Postmodernity

and the Decline of the Nation-State

(A British Case-Study)

Fariba Salehi

(A PhD Thesis)

The European Institute
London School of Economics and Political Sciences
Thesis Abstract

This thesis is a critical examination of the fundamental transformations that late capitalist societies have undergone in the last few decades and their impact on the modern institution of the nation-state. With the subsumption of industrial capitalism by a digital and informational capitalism; with the advent of global computerised network systems, software packages, satellite telecommunications, the internet, the website, and the simultaneous decline of national industries, 'national' societies have visibly changed in the last few decades. Their borders are more salient; their 'national' governments are less in charge of the dynamics of their 'national' economies; their sovereignties are threatened by 'the euro' and 'the global'; their cultures are exposed to the uninterrupted bombardment of adverts, images, signs and suggestive strategies of multinational companies for a higher level of disposable consumption; their distinctive 'national' commonalties are confronted by the media-led hyperreal culture of global consumerism and their distinct sense of time and place in history is blurred. These transformations are conceptualised and analysed as a paradigmatic shift from Modernity to postmodernity.

Furthermore the institution of the nation-state is proposed and reasoned to be perceived as an institution of Modernity in which the primordial need for bonding and belonging is crystallised. The conjunction of the conditions of Modernity with the primordial need for belonging allowed the modern ideology of state nationalism to masterfully claim eternity for the nation-state itself. This thesis argues for the temporality of the nation-state while preserving the notion of a primordial and transverse mode of collective being based on vernacular cultures and ethnicities. The temporality of the nation-state is empirically substantiated in this thesis in reference to the twin postmodern forces of 'globalisation' and 'localisation' which work to denationalise collective identities by rendering their 'national' borders obsolete.
Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor Professor Anthony D. Smith whose intellectual challenge, advice and support enlightened my thesis and never allowed me to ignore the need for the intimacy and familiarity of belonging to 'an ethnie' to survive the cold profanity of 'the global'. As an immigrant I could have forgotten it. I would also like to thank my co-supervisor Dr. Alan Swingewood for his time, insightful comments and directions. Last, but not least, I must thank my colleague Mr. Kaveh Kalantari for his untiring support in teaching me how to draw computerised graphical representation of my data.

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"(Capitalism) cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered forms was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from earlier ones. All fixed, fast frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned...." (Preface to Manifesto of the Communist Party, Marx and Engels 1888).

At the turn of the third millennium, Marx's vision of the essence of capitalism and its impact on human relationships still makes great sense. As capitalism enters its latest postmodern micro-electronic phase, and its flexible accumulation strategies and digital codes dictate a new spatial and temporal organisation of social and economic life, the modern socio-economic boundaries and epistemic paradigms are slowly replaced and rendered obsolete. As humanity is globally and instantaneously exposed to the powerful suggestions of the global capitalist marketing and advertising strategies, their solidities 'melt into air' and their distinct ties and identities are 'agitated' and/or 'profaned' by an 'uninterrupted disturbance' of the global economy and its consumerist culture.

The post-industrial phase of capitalism or postmodernity poses fundamental questions regarding the meaning of individual and collective identity and the problematic of their representation. One of the greatest platforms of representation of collective identity is the national-state which has powerfully controlled the administration of a 'national' identity and the delegation of 'national' groups such as armies, politicians and policy-makers since the 18th century.

However in recent years the 'sovereignty' and 'homogeneity' of the national-state has been agitated and threatened by global economic and cultural imperatives. The
challenge is multidimensional. On the one hand, the need for a constantly expanding market for its products drives capitalism over the whole surface of the globe, accelerates its geographical or spatial expansion beyond the national boundaries and gives insight into the logic behind globalisation. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere and establish connections everywhere. The need for creating and/or retaining its local affiliations provides another insight into the capitalist logic of decentralisation and localisation. This is reflected in the postmodern sensibility of 'think globally, act locally'. The unity and sovereignty of the national-state is continuously pulled apart by this twin force, while simultaneously the structures of postmodernity erode those of Modernity on which the nation-state rose and reached the peak of its power from the 18th century to the mid 20th century.

On the other hand, 'fact and fiction', 'truth and falsehood', 'genuineness and forgery' and 'value and non-value' become unverifiable and fuse together as virtual reality to characterise the fast growing postmodern world of the Internet. Once again all modern divisions and boundaries collapse in the new social sphere of the internet and the website becomes the new locus of emerging and/or forging new identities and relationships in a transborder fashion. The internet provides a new international space and a global board in which all sorts of connections and exchanges take place. National boundaries and identities lose their anchorage point in place and time and sink into the global simultaneity and anonymity of the digital sign.

Furthermore, in the new millennium the techniques of cloning and genetic engineering will remove the last frontier of genetic identity and a conception of 'blood and belonging', which allegedly enlightened humanity of their inherent racial and ethnic distinctions throughout the modern period. The horizon for a genetically engineered and cloned identity is vast. It also is potentially highly manipulable by the western elite in the scientific processes of selection of the ideal physical and genetic type. Scientific innovations have already made it possible for humans to decide the physical and genetic make-up of the next generation and interfere in the natural
process of ageing. A preferred combination of intelligence and physical type can be created and the ones less preferred can be genetically cleansed. In this process, the natural evolutionary path of genetic determination can be overcome and replaced by artificially engineered and cloned identities.

These developments will have serious consequences for individual and collective identities and their conceptualisation in the third millennium. Authorities that currently represent individual and collective identities such as the national-state have come under increasing pressure to abandon some of their sovereign power to meet the requirements of the global, the euro, and the ethnic, and also in order to deal with global issues such as the environment, poverty, over-population, AIDS, genetic engineering, and war-mongering.

The Argument

The nation-state has been the dominant platform for representing individual and collective identities throughout the modern period. In the name of 'national identity' and in the official language and ideology of 'nationalism', modern states have legitimised their policies of segregating or conglomerating and regulating diverse human collectivities into 'national' boundaries, and in delegating 'national' groups. The underlying assumption of modern 'nationalism' is that human collectivities are distinctly separable along ancestral and sometimes racial divides which if combined with some other shared attributes of a community such as language, religion, ethnicity and territory, could then naturally be crystallised in the form of a nation-state if the collectivity so wishes. Hence according to 'nationalism' all distinct collectivities share a fundamental homogeneity and unity that can be expressed in the form of a 'nation', and all 'nations' have the right to self-rule and sovereignty by creating their own territorial 'state'. It follows from a nationalist perspective that the maintenance and/or building of a homogenous, united and sovereign 'nation-state' is
always explicable with reference to a shared past and rooted in some primordial or perennial need.

The ideology of nationalism offers a teleological and functionalist explanation that is based on a circle of assumptions that all nation-states are the result of an ethnic past; all those ethnic groups who have not made their own distinct nation-states have not really wanted it seriously enough; and all the ethnic groups that have become extinct could not properly utilise their shared values to create a viable nation.

Nationalism confuses the unmediated and transverse truth of ‘ethnic identity’ with a ‘national identity’ whose embodiment in the form of the nation-state is mediated from above by the colonial, imperial and modern processes of nation-state building. I will argue that there are fundamental differences between an ethnic collectivity and its distinct cultural and historical attributes, and the nation-state. The main differences are:

- An ethnic community is bonded together at the grassroots levels by a vernacular culture. A nation-state, on the other hand, is a political institution and it is held together by the administrative power of the modern state from above.

- An ethnic community can take the form of a nation-state, but in most cases there is no one to one relationship between them. Most ethnic groups do not have their own nation-states and most existing nation-states do not represent all the ethnic groups that live in them equally. Many ethnic groups such as the Kurds are divided among several nation-states and most national-states conglomerate several ethnic groups in a hierarchical relationship of power. Hence a nation-state cannot be explained merely in terms of a shared ethnic past.

- An ethnic collectivity is temporally transverse, whereas the nation-state is a modern entity whose basic definitions originate from the French Revolution of 1789 and the
Enlightenment which mark the start of the era of Modernity.

- It follows that if the conditions of Modernity change, the conditions of the existence of the nation-state will change too.

Against the basic nationalistic assumptions that all ethnic groups could evolve into a 'nation-state', it is argued below that the nation-state is a historically temporal and spatial form of representation of a collectivity, and hence can be subjected to the transcending and mortalising passage of time. With the postmodern processes of globalisation and decentralisation, there are serious impediments for the nation-state to effectively represent the sovereignty and unity of 'its' people as it did throughout the modern period.

The substantiation of this argument constitutes the main task of this thesis. Three fundamental attributes of homogeneity, unity and sovereignty of the nation-state have been chosen through a pilot study to examine whether the nation-state has declined in the context of postmodernity or not. The question tackled by this thesis is "can the sovereignty, unity and homogeneity of the nation-state survive the structural transformations of late capitalism"? If this research finds no changes in the perceptions of 'homogeneity', 'unity' and 'sovereignty' of the nation-state in the context of postmodernity, then the primordial roots of the nation-state asserted by nationalism are confirmed. And if the reverse is found, the temporality and hence mortality of the nation-state is substantiated.

This thesis, therefore, has set itself the twin task of firstly conceptualising the 'postmodern' phenomena and analysing the fundamental transformations that have resulted from the micro-electronic and digital revolution which characterise the structures of postmodernity. This is to show how Modernity can be structurally differentiated from postmodernity. Secondly by locating the institution of the nation-state in the structural and epistemic framework of Modernity, this thesis intends to
find out whether the nation-state will sustain itself as a unit of representation of individual and collective identity in the context of postmodernity.

It is important to add here that although this thesis proposes a linkage between postmodernity as the structural facets of late capitalism, postmodernism as the ideological, artistic and aesthetic expressions of late capitalism and postmodern theory as epistemic contemplations of late capitalism, it only concentrates on postmodernity. A full elaboration of the proposed linkage is not the intention of this research. The aim is to show the decline of the nation-state under the conditions of postmodernity, and the need to focus on this central discussion together with the pressure of time and space to expand the discussion in other directions, made me reflect on the linkage between digital capitalism and changes in epistemology, politics, ideology and culture only schematically.

There is another point I wish to make here. There is now a vast literature on the postmodern phenomena, and I have had to be highly selective in choosing only those books and articles which have a crucial importance and relevance to this thesis. I have not included many interesting books and articles in this area which do not have an immediate bearing on my discussion. Limited time and space also constrained me to demonstrate the results of my research in reference to other countries and I have had to conduct my research in reference to a single case-study: Britain.

**Organisation of the thesis**

My examination of these problems is comprised of a theoretical and an empirical part. There are five chapters in the theoretical part and one extended chapter together with four appendices in the empirical part. In the theoretical part the thesis does two things. Firstly it locates the institution of the nation-state in the context of Modernity and in doing so the temporality and spatiality of the phenomenon is established. Secondly it shows how the structures of Modernity are being subsumed by those of
postmodernity under the conditions of micro-electronic and digital capitalism. The theoretical conclusion of Part One is that as the modern contexts on which the nation-state rose, are being transformed by the global imperatives, the institution of the nation-state will weaken and slowly decline as a ‘sovereign’ unit of representation of an allegedly ‘united’ and ‘homogenous’ collectivity.

The second part of this thesis examines empirically the above theoretical suppositions. This time no conceptual and abstract analysis is offered, but the aim is to empirically ‘observe’ what is impervious to theoretical reasoning: subjectivity. The focus is on the feelings and perceptions of the people of the nation-state regarding their ‘national identity’ expressed in the concepts of homogeneity, unity and sovereignty. The aim of the empirical part is to find out if what people sense about their identity in the context of postmodernity has any level of correspondence to our theoretical hypotheses.

On this basis the theoretical part moves largely on a global canvass whereas the empirical part concentrates on a national canvass. The linkage should be clear. In the conceptual framework of the theoretical part I attempt to differentiate between the structures of modernity and postmodernity in order to show the subsumption of the former by the latter, and how the modern grounds on which the ‘national’ was originally formed, now are agitated and disturbed by the twin forces of globalisation and decentralisation. In the empirical part, however, the thesis examines the extent of the agitation and disturbance of the solidity of ‘national identity’ in the subjective realm.

**Part One: Theory**

Chapter One is a ground clearing chapter which defines the term *postmodern* in its multiple applications. The *postmodern phenomena* are diverse and the term postmodern is used in social and cultural debates of recent years to signify almost anything from McDonaldisation of the world to the banality of the simulated
televisual representation of a hyper-reality; from post-enlightenment epistemology to the abolition of scientism and meta-narratives; from celebration of cult religions, Islamic Fundamentalism, homosexual politics, intuitive power, the god within, science-fiction, the findings of Quantum Physics, the quark in the atom (which has no objectivity, but determines the behaviour of the atom), the notion of 'difference' to the abandonment of 'fixed categories and hierarchies', 'certainty', and 'a sense of destination' in artistic productions; from computerisation and flexible accumulation thesis to satellite telecommunication and media controlled consumerist society. The list is long and the range is wide.

Chapter one proposes a typology of 'postmodern phenomena' in order to clarify the researcher's use and definition of the term 'postmodern' throughout this work. Furthermore, Chapter One paves the way for specifying how the nation-state is analysed in the light of a wide range of 'postmodern phenomena'. Five different and mutually inclusive applications of the term 'postmodern' have been proposed and defined.

Chapter Two moves away from all the definitions that chapter one provides in order to establish the other important concern of this thesis, that of defining the nation-state. These definitions then meet in chapter three and onwards to be subjected to theoretical interrogations in finding out what kind of a relationship exists between the postmodern phenomena and the nation-state.

Chapter Two argues that the nation-state is a modern phenomenon whose political and territorial unity is woven together and reinforced by a powerful 'national' subjectivity and imagination of distinctiveness, antiquity and unity. The nation-state is proposed to be perceived as a dominant container in which old and new forces that shape human collective identities meet to unfold in a 'national' form. The modernity of the essential parameters of the nation-state such as its territorial and political congruence, citizenship, the print industry, the epistemology of the
Enlightenment combine to educate 'people' to the belief that 'we' are eternally a 'national we'; 'collective distinctiveness' is permanently a 'national distinctiveness' and 'them' is perpetually a 'national them'. Hence through the processes of nationalisation of culture, the 'ethnic' and the 'folk' are taught to be equivalent and even synonymous to the 'national'. In the same way modern concepts such as national sovereignty, homogeneity and unity are used by the national-states as ontological and indisputable attributes of any legitimate collectivity as if they are pre-given and timeless attributes of a people. I will argue that such misconceived equivalencies can only be attained through the implementation of power by the modern education system and the standardisation of a national identity by the national-state, and that the nation-state is only a spatial and temporal embodiment of a collectivity which uses the modern language of nationalism to claim antiquity.

I have attempted to synthesise the work of a number of significant scholars in the field such as Elie Kedourie, Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, Eric Hobsbawm and Anthony Smith to arrive at a new definition of the nation-state, because I believe that if their contributions are combined, we will be able to have a more comprehensive understanding of the nature of the phenomenon in discussion. The rationale behind this synthesis is that the nation-state cannot be only an objective modern phenomenon, nor can it reside purely on a common past and history. Past and present, subjectivity and objectivity are interwoven in both the 'performative' and 'pedagogical' discourses of nationhood. On this basis chapter two offers a new definition of the nation-state.

As soon as the nation-state is defined and asserted as a modern representative of collective identity and a power vehicle for separating 'us' and 'them', it can be

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1 By performative nation I mean the nation that unfolds and performs itself in its daily life or the diachronic nation that lives itself through the passage of time and through its daily interactions. By pedagogical nation I mean the nation that is synchronically taught by the education system, that is the nation that learns itself from lectures and books. Also see Homi Bhabha's Nation and Narration (1990, Ch. 16).
subjected to postmodern scrutiny, critique and deconstruction. This is the aim of Chapter Three. Chapter Three provides a model of a postmodern critique of the nation-state by deconstructing the nationalistic narratives of the nation-state, and replacing them with a postmodern account in which the definitions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ are hybrid, ambivalent and mutually inclusive.

However in deciphering Homi Bhabha’s postmodern critique of the institution of the nation-state, the chapter also provides a critique of postmodern theory by stating that no postmodern theory can adequately enlighten us of the essence of any phenomenon unless the analysis conceptualises, includes and comes to terms with the biggest meta-narrative of our time, capitalism. I have argued that postmodern theory ought to anchor itself in the political economy of postmodernity if it does not want to be equated with nihilism and pure relativism. On this basis the postmodern abandonment of meta-narratives altogether seems to fall short of a crucial insight that there is still a world capitalism that seeks profit across the globe and in doing so constantly reshuffles and reshapes the fabrics of our social and economic lives everywhere. The crucial task of a postmodern theory is to show awareness of how the changing structures of late capitalism have rendered *modern* meta-narratives obsolete.

This is the task of Chapter Four where the thesis turns to look at the structural transformations of late capitalism in the light of the micro-electronic revolution and the way these transformations condition the ground for postmodern cultural and aesthetic sensibilities, ideologies and theories. In this chapter the nation-state and the question of sustainability of its boundaries are analysed in the context of globalisation and postmodernity. Chapter four conceptualises the emerging postmodern institutions and spaces of governance, and a notion of postmodern time, and substantiates how under the conditions of postmodernity a different spatial and temporal reorganisation of social and cultural life is being experienced. The experience of nationhood is compared and contrasted with these developments.
Chapter Five continues the argument on the dynamics of ‘globalisation’ and ‘localisation’ from a different angle. If the focal point of chapter four was the processes of globalisation, chapter five looks at the processes of localisation by concentrating on ethnic nationalism and the issue of immigration. We must acknowledge that despite all of what has been said in asserting a decline of the nation-state, ethnic awareness and nationalism have become stronger in the context of globalisation in the last few decades. The examples of Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union suffice to show this. At first sight the claims of a decline of the nation-state simultaneously with a rising ethnic nationalism might appear contradictory. However this is not the case. A distinction has to be made between ethnic nationalism and the civil nationalism of the national-state. The national-state is created from above, and through centralised power mechanisms. Ethnic groups and what binds them together, on the other hand, are not modern creations, only their position in the nation-state is modern; they are historical and cultural entities that existed prior to modern times. Modernity has not generated ethnicity, but it has generated the institution of the nation-state. Therefore the chapter concludes that the structures of postmodernity and the processes of globalisation are accompanied by a rise in ethnic awareness precisely because the national-state is in decline.

Part Two: Empirical Enquiry

Chapter Six, (together with its four appendices), is an empirical chapter devoted to investigating whether the theoretical suggestions made in the previous chapters about a decline of the nation-state are true or not. The interest of this chapter is to measure a sense of a decline of the national identity by people. The rationale of this chapter is that if the theoretical observations made in part one are realistic, then it should also be possible to find corresponding reflections in the way people feel about their national identity in the postmodern times.
The first step was to select a single nation-state as a testing-ground, and Britain was chosen as my case-study for several reasons. It represents a classic prototype model of nation/state building from above with a strong historical sense of ethnic consciousness that goes well beyond the modern period. It is one of the strongest nation-states of the world and has always presented itself as possessing a very strong sense of ‘national identity’ in reference to a distinct ethnic past. And it has been a leading socio-economic power in both the modern and postmodern times. Hence any indication of a historical change in a sense of national identity would be highly significant for our discussion.

The second step taken in Chapter Six was to establish the ‘concepts and indicators’ of national identity. This was conducted through a pilot study which involved the study of the editorials and commentaries of four British newspapers on a daily basis for one month. Newspapers were chosen because they are one of the most powerful media that reflect on the ‘national culture’. Editorials and commentaries were chosen as units of analysis because that is where we are most likely to find opinions, views and analysis of cultural issues. The cultural sphere was chosen because people’s subjectivities are mostly expressed through the daily cultural interactions.

After a month three of the most recurrent concepts defining the nation-state were selected. These were national homogeneity, unity and sovereignty. Against each concept three of the most recurrent dimensions were chosen. The three dimensions that have a diminishing effect on national sovereignty were growth of “europeanisation”, “globalisation” and “inability to solve own (national) problems”. Likewise three of the most recurrent dimensions that challenge the unity and homogeneity of the nation-state were found to be: “a declining sense of national belonging”, “a growing sense of hybridity” and “a growing sense of ethnic

\footnote{Also see Adrian Hastings’ argument on the British nation-state in \textit{the Construction of Nationhood} (1997 CHs. 1 & 2)}
consciousness”. For each dimension one, two or three indicators were chosen. The concepts, dimensions, and indicators are organised in the form of the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Dependent Indicators and their codes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(of the concept of a ‘diminishing sense of National homogeneity and sovereignty’)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A- a diminishing sense of national belonging</td>
<td>A1- a decline in social morality/integration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| B- an increasing sense of national hybridity | B1- multiculturalism  
                                                          B2- pluralism |
| C- growing regional ethnicities    | C1- Scotland & Wales  
                                                          C2- N. Ireland |
| D- an increasing sense of inability to solve own problems | D1- environment  
                                                          D2- defence and security  
                                                          D3- decline of national economy |
| E- an increasing sense of Europeanisation | E1- Europe |
| F- an increasing sense of globalisation | F1- global village of consumerism/global culture  
                                                          F2- global technology  
                                                          F3- global economy |

The above indicators are dependent on the independent indicator of time. The measurement of the above dependent indicators against the independent indicator of time constitutes the pivotal task of the empirical chapter.

As I wanted to obtain comparative data from different decades, I consulted the British Newspaper Library in Colindale to look at the newspapers’ editorials and commentaries since the 1920s when the British nation-state was the strongest imperial power in the world and its sense of national homogeneity, unity and sovereignty was never questioned or doubted. Four British newspapers were selected. Two were from the quality newspapers. These were *The Guardian* which represents a centre-to-left perspective and *The Times* which represents a centre-to-right approach to reflecting and interpreting the daily affairs of the nation. To make sure that the data is as representative as possible two tabloids were also selected. Those were *The Mirror* and *the Daily Express*. *The Mirror* is perceived to be a socialist paper supporting the Labour Party and the *Daily Express* a right-wing paper that has always
supported the Conservative Party. All four papers have been in print since the 1920s which makes the task of historical comparison possible. These four newspapers have been sampled over five decades from the 1920s to 1990s for the purpose of content analysis. The findings of the earlier decades (1920s and 1930s) are compared to the later decades (1970s, 1980s and 1990s).

To cross-examine my findings, I then proceeded to consult *The Journal of British Public Opinion* and *The Journal of British Social Attitudes*. There I found only two sets of interviews conducted by MORI Polls on the issues of ‘Europeanisation’ and the ‘decline of civil society’ which seemed appropriate for comparison. The results of both sets of interviews tended to confirm my own empirical investigation in respect to ‘Europeanisation’ and the ‘decline of civil society in Britain’.

This research has reached the conclusion that despite the fact that the majority of the British population still has a very strong sense of national identity, there is a verifiable historical tendency towards the decline of a sense of national identity and the national-state in Britain. This conclusion proves that the national-state is a modern and time-bound phenomenon that despite its masterful utilisation of ethnicity for claiming antiquity, is losing its historical grounds in the beginning of the third millennium.
Part One:

Theory
Chapter one:

What are the postmodern phenomena?

The term postmodern has generated a large amount of literature in every academic discipline from architecture and art, to geography, law, politics, medicine, philosophy, biology, sociology and so on. The crystallisation of a postmodern literature, and/or literature on the postmodern, over the last few decades, and the impacts left on all academic and artistic fields by a seemingly rebellious postmodern critique of a hitherto existing conceptual framework of analysis called Modernist, is now so pervasive and definitions so diverse that a typology of the postmodern phenomena may be useful.

The task of this chapter is to suggest a model of such a typology and to arrive at different conceptions of the term ‘postmodern’. This chapter is only conceptually crucial for my work because it is within such a conceptual framework that I can do the grounding definitional work in order to anchor my prospective arguments on the relationship between the postmodern society and the institution of the nation-state.

It is also useful to add that the recognition of the term ‘postmodern’ is not meant to promote an adherence to the term or to discourage challenge to the postmodern phenomena. However either of these positions require a prior acceptance that new terrains of theoretical and practical discourses are created by the postmodern phenomena, that should be reflected upon critically.

The postmodern phenomena are multidimensional; as the latest phase of capitalist development, postmodernity refers to socio-economic structures of late capitalism and their mode of integration and implementation. These changes have been evolved and incorporated into the political economy of digital capitalism as a result of the third industrial revolution known as the ‘micro electronic revolution’ that has new
and distinctive technologies and machineries of articulation of power, time, space, and political economy and new modes of capital accumulation. The term postmodernity is used synonymously with informational and digital capitalism in this thesis. The primary technologies of postmodernity are computer network systems, satellite telecommunications and the media. David Harvey, Lash and Urry are proponents of postmodernity understood in this sense.

Postmodernism, on the other hand refers to the aesthetic, artistic, cultural/political movements and ideologies of late capitalism. As an aesthetic ideology, postmodernism aims to deconstruct and decode the modernist constructions of 'order', 'hierarchy', 'inherent meaning', and the universality of 'the Truth'. In political and cultural movements, the postmodern is the rise of Modernism's Other. Postmodern theory is either the conceptualisation of the shift from the Modern to the postmodern (or some aspects of it), and/or a new mode of critical analysis of Modernity and Modernism as totalitarian systems. In either case the Modern conceptual framework that explains the world around certain basic positivistic and scientific dichotomies whose binary relationship is organised hierarchically, is challenged. Foucault, Lyotard, Jameson & Baudrillard are some of the theorists that have specifically worked in this direction.

Now a few words on semantics. Broadly speaking, postmodernity is the latest phase of the modern era, but indeed as many critiques point out, it is a futile attempt to make some thing appear as beyond the modern time, after the modern, or even more modern than the modern itself! The distinction of the modern and postmodern, in this sense is indeed meaningless; because both terms are used as time adjectives for what is happening now, with no historical reference; hence their sequence or concurrence appears as totally unintelligible and arbitrary.

However, I would like to suggest that the challenge of the postmodern is towards Modernity and Modernism (with a capital M). In this sense the Modern refers to a
vision; an ideology; an epistemological paradigm; a mode of conceptualisation, institutionalisation and integration of social life, originating from the Enlightenment. The relationship between the modern as a period, with Modernity and Modernism as structures and ideologies is that the latter represents an epistemological and institutionalised mode of governance of the former. It is like the relationship between the Middle ages as a historical period, and Christianity as its dominant institutional and ideological mode of governance.

It is rather unfortunate that the word modern has a double meaning in the literature concerning us here; one referring to a specific period- the modern time; and the other (Modern) referring to specific institutional and ideological discourses characterising and governing this modern time. For this reason, I suggest using a capital M for the latter meaning. The postmodern, is a response to Modernity and Modernism as the legacy of the Enlightenment, and it also is what is happening in the latest phase of capitalism: in other words it is quite modern!

The legacy of the Enlightenment

What is it that the postmodern challenges? The Enlightenment thinkers of the eighteenth century wanted to establish a scientific understanding of the world that could disillusion and disenchant the world from religious and metaphysical explanations. Much influenced by a Newtonian revolutionary vision in natural sciences, they wanted a Newton of the moral and social sciences. For the new social scientists of the Enlightenment, the old 'truths' expounded by Christianity and the Pagan classics, now became problematic. The 'moderns' wanted to surpass the 'ancients' in their convictions that the use of the natural scientific method in social sciences was necessary for the 'advancement' of learning. They were interested to introduce 'models', similar to natural science models, to represent a complete and final account of social phenomea, each more accurate than the previous one. As Voltaire emphasised in his 'Philosophical Letters' (1733), Newton's achievements truly demonstrated that science was the key to human progress. (Porter, 1990, P. 17)
The Enlightenment thinkers demonstrated an absolute faith in a scientific understanding of man for the aim of advancement and progress of learning and knowledge and they believed that such an understanding could be acquired in the most factual way as if one could take photographs of the reality out there through rigorous scientific procedures. This faith was implicit in the work of Herder, Condorcet and Miller, that much of humanity had already risen from savagery to civilisation and a definite journey had started from myth to reason; a true scientific knowledge could be objectively grounded upon facts rather than upon untestable assumptions.

Although passionate cynics such as William Blake denounced the "dark, satanic mills" and condemned Bacon, Locke, Newton, and Voltaire as the evil geniuses behind the system, there was no reversal from this much enthused age of secular reason, technology and industrial capitalism, especially when the leading revolutionary bourgeoisie of the French Revolution delivered promises of preservation of liberty, freedom of trade and religion, and put an end to the monstrous evils of religious bigotry and feudal aristocracy.

A secular vision of the limitless human drive towards economic growth, scientific innovation, advancement of technology and human progress was evolved; a new form of reason was developed whose validity could only and autonomously be produced and judged by experimentation, observation and measurement. A 'value-free truth', objectively acquired, with a universal applicability, was passionately pursued and integrated into techno-scientific 'progress'. As a result of these overwhelming revolutionary developments of the 18th century, hermeneutic practical and intuitive reason which previously integrated the aesthetic, religious and moral judgements lost its power of judgement of truth. The new objective and scientific 'Truth' pompously divorced itself from subjective meaning and its emotional, instinctual, local and natural and intuitive sources. The separation was not the final step; there also
developed a relationship of power placing the former, the great scientific Truth, in a superior and judgmental position. This great universal, objective and scientific Truth has governed Modernity and formed the Modernist epistemological paradigm since the 18th century. This mechanistic epistemological paradigm corresponded with the mechanical phase of capitalism and a Newtonian perception of the universe.

The implication of the separation between abstract scientific Reason, and hermeneutic/practical/intuitive reason is a division between the techno-scientific world of the 'experts' on the one hand, and on the other hand the life world of the 'masses'. The separation also is an organising machinery in racial, sexual, ethnic, national and colonial discourses leading to widespread assumptions that the Truth is where the science and technology are. It is precisely in this respect that the critiques of Modernity and Enlightenment claim that Reason derived from the separation of a techno-scientific objectivity and a hermeneutic subjectivity is mechanical and totalitarian. To postmodern theorists, this Modernist conception of the world is inherently ideological. Techno-scientific reason is an ideology which replaces religion in organising the Modern power relationships.

The problem lies not so much in the theoretical principle of the Enlightenment as in its practice. In its desire to contest any form of animistic enchantment by nature, Enlightenment set out to think the natural world in an abstract form. As a result the material contents of the world become a merely formal conceptual set of categories. The Enlightenment's emancipatory endeavour turns out to involve itself with a question of power. Knowledge, conceived as abstract and utilitarian, as mastery over a recalcitrant nature, becomes a medium of power, of manipulating, mastering, controlling, categorising and bordering the world for the enhancement of science, progress of technology and furthering of capitalist profitability.

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1 It may be more clear at this point why this chapter is an appropriate opening chapter for developing an argument on the impact of postmodernity on the phenomena of a 'national' nature.

2 It must also be acknowledged here that industrial capitalism and scientific knowledge have transformed the face of human societies for the better, and the positive impact of these developments and achievements should not be
At the heart of the postmodern critique of Modernity and Modernism, lie the questions of power and totality; the dichotomies and boundaries that generate power relationships in totalitarian systems, and the way power is implemented against the hermeneutic and natural world by abstract techno-scientific Reason. The postmodern critique is essentially against the Modern dichotomies within which the discourses of power operate. Postmodern theorists, in their diverse theoretical undertakings, all embark on something very similar; they all want to dismantle Modernist boundaries and discourses within which the narratives of ‘truth’ and ‘power’ are produced.

However, I will argue below that the postmodern phenomenon can not be confined to and theorised as only a critique of, or a rebellion against the Modern. I would propose that together with a postmodern theory, a postmodern social structure is also emerging, that can be distinguished structurally from Modernity in terms of its technology and mode of economic and social integration. The question of power is not removed from the postmodern society, but its mode of integration and implementation is more horizontal than vertical, more global than national, and as a result of this structural change many Modern Boundaries and dichotomies vanish in the postmodern times to accommodate a more horizontal and global mode of integration across the globe.

I am therefore concluding here that the postmodern critique of Modernity and Modernism should be intrinsically linked to the emergence of postmodern social structures. At this point I can proceed and suggest a typology of postmodern phenomena bearing in mind that the separation of the types below is an analytical one only.

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underrated. Thus a critique of Modernity is not a nostalgic lamentation for the return of the past, but a critical reflection on the dark side of civilization and Modernity.
A TYPOLOGY OF THE POSTMODERN PHENOMENA

I suggest five analytically different, but mutually inclusive uses of the term postmodern can be detected as follow:

1- **Postmodernism as an aesthetic & artistic style** in cultural production such as visual, arts, architecture, music, dance, poetry, painting etc.

2- **Postmodern social and political movement**, referring to the rise of the Other, whose colonisation, inferiorisation and subordination was an integral part of the making of Modern identities.

3- **Postmodern social theory** poses a challenge to discourses and narratives of ‘truth’ & ‘power’ resulting from the epistemology of the Enlightenment.

4- **Postmodernity as a social and economic reality**, referring to the socio-economic changes of late 20th century capitalism due to the micro-electronic and digital revolution.

5- **Postmodernity as a cultural condition**, a term used to refer to the globalisation of a consumerist culture that controls the production and transformation of patterns of mass 'consumption' and 'life style' via the media.
1- Postmodernism as an aesthetic style

This use of postmodernism is irrelevant to my thesis, and I shall not be incorporating or referring to any aspects of aesthetic/artistic postmodernism in my thesis. However for the sake of the integrity of my argument, it has been suggested that postmodern art appeals to different sensibilities compared to modern avantgarde art.

The task of the avantgarde Modernist art was to constantly shock its audience by the creation of the New and the Original and the Novel. In doing so the 'masses' were presumed as the Other who listened to the avantgarde, and its 'progressive' understanding of the next style. This is a journey at a very fast rate for progress which is one of the central objectives of Modernity. The question of avantgarde is therefore, fundamentally a question of the Enlightenment. In political terms the Enlightenment proposed a demarcation between the advanced and the underdeveloped, and in this distinction the advanced feels itself to be legitimated in its activities of mastering, controlling and dominating what is stigmatised as the underdeveloped.

Alenity (the constitution of the Other) is fundamental to the avantgarde art too. In this relationship the avantgarde is quite elitist, because the artist is the hero who has seen the future in advance of everyone else and risks his/her greater power on behalf of the 'masses'. Baudelaire argues that aesthetic production and capturing of the New, the ephemeral, the contingent, the transient, the fugitive, the novel by the avantgarde artist becomes an aim in itself, which defines Modernity (Baudelair 1964, P.13). The avantgarde artists, while trying to popularise art, simultaneously denies that art can be integrated into daily praxis of life.

Postmodern aesthetics abandon all claims of originality, novelty, and depth and sublate claims of artistic emancipation. Fredrick Jameson describes postmodern art as a repetition of the dead style. This repetition is either to playfully tease and mock the
dead style (parody), or to blankly and humourlessly imitate the dead style and language which he calls Pastiche (Jameson, 1991).

The abandonment of the New, and the revival of the dead style in the name of art, creates a situation where the distinction between the past/present in artistic production vanishes, and instead a perpetual state of presentness that disguises the dead past, and presents it as the new style, is experienced. In such an experience different eras are juxtaposed, and the human subject loses its anchorage in history, an experience which is called 'Schizophrenia' by Jameson. He believes that in postmodernism the human subject is dead, by which he refers to a loss of his/her sense of purpose, creativity, originality, distinctiveness and autonomy. The postmodern subject has no original, distinctive core or centre in his/her identity. However more importantly the avantgarde loses its power relationship with the 'audience'. The elitist artist who was responsible for the delivery of depth to an 'audience', is dead. The boundary is gone, and hence the question of representation is dissolved.

In Ihab Hassan's *Toward a concept of postmodernism* a comparison is made between Modernism and postmodernism that sums up the difference: the Modernist artist seeks to represent a centred depth in a well boundaried and purposeful creation of the new in the form of a closed finished work from a position of 'know-better'. The postmodernist artist, on the other hand, does not have any claims of representation; the art is playfully produced in a shallow, fragmentary, dispersed and de-creative manner, and the 'end' result is disjunctive and open. (Docherty, 1993, pp. 146-156).

**2- Postmodernity as a social and political movement**

The deep formative influence lying behind most of the debate is the legacy of the Frankfurt School. According to the Frankfurt School thinkers such as Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse, the Enlightenment's emancipatory knowledge turned out to evolve in a dictatorial manner, and evolved in a techno-scientific progress that aimed
to manipulate, control, colonise, master and dominate the Other in order to furnish a self-legitimising aim of progress. In this process ‘reason’ evolved into Instrumental Reason, and separated itself from the hermeneutic, practical and intuitive reason or substantive reason in a Weberian. Instrumental Reason claimed universality, timelessness and ‘validity’ beyond the limitations of time, context, place and human experience. A new state of absolutism, this time a secular one, emerged.

In this path, certain binary opposites or dichotomies slowly but surely emerged to indicate the attributes of a techno-scientific ‘Reason’ against which the Other was constituted. The followings are some of the modern dichotomies that are the legacies of the Enlightenment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Modernist Norm</th>
<th>The Modernist Other</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1- scientific</td>
<td>religious/mystic/metaphysical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2- fact/science</td>
<td>myth/fiction</td>
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<tr>
<td>3- objectivity</td>
<td>subjectivity</td>
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<tr>
<td>4- rationality</td>
<td>emotionality/affectivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5- techno-scientific</td>
<td>nature/the natural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-development/progress</td>
<td>underdevelopment/primitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7- masculinity</td>
<td>femininity</td>
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<tr>
<td>8- public world</td>
<td>domestic world</td>
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<tr>
<td>9- white race</td>
<td>non white races</td>
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<tr>
<td>10- the west</td>
<td>the rest</td>
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<tr>
<td>10- the elite</td>
<td>the masses</td>
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<tr>
<td>11- the nation/us</td>
<td>the foreigners/them</td>
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These dichotomies and many others have been the constitutive elements of the Modern theories and practices. They have created a binary framework of reference which in turn, when combined with the Modern narratives of ‘truth’ and ‘power’,
become hierarchical platforms and organising vehicles of social life and human identities

Under a postmodern culture these binaries and platforms and what they represent are challenged. The society is perceived in a more plural, hybrid and heterogeneous cultural manner with deep impacts on the processes of representation and identification. In addition, in the last few decades some new types of social movement have emerged to challenge the modern dichotomisations. Some of these movements are:

- The rebellion of some sect religions and religious cults; of Islamic Fundamentalism on the one hand, and on the other hand a growing attraction to more ‘holistic’ religions that do not divide between the mind and the body, such as Buddhism and Taoism in the West. The latter have given rise not only to a holistic healing method as an alternative to scientific medicine, but also to an alternative way of understanding and unifying with the universe.

- A popular ‘New Age’ section has been added to all book shops encouraging a holistic vision towards the universe, the body/mind/spirit unity, meditation, yoga, self healing, as well as esoteric and mystical books and training courses with an emphasis on reliance on intuition rather than on an external truth.

- The rise of feminism, and its challenge to the masculinity of Modernity and its essential dichotomies such as:
  - objectivity/subjectivity,
  - rationality/emotionality- intuition,
  - techno-scientific/nature- the natural
  - masculinity/femininity
  - public world/domestic world
  - cultural/natural
- The rise and expansion of **science-fiction**, where the boundaries between fact and fiction collapse especially in the growing world of virtual reality;

- The rise of the **Green** movement, and its antagonism to techno-scientific developments that treat nature as an object of planning and manipulating nature in violent ways to further economic growth;

- The rise of **gay & lesbian** movements that regard heterosexuality as only one form of sexual organisation whose domination and institutionalisation in the form of the normative family denies the natural plurality of sexual orientations in humans;

- The **decline of the sovereignty and homogeneity of national-states** as the primary Modern containers of ‘us’, and ‘them’ in the face of the practices and discourses of globalisation, and the rise of so many ethnic nationalisms.

In one word the Modernist's Other has inflicted damage on the world whose boundaries and fate was once comfortably decided and drawn by a few strong and modern national-states. The Other has risen to challenge its ‘position’ of Otherness and inferiority in all spheres of social life.

Another characteristic of a postmodern politics and movement is that **class** is not their essential organising category as it was in the Modern era. The postmodern movements can not immediately be defined economically in terms of common relationships with the means of production and/or appropriation of economic resources. Any definition of postmodern politics and movement is fundamentally a question of **representation** and it ought to incorporate a critique of Modernity and its essential epistemic categories.
3) Postmodern Social Theory

By the 1970s, many French theorists began to attack modern theories rooted in Enlightenment rationalist discourses. Modernity's disciplinary institutions, practices and discourses began to be analysed in a completely different way; they were conceptualised as a machinery of legitimisation of domination and control.

Modernity in social theory is highly influenced by the intellectual legacy of the Enlightenment that adopts pure scientific 'Reason', and its tools for the acquisition of knowledge are similar to those of the natural sciences: detachment, experimentation, observation, measurement, test-result and generalisation; in a way it masters its subject matter from above and from a position of detachment and superiority in an empty space and time. Reason has a self generating position that does not need to look at itself critically. Reason offers an ontological grasp of 'progress' and 'advancement' as self-justifying pursuits and given aspirations.

In the hands of colonialism, Modernity became a civilising mission of the Other. In the hands of technology Modernity provided the tools of mastery over nature and its subjectification to the needs of 'progress'. Combined with rationality, Modernity produced bureaucratic hierarchies that categorised, codified, homogenised the diverse and the heterogeneous world, and classified and controlled them with the aid of abstraction. The public/private break reduced the 'public' into a place where the authority of pure reason was implemented, and the masculine became the carrier of this authority. The feminine went hand in hand with the Other; the private, emotional and natural. In secular education, all mystic and spiritual forms of explanation, exploration and experience became merely a matter of private pursuit. In the body of the Modern national-states, human plural and heterogeneous ethnic and local identities are administered and standardised by the State from above to generate a metanarrative of national identity and so on.
The critique of progress and pure Reason which became available once Kant distinguished Pure from Practical reason made a resurgence in the 20th century, specifically around the idea of the postmodern. All totalising metanarratives in sexual, racial, national identity discourses that constituted dichotomous identities, all great rules with their abstractions that necessarily deny the specificity of the local, natural, feminine, instinctive, ethnic, etc with their power mechanisms are challenged by postmodern theory.

Walter Benjamin says that "there is no document of civilisation which is not at the same time a document of barbarism". Modernity in the hands of postmodern analysts is increasingly treated as an example of such a document, that has given us the spaceship simultaneously with gas chambers and Holocausts; advancement and progress through discourses of racism, sexism, colonialism etc. (Benjamin, 1973, p. 258)

Horkheimer and Adorno in their *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1972) looked at how Modernity turns Reason into its opposite; into a vehicle of oppression and domination. The project of Modernity has turned to its own opposite and it has failed to put an end to totalitarianism, this time of Instrumental Reason.

For Habermas, on the other hand Modernity can still be understood as an 'Incomplete Project', and can be saved through 'communicative action'. Habermas looks at how under the influence of the Enlightenment, cognitive reason is divorced from moral-practical and aesthetic reason. He agrees with Adorno and Horkheimer that cognitive reason has evolved into Instrumental, scientific and even 'terroristic' Reason and that it has 'terrorised' practical and expressive reasons. Although the separation of practical reason from instrumental reason, and the rule of the latter, does characterise Modernity and its cultural impoverishment for Habermas, he wants to persuade us that instrumental, moral/practical and expressive spheres of experience should be re-united again through 'communicative action' (Habermas: "Modernity- An Incomplete
Unlike the first generation of the Frankfurt school, Habermas does not find the abolition of scientific Reason necessary. He is more interested to keep it in check through the development of a good communicative society that confines scientific and pure reason in the sphere of ‘work’ and for the technical advancement of the society and does not allow it to ‘terrorise’ the hermeneutic/practical reason which is a more suitable type of reason for human interaction in moral and practical fields.

However, for postmodern theorists such as Foucault, Lyotard, Harvey, Jameson, and Baudrillard the Enlightenment legacy should be challenged and fully overcome. Lyotard and Foucault oppose the Enlightenment more philosophically while others such as Harvey, Lash & Urry, and Jameson are more interested to look at the political economy of the postmodern society. Baudrillard develops his analysis of the ‘postmodern culture’ on the basis of the postmodern political economy of the ‘sign’. He is convinced that the ‘hyper real’ world created by the media is the essence of the postmodern culture.

Postmodern theory is important in respect to my thesis. Later in chapter three I will develop a ‘postmodern critique of the nation-state’ and I will argue at the same time that a postmodern analysis of the nation-state has to ground itself in the postmodern political economy in order to provide an encompassing analysis. Here it is crucial to concentrate further on what exactly the postmodern theory is and what it tries to accomplish. The work of Foucault and Lyotard as distinctive postmodern philosophers is looked at below.

Lytard, Foucault & The postmodern epistemology

In The Postmodern Condition, Lyotard is interested to create a postmodern epistemology against the discourses of Modernity. Unlike many other postmodern theorists, Lyotard is not inclined to specify a postmodern socio-economic structure.
He is rather more interested to challenge three conditions of Modern knowledge: 1) Metanarratives and meta-discourses such as Modern sciences, Positivism, Liberalism, Marxism, Philosophies of history and any other form of totalizing systems of thought; 2) Grand schemes of legitimisation, and of exclusion and inclusion, such as national belonging or not belonging, 3) Homogeneous epistemological and moral prescriptions. Lyotard’s postmodern epistemology, by contrast, fights for heterogeneity, plurality, locally bound micro-politics, incommensurability, fragmentation and difference. He writes:

"Consensus does violence to the heterogeneity of language games. And invention is always born of dissension. Postmodern knowledge is not simply a tool of the authorities; it refines our sensitivity to and reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable" (Lyotard, 1984, p. 75).

His reflections on dissension, difference, fragmentation and plurality on the one hand, and on the other hand his unconditional attack on generalities, consensus, common interests and macro social theory/politics make his theory fall into theoretical relativism and relativity of truth which is similar to that of Foucault.

Foucault also has an anti-Enlightenment position and rejects the equation of Enlightenment, reason, emancipation and progress, arguing that this equation has served to dominate the subject in various sites of domination and through various discourses. He identifies a few modern sites of domination such as the clinic, the mental institution, the prison, the school, the hospital in which the identity of the subject is produced through the dominant discourses of Truth and mechanisms of power that implement the Truth. For Foucault power is conceptualised in micrological terms and it is linked to the discourses of knowledge that give meaning and determine the functions of these sites; power is the dominant knowledge of the time.
In a series of philosophical studies he attempts to develop and substantiate the interrelationship between power, discourse and knowledge, and locate subjective identity and its constitution in such a socio-historical and contingent conjuncture. Psychiatry, medicine, punishment and criminology, the emergence of the human sciences are the perspectives that Foucault examines. Through these forms of knowledge the definitions of 'normality' and 'pathology' emerge and under the impact of modern sciences and rationality these definitions are factualised and institutionalised in different sites of power. Human behaviour is then 'problematised' and disciplined into 'normality'; subjective identities are shaped, modes of disciplines are formed and embodied. In such a process, power is automatically implemented through the very factual and scientific procedures that establish the Truth. In fact, for Foucault, power is not a quality of a central location, of a group, of a ruling class, but a mechanism, a function, a state of knowledge, an architectural design, a conceptual system that runs through the modern discourses and sites. The eventual and most intimate sites of implementation of power are human subjectivity, sexuality and body.

In his genealogical works of the 1970s, Foucault stigmatises Modern rationality, institutions, and forms of subjectivity as sources of domination. In *Madness and Civilisation* (1971), he attempts to analyse how madness is historically constituted as the Reason's Other, and how through the discourses of psychiatric knowledge madness is excluded and confined. In *Birth of the Clinic* (1975) an Archaeology of Medical Perception is investigated in the age of scientific gaze, whereby a scientific discourse of the individual can emerge and human self-conception is moulded accordingly. In *Order of Things* (1984) subtitled 'An Archaeology of the Human Sciences', Foucault describes the emergence of human sciences.

In *Discipline & Punish* (1979), various disciplinary matrices of power that operate in institutions of schools, hospitals, clinic, prisons and workshops are looked at, and how they shape the historical formation of the body and its treatment, soul and the subject. Some of the disciplinary mechanisms and techniques involved, are
surveillance, timetables, regulations of activities and performances, normalisation and standardisation of judgement, and the criteria of exclusion, etc.

Foucault is highly influenced by Nietzsche and his genealogy of morality, justice and punishment. Foucault wants to write the histories of the marginalised, excluded and 'disqualified' discourses; the mad, the patient, the criminal, the perverse. In doing so, he offers a powerful critique of modern sciences and rationality as forms of knowledge that carry power within their structures, functions, and conceptions.

He conceptualises power in an initially fascinating new way. To him power and its operation is to be found in the processes of dispersion, dichotomisation and marginalisation in individuals' bodies, sexualities and subjectivities. He rejects the Modernist idea of power to be anchored in macro-structures and ruling classes. The operation of power, according to Foucault, does not happen so much through physical force, but through the hegemony of norms, technologies of normalisation, the shaping of the body, and soul, the individual and group's subjective identity. For this reason, Foucault in *The History of sexuality* (1980a) calls this new mode of power 'bio-power'. 'Bio-power' links the 'technologies of domination' to the 'technologies of self' through the dominant paradigm of knowledge and discourse. Bio-power means that social discourses of truth, power, knowledge enter into the very subjective perceptions of individuals and the behaviours of the body by self-disciplinary modes of social control, and not by force.

Foucault gives us a postmodern analysis of modern power as disciplinary power. In his conception of power the separation between subjective/objective, structure/agency, mind/body, theory/practice vanishes. However he is not a theorist of postmodernity. He has not conceptualised a new postmodern society, nor has he intended or claimed to have done so. His intention is to offer a new way of understanding the question of power in both modern and pre-modern societies.
Both theorists have a focused philosophical interest in dismantling meta-narratives. Both see meta-narratives as vehicles of control and domination. They offer fascinating accounts on how power and domination work in the modern societies, but they never explain why meta-narratives have been produced, and why there are still macro terminals or sites of power and hegemony.

The reason for this inadequacy in postmodern theory is that it does not proceed to identify the structures of modernity and postmodernity, where macro terminals of power can be found and theorised. Their emphasis is too heavily on agency and subjectivity and neither of these theorists ever mention a single word on the most persistent, globally pervasive meta-narrative of *capitalism* and its inherent incentive to *make profit*. There is still a big ‘Truth’. That is, the inherent capitalist pursuit of maximising profit does shape and condition the parameters of social and economic sites of power. Neither in Foucault’s nor in Lyotard’s theories is there a location for a conception of macro power, or for capitalism and its global pursuit of profit. In an examination of their work, I have found that irrespective of their brilliant and fascinating contributions in the field of postmodern social theory, it is difficult to use their theories for organising a site of collective resistance or for explaining how macro discourses of power function.

It appears intrinsic to the coherence of their postmodern theories not to acknowledge the relationship between power and political economy. The result of this under-conceptualisation is that there is a vacuum in the work of Foucault and Lyotard for explaining macro-practices such as the global consumerist culture. Postmodern theory seems to be inadequate in itself if it does not proceed to identify the structures of postmodernity, where macro terminals of power can be identified and theorised

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3 The same argument applies to a postmodern conceptualisation of the nation-state. Such a conceptualisation is developed in chapter 4 where a postmodern critique of the nation-state is firmly anchored in postmodern political economy.
4- Postmodernity as the Social and Economic transformations of the late 20th century

Broadly speaking, postmodernity refers to the whole package of social, political and economic transformations since the late 1960s as a result of the micro-electronic revolution. These transformations are creating different experiences of time, space and modes of governance. These changes are mentioned here, but a full examination of their effects on national identity will be the focus of chapter four.

The term postmodernity in a socio-economic sense, refers to the micro-electronic globalisation of capital and its corresponding new methods of capital accumulation with the corollary that this micro-electronically globalised capital both controls and integrates, and is controlled and integrated by the power of mass telecommunications, and computerised information networks. So not only is there a new mode of spatial and temporal integration, but also due to this, the regime of accumulation and its associated mode of social and political regulations have changed.

This transformation in the mode of spatial and temporal integration has provided a new socio-economic ground on which we need to allow for the conceptualisation of new frameworks of experiencing time and space, and discourses of power and hegemony.

Within the literature, two authors, Anthony Giddens & David Harvey have made significant contributions in the theorisation of globalisation and its profound impact on reordering experiences of time and space. Giddens looks at it under the phrase of "time-space distantiation" The Consequences of Modernity (1990), and Harvey coins it as "time-space compression" The Condition of Postmodernity (1989), both referring to the annihilation of space through faster and faster movement in time in a shrinking globe. They both conceptualise a global village as a communicative reality, a global
single space that has emerged with the acceleration of the pace of movement of capital/information/knowledge/image and the implosion of global time and space.

Digital banking, money, production and information, satellite systems of communication, and computerised networks have all contributed towards an accentuation of velocity and acceleration of the turnover time for capital. Previous centres and hierarchies of capital and production such as manufacturing factories are slowly replaced by de-centred and more horizontal integration of capital and production through computerised systems of production, facilitating faster movement in place and time on a global level. These changes also echo Wallerstein's belief in the logic of historical capitalism being essentially a global process towards a "world system" (Wallerstein, 1983).

The new horizontally organized micro-electronic mode of capital accumulation, integration and communication is slowly replacing the previous hierarchical mode, leading to a different perception of social relationships. A postmodern theory offers an explanation of the latter. However a postmodern theory will remain one-sided if the postmodern society is not encapsulated theoretically.

Scott Lash and John Urry also have made a significant contribution in their The End of Organised Capitalism (1987), where they examine the organised capitalism and its structures first, and then move on to look at spatial restructuring of capitalism in Britain, the United States, France, Germany and Sweden. In the last chapter of The End of Organised Capitalism the postmodern culture and disorganised capitalism are correlated. Disorganised capitalism is the structural foundation for the development of postmodern culture and sensibilities, politics and theory.

It is in the conjuncture of the postmodern political economy and culture that the question of national identity will be examined in chapter four. It will be suggested and explored whether under the conditions of postmodernity the cultural boundaries
of the nation-state are subject to irreversible transformations and if they are, what the
nature of these transformations are.

5) Postmodern Culture

One of the most striking postmodern theories that give an account of postmodern
political economy and culture is that of Jean Baudrillard. He is recognised as the
most influential theorist of postmodern culture. Similar to other postmodern theorists,
Baudrillard is critical of Modernity. In *Forget Foucault*, he writes on Modernity as:

"A characteristic mode of civilization, which opposes itself to tradition, that is to say,
to all other anterior or traditional cultures: confronting the geographic and
symbolic diversity of the latter, modernity imposes itself throughout the world as a
homogeneous unity, irradiating from the Occident." (Baudrillard: 1987, p. 63)

As discussed above, Modernity for Foucault is a process of increasing rationalisation
and administration of identity. For Baudrillard Modernity is a system of objects, the
consumer society, media and information, and how these affect the commodification
of individuals' thought, perception, behaviour and sexuality. In *The System of Objects*
(1990), Baudrillard investigates the new system of mass information and how it has
led to mass consumption, geared with the bombardment of advertising, consumer
goods and services in our public and private lives. This consumerist culture with its
system of significations overwhelms the individual's identity, perception and thought,
says Baudrillard.

To him, a new dominating social order should be conceptualised which is
characterised with a 'new morality', a 'new technical order' and a 'new hyper-
civilization' ruling our every day life. He involves himself with the development of a
political economy of the sign, which is no longer an organisation around production,
as Marx had suggested, but around reproduction. The relationship between
Baudrillard's and Marx's theories will be examined in chapter four.
In the new society of *simulations*, computerisation, information technology, media, cybernetics, mass communication, models and simulation codes, replace production as the primary organisation of society. Instead they are a system of production of merely *signs*. To Baudrillard the Modern time was organised around production by industrial manufacturing of real goods. However in the new postmodern era society is organised around the production of *signs* governed by models, codes and cybernetics. Baudrillard describes the shift as 'the passage from a metallurgic into a semiurgic society' (Baudrillard, 1981, p. 185). In a semiurgic society signs take on a life of their own, organise a new social order, and dominate social life.

In its most proliferated state, the semiurgic society is synonymous to a 'hyper-real society' where the boundary between the real and the image is blurred, and the image or the hyper-real appears more real than the real itself. For example the models of the United States in Disneyland are more real than their instantiations in the social world, as the USA becomes more and more like Disneyland (Baudrillard, 1983, p 25). Similarly the images of the ideal partner, ideal relationship, ideal beauty, ideal life style etc, gain more power over the real, and the real is increasingly lost in its own simulated imagery.

With the advent of hyper-real society, simulations therefore constitute reality itself. In other words there is an implosion of the real into its image, and of information into entertainment. Baudrillard’s conception of implosion is designated to refer to a process of social entropy leading to the collapse of boundaries between the real and the unreal and hence, loss of authentic meanings into (an) apathetic silent majorities. To Baudrillard, this undifferentiated flux of simulacra that have no referents, defies any stable structure where a firm theory or politics is anchored.

If Foucault neglected the question of political economy by locating power only in the micro-processes of social life, Baudrillard deliberately makes it sound impossible to
have a political economy in the state of floating signs, in a media and information society.

To Baudrillard 'meaning' has disappeared in the postmodern society because we are caught in sites that are far apart from any judgement of reality, the sites of fatal strategy of degeneration of the real. Baudrillard argues that all of western faith was engaged in this wager on representation; that a signifier could refer to the depth of meaning of a signified, but now the whole system is weightless in the postmodern era. Now there is nothing but a gigantic simulacrum, never again exchanging for what is real, but exchanging in itself, in an uninterrupted circuit without reference or circumference. In Baudrillard's conception of simulation, representation is dead; the notion of reality is impossible; there is only hyper-reality and simulation as the deterrence and destruction of every goal and every point or category of referentiality; there is no distinction between false and true, evil and good; all hierarchies and essential categories are shattered into pieces, and no new structure is allowed.

Although in his earlier writings, Baudrillard embarked on the development of a political economy of the signs, later on by the 1980s, he abandons the project. Perhaps as some critiques have suggested he himself became trapped with what he was studying, that is a loss of location and belief in meaning.

Fredrick Jameson, another influential theorist on postmodern culture attempts to develop a postmodern Marxism by drawing a postmodern cultural map that belongs to the latest stage of capitalist development (Jameson, 1991). In such an endeavour, Jameson remains loyal to classic Marxism in giving primacy of analysis to the socio-economic foundations of late capitalism and developing a theory of postmodernism as the cultural logic of this phase.

He sees postmodern culture as the internal and superstructural expression of multinational capitalism in its post-industrial phase throughout the world. Hence the
postmodern phenomena is contextualised within the development of capitalism in the age of micro electronics and hyperspace.

In Jameson's work, the limitations of Lyotard and Foucault's postmodern theory, in not locating macro-terminals for power, are overcome. On Jameson's account, postmodernism signals a number of cultural shifts. These include the breakdown of a firm distinction between the high and low culture of the elite and the masses, of the avantgarde art and its audience; the complete commodification of culture and the abolition of critical distance and radical fragmentation of subjectivity to the point of the 'death of the subject', and the emergence of a disorientating and dislocating hyper-real, hyperspace in cultural consumerism.

Jameson's theory of postmodernism draws upon Ernest Mandel's *Late Capitalism* (1975) which locates the present consumerist culture in the late stage of post-industrial capitalism. Far from a negation of Marxism, both theorists demonstrate that late capitalism extends commodification dynamics to virtually all realms of social and personal life, penetrating all spheres of knowledge, information and the unconscious itself.

Jameson's exposition of postmodernism regards Modernity and Modernism as the cultural and institutional experiences of manufacturing industrial capitalism, whereas postmodernism and postmodernity are the experiences of a late post-industrial capitalism organised around the production of signs and services.

In his work, it is possible to think of a new postmodern society that has emerged in the last few decades. A postmodern society can be distinguished in terms of its technologies, mode of economic articulation and capital accumulation as well as a postmodern culture. This is a society of information technology, the chip, the computer and the satellite communication. These new technologies have brought fundamental structural changes in the way the society is organised.
Conclusion

In this opening chapter I have tried to create a postmodern conceptual framework that analytically separates and defines five different, but mutually inclusive, uses of the term postmodern and give a brief account on each.

I have argued that under the conditions of postmodernity, we are facing a new phase of capitalist development that is commonly called the micro-electronic and digital phase. Postmodernity refers to the structural transformations of late capitalism that can be distinguished from the previous mechanical and electronic phases in terms of their distinct technologies, time/space relationships, modes of governance and capital accumulation. Postmodernity has furnished the conditions in which a postmodern culture of consumerism and media simulations have been identified and theorised.

The principle concern of all postmodern theories has been to challenge the epistemological pillars of the Enlightenment. I have shown above that the postmodern social theories that do not anchor their explanations in a postmodern socio-economic structure, can not adequately elucidate the nature and cause of such a paradigmatic shift away from the Enlightenment and positivism that is occurring. Conversely, postmoden theorists such as Harvey and Jameson who look at cultural changes of the late 20th century in the context of political economy would provide us with a better understanding of postmodern phenomena.

These developments and changes have affected all Modern structures and boundaries including the nation-state. This chapter has paved the ground for asserting that under the conditions of postmodernity, the boundaries of the nation-state and what it represents together with all other Modern institutions can be affected. In the following chapters my focus will shift more to the question of the nation-state. Chapter two will first look at different theoretical accounts of the nation and proceed to suggest a synthesis of all these definitions in order to arrive at a new definition of the nation-
state as a political institution of Modernity. In chapter three a model of a postmodern critique of the nation-state, inspired by a Foucaultian vision, is developed before the critique is substantiated in terms of the structural changes of the nation-state as a result of postmodernity in chapter four.
Chapter Two:
The Nation-State and Modernity

The aim of this chapter is to offer a new definition of the nation-state that incorporates and synthesises all the major theoretical contributions that are made on the subject. The synthesis is important since it combines and preserves crucial and, at times, contradictory contributions which have been made on the question of the nation-state. It is also proposed in this chapter to perceive the nation-state as one of the institutions of Modernity whose constitutional identity has been established only since the French Revolution of 1789. It will be argued that the establishment of a unit of citizenship whose territorial, political and cultural boundaries are congruent, as opposed to other forms of collective identities, is a historically specific evolution rather than an ontological given. The chapter anchors the institution of the nation-state in the epistemological as well as socio-political conditions of Modernity before, in the subsequent chapters, the impact of postmodernity on the nation-state is examined.

Whether "invented", "imagined", "constructed", "reconstructed", or "evolved from shared traditions and experiences"; whether conditioned by the requirements of capitalism and its "uneven development" or formed through more subjective paths of a collective identification of an ethnic group with each other in terms of "shared language, myths, symbols, traditions" etc., the terms nation-states and national identity are both temporal and spatial representations of a people; they are historical and geographical expressions of a collectivity and its evolved "mode of being"; they gain their significance in a conjuncture where the socio-economic and cultural conditions of a community are dialectically linked to specific experiences of time and space.
In this sense, collective identities and their unique commonalities can be expressed in a diversity of forms such as kinship, clan, tribal, nomadic, agrarian, dynastic, religious, imperial, ethnic, regional, national and even global. Each of these forms of collective identities has a different mode of experiencing time and space, which in turn has an intrinsic relationship with the socio-economic structures and technological capacities, that determine the temporal and spatial horizons of the experience. In other words time and space are two important parameters that are involved in the systems of symbolic representations of collectivities, and hence in the processes of collective identification.

To substantiate this, let me provide a comparison of Medieval and Post Renaissance experiences of time and space, and show how the latter is absolutely crucial for the formation of the imagination of nation-states and national identity after the 18th century. According to David Harvey in the Medieval time there was “an easy and hedonistic psycho-physiological approach to spatial representations” (Harvey, 1991, p. 241). For the Medieval artist, the place and the space of representation and of experience coincided, and the traditions of Medieval mapping "typically emphasised the sensuous rather than the objective and rational qualities of spatial order" (ibid see p.242, plate 3.3). Basically what is being said here is that the ‘space’ had not been subjected to rationalisation and abstract mapping in the Medieval times. It was only experienced in a concrete and sensuous way.

The Renaissance, however, saw a radical reconstruction of views of space and time in the western world. A rational, objective, totalising and homogenising ordering of space in the "Renaissance maps of England played an important role in affirming the position of individuals in relation to territory" (Harvey 1991, p. 246). This rational ordering of space provided for the separation of place and space and laid down one of the important components of the Enlightenment vision.
Abstract maps stripped of all elements of specificity and concreteness, completely rational and objective, developed into functional tools for manipulating, planning, and engineering the phenomenon of space. The totalising and abstract vision of the map that presumed absolutes of homogeneous time and space allowed for spatial perceptions such as national and regional. This in turn paved the way for 'national' identities to be spatially conceptualised in the midst of geographical differences. In other words, the abstract unification of space override and contained 'the local' and the concrete and provided new containers for thought and action.

Likewise the calendar does the same thing with time; just as the map replaces the discontinuous patchy space of practical paths by the homogeneous, continuous space of geometry, so the calendar substitutes a linear, homogeneous continuous calendarial time for practical time. The latter was organised around nature, especially the position of the earth to the sun which governed the temporal cycle of production and consumption in all pre-industrial and agrarian societies.

The above argument shows clearly that the Enlightenment's vision, and its abstract perceptual/conceptual/linguistic practices form a specific experience and government of time and space, that are epistemologically fundamental in the development of the nation-state and national identity. The evolution of the nation-state and national identity both materially and subjectively could not be possible had it not been for the development of an abstract perception of time and space. An abstract perception of time and space is an essential mode of experience and government of Modernity, including the Modern practices of nationhood and the unfolding of 'national' relationships. It is on this basis that Benedict Anderson describes the time of nationhood as an "homogeneous empty time".

In modern times, abstract maps and calendrical time are the organising tools of social life. These tools are essential for experiencing nationhood. The nation, irrespective of the position of the earth to the sun and the time of sun rise or sun set,
works at specific hours of the day and days are made sense of in the context of the calendar. It can therefore be suggested to place the phenomenon of the nation-state in the time and space of Modernity; rooted in the vision of the Enlightenment; anchored in the techno-scientific capacities of industrial capitalism and rationality or to be more specific, in post-French Revolution time.

From this brief introduction, I propose the following assertions on the relationship between collective identity, space and time:

1) The formation of the nation-state and national identity, as the media of expressing and representing what constitutes the distinctiveness of a people, goes back to the post-Enlightenment and French Revolution period. Therefore it has to be studied in reference to the main underlying and time bound factors of this period, rather than to timeless factors.

2) The nation-state has to be differentiated from other forms of collective identity. The former is only a specific temporal and spatial container of the latter, and its language is nationalism.

3) Collective identities can be subject to transformations if the experiences of time and space are transformed and re-ordered.

I will come back to the last point in the next chapters when it will be argued that under the conditions of postmodernity the experiences of time and space are changing and together with these changes the experience of nationhood is being transformed. A new instantaneous computation in a global space is fast replacing the national time and space of the nation-state. In this chapter, however, I would like to proceed to show that my first point can be articulated by the synthesis of the brilliant contributions that are made in the field of nations and nationalism by Elie Kedourie, Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, Eric Hobsbawm, Tom Nairn, and Anthony D.
Smith. Although the focal point of these scholars has constituted their positions in, at times, opposition with each other, and has created the impression that they hold fundamentally antagonistic views, I wish to establish below that to understand the nation-state fully, their focal points should be combined.

The nation-state can be analysed as a modern container of collective identity, as Anderson, Gellner and Hobsbawm argue, but it is important to note that in such an analysis we should not assume a sudden break up between the past and the present, as Anthony Smith's work elaborates; the Modern and the New are tightly woven with a past or an idea of it; the idea of history lives in Modernity; the mythical and the subjective, which are normally the attributes of the pre-modern mind, live in the factuality and the objectivity of the Modern. What I am proposing here is that national 'imaginations' (Anderson) and 'inventions' (Hobsbawm) are always and invariably linked with a collective idea of an 'ethnic' past (Smith).

My second assertion can be elaborated by looking at the relationship between the nation-state and power in modern times. At this stage, I take Gellner's definition of the nation-state as a modern institution whose political and cultural boundaries are congruent, or that such a congruence is sought by nationalism.

I would argue that although the nation is the dominant modern container of identity, it is also simultaneously the one which functions as a medium of power depriving the majority of ethnic groups of the experience of independent nationhood and self-rule. Gellner has already told us that a world of nation-states does not exist; it is a mere "optical illusion". The majority of human ethnic collectivities do not have their own independent nation-states. However this reality is disguised by the power of those who do.

The nation-state as a modern political institution gains its meaning, as Gellner suggested, in the centralising procedures and practices of a national-state to make
cultural boundaries congruent with political boundaries. Noting that the number of the ethnic groups in the world are far greater than the number of nation-states, indicates that nationhood is not the norm of human communities, but a medium of power aiming to exclude the majority of human groups from the experience of independent nationhood. In this sense, the congruence of the political and cultural boundaries is a modern political aim, and a political achievement, and hence directly linked to power relationships in the international sphere.

**Part One: THE SYNTHESIS**

In what follows in this part, I wish to establish a synthesis of the contributions of Kedourie, Anderson, Gellner, Hobsbawm, Naim and Smith in understanding the different facets of the phenomenon of the nation-state as a modern unit of collective identity. As mentioned earlier the rationale of suggesting the synthesis is to locate the institution of the nation-state in Modernity and its temporal and spatial parameters, in order to develop this argument later to see how the structures of postmodernity may affect the nation-state. Obviously there have already been scholars who have analysed the nation-state as a Modern entity. I will show that their 'objective' examination of the nation-state excludes a very important facet of nationhood, that of subjectivity and a notion of an ethnic historical commonality. This should be brought back into the definition of the nation-state without implying a synonymity of ethnic identity and national identity. Folk 'ethnic' communities can not be taken synonymously to the 'nation-state' as the latter is a political institution cemented and preserved by a central power mechanism from the above. The aim of this chapter is therefore:

1) To substantiate the first assertion that the formation of the nation-state and national identity, as the media of expressing and representing what constitutes the distinctiveness of a people, goes back to the post-Enlightenment and French Revolution period. Therefore it has to be studied in reference to the main underlying and time bound factors of this period, rather than to timeless factors.
2) To arrive at a new synthesised definition of the nation-state that combines its 'Modernity' and 'mortality' with its 'timelessness' and ethnic 'immortality';

3) To analyse the nation-state as a modern apparatus of power;

4) To prepare the grounds for a postmodern analysis of the nation-state in the next two chapters.

1) The Epistemology of the Nation State

The Enlightenment, wrote Adorno and Horkheimer in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, aimed to disillusion the world with religious and magical explanations, and replace them with scientific and secular reason and rationality. Abstraction, the tool of the Enlightenment, evolved to be used to classify, codify and categorise the subjects of knowledge; the heterogeneous, the concrete and the local in order to create homogeneous, objective and universal truth, law and morality.

At the heart of the epistemology of Modernity as a social and cultural entity, since the 18th century, has remained a self-legitimising belief in a universal truth; in technoscientific development and rational administration, as the criteria of human progress. Industrial capitalism in its expansion and dominance in the world employed and embodied sciences, rationality and secular reason. The nation-state is the entity that is bit by bit built on these pillars.

The establishment of a state of affairs in society that operated on principles of this kind, also meant that humanity should be divided into units of political organisation and administration, whereby impersonal and abstract rules prevail. The philosophy of the Enlightenment prevalent in Europe in the eighteenth century held that the
universe was governed by uniform and unvarying laws of nature. These laws could be unravelled and comprehended by reason.

The new politics to which the Enlightenment gave rise was that "the Enlightened ruler regulates the economic activities of the subjects, provides them with education, looks after their health and sanitation, supplies uniform and expeditious justice, and generally concerns himself... with his subjects welfare." (Kedourie. 1994, p. 3). The state on this philosophical view is a collection of individuals who live together to secure their welfare by means of reason. The principle of popular sovereignty is hereby born.

The French Revolution inspired the wordings of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizens saying that "the principle of sovereignty resides essentially in the Nation; no body of men, no individual can exercise authority that does not emanate expressly from it" (ibid p.4) This vision laid down the political foundation upon which nationalism since then has been built; the principle of popular sovereignty began to reside in the nation.

The convergence of the words 'nation' and 'sovereignty' is an important one deserving more attention. Up to the eighteenth century, the monarch in any dynastic realm was the bearer of sovereignty. The notion of 'people' was a negative one referring to the passive subjects of a monarch whose fate could be decided upon by the rulers. Slowly, as Greenfeld shows in her *Nationalism*, from the 16th century a new meaning around the notion of 'people' emerged that transformed it into a positive concept. She argues that the root of this transformation is to be found in Protestantism, which through the Reformation period furnished the grounds for the emergence of a national consciousness.

By national consciousness, she means the kind of consciousness that places the task of obtaining and preserving sovereignty in the 'people' who are homogeneous, united
and the bearer of their own political destiny. In this sense the notion of 'people' acquires a positive meaning, and converges with the 'nation'. The belief in sovereignty, unity and homogeneity borne by a nation which can determine its future, gives us the ideology of nationalism.

The notion of 'sovereignty', or self-determination is also essential in Kedourie's analysis of nationalism. However the political and economic constitution of such an ideology in the form of the Nation-state begins with the French Revolution of 1789, and the vision of the Enlightenment that separates knowledge from morality, primarily positivism.

It is now that the individual becomes the very centre and the arbiter of the universe, who can explore and discover the natural law; who can determine and change his/her fate; who is autonomous; who is a citizen. As Kedourie shows in his book, this principle of sovereignty meant that the origins of any state and its rulers can be subject to scrutiny of its citizens. The nation is now more than the King and the Aristocracy. The citizens of the nation can legislate a common law representing the equality and liberty of its members; the nation is a sovereign entity to whom its government is responsible and accountable; and without the vote of its citizens the state can not easily claim legitimacy.

The nation becomes the vehicle of political change. And of course to obtain and retain political power, one must already have or create a nation first. Here the notions of the nation and the state, too, converge; one without the other cannot fulfil the principle of self-determination and sovereignty, which irreversibly, has characterised the political life of the last 200 years. The nation-state has become the only legitimate and internationally recognised medium of power for determining, planning and allocating natural and social resources. New battlefields in the last two hundred years have emerged under the name of nationalism, which is the formal ideology for the formation and/or preservation of a nation-state. For any people who want to
determine their destiny, a state is needed; for any state who wants to be legitimate, a nation is needed, and what is the language? Nationalism of course.

Hence, the essential aim of nationalism is self-determination; i.e. the acquisition of 'legitimate' secular political power. Nation-building and/or state-building is the instrument. The congruence of the political and the cultural boundaries is the mechanism of maintaining such a power.

In Kedourie's work the nation-state and its quest for acquiring and/or preserving sovereignty are inseparable from the Enlightenment epistemology. The Enlightenment wanted to liberate men from forces of unreason that had ruled them for centuries; it wanted to give power to the individual to seek explanation and reason for what s/he is to believe; and it wanted to exercise authority with accountability within a sovereign unit. All the components of this vision are expressed in the language of nationalism in nation/state-building processes and/or in preservation of the nation-state as a sovereign, homogenous and united unit. On the other hand the abstract temporal and spatial imagination of the nation-state and national identity was also founded by the vision of the Enlightenment which paved the way for these homogenous, sovereign and united units to unfold in their own national time and space (territory).

I now turn to look at the mechanisms whereby the pursuit of congruence of political and cultural boundaries, and of secular power for self-determination, unfolds in the body of the nation-state. "High Culture", "invention of tradition" and "imagined communities" are key concepts for analysing the process.
2) Socio-Economic conditions of the Nation-State

If the Enlightenment provides the epistemological foundation of the nation-state, industrial capitalism gives us the infrastructural capacities whereby the nation-state can materialise and be embodied economically and socially. In other words the awakening and political self-assertion of the nation-states can only be explained in the age of industrial capitalism.

To Gellner, nationalism is about making the culture and the polity congruent. I believe this is the task of nationalism, and it is also the mechanism whereby the aim of obtaining and/or retaining secular political power for self determination, is pursued. Gellner calls such a congruence "High Culture" in (Gelner, 1983).

'High Culture' refers to an industrial capitalist culture in the modern period, whereby high productivity and a very complex and refined division of labour are required for perpetual and rapid growth and change. The idea of a perpetual and rapid change is of course rooted in the heart of Modernity where 'progress' and 'growth' are the aim of the economic activities in a never ending pursuit of profit. Individuals in the modern 'High Culture' can rarely remain in the same niches throughout their lives; they can rarely rest in them unlike in the agrarian society where positions were ascribed from birth. A high degree of mobility and a preparation for mobility are the immediate consequences of Modern society.

This in turn requires a standardised and specialised education and training. Gellner summarises the general and central features of industrial society as follow: "Universal literacy and a high level of numerical, technical, and general sophistication (of the public). Members are and must be mobile, and ready to shift from one activity to another, and must possess the generic training which enables them to follow the manuals and instructions of a new activity or occupation. In the course of their work they must constantly communicate with large number of other men, with whom they frequently have no previous association, and with whom communication must
consequently be explicit, rather than relying on context. They must also be able to communicate by means of written, impersonal, context-free, to whom-it-may-concern type messages. Hence these communications must be in the same shared and standardised linguistic medium and script. The educational system which guarantees this social achievement becomes large and is indispensable..." (Gellner, 1983, p. 35).

Hence, an educational infrastructure, that can produce standardised and homogeneous training and skill in an impersonal manner, is the major attribute of the 'High Culture' of industrial society. Because of its size, indispensability and its expense, only the state can control and maintain the education system. The significance of this is that culture is no longer locally and intimately bound or defined, as it was in pre-modern times; it is defined, controlled and administered from above by the State. And this is at the heart of the congruence of the polity and culture, which nationalism seeks. And of course perceptions and practices of an abstract national time and space are integral to the 'high culture'.

Mobility, literacy, cultural homogeneity, objectivity and impersonality of training, standardisation of knowledge, together with abstract and rational methods of communication, in a 'national' market, with a 'national' currency and language, all of which are centrally administered and sustained by a legitimate agency of power that is the state, are the mechanisms whereby a nation-state unfolds and crystallises.

The nation-state is now extremely important, not only because it is the vehicle of self-determination and sovereignty, but also because it is where industrial capitalism, possessing a legitimate political power, can grow. The nation-state is therefore the institution in which the socio-economic parameters of capitalism unfold in conjunction with the parameters of the Enlightenment epistemology; and where the freedom of the individual and the sovereignty of the nation are expressed in their liaison with a ‘high culture’, standardised by the state.
However, due to the modern impersonal, anonymous, and abstract ties between the members of the sovereign nation, their linkage has to live in the 'imagination'. To Anderson, the nation is a modern 'artefact' that creates its own narrative in the hands of nationalism; it is "an imagined political community that is inherently limited and sovereign" (Anderson 1991, P. 6). It is imagined because as elaborated above, the linkage between the members of a nation is centrally administered and maintained from above; and as Anderson mentions himself, the members of a nation could never know the rest of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear from them. They remain anonymous to one another, but a national unit is constantly imagined by its citizens.

To Anderson the nation creates itself through the imagination; it is sovereign, as it is born in the age of the Enlightenment as a negation of divinely-ordained and hierarchical dynastic realms. The nation is also limited because even the largest nations of the world have finite boundaries. Finally the nation is imagined as a lateral, horizontal community of comrades who are linked together with a sense of fraternity.

Anderson's central concern is to elaborate for us that this secular-horizontal, sovereign, limited community can only become imagined through the print industry as a capitalist enterprise. The most important step in this process was the revolutionary vernacularizing thrust of capitalism, which was stimulated by three factors; 1) the abolition of Latin, and increasing separation from ecclesiastical rule in every day life; 2) the impact of the Reformation, which owed a lot of its success to print industry, enabling the vernacular publication of the Bible. The coalition between Protestantism and print-capitalism helped immensely the rise of national consciousness in the decades and centuries after the Reformation, together with 3) spread of particular vernaculars as instruments of administrative centralisation.

The educational infrastructure and the print language, argues Anderson, laid down the "bases for national consciousness in three distinct ways; firstly they created a network
of communication and exchange below Latin, and above the spoken vernaculars. Speakers of the huge variety of Frenches, Englishes or Spanishes, who might find it difficult, or even impossible to understand one another in conversation, became capable of comprehending one another via the print and paper. In the process they gradually became aware of hundreds of thousands, even millions of people in their particular language-field, and at the same time that only those hundreds, or thousands, or millions, so belonged. These fellow readers, to whom they were connected through print, formed, in their secular, particular, visible invisibility, the embryo of the nationally imagined community" (Anderson, 1991, p. 44).

Secondly, he goes on to say, that print capitalism gave fixity and permanence, and provided the image of antiquity to the central idea of the nation. The printed book, capable of being infinitely reproduced, both spatially and temporally became an 'objective' testimony to the immortality and timelessness of the nation-state, although ironically the printed book itself is a very modern product.

Thirdly, human linguistic diversity and print industry created languages of power which were different to the older administrative vernaculars. Certain languages dominated the final form of the printed language, and others lost caste. For instance, Anderson gives the example of "Northwestern German' which became Platt Deustch, a largely spoken, thus sub-standard, German, because it was assimilable to print-German in a way that Bohemian spoken-Czech was not. High German, the King's English, and, later Central Thai, were correspondingly elevated to a new political cultural eminence." (Anderson, 1991, p 45.)

These three factors under the productive relations of capitalism, gave rise to a technology of communication, which in the face of the human linguistic diversity, played the most crucial role in the formation of national imagination. The essential thing for Anderson is that the interplay between insurmountable differences between particular languages, and their association with certain territories, technology and
capitalism is what nourishes national 'imagination', and links this 'imagination' to power.

In this conjuncture Anderson defines the nation as a "modern artefact" that has been "imagined" into an objective and universal reality, whose truth and rationale derive from its Modernity. Industrial capitalism and its print industry enabled this imagined and novel modern community to assume objectivity, universality and timelessness.

The 'imagined' community can be envisioned, writes Anderson, through two obliquely related sources. Firstly through calendrical coincidence; "the date at the top of the newspaper, the single most important emblem on it provides the essential connection- the steady onward clocking of homogeneous empty time" (Anderson, 1991, p 33). The second source of imagined linkage is in the relationship "between the newspaper, as a form of book, and the market" (ibid, p. 33). These two conditions create a private confidence of the presence of thousands or millions of others who read the same newspaper and live in the same calendrical time.

This view is basically reiterated by Hobsbawm in his _Nations and Nationalism since 1780_ (1990). He opens his first chapter by saying that "the basic characteristic of the modern nation and every thing connected with it is its modernity" (p 14). He refers to the discourse of citizenship and sovereignty, and shows that both of these concepts are rooted in the equation of nation=state=people. I shall look at Hobsbawm's book in greater detail in the second part, but it would suffice here to show that alongside with Anderson he, too, sees the nation as a novelty of the post-French Revolution time whose existence is given fixity and eternity through the print industry.

In this light, the nation-state is a historical category that belongs to the period of political Modernity and modernisation of post-French Revolution; epistemologically to post-Enlightenment and economically to industrial capitalism. The nation-state is treated by Hobsbawm and Anderson as a temporal phenomenon that is expressed
timelessly by nationalism. The nation-state claims to be universally true, and has evolved to become the sole constituent unit of collective identity.

So far, the origins of the modern nation-state have been explained in the vision of the Enlightenment, and in the social, economic and political aspects of industrial capitalism. It is fair to say that these contributions, indeed understand and explain the nation-state from an 'Enlightened' positivistic position, and offer an analysis that does not give much weight to the subjectivity of the nation. The institution of the nation-state is one thing and the way it is lived and performed by its citizens is something else. The latter requires a closer observation.

One of the most striking characteristics of all nationalisms, is that they do not believe in their historical newness, and their Modernity. The most fundamental claim of all nationalists is their antiquity, that is their timelessness and eternity which points to a very important ingredient of the nation and its discourse; the idea of a common ancestry, common traditions and past. This brings me to the subjective aspects of the nation. I believe that the objectivity and the subjectivity of the nation-state can not be separated in explaining it; they have to be synthesised. I also believe that placing too much emphasis on nationalism's 'self deception', 'fabrication', 'fallacy' in the way in which Modernist expositions explain the nation does not actually enrich our grasp of its pervasiveness, even if these claims are true. The more important task is looking at why the nation-state needs to have a subjective and historical perception of itself.

3) History and the Nation-State
There are two major contributions in the field that I would like to look at, and once again show that both cover angles that are undeniably invaluable in explaining the complex phenomenon of the nation-state; the work of Eric Hobsbawm and Anthony D. Smith.
For Hobsbawm, the nation is a political novelty that 'invents' its own traditions, and for Smith the nation is rooted in the ethnic past and traditions. In *The Invention of Tradition* Hobsbawm maintains that not only are nations modern novelties, but their traditions are also "invented" in order to claim continuity with the past. So, for example, the National Flag, Anthem and Emblem are "invented" as symbols of identity and sovereignty of each nation. Hobsbawm suggests that the principle of nationality transformed the peasants or the subjects of pre-1789 into citizens, whose public lives as members of the national work force, armed forces, schools, etc, created them as homogeneous nations. They learned to speak a "standardised national language" and read about their 'National History' and in these senses the 'traditions' of nationhood were 'invented' by the central state.

Consequently, according to Hobsbawm, most national 'traditions' of the nation-state are very recent inventions in history, but they are symbolically accepted to inculcate certain values and norms, which aim to create the impression of continuity with a historic past, whereas they are essentially processes of normalisation and ritualization of nationhood. Hobsbawm does not explain why these inventions are needed in the daily lives of people. He believes that it is the state that needs these inventions. The state is systematically involved in inventing traditions and the real cause is the acquisition or maintenance of political power.

Hobsbawm gives us a rich selection of examples: Christmas Broadcast in Britain were only 'invented' in 1932; "festival pavilions, structures for the display of flags, temples for offerings, processions, bell ringing, tableaux, gun-salutes, government delegations in the honour of the festival, dinners, toasts and oratory.." (ibid P. 6).

On the other hand, the convergence of the notions of 'people', 'nation', 'society' and 'state' in the modern time, has led to the 'invention' of mass traditions, such as state education, which in an administered and standardised form "transformed people into citizens of a specific country; peasants into Frenchmen" (ibid P. 264), or quoting
d'Azeglio in the 19th century saying, "we have made Italy, now we must make Italians" (P 266). With the widespread progress of electoral democracy, and respect for citizenship, a type of mass politics emerged, that according to him, encouraged the invention of official traditions in the period 1870-1914; by 1914 some form of "extensive if not universal manhood suffrage was operating in Australia (1901), Austria (1907), Belgium (1894), Denmark (1849), Finland (1905), France (1875), Germany (1871), Italy (1913), Norway (1898), Sweden (1907), Switzerland (1848-79) the United Kingdom (1867-84)" (P 267). The 'tradition' of Social Democracy was largely 'invented' in this period, to replace the church and monarchy, and function as a cementing factor in the society.

In this way, the 'tradition' of Social Democracy emerging from the convergence of the notions of 'people', 'society', 'nation' and the 'state', required and went hand in hand with the 'invention' of 'public and national' language, mass education, ceremonies, monuments, uniforms, parades, bands, etc to signify the antiquity of the traditions of the civil society. I shall look at some of the examples that Hobsbawm gives us in the second part on the relationship between the Nation-state and power, but here I would like to turn to the work of Anthony Smith who scrutinises the Modernity of nations at a different level in his 'The Ethnic Origins of the Nations'.

Smith does not refute the validity of what Kedourie, Gellner, Anderson and Hobsbawm tell us about the modern essence of the nation-state, but he refuses to accept that the nation-state is "purely" or "strictly" a modern phenomenon. He says:

"in a sense, the 'modernists' are right. Nationalism, as an ideology and movement is a phenomenon that dates from the later eighteenth century... the 'nation-state', too, as a political norm is quite modern....it was not until the nineteenth century that these (European) states began to be converted into 'nation-states', and hence a system of 'nation-states' came into being. Even the 'nation' and its 'national character' would appear to be modern: certainly it was not until the early modern period in Europe... that the idea of populations being divided by 'national character' and possessing a common identity became widespread among the European educated classes." (Smith, 1994, P. 11).
However, what he wants to establish is that in accepting the Modernity of the nation-state, we can not assume "a radical break between pre-modern units and sentiments and modern nations and nationalism" (Smith, 1994, P. 13). We should not dichotomise between 'industrial and modern' and 'agrarian and pre-modern' societies, since even if "the break is radical in some respects, in the sphere of culture it is not as all-encompassing and penetrative as was supposed" (ibid p. 13). The most crucial concept in the work of Smith is 'ethnie' and the symbolism and the sentiments that go with it. To him 'ethnie' is a continuum that weaves the 'past' into the 'present'; the 'subjectivity' of the nation into its 'objectivity' and its 'antiquity' into its 'modernity'. 'Ethnie' is what coheres the nation around common (mythical or real) ancestry, traditions, myths and symbols.

Although his focal point gives the impression that he understands the nation-state in terms of the former categories (ie past, subjectivity, antiquity, common historical myths and symbols), more heavily than the latter ones ( present, objectivity and modernity), I would argue that his work can be read in a different way; that his effort is to bring back sentiments, emotions, subjectivity and a 'heart' into the objective, factual and head orientated modernist expositions of the nation-state.

I am not sure if ethnicity is the core of nation-building, but I would certainly agree that ethnic components, and a belief in a common distinctive past, even if they are 'invented', are cementing cultural factors in the processes of national identification; they are like the raw material in the final product. Obviously the final product, that is 'national identity', needs certain industries and technologies that produce the 'high culture' and an 'imagination' of the experience of 'nationhood'. Undoubtedly these technologies are bound to industrial capitalism and its mode of production and reproduction of cultural entities; the technological capacities that make the institution of the nation-state viable are very modern indeed; in the ways it gives meaning to, and employs, 'ethnicity', and in how its 'imagination' of itself is produced, the nation-state is indeed very modern, but there is nothing modern about the raw
material itself. A popularly convincing idea of the past is crucial for the nation to feel united and distinctive from other nations.

Hence, in this sense, 'ethnicity' has to be processed industrially and politically, before it can weave, brutally or smoothly, into the final product of the nation-state. Smith would be the first to admit this. In fact chapter six of his book looks at this issue. He believes that "generally speaking citizenship and ethnic solidarity operate in separate spheres...and there is friction and unease between them..."(Smith, 1994, p. 151) They require different loyalties; the nation is a "territorially centralised, politicised, legal and economically unified unit, bound by a common civic outlook and ideology....that must take over some of the attributes of pre-existing ethnie and assimilate many of their myths, memories and symbols, or invent ones of its own" (Smith, 1994, p. 152). He is obviously aware that ethnic identity does not automatically transform and translate into national identity, and that there is a tension between them.

The fundamental difference between Hobsbawm and Smith lies in the way they focus on the nature of the tension between ethnic and national identities. In their expositions, Hobsbawm does not disagree with the fact that 'traditions' and 'ethnicities' are needed in the making of the nation-states, but he merely looks at the way they are invented. On the other hand, as quoted above, Smith does not really disagree that an idea of the past ethnic traditions can be 'invented', but he focuses on how these traditions are needed as a continuum to avoid the dichotomisation of past/present, even if this continuum is presumed or imagined. The past/present dichotomisation is, on the other hand, an essential part of Hobsbawm's positivistic stance; to him the invented traditions bear no relation to the past and its 'proto-national' identities. To Smith collective identities are the result of an idea of the ethnic traditions and the past.
Towards a New Definition of the Nation state

I have tried to argue that a complete separation between the past/present dichotomy is not necessary in defining the nation-state. In this sense the division between 'civic' and 'genealogical' nations is merely an analytical one; 'perennialists' and 'modernists' need one another in explaining the nation-state. Objective and subjective dimensions are both needed in the process of nation/state building and ethnicity is essential in weaving the discourse of nationality. I propose the following definition of the nation-state, which I believe synthesises the major existing theoretical contributions covered above.

The nation-state is a distinct modern political institution of administration and representation of collective identity, that is anchored in the vision of the Enlightenment, and rooted in the era of industrial capitalism which utilises, adopts and/or invents incommensurable human historical cultural differences, and employs them in obtaining and/or retaining political power. Nationalism is the language of such endeavour.

In this definition, all the above positions are embedded; Kedourie’s account of the Modern epistemology of the nation, Gellner and Anderson’s accounts of the links between the nation and a capitalist political economy, Hobsbawm’s notion of ‘invented traditions’ in the making of modern nations and Smith’s elaboration of the ‘ethnic past’ of the nations are all synthesised.

In such a synthesis, the nation-state is the Modern Janus and it is two faced. The nation-state administers the unification of collective past/present, fact/fiction, subjectivity/objectivity, eternity and immutability/historical newness and mutability in the name of ‘national identity’. In the body of this Modern ‘Frankenstein Monster’ called the nation-state, the human desire for eternity and immortality (at a collective level) is ironically linked to the modern technologies and discourses that make its expression possible.
**Part Two: THE NATION-STATE & POWER**

In this part, I wish to argue that although the nation is the dominant modern political container of collective identity, it is also simultaneously one which functions as a medium of power depriving the majority of human distinct ethnic cultures of the power to form their own nation-states. In a sense Gellner is right to tell us that a world of nation-states does not exist; it is a mere "optical illusion". However this 'optical illusion' is reinforced because the world is based on international and transnational relations, that only recognise the nation-state as the legitimate unit of collective identity. The fact that the majority of ethnic groups do not possess their independent nation-states remains largely invisible in this international scene. Most ethnic communities either forcefully or voluntarily live in the body of a nation-state.

Similarly, Walker Connor (1978), breaks down the discrepancy between the potential nations and existing nation-states as follow:

"1) Only 12 states (9.1%) can justifiably be described as nation-states.
2) Twenty five (18.9%) contain a nation or potential nation accounting for more than 90% of the state's total population but also contain an important minority.
3) Another 25 (18.9%) contain a nation or potential nation accounting for between 75% and 89% of the population.
4) In 31 (23.5%), the largest ethnic element accounts for 50% to 74% of the population.
5) In 39 (29.5%), the largest nation or potential nation accounts for less than half of the population" (Connor, 1978, p 382).
The significance of this picture is clear; the majority of the nation-states in the world in fact are national-states which contain several ethnic groups, under their homogenising rule.

On the other hand, Gellner takes the criterion of language to refer to the distinctiveness of a culture, and shows that for about 8000 spoken languages in the world, only about 200 nation-states exist (Gellner, 1983, p. 45). This means for each official 'national' language, there are 40 other languages, and ethnic groups, that are deprived of their official speech and administration and from the formation of their own nation-state, although some may not fight for them. For instance in Iran the official national language is Farsi. This means that Kurdish, Turkish, Arabic, Armenian, and Balouchi languages, and their respective ethnic communities, are deprived of their own national language and state. Of course, some of these linguistic communities may not have any desire for autonomy, but surely some, especially the Kurds and Armenians, do.

Likewise, the idea of the 'national' imposed by the colonial states in Africa and Asia, is the result of the colonial conquests and power of the western nation-states, and has no intrinsic relationship to the indigenous cultural and ethnic boundaries of the these areas.

The denial of the right of ethnic communities to form their own nation-states that are congruent with their ethnic past, clearly shows that ethnicity cannot sufficiently explain the parameters of nation/state building. Power and politics are essential tools for such formations. The nation-state as a dominant political power vehicle in the world politicises culture, language, race, religion, ethnicity etc. Some of these politicised cultures are in positions of power, and some others are represented as 'ethnic minorities'. In this sense, 'ethnic minorities' always appear as if they do not quite fit into the 'normative' national ways or do not sufficiently desire to become
independent nation-states; the ‘national’ assumes superiority over the ‘ethnic’ and as Anthony Smith argues there is a tension between them.

The formation and preservation of the nation-state, must therefore be looked at in the context of power relationships within and outside the national boundaries. The process of nation-state building is the mechanism whereby political power is sought. I am now about to look further at several components of this process.

The making of the ‘National’

In the process of nation-state building three important criteria are used by nationalisms to indicate the distinctiveness of their nation-state or nation-state-to-be in order to acquire and/or maintain power: language, ethnicity and religion.

LANGUAGE

In the era before general primary education, writes Hobsbawm, "there was and could be no spoken 'national' language...and the popular audience across dialectal boundaries" could not be addressed" (Hobsbaum 1990 p. 52). This ability had to be slowly developed and administered with the technical abilities of the print industry and the idea of a standardised and homogenised 'national' education. Hence a 'national' literary language is always to some extent artificial and 'invented'. It is not an existential concept. It is a literary concept and the choice of it is always political or has political implications. Let me look at some examples that are given by Hobsbawm.

Croats spoke three dialects, cakavian, kajkavian and stokavian. Only one of them was spoken by the Serbs. The latter two "developed literary versions. The great Croat apostle of Illyrianism, Ljudevit Gaj (1809-72), though a native speaker and writer of Kajkavian Croat switched his own writing from this dialect to Stokavian in 1838, in order to underline the basic unity of southern Slavs, thus ensuring that a) Serbo-Croat
developed more or less as one literary language...b) depriving Croat nationalism of convenient linguistic justification and c) providing both Serbs and later Croats with an excuse with later expansionism." (ibid p 55).

In Norway, a purely Norwegian language as distinct from a Danicized written language was constructed (in 1808-45) which is called Nynorsk today. In spite of Norway's independence and official support for this language, the language has remained a minority one in the country, spoken by only 20% of Norwegians.

The Welsh claim that their language is the most ancient living literary language going back to the 6th century, but it has remained a 'minority' language, and they have to receive official education in English.

In 1789, 50% of "Frenchmen" did not speak French, only 12-13% spoke it 'correctly', and indeed outside the central region it was not usually habitually spoken....In northern and southern France virtually nobody talked French.

Likewise in the vast Chinese empire, it was only through the language of the central government that people could start to understand one another, above the diversity of languages and dialects that existed in the empire.

In most ex-colonies, the official national spoken language is imported into the country by the colonialists; English for British past colonies, French for the French past colonies, and so on.

Russian was imposed on the multi-ethnic/lingual population of the ex-Soviet Union.

Therefore it would be justified to claim that the national language for communication and administration, the language that homogenises and unifies the nation-state, the language that inspires 'national consciousness', has to be selected from many existing
vernacular (or non-vernacular in the colonial cases) languages. This selection is done by the state, or the nationalist intellectuals aspiring to form a state. And in that selection, the language that constitutes the national language is empowered to treat the non-national languages as 'minority' ones.

ETHNICITY

Ethnicity refers to common cohering cultural characteristics of a group, that are not acquired through national language and education. Although the concept of ethnicity is utilised, instrumentalised and politicised by Modern practices, an ethnic group can only be explained in terms of a common past. It is interesting to know that, as Connor mentioned above, there are only about 12 nation-states whose national boundaries roughly correspond with their ethnic boundaries; Germany, Iceland, Japan, the two Koreas, Finland, and a few others. The national boundaries of the rest do not correspond with ethnic boundaries.

The most obvious implication of this observation, is that the rest are either a) national-states which contain several ethnic groups, and are, therefore, ethnically heterogeneous like Spain, France, Britain, Belgium, or b) colonial nation-states that strictly 'invent' ethnicity, as in Nigeria, Ghana, Zaire, the Gulf states, Jordan and the rest. The national homogenisation of identity, therefore, is a medium of power to impose a new type of identity on the previously heterogeneous ethnic populations. In this sense, through the process of nation-state building, and in the age of nationalism, ethnicity is politicised in order to fit into the nation-state. This explains further the nature of the tension between ethnic and national identities.

The politicisation of the ethnie is looked at by Smith. He says any ethnie

"that aspires to nationhood, must become politicised and stake out claims in the competition of power and influence in the state arena...but it applies also to ethnie which remains within a larger state, and even to those which do not seek 'national status'"

(Smith, 1994, PP. 155-7).
Basques and Bretons, Scots and Croats, Kurds, Eritreans, Armenians have to be first politicised, before they can obtain a base for mobilising resources and power. Nationalism, unavoidably becomes the only language that they can adopt; 'rediscovery' or 'invention' of history is one of the focal points of all nationalisms, which is absolutely essential for the creation of the nation-state and the idea of the national. The point substantiated here, is that what links nationalism to ethnicity is the unequal distribution of modern political power.

The above point shows clearly the difference between ethnicity and nation-state. The latter is a modern political container of identity that has access to resources and power; the former is a politicised cultural discourse that is 'invented' and/or used creatively in the process of nation-state building. In this sense, all nation-states need an ethnic past, even if they have to create it from scratch. However, it would be naive and tautological to think that all ethnicities will lead to a 'nation-state' or that all 'nation-states' have had an ethnic past.

In this sense, Hobsbawm is both right and wrong in his claim that "ethnicity has no historic relation to what is the crux of the modern nation, namely the formation of 'nation-state'." (Hobsbawm 1990, p 64). He is wrong because an idea of ethnicity, even if it is totally invented, is needed in the cultural discourses of the nation-state. He is also right; nation-states and ethnic groups are two incommensurable socio-economic and cultural entities; ethnicities do not have political boundaries; they are not the containers of modern political power unless they are the dominant ethnicity in the nation-state, like the English in Britain.

RELIGION

Hobsbawm proceeds to explore the relationship between religion and national consciousness. The examples of Ireland, Israel, Pakistan demonstrate a very close link between the two. In Zionism, which led to the creation of Israel in 1948, Judaism and the Jewish 'national consciousness" were inseparable. In Ireland, Catholicism is
an indispensable element in explaining Irish nationalism. In their refusal to follow the English into the Reformation, the Irish national identity had been linked to Catholicism. The creation of the nation-state of Pakistan is based purely on Islam.

However can we claim that all nation-states are based on a distinctive religious identity? The answer is clearly not; such an affinity does not explain why the Muslim, Christian or Buddhist worlds are divided among many diverse, and at times belligerent nation-states. The major religious mobilisation of this century to unify all the Muslims of the world, under one banner -Islamic Fundamentalism- is the one that does not promote the idea of nationalism in any sense; it seeks the unity of all the Muslims in the spiritual realms against the 'Satan'. However, the fact that the Muslims of the world belong to different nation-states is one factor that has effectively prevented such a religious unity. In other words nationalism or the nation-state has largely prevented a religiously defined ethnicity to take root. However this deduction is only tentative, as there are two obvious religiously defined communities who made their nation-states on the very basis of religion; Israel and Pakistan. It must therefore be acknowledged that religion has played a greater role in the formation of some nation-states.

On the other hand, religion is in decline. Increasingly the traditional tasks of the clergy in transmitting and disseminating a sense of a common past, memory and identity have declined, giving this function to systems of formal education. Hence even if religion has been more tied in with the nationalist sentiments in the past, over time more secular types of identification characterises national sentiments.

THE ELITE
The above observations bring me to my last point, which is that the most decisive criterion behind the formation of national consciousness is a sense of belonging to a lasting political entity. If the nation-state is defined politically, as I have tried to argue, then in most cases the nation-state and its vocabulary that later constitutes the
national language includes "only a small fraction of the inhabitants of the state, namely the privileged elite, or nobility and gentry" (Hobsbawm, 1990, P. 73). This nationalism of the nobility may certainly be regarded as proto-nationalism, as the unification of the concepts of state=nation=society, "that is the categories of 'nationality', 'political loyalty' and 'political commonwealth' were united in the socio-political consciousness and the emotions of a group within society..." (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 74).

The characteristics of the modern western state, which found its precise shape after the French Revolution evolved from the European principalities of the 16th and 17th century. These characteristics were novel in a number of ways; firstly the modern state territorialized the unit of rule out of the previous dynastic and religious realms, and with that identity was territorialized. Secondly the rule of the Modern State was tied in with modern notions of sovereignty, citizenship, democracy and nationalism. Thirdly, the State machinery of implementing these notions were central administration, census, 'national' police, education, communications, transport, and democratisation of politics, all of which, since the 19th century, have linked the population of any specific territory together, and have furnished the grounds for 'imagining' a national unit of 'us', distinctive from 'them'. Fourthly, history and ethnicity were politicised; elements of them were prioritised in the process of inclusion and exclusion, to culturally cement the new unit of identity.

The modern state, very similarly to the pre-modern state, has been interested to secure power. However in the new political atmosphere, the loyalty and approval of the citizens are crucial in the maintenance of power. For this reason the congruence of the political and cultural boundary is sought through nationalism. The development of this network called the nation-state has evolved through different routes in the world, but nation-state building involves all of the above elements. However, the order by which these elements are combined, depends on specific
conditions that, because of incommensurable human cultural diversities and power relations in the context of 'capitalist uneven development', cannot be generalised.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have suggested that a synthesis of the major theoretical contributions to the study of the nation-state is necessary if the nation-state is to be defined in a new way that is more reflective of its complex character. In the body of this complex institution called the nation-state, the shared ancestry and traditions of the nation meet the technologies of capitalism; past is woven into the present; ethnicities unfold in modern frameworks; Modernity finds its immortality; and humans are categorised on the basis of race and nationality and placed in hierarchies of power and control.

I have defined the nation-state to be a "distinct modern political institution of administration and representation of collective identity that is anchored in the vision of the Enlightenment, and rooted in the era of industrial capitalism that utilises, adopts and/or invents incommensurable human historical cultural differences, and employs them in obtaining and/or retaining political power". Nationalism is the language of such endeavour.

The nationalism of an existing nation-state has the language and technologies of power that exclude 'ethnic minorities' from their representative share of state power. The nationalism that seeks to build a nation-state has a more difficult time; it has to directly confront the institution of (its respective) nation-state for its share of state power. If all ethnic groups could have their own nation-states, the world would comprise lots of small nations.¹

¹ As Smith writes: "a world of small nations is a decentralised world, and as a model, decentralisation flies in the face of much accepted ... social planning (I read this to mean, the machinery of homogenisation and standardisation of identity and control of the world's resources). It also flies in the face of the so-called 'realities of power', founded on state maximisation of territory and resources, including man-power, and now regarded as almost sacrosanct, even if state sovereignty is cloaked with the legitimisation of popular, that is national, consent.....They (the state elite) claim that their state constitutes a 'nation', and the nation is
"The inherent drive towards national congruence, that is to make the state, the territory, the culture and the population coterminous and homogeneous, inevitably destabilises the regional systems..." (Smith 1994 p. 221), and such a congruence can only happen through the modern state apparatus of power. The original French and British models of the nation-state then become a point of aspiration and emulation for others. However in the context of "uneven capitalist development such aspirations have created nationalistic battlegrounds in the late 20th century involving genocide and ethnic cleansing. Hence what deprives the majority of human ethnic communities of the chance of having their own nation-state, is ironically the embodied aspiration itself. That is, centralised power in the form of the nation-state that seeks to nationalise culture, and eradicate cultural difference for creating a 'homogeneous', 'united' and 'sovereign' national-state.

The standardisation and homogenisation of culture and identity from above, is a prime example of what Adorno and Horkheimer in their original critique of Modernity called 'culture industry', which locates the questions of identity and culture in the context of macro and micro power relationships and political economy. Critical theory has left an unmistakable impact on the formation of postmodern theory, to which I am about to turn. In the next chapter, a model of a postmodern critique of the nation-state is offered.
Chapter Three:
A Postmodern Critique
of the Nation-State

Having established the nation-state as a gigantic modern institution of power and administration of collective identity, I intend, in this chapter, to develop a postmodern critique of the phenomenon of the nation-state. In attempting to do so, I will combine the work of Benedict Anderson and Edward Said with that of Homi Bhabha. The rationale behind this combination, is that in the work of Anderson and Said, the questions of national and cultural identity are analysed in the macro-contexts of colonial and imperial power relationships. And in the work of Bhabha, such a question is tightly linked to the narrative processes and discourses of power within what he calls the 'Nation-Space'.

National identity, as a specific form of collective identity, is embodied in the institution of the nation-state. The focal point of this chapter is to develop a postmodern analysis and critique of national identity, and to offer a model of deconstruction of the nationalist representation of the nation-state as a unit in which people are united around a historical, sovereign and homogeneous common core. In deconstructing the nationalist representation of the nation-state, this chapter looks at how contingent and heterogeneous human collectivities are constructed as dichotomised and homogenous ‘us’ and ‘them’, both structurally through colonialism and subjectively through narratives of nation-building.

In chapter two, I proposed the following definition of the nation-state:

*The nation-state is a distinctive modern political institution of collective identity that is anchored in the vision of the Enlightenment, and rooted in the era of industrial*
capitalism which utilises, adopts or invents incommensurable human historical cultural differences, and employs them in obtaining and/or retaining political power. Nationalism is the language of such endeavour.

In the above definition, the nation-state is located in the modern era, and is analysed as an institution of Modernity that administers and standardises diverse human historical cultural differences, for political power.

As soon as such a definition is proposed, the grounds for a postmodern critique of the nation-state is furnished. As argued in chapter one, postmodern theorists such as Lyotard, Foucault and others were essentially against meta-narrative discourses of Modernity, and of the Enlightenment's practice of establishing universal Truths. Such discourses are regarded as invariably ideological and linked to power relationships in organising and 'normalising' human identity. Now, if the nation-state is one of the prime dominant containers and organisers of a grand and homogeneous national identity, then from a Foucaultian perspective, it is an institution that is very similar to 'the clinic', 'the hospital', 'the school', 'the prison', and is in itself a discourse of power, and a Modern institutional apparatus of both making and representing collective identity as synonymous with national identity.

On the other hand, as Benedict Anderson and Edward Said have shown, the question of national identity/culture cannot be separated from larger discourses of power; especially those of colonialism and imperialism.

The Modern and the postmodern subject

However, before proceeding, there remains some yet untackled questions regarding the distinction between a modern and a postmodern analysis of the nation-state: In what sense is a postmodern understanding of the human subject different from a Modernist conception? How is the question of representation of identity treated in these two perspectives? The answer is given to us by Stuart Hall. He offers three
different conceptions of identity. These are the "(a) Enlightenment subject, (b) sociological subject, and (c) post-modern subject". (Hall, 1993, pp. 275-7). My concern here is with the first and the third categories.

The Enlightenment subject, explains Hall, adopts a conception of the human subject who is a "fully centred, unified individual, endowed with the capacities of reason, consciousness and action, whose 'centre' consisted of an inner core, which first emerged when the subject was born, and unfolded with it, while remaining essentially the same- continuous or 'identical' with itself- throughout the individual's existence." (Hall, 1993, pp. 257-277). This conceptualisation of the subject as sovereign, rational and capable of reason, is undoubtedly very modern and closely linked to the Enlightenment.

The Enlightenment collective subject (the nation-state here), is also to be understood in reference to an inner core within the collectivity, which is present ontologically, self-referentially and as a priori in thought and action of the collectivity. This inner core within human collectivities distinguishes them from others, gives a meaningful significance to the separation of 'us' and 'them', and assumes some kind of unquestionable cultural homogeneity or commonality within each collectivity on which their political sovereignty is based. This is the philosophy of nationalism too, that has dominated the world ever since the French Revolution of 1789. And this is what constituted the spirit of The League of Nations in 1922; the 'legitimacy' of national-states to attempt cultural and political congruence; and the belief behind the aspirations and ambitions of all 'ethnic groups' who want to build nation-states.

The notion of ethnie in Anthony Smith's work is a very good example of this usage. Nations and national identity, are consistently analysed and explained in his work on the basis of a self-referential inner core called ethnie that unfolds and represents itself in the body of the nation-state, and/or in the voice of nationalism. A dominant pre-existent 'ethnie' is crucial for the formation of nation-states in Smith's argument,
A postmodern subject, on the other hand, is conceptualised by Stuart Hall as having no "fixed, essential or permanent identity. Identity becomes a 'moveable feast': formed and transformed continuously in relation to the ways we are represented or addressed in the cultural systems which surround us". According to Hall, if we feel that we have a unified identity from birth to death, both individually and collectively, it is only because we narrate it as such; because we narrate it according to fundamental facets of Enlightenment thought.

A postmodern view holds that the human subject not only has formed different collective identities in different times and places, but also these formed identities have a hybrid nature; there is no unified, coherent, completed 'self', or an inner core that is spatially and temporally transverse. The only 'time' that is spatially and temporally transverse, is Anderson's 'homogeneous empty time' in which anonymity of the individual is linked to an 'imagined community'. Or to look at it from a different angle, humanity has formed many different types of collective identities in different times and places, of which national identity is only one type. Some of these collective identities are based on kinship, tribes, clans, religions, dynasties, empires, ethnicities, regions and nation-states. The modern explanation of national identity based on an immemorial inner core, does not sufficiently explain why this inner core has only been represented by the nation-state, and in the form of national identity in the modern period.

In postmodern theory, the nationalised collective identity of the modern subject, in the body of the nation-state, is conceptualised as hybrid, ambivalent and fragmented in the processes of cultural representation (Bhabha); embodiments of 'disciplinary power' (Foucault); the product of official nationalism and colonialism (Benedict Anderson); Orientalised and Occidentalised in the colonial relationships (Edward Said).
To make it sound more familiar and in touch with postmodern literature, a postmodern critique of the nation-state deconstructs the Modernist accounts of the nations and nationalisms of themselves that are based on the assumptions of a distinctive common inner core, expressed in a homogeneous culture, embodied or to-be-embodied in the form of a nation-state. In a postmodern critique a different meaning is given to the phenomenon of the nation-state; to the distinction between 'us' and 'them'; to the way they are formed and to what they represent.

Let me try to capture the critique by first looking at the work of Said and Anderson, who posit the question of national identity in the context of colonialism, and then proceed to the work of Homi Bhabha.

In what comes below, I wish to link up the colonial context of the emergence of national identity and culture to the Foucaultian/Freudian/Saussurian analysis of Homi Bhabha in arriving at my postmodern conception of the nation-state.

1) The Nation-State & Colonialism
Edward Said offers one of the most illuminating contributions on the relationship between (National) culture and imperialism. In *Orientalism* as well as in *Culture and Imperialism*, he puts the question of 'culture' in the context of colonialism and imperial power relationships, and elaborates that the 'Oriental' and the 'Occidental' are part of each other's definitions, not mutually exclusive identities. He analyses the colonial processes as being bound to material interests, that have gone into the making of 'Oriental' & 'Occidental' identities. To him the making of 'us' & 'them' must be understood as a discourse of power in a Foucaultian sense, that is crystallised in the colonial discourses and relationships.

The dichotomisation of the 'Oriental' and 'Occidental' as mutually exclusive identities, is analysed, by Said, as a function of language and power, not reality. He defines 'Orientalism' as:
"a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between 'the Orient' and (most of the time) 'the Occident'....Thus a very large mass of writers, poets, novelists, philosophers, political theorists, economists and imperial administrators have accepted the basic distinction between East and West as the starting point...". (Said, 1978, p. 2).

He develops a style of analysis such as Foucault used in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* and *Discipline and Punish*, to write his *Orientalism*, and to develop a postmodern methodology. His contention is that without "examining Orientalism as a discourse, one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage, and even produce, the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period". (Said, 1978, P. 3).

In the above quotations, Said is clearly saying that the nexus of knowledge and power that has formed the discourse of 'Orientalism' is largely an 'Occidental' phenomenon. The Orient has never been an autonomous and free subject in determining what is thought, taught and written about it; how it is represented, and what network of interests it serves. The narratives of the Orient are largely produced outside it; the Orient has been turned into a historical and cultural professional 'field' for the involvement of Franco-British and later American experts: scholars and academics, politicians, businessmen and economists, military forces and the rest. The Orient is an enterprise with a considerable material investment, a system of knowledge, or as Disraeli wrote in his novel *Tancred*, the East was a career.

The Orientalisation of the Orient, is largely an Occidental product. Orientalism in this sense is a western ideological and practical vehicle of producing 'knowledge', and authorising views that can be institutionalised, taught and learned about the Orient. Hence, in the very nature of the discourse is embedded a power relationship in which knowledge about the Orient is linked with hegemony over the Orient.
In this discourse the ‘Occident’ is in a position that both creates its ‘Other’ (here the Orient), and also does the knowing, representing, and displaying of its ‘other’. The Orient, on the other hand, is both made/‘Orientalised’, subjectified, represented and displayed from its without; the Orient does not represent itself on its own terms; it is not a free subject in the process of representation; it is the exotic, erotic, savage...
Other. Two main conclusions can be drawn from Said’s ‘Orientalism’:

1) On the one hand, Said shows that the Orient constitutes an academic and a practical career for the West, and is an integral part of Western material and intellectual civilisation. Thus the Orient is part of the definition of the West, in the same way that the West is integrated in the making and the definition of the Orient. The dichotomy of ‘us’ and ‘them’ becomes very unstable in this light.

2) On the other hand, he contends that ‘pure’, ‘objective’ and ‘scientific’ knowledge has always been political and hegemonic in nature. Any ‘pure’ ‘knowledge’ about the cultural identity of the Orient and Occident is unavoidably linked to the positional superiority of the Occident. These positions are incommensurable, and the question of cultural representation in embedded in such a power relationship.

Like Gramsci and Foucault, Edward Said understands culture and cultural representation as essentially hegemonic systems. He builds an argument on the basis of this methodology, which is carried into *Culture and Imperialism*. He elaborates in his book that we can think of the ‘national’ culture as a hegemonic system. If nations’ subjective perceptions of themselves are largely based on narrations, then the power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming or emerging, is an integral part of the making of the ‘national’.
Benedict Anderson, in *Imagined Communities* argues that two forms of imagining (and narrating) the nation, from the eighteenth century onwards, have been the novel and the newspaper. These two forms are technical means for 'representing' the kind of imagined community that is the Nation. Anderson argues that in both the novel and the newspaper the idea of 'simultaneity-along-time' in a 'homogeneous empty time' is fundamental. The 'homogeneous empty time' is the time of the nation, and the time in which the 'homogeneous' nation lives. This 'homogeneous' time is printed on top of the daily newspapers, and is omnipresent calendrically and in the clock. The idea of 'simultaneity', which Anderson describes as cross-time and transverse, is fulfilled by the temporal coincidence of what the nation does in its national way of being; the nation's happening is confirmed by the news, the newspaper and the novel. In this sense, the nation is only aware of itself through a self-imagination that is produced and perpetuated by the print industry and through an 'empty homogeneous time' that links individual anonymity to his/her national identity, and to an idea of 'us'. (Anderson, 1991, pp. 24-25).

It is precisely the novel that Edward Said takes as his example in showing the colonial nature of what is regarded as national literature. He looks at many British novels in which the 'homogeneous empty time' of the nation, includes 'other' simultaneous colonial spaces and times that are transformed into, and represented as spaces of subordination.

Said refers to many novels amongst which are: Dickens's *Great Expectations*, Robert Hughes's *The Fatal Shore* and Paul Carter's *The Road to Botany Bay*. In these works of literature, references are made to Australia and 'white' colonies such as Ireland. "Australia was established as a penal colony in the eighteenth century for England to transport an irredeemable, unwanted excess population of felons to a place, originally charted by Captain Cook, that would also function as a colony replacing those lost in America. The pursuit of profit, the building of empire, and what Hughes calls social *apartheid* together produced modern Australia, which by the times
Dickens first took an interest in it during the 1840s (in *David Copperfield* Wilkins Micawber happily immigrates there) had progressed somewhat into profitability and a sort of 'free system'." (Said, 1993- Introduction, p. xvi)

In *The Road to Botany*, Carter makes an exploration of convicts, ethnographers, profiteers, soldiers whose presence in Australia is authorised by another social space called 'home'- England. The repatriation and rehabilitation of English criminals in this designated penal colony called Australia, is also reflected in *Great Expectations*, in which the character of Megawitch is transported there. In these 19th century novels, Said wants to show that 'other' colonial social spaces and times are integral and subordinated parts of the discourse of national imagination at 'home'.

What is essentially being said here is that the coloniser and the colonised, the 'Orientals' and the 'Occidentals' are part of each other's national histories, geographies, narratives and discourses. The national history of the western societies incorporates the histories and the geographies of Africa, India, Asia, Latin America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand; the question of national culture is pertinent to imperial relationships. It is within the context of colonialism and the incommensurability of the colonial positions, that systems of cultural representations, and cultural significations come into existence, and set the landscape for the national imagination.

Yet most cultural historians, Said continues, and almost all literary scholars have failed to remark the geographical notation, the theoretical mapping and charting of territory that underlies western fiction, and the philosophical discourse of the time. First comes the authority of the European observer, traveller, merchant, scholar, historian, novelist. Then comes the hierarchy of spaces, that a metropolitan economy is somehow dependent on an overseas territory to maintain prosperity at 'home'. Within this hierarchy of order, the 'other' is represented as existing as an 'object' of
some passing references as if it has no bearing on the making of national identity at 'home'.

Said gives us a perfect example of such a socio-cultural vision in Jane Austen's *Mansfield Park*, in which Thomas Bertram's slave plantation in Antigua is mysteriously necessary to the poise and the beauty of Mansfield Park, a place described in moral and aesthetic terms well before the scramble for Africa, or before the age of empire officially began. Austen's description of Mansfield Park and its potent resonance, sublimatesthe hardships of the Caribbean exploitation to a few passing references to Antigua. The geographical and cultural centrality of Mansfield Park in the literature completely disguises its contingency, and hence its hybrid identity. On the other hand, the structure of attitude and references to overseas possessions, and the social informing that this novel does, fixes normative social values at 'home'.

Said connects imperialism and culture by looking at national literature. In the light of Said's analysis all cultures embed structures of domination and subordination. At the same time that all nationally defined cultures are aspirations to sovereignty and homogeneity, they are paradoxically hybrid historical experiences.

Hobsbawm's edited book *The Invention of Tradition* gives us many examples of this hybridity. For example, in an article called 'Representing Authority in Victorian India, Benedict Cohen refers to the declaration of Queen Victoria as the Empress of India in 1876. Queen's Viceroy, Lord Lytton, was sent there to greet and celebrate in 'traditional' jamborees and durbras all over the country, as well as in a great Imperial Assemblage in Delhi, just like an old age national custom. The incorporation of the imperial Queen into the 'national' history of India, places the narratives of both 'national' cultures of India and Britain in the context of colonial contingency (Cohen, "Representing Authority in Victorian India". (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983, pp. 185-207).
To give another vivid example in the 20th century, one can refer to the narrative structures in Ian Fleming novels during the Cold War period. In all Fleming's novels *Casino Royale* (1953); *Live and Let Die* (1954); *Moonraker* (1955); *Diamonds are Forever* ((1956); *From Russia with Love* (1957); *Dr No* (1958); *Goldfinger* (1959); *Thunderball* (1961); *On Her Majesty's Secret Service* (1963) and *You Only Live Twice* (1964), there is a similar narrative structure. James Bond (Occidental hero, dutiful to the national interests, European, potent, virile, eventually in charge of the situation and successful) represents the nation and its national values. The villain represents the 'other', (normally impotent, corrupt, with disgusting physical attributes, representing 'wrong' social values, in a suspicious country, and eventually defeated). The woman in all these novels is a pretty girl, who has to be saved from the control of the villain by Bond. (Eco, 1984, chapter 6)

The binary opposition of Bond/villain is parallel to the binary opposition of 'us/them', free world/repressive world and beauty/beast and in all these novels the national interests are sought by the Occident outside the boundaries of the nation.

These novels linked social spaces, times and characters across the globe, and put them in a hierarchical order in which one set authorised and controlled the 'other' in the 'homogeneous empty time' of 'simultaneity' of the nation. Fleming's 'national' novels were made into 'national' films, and they fed the 'national' imagination of many generations enormously, not mentioning the great 'national' profits they made. They not only fed the 'national' imagination of the Occident, they also were (and still are) imported and consumed by the Orientals.

According to Said, these novelists have not just reflected on power relationships in their novels; they have also participated in making them, by weaving them into the

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1 Eco does not intend to develop a postmodern critique of James Bond novels, but to deconstruct these novels on the basis of linguistic binary opposites in order to write a structuralist account of Fleming's novels. However in doing so, the nationalistic nature of these novels is revealed.
'national' imagination, and by incorporating them into the simultaneity of 'national' discourses. In this light, Anderson's idea of 'homogeneous empty time' of the nation, can also be read as the homogeneous empty time of the empire.

In fact Anderson does relate the 'homogeneous empty time' of the nation to 'universal-imperial' interests himself, when he describes the state after the middle of 19th century as having a double status; 'universal-imperial' and 'particular-national'. The 'universal-imperial' status of the state concealed itself in the body of 'particular-national'. (Anderson, 1991, p. 85).

Inspired by Seton-Watson's *Nations and States*, Anderson develops chapter six of his book on 'official nationalism and imperialism'. He looks at the formation of national identity in the 19th century, as being simultaneously a function of 'official nationalism' of the state and 'imperialism' on the one hand, and print capitalism on the other. ²

'Official nationalism' of the State merged the idea of the nation-state with dynastic empire, and the empire began to dress in a 'national' flag and speak a 'national' language. Under the Romanov rule, the Russification of the empire (in which French and German were the spoken languages of the St. Petersburg court and provincial nobility; half of the 'nation' were still serfs, and more than half spoke a mother tongue other than Russian) was imposed. In 1887 the Russian language was made compulsory in the state schools, and Russification and the making of a Russian 'national' identity became an official policy of the empire.

2 Anderson maintains that by the mid 19th century some vernacularisation of the state language had happened in all dynasties (for a more detailed account, see his chapter two), which provided the foundation for a rapid national identification of all Euro-Mediterranean monarchies. "Romanovs discovered that they were Great Russians, Hanoverians that they were English, Hohenzollerns that they were Germans". (Anderson, 1991, p. 85)
Like Russification, Anglicization of British empire, provided vast opportunities for the armies of middle class metropolitans—functionaries, schoolmasters, merchants, planters and the rest to develop their career in 'Other' spaces. The British empire, scattered across all continents, anglicized the majority of subjected peoples who had no religious, linguistic, cultural and historical ties with the metropole.

The process of Japanification of the Koreans, Taiwanese and Manchurians, and after the outbreak of the Pacific War, Burmese, Indonesians and Filipinos also paralleled those processes of Russification and Anglicization after 1900.

In all these empires, the Japanified, Anglicized and Russified subjects were completely barred from entering the metropoles, or take positions of administration of the Russians, Englishmen, or Japanese. Ironically these empires were always resistant to any 'foreign' rule. Hence, these processes of nationalisation of diverse cultures in the hands of official nationalism of the imperial state, clearly and convincingly shows that the question of power is inseparably woven into the making of 'national' identities of 18th century onwards, and must enter into the narratives of the nation-state. The modern narratives of nationhood conceal the hybridity of 'national identity'.

Although the formation of the League of Nations in 1922, put an official end to high dynasticism, and established the nation-state as a legitimate international norm, the character of official nationalism of the state remains incomprehensible outside the framework of this colonial past.

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3 See Ronald Segal’s argument in The Black Diaspora (1995), where he clearly illustrates the interconnection of the processes of industrialisation of Britain, especially the cities such as Birmingham, Liverpool and Manchester with the slave trades of the 18th century. He shows that the industrial revolution, which characterises the modern Britain and is inseparable from British ‘national’ history evolved through the collective toil and death of the Other.

4 Anderson distinguishes between the official Nationalism of the state and ‘popular nationalism’. He looks at the 'last wave' of 'popular nationalism' in the colonial territories of Asia and Africa, largely in the second half of the 20th century, as a conditioned response to colonialism and its makings. The transformation of 'official nationalism' of the empires during the 18th and 19th centuries into the state nationalism of the nation-state after the first World War, in
In the work of Anderson and Said, we can acquire a different perception of the essence of the 'nation-state' and national identity from a different angle:

- The nation-state, and 'national' identity are essentially hegemonic and hybrid systems, whose formation, function and imagination should be analysed in the context of the slave trade, colonialism and imperialism.

- National imagination is formed by the incorporation of 'other' spaces, times and characters. Thus the 'other' is always part of the definition and conception of 'us'. The dichotomisation of us/them, is a function and a discourse of power. The incommensurability of positions in the structure of power relationships, is vital in the genesis of hegemonic systems such as 'national' culture.

- A postmodern conception of the nation-state, therefore, deconstructs the nationalistic perception of human subjects and their collectivities, that is based on an assumption of an ontological inner core within national boundaries.

Some of these conclusions are reached through the analysis of the nation made by Homi Bhabha in his *Nation & Narration*. He combines and adopts a Saussurian/Freudian/Foucaultian approach in developing his analysis of the notions of 'nation' and 'national culture'.

This paradoxical nature of nationalism, is also reflected upon by Tom Nairn in the *Break-up of Britain*, where he describes (popular) nationalism as "Janus-headed". On the one hand nationalism aims to nation-state/build, and on the other hand in its popular formation in Latin America, Asia and Africa, (and later in Eastern Europe, and in the former Soviet Union), it is a response against 'nationalising' activities of the imperial nation-States.
2) A Postmodern Narrative of the Nation-State

Homi Bhabha writes on the category of the nation-state from the position of late 20th century ex-colonised people and communities, who are gathered in exile as immigrants, refugees, foreigners, ethnic minorities, and people of diaspora, and who live in the margins of the imagined community. He writes about the cultural construction of nationhood, which in the name of the 'people', conceals their heterogeneity, and the experience of those in the edges and margins of the nation.

He presents the nation as an abstract modern meta-narrative; a narrative strategy for the standardisation of identity; an apparatus of power; a form of institutionalised political rationality; a symbolic force generated by the narcissism of self-referentiality; signified by the notion of a 'people', and in which the real individual is anonymous.

In "Nation and Narration", Bhabha looks at the concept of an imagined community which, on the one hand, comes from an immemorial past and glides into a timeless future, and on the other hand, has a historical newness in time and space of modernity. To Bhabha, this double meaning of the nation, indicates that nations and nationalisms by their very nature are ambivalent. Modern society, and the modern nation, are 'culturally ambivalent' (Bhabha, 1990, pp. 291-320).

Bhabha looks at the cultural representation of this ambivalence, that is produced by the nation's "conceptual indeterminacy" and "transitional history". He continues by arguing that the narrative of the nation, that is, the language and rhetoric of the nation, is also ambivalent, and as Tom Nairn puts it, 'Janus-headed'. Here both the narrative of the nation and the symbolic nation are agencies of ambivalence.

The ambivalence of the nation happens at three levels. Firstly, there is the temporal and spatial representation of the nation of itself that links its immemoriality to its
historical newness. Secondly there is its psychic ambivalence of love and hatred embodied in the form of 'us' and 'them'; and thirdly its representation of itself as being based on 'unities' and 'homogeneities' that as abstract representations are in tension with the realities of 'cultural difference'.

Below, I shall try to elaborate these three dimensions of 'ambivalence' in the work of Bhabha, in reference to Saussure, Freud and Foucault, whose influence on Bhabha, in my opinion, gives rise to the above levels of conceptualisation of ambivalence.

F. Saussure's influence on Bhabha

One way of establishing the ambivalence of the nation, for Bhabha, is to look at the narrative strategy of the nation that simultaneously fulfils two pedagogical and performative functions of the nation. These two functions link the nation's nationalistic self-conception of itself as immemorial and timeless, to the historical newness of the nation.

The Pedagogical function of the nation, in Bhabha, refers to the totality of social references that represent and signify the nation as immemorial and timeless; the way the nation is taught and thought by nationalism and by the official authorities, and by the institutions that represent the 'nation'.

The Performative function of the nation, on the other hand, refers to the unfolding and representation of the nation in its daily life by itself, where the nation lives and performs its modern national life. In this sense the nation is signified by its own daily activities and subjectivities in the present time.

In the body of these two functions, the nation is told in a pedagogical narrative, and it also does the telling of itself in its performative narrative; the nation is both signified in its pedagogical dimension, and is a signifier of itself in its performance; the nation is both a category of immemoriality and modernity; of
'past' and 'present'. The nation is both a structure and a practice; it synthesises the objectivity of the pedagogy that does the teaching, and the subjectivity of the participants who do the acting, feeling and self-narrating. The Modernist problematic of structure/agency is also resolved in such a conception of the nation.

The intertwining of performative/pedagogical; telling/told; signifier/signified; present/past of the nation is inspired by, and similar to, a Saussurian distinction between *Langue* and *parole* in language; one being the language of pedagogy and the other the language of people. However, the unity of these functions in the name of 'people', makes 'people' like a linguistic 'sign' that always, according to Saussure, arbitrarily unites the signifier to the signified. He proposes to retain the word sign to designate the whole and to replace concept and sound-image respectively by signified and signifier.

The first principle that Saussure established about the nature of the sign is its arbitrary nature, by which he means that there is no innate relationship between the *signified* and the *signifier*.

The implication of this for the Nation, is that there is no *innate* relationship between the pedagogical/performative, immemorial/modern dimensions of the nation. The nation-state as a modern container of collective identity has no natural one-to-one relationship to immemoriality and the antiquity of ethnicities.

However this arbitrary connection is hidden in the name of the 'people', and in the 'nation-space' of the cultural. The link is a political one living in the sphere of culture. I have already argued for 'culture' to be perceived as a hegemonic system as it is in Anderson's and Said's work. Therefore it can be concluded that the arbitrary linkages of the narratives of the nation is a hegemonic phenomenon.
The absence of an innate relationship between the immemorial nation signified by its pedagogues, and the modern nation that signifies itself in its performance, is precisely why Bhabha conceives the nation, and the 'national subject', to be 'split' in a 'double-time'. The reason is that the category of 'people' is the 'object' of narrating the nation in an immemorial sense by its pedagogues, and it is also simultaneously the 'subject' of narrating the nation in a modern sense by its performers. These disjunctive narratives, according to Bhabha, indicate the ambivalence of the nation at the level of language and consciousness.

Freud's influence on Bhabha

None of the above, however, can ever explain why the nation is so enthusiastically performed; why people sacrifice themselves for the nation; how national figures, symbols, traditions, legends and legacies get hooked into the nation's memories and sentiments.

A Freudian reading of Bhabha provides some answers to these questions, and explains the ambivalence of the nation in a different light - psychically. To Freud what binds people, communities and groups together always has a libidinal essence, that can only be analysed in reference to primary instincts and the 'unreason' of the group. Love and hate have to go hand in hand in giving rise to solid bondings and communities. Freud says "it is always possible to bind together a considerable number of people in love, so long as there are other people left to receive the manifestation of their aggressiveness". (Freud, 1961, p.114)

Ambivalence to Freud, is a psychic phenomenon. Its roots are in the period of early childhood when, in the case of little girls, their initial total love and desire for the mother has to be transformed into competition with the mother for the father's love. The little girl identifies with the mother, at the same time that she wants to replace her to gain father's love. In the case of the little boys, the original love for the mother also has to be followed by first a competition with the father for the love of the
mother, but eventually the abandonment of the mother as the original love object, and an identification with the father.

*Ambivalence*, and the intertwining of love and hatred in the processes of identification, means that at the level of the group, individuals in their narcissistic search for the love (always libidinal in nature) of the group, have to give up their egoism for altruism and be united in the group, or as Freud says, identify with the group. However the psychic function of hatred, is embodied in the group's distinction of itself from the 'Other', the 'foreigners', and in the diversion of their hatred or aggressiveness towards them. (Freud, 1959)

The most famous study that has taken place within this Freudian proposition, is that of Theodor Adorno on "Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda". In this analysis of Fascism during the 2nd World War, a Freudian approach has been adopted. The psychic ambivalence of love/hatred is manipulated for political purposes by Hitler. Through the excitement and sensationalisation of 'love for Germany', a very strong Fascist group is materialised around Hitler as the father figure, whose aggressiveness and hatred is then diverted against the Jews in the form of anti-semitism. According to Adorno no system of rationality can explain the Fascist propaganda and its barbaric genocides. Only the irrational, the unreason, the psychic can explain the mass psychological base of fascism. (Adorno, 1982, pp. 118-137).

The Freudian discovery of the unconscious furnishes the way to perceive human identity in term of symbolic and contradictory processes of identification. Thus when Bhabha talks about the intertwining of 'us' and 'them' in the 'liminality' (which I understand to mean the threshold of the unconscious) of the nation, he is in fact referring to this structure of the collective unconscious.
What Bhabha is saying here, is that the nation's ambivalent psyche, automatically constitutes the borders beyond which the Other is posited, whereas the 'other' is part of the psychic structure of the nation. The nation and its locality is neither unified nor unitary in itself, but resides beyond and outside itself in its 'Other'. Here the other important concept in Bhabha, hybridity of identity, is produced and anchored psycho-analytically. The nation and its 'other' are located in the same psychic structure. The nation has a hybrid essence. Bhabha comes to a similar conclusion to those of Said and Anderson, from a psychoanalytic angle. The rhetoric of the nation in the hands of nationalism signifying an inner common core, is always 'incomplete in its signification', as it excludes the Other from its own definition. The 'other' is part of our definition even when we think and speak most intimately and indigenously between ourselves, Bhabha reiterates.

The Freudian scheme of psychic ambivalence such as desire/disavowal, narcissism/projection, self/other, unconscious/conscious etc, is admittedly very influential in Bhabha's work. To Freud the narcissism of the group, the cohering principle that bonds the group together can only happen if there is an 'other that can be hated and enemised'. This unconscious ambivalence is the major psychic factor in any identification process. To Freud doubling, dividing and interchanging of the Self is part of being and becoming a group. And that is why Bhabha places the marginals, migrants, refugees, ethnic minorities, in the midst of the nation's liminality (collective unconscious).

The third highly influential thinker, that leaves an unmistakable impact on the work of Bhabha, is Michael Foucault.

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5 Note how the psychic ambivalence of the nation and the way it resides in the Other, is similar to the Said's conceptualisation of the Occidental/Oriental in *Orientalism* (1978), who also looks at the way the Orient and the Occident reside in each other's identities.
Foucault's influence on Bhabha

Foucault gives us an account of the modern subjects, as 'docile bodies', who are the agents of materialisation of 'disciplinary power'. 'Disciplinary power' is the 'panopticon' function of modern institutions, whose technologies of, and concern with administration, regulation and surveillance produce 'normality' and maintain a particular order. The modern sites of 'disciplinary power', according to Foucault, are the police, the school, the hospital, the clinic, the prison, the psychiatry, the mental institution, and to Bhabha, the nation-state, and its narrative strategies. 'Disciplinary power' refers to a kind of regime that produces and maintains 'normality', not so much by external force, but through its homogenising and regulating effects, here in the form of national identity. (Foucault, 1979).

Homi Bhabha takes the nation-state as one of the modern apparatuses of 'disciplinary power' that standardises, homogenises and normalises a national identity around the dichotomy of 'us' and 'them'. The 'disciplinary power' generates and preserves the rationality of nationality through the dominant state of 'knowledge' of the time; its discourses, practices, and conceptual system, which together form the notion of 'truth'. This Foucaultian triangle of power, knowledge, truth (always temporally and spatially bound) is the basis of his genealogical and archaeological investigations in all his books. According to this triangle there is no system of power that does not need some form of 'legitimation', which in turn is endorsed by what is 'known' at the time to be 'true' and 'correct'.

However the significance of this triangle, with all its regulatory functions, is that it does not function merely 'objectively' and does not emanate merely from an external source; it enters into the very depth of human subjectivity, and his/her self perception. The triangle of power, knowledge, truth forms a mode of governing the soul and the body. It is in this light that Foucault presents the 'modern subject' as the agency of the actualisation of 'disciplinary power'. He says: "it does not matter who exercises
power. Any individual, taken almost at random, can operate the machine". (Foucault, 1979, 202).

In this light, the homogenising and normalising functions of the nation are facets of 'disciplinary power'. And the homogenised community of the nation, is taught as a given in the pedagogical narrative strategies of the nation, and this is precisely the way power lives. It lives in narrative strategies of the pedagogues of the nation, and it lives in the performative function of the nation. Power lives in the mind, heart and the body of each individual, in the way they perceive themselves, and in the way their bodies are educated.

Bhabha, too, conveys the same message that power is embedded in the homogenising discourses and practices of the nation-state. Human subjectivity, human mind and body constitute the first and last 'stations' where these discourses and practices must live. Hence, the 'disciplinary power' works towards the docility of the mind and the body. A very good example of the way the body is regulated in specific manners to produce a different self perception, is given in Goffman's *Asylums* which clearly shows how the treatment of human body and mind is transformed in the asylum centre, in generating and maintaining and administering control through a new self-perception for the inmates (Goffman, 1968).

In the light of this analysis, and by a Foucaultian definition, power is inseparable from the narrative strategies of the Nation. The *imagined communities* are *docile communities*. Their soldiers, clergymen, military men, teachers, politicians, doctors, police, work force as well as their criminals, actualise the discourse of the nation and how it should behave in solidarity, in unity, in war, at work and in other situations. Each receives specialised training of their minds and bodies in order to serve and actualise the Nation.
Foucault conceptualises power in a totally fascinating new way; to him power and its operation is to be found in the processes of dispersion, dichotomisation and marginalisation; in individuals' bodies and identities. He rejects the modernist idea of power to be anchored in macro-structures and ruling classes. The operation of power, according to Foucault, does not happen so much through physical force, but through the hegemony of norms, technologies of normalisation, the shaping of the body and soul, the individual and group's subjective identity. For this reason, Foucault in *The History of Sexuality* calls this new mode of power; 'bio-power'. 'Bio-power' links the 'technologies of domination' to the 'technologies of self' through the dominant paradigm of knowledge and discourse. (Foucault, 1980, Vol. 2).

I suggest Foucault's conceptualisation of 'technologies of domination' is the same as Bhabha's 'pedagogical narrative' strategy of the nation. And his 'performative narrative' of the nation echoes Foucault's 'technologies of self', where the nation performs its 'own' discourse in a daily 'national' life. The 'split' between the two, is conditioned by the structure of our psychic ambivalence, but in its external manifestation it is dichotomised and signified by the presence of the periphery, the marginal and the 'other'. The people of the nation-state are both the embodiment of the mechanism of power over, and the exclusion of the 'other', while they also are the 'other' in their collective unconscious.

Bhabha argues: "Once the liminality of the nation-space is established, and its 'difference' is turned from the boundary 'outside' to its finitude 'within', the threat of cultural difference is no longer a problem of 'other' people. It becomes the otherness of the people-as-one" since otherness is a psychic function. (Bhabha, 1990, p. 301)

Hence, the categories of *ambivalence* and *hybridity* are essential in Bhabha's postmodern reading of the nation-state; the concept of *Power* is also vital in his scheme as it explains how the ambivalence and hybridity of identity are administered and homogenised into dichotomised notions of 'us' and 'them'. *Liminality* on the
other hand refers to the nation's collective unconscious where this dichotomisation of 'us' and 'them' finds a psychic basis.

In an article called "Reading Dissemination", Nikos Papastergiadis interprets Bhabha's theory of ambivalence and hybridity as one which attempts to understand the perplexity of cultural difference, and redefine the process of identification, and the practice of agency in modernity. In this light the post-colonial migrant, the 'subaltern colonised', the 'minority/race' discourse, the 'marginalised', are all incorporated into the making of any 'homogeneous' nation, while they are concealed in the narratives of the nation. They are subjects of both identification and derision.

**Conclusion**

Postmodern theory in one sense is a critical analysis of, and reaction to Modernity and its vision. Modernity in social theory, on the one hand, is the intellectual legacy of the Enlightenment that adopts 'pure' reason and sciences to know and master its 'subject' matter from an 'objective' position, and on the other hand Modernity constituted with its vision certain dichotomies such as objective/subjective, us/them, rational/emotional etc, that fractured the unity of human experience, language and knowledge. It constituted the 'other' in the depth of human identity.

The most gigantic modern institution of 'culture industry' that homogenises and standardises identity, in reference to the discourse of otherness, is the nation-state. In this chapter I have presented a postmodern critique of the nation-state that offers a radically different reading of the nation-state, as an apparatus of power that produces mega-narratives of a sovereign, homogenous and united collective identity in the name of the 'people'.

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According to modern narratives of the nation, the nation is built on the basis of a historical homogeneous common core, which explains the 'unity' of the nation, and unfolds itself immemorially and historically. A postmodern theory of the nation-state de-constructs this vision and anchors the question of national identity in the locus of the 'other', and in doing so, erases its totalising boundaries, thereby challenging the political and ideological manoeuvres that assume an essentialist core in the imagined communities, and argues for the hybridity of national identity.

I have tried to show how Anderson, Said and Bhabha, each in different ways, have developed a postmodern understanding on the nation. Anderson deciphers the nation as being originally a dynastic and imperial production. He shows that in almost every case, official nationalism hides a discrepancy between the nation and the dynastic realm; how Slovaks were Magyarized, Indians Anglicized, Koreans Japanified in a vertical system of power relationships which made their positions incommensurable. And he also shows how this vertical building of the nation by the state, forms a horizontal homogenous empty time in which the nation is homogenised as a 'unity'.

Said's deconstruction of the dichotomy of the 'Oriental' and 'Occidental' also serves to strengthen the argument for the hybridity of the nation, and once again he shows how hybridity is concealed in the dichotomised narratives of 'Oriental' and 'Occidental'. This argument is further illustrated, when he deciphers the colonial space and time that are interwoven into the national literature and culture.

To Bhabha, the hybridity of the nation has been analysed from the locus of the 'other'; the ex-colonised, migrants and refugees whose experience of nationhood is formed from the edges and margins of the nation. His postmodern analysis aims to locate them in the centrality of the national discourse. In doing so, he looks at narrative strategies of the nation, and develops his argument along psychoanalytic and linguistic lines to show that the (Pedagogical and performative) narratives of the nation are arbitrarily connected in the name of the 'people'. The notion of 'people' has
arbitrarily been equated with the nation. He argues that these strategies are systems of cultural representation and signification, that firstly homogenise the nation against the 'other', who is then externalised, racialised, colonised, ethnicised and located either beyond 'national' borders, and/or at the margins of it. The other function of these narrative strategies is that they disguise the heterogeneities and diversities that exist internally, and lastly authority is exercised and concealed at the same time in these narratives and in the image of 'people'.

Bhabha wants to deconstruct these narratives by adopting the Freudian concept of ambivalence, according to which all processes of identification entail both feelings of love and aversion. This psychic ambivalence conditions the bonding of the group, while simultaneously forming an 'other' for exclusion who can then be hated.

The combination of these contributions, gives a new meaning to the modern nation-state as a hybrid and ambivalent system of cultural representation and signification that is formed in the colonial and imperial contexts of power relationships, and in the midst of the incommensurability of the power positions.

This critique of the nation-state reflects the theoretical resurgence of the 'other', (in the post-colonial period) to challenge the narrative strategies of the nation-state. The challenge is an attempt to deconstruct the Modernist dichotomised identities that are anchored in the heritage of colonialism and the Enlightenment, and reconstruct a new postmodern decolonised identity based on hybridity and ambivalence.

Next, I turn to "Postmodern Political Economy and the Nation-State" where I examine the structural transformations of the late 20th century and their impacts on the nation-state and its boundaries. I believe that without a structural understanding of the postmodern society/culture, a comprehensive postmodern analysis cannot be achieved. The next chapter will examine the structural sources of power, which is missing from both Foucault and Bhabha. In my opinion Foucault and Bhabha’s
magnificent analyses are inadequate in providing the answer to why the narrative strategies (of the nation) are written the way they are. They have just told us how they are made.
Chapter four: 
The Political Economy of Postmodernity 
and the Nation-State

The postmodern opposition to the Enlightenment's totalising meta-narratives aims to deconstruct all homogenising and standardising narratives of identity in the national, racial, sexual and gender spheres. In doing so, all institutional forms of administration and representation of modern identity are analysed as discourses of power. The nation-state as the prime container of modern collective identity, in this light, can be deconstructed theoretically as a modern apparatus of power. A model of a postmodern analysis of the nation-state has been offered in the previous chapter.

In the work of Foucault, the school, the prison, the asylum centre, the psychiatric clinic/hospital etc, are analysed as the institutional forms of both making and representing human identity in a historically specific triangle discourse of power, truth and knowledge. In the work of Bhabha, Anderson and Said, as I have tried to show in chapter three, the Foucaultian concepts of power, discourse, truth and knowledge are employed to define the nation-state; to show how the discourse and truth of nationhood and the making of national identity are historically linked to specific power relationships. The very knowing of the nation of itself; the knowledge of nationhood that is embodied and represented in various national institutional forms; the nation's 'imagination' of itself can be analysed as intertwined with the issue of power, emanating from the modern machinery of representation of identity. Accordingly the nation-state is a discourse of power that through the apparatus of the western modern state, has produced a few grand 'homogeneous' national identities,
histories and geographies from diverse 'peoples', 'communities', 'localities', and 'ethnicities' that existed in the pre-modern world.

What is missing from a postmodern account of power, and Bhabha's account of the nation-state, is a conceptualisation of the infrastructure and location of power. It might even be a contradiction in terms for a postmodern theory to seek and explain the structural location of power since causal analysis is largely abandoned in postmodern theory. If that is the case, my suggestion is that the conceptualisation of power as dispersed and fragmented, and as incorporated into the discourses and practices of every day life, can be enriched if grounded in the political economy of the post-industrial or postmodern society. The question of political economy has always been pivotal in the analysis of power, and I do not think that a meaningful analysis can be made on the issue of power or its deconstruction in the postmodern society outside the framework of political economy. What are the infrastructures of social power? Which interests does power serve? and what are the structural forms and discourses of power? The answers to these questions are of paramount importance for a postmodern analysis of power and its institutional forms in any historical era.

I would like to save the invaluable Foucaultian postmodern approach to the question of power in which power operates in a diffuse force-field of relations of subjugation and struggle, but I would like to propose that this diffusion does not require us to deny that power is still controlled and integrated by specific and identifiable macrological positions of economic and political hegemony, such as transnational corporations, multinational banks, the mass media and the whole industry of software and digital telecommunications. Power may be dispersed, it may be operating through the 'technologies of self', and it is surely possible to perceive all power as ultimately 'bio-power', but there are certain social, cultural and political positions, 'fields' or 'habitus', as Bourdieu puts it, where power/knowledge is more concentrated than others. What Foucault does not adequately reflect on is that
diffused and dispersed power is unevenly distributed, it *does* serve some more than others, and we can still distinguish between the macro-terminals of power located in the context of capitalist political economy and the micro-terminals of power where it is effectively integrated in the belief systems and the body. If this is so, then it should also be possible to conceptualise structures of power in relation to political economy.

What Foucault, and Bhabha, rarely analyse is the importance of macro-terminals of power, (such as transnational corporations, multinational banks, the mass media and the whole industry of software and digital telecommunications), and I believe this prevents their theories from being firmly grounded in macrological forces. Even if power is conceptualised as diffuse and disciplinary, it still needs to be more adequately conjoined with macro-perspectives that are necessary to illuminate a wide range of contemporary issues in the light of the *hegemony of capital*.

The aim of this chapter is, therefore, to ground a postmodern critique of the nation-state, as modelled in Chapter Three, in the political economy of postmodernity. By ‘political economy of postmodernity’, I mean the structural changes that have occurred with the advent of micro-electronics as the third significant phase of capitalist development in the last few decades. It will be argued below that it is possible to ground postmodern theory, art, culture and society on a postmodern political economy, and develop a macro-perspective of it. Consequently, it will also be suggested that the deconstruction of modern macro-narratives of identity by postmodern theory, need not and cannot eliminate all macro-narratives in giving an account of postmodern society. To conceptualise a postmodern society and culture without linking the argument to the structures of late capitalist political economy, and its new spatial and temporal modes of governance, will lead to reductionism and partial understanding of the postmodern phenomena, because as I have explained above, an understanding of the political economy of late capitalism helps us to deepen our explanatory power on postmodern social and cultural phenomena.
I shall therefore try to analyse the structural changes of late capitalism that have furnished the ground for a postmodern conceptualisation and transcendence of the time and space of the nation-state. The work of scholars such as Scott Lash and John Urry, David Harvey and Baudrillard who have made profound contributions in explaining the structural changes of late capitalism, will be examined.

The aim of this chapter is to explore the effects of the structural changes of the late 20th century on the institution of the nation-state. This analysis will focus firstly on the general literature on globalisation, before proceeding to the second and third parts on the postmodern political economy and politics.

1) Globalisation

The blanket term 'globalisation' has been frequently used by many academics and non-academics alike to denote the structural changes that have occurred in the national society in the age of micro-electronics and to refer to the emergence of a global village of mass telecommunications. The primary concern of most traditional sociology text-books is to engage themselves with the analysis of 'modern society'. 'Modern society' is conventionally understood as a cohesive, bounded entity that can adequately and comprehensively lend itself to an investigation of different aspects of the social system. The notion of 'modern society' normally becomes indistinguishable from the nation-state and the national society.

During the 1980s, the concept of globalisation appeared and rapidly became a normative word, not only within the social sciences, but also in the world of media, business, advertising, financial and intellectual circles. Many scholars believe that humanity has entered a new phase of its life that can best be understood as 'global'. and the 'global society' is subsuming the 'national society'.

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Rosenau proclaims that the world has entered the era of post-international politics, a 'historical break-point' in which "present premises and understanding of history's dynamics must be treated as conceptual jails" (Rosenau, 1990. p. 5). To him the era of post-international policies is the time of post-national society as well.

Anthony McGrew suggests that "globalisation (is) simply the intensification of global interconnectedness, (and) it is transforming the existing world order most conspicuously through its direct challenge to the primacy of the nation-state in its present form" (McGrew 1992, P.63). In the same passage McGrew identifies the major globalising forces to be:

- the global financial system;
- the intensification of corporate activity;
- the existence of global telecommunications and media networks;
- the global production and dissemination of knowledge;
- escalating significance of transnational religious and ethnic ties;
- the enormous flows of people across national boundaries (as tourists, as immigrants, as refugees, and for business);
- the emerging authority of institutions and communities above the nation-state

These forces, he argues, are reconstituting the world as a single space. The task of sociology should be to look at the 'world society' that is constituted under the impact of these forces, instead of national society, in order to make sense of contemporary human conditions.

McGrew's proposition is congruent with Wallerstein's introduction of the concept of the 'world system' into the social sciences. Wallerstein has emphasised the pivotal role of capitalism in the process of globalisation. To him historical capitalism by its very essence is a globalising enterprise. The logic of capitalism is to conquer new markets, gain and maximise profit, and this logic is necessarily global in reach. The
entire globe moves towards operating on the basis of a single social division of labour, single market and price mechanisms that we can call world-economy (Wallerstein 1984, P.18). To Wallerstein, although the world-economy moves towards a single universal space, the fragmentation of power and wealth will not be eradicated, which in turn will cause periodic crises in the form of nationalist movements, socialist up-rising, and environmental campaigns. Hence the integrative global space of capitalism, is simultaneously a space of fragmentation, contradiction and crisis.

To Wallerstein the nation-state is an important political unit of the world to deal with the conflicts that have resulted from inequalities of wealth and power. The world-economy is conceived as having unequal structural arrangements linking the core to semi-peripheral and peripheral areas, each of which have a functional role in sustaining the global world-economy.

Two themes are important in Wallerstein's work. One is that globalisation does not mean homogenisation of culture, since the inequalities of wealth and power are sustained in both national and international levels. Globalisation merely means incorporation of difference at a world level within a framework that is formed by global forces. Secondly the capitalist economy is regarded as the structural mechanism behind processes of globalisation.

Contrary to Wallerstein, Rosenau stresses the primacy of technology and its transformative capacities in the processes of globalisation. He says:

"It is technology... that has so greatly diminished geographic and social distances through the jet-powered airliner, the computer, the orbiting satellite, and the many other innovations that now move people, ideas and goods more rapidly and surely across space and time than ever before. It is technology that has profoundly altered the scale on which human affairs take place... ". (Rosenau, 1990. P.17)
McGrew gives us a summary of Giddens' conception of globalisation, according to which Giddens refers to globalisation as a multidimensional discourse of capitalism, the interstate system, militarism and industrialism. Each of these dimensions impose their own globalising imperatives, and entail distinct institutional and constitutional forces. Giddens' account of globalisation connects the emergence and spread of capitalism, industrialism and the inter-state system, and holds them all responsible for the creation of a single world space (Giddens 1990, P. 283). Globalisation, for Giddens, should not be understood as a diffusion of western institutions across the world, crushing other cultures, but it should be perceived as multi-layered, contingent, patchy, heterogeneous, discontinuous process which is caused by diversity of intersecting dynamics; it is "a process of uneven development that fragments as it co-ordinates" (Giddens, 1990, P 175).

Appadurai's 'Disjunction and Difference in the global Cultural Economy' in *Theory, Culture and Society* (June 1990 Vol. 7 No. 2-3) proposes five dimensions of national fragmentation that in their re-articulation on a global level, constitute the infrastructure of the process of globalisation. He underlines five dimensions of the global culture:

a) "ethnoscapes" referring to tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles, guest-workers and other moving groups that form an essential feature of the postmodern world;

b) "Medioscapes" denoting the global nature of the media world;

c) "Ideoscapes" which are related to the production of images and impressions available throughout the world to the people through the media and the culture of consumerism;

d) "technoscapes" reflecting on the multinational and cross-boundaried character of informational technology and finally
e) "finanscapes" referring to the rapid dispositions of global capital, currency, markets, stocks and exchanges.

These five parameters, which characterise the global culture, argues Appadurai, are in a deep disjunctive relationship, and provide an infrastructure for the postmodern socio-economic and cultural space. It is within this disjunctive framework that production and consumption strategies are integrated and enforced.

It is, therefore, the rise of a global infrastructure, which determines cultural strategies on the global level. According to Appadurai ethnic, media, ideological, financial and technological 'scapes' are first fractured and fragmented within the limits of the national bounds, and then re-articulated disjunctively at a global level. In this way the notions of cultural 'fragmentation', 'dispersion' and 'de-centring' of identity become explicable in reference to the political economy of the latest phase of capitalism.

The first common conclusion, that most scholars who advocate the idea of globalisation arrive at, is that the process of globalisation does not entail homogenisation of a global culture. They theorise globalisation as a multi-layered, contingent, patchy, heterogeneous process which entails fragmentation and dispersion of national spaces of culture and identity along ethnic, ideological, financial, technological, and communication levels; it is also why Stuart Hall conceptualises the postmodern subject as 'de-centred' (Hall 1992, P. 285); and why in Bhabha's account 'ambivalence' and 'hybridity' are at the core of human identity (Bhabha 1990).

I believe it is difficult for a postmodern theory to grasp the essence of fragmentation, dispersion, ambivalence, uncertainty and hybridity of 'postmodern identity/culture' if their accounts are not clearly linked to the deep infrastructural changes that
characterise late 20th century capitalism. These structures are the focus of the rest of this chapter.

On this note, I now turn to look at the work of David Harvey, Scott Lash and John Urry, and Baudrillard whose works are dedicated to analysing the structural changes of capitalism in recent decades.

2) Postmodern political economy

The terms postmodernity and post-industrial structures are used synonymously in this chapter because they both denote the structural transformations of the last few decades that have resulted from the advent of computerisation and mass telecommunications. There are several theses that attempt to analyse the structural changes of late 20th century. Below I will briefly look at three of them; 1) The Flexible accumulation thesis; 2) The Disorganised capitalism thesis, and 3) Economies of the sign thesis.

2.1- Flexible Accumulation thesis

David Harvey begins the second chapter of his book The Conditions of Postmodernity with the assumption that the "basic rules of capitalist mode of production continue to operate as invariant shaping forces in historical (experience of time), and geographical (experience of space) developments" (Harvey 1989 p.121). Seeking profit and expanding on the basis of such pursuit under the coercive laws of competition and over-accumulation in the local markets, remains the central attribute of the capitalist mode of production.

To overcome the problems caused by high competition and over-accumulation, capital has always had the tendency to expand to new territories and new markets. In doing so, in the last few decades there has evolved a new phase in the development of the capitalist mode of production. This phase is marked by a micro-electronic
revolution that has led to a new mode of integration and control of global capital. There has also been a corresponding "transition in the regime of accumulation and associated modes of social and political regulation" (Harvey 1989, P. 121).

Due to the pressure of competition and over-accumulation, fall in prices and loss of profit, capitalism is always experimenting and innovating new methods of accumulation that reduce the turnover time, on the one hand, and on the other hand expand geographically to find new markets and cheaper resources. This means that capitalism by its very nature works towards the annihilation of time and integration of space.

The development of micro-electronic technologies, such as mass telecommunications and computerised network systems, fulfils both of the above strategies. They make the whole cycle of production much faster, while they enable capital to gain a new dimension in its geographical integration across national boundaries. As a result the previous rigid hierarchies in the structure and organisation of production have been replaced by more horizontal integration of capital both organisationally and structurally across space. Harvey calls this a transition from Fordism to post-Fordism and 'flexible accumulation'; a transition that involves new temporal and spatial strategies and allows for a much more flexible accumulation of capital across the globe.

In this sense the tendency of becoming global and beyond the boundaries of the nation-state, is simply part of the essence of capitalism. Harvey suggests that in a sense, the spatial and temporal confines of the nation-state, were largely responsible for the crisis of over-accumulation. The time and space of the nation-state had to be overcome through global mechanisms of flexible accumulation, which also explains how the material growth of capitalism enlarges the spatial framework of capitalist production and organisation. This is echoed by Wallerstein, when he reminds us that
capitalism from the beginning has never had any spatial commitment, and has always been globally tentative (Wallerstein 1983).

The fundamental changes that have shifted our experiences of time and space in the last few decades can therefore be explained in reference to the transition from Fordist methods of production to post-Fordism and a regime of flexible accumulation. In this historical transformation and transition from industrial capitalism to microelectronic capitalism, the vertical integration of capital has been replaced by a horizontal integration through computer networks and global telecommunication systems leading to a more flexible accumulation of capital. Financial centralisation, hierarchical and bureaucratic organisational forms of capital management have also been disintegrated at a vertical and bureaucratic level of the nation-state, and have horizontally been articulated into a global microelectronics and computerised networks of control and integration. Just-in-time, small-batch production and delivery system, sub-contracting, outsourcing, all have reduced the turnover times in many sectors of production.

Acceleration of the turnover time in production entails parallel accelerations in exchange, distribution and consumption. Electronic banking, plastic money, containerisation, computerised financial services are some of the media that speed up the rate of exchange, the rate of accumulation and profit. The postmodern forces and technologies of production such as computerised network systems and mass telecommunications speed up the distribution of commodities both in physical and imagery forms. And finally the consumerist culture, and the mobilisation of disposable fashions and commodities among masses are some of the ways of increasing the rate of consumption within a global economic network.

The first major consequence of the transition to the microelectronic phase of capitalism, according to Harvey, has been to "accentuate volatility and ephemerality of fashion, products, production, techniques, labour processes, ideas, ideologies,
values and established practices" (Harvey 1989 P. 285). Disposability, instantaneity and the uninterrupted ephemerality of pleasurable pursuits and consumption affect the value structures of the society, enter into the cultural realm and lead to a break-up and fragmentation of consensus. All that is solid melts into air. Solidities and continuities weaken and ‘difference’ becomes the sensibility of the day which is then celebrated and promoted by the cultural and economic strategists of the global economy.

Thus as the microelectronics technologies and the digital mass telecommunications transform the strategies of capital accumulation across time and space, and as they lay down the foundation of the political economy of postmodernity, they also shape new cultural sensibilities that are ironically united around notions such as fragmentation and difference. This argument clearly shows how the cultural forms and discourses of power, and the ideology or culture of postmodernism, can be firmly rooted in the political economy and hegemony of (late) capitalism.

In the transnational force-field of late capitalism the material links between political-economic and cultural processes can be highlighted. Postmodernism, postmodern theory and postmodernity can be structurally linked. This linkage can also be explored and further strengthened from a different angle by looking at the categories of time and space in Modernity and in postmodernity. Modernity is about an ongoing process of techno-scientific 'development', 'advancement' and 'progress' of social and economic life. The obsession with the process of 'becoming' (looking forward to the next), rather than 'being' and remaining (immobility in space and place) characterises Modernity. Modernity has always had a higher emphasis on temporal acceleration, because 'time is gold', and the faster the beat of social life, the faster the accumulation of 'gold'.

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1 Foucault wondered about the modern processes in which space was treated as immobile, undialectical, dead and fixed as opposed to time being associated with flux, life, fecundity and dialectic (1984, 70).
On the other hand, any system of representation always involves an attempt to stop the flow of time, and spatialize what is being represented. In other words any system of representation is always a spatialization of sorts which automatically freezes the flow of experience, and in doing so, it inevitably distorts what it strives to represent; For instance, we spatialize time, in the form of the clock, to represent it, to tell it; We spatialize family memory, in the form of an album; thought in the form of a book; life in the form of a home, an office, a car; and collective life in the form a nation-state. In all these forms of spatialization, humanity seeks to imprison the passing time, the flow of life into some recognisable form of spatial fixity that represents ‘secure belonging’ and ‘continuity’. This is why Harvey believes that space is compressed time, and that is what the space is for. However, the mode of spatial allocation and representation is always intrinsically linked to the question of political economy. On this basis it is conceivable that the postmodern political economy may also shift our strategies of spatialization in cultural realms. It is not surprising that the postmodern was first experienced and expressed in the field of architecture. And the space of the nation-state is the giant architecture of modern times.

But this is not all. Space, and the modes of utilising it, are also a discourse of power and are used in political strategies. Power is always spatialized. In fact geographers such as Edward Soja repeatedly stress the "inherent spatiality of power/knowledge" (Soja 1989, P.20). The spatial order of human existence arises from social production of space, and the social production of space involves the construction of geographies, boundaries, borders that have repeatedly been drawn and re-drawn in human history to represent territories of power.

In this sense, in the period of Modernity, from around 1880 to the outbreak of the First World War a "series of sweeping changes in technology and culture created distinctive new modes of experiencing time and space. Technological innovations including the telephone, wireless telegraph, x-ray, cinema, bicycle, automobile, locomotives and airline established the material foundation for re-orientation of
cultural developments... The result was a transformation of the dimensions of life and thought (Kern, 1983, P.1-2) that were and are fundamental to discourses of nation-state and national identity. This period also witnesses the "increasingly powerful national states, bureaucratically structured and operated, constantly striving to expand their power" (Berman, 1982, 16).

Spatial representations, thus, have an inseparable link with experiences of time and discourses of power/knowledge/political economy. The intrinsic instinct of capitalism to crush boundaries and decrease the time of profit turnover, Modernity's obsession with temporality, with 'becoming', with the 'new' and the 'next', accelerates the flow of time, and inherently destabilises spatial representations of identity and the values they hold (here the nation-state). Harvey's argument maintains that the seeds of the negation of the nation-state, as the primary architecture of modern identities, are in fact planted by the temporal processes of Modernity itself.

Individual and collective identities unfold in the space and time of daily life; at work, at leisure and at home. The space and time of daily life themselves are created, given meaning to, and represented by both politico-economic and cultural activities; they are structurally organised around common practices. These structures and activities are the frameworks within which the collective memories and myths of the nation are spatialized, and collective identities represented in a national form. With the acceleration of time through the discourse of globalisation, these structures and activities and the very spatial and temporal frameworks of representation are unavoidably affected; the spatialized forms of national representation slowly lose stability under the capitalist logic of 'all that is solid, melts into air'.

The history of capitalism has been characterised by the acceleration in the pace of the daily life, to erase the spatial barriers. The pace and the extent of this process in the age of mass telecommunication and computerised network systems has become so fast that this has led to the formation of a 'global village of telecommunications'.

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Within this new space of experience, new modes of accumulation and integration are formed, which have an irreversible effect on the processes of spatial representation.

Harvey argues that in this village of telecommunications, it seems as if the world has collapsed inwards in front of us; the bombardment of images, commodities, information, news, knowledge, fashion, food, etc. This fast pace feels as if the present is all that there is; where all historical times and places that have been available to humanity as a whole, can now be re-experienced by a single generation. This is what Frederick Jameson calls "the world of schizophrenia" by which he refers to the world where all historical times can be simultaneously experienced by computer technology; where there is a constant state of perpetual present; when human experience is increasingly bound to an ephemeral Now, and loses a sense of historical location (Jameson, 1991).

Jameson's world of "schizophrenia" can be read to refer to the same phenomenon as Harvey's "imploded globe". This is the world where an overwhelming sense of compression of our spatial and temporal experiences has led to a relative "annihilation of space through time" (Harvey, 1989 P. 241). Or in other words, the acceleration of temporal processes has made world space collapse and shrink into our 'local' space. This increasing 'crossability' and availability of world space in a diminishing time to the local population is what Harvey means by "a shrinking globe".

The faster the flux of time, the more the experience of ephemerality in individual and collective life; as the pace of change increases, memory finds a shorter and shorter span of time, of the previous era, of history. With this weakening sense of recollection of the past, comes the parallel reduction of the significance of continuity and representation in spatialized forms such as the nation-state.
To conclude, the flexible accumulation thesis shows the existence of fundamental links between the political economy of capitalism, the temporal and spatial experiences of daily life, and the way individual and collective identities are constituted and represented spatially. Our experiences of space and time have radically changed in the postmodern world of the global telecommunication village. This shift corresponds to the politico-economic changes in late capitalism where a micro-electronically linked global capital has produced a single global space that can be experienced on the TV, in our daily diet, in the News we receive as our information, the knowledge we think, the styles and fashions available to us, etc.

The juxtaposition of all these different times and spaces of the world, and its effect on what we experience in our daily life, also has a fundamental impact on collective identities. The strong sense of the 'Other', the homogeneity and distinctiveness of 'us' in the form of national identity, is being replaced by a weak sense of plural others whose demarcations with 'us' are less and less definable within the discourse of globalisation.

2.2- Disorganised Capitalism thesis
Scott Lash & John Urry put forward the disorganised capitalism thesis in 1987. The transition from Fordism to flexible accumulation in Harvey, is echoed by Lash & Urry as a transition from 'organised capitalism' to 'disorganised capitalism' in their book The End of Organised Capitalism. Lash & Urry's 'disorganisation thesis' is comprised of fundamental structural changes that characterise late capitalism (Lash & Urry 1987, P 5-6). These are briefly as follows:

1- Due to the globalisation of capital, world market, banking and price mechanisms, national markets have become less regulated by nationally based corporations, leading to effective de-concentration or de-centralisation of capital at a national level.
2) The decline of manufacturing industries and the size of the working class has been paralleled with the escalation of the size of service industries which are largely integrated and controlled by information technology and computerised networks transnationally, and horizontally.

3) The de-centralisation of capital at a national level implies that nationally based social movements such as class politics and Trade-Unionism have declined. Instead social movements such as feminism, environmentalism, anti-nuclear campaigns, etc. have emerged. The distinctive feature of these movements is that they are not materially based or defined, neither are they national politics.

4) The decline of manufacturing industries, trade-unionism and working-class politics, also implies that collective bargaining at a national level has severely been impaired. And corresponding to this, there is also a shift from Taylorism to part-time, flexible, contractual work organisation, increasing feminisation of the economy etc., and a growth of smaller plants. The fragmentation of a working class collective identity due to the decline of manufacturing industries is only explicable at a global level.

5) Due to the increasing independence of large monopolies which control markets through global systems of production, consumption and means of communication, the individual nation-states have less regulating and controlling power to determine political and economic strategies. Regional economies become re-structured according to the world division of labour, and world-market factories in the Third World become the main sites of labour-intensive activities. The service industries grow in the west.

6) The de-centralisation of capital at an economic level, has led to a growth in cultural fragmentation and pluralism with a problematising effect on a homogenous national collectivity.
What Lash & Urry are in effect saying is that all these structural changes of late capitalism furnish the conditions of postmodernity which denotes a structural departure from the modern mode of integration and control at the cultural, political and economic levels. This new mode of economic control and integration is based on global technologies, and has had irreversible and distinct consequences for political and cultural modes of integration. The whole package comes under the title of 'postmodern' (for a more detailed account of 'postmodern phenomena' see chapter one).

It is obvious from these accounts that the postmodern 'society' is still a capitalist society which works on substantially different parameters of time and space in order to secure growth and accumulation. A new horizontal and global mode of economic integration has emerged that is slowly breaking down the parameters of the previous vertical and national one. Postmodern cultural forms and sensibilities are conditioned that reflect the fractures inflicted upon the old unities and homogeneities. Uncertainty permeates into the definitions of all modern constituted identities of nation, race, class, gender, sexuality that throughout the modern period preserved the boundaries of national society alongside ethnic, racial, class and gender boundaries (Anthias & Yuval-Davis 1989). As the economic foundations of scale, homogeneity and collective bargaining break down; as class economics and politics face irreversible crisis due to economic re-structurating of late capitalism; as the world enters its post-colonial phase, there develops a break-down of consensus.

The de-centring of identity conceptualised in most postmodern theories, can now be perceived in a new light: in the light of the political economy of the postmodern condition. The influence of the postmodern technologies and the mass media, disruptions in our perception of time and space on the national level of daily life and changes in the class structure, in particular of the working class, are among the main causes of fragmentation of identity.
2.3- Economies of the 'Sign' thesis

So far we have argued that the globalisation of capitalism and the development of a new mode of social and economic integration, constitutes the political economy of cultural fragmentation and de-centring of identity. These themes will now be explored further in reference to the work of Baudrillard, Lash & Urry.

Baudrillard’s early works are in the framework of a neo-Marxian critique of capitalist societies, but later in his (1973) *The Mirror of Production* and (1976) *Symbolic Exchange and Death* he broke up with classical Marxism, claiming that Marxist interpretations of the capitalist mode of production are outdated. To Marx the relations of production were the central organising theme of the society to which corresponded the political and legal superstructure and all other forms of social activities and ideologies. In their relations of production men produced actual commodities which were exchanged according to their exchange-value. Baudrillard claims that this was true only for bourgeois societies. In postmodern societies production is no longer the organising theme, but the ‘sign’ is; and ‘exchange’ no longer involves actual commodities but largely ‘symbols’ and ‘signs’. Baudrillard makes a break with modern society, Modernity and the mode of production and instead declares the ‘end of political economy’; the end of the era in which production was the organising principle.

In theorising his postmodern culture, Baudrillard has failed to distinguish between postmodernism and postmodernity (see chapter one). His key categories of hyperreality, simulation and implosion are analysed in the cultural field. However as this argument has shown the postmodern cultural question can be anchored in the political economy of late capitalism. I will argue below that Baudrillard is wrong to speak of postmodernity as a society without a political economy.
He states that the postmodern society constitutes a radical transformation in the 'semiotics of every day life'. His argument essentially unfolds as follows: In industrial capitalism there is a firm relationship between the exchange-value and the use-value of the commodity. The exchange-value in the 'semiotics of every day life' is the 'signifier' of the use-value as the 'signified'. The exchange-value or the 'signifier' is legitimated in reference to the utility of the use-value, and in this way the hegemony of capital permeates in the society through the 'social bond' between exchange and use-values expressed in the commodity as well as in the 'semiotics of daily life'. This social bond between the use-value and exchange-value, between the signifier and the signified, he claims, has been eradicated by the economies of 'sign' where signs and images float freely with no referents.

The postmodern 'sign-value' is even more abstract than the modernist exchange-value. In the exchange-value it was possible to make some form of calculation of what amount of value (labour, capital, raw material, cost of depreciation of machinery, fuel etc.,) had been invested in the commodity in order to determine its average social value. In the 'sign-value' this is impossible, as the 'sign-value' does not have any social-bond with the use-value. 'Sign-value', in a sense, cuts away from "the last remaining foundation of an already almost foundationless object. It clears away the last traces of territorialization of an already largely de-territorialized object" (Lash & Urry 1994, P. 14)

Baudrillard differentiates between industrial capitalism and consumer capitalism. Industrial capitalism for him characterises the period of Modernity geared to manufacturing goods and products. Consumer capitalism of the age of microelectronics, on the contrary, is not based on the production of actual goods and products, but images and signs. What we consume in the age of consumerism are signs and images, rather than actual commodities. Commodities comprise both the 'signifier' and the 'signified', one being its exchange-value and the other its use-value. Signs, on the other hand, float free from the referent (Poster 1981, PP 456-76).
Baudrillard argues that the 'exchange-value' has been replaced with 'sign-value'. This substantial shift has led to the reconstruction and expression of our economic and cultural behaviour through the exchange of 'sign-values' in the culture of consumerism. However Baudrillard fails to account for the fact that the capitalist pursuit of profit and accumulation is still the main underlying principle of production even though what is produced maybe merely a sign. The fact that Baudrillard's society of signs and images or what he calls 'spectacles', is a 'hyperreal' society that is ruled by models and 'simulations' produced by the mass media, in particular the satellite television does not change the underlying principle that the pursuit of profit has remained fundamentally unchanged in Baudrillard's hyperreal simulated society.

To Baudrillard collective identity in the postmodern information society is expressed through consumption of signs and models. The result is a situation in which the boundaries between the realm of culture and every-day life are continually blurred and transgressed in the context of global consumerism. Hyper-commodification finally erodes the distinction between commodified and non-commodified areas of life, and gives a twist to the commodification of meaning. The relationship between the signifier and the signified collapses under the reign of the simulated hyperreality.

In a postmodern hyperreal society the producing and consuming subject is de-centred and so the relations of production and power no longer have any force. The effectiveness of culture is so increased that only the relations between its symbolic contents, its 'signs', have force. The postmodern experience consists of 'hypersimulation', a double counter reflection in which life simulates the simulated contents of the mass media. In the society of simulation, identities are constructed by the assignment of images, and codes and models determine how individuals receive themselves and relate to other people. In this universe subjectivities are fragmented and lost, and a new terrain of experience appears that allegedly renders previous social theories and politics obsolete and irrelevant. Thus Baudrillard's concepts of
simulation, implosion of meaning, and hyperreality combine to create a new postmodern culture. In this postmodern world individuals flee from the real and take ecstatic pleasures from the hyperreal world of computers, media and other technological ‘signs’ and to Baudrillard the subjects lose contact with the real and themselves fragment and dissolve. To Baudrillard the postmodern culture manifests an unlimited artificiality, where the satisfaction of primary human needs is replaced by an uninterrupted fabrication of pseudo-needs within the spectacle hyperreal society of simulacrum; an abstract non-society that has lost all its cohesive relations, social meaning, and ability of meaningful collective representation.

2.4) Postmodern Political Economy:

Digital Capitalism and a new Spatial and Temporal Re-organisation

The above three theses on post-industrial, disorganised capitalism and postmodern culture are incomplete without one another. We are to be persuaded by Baudrillard that the central axial principle of postmodern society is the production of ‘signs’ in a de-centralised network of global information technology. Lash & Urry's *Economies of Signs and Space* adopts Baudrillard's conception of the 'signs', but places it in the political economy of late capitalism. They write on the "rapid circulation of subjects and objects, in multiple space odysseys where signs are emptied of meaning and significance, while this meaninglessness and insignificance are themselves regulated by and anchored in the political economy of late capitalism. The reason for this is that capitalism accelerates the pace of production and consumption, ensuring as rapidly as possible the disposability and ephemerality of products". (Lash & Urry 1994, P.12).

In *Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (1991), Jameson too attempts to give a panoramic view of the postmodern cultural scene as a stage in the development of capitalism. In a Marxian line of analysis he sees the global postmodern culture of depthlessness, 'pastiche' and 'schizoid' to be the superstructural
expressions of the development of late capitalism. The contextualisation of postmodern culture and theory in the political economy of capitalism, allows Jameson to proceed to his assertion that the schizophrenic breakdown of the subject into a fragmented, hybrid, de-centred and plural self is intelligible only in the context of late capitalism where the logic of postmodernism is geared. This echoes Lash & Urry's 'emptying out' of meaning of the subject in the postmodern hyperspace of simulacra and images.

The concept of the 'sign' is very important because it does represent the postmodern hyperreal phenomenon but only descriptively. It is now time to question what is a 'sign'? In the analysis of Baudrillard, as well as Lash & Urry, we are never presented with a clear definition of a 'sign' or 'model', even though the economy of the sign is supposed to be imperative to the analysis of postmodern society. The problem in the work of Baudrillard is that his argument on the semiological significations of the sign is totally divorced from the process of economic production whereas it does not need to be. In defying Marx's alleged economic determinism, Baudrillard develops a determinism around semiology and in doing so he declares the end of political economy. However I would like to suggest that the sign contributes towards a new historical conjuncture in the political economy of late capitalism by shaping the current forms of production, property and political organisation. The 'sign', which is increasingly the digital sign, is the new institutional force-field and habitus of capitalism which enables capital to flow and pursue its historical essence of profit maximisation without any restrictions across all borders in the global age. The 'digital sign' is the new locus of the hegemony of capital.

2.4a) Postmodern Habitus

It can be asserted that postmodernity or the political economy of late capitalism resides in a new global force-field or habitus. Capitalism imposes its new particular
logic on incorporation and inhabits new forms of objectified global institutions. Bourdieu writes on the concept of habitus as follow:

"The habitus is constituted in the course of an individual history, imposing its particular logic on incorporation, and through which agents partake of the history objectified in institutions, is what makes it possible to inhabit institutions, to appropriate them practically, and so to keep them in activity, continuously pulling them from the state of dead letters, reviving the sense deposited in them, but at the same time imposing the revisions and transformations that reactivation entails. Or rather, the habitus is what enables the institution to attain full realisation: it is through the capacity for incorporation, which exploits the body's readiness to take seriously the performative magic of the social, that the king, the banker or the priest are hereditary monarchy, financial capitalism or the church made flesh..." (Bourdieu, 1990 p. 57)

To apply this definition of the history of capitalist development, one can suggest a new force-field has been developed for capitalism to inhabit and expand. This force-field is comprised of the postmodern technologies of mass digital telecommunications and the computerised network systems which are globally linked by big monopolies. The digital sign and commodities constitute the force-fields of capital as well as the symbolic systems of a society in a semiological manner. In all societies information is one form of power, but in the postmodern society control over the generation, storage and dissemination of information has assumed greater significance and they are largely centralised in the core metropolitan cities. These new technologies are incredibly flexible and fluid and allow capital flow in the habitus of global digital sign. This transborder flow overpowers and incorporates the national imagination which is based on national print industries. Print becomes secondary to, and a result of, the primacy of the global digital sign. This "is done by capitalism "imposing its particular logic (of profit maximisation) on incorporation... (and) at the same time imposing the revisions and transformations that reactivation entails....to attain full realisation." (Bourdieu, 1990 p 57)

In this historical transformation and transition from industrial print capitalism to global digital capitalism, the vertical integration and control of capital at a 'national' level has been replaced by a horizontal integration of capital through global computer
networks and communication systems leading to a more flexible accumulation of surplus.

The *digital sign* is a transborder computerised data that flows internationally. The flow of indistinguishable transborder digital data is what Baudrillard calls *hyperreal* objects, but in line with a Marxian frame of analysis they can be analysed as flows in the process of capitalist trade and production through mass telecommunications and microelectronic technologies. The use of transborder data flows and software in trade and production allows the commodification processes to be extended to intact markets which simultaneously reinforces centralised control of these operations in the core cities where the infrastructures of microelectronics and mass telecommunications reside. Both of the issues of capitalist expansion and control are tightly embedded in the economies of the *sign*, even though the *sign* is free floating.

In the past decades, transborder data flows have become increasingly central to the international business operations of transnational corporations who are the major users. These major users of postmodern technologies share an instantaneous time beyond and over geographical barriers. Corporate activities and executives do not have a nation-state. They can virtually be in the same room across the globe and do instant business. Instant global communication allows them to carry out more specialised tasks and assemble their production more effectively across the globe. Hence in this light *digitality is hyperreality, transnationality, fragmentation and dispersion, but it certainly is not the end of political economy*, as Baudrillard would have it.

*Digital commodities* represent software, computerised networks, data processing and satellite telecommunications. These commodities do have social meaning within the context of capitalist production and exchange and for the purpose of flexible accumulation in the global economy. In this sense the digital transborder flows, or the ‘signs’, are the new *habitus and force-field* of late capitalism to which correspond
emerging transnational legal and political institutions and a postmodern consumerist culture.

Baudrillard's hyperreal simulated society refers to postmodernism where the semiological discourses of late capitalist culture prevail. My argument is that this semiological discourse, or postmodernism, is tightly linked with the political economy of digital capitalism, or postmodernity. The emphasis of postmodern theories on cultural difference, fragmentation, depthlessness, indeterminacy and hybridity of identity can be understood adequately in the systemic context of digital capitalism. Without this conjoint analysis postmodern theory remains speculative and itself free floating without any referent.

As soon as diverse dimensions of postmodern phenomena, such as postmodern theory, culture, economy, technology and politics are contextualised in the latest phase of capitalism, it would be possible to look at the institutional forms of spatialization of global capitalism, and of postmodernity.

2.4b) Postmodern institutions and spaces of governance

Lash & Urry formulate institutions of spatial regulation. They argue that the free-flow of objects and subjects and the de-centring of identity, on a global level, are "significantly mediated and determined through a set of very specific institutions, the institutions of 'economic governance'" (Lash & Urry, 1994, P. 17). These institutions of economic governance are the same as institutions of spatial governance in which goods, people, money, information, images, knowledge are mobile. There are three main postmodern economic spaces of governance.

Firstly the 'core' of organised and industrial capitalism was about manufacturing of goods and products around networks of heavy industries of chemicals, motor, steel and electronics. The 'core' of post-industrial, or disorganised capitalism is clustered
around information, communications, telecommunications, and service industries. Spatially this new 'core' is centred in global cities. The main economic institution of these global cities where people, money, images and signs, goods, capital, labour and information flow freely is the market. The more markets are unconstrained by economic governance of the state, the more freely the flow of objects and subjects takes place. In recent decades all advanced industrial societies have moved towards complete de-politicisation of the markets.

Postmodern markets are intrinsically global places, which push the state and its national economic institutions and spaces outwards. The welfare state comes under fire; poverty, unemployment, housing, health, education and all related social problems become slowly privatised and the sphere of the market is increasingly freed from all sorts of moral responsibility. The state's funding, subsidies and regulatory mechanisms towards the public sector shrink. Public housing is up for sale; nationalisation becomes 'old-fashioned' and is replaced by privatisation policies. The market forcefully imposes its imperatives, which determine the governing principles of economic activity as a whole. The space of many economic institutions and activities, previously subsidised and governed by the state, shrinks.

Some major deregulatory events that in the last decade have cut off the hand of the state from regulation of the markets are the abolition of exchange rate mechanisms in 1970s, which led to outflow of substantial pension and portfolio capitals in all major capitalist countries, the London Big Bang in 1986, global electronisation and computerisation of trading systems, all of which have led to remarkable changes in the nature of capital markets. These changes are unavoidably paralleled by the decline of the sovereignty of the national-state and its regulatory economic hierarchies.

The second spatial institution of postmodern governance are 'networks', that both facilitate and integrate disorganised digital capitalism and flexible accumulation.
These networks are comprised of six principal media, used in telecommunications to move information from one place to another. Lash & Urry summarise these six media as follow:

“1- Transportation: including mail and express services, slow but suitable for small users;
2- Wire cable: very sturdy, but low volume of information can be carried by them;
3- Co-axical cable: expensive, but suitable to carry images with a large bandwidth (volume of information carried);
4- Micro-wave channel, with a large bandwidth, cheap but susceptible to intersections by atmospheric conditions;
5- Earth satellites: cheap and suitable for isolated places;
6- Fibre-optic cables: expensive, has a large bandwidth; can carry 40000 conversations, and transmit 246 bites of information per second”. (Lash & Urry 1994, P. 25)

During the era of Modernity, the paradigmatic means of mobility were networks of railways, telegraphs, telephones, postal services and roads. These media created time-space convergence at the National level and constituted the grounds for a National discourse and identity. The new networks of mobility belong to the era of disorganised capitalism, and they correspond to a new level of 'time-space convergence' on a global scale. Hence it should follow that the postmodern institutional network of mobility, communication and transport should spatialize global discourses of identity.

On a third level, the global 'time-space convergence' also leads to another way of conceptualising 'core' and 'periphery' on an international scale. The classic usage of these words, places advanced industrial countries as the 'core' in the face of the third world and eastern European countries as 'peripheries' and 'semi-peripheries. Lash and Urry suggest that "the core comprises of heavily networked more or less global cities,
as a 'wired village of non-contiguous communities'. And the periphery consists of isolated areas in the same countries, in the former eastern Europe or in the Third World. In terms of time-space convergence, the disparity between core and periphery in a restructured world order is, we think, likely to grow greater" (Lash & Urry 1994, P.28).

Both 'markets' and 'networks' are non-hierarchical spaces and are largely horizontally integrated and concentrated in global cities or the 'core'. The horizontality of these 'networks' and 'markets' is not to suggest a lack of stratification systems, but that the strata around the new technologies can largely be conceptualised on a global level, as opposed to a national level. The Transnational Corporation class controls the largest sums of capital. The politicians, the managerial-professional classes in media, advertising, banking, computing, information technology, and other professionals who control the production of global information (such as academics), are at the top of the scale, and are highly mobile in the global 'core'.

This differentiates the postmodern institutional spaces of economic governance from the state controlled spaces of economic governance which are largely concentrated in the nation-state, such as manufacturing industries. As old manufacturing industries shrink, and the remaining ones are de-centralised, they emigrate to the suburbs and 'peripheries' where labour/land is cheaper, the new industries in the 'core' become increasingly less distinct from telecommunications and computing networks.

With this fundamental shift in the economic structure of the world, the balance of economic activity within given national boundaries tends to become much less significant. The global networks of communicational and computerised infrastructure in global cities, and global markets re-constitute a new spatial mode of governance.
2.4c) Postmodern time

Time and space are both categories that enter into the social organisation of being and modes of representation of identity; they are both constitutive features of social organisations and social systems, and they are both ingredients of thought. Giddens' 'time-space distantiation' and Harvey's 'time-space compression' are the phrases that are associated with the spatial and temporal mode of integration in disorganised informational capitalism.

As stated before, collective identities and their unique commonalities can be expressed in the forms of kinship, clan, tribal, nomadic, agrarian, dynastic, religious, imperial, ethnic, regional, national and even global. Each of these forms of collective identities has a distinct mode of governance and time/space articulation, which in turn has an intrinsic relationship with the question of political economy and technological capacities.

Harvey compares Medieval and Post-Renaissance experiences of time and space and shows that post-Renaissance mapping was absolutely pivotal for the formation of nation-states and national identity after the 18th century. According to David Harvey, in Medieval times, 'place' and 'space' coincided, as temporal relationships were merely sensuously experienced. There was no abstract, objective and rational perception of time and space beyond the limits of sensory experience. The nation-state, on the other hand, can not imagine itself as a unified entity if perceptions of time and space are only sensory; almost all of the nation-state practices require abstract notions of time and space.

Totalising, objective, rational and territorial maps allowed for strong senses of abstract collective (national) identities to be constructed in the midst of geographical differences. With this new development, a new mode of belonging (national) to an
'imagined community' of 'empty homogeneous time' (Anderson 1983) evolved that proved to be crucial in nationalist sentiments of nation/state building.

What maps did to space, was replicated by the calendar in relation to time; just as the map replaces the discontinuous patchy space of practical paths by the homogeneous, continuous space of geometry, so the calendar substitutes a linear, homogeneous continuous calendrical time for practical and natural time.²

Harvey's argument shows that the Enlightenment's vision, and its perceptual/conceptual/linguistic practices are inherently linked to a specific experience of time and space that are fundamental in the later development of the nation-state and its transverse 'homogeneous empty time'.

This argument firmly locates the notion of time in 'society', and shows adequately that abstract time and space are socially organised. The Nuer for example have no sense of time and that it can be wasted, saved or spent. Time is not a resource in their culture (Evans-Pritchard 1940). 'Leisure time' did not exist as a social concept in pre-industrial societies.³

² Of course during the ancient and medieval epochs, some notion of 'empty time' did also exist. However those conceptions were not used by masses in performing their daily activities, nor were they used in pedagogy in teaching a specific mode of collective identity.

³ The calendar and clock-time which are the dominant temporal base for modern social life have been incorporated in the analysis of many scholars such as Karl Marx in calculating the 'rate of exploitation' of the Proletariat. The working classes for Marx were exploited on two levels; firstly the extension of the working day by the employer, and secondly the acceleration of the pace of work. What was happening in both methods, Marx shows, was that through the dynamics of capitalist production the 'surplus labour' or 'unpaid labour' was produced in 'surplus time' or 'unpaid time'. Hence the notion of 'time' was not only incorporated in the very definition of the working class and Bourgeoisie, but also in their class strategies. Marx provides one of the most radical analyses of socially organised 'time' grounded in the context of (capitalist) political economy (Marx 1954).

Weber wrote on the culture of Calvinism: "Waste of time is thus the first and in principle the deadliest of sins. The span of human life is infinitely short and precious to make sure of one's own election. Loss of time through sociability, idle talk, luxury, even more sleep than is necessary to health... is worthy of absolute moral condemnation" (Weber 1930 P. 158)
The notion of time has remained crucial in organising labour resistance movements and social conflicts since the nineteenth century, and not surprisingly it was Henry Ford who first devised the mass production of clocks and watches in 1880s. In the last two centuries therefore, there has been a growing time consciousness which has permeated into the structures of work, leisure, discipline, and in regulating and planning social activities.

In the second half of 19th century the co-ordination of European countries, increasingly needed a time co-ordination, which eventually led to the adoption of Greenwich mean time at the International Meridian Conference in 1884. This had profound consequences: "gradually all other countries began to adopt the time zone system based on the prime Meridian of Greenwich, the specifically western temporal regime which had emerged with the invention of the clock in medieval Europe became the universal standard of time measurement. Indeed this hegemonic development signified the irreversible destruction of all other temporal regimes in the world, the last vestiges of which remain only in the form of historical and anthropological curiosities" (Nguyen 1992, P.33).

Greenwich mean time, therefore, is not an ontological state of temporal awareness, but another discourse of power/political economy aiming towards the temporal homogenisation and centralisation of human experience and awareness of absence and presence. It is Anderson's 'homogeneous empty time'.

This 'homogenised empty time' has irreducibly been part of the modern mode of being of human collectivities and their identities in the last two centuries. The intimate relationship between (national) time and (national) geography has been drawn upon by Giddens. He argues that we are not only restrained by physical and geographical boundaries, but also by 'time-space walls on all sides' (Giddens 1984 P. 114) that impose constraints on the horizons of thought. The more time and space converge due to faster mobility in time, the less they impose a constraint on mobility.
in time and space. In other words the further the convergence of time and space will accelerate and ‘lubricate’ the flow of energy, allowing for larger amounts of energy to be transferred across borders in a shorter span of time. The solidity and significance of (national) space, therefore, will reduce.

The invention of the media of networks of roads, rail, telegraphs, telephones and postal services, compressed time and space at the level of the boundaries of the nation-state. The development of the territorially bounded nation-state with its expanded powers of documentation and standardisation, also means the dominance of national time-space. The time and space of the nation-state are two important parameters that have entered into the construction of national discourses, and are dimensions of national disciplinary power.

With the changing frontiers of satellite telecommunications and computerised network systems, Giddens’ 'time-space distantiation' suggests that societies are 'stretched' over shorter spans of time across space. Such 'stretching' reflects the fact that social activities increasingly depend upon interactions with those who are absent in the time-space of the nation-state, but on whom there is an increasing dependence. (Giddens, 1985, Ch. 7).

The most crucial comparison between global and national time is made by Rifkin. Rifkin talks of how computers and other electronic equipment that work on the basis of seconds, influence many important activities that take place below the threshold of human consciousness, and that social time which is organised by electronic equipment becomes increasingly irrelevant to the (national) time that is organised by the clock. He says "the events being processed in the computer world exist in a time realm that we will never be able to experience. The new 'computime' (instantaneous global computer time) represents the final abstraction of time and its complete separation from human natural experience and rhythms of nature". (Rifkin 1987 P. 15).
The crucial implication for the nation-state and national identity, is that the instantaneous global 'computime' is gaining preponderance in organising global economic relationships compared to the 'homogeneous empty time' of the nation-state. Clock-time was the organising principle of Modernity. The instantaneous global computime is far more abstract than the clock time of the nation, because it crosses the nation in an instant. The global time is the business time of multinational corporate activities and links global markets and networks.

In what has been said so far, I have suggested that under the conditions of the postmodern political economy or digital capitalism, a new configuration of social life has emerged whose economy, culture, modes of spatial and temporal governance and technologies, paradigmatically shift the old boundaries in human life. These cultural and material transformations transcend the infrastructural grounds on which the nation-state has resided since the 18th century. Although the world is still visibly divided among the national-states, the 'clock-time' of the nation-state is beginning to be made secondary to the computime of the global society in determining social and economic movements.

3) Postmodernity & Politics

The rapidity of 'time-space compression' to the extent of the 'implosion' of the globe in recent years, has definite geopolitical implications for our mental maps, political attitudes and political institutions such as the nation-state. The serious diminution of the power of the nation-state over strategies of capital accumulation, fiscal and monetary policies have been paralleled with a shift towards an internationalisation of politics to deal with political, economic, security, military, environmental and some social issues such as poverty, drugs, AIDS and crime. On a cultural level too, postmodern sensibilities encourage difference, individuality, fragmentation,
disjunction, heterogeneity and dispersion. All these tendencies are in fundamental tension with the homogeneity and unity of the national-states. In this section, I shall consider some of the global forces that have undermined the political sovereignty of the national-state.

**Political Modernity of the National-State**

I have argued for the contextualisation of the phenomenon of the nation-state as the modern container of collective identity in the second chapter. Here I would like to add some historical and theoretical accounts to the argument with reference to the modern state.

The nineteenth century was the great epoch of nation-building in the west; the era saw the emergence of the nation-state system we view as natural today. In the 1800s mass education, national lines of communication, the infrastructure of industrial capitalism, the standardisation of national language that was authorised to reflect on the public sphere, together with military conscription, censuses, and the emergence of national institutions of governance, all determined the horizons of thought and practice in national terms. The power of the state was multiplied with its ability to administer and standardise diverse ethnic and linguistic communities into the discourse of the nation.

In the last decade of the 19th century and the early years of the 20th century, a massive build-up of armaments and secret diplomacy characterised the fatal competitions that existed between western nation-states over colonies in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. In the great age of imperialism, and by the first World War, all parts of the planet were carved up inch by inch and bounded as the territories of influence by European, American and Japanese States. This is also the period which is known as the age of nationalism and the age of nation/state building.
Internally most European governments were prepared to legislate for a range of social protections at 'home', from extending the power of the state in the economy, to providing welfare to the jobless, poor and homeless; from imposing free national compulsory education and health to making the citizens pay for it by income tax; and to the legislation and harnessing of a public mass culture. All these became the major functions of the modern state.

The world divided and organised by nation-states originated in Europe, but was later replicated across the globe under the disciplinary forces of the European states. Nationalist movements in the Third World have their roots in opposing the cruelty, exploitation and increasing weakness of colonial states.

The paradoxical situation is, however, that the nation in the Third World for which sovereignty was claimed frequently had very little meaning, considering that different ethnic, linguistic, religious and social groups were lumped together into areas with little historical experience. The borders which were artificially drawn by European powers, became themselves the borders of nationalist movements against western power. The modern state subsequently played a crucial role in creating national unity out of diverse elements in the third world as well as at home. Territoriality and the creation of a common 'culture' went hand in hand in materialising national projects. In fact it is suggested by Horsman and Marshall that territoriality is very closely linked to the political drive for nationhood through relentless reference to common culture. "The physical aspect of nationalism, that is, its territoriality, pervades its mythology. This is not just the remembering of great historical events which took place at specific locations, but the reverence for landscape, for the environment in its broadest sense." (Horsman & Marshall, 1994 p. 45)

In this sense the existence of modern borders is first a function of the modern state to create and maintain areas of influence, defend them militarily, and also the function
of disciplinary power for the administration and regulation of a 'national' culture and identity.

The world divided by nation-states was for the first time broken beyond repair during the Second World War, when the modern state became the industrial vehicle of the administration of genocide and massacre in creating and preserving an ideal 'national' subject. National self-determination and genocide coincided in perhaps the most barbaric 'incident' of human history - in Fascism.

Ever since the Second World War, it has been possible for theoreticians to develop critical accounts of the nation-state and nationalism. The legitimacy of the nation-state and the nationalist aspirations which were indisputable prior to the Second World War, were shaken afterwards.

With the emergence of the world economy dominated by TNCs the salience of the borders along temporal, spatial, technological, economic and cultural lines has also been reduced to the point that today's functions of the state under the political economy of postmodernity have shrunk in some important directions that will be considered shortly.

Political Modernisation involved a concentration of the means of administration in the centralised state machinery, a process which was subsequently accelerated by centralisation and concentration in the economy and mass media. The process of modernisation of politics involved differentiation of political functions, bureaucratisation of organisation and the rationalisation of political action.

The terms 'differentiation', 'rationalisation' and 'bureaucratisation' are inexorably linked to the Durkheimian and Weberian traditions of thought in their analyses of Modernity. According to the Weberian scheme, bureaucratisation and rationalisation processes are the Modern mechanisms that aim to maximise efficiency through
calculable, deliberate, systematic and impersonal arrangements. To Weber, the purest type of 'rational-legal authority' was, of course, bureaucracy and its hierarchical, rule-oriented structure. Bureaucracies, and their employment of impersonal, technical and specialised knowledge, are the most viable social mechanisms that maximise rational gains. The structure of the modern state is a significant example of the Weberian 'rational-legal' type of authority.

The essence of the modern state can not be separated from bureaucracy and its levels of administration. Bureaucratic politics, legislative rules, administrative procedures and the modern state are intertwined. This huge paradigmatic mechanism ensured the implementation of the central state functions. These functions are captured by Crook, Pakulski & Waters (1992) as follows:

- Internal stabilisation by mediation and arbitration in industrial conflicts;
- Economic regulation, co-ordination and harmonisation of increasingly complex activities;
- The development of an economic infrastructure of transport, communication, etc., and the running of education, training and research;
- The reparation of industrial side-effects including environmental damage, regional poverty and urban plight;
- Legitimisation: justifying and defending policies and mobilising generalised normative support;
- External stabilisation, through military and political bloc arrangements

It has been argued above that all these functions have been undermined in the last few decades. The most fundamental suggestion here, is that with the advent of information technology, strategies of flexible accumulation, de-centralisation of production and consumption, horizontal mode of integration through computer network systems etc., the pillars of bureaucracy are shaken. With that, the state's
ability to regulate and govern has been shaken too and there are grounds for believing that the modern state shrinks in the context of a postmodern political economy\(^4\).

Crook et al (1992) distinguish three different types of corporate states in the modern period which either have collapsed or have become impaired in their functions; 'The workers state', 'the fascist state' and a 'liberal-democratic-bureaucratic state'.

The 'workers state' in its Leninist-Stalinist version was the type whose pivotal concern to create and maintain a centrally managed 'command economy' led to the fusion of party, state, economy and ideology that ruled the whole country; and administered, coerced and mobilised the 'mass' culture. The ideological nature of the new socialist national identity was not disguised. Nor was the 'necessity' of the development of a new politics based on the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' to create the new (Soviet) identity, denied.

The second type of state, mentioned by Crook, is the Fascist state whose project was to administer a racially homogeneous nation. The national identity that the fascists wanted to preserve was defined by race and religion, and the state machineries and bureaucracies were engaged in implementing the fascist definition of a pure nation.

The third type of bureaucratic state is the liberal form which emerged in Western Europe. It has had no apparent aspiration to stand above the law of the market and has respected certain freedoms which underlay the functioning of civil society. It largely relied on administrative-redistributive bureaucracies.

\(^4\) Anthony Smith challenges this point of view in *Nations and Nationalism in the Global Era* He writes: "If the state's economic control is now being challenged by the vast transnational companies and practices that dominate much of the globe, if its military preponderance has been limited first by the superpowers' nuclear dominance and then by the internationalisation of command structures and military technology, its social and cultural power and penetration have, if anything, been enhanced......mainly in three areas: public education, the mass media and cultural and social policy. All three bear closely on the ethnic character and nationality of the state's population" (Smith, 1995 pp. 90-91). However chapter six of this thesis demonstrates empirically that there has been a decline in a sense of national sovereignty and unity in the Britain of the late 20th century compared to the earlier decades.
The first two types of bureaucratic states have already collapsed, and the third type has allegedly shrunk. The decline of the third type of modern state and the weakening of modern bureaucracies in regulating national life, is associated with the most radical form of "political-administrative de-centralisation and devolution due to postmodern political economy: Privatisation, marketization and deregulation" (Crook, Pakulski & Waters, 1992, P.97).

Postmodern forces of national deregulation, privatisation & marketization

Crook, Pakulski & Waters in their Postmodernization (1992) look at these three main themes. Their argument runs as follow:

Decentralisation: The process of economic decentralisation shifts state power from monocentric spatializations into polycentric ones. A lot of state power is shifted to relatively autonomous and non-governmental bodies such as specialised agencies, and public corporations. Since the 1970s, these bodies have grown in Britain: "by the end of 1990, 34 such agencies had been created, and a further 28 departments were candidates for agency status. The reforms foreshadowed by the 'Next Step' initiatives despatched over half a million civil servants into free-standing executive agencies" (Crook, Pakulski & Waters, 1992, P. 97)

As a result of this process a large portion of power has been vertically deconcentrated. The deliberate de-bureaucratisation of power and the privatisation of some state functions, shift the associated responsibilities out of the sphere of the state. This changes the political configuration of the 'society' by making it more pluralistic, fragmented, and polycentric.

Alongside decentralisation of state power, comes the whole strategy of selling nationalised properties and corporations to the private sector and withdrawing
centralized administrative regulations. The selling off of what was once 'national' to the 'markets' and 'networks', is synonymous to selling off to the postmodern institutional spaces of governance (see above).

The twin strategy of privatization and marketization is most pronounced in Britain, but it has hit many other advanced capitalist countries such as France, Germany, Austria, Scandinavia etc. In the last decade in Britain "40 per cent of the state sector has been transformed into private enterprise; more than one million public housing tenants have become home owners; the proportion of share owners grew from 6 per cent to over 22 per cent; more than 600,000 government employees have been transferred to the private sector" (Crook et al, 1992, P. 101). Parallel to privatization and marketization of previously state owned properties and power, is the process of the removal of the state power from strategies of production, prices, wages and salaries. State-provided welfare is under tremendous pressure; nationalised education and health are subject to heated public controversies, and state money is increasingly withdrawn from them. Public housing is under attack, and most of it is in the process of being sold off. The principle of 'market efficiency' under global marketization of economy brings a "post-welfare paradigm" (Bennett 1990 P. 12).

Analogous to what happens inside the boundaries of the nation-state in undermining the power of effectiveness of the state regulatory mechanisms, there is also a growth in size of international agencies and politics that are not state agencies. These forces include the UN bodies, EC organisations, cartels such as OPEC, regulative agencies, International Monetary Fund, Transnational Corporations, etc. "Between 1950 and late 1980s the number of intergovernmental organisations increased 3.5 times to about 400; the number of international non-governmental organisations grew 6 times to about 5000. UN agencies alone grew from about five in the late 1940s to fifteen in the late 1980s. The number of employees has increased to over 50,000. The annual budgets of specialised agencies exceeded $1 billion" (Crook et al 1992 P. 101)
All these trends suggest that the centralising, administrative and regulative power of the modern state may be diminishing in the face of multi-layered forces of marketization and globalization. These postmodern forces reduce the nation-state's autonomy and sovereignty. The role of the state in administering 'national' identity decreases as the process of postmodernisation accelerates.5

The breakdown of an organised and vertically integrated capitalism, and its associated bureaucracies, has had consequences for collective identity. As argued above, with the development of a flexible accumulation strategy in the age of digital capitalism, a postmodern culture of fragmentation and dispersion uniting around the sensibilities of difference and lacking an axial referential theme of unity grows. This together with the fact that the individual nation-states have also been subject to a variety of global technologies and processes that affect the economic organisation of wages, markets, division of labour, production and consumption, trade and exchange, suggests that global processes gain increasing power which affect and blur the boundaries of the nation-state and what these boundaries symbolise.

National decentralisation and global centralisation

The process of national decentralisation is twinned with a process of global centralisation. Transborder data flows decentralise production at a national level by allowing firms to co-ordinate production activities in different locations. However, as Sara Schoonmaker has made clear in her argument on “Capitalism and the Code” in Baudrillard (1994), centralised control over the work done at corporate headquarters has increased at the same time. Headquarters functions operate to co-ordinate and manage a global production system with corporate branches across the globe. “The decentralisation of the firm’s production system and labour force has created a countervailing tendency toward central control and planning. Firms with dispersed

5 This relationship between the sovereignty and homogeneity of the nation-state and globalisation will be empirically tested in the next chapter.
loclational structures have tended to provide top-level management, planning, specialised business services, research, and technical functions from national headquarters” (Kellner ed. 1994 p. 176). The centralisation of global corporate control over national and international economic operations has largely been made possible by the development of the digital telecommunications infrastructure, concentrated in the core cities where the corporate headquarters are based.

A new class composition emerges on a global scale which reflects a new global stratification. Transnational corporations, multinational trusts and corporate businesses control the mass media, telecommunications, computer/software and information/knowledge technologies. This global ‘class’ has a very high degree of control of the technologies of production, storage and dissemination of signs, images, information and knowledge with a direct controlling effect of the semiotics of daily life. Then there are high profile professionals and senior officers and managers who are in charge of the operation of the global strategies on a local and regional level. A large clerical and technical- mostly computer literate - work force in the service sector constitute the next major class, and they process the transactions of these goods, signs and images, and at the bottom of the stratification system are the low-waged/unemployed, immigrants and refugees.

4) Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that the phenomenon of the nation-state, as the most gigantic institution of Modernity, is undergoing fundamental changes, that would radically alter the material conditions for the existence of the nation-states as sovereign units of economic and political decision-making.

These fundamental changes are conditioned by the third wave of the industrial revolution known as the microelectronic phase, which has transformed the spatial and
the temporal boundaries of experience beyond the limits of the nation-state. The issue of the political economy of the latest phase of capitalism and its analysis, is therefore vital for an understanding of the transformative changes of the last few decades.

Three theses that have concentrated their attention on the question of political economy have been considered: Harvey's 'flexible accumulation' thesis, Lash & Urry's 'disorganised capitalism' thesis, and Baudrillard's 'economies of sign' thesis. In all these three theses, it has been maintained that capitalism has undergone such fundamental changes in the spheres of production, distribution and exchange that these have irreversibly affected its institutional and organisational structures. The previous phase of 'industrial capitalism' was characterised by large-scale factory production, heavy industries, concentration of man-power as well as capital in the same space, so that it was vertically and hierarchically integrated. The new phase of microelectronic digital capitalism, on the contrary is characterised by small scale, just-in-time production, with a dispersed labour force and spatial segmentation. The latest phase of capitalism is integrated by horizontal networks of satellite telecommunication and computerised systems.

These changes have produced different modes of spatial and temporal governance. In spatial terms bureaucracies and vertical managerial structures which were largely integrated within the confines of the national-states, are slowly being segmented and replaced by networks of global corporate business and/or by non-governmental agencies locally through the telecommunications and computerised infrastructures. Temporally too, the 'homogeneous empty time' of the nation is juxtaposed with an instantaneous global 'computime', allowing for transborder data flows to be exchanged across the globe instantaneously.

These parameters of the political economy of postmodernity have transformed the essential structural pillars of the national-states. They segmentalise, fracture and disperse national institutions and transcend their modes of spatial and temporal
governance. These socio-economic segmentations, fragmentation and dispersions lead to similar effects in the sphere of culture. Postmodern cultural productions and sensibilities are also described as promoting a lack of cohesion, unity, centre, aim, order, homogeneity, emphasising notions such as plurality and difference.

Postmodern theory with its obsession to dismantle and deconstruct the Enlightenment's legacy around the production of meta-narratives of identity is, I would argue, the theoretical expression of what late capitalism, and its globalising processes, are themselves doing at the level of culture and political economy. The disjunctive processes of globalisation with their dispersed structures, spaces, times and man-power in the post-colonial era no longer need a universal narrative of truth and progress. Modernity's epistemology, its political institutions, ideologies, identities, and its national societies are eroded in the age of digital capitalism with its flexible accumulation strategies. It is on this basis that I suggest that postmodern theory ought to anchor itself in the conditions of postmodernity, and in the political economy of post-industrial capitalism in order to be empirically grounded.

The postmodern total negation of meta-narratives, is therefore, challenged in this chapter, as the argument has unfolded itself on the basis of the global discourse and hegemony of capital, which continues to be narrated as a meta-narrative itself even though it has led to the fragmentation and dispersion of economic and cultural production.

Having said this, I do not mean to promote a romantic vision of globalisation, and to claim that under globalisation processes humanity will live next to each other in better harmony. What is being maintained here is that under globalisation the institution of the nation-state, and its administrative and representative authority will diminish in significance, and will be eventually made obsolete under the imperatives of global capitalist development. Through the process of globalisation a sense of difference and distinctiveness is constantly sharpened, while simultaneously they are
commodified and invested in by capitalist flexible accumulation strategies. This can be better argued in the context of the dialectic of globalisation and localisation which is the title of the next chapter.
Chapter five: The Dialectic of Globalisation and Localisation

Despite the radical changes that have affected the nation-state's sovereignty in the last few decades, the nation-state is still the most important single institution of belonging. Despite the advent of the global village of digital telecommunications and irrespective of many indicators of globalisation, most national-states resist to succumb to the idea of globalisation, and cling to the idea of national sovereignty. Citizens continue to hold their national governments accountable on social issues over which the state has had an autonomous control, and a sense of allegiance to the nation-state borne by its citizens has not been radically undermined.

Moreover the resurgence of ethnic, regional and nationalist movements in the same period of globalisation, poses a dilemma in asserting that globalisation is an all-encompassing process. It is precisely the will for belonging and continuity against globalising processes that shifts our attention to the paradox of the process at a political as well as cultural/sentimental levels. The forces of 'time-space compression' are in a dialectical relationship with the emotional forces of ethnicities and communities that seek a continuous and spatialized sense of belonging to crystallise their distinctiveness. Hence, on the one hand, the time and space of the nation-state lose strength in reversing globalisation forces, yet on the other hand, on the emotional and subjective fronts globalisation has not fostered a comfortable sense of global identity yet.

Indeed this is why Anthony Smith's article "Towards a Global Culture?" (1990) echoes a voice that cannot be disregarded. For him the notion of a global culture is meaningless, since it has no past and no history; a global culture has no emotional or
affective connotations attached to it, since its very integration is based on and
controlled by non-human factors of mass telecommunications and computer network
systems; the signs, images and symbols of a so-called global culture do not have any
hold on real human memories of the past, and hence do not possess the capacity to
overcome particular histories and cultures that crystallise the experiences of
historically distinct peoples. A global culture, argues Smith, has no past, no roots in
people's memories, and thus it can not have a common future. Above all else, Smith
would not agree with the "economic determinism" that allegedly is implicit in the
postmodern analysis of national identity. In other words even if a global economic
union has emerged, a global culture will not by any means have to follow. Nations are
ethnically and historically distinct and will remain so. (Smith 1990, PP. 171-193).

This dilemma is worth closer investigation. I will argue below that globalisation
need not to be in contradiction with expressions of ethnic identity and even its
spatialisation in marginalised, localised, and national forms. It only becomes
confusing when ethnicities and national-states are regarded as the same phenomena.

This paradoxical situation can be examined in terms of the "Dialectic of
Globalisation and Localisation". I shall focus my attention on the mechanisms
whereby the global and the local are dialectically linked, leading to perpetuation and
strengthening of local identities in the disjunctive processes of globalisation.
However local or ethnic identities are not synonymous with national identities. In fact
nationalisation and standardisation of identity by the national-states in the midst of
human ethnic, linguistic and geographical differences has undermined the conditions
of ethnic belonging and expression. The centralised power mechanisms of national-
states which have been in charge of producing a homogeneous national identity since
the 18th century are absent in globalising processes. Some have argued that the global
culture of consumerism works towards the creation of a global identity. There is
equal truth in maintaining that the global culture of consumerism opens its way into
different markets by an emphasis on difference and heterogeneity. And in this complex situation the global and local/ethnic are united in their tension.

Raphael Samuel has in his introduction to *Patriotism* pointed to the whole range of changes in the realms of economy, politics, culture that have occurred in British society since the Second World War, which do not allow 'nationality' to be taken for granted any longer (Samuel, 1989). Samuel argues that with the decline of British imperialism which during its peak underlined and celebrated the idea of 'British Nationality', and with the transformations of the last thirty years, British sovereignty has been severely undermined. There has emerged a political division between the north and the south; minority identities do not fit into the idea of the nation as an organic whole, and hence, a new cultural and political pluralism has damaged both the "uniqueness of English identity" and its consensus politics. Immigration and foreign settlements have brought the third world communities into the heart of major cities, making it fictional, if not publicly offensive, to regard the idea of the British as a common nation.

On the other hand, with the globalisation of the City of London by global capital, argues Samuel, the economic sovereignty of the 1930s, when the label of "made in Britain" was a token of durability and quality and indicative of national economic supremacy and self sufficiency, when 40% of films in circuit were home made, and foreign travels were severely restricted due to exchange controls, all this has been eroded.

Along with the structural economic and political changes that to some extent have eroded the borders of a distinctive and sovereign nation, there are cultural changes too, continues Samuel. In the last 30 years American cultural and commercial penetrations into British society have gone unresisted and even unresented. National diet, clothing, designs, artistic and architectural styles, fashion, production and consumption all have incorporated ideas of 'difference' and 'ethnic'. The
commercialisation and promotion of 'difference' and 'ethnicity' by global capitalist strategies, indicates that capitalism is not committed to the national idea, but it dresses in a national costume when home markets are targeted; commodity (or the sign) appears in a national or ethnic dress depending on what image is being produced, and what market is being penetrated. The ephemera of "Georgian", "Edwardian" or "Victorian" traditions, for example, can easily be revived and commercialised in response to a nostalgia for the past.

Raphael Samuel is not denying that there is a will for distinct cultural spaces of identity, but he is referring to how this will is employed and utilised by capital, and how difference and heterogeneity become the cultural sensibilities of the postmodern times. We live in a society that "creates a theatre of appearances at the very moment when the substance is slipping from our grasp. It preserves facials while allowing the interiors to be ruthlessly stripped..."(Samuel, 1989, P.1)

This nostalgia for 'home', 'simplicity' and 'past' at a time when capitalism is becoming more cosmopolitan, is one of the attributes of postmodern culture and it lives in tension with global consumerist culture. The more cosmopolitan capitalism becomes, the more it advertises its local affiliations, and goes nomadic. Something of the same nature may be true of the British people as a whole. Geographically the population may be becoming more mobile, but imaginatively it cleaves to a sense of place; new offices and housing developments take the names of villages, and the sentiments of nationalism and national identity increasingly become integrated with imagination and invention. The idea of nationality, says Samuel, has not got much relationship with what we really are, but with what we imagine we are.

Another challenge to the Modernist version of ethnicity, from a different angle is offered by Tonkin in her introduction to History and Ethnicity. Echoing Anderson, Raphael Samuel maintained that through national imagination we recreate ourselves as a traditional entity. Tonkin wants to investigate the same thing anthropologically.
She is interested to know how can the present create the past?, how can identities construct their uniqueness and their exclusive history? Tonkin recognises that group identity is a passage to the assertion or construction of self-definition, and successful self-defining entities such as nations create their history retrospectively, and in relation to the identities of 'Other'. The construction of one's history in relation to other identities always entails elements of fiction, but as long as people believe in them, then their history is true. Here Tonkin tries to elaborate that the truth of one's identity and the history that the 'present' creates, do not necessarily depend on their factuality; history and myth are not mutually exclusive realms, not even when a historical 'fact' is used in empirical research, and is transformed into empirical material. And in turn this empirical material constantly constructs the past and re-establishes the difference between 'us' and 'them'.

It is obvious here that Tonkin is essentially implying that the establishment of the epistemology and consciousness behind separate national identities is intrinsically linked to the epistemology of the Enlightenment that separated sciences from myth and believed that 'fact' and 'fiction' belong to two different realms. The negation of such a division is another criterion that separates Modernity from postmodernity.

Tonkin explores these remarks in terms of a very important notion in social sciences today (which she believes should have never been allowed into academic use), that is, ethnicity. The concept of 'ethnicity' which first arrived into the Oxford English Dictionary in 1953, can only be applied to a group from without and in identity differentiating processes, argues Tonkin. No child growing up at home ever feels that s/he is a member of an ethnic group. In other words ethnicity is an abstract noun that is not derived from vernacular morphological processes, but from the discourse of Otherness. Interestingly enough, although the term ethnicity expresses commonalities of various kind, of culture, language, religion, race, etc, no ethnic studies of majorities or nations have ever taken place by anthropologists, except perhaps in the
case of Japan which is one of the few mono-ethnic nation-states in the world. The term has remained to express the identity of minority, the opposition, the Other.

In this sense the term ethnicity is loaded by power relationships. Tonkin believes that ethnicity should be understood only in the context of relativities of the process of identification. In this light an anthropological study and grasp of nation would suggest that the very definition of the nation is dependent upon a process of identification that can only happen in relation to ethnicity, race and the Other. Hence the discourse of ethnicity that has tended to concern itself only with sub-national units or minorities of some kind or another, has been criticised by Tonkin as biased and imprecise, suggesting that either anthropology should come 'home' and study 'us' as an ethnic group too, or the term should be abandoned altogether by social scientists.

Tonkin's argument is a challenge to Modernist conceptions of the nation as rooted identities that can be defined in reference to their own inherent attributes from within. To Tonkin all identities are shaped in interaction and in relativity. Hence, the very definition of collective identities, here nations, includes the notion of the Other; the Other in this sense is never external. Secondly, the process of self-identification, always entails myth and imagination as media used by the 'present' to construct a 'past'. Past and present are mutually inclusive.

In this sense, nationality and ethnicity can be analysed as two fundamentally different entities. Under the process of nation-state building, ethnicities, that is the real communities to which people are sensuously and tangibly tied, are incorporated into a standardised national identity, and the expressions of their differences are discouraged and blunted. Only those excluded from the nation are regarded as 'ethnic'. Under the process of globalisation, on the other hand, expressions of ethnicity and difference are gaining firmer ground rather than the reverse. In other words *globalisation and localisation* are mutually inclusive processes that work
towards de-construction of grand national identities in which difference was largely disguised in the name of homogeneity and unity of the national culture.

A similar theme has been echoed by Stuart Hall in his contribution to King's *Culture, Globalisation, and the New World System* (1991). To Stuart Hall ethnicity in a sense has been rediscovered by the English in the last few decades to salvage the English past and identity. The new nationalism of the last few decades uses race and ethnicity in a structure of binary representation of English identity. Britishness, according to Hall, has always absorbed the heterogeneities within, such as class, regional, linguistic and ethnic differences, and negotiated itself as a homogeneous entity against difference with the other outside and inside national boundaries.

On a cultural level the continuous migration of labour in the post-war period, the development of an ecological consciousness, the expansion of global mass culture dominated by signs and images that reconstitute popular life and popular entertainment, all indicate the evolution of a new social and economic fabric which is largely woven by the global forces rather than national ones. The logic of this global culture is to promote mass production and mass consumption, and it employs the techniques of 'just-in-time production', new flexible accumulation strategies, segmented markets, post-Fordist modes of spatial and temporal organisation, all aiming at a diversified and localised mass consumption in the global market.

In this sense Stuart Hall is arguing that at the heart of a postmodern global culture lies a contradiction and also a unity. This echoes what Raphael Samuel said, that the global opened its way through the local and the ethnic. The global is therefore a contradictory and disjunctive discourse that incorporates, gives space to, and empowers difference and heterogeneity. The hegemony of global capital is not the disappearance or destruction of difference, it is the construction of a global culture through difference in the age of digital communication and for the purpose of flexible accumulation.
Ronald Robertson, one of the other contributors to *Theory, Culture and Society* (June 1990 vol. 7 numbers 2-3, PP.15-31), suggests that the expectations of particularity on the one hand, and on the other hand, the expectations of universality should be tied together as part of a global cultural nexus. In harmony with Hall, he calls the dialectic of globalisation and localisation "particularisation of universalism" which can be interpreted to mean the global culture is expressed through localisation/ethnicization, that is, through incommensurable human ethnic differences.

In response to the question "can there be such a thing as a world culture?", Immanuel Wallerstein looks at the national, as the prototype of the ‘particular’ in the process of globalisation (King 1991, P. 93). He argues that the universality of the nation-state as our primary cultural container came into existence only in the 19th century. Over time, the particular nation-states have evolved to resemble each other more and more in their structural and cultural forms. In Wallerstein’s words “all nation-states have today standard political forms; a national currency, a school system, a legislature, a constitution, a bureaucracy” (King 1991, P. 93). Wallerstein implies that this evolved similarity of the nation-states has been taken as an ontological and inherent one disguising the temporality of the nation-state.

The modernist binary logic in the dichotomisation of heterogeneity/homogeneity, integration/disintegration, unity/diversity, is challenged by these postmodern propositions. Accordingly, these terms are not mutually exclusive; they are both explanatory dimensions of the global culture. Postmodernism to Featherstone is "both a symptom and a powerful cultural image of the swing away from the conceptualisations of the global culture less in terms of alleged (Modernist) homogenising processes... and more in terms of the diversity, variety and richness of popular and local discourses, codes and practices which resist and play-back systemicity and order" (Featherstone, 1990, P. 2).
Hence it is obvious that for Hall, Robertson, Featherstone and Wallerstein, the process of globalisation does not entail homogenisation. This ties into with the aforementioned positions of Appadurai and Giddens as the other proponents of globalisation theory. To them too globalisation is a multi-layered, contingent, patchy, heterogeneous, discontinuous process which is caused by the diversity of intersecting dynamics; it is "a process of uneven development that fragments as it co-ordinates" (Giddens, 1990, P. 175), and this infrastructure for Appadurai is deeply disjunctive.

Consequently the central argument suggests that the general power of the centralised Modern state diminishes, while simultaneously ethnic differences and localised strategies and spatializations strengthen in the discourse of postmodernization. While under the conditions of postmodernity the global forces of digital capitalism diminish the power of a sovereign and centralised state in regulating an independent national society and culture, they do strengthen certain incommensurable folk identities at the local levels. This assertion has been fully explored in chapter four. It was suggested that the modes of vertical integration and control in bureaucratic structures in the industrial time, are slowly being replaced by a more horizontal mode of integration and control in the post-industrial society due to postmodern technologies and flexible accumulation strategy of digital capitalism. The national-state is a prime example of a vertical and bureaucratic power mechanism.

Raymond Williams and Daniel Bell both have suggested that the nation-state is too small for resolving global problems and too big for tackling local problems in the postmodern times (Williams 1983, PP. 197-9; Bell 1988, P. 116). With the growth of global problems and global modes of governance, we need to think globally and act locally. The dialectic of global and local can be segmented analytically at the following levels:
Internationalisation of economy, politics, culture, and the 'hollowing' out of the national-state lead us to think globally. The diversity of local, regional and ethnic characteristics with their diverse beliefs, conditions and traditions localise the reception of the global phenomena. All global processes are locally spatialized, and all local characteristics are subject to global processes.

Transnational Companies subdivide their operations and spatialize their diverse activities locally and within different markets. BT and BA for example operate Transnationally. The telephone bills we receive every quarter as well as the London-Liverpool air tickets are both produced by very cheap labour in Dehli.

Centralised national hierarchies break down and the body politics are both globalised/Europeanised and dispersed nationally to local governments, private sector, non-governmental agencies, councils, etc.

Localities are the spaces for social interaction and such interactions provide the local context for interpretation of global processes, gathering of information, arranging coalitions and contracts, and developing initiatives and rules of acceptable behaviour. (Amin & Thrift 1992)

The globalisation of the City of London is another example of local spatialization of global financial mechanisms. The increasing number of foreign banks from 100 in 1961 to about 450 in the 1980s spatially transformed the City of London to facilitate for the flows of global money and finance, leading to effective de-nationalisation of the economy. (Lash & Urry 1994, PP. 288/89). International problems relating to overwhelming consumerism such as holes in the ozone layer, global warming, acid rain, nuclear accidents, as well as poverty, over-population, famine, AIDS,
unemployment, defence all pose a common future for humanity, and can only be tackled by global strategies and implemented locally.

- Global processes have increased ethnic and local awareness at two levels: firstly at a constructed and commodified level; the image of many ethnicities is exploited, commodified and partially constructed through the advertising strategies of late capitalism to promote further sale of ethnic art, fashion, tourism, package holidays. This is what MacCannell calls 'reconstructed ethnicity', an 'ethnicity-for-tourism' in which 'other' cultures are exoticized for tourist attraction. (MacCannell 1992, 158).

- Secondly is the resurgence of ethnic and nationalist movements of real historical cultures of real people against the modern centralising state that through the modern period forced them into the meta-narrative of the national-state. The collapse of the Soviet Union national-state and the rise of many small ethnic nations and the ethnic wars in Yugoslavia are only some examples. The new nation-states that are created from the remains of the old ones, are largely (mono) ethnic communities whose identities are not administered and standardised through the state mechanism of national education.

In this context, it will be possible to explain the resurgence of ethnic conflicts and uprisings in the last few decades, without contradicting the assertion that the sovereign power of the bureaucratic modern state that administered and standardised diverse human identities into the meta-narrative of one national identity is diminishing. With this assertion, then, it will also be possible to speak of the weakening of national identity without meaning to say a similar thing on an ethnic level.
The real difference between the nation and ethnic identity is that the former is a Modern discourse of power/knowledge/political economy and is vertically articulated in the time and space of Modernity by the modern state, whereas the latter is based on essentialist historical human cultural differences, and their nationalisms come from their peripheral locations. These differences in turn are commodified by the global economic infrastructure, and enter into cultural sensibilities of the postmodern time.

Nation-states are the dominant political institutions of the modern time. Ethnicities on the other hand, although heavily racialized and politicized in the modern processes of nation/state-building, in themselves are based on genuine incommensurable historical folk human differences. The process of postmodernization transcends the parameters of Modernity and hence the parameters of the nation-state, while it strengthens ethnic nationalism.

**Ethnic nationalism**

The distinction between cultural nations and political nations is one of the most famous and illuminating distinctions that has been made in the enquiries regarding the nation. This thesis so far has concerned itself with the political nation-state as a modern container of collective identity. It is, however, time to look at cultural communities and nations that existed in pre-modern times and have persisted into the modern times. As I have maintained in the above section, I shall be arguing further that while the process of globalisation diminishes the power of the nation-state, cultural or ethnic nationalism is reviving, and will continue to do so.

The political nation-state is the making of Modernity and its modern territorial state, and it centres around the idea of individual and collective self-determination. The concept of political nation-state has been most vividly crystallised in France, Britain and the United States; a process of political transformation regarded a community of aware citizens equal in the eyes of the law irrespective of their ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural origins. The nation and the state constituted a unifying whole,
and through the state project of nationalisation, the cultural and political boundaries were made to slowly coincide. *Thus the national-State is made from above, and through centralised power mechanisms. Ethnic groups and what unites them, on the other hand, are not modern makings, only their position in the nation-state is; they are historical and cultural entities that existed prior to modern times. Modernity has not generated ethnicity, but it has generated the institution of the nation-state.*

The existence of an ethnic community is constituted by the consciousness of the social groups wanting and believing in being one community and is based on seemingly objective criteria such as a distinct area of settlement, language, customs and traditions.

These two types of nations have been respectively called 'Western-territorial nations' and 'Eastern ethnic nations' by Anthony Smith. The 'Western-Territorial Nations' or 'Civic Nations' such as Britain, France, Holland, Spain, Sweden and Russia are the ones that gradually transformed themselves into territorial national-states due to the unification of the "economy, territorial centralization, the provision of equal rights for more and more strata, and the growth of public mass education system" (Smith, 1986, P. 138). Territoriality, citizenship rights, legal codes and the development of a political culture are the main features of the western model. Smith stresses that as European inter-State rivalries grew, the national-state moved to subordinate and standardise the peripheral populations and their ethnic cultures, as happened in Gaelic Highlands.

The western model of nation/state-building was initially imported to African and Asian colonies by the western rulers, and later it was adopted by 'indigenous' political elite and intellectuals in their nationalist aspirations for de-colonisation of their countries.
The second type of nation is the 'Eastern ethnic' model that developed 'genealogically' during the 19th century in Central, Eastern Europe and the Middle East, and it "revealed the growing influence of 'ethnie' and ethnic models of the nation, on the trajectories and concepts of nationhood" (Smith 1986, P. 145). Ethnic ties and sentiments, a vernacular culture, emphasis on a unique collective past and destiny were the basis of popular and national mobilisation.

*It is the rise of the second type of nationalism, that is the ethnic nationalism, against the nationalism of the national-states that underlies the resurgence of national and ethnic movements of the last few decades.* Since the Second World War most European nation-states have been facing ethnic resistance from peripheral areas. In 1980 a new law was introduced in Belgium that transformed Belgium from a centrally unified national-state into a federation allowing not only the Flemings and the Walloons but also the Germans-speaking minority in Eupen and Malmedy in east Belgium the right to run their own affairs. (Alter 1985, P. 98).

In Cyprus, the two communities of Greeks and Turks, despite many unifying initiatives eventually decided to go their own ways in 1975, which has divided the island politically into two sections.

In Spain, France, Britain, Italy, national minorities express their will for self-determination, and demand decentralization of the power of the national-state so as to allow them to run their own affairs. Despite this the claim of homogeneity and unity of the national-states has not yet been abandoned by the central state. The Welsh and Scottish constitute distinctive cultural consciousnesses in Britain which has eventually led to the devolution of Scotland in 1997; Bretons, Corsicans, Alsatians and Provencals speak a second language different from French, which is not exercised at a political level; in Spain, out of many ethnic groups, only Catalan and Basque regionalism has ever managed to rise to the level of political significance.
Although most of these ethnic communities aspire to run their own affairs, as a norm they do not want to constitute a separate national-state. Corsican regionalists for example do not want to secede from France, but want to share only the currency, foreign policy, defence and some elements of the judicial system with the mainland. That is why Hugh Seton-Watson has described regionalism as an unsatisfied nationalism. (Hugh Seton-Watson 1971, PP 3-13). Most of these ethnic nationalisms are in fact claiming their rights for self-determination of their own affairs which are denied by the national-states and their centralized power apparatus.

The sudden upsurge of ethnic revival in eastern and south eastern Europe after the collapse of the communist national-states marks the 1980s. The ethnic uprising of Azeris, Armenians, Tajiks, Uzbeks against the Russian state and against each other; the bloodiest ethnic cleansing war in Yugoslavia, years after modern events which artificially united different peoples in the body of the same nation-state at the end of First World War; the division of Czechoslovakia; the separation of the Baltic provinces and Ukraine from the Soviet State, all indicate the diminishing power of the centralised national-states and rising ethnic awareness.

These ethnic nationalisms constitute the category of *Risorgimento nationalism* for Alter (1985), which is defined as the principle of solidarity of the ethnic communities against the national-states which aim to assimilate and standardise diverse human identities into a national one from a centralised power position to produce a meta-narrative of identity from the above.

In the third world countries of Asia and Africa, after the Second World War, the intellectuals and political leaders undertook to decolonise their territories from the imperialist domination of the western nation-state. Their newly formed nation-states have faced huge problems of ethnic diversity that destabilise the intended nationalisation processes. The Third World nationalism by its very essence is contradictory; on the one hand it aims for de-colonisation and independence, and on
the other hand the territorial as well as the epistemologic framework within which the task of de-colonisation is undertaken is itself the legacy of colonialism and imperialism. But such is the agonising dilemma of Third World life!

According to what has been discussed above, it should now be more clear that the discourse of globalisation and localisation, has no inherent contradiction with the rise of ethnic nationalism. I have tried to show that in the intertwined processes of globalisation, localisation and ethnicization that characterise the postmodern times, the modern national-state and its centralising power is fundamentally undermined. The problematic of 'dual loyalty' of ethnic belonging and national belonging (Smith 1986, P 152), has remained unbridged towards the end of 20th century. The reason for this is that the former is historically transverse and the latter is historically time-bound.

**Refugees, Exception Leave To Remains, Asylum-Seekers and Exiles**

It would be difficult to finish this argument without mentioning the increasing number of state-less people in the postmodern world such as refugees, those with Exceptional Leave to Remain, asylum-seekers and the exiles who live at the margins of the nation-state. As global capitalism grows and the culture of consumerism penetrates in every corner of the planet; as borders erode and the international movement of labour force increases; as difference and ethnic conflict are further empowered, the pace of mass population movements and immigration across the globe increases. According to Richmond “throughout the developing world there are mass movements of population from rural to urban areas,...An estimated 70 million persons live and work in other countries and more than a million emigrate permanently every year”. “There are an estimated 16.3 million refugees and asylum seekers around the world...In addition the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) recognises a further 6.6 million people live in refugee-like situations in their own regions” (Richmond 1994, introduction).
The ethnic diversity of almost all post-industrial societies today raises the question of whether equality of opportunity and cooptation of immigrants with each other and with indigenous populations can be reconciled with the maintenance of separate national identities. It seems that homelessness, poverty, social exclusion, marginalisation and racism are the themes that unify and characterise the identities of refugees, asylum seekers and exiles rather than belonging to a nation-state. Yet 'they' keep flowing to inhabit state-less social positions. As ethnic conflicts, environmental risk, poverty and over-population experienced at the local level push them away, the semiotics of global satellite communications, simultaneously pull them towards 'better opportunities' (and in most cases a chance for survival) from rural to urban areas and from urban areas to global core cities. The unity, inseparability of, and the tension between, the global and the local/ethnic is vividly crystallised in the locus and identity of refugees, asylum seekers and exiles. These people together with the long-term unemployed and low waged constitute the bottom layer of the global class society, while they also experience segregation and exclusion within the same layer. Nationality is the last thing that makes them unify.

Europeans and those of European descent in the Americas and Oceania are outnumbered in an increasingly integrated world in a ratio of four to one. They fear they may lose their privileged life styles, power and control. They defend their national sovereignty by constantly reviewing their immigration policies to tighten their borders against foreigners and cling to a sense of History (with a capital H) which gave them their superiority in the last few centuries. However "as the senior legal advisor to the UNHCR has stated, even if the developed countries are based, by building new iron curtains and Berlin Walls around their common territory, the human flood would still find its ways"(Richmond, 1994, p. 216).

The first step towards finding a solution to the problems arising from immigration is to come in terms with the logic of late capitalism and to perceive the phenomenon of
mass immigration as ‘ours’ rather than ‘theirs’. The only peaceful solution to the future is that “We must all learn to live with ethno-cultural diversity, rapid social change, and mass migration” (Richmond, 1994, 217). Nationalism poses merely a barrier and a prejudice against preparing and learning new skills for a multicultural social life.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have argued that globalisation reverses processes of homogenisation of identity by empowering ethnic identities and conflict. In explaining this assertion, I proposed to distinguish the national-state and national identity from ethnic identities. The former identity is obtained through centralised power mechanisms of the national-state and it is a discourse of power in the modern period, while the latter, irrespective of severe politicisation, is based on incommensurable human cultural differences that have been formed historically and culturally on a folk and vernacular level. The relationship between different ethnic groups only becomes hierarchical when they are swallowed by the nation-state and its centralised power mechanism.

It seems that the global has become the macrological dimension in which power should be theorised. Micrologically, power can continue to be perceived in a Foucaultian way as ‘operating through different and diffused force-fields of practices and discourses’. The global, unlike the national, does not and cannot speak a single language and it has to open its way into the local markets through pluralisation and deconstruction, but it is still from a position of power. If hegemony was implemented from the position of standardisation and homogenisation of culture and identity in the age of industrial capitalism and by the nation-state, it prevails through empowerment of difference, heterogeneity and pluralism in the postmodern times and against the power of the nation-state. Under the logic of late capitalism the sovereignty and unity of the nation-state diminishes, national borders lose significance, a global culture of consumerism together with massive rates of immigration and ethnic movements characterise the future.
However, neither of the above assertions are adequately indicative of an *actual* decline of the sovereignty and unity of the nation-state in the subjective realm. In the next chapter I set out to investigate this hypothesis empirically, through a case-study.
Part Two:

Empirical Enquiry
Chapter Six:

Is The Institution of the Nation-State Declining?

In the previous chapters it has been argued that under the conditions of postmodernity, 'national' societies have been undergoing fundamental changes in the spheres of production, distribution, consumption, modes of political and economic governance, time and space integration since the 1960s, with the advent of micro-electronic capitalism, computerisation network systems and mass telecommunications. I have argued that in the context of a postmodern political economy, capitalism has evolved to a micro-electronic phase of its development which some people have called post-industrial. These post-industrial or postmodern transformations have caused the individual nation-states to become increasingly fused into global networks and experience a more horizontal integration with the global networks compared to more vertical and bureaucratic structures which characterised both mechanical and electronic phases of capitalist development in the modern period. I have suggested that together with capitalist structural transformations, there have also been corresponding changes in sensibilities and styles expressed in the cultural and aesthetic realms that are commonly called postmodernism. Without attempting to recapitulate what postmodernism entails it is useful to remember that in the first chapter of this thesis it has been suggested that postmodernism is an umbrella term referring to cultural and aesthetic sensibilities and styles that, quite contrary to the avantgarde artistic and cultural styles, celebrate notions such as plurality, fragmentation, diversity, open endedness and an abandonment of a sense of completion and destination.

I have also argued that although at its face value the postmodern phenomena seem to be a confusing mixture of contradictory elements of 'anything goes', there are
underlying explanatory developments which in this thesis have been analysed as the postmodern political economy. It is only in the context of a postmodern political economy, as the latest phase of capitalism, that the postmodern phenomena can be better explained. The abandonment of notions such as ‘destination’, ‘meaning’, ‘completion’ and the adoption of alternative notions such as ‘plurality’, ‘diversity’, ‘fragmentation’ and ‘juxtaposition’ in aesthetic expressions combined with the most advanced and powerful computerised technologies of fashion, design, marketing and advertising speed up the cycle of production and consumption and increase the speed of disposability. An increase in the rhythm of social and cultural disposability means shorter production and consumption cycles and higher profitability which is the prime motive of capitalist production.

As regard the nation’s diminishing sense of ‘homogeneity’, ‘unity’ and ‘sovereignty’, the same logic has been implemented. Under capitalist development “all that is solid, melts into air” and here, as an example, we are looking at the discourses of collective identity in the form of (the) national identity. It is in this context that I am proposing that under the conditions of postmodern political economy discourses of national identity are also losing power and the nation-state is increasingly less able to standardise, administer and represent a ‘sovereign’ and ‘homogenous’ collectivity. As a result nations also feel less homogeneous and sovereign.

Putting it in other words, as the latest technologies create a sense of global simultaneity, juxtaposition of different experiences and disposability, the chronological, sequential and continuous experiencing of social life which was essential for historical perceptions and identities, loses its vigour and the juxtaposition of ‘diverse’ and ‘heterogeneous’ experiences over-ride chronological experiences of ‘united’ and ‘homogenous’ nations. History, based on chronology, which has been a crucial explanatory platform for nation-states to substantiate their ‘distinctiveness’ and to lend meaning to their ‘homogeneity’, ‘unity’ and
'sovereignty', becomes less and less significant in the simultaneous experiences of modern computerised (inter)networks of postmodern societies.

The aim of this chapter is to empirically test the proposition that under the conditions of postmodernity, and alongside the structural transformations of the socio-economic fabrics of post-industrial societies, there is also a diminishing sense of national 'sovereignty, unity and homogeneity' in the context of globalisation together with a growing sense of plurality and heterogeneity within the space of the nation.

As will become apparent in this chapter, despite the fundamental transformations that nation-states have undergone in their social and economic lives, the nation-state is still the dominant institution for both making and representing collective identities. Therefore none of the postmodern structural changes that have been referred to above could automatically prove that the experience of nationhood in the subjective realm has also changed, especially now that the waves of ethnic nationalism have expanded in the last few decades rather than the reverse. This chapter has therefore been developed to test whether, and to what extent, the self-perception of the nation has changed since the 1920s in respect to its 'unity', 'homogeneity' and 'sovereignty'. The purpose of this chapter is to make a historical comparison between the periods of 1920s/1930s and 1970s/1980s/1990s. The chapter presents the data that is obtained from the two historical periods and examines the findings on the question of whether the western nation-state perceives its sovereignty, unity and homogeneity to be in decline or in question. I have chosen Britain as my case-study to answer empirically the following question: "Has there been a historical trend towards a sense of decline of national sovereignty, homogeneity and unity in Britain?"
Methodology

My objective is to find out whether there has been a historical trend towards a sense of decline of national sovereignty, homogeneity and unity in Britain.

I have chosen content analysis of the 'text' to investigate whether there has been a historical trend towards the decline of the sovereignty, homogeneity and unity of the western nation-state. Content analysis is a conventionally suitable method for investigation and extraction of valid references from the text. This is especially true if historical trends in social, group or institutional behaviour and attitudes are looked at. The method is appropriate for making inferences from the text in studying cultural patterns of change over time. As my intention is to find a historical trend in the nation’s self-perception of its sovereignty and unity, newspapers have been chosen for the purpose of content analysis because they have existed over long periods of time and are suitable for inferring historical trends. Newspapers are one of the most important media in which the nation unfolds itself on a daily basis, and it is relatively cost effective to have access to newspapers of the previous decades. Editorials and commentaries are the sections that have been looked at because daily interpretations and analyses of national life are more likely to be reflected upon in those areas.

There is a drawback in choosing newspapers for testing the strength of a sense of national identity, because newspapers constitute the very media for unfolding and representing the institution of the nation. They are the daily voice of the nation-state, through which as Anderson says, the nation ‘imagines itself’, and as Bhabha says, the nation ‘performs itself’. They are bound to voice the nation-state and in this sense it can be argued that I have chosen a biased medium. However newspapers have been chosen for the very reason of their representation of the nation-state, because if the nation has undergone changes in its subjective understanding of itself, then newspapers are where the trend of change can be found.
Britain has been chosen as my case-study because Britain is one of the oldest nation-states of Europe which has historically demonstrated a very high sense of national unity, homogeneity and sovereignty. It would therefore be significant to find out how the British national sentiments have changed over time since the 1920s. Four daily British newspapers that have been in print since 1920s have been selected: The Times and The Guardian from the quality papers and The Daily Express and The Daily Mirror from the tabloids. I have chosen The Times and The Daily Express because of their positions as so-called right-wing papers and The Guardian and The Daily Mirror because of their positions as centre and more left-wing papers. This combination will give us a tentatively balanced and representative coverage of the views of different sections of the population.

**Sampling**

The historical periods covered are three years in each decades of the 1920s and 1930, in all four newspapers, to be compared with three years in each decade of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s for the Times and the Guardian and the 1980s and 1990s for the Daily Express and The Daily Mirror. The years chosen are 1925-1926-1927/ 1935-1936-1937/ 1975-1976-1977/ 1985-1986-1987 & 1995-1996-1997. The 1970s period has not been covered in the tabloids. This is to reduce the scope of an already very large piece of research in order to save time and space, which at the same time has not affected the comparability of the two historical periods.

The 1920s and 1930s were chosen because I wanted to look at the pattern of attitudes to national identity in the early 20th century, the time that characterised the peak of the era of Modernity and the triumph of the western nation-state and nationalism; when the sovereignty of the nation-state was highly praised and undisputed. The decades of the 1970s (The Times and The Guardian only), 1980s, & 1990s were chosen to find out if the structures of postmodernity or post-industrial capitalism since the late 1960s have affected the nation’s subjective attitudes. Three years in
each decade gives us 36 consecutive months in each decade. The three years of the 5th to the 7th of each decade were randomly selected; one issue per week covering each day of the week (excluding Sundays) for 6 months and then moving to the next day. So for example Monday papers are only looked at from January 1925 to June 1925; Tuesdays from July 1925 to December 1925; Wednesdays from January 1926 to June 1926; Thursdays from July 1926 to December 1926; Fridays from January 1927 to June 1927 and Saturdays from July 1927 to December 1927.

The information given above can be listed as follows:

**Method:** Content Analysis

**Daily Newspapers:** *The Times, The Guardian, The Daily Express and The Daily Mirror*

**Unit of Analysis:** Individual editorials and commentaries.

**Historical period:** 1920s, 1930s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, for *The Times & The Guardian.*

**Sampling universe** 1920s, 1930s, 1980s, 1990s, for *The Daily Express and The Daily Mirror*

**Sampling Frame:** 36 months per decade of the years 5 to 7; one day a week, covering each day of the week (Except Sundays) for 6 months

**Size of the Sample:** A total of 2808 editorials and commentaries:

- *(The Times)* 52 editorials and commentaries per year X 15 years = 780
- *(The Guardian)* 52 editorials and commentaries per year X 15 years = 780
- *(Daily Express)* 52 editorials and commentaries per year X 12 years = 624
- *(Daily Mirror)* 52 editorials and commentaries per year X 12 years = 624

**Total** 2808

**Location of Research:** British Newspaper Library in Colindale
Concepts and Indicators

The very important task of determining concepts and indicators was subsequently undertaken. I wanted to find suitable and measurable indicators of the concept of 'national sovereignty, unity and homogeneity'. 'Sovereignty', 'unity' and 'homogeneity' are abstract concepts that may be useful in constructing theories, but cannot be directly observed or operationalised. It is therefore necessary to find suitable indicators for these theoretical concepts which can be subjected to observation and measurement. This process is called 'operationalisation' in social sciences which simply means that theoretical concepts and propositions must be translated into operational concepts and propositions before the research begins.

In order to establish valid indicators of the concept of 'national sovereignty, unity and homogeneity' a pilot study was conducted for a month to arrive at the main indicators that refer to the concept. In the course of a month's pilot study, the four newspapers mentioned earlier were analysed and a surprisingly high range of dimensions and indicators were extracted. A whole range of issues such as oil, fuel, immigration, minorities, Europe, Wales and Scotland, Northern Ireland, the job situation, unemployment, EEC food producers, international prices and inflation, globalisation, the world economy, economic volatility and uncertainty, global interdependence, lack of career prospects, terrorism, overpopulation, environmental problems, HIV, decline of religion and family, sexual immorality, pornography, the Internet etc. were found to make stronger or weaker references to the concepts of national unity, homogeneity, sovereignty, or suggest implications and consequences for national identity.

It is important to underline here that neither the dimensions nor the indicators are selected and elaborated theoretically. They are selected on the basis of the empirical results of the pilot study which showed that newspapers use several dimensions for each (of our) theoretical concepts. I chose the most recurrent dimensions of the concepts of 'sovereignty, 'homogeneity' and 'unity'. Likewise the indicators of each
dimension are merely chosen on the basis of the frequency of their recurrence. Those with the highest frequency of recurrence have been selected.

After the pilot study was completed, it was obvious that there was no way that all the indicators of a decline or continuity of the national sovereignty and unity could be incorporated into the research. I had to dispose of many of these indicators and select the ones that seemed more frequent and encompassing. I chose a few broad indicators through which the degree of the strength of national sovereignty or unity could be measured. The question I have been interested in is “Has there been a historical trend towards the decline of the sovereignty and unity of the nation-state?” My research intends to measure to what extent, if any, the nation’s self-perception of its sovereignty and homogeneity has changed since 1920s. After the completion of the pilot study, I decided to choose six main dimensions of the concept of a ‘decline of national sovereignty and homogeneity’ and then proceed to extract the most frequently repeated indicators. The reason for this decision was to enhance the validity and reliability of the findings. Three dimensions have been chosen to express ‘a diminishing sense of homogeneity and unity’ and three dimensions to express ‘a diminishing sense of sovereignty’. These are

**Dimensions of the concept of a “diminishing sense of National Homogeneity & Unity”**

A- A diminishing sense of national belonging
B- An increasing sense of hybridity of the nation
C- Growing regional ethnicities against the national-state

**Dimensions of the concept of a “diminishing sense of National Sovereignty”**

D- A growing sense of inability to solve own problems
E- A growing sense of Europeanism
F- A growing sense of Globalisation
For each of the above dimensions I have selected a number of dependent indicators which reveal their presence in the texts I have investigated. The dimensions and indicators to each dimension are presented below:

**Dimensions**  
(of the concept of a 'diminishing sense of National homogeneity and sovereignty')

A- a diminishing sense of national belonging  
B- an increasing sense of national hybridity  
C- growing regional ethnicities  
D- an increasing sense of inability to solve own problems  
E- an increasing sense of Europeanisation  
F- an increasing sense of globalisation

**Dependent Indicators**  
and their codes

A1- a decline in social morality/integration  
B1- multiculturalism  
B2- pluralism  
C1- Scotland & Wales  
C2- Northern Ireland  
D1- environment  
D2- defence and security  
D3- decline of national economy  
E1- Europe  
F1- global village of consumerism/global culture  
F2- global technology  
F3- global economy

The above indicators are dependent on the Independent indicator of time. The measurement of the above dependent indicators against the independent indicator of time since the 1920s constitutes the pivotal task of this chapter.

The relationship between the dependent and independent indicators are shown in the form of the following table. The table has been used for summarising all the findings throughout the research.
Dependent indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A1</th>
<th>B1/2</th>
<th>C1/2</th>
<th>D1/2/3</th>
<th>E1</th>
<th>F1/2/3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Independent indicator
(time)

The above six sets of dimension-indicators lead to six sets of operationalisable propositions for the measurement of the concept of 'national sovereignty, unity and homogeneity'.

**Dimension-Indicator A** - One of the most endemic and pervasive self-perceptions of all state nationalism has been that belonging to the nation-state is based on some 'homogenising and unifying' sets of values that are distinctive only to the members of a particular nation-state and exclusive of 'others'. These 'homogenising and unifying' sets of values can be based on one or more factors like common ancestry, territory, history, religion, language, etc. More often than not the nation is fractured in respect of socio-economic groupings such as class, gender, regions and ethnicities. These heterogeneities are normally diminished through a 'national education' and a 'national culture', and people are more united around certain 'core values'. Under the conditions of postmodernity metanarrative-based discourses of identity and belonging are fractured, giving rise to a more ambivalent sense of identification. The 'national education' can only deliver a weaker sense of 'unity' and the cultural 'homogeneity & unity' of the nation is expressed with a weaker language. Amongst these declining metanarratives is a sufficiently unifying moral vision of what is right and what is wrong. It seems that post-modern societies are less unified on judgements and practices of issues concerning social morality and solidarity. Consequently individuals of the nation-state have a more blurred sense of collective belonging.
Indicator A1: 'A decline in social morality/integration' has been chosen to investigate if, as far as it is reflected in the editorials and commentaries, there has been any historical change in the nation’s self-perception of its coherence and integration. Obviously if national newspapers express that such cohering principles have declined over time, they are reflecting on a weaker sense of national unity and a growing sense of national fragmentation. I have purposely left the indicator open to include the decline of any cohering and integrating sets of values that have made references to the question of social morality and integration in relation to heterogeneities within.

Data presented under column A are drawn from all the editorials and commentaries that have been written on moral and social issues in their relationship to ‘national/social unity’. The column excludes editorials and commentaries about differences between political parties and their policies. Here we may put forward the following hypothesis for testing:

With the decline of a binding and cohering social morality, there follows a diminishing sense of social unity and belonging.

Dimension -indicator B1/2- Multiculturalism and pluralism are two indicators that have been most frequently repeated in the texts to indicate the extent by which the nation has transformed its perception of its cultural 'homogeneity and unity' and has accepted a sense of cultural hybridity. The feeling of homogeneity is exclusive of 'others' and is centred around a clear vision of 'us' and 'them'. A sense of hybridity is indicative of the extent to which the nation perceives its definition of 'us' to include 'otherness' and to incorporate other cultures and ethnic groups. Both the indicators of 'multiculturalism' and 'pluralism' are to measure the concept of hybridity of the nation, which also indicates a decline of the homogeneity of the nation. Multiculturalism and pluralism are used synonymously in the editorials and commentaries studied as well as in this text to indicate cultural hybridity.
Data presented under column B1/2 are drawn from all the editorials and commentaries that have been written on questions of 'multiculturalism' and 'pluralism' in respect of the definition of national society. This suggests the following hypothesis to be tested:

*With the growth of pluralism and multiculturalism, the nation has a diminishing sense of 'unity and homogeneity' within and feels more hybrid.*

**Dimension-Indicator C1/2:** One of the attributes of the nation-state most insisted on by nationalists has been the ‘homogeneity and unity’ of the nation. The emphasis on this matter has normally disguised the internal heterogeneities such as regional, ethnic, class and gender fractures within the nation. The aim of this dimension and indicator is to find out to what extent the consciousness of ethnic heterogeneities within the framework of the nation-state has increased over time in the case of Scotland and Wales, and Northern Ireland.

Data presented under column C1/2 includes all the reflections that have been made on the question of Scottish/Welsh and Irish ethnic nationalisms in the editorials and commentaries. Here we may test the following proposition:

*With the growth of ethnic consciousness, there is a sense of decline of the homogeneity and unity of the nation.*

The above three indicators of A, B1/2 & C1/2 examine whether there has been a historically diminishing sense of national unity and homogeneity. The findings of each dimension are mutually supportive in their implications.

The three indicators of D1/2/3, E & F1/2/3 below aim to examine whether there has been a historically diminishing sense of national sovereignty. The findings of these
three columns are also mutually supportive in their reflections on the question of national sovereignty.

**Dimension-Indicator D1/2/3:** One of the dimensions focuses on whether the nation thinks of itself as a weaker entity in comparison with the past. This is indicated by its 'increasing sense of inability to resolve its own problems' such as the environment, drugs, defence, security and the economy. This shakes the essential foundation of the 'sovereignty' of the nation-state. The cause of this sense of inability usually lies in the fact that these issues have gained global dimensions beyond the boundaries of decision-making of the national-states, and the resolution of such problems requires a higher degree of awareness of international dependency and contingency.

Three indicators that bear on these issues and have been more frequently repeated in the editorial texts are the environment, the defence/security and the economy. The data presented under the dimension D1/2/3 reflects these three categories respectively. Here I would like to suggest the following hypothesis:

*With the growth of global interdependence, the nation-state feels itself to be increasingly less sovereign and unable to independently tackle crucial human problems such as the environment, defence/security and the economy.*

**Dimension-Indicator E:** The notion of *Europeanism* has grown considerably in the national literature of the nation-state. The growth of this notion expresses the question of national dependence on a larger unit of collective life, and has implications for the *decline of the nation-state as a sovereign unit* of economic and to some extent political decision making. There has been a high degree of European co-operation in the form of the European Community, but crucial propositions regarding the erosion of national borders and currencies for the early 21st century have increasingly provoked concern about the decline of the sovereignty of the nation-state.
Data presented under column E includes all the editorial and commentaries that have reflected on the issue of Europeanism and have questioned its impact on national sovereignty. Some of the articles are of course against Europeanisation, however they are all listed because of the growing concern over the question of Europe, whether negatively or positively, and national Sovereignty. The proposition I would like to test in this regard is:

There is a growing sense of Europeanism—critically or favourably—amongst the citizens of Europe, which indicates a diminishing sense of national sovereignty.

Dimension-Indicator F: With the development of postmodern technologies, there has been an accelerating global interdependence of human activities, practices and thoughts in all spheres of production, distribution, knowledge, information, work, and leisure. This global interdependence of fundamental human social practices and thoughts is reflective of the decline of the sovereign power of the Nation-state.

Data presented under the dimension F1/2/3 includes all the reflections that have been made on the questions of a global technology, global economy and global culture/village in relation to the question of national sovereignty. Here the proposition to be tested is:

With the intensification of dependency of national units on global technology, economy and consumerism, nations feel less self-reliant and sovereign.

To summarise, the general concept under consideration is a ‘diminishing sense of homogeneity & sovereignty of the nation-state’. This concept may be substantiated along the following dimensions: Three dimensions of social integration, hybridity and ethnicity have been selected through the pilot study to define the concept of homogeneity of the nation-state. Three dimensions of
'growing inability to solve own problems', 'Europeanism' and 'globalisation' have been selected to define the concept of 'sovereignty' of the nation-state. Our theoretical propositions can be summarised as follows:

**Testable proposition A:** With the decline of a *binding and cohering social morality*, there follows a diminishing sense of *social unity* and belonging.

**Testable proposition B:** With the growth of *pluralism and multiculturalism*, the nation has a diminishing sense of *unity and homogeneity* within and feels more *hybrid*.

**Testable proposition C:** With the growth of *ethnic consciousness*, there is a sense of decline of the *homogeneity and unity* of the nation.

**Testable proposition D:** With the growth of global interdependence, the nation-state feels to be increasingly *less sovereign* for independent tackling of crucial human problems such as the *environment, defence/security and the economy*.

**Testable proposition E:** There is a growing sense of *Europeanism*—critically or favourably—amongst the citizens of Europe, which indicates a *diminishing sense of sovereignty*.

**Testable proposition F:** With the intensification of dependency of national units on *global technology, economy and consumerism*, nations feel *less sovereign*.

As is shown above each theoretical proposition has been crystallised in the form of a set of concept-indicator(s). The indicator(s) and their codification are listed in each individual appendices. Please see Appendices 1, 2, 3 and 4 for an itemised list of findings and graphs.
The Times

(See Appendix 1)

Summary of the findings and Analysis of changing consensus on the questions of national unity, homogeneity and sovereignty (1920s-1990s)

A) Summary of the findings

Before an analysis is made, it is useful to have a summarised picture of the findings. The table below shows the frequency of the repetition of the indicators since 1920s.

Table 1: Summary of the Findings - The Times

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variables</th>
<th>A1</th>
<th>B1/2</th>
<th>C1/2</th>
<th>D1/2/3</th>
<th>E1</th>
<th>F1/2/3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920s</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930s</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 (D2)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1 (B1)</td>
<td>3 (C2)</td>
<td>22 (D3)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(B2)</td>
<td>10 (C1)</td>
<td>1 (D2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2 (B2)</td>
<td>12 (C2)</td>
<td>1 (D2)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4 (F2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(B1)</td>
<td>2 (C1)</td>
<td>2 (D3)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>(F3)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(F1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1 (B2)</td>
<td>14 (C2)</td>
<td>2 (D1)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3 (F2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>(C1)</td>
<td>2 (D2)</td>
<td>2 (D3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 (D3)
1. The 1920s and 1930s:
During the 1920s no indications were found of a sense of diminishing sovereignty or unity of the nation. Far from it, British Society was a thriving colonial and imperial power which had a substantial part of the world under its rule. The terms ‘Britain’, ‘us’ and the ‘British empire’ were largely used synonymously and as a matter of fact. The Royal edition of The Times was filled with colonial and imperial news and developments. The paper reflects on notions such as ‘industry’, ‘progress’, ‘new developments’ and ‘trade’ within the sphere of the empire with indisputable belief and vehemence. The nation continually enjoyed high levels of industrial development and expansion of the mines, railways, coal, steel and ship-building industries; the magic of the wire-less and the telegraph and the excitement of the first examples of private motorcars were all enthused and written about endlessly. The combination of these factors together with a strong sense of religious solidarity around the moral codes of Christianity, marriage and the family characterised the solid unity of a booming nation. The ‘separate’ identities of the ‘subjects’ in the colonies and also of the immigrants and the Jews were always reflected upon as ‘others’.

During the 1930s we only find that a sense of a cohering and binding social morality and a feeling of inability to look after its own national security declined slightly compared to the 1920s. A larger entity than the nation-state, that is The League of Nations, was looked up to for a preservation of national security.

During the 1930s the closest the British nation came to perceive of itself to be part of a larger collectivity was ‘The League of Nations’ and the anxieties surrounding the ‘security’ of the nations which were caused and intensified by an increasing sense of Fascism and the threat of Germany. However ‘The League of Nations’ was not an entity in itself overpowering individual nations. The League was comprised of separate sovereign nation-states who wanted to co-operate for maintaining and
strengthening security and peace in Europe. The significance of the League cooperation is in its acknowledgement that issues such as ‘peace’, ‘defence’ and ‘security’ can not be adequately acquired by any individual nation-states. In other words individual nation-states were inadequate units for self-defence.

On the other hand, as regard to divisions within the nation, The Times newspaper for the first time writes about “The Jewish Dilemma” (October 10th 1936) inside Britain and the rise of an anti-Jewish movement in East London. At the same period issues such as ‘juvenile delinquency’ and the decline of Christianity and solidity of marriage are reflected upon. These references are historically the first ones to indicate divisions within the Nation.

Apart from these rare comments, that were not even made by all newspapers such as The Daily Express, the sense of sovereignty and unity of the nation was almost intact during the 1920s and 1930s. Only a handful of editorials expressed doubts about the unconditional unity of the nation. The rest showed an un-diminished and united passion about the new industrial developments and expansions that were enormous new sources of pride for the nation. The parliament was constantly busy looking at new bills such as the Housing Bill, The Education Bill, The Transport Bill to accommodate new developments.

2. The 1970s

Forty years later, during the 1970s the picture is very different. There were signs of decline of sovereignty and unity of the nation-state in the following ways:

Under dimension A there was a sense of a diminishing unity in moral and social terms compared to the 1920s and 30s (2xA). New industrial developments are no longer viewed with unquestionable admiration but with apprehension about their consequences for the solidarity of the Nation. With the decline of the British economy and rise of unemployment, poverty and violence, increasingly the Nation is
concerned about the extent to which these developments are beneficial for its unity and welfare.

For the first time during the 1970s the Times reflects on the issues of hybridity of identity (2xB1/2). The notions of ‘positive Discrimination’ and ‘cementing for a plural society’ are born. It must be added the growth of multiculturalism and pluralism were very slow in Britain.

Ethnic consciousness and nationalism of Scottish/Welsh and Irish people grew unprecedentedly in the 1970s (13xC1/2). Thirteen references were found during the 1970s to have been made on Scottish and Welsh nationalism compared to zero during 1920s and 1930s.

The proud and economically thriving nation of the 1920s and 1930s showed growing anxiety about British economic decline together with the problem of high unemployment during the 1970s (23xD1/2/3). National industries such as coal, textiles, ship-building, steel, docklands, standards of education, housing and urban life all showed serious and at times irreversible signs of decay, decline and/or closure. Very few people could actually explain why it was happening. The Times expresses concern on this matter and seeks or gives explanations.

In this period the concepts of ‘Europeanism’ and Europe as one entity are born (1xE1).

No indication of a sense of globalisation was found (0xF).

3. The 1980s

During 1980s the signs of decline of the sovereignty and unity of the nation-state in every dimension continued to grow. However with the introduction and rapid
expansion of micro-electronics and new economic fields, the extent of the economic despair that the Times expressed during the 1970s reduced.

A very strong and unprecedented decline of unity in a moral and social sense was experienced (10xA1).

The Times reflects on the hybridity of national identity, but plays it down (3xB1/2).

Ethnic disunities within the nation grew. There was a continuous conflict and controversy on Scottish/Welsh and Irish nationalisms which increased even more during the 1980s (14xC1/2).

A big economic recovery was registered by the Times compared to the 1970s. However it is no longer called ‘national’ economy, but merely ‘the’ economy (3xD1/2/3).

In this period the concept of Europeanism was used more frequently (2xE1).

The Times reflected on the new micro-electronic industries that characterised over 50% of the British economy during 1980s causing a significant level of awareness of a declining sense of national sovereignty. (12xF1/2/3).

4. The 1990s

A strong sense of a ‘diminishing unity’ in a moral spheres continues to characterise the social life of the nation as expressed in the Times (6xA1).

The Times reflects on the issues of hybridity of British national identity, but still plays it down (3xB1/2):
The Times reflects on the ‘ethnic disunities’ within the nation much more than the previous decades; reflections on the continuous Scottish /Welsh and Irish distinct identities increased considerably during the 1990s to the extent of the break-up of Britain and Scottish devolution in 1997 (25x1/2).

The sense of inability to deal with own problems has increased further (6x1/2/3).

In this period the concept of Europeanism expands unprecedentedly (16x1).

In this period the concept of globalisation continues to signify important social and cultural changes at the price of national sovereignty (12x1/2/3).

The Times:

B) Analysis of the findings

As previously stated, the objective of this chapter is to find out if there has been a historical trend towards a sense of decline of national homogeneity, unity and sovereignty.

The findings in the Times suggest that the answer to the above question is ‘yes’. There has been a steady decline of the sense of unity, homogeneity and sovereignty in Britain since the 1920s. The analysis of three sets of indicators (A, B & C) which measure the concept of ‘diminishing national homogeneity and unity’ as well as the three sets of indicators (D, E & F) which are designed to measure the concept of ‘diminishing national sovereignty’ shows the following results:

A- Decline of social morality/integration

Figure 1.2 shows that tendencies of the nation sensing itself as less unified and homogenous grew from 0% in the 1920s by 16% during the 1930s, 20% during the
1970s, 40% during the 1980s and 24% in the 1990s. (See section A in Figure 1.1 which shows the above percentages in the form of graphs).

These Figures show a constant growth in the Times’ reflecting on a less unified and coherent nation with a sudden rise of such reflections during the 1980s. The rise can be explained by the fact that during the 1980s Britain moved away from home based industries under Mrs Thatcher’s government through integration into global spaces of ‘privatisation’ and ‘market networks’ as the principle sources of economic organisers. Many people lost their jobs with no prospects for employability as they had worked in the traditional economic sections that were no longer needed. Vast degrees of privatisation and encouragement to ‘the individual’ to get what s/he can created a society that felt greedy and dis-united. As Mrs Thatcher claimed with pride “there is not such a thing as ‘society’, there are only individuals”. It is evidently the case that with the decline of the national economy and the integration of Britain into the network of global economic forces, the unifying power of the national society also decreases.

British society has experienced a higher degree of violence, hooliganism, and selfish individualism. The data found suggest that the reasons are ‘global economic forces’, ‘break-down of the family’; ‘weakening of Christianity’, ‘decline of old-fashioned neighbourhood’, ‘collapse of a strong education system’ and too much ‘social permissiveness’ on issues such as ‘(homo)sexuality’, ‘abortion’, ‘adultery’, ‘women’s liberation’ and ‘children’.

An article called “Markets and Morality” dated 16/01/1987 on the Guinness Affair suggests that there is a link between “growing economic forces of the markets and the weakening sense of moral and political judgements and abandonment of moral codes of behaviour”. Another editorial on “The Decline of Nuclear Family” of 12/12/87 suggests that a diminishing sense of social unity is caused by decline of the nuclear family and Christianity which has had an impact on the growing inability of the
education system to teach a ‘sense of right and wrong’ to the new generation. It says that the decline of ‘old fashioned neighbourhood, of nuclear family’ of church’s parochial structures... means there are heavy burdens on schools. However the lessons of right and wrong have been pushed to the margins of curriculum” and the new generation is brought up without having a clear idea of what is right and what is wrong.

B1/2- Multiculturalism and Pluralism

The above two concepts were chosen to measure the degree to which a sense of national hybridity has increased over time. I have suggested that if the nation expresses a higher sense of hybridity, it feels less homogenous. Figure 1.3 shows that there were no references (0%) to multiculturalism or plurality of the society during the 1920s and 1930s. However the notions were used for the first time in the post-war period by the newspapers. The rate of growth of the concepts of multiculturalism and pluralism are 33% during 1970s, 50% during the 1980s and 17% during the 1990s. (Also see section B in Figure 1.1 which shows the same percentages in the form of graphs. The three coloured columns indicates the three decades of the 70s, ‘80s & ‘90s.)

It is interesting to note that although the concepts of ‘multiculturalism and pluralism’ have been used by the editorials and commentaries, they are not used vastly and enthusiastically. Only a few articles have actually been written on the subject. The data found in The Times suggests that these concepts are more welcome in the field of religion. An editorial titled Islam In Britain of 20/08/87 writes “it is in the interests of the society as well as a requirement of human rights (that) Muslims in Britain should be free to observe their religion and build a community life with institutions of their own; a multicultural religious and social fabric is for a healthy British way of life”. In another editorial called “Black Road to Canterbury” of 01/05/85, this can be read: “Black Christian presence in Britain is a significant enrichment of the religious life of the nation; it is perhaps no pity that it preserved its
special character on arrival and did not assimilate too readily into the style of church worship that was customary here”. These two editorials are examples of the way religious multiculturalism is supported. Both articles encourage religious multiculturalism in Britain and describe black Christianity and Islam as enrichments to the religious life of the nation.

C1/2-Scotland/Wales and Northern Ireland
Scotland/Wales and Northern Ireland were selected as indicators of the growth of ethnic consciousness and heterogeneity within the nation. Figure 1.4 shows that the level of ethnic consciousness during the 1920s and 30s stood at a 0% level and profoundly grew after the Second World War. Ethnic consciousness grew by 25% during the 1970s, 27% during the 1980s and 48% in the 1990s. (These percentages are indicated in the form of graphs in section C Figure 1.1. Also look at Figure 1.4)

D1/2/3- Environment, Defence/Security & Decline of National Economy
The individualised findings are listed in Table 1 above and also in Appendix A. These three indicators have been selected to measure the degree by which the nation finds itself less adequate to solve its own problems, as reflected in The Times.

Figure 1.5 shows that there were no signs of an ‘inability to solve own problems’ in the fields of environment, defence or the economy during the 1920s. A growth of 9% in the ‘sense of inability to deal with own problems’ is indicated during the 1930s, rising sharply to 65% in the 1970s, 9% in the 1980s and 17% in the 1990s. The composition of the data suggests that the sense of ‘inability to deal with national economic problems’ rose unprecedentedly during 1970s, with other factors such as the environment and defence rising steadily and less sharply during 70s, 80s and 90s. (These percentages are also shown in the form of graphs in section D of Figure 1.1)

The 9% increase during the 1930s only refers to a sense of threat by Germany that caused the British nation to feel a sense of vulnerability on issues regarding security
and defence. Most articles expressing ‘inability to solve own problems’ in respect to ‘defence and security’ were in relation to wanting the League of the Nations to do something effective against the rising threat of war by Germany.

During the 1970s, 22 out of 23 editorials that reflected a diminishing sense of sovereignty were on the ‘decline of national economy’ and a sense of national insecurity. The editorials covered issues such as the insecurity of food producers (farmers, fishermen, cattlemen) in the context of the EEC, insecurity of miners, economic deterioration of all manufacturing industries (such as the textiles, shipbuilding & steel) and the economy in general, decline of the general level of investment, profitability and effective management together with high level of unemployment, poverty and a growing sense of insecurity about the future.

The findings suggest that the British society lost a lot of its national economic footing during the 1970s and a consequence of that was the national society perceived itself to be a weaker entity and less of a sense of sovereignty. This trend together with the simultaneous rise of micro-electronics and global economic networks suggest that the latter is the cause of the former and the nation-state loses some of its sovereignty in the global networks.

**E-Europe**

Figure 1.6 shows a very sharp rise of a sense of ‘Europeanism’ during the 1990s. The rise is 84% compared to the previous decades; an 11% rise in the 1980s, 5% in the 1970s and 0% during the 20s and 30s. (These percentages are shown in section E of Figure 1.1.)

It can be concluded from the data found that a diminishing sense of sovereignty is unmistakably linked with the growth of ‘Europeanism’ together with a sharp decline of the national economy. The growth of Europeanism is an indication of the enlargement of the unit of collective economic organisation and its inevitability. The
findings suggest that in the new global order, the nation-state is increasingly less able to protect its sovereignty against the social and economic imperatives of the global age and there is also a growing sense of awareness of Europe as a kind of ‘future that will come anyway’. In nearly all the debates on Europe and examinations of its different facets and implications, the question of sovereignty is looked at. This suggests that with the growth of ‘Europeanism’, national sovereignty is perceived to diminish. The growth of ‘Europeanism’ has been so strong during the 1990s that The Times wrote in its editorials of 22/05/1997 *Is Euro-Skepticism dead?* In this editorial, the issues concerning the inevitability of a single currency are looked at in frustration. The editorial calls for more resistance against the European developments.

**F1/2/3 Global Village- Economy and Technology**

The process of ‘globalisation’ started long before a mass awareness of it emerged and grow fast during the 1980s. Figure 1.7 shows a 71% rise of a sense of ‘globalisation’ during the 1980s and a 29% rise during the 1990s compared to 0% during the 1920s, 1930s and even 1970s. (These percentages are shown in section F of table 1.1.)

As the national economy deteriorated in 1970s and ‘Europeanism’ started to occupy thoughts and debates more frequently, there has been another unmistakable trend in the British society that is perceived by The Times to undermine British national sovereignty, that of ‘globalisation’. As from the decade of the 1980s, simultaneous with the effective closure of most manufacturing industries, ‘the new global order’ and the ‘post-industrial society’ are commented on with frequent references to the question of sovereignty. The findings show a direct link between the ‘decline of home industries’, ‘growth of global economy’ and a sense of ‘diminishing sovereignty’.
In an editorial called *1985* dated 12/31/1985 it is said that “by 1985 the boundaries of greater London are extended to Nicaragua...we become too blase about privatisation, (we are) private citizens, demythologised, de-regulated and de-banked”. The article captures the spirit of Britain of the 80s after the loss of its national industries and collapse of belief of the individual in national society. In another article called *Two Kinds of Nations* dated 29/03/1995 we read that “a growing sense of anxiety about the way the national interest is defined under global economy, global security has affected the definitions of national interest and national identity”...“these definitions (cannot but) are reduced to a common past” under the new world order.
**The Guardian**

*(See Appendix 2)*

Summary of the findings and Analysis of changing consensus on the questions of national unity, homogeneity and sovereignty (1920s-1990s)

**A) Summary of the findings**

The following table summarises the findings which have also been in the Appendix 2:

**Table 2: The Summary of the findings - The Guardian**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>A1</th>
<th>B1/2</th>
<th>C1/2</th>
<th>D1/2/3</th>
<th>E1</th>
<th>F1/2/3</th>
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<tr>
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<td>2 (f1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. The 1920s & 1930s

Like *The Times, The Manchester Guardian* was printed every day to publish the colonial and imperial news as well as the internal news. The paper was like a general board displaying wills, offering or seeking house-keepers, printers, partnerships, tailors, barbers, dyers, clerks, millenaries, drapers, governesses, tutors, servants and sport facilities.

The notions of 'progress', 'industry', 'commerce', 'efficiency' 'free trade' and 'competition' were cherished and pursued. Strong emphasis was laid on the values of 'Christianity', 'duty', 'the Nation', 'National Unity', 'family' and the Arts.

Apart from one reference to the issue of Northern Ireland and two references to a 'feeling of insecurity' in the face of a rising threat of war during 1930s, no other indications were found to suggest anything but a very strong sense of national unity and sovereignty. The world was conceived as a space divided by nation-states and no real power beyond the boundaries of the nation-states was imagined to be able to exist. The only challenge to the sovereignty and unity of the nation-states was perceived to come from a counterpart and never from an ethnic, European or global force.

2. The 1970s

The first indications of a sense of declining of social unity appeared during 1970s when the data shows that 'social homogeneity' of the nation was questioned (5xA1).

Like *The Times, The Guardian* also conceptualises a 'multicultural' definition of the British society for the first time (1xB1).
There is an unprecedented rise in ‘ethnic consciousness’ in the 1970s. The Guardian frequently reflects on ethnic fractures within the nation (20xCl/2).

Britain is caught in a state of panic and shock about its economic decline during the 1970s (11xd3).

Europe is a new concept that is growing fast (3xE).

The notion of ‘global economy’ is also used for the first time. The Guardian suggests that the decline of the national industries should be understood in reference to globalisation (1xF3).

3. 1980s
The nation shows more or less the same degree of anxiety about the growth of ‘moral and social disunities’ (4xA1).

As with in the previous decade, The Guardian continues to show an awareness of defining the society in a ‘multicultural’ manner, something that did not exist in pre-war period (1xB1).

The persistence of ‘ethnic consciousness’ continues to characterise the British national society of the 1980s (11xC1/2).

Britain loses some of its panic about economic decline, as it realises that it is irreversible in the face of new technologies and global competitiveness. The Guardian also becomes aware of other dimensions of global interdependence such as the ‘environment’ and global ‘security’. Six references are made to the ‘environment’, seven to the ‘decline of manufacturing industries’ and three to the issue of ‘defence and security’ (16xD1/2/3).
Europe is a growing concept in the Guardian, a concept that is referred to and examined frequently. Different aspects of British sovereignty are also examined in the context of Europeanisation (6xE).

There is a noticeable rise in the 'global' conceptualisations during the 1980s as compared to the 1970s. Thirteen references were made to different dimensions of globalisation in relation to national sovereignty (13xF1/2/3).

4. The 1990s
All indicators of a 'diminishing national homogeneity and sovereignty' show a growing tendency during the 1990s.

_The Guardian_ expresses a less sense of national unity than ever before by referring to a sharp decline of integrative and 'unifying moral codes' of togetherness. The data suggests that the validity of all moral wrongs and rights is felt to be increasingly subjective and a matter of individual opinion (14xA1).

There is a considerable increase in the Guardian's conception of Britain as a 'multicultural and plural' society during 1990s (5xB1/2).

The persistence of 'ethnic consciousness' characterises British national society of the 90s more desperately than ever. The Guardian frequently reflects on ethnic dilemmas of the nation. (Devolution of Scotland materialised in 1997) (31xC1/2).

Britain loses all its panic about economic decline, as it realises that it is irreversible in the face of new technologies and global competitiveness. She accepts the loss of national industries and does not mention it any more. No editorials are written on 'decline of national economy', The concept of 'national economy' is less frequently used than the concept of 'the economy'. The number of editorials written on other
dimensions of global interdependence such as the 'environment' and global security increases ten times (10xD1/2/3).

The notions of 'Europe and Europeanism' occupy the spaces of editorials and commentaries quite intensely. Twenty three articles have investigated the question of Europe and national sovereignty. The significant development of the 1990s is that there is a kind of resignation in respect of the concept of Europe and its materialisation as a single entity, which did not exist in the previous decades (23xE):.

The notions relating to the 'globalisation' of the economy and culture continue to grow in the 1990s. As with Europeanisation, there is also a sense of inevitability about its happening (14xF1/2/3).

The Guardian:

B) Analysis of the findings

The findings of The Guardian also suggest that there has been a steady decline in a sense of unity and homogeneity and sovereignty in Britain since 1920s. The analysis of three sets of indicators (A, B & C) which measure the concept of 'diminishing national homogeneity and unity' as well as the three sets of indicators (D, E & F) which are designed to measure the concept of 'diminishing national sovereignty' is set out below.

A - Decline of social morality/integration

Figure 2.2 shows that tendencies towards sensing the nation as a 'less unified and homogenous' group grew from 0% in the 1920s and 1930s to 22% during the 1970s, 17% during the 1980s and 61% in the 1990s. (Also see section A in Figure 2.1 which shows the above percentages in the form of graphs).
These Figures show a constant growth in the nation’s self-perception as less unified with a sudden rise of such sentiments during the 1990s.

The data shows that British society has experienced a ‘decline of personal morality’, a higher degree of crime, violence, hooliganism, delinquency, and emotional disengagement. The reasons are suggested to be ‘the inability of the education system to cement the society’, ‘global economic forces’, ‘break-down of the family’, ‘social atomism’ and ‘moral relativism’, and a growing ‘psychological insecurity and passivity’ caused by consumerism.

An editorial called *The Withering Indictment of our public spirit* of 03/05/1995 writes on the “demoralisation of the society, and that the refusal to believe in absolutes have undermined the society. (People) don’t know the difference between the right and the education system no longer cements the society”.

Another commentary titled *Loner in our midst* of 15/03/1996 questions: “What kind of society are we creating, crime against small children, too many lone parents, social atomism after the nuclear family, British towns are evidence of the elaborate communities of fantasy that men create as substitutes”. And an article titled *The mirrors that matter* of 19/10/1996 in reflecting on the Britain of the 1990s suggests that there is a link between ‘growing individualism’ and ‘social atomism’ on the one hand, and a ‘decline of social and personal morality’ on the other. “Our political institutions are more elitist and visibly less performed than other established democratic societies... a perceived national decline is the immanent descend to the history of 20th century UK”.

**B1/2- Multiculturalism and Pluralism**

Figure 2.3 shows that there were no references (0%) to ‘multiculturalism or plurality’ of the society during the 1920s and 1930s indicating that there was no sense of hybridity then. However such an awareness grew in the post-war period by 14% during the 1970s, 14% during the 1980s and 72% during the 1990s. (See section B in
Figure 2.1 which shows the same percentages in the form of graphs. The three coloured columns indicate the three decades of 70s, 80s & 90s).

It is interesting to note that, unlike The Times which only reflected on these concepts in the realm of religion, The Guardian uses ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘pluralism’ to describe the kind of society we live in the modern UK now. The paper describes the nature of metropolitan centres as ‘multicultural and plural’. Therefore it can be deduced that the Guardian perceives modern Britain to be increasingly a hybrid and heterogeneous country.

C1/2-Scotland/Wales and Northern Ireland

Figure 2.4 shows that the level of ‘ethnic consciousness’ during the 1920s and 1930s stood at a 0% level and grew profoundly after the Second World War. ‘Ethnic consciousness’ grew in the Editorials by 32% during the 1970s, 18% during the 1980s and 50% in the 1990s. (These percentages are indicated in the form of graphs in Figure 2.1).

It can be deduced that with the rise of ethnic consciousness in the last three decades, the nation perceives itself as less united and homogeneous compared to the 1920s and 1930s.

D1/2/3- Environment; Defence/Security; Decline of National Economy

The individualised findings are listed in Table 2 above and also in Appendix 2.

Figure 2.5 shows that there were no signs of ‘inability to solve own national problems’ in the fields of environment, defence or economy during the 1920s. A growth of 5% sense of inability to deal with own problems is indicated during the 1930s due to the threat of Fascism, rising sharply to 28% in the 1970s, 41% in 1980s and 26% in the 1990s. (These percentages are shown in the form of graphs in section D of Figure 2.1)
The 5% increase during the 1930s only refers to a sense of threat by Germany that caused the Guardian to reflect on the nation's vulnerability on issues such as security and defence. The League of Nations was needed to protect the Nation-state s against the rising threat of war and Fascism.

The 1970s and 1980s were the decades when anxiety and concern about the decline of the national economy and prospects grows. A large number of editorials covered issues such as the unemployment, cuts in living standards, insecurity of food producers (farmers, fishermen, cattlemen) in the context of the EEC, insecurity of miners, economic deterioration of all manufacturing industries (such as the textiles, ship-building, motor & steel) and the economy in general.

The findings suggest that the British society underwent a fundamental transformation in its economic and social structures during 1970s and 1980s. As a result of these changes the British society was reflected upon as being less able to solve its economic problems. This trend together with the simultaneous rise of micro-electronics, computerised and satellite networks suggest that the developments and imperatives of post-industrial society are responsible for the decline of the national economy and, to some extent, national sovereignty.

In the same period the nation shows a higher degree of awareness about global issues such as the environment, the risks of nuclear weapons, atomic energy and global warming.

**E-Europe**

Figure 2.6 shows a 72% rise in a sense of 'Europeanism' during the 1990s, which, compared to 19% during the 1980s, 9% during the 1970s and 0% during the 1920s & 1930s constitutes a considerable shift. (These percentages are shown in section E of Figure 2.1).
The indisputable growth of Europeanism can be better understood in relation to the decline of national society and in the context of globalisation. The data indicates that these three trends have risen in the last few decades, suggesting a link between the three. It is an indication of the enlargement of the unit of collective economic pursuits in the framework of global interdependence. The findings suggest that in the new global order, the boundaries of the nation-state are increasingly inadequate for an independent tackling of social and economic issues. Europe is the future that, whether liked or disliked, paves the ground for transcending the boundaries of the nation-state. With such transcendence, national sovereignty is perceived to diminish.

The Guardian takes a positive stance towards 'Europeanisation'. It started exploring the ideas of a super-national Europe and a single currency as from Oct. 11, 1977. In an editorial called "America and the ritual, but" dated 7/2/1986 it writes "it is easy to be anti-American when it comes to be viewed as future eclipse and present danger. If European nation-states do not want to become de facto the 51st state, they should put their schizophrenia behind them and form one Europe". In another editorial named "Taking the blinkers off John Bull" of 1/3/1987 The Guardian asks the "Eurosceptics defenders of our nationhood... what makes you proud to be British?....(is it) hooligan nationalism that offers a blend of imperial nostalgia and implicit racism, in corrupt political institutions?". On 17/11/1987 it reflects on Europe as "a central axis". In July 5th 1987 the Guardian refers to "the realities of Europeanism and Global power". In October 19th 1995 there is another editorial called "put out more flags", which describes the "ridiculous hooligan quality of right-wing nationalism and their Euroscepticism (as) extraordinary facets of inflated ego of reactionaries and romantics. These people are responsible for the actual loss of sovereignty by letting manufacturing industries go...". Another commentary "The West V the rest" of 16/11/1996 writes: "the people of the west (should) hang together or they will hang separately in a world multi-popular, multi-civilised of the global age where all power is local. The west should unite." The Guardian generally has encouraged the politicians and voters of pro-European positions.
Fl/2/3 Global Village- Economy and Technology

The growth of a sense of ‘globalisation’ emerged and grew fast during the 1980s and 1990s. Figure 2.7 shows a 46% rise of a sense of ‘globalisation’ during the 1980s and a 50% rise during the 1990s compared to 0% during the 1920s, 1930s and 4% during the 1970s. (These percentages are shown in section F of Figure 2.1).

The Guardian suggested that the rapid growth of multinationals would inhibit the peaceful advancement of Britain by manipulating the economy and damaging its sovereignty in a article of January 8th 1975 called multinational ghosts. A decade later in Making the Future Green on 30/01/1985, the trend was reflected upon again, but this time with admiration: The technologies of the post-industrial world work towards “decentralisation and localisation of the economy at grass root levels; the break-down of the economy into local and regional levels with their flexible and diversified economic base... would liberate the enterprise at all levels”. In the same year in another article called The Tower Tumbles on May 22, 1985, information technology is referred to as “having cut the umbilical cord of places....You can be part of the global market and in Hammersmith” linking the regions to the global space,” and all this is said to be beyond the control of national governments. In June 19th 1985 a commentary called minimal self reflects on the “narcissistic retreat from the society; an emotional disengagement and the destruction of selfhood.... due to the developments of giants of communication industries and wired technology...... in the global culture of consumerism and under the state of oneness with the outer world”.

In an editorial dated 8/3/95 economic mobility and the labour flexibility of the post-industrial global world are regarded as the causes of insecurity, loss of meaning, identity, sovereignty and the collapse of the family. In Oct. 20th 1987 in an article called the big bang and the real world speaks of the “crash of national markets, shares, and instantaneous global markets.....(and) .governments with no power”, and it continues in Too late to escape with too little in November 24th 1987 by adding
"The Wall Street crash (is) dragging down the rest of the world beyond the control of national governments". It asks in Ducking the Future on 1/12/87 "Can national interests be reconciled with short term city profits?" and it answers that it is too late.
Summary of the findings and Analysis of changing consensus on the questions of national unity, homogeneity and sovereignty (1920s-1990s)

A) Summary of the findings

Table 3: The summary of the findings- The Daily Mirror

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>1 (b1)</td>
<td>8 (c1)</td>
<td>2 (d2)</td>
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</tr>
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</table>
1- The 1920s and 1930s:
Four references were found on the issue of ‘social unity’ during the 1920s and 1930s. They are all expressions of doubt about the nature and ability of the ‘modern society’ to unite people (4xA).

A sense of hybridity was expressed through an adaptation of artistic ideas from other cultures in the age of ‘mobility’ (1xB1/2).

There were no signs of ‘inability to solve own problems’ during the 1930s. The only concern was over the growing sense of danger about rising Fascism and increasing need for the League of Nations to prevent the war. (1xD2).

2- The 1980s:
Twenty references were found to a decline of ‘social unity’ during 1980s (20xA).

One reference was made to the notion of ‘pluralism’ (1xB1/2).

The question of ‘ethnic nationalism’ of Northern Ireland is reflected upon (2xC2).

There is a very sharp rise in the paper’s coverage of the problems regarding the ‘national economy’, ‘the environment’, ‘security’ and the society’s ‘inability to solve them (15xD1/2/3).

The paper reflects on the growing significance of the notions of ‘Europe and “Europeanism”’ (6xE).

No references were found to ‘globalisation’.
3- The 1990s:
Fewer references are made to a ‘declining social morality’ compared to the 1980s but still a large increase compared to the pre-war period (8xA).

Two references were found to the questions of ‘multiculturalism and ‘pluralism’ (2xB1/2).

A significant increase of ‘ethnic consciousness’ was registered (13xC).

A significant decrease of ‘inability to solve own problems’ has been found compared to the 1980s (3xD1/2/3).

The concepts of ‘Europe and Europeanism’ continue to be an important topic for editorial coverage (5xE).

No indications of ‘globalisation’ was found.

The Daily Mirror:  
B) Analysis of the findings

The Daily Mirror was one of the most radical papers of the decades of the 1920s and 1930s. When the Guardian and The Times were busy covering the ‘colonial and imperial’ news, and never mentioned much about the General Strikes of the 1920s, The Daily Mirror covered these strikes on a day to day basis. It was a socialist paper that perceived the nation as divided on class lines and critically reflected on all issues concerning the nation.

Although the Daily Mirror is classed as a ‘tabloid’ paper (and it has gone heavily ‘tabloidish’ and cheap over time) it used to have a much more serious and dedicated
language and it also used to preserve a much higher quality in its daily reflections during the 1920s and 1930s. The Mirror went through serious changes during the 1980s and 1990s by solely concentrating on trivial topics and gossip classed as 'internal affairs' and by using more of a slang language. The editorial articles of the paper are normally only one third of a page and are published with very large and eye-catching print.

The Daily Mirror is therefore an unsuitable paper for investigating structural and cultural changes of the nation-state. However it has been chosen to have a more balanced reflection on the nation’s self perception.

A— Decline of social morality and integration

Figure 3.2 shows that the expressions of the level of decline of 'national unity' stood at 6% during the 1920s and 1930s, but they grew by 63% in the 1980s and 25% in the 1990s. [These percentages are shown in the form of graphs in section A Figure 3.1]

During the 1920s The Mirror expresses doubts on the nature of Modern Unrest that brings lack of unity at home (13/08/1925) suggesting that 'our' unity is strong when it comes to combating foreign powers but not enough to keep us united at home. The article says "we are at the edge of a volcano... foreign competition is too high... We have enough patriotism to unite us against the foreign force, but not enough to keep us united at home.". The Mirror also questions the Age of Experts on 29/11/1925 and whether science can have a binding power for the society that experiences an increasing level of agitation, restlessness and mental diseases. The paper was suspicious of the 'modern' developments in sciences and technology in terms of their binding power for the society. During the 1930s The Mirror reflects on the nature of mechanical advancements in British society by suggesting that science jeopardises the natural order of social unity by creating menace in A Menace to Society on 6/3/35.
It is obvious that during the 1920s and 1930s the Daily Mirror was critical of the fast industrial and scientific developments that were happening in the British society, by signalling that they would disrupt social unity. However under the overwhelming weight of multiple daily references to the nation as one proud entity, these criticisms were too occasional to characterise any real trait about the British society.

Five decades later there is a different picture. The Mirror rarely shows signs of pride about ‘us’. Instead it reflects on many disuniting themes that divide the nation. During the 1980s in an editorial called *Private Grief* dated 13/3/85, the Mirror describes the nation as divided along economic lines. It says that the nation is divided between ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ by high unemployment, bad housing and widespread poverty. Other editorials such as *Crossing the Line* of 15/4/1985 refer to fractures in the ‘permissive society’ of the nation that allow too much drugs, sex, pornography, violence, hooliganism. In *Suffering little children* 12/9/85, the paper refers to children who are sexually abused and molested. The pictures painted in *Bloody Brutal Britain* on 14/3/86, and in *Poverty* on 1/6/87 describe the British society as follow: “The frightening truth about Britain’s sick society was revealed yesterday with the release of crime figures...one in 8 girls and one in 12 boys are molested under 14; rape has risen by 29%; doctor raping a 8 year old; a vicars’ series of sexual assaults...vandalism happens one every minute...violent crime one every 4 minutes...children are at risk”. In *Bridge too far* of 12/09/1995 the Mirror writes “The Tories’ creation of a divided Britain is now being extended to teeth”.

On the whole the data found from the Mirror shows a rising ‘social and moral disunity’, mostly along class and economic lines and also by too much social permissiveness during the 1980s and 1990s.

**B- Multiculturalism and Pluralism**

The origin of the idea of hybridity was found in the field of fashion and design during the 1930s, when the ‘adaptation’ of oriental ideas by western fashion designers was
associated with the ‘age of mobility’. However during the 1980s and 1990s the idea of ‘intermarriage’ is encouraged as something very positive that would reduce racial prejudice and create a more plural society.

Figure 3.3 shows a 0% reflection of ‘multiculturalism and pluralism’ during the 1920s. These reflections rose by 25% during the 1930s, 25% in the 1980s and 50% during the 1990s. [These percentages are shown in the form of graphs in section B of table 3.1]

C- Scotland/ Wales and Northern Ireland
The findings of the Mirror suggest that the ‘ethnic consciousness’ of Scotland/Wales and Ireland stood at 0% during the 1920s & 1930s, and it rose very sharply by 13% during the 1980s and 87% by 1990s. [See Figure 3.4 and also section C of Figure 3.1]

D- Environment, Security & defence and National economy
Similar to the previous trends found in the Guardian and in the Times newspapers, no signs of ‘inability to solve own problems’ were reflected upon during the 1920s and 1930s. The only exception to this rule was the sense of danger about the rise of Fascism and increasing need for The League of Nations to prevent a war.

This picture undergoes serious transformations during the 1980s. Declining manufacturing industries and the closure of the national pits indicate that “the nation has been beaten” and has lost some of its sovereignty in New Realities on 3/4/85. It says “we needed a budget for the nation, instead we got a budget for ‘the City’” In Nigel Nothing on 20/3/85, indicating that the ‘the City’ is linked to the global economy and that is where the national budget has been dedicated, instead of to the nation. An editorial called Selling off Britain of 22/8/96 suggests that Britain is being sold off to foreign firms by the pound through privatisation policies.
The ‘inability to solve own problems’ is also reflected in the question of the environment. There are frequent references to the crisis of nuclear power, symbolised in the disaster of Chernobyl, the toxic chemicals disposal into the North sea and that ‘European’ ministers should do something about it.

Figure 3.5 shows that compared to 0% indication of ‘inability to solve own problems’ in respect to the environment, the National economy and defence during the 1920s & 1930s, the figure rose to 80% during the 1980s and 20% during the 1990s. [These percentages are also shown in the form of graphs in section D of table 3.1.]

E-Europe

Figure 3.6 shows a 0% indication of the notion of ‘Europeanism’ during the 1920s and 1930s. The figure rose by 55% during the 1980s and 45% in the 1990s which is a remarkable growth of ideas surrounding ‘Europeanisation’. [These percentages are shown in the form of graphs in section E of table 3.1].

In an encouragement of Europeanism, in an editorial called Divide and Rule of 24/4/96 the Mirror analyses that a “Britain outside a growing European Union does not have a future- at least not a prosperous one. If we are not in, we can not win our share of this huge market”. Or in Cashing an old Grudge of 12/6/96, The Mirror says “he (a minister, I suppose) and his anti-European allies are stuck in a time-warp when Germans were jack-booted Nazis and Britain ruled the waves and an empire. The reality of 1996 is that Britain could never prosper outside European Union”. Both these editorials suggest that the inevitable realities of 1996 dictate that one should accept the reality of Europe and join it rather than resist it in the nostalgic or phobic remembrances of the past.

F-Globalisation.

No indications of a process of globalisation were found in the Mirror.
The Daily Express

(See Appendix 4)

Summary of the findings and Analysis of changing consensus on the questions of national unity, homogeneity and sovereignty (1920s-1990s)

A) Summary of the findings

The following table summarises the findings of the Daily Express.

Table 4: The summary of the findings - The Daily Express

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variables</th>
<th>A1</th>
<th>B1/2</th>
<th>C1/2</th>
<th>D1/2/3</th>
<th>E1</th>
<th>F1/2/3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920s</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930s</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 (c2)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8 (c2)</td>
<td>1 (d3)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1 (f3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (c1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1- The 1920s and 1930s:
No indication whatsoever was found to suggest any sense of doubt about the unity and sovereignty of the empire during the 1920s and 1930s, not even one single reference to the rising danger of war which was concerning everybody else.

2- The 1980s:
A relatively sharp rise of a sense of 'decline of unity' is registered (3xA).

No reference was found to have been made to social multiculturalism (0xB1).

'Irish ethnic nationalism' was acknowledged and that it has a disuniting effect on the nation (3xC2).

No references were found to a sense of decline of national economy or any other issue that may indicate a sense of 'inability to solve own problems' (0xD).

Only one reference was found to have been made on Europeanism, and that is when all other papers are constantly writing on the issue (1xE).

(0xF) No indication of 'globalisation' has been found.

3- The 1990s:
Only one indication of lack of 'social unity' was found (1xA).

No indication were found to suggest the multicultural nature of modern Britain.

A relatively sharp rise in Irish ethnic nationalism is registered and for the first time Scottish nationalism is also reflected upon (9xC1/2).
Just when other papers have finished talking about the economic decline of Britain, The Daily Express begins to mention it for the first time! (1xD3).

A huge and unprecedented rise of a sense of ‘Europeanism’ has been recorded (11xE).

A first time admission of a global economy (1xF3).

**The Daily Express:**

**B) Analysis of the findings**

The Daily Express is the most right-wing paper of the four, if not of Britain. When everybody else was expressing fear about the rise of Fascism during 1930s, it praised Hitler and ‘his achievements’ in an editorial called *I talked to Hitler* on 17/9/1936 and disregarded the fear of war as unfounded. On July 23rd 1936 the Daily Express’s editorial page rejected the possibility of war and called it *An Answer to Scaremongers*. During all that time the paper opposed The League of Nations without any hesitation and informed Britain of its uselessness. The paper openly admired racism, sexism, and previously colonialism in its life time, and according to itself it was the biggest newspaper in Britain during the 1920s and 1930s. The paper has given its full and uncritical support to a ‘distinctive and superior British identity’ almost at all times and has shown adoration of ‘the’ superior race, monarchy, kingdom, Britishness, power and the empire.

*The Policy of The Daily Express* published on 6/5/1936 has the following components in its objective:

1- The strengthening of the empire and its free trade...

2- Withdrawal from the League of Nations; our imperial obligations separate us from the rest of the world and demand us to follow a path of isolation....
3- To bind the empire we should provide our own people with wealth and abundance...

4- By full use of our resources and the resources of our colonies...”

The Daily Express is not the place to look for data that covers anything except ‘home news’ and that is mostly on sex scandals, gossip, pop stars and their sex lives, and football. Even though the pages of the Daily Express are the last place for a researcher to look for indications of a sense of ‘diminishing national unity and homogeneity’, these indications, at their minimal level, have been found during the 1980s and 1990s!

A- Decline of social morality/integration

Figure 4.2 shows that indicators of a ‘declining social morality’ stood at 0% during the 1920s and 1930s and they rose by 75% in the 1980s and 25% in the 1990s. [These percentages are shown in the form of graphs in section A of Figure 4.1]. The main area of concern has been the rise of ‘violence’ and ‘hooliganism’. No references have been made to other factors of social and moral significance that may or may not have an effect on the level of social unity.

B- Multiculturalism and pluralism

No signs of a perception of multiculturalism or pluralism were found in any decade. In fact the opposite has been encouraged by the paper throughout the sampled period. The Daily Express is heavily race and colour conscious and emphasises on a homogenous white Britishness.

C- Scotland/Wales and Northern Ireland

According to our findings the level of ethnic consciousness in the United Kingdom stood at 0% during the 1920s and 1930s. Figure 4.4 shows that there has been a sharp rise in the reflections of Scottish/Welsh and Irish nationalism during the 1980s and
The figures have grown to 25% and 75% respectively. [These percentages are shown in the form of graphs in section C of Figure 4.1].

Although a sharp rise in ethnic nationalism in the United Kingdom is reflected upon, the Daily Express has a very negative attitude towards them. Three editorials were written, in the sampled period of the 1980s on Irish Nationalism and all three of them encouraged the British government to launch such a “war against Irish nationalists that can only win” in *Let’s start fighting to win* on 6/8/85 and *Smash this IRA terror* on 10/12/85; and the IRA is called *Busy Thugs* on 27/8/85. In the sampling frame of the 1990s eight references were found in respect to the existence of Irish nationalism and only one regarding Scottish nationalism and that was when the discussion over the devolution of Scotland became more urgent in the mid 1990s.

**D- Environment- Defence and National Economy.**

When all other papers have been writing on the issues and problems surrounding British manufacturing industries for almost twenty years, The Daily Express mentioned nothing on the subject and kept up with British images that had their roots in imperial times. It was only on 7/3/1996 in *Is Britain on the road to the 3rd world?* that the paper for the first time cried out and expressed doubts about the state of the British economy and acknowledged that something had fundamentally changed.

[See section D of Figure 4.1 for an expression of the change in graphs. In percentage terms a 100% rise in ‘inability to solve own economic problems’ would have to be indicated during 1990s compared to 0% during the 1920s, 1930s and 1980s, and for this reason no percentage figure has been enclosed].

No references were found to have been made to ‘defence/security’ or ‘the environment’.
Figure 4.5 shows that indications of ‘Europeanism’ stood at 0% during the 1920s and 1930s and rose to 8% in the 1980s and 92% during the 1990s. [These percentages are shown in the graphic form in section E of Figure 4.1.]

The Daily Express supported Europeanism to the extent that it would abolish obstacles to free movement at a cheaper price in *Scandal of Europe* on 1/10/1985. Although the paper generally opposes Europeanism, it uses terms such as Euro-Agriculture, Euro-food, Euro-Citizen and Euro-Budget in *Cap does not fit* on 6/2/95 with ease and without much resistance. I must say that I found the paper’s position on Europe rather surprising. It seems that Europe, although not an adorable term for the Daily Express, is seen as a profitable source that should not be ignored and more importantly cannot be ignored any more. For the first time the Daily Express describes the nation as ‘divided and apart’ on the issue of Europe with 49% against and 51% for Europeanism in *Why are we so proud to be a nation apart?* on 5/6/95. The paper also encouraged *Euro-doubters* on 1/6/95 not to be *blinkered by Euro fears* on 12/12/95 and open the way for the Euro. All these editorials are written with a sense of acceptance that “we must surrender more of our ‘sovereignty’.....to prevent the creation of a European super-state that will be German-led” in *Raw Ambitions* on 3/4/1996.

Of course when the paper urges ‘surrendering more sovereignty to prevent a German-led Europe’, or when it refers to the painful facts on 15/8/1996 about ‘diminishing British independence and sovereignty’, it is evidently suggesting that expansion of Europeanism directly implies that national sovereignty would diminish.

**F- Global Culture, Technology and Economy**

Only one editorial was found on the issue of globalisation and its ‘iron law of global market’ in *Put the Screws on (state) Subsidies* on 8/8/1995. In this editorial the paper shows a very open opposition to nationalised industries and the industries that require
state subsidy for survival, and mentions only mockingly the home industries such as British shipyards, steel & Leyland who ‘gobble too much national wealth’. It adds that the ‘iron law of global market is imposed on our economy any way’.

This one editorial expresses the position of the Daily Express on the question of ‘globalisation’ as opposed to a ‘sovereign’ economy. The paper shows no signs of pain or resistance to the requirements or implications of a global market because it finds it, as with Europe, more profitable than sticking to ‘national independence and sovereignty’. [Section F of Figure 4.1 shows the graphic growth of ‘globalisation’.]

**Conclusion**

The objective of this chapter has been to find out whether there has been a historical trend towards a sense of decline of national sovereignty, homogeneity and unity in Britain? The findings indicate that the answer is ‘yes’. A British sense of national sovereignty, homogeneity and unity has declined by 33% during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s compared to the 1920s and 1930s. Of the total 1248 editorials that were looked at during the 1920s and 1930s, only 16 (just over 1%) of them were found to indicate a diminishing sense of ‘unity’ and/or ‘sovereignty’ of the British nation-state. However during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s of a total 1560 editorials and commentaries that were carefully considered, 513 were counted (about 33%) that contained data indicating a diminishing sense of national ‘sovereignty and unity’.
On the question of validity and reliability of the data

The question of validity and reliability of data has been carefully considered throughout the research. The data used in this chapter and their meanings are symbolic in nature. Messages and their symbolic communications can not be directly observed. Symbolic meanings, therefore, have to be un-wrapped and in that process there is always an element of subjectivity involved and embedded in selecting, prioritising and interpreting the data. This is not only the case with this thesis, but with all scientific inquiries. I have argued in the previous chapters that the 'Scientific' perception that a strict separation can be made between 'objectivity' and 'subjectivity' is a mechanistic view that fails to recognise that the researcher's mind, and what s/he perceives to be significant are unavoidably involved in research. This thesis, therefore, makes no pretension or claim that all subjectivity has been kept out of the process of research. However it can be claimed that efforts have been made to minimise the impact of subjectivity in unwrapping symbolic meanings.

One way of unwrapping symbolic meanings is to look at them from different angles, and for this reason multiple indicators have been used in this chapter to produce a verifying effect on each other. For example if 'a growing sense of inability to solve own problems' is not regarded as sufficient to indicate a 'lessening sense of National sovereignty', then the other two indicators of 'Europeanism' and 'globalism' can help to establish a more valid inference in that direction. If one can show that simultaneous with a 'growing sense of inability to solve own problems', there has also been a growing sense of 'Europeanism and Globalism', then the concept of 'diminishing national sovereignty' is supported better and the empirical results are more meaningful.
Likewise on the question of a 'lessening sense of National homogeneity and unity', it may not be enough just to show a growth of multiculturalism and pluralism during the last few decades. However if it can be shown that parallel to a growth of multiculturalism and pluralism in Britain, there has been a growth of 'ethnic consciousness' and a diminishing sense of 'moral and social unity', the findings and the interpretation of their meanings receive greater meaning.

It is for the reason of enhancing the reliability and validity of the data that three dimensions to each concept of 'sovereignty' and 'homogeneity and unity' were chosen, before establishing indicators to those dimensions. However to further enhance the reliability and validity of the data a cross-examination of the findings has been conducted as follows:

A cross-examination of the findings

According to the data obtained from the editorials and commentaries of four aforementioned British newspapers, it has been suggested and concluded in this chapter that during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s there has been a 33% decline in a sense of 'sovereignty', 'homogeneity', and 'unity' of the British nation-state compared to the decades of the 1920s and 1930s.

For some readers, especially those who still believe that the acquirement of 'pure and objective' data is a possible task, the data obtained from our sample may not be qualified as 'objective and reliable' enough to substantiate the argument and conclusion derived from them. It may be argued that the data merely reflects on the opinions of the individuals who wrote the texts rather than the 'Reality'. Against such a positivistic view of the social world, I believe that the processes of selecting and interpreting data always unavoidably entails the participation of the researcher's mind and subjectivity, and no definite demarcation can ever be made between 'objectivity' and 'subjectivity' in the processes of social research. However to
safeguard my own research I decided to compare the results of my findings with those of MORI Polls that are conventionally understood to be more 'objective'.

Ideally I would have liked to find similar kinds of research on two other European countries in order to compare them to the findings of this thesis in order to reach to a higher degree of ‘objectivity’ and accuracy of analysis. However I could not find such research in English in the UK, nor was there sufficient time and resources to allow me to travel abroad to search for them. Instead two empirical British Journals which conduct surveys on the British Public attitudes have been consulted. One is the *Journal of British Public Opinion* and the surveys published by the Journal are also well known as MORI Polls. The other one is the *Journal of British Social Attitudes*. Both are dedicated to measure and reflect on the public opinions and attitudes towards social issues through conducting social surveys and interviews.

The range of social issues they cover is vast. Having searched the journals thoroughly, it became obvious that only two sets of interviews published in the journals were useful for comparison and cross-examination of my findings. The first set was a whole range of MORI interviews that were carried out to measure the degree of the British (and in one occasion French and German) public inclination for ‘European Integration’. Through the comparison of the results of these interviews, I have double-examined my Testable Proposition E on ‘Europeanisation’ and a ‘diminishing sense of sovereignty’ of the British nation-state. The proposition suggested was: “There is a growing sense of Europeanisation- critically or favourably- amongst the citizens of Europe, which indicates a diminishing sense of (national) sovereignty”.

The second set of interviews conducted by the journals that seemed relevant to this thesis, was comprised of a set of questions asked from the public to measure the decline of the ‘civil culture’, which is the social sphere in which the unity of the nation-state is expressed. Unlike the folk culture that unfolds on the grassroots levels
of every day life, the strength of the ‘civil culture’ depends on a strong state whose legitimacy and accountability is largely trusted by its citizens. So if the level of public trust towards the state shows a historically diminishing trend it can be deduced that the civil unity will suffer a decline too. On this basis I decided to incorporate the findings of MORI Polls on the question of Civil Culture into my thesis to compare them with my findings. This would enable me to double-examine my Testable proposition A about a ‘diminishing sense of national unity’. The proposition suggested above was: “With the decline of a binding and cohering social morality/integration there follows a diminishing sense of social unity and belonging”. I am aware that social morality/integration does not immediately translate into civil culture, but ‘civil culture’ is surely a profound area where social morality/integration is expressed.

The comparisons are presented below. What is compared is firstly some of the findings of the MORI Polls in respect to the issue of Europeanisation to measure national sovereignty. And secondly Curtice and Roger’s article on the decline of the civil culture in Britain called ‘The Sceptical Electorate’ will be briefly looked at to examine the concept of national unity.

1) Europeanisation and National Sovereignty

MORI Interviews

“MORI interviewed a representative quota sample of 1068 British adults aged 18+ at 19 constituency points throughout Great Britain. Interviews were conducted face-to-face in street, on 27 April 1996. Data were weighted to match the profile of the population. (The survey was conducted on behalf of the Sun and published on 29 April 1996). Interviews were to measure “Attitudes to the EU”. The followings are some of the questions and answers which were made” (British Public Opinion, Vol. XX, No 8, May 1996 P.5).
"Q : At the moment, a number of ideas are being considered for the future of the European Union. On balance would you support or oppose Britain participating in each of the following?" (British Public Opinion. Vol. XX, No 8, May 1996 P.5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>support</th>
<th>oppose</th>
<th>don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A united States of Europe</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Single European Currency</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Central Bank of Europe</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A single co-ordinated foreign policy</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully integrated armed forces</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Supreme Court of Europe</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The above question measures British public opinion on the issue of ‘Europeanisation’ (which has a reverse relationship with national sovereignty). The question has three themes:

1) Economic and Political Integration (the first four questions),
2) Military and Defence Integration (question five)
3) Legal Integration (question six)

The results show that about one third of the British population is in favour of economic, political, military and legal integration with Europe, and is willing to prioritise it to retaining a distinct sense of national sovereignty.

"Q : At the moment the European Court of Justice has the power to overturn decisions made by courts in Britain. On balance do you think the European Court
should or should not have this power?” (British Public Opinion, Vol. XX, No 8, May 1996 P.5)

Table 6: Attitudes to the European Legal Integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>should</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>should not</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>don’t know</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: Again about one third (31 %) of the British population is in favour of subordinating the sovereignty of the British legal judgements to the European Court.

― Q : In principle who do you think should have the power to regulate conditions of employment, for example on working hours and health and safety- The British Government or the European Union?” (British Public Opinion, Vol. XX, No 8, May 1996 P.5)

Table 7: Attitudes to the EU- Employment Regulations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British Government</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The figures above show that about one third of the population (30%) are in favour of the European Union taking over the sovereign power of the British government in respect to economic regulations.
Cross-national trends

"To supplement the Sun, MORI was commissioned by the European newspaper to research attitudes to three (following) questions in France and Germany. A representative sample of 508 German adults aged 18+ across all 16 Bundeslander were interviewed by telephone on 30 April 1996 by gdp Marktund Meinungsumfragen GmbH (Hamburg), and a representative sample of 525 French adults were interviewed by telephone on 30 April-1 May 1996 BVA. Data were weighted to match the profiles of the populations". (British Public Opinion, Vol. XX, No 8, May 1996 P.5)

Q. On balance, do you support or oppose the following?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8: Attitudes to the EU</th>
<th>GB 1996 %</th>
<th>France 1996 %</th>
<th>Germany 1996 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Central Bank of Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oppose</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>don't know</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Single European Currency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oppose</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>don't know</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A united states of Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with a Federal Government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oppose</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>don't know</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Comment: The figures above clearly show that an average of *a third* of the British population remains inclined to European integration on political and economic (and legal and military) grounds. Even though the majority of the British population opposes the issue of European integration, and the British show far less willingness for integration compared to the French and Germans, still *one third* of the British population supports a higher degree of European integration.

The fact that one third of the British population supports a higher degree of European integration, significantly illustrates a sense of a decline of *national sovereignty* because it represents a historical trend that did not exist in the Britain of 1920s and 1930s. The average figure for the French case is over 50% and for the Germans over 40% (see table 8). The fact that the trend for Europeanisation is stronger on the continent than here in Britain shows that the findings of this thesis about the British nation-state and national identity can be generalised to the rest of the Europe with ease.

Another piece of research that reinforces the above argument is made by Geoffrey Evans in his article called “The state of the Union: attitudes towards Europe” (British Social Attitudes, the 12th report, 1995/6 edition, Ch. 6). He examines the extent of support for European integration in Britain. He also measures the extent the public is willing to give the European Union the power to make cross-border policy decisions. He finds that 37% of British people interviewed wanted closer links with Europe and 40% voted for “full unity with the EC” (ibid p. 122). A cross survey to find out the age composition of the interviewees reveals that a higher percentage of young people (27%) are interested in European integration compared to 11% amongst people over 50. Table 8 also shows that 58% of British people oppose closer integration with the EC and regard it as a threat to national sovereignty. However the significance of these findings for my argument is a *historical* one. Data have shown that in the 1920s and 1930s there was a 0% inclination for closer European integration in Britain while by
the 1990s it has grown by over 30%. Likewise Britain’s opposition to European integration has declined from 100% to 57% in the same period).

2) Social Integration and National Unity

In an article called “The Sceptical Electorate” by John Curtice and Roger Jowell (British Social Attitudes, the 12th report, 1995/6 edition, Ch. 7), they investigate the decline of the ‘civil culture’ in Britain which, as explained above, can be interpreted as an indication of a decline of ‘national unity’.

The article suggests that the civil culture has declined in Britain: “Since the early 1960s, when Almond and Verba were writing, many a commentator has argued that, even if Britain once had an ideal political culture, those days are past. Particularly important was Marsh who suggested that political trust is at a much lower ebb than would seem healthy from Almond and Verba’s point of view (Marsh, 1977:232). He also drew a helpful distinction between two kinds of political efficacy. First there was personal efficacy, the confidence among citizens that they could participate in and influence politics by, say writing a letter to a newspaper, contacting an MP, and so on. Britain’s scores on this attribute were relatively high. Also important, however, was system efficacy, the confidence among citizens that the nation’s political institutions and those who operate them are able to listen and respond to the citizens’ demands and grievances. According to Marsh’s work, Britain scores on this attribute were relatively low” (British Social Attitudes, the 12th report, 1995/6 edition, Ch. 7 p.143).

The first question was to measure the trust and confidence of the citizens towards the efficacy of the system of government.
Table 9: Trust and confidence of the citizens towards the system of governing Britain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The system of governing Britain...

...‘could not be improved.... 48 34 33 29
...‘could be improved... 49 62 63 69


Comment: The results show that whereas 48% of people in 1973 thought that the governing system of Britain was almost perfect and needed no improvement, the figure dropped to 29% in 1994. Similarly whereas 49% of people believed that the system was not good enough and needed some improvements in 1973, in 1994 the figure rose to 69%.

The second question was on the nation’s trust in government:

Table 10: Citizens’ Trust in Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Governments put the needs of nation above the interests of party........

‘Just about always’... 39 38 33 24
‘Only some of the time’... 57 57 63 73

236
Comment: Only 24% of the population believed in 1994 that British government always or mostly placed the national interest above their party interests, compared with 38% who believed this only eight years ago. (BSA the 12th report, 1995/6 edition Ch. 7, p.148)

The figures above suggest a decline in the confidence of the British nation both in the systems of government and in government itself since the 1970s. They are also more sceptical about the ability of the system to respond to the demands of the citizenry for the nation’s democracy which is also indicative of a decline of the strength of ‘civil culture’ and system efficacy.

I have suggested that the degree of the ‘system efficacy’ or ‘efficacy of the civil culture’ measured by the article has a direct relationship with the degree of ‘civil unity’ of the nation-state. The weaker the former, the weaker the latter. If the trends show a declining civic culture, then we can also deduce that civic nations and their unities will decline. If this is accepted, then the findings of the interviews on the decline of the ‘civil culture’ in Britain would support the findings of this thesis based on a historical decline of a sense of national unity and sovereignty in Britain.

A Complementary interpretation of the Findings

Although the results of my survey show a 33% decline in a sense of national unity and sovereignty in Britain since the 1920s, some may argue that the significance of the findings resides more heavily in the fact that about two thirds (67%) of the British population has retained a very strong sense of national identity. And it is, therefore, reasonable to describe today’s British society as a strong ‘national’ society based on the popular perceptions of distinct historical commonalities. This is of course true and my argument does not propose to refute this claim. The results of the findings do demonstrate that the majority of the British population has retained a very strong sense of national identity to date. The significance of my findings is merely in the
fact that this majority has historically diminished from 100% in the 1920s and 1930s to 67% in the 1980s and 1990s.

There are many reasons that explain why the nation-state is relatively resilient in the global era. One of the most important reasons is the fact that at a hermeneutic level, and as a species, humanity needs to belong to a community intimately and sensuously. The accumulated experience of belonging to a specific collectivity leads to distinct collective histories, and automatically creates a perception of the ‘other’. This basic transverse psychological function of human groups is embodied in the social forms of kinship and ‘ethnicity’ through which vernacular commonalities are shared and transmitted to the next generation. The nation-state as a time-bound institution of Modernity has incorporated and politicised ethnicity and represented collective identity only for the last two centuries. However in its language of nationalism the nation-state has successfully symbolised and embodied the transverse hermeneutic need for belonging to the extent that many of its ‘people’ equate ethnicity as a vernacular mode of collective existence with nationality as a conventional, modern and state-administered identity. The equation has led to the belief in the eternity of national identity itself.

In Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era Anthony Smith gives us several reasons as to why the nation-states are so resilient. They embody the (hermeneutic) needs for belonging and continuity which require:

- the growth, cultivation and transmission of common memories, myths and symbols of the community;
- the growth, selection and transmission of historical traditions and rituals of community;
- the designation, cultivation and transmission of ‘authentic’ elements of shared culture (language, customs, religion, etc.) of the ‘people’;
- the inculcation of ‘authentic’ values, knowledge and attitudes in the designated
population through standardised methods and institutions;
* the demarcation, cultivation and transmission of symbols and myths of a historic territory, or homeland;
* the selecting and husbanding of skills and resources within the demarcated territory;
* and the definition of common rights and duties for all the members of the designated community" (Smith, 1995, PP 89-90).

The above are some of the reasons that explain the resilience of the sense of national identity. There are many historical events through which the British sense of national identity has been expressed lastingly and gloriously. It goes without saying that the modern British history contains ample examples of expressions of nationalistic unity of which The Second World War is the most profound example of the expression of this unity and memories of it to date.

It should be clear at this point that this thesis is not claiming that British national identity or the British nation-state is weak. What this thesis has substantiated is a decline in a sense of national homogeneity, unity and sovereignty since the 1920s when the British sense of national identity was 100% compared to the 1990s when it has dropped to about 67%. It is important to note that it is only within this historical comparative analysis that the findings gain significance. Had the research been conducted merely at the present time, the findings could have only suggested that the majority of the British people do not want to lose their national sovereignty and unity, and would have voted against it. Likewise if the research had been conducted around indicators supporting ‘national identity’, many indicators could have been chosen from the editorials and commentaries.

However to limit the scope of this research in order to make it manageable, I chose six dimensions which were most recurrent in the editorials and commentaries in contradicting a sense of national unity and sovereignty. All the research has been
conducted around these six dimensions in two different historical periods. The results of the two historical periods have been compared, and the comparison has shown a historical growth of the dimensions which contradict or undermine a sense of national unity, sovereignty and homogeneity.

**Conclusion**

Britain was a very strong colonial empire during the 1920s. British people reflected on themselves as a united and thriving nation whose 'distinctiveness' and 'superiority' did not need to be emphasised. Questions regarding these issues simply just did not occur. The only way the British nation-state reflected upon itself was with enthusiasm and on new 'developments', 'progress', 'scientific and technological discoveries', 'liberation of women and their clothing', 'fashion', 'arts', 'parliamentary Bills' and 'the colonies'.

Both the realities and the sentiments of a united and sovereign nation in the 1920s continued during the 1930s. The only factor that made the British, and indeed every western nation-state, feel vulnerable and in need of stronger support from The League of Nations was the threat of rising Fascism in Germany. In fact if there were any single factor indicating a diminishing sense of 'sovereignty' it could only be British foreign diplomacy and its insecurities in respect to its own defence.

By the 1970s, the picture is completely different. Britain no longer runs an empire; its sovereign economic viability came under severe questioning and challenge; its manufacturing industries and food production declined irreversibly with falling rates of profit in all of them; unemployment rose; poverty increased; housing slums, especially in inner cities, appeared; public contemplation and questions about 'progress and development' for their own sake began; and public lack of satisfaction about the way the country was being managed slowly translated itself into forms of alienation, indifference, apathy and a diminishing sense of belonging, especially
amongst the younger generation. Regional ethnicities grew. Even though British society at large does not perceive itself to be ‘multicultural’ and/or part of ‘Europe’, these notions are introduced for the first time in the 1970s. Britain began experiencing itself as a less ‘united and sovereign’ country compared to the 1920s and 1930s.

By the 1980s the British economy loses its ‘sovereignty’ in every sense of the word to global markets and with the globalisation of the City of London, it will be increasingly difficult to draw a meaningful distinction between global economic mechanisms and ‘the economy’ of any single nation-state. The data shows that in the same period there is a sense of diminishing ‘sovereignty’ under the influence of a sharp rise of ‘globalisation’ and ‘Europeanisation’. During the 1980s micro-electronic technologies dominated the market giving rise to a plastic boom and this was accompanied with an increasingly selfish individualism of a “go and get it” attitude. The relatively alienated and declining society of the 1970s shifted into a right-wing and conservative society of the 1980s and expressed its (state) nationalism only when it came to the ‘others’ through the Falklands’ and the Gulf War. However the internal unities and memories derived from these nationalistic boosts have been relatively ephemeral and shortlived.

Ethnic consciousness increased further but no substantial growth of a sense of multiculturalism has been found in the data. Although Britain feels less ‘sovereign’ and ‘homogeneous’ during the 1980s, it does not like and resists perceiving itself as a multicultural society by uniting itself under the right wing nationalism of Mrs Thatcher and by avoiding reflections on ‘multiculturalism’. However the realities of globalism, the growth of Europeanism, the rise of ethnic consciousness (to the point of the Scottish devolution) and a declining collective integration were too strong to be conquered by the sheer politics of Thatcherite state nationalism.
It is not surprising that the decisive factors in the fall of the conservative government during the 1990s were 'Europe' and a sense of insensitivity and lack of accountability of the government to public opinions. The data shows that during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, 'ethnic consciousness', 'Europeanism' and 'globalism' all increased considerably in Britain compared to the 1920s and 1930s. With the acceptance of these realities, Britain is slowly reducing its resistance against them which entails a reluctant recognition that the formative grounds for the constitution of collective identity and sovereignty are unavoidably changing.

This chapter was designed to find out whether there has been a historical trend towards a sense of decline of national sovereignty, homogeneity and unity in Britain. As substantiated above, the findings indicate a 33% decline compared to the 1920s and 1930s. The results of the cross-examination presented above further supported the findings. This remains true without refuting the fact that the majority of the British population still has a strong and distinctive sense of national identity; Britain still is one of the strongest nation-states of the world; The nationalistic memories of the past, especially those of the Second World War, unite the nation, in particular the older generation- around a distinctive common past and identity, and about 67% of the British people do not want to see a decline of British sovereignty, unity and homogeneity.
Retrospective Reflections

At the beginning of the third millennium humanity is visibly shifting into a new 'paradigm' or a new mode of being. The emergence of a postmodern social reality based on the dialectic of 'globalisation' and 'localisation' is increasingly influencing and conditioning the dynamics of our thoughts, perceptions, values and the fabrics of our social relationships.

The beginning of this shift can be characterised in reference to a few fundamental developments. Firstly the subsumption of industrial capitalism by a micro-electronic and digital capitalism has led to 'time-space compression' to the extent of fusing a nation-state segmented world into a single global social reality. Secondly the repudiation of the Eurocentric epistemology of the Enlightenment based on the meta-narratives of modernisation, scientism and a positivistic rationality has allowed the natural, the feminine, the organic, the subjective, the holistic, the ethnic and the local to play a greater role in the making of the narratives of social reality. Thirdly the latest scientific discoveries, especially those of quantum physics (which have quite clearly shown that the structure of the atom is not mechanical), have shaken the foundations of a Newtonian vision which was at ease with a mechanically bordered world and replaced them with a holistic picture of the universe and social life. The emergence of new spaces of global governance and interaction such as the integrated network of global markets and cities, the internet, global telecommunications, and the network of computerised systems and software packages have gone hand in hand with these developments to condition the integration of a single global space.

Some of the structural components of the shift from modernity to postmodernity can be characterised as below:
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structures of Modernity</th>
<th>Structures of postmodernity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Industrial capitalism</td>
<td>- Digital and informational capitalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>- National industry as economic</td>
<td>- Global telecommunications, computer</td>
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<tr>
<td>infrastructure</td>
<td>network systems and software packages as</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>economic infrastructure</td>
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<td>- National economic concentration</td>
<td>- Global Economic dispersion</td>
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<td>and centralisation</td>
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<td>- National firms and companies</td>
<td>- Transnational and multinational companies</td>
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<td>- The transborder digital code</td>
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The above structural transformations have made the flow of capital across the globe via the transborder digital sign instantaneous, rendering borders obsolete. Some of the manifestations and implications of this 'paradigmatic' shift, especially in respect to the problematic of border-divided collective identity and representation, have been the subject of this thesis. These boundaries have been analysed as discourses of modern power in the colonial and imperial processes that historically contextualised the building of territorial and civil nation-states from above. There is no doubt that world affairs are still largely organised around modern boundaries both literally and symbolically. However this thesis has argued for the temporality of these boundaries.

The evolution of an organic and hybrid, rather than a mechanical perception of social and cultural collective identity is fundamentally different from the consecutive stacking of nationalistic building blocks or the manufacture of a state machine product in precise administrative and programmed steps. Organic systems are open and interactive, while mechanical systems are closed and self-referential. This is not
to deny the importance of machine-like (state) operations, administration and segmentation of specialised tasks such as human collectivities, but it is dangerous only when it is taken to be the complete explanation. Reductionism will then follow. Reductionism and holism are complementary approaches that, used in proper balance, help us to obtain a deeper knowledge of life and who we really are. As in regard to the issue of collective identity the same perception can be used. The reduction of the human race to segmented ‘nationalities’ and nation-states could be better comprehended if complemented with the knowledge of their essential hybrid interconnectedness. This thesis has argued that the administration, standardisation and representation of national identity is a function of the modern state which by using the ideology of nationalism conceals the transborder human hybrid histories and the inborder human heterogeneities.

The systematic production of national identity in the modern era incorporates and is inseparable from the significant task of producing the spectacle of and exhibiting ‘the other’ in ‘national’ spaces such as the museum, and anthropology intellectualised such an exhibition. The ‘other’ and its inferior position are made intelligible in a pole of binary apposites. One pole of the binary is usually the dominant one, the one which includes ‘the other’ within its field of operations. There is always a relationship of power between the poles of a binary opposition such white/black, British/alien, us/them, the west/the rest, developed/underdeveloped, rational/emotional, etc. These binaries form the epistemic and linguistic force-fields in which the dominant discourse (here nationality) and strategic knowledge (here nationalism) are constituted as the Truth (here national identity), and are objectified in the normative institutional and structural forms (here the nation-state. These binaries together with the borders and structures they represent constitute and characterise different collective modes of being or paradigms. The shift from modernity to postmodernity has furnished the grounds for the weakening of

1 Edward Said provides a good example of linguistic binaries such as the Oriental and the Occidental which constitute both the force-field of inquiry and its normative hegemonic operations (Said, E. Orientalism (1978, Int.)
modernist binaries and boundaries of representation. New postmodern force-fields of *truth knowledge power* (Foucault) are in the making and in ‘globalising’ and ‘localising’ the *hegemony of capitalism*, they fragment and undermine the nation-state as its sovereign regulatory *habitus* (Bourdieu).

The globalisation and localisation of the hegemony of capitalism has another important consequence. For the first time in human history the capitalist mode of production appears to be divorcing itself from its historically specific origins in Europe. In other words its narratives are not solely written in the time and space of Europe any more. For the first time non-European countries of the Far East, Latin America, Eastern Europe and Asia make their own claims on the history of capitalism, and in fragmenting capitalism’s Eurocentric force-field of operation, also fragment its Eurocentric cultural narratives and epistemic binaries. One of the effects of time-space compression is the possibility of simultaneous cultural transactions, interactions and creations which over time deteritorialise border-bound ‘national’ cultures.

Furthermore the fragmentation of space along national borders and the unification of global space together with decentralisation of production across the globe, mean that the discourse of capitalism is no longer located only in the west and it is possible to conceive of the future in ways other than those dominated by Euro-American political and social models. The simultaneous global integration and national fragmentation of space implies that economic activity becomes localised in regions below the nation-state, while its management will increasingly require supranational and global supervision and co-ordination. In other words the sovereignty and homogeneity of the nation-state is constantly undermined from above and below.

Having proposed, examined and demonstrated an emerging global/local social reality at a *structural* level, it is time to reflect on the *hermeneutic* mode of existence, whereby people feel, love, belong, interact and share familiarity and intimacy with
their immediate environment (locality) and collectivity (ethnicity) in the framework of conditions that make them possible. Our conclusions on the structural changes in human societies should incorporate the hermeneutic expressions that are derived from deep human psychological and organic needs for bonding and belonging to an immediate locality and a concrete collectivity where life is ‘experienced’ and experience is ‘lived’.

Anthony Smith articulates the (hermeneutic) need for collective belonging, a shared past, myths, memories, traditions, heroes and landscapes that are imagined and organised as a primordial quality in ‘the ethnie’. He reminds us of the importance of retaining a sense of ethnic belonging if we are not to sink into the secularising profanity of modernist accounts of collective belonging. Smith’s contribution in elaborating the meaning of collective identity around an ethnic core prevents this chapter from being concluded without reflecting on the primary need of humans for intimacy and belonging. The strong emotions that collectivities have expressed in their commemorative rituals and ceremonies can be understood as a sacred and intoxicating experience of intimate belonging that both at a personal and collective level imply love, loyalty and sacrifice and which are ‘lived’ by ‘the (collective) body’ in its memories, reactions, reflections, attractions and chemistries. It is on this basis that the local can constitute the locus of ethnic resistance against (‘the national’ and) ‘the global’ (Dirlik, 1996, PP 21-46).

The hermeneutic need of ‘belonging’ is ‘primary and transverse’ and it permeates into the tissues of social relationships. Hermeneutic interactions flourish in their intertwining with the structural conditions of experience which are socio-economic and temporal. Their unique encounter unfolds in “the habitus- the embodied history, internalised as a second nature and forgotten as history” (Bourdieu, 1990, P. 56) where agents equipped with a shared past make structures work. Linked with the structural conditions of Modernity cited above, the hermeneutics of belonging are crystallised in the habitus of the nation-state, and faced with the more fluid
structures of postmodernity, a different mode of collective being is crystallising which at its early stages has been theorised as global/local and global/ethnic.

No organic bonding of the two can be systematically conceptualised. The bonding between national identity as a ‘second nature’ and ethnic identity as a primary nature is largely ideological and a matter of the administration of culture industry from above. However this ideological linkage is not forcefully experienced. It is bio-power. It is lived in the memories, beliefs and the performance of the (collective) body which lend themselves so ‘willingly’ to nationalism’s claim of what it is not: eternity. It is this masterful articulation of ethnicity and nationality that, as Bhabha argues, allows the ‘performative’ and ‘pedagogical’ narratives of nationhood to fuse together in the name of ‘people’. The nation-state is the habitus of modern collective identity where the transverse human need for belonging inhabits itself in the temporal structure of the nation-state. Subjectivities and objectivities merge together to constitute and objectify a ‘national’ mode of collective belief and identity. This thesis has substantiated the shift from modernity to postmodernity as a historical moment when the transcendence of the habitus of collective identity can be conceived.
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Appendices
Appendix One
(The Times)

### Dimensions
(of the concept of a diminishing consensus on National 'sovereignty' and homogeneity')

- **A**: Diminishing sense of National belonging
- **B**: An increasing sense of national hybridity
- **C**: Growing Regional Ethnicities
- **D**: Growing sense of inability to solve own problems
- **E**: Increasing sense of Europeanisation
- **F**: Growing sense of Globalisation

### Dependent Indicators and their codes

- **A1**: Decline of social morality/integration
- **B1**: Multiculturalism
- **B2**: Plurality
- **C1**: Scotland & Wales
- **C2**: N. Ireland
- **D1**: Environment
- **D2**: Defence and Security
- **D3**: Decline of National Economy
- **E1**: Europe
- **F1**: Global village of consumerism/global culture
- **F2**: Global Technology
- **F3**: Global Economy

The Independent indicator is time ( the left hand column below).

#### The Times
1920s & 1930s

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<th>1925</th>
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<td><strong>A1</strong></td>
<td><strong>B1/2</strong></td>
<td><strong>C1/2</strong></td>
<td><strong>D1/2/3</strong></td>
<td><strong>E1</strong></td>
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*1925 - * "Security in Europe" warning against the possibility of war and wanting collective defence against Fascism.*

269
May 22  a1. Decline of religious beliefs, and absence of Christian teaching, too many pagans, causing juvenile delinquency and an unstable society.

May 15  d2. The League of the Nations must extend its authority for the security of Europe against war.


1937  d2. "The Marriage Bill" : the Bill lowers the sexual morality of the Nation; stability of marriage is part of national interest and is part of general conscience and reason.

Feb. 8  a1. the relationship of sexual morality, marriage and nationhood; against the marriage Bill

Feb. 15  d2. "Failure of the League" (the closest the Nation thought of another concept of collective security).

1970s, 1980s, 1990s

1975  c2. Northern Ireland and secession

Jan 15  c2. Northern Ireland

Feb. 19  d3. Insecurity of food producers such as farmers, fishermen & cattlemen in the context of EEC

Feb. 25  d3. Insecurity of miners and the decline of mines

Mar 19  d3. national volatility and economic uncertainty in the context of EEC

Mar 26  c2. Northern Ireland

Apr. 16  d3. economic decline, and rise of unemployment

May 28  d3. economic deterioration of manufacturing industries, jobs and the rise of inflation

Aug. 19  d3. decline of the economy

Oct. 21  d3. decline of morale/public steam and economic deterioration

Nov. 11  c1. devolution of Scotland and break-up of Britain

Nov. 18  d3. recession, economic decline, need for protectionism against the international economy

1976  c1. Can the Scots be satisfied? the question of devolution

Jan 12  c1. Devolution of Wales/Scotland

Jan 19  d3. decline of docks and ports due to EEC containerisation

Feb. 9  d3. decline of docks and ports due to EEC containerisation
Mar 1  

d3. decline of fishing industries and the EEC

Mar 29  
c1. devolution of Scotland

Apr. 19  
d3. decline of Docklands

July 24  
d3. economic decline and high unemployment

Sep. 25  
d3. lack of economic profitability, growth and certainty about future

Nov. 13  
d3. Britain’s post-war decline in standards of education and numeracy

Dec. 4  
c1. the issue of Scotland’s devolution in “Tories and Scotland”

Dec. 11  
d3. “urgency in the shipyard”: decline of British ship-building manufacturing industries

Dec. 18  
c1. “over the first hurdle” the issue of devolution

1977  

Jan. 7  
d3. “Boat-builders catch the tide”: decline of ship-building industries

Jan. 14  
d3. “Process of urban decay” rise of unemployment & decline of housing

Feb. 18  
c1. Devolution Bill

Feb. 24  
c1. “Guillotine Bill and its failure” re Scottish devolution

Mar 16  
b1. “positive discrimination” services should be provided for ethnic minorities to avoid racial hostility

Mar 25  
d3. “the members of the club”: general economic decline of industry, productivity, management, investment

May 6  
d3. “pax Americana” Britain entertain doubts about its ability to self-rule and its governability. Too much economic problems, unemployment 25 years after the war.

Jun. 10  
c2. terrorism and the issue of Northern Ireland

Jul. 7  
d3. decline of provinces theatres.

Jul. 14  
d3. decline of British economy in the context of world economy.

Jul. 14  
c1. autonomy for Wales and Scotland

Jul. 28  
d3. coal mining in decline

Aug. 18  
d2. “the unworthy squabble” Europe should remember the war and put aside national antagonisms for collective security.
Sep. 8  a1. spread of violence likely to come from broken homes, marriages and weak education

Oct. 13  c1. "Heath's European Survey": the notion of an enlarged community

Nov. 17  b2. "cementing a plural society".

Nov. 24  c1. the separation of Scotland and Wales.

Dec. 1  a1. "a message half-heard" referring to Schumpeter's analysis that economic & technological developments have not overcome unemployment, poverty, exclusion; a need for spiritual home-coming and belonging

1985

Jan. 2  f2. The Times & global technology; a new world order; a new world order a post-industrial society.

Jan. 30  f3. "vicious Market Circle" global economy and exchange rates

Feb. 20  c2. "Personal Irish problem" about Irish national identity

Mar. 27  f2. technological age for schools and the slowness of local governments to respond to it.


Apr. 24  f2. electronic communication, instant transactions-markets-consumers in the "global market" in which the sun never sets; maximum flexibility with minimum bureaucracy.

Apr. 24  a1. "Soccer Hooliganism"

May 1  b2. "Black Road to Canterbury": Black Christian presence in Britain as a significant enrichment of the religious life of the nation; it is perhaps no pity that it preserved its special character on arrival and did not assimilate too readily into the style of church worship that was customary here.

May 8  c1. the issue of Scotland

May 15  f2. "the sun has risen": why the government who
generally improves technologies of micro-electronics, fibre-optics, opto-electronics is so reluctant to assist British Leyland and Midland’s economy?

May 22  a1. Football hooliganism
Jun. 12  c1. "now we are 12"; on the notion of European community

Jul. 30  c2. "Screening the IRA"
Aug. 27  c2. "Mr Barry goes wooing" on Irish nationalism.
Nov. 5  c2. "Banning ballots backs bullets"
Nov. 19  c2. "No referendum" in Ireland
Nov. 26  c2. "Hillsborough"
Dec. 31  a1. &

1986
Feb. 17  c2. "Breaking The Irish Wound"
Mar. 13  c2. Anglo-Irish agreements
Mar. 24  b2. Britain a pluralist society in "Death warrants"
Mar. 24  f3. "1985" boundaries of greater London extended to Nicaragua.... we become too blaze about privatisation...(we are) private citizens demythologised, deregulated, de-banked.

May 5  c2. "screening reconciliation"
Jun. 2  a1. "can doctrine develop?" ordinance of women as demythologising Jesus; dispersed authority; threat to social consensus; break-down of the unity of the church.
Jun. 9  c2. "Question of Ulster’s police?"
Jun. 30  a1. "Priesthood and gender" Jesus can only be represented by men
Jun. 30  c2. Irish nationalism
Jul. 12  f1. "Birthday of a concept" : the inception of Bent cross to symbolise the global
Sep. 13 consumer culture; decline of small shops.

**1987**
Jan. 9 d2. EEC and the question of developing a common security strategy against the international terrorism.
Jan. 9 d3. decline of manufacturing industries

Jan 16 f3. decline of national economy due to global market forces beyond the controllability of policy makers.

Jan 16 a1. "markets and morality": abandonment of moral codes of behaviour, loose legal interpretation on Guineas Affair meaning economic forces Vs political and moral judgement.

Feb. 13 c1. "Strategic Defence" a European issue Vs USA.

Feb. 27 a1. "an unhappy compromise" on the ordination of women.
Feb. 27 f3. "Debt Fatigue"; an analysis of the World Bank identifying a global 'debt fatigue' affecting the public in Europe and USA.

Apr. 10 d3. decline of British economic manufacturing sector beyond investment.

Jun. 26 c1. "The Scottish Question"

Jul. 2 a1. on the question of sexual abuse of children within the family and at 'home' that is the place where a child should feel secure has been transformed into a closed world of secret suffering.

Aug. 20 *b1. "Islam in Britain": in the interests of society as well as requirement of human rights, Muslims in Britain should be free to observe their religion and build a community life with institutions of their own; a multicultural religious and social fabric is for a healthy British way of life.

Sep. 10 f3. "Loyalty to the City": accelerated development of London operations by financial houses abroad; learning to live with the presence of new market place; life different compare to the past.

Sep. 17 c2. on the Question of N. Ireland

274
Oct 29  a1. “The Alton Bill” the dilemma of legality and morality on the issues of abortion, homosexuality and adultery.

Dec. 2  a1. “case against Dr Runcie”: the church of England, a declining institution, liturgical modernisation; confusions over Christianity and docency.

1995
Jan 18  c2. On the question of N. Ireland
Feb. 1  c2. On the question of N. Ireland
Feb. 22 c2. On the question of N. Ireland
Mar. 15 a1. “The decline of the family”: a decline of organised religion.
Mar. 22

f2. “High the bonds”: modern society too fragmented with the flow of capital; too hectic; economic insecurity too high for the stability of society.

Mar. 29

f2.3. “Two kinds of Nations”: a growing sense of anxiety about the way the national interest is defined; global security has affected the definitions of national interest and national identity. These definitions can not be reduced to a common past.

Apr. 20  c2. The question of N. Ireland
Jul. 25  c2. The question of N. Ireland
Aug. 1  a1. “Monster within”: has Britain become a more dangerous place for children? is child murder a symptom of a wider break-down in society?
Aug. 15   c2. “Adams holds the key”
Aug. 29   c2. “Molyneaux’s Legacy”
Sep. 5    c1. “the pride of advice”
Sep. 26   a1. “A measure of faith”: 26 London churches are proposed to be converted into wine bars and galleries instead of closure.
Oct. 3   c2. “Ulster’s Modernisers”
Oct. 10

d3. economic decline/ job insecurity/ high unemployment/factory closures in all G7 countries under the impact of the world economy in “Feeling Good”.

275
Nov. 21  c1 Europeanism
Nov. 28  c2. "The American Dream" about peace in Ulster
Dec. 12  a1. "The decline of nuclear family": of old-fashioned neighbourhood, of church's parochial structures; there are heavy burdens on schools; lessons of right and wrong pushed to the margins of curriculum.

**1996**

Jan 15  c2. "A IRA Offer"
Feb. 12  c2. on IRA
Mar 1  d2. defence and Europeanism
Apr. 1  d3. age of anxiety and uncertainty regarding economic lack of security
Apr. 15  c1. "Scottish Scar"
Jun. 3  d1. Pollution in the new global order: the issue of the environment, human rights, population, poverty in "towards a habitable habitat"
Jun. 10  c1. "Hour of Truth" Britain should fight for a sort of Europe
Sep 7  c1. Labour for the devolution of Scotland and decentralisation of power
Oct. 5  e1. "Major's maybe" on single currency as a very important political and economic decision since 1945.
Oct. 17  e1. "Europe's History": reluctance of westerners to include southern and central Europeans into their history. They should.

**1997**

Jan. 23  e1. "The peoples of Europe must speak": we are committed to European identity.
Jan. 30  b2. "decline of the past" an analysis of the reactions against western culture due to the growth of Islam, pluralism and global civilisation.
Mar. 6  a1. "stand up for bastards": the weakening of marriage is only part of a general weakening of a sense of responsibility towards the new generation
Mar. 13  e1. "our meat is his poison" on the influence of Europe on British beef and farmers.

276
Apr. 3

cl. On the question of Scotland

Apr. 10

a1. "morals are made in the classroom": our society has become morally reticent, even inarticulate. Popular cultural assumptions are that re-definitions happen and things are only a matter of individual view.

Apr. 17

c1. "The Tories, Europe and the people."

Apr. 17

c1. "Defining issue", expressing doubts on European identity

Apr. 24

c1. "How to vote sceptically", expressing doubts on Europeanism

May 1

c1. "Vote with Relish": between this and next election the principle of single currency with all the loss of sovereignty that it entails should be decided.

May 8

c1. Devolution needs constructive opposition In "The Scottish Vote"

May 15

d2. "The end of one alliance" and the beginning of a new era of European security

May 22

e1. "Is Euro-scepticism dead?" opposition with the issue of single currency.

May 22

c1. "pies in pokes": we need to know more about the issue of devolution.

May 22

c1. On the question of devolution.

June 5

e1. "Europe on the defensive" we can become less competitive in one single space of Europe

Jun. 19

c1. "make them tell us why secrets sink without trace"

Jun. 26

e1. "Amsterdam soup" on the notion of European tax-payer

Jul. 4

f3. The age of global economy to re-educate themselves to "Reinventing the Protestant Ethics"

Jul. 11

c2. "our prime ministerial modernisers"

Jul. 25

c1. "a hard bargain" Scotland's parliament should satisfy

Aug. 15


Aug. 22

c1. "Does Blair know how to save the Unions" right to govern itself is the UK's loss.
Aug. 29  c2. “talk or walk” referring to the Irish dilemma
Sep. 12  c1. Scots have given voice to their hearts in “Vote of Destiny”
Oct. 10  c1. “off the mark” In European Monetary Union and the interest rates.
Nov. 7   c2. “IRA irreconcilables” on peace in Ireland.
Dec. 5   b2. “Blair’s militant tendency”: I am for pluralism and pluralism should not exclude people from ordinary backgrounds.
Dec. 19  c1. “A tongue for Europe”

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**Table 1: Summery of the findings - The Times**

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A-Diminishing sense of National Belonging
B-Increasing sense of National Hybridity
C-Growing sense of Ethnic Consciousness
D-Growing sense of inability to solve own problems
E-Growing sense of Europeanisation
F-Growing sense of Globalisation

The Times

Fig. 1.1: A graphic demonstration of the findings
The Times

Fig. 1.2

Dependent Dimension (A): A diminishing sense of National Belonging
Dependent Dimension (B): An increasing sense of National Hybridity
Dependent Dimension (C): A growing sense of ethnic consciousness
Fig. 1.5

Dependent Dimension (D): A growing sense of inability to solve own problem

- 1970s: 65%
- 1980s: 9%
- 1990s: 17%
- 1920s: 0%
- 1930s: 9%
Dependent Dimension (E): A growing sense of Europeanisation

1990s
84%

1920s
0%
1930s
0%
1970s
5%
1980s
11%
Dependent Dimension (F): A growing sense of Globalisation

1980s: 71%
1990s: 29%
1920s: 0%
1930s: 0%
1970s: 0%
Appendix Two

(The Guardian)

Dimensions
(of the concept of a diminishing consensus
on National 'sovereignty' and 'homogeneity')
A- Diminishing sense of National belonging
B- An increasing sense of national hybridity
C- Growing Regional Ethnicities
D- Growing sense of inability to solve own problems
E- Increasing sense of Europeanisation
F- Growing sense of Globalisation

Dependent Indicators
and their codes
A1- Decline of social morality/integration
B1- Multiculturalism
B2- Plurality
C1- Scotland & Wales
C2- N. Ireland
D1- Environment
D2- Defence and Security
D3- Decline of National Economy
E1- Europe
F1- Global village of consumerism/global culture
F2- Global Technology
F3- Global Economy

The Independent indicator is time (the left hand column below).

The Guardian
1920s & 1930s

Dependent variables

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1935
Nov. 21
c1. "Estates for Nations in Wales and Scotland

1936
Jun. 21
d2. The covenant of the League

Sept. 14
d2. "The League & the Industry": the idea of collective security should predominate (this is the closest they come to think of collective security i.e. in the body of the League of the Nations).
1970s, 1980s & 1990s

1975

Jan. 8

f3. "Multinational ghosts.." suggesting that multinationals inhibit peaceful advancement in Britain by manipulating economy.

Jan. 15
c2. "a choice for the IRA"

Apr. 2 a1. +
d3. "where are we going?" disturbing signs of Britain failing to produce its vicious spiral. Economic failure, selfish society, decline of national morale. we do not know how to reverse, do we?

May 7
c1. "Sovereignty is not freedom", pro EEC. Britain has not had an independent defensive foreign policy for the last 70 years.

Oct. 16 a1. "something wrong, but what?" Britain feels itself to be adrift; decline of the standards of personal morality, search for faith

Nov. 6
d3. "With a decent sense of scepticism" about ending the decline of national economy and industry.

Nov. 13
c2. "Where is it going?"

Nov. 13
d3. inevitability of cuts in living standards, economic decline in the UK

Dec. 4
c1. Scots and Devolution

1976

Jan 31

Feb. 13
c2. The Irish question

Feb. 20
d3. uncontrollable decline of industries/unemployment

Mar. 5
c2. The Irish question

Mar. 19
c2. The Irish question

Apr. 23
d3. unemployment

Jun. 4
c2. "last man through the loophole", IRA

Oct. 30
c2. The Irish question

Sept. 11
c2. "out of mind, out of print"
Dec. 11
Dec. 11
Dec. 25
Dec. 25
Jan. 24
Jan. 31
Feb. 7
Feb. 14
Feb. 14
Feb. 21
Feb. 28
Apr. 11
May 2
May 16
Jun. 6
Jun. 13
Jul. 26
Aug. 30
Sept. 20
Oct. 11
Oct. 25
Dec. 13
Dec. 24
1977

**1977**

Jan. 24. **"The school shake up starts here"** the education can no longer manage our mobs and hooligans; schools escape-goats goats for society’s ills for decades.

Jan. 31. c2. Ireland

Feb. 7. c1. Devolution of Scotland

Feb. 14. a1. **"The dilemma of delinquency"**: hooligans.


Feb. 21. c1. The question of devolution

Feb. 28. c1. The question of devolution

Apr. 11. c2. The question of Ulster still looking for a solution

May 2. c1. Ireland

May 16. c2. Ireland

Jun. 6. c1. Scotland and devolution

Jun. 13. c2. Ireland


Aug. 30. b1. **"The message of steel drums"** those who like the multinational, multi-cultural character of metropolitan centres; ideas for both the white and black souls

Sept. 20. c2. What wants a united Ireland?

Oct. 11. e1. Exploring the idea of a super-national Europe and single currency

Oct. 25. d3. **"When every option displeases"** decline of industry, & economy

Dec. 13. e1. **"one Europe vote when the case is more clear"**

Dec. 24. a1. commercialisation of Christmas and transformation of x-mass values in “face to faith”

1985

Jan 30

f3. "making the future small and green": with the IT technology,
working towards decentralisation, humanisation and localisation of economy at gross root levels: Break down of economy into local and regional levels; flexible and diversified economic base; liberate enterprise at all levels.

Mar. 6 c2. On the question of Ireland

Mar 20 d3. +

f2. “the seeds of hope are thinly sown” decline of British, the effects of microchip take-over from the recession; high unemployment

Apr. 24 d3. “two motors taking over” decline of motor mfg. dependency on foreign exchange market; huge deficit; British Leyland only 20% of the market in 1985, 60% in 1975.

May 22 f2. “The tower Tumbles”

the advances of IT have cut the umbilical cord between places. You can be part of the global market and in Hammersmith.

Jun. 19 a1. Minimal self; Narcissistic retreat from the society; emotional disengagement, the destruction of selfhood due to:

f2. Giants of communication industries & wired technology &

f1. global consumer culture and state of oneness with the outer world.


Jul. 4 e1. Euromissiles.

Jul. 4 f2. Telecommunication satellites form the future

Oct. 24 d3. “The shop-keepers eye view of the world” now we have much less to contribute to the global order, and we are paupers in decline due to de-colonisation.

Dec. 5 C2. N Ireland

Dec. 5 a1. “lost amid the rambo-jambo” pervasiveness of violence and pornography; concern with moral standards.
f2. "words count in the balance of fear" on global communication and surveillance satellites affecting security, by opening up forbidden territories for inspection.

Feb. 7
e1. "America and the ritual, but" it is easy to be anti-American when it comes to be viewed as future eclipse and present danger. If European Nation-States do not want to become de facto the 51st state, they should put their schizophrenia and form one Europe.

d1 + 2. Chernobyl: a simple need for help

d1 + 2. Chernobyl nuclear disaster and its conclusions for mankind.

d3. Decline of manufacturing industries; 17% decline since 1979.

Mar. 14  a1. "the facts of crime": crime in Britain is serious due to high unemployment.

May 9  d1 + 2. Chernobyl: a simple need for help

May 16  d1 + 2. Chernobyl nuclear disaster and its conclusions for mankind.

May 23  d3. Decline of manufacturing industries; 17% decline since 1979.

Jun. 13  c2. The question of Ireland


1987

Jan. 5  c2. Failure to provide real prospects

Feb. 16  d2. Alliance doubt...

Mar. 2  d2 + e1. There is sense of Europeanism in respect to a defence platform

Apr. 13  d2 + e1. Gorbachev and Europe’s security

Apr. 27  c2. N. Ireland

May 4  a1. + *d3. "hands in search of hearts and minds": unemployment over 3m, massive dislocation, shrugging indifference... without wide spread anger and sense of alarm; we shall sit and watch the rotten core of our cities become the hopeless homes for a fifth of our citizens; economic uncertainty.
May 11  c2 “laughgall”

Jun. 15  c2. “The voters vote to the unionists”

Jun. 22
d3. “when colonial rules come to the inner cities” the supreme irony is that Britain’s new colonies will be the cities which were created on the surplus of the former ones.

Aug. 4
d3.” Aristocrates rule in the urban global “: move towards hi-tech and service industries

Sept. 29
f3. “how to dam the deficit”: IMF mechanisms.

Oct. 13  c2. The Irish question

Oct. 20 f3. “the big bang & the real world”: crash of (national) markets, shares and instantaneous global markets, governments with no power.

Oct. 27 f3. “a real test for the politicians”: world stock market; London could not resist the global hurricane; a world wide solution needed.

Nov. 17  c1. Europeanism in “thinking beyond the channel”

Nov. 17  b1. “The unknown quantity”: on multicultural society

Nov. 17  c2. “labouring under Sinn Fein”

Nov. 17  c1. Europe is a central axis

Nov. 24  c2. “the real state under siege”

Nov. 24  f3. “too late to escape with too little” Wall street crash dragging down in the rest of the world beyond the control of national governments.

Dec. 1  f3. “Ducking the future” the height of technological folly of Britain’s most advanced micro-electronics sold overseas. The question is
can long term national
interests be reconciled
with short term city
profits?

1995
Jan 18
c1. “why this Europe won’t lie
down” reflecting of Europeanism
and Euro-sceptics’ resistance

Feb. 25
f3. “some of our trains will go
missing”: on world market
economy and rail privatisation

Feb. 8  a1. “Shivering in the shadow of history’s fallen cities”: how bombs, wars, military destruction destroy
memory, collective symbols, history, identity.

Feb. 15  c1. “borders go down...” referring to EU
destruction of borders

Mar. 1
f1. “taking the blinkers off John Bull”: what makes you proud to be British?
Euro-sceptics defenders of our nationhood,
but a redefining Britain; hooligan
nationalism offers a blend of imperial
nostalgia and implicit racism in
corrupt political institutions.

Mar 8  2. On N. Ireland

Mar 8  a1  +  f3. economic mobility,
labour flexibility, collapse of the family are effects of globalisation which have accelerated the pace of
life. New technologies lead to insecurity, poverty communities can not survive; loss of meaning and
identity.

Feb. 8  a1. + b1. “Rock ages that rolls with the flow”: increasing secularisation lead to erosion of moral
absolutes in modern world; society of multiculturalism.

Feb. 8  f3. “Taking and
pondering”

Feb. 15  a1. hooliganism in English football

Mar 22  c1. “question for cash”: the issue
of single currency, Europe’s
monetary union.

Apr. 19  f3. “World Bank, Global
Vision”, golden age of
economic growth in the global
age.

May 3  a1. “Withering indictment of our public spirit” the demoralisation of society, refusal to believe in
absolutes have undermined the society. Don’t know the difference between wrong and right; Education
does not cement society.

May 24  b2. Plurality of society  +  f3. Global media and
how they have a control on society
Jun. 7  
Blair's emphasis on Europeanisation and the sovereignty of the Nation-State

Jun. 7  
“Crunch time looms in Europe’s state of flux” immutability of integration and flux; ERM and single currency

Jun. 21  
“Shelling out for pollution”: the question of multinationals and the dumping of the toxic waste in the water.

Jul. 5  
“A game of…” realities of Europeanism and global power

Aug. 3  
Globalisation supported by local language and culture; global village in “a cook’s…to no where”

Aug. 31  
N. Ireland

Sept. 7  
“Clouded judgement”: French nuclear testing is to Europe’s joined security

Sept. 21  
“that nuclear club buzz” on European nuclear cooperation

Oct. 19  
“Put out more flags”: ridicule hooligan quality of right wing nationalism and their Eurocepticism are extraordinary facets of inflated ego of reactionaries and romantics. These people are responsible for the actual loss of sovereignty by letting manufacturing industries go.

Oct. 26  
“disaster waiting to happen” decisive action needed to make nuclear reactors ‘safe’, and not commercial considerations. The international atomic energy in Vienna has begged for safety.

Nov. 16  
The Gulf between Britain and Ireland.

Nov. 30  
On the question of Scotland

Dec. 7  
“Views and Values”: moral, religious and practical imperatives needed to make public commitment to marriage after cohabitation

Dec. 14  
“Last warning of Earth” prediction of global warming, nations procrastinate; intergovernmental panel on climate changes.
1996
Jan 12 c2. Sinn Fein suggestion to remove the impasse.
Jan 26 c2. The sound silence of Sinn Fein
Feb. 2 c2. The vicious cycle of the peace talks
Feb. 9 c2. Talks and peace process
Feb. 9 c2. On the peace process
Feb. 16 c1. Scots inquiry
Feb. 16 e1. Europeans and the far east in "Tweaking the tail of the tiger"

Mar 15 a1. "Loner in our midst" what sort of society are we creating, rime against small children, too many lone parents, social atomism after the nuclear family, British towns are evidence of the elaborate communities of fantasy that men create as substitutes.

Mar 22 c2. "Ulster reverts to type"
Apr. 5 c2. IRA barrier to talks
May 17 c2. "London falls into line"
Jun. 7 c2. "In the shadow of IRA"

Jun. 14 a1. "When care is a dirty word" ordering a national inquiry into child sexual abuse, need for skill care and counselling
Jun. 28 c1. Devolution of Scotland
Jul. 6 a1. "Pulling a moral vacuum": condemning moral relativism, decline of morality, spread of adultery in the royal family. 75% of people have said in a survey that the society is less moral with 72% believing that there is no longer a broadly agreed set of moral standards.
Jul. 20 c1. "Stuck in a great cultural divide": Europeanism in the face of Eastern Europe.
Jul. 20 c2. Talking through our bowler hats.
Aug. 8 f3. "Creed out of control": the issue of privatisation of previously national industries and selling to the private sector.

Oct. 19 a1. "The mirrors that matter": 1990s Britain: our political institutions more elitist and visibly less reformed than other established democratic societies; a perceived national decline is the immanent descent to the history of 20th century UK.
Sept. 7 f2. "The temple of Desire" when British
library moves next year, it will offer greater electronic access than ever. From catalogue to digital text, its on-line resources will serve the world.

Nov. 9  a1. "decline and fallacy" Is Britain a less moral nation?

Nov. 16  f2. the digital dictator

Nov. 16  e1. "The west V the rest" The people of the west hang together or they will hang separately in a world -multi-polar, multi-civilised of the global age where all power is local. The west should unite.

Nov. 30  c2. "the necessity of cease-fire", IRA

Nov. 30  c1. Scotland, Britain’s last colony

Dec. 7  e1. "time to go to the polls": A modernised Britain must be part of Europe, not to stand apart from it.

Dec. 7  b1. "Black looks and white lies": Anti-racist campaign have failed. We now need a radical new approach to multi-culturalism.

Dec. 14  e1. "enter the Europe" The European currency.

Dec. 21  f2. "school's out for ever" do our children exist only to shop or sit slavishly in front of a computer? The whole purpose of learning has become learning new technology. What has happened to the rationale of learning?

1997

Jan. 20  e1. Blair government in future shock: pro Europeanism

Jan. 27  f1. Global consumer culture: children's demand for fashion food; 85% of children have asked their parents to buy food they saw on the TV; market economy for jingles.

Feb. 3  c2. "Unfinished business"
Feb. 17 c1. “But what about Wales?”

Mar. 10 d1. “New Hope for forests” despite the slowing down of the rate of deforestation, mankind is relentlessly swapping primary forests for a new utilitarian version due to demand for timber.

Mar. 31 b1. "time to stop being scared of aliens" immigrants not a threat

Apr. 7 c2. “Dealing with seriously disturbed IRA”

Apr. c2.” Quite simply independent”

Apr. 14 f2. “The open road leads only to internet”.

Apr. 21 d1. The space question

May 19 c2. Only the IRA benefits

May 26 a1. “worse than the US” Britain is on top of the table of crime now.

May 5 e1. The idea of Europe did not frighten the voters

Jun. 9 c2. the question of Ireland

Jun. 16 c1. Re-thinking the route to Europe

Jun. 23 d1. “how to protect ecology” the earth needs deeds not words. Earth summit and the issue of global warming

July 8 c2. “history marches on” Ireland and peace issue.

Jul. 22 c2. “decommissioning does matter” but only as part of the eventual deal...

Jul. 22 b2. "tackling the ceiling” where are the blacks and Asians in governments... thanks to the swelling number of black-Asian professionals in Britain... no tokenism abut equality, not positive discrimination but affirmative action in a plural society

Aug. 19 c1. Scotland and devolution

Sept. 9 c1. Scotland and devolution

Sept. 16 c1. questions for Wales

Sept. 16 e1. “Ostrich time is over, its time for EMU”

Sept. 16 f2. “cat’s out of the bag” controlling the contents of the net is a task to daunt even the most zealous believers of national sovereignty; the material can be re-labelled, copied and re-routed endlessly.

296
e1. "praising open the palaces" one of the more civilising initiatives of recent years has been the opening to the public of houses, offices, monuments and governmental buildings under the umbrella term of "European heritage".

Oct. 7
d1. "Good news on global warming" : an international consensus needed in TOKYO Earth summit about how to address surplus green house gases.

c2. Sleaze goes Irish

e1. Brown wants to change EMU even before joining

Oct. 14
e1. EMU: in, out or maybe

Oct. 14
e1. EMU: the acceptance of Euros in the UK.

Oct. 21
e1. "the Euro is coming. like it or not" let's get ready for it.

Nov. 11
d1. "power for the Sahara" if we really wanted to reduce global warming we should stop travelling on the air. Aircrafts currently count for 3% of global warming.

Nov. 25
e1. "prison does wonder for the jobless figures": Comparing European crime rates with those of the USA.

Nov. 25
d1. "Trouble is on its way" four climate scientists warn that whatever happens at the Tokyo global summit, we must adapt to a future of bad weather with floods and draughts.

Dec. 2
c2. N. Ireland.

Dec. 2
e1. " the new Briton" under estimates the psychological damage inflicted on people in the attempt to turn us into independent economic animals, encourage to mistrust any form of community or collective endeavour; the psychological shift is one of insecurity and passivity in the sphere of life. This combination deeply in consumerism has made us different people
Table 2: Summary of the findings - *The Guardian*

**Dependent variables**

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E-Growing sense of Europeanisation
F-Growing sense of Globalisation

2.1: A graphic demonstration of the findings
Fig. 2.2

Dependent Dimensions (A): A diminishing sense of National Belonging
Fig. 2.3

Dependent Dimension (B): A growing sense of National Hybridity
Fig. 2.4

Dependent Dimension (C): A growing sense of Ethnic Consciousness
Fig. 2.5

Dependent Dimension (D): A growing sense of inability to solve own problems
Dependent Dimension (E): A growing sense of Europeanisation
Dependent Dimension (F): A growing sense of Globalisation
Appendix Three

(The Daily Mirror)

Dimensions
(of the concept of a diminishing consensus on National 'sovereignty' and' homogeneity')
A- Diminishing sense of National belonging
B- An increasing sense of National hybridity
C- Growing Regional Ethnicities
D- Growing sense of inability to solve own problems
E- Increasing sense of Europeanisation
F- Growing sense of Globalisation

Dependent Indicators and their codes
A1- Decline of social morality/integration
B1- Multiculturalism
B2- Plurality
C1- Scotland & Wales
C2- N. Ireland
D1- Environment
D2- Defence and Security
D3- Decline of National Economy
E1- Europe
F1- Global village of consumerism/global culture
F2- Global Technology
F3- Global Economy

The Independent indicator is time (the left hand column below).

The Daily Mirror
1920s & 1930s

Dependent variables

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<tr>
<td>Aug. 13</td>
<td>a1. “Modern unrest” gravity of industrial peril; we are at the edge of a volcano; foreign competition too high. We have enough patriotism to unite us against the foreign force, but not enough to keep us united at home.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov. 29</td>
<td>a1, “Age of Experts” questioning the age of science, its superiority; its experts; the age of restlessness, speed, nervous diseases etc. Questioning the binding power of science for the society.</td>
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306
1935
Mar 6  a1. "A menace to society" who does not believe in science and its beneficence in these days of mechanical advancement. The question is common amongst the men of science whether science is a standing menace to the orderly standards of society.

May 1  a1. "patriotic Knowledge": I wonder how many English people know the words of the national anthem of the "rule Britain" and how many recognise what regiment a soldier belongs to and what badges and stripes go to the respective ranks from officer to private, and why colours are dipped to the sovereign and why officers bring sword hilt to front of face when saluting with sword...flags. I was wondering if teachers know it.

Dec. 19  b1. "Honourable Fashion": the Chinese exhibition is already having an effect on women’s fashion and fashion designers have been quick to realise the possibilities for modern adaptation of the ideas of the old Oriental artists in this age of mobility.

Dec. 19  d2. European Security is a matter of great concern due to rising danger of war and Germany.

1936  
1937  

1980s & 1990s

1985
Jan 2  a1. "1985": division between have’s and have nots; no democracy, bad housing, high unemployment

Jan 23  a1. "cuts and more cuts": another 3 years misery with Magi Thatcher; high unemployment, divided society

Feb. 6  d3. "Strike a light" declining manufacturing industries, mining


Feb. 20  d3. The final curtain" coal miners and the closure of the pits; closure of national economy.

Mar 13  a1. "private grief"; privatisation of national health service, private treatment, health dependent of wealth now

Mar. 20  d3. “Nigel Nothing” we needed a budget for the nation, we got a budget for ‘the City’ instead

Apr. 3  d3. “the new realities” miners strike, rail strikes, the unions have been beaten meaning that the national economy has been beaten, the nation has been beaten.

Apr. 15  a1. “Crossing the line” society too permissive, drugs, sexual experience in a world where women are used, abused, degraded; pornography etc. The permissive society has not liberated women, it has enslaved them even more as sex objects.

May 23  a1. "Tough and right": football hooliganism

Jun. 12  a1 “Countdown or danger” football hooliganism
Jun. 19  a1. "Brutal truth" football hooliganism
Aug. 1  a1. "Home Truth". Decisions to cut benefits is ruthless to young people, thousands of youngsters turned into rootless wanderers and this is the modern civilised Britain in mid 80s; many turn to crime.
Sept. 12 a1. "None so blind" in an area where 95% of recent black school leavers are out of work, only an idiot could say unemployment had nothing to do with riot and violence; an area of disadvantaged overcrowded, poor schooling, inadequate welfare services. non existent prospects and widespread poverty only the wilfully blind can claim that deprivation and frustration had nothing to do with riot and violence.
Sept. 12 a1. "suffering little children" in Britain today many are suffering terrible misery, victims of cruelty and violence, alcohol and sexual abuse, homelessness, unemployment, crime and poverty.

1986
Mar 14 a1. "Bloody brutal Britain" the frightening truth about Britain 's sick society was revealed yesterday with the release of crime figures... one in 8 girls, and one in 12 boys are molested under 14; rape has risen by 29%; doctor raping a 8 year old; a vicars' series of sexual assaults etc. vandalism happens one every minute; violent crime one every 4 minutes; children are at risk.
Apr. 4  a1. "Backboard Jungle" the catalogue of crimes revealed at teachers union conference is appalling; too many parents do not care where their kids are or what they do, Classrooms hold the future of our society; if they continue to be breeding violence
Sept. 5  d1+2. "No need to over-react" Nuclear power may benefit mankind or destroy it. We can not abolish it; Chernobyl catastrophe; the nuclear industry has only itself to blame for much of the terror.
Oct. 17  d3. Rise of unemployment and inflation
Oct. 24 a1. no jobs for the young people; very low morale.

1987
Jan 12 a1. "Forgotten Britain": like the unemployed, the homeless and the ill housed ought to tear at the conscience of the nation; they are in a plight
Jan 19 a1. "Where is the pity" cold kills in silence; the hypothermia death; Tories have no conscience about the people who freeze to death
Jan 26 a1. "freedom behind the wire" Murdock’s newspaper 5000 print workers sacked by the Sun, Sunday Times, News of the World.
Feb. 2  e1. US Missiles the airbus" the American have dropped their threat towards the success of Europe’s new airbus jet (Europe Vs America)
Mar. 4  d1+2 "Jov over Nuclear Peace Move" disaster of Chernobyl.
May 4 a1. "Britain joins hands with giss job demo": thousands of jobless linked hands across yesterday in protest against mass unemployment.
May 11  c2. "A battle well won" The IRA

308
May 18  a1. "Arrogant, blinkered, divisive, patronising": Thatcher; 1250000 unemployed in 1979, now trebled.
She also deprived the youth from a future, the problem of homelessness,

Jun. 1  a1. "Poverty": the truth behind the damning figures that Mrs Thatcher is trying to hide; unemployment.

Jun. 23 a1. "100,000 jobless kids lose dole money."

Nov. 10  c2. "A town in mourning" Enniskillen in tears after IRA cruelty and atrocity: a war within (the nation)

Nov. 24  d1+2. "The dead sea" The North sea as a cesspool locked with ash, toxic chemicals and radio-active waste. The meeting of North European ministers on 'what to do?'

1995
Jan 6  c2. "peace before politics"

Feb. 20  c2. "... step closer to oblivion"

Jul. 11  d1. "end this nuclear waste" the cold war is over, communism has collapsed, so what is France doing? referring to French nuclear tests and their damage to the environment.

Aug. 22  f2. "All systems go" the launch of windows 95 another leap into future which further separates generations.

Sept. 12  e1. "Visions at the heart of Europe" Europe with social justice. yes.

Sept. 12  a1. "Bridge too far" the Tories creation of divided Britain is now being extended to teeth.

Oct. 3  a1. "let the rich pay their way": of all tax increases by this government VAT on fuel has been the worst. It hills the poor, the elderly and the low paid.

1996
Jan 10  a1. "for god sake", help her madam, break downs in the Royal family;

Feb. 21  a1. "don't let lives go to waste" official figures of unemployed Rowntree Foundation reveals that 7 million people of the working age are jobless.

Feb. 28  c2. "Time to save lives not face."

Mar. 6  a1. "a cruel lesson" rising violence in schools due to under-spending

Mar. 13  e1. "Divide and Rule" Britain outside a growing European Union does not have a future- at least,not a prosperous one. If we are not in we can't win our share of this huge market.

Apr. 3  c2. The question of N. Ireland
Apr. 24 a1. "Stop this football thug tape": with this disgraceful timing a sick video glamorising soccer thugs is due to go on sale.

May 1 a1. "Criminal..." the chances of being attacked has risen three times since the Tories came to power.

May 1 b1. “our race shame”, we are a pluralist society; racism is a shame.

May 22 e1. "Tantrums can not hide buntings" beef crisis and our European partners

Jun. 12 e1. “cashing an old grudge” he and his anti-European allies are stuck in a time-wrap when Germans were jack-booted Nazis and Britain ruled the waves and an empire. The reality of 1996 is that Britain could never prosper outside European union.

Jun. 19 e1. “EU tell ’em Tony” on Europeanism

Aug. 22 c3. “selling off Britain” by the Pound; on privatisation and selling to foreign firms.

Sept. 26 a1. "Death Trips": on drugs

1997

May 23 b2. “Winning race” racial prejudice is reducing with intermarriages increasing which is good. A more plural society.

May 30 c2. ON the question of N. Ireland

Table 3: Summary of the findings- The Daily Mirror

Dependent variables

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1990s 1 (b1) 8 (c1) 2 (d2)
3.1: A graphic demonstration of the findings
Dependent Dimension (A): A diminishing sense of National Belonging
Dependent Dimension (B): A growing sense of National Hybridity
Dependent Dimension (C): A growing Ethnic Consciousness

- 1920s: 0%
- 1930s: 0%
- 1980s: 13%
- 1990s: 87%
Fig. 3.5

Dependent Dimension (D): A growing sense of inability to solve own problem
Dependent Dimension (E): A growing sense of Europeanisation

Fig. 3.6
Appendix Four

(The Daily Express)

| Dimensions                                                                 | Dependent Indicators      |
|                                                                           | and their codes            |
| (of the concept of a diminishing consensus                                | A1- Decline of social morality/integration |
| on National 'sovereignty' and 'homogeneity')                              | B1- Multiculturalism       |
| A- Diminishing sense of National belonging                                | B2- Plurality              |
| B- An increasing sense of National hybridity                              | C1- Scotland & Wales       |
| C- Growing Regional Ethnicities                                           | C2- N. Ireland             |
| D- Growing sense of inability to solve own problems                       | D1- Environment            |
| E- Increasing sense of Europeanisation                                    | D2- Defence and Security   |
| F- Growing sense of Globalisation                                        | D3- Decline of National Economy |
|                                                                           | E1- Europe                 |
|                                                                           | F1- Global village of consumerism/global culture |
|                                                                           | F2- Global Technology      |
|                                                                           | F3- Global Economy         |

The Independent indicator is time (the left hand column below).

**The Daily Express**

1920s & 1930s

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1980s, 1990s

1985
Jun 3  a1. "Soccer pays the price of neglect": sense of revulsion and shame about football hooliganism and violence in front of our European partners.
Aug 6  c2. "Let's start fighting to win"
Aug 27  c2. "The busy thugs": on IRA
Oct. 1  e1. "Scandal of Europe's ski-high air force" the activities of the European community shall include the abolition of obstacles for free movement and the inauguration of a common transport policy and common market. It is cheaper to remove obstacles.
Oct. 8  a1. “Enough is enough” reflecting on violence
Dec 10  c2. “Smash this IRA terror “

1986

1987
Jan 9  a1. “Tenant Power” many council estates especially in the inner cities have been degenerated into breeding grounds for crime and vandalism.

1995
Jan. 16  c1. Devolution of Scotland
Jan. 30  c2. 25 years of Ulster nightmare
Feb. 6  c2. “Blair must pass the peace test”
Feb. 6  e1. notions of Euro agriculture, Euro; Euro citizen; Euro budget in “cap does not fit”
June 5  e1. “Why are we so proud to be a nation apart?”, on the question of Europe; 49% voted against Europe The rest agree with Europeanism.
June 1  e1. “A new ally for Euro-doubters”
Aug. 8  f3. “put the screws on (state ) subsidies”: the world will not fly apart if the state sector has to go on a diet. It is gobbling too much of our national

318
wealth...their brothers
in the shipyards,
British Leyland, steel
industry could tell
them (the state
subsidy lobbies) that
the iron law of the
global market is
imposed on our
economy any way.

Dec. 12

Dec. 19
c2. On the question of IRA

1996
Jan. 3
c2. "Killing to keep the fear alive"

Apr. 3
e1. "Clerks opts for Euro
Vote"

Apr. 3
e1. "Raw ambitions" we must
surrender more of our
sovereignty at inter-
governmental conferences to
prevent the creation of a
European super-state that will
be German led.

Apr. 17
c2. On the question of IRA

May 22
e1. "Urgent action must be
taken": expressing frustration
and lack of Britain is not taken
seriously enough on its position
on beef. "Humiliatingfiasco,
certainly illegal move by
partners in the European union
to ban our beef.

May 29
e1. "Euro-folly takes its doll":
the emerging European super-
state is destroying our national
industries. (The article
expresses anger and
disappointment but resigns to
it).

June 19
c2. "This quiet silence": on IRA

July
c2. "Don't give up on peace"
Aug 15

1. "The painful facts": wake up to the threats to British independence and sovereignty under the threat of Europeanism.

Aug. 15

1. "Chance to halt a rash cattle call": on European ban on British beef, referring to the power of Europe to influence British economy.

Sept. 19

1. "Churchill's Choice": the question in front of us is whether we are willing to recover our greatness as an independent & sovereign nation, or we submerge our identity in a European super-state.

Sept. 26

1. "Leo's Brussell..." on the question of European super-state or preservation of national sovereignty.

1997

1. So why are our young women behaving badly?": a disturbing number of teenage girls are finding expressions in foul language, threatening behaviour and assault, using the worst aspects of male characteristics. Expressing uncertainty about changing gender roles.

Mar. 7

d3. "Is Britain on the road to the 3rd world?": casting doubts on the issues of national progress/civilisation etc.

c2. "IRA killers must not be allowed to escape justice"
Table 4: Summary of the findings - The Daily Express

Dependent variables

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0 l (c1)
A-Diminishing sense of National Belonging
B-Increasing sense of National Hybridity
C-Growing sense of Ethnic Consciousness
D-Growing sense of inability to solve own problems
E-Growing sense of Europeanisation
F-Growing sense of Globalisation

The Daily Express

Fig 4.1: A graphic demonstration of the findings
Dependent Dimension (A): A diminishing sense of National Belonging
Dependent Dimension (C): A growing sense of Ethnic Consciousness

- 1920s: 0%
- 1930s: 0%
- 1980s: 25%
- 1990s: 75%
The Daily Express

Fig. 4.5

Dependent Dimension (E): A growing sense of Europeanisation