resolution of Greco-Turkish problems that was assigned to the EU as Simitis’ notion of communitisation prescribed and it was meant to be part of the EU’s broader international role. Indeed, the four EU decisions that Greece secured (15 July 1996, 29 April 1997, Luxembourg decision, Helsinki decision) during the period under investigation progressively increased the EU’s involvement in Greco-Turkish relations.

Chapters five to seven will compare the four pathways to the Helsinki strategy predicted by the four alternative explanations with what actually happened during the period under investigation. The concluding chapter will reconstruct the argument, show that post-1999 developments are consistent with the argument and discuss its implications for the analysis of both Greek foreign policy and aspects of other EU member-states’ foreign policies which the literature has identified as crucial.
Chapter 2: Leadership, Europeanisation and Balancing

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to fully elaborate the implications of the various explanatory variables mentioned in the previous chapter for Greek policy towards Turkey and specify the interactions between them in order to formulate theoretically informed alternative explanations of the Helsinki strategy. In contrast to the long lists of relevant developments discussed in the literature, four parsimonious explanations are formulated here, each of which only incorporates variables (sources of foreign policy change) that constitute individually necessary and jointly sufficient causes for the outcome under investigation (change in Greek policy towards Turkey); such combinations of necessary/sufficient causes are typical of the understanding of causality in qualitative research.

The first explanation draws on foreign policy analysis and the literature on leadership styles in particular and conceptualises the Helsinki strategy as the culmination of Prime Minister Simitis' attempts to pursue what he referred to as the "communitisation" of Greco-Turkish relations. This notion constituted an internal, pre-conceived idea, according to which Greece should allow Turkey to develop its relations with the EU within a framework of EU rules for Turkey's behaviour towards Greece. If Greece could have such rules established at the EU level, the EU itself would become responsible for ensuring that its rules were observed. Change in Greek policy towards Turkey was not a response to contextual variables, but followed from the unequivocal commitment of a task-orientated key policy maker to an internal, pre-conceived idea, which he had difficulty changing even in the face of disconfirming information and formidable constraints.

The next two explanations conceptualise the Helsinki strategy as the outcome of a process of Europeanisation. It will be argued that of the several "faces" of the concept discussed in the literature, only one is useful for empirical research on

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85 Mahoney – Goertz, op. cit. p. 232
foreign policy change: Europeanisation as a process of incorporation of EU norms, practices and procedures into the domestic level. In this sense, the Helsinki strategy can be conceptualised as the outcome of the incorporation of EU enlargement conditionality into Greek policy towards Turkey. It will be shown that Europeanisation can indeed be applied to foreign policy provided that the voluntary nature of the process is taken into consideration. According to the Europeanisation thesis, Greek foreign policy makers interpreted the Imia/Kardak crisis as an external shock that demonstrated policy failure and decided to incorporate EU enlargement conditionality into their policy towards Turkey because they calculated that it would offer Turkey a greater incentive to comply with Greek demands. In contrast, according to the socialisation thesis, Greek foreign policy makers came to share a new definition of the situation with their EU partners and became convinced that their policy towards Turkey was inappropriate for an EU member-state given the common definition of the situation.

Finally, the balancing thesis conceptualises the Helsinki strategy as an external balancing strategy against Turkey. Drawing on neo-realist international politics theory for baseline predictions for state behaviour, it is argued that Greece’s relative power position vis-à-vis Turkey was weakened as a result of what was perceived as Turkey’s increasingly aggressive policy towards Greece and US support for Turkey’s aspiration to develop its relations with the EU further. Consequently, balancing against Turkey was considered necessary. At the same time, however, Greece was pursuing EMU entry. As resources were scarce, Greek foreign policy makers formulated the Helsinki strategy in an attempt to reconfigure the combination of internal and external balancing in favour of the latter.

The unequivocally committed leader

While the literature has acknowledged the formation of a new government in 1996 under the leadership of Costas Simitis as a critical development, its effects on Greek policy towards Turkey have not been specified in a theoretically
informed manner. In contrast to developments that have implications for Greece’s relative power position vis-à-vis Turkey and serve as the basis for a structural explanation of change in Greek policy, Simitis’ election as Prime Minister has implications for domestic sources of foreign policy change. The emphasis on the foreign policy making process within the state and especially on policy makers and their particular characteristics, motivations and intentions has been a central element of foreign policy analysis since the 1950s. While international relations scholarship has often “neglected” the study of foreign policy change, it has been suggested that the latter might be the result of “the determined efforts of an authoritative policy maker, frequently the head of government, who imposes his own vision of the basic redirection necessary in foreign policy.”

More recently, policy makers’ responsiveness to the policy context has been identified as the key variable that determines the scope of the causal significance of policy makers’ personal attitudes and beliefs. The latter is inversely proportionate to his responsiveness to the policy context. The less responsive to context a policy maker is, the more goal-driven she will be. Such policy makers are driven by internal, pre-conceived ideas, a cause, a problem to be solved or an ideology. They enter the decision making process with a fixed set of priorities, which they have difficulty changing. In such cases, it is more important to know about policy makers’ attitudes and beliefs than about the policy context. Different characteristics of policy makers combine to produce different leadership styles in this respect. Responsiveness to policy context can be assessed on the basis of the following characteristics: a) reactions to constraints,

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86 This distinction between structural/systemic and domestic-political explanations of variation in foreign policy is based on whether they incorporate unit-level attributes of states, such as political institutions, economic structures, culture or leadership, which are not related to a state’s relative power position in the system; for an alternative distinction based on a more inclusive definition of structural/systemic explanations and a more narrow definition of domestic-political explanations see J. D. Fearon, “Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy and Theories of International Relations”, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 1, 1998
87 Hudson – Vore, op. cit.
89 Hermann, “Changing Course...”, op. cit. p. 11
90 For goal-driven leaders see Hermann et al., op cit
as non-responsive leaders will challenge the constraints imposed on them by the
policy context and they will act decisively in an attempt to achieve a resolution
of the policy problem that is consistent with their attitudes and beliefs and (b)
openness to information, as non-responsive leaders who enter the decision
making process with a well-formulated vision for reform will seek information
that reinforces their beliefs and overlook disconfirming evidence\(^{92}\).

Leaders who challenge constraints and are closed to information are the most
committed and unresponsive\(^{93}\). The motivations of such leaders vary: they may
be focused on relationships, in which case their style would be "evangelistic"; or
they may be focused on the resolution of a problem, in which case their style
would be "expansionist"\(^94\). The term expansionist may be somewhat misleading.
It does not necessarily refer to territorial expansion, but to the expansion of
power and influence, the ability to control a particular domain of affairs.
Regardless of whether they seek to resolve a problem or convert others to their
cause, such leaders will be the least sensitive to the policy context.

The style of leadership will matter most when certain conditions hold. First, there
must be an individual with the necessary authority in the political system and
second, the individual must exercise his authority\(^{95}\). That will be the case when
the leader is interested in getting involved in foreign affairs in general or in a
specific foreign policy issue and when the foreign policy problem is critical or
involves high-level diplomacy, when the leader remains involved after she has
set the general direction of the policy and when those who participate in the
decision-making process are not granted the right to veto decisions\(^{96}\).

\(^{92}\) For these characteristics see Hermann et al., op. cit. pp. 89-94 and M. G. Hermann, "Assessing
Leadership Style: Trait Analysis" in J. M. Post (ed), The Psychological Assessment of Political
Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan
Press, 2003, pp. 187-197

\(^{93}\) Herman et al., op. cit. p. 96

\(^{94}\) Such leaders are often referred to as "crusaders"; see ibid. p. 98; J. Kaarbo, "Prime Minister
Leadership Styles in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Framework for Research", Political
Psychology, 18: 3, 1997, p. 565. While the term might be considered unfortunate, its meaning is
neither inherently positive, nor inherently negative.

\(^{95}\) While more often than not the literature discusses US Presidents, the framework has also been
applied to Prime Ministers; see Kaarbo, op cit and J. Kaarbo – M. G. Hermann, "Leadership
Styles of Prime Ministers: How Differences Affect the Foreign Policy Making Process",
Leadership Quarterly, 9: 3, 1998

\(^{96}\) For these conditions see M. G. Hermann – C. F. Hermann, "Who Makes Foreign Policy
The above conditions indicate that the emphasis on Simitis’ beliefs is pertinent. The centrality of the Prime Minister in the Greek political system, especially since the constitutional reform of 1986, is well established. Furthermore, Greco-Turkish relations were indeed a crucial foreign policy issue that involved high-level diplomacy. As was mentioned above, Greco-Turkish relations have occupied the top of the Greek foreign policy agenda for the better part of the past forty years. The beginning of Simitis’ Premiership coincided with the Imia/Kardak crisis, which brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war and turned Greco-Turkey relations into an issue that could hardly be ignored. Finally, change in Greek policy towards Turkey was decided in view of a European Council summit.

Simitis has indeed been arguing the need for further integration and a political union based on a federal model since before he was elected Prime Minister\(^9\) \(^7\). Simitis’ preferences for the future of the integration process, however, indicate little regarding his stance on EU-Turkey relations. Simitis’ ideological commitment to federalism does not explain the decision to grant Turkey candidate country status. German Christian Democrats are an instructive example in this respect. While they share Simitis’ commitment to federalism\(^9\) \(^8\), they were

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98 Chancellor Kohl in particular considered German efforts to promote European unification “a political task of historic dimensions”; see A. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, London, UCL Press, 1999, p. 390
opposed to the Turkish candidacy for EU membership. In order to establish the causal significance of Simitis' beliefs one needs to identify an internal, pre-conceived idea regarding Greek policy towards Turkey and a commitment to realising this idea regardless of external constraints or disconfirming evidence. The first explanation to be tested is the following:

The Helsinki strategy was the outcome of Prime Minister Simitis' efforts to pursue what he referred to as the "communitisation" of Greco-Turkish relations. According to this notion, Greece should allow Turkey to develop its relations with the EU within a framework of EU rules for Turkey's behaviour towards Greece. The Helsinki strategy secured an EU decision that established such rules. Simitis was driven by this idea and he remained unequivocally committed to it even in the face of formidable constraints and disconfirming information.

Conceptualising change in Greek policy as the outcome of Europeanisation

As was mentioned above, there is no consensus in the literature regarding the precise meaning of Europeanisation. While initially the growing number of meanings attributed to the concept received attention and was considered problematic, it is now understood that the usefulness of Europeanisation lies in its ability to raise interesting questions and the challenge for researchers is to develop explanatory models that provide answers to these questions. This line of reasoning may, at first sight, lead one to conclude that any conceptualisation of Europeanisation can be useful provided that it poses certain questions. The argument, however, implicitly indicates two specific criteria that definitions of Europeanisation should meet. First, each conceptualisation should help

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100 It should be pointed out that when this particular explanation was tested empirically, it predicted that Simitis had an internal, pre-conceived idea that had implications for Greek policy towards Turkey and that he remained unequivocally committed to it, but not what that idea was. Simitis' belief in the necessity of communitisation was an empirical finding, which is discussed here for the sake of clarity of presentation.

researchers ask *new* questions: the concept of Europeanisation would indeed be redundant if it only directed our attention to and raised questions about phenomena captured by other concepts. Second, each conceptualisation should help researchers ask questions that are *researchable*: the concept of Europeanisation might remain interesting if it only raised questions the answers to which cannot be tested empirically, but it would not be useful.

At this point it would be instructive to consider some of the definitions of Europeanisation that feature most prominently in the literature in the light of these two criteria. In a comprehensive review, Olsen identified five different uses of Europeanisation: a) changes in external boundaries, b) developing institutions at the European level, c) central penetration of national systems of governance, d) exporting forms of political organisation and e) a political unification project and explained that he suspected that Europeanisation as a political unification project would turn out to be the most interesting because it includes the other four meanings. This assessment, however, contradicts his understanding of Europeanisation as an "attention-directing device". This conceptualisation encompasses European politics virtually in its entirety and thus fails to direct our attention to a specific set of phenomena. Furthermore, Olsen argues that this political unification project proceeds through "the mutual adaptation of co-evolving institutions". It is certainly important to point out that neither the EU, nor the domestic level is static; processes of change can be observed at both levels. Olsen, however, explicitly discusses "simultaneous processes of change" and European, national, sub-national and non-European institutions and actors changing at the same time. If the two levels interact and change simultaneously, it is not possible to determine what the *direction of causality* is. In Olsen’s own words, "no coherent empirical research programme is possible if everything is seen as endogenous and in flux". Reality is by definition more

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1. Olsen, op. cit. pp. 923-4, 943
2. Ibid. p. 941
3. Ibid. pp. 941, 943
4. Ibid. p. 942; The problem here is similar to that Wendt faced, when he attempted to address issues of research design that stem from Giddens’s structuration theory. The research strategy Wendt proposed for the study of the interplay between agency and structure was incompatible with Giddens’s theory because, according to the latter, agency and structure presuppose each other; for a critical discussion see W. Carlsnaes, "The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis", *International Studies Quarterly*, 36: 3, 1992, esp. p. 258. While Olsen does not explicitly subscribe to such an extreme understanding of the mutual constitution of agency
complex than theory. The purpose of theoretical frameworks is to isolate certain of the infinite elements that constitute reality, create order amongst them and, thus, simplify. This conceptualisation does not isolate certain elements of European politics, but includes it in its entirety, effectively rendering research impossible. If the usefulness of Europeanisation lies in its ability to help us ask researchable questions, this conceptualisation severely limits the usefulness of the concept because it only raises questions the answers to which cannot be tested empirically.

It follows from the above that Europeanisation will be a useful concept if it only has one face, that is to say if it directs our attention to a single set of phenomena. Of the four meanings of Europeanisation that Olsen's preferred conceptualisation includes, only one refers to a new set of phenomena. According to a prominent use of the concept, Europeanisation refers to "the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal and social institutions associated with political problem-solving that formalise interactions among the actors and of policy networks specialising in the creation of authoritative rules." These institutions, however, do not simply "emerge". National governments establish these institutions as an integral part of the integration process. Consequently, this particular conceptualisation of Europeanisation renders it indistinguishable from integration. Indeed, one of the key debates within the context of integration theory discusses the extent to which national executives are capable of exercising control over the institutional...

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107 T. Risse - M. G. Cowles - J. Caporaso, "Europeanisation and Domestic Change: Introduction" in M. G. Cowles - J. A. Caporaso - T. Risse (eds), Transforming Europe: Europeanisation and Domestic Change, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2001, p. 3. It should be noted that Caporaso has conceded that this definition "poses some problems" and he has opted for a definition that is consistent with the third meaning on Olsen's list, which does not render the concept "redundant"; see J. Caporaso, "The Three Worlds of Regional Integration Theory" in P. Graziano - M. P. Vink (eds), Europeanisation: New Research Agendas, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp. 27, 33
108 For this critique see Dyson - Goetz, op. cit. pp. 13-15, 20; Featherstone, "Introduction: In the Name...", op. cit. p. 10 and Radaelli, "The Europeanisation...", op. cit. p. 34
evolution of the EU\textsuperscript{109}. Similarly, Europeanisation as changes in external boundaries and exporting forms of political organisation refers to different aspects of the EU’s external relations - the process of enlargement, relations between the EU and other international actors and the EU’s attempts to define its international role – which the literature on EU foreign policy has discussed extensively\textsuperscript{110}. What remains unclear is the added value of their re-conceptualisation as Europeanisation. If the usefulness of Europeanisation lies in its ability to help us ask \textit{new} questions, these conceptualisations limit the usefulness of the concept because they only raise questions that have been asked before.

The final meaning – central penetration of national systems of governance – seems more promising. In this vein, Radaelli has suggested that Europeanisation “consists of processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub-national) discourse, political structures and public policies”\textsuperscript{111}. The word “construction” in this definition signifies that Europeanisation can derive from the stage of policy formulation\textsuperscript{112}. It is made explicit, however, that the stage of policy formulation is \textit{not} synonymous with

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\textsuperscript{111} Radaelli, “Europeanisation: Solution...”, op. cit. p. 3

\textsuperscript{112} Bulmer and Radaelli contradict themselves at this point; even though they make the possibility of Europeanisation emanating from the stage of policy formulation - that is prior to the making of a decision - explicit, they then argue that, in the case of the CFSP, there can be no Europeanisation of national foreign policy, unless a decision is made at the EU level; see Bulmer – Radaelli, op. cit. pp. 3-5, 7 and Radaelli, “Europeanisation: Solution...”, op. cit. p. 12
\end{footnotesize}
Europeanisation\textsuperscript{113}. Consequently, Europeanisation does not consist of processes of construction of EU rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, "ways of doing things", beliefs and norms, but may originate from such processes and these "EU ways of doing things" need not be "consolidated" at the EU level prior to their incorporation into the domestic level.

Furthermore, it remains unclear with which modes of governance "institutionalisation" and "diffusion" correspond. Given that diffusion is understood as incorporation in a fashion less structured than institutionalisation\textsuperscript{114}, it would be reasonable to assume that diffusion corresponds with "facilitated coordination", a mode of governance that relates to policy areas not subject to EU law, where decisions are made unanimously and the EU simply serves as an arena for the exchange of ideas\textsuperscript{115}. In theory, however, there is no reason to assume a priori that EU rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, "ways of doing things", beliefs and norms generated from facilitated coordination will not be institutionalised, but simply diffused into the domestic level. Such an assumption would appear to imply that the process of Europeanisation in such policy areas is more easily reversible, while the reversibility of the process remains a matter of empirical investigation.

It follows from the above that Europeanisation should be defined as "a process of incorporation in the logic of domestic (national and sub-national) discourse, political structures, and public policies of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms that are first defined in the EU policy processes".

This revised definition retains all the advantages of Radaelli’s initial formulation\textsuperscript{116} and meets the two criteria set out above. First, it emphasises the importance of change. Second, it refers to "EU policy processes" as opposed to EU laws. It is, therefore, clear that a truly common EU policy with legally

\textsuperscript{113} Bulmer – Radaelli, op. cit. p. 5
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid. p. 3
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid. p. 7
\textsuperscript{116} For a discussion of these advantages see Radaelli, “The Europeanisation of…” , op. cit. pp. 30-
binding instruments and under judicial review is not a pre-requisite of Europeanisation. Third, it is broad enough to cover both member-states and non-member-states, both national and sub-national levels and both political structures, political processes, public policies and the cognitive and normative frames that cut across the former. Finally, it secures the usefulness of the concept because it allows researchers to demarcate a set of empirically manageable phenomena (the incorporation of EU norms, practices and procedures in the domestic level), which are not captured by other concepts.

It should be noted here that possible interactions between the process of institution building at the EU level and the process through which these institutions impact on the domestic level cannot be ruled out at the analytical level. Europeanisation, at this stage of research in the field of EU studies, however, is not useful as a conceptualisation of the interaction between or the mutual constitution of these processes simply because there is something missing. Before one attempts to study the interaction between these two processes, one needs to isolate each one of them and study them separately first. Such a conceptualisation attempts to take both steps at once. If agency (member-states) and structure (the EU) are mutually constitutive and integration theory informs us of how agency is “structuring”, then Europeanisation is best suited to direct our attention to how agency is being “structured”. That particular process whereby the EU causes change in national polities, public policies and domestic politics is what the concept of Europeanisation can help us identify, isolate, and ask questions about. Research on such questions logically precedes research on how processes of Europeanisation feed back into the integration process.

As the range of possible outcomes of this process has not been specified yet, researchers often establish the accession of a state to the EU or the beginning of cooperation in the field of foreign policy as their starting point and organise their research as a search for some sort of impact that can be attributed to the EU. Consequently, studies on Europeanisation often lack explicit rules for case selection. Given the above definition of the concept, why does change in Greek

\[\text{\textsuperscript{117} Major, op. cit. pp. 176-7}\]
policy towards Turkey constitute a potential case of Europeanisation of national foreign policy?

As has been pointed out, one should begin by observing change in national foreign policy that follows the establishment of foreign policy norms, practices and procedures at the EU level and is consistent with the latter\textsuperscript{118}. In order to be able to discern whether national foreign policy has been reoriented along the lines of the EU way of doing things, one needs to identify the relevant EU foreign policy norms, practices and procedures and the elements of national foreign policy each one of them has affected. As was mentioned above, the formulation of the Helsinki strategy constituted marked change in Greek policy towards Turkey and therefore it serves as a useful starting point. The Helsinki strategy can be conceptualised as the outcome of the incorporation of the type of conditionality that the EU applies within the context of enlargement into Greek policy towards Turkey. The mixture of predominantly diplomatic and economic EU foreign policy instruments includes the offer of EU membership, which has turned out to be the most effective\textsuperscript{119}. A specific type of conditionality applies to the use of this instrument, which has been referred to as "reinforcement by reward"\textsuperscript{120}. The EU offers the reward of membership and creates a link between payment of the reward and certain conditions. If the target government complies, the reward is paid. If the target government fails to comply, payment of the reward is withheld, but the EU "does not intervene either coercively or supportively"\textsuperscript{121}. Greek governments had intended to use financial assistance and institutional ties between the Communities/the EU and Turkey – including the offer of membership – as an instrument of their policy towards Turkey since Greece applied for membership of the Communities\textsuperscript{122}. There was, however, a

\textsuperscript{118} For these guidelines see Radaelli, "Europeanisation: Solution…", op. cit. pp. 8-10
\textsuperscript{119} Smith, European Union Foreign Policy…, op. cit. p. 52, 67; A. Missiroli, “The EU and its Changing Neighbourhoods: Stabilisation, Integration and Partnership” in J. Batt et al., Partners and Neighbours: A CFSP for a Wider Europe, Chaillot Papers, No 64, 2003, p. 17. The use of military instruments, however, has increased to such an extent that it is no longer possible to classify the EU as a "civilian power"; see K. E. Smith, “Still ‘Civilian Power EU’?”, European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper, No. 1, 2005
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid. p. 497
\textsuperscript{122} P. Yannas, “The Greek Factor in EC-Turkey Relations” in P. Kazakos – P. C. Ioakimidis (eds), Greece and EC Membership Evaluated, London, Pinter, 1994, p. 216
discrepancy between the way in which Greece applied conditionality and the EU practice of reinforcement by reward. When the EU formulated the Copenhagen criteria, it made the link between association and membership "clear and explicit"\textsuperscript{123}. Conditionality was selected as a mode of governance of EU relations with third countries\textsuperscript{124}. In contrast, Greek governments applied conditionality in an attempt to prevent the development of EU-Turkey relations. Greek governments never offered Turkey a reward payable upon compliance. Instead, they unilaterally withheld those rewards (financial assistance, Customs Union) Turkey had already been offered and the offer of the "tastiest"\textsuperscript{125} reward (membership) at the EU's disposal. The Helsinki strategy marked a shift from attempts to block EU-Turkey relations to attempts to shape them as Greece allowed the EU to offer Turkey the reward of membership.

Furthermore, the policy previously pursued had allowed Greek governments to maintain control over EU-Turkey relations. Such control has been identified as the "principle (sic) objective" of Greek foreign policy\textsuperscript{126}. Indeed, the right to veto progress in EU-Turkey relations was exercised unilaterally. The Helsinki strategy involved considerable multilateralisation\textsuperscript{127} because the offer of EU membership can only be made collectively at the EU level. As has been pointed out, EU level cooperation "has moved the conduct of national foreign policy...towards a collective endeavour"\textsuperscript{128}. EU foreign policy is primarily about making collective decisions, coordinating, consulting or, at the very least, informing one's partners. When the establishment of EU foreign policy instruments and practices (in this case the establishment of reinforcement by reward as the practice that governs

\textsuperscript{123} Missiroli, op. cit. p. 18; The irony of this is that Central and Eastern European Countries argued that they were entitled to the offer of membership because Greece and Turkey had concluded association agreements that included a future-membership clause; see Schimmelfenning, op. cit. p. 70

\textsuperscript{124} F. Schimmelfenning - U. Sedelmeier, "Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe", \textit{Journal of European Public Policy}, 11: 4, 2004


\textsuperscript{126} Kavakas, op. cit. p. 158

\textsuperscript{127} Economides, op. cit. p. 484

the use of the offer of EU membership as a foreign policy instrument) leads national foreign policy makers to calculate that “uploading” will allow them to achieve their goals more effectively, they decide to incorporate the norm of collective decision-making into their policies. While Europeanisation refers to the process of incorporation of procedural EU norms into national foreign policy, uploading refers to the outcome of the process. National foreign policy makers begin “to employ a formerly unused mechanism of institutional cooperation with other member-states”\(^{129}\) to pursue collective decision-making on issues, which they had previously sought to handle unilaterally. While policy goals are not transformed, the decision-making process itself is elevated onto the EU level and national foreign policy makers’ EU partners become co-equal decision-makers.

Finally, it is plausible to suggest that beyond the incorporation of the practice of reinforcement by reward and the procedural norm of collective decision-making the Helsinki strategy was also the result of the incorporation of substantive EU foreign policy norms into Greek policy towards Turkey. Once incorporated into national foreign policy, these behavioural norms change national foreign policy goals. When peace, democracy and the rule of law are threatened, when human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rights of minorities are being violated, when international cooperation and good governance falter, national foreign policy makers begin to identify foreign policy problems that need to be resolved. Their objective is to ensure that third countries start taking the course of action substantive EU foreign policy norms prescribe.

It should be noted here that any mention of a “European Union foreign policy” almost inevitably raises certain issues, which are the subject of heated debates in the literature. First of all, certain scholars would go as far as to debate the very existence of an EU foreign policy\(^ {130}\). Second, the literature discusses whether and to what extent different aspects of EU foreign policy are “unique”\(^ {131}\). It should be


\(^{131}\) Manners argues that the EU is a “normative power” that is different from “pre-existing political forms” and this ontological difference “predisposes it to act in a normative way”; Smith argues that the objectives the EU’s “international identity” entails are not unique, yet the way in which they are pursued is; finally, Hyde-Price argues that EU foreign policy is not at all peculiar
made explicit that these debates are only marginally related to the study of Europeanisation. Whether or not the substantive and procedural norms and practices discussed here amount to a “foreign policy” is a matter of conceptualisation that has implications for the theoretical approaches selected to answer the question of why these norms and practices have been established at the EU level. As was mentioned above, this is not one of the questions the concept of Europeanisation raises. Europeanisation helps us ask why these norms and practices are incorporated into national foreign policy, not why they were established at the EU level to begin with.

Furthermore, it is clear that the EU is not the only international actor that emphasises norms such as respect for human rights\textsuperscript{132}. This is not to suggest, however, that the possibility that Europeanisation will occur can be ruled out at the analytical level. The fact remains that these are indeed features of the way in which the EU manages its external relations. Consequently, when national foreign policy changes so as to incorporate these norms, it is plausible to suggest that it might have been the EU that caused this change provided that causal mechanisms that explain this process of incorporation can be identified\textsuperscript{133}. The fact that the EU is not the only actor that emphasises human rights simply means that the EU is not the only plausible source of this particular type of foreign policy change. This is partly why the set of research questions relevant to Europeanisation are puzzling and the multitude of possible explanatory factors should come as no surprise to students of foreign policy. The difference in terms of the analysis is that these norms are not incorporated into national policy because they are universally accepted, but because the course of action they prescribe is considered appropriate \textit{within the EU context}. The concept of Europeanisation does not imply that EU foreign policy is unique or \textit{sui generis}, but it suggests that it might be causally significant for processes of national foreign policy change.

\textsuperscript{132} It is equally clear that not all international actors share these norms.

\textsuperscript{133} For the mechanisms that explain Europeanisation in the case of foreign policy see the next section of this chapter.
Explaining change in Greek policy as the outcome of Europeanisation

Even though the literature on Europeanisation has been steadily growing and research has shown that it is mostly public policies that have been penetrated by the integration process, foreign policy has not been studied extensively. Apart from doubts regarding the usefulness of the concept of Europeanisation in general, its applicability in the case of foreign policy in particular has also come into question due to the "unique nature of foreign policy" and the intergovernmental nature of decision-making at the EU level. Europeanisation, it is argued, was initially applied to the study of policy areas where the Community method applies; applying the concept to the study of foreign policy is problematic because the latter lies at the core of national sovereignty, thus hindering the development of international cooperation. Limited and weakly institutionalised cooperation can only have a weak impact on national policies.

This skepticism is not theoretically justified. As was mentioned above, the growth of the literature on Europeanisation reflects a research interest in the implications of certain EU level developments, including the introduction of guidelines on employment and social security policy that followed the decision to establish EMU. While these policy areas fall within the scope of the first pillar, the Community method does not apply. Consequently, the concept of Europeanisation never referred exclusively to "Communitised" policy areas to begin with. Furthermore, it follows from the "unique nature" of foreign policy argument that one should not expect variation of preferences on cooperation in the field of foreign policy across countries. If the nature of the policy area determines member-states' preferences, no member-state should be expected to prefer cooperation in the field of this uniquely sensitive policy area. Since national preferences do vary across countries, the nature of foreign policy does not constitute a convincing explanation of limited and weakly institutionalised cooperation. More importantly, regardless of the reason why cooperation in the

\[134\] Featherstone, "Introduction: In the Name...", op. cit. p. 6

field of foreign policy remains limited, a high level of integration in a particular policy area is not a pre-requisite of Europeanisation. Indeed, there is no theoretical association between the level of integration and the magnitude of policy change. The latter remains a matter of empirical investigation. In fact, it has been argued that the reason why national foreign policy makers incorporate EU norms, practices and procedures into their policies is their socialisation during EU level interactions. Socialisation may result in change in foreign policy objectives, that is to say in change of the greatest magnitude possible.

Finally, it should be pointed out that this skepticism is based on a misinterpretation of the implications of “intergovernmental” decision-making. It is assumed that since intergovernmental decisions require the agreement of all member-states, EU foreign policy norms, practices and procedures established intergovernmentally simply constitute what all member-states want. Consequently, even if these norms, practices and procedures are incorporated into national policy, the EU could not possibly have been causally significant. Both liberal intergovernmentalist and rational choice institutionalist analyses of the effects of unanimity – which is the key feature of the institutional environment of EU foreign policy decision-making – make explicit that this is inaccurate. The effect of unanimity is that the government with the least desire to change the status quo will be the most powerful and it will determine the content of the agreement. Member-states will not get what they want, but simply an outcome that is preferable to the status quo. The agreement will not even perfectly reflect the preferences of the most recalcitrant government. Consequently, even intergovernmental decision-making may create a discrepancy between national policy and EU policy. Furthermore, even if a member-state has achieved “perfect uploading”, a discrepancy may still emerge if national preferences change over time. Finally, the fact that EU foreign policy

136 Bulmer - Radaelli, op. cit. pp. 12-3
138 Moravcsik, op. cit. p. 501
139 Despite the fact that multilateralism has been the “defining characteristic” of German foreign policy since the end of World War Two (see A. Miskimmon - W. E. Paterson, “Adapting to Europe? German Foreign Policy, Domestic Constraints and the Limitations of Europeanisation since Unification” in H. W. Maull (ed), Germany's Uncertain Power, Basingstoke, Palgrave
policy is a common, but not a single policy, the absence of legal impediments to refraining from using the EU foreign policy framework and the lack of mechanisms that could enforce compliance with EU foreign policy positions\(^{140}\) only render the Europeanisation of national foreign policy more puzzling. Why do national foreign policy makers incorporate EU foreign policy norms, practices and procedures into their policies even though they cannot be forced to?

The intergovernmental nature of EU foreign policy making is reflected in the causal mechanisms through which Europeanisation produces foreign policy change\(^{141}\). The adaptational pressure mechanism is not applicable. According to the latter, the misfit between national and EU policy produces pressure for adaptation because the EU constitutes an "authoritative decision-making structure" and "member-states have no exit option given that EU law constitutes the law of the land"\(^{142}\). Despite the fact that the literature has discussed the adaptational pressure national foreign policy makers are supposedly under\(^{143}\), in policy areas where legally binding instruments are not available, *by definition* the misfit between national and EU policy does not produce adaptational pressure and EU policy produces its effects through different mechanisms. National executives are the key actors and the process is voluntary\(^{144}\).

Scholars have indeed identified such alternative causal mechanisms. As was mentioned above, it has been argued that reiterated interactions within the context of EU level cooperation in the field of foreign policy entail processes of socialisation\(^{145}\). During these interactions, national foreign policy makers become

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\(^{140}\) Nuttall, op. cit. pp. 188-190, 267; Smith, "The EU in the World...", op. cit. p. 17

\(^{141}\) Radaelli, "The Europeanisation...", op. cit. pp. 40-50

\(^{142}\) Borzel – Risse, op. cit. p. 61

\(^{143}\) Miskimmon – Paterson, op cit; J. I. Torreblanca, op cit

\(^{144}\) Bulmer – Radaelli, op. cit. p. 7

\(^{145}\) For this explanatory model see ibid. p. 7; Economides, op. cit. p. 472; Smith, "Toward a Theory of EU Policy-Making...", op cit; P. Rieker, *Europeanisation of National Security*
convinced of the appropriateness of the EU way of doing things and internalise EU behavioural rules. Consequently, when they re-enter the national decision-making process, they begin to think of the foreign policy issues at hand through the prism of internalised rules and their preferences are thus transformed. National foreign policy makers identify policy problems and define policy goals in accordance with established substantive EU foreign policy norms and they select the instruments and procedures that are considered appropriate for EU member-states in each situation. Foreign policy change is guided by a logic of appropriateness, that is to say by considerations of what constitutes standard, normal, right or good behaviour within the context of the EU. When social action is driven by the logic of appropriateness, actors try to answer the following questions: what kind of situation is this, what kind of person am I and what does a person such as I do in a situation such as this? The second explanation to be tested is the following:

Greek foreign policy makers redefined the situation they were facing. They began to see Turkey as an applicant country with a rather weak democratic regime, where the rule of law was not observed and human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rights of minorities were being violated. Turkish violations of these substantive EU foreign policy norms were defined as the problem Greek policy towards Turkey was intended to address. The objective was to ensure that Turkey ceased to violate these norms and started to take the course of action they prescribe. Greek foreign policy makers identified themselves as officials of an EU member-state and they identified reinforcement by reward as the established practice that determines what constitutes appropriate behaviour for EU member-states when applicant countries violate substantive EU foreign policy norms. The Greek practice of preventing Turkey from developing its relations with the EU was inappropriate because it contradicted established EU practice. Greek foreign policy makers chose to incorporate reinforcement by


147 Ibid. p. 4
reward into their policy towards Turkey because they felt that this was the appropriate course of action for an EU member-state given the situation.

Constructivist explanations of the Europeanisation of national foreign policy have been widespread in the literature. In fact, in a most prominent contribution, Tonra offered no explicit definition of Europeanisation and he implicitly identified the concept with norm internalisation. In the absence of legally binding instruments and adaptational pressure emanating from the EU level, an explanation based on processes of socialisation is certainly plausible and therefore requires empirical testing. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that it may not be the most convincing and certainly not the only plausible explanation. First of all, Hooghe's research has shown that even in a most-likely critical case - the European Commission - there is little evidence to support the idea that adherence to EU norms is the outcome of international socialisation. Since the argument has failed the rather undemanding empirical test of a most-likely case, the phenomenon of international socialisation might not be as common as the literature on EU foreign policy suggests. In fact, Nuttall has argued that the transition from European Political Cooperation (EPC) to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) reinforced the decline of socialisation during EU level interactions and the empirical record appears to confirm this view. Furthermore, with regard to the Europeanisation of foreign policy in particular, even though Tonra identifies Europeanisation with norm internalisation, his research has produced empirical evidence that suggests that when national foreign policy makers do adhere to EU foreign policy norms they do so for

148 As Karen Smith has pointed out "a rather colossal omission in the book is that Tonra never directly gets to grips with the concept of 'Europeanisation' - there is no discussion of the meaning of this term (although it appears in the title), so his book can only make a disappointing indirect contribution to the burgeoning literature on it" (see K. E. Smith, "Understanding the European Foreign Policy System", Contemporary European History, 12: 2, 2003, p. 250). Tonra made his understanding of the concept explicit in his contribution to the volume edited by Manners and Whitman, when he defined Europeanisation as "a transformation in the way in which national foreign policies are constructed, in the ways in which professional roles are defined and pursued and in the consequent internalisation of norms and expectations arising from a complex system of collective European policy making" (see B. Tonra, "Denmark and Ireland" in I. Manners - R. G. Whitman (eds), The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2000, p. 229).


instrumental reasons. The instrumental logic is clear when Danish, Dutch and Irish diplomats refer to the value of privileged access to information, the increased international weight and the greater impact their foreign policies have had through the EPC/CFSP\textsuperscript{151}. Consequently, it is at least equally plausible to argue that norm conformance may be driven by self-interest\textsuperscript{152}.

It follows from the above that the incorporation of EU ways of doing things into national foreign policy might be the result of strategic calculation\textsuperscript{153}. The differences between the two explanatory models are considerable. According to this explanation, the definition of the policy problem and foreign policy goals are not transformed as a result of Europeanisation. Foreign policy makers engage in strategic calculation in order to maximise the attainment of clearly identifiable preferences, to secure specific foreign policy goals. They consider the consequences of alternatives (the costs and benefits of each alternative in terms of the goals set) and they choose the relevant EU foreign policy practices and procedures amongst them because they allow for such maximisation; they offer the means to achieve national foreign policy goals more effectively. Policy change is driven by a logic of expected consequences. The third explanation to be tested is the following:

*The establishment of EU enlargement conditionality altered the range of alternatives available to Greek foreign policy makers and provided them with the option of offering Turkey a conditional reward (EU membership). The 1996*

\textsuperscript{151} Tonra, "Denmark and Ireland" op. cit. p. 229


\textsuperscript{153} Rieker's analysis constitutes a notable exception in the sense that it makes explicit that the Europeanisation of national foreign and security policy may be the outcome of instrumental calculations; see Rieker, *Europeanisation of National Security Identity...*, op cit and Rieker, "From Common Defence to Comprehensive Security…", op cit. This is considered as an early stage of a socialisation model. There is no reason, however, to assume that socialisation is invariably preceded by the incorporation of EU norms, practices and procedures for instrumental reasons. For rational choice models in foreign policy analysis see G. T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis", *The American Political Science Review*, 63: 3, 1969 and G. Allison – P. Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, New York, Longman, 1999, esp. pp. 16-26. It should be pointed out that, in contrast to what Allison’s discussion of rational choice models in foreign policy analysis suggests, it is possible to construct such models without introducing the state-as-a-unitary-actor assumption and treat the preferences of different actors as a matter of empirical investigation; see M. Hollis – S. Smith, "Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making", *British Journal of Political Science*, 16: 3, 1986, esp. pp. 273, 278.
Imia/Kardak crisis demonstrated the failure of the policy based on withholding the offer of rewards to induce Turkey’s compliance with Greek demands and prompted a search for a more effective alternative. Greek foreign policy makers identified the discrepancy between Greek policy and established EU practice and chose to incorporate the practice of reinforcement by reward and the procedural norm of collective decision making into their policy towards Turkey because they calculated that it might be more effective as it would offer Turkey greater incentive to comply with Greek demands.

Reconfiguring internal and external balancing

As was the case with Simitis’ election as Prime Minister, while the end of the Cold War has been identified in the literature as a potentially significant development, its potential effects on Greek policy towards Turkey have not been specified in a theoretically informed manner. This is particularly problematic in light of the fact that change in Greek policy can be conceptualised as the outcome of Europeanisation. In the same fashion that the EU effect needs to be distinguished from that of globalisation in the field of economic policy, the EU effect also needs to be distinguished from that of international, non-EU related factors in the field of foreign policy.

It is often pointed out that the end of the Cold War resulted in a rearrangement of the items on the agenda of international politics: international economic relations, environmental protection, energy, immigration, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cross-border organised crime and terrorism have replaced relations between two great powers. With only one great power remaining in the international system, security competition has been limited (yet

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154 This explanation constitutes a modified version of Tsakonas’ argument discussed in the introduction of this thesis. While Tsakonas discusses only the implications of Turkey’s military capabilities for power relations between Greece and Turkey, this version of the argument also discusses the similar implications of US policy within the context of the post-Cold War international system, thus reinforcing the argument.

155 Ioakimidis, “The Europeanisation of Greece’s Foreign Policy...”, op. cit. pp. 368-9; Stavridis, “The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy...”, op. cit. p. 22

156 Featherstone, “Introduction: In the Name...”, op. cit. p. 4; Radaelli, “Europeanisation: Solution...”, op. cit. p. 8
not eliminated). This development led to a shift in the focus of foreign policy agendas, the widening of the range of foreign policy actors and shifts in the location and instruments of foreign policy activity\textsuperscript{157}.

These changes, however, have been of little consequence to Greco-Turkish relations. Relations between the two countries are still dominated by territorial disputes and, thus, by more “traditional” security considerations, which were prevalent during the Cold War\textsuperscript{158}. It should be noted here that, prior to the Helsinki summit, Greece and Turkey had begun to explore the possibility of cooperation in low-politics issues. Those efforts led to the conclusion of nine bilateral agreements on Greco-Turkish cooperation in policy areas, which included trade, the environment, tourism, energy, immigration, organised crime and terrorism\textsuperscript{159}. Such attempts at cooperation in low-politics issues, however, did not constitute a major innovation. Even the socialist governments of the 1980s, which had decided to terminate negotiations over territorial issues with Turkey, tried to explore the possibility of cooperation in economic issues in 1983, but those efforts were abandoned, after the establishment of the so-called “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” in November of the same year\textsuperscript{160}.

It is possible, however, to conceptualise the implications of the end of the Cold War in a rather different fashion. The Cold War was in Waltz’s terms a “system transforming” war: it eliminated one of the great powers in the system (the Soviet Union), thus changing the distribution of capabilities that constitutes one of the defining attributes of the system’s structure\textsuperscript{161}. Clearly, any impact the end of the Cold War as systemic change may have had on Greek policy towards Turkey could not have been direct; it was not Greece that ceased to be a great power. It is possible, however, that there was an indirect structural effect: it is possible that the new distribution of capabilities had implications for the relative


\textsuperscript{159} Tsakonas, “Socialising...”, op. cit. pp. 75-7

\textsuperscript{160} Valinakis, op. cit. p. 215

\textsuperscript{161} The other being its “ordering principle”, that is anarchy; see Waltz, op. cit. pp. 88-99
power position of Greece in the system and vis-à-vis Turkey in particular. Since Turkey was not directly affected by the end of the Cold War either, the structural effect would have had to be channeled through the remaining great power in the system (the US). As has been pointed out, in an international system, where a single state has achieved a dominant position, weaker states will worry about how that state will use its unparalleled power. Unbalanced power offers states incentives to balance against it. Consequently, Greek foreign policy makers' concerns should be expected to have revolved around the way in which the US would use its dominant position in the system.

While Waltz's version of balance of power theory predicts that - under conditions of anarchy and with two or more states that wish, at the very least, to survive - unbalanced power will, eventually, be balanced, in Walt's formulation states balance against threatening power. In this sense, Greek foreign policy makers were not concerned with US power per se, but with the exercise of US power in a fashion detrimental to Greek security and US support for Turkish positions on Greco-Turkish relations in particular. Increased American support for Turkey may have been the result of the reduced geo-strategic importance of Greece and/or the increased geo-strategic importance of Turkey. In a unipolar international system, the ability of the allies of the great power to influence the latter are limited because their actions can only have a limited effect on the distribution of capabilities. Consequently, the only option for Greek foreign policy makers was to attempt to counter US support for Turkey.

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164 S. M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power", International Security, 9: 4, 1985, pp. 8-9 and S. M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1987, pp. 21-6. Essentially, the range of applicability of Walt's argument is more limited. Greco-Turkish relations, however, fall within that range because Turkey is considered to pose a threat to Greek security. Indeed, Turkey qualifies as a state that possesses threatening power: Turkey's total resources are greater than those of Greece, its geographical position is proximate, it possesses offensive capabilities and, finally, it is perceived as an aggressor that wishes to revise the status quo.

Such considerations regarding US policy would not have been unprecedented. Since 1974, when Greece started to consider Turkey as the main threat to its security, Greco-American relations have been seen in Greece through the prism of Greco-Turkish relations\(^{166}\). Greece's withdrawal from NATO in the aftermath of Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus in 1974 was a form of protest against the unwillingness or inability of the US to prevent Turkey's intervention, as they had done ten years earlier\(^{167}\). Similarly, it has been suggested that in the late 1980s the new détente of the Cold War that shifted the focus of US foreign policy further east, thus increasing the geo-strategic importance of Turkey prompted Greece to place greater emphasis on the framework of the Communities\(^{168}\). Finally, such considerations would not have been unique to Greek foreign policy makers. It has been argued that the end of the Cold War prompted similar concerns regarding US policy in Britain. British foreign policy makers were concerned with the possibility that the US would offer a reunified Germany a “partner in leadership” in the post-Cold War international order\(^{169}\).

The unfavourable exercise of US power would be demonstrated most clearly in cases of American intervention in Greco-Turkish relations. The case of the Imia/Kardak crisis, during which the US was directly involved, should be instructive in this respect. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the crisis, the Turkish government announced a large armaments programme. As the latter allowed Turkey to build up its military capabilities, it reinforced the weakening of Greece's relative power position vis-à-vis Turkey, thus offering Greek foreign policy makers further incentives to balance against the neighbouring country\(^{170}\).

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\(^{166}\) Valinakis, op. cit. p. 265  
\(^{167}\) Ibid. p. 217  
\(^{170}\) Tsakonas, “Socialising...”, op. cit. pp. 61-3
Faced with threatening power, states will try to balance against the threat either by increasing their own power or by forming alliances with other states. The shifts in power relations between Greece and Turkey, however, tell us very little about the particular configuration of internal and external balancing selected. Balance of power theory neither intends to nor is it capable of explaining "the particular policies of states"; in order to explain differences between states' responses to structural incentives, one needs to focus on their internal characteristics. As was mentioned above, Greece had accumulated economic problems throughout the 1980s, the process that was going to lead to the creation of EMU had been initiated and macroeconomic stabilisation had been set as a criterion for accession by the mid-1990s and a new government that defined EMU entry as its primary goal was elected in 1996. At the same time, public expenditure on defence was systematically rising and was far higher than both the EU and the NATO average. Greece sought to deter Turkey and enter EMU. In order to achieve both foreign and economic policy goals it was necessary to re-allocate resources. As Hill has pointed out, while "heavy domestic costs, both financial and political, are sometimes accepted for external reasons...a point will sometimes be reached, where high expenditure on external goals imposes a crippling burden on a state, often leading to foreign policy decisions being taken for financial, domestic reasons." Consequently, it was necessary to reconfigure internal and external balancing. The logic of external balancing is based on the premise that bandwagoning entails risks both in terms of survival and influence: it entails a security risk because it requires trust in the benevolence of the dominant power and it limits influence because the dominant power is not in great need of assistance. In that sense, the EU was the obvious choice for Greek foreign policy makers because institutionalised cooperation under the rule of unanimity involves no loss of sovereignty. The fourth explanation to be tested is the following:

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171 Waltz, "Structural Realism...", op. cit. p. 28
173 Tsakonas, "Security Regimes...", op. cit. p. 59; Tsakonas, "Socialising...", op. cit. p. 65
175 Walt, "Alliance Formation...", op. cit. pp. 5-6
The exercise of US power in the post-Cold War international system and the build-up of Turkish military capabilities weakened Greece's relative power position vis-à-vis Turkey and rendered balancing against Turkey imperative. Accumulated economic problems, EMU accession criteria and the Greek government's emphasis on EMU entry rendered the reallocation of resources imperative. The Helsinki strategy was formulated in order to place greater emphasis on external (EU support) rather than internal (defence expenditure) balancing in an attempt to secure both foreign and economic policy goals.

Conclusions

The four alternatives formulated above offer theoretically informed parsimonious explanations of change in Greek policy towards Turkey that clarify the implications of the various explanatory variables mentioned in the previous chapter, thus maximising their explanatory potential. The explanation based on Simitis' unequivocal commitment to communitisation emphasises domestic sources of foreign policy change and leadership style in particular. In contrast to what has been the case in the literature, it does not merely acknowledge the fact that Simitis has been a firm supporter of European integration. It identifies an internal, pre-conceived idea (communitisation) that had direct implications for Greek policy towards Turkey. As Simitis' leadership style was marked by limited responsiveness to the policy context, his belief in the necessity of communitisation was more significant than contextual variables.

The conceptual analysis of Europeanisation pursued here showed that the concerns of those who have questioned the usefulness of the concept have not been entirely unjustified. The various meanings that have been attributed to the concept are not invariably useful for empirical research. The conceptual analysis of Europeanisation, however, has made considerable progress. It is now understood that Europeanisation is a concept that can help us ask interesting new research questions. In this sense, definitions of the concept should demarcate a set of empirically manageable phenomena, which are not captured by other concepts.
The explanations of change in Greek policy towards Turkey as the outcome of a process of Europeanisation take the institutional environment of cooperation in the field of foreign policy into consideration. The latter is reflected in the causal mechanisms through which Europeanisation produces foreign policy change. While these explanations are not based on the adaptational pressure model, they do not equate Europeanisation with socialisation. Greek foreign policy makers chose to incorporate enlargement conditionality into their policy towards Turkey either because they became convinced it was appropriate or because they calculated it was utility maximising. In the case of foreign policy change driven by a logic of appropriateness, it is made explicit that rules that define what constitutes appropriate behaviour for EU member-states are matched to a specific definition of the situation. In the case of foreign policy change driven by a logic of expected consequences, it is made explicit that uploading is an outcome of the process of Europeanisation.

Finally, the balancing thesis draws on structural realist international politics theory in order to produce baseline predictions regarding the type of behaviour expected (balancing) and it is combined with the economic implications of foreign policy in order to predict the precise configuration of balancing selected (external balancing). Conceptualising the implications of the end of the Cold War in terms of the implications of US policy for Greek policy towards Turkey makes it possible to address this question that has hitherto remained open and at the same time reinforces the balancing thesis. The next chapter will show that the four explanations discussed above predict different pathways to the formulation of the Helsinki strategy and it will establish how it is possible to distinguish between them empirically.
Chapter 3: Establishing causality

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to establish how it is possible to empirically distinguish between alternative explanations of change in Greek policy towards Turkey and determine which of the variables discussed in the preceding chapters were causally significant. It will be shown that while the four explanations formulated in the previous chapter predict the same outcome (change in Greek policy towards Turkey), they predict different pathways to foreign policy change. It is possible to empirically distinguish between the four explanations by process tracing their observable implications for three dimensions of the foreign policy making process: Greek foreign policy makers' definition of the policy problem the Helsinki strategy was intended to address, the alternative courses of action they considered and, finally, the manner in which the latter were assessed.

It will be shown that the balancing thesis predicts that Greek foreign policy makers intended to resolve a "guns-or-butter" dilemma when they formulated the Helsinki strategy. In contrast, both the Europeanisation and the leadership style thesis predict that Greek foreign policy makers identified the failure of Greek policy towards Turkey to achieve its objectives. While the Europeanisation thesis suggests that the 1996 Imia/Kardak crisis demonstrated policy failure and prompted a search for a more effective alternative, the leadership style thesis predicts that Simitis had identified policy failure prior to the crisis and that he had already selected the alternative he deemed optimal. Finally, the socialisation thesis predicts that Greek foreign policy makers began to identify Turkish violations of substantive EU foreign policy norms as the policy problem.

With regard to the alternatives Greek foreign policy makers considered, the balancing thesis predicts that the Helsinki strategy was formulated as an external balancing strategy that could substitute for defence expenditure. The Europeanisation and the socialisation thesis predict that Greek foreign policy makers distinguished between a policy based on withholding the offer of the reward of accession until Turkey complied with Greek demands and a policy based on offering the reward and making payment conditional upon compliance
with Greek demands. In contrast, the leadership style thesis predicts that Simitis preferred a policy that would establish EU rules for Turkey's behaviour towards Greece regardless of the offer of rewards and he was unwilling to consider alternatives to his preferred course of action.

Finally, while the socialisation thesis predicts that the Helsinki strategy was selected because it was considered the appropriate course of action for an EU member-state given the definition of the policy problem, the remaining explanations predict cost-benefit calculations. The balancing thesis suggests that the Helsinki strategy was selected over an internal balancing strategy for its economic benefits. The Europeanisation thesis suggests that the Helsinki strategy was selected over the policy traditionally pursued because it would offer Turkey greater incentive to comply with Greek demands. Finally, the leadership style thesis predicts that Simitis pursued the Helsinki strategy because he believed that if rules for Turkey's behaviour towards Greece were established at the EU level, the EU would assume responsibility for ensuring Turkey's compliance.

**Process tracing**

Foreign policy analysis as a strand of international relations theory is based on the premise that foreign policy may be affected by a multitude of variables spread over different levels of analysis\(^{176}\). Similarly, having identified a potential case of Europeanisation, empirical research aims at establishing the causal significance of the EU. As has been pointed out, the problem here is that the emergence of the literature on Europeanisation has been triggered by attempts to answer the question of what has been the domestic impact of the EU. By posing this question, however, the literature has prejudged the significance of the EU as an explanatory variable\(^{177}\). The most advanced discussion of Europeanisation in the literature suggests that - in contrast to what has been hitherto the case - the starting point of research on Europeanisation should be an empirical puzzle and explanations that attribute causal significance to the EU should be tested against.

\(^{176}\) Hudson, op. cit. pp. 2-4  
\(^{177}\) Radaelli, "The Europeanisation of...", op. cit. p. 50
alternatives\textsuperscript{178}. In other words, both literatures emphasise "comparison"\textsuperscript{179}, in the sense of establishing the superiority of a particular cause in comparison with other possible causes, as a crucial property of powerful causal arguments.

Process tracing is a method that allows researchers to trace a series of "theoretically predicted intermediate steps" between the explanatory and the dependent variable\textsuperscript{180}. First, this method allows researchers to establish causality in cases of equifinality – that is to say in cases where there are multiple causal paths to the same outcome – by focusing on the possible causal mechanisms, through which a particular outcome may have occurred\textsuperscript{181}. As was indicated above, the empirical puzzles foreign policy analysis and Europeanisation are related to often constitute cases of equifinality. Indeed, change in Greek policy towards Turkey may have been the result of a shift in Greece’s relative power position vis-à-vis Turkey combined with the economic implications of Greek policy or a response to an external shock that demonstrated policy failure combined with the establishment of EU enlargement conditionality or a response to EU level interactions during which Greek foreign policy makers became convinced of the inappropriateness of their policy towards Turkey or, finally, the result of the efforts of a key foreign policy maker unequivocally committed to a specific type of foreign policy reform. The emphasis on the "point of intersection"\textsuperscript{182} of the determinants of foreign policy (the policy making process whereby actors make and change foreign policy) allows us to establish which sources of foreign policy change were causally significant and whether Europeanisation produced foreign policy change through socialisation or strategic calculation. Second, the emphasis on "intermediate steps" allows for


\textsuperscript{179} For "comparison" as a criterion good causal arguments ought to meet see Gerring, op. cit. pp. 181-2; See also S. C. Brooks – W. C. Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing", \textit{International Security}, 30: 1, 2005, esp. p. 106, where Brooks and Wohlforth argue that the reason why various Russian, French, German and Turkish foreign policy decisions have been mistaken for "soft balancing" against the United States is that analysts "have failed to consider alternative explanations".


\textsuperscript{182} Hudson, op. cit. p. 3
greater spatial and temporal continuity between the explanatory and the dependent variable than analyses based merely on correlation\textsuperscript{183}. Consequently, it is not only possible to empirically distinguish between explanations based on different theoretical premises, but also to compare causal arguments with regard to this dimension and determine which is "richest"\textsuperscript{184}. Finally, the emphasis on "intermediate steps" multiplies observable implications and makes it possible to establish causality within the context of a single case based on within-case observations\textsuperscript{185}.

While process tracing does not focus on the "big picture" and, thus, does not allow researchers to identify possible explanatory variables, it does focus on the possible causal mechanisms, through which a particular outcome may have occurred\textsuperscript{186}. Consequently, process tracing is complementary to research designs based on testing alternative explanations. It should be noted, however, that certain sources of foreign policy change will be more pertinent in some cases than in others. As Hill has pointed out, "every domestic environment is unique and is in a condition of perpetual movement...this means that generalizations are always contingent"\textsuperscript{187}. Consider Greek foreign policy and bureaucratic advocacy\textsuperscript{188}. It would not be useful to formulate a hypothesis based on bureaucratic advocacy and informed by a bureaucratic politics model of foreign policy analysis and test it in a case of change in Greek foreign policy, since it has been shown that access to the foreign policy making process in Greece is fairly restricted. Elected officials do not seek instructions from the diplomatic service and the latter do not consider it part of their job to make suggestions, but simply prefer to implement decisions made by elected officials instead\textsuperscript{189}. It, therefore,


\textsuperscript{184} For "richness" or "completeness" as a criterion good causal arguments ought to meet see Gerring, op. cit. pp. 173-4

\textsuperscript{185} A. Bennett - C. Elman, "Complex Causal Relations and Case Study Methods: The Example of Path Dependence", Political Analysis, 14: 3, 2006, p. 262

\textsuperscript{186} Ibid. pp. 3-6, 14-5, 19-20; Cortell - Davis Jr., op. cit. pp. 84-6

\textsuperscript{187} Hill, The Changing Politics... op. cit. p. 224

\textsuperscript{188} For the term see Hermann, "Changing Course...", op. cit. pp. 11-2

\textsuperscript{189} Ioakimidis P., "The Model of Foreign Policy Making in Greece: Individuals Versus Institutions" in Tsakonas P. I. (ed), Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy (in Greek), Athens, Sideris, 2003
rests with each particular research project to determine which sources of foreign policy change are relevant to the case under investigation.

**Defining the policy problem**

In this sense, research should start by establishing *how Greek foreign policy makers defined the policy problem the Helsinki strategy was intended to address.* According to the balancing thesis, the Helsinki strategy was selected as a solution to a “guns-or-butter” dilemma. The policy previously pursued was not considered ineffective. Greek foreign policy makers did not identify foreign policy failure. Balancing against Turkey was considered an effective strategy. Yet Turkish policy towards Greece and US policy on Greco-Turkish relations had resulted in a weakening of Greece’s relative power position vis-à-vis Turkey. Turkey had grown more powerful, more threatening and enjoyed US support. The territorial integrity of the Greek state had to be secured. Consequently, further balancing was necessary. At the same time, however, macroeconomic stabilisation was also considered necessary and thus resources were scarce. The policy previously pursued could not accommodate economic policy goals.

In contrast to what the balancing thesis predicts, both the Europeanisation thesis and the leadership style thesis predict that the policy previously pursued was considered ineffective. Greek policy towards Turkey could not achieve its goals. According to the Europeanisation thesis it was the 1996 crisis that demonstrated policy failure and led to this realisation, which in turn led to a search for a new policy, within the context of which the discrepancy between Greek policy towards Turkey and EU enlargement conditionality was assessed. In contrast, the leadership style thesis predicts that Simitis had identified policy failure *prior to the crisis* and he had already selected the alternative he thought best. The crisis did not prompt a search for a new policy towards Turkey. It was simply interpreted as evidence that reinforced Simitis’ belief that the policy he preferred was necessary. His understanding of the policy problem remained unchanged during the period under investigation.
Finally, the socialisation thesis predicts that Greek foreign policy makers began to identify Turkish violations of substantive EU foreign policy norms as a foreign policy problem. They started to see Turkey as an applicant country with a weak democratic regime that lacked good governance, where the rule of law was not observed and human rights and the rights of minorities were being violated and set the transformation of the Turkish regime as their goal.

The four explanations of change in Greek policy towards Turkey make different predictions, which in turn raise the following questions. Did Greek foreign policy makers identify a deterioration of the relative power position of Greece vis-à-vis Turkey as the balancing thesis predicts? If so, what caused it? Were Greek foreign policy makers primarily concerned with Turkish or US policy? Did Greek foreign policy makers identify policy failure? If so, when was this assessment made: prior to or in the aftermath of the 1996 crisis as the leadership style and the Europeanisation thesis respectively predict? Did the Prime Minister present his own vision for Greek policy towards Turkey? Did he remain committed to his preferred course of action during the period under investigation as the leadership style thesis predicts? Did Greek foreign policy makers redefine the situation they were facing as the socialisation thesis predicts? Did they begin to identify Turkish violations of substantive EU foreign policy norms as a foreign policy problem?

The following table summarises the observable implications of the four alternative explanations for the definition of the policy problem the Helsinki strategy was intended to address:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>Policy Problem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The socialisation thesis</strong></td>
<td>• <em>Turkish violations of substantive EU foreign policy norms</em> began to be understood as a foreign policy problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Greek foreign policy makers identified Turkish violations as a problem for the first time during the period under investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The objective was to ensure Turkey's compliance with substantive EU foreign policy norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Greek foreign policy makers did not identify foreign policy failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Greek foreign policy makers did not define the policy problem as a guns-or-butter dilemma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Prime Minister did not present his own, internal, preconceived understanding of the policy problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Europeanisation thesis</strong></td>
<td>• Greek foreign policy makers identified foreign policy failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The 1996 Imia/Kardak crisis led to the realisation that Greek policy towards Turkey had failed to prevent Turkish aggression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Greek foreign policy makers decided that Greek policy towards Turkey ought to be discontinued and they began to consider alternatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Greek foreign policy makers did not begin to identify Turkish violations of EU foreign policy norms as a foreign policy problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Greek foreign policy makers did not define the policy problem as a guns-or-butter dilemma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Prime Minister did not present his own, internal, preconceived understanding of the policy problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The balancing thesis</strong></td>
<td>• Greek foreign policy makers defined the policy problem as a guns-or-butter dilemma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Greece foreign policy makers were concerned about the implications of Turkish and US policy for Greece's relative power position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Greek foreign policy makers considered the economic costs of their policy towards Turkey as a reason why foreign policy change should be pursued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Greek foreign policy makers did not identify foreign policy failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Greek foreign policy makers did not begin to identify Turkish violations of EU foreign policy norms as a foreign policy problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Prime Minister did not present his own, internal, preconceived understanding of the policy problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The leadership style thesis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Prime Minister presented his own, internal, pre-conceived understanding of the policy problem</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Prime Minister identified foreign policy failure prior to the Imia/Kardak crisis and he had selected the policy he thought best prior to his election</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Imia/Kardak crisis was interpreted as evidence that confirmed the Prime Minister’s beliefs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Prime Minister’s understanding of the policy problem remained fixed during the period under investigation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Greek foreign policy makers did not begin to identify Turkish violations of EU foreign policy norms as a foreign policy problem</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Greek foreign policy makers did not define the policy problem as a guns-or-butter dilemma</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Framing alternatives

The next step is to identify the various courses of action that were considered as alternative options. According to the balancing thesis, Greek foreign policy makers distinguished between a policy based on high defence expenditure that would allow Greece to build up its military capabilities (internal balancing) and a policy based on EU support for their positions on Greco-Turkish relations (external balancing). Both explanations that conceptualise change in Greek policy towards Turkey as the outcome of Europeanisation predict that Greek foreign policy makers identified enlargement conditionality as a relevant established EU practice and distinguished between the Greek practice of withholding the offer of EU membership until Turkey complied with Greek demands and the EU practice of offering applicant states the reward of membership, whilst making payment of the reward conditional upon the target country’s compliance. If the evidence shows that substantive EU foreign policy norms did not affect the definition of the policy problem and the practice of reinforcement by reward did not affect the alternative courses of action Greek foreign policy makers considered, both explanations that conceptualise change in Greek policy towards Turkey as the outcome of a process of Europeanisation can be refuted. In contrast, the leadership style thesis predicts that enlargement conditionality was not considered as an alternative course of action. Greek foreign policy makers distinguished between the policy previously pursued...
(preventing progress in EU-Turkey relations) and the policy Simitis' vision for reform prescribed (allowing progress within a framework of EU rules for Turkey's behaviour towards Greece regardless of whether those rules would be part of a conditional offer of EU membership). Finally, Simitis was unwilling to consider alternatives to his preferred course of action.

The following table summarises the observable implications of the four alternative explanations for the alternative courses of action Greek foreign policy makers considered:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>Alternatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The socialisation thesis</td>
<td>• Greek foreign policy makers identified enlargement conditionality as a relevant established EU practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Greek foreign policy makers distinguished between the national policy previously pursued (unilaterally withholding the offer of EU membership until Turkey complied with Greek demands) and EU enlargement conditionality (collectively offering Turkey EU membership and making payment of the reward conditional on compliance with Greek demands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Greek foreign policy makers did not consider allowing progress in EU-Turkey relations without offering Turkey the reward of EU membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Greek foreign policy makers did not consider the Helsinki strategy an alternative to defence expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The balancing thesis</td>
<td>• Greek foreign policy makers considered the Helsinki strategy an alternative to defence expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Greek foreign policy makers did not identify enlargement conditionality as a relevant established EU practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The leadership style thesis</td>
<td>• Greek foreign policy makers distinguished between the policy previously pursued (unilaterally preventing progress in EU-Turkey relations) and Simitis' preferred course of action (collectively allowing progress within a framework of EU rules for Turkey's behaviour towards Greece regardless of whether those rules would be part of a conditional offer of EU membership)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Prime Minister was unwilling to consider alternatives to his preferred course of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Greek foreign policy makers did not identify enlargement conditionality as a relevant EU practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Greek foreign policy makers did not consider the Helsinki strategy an alternative to defence expenditure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Assessing alternatives

The final step is to establish whether Greek foreign policy makers considered the consequences (costs and benefits) of each alternative and, if so, what type of costs and benefits they calculated. According to the balancing thesis, alternatives were assessed on the basis of their economic costs and benefits. The Helsinki strategy was selected as an external balancing strategy over internal balancing because it could accommodate both foreign and economic policy goals. Given the general state of the economy, the EMU accession criteria and the new government’s emphasis on EMU entry, a policy based on internal balancing would be too costly in terms of economic policy goals.

According to the Europeanisation thesis, enlargement conditionality was selected over the “Greek way of doing things” because it would offer Turkey a greater incentive to comply with Greek demands. As was mentioned above, Greek policy towards Turkey had for long been based on the idea that Greek membership of the Communities/the EU would prevent Turkey from pursuing an aggressive policy towards Greece and that the ability of Greece to prevent progress in EU-Turkey relations would force Turkey to accept Greek positions on Greco-Turkish relations. From that perspective, the crisis showed that Greek policy had failed. Neither did Greek membership of the EU suffice to prevent Turkey from pursuing an aggressive policy towards Greece, nor did it manage to prevent a crisis that brought the two countries to the brink of war, in the aftermath of which Turkey was claiming sovereignty over numerous islets in the Aegean, which Greece considers its own territory.

While the Imia/Kardak crisis demonstrated foreign policy failure and, thus, established the need for policy change, it can provide us with little insight into the direction and shape the new policy was going to take. This is precisely the point where EU enlargement conditionality entered Greek foreign policy makers’ calculations and became a point of reference. Enlargement conditionality constituted an EU practice that was very different, if not diametrically opposed to the Greek way of doing things and, thus, constituted an alternative to be

\textsuperscript{190} Valinakis, op. cit. pp. 244-5
considered. If Greece withdrew its objections and allowed the EU to offer Turkey the reward of membership, Turkey would be offered a powerful *incentive* to comply with Greek demands.

As Turkey is considered the main threat to Greek security and Greco-Turkish relations are classified as a national issue, Greek preferences on the substantive issues in Greco-Turkish relations are extremely intense. In fact, Greek governments appear most reluctant to make any concession on any of the issues related to the Aegean and they seem to prefer the status quo to any settlement that would not entail Turkey’s full compliance with all Greek demands. Turkish preferences, on the other hand, are not nearly as intense. As one analyst put it, Greece occupies “perhaps one-sixth of Turkey’s foreign policy problems”\(^1\). The differences in preference intensity and — consequently — bargaining power are manifested in the two countries’ approaches to the dispute. Greece has always insisted on a judicial settlement, whereas Turkey has favoured political negotiations.

Enlargement conditionality could remedy the problem. If Greece withdrew its objections and allowed the EU to offer Turkey membership, limited bargaining power would no longer present a problem because Greco-Turkish relations would be placed within the context of enlargement, where a “profoundly asymmetrical power relationship”\(^2\) exists between member-states and candidate countries. *In that particular context*, EU member-states are policy makers and candidate countries are policy takers, which are obliged to comply with non-negotiable rules that they did not make\(^3\). The reward of membership constitutes the *incentive* that renders compliance likely\(^4\).

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\(^1\) P. Carley, “US Foreign Policy and the Future of Greek-Turkish Relations” in T. Bachceli – T. A. Coulombis – P. Carley, *Greek-Turkish Relations and US Foreign Policy: Cyprus, the Aegean and Regional Stability*, United States Institute of Peace – Peaceworks No. 17, 1997, p. 4


\(^3\) Ibid. p. 110; K. H. Goetz, “The New Member-States and the EU” in S. Bulmer – C. Lequesne (eds), *Member States and the European Union*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004

\(^4\) In this sense enlargement conditionality resembles what is referred to as a policy of “engagement”, which is defined as “a foreign policy strategy which depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives”; see R. N. Haass – M. L. O’ Sullivan, “Terms of Engagement: Alternative to Punitive Policies”, *Survival*, 42: 2, 2000, p. 114. See also Ifantis, “Greece’s Turkish Dilemmas...”, op. cit. where Ifantis refers to Greek policy towards Turkey as a policy of engagement; in his formulation, however, engagement refers to “increased
While the benefits of incorporating enlargement conditionality into Greek policy towards Turkey are clear, there were also certain costs involved, as the offer of EU membership can only be made collectively at the EU level. In order for Greek demands to be turned into a criterion that the EU was going to apply to Turkey, Greek foreign policy makers had to accept that subsequent decisions were going to be made collectively by all EU member-states. Since the rule of unanimity applies to such decisions, collective decision-making did not involve loss of sovereignty, but Greek foreign policy makers had to accept a certain loss of autonomy with regard to a national issue that pertains to the territorial integrity of the Greek state. While the rule of unanimity allowed Greece to maintain the right to veto further progress in EU-Turkey relations in the future, the ability to allow progress in response to compliance on Turkey’s part became conditional upon the agreement of Greece’s EU partners. Given that the policy previously pursued had failed and could not secure Greek objectives, Greek foreign policy makers became willing to accept the autonomy costs collective decision-making entailed. Consequently, Greek foreign policy makers were willing to allow progress in EU-Turkey relations only within a framework that would render compliance with Greek demands more likely by offering Turkey rewards and especially membership of the EU.

Apart from the differences discussed above, the two explanations of change in Greek policy towards Turkey as the outcome of Europeanisation have different implications for the possible interactions between EU norms, procedures and practices and other sources of foreign policy change. According to the socialisation thesis, Greek foreign policy makers did not calculate the costs and benefits of the relevant established EU practice that they felt obliged to follow and they did not take other relevant developments and their implications for

contacts” and “dense relationships” and not to the offer of incentives.

While the logic of behaviour (reinforcement by reward) is the same, the criteria are different, as “good neighbourliness” - including referring unresolved border disputes to the ICJ - had been set as a criterion before and it was also included in the Commission’s Agenda 2000, but it was not one of the Copenhagen criteria; see Smith, “The Evolution…”, op. cit. p. 118

For these costs see I. O. Lesser, “Greece’s New Geopolitical Environment”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 5: 3, 2005, p. 350. Apart from costs in terms of the government’s ability to achieve its foreign policy goals autonomously, this policy also entails domestic-political costs because “engagement is open to charges of appeasement”; see Haass – O’ Sullivan, op. cit. p. 115.
Greek policy towards Turkey into consideration. What constitutes appropriate behaviour is determined independently of such developments and policy choices are made regardless of such considerations. Consequently, all other developments discussed above can only be part of explanations that constitute alternatives to the socialisation thesis.

In contrast, the Europeanisation thesis predicts that Greek foreign policy makers took into consideration developments other than the establishment of EU norms, procedures and practices and their implications for Greek policy towards Turkey. According to this explanation, EU enlargement conditionality was not the utility maximising course of action at the time of its establishment. The Imia/Kardak crisis, however, rendered enlargement conditionality utility maximising. Established EU practice became a point of reference with a delay and it was the interaction between enlargement conditionality and the crisis that affected Greek foreign policy makers' considerations.

In contrast, the leadership style thesis predicts that alternatives were assessed on the basis of the Prime Minister's vision for foreign policy reform. The Helsinki strategy was selected because it brought Greece closer to the realisation of Simitis' vision. While the Europeanisation thesis predicts that the EU had an effect on Greek policy towards Turkey that was channeled through Greek foreign policy makers as enlargement conditionality affected their calculations and the balancing thesis predicts that Greece's relative power position combined with the economic implications of Greek policy affected their calculations, the leadership style thesis attributes no such role to contextual variables. Choices were made on the basis of considerations of consequences for an internally defined task, which remained independent of the policy context. In this case, foreign policy did not change in response to EU norms, procedures and practices or any other external event, but because a key policy maker saw something that he wanted to change and moved\textsuperscript{197}. Furthermore, leadership that challenges constraints and is closed to information implies considerable commitment and continuity. The behaviour of unresponsive leaders is generally consistent over time and, thus, predictable. Consequently, Simitis was willing to allow progress in EU-Turkey relations only

\textsuperscript{197} Allison, op. cit. p. 50
within a framework that would establish EU rules for Turkey's behaviour towards Greece that would attribute the role of guarantor of the resolution of Greco-Turkish problems to the EU and regardless of whether Turkey would be offered incentives to comply.

Finally, the socialisation thesis predicts that Greek foreign policy makers incorporated enlargement conditionality into their policy towards Turkey because they became convinced that it was the right thing to do for an EU member-state given the situation. By definition, behaviour based on the logic of appropriateness is behaviour that is not driven by considerations of consequences. If the evidence shows that Greek foreign policy makers calculated the costs and benefits of the alternatives they considered, the socialisation thesis can be refuted. Furthermore, it is important to check for consistency. Given that change, according to this explanation, is caused by the internalisation of behavioural rules, national foreign policy makers are expected to take the course of action internalised rules prescribe consistently across issues and over time. If Greek foreign policy makers took the course of action prescribed by EU norms in the case of certain policy issues but not in others, if they took the course of action prescribed by EU norms once or if they alternated between courses of action that are prescribed by EU norms and courses of action that are not, the explanation based on socialisation can be refuted.

The following table summarises the observable implications of the four alternative explanations for the manner in which Greek foreign policy makers assessed the alternatives they considered:

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198 March – Olsen, op. cit. p. 3
199 Cortell – Davis Jr., op. cit. pp. 71-2
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
</tr>
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| The socialisation thesis         | • Greek foreign policy makers did not calculate the costs and benefits of the alternative courses of action they considered  
• Greek foreign policy makers were concerned with what their EU counterparts expected of them  
• Greek foreign policy makers began to consider the policy previously pursued (unilaterally withholding the offer of EU membership) inappropriate because it contradicted established EU practice (enlargement conditionality)  
• The Helsinki strategy was presented as the right thing for an EU member-state to do given the situation  
• Greek foreign policy makers applied enlargement conditionality consistently across issues and over time                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| The Europeanisation thesis       | • Greek foreign policy makers calculated the costs and benefits of the alternative courses of action they considered  
• Greek foreign policy makers did not calculate the economic costs and benefits of the alternative courses of action they considered  
• Greek foreign policy makers calculated that enlargement conditionality would offer Turkey a greater incentive to comply with Greek demands  
• Greek foreign policy makers allowed progress in EU-Turkey relations only when Turkey was offered an incentive to comply with Greek demands                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| The balancing thesis             | • Greek foreign policy makers calculated the economic costs and benefits of the alternative courses of action they considered  
• Greek foreign policy makers did not calculate that the Helsinki strategy would offer Turkey a greater incentive to comply with Greek demands                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| The leadership style thesis      | • The Prime Minister calculated the costs and benefits of the alternatives he considered  
• The Prime Minister selected the Helsinki strategy because it allowed progress in EU-Turkey relations within a framework of additional EU rules for Turkey's behaviour towards Greece that attributed the role of guarantor of Turkey's compliance to the EU                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |

Finally, it should be pointed out that the assessment of the evidence did not begin with EU level interactions, but at the domestic level prior to these interactions. This has been referred to as a “bottom-up” as opposed to a “top-down” research design. Top-down research designs that trace the “absorption” of EU practices  

200 Radaelli, “The Europeanisation of...”, op. cit. p. 51
are more likely to produce evidence that confirms the causal significance of the EU because they ignore other processes that may be taking place at the domestic level. In contrast, bottom-up research designs begin by mapping out the state of affairs at the domestic level in order to determine whether "there was something moving on before Brussels entered the scene." Then research moves upwards to the EU level in order to trace relevant developments. Finally, the national level is revisited in an attempt to detect the effects, if any, of the developments at the EU level and further developments at the national level that may have occurred prior to policy change. In other words, bottom-up research designs allow researchers to compile a detailed chronology of the events that led to policy change. This research strategy is particularly pertinent in this case, since one of the explanations formulated here (the leadership style thesis) emphasises the causal significance of a key foreign policy maker's (Prime Minister Simitis) commitment to internal ideas that had been crystallised before he assumed his duties.

The evidence presented in the following chapters was drawn from the Greek government's policy actions and Greek foreign policy makers' policy statements. The latter include speeches, articles published in the press, interviews with reporters, press conferences, Parliamentary debates and statements by the government's and the Foreign Ministry's spokesmen. In 2005, Simitis published his memoirs, which constitute a most useful source of information. Finally, evidence was drawn from twenty-three interviews conducted by the author between March and August 2008. Interviewees included members of the inner Cabinet, high-ranking Foreign Ministry officials, diplomats and advisors to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. Reports in the press were used as sources of information only when they included quoted public statements by Greek foreign policy makers and in conjunction with evidence from other sources in order to confirm events.

The period covered by this thesis began with the Imia/Kardak crisis that brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war and relations between the two countries...
did not improve significantly until late 1999. Consequently, Greco-Turkish relations were particularly salient during the period between January 1996 and December 1999 and both policy actions and policy statements were numerous. Empirical testing of the leadership style thesis benefited from the fact that Simitis has been publicly expressing his views on government policy – including foreign policy – during the better part of the past two decades. Consequently, it was possible to establish Simitis’ ideas about Greek policy towards Turkey before, during and after his Premiership and assess their consistency. The assessment of the views Simitis had expressed prior to his election as Prime Minister made it possible to establish whether his beliefs regarding Greek policy towards Turkey had been crystallised prior to his Premiership and whether they were distinctive. A similar assessment of Simitis’ analyses of Greco-Turkish relations during and after his Premiership made it possible to establish the degree of his commitment to these beliefs and their consistency over time. The period between the December 1997 Luxembourg European Council summit and the formulation of the Helsinki strategy (June 1999) in particular – during which the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations that Simitis had pursued had not had the desired effect and the Greek government was facing pressure from its EU partners, the US and Turkey and the reluctance of domestic political actors – was instructive with regard to the manner in which he handled constraints and assessed information that contradicted his beliefs.

As the 1996 Imia/Kardak crisis that marked the beginning of Simitis’ Premiership was a traumatic event, its implications were discussed extensively and the relevant policy statements made it possible to establish whether it was interpreted as a demonstration of policy failure. In the aftermath of the crisis, the Turkish government took several initiatives and the US became particularly pro-active. The Greek government’s response – or the lack thereof – indicates Greek foreign policy makers’ concerns regarding the implications of Turkish and US policy for Greece’s relative power position. Similarly, debates regarding economic policy indicate whether the above implications were assessed in conjunction with the economic implications of Greek policy towards Turkey.
The numerous initiatives the Greek government pursued during the period under investigation – which have hitherto received little attention in the literature – were instructive especially with regard to the alternatives Greek foreign policy makers considered. The government’s initiatives exhibit considerable variation with regard to the political arena, the procedures and the instruments selected. Consequently, it was possible to compare the Helsinki strategy with policy actions taken earlier during the period covered by this thesis and establish patterns and their consistency with the predictions of the four explanations discussed above for the alternative courses of action Greek foreign policy makers considered.

Furthermore, the fact that Greek policy towards Turkey was driven by a quite distinctive logic that was not generally accepted resulted in numerous comprehensive and detailed policy statements that intended to clarify that logic both prior to and in the aftermath of the Helsinki summit. Prior to the summit it was widely held that Greece was under pressure to make unilateral concessions and Greek foreign policy makers systematically attempted to explain why the strategy they had formulated could secure a beneficial decision for Greece. Since the 2004 general election, further debate on the benefits of the Helsinki strategy has taken place as PASOK has argued that the newly elected conservative government abandoned the Helsinki strategy. Besides increasing the time span of policy statements, the collection of evidence ensured that policy statements made before different audiences were considered\textsuperscript{203}, as the purpose of what is being said varies depending not only on circumstance, but also on whom it is being said to\textsuperscript{204}. Finally, answers to questions posed during interviews or press conferences were privileged over policy statements in speeches or published articles in order to ensure spontaneity and reliability\textsuperscript{205}.

\textsuperscript{205} M. G. Herman, “Assessing Leadership Style: A Trait Analysis”, \textit{Social Science Automation}, November 1999
Conclusions

It follows from the above that while all four explanations predict the same outcome (change in Greek policy towards Turkey), they predict different pathways to foreign policy change. It is possible to empirically distinguish between these explanations and determine which variables were causally significant by process tracing their observable implications for the definition of the policy problem the Helsinki strategy was intended to address, the alternative courses of action Greek foreign policy makers considered and the manner in which they were assessed.

The acknowledgement of the voluntary nature of the Europeanisation of foreign policy, the construction of two alternative explanations of change in Greek policy towards Turkey as the outcome of Europeanisation and the consequent emphasis on process tracing allows research on Europeanisation to fit traditional analyses of foreign policy well. The theoretical framework presented here refrains from assuming that foreign policy change produced by Europeanisation constitutes a *sui generis* phenomenon, which requires *ad hoc* explanations. The emphasis is placed on the actors who make and change foreign policy and the process through which change is produced. The emphasis on this "point of intersection" of the determinants of foreign policy makes it possible to take into consideration a multitude of variables from different levels of analysis. The concept of Europeanisation suggests one further factor (the EU) that may (or may not) be of significance, thus preserving the multifactorial and multilevel character of the study of foreign policy\(^{206}\).

It has been argued that explanations based on the premise that actors are rational and attempt to maximise the attainment of their preferences are often formulated in an abstract and empirically intractable fashion and that researchers search for confirming evidence only and ignore alternative explanations\(^ {207}\). Precise predictions regarding actors' understanding of the policy problem and their preferences, detailed predictions regarding variation in the cost-benefit

\(^{206}\) Hudson, op. cit. pp. 2-4

calculations that actors are expected to make depending on what their preferences are and research designs that allow for competitive testing avoid these pitfalls\textsuperscript{208}. Research designs based on testing alternative explanations, however, "run the risk of excluding crucial aspects from the researchers’ attention, notably those aspects which at the outset were not supposed to exist or matter"\textsuperscript{209}. Process tracing minimises this risk because it is "as amenable as possible to recognizing unexpected dynamics and diverse causal effects"\textsuperscript{210}. Indeed, qualitative research in general and process tracing in particular is much like detective work that occasionally reveals initially unforeseen causes\textsuperscript{211}.

\textsuperscript{208} Ibid
\textsuperscript{210} Ibid
\textsuperscript{211} Bennet – Elman, op. cit. pp. 262-3; Mahoney – Goertz, op. cit. pp. 241-2
Chapter 4: Greek policy towards Turkey 1996-1999

Introduction

This chapter will show that as soon as Simitis was elected Prime Minister, the Greek government began to systematically pursue EU decisions that bear similarities to the agreement that Greece secured in Helsinki despite the fact that it was severely constrained by domestic opposition to foreign policy reform. The first phase of the period under investigation (January – September 1996), was marked by considerable uncertainty. The beginning of Simitis’ Premiership literally coincided with the Imia/Kardak crisis. Subsequently, Turkey engaged in what was perceived by Greek officials as an escalation of its territorial claims. At the same time, the hospitalised Andreas Papandreou had resigned from his post as Prime Minister, but not from PASOK’s leadership. This irregular situation created speculation until the start of July, when Simitis was elected leader of PASOK. Subsequently, speculation revolved around whether the Prime Minister was going to call for an early election. Despite the fact that this first phase was a transitional one, the Greek government was particularly proactive and Greek foreign policy makers’ efforts culminated in the 15 July 1996 EU statement on Greco-Turkish relations, which suggested that territorial disputes “such as the Imia Islet issue” should be submitted to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

As the uncertainty that marked the first phase gradually subsided, further initiatives were pursued. The second phase (October 1996 – December 1997) was marked by the initiatives of the Dutch Presidency and the US and it culminated in the decision made during the Luxembourg European Council summit. The Dutch Presidency proposed the formation of a wise-men committee that would discuss Greco-Turkish relations and even though the US concentrated its efforts on the Cyprus problem, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright assumed a mediating role in purely bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey. The Dutch Presidency’s proposal resulted in a mere exchange of reports between Greek and Turkish experts. While Secretary of State Albright’s mediation resulted in the so-called “Madrid Declaration” on certain rules of conduct for Greece and Turkey, the spirit of the latter was undermined by
persistent disagreements on the appropriate method of resolution of Greco-Turkish problems. The decision made during the Luxembourg European Council constitutes the most significant shift in Greek policy towards Turkey during this phase, as the Greek government agreed to offer Turkey participation in the European Conference, an offer conditional upon Turkey's acceptance of the jurisdiction of the ICJ.

In contrast, the third phase (from January 1998 to the Cologne European Council summit in June 1999) was marked by the Greek government's efforts to avoid any revision of the agreement reached in Luxembourg despite pressure from Turkey, other EU member-states, the European Commission and the US. The final phase of the period under investigation began shortly after the Cologne summit in June 1999, when the Helsinki strategy was formulated and culminated in the negotiations in Helsinki in December 1999, where the Greek government managed to secure the agreement that it preferred.

From the crisis to the election

In December 1995 – January 1996, the Imia/Kardak crisis broke out\(^\text{212}\). When a Turkish ship run ashore two islets referred to as Imia by the Greeks and Kardak by the Turks, controversy arose regarding the state that had the authority to salvage the ship. Soon enough it became clear that both countries were claiming sovereignty over the islets. A few weeks later, civilians from both countries started sailing to the islet and raising their national flag. Within a matter of days, military forces were gathering in the area and the two countries came to the brink of war. At that point, Greece was in the process of electing a new Prime Minister to replace the hospitalised Andreas Papandreou and Turkey was in the process of forming a coalition government. Once again, war was avoided only after American intervention\(^\text{213}\).


\(^{213}\) While Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Richard Holbrook commented that "Europeans were literally sleeping through the night" and Prime Minister Simitis argued that "the European Union was impressively absent", Commissioner Hans Van den Broek was reportedly outraged because Greece had not sought the EU's assistance during the crisis; see "Ciller Threatens Us with War", *Eleftherotypia*, 5 February 1996, D. P. Dimas, "Holbrook: The
The crisis marked the beginning of a considerably long period of criticism that went as far as to question the “patriotic character” of the government’s policies. During the Parliamentary debate on the new government’s programmatic statements, the leader of the main opposition party spoke of treason. “The incompetence and the timidity of the government”, Miltiades Evert argued, “led our country to national humiliation. The withdrawal of Greek military forces and the removal of the Greek flag constitute abandonment of national soil. They constitute (an) act of treason”\(^{214}\). Similarly, the future Head of the Greek Church commented: “The real dilemma was and still is: peace or freedom”\(^{215}\).

After a meeting of the Council of Ministers in January 1996, Foreign Minister Theodore Pangalos warned that since Turkey had responded to the Greek government’s decision to consent to the EU-Turkey Customs Union with provocations, the Greek government was going to take that behaviour into account whilst considering its stance on EU-Turkey relations\(^{216}\). A few days later he stated: “There are no European prospects in the EU for anyone who challenges the post-war status quo and international treaties”\(^{217}\). The government’s response was referred to as a “step-by-step” approach\(^{218}\). This approach did not specify a course of action to be taken by Greece; it actually referred to the “steps” Turkey ought to take according to the Greek government. According to this approach, Turkey was asked to denounce the use of force and the threat of the use of force, to accept the international treaties that determined the status quo in the Aegean and abandon its claims on the islets or submit the issue to the ICJ. The second step Turkey ought to take was to agree to refer the issue of the Aegean continental shelf to the ICJ. Subsequently it would be possible for the two countries to discuss other issues of mutual interest. Unless Turkey complied, Greece would have to block the release of EU financial assistance to Turkey.

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\(^{214}\) "Patriotic Bidding Storm in Parliament", *Eleftherotypia*, 1 February 1996; Mardas, op. cit. p. 380

\(^{215}\) Vasilakis, op. cit. pp. 307-8


\(^{217}\) “Ciller Threatens Us with War”, op cit

\(^{218}\) For the step-by-step approach see Simitis, *Policy...*, op. cit. pp. 82-3
The following month, the European Parliament (EP) adopted a resolution, where it acknowledged "Turkey's provocative military operations" and a few days later, Foreign Minister Pangalos warned that unless the Council of Ministers adopted the EP's positions Greece would not allow a meeting of the EU-Turkey Association Council. By the end of the month, however, a Council of Ministers statement that explicitly identified the situation in the Aegean as one that concerned the EU as a whole and its relations with Turkey was vetoed by the British government.

At the same time Prime Minister Simitis embarked on a tour of EU member-states' capitals in an attempt to inform Greece's EU partners about recent developments and his government's positions on Greco-Turkish relations. By the end of February 1996, the Prime Minister was indicating that he intended to continue to pursue such initiatives. "Turkey", Simitis stated, "should get used (to the fact) that we are going to be moving in the European Union. And its stance will have consequences." At the start of March, the government vetoed the release of a European Investment Bank loan to Turkey included in the Customs Union Agreement. Simitis reiterated the Greek government's position during a meeting with Italian Prime Minister Lamberto Dini and Foreign Minister Pangalos stated that "from now on, the explicit abandonment of territorial claims on the Dodecanese...will be a condition for any development of Turkey's relations with the EU".

Criticism of the government's policy continued unabated. During a meeting of PASOK's Central Committee in February, the Prime Minister described the situation his government was facing: "Daily frictions about the self-evident."

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220 Simitis, Policy..., op. cit. p. 81; see also P. Pantelis, "British Torpedo In Greece", Eleftherotypia, 27 February 1996

221 Simitis visited Belgium (where he also met EU officials), Germany and France in February, Italy in March, the UK and Ireland in April. He also visited US President Clinton in April.


Confrontation over fundamental choices. An image of questioning the government's choices not because of the choices as such, but for the sake of questioning alone. Shortly afterwards, controversy arose regarding a televised interview Foreign Minister Pangalos gave to Mehmet Ali Birand. In an article published before the interview was broadcast on television, the Turkish reporter mentioned that a statement by the Greek Foreign Minister had led him to conclude that Greece would be willing to de-militarise the Aegean islands, if Turkey were to remove the Aegean Army (also known as the Fourth Army) from its west coast. The opposition accused Pangalos of exercising foreign policy on television and referred both to the Foreign Minister and to his proposals as dangerous for the nation. Even Defence Minister Gerasimos Arsenis in a letter to the Prime Minister called for a meeting of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Council in order to discuss what he saw as the Foreign Minister's deviation from the government's policy. His request was denied. Later that month, it was reported that Arsenis had sent yet another letter to the Prime Minister, where he hinted at the existence of secret agreements regarding the Imia/Kardak islets. The opposition picked up on this demanding a clarification from the government, forcing the government's spokesman to make explicit that no such agreements existed. In April 1996 the Foreign Minister colourfully described the situation he was facing: "I would prefer a strong national front and understanding from opposition parties and the support of my own party. I am under the impression, however, that I am walking a tight rope. There is no safety net underneath, but there are crocodiles. I have not seen their colour. I hope they are not green." In an attempt to deflect criticism, he pointed out that it was the previous government that had lifted its veto on the EU-Turkey Customs Union Agreement and that the government he was a member of had reversed that policy since the Imia/Kardak crisis. He concluded with a rhetorical question: "Was it then or is it now that we are compromising?"
Later that month, continuing his diplomatic campaign, the Prime Minister visited US President Bill Clinton and Irish Prime Minister John Bruton, initiating the practice of holding bilateral meetings with the head of state or government that was going to hold the Presidency of the Council next. According to Simitis, the meeting with Clinton was successful, in the sense that a series of statements by US officials verified US support for a judicial settlement of the dispute regarding the Imia/Kardak islets, which Greece had proposed. The Greek government was monitoring public statements on the issue made by other EU member-states' government officials and it was believed that Simitis' campaign had been successful as these statements followed Greek positions quite closely. A meeting between Foreign Minister Pangalos and his Turkish counterpart Emre Gonensay in Bucharest a few days later, however, verified the differences of approach to the resolution of Greco-Turkish problems. The Greek Foreign Minister insisted on a judicial settlement, while his Turkish counterpart insisted on bilateral negotiations. Pangalos stated that Greece was going to continue to consider EU financial assistance to Turkey impossible to grant. It was decided that the two Foreign Ministers should meet again, yet Pangalos made explicit that those meetings constituted neither dialogue nor negotiations.

The following month, twenty-one PASOK MPs issued a statement, where they argued that the “patriotic character” of the party had been “distorted”. Amongst other things, they discussed EU-Turkey relations: “From concession to concession, we opened – by lifting our veto – wide the door for Turkey to enter the EU”. Domestic opposition seemed to lead the government to assume a more uncompromising stance. The Prime Minister sent a letter to EU officials, member-state officials, the US and Russian Presidents and the Secretary Generals of NATO and the UN, where he discussed the escalation of Turkish territorial claims. As PASOK’s conference was drawing near, he stated: “If need be we are going to teach the Turks a lesson which they are going to

230 Simitis, Policy..., op. cit. p. 83; see also “He Achieved Three Goals during the Meeting with Clinton”, Eleftherotypia, 10 April 1996; Dimas D. P., “Clinton’s Three Yeses”, Eleftherotypia, 10 April 1996
231 Interview with high-ranking Greek government official, 2 April 2008
232 “We Disagree, but We Will Meet Again”, Eleftherotypia, 29 April 1996
remember for years”. “We will defend our national sovereignty with arms”, he continued, “and in such a way that anyone who attacks us will regret it bitterly – most bitterly”\(^{235}\). In May 1996, a letter given to the Prime Minister by Justice Minister Evangelos Venizelos a few weeks earlier was published, where Venizelos expressed his concerns regarding the “step-by-step” approach. In particular, he explained that he was concerned with the possibility that the government’s main response to the crisis – asking Turkey to abandon its claims on the islets or submit the issue to the ICJ – might spill over into a number of other issues related to the Aegean, which Turkey had raised and Greece had not acknowledged as disputes\(^{236}\). Later that month, it was a member of the Cabinet – Interior Minister Akis Tsohatzopoulos – that called the Foreign Minister “dangerous”, forcing the government’s spokesman to make explicit that the Prime Minister did not share this view\(^{237}\).

July saw the most significant development during the first phase of the period under investigation. Despite the fact that domestic opposition to the government’s policy had continued virtually uninterrupted since the Imia/Kardak crisis and Turkey had not taken the first step prescribed by the step-by-step approach, the Greek government decided to lift its veto of the MEDA regulation in exchange for an EU statement that made explicit that disputes such as the one over the islets should be submitted to the ICJ and instructed the Presidency to ask Turkey to indicate whether it committed itself to this principle\(^{238}\). As Turkey declined to respond, no progress was achieved by the end of the year. The Presidency Conclusions of the Dublin European Council summit simply referred to the 15 July statement and requested the Presidency to “continue its efforts”\(^{239}\). Greek initiatives outside the context of the EU were not particularly successful either. In a letter to NATO’s Secretary General Javier Solana in September 1996, Foreign Minister Pangalos suggested that a dispute settlement mechanism should


\(^{236}\) *Eleftherotypia*, 6 May 1996

\(^{237}\) *Eleftherotypia*, 18 June 1996


\(^{239}\) Presidency Conclusions, Dublin European Council, 13-14 December 1996
be established within the alliance, but no member-state looked upon the request particularly favourably during the Alliance’s summit in December 240.

Towards Luxembourg

Criticism continued unabated even after the party won an early election in September 1996. During a meeting of PASOK’s Central Committee meant to assess the party’s electoral performance, the Prime Minister was criticised for the party’s failure to attract left wing voters 241. During a meeting of PASOK’s Executive Bureau the Prime Minister reportedly stated: “Those who think that they are hurting Simitis are mistaken. It is not a personal issue. If we fall, we (will) all fall” 242. Apart from domestic, intra-party opposition, the government was facing Turkey’s attempts to develop its relations with the EU further and the explicit linkage between Turkey’s prospects of accession to the EU and Turkey’s policy towards Greece. In the aftermath of the Dublin European Council summit, Turkish Foreign Minister Tansu Ciller was stating that “Greece should indeed fear Turkey, should the latter be left out of the European Union” 243.

During the Dublin European Council summit, Deputy Foreign Minister George Papandreou had a meeting with Foreign Minister Ciller. When Dutch Foreign Minister Hans Van Mierlo referred to the meeting as “the beginning of a Greco-Turkish dialogue”, the Greek government’s spokesman Dimitris Reppas was prompted to clarify that the above discussion constituted no such dialogue 244. The press, however, was reporting that the Prime Minister was in the process of “studying” Greco-Turkish relations in order to formulate the main aspects of Greece’s strategy and that the discussion between Papandreou and Ciller was a manifestation of a new idea, according to which Greece could engage in

241 “MPs’ Critique of Losses on the Left”, Eleftherotypia, 19 October 1996
242 “Simitis Explodes: “If We Fall, We All Fall”, Eleftherotypia, 15 November 1996
243 A. Abatzis, “Ciller Threatening in Hysterical Crisis”, Eleftherotypia, 17 December 1996
244 “He Sees the Beginning of Dialogue between Greece and Turkey”, Eleftherotypia, 19 December 1996
dialogue, yet not in negotiations. It would appear that divisions emerged amongst Greek foreign policy makers after the election. The press was reporting that the latter were divided between those referred to as “traditionalists” or “unyielding” and “modernisers” or “retreatists”. Foreign Minister Pangalos was identified with the former, while Prime Minister Simitis, Deputy Foreign Minister Papandreou and Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Christos Rozakis with the latter. These reports focused on “new ideas” about Greek policy on EU-Turkey relations. In his memoirs, while Simitis confirmed that ideas regarding Greco-Turkish dialogue on low-politics issues on one hand and EU-Turkey relations on the other were discussed after the election in September, he mentioned no differences of opinion.

In January 1997, however, shortly before a meeting of government officials on Greco-Turkish relations, Undersecretary Rozakis resigned from his post. Rozakis argued that the reason for his resignation was his deteriorating health, yet he also referred to “unjust attacks” that he had suffered during his tenure. The press was reporting that an equally substantial reason for his resignation was his less than harmonious collaboration with Foreign Minister Pangalos. During a meeting of the Governmental Committee, both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister argued that the issue had been blown out of proportion by the press. Pangalos, in particular, argued that the distinction between “tough” Pangalos and “soft” Rozakis was inaccurate. Deputy Foreign Minister Papandreou, however, conceded that Rozakis’ resignation constituted an enormous symbolic blow to the forces of modernisation. Rozakis’ resignation certainly did not bring an end to the criticism the government was facing. According to government spokesman Reppas, the Governmental Committee had investigated alternatives with regard to tactics. Minister for

248 Simitis, Policy..., op. cit. pp. 85-6
249 “Rozakis’ Resignation Letters”, Eleftherotypia, 3 January 1997
250 “Blow for Simitis”, Eleftherotypia, 3 January 1997
251 “Bandages on the Wound”, Eleftherotypia, 4 January 1997
252 “Modernisers’ Massive Reaction”, Eleftherotypia, 16 January 1997
Education Arsenis, however, had indicated that differentiation in terms of tactics might result in an overturning of strategy. The following month, five members of PASOK’s Central Committee sent a letter to the Prime Minister, the party’s Secretary and the members of the Executive Bureau and the Central Committee, where they criticised Cabinet members whose divergent approaches to national issues gave the impression that there were deviations from PASOK’s traditional foreign policy positions.

Pangalos himself became the target of criticism in March 1997, when, in response to a statement by the European People’s Party, according to which Turkey had no place within the EU, he stated: “Turkey is certainly a part of Europe...a big part of European history...Greece should never change its mind on this issue...if Turkey is not a part of European history, then neither is Greece.” Defence Minister Tsohatzopoulos argued that the Foreign Minister was overstating matters. The conservatives’ spokesman claimed that either due to inexperience or inaccurate political assessment the Foreign Minister had either made an historical mistake or he was trying to cover up the concessions he had made or he was planning on making and that it was no longer acceptable for him to be in charge of Greek foreign policy. According to the head of splinter party “Political Spring” Antonis Samaras, it was neither naivety, nor a gaffe, but a conscious announcement of Greece yielding in favour of Turkey in the EU. In a similar vein, Greek President Costas Stefanopoulos stated: “Hellenism in its long history has been subjected to and is still being subjected to other nations’ pressures, but no more. No further concession is conceivable and none shall be made.”

In the meantime, Greece’s EU partners were pursuing the release of EU financial assistance to Turkey within the context of the EU-Turkey Customs Union. During a meeting of the Council of Ministers in Apeldoorn, when German...
Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel asked his Greek counterpart to give him a yes-or-no answer, Pangalos replied “no, no, no”, infuriating Kinkel, who walked out on the meeting\textsuperscript{258}. The following month, however, Greek and Turkish Deputy Foreign Ministers and the Dutch Foreign Minister met in Malta in order to discuss a proposal by the Dutch Presidency, according to which the two countries were going to set up a wise-men committee that would discuss possible ways to resolve Greco-Turkish problems. The Dutch Presidency had presumably been encouraged by the fact that, during a visit to the Hague in December 1996, Prime Minister Simitis had indicated that Greece would be willing to assume a constructive attitude, should the Dutch Presidency decide to take the initiative\textsuperscript{259}. While Deputy Foreign Minister Onur Oymen explained that it had been agreed that no public statements would be made, it was reported in the press that initially an agreement was reached on a text, which included provisions regarding the resolution of the Imia/Kardak dispute, yet Foreign Minister Pangalos and Undersecretary Yannos Kranidiotis (who had replaced Rozakis) appeared more reluctant than Deputy Foreign Minister Papandreou and certain revisions were discussed\textsuperscript{260}.

While the details of the proposal were still under consideration, thirty-two PASOK MPs sent a letter to the Prime Minister, where they argued against any form of dialogue between Greece and Turkey. While government spokesman Reppas stated that their concerns were unjustified\textsuperscript{261}, the incident demonstrated the persistent opposition to the idea, according to which Greece could engage in dialogue, but not in negotiations. As Deputy Foreign Minister Papandreou explained during a visit to Germany, Greece was not going to lift its veto of EU financial assistance to Turkey, unless an agreement was reached on the settlement of disputes before the ICJ, an issue that the wise-men committee was


\textsuperscript{259} N. Marakis, “A Critical Ten Days for Greco-Turkish Relations”, \textit{To Vima}, 20 April 1997  


\textsuperscript{261} G. Karelias, “32 of PASOK Warn Simitis”, \textit{Eleftherotypia}, 21 April 1997}
going to discuss\textsuperscript{262}. By the end of the month, the Greek government consented to a meeting of the EU-Turkey Association Council (29 April 1997). The member-states' common position reiterated the content of the 15 July 1996 EU statement regarding the settlement of territorial disputes and an agreement was reached on the Dutch Presidency's proposal. It was agreed that the Presidency – in an unprecedented direct involvement of the EU in Greco-Turkish relations – would facilitate the efforts of experts appointed by Greece and Turkey to produce a report on procedural aspects of the resolution of Greco-Turkish problems\textsuperscript{263}.

In May 1997, the Greek government announced the names of the two experts, who were going to represent Greece: Professor Krateros Ioannou and Professor Argyris Fatouros\textsuperscript{264}. The appointments reflected Greek preferences on the resolution of Greco-Turkish problems. Since the Greek government insisted on a judicial settlement through the ICJ, the appointment of two international law professors was to be expected. As Professor Ioannou pointed out right from the start, however, the procedure had not been planned in great detail and what had been agreed between the Greek and Turkish governments and the Presidency remained unclear to him\textsuperscript{265}. The agreement was indeed “diluted”\textsuperscript{266} later that month, when Foreign Minister Pangalos rejected the Presidency’s proposal for a joint meeting of the groups of experts from the two countries at the end of May, insisting that the two groups should first exchange reports in order to establish that a joint meeting would indeed be meaningful\textsuperscript{267}. By the start of June 1997, Foreign Minister Pangalos was stating during a meeting of the Council of Ministers that the Presidency appeared “frustrated” with the process and that he did not think that the Presidency was particularly concerned with the experts’ reports\textsuperscript{268}.

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{Adam97a} K. Adam, “Ankara Backs Up with the Pretext of 12 Miles”, \textit{Eleftherotypia}, 25 April 1997
\bibitem{Ioannou97} Professor Theodore Couloumbis replaced Ioannou later that year.
\bibitem{Adam97b} K. Adam, “US Giveth, US Taketh Away”, \textit{Eleftherotypia}, 17 May 1997; N. Marakis, “Confusion in Greco-Turkish Relations”, \textit{To Vima}, 18 May 1997
\bibitem{Pantelis97} P. Pantelis, “Pangalos and Ciller’s Dance”, \textit{Eleftherotypia}, 3 June 1997
\end{thebibliography}
In the meantime, the government continued to struggle to convince its critics that the procedure that had been agreed upon did not constitute a negotiation of “Greek sovereign rights”. During a meeting of PASOK MPs, Prime Minister Simitis made explicit that Greece would only allow the release of EU financial assistance to Turkey, if Turkey denounced the threat of war and the use of force and accepted the international treaties that determine the status quo in the Aegean and the ICJ as the appropriate institution for the interpretation of those treaties. He also made explicit that the procedure that had been agreed upon did not constitute “political dialogue”, but “an exchange of views on procedural issues pertaining to the implementation of the legal framework”\textsuperscript{269}. During the same meeting, Foreign Minister Pangalos argued that the thirty-two PASOK MPs’ letter had undermined the government’s bargaining position because it gave the impression that the government was about to yield and stated that he suspected that those who had been defeated in their attempt to succeed Andreas Papandreou, were criticising the government’s policy towards Turkey because they still intended to claim the party’s leadership. “I fear”, he said, “that some said not that they lost, but that they lost for the time being”\textsuperscript{270}.

Public opinion did not appear to approve of the government’s policy either. An opinion poll published in June 1997 showed that the public preferred the foreign (amongst others) policy of PASOK governments under Andreas Papandreou to that of PASOK governments under Simitis. Barely over twenty percent of those surveyed thought the foreign policy of the Simitis governments better than those of the Papandreou governments, while over forty-three percent of those surveyed thought it worse, with the figure rising to over forty-five percent amongst PASOK voters\textsuperscript{271}.

As a result of US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s mediation during a NATO summit in July 1997, the Greek Prime Minister and the Turkish President signed the so-called “Madrid Declaration”. According to the latter, the two countries would “pursue efforts to promote bilateral relations based on: a mutual

\textsuperscript{269} K. Adam, “Money for Turkey if It Accepts the 3 Conditions”, \textit{Eleftherotypia}, 8 May 1997


\textsuperscript{271} T. Pappas, “Andrea, You Are Superior”, \textit{Eleftherotypia}, 15 June 1997
commitment to peace, security and the continuing development of good
neighborly relations, respect for each other’s sovereignty, respect for the
principles of international law and international agreements, respect for each
other's legitimate, vital interests and concerns in the Aegean which are of great
importance for their security and national sovereignty, commitment to refrain
from unilateral acts on the basis of mutual respect and willingness to avoid
conflicts arising from misunderstanding and commitment to settle disputes by
peaceful means based on mutual consent and without use of force or threat of
force. As Undersecretary Kranidiotis explained, the implication of the
Madrid Declaration was that Turkey had withdrawn the threat of war and it had
accepted the international legal framework that determines that status quo in the
Aegean. What Turkey had not accepted was the submission of territorial disputes
to the ICJ as the appropriate method to resolve Greco-Turkish problems, an issue
which was going to prove crucial both during bilateral meetings between Greek
and Turkish officials and during EU level meetings on EU-Turkey relations.

Twenty-two PASOK MPs signed a letter critical of the Madrid Declaration and
Minister for Education Arsenis expressed his disagreement. The spirit of the
Declaration, however, was quickly undermined. In August 1997, Turkish Prime
Minister Mesut Yilmaz stated during an interview with “The Washington Post”
that the Aegean Sea was a “very special case”, where “international law cannot
be applied” and Turkey signed an Association Agreement with the so-called
“Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”, prompting Defence Minister
Tsohatzopoulos to draw parallels between Hitler’s policy towards
Czechoslovakia and Turkey’s policy towards Cyprus.

In an attempt to restore the spirit of the Madrid Declaration, Greek Foreign
Minister Pangalos and Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem met in New York

272 For the full text of the declaration see “Simitis-Demirel meeting leads to joint communique on
Greek-Turkish relations”, Greek Embassy in Washington Press Office News Archive, 9 July
office=3&folder=255&article=1520, accessed on 15 November 2007
273 Yannis Kranidiotis interview with Stefanos Kasimatis, Eleftherotypia, 13 July 1997
274 “Crack in the 32”, Eleftherotypia, 11 July 1997; “Unanimous Approval...with Arsenis’
Disagreement”, Eleftherotypia, 12 July 1997
“Tough Akis towards Turkey, Milder Papandreou”, Eleftherotypia, 1 September 1997
during the meeting of the UN General Assembly in September 1997. The meeting was unsuccessful due to the differences of approach to the resolution of Greco-Turkish problems. As Pangalos explained in a telegram to Prime Minister Simitis, he insisted on the submission of the Imia/Kardak issue to the ICJ as a necessary first step, while Cem proposed a discussion on all issues, which Pangalos rejected. The spirit of the Madrid Declaration was further undermined after the meeting, when Pangalos stated: “A certain...part of their military and diplomatic establishment has conceived the idea of challenging Greek borders in the Aegean. This will not pass as international practice and of course it is impossible to discuss this or even have the beginning of an exchange of views because you cannot discuss with the thief, the murderer and the rapist. It is impossible.” By November 1997, when Prime Ministers Simitis and Yilmaz met in Crete during the Balkan Conference organised by Greece, it became clear that the process had come to a standstill. While their commitment to the principles included in the Madrid agreement was reiterated, their differences of approach to the resolution of Greco-Turkish problems were yet again confirmed.

At that point EU level developments became crucial. During the November 1997 Extraordinary European Council summit on employment in Luxembourg, the issue of Turkey’s participation in the proposed European Conference – a forum for consultation between member-states and applicant countries – was raised. As Luxembourg’s Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker had informed Simitis during a bilateral meeting the day before, all member-states wished to make a gesture towards Turkey. Simitis insisted on the need for Turkey to accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ and change its policy towards Cyprus before any such gesture was made by the EU and suggested that the latter should put pressure on Turkey, if they wished an agreement to be reached during the European Council summit in December. The Luxembourgish Presidency informed the Turkish government of the conditions that Greece had set for Turkey’s participation in the European Conference, yet the Turkish government was not only unwilling to accept those

277 “I Don’t Discuss with Thieves, Murderers and Rapists”, Eleftherotypia, 25 September 1997
terms, but also considered the offer to participate in the European Conference to be unsatisfactory\textsuperscript{279}.

Later that month, Prime Minister Simitis met his British counterpart in London, where their disagreements over Turkey's participation in the European Conference were confirmed. While Tony Blair supported Turkey's participation, Simitis explained that the necessary pre-conditions for Turkey's participation had not been met and that the Greek government doubted that Turkey was eventually going to accept these terms once it had been admitted to the European Conference, as Blair had suggested\textsuperscript{280}. Similar disagreements arose between Simitis and French President Jacques Chirac and French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, when they met in Paris at the start of December. During a press conference after the meeting, Simitis explained that states that wished to participate in the European Conference would have to accept UN resolutions on the Cyprus problem, the desire of other states to accede to the EU and the jurisdiction of the ICJ. While French officials considered the first two conditions to be "self-evident", they were more reluctant to ask Turkey to commit itself to a specific method of settlement of its disputes with Greece\textsuperscript{281}. Simitis also indicated that the issue of the European Conference might turn out to be less controversial during the European Council summit in December, since the Turkish government had indicated to the Presidency that the offer to participate in the European Conference was unsatisfactory\textsuperscript{282}. A few days later, Foreign Minister Pangalos reiterated the Greek government's reservations regarding the usefulness of the European Conference and its intention to propose conditions for participation should the European Conference materialise\textsuperscript{283}.

\textsuperscript{279} "EU's Terms to Ankara", \textit{Ta Nea}, 28 November 1997


\textsuperscript{282} S. Tzanakis, "Pleasant Surprise from Chirac", \textit{Ta Nea}, 2 December 1997

\textsuperscript{283} P. Pantelis, "Opening with the Conditions for Turkey", \textit{Eleftherotypia}, 9 December 1997; G. Kouvaras, "Either The Hague or the Veto", \textit{Ta Nea}, 9 December 1997
At the start of December 1997, an agreement on the new military structure of NATO re-activated domestic opposition. Minister for Education Arsenis argued that Greece had entered a “minefield” and warned against “blindly following signposts (others) have set up for us”\textsuperscript{284}. Arsenis made explicit that the situation would have been “satisfactory”, had Tsohatzopoulos consulted him\textsuperscript{285}. Public opinion continued to disapprove of the government’s foreign policy. A poll published the day before the Luxembourg summit showed that over fifty-three percent of those surveyed believed that during 1997 Greece’s position vis-à-vis Turkey had been weakened or remained as weak as it was previously\textsuperscript{286}.

The decision of the December 1997 Luxembourg European Council summit constitutes the most significant development during the second phase of the period under investigation. It was decided that a European Conference would be set up in order to “bring together the Member States of the European Union and the European States aspiring to accede to it”. The EU offer to participate in the European Conference was addressed to Cyprus, the states of Central and Eastern Europe and Turkey. Despite the fact that the European Conference was seen as being largely symbolic, Greece was for the first time consenting to the offer of a reward that went beyond what was provided for by the 1963 Association Agreement. The offer, however, was conditional and the conditions reflected Greek preferences quite accurately: “The members of the Conference must share a common commitment to peace, security and good neighbourliness, respect for other countries' sovereignty, the principles upon which the European Union is founded, the integrity and inviolability of external borders and the principles of international law and a commitment to the settlement of territorial disputes by peaceful means, in particular through the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in the Hague. Countries which endorse these principles and respect the right of any European country fulfilling the required criteria to accede to the European Union and sharing the Union's commitment to building a Europe free

\textsuperscript{284} D. Vayena, “Shot Fired Straight at Akis: We Are in the Minefield”, \textit{Eleftherotypia}, 2 December 1997
\textsuperscript{285} Ibid.
of the divisions and difficulties of the past will be invited to take part in the Conference.287

While the summit was marked by lasting British and especially French support for Turkey, Greece benefited from Germany’s reluctance and Turkey’s uncompromising stance288. By the end of the first day of the summit, it had been agreed that Turkey was not going to be given candidate country status and that EU-Turkey relations would have to be improved in a different way289. The following day France attempted to secure an agreement on the question of Cyprus’ accession that would satisfy Turkey. French President Chirac argued that the Cyprus problem would have to be settled prior to Cyprus’ accession to the EU and he indicated that failing a settlement, France would have to veto Cyprus’ accession. Greek Prime Minister Simitis replied that in that case Greece would have to veto the enlargement process in its entirety290. While no conclusive agreement was reached at that time and the issue re-emerged during the next two years, the French position was weakened by the fact that it lacked British support, as Britain was in favour of Cyprus’ accession, regardless of the resolution of the political problem291. Finally, as Prime Minister Simitis confirmed in his memoirs, Luxembourg’s Prime Minister Juncker significantly contributed to the adoption of Greek positions by the EU292. During an interview with the Luxembourgish daily “Wort” ahead of the summit, Juncker stated: “A country in which torture is still a common practice cannot have a seat at the table.
of the European Union”. According to Juncker, apart from respect for human rights, Turkey would also have to stop impeding Cyprus’ accession to the EU and accept the submission of its disputes with Greece to the ICJ\(^2\). He reiterated this position during a speech in the EP after the summit\(^3\). The Turkish government dismissed the offer to participate in the European Conference as insignificant and made explicit that Turkey was not going to accept any terms\(^4\). Turkish Prime Minister Yilmaz stated that Turkey was going to withdraw its application for membership of the EU, if the latter did not change its attitude towards Turkey before June 1998\(^5\).

**From Luxembourg to Helsinki**

The decision made at the Luxembourg European Council summit was considered unsatisfactory – to say the least – by Turkey. Political dialogue with the EU was suspended and relations with Greece started to deteriorate. At the start of 1998, Turkey announced a military exercise in the Aegean and Turkish military aircraft infringed Athens’ FIR and violated Greek airspace\(^6\). According to US Undersecretary of State Marc Grossman, Turkey had cancelled part of its planned exercise at the request of the US, so that Turkish aircraft would not fly over islets, which Greece considered part of its territory\(^7\). At the same time, a series of exchanges between the two countries began, when Foreign Minister


\(^{295}\) N. Papadopoulos, “Yilmaz’s Threats after the European Union’s ‘No’”, *Ta Nea*, 15 December 1997


Pangalos drew parallels between the treatment of Kurds by Turkish authorities and the treatment of Jews by Hitler.\textsuperscript{299}

In response to Turkish violations of Greek airspace, Foreign Minister Pangalos argued during an interview in January 1998 that there was nothing keeping Turkey from challenging Greek views on Aegean airspace before the ICJ.\textsuperscript{300} The following day, government spokesman Reppas confirmed that, even though no specific proposal on that particular issue had been made, the general position of the Greek government was that any country that believed there was a problem should try to resolve it through the ICJ.\textsuperscript{301}

The following month, Turkish Foreign Minister Cem responded by presenting a set of proposals on Greco-Turkish relations. It was suggested that Greece and Turkey should jointly define disputes over the Aegean, the Madrid Declaration should be transformed into a formal agreement, NATO's Secretary General's Confidence Building Measures should be developed and implemented, a meeting of the wise-men committee should be held and a high-level meeting of Foreign Ministry officials should be held in order to discuss the above proposals.\textsuperscript{302} Government spokesman Reppas dismissed the proposals as "nothing new", yet Deputy Foreign Minister Papandreou and Undersecretary Kranidiotis stated that the government was going to study them.\textsuperscript{303} A few days later, the government responded by reiterating its commitment to the ICJ as the appropriate means to resolve Greco-Turkish problems.\textsuperscript{304}


\textsuperscript{300} "To The Hague for the 10 Miles", \textit{Eleftherotypia}, 22 January 1998

\textsuperscript{301} Pangalos reiterated this position a few days later, during an interview with Turkish daily "Milliyet"; see "Athens: To The Hague for Any Issue You Like", \textit{Eleftherotypia}, 23 January 1998 and "For Everything to The Hague", \textit{Eleftherotypia}, 26 January 1998

\textsuperscript{302} "Information Note Concerning the Proposals Made by Turkey to Greece on 12 February 1998 about a Process of Peaceful Settlement of Problems over the Aegean between the Two Countries", \textit{Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs}, 3: 1, 1998


\textsuperscript{304} "Response With Invitation", \textit{Eleftherotypia}, 25 February 1998
In response to the stalemate, the British government – which was holding the Presidency of the Council – indicated that the EU should “redouble its efforts” to give Turkey “a very clear signal” about its “true intentions”\textsuperscript{305}. Indeed, during the Cardiff European Council summit, the British Presidency presented a draft of the Presidency Conclusions, which referred to twelve candidate countries, implicitly identifying Turkey as a candidate for EU membership. Greek Prime Minister Simitis insisted that there were only eleven candidate countries and that the decision made during the Luxembourg European Council summit should not be discussed further\textsuperscript{306}. The relevant passage was removed from the text and the section that discussed the Commission’s progress reports explicitly differentiated Turkey from candidate countries. “The European Council welcomes the Commission’s confirmation that it will submit at the end of 1998 its first regular reports on each candidate’s progress towards accession. In the case of Turkey, reports will be based on Article 28 of the Association Agreement and the conclusions of the Luxembourg European Council”\textsuperscript{307}. The European Council also asked the Commission to table proposals for the implementation of the European strategy for Turkey and noted the Commission’s intention to do so, specifically referring to the need for financial support for the European strategy\textsuperscript{308}.

During a press conference after the summit, Prime Minister Simitis discussed a phone call that he had received from US President Clinton. Clinton had asked Simitis to accept the Presidency’s proposals and promised that the US would put pressure on Turkey in return. Simitis declined and explained to Clinton that his assessment of the situation in Turkey was erroneous. With an election drawing near, Simitis argued, Turkey was in no position to make any decision regarding Greco-Turkish relations. When Clinton indicated that lack of progress in EU-Turkey relations might lead to tension in the region, Simitis responded by saying that in that case Turkey would be responsible\textsuperscript{309}. Two rather irregular incidents followed. First, shortly after the summit, four military aircraft flew from a Greek


\textsuperscript{307} Presidency Conclusions, Cardiff European Council, 15-16 June 1998, p. 22

\textsuperscript{308} Ibid. p. 24

\textsuperscript{309} K. Adam, “Clinton Struck During the Night”, \textit{Eleftherotypia}, 17 June 1998
military base to a Cypriot airport, without any relevant announcement having been made beforehand. Second, a few days after the summit, Foreign Minister Pangalos referred to a Commission employee of Greek nationality – whom he did not name – as a traitor, who was trying to find a way for the EU to release its financial assistance to Turkey, despite the Greek government’s veto.

Given Greece’s refusal to consent to the Turkish candidacy, efforts focused on the release of EU financial assistance. Commissioner Hans van den Broek indicated to the Greek government that the Commission intended to submit to the Council two proposals for regulations regarding EU financial assistance to Turkey, one of which was based on a treaty article that allowed for a decision to be made by qualified majority. In a letter to Commission President Jacques Santer, Simitis explained that the situation had led him to conclude that the sole purpose of the proposal the Commission intended to table was to overcome Greek objections to the release of EU financial assistance to Turkey and indicated that a decision based on such a proposal could be challenged before the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The issue was discussed during a meeting of the Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER) in October 1998, where no agreement was reached due to the objections expressed by the Greek Permanent Representative. Deputy Foreign Minister Papandreou reiterated these objections during a meeting of the Council of Ministers at the start of November. While no decision was made, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy issued a statement, where they drew attention to the problems the situation in Cyprus would raise for the CFSP, if Cyprus were to join the EU prior to the settlement of the Cyprus question. Papandreou stated that it would be impossible for the Greek Parliament to ratify the Treaty of Accession of any candidate country, if Cyprus were not allowed to join the EU, essentially reiterating the threat to veto the entire process of enlargement, previously expressed by Simitis during the Luxembourg European Council summit. With regard to Turkey, he insisted that there should be no deviation from the Luxembourg European Council decision, which clearly separated Turkey from candidate countries, and

310 "4 F-16 in Cyprus As a Response to Pressure", *Eleftherotypia*, 17 June 1998
311 "Pangalos: EU Employee Is a Traitor", *Eleftherotypia*, 19 June 1998
that Greece would refer the issue of EU financial assistance to Turkey to the ECJ if necessary, as Simitis had indicated in his letter to Commission President Santer314.

In the meantime, Simitis announced a Cabinet reshuffle and asked for a vote of confidence from Parliament. As government spokesman Reppas explained, the majority of those present required by the Constitution would not suffice, as the Prime Minister wished that all PASOK MPs offered the new government their support315. Eleven PASOK MPs, however, submitted a letter to the Speaker of the House, where they explained that, while they were going to provide the government with their vote of confidence, they did not intend to cease to express objections to the government’s policies316. Government spokesman Reppas informed the press that the Prime Minister had decided not to accept their votes317. As Simitis put it: “The government cannot be based on a vote of tolerance. At the moment of this vote, clear answers are required. There can be no ‘yes, but’. Terms and conditions constitute evasions. The government asks for a vote (of confidence) on all its policies. A clear ‘yes’. Footnotes are recorded as negative votes. Clear positions are required. Whoever disagrees should have the courage to say it with a ‘no’”318. The letter was eventually withdrawn and the government won the vote.

Simitis’ success in consolidating his position did not last more than a few weeks. At the end of the year, Cypriot President Glafcos Clerides announced the decision not to deploy the S 300 missiles – the purchase of which the Cypriot government had announced two years earlier prompting the Turkish government to warn that it would destroy them – in Cyprus. The decision proved quite controversial. According to Cypriot Foreign Minister Ioannis Kasoulidis, Greek Foreign Minister Pangalos had indicated to the Cypriot government that it would be inadvisable to deploy the missiles in Cyprus six months before the decision.

314 Briefing of political editors and members of the foreign press by the Minister for Press and Mass Media and Government Spokesman Dimitris Reppas, Athens, 22 October 1999; P. Pantelis, “Fire Exchange between Greece and 4”, Eleftherotypia, 10 November 1998
317 G. Karelias, “Panic As Soon As Simitis Said ‘Election’”, Eleftherotypia, 4 November 1998
318 Dailiana – Matsi, op. cit.
was announced. This was emphatically denied in a statement issued by the Greek
Embassy in Nicosia, where it was reiterated that the decision was the outcome of
talks between Greek Prime Minister Simitis and Cypriot President Clerides held
shortly before the official announcement.\textsuperscript{319} A few days later, leader of the
Cypriot coalition government’s junior partner Nikos Anastasiadis argued that
Pangalos had made explicit to Kasoulidis that the Greek government was not
going to stand by Cyprus on the issue at the start of November 1997,\textsuperscript{320} while two
members of the Cypriot Cabinet resigned protesting against the decision.\textsuperscript{321}
Finally, Kasoulidis argued that the French government had linked the issue with
Cyprus’ accession to the EU.\textsuperscript{322} In Greece, the decision was seen by those who
opposed the government’s foreign policy as yet another failure to safeguard the
national interest. As member of PASOK’s Executive Bureau Pantelis Oikonomou put it: “(Pangalos) has participated in unprecedented in number and
size failures. (The agreement on the Dutch Presidency’s proposal reached in)
Malta, (the) Madrid (Declaration), the non-expansion of our territorial waters to
twelve nautical miles, (the) S 300 (affair)”\textsuperscript{323}

A few weeks later, the arguments of those who presented the government’s
policy as a series of fiascos were reinforced by the capture of Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan, while he was being transported
from the Greek Embassy in Nairobi to the Kenyan capital’s airport. The Turkish
government argued that the incident constituted evidence that confirmed its
claims that Greece was supporting PKK. The Kurds argued that the Greek
government had betrayed their leader, a Kurdish man set himself on fire in front
of the Greek Parliament and PKK members occupied the Greek Embassy in
Vienna during President Stefanopoulos’ official visit. Finally, forty-two members
of PASOK’s Central Committee argued that the government was “obviously”
responsible for the incident, drew parallels between the Imia/Kardak crisis, the S-
300 affair and the Ocalan incident and asked for a meeting of the party’s Central
Committee because “no one has the right to stain with actions or omissions the

\textsuperscript{319} “Nicosia This, Athens That”, \textit{Eleftherotypia}, 2 January 1999
\textsuperscript{320} M. Drousiotis, “Stairs, My Dear, Stairs to Walk Down”, \textit{Eleftherotypia}, 4 January 1999
\textsuperscript{321} F. Konstantinidis, “EDEK Decided Resignation of Ministers”, \textit{Eleftherotypia}, 4 January 1999
\textsuperscript{322} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{323} Pantelis Oikonomou interview, \textit{Eleftherotypia}, 3 January 1999
honour and morale of the Greek people"\textsuperscript{324}. In an attempt to relieve the pressure on his government, Prime Minister Simitis requested the resignation of Foreign Minister Pangalos, Interior Minister Alekos Papadopoulos and Minister for Justice Filippos Petsalnikos. Commenting on the Cabinet reshuffle, the main opposition party's leader Costas Karamanlis stated: "If someone had to resign, that was Mr. Simitis...the problem remains, as long as the major and main (person) responsible for the national humiliation remains in his post"\textsuperscript{325}. Apart from renewed Turkish claims that Greece was supporting terrorists and opposition claims that it had led the country to yet another "national defeat", the government earned itself yet another outspoken critic of its policy towards Turkey, namely former Foreign Minister Pangalos.

As the issue of terrorism had become particularly salient, Turkish Foreign Minister Cem sent his Greek counterpart a letter at the end of May 1999, where he argued in favour of cooperation between Greece and Turkey in the fight against terrorism\textsuperscript{326}. A few weeks later, Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou (who had replaced Pangalos after the Ocalan incident) replied by suggesting that cooperation was also possible in a number of other low-politics areas. Papandreou and Cem met a few days later in New York, where it was agreed that six committees of high-ranking Foreign Ministry officials from the two countries would meet and explore the possibility of cooperation in low-politics issues\textsuperscript{327}. The opposition remained unconvinced. As the first round of talks was about to begin, leader of the main opposition party Karamanlis stated: "The Simitis government is once more making a supposed good will gesture towards Turkey. It is proceeding without terms and conditions and especially without setting, at least clearly, the framework, within which any attempt to move closer to dialogue could assume constructive form. And while this is happening, Turkey is escalating tension and its unyieldingness"\textsuperscript{328}.

\textsuperscript{324} Y. Pantelakis, "N.D. Demands Simitis' Resignation", \textit{Eleftherotypia}, 19 February 1999
\textsuperscript{325} Y. Pantelakis, "42 C.C. Members' Text against Simitis", \textit{Eleftherotypia}, 18 February 1999
\textsuperscript{326} Ker-Lindsay, "Greek-Turkish Rapprochement...", op. cit. pp. 219-220. For Cem's letter and Papandreou's response see J. Ker-Lindsay, \textit{Crisis and Conciliation: A Year of Rapprochement between Greece and Turkey}, London & New York, I. B. Tauris, 2007, pp. 123-6
\textsuperscript{327} K. Adam, "They Were Breaking the Ice for Two Hours", \textit{Eleftherotypia}, 1 July 1999
\textsuperscript{328} Y. Pantelakis, "Karamanlis Emphatically Opposed", \textit{Eleftherotypia}, 26 July 1999
In June 1999, during the European Council summit in Cologne, the German Presidency submitted a draft of the Presidency Conclusions that identified Turkey as a candidate country. As Prime Minister Simitis explained during the press conference after the summit, he expressed Greece's objection to the proposal, cited the decisions made in Luxembourg and Cardiff and argued that another decision would be premature, since EU-Turkey relations were going to be discussed during the Helsinki European Council summit. The Presidency removed the relevant passages from its Conclusions.

At the end of July 1999, Foreign Minister Papandreou caused controversy with a statement, which he subsequently defended during an interview with Greek daily “Eleftherotypia”, regarding the Muslim minority in Greece. Papandreou argued that Greece should not deny members of the Muslim minority the right to identify themselves as Turks. Papandreou's statement prompted eighteen members of PASOK’s Central Committee to demand his resignation, while a spokesman for the opposition spoke of “vague” and “naïve” views, which were “dangerous for the nation”.

The lack of tension between Greece and Turkey, in which bilateral negotiations on low-politics issues had resulted, was consolidated at the start of September 1999, when the Greek government consented to the release of EU financial assistance to Turkey, on condition that it would be used to relieve the problems caused by the earthquake that had hit Turkey a few weeks earlier. In the meantime, Foreign Minister Papandreou stated for the first time during an interview in August 1999 that Greece did not object to the Turkish candidacy “in principle”. The statement was somewhat vague, but a Greek foreign policy maker was for the first time referring explicitly to the Turkish candidacy as opposed to Turkey’s “European vocation”, while only one month earlier

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330 George A. Papandreou interview with Spyros Frementitis, Eleftherotypia, 1 August 1999

331 "Akis Supports George”, Eleftherotypia, 2 August 1999

332 George A. Papandreou interview with Nikos Marakis, To Vima, 5 September 1999

333 George A. Papandreou interview with Christina Poulidou, Ayti, 29 August 1999
Papandreou had stated with regard to the government’s position on the Turkish candidacy that “we will decide when the time comes”\textsuperscript{334}.

As soon as the government indicated that it might consent to the Turkish candidacy, arguments regarding “national defeat” re-emerged. Former Foreign Minister Pangalos, in particular, was highly critical of the government’s policy towards Turkey. During an interview with Greek daily “To Vima” at the start of October 1999\textsuperscript{335}, he argued that the policy he had pursued as Foreign Minister was not different from the standard policy of all Greek governments since 1974. “The policy that is being pursued today”, he continued, “is not in accordance with what we had announced. This policy of dialogue, friendship and creating impressions, without it being clear for what reason these impressions are being created”. When asked whether he disagreed with the attempts to relieve tension in Greco-Turkish relations, Pangalos argued that those efforts had not managed to elicit a response from Turkey, while at the same time they had made it increasingly difficult for the Greek government to support its positions during the Helsinki European Council summit. “How will the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister go to Helsinki tomorrow and say: ‘No, we cannot withdraw all our demands’? (Their EU counterparts) will tell them and rightly so ‘but were you not dancing with the Turks? Were you not looking at each other with tears in your eyes? What was all that?’”. When asked to comment on what had changed since his resignation, the former Foreign Minister argued that his successor’s advisors believed that the national interest was served best by not disagreeing with the most powerful state in the system, namely the US. When asked about the bargaining position the government was going to assume in Helsinki, Pangalos’ phrasing was virtually identical to that of those who had been arguing that the government’s policy was distorting PASOK’s so-called “patriotic character”. “A possible retreat would correspond with a national defeat”, he replied and he concluded by posing the following rhetorical question: “Why do

\textsuperscript{334} George A. Papandreou interview with Maria Gripari, \textit{To Ethnos}, 12 July 1999. Reuters had quoted Kranidiotis as saying that Greece might lift its veto of the Turkish candidacy under certain conditions in July; see J. Gaunt, “Greece Offer EU Way to Make Turkey Candidate”, \textit{Reuters}, 12 July 1999. Kranidiotis denied he had made any such statement.

\textsuperscript{335} Theodore Pangalos interview with Thanasis Lalas, \textit{To Vima}, 3 October 1999
not we admit Taiwan in the European Union as well, which is industrially and culturally more advanced (than Turkey)?”

According to Prime Minister Simitis, during the Tampere European Council summit in October 1999, all EU member-states agreed that Turkey should be given candidate country status, but there was no agreement on what the precise conditions that Turkey would have to meet should be. A few days after the Tampere summit, Foreign Minister Papandreou started touring EU member-states’ capitals in an attempt to convince Greece’s EU partners to accept the government’s positions. Subsequently, Simitis had bilateral meetings with all his EU counterparts in November 1999 during the Socialist International summit in Paris and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE ) summit in Istanbul. According to Simitis, the meeting with French President Chirac in Paris at the start of November was a “pleasant surprise”. Chirac argued that it was necessary to take issues of special interest to Greece into consideration and Simitis concluded that their relationship had changed since their “not so pleasant” confrontation during the Luxembourg European Council summit336. Later that month, Simitis met Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit during the OSCE summit in Istanbul. According to Simitis, no progress was achieved, “as (he) had expected”337. At the same time, a Turkish news agency was reporting that European leaders and especially French President Chirac had urged Ecevit to accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ, a position reiterated by US President Clinton during his visit to Greece338.

The link between public opinion and domestic actors opposing foreign policy reform was clearly manifested shortly before the Helsinki summit. During the last meeting of the Cabinet before the summit, certain Cabinet members opposed the strategy that the Prime Minister seemed determined to pursue. As the next election was drawing near and opinion polls showed skepticism towards Turkey increasing amongst the public, several Cabinet members preferred to postpone

336 Simitis, Policy…, op. cit. p. 94
337 Ibid. p. 95
the decision\textsuperscript{339}. In fact, it was reported in the press that several Cabinet and party members believed that a Greek veto would allow the ruling party to call for and win an early election\textsuperscript{340}.

The day before the Greek delegation travelled to Helsinki, Finnish Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Jaakko Blomberg visited Athens representing the Finnish Presidency and submitted written proposals for the first time. A meeting at the Foreign Ministry led to the conclusion that "serious disagreements" remained\textsuperscript{341}. Disagreements were confirmed the day before the beginning of the summit, when the Finnish Presidency presented a draft of the Presidency Conclusions to the Greek delegation, which Prime Minister Simitis "rejected immediately"\textsuperscript{342}. The Greek delegation and the Finnish Presidency continued to negotiate until late that night, while Finnish Undersecretary of State Blomberg was invited to the hotel the Greek delegation was staying at the following morning for a final round of talks. Negotiations were unsuccessful and at the start of the summit Simitis stated that he was "unable to consent"\textsuperscript{343}, since Greek positions had not been accepted. The summit came to a halt and further negotiations between the Greek delegation and the Finnish Presidency followed.

While Greece's EU partners did not object to the Greek government's demand to reiterate the obligation of candidate countries to submit unresolved disputes to the ICJ in principle, they remained unwilling to accept the specific deadline for compliance that the Greek government had proposed in fear of Turkey's response\textsuperscript{344}. What was considered to be even more problematic was the condition regarding Cyprus's accession to the EU regardless of the resolution of the political problem because the rest of the member-states feared that Greek-Cypriots were going to assume an uncompromising stance on the Cyprus

\textsuperscript{339} Marakis, "Two and a Half Lines for Helsinki", op cit
\textsuperscript{340} Lakopoulos, op cit.
\textsuperscript{341} Christos Rokofyllos interview with Stelios Chrysostomides, \textit{Horizon}, Issue 6, January 2000 reprinted in C. Rokofyllos, \textit{Greece Against the Challenges of the Modern World} (in Greek), Athens, Papazisis, 2000, pp. 69-70
\textsuperscript{342} Simitis, \textit{Policy...}, op. cit. p. 96
\textsuperscript{343} Ibid. p. 97
\textsuperscript{344} Ibid; Interviews with high-ranking Greek government official, 2 April 2008, member of the Cabinet, 7 May 2008 and Greek Foreign Ministry official, 15 May 2008
question after Cyprus’ accession to the EU. As the Greek government had made explicit that the above demands constituted “red lines”, the provisions that it had proposed were eventually accepted. According to the Presidency Conclusions, “...the European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges candidate States to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failing this they should within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004”. With regard to Cyprus, “the European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors”.

Turkey was identified as “a candidate State destined to join the Union”, the pre-accession strategy for which “will include enhanced political dialogue, with emphasis on progressing towards fulfilling the political criteria for accession with particular reference to the issue of human rights, as well as on the issues referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9(a)”.

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345 Interviews with member of the Cabinet, 7 May 2008, high-ranking Greek government officials, 2 April 2008 and 5 May 2008 and Greek Foreign Ministry official, 14 March 2008
346 Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999
347 This particular provision of the agreement that was reached in Helsinki was the result of Greece’s policy on the Cyprus problem. The latter was formulated by the late Yannis Kranidiotis, who believed that the pursuit of Cyprus’ accession to the EU was the most effective way to resolve the Cyprus problem. As was mentioned above, the main objective of this policy during the period under investigation was to secure an EU commitment that Cyprus would join the EU regardless of the resolution of the Cyprus problem. This policy will not be discussed in great detail here, as Greece began to pursue it prior to Simitis’ election as Prime Minister in 1996 and the opposition was supportive of it during the period under investigation. For this policy see amongst others Y. Kranidiotis, Greek Foreign Policy: Thoughts and Concerns at the Threshold of the 21st Century (in Greek), Athens, Sideris, 2000 and Simitis, Policy..., op cit. pp. 106-124.
Conclusions

It follows from the above detailed narrative of Greek policy towards Turkey that between the Imia/Kardak crisis and the Helsinki European Council summit the Greek government took or supported numerous initiatives with the purpose of improving Greco-Turkish relations despite the fact that it was severely constrained by domestic actors that opposed foreign policy reform. These initiatives included proposals directed to Turkey (the step-by-step approach, Papandreou's response to Cem's letter) and subsequent bilateral meetings, proposals tabled within the context of NATO (Pangalos' proposal for an intralliance dispute settlement mechanism) and even ad hoc arrangements during international summits (the Madrid Declaration). While these initiatives were developed within a number of different frameworks, the Greek government most consistently pursued initiatives within the context of the EU. The Greek government had pursued and secured EU decisions prior to December 1999 that bear considerable similarities to the outcome of the Helsinki summit, namely the 15 July 1996 EU statement, the member-states' common position for the 29 April 1997 EU-Turkey Association Council and, finally, the decision made during the Luxembourg European Council summit. All these decisions were made in the EU, they became possible only when the Greek government had lifted its veto on a certain aspect of EU-Turkey relations despite the fact that Turkey had not complied with Greece's demands, they established rules for Turkey's behaviour towards Greece and they attributed a role in Greco-Turkish relations to the EU. The following chapters will show why this series of decisions was pursued, especially by establishing how Greek foreign policy makers defined the problem that Greek policy towards Turkey was intended to address, what alternative courses of action Greek foreign policy makers considered and, finally, how the latter were assessed.
Chapter 5: Defining the policy problem

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to establish how Greek foreign policy makers defined the policy problem the Helsinki strategy was intended to address. According to the balancing thesis, Greek foreign policy makers were facing a guns-or-butter dilemma: Greek policy towards Turkey could achieve its objectives, but it could not accommodate economic policy goals. In contrast, both the Europeanisation thesis and the leadership style thesis predict that Greek foreign policy makers identified policy failure. While the Europeanisation thesis predicts that the Imia/Kardak crisis demonstrated policy failure and prompted an assessment of the discrepancy between Greek policy towards Turkey and EU enlargement conditionality, the leadership style thesis predicts that Simitis had identified policy failure prior to the crisis and that he had selected a new strategy for Greek policy towards Turkey prior to his election as Prime Minister. Finally, the socialisation thesis predicts that Greek foreign policy makers began to understand Turkish violations of substantive EU foreign policy norms as the policy problem.

It will be shown here that the evidence supports the explanation based on the Prime Minister’s leadership style. As the latter predicts, Simitis was driven by an internal, pre-conceived idea, to which he remained unequivocally committed throughout the period under investigation. In notable contrast to what the Europeanisation thesis predicts, Simitis had already identified policy failure prior to the Imia/Kardak crisis and he had argued the need for a different policy towards Turkey prior to the establishment of enlargement conditionality. Consequently, the establishment of this EU foreign policy practice could not have influenced his calculations. Simitis had been publicly arguing the need for what he referred to as the “communitisation” of Greco-Turkish relations since the early 1990s and he interpreted the 1996 crisis as evidence that confirmed his belief in the necessity of this strategy. In contrast to what the balancing thesis predicts, there is only limited evidence that the economic implications of Greek policy towards Turkey were considered a reason why Greece should change its
policy. The implications of Turkey’s policy towards Greece constituted a greater cause for concern than US support for Turkey. Finally and in contrast to what the socialisation thesis predicts, Greek foreign policy makers did not begin to identify Turkish violations of substantive EU foreign policy norms as a policy problem for the first time during the period under investigation.

**Simitis’ vision for reform**

In his memoirs, Simitis argued that, when he was elected Prime Minister, he “had a specific policy plan for PASOK and its government”\(^{348}\). With regard to foreign policy, “Greece above all had to place Greco-Turkish relations on a different basis. To show that Turkey’s stance causes problems for European integration and constitutes a constraining factor on the route to unification. Peace in the region and the territorial integrity of Greece should therefore become the objective of all European states”\(^{349}\). Indeed, Simitis had been arguing this point since the early 1990s.

Simitis shared the view that Greco-Turkish problems were the result of Turkey’s aggressive policy towards Greece. The fact that these problems remained unresolved, however, was not only the result of Turkey’s consistently revisionist policy, but also of Greece’s failure to formulate an effective strategy that could be followed steadfastly. According to the former Prime Minister\(^{350}\), between 1981 and 1996, Greece “systematically prevents the improvement of Turkey’s relations with the European Community. The logic of this political tactic was based on the idea that preventing the international upgrading of Turkey and especially its European course would result in bending Turkish resistance and the reduction or elimination of Turkey’s claims in the Aegean and in Cyprus”. While he argues that it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of this policy and that this is a task for historians, he does offer his own rather balanced assessment. He concedes that this policy contributed to the preservation of the status quo in the Aegean, “on the other hand, however, during the same period of time...certain

\(^{348}\) Simitis, *Policy...*, op. cit. p. 38  
\(^{349}\) Ibid. p. 40  
\(^{350}\) Ibid. pp. 56-8
incidents between Greece and Turkey reached the brink of armed conflict...while Turkish claims in the Aegean not only did not cease, but also included, for the first time in this period, territories of the island complex (grey zones)"). Simitis discusses those events in the history of Greco-Turkish relations that challenge the assumption that Greece would manage to force Turkey to abandon its claims if it prevented progress in EU-Turkey relations and clearly considers these crises as manifestations of the failure of Greek policy towards Turkey to achieve its goals.

As has been pointed out, the fairly prominent idea that Greece is a state that seeks to preserve the status quo in the Aegean has resulted in a rather defensive policy towards Turkey. Simitis was diametrically opposed to the view that as a status quo power Greece should pursue a defensive policy. He intended to formulate a pro-active Greek policy towards Turkey and reduce its responsiveness to Turkey's aggressiveness and other contextual factors. "A hyper-reactive and defensive mentality defines the country's foreign policy today", he argued in 1992. "Our positions follow from reactions to Turkish provocations, statements by American officials, developments in neighbouring countries and not from our own initiatives". Strikingly enough, Simitis was suggesting that Greece's "hyper-reactive" policy towards Turkey should be replaced by a policy on European integration. "We must move from a defensive and reflexive policy towards Turkey to a promoting and constructive strategy towards European integration".

"Europe" has been a central element of Simitis' ideas about governance in Greece since before his Premiership. As was mentioned above, Simitis has been arguing the need for further integration and a political union based on a federal


model. With regard to Greece's role in the EU, he has emphasised the need for Greece to be part of "core Europe". This was going to emerge as one of the main themes of Simitis' discourse. During a speech at PASOK's third conference in 1994 he stated: "The effort for international participation on an equal footing is painful and uncertain. We must participate. This is a one-way street. We will face great difficulties. There are, however, no other options". Two years later, whilst reading his government's programmatic statements in Parliament, he mentioned the need for Greece to participate in the integration process on an equal footing seven times. The emphasis on this point is associated with EMU. Writing in the early 1990s, Simitis argued that EMU entry was possible, yet doubtful because of the great distance Greece needed to cover in order to meet entry criteria. The same is true of his understanding of "modernisation". During a round-table discussion of modernisation in Greece at the LSE in 1994, he extensively discussed the precise meaning of the concept. "A modernisation programme for Greece", he concluded, "should be a programme that will allow it to participate in and shape the European society".

Simitis had made explicit that Greece's failure to accede to EMU would have negative implications for variables beyond those that the European Central Bank's common monetary policy and the fiscal policy rules of the Stability and Growth Pact may affect. The exclusion of Greece from "core Europe" would impose financial costs and result in reduced bargaining power and limited ability to "use European institutions". Simitis feared that in a "two-speed Europe" EMU member-states would form a "core" of economically advanced countries, which would be reluctant to continue to finance EU budgetary policies (the Common Agricultural Policy and EU cohesion policy) that benefit their less developed partners. Simitis believed that economic development was a significant

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355 Simitis, "Towards...", op. cit. pp. 14-7
357 Eastern enlargement would exacerbate this problem; see Simitis, "Towards...", op. cit. pp. 17-8. As Scharpf has pointed out, "objections to closer cooperation may be based on the suspicion that rich member-states might form a club of their own in order to escape from the obligations of solidarity and from the side-payments exacted by the beneficiaries of cohesion programmes whenever advances of European integration were on the agenda"; see F. W. Scharpf, "The
determinant of state power and that successful economic policies resulted in increased bargaining power in the EU. In this sense, the economic policy failure Greece was facing in the early 1990s had already reduced Greece's bargaining power. If not resolved, economic problems would prevent EMU entry and the latter coupled with limited EU funds would reduce Greece's bargaining power further. Formally excluded from EMU and with its bargaining power reduced, Greece would be unable to "use European institutions" in order to gather support from its EU partners.

This last point is particularly relevant with regard to Greco-Turkish relations. Considerable influence in the EU was necessary for the pursuit of the policy towards Turkey that Simitis preferred. Simitis believed that Turkish policy towards Greece was fairly consistent and in fact he expected that Turkish pressure on Greece would intensify. Nevertheless, this was a constraint he was willing to challenge. "We will check the pressure and handle it effectively", he argued, "if we manage to alter the framework of the confrontation. Today we have accepted the existence of (a) Greco-Turkish problem, Greco-Turkish competition, the hyphenation of Greece and Turkey. Every issue related to Turkey, either within the EEC or within NATO, is assessed by our partners in conjunction with Greek reactions. We should change this dominant view. (We should) place (Greco-Turkish) problems on a different level. Our position should be that the Turkish stance creates problems for European integration and constitutes a constraining factor on the route to unification. Peace in the region and the territorial integrity of Greece should not just be a goal of ours, but of all European states. In sharp contrast to what the Europeanisation thesis predicts, the selection of the Community as the preferable "framework" for Greco-Turkish relations was not the outcome of calculations, according to which incorporating an established EU practice (enlargement conditionality) into Greek policy towards Turkey could achieve Greek goals more effectively. Simitis had already

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Simitis, "Towards...", op. cit. pp. 13-16

Ibid. p. 17

Ibid. pp. 26-7, emphasis added; It is interesting to note that peace is implicitly considered synonymous with the territorial integrity of Greece. Turkey has expressed claims over Greek territory and seeks to revise the status quo, even through the use of military force (Cyprus). Greece seeks to maintain the status quo and thus preserve peace.
argued this point *prior to the establishment of enlargement conditionality* and therefore the latter could not have affected his calculations. Apart from the fact that this particular practice had not been established, leading European foreign policy analysts suggest that European foreign policy in general did not appear particularly promising at that time. The Gulf War and the disintegration of Yugoslavia had shown that “the Community (was) not an effective international actor, in terms both of its capacity to produce collective decisions and its impact on events”\(^{361}\) and the recognition of the former Yugoslav Republics fiasco had brought the very notion of a European foreign policy into “dispute”\(^{362}\). In 1992, Simitis had selected the Community as the “default arena”\(^{363}\) for the exercise of Greek policy towards Turkey nonetheless\(^{364}\). During a speech the following year, Simitis reiterated the need for Greece to develop a multilateral strategy towards Turkey within the context of the Community, despite the fact that his speech was entitled “Relations between the US – Greece – Turkey”. “(Greece)”, he argued, “should make clear to its Community partners that the problems in Greco-Turkish relations are not problems that concern only the two countries. They are Community problems because they affect Community action and presence both in the Balkans and in the Eastern Mediterranean negatively”\(^ {365}\).

Even though they offered little insight into what exactly he intended to do, reports on political developments in Greece during Simitis’ Premiership identified his distinctiveness. Shortly after his election, Greek policy towards Turkey was identified as his “top foreign priority”\(^{366}\) and his desire to improve Greco-Turkish relations was immediately assessed as “remarkable for a Greek politician”\(^{367}\). Less than a year after his election, it was being pointed out that he appeared “determined to get on better with Turkey”\(^{368}\) and half way through his first term in office it was argued that changes in Greek foreign policy “could be

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\(^{361}\) Hill, “The Capability-Expectations Gap…”, op. cit. p. 306

\(^{362}\) Nuttall, op. cit. p. 223


\(^{364}\) This shows that uploading *per se* cannot be considered synonymous with Europeanisation. Uploading *may* be an outcome of the process of Europeanisation. Clearly, this is not the case here.

\(^{365}\) Simitis, “Relations…”, op. cit. p. 162, emphasis added

\(^{366}\) “A Gleam of Hope in Greece”, *Economist*, 338: 7954, 24/02/96 (emphasis added)

\(^{367}\) “Looking More Modern”, *Economist*, 338: 7950, 27/01/96 (emphasis added)

\(^{368}\) “Unrevolutionary”, *Economist*, 340: 7983, 14/09/96 (emphasis added)
traced to the man at the top, Prime Minister Simitis"\(^{369}\). Indeed, it is often pointed out that Simitis was imbued with an entirely different understanding of what Greek policy towards Turkey ought to be, that he intended to pursue policy change as soon as he was elected Prime Minister, that he did so with a clear and firm sense of purpose and that the shift in Greek policy towards Turkey would not have been possible without his leadership\(^{370}\). Professor Ioakimidis, Prime Minister Simitis' advisor on EU affairs, identified this particular understanding of the policy problem as the "crucial factor" that drove foreign policy change\(^{371}\). By mid-1996, Simitis' understanding of the policy problem and his preference for communitisation had penetrated the Greek government's official discourse to such an extent that government spokesman Reppas was stating: "It is time the European Union understood that the problems in relations between Greece and Turkey are problems born out of Turkish provocations and claims on our national sovereign rights and Greek territory and they should understand that the preservation of calm, peace and security in the region is their concern too - I would say - it should be primarily their concern"\(^{372}\).

The 1996 crisis and Greek concerns about Turkey's policy

The evidence shows that the 1996 Imia/Kardak crisis did not alter Simitis' understanding of the policy problem. On the contrary, the crisis was interpreted as evidence that confirmed his beliefs, as the leadership style thesis predicts. In contrast to what the Europeanisation thesis predicts, the crisis did not lead to the realisation of policy failure and it did not prompt a search for a more effective policy. As was shown above, Simitis had identified the inability of Greek policy towards Turkey to achieve its goals prior to the crisis and he had selected the strategy that he believed should replace it. The new policy ought to challenge the

\(^{369}\) R. J. Guttman, "Greek Foreign Policy", *Europe*, Issue 370, October 1997

\(^{370}\) Interviews with member of the Cabinet, 7 May 2008, high-ranking Greek government officials, 13 March 2008, 2 April 2008 and 5 May 2008, Greek Foreign Ministry officials, 18 April 2008 and 27 May 2008. It is interesting to note that little attention has been paid to the views Simitis had expressed on the subject prior to his election as Prime Minister. It is instructive in this respect that, while several policy makers confirm the significance of Simitis' personal beliefs, few are able to assess whether his beliefs had been formed prior to his Premiership.

\(^{371}\) Interview with Professor Panayotis Ioakimidis, advisor to Prime Minister Simitis, Athens, 3 April 2008

\(^{372}\) For the Reppas' statements see "Turks Insist", *Eleftherotypia*, 8 August 1996, emphasis added
idea that Greco-Turkish problems were bilateral problems and pursue the EU’s involvement in Greco-Turkish relations.

In contrast to what the Europeanisation thesis predicts, the crisis performed none of the functions that the literature on external shocks suggests it might have. First of all, the new government’s electoral mandate was not quite “impressive”373. On the contrary, PASOK’s share of the vote (41.49%) in the election of September 1996 was “the lowest of any victorious party since 1977” and 5.39% lower compared with the previous election of 1993374. More significantly, the crisis did not discredit the ideas that the policy previously pursued was based on375. Instead, the idea that the government’s lack of resolve during the crisis had led the country to a defeat emerged and remained popular until the Helsinki summit. In fact, even members of PASOK were systematically arguing that the government’s policy towards Turkey was little more than a series of fiascos376. As Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs and advisor to the Prime Minister Christos Rozakis has pointed out, the crisis “undermined at the most inappropriate moment the new tendencies for change in foreign policy towards Turkey”377. The crisis led the government to veto the release of EU financial assistance to Turkey—a policy that contradicted the Prime Minister’s preferences—in an attempt to gain the time necessary to pursue communitisation378.

Simitis made it clear that the crisis constituted an escalation of Turkish aggression—which he had anticipated—that required Greece to maintain sufficient military capabilities: “...we must arm our country against the threats manifested at its borders...we are the only EU member-state that faces a threat to its national sovereign rights and its territorial integrity. Turkish malevolence now assumes a rawer form, rises to a new degree of escalation. Turkey, with its new

373 Keeler, op. cit. p. 436
374 K. Featherstone – G. Kazamias, “In the Absence of Charisma: The Greek Elections of September 1996”, West European Politics, 20: 2, 1997, pp. 161-2. The lack of an “impressive” mandate invalidated all three mandate-related mechanisms (public authorisation, legislative empowerment—which is not particularly relevant to foreign policy reform—and party pressure) that may have opened a window for reform; see Keeler, op. cit. pp. 437-9
375 Keeler, op. cit. pp. 440-1
376 Pantelis Oikonomou interview, Eleftherotypia, 3 January 1999
378 Interview with high-ranking Greek government official, 2 April 2008
theory of "grey zones" in the Aegean, has made its darkest aspirations visible: "gray zones" are intended to alter the recognised by international treaties status quo in the Aegean.\textsuperscript{379} Simitis also drew attention to the implications of Turkey's policy for the broader region: "(Our country) is facing Turkish aggressiveness in the Aegean and in Cyprus. Turkey has turned into the greatest de-stabilising factor in the Aegean, the Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Caucasus and the Middle East. The unhistorical visions of reviving the Ottoman Empire are an invention of the Turkish establishment in order to relieve the sharp domestic problems and acquire an increased role in the area.\textsuperscript{380} At the same time, however, Simitis made it clear that he wished to reverse the situation: "We want to have cooperative relations. We want to develop our economic relations with Turkey, (our) societal, cultural relations with Turkey.\textsuperscript{381} The problem, however, was that Turkey's policy had proven consistently revisionist. "The Turkish stance, I should think, has not changed for a long time. All representatives of Turkey...handle issues within a general framework. And this general framework...that determines Turkey's stance is the attempt to revise the status quo in the Aegean.\textsuperscript{382}"

It is instructive to note that a year after the Imia/Kardak crisis the possibility of armed conflict was openly discussed. When asked about that possibility in February 1997, government spokesman Reppas stated: "Given the aggressive and belligerent policy that Turkey is following, Greece is obliged to prepare itself, so that its defence is at a high level of deterrence. If these efforts that are being made by different parties to search and find solutions in the diplomatic and political field fail, you understand that given Turkey's behaviour, which is intensifying at the expense of Greece, this possibility is not in the area of the improbable.\textsuperscript{383} A few days later, British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind stated during an interview with BBC radio that there was a "serious possibility"

\textsuperscript{380} C. Simitis, Reading of the government's programmatic statements in Parliament, 10 October 1996
\textsuperscript{381} C. Simitis' 6 Foreign Policy Commitments", \textit{Eleftherotypia}, 12 September 1996
\textsuperscript{382} K. Adam, "Discussion without Rules Is out of the Question", \textit{Eleftherotypia}, 28 May 1997
\textsuperscript{383} "Reppas: It Is Not Improbable, War Against Turkey...", \textit{Eleftherotypia}, 4 February 1997
of armed conflict between Greece and Turkey and during a relevant Congressional committee session US Secretary of State Albright spoke of a “new cycle that is dangerous for stability in the region”. Undersecretary Kranidiotis confirmed this assessment of the situation. “These ‘belligerent’ statements”, he argued, “show that it is beginning to be understood how critical the pending situation in Cyprus is and how many dangers the crisis in Greco-Turkish relations holds”. By the end of the month, Foreign Minister Pangalos was arguing that the Greek government knew of a Turkish map, which depicted the entire Eastern Aegean as an area, sovereignty over which was under negotiation. Finally, when Simitis was asked whether the Turkish threat was a Greek obsession rather than a real threat during an interview with German magazine “Der Spiegel” in November 1997, he replied: “You cannot argue that the threat is a figment of our imagination! I shall remind you of the dispute over the Greek island Imia”. When the interviewer insisted, explaining that Imia was only an uninhabited islet in the Aegean, Simitis replied: “Turkish soldiers violently removed the Greek flag in January 1996 and brought the region to the brink of war. Ankara argues that there are ‘grey zones’ in the Aegean, that is to say areas sovereignty over which remains unclear. That is why, according to Turkey’s logic, whom these islands belong to should be examined. There can be, however, no discussion on sovereign rights recognised by international law”.

Despite the fact that the crisis was interpreted as an escalation of Turkish aggression – which Simitis had predicted – that necessitated Greek military preparedness, Simitis’ belief in the necessity of communitisation remained unchallenged, as the leadership style thesis predicts. According to Simitis, “the

388 “Simitis: Neither Veto, Nor Package”, Eleftherotypia, 3 November 1997
Imia crisis revealed, first, the latent aggressive – expansionist – strategy of Ankara...second, that, for the first time during the troubled post-1974 period, Turkish claims were not just limited to challenges of the legal regime of the waters and the airspace of the Aegean, but also included claims (on Greek) soil...finally, the need for a new integrated strategy on Greco-Turkish relations for Greece". After discussing the government’s immediate response to the crisis in his memoirs, he wrote: “That, however, would not suffice. We had to intensify our efforts in the intra-European direction as well. Turkey’s European vocation had to become the central issue of our policy because a development on this point would drastically limit any sort of aggressiveness towards us. The effectiveness of this strategy, however, depended on the extent to which we could achieve terms and preconditions that would definitively transform the Greco-Turkish dispute into a Euro-Turkish one".

Clearly Greek foreign policy makers were particularly concerned about the implications of the crisis and what they perceived as an escalation of Turkey’s aggressiveness. Such a traumatic external shock could have hardly gone unnoticed. Their interpretations of the crisis, however, seem to vary. The significance of Simitis’ beliefs is reinforced by the fact that the views he was expressing were not invariably shared. A comparison with the conclusions Foreign Minister Pangalos drew is instructive. More often than not Pangalos is referred to as a “nationalist”, a “hard-liner” and even “rabidly anti-Turkish”, known for his “nationalist outbursts” and “inflammatory and derogatory comments”. The most often cited of the latter was the reference to “thieves, murderers and rapists” mentioned above. While most believe that Pangalos was indiscriminately referring to all Turks, he was in fact referring to “a certain part of the Turkish military and diplomatic establishment”. The emphasis placed on such comments, which certainly did not contribute to the improvement of Greco-

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389 Simitis, Policy..., op. cit. pp. 74-5
390 Ibid. p. 86, emphasis added; It remains unclear how exactly Turkey’s behaviour poses problems for the integration process or how Greece could manage to convince its EU partners to share its goals.
Turkish relations, has overshadowed Pangalos’ views on the matter, which indicate a rather more substantial reluctance towards Turkey.

While Pangalos identified the crisis as an indication of increased aggressiveness, he did not seem to identify policy failure. He has repeatedly stressed that the crisis marked the first time that Turkey claimed a part of land that Greece considered its own. His initial reaction was to refer to it as an “outrageous demand”\(^{392}\). When Interior Minister Tsohatzopoulos revealed that Andreas Papandreou had confessed his concerns regarding Greco-Turkish relations to him, the Foreign Minister stated: “How could I not share (these concerns)? We now have a qualitative change in the promotion of Turkey’s standard claims. We are moving from questioning (sovereignty over) to claiming territory”\(^{393}\).

According to Pangalos, the fact that Turkey had claimed “a part of land that belongs to (Greece)...disturbed us a great deal because thus far we have never faced such a situation...I felt that war could break out”\(^{394}\). Pangalos also made it abundantly clear that Turkey constituted a threat to Greek security. In fact, during his speech at a conference on Greco-American relations in May 1996, he remarked: “We are afraid of a (Turkish) invasion”\(^{395}\).

Pangalos repeatedly argued that Greco-Turkish problems were the result of Turkey’s systematically and purposefully hostile policy towards Greece, “the purpose of which is a general political negotiation for the transformation of the status quo in the Aegean”\(^{396}\). During a speech in Parliament in January 1999, where he discussed his understanding of the nature of Greco-Turkish problems extensively, Pangalos argued that those who claim that the latter are “the product of a long history” are either “misinformed” or “ill-intended” and that Greco-Turkish relations began to deteriorate in the early post-World War II period, “when Turkey joined NATO and started to search for a broader strategic role in

\(^{392}\) “Outrageous Demand about the Islet”, *Eleftherotypia*, 27 January 1996

\(^{393}\) Yannakidis, op. cit.

\(^{394}\) “This Is The Only Way We Will Resolve Our Issues With Turkey”, *Eleftherotypia*, 6 March 1996

\(^{395}\) K. Adam, “We Fear A Turkish Invasion”, *Eleftherotypia*, 9 May 1996. According to Greek ambassador in Ankara Dimitris Nezeritis, “since the (Imia/Kardak) crisis, Greece considers Turkey a far greater danger and threat than it used to be”; see “Ankara Forbids Us...”, *Eleftherotypia*, 20 January 1998

\(^{396}\) Theodore Pangalos interview with Kyra Adam, *Eleftherotypia*, 30 April 1998
the region... (and pursue) a policy of systematic hostility towards Greece". He concluded by attributing the 1996 crisis to Turkey's policy: "Since you mentioned (the) Imia (crisis) as something that resulted from the swearing in of the Simitis government, I will tell you that we have all the evidence and information that shows that the relevant opinion at theoretical and practical level had been prepared in Ankara seventeen years before the Imia incident. That is to say (they) had expressed the opinion that (sovereignty over) certain islets in the Aegean is questionable seventeen years earlier and (they) had also prepared a series of moves in case anything arose at diplomatic or practical level".

During a conversation with members of the press the Foreign Minister reportedly criticised the foreign policy of previous Greek governments and its poor results. What he seemed to identify as problematic, however, was not the practice of preventing progress in EU-Turkey relations, but deviation from that practice, when Greece consented to the EU-Turkey Customs Union. When asked to comment on Turkish Prime Minister Yilmaz' statements according to which referring the issue of the islets to the ICJ was not out of the question, Pangalos pointed out that even though Turkish officials had made similar statements prior to Greece's decision to allow the Customs Union to take effect, "as soon as Greece conceded and accepted the Customs Union, overlooking as I have been repeatedly reminding during the past few days the situation with human rights in Turkey, the Cyprus problem and all of Turkey's blackmails and threats at our expense, we had the Imia incident". It is clear that Simitis and Pangalos' assessments of the effectiveness of the policy that Greece had been traditionally pursuing diverged. Pangalos believed that "unilateral good will gestures" – such as Greece's consent to the EU-Turkey Customs Union – should be avoided because they would be interpreted as signs of weakness and result in further aggression. This view constitutes PASOK's traditional understanding of the

398 Ibid.
400 "Meeting of the Council Only After Turkey's Explicit Commitment", *Eleftherotypia*, 16 March 1996
401 T. Pangalos, "EU Financial assistance to Turkey", *Ta Nea*, 30 August 1999. According to former Ambassador Zaharakis, Pangalos believed that Greece did not need to make any concessions towards Turkey unless it lost a war against it; see C. Zaharakis, *Top Secret – Special Handling: Deposition of Memory and Thoughts, 1979-2004* (in Greek), Athens, Livanis, 2008, p.
problem that Turkey poses and formed the basis of PASOK's critique of the conservative governments' policy towards Turkey during the second half of the 1970s. This particular issue had also been a source of friction in Greco-American relations. When the US would suggest that Greece should make certain "gestures" towards Turkey – including allowing the EU to grant Turkey candidate country status – Pangalos would insist: "Name one time, when the Turks did not attack after a concession (made) by Greece." Pangalos was certain that Turkey was going to continue to pursue this policy in the future: "this (is what) has happened so far, this (is what) is going to happen in the future." Finally, Pangalos made explicit that "friendly relations" between Greece and Turkey were "impossible" and a personal friendship between him and a Turk was undesirable.

Given these beliefs regarding the nature of Greco-Turkish problems, it is fairly unsurprising that Pangalos has criticised the agreement reached in Helsinki. During an interview a few weeks after the Helsinki summit Pangalos expressed his concern with regard to future developments and when the interviewer indicated that there was a possibility that Greece would have to make concessions Pangalos interrupted and stated: "Why do you speak in future tense? We have made substantial concessions towards the Turks. The Turks have gained two monumental benefits of the highest significance, the first two goals of their foreign policy from this policy, which the Greek Foreign Ministry has been following since February. The first was funding from the European Union...And we are also talking about candidate country status, Turkey's colossal achievement of strategic significance...Turkey achieved, beyond any European

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623 For PASOK's traditional positions on Greco-Turkish relations see Coufoudakis, "Greco-Turkish Relations and the Greek Socialists...", op. cit. pp. 380-1 and Coufoudakis, "Greek-Turkish Relations, 1973-1983...", op. cit. p. 211. Despite the fact that the changes that PASOK introduced in the 1980s have been occasionally dismissed as insignificant, they have had a lasting impact on the dominant understanding of the nature of Greco-Turkish relations. As an advisor to former Prime Minister Simitis pointed out to the author (14 July 2008), the conservatives' critique of the government's policy towards Turkey during Simitis' Premiership was remarkably similar to PASOK's critique of the conservative governments' policy during the second half of the 1970s.

402 Theodore Pangalos interview with T. Lalas, To Vima, 3 October 1999
403 Theodore Pangalos interview with N. Meletis - P. Tsoutsias, To Ethnos, 19 November 2000
logic, its dream of a Europe à la carte! She will be in Europe without being in Europe! This is what Turkey achieved and I am asking: what did we achieve in the whole process?...Nothing. Absolutely nothing!"406

While Foreign Minister Pangalos’ belief that Greece should refrain from making any concession rendered his support for communitisation reluctant, Deputy Foreign Minister Papandreou shared Simitis’ commitment to it. During his first interview after his appointment, Papandreou argued that Greece “should not be speaking of ‘national issues’ when referring to issues of (its) external relations” and that it would be “in the interest of Americans and Europeans (if) Turkey respected Greek borders, (if) the Cyprus problem were resolved and (if Turkey) joined Europe”. Indeed, classifying Greco-Turkish relations as a “national issue” for Greece was by definition incompatible with the notion of communitisation and the transformation of Greco-Turkish problems into EU-Turkey problems. In a critique of the policy previously pursued, he identified Greece’s inability to understand the point of view of third actors and the consequent inability to “engage” them in a line of reasoning they can accept407. Finally, during a speech delivered a few weeks after the Helsinki summit, Papandreou acknowledged Simitis’ role in the pursuit of communitisation. “The Prime Minister”, he stated, “Mr. Simitis, our President, (by) rapidly touring European capitals ‘communitised’ the handling of our disputes and our relations (with Turkey)”408.

While Pangalos emphasised the systematic and purposeful character of Turkish policy towards Greece, Papandreou emphasised the possibility of improvement of relations between Greece and Turkey. “What unites us”, he argued during an interview with Turkish daily “Milliyet” in September 1999, “is in fact a lot more than what divides us...if you think of our problems as a sphere, we have managed to penetrate several layers that surround this sphere and we may have realised that the issues at the centre are in fact not so big...undoubtedly, no one should express claims on others’ territories, but for countries that cooperate on a global scale, issues that their borders and the seas between them create cannot be

406 Theodore Pangalos interview with Y. Papadopoulos, Apoyeumatini, 24 January 2000
407 George A. Papandreou interview, Eleftherotypia, 6 October 1996
408 George A. Papandreou, Speech, 6 February 2000
that significant\textsuperscript{409}. Papandreou’s statement should be understood within the context of the favourable climate that the earthquakes had resulted in, which he consistently tried to sustain in an attempt to reinforce the process of bilateral negotiations in low politics issues, in which he was indeed the “main protagonist”\textsuperscript{410}. What constitutes a more substantial matter is the difference of opinion with regard to what constituted an appropriate Greek response. Pangalos had made explicit that “gestures” or “concessions” were to be avoided because they would result in further aggression. Papandreou, however, persisted despite incidents that appeared to confirm Pangalos’ views. A few days before the first round of talks on low politics issues between Greek and Turkish officials, Turkish military aircraft harassed the civilian aircraft that was transporting Minister for Transport Tasos Mandelis from Cyprus to Greece. Papandreou issued a statement, where he denounced the incident and argued that Turkey was giving out mixed signals. He made explicit, however, that the incident would not affect Greece’s efforts to pursue the improvement of Greco-Turkish relations\textsuperscript{411}.

Simitis’ understanding of the problem was quite distinct. While Simitis never argued that a Greek gesture would result in further aggressiveness, he did think gestures inadequate because Turkey would simply not respond. This is precisely what he indicated to US President Clinton, when the latter tried to convince Simitis to accept the draft of the Presidency Conclusions that Britain had prepared for the Cardiff European Council summit in June 1998, which implicitly identified Turkey as a candidate country. Simply granting Turkey candidate country status would be inadequate, especially shortly before an election in Turkey. Greco-Turkish relations had to be transformed into EU-Turkey relations. This was the central element of Simitis’ strategy and it was not affected by the earthquakes and their impact. While Papandreou had argued that the earthquake in Turkey had created a “historic opportunity”\textsuperscript{412} for the improvement of Greco-Turkish relations, when asked whether the earthquake

\textsuperscript{409} “George’s New Line on the Aegean”, Eleftherotypia, 24 September 1999
\textsuperscript{410} Ker-Lindsay, Crisis and Conciliation..., op. cit. p. 9
\textsuperscript{412} George A. Papandreou, Interview with Christina Poulidou, Avyi, 29 August 1999
constituted such an opportunity, Simitis responded: “I would say that the earthquake cannot be seen as an opportunity at all. That would cheapen our policy”\(^{413}\). Similarly, during a speech in October 1999 he stated: “The recent earthquakes in Turkey and Greece caused moving acts of help and solidarity. All this opens roads of friendship between peoples. However, there should be no confusion between humanitarian aid at a time of disaster and the exercise of foreign policy”\(^{414}\).

**The lack of US influence**

While Greek foreign policy makers were particularly concerned about Turkey’s policy, their calculations were not significantly affected by US policy. The evidence shows that the role the US played during this period was not causally significant, despite the fact that the US was particularly proactive and pressure on Greece rose considerably. Despite the fact that the literature has largely overlooked the role of the US, Greek foreign policy makers have acknowledged the US as a relevant actor, yet they did not consider eliciting support from the EU as a balancing act against US support for Turkey. Simitis has indeed discussed Greco-Turkish relations in the post-Cold War era in relation to the US. He seems to acknowledge the significance of great power politics for smaller states, as theorised by structural realism. Yet he also emphasises agency in the form of states’ initiatives. He has drawn attention to Turkey’s attempts to find “new roles” in the post-Cold War world, especially in the Middle East and in the former Soviet Republics, in an attempt to increase its geo-strategic significance. Greece’s balancing act had to be similar. Greece should not try to elicit EU support in response, but to claim a “new role” for itself in the Balkans\(^{415}\).

Simitis’ narrative of the Imia/Kardak crisis is interesting in this respect. In his memoirs, the Prime Minister explained that at some point during the crisis he suspected that Turkey’s goals might have been endorsed by the US. Eventually,


\(^{415}\) Simitis, “Relations...”, op. cit. pp. 159-160
however, he concluded that the US did not support Turkey’s demands and that “Turkey was probably acting on its own initiative”. The decisions he made in the aftermath of the crisis are even more instructive. “I decided”, he wrote, “that we should be constantly present in the EU and in the US”. Furthermore, on the flight to the US, he told reporters that he was going to ask of the US the same thing he had asked of EU member-states: “To help Turkey understand that aggression leads nowhere”. Finally, the Prime Minister has argued that during his meeting with US President Clinton, the latter adopted the Greek government’s approach without reservation.

Foreign Minister Pangalos has also made explicit that the US was not supporting Turkey. In fact, that had always been the problem: “It has been known for a long time that the US is keeping equal distances. And this is something we have repeatedly denied to accept. Because we believe that it is not a dispute between two similar parties. It is a dispute between a side that is based on international law and treaties and a side that uses violence and threat as a means of presence in international relations. This is why we believe that the US should discourage the attacker and the aggressor, which in this case are the Turks”. While the Foreign Minister was critical of US policy, government spokesman Reppas thought it justified. US policy, he stated, “cannot be identical to Greek positions for many reasons”.

While occasionally US mediation followed the Greek government’s preferences fairly closely, Greek and US policy towards Turkey, especially with regard to EU-Turkey relations, often diverged. As was mentioned above, the Madrid Declaration – which was the final product of US Secretary of State Albright’s initiative – satisfied two of the conditions (denouncement of the threat of war and acceptance of the relevant international legal framework) that the Greek government had set as part of the first step of its step-by-step approach and, when American mediation resumed in September 1997, the US was also

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416 Simitis, Policy..., op. cit. pp. 65, 67
417 Y. Pantelakis, “Simitis: We Are Going To Determine The Country’s Role”, Eleftherotypia, 8 April 1996
418 Simitis, Policy..., op. cit. pp. 82-3
419 K. Adam, “Problems with Holbrook’s Visit”, Eleftherotypia, 3 February 1996
420 “Greek Understanding of US’ Equal Distances”, Eleftherotypia, 18 April 1996
supportive of the third condition (submission of the Imia/Kardak dispute to the ICJ), as the Secretary of State’s spokesman publicly stated and Foreign Minister Pangalos confirmed. During a press conference after a G7 summit in May 1998, however, US President Clinton argued that it was not possible “to solve one problem in isolation from the other” and that Greece and Turkey would have to make “difficult decisions”. The package deal that Clinton was implicitly referring to was precisely the type of settlement that the Greek government was trying to avoid, when it formulated its step-by-step approach. As Foreign Minister Pangalos put it: “Neither the notion of a package (consisting) of the Cyprus problem and Greco-Turkish relations, nor the notion of Greco-Turkish relations as a package of disputes (can be accepted). (Keep) the package far away from us. We do not accept (a) package and we do not collect it, no matter whom it is coming from”.

With regard to EU-Turkey relations, the US had indeed made explicit its support for Turkey’s inclusion in the process of enlargement. As Director for European Affairs at the National Security Council Philip Gordon put it, US pressure was “a persistent thorn in Europeans’ side until removed in Helsinki”. Similarly, when asked whether the impression that the Luxembourg decision was going to be revised was the result of US pressure, Deputy Foreign Minister Papandreou replied: “Yes, absolutely. This is absolutely certain because Europeans believe that Luxembourg is over, that is to say that there is a clear framework and that

422 Blair – Clinton – Santer, op cit
423 Adam K., “We Are Not a Grocery Store, We Do Not Accept the Package”, Eleftherotypia, 20 May 1998
beyond that it is a matter for Turkey itself to take the necessary steps and come close to Europe.”\textsuperscript{425}

The details of US President Clinton’s phone call that Prime Minister Simitis disclosed during the press conference after the Cardiff European Council summit made the divergence between Greek and US policy on EU-Turkey relations particularly visible. The US wanted Greece to allow the EU to acknowledge Turkey as a candidate country, while Greece remained unwilling to do so. The fact that the Greek government insisted on its veto shows that US activity did not translate into influence. Despite the direct involvement of US President Clinton, which was seen as highly inappropriate in Greece prompting US Ambassador Nicholas Burns to clarify that Clinton’s phone call had been misinterpreted\textsuperscript{426}, the position of the Greek government remained unchanged. The incident confirms the unresponsive style of Prime Minister Simitis. As he put it during the press conference, “when the President of the US calls the Prime Minister, caution is necessary, but we think that we are right.”\textsuperscript{427}

Finally, the divergence between Greek and US positions should not be overstated. Clinton did not simply ask Simitis to make a concession. He indicated that if the Greek government allowed progress in EU-Turkey relations, the US would subsequently put pressure on Turkey in return. Shortly before the Luxembourg European Council summit, British Prime Minister Blair had similarly suggested that Greece should accept Turkey’s participation in the European Conference and that Turkey would subsequently comply with the conditions that Greece had set. Simitis explained to Clinton, as he had explained to Blair, that he did not think it likely that Turkey would respond to such gestures or pressure, especially not when the Turkish government was facing an election.

Even after the Cardiff summit, the Greek government did not consider it necessary to pursue a balancing act against US support for Turkey. When it was pointed out to Deputy Foreign Minister Papandreou that US President Clinton had advocated in favour of Turkey’s candidacy, he argued that Greece had to

\textsuperscript{425} George A. Papandreou interview with Phevos Karzis, Flash 9.61, 21 May 1998
\textsuperscript{426} Stagos A., “Nicholas Burns: You Misinterpreted the Phone Call”, To Vima, 21 June 1998
\textsuperscript{427} Adam, “Clinton Stuck…”, op. cit.
continue to try and elicit the support of the US. “This is not the first time”, he argued, “that the Americans did this. Mr. Clinton had spoken with Mr. Kohl during a recent meeting he had with him and the new UN ambassador Mr. Holbrooke had repeatedly stressed the Europeans’ mistake in Luxembourg (these were his exact words). (Both) the Foreign Ministry (and) I...had repeatedly criticised those statements, saying that they do not help Turkey understand that Europe is seriously setting these conditions so that she can move herself closer to the EU. I think that these are wrong tactics, which do not help Turkey...but also undermine a systematic policy that the EU is trying to develop”428. “US positions”, he concluded, “are known and we (often) disagree with these positions. This does not mean, however, that we do not have contacts with everyone and that we do not ask (them) to promote our positions and I would say the opposite, Greece is obliged – this is the Foreign Ministry’s responsibility – to discuss with everyone and promote her positions with everyone, whatever their position is”429. In fact, it was reported in the press that shortly before the Helsinki summit Foreign Minister Papandreou asked US Secretary of State Albright to try and convince Greece’s EU counterparts to accept Greece’s positions. Finally, even though US policy makers were primarily concerned with Turkey’s inclusion in the process of enlargement and not the Copenhagen criteria or the additional conditions that Greece wished to introduce, the US put considerable pressure on Turkey to accept the agreement reached in Helsinki that had incorporated Greek conditions430.

As was mentioned above, Pangalos has argued that Papandreou’s initiatives were taken for the purpose of satisfying American requests and constituted deviations from PASOK’s foreign policy positions. Pangalos’ assessment of the government’s policy is not entirely accurate. While bilateral negotiations on low-politics issues have never featured prominently in Greek policy towards Turkey, they were not unprecedented. PASOK governments under Andreas Papandreou had pursued such negotiations in the early 1980s, despite the fact that they

428 George A. Papandreou interview with Phoebos Karzis, Flash 9,61, 19 June 1998
429 Ibid.
430 Interviews with high-ranking Greek government official, 2 April 2008, advisor to Foreign Minister Papandreou, 12 May 2008, Greek diplomat, 14 March 2008
remained unwilling to negotiate with Turkey over territorial issues. Furthermore, bilateral negotiations on low-politics issues in 1999 were neither the outcome of American mediation, nor that of a Greek initiative. They were based on a proposal by Turkish Foreign Minister Cem for cooperation in the fight against terrorism, which Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou had proposed should be extended to other low-politics issues as well. Finally, the content of the negotiations was different from the issues that the US had raised, as they included neither bilateral territorial disputes, nor EU-Turkey relations.

It follows from the above that Greek foreign policy makers were primarily concerned with the implications of Turkey's policy towards Greece, not US support for Turkey. In contrast to what the balancing thesis predicts, however, there is little evidence that the policy problem was defined as a guns-or-butter dilemma. While the implications of increasing defence expenditure constituted a cause for concern within the government, this was mostly a concern of the Finance Ministry rather than the Foreign Ministry. In fact, few foreign policy makers identified the economic implications of Greek policy towards Turkey as a significant aspect of the problem, while most did not identify them as a reason why foreign policy change should be pursued. Finally, policy makers who worked closely with Simitis point out that his commitment to the pursuit of communitisation was such that he would have pursued it even if Greece could easily afford to allocate considerable amounts of resources to building up its military capabilities.

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431 Valinakis, op. cit. p. 215
432 For a similar assessment of the role of the US in 1999 see Ker-Lindsay, Crisis and Conciliation..., op. cit. p. 117; According to Ker-Lindsay, “the United States appeared to be relatively insignificant” during 1999.
433 Interview with member of the Cabinet, 17 March 2008
434 Interviews with high-ranking Greek government official, 2 April 2008 and Greek Foreign Ministry official, 15 May 2008. As will be shown in the following chapters, even those who argue that this was a significant aspect of the problem make explicit that the Helsinki strategy did not constitute an alternative to defence expenditure and therefore it did not address the guns-or-butter dilemma.
436 Interviews with Greek government official, 5 May 2008 and advisor to Prime Minister Simitis, 14 July 2008
Finally, in contrast to what the socialisation thesis predicts, Greek foreign policy makers did not begin to identify Turkish violations of substantive EU foreign policy norms as a problem for the first time during the period under investigation. Greece had criticised the Turkish regime long before the Helsinki strategy was formulated\textsuperscript{437}. Turkey's weak democratic regime and human rights violations, however, were seen as further reasons why Turkey should not be allowed to develop its relations with the EC/EU further. It is instructive to note that during the June 1995 Cannes European Council, French President Jacques Chirac proposed that the Turkish Prime Minister should be invited to attend the Madrid summit in December 1995 and Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez supported the proposal. Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, however, categorically rejected it citing not only Turkish policy towards Greece and Cyprus, but also human rights violations\textsuperscript{438}. Consequently, the understanding of this particular aspect of the problem that Turkey posed remained constant and therefore it cannot explain change in Greek policy\textsuperscript{439}.

Conclusions

The evidence showed that Simitis had defined the policy problem in an idiosyncratic manner that deviated from the norm prior to his election as Prime Minister. According to Simitis, Turkey's aggressive behaviour towards Greece had indeed caused problems in Greco-Turkish relations, yet the fact that those problems remained unresolved was partly the result of the lack of an effective Greek strategy. Not only had Simitis identified policy failure prior to his election as Prime Minister, but he had also selected the strategy that he believed Greece ought to pursue. Simitis' internal, pre-conceived notion of communitisation comprised the transformation of Greco-Turkish relations into EU-Turkey relations in the sense of the establishment of EU rules for Turkey's behaviour towards Greece. Simitis remained unequivocally committed to the pursuit of communitisation during the period under investigation and in fact he intended to

\textsuperscript{437} Valinakis, op. cit. p. 256
\textsuperscript{438} For Papandreou's statements see Athens News Agency Bulletin, No 624, 28 June 1995
\textsuperscript{439} As will be shown in the following chapters, Greek foreign policy makers did not become convinced that this course of action constituted an inappropriate response to this problem.
reduce what he perceived as an excessive responsiveness of Greek policy to external developments.

In contrast to what the Europeanisation thesis predicts, the Imia/Kardak crisis did not prompt a search for a new policy towards Turkey. In fact, Simitis had selected communitisation as his preferred policy prior to the establishment of enlargement conditionality at the EU level. Consequently, the latter could not have affected his considerations and his decision to pursue communitisation cannot be attributed to an assessment of EU level developments. In contrast to what the socialisation thesis predicts, Greek foreign policy makers did not begin to identify Turkish violations of substantive EU foreign policy norms as a problem for the first time during the period under investigation. In contrast to what the balancing thesis predicts, the policy previously pursued was not considered an effective policy, which could not accommodate economic policy goals. Despite the unparalleled US position in the international system during the period under investigation, American diplomatic activity did not translate into influence.

While Papandreou firmly supported the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations, Pangalos appeared more reluctant. While he did not object to communitisation in principle, he was unwilling to make concessions in order to achieve it. Nonetheless, Pangalos’ views as a constraining factor have been overstated. As will be shown in the next chapter, Greece did make concessions while Pangalos was Foreign Minister and it was approximately four months after Pangalos’ resignation that the Helsinki strategy – the final phase of communitisation – was formulated.
Chapter 6: Framing Alternatives

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to establish the alternative courses of action Greek foreign policy makers considered. According to the balancing thesis, Greek foreign policy makers distinguished between a policy based on increased defence expenditure that would allow Greece to build up its military capabilities (internal balancing) and a policy based on EU support for its positions on Greco-Turkish relations (external balancing). Both explanations that conceptualise change in Greek policy towards Turkey as the outcome of Europeanisation predict that Greek foreign policy makers distinguished between the policy previously pursued, which was based on preventing progress in EU-Turkey relations until Turkey had complied with Greek demands, and EU enlargement conditionality, which was based on granting applicant states candidate country status prior to compliance with EU conditions and promising payment of the reward of accession once the conditions had been met. In contrast, the leadership style thesis predicts that Greek foreign policy makers distinguished between the policy previously pursued and Prime Minister Simitis’ preferred course of action, that is to say allowing progress in EU-Turkey relations only within a framework of EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece and regardless of whether Turkey would be offered EU rewards.

The evidence is consistent with that presented in the previous chapter. The Prime Minister’s notion of “communitisation” framed the alternatives Greek foreign policy makers considered. Based on this notion, Greece pursued and secured four EU decisions that allowed EU-Turkey relations to develop further and established EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece despite the fact that Turkey had not complied with Greek demands: the 15 July 1996 EU statement, the member-states’ common position for the 29 April 1997 EU-Turkey Association Council, the December 1997 Luxembourg European Council decision and the December 1999 Helsinki European Council decision.
In contrast to what both explanations that conceptualise change in Greek policy towards Turkey as the outcome of Europeanisation predict, the first two of these decisions did not offer Turkey a reward payable upon compliance with Greek demands and while the third did offer a reward (participation in the European Conference), the latter was different from and much less significant than the reward of accession. Similarly, Greek foreign policy makers did not identify EU enlargement conditionality as a relevant EU practice that was different from Greek policy and that might be more appropriate or more effective. In contrast to what the balancing thesis predicts, the first three of the above decisions were pursued and secured at a time when reducing defence expenditure was considered unthinkable. Similarly, Greek foreign policy makers – including those few who identified the economic costs of Greek policy towards Turkey as a significant aspect of the problem that Turkey posed – did not consider the Helsinki strategy an alternative to defence expenditure and therefore the Helsinki strategy could not address the guns-or-butter dilemma. More significantly, the Helsinki strategy was formulated in June 1999, when it was believed that the success of macroeconomic stabilisation had rendered Greece’s accession to EMU fairly certain. As Simitis believed that successful economic policies increase bargaining power in the EU, it was decided that Greece was in a powerful bargaining position that would allow it to pursue the culmination of the policy that it had been pursuing since 1996.

As the leadership style thesis predicts, as soon as Greece successfully pursued the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations at the level of the European Council in December 1997, it became most unwilling to consider any revision of the framework for EU-Turkey relations constructed in Luxembourg. The Helsinki strategy was only formulated in June 1999 when it became clear that the communitisation that Greece had achieved in Luxembourg could not produce the desired results. Despite that fact and as the leadership style thesis predicts, Simitis was willing to pursue the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations further, in the sense of pursuing the establishment of additional EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece.
As was shown in the previous chapter, Simitis believed that the reason why Greco-Turkish relations had failed to improve was the lack of an effective Greek policy and in particular a strategy that would pursue the transformation of Greco-Turkish relations into EU-Turkish relations. Such a strategy would by definition require Greece to allow Turkey to maintain some sort of relations with the EU. Inevitably, Simitis' understanding of the policy problem raised the question of whether it would be best for Greece if Turkey were included in the integration process. In contrast to the logic the policy previously pursued was based on, Simitis believed that it would be best for Greece if Turkey were allowed to develop its relations with the EU. Indeed, while discussing Greece’s alternatives with reference to Turkey’s relations with the Community in 1993, Simitis indicated that isolating Turkey might not be the most effective option. “Greece”, he argued, “must decide whether it accepts Turkey’s closer cooperation and communication with European organisations or not. [This] connection will mean compliance with the principles and rules of these organisations as compensation. It should decide whether such a strategy is more effective for the prospect of peace and security than that of isolation or attempting to isolate Turkey from European developments.

A further implication of Simitis’ preference for the transformation of Greco-Turkish relations into EU-Turkey relations was the increased relevance and significance that the preferences of Greece’s EU partners assumed. During the period when Greek governments did not wish to allow progress in EU-Turkey relations, the preferences of Greece’s EU partners on the precise nature of the latter were largely irrelevant, as the decision-making rule of unanimity and the right to veto progress in EU-Turkey relations allowed Greek governments to disregard them. Communitisation, however, required the precise nature of EU-Turkey relations – into which Greco-Turkish relations were going to be incorporated – to be compatible with the preferences of Greece’s EU partners.

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40 Interview with advisor to Prime Minister Simitis, 21 March 2008
41 Simitis, “Relations...”, op. cit. p. 161
42 This implication of Simitis' notion of communitisation is particularly relevant today, as the preferences of Greece’s EU partners on EU-Turkey relations appear to have changed. This issue
In the aftermath of the Imia/Kardak crisis, the alternatives available to the Greek government appeared limited. According to the Greek government's interpretation of the crisis, Turkey intended to cause limited armed conflict in the Aegean, which in turn would trigger an international intervention that would result in Greece being forced to accept negotiations on the issues that Turkey had raised regarding the Aegean. Greece remained unwilling to accept such negotiations and preferred a judicial settlement instead. As the EU-Turkey Customs Union Agreement had already entered into force, the Greek government decided to exercise its right to veto the only remaining aspect of EU-Turkey relations, the release of EU financial assistance to Turkey and the meeting of the EU-Turkey Association Council. The exercise of the right to veto progress in EU-Turkey relations would provide the Greek government with the time necessary for the pursuit of the transformation of Greco-Turkish relations into EU-Turkey relations. From that point onwards, Greek policy can be seen as a consistent attempt to break from the practice of vetoing progress in EU-Turkey relations and pursue communitisation. Indeed, the implementation of Simitis' preferred policy began immediately, as the Greek government attempted to have a statement that identified the issue of the islets as one that concerned the EU adopted by the Council. As was mentioned above, the British government eventually vetoed the adoption of the statement. At the same time, the prevalent interpretation of the crisis coupled with Simitis' belief that Greek policy towards Turkey had previously been excessively reactive led to a calculated moderation in Greece's response, which in turn prompted criticism.

Simitis assumed an active role in the implementation of communitisation. He started touring EU member-states' capitals (February-April 1996) in an attempt to convince his counterparts that the problem Greece was facing should concern the EU. The arguments he made during his visits to EU capitals were quite instructive. In contrast to what both explanations that conceptualise change in

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is discussed more extensively in chapter 8.

443 As a Brussels-based Greek diplomat pointed out to the author (18 April 2008), had the decision of the European Parliament on the EU-Turkey Customs Union not been delayed until December 1995, the regulation on EU financial assistance to Turkey would have already been passed and not even this option would have been available.
Greek policy towards Turkey as the outcome of Europeanisation predict, Simitis did not seem to acknowledge an established EU practice that might be more effective or more appropriate than Greek policy. On the contrary, he was stressing the need for EU rules to be established. After a meeting with Belgian Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene in February 1996, he stated: “There should be a common policy of Europe towards the policy of third countries”\(^4\)\(^4\)\(^4\). He mentioned in his memoirs that he stressed the exact same point to Prime Minister John Major during his visit to London: it was imperative that the EU formulated certain common rules on relations with third countries\(^4\)\(^5\). Stressing the need for such rules indicates that the Prime Minister identified no relevant established EU practice. He did not acknowledge enlargement conditionality as a relevant EU practice even when he was specifically discussing Turkey’s prospects of accession. During the European Council summit in Florence, he remarked: “The European Union is obliged to formulate a common policy in order to deal with the dangers one of its member-states is facing, the borders of which are being threatened by another country, which aspires to follow a European route and upgrade its relations with the European Union by a Customs Union today and by becoming a member tomorrow”\(^4\)\(^4\)\(^6\). The situation is described quite accurately, yet, in contrast to what both explanations that conceptualise change in Greek policy towards Turkey as the outcome of Europeanisation predict, enlargement conditionality is not identified as a relevant EU practice.

Whilst pursuing the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations, the Greek government suggested the so-called “step-by-step approach” to Turkey. According to the first step, Turkey should abandon its claim on the Imia islets or submit the issue to the ICJ. If Turkey took this first step, Greece would allow the release of EU financial assistance to Turkey. The proposal proved quite controversial. Greece was offering Turkey an option (submission of the issue to the ICJ), which was considered a deviation from traditional Greek policy towards Turkey\(^4\)\(^7\). Greek foreign policy makers argued that offering Turkey this option

\(^{45}\) Simitis, Policy..., op. cit. pp. 83-4
\(^{46}\) “They Listened...but Major Did Not”, Eleftherotypia, 22 June 1996
\(^{47}\) According to Petros Molyviatis, “it is as if you were telling someone who is claiming your house that I will pay you if you go to court in order to take my house”; Petros Molyviatis, Speech in Parliament, 29 January 1999
was the only way to address the matter, unless Greece became willing to accept bilateral negotiations. It was believed that the latter should be avoided because Turkey had previously raised an increasing number of issues during bilateral negotiations in the second half of the 1970s in what was perceived in Greece as an attempt to maximise its gains from a redistribution of control over the Aegean.

It soon became clear that the step-by-step approach was of secondary significance compared with communitisation. In July 1996, the Greek veto of EU financial assistance to Turkey within the context of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation was lifted in exchange for the 15 July 1996 EU statement. The Greek veto was lifted despite the fact that Turkey had not taken the first step prescribed by the step-by-step approach. On the contrary, it had even raised the issue of sovereignty over Gavdos – a small Greek island to the south of Crete – within the context of NATO. As the leadership style thesis predicts, Greece was willing to lift its veto because EU rules for Turkey's behaviour towards Greece were established at the EU level as Simitis' notion of communitisation prescribed. Indeed, the EU expressed the Greek view that territorial disputes should be submitted to the ICJ and the Council requested the Presidency to invite Turkey to indicate whether it committed itself to a judicial settlement of the dispute. In contrast to what the Europeanisation thesis predicts, this particular decision that Greece secured offered Turkey no reward and therefore no incentive to comply with Greek demands. On the contrary a reward was being paid to Turkey and therefore this particular decision is not consistent with the Europeanisation thesis.

Simitis appeared to be assuming a more uncompromising stance during the September 1996 election campaign. "We should be cautious", he said, "and try to develop diplomatic initiatives that put Turkey in the corner and we have

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48 Christos Rozakis, Speech in Parliament, 6 December 1996. It should be noted that despite the fact that this first step regarding the Imia islets was considered a precondition for any policy of improvement of Greco-Turkish relations, Greece subsequently proposed bilateral negotiations on low-politics issues in June 1999 despite the fact that Turkey had not taken this step. According to Foreign Minister Papandreou, this change of tactics became possible when Turkey ceased to insist on negotiations over all issues; see George A. Papandreou interview with Costas Iordanidis, Kathimerini, 5 July 1999
managed that⁴⁴⁹. As was mentioned above, he also made an unusually strongly phrased statement regarding the Greek military response in case of a Turkish attack. These statements should be understood within the context of two factors: the domestic critique of the government's policy as one that lacked determination and the perceived escalation of Turkish territorial claims. Simitis' statements served as a deterrent by stressing the costs that Turkey would suffer if it decided to attack Greece and also as an attempt to dilute the impression that the government lacked resolve.

In the aftermath of the election and while Foreign Minister Pangalos was stating that the government was not considering any differentiation in its policy and that it was waiting for a response from Turkey, Simitis was preparing the next step of communitisation⁴⁵⁰. The Greek government consented to a meeting of the EU-Turkey Association Council, despite the fact that Turkey had not offered the commitment that the 15 July 1996 EU statement required. Having secured an EU statement that identified submission to the ICJ as the appropriate method to resolve territorial disputes – which was reiterated in the member-states’ common position for the meeting of the Association Council – the Greek government was willing to involve the EU further, as Simitis' notion of communitisation prescribed. It was decided that the Presidency would facilitate the efforts of individuals appointed by the two governments to write a report with procedural recommendations regarding the resolution of Greco-Turkish problems. In contrast to what both explanations that conceptualise change in Greek policy towards Turkey as the outcome of Europeanisation predict and as was the case with the 15 July 1996 EU statement, this decision offered Turkey no reward – and therefore no incentive to comply with Greek demands – either. During a debate in Parliament a few days after the meeting of the Association Council, Deputy Foreign Minister Papandreou defended the idea that Greece could engage in dialogue with Turkey without negotiating its sovereign rights. This purpose was served by meetings between Greek and Turkish officials – especially within the context of the EU – and the initiative of the Dutch Presidency within the

⁴⁴⁹ P. Sokos, “Simitis Raises The Danger of the Right”, Eleftherotypia, 10 September 1996
⁴⁵⁰ “They Agreed on Everything, They Did Not Cover Rozakis”, Eleftherotypia, 9 November 1996
context of which only procedural issues and not the substance of Greco-Turkish
problems would be discussed\textsuperscript{451}.

In an article published in June 1997, Deputy Foreign Minister Papandreou
discussed Greece's alternatives extensively: "We have the responsibility and the
obligation to answer the question of whether we accept being from now on
passive by-standers in developments in the relationship between Europe and
Turkey and simply resort from time to time to an outburst of vetoes (which are
usually overcome in a multitude of ways) or we want to be present everywhere
and co-shape this relationship"\textsuperscript{452}. Papandreou's language echoes Simitis' idea
about the necessity of Greece's "presence" on the international scene and,
especially, in the EU, which was necessary in order to achieve the transformation
of Greco-Turkish problems into a problem between the EU and Turkey. Indeed,
Papandreou made this explicit, when he argued in favour of the meetings
between Greek foreign policy makers and their Turkish counterparts and the
reiteration of Greek positions at the EU level. "I think", he concluded, "that what
we should stress is that at the moment we have managed to give through the
European Union a different dimension to Greco-Turkish problems because
Greek problems are in the end Euro-Turkish problems and I think that this is a
big success"\textsuperscript{453}. This policy was distinguished from "the miserable contentment
of self-inflicted isolationism that castrates our ability to historically shape
developments in the EU"\textsuperscript{454}.

Simitis' discussion of Greece's alternatives is quite instructive. During a speech
in Parliament in November 1997, he reiterated his opposition to the view that
Greece was a status quo power that should pursue a defensive policy: "In foreign
policy, dear colleagues, there are usually two options. The first option is that of
motionlessness, the detachment from developments...the attitude of proud
isolation, which is also presented as a safe option because superficially it does
not impose any cost on those who forgo any action"\textsuperscript{455}. Simitis' critical tone

\textsuperscript{451} George A. Papandreou, Speech in Parliament, 15 May 1997
\textsuperscript{452} G. A. Papandreou, "Greece, Europe and Turkey", \textit{To Vima}, 1 June 1997
\textsuperscript{453} George A. Papandreou, Speech in Parliament, 15 May 1997, emphasis added
\textsuperscript{454} Papandreou, "Greece, Europe...", op. cit.
\textsuperscript{455} Costas Simitis, Speech in Parliament, 6 November 1997
becomes clear, when he shifts to past tense. "At best, capabilities have been conceded, which are not being taken advantage of, opportunities have been missed, as others take the initiative. This proud isolation, this motionlessness is always paid with the retreat of national interests under circumstances of significant developments and results in defeats". "We have chosen", he continued, "the only road that produces results in foreign policy, the aggressive initiative, motion and not motionlessness...If you move and have presence, you matter, they take you into consideration, you are not being bypassed, you are not being ignored". Simitis concluded that his government's pro-active policy had resulted in the 15 July 1996 EU statement and the member-states' common position for the 29 April 1997 EU-Turkey Association Council, which had strengthened Greece's position and that Turkey's behaviour was the result of its inability to influence the EU.

In accordance with his expressly stated preference for a pro-active policy, Simitis pursued communitisation further during the Luxembourg European Council summit in December 1997. The decision made in Luxembourg can be conceptualised as an early incorporation of the EU practice of reinforcement by reward into Greek policy towards Turkey. A reward was offered (participation in the European Conference) and conditions (acceptance of the resolution of outstanding disputes before the ICJ and respect for the right of other countries to accede to the EU) were outlined; upon compliance the reward would be paid, otherwise it would be withheld.

In his memoirs, the Prime Minister confirmed that communitisation took precedence over other initiatives that the Greek government pursued. He argued that his attempts to achieve rapprochement in a "traditional" fashion "could not under any circumstances resolve (Greco-Turkish) problems". Whilst discussing the Madrid Declaration, he argued that little became of it, since both Greece and Turkey "continued to insist on their positions", as his meeting with Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz in Crete confirmed. Rapprochement would be possible "only when the resolution of (Greco-Turkish) problems had

456 Ibid.
457 Simitis, Policy..., op. cit. p. 88
become compulsory for Turkey in order to achieve its broader goal, progress in its accession process\textsuperscript{458}. Yet the Prime Minister only discussed the conditions that Turkey would have to meet, not the offer of the reward of accession. He pointed out that the Presidency Conclusions of the Luxembourg summit marked the first time that the European Council was acknowledging submission to the ICJ as a possible way to resolve Greco-Turkish problems and that they transformed the “Greco-Turkish crisis into a Euro-Turkish dispute”\textsuperscript{459}. He did not even mention that the European Council decided to offer Turkey participation in the European Conference. The decision was not understood as one whereby Greece was for the first time allowing the EU to offer Turkey a reward (participation in the European Conference), but as the culmination of the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations, as rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece were established at the level of Heads of State and Government for the first time\textsuperscript{460}.

It is instructive to note the discrepancy between the Prime Minister’s understanding of the role of conditionality and that of the Commission. During the negotiations, the Prime Minister had tried to find support for Greece’s positions in the section of the Commission’s Agenda 2000 that discussed border disputes. According to the latter, “all candidate countries should therefore, before accession negotiations are completed, commit themselves unconditionally to compulsory jurisdiction, including advance ruling of the International Court of Justice in any present or future disputes of this nature”\textsuperscript{461}. During a press conference in London in November 1999, the Prime Minister explicitly referred to Hungary and Slovakia – the dispute between which over the dam on the Danube had been submitted to the ICJ and cited by the Commission in its communication – and asked: “why should not Turkey do the same?”\textsuperscript{462} A few days later, he reiterated this position during a speech in Parliament: “In the Commission’s communication for the ‘Agenda 2000’ it is mentioned that countries that want to participate in the European Union should state that they

\textsuperscript{458} Ibid. p. 89
\textsuperscript{459} Ibid. p. 90
\textsuperscript{460} Interview with high-ranking Greek government official, 2 April 2008
\textsuperscript{461} European Commission, \textit{Agenda 2000 Communication: For a Stronger and Wider Union}, 15 July 1997, p. 68
\textsuperscript{462} “Simitis: Turkey Is Also Thinking about Acceding”, \textit{Eleftherotypia}, 29 November 1997
accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in the Hague. We believe that this should also be a pre-condition for participation in the European Conference in the case of Turkey. Yet the Commission's understanding of the role of conditionality was rather different. The Commission pointed out that "enlargement should not mean importing border conflicts" and that the prospect of accession constituted a "powerful incentive" for the settlement of disputes. In contrast, the Prime Minister did not discuss the decision of the Luxembourg European Council in terms of incentives. In fact, participation in the European Conference without candidate country status was not a powerful incentive for Turkey. According to the Prime Minister, the significance of the decision lay in the fact the EU was getting involved in Greco-Turkish relations and Greco-Turkish problems were being transformed into Euro-Turkish problems, which was precisely what his vision for foreign policy reform prescribed.

The culmination of communitisation

The evidence shows that Greek foreign policy makers considered the decision made at the Luxembourg European Council summit a great success of their policy towards Turkey. At the start of the period under investigation, Prime Minister Simitis was repeatedly stressing the need for a set of common EU rules on Turkey's behaviour towards Greece. As the decision made in Luxembourg had established such rules, the Greek government became most unwilling to consider alternatives that would modify the framework agreed upon in Luxembourg. When asked what Greece's objections to Turkey's accession to the EU were in March 1998, Deputy Foreign Minister Papandreou replied: "I would like to point out that it is not unilateral Greek objections to Turkey's participation in the EU, but on the contrary the EU itself and the fifteen member-states have jointly formulated a framework of principles and conditions, on the fulfillment of which the enhancement of relations between Turkey and the EU and I would also say her future accession depends." This view was reiterated shortly before the Cardiff European Council summit, when Papandreou made explicit that the

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464 European Commission, Agenda 2000..., op. cit. p. 67
465 George A. Papandreou interview, Lidove Noviny, 1 March 1998, emphasis added
Luxembourg decision was not going to be modified and that Turkey was not ready to be upgraded to candidate country status. "Regarding Turkey, I can tell you very clearly that the Luxembourg decisions will not be reversed or distorted. The Luxembourg decisions were decisions of the "fifteen"...I think that the message is clear, not the Greek, but the European message to Turkey that she is not ready at the moment to be given the candidacy"\textsuperscript{466}.

It should be pointed out that in Luxembourg Greek foreign policy makers were not trying to keep Turkey away from the EU; they were simply trying to show it the way. During a speech in June 1998, Deputy Foreign Minister Papandreou recalled the "battle" Prime Minister Simitis had fought in Luxembourg in an attempt to formulate the conditions countries that wished to join the EU would have to meet and stated: "So today we say that \textit{there is a road to Europe for Turkey}. But with conditions...We say yes to that Turkey, which respects its neighbours, sovereign rights, the international legal order...which has the political courage to resolve justly, in accordance with UN resolutions, the Cyprus problem, but...Turkey...should know that there will be no road to the EU if these conditions are not fulfilled. \textit{And this is not only a Greek position any more. The significant success of this policy is that it is European}"\textsuperscript{467}. It has been argued that the Commission held a similar view of the decision made in Luxembourg. The latter was seen in Brussels as a "launching pad" for Turkey's accession rather than a "slammed door"\textsuperscript{468}.

As the explanation based on Simitis' leadership style predicts, Greece became most reluctant to consider alternatives to the status quo, once the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations was achieved at the highest political level in Luxembourg. In the face of Turkish military pressure, EU attempts to grant Turkey candidate country status and release financial assistance to Turkey and US interventions in favour of Turkey, the Greek government invariably continued to defend the Luxembourg decision. Whilst discussing the briefing of EU member-states' ambassadors in Athens regarding Turkish violations of Greek

\textsuperscript{466} George A. Papandreou, Press Conference, Athens, 12 June 1998, emphasis added
\textsuperscript{467} George A. Papandreou, Speech at the opening of the "Andreas G. Papandreou" Exhibition, Thessaloniki, 25 June 1998, emphasis added.
\textsuperscript{468} D. Barchard, "Turkey and the European Union", \textit{Centre for European Reform}, July 1998, p. 2
airspace, government spokesman Reppas stated: “We are pointing out that Turkey’s stance does not only concern Greece, but also the EU, since the EU with its decisions has defined the framework, within which, with Turkey’s compliance with specific terms and conditions, Euro-Turkish relations can be developed.” Similarly, when commenting on reports in the press, according to which British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook had told Commissioner Hans van den Broek that it was appalling that some rocks in the Mediterranean had brought the EU to a standstill, Reppas stated: “These reports implicitly recognise the powerful position of the Greek government, which for an issue that some third parties consider small and insignificant is fighting this battle successfully, since we have managed (to make) this issue a criterion for Euro-Turkish relations.”

As the Luxembourg decision had been received negatively – to say the least – in Turkey, EU member-states and the Commission attempted to release EU financial assistance to Turkey in an attempt to reverse the deterioration of EU-Turkey relations. The Greek government dismissed the proposals, arguing that EU-Turkey relations had already been appropriately defined. According to Deputy Foreign Minister Papandreou: “There are – admittedly – on certain issues (such as the financial protocol) different opinions on how to handle the matter tactically. Many of our partners believe that it is our contractual obligation to release the funds, despite Turkey’s behaviour. They are stressing that this will...contribute to (Turkey’s) participation in programmes that will ‘open up her eyes’ regarding her obligations towards Europe and towards Greece in particular. I think that they are too optimistic and of course they are not experiencing Turkey’s daily military pressure”. Papandreou conceded that some of Greece’s EU partners felt that Greece was “abusing its (right to) veto” with regard to EU financial assistance to Turkey. “This, however, is happening because...they do not believe that they can give Turkey anything more given the situation there today (i.e. human rights, Kurds, Cyprus) and they are seeking something to move forward in case they can entice Turkey with a good will gesture”. According to Papandreou, however, that was not necessary because Turkey had already been offered “a specific road to Europe”.

471 George A. Papandreou interview with Titos Kontopoulos, To Ethnos, 31 May 1998
Even Foreign Minister Pangalos, who had never explicitly committed himself to Simitis' preferred course of action, insisted on practical measures that would keep Greco-Turkish relations firmly placed within the context of EU-Turkey relations without requiring further concessions. When certain member-states and the Commission started to prioritise the release of EU financial assistance to Turkey, Pangalos insisted that the EU-Turkey Association Council should discuss both economic and political aspects of EU-Turkey relations, including Greco-Turkish relations\(^7\). Similarly, Deputy Foreign Minister Papandreou argued that Turkey could not have an exclusively "technical relationship" with the EU\(^3\) and that the political dialogue between Turkey and the EU should cover "all the issues that have been raised at various times, such as the Kurdish problem, (the) Cyprus (problem) and (the issue of) referring disputes to the International Court of Justice in The Hague"\(^4\).

While Greece had successfully pursued the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations, the latter did not have the desired effect. On the contrary, both EU-Turkey relations and Greco-Turkish relations deteriorated further. In fact, six months after the Luxembourg decision, which was greeted as a great success, Deputy Foreign Minister Papandreou argued that he was not particularly optimistic regarding Greco-Turkish relations and that he did not believe that Greece and Turkey were at that point any closer to a resolution of their problems than they had been two or three years earlier\(^5\). This unintended development created the additional problem of EU member-states and US pressure on Greece. On the one hand, Turkey's response to the Luxembourg decision was quite detrimental to the Greek policy of communitisation. As the decision made in Luxembourg constituted a "clear victory" for Greece, the EU could no longer be considered a "neutral party"\(^6\). Turkey interpreted the decision made in

\(^{72}\) K. Adam, ""Grey Zones' In...Environmental Cloak", *Eleftherotypia*, 28 April 1998

\(^{73}\) George A. Papandreou, Press Conference, Athens, 1 October 1998


\(^{75}\) George A. Papandreou interview to Titos Kontopoulos, *To Ethnos*, 31 May 1998

Luxembourg as evidence that confirmed its “profound suspicion of Western Europe”\(^{477}\). Not only did Turkey not comply with the conditions the European Council had set, but it also decided to suspend its political relations with the EU. Foreign Minister Pangalos identified the reversal of communitisation as Turkey’s objective. “The objective of Turkey’s foreign policy”, he argued during a speech in Parliament in January 1999, “is for Greco-Turkish disputes not to be an issue in Europe. She wants Greco-Turkish disputes to be one issue and Turkey’s relationship with Europe to be another”\(^{478}\).

On the other hand, Turkish policy appeared to be quite effective, despite Pangalos’ assertion that “the European Union, of course, and not just we, but also the big countries, do not want to concede this original and unprecedented association status to Turkey”\(^{479}\). France continued to press the matter, British Prime Minister Blair indicated that the decision made in Luxembourg had resulted in a misunderstanding, US President Clinton personally intervened during the Cardiff summit and at least since the election of a new government in September 1998 Germany appeared more willing to accept the Turkish candidacy, which it in fact proposed while it was holding the presidency of the Council during the first half of 1999. In Simitis and Papandreou’s terms a “virtual candidacy” for Turkey was proposed, that is to say a less restrictive and demanding framework for EU-Turkey relations\(^{480}\). Greece was most unwilling to accept such an arrangement because the latter would not allow it to preserve the EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece that Simitis’ notion of communitisation required. The member-states that were proposing a virtual candidacy for Turkey were undermining the binding character of the rules that Greece had managed to establish in Luxembourg. Papandreou made this explicit when he discussed the implications of US attempts to have the Luxembourg decision modified during the Cardiff summit. The conviction that the Luxembourg decision had transformed Greco-Turkish relations into EU-Turkey

\(^{477}\) P. Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War, Hurst & Company, London, 2003, pp. 100-12; For history as a determinant of Turkish foreign policy see also M. Aydin, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs”, Middle Eastern Studies, 35: 4, 1999

\(^{478}\) Theodore Pangalos, Speech in Parliament, 29 January 1999

\(^{479}\) Ibid.

\(^{480}\) Interviews with Greek Foreign Ministry official, 19 May 2008, advisors to Foreign Minister Papandreou, 27 March 2008 and 12 May 2008
relations was such that he referred to the costs that US policy imposed on the EU. “Asking for Turkey to join the EU”, he argued, “the US can make her proposal or exert her pressure because it is not going to cost the US anything. For Europe, however, which has proceeded in a deepening of institutions, the issues of human rights, of democratic procedures, of good neighbourliness, of Cyprus and several others such as Turkey’s economic problem will cost very much and they are very big issues for one to be able to speak easily and without consideration of a candidacy for Turkey”.481.

The situation the Prime Minister was facing appears to have been quite impossible. As one commentator put it: “If he voted for Turkish candidacy but with onerous conditions that could be interpreted by Ankara as being more than the conditions placed upon other candidate countries, he would risk Turkish rejection and a possible backlash. But he would also face a similar backlash from Turkey if he decided not to lift the veto. Meanwhile, if he was seen to be too lenient on Turkey, he would come under heavy criticism at home. This could even lead to electoral defeat. It appeared as if, no matter what route he chose to take, he would face an extraordinarily high political cost”.482.

Neither Turkey’s response to the Luxembourg decision, nor EU member-states and US pressure on Greece, however, challenged the logic Greek policy was based on. The undesirable effect of the Luxembourg decision did not challenge Simitis’ commitment to the EU as the “default arena” for Greek policy towards Turkey, where EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece should be established. The fact that Greece continued to pursue the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations in the aftermath of the Luxembourg decision shows that Greek policy towards Turkey was primarily determined by this internal logic and not by contextual variables.

When asked to comment on the Helsinki summit during the press conference after the Cologne summit, Prime Minister Simitis stated: “There is a decision (according to which) the whole issue of enlargement will be discussed in

481 George A. Papandreou interview with Phevos Karzis, Flash 9.61, 19 June 1998
482 Ker-Lindsay, Crisis and Conciliation..., op. cit. pp. 95-6
Helsinki. And relations (between) Greece-Turkey are part of the issue of enlargement\textsuperscript{483}. The Helsinki strategy was formulated in June 1999 shortly after the Cologne European Council summit\textsuperscript{484}. The problem was that, despite the fact that Greece had succeeded in pursuing the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations, thus producing an *acquis* of EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece, and also in resisting efforts to modify this *acquis*, Turkey had not changed its policy and thus the framework did not suffice to resolve Greco-Turkish problems in a manner consistent with the Greek government’s preferences. An alternative was sought that would constitute *the culmination of the policy of communitisation* in the sense of establishing *additional EU rules* for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece, including a specific timeframe for Turkey’s compliance and provisions regarding the course of action that the EU would take in case of non-compliance. Candidate country status for Turkey could be exchanged for an EU decision that would incorporate the conditions previously set out and an additional provision, according to which unless Greco-Turkish problems were resolved within a specific timeframe, the matter would have to be submitted to the ICJ, thus creating an even more restrictive framework\textsuperscript{485}.

In sharp contrast to what the balancing thesis predicts, at that stage it was believed that even though the official decision had not been made, it was fairly clear that the policy of macroeconomic stabilisation had been successful and that Greece would be able to join EMU\textsuperscript{486}. As was shown in the previous chapter, Simitis believed that a successful economic policy was a source of bargaining power in the EU. In this sense, the success of macroeconomic stabilisation had improved Greece’s bargaining position and it had made it possible for the government to extract from its partners the concessions that the further communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations required. Simitis explained this shortly after the Helsinki summit: “The economic record we achieved during all these years was significant for our external relations; for the outcome in Helsinki

\textsuperscript{483} Simitis, Press Conference, Cologne European Council summit, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{484} Simitis, *Policy...,* op. cit. p. 91; Interviews with high-ranking Greek government official, 2 April 2008, advisors to the Prime Minister, 21 March 2008 and 14 July 2008; see also George A. Papandreou interview with Dimitris Konstantakopoulos, *O Cosmos tou Ependyti*, 22 July 2006
\textsuperscript{485} Interview with high-ranking Greek government official, 02 April 2008
\textsuperscript{486} Interviews with advisor to Prime Minister Simitis, 21 March 2008 and high-ranking Greek government official, 02 April 2008
and the support of our fourteen partners\textsuperscript{487}. The outcome of the Berlin European Council negotiations over the Community Support Framework 2000-2006 was considered an indication of Greece's improved bargaining position\textsuperscript{488}. Furthermore, Greece could benefit from the intensity of other EU member-states' preferences. In the aftermath of the Cologne European Council summit, Greek foreign policy makers discerned an increase in the intensity of their EU counterparts' preference for upgrading Turkey to candidate country status\textsuperscript{489}. As relative bargaining power is inversely proportionate to preference intensity, this development had also improved Greece's bargaining position. Finally, Greek foreign policy makers often point out that considerable effort was required in order to convince both Turkey and EU member-states of the sincerity of Greece's intentions. A substantial as opposed to a virtual candidacy would also serve this purpose.

Shortly afterwards, the Greek government indicated that it would be willing to consent to the Turkish candidacy provided that it was a substantial one\textsuperscript{490}. Despite the fact that the Greek government had repeatedly asked Turkey to facilitate Greek support for the Turkish candidacy by taking steps towards compliance with the conditions the EU had previously set out, the Greek government had also made explicit that any such response from Turkey would not be sufficient for Greece to support the Turkish candidacy. The EU would have to agree on a framework, according to which Turkey would have to comply with EU conditions within a specific timeframe. When it was pointed out to Foreign Minister Papandreou in October 1999 that it was unclear whether Greece was asking something from Turkey or from its partners or nothing at all, he replied: "I think (that), always under certain conditions I should stress, which we are currently negotiating, (it) is...(in) the national interest...to place (Turkey) on

\textsuperscript{487} Constantine Simitis, Speech in Parliament, 21 December 1999
\textsuperscript{488} Simitis, Policy..., op. cit. p. 91; Interview with high-ranking Greek government official, 2 April 2008
\textsuperscript{489} Interviews with advisor to Prime Minister Simitis, 14 July 2008 and Greek Foreign Ministry official, 19 May 2008
\textsuperscript{490} It is often pointed out (interviews with member of the Cabinet, 7 May 2008, high-ranking Greek government official, 2 April 2008 and high-ranking Foreign Ministry official, 15 May 2008) that once the Helsinki strategy was formulated, preparations for the Helsinki summit were extensive. As an advisor to Prime Minister Simitis pointed out to the author (14 July 2008), Foreign Minister Papandreou pursued the implementation of the Helsinki strategy most competently.
a specific road that has specific steps that she must take, specific frameworks within which she must move, specific conditions that she must meet...in order to move from one step to the next. *This framework is not going to be a framework that only Greece will adopt, but (one that) the fifteen countries will adopt together and together the fifteen we will move in unison*491. “What we are saying”, he remarked a few days before the summit, “is that if you, our partners, want Turkey to be a candidate, this means that the EU is assuming obligations, is assuming responsibilities and it must commit (itself) to dealing with the real issues that exist. Greco-Turkish (problems) are not bilateral problems, they are problems that will be related to a member-state of the EU and a candidate country. Therefore, should relations between these two countries not be governed by European principles, such as...use of the ICJ for the issue of the continental shelf? If our partners agree on these issues...we will be positive. If they simply want to give Turkey a virtual, not substantial candidacy, we will be negative...During these past few months, Greece has built half, perhaps more than half, the bridge to cross this river. Now it is their turn to build the other half of this bridge so that we can cross the issue of the candidacy together492.

Despite the fact that Prime Minister Simitis made explicit his intention to avoid public statements regarding the details of the government’s positions493, he discussed the matter extensively after a meeting with Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen a few days before the summit. He reiterated his view that isolating Turkey from the EU was not in Greece’s best interest. As Simitis had indicated as early as in 1993, it would be more effective for Greece to allow Turkey’s participation in the integration process because that would lead to compliance with the rules and principles of the EU. “We do not believe”, he argued, “that isolating Turkey...refusing to (allow Turkey to) participate in a process that leads to compliance with the very rules that we seek to govern our

491 George A. Papandreou interview with Pavlos Tsimas, *Flash 9,61,* 27 October 1999, emphasis added
492 George A. Papandreou interview with Yannis Roubatis, *Flash 9,61,* 7 December 1999, emphasis added; see also George A. Papandreou interview with Jan Skoda, *Pravda,* 4 October 1999
493 E. D. Karanasopoulou, “Tampere Lit Fires”, *Ta Nea,* 16 October 1999; Y. Pantelakis, “Yes, but...on Turkey”, *Eleftherotypia,* 16 October 1999
relations is in Greece’s interest regarding her relation with Turkey\(^{494}\). Despite references to the positive impact that existing rules would have, Simitis made explicit that further rules would have to be established that would make Turkey’s obligations and the role of the EU in case of non-compliance explicit. “Turkey’s participation in the processes of European unification, however, will lead to problems, tensions and will not allow the realisation of the goal for which participation is sought, if there are no clear positions on pending problems. Clear positions on what the rules of the game are regarding issues, which have arisen in the past or may arise in the future. Clear positions on the behaviour of all parties involved, so that we will be led to solutions – if there are problems – and not to deadlocks...Greece does not want to face challenges of its sovereign rights, without having made explicit and accepted by everyone what the most effective way to resolve the challenges is\(^{495}\). On the same day, government spokesman Reppas made this explicit: “We do not expect (anything) in return from Turkey. We have made this clear\(^{496}\). The stance of the Greek government remained unchanged even after Turkish Foreign Minister Cem stated that Turkey was committed to harmonising its conduct with Agenda 2000 rules regarding the settlement of territorial disputes. The Turkish government was offering a verbal commitment to the principle of the judicial settlement of disputes. Only hours later, Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou greeted Cem’s statement as a “significant commitment”, yet he insisted that it should be incorporated in the Helsinki summit’s Presidency Conclusions\(^{497}\).

Finally, despite the fact that Commission President Romano Prodi was publicly stating in October 1999 that Turkey was a candidate country\(^{498}\), the Greek

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\(^{495}\) Ibid., emphasis added

\(^{496}\) Briefing of political editors and members of the foreign press by the Minister for Press and Mass Media and Government Spokesman Dimitris Reppas, Athens, 2 December 1999


government made it clear that vetoing the Turkish candidacy was still an alternative, which Greece would have to select, if the EU refused to establish additional rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece. At the end of October, Foreign Minister Papandreou denied “in the most emphatic fashion” reports on Turkish television network CNN-Turk, according to which he had announced Greece’s unconditional support for the Turkish candidacy. At the end of November, he stated: “We have a tough negotiation before us in Helsinki. The negotiation is not finished. Therefore, our position on whether we will say yes or no to the Turkish candidacy is not given, it is open and of course it will be determined by the final draft, the final positions and commitments of the EU on a series of issues that pertain to the nature and the texture of the Turkish candidacy, but also to securing significant Greek interests.” A few days later, Papandreou also made clear that the Greek government would defer the decision until later if it had to. “There are other Presidencies in the EU”, he stated, “and therefore opportunities to find a better solution.” In an article published a few days before the Helsinki summit, Papandreou reiterated the government’s position. “Both Greco-Turkish relations and the Cyprus problem”, he argued,
“are part of the broader framework of Euro-Turkish relations. It is our success that these issues have returned to their ‘natural river bed’, which is the European Union. Consequently, it is not just us, but it is the Union itself that is asking for substantial and in depth progress on Turkey’s part”. “And we believe”, he continued, “that Turkey’s candidacy should be linked with a ‘road map’, the partnership, to the content of which Turkey will have to respond from its candidacy to the beginning of substantial accession negotiations. This ‘framework’ means the assumption of most substantial real obligations by Turkey, the non-fulfillment of which will stop the European prospects of the neighbouring country...The assessment according to which we are making unilateral concessions is erroneous”503. Similarly, Simitis argued that if Greece’s positions on Turkey’s obligations and the role of the EU were not accepted, Greece would have to veto the Turkish candidacy. “If we do not manage to create such a framework, then we will project our refusal in Helsinki”504.

Simitis’ assessment of the Helsinki European Council decision leaves no doubt regarding the alternatives he considered. The Helsinki strategy was an alternative to Greek attempts to prevent progress in EU-Turkey relations. “The European Union”, Simitis wrote in his memoirs, “had to be involved in the resolution of pending Greco-Turkish (problems) as a directly interested (party), making easier in this way, amongst other things, the consistent implementation of the agreements. In other words, the ‘communitisation’ of Greco-Turkish relations could serve as a credible and, mainly, effective substitute for constant vetoes against Turkey, which, in any case, had exhausted all its potential...what Greece had not managed to achieve by exercising its right to veto, was achieved now through the ‘communitisation’ of Greco-Turkish relations”505.

In contrast to what both explanations that conceptualise the formulation of the Helsinki strategy as the outcome of Europeanisation predict, Greek foreign policy makers did not consider EU enlargement conditionality as a relevant established EU practice that might serve as a more effective or more appropriate

503 G. A. Papandreou, “Our Position on ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to Turkey”, To Vima, 5 December 1999, emphasis added
504 Simitis - Lipponen, op. cit.
505 Simitis, Policy..., op. cit. pp. 92, 99, emphasis added
alternative to the policy previously pursued\textsuperscript{506}. In fact, the discrepancy between EU enlargement conditionality and the way in which Greece had been applying conditionality was pointed out to Foreign Minister Papandreou during an interview in August 1999. As Papandreou was discussing the conditions that Turkey would have to meet, the interviewer asked: “According to Community logic, however, a response on these issues is a condition for accession and not a condition for giving a country the candidacy – is it not?” Strikingly enough, Papandreou replied that Greek policy was not different from EU policy and referred to the case of Slovakia. “I agree”, he replied, “we are saying that during its pre-accession course Turkey must meet these conditions – we are not saying anything different. As in the case of Slovakia, some time ago the issue (with different parameters of course) of delaying the opening of her accession negotiations was raised because of the problem she had with her Hungarian minority and the deficit it showed in the field of democratic reforms, we are saying that similar principles should apply to the case of Turkey. There cannot be double standards”\textsuperscript{507}. Slovakia, however, was already a candidate country regardless of the fact that the opening of its accession negotiations had not been decided during the Luxembourg summit.

In contrast to what the balancing thesis predicts, Greek policy on EU-Turkey relations was not considered an alternative to defence expenditure that would improve Greece’s military capabilities. During an interview with BBC radio, Foreign Minister Pangalos made explicit that the EU could not offer its members the benefits of a military alliance. In fact, the prospects of external balancing against Turkey appeared bleak for Greece. “There is no protection”, he argued, “in the sense of a military alliance. The EU is not (like) NATO and even NATO has a very doubtful approach on problems existing between its member-states”\textsuperscript{508}. Similarly, Foreign Minister Papandreou made explicit that Greek policy on EU-Turkey relations was not an alternative to the improvement of

\textsuperscript{506} Interviews with high-ranking Greek government official, 2 April 2008, high-ranking Foreign Ministry officials, 15 May 2008 and 27 May 2008, advisor to Prime Minister Simitis, 14 July 2008, advisor to Foreign Minister Papandreou, 12 May 2008

\textsuperscript{507} George A. Papandreou interview with Christina Poulidou, 	extit{Ayi}, 29 August 1999

Greek military capabilities and that the two should be pursued *in parallel*. “First of all”, he explained, “I believe that there are two things that we should do in parallel with regard to Turkey. For as long as Turkey is what she is today, not a democratic country, a semi-military regime with expansionary intentions, we must have our defence absolutely secured and our readiness to face possible military challenges. On the other hand, we must take advantage of Turkey’s European course creatively”509. Indeed, Greek foreign policy makers – including those who identified the economic implications of Greek policy towards Turkey as a significant aspect of the problem – made explicit that the Helsinki strategy did not constitute an alternative to defence expenditure510.

**Conclusions**

The evidence showed that Prime Minister Simitis’ preference for the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations determined the alternative courses of action Greek foreign policy makers considered. While initially the Imia/Kardak crisis prompted the Greek government to veto EU financial assistance to Turkey and a meeting of the EU-Turkey Association Council, the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations was pursued immediately after the crisis. While initially a British veto prevented the adoption of a statement that identified Greco-Turkish problems as problems that concerned the EU, the Greek government managed to have such a statement adopted a few months later in July 1996. In return, the Greek government lifted its veto of EU financial assistance to Turkey within the context of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, despite the fact that Turkey had not completed the first step of the step-by-step approach, which had been presented by the Greek government as a pre-condition for lifting its veto. The content of the statement was reiterated in the member-states’ common position for the 29 April 1997 meeting of the EU-Turkey Association Council and more significantly in the Presidency Conclusions of the Luxembourg European Council summit in December 1997.

510 Interviews with Greek Foreign Ministry official, 15 May 2008 and Greek diplomat, 21 May 2008
The outcome of the Luxembourg summit was considered a great success for Greek policy towards Turkey as it had successfully communitised Greco-Turkish relations at the highest political level. As the explanation based on Simitis' leadership style predicts, Greece became most unwilling to consider any revision of the decision made in Luxembourg, despite the fact that the latter had not had the intended effect. Not only had the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations failed to bring Greece and Turkey closer to a resolution of Greco-Turkish problems, but also Turkey had suspended political dialogue with the EU and threatened to withdraw its application for EU membership.

Nonetheless, Simitis' commitment to communitisation remained unchallenged. When Greece decided to consider a revision of the Luxembourg decision, it was only to pursue the further communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations. In June 1999, Greek foreign policy makers concluded that the framework for EU-Turkey relations that communitisation had resulted in was insufficient. In Helsinki, Greece would allow the EU to grant Turkey candidate country status provided that the conditions introduced in Luxembourg would be reiterated and additional rules would be established, according to which Turkey would have to comply with the conditions within a specific timeframe. The formulation of the Helsinki strategy was seen as the culmination of the policy of communitisation in the sense that it established additional EU rules for Turkey's behaviour towards Greece, thus involving the EU further as Simitis' vision prescribed. In contrast to what both explanations that conceptualise change in Greek policy towards Turkey as the outcome of Europeanisation predict, Greek foreign policy makers did not identify enlargement conditionality as an established EU practice that might serve as a more effective or more appropriate alternative to the policy previously pursued. In contrast to what the balancing thesis predicts, the Helsinki strategy was not considered an alternative to defence expenditure. In fact, when the Helsinki strategy was formulated, it was believed that Greece's accession to EMU had already been secured.
Chapter 7: Assessing Alternatives

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to establish how Greek foreign policy makers assessed the alternative courses of action they considered. According to the socialisation thesis, Greek foreign policy makers did not calculate the costs and benefits of these alternatives. The Helsinki strategy was selected because it was considered the appropriate course of action for an EU member-state given the situation. In contrast, the remaining three explanations predict cost-benefit calculations. According to the balancing thesis, the Helsinki strategy was selected for its economic benefits, as it would allow the government to pursue both foreign and economic policy goals successfully. In contrast, both the Europeanisation thesis and the leadership style thesis predict that Greek foreign policy makers concluded that the policy previously pursued could not achieve its objectives and ought to be discontinued. The Europeanisation thesis predicts that the Helsinki strategy was selected because it would offer Turkey the reward of accession, which would serve as an incentive that would render Turkey's compliance with Greek demands more likely. In contrast, the leadership style thesis predicts that the Helsinki strategy was selected because it would establish additional EU rules for Turkey's behaviour towards Greece and it would thus attribute the role of guarantor of Turkey's compliance to the EU.

The evidence is consistent with that presented in the preceding chapters. In contrast to what the socialisation thesis predicts, Greek foreign policy makers did calculate the costs and benefits of the alternative courses of action they considered and they selected the Helsinki strategy because of the role it would attribute to the EU, as the leadership style thesis predicts. Indeed, the period under investigation is marked by an increasing and unprecedented involvement of the EU in Greco-Turkish relations. This stems directly from Simitis' notion of "communitisation". According to the latter, if Greece could manage to have rules for Turkey's behaviour towards it established at the EU level, the EU itself would see to it that its rules were observed.
While there is evidence that the Helsinki strategy was considered to offer Turkey an incentive to comply with Greek demands, this was a secondary consideration. In contrast to what the Europeanisation thesis predicts, Greece was most unwilling to consider granting Turkey candidate country status without additional EU rules for Turkey's behaviour towards it despite the fact that such an arrangement would offer Turkey greater incentive to comply with Greek demands. Similarly, the additional rules that Greece managed to establish included provisions regarding the course of action that the EU would take in case of non-compliance, that is to say in case the incentive did not suffice. Attributing the role of a guarantor of the resolution of Greco-Turkish problems to the EU was considered a more significant benefit than the offer of an incentive to Turkey. Finally, this secondary consideration was not the result of an assessment of the discrepancy between Greek policy and EU enlargement conditionality and therefore it cannot be attributed to EU-level dynamics.

The evidence shows that the balancing thesis constitutes an even weaker explanation. The economic costs of Greek policy towards Turkey was only one of the reasons why Greek foreign policy makers wished to resolve Greco-Turkish problems, not the reason why the Helsinki strategy was selected to resolve them. In fact, the Helsinki strategy was formulated at a time when it was believed that the success of the government’s economic policy had increased Greece’s bargaining power in the EU and it had therefore made it possible for Greece to pursue the establishment of additional EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards it. Finally, the evidence of these cost-benefit calculations effectively refutes the explanation based on socialisation. There is no evidence that Greek foreign policy makers became convinced of the inappropriateness of the policy previously pursued. On the contrary, they systematically argued that it was their EU partners and the Commission that had on certain occasions behaved inappropriately.
The benefits of communitisation

As was shown in the preceding chapters, Simitis believed that Greece lacked an effective policy towards Turkey and that it should allow Turkey to develop its relations with the EU further in exchange for the establishment of EU rules for Turkey's behaviour towards Greece. The main benefit of this communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations for Greece was the role that the EU would assume. Simitis believed that Turkey's policy towards Greece was not only outdated, but also incompatible with the logic of integration. "(It) overlooked the developments and the dominant ideologies in Europe during the past fifty years and referred back to understandings of foreign policy on the eve of World War II". If Greece could transform Greco-Turkish relations into EU-Turkey relations, the discrepancy would become apparent and the EU would not merely adopt Greece's positions, but it would also pursue changes in Turkey's policy towards Greece. If rules for Turkey's behaviour towards Greece were established at the EU level, the EU would have to ensure that its own rules were observed.

As was mentioned above, Simitis firmly supported further integration and a political union based on a federal model. Developing the EU's international role further would be an essential element of the political union Simitis envisioned and the EU's role in Greco-Turkish relations was seen as part of the EU's broader international role. In this sense, a strategy that actively "promoted" European integration (in the field of foreign policy) could replace Greece's "defensive" policy towards Turkey. "As we all know", Simitis argued shortly before the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference, "the European Union, despite attempts from time to time, despite expressed desires, has not managed to develop a common foreign policy. This deficit was obvious during all recent crises, for instance in Yugoslavia and the Middle East. But also, as far as our issues are concerned, the European Union was either absent or simply had a symbolic presence. And it is not right (for the European Union) to have a symbolic presence, where other countries are actively involved. That is why

511 Simitis, Policy..., op. cit. p. 99; Rozakis, op. cit. p. 161; Interview with advisor to Prime Minister Simitis, 14 July 2008.
512 Simitis, Policy..., op. cit. p. 75
513 Simitis, "Relations...", op. cit. p. 163
Greece supports the need for a common policy in these fields. And it submitted a series of ideas in order to enhance the international role of the Union. The proposals we have submitted include the protection of the inviolability of the territorial integrity and the borders of the Union, the principles of peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for international law and political solidarity amongst the member-states of the Union. That which we seek is...a sense in the European Union that it constitutes a whole, that this whole has borders, that the member-states have the obligation of political solidarity to each other, that it is necessary that they all together pursue respect for international law, pursue the peaceful settlement of disputes and intervene for these purposes514. Simitis' assessment of the EU foreign policy record shows that he acknowledged that the Union had enjoyed limited success as an international actor. As the leadership style thesis predicts, however, this information did not lead him to question the benefits of conducting Greek policy towards Turkey through the EU.

Several Greek foreign policy makers have identified the provisions of the Helsinki decision regarding Cyprus’ accession to the EU regardless of the resolution of the Cyprus problem as a benefit of great significance515. This aspect of the Helsinki strategy was not particularly controversial. In fact, Greece had made concessions in order to secure progress in Cyprus' accession process prior to Simitis' Premiership. In 1995, the Greek government exchanged its consent to the EU-Turkey Customs Union for an EU commitment regarding the opening of Cyprus' accession negotiations. Similarly, the main opposition party conceded that the relevant provisions of the agreement reached in Helsinki were beneficial for Greece and Cyprus516.

The provisions of the agreement regarding Greco-Turkish relations were far more controversial. During a debate in Parliament a few days after the Helsinki summit, Simitis argued that the decision that Greece had secured constituted both a great success for and a vindication of his government's foreign policy. In contrast, the leader of the main opposition party reiterated the view that the

514 Constantine Simitis, Speech in Parliament, 9 December 1996, emphasis added; see also Simitis, "Eleven Goals...", op. cit. esp. p. 135
515 Simitis, Policy..., op. cit. pp. 99-101
516 Constantine Karamanlis, Speech in Parliament, 15 December 1999
government's foreign policy constituted little more that a series of fiascos and stated: "...if this is how you were vindicated in Helsinki as well, God help us! God knows what ills await us (as a result of) your consecutive vindications!"\textsuperscript{517}

In sharp contrast to the assertion that a "widely shared consensus" has been reached regarding fundamental foreign policy issues\textsuperscript{518}, the fact that the opposition remained skeptical of the government's policy even in the aftermath of the Helsinki decision shows that the logic that the Helsinki strategy was based on was not invariably shared and therefore it reinforces the causal significance of Simitis' beliefs, as theorised by the leadership style thesis.

The Prime Minister's assessment of the outcome of the negotiations leaves no doubt regarding his calculations. The decision made in Helsinki constituted the culmination of communitisation: in Helsinki, the transformation of Greco-Turkish relations into EU-Turkey relations was completed. The main benefit of the agreement was the role that the EU would assume in case Turkey did not comply with the conditions that Greece had introduced. Whilst discussing the benefits of the Helsinki decision for Greece during the Parliamentary debate mentioned above, Simitis reiterated the significance of the rules that Greece had managed to establish, which he had argued as early as in 1992\textsuperscript{519}: "The rules of the game are clear to all. There is only one way: the peaceful settlement of the disputes and their submission to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Endless dialogue, arbitration, reference to third (parties) in order to resolve the disputes are not included in the rules of the game. Each candidate country is obliged to act within a reasonable time. If it does not do so by 2004, the Union can also intervene, (it can) even suggest that a reasonable time has elapsed (and) that it is necessary to submit the dispute a candidate country (is involved in) to the (International) Court of Justice."\textsuperscript{520} Simitis confirmed this in his memoirs. "The European Union", he wrote, "was being transformed into an agent (responsible for) monitoring progress in the resolution (of Greco-Turkish problems) and, in the final analysis, into its guarantor...from now on on the Union

\textsuperscript{517} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{518} Couloumbis – Dalis, op. cit. p. 84
\textsuperscript{520} Constantine Simitis, Speech in Parliament, 15 December 1999, emphasis added
itself would be the one that would have to monitor Turkey’s European course and place obstacles every time it realised or was indicated to it by a concerned country that it was not fulfilling its obligations.\textsuperscript{521}

Shortly after the conservatives won the 2004 general election, Simitis expressed his concern regarding the new government’s alteration of his policy towards Turkey and reiterated his views regarding the benefits of the Helsinki decision for Greece. “Greece’s strategy... (aimed) to render the resolution of the problems in the region a function of enlargement and the future course of the European Union. \textit{(To make) the European Union seek their resolution. (To make) the European Union consider them obstacles that must be overcome and work herself to overcome them.} That strategy was absolutely successful... Greece managed to change things. Greece managed to integrate her pursuits within a broader European Union policy. Because it implemented a strategy different from that of bilateral discussion and confrontation, a European strategy.”\textsuperscript{522}

Indeed, earlier EU decisions had acknowledged submission of territorial disputes to the ICJ as the appropriate method of settlement. The 15 July 1996 declaration stated that territorial disputes should be submitted to the ICJ. Furthermore, the Council requested the Presidency to invite Turkey to indicate whether it committed itself to this principle. It remained unclear however what the EU’s response would be if Turkey declined to respond or if its response were unsatisfactory. Similarly, the member-states’ common position for the 29 April 1997 meeting of the EU-Turkey Association Council did not indicate what the next step would be if the committee of wise men did not manage to make joint recommendations or if its recommendations were not accepted by Turkey.

The Luxembourg decision addressed this shortcoming to a certain extent. The decision stated that members of the European conference must share a commitment to the settlement of territorial disputes by peaceful means, in particular through the jurisdiction of the ICJ, that states that subscribed to this principle would be invited to participate in the European Conference and that

\textsuperscript{521} Simitis, \textit{Policy...}, op. cit. pp. 99, 101

\textsuperscript{522} C. Simitis, “The End of a Strategy”, \textit{Ta Nea}, 23 April 2004, emphasis added
initially the offer would be addressed to a group of countries that included Turkey. The implication was clear. If Turkey declined to commit itself to a judicial settlement of the disputes, it would not participate in the European Conference. In that case, however, Greco-Turkish problems would remain unresolved and Greece would still lack the means to change Turkey's policy.

The Helsinki strategy was formulated in order to address this shortcoming. According to the Presidency Conclusions, by the end of 2004 the European Council would review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes "in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice". Not only would the EU monitor Turkey's compliance and consider the implications of non-compliance for Turkey's progress towards accession, but it would also "promote" the judicial settlement of outstanding disputes. As was mentioned above, the type of conditionality that the EU applies within the context of enlargement does not entail EU interventions either coercive or supportive. Despite the fact that it was never made explicit how exactly the European Council would perform this function, this particular provision of the agreement attributed to the EU a role considerably more pro-active than that enlargement conditionality usually entails precisely as Simitis' notion of communitisation prescribed.\textsuperscript{523}

\textsuperscript{523} It has been suggested that the phrase "at the latest by the end of 2004" did not establish a deadline for compliance with the principle of the judicial settlement of disputes, but merely the point in time at which the European Council would "review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes". This particular interpretation of the Presidency Conclusions is based on the usage of commas in the text and a letter that Finnish Prime Minister Lipponen sent his Turkish counterpart. Indeed, whilst presenting the outcome of the summit to the EP, Lipponen argued that the European Council would merely "re-examine the situation again" by the end of 2004, but he also stated that the European Council would "then...strive to promote their settlement in the International Court of Justice". At any rate, the Greek government never accepted this interpretation of the Presidency Conclusions. It might be suggested that this particular interpretation is not entirely plausible. The European Council reviews candidate countries' progress towards accession annually. In fact, the European Commission had submitted to the European Council two reports on Turkey's progress prior to the Helsinki summit despite the fact that Turkey was not a candidate at that time. Both reports discussed Greco-Turkish relations and the Cyprus problem. In this sense, it is difficult to see what purpose the phrase "at the latest by the end of 2004" served, if it did not establish a deadline for compliance, as the European Council would have reviewed the situation annually even if this particular phrase had not been inserted into the Presidency Conclusions. For the Greek government's interpretation see Constantine Simitis, Speech in Parliament, 15 December 1999; for the usage of commas in the text of the Presidency Conclusions see "Finnish Olives", \textit{The Times}, 15 December 1999; for Lipponen's letter see "Tense Hours Precede Ecevit Taking his Place for EU 'Family Snapshot'", \textit{Turkish Probe}, 20 December 1999; for Lipponen's speech in the EP see P. Lipponen, The Finnish Presidency and the Outcome of the European Council Meeting in Helsinki, Speech in the European Parliament, 14 December 1999, available at
Foreign Minister Papandreou also emphasised the role of the EU as a benefit of the Helsinki strategy. When it was pointed out to Papandreou in August 1999 that, while he was speaking of a historic opportunity for the improvement of Greco-Turkish relations, his approach to the issue of the Turkish candidacy appeared halfhearted, he responded: “But our approach is positive and I believe that most of us have realised that Turkey’s European course is in Greece’s interest, that it *is in Greece’s interest to assign to the European Union the responsibility of a systematic surveillance, monitoring and assessment of Turkey*”\(^5\)\(^2\)\(^4\). During an interview with Greek daily “Ta Nea” in September 1999, Foreign Minister Papandreou made explicit that if Turkey was asked to meet the conditions that the EU had outlined in previous European Council decisions and the EU was charged with monitoring Turkey’s compliance, upgrading Turkey to candidate country status would serve Greek interests best. In contrast to what the Europeanisation thesis predicts, when the interviewer pointed out that the government was considering consenting to upgrading Turkey without having received anything in return, Papandreou did not argue that offering Turkey membership of the EU would constitute a greater incentive for Turkey to comply with Greek demands compared with the offer to participate in the European Conference, which Turkey had rejected. Instead, he distinguished between a policy that would lead to the EU’s involvement and one that would not. “Is it in Greece’s interest for Turkey to be a candidate for European Union membership, to move and be assessed on the basis of the principles of democracy and good neighbourliness? And therefore for the *European Union to exercise constant surveillance* as is the case with other candidate countries and for Turkey itself to have to fulfill its obligations in all fields? Or is it in Greece’s interest for Turkey to be left out of such a process?”\(^5\)\(^2\)\(^5\)

It is often pointed out that the transformation of Greco-Turkish relations into EU-Turkish relations and the inclusion of Turkey in the integration process would

\(^5\)\(^2\)\(^4\) George A. Papandreou interview with Christina Poulidou, *Avyi*, 29 August 1999, emphasis added

\(^5\)\(^2\)\(^5\) George A. Papandreou interview with Notis Papadopoulos, *Ta Nea*, 27 September 1999, emphasis added
lead Turkey to abandon the outdated practice of using or threatening to use force and accept the modern practice of settling disputes in accordance with international law, which was associated with the EU. This is often referred to as “the Europeanisation of Turkey” and was indeed considered one of the benefits of the Helsinki decision for Greece. According to Simitis: “The clearing of the European road for Turkey was allowed. This development will have positive effects for the region in the long run, as the neighbouring country, during the phase of both its candidacy and especially its full accession, will be gradually adjusting to the requirements of the Union. There is no doubt that these adjustments require systematic effort and time, as there is no doubt that whatever efforts (are made) will meet resistance, but the European choice constitutes almost a one way street for the neighbouring (country) and she is obliged to follow it.” The process of Europeanisation, in the sense of adjustment to EU requirements, would limit the role of the military in the policy-making process and lead Turkey to abandon (the threat of) the use of force, which was considered incompatible with the very logic of integration, and pursue the peaceful settlement of disputes.

As has been pointed out, some believe that progress in EU-Turkey relations is unlikely to result in successful democratisation and that even if the latter were achieved Turkish policy would remain aggressive and therefore Greco-Turkish problems would remain unresolved. On the contrary, progress in EU-Turkey relations – which Greek concessions have made possible – is more likely to embolden Turkey and result in further aggression. Consequently, “even modest progress of the EU-Turkey relations should be resisted” as part of an attempt to prevent an increase in Turkey’s relative power.

This particular critique of communitisation indicates a limited understanding of the logic underlying Simitis’ preferred policy. It should be pointed out that the

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527 Simitis, Policy..., op. cit. p. 100

528 For these beliefs and a critique see Ifantis, “Greece’s Turkish Dilemmas…”, op. cit. p. 390
Europeanisation of Turkey as a benefit of the Helsinki decision was a secondary consideration. First, Greek foreign policy makers were aware of the fact that it was not certain at all that this benefit would materialise because it was clear that the pursuit of membership and the process of Europeanisation were not unchallenged in Turkey. Second, it was clear that the Europeanisation of Turkey would require a considerable period of time. By contrast, the agreement that the Greek government secured provided that the European Council would assess progress in the resolution of outstanding disputes by the end of 2004. Finally and most significantly, it was not certain that the Europeanisation of Turkey would result in the resolution of Greco-Turkish problems, if the provisions that Greece had proposed were not incorporated in the Helsinki decision. While attributing Turkish aggression to the role of the military in the Turkish policy-making process was consistent with various statements and reports by military officials, it remained unclear whether a Turkish government free from the influence of the military would adopt significantly different positions. According to Undersecretary Rozakis: "...on the other side of the Aegean there is a government in which the precise balance of power we ignore. We ignore specifically who really decides on foreign policy issues. And no matter how strange this seems, we are not the only ones who ignore this. There are other countries too that ignore this and wonder and investigate at this moment what are those main forces that formulate policy." At any rate, the role of the military in Turkish politics would be addressed within the context of the Copenhagen criteria, not the additional conditions that Greece wished to introduce. Consequently, if aggression were the result of the role of the military and the latter were limited as a result of compliance with the Copenhagen criteria, Greece would benefit from the fact that Turkey would refrain from using force or threatening to use force, yet differences of approach to the resolution of Greco-Turkish problems might remain. This is precisely why Greece would not consider a "virtual candidacy" for Turkey. The latter would not allow Greece to construct a framework for EU-Turkey relations, where the rules for the resolution

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529 As an advisor to Prime Minister Simitis pointed out to the author (14 July 2008), Greek foreign policy makers did not believe that the military was exclusively responsible for Turkey's aggressive policy towards Greece, as it was the Turkish Parliament that passed a resolution (8 June 1995), which declared that an expansion of Greek territorial waters would constitute a casus belli and authorised the Turkish government to use military instruments.

530 Christos Rozakis, Speech in Parliament, 6 December 1996
of Greco-Turkish problems and the role for the EU that Simitis had envisioned would be incorporated.

Finally, it should also be noted that both Simitis and Papandreou believed that the framework for EU-Turkey relations that Greece had proposed was beneficial to all parties involved: Greece, Turkey and the EU. In fact, when he was asked whether Greece could say that it had won during the press conference after the first day of the Helsinki summit, Simitis responded: “Excuse me, but this is a way to perceive the problem that does not correspond with the way I see things. If I were to use this word, I would use it...with regard to our effort for peace, friendship and cooperation. With regard to our effort to persuade that Greece is a country that wants broader cooperation in this region. This is the message of this decision. We never support the view ‘up with Greece, down with the rest’. We are together with everyone else in the same course for prosperity, growth and cooperation.”

**Doing the right thing**

As was shown in the previous chapter, Greek foreign policy makers did not identify a discrepancy between Greek policy towards Turkey and established EU practice. Consequently and in contrast to what the socialisation thesis predicts, there is no indication that they became convinced of the inappropriateness of Greek policy within the context of the EU. The evidence shows that Greek foreign policy makers were particularly concerned with the costs and benefits of the alternatives they were considering. While Greek policy was not considered to contradict established EU practice, the preferences of the Greek government were considered to diverge from those of its EU partners. The debate regarding the role of the EU was structured by the belief that Greco-Turkish relations should be “communitised” and thus it revolved around what Greek foreign policy

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531 Interview with high-ranking Greek government official, 2 April 2008
532 Constantine Simitis, Press Conference, Helsinki European Council, 10 December 1999; See also Constantine Simitis and Paavo Lipponen, Joint statements, Athens, 2 December 1999, available at [http://www.pasok.gr/oldwebsite/gr/nea/021299simlip.html](http://www.pasok.gr/oldwebsite/gr/nea/021299simlip.html), accessed on 7 February 2008, which were made before the summit.
makers expected of their EU partners. In fact, it was argued that it was Greece’s EU partners that had on certain occasions behaved inappropriately.

First, Greek foreign policy makers believed that certain EU member-states were successfully presenting the lack of progress in EU-Turkey relations as the result of Greece’s stance, while in fact they remained unwilling to accept substantial progress. Deputy Foreign Minister Papandreou argued that they were insincere and that they lacked commitment to EU norms, such as respect for human rights and democratic political institutions. In an article published in June 1997, he argued that Foreign Minister Pangalos’ statement regarding Turkey’s place in Europe had made “some of our partners start ‘worrying’, realising that Greece can no longer be used as a scapegoat and an alibi of any type for Euro-Turkish relations” and that “the public relations game between Europe and Turkey which was full of talk and rhetorical schemata for domestic consumption was over”.

Papandreou reiterated this position in the aftermath of the Luxembourg European Council. While discussing Turkey’s reaction to the decision made in Luxembourg, he argued that the EU was not without blame. “EU circles”, he argued, “and especially some of our partners, were using an easy double-faced policy towards Turkey. While they were speaking as if she were their favourite child, they were essentially keeping her away from Europe. In relations between our partners and Turkey lip service was being paid to human rights and democratic procedures. They were always speaking of Turkey’s geo-strategic importance for Europe. Words of flattery were a cheap means of gaining sympathies which Ankara was taking advantage of in its domestic political game. And several had also found an easy alibi: Greece.” The benefit for Greece, he concluded, was that the practice described above “was defeated in Luxembourg”.

Similarly, in his letter to Commission President Santer, Prime Minister Simitis argued that the Commission’s intention to submit two proposals for regulations regarding EU financial assistance to Turkey based on different treaty articles “offended every sense of logic and legality”. Finally, in a dossier on EU-Turkey relations submitted to member-states’ Foreign Ministers and the

533 Papandreou, “Greece, Europe and Turkey”, op. cit.
534 George A. Papandreou, “After Luxembourg”, To Vima, 21 December 1997
Commission, the Greek government argued that any change in the conditions for the improvement of EU-Turkey relations set out in previous EU decisions that could be interpreted as a relaxation of the EU’s commitment to the principles included in those decisions would undermine the EU’s credibility.  

In the aftermath of the Luxembourg European Council summit, this problem assumed a different form. Certain EU member-states proposed what Simitis and Papandreou referred to as a “virtual candidacy” for Turkey. As the leadership style thesis predicts, Greece was unwilling to consider this alternative because it would fail to establish rules that would attribute a role in Greco-Turkish relations to the EU. Foreign Minister Papandreou systematically argued that if Greece’s EU partners were to refuse this role, there would be no agreement in Helsinki and they would be to blame. “In this vision, of course, Turkey has a place, if our partners agree that they are ready to assume their responsibilities. If Europe is ready to face on the basis of its own European principles the great issues in the region: (the) Cyprus (problem), Greco-Turkish relations, the issues of democracy. If Europe is indeed ready to assume its responsibilities, Greece will be able to say yes so that candidate country status can be given to Turkey. If she is not, she will be responsible for the deadlock we will be facing.”

Second, Greek foreign policy makers believed that it was inappropriate for other EU member-states to raise the issue of the Cyprus problem in an attempt to set its resolution as a precondition for Cyprus’ accession to the EU because such a linkage had not been established when the opening of accession negotiations with Cyprus had been decided. While discussing Cyprus’ prospects of accession to the EU, Foreign Minister Pangalos stated: “Unfortunately, two countries that play a leading role in the European Union, Germany and Great Britain, are now attempting to overlook the agreement regarding the opening of accession negotiations between Cyprus and the European Union six months after the end of the (Amsterdam) Intergovernmental Conference. This is an attitude that opposes any sense of political morality, a despicable behaviour.” Simitis also argued that certain member-states appeared unwilling to implement the decision on

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536 Adam, “We Will Take…”, op. cit.
537 C. Korai, “George: Europe Will Be Responsible if…”, ELEFTHEROTYPIA, 6 December 1999
538 “Despicable Behaviour of Germany-Britain”, ELEFTHEROTYPIA, 5 April 1997
Cyprus' accession. According to the Greek Prime Minister, the resolution of the Cyprus problem could not be linked with Cyprus' accession because the issue had not been raised when the decision to open accession negotiations with Cyprus was made, despite the fact that the Cyprus problem was already twenty years old.\(^5\)  

Foreign Minister Pangalos was particularly critical of French President Chirac's stance. After a meeting of the Council of Ministers at the end of April 1998, Pangalos argued that certain EU leaders were behaving as if they were taking part in a Turkish "beauty contest" and he referred to Chirac as the "star" of the latter.\(^5\)  The following day Pangalos argued that the French stance constituted an "exception" amongst member-states, which was "inexplicable". "Some (of our partners)", he stated, "have enormous interests, some (of our partners) have formulated a strategy, within which Turkey has such a place that allies and friends of centuries, such as France and Greece, are literally thrown away with utter indifference to the consequences of the behaviour of the current rulers of France". He also argued that France was the only member-state that had "dared" to link EU-Turkey relations with the accession of Cyprus.\(^5\)  Commenting on the issue, government spokesman Reppas stated: "...(Minister for European Affairs) Mr. Moscovici states that Greece's stance is incomprehensible, when it blocks the financial regulation. Now, an average mind can easily grasp what is incomprehensible. That is whether that, which Greece as (a) policy, expresses and implements or the position of those, who from time to time ignore in an opportunistic fashion that Turkey is claiming Greek territory, questioning Greek sovereignty over small inhabited islands, where there is economic activity, where there are schools, churches, public services, only to serve her own interests is incomprehensible".\(^5\)


\(^5\) ‘French Protest for her ‘Star’ President’, Eleftherotypia, 30 April 1998  

\(^5\) Theodore Pangalos interview to Kyra Adam, op. cit.  

\(^5\) ‘French Protest…’, op. cit.
Finally, the most striking piece of evidence is the inconsistency between the Greek government's stance on the Turkish and the Cypriot candidacy. According to the socialisation thesis, adherence to internalised behavioural rules should be expected to be consistent across issues and over time. While Greece insisted that Greco-Turkish disputes should be submitted to the ICJ and settled within a specific timeframe prior to the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey, it also insisted on an explicit commitment that Cyprus would join the EU regardless of the resolution of the Cyprus problem.

The offer of membership as an incentive for compliance

While it is clear that change in Greek policy towards Turkey was not driven by considerations of what constitutes appropriate behaviour for EU member-states, there is evidence that Greek foreign policy makers calculated that the Helsinki strategy would offer Turkey greater incentive to comply with Greek demands. Nonetheless, this was a secondary consideration. Greece had made explicit that it preferred an agreement that would grant Turkey candidate country status and introduce additional EU rules for Turkey's behaviour towards Greece to the status quo. The status quo, however, remained preferable to an agreement that would grant Turkey candidate country status without establishing additional rules. The status quo was preferable to such an agreement, despite the fact that the latter would offer Turkey greater incentive to comply with Greek demands. The consistently categorical refusal to consider this alternative indicates that the greater incentive for Turkey to comply with Greek demands was not considered to be the main benefit of the Helsinki strategy and it is therefore inconsistent with the Europeanisation thesis. Indeed, Greek foreign policy makers – including those who identified the greater incentive for Turkey to comply with Greek demands as a benefit of the Helsinki strategy – make explicit that without additional EU rules that would establish a deadline for Turkey's compliance and the course of action that the EU would take in case of non-compliance there was no guarantee that Greco-Turkish problems would be resolved in a manner.

consistent with Greek preferences and therefore the role of the EU was a more important benefit than the incentive for Turkey to pursue policy change. Finally and in contrast to what the Europeanisation thesis predicts, this calculation was not the result of an assessment of EU-level dynamics. As was shown in the previous chapter, Greek foreign policy makers did not identify enlargement conditionality as a relevant established EU practice. Consequently, the calculation of the greater incentive for Turkey to comply with Greek demands as a benefit of the Helsinki strategy was not the result of an examination of Greek policy towards Turkey and EU enlargement conditionality as alternatives.

Process tracing the evidence made it possible to identify Greek foreign policy makers’ calculations that are not predicted by the explanations formulated and tested here. As was mentioned above, this is an advantage inherent in this method. Simitis has argued that the Helsinki decision relieved Greece from the burden of being the only member-state that objected to the Turkish candidacy. This calculation is not to suggest, however, that the preferences of Greece’s partners were the cause of change in Greek policy. Greek foreign policy makers have consistently argued that disagreements as such should not necessarily be avoided and they have made explicit that exercising the right to abstain from or veto an EU decision does not constitute inappropriate behaviour. When a reporter pointed out that Greece had objected to the German Presidency’s draft that identified Turkey as a candidate country and abstained from the vote on Solana’s appointment as High Representative for the CFSP and asked whether Greece was – yet again – appearing to be the enfant terrible of the EU during a press conference after the Cologne European Council summit, Simitis responded: “Why do you see it that way? We expressed our opinion…sometimes we say yes, sometimes we say no, sometimes we abstain, depending on what is in Greece’s interest…and to refer back to your expression, I would like to tell you that we are neither a good child, nor a bad child. We are people with knowledge.”

544 Interviews with Greek Foreign Ministry official, 19 May 2008 and advisor to Foreign Minister Papandreou, 12 May 2008
545 Simitis, Policy..., op. cit. p. 101
Both Papandreou and Pangalos have expressed similar views. According to Pangalos: “Vetoing funding is the right of a country to deny a Community policy, even alone, if it thinks that it has interests of great significance. Greece is not the only country that is isolated on an issue. There are Community policies of great extent and great significance, which did not move forward for decades because one country found that it should not let them move forward”\textsuperscript{547}. “We have an inferiority complex here”, he continued, “(according to which) we are doing something that is isolating us, we should be with the others, we should not differentiate ourselves”\textsuperscript{548}. When Papandreou was asked whether Greece’s policy towards Turkey was dictated by Greece’s fear of being isolated within the EU, he replied: “That does not concern us”\textsuperscript{549}. Especially not when it was believed that Greece’s EU partners and EU institutions were behaving inappropriately.

Furthermore, it is clear that Greece’s stance was not considered unsustainable. As was shown in the previous chapter, Greek foreign policy makers had repeatedly made explicit that exercising the right to veto the Turkish candidacy was a viable option that Greece would have to take if its positions were not accepted in Helsinki. Simitis was unwilling to bear the burden of confrontation with Greece’s partners over an arrangement that had proved ineffective. As the leadership style thesis predicts, however, he also remained unwilling to abandon his preferred strategy in the face of the unfavourable stance of his counterparts.

Finally, Simitis’ considerations regarding the timing of the decision confirm this view. Simitis wished to ensure that the decision on the Turkish candidacy and the decision on Greece’s accession to EMU would not be made at the same time because he wished to avoid the possibility of a linkage between the two issues\textsuperscript{550}. This was precisely because Greece did not concede to its partners and differences of opinion still remained. In fact, the distance between the position of Greece and

\textsuperscript{547} Theodore Pangalos, Speech in Parliament, 29 January 1999
\textsuperscript{548} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{549} George A. Papandreou interview with Louis Prados, \textit{El Pais}, 3 October 1999
that of the rest of the member-states grew greater when the Helsinki strategy was formulated. Whereas previously the rest of the member-states wished to grant Turkey candidate country status in a symbolic manner and Greece insisted on the conditions that it had managed to establish in Luxembourg, with the Helsinki strategy Greece sought to establish even more restrictive conditions. In fact, when Simitis presented the Helsinki strategy to the inner Cabinet, a member of the latter told him that it was “impossible for him to succeed”\textsuperscript{551}. Consequently, it was understood that the pursuit of the Helsinki strategy would require confrontation. Despite the fact that the divergence between the positions of Greece and those of its partners had grown greater, Greece could still secure the agreement it preferred by threatening to veto any agreement that would not include the provisions it had proposed. Being aware of the difficulty of the negotiations, Simitis did not wish to offer his counterparts the opportunity to express a threat to exclude Greece from EMU – a threat that was not available within the context of negotiations on enlargement – in an attempt to counter Greece’s threat to veto the Turkish candidacy\textsuperscript{552}.

The economic benefits of foreign policy change

While Greek foreign policy makers were concerned with the costs and benefits of the alternatives they considered and they were particularly aware of the economic costs of their policy, they were willing to accept these costs. In fact it would appear that it was not foreign policy that ought to accommodate fiscal policy, as the balancing thesis predicts, but vice versa. While discussing public finances, Simitis explained that Greece needed to overcome structural weaknesses without overlooking the necessities of national defence. “We need to combine these two goals”, he said, “and their combination goes through the answer to the problem of public finances”\textsuperscript{553}. In the face of criticism of the government’s economic policy in early 1997, Prime Minister Simitis argued that high defence expenditure constituted a constraining factor, yet such expenditure

\textsuperscript{551} Simitis, \textit{Policy...}, op. cit. p. 96
\textsuperscript{553} Costas Simitis, Reading of the government’s programmatic statements in Parliament, 10 October 1996
was considered necessary at that time\textsuperscript{554}. The implications of Greek policy towards Turkey for the government’s economic policy were scarcely discussed after the armaments programme was adopted and there was no indication that the government was considering changes in its policy towards Turkey that would make cutting defence spending possible.

Similarly, Foreign Minister Pangalos did not consider cutting defence spending possible, perhaps not even desirable either, and this is despite the fact that he acknowledged the implications of Greek policy towards Turkey for the Greek economy. During an interview in May 1996 he stated: “Defence spending of such magnitude does not allow for economic growth...on the other hand, such circumstances rule out any thought of cutting defence spending. I would say it is necessary to find new resources for armaments”. “I am not suggesting that we should become just like Israel”, he continued, “but we should be headed in that direction...In order to exercise diplomacy, I need military power”\textsuperscript{555}. After a meeting with Defence Minister Tsohatzopoulos in November 1996 he stated: “Greece has not been armed sufficiently until now. When one makes such moves, one can use them in order to exercise influence in one’s international relations. Other countries do so systematically. We should do so too. There is total coincidence of opinion between the two ministers on this”\textsuperscript{556}. Even Finance Minister Yannos Papantoniou, when asked about the economic implications of defence policy, stated that he considered a “strong defence” and a “strong economy” to be “inter-related concepts” and that speeding up macroeconomic stabilisation was necessary in order to find new resources to finance the armaments programme\textsuperscript{557}.

On one occasion, however, the Prime Minister indicated that foreign policy should change so as to give the country greater power and make cutting defence spending possible. After a meeting of the Cabinet in November 1996 he stated: “The armaments programme constitutes a great burden. Therefore we are obliged

\textsuperscript{554} G. Karelias, “There Is Only One Way...”, \textit{Eleftherotypia}, 12 February 1997
\textsuperscript{555} Theodore Pangalos interview, \textit{Eleftherotypia}, 19 May 1996
\textsuperscript{556} “They Agreed on Everything...”, op. cit.
to...consider our foreign policy, in order to gain greater strength on the international scene, in order to be able to change, perhaps, in the future these expenses, which are imposed on us by circumstances and the need to defend our national rights. On the other hand, Simitis does not appear to consider the role of the EU as a substitute for military capabilities. During his speech at PASOK's 1996 conference he stated: "We have developed a multi-faceted diplomatic campaign...in all international organisations (informing our partners of) the character of the Turkish threat and the dangers of de-stabilisation that Ankara creates in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean. We have international law on our side. Yet international relations do not always and automatically move in the trajectory of law. Law must be accompanied by power. And this is what we are doing. We have no illusions regarding the limits of our interventions in international organisations. Neither should it escape us that even our partners in the European Union seem to be understating the dangers of Turkish aggressiveness.

At any rate, no course of action that would qualify as an attempt to reconfigure internal and external balancing was taken by the government at that time. On the contrary, the Prime Minister tried to elicit understanding from Greece's EU partners regarding Greek fiscal difficulties. In a letter addressed to his EU counterparts ahead of the Dublin European Council summit, he argued that the EU needed to show the "necessary sensitivity and solidarity our people expect" with regard to issues that were of concern to Greece. He was referring to Greco-Turkish relations. "Unfortunately", he wrote, "Greece is facing great difficulties in meeting certain demands of the integration process. One of the main reasons for these difficulties is the continued aggressive behaviour of neighbouring Turkey, which remains a source of instability in the broader region and (a) threat of the sovereign rights of Greece. This situation affects Greece's position and choices on a series of other issues. For instance, our obligation to adopt a new armaments programme that constitutes an additional annual burden, which is over 1% of our country's GDP in the medium term and renders the timely meeting of the Maastricht criteria almost unfeasible." During a speech in

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558 "Measures: For the Sake of Unification", *Eleftherotypia*, 20 November 1996
559 "Speech Against Centralisation...", op. cit.
560 "Support Us Or We Are Missing Maastricht", *Eleftherotypia*, 4 December 1996
Parliament, he confirmed that Greece was seeking provisions that would allow a state to deviate from the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact under special circumstances, including cases of increased defence spending.\textsuperscript{561}

Furthermore, it was argued that the evolution of the EU was going to remedy the problem. During a debate in Parliament, Finance Minister Papantoniou defended the government's economic policy as one that was going to achieve EMU entry. The latter was going to benefit Greece not only in economic terms, but also in terms of its security. "Of course", he stated, "I am omitting the crucial factor of our national security, that it is good for Greece to belong to a family. It is not good to be all alone in this difficult international surrounding, in which we live, with Turkey, which is a constant and most serious threat, with a northern horizon, which is never clear. It is good for reasons of national security, for reasons of cutting defence spending, to accede to this broader family, which may evolve, and it will evolve, into a defence and more substantial political union, which in the long run, not immediately of course, will give an answer to the major, the crucial, the enormous problem of national security, which we are facing. Therefore, the issue of economic success has a broader political and national significance."\textsuperscript{562} It was believed that economic policy would not simply accommodate, but substantially benefit foreign policy. These benefits, however, would only materialise in the long run and the relevant predictions regarding the evolution of the EU have thus far proved inaccurate.

In contrast to what the balancing thesis predicts, the Helsinki strategy was not conceived as an external balancing strategy that was selected because it was less costly than an internal balancing strategy. As was shown in the previous chapter, the Helsinki strategy was not considered an alternative to defence expenditure that would allow Greece to build up its military capabilities. Since the Helsinki strategy and defence expenditure were to be pursued in parallel, the Helsinki strategy did not constitute a solution to a guns-or-butter dilemma. Consequently, the calculation of the economic costs of the policy previously pursued towards Turkey does not constitute a convincing explanation of the formulation of the

\textsuperscript{561} Costas Simitis, Speech in Parliament, 9 December 1996
\textsuperscript{562} Yannos Papantoniou, Speech in Parliament, 19 May 1997
Helsinki strategy. The calculation of these costs can at best be considered as one of various reasons why the improvement of Greco-Turkish relations and the resolution of Greco-Turkish problems were considered beneficial. In other words, Greece was not pursuing a costly policy; it was facing a costly problem. The balancing thesis fails to address the question of why the Helsinki strategy was selected in an attempt to resolve the costly problem that Turkey posed. In fact, when asked about the possibility of reducing defence expenditure after the Helsinki summit, Foreign Minister Papandreou argued that it was too soon. It was a “long-term thought” and it depended on the evolution of Greco-Turkish relations. This view was confirmed by government spokesman Reppas a month later. Similarly, former Finance and Defence Minister Papantoniou argued in 2004 that reducing defence expenditure during the period 2000-2004 became possible because Greece had already acquired large and costly weapon systems and the government had managed to reduce functioning expenditure. As Papandreou had pointed out, further reduction depended on the evolution of Greco-Turkish relations.

Finally, this explanation of change in Greek policy towards Turkey contradicts Simitis’ understanding of the relationship between economic and foreign policy. According to Simitis, successful economic governance domestically is the most significant determinant of bargaining power internationally. Greek policy towards Turkey did not need to change so that economic policy goals could be achieved. On the contrary, a successful economic policy had empowered Greece and enabled Simitis to pursue communitisation. In that sense, the Helsinki decision reflected the success of macroeconomic stabilisation. “(The fact that) the economy and the process of accession (to EMU were) on course rendered Helsinki possible, that is to say the acknowledgement by the European Union that the issues with Turkey are not only bilateral but in essence they concern the

563 George A. Papandreou interview with Spyros Sourmelidis, Hmerisia, 24 December 1999
564 Briefing of political editors and members of the foreign press by the Minister for Press and Mass Media and Government Spokesman Dimitris Reppas, Athens, 21 January 2000
566 Simitis, “Towards…”, op. cit. pp. 13-16
In Simitis' view, it was not economic weakness that necessitated the formulation of the Helsinki strategy; it was the powerful bargaining position that economic success had resulted in that made the formulation of the strategy possible.

Conclusions

The evidence showed that the role that the Helsinki decision attributed to the EU was considered the main benefit of the Helsinki strategy. This follows directly from Simitis' notion of "communitisation". If Greece could manage to convince its EU partners that Greco-Turkish problems were in fact EU problems and establish certain rules for Turkey's behaviour towards Greece as part of EU policy towards Turkey, the EU itself would be responsible for ensuring Turkey's compliance with those rules. Indeed, the Helsinki decision set a timeframe for Turkey's compliance, as by the end of 2004 the European Council would review the situation in order to promote the settlement of outstanding disputes by the ICJ. While there is evidence that the Helsinki strategy was considered to offer Turkey a greater incentive for compliance than the policy previously pursued, this calculation was not the outcome of an assessment of the discrepancy between Greek and EU policy and, thus, it cannot be attributed to EU-level dynamics. More significantly, the role that the Helsinki decision assigned to the EU was considered a more significant benefit for Greece than the incentive that the decision offered Turkey.

While Greek foreign policy makers were particularly concerned with the costs and benefits of the alternative courses of action they considered, economic costs and benefits do not appear to have featured prominently in their calculations. The financial burden of Greek policy towards Turkey was one of the reasons why Greek foreign policy makers wished to resolve Greco-Turkish problems, not the reason why the Helsinki strategy was selected to resolve them. Consequently,

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while the balancing thesis draws attention to a certainly relevant calculation, it fails to address the main research question of this project.

In contrast to what the socialisation thesis predicts, Greek foreign policy makers did not become convinced that the policy previously pursued was inappropriate within the context of the EU. In fact they systematically argued that Greece’s EU partners and the Commission had behaved inappropriately on several occasions. They raised the issue of the settlement of the Cyprus question as a pre-condition for Cyprus’ accession to the EU after the decision on the opening of accession negotiations with Cyprus had been made, they were willing to overlook Turkey’s democratic deficit and human rights violations and they were insincere regarding the content of the Turkish candidacy they appeared eager to promote. Finally, even the Commission attempted to circumvent the Greek veto on the regulation on financial assistance to Turkey by proposing a regulation based on a treaty article that allowed qualified majority voting.
Chapter 8: Conclusions

The Helsinki strategy as the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations

The empirical puzzle that was presented in the first chapter of this thesis continues to constitute a real-world problem with considerable implications. While opposition to Turkish accession amongst the public – according to the most recent Eurobarometer data, public opinion in the EU remains at best split over Turkey’s prospects of accession to the EU\textsuperscript{568} – has highlighted the possibility that the ratification process of Turkey’s Accession Treaty will face obstacles – especially in those member-states where a referendum will be held on the matter – the negotiations amongst national governments that will precede the ratification process will be of at least equal significance and the Greek government will undoubtedly be a key actor. Predicting Greece’s stance on the conclusion of Turkey’s accession negotiations requires the identification of the causes that underlay the decision to grant Turkey candidate country status in the first place.

Empirical testing of alternative explanations of change in Greek policy towards Turkey that incorporated all the explanatory variables discussed in the literature showed that a domestic source of foreign policy change – former Prime Minister Simitis’ unequivocal commitment to what he referred to as the “communitisation” of Greco-Turkish relations – was of greater causal significance than the structural incentives associated with Greece’s relative power position, the economic implications of Greek policy towards Turkey, an external shock that demonstrated policy failure or the establishment of relevant EU foreign policy practices. The evidence showed that the leadership style thesis constitutes a parsimonious explanation of all three dimensions (the definition of the policy problem, the alternative courses of action considered and the

\textsuperscript{568} When asked “would you be in favour or against Turkey becoming a part of the European Union in the future”, thirty-one percent (31\%) of those surveyed responded that they would be in favour, while fifty-five percent (55\%) responded that they would be against. When asked “when Turkey complies with all the conditions set by the European Union, would you be strongly in favour, fairly in favour, fairly opposed or strongly opposed to the accession of Turkey in the European Union”, forty-five percent (45\%) of those surveyed responded that they would be strongly or fairly in favour and an identical proportion responded that they would be strongly of fairly against. See European Commission, Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Union, Report Number 69, 2008
assessment of the latter) of all four decisions (the 15 July 1996 EU statement, the member-states’ common position for the 29 April 1997 EU-Turkey Association Council, the Luxembourg European Council decision and the Helsinki European Council decision) that the Greek government pursued within the context of the EU throughout the period under investigation.

Simitis was reportedly enthused after the end of the Helsinki summit and congratulated by his counterparts on his negotiating skills. A few months later, Simitis identified the moment when Greece's positions were accepted by its partners in Helsinki as the happiest of his first term in office. It was also reported in the press that the Prime Minister considered the Helsinki decision a “personal vindication”. As some of his advisors indicated, he had been arguing the need for a different policy towards Turkey for almost a decade, at a time when such views were considered “heretical”, he began to pursue this policy as soon as he was elected Prime Minister and he persisted in the face of criticism and calls to veto the Turkish candidacy so that PASOK could win the next election. By the end of 2002, Simitis conceded that during his first term in office it was generally believed that Greece was teetering on the brink of destruction, his government was accused of constantly yielding in favour of Turkey and very few believed in a strategy that would not be bilateral in nature, but would integrate Greece’s problems into a European framework instead.

Indeed, the evidence showed that Simitis selected the European Community as the default venue for Greek policy towards Turkey in the early 1990s. He believed that Greece lacked an effective strategy that could be pursued systematically and he argued that it would be best if Greece allowed Turkey to develop its relations with the Community further provided that problems in Greco-Turkish relations would be acknowledged as problems that concerned the Community and the latter would formulate rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece. The beginning of Simitis' Premiership, however, coincided with the

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569 S. Liarelis, “Election against New Backdrop”, ELEFTHEROTYPIA, 12 December 1999
570 Constantine Simitis interview with G. Karelias – S. Liarelis, ELEFTHEROTYPIA, 2 April 2000
571 I. K. Pretenderis, “Mr. C. Simitis' 100 Days”, TO VIMA, 12 December 1999, emphasis added
572 Constantine Simitis, Speech during the presentation of the three-volume work: “For a Powerful Greece in Europe and in the World”, Athens, 16 October 2002
Imia/Kardak crisis. While such external shocks are considered powerful factors that drive policy change in the literature, the 1996 crisis performed no such function. The ideas that Greek policy towards Turkey was based on were not discredited, support for policy change did not emerge and therefore no window of opportunity for Simitis to pursue a policy closer to his own preferences was opened. The dominant view was that the government’s management of the crisis had led the country to a humiliating defeat. The government was in fact accused of treason. The government’s immediate response was to veto further progress in Turkey’s relations with the EU. Simitis’ views regarding the necessity of communitisation, however, remained unchallenged. In fact, he interpreted the crisis as evidence that confirmed his beliefs regarding the necessity of his preferred course of action. The period between the Imia/Kardak crisis and the Helsinki summit (January 1996 - December 1999) was one of systematic efforts to break from the situation that the crisis had created and realise Simitis’ vision for foreign policy reform.

Indeed only weeks after his election as Prime Minister, the government tried to have a statement adopted by the Council of Ministers that identified Greco-Turkish problems as problems that concerned the EU. While the Greek government was initially unsuccessful, Simitis continued to tour EU member-states’ capitals in an attempt to convince his counterparts of the necessity of EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece and a few months later, in July 1996 Greece managed to have such a statement adopted. Not only was the EU expressing Greece’s views, but it was also assuming a role in Greco-Turkish relations as the Council was requesting the Presidency to invite Turkey to confirm that it was committed to the principles mentioned in the statement, which included the principle of judicial settlement of disputes. In exchange Greece lifted its veto of EU financial assistance to Turkey within the context of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation despite the fact that Turkey had not taken the steps that Greece had defined as preconditions for lifting its veto. Having established the principle of judicial settlement of disputes at the EU level, the Greek government wished to involve the EU further. Indeed, the EU assumed a more pro-active role in April 1997, when it was agreed that the Dutch Presidency would accommodate exchanges between two groups of experts appointed by the
two countries and instructed to make suggestions regarding procedural aspects of
the resolution of Greco-Turkish problems. While little became of this, the EU's
involvement in Greco-Turkish relations was unprecedented. Finally, in
December 1997 Greece managed to secure a decision that communitised Greco-
Turkish relations at the highest political level, that is to say at the level of the
European Council. Turkey had still not met the conditions that Greece had
imposed, yet Greece allowed the EU to invite Turkey to participate in the
European Conference. As Turkey had indicated prior to the Luxembourg summit,
the offer was unsatisfactory, yet the decision marked the first time that Greece
was offering Turkey a reward that was not explicitly provided for by the
Association Agreement, adding substance to the often proclaimed support for
Turkey's European vocation.

The eighteen months between the Luxembourg summit and the Cologne summit
constitute one of the most instructive phases of the period under investigation. As
it was believed that the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations had been
achieved in Luxembourg, the Greek government was adamant that the decision
made in Luxembourg should not be revised. It persisted in the face of Turkish
military pressure in the form of military exercises in the Aegean and violations of
Greek airspace, EU member-states' pressure and US pressure that culminated in
a late night telephone call Clinton made to Simitis during the Cardiff summit in
order to convince him to accept the proposals of the British Presidency. Turkey's
response appears to have been most pertinent. Greece was attempting to integrate
Greco-Turkish relations into EU-Turkey relations and Turkey was suspending its
relations with the EU. At that stage, communitisation did not have the intended
effect. Nonetheless, when Greece became willing to move beyond the agreement
reached in Luxembourg, it was only to pursue the communitisation of Greco-
Turkish relations further. It was decided that the conditions set out in
Luxembourg would have to be reiterated and additional rules for Turkey's
behaviour towards Greece would have to be established: a specific timeframe for
Turkey's compliance and provisions regarding the course of action that the EU
would take in case of non-compliance. The Helsinki strategy constituted the
culmination of Simitis' attempts to communitise Greco-Turkish relations. The
formulation of the strategy reflected Greek foreign policy makers' assessment of
Greece’s relative bargaining power. On the one hand, it was believed that a successful policy of macroeconomic stabilisation had rendered EMU entry fairly certain and it had thus improved Greece’s bargaining position. On the other hand, Greek foreign policy makers had discerned an increase in the intensity of their EU partners' preference for upgrading Turkey to candidate country status. As bargaining power is inversely proportionate to preference intensity, Greek foreign policy makers concluded that it would be possible to extract from their EU partners the additional concessions that the further communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations required. It is interesting to note that while it might appear as though Greece’s bargaining position moved closer to that of its EU partners when the Helsinki strategy was formulated, it in fact moved further apart. While the other member-states wished to grant Turkey candidate country status within the context of an agreement that would be less demanding than the one reached in Luxembourg, with the Helsinki strategy Greece was proposing an even more restrictive framework for Turkey’s relations with the EU.

Simitis’ belief in the necessity of communitisation also had implications for the way in which Greece exercised its right to veto. Transforming Greco-Turkish relations into EU-Turkey relations by definition required Greece to allow Turkey to maintain some sort of relations with the EU. According to the Helsinki strategy, the framework for these relations should include the conditions that Greece had previously introduced, a deadline for Turkey’s compliance and provisions regarding the course of action that the EU would take in case of non-compliance. The latter constituted red lines; if crossed Greece would have to veto the Turkish candidacy. Consequently, the threat to veto was expressed in order to ensure that EU-Turkey relations would progress within a framework of EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece, whereas previously the threat to veto was expressed in order to prevent progress in EU-Turkey relations. Exercising the right to veto in this fashion appears to be more effective. As Finnish President Tarja Halonen recently argued: “(The veto may be used) when you really need it and you have a plan what to do after that. Because saying no, you do not stop the process. You just take time out”573.

Simitis' preference for the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations is the only factor that convincingly explains all the decisions that the Greek government pursued within the context of the EU, which otherwise exhibit considerable variation. Indeed, while the decisions made in Helsinki and Luxembourg offered Turkey rewards – accession to the EU and participation in the European Conference respectively – the 15 July 1996 and 29 April 1997 agreements did not. The former granted Turkey a reward that had previously been withheld – EU financial assistance within the context of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation – and the latter merely allowed a meeting of the EU-Turkey Association Council. While only the decisions made in Helsinki and Luxembourg are consistent with the logic of reinforcement by reward, all four decisions are consistent with the logic of communitisation.

The logic underlying the strategy of communitisation was fairly straightforward. If Greece could have rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards it established at the EU level, the EU would see to it that Turkey observed its rules. Simitis’ policy towards Turkey was a two-stage policy. During the first stage, Greece was to pursue the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations. During the second stage, Greece was to pursue the resolution of Greco-Turkish problems. According to Simitis, the role that the EU would assume in Greco-Turkish relations would constitute a part of the EU’s broader international role. Despite the fact that EU foreign policy has enjoyed limited success since its inception, Simitis remains adamant that the EU’s involvement is necessary even in bilateral and regional problems. Whilst commenting on the Lisbon Treaty he argued: “True, many ordinary Europeans do not think that Europe should play an important part in global developments. They believe that foreign policy should be handled by their national governments. This view is outdated. Even in bilateral or regional crises, viable solutions are possible only at the supranational level.” In fact, Simitis was arguing the necessity of the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations in the early 1990s, when it was evident that the Community was an ineffective international actor and the very notion of a European foreign policy was being brought into “disrepute” due to the recognition of the former Yugoslav Republics

\[C. Simitis, “The Rebirth of European Integration”, Guardian, 23 June 2008, emphasis added\]
fiasco, which coincided with the transition from EPC to CFSP. Clearly, the necessity of communitisation is not the conclusion anyone would have reached after assessing the empirical record of European foreign policy in the early 1990s.

It should be pointed out that while what has been referred to as the "Europeanisation of Turkey" has been discussed as a benefit of the Helsinki decision for Greece, this was a secondary consideration. Greek foreign policy makers indeed believed that if Greece allowed EU-Turkey relations to progress, Turkey would become Europeanised in the sense that it would abandon the practice of using or threatening to use force. As the Imia/Kardak crisis had yet again brought Greece and Turkey very close to armed conflict only a few years earlier, this particular benefit was of course considerable. Greek foreign policy makers, however, were also very much aware of the possibility that this benefit would not materialise. It was understood that both the pursuit of membership and the process of Europeanisation would prove divisive in Turkey. More significantly, even if both Turkey's European orientation and the Europeanisation of Turkey could be taken for granted, the latter would not transpire overnight; it would require a considerable period of time. In contrast, the Helsinki decision required the resolution of Greco-Turkish problems by the end of 2004 at the latest. Finally, unless the conditions and the deadline that Greece had proposed were incorporated into the agreement, there was no guarantee that Greco-Turkish problems would be addressed and resolved in a manner consistent with Greek preferences. This is precisely why Greece would not consider granting Turkey candidate country status without additional EU rules for Turkey's behaviour towards it.

This last point stems directly from Simitis' notion of communitisation. The benefit of the transformation of Greco-Turkish relations into EU-Turkey relations was the role of guarantor of the resolution of Greco-Turkish problems that the EU would assume. The agreement reached in Helsinki did indeed attribute such a role to the EU. The Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki summit clearly stated that if any dispute any candidate country was involved in remained pending by the end of 2004, the European Council would review the
situation "in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice". It remained unclear, however, how exactly the European Council would perform that role. While the fact that the 2004 deadline was allowed to expire has turned this into a matter of conjecture, it might be suggested that the calculation of the role that the Helsinki strategy attributed to the EU in Greco-Turkish relations as the main benefit of the strategy was a manifestation of what Hill has termed the "capability-expectations gap", in the sense that the EU's role in the process of enlargement is considerably less interventionist than that implied by the Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki summit.

The evidence showed that the alternative explanations of change in Greek policy towards Turkey are fairly unconvincing. In sharp contrast to the assertions of a group of leading Greek scholars in the fields of International Relations and European Studies, who have argued that foreign policy is the most successful, if not the only area of Europeanisation in Greece, this thesis showed that change in Greek policy towards Turkey was not the outcome of Europeanisation. The discrepancy between the assertions of leading experts and the evidence becomes rather striking in light of the fact that Greco-Turkish relations constitute such a large part of Greece's external relations. If Greek foreign policy has been Europeanised, but Greek policy towards Turkey has not, it is difficult to see what part of Greek foreign policy has been Europeanised.

As was mentioned above, Simitis had selected communitisation as the best policy for Greece and the European Community as the default venue for Greek policy towards Turkey prior to the establishment of enlargement conditionality. Consequently, the establishment of this EU foreign policy practice could not have influenced his calculations. Furthermore, Greek foreign policy makers did not consider enlargement conditionality as a relevant established EU foreign policy practice that was different from traditional Greek policy towards Turkey and might be more effective or more appropriate. Consequently and in contrast to what both explanations that conceptualise change in Greek policy towards Turkey as the outcome of Europeanisation predict, Greek foreign policy makers did not incorporate a practice previously established at the EU level into their policy towards Turkey, but rather formulated EU policy on the matter. Indeed,
one of the very first things that Simitis did during his interactions with his peers was to argue the need for EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece. Enlargement conditionality was not identified as a more effective way to achieve fixed policy goals. The understanding of the policy problem and policy goals had been fundamentally altered. There is some evidence that Greek foreign policy makers calculated that the Helsinki strategy would offer Turkey greater incentive to comply with Greek demands, a calculation which is consistent with the Europeanisation thesis. This, however, was a secondary consideration. Greece was most unwilling to consider granting Turkey candidate country status without additional EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece, even though such an agreement would offer Turkey greater incentive to comply with Greek demands. The consistently categorical refusal to consider this alternative is not consistent with the Europeanisation thesis. Furthermore, the role of the EU as a guarantor of the resolution of Greco-Turkish problems – which Simitis’ notion of communitisation prescribed – was considered a more important benefit than the incentive the decision offered Turkey and it was believed to be necessary precisely in case the incentive did not suffice to induce Turkey’s compliance. Finally, there is no evidence that the policy previously pursued was considered inappropriate. In fact, Greek foreign policy makers systematically argued that their EU partners and the Commission had behaved inappropriately on several occasions.

It should also be noted that Greek foreign policy makers did not attempt to legitimise foreign policy change by arguing that Greece was under the obligation to converge with its EU partners\(^{575}\). It is not particularly surprising that Greek foreign policy makers made no such attempts. Having been accused of having committed acts of treason and of constantly yielding to external pressure, Greek

\(^{575}\) It has been argued that this is one of the advantages cooperation in the field of foreign policy affords participating states. According to Nuttall, “some participants proffered their international obligation to achieve convergent policies as cover for effecting a change in national policy which otherwise might have met with too much domestic opposition”. See Nuttall, op. cit. p. 15. Nuttall, however, contradicts himself on this point when he argues that “when domestic pressures became too strong they invariably prevailed over the cohesion demanded by EPC”. See Nuttall, op. cit. p. 129. At any rate, it has been suggested that when national policy makers legitimise policy change in such a fashion, it is possible to conceptualise policy change as the outcome of Europeanisation. See K. Featherstone, “‘Varieties of Capitalism’ and the Greek Case: Explaining the Constraints on Domestic Reform?”, *Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe*, GreeSE Paper No. 11, February 2008, pp. 34-5
foreign policy makers should not have been expected to make such an argument. In fact, this was not an available option, since it is most likely that it would have had the opposite effect.

As was mentioned above, it has been argued that the Helsinki strategy is consistent with "Europeanisation" in the sense of "uploading"\textsuperscript{576}. In contrast to what has been suggested in the literature, uploading \textit{per se} is not identified here with Europeanisation. Uploading only describes an empirically observable type of (foreign) policy action. It does not indicate what the process that produced this action was. As was mentioned above, uploading \textit{might} be an outcome of Europeanisation. This is the case only when the establishment of EU practices leads national foreign policy makers to calculate that a collective decision on an issue that they had previously handled unilaterally might serve their interests best or when EU level interactions convince national foreign policy makers that collective decision-making on such an issue is appropriate. In both cases, developments that take place within the context of the EU cause uploading and therefore the latter is consistent with Europeanisation.

In contrast, the evidence showed that the Helsinki strategy was not "originated by EU dynamics"\textsuperscript{577}. It was the outcome of a process of leader-driven foreign policy change. The task Simitis was determined to complete was pre-conceived in the sense that it had been defined prior to his election as Prime Minister and his participation in EU-level interactions throughout the period under investigation did not alter it. Similarly, leading European foreign policy analysts suggest that at the time Simitis defined this task European foreign policy dynamics offered little evidence that it was necessary. As has been pointed out, it should not be assumed that Europeanisation will result in convergence and homogeneity because domestic actors "refract, translate and edit" Europeanisation\textsuperscript{578}. It is equally important to point out that processes of change may originate from domestic actors, who offer their own vision for the

\textsuperscript{576} Economides, op. cit. pp. 481-2

\textsuperscript{577} For the phrase see Radaelli, "The Europeanisation of...", op. cit. p. 50

redirection of national foreign policy without trying to mold EU-generated processes. This particular process of foreign policy change can be identified and explained by existing theories that emphasise the causal significance of key foreign policy makers and their leadership style. In qualitative research, inadequate conceptual analysis results in measurement error\textsuperscript{579}. When conceptual analysis fails to distinguish between Europeanisation and alternative processes of (foreign) policy change that are not generated by EU dynamics, the causal significance of the EU is overestimated and the emergence of Europeanisation as a new “research agenda”\textsuperscript{580} is inhibited.

Similar errors occur when uploading is identified with Europeanisation in the field of regulatory and budgetary policies. It has been argued that national executives in highly industrialised EU member-states – Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Austria, Sweden and Finland – upload their preferences onto the EU level, pursue collective decision-making and minimise the costs of regulatory legislation\textsuperscript{581}. While this pursuit of uploading is interchangeably referred to as a dimension of Europeanisation, a response to Europeanisation and an aspect of the “European policy process”, it is shown that it was not originated by EU dynamics. In fact, the explanation of the pursuit of uploading (the economic – primarily commercial – interests of domestic industries, societal demands for environmental protection and the interdependence that environmental pollution creates cause national policy makers to upload) is remarkably consistent with liberal international relations theory, which emphasises the social identities and economic interests of powerful domestic groups as the sources of state preferences and patterns of interdependent state preferences as the determinant of state behaviour\textsuperscript{582}. Analyses of Europeanisation that explicitly draw this parallel, distort the literature to such an extent that Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism is reviewed as part of a “school of thought on Europeanisation”\textsuperscript{583}.

\textsuperscript{579} Mahoney – Goertz, op. cit. pp. 244-5
\textsuperscript{580} For the term see Featherstone – Radaelli, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{581} T. A. Borzel, “Pace-Setting, Foot-Dragging, and Fence-Sitting: Member State Responses to Europeanisation”, \textit{Journal of Common Market Studies}, 40: 2, 2002
\textsuperscript{582} Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously…”, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{583} Wong, \textit{The Europeanisation of French Foreign Policy}…, op. cit. p. 7
Similarly, uploading has been identified with Europeanisation in studies that discuss national governments' attempts to influence area designation within the context of EU cohesion and competition policy and variation in their success across decision-making procedures\textsuperscript{584}. It remains at best unclear what the added value of conceptualising national governments' attempts to maximise the attainment of their preferences and the empowering and/or constraining effects of the institutional setting as Europeanisation is, when rational choice institutionalist analyses would have been able to identify and explain this process\textsuperscript{585}. This conceptualisation of Europeanisation renders the concept redundant because it merely labels processes identified and explained by existing theories Europeanisation.

The balancing thesis constitutes an even weaker explanation. The conceptualisation of the Helsinki strategy as external balancing is not quite accurate. The Helsinki decision was not the equivalent of alliance formation. It would not have been possible for Greece to invoke the Helsinki decision and request the use of means available to other EU member-states in order to balance against Turkey. More significantly, there is no evidence that Greek foreign policy makers conceived the Helsinki strategy as an external balancing strategy. While the Imia/Kardak crisis was perceived as a shock that necessitated military preparedness, which in turn would entail considerable economic costs, neither the Helsinki strategy, nor the policy of communitisation would address that problem \textit{directly} because the Helsinki strategy was not considered an alternative to defence expenditure.

The reduction of defence expenditure depended on the evolution of Greco-Turkish relations and it could only be achieved once Greco-Turkish problems had been resolved and Turkey had ceased to constitute a threat to Greek security. This is in fact consistent with balancing against the threat theory. If Greco-Turkish relations improved, the perception of a Turkish threat to Greek security


would diminish. As the perception of threat is one of the elements that define threatening power, balancing (either internal or external) should be expected to become less intense. As the Helsinki strategy was not intended to substitute for military capabilities, additional available resources were not considered to be the benefit of the Helsinki decision. EMU entry was achieved prior to any reduction in defence expenditure and the Helsinki decision did not affect defence expenditure that had already been agreed upon. Finally, this explanation of change in Greek policy towards Turkey contradicts Simitis’ understanding of the relationship between economic and foreign policy. According to Simitis, the success of Greek foreign policy in Helsinki reflected the success of his government’s economic policy. Ultimately, the Helsinki strategy was more ambitious than a balancing-against-the-threat strategy. It was believed that it could resolve Greco-Turkish problems, thus eliminating the Turkish threat.

Interestingly enough, while Greek foreign policy makers were concerned with what was perceived as increased Turkish aggression, US support for Turkey played a remarkably limited role in Greek foreign policy makers’ considerations. It has been suggested that when the Greek government applied for membership of the European Communities it intended amongst other things to reduce Greece’s dependence on the US. If future research were to assess whether this strategy has been effective the evidence from the study of Greek policy towards Turkey during the period covered by this thesis would indicate that it has indeed been most effective with regard to Greco-Turkish relations with the exception of crisis management. The evidence shows that the formulation of Greek policy was indeed quite independent of US policy during the period under investigation. As was mentioned above, Greek policy remained unchanged even when US President Clinton personally intervened during the June 1998 Cardiff European Council summit. US mediation during the 1996 Imia/Kardak crisis, however, was the only factor that prevented armed conflict, while the EU was – in Simitis’ words – “remarkably absent”.
Beyond the Helsinki strategy

When the Helsinki strategy was formulated, no decision was made regarding the precise course of action that Greece would take once Greco-Turkish relations had been successfully communitised. Consequently, a considerable period of time elapsed between the Helsinki summit and the launch of the process that was intended to result in the resolution of Greco-Turkish problems. The European Commission noted this in its progress reports. Initially, "little progress" was achieved with regard to the settlement of disputes and the adoption of confidence building measures was only considered a development that "should create a climate conducive to progress". This confirms the significance of Simitis' vision for foreign policy reform. Greece began to pursue the strategy of communitisation, the necessity of which Simitis had consistently advocated, within a matter of weeks after his election as Prime Minister. As Simitis had indicated little regarding post-communitisation Greek policy towards Turkey, it took Greece over two years to begin to actively pursue the resolution of Greco-Turkish problems within the context of the Helsinki decision.

What has followed the Helsinki summit confirms the significance of the strategy for Greek foreign policy, as public debate regarding Greco-Turkish relations has revolved around the Helsinki decision. In 2004, the newly elected conservative government modified Greek policy towards Turkey. The 2004 deadline for the settlement of disputes that candidate countries were involved in was allowed to expire. This decision proved quite controversial. The socialists argued that the Helsinki strategy had been abandoned and that Greco-Turkish problems had yet again become bilateral problems. The conservatives argued that the Helsinki strategy had in fact been improved and that Greco-Turkish relations had been so clearly transformed into EU-Turkey relations for the first time. It would be

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586 Interview with advisor to Prime Minister Simitis, 14 July 2008
587 European Commission, Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession, 8 November 2000, p. 67
588 European Commission, Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession, 13 November 2001, p. 31
589 For Prime Minister Karamanlis' assessment of the decision to open accession negotiations with Turkey as an improvement of the Helsinki decision see Costas Karamanlis, Press Conference, Brussels, 17 December 2004, available at http://www.primeminister.gr/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3486, accessed on 17 February 2008. Foreign Minister Bakoyanni went so far as to argued that Greco-Turkish issues were transformed into Euro-
more accurate to argue that, while the logic of “communitisation” that Simitis introduced was not abandoned, the main element of the Helsinki strategy was. Indeed, the Helsinki strategy had produced a lock-in effect, thus binding the new government. Candidate country status could not be rescinded, especially not a few months before the opening of accession negotiations was going to be debated in the EU. The 2004 deadline, however, was the element that distinguished the Helsinki strategy from the earlier stages of communitisation. During a speech in Parliament a few months after the December 2004 European Council, Simitis argued: “During the recent summit in Brussels, the government achieved absolutely nothing substantial for the protection of Greek interests, despite what it claims. On the contrary, it achieved something negative. It accepted no time limit to Turkey’s obligation to fulfill its obligations towards Greece in accordance with the principles of international law, it revoked the relevant provision of (the) Helsinki (agreement) and it rendered Greco-Turkish issues bilateral once again, (while) after the Helsinki agreements they were Euro-Turkish (issues)”.

Similarly, in an implicit critique of the government’s policy, Rozakis has pointed out that Greece “cannot expect the pulverisation of all (Turkish) claims” as a result of Turkey’s accession process and therefore it should avoid foreign policy “inertia”.

PASOK under Papandreou (he succeeded Simitis in the leadership of the party in 2004) has argued the need for a “new Helsinki”, which was explicitly mentioned in the party’s manifesto published in 2007. Simitis, however, has made a different suggestion. According to the former Prime Minister, Greece should not commit itself to a specific outcome of Turkey’s accession negotiations and in

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Foreign Minister Molyviatis appeared to regret this binding effected, when he stated that the government had managed to change certain elements of the Helsinki decision, yet such agreements could not be changed in their entirety. Petros Molyviatis, Press Conference, 18 December 2004

Costas Simitis, Speech in Parliamentary, 21 December 2004

C. Rozakis, “Greco-Turkish Problems: Political or Legal Solution?”, To Vima, 9 July 2006


particular it should not insist on Turkey’s accession, if the majority of EU member-states prefer a special relationship between Turkey and the EU. Simitis has pointed out that public opinion in the EU is most skeptical of Turkey’s accession and he has argued that when Turkey becomes more populous than any other member-state, it will be difficult for the EU to ignore issues of particular concern for Turkey. As far as Greco-Turkish problems are concerned, even if Turkey were to eventually accede to the EU, it is unlikely that it would be willing to comply with the conditions that Greece has introduced and other EU member-states would be reluctant to press the matter. Since Greece missed the opportunity afforded by the Helsinki decision, it should negotiate with those member-states that propose a special relationship between the EU and Turkey ways in which Greco-Turkish problems could be resolved within the context of such a special relationship.

At first sight it would appear that Simitis has abandoned the policy that he so persistently pursued during his Premiership. Simitis’ suggestion, however, directly follows from the logic of communitisation. As was mentioned above, the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations required Greece to take its EU partners’ preferences into consideration, thus resulting in a certain loss of autonomy. Indeed, Simitis invariably pursued the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations regardless of whether the issue at hand was the Turkish candidacy for EU membership (December 1999), Turkey’s participation in the European Conference (December 1997), EU financial assistance to Turkey (July 1996) or a meeting of the EU-Turkey Association Council (April 1997). If Greece does not prefer EU-Turkey relations to progress, it can afford to disregard the preferences of its partners. If it wants them to progress in a specific fashion, that is to say if it wants to establish EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece, it will have to take its partners’ preferences into consideration. Interestingly enough, Greece is no longer the most recalcitrant member-state, yet it is still the one whose preferences are closest to the status quo in the sense that it continues to support the EU’s offer of accession. If the reluctance to admit Turkey to the EU were translated into a proposal to formally withdraw the offer of accession and replace it with the offer of a special relationship, Greece would be able to demand an arrangement similar to that which Simitis has suggested in
return. If Turkey responds to such an offer in a manner similar to that in which she responded to the offer to participate in the European Conference, communitisation is unlikely to accommodate a resolution of Greco-Turkish problems. If the offer of EU membership is not formally withdrawn, timing will acquire greater significance. Even if accession negotiations are successfully concluded, it is unlikely that Turkey’s Accession Treaty will be ratified by all EU member-states. It would appear that in that case the resolution of Greco-Turkish problems would only be possible prior to the process of ratification.

Beyond Greco-Turkish relations

As has been pointed out, structural explanations have been traditionally prominent in the study of Greek foreign policy, while explanations that attribute causal significance to domestic sources of foreign policy have been lacking. It would appear that the literature suffers from the “widespread belief that balancing is a universal empirical law”. Greece is expected to pursue balancing against Turkey. Various Greek foreign policy initiatives as diverse as the decision to apply for membership of the European Communities and the decision to grant Turkey candidate country status have been conceptualised either explicitly or implicitly as forms of “balancing”. One analyst went so far as to criticise the Greek International Relations community for its inability to make specific proposals on the exact content of Greece’s “balancing strategy” vis-à-vis Turkey. Recent empirical studies of impressive breadth, however, have shown that even though balancing does occur it is not nearly as common as it is presumed to be and that there is only evidence from most-likely cases that supports arguments, which predict that balancing occurs only under fairly restrictive conditions.

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595 Tsakonas, “Theory and Practice...”, op. cit. p. 435, note 8
597 Couloumbis – Dalis, op. cit. p. 80; Ifantis, “Whither Turkey...”, op. cit. p. 122
598 Tsakonas, “Theory and Practice...”, op. cit. p. 430
Tsakonas’ formulation of a multi-causal explanation of change in Greek policy towards Turkey that incorporated both Greece’s relative power position and the economic costs of Greek policy constitutes a welcome attempt to open the “black box”. The weakness of this attempt lies in the fact that it remains incomplete. While this explanation refrains from attributing causal significance exclusively to structural variables and takes unit-level variables into account, it fails to consider the “specific and concrete information about the decision-makers”, which explanations of specific foreign policy decisions require. Indeed, it is only assumed that all Greek foreign policy makers identified the combination of imperatives described by the analyst and responded to them. The detailed empirical investigation of actors’ preferences and calculations pursued here produced evidence that suggests otherwise.

The evidence confirms the centrality of the Prime Minister’s role in the Greek political system in general and the Greek foreign policy making process in particular. Despite reforms of the Greek Foreign Ministry’s structure, access to the foreign policy making process remained severely limited during the period under investigation. As Simitis made explicit, the Helsinki strategy was formulated by the Prime Minister himself, Foreign Minister Papandreou, Deputy Foreign Minister Kranidiotis, Head of the Prime Minister’s Office Nicholas Themelis and Christos Rozakis, who held no official post at that time. The strategy was merely “presented” to the Cabinet. Consequently, the number of participating actors was limited, participating actors’ preferences were individual rather than organisational and there were no institutional advantages for any of the actors involved inherent in the policy making process. The latter was in

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603 Simitis, Policy..., op. cit. pp. 93, 96
604 For the significance of these variables in bureaucratic politics models of foreign policy analysis see G. T. Allison – M. H. Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Implications”, World Politics, 24, Supplement: Theory and Policy in International Relations,
fact very similar to that of the periods between 1974-1981 and 1981-1989, when Prime Ministers Karamanlis and Papandreou respectively were the key foreign policy makers assisted by Foreign Ministers and advisors, who were often loyal personal friends.\(^{605}\) Given the fairly well established significance of the role of the Prime Minister in the foreign policy making process, it is rather striking that the literature has failed to investigate the nature and causal significance of Simitis’ preferences beyond the mere acknowledgement of the fact that he was pro-integration.

In a rare attempt to assess the implications of the Greek foreign policy making process, Ioakimidis has suggested that the latter renders the causal significance of key foreign policy makers and public opinion crucial.\(^{606}\) This particular approach contradicts both (structural) realist and constructivist explanations that emphasise states’ relative power positions and international socialisation respectively. This approach is consistent with liberal international relations theory. While the thrust of the latter suggests that the interests and identities of powerful domestic groups are the main determinant of the substantive content of foreign policy, it has also been pointed out that when the costs and benefits of alternative foreign policy options for powerful domestic groups are either diffuse or uncertain,\(^{607}\) the personal commitments of leading politicians and mass public opinion become causally significant.\(^{608}\)

As was shown here, however, public opinion was not causally significant in this particular case. On the contrary, it was an obstacle to foreign policy reform that had to be overcome. The evidence confirms the view that the earthquakes in Turkey and Greece in August and September 1999 respectively had little to do with the formulation of Greek policy towards Turkey.\(^{609}\) The Helsinki strategy was formulated prior to the earthquakes. Whatever the impact the latter had on public opinion it neither prevented criticism of the government’s policy, nor did

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\(^{605}\) Ioakimidis, “The Foreign Policy Making Model in Greece . . .”, op. cit. pp. 111-115

\(^{606}\) Ibid. esp. pp. 95-8

\(^{607}\) As was mentioned above, the understanding of Greco-Turkish relations as a “national issue” implies that alternative policy options affect the nation as a whole in a uniform fashion.

\(^{608}\) Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community . . .”, pp. 483-496 and esp. 494-6

\(^{609}\) Ker-Lindsay, Crisis and Conciliation . . ., op. cit. p. 118
it limit the political risk that Simitis took. In fact, not only was government policy not following public opinion, but it also had a significant impact on it. The highest levels of support for the prospect of Turkey’s accession to the EU amongst the Greek public were recorded during the period immediately after the Helsinki summit. It would appear that the decision that the Greek government secured in Helsinki was more convincing than the earthquakes in demonstrating that it was worth supporting Turkey’s prospects of accession. Nonetheless, the increase in support was short-lived and at no point in time was it offered by the majority of the Greek public. According to a Eurobarometer survey conducted during April and May 2000, while thirty-nine percent (39%) of those surveyed stated that they would be in favour of Turkey becoming a part of the EU, fifty-three percent (53%) remained opposed. Finally, Simitis’ assessment of the implications of the earthquakes for Greco-Turkish relations was quite characteristic of his leadership style. He was most reluctant to concede that a natural disaster – a variable beyond his control – could systematically affect his government’s policy. In sharp contrast to Papandreou’s assessment, Simitis made explicit that understanding the situation that the earthquakes had created as an opportunity for the improvement of Greco-Turkish relations would “cheapen” the policy that had been consistently pursued until that time and he even argued that it was necessary to clearly distinguish between the exercise of foreign policy and the humanitarian response to the earthquakes.

The predictions of Ioakimidis’ model have been only partly confirmed because the model assumes that foreign policy makers invariably seek to maximise their chance of being reelected, which in turn renders public opinion the primary source of foreign policy. While the assumption is plausible, it needs to be qualified. Both the theoretical analysis of leadership styles and the empirical evidence from this particular case suggest that given the absence of bureaucratic politics the causal significance of public opinion will be inversely proportionate

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611 Similarly, the Helsinki strategy was formulated independently of bilateral negotiations on low-politics issues and the former clearly constituted the centerpiece of Greek policy towards Turkey. The evidence contradicts the view that “the process of rapprochement...resulted in the confirmation of Turkey’s EU candidacy at the December 1999 Helsinki European Council”; see Ker-Lindsay, Crisis and Conciliation..., op. cit. p. 8
to key foreign policy makers’ responsiveness to the policy context. As Simitis’ leadership style was based on an unequivocal commitment to a distinctive, internal, preconceived idea (the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations) – that remained unchallenged by external constraints or disconfirming evidence – the causal significance of public opinion diminished.

Change in Greek policy towards Turkey was not a response to an event, but the result of a foreign policy maker “seeing something that he wanted to change and moving”\(^{612}\). While foreign policy analysts have argued that the former is a more common occurrence\(^{613}\), the latter is not unprecedented in Greek foreign policy. When PASOK won a general election for the first time in 1981, Greek policy towards Turkey was modified, as the newly elected government refused to negotiate with Turkey over territorial issues. Simitis’ leadership style, however, appears to have been quite different from that of his predecessor. It has often been pointed out that Simitis lacked Andreas Papandreou’s charisma in the Weberian sense\(^{614}\). While Weberian leadership types are based on the sources of a leader’s legitimacy\(^{615}\), the leadership styles discussed in the foreign policy analysis literature are based on the individual characteristics of leaders. The evidence shows that there are further differences between Simitis and Papandreou’s leadership styles. Andreas Papandreou’s leadership style is described as “flexible” and “pliable”\(^{616}\). Indeed, the frequent shifts in Papandreou’s preferences – and consequently in PASOK’s positions – indicate considerable responsiveness to the policy context. In fact, it has been argued that the shifts in Papandreou’s foreign policy positions between 1974 and 1981 “came in clear response to Greek public opinion”\(^{617}\). Furthermore, Papandreou’s

\(^{612}\) Allison – Halperin, op. cit. p. 50
\(^{613}\) Ibid.
\(^{614}\) Featherstone – Kazamias, op. cit.
\(^{616}\) Couloumbis has discussed the leadership style of two of the most prominent Greek Prime Ministers of the twentieth century, namely Constantine Karamanlis and Andreas Papandreou; while his discussion constitutes a fairly accurate description of their respective leadership styles, it is not informed by the relevant arguments put forward by foreign policy analysts. See T. Couloumbis, “Andreas Papandreou: Style and Substance of Leadership” in T. C. Kariotis (ed), The Greek Socialist Experiment: Papandreou’s Greece 1981-1989, New York, Pella, 1992 and T. Couloumbis, “Karamanlis and Papandreou: Style and Substance of Leadership” in S. Papaspiropoulos (ed), PASOK: Conquest and Exercise of Power (in Greek), Athens, Sideris, 1996
\(^{617}\) J. C. Loulis, “Papandreou’s Foreign Policy”, Foreign Affairs, 63: 2, 1984/1985: Winter, p. 379
considerable responsiveness to the policy context is particularly evident in what has been referred to as the “transformation” of PASOK’s foreign policy positions shortly after its first electoral victory in 1981. In contrast, Simitis’ preferences on foreign policy exhibit considerable continuity both before and after his election as Prime Minister. Instead of Papandreou’s flexibility and responsiveness to the policy context, Simitis demonstrated considerable rigidity and an unequivocal commitment to the notion of communitisation. In this sense, Simitis’ leadership style is similar to that of Karamanlis. As has been pointed out, the latter was so “unyieldingly committed” to Greece’s accession to the European Communities and he pursued it with such “vigor and singlemindedness” that some of his advisors indicated that it had turned into an “obsession”. It follows from the above that a useful starting point of studies of change in Greek foreign policy is the Prime Minister’s preferences and his leadership style and in particular the extent to which she is committed to a specific type of foreign policy reform.

Beyond Greek foreign policy

The theoretical framework constructed for the purposes of this research project, the manner in which process-tracing was applied and the findings have implications for the study of aspects of the foreign policies of other EU member-states that the literature has identified as crucial, especially in those cases, where it is plausible to argue that the EU may have caused change in the foreign policies of its member-states. This study advanced the analysis of Europeanisation by addressing a series of problems, which have been pointed out in the literature. First, it addressed the issue of the precise meaning of the concept. In sharp contrast to Olsen’s understanding of Europeanisation, the definition adopted here refrains from considering Europeanisation as an all-encompassing concept. Europeanisation refers to a single set of empirically manageable phenomena, the process of incorporation of EU norms, practices and procedures into the domestic level. This definition of the concept does not pre-
determine the causal mechanism through which Europeanisation produces foreign policy change. It was made explicit that while a discrepancy between national and EU foreign policy does not produce adaptational pressure because legally binding instruments are not available at the EU level in the field of foreign policy, Europeanisation should not be identified with processes of socialisation. It is at least equally plausible to argue that national foreign policy makers incorporate EU foreign policy practices and procedures into their policies for instrumental reasons.

Second, both the theoretical framework and the findings showed why uploading *per se* should not be identified with Europeanisation. The two explanations of Europeanisation presented here clearly separated the process of Europeanisation from its outcomes. It was made explicit that uploading *might* be an outcome of the process of Europeanisation, in which case the process refers to the incorporation of the procedural EU foreign policy norm of collective decision-making. It was thus made possible to move beyond mere descriptions of how member-states project their policy goals onto the EU’s agenda to an analysis of why they choose to do so. The evidence showed that Simitis had already selected the European Community as the default venue for Greek policy towards Turkey prior to the establishment of the relevant EU foreign policy practices (enlargement conditionality). Consequently, the decision to upload was not the outcome of an EU-generated process.

Third, the theoretical framework presented here clarifies the relationship between explanations of policy change informed by the logic of expected consequences and explanations of policy change informed by the logic appropriateness. It has been argued that the two logics are not mutually exclusive and that they may occur simultaneously. It has been suggested that when the costs and benefits of

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620 Tonra identifies Europeanisation with the internalisation of norms and Torreblanca argues that change at the domestic level originates from adaptational pressure generated at the EU level; see Tonra, “Denmark and Ireland”, op. cit. and Torreblanca, op. cit.

621 See J.-G. March – J. P. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders”, *International Organization*, 52: 4, 1998, esp. pp. 952-4 for a discussion of the interactions between the two logics in general and Borzel – Risse, op. cit. pp. 74-5 for a similar discussion in relation to processes of Europeanisation. It should be pointed out that the process of instrumental Europeanisation discussed by Borzel and Risse is different from the one presented here, as it refers to the redistribution of resources and the differential empowerment of domestic actors inside the state. The Europeanisation thesis implies no such redistribution. Instead, it refers to the
alternative courses of action are clearer than the prescriptions of rules that define appropriate behaviour, the logic of expected consequences prevails and vice versa, that cost-benefit calculations inform major decisions and rules that define appropriate behaviour inform minor decisions or vice versa and finally that behaviour based on the logic of expected consequences evolves into behaviour based on the logic of appropriateness over time. This is not to suggest that the two logics are not mutually exclusive. The clarity of prescriptions, the significance of decisions and the point in time when action is pursued are scope conditions that determine the range of applicability of the two logics. Finally, it might be argued that the pursuit of the utility-maximising course of action is considered appropriate behaviour within certain contexts or that the pursuit of the course of action that is considered appropriate is utility-maximising for certain actors' utility function. March and Olsen argue that this approach is to be avoided because it denies the distinctiveness of the two logics. The argument remains unconvincing. If one could subsume either logic to the other, one would have a single explanation of a greater class of events and thus one would have gained both in terms of parsimony and in terms of breadth.

The theoretical framework presented here establishes the distinctiveness of the two logics more convincingly. When they inform explanations of policy change, the two logics are mutually exclusive with regard to two dimensions of the policy making process: the definition of the policy problem and the assessment of alternative courses of action. While policy change driven by the logic of expected consequences aims at the attainment of fixed goals through a different course of action, policy change driven by the logic of appropriateness is the result of a change in goals. In the case of Europeanisation and foreign policy, EU level interactions may result in the internalisation of substantive EU foreign policy norms that define third actors' violations of these norms as foreign policy problems. Once the internalisation of these norms has modified the understanding of the policy problem, goals will also change, as third actors' establishment of EU practices that modify the range of alternatives available to national foreign policy makers and empower them to pursue aggregated interests.


March – Olsen, "The Logic...", op. cit. p. 20
compliance with these norms becomes national foreign policy makers' objective, which is pursued in accordance with the relevant established EU practices. In contrast, when Europeanisation is driven by the logic of expected consequences, established EU practices are incorporated into national policy because it is expected that they will achieve fixed policy goals more effectively. Similarly, policy change driven by the logic of appropriateness is by definition policy change that is not driven by cost-benefit calculations. As was shown above, this is a most instructive observable implication, which makes it possible to empirically distinguish between the two logics.

Fourth, the argument and the findings of this thesis have implications for the debate on whether actors' preferences are endogenous to the process of integration. As was shown here, Simitis' preference for communitisation was indeed "causally independent of the strategies of other actors". Those who argue that EU level interactions do entail processes of socialisation that result in change in actors' preferences have suggested that this is more likely when the actors involved do not hold beliefs that are inconsistent with the behavioural rules that they are being socialised into. It might be argued that these beliefs as such are less significant than the actors' responsiveness to the policy context, as theorised by the literature on foreign policy leadership styles. According to the latter, responsiveness to the policy context depends partly on actors' willingness to challenge constraints. As rules that determine what constitutes appropriate behaviour for EU member-states constrain action, actors who are reluctant to challenge constraints are more likely to be susceptible to the internalisation of such rules.

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624 See also P. A. Hall, "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain", *Comparative Politics*, 25: 3, 1993, where it is argued that third order change or a paradigm shift entails a redefinition of the policy problem and policy goals.

625 Indeed, March and Olsen's claim that the two logics are not mutually exclusive contradicts their understanding of the logic of appropriateness as a negation of the logic of expected consequences; see March - Olsen, "The Logic...", op. cit. p. 3.


Fifth, the explanations formulated here distinguished between those configurations of explanatory variables that could have led to policy change independently of one another — and thus constitute the basis for alternative explanations — and those that could have led to policy change in conjunction with one another — and thus constitute the basis for multi-causal explanations of foreign policy change.

Sixth, the findings confirmed the view that testing explanations that conceptualise foreign policy change as the outcome of Europeanisation against alternative explanations is useful. Evidence that effectively refutes such explanations is perhaps the most compelling indication that Europeanisation can indeed be a useful concept for empirical research. It is after all possible to be “clear enough to be wrong”\textsuperscript{628}. The set of explanations tested here comprised all the explanatory variables identified in the literature and clarified the implications of the interactions between them for Greek policy towards Turkey. Consequently, the relevant EU norms, procedures and practices were not privileged as the single most important explanatory variable.

Seventh, it was shown how it is possible to empirically distinguish between alternative explanations of foreign policy change. As has been pointed out, even though the use of “some form of process tracing” is fairly common, what constitutes “good process tracing” is yet to be determined\textsuperscript{629}. If “determining the relative causal significance of the external and the domestic” and “disentangling the global from the European” is the problem\textsuperscript{630}, clarifying the observable implications of alternative explanations for three basic dimensions of the policy making process — the definition of the policy problem, the alternative courses of action considered and the assessment of the latter — is the solution. Since “explanatory variables from all levels of analysis, from the most micro to the

\textsuperscript{628} Radaelli, “Europeanisation: Solution...”, op. cit. p. 15; P. Sabatier, “Clear Enough to be Wrong”, \textit{Journal of European Public Policy}, 7: 1, 2000


\textsuperscript{630} Featherstone, “‘Varieties of Capitalism’...”, op. cit. p. 32
Establishing key foreign policy makers' understanding of the policy problem is particularly relevant when explanations of foreign policy change that emphasise the causal significance of leadership are being tested. As the latter is inversely proportionate to a leader's responsiveness to the policy context, it is useful to determine whether she is driven by a distinctive, internal, preconceived vision for foreign policy reform. Examining the framing of alternatives is particularly useful when explanations that conceptualise foreign policy change as the outcome of Europeanisation are being tested. Europeanisation implies a discrepancy between EU and national foreign policy. Determining whether national foreign policy makers identified the discrepancy and distinguished between the national policy previously pursued and the relevant EU practice is a key indicator of Europeanisation. Finally, examining the assessment of alternatives is particularly pertinent when explanations that attribute foreign policy change to international socialisation are being tested. Socialisation results in behaviour that is driven by a logic of appropriateness, which by definition is behaviour that is not preceded by cost-benefit calculations. Investigating whether national foreign policy makers made such calculations is a key indicator of socialisation. The above has implications for the direction theory development ought to take. As "one cannot offset theoretical imprecision with methodological sophistication"\(^{633}\), it would be useful if theoretical approaches to the study of foreign policy change made their within-case observable implications more explicit.

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\(^{631}\) Hudson, op. cit. p. 2

\(^{632}\) This particular research strategy is also useful for the empirical investigation of the causal significance of the EU for processes of change in policy areas, where the Open Method of Coordination applies. As has been pointed out, actor-based analysis that focuses on policy makers' considerations is necessary because legally binding instruments are not available at the EU level and the incorporation of EU practices — or rather practices that have been identified as optimal at the EU level — into national policy is voluntary; see K. Jacobsson, "Trying to Reform the 'Best Pupils in the Class'? The Open Method of Coordination in Sweden and Denmark" in J. Zeitlin — P. Pochet (eds) with L. Magnusson, *The Open Method of Coordination in Action: The European Employment and Social Inclusion Strategies*, Brussels, P.I.E. — Peter Lang, 2005, pp. 108-9

\(^{633}\) Checkel – Moravcsik, op. cit. p. 228
The theoretical framework presented here sheds new light on crucial aspects of several EU member-states' foreign policies. As has been pointed out, all candidates for EU membership are involved in disputes, which are inhibiting their progress towards accession. As far as Turkey is concerned, in December 2006 it was decided that eight chapters will not be opened and no chapter will be provisionally closed unless Turkey applies the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement to Cyprus\textsuperscript{634}. With regard to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, even though the Commission has yet to recommend the opening of accession negotiations due to various shortcomings including violent incidents during the 2008 elections, government officials have argued that they suspect this might not be the only reason – alluding to the name dispute with Greece – and French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner has been quoted as saying "the problem of Macedonia, it's the name"\textsuperscript{635}. Finally, Slovenia has been blocking progress in Croatia's accession negotiations due to a border dispute. While in November 2008 enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn suggested that the dispute was a bilateral issue and that in the Commission's view "bilateral issues should be settled bilaterally"\textsuperscript{636}, once Slovenia blocked the opening of nine chapters in Croatia's accession negotiations in December 2008, the Commission proposed the formation of a group of experts that would mediate between the two countries, which is currently under negotiation\textsuperscript{637}. The theoretical framework constructed for the purposes of this thesis can be used to explain variation in the usage of the offer of EU membership as a policy instrument across these cases by establishing national foreign policy makers' considerations.

The theoretical framework presented here can also be useful for the study of aspects of EU member-states' foreign policies that are not related to the use of this particular policy instrument. Consider the foreign policy of the United

\textsuperscript{634} The eight chapters are: Free Movement of Goods, Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services, Financial Services, Agriculture and Rural Development, Fisheries, Transport Policy, Customs Union and External Relations; see Conclusions of the 2770\textsuperscript{th} General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 11 December 2006


\textsuperscript{636} "As a Nordic", Rehn added, “and Nordics don't understand the Balkans by definition, I have sometimes difficulty in seeing that this kind of historical dispute should be in the first place settled in courts, instead by political means”. See Olli Rehn interview with EurActiv, op. cit.

Kingdom. While a recent review concluded that British foreign policy has been Europeanised\textsuperscript{638}, according to the theoretical framework presented here there is not sufficient evidence to support this argument. First of all, the better part of the review discusses British preferences on cooperation in the field of foreign and security policy and the evolution of the latter. What is implicitly being argued under the heading of Europeanisation is that British preferences on cooperation in these policy areas have been endogenous to the integration process. It remains at best unclear why it is necessary to conceptualise this as the outcome of Europeanisation. Furthermore, it is argued that international pressures and domestic factors have brought about Europeanisation\textsuperscript{639}. Clearly, if Europeanisation is not a process whereby the EU causes change in national (foreign) policy, the concept is indeed redundant.

Second, while it is asserted that thirty years of participation in cooperation in the field of foreign policy have entailed processes of socialisation and resulted in a coordination reflex, it is made explicit that Britain frequently refrains from coordinating within the context of the EU\textsuperscript{640}. As has been pointed out, the US remains the UK’s “preferred partner” in the post-Cold War era and “the UK has routinely been willing and able to break free from EU level commitments...(and) act alone or in partnership with other countries when they deem it necessary”\textsuperscript{641}. As was mentioned above, adherence to EU foreign policy norms and practices as a result of socialisation should be consistent across issues and over time. Indeed, the inconsistency of the Greek government’s approach to the Turkish and Cypriot candidatures was identified above as evidence that refutes the socialisation thesis. In this sense, if coordination does not occur consistently across issues and over time it is not a reflex, but the outcome of a calculation. Acknowledging that coordination is the result of a calculation and asking what that calculation is would be a useful step for further research.

\textsuperscript{638} T. Oliver – D. Allen, “Foreign Policy” in I. Bache – A. Jordan (eds), The Europeanisation of British Politics, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006
\textsuperscript{639} Ibid. p. 199
\textsuperscript{640} Ibid. p. 197
Finally, having argued that measuring Europeanisation is difficult, the authors conclude by arguing that Kissinger’s failure to distinguish between the UK and the EU in a speech entitled “Britain and the World” constitutes the most accurate measurement of the extent of the Europeanisation of British foreign policy.\(^\text{642}\) Clearly, a badly prepared speech or at best third actors’ perceptions do not constitute relevant evidence. As was shown above, the process of Europeanisation of national foreign policy is voluntary and therefore establishing the causal significance of the EU requires evidence of national foreign policy makers’ considerations.

Consider French policy towards China. While it has been argued that change in French policy towards China in the early 1990s has been the outcome of a process of Europeanisation,\(^\text{643}\) the theoretical framework presented here shows that the argument remains unconvincing. First, as far as the policy making process is concerned, it remains unclear what the variation is. France pursued collective decision-making both during the period when it preferred what has been referred to as a “confrontational” policy towards China and during the period when it preferred a policy of so-called “constructive engagement”. During the first period, France promoted the imposition of sanctions by the Community and during the second period France promoted the creation of the Asia-Europe Meeting.\(^\text{644}\)

Second, adherence to procedural EU foreign policy norms was inconsistent in both periods. During the first period, France (and Germany) defected from the Community’s agreement to impose sanctions on China in response to the Tiananmen massacre and during the second period France (along with Germany, Italy and Spain) deviated from the established Community practice of cosponsoring a United Nations Commission on Human Rights resolution criticising China’s human rights record.\(^\text{645}\) This constitutes further evidence that coordination is not a reflex, but the outcome of a calculation.

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\(^{642}\) Ibid. p. 200
\(^{643}\) Wong, *The Europeanisation of French Foreign Policy*, op. cit.
\(^{644}\) Ibid. pp. 81-2, 84-5
\(^{645}\) Ibid. pp. 92, 94-5
Third, it remains unclear why a policy that privileged French economic interests over respect for human rights is more consistent with substantive EU foreign policy norms than a policy based on sanctions in response to a massacre. At any rate, policy change was pursued when a new Prime Minister and a new President were elected. The motivations of French foreign policy makers that led to policy change cannot be attributed to EU dynamics. As was the case with Greek policy towards Turkey during the period covered by this thesis, policy change was the result of political turnover. Finally, this particular case empirically demonstrates that the emergence of a discrepancy between national foreign policy and EU foreign policy is possible even after a national government has successfully uploaded its preferences onto the EU. The reason is simple; national preferences might change over time.

Consider German foreign policy. As has been pointed out, the increased willingness to use military instruments constitutes the most "profound" change in German foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. On the one hand, it has been argued that this change has been the outcome of Europeanisation. It is indeed plausible to argue that German foreign policy makers have become convinced that it is appropriate to use military instruments in situations that fall within the scope of acceptable military action defined by the EU. The literature has also debated the room for maneuver that increasing post-Cold War US pressure on Germany to assume greater responsibilities within the context of NATO left German foreign policy makers. On the other hand, it has been argued that "these changes were intended from early on", that the government's efforts to pursue reform have been observable since 1987 and that they played a "key role" in overcoming the constraints imposed by public opinion. The explanatory variables discussed in the literature on change in German foreign

647 As Pierson has pointed out, change in national preferences over time is on of the reason why gaps emerge between national preferences and EU institutions and policies; see Pierson, op. cit. pp. 139-40
650 Ibid. pp. 69-77
651 Baumann - Hellmann, op. cit. pp. 64, 68-9, 73, emphasis added
policy are similar to those incorporated into the theoretical framework of this thesis. Process-tracing the observable implications of these explanations for the definition of the policy problems the use of military instruments was intended to address, the alternative courses of action German foreign policy makers considered and the manner in which the latter were assessed would allow researchers to establish which of the above variables were causally significant for change in German foreign policy. If one can show that German foreign policy makers' intentions to pursue policy change had been crystallised prior to the end of the Cold War and the establishment of the relevant EU rules – as was the case with Simitis' preference for communitisation – explanations that emphasise the causal significance of structural incentives and the role of the EU can be refuted.

Consider Finland's policy towards Russia. It has been argued that Finland promoted the Northern Dimension Initiative in an attempt to multilateralise its policy towards and engage with Russia and that Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen – assisted by Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari – was the key policy entrepreneur. Certain beliefs regarding the future of the integration process and Finland's role within the EU that present similarities with Simitis' views on the matter have been attributed to Lipponen. As has been pointed out, Lipponen "has often been seen as the personification" of a policy based on the idea that further integration and Finland's active participation in the EU will increase Finland's influence and security. It might be suggested in this sense that the Northern Dimension Initiative was the outcome of the entrepreneurship of a key foreign policy maker, who was highly committed to his internal vision for Finnish foreign policy. At the same time, however, it has been pointed out that Finland's Northern Dimension Initiative was not particularly coherent. In fact, it has been argued that the Commission viewed it as a "sublime piece of mysticism and nonsense". It might be suggested that Lipponen was not committed to an internal, well-formulated vision for Finnish foreign policy and that he was therefore quite responsive to the policy context. Indeed, Lipponen explicitly drew

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653 Rieker, *Europeanisation...*, op. cit. p. 103
654 Arter, op. cit. p. 682
parallels between the Northern Dimension Initiative and the EU’s Mediterranean policy. It might be the case that Finnish foreign policy makers identified benefits in incorporating EU foreign policy practices established within the context of the EU’s Mediterranean policy into their policy towards Russia. Testing alternative explanations of the Finnish government’s initiative that emphasise Lipponen’s leadership and the role of established EU practices would make it possible to establish the origins of the initiative.

Finally, consider the policies of Poland and the Baltic states – especially Lithuania – towards Russia. It has been argued that Poland and Lithuania promoted the Eastern Dimension and generally the EU’s involvement in neighbouring states, such as Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus in an attempt to contain Russia. While the pursuit of stability, democracy and prosperity in the region is consistent with the logic of EU foreign policy, EU support for its Eastern neighbours as a type of containment policy aimed at Russia is not. While historical experiences, geographical proximity, relative power positions vis-à-vis Russia and Russia’s assertiveness make these member-states concerned about Russia, they pursue quite different policies. Finland believes that the EU can provide security, while Poland and Lithuania reserve that role for the US and NATO. The discussion of uploading in the literature would have led one to identify the efforts to promote both the Northern and the Eastern Dimension as Europeanisation. The theoretical framework presented here, however, sheds a different light on these policies and raises interesting research questions. Why does Finland prefer to engage Russia, while Poland and Lithuania prefer to contain it? Do national foreign policy makers understand the problem that their policies towards Russia are intended to address differently? Were the initiatives that national foreign policy makers pursued the outcome of an assessment of relevant EU foreign policy practices? It follows from the above that the

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655 Ibid. p. 686
657 Kononenko, op. cit. p. 80
658 Zaborowsky – Longhurst, op. cit.
theoretical framework constructed for the purposes of this thesis can be fruitfully applied to the study of the foreign policies of numerous EU member-states, which present empirical puzzles that have considerable real-world implications, thus advancing the theoretically informed empirical study of foreign policy.
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