GERMANOPHILISM IN BRITAIN:
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ELITES AND THE LIMITS
TO ANGLO-GERMAN ANTAGONISM, 1905-1914

By

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the limits to Anglo-German antagonism and the sources of rapprochement between Britain and Germany, during the approximate period 1905-1914. It thus explores Anglo-German relations before the First World War from a perspective which has up to now been largely neglected, and serves as a corrective to the emphasis on the sources of antagonism which prevails in the English-language historical literature.

The study probes Germanophilia among British non-governmental elites, focusing on the commercial, financial and academic communities, as well as cooperative links between the two countries at the non-governmental level before the war. The topics examined include the Anglo-German friendship movement in Britain, ties between British and German commercial interests and Anglo-German economic interdependence, and Anglo-German links in education.

The thesis also studies attitudes, including a discussion of British stereotypical images of Germany based on travel accounts. British textbooks on German history that were published before the war are analysed as well as a means of assessing the prewar attitude of British academics, in particular historians, towards Germany. This investigation reveals the strength of the idea of Anglo-German racial kinship, and demonstrates that British historians tended to view Germany favourably before the war. Their attitude, however, changed after the outbreak of hostilities in August 1914.

In conclusion, the thesis reappraises the ultimate failure of the 'pro-German' forces in Britain to prevent the outbreak of Anglo-German hostilities in 1914. Its primary aim, nevertheless, is not to argue that the limits to the Anglo-German antagonism could have prevented the First World War, but to demonstrate that they existed and were important.
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<td>Imperial Chemical Industries: A History</td>
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<td>IGS</td>
<td>Institute of Germanic Studies</td>
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<td>JHI</td>
<td>Journal of the History of Ideas</td>
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<td>KCMAC</td>
<td>King's College Modern Archive Centre, Cambridge</td>
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<td>KEBF</td>
<td>King Edward VII British-German Foundation</td>
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<td>LCC</td>
<td>London County Council</td>
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<td>MLT</td>
<td>Modern Language Teaching</td>
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NCA Nineteenth Century and After
NLS National Library of Scotland
PRO Public Record Office
RHL Rhodes House Library
RTC Report of the Tariff Commission
T Treasury papers
ULL University of London Library
USL University of Southampton Library
WO War Office papers
ZUG Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Anglo-German relations before the First World War have been the subject of numerous historical works. Paul Kennedy's *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914*\(^1\) probably stands as the most comprehensive study of the Anglo-German relationship in the half-century before 1914, touching on virtually all aspects of the countries' bilateral relations. His book traces the origins of the antagonism and views the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 mostly as the culmination of a long-term pattern of growing and intractable Anglo-German tensions. Other works, approaching the prewar period coloured by the knowledge that war did break out in 1914, have similarly stressed the prewar sources of discord and forces contributing to an Anglo-German conflict, such as the growth of the German navy after 1898 and the Anglo-German naval race, the rise of German economic power in the late nineteenth century and the Anglo-German commercial rivalry, war scares and spy fevers, and the rise of militarism and right-wing movements.

E.L. Woodward's *Great Britain and the German Navy* (1935), for example, views the growth of the German navy and the Anglo-German naval rivalry as the primary causes of the First World War.\(^2\) Richard Langhome's article in the *Historical Journal* (1971), 'The Naval Question in Anglo-German Relations, 1912-1914', similarly focuses on the naval race in pre-1914 Anglo-German relations.\(^3\) Other works analysing the Anglo-German relationship from the standpoint of its diplomatic and naval aspects include Zara Steiner's *Britain and the Origins of the First World War* (1977),\(^4\) and a series of essays in F.H. Hinsley (ed.), *British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey* (1977).\(^5\)

Ross J.S. Hoffman's *Great Britain and the German Trade Rivalry* (1933),\(^6\) is an exponent *par excellence* of the economic interpretation of the Anglo-German antagonism. It views the prewar rise of German commercial competitiveness as the chief cause of
Anglo-German friction. Other works that deal with the German 'threat' to British industrial supremacy in the prewar period include The Development of British Industry and Foreign Competition, 1875-1914 (1968), edited by Derek Aldcroft. 7

Emphasis on the prewar climate of Germanophobia and invasion scares in Britain can be found in I.F. Clarke's Voices Prophesying War, 1763-1984 (1966). 8 In his article 'Spy Fever in Britain, 1900-1915' (Historical Journal, 1978), David French examines the growth of German-spy paranoia in prewar Britain, treating that phenomenon as an expression of Germanophobia which came to a climax at the start of war.9 'In August 1914 this mutual distrust became mutual hatred,' French argues.10 Approaching Anglo-German relations as well from the standpoint of stressing discord and forces contributing to an Anglo-German conflict, M.E. Humble's 'The Breakdown of a Consensus: British Writers and Anglo-German Relations, 1900-1920' (Journal of European Studies, 1977) examines the prewar proliferation of sensational invasion novels which contributed to the estrangement between Britain and Germany.11 In Humble's view, 'fear and hatred of Germany had been encouraged from an early date by a series of crude alarmist novels',12 suggesting that these books were indirectly a cause of the war of 1914.

The rise of racist and nationalist ideologies and movements as sources of Anglo-German friction has also been emphasized by some of the secondary literature. A fine example is Nationalist and Racist Movements in Britain and Germany before 1914 (1981), a collection of essays edited by Paul Kennedy and Anthony J. Nicholls.13 'Rethinking the Radical Right in Germany and Britain before 1914' (Journal of Contemporary History, 1986), by Frans and Marilyn Shevin Coetzee, also focuses on the development of right-wing movements in the prewar period.14 Anne Summers's 'Militarism in Britain before the Great War' (History Workshop, 1976), concentrating on 'popular' militarism and the working classes, traces the growth of militarist modes of thinking in prewar Britain as a way of explaining the British population's readiness for war in 1914.15
In an essay in War and Society, edited by Brian Bond and Ian Roy, John Gooch similarly delves into British society's conditioning for war during the pre-1914 period.\textsuperscript{16}

This brief overview of the English-language literature suggests that the prevailing trend in the English-language historiography has been to stress the sources of Anglo-German antagonism, giving them in my view a disproportionate amount of attention. The result has been a tendency to emphasize mainly Germanophobic forces in Britain and, conversely, Anglophobic trends in Germany before 1914. As J.A.S. Grenville has pointed out: 'The bankers, industrialists, politicians and ordinary people who did not share the strident Germanophobia and Anglophobia have tended to be neglected by historians whose perceptions are foreshortened by the knowledge of what was to happen in 1914.'\textsuperscript{17}

There is, nonetheless, a body of secondary literature concerning itself with the relaxation of Anglo-German tension during the few years before 1914. One example is R.J. Crampton's The Hollow Détente (1980), which examines Anglo-German cooperative efforts in the Balkans from 1911 to 1914, particularly during the Balkan wars of 1912-13.\textsuperscript{18} Richard Langhorne's article, 'Anglo-German Negotiations Concerning the Future of the Portuguese Colonies' (Historical Journal, 1973) brings to light the Anglo-German negotiations between 1911 and 1913 which resulted in an agreement on the future disposition of the Portuguese colonies in Africa.\textsuperscript{19} Anglo-German attempts at political cooperation are also examined by P.H.S. Hatton in 'Harcourt and Solf: The Search for an Anglo-German Understanding through Africa, 1912-14' (European Studies Review, 1971).\textsuperscript{20}

These episodes in Anglo-German collaboration, however, are analysed primarily from the diplomatic standpoint, leaving the non-political sources of prewar Anglo-German détente still in need of further examination.

This thesis aims to provide a balance to the literature on prewar Anglo-German relations by examining the forces seeking rapprochement between Britain and Germany. It analyses Germanophile tendencies and attitudes of non-governmental elites in Britain, as
well as cooperative links between these elites and their German counterparts, in the approximate period from 1905 to 1914. Its purpose is not to argue that these 'limits to the antagonism' could have prevented the outbreak of war in 1914. They did exist nonetheless, and by examining them as well as approaching the Anglo-German relationship from the perspective of the British Germanophiles who have up to now been wholly neglected by historians, this thesis expects to make an important contribution to the historiography.

Roger Chickering's *Imperial Germany and a World without War* is an instructive source. As his work argues, the peace movement did exist in prewar Germany but was stymied by structural forces in German society. In similar vein, one could examine how the Anglo-German linkages and cooperative forces were frustrated and why they were ultimately unable to prevent the outbreak of war in 1914.

This thesis suggests that the July crisis of 1914, which triggered the First World War, can be understood as a short-term stimulus quite divorced from anything having to do directly with long-term Anglo-German relations. The First World War stemmed largely from a Balkan crisis and began as the 'Third Balkan War'. Even though Britain and Germany had by 4 August 1914 entered the war on opposing sides, this conflict did not originate as a quarrel between Britain and Germany. Arguably, the British and German governments went to war only as a result of the particular set of circumstances confronting them which had been created by the crisis at hand. Even if there had been a growing antagonism between the two powers during the previous fifty years, the circumstances which led to their intervention in the European conflict in 1914 did not issue directly from that antagonism.

It would be reasonable to contend, nevertheless, that Britain's decision to intervene was influenced by the background of Anglo-German relations prior to 1914. The prewar climate generated by the intense naval race and the German eclipse of British industrial supremacy certainly had an effect on the attitudes and assumptions of the British leadership...
during the July crisis, particularly those of the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, and the Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith. That background, along with Germany's position as the strongest military power in Europe, no doubt rendered her more likely to be viewed as a serious threat and the one country which would upset the European balance of power, thereby infringing on a centuries-old precept of British foreign policy. The maintenance of a power equilibrium in Europe was indeed regarded as a 'historical truism' of British policy. Even in 1909 Grey had warned that 'the domination of Germany in Europe' would mean war. Moreover, by invading Belgium on 4 August 1914 and thereby violating the neutrality of one of the Low Countries, Germany threatened yet another vital and centuries-old British interest and thus made Britain even more predisposed to go to war against her. Keeping the Low Countries from falling into the hands of a potentially hostile Great Power was, as Lord Palmerston had stated in 1838, the 'antient and hereditary Policy of England'.

Properly understood, however, Germany's invasion of Belgium was less important in providing the British government with a casus belli than in rallying public opinion and giving the waverers in the cabinet a justification for entering the conflict. As Kennedy points out, 'by 2 August the majority of the Cabinet felt committed to joining the war even if Belgium ranged herself on the side of the Germans' (emphasis in the original). Vital as Belgian neutrality was to Britain's security interests, one may have to speculate whether Britain would have readily considered Belgium a worthy cause for intervention had the French been the ones to march through that country.

The diplomatic crisis of July 1914 also should not overshadow the complexity of non-political factors in the Anglo-German relationship during and before the July crisis. Why, for instance, were financial interests in the City of London, along with a substantial portion of the British business classes, opposed to intervention even as late as 1 August - not least against a long-standing economic 'rival' which had for many years been widely
regarded as Britain's main commercial threat? Might Germany's prewar economic ascendancy have, in fact, been a source of material benefit to certain British commercial and financial interests? Why also were the German Emperor Wilhelm II and the Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, during the diplomatic crisis of July 1914, willing to calculate on Britain's remaining neutral, at least for the early duration of the anticipated war? Were they perhaps guided by a set of attitudes, beliefs and 'unspoken assumptions' which led them to think that their Teutonic cousins somehow would not have the gall to go to war with Germany?

* * * *

This thesis will consist of two parts. Part One is 'empirical'; it analyses 'pro-German' and Germanophile forces at work in Britain during that period. Part Two, being 'interpretive', analyses Germanophilism in a mentalités framework, with a focus on the study of stereotypical images and elite attitudes. This analytical framework is influenced by imagology.

In Part One I will first examine, in Chapter 2, the founding of the Anglo-German Friendship Committee in 1905 as well as subsequent developments in the Anglo-German friendship movement in Britain up to 1914. Particular attention will be paid to the social elites spearheading this movement, as well as their motives and objectives.

Another area analysed is business. My investigation, in Chapter 3, will concern itself with Anglo-German economic ties, examining linkage in the strategic sectors of industry - namely, explosives and armaments - as evidenced by the high level of British and German collaboration in prewar trusts and cartels. This chapter will also probe aspects of economic interdependence between the two countries. As will be shown, numerous British and German commercial interests were indeed engaged in mutually beneficial relationships which ran counter to the tide of the political antagonism. Cooperative forces
were certainly discernible between the two countries on the private, business level.

Chapter 4 will examine Anglo-German links in education, focusing on the Imperial College of Science and Technology as a symbol of the German connection in British education in the prewar period. Modelled on the German Technische Hochschule, Imperial, founded in 1907, was hailed as the 'London Charlottenburg'. The usefulness and shortcomings of German technical education as a model for emulation in Britain have already been examined at length.29 My aim is not to duplicate research but to concentrate on the German element in Imperial's founding which was manifested not just by the relevance of the German model, but also by the influence of the German philosophy towards education, and more importantly, by the private funding for the college which came largely from German business interests in Britain.

In this chapter, the thesis will also study the King Edward VII British-German Foundation, established in 1911 by Sir Ernest Cassel, a German-born British financier who responded to the rising Anglo-German tension by promoting educational and cultural exchange between Britain and Germany. Another area examined will be the Rhodes Scholarships, a scheme conceived by Cecil Rhodes which took effect in 1903 after his death. The focus will be on the German scholarships, which Rhodes set aside as a tribute to his friendship with the German Emperor.

The reception of German thought in British intellectual and cultural life in the nineteenth century, as well as in the social reform movement, has been dealt with at length by the secondary literature.30 The broad influence of German ideas and trends in British culture in the nineteenth century certainly cannot be overlooked. The founding of the English Goethe Society in 1886, for instance, no doubt attested to the strength and appeal of German literature in British educated circles.31 Advocates of educational reform in Britain, Matthew Arnold being a notable example, indeed drew their inspiration largely from German methods and organization. German Idealism also had a tremendous impact
on the development of philosophy in Britain in the nineteenth century, Hegelianism being in effect the foundation for British Idealism. Centred at Oxford, Idealism was the prevailing school of philosophical thought in prewar Britain, and dominated that university up to the outbreak of war in 1914. The names of the Oxford Idealists are legion: Edward Caird, T.H. Green, Bernard Bosanquet, F.H. Bradley, among others. While recognizing these German contributions to British academic developments in the nineteenth century, this thesis will not deal with them directly as they fall outside the time frame and scope of this study.

The examination of Anglo-German educational links will mark the end of the first part of the thesis. Part Two, being the interpretive section, will follow, centred around the study of mentalités. This part will provide an analytical framework devoted to the analysis of stereotypes and Germanophile attitudes in prewar Britain. It should be mentioned from the outset that this thesis is not concerned with theory or theoretical approaches to the study of elites or attitudes, though it is influenced to some extent by structuralist theory and the Annales school. A theory-based approach to analysing the images of Germany in British attitudes has already been offered elsewhere and needs no duplicating here.

Chapter 5 will examine British stereotypical images of Germany and Germans, based on memoirs, journals and first-hand accounts written by Britons travelling or residing in Germany in the approximate 1905-14 period. This investigation derives its method and approach from imagology, defined as 'the study of national, ethnic and racial stereotypes as they appear in all literary contexts'. A field of literary studies, imagology has become an important tool in comparative literature and 'stresses that all kinds of texts can and indeed should be examined'. The primary texts examined in this chapter, being of both literary and historical value, are certainly relevant. Unfortunately, imagology is far less developed in the English-language literature than in the German. The study of the image of Germans in British literature, for instance, has been much more extensively undertaken in German
than in English.36

Chapter 6 will examine imagery of Germany utilizing a different type of text: the history textbook. A source of images, the textbook can be treated also as a primary text from the period. Having a historical context of their own, history textbooks provide insights into the attitudes and viewpoints of their authors and of the historical profession as a whole. They can thus aid in one's attempt to probe the attitudes of the prewar British academic establishment, a very important segment of Britain's `intellectual aristocracy'. The historians are especially pertinent to this study because they were active in disseminating opinion on Germany before the war and, furthermore, played a major role in the anti-German propaganda campaign after the start of hostilities in August 1914. This chapter will demonstrate that the British historians, at least as seen through their textbook writings, tended to be pro-German before the war. In examining the pamphlets and other propagandistic works which they issued after Britain's entry in the war on 4 August 1914, one can discern a marked change in their attitude towards Germany. Once mobilized into the war effort, they adopted a distinctly anti-German stance. As my analysis will show, in assessing their public pronouncements on Germany one can indeed draw a line through August 1914. The tone of the 'anti-German' works put out after the start of hostilities should not detract from the Germanophile attitudes exhibited by a considerable section of the British academic community before the war. This investigation, I believe, will contribute to a greater understanding of the mentalité of the British academic establishment in the prewar period.

Chapter 7 will complement this study further by examining the limits to the historians' anti-Germanism even after the outbreak of war. It will discuss the origins and rise of racial Anglo-Saxonism in Britain in the nineteenth century, and analyse the importance of racial Anglo-Saxonist ideas in the prewar assumptions and attitudes of the British intellectual elite. As this chapter will demonstrate, the prestige enjoyed by German
universities and scholarship within the British academic establishment must be duly taken into account. Respect for German learning was truly a deep thread in Britain's prewar intellectual circles. Lastly, this chapter will undertake case studies of three Britons from different backgrounds who had a strong personal German connection and who sought to improve Anglo-German relations before 1914. The purpose here will be to assess the limits to their ability to prevent the Anglo-German rupture in 1914. This study will be important in helping one understand the limitations of the British non-governmental elites' influence on official policy-making.

A dominant theme which emerges from the analysis in Part Two is the idea of Anglo-German racial kinship in prewar Britain. In my examination of stereotypes and elite attitudes, the notion that Britons and Germans were descended from common roots and belonged to the same Teutonic family resurfaces over and over again. One must indeed appreciate the strength of the idea of shared Anglo-German heritage in pre-1914 British attitudes. Racialist ideas were certainly important as a mainstay of Germanophilia in Britain, not least among the academic elite as well as the commercial and clerical groups that spearheaded the Anglo-German friendship movement.

In the concluding chapter I will examine Britain's response to war in August 1914, paying close attention to the cabinet's decision as well as the response of the business and financial interests that constituted an important segment of the British non-governmental elites. An evaluation will be made of the institutional framework in which they operated, and of the weaknesses of the 'pro-German' forces in Britain in general.

Lastly, an explanation should be given as to why the thesis has chosen to concentrate on non-governmental elites, notably the commercial and financial and the academic elites. In seeking to probe Germanophilia in Britain, this project had as its starting point the aim of examining forces which went counter to, or could be seen as offsetting, the Anglo-German political antagonism. Consequently, I decided to move away
from governments and official policy and focus instead on the social and cultural aspects of the Anglo-German relationship. This move towards the non-political and non-governmental sector was also prompted by a desire to explore the attitudes and actions of private interests in Britain that did not share the Germanophobia often associated with the prewar period. From the standpoint of methodology, this approach has certainly been vindicated, for there is undeniably a substantial amount of material into which I have been able to tap to study the activities and attitudes of these elites. But more importantly, these interests also evinced identifiable manifestations of Germanophilism, thus making themselves a very suitable subject for this study.

NOTES

10. Ibid., p. 364.
12. Ibid., p. 42.


27. Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, p. 462.


31. For more on its founding, see H.G. Fiedler, *Memories of Fifty Years of the English Goethe Society* (Cambridge, 1936).


35. Ibid., p. 28. A brief account of the origins and uses of imagology is provided by Peter E. Firchow, *The Death of the German Cousin: Variations on a Literary Stereotype, 1890-1920* (London, 1986), Appendix.

CHAPTER 2
THE ANGLO-GERMAN FRIENDSHIP
MOVEMENT, 1905-1914

'On the other side of the water we see the United States; we should like to see on this side the United States of Europe.'

Lord Avebury

The year was 1905. It was neither the best nor the worst of times in Anglo-German relations. Britain and Germany were at peace. The Great War was to come only almost a decade later. Yet the two powers were not exactly on the most cordial of terms. Much of 1905 witnessed a relentless spate of 'press wars' between them, exacerbating a tension already fuelled by strained relations between London and Berlin.

In 1905 the Anglo-German 'antagonism' was already well established. One could trace its beginnings to the very birth of the Second German Empire in January 1871, itself the result of a quick and convincing military conquest of France. Emerging as a new, unified power at the heart of Europe, Germany now had the potential to establish her hegemony over the continent. Even though Britain had not intervened in the Franco-Prussian War, the spectre of German territorial aggrandizement, resulting from Berlin's annexation of the French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, already caused apprehension in London. During the 'war-in-sight' crisis of 1875, when a renewed Franco-German war loomed on the horizon, the possible annihilation of France as a Great Power and the prospect of a German dominance of western Europe, caused alarm again in Britain. On this occasion, London promptly intervened to avert a German attack on France.¹
Germany's bid for colonies in Africa in the mid-1880s further contributed to the 'antagonism' with Britain. London may not, in principle, have been strongly averse to Germany's participation in the 'Scramble for Africa'. However, the manner of German diplomacy - characterized by Reich Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's hard-bargaining and 'blackmailing' methods - in pressing Berlin's colonial claims and wringing concessions from Britain could not but arouse London's suspicions about German goodwill and trustworthiness. It was largely because of Bismarck's Realpolitik that German approaches in the late 1880s for an alliance with Britain met with little success. As Kennedy explains: 'What "Bismarckism" had done was to make every British government from the 1860s to the 1880s, ... so distrustful of Berlin's real motives in its external policy, ... that a firm, public and binding Anglo-German alliance was out of the question.' Moreover, during the 1880s also Germany's growing economic power and competitiveness, subsequent to the introduction of her 1879 tariff increases, began to attract notice in Britain, thereby threatening further the British sense of security.

Kaiser Wilhelm II's incompetence as a statesman no doubt contributed to a large degree to the worsening of Anglo-German relations. Noted for his bombastic outbursts, erratic behaviour and unstable temperament, the German monarch came to earn such apppellations as 'Wilhelm the Sudden' and 'His Impulsive Majesty'. There is little denying that the Kaiser's 'impulsiveness, which often amounts to tactlessness', heightened and in some instances confirmed British distrust of Germany's intentions. One manifestation of his tactlessness, which created a great stir in Britain, came in the 'Kruger telegram' episode. In late December 1895 Leander Starr Jameson, friend and agent of Cecil Rhodes, Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, launched an ill-conceived and ill-fated incursion into the Transvaal which has since become known as the Jameson Raid. Planned with the object of inciting an Uitlander revolt in Johannesburg against Boer rule, Jameson's poorly executed venture was promptly put down in January 1896. In a telegram to Paul Kruger, President
of the Transvaal, Wilhelm congratulated him on his success in smashing the raid. The publication of this dispatch, inevitably offending British sensitivities, led to a 'passionate denunciation' of the Kaiser in the British press and heightened Anglo-German tension.6

The late 1890s were certainly pivotal in contributing to the growth of the Anglo-German 'antagonism'. The year 1897 marked a turning point in German foreign policy as a decision was made by the Kaiser to embark on Weltpolitik and seek world-power status for Germany. In that year Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz became State Secretary of the Reichsmarineamt, an appointment heralding the start of Germany's naval buildup.

Beginning with her first Navy Law of 1898, which provided for the construction of a modern battleship fleet, Germany was to present a direct challenge to the Royal Navy for over the next decade.7 The naval arms race, indeed, was to remain the thorniest issue in Anglo-German diplomatic relations during the decade before 1914, especially between 1908 and 1912. Berlin's determination to carry out its naval programme 'touched the British nerve at its most sensitive point'.8

The militant tone of the German press campaign against Britain, as well as the heightened Anglophobia in Germany during the Boer War (1899-1902), further added to the Anglo-German discord. This long and costly war in South Africa shook late-Victorian Britain's confidence to the roots and raised serious doubts about the merits of John Bull's continued 'splendid isolation'.9 At a time when Britain was experiencing difficulties in South Africa, rumours that the Kaiser was organizing a European coalition against her widened the rift between London and Berlin further.

Nevertheless, a glimmer of hope offered itself during the period from 1898 to 1902 for an Anglo-German rapprochement. In the very year of Tirpitz's first Navy Law, Joseph Chamberlain, the British Colonial Secretary, made overtures to Berlin for an Anglo-German alliance, but his approach was rejected by the Wilhelmstraße. Renewed efforts for an alliance were launched after Lord Lansdowne's accession to the helm of the Foreign Office.
in 1900. The bilateral negotiations that ensued during 1901 and 1902, however, proved futile - a failure due mostly to Prime Minister Lord Salisbury's distrust of German diplomacy and intentions, and to the fundamental divergence between both sides' positions and interests. As J.A.S. Grenville suggests:

Bülow [the German Chancellor] had decided that if an alliance was to be concluded at all Britain must join the Triple Alliance; ... In London, on the other hand, anything more than a carefully defined and narrow agreement specifying the exact conditions of the casus belli was regarded with extreme misgivings. The gap between these different points of view was never closed. In the long run it is impossible to conclude an alliance unless there is some degree of faith on both sides.

This mutual good faith, it turned out, was 'singularly lacking' between the governments of London and Berlin.\(^\text{10}\) The failure of the alliance talks was significant, for 1901-02 marked a watershed confirming the rise of the 'German challenge' in the eyes of British governmental circles.\(^\text{11}\) By 1902 the embryonic German fleet had begun to attract the British Admiralty's attention. In September of that year, the Parliamentary and Financial Secretary at the Admiralty and future War Secretary, Sir Hugh O. Arnold-Forster, warned that 'Germany must be regarded as a possible enemy'. Lord Selborne, the First Lord of the Admiralty, wrote a memorandum in October 1902 claiming that 'the great new German navy is being carefully built up from the point of view of a war with us'.\(^\text{12}\) In late 1904, with the arrival of Sir John Fisher as First Sea Lord, the Admiralty redistributed its fleets, reducing the Royal Navy's strength in the Mediterranean and withdrawing the bulk of its battleships to home waters, apparently in response to the growing German naval presence in the North Sea. As
Samuel Williamson observes, Fisher, who often talked of 'Copenhagening' the German fleet, 'quickly gave British strategy an anti-German orientation'.

Before leaving office in April 1905, Selborne had occasion to reflect on Anglo-German relations when another round of heated exchanges took place between the British and German press. He attributed the 'real source' of British resentment of Germany to 'the libels of the German Press on the British Army during the Boer War'. As Selborne observed:

The people did not mind German opinion being against us as to the merits of the quarrel; they did not mind French opinion being against us as to the merits of the quarrel; they did not much mind, though they made a grimace over, the French libels against the British soldier, for they never really expected anything else from the French considering what the history of the two countries has been and that the Fashoda incident had only just closed. But they never for one moment had anticipated the libels in letter press and in cartoon of the German Press and it bit them to the bone [emphasis added]. This being so they were predisposed to view with suspicion everything that Germany did, and inevitably the sudden growth of the great German Navy has absorbed their attention.

Selborne thus pinpointed a discrete series of events which contributed to the Anglo-German antagonism. It is interesting to note, though, that from Selborne's standpoint, perfidious libels were expected of the French but not the Germans.

The year 1905 also witnessed the first Moroccan crisis. Following the sending of a French expedition to Fez in the early part of the year, the German government felt compelled to act to safeguard German economic interests in Morocco. Under pressure
from his ministers, Wilhelm landed at Tangier in full military dress on 31 March. In a flamboyant display of brinkmanship, he made a speech affirming the maintenance of that country's integrity. This move, however, was also aimed at testing the Anglo-French entente, which had been born in April 1904 when Britain and France settled their longstanding colonial disputes by concluding a set of agreements. These accords, among other things, had recognized French preponderance in Morocco and Britain's 'free hand' in Egypt. In the view of Sir Francis Bertie, the British ambassador in Paris, the Kaiser wanted to 'show to the French people that an understanding with England is of little value to them and that they had much better come to an agreement with Germany'. Careless and impetuous, the Kaiser's actions at Tangier had the ultimate effect only of exacerbating Anglo-German tensions and strengthening the Anglo-French entente.

Although the German government's bold step might have come as a surprise to Whitehall, its grievances were to an extent justified, judged by the merits of its case. In the previous summer, Berlin had expressed concerns about its commercial interests in Morocco, as well as the maintenance of the status quo and an 'open door' in that country. Lansdowne observed that 'they [the Germans] thought they saw symptoms of an intention on the part of France to monopolize' the concessions and industrial enterprises in Morocco - a suspicion which was not without foundation. Given a free hand in Morocco, the French naturally took the most of what their position there afforded them through their 'peaceful penetration' of the nominally 'independent' country. Germany after all was a signatory to the Treaty of Madrid of 1880 which stipulated equal rights in Morocco for all parties and if German rights were being infringed upon, it is natural that Berlin would want to seek redress. After long drawn-out negotiations, this crisis was ultimately resolved, peacefully, in April 1906 with the signing of the Treaty of Algeciras.

During the intervening period, the War Office and Admiralty began drawing up contingency plans for a possible war with Germany. Incidentally, the keel of the first all-
big-gun battleship, HMS "Dreadnought," was also laid down in Britain on 2 October. Powered by turbine engines (the first of its type), armed with ten twelve-inch guns, and achieving a maximum speed of twenty-one knots, this vessel which would be launched in February 1906 was to render all existing battleships obsolete. Rather than 'win' the naval arms race for Britain, however, this technological marvel was only going to intensify it; rather than sap the German will to contest British naval supremacy, it hardened Berlin's resolve to stay the course.

But while the "Dreadnought" was being developed in Britain, inaugurating a new phase in naval technology, a changing of the guard was also taking place in the German military establishment. In December 1905 Count Alfred von Schlieffen, architect of the famed Schlieffen Plan, retired from his post as Chief of the German General Staff, making way for Helmuth von Moltke the Younger. Just about nine years later, his plan for a two-front European war, involving a German offensive against France via Belgium, was to be put into effect at the outbreak of the continental conflict.

December 1905 also saw the fall of the Conservative government of Arthur James Balfour. Having been in opposition for close to a decade, the Liberals finally returned to office. On 5 December the Liberal leader, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, was granted an audience with the King and requested to form a government. Shortly thereafter, in January 1906, the Liberals were to be swept into office in an electoral victory of unprecedented proportions.

Meanwhile, Britain's entente with France was being reinforced. Barely two weeks after the Liberals assumed office, military conversations were begun unofficially between the British and the French. On 15 January 1906 these staff talks were given their official stamp of approval by Sir Edward Grey, the new Foreign Secretary. He in turn advised the incoming War Secretary, Richard Haldane, to be prepared lest a situation might arise which would suddenly compel the British government to go to the aid of France in her
continuing dispute with Germany.\textsuperscript{20}

It was also during this protracted Moroccan crisis that the first tangible, unofficial efforts at Anglo-German conciliation came to fruition. The year 1905 may have witnessed an invasion scare, the heated press wars, and the crisis in Morocco. But to paraphrase and even risk over-simplifying Marx and Hegel, every thesis has its antithesis. Just as the forces making for war were gaining strength in 1905, so the forces promoting peace too were making headway in their efforts. For by the autumn of that year, certain individuals in Britain and Germany had decided to take action to defuse the Anglo-German tension.

\textbf{The Fourteenth Universal Peace Congress}

The setting for this coming together of high-minded Britons and Germans was provided by the salubrious shores of Lake Lucerne in Switzerland at the town of Lucerne, where the fourteenth Universal Peace Congress was held from 19 to 23 September. At the congress, a paper by H.R. Fox Bourne entitled 'Civilization by War' was read. 'We are all pledged to denounce war between civilized nations as a dangerous, degrading, and essentially savage institution', the paper declared, 'and to do our utmost towards putting an end to it.' It added that war against 'uncivilized communities', waged under the pretence of civilizing them, was 'yet more degrading and the climax of savagery'.\textsuperscript{21} Among the noteworthy issues discussed at Lucerne was that of arbitration agreements. According to a report prepared by Elie Ducommun, Swiss delegate and president of the congress, twenty bilateral arbitration agreements had been completed since the previous year's congress at Boston. Switzerland appeared to be the most avid participant in arbitration, being a signatory to six of such agreements, whereas Britain had concluded only three.\textsuperscript{22} At the end of the five days' proceedings, the congress adopted resolutions calling for the promotion of international fraternity, international law, propaganda in the interests of peace, and resolutions dealing with such questions of 'actualities' as the Russo-Japanese War and
Scandinavian neutrality. Eight principles were laid down by means of which a system of international law might be created, one of them being that 'nations are mutually dependent'. In the field of propaganda, the congress set forth the idea of international educational exchange, advocating the establishment of a 'common curriculum', 'official exchanges of students and scholars', and the founding of an 'International University'.

Throughout those five days, some of the British and German delegates were also able to confer in private and, anxious to check the spiralling tension between their nations, undertook to organize an Anglo-German Conciliation Committee in their respective countries. Following the congress, individuals in Britain who were involved in the peace movement set about organizing an inaugural public meeting of the Conciliation Committee. One such individual was Sir Francis William Fox, the prime mover in this campaign in Britain. A prominent member of the Society of Friends, Fox had himself been in attendance at Lucerne, where he had submitted a mémoire calling for the establishment of a European consultative council - in his own words, 'un Conseil consultatif suprême pour l'Europe' - as a step towards strengthening the Concert of Europe. An internationalist of vision, he conceived of a European federation having its own council which would be presided over alternatively by the European Great Powers: Britain, Germany, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary and Italy. In his plan, the council would meet every two years as a matter of course, but could be convened at any time with the consent of any two of the six powers. As Fox stated, this council would have as its function 'le règlement des questions internationales ayant un caractère administratif'.

In a letter of 8 November, Fox invited Lord Avebury to preside over the proposed meeting to be held at Caxton Hall, Westminster, in the afternoon of 1 December. In Fox's own words, 'Your Lordship's presence would add greatly to the weight of the Meeting.' Most unfortunately for the committee, the Duke of Argyll could not attend the meeting but would have a letter to be read there nevertheless. As of the day of Fox's letter, over 150
signatures - belonging to peers, bishops, clergymen, Members of Parliament of both parties, and well-known lawyers - had been secured for the address to be issued at the meeting.27

Son of a banker, Fox was born in Kingsbridge in 1841, one of thirteen children descended from Quakers on both parents' sides. In addition to acquiring knowledge in banking at his father's firm during his early days, he was trained as an engineer and in 1873 opened the Atlas Engineering Works at Bristol. Later in life, Fox became involved in licensing reform and the anti-slavery movement, serving on the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society from 1888 onwards. An activist in international arbitration and naval disarmament, he turned his attention from 1906 to 1912 towards the work of the China Mission Emergency Committee, serving as one of its honorary secretaries.28

On 25 November Fox addressed a communication to Lord Lansdowne, asking if he 'would be willing to send a Message of sympathy with the objects of the Meeting and the movement which the Meeting is intended to inaugurate'.29 Three days later Lansdowne replied in very guarded terms that he considered it 'quite unusual' for him to undertake such action, being afraid that extending the message of sympathy might create an 'inconvenient precedent'. He, however, added that Anglo-German relations 'are at this moment so far as His Majesty's Govt are concerned, uncomplicated by any international difficulty'.30 Curiously, it appears that in the face of Lansdowne's intractable resolve to avoid setting 'inconvenient precedents' for his office, a compromise of sorts was reached with Avebury and the cracks papered over. The text of Avebury's speech that was to be read at the meeting was submitted for the Foreign Secretary's approval, which was given on 29 November.31

Caxton Hall: The Birth of the Friendship Movement

On Friday, 1 December, up to 2,000 devotees to the cause and spirit of Anglo-German conciliation converged on Caxton Hall for the scheduled meeting at 4.30 p.m.32
Lord Avebury, otherwise known as Sir John Lubbock, had accepted Fox's invitation to take the chair at this meeting. A man of diverse interests and talents, Avebury was at once a writer, lover of nature, politician, lawyer, scientist, philanthropist, and now assumed the role also of international peacemaker. An Eton boy and prominent financier, he was a partner in the merchant banking firm of Robarts, Lubbock & Co. on Lombard Street, and 'the beau ideal of the City banker'. Between 1866 and his death in 1913, Avebury also served as a director of the Phoenix Assurance Company. He was first elected as a Liberal to the House of Commons in 1870 and was elevated to the peerage in 1900. His credentials indeed seem impressive: Fellow of the Royal Society, Trustee of the British Museum, Doctor of Civil Law from Oxford, German Order of Merit. He was now aged seventy-one but still able to maintain a relatively active political and literary life. With such diverse titles as *The Pleasures of Life* (1887-89), *The Scenery of Switzerland* (1896), *The Scenery of England* (1902) and *Peace and Happiness* (1909) already under his prolific penship, he issued his *Notes of the Life History of British Flowering Plants* literally just days before the Caxton Hall meeting. In 1904 alone, he had published his pamphlet *Free Trade*, a personal copy of which was sent to, among other people, the Prince of Wales and the American President Theodore Roosevelt. At one time Senate member and Vice-Chancellor of the University of London, chairman of the London County Council (1890-92), and president of the Institute of Bankers (1879-83), the Associated Chambers of Commerce of the United Kingdom, the Metaphysical Society, and the Society of Antiquaries (he was re-elected to this post just in 1905), he was indeed no stranger to philanthropic organizations or public service.

Opening the proceedings, Avebury cited the efforts begun in Lucerne and admitted that even though 'the two countries have really no antagonistic interests', 'it cannot be denied that a feeling of antagonism, if not yet strong, has recently been growing up'. Likening the 'lack of a good understanding' between Britain and Germany to the story of
Much Ado about Nothing. Avebury ascribed the current 'feeling of irritation' foremost to the irresponsible exchanges between the British and German press. He also urged that 'we should like to see on this side [of the Atlantic] the United States of Europe'.

Pointing to the benefits of Britain's commercial ties with Germany, Avebury mentioned that Germany, next to India, was Britain's best customer. After acknowledging the debt which Britain owed to Germany in literature, Avebury hailed the German Emperor as one of the ablest men of that generation. Evoking racial and cultural kinship, he declared: 'We belong to one race; have one common origin, kindred laws and kindred faiths, and have the same great interest in the maintenance of peace of the world.'

Fox, acting as honorary secretary, then read letters of sympathy; indeed, there was none from Lansdowne. The Duke of Argyll's letter scolded Britain for becoming childish in her 'suspicious old age', unfairly jealous of Germany while the economic progress and navies of the United States and France passed unnoticed. He further accused the British mentality of being averse to changes to the status quo and thus liable to treat the Germans as scapegoats.

The letter from James Bryce, M.P., chided the 'happily small, though vociferous' section of the British press that had been attempting to incite feeling against Germany. 'I earnestly trust', said Bryce, 'that your meeting may help to shew that the British people at large, so far from being hostile to Germany, desire not only peace but friendship.' Letters of sympathy were also read from, among others, Noel Buxton, the Lord Chancellor Sir Robert Reid, Sir West Ridgeway of the Athenaeum Club, Edward Caird, Master of Balliol College, Oxford, the Dean of Durham University, the secretary of the National Society of Amalgamated Brassworkers and Metal Mechanics, and the secretary of the National Amalgamated Union of Labour.

Sir John Kennaway moved a resolution declaring that 'neither the economic nor political interests of the two nations are antagonistic; and that there is good ground for
believing that in the hearts of the main body of the people of this country there exist feelings of cordial friendship and respect for the German people. Citing the ties of common blood and the Protestant faith of the two peoples, he declared that at bottom both nations had 'a sincere admiration for each other'.

The Bishop of Southwark, seconding Kennaway's resolution, also invoked the idea of Anglo-German racial kinship. Alluding to the 'real cousinship' between the British and Germans, he remarked that the British people could understand the Germans, just as they could not understand the Oriental or Slavic races, and not even always the Celts - an observation that brought laughter to the hall. He also spoke of the brassworkers of Birmingham as an example of Anglo-German cooperation in industry. In his view, a war with Germany 'ought to be only less impossible than a conflict between England and our own brethren in America, the very suggestion of which a little while ago produced so remarkable and splendid a recoil of protest of opinion on both sides of the Atlantic'.

Kennaway's resolution was declared to be carried unanimously, in spite of one hand, that of an Arnold White, raised against it.38

Sir Herbert Maxwell moved the second resolution calling for the formation of an Anglo-German Friendship Committee, claiming that the Anglo-German misunderstanding arose 'in great part from a mutual want of appreciation of the true facts', again a veiled reference to the general ignorance of the people and the exaggerated tones of the newspapers. Reiterating what previous speakers had already mentioned, he emphasized that the British and Germans were 'kindred alike in blood and religion'. Leonard Courtney, seconding the resolution, remarked that a prosperous Germany made a better customer for Britain - a reference to the importance of German trade to Britain. Lord Stanmore, also seconding the resolution, claimed, again alluding to racial kinship: 'There is a closer affinity between Germans and English than between any other nation in the world.' Towards the end of the proceedings, Sir Michael Foster moved for the appointment of a
committee to carry on the task of promoting good relations between Britain and Germany. Seconded by the Rev. Dr. R.F. Horton, the resolution was carried.

Thus was born the Anglo-German Friendship Committee in December 1905, as a successor to the Conciliation Committee, and having its office at 28 Victoria Street, London. Avebury was appointed its president, the Duke of Argyll its honorary president, and Fox and George Herbert Perris its honorary secretaries. Sir Ernest Tritton occupied the post of treasurer, and Thomas Newman that of chairman. Its vice-presidents included the Earl of Lonsdale, Kennaway (later to become president of the Church Missionary Society), Stanmore, Maxwell, the Bishop of Southwark and Lord Monkswell. The signatories to the committee's inaugural address counted close to fifty Members of Parliament, fourteen academics, twenty-seven members of clergy or persons involved with church societies, three persons connected with the Society of Friends, and two prominent German men of business and finance: Alexander Siemens and A. Roese of the Deutsche Bank, London. Among the individual names that stood out were the Liberal politician Noel Buxton; the barrister and legal scholar Sir Thomas Barclay; Henry Hobhouse, the Liberal pioneer in local government; Sir Thomas Barlow, Professor of Medicine at the University of London; Adolphus William Ward, Master of Peterhouse, Cambridge; Karl Breul, University Reader in German at Cambridge; Henry F. Pelham, president of Trinity College, Oxford; Prof. Arthur Schuster, prominent physicist and mathematician; the historian George Peabody Gooch, then a Member of Parliament for Bath; John H. Muirhead, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Birmingham; Thomas W. Rhys Davids, Orientalist scholar and Professor of Comparative Religion at London; William Stead, editor of the *Review of Reviews*; Sir Percy William Bunting, editor of the *Contemporary Review*; Alfred G. Gardiner, journalist; B. Seebohm Rowntree, the eminent sociologist; the Quaker, Joseph Allen Baker, M.P.; John Bright, M.P.; John Burns, M.P.; Herbert J. Gladstone, M.P.; J. Keir Hardie, M.P.; Arthur Henderson, M.P.; Thomas Lough, M.P.; Joseph A. Pease, M.P.;
Herbert Samuel, M.P.; Charles Trevelyan, M.P.; Henry J. Wilson, M.P.; the Archbishop of Westminster; the afore-mentioned Rev. Horton, president of the Free Church Council; George Cadbury, the chocolate manufacturer; and Francis A. Bevan of Barclay & Co., Ltd. Comprising influential businessmen, clergymen, academics, journalists and politicians, this committee had considerable stature. In January 1906 a compendium newspaper, the Anglo-German Courier, began its weekly issues under the editorship of Leo Weinthal, who also edited the African World and had connections with businessmen and financiers in South Africa, many of German descent. This newspaper was financed by Alfred Beit, a German-born banker who, as one will see in Chapter 4, played an active role in the Anglo-German friendship movement before the war.

As we have seen, there were numerous references made at Caxton Hall to racial and cultural kinship between British and Germans. Most of the participants at the meeting tended to recognize Germans as belonging to the same racial stock and cultural heritage as Britons. Avebury invoked Britain's debt to Goethe, Schiller, Humboldt, Beethoven, Mendelssohn, Haydn, Mozart and Wagner. Expressing a sentiment of cooperation and affinity, W.J. Davis, the secretary of the National Society of Amalgamated Brassworkers, wrote in his letter addressed to the meeting that, 'Such noble races as the English and German must not be brought into conflict.' Where German industrial might and the trade rivalry were mentioned, the economic relationship was invariably viewed as a benefit to Britain. Alluding to Anglo-German economic interdependence, Avebury argued that Germany was Britain's best customer after India. Reinforcing this mood, Courtney declared: 'The more Germany prospers the better customer she will be to us and there is nothing in this that should set people against each other.'

But the speeches at Caxton Hall are notable for what they omitted as much as for what they mentioned. The growth of German naval power, a major issue in Anglo-German relations at the time, was hardly touched upon. Equally absent were references to the other
sources of friction such as the Moroccan crisis and the invasion scare of the previous year. These omissions could well be explained by the composition of those present or involved in the committee. Of the some forty-seven Members of Parliament who either were there or signed their names to the address, an overwhelming majority were Liberal, followed by a significant handful of Labour members. Conservatives, not counting the Liberal Unionists, numbered only two.42

The overwhelming presence of Liberals in this gathering no doubt set the tone for the proceedings. By 1905 the political battle lines in the 'tariff reform' debate had been clearly drawn. The Conservatives, who in large numbers were in favour of enacting protective tariffs, had forged an informal alliance with the Tariff Reform League (which will be discussed further in Chapter 3). Having in common a fear of German economic competition, both groupings tended to stress the German menace. The Liberals, on the other hand, generally adhered to the tenets of Cobdenism. That affirmations of commercial linkage with Germany received a favourable hearing at Caxton Hall should not be surprising. They veritably reflected the Liberals' commitment to free trade.

Also notable is the large representation of business and financial interests in the Anglo-German Friendship Committee, especially in its executive committee,43 which would make the various references to trade and business relations all the more understandable. Consider, for instance, the presence of Harry Nuttall, Liberal M.P. for Stretford who became president of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce in 1905. Formerly an import-and-export merchant in Manchester, Nuttall was also president of the Manchester Geographical Society. Another person worthy of mention is Sir John Brunner, Liberal M.P. for Northwich and co-founder of Brunner, Mond & Co., the renowned alkali works established in 1873, itself an Anglo-German venture.44 The trade unions too were well represented. As mentioned, letters of sympathy were received from the National Society of Amalgamated Brassworkers and Metal Mechanics as well as from the National
Amalgamated Union of Labour. Among those in the Friendship Committee representing labour interests were Richard Bell, Labour M.P. for Derby, and general secretary of the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants; W.H. Appleton, secretary of the Society of Operative Lace Makers; and George Barnes, secretary of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers.

Soon after Caxton Hall, Francis Fox travelled to Berlin to gauge the effects of the meeting in Germany. Apparently the meeting produced a positive response from commercial interests in Germany which promptly organized reciprocal gatherings. Already by mid-December 1905, we have evidence from the British Consul-General in Hamburg, William Ward, that the 'better class of the inhabitants of Germany' were beginning to feel the necessity, 'in view of the unsatisfactory state of the relations between Germany & Great Britain, - of giving public expression to their wish that these relations should be re-established on a friendly footing'. Reflecting this spirit, the Berlin Merchants' Guild held a public meeting at the Bourse on 17 December. This function, attended by about 2,000 persons, mainly members of the banking and business communities, passed a resolution stating that the meeting 'reciprocates in the warmest manner the desires for a good understanding between the two nations as recently expressed at various meetings held in London at the instance of leading Englishmen'.

On 30 December the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce in turn held its annual public meeting, attended by a 'very large number of Hamburg Merchants & Shipowners', and issued a unanimous resolution expressing a desire that a more friendly footing be reestablished between Germany and Britain. A meeting took place on the same day in Frankfurt carrying a similar resolution. As Ward reported, the Bremen Chamber of Commerce, in its annual report issued in December, expressed sentiments to the same effect 'on the part of the Bremen Commercial classes'.

These public expressions of goodwill in Germany, spearheaded by the business and
financial classes, were to continue into the following year. On 6 January 1906, for instance, a meeting was held in the Old Town Hall of Munich. Though concerned primarily with Anglo-German trade matters, this gathering also invoked racial and cultural ties. One speaker, for example, declared that Britain and Germany were 'the two greatest cultured States of Germanic origin' and should thus remain on good terms. Also in attendance was the president of the Bavarian Local Navy League who was related to the Dukes of Norfolk. Betraying his Anglophilism, he referred to both countries' common interests of culture and spoke fondly of his own early days in Britain. Not surprisingly, the meeting carried a resolution citing the two countries' 'common origin and joint heritage of culture'.

Fox, along with Sir Frank Lascelles, the British ambassador at Berlin, also attended a banquet on 6 January 1906 given by the Berlin Chamber of Commerce. Three days later the president of the Cologne Chamber of Commerce addressed an invitation to Avebury to attend a meeting scheduled for 14 January - 'a public manifestation in support of the promotion of good feeling and a mutual good understanding between England and Germany'.

Even though the Anglo-German Friendship Committee was formed in late 1905, unofficial steps had already been taken in Britain at least twelve months before towards improving Anglo-German relations. One individual actively engaged in these efforts was Sir Thomas Barclay. A member of the international arbitration movement, and author of Problems of International Peace and Diplomacy (published later in 1907), Barclay made a trip to Germany in December 1904 on a 'mission of peace'. In an interview with the Standard, he warned that the anti-British feeling in Germany was not as strong as the press in both countries would suggest, and called on Britain and Germany to appeal to their 'business instincts'. Keenly aware of the ties between British and German commercial interests, Barclay attended the annual meeting of the German Associated Chambers of
Commerce, in February 1905, where he delivered a speech in German.\textsuperscript{51}

We know from Lascelles's private papers that the formation of an Anglo-German Union Club was proposed as early as December 1904. This scheme elicited support from, among others, Arnold-Forster, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Walter Kerr, Lord Rosebery, Earl Spencer, and the presidents of the Royal Society, the Royal Geographical Society, the Royal College of Physicians, and the Royal College of Surgeons of England.\textsuperscript{52} By May 1905, the Anglo-German Union Club had already established its offices on Fleet Street, London. Its stated objectives were to promote Anglo-German friendship, to advance knowledge, science and art, to arrange meetings between British and German parliamentary representatives, and to hold international sporting events. Field Marshal Lord Roberts was made honorary life member of the club. It must be noted that several Germans of the upper and business classes served on the Union Club's committee: C. Edward Melchers, president of the German Athaeneum Club in London, the industrialist Alexander Siemens, Baron Bruno Schröder, Alfred Beit and Sir Edgar Speyer, the last three of whom were prominent bankers in the City of London.\textsuperscript{53} Hence, even before the peace congress at Lucerne in September 1905, a parallel movement for Anglo-German conciliation had already been initiated in Britain under different auspices.

Further Developments in the

Anglo-German Friendship Movement

During the first few months following the Caxton Hall meeting, the Anglo-German Friendship Committee in Britain was gripped with inertia. As long as Britain and Germany maintained a semblance of normality in their relations, the committee's goal of preserving Anglo-German 'friendship' was met, thereby rendering the body in a sense superfluous. Its lack of vigour could also be explained by the inability of its varied interests to unite on the political issues facing Anglo-German relations. As a result, the Friendship Committee
lacked effectiveness as a pressure group. Moreover, Anglo-German tensions did in fact abate after the settlement of the Moroccan crisis in April 1906, leading Fox to conclude, prematurely, that the committee's aims had been achieved.

The period between 1906 and 1910 saw a decline in the number and influence of the 'pacifists' in the executive committee who were committed to the broader international peace movement. Those years indeed were marked by the ascendancy of Thomas Barclay, Percy Bunting, Karl Breul and Lascelles, British ambassador to Germany from 1895 to 1908. Their rise confirmed the trend of the Friendship Committee towards concentrating its efforts on Anglo-German relations alone, rather than striving to promote world peace.

In 1910 Thomas Rhodes, an agent of Albert Ballin, the German shipping magnate and owner of the Hamburg-Amerika shipping line, formed the Albert Committee, spurred by his belief that the Friendship Committee was too loosely organized to respond effectively to press attacks against Germany. The objective of the Albert Committee, named in honour of the late Prince Consort, was to 'disseminate trustworthy information about Germany and German affairs'. Besides publishing pamphlets, it helped to promote the study and teaching of German in Britain, and in 1911 it organized a London conference of teachers and professors of German. Though not officially affiliated with the Friendship Committee, Rhodes's organization was nonetheless presided over by Avebury, who therefore represented a personal link between the two bodies. An Anglo-German Students Committee was also formed in 1910 to encourage the exchange of students between Britain and Germany.

Meanwhile, a parallel clerical movement emerged in the promotion of Anglo-German friendship. As early as the autumn of 1907, Joseph Allen Baker, M.P., and Baron Eduard de Neufville proposed bringing together the British and German clergies to further the interests of peace. Throughout 1908 and 1909 exchange visits were undertaken between British and German churches, leading to the establishment in April 1910 of the
Associated Councils of the British and German Churches for Fostering Friendly Relations between the Two Peoples. Presided over by the Archbishop of Canterbury, the British Associated Council had over 130 vice-presidents and began the first issue of its quarterly magazine, the Peacemaker, in July 1911.56

In 1911 the Anglo-German Friendship Society was formed to incorporate the Anglo-German Friendship Committee, the Albert Committee, and other bodies affiliated with the Anglo-German friendship movement. Avebury was again appointed president of this new body. Its honorary president was the Duke of Argyll and its chairman Lascelles.57 At the inaugural meeting held on 1 May 1911, the same themes of traditional Anglo-German friendship, racial kinship and economic interdependence, were echoed. Avebury, for instance, declared in his speech that: 'In reality there are no foreign nations, and the more we realize how closely our interests are interwoven, how every country, and especially our own, benefits by the prosperity of others, the less becomes the chance of war.'58

In the meantime, though, relations between London and Berlin had again deteriorated. During 1908 Whitehall received a stream of reports alleging that the Germans were planning to invade Britain, thereby heightening fears of war. The atmosphere was further charged by the 'Daily Telegraph affair', an episode arising from the newspaper's publication on 28 October 1908 of a supposed 'interview' with the Kaiser. Some of his indiscreet and embarrassing remarks that were printed caused a sensation and a public outcry in Germany. Wilhelm's comments about the German navy and his role in the Boer War aroused particular consternation in the Foreign Office, fuelling suspicion in Whitehall of Wilhelm's im petuosity, unreliability and lack of good faith.59

The latter part of 1908 and early 1909 also witnessed a naval panic, triggered by rumours that the Germans were secretly accelerating their battleship construction programme. News of the supposed German plans created a panic and led to the
Admiralty's demand for the laying down of six dreadnoughts for fiscal year 1909-10. However, the Radical 'economists' in the Liberal cabinet, keen on implementing social reform and keeping naval spending under control, favoured the laying down of just four. In February 1909, Prime Minister Herbert Asquith agreed to a formula whereby the keels of four dreadnoughts were to be laid down immediately in the fiscal year 1909-10, and another four by 1 April 1910 if rendered necessary by the German pace of construction. The crisis intensified in March when, upon the naval estimates for 1909-10 being made public, the Conservative opposition began clamouring for the laying down of eight dreadnoughts and launched the 'We want eight and we won't wait' campaign in the Commons. The upshot and irony of this scare was not lost on Winston Churchill, then the President of the Board of Trade, who later observed: 'The Admiralty had demanded six ships: the economists offered four: and we finally compromised on eight.' In reality, of course, the British fear of the Germans' furtive fast-track building scheme was to prove to be unfounded. By April 1912, contrary to the gloomiest predictions made during the scare of 1908-09, the Royal Navy was still ahead of the Germans by fifteen dreadnoughts to nine. Nonetheless, this panic and the public campaign which it aroused in the press did not fail to stir up a fresh invasion scare. The German bogey once again reared its ugly head.

Just when Anglo-German relations appeared to be improving in 1910, tensions mounted again in the summer of 1911 with the onset of the second Moroccan crisis, known otherwise as the Agadir crisis, sparked by the docking of the German gunboat Panther at Agadir. Though the crisis was eventually resolved peacefully, Britain came close to the brink of war with Germany in that summer. In response to the heated state of Anglo-German relations, a meeting of the Anglo-German Friendship Society was convened in London in November 1911, calling for 'the removal of all existing misunderstandings with Germany.'
In 1912 the Anglo-German Friendship Society was renamed the British-German Friendship Society. The impetus for peace was not lost, for in that year an Anglo-German Understanding Conference was organized in London from 30 October to 1 November, presided over by Lascelles and his German counterpart, Graf von Leyden. Based on an initiative by the National Peace Council, this conference brought together the British-German Friendship Society and the Associated Councils of Churches. The clerical and secular branches of the movement thus joined forces. Thanks to the relative calmness of Anglo-German relations between the end of 1912 and the summer of 1914, the movement did not see much activity during that period.

Among the British clergy, too, notwithstanding the commonly cited historic ties of religion between the two Protestant nations, the idea of shared Anglo-German racial origins was dominant. In one of his sermons, the Rev. R.F. Horton, for instance, referred to Britons and Germans as 'two kindred peoples' as closely related as 'the kinship between Ephraim and Judah'. But not only were these two peoples sprung from the same racial stock, they were in his eyes the most progressive, free and noble of all races. As Horton argued: 'The Angles and the Saxons who came to this island at the close of the Roman occupation were Germans, and they brought with them their language, their social organization, their fundamental ideas of liberty, of truth, and of social purity, which have been the strength of this country ever since.'

* * * *

Race and economics thus appeared to form the backbone of the Anglo-German friendship movement. When tensions between London and Berlin rose to seemingly dangerous heights, the commercial interests in both countries readily awoke to the clarion call and sprang to action - in defence of Anglo-German understanding and the maintenance of peace. If the governments seemed to be heading towards war, then there was evidently
a divergence of interests between official policy and private business, which compels us to reconsider how important economic factors in effect were in the Anglo-German relationship. Selborne insisted that Germany's navy constituted the main stumbling block to improved relations and downplayed her commercial ascendancy. As he argued: 'I do not think that the existence of a German Colonial Empire or the marvellous expansion and prosperity of German commerce are in any way responsible for the Englishman's suspicion of Germany. He regards the former as quite natural and the latter with admiration although he feels the competition.'

But on the other hand, William Ward placed primary importance on the rise of German economic power. As he claimed: 'the dislike of Germany in Gt Britain is, to a great degree, owing to the feeling of commercial & industrial jealousy.' Ward even argued that the expressions of goodwill by the German business classes should not be 'overrated in their importance'. But in stating this claim, he was only suggesting that the British and German press may not have shared the spirit of conciliation. Indeed, Ward did not at all question the authenticity of the German businessmen's desire for improved Anglo-German relations.

It is important to bear in mind that The Times was not exactly pro-German. In fact, as a mouthpiece for the Conservative Party, the paper was often Germanophobic. Yet its coverage of the Merchants' Guild meeting of 17 December 1905 in Berlin seemed almost to reflect the spirit of conciliation embodied by that occasion. Drawing attention to the disparities between official and non-official aims, The Times stressed that the German government's agenda did not always coincide with that of the German business classes. 'It may be safely affirmed', the paper's correspondent observed, '... that few or none of those who took part in the meeting on Sunday would have endorsed the particular way in which the Morocco policy of Germany was inaugurated last spring, or, perhaps, even the way in which it has since been conducted.' However, the paper also drew attention to the relative
weakness of these commercial interests in shaping official policy. As it noted, 'the financial, commercial, and intellectual classes in Germany are seldom able to exercise any appreciable, or at least any direct, influence upon the daily phases of German policy'.

The demonstrations of goodwill at Caxton Hall and elsewhere in Germany suggest that some non-governmental interests in Britain and Germany may have had a stronger tendency to see eye to eye than their respective governments. It is obvious, then, that there existed a certain commonality of interests between the British and German business and financial elites. These commercial links between the two countries will be the subject of the next chapter.

NOTES


2. See Kennedy, *Anglo-German Antagonism*, chap. 10.

3. Ibid., p. 204.

4. Ibid., p. 409.

5. Lascelles to Fitzmaurice, 2 June 1906, Public Record Office (PRO), Kew, Lascelles MSS., FO 800/19, f. 61.


9. See Christopher Howard, Splendid Isolation: A Study of Ideas Concerning Britain's
International Position and Foreign Policy during the Later Years of the Third Marquis of
Salisbury (London, 1967), chaps. 1-4; and George Monger, The End of Isolation: British
Foreign Policy, 1900-1907 (London, 1963), chap. 1.

10. J.A.S. Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy: The Close of the Nineteenth
Century (London, 1964), p. 351. For more on the Anglo-German alliance talks, see his
chaps. 7 and 15, as well as Monger, End of Isolation, chap. 2.


12. Quoted in Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and
Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-


14. Selborne to Eisendeiker, 17 Feb. 1905, attached to letter from Selborne to
Lansdowne, 1 March 1905, PRO, Lascelles MSS., FO 800/12, f. 177.

15. See Katherine Anne Lerman, The Chancellor as Courtier: Bernard von Bülow and
the Governance of Germany 1900-1909 (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 127-8; Williamson, Grand
Strategy, pp. 30-2; and Eugene N. Anderson, The First Moroccan Crisis, 1904-1906
(Chicago, 1930), pp. 181-95.

British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914 (hereafter BD), 11 vols. (London,
1926-38), III, doc. 93.


20. Grey to Haldane, 8 Jan. 1906, National Library of Scotland (NLS), Edinburgh,


27. Fox to Avebury, 8 Nov. 1905, British Library (BL), London, Avebury MSS., Add. MS. 49673, f. 151.

28. de Montmorency, Fox, pp. 5-20, 27-45, 66 and 92-3.


30. Lansdowne to Avebury, 28 Nov. 1905, ibid., f. 159.

31. Sanderson to Avebury, 29 Nov. 1905, ibid., f. 161; f. 162 is the draft text of Avebury's speech.

32. Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, p. 287. See also The Times, 30 Nov. 1905, p. 6; and 2 Dec. 1905, p. 10.


36. BL, Avebury MSS., Add. MS. 49681C, ff. 47 and 103.


38. These proceedings are in Anglo-German Friendship Committee (AGFC), The Inaugural Meeting in Caxton Hall (London, 1906). See also The Times, 2 Dec. 1905, p. 10; and Daily Telegraph, 2 Dec. 1905, p. 10.

39. AGFC, Inaugural Meeting, pp. 3-4.

40. Hollenberg, Englisches Interesse, pp. 75-6.

41. AGFC, Inaugural Meeting, pp. 7, 11 and 19.

42. These two Conservatives were Sir Gilbert Parker and H. Pike Pease. Our tabulation is based on the information provided in Michael Stenton and Stephen Lees (eds.), Who's Who of British Members of Parliament, 4 vols. (Hassocks, Sussex, 1978), for all the Members of Parliament mentioned in AGFC, Inaugural Meeting, pp. 3-4.


47. Ward to Lascelles (previously cited), ff. 389-90.


49. de Montmorency, Fox, p. 97.


52. PRO, Lascelles MSS., FO 800/12, ff. 191-2.
53. Ibid., ff. 195-201.

54. See Times Educational Supplement, 16 June 1911, p. 91, for a report of the conference.

55. Hollenberg, Englisches Interesse, pp. 76-89.

56. Peacemaker 1 (July 1911), pp. 9-10.


62. K.G. Robbins, 'The Foreign Secretary, the Cabinet, Parliament and the Parties', in Hinsley (ed.) British Foreign Policy, p. 10; and Steiner, Britain and Origins, p. 53.

63. For an account of the British government's decision-making during the crisis, see M.L. Dockrill, 'British Policy during the Agadir Crisis of 1911', in Hinsley (ed.) British Foreign Policy, pp. 271-87.

64. AGFS, Report of a Meeting Held at the Mansion House, on November 2nd, 1911 (London, 1911), p. 1.


68. Selborne to Eisendeiker (previously cited), f. 178.

69. Ward to Lascelles (previously cited), f. 390.

CHAPTER 3

ANGLO-GERMAN ECONOMIC RIVALRY:
AN OPTICAL ILLUSION?

'Neither Crowe nor we who succeeded him ever gave to
the Germans the least ground for thinking our antagonism
due to commercial jealousy. It would have suited us well
that Germany should develop smoothly and buy more, ...'

Lord Vansittart

As we have seen, the Anglo-German Friendship Committee was dominated by
business and financial interests. Lord Avebury himself was a prominent City banker and
president of the Associated Chambers of Commerce, reflecting the strength of economic
forces in the campaign for Anglo-German peace. Judging by the speeches made at Caxton
Hall, a widespread assumption among many of the British business classes was that
Britain's prosperity was greatly dependent on Germany's, and that an Anglo-German war
would be detrimental to Britain's commercial well-being. The aim in this chapter is to
examine in greater depth the nature of the Anglo-German economic relationship and probe
links between British and German business interests.

Anglo-German Trade Relations, c.1890-1914

That the thirty years before 1914 marked a period of German industrial and
commercial ascendancy is a commonplace. But this period also saw a gradual but distinct
change in the terms of the Anglo-German economic relationship, a transformation
characterized by the relative decline of Britain's world economic position in manufacturing.
and trade, and Germany's concurrent rise. For though the British economy was growing in absolute terms during this period, Germany's rate of growth was higher. During the 1906-10 period, Britain's share of the world's manufacturing capacity stood at 14.7 per cent, eclipsed by Germany's 15.9 per cent. The change in Germany's position between 1880 and 1914 is further reflected in her growing share of world trade. As Table 3.1 below indicates, even though Britain still held the largest percentage of the world's trade in 1913, her share had fallen from 23 per cent in 1880 to 20 per cent in 1900 and 17 per cent in 1913, with Germany a close second in 1913 with a 13 per cent share.

Table 3.1
Percentages of World Trade

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<th>1880</th>
<th>1900</th>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>U.S.A.</td>
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A glance at individual manufacturing sectors would show even more glaringly Germany's phenomenal rise during that period, because by 1914 she had clearly outstripped Britain in certain key areas of industry. In pig iron, for instance, Britain's output was 8 million tons in 1890 compared to Germany's 4.1 million; by 1914, however, Germany was producing 14.7 million tons compared to Britain's 11 million. In steel production, Germany's rise was even more spectacular, from 2.3 million tons in 1890 to 14 million in 1914, an approximate sixfold increase. During the same period, Britain's production rose only from 3.6 million tons to 6.5 million, about twofold. The output of coal, often an
indicator of heavy-industrial capacity, also did not augur well for Britain. Though she still
told Germany in coal production in 1913 - only narrowly, with 292,000 tons compared to
Germany's 279,000 - Britain's relative decline in this field was quite pronounced.3 Thus
again, Britain's output was growing but Germany's was rising even faster.

As these figures suggest, Germany's economy during these thirty years underwent a
remarkable and relatively rapid restructuring involving a shift from agriculture to heavy
industry - as was reflected in her exports. In the early 1890s beet sugar was Germany's
leading export in value terms; in 1913, by contrast, her main exports consisted of
chemicals, machinery, ironware, coal and textiles. In that year her exports of chemicals
amounted to £52 million, whereas those of beet sugar came to a mere £13.2 million.4

These shifts in the German economy no doubt had an impact on the Anglo-German
trading relationship. As the trade figures demonstrate, Britain came to rely increasingly on
German manufactures so that by the start of 1914, Germany had become the principal
source of Britain's imports of manufactured products. In 1908, for example, the value of
'wholly or mainly manufactured' goods from Germany amounted to about £36.6 million.
Imports of these goods from France, the second largest source, came to almost £25
million.5 In 1913 Germany, still the biggest supplier, sold approximately £56.1 million of
these products to Britain, an increase of almost £20 million in five years. France, still
ranked second, exported a mere £29.5 million in that year.6 Evidently, whereas the level of
imports of 'wholly or mainly' manufactured products from France remained relatively stable
during the 1908-13 period, German imports soared at a phenomenal rate, reflecting Britain's
growing dependence on Germany's industrial output.

Over the same period, even though Britain's exports of manufactured goods to
Germany rose, the value of those exports was much lower than that of her imports from
Germany. For example, in 1913 Britain exported approximately £27 million worth of
wholly or mainly manufactured products to Germany, less than half the value of such
imports from Germany ($56.1 million).7

Incidentally, Germany was also an important source of 'food, drink and tobacco' for Britain, which was more dependent on Germany than Germany was on her for these products. In 1913 Britain took in close to £16.5 million worth of these goods, while exporting only slightly over £4 million worth to Germany8 - a considerable deficit. Even if beet sugar had decreased sharply in importance as a German item of export, Germany still remained Britain's principal source of sugar up to 1914. During the 1909-11 period, for instance, Germany provided up to 40 per cent of Britain's imports of sugar.9

During the prewar period, Britain's share as a supplier of raw materials and foodstuffs to Germany also fell consistently, from 15 per cent in 1890 to 8.1 per cent in 1913, with the United States and Russia rising to become Germany's major sources in this area. In certain products, however, such as certain types of woollen yarns, Britain remained Germany's important and almost exclusive supplier up to 1914. But at the same time, Germany's imports of raw materials and foodstuffs from Britain's overseas possessions also increased. In 1913 the British Empire provided 12 per cent of such imports, with India alone, Germany's leading source of jute and rape seed, accounting for 5 per cent.10

Raw wool represented a product for which Germany was greatly dependent on the British dominions. The United Kingdom may have supplied only a relatively small portion of Germany's wool imports, but the Second Reich's single largest source of wool by 1914 was Australia. New Zealand and South Africa too were important suppliers of wool for Germany. In 1910, for instance, all three countries accounted for about half of Germany's intake of raw wool, so that the whole British Empire provided her with up to 55 per cent of such imports in that year.11 One indeed should not overlook the size and importance of Britain's dominions as a trading bloc for Germany. With the onset of any Anglo-German hostilities, as was to be borne out in 1914, Germany would suffer a major interruption of
her trade not only with Britain but with her entire imperial domain as well.\textsuperscript{12}

In the prewar period, the significance of Britain as an export market for Germany, especially German manufactures, was undeniable. Alternatively put, Germany was without doubt a mainstay for Britain's imports. Even as early as the 1890s, Britain ran annual trade deficits with Germany (not counting the re-exports of German imports or the trade in 'invisibles') but by 1913 the trade gap had widened significantly. In that year Britain's imports from Germany (£80.4 million) amounted to almost twice the value of her exports to Germany (£40.6 million). In 1913 also, German imports into Britain ranked second in value only to imports from the United States (£141 million). As an export market for Britain, Germany (at £40.6 million) was only the second largest behind India (£70.2 million) but well ahead of Australia (£34 million) and the United States (£29.2 million).\textsuperscript{13} In view of Germany's importance as both a source of imports for Britain and a market for British exports, it would be easy to understand the motivation behind Avebury's efforts to bring about Anglo-German conciliation. Indeed, an Anglo-German war would have been disastrous for Anglo-German trade, as was to be demonstrated in 1914-18.

Along with these shifting patterns, an awareness of the tilt in the Anglo-German economic balance of power was growing as well in Britain throughout the 1890s, when Germany's economic power became a major issue of public debate. In 1896 there appeared 'Made in Germany', a book by Ernest Edwin Williams prophesying the eclipse of British trade and industry at Germany's hands. 'The industrial glory of England is departing, and England does not know it,' Williams wrote.\textsuperscript{14} Aiming to explain the causes of German success, Williams cited such factors as protective tariffs, government subsidies, cheaper transportation, superior technical education, and the Germans' adaptability. As a remedy, he proposed the federation of the British Empire.\textsuperscript{15} It should be remembered that the German Empire enacted its first tariff increases in 1879, thereby shielding German industries from foreign competition behind a protective barrier which, it was widely
believed in Britain, gave Germany an unfair advantage. The call for retaliatory tariffs was thus made, shaking the foundations of Cobdenism and free trade and inaugurating a national debate in Britain which, in the end, would split the Conservative Party and lead to the fall of Arthur Balfour's government in December 1905. The upshot of this national debate was the emergence of the Tariff Reform movement spearheaded by Joseph Chamberlain, who launched his campaign for protective tariffs in 1903.

It is clear, then, that during the decade preceding the Liberals' sweeping electoral victory of January 1906 centred around the slogan of 'cheap bread', the German threat to British industrial supremacy was a burning issue in Britain. Not all commentators, however, regarded Germany's rise in as pessimistic a light as Williams did. There were some indeed, particularly free traders, who were not persuaded by Williams's prophecy of doom and tended to see his prognosis as overly alarmist. In reply to Williams, for instance, George Medley published The German Bogey, asserting the continuing vitality of Britain's trade. In his view, Williams's alarm was groundless. Another voice of optimism was provided by Harold Cox in his Are We Ruined by the Germans?, in which he accused Williams of exaggerating Germany's economic strength. While admitting that Germany was 'hitting us hard' in some areas, Cox maintained that she was not on the whole causing Britain any injury. Evoking interdependence, he pointed out that Germany was one of Britain's best customers.

Yet a quick glance at the popular periodicals of the day would undeniably suggest that cracks were showing in the veneer of British commercial and industrial self-confidence. German superiority and methods became much talked about, as did British vulnerability. In 1899 a piece in the Nineteenth Century declared that with the exception of 1877, 1898 marked 'the only year in the long history of our commerce of which it can be said that our visible exports plus the latest estimated "invisible exports" have failed to pay for our imports'.

58
One commonly cited reason for this intense and seemingly intractable German challenge to Britain's industrial preeminence was the Germans' superiority in technical education, along with their greater investment in new plant and technology. But the most vocal complaints coming from the branches of British industry most affected by German competition were focused less on Germany's efficiency than on her protective tariffs and her practice of 'dumping' in the British market - that is, of undercutting the British manufacturers by selling in Britain below the cost price. A typical plea was made by a representative from the British iron and steel industry who urged: 'Nothing less than the removal of German tariffs would enable us to compete against that country either in England, Germany, or any other part of the world. In our opinion it is because Germany by her tariff is able to secure her home market that she is able to attack us elsewhere.'

It was against this backdrop that Joseph Chamberlain formed the Tariff Reform League in July 1903, receiving support particularly from leaders in the iron and steel, engineering and electrical industries - the sectors most harmed by German competition. Later in the year, Chamberlain established the Tariff Commission, a body of experts and business representatives formed to gather evidence on tariff reform and examine the state of the various sectors of British industry. Between 1904 and 1909 the commission issued a series of reports, along with witness testimonies and exhibits.

Anglo-German Linkage: Explosives

At the turn of the century, Britain and Germany thus appeared to be heading for a trade war which was, however, averted as tariff reform faced a sound defeat in the elections of January 1906. There can be little doubt about the existence of Anglo-German industrial and commercial competition in the prewar period. Yet any suggestion of an economic 'antagonism' between the two countries is tempered by instances of cooperation and linkage between British and German business interests, some of which were locked
together in arrangements yielding mutual benefit as well as mutual dependence. Trusts and cartels represented instances of such arrangements. In fact, of the forty international cartels existing before the First World War, some twenty-two were Anglo-German.21

In the pre-1914 era, despite Lord Avebury's call for a united states of Europe, European economic integration was only in its embryonic stages, certainly nowhere approaching the level of consolidation seen in the European Union during the 1990s, or even near the post-World War II internationalization of economic ties as symbolized by the growth of multinational corporations.22 But to deny the existence of integration altogether in pre-1914 Europe would be erroneous. As Carl Strikwerda argues, 'a high degree of economic integration already existed in Western Europe on the eve of the war, a level not achieved again until at least the 1960s'.23 Examples of integration could be found in the strategic sectors such as explosives and armaments, which underwent a high degree of trustification and cartelization in the thirty years or so before 1914. In these trusts and cartels one could in fact discern a network of interconnecting British and German interests. It is this complex web of Anglo-German ties in explosives and arms manufacturing, sectors crucial to what is today called the 'military-industrial complex', which will be examined below.

At the time the Anglo-German friendship movement was being launched at Caxton Hall in late 1905, there already existed well-developed ties between British and German interests in the explosives industry. The businessmen in this sector, being far-sighted and pragmatic, were well ahead in this game of conciliation and had appreciated the value of compromise as early as the 1880s - approximately the time of Germany's emergence as a commercial power. In April 1906, British and German representatives from the explosives industry met in Cologne to discuss collective action and policy with regard to a common threat, the American producers. Hence, amidst the hoopla and rhetoric of Caxton Hall, a fine example of Anglo-German collaboration was already in motion - albeit in corporate
boardrooms, far from the public view.

Just as the Anglo-German friendship movement was getting under way, some British business interests were already securely locked in, and still reinforcing, links with the future 'enemy' in connection with a substance that tended to render war - an Anglo-German war no less - easier, more destructive, and more efficient than ever. By the dawn of the twentieth century, dynamite and smokeless propellant powder had undoubtedly become the most crucial ingredients in modern instruments of war, ranging from rifles, machine-guns and cannon to artillery and battleship guns. By August 1914, of course, what may have been viewed as an instance of Anglo-German cooperation in explosives had turned into an embarrassing case of British firms' 'sleeping with the enemy'.

Explosives in Britain: Alfred Nobel

The British blasting-explosives industry owed its birth to Alfred Nobel. His father Immanuel had pioneered the large-scale production of explosives in Sweden in the 1860s using nitroglycerine as the blasting explosive. Nitroglycerine, first produced in 1846, represented a revolutionary advancement in explosives as it replaced gunpowder which had been in use for the previous five centuries. Thus the Nobels' family business took off in earnest. But owing to the volatility of nitroglycerine, Alfred Nobel was compelled to search for a less hazardous substitute. His quest led him to the invention of kieselguhr, better known as dynamite, which he began to produce commercially in 1866. Later in the mid-1870s, Nobel was to invent an even more advanced explosive called 'blasting gelatine' which, resembling a rubbery gel, was easily extruded, cut and wrapped, and was hailed as the 'perfect explosive'.

In the 1860s Alfred Nobel sought to establish a foothold in Britain, appreciating the full potential of Britain's imperial market and the economy of manufacturing dynamite domestically. His search for partners led him to John Downie, an engineer who introduced
Nobel to Glasgow, which had a concentration of mining, shipbuilding, and heavy-chemical interests. By a formal agreement concluded between Nobel and Downie in April 1871, a limited liability company bearing the name of British Dynamite Company was formed, having its factory in Ardeer, a section of Glasgow. In 1877, by another set of agreements, this firm was superseded by a new company, Nobel's Explosives Company Ltd.

**Nobel in Germany**

Nobel's Explosives of Glasgow was not Nobel's sole enterprise abroad. Even at the time of its inception, the Glasgow company already had a counterpart in Germany. Before setting up his venture in Britain, Nobel had left Sweden for Germany in 1865. Settling in Hamburg, Nobel went into partnership with Wilhelm and Theodor Winkler, Swedish merchants, and C.E. Bandmann, a German lawyer. On 20 June 1865 the partners officially formed Alfred Nobel & Co. As we will see later, this German company was to prove to be a vital link in the Anglo-German explosives cartel. On 8 November 1865 the firm was granted permission to construct a nitroglycerine factory in Krümmel, a few miles south of Hamburg on the Elbe. The Krümmel works, wrecked by nitroglycerine-induced explosions in 1866 and 1870, were consequently rebuilt, and the firm reorganized as a limited liability company. First renamed the Deutsch-Österreichisch-Ungarische-Dynamit Aktiengesellschaft (AG), it then became known as Dynamit AG in 1876, still headquartered in Hamburg.

By the time Dynamit AG was formed, it already had a serious German competitor in the shape of Rheinische Dynamitfabrik, established in Opladen, near Cologne, in 1873. Then, in 1882 there appeared two new firms: Deutsche Sprengstoff AG, Hamburg, and Dresdner Dynamitfabrik, Dresden. In the mid-1880s, the German explosives industry expanded further with the emergence in the Cologne district of A-G Siegener Dynamitfabrik of Siegen and Rheinisch-Westfälische Sprengstoff AG of Troisdorf, both
known as the Rhein-Siegen Group. Taken together, these German companies constituted the most powerful constellation of explosives firms in Europe. Though Nobel's company, Dynamit AG, was still the oldest and largest of them all, Nobel would have been wise to come to terms with these rivals rather than engage in futile competition with them.

Trustification: The Anglo-German Connection

Pressure for amalgamation was building up from within Nobel's own 'empire', brought on by internecine struggle. It must be noted that although Nobel was a shareholder in both Nobel's Explosives and Dynamit AG and sat on both boards as well, he was not in a position to direct or run either company. As W.J. Reader reminds us: 'He could warn, encourage, advise, and threaten, ... but that was the limit of his power.' The limits to his ability to control the conduct of his firms were made glaringly obvious by the fierce competition in which the Glasgow and Hamburg companies engaged themselves during the 1870s, when Nobel himself confessed to being 'an idle spectator' to the proceedings. Though both firms belonged to the 'Nobel group', the name 'Nobel' was about the most they had in common. Concerned mainly with their own profits, both behaved as independent entities without much regard for the other's interests, leading Nobel to characterize their policies as 'pugilistic' and their relationship as 'suicidal'.

But as much as the acute Glasgow-Hamburg rivalry propelled Nobel towards amalgamating the two companies, another factor which lent further impetus to the move was the imminent expiration of the patent protection which the Glasgow company enjoyed in Britain. Once Nobel's Explosives lost that protection, the floodgates would have been opened and the British market threatened by foreign, not least German competition, including competition from Dynamit AG. In 1879 Nobel was duly warned that: 'Within a few years the English dynamite patents will lapse, and unless you come to some kind of arrangement with Hamburg, you will find their competition very serious indeed.'
With the resignation of the Glasgow chairman, Alexander Cuthbert, in 1883, the last major obstacle to amalgamation was finally removed. By this time also, as we have noted above, two other non-Nobel firms had emerged in Germany in addition to Rheinische Dynamitfabrik. Competition in Germany was thus growing relentlessly. Not only did Nobel face the challenge of attenuating the Glasgow-Hamburg rivalry within his own empire, he also had to deal with the threat from the other companies in the German market.

By 1884 conditions were proving favourable not only for bringing the two Nobel companies closer together but also for entering into a trust with the non-Nobel German manufacturers, who were themselves caught in the throes of competition. In September 1884 the German companies, seven in total, signed a price-fixing convention, essentially an agreement between six dynamite firms on the one part and one on the other. The six were Dynamit AG, Rheinische Dynamitfabrik, Opladen, Deutsche Sprengstoff, Hamburg, Kölner Dynamitfabrik, Kalk, Dynamitfabrik, Vingst, and Dresdner Dynamitfabrik, Dresden. On the other part stood Siegener Dynamitfabrik, Cologne.32

On the heels of this convention came a preliminary agreement concluded in October 1884 for an international convention. The parties to this preliminary agreement included Nobel's Glasgow and Hamburg companies, and three of the independent German companies: Rheinische Dynamitfabrik, Kölner Dynamitfabrik and Deutsche Sprengstoff. This led to the First International Convention of 1885, whereby the signatories agreed on prices and terms of sale in all markets, and consented to the creation of a common fund. They also agreed not to supply explosives to competing manufacturers.33

More importantly, though, in November 1885 the German Union was formed, comprising Nobel's Dynamit AG, Rheinische Dynamitfabrik, Deutsche Sprengstoff, and Dresdner Dynamitfabrik. This union, as Reader explains, constituted more than just a price-fixing conglomeration and approached what the Germans would call a 'community of interests' (Interessengemeinschaft). Under this agreement, a Union Board was established
as a permanent body of administration, having directors delegated to it from the board of each member firm. Below this board was a Board of Managers. These four companies were in effect parties to a pooling agreement, with a machinery for determining the pooling of profits and losses. Dynamit AG, being the largest of the four, was allocated the biggest proportion of the union's profits.34

In May 1886 the German convention of 1884 was superseded by the Second German Convention, being a more comprehensive agreement drawing in a larger number of companies. In that year also a Second International Convention was concluded, aimed at regulating prices everywhere except in Germany, Luxembourg and Russian Poland, as well as setting up a common fund financed by a tax on explosives according to the method laid down in the First International Convention.

This spurt of price-fixing and pooling activity set the stage for Nobel's Explosives and the German Union to resolve outstanding matters between themselves and between them and other companies, as well as to enter upon a trust agreement. A series of trust agreements were thus concluded in October 1886, one of which, Trust Agreement No. 2, established a new company in London called The Nobel-Dynamite Trust Company Ltd., which was to have an authorized capital of £2 million, about half of it to be issued in £10 shares. These stocks were to be exchanged for shares in Nobel's Explosives and each of the four firms of the German Union. Consequently, Nobel's Explosives, Dynamit AG, Rheinische Dynamitfabrik, Deutsche Sprengstoff and Dresdner Dynamitfabrik became subsidiaries of the Nobel-Dynamite Trust Company.

This trust company, formed for the purpose of consolidating the dynamite business, was indeed a holding company, having at its disposal all of its subsidiary companies' assets. The management and policies of these subsidiaries were placed entirely in the hands of the board of the trust company whose chairman was always to be British, though German interests were to be represented on the board. This new grouping was indeed more
consolidated than a price-fixing or profit-pooling arrangement. Clear, non-contradictory, long-term policies among the subsidiary companies could thenceforth be set and enforced, all their resources channelled to serve the interests of the whole, and all decision-making concentrated in the centre. No longer was there going to be futile internecine rivalry. In the immediately ensuing years, the trust company proceeded to conclude agreements with companies and syndicates in Germany, Belgium, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States, all with the aim of controlling the trade in high explosives, detonators and fuses.

The Cartelization of Dynamite and Smokeless Powder

Until now, we have been concerned mostly with the dynamite side of the explosives industry. Broadly speaking, 'explosives' consisted of two categories: dynamite and propellant powder. The former, under which blasting gelatine fell, was a blasting agent and used primarily for civil purposes; propellant powder, on the other hand, was a military explosive used in various kinds of ordnance, rifles, machine-guns and artillery shells.

In 1887 Alfred Nobel produced his last major invention: ballistite. A composite of nitroglycerine and nitrocellulose, ballistite was a propellant powder more powerful than any in existence then. More importantly, it was smokeless, and its advent prompted the dynamite industry to move into the military trade. Until 1887, propellant powder was easily made from old-fashioned recipes for gunpowder and, consequently, it held out little attraction to the dynamite manufacturers. Smokeless powder, however, opened up new possibilities for the coffers of the dynamite companies. Additionally, it posed a threat to them because the powder manufacturers now emerged as a force to be reckoned with. Consequently, 'The immediate reaction of the Nobel-Dynamite Trust, ... was to come to terms with the makers of propellant powders in Germany in a profit-sharing agreement so tightly and elaborately drawn as to be almost a merger.' Thus ensued another major
round of agreements in the late 1880s.

The invention of smokeless powder represented a major advancement for nineteenth-century weaponry. Nobel had found that blasting gelatine, while able to propel a projectile, would damage or destroy the gun as well. Hence, the propellant generally used in weapons was black powder. Though it burned slowly - an essential requirement for arms - it was very smoky, damaged the guns, and would not work after direct contact with water. By the 1880s, there was another propellant in the market known as 'cocoa powder', pioneered by J.N. Heidemann and Max von Duttenhofer. The former was also chairman of Rheinische Dynamitfabrik, one of the members of the German Union, as we may recall. In 1889 Heidemann became general manager of the powder company, Vereinigte Rheinisch-Westphälische Pulverfabriken. Through Heidemann alone, the Nobel-Dynamite Trust Company already had a foot in the door of the German propellant makers.

It should be noted that just when the Explosives Group was consolidating itself into a trust, a parallel movement towards amalgamation was taking place in the propellant-manufacturing group, otherwise known as the Powder Group. In 1884 Vereinigte Rheinisch-Westphälische Pulverfabriken concluded a profit-pooling agreement with Pulverfabrik Rottweil-Hamburg. In 1889 these two firms reinforced their position further by bringing Cramer & Buchholz Pulverfabriken and Wolff & Co. into the agreement. In 1890 Vereinigte Rheinisch-Westphälische Pulverfabriken and Pulverfabrik Rottweil-Hamburg merged to form Vereinigte Köln-Rottweiler Pulverfabriken of Cologne.

Meanwhile, the Powder Group also revealed an Anglo-German link, for it had a British subsidiary in the form of the Chilworth Gunpowder Company Ltd. As Chilworth was bought out by Vereinigte Rheinisch-Westphälische Pulverfabriken in 1885, Heidemann and von Duttenhofer consequently sat on Chilworth's board from that year onwards. Although Chilworth still retained a British chairman after 1885, control of the company was effectively wrested by the Germans. From the standpoint of this analysis, the irony
cannot be greater because, 'There was thus a German outpost in the heart of England, closely concerned with the supply of military explosives to the British Government.' The existence of this network of interlocking agreements and takeovers between German and British firms in the explosives industry meant that when war broke out in 1914, Britain and Germany were to some extent 'allied' in the manufacture of explosives.

What brought the Explosives and Powder Groups together was the fact that smokeless propellant powder and gelatinous blasting explosives were very closely related. There was therefore every reason for the dynamite makers to go into the propellant business and, similarly, for the propellant firms to involve themselves with dynamite. In 1889 both groups entered into the General Pooling Agreement, which stated:

Guided by the fact that the business of the two Groups ... are very closely connected in Germany, and likewise in all the markets of the world, and that, therefore, joint action would be attended with advantageous results for both parties, whilst on the other hand an eventual conflict could only result in severe losses on both sides, the four Dynamite Companies grouped as the German Union, on the one part, and the four ... Powder Manufacturers, on the other part, came to the conclusion that it would be well that they should be mutually interested in the results of their respective businesses...

Taking effect on 1 July 1889, this convention was intended to last until 31 December 1925. Basically this was an agreement to pool and divide profits, of which the Explosives Group would receive 60 per cent and the Powder Group 40 per cent. The result was the emergence of a very powerful international combination in the explosives industry, consisting of Europe's major manufacturers of both blasting explosives and propellants.
By two supplemental agreements, the non-German companies of the Explosives Group - namely, Nobel's Explosives, Alliance Explosives, South Wales Explosives, and three South American companies - were brought into the combination. As a result, the Glasgow company's profits came under the reach of the pool.

The pre-1914 Anglo-German explosives industry thus assumed its shape in 1889. (See Table 3.2 below.) The pooling agreement of that year was strengthened in 1890 by the Müller Agreement, which brought the Nobel-Dynamite Trust Company into a profit-pooling arrangement and joint-working understanding with five other German explosives companies known collectively as the Müller Group, named after the general manager of the largest of these five companies, the Rheinish-Westphälische Sprengstoff AG. The other four companies comprising this group were Siegener-Dynamitfabrik, Sprengstoff AG Carbonit, Sprengstoff Gesellschaft Kosmos and Erzgebirgische Dynamitfabrik AG Geyer. The parties to this agreement became known as the General Syndicate.39

Table 3.2

The Explosives Industry in Britain and Germany, 1889

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<tr>
<th>The Explosives Group</th>
<th>The Powder Group</th>
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<tr>
<td>Nobel-Dynamite Trust Company and its subsidiaries:</td>
<td>Vereinigte Rheinisch-Westphälische Pulverfabriken*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) German Union</td>
<td>Pulverfabrik Rottweil-Hamburg*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamit AG</td>
<td>Cramer &amp; Buchholz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rheinische Dynamitfabrik</td>
<td>Wolff &amp; Co.</td>
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<td>Deutsche Sprengstoff</td>
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<td>Dresdner Dynamitfabrik</td>
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<td>b) Non-German companies</td>
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<td>Nobel's Explosives Co.</td>
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<td>Alliance Explosives Co.</td>
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<td>S. Wales Explosives Co.</td>
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<td>3 South American Cos.</td>
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* These two companies were merged in 1890 to form Vereignite Köln-Rottweiler Pulverfabriken of Cologne.
We now return to 1906. The date is 27 April, and the setting is Cologne. The Anglo-German explosives and powder cartel had been in operation for over fifteen years, and had proven to be a workable and effective combination. Alfred Nobel also was no longer an active participant in the cartel's business, having died of a cerebral haemorrhage in 1896. On this day, three British and two German delegates met. Presiding over the proceedings was Sir Ralph Anstruther, chairman of the Nobel-Dynamite Trust Company since 1904. He was joined from Britain by Thomas Johnston, who had replaced Alexander Cuthbert as general manager of Nobel's Explosives in 1884, and Henry de Mosenthal, 'technical secretary' of the trust company since the mid-1880s. Their German counterparts were Dr. Gustav Aufschläger of the German Union, and Emil Müller, a director of Vereinigte Köln-Rottweiler Pulverfabriken. This, therefore, represented an Anglo-German gathering of the main explosives and powder forces allied under the General Pooling Agreement of 1889.

The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the renewal of a market-sharing agreement signed between the German powder firms and the American explosives makers, E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., in 1897. Subsequent to the Cologne gathering, negotiations between the German Powder Group and du Pont continued apace. Eventually, although du Pont was compelled in 1913 to nullify the 1897 agreement under pressure from the U.S. government for infringement of U.S. anti-trust laws, a cross-licensing agreement was concluded in London in June 1914 between the Anglo-German powder firms and du Pont. Therefore in 1914, on the eve of war, the Anglo-German cartel still held firm and was forging new links with its American competition. The war indeed took all the parties by surprise.41

A lesson to be drawn from these international ties in the explosives industry is that
fierce as the competition for markets was, it did not preclude the major British and German manufacturers from settling accounts and coming to a *modus vivendi* among themselves.

As Reader observes:

> The unspoken assumption seems to have been that the market, ... though large, was limited, and that there was little or nothing which either group could do to increase total demand. ... Therefore, they seem to have said to themselves, we will share out the business that is available, taking care to leave the weaker firms comfortable enough not to spoil things for everybody by desperate underselling.42

Remarking on the unique character of this international dynamite and powder cartel, Clive Trebilcock observes that between 1900 and 1914 it acquired 'a completeness that no other international armament alliance could rival'. As he adds: 'The interchange of funds and ideas between the Nobel concerns and the German Powder Group was a thing apart.'43 Thus explosives provide a fine instance of how the pursuit of profits was channelled constructively into Anglo-German accommodation and collaboration.

**Anglo-German Linkage: Armaments**

The story of explosives would not be complete without a parallel account of armaments, for rifles, guns and artillery were undeniably dependent for their function on propellant powder. At around the turn of the century, links were also being forged between explosives makers and arms manufacturers in Britain and Germany. Through this complex web, we can discern further Anglo-German linkage.
Vickers and Armstrongs: The Explosives-Armaments Connection

At around 1900 the manufacture of British armaments was dominated by two names, Vickers and Armstrong. Having origins as a steel company, Vickers, Sons & Co., was formed as a limited company in 1867. One of the leading metallurgical firms in Britain, Vickers made a decision in 1888 to lay down plant for the construction of guns and armour plate. It was then that this steel company went into the arms-manufacturing business.4

Armstrongs' origins can be traced to the Newcastle Cranage Company, established by William George Armstrong in the 1840s which, during the Crimean War, branched out from engineering and hydraulics into the manufacture of armaments, pioneering the rifled gun for use on warships. Hailed as the 'first truly modern weapon', Armstrong's invention, a three-pound breech-loader, was first delivered to the Royal Navy in July 1855. In 1864 the firm became known as Sir W.G. Armstrong & Co. and thereafter entered the warship-building industry. Having bought the Low Walker Yard, a shipbuilding yard on the Tyne owned by Charles Mitchell & Co., the firm was superseded in 1883 by a new public company, Sir W.G. Armstrong, Mitchell & Company, Ltd.46

The latter half of the nineteenth century truly represented an unprecedented period of breathtaking technological change, not least in the development of weaponry. As M.S. Anderson observes: 'The old smooth-bore musket of the Napoleonic period, little changed in essentials for generations and hardly superior as a weapon to the long-bow of the later Middle Ages, was now being changed out of all recognition.'47 In the fifty-odd years leading up to 1900, more numerous and far-reaching technical innovations were made than in the previous five hundred years. The story of dynamite and ballistite alone would serve as an illustration, as would Armstrong's contribution to the enhancement of ship gunnery.

This awe-inspiring progress was reflected also in the development of automatic weapons, and it is necessary to consider the pioneers in this area before proceeding to
examine the Anglo-German link in the Vickers-Armstrongs relationship. The pacesetter in automatic weapons was Richard Jordan Gatling, an American who invented the machine-gun in 1862 consisting of barrels rotating around a shaft and attaining a rate of fire of up to 350 shots per minute. Another important figure in pioneering automatic weapons was Hiram Maxim, also an American, who in 1881 made his first drawings of what was to become known as the 'Maxim gun'. Maxim's quick-fire gun, unlike Gatling's which was based on the concept of a 'revolver'- that is, a number of barrels revolving around a central shaft - relied on the principle of using the gun's own recoil to force each subsequent cartridge into the barrel and to detonate it as well. In this way the firing, which depended on the explosive force of the cartridge, was self-perpetuating, rendering Maxim's gun 'a truly automatic weapon'. Hence, while naval guns were becoming bigger, firing explosive shells, and attaining longer ranges, the infantryman's rifle was being complemented by a new weapon whose destructive power lay in its ability to fire rapid and continual bursts of shots.

Armstrongs obtained the right to be sole licensees of the Gatling Gun Company in Britain as early as 1870. Maxim therefore approached the Vickers family for backing. In 1884 when the Maxim Gun Company Ltd. was formed, Albert Vickers became its chairman while two other Vickers brothers, Edward and Tom, were allotted a substantial number, though not a majority, of shares in the company. It must be noted also that the Vickers brothers were merely investors in Maxim's Gun Company as private individuals; Vickers, Sons & Co. was not officially tied with it. Indeed, Vickers was not yet in the arms-manufacturing business in 1884. In 1888 Maxim was amalgamated with another machine-gun company, Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Company Ltd.; the new company became known as Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Company Ltd. In 1888 also, Maxim granted a licence to the giant German arms-manufacturing firm, Friedrich Krupp AG.
A point of note is that the merger of Maxim and Nordenfelt was made possible by financiers of German background, Ernest Cassel and Nathan (1st Baron) Rothschild, both of whom were given shares in the Maxim Gun Company and consequently held an interest in Maxim Nordenfelt. In the next chapter, Cassel and Rothschild will be reexamined for their roles in promoting Anglo-German cooperation and linkage - Cassel for his part in founding the King Edward VII British-German Foundation, and Rothschild for his ties with Cecil Rhodes as well as his role in financing South African diamond- and gold-mining enterprises.

Chilworth and Sigmund Loewe: The German Connection in British Armaments

In the last years of the nineteenth century, the Anglo-German explosives manufacturers proceeded to strengthen their ties with the arms industry. As already seen, in 1885 Chilworth Gunpowder Company was bought out by Vereinigte Rheinisch-Westphälische Pulverfabriken (superseded by Vereinigte Köln-Rottweiler Pulverfabriken in 1890), thus becoming a subsidiary of the German Powder Group. With the General Pooling Agreement of 1889, Chilworth by default fell under the partial control of the Nobel-Dynamite Trust Company as well. After the takeover of 1885, Chilworth concluded an agreement with Sir W.G. Armstrong & Co., whereby Chilworth would become Armstrong's exclusive supplier of military powder. In return Chilworth would obtain 'certain compensating advantages'. The company signed a similar agreement with Maxim Nordenfelt in 1892.

In 1897 the firms of the General Pooling Agreement established in Berlin a Central Scientific and Technical Testing Station. But it was not just the explosives and powder firms of the cartel which had a stake in this venture. Krupps were represented on the Kuratorium of the Centralstelle, along with Deutsche Waffen und Munitionsfabriken, renowned makers of machine-guns and owners of Waffenfabrik Mauser. Here one can
already discern the intermingling of explosives and armaments interests.

The year 1897 was pivotal for the arms and explosives industries as it witnessed a string of takeovers and the emergence of two blocs - Vickers and Armstrongs - in the British arms-manufacturing and warship-building sectors. In that year Sir Joseph Whitworth & Co., the naval-gunmaking firm, was acquired by Sir W.G. Armstrong & Co. to form Sir W.G. Armstrong Whitworth & Co. Ltd. Indeed, Joseph Whitworth stands alongside Armstrong as one of the ground-breaking pioneers of naval gunnery in the mid-nineteenth century. Whereas Armstrong increased the efficiency and destructiveness of naval warfare by creating the rifled gun, Whitworth revolutionized the art of gun making by introducing 'precision'. The novelty of his manufacturing process lay in the fact that whereas 'earlier, men had worked in fractions of inches, Whitworth was thinking in terms of thousandths, and even ten-thousandths, thus translating gunfounding and gunnery from the realm of somewhat airy art to the status of very exact science'.

In 1897 also, Maxim Nordenfelt was taken over by Vickers, Sons & Co., which thereby strengthened its position in the machine-gun business. Consolidating its shipbuilding base, Vickers in the same year purchased the Naval Construction & Armaments Company Ltd. at Barrow. Lord Rothschild, who had been instrumental in the 1888 Maxim-Nordenfelt amalgamation, played a big hand again in 1897 by engineering the appointment of his German protégé, Sigmund Loewe, to the board of the new company, Vickers, Sons & Maxim Ltd. In Chilworth - through the German Powder Group and its alliance with Nobel-Dynamite Trust under the General Pooling Agreement of 1889 - the Anglo-German connection is already evident. Parallel to this was the Rothschild-Loewe connection which further tightened the interlocking Anglo-German network in the explosives and armaments industries.

Between 1897 and 1903, when he was killed in a motoring accident, Sigmund Loewe was a director of Vickers, Sons & Maxim, and 'in effect, if not by title, financial
controller.\textsuperscript{33} The entrenchment of Loewe's position in the company assumes added significance because he represented a 'personal link'\textsuperscript{34} tying Vickers with Deutsche Waffen und Munitionsfabriken, a firm founded by Sigmund's elder brother, Ludwig.

The Anglo-German nexus, however, does not end there, for the Nobel-Dynamite Trust Company was an important party again in this intricate web. Vereinigte Köln-Rottweiler Pulverfabriken, the principal firm within the German Powder Group, held shares in Deutsche Waffen's predecessor company, Deutsche Metallpatronen. When Deutsche Metallpatronen became Deutsche Waffen in 1897, the German Union also took shares in the company. Consequently, Nobel-Dynamite Trust held a sizeable, though not a controlling, stake in Deutsche Waffen. In 1902, for instance, the trust company held RM3.5 million of the German firm's total nominal capital of RM15 million.\textsuperscript{35}

We now briefly return to Chilworth and Vereinigte Köln-Rottweiler Pulverfabriken. As arms, ammunitions, explosives and propellants were very closely related, it was not inconceivable for a gun maker to enter into the manufacture of propellant powder. Aiming to avert Armstrongs' and Vickers's entry into the propellant-powder business, Chilworth made an approach to the two giant arms manufacturers. Although Armstrongs dropped out of the negotiations, Vickers went on to conclude an agreement with Chilworth on 11 July 1900. By this accord Vickers, for the sum of £120,000, acquired a 40 per cent interest in Chilworth Gunpowder against Köln-Rottweiler's 60 per cent. Vickers was also empowered to nominate two of the company's directors against Köln-Rottweiler's four. Köln-Rottweiler in turn relinquished its right of veto on the Chilworth Gunpowder board. More importantly, by this agreement Vickers undertook not to go into the manufacture of blasting or powder explosives anywhere in the world. In return, it was agreed that the explosives sold to the company by Chilworth or Nobel's Explosives would never exceed the prices charged to Armstrongs. Vickers also agreed to purchase 'in preference' all of its required explosives from Chilworth, and if not from Chilworth, then from Nobel's Explosives.
Nobel's Explosives and Chilworth, meanwhile, consented to share all orders for ballistite or cordite in the United Kingdom at a 3:1 ratio. In return for Köln-Rottweiler's providing information on manufacturing military explosives for use in the British Empire, both firms consented not to sell military explosives, except cordite, outside the empire except at prices agreed to with Köln-Rottweiler. Assessing the importance of this deal, Trebilcock writes: 'These terms constituted perhaps the most substantial agreement to be struck between the hardware and software sectors of the defence industries in the ante-bellum period.' A further and important link between arms and explosives, and between British and German interests, was thus sealed.

At the heart of this complex web lay the Nobel-Dynamite Trust Company. As a holding company for the German Union and the British explosives makers, as allies of the German Powder Group under the General Pooling Agreement of 1889, and as shareholders in Deutsche Waffen, Nobel-Dynamite Trust was to a large extent the hub of this Anglo-German explosives and armaments network. Chilworth's agreement with Vickers also enabled the trust company to circumvent potential intrusion from Britain's leading arms manufacturer, the producer of 'hardware', into propellant powder, the 'software' sector of the arms industry.

**Vickers and Deutsche Waffen**

The origins of the Vickers-Deutsche Waffen connection has already been noted. This link reveals yet again a considerably high degree of Anglo-German collaboration. Vickers, through licensing and patent-sharing agreements, forged ties with Deutsche Waffen and Krupps. Vickers's dealings with Deutsche Waffen originally came indirectly through the route of Maxim Nordenfelt. As already mentioned, Vickers purchased Maxim Nordenfelt in 1897 to form Vickers, Sons & Maxim Ltd. But prior to that, Ludwig Loewe had already acquired the rights from Maxim Nordenfelt in 1891 to manufacture Maxim
machine-guns. At that time, Loewe's company was still the Deutsche Metallpatronen; as we might recall, this firm was superseded by Deutsche Waffen only in 1897. We should also recall Lord Rothschild's active role in and financial support - backed by Ernest Cassel - for the 1888 Maxim-Nordenfelt amalgamation. By the time of the 1897 takeover, Sigmund Loewe was already Rothschild's protégé, and he found a place on the board of the new Vickers, Sons & Maxim Ltd. largely thanks to Rothschild's machinations. Their relationship had in fact begun in the early 1890s when Loewe was an agent for the Roburite Explosive Company and was on friendly terms with Carl Nauheim, Rothschild's London manager. Through Nauheim Loewe met Rothschild, who offered him the management of Maxim Nordenfelt. Loewe thus became Maxim Nordenfelt's managing director in 1895, thereby giving his family's machine-gun business a foothold in Britain. His move was also undertaken on the basis that he would effect an amalgamation with Vickers, which indeed took place in 1897.58

After 1897 Vickers proceeded to supplement the 1891 licensing agreement and consolidate its relationship with Deutsche Waffen. The shrewdness of such a move is underscored by Trebilcock's observation that the German company was 'perhaps the foremost European competitor in this specialized line of weaponry and no market in which it remained a free agent could be counted secure'.59 Hence, the pattern in explosives was closely mirrored by that in the arms industry. Just as the Anglo-German dynamite and powder groups were willing to arrive at a modus vivendi to regulate competition in the face of limited demand, the arms manufacturers too - similarly locked in an Anglo-German network - proved amenable to the idea of accommodation.

In 1898 came the first concrete step towards a 'clearer codification of interests',60 when Deutsche Waffen concluded its first agreement, dated 15 February, with Vickers relating to the manufacture of Vickers-Maxim machine-guns under licence in Germany. This arrangement was elaborated further by a subsequent agreement of 5 October 1901,
which made Deutsche Waffen the sole licensee to manufacture and sell Vickers-Maxim automatic and semi-automatic weapons of 37mm calibre and under, in Germany and all other countries, with the notable exceptions of Britain and her empire, France and her colonies, and the United States of America. This agreement, however, contained a clause stating that the granting of exclusive rights to Deutsche Waffen was 'subject to the rights now vested in Friedrich Krupp or his assigns as hereinafter mentioned' - thus in effect subject to an agreement with Krupps. Pistols and rifles fired from the shoulder were excluded from the agreement. Vickers, meanwhile, would be entitled to a share of Deutsche Waffen's profits from the manufacture of those guns. As we may recall, Maxim Nordenfelt had also concluded an agreement with Krupps in 1888 - an agreement that was renewed in 1896 - granting Krupps the licence to manufacture and sell Maxim guns in the German Empire. By the accord of 1901, Vickers undertook to pay Deutsche Waffen 10 per cent of royalties received under the agreement between Maxim Nordenfelt and Krupps.

Over the following years, the Vickers-Deutsche Waffen link was consolidated further. In 1911 the two firms drew up an agreement dividing the world between themselves for the sale of Maxim guns. On the eve of war in 1914, yet another agreement was concluded, dated 10 June, serving as a second supplementary agreement to the 1901 convention. By this accord, Deutsche Waffen's orders from the German government were to be excluded from the 1901 agreement, as were the British government's orders to Vickers.

Vickers and Krupps

Meanwhile, Vickers was also securing pacts with Krupps, though dealing less with licensing than with patent-sharing. By an agreement of 1902, Vickers obtained from Krupps the right to manufacture and sell, in Britain and abroad, all Krupps time-fuses and combined time-and-percussion fuses. According to this arrangement, Krupps would
provide designs as well as information on all existing and future designs and improvements.

Moreover, Vickers participated in a major international syndicate called the Steel Manufacturers Nickel Syndicate Ltd., formed in 1901 with the object of regulating the price of nickel, virtually a French monopoly as France was at that time Europe's only producer of nickel. Loewe had already concluded an agreement with Le Nickel, the leading French company, to receive preferential treatment for the supply of the metal at reasonable prices. By forming the syndicate, all member firms were able to purchase their supplies of nickel from the French company at the same reduced prices offered to Deutsche Waffen.

Another international syndicate which Vickers joined was the Harvey Syndicate, centred around the manufacture of steel armour plate through a new process called the Harvey process. This syndicate, formed in 1894, was comprised of the main armour-plate makers of Britain, Germany, France and the United States. It, however, came to an end in 1911.

Anglo-German Economic 'Rivalry': A Reconsideration

Now that we have examined Anglo-German linkage in the strategic sectors of manufacturing, it would be worthwhile probing the 'rivalry' between the two countries before 1914 by considering other complementary and mutually beneficial aspects of the Anglo-German economic relationship. To place the trade 'rivalry' in proper perspective, one might cite Paul Kennedy's observation that despite the increase in tensions arising from Germany's industrial and commercial growth during the 1880-1914 period, 'there still remained many complementary elements in the trading pattern between Britain and Germany, and many interests benefited greatly from the steadily rising commerce and thus had a strong incentive to prevent a trade war'. Besides, the Anglo-German trade rivalry was confined largely to certain sectors and occurred only at specific times, making for a 'fragmented' commercial 'antagonism' between both countries.
As demonstrated by the Tariff Reform movement, the British industries worst hit by German competition - and thus most strongly in favour of retaliatory tariffs - were mainly iron and steel, boots and shoes, engineering and chemicals. But even in these areas, there were certain benefits produced by German competition. Some of the testimony before the Tariff Commission would indicate that cheap iron and steel from Germany had the added effect of lowering costs and allowing some British manufacturers to hire more employees. As one firm testified: 'The purchase of German steel has enabled us to employ more men and those more regularly.' It further admitted that: 'We gain far more from cheap foreign billets than we lose from competition in our own manufactures.'

The deleterious effects of German competition on British industry indeed should not be overstated. German competition bode well for the orthodox free-trading principle of buying cheaply and selling expensively, and thus suited the businessman's basic aim of maximizing profits. Hugh Bell, an iron and steel manufacturer and avid Free Trader, did not think that German 'competition' meant the death knell for British iron and steel. As he explained: 'Britain either buys cheap and sells dear, or when she buys dear she gets what she wants.' He was not the only Free Trader to express such a confident attitude, even though Britain had become the world's largest importer of iron and steel by the eve of war. As a typical Free Trader argued in the prewar period: 'By all means ... let us import cheap foreign steel bars so that we may manufacture corrugated sheets for export ... let us import cheap foreign billets so that we may manufacture the thousand and one articles of which they are the raw material ...' Thus from the Free Trader's standpoint, certain cheap foreign imports, especially of products constituting raw materials, were in fact welcome.

Steel manufacturing illustrates the trend towards specialization that was partly spurred by Germany's rise in the industry. With the onset of German competition, Britain ended up specializing in the manufacture of finished steel products, in which she remained competitive, and buying in large quantities the cheap semi-finished steel products which
Germany 'dumped' in the British market. Within this framework of open, free trade, it made economic sense for Britain to import the semi-finished goods while increasing her exports of the higher-value finished steel. As has been pointed out: 'The tendency for Britain to export steel of high rather than low value was ... all to the good, and it was not necessarily a bad economic feature that our net exports fell from 1907 onwards."

This specialization in specific products, reflecting 'the order of the pre-war international market', could also be seen in the chemical industry. Though Britain dropped from first place in 1880 to third in 1913 (behind the United States and Germany) in the production of chemicals, her eclipse was most evident only in organic chemicals and electrochemicals. In heavy inorganic chemicals, acids, alkali and soap, she was able to remain a strong world competitor. Consequently, she and her main competitors ended up specializing in different areas and carving out their own niches within the industry. Thus in 1913 Britain dominated in the production of soda ash, whereas Germany held a commanding position in dyestuffs and the United States in sulphuric acid and superphosphates.

Described as 'the most important event in the history of the chemical industry' during the late nineteenth century, the growth of Germany's dyestuffs industry in the 1880s and 1890s was indeed spectacular. On the eve of war, Britain's almost complete dependence on German dyestuffs was most pronounced. In 1913, of the close to 61,000 cwt. of dyes and coal-tar dyestuffs imported by Britain, a little over 60,000 cwt. came from Germany. In aniline and naphthalene dyestuffs, Germany provided over 90 per cent (258,629 cwt.) of all of Britain's imports (283,027 cwt.) in 1913. Commenting on the German monopoly of the British dyestuffs market, a contemporary Briton observed: 'The dye-works of this country are so dependent on dye-stuffs imported from Germany that it is not pleasant to conceive what would happen if supplies were stopped or tampered with. Any rupture in the trade between the two countries would lead to most serious difficulties
The German dominance of the British market in synthetic indigo in the prewar period was equally overwhelming. It is highly ironic that, at the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, most of the dyes used in the manufacture of the British army's khaki uniforms came in fact from Germany.

Yet British reliance on German dyestuffs can be seen in a broader context of Anglo-German interdependence. The coal tar which German manufacturers used to produce their dyestuffs was derived in huge quantities from British coal. While Germany's production and exports of coal increased tremendously between the 1890s and 1914, she still continued to import coal, a great deal of it from Britain. Even though Germany had by 1913 become only the third largest importer of British coal (behind France and Italy), her 9 million tons of British imports in that year represented almost twice more than the amount of coal which she had bought from Britain in 1898. Her continued importation of British coal could be explained by the simple dictates of economics. Although Germany produced coal sufficiently to meet her needs, in her coastal districts the cost of bringing coal from the ports to the factories proved lower than the expense of transporting coal overland from her own mining districts. It was for this reason that British coal was able to maintain a 'safe market' in Germany, especially in the north and east. Sir Francis Oppenheimer, the British Consul-General in Frankfurt, could attest in 1909 that 'near the coast, in the district of the Baltic, and in Berlin, British coal enjoys a certain popularity'. In the northern and eastern regions of Germany, he pointed out, 'the price and the facility of transport are decidedly in favour of British coal'. So much, then, for the Anglo-German trade 'rivalry'. Where it proved cheaper and more convenient, both countries still found it desirable to buy from the other the same goods in which they were 'competing'.

A similar pattern of bilateral exchange could be detected in iron and steel. In 1907, for example, Britain sold £1,518,000 worth of partly manufactured and £1,557,000 of fully manufactured iron and steel to Germany. In turn, Britain imported £2,410,000 worth
of partly manufactured and £2,532,000 of fully manufactured iron and steel from
Germany.\textsuperscript{75}

In shipbuilding, a sector in which Britain enjoyed unsurpassed supremacy even in
the face of German competition, one can clearly see the benefits accruing to British
shipbuilders from the irony that "one man's rival product was another man's raw material".\textsuperscript{76}
Many British steel manufacturers may have complained about being undersold by cheap
German imports, but to many British shipbuilders who benefited from cheap raw materials,
the imported steel, whether German or otherwise, was a welcome blessing. Up to 1914 the
comparative advantage in shipbuilding still lay with Britain, being the world's leading
builder of ships, and one country from which her shipyards received a considerable number
of orders was Germany. Ironically, German shipowners were beneficiaries of the lower
costs of British shipbuilding partly because of Germany's own 'dumping' of cheap iron and
steel products in Britain.\textsuperscript{77} During the prewar period, British shipyards increasingly relied
on steel castings from Germany which were considerably cheaper than British-made ones.
In 1912-13, for example, up to 43 per cent of steel castings used by British shipyards were
imported, mainly from Germany.\textsuperscript{78} Nonetheless, the cheaper German steel castings cannot
be considered a 'serious element' in British shipbuilding as they constituted only one item
among many in ship construction. As a rule, non-British steel was used only in small
quantities in prewar British shipbuilding owing to the fact that imported steel came mostly
in the form of open-hearth or basic steel, which was not highly favoured by British
shipyards.\textsuperscript{79}

In 1913 the British merchant marine amounted to 12,119,000 net tons compared to
Germany's 3,153,000 net tons\textsuperscript{80} - a substantial margin indeed, even though Germany by that
time already possessed the world's second largest merchant fleet. It has been estimated that
by 1914 the British mercantile marine owned 33.4 per cent of the world's tonnage, and,
more importantly, 90 per cent of the world's tramps, which were the primary ocean
The claim made by a contemporary observer that, 'We carry more goods from foreign port to foreign port ... than all our British trade amounts to' may have been a slight overstatement, but it still rightly reflected the confidence and the thriving state of Britain's shipping trade. In view of Britain's maritime supremacy, it is to be expected that her merchant fleet carried a large proportion of Germany's trade as well, especially her trade with Britain. Interestingly, British ships carried a far greater tonnage of Germany's exports to Britain than they did her imports from Britain. The Board of Trade estimated in 1911 that only about a third of the vessels bringing cargo into Britain from Germany were German, the reason being that most of German shipping arrived in British ports in ballast and left with cargo. In 1910, for instance, of approximately 2.1 million tons of goods entering British ports from Germany, over half (about 1.3 million tons) were carried on British ships, with German vessels accounting for only about 30 per cent of the tonnage (close to 637,000 tons). German ships, however, carried up to 2.1 million tons of goods leaving Britain for Germany, almost equal to the 2.5 million tons hauled by British vessels. These trends were to be maintained until 1914.

Even though Germany was not totally dependent on the British merchant marine for her trade with other countries, British ships certainly carried a substantial portion of her global commerce. In 1913, for example, British ships comprised almost half of all foreign vessels bringing cargo into Germany, totalling approximately 5.9 million tons out of over 12.5 million tons. British merchant shipping, however, carried a smaller share of Germany's export trade. In the same year, of about 7 million tons of cargo leaving Germany on foreign ships, only around 2.56 million tons (about 35 per cent) were conveyed on British vessels.

Another important element in the Anglo-German commercial maritime relationship was the provision of marine insurance by British firms, with London being the world's leading centre for marine insurance. There may not be sufficient records surviving to allow
us to determine the percentage of German merchant shipping insured by British companies in the prewar period, but one can safely assume that it was substantial. As the Alliance Assurance Company’s testimony before the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) in 1911 suggests, ‘a very considerable volume’ of German marine insurance was effected in Britain. During the prewar period, Germany was undeniably a highly lucrative market for British insurance companies, and not just in marine insurance. British firms transacted a sizeable volume of reinsurance business in Germany dealing with fire policies in particular. As the general manager of Alliance testified in 1911, British firms tended to reinsure ‘a large portion of their surplus home risks’ with German companies. The British reinsurance business in Germany, consequently, totalled approximately £700,000 a year in 1911, amounting to about 20 per cent of the entire business of the German firms.

But a more significant aspect of Germany’s maritime trade pertained to its financing, which came largely from London merchant houses. Finance thus represented an area which bound German commercial interests closely with Britain, and conversely, British financial interests with Germany’s commercial well-being. Given London’s position as the world’s financial centre and the relative weakness of the German capital markets, it was inevitable that Germany’s international trade would be dependent to a large extent on British capital and on the services provided by the City of London. Thus in 1911, as Frederick Huth Jackson contended, ‘the greater part of the trade between Germany and the British Empire, and a good deal of the trade between Germany and other countries, is financed in London’. A prominent City banker, then president of the Institute of Bankers and a Director of the Bank of England, Huth Jackson affirmed in that year that Germany was the City’s ‘principal debtor’. He estimated that no less than 20 to 25 per cent of the entire London acceptance business dealt directly or indirectly with Germany. In view of the immense value of German business to the bankers and brokers in the City, it is hardly surprising that these financial interests constituted ‘the most persistent economic lobby for
good Anglo-German relations' during the prewar period.88

Finance provided another forum of Anglo-German linkage in that the City itself contained a strong German presence. Although foreign merchants had operated in London as far back as the Middle Ages, the establishment of a German foothold in the City can be traced to the founding of Baring Bros. & Co. Ltd. in 1763, a merchant firm of German origin that arrived via Exeter. It was, however, only at the dawn of the nineteenth century that the German merchant banking community truly blossomed in London. Thanks to the Napoleonic wars, which severely disrupted the patterns of Continental trade, a string of German merchants established themselves in London during the period between 1800 and 1815. Thus from such commercial centres as Hamburg, Frankfurt and Leipzig came J.H. Schröder in 1802, E.H. Brandt in 1805, Frederick Huth in 1809, and Frühling & Goschen in 1814. Added to that were Manchester-based firms such as N.M. Rothschild & Sons, which had moved from Germany in the eighteenth century and which established a base in London also at around this time - in 1805. This period of the French wars witnessed the rise of commission agents and the subsequent growth of accepting houses in London, especially after 1825. By the mid-nineteenth century, the leading acceptance houses in the City were Rothschilds and Barings.89 The strength and importance of the German presence in the City's merchant banking community was demonstrated shortly after the outbreak of war in 1914 when the Accepting Houses' Committee was formed on 5 August. Of the twenty-one firms comprising this committee, eleven were of German origin or 'Anglo-German'. They were Baring Bros. & Co., Arthur H. Brandt & Co., William Brandt, Sons & Co., Frühling & Goschen, C.J. Hambro & Son, Horstman & Co., Frederick Huth & Co., Kleinwort, Sons & Co., König Bros., N.M. Rothschild & Sons, A. Rüffer & Sons, and J. Henry Schröder & Co.90 Trade with Germany and the lucrative acceptance business may have been disrupted in August 1914, but these Anglo-German merchant houses continued to play a significant role in the City. As Stanley Chapman notes, they represented 'one of
the most enterprising sectors' of City finance at the outbreak of war. Many of them in fact still exist today, in one form and name or another.

The prewar German presence in the City was represented also by the major German banks which opened branches in London in the late nineteenth century. Reflecting the growth of its overseas acceptance business during that period, the Deutsche Bank established its London branch in 1873. It was followed suit by the Dresdner Bank in 1895 and the Disconto-Gesellschaft in 1899. Showing a steady growth in its business over the years, the Deutsche Bank London Agency's turnover came to almost £1.1 million in 1913.

The German element was further manifest in the London Stock Exchange. Foreigners may have represented only a small minority in the membership of the Stock Exchange. For example, between 1900 and 1909, 2,297 members were admitted of whom only 99 were foreigners. Nonetheless by 1914 more than half of the Stock Exchange's naturalized members were German by birth. Even as far back as the 1870s, Germans formed the largest group of all its foreign-born members. Looking back on his pre-First World War days in the Exchange, an old member recalled in 1969 the

many German, predominantly Jewish firms ... who came to England after the Franco-Prussian War. Their names were legion - Biedermann, Schlesinger, Schwarbacker, Lichrenstadt and Weinberger among others. ...

My firm had a large and influential German and continental connection through which much trade came to London.

Moving away from firms, one should bear in mind prominent individuals of German descent in the City. One of them was Sir Ernest Cassel, who will be dealt with at length in later chapters. Born in Cologne, Cassel emigrated to England in 1869 and embarked on a career in finance with Bischoffsheim & Goldschmidt before eventually
becoming one of the leading international financiers in the City by the early 1900s. A
member of King Edward VII's entourage, Cassel was influential not only in finance but
also in government, and was consulted regularly by Chancellors of the Exchequer. In 1903
the Joint Permanent Secretary at the Treasury, Sir Edward Hamilton, remarked that he
considered Cassel to be one of his 'first counsellors'. Hamilton's other 'first counsellors', it
should be noted, were Lords Rothschild and Revelstoke (John Baring), further testimony to
the respect and prestige commanded by the Anglo-German firms in the City. Another
prominent City financier of German ancestry who acted as a financial advisor to the British
government was Sir Edgar Speyer, known to have been 'highly favoured' by David Lloyd
George, who became Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1908. Not to be forgotten also is
Baron Bruno Schröder, a partner in J. Henry Schröder & Co. Once referred to by a fellow
City banker as 'the leading German in London', Schröder acted in the capacity of ex officio
financial advisor to the German embassy in London.

One area of banking which should not be overlooked concerns the operations of
British overseas banks, notably those which established branches in Germany or otherwise
provided financing for German trade with the banks' specialist regions overseas. A fine
example is the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), which opened a
branch in Hamburg in 1889 owing in large part to the lucrative commerce carried out
between the German port-city and the Far East. Other British overseas banks which set up
offices in Hamburg were the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China (1904), and the
Standard Bank of South Africa (1905). The Hamburg branches of these banks held larger
market shares than their German competitors. The HSBC, for one, effectively had 'a
predominant role' in the financing of Germany's trade with Japan.

The interdependence between Hamburg's merchant firms and the HSBC as well as
other British merchants in the Far East is well illuminated by David King. Alluding to the
HSBC's 'special relationships' with German finance and merchants, King brings to light a
network of intricate ties reflecting a concurrence of interests that went counter to Anglo-German political discord. As he explains,

the HSBC benefited just as much from the growth of German as it did from that of the British commerce, and, in China, British and German finance worked together to the satisfaction of at least the HSBC. Furthermore, a high percentage of the British export trade to China was handled by German merchant houses financed by HSBC.99

The HSBC's Hamburg branch of course constituted only one portion of prewar British direct investment in Germany, the total amount of which, unfortunately, has not been reliably estimated. Nevertheless, it has been clearly established that the areas of German manufacturing having the largest concentration of British investment before 1914 were the tyre, soap and gramophone industries.100

Prewar German direct investment in Britain also has not been accurately quantified, a shortcoming which, incidentally, applies to all foreign direct investments in Britain for the entire pre-1945 period. As Geoffrey Jones points out: 'It is difficult to quantify the amount of capital which foreign companies invested in British industry before 1945.'101 There is, moreover, a general lack of reliable statistics on German overseas investments (direct and portfolio) for the pre-1914 period.102 One can nonetheless state that most of Germany's direct investment in Britain before 1914 was concentrated in the chemical, electrical and pharmaceutical sectors. Even so, at the outbreak of the First World War, German direct investment in Britain was well surpassed by that of the United States. During the war, the amount of German equity in identified manufacturing subsidiaries in Britain was estimated at only about £1.7 million,103 reflecting the relatively low level of German direct investment activity in the United Kingdom.
In optics, however, Britain represented an important market for German exports as well as investment. The pre-1914 decline of Britain's optical industry is already a commonplace, as is Britain's tremendous dependence on German optical products which was woefully exposed at the outbreak of war. The prewar British optical industry has been characterized as 'a fragmentary collection of craft-based family firms, many entirely concerned to retail German goods'. In August 1914 Chance Bros., the leading British manufacturer of optical glass, could meet only 10 per cent of Britain's needs. At the outbreak of war, up to 60 per cent of the British demand for optical glass was supplied by the giant German makers, Carl Zeiss of Jena. Indeed on the eve of war, Zeiss's sales to Britain made up 21.4 per cent of the entire German optical industry's exports, a testimony to the importance of the British market for German optics.

But apart from dominating sales in Britain, the firm was also a direct investor in the United Kingdom, starting first with the establishment of Carl Zeiss, London, as a sales office in 1901, then the formation of a limited liability company in 1909, after which the manufacture of optical glass was begun at a site in north London. Zeiss's operations in Britain certainly yielded huge earnings. In 1910 the London sales office accounted for 30 per cent of all of the firm's subsidiary profits.

* * * *

This chapter has attempted to provide a balanced perspective to the prewar Anglo-German economic 'antagonism' by examining collaboration as well as reciprocal relationships and mutually beneficial ties between British and German business interests. It is highly symbolic that on the eve of war, in June 1914, a paper was presented by the economist, Edgar Crammond, before the Royal Statistical Society emphasizing this very reality of interdependence and reciprocity between the economies of both countries. Back in 1910, Crammond had presciently warned of the deleterious effects of a war with a
Power in a position to challenge our supremacy upon the sea'. As he predicted then, such a war would bring down the London Stock Exchange, diminish Britain's earnings from her mercantile marine, and disrupt her supplies of foodstuffs and raw materials.  

Crammond was not the only one to recognize the growing linkage between countries in the international system of trade and finance. In 1909 Norman Angell published his work *Europe's Optical Illusion* (reissued in 1910 as *The Great Illusion*), arguing the futility of the European arms race and the counter-productiveness of a European war. 'The complexity of modern finance', Angell claimed, 'makes New York dependent on London, London upon Paris, Paris upon Berlin, to a greater degree than has ever yet been the case in history.'

As has been shown, the strategic sectors of the British and German economies, comprising the explosives and armaments industries, were in some respects 'allied' and locked in cartels. Prewar Anglo-German commercial links were indeed quite substantial. But more importantly, businessmen in both Britain and Germany were themselves highly alert to the reality of Anglo-German interdependence and keenly appreciated the material benefits to be gained from the maintenance of Anglo-German peace. It is scarcely surprising that in early 1910, in response to the growing Anglo-German diplomatic tension, the London Chamber of Commerce was spurred to form an Anglo-German Section, with the very aim of promoting trade and 'removing misunderstandings' between Britain and Germany. Undoubtedly, these two objectives were closely intertwined: Anglo-German misunderstandings were certainly harmful to healthy commercial exchange. On the eve of war, in June 1914, a delegation from the Association of Merchants and Manufacturers of Berlin was in fact in London meeting with the London Chamber of Commerce and affirming the importance of continued German trade with Britain.

Such activities were very telling indeed. Given the extensiveness of British commercial links with Germany and the high degree of Anglo-German economic
interdependence, one can understand the generally favourable attitude of the British business classes towards Germany. Their Germanophilism can be explained by the simple fact that healthy relations with Germany bode well for the British economy. As demonstrated by the Caxton Hall meeting and the reciprocal gatherings in Germany, British and German business and financial opinion shared a commitment to maintaining friendly Anglo-German relations. Moreover, these commercial circles were apt to appeal to racialist notions of Anglo-German kinship in support of promoting healthy Anglo-German economic ties. Racial attitudes were evidently closely bound to the ethos of Anglo-German business. In sum, British business opinion was far from being wholly antagonistic towards Germany.

The full dimension and complexity of the prewar Anglo-German trade 'rivalry' should thus be properly grasped. After all, Tariff Reform agitation had all but dissipated by 1914, thanks in large part to the trade cycles and the great boom that came after the 1907-09 recession. Undoubtedly, a prosperous economy spoke volumes in vindication of free trade. Lord Avebury had died by the time the war broke out in August 1914, but even if his fellow Free Traders who were alive were not able to prevent the outbreak of the European conflict, they had clearly 'won' a significant battle. Indeed, on the eve of war Anglo-German trade and business links were more robust than they had ever been. Our understanding of the Anglo-German economic relationship should not suffer from an optical illusion.

NOTES

2. Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, p. 292.
3. Ibid., pp. 292-3.
4. Ibid., p. 293.

5. Statistical Abstract for the United Kingdom in Each of the Last Fifteen Years from 1897 to 1911, no. 59 (London, 1912), p. 100.


7. Ibid., pp. 103 and 115.

8. Ibid.


See also CAB 16/18B, 'Trading with the Enemy', f. 54, for statistics of German imports of raw materials from the British Empire.

12. The importance of the Dominions' resources in time of war was well appreciated by Britain's prewar strategic planners. See Avner Offer, The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation (Oxford, 1989), esp. chaps. 15, 17-18.


15. Ibid., pp. 130-75.


26. See ibid., pp. 24-36.

27. Ibid., p. 20.

28. Ibid., p. 76.

29. Ibid., p. 68.


31. Quoted in Reader, ICI, I, p. 72.

32. Ibid., pp. 20, 67-79.

33. Ibid., pp. 79-80.

34. Ibid., pp. 81-2.

35. Ibid., pp. 81-8.

36. Ibid., p. 125.

37. Ibid., p. 132.
38. English version of the General Pooling Agreement, pp. 8-10, in ICIA, box 40, NDTC/03C/0008.
40. This is extracted from ibid., p. 136.
41. Ibid., pp. 196-215.
42. Ibid., p. 59.
49. Ibid., p. 38.
52. Scott, Vickers, pp. 44-5.
53. Ibid., p. 77.
54. Reader, ICI, I, p. 149.
55. Ibid.
56. Chilworth-Vickers Agreement (German-British Powder Agreement), 11 July 1900, esp. pp. 54, 62-8, in ICIA, box 190, NDTC/01H/0073. See also Reader, ICI, I, pp. 150-2; and Trebilcock, The Vickers Brothers: Armaments and Enterprise, 1854-1914 (London,


60. Ibid.

61. These agreements are in Vickers Archives, Cambridge University Library, Cambridge, doc. 655. For a précis of Vickers's agreements with Deutsche Waffen and Krupps, see doc. 57, folders 14 and 15.


64. RTC, I, para. 249.


76. Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, p. 300.
80. Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, p. 302.
83. 'Enquiry Regarding Trading with the Enemy', paper no. 8, memorandum by the Board of Trade, pp. 3 and 44, PRO, WO 106/45.
87. 'Enquiry Regarding Trading with the Enemy', paper no. 7, minutes of 29 Nov. 1911, testimony of the Rt. Hon. Frederick Huth Jackson, pp. 5-6, PRO, WO 106/45.
88. Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, p. 302.

90. Ibid., p. 55.

91. Ibid., p. 179.


103. Jones, 'Foreign Multinationals', pp. 429-33. His discussion of prewar German direct investment in Britain, on p. 431, is very brief and general.


105. Ibid., pp. 170-1.


107. Ibid., p. 7.


CHAPTER 4
THE GERMAN CONNECTION IN BRITISH EDUCATION

'The object is that an understanding between the three great powers will render war impossible and educational relations make the strongest tie.'

Cecil Rhodes

'These great modern Institutes, the far-reaching beneficent effects of which would soon make themselves widely felt, would require less expenditure than that needed for building the smallest Dreadnought. Their practical usefulness would in course of time be seen to outweigh by far that of many costly ships that are at present considered necessary for the preservation of peace.'

Karl Breul

Having considered Anglo-German ties in business and trade, this thesis will now turn to a different area of non-political linkage: education. In this chapter three examples of the German connection in British education will be analysed.

The King Edward VII British-German Foundation
The Original Scheme, 1910

The first example is the King Edward VII British-German Foundation, an educational and cultural foundation established by Sir Ernest Cassel in 1911 to promote
Anglo-German exchange. The foundation's surviving records have made it possible to construct the following account of its origins and early years.¹

Cassel originated the idea of his foundation in 1910, the occasion for it being provided by the death of King Edward VII, his close friend, in May of that year. As originally conceived, an endowment was to be set up in memory of the late King with the aim of fostering better understanding between Britain and Germany. Such an honour perhaps befitted a monarch who had in earlier years taken a keen interest in educational affairs, as demonstrated by his ardent support for the Imperial College of Science and Technology. One also cannot separate the actions of Cassel, the private man, from the broader context of international politics and public diplomacy. Even though the Agadir crisis was still months away, Anglo-German relations had recently been shaken by the naval scare of 1909.

By 22 August 1910 a ten-page 'suggested scheme' had been drawn up by Sir Francis Trippel, Cassel's associate, for what was tentatively known then as the 'King Edward VII Anglo-German Fund'. In this proposal, a benefaction of £200,000 was to be used to create a fund 'from which to assist necessitous and deserving English and German men and women with gifts or loans'. The main portion of the money, however, was to go towards establishing 'The Anglo-German Memorial Institute', situated both in London and Berlin, whose purpose was to 'give reliable information and advice gratuitously' as well as to 'provide teaching at a nominal cost'. These institutes were also to provide financial assistance and create twelve annual travelling scholarships - twelve each in Britain and Germany - to enable students and promising teachers from Germany to visit Britain and their British counterparts to travel to Germany. As Trippel's scheme envisaged: 'They [the institutes] will spread correct information, will render assistance of every possible kind to numerous English and German men and women at home and abroad who are in need of it, and will thus naturally develop into powerful agencies for promoting proper understanding.
This institute was most likely the brainchild of Karl Breul, who was appointed Schröder Professor of German at Cambridge in 1910 and who was at that time the president of the Modern Language Association. For years this academic had been a keen advocate of precisely such an institute in London and Berlin. In 1900 Breul had called for the establishment of an 'Imperial Institute' in London for German students and teachers of English, and as recently as 1909 he had proposed a slightly modified scheme under the title of 'A German House in London'. Untiring and undaunted in his efforts, he was active yet again on this occasion as it is evident from a letter in the foundation's files that Breul was able to meet with Trippel and 'allowed to explain his old cherished scheme'.

Giving a sketch of the institute in London, Trippel's proposal stated: 'Germans of all classes and both sexes, upon landing in England, should not be left to chance, but should know that at once they can obtain reliable information and advice on applying at the Institute.' The institute's twin purpose was to serve Germans arriving from Germany or residing in Britain, and to assist Britons who were 'anxious to learn German' or who wished to improve their German but were 'unable to pay the ordinary fees that would be charged elsewhere'.

This document made it plain that 'special attention' should be paid to teachers and students, as well as clerks, governesses, writers and journalists. It added: 'Since misunderstandings are due to prejudice which is the result of ignorance of the language, customs, and thoughts of the other nation, a main feature of the Institute in London should be instruction in the German and English languages on inexpensive terms, so that clerks, governesses, teachers and others should have exceptional facilities for acquiring a fair knowledge of these languages.'

It was estimated that the London institute, which would ideally have been located close to the German consulate on Russell Square, would have an annual operating cost of
£4,000, a fourth of which should be devoted to assisting needy Germans in England, including subscriptions to benevolent societies. This scheme, however, stipulated that the institute as a rule should not give charity to individuals. Trippel also recommended that of the twelve annual travelling scholarships, four should be half-yearly to the value of £75 each, and the other eight should be worth £40 each and meant for travel of six or three months' duration.

At the head of the institute would be a director or managing secretary, assisted by two clerks (one British and one German) and a 'typewriter' capable of reading English and German. In Trippel's proposal, the director in London should as a rule be a German or Briton of German extraction, and the director in Berlin an Englishman.4

The Foundation Comes into Being

The foundation which was finally established in 1911 did not fundamentally diverge from the one outlined by Trippel's suggested scheme, except that its name - the 'King Edward VII British-German Foundation' - was slightly different from the one originally conceived, and moreover, that it did not include the envisaged Anglo-German Memorial Institute, though the idea of travelling scholarships did survive. Having championed his cause for over a decade, Breul still could not see his dream realized. He was, therefore, tenaciously making his case again for his institute in the May 1911 issue of the Contemporary Review.5

A gift of £200,000 was made by Cassel, who provided an additional £5,000 each for the London and Berlin sections to meet the costs incurred during the first year. Each section was also invested with a capital of £100,000. In the British section, a council of administration, chaired by Viscount Esher, was established with twelve initial members of council, who numbered among them Lord Redesdale, Baron Bruno Schröder and Felix Cassel, nephew of Sir Ernest. Esher, it should be mentioned, had formerly been Cassel's
business associate, having been involved with Cassel's dealings in Egypt and the United States between 1902 and 1904 in return for a share in his business. Also on the council were Dr. Ernest Schuster and Sir Henry Babington Smith, at one time the private secretary to the Earl of Elgin, Viceroy of India, and president of the National Bank of Turkey. Coincidentally, Schuster was later to become chairman of the Anglo-German Section of the London Chamber of Commerce, which was discussed in the previous chapter. His participation in Cassel's scheme should thus not be surprising. Trippel was appointed honorary secretary, while W.B. Peat & Co. acted as the honorary auditors for the council. A committee was also set up in Manchester to serve that city as well as Salford, Bradford, Leeds and Liverpool. This committee in the north was presided over by Sir Charles Behrens, a Manchester businessman descended from German Jews who also sat as a member of council.

The first meeting of the British section's council of administration was held on 21 March 1911 at Brook House, Cassel's residence on Park Lane, where the Trust Deed was executed by Cassel and the trustees of the foundation. On 28 April the council appointed an executive committee, which met for the first time on 8 June to deal with applications for assistance. As a rule, the council met monthly while the executive committee meetings were held weekly. Meanwhile, the foundation established offices at Denison House on Vauxhall Bridge Road.

According to the report for the first financial year, allowances were typically made for one year's duration, subject to quarterly reports. However, those already in receipt of Poor Law relief were not eligible for assistance, while able-bodied applicants were referred to the German Farm Colony. "The general application of the fund", it was stated, "has been primarily to provide for the necessities of life, and next to the payment of arrears of rent and the redemption of household effects and clothes in pawn." Moreover, while the executive committee's goal was to give aid which would produce "permanent benefit", it
also made a point of assisting applicants 'incapacitated through age or ill-health from earning a livelihood'. 'Aged governesses' who were forced to relinquish their employment were also regarded with 'special favour'.

In its first year, the British section dealt with 410 cases, of which 177 were assisted, 134 refused, fifty-four deemed ineligible, and only two referred to the German Farm Colony.10 Of those receiving aid, the occupational group with the highest representation were casual labourers, numbering thirty-two. Next came the category called 'professions', consisting of teachers, governesses and journalists, totalling twenty-one; followed by hotel employees (waiters, chefs and porters) numbering eighteen; and then by butchers and bakers numbering ten. The rest of the successful applicants ranged from barbers to engineers, watchmakers to sailors, and nurses to servants. Grants and allowances were also provided for 'special purposes'. True to the foundation's stated objectives, seventeen - the single-most highest number - of these cases were for the relief of rent arrears, while eleven were for redeeming pawned effects. In ten instances assistance was given for the purpose of starting a business and purchasing stock.11 It appears that of the 177 cases assisted, only eighty-four were awarded a one-year grant, and among these eighty-four - again, reflecting the foundation's faithfulness to stated objectives - the over-sixty age group proved to have the most favourable hearing; almost three-quarters of these eighty-four were aged between sixty and seventy-nine! In fact, only one was aged below thirty (he or she was twenty-two). Additionally, about £575 was spent on nine private charities, of which the German Society of Benevolence, with a gift of £184.2s., received the lion's share. The Society of Friends of Foreigners in Distress, along with the Seamen's Hospital Society and the German Industrial and Farm Colony, was also well supported with a contribution of £100.12

In the foundation's second financial year ending on 30 April 1913 the caseload decreased. The number of cases dealt with fell from 410 of the previous year to 314. The
number of persons assisted, however, rose - from 177 to 218. As before, the 'professions', waiters, and bakers and butchers were among the most numerous assisted groups. The number of general labourers, however, fell to just eight while the category called 'miscellaneous trades and occupations' now numbered a hefty forty-two. Unfortunately it is not possible to ascertain what these 'miscellaneous' trades were. The number of applicants receiving a one-year allowance increased to 116 in the second year, again with the sexagenarians and older constituting the overwhelming majority. The number of charities, as well as the amount of contributions given to them, also rose in the second year. The total sum given out to charities now stood at £655, with twelve organizations receiving aid and, though the German Society of Benevolence still ranked among the top five entities allocated the largest contributions, the amount it received was down to £100. Among the new recipients of the foundation's charitable contributions in the second year were the German Young Men's Christian Association and the Association of German Governesses.

Despite the escalation in expenditure, the foundation was adequately equipped to sustain the increased pressure on its resources, as the second year's report would bear out. 'In view ... of the large surplus they [the executive committee] were able to deal with their cases this year on a more liberal basis,' it was noted. Another encouraging sign for the foundation was that the 'better class of applicants', who would normally be reluctant to accept help from charities, was seen to be applying to the foundation in greater numbers.

During the foundation's second year the organization of the Manchester committee was finally completed and it too began accepting cases. In that year the committee received fourteen applications, refusing three and granting assistance to eleven of them. Of these eleven, ten were awarded a one-year allowance. Students of demographics might note that the youngest one of these ten was sixty-eight years old; six of them came from Manchester alone.

The second important development of the year was the first annual joint conference
of the foundation's British and German sections, convened on 24 September 1912 at Brook House. Among the members of the German section's council of administration present were Count von Posadowsky-Wehner, Albert Ballin and Max Warburg. The question of surplus funds assumed a central place on the conference's agenda. It was proposed that the surplus funds from both sections of the foundation be used to effect an exchange of students and professors between Britain and Germany. But at the conference doubts were expressed as to the efficacy of professorial exchanges; the idea of allowing British students to pursue studies in Germany and of enabling German students to study in Britain, nevertheless, was favourably received.16 Thus a resolution was carried unanimously stating:

That a certain proportion of the surplus funds of the German Section be employed in enabling British subjects to attend or visit Universities, schools, institutes or business establishments in Germany, or to reside in Germany, and that a certain proportion of the surplus funds of the British Section be employed in enabling Germans to attend or visit Universities, schools, institutes or business establishments in the United Kingdom, or to reside in the United Kingdom.17

Hence, the third important development of the year. This studentship scheme, which went into effect in spring 1913, has indeed remained until today. The British section of the foundation expressed hope that these new studentships would provide British students with 'an insight into the customs and character of the German people' and help them facilitate 'lasting friendships with their German cousins'. This idea of racial kinship, as we will see, constituted a remarkable and constant feature in Anglo-German individual relationships before the war.

The amount allocated by the British section for the studentships was £800, and in
1913-14, their first year in operation, only about half that amount was expended. During the year ending on 30 April 1914, the British section awarded five such studentships (for German students coming to Britain) while the German section offered seven (for British students going to Germany). Of the five German studentship recipients, one remained in England for only four months to undertake the study of English dialects. The other four, all carrying the title of 'Doctor', were engaged mainly in economic studies, even if of an esoteric nature. One of them, for instance, was a Helmuth Poensgen from Düsseldorf whose special subject was 'The meat supply of European countries'. As for the seven British studentship holders, four had studied at Oxbridge, two at Edinburgh, and one at Imperial College, London. This last was in fact able to extend his stay in Germany thanks to a supplementary grant from the foundation, and went on to obtain the degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the University of Berlin.

As might be expected, the foundation's business saw a steady increase in 1913-14. Three hundred and fifty-four applications were received in that year, of which 248 were accepted. The Manchester committee also experienced an increase in workload, assisting seventeen of the eighteen cases it dealt with. This third year, however, witnessed an appreciable drop in the amount of contributions given to charitable societies, down from £655 the previous year to £220. Also significant is that only four charities were so benefited in 1913-14. The German Society of Benevolence, until then a favoured honoree, now received only £35 in aid.

The Outbreak of War in 1914

The foundation's fourth year was rudely interrupted by the outbreak of the First World War. Eight British students were selected for studentships in 1914-15; with the exception of one student, none of them had yet begun their studies in Germany when war broke out. The lone exceptional case was already in Germany in August 1914 but
managed to return safely to England, 'leaving his luggage behind'. At the outbreak of war the executive committee decided to refund these students any expenses already incurred. They were also informed that the studentships would be reserved for them until the conclusion of hostilities. Little could these men, in reaching this decision on 5 August, have foreseen how long the war was going to last or how many lives were going to be lost. Much as the foundation sought to conduct business as usual after the outbreak of war, it is apparent from the executive committee's meeting minutes that its task was becoming ever more difficult. As early as 5 August, the committee already had to deal with some of the most salient and prickly legal issues surrounding dealing with the enemy in time of war, questions complicated further by the fact that as an Anglo-German establishment, the foundation indeed had become half 'enemy'. The foundation's honorary solicitor, Bernard Barrington, was requested to ascertain from the Board of Trade the status of persons already receiving assistance, as well as the status of future applicants. Evidently with a view to a potential immigration problem, Barrington was also instructed to enquire about the status of E. von Gaisberg, the foundation's secretary who was presumably a German national.

Unmistakably the war, along with the atmosphere of suspicion which it engendered, was to encroach upon the normal running of the foundation. At its meeting of 12 August, the executive committee decided that no new cases were to be accepted until the end of the war. It was also decided, by a unanimous resolution, that payments to current recipients of aid would thenceforth be made only upon evidence that these persons were registered with the police. The problem of helping Germans stranded in Britain was cast aside by the committee as 'a matter for systematic treatment by the Government and police [rather] than for the sporadic efforts of private charity'. Requests for assistance from Breul and Christ's College, Cambridge, thus went unheeded.

An unusual occurrence at the executive committee's meeting of 26 August was the
presence of Sir Ernest himself. It appears that Cassel may have been displeased with the direction in which the foundation was moving. At this meeting, he called for a revocation of the committee's decision of 12 August. He further raised the question of employing the foundation's capital to provide relief to destitute Germans, insisting that he would be prepared to replace the capital expended. This forthrightness was apparently sufficient to silence the opposition from Geoffrey Drage, the committee chairman, and thus the shunting away of Germans in need of relief was reversed. But as the minute books suggest, this reaffirmation of the foundation's principles by the founder himself might have been inspired by a growing apprehension about the foundation's future - and also about the future of Germans in Britain. Cassel seemed to think that 'after the war there was likely to be less scope for the work of the Foundation. In his judgment feelings would be so embittered that the German population in the United Kingdom would be appreciably diminished'.

Cassel's victory on 26 August was indeed shortlived. On that day, it was revealed that the Home Office was drawing up plans for the treatment of aliens in distress, and had established a committee under Frederick Huth Jackson which would deal with cases requiring charity. Under the Home Office scheme, Germans needing assistance would be referred to the foundation. On 2 September confirmation was received of the foundation's thenceforth cooperation with Jackson's committee. In the meeting of that day, the executive committee was informed that Cassel's proposal to draw on the foundation's capital to relieve Germans had to be dropped. As the minutes record: 'The Secretary reported on behalf of Sir Ernest Cassel that the difficulty in obtaining authority for drawing on the capital of the Foundation was so great that in Sir Ernest's opinion it would not be worth while to follow the matter up. It was therefore decided to take no further action.'

Nonetheless, the work of the foundation was carried on albeit in a diminished and constrained role, and with the express blessing of the Home Office. As a letter of 30 October 1914 from Edward Troup, the Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office,
declared: 'I am directed by the Secretary of State to say that he trusts that the Foundation
will continue its work in connection with the alleviation of distress among aliens as long as
there is any scope for its beneficent services'.

Cassel was to continue playing a role in government throughout the war years,
being a member of the Anglo-French delegation to the United States in 1915 which secured
an American loan. During the war also, he donated at least £400,000 for medical services
and the relief of servicemen's families. Supplementing the work of the foundation, he
further established the Sir Ernest Cassel Educational Trust in 1919 with a gift of £500,000.
Some of the funds of this trust were later used to develop the London School of Economics
and Political Science into the Economics Faculty of the University of London.

The Imperial College of Science and Technology

The King Edward VII Foundation was not the only educational establishment with
which Cassel was involved. In 1907 he donated £10,000 towards the founding of the
Imperial College of Science and Technology, also known as the 'London Charlottenburg'.
One may recall that this project also received support from King Edward VII. It is to this
college that we now turn our attention.

Peter Alter, in The Reluctant Patron, along with Eric Ashby and Mary Anderson's
Portrait of Haldane at Work on Education, has already dealt at length with the
establishment of Imperial College. E.P. Hennock has also examined the extent to which
the German Technische Hochschule was adopted as a model for emulation and imitation in
British higher education. The aim here is not so much to present new knowledge or
source material as to highlight the German connection in the founding of Imperial.
The Role of Richard Haldane

As its epithet may suggest, Imperial was broadly modelled upon the renowned Königlich Technische Hochschule zu Berlin in Charlottenburg, otherwise known as just the Technische Hochschule of Charlottenburg, founded in 1879 and one of several polytechnics in Germany created specifically for higher education in technology.

Imperial College represents just one example of a broader social movement in Britain at the turn of the century which sought to improve the performance of government, the army's war-fighting ability, the national physique and other areas of life, by adopting German methods as the model for emulation. This 'national efficiency' movement was based on an ideology which attempted to 'discredit the habits, beliefs and institutions that put the British at a handicap in their competition with foreigners and to commend instead a social organization that more closely followed the German model'.

The early life of Richard Burdon (later Viscount) Haldane will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7 below. For now this thesis will confine its discussion to his activities in bringing about the founding of Imperial. Haldane himself was a keen advocate of 'national efficiency'. An observer at the time credited him with inventing the word 'efficiency', so widely known was Haldane as its 'recognized exponent'. His efforts with respect to the founding of Imperial, therefore, must be properly understood within the context of the National Efficiency movement. In the first decade of this century, 'efficiency' certainly was the catchword of the day, cited as the 'the most prosperous word in the language' and representing the 'political gospel' of a new doctrine.

Though Haldane was instrumental in Imperial's founding, its genesis was more rightfully provided by Sidney Webb (later Lord Passfield), co-founder of the Fabian Society and founder of the London School of Economics and Political Science, which was opened in 1895. In 1900 the University of London was formally reconstituted by statute as a result of an Act of Parliament, the University of London Act of 1898, making it not just an
institution which administered examinations and conferred degrees, such as its function had been since its foundation in 1837, but also one which provided teaching and conducted research based on a loose federation of autonomous colleges in London, governed by the reconstituted central body known as the Senate. As chairman of the Technical Education Board of the London County Council (LCC), Sidney Webb had provided an active voice in the reorganization of the university and subsequently also sat on the newly founded Senate. In this venture, he collaborated closely with Haldane, who recounts: 'Sidney Webb and I took counsel together. He was a very practical as well as a very energetic man. We laid siege to the citadel.'

In 1901 Webb began agitating for the creation of a college for applied sciences in London. In June he anonymously authored two articles in The Times putting forward his case. Entitled 'The Organization of University Education in the Metropolis', the first article appearing on 4 June declared: 'The distinctive note of the University is evidently destined to be that of applied science'. It then spelled out the various fields of science and technology in Britain which had fallen to neglect, as well as the dire dearth of institutions in London providing instruction and training in these subjects. As Webb argued: 'the most serious deficiency in the London faculty of science is not the inadequacy of the instruction for the science degree, but the lack of anything like adequate provision for chemical, physical, and biological technology, or the application of science to industrial processes'. He therefore appealed to 'those who are interested in the great mining enterprises of South and West Africa, America, and Australasia' to consider 'whether the time has not come for the establishment of a distinct school of metallurgy and mining, with special reference, not to coal and iron and the conditions of Great Britain, but to the products and needs of other climes'.

Four days later, the second part of the article appeared in The Times, discussing the deficiencies among London's various faculties and making recommendations for
improvement. Declaring that 'the provision now existing for engineering instruction can only be described ... as trivial', Webb proposed ways to expand and strengthen the engineering faculty in London, including increasing staff, enlarging existing centres, and creating new centres of instruction.38

This campaign was followed up in September of that year with an article in the Nineteenth Century and After advocating the promotion of National Efficiency.39 Invoking such terms as a "National Minimum" standard of life, Webb issued a call to arms for 'National Efficiency in education' as well. 'Nothing would be more widely popular at the present time, certainly nothing is more calculated to promote National Efficiency,' he urged, 'than a large policy of Government aid to the highest technical colleges and the universities.'40 This article elicited the warmest praise and encouragement from Haldane, who wrote: 'We are delighted with the "Escape from Houndsditch"[.] ... That is your speech for the new movement & it is a very important one.' Haldane added that 'no one can say that your line is stale or that it is not suggestive'. Characterizing her husband Sidney's article as 'a brilliant success', Beatrice Webb's diary entry of 1 October confirmed: 'The Asquith, Haldane, [and] Grey lot are delighted with it: Rosebery evidently pleased.'41

Affirming his collaboration with Webb in this campaign, Haldane later wrote: 'I worked at it, as I had worked at the University of London question, with my friend Mr. Sidney Webb.'42 Haldane made his first visit to the Technische Hochschule of Charlottenburg in April 1901, calling it 'by far the most perfect University I have ever seen'.43 As he recalls in his autobiography:

after studying the organization of Charlottenburg on the spot with the aid of my friend, Geheimrat Witt, the Professor of Chemistry there and Head of the School, I set to work in London ... to found the new Imperial College of Science and Technology ... The new College was to be fashioned so as
By September 1901, as he confided to Beatrice Webb, he too was preparing an article comparing British and German methods of higher education, based on his findings in Berlin. This paper, presented in Liverpool on 22 October, upheld the excellence of German technical education and the model of the 'alternative University', the Technische Hochschule. Observing that 'architecture, civil engineering, marine engineering, mechanical engineering, chemistry and general technical science are ... taught [in Germany] on a scale which has no parallel in this country,' he argued: 'I do not think that anyone can appreciate the form and fulness of university life there without having this relationship [between science and industry] before his eyes'.

Incidentally, Haldane was also active in the campaign in progress at that time to grant university status to University College, Liverpool. His Liverpool address of 22 October was conceived not merely as aiming for the establishment of an institute for science and technology in London, but as part of a broader and bigger fight for national higher education reform. As Haldane asserted, 'we want to make this item of "Efficiency in Tertiary Education" a link in our Chain of proposals'. Hence, his speech, along with the idea of a London Charlottenburg, was viewed as basically a first step in a long 'chain of proposals'.

The crusade for a London Charlottenburg was indeed to gather momentum. The next burst of propaganda came from Webb who, 'in the hope of catching a millionaire', began preparing yet another article in April 1902 for the Nineteenth Century; this essay appeared in the June 1902 number of the periodical. Laying down a policy of developing postgraduate work, specialist teaching and original research, Webb forecast that the faculties of science and engineering in the recently reconstituted university were 'clearly
What London University wants ... is, ... a British 'Charlottenburg' - an extensive and fully equipped institute of technology, with special departments for such branches as mining and metallurgy, naval architecture and marine engineering, ... electro-chemistry, optics, the various branches of chemical technology, and all possible applications of biology. Such an institution, which could be begun on any scale on the land lying vacant at South Kensington, should admit only graduate students, or others adequately qualified, and should lay itself out from the first to be a place of research in which there would be no teaching, in the ordinary sense, but only opportunities for learning ...50

It appears obvious from Webb's essay that the idea of establishing a Charlottenburg on the vacant land in South Kensington had already been germinated and pondered over. At that time, instruction in engineering and the applied sciences at London University was available primarily at University College and King's College. A third option was represented by the Central Technical College of the City and Guilds of London Institute. All three suffered from 'lack of space, lack of staff, and lack of funds'.51 Indeed, none of them were anything near the size of a typical German Technische Hochschule. In South Kensington, however, there was already in place a concentration of technical colleges which could form the hub of something potentially bigger. Located there were the Royal College of Science and the Royal School of Mines, both under the Board of Education as well as the above-mentioned Central Technical College of the City and Guilds of London Institute.52 As early as December 1902 enquiries were already being made within official circles to reorganize the School of Mines and to affiliate the Royal College of Science with
South Kensington may have appeared to be a favourable site for a great institute for applied sciences as the existing colleges there could be amalgamated and land was also available nearby - provided it could be obtained from the Royal Commissioners of the Exhibition of 1851 who held title to it - to facilitate the construction of new buildings and facilities for an enlarged institution. But, as has been pointed out: 'To turn the idea into reality required money, government consent to surrender its colleges in South Kensington, co-operation from the City and Guilds, agreement on the part of the 1851 Exhibition commissioners to release land, and negotiations with the University of London so that any London Charlottenburg would not be separate from the University'.

Thus, a series of obstacles had to be overcome before the 'Charlottenburg scheme' could be realized. There is certainly evidence suggesting that Haldane seized the initiative in direct action rather than engage in academic pontification in the manner of Webb. On 9 May 1902, Haldane met with the merchant and finance firm of Wemher, Beit and Co. in an attempt - which proved successful - to secure a pledge of financial support for 'our big scheme'. In January 1903, he was arranging for Sidney Webb to draft a letter for Lord Rosebery, the first Chancellor of the reorganized University of London, who would then present it to the LCC with the aim of proposing the 'Charlottenburg scheme'. The importance of securing the LCC's support for the project lay in the fact that it was the authority responsible for technical education in London.

Rosebery's letter was ready for public consumption on 27 June 1903. It was addressed to Lord Monkswell, the chairman of the LCC, and was also printed in The Times on 29 June. Making the first public reference to the 'Charlottenburg scheme', Rosebery alluded to the 'special attention' paid in other countries to the 'highest technical training'. He suggested:
Perhaps the most perfect instance of such provision is the great College of Applied Science at Charlottenburg, alongside of the University of Berlin, erected at an outlay exceeding £500,000, and costing £55,000 a year. From its portals there issue every year some 1,200 young men of 22 or 23 years of age, equipped with the most perfect training that science can give ...

Rosebery deplored that 'our London young men often find the highest places filled by the better educated Germans', and that it was 'little short of a scandal' that these students were compelled to acquire technical training in Germany or the United States. He thus called for London to be made the centre of scientific training for the whole British Empire.7

According to Rosebery's blueprint, the envisaged institution would constitute 'a distinct "School" of the University of London, though under the management of its own committee. The intricate details of what transpired between 1903 and the eventual founding of Imperial College in 1907 need not detain us here. Briefly put, the Board of Education promptly followed up on the publication of Rosebery's letter. The commissioners of the 1851 Exhibition also proved willing to relinquish the four acres or so of land at South Kensington, as requested by Rosebery. King Edward VII appears to have played a significant part in these negotiations for, according to Haldane, he 'was very helpful and was instrumental in procuring for us the grant of the requisite land from the Exhibition Commissioners'.58 During this campaign to acquire the land at the South Kensington site, Haldane forged 'what became a confidential and intimate relationship' with the monarch. 'I began to see the King very frequently,' Haldane recalls, 'and he took a good deal of interest in the plan, which gave effect to an earlier idea of Prince Albert.'59 Rosebery also appears to have made a direct approach to the King concerning acquisition of the land at South Kensington. As President of the Royal Commission of the 1851 Exhibition, Edward VII was certainly in a position to help
and exercise influence from above. As Sir Francis Knollys, the King's private secretary, remarked to Rosebery in a letter of 19 July 1902: 'The King is still nominally President of the '51 Com[mission], and will remain so until next November when he will be succeeded by the Prince of Wales. If therefore you will send me the proposal to which you refer I will submit it to H.M.'60 In view of the king's position, it is hardly surprising, then, that the commissioners were eventually persuaded to relinquish the land.

The machinery, however, ground away slowly, leading Haldane to complain to Rosebery in December 1904 that 'I still think the Education question wants settling. It is a stumbling block. ... Felix Schuster, Asquith and I had a talk about it last Friday.'61 It was not until March 1905 that the Board of Education gave its consent to the incorporation of the Royal School of Mines and the Royal College of Science to constitute the new Imperial College - a decision confirmed officially on 3 April 1905. The City and Guilds Council also showed itself amenable to allowing its college to become part of the scheme. In June 1905 the Treasury agreed to provide an annual grant of £17,000 to the new institution; in November the amount was raised to £20,000. Finally, the royal charter for the Imperial College of Science and Technology passed the Great Seal on 8 July 1907.62 When the college's foundation stone was finally laid in July 1909, Haldane boastfully referred to the occasion as marking 'the birth of another child of mine.'63

It should be noted that even after 1902, Haldane's role in the project had not diminished. He was appointed a member of the Departmental Committee on the Royal College of Science, formed by the Board of Education in April 1904. Officially this committee's task was to look into the operation of the Royal College of Science to consider how it could be employed 'to the fullest extent for the promotion of higher scientific studies in connection with the work of existing or projected institutions for instruction of the same character in the Metropolis or elsewhere'.64 In the course of its proceedings, however, the committee overstepped its mandate and as early as February 1905, when
issuing its preliminary report, recommended that the 'proposed College of Applied Science' be a federation of the three existing colleges in South Kensington.65

Haldane succeeded to the chair of the committee in early 1905, thanks to the resignation of Sir Francis Mowatt, brought down by illness. Hence, from the committee's second and third year onwards Haldane was in a prime position to influence proceedings, including and especially the committee's final recommendations and findings, issued in its report of February 1906, which were later embodied in the college's charter.

But important as Haldane's role was in bringing about the London Charlottenburg, it should not be overstated. No doubt his energy and personal and political skills, not to mention his admiration for the German model, made it all possible. First, one must bear in mind that embracing the German model as a paradigm of excellence already had precedents in the nineteenth century, symbolized, for instance, by Matthew Arnold, the educationist and Germanophile. In his *Higher Schools and Universities in Germany*, he had written glowingly of German education when arguing: 'It is in science that we have most need to borrow from the German universities. The French university has no liberty, and the English universities have no science; the German universities have both.'66 Secondly, Haldane was not the first or the only voice in this movement. In fact he had contemporaries who had for years spoken publicly in favour of reforming British education along the lines of the German model. One of them was Michael Ernest Sadler, Vice-Chancellor of Leeds University from 1911 to 1923, who was, however, unable to translate his words into action. Thirdly, one should not ignore the part played by others in the founding of Imperial. Robert Morant and Francis Mowatt, Permanent Secretaries respectively of the Board of Education and the Treasury, were important in helping to drive the scheme forward within their agencies. Mowatt in particular was critical in ensuring financial support from the Treasury. Morant, who proved to be a faithful supporter, both professionally and personally, shared Haldane's enthusiasm for higher education reform as
well as his disaffection with the apathy of the bureaucratic establishment. As Morant wrote to Haldane, heaping praise on his book *Education and Empire:* 'I am exceedingly glad to read your bold stirring of the dry bones - may it indeed make many of them live. You have said what needs saying over & over again, & you have said it pointedly ...'

Criticizing the 'smallness of vision' prevailing at Whitehall, Morant very unequivocally urged Haldane on. As he implored: 'I hope you may imbue many in authority with the realization of what England needs.'67 That Morant shared a commitment to reforming British higher education based on the German model should not be surprising considering that he was himself a Germanophile. In the 1890s, avowedly 'ashamed at my helplessness' with the German language, he had been determined to undertake an extended period of absence to travel to Germany and 'soak in German'.68 Evidently, Morant too had a high regard for German culture.

Some credit is also due to Rosebery, the 'catalyst' whose participation enabled the project to move 'beyond the stage of informal discussions'.69 Being a former Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister, Rosebery commanded even greater political clout than Haldane. When Wernher, Beit, in promising financial support to the scheme, asked for a body of trustees to be appointed, Haldane acknowledged: 'If I can get Rosebery ... to serve on it I think we may get a million' - an implicit recognition of Rosebery's influence. Consequently, Haldane was confident that Wernher, Beit 'will give much more than £100,000 really'.70 Though an 'enigma', Rosebery was known for his 'wit and original thought' and his ability to 'make all the world listen'. Moreover, he was 'a born actor' that was 'first-rate at appearances'71 - qualities of immeasurable value in any endeavour to win financial support.

As originally conceived, Imperial was to be London's 'Charlottenburg', and the relevance of the German model was widely appreciated at the time of the college's founding. Journals such as the *University Review* and *Nature* referred to the new
institution as the 'Charlottenburg of London'. As a 2 July 1903 article in *Nature* declared, 'with the magnificent institutes in Germany to adapt from, there is really no reason why it [the new college] should not be a grand success'. Nonetheless, the German model was emulated and in certain respects imitated but only in a form adapted to British conditions. The limits to the relevance of the German model in fact were recognized by Haldane, who was not keen on keeping the Technische Hochschulen and universities separate, as they were in Germany. As he noted: 'my investigations in Germany had at an early stage impressed me unfavourably with the separation which had been made there between the Universities and the great Technical Colleges'. Rather, Haldane believed in what Hennock calls the 'university ideal' of incorporating technical studies into the core of university education and avoiding overspecialization. In its final report of 1906 Haldane's committee stated: 'There are certain elements in the German system which cannot, however admirable in themselves, be reproduced in this country'.

**Financial Support from Germans**

With regard to financing, the German element is even more conspicuous. In his *Times* article of 4 June 1901, Webb made a reference to the 'great mining enterprises of South and West Africa' when firing his opening volley in his campaign for a London Charlottenburg. It is only proper that the bulk of the financial support for the scheme eventually did come from the great South African mining sector - a sector dominated by interests of German origin.

In his letter of 27 June 1903 to Monkswell, Rosebery estimated the cost of constructing the new technical institution to be at about £300,000. When completed, he predicted, the institution along with the site would be worth £500,000. In addition, he mentioned the sum of £20,000, being the institution's estimated annual cost of maintenance. 'For this sum', Rosebery wrote, 'I venture to approach the London County Council'. His
approach soon proved successful, for the LCC in the following month consented to providing the grant of £20,000 per annum. Rosebery's letter also acknowledged: 'An offer has been made by Messrs. Wemher, Beit & Co. to place a large sum of money in the hands of trustees to be applied as a contribution towards the cost of building and equipment, and further offers of the same kind have been made by other public-spirited London citizens.' Thus, the bulk of the financing had already been secured from private hands.

The Wemher, Beit offer, to the value of £100,000, was obtained evidently as early as a year prior to Rosebery's letter. As mentioned above, Haldane met with Wemher, Beit & Co. on 9 May 1902 - a visit which he recounted to Sidney Webb in a letter of the same day. Haldane wrote:

I saw the four London partners of W.B. & Co. this afternoon & had an hour with them. It was just in time. There had been no talk of a million - but they were pondering giving £100,000 to U. Coll. This I have stopped. They will give £10,000 only. But I have undertaken to prepare a scheme for a Committee or body of Trustees to begin our big scheme. They will give us £100,000 to start it, & help us to get more. The partners are keen to do something [all emphases in the original].

The body of trustees which Haldane mentioned here was in fact formed. As Haldane wished, Rosebery and the Conservative leader, Arthur Balfour, were recruited into this committee. It included Julius Wemher, the Duke of Devonshire, Haldane, the Vice-Chancellor and the Principal of the University of London, along with representatives of the LCC. 'At the request of the first donors [Wemher, Beit & Co.] I have agreed to act as chairman of a body of trustees to carry out the scheme to completion,' affirmed Rosebery.
It would be difficult to deny that it was Wernher, Beit's initial pledge of £100,000 which got the scheme under way in 1902. According to Rupert Hall, the new Imperial College had 'capital resources or endowment' totalling £281,000, not including the buildings and land. However, he fails to furnish a precise breakdown of the donors. While Hall lists £15,000 as coming from the Bessemer Memorial Fund which was established in 1903 (coincidentally at about the same time as Rosebery's letter to Monkswell), the sum of £22,000 is only identified as being given by 'private donors'. A fuller picture may be obtained from the annual reports of Imperial's governing body. Besides Wernher, Beit's £100,000 and the LCC's grant of £20,000 per annum, Imperial also received an annual grant of £20,000 from the government. Funding from private sources, however, was to play an important role during the college's early years. On the death of Alfred Beit, one of Wernher's partners, in 1906, £135,000 was bequeathed to Imperial as stipulated in his will. In its first year, Imperial received £50,000 of Beit's bequest as well as 5,000 preference shares in the De Beers Mining Company. A donation of £10,000 each came from Ernest Cassel and Maximilian Michaelis. Meanwhile, Haldane gave £1,000. During the period up to 1914, significant contributions were also received from other private sources, in particular the Worshipful Company of Goldsmiths. Nonetheless, the Wernher-Beit connection remained the most dominant. As Imperial's governing body acknowledged in 1912: 'The expenditure on these extensions of buildings with other works is expected to exceed a quarter of a million pounds sterling, and has been rendered possible by the beneficent generosity of private individuals and companies. Mention should be made especially of the firm of Messrs. Wernher, Beit & Co. ... and the late Alfred Beit, Esq.' Upon his death in 1912, Julius Wernher bequeathed to Imperial £100,000 along with a portion of his residuary estate, bringing the total of his legacy to approximately £150,000. This benefaction was given in two instalments, the second of which was received by Imperial in May 1914. Alfred Beit's younger brother, Otto, also created an endowment
worth £10,000 to be used for fellowships tenable at Imperial. These became known as the Beit Scientific Research Fellowships.8 3

Haldane's Autobiography provides a glimpse of the broader network to which the Wernher connection led. As Haldane relates,

I had called on Mr. Wernher, of the great firm of Wernher, Beit & Co., whom and his partners I did not know excepting as public-spirited men of German origin and as impressed with the necessity for this country of German scientific training. I found him and Alfred Beit and the other members of his firm at their office. They were highly appreciative, and at once offered £100,000 for the scheme. To this they added later on other very large sums. I lunched at Beit's house in Park Lane to meet Cecil Rhodes, who had heard of the scheme for the reconstruction of London University into an intellectual centre for the students of the Empire. He and I went down to Tring Park to spend a week-end with Rothschild. I had much talk with Rhodes, who assisted in getting his South African friends to help further. He impressed me, not as an idealist of the kind to which I had been accustomed to look up most, but as a splendidly energetic man of affairs, with a wide outlook and great capacity for getting things through. Sir Ernest Cassel, a man of the same type, in his turn gave a large contribution, and so did the Rothschilds.8 4

Long as the quoted passage may seem, it is useful in the names it mentions of Imperial's first sources of financial support. With the exception of Rhodes, all the names mentioned were either German or had a German connection. It has not been possible, however, to ascertain the amount of financial assistance provided by Rothschild to Imperial.
But what remains indisputable is that Rhodes, though an Englishman, had close business ties with Alfred Beit, Julius Wernher and Rothschild on account of his diamond- and gold-mining enterprises in southern Africa. One should now briefly examine this diamond-based network which linked Rhodes with Wernher, education with business, and Britain with Germany.

Wernher, Beit & Co.

The origins of Wernher, Beit & Co. can be traced to France and South Africa. After serving briefly in the Franco-Prussian War Julius Carl Wernher, born in Darmstadt in 1850, was hired by the French diamond merchant, Jules Porges, founder of the merchant house of Jules Porges et Cie. Wernher was assigned as an assistant to Charles Mège, Porges's partner, to purchase diamonds at the newly discovered Kimberley diamond fields. He and Mège arrived in the Cape Colony in early 1871 and when the latter returned to Paris in 1873, Wernher stayed behind as Porges's representative on the 'Fields'. As the Dictionary of Business Biography claims: 'Under Wernher's direction Porges et Cie became one of the largest shippers of diamonds in the colony.' In the mid-1870s, the diamond business in South Africa took off. Porges in 1876 purchased £90,000 worth of claims which were placed in a private company called the Griqualand Diamond Mining Co., which was amalgamated in 1880 with other interests to form the Compagnie Française des Diamants du Cap de Bonne Espérance with a capital of FF14 million. Otherwise known in Kimberley as the 'French Company,' this new entity was the first diamond-mining company to be offered to European investors. In 1880 also Wernher returned to England to take up his position as senior partner in Porges et Cie's London office. He was to be naturalized in 1898 and granted a knighthood in 1905. Thanks to Wernher's departure from South Africa, Alfred Beit thenceforth became the firm's new local representative on the mining fields.
Beit, like Wernher a German, was born in Hamburg in 1853. He too entered the diamond business in 1871, when he went to Amsterdam to learn the diamond trade. In 1875 Beit moved to Kimberley as a clerk to Max Gammius, the local representative of the Hamburg merchant company of David Lippert & Co. Establishing himself in the diamond fields, Beit soon became an independent local diamond merchant and speculated as well in diamond shares and claims. Beginning in 1883 he represented Jules Porges in Kimberley, taking up to one-third the share of the profits from the diamonds shipped to London for the company. The latter part of 1886 witnessed a speculative boom in diamond and gold shares, resulting in a tremendous boost to Beit's capital and establishing him as one of the top Kimberley share dealers. By 1887, his capital in his new position at Porges et Cie had risen to £100,000 from just £35,000 in 1884. Subsequent to the discovery of gold in the Transvaal in 1886, Beit and Wernher bought claims and farms on the Witwatersrand with the help of Porges's capital and his access to European funds, resulting in the floating of numerous London-based mining companies. When Porges retired in 1889, the firm was reconstituted as the London private partnership of Wernher, Beit & Co. with a capital of £1 million in cash, diamonds and other investments, and up to £2.5 million in shares and speculative ventures of other kinds. By the 1890s Wernher, Beit, becoming the most successful mining-finance group in South Africa, accounted for almost 40 per cent of South Africa's total annual gold production. Through interlocking directorships, local agents and a public holding company known as Rand Mines Ltd., the firm owned some of the richest gold mines in the Rand.87

Cecil Rhodes's initial connection with Wernher, Beit was made through Beit, whom he met in 1879 while Beit was still with David Lippert & Co. At that time, Lippert was second only to the giant merchant house of Mosenthal & Bros., both concerns constituting the dominant German presence in southern Africa prior to the opening up of the Kimberley diamond fields and the arrival of Porges.88 Rhodes too arrived in South Africa just before
the start of the boom, landing in Durban in October 1870. With the discovery of diamonds in the Orange Free State in the areas of Colesberg Kopje and Du Toit’s Pan - better known respectively as Kimberley mine and De Beers mine - Cecil Rhodes and his brother, Herbert, headed for the diamond fields in 1871. Cecil, however, interrupted this enterprise in 1873 when he returned to England to study at Oxford but went back to Kimberley late in the year. Beginning his association with Charles Rudd in 1874, Rhodes gradually accumulated his claims, concentrating his holdings in De Beers mine, one of the two great mines of Kimberley. In 1880 Rhodes and Rudd combined their holdings into a new company, the De Beers Mining Company, formed on 1 April with a capital of £200,000.

Meanwhile, Rhodes faced a rival in the shape of Barnett Isaacs, later known as Barney Barnato, who formed the Barnato Mining Company in 1880 concentrating in Kimberley mine. But as the prices of diamonds fluctuated constantly and as Rhodes's De Beers Mining Company was not on a secure financial footing, the pressure increased to fortify the company's position by amalgamating with Barnato who, though a rival, was a bigger concern and thus enjoyed a stronger financial position. The amalgamation of these two companies, effectively consolidating all the mines in Kimberley, resulted in the formation of De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. in 1888. The Wernher-Beit connection proved crucial as the deal was made possible with the aid of Wernher and Porges, who secured backing from the London merchant bankers, N.M. Rothschild & Sons.99

The importance to Rhodes of Beit’s access to the European capital markets should not be overlooked. It was largely thanks to Beit that the Rothschilds of London and of Germany, Austria and France were brought into South African mining finance. In A Pioneer Looks Back, J.B. Taylor, one of Beit’s associates, recounts: ‘There was not enough speculative capital in London for anything big. Alfred Beit saw from the start the magnitude of the financial support required by the Rand, and provided for it by obtaining Continental support.’ Underscoring Rhodes’s appreciation of Beit’s influence, Taylor adds:
It was never out of Rhodes's mind that it was Beit's money, and the money interests that Beit could 'influence', that were the chief props of the diamond industry. He realized that Beit's following among the German, Austrian and French bankers was very strong, and that through these sources almost unlimited capital was at Beit's command.90

Beit's personal and business links with Rhodes were not to end there. Expanding into north of the Transvaal, Rhodes in 1889 was granted the charter for his British South Africa Company, supported with £500,000 from Beit, who in turn sat on its board. In 1895 Beit played a role as well in the abortive Jameson Raid, arguably an instance of Anglo-German business collaboration which failed miserably.

The Rhodes Scholarships

Having explored Rhodes's links with Julius Wemher and Alfred Beit, one can see the Wemher-Beit connection entering the equation again in the Rhodes Scholarships, which came into operation in 1903. But while Imperial College represented Wemher, Beit's direct link to education, the firm's tie with the Rhodes Scholarships existed only through an indirect channel. Nonetheless, Rhodes's scholarship scheme had an added German element in its provision for German scholarships.

Rhodes and Oxford

Before amassing his wealth in the diamond business in Africa, Rhodes had obtained his education at Oxford. At age twenty, Rhodes returned from Kimberley in 1873 to attend Oxford, applying for admission to University College, which rejected him on account of his failing the entrance examination in Latin prose and perhaps also because he lacked a public school education, the real reason still remaining a matter for speculation. He was
consequently referred to the 'less particular' Oriel College, where he matriculated on 13 October 1873. Upon completing his first term, however, he returned to Africa late in that year, a move possibly prompted by the death of his mother in November. Rhodes resumed his studies at Oxford only in April 1876 and, in effect a full-time entrepreneur embroiled in his own business affairs, he was not able to take his degree until 1881.

It has been suggested that Rhodes chose to go to Oxford to 'make contact with the cream of the English ruling class' and to lay the foundation for a 'plan of life'.91 Being older than most of his peers, he certainly was not the typical Oxford undergraduate. Rhodes's Oxford years are known to have been marked by a 'lack of distinction or even of any apparent intellectual purpose', as Carleton Kemp Allen, at one time the Warden of Rhodes House, has put it.92 The Rev. Arthur Gray Butler, Dean of Oriel from 1875 to 1895, remarked about Rhodes's career at Oxford as being 'uneventful'. 'He belonged to a set of men like himself, not caring for distinction in the schools and not working for them, but of refined tastes, dining and living for the most part together', observed Butler.93

Described by his Oxford contemporaries as 'lackadaisical', 'natural and unaffected', 'reserved' and having an 'unconventional attitude towards things in general',94 Rhodes probably did not strike them as one who would attain such prominence in history as he was destined to.

Rhodes died on 26 March 1902 in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope and, as stipulated in his will, was buried in the Matoppos in Rhodesia on a hill commanding what he called the 'View of the World'. Beginning in 1877, when he had his first serious heart attack, he drew up a series of wills, the seventh, and final, one of which was made in 1899. This last, in addition to bequeathing £100,000 to Oriel College, laid down provisions for his scholarship scheme. As stated in the will, he considered that 'the education of young Colonists at one of the Universities in the United Kingdom is of great advantage to them for giving breadth to their views for their instruction in life and manners and for instilling
into their minds the advantage to the Colonies as well as to the United Kingdom of the retention of the unity of the Empire'. Hence, this was conceived as an imperial project to bring together the mother country and her colonies. Attaching 'very great importance' to a university with a residential system, Rhodes cited Edinburgh as a university at which he would have desired to establish his scholarships, but he deemed it unsuitable 'owing to its not having such a residential system'. Therefore Oxford, having such a system, was chosen instead. Although intended primarily for the British Empire, the scheme also set aside scholarships for the United States, the object being 'to encourage and foster an appreciation of the advantages which I implicitly believe will result from the union of the English-speaking peoples throughout the world' and to encourage in American students 'an attachment to the country from which they have sprung'. His will specified the annual value of each scholarship to be £300, tenable at any college for three consecutive years. Originally, fifty-two scholarships were provided for in his will: twenty for countries then forming part of the British Empire and thirty-two going to the United States. Reflecting the ethos of a man of action - whose student life was mixed with business and political enterprise, swashbuckling adventures in the mining fields, and outdoor activity in the wilderness - he stipulated that the scholarship students should 'not be merely bookworms'. Rather, in his view, they should be selected on the basis of 'literary and scholastic attainments', 'fondness of and success in outdoor sports', 'qualities of manhood', 'devotion to duty', 'moral force of character' and 'instincts to lead'. Betraying hints of progressiveness, his testament specifically laid down that a student should not be selected or disqualified 'on account of his race or religious opinions'. His will, however, failed to specify the gender eligibility of his scholars, and until 1977 the scholarships were awarded to male students only because Parliament up to that point had chosen to interpret his scheme as being single-sex. As trustees of the scholarships he named his closest friends and associates: Earl Grey, Lord Milner, Alfred Beit, Leander Starr Jameson, Lewis Loyd
Michell, Bouchier Francis Hawksley, and lastly, the Earl of Rosebery. The Anglo-German ring indeed comes full circle again. Lord Rosebery, the Chancellor of the reorganized University of London, is revisited in the founding of the Rhodes Scholarships.

The German Scholarships

The German scholarships were, as Allen points out, an 'afterthought', brought into being only by a 1901 codicil to Rhodes's will. But whether he was motivated by 'political rather than educational' reasons, it cannot be doubted that Rhodes's dealings with the Kaiser Wilhelm II played a large part in the creation of these scholarships. In 1899 Rhodes had obtained a concession from the German Emperor for the trans-African telegraph to go through German East Africa. In the course of business he had a personal interview with Wilhelm, to whom he took a great liking.  

As Hawksley suggested during the First World War when speaking about the scholarships, Rhodes 'had been having a "deal" with the Kaiser over East Africa and thought he would like to show his appreciation of his consideration and make him a little present'.  

Dr. George (later Sir George) Parkin, who was appointed the trust's organizing secretary in 1902 despite the objections of Rosebery, who saw him as 'a round peg in a square hole' in that post,  

published his book The Rhodes Scholarships in 1913. There Parkin gave a similar account of Rhodes's 'extremely cordial' reception by the Kaiser. Rhodes, according to him, thought Wilhelm a 'broad-minded man' and recounted that 'I appealed to him in connection with the portion of Africa which is under his rule, he met one with a breadth of mind which was admirable'.  

The personal element in this relationship is amply reflected in Rhodes's codicil, which accorded the Kaiser the sole authority to nominate the German students for the scholarships - a remarkable privilege considering that not even the President of the United States or the British sovereign was explicitly given such supremacy over procedure in selecting the American and Dominion students respectively. Incidentally, Rhodes's will
failed to spell out the machinery and procedures for selecting scholars. Moreover, it appears that these scholarships were inspired by a wish to pay tribute to the Kaiser for having introduced the teaching of English in German schools. Rhode’s codicil of January 1901 thus read:

This is a further Codicil to my Will. I note the German Emperor has made instruction in English compulsory in German schools. I leave five yearly scholarships at Oxford of £250 per ann. to students of German birth the scholars to be nominated by the German Emperor for the time being. Each scholarship to continue for three years so that each year after the first three there will be fifteen scholars.

In similar vein to Cassel, Rhodes was fired with the lofty ideal of preserving peace, as the last line of his codicil read: 'The object is that an understanding between the three great powers will render war impossible and educational relations make the strongest tie.' In Rhodes’s eyes, then, there were only three ‘great powers’ in the world - Britain, the United States and Germany - and these were the only ones deserving of his scholarships. This worldview is significant in its underlying assumption of a shared community of values between Britain and the United States, and between Britain and Germany. Even though his scheme was conceived primarily as a means of binding the British Empire and the Anglo-Saxon nations together, he did not deem it inappropriate to include the Germans in this framework - a tribute perhaps to his cosmopolitanism and association with German miners and merchants in South Africa. In his book, Parkin could not avoid evoking imagery of Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic brotherhood. As he noted:

Oxford's outlook on the world was already wide. ... But a scheme which
opened a possibility for chosen youth of the whole Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic world to learn their lessons at her feet was ... a wonderful widening of opportunity which she heartily welcomed.102

As stipulated by Rhodes, there were to be no more than fifteen German scholarships at any one time. It appears that these scholarships had a clumsy and inauspicious start. If the records of the Rhodes Trust are to provide any indication, then the Germans initially were anything but the models of efficiency. Preparations were in progress on the German side by the autumn of 1902 for the admission of the first five German scholars in October 1903.103 In May 1903 Francis (later Sir Francis) Wylie, a Fellow and Tutor at Brasenose College, was appointed to be the trustees' representative at Oxford. As might be expected, the finer details of the scholarships still had to be worked out. Even in June 1903 Wylie was enquiring about how the German students were going to be paid.104 Throughout that summer, there are indications of anxiety, if not annoyance, on the part of the trustees and the colleges over the German authorities' slowness in nominating their scholars and selecting the colleges which they would be attending,105 and by early October the Germans proved no more forthcoming. As Wylie wrote: 'No news from Germany: but a man who was over there this summer gathered that they may be unable to send their five this year. Meanwhile Magdalen and Balliol are getting anxious.' It was not until 13 October that news was received of the German scholars being finally named, eliciting the remark from Wylie that 'at least they seem to be waking up'. Another complaint was made that 'the German Authorities will have themselves to thank if their Scholars fail to get rooms in the Colleges they select.'106 Even when the names of the students were relayed to the trustees, a clerical error was made resulting in yet another stumble. The matter was only cleared up officially on 23 October with a letter from Count Bernstorff, Counsellor of the German embassy, who provided the correct names.107 The
first five German Rhodes Scholars were Hans Erdmann von Lindeiner-Wildau (Exeter), Karl Alexander von Müller (Oriel), Theodor Heinrich Erbe (Merton), Hans Eberhard von Schweinitz (Balliol) and Count Hélie Talleyrand-Périgord (Magdalen), the last being related to the famous French diplomat, Count Talleyrand, of the previous century.108

Despite the teething problems, at least the German scholars did arrive in the autumn of 1903, along with six from South Africa. The start of that inaugural year was marked by the noticeable absence of the Americans and most of the Dominion students, whose selection was delayed because the proper procedures and the whole bureaucratic machinery, which had to be established from scratch, could not be brought up to speed. Being hand-picked by the Kaiser thus had its advantages, not least that of expeditiousness. It must be noted, though, that these five Germans and six South Africans in 1903 were the first to arrive but not the first Rhodes Scholars as such. Two students had already been selected in 1902 before Rhodes's death but as they were just aged sixteen at the time, their arrival in Oxford had to be deferred until 1904.109

Owing to the demands of compulsory military service in Germany, maintaining residence in Oxford for three years proved to be difficult, if not impossible, for the Germans. Responding to a request from the Kaiser, the trustees agreed in 1907 to require the German scholars to remain for just two years. Theodor Erbe, one of the 1903 arrivals, actually returned for a third year after completing his military service, but he was more the exception than the rule.110

How were the Germans viewed in Oxford? In the spring of 1911 Wylie wrote to the deans of the colleges soliciting their views of their German scholars. This move was prompted by an approach from Dr. Ernst Sieper, a professor of English literature at the University of Munich, who complained that favouritism was being shown towards the aristocratic class in the selection of German scholars. As Sieper argued, 'the general feeling is that the number of aristocrats chosen for Oxford are in no proportion to the
importance and influence of the German aristocracy upon our intellectual and public life'.

The responses from the colleges to Wylie's enquiry nonetheless tended to be salutary. 'Entirely favourable', 'the right kind of German', and 'a most favourable impression' represented some of the comments received, leading Wylie to remark that the colleges 'have turned out to be rather less critical than I had myself expected'. Speaking of the average Oxford view, he was compelled to conclude that 'there is not very much ground for saying that there is any positive dissatisfaction in Oxford with the Germans; or that ... the "Aristocrats" in particular have been the unsatisfactory element'. Therefore, he recommended that no representations should be made to the Kaiser about the scholars he was nominating.

Nonetheless, certain more critical voices were heard. Balliol, for instance, besides thinking that the Germans kept too much to themselves and occasionally lacked adequate skills in English, found that their intellectual level was 'a good deal lower than that of the other Rhodes Scholars'. The reply from Exeter remarked that two of the German scholars it had previously had 'gave indications that there might be danger in sending here young men of good social standing who had no serious aims'. These views would only have bolstered Sieper's argument and were perhaps borne out by fact. Count Hélie Talleyrand-Périgord, for instance, was deemed an 'attractive fellow' but 'idle'. 'His College were annoyed with him.' Friedrich von Bethmann Hollweg, son of the German Chancellor who arrived at Balliol in 1908, was judged to be 'not very strenuous' though intelligent. But on the whole the German scholars who arrived between 1903 and 1911 received favourable reviews, according to surviving records. The one entering class with a conspicuous blotch seems to have been that of 1906, containing Herbert von Veltheim who 'went wrong', 'got badly into debt, wasted his time, and played the fool'. Even if representing just a minority, these instances of wayward upper-class lads did lend support to Sieper's criticism that the scholarships were being awarded to undeserving students. But as Rosebery pointed
out, though aristocrats may have been overrepresented among the German scholars, it
remained a German matter and not one in which the trustees could rightly intervene.115

The War and the Broken Fellowship

Described as 'a very nice fellow',116 Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, who had first
arrived in 1913, was making plans in the summer of 1914 to return to Oxford for another
year. By 4 August, however, those plans were thrown asunder as the German presence in
Oxford was drastically reduced at the outbreak of hostilities. In fact, Bieberstein would
later be killed in action.

Just as the King Edward VII British-German Foundation's educational exchange
was severed by the war, so too was the Anglo-German connection at Oxford. By 31
August 1914 Parkin was expressing his doubts about whether the German Rhodes Scholars
'will now feel like coming to us for some years to come'. He further predicted that the
scholarships would be only 'a half-hearted affair' when resumed. Nevertheless, he was not
willing to cut the German link completely. As Parkin wrote: "The Scholarships will be
here for them to take when they want them."117

During the war, the German Rhodes Scholarships were revoked by a private Act of
Parliament, the Rhodes Estate Act of 1916. But this annulment could not entirely destroy
Anglo-German relationships on the individual level. As Count Albrecht Bernstorff,
German Rhodes Scholar who had arrived in 1909, remarked in July 1915:

For me and for all those to whom Oxford was more than merely a very
happy period of life, this war is a very sad experience. Fate has built up a
wall between us, and to my mind it seems to be one of the greatest
tragedies in history that we should fight against another, where we must
give and exchange and work together.118
This sense of brotherhood among the Rhodes Scholars, transcending national origin and wartime allegiances, is evident in an account given by a former American Rhodes Scholar who wrote to Wylie in December 1918, informing him of his meeting with former German Rhodes Scholars. As a member of the American section of the Armistice Commission, the American met Baron Wernher von Ow-Wächendorff (1907) in Spa following the armistice, and was in turn introduced to Kurt Schahin von Kamphoevener. Describing his meeting with Kamphoevener, the American took particular note of the marked English influence on the German's deportment: 'He speaks English without a trace of an accent, and still has the Oxford manner.' Subsequent to that meeting, he also met with Bernstorff and Conrad Rödiger who, he reported, 'gave me to understand ... that a very influential section of the Foreign Office, headed by the Rhodes Scholars, had been in continual and violent opposition to the military dictatorship ever since the war began'.

Wylie, who in August 1914 had expressed doubts about the return of the German scholars, cited Schellens's letter and remarked that the scholarships 'were not perhaps ineffective just so far as they went'. There was indeed hope for the future of Anglo-German relations at Oxford.

By the mid-1920s, a movement was afoot to reinstate the German scholarships, culminating in their reestablishment in 1929. During the early 1920s former German scholars spoke out in favour of reinstituting the scheme. Based on the evidence available, those who were still alive after the war bore neither Oxford nor Britain much ill-will. In fact the majority of them, echoing Bernstorff's sentiments, tended to view the war as an unfortunate tragedy and favoured reconciliation between the two countries. In their thinking they also tended to separate Anglo-German personal relations, which were deemed to be healthy and strong, from the governmental and diplomatic ones, which were marred by blunders and misunderstandings. Thus, a noticeable trend was the distinction between personal ties of friendship and the impersonal ties of public diplomacy. Eckhardt von der
Lühe, for instance, wrote that 'both nations stumbled into this war and the real reason of it is, as far as Germany and England are concerned, that both nations have been badly guided by their governments and did not understand each other.'\textsuperscript{121} Any bitterness they bore emanated more from the fact that Germans had been banished from the scholarships by the Act of Parliament of 1916, than from any deep-seated hostility towards Britain. As Wylie observed: 'It is clear that some of them, while anxious to be friendly, and retaining a genuine affection for Oxford, are sore at the action taken by the Trustees during the war - or, perhaps it would be truer to say, at the continuance of its consequences.'\textsuperscript{122} Hans Eberhard von Schweinitz appeared to take up this issue with particular stridence. He complained: 'So long as the general feeling towards Germany in England is ... based upon a groundwork of untruths, ... I do not care much to gratify the curiosity of the British public as to how I have been spending my time since I left Oxford'. Nonetheless, he added that his attitude was 'of an entirely impersonal nature', expressing his willingness to share his peacetime and wartime experiences with 'some old Oxford friends'.\textsuperscript{123} Hence, while tending to view with contempt what he considered to be general ill-feeling and ignorance in Britain, he was keen on preserving personal links with Oxford, even observing that his days at Oxford had been 'among the happiest of my life'.

The abrogation of the scholarships was indeed viewed as going against the intent of Rhodes's will. Writing in 1922, Alexander von Quistorp advised that the scholarships were especially relevant and necessary in the postwar period to bring Britain and Germany closer again. In similar spirit, Hans Ludwig Rehmke saw no reason 'why one should not let the work of Cecil Rhodes go the way, which he desired to go.'\textsuperscript{124}

The idea of Anglo-German racial solidarity came to the fore again in the arguments for reinstating the scholarships. Rehmke, for example, alluded to the 'close relationship between the German and the Anglo-Saxon race', citing Parkin's book \textit{The Rhodes Scholarships} as well as his own admission that 'the coalition might be enlarged between all
the Indo-Germanic races'. 'I think it was more than politeness, that he did say so. These words show to you', Rehmke added, 'why I do regret, regret very heartily the abolition of the German R[hodes]. S[cholarships]. and be it only a temporary one.' Rehmke was here referring to a lecture given by Parkin, who in his book had evoked racial imagery, implying an Anglo-German brotherhood of shared ideals. In The Rhodes Scholarships, Parkin exalted the bringing together of 'the whole Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic world to learn their lessons at her [Oxford's] feet'. As he argued: 'The confidence in its [Oxford's] moulding power, implied in committing to the care of the University ... selected representatives of the Anglo-Saxon and German world, for the realization of a great ideal, was a rare and profound compliment.'

These Anglophile attitudes on the part of the Germans may demonstrate that Rhodes's aim of promoting mutual understanding through educational ties was at least partially realized. At the basis of Rhodes's business ventures lay the German connection - a connection comprising diamond, gold-mining and financial networks, and stretching from Kimberley to the Kaiser in Berlin. As an observer put it in 1927, in arguing for a restitution of the German scholarships:

It was Rhodes' wish that Germans should be included. He had worked with them and found them good fellows. ... I am one of those who do not think that Germany was entirely to blame for the war. After all and above all, it was Rhodes' wish that Germans should share in his testament, for his fortune was made by German co-operation [emphasis in the original], perhaps by German and Jewish inspiration.

This Anglo-German collaboration, exemplified by Rhodes's entrepreneurial dealings, indeed should not be overlooked. It symbolized an important cultural as much as a commercial
link between British and German private interests before 1914.

**Conclusion**

In the three case studies above, we have demonstrated the German link in the British academic community working in different ways. In the case of Imperial College, the connection is made by way of German technical education being used as a model for a new institution of applied sciences in London. But the German influence, rather than just being intrinsic to the concept of a technical institute, manifested itself further with the financial support given to the college by British business interests that were of German origin.

Private German money was also central to the formation of the King Edward VII British-German Foundation, established with the aim of fostering stronger cultural ties between Britain and Germany, the underlying premise being that educational and social contact would in the long run improve relations between the two countries. In both the cases of Imperial College and the King Edward VII Foundation, the impetus was provided by a 'threat' emanating from Germany: in the former, the 'threat' took the form of a widely perceived German superiority in the technical field with which Britain was prompted to catch up, whereas in the latter it was the spectre of rising Anglo-German tension induced to a large extent by Germany's determination to construct a modern battleship fleet.

The Rhodes Scholarships, with their German component, were also intended to bolster cultural ties through educational exchange. Here, German money was again a factor, though only indirectly through the channel of Rhodes's business dealings with the Germans in South Africa. The parallels between Cassel's foundation and the Rhodes Scholarships, however, run even farther upon closer scrutiny. Cassel undertook his venture in tribute to King Edward VII, with whom he had close personal ties; Rhodes created the German scholarships in honour of the German Emperor as a personal favour. In both
instances, the personal relationship between a member of the entrepreneurial class and a monarch - thus between the business and the ruling political elites - is of central importance.

All three case studies reveal a German connection in British educational projects before the First World War. That link may not have been particularly extensive and, with hindsight, it is possible to see that both Cassel and Rhodes, despite their noble intentions, ultimately failed to prevent the rupture that came in 1914. In the end, the ties of education and culture proved too weak to counter the geopolitical forces that brought about war in 1914. These educational endeavours, especially those of Cassel and Rhodes, nonetheless represented links that bound Britain and Germany more closely together, and they must be seen within the context of other social developments that were aimed at promoting Anglo-German friendship in the prewar period.

NOTES

1. Unless otherwise indicated, all primary materials cited below are from the files of the King Edward VII British-German Foundation's archives.


4. All references to this scheme are from Francis Trippel, 'King Edward VII Anglo-German Fund (Sir Ernest Cassel's Endowment Fund) - Suggested Scheme', 22 Aug. 1910.


10. Ibid., p. 15.

11. Ibid., pp. 16-17.

12. Ibid., pp. 18-19.


15. Ibid., pp. 9 and 20.


17. Ibid., pp. 21-2.


19. Ibid., pp. 6-7, and 9. It appears that the report made an error in stating (p. 6) that five studentships were awarded by the German section. There were indeed five German recipients but they would have been funded by the British section, not the German one.

20. Ibid., pp. 7, 9-10.

22. Ibid., p. 11.
23. Executive committee minute books, minutes of 5 Aug. 1914.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., minutes of 12 Aug. 1914.
26. Ibid., minutes of 26 Aug. 1914.
27. Ibid., minutes of 2 Sept. 1914.
28. Edward Troup to Geoffrey Drage, 30 Oct. 1914, in folder marked 'War'.
34. Ibid.
35. For more on the University of London's reorganization, see Negley Harte, The University of London, 1836-1986: An Illustrated History (London, 1986), pp. 156-75, which also has a brief narrative on the origins of Imperial College. Another useful source is Thomas Lloyd Humberstone, University Reform in London (London, 1926).
37. 'The Organization of University Education in the Metropolis - I', The Times, 4 June 1901, p. 11.
38. 'The Organization of University Education in the Metropolis - II', The Times, 8 June 1901, p. 5.

40. Ibid., pp. 376, 382 and 384.


42. 'Memorandum of Events between 1906-1915', NLS, Haldane MSS. 5919, f. 20.

43. Quoted in Ashby and Anderson, Portrait of Haldane, p. 45.

44. Haldane, Autobiography, pp. 91-2.


46. This paper, entitled 'Great Britain and Germany - A Study in Education', was subsequently published in Haldane, Education and Empire: Addresses on Certain Topics of the Day (London, 1902). See pp. 20-4.

47. Haldane to Thursfield, 26 Sept. 1901, NLS, Haldane MSS. 5905, f. 107.


50. Ibid., pp. 926-8.

51. 'Organization of University Education - II', p. 5.

52. Ashby and Anderson, Portrait of Haldane, p. 50.

53. See 'Original Proposal to Reorganize the Royal School of Mines, South Kensington', 18 Dec. 1902, PRO, ED 24/529.


60. Knollys to Rosebery, 19 July 1902, NLS, Rosebery MSS. 10040, f. 30.

61. Haldane to Rosebery, 26 Dec. 1904, NLS, Haldane MSS. 5906, f. 143.

62. For further details of these developments, see Alter, *Reluctant Patron*, pp. 152-72; and Ashby and Anderson, *Portrait of Haldane*, pp. 52-8.

63. Haldane to his mother, 7 July 1909, NLS, Haldane MSS. 5982, f. 11.


70. Haldane to Sidney Webb (previously cited), BLPES, Passfield MSS., II/4/b/36.


76. Humberstone, University Reform, p. 169. See also 'London Charlottenburg', University Review, pp. 18-20.
77. Haldane to Sidney Webb (previously cited), BLPES, Passfield MSS., II/4/b/36.
78. Hall, Science for Industry, p. 32.
85. DBB, IV, p. 737.


94. Quoted in Rotberg, Cecil Rhodes, p. 91. A brief account of Rhodes's association with Oriel can be found in G.N. Clark, Cecil Rhodes and His College (Oxford, 1953).

95. Rhodes House Library (RHL), Oxford, Rhodes MSS., MS. Afr. 1. This file contains a typed copy of Rhodes's final will from which these references are taken. See pp. 7-12. For further explanation of the terms of the will, see William T. Stead (ed.), The Last Will and Testament of Cecil John Rhodes (London, 1902). One of Rhodes's close friends, Stead was named an executor of his estate, a privilege which was, however, revoked by Rhodes in the 1901 codicil.


99. Rosebery to Beit, 3 July 1902, NLS, Rosebery MSS. 10131, p. 308.


103. Rhodes Trust Archives, Oxford. This and the manuscript materials cited below are, unless otherwise indicated, in these archives in a folder marked 'German Scholarships', Nov. 1902 - March 1916. See extract of letter from Hawksley to Michell, 15 Nov. 1902.

104. Wylie to Boyd, 8 June 1903.

105. See, for instance, Wylie to Boyd, 19 July 1903.

106. Extract of letter from Wylie, 4 Oct. 1903; Wylie to Hawksley, 13 Oct. 1903; and Boyd to secretary, Rhodes Estate, 14 Oct. 1903.


108. See [Rhodes Trust], A Register of Rhodes Scholars, 1903-1981 (n.p., 1981), the list for 1903.


110. Memorandum entitled 'German Scholars: Secretary's Note', Oct. 1907.

111. Sieper to Parkin, 12 May 1911.

112. Heberden to Wylie, 28 April 1911; Macan to Wylie, 27 April 1911; Phelps to Wylie, 26 April 1911; Wylie to Hawksley, 30 April 1911; and Wylie to Hawksley, 29 April 1911.

113. Bailey to Wylie, 28 April 1911; and Jackson to Wylie, 27 April 1911.

114. 'German Rhodes Scholars', 1903-1911, general remarks.

115. Rosebery to Hawksley, 8 May 1911.


117. Parkin to Aydelotte, 31 Aug. 1914.

118. Bernstorff to Wylie, July 1915.


120. Wylie to the secretary, 13 Feb. 1919.

121. Von der Lühe letter, June 1922.

122. Wylie to Dawson, 7 Sept. 1922.

124. Rehmke letter, June 1922.

125. Rehmke letter, June 1922.


127. J. Astley Cooper letter, 6 April 1927.
CHAPTER 5

THE GERMAN IN BRITISH EYES:
FRIEND, FOE OR BLOOD RELATION?1

In the early 1900s, Karl Baedeker and Thomas Cook published a series of guidebooks for Germany, providing topographical information, travel tips, and advice on currency. In 1906 D.J. Rees issued a pocket interpreter and phrasebook as part of the Briton Abroad Series, aimed at enhancing the conversational skills of the British tourist in Germany.2 But as passports at that time were not required for international travel, it is not possible to ascertain even from the Foreign Office files the annual number of Britons travelling to Germany during the 1905-14 period.

Rather than gauge the volume of Anglo-German tourism in purely numerical terms, this chapter is more concerned with Britons' impressions of Germany while visiting or residing in that country. Angela Schwarz, in a study based on sixty-four published monographs taking the form of personal diaries and journals, has analysed the impressions left on British visitors and residents in the Third Reich.3 As she explains, the Nazi Party, keen on moulding public opinion and eliciting sympathy from foreigners, 'took great trouble over British observers in particular'.4 This keenness was apparently reciprocated by the enthusiasm demonstrated by British visitors in going to Germany and also by the amount of observations they recorded while in the country.

The pre-1914 period, unfortunately, has not bequeathed records of this genre in any similar quantities. Wilhelmine Germany would seem lacklustre in comparison with the revolutionary period of National Socialism; turn-of-the-century Germany would not have evinced the fascination or appeal of the Third Reich to foreign visitors. This may help explain the earlier period's relative dearth of travel records. Moreover, if tourism had not yet become a mass activity in the 1930s as it is today, it was undoubtedly even less
developed before 1914. Therefore, the number of travellers before 1914, along with the amount of source material from the period, would naturally be substantially lower than that from the Third Reich.

This study is based primarily on published sources obtained through a search in the General Retrospective Catalogue of the British Library. Its focus has been on works written from personal experience giving accounts of Britons’ travel or residence in Germany during the 1900-14 period. But as the amount of this material is very limited, this study has included other periodical articles and non-travel-related works which deal with images and impressions of Germany. A conscious attempt, however, has been made to exclude polemical works and political commentaries. Essential as the prewar invasion novels are to our grasp of mentalities, these works have also been omitted as they have already been scrutinized at length by I.F. Clarke in Voices Prophesying War. As this study is concerned mainly with British impressions of Germany, only works written by Britons or published in the United Kingdom will be cited. Thus such books as A.T. and B.R. Wood’s Ribbon Roads (New York, 1910) and articles in the American periodicals, National Geographic Magazine and Bibliotheca Sacra, which were pertinent and useful, have regrettably been excluded from this discussion.

The discussion below will first of all examine British impressions and stereotypes of Germans. German impressions of Britain, while of secondary concern, will nevertheless be included to provide a comparative perspective, subject to the caveat that they too are derived from British, and thus a limited range of, sources.

Britons in Germany

As we know from Voices Prophesying War, the prewar era witnessed a proliferation of sensational war-scare novels boasting high sales and popularity among the low-brow reading public, a phenomenon tending to support the notion of hardening British
popular attitudes towards Germany during the period. The following analysis will attempt
to place this assumption in context - that is, it will examine whether British attitudes
towards Germany were indeed hardened and uniform.

The first items analysed will be works written from first-hand experience, whether
resulting from travels in Germany or long-term residence in the country. It is appropriate
that this study begins with an anonymous article appearing in Blackwood's Edinburgh
Magazine in the very month of the inaugural Caxton Hall meeting. Entitled 'In and about
a German Town', the article is an anecdotal account of the author's recent visit to
Germany. From the outset the author, apparently an Oxonian, declares a favourable
impression from his trip. He writes:

   Being ... hopelessly insular in my ideas, and dependent for my
knowledge of the Germans on newspapers and hearsay only, I came abroad
in the full expectation of finding in my Teutonic cousin a swaggering and
blustering semi-barbarian, eaten up with self-conceit, and never quite happy
if he was not cramming down a neighbour's throat the German military
superiority. Let me confess at once that I have been most agreeably
disappointed.

What seems most interesting about this article is that the author, in his brief walk
through the various episodes of experiences in a German town, seeks to correct certain
misconceptions about Germany. For instance, he mentions the German shopkeeper's
helpfulness, when not having in stock the desired item, in directing him to a shop that
would. He is also struck by the courtesy shown in public by the Germans. Whereas a nod
or a smile at Oxford would suffice when acknowledging a friend, he relates, 'the young
German, whose lack of courtesy is so often the topic of a letter or paragraph in an English
newspaper, is ... almost inconveniently courteous, the almost incessant taking off of the
head-dress being the more conspicuous when that head-dress assumes the form of a flat
coloured cap, invariably worn on the back of the head'. Debunking the notion that
Germans drink in exorbitant amounts, he writes that they are 'an essentially sober nation'.
In the course of two months, he claims, 'I have only come across one case of drunkenness'.
His observation on sports, as we shall see later, would indeed vindicate some of the
German criticism of the English ethos of physical exercise. As he observes: 'Outdoor
games, which form a part and parcel of our university life, are practically non-existent in
Germany.' In deprecation of British society's own ethos, he adds:

That in our own country a truly ridiculous amount of attention is bestowed
upon successful game-playing and successful game-players no one can feel
more strongly than myself: that so much valuable time is wasted on the
frivolities of life is ... nothing short of a national misfortune.7

Violet Hunt's The Desirable Alien (1913), written with Ford Madox Ford, relates
the author's 'intimate personal impressions in Germany, full of varied social experiences,
historical chat, and graphic descriptions'.8 Raised in Germany, Hunt in her book avows that
'my Tedescan sympathies were fairly developed. ... German nurses cuffed me and hushed
me in my wicked and virtuous moods respectively, till I knew their language a good deal
better than my own' - testimony to her Germanophilia developed at an early age.
'Orderly' is the impression she has of Germans - a characterization we will encounter
further in the other sources. In one of her anecdotes, she recounts postboxes having
instructions warning the sender to look carefully before posting a letter and to be sure the
letter has a proper stamp. She remarks: 'Germans seem to me to think of everything, to
know everything collectively, and yet to trust no single person, individually, to do either.9
As we will see, this dichotomy of the individual and the collective in the German character was a theme often evoked by British observers.

Nonetheless, her overall impression of her life in Germany is favourable. Revealing the respect with which British culture is regarded in certain German circles, she tells of a host she once encountered for whom Shakespeare, H.G. Wells and John Galsworthy 'were household names'. She asks, 'Where in Birmingham or Salford should I have met with this?' Describing the 'prettily decorated' beer gardens in Germany, she laments that public houses of such beauty in England would not be permitted to operate. With a tinge of irony directed at British standards of morality, she adds: 'Government morality would be on its hind legs at once lest vice should masquerade as health, as joy, as beauty.'

In 1914 Ida Wylie published *Eight Years in Germany*, memoirs of her sojourn in Germany, motivated by 'an instinctive sympathy with the people of whom I write'. Born in Melbourne, Australia, to a Scottish father, Wylie had been moved to England shortly after her birth and later, after two years at Cheltenham Ladies' College, was sent to Karlsruhe, Germany, at age nineteen for, in her own words, 'a Teutonic finishing'. During her eight years in the country, she avowedly managed to acquire perfect German as well as 'an insight into the German mentality'. Returning to Britain in 1911, she joined the suffrage movement and was to write over 200 short stories and fifteen novels in her lifetime.

In similar vein to the author of 'In and about a German Town', Wylie attempted to debunk some common British myths about Germans. Describing her eight years in Germany as 'happy', she is dismayed by the widespread ignorance of Germany often encountered since returning to England. 'The average Englishman starts off with the idea that he knows a good deal about modern Germany', she argues, even though that notion is founded on a 'complete misunderstanding of the German people'. According to Wylie,
what the average Englishman knows of the German character is 'a confusion of ideas', and when he speaks disparagingly of the 'dowdy women' and 'heavy ill-mannered men' of Germany, this type of German 'belongs to a class which, flourishing in England some twenty years ago, is now fortunately almost extinct'.

Wylie likens the Anglo-German relationship to a family quarrel, bearing out the adage that 'we do not always love our relations'. She elaborates the idea of Anglo-German kinship further by stating:

As between families so between nations kinship can become a grave hindrance to friendship. We know that the French come of an entirely different stock [emphasis added], and so we make allowances for them; ... we even study to respect and understand their susceptibilities. As a consequence, two hereditary enemies have established a pleasant if somewhat fragile entente. But with the Germans the matter is different. They are our cousins [emphasis added].

Pointing out that while the Germans were at one time patronized as a 'shiftless, unpractical branch of the family', their recent success now makes Britain 'considerably annoyed'. But nevertheless, Wylie maintains that 'they are still our relations'. 'Their very success', she argues, 'accentuates the family likeness'.

Incidentally Wylie had issued My German Year as recently as 1910, a work echoing the same theme of shared racial heritage and inveighing against ill-founded prejudices. There she writes:

And so we go on, hating, despising, tolerating, or ignoring the race to which we are so closely connected, not according to our knowledge, which
is often nil, but according to our characters and our inherited prejudices. ... 
We have stayed at hotels and judged the Germans by so-called "types",
which, if they were Englishmen in England, we should ignore as exceptions.17

Her 'ordinary experience' in Germany, she declares, has led her to regard the Germans
'with respect and affection' - that, in contrast to her 'innocent days' when she knew nothing
at all about Germans and 'disliked them heartily'. The Germany of her 'innocent days' may
reflect typical British stereotypes of the German people. As she recounts, formerly she
conceived of two types of Germans. One was 'a tall, fierce-looking individual with a
monstrous Kaiser-moustache, an insolent stare, and excessively bad manners'. The second
type was 'a stout person with glasses, a drooping, untidy moustache, long greasy hair, and
a passion for poetic outpourings. He was very exclamatory, ... ready to embrace every one
at first sight ...'18 This dual image undoubtedly corresponded to the Prussian and Bavarian
stereotypes as well.

Wylie also draws attention to the German's 'sensitiveness', which she argues often
brings him into conflict with his Anglo-Saxon cousin. She asserts that 'once you have
learnt to treat his feelings with respect, you will find the German the most amiable, kindly
host'. Therefore, calling for 'a little sympathy', she pleads: 'We might build up admiration cordiale with our cousin - surely a more natural and fitting one'.19 Among the stereotypes
she attacks are those concerning German manners. 'They [the English] hold to it that
Germans are "disgusting", and look the other way when they see an Englishman bolting his
food like a starved wolf.'20 Likewise, aiming to debunk the belief that Germany is a cheap
country, Wylie observes that 'cheapness is something unusual, indeed practically unknown
in a German household; and the hopeful English family proposing to come and settle in the
Fatherland in order to "economize" had better change their minds and go elsewhere'.21
In conclusion she admits to having experienced 'nothing but kindness, courtesy, and goodwill' in Germany, and argues that 'as individuals the two races agree admirably'. But why not as nations? Assuming an enlightened attitude, she blames Anglo-German tension on ignorance and particularly 'those dangerous people who have never been out of England but know all about it'. Appealing to the two peoples' likeness and historical ties, she argues that these two nations that once fought side by side in Europe are 'related in blood and in all the highest virtues of courage, tenacity, and loyalty'. It is telling that Wylie distinguishes between individual and collective relationships. Even when governmental ties between the countries are strained, she is suggesting that a Briton and German may get on splendidly on the individual level. But more notably, Wylie appeals to the idea of racial kinship to bolster her argument.

Sidney Whitman, a friend of Bismarck's, reminisced in German Memories on his more than fifty years' residence in Germany, from his childhood to 1912. Thus, he claims to be better informed on the 'inner life' of the country than a 'travelling potentate' or a tourist, who 'sees just as much as his limited opportunities may bring within his ken'. Among the features of German life which he recalls fondly are the 'clean aspect of the towns, the tidiness and order of the population'. Also, he observes that commuting in the tramcars between Berlin and Charlottenburg, 'I have often counted considerably more passengers reading books than newspapers'. Reinforcing what the Oxonian in Blackwood's Magazine above has related to us, Whitman too recalls that he cannot recall having seen 'habitual drunkenness' among the working classes. 'This absence of excess of the part of the masses', he observes, 'is all the more remarkable since beer, wine and spirits are far cheaper [in Germany] than in England'.

Needless to say, the police regulations also do not fail to pass his notice, though rather than speak of them disparagingly, he sounds even apologetic, stating that 'many of the police prohibitions are conceived in the best interest of the public'. In contrast, he
alludes to the 'degrading treatment' of people rendered by the 'rigidly enforced' licensing laws in Britain. In his discussion of the German public services, in particular the railways, Whitman claims that their efficiency 'could not easily be paralleled outside Germany'.

Again, this author leaves behind a generally favourable account of Germany.

_Germany_, by Mrs. Alfred (nee Cecily) Sidgwick, was published in 1909. Her peep at Germany has a most idyllic opening, beginning with a chapter on German children and relating a story of storks. According to her, storks come to Germany every spring and when a baby is born in the winter or summer, the parents say that 'the stork has brought him; for that is what all German children believe'. Her sketches deal mostly with the ordinary and routine in German life, her topics ranging from, among others, the Germans' food, eating habits, the taste of their rye bread, the age at which a German girl is confirmed, the typical design of wedding dresses in Germany, and whether cigars are preferred to pipes. In common with most British observers, she also mentions that 'thoroughness and efficiency are characteristic of Germany everywhere'. Regarding German manners, her impressions are reasonably favourable. As she explains, 'A German would not sit down at the same table with you in a hotel or even in the same railway carriage without making you a polite bow, and when he leaves he will salute you in the same way.'

Sidgwick acknowledges that since the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, Germany has become a more prosperous country. But still holding to the traditional British view of Germany as a poor relation, she adds: 'But there are whole classes of well-educated and well-born people in Germany who are terribly poor: so poor that they have to consider every penny in a way unknown in England and America.'

As may be expected, there is again no avoiding mention of the German police. She gives a descriptive recollection of her experience with the seemingly all-pervasive regulations and officialdom:
When you arrive in Berlin, you cannot even go outside the station and choose your own cab. An official in uniform gives you a numbered tally, and you must find the cab with that number, and take it or none. ... Should you be a butcher-boy, you may not walk on the pavement when you are carrying meat ... You dare not stay longer than a few days in any German town without reporting yourself to the police ... It is best to have a passport with you ... if you choose you can satisfy official curiosity by proxy.

She then relates the seemingly ridiculous story of an Englishman who, unable to produce his papers, had to send to Yorkshire for his certificate of baptism to be dispatched to Germany. When shown the certificate, the police were adequately satisfied, leading Sidgwick to conclude that 'any official paper will act like magic' in this 'mandarin-ridden' country.29

Nonetheless, it must be noted that Sidgwick is neither mocking nor severe in her account. A Briton of German parentage, she had issued Home Life in Germany just in 1908.30 Though bearing different titles, both these books are similar in content and are apparently based on a trip made in 1906-07. Her sketches are valuable precisely because they deal with the ordinary and not with such erudite topics as German taxation, naval construction, factories, or town planning. As she tells her reader, 'my knowledge of Germany, like my knowledge of England, is based on a series of life-long, unclassified, more or less inchoate impressions'. Expressing her dismay at Anglicized Germans who 'deny their descent and their country', Sidgwick reminds us of the 'Germany we know, the Germany still there for our affection and delight, the dear country of quaint fancies, of music and of poetry' - the Germany which, in her own words, 'has vanished'.31

It is worthwhile mentioning that Sidgwick's views of Germany changed after the outbreak of war in 1914. In her introductory note to the 1914 edition of Home Life, issued
when war was in progress, she writes that 'hatred and jealousy of Great Britain were rife in Germany. I believed then, and have believed for years, that the Germans would make war on us when they could.' Such sentiments, however, can hardly be detected in the first edition of her work. One can only suppose that with the onset of war she, like most Britons of German heritage, attempted to assert her loyalty to her adopted country by speaking out harshly against Germany.

A source that is both entertaining and laden with impressionistic detail is Leonora Fairweather's *An Englishwoman in Germany*, an account of her residence in the country as a governess. On the whole, Fairweather offers a balanced set of impressions of both her compatriots and the Germans. Concerning manners and decorum, for instance, she writes: 'Here in Freiburg where all kinds of people of different nations attend the mining university, the most impolite are the English.' The English, in her opinion, 'lend themselves ill to the little courtesies of life.' Moreover, she claims, the Germans are more prone than the British to observe social niceties, such as the lifting of the hat when greeting an acquaintance. And whereas the Germans 'practically all have a military deportment', the English slouch along 'with bent shoulders, and hands in pockets, in a most slovenly manner'. But on the other hand, she compensates for her almost derogatory remarks about Englishmen by observing that the 'blunt honest ways of an Englishman' are after all, 'more sincere'. 'They [the English] have a higher standard of honour, and are more moral than foreigners.' Even if the French and Germans are more socially skilful and less 'shy and awkward' than the Britons are with ladies, she writes, the charm demonstrated by the former are 'generally only on the surface'. Betraying a sense of Anglo-Saxon moral superiority over the continental Europeans, she claims that 'in his heart the average foreigner has a low conception of womanhood'.

Nonetheless, Fairweather's impressions of life in Germany are useful for our purpose of studying British stereotypes of Germans. Constantly betraying a certain sense
of British superiority and an attitude of condescension, her comments are often ingenuous if not insulting. She regards the French people as being 'most artistic', the Germans 'most practical', and the English 'most comfortable'. Referring to the Germans' 'extraordinary' habits, she observes almost contemptuously that in the trains, 'not only do they shut up all the windows and contentedly inhale all the microbes exhaled by each other, but it is not at all unusual to see them eating their breakfasts in the train as they go to business in the mornings'. Breakfasting in the train, inevitably, 'offends the sensitiveness of my nasal organ very considerably'. Commenting on the Germans' deficiency in the 'art of eating', she writes: 'I've heard it said that bands were introduced into restaurants to drown the sound of the Germans eating'.

No account of German life, not least of all Fairweather's, would be complete without a discussion of German efficiency and organization. The German schools, according to her, are 'very well organized' and the social insurance system run 'very efficiently'. '[F]or cleanliness and order reign supreme', she declares. 'The streets are kept beautifully, and no one is allowed to throw anything out of the window as in France.' Fairweather, however, argues that the German 'love of order' is 'carried to excess'. She explains:

No one is allowed to walk or sit on the grass, it is 'verboten'; also it is forbidden to cycle through the wood, which is ridiculous, ... for really one gets tired of the word 'verboten' in Germany. Notice boards with 'verboten' are placarded everywhere. Verily Germany is an orderly land!

Claiming that the Germans 'are a terrible people for noise' and have 'the heaviest feet', she observes: 'Also the Germans never think of shutting a door by turning the handle, it always goes "bang" after them, and the shaking of the house has no effect on their
nervous system, they continue to sleep, eat, and speak, without turning a hair'. So, Fairweather's conclusions about Germans are that they have appalling eating habits, are noisy and pathologically obsessed with order. Even so, she admits that all in all, the Germans 'are a friendly, kindly nation, and personally I've met with nothing but the essence of kindness from them, and I've never spent so peaceful a time in my whole life as among the Germans'. In view of her often scathing remarks about Germans, this observation represents quite a compliment indeed.

A.D. McLaren journeyed twice to Germany, spending a total of two years in the country. In An Australian in Germany he relates his 'first-hand impressions' in order to 'correct or confirm those second-hand ones'. His book not only constitutes first-hand impressions from his travels but also examines other aspects of modern Germany, such as German imperialism, national insurance, and the north-south divide in Germany.

His chapter on German 'mind and manners' is again revealing in the way in which Britons perceived Germans. McLaren acknowledges that the Germans are friendly - that is, they 'are not disobliging or inhospitable to the stranger within their gates, far from it'. Nonetheless, he finds them possessing an impenetrable 'veil' which they 'themselves call their "deepness and inwardness" (deutsche Tiefe und Innerlichkeit). More interestingly, if he has to choose one word to sum up the German 'instinct', it is 'order'. He observes:

This Order impresses all visitors, even those who claim no minute knowledge of German Volkstum. It is the characteristic that has been called the Machine Mind. ... Whence comes the capacity to organize, to obey, to become a machine? As well ask why the Italian is emotional, the Frenchman volatile, and the Englishman practical. The German is a plodder. It is part of the national psychology. The English mind is individualistic, the German mind collectivistic.
So, once again we find a reference to the German love of order. Echoing Fairweather, McLaren too dwells on the regulation and discipline of German daily life. 'The printed instructions ... with the eternal warning, "Es ist verboten" (It is forbidden), have afforded no end of merriment to visitors ... These instructions are a part of the routine mind made manifest in officialdom.'

We should note that McLaren's commentary is not written in spiteful derision; on the contrary, it attempts to give a balanced and informed account of German life based on first-hand experience. On the whole, its tone is mild and even friendly. It is illuminating that he invokes cultural kinship between Britons and Prussians in his discussion about the two halves of Germany. Writing about the warmth and hospitality of southern Germans, he asserts: 'The South German has more affinity with the Frenchman, the Northman with the Scandinavian or Englishman.' Thus McLaren adds, emphasizing the temperamental affinities of the Anglo-Saxon and the northern German:

In one respect there is a strong resemblance between the genuine Anglo-Saxon and the Prussian [emphasis added], and just as strong a contrast between him and the Munchener. The Englishman, the Berliner, the Hanoverian, and the Holsteiner are chary of making new acquaintances.

Other accounts examined include a brief article that appeared in the journal Modern Language Teaching in 1913. Entitled 'Impressions of a First Visit to Holland and Germany', the article contains generally positive impressions of Germany, evoking the Germans' good dress, clean towns and 'great pride'.

Favourable impressions of Germany were also recorded by Richard Thomsett, a British army officer and author of A Trip through the Balkan States and Impressions of Germany and Austria (1909). In this book, Thomsett too remarks about the cleanliness of
German towns and of the German 'humbler classes', noting that 'there is an air of respectability and marked cleanliness even among the poor'. The policemen, though 'like soldiers', are nonetheless 'extremely polite and civil'. And while Thomsett observes that the German waiter lacks humour, he is deemed to be more intelligent and cleaner than his English counterpart.\textsuperscript{47}

In sum, prewar British impressions of Germany were laden with images of organizational efficiency and cleanliness. The German people were generally seen as being obsessed with order and regulations, well-disciplined, hard-working and humourless, but well-mannered and hospitable. Some of the Germans' eccentricities, such as their eating habits, were treated with a degree of condescension. This disdain, however, was tempered by an overall attitude of respect for Germans, coupled with a feeling of kinship with them. Thus the British stereotypical images of Germany were not dominated by 'antagonistic' elements.

\textbf{Germans in Britain}

Some of the British accounts examined above viewed Germany with a measure of superiority and condescension. Those written by Germans in Britain tended to assume a similar attitude. Being works published in Britain, these are relevant and have thus been included in this discussion. An anonymous article in the \textit{National Review} in 1905 is an example, though it must be pointed out that this work, along with the others examined in this section, is more a commentary than a record of first-hand impressions. The author, while acknowledging the hospitality he has enjoyed during his residence in Britain, admits his views may be considered 'repugnant' but adds that 'he is the truest friend who speaks out plainly and bluntly the truth as he sees it'.\textsuperscript{48}

His first line of attack comes in the field of patriotism, which he accuses Britons of lacking. 'The first fact that strikes me is the indifference of Englishmen to their individual
duties as citizens of a great Empire.' He contrasts this state of affairs in Britain with the martial upbringing prevalent in Germany. 'We Germans are taught and trained in our schools from boyhood upwards that our country has a great claim upon us. We are taught to glory in Germany, and the noble deeds of German heroes in the past.\textsuperscript{49}

He then moves on to education, an area of recognized German superiority. Castigating the British emphasis on sports, he writes: 'We may not be so good at games as you are, but games are, after all, a very unimportant thing in life. You are mistaking the means for the end.' The public schools, he asserts, 'form character' but 'neglect intellect', while the primary schools train the intellect without paying attention to character. As a result, he claims, Britain has created two societies, 'one of which has character without full intellectual equipment, and the other a mediocre intellectual equipment without character' - hence, the reason that Britain succeeds in India ('where your men of character govern') but fails at home ('where your men of character are powerless before the characterless mob'). More instructive is his observation that 'I have found that boys fresh from Board Schools, whom I have employed, have little or no knowledge of the history of their own country.' 'I do not think you would find many Germans of the same age ignorant of Moltke', he insists.\textsuperscript{50}

In this German's view, the absence of compulsory military training has contributed to decadence and irresponsibility. 'I miss in your working class the sense of respect, cleanliness, punctuality and obedience which military service gives, while I see in it an inability to resist the allurements of drink'. Scornfully, he remarks that the British working classes 'expect everything to be given to them, and themselves to give nothing.' His derision extends to the politicians as well, whom he accuses of being 'ready to promise anything to the working man, provided it is at somebody else's expense'. Rather than being 'democratic government', the British parliamentary system constitutes, in his words, 'rule of the nursery'.

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With respect to town administration, he compares British incompetence - whereby the 'maximum of money is expended for the minimum of effect by a host of jarring authorities' - with the German reliance on experts who treat towns 'as a business and not as a matter of politics, or a means of supplying easy work to a number of very lazy men'. He cites Manchester ('the most dismal city in the world') and 'miserable' West Ham ('with its population of stunted degenerates'), and begs to compare them with the likes of Magdeburg and Essen.

Like the other authors encountered above, he cites insularity and 'haughty ignorance of the foreigner' as being fundamental characteristics of the British people. Suggesting that British misconceptions of Germany are reinforced by an irresponsible press, he also attempts to debunk some myths. As he writes,

To read some of your papers it would appear that Germans live on horse and dogs' flesh, working fifteen hours a day and paid infinitesimal wages.

Have the people who talk thus ever seen Mulhausen, Elberfeld, Cannstatt or Essen? ... Food is said to be fabulously dear in Germany, yet there are thousands of poor English families in my country living there for its cheapness.

Mariano Herggelet had been residing in Britain for fifteen years when his book* England's Weak Points * was published in 1912. In contrast to the biting criticism unleashed by the anonymous author of the National Review article, Herggelet starts with adulatory impressions of Britain, though it is inevitable that his account is also laden with simplistic stereotypes of Britons. He writes that among the British, the Scots 'are the simplest, the most hard-working, and the most energetic', and 'their language is much nearer ours than is English, since in it Anglo-Saxon has been most purely preserved'.
One must note that Herggelet's words of praise appear mostly to reflect a feeling of kinship. Racial overtones pervade his book. He observes:

Blessed with comeliness both of face and person, with proud, erect carriage and easy movements, with natural, unaffected, and manly gait, markedly tall and markedly slender, ... the Anglo-Saxons are beyond question among the finest races on the earth, if not the flower of all. This is to be attributed partly to ample nourishment and to the special climate, ... and partly, too, to that personal freedom which is the special pride and special glory of the Anglo-Saxons.54

His description of Britons certainly contrasts sharply with the population of 'stunted degenerates' characterized by the anonymous writer of the National Review article above. Among the qualities Herggelet ascribes to the British 'character' are 'gentleness, good-nature, forbearance, long-suffering, endurance, generosity, ... and goodwill towards every one'. 'Tact, refined feeling, and an outspoken preference for what is seemly, fitting, and suitable', he writes, 'are innate and instinctive in a Briton.' Consequently, from a 'purely human point of view', the British 'can hardly find a peer'. He also makes a significant observation that 'no one can get on as well with the British, or make friends with them so easily, as the Germanic nations, and ourselves especially'.55 Clearly an Anglophile, Herggelet was suggesting a racial and temperamental affinity between Britons and Germans.

He admits that describing England's weaknesses is 'much less pleasant' and 'extremely painful, indeed', and wishes to 'depreciate any suspicion of censoriousness'.56 Hence, Herggelet is from the outset claiming good intentions. Some of the British shortcomings which he addresses, however, deal precisely with 'character' and perhaps
inevitably, take the form of generalizations.

Among the rules of life which the Briton supposedly reveres are 'Never learn a foreign language', and 'Never learn anything about other nations', again a reference to British insularity. On the Englishman's idleness, Herggelet asserts that 'work seems to him to be the greatest evil on earth'. Thus, he points out that there are 42,000 Germans in London alone working as waiters and labourers because 'such hard work is not for the Englishman, who much prefers to be waited on.' In Britain, Herggelet argues, 'absolute idleness' is considered a 'distinction', and 'the highest praise possible for him [the Briton] is expressed in the words: "He is a splendid all-round sportsman!"' Again, the British preoccupation with sports finds itself an object of German mockery and a fixture in German stereotypical images of Britain. As might be expected, the lack of military training and discipline in Britain is also mentioned. 'If anything could save the English,' Herggelet claims, 'it would be sterner training at school and universal service under strict discipline.' In reference to British cultural decay, Herggelet opines that Shakespeare 'is treated as a stranger in his own country'. Thus whereas the British view of Germany was of a strict, martial and militarist society, the German vision of Britain was of an idle, undisciplined and ignorant people, with very little love for even their own literature.

The time in which Herggelet wrote was the period of Britain's quest for national efficiency based on the German model. We will now quote at length a passage from Herggelet's narrative which views with derision the incompetence with which that British quest for efficiency is carried out. Herggelet observes:

An English town council frequently discovers that some existing arrangement is entirely inadequate. ... Then some councillor, who has been abroad and has more insight than his fellows, points to Germany. ... [and] suggests sending a deputation to Germany, and this meets with approbation.
A grant of £250 is made amid great excitement, and five of the most intelligent councillors start. They are conducted in a sort of triumphal progress over half Germany ... They are properly astonished, take notes, are received, made much of ... Then they return home ... and make their report. Universal delight and many expressions of the public gratitude. The report is published ... And then no more is heard of it all.59

Thus, if from the British standpoint the Germans were efficient and well-organized, the British were, from the German viewpoint, ad hoc, clumsy and time-wasting.

Hans Ziegler, a German businessman, issued We Germans and Our British Cousins in 1909, in which called for the 'educated people' of both countries to enlighten the masses and turn them away from 'music-hall politics'.60 On the one hand, Ziegler was to a large degree an Anglophile. As he writes: 'We Germans most unhesitatingly and sincerely admit the personal superiority of the British nation in so many things'. Expressing the German recognition of British commercial prestige, he observes that a young German businessman 'with any desire to get on at all has to go over to England'. He further admits: 'we have made the study of English obligatory in all our public high schools'. Citing the deep appreciation for things British in Germany, he claims:

England is the example and the standard, and is respected by everyone connected with the German navy and mercantile shipping. A large number of English manufactures enjoy an extraordinary prestige amongst the general public in Germany. Whatever you may wish to buy in Germany, the shop-assistants will keep on repeating that this or that is 'real English'.61

Yet in extolling German virtues and strengths, Ziegler is less kind to Britain.
According to him Germany is 'unique', having a 'pronounced instinct for fighting and self-sacrifice'. He argues that 'we oppose ... the inflated idea of the superiority of the British race, but we are truly fond of the Briton as an individual.' Therefore, in similar fashion to McLaren who made a distinction between Germans as individuals and Germans as a collectivity, Ziegler too draws the divide and expresses a similar wariness of the collective Britain. Whereas he finds the individual Briton 'easy-going' and 'broad-minded', he would hesitate to 'express the same enthusiasm when taking the very same men collectively', citing as his reason his belief that Britons are 'less complete in their education' and generally 'tend to become politically superficial'.

The Idea of Racial Kinship

One should note that these accounts by Germans, though written as commentaries rather than personal journals, were produced first-hand by residents in Britain. Ziegler's book was targeted at the 'unsophisticated' bulk of the British people whom he wished to be better informed and to 'lose their partly innate feeling of superiority'. Incidentally, though, Ziegler also appealed to 'ties of race-affinity, common ideals of culture, and mutual respect', suggesting a sense of racial kinship. Thus while criticizing some aspects of British life, he was willing to cite the common ground shared by Britons and Germans. As Ziegler readily admitted, both countries were 'conscious of their intellectual power and fighting strength, both very practical and business-like, both possessing a wholesome individual egotism'. As he ponders:

Is it not a thousand pities that these two nations, who in every respect are so much alike, who in so many ways supplement each other, did not long ago come to a decision to pull together ...?
Hence Ziegler, while citing differences between the British and Germans, also points to their similarities, appealing to a deeper sense of shared ties, common ideals and cultural affinity.

In this period widely known for the rise of the Anglo-German ‘antagonism’, it may seem incongruous to find the many references made by Britons and Germans alike to the idea of common racial origins. As already seen, Wylie and McLaren respectively alluded to ‘family likeness’ and a bond between the Anglo-Saxon and Prussian. Wylie, referring to the Germans as ‘cousins’ and citing shared virtues, even called for an entente with Germany which in her opinion would be a more ‘fitting’ one than the one with France. On the German side Herggelet, while criticizing certain aspects of the British character, also expressed an affinity of feeling with, and respect for, the Anglo-Saxon race.

This idea of racial kinship can be found also in semi-political commentaries by British writers. One instance is an article which appeared in the Fortnightly Review in 1908. The anonymous writer, ‘H’, argues: ‘There is far more common ground between Britons and Germans than there is between Britons and French, and immeasurably more than there ever can be during this century at least between Britons and Russians.’ He adds:

The Germans are a capable, go-ahead race. They are good managers.

They are profoundly serious. They have little aptitude for the lighter side of life. In all these ways they are like the English and the Scotch, who form the vast majority of the British race.  

Even though the writer finds the ‘light-hearted surface gaiety’ of the French nature ‘more charming’ and ‘congenial’, and takes kindly to the ‘simple non-morality’ of the Russian character, he believes that ‘the mass of the English and Scotch people would feel entire sympathy’ with ‘the German view of life’. The author evinced little doubt that the British
and Germans should occupy the pinnacle of the racial hierarchy. 'Beyond question the British and the Germans are the two races most fitted to advance the orderly, competent administration of the world,' he insists. Hence, away from politics and diplomacy, one can detect evidence of British disdain of the French and Russians; the Germans, on the other hand, were deemed co-equals, a race fit enough to stand alongside the British in the work of civilizing the world.

An appeal to shared racial and cultural heritage was also made by Lady Phillips's *Friendly Germany*, a tract written in response to the growing Anglo-German tension. In this work, she argued that Britons and Germans are 'two great peoples' 'fitted by character, by blood relationship, and by a mutuality of interests to safeguard civilization'. Britain and Germany were, in her opinion, 'the soundest white nations' which should combine to fend off the coloured races of the world. Her appeal to Anglo-German solidarity indeed had strong racial overtones. As 'close cousins' to the Germans, Britons in her view 'are more Teutonic than most other European peoples'. Not only does she laud the British and German races as having sprung from a common stock, she cites as some of their particular qualities 'hard rationality', 'grasp of fact', 'quality of purposefulness', and love for a motive 'grounded in rational purpose'. From Lady Phillips's standpoint, then, Anglo-German tensions were merely symptoms of a quarrel between blood relations, a quarrel between similars rather than opposites.

It is further illuminating that she mentioned the British shortness of memory with regard to France and Russia. As Lady Phillips pointed out, less than a generation before the British voter had regarded France as a 'misguided foe'; Russia, meanwhile, had been 'Britain's one and only enemy. The Russian designs on India were manifest. Russian diplomacy, Russian cruelty, Russian relentlessness were the themes of every conversation'. In sum, she remarks: 'For France and Russia were, according to our augurs, as clearly determined on the destruction of the British Empire as Germany is represented to be to-
Echoing the same theme, 'H' reminded his readers that barely ten years ago Britain had gone to the brink of war with France. 'Yet to-day', he declares, 'my friend Bullock is of opinion that France and England are, ... by their natural instincts, bound to be good friends.' Similarly, as 'H' notes, until recently Russia was generally regarded 'with the gravest suspicion and distrust'. There was thus little correlation between political alignments and popular stereotypes of foreign nations.

In about 1909, the Daily Mail published a tract entitled Our German Cousins, a peek at German life and society containing virtually all the clichés already encountered in the British sources and aiming to disabuse the reader of commonly held misconceptions of Germany. The idea of shared kinship and virtues also surfaces in this book. It is argued that 'the naval spirit in the Kaiser is due very largely to his English blood', a hint at the German Emperor's own Anglophilism. Indeed, glancing through the chapter entitled 'German Views of England and the English', one acquires a strong impression of Anglophilism among Germans. English tailoring and haberdashery are described to be held in extremely high regard in Germany, as is the study of English: 'Every German family that can afford it will have an English "Miss". Moreover, 'nearly all horses and dogs have English names' and, echoing Wylie's contention that as individuals the Briton and German are practically soul-mates, it alludes to the number of Anglo-German marriages and adds: 'German naval officers make no secret of the fact that they get on better with British Navy men than with the naval officers of any other nation.' Afternoon tea, the quintessential British custom, is 'practically universal' in Germany; likewise, 'practically all the horse trainers in Germany are British'.

According to this work, then, Britain has had a tremendous influence upon German social institutions and cultural norms and is regarded with high esteem in Germany. But the book also cautions the reader to 'discriminate carefully between the people's attitude
towards Great Britain's position in the world and towards English manners and customs'.
In this dichotomy lies the difference between 'deep distrust and frank admiration'.
Therefore, in seeking to separate attitudes in politics from those in social customs and
habits, it is suggesting that we should distinguish the various layers that compose attitudes
and assumptions. It would indeed be too simplistic to categorize a German as an
Anglophobe who expresses distrust of the British government while being an admirer of
British tailoring habits.

Conclusion

In 1911 Katherine Mansfield's In a German Pension appeared on the literary scene.
The novel, a series of sketches based on her own stay at a pension in Germany, proved to
be a huge success, going into the third edition within a year. One can understand the
reason for the book's success. Its German characters are parochial, eccentric, old-fashioned,
or disagreeable. For instance Frau Fischer, a character based on a real person whom
Mansfield met at her pension, irritingly lectures the narrator of the story, who is for the
time being separated from her husband, that 'Every wife ought to feel that her place is by
her husband's side - sleeping or waking.' In another scene, one of the German characters
states arrogantly that she has never been to England but nonetheless declares, 'I have many
English acquaintances'. 'They are so cold!' she exclaims.

If this book was meant to be amusing in a sardonic way, it certainly impressed the
critics. The reviewer for the Daily Telegraph, for instance, commented on the work's
'touch of impishness'; the Pall Mall Gazette called it 'caustic'. The Times Literary
Supplement, meanwhile, observed: 'These sketches of life at a middle-class pension are
cleverly observant; but not agreeable. The point of view is jaundiced and the detail
unpleasant or ugly.'

So to what extent can one characterize this book as anti-German? Undeniably, it
helped propagate a negative image of Germans which found favour among its readers. Nevertheless, one's assessment of the book must be qualified by a consideration of the author's very own moderation, which was manifested subsequently by her refusal to have the book republished during the war. Even after the war, once more objecting to a reissue of the work, Mansfield remarked that *In a German Pension* was 'positively juvenile'.

Any discussion of stereotypes would have to take into account that while impressions and attitudes are variegated and complex, commonalities abounded as much as the differences. Indeed, there were limits to clear-cut portrayals of 'anti-Germanism' and 'anti-Britainism'. Generally, the German in the British stereotype was first and foremost efficient and sober; he was also ill-mannered, prone to making loud noise, obsessed with order, given to stern rules and regulation, lacking in humour, and imbued with militarist virtues. On the other hand, the stereotypical German image of Britons was laden with impressions of idleness, slovenliness, insularity, fastidiousness in table manners, obsession with sports, self-righteousness and complacency. Even if these images may seem 'antagonistic' and suggest a lack of common ground, the points of differences are not absolute for, beneath the polemics and prejudices of the time, the discernible commonalities in the British and German impressions of each other are remarkable. British observers tended to view Germany with a superior and condescending attitude, while simultaneously expressing a sense of respect for German accomplishments. The Germans, likewise, tended to regard Britons in a haughty and superior fashion, at the same time evincing fascination for British culture and customs. The constant allusions to racial kinship, familial ties, shared heritage and virtues, and temperamental affinities, are most striking. We might be heartened to note that in spite of the Anglo-German naval and commercial rivalry during the prewar period, observers from both sides were still referring to the other as 'cousin'. Moreover each side, in viewing the other, tended to distinguish between the collectivity - which it regarded generally with reservation - and the individual - which was generally
perceived in a salutary light.

Each side's sense of superiority, desire to be the best, and respect for the other, suggest that the strained relations between Britain and Germany may have been rooted in the two nations' similarities rather than their differences. In 1907 a group of British journalists made a trip to Germany on one of the many exchange visits organized during that time. Two of them returned summing up the irony that both Germans and Britons saw the other in like manner. As Sidney Low and Percy Bunting pointed out,

> Our notion of the Germans ... is that they are eaten up with pride, aggressiveness, domineering ambition, ready to use the mailed fist on anybody and grasp at anything; in fact, it is very much like the vision which many Teutons have of John Bull, who is pictured all teeth and claws and muscular grabbing hands.79

Our understanding of the Anglo-German 'antagonism' before 1914 may be enhanced if we regard it as a quarrel between relations rather than one between irreconcilable foes. Observers at the time certainly regarded it to be as such.

NOTES

1. I would like to thank Dr. Angela Schwarz for her advice on method and approach for this chapter.


4. Ibid., p. 488.

5. 'In and about a German Town', Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine 178 (Dec. 1905), pp. 804-18.

6. Ibid., p. 804.

7. Ibid., pp. 809-11.


10. Ibid., p. 27.

11. Ibid., p. 79.


15. Ibid., pp. 9-10, 111.

16. Ibid., p. 5.

17. Wylie, My German Year (London, 1910), p. 3.

18. Ibid., pp. 4, 23-5.

19. Ibid., pp. 33-5.


22. Ibid., pp. 280-2.


24. Ibid., pp. 260-5.


26. Ibid., p. 18.

27. Ibid., p. 83.
28. Ibid., p. 19.
29. Ibid., p. 81.
31. Ibid., pp. 7-12.
32. Ibid., p. 5.
33. Leonora Fairweather, An Englishwoman in Germany (London, n.d. [1912]).
34. Ibid., p. 26.
35. Ibid., p. 27.
36. Ibid., pp. 66-8.
37. Ibid., pp. 83-4, 121-3.
38. Ibid., pp. 118-9.
39. Ibid., p. 126.
40. A.D. McLaren, An Australian in Germany (London, 1911), 'Preface'.
41. Ibid., pp. 199-201.
43. Ibid., pp. 203-9.
44. Ibid., pp. 305-6.
46. Richard Gillham Thomsett, A Trip through the Balkan States and Impressions in Germany and Austria (London, 1909).
47. Ibid., pp. 178-82, 191.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., p. 626.
51. Ibid., pp. 627-31.
52. Ibid., pp. 632-3.


54. Ibid., pp. 4-8.

55. Ibid., pp. 8-10.

56. Ibid., pp. 10-11.


58. Ibid., pp. 23-5.

59. Ibid., pp. 33-4.


61. Ibid., pp. 8, 16-17.

62. Ibid., pp. 8-9.

63. Ibid., pp. 18, 34.

64. 'H', 'Why Not an Anglo-German Entente?', *Fortnightly Review* 84 (Sept. 1908), p. 399.

65. Ibid., pp. 399-400.


67. Ibid., pp. 9-11.

68. Ibid., p. 40.

69. Ibid., pp. 44-5.

70. Ibid., pp. 2-7.

71. 'H', 'Why Not Entente?', pp. 394-5.

72. *Daily Mail, Our German Cousins* (n.p., [1909]).

73. Ibid., pp. 19, 141-5.

74. Ibid., p. 137.


CHAPTER 6

THE BETRAYAL?

'The Betrayal (Germany 1914)'

We trusted you;- as one whose spirits tend
To some adventurous and high emprise,
Who, with low tone and quiet watching eyes,
Unfolds his heart to some beloved friend,-
So we for peace our labours did expend,
And shared our dearest hopes, scorning disguise,
With you, whom we, more confident than wise,
Held true, despite all warning, to the end.

So be it: you have swept our dreams aside,
And woken us to war,- since fight we must
When all we held most sacred is denied,
God will defend us: for our cause is just,
And swords against His justice beat in vain.-
And then,- Christ give us strength to trust again!

P.H.B.L.

Anglo-German academic ties before the war were not confined to members of the academic establishment, but extended to statesmen as well. Wilhelm II was awarded an
honorary Doctorate of Civil Law (D.C.L.) by Oxford University in November 1907, in a ceremony held at Windsor Castle. Having already seen the German Rhodes Scholarships established at Oxford in his honour, the Kaiser could thenceforth claim the university as his Alma Mater. The significance of the event, and the generally cordial attitude of Oxford which it symbolized, should not be overlooked. As Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann has noted: 'In 1985, the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, was refused the same degree by a majority of the Oxford dons, but no such opposition was voiced to the Kaiser in 1907. ... Whatever the individual feelings in Oxford may have been the Kaiser's political stance had not yet created sufficient antagonism to deny him the honour.'

At Oxford's Encaenia on 25 June 1914, three days before Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo, seven persons were conferred honorary degrees, of whom no fewer than five were Germans. These five were the Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Professor Ludwig Mitteis of the University of Leipzig, the composer Richard Strauss, the King of Württemberg, and the German ambassador to Britain, Prince Karl Max Fürst von Lichnowsky. The last two in fact were given their awards in special sessions of Convocation. Just a hundred years earlier, Wilhelm II's great-grandfather, Friedrich Wilhelm III, had also received an honorary D.C.L. from Oxford.

Although 1914 was to witness the beginning of a long, painful and costly slaughter in Europe, to many observers at the time that year was meant to mark the one hundredth anniversary of peace - a peace won by the joining of British and Prussian arms at Waterloo against the menace of French hegemony in Europe. Just on 11 June, the *Oxford Magazine* was proclaiming Lichnowsky's visit on the 3rd as 'an unqualified success' and signifying the 'best international friendships'. 'If only we have the like at the Encaenia, to glorify the Hundred Years of Peace with our Western kinsfolk!' the paper declared. How ironic, then, that the Encaenia held on 25 June, at which the Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Mitteis, and Strauss were honoured, was to herald four years of war with Germany.
In October 1914 the Vice-Chancellor of Oxford, Thomas Banks Strong, a theologian, bishop and the Dean of Christ Church, was to express the anguish and ambivalence of being at war with Germany. He lamented:

Now we are at war, and we are at war on such terms that it is difficult to see how a time of real friendship between the two nations can ever come again. Many of us here must have had friends in Germany; one of the first names of all the long list of killed in this war was one well-known and greatly popular in Oxford and specially in Christ Church, Marschall von Bieberstein. I do not think that the man who died so chivalrously was our Rhodes Scholar. I think it was an elder brother. ... the first name which gave me the shock which we all now dread on opening our papers, was the name of a German - now a foe.

It appears that the Vice-Chancellor may have had difficulty deciding where his full allegiance should lie - whether to the political entity which was his country, or to the personal ties of friendship fostered throughout the years. The poem above was published in the Oxford Magazine on 16 October 1914, expressing a sentiment of dismay, betrayal and shame. It evokes the image of the German as someone who was trusted and who shared a like-tempered spirit of 'high emprise', a member of the same community of ideals. Right to the end, he was deemed to be reliable but has now 'swept our dreams aside'. This was but one voice among many in Oxford, but it still suggests a point of view and sentiment which were probably widely shared in the British academic community.

'As a rule, good works are in German', the British historian Sir John Seeley wrote in the nineteenth century. One who held German culture and literary achievements in high regard, Seeley, the Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge from 1870 to 1895,
also owed a great debt to German historiography, having himself been a student in
Germany in his younger days. Preaching the 'German Gospel' to his fellow Englishmen,
Seeley regarded Germany less as a rival than as a 'great university', so deeply was he
imbued with the German influence. Commenting on Gustav Rein's work on Seeley, John
Herkless, in his introduction to the 1987 English translation of the book, notes: 'It is no
fluke that the only comprehensive treatment of Seeley should be by a German, even less
that it should have been written shortly before the First World War.' Even if Seeley was
dead by the time the war began in 1914, was the spirit which he embodied necessarily gone
altogether?

This chapter will be concerned with analysing British academic views of Germany
before the war through the study of textbooks, focusing on history texts written by British
historians, and published in Britain, before September 1914. Forming the core of the
sample are books which were found through a search in the British Library's on-line
General Retrospective Catalogue. Included in the sample also are works cited at the end of
Arthur William Holland's A Short History of Germany to the Present Day (1912) which
were put forth as suggested reading. Lastly, this study has consulted books constituting a
part of the Historical Association's collection of outdated history textbooks, whose titles
appear in A Catalogue of the Historical Association Collection of Outdated History
Textbooks First Published before 1915.

Although German history textbooks are of primary concern, textbooks on European
history have been examined as well. In all instances, the focus is on the treatment of the
modern period of German history. In order to obtain a substantial sample of textbooks, this
study has not confined itself to works published within the 1905-14 period, but has
included books dating back to the late nineteenth century.

The study of opinion in prewar British history textbooks on Germany has not yet
been undertaken in the English-language historiography. Valerie Chancellor's History for
Their Masters examines prewar opinion and attitudes but her work is confined to English history texts.¹³ In German, there is Manfred Messerschmidt's Deutschland in englischer Sicht, published in 1955, which deals with the image of Germany in British historiography from the eighteenth to the twentieth century.¹⁴ This book, however, does not undertake a systematic analysis of British history textbooks in the pre-1914 period and, as will be pointed out later, Messerschmidt's study contains methodological flaws which render his conclusions suspect.

A contribution to the literature on the image of Britain among German intellectuals is provided by Charles McClelland in his The German Historians and England. This work examines the appeal which Britain's 'national uniqueness' commanded among German historians during the nineteenth century.¹⁵

The views of British academics, let alone British historians, towards Germany in the prewar period have, however, been largely unexamined. Stuart Wallace's War and the Image of Germany concentrates on British academics' activities and attitudes during the First World War, not before.¹⁶ In addition, the use of school textbooks for ideological indoctrination in Britain also needs studying.¹⁷

But why focus on history and historians? First, historians constituted a significant component of the 'intellectual aristocracy' of Britain, perhaps more so than academics from other disciplines, especially among those who had received their education in Germany. As Noel Annan has demonstrated, the British intellectual aristocracy was a close-knit, and to a certain extent exclusive, community consisting of interrelated families that tended to occupy a large number of university chairs, fellowships, tutorships and public school masterships.¹⁸ Wallace affirms that: 'Before the First World War British intellectuals were a small group bound together by ties of kinship and shared assumptions based on intermarriage and common educational background (at the public schools and the older English universities).¹⁹
Secondly, history, arguably more so than any other academic discipline, had a considerable role to play in shaping public opinion before the war as well as after its outbreak. In fact, history was widely regarded to be an important socialization tool throughout the nineteenth century. The study of the past, rather than being an end in itself, was conceived as a means to higher goals - of building the individual's character, inculcating civic-mindedness and engendering patriotism. In short, history was generally seen as 'an agent of moral education'\textsuperscript{20} and the nursery of public virtue. The practical function of teaching citizenship through history indeed should not be played down. Seeley, for instance, regarded history as the basis for a 'science of politics' and, additionally, as a means of socializing man - in his own words, of teaching man 'his place in the republic of man'.\textsuperscript{21} It was Seeley who originated the axiom that,

\begin{quote}
`Without History, Citizenship has no root; without Citizenship, History has no fruit.'\textsuperscript{22}
\end{quote}

By the dawn of the twentieth century, the value of history for socialization purposes had not diminished. A teaching manual published in 1901 stipulated that 'history must be made to teach citizenship' in order to preserve the young people's 'sense of national continuity and social unity'.\textsuperscript{23} Albert Frederick Pollard, founder of the Historical Association in 1906, affirmed in a leaflet in 1911 that history 'provides a sound basis of politics'. In his opinion, 'everyone has to be a citizen; and he cannot be an intelligent citizen if he is utterly ignorant of the history of his country'.\textsuperscript{24} As late as 1913, there were voices from within the profession admonishing that 'unless the younger generation is more thoroughly taught the eternal principles of History and Patriotism, the Britain of the future must be a declining power'.\textsuperscript{25} The juxtaposition here of history and patriotism was no accident; it is very telling indeed that the two were considered to form an integral whole.
On the eve of war, in spite of the existence of moderate voices calling for the teaching of 'intelligent, but not blind patriotism', it had already become a deeply entrenched notion that history was meant to nurture patriotism in children, though there was disagreement over how extreme the forms of patriotism should take. When war broke out in August 1914, the role of history in boosting national feeling took on added importance. British historians, more so than academics from any other discipline, took the lead in rallying the country around the flag when hostilities broke out. The use of history in moral education and character-building, invariably, was to be reinforced during the war.

At the end of the Victorian era, history was becoming increasingly popular and had undoubtedly established itself firmly as an independent academic discipline in Britain, no longer a branch of other subjects such as literature or geography. History had in fact made great strides since the early 1800s. During this metamorphosis, history also became increasingly seen as a science, a branch of learning having its own 'scientific approach'. The appointment of J.B. Bury to the Regius Chair at Cambridge in 1902 marked the triumph of this 'scientific movement' in history. In his inaugural lecture entitled 'The Science of History', Bury argued that it was possible to lay down laws in history just as in the natural sciences.

History's rise in fortunes and status was confirmed in the Board of Education's Code of Regulations of 1904, which included history as one of nine subjects deemed essential for elementary school education. In that very year, George Walter Prothero, at that time president of the Royal Historical Society, co-editor of the Cambridge Modern History and editor of the Quarterly Review, took notice of the 'flourishing' of history at King's College, Cambridge, which was reflected by the 'improving numbers' of its students taking the subject. An address delivered by Thomas Hodgkin to the Historical Association in January 1908 further attested to history's coming of age in the early 1900s. Commenting on history's gaining of 'dignity and importance' during the previous fifty
years, Hodgkin remarked: 'I can well remember the time when the writing of history was looked upon as a literary accomplishment'. By 1908, undoubtedly, history had made sufficient progress to become more than just a literary venture. In that year also, Pollard had occasion to observe that history in the University of London was 'emerging from the contempt in which it was formerly ... held'.

History may have been released from its literary shackles but some old habits, norms and deficiencies still died hard. One should note that the Historical Association was founded only in 1906, an event which, as much as it signified progress in the development of history, was undeniably also a necessary and delayed response to a deepening predicament in the secondary schools. The main purpose of Historical Association's founding was to bolster history teaching in the secondary schools as it was widely perceived to be poor and underdeveloped at that level. Hence, despite the progress made, the study and teaching of history before 1914 still had to contend with various shortcomings. In 1908 the Principal Assistant Secretary of the Board of Education issued a circular conceding that it was still impossible to separate history from other subjects like literature or geography in the secondary schools. Another notable problem related to textbooks: as they were scarce and difficult to buy or borrow, it became a common practice not to use them altogether. As the circular noted: 'In some schools an attempt is made to dispense with the use of a text-book, and the instruction is entirely oral. This system has often been adopted as a reaction from the use of unsuitable text-books. Because history textbooks were few and far between before the war, their paucity accords each one added significance. As John Duckworth notes in his thesis on the history syllabus in English schools from 1900 to 1925: 'When we turn to the equipment of the schools, and particularly the provision of books, we find ourselves in an educational wasteland. It is for this reason that the textbook became so important, it was quite often the only book dealing with history in the school.' Hence, the history textbook was a rare
and highly valuable commodity when in use, being in many cases the only teaching resource available to the teacher - a testimony to the one still underdeveloped aspect of secondary-school history teaching at the time. As Duckworth explains: 'Teachers were often covering a syllabus in history that they had not drawn up themselves and therefore relied almost completely on lecturing to their classes or on using one textbook as a reader.' Indeed, in his study, largely confined to the public schools, Duckworth finds that 'many schools had only one textbook for the whole course'. The value of the textbook thus should not be underestimated.

The history textbook assumes additional importance as a primary source for our purposes because it was, and still remains, a vehicle for transmitting values and opinion. Whether intended or not by the author, the textbook did serve as a medium for his or her unspoken assumptions, values and worldviews. As Chancellor points out: 'Of all school subjects, history is perhaps the most obviously a vehicle for the opinions of the teacher and the section of society which he represents. It gives scope for the expression of a wide variety of political, moral and religious ideas'. Indeed, the expression of personal values and bias is intrinsic to the historian's craft. In the words of George Macaulay Trevelyan, a leading historian of this century: 'Because history is not an exact science but an interpretation of human affairs, opinion and varieties of opinion intrude as inevitable factors.' The pupils or students being young minds, textbooks and their opinions are no doubt prone to easy acceptance by their intended audience. The value of textbooks, and the role played by historians, in influencing opinion - and transmitting propaganda - in the prewar period should not be overlooked.

Attitudes towards Germany

In this study, we will concern ourselves primarily with textbooks published between 1880 and 1914. We will begin first with German history textbooks, followed by a
discussion of texts on European history. The texts will be treated thematically as well as in chronological sequence, according to the year of publication. After examining both types of textbooks, we will discuss our conclusions. Our objective also was to focus on Oxbridge writers. In the course of research, however, this goal was met by default as a very large number of history textbooks examined were in fact authored by historians who either were at that time, or had previously been, associated with Oxford or Cambridge. Although these texts in most instances do not evince clear-cut value judgement, they do betray hints of 'pro-German' or 'anti-German' attitudes.

Textbooks on German History

Between 1896 and 1903 Poultney Bigelow published in three volumes his work, *History of the German Struggle for Liberty*. The first volume opens with the story of John Palm, a bookseller in Nuremberg who was executed by Napoleon's occupation forces in 1806, symbolizing the subjugation of Germany by a foreign army. The dominant and unifying theme of Bigelow's work, then, is the German struggle for emancipation throughout the nineteenth century, from the period of Napoleonic despotism up to its ultimate realization in 1871.

In 1916, as the Great War was raging in Europe, Bigelow published another work entitled *Prussian Memories, 1864-1914*. In the opening pages, Bigelow cites pro-German army and navy officers who, in order to 'prove their social superiority', fill their rooms with photographs of the German imperial court - a proud display of Germanophilia. These officers, however, were in fact American. Bigelow and his works are not exactly central to this analysis as he was an American historian. He is nonetheless mentioned because he serves as an example of the prewar American historiography that viewed the unification of Germany as a liberation, the culmination of a centuries-long strife for
national actualization. How does Bigelow's analysis compare with British historiography of
the same period? Was his sympathetic treatment of modern Germany simply a North
American aberration? Or was it well-placed in the broader Anglo-Saxon historiography
spanning both sides of the Atlantic, enjoying a fair hearing in Britain no less?

* * * *

In this analysis of the British history texts, one discernible tendency among the
books was to view the Germany of recent times as a 'new' Germany, different from the
old. This theme is expressed in Modern Germany by Otto Julius Eltzbacher, who changed
his name to J. Ellis Barker after the outbreak of the First World War. The first edition of
Modern Germany was published in 1905 but the 1912 edition evoked the old-new
dichotomy, distinguishing the idealistic Germany - the 'sentimental' and 'day-dreaming'
Germany of philosophers, poets and 'backward peasants' - from the new, efficient and
ebullient Germany, an economic powerhouse. As Barker observes:

Modern Germany is matter-of-fact, hard-headed, calculating, cunning,
business-like, totally devoid of sentimentality, and sometimes even of
sentiment, and very up-to-date. But modern Germany and old Germany are
two different countries. New Germany is an enlarged Prussia. Old
Germany continues to vegetate and to dream dreams under the name and
under the banner of Austria ...

He then points out that the literary and philosophy figures such as Goethe, Schiller,
Schlegel, Fichte, Beethoven, Mozart and Haydn 'belonged to old Germany and were non-
Prussians'. The implication of this view is that the old Germany was benign and
idealistic; the new Germany, being an enlarged Prussia, is powerful and militarist, 'hard-
headed' and 'calculating'.

The Evolution of Modern Germany (1908) by William Harbutt Dawson, an avid writer on German life and institutions, echoed this dichotomy between the old and the new. Speaking of the 'new spirit' in German national life, Dawson referred to the reign of ideas in the early nineteenth century being superseded by 'the reign of matter, of things'. As he writes: 'A century ago Germany was poor in substance but rich in ideals; to-day it is rich in substance, but the old ideals, or at least the old idealism, has gone.'

Allusion to racial origins and reverence for the Teutonic race pervade many of the textbooks. Emily Hawtrey's A Short History of Germany, which appeared in 1904, starts against a backdrop of racial motifs. In her introduction, the author begins with an account of the origins of the various races before focusing on the Aryans. She writes: 'The mighty Teutonic or German race in Europe did not begin to play its part in history until the decline of the Roman Empire'.

In his work Teuton Studies, Sidney Whitman also evoked racial imagery in discussing the Germany of the past, exalting the Germans as 'a branch of the Teutonic race which again belongs to the great Aryan family'. Further describing the great strength and contributions of the German race to European civilization, Whitman writes in glowing terms that: 'Through centuries we note the old world vainly struggling against the constantly renewed force of the German race, tramping through Europe to the din of arms, laying the foundations of new peoples and dynasties in Germany, in Italy ... in France ... even in England'. It should be mentioned that Whitman, who in his youth had been sent to Germany for schooling, was a friend of Bismarck and an avid traveller to Germany. He once looked back on his early days in Germany as the period during which he developed 'a deeper and more thoughtful appreciation of the [German] people as well as the institutions of the country'. Here too he was wont to praise the 'Teutonic race' and the country which, in his words, 'has done much, and suffered even more, in the cause of human progress'.

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Though 'risen in the art of war', the new Germany, in Whitman's opinion, excelled in the 'arts of peace'. From his adulation of Bismarck, and of German life and culture, it is clear that Whitman was a faithful Germanophile.

Another theme common to most of the books examined is that the new Germany, being the creation of Prussia, had become essentially Prussified. Hawtrey, for instance, adopted this Prussocentric view of modern Germany's development in A Short History and her earlier work Outline History of Germany (1896), where she stated her aim as that of showing how Prussia 'came to hold its present position of importance amongst the continental powers of Europe'. But not only is Hawtrey Prussocentric, she is also sympathetic towards Prussian methods and objectives in her treatment of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. Citing the 'bitter jealousy' of the French who 'longed for a war' with Prussia, she notes: 'In warring against a common foe, all sectional prejudices were forgotten and hearts were knit together in a common loyalty to the Fatherland. France forced war upon Germany and ignorantly helped her to achieve unity.' Therefore, France is viewed as the agent provocateur. Hawtrey's pro-German attitude could not be more obvious than when she refers to Bismarck, Wilhelm I, Friedrich III and Moltke as 'men of intellect and of indomitable will, and God-fearing men whose faith in the God of nations helped them to lay deep and broad the foundations of the Empire'. From Hawtrey's standpoint, the new Germany is in fact a force for peace in Europe under the leadership of Wilhelm II. 'Germany is a progressive nation and has a progressive Emperor. ... no longer do people feel that European peace is imperilled', she claims.

Hawtrey was by no means the only one to adopt a Prussocentric view. James Wycliffe Headlam's Bismarck and the Foundation of the German Empire (1899) explores the theme of German nationhood with an emphasis on Bismarck's role. Professor of Greek and Ancient History at Queen's College, London, from 1894 to 1900, Headlam was also an expert on German history and served as a staff inspector of secondary schools for the
Board of Education from 1902 until the outbreak of the First World War. Bismarck, viewed as the leading protagonist of German unification, is here treated in very laudatory terms. Discussing Prussia's war with Austria in 1866, Headlam claims that 'Bismarck was no Napoleon; he had determined that war was necessary, but he did not go to the terrible arbitrament with a light heart. ... It was his strength that he never forgot that he was working, not for himself, but for others.' Thus, Bismarck is portrayed as a magnanimous and truly honourable statesman. He is also credited with creating the North German Confederation after the defeat of Austria. The constitution of the confederation, according to Headlam, 'was his [Bismarck's] work, and it shows the same intellectual resource, the originality, and practical sense which mark all he did'—providing yet further adulation of the man.

Like most other authors, Headlam places the onus of responsibility for the outbreak of the war of 1870 on the French who, with 'growing discontent and suspicion', believed that the supremacy of France was being threatened by 'this new power', Germany. Is Bismarck then viewed as a wanton warmonger? Absolutely not, for he is portrayed as having gone to war only as an absolute necessity, and with clear gains for Prussia. As Headlam explains: 'We may be sure that Bismarck would not have gone to war unless he believed it to be necessary and desirable, and he would not have thought this unless there was something to be gained.' According to Headlam, there was one reason that made war with France 'almost inevitable': the unification of Germany. Here again, German unification is seen as a good and war is implied to be justified in order to bring it about. Prussian militarism is not mentioned at all, and the guile of Bismarck in provoking the French is not even mildly criticized. According to Headlam, the one way to effect the union of the German states 'almost without resistance' was, 'if France were to make an unprovoked attack upon Germany'- an attack which would arouse the 'strong national passion' of the German states and cause them to set aside their differences. This
provocation was duly provided by the French government following the 'Ems telegram'
episode, which Bismarck seized upon to manipulate public opinion in Prussia's favour. It is
quite obvious where Headlam's sympathies lie. Characteristically, there is little in this book
which views the new Germany as a threat to Europe's balance of power or an anathema to
Britain's interests.

Headlam's favourable and supportive view of Bismarck and Germany is echoed by
W.W. Tulloch in The Story of the Life of the Emperor William of Germany (1888). In
Chapter 4 entitled 'Bismarck', for instance, Tulloch writes that 'Bismarck's presence and
counsel were a great help to the King in every way. He had now some one with whom to
share his anxieties.' In his discussion of the war with France, Tulloch similarly adopts an
anti-French position, treating the war as the culmination of French envy and jealousy of a
new power in Europe. He observes: 'War between France and Germany was only a
question of time and opportunity. France was eager to try conclusions with a state which
threatened to usurp her hitherto unchallenged sway as the greatest power on the Continent.'

At the same time, even if Bismarck is depicted as an opportunist, he is nonetheless
exonerated by his wish to achieve unification. Thus, though Bismarck and the German
statesmen 'did not in all probability do anything to hasten the catastrophe', they 'saw that
their great dream of thorough national unity could be attained in no better way than by a
war with France'. The war therefore was a means to national unity, an end which Tulloch
implies justified the defeat of France. Again, the emergence of a new power at the heart of
Europe does not evoke fear in Tulloch. Citing the German Emperor Wilhelm I's speech
made at the opening of the first Reichstag of the new empire, he embraces the view that
Germany will preserve the peace of Europe rather than threaten it. As the Emperor stated,
'Our new Germany ... will be a trustworthy guarantee of the peace of Europe.' And with
this view Tulloch takes no issue. He is no less exultant in his treatment of Wilhelm II,
referring to him as 'the incarnation of duty, and the soul of honour'. The Prussian army,
rather than a menace to Europe, is regarded as a symbol of Prussian and German greatness. Writes Tulloch: 'If Prussia was to become great, it would be by means of her army.'

* * * *

It is clear that British history textbooks on Germany tended to look upon the German Empire with approval, despite its Prussification and alleged hard-headedness. The new Germany indeed was not generally regarded with alarm or hostility. James Sime, for instance, notes in his *History of Germany* that the German Empire 'is the restoration of the old German Kingdom rather than of the Holy Roman Empire'. From his viewpoint, the new Germany does not constitute a threat. 'Some fear lest Prussia should become too powerful, and the various German States be moulded too much after one pattern. But influences remain to prevent such a result,' he asserts.

First published in 1874, Sime's book constituted a volume in the Historical Course for Schools series and was issued in a second edition in 1909, the year of the naval scare. As was typical of textbooks of that period, his narrative is straightforward and simplistic, devoid of analysis and given to generalizations. The first chapter deals with 'Ancient Germany' and it is interesting to note that at the outset he explores the racial origins of the Germans, even if in a generalized way, relating their roots in the Aryan race and their attributes. The ancient Germans, he mentions, 'were generally tall and strong'. 'They could be fierce and cruel; but they were brave, truthful, simple in their manners, and hospitable.' Another notable feature of this book is that it was revised by Adolphus William Ward, 'than whom England can supply no one better fitted to deal with matters of German History of all dates', as Sime acknowledges.

President of the Royal Historical Society from 1899 to 1901 and Master of Peterhouse, Cambridge, from 1900 until his death in 1924, Ward was a historian of Germany who had spent many years of his childhood in that country. His father, John
Ward, had been the British Consul-General in Leipzig and Hamburg in the 1840s through the 1860s. A Germanophile, Ward had an honorary Ph.D. from Leipzig and was made Knight of the Prussian Order of the Crown in 1911.\textsuperscript{63} As one of his contemporaries observed: `All through his life Ward was anxious to do all that was in his power to emphasize friendly relations between the land of his birth and that of his early education.'\textsuperscript{64} This commitment to Anglo-German rapprochement was reflected in his membership in the Anglo-German Friendship Committee and his efforts in bringing about the visit of German journalists to Cambridge in 1906.\textsuperscript{65} Along with George Prothero and Stanley Leathes, Ward was co-editor of the \textit{Cambridge Modern History}, a series inspired by Lord Acton, Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge from 1895 till his death in 1902.

In the second edition of the book, Chapter 21, by R.P. Mahaffy, was added at the end to deal with `recent events'. Entitled `The Period of William II', this chapter could hardly be more adulatory in characterizing the Emperor as `the truly remarkable sovereign', an embodiment of `the energy, the courage, the intellect and the resource of a powerful and progressive nation'. This in itself sets the tone for the ensuing narrative of recent events. In his discussion of the German colonies, Mahaffy refers to the 1890 Anglo-German agreement as `an admirable business arrangement' based on Lord Salisbury's precept that `there was room for everyone in Africa'.\textsuperscript{66} Hence, the book cites the agreement as an example of accommodating Germany and bringing positive results to Anglo-German relations.

In discussing `The German Navy', Mahaffy provides primarily a descriptive account that traces the origins of the German navy beginning in 1891 through the naval laws of 1898 and 1900 which laid down the battleship construction programme. The naval expansion, he states, `filled the English nation with anxiety'. Furthermore, Britain by now `fully realized' Germany's growing trade. `Thus commercial rivalry together with the irritation caused by a violent press inflamed English feeling against Germany.'
Nevertheless, the book then points to moderating influences which helped neutralize this growing tension. As Mahaffy observes: 'Happily there were other causes which made for better feelings between the two countries.' Citing 'commercial interests', he mentions that Britain is Germany's 'best customer', further pointing to the pacific intentions of the British and German monarchs who have undertaken efforts in recent times to improve Anglo-German relations. Reinforcing the idea of Anglo-German interlinkage, Mahaffy points to military ties, particularly the bestowing of the rank of Field Marshal on the German Emperor, and Lord Roberts's receipt of the Order of the Black Eagle, 'the most distinguished of Prussian orders'.

Between pages 291 and 292, the book deals with 'A Greater Navy', predicting that the British government 'will be compelled to adopt a programme of construction which will outpace even the break-neck programme of the Germans'. This constitutes but a brief examination of a thorny and central issue in Anglo-German relations. On page 292, the book moves on to the German army, which is described as 'a very great tax on the people' because of its harsh regimen. Yet, according to Mahaffy, 'the nation' realizes that 'popular or not, a great army is a necessity for Germany, and that the Emperor must be supported as the one force that keeps Germany together'. Thus, in his analysis, the German army is a necessity, tied as it is to the imperial idea. But more importantly, the army is not seen as an evil.

Addressing the issue of 'Germany in 1909', Mahaffy observes that in that year Germany had no 'cordial friends' in Europe except for Austria-Hungary. Nevertheless, he does make a passing remark about the naval crisis of 1909 in stating that Britain was 'much estranged by the ominous activity of the German shipyards'. This notion is, however, moderated by a laudatory view of the German people's industriousness and spirit. Germany, he declares, possesses 'one great asset, - the industry, wealth, and prosperity of her people'. Referring to Germany's rapid rise during the last thirty years, he writes
reverently of the 'sleepy old towns' which have now turned into 'teeming hives of industry',
adding: 'That all these things should have been done in thirty years' time is one of the most
remarkable facts in the recent history of Europe.' Hence, while alluding briefly to the
Anglo-German naval rivalry, he attempts to temper that view by pointing to the hardy
qualities of the German people.

Even when examining the 'Position of the Emperor', the book also evinces a strong
sympathy with the Kaiser. Apologetically, Mahaffy remarks: 'Like almost all clever men,
he makes mistakes; but he has a genius for leadership, intense devotion to his country and
duties, and, on the whole, sound judgment.' Next, Mahaffy portraits Wilhelm not just as an
Anglophile but as an Englishman. As he argues:

Though regarded in England as the personification of Germanism, he [the
Kaiser] is, in fact, very much of an Englishman. His large ideas of empire,
his contempt for idleness and respect of commercial and business success,
his love of the sea and devotion to the most arduous of sports, are not the
usual characteristics of a German.69

Lastly, the chapter ends with Germany's cultural contributions to the world.
Typically, German achievements are applauded. 'During the nineteenth century', Mahaffy
declares, 'Germany has maintained in philosophy, science, and literature the high place
which she has previously won.'70

The timing of the second edition's issuance should not be overlooked within the
broader context of international political developments. After the naval crisis of 1909, a
handful of history textbooks on Germany were in fact published in response to what was
perceived as a heightening Anglo-German crisis. But contrary to what one might expect,
these books tended to act more as voices of moderation and reason than as instigators of
hostility. Hence, rather than contribute to the Anglo-German tension, they sought to effect a conciliation. This brings us to the question of how historians viewed their roles within the broader social context, outside of academe.

Take for instance the afore-mentioned work, *A Short History of Germany to the Present Day* by Arthur William Holland, published in 1912 by the British-German Friendship Society - a fact which should alert us to the tone and purpose of the book. The direction in which it intends to take its reader is suggested already by the content and tone of its Introduction, which delves into the origins of the names of the countries. Explaining that 'England' is derived from the Angles, Holland goes on to tackle the origins of 'Germany' and points out that the three names by which Germany is commonly known - 'Germani', 'Deutschland' and 'Allamagne' (sic) - are 'the result of accident'. This chance origin of the name of the country, Holland suggests, is 'often responsible for wrong ideas'. His underlying thesis is that the Anglo-Saxons and Germans share a common heritage which is not readily apparent from the name 'Germany'. Britons and Germans, he asserts, 'belong to the same race, to the race which ... we call Teutonic, or Germanic'. Holland adds that

The ancestors of each lived, side by side, on the plains of Central Europe, speaking dialects of the same language, with manners and customs, habits and ideas, which were very much alike. Now this important fact is very often forgotten, partly because there is no connection between the words England and Germany.71

Affirming Anglo-German racial ties, he argues: 'The Saxon race has played a great part in the history of the German people, and to it we are allied by ties of kinship; nor to it only, but to all those tribes whose descendants form the German nation of to-day.'72 Therefore,
the book begins with the race motif before proceeding to give an account of Germany's history from the early period to the present day. It is significant that Holland starts by alluding to the link that binds the English and the Germans, rather than the causes of recent Anglo-German tension. As we will see, racial kinship was very commonly evoked as a unifying factor.

Throughout his narrative, Holland maintains a neutral tone. Even if he does not on the surface sound pro-German, neither is he overtly anti-German. Nevertheless, in his discussion of the modern period of German history, it becomes evident where his sympathies lie, especially when dealing with the formation of the Second German Empire in 1871. On the Franco-Prussian War, he observes: 'This great war, waged by Germany under the leadership of Prussia, made the union of the whole nation possible ... In the great hall of the palace of Louis XIV. at Versailles, on the 18th of January, 1871, William I. of Prussia was proclaimed German Emperor and the German Empire as it exists to-day was founded.' Though not exactly jubilant, his account nonetheless comes across as sharing an enthusiasm for the new Reich.

Towards the end of the book, the conciliatory intent of the book manifests itself more clearly under the heading 'The Germans as a Commercial People', followed by 'Germany's Place "In the Sun"'. Holland reminds the reader that the Germans are 'first and foremost' a commercial and industrial people. 'Their prime interests', he argues, 'are neither naval nor military, nor colonial, nor even educational, but commercial, and the extent to which the trade and manufactures of the Empire have increased during the past forty years is one of the most striking facts in the whole history of industrialism.' Here, then, Germany's rapid economic ascendancy is praised. He goes on to assert that 'a commercial nation is, of necessity, a peaceful nation,' tenuous as the claim was shown to be in 1914. The basis of Holland's argument is that a war would do more harm than good to a commercial nation and therefore, the 'aggressive spirit' displayed by Prussia in the past
is truly a thing of the past. As he explains: 'Prussia, after years of struggle, has attained the position which she sought, and Germany, under her leadership, has now no need to fight unless it is to protect her great commercial interests, a right which she retains in common with every other civilized Power.' It should not be surprising that this book, published by the British-German Friendship Society, was evoking the Norman Angellite theme of economic interdependence to argue for the peaceful intentions of Germany.

As for Germany's compulsory military service and naval buildup, Holland too offers a justification. Military service, he argues, rather than making for belligerency, 'tends to keep the people peaceable'. He defends the German navy on the ground that Germany, with a growing population, has to rely increasingly on imports to feed her people and her navy is therefore essential to protect her overseas trade and food supplies. 'She [Germany] is now passing through the same experience which Great Britain passed through after the repeal of the Corn Laws,' Holland contends, and adds: 'No country knows so well as our own the vital importance of being able to protect its trade, and more especially its supplies of food by means of a large navy; and this consideration is becoming of almost equal importance to Germany.' One should note here that Holland is attempting to elicit the reader's support and understanding by evoking Britain's own dependence on her navy and trade routes. Incidentally, the justification he provides for the German navy was the official line given by the German government.

This apology for Germany is carried on even further when Holland raises the point that Germany has to guard against the Russian menace to her east. 'We, who have carried our commerce into all the quarters of the globe and planted there our colonies, cannot blame the Germans for perceiving that the price of liberty ... is a sleepless vigilance.' Even if Germany's vast expenditure of armaments is to be deplored, Holland suggests, 'we may ask Englishmen to bring themselves to look at this matter for a moment from the German point of view'. It should not be surprising that he takes the side of the Germans vis-à-vis
the Russians. After all, the Teutons were deemed to belong to the same family as the Anglo-Saxons - a notion to which he directs his reader yet once again. 'Let us then remember our common origin and the long years of our friendship', he supplicates. It is only logical then that his next heading deals with 'Education in Germany', an area widely regarded to be the envy of Britain. As he notes: 'The German universities are famous, and rightly famous, throughout the world.'

As might be expected, the book concludes by reiterating the ties that bind the countries. The Anglo-German naval race and Germany's commercial rivalry with Britain are barely touched on - a very telling omission. Closing the book under the heading 'Links between England and Germany', Holland does not even attempt to conceal his agenda. 'Readers of these pages,' he declares, 'and all who have paid attention to the history of Germany will perceive how close and numerous are the ties which link the peoples of that country and of England, and how unnatural would be any serious or lasting estrangement between them.' 'The two peoples are of the same blood,' he reminds the reader. 'Their institutions developed side by side.' Ultimately, then, Holland returns to the oft-repeated themes in his quest for Anglo-German friendship by citing the characteristics that bind the two peoples.

This book was subsequently issued in a second edition in 1913 with a foreword by Norman Angell, who defended the author's aim of presenting the German point of view. Insisting on the book's impartiality, Angell argues: 'A knowledge of what it [the book] contains is necessary if we are to understand rather than to misunderstand one another.' But given the work's goal of effecting Anglo-German reconciliation, Angell's claim of impartiality may indeed seem dubious. Undeniably Holland was taking on the role of a publicist. Consequently, the impartiality of the historian can also be called into question. These textbooks cast much-needed light on how historians viewed their role in society and in the political debates of the day.
That some historians did not regard themselves purely as educators but also as policy advocates and propagandists through their specialized medium is demonstrated further by the publication of *Germany in the Nineteenth Century* (1912), by John Holland Rose, et al. A scholar on Napoleon, Rose was Reader in Modern History at Cambridge in 1912. This book contains an introductory note by Richard Haldane, who writes that 'such forces as we possess and such forces as Germany possesses could, if brought in aid of each the other, effect great things for the benefit of humanity at large.' Haldane asserts: 'The call of the hour is for co-operation, and this requires mutual sympathy, and therefore mutual study.'

The book then proceeds with the first part entitled 'The Political History', written by Rose. Observing that the 'strong individualism of the Teutonic nature ever made for division' up to the nineteenth century, Rose upholds and extols Bismarck's role in bringing about the unification of Germany. Specifically, he explains that Bismarck has often been quoted out of context and misunderstood when called the man of 'blood and iron', and suggests that Germany's annexation of Alsace and Lorraine consequent to the war of 1870-71 is justified by her security needs. 'We who live behind the rampart of the sea know little (save in times of panic) of the fear that besets a State which has no natural frontiers and which then had to reckon with three great military empires on its borders,' he contends. 'We must therefore not be too hard on the statesmen of the German Empire which was proclaimed at Versailles', Rose pleads.

Sympathy for Germany is further elicited by portraying France as the traditional troublemaker in Europe, the aggressor against whom continental coalitions had been built in the last century. According to Rose, the Germans after all 'were bent on building a barrier against French aggressions'. 'Look at the course of history since the time of Louis XIII,' he urges, 'and you will find that the efforts of British, Austrian, Spanish, and Dutch statesmen were directed mainly to building up Barrier-Systems against French aggressions.' In his
view, then, it is only understandable that the Germans should wish to 'end the French menace'. 'Probably, if we had been in their place, we should have done the same,' he reminds the reader. Emphasizing the persistence of the French threat, Rose adds: 'For if we look at the past, we find that our forefathers dreaded France far more than the wildest alarmists now dread Germany. And their dread was with reason. The position of France gives her great advantages for an attack on England and English commerce.'

Not only is France presented as a menace to Germany, but the spectre of French perfidy is raised against the well-being of British commerce. Evoking the French danger to Britain's security, he deflects the possible threat posed by the German Empire.

Rose indeed lays down a series of arguments to defend the German government against its common criticisms. He justifies the concentration of power in the Kaiser and the Chancellor on the basis that the German Empire, as a confederation, needs a strong executive and 'firmness' to conduct its diplomatic and military affairs. Appealing to the conservative instincts of his reader, Rose shrewdly evokes the red menace of socialism to bolster his case in defence of the Kaiserreich. As he writes:

Of late years the growth of Socialism has furnished another cause why the authorities cling, as for dear life, to the control of every wheel of the administrative machine. ... It would be impertinent for a foreigner to dogmatize as to the wisdom or unwisdom of this procedure.

Not surprisingly, remarking that 'the aims of the German rulers and of their Chancellors have been on the whole peaceful', Rose cites Bismarck's support for Britain at the Congress of Berlin of 1878 as evidence that 'German policy was far from being as anti-British as was often believed'. But what about Germany's military power right in the heart of Europe? Here, Rose points to the precariousness of Germany's geopraphical
position, sandwiched as she is between powerful neighbours. 'She has no natural frontiers on the East, and poor barriers on the South and West. Her policy', he insists, 'is therefore almost necessarily defensive.' Little does he mention, of course, that in spite of her geopraphical position, Germany has achieved unification and spectacular military victories in the last century. The cause of Germany's insecurity is instead laid at the doorsteps of France and Russia. Rose argues that 'Germany cannot well be an aggressive Power so long as the Franco-Russian alliance endures', the implication being that the Franco-Russian alliance, forged in 1894, is to blame for Germany's armaments, and that France and Russia remain the real aggressors. Reiterating Germany's vulnerability, he argues:

> Germany accomplished a wonderful work in unifying her people ...; but even so she has not escaped from the disadvantages of her situation; by land she is easily assailable on three sides; by sea she is less vulnerable; but there she labours under a great disadvantage, viz., that her oceanic commerce has to pass through the Straits of Dover and down the English Channel, within striking distance of the French and British fleets at Brest, Plymouth, Cherbourg, Portsmouth, and Dover. This is what makes her nervous about her mercantile marine. This is what makes her build a great fleet; and again, I say, were we in her situation we should do the same.83

His analysis consists in doing nothing more than offering a series of apologies for Germany, choosing to emphasize only her disadvantages and the obstacles in her way, while totally ignoring the alternative view that her ascendancy in the late nineteenth century had been a source of anxiety and unease in Europe. Germany's naval buildup is justified on the ground that her commerce is vulnerable; yet again, Rose attempts to draw his reader's sympathy by alluding to Britain's own reliance on sea power to guard her trade,
thereby employing the same ploy used by Holland to justify Germany's battleship programme.

It is worth noting that Rose regards German unification as a 'wonderful work', not as upsetting the European balance of power but as conducing to the 'peace of the world'. The German Empire is indeed exalted for, as he claims, 'it is demonstrable that the formation of the German Empire has been a gain to Europe and therefore to Great Britain'. In Rose's analysis, Germany has exerted a peaceful influence on Europe because, by being a strong power at the heart of the continent, she has precluded future wars, and more particularly, future invasions by France. As he argues, the wars of unification 'put an end, once for all, to the possibility of waging predatory wars against the hitherto unguarded centre of the Continent, thereby removing a temptation to war which had so often lured France into false courses in the previous centuries [emphasis added]'. It is thus very clear that from Rose's standpoint, France still remains the main source of instability and the instigator of conflict in Europe; the strong German Empire, a welcome presence in checking that French menace, has, in his own words, 'maintained the peace for 40 years'. Making an assertion which was to be nullified in 1914, Rose observes that German unification 'at one stroke' brought about a balance of power in Europe 'in so decisive a way as to make a great war the most risky of ventures'.

Part Two of the book consists of 'The Intellectual and Literary History', by Charles H. Herford, the Chair of English Literature at the University of Manchester from 1901 until 1921. Here he characterizes early nineteenth-century Germany as 'a series of discordant states, ruthlessly trampled on and dismembered', a reference to the Napoleonic invasion. Yet, Herford asserts, from this period emerged the 'culminating moments' of Germany's cultural development. 'The poor, ragged Cinderella of Jena and Eylau reappeared as the radiant queen of the ball, outshining both the proud elder sisters, though they were too proud, and she, as yet, too humble to be aware of it,' he observes. The apologetic tack is
carried on further by Herford in his discussion of Germany's intellectual makeup. Though conceding that the rigid Bismarckian state has 'some grave defects', Herford claims that 'this autocratic will is inspired and directed by a powerful if incomplete social sense, and precise, if incomplete, social ideas', and it is carried out with 'intellectual competence'.

Even if Herford's essay is supposed to deal mainly with Germany's intellectual history, he nonetheless does not desist from countering critics of the Bismarckian state, especially where freedom - or the supposed lack of it in Germany - is concerned. 'Let us beware of believing that Germany is less free than we in proportion as she is more controlled', he pleads, alluding to the divergent conceptions of freedom held by Britons and Germans. As he points out: 'Freedom, as ordinarily understood by us, is chiefly a negative idea, adequately conveyed in the assurance that we never will be slaves'. But on the other hand, he argues, the German idea of freedom 'is a positive and complex ideal, achieved by the individual in and through the organized state in which he plays his due part, and only fully enjoyed, as Goethe so finely said, when it is daily won'. Subscribing to the Rousseauian view that liberty can be achieved only through an individual's total surrender to his community, Herford therefore attempts to alleviate the authoritarianism of the German state by maintaining that freedom does exist in Germany - albeit in its unique form.87

E.C.K. Gonner then contributes 'The Economic History' in which he too attempts to exert a moderating view of Germany. As he points out, by the time of Germany's industrial spurt, which came later than Britain's, the German state had already acquired 'unusual dimensions' and so could 'act consciously' to carry out the country's economic development. Referring to the raising of tariffs in 1879, Gonner attempts to vindicate the German government's interference in economic matters by explaining that central authority and control are natural in Germany, having as she does a different conception of the state from the British. He writes: 'The State [in Germany] is expected to intervene and to act in
economic as in other matters. The only questions are as to the form and sphere of its action. Moreover, Gonner remarks that Germany's economic development during the late nineteenth century 'is liable to exaggeration' even if it has been 'extraordinarily great'. He further cautions that it would be a mistake to take a country's foreign trade 'as a sure index of its industrial advance'. The apparent intent of his analysis is to downplay the strength of the German economy and thereby also the threat of Germany's industrial competition.

The chapter 'The History of Education', is written by Michael Sadler, Professor of the History and Administration of Education at the University of Manchester from 1903 to 1911. Sadler identifies three periods in Germany's educational development running parallel to the periods undergone by Britain. Again, the role of the state is highlighted to contrast the developments in Germany with those in Britain. As Sadler notes:

The crucial difference between the history of German education and that of English during the nineteenth century lay in the different use which the two countries made of the power of the State. In Germany that power was exercised unflinchingly, with great forethought and clearness of purpose ... . In England it was used reluctantly, with deliberate rejection of any comprehensive plan of national reorganization and in the teeth of opposition which had to be conciliated at every turn.

Parallel to this divergence in the role of the state is a different intellectual tradition. According to him, Germany more than England has 'a greater sense of the national importance of the things of the mind'.

Sadler then goes on to discuss Britain's debt to Germany in education and culture, a tradition dating back to the days of the Reformation and reinforced in the nineteenth century by Samuel Coleridge and Thomas Carlyle, the latter of whom familiarized the
British public with the German ideas of state-organized education. Matthew Arnold, another nineteenth-century British education reformer, is also lauded for his role in disseminating and extolling German methods of organization. 'Of all foreign influences upon English educational thought during the last forty years', Sadler observes, 'the German has been, with the exception of the American, the most formative and penetrating. It has touched every grade of our education from the Kindergarten to the university.'

As might be expected, Sadler too draws the reader's attention to the ties that bind both countries in educational matters, highlighting their shared values and common roots. He claims that the British and German systems 'spring from and are governed by closely related ideas of life and duty'. Sadler adds: 'They are far more closely akin to one another than is either of them to the present educational system of France'. Hence, even in education one can detect a strand of thought which identifies a common kinship with Germany and which portrays France as an alien, coming from a different tradition and set of values. In closing, Sadler takes on the role of an advocate in urging that 'German and British education have much to gain from a closer understanding'. His generally favourable attitude towards Germany certainly bespoke his Germanophilism. An avid student of German philosophy and methods in education, Sadler in fact wrote numerous reports for the Board of Education expounding the German educational system.

In 1914 there appeared A Short History of Germany and Her Colonies, authored by Walter Alison Phillips, James Wycliffe Headlam and Arthur William Holland. An authority on modern Europe, Phillips was in that very year appointed to the newly created Lecky Chair of Modern History at Trinity College, Dublin. This book was reproduced from the eleventh edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1911), a detail which should hardly be surprising, given that Phillips was then the chief assistant editor of the eleventh edition of the encyclopaedia. The text of the book, therefore, was exactly the same as the encyclopaedia's under the heading 'Germany'. This work thus provides insight as well into
the view of Germany which the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* wished to propagate.

The *Short History* begins with the Frankish kingdom and the accession of Clovis in the fifth century and travels through the Middle Ages and the modern era. More than half of the book, however, deals with developments in the post-Napoleonic period. A few of the chapters in fact are concerned less with history than with issues of current affairs, carrying such titles as 'Internal Difficulties', 'Population and Language', 'Commerce and Shipping', 'Constitution', 'Local Government', and 'Army and Navy'. In Chapter 16, entitled 'Bismarck and German Unity', there is little doubt that Bismarck is to be credited for achieving German unification. The authors tend to take a favourable view of Bismarck, even while recognizing him as the Prussian minister of 'blood and iron'. From the authors' standpoint, 'blood and iron' have more positive connotations than negative ones. Bismarck, they write, thought that the German problem 'could only be settled by Austria ceasing to influence the German courts and transferring "her centre of gravity towards Budapest" ... that the problem could not be solved "by parliamentary decrees", but only "by blood and iron"'. 'For the supreme moment of this solution he was determined that Prussia should be fully prepared', they write reverently of Bismarck. Throughout, the chapter gives very little indication that German unification, or Bismarck's diplomacy, was undesirable. The blame for the Franco-Prussian War is placed upon France, an envious power 'irritated by the enormous increase of Prussian power'. The war is in fact credited for welding 'the dissevered halves of Germany together'. The absence of any criticism of Bismarck's shrewd and calculating policy is notable. Indeed, German unification is implied to be a natural and welcome development, a welding together of the various German states. As the authors put it plainly: 'War was now only a question of time, and the study of Bismarck was to bring it on at the moment most favourable to Germany, and by a method that should throw upon France the appearance of being the aggressor. The European situation was highly favourable.'
Chapter 17 deals with 'The New Empire', 'a new era in the history of Germany'.

This new era is viewed as signalling the end to the 'rivalry of the dynasties'. There is little hint that German unification is regarded as a conquest by Prussia. While pointing out that 'the history of the nation is centred in Berlin', the authors seek a balanced view by stating that the states still retain their autonomy and the princes their sovereignty. The fact that the German Emperor is far from being a constitutional monarch is also overlooked. The book maintains a favourable view of the constitutional arrangements, seeing the constitution as a firm bulwark and emphasizing its harmony in operation rather than its defects.94

By 1914 the Anglo-German naval race had certainly become a major issue of public debate. But in perusing the Short History, one might be lulled into regarding the naval rivalry as only secondary, judging by the scarce attention devoted to it. Chapter 25, entitled 'Naval Ambitions', is only three pages long. It starts by discussing the first Navy Law of 1898, which was followed by a turn toward colonial affairs. The Boer War, it is observed, 'helped to make the nation regret that their fleet was not sufficiently strong to make German sympathies effective'. But it is interesting to note that in their discussion of Germany's naval construction programme of the early 1900s, the authors do not evoke anti-German feeling in Britain, or even view the German navy as a threat. On the contrary, the vaunted German effort is implicitly seen as an expression of the strong German character. 'The same determined spirit which characterized German naval policy was evident also in her relations with the other powers,' it is declared.95

In treating the 'Army and Navy' in Chapter 35, the book deals very matter-of-factly with the 'nation in arms', which came into being after Prussia's defeat at the battle of Jena. The authors discuss briefly the system of military service, the command and organizational structure of the army, and provides statistics on recruits. Nowhere are any Prussian stereotyped images evoked, nor is Germany's compulsory military service suggested to be an evil. The German navy is only briefly dealt with, on one page, the discussion being
centred on its current size, administration and personnel. The book's final chapter carries the heading 'German Colonies', signifying that Germany's colonial ambitions still occupied top place on the agenda. This book, like all others, allows us insight into the authors' agenda by what it includes as much as what it omits, as well as by the manner in which what is included is treated.

As seen above, the few years preceding the First World War witnessed the publication and reissuing of numerous books on German history. None could have been more aptly titled than John Arthur Ransome Marriott's essay of 1911, *The Problem of German History*, as if suggesting that Germany and her history were a dilemma which had to be addressed and resolved. Marriott, at that time a Lecturer and Tutor in Modern History and Political Science at Worcester College, Oxford, laid down the problem of German history as being that Germany achieved political centralization late, only in 1871. But even so, according to him, 'unity has never yet been attained' as even in 1911 there still remained twenty-five sovereigns in Germany. In Marriott's view, the triumph of the centrifugal principle over the centripetal in Germany's past constitutes 'the central problem of Germany'. The 'forces of disintegration', however, slowly crumbled as a result of the Napoleonic wars, which 'evoked the latent spirit of nationality', finally climaxing in what Marriott calls the 'national uprising' of 1871 when German unification was achieved. There is little doubt that the attainment of German nationhood is seen as a positive development. Marriott claims: 'That uprising and the results that flowed from it are the crown and climax of German history. ... At last Germany has attained to nationhood; at last the German people have a common fatherland.' On this note, the book ends. German unification again is implied to be a positive development in Europe.
Textbooks on European History

This study will now turn briefly to textbooks on European history, which generally showed similar patterns in their treatment of Germany. Writing on European history, Walter Phillips's treatment of modern Germany was not much different from the discussions in his German history texts. In Modern Europe, 1815-1899 (1901) he repeated the same fundamental themes, seeing the Franco-Prussian War as marking the 'triumph of the principle of nationality'.

Take J. Holland Rose as another example. In his book The Development of the European Nations, 1780-1878, first published in 1905, Rose devoted a chapter to Germany entitled 'The German Empire', opening it with the coronation ceremony of the German Emperor in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles on 18 January 1871, and sharing in the celebratory mood surrounding the event. As Rose writes: 'the descendant of the Prussian Hohenzollerns celebrated the advent to the German people of that unity for which their patriots had vainly struggled for centuries'. Evoking the idea of a new Germany supplanting the old, Rose notes that the days of 'quiet culture and happiness are gone', replaced by 'a straining after ambitious aims'. Nevertheless, expressing a very supportive attitude towards the new empire, he hails German unification as 'the greatest event in the history of the Nineteenth Century'.

Rose had also authored an earlier book on European history entitled A Century of Continental History, first issued in 1889 with the fifth and final edition appearing in 1906. Here too he compared the 'eager competition and strenuous life' of the new Germany with the 'far deeper and more truly refined' life of the Germany of Goethe and Schiller. In the 1906 edition, he added three chapters dealing with recent events up to 1900, one of them being a chapter on 'The German Empire'. While characterizing the new Germany as 'a great industrial and military arena', Rose also upheld Bismarckian diplomacy as 'the strongest that the world has ever seen'. Alluding to the recent settlement of Anglo-
German colonial questions, Rose, hinting at racial kinship, in effect made a plea for peaceful relations between Britain and Germany. As he writes: 'it is surely time for the two great Teutonic peoples to cease from mutual recriminations, which in the main are the outcome of ignorance or misplaced jealousy'. One should note that he grouped Britons and Germans together as members of the same race, the Teutonic race. Calling for an end to their 'petty bickering', he regarded the current Anglo-German 'misunderstandings' as 'altogether unworthy of great and intelligent nations' - yet another instance of a historian's intrusion into the public arena of current affairs in an effort to stem the tide of Anglo-German tension.

In 1902 F.A. Kirkpatrick of Trinity College, Cambridge, edited a series of lectures under the title Lectures on the History of the Nineteenth Century. These lectures, delivered at the Cambridge University Extension Summer Meeting held in August 1902, were focused on recent developments in the major countries of Europe, and given by natives of those countries so that 'the most intimate and essential points of view might be presented'. The contributors sound familiar enough: among them were Adolphus Ward who delivered 'Some Aims and Aspirations of European Politics in the Nineteenth Century', and Rose, who lectured on 'England's Commercial Struggle with Napoleon'.

The lecture on Germany was given by Erich Marcks, Professor of Modern History at the University of Heidelberg. His lecture, not surprisingly, took a Prussocentric view of recent developments, being entitled 'The Transformation of Germany by Prussia'. Marcks also evoked the old-new dichotomy, the nation of power superseding the nation of thinkers, and the ascendancy of centripetal forces, finally culminating in the attainment of unity. More importantly, though, he also viewed the new German Empire as basically a Prussified Germany. Germany, as he points out,

has risen from disruption to unity, from weakness to strength; the whole
national character seems to have altered. The nation of poets and thinkers
has become a nation of power and business. ... Germany has become
Prussian.

In tracing Prussia's lead in bringing about the unification of Germany, Marcks suggests that
Prussia was bound to play the leading role as she was 'the only great power among
German states and so the only one mighty enough to carry through unification in the face
of Europe'. Nonetheless, he insists that, despite the Prussification of Germany, the 'old'
Germany is still alive. 'What is German and old, continues to thrive, along with the new
and the Prussian.'

Chapter 6 of the book consists of another lecture by Marcks, entitled 'Bismarck',
which traces Bismarck's life and career. On the whole, as might be expected, the lecture
adopts a complimentary tone and tends to adulate the Prussian statesman. Bismarck is
viewed as the embodiment of the new empire and 'the hero of the nation'. 'Never was
Germany so guided and enriched by a single hand,' Marcks proclaims.

Marcks, it should be noted, also attempted to play a role in similar manner to some
of the British historians in allaying Anglo-German tensions. In 1900 he had issued
England and Germany, which appeared in both German and English. In this work he
adopted a conciliatory tone, emphasizing the centuries-old historical ties that bound the two
countries, their shared cultural heritage, and their past political cooperation, to argue for an
improvement in Anglo-German relations. This invocation of the past to put forth
arguments relating to the present was, as we have seen, a common 'scholarly' tack
employed by historians in a propagandist capacity.

A.J. Grant's Outlines of European History (1907), dealing with events up to around
1900, also had kind words to say about the new German Empire, characterizing it as 'the
great example of a state, strongly and efficiently organized upon a monarchical basis'.

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One should also not overlook the treatment of Germany by the Cambridge Modern History, the voluminous work on ‘universal history’ planned by Lord Acton and recently described as ‘the monument of the English-speaking historical profession’ of the late nineteenth century. In volume 11 entitled The Growth of Nationalities, of the five chapters examining the political aspects of modern Germany, two were written by Adolphus Ward who, as already mentioned, was also co-editor of the series. In view of his Germanophilia, one could hardly expect Ward’s chapters, dealing with the revolution of 1848 and its aftermath, to be anti-German. Even in the other three chapters, the narrative is mostly devoid of bombast, undeniably more subdued in tone than some of the other books examined. This ‘dryness’ in the text was certainly in conformity with Acton’s desire for what he termed ‘impartial reserve’ and his proscription against ‘needless utterance of opinion’. So keen was Acton on impartiality that he insisted: ‘Our scheme requires that nothing shall reveal the country, the religion, or the party to which the writers belong.’ Yet it is still possible to detect hints of a generally sympathetic attitude towards Bismarck and Germany in this volume. For example, in Chapter 16 G. Roloff, of the University of Berlin, as though offering an apology for Bismarck, claims: ‘it can easily be shown that it was not in Bismarck’s power to avoid the war, since Napoleon had long been making careful preparation for it’. Writing on ‘The Franco-German War’ (chap. 21), Frederick Maurice affirms that the victory over France ‘made of Germany a united nation’, enabling her to ‘proudly claim to be the first military Power of the world’.

J.A.R. Marriott's The Remaking of Modern Europe, 1789-1878 (1909), while viewing the course of nineteenth-century German history as the Prussification of Germany, treated the triumph over France in 1870 as a historical necessity and a positive development in Europe. In contrast to the French Second Empire, which in Marriott’s opinion was ‘born in dishonour ... and perished in political penury’, the Second German Empire is portrayed as representing ‘the long-delayed consummation of an historical
evolution', corresponding to a 'genuine national necessity'. Even though Marriott's tone is
generally neutral, it is quite indisputable that his sympathies lie more with Bismarck and
Germany than France. Marriott too evokes racial imagery to extol the triumph of 1870,
even using the word 'folk' as though conjuring up the German notion of Volk. As he
argues: 'The whole Teutonic folk were united against the foe who had laboured for three
centuries to keep Germany divided and impotent.' Conforming with the book's central
theme of the rise of nationalism during the 1815-78 period, Marriott confers full import on
the attainment of German unification as the seminal event of the century, the triumph of the
idea of nationality. He asserts: 'The year 1870-71 is the culminating point of the political
history of the nineteenth century.'

Similarly to Marriott, L. Cecil Jane's From Metternich to Bismarck (1910), evinced
a pro-German and anti-French attitude in his treatment of the Franco-Prussian War. The
French Second Empire, he claims, was 'founded upon deceit and maintained by fraud'.
Bismarck, on the other hand, is cast in radiant terms as a 'god-fearing hero', the 'restorer of
unity to a long-divided race', and 'conqueror of his country's hated foe'. Here again,
German unification is implied to be a welcome development, and Bismarck is presented as
a noble statesman. Jane explains, perhaps too simplistically: 'The Emperor of the French
had attempted to deceive on too great a scale; ... The Prussian Chancellor was a less
soaring exponent of the deceptive art, and his humility gained its reward.'

This lauding of Bismarck was carried out as well by G. Burrell Smith in his Scenes
from European History (1911), a companion to English history for the middle forms. In
a chapter entitled 'Bismarck', Smith, true to the spirit of the other works analysed above,
adopted a pro-Bismarck attitude. The blame for the Franco-Prussian War is laid squarely at
the feet of the French, who in his view 'had determined upon war' with Prussia.
Concluding the chapter, Smith glorifies Bismarck as the 'last of the "Makers of History"'.

In 1911 Reginald Jeffery issued The New Europe, 1789-1889. On the whole,
Jeffery's discussion of the Franco-Prussian War is neutral in tone. Nonetheless, in his exposition on 'Europe since the Treaty of Berlin, 1878-1889', he evokes the spectre of a European war, highlighting the period's national rivalries and the existence of a 'peace founded upon fear'. War, Jeffery warns, has become the 'preoccupation of Europe' and has hung like a 'black thunder-cloud over the northern Continent since 1878'.

Jeffery's observations on the post-1878 period bore a similarity to Jane's assessment of recent developments. Jane too wrote of the 'ever-present danger of storm' threatening to devastate Europe. Their analyses of the recent era were certainly gloomier than that offered by George Peabody Gooch who, in his History of Our Time, 1885-1911, emphasized the interdependence of the modern nation-states and the 'shrinkage of the world' as the main features of recent times. 'We can now look forward with something like confidence to the time when war between civilized nations will be considered as antiquated as the duel', Gooch wrote sanguinely.

In 1913 Elizabeth Levett issued Europe since Napoleon, 1815-1910, a work intended for the middle forms as an introduction to nineteenth-century history. As she explains in her preface, her aim is more to trace the growth of nations than to examine the development of the European situation. Thus she ignores a great deal of diplomatic history. It is manifest from the start, nevertheless, that the dominant theme and influence of nineteenth-century Europe, in her view, is Napoleon. As Levett claims: 'The history of the nineteenth century might very well be called "What Came After Napoleon".' According to her, 'the influence of Napoleon has not passed away; in fact, we may still see it at work all over Europe.' It is noteworthy that in spite of the rapid ascendancy of Germany in the late nineteenth century, Levett still considers the period from a Francocentric point of view. The central theme of the book, then, rests on the French Revolution and its aftermath, these events being seen as the defining elements of Europe in the nineteenth century.
Chapter 5, entitled 'Bismarck and the Making of the German Empire', places Bismarck at the centre of German unification. Levett's discussion of the Franco-Prussian War is brief and adopts a neutral tone. She writes: 'Having thus subdued and crippled her enemy, Germany was left the chief military power in Europe, and free to turn her mind to the peaceful settlement of internal difficulties'. It is evident that Levett regards the new German Empire as the chief military power in Europe but still tending to promote the peace of the continent. As a satiated power, Germany can now devote her attention to internal development.

Chapter 6, dealing with 'Germany since 1871', begins with a quote that 'We Germans have ceased to be the nation of thinkers, of poets and dreamers, we aim now only at the domination and exploitation of Nature' - again, reflecting the theme of a 'new', practical and driven Germany superseding the 'old' Germany of thinkers and poets. In this chapter Levett addresses Germany's growing naval power, recognizing the Navy League in Germany as one of the strongest organizations in the country. Her tone nevertheless is apologetic. Rather than tackle the issue of Germany's naval buildup head-on, Levett skirts the question by declaring her book to be an improper arena in which to carry out such a debate. 'This is not the place to discuss the question of Germany's intention in this rapid extension of her navy', she argues. Nonetheless, she is quick to defend Germany's acquisition of a modern fleet: 'it must be admitted that a nation which aspires to be a great colonial or commercial power is necessarily obliged to develop her naval resources'. Thus she is sympathetic to Berlin's naval ambitions, seeing naval power as a necessity for colonial and commercial greatness. Further stating her belief in Germany's pacific intentions, Levett confidently claims: 'Germany has kept the peace for the past forty years; there is no reason why she should not do so for another forty.' Evidently, Levett viewed the new Germany less as a threat than as the bastion of peace in Europe - this barely a year before the outbreak of war.
'Revisionism' at the Outbreak of War

At the outbreak of war in August 1914, British historians seemed no less infected by the outpouring of patriotic feeling. As has been demonstrated in the foregoing analysis, they did in fact play an active role in the public debate on Anglo-German relations during the prewar years. After 4 August 1914, that role did not at all diminish. In fact, the historians now assumed an even more active and prominent role in influencing public opinion and rallying the country around the flag by publishing tracts justifying Britain's entry in the conflict and asserting the rightness of Britain's case. Richard Lodge, then the Chair of Modern History at Edinburgh, viewed the historian's role as being particularly germane during the country's hour of need. 'It has suddenly become obvious', he observed in October 1914, 'that the teaching of history, systematically fostered and directed, may exercise a decisive influence upon public opinion, and through this influence may determine the policy of a great state and the fate of a continent.' Lodge wrote these words in his introductory note to the second edition of Elizabeth Levett's Europe since Napoleon, the timing of whose issuance, just two months after the outbreak of hostilities, cannot be considered a mere coincidence. Obviously, Lodge believed historians had a broader social task to fulfil beyond the confines of the university.

One can perceive a form of revisionism taking place soon after the outbreak of war when the British historians became increasingly anti-German. Whereas Prussia/Germany had generally been viewed favourably before August 1914, she was now treated with apprehension and hostility. In September 1914 the Oxford Modern History Faculty published Why We Are at War: Great Britain's Case, the stated purpose being to set forth the causes of the war on the basis of 'historic evidence'. It should come as no surprise that by September 1914, the Germans, who had previously been generally hailed as having sprung from the same racial stock as the British, were now referred to pejoratively as barbaric 'Huns'. The name of the German historian, Heinrich von Treitschke, became the
catchword of the day, as his writings on the theory of state power and on the idealization of war were held up for vilification. Treitschke's philosophy, the Oxford historians argued, 'seems barbarism, because it brings us back to the good old days when mere might was right'.

These Oxford historians were not alone in carrying out their historic, patriotic and polemical duties. A succession of works were assiduously put out by other historians - all with an express and deliberate purpose. In September 1914 also Herbert Albert Laurens Fisher, formerly Warden of New College, Oxford, and at that time Vice-Chancellor of the University of Sheffield, published The War: Its Causes and Issues, condemning the evils of Prussian militarism and the Germans' worshipping of war. 'Prussia has been made by the sword,' Fisher claimed, in very absolute and sweeping terms. 'That is one of the unalterable facts of history graven upon the mind of every German schoolboy, and shaping his whole outlook on the world.' He added that 'whereas we regard war as a great calamity ... the general view in Germany is quite otherwise'. In sharp contrast to the general adulation conferred upon Bismarck before the war, as seen in our analysis of the history texts, the German statesman was now castigated and shown in a negative light. As Fisher argued: 'The two architects of modern Germany, Frederick the Great and Bismarck, are perhaps chiefly responsible for this deplorable attitude of German public opinion in the matter of international good faith.' Therefore, whereas Bismarck's method of 'blood and iron' had previously been extolled as reflecting the sturdy virtues of the German character, it was now, with the onset of Anglo-German hostilities, upheld as symbolizing German brutality.

Undeniably, 'blood and iron' now took on negative connotations never seen before, as further reinforced by Richard Lodge. In his attack on Bismarck's use of 'brute force', he opined: 'Bismarck, the founder of modern Germany, preferred to found the German Empire upon the foundation of force, or of "blood and iron" as he termed it.' Instead of being wars
of liberation, the German wars of unification in the 1860s and 1870-71 were now presented as wars of conquest, 'deliberately waged to erect the imposing edifice of modern Germany', Lodge argued. Evidently, German 'brute force' became an issue only after the outbreak of hostilities in 1914. Prior to that, Prussian military might, as we have seen, tended to be admired and glorified.

George Prothero, Professor of Modern History at Edinburgh from 1894 to 1899, followed suit with his tract, Our Duty and Our Interest in the War, issued in the autumn of 1914. Published by the National Patriotic Organization, this work was very evidently intended to appeal to the reader's sense of duty and honour. Stating the defence of national honour and the British people's national existence as among the reasons for which the country was at war, Prothero warned of the insatiable German quest for global domination. He declared: 'Germany has staked her all upon one great throw, with the object of establishing a supremacy which would surpass that of Napoleon in his palmiest days, ... And after Europe, America; there are no limits, except those of the planet, to German ambitions.' The Liberal government was truly well served by academics such as Prothero, who assumed the role of propagandist with such seeming ease, passion and skill.

At the height of the July crisis, Prothero had in fact shrewdly anticipated the outbreak of a European war and firmly believed in the need for Britain to intervene. As his journal entry for 24 July - the day on which news of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia reached Britain - suggests, he already had a keen appreciation on that day of a 'ser[iou]s danger of Europ[ea]n war'. By 3 August, he was noting down his disappointment that the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was not being dispatched to France immediately. He was convinced that Britain 'must go in now'; remaining neutral, he thought, would be 'fatal to Gr[eat] Brit[ai]n'.

Prothero also was one of the first in August 1914 to publicly express his concern about the need for propaganda to mobilize the masses and sustain the war effort, as well as
his fear that major sections of the British populace were lacking in enthusiasm for the war. Writing in *The Times* on 20 August 1914, barely two weeks after the war broke out, he argued that 'large and influential sections' of the population did not regard the war 'with whole-hearted approval, or, indeed, approved at all'. The 'vast masses of the working people in the north and centre of England', Prothero claimed, needed enlightening as to 'the true character of the struggle'. This member of Britain's intellectual aristocracy truly had an unshakable faith in the need, and in his duty, to rally the masses. Shortly afterwards, Prothero helped form the Central Committee of National Patriotic Organizations, whose aim was to 'unify and co-ordinate the work of the several leagues and associations already engaged in educating and arousing the country as to the reason, justice, and necessity of the war'. Clearly, then, Prothero saw his professional duties as lying beyond the bounds of the academic community - and he was not alone in this regard.

Indeed, the historians' response - and Prothero's no less - in August 1914 is illustrative of the patronizing attitude which these custodians of the ivory tower, in their self-appointed role, assumed towards the rest of society. They saw themselves as having a responsibility to educate the masses in support of the war effort. Charles Grant Robertson, then a Fellow of All Souls' College and Tutor in Modern History at Magdalen College, Oxford, openly declared the need to educate the 'working class and other audiences' on 'the truth' about Germany, citing specifically the academic's 'professional duty' to impart his knowledge to the public at large. In a letter to *The Times* appearing on 26 August, Robertson expressed his support for public lectures, which he believed would act as forums for a 'serious and dispassionate' discussion of the 'issues at stake for British civilization'.

J. Holland Rose shared a similar commitment to enlightening the masses. Endorsing Robertson's proposal, he too invoked the historian's 'duty to a larger public'. As Rose argued: 'Let us who know the facts better than the general public can, undertake to explain them.' In September 1914, the fourth edition of his book *The Development of* 

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the European Nations was issued. In his preface to the new edition, Rose noted that his work could help 'form a healthy public opinion so that the errors of the past may not be repeated'. Having written glowingly in 1912 of Germany's diplomatic and military achievements under Bismarck, Rose issued How the War Came About in October 1914. This tract was published by the Patriotic Publishing Company, an obvious indication of the patriotic intent of the work. Rose opened his case by invoking Germany's violation of Belgium's neutrality and Britain's historic role in protecting the neutrality of the Low Countries. As one might suppose, Germany was now presented in an entirely different light from that in his earlier work, Germany in the Nineteenth Century. 'The Germans have striven hard to mislead public opinion in their own land and in America as to the cause of this war,' he contended. Britain's struggle in the conflict is cast in lofty terms. As he urged: 'We are ... fighting not only for the security of Europe from a great conqueror, ... we are fighting for the sake of the independence of the Belgians, ... for the security of the Dutch'. The freedom of the Serbian and Balkan peoples were also at stake, Rose pointed out.

His efforts did not end there. In late 1914 Rose issued two other works: The Origins of the War and Why Are We at War? The former consisted of lectures delivered at Cambridge in the Michaelmas term of 1914, all directed at explaining the root causes of the war. That the historians, in addition to writing popular pamphlets, willingly changed their teaching programmes and tailored them to meet the war effort reflects the dual purpose of what they regarded their profession to serve: of being publicists at large, and simultaneously, propagandists in the academic community shaping their students' opinions in the classrooms and lecture halls. That their academic agenda after August 1914 was unmistakable and purposeful is confirmed by J.A.R. Marriott, who later affirmed that 'we substituted for our usual lecture-subjects courses which had a direct bearing upon the war, its antecedents and issues'. A.F. Pollard in September 1914 also talked of being 'in
communication with Prothero about his lecture-scheme, reflecting a concerted campaign of sorts by the historians in the fight to win the hearts and minds of the British people.\textsuperscript{145}

Rose later wrote the introduction to Jules Claes's \textit{The German Mole}, a book appearing in 1915 concerned with Germany's 'pacific penetration' of western Europe before the war. Here, Rose's propagandistic efforts were to manifest themselves once more. He warned of the grave danger to civilization which would result from 'the triumph of the Teutons'. 'Life under the ascendancy of Napoleon a century ago would have been Purgatory,' he argued, showing little self-restraint. 'Life under that of William II would be Hell,' he insisted.\textsuperscript{146}

John Kirkpatrick, by then Emeritus Professor of History at Edinburgh, was also not to be left out in this campaign to shape public opinion. In the autumn of 1914, Kirkpatrick issued \textit{War Studies}, in which he characterized the German government as 'medieval', implying barbarism and anachronism.\textsuperscript{147} The 'heart-rending atrocities' committed in the war by the Germans, he contended, had been 'premeditated in cold blood for many years past'. Likewise, Prussian methods are now viewed in negative terms. The 'overbearing arrogance of Prussia' is cited as the cause of Germany's 'lamentable decline'. The Franco-Prussian War, rather than being the seminal event marking the triumph of Germany's long struggle for freedom, is presented as the turning point where the rot set in, ushering in the 'new era of blood and iron'. The Prussian victory of 1870 indeed is alluded to disparagingly as the 'spoliation of France'.\textsuperscript{148}

In December 1914 Kirkpatrick issued another work entitled \textit{Origins of the Great War, or the British Case}, in which he argued: 'We are fighting in order to crush a military despotism which aspires to worldwide conquest and empire.'\textsuperscript{149} As had become the fashion by then, he too traced the root causes of the war to the actions and philosophy of Bismarck, Nietzsche and Treitschke.

It is worth mentioning that the historians were not alone in catching the anti-
Treitschke fever. A scrutiny of the *Times Educational Supplement*, for instance, reveals that the paper too was inclined to join in the literary crusade against German militarism. On 1 September 1914, the paper printed a piece entitled 'Pan-Germanism', carrying the sub-heading 'Influence of Treitschke', which proceeded to criticize the role of the German professor in German politics.\(^\text{150}\)

In late 1914, conforming with the academic spirit of the time, James Headlam issued a tract entitled *England, Germany and Europe*, in which he laid down Britain's case for entering the war. Headlam may not have been as prolific as some of his fellow historians in churning out pamphlets, but that should not detract from his contribution to the war propaganda effort. Unlike most of his colleagues who wrote in a civilian capacity, Headlam was enlisted into governmental propaganda work under the aegis of Charles F.G. Masterman, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster who, in August 1914, was entrusted with the task of setting up a propaganda machinery, subsequently located at Wellington House, headquarters of the National Insurance Commission. On 2 September the first meeting took place there which has been described as 'probably the most important gathering of creative and academic writers ever assembled for an official purpose in the history of English letters'.\(^\text{151}\) Besides historians, prominent figures from the literary and journalistic fields were mobilized for the new Department of Propaganda's operations based at Wellington House. Among them were William Archer, Hilaire Belloc, Arnold Bennett, G.K. Chesterton, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, John Galsworthy, Thomas Hardy, Ford Madox Hueffer (who was to Anglicize his name in 1919 and consequently become better known as Ford Madox Ford), John Masefield, Gilbert Murray, George Trevelyan and H.G. Wells.\(^\text{152}\) One of the earliest results of Headlam's labours at this new assignment was *The History of Twelve Days*, a detailed study of the July crisis which appeared in 1915. Headlam (who in 1918 became Sir James Headlam-Morley) indeed was to remain in public service for the duration of the war, serving in the Political Intelligence Bureau of the Department of
Information and subsequently joining the Foreign Office. In 1919 he attended the proceedings of the Paris Peace Conference as a member of the British delegation.\textsuperscript{153}

Incidentally, Headlam was not the only historian or academic to flourish in government service during or after the war. Others included James Bryce, at one time Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford and British ambassador to the United States from 1907 to 1913. Made Viscount Bryce of Dechmont as recently as 1 January 1914, he was appointed in September of that year to preside over the commission set up to enquire into German atrocities in Belgium, and which subsequently issued the Bryce Report in May 1915. Arnold Toynbee, a Fellow of Balliol College, was also a member of the British delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. Lewis Namier worked as an advisor on Polish and Austrian affairs in the Foreign Office and was to become a leading British historian after the war. Robert William Seton-Watson, a graduate of New College, Oxford, and future president of the Royal Historical Society (1945-49), also acted as an advisor on eastern Europe during the Great War. H.H. Joachim, Tutor in Philosophy at Merton College, Oxford, was recruited into Wellington House.\textsuperscript{154} The activities of Harold Temperley during and after the war further exemplify the incursion of academic life into the practical affairs of politics. As John Fair notes, Temperley, even as a young Cambridge don, 'exhibited passion, energy, and an affinity for affairs of the world outside the confines of Academe'.\textsuperscript{155} In similar fashion to Headlam and Toynbee, he was a delegate to the 1919 peace conference, championing the Balkan peoples' right to national self-determination. During the interwar period, he collaborated with George Gooch in putting together the British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914 (1926-38), an eleven-volume collection of official documents published by the government. Prothero too attended the peace conference in 1919, as historical advisor to the Foreign Office. Not surprisingly, he also had a role to play in government during the Great War. Working jointly with the Admiralty and the War Trade Intelligence Department, Prothero helped produce handbooks
between 1917 and 1919 which were subsequently used to brief the British delegates at the peace conference. Not to be forgotten also is H.A.L. Fisher, who was appointed President of the Board of Trade in 1916. This constitutes only a brief overview of British academics' employment in government service during the war. As Wallace has shown, the British government's wartime mobilization of academics from all disciplines was indeed quite extensive.

The historians' continued involvement in the wartime propaganda campaign, whether in a private or official capacity, should not be overlooked. Long after the outbreak of war, their publishing activities were to continue. Headlam, for example, issued *The Truth about England in a Letter to a Neutral* and *The Issue* in 1915 and 1916 respectively. In similar vein Pollard came out with *The War. Its History & Its Morals: A Lecture* in 1915, and Prothero published *German Policy before the War* in 1916. The 'mobilization of intellect' in Britain proceeded unhindered, and the historians' activities can be seen as part of a broader and elaborate wartime effort to promote 'enlightened patriotism'.

**The Oxbridge Connection**

We should now take a moment to consider the background of the authors of the works analysed above. The influence of Oxford and Cambridge, Britain's two oldest universities, is only too telling. John Kirkpatrick, Professor of History at the University of Edinburgh from 1889 to 1901, obtained his M.A. from Cambridge. Headlam was educated at Eton and King's College, Cambridge, as was Prothero. Prothero subsequently taught at Cambridge as well, being made a history Tutor at King's in 1876 and then University Lecturer in 1884, before taking up his appointment at Edinburgh in 1894 to the newly created Chair of Modern History. His connection with Cambridge, however, was to remain strong throughout the years, as co-editor of the *Cambridge Modern History* (1901-12) and also as Rede Lecturer. Richard Lodge, who was appointed the first Professor of
Modern History at the University of Glasgow in 1894 and who succeeded Prothero at Edinburgh in 1899, was educated at Balliol College, Oxford. Made a Lecturer and then Tutor in Modern History at Brasenose College, he went on to become Vice-Chancellor of Oxford in 1891 before departing for Glasgow. Lodge, along with Charles R.L. Fletcher, A.L. Smith and A.H. Johnson, was instrumental in developing Oxford's Honour School of Modern History during his time there.162

J. Holland Rose, though beginning his higher learning at Owens College, Manchester, where he came under the influence of Adolphus Ward, eventually moved to Christ's College, Cambridge (1875-79). Ward similarly moved to Cambridge in 1900 to take up his Mastership at Peterhouse. In 1903 Cambridge awarded Rose the Litt.D. and in 1911 appointed him to the university's newly created Readership in Modern History. In 1914 he was made a Fellow of Christ's College.163 Walter Phillips received his education at Merton and St. John's Colleges, Oxford, even though he would later teach at Trinity College, Dublin.164 Another Oxford product was J.A.R. Marriott, educated at New College, where he stayed on to become Lecturer in Modern History as well as a Fellow. He was also appointed a Tutor at Worcester College.165 Another New College man was H.A.L. Fisher, who began as a student of the college only to later become a Fellow and then its Warden.166 Fisher, together with Philip Brown and L.J. Wickham Legg who were both at that time at New College, also had a part to play in revising and correcting the text of Reginald Jeffery's The New Europe.167 Jeffery of course was also associated with Oxford: he was at Brasenose when his book was published. A.F. Pollard, though establishing his teaching career at University College, London, and becoming Professor of English History of the University of London, was no less an Oxford product: he was a student at Jesus College in the late 1880s and was also appointed a Fellow of All Souls' College.168

Considering that Oxford and Cambridge, as the oldest institutions of higher learning in the country, were also the oldest centres of historical studies in Britain, it is
only natural that the bulk of the historians in our sample should have come from, or in some manner been associated with, either university. After all, the commanding position of the two older universities before the war, and even today, is undeniable. As Eric Ashby observes:

In England higher education was dominated by the influence of Oxford and Cambridge ... And although the new institutions of higher education which were established in England were in part a protest against the exclusiveness of Oxford and Cambridge, nevertheless they had to live under the hegemony of these ancient universities. They acquired, by a process of social mimicry, some of the prevailing assumptions about higher education.¹⁶⁹

It has been shown that of approximately 2,000 university teachers in Britain in 1900, close to 800 worked at Oxford and Cambridge.¹⁷⁰ Moreover, many of the chairs in the Welsh, Scottish and English provincial universities and colleges were occupied by former fellows of Oxford and Cambridge. Oxbridge's dominance of the British academic establishment and the 'aristocracy of the intellect' needs no reemphasizing. A scrutiny of the distribution of Fellowships in the Royal Society and the British Academy would clearly reveal the commanding heights of the Oxford-Cambridge axis. In 1910, for instance, close to 40 per cent of the Fellows of the Royal Society were affiliated with Oxford and Cambridge. In the same year, those attached to Oxbridge accounted for almost three-quarters of the Fellows of the British Academy.¹⁷¹ By the dawn of the twentieth century, the academic establishment - and with it Oxford and Cambridge - had undoubtedly become firmly entrenched in the British intellectual aristocracy, and was to remain so for at least the next half-century. As has been noted, up to the Second World War 'the academic professions
were a small isolate of professional life, ... enjoying a social prestige which reflected the "magic" of Oxford and Cambridge'.

The importance of the Oxbridge connection lies precisely in the prestige of the two institutions and their dominance of the British academic establishment - being in effect at the summit of Britain's intellectual elite. That a majority of our sample of texts should have had origins in Oxford and Cambridge only attests to both universities' supreme position in the British cultural hierarchy, and to their central role in the dissemination of ideas and values. The viewpoints expressed in the prewar texts and the wartime pamphlets were to a large degree Oxbridge viewpoints, confirming the universities' academic as well as social importance.

Conclusion

From the foregoing, one may conclude that the 'passivity' of British academics in the prewar Anglo-German debate should be reconsidered. The above analysis indicates that in the prewar period, British historians were in fact actively engaged in that debate. Many regarded themselves not only as educators in an ivory tower, confined to within the bounds of the academic community, but as policy advocates and polemists, expressing their views and opinion through their medium, the textbook. Their impartiality as historians can thus be called into question.

But rather than being actively anti-German in the prewar debate, the historians tended to take on the role of moderators. Assuming the attitude of an enlightened elite, some published works with the express aim of lessening public ignorance about Germany, which was widely perceived to be a cause of Anglo-German misunderstanding. Therefore, they participated in the propaganda campaign in their self-appointed role as voices of enlightened rationality.

This belief in the historian's duty to educate persisted and became more pronounced
after the outbreak of war when, in effect, 'these patriotic scholars took it upon themselves to educate the nation through public lectures and written pamphlets'. The polemics emerging after 4 August 1914 generally revealed a sharp contrast to their prewar attitudes towards Germany. Rather than maintain a stance of moderation, these historians joined the wartime propaganda campaign embracing the cause of Crown and country. Writing works aimed at justifying Britain's fight against Germany, they threw their intellectual weight behind the state and in effect, quite unashamedly, became apologists for the British cause.

This rallying around the flag during the country's hour of need further reveals an inherent conservatism within the British academic elite. As Noel Annan suggests, the paradox of the British intelligentsia was its tendency to conform with, rather than rebel against, social and institutional norms. As he points out, this intellectual elite, largely upper-middle class in origin and assuming its shape in the early nineteenth century, was characterized by its innate stability, and was 'wedded to gradual reform of accepted institutions and able to move between the worlds of speculation and government'. This instinctive stability, solid and dependable, was - as demonstrated by the example of the historians - to prove a valuable fount into which the British government could tap after August 1914. The merging of 'the world of speculation' with government was indeed effected with relative ease. But this 'dependability' of the intellectuals in throwing in their lot behind the state, it should be pointed out, was not a purely British phenomenon. The German academics, who 'greeted the war with a sense of relief, evinced a similar attitude, rallying around their state with optimism and enthusiasm. In France, likewise, the intellectuals were effectively mobilized by their government after the outbreak of hostilities in 1914.

The conclusions reached here would refute the view put forth by Manfred Messerschmidt that British historiography in the pre-1914 period tended to move in parallel with political trends - that is, that the British historians' views of Germany assumed
increased hostility as diplomatic tensions between the British and German governments escalated. Messerschmidt argues that a turning point can be discerned in the 1894-1908 period when, according to him, British historiography began to treat Germany in increasingly negative terms.\textsuperscript{177} The evidence which he presents, however, is neither adequate nor convincing. First, he relies on a very limited range of sources to support his argument. Secondly, even within this narrow sample, a majority of the works were published after the outbreak of the First World War. Though William Dawson's \textit{The Evolution of Modern Germany} (1908) and J.A. Cramb's \textit{Germany and England} (1914), both of which Messerschmidt cites at length, were issued before the start of the conflict, the other notable works came only later. For instance, Lewis Namier's \textit{Germany and Eastern Europe}, J.A.R. Marriott's \textit{The Evolution of Prussia} and Arnold Toynbee's \textit{Nationality and the War} and \textit{The New Europe}, all appeared in 1915. G.P. Gooch's \textit{Studies in Modern History}, which he cites on page 71, was published only in 1931. Likewise, Adolphus Ward's \textit{Germany 1815-1890}, and Headlam-Morley's \textit{The German Chancellor and the Outbreak of War} were issued in 1916-18 and 1917 respectively.\textsuperscript{178} The evidence cited by Messerschmidt, therefore, is unreliable as a means of assessing prewar views of Germany. In fact, he overgeneralizes the entire period from the 1890s to the 1930s.

As this analysis has demonstrated, British historiography on Germany tended to go counter to the tide of Anglo-German governmental relations during the pre-1914 period. Given that a discernible change in attitude towards Germany came with the outbreak of war, it would not be sound to infer prewar views of Germany from books written after August 1914, as Messerschmidt does.

But even where his evidence predates the outbreak of the war, it is still not sufficiently convincing in showing the onset of 'anti-German' attitudes, or increased hostility towards Germany. Take Dawson's \textit{The Evolution of Modern Germany}, for instance. It is true that, as Messerschmidt points out and quotes, Dawson wrote that: 'the
only politic spirit in which to meet Germany's competition is the spirit of inflexible good-humour, combined with an equally inflexible determination not to abandon ingloriously fields of enterprise upon which so many victories of peace and civilization have been won in the past. But this passage, understood in its proper context, is more an affirmation of the effectiveness of time-tested British methods than an invective against German efficiency. In fact, Dawson's book is far from being a call to arms against Germany. As Dawson observed:

This book is not intended to be either a glorification or a disparagement of Germany from the standpoint of industry and labour. It seeks to show the Germans as a trading nation just as they are; to describe their efforts, energies, successes; to tell British readers what they ought to know ... if they would understand how it is that Germany has gone ahead so rapidly during recent years, not, however, by way of discouraging but of reassuring them.

It would be overstating the case to argue that Dawson's book was hostile towards Germany. His work fitted into the framework so commonly employed by him before 1914 of focusing on economic issues and using Germany as the model of efficiency from which Britain could learn. His works of such a nature were certainly numerous before the war. Their titles included The German Workman (1906), Industrial Germany (1912), and Social Insurance in Germany, 1883-1911 (1912), among others. In 1914 itself, shortly before the outbreak of war, he issued Municipal Life and Government in Germany. Here he wrote:

Most Englishmen at heart prefer the worst of amateurs to the best of
experts, and would rather be wrong with the one than right with the other.

... I shall be satisfied if what is said in these pages should serve to secure
for the German system of administration by trained officials greater
consideration than it has yet received.\footnote{182}

These words hardly seem indicative of any antagonistic attitude towards Germany. One
should indeed understand the source of Dawson's high regard for German methods of
organization. Educated at the University of Berlin, he married twice - and twice a German
woman.\footnote{183} Any accusations against him of a deep-seated anti-Germanism would certainly
be misplaced.

Similarly, one has to revise Panikos Panayi's claim that negative images of
Germany had become dominant in British history books before 1914. As he argues: 'In
academic study, we can point to history where the focus upon the early history of England
and the invasion of the Angles and Saxons died away as an area of interest, replaced by the
history of modern Germany viewed as a threat.'\footnote{184} But virtually all the texts examined
above tended to regard the unified Germany as a beneficial presence in Europe, an
embodiment of the liberal ideal of liberation and unification, a guarantor of the European
balance of power and the bastion of peace at the heart of the continent. As the above
analysis demonstrates, the view of Germany as a positive influence in Europe was still
quite prevalent in the British historiography up to 1914. One could suggest that modern
Germany as a threat only became noticeably dominant after the war had begun when, with
the benefit of hindsight, a reinterpretation of modern Germany's development emerged.
Admittedly, our understanding of the continuity, or discontinuity, of historiographical trends
in the post-First World War period would still be greatly enhanced by further study.

It may also be necessary to put into proper light Stuart Wallace's assertion that 'a
dividing line cannot be drawn through August 1914'. He argues that the polemical and
propagandistic writings of British historians during the war 'were often very similar in their content to works published before the war which sought to explain German culture or Britain's role in Europe'. Unfortunately, Wallace is too general and does not cite particular works. But this study demonstrates that many of the historians' works before the war indeed differed in tone from their wartime publications. Thus a dividing line can in effect be drawn through August 1914.

In essence, the assessment arrived at here accords with Peter Firchow's view that the First World War represented a cultural watershed in modern Europe, the turning point which confirmed with 'tremendous force' the rise of negative stereotypical images in the British conception of the German national character. As Firchow argues: 'By 1915, ... the German cousin was dead, never again to be resurrected except by cranks and Nazi-sympathizers at the fringes of British political life.'

It would appear that the shift in the historians' views of Germany after 4 August 1914 marked a significant change in attitude. This study may enhance our understanding of the anguish expressed by the Oxford Vice-Chancellor, Thomas Strong, whom we quoted at the start of this chapter. It could also bring into sharper focus the title and wording of P.H.B.L.'s poem, 'The Betrayal', cited at the beginning of this chapter. Given the British historians' attitude towards Germany, as indicated by the prewar history texts, these members of the British intellectual aristocracy would have been justified in feeling betrayed by the outbreak of war. 'We trusted you', the poem begins, a sentiment which may be fittingly applied to the British historians' outlook on Germany, the country created with 'blood and iron', possessed of admired Teutonic virtues, and generally perceived to be the guarantor of peace in Europe, the bulwark against French aggression. How treacherous and galling, then, the German decision for war in August 1914 must have seemed to many of Britain's academic elite.
NOTES


5. See the *Oxford University Calendar for the Year 1914*, p. 13, for the names of the university officers. For more on Strong, see DNB, 1941-1950 (London, 1959), pp. 849-50.


7. Ibid., p. 6.


10. Ibid., p. i.


17. Recent literature has shed light on the importance of textbooks for the propagation of ideas in the Third Reich. See, for example, Lisa Pine, *'The Dissemination of Nazi Ideology and Family Values through School Textbooks'* *History of Education* 25 (1996), pp. 91-109.


28. See, for instance, A. Mary Baylay, 'The Value of History as a Factor in Moral Education', Historical Association Leaflet No. 37 (Feb. 1915).

29. Steele, 'Study of Formative Years', pp. 9 and 20.


31. Prothero to Oscar Browning, 1 Feb. 1904, King's College Modern Archive Centre (KCMAC), Cambridge, Browning MSS., OB i/A.


33. Pollard to his parents, 4 Feb. 1908, University of London Library (ULL), London, Pollard MSS.


36. Ibid., pp. 122-3.


43. Emily [Mrs. H.C.] Hawtrey, A Short History of Germany (London, 1904), 'Introduction'.

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49. Ibid., pp. 257, 265.
53. Ibid., p. 291.
54. Ibid., pp. 315-17.
56. Ibid., p. 96.
57. Ibid., p. 127.
58. Ibid., p. 183.
59. Ibid., p. 191.
61. Ibid., p. 5.
62. Ibid., Preface.
67. Ibid., pp. 289-90.
68. Ibid., pp. 291-2.
69. Ibid., pp. 303-4.
70. Ibid., p. 306.
71. Holland, Short History, p. 5.
72. Ibid., pp. 6-7.
73. Ibid., pp. 92-3.
74. Ibid., pp. 121-7.
75. Ibid., pp. 127-8.
76. Ibid., p. 130.
77. Ibid., pp. 134-6.
79. J. Holland Rose, et al., Germany in the Nineteenth Century (Manchester, 1912).
80. Ibid., pp. viii-ix.
81. Ibid., pp. 16-17, 21.
82. Ibid., pp. 18-19.
83. Ibid., pp. 21-2.
84. Ibid., p. 20.
85. Ibid., p. 22.
86. Ibid., pp. 26-7.
87. Ibid., pp. 76-7.
88. Ibid., pp. 95-6.
89. Ibid., pp. 113-14 and 119.
90. Ibid., pp. 125-7.
92. Phillips was appointed to this position in 1903. See DNB, 1941-1950, p. 669.
94. Ibid., p. 72.
95. Ibid., pp. 108-10.
96. Ibid., pp. 155-9.
97. Between 1909 and 1914, six such works were issued in Britain as compared with four on general French history, according to a search in the British Library's General Retrospective Catalogue.
99. Ibid., pp. 3-8.
129.
102. Ibid., p. 154.
398-9.
104. Ibid., pp. 423-4.
106. Ibid., pp. 96-104.
107. Ibid., p. 111.
A.W. Ward, G.W. Prothero and Stanley Leathes (eds.), *The Cambridge Modern History* (hereafter CMH), vol. 11, *The Growth of Nationalities* (Cambridge, 1909). Ward's chapters are chaps. 6 and 7, representing the two parts of 'The Revolution and the Reaction in Germany and Austria'.

See ibid., chaps. 15, 16 and 21.

All quoted in Altholz, 'Lord Acton', p. 730.


Ibid., p. 612.


Ibid., pp. 252-3.

G. Burrell Smith, *Scenes from European History: A Companion to English History for the Middle Forms of Schools* (London, 1911).

Ibid., pp. 192 and 196.


Ibid., pp. 370 and 378.


Ibid., p. 2.

Ibid., pp. 88, 111-12, and 115.

Ibid., p. 115.

Ibid., p. 130.


139. Ibid., 26 Aug. 1914, p. 5.

140. Ibid., 27 Aug. 1914, p. 7.


143. Ibid., pp. 7-11, 40 and 42.

144. Idem, *The Origins of the War* (Cambridge, 1914); and *Why Are We at War?* (Cambridge, 1914).


146. Pollard to his parents, 6 Sept. 1914, ULL, Pollard MSS.


149. Ibid., pp. 5 and 20.


158. See Wallace, *Image of Germany*, Appendix 5, for the names of academics employed in government departments and secretariats during the war.


162. Ibid., pp. 698-9.


164. DNB, 1941-1950, p. 736.

165. Ibid., p. 669.

166. Ibid., p. 574.

167. DNB, 1931-1940, p. 275.


173. Ibid., p. 238.


177. For more on the mobilization of the intellectuals in France, see Hanna, *Mobilization of Intellect*, cited in n. 173 above.

178. Messerschmidt, *Deutschland in englischer Sicht*, p. 67. See also his concluding remarks on pp. 169-70.

179. See Messerschmidt's discussion of these works in *ibid.*, pp. 68-95.


Hail in the name of ancient friendship,
   Friends we never shall forget;
Truth and Trust and Peace abiding,
   These shall be our glory yet!

Blood is of all bonds the strongest,
   - One the Saxon blood we share;
So let Britons join with Germans,
   And be brothers everywhere!

Höchstädt, Dettingen and Minden
Drank the life-blood of our veins;
And this memory doth bind us
Closer than with forged chains.

The Duke of Argyll

In the previous chapter the words of Thomas Strong, the Vice-Chancellor of Oxford, were cited, expressing his anguish of being at war with former brethren numbering among them Rhodes Scholars who had become the enemy after the night of 4 August 1914. Over at Cambridge, the other seat of the British intellectual aristocracy, Henry Montagu Butler, the Master of Trinity College, was similarly distressed at the thought of a war with
Germany. When war loomed ominously, Butler wrote on 1 August: 'How I detest the thought of possible war with Germany. It seems a monstrous paradox - wholly unnatural.' Once war had begun, he regarded it as 'very horrible'. 'I had been brought up from boyhood with almost a romantic regard for Germany,' avowed Butler, 'due, I suppose, to my Father's visit to Schiller in 1797 and later.' Butler evidently held German culture in high regard, a circumstance sustained by many years of intimate and personal ties with Germany. His Germanophilia was certainly not exceptional, as admiration for German scholarship was deeply entrenched in the British academic community in the prewar era.

In this chapter, this thesis will probe the notion of Anglo-German kinship by considering Germany's special place in the prewar British academic establishment as well as the myth of racial Anglo-Saxonism in nineteenth-century Britain. The limits to anti-Germanism among the British academic elite will also be investigated. Then, this chapter will undertake case studies of three Germanophile Britons - one of them an academic - who had strong personal German ties and who were involved in the Anglo-German friendship movement before the war. One purpose will be to examine the limits to their ability to prevent war in 1914.

The Limits to Anti-Germanism

It has been demonstrated that British historians played a major role in mobilizing public opinion after the outbreak of hostilities and contributed greatly to the Anglo-German debate by acting as publicists on behalf of the British state. As we have seen, the pamphlets put out by Marriott, Pollard, Headlam, Rose, Fisher and Kirkpatrick after 4 August 1914 left little doubt as to which side they believed right to be on.

As polemics they acquitted themselves commendably in carrying out their duty to Crown and country. Nonetheless, in studying their attitudes, it may be necessary to distinguish between their personal thoughts and the opinions which they propagated for
mass consumption. A closer examination of the evidence would suggest that there were
certain limits to their hostility to Germany even after the outbreak of war.

The writings of William Dawson illustrate this ambivalence of being at war with
Germany. As already mentioned, Dawson was before the war a keen writer on Germany.
Though not a historian, Dawson too, after August 1914, wrote on behalf of the British
cause. In 1915 he issued a tract called *What is Wrong with Germany?*, in which he laid
the blame for the war on the emergence of a new Germany and her new ethos, the
 teachings of Treitschke, and Prussian militarism - a tried and tested tack by that time. Yet
in this very work he avowed, 'This is the first book upon Germany which I have written
without pleasure.' This suggests that, though a participant in the propaganda campaign
against Germany, Dawson undertook the task with regret and misgivings.

It is apparent that Michael Sadler also underwent a change of heart after August
1914. As we recall, Sadler contributed a chapter to *Germany in the Nineteenth Century*
(1912), co-authored with J. Holland Rose, in which he wrote glowingly of German
educational methods and organization. Like Dawson, Sadler in the prewar period looked to
Germany as the model for emulation. In his preface to the English translation of Friedrich
Paulsen's work *Die deutsche Universitäten und das Universitäts-Studium* (1902), Sadler
cited the academic freedom and scientific method of German universities as the sources of
German excellence in education. He observed: 'It is the inner tradition of German
 university life, ... that most deserves study and excites our admiration.' That tradition, in
his view, included the German notion of a 'personal obligation to the claims of the state'.
By 1915, however, Sadler was adopting a much different attitude in his treatment of the
German educational tradition and the German concept of subservience to the state. In an
essay entitled 'The Strength and Weakness of German Education', he argued that the state
administration of German education 'has weakened its moral independence'. While
conceding that German education was 'exacting in its intellectual standards', Sadler
maintained that it `has evidently produced intellectual impressionableness rather than independence of mind'.

The 'Two Germanies'

Interestingly, after the outbreak of war Sadler came to form a dual image of Germany consisting of a `good' Germany as opposed to a `bad' one. As he remarked: `Of the two Germanys the one which you and we love is not responsible for this wickedness, except so far as it has not had the moral or physical courage enough to stab its Junkers in the face long ago.' In *What is Wrong with Germany?* Dawson also evoked the concept of the 'two Germanies' in drawing a distinction between the German government and the German people. Though arguing that the entire German nation bore responsibility for the war, he conceptualized three different layers of culpability, the government being the party primarily to blame, followed by the 'professional war party' and 'Chauvinists', and lastly by the German people, who in his scheme were the least responsible as they were 'duped by their rulers, mesmerized and overborne by the war-makers'.

This two-Germanies conception was shared by others in the academic community, not least by a few of the historians examined in the previous chapter. John Kirkpatrick, for instance, while inveighing against Germany's `monstrous ambitions' in *War Studies*, also distinguished the German people from their ruling classes, and in so doing separated the 'good' from the 'bad' in Germany. As Kirkpatrick stated, one of his aims was to `differentiate the Prussian military caste, headed by the Kaiser, from the German people, the vast majority of whom, had they been constitutionally governed, would certainly have voted against the war'. Thus in very similar vein to Dawson, he viewed the war as the work primarily of a small minority of Prussian military hawks surrounding the Kaiser. The bulk of the German people, in his conception, were peace-loving but being victims of deception, they had been dragged into the war by Kaiserism, the 'evil spirit' which had
seized Germany.8

This apparent moderation on Kirkpatrick's part would be better understood if we took into account that he was a recognizable Germanophile before the war. As he once remarked to Karl Breul (who will be examined further below) in 1912: 'I have always loved Germany & the Germans'. Kirkpatrick on that occasion affirmed that 'I have experienced an immense deal of kindness, generosity, & hospitality from many old German friends.' Finding it 'distressing' that the German press seemed to be 'on the war-path', he expressed strong support for Breul's 'German entente society', a reference to the Anglo-German Friendship Society of which Breul was an active member. Kirkpatrick further invoked what he called the 'beautiful old German' concepts of Biederkeit and Gemütlichkeit (uprightness and sociability), which he feared were going to be extinct.9

Another one of Kirkpatrick's prewar letters sheds further light on how he viewed the French compared with the Germans. As he related to Breul, he considered the French to be in every respect far behind the English and the sociable, good-natured Germans ('ach du liebe Zeit, sie stehen in jeder Hinsicht den Engländern und den lieben gemütlichen Deutschen sehr weit zurück!).10 Indeed, Kirkpatrick's wartime rantings in War Studies should not detract from his prewar Germanophile tendencies and Francophobic views.

Even though Albert Pollard acted as a propagandist for the British cause, he in similar vein tempered his denunciation of Germany by making a distinction between the militarist Germany and the idealist Germany of old, between the aberrant and the authentic, between the 'bad' and the 'good'. As he claimed: '[General Friedrich von] Bernhardi and Treitschke ... represent only one school of German thought, which obtained the ascendant through the support of the Emperor and his militarists. A great defeat for them would mean the revival of the older Germany of Schiller, Goethe, von Ranke etc.'11 This line of thinking suggests that the ascendancy of the militarist school was an aberration and that, from Pollard's standpoint, the true essence of Germany lay in her poets and intellectuals. It
is interesting that he harked back nostalgically to the old days when Germany was the land of poets and dreamers - which he longed to see rejuvenated.

One should not doubt Pollard's commitment to Britain's entry in the war and to the ultimate defeat of Germany. During the July crisis, he viewed Austria-Hungary's harsh ultimatum to Serbia as 'a monstrous and wanton provocation'. Referring to the German treatment of Belgium, Pollard noted that 'the extortion from Brussels is a precedent which Germany will have cause to regret' and one which, in his view, 'will have to be repaid with interest'.12 Meanwhile predicting, quite accurately, that there would be no decisive victory on the battlefields in France, he was counting on the Russians to deal the German government its final blow by driving into Germany and seizing Berlin.13

Nevertheless, one can gain a fuller understanding of Pollard's views of Germany by considering his benign attitude towards German civilians in Britain who had by then become enemies of the state. Here too he differentiated between the German people and their government. In reference to the former, he observed compassionately that: 'The poor creatures are suffering from the conduct of their government, and their chances of employment in England will be bad for some time to come.' Seeing no reason for the Germans to be resettled elsewhere, he remarked that 'it is difficult to see what harm they could do here'.14 Thus while denouncing the German government and its militarists for causing the war, Pollard was willing to accord the German 'enemy aliens' a large measure of sympathy, suggesting the continued strength of his cultural affinity with Germany. Obviously he did not regard the conflict as a war against German society as a whole, suggesting limits to his wartime 'anti-German' invectives. Pollard's personal correspondence, by providing us with insights into his private and candid thoughts, lends a useful balance to the opinions which he disseminated in his role as a propagandist. It is clear that his public polemics did not totally mirror his personal sentiments.

Moderating influences were evident as well in James Bryce's attitude towards
Germany after the outbreak of war. In his *Neutral Nations and the War* (1914), he blamed
Bernhardi and Treitschke for threatening to bring Europe back to the age of 'primitive
savagery'. Yet Bryce also declared that 'I have been one of those who for many years
laboured to promote good relations between Germans and Englishmen, peoples that ought
to be friends, and that never before had been enemies'. Repudiating the notion that Britons
regarded Germans with hatred, he evoked the idea of the two peoples' shared racial
heritage. 'The two nations,' he asserted, 'German and British, were of kindred race, and
linked by many ties. To the German people, even now we feel no sort of enmity.'

Needless to say, Bryce was an exponent of the two-Germanies view.

It would be worthwhile considering some of Bryce's prewar apologies for Germany.
Decrying the 'deplorable' Anglo-German press wars in 1912, he commented to his friend
George Prothero that the British publications - and he singled out the *National Review* -
were as much to blame as the German press for inciting Anglo-German tensions. In
Bryce's opinion, Treitschke, though a mischief-maker, belonged to 'a noxious element on
that side which has been no stronger than a similar noxious element on our side'. It is
interesting to note that in this instance, before the war, Bryce was willing to downplay
Treitschke, dismissing him as 'an isolated phenomenon' while expressing support for
Germany's desire for commercial and naval expansion. Comparing Germany's situation
with Britain's own, he argued:

> Should we have acted differently? Should we not have tried to expand?
> Have we not gone on doing so when there was far less need? I dislike
> many of the tendencies of *very modern* Germany, but find no cause for
> complaint in their wish to develop [sic] their trade and to have a strong
> navy[.]'

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Bryce's prewar Germanophilism would help explain his wartime moderation towards Germany. A keen admirer of German culture, he was awarded the order of Pour Le Mérite by the Kaiser before the war, the highest honour which the German Emperor could bestow. Bryce's attitude towards Russia also offers insights into his Russophobia in contrast to his pro-Germanism. On 30 June 1914, just a little over a month before the outbreak of war, Bryce had a conversation with C.P. Scott, the Liberal editor of the Manchester Guardian, during which they 'talked a good deal about Russia'. Apparently, Bryce feared that Russia was becoming a 'menace' to Europe owing to her rapid population growth and economic prosperity. As Scott noted down in his diary, Bryce believed that Germany, in order to counter the Russian threat, 'was right to arm and she would need every man'.

It is obvious, then, that Bryce's affinities lay with Germany and that Russia was regarded as inimical. One can only appreciate the irony of his position after 4 August 1914 of being at war on the same side as the Russians - against the Germans. Thus, though appointed to head the commission to investigate German atrocities in Belgium, Bryce still maintained 'a sense of proportion in his view of Germany'. His ambivalence about being at war with Germany had occasion to express itself two months into the conflict, when he voiced his doubts to H.A.L. Fisher about whether 'the German learned class, or the commercial class - or the people in any sense - were really pervaded by the Treitschke[-]Bernhardi system of doctrines'. Clearly, Bryce was not wholly convinced of the reach and strength of Prussian militarism. His commitment to the war against Germany was certainly not absolute.

Fisher also tempered his condemnation of Germany by invoking the racial motif and expressing respect for German contributions to the arts. In his propagandistic tract The War: Its Causes and Issues, Fisher denounced Prussian militarism and the German political mind which made a 'sacred virtue of war'. Nevertheless, like Kirkpatrick, Fisher subscribed to the two-Germanies school, which distinguished between the German people
(the embodiment of good) and their government (the symbol of evil). Thus, even while fulfilling his duties as a polemicist on behalf of the British government, he was still able to admit that: 'I am the last man to draw up an indictment against a whole people of whose contributions to the great causes of humanity I am keenly sensible, whose poetry I read and love, of whose great masters of historical learning I count myself to be in some measure the humble disciple.' Evidently, this academic still held a high regard for the Germany of ideals and high learning, and betrayed a sense of reservation and regret at being at war with her. As he claimed, 'I can take no pleasure in contemplating the ruin of any civilized country under the barbaric processes of war'. Notably, hinting at the dreadful prospect of a civil war with this 'civilized country', Fisher conceded: 'in this struggle between two great members of the Teutonic family there is to me something fratricidal and therefore peculiarly terrible'.

Obviously, then, Fisher viewed Britons and Germans as belonging to the same 'great' Teutonic race. He was by no means unique in seeing the war as 'fratricidal' and 'peculiarly terrible'. In spite of his ardent wartime publications (which have been examined), George Prothero too regarded the war as 'a sort of civil war'. Interestingly, it must be noted, Prothero was married to a German, just as Dawson was. This fact ought to temper any presumption of deep anti-Germanism which Prothero's propagandistic activities after the outbreak of war may call to mind. Incidentally James Headlam who, as one may recall, was recruited into Wellington House after the outbreak of war, also had a German wife; he had met her while studying in Germany in the 1880s. Charles Herford, Professor of English Literature at the University of Manchester who, as seen in the previous chapter, was co-author of *Germany in the Nineteenth Century* (1912), suffered a similar personal dilemma after August 1914: his wife was German as well. Though foremost a scholar in English, Herford, who had studied at Berlin, also took a keen interest in German literature, especially Goethe. In 1885-86 he had helped found the English Goethe Society.
wartime Herford too became a subscriber to the two-Germanies idea, even going so far as to expound his concept of dividing the German people into 'two alien hosts'. As he contended, on the one hand were the 'thinkers, the idealists, the science-workers, the musicians, and the millions of kindly men and women'; but on the other, the 'brutally aggressive military caste'. Separating Germany into two 'alien hosts' may have been Herford's way of reconciling himself with the reality of being at war with the Germans.

This belief in the 'two Germanies' casts useful light on the academics' ambivalence of being at war with Germany.

William James Ashley, Professor of Commerce at the University of Birmingham, may not have articulated the two-Germanies view but nevertheless did show himself to have mixed feelings about being at war with Germany, an attitude no doubt compounded by deep Germanophile sympathies. Soon after the outbreak of war, he was commissioned to write a propagandistic pamphlet called *The War and Its Economic Aspects*. In this work he argued that he was 'convinced' that Germany was 'in the wrong' and that it was every Englishman's 'bounden duty' to bring about Germany's 'complete defeat'. Yet Ashley admitted that the war represented 'a special and personal grief'. Reminiscing on his many years' personal ties with Germany, Ashley opened his work by 'unburdening himself of his grief' and betraying a sense of dismay. 'For many years ... I have had a warm place in my heart for the German people,' he avowed, declaring his fondness for their 'cheerful simple kindliness' which he had encountered during his time in that country. Here, again, was a propagandist who undertook his task with a certain reluctance and expressed regret at being at war with Germany.

**The German Factor in the British Academic Community**

The personal quandary in which Kirkpatrick, Bryce, Pollard, Fisher, Prothero, Headlam, Herford, Ashley and others found themselves after August 1914 may be better
understood if one considers the stature of German scholarship within the British academic establishment during the prewar period. During the first half of the nineteenth century, a 'new ferment' occurred in German universities, resulting in higher standards of learning and research. From about 1840 to 1866 a new spirit emerged in German higher education as 'the ideal of Wissenschaft was extended beyond the confines of a few innovative universities to become the leading principle of German universities'. Translatable into English as 'science', Wissenschaft had far greater connotations in meaning, implying a scientific method of acquiring knowledge, rational understanding and personal fulfilment. This ethos had a strong impact on the spirit of learning in North America and the rest of Europe, not least Britain, where the new thread of 'education through training in science and scholarship' gained a foothold. In the latter half of the century, the German example of learning and educational organization, centred around the idea of Lehrfreiheit, was responsible for inspiring a 'knowledge revolution' in Britain, one marked by 'the search for new knowledge'. The result was the 'institutionalization of the German influence in British education. It is no coincidence that the impetus for educational reform in Britain grew during this period, along with the professionalization of academic disciplines, including history, which saw the creation of its first professional journal, the English Historical Review, in 1886.

We have already noted Fisher's publicly avowed respect for German contributions to culture and civilization as well as Sadler's admiration for the German educational tradition. The prestige which German universities commanded in British intellectual circles before the war cannot be underestimated. As Fisher would later recall: 'To sit at the feet of some great German Professor ... was regarded as a valuable, perhaps as a necessary passport to the highest kind of academic career.' He adds that

Every year young graduates from our universities would repair to Berlin
and Heidelberg, to Göttingen and Bonn, to Jena and Tübingen. The names of the German giants, of Ranke and Mommsen, of Wilamowitz and Lotze, were sounded again and again by their admiring disciples in British lecture-rooms.

Affirming the value of a German education, Alexander James Carlyle, the Oxford historian, testified in 1911 that 'the position of the great German nation in philosophy, science and literature was so powerful that students were bound to study German and go to Germany if they were of any promise'. Respect for German scholarship was echoed by Bryce who, while ambassador to the United States, remarked to an American audience in 1908 that German universities 'led the world in the completeness of their teaching organization' and in their research facilities, thereby setting 'an example to the world'. 'The level of learning among the teachers [in Germany], ... is perhaps higher than anywhere else', he declared. Even in wartime, Sadler could profess that 'the educational achievement of Germany has been unequalled in the world'.

If a German education was deemed to be the passport to high scholarly achievement, then the pursuit of learning in Germany was certainly an established tradition among British academics. Among the historians examined in Chapter 7, the German connection is obvious. We have already mentioned Adolphus Ward's formative years in Germany, growing up as the son a British consul based in that country. Raised in Germany between the ages of three and sixteen, Ward spoke German like a native and, reflecting the influence of his German masters, became 'one of the earliest and best of the interpreters of German scholarship to English readers'. Walter Phillips similarly spent some of his early childhood in Germany, as his family moved to Weimar in 1871 when he was seven years old. There his family had a friend in Ottilie von Goethe, daughter-in-law of the great poet. Although Phillips returned to Britain in 1875 for his schooling, he was
back in Weimar between 1888 and 1891 to study music and painting.38

The German connection is no less apparent among the other historians. After completing his degree at New College, Fisher enjoyed a stint at the University of Göttingen in 1890.39 Kirkpatrick received a doctorate in law from Heidelberg.40 In 1873-74, Prothero attended Bonn University, where he studied under Heinrich von Sybel and became acquainted with the works of the distinguished German historian, Leopold von Ranke, the first volume of whose Weltgeschichte Prothero would translate in 1883.41 Headlam, as mentioned above, spent some of his youth in Germany. Besides perfecting his German and meeting his future wife there, he studied at Berlin University under Hans Delbrück and, quite ironically, Treitschke - the same Treitschke who was to be vilified by his British counterparts after the outbreak of hostilities in 1914.42 In similar fashion Bryce, then a newly appointed Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford, went to Heidelberg in 1863 to study law under Karl Adolf von Vangerow.43 Later in wartime, when writing about the Prussian militarist spirit which he thought had infected all of Germany, Bryce would look back on these earlier days with nostalgia. 'There was nothing of this kind in Southern Germany when I knew it fifty years ago,' he lamented.44 W.J. Ashley studied both at Göttingen and Berlin, coming under the influence of Adolf Wagner and Gustav von Schmoller and, after the outbreak of war, would pay tribute to the formative influence of Wissenschaft on his pursuit of knowledge. As he wrote in 1914: 'Like many other young Englishmen, it was in Germany I first caught the infection of the scientific spirit'.45 Other British historians who studied in Germany before 1914 included J.B. Bury and R.W. Seton-Watson. Historians of course were not the only academics to make it a practice of pursuing their studies in Germany. As Stuart Wallace's study demonstrates, numerous British scholars in theology, the classics and philosophy also went to Germany before 1914.46

Lord Acton, the Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge from 1895 to 1902 who was responsible for the Cambridge Modern History, can be characterized as the
embodiment of this German influence in the British academic establishment. Born John Emerich Edward Dalberg in Naples in 1834, he was of German descent and studied as well in Germany. Acton's mother, Countess Marie Louise Pellini de Dalberg and his father's second wife, was descended from a branch of the Habsburgs and was heir to the family estate at Herrnsheim, Bavaria. In 1848 Acton began his six years of study at Munich under the tutelage of the eminent scholar, Ignaz von Döllinger, with whom he also lived. During his apprenticeship in Germany, Acton was fired with a passion for the scientific study of history and came under the influence of Barthold Niebuhr and Ranke.

The German stamp on Acton's scholarship was to be revealed in later years. Besides helping to launch the English Historical Review, he contributed an article to its first issue which appeared in 1886. It should hardly be surprising that this article, coming immediately after the editor's prefatory note and in effect opening the inaugural issue of Britain's first professional journal for history, dealt precisely with 'German Schools of History'. There was apparently no escaping the pervasiveness of the German hold on the British historical profession. In recognition of the preeminence of the German historical schools, Acton acknowledged that German historians are ahead of other nations by twenty years.

Given this link with Germany, one may better understand why Henry Montagu Butler regarded war with Germany as a 'monstrous paradox'. But although admiration for German learning was profound within the British academic establishment, the high regard for Germany was not motivated purely by her scientific, technical or educational excellence. Another factor which bound the British academics with Germany was the concept of racial identity. One must bear in mind that Germany was a model of excellence largely because she was a Teutonic nation.

Racial Anglo-Saxonism

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The limits to the historians' 'anti-Germanism' after the outbreak of war in 1914 may indeed be explained by the strength of the idea of racial kinship. As mentioned above, Fisher and Bryce invoked the notion of common racial origins to suggest a natural affinity between the British and German peoples. Ashley also alluded to the likeness between Britain and Germany, asserting that 'our two nations possessed many traits in common'. The analysis of textbooks in the previous chapter further revealed a general tendency by historians to cite race as a source of common identity and familial linkage between Britain and Germany. The examination of stereotypes in Chapter 5 similarly demonstrated the vitality of the perception of, and belief in, shared Anglo-German heritage.

The importance of race as an element in popular and elite attitudes during the early twentieth century must be duly appreciated. Doctrines expounding racial superiority may nowadays be deemed racist, scientifically unsound, socially unacceptable or 'politically incorrect', but just a hundred years ago these 'racist' ideas and attitudes were very much in vogue, being the foundation of eugenic theories and practices, for instance. One need only consider the subsequent articulation and implementation of the Final Solution in Europe to grasp the strength and relevance of racial ideas as a fundamental component of Western mentalités all the way through the 1930s and later. Though we may today dismiss as 'myth' theories on the origins of the Aryans and the purity of superior races, these myths in earlier days enjoyed a considerable audience and were widely accepted as 'truth'.

The idea that Britons and Germans were descended from a common stock was certainly pervasive in Britain in the prewar period, especially among the educated classes. One instance can be seen in Joseph Chamberlain's oft-quoted speech in Leicester in 1899, in which he appealed to racial affinity when calling for 'a new Triple Alliance between the Teutonic race and the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race'. In Chamberlain's worldview, the Anglo-Saxon races of Britain and the United States and the Germans belonged to the same family. As noted in Chapter 4, Cecil Rhodes found similar
inspiration in the belief in familial links between the Anglo-Saxons and Teutons. Kaiser Wilhelm II himself had a propensity to think in racial terms, especially in terms of shared Anglo-German racial ties. He once remarked that the British and Germans 'are of the same blood and they have the same creed and they belong to the great Teutonic race which Heaven has entrusted with the culture of the world; ... there is no other Race left for God to work his will in and upon the world except ours'.

The concept that Britons and Germans shared a common ancestry formed the basis for what is today known as racial Anglo-Saxonism, a myth which first emerged in the sixteenth century, matured through the following three hundred years, and attained its heyday in the late nineteenth century when Britain ruled the seas and was the world's foremost imperial power. At its inception in the sixteenth century, Anglo-Saxonism was formulated to extol the Anglo-Saxon period of English history, mythologizing that period as the golden age of freedom. Though Anglo-Saxonism then was still non-racial - that is, it did not show an interest in racial attributes or features in Anglo-Saxons which rendered them superior to other races - it emphasized the links between the Anglo-Saxons and their Germanic ancestors, who were understood to have brought their freedom over to England from their forests in Germany. The freedom-loving Germans and independent Anglo-Saxon institutions thus became fused as one. Through this myth the notion was evolved that: 'The love of liberty, a trait of the Germanic peoples ... had been transposed by the Anglo-Saxons in England into a system of free institutions'.

The racial factor only began to supersede institutional definitions of Anglo-Saxonism in the early nineteenth century with the onset of linguistic nationalism and the Romantic spirit emphasizing pride in the past, in language, race and national identity, as well as the rise of philology and ethnology in Europe. The first half of the nineteenth century in fact witnessed the emergence of racial ideas in 'scientific' and learned jargon as well as a sharp growth in ethnological publications in Britain and the development of
eugenic theories. During this period, racial hierarchies were established attributing different innate characteristics and capacities to different races, with the concomitant ascribing of superior capacities to the Caucasian race. Thus by the 1840s, 'the importance of race, of "blood", was assumed in a manner quite unlike that of one hundred years before'. A revolution in thinking and attitudes indeed was taking place which would have a lasting impact on the Zeitgeist of the remainder of the century. The stage was set for the consummation of racial Anglo-Saxonism in the mid-nineteenth century. As Reginald Horsman explains:

Those ideas of Anglo-Saxon freedom that had persisted in English thought since the sixteenth century were now melded, on the one hand, with the ideas of Teutonic greatness and destiny developed by the comparative philologists and German nationalists, and on the other, with the ideas of inherent Caucasian superiority developed by those interested in the science of man.

Typical were the words of Robert Knox, the British anatomist, author of *The Races of Men* (1850-62), and a leading eugenicist of the day, who wrote in 1850: 'With me, race or hereditary descent is everything; it stamps the man.' But the emergence of racial Anglo-Saxonism was not merely symptomatic of the rising stature of theorists such as Knox, it showed the potential of the myth as an enduring force over the general population. As Donald White observes, the 'belief that the origins of England's greatness ... lay in a sturdy Germanic insularity struck a responsive chord in the hearts of most Victorian Englishmen. That they subsequently became inordinately fond of their Germanic ancestors is a commonplace'.

It was during this period, in 1859, that Charles Darwin issued his seminal work,
The Origin of Species, which was to lead subsequently to the rise of Social Darwinism and bring into vogue the notions of 'natural selection' and 'survival of the fittest', thereby bolstering the strength of racial ideas. Lending further legitimacy to this late nineteenth-century preoccupation with racial ideas were other phenomena such as imperialism, nationalism and right-wing patriotism. Rudyard Kipling, who popularized the idea of 'the white man's burden' in the late nineteenth century, reflected the spirit of his age when he stated, 'Truly ye come of The Blood', a remark showing the close identification of race with patriotism.

By 1900 racial Anglo-Saxonism had reached its pinnacle. It contained four basic premises - namely, that

1) Germanic peoples, owing to their unmixed origins and universal civilizing mission, are inherently superior to all others.

2) The English are of mainly Germanic origin and their history begins with the arrival of Hengist and Horsa at Ebbsfield, Kent, in 449.

3) 'The qualities which render English political and religious institutions the freest in the world are an inheritance from Germanic forefathers.'

4) 'The English, better than any other Germanic people, represent the traditional genius of their ancestors and thereby carry a special burden of leadership in the world community.'

The importance of this myth is not just that the English people were believed to have sprung directly from Germanic roots, but also that the English and Germans, being of Germanic descent, were superior to all other races. This myth thus held, as its central tenets, that both peoples were of the same family, shared a common civilizing mission in the world, and belonged at the top of the racial hierarchy. The 'lingering Germanism' in the conception of England's Anglo-Saxon heritage persisted into the first half of the
Proper account should therefore be taken of the sustained importance of England's Germanic roots in the myth of the country's ancient past.

The British academic elite not only shared in the tenets of racial Anglo-Saxonism but became its leading proponents as well, not least among them the historians. As Hugh MacDougall points out: "Of all professions none served the cause of progress and Anglo-Saxonism more faithfully than historians." These nineteenth-century academic propagators of the myth of England's proud Germanic heritage numbered among them scholars in England's Anglo-Saxon period, such as Sharon Turner and John Kemble. They included other authorities in English history such as Lord Macaulay, Thomas Arnold, Thomas Carlyle, John Green, James Anthony Froude, Charles Kingsley, Edward Freeman and Lord Acton - all centred at Oxford and Cambridge. Indeed, one must not overlook the prominent role played by historians in developing the myth of racial Anglo-Saxonism. Turner, with his History of the Anglo-Saxons (1799-1805), pioneered the study of the ancient origins of England. Kemble, the next historian to make a major contribution to Anglo-Saxon studies, issued his Saxons in England in 1849, which "placed English-German kinship on a firm scholarly base". However, it was Carlyle who, acquiring his inspiration from Germany, was "the first great British writer to view Saxon triumphs as clearly a product of racial superiority" - and especially, the superiority of the Teutonic race.

Freeman, who established his reputation as a scholar with his six-volume History of the Norman Conquest (1867-76), once wrote: "I will assume that what is Teutonic in us is ... the very life and essence of our national being". He added that "the Parliament of England can trace its unbroken descent from the Teutonic institutions of the earliest times", reflecting a basic tenet of the Anglo-Saxon myth. One of the most eloquent assertions of Anglo-German racial kinship and the Teutonic origins of English institutions was perhaps provided by William Stubbs, Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford from 1866 to 1884. As he claimed:
It is to Ancient Germany that we must look for the earliest traces of our forefathers, for the best part of almost all of us is originally German: though we call ourselves Britons, the name has only a geographic significance. The blood that is in our veins comes from German ancestors.

In Stubbs's view, then, the English and Germans were practically one and the same.

The racial factor and the importance of racial Anglo-Saxonism in the British academics' attitudes towards Germany should thus not be overlooked, even as late as 1914. The myth of England's Germanic roots can be properly understood as providing a broader context for the academic elite's admiration of German culture and civilization. The strength of racial Anglo-Saxonism may help explain the limits to anti-Germanism evinced by academics such as Bryce, Fisher, Kirkpatrick, Pollard and Sadler. Moreover, the significance of race as a fundamental concept in prewar historical studies must not be overlooked. As a teaching manual issued in 1901 suggested, 'The history of a nation ... is the history of a particular race; ... The chief factor is, doubtless, the racial type'.

This chapter will now examine three Britons from different professional backgrounds who had strong German ties and who may to a large extent be considered 'pro-German'. The aim here is not to write their biographies but to focus on the German connection in their lives, and how this connection motivated them in their attempts to improve Anglo-German relations during the ten years or so before 1914. Consequently, one may also gain a better understanding of the limits to what they could achieve individually in their efforts to promote Anglo-German détente. The first person examined will fittingly be an academic, Karl Breul.
Karl Hermann Breul

As seen in Chapter 4, Karl Breul played an active part in the founding of the King Edward VII British-German Foundation, providing advice to Sir Francis Trippel and championing his cause, the Anglo-German institute. Breul was truly an Anglo-German, a German by birth who spent most of his life in his adopted country, Britain. He was born in Hanover on 10 August 1860, being a mere child when the Second Reich was proclaimed in 1871. At eight years of age, he was enrolled at the Lyceum II in Hanover where the study of Latin, Greek, French and English was compulsory; Breul was thus introduced to English at a very early age. After obtaining his leaving certificate in 1878, Breul moved to Tübingen and then headed to the University of Berlin in October 1879, earning his Ph.D. in 1883. His dissertation, on the old English epic Sir Gawther, was subsequently published as a book in 1886. From Berlin he went to Paris in the autumn of 1883 to research on the legends of 'Robert le Diable' and 'Richard sans Peur'. During his time in Paris, he also translated, in conjunction with a friend, the book Vom französischen Versbau alter und neuer Zeit (French Versification in Old and Modern Times) by Professor Adolf Tobler, from German into French. This translation appeared in 1885.

Breul in Britain

Breul's contact with England began in 1882 when he visited the country as an undergraduate for research purposes. In May 1884 he returned to Britain and in June of the same year was appointed the first University Lecturer in German by the University of Cambridge, which had just founded the Mediaeval and Modern Languages Tripos. Two years later Breul received an honorary M.A. from Cambridge and was also made a member of King's College. A few years later he became a naturalized British subject and was to remain in Britain for the rest of his life. Flourishing at Cambridge, he was awarded the Litt.D. in 1896, and was three years later made University Reader in Germanic. During his
time at Cambridge, in addition to being a University Lecturer, Breul served as Lecturer in
Germanic and German Language and Literature at Girton and Newnham Colleges. For
several years, he also acted as Director of Modern Language Studies at St. John's College.
Reflecting his rising status among the ranks of Germanists in England, he was in 1902
appointed one of the first two Professors of German Language and Literature to be
nominated by the University of London. Breul, however, turned down the appointment.

A prolific writer, he published numerous articles and books in his lifetime, among
them 'Schiller as an Historian' and 'Herder' in the Modern Language Quarterly,
contributions to Die Neueren Sprachen, and A Handy Bibliographical Guide to the Study of
the German Language and Literature for the Use of Students and Teachers of German.
Between 1887 and 1899, he wrote ten volumes of German Classics under the Pitt Press
series. These volumes 'seemed to us the last word in German literary scholarship', as one
of Breul's students would later testify in acknowledgement of Breul's outstanding scholarly
reputation. Cassell's A New German and English Dictionary, compiled by Elizabeth
Weir, was revised and enlarged by Breul in the 1906 edition. Cassell's German and
English Dictionary, issued in 1909, was also Breul's product. This dictionary made it to
its eighth edition in 1963 which, though revised and enlarged, was still based upon Breul's
edition. Although not a historian, Breul was nonetheless asked to contribute to the
Cambridge Modern History; his piece, entitled 'German Literature (1840-70)', appeared as a
section of Chapter 15 in the eleventh volume of the series which was published in 1909.

His publications, however, were not limited to the field of language and literature.
Being a member of King's College and teacher at Cambridge, he also showed an interest in
student affairs. In 1908 his Students' Life and Work in the University of Cambridge
appeared. Two years later Breul wrote Willkommen in Cambridge: Schlichte Antworten
auf kluge Fragen, an account of life in Cambridge directed at a German audience.
Breul's Academic and Anglo-German Friendship Activities

A role which he relished was that of advocate and authority in modern-language teaching methods. His endeavours in this area also resulted in a few publications. In 1898 Breul issued The Teaching of Modern Foreign Languages in Our Secondary Schools, a work which went into its second edition in 1899 and became widely used in Britain. In this book, he called for more time and training to be devoted to the study of modern languages and, while admitting that there existed no 'true method' of language teaching, he urged that modern language teachers in Britain 'should have a much longer and better training' for their profession than they generally possessed at the time. Here also, Breul was departing from the more conventional notions of language instruction for, in his view, modern languages should be taught differently from what he called the 'ancient languages', with the object of imparting culture and history as well. As he argued, 'in teaching Modern Languages we aim at teaching the principal features of the life, character and thought of great foreign nations'. In 1906 the book was revised, enlarged and issued in its third edition under a new title, The Teaching of Modern Languages and the Training of Teachers.

Breul also promoted foreign language teaching through the Modern Language Quarterly, a journal established in 1897 of which he was co-founder and co-editor. The journal was, however, superseded by the Modern Language Review and Modern Language Teaching in 1905. In 1910 Breul was made president of the Modern Language Association, a tribute to his many years' service to the organization, the foundation of which in 1892 he had also been prominent. Active in the advancement of German language and culture, Breul helped found the English Goethe Society in 1886 and served as its vice-president as well.

The crowning of his teaching career came with his appointment in March 1910 as Schröder Professor of German at Cambridge. The creation of this chair was made public
as early as July 1909 when J. Henry Schröder & Co., announced its offer of an endowment, made through Baron Bruno Schröder, for a permanent professorship of German at Cambridge which was to carry the name of Schröder. Bruno Schröder, one may recall, also served on the council of administration of Ernest Cassel's King Edward VII British-German Foundation. The link thus comes full circle again: the network of academic and business ties manifests itself here once more, with a 'pro-Germanism' at the heart of its purpose.

Just as the King Edward VII Foundation was established with the aim of fostering better ties between Britain and Germany, Breul too was an ardent activist in the Anglo-German friendship movement. He was one of the founding members of the Anglo-German Friendship Committee which grew out of the Caxton Hall meeting in December 1905. In subsequent years, his endeavours in this area were to prove to be untiring. In 1911 when the Anglo-German Friendship Committee was superseded by the Anglo-German Friendship Society, Breul drew up a pamphlet for the new organization. By this time, of course, he had spent over twenty years in Britain and was caught in the middle of the mounting Anglo-German diplomatic difficulties. A friend remarked to Breul in 1907 that he had become 'practically English, or at least as much so as is possible without losing your own nationality'. This circumstance of being an Anglo-German must have posed a most difficult personal dilemma, considering that he was honoured by the German government with the Prussian Order of the Red Eagle in 1908. Over three months into the war in 1914, one of Breul's German friends living in England wrote to him expressing his 'heartfelt sympathy' for Breul in those 'cruel times' and complimented him for having been 'the leading spirit' in the quest for Anglo-German friendship before the war. 'It is heartrending that all these efforts have availed so little,' his friend added, no doubt sharing the same sense of despair which Germans such as himself and Breul must have felt at the onset of war.
The connection between the academic community and the Anglo-German friendship movement is reflected also in Breul's personal relations. Francis William Fox, the Quaker whose efforts at the fourteenth Universal Peace Congress in Lucerne of 1905 led to the Caxton Hall gathering, had in fact been a pupil of Breul's. It may not be a mere coincidence that both men shared the same outlook on and commitment to bettering Anglo-German ties. Even though we cannot ascertain how close their relations were in later years, it is clear that Fox still sought Breul's help when he had difficulties with German. In early 1914, for instance, Fox wrote to Breul asking him to read over a text in German which Fox intended to submit to German newspapers. Breul also appears to have been on close terms with Sir Francis Trippel, Cassel's associate who was one of the originators of the King Edward VII Foundation.82

The Teaching of German in Prewar Britain

During the prewar period, the teaching of German in Britain was generally still rudimentary. Modern languages, as a recognized discipline, had been established only in the 1880s. The 'direct method' of language instruction, coming into its own in the 1900s, still faced considerable resistance from the traditionalists. Recounting his early days as a student of German before the First World War, Walter Bruford, a Germanist who studied under Breul at Cambridge and, following in his teacher's footsteps, later became Emeritus Schröder Professor of German at Cambridge, could attest that virtually all of his masters at the Manchester Grammar School were graduates in the classics. Consequently Bruford, who began the study of German at the school in 1906, recalls: 'Our masters had a great contempt for anything resembling the "play way" in education, and that is how the Direct Method, which aimed at teaching a boy to speak by imitating what he heard, with little conscious effort and analysis, no doubt appeared to men trained in the study of dead languages.' The shortcoming of the older masters was, as Bruford explains, that they 'did
not pretend to make us fluent speakers'. It was not until Bruford's last years in school that the direct methodists began replacing the retiring masters.83

Even so the Manchester Grammar School, under the direction of its High Master, J.L. Paton, represented one of the few schools in the country at that time which actively attempted to promote the study of modern languages. Though a classicist, Paton had a keen interest in German, having himself been educated in Germany. He developed the teaching of modern languages at the school and in 1910 initiated a pupil exchange programme with the Musterschule in Frankfurt, where the headmaster, Max Walter, was also a pioneer of the direct method of modern language teaching. Paton, moreover, arranged for his pupils to stay with German families during their holidays in Germany and even helped with expenses. It appears that he was also a friend of Breul's, at one time agreeing to offer himself as a referee for Breul's son. Praising Breul for his work at Cambridge, Paton remarked in 1914, 'What a great gain it is for these lads like Bruford to have you.'84 It was largely owing to Paton's efforts and generosity that Bruford, before attending Cambridge, was able to travel to Germany for the first time in the summer of 1911. Giving the 1979 Bithell Memorial Lecture at the Institute of Germanic Studies in London, Bruford reminisced fondly of the trip:

My sharpest early memory of Germany is of that welcome meal, the bewilderingly ample Speisekarte, the waiters hurrying with great trays, the acrid smell of German cigars. I have no memory of any military display, and we did not hear till our return about the Agadir Crisis of that summer, one of several war-scares which heralded the Great War.85

It should not at all be surprising that Bruford went on to pursue his study of German at Cambridge under Breul, a friend of Paton. Bruford first met Breul in 1911 at
the oral examination for the entrance scholarship for which he was competing. Describing Breul as looking 'venerable' with his grey moustache and short beard, Bruford recalls: 'His smile and kindly manner put candidates soon at ease'.

In promoting modern languages, the Manchester Grammar School was indeed more the exception than the rule. Generally, modern languages still had some ways to go in holding their own against the classics. A reliable indicator of the prewar position of modern languages is provided by Bruford's account that in 1911-12, the year for which he competed, out of 440 awards given by Oxford and Cambridge colleges, 205 went to the classics and only eight were allocated to modern languages. Even within modern languages, German still tended to rank second to French in popularity. Writing in *Modern Language Teaching* in 1906, a school master, urging the promotion of German, complained that French had 'nearly killed' the teaching of German in British schools. Hence, German had to contend not just with the classics but with French as well. Breul himself was acutely aware of the state of neglect of German-language teaching in British secondary schools. In 1911 he lamented:

> The danger does not consist in any invasion of this country by Germany, but in the gradual extinction of the teaching of German in the schools of Great Britain, and consequently in the grave danger that the rising generation of British boys and girls of the upper middle classes may in most cases grow up without the least knowledge of the German language.

There were, nonetheless, encouraging signs, for voices were increasingly making themselves heard in favour of German and, characteristically, the racial motif was evoked even in the advocacy of the German language. One such voice, for instance, arguing that the English and Germans 'are really one race', used this premise to assert the linguistic
affinity between the two peoples and to suggest the preferability of German over French as the primary modern foreign language to be taught in schools.90

But if German language and studies were poorly developed in the schools, the universities left even more to be desired. As Bruford reminds us: 'The state of German studies in our universities was in 1914, with one or two exceptions, even less satisfactory than in the schools, and as an independent branch of British scholarship, the subject had very little work to its credit.'91 There is certainly evidence from British academics of that period to support Bruford's assessment. A colleague at the University College of North Wales, for example, informed Breul that 'the study of German does not exist here at present', a rather frank but grim admission. In 1906 John Kirkpatrick complained that the study of German was 'lately so languishing' at Edinburgh.92 Cambridge, however, would appear to be one of the exceptions which Bruford mentions, thanks in no small part to Breul. The Schröder Professorship, indeed, was set up about ten years before a similar chair in French was created at Cambridge.93 Nonetheless, significant as the Schröder Chair was, one should not overlook the relative lateness of such a major step - occurring as it did only after the turn of the century - in the teaching of German at this, one of Britain's two oldest and most prestigious institutions of higher learning. Oxford was no farther ahead than Cambridge in the advancement of German, for the former's first Taylorian Professor of German, Dr. Hermann G. Fiedler, was elected only in 1907. In 1909 Sir Julius Wemher (of Wemher, Beit & Co., which has already been dealt with in Chapter 4) donated £2,000 to the university to be used to raise the stipend of the Taylorian Professor by annual payments of £200 for the following ten years. Here is yet another instance of Wemher's involvement in education, on this occasion in the promotion of the German language.94

There can be little doubt that the study of German was lagging behind in Britain. It was widely accepted in the prewar period that Germans knew more of Shakespeare than Britons did of Goethe, and that the study of English language and literature in German
schools and universities was more extensive than the study of German in British schools and universities. Generally also, relatively few British university students pursued their studies in Germany. As a contemporary observer lamented: 'So few English students are found in German universities.' In fact, from the 1880s to the 1900s there was a drop in the percentage of Britons constituting foreign students in Germany. Like the Anglo-German friendship movement to which Breul belonged, the study of German in Britain in the prewar period was an elite - though not necessarily an elitist - activity, confined to a relatively small number of people. As discussed in Chapter 2, it was this underdeveloped state of German learning in Britain which the Albert Committee, presided over by Lord Avebury, sought to rectify.

Like Avebury, Breul too sought to promote German language and culture in Britain as a means of increasing Anglo-German understanding. But given the backwardness of the teaching of German in Britain, it is hardly surprising that popular affinity with Germany was lacking at the grass-roots level. It was not just that Breul belonged to a narrow elite movement, but bicultural 'Anglo-Germans' such as himself were also in a minority. The limits to what he could achieve in promoting German and Anglo-German friendship should thus be properly understood.

Richard Burdon Haldane

We now move to the merging of politics with education. As seen in Chapter 4, Haldane played a major role in the founding of Imperial College of Science and Technology, otherwise known as the 'London Charlottenburg'. Trained as a lawyer, Haldane entered politics in 1880, joining the Liberal Party and in the same year becoming a member of the Albert Grey Committee, set up to bring together young speakers of the Liberal Party. In 1885 Haldane won his first seat in the Commons representing East Lothian and remained in politics until his death in 1928. When the Liberals came to power
in December 1905 he took charge at the War Office as Secretary of State for War. Made a peer in 1911, Haldane became Lord Chancellor in 1912, marking the pinnacle of his legal career.

The commemorative plaque on the house at 28 Queen Anne's Gate, London, where Haldane once lived, reads 'Statesman, Lawyer, Philosopher', a summation of the man's public career and private interests. A Scotsman who hailed from Edinburgh, he was born in 1856, the second of five children born to Robert Haldane, an ardent Calvinist, and his second wife, Mary Burdon Sanderson, also a deeply religious person. A lawyer, Robert Haldane was known as a writer to the signet, a position of high status in Scottish law. Throughout his childhood, Richard Haldane spent his time between their home on Charlotte Square, Edinburgh, and the family estate at Cloan (known at one time as Cloanden). He received his early education at the Edinburgh Academy, remembered as 'never an interesting period to me', during which time Haldane also first came to question his religious teachings.

At age sixteen, Haldane was sent to the University of Edinburgh. By this time, Haldane had become deeply sceptical of the 'essential foundations of Christianity' and turned to German Idealism and metaphysics in the search for truth. As he writes: 'The divines to whom I turned for personal guidance in those days could not help me much, for they had not themselves gone deeply enough down. I was driven to look to the philosophers, and I then began the study of metaphysics.' At Edinburgh he came under the tutelage of John Stuart Blackie, Professor of Greek who, having himself been a student at Göttingen and Berlin, persuaded him to further his study of philosophy at the University of Göttingen under the renowned German philosopher, Hermann Lotze. As Haldane confided to his uncle in March 1874, he considered himself at that stage to be someone who knew 'very little of the world and of himself'. Realizing that he had a duty to do good for humanity, Haldane saw the study of philosophy as a way of attaining that object.
in life. He wrote: 'I have prepared myself so far for my studies in Göttingen next month, where I expect not only the course of work, but the solitude which is always congenial to me will have a beneficial effect.'

**Haldane in Germany**

Thus Haldane set off for Göttingen in April 1874, just three months short of his eighteenth birthday. Upon arrival, his impression of the city was one of a 'fairy tale', a natural reaction for a young lad in a foreign land for his first time. Haldane was further struck by what he perceived to be an 'old fashioned' town which had not changed for 400 years. 'I can imagine myself gone back into the age of the Reformation and Luther', he imparted to his mother, further remarking about Göttingen's narrow and winding streets and tiny houses that reminded him of Swiss cottages. His initial impression of Germans was punctuated by images of their quaint habits: Haldane found that they 'smoke cigars incessantly, sleep on every possible opportunity, and appear to have a strong objection to fresh air, & cold water'. He also took particular notice of their custom of eating raw meats and fish, a habit which he gladly abandoned hardly a couple of weeks after his arrival in Germany.

His letters to his mother are rich in details comparing life in Göttingen with conditions in Scotland. He noted that the German houses had no carpeting on the floor, and that instead of using blankets, the common practice in Germany was to place one feather-bed on top of another - 'a plan I am not quite sure of', he complained. An aspect of British life which he sorely missed was having afternoon tea, which he described as a 'luxury' enjoyed only very rarely, the only occasion during his stay in Göttingen being recalled fondly as 'an event to be remembered'. The German tea, being 'dreadful to taste', 'straw coloured', and 'more like boiling water than anything else', obviously left much to be desired to the Scotsman's taste-buds. Nonetheless, by the end of his first
month Haldane had managed to settle into his new surroundings and lifestyle.

On 23 April Haldane presented Professor Lotze with his letter of introduction from Blackie. Haldane recalled: ‘I had a very pleasant conversation with him about Metaphysics, and he asked as I was going away to come and see him often in the course of the session.’\textsuperscript{103} Emancipated from his ‘religious depression’, Haldane with Lotze’s help embarked on his search for the truth about ‘God, Freedom, and Immortality’.\textsuperscript{104} One of the first things Lotze did was to set Haldane to read the works of Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Many years later, Haldane would speak reverently of Lotze as a great teacher and moral figure who stood above all the other masters at Göttingen.\textsuperscript{105} Besides attending lectures at the university and coming under the influence of Lotze, Haldane took German lessons from Fräulein Schlote, a person well versed in Goethe who remained a close friend and whom he visited often in subsequent years until she died - killed by ‘the grief of the War’, in Haldane’s own words.\textsuperscript{106}

In August 1874 Haldane returned to Edinburgh, whereupon, finding more leisure on his hands, he directed his energy towards studying Immanuel Kant and Fichte. Subsequently, he was to turn to Georg Friedrich Hegel as well. Despite losing weight while at Göttingen, he would later recall fondly that his time in Germany had developed him intellectually where he had degenerated physically. ‘I had been taught to study systematically, ... [and] that if a book is really worth reading it must be read carefully through, and its standpoint mastered.’\textsuperscript{107} Intending to broaden his horizons even further, he went on to study law at the University of Edinburgh, a new passion springing from ‘the engrossment of abstract and academic topics’.\textsuperscript{108} He was admitted to the Bar in 1879, whereupon he moved to London and shortly thereafter his entry into politics was to take place.

Haldane’s Impressions of Germany

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One aspect of home life for which Haldane craved in Göttingen was the strict observance of piety on Sundays. Rather than being a day of quiet solemnity and pensive rest, Sunday in Göttingen was filled with public activity and celebration - a seeming novelty to Haldane. As he observed, the town reeked of beer and tobacco, was resplendent with military music, and the people were 'either dancing, playing billiards, or playing cards'. He confided that 'one feels themselves [sic] away from home with all its comforts and associations, the "religio loci", more on Sunday than any other day when one lie [sic] engaged in study'.

But even if he might have felt home-sick on Sundays, his time at Göttingen no doubt held the roots of his well-known 'pro-Germanism', for which he paid the price in May 1915 when, in the throes of war, he was removed from office. As testimony to the deep impact which Göttingen had on his outlook and intellectual growth, Haldane wrote to his German friend, Hugo Conwentz, about his yearning to return to Germany - just two months after leaving. He had these critical thoughts about Britain:

I actually dislike my own Country now. The people seem to think of nothing but how to make money and never how to attain to a high culture. I dislike going into the streets even because everybody is so much dressed out. ... I wish I had been born a German for Germany suits me far more than here, where life is literally a struggle after position etc. instead of the path to the blessed life of Culture. One dare not here even express one\['s religious opinions if one is not orthodox, and nobody studies anything but the 'Brotwissenschaften'. I have only one friend to whom I can talk in this whole city, and him I see very seldom.10

No doubt youthful musings of a man who had just returned from his eye-opening foreign
travels, these words were nonetheless met with a cold shower from his friend Conwentz, who pressed upon him to take heart and see the good side of British society. Conwentz suggested that Haldane's view of Germany was skewered as he had been exposed only to the outer facets of German life. Still, it is obvious that Haldane returned to Edinburgh deeply impressed by his experiences in Germany.

Haldane in Education and His Admiration of Germany

While at Göttingen, Haldane was struck by the general level of erudition of the German students, remarking that they 'study well, but not so much as they get credit for with us', and that it was customary for soldiers to wear a shoulder stripe to indicate their having passed an exam in Greek or Latin, thereby rendering them eligible for an exemption of two years of their military service. While some German students might have shown a proclivity to laziness, Haldane observed that 'most of them have learned a great deal at the Gymnasium ... and ... far more than we do at our universities'. As he added in one of his letters, testifying to the superior quality of German learning: 'Even an ordinary [German] student laughs at 4 out of 5 of the working students who come from Oxford or Cambridge.'

This appreciation for the merits and achievements of the German system of education formed an important basis for Haldane's future involvement in British educational reform. That involvement came as early as 1889 when, as a junior Liberal M.P., he spoke in the House of Commons on a Bill dealing with the reform of Scottish universities. In the 1890s, he became an active participant in the campaign to remodel the University of London as a teaching institution (already dealt with in Chapter 4). In collaboration with his friend Sidney Webb, Haldane was instrumental in steering the London University Bill through Parliament, finally resulting in the London University Act of 1898. Subsequently, his efforts in higher-learning reform were extended to a broader movement aimed at
establishing new universities in England and Wales, and he became a leading advocate for
the establishment of a university in Liverpool as an independent entity divorced from
Victoria University, which up to then was the umbrella university for the teaching colleges
of Manchester, Liverpool and Leeds. By an Order in Council of February 1903, charters
were granted for the universities of Manchester, Liverpool and Leeds. Haldane's role in the
founding of Imperial College has of course been examined in Chapter 4. Later, as
chairman of the Royal Commission on University Education in London, Haldane was able
to exert his influence on the tone and direction of the commission's proceedings.

Addressing university students at Aberystwyth in 1910, Haldane declared that 'it is
in the Universities, with their power over the mind, ... that we see how the soul of a people
at its highest mirrors itself. In this very speech he cited the examples of Lotze and Kant
as 'typical figures' distinguishing the soul of modern Germany, her idealism and culture.114
The German stamp on Haldane's own philosophy, reflected in his emphasis on the mind
and the power of ideas, is undeniable. His attitude towards educational reform in Britain
was certainly also rooted in his grounding in German philosophy and his admiration for
German culture and achievements. 'Our people have no genius for Education such as the
Germans have,' he once complained.115 His sense of despair with the state of education in
Britain went hand in hand with his praise for the German attitude towards education.
During a trip to Königsberg with his brother in 1901, Haldane noted: 'we have been
contemplating the University buildings in the moonlight & wishing that our Government in
England would see to the housing of our Universities as is done here'.116

Haldane's role in education was not confined to the area of reform, for he also
acted as a lecturer and speaker on philosophy and law. During 1903-04 he gave the
Gifford Lectures at the University of St. Andrews centring on the meaning of reality, no
doubt an area for which he was suitably qualified. These lectures were subsequently
published as The Pathway to Reality.117 After the First World War, Haldane was to
continue on the lecture circuit giving talks on university education and philosophy.

Haldane's Army Reforms

Important as his efforts in educational reform were, Haldane has nonetheless become better known perhaps for the reforms in the British army and the War Office that were undertaken during his tenure as War Secretary. When the Liberals came to power in December 1905, the office that Haldane coveted most was the Lord Chancellorship, a post offered, however, to Sir Robert Reid (Lord Loreburn). Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Liberal leader, initially proffered Haldane the Attorney-Generalship, a position which did not command cabinet rank, and only subsequently suggested that Haldane take up the War Office.

The War Office was arguably the least coveted cabinet posting, having a reputation for being what one author has described as a 'political graveyard' and for good reason. When Haldane assumed his post, the War Office was in shambles and disarray, having seen in recent years the departure of two successive heads, St. John Brodrick (1900-03) and Hugh Arnold-Forster (1903-05), who had been thwarted in their attempts to overhaul the army. Upon taking office, therefore, Haldane had a considerable task before him where his predecessors had failed.

Incidentally, Haldane had in fact been involved with War Office work even before 1905 when, following the catalogue of disasters in the Boer War, he had a private conversation with the then Foreign Secretary, Lord Lansdowne, who appreciated the need to conduct a 'special investigation' into explosives and propellants then in use and appointed Haldane to serve on the newly formed Explosives Committee. Established in 1900 under the chairmanship of Lord Rayleigh, the committee was entrusted with the task of investigating and recommending the best smokeless propellant powders to be adopted by the army, among other things. Sitting on and off for four years, it provided Haldane with
insight into the War Office and the technical problems of explosives. It is coincidental that the Anglo-German link in explosives manifests itself again in the person of Haldane.

The pressure for War Office reform had indeed been mounting since the Boer War which, besides exposing glaring weaknesses in the organization and equipment of the British regular and auxiliary armies, demonstrated the military's lack of, and need for, strategic planning and a General Staff. Between 1901 and 1904, various commissions and committees were established to review the performance of the army in South Africa and recommend reforms and reorganization of the War Office. Among them was the Esher Committee, which recommended that the CID, which had been established by Balfour in December 1902, be given a full-time secretariat and permanent staff. In order that policymaking, administration and command could be separated, the committee further proposed that the position of Commander-in-Chief be replaced by a policy-making Army Council, to be assisted by administrative directors and an Inspector-General. In addition, it called for the creation of a General Staff. These reforms, endorsed by Balfour, were implemented in 1904.

Thus when Haldane took over at the War Office vowing to create his 'Hegelian Army', a set of reforms was already in place dealing with a reorganization of the War Office. The task at hand was to reorganize and reform the army. Undaunted, Haldane was by January 1906 already boasting of having drawn up 'a great Army Scheme' involving potentially 'sweeping changes'. One of such changes, which he laid down in his package of proposals in the summer of 1906, pertained to streamlining the auxiliary forces which, when Haldane took office, consisted of the Militia - known also as the 'old Constitutional Force' - the Yeomanry and the Volunteers. All three were in some measure poorly organized, equipped and trained. The inability of the auxiliaries to support and expand the first-line forces during the South African war had swelled the impetus for reform. By the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act of 1907, the Volunteers and Yeomanry were superseded
by a new Territorial Army, and the Militia was refashioned into a corps of reserves for the first line of the army, thus conforming with Haldane's notion of a two-line army.\textsuperscript{123}

Another major component of Haldane's army reforms was the creation of the BEF, which was launched also in 1907, comprising six divisions and one cavalry division, numbering approximately 160,000 men. At the same time he reduced the size of the regular army by 20,000. The BEF indeed reflected Haldane's adoption of a Continental strategy, which in turn mirrored shifts in the European alignments and in Britain's strategic position and requirements in Europe. These changes, we may recall, had already begun before the Liberals took office when Britain and France signed the accords of April 1904 giving rise to the Anglo-French entente.

Although the BEF was not created for the express purpose of fighting a land war with Germany, it would have been obvious to any astute observer that, based upon Britain's diplomatic realignment with France, and the army's subsequent war plans and preparations, the 'expeditionary' force was for all intents and purposes meant to be deployed in a European war in which Germany figured as the most likely opponent. As a subscriber to the 'blue water' school, Haldane believed in the primacy of naval power for home defence, the implication being that the regular army would have mainly an overseas role. As he claimed: 'The first purpose for which we want any army is for overseas war. The Fleet defends our coasts.'\textsuperscript{124} Therefore, his reforms were designed to fulfil the army's strategic overseas role.\textsuperscript{125} Over the course of the few years leading up to 1914, exchanges were carried on between the British and French General Staffs. General Sir Henry Wilson, the Director of Military Operations from 1910, played a leading role in consulting with his French counterparts in the preparation of British war plans. After the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, the BEF was dispatched to the Continent in support of the French forces on the Western Front. By November 1914, however, it was virtually wiped out at the first battle of Ypres.
The German influence in the army reforms could be seen especially in the creation of the General Staff. When Haldane took charge in 1905, the General Staff, being in its embryonic form, was in operation only in the War Office. Subsequently, by the Army Order of 12 September 1906, it was constituted throughout the army, in the commands and districts. It should be noted that emulation of the German idea of a General Staff was already in vogue even before Haldane's arrival at the War Office. In March 1905, spearheading the campaign to build up the General Staff, Sir George Clarke, Secretary of the CID, remarked that General Sir James Grierson's 'knowledge of the German system enables him to understand our meaning' - testimony to the value placed on the German model of military organization by the British army reformers. Not surprisingly, Clarke (later to become Baron Sydenham) also based his idea of the General Staff on the Prussian/German example. In a memorandum submitted to Haldane in February 1906, he argued that the General Staff system 'lay at the root of German efficiency'. The absence of such a system in Britain, Clarke maintained, represented a 'serious obstacle to well-ordered progress'.

Assisted by Colonel Gerald Ellison, whom on Lord Esher's recommendation Haldane appointed to be his military private secretary, Haldane spent the first few weeks of office in solitude isolation at Cloan, ruminating on the future army reforms. Ellison, who during this time of seclusion 'was closer to Haldane than any other adviser', had the task of tutoring him on aspects of military organization. It was during this period that Haldane deepened his interest in the General Staff, poring over works dealing with that very subject, such as Spenser Wilkinson's *The Brain of an Army* and *The Duties of the General Staff*, by Bronsart von Schellendorf. The relevance of the German model to Haldane's thinking on army reform is evidenced also by his trip to Berlin, between 29 August and 4 September 1906. During that visit Haldane had discussions with Count von Moltke, the Chief of the German General Staff, gained first-hand knowledge of the German military machinery, and
'saw much in German methods that commended itself to him'. It cannot be doubted that Haldane's quest for efficiency in the British army was influenced in no small part by German methods of organization.

**Haldane's Attitude towards Germany**

It is only ironic that the 'Hegelian Army' which Haldane set out to create was ultimately deployed against the country which he greatly admired and from which Hegel hailed. In the prewar period, Haldane had a reputation in the cabinet for wearying his colleagues with his 'long harangues on the contribution of Germany to civilization'. Yet he was also largely responsible for building up the British army's preparedness for offensive action against Germany. Extolling German virtues, organizational skill and technical prowess, Haldane was willing and ready to borrow precisely from the German example of efficiency in warfare to fashion a fighting force to be used against the Germans.

The irony, however, is mitigated when considered in light of the fact that Haldane, as much as he admired German literature and philosophy, remained a patriot and a statesman charged with carrying out the duties of his office. Haldane's position as a politician and statesman and simultaneously a Germanophile, can probably be best characterized as a duality. Having already set in motion his army reforms and raised the efficiency of the British military machine for a possible war with Germany, he took on the role of a peace emissary in February 1912 when he made a secret trip to Berlin in what has become known as the 'Haldane mission'. Bringing about Anglo-German reconciliation had in fact been Haldane's 'personal mission' since at least 1907. The purpose of the 1912 visit to Berlin, coming just a few months after the Agadir crisis, was to smooth Anglo-German relations and 'to talk over the ground' with the German government with regard to a possible political agreement. As both Grey and Churchill declined to undertake the
trip, Haldane was asked to go, being the ranking cabinet member who spoke fluent
German. But as Berlin was obdurate in its desire to increase the number of war-ready
capital ships in its fleet and Whitehall reluctant to give the guarantee of neutrality in a
European war which the Germans desired, Haldane's mission failed in the end to secure an
agreement.  

Haldane's views of Germany and Germans can be summed up as reflecting a
duality and perhaps ambivalence. His image of Germany was certainly far from being
simply black and white. It is indicative of Haldane's attitude that when Whitehall received
an unconciliatory cable from the German government in March 1912, following his
abortive mission to Berlin, he characterized the telegram as an 'ungracious' document,
written 'in real Prussian style'. Therefore, while on one hand a keen admirer of German
culture, Haldane was nonetheless alert to the ugly side of the German character and was
wont to identify it as a Prussian trait.

This duality of feeling was apparent in his holding on to the belief, during his
tenure as War Secretary and Lord Chancellor, that there existed a 'war party' in Berlin. In
this conception, Anglo-German tension was the work of a small group of malicious hawks,
led by Admiral von Tirpitz and the naval people surrounding the Kaiser and Bethmann
Hollweg. The notion of a war-mongering naval group overwhelming the more pacifist
civilian leadership in Berlin was a consistent strand in Haldane's understanding of the
German government. Writing to his sister in March 1912, Haldane reasoned that the
German Chancellor's intransigence was not deliberate or due to evil intent but was the work
of the hawks in Berlin. As Haldane explained: 'It is plain that the naval people in Berlin
have been too strong for Bethmann [Hollweg].' At the outbreak of war in August 1914,
Haldane still clung to this view, believing that the Kaiser was a well-intentioned man who
was duped and overpowered by the 'war party'. 'It is pretty plain', Haldane argued on 4
August 1914, 'that the German War Council has been planning this war sometime past, &
has overcome Bethmann Hollweg & probably the Kaiser.138 Later, looking back on the period from 1906 to 1915, he was to recall: 'Right throughout I have known of the existence and danger of this War Party, but I took the view that until a very late period it was not really the dominant party in Germany.'139

The ambivalence in Haldane's attitude towards Germany was evident even during his younger days. Writing the above-quoted letter to Hugo Conwentz in October 1874 having only recently returning from Germany, he must have felt a pining for Göttingen and therefore reminisced nostalgically. While still in Germany, however, he was wont to feel alienated occasionally. He once referred to Germans as 'either careless beer drinkers or materialists', remarking that, 'Truly this is a curious country, very different from our own.'140 Visiting Germany again in the summer of 1876, Haldane wrote from Leipzig admitting to feeling 'lonely' in that country 'where one knows no one, and the customs & language are so different from one's own'.141 Yet these variations in customs and language did not prevent him from admiring German culture and philosophy or from being an ardent and devoted visitor to the country. Indeed, the annual pilgrimage to Germany became a permanent routine for Haldane. In later years, he was to undertake these yearly expeditions, almost without fail, with his good friend P. Hume Brown, Professor of History at Edinburgh and disciple of Goethe.142

Being one who had had close contact with Germans and who understood the German mindset, Haldane was able to appreciate their strengths as well as their flaws. As he observed in his Autobiography: 'They are a difficult people because the "abstract mind" predominates with them.' But having said that, he also conceded that 'that very quality makes them exact and reliable in their dealings when an agreement has once been arrived at'.143

As an advocate of educational reform, he often upheld the German model of excellence in technical education and training. But even in that capacity, he was under no
illusion as to the nature of the challenge posed by Germany's economic progress and
technical advancement. A champion of free trade, he saw Britain's economic disadvantage
as lying in the fact that the application of science to industry in Britain was less developed
and intensive than that practised in Germany. 'Our real danger was not one of German
invasion,' he contended, 'but one of German permeation of our markets by the employment
of scientific knowledge.' Though a pro-German, Haldane was not blind to the German
threat. But rather than see Germany's rise as being outright incompatible with British
interests, Haldane viewed Germany's scientific advances as providing a spur to the
development of British manufacturing.

On 3 August 1914, when Germany was already at war with Russia and Britain's
entry in the conflict was only hours away, Haldane wrote of his 'sense of crushing personal
sorrow', brought on by the prospect of inevitable war with Germany. That he should
have felt thus is understandable, though just three days later he could just as confidently
declare, as though still speaking as the War Secretary, that: 'Our mobilization arrangements
have come off splendidly ... & the machine is working beautifully. Everyone knows just
what he has to do.' Though an advocate of a better understanding between Britain and
Germany, Haldane was nonetheless resigned to having a war with Germany - the land of
Goethe, Kant, Schiller and Hegel - if one had to be fought. One should note that, in
similar vein to some of the academics examined above, Haldane too subscribed to the two-
Germanies view, distinguishing between the German people and their government. 'The
nations themselves,' he later asserted in Before the War, 'taken as aggregates of individual
citizens, ... desired the continuance of peace.' In his view, then, it was the rulers of
Germany who were responsible for the war.

It is also worth mentioning that throughout the July crisis Haldane, though the
architect of the BEF, was far from being a hawk. The prospect of war with Germany was
accepted as an unavoidable fate - and accepted with deep resignation. 'It is horrible here -
war with Germany is drawing near,' he remarked on 3 August, adding that 'it is all like a
horrid dream'. Thus, much as he had embraced the Continental strategy and created the
BEF for a possible showdown with Germany, at the decisive moment in 1914 he still
lacked a genuine desire for a war with Berlin. His attitude during the July crisis, a period
which he described as 'the most trying time' since the Liberal government had taken office
in 1905, is indeed very telling. It appears that right to the end, Haldane hoped for the
crisis to be resolved peacefully. As late as 29 July, he clung to the belief that there was
still hope for peace. It has been argued that it was not until 1 August that Haldane was
won over to the side of intervention by his fellow Liberal Imperialist, Sir Edward Grey.
The decisive event supposedly was Grey's offer of neutrality to Germany in return for
Berlin's promise not to invade France, and the Germans' rejection of the offer, thereby
making it seem to Haldane that every chance for peace had been tried and exhausted, and
that Britain had little choice but to intervene. Given Haldane's pro-Germanism and his
deep sense of 'crushing personal sorrow' felt at the prospect of war with Germany, it is
hardly surprising that he gave in only at the last hour.

Ernest Joseph Cassel

As mentioned above, Haldane undertook his abortive mission to Berlin in February
1912. This mission was facilitated by Sir Ernest Cassel, founder of the King Edward VII
British-German Foundation, prominent City banker, financial contributor to Imperial
College, and business associate of Wernher, Beit as well as of Cecil Rhodes.

Cassel was born in 1852 in Cologne, the youngest child of three in a Jewish family
with a strong tradition in banking. At age fourteen, he began work at the banking firm
of J.W. Eltzbacher & Co. before leaving for Liverpool in 1869. There he found
employment with Blessing, Braun & Co., German grain merchants, but in April 1870 he
became a clerk at the Anglo-Egyptian Bank in Paris. At the outbreak of the Franco-
Prussian War in 1870, Cassel left France and returned to Britain, this time securing a clerkship with the merchant banking firm of Bischoffsheim & Goldschmidt. He was not yet even twenty.

Cassel's rise at Bischoffsheim & Goldschmidt was meteoric. In recognition of his business acumen and negotiating skills, particularly with regard to the firm's dealings in Constantinople and high-risk loans in Latin America, his employers made him manager in 1874, with an annual salary of £5,000. Throughout the 1880s, he established his position in international finance with ventures in Swedish iron ore-mining and transportation, as well as American and Mexican railways. Further widening his global network, Cassel also arranged loans for the governments of Egypt, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay.

As one may recall from Chapter 3, Vickers, Sons & Co. acquired Maxim Nordenfelt as well as the Naval Construction & Armaments Company Ltd. at Barrow in 1897. The financing for these takeovers was provided by Cassel, himself a friend of Albert Vickers. At around this time also, Cassel moved into his own offices at 21 Old Broad Street in the City, and made inroads into the financing of projects in Egypt, notably the Aswan Dam. In 1898 he established the National Bank of Egypt. An avid investor in South African diamond- and gold-mining enterprises, Cassel also had a sizeable stake in Rand Mines Ltd., the holding company floated by Wernher, Beit in 1893. Besides Julius Wernher and Alfred Beit, Cassel had links with Cecil Rhodes. These men formed a loose but interconnected grouping which, as we have seen, was active in promoting Anglo-German linkage during the pre-1914 period. Among Cassel's other business associates, those with whom he developed particularly close ties were Jacob Schiff of Kuhn, Loeb & Co. of New York, and Carl Meyer, Rothschild's agent in South Africa.153

In 1895 Cassel secured a loan for the Chinese government with the support and encouragement of the Foreign Office, which was keen on maintaining Britain's influence in China and thus desirous of shoring up that government's financial position. With this
episode began Cassel's association with the Foreign Office, which in a rare instance showed itself willing to enlist the aid of finance in pursuit of political objectives.\footnote{154}

Cassel's involvement with affairs of state was maintained in later years during his attempts to play a part in improving Anglo-German relations, one example of which was manifested by the Haldane mission of 1912. The origins of the mission remain 'an historical mystery', though it was 'most likely' Cassel's friend, Albert Ballin, the German shipping tycoon, who made the initial approach to the German government.\footnote{155} As the surviving records indicate, both men had been engaged in discussions on naval disarmament at least as early as 1909, when they broached proposals for Anglo-German naval spending cuts.\footnote{156} Anglo-German talks were begun in December 1911 with a view to a possible settlement of such issues as the Baghdad railway and the Portuguese colonies in Africa, with Cassel or Ballin probably acting as the 'unofficial channel' between London and Berlin.\footnote{157} The upshot of these initial exchanges was a proposal to send a British cabinet member to Berlin for further consultations. Shortly before Haldane's departure for Berlin on 7 February, there was a flurry of activity between himself, Churchill and Cassel in preparation for the trip. Not only did Cassel serve as an 'unofficial channel' in the London-Berlin exchanges, he also had a role in formulating the points which Haldane was to talk over with the Germans.\footnote{158} So intimately involved was Cassel in the proceedings that he accompanied Haldane on the trip to Berlin. In recognition of his contribution, Haldane praised Cassel for his 'tact and skill' and referred to their work as 'our joint labours'. But the Germans' 1912 Novelle, which Haldane characterized as 'formidable',\footnote{159} called for an additional squadron of the German High Seas Fleet to be placed at war readiness, thereby increasing the size of the active fleet.\footnote{160} The Novelle inevitably caused alarm in London and proved to be a major stumbling block to securing an Anglo-German agreement. Thus in spite of Cassel's and Haldane's efforts, the mission to Berlin did not bear fruit.
To conclude, connected as Cassel was to both the British and German governments, there was little he could do to achieve a settlement between the two powers when the divergence between their political interests proved too wide, and when they were incapable of compromise. Though a man of tremendous influence in financial circles, a member of King Edward VII's entourage, and one who had access to the Kaiser, Cassel could not in the end surmount the obstacles posed by the governments' lack of flexibility and their unwillingness to reach an accommodation. He could act as an emissary, provide advice and help shape policy, but ultimately governmental decision-making still rested in the hands of the politicians and statesmen. Cassel's ability to influence political outcomes was limited, as was the power of high finance, and of the City, in public diplomacy, especially where economic and political interests did not intersect.

NOTES

1. Untitled poem originally written in German. This English version is in the Institute of Germanic Studies (IGS), London, Breul MSS.
7. Dawson, What is Wrong, pp. viii-ix.
9. Kirkpatrick to Breul, 8 March 1912, IGS, Breul MSS.
11. Pollard to his parents, 13 Sept. 1914, ULL, Pollard MSS.
16. Ibid., p. 10.
22. Ibid., p. 8.
23. Quoted in Wallace, Image of Germany, p. 29.
27. Ibid., p. 29.
34. Times Educational Supplement, 16 June 1911, p. 91.
37. [Tout], Sir Adolphus, p. 12.
38. DNB, 1941-1950, p. 669.
40. Who was Who, II, 590.
41. Wallace, Image of Germany, p. 66; and DNB, 1922-1930, p. 698.
42. DNB, 1922-1930, p. 411.
43. Ibid., p. 128.
45. Ashley, The War, p. 3.
46. For the names of British academics from all fields who had a German education before 1914, see Wallace, Image of Germany, Appendix 1.
49. Acton, 'German Schools of History', English Historical Review 1 (1886), pp. 7-42.
50. Ibid., p. 7.


57. For an examination of the relationship between racial ideas, the concept of moral and physical degeneration of a nation's 'stock', and the development of eugenic theories in the nineteenth century, see Daniel Pick, *Faces of Degeneration: A European Disorder, c.1848-c.1918* (Cambridge, 1989).


59. Ibid., p. 399.

60. Quoted in MacDougall, *Racial Myth*, p. 91.


64. White, 'Changing Views', p. 590.


66. Ibid., pp. 91-2.


68. Ibid., p. 399.

70. Ibid., p. 102.


74. *CMH*, XI, pp. 411-31. See also Prothero to Breul, 2 Nov. 1906, IGS, Breul MSS.

75. Breul, *Students' Life and Work in the University of Cambridge* (Cambridge, 1908).


77. Details of Breul's life can be found in *The Biographical Series* (London, 1905) under the heading 'Karl Hermann Breul, Esq.' See also the biographical notes in King's College's *A Register of Admissions to King's College Cambridge, 1797-1925* (London, 1929), p. 163.


79. See Breul to Tiarks, 27 April 1911, IGS, Breul MSS.

80. F.E. Sandbach to Breul, 28 Sept. 1907, ibid.

81. W. Rippmann to Breul, 22 Nov. 1914, ibid.

82. Fox to Breul, 2 Feb. 1914, ibid. See also Trippel to Breul, 28 Jan. 1913.


84. Paton to Breul, 13 July 1914, IGS, Breul MSS.


87. Ibid., p. 6.
88. Hardress O'Grady, 'German?', MLT 2 (1906), pp. 207-10. See also E.L. Milner-Barry, et al., 'The Position of German in English Schools', MLT 4 (1908), pp. 68-81.


92. E.V. Arnold to Breul, 4 June 1904; and Kirkpatrick to Breul, 20 Dec. 1906, IGS, Breul MSS.


95. A.B. Young, 'German Universities', MLT 3 (1907), pp. 65-7.


98. Haldane to his uncle, 24 March 1874, NLS, Haldane MSS. 5901, f. 11.

99. Haldane to his mother, 30 April 1874, NLS, Haldane MSS. 5927, f. 18.

100. Haldane to his mother, 21 April 1874, ibid., ff. 11-12.

101. Haldane to his mother, June 1874, ibid., f. 31.

102. Ibid., f. 18.

103. Haldane to his mother, 24 April 1874, ibid., f. 14.


For more on the behind-the-scenes bargaining in those early days of December 1905, see pp. 31-40.

107. Ibid., p. 19.
108. 'Memorandum of events between 1906-1915', NLS, Haldane MSS. 5919, f. 10.
109. Haldane to his mother, 26/27 March 1874, NLS, Haldane MSS. 5927, f. 15.
111. Conwentz to Haldane, 10 Dec. 1874, ibid., f. 31.
112. Haldane to his mother, 24 April 1874 (previously cited), f. 14.
113. Haldane to his mother, 27 April 1874, NLS, Haldane MSS. 5927, f. 17.
114. Haldane, 'Soul of People', p. 31.
115. Haldane to Elizabeth Haldane, 20 April 1903, NLS, Haldane MSS. 6010, f. 200.
116. Haldane to Rosebery, 6 April 1901, NLS, Rosebery MSS. 10029, f. 131.

119. Lansdowne to Haldane, 1 April 1900, NLS, Haldane MSS. 5905, f. 24.
120. Haldane, Autobiography, pp. 164-5. See also Knox to Haldane, 10 May 1900, NLS, Haldane MSS. 5905, f. 31.
121. Haldane, Autobiography, p. 185.
123. For more on Haldane's military reforms, see Edward M. Spiers, Haldane: An Army Reformer (Edinburgh, 1980).
125. Spiers, Haldane, pp. 78-80.

128. George Clarke, 'The General Staff', undated but marked sent to Haldane on 1 Feb. 1906, BL, Sydenham MSS., Add. MS. 50836.


133. Sweet, 'Great Britain and Germany', p. 221.

134. PRO, CAB 1/8, f. 31. Haldane's diary of his visit to Berlin is in ff. 30-54 of this file.


136. Haldane to Elizabeth Haldane, 8 March 1912, NLS, Haldane MSS. 6011, f. 195.

137. Haldane to Elizabeth Haldane, 11 March 1912, ibid., f. 197.

138. Haldane to Elizabeth Haldane, 4 Aug. 1914, NLS, Haldane MSS. 6012, f. 51.

139. NLS, Haldane MSS. 5919, f. 2.

140. Haldane to his mother, June 1874, NLS, Haldane MSS. 5927, f. 32.

141. Haldane to his mother, 7 June 1876, ibid., f. 61.


143. Ibid., p. 245.

144. Ibid., p. 152.

145. Haldane to Elizabeth Haldane, 3 Aug. 1914, NLS, Haldane MSS. 6012, f. 50.

146. Haldane to his mother, 6 Aug. 1914, NLS, Haldane MSS. 5992, ff. 10-11.


148. Haldane to Elizabeth Haldane, 3 Aug. 1914, NLS, Haldane MSS. 6012, f. 50.

149. Haldane to his mother, 27 July 1914, NLS, Haldane MSS. 5991, f. 275.
150. See Haldane to his mother, 29 July 1914, ibid., f. 279.


152. For more on his family's background, see Kurt Grunwald, '"Windsor-Cassel" - The Last Court Jew: Prolegomena to a Biography of Sir Ernest Cassel', Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 14 (London, 1969), pp. 121-3.


156. See Grey to Cassel, 5 Aug. 1909, University of Southampton Library (USL), Broadlands Archives (BA), MB1/X4, f. 7.


158. Churchill to Cassel, 26 Jan. 1912, USL, BA, MB1/X4, f. 32; and outline (in Cassel's handwriting) of the three major points, f. 36.


CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION

'What ... fools[..] We've all been believing that Germany
w[oul]d never go for us! Poor Haldane & all the pro
Germans among whom I have always counted myself!'
Margot Asquith to Lord
Rosebery, 1 September 1914

In August 1914 erupted the European conflagration which has become known to
subsequent generations as the Great War or the First World War, an armed struggle initially
pitting the powers of the Triple Entente - Britain, France and Russia - against the Central
Powers: Germany and Austria-Hungary. Extending around the globe, this truly 'world'
conflict, Europe's first 'total' war and 'the war to end all wars', has affixed the slaughter of
the trenches forever in the annals of modern memory. To borrow Sir Edward Grey's
phrase, the lamps went out all over Europe during this four-year-long conflict, which saw
the effective deployment of mustard gas, the tank, the fighter plane and the submarine.
The deadliness of armed warfare was raised to frightening and unprecedented heights.

The July Crisis

The July crisis of 1914, which triggered the war's outbreak, has already been
sufficiently recounted. Briefly put, the crisis began on 28 June when the Austrian
Archduke and heir to the Habsburg throne, Franz Ferdinand, and his wife were assassinated
by Bosnian revolutionaries in Sarajevo. Determined to put an end once and for all to its
'south Slav' menace, the Austro-Hungarian government decided to take vigorous action
against Serbia, believing that inaction would place the Dual Monarchy's survival as a Great
Power in mortal peril. During 5-6 July, in what amounted to an offering of a 'blank cheque', the Kaiser promised the Austrians Germany's 'full support', even in the event of a war with Russia. Having secured Germany's firm backing, Vienna resolved to crush Serbia by force. On 23 July it delivered an artfully crafted ten-point ultimatum to the Serbian government, which was given forty-eight hours in which to reply. The harsh Austrian terms were designed to be unacceptable to Belgrade. The Serbs nevertheless met the forty-eight-hour deadline and accepted all but one of the Austrian demands. Using the Serbian rejection of its ultimatum as a pretext, Vienna proceeded to declare war on Serbia on 28 July.

If the Austrians proved determined to adopt a firm line in this crisis, so too did the Russians. Rather than remain an idle spectator, the Russian government resolved to stand by the Serbs and face the risk of war. Reflecting its hardened attitude, St. Petersburg decided on 25 July to proclaim 'the period preparatory to war', thus setting in motion a series of premobilization measures which were carried out along its Austrian and German frontiers. In response to the Austrian declaration of war against Serbia, Russia ordered partial mobilization on 29 July, and on the next day the Tsar decided on general mobilization, which was proclaimed on 31 July.

Germany, meanwhile, proclaimed the 'state of imminent danger of war' on 31 July, and declared war on Russia on 1 August. Constrained by the demands of the Schlieffen Plan, which called for a quick, decisive campaign against France followed by a concentration of German forces in the east to face the onslaught of the Russian steamroller, the Germans had to act with speed. In the evening of 2 August, Berlin dispatched an ultimatum to Belgium demanding the right of passage for German troops in the impending offensive against France. The German ultimatum, expiring on the morning of 3 August, was rejected by the Belgian government. On the same day Germany declared war on France and her troops crossed into Belgium in force on 4 August. The First World War
Describing scenes of panic, pandemonium and euphoria, Sir Francis Oppenheimer has left behind a vivid account of those last days of peace in July and August 1914. Born in London in 1870 to a family of German-Jewish heritage, Oppenheimer was appointed British Consul-General in Frankfurt in 1900. He left the Consulate Service for the Diplomatic Service in 1912 when he became the Secretary of Embassy in Berlin, in effect discharging the duties of a commercial attaché.11

Oppenheimer left Germany barely before the outbreak of Anglo-German hostilities in August 1914. He departed from Berlin on 30 July, just hours before the German proclamation of the ‘state of imminent danger of war’. The railway station was, in his words, ‘one mass of humanity’. Five passengers were crammed into his first-class carriage which was intended for four. The chaos around him bespoke the tension and excitement arising from the imminent approach of war. ‘The atmosphere charged as with electricity,’ Oppenheimer observed. Describing the German crowds, he remarked: ‘They believe War has been declared & ... a cheer - the whole station chimes in - no one knows why he is shouting - but cheering is like a relief to the tension of the nerves …’ Arriving in Frankfurt on 1 August, he saw that there were ‘no porters - platforms block[ed] with people - crowded with Pyramids of luggage’. Later in the same afternoon, the station seemed to him ‘One mass of people’ as throngs of foreign travellers scrambled to head for the ports. Leaving his wife behind for fear that the journey might be too hazardous, Oppenheimer boarded the jam-packed train for Flushing in difficult conditions that were compounded by the sweltering August heat. As he recorded: ‘... train packed: gangways of corridor carriage impassable.- No dinner.’ He added: ‘So crowded have to open door of W.C & three women stand in there - the heat & crowd & smell of luggage quite unbearable.’ Despite these circumstances, Oppenheimer was able to board the steamer at Flushing and arrived at Folkestone on the morning of 2 August, finally reaching London’s Victoria
Station seven hours late - and without his lost luggage. By 6 August, when Britain was already at war, he took notice of the electricity in the London air that was generated by the public's enthusiasm for the war. Describing scenes of mob hysteria, Oppenheimer wrote: 'Vast crowds are presenting themselves at the Recruiting Office off White Hall. Six Policemen on horseback have to keep the crowd in order. Every one tries to be the first to enter the recruiting office.'

These public scenes which Oppenheimer witnessed might suggest a spontaneous popular response to the country's call of the hour. The British government's path to war, however, was arduous and punctuated by agonizing indecision and cabinet tussles. The cabinet's decision-making during the July crisis has indeed been sufficiently recounted and need not detain us here.

A lack of enthusiasm for war was also noticeable among an important segment of the non-governmental elites: the business and financial interests. While the Liberal cabinet deliberated and procrastinated, the July crisis wreaked havoc with the City of London. On 25 July, the day on which Serbia replied to the Austrian ultimatum, the London Stock Exchange recorded a sharp fall in prices. By 27 July, the following Monday and first business day of the new week, panic had broken out in the stock exchanges across the Continent as well as in New York. By 29 July, though nominally still open, 'the Continental Bourses had practically ceased to function'. Consequently, the London market bore the brunt of the massive sales of securities that were precipitated by the panic. Besides the collapse of stock prices, the foreign exchange market, which proved to be the 'weak point', also foundered. Unable to cope with the deluge of 'unwanted securities of the world's markets', the London Stock Exchange was finally forced to close, for the first time in its history, on 31 July. By a royal proclamation of 3 August, a moratorium was imposed on the payment of certain bills of exchange. Meanwhile, a financial breakdown of a different order was occurring with the massive run on money provoked by the crisis,
when notes were being redeemed in huge quantities for sovereigns. In the two days of 30-
31 July alone, the Bank of England's gold reserves fell by about £6 million. Evidently,
'business as usual' could not be maintained for long.

Given this enormous disruption, the City's aversion to a British entry into the
European war was understandable, even predictable. Testimony by British marine
insurance companies before the CID in 1911 had already given an indication of the
business circles' questionable zeal for any British armed conflict with Germany. As firms
such as Lloyd's testified in 1911, they considered themselves bound to fulfil their
contractual obligations to their German maritime clients, and to cover their losses incurred
in an Anglo-German war for damages inflicted by the Royal Navy, provided that those
obligations were entered into prior to the start of hostilities. As one may recall, the
German merchant marine represented an important market for British insurance firms in the
pre-1914 period. The business sense of forthrightness in this instance was obviously at
odds with the government's interests, especially in the event of an Anglo-German war.

At the height of the July crisis, the pacifist attitude of the British financial,
commercial and industrial circles should hardly have been surprising. David Lloyd George,
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, is said to have stated on 31 July: 'All the bankers and
commercial people are begging us not to intervene.' According to him, Lord Cunliffe, the
Governor of the Bank of England, 'with tears in his eyes' pleaded with him, 'Keep us out
of it. We shall all be ruined if we are dragged in!' Arguing against intervention at that
day's cabinet, John Morley, Lord President of the Council, and John Simon, the Attorney-
General, cited the pacific opinion of the industrial centres of the north and the banking and
commercial circles of London. On 31 July also, the day on which the London Stock
Exchange closed, City bankers were pleading with Asquith not to bring Britain into a
European war. Morley later confirmed that Lloyd George 'informed us that he had been
consulting the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, other men of light
and leading in the City, also cotton men, and steel and coal men, etc., in the North of England, in Glasgow, etc., and they were all agast at the bare idea of our plunging into the European conflict. Sir Eyre Crowe, the Assistant Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, complained that commercial opinion was 'generally timid, and apt to follow pusillanimous counsels'. So irked was he by this apparent irresoluteness that he blamed the City's anti-interventionist stance on 'the deliberate acts of German financial houses', alleging that they were 'notoriously in daily communication with the German Embassy'. As Haldane's correspondence suggests, the acuteness of the financial crisis was keenly appreciated by the City's interests and the government which they sought to lobby. As Haldane noted on 1 August: 'We have had the Governor of the Bank of England & the City Bankers with us. The financial crisis is serious & we are taking strong measures.'

Up north, in Manchester for example, business opinion was similarly 'overwhelmingly in favour of neutrality'. Sir Charles Macara, president of the International Federation of Master Cotton Spinners and Manufacturers' Association, argued publicly on 31 July for non-intervention. On 1 August the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, speaking on behalf of Manchester's mercantile community, addressed a telegram to Asquith urging him to preserve Britain's neutrality in the European conflict.

The attitude of the commercial classes during those last days of peace certainly puts into clearer perspective their subsequent attempts to maintain 'business as usual' in wartime, even to the extent of preserving indirect trade links with Germany through neutral countries. In October 1914 the Chamber of Commerce Journal could enthusiastically express its 'hope that our overseas trade may not only be maintained, but even substantially increased'. But after the first six months of war, with the onset of state economic intervention and a severe loss of the British export trade, that attitude was to be tempered by an increased hostility towards governmental interference. The businessmen's unwillingness to subordinate the pursuit of profit completely to the government's war effort
was to be a cause for concern at Whitehall.

During the July crisis, the commercial interests found cohorts in the academic community. It should be remembered that Norman Angell had, during the prewar period, gone to great lengths to underscore the economic counter-productiveness of a European war. During those last days of peace in July 1914, he organized the British Neutrality League and was joined in this venture by C.P. Scott, the editor of the *Manchester Guardian*, and J.J. Thomson, Cavendish Professor of Experimental Physics at Cambridge.\textsuperscript{26} Incidentally, Thomson was also one of four Cambridge dons who spearheaded a public protest in *The Times* against British intervention in a war against Germany. On 1 August 1914, the day on which Germany declared war on Russia, a letter signed by nine academics appeared in the paper under the heading 'Scholars' Protest against War with Germany'. These scholars argued that Germany was 'a nation leading the way in Arts and Sciences' and 'so near akin to our own'. In their opinion, 'War upon her in the interest of Servia and Russia will be a sin against civilization.'\textsuperscript{27} Hence, racial imagery was evoked again, and Germany presented as an epitome of civilization, related by blood ties to Britain. By the morning of 5 August, however, these academics had been overtaken by events and their arguments rendered irrelevant.

During those last days of peace, Liberal academics such as the eminent social scientist Graham Wallas, G. Lowes Dickinson, Fellow of King's College, Cambridge, and the 'Norman Angellite' Leonard Hobhouse, also attempted to keep Britain out of the war. At about the same time as Angell was setting up his Neutrality League, Wallas, along with the Radical economist John Hobson and Labour leader Ramsay MacDonald, was organizing the British Neutrality Committee. Its membership included Bertrand Russell, A.G. Gardiner, J.L. Hammond, the historians G.M. Trevelyan and Basil Williams, and Gilbert Murray, Regius Professor of Greek at Oxford. As might be expected, this committee, in advocating neutrality, expressed Russophbic and Germanophile opinions, with the racial
theme appearing dominant. Its manifesto of 3 August referred to Russia as 'only partly civilized', governed by 'a military autocracy largely hostile to Western ideas of political and religious freedom' and, if victorious in the European war, liable to become 'the dictator both in this continent and in Asia'. Germany, on the other hand, was deemed to be 'highly civilized' and 'racially allied to ourselves and with moral ideals largely resembling our own'.

It was also on 3 August that Grey gave his 'very remarkable, moving and powerful' address to the Commons, stating the case for intervention. Reflecting the futility of these neutralists' efforts, Hobson wrote on that very evening: 'If there is war tomorrow, as seems pretty certain, our Neutrality Committee will drop that name, and lie low as a watching Conciliation Committee, ...' Murray, seeing that Germany 'has plainly run amok', in a similarly defeatist manner 'says he finds it difficult to resist Grey's case'.

Outpaced by the alacrity of events, the Neutrality Committee held its first meeting only in the afternoon of 4 August. By eleven o'clock that night, of course, Britain was already at war. On 5 August the Neutrality Committee was dissolved. Angell's Neutrality League was to suffer the same fate.

Concluding Remarks

If the First World War took Britain by surprise, that was largely because the European situation was widely considered to be peaceful. Alluding to the 'distinct feeling of optimism' prevailing in Britain then, Winston Churchill recalls that: 'The spring and summer of 1914 were marked in Europe by an exceptional tranquillity.' Indeed, the Balkan crises of 1912-13 had passed and there was little expectation of an impending conflagration. In January 1914 Lloyd George could optimistically state that 'Never has the sky been so perfectly blue.' Sir Arthur Nicolson, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, declared in May 1914: 'Since I have been at the Foreign Office I have not
seen such calm waters.  Looking back at the summer of 1914, a contemporary observer would later recall: 'That July was like any other July that had gone before it. ... Life was jogging on as it had done for ten or twenty years and might do for ten or twenty years to come.' Thus as C.W. Hughes, an art master at Marlborough College at the outbreak of war, would subsequently attest: 'The European situation, the trouble between Austria and Servia, seemed at first too remote to bother about.' This lack of attention to Balkan affairs, particularly the recent events, was hardly atypical. Reflecting on his undergraduate days at Oxford before the war, E.L. Woodward could testify to the students' general ignorance of international politics. As Woodward writes, '... no one bothered much about anything which happened after the Battle of Waterloo. ... I had only a vague and inaccurate knowledge of European history after the Napeolonic wars, and I could not have drawn even an outline map of the contemporary frontiers of the European states.'

Additionally, Anglo-German relations were probably on a better footing in 1914 than they had been for many years. Though there remains disagreement over whether London and Berlin achieved a genuine rapprochement between 1912 and 1914, it is generally accepted that a détente was attained and that 'a certain optimism had returned to Anglo-German relations' by the summer of 1914. Subsequent to the Agadir crisis and the Radical revolt against Grey in 1911 - which witnessed the 'Grey must go' campaign in the Commons - Whitehall's relations with Germany saw a gradual improvement, marked by attempts to secure a political agreement (the Haldane mission), cooperation during the Balkan wars of 1912-13, and an accord on Portugal's African colonies and the Baghdad railway. The naval rivalry had also ceased to be a source of friction between the British and German governments, with Berlin having shifted its attention in 1913 to its military buildup on land. In effect, the Anglo-German naval race was over.

Thus by 1914, the Foreign Office's 'long distrust' of Germany 'was sensibly modified.' Reflecting the health of Anglo-German relations, the British fleet visited Kiel
in June during the Kiel Regatta Week. Describing those scenes heralding the last days of peace in Europe, Churchill paints a picture of an idyllic summer setting in which the German and British navies met. He observes:

There were races, there were banquets, there were speeches. There was sunshine, there was the Emperor. Officers and men fraternized and entertained each other afloat and ashore. Together they strolled arm in arm through the hospital town, or dined with all goodwill in mess and wardroom.41

Reporting on the British fleet's visit, the British naval attaché in Berlin, Captain Wilfred Henderson, attested to its 'great success' and praised the German naval officers' attitude as being 'the very opposite of that insincere toadyism and sickly sentimentality' often associated with them. According to him, the German newspapers, viewing the British visit approvingly, had been apt to mention 'the blood-relationship between England and Germany' and to see the two nations as 'the leaders of modern culture'. Citing a German officer's joke about the brotherhood of 'the two "white" nations', Henderson remarked: 'It is in the subtle meaning of that word "white" that the interpretation of their feeling towards us is to be found.'42 Obviously, the racial theme was a binding factor in the Anglo-German naval officers' relations.

The Anglo-German 'antagonism' as a cause of the First World War indeed should not be overstated. The post-Agadir détente cannot be overlooked and it was certainly discernible by contemporaries, among them Michael Sadler. As he noted in his journal in June 1912, recounting a recent conversation with Frank Lascelles:

There has been great danger but things for the time are better. Harnack

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who last year refused to come to England because he believed that England had nearly attacked Germany, has changed his views & is willing to come again. That is symptomatic.41

In June 1914 the British Chargé d'Affaires in Darmstadt related to Grey the Russian perception that Britain was 'now on such friendly terms with Germany'.44 On 23 July, the day of Austria-Hungary's ultimatum to Serbia, Lloyd George, sharing this overall optimism about Anglo-German relations, declared in the Commons that 'the points of co-operation [between Britain and Germany] are greater and more numerous and more important than the points of possible controversy'.45 Reminiscing on that summer, Prince Lichnowsky, the German ambassador in London from 1912 to 1914, recounts that Germany's relations with Britain 'manifested a warmth and cordiality that had hitherto been conspicuously absent'.46 Clearly, on the eve of war, Anglo-German relations were not characterized by mutual antagonism.

It is easy to suppose that the prewar invasion scares, naval and commercial rivalry, and German bogeys, had primed the British population for Armageddon in July 1914. But as James Headlam suggested soon after the outbreak of hostilities, the expectation of a war with Germany during that summer had not been particularly acute. As he noted: 'The stories of German hostility seemed too crude and stupid: this was not the sort of stuff that sensible people troubled about.' The British public might have in fact become inured to the war scares. The repeated warnings of impending doom, Headlam argued, had 'lost their effect'. As he explained: 'We were getting tired by prophecies of the coming of war. Armageddon had been vulgarised'.47

Ironically, the improved state of Anglo-German relations may have inadvertently contributed to the outbreak of war in 1914 by 'fostering a set of misperceptions' between London and Berlin.48 Because of the détente, the British government, Grey especially, may
have unwittingly placed an inordinate amount of faith in German goodwill and Berlin's
willingness to rein in the Austrians during the early phases of the July crisis. The German
leaders, meanwhile, could have been mistakenly led to believe that, provided Germany did
not appear to be the agent provocateurs, Britain would stay out of the European conflict, at
least during its early stages. As Sean Lynn-Jones proposes:

In Britain, the détente produced false belief that the July 1914 crisis could
be resolved through Anglo-German cooperation. British leaders did not
want to appear to provoke Germany and thus failed to take early steps to
deter German moves that led to war. The détente also fostered false
German hopes that Britain would remain neutral in a continental war,
thereby encouraging Germany to adopt policies fraught with the risk of
such a conflict.49

There is certainly evidence that Grey was guided by the premise that Berlin would
again cooperate with Britain and take on the pacifying role which it had adopted in the
previous Balkan crisis. As Grey stated on 9 July: 'I would continue the same policy as I
had pursued through the [previous year's] Balkan crisis, ... The greater the risk of war, the
more closely would I adhere to that policy'.50 Grey's misjudged reliance on the Germans to
restrain Vienna was thus based on the previous pattern of Anglo-German cooperation in the
Balkans.51

The German government's expectations of British neutrality certainly cannot be
dismissed. Whether or not the German leadership confidently counted on British
neutrality52 or merely hoped for it, it cannot be denied that keeping Britain out of the
anticipated European war constituted an important calculation in German decision-making
in July 1914. So concerned was Berlin with preventing Britain's intervention that it went
to great lengths to avoid any action that would arouse London.\textsuperscript{33} Indeed, throughout the crisis, Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's overriding consideration was to make the war appear to be a provocation by Russia and France. By that device, he hoped, British neutrality could be secured and Germany's entry into the war presented as 'defensive' in nature. So keen were the Germans on British non-intervention that in the evening of 24 July, Ballin met with Churchill in Cassel's house, apparently on 'a fishing expedition' for the Kaiser to gauge London's attitude towards a European war.\textsuperscript{34} Count Ladislaus Szögyény-Marich, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Berlin, reported in early July that 'Germany feels that she need no longer fear a directly hostile attitude by Britain'.\textsuperscript{35} On 26 July the German Secretary of State, Gottlieb von Jagow, could claim that 'we are sure of England's neutrality'.\textsuperscript{36} Years after the war, Lichnowsky wrote of 'the strong sympathy for Germany' which he believed existed in the British government in July 1914.\textsuperscript{37} In short, the German leaders' confidence in securing British neutrality during the July crisis 'reflected the German belief that a détente had emerged between Berlin and London'.\textsuperscript{38}

The significance of British neutrality to Bethmann Hollweg's calculations was revealed during the night of 29-30 July, after Berlin had received Grey's warning that Britain would not stand aside in a European war involving France. The effect of the news on the German leadership was immediate. Hoping to 'reverse the wheels of German policy',\textsuperscript{39} the Chancellor sent a flurry of telegrams to Vienna during that night in an attempt to restrain the Austrians.\textsuperscript{40} Incensed at what he regarded to be a betrayal by Britain, the Kaiser released a blistering tirade against 'perfidious Albion'\textsuperscript{41} and 'that mean crew of shopkeepers', calling Grey's warning the 'most scandalous piece of English pharisaism that I ever saw!'.\textsuperscript{42} The German leadership's reaction consequent to the 'misunderstanding' of 1 August is further suggestive of its attitude. On that day Grey first offered British neutrality in return for a German pledge not to invade France, and then proposed British neutrality even in the event of Germany going to war against France and Russia. On receiving news
of Grey's proposal, the Kaiser in his elation ordered the champagne bottles to be opened - a celebration which was, however, short-lived.\textsuperscript{63} But as much as the Germans were keen on having one fewer Great Power, along with its navy, against which to contend, their attempt to secure British neutrality can also be seen as reflecting a lack of a desire to engage in hostilities with Britain. Although Bethmann Hollweg from the outset hoped for a localized Balkan conflict and for Russia to stay out, the prospect of a war with France and Russia was part of the 'calculated risk' which he was willing to take in July 1914.\textsuperscript{64} A war with Britain, however, was greeted with a greater degree of reluctance. In short, British intervention may have entered Berlin's calculations as a contingency that had to be dealt with when it arrived, but the German government did not actively seek to wage a conflict with Britain in July 1914.

The evidence appears quite convincing that Grey's non-interference with Berlin during the early stages of the crisis, and the Germans' overly optimistic expectation of British neutrality, were rooted more in recently improved bilateral relations than in the rise of hostility. Although the background of Anglo-German relations influenced both London's and Berlin's decisions for war in 1914, the Anglo-German 'antagonism' should be viewed in its proper context. It was by no means the driving force for war in July 1914.

The First World War, therefore, did not originate as an Anglo-German quarrel, and it certainly was not triggered by a German attack on, or hostile action against, Britain. It should be noted that the Schlieffen Plan was aimed at France and Russia; there was no German plan to invade Britain in 1914. Similarly there existed no British intent to start a war with Germany, despite the many years of naval and commercial 'antagonism'.

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In conclusion, the academic community had only a negligible role to play in the British government's decision-making during the July crisis. Whatever attempts were made
by the intellectuals to prevent Britain's entry into the war proved to be too little and too late. Though some of the academics were to retain their anti-war convictions during the course of the war, many others who had evinced Germanophile attitudes before were swept along by the tide of patriotic fervour that swelled up after 4 August 1914. A significant number of British historians, as already discussed, joined the anti-German propaganda campaign in support of Crown and country.

This turn toward anti-Germanism after 4 August 1914, as has already been demonstrated, marked a significant break from prewar patterns. The change in the manner in which the British historians treated Germany in their writings after the outbreak of hostilities must indeed be duly noted. One purpose of this thesis has been to contribute knowledge in this area which has heretofore been largely overlooked by the secondary literature.

Our analysis of the prewar history texts confirms the favourable views of, and respect for, Germany which the historical branch of the British academic establishment propagated before August 1914. The historians' Germanophilism is understandable, given the prestige of German universities and scholarship before the war. The German connection in British education has further been probed in this thesis through the examination of Imperial College, the King Edward VII British-German Foundation and the German Rhodes Scholarships. This connection was only reflective of the broader influence of German thought in British academic life which was exemplified not just in history but also in theology, philosophy and the sciences. The excellence of German technical education in providing the impetus for the founding of Imperial certainly cannot be underestimated. But the German 'influence' in the three examples examined can be seen not only by way of intellectual trends and organizational methods, but also through the personal ties that connected the business with the educational sector. As pointed out, the financial support of Wernher and Beit was central to the establishment of Imperial.
German money, in this instance being provided by Cassel, another prominent City banker, was also important in the founding of the King Edward VII Foundation, itself symbolizing Cassel's close ties with the British monarch and an attempt at promoting Anglo-German friendship and cultural exchange. Meanwhile, the German Rhodes Scholarships reflected no less their founder's fondness for the German people and his personal ties with the German Emperor. Wernher, Beit, Cassel and Rhodes, all of whom sought to foster Anglo-German ties before the war, also had in common a connection with the South African diamond business. In this interconnected grouping one can detect the linkage of business interests with the academic community, inspired by Germanophile views and attitudes.

The German link in British education as exemplified by Wernher, Beit, Cassel and Rhodes was, however, relatively weak and not sufficiently strong to prevent the rupture in Anglo-German relations that came in August 1914. Ultimately, the geopolitical forces that brought on the war proved far stronger than the cultural and educational ties that bound. These men's endeavours in education, especially those of Cassel and Rhodes, should nevertheless be noted for being part of a non-governmental effort aimed at promoting Anglo-German friendship during the prewar period.

As shown by the example of Rhodes, who was motivated in large part by his belief in the kindredness of the Anglo-Saxon and German races, the idea of shared Anglo-German heritage certainly represented a significant and enduring basis for British prewar Germanophile attitudes. The numerous evocations of Anglo-German racial kinship and references to the likeness of the British and German peoples have already been cited in this thesis and need no repetition here. It is important to note, as mentioned in Chapter 5, that the Anglo-German 'rivalry' was widely viewed at the time as being a quarrel between blood relations sharing similar traits, rather than one between die-hard foes. Much as notions of race might be a divisive force and provide the seeds for extreme right-wing ideological movements, they may also act as a binding factor in international relations.
One aim of this thesis is to underscore the importance of racialist ideas as a source of Anglo-German friendship before the First World War, and as a component of prewar Germanophile attitudes in Britain.

The articulation of the two-Germanies conception after the outbreak of war in 1914 can be explained by the continued relevance of this belief in common Anglo-German racial origins and by the persistence of prewar Germanophile attitudes among the British historians. As has been mentioned, these academics, even while acting as propagandists and pouring out anti-German invectives after the start of hostilities, still tended to differentiate between the German people and their government. Typical were Charles Herford, who chose to separate Germany into two 'alien hosts', and George Prothero, who saw the war as 'a sort of civil war'. While not a historian, Gilbert Murray expressed the essence of the two-Germanies idea when arguing that: 'We abominate their [the Germans'] dishonest Government, ... But not the people in general.'

As demonstrated in Chapter 3, British business and trade links with Germany were quite extensive before the war and a substantial portion of British business opinion tended to regard Germany in a positive light. The attitude of British business and finance during the July crisis could easily have been foreseen. A European war in itself would have been sufficiently unsettling for British business, but a war with Germany in particular would have had an even more disastrous impact on important sectors of the British economy. The British business classes' aversion to a war against Germany was thus understandably based on the practical dictates of profit-making.

Despite their relentless efforts, the financial and commercial circles encountered limits to their ability to force the government to stay out of the conflict. A European war might be highly unprofitable to some of these economic elites but the war nevertheless came and, when it did, was accepted with resignation, despite the massive disruption of normal business patterns - not to mention the substantial losses which were to be endured.
for the next four years. The commercial interests' lack of decisive influence over official policy can be viewed as confirming the validity of Clausewitz's dictum that war, being a political instrument, is 'a continuation of political activity by other means'. Ultimately, the British decision to go to war in August 1914 was essentially a political decision and not an economic one, though doubtless economic considerations had to be taken into account and the decision itself had profound economic and social ramifications for the country. Even if the economic blockade was to be used as an instrument of war, the conflict was fought essentially for political, not economic, goals. The British national interest, in defence of which the political leadership intervened in August 1914, was grounded on vital geopolitical factors: the maintenance of the European balance of power and with it the corollary that France should not be wiped out as a Great Power, and preventing the Low Countries from falling into hostile hands. Being a political act, therefore, the Liberal government's decision to intervene was one in which private economic interests could have but a secondary voice. This study, it is hoped, will contribute to our understanding of the primacy of politics in Anglo-German relations in the early twentieth century.

To sum up, this thesis has examined non-governmental links between Britain and Germany before the First World War. Focusing on Germanophile activities and attitudes in Britain, it has identified a group of individuals such as Cassel, Beit, Wernher and Rhodes, spanning both the business and academic communities, who sought to promote Anglo-German linkage and détente during the prewar period. The prewar Germanophile views of British historians have also been analysed. Though overwhelmed during the July crisis, these 'pro-German' forces were certainly present and reasonably active before August 1914. Having discussed how they failed to prevent the Anglo-German rupture in August 1914, this thesis suggests that further study is needed of the balance of power between the 'pro-German' and 'anti-German' forces in Britain during the prewar period as well as the July crisis.
In closing, we might argue that even though the 'pro-German' non-governmental groups proved unable to prevent Britain from intervening in the European conflict, the driving force behind the British decision for war was also not provided by either elite or popular anti-German sentiment. The cabinet decision for war, based on the national interest and balance-of-power considerations, came from the top and was spearheaded by a small group of ministers, who took the lead in mobilizing Parliament and the people. Private interest groups were effectively sidelined in the decision-making process. Instead of steering the government, 'public opinion' was led by it in July 1914. Popular anti-German fervour, which was whipped up with the aid of historians, among others, after the outbreak of hostilities, was largely lacking before 4 August 1914. Anti-Germanism was thus more a consequence than a cause of the war. The prewar limits to Anglo-German antagonism should be duly appreciated.

NOTES

1. NLS, Rosebery MSS. 10124, f. 181.


4. For a brief account of the assassination, see Vladimir Dedijer, The Road to Sarajevo (London, 1967), chap. 1.


7. See Austria-Hungary's ten demands in ibid., pp. 144-5.

8. For more on the Russian government's decision-making during the crisis, see D.C.B. Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War (London, 1983), chap. 5.


10. See idem, 'The Significance of the Schlieffen Plan', in ibid., pp. 199-221.

11. Francis Oppenheimer, Stranger Within, p. 211.


22. Haldane to his mother, 1 Aug. 1914, NLS, Haldane MSS. 5992, f. 3.


27. The Times, 1 Aug. 1914, p. 6. The Cambridge contingent consisted of Thomson; C.G. Browne, Professor of Arabic; F.C. Burkitt, Norrisian Professor of Divinity; F.J. Foakes-Jackson, Fellow of Jesus College.

28. BLPES, Wallas MSS., box 39. The newspaper cutting containing the manifesto as well as the minutes of the meetings of 4-5 Aug. is in this box.


35. Nicolson to Goschen, 5 May 1914, PRO, Nicolson MSS., FO 800/374, f. 144.


41. Ibid., p. 187.


43. 'Sir Frank Lascelles & Anglo-German relationship', 2 June 1912, BodL, Sadler MSS., MS. Eng. misc. c. 542.


49. Ibid., p. 168.


52. Marc Trachtenberg argues that, 'There is little evidence to support the claim that Bethmann had been confidently counting on British neutrality.' See his 'The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914', in Miller, et al. (eds.), *Military Strategy*, p. 210.


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59. Ekstein and Steiner, 'Sarajevo Crisis', p. 402.


61. Quoted in Fischer, *Germany's Aims*, p. 83.


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