
Gary Sussman.
Abstract:

This study presents an original effort to explain referendum use through political science institutionalism and contributes to both the comparative referendum and institutionalist literatures, and to the political history of South Africa. Its source materials are numerous archival collections, newspapers and over 40 personal interviews.

This study addresses two questions relating to F.W. de Klerk's use of the referendum mechanism in 1992. The first is why he used the mechanism, highlighting its role in the context of the early stages of his quest for a managed transition. Beyond the politics of the transition, the second question addressed is where he acquired the idea. The main argument is that de Klerk used the referendum to manage white public opinion to execute a swift transition. His intentions were challenged by a series of unplanned by-elections, which enabled the White conservative opposition to undermine his legitimacy to lead the transition. In sharp contrast to what the existing literature on referendums suggests, de Klerk's referendum pledge did not follow internal divisions in his National Party over the reform process.

He in fact anticipated a right wing demand for a new general election, which he could not win, and used a referendum pledge to preclude this vote. The reason he was able to do so is that he was a key player in earlier efforts to reform Apartheid, under the leadership of P.W. Botha, his predecessor. As a result, he brought with him an experience and template that he applied to his reform process. Understanding where de Klerk got the idea from, therefore, requires that we appreciate Botha's earlier use of the referendum. Grasping Botha, in turn, demands that we analyse the decision, in 1960, to deploy a referendum on South Africa's declaration of a republic. This referendum was the outcome of intense historical struggles within the party over the republican issue. The second part of this study traces those struggles.
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Introduction:

On 17 March 1992, South Africa's White only electorate participated in their third national 'controlled' referendum. This vote meant that each of the country's four National or Nationalist Party (NP) leaders, since H.F. Verwoerd's accession, in August 1958, had employed a referendum in order to introduce far-reaching constitutional changes. The first of these was H.F. Verwoerd, in 1960 on the question of creating a republic, then B.J. Vorster in Namibia alone, on the Turnhalle process. P.W. Botha followed them in 1983, with the introduction of the tri-cameral constitution, and, finally, F.W. de Klerk in 1992.

De Klerk announced a snap referendum after his party had lost its third by-election in succession to the Conservative Party (CP). The party was posing an increasingly concerted challenge to his mandate to negotiate with the African National Congress (ANC), and the referendum was a key feature of the initial phase of the South African transition to democracy. A transition is defined as, an 'interval between one political regime and another.'

Why did de Klerk deploy a referendum? Where did he get the idea to stage a referendum? And how was the referendum introduced into South Africa? This dissertation sets out to answer these questions and, in doing so, enhance our understanding of referendum use. The existing referendum literature does not really help us to fully understand de Klerk's use of the controlled referendum. Sharp divisions in the ruling party or coalition are an important antecedent condition in the literature, but this NP government was not deeply divided over the reform process. It seems more likely that de Klerk was emulating his predecessor, P.W. Botha, who a decade earlier also had to deal with a similar right wing challenge to his reforms. F.W. de Klerk, then serving as the NP's provincial leader in the conservative Transvaal, where the CP's challenge to the government was most acute, not only drafted the appropriate referendum legislation, but also pushed Botha to deploy the referendum, in order to deal with the right wing backlash.

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1 The controlled or facultative referendum allows the government full discretion as to whether and when to call a referendum. Such votes are more likely in entities without a codified constitution. Vernon Bogdanor, 'Western Europe', in David Butler and Austin Ranney (ed.), Referendums Around the World: The Growing Use of Direct Democracy (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 1994), pp. 30-33.

2 The Nasionale Party is interchangeably referred to as the Nationalist or National Party throughout the thesis.

If de Klerk was emulating Botha, then Botha found inspiration in Verwoerd’s use of the referendum. Like de Klerk, Botha introduced the legislation for the 1960 referendum on Verwoerd’s behalf. Moreover, Botha had served as a party worker since 1936, and intimately followed debates within the party over a referendum on the establishment of a republic. In order to understand the 1960 referendum, which represents the successful introduction of the referendum institution into the NP’s political repertoire, we need to fully appreciate post-Union White politics.

This first referendum was indeed the culmination of almost five decades of intra-White conflicts over White South African identity and symbols. Furthermore, it was the product of internal conflicts within the National Party over the republican issue and tactical considerations. Specifically, the desire to appeal to non-republicans at election time, especially prior to and after 1948. It is only through an understanding of this long history that we can fathom the 1960 referendum, which, in turn, helps to explain the behaviour of successive NP leaders.

The existing accounts of controlled referendum use, generally, fail to fully recognise the value of path dependency. In other words, it is argued that the successful use of the first referendum, as was the case in 1960, is habit forming and sets a precedent for future use. In John Ikenberry’s words, this vote cast ‘a long shadow’ over future behaviour. The sociological institutionalist literature identified with James March and Johan P. Olsen (1989) explains how elites use existing templates in order to respond to problems that are seemingly familiar. This account is, however, criticised for giving insufficient recognition to agency in decision-making. Accordingly, I harness the historical institutionalist literature in order to fortify our understanding of referendum use. I have chosen this account as it recognises the importance of both structure (culture, institutions) and agency in explaining the behaviour of political actors. The historical institutionalist approach does so by recognising that decision-makers, though rational, operate with a limited political repertoire or toolbox.

The literature on contentious politics defines repertoire as the ‘culturally encoded ways in which people interact in contentious politics,’ and notes that the notion ‘conveys the idea that participants in public claim-making adopt scripts they have performed, or observed, before. They do not simply invent an efficient action or express whatever

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impulses they feel, but rework known routines in response to current circumstances.5
F.W. de Klerk was, therefore, not merely mimicking P.W. Botha. He was a rational agent
drawing upon a toolbox, which contained the referendum.

Defining a referendum:
The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Institutions defines a referendum as 'a device of
direct democracy by which the electorate can pronounce upon some public issue put to it
by a government, or, in the case of a transfer of sovereignty, by an international
organisation. Where changes of sovereignty are in question, the referendum is called a
plebiscite, although there is no uniformity of usage.6 This definition will be employed for
the purpose of this study.

Though Sarah Wambaugh (1920, 1933, and 1940) and Lawrence Farley (1986)
employ the term plebiscite to describe all popular consultations on issues of sovereignty,
the word has largely come to be associated with the rule of Mussolini, Hitler, Napoleon
and dictatorships. Hence, Pier Vincenzo Uleri defines a plebiscite 'as any kind of popular
vote (of the electoral or referendum type) where there is no possibility to compete in a free
and fair way.'7 A.V. Dicey held a similarly dim view of the plebiscite.8

The plural form of the referendum employed is referenda, and not referendums.
Referenda that deal with issues that pertain to borders, sovereignty, national identity,
citizenship, group rights, etc. are defined as ethno-national referenda, a phrase first coined
by Mads Qvortrup.9

The referendum as an institution?
The decision to stage a controlled referendum, ultimately, occurs within political
structures and is an artefact of institutions, like constitutional arrangements, and electoral
arrangements. Moreover, referenda are themselves institutions. In some countries, Ireland,
Denmark, France, and Switzerland, for example, referendum use is highly institutionalised
and regulated. Here, the terms under which the so-called 'uncontrolled' referendum
mechanism is invoked are clearly stipulated by the constitution. This is especially the case

5 Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 16,
138.
7 Pierre Vincenzo Uleri, 'Introduction' in Michael Gallagher and Pier Vincenzo Uleri (eds). The Referendum
8 A.V. Dicey, 'Ought the Referendum to be Introduced into England?' The Contemporary Review, Volume
LVII (January – June 1890), p. 492.
9 Mads H. Qvortrup, Referendums and Ethnic Conflict (Copenhagen, 1999).
Interviews Conducted:

Aurett, Derrick. Former Ministry of Foreign Affairs official and assistant to Brand Fourie (Director General of the Ministry). Whilst in the MOFA, Aurett worked closely on the Namibia negotiations. Interview conducted on 12 December 2001, Cape Town.

Barnard, Dr. Neil. Former Director of National Services (NIS), serving under both Presidents PW Botha and FW de Klerk. Interview conducted on 5 December 2002, Panorama, Cape Town.

Breytenbach, Prof. Willie. A former civil servant, serving as Secretary of a special cabinet committee investigating models for incorporating urban blacks. Under Minister Chris Heunis. Upon leaving the government in 1985 Breytenbach became involved in numerous IDASA activities and returned to academia. Interview conducted on 4 December 2002, Stellenbosch.


Cloete, Prof. Fanie. Served for 9 years (1980-1989) in the Prime Minister’s and later President’s Office as a constitutional planner, serving as Chief Director of the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning. Cloete is currently teaching at Stellenbosch University. Interview conducted on 4 December 2002, Stellenbosch.

Cronin, Jeremy. South African Communist Party (SACP) activist and current Member of Parliament.


Dommissie, Ebbe. Long serving NASPERS journalist, columnist (Deur Dawie column) and former editor of Die Burger. In addition to his media related work, Dommissie was
formation in 1914 until the introduction of the referendum. This analysis will seek to expose the interests and preferences that politicians, in this case, NP leaders, were trying to fulfil, in considering the referendum mechanism. In order to do so, I have consulted a wide array of primary sources, especially newspapers, in addition to personal collections surveyed. One major potential pitfall of using historical data is that it cannot always be corroborated, and is ultimately interpreted by the researcher. Hence, the primary research was complemented and, indeed, preceded by extensive consultation of the secondary literature. In seeking to understand de Klerk and Botha, I not only draw on archival material and newspapers, but also on 46 interviews. The list of interviewees includes government and opposition politicians, journalists, officials, academics and analysts.

Why a single case study?
In recent decades, the focus of comparative research has shifted from its traditional single case focus, to a quest to include as many different case studies as possible, in order to ensure maximal external validity. Such studies, however, sacrifice vital internal validity, as every additional case implies less attention to detail. The dialectic between internal and external validity, or empiricism and generality, which are essentially conflicting values, is a long-standing dilemma in political science. This research will, by design, emulate the more traditional approach to comparative political science, emphasising understanding and historical detail. In this regard, I share Samuel Finer's conviction that political science is unthinkable without history, and seek to stick to the 'more modest ambition of presenting facts.' Where relevant, insights from referendum use elsewhere will be introduced throughout the study.

Those comparativists, who stress that comparative research needs to move from understanding to explanation may not, as Lawrence Mayer notes, consider this research comparative political science. In practice, however, some of the most important contributions to political science come from single case or country studies, which were

21 Lawrence C. Mayer, Refining Comparative Politics, p. 15
prevalent before World War Two, and not from the positivists. Examples of seminal single country studies include, Robert Putnam’s (1993) study of democracy in Italy, Stein Rokkan’s (1967) study of cleavages and party support, based on Norway, and Arend Lijphart’s (1975) seminal study of consociationalism, based on his native Netherlands. And in their quest for science, the positivists have often overlooked the simple politics that leaders engage in. This research is, ultimately, about the role of the referendum in NP political struggles, internal and external.

Moreover, given the variation in the frequency, scope and nature of referendum use, the ability to produce a catchall theory of referendum use is highly debatable. Suffice it to add that there are many independent variables that could potentially explain referendum use. Amongst these we can list the regime type (presidential, Westminster, PR), political culture, the type of nationalism (eastern or western), colonial history, the date of state formation, intellectual influences, etc. It is, thus, no surprise that David Butler and Austin Ranney conclude that in 'most countries referendums are unique, both in origin and consequences. There are no universal rules; at most, there are some widely observed tendencies.'22 Arend Lijphart shares this assessment.23

In effect, this study represents a comparative study, within a single case study, of debates on the referendum mechanism within the NP, and allows me to search for patterns in NP thinking. Moreover, this research provides a unique opportunity to contribute to what Lawrence Mayer describes as 'cumulative knowledge,'24 by adding to existing research on controlled referendum use. The art of applying and corroborating (or falsifying) the models and theories of others is an important academic challenge.

Why South Africa and the 1992 vote?

To date, most of the research on controlled referendum use has focused on Western Europe and Scandinavia in particular. Tor Bjorklund (1982), who looked at Norwegian referendum use, provides one leading example of research on controlled referendum use. South Africa represents the third (or rest of the) world, which has been largely ignored to date. Besides, most European case studies look at polities using a PR electoral system. South Africa, on the other hand, employed a Westminster (first-past-the-post-system),

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24 Lawrence C. Mayer, Refining Comparative Politics, pp. 47, 292.
which it inherited from Britain. Britain, like South Africa, has been a relatively rare user of the referendum mechanism. The low frequency of controlled national referenda (South African 3) is the norm and not the exception in international use. But it also serves to explain why countries like South Africa are often ignored. And in contrast to Europe, South Africa only began its referendum tradition much later, in 1960.

In the absence of a constitutional provision, referendum use is a convention or praxis in the political culture of polities like Norway, the UK and South Africa. Referendum use is thus subject to the judgement of elites. South Africa is all the more interesting for the reason that it provides an example of a society involved in a long running ethnic conflict and, therefore, represents a case where the referendum has been used to both exacerbate and ameliorate an ethno-national conflict. This aspect of referendum use has been sorely neglected to date. Finally, this research provides an in-depth analysis of the role of the referendum in the South African transition, thus highlighting its role in resolving ethno-national conflicts. Beyond providing an understanding of the role of the referendum as a tool for transition heresthetics and manoeuvring, this study allows us to revisit the South African transition and re-asses de Klerk's quest for a managed transition. The 1992 referendum is one of the most important managed ethno-national referenda in recent history, and it played an important role in South Africa's transition to democracy. Hence, this vote will be the focus of the research on the referendum in South Africa.

Literature consulted:
As a first stage of the research I extensively surveyed the comparative and descriptive referendum literature. The important texts in this regard are those written by Sarah Wambaugh (1920, 1923), and the edited works of David Butler and Austin Ranney (1978, 1994), Austin Ranney (1981), and Pier Vincenzo Uleri and Michael Gallagher (1996), whilst David B. Magelby (1984, 1994) and Thomas E. Cronin (1989) have made important contributions to our understanding of the use of direct democracy in the US. Other descriptive studies consulted include those by Phillip Goodhart (1971, 1976), Jo Grimond and Brian Neve (1975) and Anthony King (1977). These studies were inspired by the introduction of the referendum mechanism in Britain in 1975. Vernon Bogdanor (1981, 1994) is also a leading contributor to the referendum literature. In addition, a plethora of articles published in academic journals were consulted. The most important of these are
Tor Bjorklund (1982) and Laurent Morel (1993). This literature is analysed in greater detail in the ensuing chapter.

Having consulted the referendum literature, I reviewed the secondary literature on South African politics and history, in order to guide my subsequent archival research. This reading helped in identifying key developments within White politics and the NP, as well as relevant protagonists. A key source consulted was the 4-part anthology of the history of the Party (1975, 1980, 1980, and 1986), produced by the Institute for Contemporary History at the University of the Orange Free State. Other invaluable secondary resources include William Henry Vatcher Jr. (1965) and Dunbar T. Moodie's (1975) studies of Afrikaner nationalism, Dan O'Meara's two materialist accounts (1983, 1996), and the works of Hermann Giliomee (1982, 2003), Hermann Giliomee and Andre du Toit (1983), and Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee (1979). Extensive use was also made of autobiographies and biographies of leading political figures, and journalists, especially from the Naspers\textsuperscript{25} group. Some specific historical studies, like Harry Saker's (1980) study of the flag struggle and Leonard Thompson's (1960) study of the Union’s formation also proved invaluable.

Prior to embarking on the archival research I extensively consulted the institutionalist (sociological, rational choice and historical) literature in order to better understand how institutions, like referenda, are introduced and affect the behaviour of decision-makers. The literature is reviewed in chapter one. Given that the referendum was a key event in the early stages of the South African transition to democracy, the transition literature is also consulted.

Archives consulted:
The archival research was based on a twin strategy of initially consulting newspaper archives, and later, personal collections. In the first phase of the search for primary sources leading South African newspapers were consulted in the British Library's Newspaper Archives at Collingdale.

Due to the prominence of Die Burger, the Cape Town based mouthpiece of the National Party this paper was most extensively consulted. The paper, which was established in 1915, is the only NP newspaper that covers the entire period of the study. Moreover, the Cape party was predominant throughout the period in question, especially until 1954, by which time the referendum was a central plank of the NP’s policy. From

\textsuperscript{25} Naspers stands for Nasionale Pers or National Press.
1954 to 1978, the years under Strijdom, Verwoerd, Vorster, and again from 1989 to 1992, the balance of power lay in the Transvaal as this province provided the party’s leaders. *Die Burger*, however, continued to reflect and refract NP opinion and maintained its role as the leading paper in the *Naspers* stable. One potential danger of an over-reliance on this particular source is that it might paint a skewed (Cape) interpretation of events, hence key developments were also researched in *Naspers* papers representing other provinces, as well as the conservative and dissident Afrikaner press, the English and international press. *The Round Table* publication, which covers Commonwealth affairs, and *Hansard* were also consulted.

The second phase of the inquiry focused on archival research and interviews in South Africa, from October to late December 2001. During the excursion I visited the National Archive in Pretoria, the J.S. Gericke Library at the University of Stellenbosch, the University of Cape Town’s Africana Library, the Johannesburg Library, and the Archive of the Institute for Contemporary History (INCH) at the University of the Orange Free State. The latter archive is the most important for students interested in White South African politics. In addition, the Public Records Office (PRO) archives were consulted; in order to get a sense of how British officials viewed certain key developments in Southern Africa. In subsequent trips to South Africa (May and December 2002 and February 2003), I returned to the Stellenbosch Library, and visited the Cape Town branch of the National Archive and the National Library in Cape Town. Additional interviews were also conducted. Much of the material consulted is in Afrikaans and quotations cited in the study are my translations.

Access to certain key collections, like that of the South Africa Bureau of Race Relations (S.A.B.R.A.), which is held in the INCH archive, was denied. Similarly, the *Broederbond*, which had kindly provided limited information on the internal referendum on the de Lange paper, declined to grant me access to its archives. Given the central role of the group and disproportionate influence of its members, no study on White South African politics can be complete without access to these archives. Paul Williams notes that the organisation served as 'a kind of strategic planning unit for the Afrikaner nationalist movement, organising activities and waging the struggle for ideological hegemony within Afrikanerdem.'

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O’Meara (1977, 1983) was consulted, but in no way compensates for the material that this collection might contain. In addition to the archival research, over 40 interviews were conducted with a wide range of individuals active in the Botha and de Klerk eras. The interviewees comprised NP politicians, including former Ministers and President de Klerk, opposition politicians, ANC/UDF politicians, leading journalists, academics, analysts and former officials. Certain leading politicians (Pik Botha, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mac Maharaj, Cyril Ramaphosa) and former officials (George Meiring, former Chief of Staff of the SADF) declined interviews. Former President F.W. de Klerk, unfortunately, declined a second interview that was designed to focus on the 1983 referendum and on ethical aspects of his use of the referendum. A detailed list of those interviewed, the archives and newspapers consulted, as well as the literature used is provided in the bibliography.

Structure of the dissertation:
In the ensuing chapter I will review the referendum literature, with particular emphasis on accounts of referendum use. I primarily identify accounts that highlight agency, culture and structure. I also explore the sociological institutionalist literature, in order to account for repeated use of the referendum. In order to bridge the gap between accounts that highlight agency, and the sociological institutionalist literature, which emphasises structure or institutions, I will adopt the historical institutionalist paradigm. Though primarily applied to research that compares the varied response to key events, like the great depression,27 or EU legislation,28 in different settings, this approach will be applied in order to explain the introduction of the referendum in South African politics and its subsequent use. An explanation of institutional change and the introduction and spread of new institutions will follow this theoretical discussion, which is sprinkled with many practical examples of referendum use.

In chapter two, I briefly explore Ian Lustick’s (1995) analysis of processes of state contraction and suggests how referenda fit into such processes, in order to proffer a typology of ethno-national referenda. I next examine de Klerk’s effort to lead a managed transition and the role of the referendum in that process. This particular section of the study, which is most important of the cases analysed, is plainly the most detailed, and is

divided into two separate chapters. The first provides a backdrop to de Klerk's transition and highlights his assumptions and stratagems going into the transition. This is essential to understanding the use of the referendum in 1992, which is analysed in the fourth chapter. This section looks at what Alfred Stepan describes as the 'micro-politics'\textsuperscript{29} of the transition, and highlights the role of the referendum.

Having explained the 'why' of the 1992 referendum, the bulk of this thesis addresses the question of where de Klerk got the idea of a referendum. I first review post-Union White politics and intra-White conflicts. This chapter provides an invaluable background to key fault lines in White politics, and analyses the NP's first years in opposition, from 1914 to 1924, which is essential in order to understand the party's initial attraction to the referendum. Some key developments analysed are the 1914 rebellion, and efforts to improve the party's image thereafter, and the impact of Wilsonian nationalism on the NP. I also discuss the Rhodesian referendum of 1922, through which Imperial Britain encouraged the NP to embrace the referendum mechanism.

The sixth chapter specifically analyses the promise to stage a referendum on a 'clean' flag\textsuperscript{30} in 1926. The referendum pledge, which was designed to ameliorate the conflict within the party and the PACT government (which brought together the NP and English speaking Labour Party) over the flag issue, is accordant with the existing literature. Though this referendum was, eventually, not held, it set an important precedent for dealing with intra-White symbolic and constitutional conflicts.

The seventh chapter deals with the hard line element of the NP's response to political Fusion, between the South Africa Party (SAP) under J.C. Smuts and the NP under the leadership of J.B.M. Hertzog, in 1934. This particular event is perhaps one of the most important political events in the development of Afrikaner nationalism, and represents the juncture where a new and exclusive nationalism, with 'a new class basis, ideological orientation and organisational structures,'\textsuperscript{31} emerges to replace the more inclusive (in White terms) Hertzogism. Despite the radicalisation and republicanism of the Purified NP under D.F. Malan's leadership, it continued to embrace Hertzog's referendum pledge. An equally important crisis in this period is the war vote in September 1939. As a consequence of the vote, the Purified NP and the Broederbond increasingly came to set

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\item \textsuperscript{29} Alfred Stepan, 'Political Leadership and Regime Breakdown: Brazil', in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (eds). The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. Latin America (Baltimore, 1978), p. 132.
\item \textsuperscript{30} By a 'clean' flag I refer to an ensign without any symbols associated with Britain and the Boer Republics.
\item \textsuperscript{31} Dan O'Meara, Volkskapitalisme. Class, Capital and Ideology in the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism (Cambridge, 1983), p. 22.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
the agenda and jettisoned the referendum pledge, and with it the party’s commitment to constitutionalism. The growing recognition that Nazi Germany faced military defeat, once the US entered the War, strengthened the moderate, constitutional, wing of the party, and underscored the need to win a general election by appealing to non-republicans.

Chapter eight provides a study of the period leading up to the 1948 elections and after, when the party assumed power. This section analyses the role of the referendum in allowing the party gain dominion, consolidate its grip on power and promote its Apartheid agenda. The chapter also deals with the founding referendum – the 1960 referendum. The tactical debate over the best way to ensure victory in the referendum, specifically the question of Commonwealth membership, is fascinating and highlights the differences between the factions in the party.

Chapter nine deals with the 1983 referendum, which followed major divisions within the NP and a subsequent splinter from the ruling party, after it broke with the traditional Verwoerdian model. The research demonstrates, unequivocally, how Botha explicitly referred to Verwoerd’s referendum in explaining to his party where the idea came from. What also emerges from Botha’s use of the referendum is how his thinking on the referendum evolved over time, in response to unfolding developments. Chapter 10 explores the evolving role of the referendum in White South African politics from 1910 to 1992, with particular emphasis on the role of the referendum in the making and un-making of Apartheid. I then present the principle conclusions of my research.

Cases and issues not dealt with:
Not included in this historical study is the Namibian referendum of 1977, on grounds that it was not a nation-wide vote. All indications suggest that Vorster’s behaviour was consistent with that of Botha and de Klerk. Vorster was confronted with deep divisions within the party over the reform process in Namibia and feared that the newly formed Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) would profit from disaffection over the Turnhalle process. Also excluded, is the Smuts government’s 1946 consultation of Namibia’s tribal leaders, in order to bolster the Union's effort to annex the territory. The Smuts government

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32 The Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP), warned of a mixed ('bont') government, and accused (Die Afrikaner, 27 August, 3 and 17 September 1976) and accused the NP of selling out SWA’s Whites (van Wyk, 1999: 26, 36, 40). The referendum thus served to counter claims that Pretoria was not forcing Whites into the new dispensation (du Pisani, 1986: 344; Interview with Chris Thirion, 29 November 2001 and Derrick Aurette, 12 December, 2001) Moreover, the party within South West Africa (Namibia) and South Africa was increasingly divided over the Turnhalle process (van Wyk, 1999: 65; Die Afrikaner, 30 July, 17 August and 3 September 1976; Interviews with Dries van Heerden, 3 December 2002 and Andre Le Roux, 14 December 2002).
saw the process as a means to deflect international criticism of the government's effort to incorporate the territory after World War Two. Similarly, the 1909 Natal referendum on joining the Union will not be treated, as it was a sub-national vote and took place prior to the formation of the Union.

I have, similarly, passed over the *Broederbond* 's internal referendum. In 1985 the secret organisation conducted a vote amongst its 15,000 strong membership on the so-called de Lange document (authored by its chairman Prof. J.P. de Lange). 78 percent of the participants supported the paper, which included, amongst other things, full citizenship rights for Blacks. I have also excluded the numerous local referenda staged on the city scale, by CP controlled councils after the 1990 reforms process was begun, and the King William's Town referendum, staged by residents opposed to the town's incorporation into the Ciskei. I have also omitted the Ciskei independence referendum of 1980. This marks the only occasion on which an NP government employed a referendum in executing its *Bantustan* (homeland) policy. The referendum was triggered by the report of the Quail Commission, created by the Ciskei government, which recommended a referendum prior to moving ahead on independence. Interestingly, the last Transkei leader, Banthu Holimisa considered staging a referendum on the homeland's re-incorporation into South Africa in 1990. De Klerk, however, thwarted such plans by applying pressure on the homeland leadership.

Two additional fascinating subjects related to the referendum are also excluded by design. The first is an analysis of the opinion of the excluded majority in regard to each of the referenda discussed. It is indeed fascinating that the ANC never staged an alternative referendum as the opposition movement did in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). In 1961 the Black opposition National Democratic Party (NDP) staged its own vote in parallel to a Whites-only referendum on the issue of creating a Federation that would include Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi). Margaret Ballinger (1969) provides a brief description of the Black and Coloured opposition's response to the

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35 Interview with J.P. de Lange (22 November 2001); Alistair Sparks, *Tomorrow is Another Country. The Inside Story of South Africa's Road to Change* (Chicago, 1996), p. 75.
'fraudulent' White referendum of 1960. The debates within the United Democratic Front (U.D.F.) over participation in the 1983 referendum, which came perilously close to splitting the newly forged movement, are covered by Jeremy Seekings's (2000, chapter 5) excellent study of the UDF. The fact that the government considered a referendum for the so-called Coloured and the Indian communities makes this period particularly interesting. Nelson Mandela and the ANC opposed the 1992 White referendum on grounds of principle. The impact of the referendum mechanism, over time and in each specific case, on the excluded majority, certainly demands serious attention. I also refrain from analysing the CP's debate over boycotting the 1992 referendum in great detail. The failure of this opposition party to heed the lessons of its previous defeat in the 1983 referendum, and the broader dilemmas of boycotting referenda also deserve attention. This latter question is an aspect also neglected in the referendum literature.

The argument:
The core argument of this dissertation is that de Klerk's use of the referendum defies the predictions of the existing literature. This referendum was a pre-emptive move. It was, in fact, an integral part of the NP's transition script, and it did not emerge as a response to party or coalition divisions over reform. Moreover, though driven by maximising motivations, history of past use played a crucial role, as de Klerk also applied a logic of appropriateness. De Klerk, though a rational actor, operated with a historically and culturally constrained political repertoire.

In order to understand the use of the 1992 referendum we need a deeper historical analysis of referendum use in this particular setting. As I will demonstrate, de Klerk was emulating Botha - having learnt a great deal from his reforms in the 1980's. Botha was, in turn, applying lessons he learnt from his rich experience as a machine politician - under Malan and his successors. Perhaps the most important of these experiences was his involvement in the 1960 referendum, and Botha's application of the logic of appropriateness will also be demonstrated.

In order to understand this founding referendum, we need to understand the historical struggles that produced this referendum. These pitted republicans against non-republicans and the Cape against the North. Moreover, the referendum came to be viewed as a vital tool in electoral politics, especially in allowing the party to appeal to non-republicans. And this research - with its extensive use of historical material - will demonstrate the powerful insights that an understanding of these struggles provides. And
whilst the existing literature is seminal to appreciating the founding referendum, path
dependency made the institution a part of the NP's political repertoire. The theoretical
insight that South Africa provides is that once introduced, the referendum precedent itself
serves as a resource and constraint in the behaviour of future political actors. A script is
set.
Chapter One
Explaining referendum use.

Actors are strategic, seeking to realise complex, contingent and often changing goals. They do so in a context which favours certain strategies over others and must rely upon perceptions of that context which are at best incomplete, and which may very often reveal themselves inaccurate after the event.¹

Why elites use referenda:
Despite the fact that there have been well over 1,000 referenda at the national level since 1791, insufficient analytical attention has been assigned to understanding their use, especially the use of controlled or government initiated referenda. The existing literature has either been of a descriptive/comparative nature, surveying referendum use, or it has dealt with theoretical dimensions of usage. One reason why referendum use has traditionally received less attention in the political science literature is that referenda are, relatively speaking, rare and irregular in most polities. A second reason has to do with the rather dim view that many political scientists have of referenda. In this chapter I review the referendum literature. Broadly speaking, the existing literature explains referendum use as being driven through, either consequential or utilitarian considerations and cultural traditions. I also assess the sociological institutionalist literature and suggest its contribution to our understanding of referendum use. Despite the appeal of this literature, it gives insufficient recognition to the role of agency. In order to suggest an account that synthesises consequential and structure driven explanations, I embrace the historical institutionalist approach.

A cultural explanation:
Switzerland provides an example of a polity where the explanation for referendum use draws heavily on culture, and it is suggested that modern referendum is an application of the traditional landsgemeine (or tribal gathering), which was particularly pervasive in Switzerland's Germanic cantons.² Wolf Linder, however, dismisses such accounts as myth

making and submits that direct democracy was imposed upon the Swiss by Napoleon. Besides, culture alone, has limitations as an independent variable in explaining referendum use.

The fact that referenda are relatively absent from modern Greece (8 votes), where the original plebiscite took shape, questions the centrality of culture in accounting for referendum. And, the near absence of referenda in British political tradition must be contrasted with their prevalence in New Zealand and Australia. Moreover, there is a difference in patterns of referendum use between these two former colonies. Several democracies (India, U.S.A., Japan, Netherlands, Israel and post-war Germany) have thus far refrained from employing the referendum on a national level, and there seems scant evidence that would suggest a common set of cultural (or institutional) traits that might explain this. And, not all American states employ direct democracy.

It should also be added that political elites often make a conscience choice to harness culture as a political resource. One example of how elites use culture to justify a particular form of popular consultation is provided by the Marcos regime in the Philippines. Fearful that he would lose a referendum on a new constitution in 1972, Ferdinand Marcos postponed it and allowed for controlled consultative decision-making by barangay elders. Marcos, who held three further barangays (1973, 1975, and 1976), claimed that the vote marked a return to the democracy that was practised prior to Spanish conquest.

Culture in South Africa:
Tempting though it may be to attribute the use of referenda to culture – in the case of South Africa the Great Trek (which approximates the landsgemeine in that the Trek party made and unmade laws) or the former Boer Republics in the Transvaal and Free State, and their debatably democratic traditions, there is no evidence whatsoever that this is the case.

4 Colin A. Hughes, 'Australia and New Zealand', In David Butler and Austin Ranney (eds), Referendums Around the World, p. 154.
7 Whilst Dunbar Moodie (1975: 30 – 31) claims that the Boer’s almost ‘perfectly expressed Rousseau’s notion of the general will’, within the racial constraints, his assessment merits qualification. Although Transvaal legislators and President Paul Kruger placed a high premium on the ‘will of the people’ (Kleynhans, 1966: 12, 23-26, 136; Thompson, 1960: 99 and Marais, 1961: 11), Kruger was a rather autocratic leader, who employed the idea of popular sovereignty to limit the sovereignty of the legislature (Furlong, 1991: 171-175). G.H. Calpin (1941:73) speculates that had the ‘Transvaal and Orange territory
It is indeed curious that neither of the former Boer republics voted on the Union in 1909, whilst Natal, the most British of the former colonies, did.

Why elites use referenda?
The decision to use a referendum is, ultimately, that of political elites. French academic, Laurence Morel’s (1993) analysis of European votes identifies four functional roles of referenda, and provides a helpful insight into what motivates consequential political elites to use referenda. These roles include; 1) providing internal cohesion or party unity; 2) smoothing the adoption of legislation; 3) enhancing the political power of parties of leaders; 4) and giving legitimacy to decisions or policies. The first three roles will be explored in detail in the coming paragraphs.

The question of legitimacy is especially notable in regard to ethno-national votes, and legitimacy is vital if the opponents of reform are prepared to harness violent forms of resistance. Some problems, as Ian Lustick notes, 'such as taking a decision to contract the borders of a state in order to achieve peace, are too big for democratic procedures.' In the ensuing chapter I discuss the role of the referendum in providing legitimacy for controversial processes – like state contraction – in greater detail.

Promoting policy and party:
The most popular perception regarding referendum use is that political actors, being utilitarian, view them as the most efficient mechanism to promote a certain policy or their party. And, a referendum often offers a low-risk route to passing potentially unpopular policy decisions or reforms. In the case of F.W. de Klerk, a referendum presented an infinitely safer option, than a general election, in order to address challenges to his legitimacy to lead a reform process. Given that some 80 percent of all controlled referenda produce outcomes that favour ruling elites, the referendum is, indeed, a highly efficient means to promote elite interests. This has ensured that many view the referendum a conservative mechanism that enhances elite control.

continued uninterruptedly as republics, all forces were there to make them one-party governments, with a tendency towards dictatorship.8

9 Mads H. Qvortrup, 'Are Referendums Controlled and Pro-hegemonic?', Political Studies, Volume 48, 2000, pp. 821-826.
Explaining a recent upsurge in referendum use in Latin America, Monica Barczak (2000), suggests that dissatisfaction with the existing political system has resulted in the rise of neo-populist and modernising leaders. Once in power, these non-party based leaders and their followers have amended the existing constitution in order to ensconce their position and prevent the return of the parties associated with paralysis.

In the extreme, someone like Giovanni Sartori simply views the referendum mechanism as a means to circumvent representative democracy. Its association with Napoleon Bonaparte, inter-war fascism and Nazism, and its continued use by regimes that flout the rules of democracy, has bolstered this perception. It should, however, be noted that there are several examples where governments have suffered ignominious defeats in controlled referenda. Examples include Pinochet's defeat in a 1988 referendum, and Charles de Gaulle, who harnessed the referendum mechanism in order to bolster his Fifth republic, was, ultimately, the victim of the referendum mechanism and resigned after losing a vote in 1969. In 1992 and in 2001 the Danish government and the establishment were defeated on EU integration. A similar pattern was witnessed in Norway's 1972 European referendum. In 1978 Austrian Chancellor, Bruno Kreisky's, decision to turn a referendum, on proceeding with a nuclear energy plant, into a vote of confidence proved disastrous. Kreisky's decision provided the conservative opposition (which supported the development of the plant) with an incentive to vote 'no'. More recently Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe (2000) made a similar error.

The image of the referendum as a 'policy/power maximising' mechanism is further undermined by the fact that referendum use is, in general, very sporadic and not universal. Despite the clear incentive for governments to use the discretionary referendum, this has not been the case, and referendum use has not been addictive, or habit forming. Instead, referenda tend to serve mainly as 'crisis instruments, invoked to solve a particular problem or in order to justify a particular solution. The average number of national

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12 Ronald Butt, quoted in Austin Ranney, 'Reflections on Referendums', in Austin Ranney (ed.), The Referendum Device, p. 12
13 Wolfgang C. Muller, 'Party Competition and Plebiscitary Politics in Austria', Electoral Studies, 17, 1, 1998, p. 27.
16 David Butler and Austin Ranney, 'Practice', in David Butler and Austin Ranney (ed.), Referendums Around the World, p. 3.
17 Ibid. p. 1.
referenda per country (excluding Switzerland) is less than 7, measured from 1791 to 2000. Moreover, it should be noted that several countries, which are relatively frequent users of the referendum institution, in fact, further inflate this average. The high rate of variation in the frequency of referendum use across countries has led David Butler and Austin Ranney to suggest that there is indeed no pattern of referendum use.

Furthermore, a utilitarian view of political behaviour ignores the influence of culture, ideas and history in decision-making. It is a curious observation that those European nation states that have employed the referendum mechanism on ceding sovereignty to the European Union are often victims of past territorial conquests. And, as Vernon Bogdanor has noted, neither 'constitutional principles nor political attitudes can be understood without grasping their roots in the historical experience of a society, which dominates the attitudes of the contemporary politician, even when he is least aware of it.'

This thesis, therefore, seeks to provide an account of referendum use, which recognises that instrumental rationality clearly looms large in decision-making, yet assumes that this rationality is itself a product of particular historical developments.

Navigating party and coalition splits:
Tor Bjorklund (1982) provides a more refined consequential understanding of why elites employ controlled referenda. Analysing referendum use in Norway, over time, he concluded that the referendum is generally demanded by a minority that is facing defeat in a parliamentary vote. In order for this minority to succeed in having their demands met, Bjorklund suggests two important conditions. The first is that the ruling political party or coalition must be split on the issue, and the second is that voters view the issue as salient.

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18 This calculation is derived from the C2D database. See http://c2d.unige.ch/.
19 The list of countries that have to date used over 20 votes includes, Liechtenstein (78 since 1919), Australia (51 since 1898), Italy (58 since 1921), New Zealand (44 since 1902), Ecuador (34 since 1986), France (28 since 1793), Egypt (24 since 1956), Ireland (23 since 1937), Haiti (22 since 1918), and Uruguay (21 since 1917).
20 David Butler and Austin Ranney, 'Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory', in David Butler and Austin Ranney (eds), Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory, p. 18; David Butler and Austin Ranney, 'Conclusion', in David Butler and Austin Ranney (eds), Referendums Around the World, p. 258.
Accordingly, the referendum serves to mediate party or coalition divisions, and it appears that party disputes are the primary reason for the use of the controlled referendum.²⁴

The UK, where divisions over the question of EEC membership²⁵ and, later, over devolution, produced referenda, provides an example. The referendum also served to mediate internal Swedish tensions in the case of Norwegian cession from Sweden in 1905.²⁶ Similarly, the Australian conscription referendum in 1916 and 1917,²⁷ the prohibition question in Norway (1919 and 1926), Sweden (1922) and Finland (1931), were settled by referenda after they divided the ruling party. This was also the case with the nuclear issue in Sweden (1980) and Austria (1978), and in Spain's (1986) referendum on NATO membership. In 1986 John Major was forced to pledge a referendum in the face of internal spats in the Tory party over European issues.²⁸ Laurence Morel, however, also highlights an important paradox, namely, that using the referendum mechanism, may in fact intensify existing divisions.²⁹ These differences may emerge during the campaign, as was the case in the West Indies Federation vote.³⁰ In South Africa, Botha’s 1980 pledge to stage a referendum on power-sharing failed to keep the ruling party together.

The referendum as a form of heresthetics:
One of the fascinating insights that will emerge from this study, is the way the NP used the referendum in order to secure the support of a wider – non-republican - constituency at election time. This use of a referendum pledge to de-couple a key policy issue, like secession, at election time was similarly applied in Quebec by the Parti Quebecois in the 1976 elections.³¹ Similarly, Tony Blair made a referendum pledge on the question of additional taxation powers for the proposed Scottish Assembly. It was widely recognised that the undertaking was used to “nail forever” the Tory lie that Labour was imposing a

Tartan Tax on the people of Scotland,' thereby keeping the issue off the agenda of the 1997 elections. Prior to committing his party to a referendum on this issue, Blair promised a referendum on devolution, in order to undermine John Major’s efforts to attack New Labour on the issue, judging that the Tory 'save the Union message' was highly effective against Labour in the 1992 elections. Tony Blair's later promise to hold a referendum on the Euro, also served to ensure that the issue does not cloud British elections in 2001, as did a similar Norwegian pledge to hold a vote on EU membership ahead of the 1993 elections. In Ireland, Fianna Fail used a referendum pledge to ensure that pressure groups keep the abortion issue off the agenda of the Irish elections in the early 1980. Incumbents, or their contestants, thus seek to improve their electoral prospects by using a referendum pledge in order to remove a controversial issue from the electoral agenda.

John Matsusaka (1992) has demonstrated that Californian legislators tend to avoid distributional issues that are 'too hot to handle' (like abortion) by employing referenda, as they fear being punished by voters. Politicians, thus, also adroitly exploit the referendum in order to 'escape from making decisions that they fear will create as many enemies as friends.' Bjorklund, appropriately, suggests that the referendum serves as a 'lightening rod,' allowing a ruling party or coalition to avoid the wrath of voters at election time. As will be described in chapter four, however, the referendum does not always succeed as a lightening rod, and voters may, at times, use referenda to punish unpopular governments.

William Riker has introduced the handy concept of heresthetics, in order to describe actions taken by politicians to 'structure the world' so that they can win political contests. Referenda are a vital tool of electoral heresthetics, and their tactical use in electoral contests may, in fact, explain their later use. In other words, parties that repeatedly promise a referendum during election campaigns might have little choice but to honour that pledge afterwards.

36 David Butler and Austin Ranney, 'Practice', p. 3.
The Logic of Appropriateness:

Whilst Bjorklund’s account qualifies the conditions under which the controlled referendum is viewed as an efficient mechanism, it does not help us to understand F.W. de Klerk’s decision to promise a referendum in 1990. For de Klerk did so despite the fact that there were no major divisions within his government over the reform process he launched.

One reason is that Bjorklund pays insufficient attention to the structure (institutions) and culture within which these elites make their decisions on referenda. Moreover, accounts that focus on divisions, at a particular juncture, fail to pay sufficient attention to the impact of path dependency on future referendum use. Applied to Bjorklund’s Norway, one could argue that the successful introduction of the referendum in 1905, on the question of independence, constrained future referendum use, by inextricably linking sovereignty issues and referenda.

I argue that whilst controlled referenda are not addictive, patterns of referendum use, which are shaped by early use, are discernable. Even though a controlled referendum is not mandatory, convention or precedent may cause a government to feel that ‘it has no choice but to call a referendum.’38 As Vernon Bogdanor notes, the referendum has, over time, come to demarcate ‘some laws from others as fundamental, such that they require ratification by the people.’39

In the case of Britain, for example, referenda have been used to legitimate the transfer of Parliament’s power (devolution, the EEC, Northern Ireland), and in the build-up to the 1975 referenda, the precedent of EC referendum loomed large.40 In South Africa the NP went to the volk on matters related to the definition of citizenship, and P.W. Botha explicitly made reference to the 1960 referendum in justifying his 1983 referendum.

In order to understand how elites emulate their predecessors, and how patterns of referendum use are formed, I turn to the work of James March and Johan P. Olsen. In sharp contrast to the choice metaphor, which guides the actions of the utilitarian actor, they suggest that the behaviour of political actors is driven by the ‘logic of appropriateness.’41 One prominent example where the logic is applied is the Cuban Missile Crisis.42 And, in Graham Allison’s fascinating study of the crisis, he notes how Robert

39 Vernon Bogdanor, ‘Western Europe’, p. 46.
40 Barry Jones and Rick Wilford, Further Considerations on the Referendum: The Evidence of the Vote on Welsh Devolution, Political Studies, XXX, 1, 1975, p. 18.
42 Ibid. p. 25.
Kennedy effectively ruled out the option of bombing Cuba’s naval fleet as a possible response, by suggesting that the USA could not conduct a ‘Pearl Harbour in reverse.’

Hence metaphor and history not only constrained the decision maker’s search for alternatives, but also defined the situation.

This anecdote strongly contrasts with the image of rational decision-making. Namely, that all possible alternatives are canvassed and their respective costs and benefits are weighed up, prior to deciding on which course of action to pursue. Instead, decision-makers are pre-occupied with questions like ‘what situation is this?’ and ‘what should I do?’ Actions are, therefore, fitted to situations by their appropriateness, and Stephen Krasner notes that actors operate with cognitive scripts, which serve as ‘classificatory schemes – cognitive models that filter perceptions and suggest appropriate behaviour. Scripts might or might not be followed; they can be deeply constraining or invitations to hypocrisy.’

It is important to note that sociological institutionalism does not negate intentional behaviour. It rather replaces it with a notion of 'bounded' rationality, where actors are pre-occupied with 'satisficing', as opposed to maximising, behaviour. Elite pacts in transitions to democracy provide one form of satisficing behaviour, where each side obtains 'some important satisfactions' and avoids the 'worst possible disaffections.'

### Applying the logic to referendum use:

This literature, thus, recognises that once an institution or solution is applied to a particular issue, a script or precedent has been created. This account further implies that a satisfactory and legitimate course of action is chosen, often, at the expense of the most efficient solution. Applied to referenda, I suggest that whereas consequential actors view them as an efficient means to an end, interpretive actors rather view referenda as the right or legitimate way to resolve an issue.

Denmark, a victim of past territorial aggression, insisted on conducting a referendum in the Danish West Indies (The Virgin Islands) before selling the islands to the

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44 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, p. 25.
47 Jack Walker (1969), for example, has demonstrated how Americans moving westward inappropriately applied their existing institutional norms (zoning, town planning) in the drier west. And in the case of Suriname, the Dutch consociationalism was applied to this former colony, even though it was ill suited (Thorndike, 1990: 35).
Danish elites (like Robert Kennedy in the Bay of Pig incident) may have felt that they could not behave towards others as the Prussians behaved towards them, on the question of Schleswig-Holstein. And by using a referendum in this particular context, Denmark clearly also hoped to legitimate its demand for a vote on the status of Schleswig-Holstein. French elites were equally insistent that they could not purchase St. Bartholomew from Sweden without the consent of the people for similar reasons. Besides, such generosity would, no doubt, bolster French efforts to secure a vote on the future of Alsace-Lorraine.

Colin Hughes provides an apposite example of the application of this logic in referendum use. According to Hughes, the acceptance of Advance Australia Fair, as a national anthem, following a referendum in 1977, 'makes it likely that should a replacement for the present flag be proposed, that choice would be put to a referendum.'

Given that referenda are often viewed as crisis instruments, used when 'normal consensual mechanisms have broken down,' or associated with certain situations, their use is limited to such situations by interpretive behaviour. And, once employed on a salient issue, like sovereignty, the referendum becomes an established and legitimate institution through which to resolve such issues. Political actors are thus obliged to act in accordance with these norms and may feel that ceding sovereignty to Brussels in the process of European integration, for example, requires popular consent, even though a referendum might in fact be an inefficient solution.

The referendum as a value:
Clearly on certain matters, like sovereignty, efficiency is not the only consideration. Eamon de Valera’s insistence that the Irish people vote on the 1937 constitution, was driven by his belief that such an exercise would 'symbolise that the Irish people, for the first time, were giving themselves a constitution and no longer owed allegiance to any foreign power.' De Valera on occasion made it clear to Jan Smuts that 'the question [of a republic] must be decided by the people.' The referendum is thus the product of more than utilitarian consideration; it is an institution that reflects a new set of ideas about the

49 Charles Callan Tansill, The Purchase of the West Indies (Baltimore, 1932), pp. 59, 73-74, 479.  
51 Sarah Wambaugh, A Monograph on Plebiscites, pp. 23, 156; Phillip Goodhart, Referendum, p. 109.  
52 Colin A. Hughes, 'Australia and New Zealand', p. 169.  
53 Vernon Bogdanor, 'Western Europe', p. 74.  
54 Ibid. p. 78.  
relationship between people and land. It articulates the value of popular sovereignty, and thanks to institutional stickiness it has endured for over 300 years in its modern form.

The institutionalist literature recognises the salience of values in adopting institutions, and that in their quest for social legitimacy, actors (businessman, politicians, and states) seek to be consistent or 'isomorphic' with their external environment and its values. And both the social movement and transition literatures confirm the salience of conformity or isomorphism in political behaviour. The referendum literature has accorded far less recognition.

Applied to referendum use, this desire to be isomorphic with the idea of popular sovereignty explains the introduction and spread of the referendum mechanism after the French Revolution. Besides, the referendum allowed post-Revolutionary France to balance its aggressive foreign policy and territorial conquests with its new domestic agenda. Indicative of the growing importance of the notion of popular sovereignty, after the French Revolution, is the fact that several aspirants to thrones felt compelled to seek a popular mandate for their reign. In 1860 the residents of Nice and Savoy, ceded to France by Sardinia by the Treaty of Turin, were consulted on the matter by plebiscite. According to Sarah Wambaugh, Cavour insisted on the use of a referendum 'to legitimate in the eyes of Europe a transaction sure to be repugnant to it as well as to protect himself against the certain attack of Italian patriots against the cession of Sardinian soil.' Though this vote merely served to rubber stamp a decision already taken, the norms of the day compelled Cavour to employ a plebiscite.

In more recent times, colonial powers have also sought to be isomorphic with the value of popular sovereignty. Imperial Britain staged a consultation amongst tribal leaders before imposing a Monarch of its choice in Iraq, in order to comply with Wilsonian norms, and ensure that this 'king making might have the semblance of government by

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57 Examples from the social movement theory include Elisabeth Clemens (1998: 117), and Sidney Tarrow (1998: 34), and from the transition literature, support for isomorphism comes from Schmitter (1997: 30-39) and Linz and Stepan (1996: 76).
58 Sarah Wambaugh, A Monograph on Plebiscites, p. 2.
59 Examples include Prince Christian Frederik in Norway in 1814 (Larsen, 1965: 376-379), an 1862 Greek vote to choose Prince Alfred, a British candidate for the throne (Kousoulas, 1974: 42-45) and Ferdinand Maximilian of Hapsburg, in Mexico 1863 (Haslip, 1971: 191-192).
60 Sarah Wambaugh, A Monograph on Plebiscites, pp. 76, 87.
consent of the governed.\textsuperscript{62} In the ensuing chapter, I address the increased use of referenda by colonial powers in the post-colonial period, in an effort to legitimate their continued control over territories and peoples.

At key points in history, this value of popular sovereignty has come to enjoy greater value, resulting in the referendum being more fashionable. Such referendum high tides are similar to what Samuel Huntington's (1991) 'waves' of democracy and Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan recognise the importance of the political environment in encouraging democratisation. They argue that there is a \textit{zeitgeist}, which is either democracy friendly or hostile.\textsuperscript{63} As a result, waves of democratisation produce temporal clustering.\textsuperscript{64} The Progressive era\textsuperscript{65} in the United States, which explains the introduction of direct legislation in the several states,\textsuperscript{66} is said to have encouraged the introduction of the referendum in Australia,\textsuperscript{67} suggesting the existence of a Progressive \textit{zeitgeist} (contagion) effect. Similarly, the Wilsonian \textit{zeitgeist} encouraged the spread of referenda in the early 1920s. It will be argued that this zeitgeist affected the NP after World War One.

**The referendum deemed inappropriate:**

It is also worth noting that in some settings, institutions, though efficient, are ruled out as they imperil 'the cohesion of the system.'\textsuperscript{68} This is especially the case with referenda in consociational democracies, as they are liable to undermine the stability of the social order. Belgium's single national referendum, held in 1950 on the reinstatement of the pre-war Monarch, King Leopold, proved a highly divisive event. Whilst the Flemish (Flanders) widely supported the monarch's reinstatement, the Walloon community voted against it.\textsuperscript{69} In Israel, significant voices in the academic community continue to oppose the

\textsuperscript{63} Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, \textit{Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation}, pp. 74-76.
\textsuperscript{65} Progressive-era (1890-1920) reformers mobilized against the party-machine and the lack of public accountability of the Senate. Consumer rights were also a key issue in this time period. President Theodore Roosevelt supported the movement and implements many of the reforms they demand. Woodrow Wilson, who was elected President in 1913, also fostered many of these reforms.
\textsuperscript{66} David B. Magleby, 'Direct Legislation in the American States', in David Butler and Austin Ranney (eds). \textit{Referendums Around the World}, pp. 219, 223.
\textsuperscript{67} Colin A. Hughes, 'Australia and New Zealand', p. 158.
introduction of the referendum on similar grounds. It is, however, worth noting that the most frequent user of the referendum, Switzerland, is also a consociational democracy.

Further evidence that political institutions, deemed appropriate in one setting, might be inappropriate in other settings, is furnished by the Federal Republic of Germany, which does not employ the referendum on a national level. The reason for this is largely linked to the collapse of the Weimar republic, which staged two referenda (1926, 1929), and Nazi use of the mechanism (1933, 1934, 1936, and 1938). Referenda, however, continue to be extensively used on the Land level.

In the case of Italy, on the other hand, the referendum was embraced as part of a concerted effort to ensure that political power was diffused. This demonstrates a rather different response to Benito Mussolini’s rule. As already noted in regard to culture, considerations of appropriateness are also harnessed by political elites in averting the use of the referendum. Vernon Bogdanor describes how Clement Atlee, for example, invoked Nazi use of the referendum to state his opposition to its introduction in Britain in response to Winston Churchill’s suggestion that a referendum would prolong the life of the wartime unity government.

Accommodating structure and agency:

Though March and Olson are instructive in helping us understand later use of the referendum, the sociological intuitionalist account does not provide a satisfactory account of how institutions, like referenda, are introduced in the first place. Moreover, this account of behaviour is criticised for presenting an 'over socialised' account of human behaviour.

So whereas rational choice accounts tend to ignore structure (culture, class, norms), in favour of agency, sociological institutionalists tend to denude agency, in favour

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73 Vernon Bogdanor, 'Western Europe', pp. 61, 69.
74 Ibid. p. 37.
Stephen Krasner succinctly captures the difference between the two approaches when he notes that 'For actor-orientated arguments the actors create the institutions; for sociological arguments institutions generate agents.' Hence, Krasner warns that the logic of appropriateness is limited to situations where the logic 'is unambiguous and the consequences of alternative courses of action unclear.' In the extreme, the institutional approach might relegate agency to being a dependent variable.

Historical institutionalists attempt to resolve the structure-agency conundrum by adopting a more eclectic approach, accepting that political actors are both strategic (consequential) and cultural (appropriate). For, as Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor suggest, 'a good deal of behaviour is goal-orientated or strategic, but the range of options canvassed by a strategic actor is likely to be circumscribed by a culturally specific sense of appropriate action.' Anne Swidler describes this 'range of options' as a political 'toolbox.' This handy metaphor will be adopted for the purpose of this study, and it will be argued that the referendum formed part of de Klerk's political repertoire, making it more likely that he deploy one.

From the sociological account historical institutionalists, therefore, accept that institutions, which are inherited from the past, shape actors' perceptions of appropriate actions and mould their preferences. However, in contrast to the sociological account, institutions are not viewed as the sole cause of outcomes. Instead, institutions provide a contextual guide for understanding decisions and mediating an array of forces like history, culture and ideas. According to historical institutionalists, like Ellen Immergut, political institutions influence the means, and not the ends, of political action.

Agency in the adoption of the referendum:

Historical institutionalists introduce agency by paying close attention to the relative power and interests of actors at the time of institutional formation. And the history of referendum use is replete with examples in which the referendum is an outcome (and

78 Ibid. p. 5.
79 Whilst this position is shared by Kato (1996: 561 - 563), Immergut (1998: 28) and Grendstad and Selle (1995: 22), Hay and Wincott (1998: 951-954) question the scope for an integration of the two approaches as they are based on 'mutually incompatible premises or social ontologies.'
80 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. Taylor, 'Political Science and the Three Institutionalisms', p.956.
82 Andrew Abbot, 'From Causes to Events', p. 449.
resource) of political struggles. John P. McCormick, for example, suggests, 'Popular participation in the development of the [Roman] republic itself ensured that the nobles did not have an unhealthy predominance of power in Rome.' In Switzerland, the referendum mechanism served to provide vital checks and balances after the Sonderbund Wars, which pitted the Federal government against the Sonderbund League (of Catholic cantons formed in 1847), which threatened to secede. One concession to the defeated cantons was a double majority provision (national and amongst the cantons) on all constitutional changes, enabling Catholic and conservative cantons to block radical reforms.

In the case of Italian unification and the absorption of the Sicily, Cavour viewed the plebiscite as preferable to a constituent assembly, which might have plumped for a federal and not unitary Italy, as he desired. A plebiscite was easier too manipulate. Cavour also believed that his emulation of Napoleon on the plebiscite would secure French support. Furthermore, the votes were viewed as 'proof' to Europe that the annexations represented the will of the people. His nemesis, Garibaldi, on the other hand opposed the use of the plebiscite, as it 'would amount to tacit sanction to the loss of Nice,' which had been ceded by a similar vote.

The emphasis of the historical institutionalist approach on past battles acknowledges the impact of other variables, especially information, culture and ideas on preference formation. And, understanding the introduction of the referendum, defined as the first use, therefore, requires that we fully appreciate the political, institutional and historical context within which it was first considered.

In modern politics, referendum debate has often revolved around the role of the powerful party machine. Vernon Bogdanor suggests that the early dominance of social democrats explains the 'infrequency of the referendum,' as these elites viewed greater participation as a threat to the machine. In Britain, A.V. Dicey sought to limit its power and influence through the referendum. Dicey viewed the referendum as a measure that would prevent the introduction of Irish Home Rule, which his fellow liberal Gladstone

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86 Kris W. Kobach, 'Switzerland', pp. 101-103.
90 Vernon Bogdanor, 'Western Europe', pp. 77, 91-94.
championed. The use of direct democracy in the US also reflects a desire by the Progressive movement to weaken the party machine and 'take politics out of the smoke filled rooms.' It was this spirit, which Woodrow Wilson also sought to inject the Versailles deliberations.

**Institutional stickiness:**

The fact that institutions, which represent 'institutionalised historical conflicts,' continue to exert influence over contemporary conflicts and decision-making is explained by a political lag effect or institutional stickiness. Institutional stickiness presupposes that previous 'institutional choices limit available future options,' thereby leading to path dependency. Otherwise stated by Robert Putnam, 'what comes first matters.'

As already suggested, once independence has been won through a referendum – as was the case in Norway in 1905 – it may be hard to cede any sovereignty without the consent of the people. And the enduring legacy of the referendum displays the extent to which ideas, like self-determination and popular sovereignty, are embedded in institutions and continue to 'specify policy in the absence of innovation.'

In Stephen Krasner’s discussion of sovereignty he argues that choices made in Europe dictated the parameters and understandings of sovereignty in post-colonial Africa. A cursory analysis of referendum use in post-colonial Africa demonstrates a greater preponderance amongst former French colonies to employ referenda than former British colonies. This can, in part, be explained by the fact that in 1958 Charles de Gaulle ran an empire-wide vote on the relationship between these colonies and France. This vote,

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which was imposed on the people of these colonies, provided an analogy or template for post-independence rulers to follow.

Historical institutionalism and its implicit path dependency do not propose historical determinism, and recognises that we cannot 'read outcomes off the institutional map.' There is, however, a danger that the approach provides overly deterministic accounts, which de-politicise decision-making. Hence the need to demonstrate agency. A further drawback of the historical institutionalist accounts (and indeed all institutionalist accounts) is that path-dependency and institutional stickiness do not easily square with institutional innovation and change.

Institutional change:
Traditionally institutionalists have accounted for institutional change in two ways. The first is through extreme and sudden external shocks like the Great Depression or major revolutions. Such external shocks are said to 'punctuate' the existing state of equilibrium, catalysing a 'struggle over the basic rules of the game rather than allocation within a set of rules,' and allow for the introduction of new rules and paradigms. The Great Depression, for example, facilitated the introduction of liberalism in trade policy and changes in US corporate practices. It is also notable that the Great Depression, indirectly, heralded an upsurge of referendum use in both Europe and Latin America. In an era when the existing constitutions were viewed as being ineffective in dealing with the economic challenges of the 1930's, and the legitimacy crises of the existing institutions, provided an opportunity for certain actors to challenge the institutional status quo. Adolph Hitler, who consolidated his power through referenda, is the most notorious beneficiary of the legitimacy crisis of existing political institutions.

98 Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, 'Historical Institutionalism', pp. 18 - 20.
99 Paul Pierson, 'When Effect Becomes Cause', pp. 609 - 610.
100 Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, 'Historical Institutionalism', p. 15.
104 Some examples include, Bolivía in 1930 (Klein, 1969: 176-177), Uruguay in 1934 (Taylor, 1960: 20-25, 30), Romania (1938) and Greece in 1935 (Mavrogordatos, 1983: 40), and the Baltic republics (von Rauch, 1974: 147-149).
The drawback of this account is that institutions might move from being an independent variable to being a dependent variable during institutional breakdown. As a result, institutions may well explain precious little during periods of crisis. Instead, other factors, like agency, may predominate during such periods, as policy entrepreneurs exploit policy windows that result from a major crisis. An institutional crisis does not, however, necessarily imply that the existing norms and institutions are totally irrelevant. Furthermore, periods of institutional insecurity may make institutions more receptive to new ideas, as external shocks undermine existing conceptions, policies and programs. William Sewell contends that in the French Revolution, 'the particular shape of the reformed institutions was largely determined by revolutionary ideology. One of these institutions was the referendum.

The end of World War One, similarly, paved the way for the increased use of the referendum in order to settle territorial disputes, thereby breaking with the existing practices of diplomacy. Both Woodrow Wilson and Vladimir Lenin supported the right to popular sovereignty and referenda, for diverging reasons. Lenin, though not supportive of nationalism, was patently aware of the resentment that various national groups harboured towards Tsarist rule, as a result of Russification policies, and hoped to secure their support in the struggle against Tsarist rule. For Wilson it was the basis for lasting peace in Europe, and a way to mobilise support for the Allied cause. Henry Kissinger perceptively notes that though Europeans were still committed to the rules of Realpolitik, both France and Britain humoured Wilson’s ideas in order to enlist his support.

Social Learning processes:
The second account of institutional change is through social learning processes, or 'politics as learning.' Here changes are incremental and largely straitjacketed by existing practices

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106 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. Taylor, 'Political Science and the Three Institutionalisms', p. 942; Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, 'Historical Institutionalism', p. 15.
108 Neil Fligstein (1997: 316, 322) suggests that an actor's response to such shocks depends on their interpretation of the shock, whilst Sheri Berman (1998) postulates that the response to such an external crisis may be determined by policy legacies of the ruling social democratic parties.
and norms, as actors deliberately 'attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in response to past experience and new information.'\textsuperscript{114} In traditional accounts of social learning, the process is by and large envisaged as expert (bureaucrats and intellectuals) driven,\textsuperscript{115} and changes occur within the confines of existing institutional norms.\textsuperscript{116} Perhaps the most illustrative example is the annual budget, which is incrementally amended. Hence, the account leaves little scope for a major break with existing institutions, and it is unable to account for the impact of ideas and social pressure. It also fails to account for major waves of policy innovation, which are often produced by changes in opportunity structures.\textsuperscript{117}

In order to account for social pressure, Peter Hall (1993) proposes a 'state-structured' theory of social learning, which he developed in order to explain the paradigm shift from Keynesianism to Monetarism in Britain. Hall describes how the persistent failure of Keynesian policies, and first and second order modifications of that paradigm, undermined the idea, and created an environment that was receptive to a new paradigm. Susan Scarrow's (1987) explanation for the increased use of direct democracy in Germany, despite the long held consensus against referendum use, provides a similar explanation. She suggests that the German party political system's 'diagnosis' in the early 1990's that Germany 'faced an upsurge of popular disenchantment which might threaten the health of the political system,' encouraged party elites to grant 'citizens new ways to participate in political life.' Scarrow, thus, notes how public disaffection prompted parties 'to attack structures that have contributed to their own strength and importance.' One such reform was the introduction of primaries within the Social Democratic Party (SPD) to select the party's candidates. Moreover, Scarrow notes that unification made constitutional reform necessary and that these debates saw the referendum receive increased attention. In the East, the party tradition was weaker, and a 'double legacy of suspicion of parties and respect for direct participation gave eastern parties compelling reasons to try and enhance their own legitimacy, and that of new

\textsuperscript{114} Peter A. Hall, 'Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State. The Case of Economic Policy Making in Britain', \textit{Comparative Politics}, April 1993, p. 278.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid. pp. 277 - 278.
\textsuperscript{116} Paul Pierson, 'When Effect Becomes Cause', pp. 611 – 613.
governmental institutions, by supporting the inclusion of plebiscitary elements in new systems.\textsuperscript{118}

Hall's account, therefore, not only incorporates attributes of agency,\textsuperscript{119} but also provides for a feasible description of self-reflective behaviour. Self-reflective actors can change their policies in order to avoid repeatedly playing the same game.\textsuperscript{120} Recent developments in the contentious politics literature also suggest that participants in such politics are self-reflective.\textsuperscript{121} In the case of South Africa, F.W. de Klerk appears to have strategically 'anticipated'\textsuperscript{122} the potential for an institutional crisis following his decision to embark upon a reform process as a result of having played a similar reform game before. De Klerk learnt many valuable lessons from Botha's incremental reforms, and one of these was that the referendum should be pre-empted, and not used as a response to conservative resistance to reform. What self-reflective behaviour implies is that political repertoire, like culture, is not merely inherited but rather learned.\textsuperscript{123}

\textbf{The spread of the referendum.}

Sociological institutionalists have produced an instructive account in order to explain the spread of institutions within organisational fields – including nation states. They suggest three processes of 'isomorphism,' coercive, normative and mimetic, which explain the spread and homogenisation of institutions.\textsuperscript{124}

In the latter form, institutions or actors copy other institutions or actors that they perceive as being more successful and legitimate, and are more likely to do so under conditions of uncertainty. Again it is worth noting that the transition\textsuperscript{125} and social movement\textsuperscript{126} literatures recognise the centrality of the so-called 'demonstration effect,' or contagion, in accounting for the spread of democracy or innovative forms of collective

\textsuperscript{118} Susan E. Scarrow, 'Party Competition and Institutional Change', pp. 465-468.
\textsuperscript{119} Colin Hay and Daniel Wincott, 'Structure Agency and Historical Institutionalism', p. 956.
\textsuperscript{120} Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, 'Historical Institutionalism', p. 9.
\textsuperscript{121} Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, \textit{Dynamics of Contention} (Lanham, Maryland, 1998), pp. 56, 138.
\textsuperscript{125} Philippe C. Schmitter, 'The Influence of the International Context upon the Choice of National Institutions and Policies in Neo-Democracies', in Marco G. Ciugini, Doug MacAdam, Charles Tilly (eds). \textit{From Contention to Democracy}, pp. 113-114.
\textsuperscript{126} Sidney Tarrow, 'Social Protest and Policy Reform', p. 34; Elisabeth S. Clemens, 'To move Mountains. Collective Action and the Possibility of Institutional Change', in Marco G. Ciugini, Doug MacAdam, Charles Tilly (eds). \textit{From Contention to Democracy}, pp. 113-114.
action. One of the earliest European examples of mimetic isomorphism is the Dutch Patriots emulation of French Revolutionaries.\textsuperscript{127} Cape Patriots in turn mirrored the Dutch Patriots,\textsuperscript{128} demonstrating how such ideas spread to colonial outposts. In the use of referenda, ancient Romans drew inspiration from earlier Greek use of direct democracy.\textsuperscript{129} Swedish Social Democrats were inspired to use the referendum on nuclear energy by Austria’s use of the mechanism in 1978 ahead of their impending elections, in order to ensure party unity.\textsuperscript{130} And, as already noted, Australians were inspired to adopt the referendum by the Progressive movement in the USA.

The transition literature, importantly, recognises that contagion is more likely to be influential in regional contexts.\textsuperscript{131} Success in the Baltic republics, which broke away from the Soviet Union through referenda, may have triggered referendum use in other Soviet Republics and Eastern Europe. Mikhail Gorbachov compounded this process by using a referendum to counter these centripetal tendencies.\textsuperscript{132}

In sharp contrast to Gorbachov, French officials were mindful of the potential consequences of a contagion effect in Africa and Asia.\textsuperscript{133} And, in the 1958 referendum, de Gaulle created a huge disincentive for any colony to vote against his new constitution. The cost of such a vote was an immediate end to French aid and blocking off French export markets, and only Guinea voted for independence.\textsuperscript{134} Don McHendry feared that the US precedent of referenda on self-determination in Micronesia would set an example for South Africa to emulate in Namibia,\textsuperscript{135} where White protagonists and Herero leader, Clemens Kapuuo, dreamt of facilitating secession of the centre and south of the territory.\textsuperscript{136}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{128} Though the Cape Patriots emulated their Dutch counterparts, their grievances were local and not ideological (Schutte, 1988: 313 and Fisher, 1969: 27).
\item \textsuperscript{130} Laurence Morel, 'Party Attitudes Towards Referendums, p. 231.
\item \textsuperscript{131} Philippe C. Schmitter, 'The Influence of the International Context upon the Choice of National Institutions and Policies in Neo-Democracies', pp. 30-39.
\item \textsuperscript{133} Robert Aldrich, France and South Pacific Since 1940 (London, 1993), pp. 60-62.
\item \textsuperscript{134} Dorothy Shipley White, Black Africa and de Gaulle. From French Empire to Independence (Pennsylvania, 1979), p. 209.
\item \textsuperscript{135} The Sunday Times, 1 May 1977.
\item \textsuperscript{136} At van Wyk. Dirk Mudge, Reenmaker van die Namib (Pretoria, 1999), pp. 33, 37-38.
\end{itemize}
Napoleonic and French revolutionary use of the referendum provide examples of coercive isomorphism as the mechanism was exported to The Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, and later colonies, by conquest. The empire-wide 1958 referendum provides another example, as do US led colonial votes (to be discussed in the next chapter). These votes were also, however, the outcome of normative isomorphism. The desire to be isomorphic with values, like popular sovereignty, is perhaps best demonstrated by the era of Woodrow Wilson, and explains the dramatic rise in the use of plebiscites in the 1920’s. The use of plebiscites by aspiring regents is another example of the impact of normative isomorphism. Cavour clearly emulated the French in Italy and popular consultations became a feature of state building. Italian state builders also employed this practical expression of the popular will, in order to legitimate state consolidation to the wider public. Normative isomorphism also explains Danish behaviour in the Danish West Indies and the behaviour of many other colonial powers since World War Two. The quest for normative isomorphism also serves important tactical goals. Colonial national movements sought to be isomorphic with Wilsonian values, in order to undermine British hegemony and demonstrate that leaders, like Wilfred Laurier and Jan Smuts, served the interests of the Empire, capital, and not those of the volk.

Referenda as a form of organised hypocrisy:

One negative implication of mimetic isomorphism, already noted, is that the copying of institutions and practices from other settings might lead to inappropriate institutions being applied. Stephen Krasner notes how third world states copy institutions (health care, education) operating in the West, even though they are unable to maintain them. He describes this behaviour, in which actions and norms are de-coupled from the objective reality (available budgets) as 'organised hypocrisy'. In the case of the inter-war Baltic republics, for example, these adopted the Weimar constitution with PR, which proved to be disastrous at the time of the depression.

Organised hypocrisy also leads to a de-coupling of behaviour and norms. James Ron notes how the Israeli Army developed an operating code that 'broke the rules while

137 Wolf Linder, Swiss Democracy, p. 88.
139 Sarah Wambaugh, A Monograph on Plebiscites pp. 10; Phillip Goodhart, Referendum, p. 104.
140 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty, Organized Hypocrisy, pp. 64-66.
appearing to remain within the bounds of the "legal," in an effort to balance repression, with the need for international legitimacy.\textsuperscript{142} In a similar vein, Samuel Huntington points out that even those leaders whose actions were clearly anti-democratic often justified their actions by [espousing] democratic values.\textsuperscript{143} In Baathist Syria, for example, Hafez Assad had such votes to "insistently and systematically avoided giving the impression of relying on military support or of endorsing a single party system."\textsuperscript{144} Viewed in this light we can far better understand the use of the referendum mechanism by leaders who impose themselves (or are imposed) upon the people. The referendum allows repressive leaders to de-couple their un-democratic behaviour by creating the impression that they have a veneer of popular legitimacy. The notorious Haitian dictator Doc Duvalier's idea of staging a referendum on his rule served to counter charges that he repressed his people.\textsuperscript{145} And the referendum has become an integral part of the template, or script, of the \textit{coup d'état}, especially in Latin America and Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{146}

\textbf{Understanding referendum use:}

What has emerged from this discussion is that cultural accounts are deficient, as the decision to use a referendum is, ultimately, political. And, whilst it is clear that agency explains referendum use, consequential accounts are also wanting. For one, referendum use is not that frequent, nor universal. And referenda are not always efficient (especially if a government is unpopular) or deemed appropriate. More importantly, these accounts ignore variables like values (especially, the notion of popular sovereignty), culture and history. These accounts are also limited to situations of party divisions, and do not give enough attention to the consequences of using referendum pledges in incumbency struggles. Finally, the existing consequential accounts are not universal, and they are unable to explain de Klerk's use of the referendum.

In addition, it is impossible to ignore the impact of past referendum use on future use, through path dependency. Once the referendum has been employed, a precedent is

\textsuperscript{143} Samuel P. Huntington, \textit{The Third Wave}, p. 47.
established and a convention created. Moreover, a template or script for dealing with similar problems has been suggested. Path dependency and institutional stickiness explain why this institution has endured. Past use does not, however, pre-ordain future use, and the decision to use a referendum is, ultimately, driven by consequential considerations. Successful past use does, however, make future use more likely. John W. Kingdon suggests that there is a 'spill-over' effect of institutional or policy success.\(^{147}\) In other words, success in the 1960 referendum encouraged others to use it. The 'spill over' effect can also be negative.\(^{148}\) Even once introduced, the success, or otherwise, of referendum use might affect the pace of use. It is argued that the Australian electorate's rejection of the 1951 communism referendum made the then Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, reluctant to 'risk another such rejection by the electorate.'\(^{149}\) No referendum was held in Australia until 1967. And as has been suggested, the institutionalist literature explains the spread of the referendum mechanism, though coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism.

Accommodating this latter logic cannot, however, be at the expense of the logic of consequentiality. In order to merge these two accounts I suggest that the initial decision to employ the referendum is a consequential one, explained by particular struggles in a particular institutional context. Path dependency and spill over effects, however, increasingly feature in future use.

In South Africa the referendum served to navigate internal party divisions over the republican issue. It also served to aid the party at election times, by enabling it to appeal to a wider constituency, forming part of the NP's electoral heresthetics. The party was pre-occupied with precluding the emergence of a competing Afrikaner party in a Westminster system (thereby creating a three-way tie favouring the ruling party). And, a referendum on a republic allowed the NP to be all things to all Afrikaners, by furnishing maximal ambiguity, and uniting the disparate provinces with varying levels of support for the republican ideal. Besides, these historical struggles, the use of the referendum in Southern Rhodesia, and the desire to be isomorphic with Wilsonian ideals and the zeitgeist of the period during and after the War explain why the NP showed an interest in the idea from 1917 onwards.


\(^{148}\) David Ben Gurion's 1935 defeat in the Histadrut (Trade Union) referendum may have reinforced the tendency of Mapai elites to oppose referenda. Though subject to what James Feron (1991) describes as counterfactual speculation, success in that vote might have led Ben Gurion to take a more positive view regarding the referendum.

\(^{149}\) Colin A. Hughes, 'Australia and New Zealand', p. 165.
It is important to note that support for a referendum was intensively contested within the party. In addition to being embroiled in a struggle with their political opponents, the South African Party and, later, the United Party there was another game. Within the National Party there was an ongoing struggle over the focus of the party and the Nationalist project. One reason why Hertzog, and later Malan managed to impose their will on the party, in regard to a referendum, was their political standing and control of the resources (especially in the case of the Cape after 1934). His predecessors tied H.F. Verwoerd’s hands, and he inherited a referendum pledge that was a product of struggles within the NP that took place before he was even active in politics.

Once established as a praxis or convention in 1960, the referendum became part of the NP’s political repertoire. This precedent made it more likely, though not certain, that future NP leaders would apply the referendum to problems that deemed worthy of a referendum. Over time, each leader amended his logic of appropriateness. The decision to use a referendum, ultimately, remained a political one.
Chapter Two.

The referendum as a war of manoeuvre.

Wars of position are fought over beliefs and expectations that can enshrine and protect the legality of regimes and the governing coalitions that rise to power them. Wars of manoeuvre are fought over the nature of these regimes, especially the stipulated rules for legal political competition and control of the mechanisms for their enforcement.

Referenda and ethno-national conflicts:
The relationship between ethno-national referenda and the evolution of a particular ethno-national conflict has not been given due attention by the existing referendum literature. Though the typologies of Gordon Smith (1976) and Pier Vincenzo Uleri (1996) recognise the interplay between the interests of those who promote referenda and the impact of the result on broader political processes, they seem deficient in assessing the full impact of ethno-national referenda. In this chapter I provide a typology for ethno-national referenda that blends the strengths of the existing typologies, yet takes cognisance of the full impact of ethno-national referenda and their role in navigating struggles that might emerge from efforts to redraw social, political, and physical borders. This typology will be developed on the basis of Ian Lustick’s (1995) model of state contraction processes.

Control, interest and outcomes in referenda:
As already noted, the existing referendum literature highlights the importance of who controls the referendum process, in terms of setting the question and the timing of the vote.\(^1\) Votes are either viewed as 'controlled' or 'uncontrolled.' In the latter case, the conditions under which referenda are triggered are strictly defined by the country’s constitution and the government has scant control over the process. Uncontrolled referenda also include cases in which the government is compelled to hold a referendum by its opposition, public opinion or elements within the coalition. Hence there are degrees of control, or lack thereof. The controlled referendum, on the other hand, gives the ruling

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government maximum control and allows it to set the agenda. Hence Arend Lijphart described the controlled referendum as a political weapon in the hand of governments.\(^3\)

Unfortunately, the referendum literature largely ignores what I describe as 'informal' referenda. Such referenda are uncontrolled votes staged by non-state or state actors, or their proxies, though more often by the former. Examples include the 1961 referendum by Southern Rhodesia's black opposition, on the same day as an all white referendum, and the 1950 Cyprus vote on *Enosis*, through the Church.\(^4\) In Swaziland, Paramount Chief Shoguza called an informal referendum in 1967, in order to demonstrate opposition to the Sandys constitution, which threatened to undermine the existing tribal structures.\(^5\) Walloon disaffection over the proposed 1967 Belgian constitution was similarly given expression through an informal referendum that year.\(^6\) More recently, Gibraltar's leaders have threatened to hold their own referendum to scupper Spanish-British rapprochement on the future status of the territory.\(^7\) The post-World War One debates on the future of the region's borders also spawned informal votes,\(^8\) and since 1989 Eastern Europe has witnessed several informal votes by groups seeking to challenge the legitimacy of the borders, constitutions and national character of re-founded states.

Gordon Smith (1976) was the first scholar to go beyond the narrow pre-occupation with the 'source of initiation' of the vote, and to highlight the broader outcome or impact of the referendum on a particular regime. Smith argued that 'if the real source [of the referendum] can be accurately located, there is a clear indication of the intended direction of effect.' He accordingly defined the referendum's outcome, or 'ultimate effect,' as a 'latent function' that 'has to be viewed as the sum of its consequences which on balance may be supportive or detrimental to a regime.' Smith described the impact of a vote on a particular regime as being, either 'pro-hegemonic' or 'anti-hegemonic.' Blending considerations of control, and an evaluation of the ultimate effects of a vote, Smith

\(^5\) *The Times*, 16, 23 January 1967.
\(^6\) *The Times*, 20 January 1967.
\(^8\) Such consultations took place in Vilnus (1922) in Lithuania, which voted to join Poland, and in the Vorarlberg (1919) whose citizens wished to break from Austria and join Switzerland, after the burden of the Versailles agreement became apparent. Informal cession votes were also held in Austria's Salzburg (1921) and Tyrol (1921), in favour of *Anschluss* with Germany, and served as an act of defiance against a ban on *Anschluss* by the victorious allies. Yugoslav representatives at the Paris peace talks claimed that informal plebiscites indicated strong opposition to the incorporation of parts of Trieste, Pula and large parts of the Istrian peninsula into Italy (Herschy, 1993: 52-53).
proposed that referenda are either, controlled/ pro-hegemonic, controlled/ anti-hegemonic, uncontrolled/ pro-hegemonic, and uncontrolled/ anti-hegemonic.

Pier Vincenzo Uleri’s (1996) subsequent typology similarly synthesises the criteria of control, ('who promotes the popular vote'), and the 'objective of the vote.' Uleri defines the objective of a referendum as being, to either counter or promote an initiative or policy, and referenda or initiatives are either 'decision promoting' or 'decision controlling.' In the decision controlling vote, the author of the question and promoter of the vote coincide, whilst in the case of decision controlling vote, the promoter of referendum is not the agent that asks the question.

Whereas the strength of Uleri’s typology lies in its emphasis on the intentions of key protagonists, Smith’s typology gives greater recognition to the immediate and longer-term impact of referenda, especially on the fortunes of a political party, or a regime. Smith’s typology does not, however, fully assess the impact of referenda on key ideas of statehood, citizenship, identity and borders, the very ideas that often lie at the heart of ethno-national contests. The Uleri typology similarly fails to incorporate the full extent to which disputes over ethno-national issues influence the calculus of politicians when considering certain referenda. In order to appreciate the impact of referenda on a society’s institutions (social and political), and their role in navigating ethno-national questions, Ian Lustick’s 'two-threshold' model of state expansion and contraction processes9 will be considered and adapted.

The referendum as a mechanism for state-contraction and expansion.

Recognising that borders are institutionalised features of states, Lustick’s framework views changes to these borders as 'institution transforming' episodes, and recognises that attempts to amend them can potentially trigger intense political struggles. And Lustick notes that the nature and level of resistance to processes of territorial disengagement provides a measure of the degree of institutionalisation or integration of that territory in the core state. For the purpose of this research a broader definition of borders is adopted, in order to include social, racial and ethnic boundaries. In South Africa these racial borders were institutionalised through Apartheid legislation, and the level of white resistance to a more inclusive identity similarly indicated the acceptance of Apartheid in the society. Lustick identifies two thresholds in the institutionalisation of borders, the 'regime' threshold and the 'ideological hegemony' threshold. In negotiating these two

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thresholds, elites contend with three phases of struggle, the intensity of which corresponds to the degree of institutionalisation.

Prior to crossing the first threshold, the 'regime threshold,' actors find themselves in the incumbency stage. In practical terms, the struggles of this phase are limited to political bargaining, coalition building and electoral campaigns. In the initial stages of a process of altering borders, electoral majorities and coalitions are sufficient to begin or reverse the process, and in South Africa, for example, the early 1950's were crucial years in which the NP sought to both entrench *Apartheid* and tighten the party’s grip on power.

But once passed the regime threshold, and into the regime stage, attempts to disengage from a territory tend to involve struggles over the integrity of the regime and the legitimacy of leaders to engage in such processes. The struggle, therefore, becomes one over the very right of the state to alter its borders (or definitions of citizenship), and the opponents of such changes may consider extra-legal means of opposition to reform processes. Once over the regime threshold, the conflict is therefore over institutions and does not take place within them. Incumbency struggles, on the other hand, take place within institutions. In the regime stage, efforts to redraw borders require an intense and demanding struggle, but are not imponderable. These struggles are referred to as 'wars of manoeuvre.'

Increasingly successful institutionalisation of territory or ideas of citizenship propels a society over the ideological threshold into the third and final phase of struggle, the 'ideological hegemony stage.' Here the struggle is over maintaining or undermining embedded beliefs. So effective is the institutionalisation of borders that the idea of territorial disengagement (or inclusion of an excluded ethnic group) is imponderable and no serious political contender can risk advising it. Changes in the status quo will require struggle over the very idea of the state. This represents the least reversible stage of institutionalisation, and the incorporation of a territory is very broadly accepted. The struggles in this stage are referred to as 'wars of position,' and their objective is to either nurture or erode ideological hegemony.

Accordingly, Lustick identifies three levels of political competition – incumbency, regime and ideological - in the institutionalisation of borders. The referendum clearly has a role in each of these stages of institutionalisation or de-institutionalisation of borders, and serves as an often-indispensable tool for navigating incumbency struggles, wars of manoeuvre and wars of position. Applying Lustick’s model, a typology for classifying controlled ethno-national referenda in suggested. The categories correspond with the level
of institutionalisation; i.e. incumbency referenda; wars of manoeuvre referenda; and wars of position referenda. Such referenda are, of course, either 'hegemonic' or 'anti-hegemonic.'

**Incumbency referenda:**

As already suggested, incumbency (or first order) ethno-national referenda are employed by contestants for incumbency, in order to aid them in electoral struggles where an ethno-national issue is salient. Incumbents can reduce the prospects of electoral defeat using the referendum as a 'lightening rod,' or they can use the referendum to strengthen their prospects for victory, assuaging public opinion. Incumbency ethno-national referenda thus serve as **heuristic** resources in incumbency struggles, fulfilling a primarily tactical role.

In addition, incumbency referenda (or pledges) ensure the stability of a coalition or party. Yitzhak Rabin’s pledge on a Golan referendum provides one example. The undertaking was— in part— designed to placate the Third Way formation within his party.10 The referendum also provides a common unifying factor for secessionist and autonomy movements, by furnishing them with a modicum of 'constructive ambiguity.'11 In Scotland, for example, a referendum pledge serves to provide common ground between the gradualist and fundamentalist wings of the SNP, reducing internal differences to timing considerations.12

In some cases, referenda on ethno-national issues may serve to bolster the popularity of a ruling party, as Georges Pompidou did on the issue of EU expansion in 1972. In 2000, the ruling Zimbabwean ZANU-PF regime’s attempt to introduce a populist constitution (confiscating white farms), in order to improve its electoral prospects13 backfired. The demand for a referendum over a sensitive issue, like the incorporation of Southern Rhodesia into the Union of South Africa, also allows opposition parties to portray the incumbent government as serving narrow and not national interests. One additional role that the referendum plays is in allowing a ruling party to pursue policies that constitute a major break with its stated policies. Adolph Hitler provided one example, when he agreed to hold a series of plebiscites on the transfer of the **volks Deutsch** from

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South Tyrol. This compromise, designed to placate his ally Benito Mussolini, contradicted the Nazi party's stated policy of regaining Germans lands lost at Versailles.\(^\text{14}\)

**Referenda in wars of manoeuvre:**

In attempting to redraw borders, governments, particularly democracies, are liable to face challenges to their legitimacy to pursue these processes. Yaakov Bar-Siman-Tov (1997) warns that the absence of formal legitimacy, which is produced by conforming to 'established constitutional and legal stipulations,' undermines the informal or public legitimacy of peace processes. Wars of manoeuvre referenda allow governments to out-maneuver their opponents in navigating the regime threshold. A successful war of manoeuvre referendum, therefore, undermines challengers to the legitimacy of a leader or government to lead a reform process and effectively moves the struggle over the regime threshold. Alternately, such referenda can institutionalise borders, taking them beyond incumbency struggles. The 1960 referendum in South Africa provides an example.

The referendum literature recognises the central role of the referendum in legitimating decision processes, especially where Parliament alone cannot secure that legitimacy.\(^\text{15}\) Moreover, numerous leading scholars highlight the important role of the referendum in settling territorial issues in particular,\(^\text{16}\) and David Butler and Austin Ranney claim that decisions taken by referendum are perceived as the most legitimate.\(^\text{17}\) In Scotland, the 1979 referendum defused the devolution issue by taking it out of the hands of extremists.\(^\text{18}\) And in the case of French disengagement from Algeria, two consecutive referenda helped to isolate extremists, by showing that they do not enjoy wide support.\(^\text{19}\) In such situations, a referendum serves to 'de-certify,'\(^\text{20}\) or marginalise, opponents to reforms.

Laurent Morel is, however, rather dismissive of claims that referenda serve to legitimate decisions, and notes that the 'legitimating function often has more to do with the...

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\(^{17}\) David Butler and Austin Ranney, 'Practice', p. 25.


\(^{19}\) Vernon Bogdanor, 'Western Europe', p. 45.

\(^{20}\) Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, _Dynamics of Contention_ (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 122-123, 204-205.
official explanation than with the real intentions of its initiators.' Morel adds that this legitimating function is 'often difficult to distinguish from a sort of 'divesture of responsibility' function,' as party's or leaders 'avoid being charged with the possible negative consequences.'

The demand for a referendum by the opposition, on the other hand, often serves as a tactic to question the ruling party's legitimacy to redraw the borders of a particular demos or polis. Informal referenda can also be used to undermine their legitimacy. In South Africa the councils of 9 towns controlled by the Conservative Party staged referenda designed to reject government reforms to integrate local town council in March 1991. The mere act of agreeing to a referendum can allow incumbents to outmanoeuvre their opponents, and 'take the wind out of their sails.' Referenda also provide an important ritual for negotiating transitions, enabling symbolic involvement of the public in a peace process. In some cases, referenda may also serve as 'symbolic distraction game,' allowing politicians to get on with things behind the scene.

In order for referenda pledges to be effective, it is vital that their use is not too frequent. Referenda like symbolic rewards (i.e. medals) are relatively cheap to produce, but scarcity begets value. It is also worth emphasising that existence of an underlying desire for agreement is a vital ingredient for making the referendum effective. Referenda do not produce support or opposition; they merely give expression to it. The referendum can play a vital role in reflecting support for reform in cases where a first-past-the-post-system distorts the real extent support for reform, as was the case in South Africa.

**Wars of position referenda:**

In wars of position, referenda are deployed in order to either embellish or undermine the hegemony of notions of state, borders and citizenship. In practice, wars of position referenda are votes that allow elites to deepen the institutionalisation of borders and pass the so-called 'psychological' threshold. French and Italian nation-state builders sought to harness the referendum in processes of state building and consolidation. Norway's 1905

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21 Laurence Morel, 'Party Attitudes Towards Referendums in Western Europe,' *West European Politics*, 16, 3, July 1993, pp. 239-240.
24 Ibid. p. 133.
referendum on separation from Sweden was also harnessed to facilitate a 'national festival.' Commenting on Cavour's use of the device, Denis Mack Smith notes.

But as a device carefully suited to a certain limited objectives there was much to be said for it. The moderates had known what they were about when adopting such a bold innovation. From that point of view it was essential that the people should give the semblance of popular approval to annexation; and they could feel quite sure that, with the national guard on duty, with a public ballot, with Garibaldi's personal directive, and presiding magistrates all of whom had taken an oath of loyalty to King Victor Emanuel two months before, there could be no doubt of the results. All that was needed was to combine discipline with excitement.

Though these votes (plebiscites) have been severely criticised by the likes of A.V. Dicey, it is worth bearing in mind that they represented a qualitative break with participation until then. Modern state building thus required and heralded wider political participation. The efficacy of the referendum in this regard, however, seems rather limited. The turnout in the Italian votes was very low (20% in Sicily) and Mack Smith warns against the assumption that the 'almost unanimous vote of the south signified a ready willingness to be absorbed into the northern kingdom.' For within days of the plebiscite in Sicily the mood swung against Victor Emmanuel.

Instead, the main role of these votes seems to be in convincing international public opinion that a territory's incorporation, or continued rule from the metropole, in cases of colonial domination, is 'legitimate' and enjoys the support of the local population. In 1958, Charles de Gaulle staged an empire wide referendum in order to legitimate France's colonial empire, which countered the spirit of Atlantic Charter of August 1941. Perhaps the most significant users direct democracy to legitimate its colonial interests is the US. It has persistently done so in an effort to de-couple between its domestic norms and its foreign policy. Commenting on a the 1952 Puerto Rico vote, The New York Times opined that the 'referendum was a cause for quiet satisfaction for all Americans,' as it was 'in the good tradition of United States colonialism.' The paper added that, 'We are depriving the communist and nationalist agitators of their charges of 'Yankee imperialism.' They will

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29 Denis Mack Smith, Cavour and Garibaldi, p. 396.
no longer be able to sustain their propaganda. This American tradition of 'organised hypocrisy' dates back to the US intervention in Haiti, and was continued by the Kennedy and Carter Administrations after World War Two, in Central America and the Asia-Pacific. Some view the 1973 'border poll' in Northern Ireland as a means to show the world that Britain was not suppressing the province's population by force. In post-War Cambodia, Son Ngoc Thangh manufactured an independence referendum in order to bolster his bargaining position against the French who were planning their return. National movements can, therefore, use such referenda to expose the hypocrisy of colonial powers and undermine colonial hegemony.

The demand for a referendum by secessionist and irredentist opponents can also serve to undermine the legitimacy and hegemony of the existing borders and notions of national identity. Talk of a Scottish or Basque independence referendum chips away at the edifice of British or Spanish notions of state-hood. And the two referenda on the status of Quebec have dramatically reshaped the debate on Canadian identity. More recently, numerous informal referenda (designed to challenge existing borders and notions of identity) were held in the former Yugoslavia, the Trans-Dniester conflict, and many other East European countries. Belgium has produced two such votes, the first was in 1962, when the people of Fourons (Belgium) staged an informal referendum to demonstrate their opposition to the town's transfer from Walloon Liege to Flemish Limbourg. The transfer was produced by a new linguistic frontier. Walloons also arranged a 1967 vote against a proposed constitution. In Italy, Umberto Bossi’s Northern...
League staged its own vote on creating the Federal Republic Padania. Elsewhere such votes have been staged on the island of Anjouan, in favour of separation from the Comoros in 1997, Rhodesia (1961), Swaziland (1967) and Nagaland (1951), Assam, India and Mexico by the Chiapas movement (1995, 1999).

Towards a typology—of sorts:
In this brief excursus I have sought to give greater attention to the role of the controlled referendum in ethno-national struggles over political and social borders. According to the typology, three types of ethno-national referenda are identified. The first are incumbency referenda, and such votes essentially include situations in which the referendum serves as a form of heresthetics. In the event that the referendum, or the use of a pledge succeeds, it is considered pro-hegemonic. The second type of referendum is a war of manoeuvre referendum, and provides the title for this dissertation. A war of manoeuvre referendum abets incumbents in their efforts to de-certify or de-legitimise those who threaten to challenge their legitimacy to re-draw borders. A referendum that neutralises groupings that are prepared to challenge the government’s legitimacy is considered pro-hegemonic. Finally, wars of position referenda are votes that are designed to embellish or erode the hegemony of an idea of demos or polis. These votes are more often informal votes and are designed to undermine efforts to impose a particular hegemony.

39 The so-called republic consists of a region stretching from the Po River to Italy’s northern border and includes the cities of Turin, Milan, Bologna, and Venice.
Chapter Three.
Understanding Klerk's transition:

He [F.W. de Klerk] was well aware of what he was about to do to our country's politics on February 2, 1990. He was confident that it was the right thing to do, and that the exigencies of our situation demanded that leap of faith.¹

Why a referendum?
This chapter seeks to understand why F.W. de Klerk employed a referendum and its role in the transition. To date, scant critical attention has been paid to the all White referendum of 17 March 1992,² and perusal of the literature that documents the transition and media coverage from that period provides at least five explanations for F.W. De Klerk's use of the referendum. These accounts, which will be shortly explored, fail to provide a satisfactory explanation for the use of the referendum. I also consider the nature of the right wing threat that de Klerk faced in the transition process, exploring the link between the political right, the security forces and extra-parliamentary groupings.

F.W. De Klerk, who argues that his decision was driven by his commitment to democracy, provides the first explanation for the use of the referendum. A second and widely noted reason, also listed by de Klerk, is the argument that the President deployed the referendum in order to undermine his right wing detractors.³ This after the CP made significant inroads in numerous by-elections, and undermined de Klerk's mandate for negotiations. A third reason, and linked to the former, specifically highlights the threat posed by right wing elements in the security forces. Dan O'Meara (1994) provides a fourth and less sanguine account, claiming that the referendum formed part of an NP strategy to manage the transition and impose its 'bottom line' on the ANC in the negotiations. Commenting at the time of the referendum, Professor Sampie Terreblanche suggests a further reason for the referendum, namely a desire to 're-build' de Klerk's bruised image after the opening ceremony of the deliberations of the Convention for a Democratic South

Africa (CODESA), where Mandela described de Klerk as a discredited and illegitimate leader.

It is argued that the NP and de Klerk's motivations included many of the above considerations, which are not mutually exclusive, though the De Klerk and O'Meara accounts will be partially or entirely dismissed. Their sequence and salience, was rather determined by developments during the first 28 months of the transition. De Klerk's thinking on the referendum was tailored to his negotiating tactics. Anticipating right wing resistance to his transition, de Klerk employed the referendum pledge in order to reassure White voters that he was leading them on a fail-safe process. The promise of a referendum assured Whites that they would have a final say over the outcome of negotiations and also served to undermine the CP's attempts to charge that de Klerk was negotiating without a mandate. More importantly, a referendum obviated the need for another general election, which the NP would not have been able to win with a clear majority. It is also argued that de Klerk's thinking on the referendum was aligned with his desire to lead a swift negotiation process in which he would seize the initiative and hold the 'high ground' in his dealings with the ANC. De Klerk's ability to maintain the 'high ground' was increasingly threatened by the growth of the CP, reflected in by-election gains that the party made. These CP gains, coupled with the humiliation that de Klerk suffered at the hands of Nelson Mandela, on the occasion of the opening of the CODESA talks, led de Klerk to view a referendum as a means to regain the initiative and strengthen his hand in these talks.

President de Klerk was always assured of victory in a referendum, especially one on the principle of negotiations, and not the details of a deal. NP defeat in the Potchefstroom by-election, provided the perfect opportunity for de Klerk to out-manoeuvre his White detractors, and regaining the initiative in the wider transition process. Beguiled by the referendum result, which exceeded NP expectations, de Klerk sought to exploit his mandate in order to impose his will on the ANC. Though this corresponds with O'Meara's account, this thinking was rather a product of the NP's impressive victory.

De Klerk's initial pre-occupation with the referendum was primarily driven by his fears of the CP and the threat they might pose to his transition. In this regard he was clearly influenced by Botha's experience with the 1983 referendum, which he viewed as a template to guide his reform actions. One essential difference between the two votes is

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that the referendum was an integral part of de Klerk's transition script and that he pre-
empted pressure for a vote. Prior to assessing de Klerk's negotiation tactics, which is
critical to understanding the later deployment of the referendum, some of the
aforementioned accounts for the referendum's use will be explored.

**De Klerk the democrat?**

In his autobiography F.W. de Klerk suggests that, 'as a democrat,' he 'always believed that
a government should have a valid mandate from the voters for the implementation of
important policies.'\(^5\) De Klerk also emphasised his 'democrat' account for his decision to
stage the referendum in interviews granted to *The Sunday Times*\(^6\) and *702 Radio*,\(^7\) prior to
the 1992 referendum.

Despite these 'democratic' protestations, it, however, seems highly unlikely that de
Klerk would have pursued a democratic whim had he not been assured of victory.\(^8\) As in
the case of Botha, a referendum provided a more certain outcome than a general election,
and de Klerk was well aware that opinion polls indicated broad support for his reforms. In
1991 Willem de Klerk, who was privy to his brother's thinking, confidently predicted
victory in a White referendum.\(^9\) De Klerk on several occasions signalled his conviction
that he would win a referendum.\(^10\) Both Botha and de Klerk harnessed direct democracy
to circumvent the distortion of public opinion that resulted from the Westminster electoral
system, especially in by-elections. The system had historically favoured the NP, especially
due to the weighting that rural seats enjoyed. But once the party lost its grip on its rural
power base, the system was less conducive to Nationalist hegemony. And in exceptional
circumstances a referendum allowed the NP to reduce the political risks of reform by
stepping out of the system. This was especially the case after the formation of the CP in
1983. De Klerk's failure to honour his oft-made pledge to stage a second White
referendum, prior to the introduction of the new constitution, and his refusal to agree to a
referendum for Whites on the question of a *volkstaat* in the 1994 elections - despite the

\(^{9}\) Willem De Klerk, F.W. de Klerk, p. 88.
\(^{10}\) In November 1991, he informed Irish Foreign Minister Desmond Malley and his French counterpart,
Laurent Fabius, that he was confident of a victory. *Die Beeld*, 26 November 1990; *Die Burger*, 16 February
ANC's apparent willingness to countenance such a referendum also undermines his democrat thesis. Moreover, had he been able to do so, de Klerk would have averted a non-racial democracy in South Africa, and he actively sought to ensure that 'the power of 'No' would remain in the hands of the old oligarchy.' The NP remained a racist party and believed that 'not all votes had the same value,' and actively sought to blunt the full impact of majority rule by promoting a consociational arrangement. De Klerk did not lead the transition out of a conviction that democratising the country was the right thing to do. He did so, as he had no choice. And once forced to reform, the reluctant reformer sought to maintain control and power.

De Klerk was neither a 'gambler' nor a 'democrat.' He was a crafty tactician who witnessed, at first hand, the efficacy of a referendum tactic, as the Transvaal leader of the NP in 1983. Based on his past experience with the CP and his understanding of the referendum mechanism, it was an appropriate solution for a seemingly familiar problem. The referendum was, ultimately, a tried and tested NP tactical ploy, which de Klerk dressed up in democratic garb. As Patti Waldmeier perspicaciously notes, in F.W. de Klerk's mind, 'conscience only follows where pragmatism leads.'

**The great NP game plan:**

Based on an interview with NP backbencher Boy Geldenhuys, Dan O'Meara claims that the referendum was part of a broader NP strategy designed to strengthen its hand in its negotiations with the ANC and secure its 'bottom-line' position. This 'bottom line' position was the NP's insistence that any amendment of the interim constitution would require 75 percent support in the legislature. In effect, entrenching a White veto. O'Meara, quite correctly, notes that the NP envisioned a dispensation that was an extension of the tri-cameral consociationalist system in which own affairs were to be managed separately.

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11 The idea emerged from talks between Thabo Mbeki and Constand Viljoen over a Volkstaat, designed to coax the right into the 1994 elections. There may simply not have been enough time to facilitate such a referendum, due to the proximity of the 1994 elections. And de Klerk opposed a suggestion that the vote for the Volkswaart serve as an indication of Afrikaner support for a Volkstaat, fearing that this would 'swing significant numbers of Afrikaners away from' the NP (Sparks, 1996, 205).

12 Interview with Constand Viljoen (23 November 2001).

13 Alistair Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, p. 127.

14 *Die Burger*, Leader, 20 April 1990.


16 Chapter eight of Alistair Sparks's (1996, 91-108) book analyses the factors behind de Klerk's decision to engage in the transition.

17 In his Radio 702 interview, de Klerk stated, 'I am not a gambler. I am a democrat.' *The Star*, 13 March 1992.

O'Meara also charges that the NP 'took a fall' in the Potchefstroom by-election in order to engineer a pretext for the referendum.\textsuperscript{19} A claim supported at the time.\textsuperscript{20}

O'Meara's account is, nonetheless, dismissed for several reasons. Firstly, Boy Geldenhuys denies the comments attributed to him.\textsuperscript{21} Similarly, de Klerk and senior negotiators Roelf Meyer and Leon Wessels dismiss the suggestion that the referendum formed part of some pre-meditated strategy to secure the bottom line.\textsuperscript{22} Whilst leading commentators and de Klerk's chief negotiators recognise his tactical acumen, they criticise his weakness as a strategist.\textsuperscript{23} Roelf Meyer encapsulates this consensus in describing de Klerk as a 'contingency leader, a pragmatist, someone who made use of opportunities when they presented themselves.\textsuperscript{24} The referendum result then presented an opportunity for de Klerk to exploit in order to insist on his 'bottom line.' But this only happened once the scale of the result became evident. Finally, CP and NP politicians, as well as leading journalists, roundly refute the claim that de Klerk 'took a dive' in the Potchefstroom by-election.\textsuperscript{25} And as will be demonstrated, the party leadership had planned to stage a referendum in August 1992, once an interim deal had been secured, at the time of the February 1992 by-election.\textsuperscript{26} The link between this by-election, which explains the timing of the vote, and the referendum will be explored in greater detail. But first, we turn to the political realities, which forced de Klerk to end White hegemony, his negotiation tactics and some of the key assumptions that guided his thinking.

\textbf{De Klerk's end game:}

P.W. Botha's sham reforms failed to placate the National Party regime's domestic and international critics, and Fredrik van Zyl Slabbert suggests an amalgam of 'intended and unintended' developments – both internal and external – made the perpetuation of

\textsuperscript{21} Interview with Boy Geldenhuys (25 October 2001).
\textsuperscript{22} Interviews with F.W. de Klerk (21 November 2001), Leon Wessels (26 November 2001), and Roelf Meyer (28 November 2001).
\textsuperscript{25} Interviews with Leon Wessels (26 November, 2001), Ebbe Domnisse (23 October 2001) and Corne and Pieter Mulder (23 October 2001).
Apartheid impossible.\textsuperscript{27} The planned internal factors included rental boycotts and the activities of opposition groups like the United Democratic Front (UDF), which made many South African townships ungovernable. The former head of the National Intelligence Agency, Neil Barnard, suggests that internal factors are what, ultimately, drove Pretoria to settle with the ANC.\textsuperscript{28} His claim corroborates the transition literature, which suggests that international factors play a secondary role in prompting transitions to democracy.\textsuperscript{29}

Some of the unanticipated internal developments listed by Slabbert include demographic trends, along with a worsening economic situation. The former Minister of Finance notes that the country was on the verge of bankruptcy,\textsuperscript{30} as the cumulative costs of the war in Namibia, internal repression and the homelands project depleted the country's treasury. Moreover, the rapidly worsening demographics or the 'arithmetic of Apartheid' were compelling and had been a major trigger for reformist thinking.\textsuperscript{31}

On the external front, the planned factors include the impact of sanctions and the Namibian settlement, whilst the unexpected developments include the collapse of the gold price, along with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, South Africa's allies had made it clear to de Klerk that a deal without the ANC would be unacceptable to the international community.\textsuperscript{32} Until the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the US had relegated the 'promotion of democracy to a lower priority' amongst its foreign policy objectives.\textsuperscript{33} That all changed with Perestroika, and the international community delegated the role of coaxing de Klerk into a reform process to Britain's Margaret Thatcher.\textsuperscript{34} According to Sampie Terreblanche, Nelson Mandela's release will only be understood once the exchange of letters between de Klerk and Thatcher in late 1989 becomes public knowledge.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{27} Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert, 'The Basis and Challenges of Transition in South Africa', in Robin Lee and Lawrence Schlemmer (eds), \textit{Transition to Democracy: Policy Perspectives} (Cape Town, 1991), p.4.
\textsuperscript{30} Interview with Barend du Plessis (29 November 2001).
\textsuperscript{31} Alistair Sparks, \textit{Tomorrow is Another Country}, p. 92; Willem de Klerk, \textit{F.W. de Klerk}, p. 59.
\textsuperscript{32} Patti Waldmeier, \textit{Anatomy of a Miracle}, p. 135.
\textsuperscript{34} The Cape Times, 2 October 1989; Alistair Sparks, \textit{Tomorrow is Another Country}, p. 99.
'Pretoriastroika':

One key, unanticipated, external development, which the transition literature describes as *fortuna*, was the dramatic collapse of the Soviet Union, emphasised by the physical destruction of the Berlin Wall. This development had multiple ramifications on White South Africa. On the one hand, it changed the interests of the superpowers, who had either shielded Pretoria or sponsored its arch-nemesis, the African National Congress (ANC). In August 1989 the Bush Administration made it explicitly clear to de Klerk that he had less time than was previously taken for granted in order to 'act with determination' against *Apartheid* and cautioned that dithering would trigger a drive for new sanctions in the Congress. Margaret Thatcher, considered a friend of South Africa, similarly informed a delegation of Black journalists visiting London that the National Party did not have 5 years 'to get negotiations with Black leaders going.' Commenting after the September 1989 general elections, Max du Preez suggested that the new President in fact only had six months within which to 'take certain fundamental steps that would place South Africa on the road to peace and a negotiated settlement.' Subsequent developments seem to have vindicated his reading at the time.

On the other hand, the fall of the Wall also removed Pretoria's primary reason for refusing to negotiate with the ANC, and 'freed' de Klerk's hands. The widely supported total onslaught paradigm that P.W. Botha and his securocrats had peddled, which portrayed majority rule as a precursor to communist rule, crumbled along with the Berlin Wall. Samuel Huntington has already noted that modern authoritarian rules have been justified by 'nationalism and ideology,' and points out that the efficacy of the former depends 'on the existence of a credible enemy to the national aspirations of a people.' *Perestroika* clearly undermined an important ideological construct for the regime's repression. *Die Burger*, for example, suggested that this 'great political earthquake of the twentieth century' had doomed socialism in Africa.

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38 *The Cape Times*, 5 October 1989.  
Some commentators even suggested that Mikhail Gorbachov's reforms provided inspiration for de Klerk, and comparisons between the two leaders and their efforts at leading managed transitions were made, and de Klerk's reforms were waggishly dubbed as 'Pretoriaastrika.' More importantly events in Europe deeply affected the NP's assessment of dealing with the ANC, convincing it that it was opportune to settle with the movement. F.W. de Klerk made explicit reference to this factor in his landmark speech of 2 February 1990, proclaiming the un-banning of the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP), as well as Nelson Mandela's release from prison. *Die Burger*’s editor, Ebbe Dommisse, penning the *Deur Dawie* column, reflected this new assessment and suggested that Soviet support for the ANC would now 'count against it.' In Willem de Klerk’s biography, his brother succinctly captures the strategic opportunity that the collapse of Communism provided for the NP.

At the same time, the decline and collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and Russia put a new complexion on things. The ANC was formerly an instrument of Russian expansionism in South Africa; when that threat fell away, the carpet was pulled from under the ANC; its base of financing, counselling and support had crumbled. It was as if God had taken a hand - a new turn on World history. We had to seize the opportunity.

F.W. de Klerk, under immense pressure to end Apartheid, therefore, identified the news from Eastern Europe as both a portent and opportunity to seek a deal, that favoured Whites, with an ANC which he reasoned was weakened by these developments. Anxious to 'ride the wave of history,' de Klerk, therefore, sought to pursue a swift and controlled reform process, which would unsettle and further weaken the ANC. Assuming that the ANC was in disarray, and that he could control the transition process, de Klerk thus viewed his arch nemesis the CP as the key threat to his swift negotiations process.

**De Klerk's blitzkrieg:**

Visiting South Africa as a guest of the government in 1981, Harvard academic Samuel Huntington offered South African academics, many of whom were influential in

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46 Willem De Klerk. *F.W. de Klerk*, p. 27.
48 Willie Esterhuysse describes the 2 February 1990 and what followed as a 'blitzkrieg.' Interview (30 October 2001).
government and *Broederbond* circles, an appealing recipe for transforming South Africa into a consociational democracy. Delivering the keynote address at the conference of the Political Science Association of South Africa, on 17 September 1981, Huntington proposed that the government pursue a 'combination of a Fabian Strategy and blitzkrieg tactics' in order to secure this outcome. These proposals were repeated in his seminal 1991 study of the Third Wave of democratisation. The essence of Huntington's advice was to 'decompose' or dis-aggregate the reforms, and implement the process through a series of bold moves or blitzes.

The extent to which Huntington influenced Botha's thinking is the subject of some debate and a sympathetic Botha biography, claims that Botha insists that he never met with, or was influenced by, Huntington. Brian Pottinger, on the other hand, suggests that Huntington had a dramatic impact on Botha. A key government official, who worked on constitutional reform in Botha's office, Fanie Cloete, confirms Pottinger's analysis, as does Huntington. Visiting the country in 1991, he expressed his satisfaction that his recipe had worked, as he did in The Third Wave.

The Botha reforms, however, ground to a halt under the spectre of the growing CP threat, and the ANC had successfully managed to discredit each of his reforms abroad. The net result was erosion of NP support from both the left and right. And for reasons already described above, de Klerk had little room for Botha style reform by stealth. Moreover, the international community expected deeds and not words, and a loyal journalist, writing after the 1989 election, hinted that delays and foot dragging would be 'political suicide.' Max du Preez noted that whilst Botha spent the latter part of his term trying to 'stop the snowball of reform which he had set in motion,' de Klerk understood that that snowball could not be stopped. Instead, he sought to direct it. The use of blitz reforms was designed to enable de Klerk to do so, and in December 1989 *Die Afrikaner* lamented that whereas his predecessors moved cautiously in dismantling *Apartheid*, de

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50 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave*, pp. 141-142.
Klerk does so in 'leaps.' Addressing the corporate sector in late 1991, De Klerk himself indicated his desire for a swiftly negotiated process in order to end the uncertainty.

The referendum, like Mandela's release and earlier reforms, were all leaps designed to ensure de Klerk's control over a process, and intended to convince the ANC to accept what de Klerk describes as the 'best minimal package.' De Klerk thus sought to secure what the transition literature describes as a transformation or 'limited democracy,' and not the subsequent 'transplacement,' and eventual regime change. De Klerk, as his chief negotiator explains, wanted to outwit the enemy in the transition process and speed was essential.

The reasoning was that if the NP made a number of far reaching reforms and did so quickly, this would 'un-balance' their 'enemies' at home and abroad. In this way the NP, by gaining the goodwill that these reforms would produce, could manoeuvre themselves in a position where it was even possible that they could end up as the winning party in any democratic election, certainly if a system of power sharing, first mentioned by Botha was introduced.

In essence, de Klerk hoped for swift negotiations, followed by a long interim period with substantial guarantees for minority (White) rights. Former officials, who were well acquainted with P.W. Botha's negotiations, also believe that de Klerk was rushed. The ANC, on the other hand, was well aware of de Klerk's stratagem, and engaged in delay tactics, initially through consultation with the outside leadership and later through 'calculated sulks.' De Klerk concedes that the negotiations, after his February 1990 speech, took longer than he had anticipated.

Roelf Meyer's frank assessment, set against the Huntington recipe, provides a vital insight into de Klerk's mindset and some of his assumptions going into the transition. Understanding these suppositions is essential in order to understand de Klerk's referendum thinking. Five core suppositions will be discussed in the ensuing pages. The first is that the

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58 Die Afrikaner. 20 December 1989.
60 Interview with F.W. de Klerk (12 December 2001).
64 Interviews with Bill Sass (23 November 2001), Constand Viljoen (23 November 2001), Willie Breytenbach (4 December 2002) and Fanie Cloete (4 December 2002).
65 Interviews with Willie Breytenbach (4 December 2002), and Fanie Cloete (4 December 2002).
NP could control or manage the process and ensure an outcome that favoured Whites. The ruling party strongly believed that speed or blitz was a vital means to control the process, as it would enable the NP set the agenda and catch the ANC off-guard. The second key ingredient of de Klerk’s stratagem was the centrality of maintaining the moral high ground, in order to neutralise the advantage the ANC enjoyed in the international community. Thirdly, the NP assumed that they were dealing with a weak and divided ANC, and that this weakness could allow the NP to steamroll the ANC into a deal that favoured it. A derivative assumption was that the NP would out-negotiate the ANC, and that early concessions and swift negotiations, followed by a long interregnum, could further divide and weaken the party. Fourthly, the NP surmised that it could do very well (possibly even win) in an election that was held as soon as possible. Finally, the NP assumed that it would have to complete this process within five years before the next Whites only scheduled election. A referendum was one way of bypassing this impediment.

Control through speed:

One key assumption made by de Klerk was that he could control or ‘manage’ the transition process, and evidence of his confidence in his ability to do so is provided by comments made shortly after Mandela’s release. In an address given to Cape Town Press Club at the end of March, de Klerk emphasised that the ‘initiative is in our hands. We have the means to ensure that the process develops peacefully and in an orderly way.’ De Klerk also displayed such confidence in mid-April, whilst addressing parliament, noting, ‘We are not acting under pressure from a position of weakness. The initiative is in our hands and we have at our disposal the means to ensure that the process of negotiation and change proceeds peacefully.’

De Klerk assumed that he could cease and maintain the initiative through a series of ‘quantum leaps,’ or blitz moves, which would pressurise the ANC and Mandela to make concessions. In an early April 1990 leader, entitled ‘The moral head start,’ Die Burger opined that government’s February initiative had ‘wrong footed the ANC.’ The leader added that bold measures provide de Klerk and his negotiators ‘a moral advantage in politics that has not been seen for years. This moral advantage, which is enlarged by the

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69 President F.W. De Klerk, Hansard, 17 April 1990, Column 6522.
ANC's behaviour, will become increasingly important. Later, the paper again argued that de Klerk had caught the ANC 'off side' with its reforms. Reading de Klerk's autobiography, one is struck by his pre-occupation with taking the initiative, and the premium he places on surprise as a means to control the process.

Thus, bold gestures, like dismantling petty Apartheid laws, releasing political prisoners, unbanning the ANC, were seen as granting the NP the 'high ground.' Ken Owen notes that de Klerk 'saw what was coming' and simply rolled all of the inescapable reforms into one package, which was his 1990 speech, in order to 'get ahead of the coming wave.' Again, de Klerk's autobiography is instructive. He notes that his speech was a package, designed to overwhelm the expectations of both the greatest optimists and the government's critics, in order to convince friends and detractors that the NP had made a paradigm shift and change people's perceptions of the NP.

De Klerk's behaviour, in this regard, conforms to the pattern of initial liberalisation by authoritarian regimes, whereby 'innovations initially introduced by the regime rarely go beyond highly controlled (and often indirect) consultations and the restitution of some individual rights (not extensive to social groups or opposition parties). Interestingly, this literature recognises that 'there are certain advantages' if the softliners, leading the transition feel that they 'are taking the initiative in most of the first moves during the transition.'

Steamrolling a weak and divided ANC:
De Klerk and his advisers were aware that the ANC, operating for so long in exile and as a banned underground organisation, was organisationally weak and potentially fraught with divisions. In the words of one analyst, the government could 'afford to be friendly with a weak enemy, especially if you are praised for this and sanctions and boycotts are tumbling down.' The ANC's precarious position, and the rapid demise of its patron, the Soviet Union, were viewed as key advantages in the negotiations. Moreover, de Klerk and his team believed they could out-negotiate the ANC. This assumption was not only a function of events in Eastern Europe, but also produced by an amalgam of arrogance, racism and a

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70 Die Burger, Leader, 2 April 1990.
72 F.W. de Klerk, Die Laaste Trek, pp. 178-183, 193.
73 Interview (10 December 2002).
74 F.W. de Klerk, Die Laaste Trek, pp. 180, 183, 200.
76 Ibid. p. 67.
miscalculation that the NP and the White bureaucracy was indispensable to the ANC. A further reason for the blitz was the desire to force Mandela into negotiations as soon as possible, without significant substantive concessions, in order to divide between the inside and outside leadership, and the militants and moderates. The idea that a swift reform process would 'split the ANC and possibly later even cause the ANC to reposition itself more broadly into the likely settlement [deal] area' had been introduced to F.W. de Klerk as early as June 1986 by businessman Nick Frangos, and was quite pervasive in NP circles. Addressing the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in April 1990, Gerrit Viljoen suggested that the February 1990 initiative had placed Mandela under pressure from the younger generation, which opposed his pursuit of peaceful negotiations.

Besides, de Klerk presupposed that the transition would realign political identities and loyalties along new fault-lines. Influenced by an old D.F. Malan maxim that those who 'belong together by inner conviction should come together,' the NP believed in an ideological re-alignment based on common political philosophies in a post Apartheid South Africa. Accordingly, de Klerk assumed that a swift transition (negotiations and elections), followed by a long interregnum, would undermine the traditional alliance between the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the ANC, by creating tensions between socialists and capitalists. Frederick van Zyl Slabbert notes that a senior NP representative, close to de Klerk, once confided in him that the party's game plan was to 'drag the ANC into negotiations politics, take a ten year rest [after a unity government was forged] and govern away the ANC's support.' Speaking in June 1990, Gerrit Viljoen presumed splits between outsiders and insiders, young and old, communists and capitalists explained the ANC's delay tactics. It is also important to note that speed was viewed as an advantage in the party's dealings with the conservative right, which had profited from Botha's incremental approach to reforms.

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78 Hermann Giliomee, 'Surrender Without Defeat', p. 143.
79 Nicholas J. Frangos, 'A Framework for Political, Economic and Social Reform in South Africa' (March 1986), pp. 73, 80-82. The paper was submitted to NP leaders, including F.W. de Klerk, who according to Frangos, (interview, 27 November 2001) was the most responsive of the recipients.
80 Die Burger, 18 April 1990.
82 F.W. de Klerk, Die Laaste Trek, p. 247;
83 Patti Waldmeier, Anatomy of a Miracle, p. 103.
86 Alistair Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, p. 101.
The NP's electoral optimism:
Willie Breytenbach suggests that democratisation processes in Africa may have provided additional encouragement for a *blitzkrieg* approach. He submits that South African officials – especially in the intelligence services – would have followed the successful Ivory Coast transition process with great interest. The country's leader Felix Houphouet-Boigny, who had long collaborated with Pretoria, led a successful *blitz* transition in which he called snap elections after having unbanned his opposition. A senior security official confirms Breytenbach's analysis, which confirms the existence of a contagion effect as predicted by the transition literature. Besides, the advantages of snap elections for incumbents were quite possibly drawn to Pretoria's attention by Huntington's academic work.

Several key NP ministers were initially bullish with regard to the first democratic elections, and some believed that the party could even win these elections by building a coalition with other moderate and ethnic parties. Explaining these optimistic assessments by the likes of Pik Botha, Anne-Marie Mischke proffered that the 'psychology of a party that has been in the saddle for more than 40 years and unable to imagine itself not winning again,' needs to be considered. The transition literature, similarly, recognises that authoritarian regimes tend to exaggerate assessments of their electoral prospects as they 'have few feedback mechanisms,' or simply believe their own propaganda. Initial optimism regarding the prospect of winning elections, or at least doing well, is said to have encouraged Spain's post-Franco leaders to persist with the transition. Optimism in the NP was bolstered by polls in early 1991, which showed that 80 percent of urban Blacks were satisfied with de Klerk's rule. These polls, in fact, prompted leading political analysts, by no means sympathetic to the NP, to also predict that it could put up a

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87 In 1990 and 1991 countries like the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Cape Verde, Sao Tome, Benin and Zambia, democratic elections followed swift and brief transitions (some only three months long) in which the opposition was un-banned. The speed of these processes caught the opposition off guard and favoured the ruling elites.
88 Interview with Willie Breytenbach, (4 December 2002).
89 Interview with Neil Barnard (5 December 2002).
good fight against the ANC.\textsuperscript{97} According to Neil Barnard, even de Klerk was susceptible to such electoral optimism\textsuperscript{98} An NP propaganda brochure, published in late 1990, quotes de Klerk as saying that 'our goal is a winning coalition. I believe that it is absolutely attainable.'\textsuperscript{99} Speaking on a television talk show, \textit{Agenda}, in early 1991 de Klerk confidently noted that he was working to ensure that the NP was part of a future government by forming alliances with other parties.\textsuperscript{100} And in a leader in September 1991, \textit{Die Burger}, supported confident assertions made by President de Klerk that the NP 'was a party of the future.'\textsuperscript{101}

\textbf{The Namibian Transition:}

A major reason for this NP optimism regarding a competitive election was the Namibian election result in late 1989. Pretoria was heartened by the fact that SWAPO, under the leadership of Sam Nujoma, had only secured 57 percent of the vote, and reasoned that the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) alliance had done phenomenally well – despite the fact that the Owambo group (seen as SWAPO supporters) were so demographically significant. Thus Pretoria, susceptible to its own ethnic conceptions of politics, reasoned that an alliance similar to the DTA, including Coloureds, Indians, Zulus and other ethnic homeland leaders could do well against the ANC, which it perceived as a Xhosa movement.\textsuperscript{102} Even the likes of Willie Esterhuyse suggested that the NP's initiative would deny the ANC the benefits of the image of a 'liberation movement,' as had been the case with SWAPO in Namibia.\textsuperscript{103}

In F.W. de Klerk's ideal world, Black moderates, so-called Coloureds and Indians and Whites would join the NP on the basis of its liberal economic platform in order to defend conservative values. The NP, as Douglas Pierce notes, simply ignored the distinct possibility that 'voters will choose not on the basis of who represents their immediate interests, but who expresses their symbolic aspirations.'\textsuperscript{104} Based on experience elsewhere in Africa, the government further fancied that its well-oiled electoral machine would outperform that of the recently un-banned ANC. By 1992 the majority of the party's

\textsuperscript{97} Thandeka Gqubule, \textit{Die Vrve Weekblad}, 13 July 1990.
\textsuperscript{98} Interview (5 December 2002).
\textsuperscript{100} \textit{Die Burger}, 16 February 1991.
\textsuperscript{101} \textit{Die Burger}, Leader, 5 September 1991.
\textsuperscript{102} Max du Preez, \textit{Die Vrve Weekblad}, 9 February 1990.
\textsuperscript{103} Rapport, 22 April 1990.
leading strategists had in any event come to recognise that they could not win an election and the party began to increasingly view power sharing as its preferred option.  

International sympathy as a transition resource:

Dave Stewart, who served as the director of de Klerk's bureau, explains the importance of the blitz gestures in securing the moral 'high ground' in the transition, arguing 'there would be no sympathy for the NP if it did not show good faith.' Speaking in parliament on 19 April 1990, de Klerk noted that whilst he was not engaging in reforms in order to placate the international community, he argued that his government 'must ensure that our country gets credit for the change and reforms we have initiated.' In other words, de Klerk and his coterie believed that support from the international community, which would be generated by dramatic compromises and gestures, would strengthen his hand in the negotiations. Stellenbosch academic, Jannie Gagiano, suggests that Britain in fact gave the de Klerk government assurances that it would seek to moderate the ANC.

At the very least, de Klerk hoped that taking the moral 'high ground' would undermine the clear advantage that the ANC enjoyed in the international community and change perceptions of the NP. Steven Friedman, who notes that moral legitimacy is 'an importance strategic resource - weapon of war' in ethno-national conflicts, submits that NP strategists viewed the maintenance of the moral high ground as essential in 'neutralising the liberation movement's most important asset.' The transition literature recognises that the declining legitimacy of authoritarian regimes, often due to failure to perform economically, for example, triggers transition processes.

Hence, many of the early gestures and reforms of the blitz were viewed as vital to convincing the international community of de Klerk's sincerity, and garnering its sympathy for the NP.

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106 Interview with Dave Stewart (12 December 2001).
107 Die Burger, 20 April.
109 Interview (19 October 2001).
111 Steven Friedman, The Shapers of Things to Come, p. 18.
Moreover, Alistair Sparks suggests that according to Herman Cohen, a former US Assistant Secretary of State, Pretoria, though publicly defiant of international pressure, yearned for the 'understanding and approval of outsiders.'

Given earlier disappointment Botha and his proverbial failure to 'cross the Rubicon,' winning such goodwill for the NP was essential. As will be discussed shortly, some even view the referendum as part of this effort to convince the international community of the NP's commitment to reform.

The credulity of the assumption that the NP could neutralise the ANC's advantage abroad was shown in the way which America, to the NP's annoyance, feted Nelson Mandela on his first visit to the country. One key early concession that de Klerk hoped for was the lifting of sanctions in the early stages of the transition. And much to the NP's chagrin, the international community deferred to the ANC on sanctions.

Avoiding another general election:

Yet a further parameter that shaped de Klerk's thinking in regard to need for speed was his assumed political timetable. On the basis of the 1987 election and the results of the 1989 general election, de Klerk could no longer take for granted an NP victory in another general election. Despite the fact that the 1987 election saw the NP enjoy massive English support, which approximated the English 'yes' vote in the 1983 referendum, the CP assumed the mantle of the official opposition, defeated a Minister and two deputy Ministers, and notched up 'widespread support of ominous proportions.' One analyst warned that the 1987 result suggested that a mere 24 percent defection amongst Afrikaner voters would allow the CP to assume power. By June 1990 the CP's by-election gains seemed to hint at such a defection.

This spectre, despite the fact that there was an overall increase of support for a reformist agenda, was an outcome of the particular institutional context within which de Klerk operated. In South Africa, the Westminster or first-past-the-post electoral system,

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114 Alistair Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, p. 98.
115 Foreign Minister Pik Botha trumped the speech (of 15 August 1985) up as a dramatic speech in which P.W. Botha would, amongst other things, declare his intention to roll back the homelands policy and extend citizenship to South Africa's Blacks as well agree to Black representation in cabinet. The speech, which was designed to stave off pressure for sanctions, disappointed an anxious international community. In response to the speech the currency rapidly depreciated.
117 The NP ran a conservative campaign that successfully presented the liberal opposition as soft on security issues. The Argus, Leader, 8 May 1987.
120 Ibid. pp. 321-325.
which gave greater weight to rural conservative constituencies served as a potentially serious barrier to a reform process. It did so by distorting the real support of the contesting parties and by allowing the CP to mobilise opposition on national issues (reform) in local contexts, especially at the time of by-elections. Given the results of the 1987 and 1989 general elections, and assuming that a significant number of Afrikaners might abandon the NP after far-reaching reforms were begun, the negotiations had to be completed by de Klerk within 5 years. With hindsight, the fact that de Klerk presented the electorate with a five-year plan for negotiations prior to the September 1989 elections attested to this time pressure.

De Klerk did, nonetheless, take for granted a victory in a referendum on reform. This assumption was based on his involvement in the 1983 referendum. An experienced machine politician, he correctly presumed that the majority of Whites backed reform and negotiations with the ANC. Such support would not, though, necessarily be expressed in a general election under the Westminster system. Moreover, ensuring stability in White politics was essential if the NP were to control the process and keep the high ground in its dealings with the ANC. This explains de Klerk's early preference for a referendum, which he assumed he would win. And it is argued that the referendum, in fact, served as a tool of transition heresthetics, and was part of his transition script.

Pre-empting the CP threat:
The 1989 general elections took place in the most disadvantageous of circumstances for the NP. The National Party, which had now been in power for four decades, had just emerged from a long and acrimonious struggle, in which the party leadership unseated P.W. Botha, forcing him to resign as State President. In addition, the NP was facing a concerted threat from both left and right, and the middle ground that it had attempted to stake out for itself in 1983 was beginning to erode with greater speed. On the left, the formation of the Democratic Party (DP)\textsuperscript{121} in 1989 provided a new and united political home for verligtes, who were disillusioned with the years of political stagnation under P.W. Botha, and liberals. The DP secured just under a quarter of the popular vote in the 1989 elections, and some analysts viewed this achievement as a 'factor, which can be expected to heighten expectations of rapid reform.'\textsuperscript{122} Moreover, the candidate of the

\textsuperscript{121} The Democratic Party united the left wing opposition by bringing together the Progressive Federal Party (PFP), the Independent Party, headed by Dennis Worrall, and the National Democratic Movement (NDM) under the leadership of Wynand Malan.

\textsuperscript{122} Gavin Evans, Shaun Johnson and Ivor Powell. The Weekly Mail, 8-14 September 1989.
verligte wing of the NP, Minister of Finance Barend du Plessis, came surprisingly close to defeating de Klerk in the leadership race, signalling a growing internal demand for reform. De Klerk received 69 votes, as opposed to 61 votes for du Plessis from the caucus in the closest leadership race ever.

To its right the NP was faced with continued growth of the CP. Support for the NP amongst the NP’s Afrikaner constituency had already fallen from 80 percent in the 1981 general election to 60 percent by the 1987 general election, and the party was in danger of becoming a minority party amongst Afrikaners. The CP continued to make inroads amongst conservative Afrikaners in the 1989 elections, and of the 29 seats the NP lost in these elections, 17 were lost to the CP, which garnered 31 percent of the popular vote. With a small gain of three percent compared to 1987, the CP therefore managed to increase its parliamentary representation by 77 percent, from 22 to 39 seats. Moreover, some 31 seats, including traditionally safe NP seats, had become marginal seats after the 1989 vote. Of these, seven were held with majorities of less than 500, 9 with majorities of less than 1,000 votes and the remaining 14 marginal seats were defended by majorities of less than 1,500 voters.

The real extent of the threat that the CP posed to the NP is better understood by looking at the party’s support in the Free State and de Klerk’s Transvaal, 46 percent and 40 percent respectively. The CP gains in the 1989 elections, despite the fact that an impressive 48 percent of Afrikaners supported negotiations with the ANC in 1989, underscored the extent to which the existing electoral institutions distorted public opinion, in favour of conservative rural constituencies.

The cardinal lesson of the 1989 elections, which was the party’s worst performance since coming to power in 1948, was that the NP could no longer safely assume that they would win another general election in a first-past-the-post system, especially once they embarked upon a significant reform process. The best that the NP could have hoped for after embarking on such far-reaching reforms was a hung parliament. It therefore seems

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123 F.W. de Klerk, Die Laaste Trek, p. 152.
127 The Weekly Mail, 8-14 September 1989.
128 Willem de Klerk, F.W. de Klerk, p. 103.
highly feasible that de Klerk embarked on his reform process in 1989 knowing, full well, that he would not hold another general election under the existing dispensation.\footnote{Interview with Ebbe Dommisse (23 October 2001) and Wynand Malan (23 November 2001).}

A referendum was the only democratic form of legitimation that he could assume and risk during his transition. Having been intimately involved in the 1983 referendum de Klerk was aware that he could count on the support of DP voters and the core of the NP support base in a referendum on reforms. In newspaper editor Ken Owen's words, de Klerk reassembled the P.W. Botha reform constituency of 1983 in order to widen his base for reforms.\footnote{Interview (10 December 2002).} Writing at the time, Mike Robertson, similarly, suggested that the 1983 vote provided de Klerk with model he could emulate.\footnote{The Sunday Times. 23 February 1992.} A referendum constituted a 'two-way gunfight' with minimal risks, compared to a general election.

De Klerk's post-6 September 1989 thinking on a referendum is best understood in the context of his negotiating tactics and the assumptions already outlined. It had little to do with a commitment to democracy, as de Klerk claimed. His major challenge during the \textit{blitz} was placating Whites and ensuring that he carried his constituency, and in this regard the referendum was an essential device.

**Coping with the right wing threat:**

The real strength of the White right was some point of speculation in the media at the time. Some analysts dismissed the right wing threat, arguing that the existence of a pragmatic wing in the right would, ultimately, see it participate in negotiations.\footnote{The Weekly Mail. 15 - 22 February 1991.} On the other hand, many role players took the threat seriously enough, and warned against dismissing the right,\footnote{The Weekly Mail. 1-7 March 1991.} Veteran editor, Harold Pakendorf, suggests that the aggrandised fear of the right, which was so pervasive amongst the ANC leadership, was produced by the exaggerated view of the English press.\footnote{Interview (9 December 2002).} Three linked, yet distinct, right wing groups posed a threat to de Klerk's post-1989 transition.

The first was the political arm of the White right, embodied by the Conservative Party (CP) and the diminutive \textit{Herstigte Nasionale} [Refounded National] Party (HNP). The second right wing threat was the ever-increasing number of extra-parliamentary groups, many of which had developed their own militias. These mushroomed from 60 in
mid 1990, to some 138 by mid 1991, and some 193 organisations by the time of the referendum. Some of the right wing movements that were prominent in these activities included the Afrikaner Weerstands Beweging (AWB), the Boere Weerstands Beweging (BWB), the Boerekommando and the Boerestaat Party. As was demonstrated in Israel, a few extremists have tremendous potential to derail such processes, and in South Africa the pool of roughly 20,000 radicals had the potential to derail the process. It is worth noting that most White South African male Whites were conscripted, though for a two year long period, and thus received military training. Furthermore, there were concerns that graduates of the Special Forces were joining such movements. One major handicap facing these organisations was the divisions – often a function of personality differences.

Finally, there were elements within the security establishment, which had the ability to scupper the reform process, either independently or in conjunction with the right wing militias, with whom they had forged links. At the time of the referendum there was media speculation of a military coup by conservative officers, and one analyst suggested that the CP enjoyed significant support in the police force (80-95 percent) and the South African Defence Force (70-80 percent). In addition to standing units of the regular army, the SADF was built on a reserve system of local commandos, with their own arms and ammunition depots and military hardware. It is also worth noting that elements in the security forces were involved in so-called Third Force activities, designed to thwart the transfer of power.

The transition literature notes that the 'possibility of a coup is not fictitious,' though it depends on the presence of 'swingmen' to execute them. The 'sunset clause,' which was an integral part of the power sharing understanding of 12 February 1993, went a long way to calm the fears of those in the military and civil service who might intervene to stop the transition.

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136 Willie Kuhn, Insig, September 1990.
141 The Star. 22 February 1992 (quoting Africa Confidential, which reported that the SADF wished to force a change in the NP leaders, rather than carry out a traditional coup). Stanley Uys, The Star, 12 March 1992.
144 Patti Waldmeier, Anatomy of a Miracle, pp. 213, 218, 272. For an elaboration on amnesties and for the armed forces, see Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions From Authoritarian Rule, pp. 28-30.
Though the CP eschewed violence, the party successfully manipulated right wing emotions and hinted that it would support violence under certain circumstances. In doing so, it contributed towards and atmosphere that encouraged violence by the latter two groups. The CP's rhetoric that de Klerk did not have a mandate thus threatened to create an environment that sanctioned violence. As Yaakov Bar Siman-Tov (1997) has argued, the absence of 'formal legitimacy,' which is obtained from formal political institutions, for peace processes tends to undermine the 'informal' or public legitimacy of such processes. And in the absence of 'informal' legitimacy, extremists find exhortation to pursue violence as a means to scupper peace. In the South African case, a string of NP by-election defeats in parallel to the transition process suggested that de Klerk did not have support for the process, thereby undermining both his formal legitimacy and public or informal legitimacy to broker a deal with the ANC.

**De Klerk's leap of faith:**

In this chapter I have explored some accounts of why de Klerk employed the referendum and sketched the background to his 'leap of faith.' De Klerk did not use a referendum due to a deep commitment to democracy. Nor did he use one as part of a deliberate strategy to impose a White constitutional veto. Assuming power in 1989, de Klerk 'was aware that the greatest risk he could take at the time was to take no risk at all.' And a speedy and controlled transition was viewed as the best stratagem to ensure the optimal outcome for the NP - a consociational democracy.

The basic ingredients of his blitzkrieg were control through speed, securing the moral high ground and undermining the ANC's international legitimacy. To boot, the NP assumed that it could steamroller a weakened ANC to accept terms that favoured the NP, and also hoped that it could do well in the first post-Apartheid elections. De Klerk was, therefore, supremely confident of his ability to control the transition and his interaction with the ANC. He was, however, far less confident of his ability to control the White right. As leader of the party in the Transvaal from 1982 to 1989, de Klerk had witnessed, first hand, the growth of the party. Hence the decision to include a referendum in his transition script - and its central role in the politics of the transition - is best understood in this context. I now turn to the politics of the transition and the role of the referendum from 1989 to 1992.

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Chapter Four.
De Klerk's finest hour.

It is time to prick the CP's balloon and the referendum, albeit ethnically anarchistic and imperfect, is the instrument with which to perform this overdue task.1

The politics of the referendum:

This chapter explores the politics of the referendum, and the numerous pledges to hold a referendum. These provide an interesting insight into the internal (White) politics that de Klerk had to contend with in the first phase of the transition. I first look at de Klerk's initial blitz and his use of the referendum pledge to placate Whites. I then demonstrate how the existing Westminster system and by-elections allowed the Conservative Party (CP) to undermine de Klerk's legitimacy to lead the reform process. The referendum pledges were a resource in managing these by-elections and enabled de Klerk to pre-empt the demand for a referendum or general elections. I next explore the impact of the impending CODESA process on de Klerk's thinking in regard to the referendum. It is argued that the opening of the CODESA deliberations gave further encouragement for de Klerk to use a referendum in order to regain the initiative. The Potchefstroom by-election defeat was the last straw, and forced de Klerk to call the vote, earlier than planned. Finally, this chapter will assess the impact of the referendum on the broader transition process and the CODESA talks.

The initial blitz, September 1989 to February 1990:

As suggested, the imperative of blitz tactics was to secure the moral high ground, set the pace of the process, shift the balance of the international community's sympathies in favour of de Klerk and pressure the ANC to make concessions, and mistakes. In sharp contrast to the Israeli government in the case of the Oslo process, for example, gradualism was not viewed as expedient.

Though no doubt dismissed at the time, de Klerk provided early hints that South Africa was in need of 'great jumps,' and already as acting State President, in the middle of August 1989, he stated his belief that 'history provided a unique opportunity for peaceful solutions.'2 Commenting on such statements, Die Burger drew a parallel with Botha's

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2 Die Burger, 16 August 1989.
famous 'adapt or die speech,' made in 1979. Speaking in his constituency of Vereneging, in mid-August 1989, de Klerk indicated that his party wished to move away from a situation where Whites dominate others, yet avoid a situation wherein Whites become the oppressed.

Once Botha had been forced to resign as State President, the 'urgency' of reform became a central message in the last fortnight of de Klerk's, previously conservative, election campaign. And it was during this period that de Klerk unveiled his 'five year plan.' The first reference to this plan was made in a TV interview on Netwerk, 20 August 1989, and in a series of public engagements in the ensuing days, the now verligte candidate prophesised that what 'will happen in the coming few years in South Africa will shape the coming 50, even one hundred, years.' In one of these speeches de Klerk warned voters that if 'we want to secure a safe and prosperous future for our children, then far-reaching moves by a strong government are needed.' His most explicit exposition of the 5-year plan was made in the city of Klerksdorp on 24 August, and de Klerk made 5 key promises. The first was an undertaking to address fear and misunderstanding, the second to promote a great Indaba (negotiations), the third to promote economic growth, the fourth to secure a new constitution, and finally de Klerk promised to tackle violence. De Klerk again emphasised the need to move swiftly. Years of inertia under Botha had obviated the path of incremental reforms, and de Klerk had no choice but to seize the initiative and transform South Africa as speedily as possible.

Despite NP recognition that the 1989 election result constituted a setback, it was portrayed as mandate for the 'five year plan' and the promised negotiations. Empowered with his 'mandate,' de Klerk set about his blitz, and Mandela's surprise release was but one component. Contrary to popular perception, it did not signal the beginning of de Klerk's

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3 The speech, which was made in July 1979 in town of Upington, highlighted the need for reform and Botha's determination to introduce reforms. It was prompted by accusations that he was deviating from party policy.
4 Die Burger. 16 August 1989.
6 P.W. Botha suffered a major (and probably second) stroke in January 1989, forcing his resignation as party leader, and paving the way for the election of F.W. de Klerk. Upon Botha's return to office, tensions between the nominal party leader and State President significantly increased, leading to the internal putsch which saw de Klerk and his allies force Botha to resign.
8 Speaking in Port Elizabeth on 21 August 1989 (Die Burger. 22 August), a speech in Cape Town, on 21 August, (Die Beeld, 22 August 1989) and in a speech in Bloemfontein (Die Beeld, 24 August 1989).
9 Die Burger. 4 September 1989.
transition, but rather constitutes one of its most significant signposts. Though few would have taken them seriously at the time, some early signs of the coming blitz included an iteration of the election campaign promise, that the coming five years would herald dramatic change, after the elections, reports that Mandela's release was imminent, the appointment of Gerrit Viljoen as chief negotiator, the elimination of petty Apartheid legislation, the release of 8 senior political prisoners, and hints of a government willingness to end the state of emergency. De Klerk touched on many of these themes on the occasion of his formal induction as State President on 20 September 1989, and these early reforms constituted what one analyst described as 'the first holes in our Berlin wall.'

These pre-February 1990 actions were an application of Huntington’s approach of disaggregating reforms, and were clearly designed to prove the government’s sincerity, especially to the international community. More importantly, they were designed to place pressure on the ANC. Following the release of 8 high ranking political prisoners, including Walter Sisulu, in early October 1989, Die Burger argued that such moves caught the opposition United Democratic Front (UDF) 'off guard' and placed pressure on the ANC to participate in negotiations and forego violence. The release of the 8 was also the product of intense international pressure. Margaret Thatcher reportedly pressed de Klerk to release Mandela ahead of the 1989 Commonwealth Conference and a reluctant de Klerk bought more time by releasing the 8 and delaying Mandela's release to early 1990.

The desire to place pressure on the ANC clearly also underpinned the release of Nelson Mandela. Chris Thirion, who served as Deputy Chief of Staff in the Defence Force, suggests that de Klerk justified the release to senior security officers by arguing that Mandela was an 'icon' all the while he remained in jail. De Klerk reasoned that his release would 'show him up as fallible' and put pressure on the ANC to compromise.

Once de Klerk’s game for the high ground passed the 2 February threshold, which was by

16 On 16 November 1989, de Klerk scrapped the 'Separate Amenities Act,' (Die Burger, 17 November, 1989), though hints of such changes were made in September of that year (Die Burger, Leader, 21 September 1989).
23 Interview (29 November 2001).
all accounts a dramatic blitz action, there would be no return to the game of Whites only electoral politics. De Klerk could no longer afford another general election.

Placating Whites:
As part of the NP’s campaign in the 1989 general elections, it promised Whites that any major changes in the constitution would be subjected to a referendum. It is perhaps ironic that Gerrit Viljoen made one such pledge in the town of Potchefstroom. Such a referendum pledge allowed de Klerk maximal ambiguity during and after the 1989 general election. As Transvaal leader of the NP, de Klerk had been engaged in a long-running battle with the CP. He was, therefore, aware that he was unable to assume complete control over conservative resistance. Hence, his immediate priority after 2 February 1990 was allaying the fears of Whites and trying to limit the right’s growth. This was achieved by repeatedly promising Whites a referendum as a final hurdle before introducing the new constitution.

In April 1990, for example, de Klerk explained his ‘repeated undertakings in respect of a referendum or election,’ prior to implementing a new constitution, by noting that the NP’s 1987 and 1989 electoral mandates were ‘linked to an undertaking that the same voters would be able to express themselves on the results of negotiations.’ Interestingly, a 1986 undertaking to stage a referendum on future reforms preceded the 1987 referendum promise, made in the context of the elections. This pledge was a response to deep divisions within Botha’s cabinet, between the reformists and conservatives, led by F.W. de Klerk over the future of reforms. The pronouncement by the verligte Foreign Minister laid bare the gulf between hardliners or 'standpatters,' and soft-liners in the cabinet.

Former government officials portray FW de Klerk as an archconservative that deliberately spoiled key reform initiatives and Fanie Cloete suggests that he set back serious reforms by at least 3 to 4 years by rejecting any power sharing with Blacks. De Klerk’s conservative image however proved to be a valuable resource in placating many

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25 PV 912, 4/1/1. Extracts from speeches by the State President and the Minster of Constitutional Development.
29 Interview (4 December 2002); Marion Edmunds, The Mail and Guardian, 11-17 October 1996.
Whites, especially conservative NP supporters, during the initial stages of the transition. His efforts to thwart the reforms of the 1980s, however, make it hard for people to accept his claims of a later conversion to a reformist agenda.

Dave Stewart describes de Klerk's numerous referendum promises as 'good politics,' designed to maintain White support for reform. Such reassurances also constituted part of a concerted effort to market the reform process to Whites as a 'fail-safe' plan. Spinning the reform process as a fail-safe plan was made both plausible and credible by the referendum promise. In his 30 March 1990 address to the Cape Town Press Club, de Klerk prefaced his claim that the initiative was in the NP's hands with a pledge to stage a referendum, and noted that a new constitution would only be introduced with the support of White voters. He repeated this theme in an address to a NP youth gathering a day later and in a parliamentary debate on 17 April.

Pre-empting the need for a referendum:
Though a referendum pledge was not part of de Klerk's 2 February 1990 speech, it clearly became an integral part of the NP's transition script in the ensuing months, probably once it emerged that the party would face numerous unanticipated by-elections. And, de Klerk, like Botha, would over time amend his tactical thinking on the referendum in order to address the most immediate threat to his particular process. But in contrast to his predecessor, de Klerk deployed a referendum promise from the very outset of his reform process. The 1989 election promise to stage a referendum in the event of serious reforms provided a convenient justification for the referendum pledge.


30 Interview (12 December 2001).
31 Die Burger, 2 and 17 April 1990.
sider Merwe, similarly promised a referendum on at least two occasions. It is worth pointing out that de Klerk's numerous pledges to stage a referendum, prior to adopting the new constitution, explain the later Afrikaner anger at de Klerk for not doing so.

**Maintaining the NP's support base:**

The bulk of the initial de Klerk and Viljoen referendum pronouncements were designed to reassure Whites, especially public sector workers, that they would have the final say over the outcome of the negotiations. Steven Friedman highlights the strategic importance of maintaining the NP's traditional support base during the transition, noting that it was premised on the fact that 'the ruling party's power rests on its control of the state. A crucial part of its constituency is, therefore, the civil service and the security establishment: if it cannot secure their consent for transition, or if they do not have the capacity to assist it, its influence wanes.' Friedman adds that an international perception that the NP's participation in the government was a 'condition for stability' would also enhance its bargaining power. And, de Klerk indeed sought to reassure White civil servants that the NP would defend their interests and secure their pensions. Ken Owen corroborates Friedman's perceptive analysis, noting that de Klerk (like Botha) viewed the bureaucracy as a vital resource. Owen points out that de Klerk dedicated an inordinate amount of time in trying to secure benefits for civil servants in the negotiations, at the expense of key constitutional issues.

Michael Macdonald provides an even more intriguing explanation for de Klerk's insistence on the rights of civil servants. He argues that the NP viewed bureaucrats 'as a Trojan horse inside the state,' who would affect the flow and distribution of resources in a way to undermine the ANC and cause splits in the movement. Furthermore, he speculated that the NP assumed that the need to

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34 In early 1997 F.W. de Klerk reportedly described the transition as a surrender of power. Certain de Klerk critics (Ebbe Dommisse, Hermann Giliomme and Izak de Villiers) pounced on this alleged use of the word surrender and wrote scathing leaders and op-eds, which triggered a huge debate and a deluge of letters to the Afrikaans papers. Many of these were very critical of the transition and highlighted what they saw as De Klerk's deceit in the 1992 referendum.
37 Interview (10 December 2002).
navigate 'unfamiliar, potentially hostile bureaucracies' would compel the ANC to share power with it.  

De Klerk’s appreciation of the importance of the bureaucracy in this transition sharply contrasts with the approach that Gorbachov took in his managed transition. Jerry H. Hough argues that Gorbachov 'distrusted the bureaucracy that would have to manage a transition,' and adds that he saw reform, not as 'constructing a new incentive system but of overcoming the resistance of those fattening off the old one.' This misreading of the situation proved disastrous for Gorbachov.

The effort to assuage White fears and transmit the sense that de Klerk and his party controlled the process, through a referendum, nonetheless, created a clash with the ANC, which opposed the promise of a 'white' veto over the negotiations process and its outcome. Such tensions increasingly came to the forefront as the formal constitutional negotiations approached. These were, however, delayed for almost two years as the ANC and the NP fundamentally differed over who would negotiate the new constitution. The government proposed a convention of existing political organisations, including the homeland leaders, whilst the ANC preferred an elected constituent assembly to craft a post-Apartheid dispensation. The NP was highly fearful of an elected assembly, as it and its allies would have less influence, and preferred a forum of non-representative delegates. The eventual compromise, which was tabled by the ANC, called for an all-party conference to consider the route to a constituent assembly. In the absence of formal negotiations, each by-election provided the CP with an opportunity to exploit White uncertainty and fears over the future.

By-election blues:
The CP’s response to the NP’s blitz was to charge the government with violating its September 1989 mandate, and call for a new general election, which it was confident it would win. The numerous by-elections in the early stages of the transition provided the CP with ideal opportunities to challenge the government on this score. In the 28 months had passed between winning the 1989 elections and calling the 1992 referendum, de Klerk had to contend with eight such by-elections, and each of these votes suggested a swing in favour of the CP, ranging from five to 27 percent. The most critical of these votes were in

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1991 and early 1992, when the party lost the Ladybrand, Virginia and Potchefstroom by-elections in quick succession. The referendum pronouncements were central in coping with these by-elections and often corresponded with these votes.

These eight by-elections provided a terrain that favoured the CP and aided its efforts to undermine de Klerk’s negotiating mandate. The official opposition party did not have the financial resources, the party machine, access to the Naspers/Perskor media empires or control of the state media that the NP enjoyed in national campaigns, especially referenda. One commentator noted that by-elections, 'by their very nature, reflect only a small, usually distorted segment of reality. In short, they don’t mean much. All that matters is the impression they create of how the governing party is faring.' In the case of South Africa’s early transition, the CP’s dramatic gains allowed it to undermine de Klerk’s negotiating mandate, as the party made these local contests mini-referenda over the peace process. De Klerk confirmed his dislike of by-elections in an interview with Rapport, after announcing the referendum.

A by-election does not give an accurate picture of what voters believe regarding the cardinal issues of the country. A by-election is like a magnifying glass, which focuses a whole array of issues at one point. A referendum is also a magnifying glass, but it only focuses on one important issue, in this case the cardinal question is how and by whom the future of the country must be shaped.

Questioned on by-elections, almost a decade later, de Klerk suggests that voters often tend to vote their grievances and are influenced by a variety of motivations during by-elections. He believes that referenda allow voters to be confronted with the 'fundamental issues.' In his Rapport interview, de Klerk highlighted the fact that the state of the economy, the drought and similar problems determined the outcome of these by-elections. It should, though, be added that de Klerk, too, was guilty of trying to use by-elections to promote his own standing, and ahead of the early March 1991 by-election in Maitland, he informed local voters that the 'support will strengthen my hand in moving forward with speed and determination.' The Natal leader of the NP, George Bartlett, also

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42 November 1989 Ceres and Vasco (Cape), June 1990 Umlazi (Natal), November 1990, Randburg (Transvaal), in 1991 three votes were held, Maitland (Cape) in February, Ladybrand (Free State) in May, and Virginia (Free State) in 1991. The final by-election was the Potchefstroom by-election in February 1992.
called on voters to support the party in Umlazi, in order to strengthen de Klerk.\textsuperscript{47} Similarly, Potchefstroom was foolishly turned into a vote of confidence in de Klerk and his reforms, after the Virginia defeat,\textsuperscript{48} and prior to the February vote.\textsuperscript{49} Die Vrye Weekblad editor Max du Preez suggested that the idiocy of making Potchefstroom a test (in the midst of a drought and a recession), stemmed from the fact that de Klerk was overwhelmed by the euphoria from the international response to his reforms, and by the fact that he was encircled by sycophants who did not inform him of what was going on in the country.\textsuperscript{50}

As will be established in the ensuing chapters, De Klerk’s thinking on the referendum shows a remarkable continuity with a traditional NP fear of making major constitutional or symbolic issues the focus of elections. Historically, referenda have provided NP elites with a convenient tool to introduce such legislation, yet avoid paying a high political cost for changes in elections and by-elections. De Klerk’s involvement in the 1982 \textit{skeuring}\textsuperscript{51} made him aware of the need for such pre-emptive action, and the use of the referendum in navigating this difficult period in the NP’s history, especially in the Transvaal, provided de Klerk with invaluable insights into how the referendum could be used to demonstrate the limit of support for the CP. This support was distorted by the existing electoral system.

**The Vasco and Ceres by-elections:**
A first indication of the disapproval amongst Whites at the post-September 1989 reforms and de Klerk’s reform talk was provided as early as November 1989 in the Vasco and Ceres by-elections, shortly after the general elections. Though the NP easily held these seats in the traditional NP stronghold of the Cape, the CP gained five percent in Ceres and 13 percent in Vasco. Commenting on the results, The Argus’s Tos Wentzel suggested that they demonstrated that there were ‘serious misgivings among White voters who are potential National Party supporters about the moves to establish open residential areas and to open beaches and the proposed scrapping of the Separate Amenities Act.’\textsuperscript{52} Die Burger

\textsuperscript{47} Die Beeld, 6 June 1990.
\textsuperscript{48} Die Beeld, 30 November 1991.
\textsuperscript{50} Die Vrye Weekblad, 21-27 February 1992.
\textsuperscript{51} The word \textit{skeuring} literally means split or cleavage and refers to the 1982 split within the party, when 17 sitting MPs left the NP to form the Conservative Party over reforms to co-opt so-called Coloureds and Indians. The \textit{skeuring} is discussed in some detail in chapter nine.
\textsuperscript{52} The Argus, 1 December 1989.
reluctantly acknowledged that the results were a 'disappointment' for the party as these were traditional NP strongholds, and suggested that the reforms, the release of security prisoners and the Namibian election result were to blame. The Cape Party leader David de Villiers, however, found comfort in the fact that turnout in Vasco had been low. According to Tos Wentzel, the poor turnout indicated disaffection amongst traditional NP supporters.

These early reforms, however, paled in significance when compared to the February 1990 un-banning of the opposition and the release of Mandela and other political prisoners. Hence, each of the ensuing by-elections would provide the CP with an opportunity to demonstrate its claim that the NP no longer represented the volk and pressurise the government to hold elections. Fortunately for the NP, there was a lull in these by-elections until June 1990, when the CP was provided with an opportunity raise vexing questions about the legitimacy of de Klerk's reforms. By May 1990 the early enthusiasm for reform and optimism was replaced by niggling doubts, as the NP-led process lost momentum. And there were growing signs that the CP and its extra-parliamentary allies were mobilising increased support against a backdrop of uncertainty over the process, a worsening economy and mounting domestic violence. On 26 May 1990, the CP attracted between 60,000 to 100,000 (probably 70,000) supporters to volksgvergadering (peoples rally) in Pretoria. Speaking at the rally, Andries Treumicht demand a new general election. A similar rally in the middle of February 1990 only attracted 30,000 people. This period also marked a phase in which the CP and its allies increasingly hinted at political violence in order to thwart the reform process. In June 1990 there were even media reports of a planned coup (leading to the arrest of 11 suspects), and the offices of two NP ministers were bombed. And Deur Dawie warned that Treumicht was becoming a threat.

The Umlazi by-election:
The potential electoral threat that the CP posed to the NP and its agenda was made clear in the Umlazi by-election of 6 June 1990. And the fact that the CP came close to taking a seat in a traditional NP constituency, indicated the extent of public disaffection with the

54 Tos Wentzel, The Argus, 30 November and 1 December 1989
57 Deur Dawie, Die Burger, 30 May 1990.
NP and uncertainty over the process. The NP's majority was trimmed from 2,835 votes in 1989 to 547 votes; representing a 23 percent swing in favour of the CP.\(^5^8\) It was the largest anti-NP swing in any by-election since the party had come to power in 1948.\(^5^9\) And the party only secured the seat thanks to support from DP voters who abandoned their candidate. What added to the significance of this defeat was the fact that 70 percent of the constituents were English speakers.

Despite de Klerk's claim that by-elections do not reflect a dramatic change in public opinion, \textit{Die Burger} was less sanguine and described the near loss of one of its safest seats as a setback for reform.\(^6^0\) Political analysts attributed the near defeat to the government's failure to explain its reforms to Whites and the CP's concerted effort in the by-election. \textit{Die Burger} also noted that the Natal violence and the socio-economic profile of the constituency contributed to the CP's success.\(^6^1\) Similarly, \textit{Die Beeld} put a brave face on things and suggested that one could not expect a good result in the light of the government's reforms. The paper also highlighted local factors that explained the defeat, and argued that 'by-elections are often escape valves for anger.'\(^6^2\)

Commenting on the result, one foreign correspondent warned, 'If the Natal poll result were repeated in a general election, President de Klerk's National Party, which has ruled since 1948, would be swept from power by the rightwing.'\(^6^3\) \textit{Die Beeld}, however, suggested that there was no correlation between by-election results and the outcome of general elections.\(^6^4\) Nevertheless, the result added new momentum to growing rightwing opposition to reform, and gave credence to its claims that de Klerk did not have a mandate. The message of the by-election, to both the ANC and the NP, opined \textit{Die Vrye Weekblad}, was that White support for negotiations 'could no longer be taken for granted.'\(^6^5\)

Buoyed by the CP's Umlazi success, Koos van de Merwe challenged President de Klerk to call a referendum or a general election in order to secure a mandate to negotiate with the ANC and the SACP and the acceptance of the principle that a Black could become president. Both, according to van der Merwe, were at variance with his 1989 mandate. Van der Merwe added that in 'making the reforms irreversible at this early stage,' the NP was 'making the role of the referendum irrelevant.' Accordingly, CP backbenchers

\(^5^8\) \textit{Die Burger}, 8 June 1990. \\
\(^5^9\) Hennie Serfontein, \textit{Die Vrye Weekblad}, 8 June 1990. \\
\(^6^0\) \textit{Die Burger}, Leader, 8 June 1990. \\
\(^6^1\) \textit{Die Burger}, 8 June 1990. \\
\(^6^2\) \textit{Die Beeld}, Leader, 8 June 1990. \\
\(^6^3\) Gavin Bell, \textit{The Times}, 8 June 1990. \\
\(^6^4\) \textit{Die Beeld}, Leader, 8 June 1990. \\
\(^6^5\) \textit{Die Beeld}, Leader, 8 June 1990.
Jan Hoon and Koos van der Merwe charged that the proposed referendum was 'a political deception.' De Klerk denied these charges, noting that a referendum would only be held before introducing a new constitution. The CP speakers explicitly pushed for an election, no doubt aware that they were less likely to win a referendum.

Commenting on de Klerk's reassurances that he would honour his undertaking to stage a referendum, *Die Burger* opined that the president had addressed charges that the process was a 'done deal, which would be forced upon Whites.' The paper also noted that de Klerk's pledge demonstrated the NP's 'determination' to negotiate a deal that would be acceptable to the majority of Whites. The paper further added that acceptance of the referendum would legitimate 'tough actions against individuals and institutions that wish to oppose the new constitution by violent means, without any moral basis.' Days later, Gerrit Viljoen echoed claimed Klerk's argument that the referendum would only follow the conclusion of negotiations, arguing that a referendum before a draft constitution would compromise negotiations. The government continued to consider it appropriate to stage the referendum after a constitution had been negotiated until January 1992, and this was how the party perceived the referendum in the initial transition script.

The Umlazi by-election had clearly demonstrated the danger of delays in the process for the NP, and, what de Klerk had feared of by-elections. By-elections, over which de Klerk had little control, were the one variable that threatened the de Klerk game plan and the referendum remained a key tool for the NP to assuage Whites about the road ahead. It was also too early to deploy it. To do so would undermine the credibility of the NP and would, at a stage where there were not yet formal talks, be of limited political value. Besides, there was no guarantee that a referendum, especially if held too early, would indeed weaken the CP and provide lasting legitimacy for negotiations. A modicum of progress in the transition process was desperately required. And, not for the first time in the process, the ANC came to the NP's rescue in order to strengthen its negotiating partner by agreeing to the Pretoria Minute and giving vital momentum to the process.

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65 *Die Vrye Weekblad*, Leader, 8 June 1990.
69 Hennie van Deventer recounts that Thabo Mbeki informed Prof. Dirk du Toit in early 1991 that it 'is not in the interest of the ANC to weaken his [de Klerk] power base.' Hennie van Deventer, *Kroniek van 'n Koerantman* (Welgemoed, 1998), p. 150.
The Pretoria Minute:

Despite assumptions of a swift process, the NP saw precious little progress in negotiations or significant rewards for its blitz six months after Mandela’s release. The absence of tangible progress and growing uncertainty, in part, explain the CP’s Umlazi success and growing opposition to the reform process. One of the key reasons for scant progress, largely of de Klerk’s own making, was the NP’s demand that the ANC foreswear violence. The Pretoria Minute, which in effect constituted a unilateral suspension of the armed struggle, was a ANC gesture designed to strengthen de Klerk, increasing pressure from the CP on this issue.70 Besides, Mandela’s gesture, which broke the existing deadlock, was also part of a concerted effort by the ANC to seek to regain the initiative from de Klerk.71

The Pretoria Minute, like the Groote Schuur Minute, constituted a 'first order understanding' or pact72 between the ANC and NP on pre-negotiations.73 Additional pacts reached along the way included: the Laboria Minute of 1991 (on labour issues), the Record of Understanding of September 1992 on banning the carrying of traditional weapons and the power-sharing deal of February 1993. The latter was the most explicit elite pact, though limited to power sharing for the first five years only.

Emboldened by the signing of the Pretoria Minute, on 7 August 1990, de Klerk sought to reassure the public that the NP had ceased the initiative.74 And he set forth two 'no's' that would guide his negotiations. The first 'nay' was to a constitution that does not give 'due recognition to the essential rights of Whites - or any other group.' His second no was to the introduction of a new constitution without a referendum.75 Both 'no's' were clearly designed to assuage White public opinion at a time of uncertainty.

Fortuitously the Pretoria Minute was signed just ahead of the NP’s annual conference season, allowing de Klerk to set out his party’s agenda to the party faithful along with some signs of progress. Buoyed by the ANC’s unilateral gesture, de Klerk informed the Cape NP conference that a new constitution would be completed prior to the next general election. Noteworthy in this speech was de Klerk’s indication that the NP

71 Ibid. p. 165.
72 Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter (1986: 25, 38, 70-71) define a pact as a 'negotiated compromise under which actors agree to forgo or underutilise their capacity to harm each other by extending guarantees not threaten each others' corporate autonomies or vital interest.'
74 Die Burger, 9 August 1990.
75 PV 912, 4/1/1.
government was 'determined not to waste time,' hinting at the NP's desire for a speedy negotiating process. At that point in time, twenty months had passed since Mandela's release and the two leading protagonists were deadlocked, holding two diametrically opposed positions on negotiations and their outcome. Whereas the NP sought a commitment to power sharing, the ANC stuck to its commitment to majority rule. The NP, though, was still convinced that it could control the flow of events. In mid-November 1990 de Klerk's then chief negotiator Gerrit Viljoen noted that, as the 'manager' of the negotiations, the government had the 'right and is even committed to test the decisions of the negotiating forum.' Viljoen added that the proposed referendum would ensure the 'acceptability and legitimacy, as well as the democratic confirmation and endorsement of the process.' Viljoen's comments reflect a continued confidence in the NP's ability to command the process, and came only days after the year's second by-election in the Transvaal constituency of Randburg. The Randburg vote, which saw the current New National Party (NNP) leader Marthinus van Schalkwyk enter national politics, indicated the positive impact of the Pretoria Minute on the NP's standing, as it retained the seat with a comfortable majority. The CP, though more than doubling its vote, was soundly defeated, and, unlike Umlazi, this by-election created the impression that the government was faring well. One indication of de Klerk's post-Randburg confidence was a statement dismissing the right wing, noting that it did not have 'significant growth potential.' Randburg was however to be followed by three taxing votes in 1991, of which two would see the NP defeated. These votes, in turn, led to mounting pressure on the NP from the CP and its extra-parliamentary allies.

The Maitland by-election:
In mid-February 1991 de Klerk twice reiterated his commitment to go to voters on a new constitution before its implementation. The implication of a 'no' vote – deemed unlikely by de Klerk – would be a return to the negotiating process. On this occasion, de Klerk expressed his confidence that Whites would support the new constitution, as it would

76 Die Burger, 9 October 1990.
77 Alistair Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country. The Inside Story of South Africa's Road to Change (Chicago, 1996), pp. 128-129.
78 PV 9124/1/1.
79 The CP increased its tally from 755 votes to 1969. The DP, which secured the seat in the 1989 elections, did not field a candidate. Die Afrikaner, 14 November 1990.
81 Die Vrye Weekblad, 16 November 1990.
contain 'protection for minority rights.' Though such a statement may be construed as an attempt to impose the NP's bottom line, as O'Meara suggests, it is more indicative of de Klerk's cocksureness.

Certain that it could hold onto the Cape Town constituency of Maitland, the NP cast the by-election as a vote of confidence on reforms. De Klerk, the winning candidate, Minister Louis Pienaar, as well as provincial leader, Davie de Villiers, all presented the vote as a mandate for reform. One indication of the importance that de Klerk attached to the by-election was his participation in the campaign. Though the party hung on to the seat, the CP increased its votes from 441 in 1989 to 3152. The DP, which secured 4749 votes in 1989, did not contest the seat, and the decision no doubt explained de Klerk's pre-vote bullishness and his decision to convert the by-election into a vote of confidence on the reform process. In interpreting the result, which it viewed as an achievement, Die Burger suggested the imminent repeal of the Land and Group Areas Acts and the recession accounted for the CP's good showing. In its comment on the result, Die Beeld, interestingly, reminded leaders that the right had in the past mistakenly used the by-election (to be discussed in the chapter on the 1983 referendum) results to predict a 'no' vote in the 1983 referendum. The paper added that whilst support for reform existed, a strategy was required to articulate that support. The by-election, had yet again served as a 'magnifying glass,' and abetted the CP's campaign to de-legitimise de Klerk and his reforms. Die Burger, regardless, dismissed claims that the vote indicated that the CP enjoyed the support for the majority of Whites. But as the ensuing Ladybrand by-election demonstrated, the referendum promise had stopped working its magic after a year of talks about talks. And the defeat in this Free State seat marked the first of three defeats in by-elections.

The Ladybrand setback:
The Ladybrand contest was triggered by the death of the serving MP, P.J. van Rhyn, who narrowly won the seat in the 1989 general elections. On 22 May 1991, the CP overturned the result, with its candidate Charl Hertzog securing 6,276 votes, as opposed to the NP

86 Leader, 8 March 1991.
87 Die Burger, 8 March 1991.
candidate, Callie Smit’s 5,018 votes. The turnout was 81.1 percent, and, as had been the case in the earlier by-elections, the DP refrained from fielding a candidate. This defeat came despite efforts to exploit the so-called Koos document, authored by backbencher Koos van der Merwe, against the CP. The document spoke of partitioning the Free State in an effort to create a Volksstaat, and was premised on van der Merwe’s understanding that the party could not win a referendum.

In its post-election analysis the local Free State daily, Die Volksblad, reassured its readers that the President would win a referendum after negotiations were completed, and noted that the referendum would prove that the CP was largely irrelevant. The State President similarly dismissed the result, and jested that Koos van der Merwe was correct when he predicted that the CP could not win a referendum. Die Beeld echoed such assessments, opining that, 'the reform supporters will comfortably win a referendum, despite Ladysmith, as the CP’s Koos van der Merwe himself predicts.' These comments confirm that the party had all along planned to hold the vote at this point in the transition process. Moreover, they suggest that the referendum pledge serve as a resource for 'damage control,' in order to play down the by-election result and dismiss CP claims that the government did not have a mandate.

In an interview with Rapport ahead of the 1992 referendum, de Klerk interestingly noted that a referendum would 'strengthen his hands,' and restore 'the situation to what it was prior to Ladybrand.' This revelation seems to affirm the importance that de Klerk attributed to this particular defeat in the context of the transition. With the notable exception of this reference to the referendum, very few pronouncements were to follow in 1991 until the CODESA talks approached. The suspension of ANC-government contacts during a part of this period, as a result of the third force violence, provides one explanation for the absence of references to a referendum. With the prospect of multi-party constitutional negotiations looming, the referendum assumed a new meaning and served a new role for the NP and de Klerk.

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88 In the election the NP candidate had received 5,805 votes as against the CP candidate (A.S. van der Merwe) who secured 5,735 votes. A Democratic Party candidate (J.P. Hughes) secured 471 votes. The turnout was 86.8%. Die Volksblad, 9 May 1991.
90 Die Volksblad, 1 and 2 May 1991.
Towards CODESA:

It was indeed only in early September 1991 that de Klerk reiterated his government’s commitment to honour its pledge to test opinion on the new constitution. Addressing the NP’s Federal Congress in Bloemfontein, he also indicated his certainty that the government would win a referendum and prove that the CP did not represent the majority that it claimed. De Klerk also rejected CP calls for a new general election. Viljoen, speaking in late October 1991, reiterated the government’s commitment to only implement a constitution once it received a mandate through a referendum.

In an interview with Die Vrye Weekblad ahead of the conference, the NP’s secretary general Stoffel van der Merwe belaboured the Party leadership’s referendum pledge and conceded that it could no longer backtrack on its pledge to submit the new constitution to the electorate in a referendum. As with Botha in 1982, a referendum promise no doubt also served to ensure acceptance of the NP’s negotiations plan at the federal and provincial congresses. The NP leadership reduced the salience of the issue, thereby neutralising potential resistance to its proposals at the conference, through the referendum pledge. And as was the case with the 1983 referendum, there was no escaping the referendum after so many pledges had been made.

One critical difference, though, between the two leaders and their reform processes was that de Klerk enjoyed a greater modicum of party unity than his predecessor had. The Federal Conference held in Bloemfontein, only four months ahead of the opening of CODESA, was a key event that allowed the government to present its constitutional blueprint to the party faithful. Some of the NP’s key proposals included a three-tier government structure, including local, regional and national government. The NP further proposed a legislature composed of two houses: a lower house based on proportional representation and a second chamber in which the key political parties and the nine regions of the proposed federation were to be represented. Regional representation was also to be determined on the basis of proportional representation. This second house would have effective veto power over the democratically elected lower house. The party also proposed a ‘collective’ executive comprising representatives of the three leading parties and further called for a rotating presidency.

94 PV 912, 4/1/1.
95 Ibid.
The key ingredients of the proposed NP package borrowed heavily from Arend Lijphart's consociational thinking, and sought to blunt the full impact of democracy. The ANC rejected the NP's package as a 'calculated plan' to undermine the results of an election based on one person one vote and render a democratically elected central government ineffectual. A subsequent ANC statement described the proposals as 'no less than an attempt to disguise an effective minority veto, designed to prevent effective government by a majority party.' Commenting on these proposals at the time, Stellenbosch economist Sampie Terreblanche noted that to 'pretend that the NP plan corresponds with the basic ideas of democracy is pure fraud.'

The Virginia by-election:
The NP's defeat in the Virginia by-election, just weeks ahead of the opening of the CODESA yet again proved the CP's ability to focus its efforts and limited resources on by-elections, and tap into local concerns, in order to send a message to the broader White community. The NP's slender majority of 47 votes from the 1989 elections was easily dissolved with the swing of 7,8 percent in favour of the CP. The by-election marked parity between the CP and the NP in the conservative Orange Free State, as each party now held seven seats. Deur Dawie, who lamented the CP gains in a traditional stronghold, warned that the CP was successfully harnessing fears of Black domination and disapproval over the ailing economy with 'distressing' success. The message from Virginia was that de Klerk did not necessarily represent Whites. Die Afrikaner, for example, viewed the result as 'a clear motion of no confidence in the government and its policy.' And going into CODESA, the NP's second consecutive by-election defeat, despite a further referendum pledge on an interim constitution, weakened de Klerk by raising doubts about his ability to deliver. The provincial leader Kobie Coetsee blamed the defeat on local factors, especially layoffs at the local mines, local violence, and the poor state of the economy.

Die Beeld also highlighted local factors in explaining the defeat. Dirk Laurie, a political

98 Marinus Wiechers to Die Vrye Weekblad, 30 August to 5 September 1991; See Michael Macdonald (1992) and Michael Macdonald and Wilmot James (1993) for an exposition of de Klerk's consociational stratagem and the influence of the work of Donald Horowitz and Arend Lijphart on the NP.
100 Die Vrye Weekblad, 6-12 September 1991.
analyst interviewed by *Die Burger* warned that the Virginia result confirmed that the CP could secure a majority of 10 – 12 seats in a general election.\(^{107}\)

Despite the mounting pressure for a referendum or general election, the latter was effectively ruled out by the NP’s repeated referendum pledges. And holding a referendum ahead of the CODESA talks would be bad timing. According to comments made by the NP’s Secretary General, Dr. Stoffel van der Merwe, in December the party had planned to stage such a vote in the latter half of 1992, following initial progress in the negotiations.\(^{108}\) Interestingly, van der Merwe had earlier noted that a September vote, three years after the last general election, was the 'ideal time to yet again test feelings, and the NP would like something specific with which to go to the voters.'\(^{109}\) In the parliamentary debate following the June 1990 Umlazi by-election de Klerk, similarly, noted that the party would stage the referendum once the negotiations had produced a constitution. This decision to hold the vote in the second half of 1992 remained unchanged as late as mid-January 1992,\(^{110}\) despite the defeat in the Virginia race. This suggests that political elites do not call referenda in response to a single development, but only after careful and long consideration, although specific political events, like defeat in a by-election, may determine its timing.

Rethinking the referendum:
With the CODESA talks approaching, the NP’s existing view of the referendum as a veto to placate Whites gradually began to evolve. And the NP now began to hint that the outcome of the negotiations should be designed in order to secure a positive result in the promised referendum. In other words, the referendum came to be viewed as an instrument to constrain the ANC’s demands at the negotiating table. In his address at the opening of the CODESA talks de Klerk stated; 'If the proposals in respect of transitional measures are fair to all, the response from every section of the population will be an overwhelming 'Yes.'\(^{111}\) A few weeks earlier, de Klerk had similarly noted that a 'yes' result in a referendum would be made possible if voters were presented with a package that 'guaranteed long-term stability, participation for all without the oppression of minorities

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\(^{111}\) PV 734, File M7/6/1 Vol. 184, F.W. de Klerk speech on the occasion of the launch of the CODESA talks, 20 December 1991.
In a similar vein, Gerrit Viljoen hinted in January 1992 that the referendum was to be viewed as a 'challenge' to overcome, and not an 'obstacle,' as the ANC claimed. Viljoen informed parliament that a 'well marketable product' was required to do so.\footnote{Die Burger, 26 November 1991.}

Dr. Stoffel van der Merwe's post-Virginia referendum pronouncement also suggests that the NP was adapting its referendum thinking in order to address the new challenges it faced in the negotiations process. Van der Merwe, also a graduate of the 1983 referendum, hinted that the planned referendum could serve to legitimise interim measures en-route to a new constitution.\footnote{Die Burger. 25 November 1991.} De Klerk also made this clear in his references to the referendum at the opening of CODESA and on the occasion of the opening of parliament in early 1992.\footnote{PV 734, File M7/6/1 Vol. 184; Hansard, 24 January 1992, Column 36-37.} The idea of holding a referendum on a transitional government reflected a growing NP interest in such an interim period, premised on a pact of sorts. The growing interest in a referendum on an interim dispensation probably also reflected the dual understanding that the ANC would not accept a referendum on the final deal, effectively giving Whites a veto, and mounting fears that too long a delay until the referendum would make a positive outcome less likely.

**A referendum for all?**

De Klerk's CODESA statements suggest that the referendum was gradually being viewed as a form of leverage in NP-ANC negotiations, and that such pronouncements only served to unsettle the ANC, which increasingly came to view the referendum as a hindrance. The oft-made pledge to give White South Africans a final say over the new constitution, therefore, emerged as a source of tension between the ANC and the government. Taken at face value, the previous NP statements on the referendum could hardly have been understood as anything else. On the occasion of the opening of the 1992 parliamentary session, the leader of the opposition, Andries Treurnicht raised a question that many in the ANC were raising at the time, namely, how the government would 'justify a White veto' of the CODESA talks, guilefully referred to as 'Condemnsa' by Treurnicht.\footnote{Hansard, 27 January 1992, Column 82.} Responding to such criticism, Gerrit Viljoen insisted that a referendum would 'clearly be about the acceptability of an already negotiated and agreed-upon draft constitutional change. Voters will have to vote yes or no with regard to accepting such a published and publicly debated...
draft constitutional amendment.\textsuperscript{117} De Klerk’s failure to honour this pledge would be held against him by his post-transition critics.

This tension with the ANC might explain the government’s increasing reference to a referendum for other population groups. The first hint of a referendum for all South Africans came from Gerrit Viljoen in early June 1990, in an interview granted to \textit{Agence France Press}.\textsuperscript{118} And as the CODESA talks drew nearer, Viljoen proposed an open referendum for all population groups, yet insisted that the support from each particular group – especially Whites – would be counted separately.\textsuperscript{119} De Klerk and his chief negotiator clearly viewed the idea of a referendum for all as a new means to justify the White referendum, reasoning that it blurred the patent racial connotation of the all-White referendum. To add credibility to the broader referendum, in which White votes would still be counted separately, de Klerk suggested to the CODESA delegates that the electorate of the three existing houses – Coloureds, Indians and Whites would have to approve the new constitution. And, in late January 1992, three weeks before calling the referendum, de Klerk pointed out that the government was 'honour bound to hold a referendum which will offer the electorates of each of the three Houses of Parliament the opportunity to express themselves,' on the new constitution. De Klerk went as far as to suggest a referendum amongst Blacks on this occasion. According to de Klerk support for the new constitution would be counted both horizontally and vertically, per population group.\textsuperscript{120} Gerrit Viljoen made four important statements regarding a referendum in January 1992, all of which were intended to deflect ANC claims that the referendum constituted a White veto. Viljoen was again at pains to point out that the referendum was not an 'obstacle,' but rather a 'challenge.'\textsuperscript{121} Moreover, the NP suddenly displayed a newfound concern with the legitimacy of the future constitution, suggesting that an all-South African referendum would furnish such legitimacy. Viljoen was also anxious to distinguish between a White referendum, as promised to the White electorate in 1989, and a referendum for the rest of the country. In separate comments made at the same time he informed the NP’s internal newspaper that it 'goes without saying, of course, that it [the constitution] must also have the support of the majority of Blacks. Should even the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[118] \textit{Dir Burger}, 16 June 1990.
\item[119] PV 912, 4/1/1.
\item[121] PV 912, 4/1/1.
\end{footnotes}
majority of Zulus be against a proposed new dispensation it would be a bad start – a recipe for failure.  

De Klerk’s February 1992 decision to stage a Whites only referendum, ahead of schedule and a final or interim deal, resolved this tension with the ANC. The irony is that de Klerk, who had so often remarked that he was 'honour bound' to consult the voters of the two other houses, did not do so. When asked to explain why, de Klerk contends that the White constituency was the only one that opposed his reforms. The ANC’s eventual decision to make space for de Klerk to run the all White referendum, despite severe misgivings over such a vote, demonstrated its strategic and tactical brilliance and its political maturity. For the ANC appreciated a referendum as a 'strategy to defeat – once and for all – the right wing through the ballot box. More importantly, the ANC recognised that it was in its interest to deal with a strong negotiating partner. For this reason, it not only consented to the NP’s war of manoeuvre with the CP, but also had hardliner figures like Chris Hani call on Whites to vote yes. And leading White ANC and SACP activists, like Jeremy Cronin, voted yes in the referendum.

The referendum and CODESA:
The very nature of the CODESA talks and the later referendum are viewed as being consonant with, and the result of, de Klerk’s strong desire to keep the moral 'high ground' during the negotiations. Securocrats who worked with P.W. Botha attribute the transparent nature of the CODESA talks, which a was marked departure from Botha’s secretive talks, to his desire to pander to the international community and maintain the high ground. This was in order to apply international pressure on the ANC, in the hope that they would make mistakes and moderate their demands. A September 1989 Die Burger leader, which opined that transparent negotiations could benefit the government after years of secret negotiations, confirms Thirion’s account. The paper noted that transparent talks would

124 Interview with F.W. de Klerk (21 November 2002).
127 Interview with Vali Moosa (29 November 2001).
serve as a 'stimulus for the entire process,' and ensure that the finger of blame would not be pointed at the government if, and when, there were delays in the negotiations. The government's blitz offensive did initially unsettle and surprise the ANC, and Willie Esterhuyse, who was sent to brief the ANC exiled leadership in London, notes that Aziz Pahad's reaction to the 2 February 1990 speech was that de Klerk had 'pulled the carpet from under the ANC's feet.' De Klerk did not, though, appreciate the full implications of what he set in motion on 2 February 1990, and whilst he managed to maintain the high ground until the opening of CODESA on 20 December 1991, the transparent nature of the talks was to lay him bare to an ignominious humiliation at the hands of Nelson Mandela.

The agreed format of the talks was that Mandela would open the CODESA deliberations, whilst de Klerk would conclude proceedings. In his address, de Klerk called on the ANC to end its armed struggle and condemned it for failing to disclose arms caches and disband its armed wing. 'Regrettably,' de Klerk noted, 'from the Government's point of view, there is one major obstacle in the way of rapid progress within CODESA.' De Klerk's robust speech, which was probably designed to placate White fears, however, enraged the ANC. A seething Mandela rose to rebuff de Klerk's charges, retorting that de Klerk was the head of an illegitimate, discredited minority regime.

Mandela's response constituted the most dramatic loss of face that a single Afrikaner leader had ever suffered. Die Burger, which described the incident as a 'head on collision,' of course, sought to suggest that it was Mandela who destroyed the 'pretense that he was a unifying national figure.' And the paper submitted to its readers that de Klerk was the better man by not responding to the 'character assassination.' A more candid Pik Botha, though, informed the CODESA audience that the Mandela comments hurt the NP government. Die Beeld was far brusquer, and in a leader, entitled, 'First Shock,' it conceded that the incident had undermined de Klerk amongst White voters. Commenting on Mandela's response, Patti Waldmeier notes that the 'aura of power which had cloaked Afrikaner leaders for the best part of fifty years began to dissipate that day.

131 Interview (30 October 2001).
133 PV 734, File M7/6/1 Vol. 184.
The balance of power which had weighed so heavily in his [de Klerk's] favour since February 1990, began subtly to shift.\textsuperscript{138} In no less dramatic terms, both Tim du Plessis and Ken Owen suggest that it was at the opening of CODESA that it dawned upon F.W. de Klerk that he could not control events.\textsuperscript{139} Owen adds that from this point on, de Klerk lost his sure touch, deftness, skill and confidence in the transition process. De Klerk was 'on the retreat.'\textsuperscript{140}

Both Willie Esterhuysen and Sampie Terreblanche, claim that the referendum was in response to this incident at the CODESA opening.\textsuperscript{141} Esterhuysen argues that the referendum allowed de Klerk to re-establish his authority and regain the initiative he had lost at CODESA.\textsuperscript{142} Though de Klerk denies this suggestion,\textsuperscript{143} his referendum campaign would suggest otherwise. For, it was a US-style Presidential campaign and focussed heavily on selling de Klerk.\textsuperscript{144} One possible explanation for this campaign is that the NP may have wanted to distil the choice to one between de Klerk, the moderate, and Treurnicht, the reactionary. \textit{Rapport} described de Klerk as the NP's most sellable product,\textsuperscript{145} and the referendum literature recognises the salience of the 'leadership effect'\textsuperscript{146} in campaigns. The nature of the campaign does, however, hint at a longer-term agenda, and it seems likely that the NP's referendum campaign might have also had the 1994 elections in mind.

Brigadier (Ret.) Bill Sass suggests that in order to maintain the support of the international community de Klerk had to produce 'gimmicks' to sustain the process and convince them that he was committed to reform. The referendum, according to Sass, then served as one such gimmick, which showed that the public was behind him.\textsuperscript{147} Support for this idea also comes from Tim du Plessis, who suggests that the referendum also served to

\textsuperscript{138} Patti Waldmeier, \textit{Anatomy of a Miracle}, p. 191.
\textsuperscript{139} Interview (28 November 2001).
\textsuperscript{140} Interview (10 December 2002).
\textsuperscript{141} Interview with Willie Esterhuysen (30 October 2001); \textit{Die Vrve Weekblad}, 28 February – 5 March 1992.
\textsuperscript{142} Interview with Willie Esterhuysen (30 October 2001).
\textsuperscript{143} Interview (21 November 2001).
\textsuperscript{144} \textit{Die Vrve Weekblad}, 28 February – 5 March 1992.
\textsuperscript{145} \textit{Rapport}, 1 March 1992.

\textsuperscript{146} The so-called 'leadership effect' (Bogdanor, 1994: 46) has been demonstrated in Puerto Rico in 1951 (Bhana, 1975:165), Spain's 1986 NATO referendum, (Valles, Pallares and Ramon Maria Canals, 1986: 310) and Ireland's 1995 divorce referendum (Adshead: 1996, 141). Robert Worcester (2000: 7, 13) argues that the credibility and popularity of the leaders of yes the camp abetted the yes vote in the UK's 1972 referendum on Europe. Dwindling popular support for governments can also have an adverse effect on referendum votes, as demonstrated in Canada's 1992 constitutional referendum (Burgess: 1993, 377), Jamaica's vote on a West Indian Federation (Mordecai, 1968: 411) and Ireland's 1986 divorce referendum (Franklin, van der Eijik and Marsh, 1995: 101-117). Canada's referendum also saw the leadership effect of the former Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau, whose opposition to the constitution aided the no campaign (LeDuc, 1993: 260 and Vipond, 1993: 50).
'buy de Klerk time and give him international recognition and goodwill.' Tellingly, de Klerk noted that there is 'growing international support, specifically for those fundamental points of departure which are part of the mandate we obtained in the referendum,' in comments made after the vote. Ultimately, though, the referendum was primarily used to stem the momentum of the CP, which after three by-election victories undermined de Klerk’s negotiating ability and his claim to speak for Whites in negotiations. In his revealing Rapport interview prior to the referendum, the President added that the CP was determined to create the impression that his hand was weakened at the negotiating table, and de Klerk argued that 'without a referendum, I believe, this idea will do further damage.' De Klerk added that he wished to address the oft-made claim that he did not have a mandate.

'Shock therapy,' de Klerk deploys the referendum:
As already noted, the CP gains in the post-1989 by-elections countered general trends of increased liberalisation in White attitudes, instead reflecting White uncertainty over the process and disaffection with the poor state of the economy, the crippling drought rising crime and violence, as well as particular local concerns. Whilst the NP managed to explain the Ladybrand and Virginia defeats, the CP’s third consecutive by-election gain, in Potchefstroom on 17 February 1992, was presented as yet further evidence that de Klerk did not have a mandate for negotiations. In addition, the result seemed to confirm mounting speculation that the CP could quite easily win a general election. For some it represented yet another Wakkerstroom, a cue that defeat in a general election was likely. Wakkerstroom had on two previous occasions provided for historical by-elections, prior to the 1924 and 1948 general elections, which on each occasion signalled Smuts’s impending defeat.

The significance of the Potchefstroom seat, which had been previously held by former Minister of Law and Order and Speaker of the Parliament, Louis Le Grange, lay in the fact that it had historically been an NP safe-seat. The importance of Potchefstroom was also derived from the fact that it was a major middle class town which was neither

147 Interview (23 November 2001).
148 Interview (28 November 2001).
dependent on mining, as had been the case in Virginia, or agriculture, as had been the case with Ladybrand. Moreover, the town housed a significant student population, drawn from a wide catchment area. Symbolically, the local university was one of the leading Afrikaans universities and had been instrumental in the emergence and propagation of Christian Nationalism. De Klerk had studied there and served as the University’s rector.

In his own account of the South African transition de Klerk suggests that the defeat at Potchefstroom brought home the point that ‘the National Party and I could not continue with the negotiations without a democratic endorsement of our policies.’\(^{152}\) De Klerk similarly focused on the issue of CP gains in an interview granted to *The Sunday Times*\(^ {153}\) and *Rapport*\(^ {154}\) the weekend after the Potchefstroom by-election. The NP’s internal newspaper also indicated that the key objective of the referendum was dispelling CP claims that the party did not have a mandate.\(^ {155}\)

Three by-election defeats in succession forced de Klerk to 'swing Whites behind' him,\(^ {156}\) and demonstrate his ability to deliver to the ANC.\(^ {157}\) Moreover, he was certain that Whites supported his reforms,\(^ {158}\) and well aware that a referendum was the only democratic endorsement he could safely assume.\(^ {159}\) A referendum was, as one journalist noted, a 'mismatch,'\(^ {160}\) which forced the CP to into 'a test of strength on a terrain and at a time' of de Klerk’s choosing.\(^ {161}\) Even on an 18 percent swing, as was the case in the Virginia by-election, the NP would win a referendum.\(^ {162}\) This did not, though, hold true for a general election.

Whilst de Klerk informed *Rapport* and *The Star* that he had for 'some time considered a referendum,'\(^ {163}\) Leon Wessels notes that the NP’s Cape leader Dawie de Villiers had warned de Klerk that defeat at Potchefstroom was likely. Wessels suggests that it was, in fact, David de Villiers who proposed that the NP administer a dose of 'shock

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\(^{156}\) Interview with Neil Barnard (5 December 2002).

\(^{157}\) Interviews with Neil Barnard (5 December 2002) and Harold Pakendorf (9 December 2002).

\(^{158}\) Interviews with Dave Stewart (12 December 2001) and Max du Preez (27 November 2001).


therapy' by calling a referendum at that point in time. Wessels adds that the Cape leader's role is not adequately recognised.164

The CP 'bogey' laid to rest:
On the morning of 18 February 1992, de Klerk informed the NP caucus that he was going to call a referendum and he reportedly presented his caucus with two alternatives to the referendum after the Potchefstroom defeat, a general election or sweating it out.165 There was very little debate, as the NP caucus traditionally did not make major decisions of this nature. There are, nonetheless, suggestions that there were some legislators, in the shocked caucus, who had misgivings over the sagacity of calling a referendum, believing the government should wait for conditions to improve.166 De Klerk, in fact, believes that that the caucus been able to vote on the issue, they would have voted against a referendum.167 The speed of the announcement following the by-election defeat reinforces the interpretation that de Klerk had some time to mull over the decision beforehand. Besides, the longer de Klerk dithered over deploying the referendum the more support the NP would lose.168

The CP's claims that de Klerk had no mandate for his participation in CODESA - reinforced by three by-election defeats - not only undermined de Klerk's legitimacy and ability to effectively negotiate,169 but also encouraged growing support amongst his opponents for violent resistance to his reforms.170 And as de Klerk had 'wrong footed' the ANC in February 1990, he now caught the CP, who were still celebrating their Potchefstroom victory, unawares by calling a snap referendum. By setting the date of the vote for less than a month after the Potchefstroom by-election, de Klerk ensured a brief - 22 day long - campaign. The date was, to some extent, dictated by the existing political timetable, as the NP was anxious to stage the referendum prior to announcing an unpopular budget on 18 March.171 The deft move was made possible by the fact that legislation for a referendum, introduced in 1983 by de Klerk, was already in place.

One unanticipated benefit of the referendum for de Klerk was the split within the CP over a boycott. Whilst moderates supported participation, hardliners, who constituted

164 Interviews with Leon Wessels (23 November 2001) and Tertius Delport (25 October 2001).
166 Interview with Boy Geldenhuys (25 October 2001).
167 Interview (25 November 2001).
170 Johann van Rooyen, Hard Right, pp. 194-200.
the majority on the party’s executive, at first, carried a vote for a boycott. The moderates, who were more preponderant in the caucus, forced a caucus vote, which reversed the executive’s earlier decision. Though this episode is beyond the scope of this study, it should be noted that the moderate wing, which favoured participation in negotiations and the pursuit of a White volkstaat, viewed the referendum as an opportunity to territorialise opposition to CODESA and support for a volkstaat. A 'no' majority in the Free State, for example, was viewed in some circles as expedient in promoting claims for a volkstaat. The moderate faction also cautioned that the party would be marginalized by a boycott. Some moderates sincerely believed that the party could win the referendum. These awry assessments were based on public opinion in the conservative rural areas they represented and these legislators were, in a sense, victims of the Westminster system.

Hardliners, on the other hand, were cognisant that they would lose the vote and hoped that a boycott would undermine the legitimacy of de Klerk’s referendum mandate. As the hardliners predicted the CP was indeed no match for the NP machine, succoured by the DP, the English and Afrikaans media, the international community and the corporate sector. The only pending variable was the scale of the victory, 67 percent, which seems to have surprised even the NP leadership.

The overwhelming 'Yes' majority delivered a 'knockout blow' to the CP and effectively ended White politics. And as de Klerk anticipated, the referendum exposed the right wing’s lack of broad public support, at most 30 percent, and graphically demonstrated the distortion that the by-elections and the Westminster (first-past-the-post) system had produced. Moreover, the CP’s opposition to reform – implied by the question - exposed the fact that it did not offer an alternative. The defeat of the right in the referendum ensured that only two alternatives remained open to the defeated right, participation in CODESA, in order to secure a volkstaat, or rebellion, thus splitting the right between the so called 'soft right' and the hard right. And in the aftermath of the referendum, the pragmatic wing of the party, under Andries Beyers split to form the Afrikaner Volksunie (AVU), which along with Carel Boshoff and Ferdi Hartzenberg of the CP joined the Kempton Park negotiations. The marginalization and radicalisation of a tiny

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173 Interview with Corne and Pieter Mulder (23 October 2001).
174 Interview with Eldad Louw (6 December 2001).
175 Leon Wessels, Die Einde van 'n Era, Vervryding van 'n Afrikaner (Cape Town, 1994), p. 64.
177 Johann van Rooyen, Hard Right, pp. 171 -172.
element of the right, as some commentators warned,179 was demonstrated by the assassination of SACP leader Chris Hani by a CP supporter at the behest of a CP backbencher Clive Derby Lewis.180 This option of a rebellion was finally tested and failed at Mmbabatho.181 In contrast to the divided CP, the referendum contributed to NP unity.182

The ANC also deserves substantial credit for its handling of the White right and developed several secret tracks of negotiations with its leadership. Spearheaded by Afrikaans-speaking Terror Lekotha, the ANC’s outreach effort saw it meet with leaders of extra-parliamentary groups on at least three occasions.183 There were even suggestions that the ANC’s Thabo Mbeki and Tito Mboweni met with CP leaders in Europe.184 Lekotha also engaged with the management and workers of the state rail company, Spoornet, the leadership of the Rapportreyers (an Afrikaner Rotary type organisation) and Afrikaans businessmen.185 The ANC’s efforts were designed to lock the right into negotiations and included hints that the party would allow the question of White self-determination to be discussed at CODESA. In doing so, the ANC sought to ensure that the transition ‘chess game’ includes a maximal number of players.186 Such initiatives also created cracks within the White right.

A strengthened hand:

The referendum, though, not only served to settle what de Klerk viewed as ‘unnecessary and wasteful’ debates over who represents Whites.187 The message of the NP’s campaign pointed to an agenda beyond merely rebutting charges that de Klerk did not have a mandate. In an interview with Rapport, de Klerk noted that if we ‘win the referendum, my position at CODESA as government and party, and thus as one of the most important actors, will be re-established.’188 Speaking in Cape Town, during the campaign, de Klerk

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179 R.W. Johnson, The Times, 16 March 1992; Johann van Rooyen, Hard Right, p. 188.
180 Leon Wessels, Die Einde van 'n Era, p. 75.
181 On 11 March 1994 the far right Afrikaner Weerstands Beweeging (AWB) movement attempt to cease control of Bophuthatswana’s capital Mmbabatho in order to intercede on behalf of the Bantustan leader, Lucas Mangope, who faced a popular revolt. The raid disastrously failed and ended with the execution, broadcast live, of three White hard-liners. The incident is said to have convinced former SADF Chief of Staff, Constand Viljoen, to desist from any armed resistance to the impeding transition (Waldmeier, 1997, 247).
183 Hennie Serfontein, Die Vrve Weekblad, 6-12 December 1991.
184 Ibid.
informed his audience that by 'voting yes you strengthen the hands of your representatives.' De Klerk also argued that a 'landslide will have an electric effect, internationally and internally, it will immediately give an impetus to the process on which we have embarked upon.' Ever reflective of the NP's thinking, Die Burger hinted to its readers that a resounding 'yes' would strengthen the NP's hand. It was indeed a long-held NP view that a strong NP was essential in order to secure minority (White) rights. Speaking after the results became known, de Klerk described the referendum result as a 'new high platform,' which should be used to forge a 'better future for all South Africans.'

De Klerk became even more bullish after the vote and remarks in a key address to parliament, on the occasion of the Budget vote in April 1992, provide a startling insight of the interpretation that he gave to the result, one that reflected his thinking on the referendum at the time. De Klerk portrayed the referendum mandate as proof positive that the process was 'irreversible,' and suggested that the vote allowed 'the full focus' to be on 'the question of how the new dispensation should look.' Moreover, de Klerk viewed the referendum result as a 'clear verdict on several fundamental points of departure – on fundamental issues which together form a clear framework for a new constitution as well as for a transitional dispensation.' De Klerk also informed the Parliament that there was broad 'understanding and growing international support, specifically for those fundamental points of departure which are part of the mandate we obtained in the referendum.' The mandate, as de Klerk understood it, included, power sharing without domination, the protection of minority rights, language and culture, etc.

Looking ahead, de Klerk spoke of a new 'political playing field' for South Africa, and prophesised that 'in the place of old divisions, new ones will emerge. As in the rest of the world, economic policy directions will become the most important factor and politics will begin to move mainly in two broad streams.' The implication for his own party was a de Klerk prediction that the NP will continue to grow and broaden its support base. Adding, 'one does not liquidate a winner,' de Klerk invited others to join the NP as the 'party political process of the new dispensation has already begun.' De Klerk’s comments on the ANC further reinforce this perception. He noted that the 'ANC now has a great

192 PV 734, File M7/6/1 Vol. 189.
responsibility to adapt to new circumstances and really begin speaking the language of reconciliation.' To this, the ebullient de Klerk added that the ANC was out of step on two issues. The first was its desire to 'ride the hobby horse of Apartheid.' Secondly, de Klerk called on the ANC to purge itself of communism. This, then, was de Klerk's rather ambitious interpretation of his mandate. The impact of de Klerk's exegesis of the vote result was to prove disastrous for the negotiating process.

The referendum and CODESA:

Whilst the referendum had positive ramifications within White politics, its impact on the broader transition process was less manifest. One of the negative aspects of the referendum was that the government became over-confident and intransigent.\textsuperscript{194} In the context of the CODESA process this translated into a 'more aggressive government stance.' And NP negotiator Kobie Coetsee, for example, commented to his fellow negotiators in Working Group 1 that, 'no one thought that I would be able to deliver a 'yes' vote in the Orange Free State.' Steven Friedman argues, 'In hindsight, that statement was read as a signal that the result had given him the power and the right to set the tone in working group 1.'\textsuperscript{195} Moreover, the referendum widened the gulf between the two principle parties in the negotiations. Whilst the NP dug its heels in after the referendum, and started 'playing 'hardball with its opponents,'\textsuperscript{196} the ANC interpreted the result as a White 'endorsement to a settlement on any terms.'\textsuperscript{197} The New Nation, for example, viewed the referendum as a 'blank cheque.'\textsuperscript{198} The referendum, then, served to embolden the positions of the respective parties and served to fortify the NP's desire to attain the 75 percent clause, which precipitated the collapse of the CODESA talks in mid May.\textsuperscript{199} Some critics charge that the 1992 referendum served to reinforce ethnic politics in the midst of the debate over South Africa's political dispensation.\textsuperscript{200} The collapse of CODESA, in turn,


\textsuperscript{195} Steven Friedman, The Long Journey, p. 40.

\textsuperscript{196} Alistair Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, p. 134.

\textsuperscript{197} Jay Naaadoo, The Sowetan, 28 March 1992; Steven Friedman, The Long Journey, p. 42.

\textsuperscript{198} New Nation, 20– 26 March 1992.

\textsuperscript{199} The CODESA process collapsed as a result of the NP's insistence that amendments to ordinary clauses of the constitution require a three quarters and not two-thirds majority. The ANC craftily agreed to a 70% requirement for amendments – whilst further consenting to the three quarters caveat for changes to the Bill of Fundamental Human Rights - but suggested that an ordinary referendum settle the constitution in the event of a deadlock of more than 6 months.

triggered some of South Africa's worst political violence, and the period following the referendum announcement alone witnessed a 100 percent increase.\textsuperscript{201}

The NP's obduracy, as a result of their referendum victory, was a small disadvantage when measured against its contribution in removing the threat of the right wing. After the 17 March 1992 it became clear to all South Africans, and not least to the right-wing politicians, that they did not represent a constituency of any significance. Furthermore, the referendum also provided the ANC with reassuring evidence that the NP could deliver its White constituency. In this regard the referendum also contributed stability to the process. And by holding a referendum on the general principal of negotiations, De Klerk did not have to return to the electorate with the specifics of the final agreement. He was increasingly unsure that he could win a referendum on a detailed final agreement, and there were suggestions that he called the early referendum to avoid the oft-promised vote on the final deal.\textsuperscript{202} Some of de Klerk's White critics charge that his considered referendum backfired in two respects. First, he gambled away his trump card of the right wing threat. Secondly, he effectively removed his planned 'White veto' on the eventual CODESA deal.\textsuperscript{203}

Conclusion:
This chapter has highlighted the role of the referendum in the initial stages of South Africa's transition, and de Klerk's use of the mechanism for transition \textit{heresthetics}. In this initial phase, the referendum was designed to placate White public opinion and free de Klerk's hand for his planned \textit{blitz}. Specifically, the referendum pledges were designed to hint to Whites that they would have the last say over the negotiations process and convince them that the managed transition was a fail-safe process. De Klerk had clearly engaged in what historical institutionalists describe as 'social learning,' having gained valuable insights from Botha's incremental reforms. One key lesson was that speed was essential. De Klerk was also patently aware that whilst the first-past-the-post system was no longer 'NP friendly,' he could, with ease, build a reform coalition – the same one that Botha had constructed in 1983 - of liberals and NP supporters in a referendum. A referendum was a loaded dice that favoured him, and articulated the basic public support for reforms, support, which the existing political institutions obscured, especially in the

\textsuperscript{203} \textit{The Star}, 22 February 1992.
by-elections. A second key lesson for de Klerk was that he should pre-empt the demand for a referendum and pledge one before the CP harnessed it as part of its efforts to undermine him.

As we have noted, thinking on the referendum evolved over time. At first serving to placate Whites, as time passed, the referendum pledge was designed to remove the reform issue from the by-elections. And once the government got as far as the CODESA talks it came to view the referendum as a resource in the negotiations and its relations with the ANC. This particular use of the referendum is not unique. Some suggest that Israeli leaders have used the promise of a referendum to extract concessions from their Arab interlocutors, or secure larger aid contributions from the international community.204 More recently Austria’s right-wing government used the threat of a referendum on Austrian-EU relations as leverage to suspend sanctions by EU member states, after the inclusion of Jorg Haider’s Freedom Party in the government.205 Such thinking became even more pervasive once the scale of the victory became known. De Klerk did not, however, enter the transition with this in mind. Though the right-wing threat might, in retrospect, have been overstated, there was no certainty that this was the case at the time. More importantly, the political right, extra-parliamentary factions and the reactionary components in the military reinforced one another. The greatest threat to the transition was the CP’s increased success in undermining the government’s formal legitimacy – through the by-elections – to erode de Klerk’s informal legitimacy, and create an atmosphere conducive to violence. The referendum exposed the real extent of support for the right and their ideology, and effectively ‘decertified’ it.

This chapter has dealt with the question of: Why the referendum? In the ensuing chapters we will try to answer the second key research question, namely: where did de Klerk get the idea from? Like Botha, De Klerk, was no intellectual and had no real experience of democracy. And, as such, both men would have learnt about the referendum from their work in the party. In order to understand de Klerk we need to understand Botha’s use of the referendum. Understanding Botha, though, requires that we understand Verwoerd’s referendum, in which Botha was intimately involved. But in order to understand the 1960 referendum we need to study the historical conflicts within White and NP politics that led to the 1960 referendum.

205 Charlemagne, The Economist, 8 July 2000.
Chapter Five.

The struggle over white South African identity.

Though they [Botha and Smuts] repudiated Hertzog's 'two-stream' policy, they repudiated just as vigorously his fears that the individuality of the Boer, as a race, would be drowned in the 'one-stream' current which they foresaw as the right future for the white national blood in South Africa. Where Hertzog feared the disappearance of the identity of his people, they looked to the energetic, vigorous survival of the Boer as at least an equal, possibly a dominant, element in that mingled tide. That was why they were not always fretting, as he was, against incidental infraction of the equal rights of the Dutch-speaking people. Their belief in the ultimate result was firm. They had, in fact, a much greater faith in the qualities of their own people than Hertzog had.¹

The introduction of the referendum in South African politics:

The ensuing chapter examines White South African politics from the institution of the Union, in 1910, till the formation of PACT government of 1924. This discussion is primarily designed to introduce the key fault line in white politics, between the opposition Nationalist Party (NP) and the ruling South African Party (SAP). An appreciation of these differences is crucial to our understanding of later politics and the eventual introduction of the referendum. The key political issue that divided Whites in the first three decades of the Union's existence was not the racial policy, over which there was remarkable consensus, it was rather the Union's relations with Britain. This question encapsulated the struggle over relations between the Afrikaans community and the smaller community of English speakers, and the republican issue. It was harnessed by those who placed narrow Afrikaner interests over the need for conciliation between the two. For the NP, its support for Republicanism was expedient in consolidating its ethnic support base and appeal, especially in the rural areas of the former republican Transvaal and Free State. This same hobbyhorse, however, served as an impediment in trying to appeal to voters in urban areas, and as a result, the NP found it expedient to qualify its support for a republic with a provision that it would only be created on the basis of broad popular will, in other words, a referendum. At election time, a referendum pledge on this issue would thus allow the party to also focus on economic issues, which were at times salient. This tactical use of the referendum was also driven by the fact that the party's leaders themselves, especially the influential founder of the party J.B.M. Hertzog, were reluctant republicans, who largely embraced republicanism out of opportunist tactical considerations.

Some other tactical motivations that will be explored, in order to understand the embrace of the referendum, include the NP's support for the failed 1914 rebellion, which significantly discredited the non-constitutional path to a republic and the NP's desire to appeal to non-republicans in elections, especially after its setback in the 1921 elections, and internal divisions within the party over the republican issue. In addition to these tactical motivations for the referendum promise, often a tool of opposition parties, I will explore where the idea of the referendum came from. A desire to appeal to Wilsonian principles after the Great War, and the use of the referendum in Southern Rhodesia in 1922, are important reasons for its adoption by the NP whilst in opposition.

Post Union political struggles over (White) South African identity:

Louis Botha's appeal to the white Transvaal electorate, in promoting the Union, was that they should not remain 'little Transvaalers,' but instead become 'great South Africans.'

What exactly it meant to be a (White) South African and the nature of relations between the Union's English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking communities was the key struggle of post-Union politics. And this struggle over identity and symbols provides the backdrop to the flag referendum proposal of 1926 and the eventual 1960 referendum on a republic.

Amongst Afrikaners, who constituted well over 50 percent of the White population, at least two distinct schools or 'streams' of thinking emerged on the question of crafting a White national identity. One approach, associated with Louis Botha and Jan Christian (J.C.) Smuts, propounded 'nation building by conciliation.' Imbued with the spirit of the Union's genesis, Botha and Smuts envisaged the two White population groups flowing into one stream, thereby creating a shared South African identity. The original proponent of this inclusive notion of Afrikaner identity was the Cape Afrikaner leader, Onze Jan Hofmeyr, who viewed Switzerland and Canada as possible models for the Cape to emulate. And until the outbreak of World War One, and the rebellion against South

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3 The 1936 census showed that Afrikaners constitute 56 percent of the two million large white population. The census also, however, demonstrated that the intra-white demographic scales were tilted in favour of Afrikaners, who made up 64 percent of the youth (Schoeman, 1977, 240).
Africa’s invasion of German South West Africa (Namibia), this approach enjoyed wide support and seemed to be taking root.

In contrast, leaders like James Barry Munnik (J.B.M.) Hertzog and Daniel Francois (D.F.) Malan, opposed conciliation. They feared that the 'one stream' philosophy would endanger the fledgling Afrikaans language and culture. The proponents of the so-called 'two-stream' approach were in essence protectionists, and propagated a separation between the cultural lives of the two White communities and the equal treatment of the two languages. For the Afrikaner nationalist, the 'alienation, anxiety, and insecurity of the new order could only be reduced within the womb of ethnic collectivity.' And, for Hertzog, who distinguished between cultural and political nationality, language equality was a precondition for political and constitutional equality.8

This dichotomy of 'streams,' though appealing, is insufficiently nuanced. For, whereas Hertzog rejected the timing of the Smuts-Botha conciliation policy and not the principle,9 and viewed English and Afrikaans speakers who saw South Africa as their home as Afrikaners,10 Malan and his supporters simply did not believe that English-Afrikaner integration was possible.11 Some extremists in the Broederbond, like Henning du Plessis, in fact hoped for the assimilation of English speakers in a Republic.12 The proponents of this exclusive approach, encapsulated in the doctrines of Christian nationalism, were inspired by Cape nationalist S.J. du Toit and President Kruger, and proposed that Afrikaners dominate. Historically, the major catalysts for an exclusive identity were immigration, competition over resources, and mounting anti-imperialist and British sentiments, fuelled by the two Anglo-Boer Wars and Anglicisation policies.13 Hertzog, however, recognised that Kruger’s exclusion of Uitlanders had failed as English speakers intended to stay.14

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Hermann Giliomee attributes these differences between Hertzog and Malan to their divergent political strategies. Whilst the former sought to build a 'cross ethnic middle class base' for his party, Malan's political strategy was to 'unify politically the Afrikaners who constituted more than 50 percent of the electorate.'

Botha, Smuts and Hertzog, ultimately, embraced a subjective definition of Afrikanerdom. They were, to varying degrees, supporters of what Hans Kohn describes as civic or western (white) nationalism. The likes of Malan, Strijdom and Verwoerd, who were not involved in the Boer war, pursued an even more exclusive identity, and subscribed to what Kohn described as an eastern or organic form of (white) nationalism. Whereas Hertzogism catered for a subjective definition of South African identity, the Christian Nationalist variant demanded 'objective' criteria for membership.

For the likes of Malan a South African nationality could not be created, a 'nationality is something which must be born.' And, a Republic, outside of the Commonwealth, became the vehicle to build an Afrikaner nation, terminating the dual loyalty of English speakers, and facilitating their assimilation.

Tensions between the younger generation of political leaders, described as 'neo-Fichteans,' and the more liberal Hertzog, focused on the issues of republicanism. The Hertzogites adopted an incrementalist approach, in which English support (demonstrated through a referendum) was viewed as a pre-condition for a republic, The neo-Fichtean wing of the party rejected Hertzog's incremental legacy.

Debates over whether to hold a referendum, who would be eligible to vote, and qualified majorities, provide an interesting indication of the type of nationalism in question. Ernst Renan, in fact, articulating a western conception of nationhood described the nation as an everyday plebiscite. So-called 'eastern' or exclusive nationalisms will, on the other hand, seek to exclude those not considered part of the volk.

And at the high tide of neo-Fichtean schools' influence, after the declaration of war in 1939, Afrikaner nationalists did not feel it necessary to seek the support of Uitlanders for a Christian National republic. Moreover, eastern national movements seek to denude the influence of

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those not considered a part of the volk over the outcome of the referendum. The 1960 referendum followed the exclusion of the Cape’s Coloured voters, and symbolised full ethnic purification of the voters’ roll. In yet another example of how referenda serve to set the borders of the demos, Cyprus’s 1950 vote on unification with Greece (Enosis), saw the use of Churches as polling booths, thereby excluding the Muslim community. In the 1999 Israeli debate on a Golan Heights referendum, right-wing politicians called for a qualified majority in order to neutralise the influence of Arab voters.

**Hertzog breaks with Botha and Smuts:**
The spirit of conciliation and the Botha-Smuts 'one stream' approach, encapsulated by the South African Party (SAP), initially enjoyed wide support amongst both sections of White South Africa. The SAP drew together the leading representatives of the Transvaal’s Het Volk Party, the Oranje Unie from the Free State and the Cape’s South African Party. These SAP candidates contested the first Union-wide general election as representatives of the ruling party, though, it in effect, did not exist and was constructed afterwards. Polity, thus, preceded party and the newly formed SAP had to balance the challenges of governing with building a party identity.

The September 1910 elections, which were fought shortly after the formation of the Union, saw the ruling coalition’s candidates win 66 seats (out of a total of 121), whilst the Unionist Party secured 36 seats, primarily in the urban constituencies of the Cape and the Transvaal, where the party provided an effective challenge to the governing party. The Unionist Party largely represented the interests of the Union’s English speaking section. In Natal independent candidates secured 10 of the province’s 12 seats.

From the outset balancing the interests and ideas of Afrikaners and English leaders from the various provinces, especially in the cabinet, proved a challenge. The chief fault line lay between J.B.M. Hertzog and Botha-Smuts, over 'equal rights' for the Afrikaans community. The former claimed that Botha and Smuts failed to defend the rights of Afrikaners in order to placate English speakers. And the first serious challenge to unity came as early as December 1912, when Hertzog made a series of speeches, which infuriated English speakers. The most famous of them was at De Wildt, in the rural Transvaal, where Hertzog attacked a prominent member of the Unionist Party, Irish-born Sir Thomas Smartt, describing him as a foreign fortune hunter. English speaking South

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23 The Cape was allocated 51 seats, the Transvaal 36 seats and the Free State and Natal 17 seats each.
Africans felt that this speech implied that Smartt was an *Uitlander*, and that it pointed to an exclusive (Krugerist) interpretation of South African citizenship.\(^\text{24}\) The aspect of his speech that Afrikaner academics have traditionally highlighted was Hertzog's reference to his 'South Africa first' principle and the conundrum of 'dual loyalty'.\(^\text{25}\)

Hertzog's speech was a serious challenge to both the premise and promise of conciliation and Botha's leadership. Relations between the two former generals were not all that good to start off with, and Botha sought to exclude Hertzog from his first cabinet by offering him a seat on the Appeal Court.\(^\text{26}\) Under pressure from English speakers, a Natal minister (Colonel G. Leuchars) threatened to resign over the speech, Botha demanded that Hertzog resign. When the obstinate Free State leader refused, Botha dissolved his cabinet and excluded both Hertzog and Leuchars from his new ministry. Within a few months Hertzog and his followers had left the SAP and forged a new party, the National Party (NP), in January 1914. A key component of the party's ideological platform was its anti-Imperialist, or South Africa first, agitation. This early focus of Afrikaner nationalism shares much in common with the early Quebecois nationalism, spearheaded by Henri Bourassa. Hertzog closely followed Quebec's national movement, as well as the Irish struggle for independence.\(^\text{27}\) And Bourassa's decision to resign from parliament in protest against Canada's involvement in the *Boer* War, no doubt, won him acclaim in South Africa. According to Dan O'Meara, this served as more than the new party's 'ideological straw man, and reflected the real economic interests of NP supporters'.\(^\text{28}\) And from 1914 to 1924 the National Party filled the opposition's benches.

**War and the National Party:**

An unanticipated boon for the newly established party was the First World War and the Union's participation in that war, which gave credence to Hertzog's claim that the SAP government placed the interests of the Empire over those of the Union. *The Round Table*, for example, reported that the 'outbreak of war gave definite form to the somewhat vague sentiments of dissatisfaction with the British connection on which the Nationalist Party first took form.' In addition, rebellion gave 'definite shape' to the differences between the

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\(^\text{24}\) B.K. Long, *In Smuts's Camp*, pp. 6-7.
\(^\text{28}\) Dan O'Meara, *Volksparkalisme*, p. 35.
two parties.\textsuperscript{29} As was to be the case with World War Two, where Malan’s Purified National Party benefited from South Africa’s decision to participate in the war, the attempt at nation building through conciliation was shattered.\textsuperscript{30}

Whereas English speakers supported the Union’s participation in the Imperial war effort, Afrikaners were less enthusiastic, and many bitterly opposed it. Indicative of the Afrikaner public’s sentiments against war, was the armed rebellion against the Union’s occupation of German South West Africa, at the behest of London. And though the rebellion was suppressed with relative ease, the death of prominent Boer generals and the execution of an army officer, Jopie Fourie, in December 1914, for his role in the rebellion, provided an electoral boost for the NP, one year before the general election. The NP and its leadership also played a leading role in campaigning for the amnesty and release of the rebels. The NP also sought to make political capital out of Fourie’s execution. Smuts and Botha (who opposed the execution)\textsuperscript{31} had little choice but to assert the newly forged state’s monopoly over the means of violence and viewed Fourie’s execution as an appropriate example to dissuade others from considering armed rebellion in the future.\textsuperscript{32} But, whereas Smuts and Botha imposed the state’s monopoly over the means of violence, the rebellion gave impetus to the development of a ‘definite [Afrikaner] national consciousness.’\textsuperscript{33} Moreover, the government lost the Dutch Reformed Church, which refused to censure the rebels, to the National Party on the issue of the rebellion.\textsuperscript{34}

In the second Union-wide elections of 20 October 1915, Hertzog’s party secured 27 of the 130 seats contested. The party’s early dominance in the Free State was demonstrated by the fact that his new party secured of 16 of the province’s 17 seats. The NP, however, only won four of the Transvaal’s 37 seats, where Botha and Smuts still enjoyed significant support. In the Cape it only won seven of the province’s 51 seats. The share of the vote, which the NP secured, ranged from 46,5 percent in the Free State to 28,2 percent in the Cape and 27,5 percent in the Transvaal. The SAP, on the other hand, secured 37 percent of the votes in the Cape and 33,1 percent in the Transvaal and 26,7

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item The Republican Movement in South Africa', \textit{Round Table}, No. 27 (1919).
\item Hermann Giliomee, 'Western Cape Farmers and Beginnings of Afrikaner Nationalism', \textit{Journal of South African Studies}, 14, 1, October 1987, p. 60.
\end{thebibliography}
percent in the Free State. In total the NP secured 78,184 votes (29.9 percent), as opposed to the 93,484 of Botha’s SAP (35.8 percent). Politically, Afrikaners were divided and the NP was an established force.

The Rebellion, republicanism and constitutionalism:
In another parallel with World War Two, which will be explored in chapter eight, some republicans viewed the Empire’s European woes and the anticipation of German victory as an opportunity to reinstate the former Boer republics through non-constitutional means. Defeat of the armed rebellion, in the name of republicanism, however, had far reaching implications both for the republican movement, which was a 'total failure' at the time, and for the newly formed NP. Though the party did not formally embrace the armed rebellion, it failed to distance itself from the rebels, and did not seek to dissuade them from their course of action. Moreover, one of the leading protagonists in the rebellion, General Koos de la Rey, was a leading NP Senator. There are suggestions that Hertzog encouraged the Commandant-General of the Union’s Defence Force, General Beyers, to resign in order to split the army, in the hope that such a crisis would see him assume power. One officer, a Captain Louw, even claimed that Hertzog was directly involved, but there is little evidence to confirm such accusations. The innuendo that the NP leader was somehow involved in the rebellion was further bolstered by the fact that the majority of rebels came from the Free State. One contemporary British commentator, sympathetic to Botha, notes that many of the rebels joined the rebellion out of fealty to their commanders and less so as a result of a commitment to the ideas they stood for. Moreover, the party actively condemned the South West Africa expedition at its first conference in August 1915. As a result of Hertzog’s tacit support for the rebels and the fact that many of the rebels were 'undoubtedly adherents of the National Party,' his party became identified with the rebellion.

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38 H.C. Armstrong, Grey Steel, p. 232.
40 Earl Buxton, General Botha (London, 1924), p. 73.
42 C.M. Van den Heever, General J.B.M. Hertzog, p. 179.
Given the high levels of opposition to the war amongst the Dutch speaking section, the party was no doubt tempted to capitalise on the crisis, which encouraged Afrikaners to rally around Hertzog and his party. Politically the rebellion had discredited the non-constitutional path to secession and a republic, as well as the party, which was identified with it. The failed rebellion, therefore, underscored the need for a gradualist and constitutional approach to secession, and pressed the NP to de-couple the questions of secession and republicanism.

The NP’s difficult relationship with Republicanism:

Support for Republicanism, though tacitly given, was the subject of a highly charged parliamentary debate on 19 June 1917, after John X. Merriman submitted a motion against republican propaganda, which he claimed, was 'directly at variance with the Constitution of the country.' The incident followed the publication by the NP’s Transvaal leader, Tielman Roos, of a pamphlet calling for the reconstitution of the former Boer republics as independent entities. In his address Merriman pointed out that a Nationalist (Zirk Bens du Toit) had admitted that the exercise served as a 'trick on the part of our [NP] leaders for the elections.' Responding to the government’s charges Dr. C.F. Steyn noted that the NP only wished to achieve a republic along constitutional lines. What also emerged from the debate, and probably served as the catalyst for Merriman’s resolution, was the fact that Die Burger (then De Burger) was promoting a 'census' on independence.

Responding to these charges, Hertzog who professed to be a republican, in theory, acknowledged 'they could only hope to make a success of the republic when all the sections could unanimously go to the British government and say, ‘Give us our independence.” Hertzog added that now was not the right time for a republic. He, however, refused to condemn Roos and his pamphlet. The objective of the debate was to put an end to the NP’s use of the republican issue to mobilise support, and a desire to divide the Cape nationalists from their Transvaal and Free State counterparts. The

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43 Letter from H.I. Bergh to John X. Merriman (dated 9 September 1914), and from John X. Merriman to former Free State President M.T. Steyn (dated 27 September 1914). Phyllis Lewsen (Editor), Selections From the Correspondence of John X. Merriman. 1905-1925 (Cape Town, 1969), pp. 261, 266.
45 William Henry Vatcher Jr., White Laager, p. 46.
47 The Cape Times, June 20, 1917.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
Merriman resolution was also a considered attempt to highlight the fact that the NP viewed republicanism as a tactical ploy for mobilisation. Further evidence of the tactical value of supporting republicanism was demonstrated by the NP’s decision to send a delegation to the Paris Peace Talks, in order to request the restoration of the republics. An act at variance with Hertzog’s reply to Merriman.

The limitations of Republicanism:

Whilst the party succeeded in consolidating its ethnic base as a result of the rebellion, it needed to expand its appeal well beyond its ethnic and provincial base and appeal to a wider constituency if it wished to secure power. This was highlighted by the 1915 elections. Despite the fact that the party secured an impressive 78,184 votes, this only constituted 29.9 percent of the total vote. The SAP and Unionist Party, on the other hand, secured 54.2 percent of the vote. The Free State was the only province where the party managed to secure over 40 percent of the vote.50

In order to expand its support, as well as rehabilitate its image, the NP now tied its mast to constitutionalism. This was done at a July 1917 meeting of the NP’s Federal Council, which de-coupled secession and republicanism. This tactical distinction between secession and republicanism was made possible by the claim that the majority would, at a future point in time, decide the republican issue.51 The Federal Council also noted the party’s opposition to the use of violence in order to change the status of the Union, and emphasised that the 'status of the Union rested on the solid foundation of popular will.'52

The Federal Council’s document also recognised that the time is not yet ripe for a republic.53 These principles, which were to be the guiding principles of the NP on the question of secession and a republic until the 1960 referendum, were undoubtedly a response to the failed rebellion and reflected an attempt to re-fashion the party’s image.

This policy decision implied that the party was not formally a republican party,54 and laid bare some of the deeper tensions, between the republicans and the leaders (Malan, Roos and Hertzog), who embraced republicanism for tactical purposes.55

50 B.M. Schoeman, Parlementere Verkiesings in Suid Afrika, p. 67.
55 G.D. Scholtz, Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner, Deel VII, pp. 357-358.
deliberations also exposed the divide between the Cape, which sought to distance the party from republicanism, and the Free State and Transvaal. Though the tension was, to some extent, resolved by the modicum of constructive ambiguity provided by this formulation, tensions persisted, and Roos sought to establish a republican movement outside of the party. These differences would potently emerge after the 1926 Balfour Declaration and Hertzog’s attempt to distance the party from republicanism.

The age of Wilsonian nationalism:
Yet a further influence on the Party’s embrace of the constitutional path and popular sovereignty was the influence of Woodrow Wilson’s thinking on self-determination. G.H. Calpin claims that President Wilson ‘became Hertzog’s hope. The principle of self-determination, which had formed the hinge of all its proposals, was placed in the forefront of the national creed.’ Evidence of this influence can be seen in speeches made by Malan and Hertzog, as well as in a De Burger’s leader at the time. Besides, the NP’s Central Committee wrote to President Wilson expressing satisfaction at the ‘recognition of the inalienable right of every civilized people to be free.’ Afrikaner Nationalism – in the form of republicanism – only really took shape after the end of the war and the rebellion. G.D. Scholtz argues that the British, French and Russian governments were the cause of the republican movement’s emergence in 1917. Though Hertzog was forced to follow, he insisted that the republic be pursued by constitutional means and with the consent of English speakers and non-republicans.

The NP leadership, on the initiative of Tielman Roos in fact dispatched a delegation to Paris to request the Union’s independence. The Mission to Versailles was designed to gain votes by showing up the ‘sanctimonious British aggression and imperialists for what they were.’ The delegation’s presence in Paris probably gave them

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56 Ibid. pp. 266-267.
57 ‘The Republican Movement in South Africa’, Round Table, No. 27 (1919); ‘The Nationalists and the Peace Conference’, Round Table, No. 35. 1919; G.D. Scholtz, Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner. Deel VI, pp. 270 - 271.
58 G.H. Calpin, There are no South Africans, pp. 107.
60 D.F. Malan Collection, File 1/1/587, J.B.M. Hertzog’s opening address on the occasion of the Union wide NP conference, 16 January 1919.
61 De Burger, Leader, 24, December 1917.
62 D.F. Malan Collection, File 1/1/582 (Cover letter to the Earl of Athlone, 7 December 1918) and File 1/1/582 (Cover letter to G.H. Murphy, US Consul General, regarding memo submitted to President Wilson. 7 December 1918).
63 G.D. Scholtz, Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner. Deel VI, pp. 258-264, 349.
64 F.S. Crafford, Jan Smuts, p. 181.
a sense of the new discourse on popular sovereignty after World War One. By pledging a referendum, the party leaders ensured that they were 'isomorphic' with other national movements and the norms set out by Wilson. Moreover, De Burger closely followed Australia’s two controversial votes (1916, 1917), on conscription. In a leader after the 1917 vote, De Berger, noted that this was 'undoubtedly the most direct and pure mechanism through which to get the volk's verdict. In a general election it is much harder.'

The period from 1916 to 1921 witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of ethno-national referenda, and De Burger reported on many of these in its foreign news section. In 1916 the sale of the Virgin Islands (Danish West Indies) was subjected to a popular vote, both in the territory and in Denmark. In 1918, Denmark provided the people of Iceland with a generous degree of autonomy, which they voted on in a referendum. One commentator suggests that the Danish motivation for a referendum was driven by both the popularity of self-determination at the time, as well as Denmark’s effort to reclaim Schleswig. In 1919 two informal votes, one in the Aaland Islands (subject of a Finnish-Swedish dispute) and the Voraalberg (a province of Austria whose residents voted to join Switzerland), demonstrated the use of such votes to articulate popular sentiment on ethno-national issues. In that same year (4 May 1919), the people of Luxembourg also voted on the questions of the Dynasty, as opposed to a Republic, and chose economic union with France over union with Belgium. De Burger reported on this vote.

The years 1920 and 1921 witnessed the execution of numerous votes designed to determine national borders redrawn at Versailles and settle the long-running Danish-German dispute over Schleswig-Holstein. De Burger reported on many of these votes in its overseas news section, and also covered the unofficial Tyrol (Austria) vote in favour of joining Germany in informal referenda. In 1922 paper also reported on New Zealand’s

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65 De Burger, 28 August, 1 September, 4 & 11 November 1916, 25 & 27 December 1917.
66 28 December 1917.
69 2 October 1919.
70 These included votes in Allenstein, Upper Silesia and Marienwerder (German-Polish border), the Klagenfurt basin (Austria-Yugoslavia border), the Sopron region (Austria-Hungary border), and the Saar basin (France-Germany).
71 Schleswig-Holstein, on 17 May 1919, 14, 16 February 1920 and 22 March 1920, on the Klagenfurt Basin on 27 October 1920 and Upper Silesia on 22 November 1921.
72 De Burger, 29 April 1921.
prohibition vote, the Greek vote to reinstate Emperor Constantin, and the vote to indict Bulgaria's war leaders.

Adopting the 'constitutional' path to secession was certainly consonant with developments in Europe, where national movements subscribed to popular sovereignty in response to a high-tide of referendum issue, and allowed the National Party to be isomorphic with Wilson and Lenin's support for popular sovereignty and the principle of self-determination. As already noted, both leaders supported popular sovereignty in order to coax national movements to support them and fight imperial Austria, Tsarist Russia and Germany.

The 1920 elections and its lessons:

Following the rebellion and the NP's failure to secure wider support from the electorate (from 1915 to 1920 the NP only won 4 of the 7 by-elections it contested against the SAP), the party appeared to abandon its republican bent as the 1920 general elections approached. As the official opposition, Hertzog and the NP were highly critical of Smuts's claim that the Dominions were free and equal in status to the United Kingdom after 1919, and insisted on an open acknowledgement of this right to secession as evidence of the higher status of the Dominions. This was granted after World War One.

At that point in time secession did not, however, imply the creation of a republic. Hertzog and the NP insisted that the theoretical right to secession was coupled with the caveat that this right only be exercised on the basis of breë volkswil - broad popular will. Moreover, Hertzog insisted that this broad 'popular will' could only be demonstrated through a special mandate from the people - a referendum or special elections - on this question. In December 1920 and July 1922 the NP's Transvaal leader Tielman Roos proposed that the Party consider deploying a referendum on the question of secession.

Covering these developments at the time, The Round Table's correspondent wrote that the

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73 14 December 1920.
74 De Burger, 14 December 1920.
75 Die Burger, 24 November 1922.
76 The Dominions were South Africa, Ireland (The Irish Free State), New Zealand, Australia, and Canada.
78 Die Burger, Leader, 3 and 8 November 1922.
79 D.F. Malan Collection, File 1/1/646, Statement by the Federal Committee of the National Party of South Africa regarding constitutional relations between the Union and the United Kingdom. Published in The Diamond Fields Advertiser, 10 December 1920.
80 Die Burger, 15 December 1920 and 18 July 1922.
opposition had also argued that a change in the country’s constitutional status required a special majority.\(^{81}\)

By the 1920 general election the NP stratagem of playing down the republican issue had paid dividends, and the party had eclipsed the SAP as the largest party, taking 44 seats as opposed to the SAP’s 41 seats. In total a 134 seats were up for grabs in the third Union-wide elections. The Unionist Party’s vote representation shrunk from 40 to 25 seats – as its share of the vote fell to 13,7 percent. In 1915 it secured 18,4 percent of the vote. The real beneficiary at the polls was the Labour Party whose share of the vote rose from 9,8 percent to 14 percent. In seats, this translated into an increase from 4 to 21 representatives in the Union’s parliament.\(^{82}\) The Labour Party’s success served as evidence that economic issues were a key influence on these elections. Neither the SAP, nor the NP enjoyed a plurality of seats and for a few months Smuts tried to govern with a slender coalition. In order to break the deadlock, he approached Hertzog to unify the two parties. The basis of the proposed unity was that secession would be subject to an expression of broad popular will.\(^{83}\) The unity talks of 1920, however, floundered over the relationship between South Africa and the Empire and propelled Smuts into the hands of the Unionists, who were absorbed into the SAP. The assimilation process does not, however, appear to have served to alienate a significant number of Afrikaans speaking SAP supporters, and the ensuing 1921 elections saw Smuts’s SAP returned with 79 seats. This represented 10 more seats than the combined 66 seats that the Unionists (25) and the SAP (41) secured a year prior. The NP, on the other hand, lost a single seat, falling from 44 to 43 seats. The fortified SAP secured 49,5 percent of the popular vote in these elections. This too represented an increase from the SAP’s 32,4 percent and the Unionist’s 13,7 percent in 1920. The NP’s growth in its share of the vote, in contrast, was marginal, rising from 35,2 percent to 37,5 percent. The growth reflected an increase in Afrikaans support and the party now represented 65 percent of the Afrikaner vote.\(^{84}\) The Labour Party bore the brunt of the move as its share of the vote fell from 14 percent to 10,6 percent and its parliamentary representation shrank from 21 to 9 seats.\(^{85}\)

Smuts astutely called on voters to ‘push Labour aside so he could smash the Republicans (Nationalists),’\(^{86}\) and made the secession issue the focus of the 1921 general

\(^{81}\) The Nationalists and the Peace Conference, Round Table, No. 35 (1919).

\(^{82}\) B.M. Schoeman, Parlementere Verkiesings in Suid Afrika, 67, 95.

\(^{83}\) D.W. Kruger, The Making of a Nation, p. 115.

\(^{84}\) G.H. Calpin, There are no South Africans, p. 113.

\(^{85}\) B.M. Schoeman, Parlementere Verkiesings in Suid Afrika, pp. 95, 124.

\(^{86}\) Arthur Barlow, Almost in Confidence, p. 166.
This, despite a concerted effort by the NP to reassure the public that the party does 'not wish to bring the matter to a vote at the next elections.' The Round Table's correspondent noted that despite General Herzog's best efforts to 'withdraw the secession issue from the electors,' his 'humbler followers seem determined to make it the issue as between themselves and the South African Party.' The correspondent added that even the pledge of a referendum on secession has 'left things very much as they were.' And, in his famous meeting with Eamon de Valera, as an emissary of the Imperial government, Smuts described the February 1921 elections as a ballot on becoming a republic.

The Cape leadership astutely recognised the potential harm to the NP of allowing these elections to focus on the republican issue. And some in the Cape reportedly 'resented the line taken by their leaders,' as they believed that identification with republicanism and secession weakened the position of Nationalists 'as guardians of a small people with its own traditions and a developing culture.' This was especially the case at a time when the worsening economic issue emerged as the most salient question. Commenting on the NP's predicament ahead of the elections, Round Table noted.

The tendency on the part of the Nationalist leaders to run away from their own secession policy seems to show that the policy, now that it has assumed a more definite and less ambiguous form, has excited considerable alarm among the more sober-minded of their followers, who realise that, whatever its political and sentimental advantages, its active pursuit is bound to involve constant disturbance and unrest, which will be disastrous as far as the material interests of the country are concerned.

And after the elections, Round Table noted that the elections made party aware that for urban voters economic issues are more important than political ones. As will be described in chapter seven and eight, the Cape Nationalists viewed a republican drive as being counterproductive in urban constituencies the party was hoping to capture in the 1948 elections.

The new SAP's gains, however, primarily resulted from the removal of additional candidates, avoiding three way contests in many constituencies. The incorporation of the

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87 'Secession: Aye or No', Round Table, No. 41 (1920); 'The General Election', Round Table, No. 43 (1921).
88 D.F. Malan Collection, File 1/1/646.
89 'Secession: Aye or No', Round Table, No. 41 (1920).
91 'The General Election', Round Table, No. 43 (1921).
92 G.D. Scholtz, Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner, Deel VI, p. 350.
93 'Secession: Aye or No', Round Table, No. 41 (1920).
94 'The General Election', Round Table, No. 43 (1921).
Unionists was a hollow victory, as it spelt Smuts’s long-term decline.\textsuperscript{95} Ultimate NP electoral success, within the constraints of the existing electoral system, required that the NP either become the hegemonic political voice of white Afrikaners or forge an alliance with the Labour Party, whose share of the vote had grown significantly, in parallel to broadening its appeal to attract SAP voters. Given the traditional allegiance of a significant proportion of the Afrikaner community to Smuts, and the apparent absence of support for republicanism, the former strategy was not viable at that point. Hence cooperation between the Labour and National Parties was essential in order to unseat Smuts. The eventual election victory of the PACT (to be discussed in the next chapter) in the 1924 elections was made possible, despite the fact that the NP’s vote slightly shrank (though the Labour Party’s share rose). The secret lay in avoiding three way contests in marginal constituencies and playing down the republican/ secession issue. And from October 1921 Nationalist leaders and their newspapers sought to distance the party from the republican enthusiasm that Wilson had sparked.\textsuperscript{96}

**Hertzog the reluctant republican?**

The pledge to hold a referendum on a republic also, in part, reflected Hertzog’s ambivalence towards a republic. The referendum literature largely ignores the influence of a particular leader’s level of commitment to a specific issue or policy on their decision to employ a referendum. Hertzog’s detractors viewed this stipulation of a referendum prior to secession as proof positive that he was not a republican. Some nationalist opponents, like C.R. Swart, claim he never pleaded for a republic in his personal capacity.\textsuperscript{97} His adherents, on the other hand, suggest that his commitment to a republic stretched back to the founding of the National Party, and argue that whilst Article 4\textsuperscript{98} was not explicitly republican, a republic was implicit.\textsuperscript{99} Others claim that his support for a republic was conditional upon on White unity. Accordingly, Hertzog believed that a republic was not

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\textsuperscript{95} F.S. Crafford, *Jan Smuts*, pp. 199, 208.
\textsuperscript{96} G.D. Scholtz, *Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner, Deel VI*, pp. 351-353.
\textsuperscript{98} Article Four called for the avoidance of any 'act whereby the political liberty of the people of the Union might be curtailed or restricted or whereby any of the liberties of the country or its Government might be withdrawn from the immediate supervision of the people of the Union' (Kruger, 1969, 69-70).
'practical politics' until the majority of both population groups desired it. Hence his support for, and insistence on, a referendum.\textsuperscript{100}

As already mentioned, Hertzog dismissed the timing of the SAP’s conciliation agenda, not the principle of conciliation, and it does appear that he sincerely believed that English speakers could and should be educated towards embracing a republic, convinced that their support was the best guarantee for retaining such a republic. The referendum pledge was then consonant with his inclusive vision of identity, and signalled that he would not impose a republic on English speaking Afrikaners. Convinced that a republic should follow unity, and primarily committed to advancing the Afrikaans language and the Afrikaans worker, through protectionist policies like bilingualism and racial legislation, a pragmatist like Hertzog was quite happy to place the republic on the back burner. He demonstrated this pragmatism (and reluctance towards republicanism) in forging his pact with the Labour Party. And as an astute tactician in electoral politics Hertzog viewed an NP quest for a republic as somewhat of a folly at a time when there was little support for recreating the republics amongst Afrikaners,\textsuperscript{101} and great antagonism amongst English speakers.

The Colonial Office exports the referendum to Southern Africa:
The value of the referendum in the politics of opposition was also demonstrated by the demand for a referendum in opposition to J.C. Smut’s quest to incorporate Southern Rhodesia. Smuts’s desire to incorporate the territory resulted from his expansionist dream of a South Africa that spanned from the Cape to the Zambezi, and his wish to secure a rail link to the copper rich Katanga belt.\textsuperscript{102} Politically, incorporating the territory and its 30,000 English-speaking whites would ensure continued SAP hegemony by adding 6 safe seats. Smut’s interests dovetailed with those of the Chartered Company and the Colonial Office, and the subsequent referendum on the inclusion of the territory into the Union was a pre-condition set by the then Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill.\textsuperscript{103}

The decision to stage the referendum on the territory’s future is, in and of itself, a fascinating story of how colonial officials – in this case Earl Buxton - sought to shape the destiny of territories that formed part of the vast British Empire. For, as Earl Buxton’s

\textsuperscript{101} M.C.E. van Schoor, 'Die Herlewing van die Republikeinse Ideaal', pp. 152 - 153.
\textsuperscript{102} 'The Rhodesian Referendum Campaign', The Round Table, No. 49 (1922).
\textsuperscript{103} 'The Rhodesian Question', Round Table, No. 45. (1921).
biographer demonstrates, the former governor to South Africa did much to ensure that the territory stayed outside of the Union.\textsuperscript{104} Buxton did so in defiance of Smuts, as he was concerned over the fate of the territory’s Black population, which enjoyed greater liberty than South Africa’s Black majority.

The Chartered Company’s license to administer the territory was set to expire in 1924 and Imperial officials were confronted with three options regarding the territory’s future. The first was prolonging the company charter (Milner’s preferred option in 1919), whilst the second option was granting the territory and its subjects’ representative or responsible government, making the territory a separate colony with full colonial status. The push for this option was led by the then High Commissioner, H.J. Stanley, who sought to ensure that the High Commissioner exercise control over Native affairs. Stanley further believed that incorporation, though the best solution, from the Imperial perspective, was impractical due to local resistance. Besides, Stanley surmised that responsible government was financially feasible.\textsuperscript{105} By 1920 Lord Milner favoured a third option, the territory’s incorporation into South Africa, insisting, however, that it be done with the consent of the (White) Rhodesians.\textsuperscript{106} Milner’s approach did not, however, necessarily imply a referendum, and there are indications that he was quite happy to see the issue settled by the local assembly after a round of general elections.\textsuperscript{107} The referendum was very much the handiwork of Buxton, who originally favouring the first option, came to be a leading proponent for Responsible Government.

The Buxton Commission:

Faced with growing pressure from the interested parties, Milner’s successor, Winston Churchill appointed the Buxton Commission, to consider the colony’s future.\textsuperscript{108} The committee’s brief was to consider the viability of Responsible Government, and Buxton, wittingly, proposed a referendum on the question of Responsible Government and the future constitution. In effect then, the choice that he suggested be submitted to voters was between responsible government and the status quo, i.e. extending the Company’s charter. Jan Smuts strongly opposed the committee’s recommendations informing Winston

\textsuperscript{104} Daniel Waley, \textit{A Liberal Life}, p. 9.


\textsuperscript{106} Ibid. pp. 327-329.

\textsuperscript{107} Drummond Chaplin to Smuts (30 October 1922), Jean van der Poel, \textit{Selections from the Smuts Papers, Volume V}, p.145.

\textsuperscript{108} Claire Palley, \textit{The Constitutional History}, p. 208.
Churchill that the 'report on responsible government for Rhodesia will prejudice a proper decision.'\(^{109}\) Instead, Smuts proposed that Churchill agree to a referendum in which the territory's Whites consider two options: responsible government or incorporation. The High Commissioner in Salisbury, H.J. Stanley, also now supported this position,\(^{110}\) and Churchill instructed Rhodesian representatives to meet with Smuts and negotiate terms of incorporation. Two rounds of talks ensued, in November 1921 and April 1922, leading to the generous South African terms of inclusion in the Smuts-Malcolm Agreement.

This use of a referendum by the Colonial Office to settle the fate of territories it controlled, despite the fact that the referendum was not part of British political culture, was not unique to Southern Rhodesia. During the partition of India the future of two principalities (Sylhet and the Northwest Province) was settled by popular votes. Though Lord Mountbatten proposed such a vote for the Kashmir, it was not held.\(^{111}\) From a Pakistani perspective, Mountbatten colluded with India in ensuring that plebiscites were held in provinces where there were Hindu majorities and Muslim rulers.\(^{112}\) Later British de-colonisation efforts also produced attempts to create three federations out of former British colonies. The first was the Far Eastern Federation, which incorporated Malaysia, Singapore the Territories of North Borneo (Brunei, Sarawak and Sabah). Similar federations were attempted in the West Indies and in Central Africa. The West Indies Federation, which was largely conceived by London as 'a way of reducing the cost of governing its possessions in the Caribbean and of making a viable state out of scattered islands,'\(^{113}\) was split asunder by a Jamaican referendum, in which voters rejected Federation on the question. Whilst the attempt to amalgamate Nyasaland (Malawi), Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), was approved by a referendum in Southern Rhodesia in 1953, opposition by Black political leaders in the other two colonies led to the scrapping of the initiative.

**Resisting Smut's attempt to incorporate Southern Rhodesia:**

Fear of the implications of this attempt at SAP gerrymandering was perhaps the single most important factor that fuelled NP opposition to the incorporation of Southern Rhodesia.\(^{114}\) And Oswald Pirow claims that Rhodesian incorporation was a response to the

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114 Die Burger. 1 August 1922.
emerging political pact between the National and Labour parties. Though the discourse of opposition was centred on questions of process and the terms of the territory’s incorporation, the NP denounced the SAP for ‘criminally’ by-passing both the people and parliament on this issue and accused Smuts of conducting a constitutional coup d’état. Moreover, the NP charged that the SAP was setting a precedent whereby matters of importance to the volk were dealt with in this manner. The NP’s mouthpiece Die Burger had a field day on the issue and published at least 11 editorials dealing with the Rhodesian question from July 1922, when the Smuts-Malcolm agreement was made public, until the vote. These invariably either highlighted the economic burden that the package implies, or condemned Smuts for failing to inform and consult the country’s elected representatives and the volk.

The opposition was especially critical of the publication of the agreement and its terms after parliament was in recess, though this may have been ‘unavoidable owing to the complexity of the negotiations.’ Smuts’s NP critics charged that he deliberately avoided publishing the terms and any details of his negotiations in order to avoid a critical debate that might startle the Rhodesians voters.

Smuts’s failure to consult the people or the country’s legislature was a particularly popular charge. In an interview granted to the Bloemfontein daily Die Volksblad, Hertzog contrasted the SAP’s handling of the Rhodesian question with his own party’s approach to the question of secession and republic. Hertzog noted that the NP would not move ahead without receiving a mandate from the people through an election or a referendum. Expanding on this theme in an address to a Smithfield (Hertzog’s constituency) audience in early December, Hertzog asked the audience if they could imagine a Steyn or Brand (former Republican presidents) incorporating territory without consulting the people. Smuts, Hertzog submitted to his audience, cared as little for the volk as Jameson or Rhodes. Die Burger, which described the agreement as a coup d’etat, similarly insisted that the volk be allowed to express their opinion on the territory’s incorporation. Elsewhere, the NP’s Transvaal leader Tielman Roos built on such contrasts in promising a

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116 Die Burger, 24 July 1922.
117 Die Burger, 26 October 1922.
118 Die Burger, 13 October 1922.
119 Die Burger, 19, 24, 25 July 1922, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15 and 27 August 1922, 29 October 1922, Round Table, No. 49. (1922). 201.
120 Die Burger, 10 August 1922.
122 Die Burger, 4 December 1922.
123 Die Burger, Leader, 12 August 1922.
referendum on secession at a speech in Pretoria. Roos further promised that the NP would not actively pursue secession in its first term of office. Such a pledge was consonant with the outlines of an electoral pact being discussed by the Labour and National parties at the time. It is worth noting that the Labour Party leader, Colonel Creswell’s strong criticism of the agreement received prominent coverage in *Die Burger*, reflecting the growing cooperation between the two parties and a desire to prepare NP opinion for the electoral PACT.

The Rhodesian question, therefore, served the NP’s effort to both portray Smuts and the SAP of not serving the interests of the *volk*, and the Party clearly viewed the issue as an opportunity to mobilise its supporters. In a memo to regional secretaries, dated 16 August 1922, the Cape NP chief organiser, C.W. Malan called on party functionaries and activists to do so. An attachment to the memo argued, amongst other things, that it was unacceptable that whilst the people of Southern Rhodesia were being consulted by referendum, the *Volk* of the Union were being ‘ignored.’ In his earlier campaign against the Naval Bill (1909), Henri Bourassa similarly demanded a referendum, in an effort to suggest that Wilfred Laurier was not serving the interests of the people. The upshot of this opposition to Southern Rhodesia’s opposition was that the party further linked the country’s constitutional future to a consultation of the *volk*. It was, however, only with the flag referendum that this link was cemented.

Independently of the Union’s domestic politics, the people of Southern Rhodesia rejected incorporation, despite Smuts’s attractive offer to the territory’s political leaders. Smuts viewed the vote as a ‘great [personal] blow’ and an even greater blow to Rhodesia. Earl Buxton had thus thwarted Smut’s plan, by taking the decision out of the hands of colonial officials and local politicians, proving its value as a conservative device. Beyond settling the fate of Rhodesia, Earl Buxton facilitated the application of Woodrow Wilson’s idea of popular sovereignty in Southern Africa. The referendum institution had been successfully exported to the region.

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125 *Die Burger*, 4 December 1922.
126 *Die Burger*, 7 February 1922.
127 INCH Pamphlet Collection, File Number P5.51.
Hertzog's referendum legacy:

Hertzog, who enjoyed unchallenged authority as the leader of the NP for almost two decades, set a condition for pursuing the republican debate whose historical legacy, in part, explains the 1960 referendum. This policy proposal enjoyed unquestioned endorsement in the NP’s manifestos, even after Fusion and the creation of the Purified NP, until the outbreak of World War Two. This adoption of the referendum by the NP from 1914 onwards was influenced by particular historical developments. These include, the party’s need to re-cast itself after it was identified with the botched 1914 rebellion, the salience of Wilson’s idea of popular sovereignty, and the desire of the NP leaders to tap into this new fashion. It is no coincidence that the NP’s embrace of the referendum corresponded with the high tide of modern nationalism and a marked increase in referendum use. For good measure, the fashion spread to Southern Africa with the Southern Rhodesia vote. Moreover, a referendum pledge was viewed as a resource that allowed the party to differentiate itself from the ruling SAP and appeal to its ethnic core, by embracing secession/ republicanism, yet appeal to a wider constituency by re-assuring non-republican voters that the party would not abuse their votes to change the constitution.

Hertzog’s formula provided the only sound tactical basis on which the NP could realistically gain power, and emerge as a successful middle class party. Despite its initial success in 1915, the path to electoral success lay in more popular policies (like racial legislation in the labour market). Embracing a narrow republican agenda would certainly have doomed the NP. Key components of the middle class, like commercial farmers, no doubt viewed the trade and economic implications of secession with trepidation. Moreover, there was no republican tradition in the Cape. It should be noted that the Cape and rural constituencies representing farmers enjoyed disproportionate representation in the post-Union South African parliament. The latter was a legacy from the Boer republics, which viewed the farmers as the ‘true burghers, the back bone of the country.’ By giving greater weight to rural constituencies, the Transvaal republic was able to reduce the political influence of the swelling uitlander population in Johannesburg. And, at a time of rapid urbanisation, poor urban Afrikaners were more pre-occupied with ensuring job security through discrimination in the labour market. Talk of secession would not garner their votes.

Faced with criticism over the party’s republican propaganda (as seen in the 1917 debate), and claims that such propaganda was unconstitutional, a referendum implied that

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130 Sheilagh Patterson, The Last Trek, pp. 80 – 81.
the party was committed to constitutionalism. In some respects, it also served to make the republican propaganda seem innocuous. On another level, the referendum was also consonant with Hertzog's two-stream approach. G.H. Calpin notes that the difference between Malan and Hertzog after Fusion on the republican question reminded him of the debate within the British Labour Party over Socialism. In this debate there were essentially two schools, the 'Socialism in our time' approach and, the 'Socialism some time' approach.\textsuperscript{131} The referendum pledge was proof positive of Hertzog's commitment to the 'Republicanism some time' approach.

Furthermore, the referendum pledge allowed the party a large measure of constructive ambiguity on the republican issue. This ambiguity, in turn, ensured a modicum of party unity, over a question that divided the Free State and the Transvaal and Cape.\textsuperscript{132} In 1917 Hertzog sided with Cape leader D.F. Malan, who campaigned against efforts to make the party republican in the build-up to the Party's conference.\textsuperscript{133} At that point in time (and until 1937) the Cape was electorally the most significant province, having being allocated 51 of the 130 seats in the parliament. The Transvaal had 45 seats and, the Free State and Natal 17 each.

\textsuperscript{131} G.H. Calpin, \textit{There are no South Africans}, p. 296.
\textsuperscript{133} C.M. Van den Heever, \textit{General J.B.M. Hertzog}, p. 185.
Chapter Six.
The flag referendum.

The Bill, according to the decision of the government, so far as it concerns the flag, shall not, when passed by parliament, come into operation unless and until it has been clearly ascertained by a proper referendum to the registered voters of the country, that such is the will of the people. I sincerely hope, and think that I have the right to believe, that in view of this announcement, the existing feeling of acrimony in connection with the question of the 'Flag,' will cease, and that all party or sectional strife will be converted into a more patriotic contest imbued by national spirit.

The National Party embraces the referendum as the ruling party.
In the ensuing chapter I explore the NP’s use of the referendum as a ruling party. The promise to stage a referendum (which was later cancelled) was a product of deep divisions within the ruling coalition, especially within the Labour Party over the design of a new Union flag. Given that the NP’s electoral PACT with the Labour Party was premised on a pledge not to promote secession and republicanism, the flag issue became a metaphor and indeed substitute for republicanism, and leading Nationalists viewed securing a flag as a symbolic victory. The flag issue was the single most salient issue of the government’s incumbency.

Not only would the referendum over a flag serve to accommodate the divided Labour Party and ameliorate divisions over the flag issue within the National Party, it also served to ‘take the wind’ out of the opposition SAP’s sails. Having lost the 1924 elections on account of the poor economy, and Smuts’s brutal repression of a miners’ strike on the Rand in 1922, the SAP saw in the flag issue a way to regain power in the 1929 elections. Moreover, the SAP was fully aware that NP (with only 63 seats out of a total of 135) would be unable to rule without the Labour Party (with 18 seats). Hence it hoped to exploit the flag issue to split the coalition asunder. On the other hand, by promising a referendum on the issue, J.B.M. Hertzog in turn hoped to keep it off the agenda of the 1929 general election. It will also be argued that Hertzog’s willingness to acquiesce to holding a referendum reflected his own ambivalence to the flag, and his deep desire to ensconce NPs rule. The chapter ends with an analysis of some of the later tensions that emerged within the party over the republican issue.

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The PACT government and the use of tactical voting:
The introduction of a Westminster, first-past-the-post, system in 1910, in a polity made up of two almost equally sized language groups, implied that the party that managed to secure support from significant proportions of both communities, or dominate the rural areas (which were over-represented) and capture the hearts and minds of the majority of Afrikaners, could maintain power. The SAP enjoyed support from both communities – especially after absorbing the Unionists – as well as support in the rural Transvaal. Hence defeating the SAP required tactical cooperation between the English speaking and Afrikaans opposition. Whereas the Labour Party was most effective in the country’s cities, the NP enjoyed an advantage in certain rural Afrikaans areas. Here the party benefited especially from the skewed representation that rural constituencies enjoyed. Despite this advantage, the NP could only muster 44 seats in the 1920 general elections (the SAP garnered 41 seats, whilst the Unionist Party and Labour Party secured 25 and 21 seats respectively) and Tielman Roos, Transvaal leader of the NP, understood the absolute need for cooperation between the two opposition parties. As a result, he emerged as the midwife of the later electoral pact premised on tactical voting, especially in urban constituencies where the Labour Party could capture disaffected swing voters.

In the 1921 general elections the Labour Party, South African Party and the National Party fought each other in three way ties in seven urban constituencies, with the SAP benefiting in all seven as a result. Roos no doubt also took heart from the fact that the Labour Party defeated the SAP in four of the six by-elections that the two parties contested ahead of the 1924 elections. As these votes indicated, Smuts’s suppression of miners’ strike in 1922 proved extremely costly for the SAP. A precedent for cooperation between the two parties had been set in the Transvaal, where the NP under Tielman Roos had successfully cooperated with the Labour Party in provincial and local politics. And the Labour Party-NP electoral PACT was very much an outcome of politics in the industrialising Witwatersrand. Rising Afrikaner urbanisation and growing competition in the workplace between White and non-White workers further facilitated such cooperation against the SAP, which was seen to represent the interests of capital. At that stage the NP had neglected the urban Afrikaner, and trade unionism was largely the province of English speakers. It is also worth noting that the two parties and their leaders, Colonel F.H.P.

3 Boksburg, Denver, Drie Rivier, Fordsburg, Germiston, Krugersdorp and Springs.
Creswell and General J.B.M. Hertzog both viewed capitalism with grave misgivings. Roos and a Free State Labourite, Arthur Barlow, facilitated a meeting between the two leaders and a resultant exchange of letters set out the basis for an electoral pact and a Labour-NP government, which ruled until the 1929 elections and afterwards, though the Labour party by then had split into two factions.

Dan O'Meara argues that Roos viewed the PACT as a way to compete with the Labour Party through collaboration. Accordingly, the PACT 'stole much of the political thunder and deeply divided Labourites.' The Cape leadership, however, opposed the PACT, fearing that it would dilute the party's principles, and D.F. Malan required permission from the NP's provincial Head Committee before accepting a position in the PACT government. Even more outspoken in his opposition to the PACT was an unknown, yet aspiring politician, J.G. Strijdom, who in a letter submitted to *Ons Vaderland* argued that the party's role was ensuring the continued existence of the Afrikaner volk and language, and cautioned that short term tactical gains would compromise the party's ability to fulfil its role.

Making a PACT possible: Such tactical cooperation was, moreover, hampered by the two parties' platforms. On the one hand, Article Four of the NP's platform and its secessionist tones were a bugbear as far as the Labour Party's Jingoist voters and potential voters were concerned. On the other hand, the Labour Party's socialist principles were viewed with misgiving by the NP's rural support base. This despite the fact that the party leadership had a strong anti-capitalist bent. In order to facilitate this political cooperation, the former softened its socialist image, whilst the NP started to 'push Republicanism and secession into the background.' Specifically, the NP pledged that none of its candidates would deploy their vote to alter the country's constitutional status once in power. Convincing the NP leadership was somewhat made easier by the knowledge that the party's poor performance in the 1921 general elections was attributed to its focus on secession, and not the economy. As noted

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10 A3, Creswell Collection, File 3/4, Letter from Colonel Creswell to J.B.M. Hertzog, 12 April 1923.
in the previous chapter, the NP's Cape leadership recognised the damage that the party's strong identification with Republicanism had caused in the previous elections, and feared that the republican issue would split the party.\textsuperscript{11} Republican elements were upset by the decision to fudge the republican issue.\textsuperscript{12}

Hertzog appears to have had little problem in further de-coupling the party from republicanism and, in fact, denied that his party was republican. The climb down was, in part, made possible, by claims that the party had always pre-conditioned secession to a referendum. In a key interview to \textit{Die Volksblad}, the NP's Free State mouthpiece, Hertzog added that referendum on something like secession was 'consistent with the policy of the party.' And Hertzog pointed to the incorporation of Southern Rhodesia in justifying his argument.\textsuperscript{13} The 1924 election, thus, marked the introduction of the referendum in the NP's electoral \textit{heresthetics}. Hertzog's critics argued that this initiative to forge the PACT spelt the beginning of his opposition to republicanism.\textsuperscript{14} Ultimately, the leadership's willingness to drop the republican issue spoke volumes for its pragmatism, and underscored its shallow commitment to secession. And the relative ease with which it did so further demonstrates that a republic had not yet gained widespread support in the party.

As a result of this concerted effort to reassure the public that the government would not move ahead on the question of secession without broad popular support,\textsuperscript{15} and disaffection with the SAP government over its handling of the 1922 strike, the Labour Party gained 9 seats in the 1924 elections. Moreover, the party narrowly failed to win a further seven seats by less than 150 votes. The National Party gained 20 seats despite the fact that its share of the vote actually dropped from 37,5 percent in 1921 to 34,9 percent. The Labour Party's share rose from 10,6 percent in 1921 to 13,4 percent, whilst the SAP's share of the vote only fell by 3 percent. Thus tactical voting and a higher turnout, 79,4 percent, as opposed to 72,2 percent in 1921, made a significant difference,\textsuperscript{16} and the PACT government enjoyed a majority of 81 seats, as opposed to the SAP's 52 seats, in the 135 strong parliament. Amongst the defeated SAP candidates was J.C. Smuts. In the 1948 elections, D.F. Malan successfully emulated the formula of downplaying the republican


\textsuperscript{13} C.M. van den Heever, General J.B.M. Hertzog, pp. 203-204.

\textsuperscript{14} G.D. Scholtz, Dr. Nicolaas Johannes van der Merwe, 1888-1940 (Johannesburg, 1943), p. 72.


issue in order to tap into popular economic disaffection. In both elections racial legislation had greater appeal than the promise of republic.

A flag for a republic:

Until the controversy over adopting a 'clean' or neutral flag for the Union, it seemed that the PACT arrangement, whereby social legislation was gained in exchange for nationalist legislation, was working and that the country's two White 'streams' were indeed flowing side by side, in relative harmony. Why then did the government court controversy and press ahead with legislation to introduce a new flag?

One reason was that some in the NP searched for a way to provide their core supporters, alienated by the election ploy of minimising the republican issue, with some tangible and symbolic expression of NP dominance. Replacing the Union Jack as the Union's flag with a new and neutral flag was certainly a powerful symbolic display of newfound NP hegemony. Others saw a national flag as a 'logical, essential and urgent step in the future program of the Hertzog government,' whilst Tielman Roos viewed the adoption of a new flag as the basis for the NP's abandonment of Article 4. More importantly, adopting a flag without the Union Jack had been a longstanding objective of D.F. Malan since 1918. Appointed as Minister of the Interior, Malan had the power to pursue his dream.

Malan, whose insistence on a new flag was to earn him the notoriety in imperial London as the 'Mahomet of Nationalism,' long believed it would nurture 'strong South Africa love for the fatherland,' and bring about an end the struggle between nationalism and imperialism. Malan was convinced that the promotion of the flag bill, if approached 'calmly and decisively,' would lead to 'the last gasp of Jingoism.' This argument would be echoed in the context of the republican debate. As examples of societies where a 'clean flag' had contributed to racial harmony and national unity, Malan cited Switzerland,

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17 By a clean flag I refer to a flag that did not include symbols, the Union Jack or the old Republican flags, which alienated a particular language group.
21 The Argus, 28 September 1926.
22 The Economist, 21 January 1928.
24 PV 4, Eric Louw Collection, File 1, Letter to Eric Louw from D.F. Malan on 25 June 1926.
Canada and Belgium.\textsuperscript{25} And, despite later claims that a new flag was both a 'duty and an honour',\textsuperscript{26} Malan also believed that the flag issue served to cast Smuts in a bad light.\textsuperscript{27}

The demand for a new flag was not only limited to the NP and Malan. The Johannesburg based English language newspaper, \textit{The Sunday Times}, conducted a national competition for a new flag as early as 1910. Indeed, Harry Saker suggests that the positive response to this contest and the clean design selected may have created the impression that there would be broad support amongst English speakers for a new flag.\textsuperscript{28} It is therefore entirely plausible to suggest that The PACT government was 'taken by surprise at the storm which the proposal to exclude the Union Jack had aroused.' Malan's failure to fully grasp the sensitivity of English-speaking opinion on this issue was also partly thanks to the weight he gave to Creswell's opinion.\textsuperscript{30} Creswell, fervently supported Malan on this issue, and shared his belief that a clean flag would serve as a symbol of unity.\textsuperscript{31}

\textbf{Smuts exploits the flag bill:}

The submission of the flag bill on 20 May 1925, after the government and opposition failed to reach a compromise, sparked a festering conflict. The ever-astute General Smuts, who had previously supported a 'clean' flag for the Union,\textsuperscript{32} spotted the political opportunity of proffering a clean flag as a \textit{de-facto} act of secession, and, in doing so, topple the PACT government.\textsuperscript{33} The proposed flag legislation deeply offended the sensibilities of the Union's English-speakers, and the 'flag controversy' became an allegory for the struggle between the 'jingoist' sentiments of English speakers and the republican sentiments of Afrikaans nationalists. In Natal, where the White community was predominantly English-speaking, the flag bill was viewed as part of a policy of 'getting rid of everything British.'\textsuperscript{34} And, for the Labour Party, which represented an English-speaking constituency, the political costs of the flag bill soon became apparent. The flag bill

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{25} D.F. Malan Collection. File, 1/1/588, Malan's speech at the NP's 1919 conference, dated 16 January 1919.
\textsuperscript{26} D.F. Malan, \textit{Afrikaner Volksheid en my Ervarings on die Paad Daarheen} (Kaapstad, 1961), p. 102.
\textsuperscript{27} PV 4, File 1, Letter to Eric Louw from D.F. Malan on 25 June 1926.
\textsuperscript{28} Harold Saker, \textit{The South African Flag Controversy} (Cape Town, 1980), p. 10.
\textsuperscript{29} 'What is Known as the Flag Issue', \textit{Round Table}, No. 64 (1926).
\textsuperscript{31} Margaret Creswell, \textit{An Epoch of the Political History of South Africa in the Life of Frederic Hugh Page Creswell} (Cape Town, 1956), pp. 116-117.
\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Ons Vaderland}, 7 September 1926.
\textsuperscript{33} Arthur Barlow, \textit{Almost in Confidence}, pp. 195 - 196.
\end{footnotesize}
exacerbated existing ideological\textsuperscript{35} and institutional tensions within the Party. The most significant of these was the dissension between the party machine (the Councilites under Barlow-Kentridge) and the ministers (Creswell-Boydell).\textsuperscript{36}

Both Tielman Roos and Hertzog recognised that the Labour Party was the government’s Achilles heel, and were deeply concerned that this legislation would undermine the coalition. Moreover, the architects of the PACT were reluctant to provide Smuts with an issue with which to erode support for the government. Over time, Smuts’s SAP managed to mobilise increasing support on this issue. It is also worth emphasising that Hertzog was not deeply enamoured with the flag legislation, as he favoured an emphasis on racial legislation.\textsuperscript{37} And, as one commentator noted, two years ‘of actual experience of government [may] have tempered the exuberant enthusiasm of opposition days for spectacular vindications of a formal ‘independence.’\textsuperscript{38} In response to mounting opposition, from within his coalition and without, Hertzog agreed to a Flag Commission, to be headed by Sir William Campbell.\textsuperscript{39} According to Saker, Malan proposed the commission in response to Campbell’s support for a clean flag.\textsuperscript{40} Sixteen months after the bill’s introduction, Hertzog promised a referendum to settle the issue.

**Salvaging the PACT through a referendum:**

The conventional explanation for the proposed flag referendum is that Campbell preconditioned his acceptance of the chairmanship of the Flag Commission on a referendum to approve the final design selected by the committee.\textsuperscript{41} Yet, Saker suggests that the Labour Party’s leadership demanded the referendum, as they feared a backlash from their constituency.\textsuperscript{42} To boot, existing divisions in the Party were exacerbated, and on 8 July 1926 George Hay, one of the party’s serving MPs, dropped a political

\textsuperscript{35} Ideologically, the party was divided between three groups, which The Star newspaper classified as the Creswellian or right-wing element, the left section (which according The Star’s correspondent is said to have represented the ‘best sentiments of the party’) and a center group of so-called ‘true Labourites. Though the later were the strongest of the three, The Star suggested that they were eclipsed by the two other elements. The Star, 16 July 1926.

\textsuperscript{36} Harold Saker, *The South African Flag Controversy*, p. 257.


\textsuperscript{38} ‘What is Known as the Flag Issue’, *Round Table*, No. 64 (1926), p. 859.

\textsuperscript{39} Sir William Campbell had served as the Dominion Chairman of the British Empire Service League (B.E.S.L.) and previously supported a clean flag to be flown along with the Union Jack. His support for Malan’s proposals in June 1926 led to his resignation from the leadership of the B.E.S.L.

\textsuperscript{40} Harold Saker, *The South African Flag Controversy*, pp. 48, 60.

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid. p. 61.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid. p. 79.
'bombshell' by informing a public meeting that the Flag Bill amounted to secession, adding credence to Smuts's charges. Three days later the Party's Troyville branch passed a resolution calling on the National Council to drop the flag bill as it was 'breaking up the party.' Though only a branch meeting, the party's National Chairman, B. Jenkins, and its Transvaal organiser were present at the meeting. The Star submitted that the Hay speech and the 'Troyville SOS' was an 'unmistakable sign that Labour followers are becoming distinctly restive, not to say rebellious, under the irritating and humiliating yoke of the PACT.' The paper also intimated that the 'Party leaders were heartily glad when the Council, at their Johannesburg meeting discovered a formula upon which the flag question might, for the moment be regarded as a closed chapter.' There is no archival evidence that The Star's correspondent was referring to a referendum, though this seems likely.

By mid-August there were rumours that Creswell was to be replaced as party leader and his critics charged that he had 'made a political mistake of the first magnitude' by agreeing to the flag bill without consulting the Party. Whilst Creswell became increasingly obdurate, affiliates of the party, like the Typographical Union, threatened to leave the Party over the issue. The proximity of the referendum announcement of 17 September 1926 to the Labour Party's Transvaal provincial conference held in Johannesburg in early September reinforces the argument that the referendum was in response to the difficulties of the Labour Party. Following the conference, Hertzog met with a delegation of the Party's 'malcontents,' and gave them assurances that he would not move ahead on the issue without having secured a broad popular mandate for the flag. Saker recounts that at a public meeting in May 1927, Hay claimed that the party had asked for a referendum. Saker's argument, that the referendum pledge primarily served to save the coalition is substantiated by the memoirs of Labour Party parliamentarians, and Pamela Maud's study of the PACT government. It is worth

43 The Star. 9,12 July 1926.
44 The Star. 12 July 1926.
45 The Star. 12, 13, 14, 15 July 1926.
46 The holdings for the Labour Party collection, which are held in Johannesburg City Library, only begin from 1927 and there is no reference to this proposal in the Creswell Collection, which is held in the National Archives in Pretoria.
47 The Star. 13 August 1926.
48 The Star. 20, 21 August 1926.
49 The Rand Daily Mail. 4 September 1926.
50 The Argus. 6 September 1926; The Rand Daily Mail. 4 September 1926; Die Burger. 31 January 1957, J.P. Brits, Tielman Roos – Political Prophet or Opportunist (Pretoria, 1987), p. 139.
51 Harold Saker, The South African Flag Controversy, p. 79.
noting that this was not the first time that the demand for a referendum united Labour Party and NP leaders. In February 1909, Tielman Roos and others drew up a petition demanding a referendum or new elections on the question of the Union. Both Creswell and Sampson of the Labour Party supported his demand.54

The Labour Party’s Thomas Boydell welcomed the eventual decision to stage a referendum and spoke of the need for a ‘people’s flag.’55 The referendum announcement, however, came too late for the embroiled Labour Party and the entire incident proved to be an unmitigated electoral disaster. In the 1929 elections its parliamentary representation fell from 18 to 8 and the party lost all its seats in the Cape and Natal. In the 1927 provincial elections the party lost half its seats.56 More importantly, the referendum pledge did not avert the later party split and the two factions, the Cresswellites and the Councilites, fought each other in the 1929 elections. In 11 constituencies candidates of the two factions of the Labour Party entered three way ties involving the SAP, with the SAP winning 6 of these. Despite the fact that the Creswell faction again benefited from tactical cooperation with the NP, the combined share of the vote for Labour candidates dropped off to 9.7 percent, from the 1924 high of 13.4 percent.57

Taking the wind out of Smuts’s sails:

Saker further suggests that the NP themselves ‘probably felt that they had much to gain from a referendum.’58 Perhaps the most important reason was the NP’s desire to refute criticism that it had no mandate for such a policy and evade the charge that it was ‘forcing’ a flag upon an unwilling people,59 by means of its parliamentary majority. This was a charge that Jan Smuts made on a national speaking tour at that time.60 In the 1924 election the party only secured 34.9 percent of the national vote, and some NP leaders no doubt recognised that relying on a parliamentary majority alone would undermine the legitimacy of the new flag. The fact that the Westminster system technically allows a party to capture

60 Smuts in Port Elizabeth. Die Burger, 2 September 1926.
power with less than 50 percent of the popular vote is an important factor to take into consideration.

Smuts, in fact, demanded a referendum on the flag during the tour, only days before Hertzog announced the referendum. Hertzog viewed the flag bill as a costly political exercise, and three weeks prior to calling the referendum, warned the NP that the SAP saw the Union Jack issue as a 'soft carpet on the way to victory' in the forthcoming elections. This was an assessment shared by the Transvaal leader Tielman Roos. In early September 1926, Hertzog lamented that 'political wire pullers' have kept the issue on the boil for political purposes and argued that 'the time has come when the flag shall be taken out of their hands [the party politicians] and placed there, where it shall no longer be within their reach to be abused for petty party purposes.' When announcing the referendum, Hertzog emphasised that 'this question should be considered as a national and not as a party issue.'

Hertzog’s decision to promise the referendum thus served to not only address the woes of his Labour Party allies, but also ensure that the issue not cloud a future round of general elections. Ons Vaderland editor, Gustav Preller, opined that in declaring a referendum, Hertzog had managed to 'totally take the wind out of Smuts’s sails.' Preller, whose supported Roos on the flag issue, pointed out that only days before the announcement, Smuts had demanded a referendum in Kuruman, and argued that the fact that Smuts’s now opposed the referendum announcement proved that he needed to use the flag issue in order to fight the government. Die Burger confirmed this assertion and added that the NP did not want to impose a flag on the country against the will of the people.

Supporting his Prime Minister in an interview with Die Burger, at the time, Malan argued that an ordinary parliamentary majority was insufficient and further argued that the decision showed that Hertzog was a democrat. Malan also charged that Smuts wanted the flag issue to be an election issue.

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61 The Argus, 12 September 1926.
62 A 32, File 24, J.B.M. Hertzog address to the National Party Chief Executive, 31 August 1926.
64 A 32, File 24, Hertzog address in Cape Town, 6 September 1926. J.
65 A 32, File 24, Hertzog’s referendum announcement, 17 September 1926.
66 Ons Vaderland, 21 September 1926.
67 Ons Vaderland, 21 September 1926.
68 Die Burger, 18 September 1926.
69 Die Burger, 20 September 1926.
Reflecting on Malan’s ‘democratic gloss,’ Harry Saker later argued, ‘Concern for the ‘will of the people’ appears in Malan’s account to have been seen more as a compensation of the concession than a reason for it.’\(^70\) *The Cape Times* also suggested that the referendum provided a means to bypass an important institutional and constitutional obstacle, the opposition-dominated Senate.\(^71\) Thus Saker concludes that the adoption of the referendum became an ‘act of political necessity.’\(^72\) The referendum was, thus, designed to serve as a ‘lightening rod’ and ensure the survival of a tenuous coalition.

Smuts’s SAP, which had demanded a referendum prior to the announcement, now came out against a referendum, accusing the government of ‘ducking’ an issue of great national importance. The SAP press echoed these criticisms. *The Argus* described it as a bogus referendum, quoting Smuts’s line (taken from Paul Kruger) that the referendum was a ‘Splendid funeral after the hanging.’\(^73\) *The Cape Times* echoed this assertion and demanded a 2/3 majority and the withdrawal of the flag bill.\(^74\) The paper also dismissed Malan’s claims that the announcement reflected the party’s democratic nature and mused that the spirit behind the call was ‘more nationalist than national.’\(^75\) J.H. Le Roux and P.W. Coetzer suggest that the SAP’s opposition to the referendum further strengthened the NP’s desire to stage the referendum.\(^76\)

**NP divisions over the flag:**

Hertzog’s willingness to risk a referendum also spoke volumes for his actual commitment to a clean flag. His biographers argue that he reluctantly supported a new flag and believed it would alienate many English speakers. Moreover, they contend that he believed that in some cases one had to ‘sacrifice personal ideals for the sake of national unity.’\(^77\) Hence, Hertzog viewed Malan’s flag as a personal crusade and not as a priority for the party. As with the republican issue, Hertzog the gradualist called for the NP to give English speakers more time to realise they were South Africans.\(^78\) There are also indications that

\(^{71}\) *The Cape Times*, 21 September 1926.
\(^{73}\) *The Argus*, 18 September 1926.
\(^{74}\) *The Cape Times*, 18 September 1926.
\(^{75}\) *The Cape Times*, 21 September 1926.
the NP itself was divided on the issue,\textsuperscript{79} and the NP's Transvaal conference displayed less than enthusiastic support for the flag.\textsuperscript{80} Given the level of animosity between Roos and Malan, the Transvaal and Cape leaders, such provincial support for, or opposition to the flag, is not surprising. The flag controversy also exacerbated tensions between Hertzog and the Republican wing of his party,\textsuperscript{81} which demanded a clean flag. Scholtz suggests that the first inklings of the split, which was to follow with Fusion in 1933, were on view over the flag issue.\textsuperscript{82} In general, however, Afrikaners were, at best, docile in regard to the flag and the agitation against it came primarily from English speakers.\textsuperscript{83}

**The flag settlement and the cancellation of the referendum:**

Responding to the announcement of a referendum, *The Rand Daily Mail* prophetically warned, 'Extremists on both sides will regard the referendum as a tussle in which victory must be achieved at all costs.'\textsuperscript{84} And mounting tensions over the exclusion of the Union Jack led to increasing speculation of a civil war. The notorious Bloemhof riot of 30 September 1927 added credibility to such conjecture.\textsuperscript{85} Local NP supporters violently disrupted the annual SAP fete in the village of Bloemhof, which hosted Smuts as the guest of honour. In response to the escalating tension, Smuts and Hertzog, through the intercession of the Governor-General, negotiated a flag design in late October 1927, thereby obviating the need for a referendum. A substantial parliamentary majority supported their flag design, and the 'Flag Settlement' was widely welcomed in the White community. *The Argus*, for example, described it as a return to the spirit of the National Convention of 1910.\textsuperscript{86}

Smuts submitted to the House that this was the last of the racial questions and suggested that this was more than a flag settlement. This was indeed true, for the settlement, in part, paved the way for the creation of the United Party under Smuts and Hertzog in 1933.\textsuperscript{87} Malan, who was later to leave the NP after Fusion, opposed the cancellation of the referendum and the Smuts-Hertzog deal. Years later, he blamed

\begin{itemize}
\item *The Rand Daily Mail*, 4 September 1926.
\item PV 18, C.R. Swart Collection, File 3/1/7. In a letter to Blackie Swart, A.J. Werth (dated 26 July 1926) bemoaned the fact that Afrikaners were so quiet on the issue.
\item *The Rand Daily Mail*, 18 September 1926.
\item *The Argus*, 26 October 1927.
\end{itemize}
Tielman Roos and the Anti-Creswell (National Council) of the Labour Party. According to Roos’s biographer, the Transvaal leader feared defeat in a referendum.

Though no referendum was held, the flag controversy further contributed towards the emergence of the referendum mechanism as a key instrument in negotiating English–Afrikaans relations. Moreover, the flag struggle also underscored the limitations of a simple parliamentary majority in determining the symbols and constitutional status of a divided society, especially where a Westminster system does not give relative representative weight to each community. The flag controversy, therefore, abetted the NP’s adoption of the referendum highlighted the evolution of the referendum mechanism from being a tactical ploy, deployed in opposition, to a tool for maintaining political power. The argument that a referendum places an issue above party politics, which became a central motif of the NP’s discourse on referenda, first emerged here. It was a theme that Malan, Strijdom, Verwoerd, Botha and de Klerk would return to.

The Balfour Declaration and republicanism:
As already noted the flag question served as an allegory for an internal NP struggle between the republican wing of the party and the Hertzogites. At a time when the PACT agreement limited the promotion of secession/republicanism, the republican wing viewed the flag issue as a substitute for a republic. The republican wing’s support for Malan’s positions on the flag issue, in part, explains his later cooperation with the group of the party at the time of Fusion (to be discussed in the next chapter).

The announcement of the flag referendum preceded Hertzog’s departure to the 1926 Imperial Conference in London. The conference, and the resultant Balfour Declaration, soon emerged as a central locus of internal party conflict. Hertzog played a leading role in the conference and securing the Declaration, which set out to clarify the relationship between Britain and her Dominions. G.D. Scholtz suggests that Hertzog might have pledged the referendum in order to remove the issue from the public agenda, as division at home would weaken him at the Imperial Conference. Hertzog viewed attaining clarity on the Union’s constitutional position as an absolute priority. In effect, the Balfour Declaration recognised that Britain and the Dominions were equal in stature,

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88 From 29 January to 5 February 1957 D.F. Malan re-told his version of events surrounding the flag struggle in Die Burger.
90 G.D. Scholtz, Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner. Deel VII, pp. 162, 168.
implying that the Union was, in theory, able to claim the right to secession. G.H. Calpin describes the Declaration as a 'masterpiece of ambiguity,' which penned the 'feeling of the Empire in words which leave the foreigner guessing at the meaning of the Commonwealth of nations and provide the rebel Dominion with subjects for interminable debate.'91

Hertzog, who returned to the Union, triumphantly, claimed that South Africa gained a level of independence within the British Empire that obviated secession and, by definition, republicanism. His position deeply upset the Republican wing of his party,92 and these tensions were exacerbated when Hertzog sought to amend Article 4 of the NP’s constitution. The amended article, adopted in 1927, now read,

'The National Party accepts the declaration of the Imperial Conference of 1926 and agrees that it amounts to the attainment of Sovereign Independence and of the power to exercise our state functions according to our own wishes. The opinion is further expressed that the party is strongly against any attempt, in action or policy, which might restrict this freedom or existing rights. Any such attempt will be strenuously opposed.'93

Republican resistance to Hertzog emerges:

Hertzog’s decision to amend Article 4 was, to some extent, influenced by the approaching 1929 general election,94 and no doubt served to sustain the PACT arrangement. The argument that secession or independence did not imply republicanism was certainly consistent with his pre-PACT position,95 and his desire to broaden the appeal of the party. Hertzog no doubt feared that the ebbing economic situation would leave the party vulnerable to the SAP on the republican issue in these elections, and the longer the party had been in power, the less inclined its leadership was to raise the republican banner.96 The fact that the NP’s share of the vote increased, despite this change, certainly vindicates Hertzog’s gambit. Hertzog could hardly afford not to alter Article 4, as a failure to do so would in fact deny the great achievement he claimed. With the Balfour Declaration Hertzog, in fact, lost the secession issue as a tool for mobilisation.97 And, accordingly, he held that the 'further step to a Republic must rest on the broad basis of national will.'98

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91 G.H. Calpin, There are no South Africans. (London, 1941), p. 137.
92 G.D. Scholtz, Dr. Nicolaas Johannes van der Merwe, p. 82.
94 B.K. Long, In Smuts’s Camp (London, 1945), p. 34.
96 G.D. Scholtz, Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner, Deel VII, p. 363.
98 Ibid. p. 220.
The Republican wing of the party vehemently opposed the amendment of Article Four. In addition, D.F Malan and De Burger also opposed the change to Article 4, in part, out of fear of having to confront the republicans.\textsuperscript{99} The cardinal difference between the positions of Malan and Hertzog, on the amendment of Article Four, was that the former viewed Republicanism as a danger to harmony between the two White communities, while Malan regarded Republicanism as a danger to the party.\textsuperscript{100} The republicans were, however, reluctant to break from the NP at this stage.\textsuperscript{101} The fact that there was little opposition to the amendment in the eventual votes within the party structures\textsuperscript{102} suggests that there was probably little popular support for republicanism. The fear of splitting from the party over Article Four was also driven by a deeper fear that the formation of a republican party would undermine republicanism. Republican leaders like N.J. van der Merwe seem to have realised that, asked to choose between the Republican idea and loyalty to Hertzog, the NP faithful would support their leader.\textsuperscript{103}

The referendum's acceptance:
As demonstrated in this chapter, the referendum handily served the NP in navigating its first major crisis as the ruling party. In dealing with the flag issue, Hertzog had set a precedent according to which referenda were deployed to settle issues that divided Whites, and a script for negotiating major symbolic questions and divisions within the party over these issues had been developed. Hertzog was ultimately pressed to call a referendum in order to resolve tensions within his party (between the Cape and Transvaal leaders) and within the coalition over a salient issue, and deny the SAP any space within which to mobilise opposition to his government in the 1929 general elections. Besides, Hertzog was not that deeply committed to Malan’s flag.

The promise to stage a flag referendum, however, failed to address the inherent tensions within ruling party and its junior ally. Whilst the latter eventually split, the ruling party entered into a long-running battle between the radical republican (organic/eastern) elements and the moderate (civic) wings. This clash was to be the defining clash within South African politics in the 1930 and would ultimately see the NP split after Fusion and led to Hertzog’s defeat.

\textsuperscript{100} H.B. Thom (Edited M.C.E. van Schoor), \textit{Dr. D.F. Malan en Koalitie} (Kaapstad, 1988), pp. 39-40.
\textsuperscript{101} G.D. Scholtz, \textit{Dr. Nicolaas Johannes van der Merwe}, p. 88.
\textsuperscript{102} H.B. Thom (Edited M.C.E. van Schoor), \textit{Dr. D.F. Malan en Koalitie}, p. 38.
\textsuperscript{103} G.D. Scholtz, \textit{Dr. Nicolaas Johannes van der Merwe}, pp. 100-104, 197, 206.
Hertzog’s opponents in the Republikeinsbond [Republican League], identified with the Broederbond, repudiated Hertzog’s moderate nationalism, and embraced republicanism. According to Dan O’Meara, the developments after the Balfour Declaration encouraged the Broederbond to assume the ‘vanguard mantle of Afrikaner nationalism.’ Hertzog feared that the group sought to depose him, and tensions between the two increased, reaching the peak when Hertzog and Smuts formed a coalition government in response to the worsening economic crisis. The Balfour Declaration and the amendment of Article Four paved the way to the political fusion that followed from this coalition. The final catalyst for the welding together of Smuts and Hertzog was the global economic crisis of the early 1930’s. And it is to the story of Fusion and its consequences that we turn in the ensuing chapter.

107 Ibid. p. 220; G.D. Schultz, Dr. Nicolaas Johannes van der Merwe, p.70.
Chapter Seven.
From Fusion to war: The radicalisation of Afrikaner nationalism.

Parliament had decided many things: that South Africa should have two official languages that it should have two anthems, two flags and two capitals; and that, in essentials, and non essentials, there should be equality of status and opportunity, a fifty-fifty ratio, and a sort of national charity in all things. But there was now a case which could not be divided into equal parts or settled by the South African genius of duality. You might have two flags, two songs, two languages, but you could not have two conditions of war and peace. The decision about war must be an outright decision. There was no escape from it, no alternative.1

The referendum contested:
The 1930s witnessed the growing radicalisation of Afrikaner nationalist politics and the adoption of republicanism. This process was more pronounced after J.B.M. Hertzog and J.C. Smuts captured the middle ground by combining their two parties to form the United Party (UP). In the process, both parties jettisoned their more radical wings, and Hertzog’s National Party in the Cape and Nationalists elsewhere opted to pursue and independent path. In order to distinguish itself from the UP, its new leader D.F. Malan allowed the Gesuiwerde or Purified National Party (GNP) to become more aggressive in its pursuit of a republic. Further radicalisation was to follow, as European political fashions were imported to South Africa, and many in the party embraced an organic definition of citizenship and Anti-Semitism. The full force of these ideas was unleashed after the country’s decision to enter the war on Britain’s side after a controversial parliamentary vote. This chapter examines this period and its impact on the referendum debate.

It is important to do because it was during this period that the now purified NP’s commitment to a referendum on a republic was contested by impatient republicans, who held increased sway. Their challenge was initially seen off by Malan and the Cape leadership, but was revitalised by the war vote. Their challenge formed part of a wider onslaught against representative (Westminster) democracy, which had purportedly failed the Afrikaner in the war vote, and reflected the growing appeal of fascism and National Socialism – which eschewed party democracy. The challenge to the acceptability of a referendum also reflected the rejection of Hertzog, his civic white nationalism and his incremental approach. For many the constitutional path to a republic, which was a central

1 G.H. Calpin, There are no South Africans (London, 1941), p. 248.
feature of Hertzogism, was obviated by the prospect of a German victory and the restoration of independence after Britain’s defeat.

Unable to outbid the radical fascist groups, Malan abandoned his initial stratagem of breaking right, and now sought to steer his party back to constitutional politics. Rejecting both imperialism and Nazism, at a time when German victory seemed increasingly elusive, Malan embraced a return to Boer democracy. The US’s entry into the War and the German setbacks on the Eastern Front confirmed that the constitutional path was the only game in town and required that the party improve its electoral prospects. A republic was simply not appealing enough in order to win elections and the 1943 elections confirmed this. The road to power lay in playing down the republican issue, and the party returned to its traditional use of the referendum pledge as part of its electoral heresthetics. The politics of the referendum from Fusion to the end of the War, especially challenges to the referendum pledge on a republic, provides important insights into the role of the referendum in NP political thinking.

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The genesis of Fusion:
The resolution of the flag issue and South Africa’s worsening economic situation, following the world economic depression of the early 1930s, paved the way for the unification of the NP and SAP. The two amalgamated to form the United South African National Party or United Party (UP) in early December 1934, signalling a renewed attempt by Smuts and Hertzog to pursue conciliation.² The basis for this political marriage, widely referred to as Fusion, was Hertzog’s abandonment of a republican platform, in exchange for Smuts’s acquiescence in the removal of Cape Africans from the common voters role.³ Hertzog was increasingly confident that the majority of his compatriots now embraced the principle of ‘South Africa first,’ and, having fulfilled many of the NP’s stated objectives, prior to 1924, surmised that cultural segregation was no longer necessary. Having served as Prime Minister since 1924, Hertzog could hardly assent that full equality between English and Afrikaners did not exist.⁴ To do otherwise would constitute an admission of failure.

No less an important motivation for Hertzog was his very real concern that the NP would be defeated in the 1934 elections.\(^5\) The economic crisis and his government's insistence on remaining linked to the Gold Standard, as a demonstration of the country's independence in monetary policy, had made the government highly unpopular. Fusion, then, was 'essentially the child of depression.'\(^6\) One ardent Malan supporter impressionistically claims that Hertzog, influenced by German philosopher Oswald Spengler,\(^7\) was disillusioned with democracy and wished to do away with party politics. Yet another reason why Hertzog desired a coalition and later Fusion was his inability to secure a sufficient majority in order to introduce the racial legislation he was anxious to promote.\(^8\) Finally, there was widespread public support for such political cooperation and Fusion, especially as a result of the economic crisis.

According to F.S. Crafford, Smuts pursued Fusion with an eye to the impending war with the intention of breaking the neutrality party. Crafford adds that it was his 'most amazing experiment in holism.'\(^9\) This assertion, however, seems questionable as Adolph Hitler did not pose a threat to world peace at the time of Fusion, and both Hertzog and Smuts had hoped that the question of neutrality, in the advent of war, would never have to be answered. Alan Paton, who authored the biography of Smuts's brilliant deputy, Jan Hofmeyer, argues that Smuts only became convinced that Hitler was a threat in 1938. Paton adds that it was rather the threat of Hitler which explains why Smuts was prepared to keep the UP united.\(^10\) Sampie Terreblanche contends that for Smuts Fusion was designed to abet the efforts of gold mining companies, long-standing allies, to avoid the taxation of the gold bonanza, after the country left the Gold Standard.\(^11\) A far more unelaborated explanation might be that Smuts, attentive as he was to public opinion, did not want to stand in the way of the clamour for unity at a time of severe economic crisis.\(^12\)

\(^7\) H.B. Thom (Edited M.C.E. van Schoor), Dr. D.F. Malan en Koalisie (Kaapstad, 1988), pp. 17, 97.
\(^8\) Ibid. pp. 24, 30.
\(^12\) Alan Paton, Hofmeyer. p. 144.
Purifying nationalism:

Whilst Hertzog indeed 'carried with him into the United Party practically all the great principles of Nationalism,' he failed to convince 'all the nationalists' to join him. The most important of these was the Party's Cape leader, D.F. Malan, who opposed this political union and eventually broke with Hertzog along with several sitting MPs, almost all from the Cape. Malan and his followers formed the Purified National (Gesuiwerde Nasionale) Party or GNP.

Malan and his supporters opposed Fusion for several reasons. One reason was their conviction that Afrikaners had not sufficiently asserted themselves in the cultural and economic spheres. But, beyond misgivings over the timing of Fusion, many of Malan’s supporters, who embraced an exclusivist definition of citizenship, dismissed the very prospect of white unity. The Malanites, no doubt, also feared that the interests of English mining and Jewish capital would drive the new party’s agenda. There was also a fear that the party’s key ideological pillars would be sacrificed in the Fusion process. Eric Louw, for example, cited the precedent of British Liberal Party, which gradually lost out to the Labour Party after the wartime national government. On a personal level, there were Nationalists who realised that Fusion would relegate them to lesser importance and dilute their influence. Hertzog’s biographer claims that the personal disappointment of legislators, not rewarded with office, drove the tensions between Hertzog and the Republican wing of the party. Some Malan supporters argue that Malan, in contrast to Hertzog, was a committed democrat, suggesting that he opposed Fusion in support of democracy. The argument that Malan was a committed democrat is also said to explain his later opposition to the Ossewa Brandwag and The New Order. Such claims are,
however, highly suspect, for as will shortly be demonstrated, Malan was quite happy to abandon the democratic path from 1939 to the middle of 1941. It was only after it became clear to Malan that America's entry into the war would preclude a Nazi victory that he resumed his unambiguous support for democracy. The Malanites additionally feared that Fusion and partnership with Smuts, of whom they were deeply suspicious, would involve stronger ties with Britain. The materialist explanation for the Cape's opposition to Fusion is that Cape wool farmers feared that they would lose access to the German market.

**Malan breaks with Hertzog.**

Malan and Hertzog's public disagreements, on matters of principle, centred on two inter-related issues. These were the question of South Africa's sovereign independence and relations with the Commonwealth, and differing interpretations of the Balfour Declaration. Hertzog held that the Declaration and the derivative 1931 Statute of Westminster had provided for the country's constitutional independence. Malan, who had previously refrained from confronting Hertzog on his interpretation of the Balfour Declaration, presciently highlighted South Africa's theoretical right to neutrality in a war that involved Britain. Significantly though, Malan and Hertzog agreed, with the consent of Smuts, that members the prospective UP could advocate a republic. The fact that Smuts accepted the traditional NP position on this issue reflected somewhat of a victory for Hertzog. It is further worth adding that the new party's final programme of principles indeed allowed for this, despite Malan's decision not to support Fusion.

Ultimately, however, Hertzog was unwilling to accede to Malan's new demand that republicanism become a test of party membership for the proposed United Party. Hertzog's biographers suggest that he had long concluded that transforming the NP into a purely republican party would spell the party's 'destruction' and lead to the 'demise of the Afrikaner.' Michael Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip suggest that the discord is explained by Malan's conclusion that national unity would be secured by a republic. In contrast, Hertzog believed that a republic should be preceded by unity.

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23 Dan O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme*, pp. 46, 49-50.
24 Newell M. Stultz, *The Nationalists in Opposition*, p. 34.

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Given that the National Party did not demand a commitment to republicanism of its members on the eve of Fusion, it seems likely that this demand was a rather transparent obstacle introduced by Malan in order to scupper Fusion. Malan’s sudden fervent support for republicanism is indeed strange when considering that he had been a sceptical republican. Moreover, the Purified NP (GNP) only made support for republicanism a condition for party membership in 1936, and Malan initially staved off efforts to radicalise the party’s republican position.

H.B. Thom defends Malan’s republican track record and claims that his decision to play down the republican issue, at certain times, was driven by tactical considerations. By the same logic, one could argue that Malan at other times articulated a republican position for the self-same tactical considerations. Interestingly, Malan’s party perpetuated Hertzog’s pledge that a change in the country’s constitutional status be preceded by an expression of broad popular will, i.e. a referendum.

The salience of ideological issues and the republican issue in explaining Malan’s opposition to Fusion, therefore, seems debatable. Moreover, Die Burger, which was closely linked to Malan, did not actively support the Republican wing of the National Party, in their struggle with Hertzog from 1926-1933. Besides, At van Wyk demonstrates how Die Burger editor, Dr. A.L. Geyer, prodded a reluctant Malan to split from Hertzog. Geyer viewed coalition and Fusion as an SAP trap. Similar pressure was brought to bear by the Broederbond.

Support for, or opposition to, Fusion was often a function of personal fealty. Whereas former Boer Generals Smuts and Hertzog carried their supporters in the Transvaal and, less so, in the Free State, Malan’s support came almost exclusively from the Cape, which had no republican tradition. In the Cape rural district of Beaufort West, for example, only 3 NP members reportedly joined the UP after Fusion. O’Meara accounts for the lack of republican fervour in the Cape because its farmers feared of losing access to lucrative imperial export markets. Why then did Malan indulge republicanism?

31 G.D. Scholtz, Dr. Nicolaas Johannes van der Merwe, p. 201.
34 According to O’Meara, the rural farmers in the Transvaal and Free State and Cape supported Fusion, leaving only the petty bourgeoisie to support the purified NP. Dan O’Meara, Volkskapitalisme, pp. 50-51.
36 Dan O’Meara, Volkskapitalisme pp. 46, 49-52.

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As will be suggested shortly, he did so in order to set the HNP apart from the UP and accommodate the northern nationalists.

An analysis of the 1938 elections shows that whilst the HNP garnered 29.6 percent of the vote, nationally, its Cape support was 35.6 percent, and its Free State support an impressive 46.8 percent. In the supposedly Republican Transvaal, the party received only 23.7 percent of the vote.37 There are three possible explanations for the GNP's success in the Cape, despite the absence of a republican tradition in the province. The first is Malan's personal stature, and the second his control of Naspers and Die Burger. The GNP's control of the paper ensured that it held together its 'imagined community,' and its relatively high support in the Free State, despite Hertzog's standing, must also be attributed to the Volksblad's support for the GNP. In contrast, the party did not do that well in the republican Transvaal, where it had no newspaper until October 1937. Thirdly, the party broke with many sitting MPs in the Cape and largely maintained its structures. The fact that only a few sitting MPs outside of the Cape joined Malan undermined its ability to make significant inroads elsewhere. The weak parliamentary representation in the Free State and the Transvaal, which continued until 1943, paved the way for extra-parliamentary groups, like the Broederbond, to set the agenda, and lead the 'ideological transformation' of the Purified NP in these provinces.38

**Fusion and Republicanism:**

Fusion also had far reaching consequences for republicanism, as it increased the influence of republican elements and the Afrikaner Broederbond39 within the party, and facilitated its transformation into a republican party.40 J.G. Strijdom, a little known front-bencher and republican only elected in 1929, was suddenly promoted to Transvaal leader of the new party by virtue of being the sole sitting Transvaal MP who broke with Hertzog. Under the influence of the Broederbond,41 Strijdom is said to have played a significant role in encouraging Malan, to embrace republicanism.42 Similarly, the Free State leadership included principled republican activists like N.J. van der Merwe who lobbied Malan on

38 Dan O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme*, pp. 51, 64, 120.
this issue. A leading *Broederbond* activist, A.C. van Rooy, in fact claimed that the organisation created the GNP in order to serve as an instrument for Republicanism, and the organisation called upon its members to join the party.

Malan, though a reluctant republican, had several reasons to embrace a republican agenda. As already noted, his strategy for winning political power was through securing a monopoly of Afrikaans support as the basis for political power. Afrikaner nationalism, which was essentially a modern and urban phenomenon, found its marshalling project in the republican drive. This was especially so in the Transvaal. As editor of *Die Transvaler*, H.F. Verwoerd argued 'when a people has clarity over its goal, much is already gained.' D.F. Malan undoubtedly recognised the tactical value of the republican banner for mobilising support for his party. But the Cape leadership was more cautious. The real extent of support for Republicanism until the outbreak of World War Two, however, remains unclear. In the first post-Fusion general elections the GNP secured just under a third of voters nationally, which represents over 50 percent of the Afrikaans voters. The ease with which Tielman Roos abandoned Republicanism in 1932, along with Thom's explanation of Malan's inconsistent republican track record, suggests that it primarily served as a tactical ploy for opposition politicians.

According to N.J. van der Merwe's biographer, a switch to a republican agenda was essential in securing the support of the republicans for the GNP. Patrick Furlong also suggests that had Malan refused to embrace the agenda of his northern colleagues, they may well have forced him to abandon the Nationalist cause. And the threat of a republican party, outflanking the GNP on the right, particularly in the north, also encouraged Malan to agree to the party becoming republican. A third reason to embrace republicanism was that it legitimised the break with Hertzog and served to differentiate the

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45 At van Wyk, *Die Keeromstroom Kliet*. p. 166.
47 D.F. Malan Collection. 1/1/1148, Mrs. M. Jansen to D.F. Malan, 12 September 1935.
48 *Die Transvaler*, Leader, 6 August 1941. In O. Geyser (Editor), *Dr. HF Verwoerd*. p. 71.
49 Piet Meiring, *Fyvrig Jaar op die Voorblad*. p. 43.
GNP from the UP, and allowed it to appeal to Afrikaners. Ahead of the 1938 elections, for example, the GNP sought to argue that the United Party 'stood for precisely those things that the [jingoist] Dominion Party stood for, only differing in method.' In a fascinating letter to A.L. Geyer in 1933, a Free State GNP leader A.J. Werth warned that a new national movement could not be formed on tactic alone. Werth argued that 'the harder the fight (without kid gloves) and the greater the number of casualties left lying on the battlefield, the faster we can shock the people's conscience and reach our goal.'

The UP's success in capturing the political centre, therefore, forced the Purified NP to adopt 'even more narrow, isolationist and reactionary attitudes.' The GNP's embrace of anti-Semitism after Fusion is yet another example of this post-Fusion radicalisation. Furthermore, adopting a fiery republican posture also abetted the GNP stratagem of laying bare and aggravating prevailing tensions within the UP on the issues of neutrality and secession. Malan thus embraced republicanism in order to ensure his political survival and that of his new party.

The republic and breë volkswil:
The GNP's fervent embrace of republicanism was, however, accompanied by the preservation of the existing principle that a republic could only come into being on the 'broad basis of the people's will, [and] on the basis of racial and language equality.' This move by Malan to maintain the formulation that had served Hertzog's party, however, sparked an acrimonious struggle within the party, as the Free State and Transvaal resisted the formula. Their resistance provides a fascinating insight into the patently tactical role of the referendum, as seen from a Republican perspective. Malan and the Cape finally won the day. And the continued use of the referendum for tactical purposes—whilst in opposition—cast a long shadow, and explains its eventual use in 1960 over the issue of a republic.

The Cape leadership, though willing to indulge greater identification with the republican quest, also wished to appeal to non-republican voters, especially at election

53 Die Burger. Leader, 13 May 1938.
54 A.L. Geyer Collection. Volume 1, A.J. Werth to A.L. Geyer. 18 December 1933.
56 It is worth mentioning that Hertzog's NP fielded a Jewish candidate (H.J. Schlosberg) in the high profile Germiston by-election of late November 1932. In 1936 the party denied Jews party membership.
57 D.F. Malan Collection. 1/1/1110, Federal Committee debate on the party's Republican position in 1935.
time. The Cape leadership and Malan, in fact, feared that the party’s strong republican bent would alienate many voters in the Cape, and elsewhere, especially in urban areas.58 One example of a leading Hertzog supporter, and later leader of the National Party in the Transvaal, who was not a republican at the time of Fusion, is Ben Schoeman, who served as an NP minister from 1948 to 1974.59 H.F. Verwoerd’s long-serving aide, Fred Barnard, also notes that at the time of the formation of the GNP there were many nationalists who were ‘fiery opponents of the republic.’60 Explaining his approach to the republican issue in September 1935, to the Party’s Federal Council, Malan warned,

If the nation gets the impression that we go about the republican issue in an irresponsible manner then both republicanism and the GNP will be doomed. The possibility of realising the ideal depends on our ability to carry moderate elements with us. If we do not do this we will not attain our objective. It is for this reason that the Federal Committee [of the GNP] wishes, in the first place, to clarify that we only want to attain a republic through constitutional means. This we only want, when through referendum [or] in a general election called for this purpose…. Ensuring that this is the will of the nation… It would be foolhardy if we leave any doubt on this issue and even more destructive if we pursue revolutionary methods.61

In defending this position, Malan also noted that the only alternative to attaining a republic through constitutional means, on the basis of broad popular will was through violence. This, he noted, had disastrous consequences in the 1914 rebellion.62 Confirmation of the party’s desire to appeal to non-republicans is provided by the GNP’s 1938-election campaign. Malan noted that the republican issue should not be dragged into the general election and submitted that that it should be kept ‘above party politics,' and be a product of volkswil. Malan further added that a referendum would allow voters to support the GNP’s racial and anti-Jewish policies, comfortable in the knowledge that their vote would not be 'abused' for the purpose of creating a republic.63 Speaking at a Heilbron (Orange Free State), Malan noted that the GNP would not use a simple majority to bring about a republic.64 Days ahead of the vote, Die Burger presented a list of nine issues it defined as being seminal to the vote. Interestingly, the republic was not featured in this

59 Ben Schoeman, My Lewe in die Politiek. p. 26
61 G.D. Scholtz, Dr. Nicolaas Johannes van der Merwe. p. 302 - 303.
64 Die Burger, 3 May 1938.
list. Instead, the paper highlighted racial policies, the UP’s support for mining interests and Fusion.\textsuperscript{65} Despite its radicalisation, the party and its Cape dominated leadership, continued to view the referendum pledge as a vital instrument in its electoral heresthetics.

One further reason why Malan may not have wished to overemphasise the republican issue in the campaign was that his own republican credentials were in question. The UP’s mouthpiece Die Suiderstem published a stinging leader in November 1937, which took Malan to task for his indifference to republicanism. The paper supplemented this leader with an array of quotes from Malan’s long political career that gave credence to this claim.\textsuperscript{66} In his Dordrecht speaking engagement on the campaign trail, Malan was in fact questioned on the Party’s republican commitment.\textsuperscript{67}

**Transvaal resistance:**
From the Transvaal and Free State perspective,\textsuperscript{68} the Malan led Federal Council formulation implied that there was little difference between the UP and the GNP. And the Transvaal party sought to defy Malan and the Federal Committee’s formulation on the republican issue, by adopting their own formula, which made no reference to a referendum. The Transvaal party program was hastily adopted ahead of the acceptance of the Federal manifesto, and the hardliners introduced a clause, which could only be changed by a two-thirds majority. In contrast to the Cape’s moderation, the Transvaal and Free State parties not only demanded that the party explicitly adopt the creation of a republic as its goal and sought to remove the party’s commitment to a referendum, but the Transvaal leadership also called for Afrikaans to be the only official language.\textsuperscript{69} The Transvaal party was particularly assertive on this issue, as it was deeply concerned that it would be unable to maintain the support of urban Afrikaners without such an objective.\textsuperscript{70} Explaining the decision to adopt the more radical position to Malan, Strijdom noted that it was 'increasingly clear' to him that it was highly unlikely that the Federal formulation would be accepted in the Transvaal. Interestingly, Strijdom informed Malan that the stream of urbanisation to the Witwatersrand (Johannesburg area) made the area the focus

\textsuperscript{65} Die Burger. Leader, 4 May 1938.
\textsuperscript{66} Die Suiderstem. Leader, 8 November 1937.
\textsuperscript{67} Die Burger. 7 May 1938.
\textsuperscript{68} There was also disaffection with the Cape's reluctance on the republican issue in Natal, as demonstrated by H.T.W. Tromp, who insisted that the Cape fall in line with the other three provinces, which were declared republican parties. D.F. Malan Collection, File 1/1/1149, Letter from H.T.W. Tromp to D.F. Malan, 16 September.
\textsuperscript{70} Patrick Furlong. Between Crown and Swastika. p. 19.
of politics and long-term survival of the volk. Some leading Transvaal activists even proposed the formation of a Republican Party, though J.G. Strijdom prudently opposed this suggestion as well as the later call to rename the Purified NP as the Republican Party. He recognised that such a move would limit its appeal.

The Transvaal Party’s draft platform was obviously at variance with the formulation of the Federal Council, where Malan’s position was dominant, and prompted a major Cape – Transvaal crisis between July 1935 and September 1936. Malan, though expressing his willingness to make every effort to ensure party and volk unity, warned Strijdom that the Transvaal’s provincialism was destructive, and added that divisions over the issue would play into the hands of the party’s opponents. Malan also emphasised that the ‘the Federal Council wishes to openly and clearly follow a constitutional path towards republic through the use of our sovereign independence rights.’ The party leader cautioned that the Transvaal’s formulation implied that the party embraced the path of revolution towards a republic and constituted a rejection of the NP’s policies of the past twenty years.

Angered by the party’s prudence on creating a republic, several members of the provincial executive resigned weeks before provincial elections in 1936. The group, opposed to the idea of breë volkswil, in effect demanded that the GNP commit itself to securing a republic in its first term in office. The radicals controlled the party’s provincial mouthpiece Die Republikein [The Republican] and refused to support the party’s adulterated republican position. The Transvaal republicans warned Malan that a failure to embrace the Transvaal’s formulation would limit the new party’s appeal amongst the youth and play into the hands of those who sought to argue that there was no substantive difference between the supporters of Fusion and the Purified NP. Moreover, the group believed that it was incumbent upon Malan and Die Burger to swing the Cape party behind the Transvaal formulation. Indicative of the intolerance towards moderates, the Transvaal republicans stated that to date far to much consideration had been given to ‘persons that we cannot today rely upon as good nationalists.’ In later correspondence,

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73 G.D. Scholtz, Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner. Deel VII. p. 457.
74 G.D. Scholtz, Dr. Nicolaas Johannes van der Merwe. pp. 299 - 303.
the hardliners candidly stated their fears that the combined power of English capital and the media would defeat a referendum on a republic.78

In an open letter to Malan, the directors of the Transvaalse Pers, which published Die Republikein, set Malan a two-week ultimatum, at the end of which he would have to commit himself to establishing a republic in his first term in office. Failure to comply with their deadline would lead to the suspension of the newspaper's support for Malan. The authors noted that a referendum allowed the GNP to indefinitely postpone a decision on the republic until the 'time was ripe.' Hence the need for clarity on the party's commitment to a republic in its first term. Interestingly, the authors of the ultimatum noted that the longer the party was in power the less likely it was to break the constitutional ties with the Empire. As evidence, they cited Hertzog's behaviour from 1926 onwards.79

Strijdom concedes to Malan:
Malan refused to budge on the question of the party's Federal republican formulation, and forced the Transvaal leadership to amend the party's Provincial platform, leading Die Republikein to eventually establish its own party, the National Republican Unity Front, in January 1937. Strijdom's biographer notes that the radical group, possibly influenced by Hitler, was a backlash against party politics and the Westminster system.80 This suggests that the pressure for a break with democracy preceded the war declaration of 1939. Ironically, Strijdom, who was to counter Malan on these grounds a decade later, opposed the group, warning the hardliners that if introduced by a simple parliamentary majority, a parliamentary majority could also rescind a republic. Hence, Strijdom justified his support for a referendum.81 A year later, Strijdom similarly warned that a republic not based on 'broad popular will' would be a 'hopeless failure,'82 thus recognising the essence of the Westminster conundrum, i.e. that the system skewed support for the NP. As it would emerge years later, this position was, however, a temporary tactical concession (shaped by his relative weakness at the time). Strijdom's fellow provincial leader, Mabel Jansen, conceded to Malan that the 'Transvaal fully understands that it could achieve little without the Cape.'83

83 D.F. Malan Collection, File 1/1/1148, Mrs. M. Jansen to D.F. Malan, 12 September 1935.
In the aftermath of the disastrous 1938 elections Die Burger conceded that the party had failed in the Transvaal in general as well as in urban areas. Interestingly, the paper noted how the Westminster, first-past-the-post system had favoured the UP, which had gained 27 seats with 75,000 votes, whilst the GNP gained no seats, despite securing 45,000 votes. It was with this in mind that Verwoerd also supported a referendum in March 1939. The editor Die Transvaler, Verwoerd, suggested that whilst voters were disaffected with the UP, the party managed to keep their support 'by instilling fear on the issue of constitutional changes.' The leader was written in support of a similar statement made by Malan on the referendum. In January 1940, Verwoerd also argued that the pledge to stage a referendum would placate voters supporting the GNP on its racial and other policies who would thus be assured that the party would not use their vote for major constitutional change – the republic. The referendum pledge, therefore, remained a tool of electoral heresthetics and reflected political realism and tactical acumen.

The ultimate acceptance of the Cape's approach reflected the dominance of the Cape, which provided the party's founding institutional and political base, had access to the capital of Cape Afrikaners, controlled Naspers and was the only province with a political machine that was wholly intact after the formation of the GNP. A further factor explaining the Transvaal and Free State's acquiescence was a strong desire to avoid a split within the opponents of Fusion. A further reason why some hard-line elements of the party might have accepted the referendum was its association with Hitler. Die Burger gave much prominence to the November 1933 vote (on Germany's leaving the League of Nations) and the March 1936 vote in which Germans supported the Fuhrer's foreign policy – including the re-occupation of the Rhineland. A leader supporting the German approach and position in fact supplemented this coverage.

Malan’s victory was, however, a temporary one, and much of the radicalism that was to emerge after the declaration of war was already evident in the Transvaal after Fusion. The controversial declaration of war of 1939 emboldened the radical and anti-democratic elements in Afrikaner nationalism and forced Malan to forsake his commitment to a republic by constitutional means.

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84 Die Burger, Leader, 30 May 1938.
85 Die Transvaler, Leader, 21 March 1939 in O. Geyser (Editor), Dr. HF Verwoerd. p. 38.
86 Die Transvaler, Leader, 5 January 1940. In O. Geyser (Editor), Dr. HF Verwoerd. p. 49.
87 G.D. Scholtz, Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner. Deel VII. p. 457
88 Die Burger, 14 November 1933.
89 Die Burger, 30 March 1936.
A contentious war declaration:

In its first general election in 1938 the Purified NP only managed to secure seven additional seats, increasing its representation in parliament to 27. Initially, the party made scant gains in the supposedly republican Transvaal. This may, in part, be explained by the fact that the party only established a newspaper, *Die Transvaler*, in October 1937. *Die Vaderland*, which maintained its loyalty to Hertzog, was the predominant Afrikaans newspaper in the province. By the 1943 elections the party had adopted a decidedly more republican direction and increased its representation to 43 seats, and by 1948 it won 70 seats. In this time its overall support grew from 29.6 percent in 1938, to 36.6 percent in 1943 and 37.2 percent in 1948. This remarkable progress, especially the seven percent increase in support between 1938 and 1943, was as a result of disillusionment with Fusion after Parliament rejected neutrality in September 1939. The 'marriage of convenience,' Fusion, was brought to an abrupt end, and yet again the conciliation project was undermined by an external development over which the country's protagonists had little control. In 1914, the newly formed NP, similarly, benefited from South Africa's involvement in Europe's war and the anticipation of German victory. For Malan the declaration of war heralded vindication of his opposition to Fusion and his party was well placed to benefit from the unprecedented support for republicanism. As Hermann Giliomee has noted, the war declaration, thus, re-kindled 'all the old anti-British and anti-imperialist sentiments and was ultimately decisive in persuading the majority of Afrikaners to go it alone politically.' Dan O'Meara, in part, ascribes opposition to the war declaration to the interests of farmers, who lost access to the German market. Though somewhat reductionist, he correctly notes that the event 'destroyed for ever the Hertzogist conceptions of cooperation with Imperialism.'

Disillusionment with democracy:

The nature of the declaration of war also triggered widespread disillusionment with the Westminster system and increased the idealisation of the former republican institutions and fascism, spurring on a further radicalisation of the GNP's policies. Nationalists

91 In a parliamentary vote Smuts and his supporters defeated a neutrality motion submitted by Hertzog by 80 votes to 67. Hertzog tendered his resignation following the vote and called on the Governor General, Patrick Duncan, to call a general election on the war issue.
95 Dan O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme* p.121.
charged that the Westminster system distorted the national will and Malan lamented that the Union was 'dragged into the war by the votes of Jews, the Coloured representatives and MPs who betrayed their voters.'\textsuperscript{96} In his 1940 New Year's address, Malan accused Smuts of creating a 'Jewish-Imperialist war machine' without a mandate from the volk.\textsuperscript{97} As a result of the declaration of war, GNP leaders increasingly referred to the Westminster system as a 'British-Jewish democracy' and a 'Skyndemokrasie' (pseudo-democracy).\textsuperscript{98} In contrast, the party had portrayed the old Boer republics as true democracies already prior to the 1938 Trek commemoration.\textsuperscript{99} As intended, the centennial commemoration of the Great Trek, orchestrated by the Broederbond,\textsuperscript{100} provided a receptive audience for such claims. The Broederbond viewed the Trek Centennial as an opportunity to stem the de-nationalisation of the Afrikaner,\textsuperscript{101} and successfully hijacked it, in order to promote republicanism and Afrikaner unity. Journalist Schalk Pienaar, who covered the trek as Die Burger's correspondent argues that this event laid the foundations for victory in the 1948 elections.\textsuperscript{102}

Afrikaner anger was increased by the Governor General Patrick Duncan's refusal to acquiesce to Hertzog's demand for fresh elections after the war declaration. Duncan was a former SAP and UP leader, and it seems reasonable to assume that such elections may well have produced a Nationalist anti-war majority,\textsuperscript{103} as there was popular sympathy for Germany amongst Afrikaners. In two by-elections called in rural constituencies after the war vote, the Purified NP emerged victorious with handsome majorities. Kuruman, which was won by the UP with a 56,2 percent majority in the 1938 general elections, was taken by the GNP with 56,5 percent of the vote on 7 February 1940. The GNP maintained the Winburg seat, contested on 8 January 1941, with an eleven percent bigger majority than in 1938.\textsuperscript{104}

\textsuperscript{96} D.F. Malan Collection, File 1/1/1573, D.F. Malan's address to the NP Conference in Pretoria, 26 September 1939.
\textsuperscript{97} D.F. Malan Collection, File 1/1/1630, D.F. Malan's New Years message, 1 January 1940.
\textsuperscript{98} D.F. Malan Collection. 1/1/2012, J.G. Strijdom address to National Juegbond conference, 1942.
\textsuperscript{99} Die Transvaler, Leader, 11 October 1937, 26 March 1941, 29 April 1941, 12 May 1941. In O. Geyser (Editor), Dr. HF Verwoerd. pp. 51, 56 - 59.
\textsuperscript{102} Schalk Pienaar, Getuie van Groot Tye (Kaapstad, 1977), pp. 12, 16.
\textsuperscript{103} Oswald Pirow, James Barry Munnik Hertzog, p. 249.
This apparent distortion of the popular will triggered a wide-scale abandonment of democracy by many Afrikaners, like future Prime Minister John Vorster. The declaration of war affected procedural debates on the route to a republic. For Hertzog and his followers, it reinforced the moral and political imperative of basing a future republic on a referendum. For radical republicans like Strydom, on the other hand, Smuts’s behaviour justified the use of a simple parliamentary majority to impose a republic and even Malan supported this approach for a while. Besides, the prospect of German victory made Hertzog’s gradualism irrelevant and in July 1940 Strijdom, for example, suggested that whilst attaining a republic on the basis of broad will was a sound tactic in normal times, these were not normal times. In a *Transvaler* editorial, on 16 July 1940, Dr. Verwoerd echoed such sentiments.

If Germany wins and the opportunity suddenly arrives to choose between becoming a German or Italian colony or to establish a free republic, and action has to be taken at once to decide, then the ‘special and definite instruction of the people’ and ‘the broad will of the people’ cannot be obtained through a plebiscite, which would first have to be satisfactorily arranged. This would be slavery to the letter of the constitution and perhaps cost the Union its freedom.

Even Malan began to articulate the Transvaal’s sentiments. Speaking in the Free State town of Fuarsmith, in March 1941, he noted.

We are not going to give up our national ideal for the sake of co-operation. As regards the obtaining of a republic, Mr. Havenga interprets this as the ‘broad will of the people.’ So a majority will have to be obtained among the English and a majority among the Jews. . . . I do not agree that in our country we are going to grant the right of veto to decide about a republic to any section which is not imbued with the real Afrikaner spirit.

Such comments were echoed in Cradock, Stellenbosch and Cape Town by Malan in early 1941 and as late as 1942. Afrikaner disillusionment with Westminster

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110 The Star, 28 September 1946.
111 Die Burger, 25 March 1941.
112 The Star, 5 July 1942.
democracy, the hope of Nazi victory and the radicalisation of Afrikaners explain the GNP's abandonment of Hertzog's legacy of constitutionalism and a referendum as the basis of a republic. If elections were no longer relevant, then the referendum no longer had any merit as a tool of heresthetics. The move also, however, symbolised the GNP's rejection of Hertzogism and Hertzog.

The rejection of Hertzogism:

Following Hertzog's defeat on the neutrality issue, he and Malan sought to ensure Afrikaner political unity. Both leaders were patently aware of the clamour for Afrikaner political amalgamation, and Malan certainly welcomed the prospect of a 'healthier party division in politics,'[^113] i.e. Afrikaner political unity. But, despite the fact that Hertzog and Malan initially agreed on guiding principles for Hereneging (unification), under Hertzog's leadership, Afrikaner accord proved elusive and the Reconstructed National (Herstigte Nasionale Party - HNP) or Volks Party would not count the NP's founder amongst its ranks. The 'neo-Krugerist wing'[^114] of the party which represented the younger leaders in control of the party machine[^115], spurred on by the Broederbond[^116], were determined not to 'tolerate any watering-down of their principles,'[^117] and were bitterly opposed to Hertzog's return. Biding their time, the hard-liners successfully scuppered the unity effort and jettisoned Hertzog.

Opposition to Hertzog stemmed from his obstinate adherence to his two-stream principle and his inclusive definition of citizenship. Hertzog's opponents were equally irked by the fact that he remained committed to a republic by consent, despite the war vote.[^118] This difference of approach and opinion also laid bare the fact that the likes of Strijdom viewed a referendum as a tactical concession, whilst Hertzog viewed it as a derivative of his principle of conciliation. Whereas Hertzog increasingly believed that an independent republic forced upon English speakers would 'prevent English speakers from becoming good Afrikaners [South Africans],[^119] the Broederbond desired the assimilation

[^113]: D.F. Malan Collection. 1/1/1573, D.F. Malan's address to the NP Conference in Pretoria, 26 September 1939.
[^114]: Sheila Patterson, The Last Trek, p. 77.
[^115]: A.C. Cilliers, Genl. Hertzog en Hereniging (Stellenbosch, 1941), p. 35; G.H. Calpin, There are no South Africans, pp. 296-297.
[^117]: Michael Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip, The South African Opposition, p. 22; Die Transvaler, Leader, 8 November 1939. In .Geyser (Editor), Dr. HF Verwoerd, p. 45.
[^119]: A.C. Cilliers, Genl. Hertzog en Hereniging, p. 32.
of English speakers. Like Henri Bourassa, who spent his last years increasingly 'in disagreement with the forces he had set in motion,' Hertzog no longer found common ground with the forces of nationalism he had unleashed.

A further reason for enmity towards Hertzog was his demand that the new party opens its ranks to non-republicans. No doubt an anathema for purists, unwilling and unable to exonerate those who had 'strayed from the path' at the time of Fusion. Despite claims that Hertzog’s opposition to the HNP becoming a Republican party led to his resignation, the struggle was in essence over the very meaning of *volkswil* and white South African identity. For Purified Nationalists, *volkswil* was now viewed as the 'will of Nationalist Afrikanerdom, expressed through its parliamentary party.' For Hertzog and Hertzogism a referendum remained the only expression of *volkswil*.

Yet a further source of opposition to Hertzog was his support for a republic within the Commonwealth. For fervent nationalists a republic was a means to effect a radical transmutation of the social, economic, cultural and political foundations of the Union and wean the country from its British influence. The concern that a soft-peddling of the HNP’s republican principles would lead youth to desert the party was a further reason to oppose union with the Hertzogites. This fear was vindicated by the subsequent appeal of extra-parliamentary Fascist groups. Hans Strijdom’s biographer adds that he feared the emergence of the Christian Republican Party, which could appeal to HNP supporters. In a Westminster, first-past-the-post, system, such a development could have spelt disaster for the party.

The failure of unity, like Malan’s earlier rejection of Fusion, was however tainted by far less wholesome considerations. For both the *Broederbond* and the Purists, often interchangeable, had long standing scores to settle with Hertzog - the former, for his 1935

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125 *Die Transvaler*, Leader, 7, 8, 28 November 1939, 5 January 1940, 27 March 1941, 21 May 1941, 10 February 1943, In O. Geyser (Editor), *Dr. HF Verwoerd*. pp. 41-50, 52, 55, 64, 82.
attack on the organisation, reportedly prompted by N.C. Havenga, and the latter, for the vituperations they had endured whilst sitting on the opposition benches after Fusion. And, as was the case with Fusion, certain Gesuiwerdes may well have viewed the return of Hertzog’s supporters to the party as a threat to their personal careers and standing. According to Ben Schoeman, the highly popular Oswald Pirow was especially viewed as a threat. An ancillary consideration was the fact that whereas Malan had yet to establish his authority and a strong national following, Hertzog was an established and popular leader. Malan was, therefore, far more malleable from the perspective of the hardliners. Moreover, Malan without Hertzog would be more dependent upon them.

In November 1940 Hertzog’s determined detractors, led by C.R. Swart, humiliated him at the Free State unity conference, when delegates rejected the principle of equality between English and Afrikaans-speaking Whites. Malan, who had on several occasions noted his readiness to subscribe to Hertzog’s civic definition of Afrikanerdom, now collaborated with the exclusivist school. In targeting the issue of English-Afrikaner relations, the extremists had manufactured a crisis through which to hound Hertzog out of the party and politics, yet craftily refraining from rebuffing the terms of unity. Ben Schoeman notes that these determined Purified NP leaders would have driven him out 'one way or another.'

The HNP had been purified, Hertzogism exorcised, and the high tide of exclusivist Christian-Nationalist republicanism had arrived. Indicative of the party’s abandonment of Hertzogism was the formal decision by the Transvaal Congress of the HNP in early December 1940 to expunge the pledge to inaugurate a republic on the basis of broad popular will from its constitution. Hertzog’s departure yet again left Malan at the mercy of the republican wing. The weakening of the HNP’s constitutional commitment is probably best understood as a response to the controversy surrounding the declaration of war. A
second factor was the anticipation that a Nazi military victory would lead to a republic in South Africa.

**Afrikaner disunion:**

On 30 January 1941 Hertzog’s followers announced the establishment of the Afrikaner Party (AP). Hertzog, to the relief of the hardliners, declined leadership of the party. 'Hertzogism without Hertzog' had limited appeal and saved the HNP from the threat of a far-reaching Afrikaner political split.\(^{136}\) The weakness of the Party without its leaders was demonstrated in the Fauresmith and Smithfield by-elections, after Havenga and Hertzog resigned their seats. HNP candidates soundly beat both AP candidates in March 1941.

The extremist victory over Hertzogism was, however, to prove spurious. The flip side of growing support for a republic, combined with the fall-out of failed Hertzog-Malan unity efforts and the allure of Nazi victory, was a debilitating split within the Christian-Nationalist Afrikaner camp over the kind of republic they desired and the method of attaining that republic.\(^ {137}\) On the former count, a struggle emerged over the role of National Socialism in the proposed republic. On the latter count, even within the NP, differences emerged between those who championed constitutionalism and those who propagated extra-parliamentary and violent actions in order to secure a republic.

The debate over the legitimacy and relevance of constitutional means - which also played out in the *Broederbond* - undermined the relevance of party politics, in general, and the *Hereenigde Nasionale* Party in particular. Whilst the HNP's response to the declaration of war was the abandonment of its traditional commitment to changing the status of the Union through a referendum, disgust with the events following 6 September 1939 elicited an even more extreme response, the rejection of representative democracy and party politics. Two groups effectively mobilised support for a single party state, *The New Order Study Group*\(^ {138}\) and the *Ossewa Brandwag* (OB), or Ox Wagon Sentinel.

The OB, which was created in order to nurture the spirit of the Great Trek following the 1938 commemorations, provided an appealing extra-parliamentary alternative at a time of division and disillusionment with party politics. And it threatened to eclipse the HNP. The organisation was viewed as the 'most powerful organisation in the

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\(^{138}\) Oswald Pirow, who was joined by sixteen former Hertzogites that did not join the Afrikaner Party, led the New Order group. This group functioned as a faction within the HNP, and called for the establishment of a Nationalist Socialist republic.
history of Afrikanerdom, and for many provided the 'Highest Factor of Afrikanerdom.' Explaining the appeal of the movement, Piet Meiring notes that the 'OB and its storm troopers were so much more lively and attractive than the Party and its bazaars and gatherings.' Dan O'Meara suggests that the proclivity towards extra-parliamentary activities in the north had its roots in Fusion and the fact that so few Transvaal and Free State MP's broke with Malan. This not only denied people a stake in the political system, but also ensured that the Broederbond emerged as more central than the party in these areas. G.H. Calpin, on the other hand, suggests that the OB's popularity reflects a revolt against 'fissiparous [Afrikaner] political tendencies,' a reliance on persons and not ideas in Afrikaner politics and British rule. In a memo to D.F. Malan, drafted in March 1941, the Broederbond's Piet Meyer informed Malan that 'many leading Afrikaners in the activist and cultural groups only 'tolerated' the party as a necessary organisation, but expect no salvation from it.' Instead, they sought deliverance in the OB.

The OB as a threat to the party:
The OB was initially viewed as a potential resource for the party. According to Alan Paton, Malan, who was politically weakened by the formation of the New Order and the Afrikaner Party, viewed the movement as a weapon with which to startle Smuts. Malan, thus, initially sought to curry favour with the organization and cooperate with it. Such assessments were, however, later altered as the movement threatened to eclipse the party. The OB's membership almost doubled from 200,000 in November 1940 to well over 350,000 in February 1941 and many of its key activists were drawn from the party and began to lose interest in HNP activities. Some opponents of parliamentary democracy sought to argue that political parties were not a feature of the Boer republics, a claim rejected by Free State National Party leader N.J. van der Merwe. The appointment of

139 Ben Schoeman, My lewe in die politiek, p. 78.
141 Piet Meiring, Fyvtig Jaar op die Voorblad, p. 87.
143 G.H. Calpin, There are no South Africans, pp. 286-287, 302.
144 D.F. Malan Collection, File 1/1/1755, P.J. Meyer to D.F. Malan. 15 March 1941.
145 Ben Schoeman, My Lewe in die Politiek, p. 93.
147 William Henry Vatcher Jr., White Laager, p. 65.
Dr. Hans van Rensburg, an effectual and charismatic leader with well-known Nazi sympathies, as the OB’s leader in January 1941 dramatically strengthened the organisation’s Nazi bent, organisational efficacy and public appeal. In his memoirs, Ben Schoeman recounts that the deputy leader of the OB, J.A. Smith received a rousing welcome at the NP’s Unial conference in June 1941 and notes that his reception surpassed that for D.F. Malan. The party leadership thus realised that it stood to lose from its stratagem of cooperation with the more radical groups.

In addition to campaigning for a one-party state, both the OB and Pirow’s New Order promoted a Nationalist-Socialist republic. Pirow, at the very least, sought to emulate the model promoted by Portugal’s Salazar. Their efforts were abetted by a string of initial Nazi successes on the battlefields of Europe in 1940, which raised expectations that a Nazi victory in Europe would lead to a republic in South Africa. The eschewal of parliamentary politics and constitutionalism by these two groups further eroded support for the parliamentary system, and undermined the HNP’s electoral prospects by encouraging the boycott of elections. The HNP was, for example, weakened by an OB inspired boycott in a Johannesburg City Council (Northmead) by-election. More importantly, significant numbers of Afrikaners boycotted the 1943 general election, to the detriment of the HNP. Whereas the participation rate in 1938 was 81.6 percent, it dropped to 78.4 percent in 1943. Ben Schoeman claims that he lost his seat in the 1943 election as a result of an OB sponsored boycott. His UP opponent secured the seat by a slender majority of 232 votes and he further contends that the OB all but ‘destroyed’ the NP in Natal. Beyond an ideological aversion to the institutions of representative democracy, many believed that the interests of the OB were served by a boycott. In addition to the boycott, several ‘unity candidates,’ identified with the OB and New Order contested the 1943 elections. Strijdom himself faced one such candidate, and these candidates are said to have cost the party the Soutpansberg, Middleburg, Pretoria District and Heidelberg constituencies. In the latter constituency the UP held the seat with a

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149 Dr. Hans van Rensburg resigned his post as Administrator of the Orange Free State and galvanized the movement into an effective force. Van Rensburg, a Hertzog appointee and supporter, was a charismatic and effective leader. He was one of an increasing number of Afrikaners who had studied in or visited Nazi Germany, and in fact met with the Fuhrer during his visit.

150 Ben Schoeman, Mv Lewe in die Politiek. p. 97.


155 Ben Schoeman, Mv Lewe in die Politiek. pp. 113-114.

156 Ibid. p. 117.
slender majority of 57 votes after the unity candidate, who had withdrawn from the race, still polled 79 votes.\textsuperscript{157} The relative ease with which Strijdom dealt with the third candidate (who secured 810 votes) in the 1943 vote, might account for his opposition to a later pact with Havenga. From the middle of 1941 the OB and the Party were engaged in an acrimonious struggle for political predominance. Though key OB activists were loathe to vote for Smuts, a vote for Malan would strengthen him in his efforts to marginalise the OB. Hence the movement’s leaders toyed with the idea of a boycott.\textsuperscript{158}

This was not the only threat that the OB posed. Van Rensburg’s growing appeal threatened Malan’s status as the political leader of the Afrikaners, and there were even suggestions that the Germans viewed van Rensburg, and not Malan, as their leader designate.\textsuperscript{159} Van Rensburg complicated matters by suggesting that the OB alone could bring about a republic. Patrick Furlong also suggests that Malan may have feared that the OB’s extremism might 'force the hand of the government' against his own party.\textsuperscript{160} It should be noted that Hertzog’s dramatic announcement to the Head Committee of the Afrikaner Party that he supported fascism in October 1941,\textsuperscript{161} though denied and played down by his supporters,\textsuperscript{162} could only have served to strengthen the resolve of the HNP to eliminate the threat posed by the OB. The combination of van Rensburg and Pirow (both Hertzog loyalists), and Hertzog provided a potentially grave threat at a precarious time for the party.

National Party radicalism:
The HNP’s initial response to the OB, and \textit{New Order}, was to further radicalise its positions, as the party was swept along by public sentiment, and to seek cooperation with the neo-Fascist organisations. The HNP absorbed the \textit{New Order} supporters, allowing them to operate as a separate faction within the fold of the party. The shift to the right was not only tactical, based on a recognition that the OB was a 'political power in its own right,'\textsuperscript{163} but also reflected the influence of proto-fascists within the party and the \textit{Broederbond}. As a result of the influence of the radical right, there was indeed little to set

\begin{footnotes}
\item[I. L. Basson, J.G. Strijdom, pp. 445-449.]
\item[Michael Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip, \textit{The South African Opposition}, p. 146.]
\item[Patrick Furlong, \textit{Between Crown and Swastika}, p. 190.]
\item[Oswald Pirow, \textit{James Barry Munnik Hertzog}, pp. 259-261.]
\item[A.M. van Schoor, \textit{Notes from my Diary} (Pretoria, 1979), pp. 97-99.]
\item[Christoph Marx, 'The Ossewabrandwag as a Mass Movement, 1939-1941', \textit{The Journal of Southern African Studies}, 20, 2, 1994, p. 205.]
\end{footnotes}
the OB and HNP apart on constitutional ideas between 1939 and 1941, and Christoph Marx suggests that the 'principle that caused the conflict between the HNP and the OB was parliamentary democracy – not as an end in itself, though, but as a principle – or means – in the sense of gaining power.'

Patrick Furlong notes that pro-Nationalist historians have tended to exaggerate differences between the OB and HNP in order to demonstrate that the party was unaffected by the rise of fascism. Hermann Giliomee has recently sought to renew efforts to underplay these links, and suggests it is 'far fetched to describe the NP as Fascist or proto-Fascist.' Similarly, Louise Vincent argues that this perception is fuelled by Communists, like Union leader Solly Sacks, who confused shirt movements with Afrikaner nationalism. Vincent holds that the NP was anti-fascist. Though Giliomee's claims serve to revise Afrikaner history and demonstrate that the NP was not in any significant way influenced by the far right in forging racial policy, he far to easily dismisses Bloomberg, Furlong and Marx. Whilst Giliomee is correct in highlighting that the declaration of war was a critical development that shaped the nature of Afrikaner nationalism during this period, the roots of Afrikaner radicalism lay in the growing appeal of cultural or organic nationalism, which preceded the war, and were propelled by Afrikaner urbanization and poor whitism. It was, in turn, this radicalization that made Afrikaner nationalism receptive to fascist ideas. Though counterfactual speculation, continued Nazi success in the war effort would have encouraged continued support for fascism and further undermined the NP's commitment to democracy.

The HNP's draft constitution:
As part of the wider struggle for the hearts and minds of Afrikaners, the party developed its own draft constitution. The task was delegated to the Broederbond, but at the time of publication in January 1942 the political context (specifically assessments regarding the war) was already changing, and the Cape leadership – notably Die Burger - opposed the draft. Explaining the decision to publish the draft, the pro-government Star suggested

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165 Christoph Marx, 'The Ossewabrandwag', p.217
169 Christoph Marx, 'The Ossewabrandwag', pp.198, 199, 217
170 Dan O'Meara, 'The Afrikaner Broederbond', pp. 176-177.
that the publication was part of a 'desperate attempt to outbid the Ossewa Brandwag.' The paper also hinted that Malan had done so against the wishes of Die Burger.\textsuperscript{171} Whereas this neo-Fichtean document proposed that Afrikaans serve as the sole language in the proposed republic, Malan supported a more tolerant and inclusive approach towards English-speaking white South Africans.\textsuperscript{172} Notwithstanding these differences, the preparation of the draft and its publication corresponded with the party’s decision to make the Republican issue the focus of the opening debate of the 1942 parliamentary session. According to Die Burger, the decision to highlight the republic, served to 'underscore the tremendous gulf between Nationalist Afrikanerdom as represented by the HNP, and the imperialists under Field Marshall Smuts.'\textsuperscript{173}

The key difference between its draft constitution and that of the OB, published in 1941, was the HNP’s support for a multi-party system. As already suggested the OB’s demand for a one-party state undermined the legitimacy of the HNP and its constitutional role. Of interest was the fact that the draft provided for the use of referenda under certain circumstances. Earlier, L.J. du Plessis had argued that the president should have the power to call referenda to get support for legislation in certain cases.\textsuperscript{174} Patrick Furlong suggests that this support for the referendum was consonant with the Bonapartist and Kruger tradition, and links it to the later use of referenda.\textsuperscript{175}

As the war drew to its end, this exclusivist and authoritarian constitution became an embarrassment to the HNP. But, in spite of the fact that Malan may have paid a certain price for this in the 1943 elections,\textsuperscript{176} his stratagem was essential in his effort to consolidate his ethnic base and ensure the HNP’s leading role at the time. Having attained this objective, Malan now sought to make the HNP electable and broaden its appeal in order to tap into post-War disaffection. Addressing the Union wide conference of the HNP in September 1942, he noted that after 'every war – this was always the experience – comes the political setback [for the incumbent] as sure as night follows day.'\textsuperscript{177} A memo cabled to London by the British High Commission underscored the NP’s acceptance of an Allied victory, noting that the NP opposition found ‘their chief interest during the [1943]
session in preparing the way, by judicious propaganda, for their election appeal to the
country. Dr. Malan, forsaking the familiar ground of political and constitutional questions,
introduced a long motion setting out the Nationalist Party's policy on economic and social
matters.178

The HNP embraces Boer democracy:
Ironically, the threat from the far right would best be addressed not by trying to outflank
them from the right, but by presenting the HNP as an indigenous 'third way,' drawing on
Boer traditions. In doing so, the party rejected both the OB's Nazism and the UP's
imperialism. It should be noted that the shift towards fascism was not unopposed, and
prominent Broederbond and HNP figures like H.F. Verwoerd,179 though accepting
authoritarianism, believed that the basic tenets of Fascism clashed with basic Calvinist and
Kuyperian doctrines.180 And as early as 1939, N.J. van der Merwe warned that there are
certain ideals - like parliamentary democracy - that are more important than unity of the
volk.181

When the OB distributed 100,000 copies of its draft constitution in July 1941,
Malan decided to move against the organisation and 'decertify' it. The act constituted a
violation of the Broederbond sponsored Cradock Agreement,182 of 29 October 1940, and
provided a casus belli for an HNP attack on the OB.183 And from August 1941 the party
publicly denounced the OB and the New Order. Malan, for example, informed the Unial
congress of the HNP on 3 June 1941 that he refused to identify with Nazism, arguing that
the Afrikaner's tradition was anti-dictatorial.184 The party also deployed its influential
newspapers to discredit Nazism as a foreign import and 'decertify' the OB and the New
Order. Similarly, intellectuals began to articulate a unique Afrikaner democratic theory.
The shift in thinking is perhaps best demonstrated by two articles published in the
influential journal Koers,185 one in the early stages of the war and the second after the war.
Writing in February 1941, J. Albert Coetzee argued that the Boer tradition was not democratic in the modern or 'heathenish' sense. Coetzee argued that democracy in the modern heathen sense was only applicable to 'mongrel nations.' In South Africa, for example, the 'demos' – the 'volk' of the democracy – made up of English speakers, Jews, some Afrikaners, Hotnots [Coloureds],] have dictated to the Boerevolk, the 'real volk of the land,' what they may or may not do. Hence in the past there was a pure democracy because the volk was not so mixed. Coetzee noted that the Bible, and not the volk, had the final say in Paul Kruger's polity. This approach, according to him, was consonant with the principles of Calvinism. Coetzee even suggested that to claim that the Afrikaner tradition was democratic, or that Paul Kruger was a democrat, was to brand them as heathen. According to Coetzee, all forms of organic nationalism, including the German, Italian, Spanish and the Boer form rejected democracy.

Whereas G.F. de Vos Hugo (1946) similarly argued that God is sovereign, and agreed with Coetzee that the government's law should be consonant with God's law, he was critical of Nazism. According to de Vos Hugo, elections serve to judge whether the government in its previous term ruled in accordance with God's law. In the event that the ruling party failed to do so, the volk repudiates it by electing the opposition. De Vos Hugo cited Kruger's four electoral victories as an example of a leader who was rewarded for ruling in line with God's law. De Vos Hugo noted that voting was integral to the Protestant ethic and suggested that the hardships that the German people were enduring were divine punishment for being untrue to their Protestant freedom. Similarly, H du Plessis rejected Fascism, National Socialism or any other 'ism' as the basis for Afrikaner unity in 1947. The difference between the Coetzee and Hugo, no doubt, reflect the changing strategic context in Europe and evolving political realities in South Africa. Coetzee wrote in 1941, at a time of HNP-OB cooperation, whereas de vos Hugo's contribution came after the war and the OB-HNP struggle.

appeared in this journal provide a helpful insight into the constitutional thinking of the Broederbond and the Republican movement.

Why the return to democracy?
The embrace of the Boer tradition and the party’s growing aversion to Nazism are explained by several factors. One was the growing concern that identification with Hitler would paint the organisation as a Nazi fifth column and invite state repression.\textsuperscript{189} Moreover, the party’s association with the New Order and the OB may increasingly have served the government’s efforts to discredit the party. Secondly, Malan may indeed have had an aversion to Nazism, especially in light of the benefits that the OB gained from its identification with the movement. According to Dan O’Meara the appeal of groups like the OB was limited to urban areas, where the party had traditionally been weak, as farmers were startled by their anti-capitalist rhetoric in support of National Socialism. And GNP politicians are said to have understood that electoral success required an allegiance with farming capital in the Transvaal.\textsuperscript{190} Thirdly, the party feared an alliance between van Rensburg, Pirow and Hertzog. Fourthly, in the absence of a concerted insistence that democracy was relevant, the party would concede to its own irrelevance. Addressing the Unial conference of the GNP in early June 1941, Malan warned against those who believed that the party was no longer necessary and predicted that the time would arrive when the party would be vital to navigate the constitutional crisis.\textsuperscript{191} Addressing the party’s national conference a year later, in mid-September 1942, Malan reiterated his argument that the route to the republic is via the ballot box, no matter what the outcome of the war.\textsuperscript{192} Finally, the change in Malan’s posture can only be understood in the context of changing war fortunes and the fact that the party now viewed the OB as its single largest competitor. A Dominion Intelligence report drafted in 1943 notes,

Gradually it became apparent to Dr. Malan that a parliamentary party which relied largely upon the support of the Dutch Reformed Church and claimed to be the sole exponent of the 'Afrikaner tradition' was no match for his rivals when it came to demonstrating his passion for the Nationalist Socialist ideal. Moreover, Britain was not dead after all, and indeed showed a disturbing capacity of resiliency; and American help was beginning to be effective.\textsuperscript{193}

\textsuperscript{190} Dan O’Meara, \textit{Volkskapitalisme}, pp. 125, 128, 131-133.
\textsuperscript{191} S.W. Pienaar, \textit{Glo in u volk}, pp. 42, 48.
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid. pp. 45, 58.
\textsuperscript{193} Public Records Office. FO/371/36598.
It has been suggested that Malan’s recollections of the 1914 rebellion and the damage it did to the fledgling HNP, at the time, informed his thinking at the time.\textsuperscript{194} Hence, Malan not only applied the logic of appropriateness, but he had also learnt valuable lessons from his previous experience.

**The return to electoral politics:**

In many respects this chapter is the most important of all, as the very struggle over the path towards a republic and over a referendum highlights the NP’s understanding of the role of the referendum mechanism. *Die Republikein*’s harsh criticism of Malan and his defence of the referendum mechanism, after Fusion, laid bare the Party’s tactical considerations – electoral *heresthetics* - in supporting the mechanism. And despite the break with Hertzog, the party machine, which continued to be controlled by the Cape and men like P.W. Botha, did not amend its tactical appreciation of the referendum. Forced to articulate radical positions, in response to the UP capturing the middle ground, the Purified NP machine did not lose sight of the value of the referendum in order to appeal to non-republican voters, especially at election time. This was certainly the case in the 1938 elections and Malan’s campaign speeches, and again in the 1943 elections once the folly of assuming a Nazi victory had become clear to all. It is also worth re-emphasising the fact that the Cape was uniquely able to 'hold the line' and get it’s way on the referendum issue for the simple reason that it was the only province in which the HNP made an almost clean break after Fusion.

It was only after the controversial war declaration of 1939 and the phenomenal growth of the fascist right that Malan surrendered to the Northern party on the referendum and the party’s commitment to the constitutional path towards a republic. The rejection of Hertzogism, gradualism and representative democracy can only be understood in the context of a massive Afrikaner rejection of the Westminster system after September 1939. And given early German successes in the battlefront, the public mood and the popularity of pro-Nazi groups, Malan seems to have had little choice in amending his tactics.

Once it became apparent that this approach merely served to further weaken the party and make it irrelevant, and once the prospect of a Nazi victory became slim, Malan returned to the centre and embraced democracy. Malan’s approach was now calibrated by the party’s embrace of its own 'Third Way,' a return to Boer democracy, which continued

to reject the imperialism that Smuts represented, but also repudiated Nazism and Fascism as foreign imports. The Party’s strong republican bent, from 1939 until the 1943 elections, was a carry over from these internal struggles for the hearts and minds of Afrikaners. During this period Malan was pre-occupied with consolidating the party’s ethnic base, and did so around the republican issue. The 1943 election signalled the culmination of the battle over the interpretation of Christian Nationalism in favour of the HNP and Malan. Malan had ‘isolated his right-wing opponents as exponents of foreign ideologies, or as extremists with no sense of gratitude for what the party had done for Afrikanerdom.’ The end of this battle was not only the restoration of the HNP’s monopoly as the sole political representative of the Afrikaners. It also, ultimately, empowered the moderates in the party. They seized upon the party’s failure in the 1943 elections as positive proof that the party could only win the 1948 elections by moderating its stance. The hardliners had overplayed their hand, and adapting parts of the Hertzog programme, especially a return to the pledge of a referendum on a republic, was required if the NP was to gain power.

Chapter Eight.

The 1960 referendum and the realisation of the republican dream.

When the Nationalists finally converted South Africa into a Republic in 1961, the wheel of history had turned full circle. At a single stroke the jubilant Afrikaners had liquidated the consequences of the 1902 Treaty of Vereeniging and the constitutional legacy of defeat. A dynamic, united and supremely confident Afrikanerdom ruled over the whole of South Africa and all but eliminated the last traces of British influence in the Union. Dr. Verwoerd's withdrawal from the Commonwealth in that year finally severed South Africa's 150-year link with Great Britain. The Boer martyrs had been avenged.¹

The introduction of the referendum:

This chapter describes the period leading up to the first referendum in 1960 and the vote. This referendum, it will be argued, cannot be viewed in isolation from the NP's historical use of the referendum pledge in order to navigate the 1948 election campaign. The referendum again served as an instrument of electoral heresthetics that allowed the NP to play down its republican focus, in order to appeal to non-republican (especially urban) voters. Throughout, the referendum pledge also offered the party ample constructive ambiguity, signaling its commitment to a republic to its support base, yet demonstrating moderation and caution to the wider community.

Once in power, the NP leadership, particularly D.F. Malan and N.C. Havenga, were preoccupied with consolidating the party's tenuous hold on power. This required caution on many issues, and the republican question in particular. The numerous referendum pledges, and the caution of the two elder leaders, incensed the more radical nationalists of the Transvaal. So numerous were these pledges that Malan's critics, J.G. Strijdom and H.F. Verwoerd, who were also his successors, were unable to retreat from a referendum. Though it would have been easier for the party to use its growing parliamentary majority, which was skewed by the Westminster system, Malan's promises cast a long shadow over the party's behavior in regard to a republic.

Having embraced the referendum, the party now sought the most effective path to that republic and a referendum victory, at a time when the NP did not enjoy the support of half of the white voters. It will be argued that the Cape, which had basically imposed the referendum on the North, believed that a referendum victory would only be possible if the

proposed republic involved as few symbolic and constitutional changes as possible. This logic, correctly, recognized that the NP needed to limit the scope for the UP to mobilize an anti-republican majority. The most significant of these changes would be an alteration in South Africa's relations with Britain and the Commonwealth. And from 1949 onwards Malan argued that a republic could, and would, remain a member of the Commonwealth. This issue quickly became the new fault line between the North and South.

After the 1958 election, when the NP managed to garner over 50 percent of the popular vote, the referendum became 'practical' politics. In other words, victory was possible. Strijdom was, however, still unable to secure a wide endorsement for a republic, as the party had committed itself to a special majority. The one variable of the traditional Malan referendum package that the Transvaal leadership was in a position to change was the size of the majority. Verwoerd, who conceded that his hand was tied by past promises on the referendum, broke with the long-standing pledge to a qualified majority. In the analysis of the 1960 vote I will, briefly, dwell on the impact of economic arguments on ethno-national referenda. I argue that that economic arguments are of limited value on ethno-national questions.

Laying the groundwork for Nationalist victory:

As argued in the previous chapter, Nazi defeat spelt an acceptance of a return to parliamentary politics and D.F. Malan set about recommitting the HNP to changing the country's constitutional status by legal means. Malan also accepted that unseating Smuts would, at the very least, require Afrikaner political unity, through a pact with Havenga's followers, and playing down the republican issue. In doing so, he sought to emulate Hertzog's conduct in 1924. Though the Afrikaner Party fared dismally in the 1943 elections, obtaining a meagre 1.6 percent of the national vote, it represented significant Afrikaner opinion, especially in the Free State, which was loyal to J.B.M. Hertzog's legacy. In the Free State the party secured 11.4 percent of the popular vote in the 1943 elections. Besides, in Afrikaner Party strongholds and marginal constituencies, the HNP was faced with the prospect that Smuts would benefit from a three-way struggle. Mindful of this danger, Malan forged a pact with the Afrikaner Party ahead of the 1948 elections,

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allowing it to contest certain seats unopposed. Moreover, Malan realised that Havenga was more palatable to English speakers due to his moderate image and his long association with Hertzog.

As part of this deal Havenga insisted, at the very least, on his mentor’s promise of a referendum on the republican question as an intrinsic principle of the post-1948 coalition. Malan who supported this approach adroitly agreed, and in its 1948 election manifesto the party noted that the coming elections 'will not be fought over the endeavor for the creation of a republic.' A further incentive for the pact, from Malan’s perspective, was that an allegiance with Havenga would counterbalance those elements in the HNP who were propagating a republic in the immediate future, in spite of the NP's slender parliamentary majority. A coalition with Havenga, in fact, made Malan’s referendum pledge more credible. The referendum pledge was essential in order to counter United Party (UP) propaganda that the HNP would create a republic, if they won the election, and removed this issue from the electoral agenda. In the 1953 election campaign Malan and the NP similarly defended its incumbency by focussing on racial issues and its Apartheid policies, and not the republic.

Elements in the Republican Transvaal HNP leadership vehemently opposed cooperation with the diminutive Afrikaner Party, although moderate HNP leaders like Ben Schoeman, backed the pact. Ideological issues, a republic and breë volkswil did not, however, play a central role in the Transvaal’s opposition to this pact. The correspondence between Malan and Strijdom, and between Malan and Havenga, indicates that the source of the dispute was a fear that the AP was being taken over by its bitter enemy, the Ossewa Brandwag.

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6 D.F. Malan Collection, File 1/1/2390, HNP se Verkiesings Manifes. Dr. Malan in die Paarl, 21 April 1948.
8 Ben Schoeman, My Lewe in die Politiek (Johannesburg, 1978), p. 128.
Another cause of disaffection was the decision to allocate a quota of safe seats, especially in the Free State and Transvaal, to the party.\textsuperscript{12} Hans Strijdom, in fact, threatened to leave the party over the issue, as he believed that the HNP was paying too heavy a price. To add insult to injury, the AP set about opening branches in areas where they had never been active before. Often known OB supporters led these initiatives. Given the small, yet not insignificant, boycott of the 1943 elections and the acrimony between the party and the OB, Malan clearly saw the AP as a vehicle through which to launder non-HNP Afrikaner votes in order to topple Smuts. Opponents of the pact, however, warned Malan that floating votes might be lost due to a link between the HNP and the OB, through the AP, which increasingly became identified with the OB.\textsuperscript{13}

Though Strijdom preferred to absorb the AP, Malan was mindful of the fact that it would have been very difficult at that point in time,\textsuperscript{14} due to past animosities. Again, the dimension of personal enmity towards Havenga cannot be dismissed. So strongly identified with Hertzog, and condemned as the 'beskermheer' (protector) of anti-republicans,\textsuperscript{15} Havenga also threatened Strijdom’s prospects of succeeding Malan.

Malan stood his ground and his stratagem paid off handsomely. The AP won 9 of the 10 seats it contested.\textsuperscript{16} More importantly, the pact allowed the HNP to concentrate its efforts and limited resources more effectively. Of the 92 seats the party contested, it won 70. In the 1943 elections the party contested 99 seats and only won 43 of these. This dramatic increase in seats happened despite the fact that the party’s share of the vote only rose by 1,4 percent to 37,2 percent. The AP’s share rose to 3,9 percent, whilst the UP’s share fell from 48,7 percent to 47,9 percent.\textsuperscript{17} Smuts, who lost his own seat, led a party with only 65 seats in parliament. The Westminster system, therefore, demonstrated how a party or coalition without a plurality of votes (41,1 percent) could come to power. The challenge for the party was thus to consolidate its power and widen its support base during its first term in power.

\textsuperscript{12} D.F. Malan Collection, File 1/1/2370, D.F. Malan to C.R. (Blackie) Swart, Free State NP leader, 21 February 1948.
\textsuperscript{13} D.F. Malan Collection, File 1/1/2307, Letter from Eric Louw to D.F. Malan, 16 July 1947.
\textsuperscript{14} H.B. Thom, 'Politieke Driehoek', p. 8.
\textsuperscript{16} Bethal-Middleburg, Uitenhage, Vryburg, Kliprivier, Ladybrand, Lydenburg and Pretoria District, Potchefstroom, Roodepoort (the only seat the party lost) and Vryheid.
\textsuperscript{17} B.M. Schoeman, Parlementere Verkiesings in Suid Afrika. pp. 270, 271, 301-302.
Placing Apartheid ahead of the republic:

Malan sought to shift the focus of the HNP campaign from the republican question to social-economic and racial issues, in order to appeal to non-republicans, especially in urban areas.\(^{18}\) Addressing the HNP's 1946 Cape provincial conference, Malan noted that the party needed to secure the support of its voters who were flocking to the cities.\(^{19}\) Dwelling on this challenge, \textit{Die Burger} noted that the party 'would have no hope of coming to power' if it failed to make progress amidst urban voters.\(^{20}\) In its ensuing leader, \textit{Die Burger} added that in addition to pursuing a republic, the party also had another task to fulfil, namely, addressing the economic plight of the \textit{volk}. The paper further observed that the party represented the interests of both republicans and non-republicans. A referendum on the republican question, according to \textit{Die Burger}, meant that the party did not have to choose between the republican issue, and the economic question. For this reason, the paper remarked, Malan had chosen not to make the republican issue the focus of the next election, adding that it was only appropriate to call a vote when there was a majority for such a republic. To do otherwise, it conceded, would harm the republican cause.\(^{21}\) Malan repeated this theme at the 1946 conference of the Transvaal party.\(^{22}\) Commenting on Malan's referendum pledge, \textit{The Star} suggested that it provided 'a clear indication that the Herstigte Nasionale Party is preparing to follow a policy of expediency for the next general election.'\(^{23}\)

In the build up to the election Malan\(^{24}\) and other senior party leaders, like Eric Louw,\(^{25}\) continued to highlight the party's pledge to submit the republican issue to a referendum. Dr. E.G. Jansen, for example, informed a Greytown audience 'that there is no truth in the United Party allegations that that the Nationalists have a threatening plan to impose a republic upon South Africa.'\(^{26}\) As \textit{Die Oosterlig} noted in 1947, a vote for the National Party was not, therefore, a vote for a republic.\(^{27}\)


\(^{19}\) \textit{Die Burger.} 24 September 1946.

\(^{20}\) \textit{Die Burger.} Leader, 24 September 1946.

\(^{21}\) \textit{Die Burger.} Leader, 25 September 1946.


\(^{23}\) \textit{The Star.} 28 September 1946.


\(^{27}\) \textit{Die Oosterlig.} Leader, 18 July 1947. Ibid. p. 56.
Apartheid and the economy, and not the republic, were thus viewed as the rallying cry that would draw Afrikaners from Smuts to the HNP. In the words of journalist and politician Arthur Barlow, 'Malan now placed his vaunted cry for a republic in the deep freezer and cried out to the high heaven that the nation was in danger of being swamped by the big Black of Africa.' Writing days ahead of the vote, The Star noted.

Never in the political history of our country, noted sometimes for its strife and always for its liveliness, has a general election been contested in such a placid atmosphere. Here lies the danger. The lines of cleavage may be temporarily obscured; they have not been wiped out. Clever platform policy at Nationalist meetings has quietly evaded the controversial subjects of republicanism and isolationism. Apartheid has been presented in most plausible generalizations, but no Nationalist candidate has demarcated the areas into which the native people will be segregated.

As part of this electoral heresthetics, the party pledged not to tinker with the country's constitutional status in its first term in its 1948 manifesto, and such reassurances were repeated after the elections. In doing so, the HNP emulated the PACT's success of 1924, pressing home racial and economic issues, like the poor maize price, which undermined support from farmers, disaffection amongst returning soldiers over de-mobilization, and the UP's failure to deal with African urbanization and provide job security for whites. The promise of a referendum on the republican question, therefore, played a vital role in enabling the HNP to accentuate its Apartheid agenda as well as the poor state of the post-war economy and assuage conservative and non-republican voters that their votes would not be used to create a republic.

29 Arthur G. Barlow, Almost in Confidence. p. 315.
30 The Star, Leader, 22 May 1948.
31 Die Burger, 13 May 1949.
34 Both Hermann Giliomee (2003, 481) and the journalist Schalk Pienaar (1977, 12, 16), dismiss claims that the 1948 victory is attributable to the appeal of Apartheid. The latter in fact suggests that the foundations for the 1948 victory were laid in the 1938 Trek commemorations and that nationalism peaked in 1948. According to Alan Paton (1971, 382-383, 388), Jan Hofmeyr and his critics in the party (like deposed MP David Jackson) attributed the defeat to the race issue. Hofmeyr did also, however, recognize the salience of the 'irritation vote' in the defeat. B.M. Schoeman (1977, 272, 274) is perhaps correct in attributing the sensational victory to an amalgam of factors, and not a single factor. These included, the poor post-war economy, white fears of black urbanization and competition in the labor market and the threat of economic competition from Indians. Besides, Schoeman notes that the pre-election Smuts government was particularly weak. Deborah Posel (1987, 131) does, however, note that Apartheid was important in securing the support of farmers who were anxious to ensure a supply of labour.
Charles Bloomberg argues that it was the *Broederbond*, which effected this change of focus. But despite Bloomberg’s claims, there was significant resistance to these efforts to moderate the party’s image. Malan, for example, had to resist efforts by the Transvaal leadership to rename the party the Republican National Party, cautioning that such a move would limit the ITS appeal. Besides, *The Star* noted that the *Transvaler* received Malan’s 1946 referendum pledge ‘frigidly’ and ‘buried the report in a back page.’

**From political ascendancy to a republic:**

Once in power, deep internal divisions on issues related to a republic surfaced to plague the HNP. The Cape leadership, which was pre-occupied with consolidating the HNP’s hold on power and the pursuit of the *Apartheid* agenda, wished to defer a referendum. Differences also surfaced on the issue of Commonwealth membership. As already noted, supporters of a ‘republic now’ approach favoured terminating Commonwealth membership, in order to enhance white unity and ensure the support of conservative English-speaking whites for the HNP’s *Apartheid* agenda. Both Strijdom and Verwoerd viewed white division over the republican issue as a handicap in the ‘greatest struggle, the struggle for self maintenance.’

The fact that the UP began to hint that it would support a republic inside the Commonwealth after the 1943 elections, in order to placate restless republican UP supporters, encouraged some in the HNP to highlight the break with the Commonwealth. Malan’s supporters, on the other hand, feared that a republican spat would exacerbate English-Afrikaans tensions between, and undermine efforts to institutionalise *Apartheid*. And tactically, the Cape leadership were deeply concerned that fighting a referendum on a republic outside the Commonwealth would spell defeat. Moreover, the acceptance of a republic within the Commonwealth also reflected the Cape’s ambivalence towards republicanism, certainly the exclusivist brand propounded by their northern colleagues.

A third fault line in the party emerged on the question over what constituted a sufficient majority for securing a republic. The Cape leadership had adopted Hertzog’s

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37 *The Star*, 28 September 1946.
position on the need to secure a broad majority.\textsuperscript{41} In contrast, the Transvaal leadership pressed for the creation of a republic through a simple parliamentary majority. Dan O’Meara’s structuralist account explains the Cape–Transvaal split on the republican issue in terms of the markedly different 'social base and content' of Afrikaner nationalism in the two provinces.\textsuperscript{42}

The intensity of the Cape-Transvaal rift on the republican issue, especially the question of Commonwealth membership after 1949 led, at one stage, to a suspension of caucus meetings, and Strijdom considered tendering his resignation as a minister. The compromise reached on this matter was that the attainment of a republic and Commonwealth membership were to be treated as two separate issues, and that the Commonwealth question also be subjected to a later referendum.\textsuperscript{43} By July 1953 this compromise became the government’s official policy.\textsuperscript{44}

\textbf{Apartheid before a republic:}

The seasoned and astute D.F. Malan, serving as Prime Minister at the age of 74, feared that pursuing a republic would detract from what he viewed as the HNP’s most important and electorally rewarding project, sweeping Apartheid legislation.\textsuperscript{45} Moreover, Malan was patently aware that the 1948 victory was not a mandate for a republic, and he was pre-occupied with securing the HNP’s hold on power. Its narrow margin of victory in 1948\textsuperscript{46} provided ample evidence of the exigency for caution. Commenting after the fall of the UP government, The Star noted that it 'is certain that Dr. Malan cannot afford to revive republicanism at this stage.'\textsuperscript{47} The NP’s loss of Paarl in the 1949 provincial elections

\textsuperscript{42} Dan O'Meara, Forty Lost Years, p. 55.
\textsuperscript{44} S.W. Pienaar, Glo in u Volk, pp. 82-83.
\textsuperscript{46} The NP secured 70 seats, as opposed to the UP’s 65. The Afrikaner Party held nine seats and the Labour Party 6. In absolute terms, more voters voted for the UP and the NP’s victory was made possible thanks to the relative weight that the rural constituencies enjoyed. The HNP only represented 37.2 percent of the popular vote, as opposed to the 47.9 percent of the UP.
\textsuperscript{47} The Star, Leader, 28 May 1948.
highlighted the tenuous nature of the NP’s victory,\(^{48}\) and a referendum on the republic issue was again pledged in parliament in 1951.\(^{49}\)

In that same year, Malan urged the caucus to play down the republican issue, warning that it would undermine the party’s electoral prospects,\(^{50}\) and allow the UP to destroy the Apartheid policy.\(^{51}\) And, in the build-up to the 1953 campaign the NP made scant reference to the republican issue. Instead, it again highlighted racial issues and the threat of communism.\(^{52}\) As was the case in 1948, NP strategists sought to make inroads in urban constituencies. Explaining the strategic imperative, Die Burger noted that the ‘main challenge is no longer in the rural areas but rather in the urban constituencies.’\(^{53}\) And, in a campaign speech in Port Elizabeth, Theo Dönges, informed his audience that the UP ‘tries to scare voters by perpetually assuming what the party will do [on a republic] once it wins the elections.’ Dönges added that this question would be decided at the right time.\(^{54}\) The challenge for the party in 1953, therefore, continued to be penetrating the urban areas, without forsaking its rural base and dividing the party. The pledge of a referendum on a future republic allowed this.

Even after the 1953 elections, Malan continued to warn that fighting a general election over the republic would serve the interests of the United Party. Malan also candidly acknowledged that many of those who voted for the HNP in the 1948 elections were anti-republicans, and did so in support for the party’s Apartheid policy. Malan reminded Party activists that these votes were secured on the premise that they would not be used to change the country’s constitutional status, which was to be settled by a referendum.\(^{55}\) This position mirrored Hertzog’s 1926 reticence regarding a clean flag, and Malan, who had previously disagreed with Hertzog, arguing ‘it was unrealistic to wait for National unity before establishing a republic,’\(^{56}\) was now guided by the same caution. The Cape Nationalists now firmly held the Hertzog line that national unity was a precursor to a republic.\(^{57}\) Malan’s outlook – like Hertzog’s in the case of the flag - may well have been

\(^{50}\) A2, J.G. Strijdom Collection, File 53, Notes of NP caucus meeting, 13/3/1951, 20/3/1951.  
\(^{51}\) B.M. Schoeman, Van Malan tot Verwoerd, p. 15.  
\(^{52}\) Malan’s speech in Stellenbosch (Die Burger, 1 April 1953) and his pre-election radio address (Die Burger, 14 April 1953) as well as Die Burger, Leader, 7, 11 April 1953.  
\(^{53}\) Die Burger, 15 April 1953.  
\(^{54}\) Die Burger, 23 March 1953.  
\(^{55}\) S.W. Pienaar, Glo in u Volk, p. 101.  
tempered by the responsibility and realism that comes with being Prime Minister. Besides, Malan may well have had the benefit of his experience from the flag struggle. Having 'played the game before' he was well aware of the potentially devastating impact of promoting such controversial legislation in his first term.

North-South Tensions:
The Transvaal leadership's penchant for the speedy creation of a republic bordered on oppositional behaviour, and the fact that Strijdom received a relatively junior ministry, Lands, nettled his supporters.\(^58\) Charles Bloomberg contends that the decision reflected Malan's desire to 'not be a prisoner of the militant northerners.'\(^59\) According to Ben Schoeman, the position was of Strijdom's choosing, as he hoped to build the base of the Transvaal party.\(^60\) A letter from Strijdom to Malan in 1950, however, reinforces the former account, and confirms that Malan did not consult the Transvaal leader on many cardinal policy issues.\(^61\) To add insult to injury, Malan appointed seven Cape ministers, as opposed to only three from the Transvaal in his first cabinet. In 1948 the Transvaal supplied the largest numbers of MPs, 32, as opposed to the Cape's 26.

The referendum pledge, however, continued to provide the party with maximal ambiguity on the republican issue. For a party obsessed with unity,\(^62\) it served to ensure that the HNP would mean different things to different Afrikaners, drawn from different traditions. In a cable to London, drafted in 1954, the High Commissioner quipped that 'spokespersons of the NP in the four provinces of the Transvaal, the Free State, the Cape and Natal, whose spokesman, if asked respectively when the republic should be established, would no doubt reply: "This year," "Next year," "Sometime," "Never".'\(^63\) The referendum, therefore, provided a modicum of unity through ambiguity for the disparate provincial structures on the republican question. Moreover, the pledge to stage a referendum limited the scope for the Transvalers to attack the Malan-Havenga axis within the party and in public, as it confirmed their principle support for the republic, yet allowing them to be cautious in practice.

\(^60\) Ben Schoeman, My Lewe in die Politiek, p. 148.
\(^61\) D.F. Malan Collection, File 1/1/2543, J.G. Strijdom to D.F. Malan, 10 January 1950.
\(^62\) David Welsh, 'The Politics of White Supremacy', in Leonard Thompson and Jeffrey Butler (eds), Change in Contemporary South Africa (Berkley and Los Angeles, 1975), p. 64.
\(^63\) Public Records Office, DO 35/ 5358, Draft Intel, Johannes Gerhardus Strijdom, composed by the United Kingdom High Commission in South Africa.
Havenga and Malan’s caution:
It is also important to note that the Malan-Havenga axis was far more cautious in implementing the *Apartheid* agenda, and Havenga resisted efforts to remove coloured voters from the Cape voter’s role. This caution by the party’s two elder leaders not only reflected deep divisions over *Apartheid* within the party, but was also clearly driven by their strong desire to safeguard the party’s tenuous hold on power in the 1953 elections. Havenga, who is unfortunately a much under-researched Afrikaner leader, had a tremendous influence on Malan’s cautious approach towards a republic. True to his mentor’s legacy, Havenga continued to insist on Hertzog’s demand for broad support for a republic. The slender 1948 majority provided Havenga with the requisite leverage to ensure that Malan honoured his commitment. In addition to ideological differences between Malan and Strijdom, Malan personally disliked Strijdom, and went out of his way to ensure that Havenga would succeed him. Given that Malan viewed Havenga as his successor, the republican issue provided a useful rallying point for opposition to Havenga.

Despite claims by Havenga that the cabinet supported the position that a republic would only be created after a referendum, the 1953 parliament session laid bare Transvaal-Cape tensions on the republican question. In a debate in early July 1953, Malan’s assurance on a republican referendum and continued Commonwealth membership triggered an angry response from Strijdom. The Transvaal leader described this statement as ‘the deed of an assassin who hides a dagger behind his cloak in order to administer a fatal stab.’ The High Commission’s interpretation of Strijdom’s outburst was that the Transvaal leader would use a simple parliamentary majority to introduce a republic. *The Star*, which welcomed Malan’s speech, called on Strijdom, Eric Louw and C.R. Swart to resign from the party and form a Republican party. Ultimately though, the imperative of party unity compelled Strijdom to back down. The premium placed on unity

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64 Nic Olivier, *The Head of Government and the Party*, p. 82.
65 Deborah Posel’s research highlights the varying interpretations of *Apartheid* within the Nationalist movement and she attributes these diverging blue-prints of *Apartheid* to the varying blue prints for the economy (1987, 133).
70 Leader, 9 July 1953.
— a feature of the NP until 1982 and the right wing’s break under Andries Treurnicht— was informed by the deep divisions of the early 1940’s.71

Malan’s reluctance:
Malan’s insistence on a referendum prior to introducing a republic also reflected his personal equivocacy towards a republic,72 certainly one as envisaged by the northern NP. A fascinating parallel with Hertzog’s behaviour in the 1926 Flag Bill. For in agreeing to a referendum, Malan handicapped the NP’s republican drive. Given that the NP’s majority was only made possible by the relative weight that rural constituencies enjoyed, a referendum favoured the opponents of a republic. Besides, Malan realized that a referendum pledge would deprive the UP of one of its key arguments against a republic, i.e. that the NP majority in parliament did not represent a majority of the voting public.73 The precarious majority that the Party enjoyed during its first term may have reinforced arguments that a referendum and its ‘sufficient majority’ was a guarantee for the retention of a republic.74

Moreover, the Cape Nationalists also recognized that there were republicans – like Sakkies Fourie and Louis Steenkamp - in the United Party. Thus a referendum was designed to allow them to support the Republic without breaking with the party.75 Die Burger claimed that the republican issue exposed differences between the UP’s leadership and membership,76 and party members outside of Natal were less opposed to a republic. Capturing the sentiment of many in the party, The Rand Daily Mail’s editor, Laurence Gandar, warned that the party’s blanket rejection of a republic ‘does not truly reflect the state of feeling in the country.’ Gandar also cautioned that the UP’s demurral would limit its ability to influence the institutions of the coming republic.77 Having entrenched the referendum pledge, Cape Nats and supporters of the ‘republic later’ school effectively gained control over the timing of the vote. Moreover, the insistence on a referendum strengthened Malan’s hand in the debate on Commonwealth membership, as it was possible to argue that this specific demand would undermine the greater goal.

73 Louis Louw (Editor), Dawie 1946-1964, pp. 75, 83; Fred Barnard, 13 Jaar in die Skadu van Dr. H.F. Verwoerd (Johannesburg, 1967), p. 118.
74 Die Nasionale Partyynuus Number 9 (1954).
75 Louis Louw (Editor), Dawie 1946-1964, pp. 151-152.
76 Die Burger, 30 May 1958.

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South Africa and the Commonwealth:
For ardent republicans, attaining an independent republic was part of a process of cutting the Gordian knot with Britain and ending British cultural and trade influence over South Africa. Verwoerd, for example, viewed the attainment of a republic as a means to address the poor white problem, and end the country's trade dependency. It was also to be the final reversal of Vereeniging and the defeat of 1902. In a letter to an NP supporter, J.G. Strijdom articulated the importance for the Transvaal republicans in breaking the ties with the Commonwealth. Strijdom noted that the Scottish, the Welsh, part of the Irish and the urban Afrikaners are all examples of communities that had surrendered to the 'British connection' and Anglicisation. Ending the ties with the Commonwealth and the Empire was, thus, viewed as a pre-condition for preserving the Afrikaner volk.

On the other hand, Malan, who favoured breaking with the British connection during the war, now viewed South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth as being contrary to the country's interests, and argued that attaining republican status need not spell the end of South Africa's membership. After the 1949 Commonwealth Conference, Malan returned to South Africa claiming that India's precedent for continued membership as an independent nation-state ended the long-standing tension between republican status and Commonwealth membership. Addressing parliament, upon his return, Malan reiterated his party's commitment to only create a republic on the basis of broad popular will, so as not to 'confuse the issue of establishing a republic with other issues facing the people.' Malan also submitted that the party had in 1948 committed itself not to promote the republic in this term of office. He noted that party made this commitment, as it was aware that there were 'hundreds and thousands,' who though opposed to the republic, supported the NP's racial policies. In the same debate, Havenga added that there are 'larger issues that require our attention and it is desirable that the republican question' not be allowed to divide us.

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78 O. Geyser (Editor), *Dr. HF Verwoerd*, p. 3; *Die Transvaal* editorial, 26 March 1941, 25 March 1938, 15 September 1938, 14 March 1939, and 30 July 1945; In O. Geyser (Editor), *Dr. HF Verwoerd*, pp. 24, 28, 35-37, 50, 89-91.
82 *Die Burger*, 13 May 1949.
This announcement was a severe setback for the Transvaal leadership and Malan’s stand threatened his position as party leader and infuriated the Broederbond. Ireland, which had left the Commonwealth on becoming a republic, was cast as the example that Transvaal Republicans sought to emulate, and party insiders feared a split over the Commonwealth issue. For Malan, deferring the republican issue was clearly designed to bolster the party’s chance of winning the 1953 elections and in 1950 he argued it would remove 'any stigma of anti-British feeling, which some have thought to be inseparable from it [republicanism].' He noted, yet again, that the republic would not be 'forced upon the country, but can and will only come about if it is broadly based on the people’s will.' A year later, he reiterated such assurances, highlighting the argument that republicanism was a ‘political principle and not a racial matter.’ The Prime Minister (who was also Foreign Minister), also feared that breaking ties with the Commonwealth might spell not only greater isolation, but further expose the Union to greater UN pressure and sanctions over its Apartheid agenda. Interestingly, Malan saw the Commonwealth as a 'foothold' in Africa, and believed that a republic outside the Commonwealth would undermine relations with Northern and Southern Rhodesia and the white communities in Kenya and Tanganyika. Forced to choose between Russian and American imperialism, the Commonwealth 'provided the safest harbourage for a small nation in distress.' A further consideration in the Cape’s support for continued Commonwealth membership was the desire to maintain access to lucrative export markets for farmers.

Strategically the proponents in the debate had different views on positions on the impact of severing Commonwealth ties on relations between the two white communities. Those who favoured severing ties with the Commonwealth believed that such a step would make English speakers more loyal to South Africa and more supportive of the party’s Apartheid agenda. In contrast, the Cape leadership feared that suspending

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84 Die Suiderstem, 14 May 1949.
86 Ben Schoeman, My Leve in die Politiek, p. 165.
87 D.F. Malan collection 1/1/2577, D.F. Malan speech in Durban, 19 September 1950.
88 D.F. Malan collection 1/1/2702, D.F. Malan speech at Ladysmith, 11 October 1951.
89 B.M. Schoeman, Van Malan tot Verwoerd, pp. 12, 18.
90 A 2, File 53, Notes of NP caucus meeting, 13 and 20 March 1951.
92 Dan O'Meara, Forty Lost Years, p. 105.
Commonwealth membership would polarise differences between the two white communities, to the detriment of the Apartheid agenda.

A painless republic:
Above all, however, the Cape leadership feared that it would be impossible to win a referendum in which voters were asked to support a republic outside of the Commonwealth. The Cape leadership had long argued that attaining a republic was only practical if it involved minimal changes for the sceptics. The example that the Cape Nationalists invoked was Ireland’s route to a republic, and the 'painless republic' approach, thus, sought to ensure that the vote focus on the general idea of a republic and not its attributes. Detaching the question of Commonwealth membership, and the earlier removal of issues like a single flag and anthem from the republican debate, therefore, served to minimise the number of issues around which the opposition could mobilise resistance to a republic. Cape Nationalists also believed that incremental changes, like the national anthem and flag, would 'pave the way for the Republic.'

The Cape’s sensitivity towards the need for such an approach reflected the province’s demographics (the English and Afrikaans speaking communities were almost equal in size) and the absence of a deep hankering for a republic. Moreover, Cape fruit and wine farmers were fearful of losing access to British and Dominion markets. The United Party, in fact, made the economic costs and the export markets a central focus of their anti-republican propaganda. Nasionale Pers’s senior management, and later Verwoerd, recognized this potential Achilles heel in the NP’s case for a republic. In a memo to NP legislators, Verwoerd instructed them not to make any reference whatsoever to the issue of the boycott of SA products in order to quash the debate. Havenga, who served as the Minister of Finance, was acutely aware of the costs of disengaging from the Commonwealth, and no doubt influenced Malan’s thinking in this regard. Strijdom, who had earlier supported a gradual loosening of ties with the Commonwealth, vociferously

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95 Louis Louw (Editor), Dawie. pp. 125, 158.
96 PV 28, M.C.G.J. (Basie) van Rensburg Collection, File 532, Extract from Hansard, 27 January 1959.
97 Die Burger. 22 May 1958.
98 In May 1958 the NP, through its Transvaal leader in the Provincial Council, F.H. Odendaal, clarified that the Republican (Transvaal) flag would not become the Republic’s flag. Die Burger. 16 May 1958.
99 Louis Louw (Editor), Dawie. p. 152.
100 Dan O'Meara, Volksparkapitalisme. pp. 51 – 52.
102 PV 93, Verwoerd Collection, File 1/30/1/5. Items 3-5, Memo dated 21 August 1959.
opposed the formula after 1949. These tensions continued until 1954 and were exacerbated after 1958. But by 1960 Verwoerd had been forced to accept the Cape’s position,\textsuperscript{104} despite the fact that the party no longer controlled the NP’s federal structures.

**Transvaal ascendancy, Cape contention:**

In 1954 the balance of power shifted towards the Transvaal, when J.G. Strijdom was elected as NP leader, despite the fact that Malan had publicly supported Havenga’s candidacy as his successor. The English press viewed Strijdom’s appointment as a victory for the extremists,\textsuperscript{105} and a rejection of Malan.\textsuperscript{106} Perceptively, The *Rand Daily Mail* noted that the party under Malan and Havenga was not moving fast enough on key policy issues and added that the two were ‘obsolete relics of Hertzogism.’\textsuperscript{107} Havenga, who confidently informed British officials in mid-1953 that the republic was not an issue at that time, confirmed that the Malan-Havenga combination indeed stalled on the republican issue. Havenga confidently predicted that there would not be a republic in his lifetime and emphasized that he and Malan had support for this position in the cabinet.\textsuperscript{108}

*The Cape Times* aptly captured the full implications of the changing of the guard by noting that whereas the likes of Hertzog, Smuts, Malan and Havenga were conservatives, ‘Mr. Strijdom is a younger man and a newer man. He is a product of Nationalist politics, not a creator like Malan and Hertzog.’\textsuperscript{109}

Defiantly, *Die Burger* continued to campaign for a moderate republic within the Commonwealth. The paper did so by running its own ‘referendum’ on the issue among its readers. In a referendum newspaper referendum in June 1958, 78.1 percent of the participants stated their preference for a republic within the Commonwealth.\textsuperscript{110} The referendum was ostensibly designed to allow the paper’s readers to have their say on how the republic should look, but it also served the Cape in its struggle with the Transvaal NP leadership on the republican debate.\textsuperscript{111} The newspaper’s ‘referendum’ is said to have

\textsuperscript{104} B.M. Schoeman, *Van Malan tot Verwoerd*, p. 183; Dan O’Meara, *Forty Lost Years*, p. 105.

\textsuperscript{105} The Natal Mercury, 1 December 1954 and The *Friend*, 1 December 1954.

\textsuperscript{106} The Pretoria News, 1 December 1954 and The *Star*, 1 December 1954.

\textsuperscript{107} The *Rand Daily Mail*, 2 December 1954.


\textsuperscript{109} The *Cape Times*, 1 December 1954.


\textsuperscript{111} Louis Louw (Editor), *Dawie*, pp. 147, 171.
forced Verwoerd's hand in calling his referendum in 1960, and had a major influence on the internal NP debate on the republic, and Commonwealth Membership in particular. In parallel, the new Cape leader of the NP Dr. T.E. (Theo) Dönges carried on fighting for a republic within the Commonwealth. One contemporary commentator suggested that the 'Dönges-Burger republican axis' and its campaign for a painless republic was motivated by a desire to 'regain lost political influence.'

Verwoerd, who had traditionally preferred a 'true' republic outside the Commonwealth, knew that to push ahead on this would split the NP, and was obliged to back down. He justified his about-face by claiming that it was out of respect for the sentiments of the English speaking South Africans and in recognition of the imperative of white unity. The theme of white unity through a republic was articulated in Verwoerd's first speech to the public as Strijdom's successor, and was to become a hallmark of his speeches on the republic. Alexander Hepple perceptively notes that the shift in discourse towards 'white unity,' was designed to reframe the republican debate, which until then had come to be associated with anti-British sentiments. This effort to woo English speakers was bolstered by increased use of English in Verwoerd's speeches.

In justifying Commonwealth membership, Verwoerd further suggested that nations tended 'to group together.' Moreover, Verwoerd recognised that this was the only way to secure a yes majority, and conceded as much to Harold McMillan in their 1960 meetings. Verwoerd never quite forgave Die Burger for its campaign to de-couple the issues and Die Burger's editors were concerned that Verwoerd would try and wrest control of the Cape National Party and the newspaper. There were even rumours that

118 Message to the People of South Africa, on September 3 1958; First Speech as Prime Minister in the House of Assembly, on September 18, 1958. A.N. Pelzer (Editor), Verwoerd Speaks. Speeches 1948-1966 (Johannesburg, 1966), pp. 162, 177.
119 Alexander Hepple, Verwoerd, p. 175.
120 Jan Botha, Verwoerd is Dead (Cape Town, 1967), pp. 38, 51.
123 Public Records Office. DO 351/10571, Provisional note of a discussion between the Prime Minister and Dr. Verwoerd at Groote Schuur, Cape Town, on Thursday, 4 February 1960 at 10:00 a.m.
certain northern Nationalists were about to establish a competing paper in the province. The Cape's determination to separate the issues was, however, vindicated by the final result in that province, for the yes vote in the Cape secured a tenuous majority of less than 2,000 out of the 540,000 voters in that province. The Rand Daily Mail's editor, Laurence Gander provided further vindication for Die Burger's strategy. In correspondence with N.J. Olivier, Gander indicated that his paper would call upon the public to give 'earnest consideration to the question of a republic without endeavouring to influence it one way or another,' in the event that the government would agree to a republic as proposed by Die Burger.

A Republic becomes 'practical politics.'

Although the balance of power within the party tilted towards the Transvaal after 1954, Strijdom did not aggressively pursue the republican issue. This reticence reflected his concern that the referendum, from which there was by now no bilking, would not be won. In the 1953 elections the NP still lagged behind the UP by 70,000 votes in overall support, and it became clear that the republicans required support from English voters. It was only until after the 1958 general election, when the NP had enhanced its political power, that the goal of a Republic became 'practical politics.'

The 1958 vote marked the first time that the NP represented over 50 percent of the absolute vote, as the party secured the support of 55.2 percent of the white electorate's support. In these elections the NP's tally of seats rose from 95 in 1953 to 103, whilst the UP shrank from 57 seats to 53. In other words, theoretically a referendum could be won. The party now held two-thirds of the seats in the legislature, but its numerous referendum pledges made a retreat politically impossible. Moreover, NP strategists continued to believe that a referendum would ensure greater support for a republic than the existing support for the party.

Though Nationalists sought to portray the 1958 result as a mandate for a republic, the 1958 success was, like the 1948 and 1953 elections, made possible by the party's ability to play down the republican issue and focus on whites fears of losing hegemony. But the 1958 claim that a republic was now 'practical politics' also served to 'persuade the

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anti-republican section of the people that a republic is inevitable.\textsuperscript{130} This effort were bolstered by claims that defeat in a referendum would not spell the end of the republican dream, but merely serve as a temporary setback.\textsuperscript{131} Verwoerd even went as far as hinting that the party 'was fighting through soft means .... But if we do not win, I am afraid that the struggle will be harder and more bitter.... We will have to fight with methods that might demand that we might have to go further than we were in the past prepared to promise.'\textsuperscript{132} Verwoerd also hinted that a 'no' result would simply mean that the party would deploy its parliamentary majority in order to secure a republic.\textsuperscript{133}

One important step taken by Strijdom in order to promote the Republican cause was lowering the voting age from 21 to 18. Demographically, Afrikaners made up a larger percentage of the young voters, as they had a higher birth rate. An NP parliamentarian, Marais Viljoen, in fact predicted that this move added 150,000 new voters, of which 95,000 were Afrikaans speakers.\textsuperscript{134} Moreover, the NP recognised that younger English-speaking voters would be less attached to Britain and the Commonwealth. In lowering the age of voters, the NP chose the path of least confrontation in preparing the way for a republic. In 1954 British officials assessed that Strijdom would either pursue this stratagem, or force 'to a head outstanding issues with the United Kingdom (e.g. the transfer of High Commission Territories).' In choosing 'to turn the numerical scales in favour of republicanism,' the High Commission suggested that Strijdom demonstrated caution and moderation.\textsuperscript{135}

Strijdom did not, however, live to see the fulfilment of his republican dream. His hesitancy is said to have been the product of opposition to a republic within the party at that time and the deliberations over what would constitute a sufficient majority for a republic.\textsuperscript{136} Strijdom not only supported a referendum, but also championed a qualified majority of 50,000.\textsuperscript{137} The task of creating a republic was, instead, left to his successor Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd. In securing a republic, Verwoerd harnessed the support of the Broederbond, which had since 1954 channelled its energies into a campaign for a republic. So central was the role of the Broederbond that Verwoerd strategised with the

\textsuperscript{130} The Argus. 12 May 1958.
\textsuperscript{132} Die Transvaler. 17 March 1960.
\textsuperscript{133} Jan Botha, Verwoerd is Dead, p. 54; Alexander Hepple, Verwoerd, p. 176
\textsuperscript{134} Die Burger. 20 October 1958.
\textsuperscript{135} Public Records Office. DO 35/ 5358, Draft Intel. Johannes Gerhardus Strijdom, composed by the United Kingdom High Commission in South Africa.
\textsuperscript{136} B.M. Schoeman, Van Malan tot Verwoerd, pp. 127-128.
\textsuperscript{137} Jan J. van Rooyen, Ons Politiek van Nabu, p. 54.
organisation on the referendum long before he did with the party caucus.\textsuperscript{138} Strijdom had tenaciously opposed the organization's involvement in the referendum, believing it should focus on economic issues.\textsuperscript{139}

Verwoerd's redefinition of the majority:

As already suggested, Verwoerd was unable to break with the numerous referendum promises of his predecessors and, addressing the cabinet on the issue of the republican referendum, he conceded that the 'leaders of the National Party had placed the Party in a difficult position regarding a referendum.' To the promise of respecting the commitments of his predecessors, he added that he did not want political parties and candidates to mediate on the issue.\textsuperscript{140} According to the journalist Beaumont Schoeman, Verwoerd also noted that whilst the NP had a parliamentary majority, it wanted to be certain that it had the public's support on the republican issue. Schoeman adds that there were legislators within the faction who feared defeat in a referendum.\textsuperscript{141} Explaining his decision to use a referendum to parliament, Verwoerd noted that in elections the personalities of candidates also played a role and that an election regarding the republic could be turned into a vote of confidence in the government.\textsuperscript{142} Earlier in his career as editor of the influential \textit{Die Transvaler}, Verwoerd had argued that elections were about a variety of policy issues and warned that 'all sorts of socio economic questions impact on' ordinary elections.\textsuperscript{143} As already witnessed, De Klerk echoed such claims in explaining his support for a referendum from 1990 to 1992.

Straitjacketed by the promises of his predecessors, stretching back almost three decades, Verwoerd, who was anxious to expedite the referendum, made one major break with his predecessors. For they had insisted that a referendum reflect \textit{bree volkswil}. Speaking in 1954, D.F. Malan spoke of a 'substantial majority' in favour of a republic.\textsuperscript{144} Even Strijdom supported a qualified majority of 50,000.\textsuperscript{145} Honouring this pledge, which was understood by many to imply a two-thirds majority,\textsuperscript{146} might rule out a referendum

\textsuperscript{139} J.H.P. Serfontein, \textit{Brotherhood of Power}, p. 85; B.M. Schoeman, \textit{Van Malan tot Verwoerd}, pp. 127, 184
\textsuperscript{140} B.M. Schoeman, \textit{Van Malan tot Verwoerd}, p. 187.
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid. p. 188.
\textsuperscript{142} PV 28, File 532, Extract from Hansard, 20 and 27 January 1960.
\textsuperscript{143} Transvaler editorial, 21 March 1939 and 30 September 1946. In O.Geyser (ed.), \textit{Dr. HF Verwoerd, Die Republikein}, pp. 38, 93.
\textsuperscript{144} S.W. Pienaar, \textit{Glo in u volk}, p. 101.
\textsuperscript{145} Jan J. van Rooyen, \textit{Ons Politiek van Nab}, p. 54.
\textsuperscript{146} Eastern Province Herald, Leader, 17 September 1952, in Stephen Fouche, \textit{'n Vergelyking}, p. 280.
for many years, if not decades. Verwoerd now argued that a simple majority of one would settle the issue. His justification for this was disingenuous, but simple. He claimed that the opposition’s ‘false propaganda,’ like claims that the NP wanted a totalitarian republic,147 was ‘misleading’ voters. Accordingly, size of the majority, which the government would determine, was made a function of its subjective assessment of the ‘honesty of the republican struggle.’148 The opposition press described the NP’s about-face as a ‘breach of faith.’149

Ensuring a majority of one:

A government-sponsored poll at the end of 1959 suggested that even in the event of a 90 percent turnout, the referendum would be lost by some 60 to 70 thousand votes.150 Winning a referendum by the rules imposed by Hertzog, Havenga and Malan was, therefore, impractical. Verwoerd’s remorseless move away from a simple majority was followed by two complementary, yet controversial, measures to ensure that majority. The first was the removal of the coloured vote and the second was the decision to allow Namibians to vote in the referendum. By removing the country’s 50,000 coloured voters and adding some 32,000 Namibian voters, the bulk of whom (58.25 percent) supported the NP in the 1958 elections, the government ensured victory.

The coloured community’s exclusion also had far reaching implications in reinforcing Apartheid, so that symbolically the referendum represented the first ever all white election. Naturally, the English press was critical of the NP decision to exclude coloured voters.151 In contrast, Die Burger justified the community’s exclusion by submitting that the republican question had historically divided whites - and counselled that their participation would have a negative impact on race relations. ‘What if the 30,000 coloureds ensure a majority of 20,000?’ it asked.152 Similarly, Die Volksblad suggested that allowing coloureds to participate would make them a political football.153 Similar claims would be submitted in the 1983 referendum when the PFP involved the Inkatha

147 The Cape Argus, for example, asked its readers, ‘will final achievement of racial peace and happiness be left to the last step, that authoritarian State where there will be no dissenting opinion to be glibly dismissed as racial prejudice because the only opinions which will be permissible are defined by the politicians in power’? The Argus, Leader, 12 May 1958.
148 The Natal Mercury, 7 November 1958, Die Transvaler, 8 and 12 November 1958; and January 27, 1959, A.N. Pelzer (Editor), Verwoerd Speaks, pp. 204-205, 239.
Freedom Party in its 'no' campaign. And in the debate over an Israeli referendum on territorial concessions, Jewish right-wing politicians argued that Arab voters should also be excluded on similar grounds.\(^{154}\)

The person charged with removing the coloured voters from the referendum in April 1960 was P.W. Botha,\(^{155}\) who would later seek to co-opt the community in the 1980s. Moreover, P.W. Botha, serving as the deputy minister for Internal Affairs was charged with guiding the requisite referendum legislation through parliament. His insights into the referendum process would prove vital just over two decades later when he broke with Verwoerd's model.

Anxious to avoid a confrontation with the international community, Verwoerd originally decided to exclude Namibia's 30,000 voters.\(^{156}\) In doing so, he claimed that Namibia was not a fifth province and added that the relationship between South West Africa and the Union would not change if it became a republic.\(^{157}\) By May 1960 Verwoerd, however, reversed his decision. One reason he cited was his 'surprise' that the UP was unopposed to their inclusion. The second reason was the demand by the local white community and the local party that they be included.\(^{158}\) Commenting on the U-turn, The Rand Daily Mail noted that Verwoerd had given in to 'pressure from groups within the party who have few scruples and fewer principles.'\(^{159}\) The South West Africa UP leader, J.P. Niehaus intimated that Verwoerd had never consulted the local NP party before his 20 January announcement that the local voters would be excluded.\(^{160}\) In the final tally the 'yes' vote of 19,938 as opposed to a 'no' vote of 12,017, constituted 10 percent of the yes majority.

**A referendum becomes a political necessity:**

Verwoerd's insistence on paring down the majority indeed reflected a deeper sense of urgency to expedite the referendum and settle the republican issue. Having been in power for just over a decade, the same caution that had allowed Malan to consolidate the party's hold on power now threatened the party's unity. And, it became increasingly costly to


\(^{156}\) B.M. Schoeman, Parlementere Verkiesings in Suid Afrika, p. 370; B.M. Schoeman, Van Malan tot Verwoerd, pp. 188-189.


\(^{158}\) PV 28, File 532, Extract from Hansard, 9 May 1960; B.M. Schoeman, Van Malan tot Verwoerd, p. 189.

\(^{159}\) The Rand Daily Mail, 14 March 1960.

\(^{160}\) The Argus, 16 March 1960.
drag out the issue, as many supporters became restive over the perceived dithering of the NP leadership. Verwoerd had four further reasons to push ahead with the referendum, which he announced in January 1960. The first was the need to consolidate his leadership, having just won a close race for the premiership. The second was Verwoerd’s fear that dithering on the republican issue would enable the anti-republican camp to sow seeds of doubt in the minds of voters, especially regarding the economic wisdom of a republic. The third reason was mounting disaffection within the party over his separate development policy, and the fourth reason according to the United Party leader, Sir de Villiers Graaf, was to deflect attention from domestic crises. Hence political commentator Stanley Uys suggested that referendum was a ‘masterly stroke of self-preservation.’ Uys noted that Verwoerd would not have risked a referendum if he were not going to win. This interpretation is, however, disputed by those who note that Verwoerd was a headstrong leader. Alexander Hepple, for example, notes ‘Where previous Nationalist leaders had toiled with agonizing caution to surmount the numerous obstacles in the way of declaring a republic, Verwoerd rushed forward confidently, to seize the republic with ease.’

The vote:
In January 1960, days ahead of the arrival of British P.M. Harold McMillan, Verwoerd announced his decision to hold the referendum later that year. Symbolically, the vote would take place fifty years after the Union had been forged. Non-Nationalists were shocked at the announcement and did not believe that the NP ‘would force the issue.’ The fact that the NP chose to hold the vote in the Jubilee year nettled the English press. The Cape Argus, for example, suggested that South Africans ‘will feel like a couple giving dinner to celebrate their golden wedding while in the next room the lawyers are busy drawing up a deed of judicial separation.’

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161 Fred Barnard, 13 Jaar in die skadu van Dr. H.F. Verwoerd. p. 119.
162 The Star, 2 October 1960.
167 Interview with Colin Eglin (11 December 2001).
168 Alexander Hepple, Verwoerd, p. 165.
170 The Cape Argus, Leader, 30 January 1960.
Despite NP suggestions that it would be a close race, the party was confident of victory at the time it announced the voting date. After the referendum *Die Volksblad*'s political columnist Willem confessed that NP strategists had called the referendum after calculating that they had a slender lead of 20,000 votes. It should also be noted that the vote came months after the Progressive Party (PP) split from the United Party. Verwoerd thus took advantage of the disarray in the opposition. The UP refused to cooperate with the PP in the referendum campaign, and blamed the PP for the defeat.

The 1960 result produced a slender majority of 70,000 votes in favour of a republic. The victory, which required the support of English speaking whites, was made possible by astute tactics, especially campaigning that played on white fears of black rule. The year 1960, fortuitously for the NP, produced numerous events to exploit in this regard. These included the expulsion of colonial settlers from the Belgian Congo, white anxiety after Harold Macmillan's 'Winds of Change' speech, the Sharpeville massacre, the Langa riots, and concern over developments in neighbouring Rhodesia. Inevitably, the removal of Coloured voters from the voter's roll and the lowering of the voting age also paid dividends. A further factor, which explains the NP's success in the referendum, was Verwoerd's miraculous survival of an assassination attempt in April 1960, at the hands of David Pratt.

The referendum result had a devastating effect on the United Party, already divided on the issue and out of power for over a decade. The yes result led to the loss of its Afrikaner support. The party's opposition to a republic outside the Commonwealth had served as the glue that held it together, and the party no longer seemed to have an agenda after 1960. After the vote, the UP leader, Sir de Villiers Graaf, conceded that the Party had underestimated the strength of republican sentiment and feared that the *platteland* (rural areas) was 'running away' from it. Moreover, the party was

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173 In August 1959 12 parliamentarians, representing the more liberal wing of the party, left the United Party, to form the Progressive Party (P.P.) under the leadership of the Cape U.P. leader Dr. Jan Steytler. The split was the outcome of a longer running battle over the liberal wing of the party's support for greater economic and political integration of blacks.
The demise of the UP, in turn, saw the NP strengthen its hold on power and mobilize increasing white support for its Apartheid policies. The declaration of the republic did indeed generate the white unity that Verwoerd had anticipated.

The folly of the economic argument:
The UP campaign relied on rational economic arguments, like the loss of Commonwealth trade markets.\(^{180}\) As is so often the case in ethno-national referenda, such arguments, ultimately, carried little weight, and this particular aspect deserves some closer attention. The Rhodesian referendum of 1922 provides one of the most startling examples of how seemingly rational economic arguments can be swept aside by scare-mongering tactics. Commenting on the defeat at the time, *The Round Table*’s correspondent noted.

> The Unionists are bad psychologists. They have overdriven the argument of material gain to such an extent that Rhodesians are becoming bored with it. The leader of the "Responsible" has even moved to observe – and he has good scriptural authority behind him – that men have souls as well as bodies.\(^{181}\)

The Responsibilities\(^{182}\) effectively undermined the Unionist's economic arguments in favour of incorporation by preying on the fears of the consequences of integration, exhorting voters that the colony’s strict immigration policies would be swept aside, allowing for an invasion of poor Afrikaners.\(^{183}\) Besides, Rhodesian voters found the Smuts-Hertzog spat distasteful and were concerned by the NP’s republican agitation.\(^{184}\) The 'no' camp also raised the spectre of increased taxation, the confiscation of weapons, and warned that Rhodesian women would lose their right to vote in the event of incorporation, as South African women were not yet on the voters' roll.\(^{185}\) Writing to Jan Smuts after the vote, Drummond Chaplin [Administrator in Rhodesia] noted that the trade unions believed that they would have more power under responsible government.\(^{186}\)

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\(^{179}\) PV 71, Catherine Taylor Collection, File 1/7/1/1/2 Vol. 2, Minutes of the United Party Central Executive Committee. 7-8 October 1960.

\(^{180}\) PV 71, File 1/7/1/1/3 Vol. 1 and File 1/7/1/1/4 Vol. 5, Speeches made by Catherine Taylor.

\(^{181}\) 'The Rhodesian Referendum Campaign', *Round Table*. No. 49. (1922).

\(^{182}\) The so-called Responsibilities campaigned for Responsible Government and opposed the option of incorporation into South Africa.


\(^{184}\) 'The Rhodesian Question', *Round Table*. No. 45. (1921).

\(^{185}\) *The Bulawayo Chronicle*, 16, 30 September 1922.

Eighty years later the Danish 'no' camp defeated an impressive coalition of the established political parties, the media and big business on the question of the Euro. Again, economic arguments proved insufficient in an essentially emotional issue, as the 'no' camp 'preyed on fears that 1,000 years of Viking history were about to be bulldozed by Brussels.' Commenting on the defeat, Mark Leonard suggested, 'Denmark shows that it's politics, stupid,' whilst a Danish pollster, Hans Jorgen Nielsen, similarly endorsed the claim that 'economics aren't enough.' In the case of Aruba, voters supported independence in a 1977 vote, despite lingering doubts as to the financial viability of independence outside of the Netherlands Antilles.

Having studied the Norway (1994) and Switzerland (1992) referenda, Pascal Sciarini and Ola Listhaug suggest that cultural and political factors are more salient in cases where the economic arguments for surrendering sovereignty are not compelling. The wisdom of highlighting economic arguments in referenda where national sovereignty and national symbols are been disputed, therefore, seems questionable, at least, when these economic dividends are not obvious to voters. In the case of Norway, oil wealth has made economic arguments for entering the EU less salient. As Drummond Chaplin noted in regard to the 1922 Rhodesian referendum, the Unionists failed in their campaign, as their 'method of putting the case seemed to be based on the assumption that the electors were reasonable and reasoning people. The support of such people they did as a rule secure, but unfortunately these are only a minority of the electorate.' Whilst the economic arguments seemed rational for Chaplin and Smuts, they were far from compelling for the reasoning White Rhodesian mine workers, civil servants and farmers.

Conclusion:
This chapter has charted the role of the referendum in the NP’s last years of opposition and in its first decade in power. The promise to stage a referendum was instrumental in playing down the salience of the republican issue and allowing the party to broaden its

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192 Detlef Jahn and Anne-Sofie Storsved, 'Legitimacy through Referendum? The Nearly Successful Domino Strategy of the EU-Referendums in Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway', West European Politics, 18, 4, 1995, p. 33.
193 Drummond Chaplin to Smuts, 30 October 1922. Jean van der Poel, Selections From the Smuts Papers, Volume V, p. 145.
appeal in successive elections. It had, therefore, become an integral part of the NP’s
election campaigns and this use of the referendum in electoral heresthetics was largely
based on a Cape perception that it needed to appeal to urban Afrikaans voters. The
referendum pledges also allowed for maximal unity in a party divided over the republican
issue. But the fact that the party had persistently committed to itself to a referendum meant
that the leadership was unable to backtrack from this commitment, once it had established
its hold on power. The referendum was, in fact, an inefficient mechanism through which
to gain a republic in a Westminster system that allowed the NP a majority of seats in
parliament, despite the fact that it barely enjoyed more than 50 percent of the vote in 1958.
Unable to extricate itself from these pledges, the party sought conditions under which a
referendum on a republic could be won. Hence the party promoted its strategy of a
'painless' republic that involved minimal changes. The decision to support South Africa's
continued membership of the Commonwealth, after becoming a republic, was a direct
result of this approach. This decision, yet again, laid bare the tensions between the North
and South, but the Cape NP’s domination from 1948 to 1954 (despite the fact that it had
less MPs than the Transvaal) allowed it to continue impose its will on the North in policy
formation. The only variable that Verwoerd could change after the North had taken control
of the party leadership was the size of the majority needed, which he reduced to a simple
majority. Moreover, the referendum had formally arrived and it had proven to party
officials that the NP could get voters to break with their sectional and party loyalties in a
referendum. Its success ensured that future NP elites would view it favourably. This
referendum also proved that it was a helpful resource in negotiating symbolic issues that
affected whites. Ultimately, the 1960 vote set a precedent by which key constitutional
matters were resolved by a referendum, and a script for navigating them was created. Once
in existence the script would evolve incrementally, and within less than two decades
Verwoerd's successor would embrace the referendum in extricating South Africa from
South West Africa. It was, however, under P.W. Botha that the referendum was most
effectively put to use in order to both navigate party tensions and promote reforms.
Chapter Nine.
The 1983 referendum: P.W. Botha taps into Verwoerd's legacy.

The present constitutional debate in South Africa will probably be regarded by historians one day as of monumental significance in shaping the destiny of our country and its peoples.1

South Africa's second referendum:
In this chapter I discuss the country's second referendum and analyse the variables that explain P.W. Botha's use of the vote. It will be demonstrated that Botha in fact got the idea from Verwoerd, under whom he had served as a deputy Minister in 1960. One of the key lessons that Botha had learnt from the 1960 referendum is that White South Africans do indeed break with sectional loyalties – their party – in referenda. What also clearly emerges from this chapter is the extent to which the role of the referendum evolved dynamically over time, in response to developments in White politics. A similar evolution emerged from the analysis of the 1992 referendum.

The politics of the 1983 referendum suggests that it was initially introduced as a result of deep divisions within the party over how to adapt Apartheid, in order to maintain White hegemony. The first pledge to stage a referendum, made in late 1980 was clearly designed to help Botha to navigate the growing resistance to his proposal to co-opt Coloureds and Indians, thereby breaking with the Verwoerdist model. The referendum returned to the forefront of NP politics in early 1982, when the split in the NP was a fait accompli. Hereafter the referendum served as a tool of damage control, and to stem the growth of the party of malcontents. The party leader had by then made so many pledges to stage a referendum on the new constitution that backtracking would have been politically impossible. And it was eventually confirmed that a referendum would be held after the party had to face three contentious by-elections in the Transvaal. These votes threatened to allow the Conservative Party to undermine the NP’s legitimacy to continue with reforms and demonstrate White opposition to Botha’s reforms. The referendum pledge proved instrumental in navigating this particular challenge. Finally, the party used the actual referendum to reframe White politics and re-brand the party.

One central feature of this chapter is its demonstration that F.W. de Klerk was involved in the 1983 referendum as leader of the party in the Transvaal. And there are several seminal lessons that de Klerk would have garnered from this experience. These include the benefit of a referendum in limiting the negative impact of by-elections on

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1 PV 895, C.J. (Chris) Heunis Collection, File 1/11/1/2 vol. 2, Briefing to foreign correspondents.
reform processes, and the understanding that the referendum allowed the NP to forge a reform coalition of its supporters and those of the PFP. The NP did so by portraying its reforms as a 'step in the right direction,' to the latter, whilst reassuring the traditional NP supporters that the party would control the process and defend White interests. It was to this formula and coalition, of roughly two thirds of the pragmatic White electorate, that de Klerk would return in 1983. The 1983 vote, therefore not only further institutionalised the referendum, ensconcing it in the NP political toolbox, but also provided its leadership with a script for implementing reform in the face of a conservative backlash.

The 1983 Referendum - A Spiritual Trek:

By the mid 1970s the glaring shortcomings of grand Apartheid had become increasingly evident. The homeland policy had proved a failure and the heavy hand of the government failed to stem - let alone reverse - the influx of Blacks to urban centres. In addition, Apartheid in the workplace had become an economic burden, depriving the economy of requisite human resources, and maintaining the facade of separate institutions for each population group became unsustainable. Simply stated, Afrikaners and Whites did not 'have enough people to go it alone any longer.' Moreover, the traumatic Soweto riots of 16 June 1976 had signalled to Whites that the era of Black passivity was over. Regional developments, like the end of White rule in Rhodesian in 1980 and the termination of Portuguese colonial rule in Mozambique and Angola, further undermined White self-confidence. In response to these developments, the NP sought to broaden its support base through greater collaboration with English capital and English speakers, as well as efforts to co-opt the so-called Coloured and Indian communities. The emergent paradigm for White politics was the politics of survival, a paradigm in which economic growth, and not separate development, became the NP's key objective.

The politics of survival required a break with the Verwoerdian paradigm and triggered an intensified struggle between enlightened or verligte Afrikaners, who

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2 Speaking in Bloemfontein during the campaign, P.W. Botha described the referendum as a spiritual trek. Die Burger, 8 September 1983.
3 Hermann Giliomee and Lawrence Schlemmer, From Apartheid to Nation Building (Cape Town, 1989), pp. 114 - 49.
4 The Sunday Times, 7 December 1980.
7 F. van Zyl Slabbert (1975, 13 - 14) defines a verligte as an 'individual who experiences a conflict between the parochial demands of the particular organization within which he finds himself and the more universal demands of his occupation.'
advocated a 'less blatant form of Apartheid,' and conservatives or verkramptes. Whether one ascribes this strain to diverging class interests, symbolic and status issues, the personal frustrations of backbenchers overlooked for promotion, or even anger at cooperation with English speakers, the 1983 referendum was a direct result of P.W. Botha’s efforts to navigate the verligte-verkrampte tensions. The initial referendum promise failed in its role of averting a split in the NP. And having promised a referendum, Botha deployed it for other reasons, at first to navigate a contentious set of by-elections after the Conservative Party (CP) was formed, and then later to weaken the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) in order to compensate for the loss of support to the CP. This particular case study provides clear evidence that elite objectives in considering a referendum are often evolving and dynamic. Moreover, the 1983 referendum demonstrates the process of social learning – or politics as learning in referenda use.

Minimal inclusion for maximal exclusion – Tri-Cameralism:
P.W. Botha’s predecessor B.J. Vorster had already set in motion a process to scrap some of the public manifestations of Apartheid by allowing for mixed sporting events. Yet the most important reform process he inaugurated was the creation of a cabinet committee to address the status of the Coloureds. The findings of the Theron Commission, submitted in 1976, proposed a radical break with the Verwoerdian model by recommending that Whites share power with Coloureds and Indians. These proposals were incorporated in the 1977 election manifesto of the NP, which P.W. Botha inherited after succeeding Vorster in 1979, and were the genesis of the Tri-Cameral constitutional reform process. This emerged as the central feature of P.W. Botha’s 'reform Apartheid.' In practice the reforms proposed the creation of a Coloured House of Representatives with 92 legislators and an Indian House of Delegates comprising 46 members. These two additional houses, along with the White parliament made up of 185 members, would legislate on so-called 'own' or racial affairs. These 'own affairs' included culture, education, social welfare, etc. In tandem, the constitution created a President’s Council to deal with 'general' affairs. The
composition of the President’s Council was based on a 4:2:1 key, thereby ensuring that the
NP and Whites would dominate it. Reform Apartheid, therefore, represented a strategy of
'sharing power' without losing control or surrendering White hegemony.13 Despite
insinuations that this reform constituted part of a broader reform process, it was, as
Frederik van Zyl Slabbert warned, clear that 'Black exclusion is a pre-condition for
Coloured and Asian inclusion.'14

The prospect of tinkering with the hegemonic Verwoerdian model had long been a
source of tension between verligtes and verkramptes. Minor reforms during Vorster’s
tenure precipitated the departure of a group of purists – under the leadership of J.B.M
Hertzog’s son Albert. Vorster did not use a referendum to navigate this particular crisis,
though he did employ one on the Tumhalle process.15 Although the NP managed to
contain the impact of the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) split from the party in October
1969, thanks to swift action by the Broederboōd,16 support for the NP amongst Afrikaners
decayed, from 85 percent in the 1977 general elections to 60 percent in the 1981 general
elections.17

This trend underscored the danger of an institutionalised political verkrampte
alternative, especially in the conservative Transvaal. Beyond the threat that such a split
would pose to the NP in its rural strongholds, the emergence of a credible conservative
Afrikaans party in urban constituencies could split the Afrikaner vote, favouring the PFP,
now led by a charismatic liberal Afrikaner. Frederik van Zyl Slabbert was appointed
leader of the PFP in 1979.

Since coming to power in 1948, the goal of maintaining unity was the 'only clear
priority' that transcended whatever internal differences might exist amongst Afrikaner
institutions.18 But whereas Vorster chose NP unity over meaningful reform, P.W. Botha
understood that he would have to choose between survival and unity.19 Though a product

13 Brian Pottinger, The Imperial President, P.W. Botha and the First 10 Years (Johannesburg, 1988), pp. 69,
137, 235.
14 Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert, The System and the Struggle, Reform, Revolt and Reaction in South Africa
Edited by Dene Smuts. (Johannesburg, 1989), p. 62; F. Van Zyl Slabbert, The Last White Parliament,
(Johannesburg, 1985), p. 106; Andre du Toit, The Rand Daily Mail, 28 October 1983; Allen Boesak, 'No
positive side to Apartheid', South African Outlook, 113, 1348, October 1983, p. 156.
15 The Tumhalle Conference, which was launched in 1976, brought together Namibia’s Bantustan leaders
and representatives of the local White community in an effort to create an interim constitution, premised on
a confederation of eleven separate ethnic states, though guaranteeing White political and economic
domination. There were fears that the Pretoria planned to use the emerging Democratic Tumhalle Alliance
(D.T.A.) for a future unilateral declaration of independence (Wellmer, 1988: 505).
18 Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, 'Afrikaner Nationalism', p. 9.
of the party machine and committed to maintaining unity, and despite being a reluctant
reformer, Botha largely moved ahead under the influence of the South African Defence
Forces (SADF), and certain elements within the Broederbond. The Broederbond itself
was divided on the question of the tri-cameral reforms, and the later split in the party was
mirrored within the organisation. As Minister of Defence under both Verwoerd and
Vorster, since 1966, Botha developed an intimate relationship with the SADF, which had
articulated and propagated the notion of 'total war' paradigm in response to the spectre of a
'total onslaught,' against the country and its institutions. The two ideological pillars
underpinning this strategy were provided by the writings of Samuel Huntington and a
French counter-insurgency theorist Andre Beaufre. The latter argued that wars are won in
the minds of men, implying that reform could remove the grievances that drive the
'onslaught.' Seeking to balance the inherent contradiction between the old Verwoer
dian paradigm and the new politics of survival, and to ensure party unity, Botha tapped into
Verwoerd's legacy by promising a referendum.

The politics of the referendum promise:
Botha's first pledge to stage a referendum was made on 31 November 1980, in a public
address in Ladysmith, Natal. The Prime Minister informed his audience that he would 'call
a referendum to let the nation give its verdict' on the new constitution if there was a
discrepancy between the proposals made by the President's Council and the party's 1977
platform. This platform included reference to the proposed reforms. In making the
promise Botha sought to attain several objectives.

The first was securing maximal support within the party for his reforms in the face
of mounting verkrampte opposition. In early November 1980 the NP's Transvaal leader,
Dr. Andries Treurnicht, who emerged as leader of the verkrampte wing, informed the
Party's provincial executive that he opposed the representation of other colour groups in
parliament. Tensions between the camps were rising and in mid 1979 Botha threw down
the gauntlet to his conservative critics in his Upington speech by warning them that the

20 Ibid. p. 128.
22 The Rand Daily Mail, 2 November 1983.
23 Mark Swilling and Mark Phillips, 'Reform, Security and White Power: Re-thinking State Strategies in the
1980s', Paper Delivered to the Annual Conference of the Association of Sociology of Southern Africa,
University of Durban-Westville, July 1988.
24 PV 203, P.W. Botha Collection, File PS 12/23/1, Ladysmith speech on 30 November 1980; The Citizen, 1
December 1980.
25 Brian Pottinger, The Imperial President, p. 61.
26 Alf Ries and Ebbe Dommisse, Broedertwis, p 94; Die Afrikaner, 5 December 1980.
party needed to 'adapt or die.' In his speech Botha made an important distinction between principle and policy, and conceded that certain principles could not be successfully implemented as policies. Furthermore, Botha indicated that he recognised that, though a White leader, he had to take responsibility for all South Africans. These long standing tensions dated back to June 1976, when the Minister of Cooperation and Development, Dr. Piet Koornhof, had informed an American audience in Palm Springs that Apartheid was dead. Andries Treurnicht was highly captious of Koornhof's speech, and the critical media already warned of an impending party split at that time. A further source of tension was the government's willingness to surrender SWA/ Namibia and consent to a multi-racial constitution. These divisions within the local Namibian and Federal structures of the party, led to the referendum. A further incentive for promising the vote was a Windhoek by-election in 1976.

In his Ladysmith address Botha explicitly stated that a referendum was a means both to measure opposition to reform within the party and legitimate change. In this regard the referendum pledge signalled that Botha was committed to pressing ahead with the constitution. Botha also made it quite clear that individuals within the party would not dictate the pace and scope of reforms to him. The ultra-conservative HNP's mouthpiece, Die Afrikaner, viewed the Ladysmith speech as nothing less than a declaration of war against the anti-Botha faction in the NP, whilst The Argus speculated that it might provoke a split by serving as the last straw for the conservatives. Veteran journalist Dries van Heerden notes that the conservative elements in the NP would have preferred to remain within the party and slow reforms down from within. Van Heerden, therefore, suggests that a referendum would force them to take a stand on the issue. Furthermore, he suggests that Botha reasoned that if the conservative elements would have remained in the party they would have been obliged to campaign for a 'yes' vote, thereby tying themselves to his reforms. A Cape Times editorial, republished in Die Burger in December 1980,

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27 The 'famous adapt or die' speech, made in Upington on 27 July 1979 was designed to answer Botha's critics in Namibia (Rapport, 29 July 1976) and those in the party, like Andries Treurnicht (Die Afrikaner, 3 August 1979).
28 Die Afrikaner, 29 June 1979.
30 The party's Namibia leader A.H. du Plessis had in early 1976 promised Whites a final say in Turnhalle decisions, just prior to a crucial by-election on 28 May 1976 (Die Afrikaner, 10 September 1976).
32 Die Afrikaner, 5 December 1980.
33 The Argus, Leader, 1 December 1980.
34 Interview (3 December 2002).
intimated that Botha had hoped to 'ease out Dr. Treurnicht without precipitating a serious split in the party,' supporting van Heerden's interpretation.

A third reason for promising the referendum was Botha's desire to smooth the acceptance of the new constitution in the provincial and federal NP conferences, which ultimately needed to approve it. Each of the party's provincial conferences had a de-facto veto over policy change, enabling the conservative Transvaal conference and Treurnicht to stymie reforms. The referendum pledge was thus designed to remove the constitutional debate from the party structures, in order to facilitate the acceptance of the reforms in these conferences, by reassuring the party faithful that the onus of the constitution's acceptance did not depend solely on them. In this way, Botha sought to go 'over the heads of verkramptes' in the party and appeal directly to the country. One verligte NP parliamentarian in fact hinted to the paper that Botha was in effect ignoring the party on a major policy issue.

Besides all this, a referendum represented a much safer option than an election for the new reformist leader. An opinion poll conducted in early December 1980 indicated that White opinion was far more liberal than the verkrampte leadership, with three-quarter (85 percent amongst English speakers and 62 percent amongst Afrikaners) of Whites accepting Coloureds in the White parliament. The Westminster system would not give expression to such support, and the 1960 referendum had demonstrated that referenda allowed opposition (English) voters to break with party loyalty and support the government. The HNP was, therefore, correct when it charged that Botha was planning to use forces outside of the NP, specifically PFP and the National Republican Party (NRP) voters, to defeat his opponents within the party. Thus a referendum allowed the NP to assemble a reform coalition made up of its loyal supporters and English speakers, representing at least 60 percent of the population.

A fifth reason for promising a referendum was that it enabled Botha to proceed with the planned 1981 general elections, without having the new constitution dominating the election agenda. These early elections were designed to thwart any plans that his

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36 Interview with Chris Heunis (13 December 2001); Die Afrikaner, 5 December 1980.
37 Brain Pottinger, The Imperial Presidency, p. 61.
38 The Argus, Leader, 1 December 1980.
39 The Argus, 1 December 1980.
40 The Sunday Times, 7 December 1980.
41 The NRP was a remnant of the former United Party, with its stronghold in Natal.
42 Die Afrikaner, 5 December 1980.
opponents might have had to leave the party.43 The elections were also designed to reconsolidate the NP's ethnic base,44 and fortify Botha's leadership. This was his first general election after he succeeded Vorster following the Information Scandal in 1979, and Botha could hardly afford to have power-sharing as the focus of the election. And, in his Ladysmith speech, Botha noted that there was no need for the country to be pre-occupied with concerns over drastic changes, as he would subject them to a referendum.45 P.W. Botha was a machine politician whose first and only job from 1936, until he entered parliament in 1948, was as a paid party organiser in the Cape. Working with Malan, Botha observed intently how the NP leader kept the republican issue off the electoral agenda and maintained internal cohesion. A further motivation for calling an early general election was to avoid a series of looming by-elections.46

A sixth motivation for promising a referendum was Botha's need to counter perceptions that he, and his President's Council, which was drafting the constitution, were not democratic. The 55-member President's Council, created in February 1981 to replace the Senate, enjoyed increasing command over policy making, at the expense of the caucus and cabinet, thus, leading to disaffection within the party.47 In describing the Council, Jannie Gagiano suggested that the party 'has been supplanted by the state itself.'48

Eight days before Botha promised the referendum, The Rand Daily Mail led with a massive expose claiming that he had personally amended the contents of the Erasmus Commission's report.49 The Commission had been appointed to explore the Information Scandal, which had unseated Botha's predecessor, John Vorster. The paper viewed his behaviour regarding the report as a show of arrogance, and he dedicated 3 of the 15 pages of his Ladysmith speech to dismissing these insinuations and attacking the left-wing media for cooperating with his right-wing opponents.50 The December edition of the party's federal newsletter was at pains to point out that the referendum announcement disproved the 'gossip stories that Botha had manipulated the NP in a direction than ran counter to the wishes of the majority.'51

45 PV 203, File PS 12/23/1, Ladysmith speech.
47 Hermann Giliomee, The Parting of the Ways, p. 27.
50 PV 203, File PS 12/23/1.
51 'Premier oor Referendum. Nuwe era kan kom', NAT80's, 1, 7, December 1980.
The end of the NP's monopoly over Afrikaner opinion:

Far from dissipating tensions over the new constitution, the referendum pledge exacerbated them, and verkramptes viewed it as an attempt to override the party caucus and institutions. The Rand Daily Mail, which had initially hailed the referendum as a 'brilliant move' to 'neutralise his right wing,' soon questioned the NP's assumption that it would secure the opposition's support, and warned that the referendum would alienate his right.

The referendum pledge was largely forgotten and only reiterated in the midst of the split - or skeuring - of the National Party in early 1982. The catalyst for the split was an article penned by the party's new information secretary and editor of the party's Nat80 newspaper, Jan Groblaar. In early 1982, Groblaar, a member of the verligte camp, set out his support for 'healthy power-sharing' in the paper. The article was, in all likelihood, the opening shot of a campaign to sell the tri-cameral package to the Party faithful. With the 1981 elections behind the Party, it may also be that the article was designed to bring to a head the long anticipated showdown with the verkramptes. Certain elements in the verligte camp of the party had desired a split, probably assuming that it could be successfully managed, just as the earlier HNP break had been.

The article elicited an outcry from verkrampte elements and led to a showdown between the two camps in the caucus on 24 February 1982. Despite a second promise during this debate to hold a referendum, designed to reduce opposition to reforms within the faction, the debate was forced into a showdown by Treurnicht's supporters. In the ensuing vote 22 MPs supported Treurnicht: 17 of these eventually left the NP to create the aptly named Conservative Party (CP) on 20 March 1982 under Treurnicht's leadership. The final split followed an attempt by Treurnicht to engineer the secession of the Transvaal NP at a meeting of the provincial executive on 27 February 1982. Treurnicht and his supporters sought to emulate D.F. Malan, who in 1934 succeeded in capturing the Cape NP structure after 'Fusion.' Interestingly, Treurnicht, like Malan, was a preacher, turned journalist, turned politician. Botha and his supporters, however, prevailed when the members of the Provincial Executive comprehensively defeated Treurnicht's followers by 172 votes to 36.

Despite the fact that Botha averted a break by the Transvaal NP, Treurnicht's departure, with so many sitting Transvaal MPs, represented the NP's worst crisis since 1980.

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52 The Rand Daily Mail, 1 December 1980.
53 The Rand Daily Mail, 2, 3 December 1980.
54 Alf Ries and Ebbe Dommisse, Broedertwis, p. 119; Brain Pottinger, The Imperial Presidency, p. 14; Die Afrikaner, 10 February 1982.
coming to power. The Transvaal was, electorally, the most important of the provinces. As its new provincial leader, the party elected a candidate with proven centrist tendencies, F.W. de Klerk, in order to stem the tide of support for the CP.

**Damage limitation by referendum:**
The referendum pledge failed to heal the deep divisions in the party in February 1982, and shortly after the split Botha, for the third time, promised a referendum in a parliamentary debate on 15 April 1982. In the period from April to May of 1982, Botha committed himself to a referendum on at least four occasions. These promises served to suggest to the public that ideological issues were not that important in explaining the split. They also served to take the 'wind out of the sails' of the newly formed CP. Barend du Plessis suggests that the party made a cardinal error in not letting Treurnicht and his supporters split away from the party on the earlier controversy surrounding the question of 'mixed sport' in the Craven Week rugby competition. Ironically, FW de Klerk was responsible for preventing this split. A party, suggests, Barend du Plessis, could not have been formed over 'one Coloured kid playing rugby.' A viable party could, on the other hand, be formed on the basis of a significant break with Verwoerdian principle. This sense that split was inevitable serves to explain why the referendum pledge failed to avert the partition. Moreover, referenda often exacerbate the very tensions that generate them and Vernon Bogdanor suggests that 'in Scandinavia, referendums have revealed cleavages that the party system has hidden, and this has been a potent force in breaking up seemingly united parties.'

**Tapping into Verwoerd's legacy:**
By the middle of 1982 the Botha government had set about approving a referendum bill, which passed through its second reading on 27 May 1982 and 1 June 1982. Introducing the bill, Chris Heunis informed the House that in his view 'the most important reasons for

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57 The Craven Week is an annual Rugby competition that draws together the country's leading young rugby players who represent a variety of provinces and regions. The Transvaal Teachers Union lead a campaign against the participation of non-White players and the incident almost split the NP (Alf Ries and Ebbe Domnisse, 1982: 85-88).
58 Interview with Barend du Plessis (29 November 2001).
the holding of a referendum under specific circumstances is therefore that it is an instrument to test people’s opinions.\textsuperscript{61} He also sought to link the proposed referendum to the 1960 referendum. In linking this second referendum to the NP leader who represented the high tide of unity, the NP leadership, no doubt, sought to signal the gravity of the issue and need for unity.

P.W. Botha was far more explicit in linking his referendum to that of Verwoerd. In a speech, only five days after the formation of the CP, he informed an audience of key party activists, at a meeting chaired by F.W. de Klerk, that he was following Verwoerd’s example by calling a referendum. Having asked his audience where he got his ‘referendum example’ from, Botha noted.

I got my example from the late Dr. Verwoerd. Because when he created a republic, he deviated in policy of his predecessors Malan and Strijdom. They had said that a republic must be created with a two-thirds majority, and Verwoerd said with a simple majority. He then used a referendum to consult the people after he consulted the conferences. In other words, the path that I want to take is the path that my great predecessor H.F. Verwoerd took, in order to get to the people’s will.\textsuperscript{62}

Fanie Cloete, who served in the Prime Minister’s Office, confirms that Botha took his cue from Verwoerd and gained his understanding of the referendum from his long involvement in the party as a paid organiser.\textsuperscript{63} Though Botha stretched the historical context somewhat, he clearly applied the 'logic of appropriateness,' by suggesting that major disputes and policy departures require a referendum.

Implicit in his statement was, after all, a recognition that his proposals deviated from the 1977 program. Moreover, the pledge and its Verwoerdian gloss served to enforce a message of continuity. At a time when the CP charged the NP and Botha of deviating from NP orthodoxy, the referendum undertaking signalled Botha’s desire to identify himself with Verwoerd. The referendum assurance was also aimed to take the wind out of the sails of the renegades, and trivialise their decision to leave. The referendum promise also served to buttress NP claims that those who left the party were disaffected MP’s overlooked for positions.\textsuperscript{64}

But, beyond tactical considerations for invoking the Verwoerdian precedent, Botha viewed his constitutional change as being as important creating a republic, if not more. In

\textsuperscript{61}Hansard, Thursday 27-28 May, column 7901.
\textsuperscript{63}Interview (4 December 2002).
\textsuperscript{64}Alf Ries and Ebbe Dommisse, Leierstryd, p. 17.
an address in May 1982, Botha presented the new constitution as being a natural extension of the establishment of a republic. Botha submitted that whereas the creation of a republic settled the 'most important differences between English and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans' since 1910, his new constitution represented a concerted effort to improve relations with Coloureds and Indians.\(^6^5\) If the tri-cameral reforms were as salient as the establishment of a republic, then a referendum was appropriate.

**The NP's referendum conundrum:**

By August 1982 the referendum was embraced with a new purpose in mind, namely selling the constitution to the NP structures. Despite the departure of Treurnicht's supporters, party activists continued to treat the new constitution with suspicion. Botha's constitutional supremo, Chris Heunis, who was charged with selling the new constitution to the Party's federal and provincial congresses in the latter half of 1982, notes that this was the first time that 'the party saw where we were going.' According to Heunis there was resistance at the Federal Party's conclave, and the party had to 'do something about it.'\(^6^6\) On this score the referendum proved far more fruitful, and *Die Burger* highlighted the referendum as one of the three key outcomes of that conference.\(^6^7\)

The post-*skeuring* referendum pledges soon turned out to be a poisoned chalice, however. The CP now craftily portrayed the promised referendum as proof positive that Botha's proposed constitution had indeed departed from the 1977 guidelines. Moreover, the 1977 elections could not be viewed as a mandate for these guidelines, as that Botha and his strategists in effect ran an anti-Jimmy Carter, US intervention, campaign.\(^6^8\) Botha now, briefly, sought to wriggle out of the referendum as the 'growth of the right stifled verligte rhetoric.'\(^6^9\) And in September 1982 he informed the NP's annual Free State conference that the government had a two-thirds majority and that there was no need for a referendum. He reasoned that the proposed constitution did not radically differ from the 1977 proposals.\(^7^0\)

One explanation for this about-face might have been the results of a by-election in the constituency of Germiston, where the combined vote of the CP and the HNP was significantly larger than that of the NP. The HNP's mouthpiece, *Die Afrikaner*, viewed the

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\(^{6^5}\) PV 203, File 4/2/102, Speech at RAU, 27 May 1982.

\(^{6^6}\) Interview with Chris Heunis (13 December 2001).

\(^{6^7}\) *Die Burger*, 2 August 1982.

\(^{6^8}\) Brian Pottinger, *The Imperial Presidency*, pp. 98-99.

\(^{6^9}\) *The Sunday Tribune*, 3 April 1983.

\(^{7^0}\) *Die Volksblad*, 2 September 1982.
result as evidence that Botha did not have the necessary support for his new constitution in the Transvaal, Orange Free State, the Northern Cape and Northern Natal. The paper also accused Botha of using the referendum pledge to merely to steamroll his new constitution through his party structures. Yet this manoeuvre also backfired and the CP now adapted its tack. The CP responded to the about-turn by accusing the NP of forcing the constitution upon the volk. The attempted retreat from the referendum did indeed prove damaging and threatened to abet the CP in mobilising growing support in a spate of forthcoming by-elections (to be discussed shortly).

Fanie Cloete notes that Botha did not want to go through with the referendum, and argues that he 'had painted himself into a corner.' Unable to back off from his (at least) seven earlier referendum pledges, and concerned by the threat of CP gains, Botha now sought to provide supplementary legitimisation for the referendum prior to announcing it. As already described, F.W. de Klerk would find himself in a similar situation almost a decade later. A rationale that de-coupled the referendum from the earlier link between the President’s Council constitutional draft and the 1977 proposals was essential.

One new reason for the referendum, according to Botha, was that the new constitution would involve far reaching changes to the Westminster system. Botha also returned to the Verwoerd argument that general elections were about many issues, hence a referendum would give the clearest indication of public support for the new constitution. As already noted, this argument was a central one that de Klerk employed. Accordingly, Botha suggested that government wanted to place the constitution above party politics. Yet again tapping into the NP’s past, Botha also submitted that previous major constitutional changes - the establishment of a republic - had been submitted to a referendum. In addition, Botha quoted Carl Friederich’s argument that the 'will of the people' is the ultimate 'basis for legitimacy.' Botha further added that a referendum would provide for stability.

Botha calls the referendum:
The eventual announcement of the referendum was made on 30 March 1983, in parliament. Though viewed by some as a 'political bombshell,' it was unavoidable after
the Party leadership had pledged a referendum in December 1980, during and immediately after the *skeuring* and at the provincial and Federal conferences of 1982. At the time, the English and conservative Afrikaans press attributed the timing of the announcement to a desire to remove the constitutional issue from the approaching by-elections in Soutpansberg, Waterberg and Carletonville on 10 May 1983. Die Afrikaner noted that the referendum served to allow disgruntled NP voters to support the NP in the by-elections. The paper added that NP officials hinted to voters that the referendum would be the time and the place to express their views on the new constitution. In the build up to the by-elections, known as the Battle of the *Berge*, the CP charged that the NP was avoiding a referendum on the constitution and forcing it upon the *volk*. The referendum, thus, served yet again to take wind out of the opposition’s sails.

Though the timing of the formal referendum announcement was linked to the impending by-elections, Botha also wished to check the growth of the CP through a referendum. Broederbond leader Prof. J.P. de Lange suggests that Broeder Botha viewed the referendum as a way to demonstrate that the CP was making noise beyond their numbers. Ironically, the Westminster system, which had for so long served the NP, allowed the CP to do so. The HNP daily reported that the rather 'sudden referendum announcement' followed pressure from the new Transvaal leader, F.W. de Klerk, who was alarmed by the extent of opposition to the new constitution in this province. The Transvaal was indeed viewed by many as the key battleground. Die Afrikaner also suggested that de Klerk feared that a delay in the vote would allow the PFP leadership to convince its followers to vote against the new constitution.

De Klerk’s apparently central role in the referendum process was clearly a function of the pressure he was under in the Transvaal at the time. The use of the referendum to check the growth of the CP was similarly a central motif in de Klerk’s 1992 referendum, and herein lie the origins of de Klerk’s 'logic of appropriateness.' Thus, interestingly, Fanie Cloete suggests that de Klerk used a referendum pledge to pacify his conservative

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75 Die Transvaler, 31 March 1983.
76 The Sunday Tribune, 3 April 1983; Peter Mann, The Sunday Tribune, 3 April 1983; Die Afrikaner, 13 April 1983.
77 Die Afrikaner, 20 April 1983.
78 These by-elections were precipitated by a moment of folly in which Minister Fanie Botha challenged Treurnicht to resign and contest his Waterberg seat if he resigned to contest his Soutpansberg seat. As a result of this challenge, Tom Langley resigned his Waterkloof seat to challenge Fanie Botha, thus engineering three by-elections.
79 J.P. de Lange (22 November 2001) and Tim du Plessis (28 November 2001) also recognise that these by-elections did feature, though not centrally, in the NP’s thinking at the time.
80 Interview with J.P. de Lange (22 November 2001).
82 Die Afrikaner, 25 May 1983.
supporters, providing them with a sort of safeguard. But he also adds that he supported a referendum for far less wholesome reasons. According to Cloete, the resolutely conservative de Klerk saw a referendum as a vehicle by which voters could send a message to PW Botha to slow down the pace of reforms. This, he intimates, explains the conservative nature of the campaign in the Transvaal. Cloete further suggests that de Klerk believed that he could blame Botha in the event of a failure. 

**Botha calls the referendum:**

In an internal NP discussion, one day prior to announcing the referendum, Botha candidly listed twelve reasons for calling the referendum. Significantly, he not only repeated his previous parallel with the republican referendum, but also alleged afresh that this issue was even more important. In a patent application of the 'logic of appropriateness,' Botha informed the caucus that 'Every NP leader has, when confronted with a major decision, called upon the volk.' Botha clearly tapped into the Verwoerd legacy. But he further submitted that this was the greatest decision that the country had had to deal with so far, and he warned his colleagues not to underestimate resistance to the new constitution. Botha also argued that introducing the new constitution posed a risk to the party and warned of the dangers of being held accountable by the people if it failed. Botha further warned that without a referendum, the new constitution would be associated with a handful of people.

Commenting on the announcement Die Volksblad noted that the referendum placed the issue above party considerations. Botha, therefore, sought to limit the party’s identification with the constitution, and from Botha’s hand-written notes from this meeting, one gets a sense of a certain degree of ambivalence on his part. The referendum may thus have contributed to what David Butler and Austin Ranney warn is a 'political culture in which politicians are inhibited, for good or ill, from acting as representatives.'

At this stage, the NP and Botha clearly had Afrikaners and the CP in mind. In all of the discussions, until then, there was no reference to the PFP. The referendum was seen as an essential risk-management exercise, serving to placate NP supporters and address the growth of the CP. Elections only represented uncertainty for the NP and provided the CP

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83 Interview (4 December 2002).
84 PV 203, File PS 12/23/2.
85 Die Volksblad, 31 March 1983.
86 David Butler and Austin Ranney, 'Conclusion', in David Butler and Austin Ranney (eds). Referendums Around the World, p. 260.
with a platform to make further gains and build on its seventeen seats. A referendum substituted for an election.\textsuperscript{88} Naspers journalist Tim du Plessis notes the NP assumed the support of English speakers in a vote for the constitution. Moreover, he adds that that the NP knew that 'you cannot lose power if you have lost a referendum.'\textsuperscript{89} The subsequent claim by Botha’s official biographers\textsuperscript{90} that the referendum was a high-risk decision, is, at best, exaggerated. As with the 1992 referendum, the party was confident of victory all along.\textsuperscript{91} Interestingly, Botha’s biographer reports that there was 'little enthusiasm' in the cabinet for a referendum.\textsuperscript{92}

Other reasons for the referendum cited by Botha in the pre-announcement meeting were the claim that that a 'yes' majority would be viewed as a 'national movement of goodwill' and a guarantee of stability. Botha reiterated the reference to Carl Friederich. Interestingly, neither the by-elections nor the PFP explicitly feature in Botha’s notes. More important for Botha and the NP was stemming the long-term growth of the CP and placing a ceiling on their public support. A leading newspaper editor at the time notes that the party leadership 'did not want the impression to be created that the CP was rising,' and calculated that the PFP’s voters could be used for this purpose.\textsuperscript{93} One of the Ministers present in these discussions was F.W. de Klerk.

Despite P.W. Botha’s insistence that he had called a referendum in order to allow Whites to express their views, and his vehemence claim that a referendum did not mean that the proposals drastically deviated from the 1977 guidelines,\textsuperscript{94} his conservative opponents viewed the announcement as a vindication of the claim that the new constitution in fact diverged from the 1977 proposals.\textsuperscript{95} The CP’s Koos van der Merwe interpreted the proclamation as a political 'triumph' and argued that it proved that the NP did not have a mandate for the new constitution. For van der Merwe the announcement was also viewed as evidence of the CP’s strength.\textsuperscript{96} All that now remained was for the NP to determine the date of the vote. Conveniently the country’s drought was used to justify a delay. The real

\textsuperscript{88} Interview with Koot Jonker (29 November 2001); Die Afrikaner, 06 April 1983.
\textsuperscript{89} Interview with Tim du Plessis (29 November 2001).
\textsuperscript{91} Interview with Barend du Plessis (29 November 2001).
\textsuperscript{92} Dan Prinsloo, Stem Uit die Wilderness, p. 103.
\textsuperscript{93} Interview with Harold Pakendorf (9 December 2002).
\textsuperscript{94} Die Vaderland, 31 March 1983.
\textsuperscript{95} Louis Stofberg, Secretary General of the HNP in Die Transvaaler, 19 April 1983; Koos van der Merwe in Die Transvaaler, 20 April 1983.
\textsuperscript{96} Die Transvaaler, 20 April 1983.
reason for the delay in the vote was more probably the difficult time the party had endured in the earlier by elections.97

Referendum campaign objectives:
The *skeuring* sped up the NP's transformation into a bourgeois party,98 heightening its need to solicit the support of English voters. This was because the CP threat was greatest in rural Afrikaans constituencies, especially after Botha had ended generous state subsidies to maize farmers in 1981.99 The NP could, therefore, only grow in urban and English constituencies at the expense of the PFP.

Internal NP polling, conducted in June 1983 demonstrated that, nationally, 48 percent of the public was moderate, whilst 26 percent was either conservative or liberal.100 The PFP, under the leadership of Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, threatened to attract increasing numbers of *verligte* voters.101 In his profile of Slabbert, Paul Cassar notes that he 'regularly drew larger audiences than PW Botha,' and adds that he was feared by the conservative wing of the NP for his potential to draw less conservative supporters from the party.102

The real extent of the threat posed by the PFP under Slabbert was demonstrated by a deeper internal analysis of the NP's polling in urban constituencies. In urban areas, defined as 'right of centre,' the research showed that NP candidates were incapable of defeating a conservative candidate [assuming CP and *Herstigte Nasionale Party* (HNP) cooperation] if the PFP fielded a candidate.103 Post *skeuring* politics thus made the PFP no less of a long-term strategic threat to the NP than the CP.

The referendum campaign, which was launched in August 1983, provided a unique opportunity for the NP to discredit its opposition, the CP and PFP, and re-brand the ruling party as the guarantor of stability. The NP thus refined and broadened its previous referendum objective, from limiting the expansion of the CP to weakening the PFP, in order to ensure the support of the moderates (48 percent), and scaring English voters to throw their lot in with the NP. *Skeuring* had irreparably undermined Malan's stratagem,

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97 *Die Afrikaner*, 4 May 1983.
100 PV 895, File 4/2. Vol 15, Memo from Dr. G. (Org) Marais to Chris Heunis.
102 Paul Cassar, 'Dr. Frederik van Zyl Slabbert: The Emergence of a Key Figure', *Journal for Contemporary History*, 10, 3, 1985, pp. 18, 20.
which was premised on Afrikaner political unity, and forced the NP to return to Hertzogism.

In order to portray the NP as 'the only alternative to chaos seen elsewhere in Africa,'\textsuperscript{104} the NP employed the referendum to discredit the CP and PFP as extremists and portray the party as the voice of moderation and stability. Days prior to the vote P.W. Botha warned a Johannesburg audience that 'no' voters were in league with ANC.\textsuperscript{105} Confirmation that this was an NP objective is provided by a letter addressed to P.W. Botha by Dr. Jan Groblaar, the Party's Chief Information Officer, who noted that the 'referendum has again proven that you are the middle point of the total political spectrum in South Africa, and indeed Southern Africa.'\textsuperscript{106}

The brunt of the NP referendum campaign was to destroy the credibility of the opposition party leaders and to undermine their voters' confidence in them.\textsuperscript{107} Ultimately, the nature and extent of the threat posed by each of the two opposition parties to the NP was specific to each province. In the Free State and Transvaal, especially rural areas, the CP was the primary threat. In the Cape, Natal and urban Transvaal constituencies the PFP posed the major threat. The local campaigns were, accordingly, calibrated.

\textbf{Re-branding the NP:}

This tactic of portraying the NP as a force of moderation, uniting all moderates against CP and PFP extremism, is ascribed to the party's 'political Commissar,' Ebe Dommisse\textsuperscript{108} who penned the influential \textit{Deur Dawie} column at \textit{Die Burger}. Despite emphatic denials,\textsuperscript{109} Dommisse led a concerted campaign to paint all opposition to the new constitution with the same brush and to pose a 'yes' vote as a choice for peace over chaos.\textsuperscript{110} Dommisse, for example, warned of an 'Unholy Alliance' that spanned the United Democratic Front (U.D.F.), on the left to the neo-Nazi \textit{Afrikaner Weerstands Beweging} (AWB) on the right.\textsuperscript{111} As will be discussed shortly, the most effective way of doing this was to attack the PFP and its leadership. This tack served to present the new constitution as a moderate 'third way.'

\textsuperscript{104} PV 203, File 4/2/108, Speech at George, 23 October 1982.
\textsuperscript{105} The Rand Daily Mail. 1 November 1983.
\textsuperscript{106} PV 203, File C3/19/13, Letter dated 8 November 1983.
\textsuperscript{107} Interview with Eldad Louw (6 December 2001).
\textsuperscript{108} Interview with Tim du Plessis (29 November 2001).
\textsuperscript{109} Interview with Ebbe Dommisse (23 October 2001).
\textsuperscript{110} \textit{Die Burger}, 14 September 1983.
Furthermore, the NP machine and its leadership explicitly spoke of a new political map in which English and Afrikaans speakers would move beyond 'sectional loyalties.' In a campaign speech at Sedgefield, for example, P.W. Botha pointed out that the referendum was an opportunity to demonstrate English and Afrikaner unity and a 'a new spirit for South Africa.'\(^{12}\) It is worth pointing out that the theme echoed Botha’s campaign speeches in the build-up to the Republican referendum,\(^ {13}\) and provides further evidence that Botha had gained many of his referendum insights from his involvement in the previous vote. During the campaign *Deur Dawie* also argued that politics would never be the same after the referendum,\(^ {14}\) which suggest that the party indeed sought to re-brand the NP through the referendum. The response to the eventual referendum result, a two-thirds 'yes' majority, is similarly instructive in this regard. *Die Burger* opined that thanks to the referendum an 'unparalleled breakthrough was made across the boundaries of language and party affiliation.' P.W. Botha, similarly, described the referendum as 'a platform for national unity and evolutionary reform.'\(^ {15}\)

**Tackling the PFP:**

According to Barend du Plessis, P.W. Botha viewed the 1983 referendum as a strategic opportunity to tap into the PFP’s support base by scaring the 'Prog' voters with the threat of the right,\(^ {16}\) because, passing the constitution depended on the support of PFP voters and the NP needed to get PFP voters to break with their existing party loyalties. However, whilst many of the PFP’s voters and some of its more conservative legislators, like Harry Schwartz and Jaapie Basson, were inclined to support the constitution, its leader van Zyl Slabbert opposed it on grounds of principle.\(^ {17}\) Slabbert, in fact, threatened to resign as leader of the party if the faction supported a 'yes' vote.\(^ {18}\) Moreover, once he had convinced the faction, a special party conference was called to convince party activists. From the NP’s perspective, this tension, which was reminiscent of tensions within the United Party in 1960, was an unintended, though welcome, consequence of the referendum. *Die Burger* revelled in this intrigue and portrayed the PFP as divided.\(^ {19}\)

\(^{12}\) *Die Burger*, 1 October 1983.

\(^{13}\) *Die Burger*, 9 May 1958.

\(^{14}\) *Die Burger*, 3 September 1983; *Die Burger*, Deur Dawie, 10 September 1983.

\(^{15}\) *Die Burger*, 4 November 1983; *Die Burger*, Deur Dawie, 5 November 1983.

\(^{16}\) Interview with Barend du Plessis (29 November 2001).

\(^{17}\) Interview with Peter Gastrow (24 October 2001).

\(^{18}\) Interview with Frederik van Zyl Slabbert (30 October 2001).

\(^{19}\) *Die Burger*, 5, 20 September & October 8, 1983. There were also intermittent reports of party members leaving the party. The reported resignation of Errol Musk, the PFP candidate for Sunnyside (Pretoria) election the 1981 elections was made a front-page story. *Die Burger*, 4 October 1983.
The referendum campaign focused much energy on discrediting the PFP leadership and driving a wedge between it and its voters. One way of doing this was by linking its leaders to communism and the ANC with information supplied by the US based Freedom Foundation. Deur Dawie derided the PFP for administering a campaign that encouraged a vote for leaders and the party, and not the constitution. When the PFP did focus on the constitution's flaws, especially the danger of excluding Blacks, and candidly stated that Black majority rule was inevitable, the NP portrayed it as a radical party.

The referendum may also have been viewed as an opportunity to drive Slabbert out of politics. Die Burger, for example, called on him to resign in the event of defeat. In February 1986 Slabbert stunned South Africa by resigning from party politics to establish a non-governmental organisation called the Institute for a Democratic Alternative to South Africa (IDASA). Veteran PFP leader Colin Eglin, who was active in politics during all three referenda, notes that the 1983 referendum, eventually, drove Slabbert out of politics. According to Eglin, it was the 'beginning of the end,' as the business community, who abandoned him on a crunch issue, offended him.

The NP's effort to undermine the PFP's opposition to the referendum was bolstered by the support of regional and national English newspapers. Six daily and weekly papers supported the government, whilst ten supported the opposition. The Star called on Whites to boycott the vote. And Helen Suzman suggests that the PFP campaign was undermined by the support of important newspapers for the constitution. Furthermore, the business community widely endorsed the new constitution, despite their misgivings. The support from segments of the English media reflected the growing cooperation between English speaking business interests and the NP. Deur Dawie, of course, submitted that the support of these papers reflected the sentiments of their readers, who opposed the PFP's 'boycott politics' and their association with the extreme right.

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120 Interview with Eldad Louw (6 December 2001).
121 Die Burger, 21 September 1983.
122 Die Burger, 26 August 1983.
124 Interview with Colin Eglin (11 December 2001).
125 The Star, 28 October 1983.
126 Helen Suzman, In No Uncertain Terms. Memoirs (Johannesburg, 1993), p. 239.
128 Die Burger, 3 and 10 September 1983.
The support of significant elements in the English press, the NP’s control over the Afrikaans press (which denied the opposition advertising space), and its flagrant abuse of state controlled electronic media all hampered the 'no' campaign.\textsuperscript{130} To top this, the NP outspent the PFP by 10-1,\textsuperscript{131} eventually spending more on the referendum than Margaret Thatcher had in the British elections of 1983.\textsuperscript{132}

'A step in the right direction.'

PFP claims that the reforms did not go far enough were bolstered when Inkatha leader, Gatsha Buthelezi, stated his opposition to the reforms on 20 August 1983. Buthelezi, who had for a long time been trumpeted by the NP as a moderate alternative to the ANC, warned he would end his regime-friendly opposition to sanctions if the constitution were adopted. Buthelezi further cautioned that the proposed constitution would heighten Black alienation.\textsuperscript{133}

Criticism from a pliant Black leader underscored the failings of the constitution and potentially enabled Slabbert to force a debate on the constitution. Slabbert was well aware of the NP’s effort to focus the debate on the costs of a 'no' vote and not on the constitution’s merits.\textsuperscript{134} To the chagrin of the NP, the PFP also actively cooperated with Buthelezi’s Inkatha in calling for a 'no' vote in Natal. In response, the NP and its press rehashed arguments from the 1960 referendum campaign, warning that this cooperation would make Blacks a 'political football.'\textsuperscript{135} The NP’s Minister for Constitutional Development and key strategist, Chris Heunis, attacked the PFP for involving Buthelezi, and also questioned the right of 'Blacks with their own [homeland] parliaments' to 'interfere in a debate on the rights of Coloureds and Indians.'\textsuperscript{136} Similarly, \textit{Die Burger} accused the PFP of shifting the focus of the referendum away from the Coloureds and Indians (who have no political rights) to the Blacks (who have).\textsuperscript{137} Criticising Slabbert’s supposed 'abuse of Blacks,' by noting Inkatha’s opposition to the reforms, \textit{Deur Dawie} sniped that that the PFP could bear it that a plan that did not involve them would succeed,
and also charged that Slabbert had never made the transition from being an academic to being a politician.\(^{138}\)

In order to counter the PFP’s cutting critique, the NP portrayed the constitution as a ‘step in the right direction,’ hinting that Black inclusion would be an inevitable outcome of its adoption.\(^{139}\) Chris Heunis, who is accredited with the ‘step in the right direction’ argument,\(^{140}\) reassured White business leaders that the ‘government accepts that further reform and adjustment is also required in this area as well.’\(^{141}\) And, on at least one occasion he cynically converted a ‘no’ vote into a vote for racism.\(^{142}\) In the NP’s propaganda, the process was now made more important than the outcome.\(^{143}\) Sampie Terreblanche, one of the most articulate proponents of the ‘step in the right direction’ argument and a government supporter at the time, claimed.

It is unrealistic to think that we can tackle the problem of Black participation in the decision making process without, firstly, accommodating Coloured representation in a satisfactory way and secondly, without building a strong middle-ground consensus on the process and methods of gradual and incremental constitutional reform between Afrikaans and English speakers.\(^{144}\)

In effect, the tactic of building support for the process, and not the constitution, amounted to recognition that the constitution was flawed. Constitutional expert Marinus Wiechers commented that the new constitution was not a constitution. Instead, he described it as a ‘tortuously constructed compromise, which a particular political party has reached with itself to consolidate its own political strength for the purpose of limited power-sharing with Coloureds and Indians.’\(^{145}\) Slabbert suggests that leading NP figures, including F.W. de Klerk, unabashedly admitted to him that the constitution was unworkable.\(^{146}\)

\(^{138}\) Die Burger September 24, 1983.
\(^{139}\) P.W. Botha at Randfontein (Die Burger, 14 October 1983). Similarly, Dr. Piet Koornhoff promised a Fish Hoek audience that the Government would address the aspirations of urban Blacks after the referendum (The Rand Daily Mail, 26 September 1983) as did the Cape Administrator Lappa Munnik, speaking in East London (The Daily Despatch, 17 September 1983).
\(^{140}\) Interview with Frederik van Zyl Slabbert (30 October 2001).
\(^{142}\) PV 895, File 1/11/1/2 vol. 24, Speech by Chris Heunis, 1 September 1983.
\(^{143}\) Interview with Wynand Malan (26 November 2001).
\(^{146}\) Interview with Frederik van Zyl Slabbert (30 October 2001).
The 'step in the right direction' argument proved to be a highly convincing, and explains the English press’s abandonment of the PFP. In retrospect, Slabbert notes, 'now who is against a step in the right direction? Only mad dogs.' Fortuitously, the NP’s 'step in the right direction' claim also exacerbated fissures within the PFP over the new constitution. More importantly, it resonated with the PFP’s constituency and, after the referendum, *Die Burger* gleefully noted that one third of its supporters defied the PFP leadership. The paper speculated that the outcome would exacerbate internal PFP tensions. To the carrot of a 'step in the right direction,' the NP added the threat that a 'no' vote would spell the end of reform, and the demise of the *verligtes.* Barend du Plessis confesses that the gambit was to convince voters that a 'no' vote was 'too ghastly to contemplate,' and it was 'made clear that a 'no' vote would create a crisis in government and lead to elections.' Research on the 1995 sovereignty referendum in Quebec suggests that voters who are reluctant to take risks, such as voting for independence, tend to focus worst case scenarios and catastrophic predictions in considering their vote. If these are made credible, they are likely to play an important role in the vote. In both the 1983 and the 1992 vote the NP masterfully played up the potentially calamitous consequences of voting no. Fear proved to be their best resource.

The conservative campaign, addressing the CP’s challenge:

In order to counter the CP, the NP hoped to discredit its leaders and, at the same time, allay the fears of White Afrikaners. This required a message that ran counter to the 'step in the right direction' argument in conservative strongholds. Politicians, academics and journalists based in the conservative Transvaal note that the campaign here focused on the CP. And seen from the CP perspective, Koos van der Merwe notes that the NP was 'definitely not pre-occupied with the PFP,' and argues that the CP was the focus of the government’s concerns. The ability of the party to calibrate a double message was made possible by the fact that *Naspers* had a different newspaper for each area.

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147 Ibid.
151 Interview with Barend du Plessis (29 November 2001).
154 Interview (26 October 2001).
Discrediting the CP's leaders, however, proved much more difficult as there simply was not sufficient material to smear them with. The single opportunity to attack the CP leader was provided by his Kruger Day address when he suggested that Christians could not vote yes in the referendum. As part of its effort to reassure its traditional support base, the NP presented the reforms as a minimal set of changes that would perpetuate White rule. In the conservative Free State, the NP's provincial leader, Kobie Coetsee, argued that constitutional change would allow Whites to prolong their future. The reforms were further justified as an essential response to the 'total onslaught' on the country. Botha often informed his audiences that the country's security forces and military industries depended on Coloureds and Indians, and pointed out that the fight against Communism could no longer afford the exclusion of these two communities. On one occasion Botha argued that Afrikaner nationalism, which had fought for the freedom of Afrikaners, could not deny others their freedoms.

Far more convincing, however, was the NP's attack on the PFP and its agenda. Accused by the CP of moving left, the NP responded by attacking the left. Tim du Plessis argues that Ebbe Dommisse suggested this stratagem, in which the NP engaged in a form of 'shadow boxing' with the PFP. According to du Plessis, Dommisse recognised that in reviling the PFP, the 'yes' campaign could convince the core NP supporters that the Party was true to its ideals. Attacking Slabbert, therefore, not only addressed the threat that he posed to the party, but also had propaganda value in the conservative north. The NP's preoccupation with the PFP and van Zyl Slabbert, in particular, was most telling in the party's Cape mouthpiece, Die Burger, which relentlessly sought to paint Slabbert as a radical and linked the emergence of the U.D.F. to the PFP's opposition to the constitution. From August 24 to October 7 the paper attacked the PFP and Slabbert on at least fourteen occasions. Given Dommisse's proximity to the NP leadership and his

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155 Interview with Eldad Louw (6 December 2001).
157 Die Volksblad, 19 October 1983.
159 PV 203, File 4/2/102, Speech at The Rand Afrikaans University, 27 May 1982 and at Lichtenburg, 26 May 1982.
160 Interview with Tim Du Plessis (28 November 2001).
161 Interview with Barend du Plessis (29 November 2001).
163 Die Burger, 24, 26, 27 August; 3,10, 13, 14, 19, 21, 24, 26, 28 September and 1,7 October 1983.
involvement in the *Broederbond*,\(^{164}\) his approach undoubtedly reflected the NP's referendum strategy.

Yet a further incentive to attack Slabbert was the fact that he challenged the NP's working assumption that they could defeat the CP with the votes of English-speaking Whites. Slabbert, in fact, posed the greatest threat to Botha's designs of building a reform coalition, of traditional (moderate) NP supporters and the PFP's support base, against the CP. Capturing the latter required discrediting Slabbert, while delivering the former required a conservative and cautious campaign – especially in the Transvaal and Free State. Where propaganda failed to assuage the NP faithful, the NP added incentives that bordered on flagrant bribery ahead of the vote. These included a 12 percent pay increase for the country's one million civil servants,\(^{165}\) and promises of 15,000 new public houses for Whites.\(^{166}\) For good measure, the government cut fuel prices by almost seven percent.\(^{167}\)

**The NP captures a new constituency:**

The two-thirds 'yes' majority on 3 November 1983 exceeded the expectations of the NP,\(^{168}\) and the result was indeed a major setback for the PFP, whose voters defied the party. There was consensus that the NP had made major inroads into the English vote.\(^{169}\) *The Rand Daily Mail*, for example, opined that P.W. Botha had changed his constituency, leaving behind the right. The paper also warned that the NP could not afford to disillusion English voters.\(^{170}\) Commenting on the result, Hermann Giliomee argued that the vote demolished 'the historical myth that Afrikaners are solely responsible for *Apartheid*.'\(^{171}\) And continued NP rule was indeed made possible by English-speaking Whites. On the other hand, this transformation also fundamentally changed the leadership of the party, which in turn made its abandonment of *Apartheid* possible.

From *Die Vaderland*'s perspective the result enabled the NP to move ahead with his reforms, without 'having to look over its shoulder' to Mayfair and Waterberg (by-elections). This confirms claims that the referendum served to by-pass these by-elections.

\(^{164}\) Interview with J.P. de Lange (22 November 2001).

\(^{165}\) *The Rand Daily Mail*, 7, 8 September 1983.

\(^{166}\) *Die Burger*, 27 September 1983.

\(^{167}\) *The Rand Daily Mail*, 11 August 1983.

\(^{168}\) PV 203, File number C3/19/5, Letter from Professor J.A. Heyns to P.W. Botha, dated, 6 November 1983, Interview with Eldad Louw (6 December 2001).

\(^{169}\) *The Argus*, 4 November 1983.


\(^{171}\) *The Rand Daily Mail*, 5 November 1983.
Interestingly the paper now called for dialogue with Blacks. Botha, however, dithered. In doing so, he ultimately alienated his English-speaking supporters as well as verligtes, prompting the emergence of the Democratic Party (DP).

In contrast to the PFP, the CP viewed the 700,000 'no' voters as evidence of its strength, noting that many PFP supporters voted yes. The NP, however, viewed the 'no' vote as evidence of a ceiling of its conservative opposition, despite the CP's impressive growth; the result quantified the absolute support for the right and undermined 'the right wing bogey.' F.W. de Klerk was no doubt alert to this when he called the 1992 referendum. And, as a master tactician, he had come to appreciate the fact that scare tactics, coupled with the support of English voters made the referendum an excellent last resort for the NP in times of political difficulty. Nine years later, de Klerk would finally bury his conservative nemesis in the third all-White referendum, employing the legislation that he had passed in 1983 as Minister of the Interior.

Interestingly, one commentator welcomed the 'no' camp's relatively good showing, hinting that it would give legitimacy to the process and demonstrate that it was not cosmetic. In Puerto Rico's 1951 vote on Commonwealth Status, Munoz Marin also noted his satisfaction with a substantial minority 'no' vote (23.5 percent), as it strengthened 'the favorable decision by showing that [the] opposition was fully and freely represented and [the] people made their own choice.' Prudence in referendum victories is at times, thus, viewed as an asset.

Partisanship and cues:
What the 1983 vote clearly demonstrated is the extent to which PFP voters took their cues from non-party elites (business leaders, academics, diplomats and editors) and defied their party. This not only highlights the importance of cue-givers in referenda, but also raises questions about the role of partisanship in referendum outcomes. The referendum literature, by and large, suggests that partisanship is an important factor in determining

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172 *Die Vaderland*, 4 November 1983.
175 *Hansard*, Thursday 1 September 1983, column 12966.
referendum results, especially if parties are united. Simon Hug and Pascal Sciarini, who suggest that the objectives behind the use of the referendum determine the salience of partisanship, provide a more refined explanation. Specifically, they argue that if voters view the referendum as 'essentially political,' and not as a vote on a policy issue, they will tend to behave in a partisan manner. Hence, they are more inclined to punish governments in controlled votes. Similarly, Denis Balsom and Ian McAllister argue that Scottish and Welsh devolution proposals were defeated in 1975 because they were viewed as the product of one party. They note that this encouraged Conservatives supporters to put party loyalty first. In all three of South Africa’s referenda partisanship was a negligible factor, especially for the liberal White voter, and the NP successfully managed to tap into its opponent’s support base, despite the fact that these were all political votes. This suggests that the NP successfully presented all three political votes as policy votes, playing down the party political aspects. Moreover, the party managed to raise the revenant of a 'no' vote.

The dynamic of the referendum:
It is also worth adding that the 1983 referendum demonstrated the dynamic evolution of its role in the party’s thinking. Initially, Botha used it in response to internal divisions, and to remove the constitution from debates within the party structures. The initial pledge was also designed to serve as a tool of electoral heresthetics, removing the proposed constitution from the 1981 elections. This move was primarily aimed at the HNP, which at the time stood to benefit from conservative disaffection. During the skewuring Botha, however, sought to use the referendum in order to prevent the split. And once the skewuring had taken place, Botha viewed the referendum as a tool to limit the fall-out from the split.

Once the partition was final and the CP a political fact, Botha viewed the referendum as a tool to address further resistance within the party (navigating the federal and provincial conferences) and as a mechanism to stunt the growth of the CP, especially

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182 Simon Hug and Pascal Sciarini, 'Referendums on European Integration. Do Institutions matter in the voters decision?' Comparative Political Studies, 33, 1, February 2000, pp. 9, 11, 26, 32.

by removing the constitutional issue from the Berge by-elections, set for 1983. The referendum thus served as a tool of reform heresthetics, in the face of a conservative backlash and un-planned for by-elections. The referendum further served as a mechanism to de-link the constitution from the party. Moreover, Botha, aware that he could secure the support of English voters, as had been the case in 1960, used the PFP’s voters to fight the CP. This was especially the case where the question was rather ambiguous and allowed the party leader to seek a wide mandate. This is perhaps the single most important lesson that de Klerk would take forward to 1992.184 The decision to deploy the referendum also reflected his increasing self-doubt about the reforms. Once the referendum date had been set, the party used the vote to re-align the party system and compensate for the loss of the CP. The PFP was set to foot the bill.

The evolution of elite objectives and motivations in referendum use, which is demonstrated in the 1983 and 1992 votes, is ignored in the referendum literature. The basis for the referendum was, however, rooted in Verwoerd’s 1960 precedent, which provided an important template for Botha. He, in turn, provided a template for de Klerk. As already argued in chapter two, F.W. de Klerk owes a huge debt to this predecessor. Botha undid many of the ideological underpinnings of Apartheid, through his reform by stealth. He also provided de Klerk with a recipe for dealing with White resistance to reform.

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184 Interview with Harold Pakendorf (9 December 2002).
Conclusion.

*Today we have closed the book on Apartheid and that chapter is finally closed. There were those who objected, somehow or another, to the fact that this was an all White referendum. I think that it sounds an element of justice that we who started this long chapter in our history were called upon to close the book on Apartheid.*

Referendum roots and early NP incumbency struggles:
The history of the referendum in White South Africa neatly corresponds with the broader citizenship debate following the establishment of the Union in 1910, and the later evolution and demise of Apartheid. Historically, the referendum primarily served the NP in its incumbency struggles, as a resource of heresthetics, initially, as an opposition party (1914-1924), and later in holding the PACT government (1924-1929) together. The motivations for embracing the referendum were clearly driven by consequential considerations, and reflected the interests of the more dominant actors in the party, especially Hertzog and the Cape NP, who were less committed to republicanism. As demonstrated, the motivations to adopt the referendum in the first decade of the party’s existence included its desire to rehabilitate its tarnished image after the 1914 rebellion, the aspiration to be 'isomorphic' with Wilsonian principles, the influence of the referendum zeitgeist at the time, and the need to forge unity between the different provincial branches of the party.

The referendum pledge was also essential if the party wished to appeal to a wider constituency. The 1921 general elections graphically demonstrated that secession, though tactically helpful in building an ethnic support base, was also, ultimately, an impediment to securing political power. The referendum critically allowed the party to assume a republican position, yet pursue a broader appeal. The pledge also provided a modicum of constructive ambiguity and consensus in the party on the constitutional issue. This was essential, for the creation of a third, Republican Party, or provincial party, would spell disaster for the NP, in a polity with a Westminster first-past-the-post electoral system. Jan Smuts and the ruling South African Party (SAP) or the United Party (UP) would be the only beneficiaries.

More importantly, the pledge that any change in the Union’s constitutional status only follows a referendum reflected Hertzog’s civic definition of White nationalism. By

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1 PV 734, F.W. de Klerk Collection, File M7/6/11 Vol 189, Speech following the announcement of the referendum result, 18 March 1992.
insisting that a change in the country constitutional status only come about on the basis of
an expression of broad popular will (a referendum), Hertzog demonstrated his
commitment to incrementalism and gradually forging a White identity by consent. Given
Hertzog's early dominance of the party, his pledge cast a 'long shadow' over policy
formulations and tactical thinking on the constitutional issue.

The NP's early tactical thinking on the referendum was graphically reflected in the
party's response to efforts to incorporate Southern Rhodesia in 1922. The demand for a
referendum allowed Hertzog to paint Smuts as someone who was not serving the interests
of the volk, but rather those of mining capital and Imperial Britain. And, indirectly,
Winston Churchill and the Colonial Office contributed to the introduction of the
referendum, by imposing it upon the people of Southern Rhodesia. The spread of the
referendum from Europe and North America to the 'third world,' through coercive
isomorphism, was not unique to South Africa.

In the case of the promise to stage a flag referendum in 1926, the decision was
consistent with what the literature on controlled referenda suggests. Both the coalition and
the NP were divided on this salient issue, and the existing mechanisms to resolve internal
differences proved futile. Moreover, a referendum was viewed as a 'lightening rod,' to
remove the issue from electoral politics, and take the wind out of the opposition's sails.
Though the vote was, ultimately, not deployed the first decade in opposition and the flag
question ensured that the referendum was further accepted in the political repertoire of the
NP. The referendum had taken one step closer towards becoming a 'constitutional
convention' for addressing symbolic and constitutional issues that divided the two
communities.

The break with Hertzogism:
After the 'Fusion' of 1934, the reduced and lustrated NP returned to the opposition, and the
party assumed a far more republican posture. In doing so, Malan used the republican
standard to differentiate his party from the UP, which captured the middle ground.
Moreover, Malan depended on the republican elements from the old NP, who became
increasingly prominent outside of the Cape, as the moderate Free State and Transvaal
leadership followed Hertzog. The break with the old principles of Hertzogism heralded the
strengthening of the ethnic variant of Afrikaner nationalism, which embraced an organic
conception of nationhood. Despite this, the Purified National Party (GNP) continued to
view the referendum as a vital tactical tool in its incumbency struggles until 1939. It is
important to recall that Malan’s ability to maintain the former NP position was a direct result of the Cape’s dominance in the new party. Moreover, it also confirms that Hertzog’s traditional policy had served to accommodate the Cape, which was less republican, in the old NP. The referendum pledge also served to provide the party with a modicum of constructive ambiguity on a divisive issue.

The commitment to a referendum on constitutional change was only abandoned after the controversial war vote in 1939. The trauma of the war declaration led to Afrikaner disillusionment with party politics and made incumbency struggles, the referendum included, seem irrelevant. The struggle over the referendum between the Cape leadership and the radical republicans – from 1935-1936 – provides valuable insights into how the party machine viewed the tactical role of the referendum. It was viewed as an indispensable form of electoral heresthetics designed to enable the NP to reach out to urban voters. After the War vote and failure to unify with Hertzog, Malan was unable to deflect the radical wing of the party. Besides, outbidding radical contenders – like the Ossewbrandwag – required embracing radicalism. As a result, the early 1940s saw the party totally break with Hertzog’s prescription.

Paving the way to Nationalist victory and hegemony:
After the party had seen off the challenges to its role as representative of the volk, and once the phantasm of a Nazi victory had evaporated, it began to plot its route to capturing political power. Tactically, Malan understood that ultimate electoral success against the UP, notwithstanding the successful consolidation of Afrikaner support, would require the support of the non-republican Afrikaners (especially urban voters) and disaffected English speakers. The republic would have to play second fiddle to Apartheid, hence, the referendum’s centrality in party’s post-1943 election incumbency struggles.

The referendum pledge on a republic was not only instrumental in the party’s struggle for incumbency in 1948, but also in its maintenance. The surprise success of the NP in these elections reinforced the sense amongst the Cape party that its republican prescription and its focus on Apartheid were correct. Furthermore, the tenuous nature of the victory buttressed the argument for caution. Malan – to the chagrin of the northern Nationalists – was quite explicit in this regard, in the lead up to the 1953 elections. In this regard, Malan again emulated Hertzog, who in 1926 placed discriminatory labour market legislation ahead of the flag issue. A general election on the republican issue in 1953 might have allowed the UP to regain lost seats.
Thus the referendum pledges on the republic from 1946 to 1953 were important in laying the platform for, and consolidation of, power. But the frequent use of the referendum as a tool of electoral heresthetics also tied the party to a referendum on a republic. In effect, the NP was unable to sidestep the referendum. Straitjacketed by its past tactical pledges, the debate now shifted to how best to obtain the republic. This was the nub of Transvaal-Cape tensions after 1948, and the 'painless' approach, advocated by the Cape, emerged victorious. The key consequence was a decision to separate the republican and Commonwealth membership issues.

Malan's dithering on the republican question also suggests that he, like Hertzog, was at heart a gradualist, perhaps even a reluctant republican. Moreover, Malan recognised that a republic, introduced by a simple parliamentary majority, at a time when the NP did not yet enjoy an absolute majority of support amongst all voters, would lack legitimacy.

Creating the Apartheid republic:
As the NP consolidated its hold on power through the 1953 and 1958 elections, the need to expedite the republican issue increasingly came to the fore. J.G. Strijdom and H.F. Verwoerd viewed Apartheid and a Christian-national republic as consummative, and not conflicting, objectives.² The two, thus, inverted Malan's position, arguing that cutting ties with Britain would force English speakers to support Apartheid.³ Despite their neo-Fichtean misgivings, Strijdom and Verwoerd realised that they would need to co-opt English speakers in a post-colonial era, as Afrikaners could not go it alone. The unavoidable referendum, therefore, soon became a means to engineer a realignment of White politics — between those who subscribed to a 'conservative' and 'Liberalistic' approach on the race issue.⁴ The Afrikaans press and Broederbond academics echoed this theme.⁵

Hence, The Star lamented that Verwoerd had 'bent his energies and those of his administration towards unifying the Whites in a single pattern of political thought namely

² Verwoerd speaking at Heidelberg, Die Burger, 6 October 1958.
his own concept of separate development. I submit that Verwoerd viewed the referendum as an exercise to institutionalise Apartheid and push it over the ideological threshold. The referendum, thus, moved from a resource in incumbency struggles – until 1958 – to being that of a 'war of position.'

Prior to the referendum, Verwoerd despatched a letter to White voters, which is instructive in understanding his objectives. In his appeal, he noted that only a republic would enable the country to give 'full attention' to developing a 'safe future for our White population.' Playing on White fears, at a time of de-colonisation, Verwoerd warned that if South Africa’s Whites did not 'take this step now,' they would endure the suffering that Whites had in other parts of Africa. And writing to Thomas Boydell, a former Labour Party leader, after the referendum, Verwoerd concluded his letter by noting that 'together we must succeed in establishing our White South Africa firmly, while safeguarding too the future of our non-European groups.'

The campaign was, thus, about ensuring 'that the republic remains a White republic.' And like his predecessor, Strijdom, Verwoerd was also convinced that a republic was essential for White survival. It was for this reason that he charged that the opponents of a republic wanted a multiracial state. And, it was for this reason that Jan Steytler and the Progressive Party warned of the creation of the 'wrong republic.' Interestingly, Gary Allighan suggests that the opposition gravely erred by converting the referendum into a confidence vote in Verwoerd’s policies, as he was thus able to view the 'yes' vote as a mandate for his programme. The outcome of the referendum was also hegemonic in that the republican victory served to ensconce the NP and weaken its opposition, as predicted. And the referendum cemented Verwoerd’s leadership, thereby allowing him to take the offensive against dissident moderates who opposed his policies regarding the Coloureds. Besides, Verwoerd’s success heralded the introduction of the

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6 The Star. 3 October 1961.
7 PV 93, HF Verwoerd Collection, File 1/45/3/1, HF Verwoerd letter to voters. 21 September 1960.
8 PV 93, HF Verwoerd Collection, File 1/30/1/8.
9 Die Burger. 20 October 1958.
referendum mechanism in the political repertoire of the NP. A template had been created and an institution for dealing with seminal constitutional issues inaugurated.

The unravelling of Apartheid hegemony:
The republican referendum, however, also proved to be a double-edged sword for the NP. A consequence of attaining the republic was that the party lost its unifying project. Instead, its focus shifted to separate development and the preservation of 'White South Africa from the forces of Communism through White unity and resolve.' Botha perfected the politics of security, which he began under Verwoerd, serving as Minister of Defence. And the NP leadership, no doubt, viewed the cold war as an opportunity to recast the terms of the South African conflict, especially in an age when there was increasing intolerance of Apartheid. This opportunism is analogous to the way in which the Israeli or the Russian governments have re-framed their policies of dealing with the Palestinian and Chechnyan challenges to their domination, as part of a wider struggle against the scourge of Islamic terror, after 11 September 2001.

This move to re-frame the Apartheid project, in turn, made the crucial clash between hardliners and soft-liners possible, especially after Verwoerd’s assassination. For, the politics of survival also produced a need to amend Apartheid and do away with its more brutal components, and accentuated the imperative of 'winning hearts and minds.' Both implied a break with Verwoerdian orthodoxy. This process was begun under Vorster, and carried forward by Botha who increasingly needed to cater to the verligte wing of the party and also co-opt Coloureds and Indians when it became apparent that Whites could not, 'go it alone.' This break implied a costly struggle, in which P.W. Botha would also employ the referendum.

Breaking with Verwoerd:
Many consider PW Botha’s role, and that of Chris Heunis, as instrumental in paving the way for the country’s later reforms. The importance of these reforms is that they were

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essentially ideological, and, as a result, de Klerk 'inherited a half full glass.'\textsuperscript{18} Brian Pottinger argues that the 1983 constitution 'established, irrevocably, that South Africa's future lay along the road of inclusive, and not exclusive, citizenship and political structures.'\textsuperscript{19} And, Hermann Giliomee adds that whilst the two new chambers were relatively powerless, the new Parliament 'irrevocably undermined the symbolism of White supremacy. Unexpectedly it also materially contributed to the destruction of two of the three pillars of the Afrikaner's power: their own unity and Black political fragmentation.\textsuperscript{20} Responding at the time, the \textit{Herstigte Nasionale Party} (HNP) viewed the new constitution as anchored in the 'ideology of departing from discrimination,'\textsuperscript{21} whilst the CP viewed it as the 'destruction of White sovereignty.'\textsuperscript{22}

Such assessments are at variance with the claims of Botha's critics, at the time. They viewed his reforms as an attempt to merely modify the existing model.\textsuperscript{23} Nevertheless, while it was probably not Botha's intention, the ultimate consequences of his reforms (and the 1983 referendum) were radical. As Steven Friedman notes, the sacrifice of what were perceived to be marginal issues, in order to preserve the core, only 'succeeded to expose it [the core of \textit{Apartheid}] to further attack.' And once the NP had begun its strategic retreat, it was 'never to be undone.'\textsuperscript{24}

Given that the NP was still such a powerful party prior to the 1982 \textit{skeuring}, and given the overwhelming imperative of ensuring party and Afrikaner unity, the eventual split is testimony to the level of resistance to the reform process within the party and Afrikanerdom. \textit{Skeuring} also proves that the existing means of resolving conflicts within the party had failed. Writing at the time, Willie Esterhuyse argued that the NP 'could not afford to move in a more dramatic way on the constitutional issue,' cautioning that too much of a reform would only benefit the right.\textsuperscript{25}

With hindsight then, the 1983 referendum was the seminal event in the NP's retreat. It expanded the demos, in order to co-opt so-called Coloureds and Indians. And, in

\textsuperscript{18} Interview with Ken Owen (10 December 2002).
\textsuperscript{19} Brian Pottinger, \textit{The Imperial President. P.W. Botha and the First 10 Years} (Johannesburg, 1988), p. 111.
\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Die Transvaaler}, 19 April 1983.
making this qualitative break with his predecessors, Botha jettisoned the conservative and exclusivist wing of his party, freeing up the reformists. This development, according to de Klerk, was 'liberating' for the NP. As Adam Przeworski notes, 'a regime begins to crack when members of the ruling block go outside for support.' P.W. Botha cracked the NP regime, and thrust it well over the ideological threshold through his referendum. This was his great contribution to the later making of a democratic polity.

De Klerk's lessons in appropriateness:

At Ladysmith, Botha promised a referendum in an effort to remove the reform debate from the party's provincial and federal structures, in order to maintain party unity, and in order to deny the HNP an opportunity to make gains in the 1981 general election. His stratagem, however, failed in the former regard. And, once *skeuring* was inevitable, Botha skilfully used the referendum, at first, in order to play down the significance of the split. Next, he sought to check the CP's growth, by removing the constitutional issue from a string of by-elections in mid 1983 (the 'Battle of the Berge'), that could potentially give momentum the newly formed CP. The referendum was, thus, used to 'take the wind out of the opposition's sails.'

Once the *skeuring* was a fait-accompli, Botha's preoccupation shifted to capping the CP's growth and realigning White politics in order to compensate for the loss of CP supporters. Botha also wished to demonstrate the extent to which the existing electoral system distorted the CP's strength. In order to do so, he needed the votes of the English speakers. And as a graduate of the 1960 referendum he was well aware that only a referendum would allow English voters to break with their 'sectional loyalties.'

By the time of the referendum campaign, Botha began to view the referendum as a means of re-aligning White politics and weakening the PFP. This was to be done by attacking its leader. Strategically, van Zyl Slabbert was seen as no less of a threat than Andries Treurnicht. What the split and the referendum, therefore, did was to make English-speaking White voters relevant to the NP, and supporters of reform *Apartheid.* Skeuring also, however, transformed the NP into a bourgeois party, speeding up the demise of its ideological component.

28 The Rand Daily Mail. 28 October 1983.
29 The Rand Daily Mail. 5 September 1983.
Botha’s reasoning for turning to the referendum was two-fold. One, was his sincere belief that the reforms were, at least, as important as the creation of the republic. Hence, in his mind he drew a parallel with Verwoerd. His second reason was his belief that a situation in which the leader deviated from the policy of his predecessors required a referendum. This was his subjective interpretation of the 1960 referendum, and Verwoerd’s decision to proceed with a simple majority, which broke with the pledges of his predecessors. This was Botha’s logic of appropriateness. This was why Botha viewed a referendum as the appropriate solution for the particular problem at hand; he had deviated from the 1977 proposals.

For the party’s new Transvaal leader, F.W. de Klerk, the referendum was primarily a resource in an incumbency struggle - coping with messy by-elections, like the three produced by the 'Battle of the Berge'- in his province. But Botha also demonstrated to de Klerk how the referendum set a ceiling on the CP’s real strength. Above all, Botha showed de Klerk how to construct a reform coalition, against the conservatives, who benefited from the Westminster system and its distortions.

De Klerk’s referendum:
During the 1983 campaign the government’s media insinuated that the referendum was a means to an end, and not an end in itself.\textsuperscript{30} Attaining that end became increasingly difficult, and Botha’s early zest for reform was replaced by dithering, and divisions between hardliners and soft-liners over the full implications of a 'step in the right direction,' paralysed the party.

By the time that de Klerk had become party leader and State President in late 1989, mounting domestic and internal pressures demanded a serious and swift reform effort. As Roelf Meyer notes, de Klerk 'was aware that the greatest risk he could take at the time was to take no risk at all.'\textsuperscript{31} And even before the collapse of the Berlin Wall, de Klerk had decided to embark on a bold five-year long transition. His intrepidity was only strengthened by the collapse of Communism.

One of de Klerk’s key working assumptions, in embarking upon this attempt at a managed transition, was that he could not afford another general election, once he had begun his reforms. He further assumed that his control over a blitz process would produce a favourable outcome – a consociational democracy – and allow him to outwit the ANC.

\textsuperscript{30} Die Burger. 9 November 1983.
Successfully implementing a swift transition, however, required that de Klerk placate Whites and operate with a free hand. He did so by giving them a sense that they had ultimate control over the process. De Klerk, who had sagaciously anticipated the CP’s response to his reforms (claiming that de Klerk did not have a mandate and undermining his legitimacy), did so by promising a referendum at the outset.

A series of unanticipated by-elections, however, provided his opponents with ample opportunities to undermine his ability to control the process, and increasingly eroded his public legitimacy as a reformer. Having previously played the reform game against the CP, and being a 'self-reflective' actor, the veteran of the 'Battle of the Berge' applied Botha’s post skewing solution to his by-election problems. De Klerk applied his logic of appropriateness to his context, as Botha had previously done. The fact that the referendum was part of the NP’s repertoire, and the fact that Botha had used one in his reforms, did not ordain that de Klerk would use one. Previous use did, however, make it more likely that de Klerk apply a tested response to a familiar problem. De Klerk knew that a referendum was a 'loaded dice.' It was safer than another general election in giving legitimacy to his reform process. But the referendum served as more than an incumbency struggle, it blocked a round of potentially disastrous elections under the existing dispensation.

Once he had secured the mandate, and ended White politics and incumbency struggles, de Klerk, squandered it by overplaying his hand at CODESA. Despite his ill-judged behaviour, the referendum was still one of his finest political moments. Ironically, de Klerk who played a masterful game against the CP was less successful in his game against the ANC. Having never negotiated with the ANC, or a representative Black leader, the NP was hopelessly ill prepared and arrogantly over-confident. Though the NP won the battle against the CP; they lost the war for a consociational democracy.

Lessons from South Africa:
This study has demonstrated that both Botha and Verwoerd displayed both consequential and appropriate behaviour in their respective decisions to use referenda. As suggested, understanding Botha is seminal to understanding de Klerk’s use. Botha’s behaviour, on the other hand, cannot be understood in isolation from Verwoerd’s use of the referendum, and an analysis of the origins of the referendum in NP repertoire.

The referendum owes its introduction into South African politics to the NP’s incumbency struggles (1914-1924, 1934-1948) and its efforts to retain incumbency (1948-
1958). Throughout, the referendum primarily served as a resource of electoral heresthetics. Over time, the notion that a referendum on the republic was handy at election time, probably unfounded, became a praxis. And, having used the referendum pledge so often, it later became increasingly difficult for the NP not to hold one. The referendum also, in part, owes its introduction to earlier efforts by Afrikaner nationalism to be 'isomorphic' with Woodrow Wilson's ideas of popular sovereignty, and Britain's use of the referendum in Rhodesia in 1922. Moreover, both Hertzog and Malan were actually reluctant republicans, who supported the idea for tactical reasons. Their tactical use of republicanism was balanced by the referendum pledge. Both leaders had the ability to impose a referendum upon the party, and their legacy cast a long shadow over future behaviour. In the case of Malan, the dominance of the Cape machine after Fusion was critical.

This historical agency laid the platform for the later emergence of the referendum as the legitimate and appropriate manner to deal with particular issues in White politics. Existing accounts of controlled referendum use, like Bjorklund's account do bear out in South Africa, as this research suggests. But they only partially help us to understand the motivations for embracing the referendum, and though party feuds are important, they do not tell the entire story of referendum use.

This research makes several contributions to our understanding of referendum use. It also makes an important endowment to the historical institutionalist research effort, by demonstrating how de Klerk's behaviour tied together both logics of behaviour - consequential and appropriate - as the literature would suggest.

This study establishes that, once used, a referendum convention is created, thereby demonstrating the salience of path dependency in referendum use. It also shows how the referendum becomes a tool in the political repertoire of a party, and how, over time, it becomes associated with certain issues. In the case of the NP and de Klerk it came to be viewed as a resource in navigating reform. Moreover, this probe suggests that politicians cannot easily ignore the precedent of previous referendum use.

One further insight that this research provides is how the elite perceptions of the referendum evolve over time, in response to political developments. Beyond this evolution, within a particular struggle and context (as graphically shown by the 1983 and 1992 referenda), a party's understanding of the referendum (i.e. its 'logic of appropriateness') and its view of the referendum's tactical role evolves over time. In the case of the NP it evolved from a tactical tool in opposition, to an adroit stratagem in
government at the time of the flag bill. Later it served as a tool to balance a narrow republican focus and the exigencies of ensuring a broader appeal at election time. Once in power it was seen a critical to entrenching NP power. After the first referendum, it came to be viewed as a resource in navigating political reform, away from orthodox Apartheid. Later still, it became a resource in the quest for a managed transition.

The study also demonstrates how particular interests — especially of Hertzog and the Cape — imposed the notion of broad popular will on the party. This focus on the politics of the referendum within political parties — whilst in opposition and power — is an oft-neglected aspect. Pre-occupied with science, referendum scholars have often ignored the naked politics behind the referendum. For the referendum is, ultimately, a tool of party and machine politics. It serves to navigate internal differences, sell policies and fudge differences. Moreover, it is a resource in electoral heresthetics. It allows parties to pursue policies that have a narrow focus, yet appeal to a wider audience at election time. Moreover, a referendum pledge (or a demand for one), serves to embarrass competitors, hinting that they do not serve the interests of the people.

What also emerges from this study is that pledges to make referenda are no less important than the decision to use one. And, such pledges (as a part of incumbency struggles, or wars of manoeuvre and position), often lead to referenda. Once frequently used as a resource of electoral heresthetics, it is hard for politicians to jettison the referendum pledge.

The research also verifies the existence of a 'leadership effect' South Africa's 1992 referendum. De Klerk took full advantage of his popularity, and that of the reform government, in securing an overwhelming 'yes' result. Moreover, the NP used fear of a 'no' result to great effect in all three referenda. The three South African referenda, therefore, also provide further evidence that referenda, that have the appearance of being substantial policy issues, allow governments to undermine partisanship, and secure support for their initiatives from opposition voters. In 1992 de Klerk not only got full support from the DP's voters, but he also appears to have got CP voters to cast their lot with his reforms.

The research also enhances our understanding of the role of referenda in political transitions. In particular, it highlights the role of the referendum in F.W. de Klerk's quest for a managed transition, and his attempt to outsmart the ANC through a swift transition, whilst at the same time outmanoeuvring the White conservative opposition. De Klerk's referendum proves just how handy a well timed vote can be in 'de-certifying' extremists and weakening their cause. Like de Gaulle, de Klerk harnessed a referendum in his war of
manoeuvre against those opposed to his efforts to extricate South Africa from *Apartheid*. Moreover, the 1992 vote shows how leaders, leading complex and controversial processes, can articulate support for such process, especially where the electoral system distorts in favour of their opponent. The referendum, as de Klerk notes, serves as a 'magnifying glass,' and gets voters to set aside sectoral interests, in order to pass judgement on issues that divide their societies. Moreover, I have established how de Klerk – a self-reflective actor – benefited from Botha’s reforms (which took whites well over the ideological threshold), and from his own involvement in Botha’s reforms. Having previously played the reform game against the CP, de Klerk got his referendum and transition politics right.

This study also provides a fascinating insight into the use of the referendum in a wider effort to construct and de-construct boundaries: in this case racial and constitutional border of the demos. One final contribution that this research makes is the typology for ethno-national referenda, which allows for a more nuanced understanding of how referenda impact upon ethno-national questions. Referenda, as we have seen, are an important resources in fashioning and dismantling constructs of society, borders and nation.
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