THE LAST DITCH: AN ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY
OF THE NAZI WERWOLF MOVEMENT, 1944-45

by

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

FOREIGN TERMS, ACRONYMS, AND ABBREVIATIONS

TABLE OF OFFICER RANKS

CHAPTER

I  INTRODUCTION: THE WERWOLF MOVEMENT AS A RESEARCH TOPIC

II  THE PREHISTORY OF THE WERWOLF: A BRIEF REVIEW OF GUERRILLA WARFARE AND TERRORISM IN GERMANY

III  UNTERNEHMEN WERWOLF: THE SS/HJ DIVERSIONARY ORGANIZATION

IV  THE RSHA AND THE WERWOLF

V  THE "PEOPLE'S WAR": THE PARTY AND THE WERWOLF

VI  CONCLUSION: CONSEQUENCES AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WERWOLF

CHART

I  UNTERNEHMEN ZEPPELIN, EARLY 1944

II  DIENSTELLE PRÜTZMANN

III  HSSPFs IN THE GREATER REICH, AUTUMN 1944

IV  THE SS-POLICE COMMAND STRUCTURE

V  AN EXAMPLE OF REGIONAL WERWOLF ORGANIZATION -- THE WERWOLF STAFF OF HSSPF GUTENBERGER (WEHRKREIS VI)

VI  THE SS-JAGDVERBÄNDE
CHART

VII  KAMPFGESCHWADER 200

VIII  AN EXAMPLE OF REGIONAL JAGDVERBAND ORGANIZATION -- JAGDVERBAND SÜDWEST

IX  AN EXAMPLE OF A GERMAN-ORGANIZED RESISTANCE MOVEMENT -- THE "CENTRAL OFFICE FOR THE AKTION IN RUMANIA"

X  THE VOLKSTURM

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abstract

Near the end of World War Two, a National Socialist resistance movement briefly flickered to life in Germany and its borderlands. Dedicated to delaying the advance of the victorious Allies and Soviets, this guerrilla movement, the Werwolf, succeeded in scattered acts of sabotage and violence, and also began to assume the character of a vengeful Nazi reaction against the German populace itself; collaborators and "defeatists" were assassinated, and crude posters warned the population that certain death was the penalty for failure to resist the enemy. Participation in "scorched earth" measures gave the movement an almost Luddite character.

In the final analysis, however, the Werwolf failed because of two basic weaknesses which undercut the movement. First, it lacked popular appeal, which doomed guerrillas and fanatic resisters to a difficult life on the margins of their own society; such an existence was simply not feasible in a country heavily occupied by enemy military forces. Second, the Werwolf was poorly organized, and showed all the signs of internal confusion that have been identified by the so-called "functionalist" school of German historiography. In fact,
confusion and barbarism became worse as the bonds of military success which had united the Reich began to loosen and unravel; the Werwolf can perhaps serve as the ultimate construct in the "functionalist" model of the Third Reich.

Although it failed, the Werwolf did have some permanent significance. While it is a classic example of guerrilla warfare gone wrong, the mere fact that it was active also caused a reaction among Germany's enemies. The Western Allies altered their own military and political policies to allow for extermination of the Werwolf threat, and it is likely that immediate security considerations also influenced the direction of Soviet policies in Germany.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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Foreign Terms, Acronyms, and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abschnitt</td>
<td>-- Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abschnittsleiter</td>
<td>-- Section Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abwehr</td>
<td>-- German Military Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aktion Bundschuh</td>
<td>-- a Secret Police resistance group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alpenvorland</td>
<td>-- Alpine foothills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;alte Kämpfer&quot;</td>
<td>-- &quot;Old Fighters,&quot; veterans of the Nazi struggle for power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amt</td>
<td>-- Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amtchef</td>
<td>-- Department Head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amt III</td>
<td>-- Internal Sicherdienst, third Department of the RSHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amt VI</td>
<td>-- External Sicherdienst, sixth Department of the RSHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amt IV</td>
<td>-- the Gestapo, fourth Department of the RSHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anlaufstelle</td>
<td>-- secret contact points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>antifa</td>
<td>-- Anti-Fascist Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armija Krajowa (AK)</td>
<td>-- Polish Home Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ausmustierungschein</td>
<td>-- Military demobilization papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bataillon</td>
<td>-- Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baurnkrieg</td>
<td>-- Peasant's War</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Beauftragter für den Westwallbau -- Representative for Westwall Construction

Befehlshaber des Sicherheitspolizei (BdS) -- Commander of the Sicherheitspolizei

Brieftaube -- "Carrier Pigion," the communications center of Schutzkorps Alpenland

Bund Wehrwolf -- Interwar German political and terrorist organization

Bürgerkriegstruppe -- "Civil War Troop"

Bürgermeister -- mayor

Deutsche Arbeitsfront (DAF) -- German Labour Front

Deutsche Freiheits und Friedensbewegung (DFFB) -- "German Freedom and Peace Movement," a postwar resistance group

Deutsche Revolution -- "German Revolution," a loose-knit postwar resistance movement

Deutsche Widerstandsbevewegung SS -- "German Resistance Movement - SS," a postwar resistance group

Deutschlandsender -- German Radio

Dienstelle Prützmann -- Headquarters Staff of the Werwolf

Dienstelle 2000 -- Sicherdienst Office for sabotage and espionage in the Balkans

Deuxième Bureau -- French Intelligence

Edelweiss Piraten -- dissident youth gangs
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Einsatz</td>
<td>Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Einsatzbataillonen</td>
<td>Mobile &quot;Action Battalions&quot; of the Volkssturm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Einsatzgruppe</td>
<td>&quot;Action Group,&quot; often a SS unit used to wipe-out Jews and political opponents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsa</td>
<td>a Secret Police resistance group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entlassungstelle</td>
<td>Demobilization Centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erganzungstelle</td>
<td>Recruiting Centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feldjäger</td>
<td>Field Rangers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feldjägerdienst</td>
<td>Field Ranger Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freibataillone</td>
<td>&quot;Free Battalions,&quot; Seven Years War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freies Deutschland</td>
<td>Soviet-sponsored &quot;Free Germany&quot; movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freiheitskämpfer</td>
<td>&quot;Freedom Fighters&quot;</td>
</tr>
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<td>Freikorps</td>
<td>&quot;Free Corps,&quot; mainly from the 1813-14 and 1919-20 periods</td>
</tr>
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<td>Freikorpsmänner</td>
<td>members of a Freikorps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>&quot;elite&quot; Party militia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freikorps &quot;Böhmen&quot;</td>
<td>Bohemian subsection of Freikorps &quot;Adolf Hitler&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freikorps &quot;Frankreich&quot;</td>
<td>Freikorps supposedly formed by German stragglers in France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freikorps &quot;Sauerland&quot;</td>
<td>a local Freikorps in the...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
eastern Ruhr

Freischöfen -- jury and executioners of Vehme sentences

Freiwillige Jägerschar -- Post-WWI Freikorps, predecessor to the Bund Wehrwolf

Fremde Heere Ost (FHO) -- High Command Intelligence on the Eastern Front

Frontaufklärung (FAK) -- Front Reconnaissance

Führerreserven -- Führer Reserves

Gaue -- Nazi Party administrative regions

Gauleiter -- local Nazi chieftains

Gebirgsjäger -- mountain troops

Geheimstaatspolizei (Gestapo) -- Secret Police

General Inspekteur für Spezialabwehr -- Chief of the Werwolf

Gruppe -- Group

Gruppenleiter -- Group Leader

Heeresschule -- Army Schools

Heereswaffenamt -- Army Ordinance Department

Heereswaffenschulen -- Army Weapons Schools

Heimatschutz -- local Home Guard

Hitler Jugend (HJ) -- Hitler Youth

HJ-Beauftragter der Reichsjugendführung -- Hitler Jugend Representative at Dienstelle Prützmann
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer</td>
<td>Higher SS and Police Leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideenträger</td>
<td>&quot;Bearers of the Idea&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jagdeinsatz</td>
<td>individual Jagdverband company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jagdkommando</td>
<td>individual Jagdverband platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jagdverbände</td>
<td>&quot;Hunting Units,&quot; SS commando formations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jägerkorps</td>
<td>Ranger Corps, 1814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junkerschule</td>
<td>elite Nazi Party schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-Staffel</td>
<td>HSSPF Motor Pools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kameradenschaft</td>
<td>postwar Nazi organization and mutual aid society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kampfgeschwader 200</td>
<td>Luftwaffe special forces unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kampfgruppe</td>
<td>Battle Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kampfpatrouillen</td>
<td>&quot;Battle Patrols&quot; of the Feldjägerdienst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kampfzeit</td>
<td>&quot;Time of Struggle,&quot; Nazi term for the pre-1933 period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennkarte</td>
<td>Identification papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kleinkrieg</td>
<td>&quot;Small Warfare,&quot; sometimes used interchangeably with &quot;guerrilla warfare&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kommissar der Sicherheitspolizei (KdS)</td>
<td>Sipo Commanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kriminalpolizei (Kripo)</td>
<td>Criminal Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kriminaltechnisches Institut (KTI)</td>
<td>Berlin think-tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Kurt Eggers&quot; Standarte</td>
<td>SS propaganda unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landespolizei</td>
<td>provincial police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landrat</td>
<td>District President (Prussian title)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landsturm</td>
<td>Prussian Minutemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landwehr</td>
<td>Prussian Militia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letzi</td>
<td>Alpine defenceworks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luftflotte Reich</td>
<td>Home Defence Arm of the Luftwaffe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luftwaffe</td>
<td>German Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxemburger Volksjugend</td>
<td>Luxembourgish version of the Hitler Jugend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machtergreifung</td>
<td>Nazi seizure of power, 1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maquis</td>
<td>Bush bands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maquisards</td>
<td>Bush fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militärisches Amt</td>
<td>military Intelligence Department of the RSHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militz</td>
<td>Militia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nachrichtenköpfe</td>
<td>Secret contact groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narodny Kommissariat Vnutrennikh Del (NKVD)</td>
<td>Soviet Secret Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oberbürgermeister</td>
<td>Lord Mayor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oberkommando Heeres (OKH)</td>
<td>Army High Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oberkommando Wehrmacht (OKW)</td>
<td>Armed Forces High Command</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Obrana -- Croatian military guerrillas

OKH - Abteilung Ausbildungswesen -- High Command Training Section

Organisation Schäfer -- Shepherd Organization, a Nazi resistance group in the Sudetenland and Bohemia

Organisation der SS-Angehörigen (ODESSA) -- a postwar Nazi organization and mutual aid society

Panzer Abwehr -- Tank Defence Organization

Panzerfaust -- a one-shot bazooka

Panzer Jagdkommando (or Panzer Jagdeinheit) -- Tank-Hunting Unit

Pionier-Schule -- Sapper School

Pionier Sonderkommando -- Special Sapper Unit

Politische Staffeln -- "Political Staffs," paramilitary Party squads

R-Aufgaben -- Rück-Aufgaben, or stay-behind tasks

"die rächende Schar" -- "the avenging band"

Rächer Deutscher Ehre -- Avengers of German Honour

Reich Arbeitsdienst (RAD) -- Reich Labour Service

Reichsicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) -- Reich Security Main Department

Reichsjugendführung -- Reich Youth Leadership

Reichsverteidigungskommissar -- Reich Defence Commissar

Reichswehr -- German Army, a term
particularly used to denote the Army during the Weimar Republic

**SA-Wehrcischen** -- SA rifle training program

**SS-Chef der Bandenkampverbände** -- SS Chief of Counter-Guerrilla Units

**SS-Hauptamt** -- SS Main Office

**Schutzkorps Alpenland** -- "Alpine Guard Corps," Redoubt partisan force

**Schutzstaffel (SS)** -- Elite cadre of the Third Reich

**Schutztruppe** -- Colonial Troops

**Schwärme** -- Swarms

**Sektor** -- Sector

**Sicherdienst (SD)** -- SS Security Service; divided into SD-Ausland and SD-Inland

**Sicherheitspolizei (Sipo)** -- Security Police

**Sigrune** -- a Secret Police resistance group

"Skorpion" -- SS propaganda operation on the Eastern Front

**Sonderauftrag** -- Special Assignment

**Sonderbeauftragter** -- Special Representative

**Sondereinheit** -- Special Unit

**Sonderkommando Totenkopf** -- Special Unit "Death's Head," a Luftwaffe Werwolf formation

**Spähtrupp** -- Reconnaissance Unit
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>die Spinne</td>
<td>the Spider, a postwar Nazi organization and mutual aid society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sprengkommando</td>
<td>Demolition Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sprengtruppe</td>
<td>Demolition Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staatssekretär</td>
<td>State Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standbataillonen</td>
<td>local battallions of the Volkssturm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standschützen</td>
<td>Alpine militia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stapostelle</td>
<td>Local office of the Gestapo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Streifkommandos</td>
<td>Raiding parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Stunde Null&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Zero Hour,&quot; the end of the Third Reich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sturmabteilung (SA)</td>
<td>Storm Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suchkommando</td>
<td>Anti-partisan search units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudetendeutsches Freikorps</td>
<td>Sudeten-German Free Corps, 1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totaleinsatz</td>
<td>&quot;Total Action,&quot; ie. near-suicide missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainska Povstanska Armija (UPA)</td>
<td>Ukrainian Partisan Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Untergruppe</td>
<td>Subgroup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unternehmen</td>
<td>Undertaking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V-Männer</td>
<td>Vertrauen-Männer, trusted agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehme (gericht)</td>
<td>Medieval vigilante courts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Volksbewegung -- People's Movement
Volksdeutsch -- ethnic Germans living outside Germany
Volksgruppenführer -- leader of an ethnic German "Volksgruppe"
Volkssturm -- German mass militia
Volkssturmmänner -- members of the German mass militia
Waffen-SS -- Combat SS
Wehrkreis -- Home Military District
Wehrmacht -- German Armed Forces
Wehrmachtführungstab -- Armed Forces Leadership Staff
Werbkommissionen -- Recruiting Commissions
Werewolf -- Werewolf Organization
Werwolf-Beauftragter (or W-Beauftragter) -- local Werewolf Commanders (later designated as Kommandeur für Spezialabwehr)
Werewolf Referat -- Werewolf Bureau in the Propaganda Ministry
Werewolf Sender -- Werewolf Radio
Widerstandsbewegung -- Resistance Movement
Wolf Freies Deutschland -- "Wolf" Free Germany, postwar Austrian resistance movement
Wolfsangel -- "Wolf's curve," a Werewolf symbol
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Zentrale für geheime Spezialzerstörungsmittel</strong></td>
<td>Central Office for Special Destructive Material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Zhdanovschina</strong></td>
<td>postwar Communist Party revival in the Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Zug</strong></td>
<td>platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Zugvogel</strong></td>
<td>&quot;Bird of Passage&quot;; an SD underground net in Metz</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Table of Officer Ranks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>British Army</th>
<th>German Army</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>NSDAP</th>
<th>HJ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field Marshal</td>
<td>Generalfeldmarschall</td>
<td>Reichsführer</td>
<td>Reichsleiter</td>
<td>Reichsjugendführer</td>
</tr>
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<td>General</td>
<td>Generaloberst</td>
<td>Oberstgruppenführer</td>
<td>Gauleiter</td>
<td>Stabschef</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt.-General</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>Obergruppenführer</td>
<td>Stv. Gauleiter</td>
<td>Obergebeitsführer</td>
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<td>Generalmajor</td>
<td>Brigadeführer</td>
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<td>Hauptbannführer</td>
</tr>
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<td>Oberführer</td>
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<td>Oberst</td>
<td>Standartenführer</td>
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<td>Oberstleutnant</td>
<td>Obersturmbannführer</td>
<td>Kreisleiter</td>
<td>Oberstammführer</td>
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<td>Ortsgruppenleiter</td>
<td>Stammführer</td>
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<td>Zellenleiter</td>
<td>Hauptgefolgschaftsführer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>Oberleutnant</td>
<td>Obersturmführer</td>
<td>Blockleiter</td>
<td>Obergefolgschaftsführer</td>
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<td>Second Lieutenant</td>
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<td>Untersturmführer</td>
<td></td>
<td>Gefolgschaftsführer</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Introduction: The *Werwolf* Movement as a Research Topic

The orthodox opinion on Nazi partisan warfare is that it was nonexistent, or was a myth produced by a last-minute Goebbels propaganda campaign; one historian even goes so far to claim that Germany "did not produce a single saboteur, far less a resistance movement." The corollary of this assumption is the belief that the German populace was obedient, subdued, and even apathetic during the so-called "Stunde Null" (or "zero hour"), when the Third Reich crumbled and control of Germany passed over to the victorious powers of the Grand Alliance. This impression was formed during the occupation period and continues to be widely accepted today. Undeniably, it is largely the truth, but it is not the entire truth, if only because the total breakdown and atomization of the Reich makes such generalizations over-simplified.

In fact, there was an active Nazi resistance campaign during the *Stunde Null* period, albeit a scattered and sporadic struggle which varied in regional intensity and failed to jolt the advancing Allied and Soviet armies. Lack of success, however, should not deny the Nazi Resistance Movement recognition as the same kind
of phenomena experienced in occupied Europe from 1940 to 45, if on a lesser scale. Even the most celebrated anti-
-Nazi groups did not succeed in seriously undermining the presence of the occupying power until Allied and Soviet troops had already pushed back the frontiers of the Axis "New Order," and it should also be noted that Nazi guerrillas -- unlike the other European resistance movements -- lacked the impression of mass involvement that inevitably came with final triumph, when scores of opportunistic recruits sought at the last minute to align themselves with the winning side.

A careful examination of surviving evidence shows that contrary to conventional wisdom, there was in fact a string of Nazi terrorist incidents aimed at both the enemy powers and at German "collaborators" who worked with the occupiers in maintaining civil government. In the spring of 1945, bridges were destroyed by saboteurs, Allied and Soviet soldiers were murdered and their vehicles ambushed, public buildings were mined or bombed, and underground leaflets were widely used to threaten domestic opponents of the defeated Nazi regime. Even after conditions settled into the unhappy post-war routine established by the occupying powers,
minor sabotage continued, particularly such acts as the cutting of telephone lines,\textsuperscript{6} the erection of roadblocks and "decapitation wires,"\textsuperscript{7} vandalism of military vehicles,\textsuperscript{8} and attacks upon occupation troops, mainly sniping and bodily assaults.\textsuperscript{9} As late as 1946, several Allied denazification officials were the victims of mysterious \textit{Vehme}-style killings, the most infamous case being the assassination of American sociologist Edward Hartshorne, who was ambushed on the \textit{Autobahn} near Munich (28 August 1946).\textsuperscript{10} In a number of instances, bombing and arson attacks were carried out upon such targets as MG facilities,\textsuperscript{11} denazification courts,\textsuperscript{12} and Communist meeting halls.\textsuperscript{13}

Most of this resistance was generated by right-wing individuals or small gangs acting in sporadic fashion, much like the violent practices of the earlier Nazi \textit{Kampfzeit}, when spasmodic threats or acts of violence were undertaken on local Nazi initiative rather than as cogs in a larger and more impersonal terror machine. By 1946-47, however, organized Nazi resistance groups had also developed in all four occupation zones, based mainly upon veterans of the SS, HJ, and SA who had reestablished contact and built-up widespread networks among their
former comrades-in-arms.\textsuperscript{14} In retrospect, of course, the reality of such scattered resistance in a country which had been home to a radical and pervasive totalitarian movement makes much more intuitive sense than the claim that Nazi resistance was totally lacking; Nazi fanaticism, in fact, did not totally disappear in a puff of smoke.

This work, however, lacks the scope of an overall history of such anti-Allied resistance, but is essentially a more limited investigation of last-minute Nazi efforts to prime underground and guerrilla activity, which was done mainly through a series of desperate measures in the last eight months of the war. The principal term associated with such efforts was "Werwolf," although use of the expression quickly became so general -- a Luftwaffe kamikaze squadron, for instance, was codenamed "Werwolf"\textsuperscript{15} -- that it eventually threatened to lose any specific sense of meaning.\textsuperscript{16} It is thus the task of this work to sort out the various aspects of this last ditch Werwolf resistance, and thereby provide some sense of coherence to the history of the movement.

As a means of providing such coherence through a
logical arrangement of chapters, "Werwolf" and other key concepts shall first be put in an historical context, and an attempt will be made to identify a clear German tradition of partisan warfare. It will then be shown that the different functions of the Nazi Resistance Movement were split up among the various SS, Party, and Government agencies that proliferated during the time of the Third Reich. The basic Werwolf diversionary Gruppen were under the purview of the SS-Police establishment, which also maintained a loose suzerainty over an autonomous Hitler Jugend (HJ) partisan program. The Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) received supplementary tasks, such as organization of an intelligence service for the Werwolf, and the construction of foreign resistance groups running parallel to the German model, although the insipid performance of the main Werwolf organization in launching diversionary activities evidently led the various RSHA offices to fill this gap. The Party, finally, was entrusted with political aspects of the Werwolf movement, which eventually resulted in the dissemination of nihilistic neo-Nazi doctrines which sprang from Goebbels' fertile imagination and were spread mainly by means of radio propaganda. No
aspect of the movement was intended primarily to influence events after the final capitulation of the Reich, although a few sub-sections did make last-minute plans for survival, usually without much effect.

Considering the breadth of such involvement by the main institutions of the Nazi state, it might be argued that although the Werwolf failed to lay a strong basis for organized resistance, this failure was not due to lack of effort. In fact, the Werwolf movement constituted one of the last major military and political initiatives of the Third Reich, and due to the stress and tension caused by the approaching conclusion of a lost war, it most vividly revealed the true nature of the Nazi regime. Seen in these terms, two points are immediately obvious: first, that the Nazi Reich was hardly a unified totalitarian state, but was rather a feudal patchwork of rival fiefs and bureaucratic principalities, each usually in conflict with the others; and second, that the Nazi regime had slid a great deal in terms of mass support since the movement's golden days in the mid-1930s. Considered as a referendum on the New Order, the Werwolf revealed a regime which (by 1944) was isolated and out of touch with even the most basic desires of the German
population.

The inquiring reader will wonder, of course, how such an important story has almost slipped through the cracks in written history. Much of the problem is related to sources, particularly the fact that there is no central collection of Werwolf documents. Most Werwolf records were purposefully destroyed during the German retreat, a process not unrelated to the fact that most Germans continued to regard guerrilla warfare as an illegal tactic and therefore feared that any surviving evidence could be used by the enemy to prosecute breaches of the rules of war. In any case, many of the most sensitive messages relative to Werwolf organizational matters were probably only verbally communicated: "Nothing written," it seems, was the watchword of the Werwolf organization. Because of this lack of extensive documentation and membership lists, it is difficult to produce a quantitative history, the present monograph being perforce narrative and largely impressionistic in content. It is similarly difficult to produce a class analysis of the Werwolf or Jagdverbände; therefore, this work concentrates mainly upon the organizational structure of such guerrilla groups.
The fact that it is possible to form a picture of the movement at all is due mainly to the work of the counter-intelligence agencies of the occupying powers, which gathered information on the movement in order to destroy it. Allied impressions of the movement were built largely upon interrogation records, which are a valuable source considering the fact that guerrilla movements have traditionally been loath to create a written record of incriminating details, and that partisan commanders are therefore unusually valuable sources of information precisely because so much material is reposited in their memories rather than on paper. 17 The problem, of course, is that the captured guerillas most willing to talk were usually those least committed to the movement, and also those most willing to tell their questioners what they wanted to hear. Less talkative captives either denied membership in the organization or swore that it was inactive, quite correctly fearing that their captors would show an adverse reaction as a result of open admissions of murder or sabotage directed against the occupying forces. For instance, the SS-Police official in command of the Rhenish Werwolf was extremely reluctant to talk even
about the assassination of a fellow German, the Oberbürgermeister of Aachen, and he only partially broke down on this matter after "intensive interrogation."\(^{18}\) (And to the end, this official stubbornly refused to admit involvement in the assassination of a senior German officer, General Diether Korst, about which he was also questioned by British interrogators.)\(^{19}\) Based upon such cases, it is correct to assume that facts about the Werwolf revealed through interrogation probably constituted a bare minimum, particularly with regard to actual Werwolf operations. This source of information is further limited because the majority of American, British, and French counter-intelligence files are still not open to public inspection.

Interrogation reports were also influenced by the mind-set of the interrogators, who filtered all available information through the screen of their own perceptions and prejudices.\(^{20}\) Considering the generally warped view of all things German which existed in 1945; considering the image of National Socialism as a pure and inseparable extension of "German Nationalist philosophy"; and considering the inability of many Allied authorities to distinguish between different German age groups and
social classes in their relationship to Naziism, it is scarcely surprising that various Allied "experts" either overestimated or underestimated the movement, each according to his own particular biases. One popular theme was that the Germans were an inherently warlike race tied by a mystical bond to their Führer, and that the latter would readily demand -- and receive -- die-hard fanaticism, large scale underground warfare, and the deception of Allied authorities. When Allied officers first encountered unarmed German soldiers surrendering in great masses, for instance, there was a great temptation to disregard the claim of these men that they had destroyed their weapons, in favour of the more paranoid supposition that the defeated troops had given their arms to German civilians for use in partisan warfare.\(^2\) This type of stereotyping, however, could also point to the opposite conclusion, specifically on the grounds that guerrilla fighting required a degree of independent enterprise supposedly alien to the German character. "I thought from the first," said General Patton, "that the threat of 'werewolves' and murder was inconsequential because the German is incapable of individual initiative action."\(^2\)
It is also likely that the Allies never constructed a totally realistic model of the Werwolf, not only because their conclusions were influenced by difficulties in objective and accurate perception, but also because the dissemination of intelligence information was not particularly thorough. This problem indirectly resulted from the increasing professionalization of intelligence work during the inter-war years, which tended to separate the three basic intelligence functions of gathering, analyzing, and disseminating information. Problems in the diffusion of intelligence on the Werwolf is shown most clearly by the fact that various incidents of violent resistance are not uniformly reported in the different sources of information now available to the researcher, particularly Allied intelligence reports and summaries. Unit histories, for instance, contain abundant information which apparently never reached the central intelligence departments at SHAEF, the Army Groups, and the headquarters of the various occupation armies, and the head of SHAEF Counter-Intelligence, Colonel H.G. Sheen, is on record in mid-April 1945 pleading with the Army Groups for an adequate flow of information on the Werwolf -- "it is urgently requested
that your lower echelons be impressed with the importance of sending material back through you [to us] at the earliest practicable moment."

Of course, collecting timely information from subordinate units was the kind of problem that inevitably faced every superior headquarters, but collecting information about guerrillas apparently posed a special difficulty because of the inherent hostility and disdain toward such forces within the professional military. R.F. Weigley rightly notes that "guerrilla warfare is so incongruous to the natural method and habits of a stable and well-to-do society that the American Army has tended to regard it as abnormal and to forget about it whenever possible." It is also apparent that the great initial concern shown by the Allies over the possibility of guerrilla warfare gradually began to dissipate as it became apparent that most instances of guerrilla and underground operations were uncoordinated and that the Werwolf had failed to lay a strong basis for any form of concerted action. This factor was particularly apparent in American and British intelligence digests, where attacks upon Allied troops and communication lines -- both during the war and after -- were routinely denied
importance because they were uncoordinated and therefore posed no long term threat to the occupation forces; for instance, one is surprised to find SHAEF calmly reporting that instances of sniping and sabotage in the Allied rear were usually the work of bands of by-passed German soldiers and not Werwölfe per se, which was apparently regarded as a good sign. After the massive bloodletting of a World War, sporadic incidents resulting in minor inconveniences and a handful of casualties seemingly did not inspire much worry.

Werwolf attacks upon Germans themselves warranted even less attention, particularly since Allied troops had difficulty envisioning the victims as martyrs. As Earl Ziemke notes (with regard to an assassinated Bürgermeister), a great many Germans died in the spring of 1945, most of them in forgotten circumstances and most without many questions asked.27

On top of all these inhibiting factors, one must also note the censorship imposed by Allied authorities, which prohibited the contemporary press from making all but the most general observations about the Werwolf movement, and which thereby reinforced the dominant impression of German docility. The Twelfth Army
Group suggested in early April 1945 that press accounts of the fighting should avoid extensive reportage of Werwolf activity -- mainly on the grounds that any publicity would magnify the movement and win it new recruits -- and this policy was subsequently adopted by the relevant SHAEF censorship and public relations authorities. American, British, and French censorship strictures lasted as late as September 1945, and by the time that such measures were rescinded, the American press, at least, had lost interest in Germany and shifted its collective gaze elsewhere.

Even less information filtered out of the Soviet Zone, although it is true that the Poles and Czechs released considerable information on alleged Werwolf outrages in an attempt to prove the continuing perfidy of Germanic populations in re-annexed areas (and thereby expedite the forced expulsion of such groups). This information from the East is of somewhat dubious reliability -- considering the fact that it obviously served the designs of Polish, Czech, and Soviet policy -- but with regard to this question, it is also notable that information from Eastern Europe has usually been given enough credence to serve as evidence in war crimes cases.
tried in American courts. Even if the evidence from Eastern Europe is treated with due caution, however, one is still left with the impression that Werwölfe and other German resisters actually achieved much more than is generally acknowledged, and that even the data presented in the following pages constitutes only the tip of the iceberg.

Of course, historians have frequently overcome a scarcity of source material and still produced voluminous accounts of past events. With the Werwolf movement, however, there has been no strong motivation for original scholarship. In West Germany, the Werwolf does not fit easily into the semi-official Bundesrepublik line of history, which concentrates heavily upon the resistance against Hitler as a basis of legitimacy for the modern German state, and as a means of moral redemption for the German people. For many years, the only group of historians with a deep and abiding interest in the intricate workings of the Third Reich was the Institut für Zeitgeschichte, which not incidentally published the only German research on the Werwolf until the 1980s. A seminal history has since been written by Arno Rose (1980), but it is still a significant comment on modern
German historiography that there are only several German works on the Werwolf, whereas one could literally fill a library with books on the underground resistance against Hitler.

The East Germans and the Soviets, meanwhile, are traditionally shy about admitting any popular resistance to the triumph of Socialism. Soviet and East European historians have usually given primary attention to the survival of "fascist" industrial and military elites, which has in turn served as a convenient means of discrediting the Bundesrepublik. It is obviously difficult to fit such a self-destructive impulse as the Werwolf into a general historiography which regards the Third Reich as a creature of German capitalism, although some attempt has been made in this direction: certain Soviet and Czech sources, for instance, suggest that the Werwolf was established mainly to survive the defeat of the Reich,\(^3\) or that it was composed of Nazi politicians and industrialists who later received the patronage of the Western powers. ("The fascist 'werewolves'", said Izvestia in February 1949, "are becoming the allies and servants of Wall Street and the City.")\(^3\)

It also seems likely that the usual Communist
portrayal of partisan fighting as a rallying of patriots dedicated to Soviet Socialism made it difficult to subsequently reverse the positive connotations of this type of fighting by focusing attention upon a specifically Nazi version of guerrilla warfare, even if it failed. The logical conclusions of a study of the Werwolf might seem — in a totalitarian society — to diminish the contrast between the forces of light (ie. Soviet Socialism) and those of darkness (ie. Hitlerite fascism). It is entirely possible, of course, that in the emerging era of Glasnost, with its more liberal policies of access to archival information, a Soviet study may yet be written which definitively examines Russian security problems in Germany and Eastern Europe during the first years of occupation by the Red Army.

Western historians have long laboured under the perception of uniform German docility which has held sway since 1945, although several British writers — specialists in popular war narratives — have discussed the Werwolf in considerable detail. Overall, however, it seems that inhibitions similar to those of the Germans and East Europeans also exist in the West. In Western Europe and the Anglo-Saxon world, the popular view of the
anti-German wartime Resistance is still influenced not only by the lingering effects of 1940s propaganda, but also by the vogue of humanist existentialism which ushered forth as an intellectual product of the Resistance, and which identified an individual sense of morality and courage as the engine which had supposedly propelled a brave minority of résistants. This revival of humanism had little or no relation to National Socialism: in fact, it was generally felt -- and still is -- that the absence of an inner sense of moral responsibility was one of the most notable lackings of the Nazi character, and one of the main factors which led Germany upon the road to ruin. Following this line of reasoning, one must conclude that National Socialists lacked a key ingredient essential to founding a strong resistance movement, particularly since, with the possible exception of the East, occupied Germany was not faced with a shadow half as black as that which she herself had cast upon her occupied territories and protectorates. French historian Jean Hugonnot, for instance, suggests that the German guerrilla movement "was a denial of the reality of history's teachings, in forgetting that an army of Resistance is fundamentally an
army of free men, an army in the service of national independence and liberty; that is to say, the exact antithesis of this artificial maquis, this paper maquis..." Not surprisingly, he concludes that the Werewolf was a total failure.33

The main assumption of this brief review is certainly not that there has been an overt suppression of the facts, nor that there has been any nefarious plot to cover-up the Werewolf; rather, there has simply been a lack of interest governed by historiographical forces which focus the attention of historians in the first place. Thus the aim of this work is to disinter the story of the Werewolf, to explore the limits of its success, and to explain its ultimate failure. The goal is not an aggressive revisionism, but rather a stocktaking of forgotten men and incidents; the hope is that such an account will be read in conjunction with the existing literature to create a more balanced view.
Footnotes


4. American military intelligence report, p. 6, OSS 134791, RG 226, NA; SHAPE JIC "Political Intelligence Report", 14 May 1945, p. 3, WO 219/1659, PRO; Capt. N. Hemmendinger, 6th AG G-5 Mission, "Alleged Sanctions at Freiburg and Freudenstadt", 26 June 1945, State Dept. Decimal Files 1945-49, 740.00119 Control (Germany), RG 59, NA; Enclave Mil. Dist. ACoS G-2 "CI Periodic Report" #3, 18 July 1945, pp. 1-2, OSS XL 12926, RG 226, NA; The Stars and Stripes, 10 June 1945; The Christian Science Monitor, 5 June 1945; Rose, p. 304; and Binkoski and Plaut, pp. 349, 351. For an abortive attempt to blow up the Schloss Eller in Düsseldorf, see History of the 94th Infantry Division in World War Two, pp. 480-481. For the demolition of ammunition trains, see The Stars and Stripes, 27 May 1945; and Silesian Inferno, pp. 64-65. For details on a suspicious fire in an American chemical warfare dump near Grafenwohr (28 May 1945), see Dyer, p. 460.


11. 5 Corps "Weekly Intelligence Summary" #7, 30 Aug. 1945, p. 10, FO 1007/299, PRO; ACA (BE) Intelligence Organisation "Joint Weekly Intelligence Summary" #28, 26 Jan. 1946, p. 4, FO 1007/300, PRO; CCG (BE) "Intelligence Division


Sept. 1945, pp. 6-7, both in FO 371/46967, PRO; The Times, 6 Oct. 1947; MI-14 "Mitropa" #21, 7 May 1946, p. 5, FO 371/55630, PRO; FORD "Digest for Germany and Austria" #690, 7 Jan. 1948, p. 4; #693, 10 Jan. 1948, p. III, both in FO 371/70791, PRO; FORD "Digest for Germany and Austria" #731, 4 March 1948, p. 7; #732, 5 March 1948, p. 7, both in FO 371/70792, PRO; FORD "Weekly Background Notes" #112, 16 Oct. 1947, pp. C3-C4, FO 371/64392, PRO; FORD "Germany: Fortnightly Background Notes" #140, 8 July 1948, State Dept. Decimal Files 1945-49, 740.00119 Control (Germany), RG 59, NA; ACA (BE) Intelligence Organisation, Digest #25, 1 March 1946, p. 2, FO 1005/289, PRO; and USFET G-2 "Weekly Intelligence Summary" #35, 14 March 1946, p. A21, State Dept. Decimal Files 1945-49, 740.00119 Control (Germany), RG 59, NA.


16. French intelligence agencies were especially bothered by the over-extensive use of the term 'Werwolf', which they felt denied it any specific sense of meaning. Directions des Services de Documentation Allemagne "Note sur la Formation du Werwolf," 6 July 1945, p. 6; and Direction Générale des Études et Recherches "Bulletin d'Information de CE" #64, both in IRR File XE 049 888 "Werewolf Activities Vol. I", RG 319, NA.


24. For SHAEF's problems in the collection of Werwolf intelligence from the Army Groups, see Minutes of the 3rd Mtg., Political Intelligence Committee, SHAEF JIC, 14 April 1945, WO 219/1603, PRO. For the general lack of coordination and information-sharing between the various CIC regional offices in Germany during the postwar period, as well as inter-zonal barriers to the flow of intelligence, see Bower, Klaus Barbie, pp. 150-164.


26. R.F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: MacMillan, 1967), p. 161. One of the main difficulties in writing about partisan warfare involving US troops -- at least until the time of the conflict in Vietnam -- is that academy-trained officers gave little credit or recognition to guerrillas, and in the few cases where they were mentioned in reports and dispatches, they were defined in only the most general terms. See, for instance, Virgil C. Jones, "The Problem of Writing about the Guerillas", in Military Affairs, Vol. XXI (1957), p. 21.


28. For the evolution of Allied censorship policy on the Werwolf, see: 12th AG from Sands from Sibert sgnd. Bradley to SHAEF Main G-2 (CIB), 9 April 1945; Maj. N.B.J. Hujsman, PWD SHAEF (Fwd) to SHAEF (Fwd), 28 April 1945; Col. G. Warden, Press Censors Guidance #57 (New Series) -- "Werewolves' or German Underground", 20 June 1945, all in WO 219/1602, PRO; PWE Central Directive, 5 April 1945; PWE Political Warfare Directive (European Theatre), 8 June 1945, both in FO 371/46790, PRO; and SHEAF PRD, Press Censors Guidance #1 (New Series) --


One of the most common fallacies regarding the Werwolf movement is that guerrilla warfare failed in Germany because certain deeply ingrained aspects of German "national character" did not favour such tactics, a misconception often repeated even by Germans themselves. The German people, for instance, have been regarded as too orderly, too steeped in a tradition of strict obedience to established authority, too chivalrous (in a hollow sense), and too lacking in individual initiative to resort to any sort of popular or partisan warfare.¹ One German general noted that Germanic "common sense" did not permit acceptance of a tactic more appropriate to hot-blooded Latins and Slavs, and this sort of biased commentary has been given serious consideration by the British military writer Kenneth Macksey, who claims that such "racial aspects" are significant and "worthy of further study."²

In truth, of course, Germany had a history of partisan warfare as full as that of most European countries -- "The German people," as Friedrich Engels noted, "are by no means lacking in revolutionary
tradition.\textsuperscript{3} It is also true, however, that the German mass culture which arose after 1871 cast a shadow upon this method of warfare. Unlike such countries as Greece or Italy, partisan warfare did not play a significant role in the saga of German national consolidation, mainly because the unification of the German state was orchestrated from above, by Bismarck and William I, and did not arise from a popular initiative; after all, the liberal-bourgeois nationalists had tried such a revolutionary course in 1848 and had failed. Bismarck and his contemporaries were happy to convert nationalism into a prop for the new Wilhelmine Empire, thus stealing the thunder of German liberals, but they were certainly not prepared to officially favour the doctrine of a "people's war" as well. War in the Bismarckian view remained what it had long been in the eyes of European reactionaries and conservatives -- namely, a sole prerogative of the state and the professional army.

In fact, Prussia/Germany established itself during the Imperial period as the dominant political force in Europe and as an outwardly expanding power; opinion-makers in a country at such a stage of development tended to harbour some natural resentment against a type of
warfare which was a natural weapon of the weak, and which could only mean trouble for a dynamic nation which saw its destiny in the domination of considerable portions of the globe. This prejudice first arose as a result of Prussian/German experiences with French franc tireurs in 1870-71 -- a breed of warrior who subsequently received short shrift in standard German accounts of the war\textsuperscript{4} -- and it was further exasperated by problems with Belgian and French partisans in the First World War. Even during the period of the Weimar Republic -- when the weakened Reichswehr itself experimented with tactics of guerrilla warfare -- there was a major rally around the flag in reaction to Belgian and French claims regarding the illegality of a number of summary executions which had taken place in 1914, when enemy franc tireurs had fired upon advancing German troops.\textsuperscript{5} This kind of popular prejudice was further inflamed during the early years of World War Two, when Germany lay astride most of Europe, and by the time this situation was finally reversed in 1944 -- and the Germans were forced to establish their own partisan movements -- the Nazi leadership was faced with the crusted accumulation of over seventy years of indoctrination, through which many Germans had come to
consider themselves far above the level of "guerrilla banditry." Not surprisingly, Nazi ideologues and propagandists desperately searched for traditional sources of inspiration which could rouse a Volkskrieg and erode the prejudices which had built up since 1871.

In truth, of course, guerrilla warfare in Germany had a history beginning in ancient times, when the Teutonic tribes — like many primitive peoples — adopted tactics of diversion and stealth in facing a technologically and culturally superior enemy, in this case the Romans. However, the beginning of an identifiably German tradition of popular warfare dates only from the Middle Ages, when the very idea of "regular" and "honourable" warfare itself came into being and thus marked the contrast between "regular" and "irregular" operations. This definition of "honourable" warfare and — in a more general sense — of "law and order" itself, was part of the value system which accompanied a series of social and military changes which occurred in Germanic Europe during the early Middle Ages: in sociological terms, the voluntary factor of clan solidarity as an associative element in military and political organization was gradually replaced by
hierarchical authoritarianism; in military terms, infantry levies became distinctly secondary to heavily armed cavalry; and in sociopolitical terms, armed power was reserved largely for the knighthood and the peasantry was effectively disarmed.

Despite these crucial changes, however, it is important to note that the popular aspect of warfare never entirely disappeared. Particularly during the period after the 13th century — when the central power of the Empire began its gradual decline — the German peasantry was subject to the oppression of local princes or of foreign armies of occupation, which in turn resulted in the repeated occurrence of a "peasant's war", or Bauernkrieg, as well as the emergence of a strong tradition of vigilantism.

Peasant revolts were mainly a conservative reaction against the arbitrariness of local princes or the rapaciousness of foreign armies, and such uprisings were actually constitutional under medieval German law: the German people possessed ancient rights — dating at least to the time of the Völkerwanderung — which allowed for violent opposition to any form of tyranny which defied "the old law," i.e., the "law of one's fathers," which
formed the customary code of rights, duties, and obligations. Some of the peasant rebellions in western Germany were coordinated by an underground movement called the Bundschuh, after the farmer’s laced boot which frequently appeared on the banners of peasant rebels, and the more radical rebels sought to institute a sort of semi-republican political system based upon the autonomy and rights of local communities. The armed Lumpengesindel was also responsible for guerrilla-style raiding — or "social banditry" — in mountainous or heavily wooded areas, such as the Harz, the Thüringer Wald, or the forests bordering the Rhine Valley; even as late as the 18th century, the highwayman "Schinderhannes" achieved a renowned reputation in the Rhine-Main region by stealing from "the rich" (by which he meant Jews) and supposedly giving to "the poor." Particulariy during the Thirty Years War — which was an example par excellence of a war without limits — Germany and Austria were wracked by vicious fighting between peasant guerrillas on one side and various princes, mercenaries, and foreign occupation armies on the other. In the Harz, for instance, partisan bands received the support of the Danes and preyed upon the
riches of local magnates, particularly the wealthy burghers of Goslar. Similar bands roamed the Lüneberg Heath during the same period, attacking Swedish troops and generally seeking to protect their families and property; according to Hermann Löns, one of these bands adopted the name Wehrwolf, and chose as their terrorist emblem the so-called "Wolfsangel", which resembled an inverted letter "N".

The classic example of such peasant forces was in the Alps, where natural and social conditions -- ie., tribal loyalties; a culture of continual unrest produced by cattle breeding; lack of means to maintain permanent troops; and a terrain which favoured light infantry over more mechanized and organized forms of warfare -- conspired to produce an independently-minded armed peasantry and a highly martial culture. In this area, independent peasant republics actually took shape, and depended for their defence upon the militia system and a style of guerrilla warfare centering upon resistance echeloned in depth and supported by natural obstacles. After the 14th century, warfare in the Alps was based upon earthen or masonry barricades called "Letzi", and on the fighting which took place -- less at the Letzi
themselves -- than on a wide front both behind and in front of the barricades; typically, enemy forces were ambushed as they focused upon delaying units stationed at the Letzi.14 Such tactics became a kind of national strategy for the Swiss and eventually took shape in the form of the Swiss "National Redoubt," a system of mountainous fortifications which, in turn, lent itself to the idea of a Nazi "National Redoubt," also based in the Alps.

In general, Medieval Germany was marked by a strong tendency among individuals or communities to supersede ineffective government by means of voluntary association, and this tendency particularly characterized the Vehme, or secret courts of justice.15 Because of the Balkanization of the Reich and the absence of a strong central power, certain Westphalian courts in the 13th century adopted clandestine practices as a means of preserving justice in the face of local princes who were otherwise disposed to tamper with the normal execution of law. The proceedings of these courts were carried out in true cloak-and-dagger fashion, and free jurymen, or Freischöffen -- who both decided the cases and carried out the verdicts -- established a secret fraternity among
themselves. In the 14th century the Vehme courts were recognized by the Emperor, mainly as a means of counteracting the unbridled power of the regional lords, and the jurisdiction of the courts also expanded into other areas of Germany (1385).

As time passed, however, the Vehmegerichte began to exercise their own authority in an increasingly arbitrary fashion: the accused, for instance, were often sentenced in absentia, and were subsequently considered marked men by the Freischöfen. Such quarry were caught and hanged in the dark of night, and were usually marked by one of several mottos which showed that the victim had been a target of the Vehme. This kind of practice eventually aroused criticism not only from the local princes, but also from the rising burgher class, and finally from the Emperor, and in the late 15th century the power of the courts was broken, although they survived in much weakened form until the end of the Holy Roman Reich. It is important for our purposes to note, however, that even as the courts declined they were remembered and romanticized in German popular culture, and such writers as Goethe and Kleist made the Vehme a standard prop in the new genre of Romanliteratur.
The unifying element in such medieval movements was the basic desire to protect and honour "the old law," as well as the vague belief that the existing social and political order in Germany was unbalanced. However, with the decline of feudalism and the rise of the monarchial state, the ancient German right of popular resistance was overridden by new absolutist legal principles, such as the criminalization of resistance through ordinances against "treason" and "sedition" (c. 1502-1532), or the revival of the ancient Roman doctrine of Lex Regia, which maintained that the people transferred sovereignty to the monarch in a social contract which was irrevocable. Moreover, basic social prerogatives like maintaining civil security or waging war were once and for all taken out of the hands of such irregular bodies as Vehme courts or guerrilla bands, and rather were monopolized by the institution of the state.

In Prussia, which had emerged as the monarchial state par excellence and as the main North German principality, the term "Militz" was itself strictly forbidden, and there was no country-wide militia system after the early 18th century. It is true that men of the peasantry were drafted into the Army to augment its
mercenary core, but there was no attempt to motivate this peasant soldiery by patriotism or by anything else intended to appeal to the common man. Rather, the Fredericks presided over a type of military slave system, in which the men of the ranks were motivated solely by regimentation and the threat of corporal punishment; in turn, therefore, it was impossible to deploy manpower outside restrictive line formations -- ie., as reconnaissance patrols or skirmishing detachments -- because of the reasonable expectation that the men of the ranks would desert amass once free of the immediate control of their officers. To the extent that it was necessary, military reconnaissance and patrol activity was performed by small elite units, such as Hussars and Feldjäger (Field Rangers), whose discipline and loyalty was ensured by preferential treatment; the Feldjäger, for instance, were recruited solely among foresters, who were promised jobs as huntsmen on royal and Junker estates in return for a term of loyal military service.

In fact, this ossified hierarchical order was a fragile arrangement, which was clearly shown by the desperate appeals to "the people" which issued forth whenever the system was under great strain. Note, for
instance, that during the Seven Years War, when much of Prussia was overrun, Frederick the Great reluctantly raised some twenty-three "Freibataillone", which were units of armed peasants, foreigners, and POWs — in effect militiamen or partisans — under the command of a few qualified Army officers.²⁰

The greatest crisis, however, came only in the wake of the French Revolution, when the revolutionary ideas which swept out of France were used to defeat the French Army, which also swept out of France and into Germany. In the early 19th century, a powerful coterie of reform-minded officers, including such memorable names as Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Boyen, and Clausewitz, argued that Germany should be liberated from Napoleonic domination by reliance upon a patriotic "War of Liberation." The basic idea was to exploit the new spirit of German nationalism as a means of rousing mass involvement in a war against France, and also to abolish the extensive military exemptions that had previously protected the privileged classes from conscription — the eventual goal was true mass army which would cut across class lines in the name of national unity. The reformers were also inspired by anti-French guerrilla wars in Spain
and Russia, and by a peasant revolt in the Tyrol — under the inspired leadership of Andreas Hofer — as well as the simultaneous organization of a mass militia, or Landwehr, by the Austrian regime.21

Leading Prussian reformers were plotting as early as 1806 to convert the traditional Bauernkrieg into a modern "people's war," and several precipitate rebellions were actually launched in 1809, perhaps the most significant being the abortive revolt of a five thousand man Freikorps under Major Ferdinand von Schill. The Prussian monarchy and ruling classes, however, remained understandably suspicious of a popular uprising by their subjects, even if it was directed at the French, and it was only after the massive French defeats in Russia in 1812 that the call for a mass uprising became so tempting that it could no longer be rejected, even by the staunchest advocates of the Old Regime. The newly emancipated peasantry was swept into a new patriotic mass army or was called upon to join local bands of a partisan militia, the Landsturm, and thereby harass the Napoleonic armies along their lines of communication. A more formal militia, the Landwehr, attempted to appeal to the landed peasantry and the bourgeoisie, while independent
volunteer detachments (Jägerkorps) called upon young men of noble birth. Guerrilla units contributed -- somewhat marginally -- to the subsequent victories of the Prussians and their allies, and Romantic thinkers like Ernst Arndt gushed about a supposed revival of the associative spirit of ancient Teutonic tribal warfare.

Of course, a significant question remained: namely, how could the forces of Prussian autocracy stuff the genie of mass nationalism -- and its "associative" spirit -- back into its bottle? Although the German partisans of 1813 were "conservative" in the sense that they nominally fought for the status quo and were authorized in advance by the Prussian monarchy, the implicit relationship between partisan warfare, democratic nationalism, and revolution, was all but impossible to ignore. The mass of the population, after all, was given a chance to perceive its own unity apart from the person of the monarch, and in areas of disputed control, guerrillas were able to exercise a measure of power before the Old Order fully reestablished itself. Moreover, units such as the Lutzöwsche Freikorps recruited patriots from all over Germany -- not just from Prussia -- and they advanced into battle under the banner
of "the Fatherland" rather than under the device of any regional monarch. 25

In fact, however, the state worked to rapidly reinforce its authority and minimize any revolutionary implications arising from its military strategy: an English liaison officer noted, for instance, that while the Landsturm was indeed a popular uprising, "it differs from that in Spain in that it has been firmly organized," and a Prussian contemporary put forth an even more fundamental observation, noting that the government was actually stifling spontaneous risings by imposing too many rules. 26 Within several months of the Landsturm decree, Prussian guerrillas had sunk under the weight of bureaucratic ordinances which allowed them to assemble only with the express authority of local Prussian Military Governments, and since the French evacuated Prussian territory more quickly than expected, guerrilla levies were rapidly demobilized or used to fill the ranks of the Landwehr. The Landwehr, in turn, was up-graded into a full-fledged field army, and subsequently enjoyed a brief period as a first line combat force, equal in status to the regular Army and yet organized as a citizen's force on a militia basis. In 1819, however, it
was reduced in status to a special reserve for the regular Army, partly because of its own inadequacies, partly because noblemen and reactionary military officers feared the political tenor of a force which was dominated by the nationalistic and democratic middle classes. Even after this emasculation, tensions over the status of the Landwehr remained not far below the surface of Prussian politics for a half century, and in the 1860s the monarchy and Junkers further strengthened the regular Army at the expense of the Landwehr.27

The message that seems to have arisen from the War of Liberation -- at least for the Prussian military -- was that guerrilla warfare was a useful tactic in times of desperation, a concept which, in fact, had already been advanced by some 18th century German theorists and was usually associated with the term "Kleinkrieg" (or "small-scale warfare").28 Clausewitz, in his postwar writings, stressed partisan warfare in exactly this sense: as a defensive rising of "armed peasantry" undertaken once the interior of the homeland was invaded, but closely coordinated by the state and conducted as a diversionary adjunct to regular military operations. In fact, he proclaimed that without direction by special
detachments of the regular Army, "the local inhabitants will usually lack the confidence and initiative to take to arms." Clausewitz glossed over partisan warfare as a means of radical social or political change, and he also refused to consider it as a method in itself capable of achieving victory anywhere but in the vast expanses of Russia, a proposition which again deemphasized the revolutionary aspects of the Kleinkrieg.

This specifically Prussian/German approach to partisan warfare was not provided with many opportunities for application during the century after the War of Liberation. It is true, however, that from 1814 to 1888, Prussia/Germany maintained the status of the Landsturm as a vague kind of final call-up in case the country was invaded, and supply depots for such last ditch minutemen were supposedly prepared. The best single attempt to define this ghost of the Landsturm was the so-called Landsturm Law of 1875, which was specifically intended to invoke the spirit of the 1813 decree and which described the Landsturm as a special Volksbewegung to be raised in case of enemy invasion and to be subject to possible wartime service as a pool of replacements for the Landwehr.
In effect, however, very little attention was paid to the Landsturm because the main thrust of military planning was directed toward the emergency mobilization of as many front line troops as possible, the principal intent of which was to mount a successful preemptive attack in case of imminent danger. The reasons for this orientation of strategy are not difficult to determine: German unification, after all, was achieved by regular field armies operating under the command of the Prussian aristocracy, and the new German Empire thereafter became an economic and military powerhouse which soon developed a supposedly fail-safe method of "offensive defence" in the form of the Schlieffen Plan. Moreover, a shadow seemed to fall upon guerrilla warfare as both a tactic and as a strategy; as noted above, the only guerrillas which the Reich actually encountered during this period were those facing German troops, and for northern Europeans in general, partisan warfare seemed to fit neatly into the popular Spencerite view of war as a product of barbaric cultures existing at the fringes of Western civilization.31

The outbreak of World War One destroyed much of this Spencerite arrogance about the nature of war, and to some
extent revived the legitimacy of partisan warfare as a tactic. Of course, with the brief exception of the East Prussian campaign in 1914, the German High Command did not have to face the prospect of defending German national soil until the very end of the war, and even in this final hour they preferred an armistice -- supposedly on liberal Wilsonian terms -- rather than supporting the \textit{levee en masse} being suggested by such men as Walther Rathenau, the wartime boss of the German economy.\textsuperscript{32} It is interesting to note, however, that in several cases where German military units were isolated by enemy forces, the supposedly staid and unimaginative Prussian officer corps successfully adopted itself to partisan warfare, albeit along the narrow tactical lines of a diversionary Kleinkrieg. There were several instances of such activity along the fluid lines of the Eastern front, but the classic example was in German East Africa, where \textit{Oberstleutnant} Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck led his guerrilla column of several thousand \textit{Schutztruppe} and Africans through a four year odyssey which ended only several weeks after the Armistice in Europe.\textsuperscript{33} (One of Lettow-Vorbeck's young officers, Theodor von Hippel, was so inspired by the Tanganyikan Campaign that he later
designed, built, and led the so-called "Brandenburg" detachment, Germany's main commando unit during the early stages of World War Two.\textsuperscript{34} In addition, German agents also attempted to spur guerrilla warfare in Poland, the Ukraine, Persia, and various points beyond.\textsuperscript{35}

The immediate period after the Great War developed along lines very similar to the earlier period of defeat and humiliation from 1806 to 1813. As during the Napoleonic period, the regular Army was strictly limited in size, and this disability created a need for innovative tactics and methods. Under General Hans von Seeckt, the Reichswehr developed a doctrine of mobile warfare in order to offset Franco-Polish advantages in armour, artillery, and aircraft, and it also inculcated a reliance upon tactics of manoeuvre -- the eventual basis of Blitzkrieg warfare had thus been established, particularly after the full realization of opportunities for mechanized forces operating within such a doctrine of mobility.\textsuperscript{36} German officers schooled in this environment developed a sense of independent initiative and flexibility generally greater than that of their eventual opponents in World War Two,\textsuperscript{37} and they hardly fit the usual stereotype of the starchy, intractable
Prussian automaton, supposedly incapable of exercising the independent initiative necessary for guerrilla warfare.

In truth, guerrilla warfare formed an important element in the new strategy: Hauptmann Arthur Erhardt argued that the increasing mechanization of war made supply lines an obvious target for partisans, and the Reichswehr's expert on "Eastern affairs," Oberstleutnant von Voss, noted that the Kleinkrieg was potentially of great value as long as it was "systematically organized."

In actual practice, the Reichswehr helped form special partisan units which maintained resistance against the Allied powers in the Rhenish occupation zones, and -- during the dark years of 1923 to 1925 -- in the Ruhr as well. These guerrillas formed the original nucleus of a nationwide partisan organization called the Feldjägerdienst, which was under the purview of the regional military commands (Wehrkreise) until 1928, when it was transferred to the Grenzschutz. Guided partly by Swiss and Soviet influences, the Feldjägerdienst was composed of one hundred man stay-behind companies (Kampfpatrourielen) which, in turn, were sub-divided into eight man Gruppe and intended to harass the enemy rear in
case of an invasion of Germany, particularly in the enemy-occupied and demilitarized zones in the Rhineland. Special Volksdeutsch units were also established for the execution of sabotage activity in the Sudentenland, the Memelgebeit, and the Polish-annexed borderlands, and the Feldjägerdienst also trained and supplied foreign partisans, such as Ukrainian separatists and Hungarian revanchists, who offered any sort of conceivable opportunity for diverting the attentions of Germany's foes.39

After the Nazi Machtergreifung in 1933, irregular warfare continued to play an important role in German strategy and tactics — in fact, as David Thomas notes, the Wehrmacht was the first army to develop a systemic concept of the value of commando operations and to exploit such tactics on a large scale.40 Ideologically, the image of the partisan fit comfortably into the romantic National Socialist image of the individual warrior — i.e., an elite man of action and fanatic ideologue, rather than a modern soldier-as-manager. This was exactly the spirit used to deify the memory of Leo Schlageter, the one-time leader of a Nazi sabotage team in the Ruhr who was captured and executed by the French in
1923. Schlagter subsequently became honoured as the so-called "first soldier of the Third Reich," and in 1933 the new regime even unveiled a massive "Schlagter Monument" on the Golzheimer Heath.\textsuperscript{41}

The German Left had also developed its own fascination with partisan warfare, and this was fused into the Weltanschauung of the Sturmabteilung (SA), the Nazi Party's activist militia. It was the SA which spoke of organizing a "People's Army" and which established training camps for guerrilla fighters,\textsuperscript{42} all of which came to an abrupt stop when the militia was violently suppressed in 1934. The Army had convinced Hitler that talk of a "People's Army" and a "Second Revolution" were as dangerous to the dictator himself as to the Officer Corps and Big Business.

The Party's brief history also suggested a sympathy for irregular modes of warfare and for political violence. Many senior Party figures -- including Martin Bormann, Heinrich Himmler, and Reinhard Heydrich -- had once been members of irregular military formations which had originally taken shape in 1918-19, as the rank-and-file of the Army disintegrated. During this time of chaos and decay, a few junior officers had retained the
services of elite formations of troops -- the most fanatic and brutal of a whole generation brutalized by war -- and to this core they had added a mixture of cadets and right-wing civilians. The final result was a variety of semi-private, nationalistic military units, which guarded the Eastern frontiers and in 1919 were used by the new Republican Government to defend the cities of the Reich against Communist insurrectionists. Similar bands had formed in a number of countries after World War One, particularly in nations which were threatened by anarchy or Communism, but in Germany such detachments adopted the specifically German appellation of "Freikorps," which seemed to link them to heroic deeds dating from the time of the Seven Year's War and the campaigns of liberation against Napoleon.

In 1920, the Freikorps turned against their erstwhile Republican masters and staged an abortive Putsch under the leadership of the Prussian civil servant Wolfgang Kapp. After having thus bared their fangs, the units were exploited to crush one further Communist uprising in the Ruhr, and were then ordered to disarm and dismantle. In effect, however, the Freikorps degenerated into a variety of minor militias, patriotic clubs, and
underground conspiracies, some of which were used by the Army to form a secret reserve informally called the "Black Reichswehr." When the Poles or the Allied Powers became overly aggressive, such groups were employed for guerrilla warfare: Freikorps remnants, for instance, waged partisan warfare in Upper Silesia against the Poles (1921), and were also active in the Ruhr against the French and Belgians.

Other Freikorps fragments declared war upon the "inner enemy" and revived the medieval rituals of the Vehme. Politicians who dickered with "the enemy" became marked men for the murderers of this new Vehmegericht: the Catholic politician Matthias Erzberger, who had negotiated the Armistice and had signed the Versailles Treaty, was gunned down in August 1921, and a year later he was followed to the grave by Walther Rathenau, the German-Jewish industrialist and statesman who as Foreign Minister had negotiated the Rapallo Pact with Soviet Russia. More than four hundred victims fell to the Vehme (according to figures compiled by E.J. Gumbel), and the German tradition of vigilantism thus reemerged in a most virulent form.

After the mid-1920s, most of the fragmentary remains
of the Freikorps were merged into the National Socialist Party, but a prime example of the type of organization which existed in quasi-legal form during the interim -- ie., after the suppression of the Freikorps but before the final rise of Naziism as a right-radical monolith -- was the Wehrwolf. This movement, under the leadership of Leutnant Peter von Heydebreck, adopted its name from Der Wehrwolf (1910), Hermann Löns' best-selling historical romance about the guerrillas who roamed the Lüneberg Heath during the Thirty Years War. The first "Wehrwölfe" were the dispersed remnants of Heydebreck's "Freivillige Jägerschar," elements of which fled to the woods after the conclusion of major operations in Upper Silesia, and undertook terrorist activity until the fall of 1922. Within the next several years, the Bund Wehrwolf was also active in fomenting partisan warfare in the Ruhr, and even within the interior of the Reich it posed such a threat of destabilization that it was harassed and partially banned by the Prussian state authorities.48

Despite its prodigious energy, however, the Wehrwolf was a short-lived phenomena: a Reichswehr file (later captured by Allied forces in 1945) shows that in the mid-
1920s, whole regional sub-sections of the Wehrwolf went over to the NSDAP en bloc. Heydebreck, who was an old crony of Röhm, formed his own immediate following into the Upper Silesian SA and was later appointed regional SA commander in Pomerania (1933).

It is interesting to note, however, that the National Socialists eventually developed mixed feelings toward the Wehrwolf and other Freikorps type groups. In practice, the Party adopted many of the worst characteristics of the postwar right-revolutionaries, such as their exaggerated appreciation for violence, and their use of Vehme rituals in the disposition of political foes -- Peter Merkl, for instance, has noted the particular importance of the anti-French Resistance for the establishment of local Party cells in western Germany, and for the injection of a violent atmosphere into the movement as a whole. On the other hand, there was a strict limit to the sentimentalization of the Freikorps and the Wehrwolf during the Third Reich, mainly because the rowdyism and the vague revolutionary sentiments of the Freikorps were obvious forerunners of the same spirit within the discredited SA, and many of the Freikorpsmänner and Wehrwölfe had actually been drawn
to this mutinous segment of the Party, or to the even more radical ranks of the breakaway "Black Front." Heydebreck himself was murdered in the Blood Purge of June 1934, and many other ex-Wehrwölfe -- lucky to be alive -- were relegated to minor positions within the Nazi bureaucracy: the one time Wehrwolf section chief in Berlin, for instance, eventually turned up as a Wehrmacht sanitary sergeant in a military hospital in Warsaw. The interwar Wehrwolf movement was rarely mentioned in propaganda calling for last ditch resistance in 1944-45, nor were former members of the Wehrwolf or the Freikorps specifically involved in the organization of new underground groups during this later period.

After the Machtergreifung the Party had little further use for maintaining an underground terror against domestic opponents, since the regular police and bureaucracy were now employed for this purpose of enforcing a Nazi tenor upon society. However, Nazi methods of terror and intimidation were turned toward foreign policy, and in the process terrorism and guerrilla warfare was converted from a defensive tactic -- which it had been during the Weimar period -- into a weapon for the destabilization of various targets of
conquest. Military Intelligence (Abwehr) and various Party and SS apparatus were used to sponsor such subversive activities, and soon after the outbreak of war in 1939, Hauptmann von Hippel's special Abwehr unit, the "Brandenburg Formation," was organized as a specialist detachment for commando operations and partisan warfare. There were some momentary doubts within the Abwehr about such an exploitation of the Kleinkrieg -- Admiral Canaris, for instance, displayed a haughty regard for such "Bolshevist" techniques -- but these reservations were more than offset by the obvious desirability of maintaining special troops who could seize objectives coveted by the advancing German forces, such as key bridges, and who could also cause military and political chaos in the rear area of retreating enemy forces. Volksdeutschen were especially favoured as "fifth columnists" and as recruits for the Brandenburg unit, although sponsorship of guerrilla warfare was certainly not confined exclusively to support for ethnic Germans.

The first external victim of Nazi destabilization techniques was Austria, where native Nazis launched a precipitate terror campaign and assassinated the pro-Italian Chancellor in 1934, in the process nearly
triggering an Italo-German conflict. A more cautious policy was adopted over the next three years, although in 1937 full-scale Nazi provocations resumed, and in the spring of 1938 Austria fell without resistance into the lap of the Third Reich. The next target was Czechoslovakia, where a "Sudetendeutsches Freikorps" helped lay the groundwork for the Munich Settlement, followed in short order by Poland, where thousands of Volksdeutsch guerrillas -- some of them specially trained commandos (K-Truppe) -- helped facilitate the Blitzkrieg attack of September 1939. It was the veterans of these campaigns who formed the original nucleus of the Brandenburg Formation.

There was also minor skirmishing by Volksdeutsch fifth columnists in eastern Belgium during the assault upon the Low Countries in 1940, but it was only with the reorientation of German attentions toward the East in 1941 that efforts to exploit Volksdeutsch rebels once again reached a pitch: the attack upon Yugoslavia in April 1941 was accompanied by guerrilla activity on the part of ethnic Germans in Slovenia and the Yugoslavian Banat, and the Soviets also claimed that constant distress was caused by the work of German saboteurs in
the Volksdeutsch settlement areas along the Middle Volga.64

As briefly noted above, the Third Reich also made use of non-German ethnic minorities as a potential source of trouble for its enemies. A few Flemish saboteurs were sent into the Allied rear during the 1940 campaign in the West (Unternehmen Wespennest II), but once again, it was mainly in the East that such activities reached a significant magnitude and achieved considerable results. Continuing contacts between the Abwehr and Ukrainian separatist groups such as the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) were used to ignite small scale rebellions in eastern Poland during 1939,65 and in 1941 pro-German Ustasche elements in northern Yugoslavia were also able to aid the German advance.66 The Soviet Union, in particular, seemed a vast and tumultuous field for subversive activity, and even before the German invasion in the summer of 1941, the Soviet borderlands were plagued by fifth column activity.67 Once the Wehrmacht stormed across the frontier, pro-German commandos led uprisings and guerrilla warfare in the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and the Baltic States,68 and the same strategy was applied once again in 1942, when the
The focus of German efforts shifted to southern Russia. Although the once exuberant separatists in the western Soviet Union were already souring upon the exploitative and brutal nature of the German occupation regime, there was a chance to harvest a new yield of discontent in such areas as Kalmykia, and during the 1942 campaign military occupation authorities made some effort to establish a more liberal regime in areas that were actually overrun. In the Caucasus, hundreds of Abwehr and SS commandos were infiltrated or parachuted into the Soviet rear, in the process diverting several divisions of Red Army and security troops, whose presence was necessary in order to contain this sideshow.

After the Eastern Front solidified in 1942, the Germans stepped up subversive warfare and doubled the number of saboteurs air-dropped into the Soviet rear, with another substantial increase following again in 1943. The Abwehr decided that long range reconnaissance and sabotage missions could achieve success, and Abwehr front reconnaissance groups (Frontaufklärungen -- FAK) began heavy recruitment and training activity among Red Army POWs and Russian workers, many of whom were eventually sent behind Soviet lines. A parallel
program for parachuting pro-German guerrillas into the Soviet rear was also organized by the **Sicherdienst-Ausland** (SD), which was the sixth bureau (Amt) of the **Reichsicherheitshauptamt** (RSHA), the SS security directorate formed in 1939. This SS program, called **Unternehmen Zeppelin**, established links with the FAK units and also with the intelligence services of the various "national liberation committees," which had been set up in Germany as a focus for ethnic nationalism in unoccupied areas of the USSR. From 1942 to 1945, several thousand **Zeppelin** commandos were trained and several hundred were infiltrated or air-dropped into the Soviet rear.72

Naturally, there was a congenital rivalry between the two main players in the field of irregular operations -- the **Abwehr** on one side and the SS on the other -- and this rivalry intensified as time passed and Germany's situation worsened. The **Abwehr** was the losing side in this confrontation, largely because its senior echelon was heavily staffed by conservative **Junkers** who tended to hold anti-Nazi opinions and were dedicated to the overthrow of the Hitler regime. The Brandenburgers, for instance, were regarded as a shock troop of the anti-Nazi
opposition, and the SS no doubt breathed a sigh of relief as the unit was gradually converted into a regular line formation, in which only a few training staffs retained a specialized interest in commando activity; to a large extent, the Brandenburger's special functions were taken over by the FAK detachments during the last half of the war.\textsuperscript{73} Finally, in February 1944, the Abwehr itself was subordinated to the RSHA with most of its functions passing to the control of the SD-Ausland and the Gestapo, and later in the same year, the FAK units were also transferred to RSHA oversight, being placed under the control of the Militärisches Amt, a new SS organization intended to succeed the Abwehr.\textsuperscript{74}

The RSHA, meanwhile, had also developed its own independent commando organization (apart from Unternehmen Zeppelin). The Führer, it seems, had a short memory regarding the exploits of the Brandenburgers, and in 1942 he raged about the need for a German unit which could fully match the accomplishments of the British Commandos. Hitler's pique suited Himmler, who wanted his own special force to match that of Canaris, and the final result was the "Friedenthal Special Formation," led by Hauptsturmführer Otto Skorzeny of the Waffen-SS.\textsuperscript{75} This
unit formed a nursery for some of the eventual partisan groups which took shape during the 1944-45 period, and it also launched Skorzeny upon a path which eventually made him the dominant figure in almost all German irregular operations.

The Friedenthal Formation, however, was the last German commando unit conceived as part of the offensive strategy of irregular warfare that had guided German efforts in this field for the previous decade — ie., the idea that guerrilla operations were intended to soften enemy defences as part of an overall military (and political) offensive. After 1943, almost all German efforts in this area were defensively oriented, and were intended as a means not of augmenting German advances, of which there were very few, but of disrupting the advance of the enemy. At this point, German tacticians and policy-makers fell back upon the Clausewitzian theory of defensive partisan warfare, and it is here that our main story begins.

Before proceeding further, however, it is worth reiterating two primary conclusions which arise from this brief survey and which bear directly upon the story of the partisan movement in 1944-45. First, it is clear
that Germans were not culturally or racially ill equipped to participate in a guerrilla struggle; in fact, the ancient Germanic concern for "old law" -- evident in such phenomena as the Bauernkrieg and the Vehme -- composed a tradition which smoothly evolved into the doctrine of a modern, nationalistic Volkskrieg. However, it would also be fair to conclude that late 19th and 20th century German culture had encouraged a mass prejudice against partisan warfare per se, simply because German troops were so often faced with such a menace.

Secondly, German tacticians and strategists developed a doctrine of guerrilla warfare which both accommodated the prejudices of their culture and also fit the generally autocratic nature of the Prussian/German state. In short, their tenets of guerrilla warfare were limited in scope because of the Prussian fear -- notable as early as 1813 -- that disaster would arise from any wholesale subjugation of the prerogatives of the state to the desires of the mobilized masses. The Prussian/German concept of partisan warfare thus evolved as a narrow doctrine of mere diversionary activity, tightly controlled from above and closely coordinated with the operations of a regular field army. It is true that
after the Great War, when the National Socialist Party emerged as mass movement, this new party was opposed in many ways to the restrictive Prussian tradition and was somewhat more accommodating to a leftist-popular view of partisan warfare. It is also true, however, that the segment of the Party which most favoured a "People's War," namely the SA, was discredited early in the Nazi era, and that during the course of the Third Reich, the traditional Prussian strain of thought ran deep enough to influence almost all official considerations of guerrilla warfare, including the planning and organizational preparations of 1944-45.
Footnotes


6. Note, for instance, the remarks made by Werwolf radio on 4 April 1945 -- "We hear that we are abused and derided and mud is slung at us..."
Cowards say that the Germans are unsuited for the role of 'werewolves'. Is not the 'werewolf' a German invention dating back to the Thirty Years War." PWE "German Propaganda and the German," 9 April 1945, p. C7, FO 898/187, PRO.


10. Carsten Kuther, Räuber und Gauner in Deutschland (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1976); and T.C.W. Blanning, The French Revolution in Germany


25. Prignitz, pp. 110-111; and Dorpalen, p. 511.


Internationale d'Histoire Militaire, #43 (1979), pp. 38-53; Showalter, pp. 13-33; Simon, pp. 171-193, 220-221; Olden, pp. 51-53, 87-90; Ellis, p. 164; Hajo Holborn, A History of Modern Germany, 1840-1945 (New York: Knopf, 1969), pp. 139-142; Friedrich Meinecke, "Boyen und Roon" (pp. 301-303, 307, 313); Friedrich Meinecke, "Landwehr und Landsturm seit 1814" (pp. 533-543, 554-556), both in Friedrich Meinecke Werke, ed. Eberhard Kessel (Stuttgart: K.F. Koehler, 1979), Vol. IX; Howard, pp. 94-95, 100; Obermann, pp. 57-58, 117-119, 130-131; Parkinson, pp. 293-298, 301-303; Laqueur, "The Origins of Guerrilla Doctrine", pp. 352-377; Dorpalen, pp. 510-513; and Craig, pp. 61, 69-71, 74-75, 139-148, 151-152. In the period between the Military Laws of 1814 and 1860, German liberalism reached its point of high tide (1848), and a new people's militia, the Burgerwehr, was briefly established. However, once the forces of reaction regained the upper hand in late 1848, the Burgerwehr was abruptly dissolved. Craig, pp. 106, 111-112, 119-120.

28. As Peter Paret notes, there is no exact English equivalent for the term "Kleinkrieg". He feels that the truest rendering of the term is "war of detachments," although it is admittedly cumbersome. Paret, p. 21. For reference to 18th century German Kleinkrieg theorists and their influence on Clausewitz, see Laqueur, "The Origins of Guerrilla Doctrine," pp. 344-350.


31. Metz, pp. 8, 15.
32. Holborn, p. 508. For the full story, see Werner Cömez, Die Zeit Wilhelms II und die Weimarer Republik (Tübingen: Wunderlich, 1964), pp. 112-125.


38. Laqueur, Guerrilla, p. 199.


42. Rose, p. 25.

44. Wheeler-Bennett, pp. 92-95, 111-112; Merkl, p. 201-202; Waite, pp. 188-212, 240-254; Craig, pp. 401-404; Emil Julius Gumbel, *Vier Jahre Politischer Mord* (Heidelberg: Verlag des Wunderhorn, 1980), pp. 128-140; and Jones, *Hitler's Heralds*, pp. 186-192. For the ties between the "Black Reserve" and the Navy, see Höhne, pp. 82-86.


46. Waite, pp. 233-238; Fauez, pp. 194-208; Wheeler-Bennett, p. 104; and Jones, Hitler's Heralds, pp. 227-228.

47. Stern, pp. 20-32; Waite pp. 212-227; Salomon, pp. 228-314; Wheeler-Bennett, pp. 69, 93-94; Gumbel, pp. 64-78; and Jones, Hitler's Heralds, pp. 192-210. For Gumbel's figures, see "Denkschrift des Reichsjustizministers zu 'Vier Jahre Politischer Mord'", pp. 178, 182, in Gumbel.

48. Merkl, p. 80, 127, 141, 202, 237-238, 244-245, 318-319, 373-374; Waite, pp. 50, 56, 190-191, 193, 228-229, 232, 248; Rose, pp. 46-47, 54-60; Heydebreck, pp. 123-149, 158-162; and Jones, Hitler's Heralds, p. 221.

49. CCG "Intelligence Review" #5, 6 Feb. 1946, p. 9, FO 371/55807, PRO. See also Merkl, p. 319; and Rose, pp. 58-60.


52. There is some evidence that a price was put on the heads of prominent emigres during the early days of the Third Reich, and that Nazi "Vehme" squads -- actually detachments of the Gestapo and
Sicherdienst — were deployed against the emigre community, particularly in the Czech Sudetenland. The philosopher Theodor Lessing was murdered by a Vehme squad in August 1933, and Albert Einstein was also reportedly a primary figure on their blacklists. See, for instance, Philipp Frank, *Einstein: His Life and Times* (New York: Knopf, 1947), pp. 239-240; *The New York Times*, 12 April 1933; 31 Aug. 1933; 1 Sept. 1933; 2 Sept. 1933; 3 Sept. 1933; 7 Sept. 1933; 8 Sept. 1933; 17 Sept. 1933; 8 Nov. 1933; 4 April 1934; *Calic*, pp. 145-150; and Victor Alexandrov, *O.S.1: Services Secrets de Staline contre Hitler* (Paris: Planete, 1968), pp. 57, 61-62.

53. Merkl, pp. 201-206.

54. Waite, pp. 254, 279; Bessel, pp. 41, 133, 137; and Jones, *Hitler's Heralds*, pp. 78, 220, 245.

55. "Werwolf" (no date), IRR File XE 049 888 "Werewolf Activities Vol. I", RG 319, NA.

56. The only recorded case where the interwar Wehrwolf was presented as a precedent for die-hard Nazi partisan resistance was in a speech by an obscure Ortsgruppenleiter in Flensburg. PID "News Digest" #1596, 4 Nov. 1944, p. 7, Bramstedt Collection, BLPES. For the apparent absence of veterans of Bund Wehrwolf in the Werwolf movement of 1944-45, see Rose, pp. 60-61.

For links established by the Sicherdienst with foreign terrorist groups and Volksdeutsch minorities, see Calic, pp. 131, 152-155.


59. Schuschnigg, pp. 155, 168, 172; Luza, p. 40; and Shirer, p. 323.


64. The actual order of events in the Middle Volga region in 1941 is difficult to reconstruct. A Soviet decree in 1941 claimed that "thousands and tens-of-thousands of diversionists and spies" had infiltrated into the area, and that their presence had been unreported by the local Volksdeutsch authorities. However, a resolution by the Supreme Soviet in August 1964 amended this 1941 document, claiming that the charges against the Volga Germans were indiscriminate and unfounded -- "an expression of despotism attributable to Stalin's personality cult." Furthermore, Louis de Jong -- writing largely upon sources who had served in the Abwehr -- claimed during the 1950s that there was no evidence to show that the Abwehr was ever in contact with the Soviet Volksdeutschen. This claim, however, was sharply refuted by the memoirs of a former NKVD officer, D.M. Smirnov, who was stationed at Orenburg in 1941 and was purportedly an eye witness to Volksdeutsch diversionist activity in the Volga area. Smirnov claimed that the great majority of the Volga Volksdeutchen were loyal to the Soviet regime, but that there were Nazi agitators in the area, printing underground newspapers, preparing sabotage, and attempting to stir up revolts. According to Smirnov, fantastic reports arrived at Orenburg which suggested an attempt by German commandos to build an "insurgent" stronghold, construct an underground army of escaped German POWs, and cut Soviet communications between the Southern Front and the Ural industrial complex. The Soviet authorities, in any case, decided to test the loyalty of the Volksdeutschen with a special unit of NKVD provocateurs, who were air-dropped into the Volga German Republic disguised as German commandos and equipped with orders to organize a bogus "anti-Soviet rebellion." NKVD aircraft also dropped phoney "anti-Soviet" pamphlets. The Volksdeutschen, in responding to these provocations, did not stand up to Stalinist


during the German Campaign in Russia," pp. 178-190,
in *World War II German Military Studies* (New York:
Garland, 1979), Vol. 18; and H.W. Posdnjakoff,
"German Counter-Intelligence in the Occupied Soviet
Union," pp. 147-148, in *World War II German
19. For individual Abwehrtruppe mission reports
from 1942-1943, see Records of OKW, Microcopy #T-77,
Roll 1499, frames 892-976, NA. Julius Mader
claims that overall, approximately two thousand
pro-German commandos and agents were parachuted
into the Soviet rear during World War Two. Mader,
*Hitlers Spionagegenerale sagen aus*, p. 280.

Robert Stephen, "Smersh: Soviet Military Counter-
Intelligence during the Second World War", in *The
1987), pp. 604-606; Kosikov, p. 223; CSDIC (WEA)
BAOR "Final Interrogation Report on Dr. Gerhardt W.
Teich," FR #31, 21 Jan. 1946, Appendix "B", pp. i-
iv, ETO MIS-V-Sect. CSDIC/WEA Final Interrogation
Reports 1945-47, RG 332, NA; History of the Counter
Intelligence Corps, Vol XXXVI, p. 76, NA; Höhne and
Zolling, pp. 39-40; Muhlen, p. 173-177, 208-209; A.
Belyayev et. al., "The Failure of 'Operation
Zeppelin'," in *Collection of Articles on Soviet
Intelligence and Security Operations* (Arlington,
Va.: Joint Publications Research Service/Dept. of
Commerce, 1972), pp. 116-131; V.V. Korovin and V.I.
Shibalin, "Giterovskii Abwehr Terpit Parazhenie,"
in *Noviaia i Noveishaia Istorija*, #5 (Sept.-Oct.
1968), pp. 100-101; Walter Schellenburg, *Hitler's
Secret Service* (New York: Pyramid, 1962), pp. 127-
133; and David Kahn, *Hitler's Spies: German
Military Intelligence in World War II* (New York:

Unternehmen Zeppelin was thrown into flux in the
late summer of 1943 by the desertion of two
thousand Zeppelin trainees who were momentarily
employed as counter-guerrillas in Byelorussia.
This so-called "Druzhina" unit, under the command
of Vladimir ("Gil") Rodinov, murdered its SS
liaison officers and then returned itself to the
Soviet side. Timothy Patrick Mulligan, *The
Politics of Illusion and Empire: German Occupation
Policy in the Soviet Union, 1942-1943* (New York:
Praeger, 1988), pp. 156-157; Sven Steenberg, Vlasov
(New York: Knopf, 1970), pp. 105-110; Soviet
Partisans in World War II, p. 236; and
Schellenberg, pp. 132-133.

73. Buchheit, pp. 307-308, 321-327; Thomas, p. 693;
German Military Intelligence, 1939-1945, p. 306;
Höhne, pp. 467-468, 490, 575; Leverkeuhn, pp. 48-
49; Kriegsheim, pp. 305, 311, 314; and Spaeter, pp.
308-310. For a discussion of whether or not the
Brandenburg unit was actually a
"Burgerkriegstruppe," see Kriegsheim, pp. 59-60,
288-289.

74. Buchheit, pp. 429-437; Mader, Hitlers
Spionagegenerale sagen aus, p. 140; Paine, pp. 184-
185; Kahn, p. 62, 249-250, 268-271; German Military
Intelligence, 1939-1945, p. 308; Brissaud, pp. 315-
318; and Höhne, pp. 553-554, 557-560.

75. SS-0/Gruf. Jüttner, Memo, 5 Aug. 1943, R 58/862,
BA; Paine, pp. 154-156; Charles Foley, Commando
Extraordinary (London: Grafton, 1987), pp. 48-50;
Heilbrunn, p. 66; and Macksey, p. 156.
Unternehmen Werwolf: The SS/HJ Diversionary Organization

By 1944, with military crises unfolding in both East and West, Germany was once again forced by its own weakness to return to a strategy in which defensive guerrilla warfare played a major role. As the previous chapter suggests, this is a repeated theme in German history, and the country's military leaders had previously pursued such a course both during the period of Napoleonic domination from 1807-1813, and again during the era of the Versailles Diktat. Presumably, the basic strategy was not to win the war by guerrilla operations, but merely to turn the tide, delaying the enemy long enough to allow for a political settlement favourable to Germany. To Hitler and company, the break-up of the Grand Alliance seemed to shimmer clearly on the horizon.

Such a strategy was elementally flawed not only by a failure to comprehend the universal opprobrium which the Nazi regime had brought upon itself -- and which provided the necessary mortar to cover the cracks in the enemy alliance -- but also by basic internal weaknesses. One of the main problems, for instance, was the declining lack of a popular basis for the New Order, even within
the German heartland itself, where the Hitler regime edged toward becoming a dictatorship based almost entirely upon terror rather than upon mass support. Nazi promises of a just peace were still accepted at face value only by a few blinded devotees of the movement; most Germans had lost faith in the Party, and although they were too physically and morally exhausted to turn against it, they were also too tired -- and too disabused of notions of glory -- to burn their homes; or snipe at the enemy; or valiantly enroll in the ranks of the mass militia.¹ The establishment of Nazi guerrilla movements meant that the state itself had risked national suicide by entering upon a path fraught with danger; the people refused to follow and the social contract was thus threatened. Gradually, as the final collapse loomed increasingly near, the Werwolf became something akin to a means of revenge which the fanatics pitted against their own people as well as against the enemy.

Another problem which immediately emerged was the behind-the-scenes disorganization associated with almost every aspect of the Nazi state, and which has been variously regarded as either an unintentional result of Hitler's sloppy management style, or as a deliberate
Hitlerian tactic meant to incite factionalism and thus increase the Führer's ascendent power and prestige. Whatever the case, loyalty in the Third Reich was transformed into a sort of medieval fealty, and the raging confusion encouraged Nazi leaders to construct personal bases of power by reserving from the common pool whatever resources they had managed to acquire. Thus the Nazi system of administration was factionalized rather than totalitarian, and the concept of a monolithic commonwealth existed only in propaganda. Moreover, this system of feudal anarchy actually increased as the war reached a crises stage -- violent charges and recriminations tended to fly with even greater abandon between the chief Nazi satraps -- and this atmosphere naturally characterized the guerrilla program, which was perhaps the last initiative of the fading Reich worth a bureaucratic battle. "The inner chaos", as a British intelligence report noted, "was never better exemplified than in the Werewolf movement."

Discussions about the need for a Nazi guerrilla organization actually began in 1943 and early 1944, and tended to center around a number of immediate precedents from German history: we know, for instance, that the
1813 Landsturm decree was unearthed and circulated; that evaluations of the Feldjägerdienst were withdrawn from the military archives in Potsdam and also circulated; and that relevant passages from Clausewitz were examined in detail. All these sources of inspiration implied a traditional Prussian-style guerrilla movement which would cooperate with the regular Army in a policy of diversion and delayance, although certain SS leaders were also inspired by several of the more visionary underground movements which proliferated during World War Two. In fact, a special top secret SS unit was formed in order to study these movements in detail, and specialists from this unit were sent to observe the Warsaw Rising in 1944, particularly since the Armija Krajowa (AK) was considered a revolutionary movement par excellence.

The actual SS guerrilla organization was formed in September 1944, and was perhaps influenced in its exact shape by a memorandum submitted by Obergruppenfuhrer Richard Hildebrand, a senior SS-Police official on the Eastern Front. The new organization was called the Werwolf, a term borrowed directly from Hermann Löns, and which fit well into the primitive superstitions and Volkish obsessions of the SS.
One of the most basic problems with the new movement was that it was not placed under the purview of the military -- upon which suspicions of treason had fallen -- but was under the SS, and even within this sphere it was not associated with the Waffen-SS. Rather, the Werwolf was placed under the control of Himmler's own regional police inspectors, the Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer (HSSPF), although a number of subsidiary functions were also set aside for the RSHA. Thus, not only was the diversionary organization cut off from a military chain of command -- which would have seemed its most natural and expedient home -- but the effective division of the program between two agencies within the SS also created a coolness, if not an actual rivalry, between these organizations. It seems, in fact, that the main RSHA chiefs, Obergruppenführer Ernst Kaltenbrunner and Walter Schellenburg, set out from the beginning to disable the main body of the movement, which remained outside their control.

Another of the most delimitating features of the new movement, evident from the Hildebrandt memorandum onward, was that it was never seen as anything more than a mere diversionary organization meant to function in Germany's
border lands, at least not until the last dark days of the war. Any intimation that the armed forces might fail to protect the frontiers of the Reich smacked of "defeatism" — at least in the Nazi Weltanschauung — and this led the SS guerrillas to proceed upon the assumption that their group was solely a pre-defeat organization, and that its potential zone of operations was limited to the few areas already occupied by the enemy or immediately threatened. This confusion of morale with common sense meant that no preparations were made for resistance in the interior until well into 1945.11

Conceived within this narrow Clausewitzian mandate, SS partisans were regarded primarily as a means of harassing enemy lines of communication, particularly rail lines. They were also charged with committing impromptu acts of political and economic sabotage; killing collaborators; encouraging the population in boycotts and passive resistance; spreading propaganda; infiltrating enemy MG offices; and collecting intelligence on enemy means of supply and transportation routes.12 Captured documents show that Werwölfe were also regarded as the core of future guerrilla bands and local resistance movements, since it was expected that Wehrmacht
stragglers and disaffected Nazi civilians in the enemy rear would naturally coalesce around such a nucleus.  

These duties were to be carried out by Gruppen, or small cells of four to six men, which in turn were grouped into Sektors (alternately called Züge, or platoons), consisting of six to ten cells; six to eight Sektors formed an Abschnitt. Cell members were equipped with small arms, hand grenades, Panzerfäuste, and a wide array of Nipolit and Donarit plastic explosives, often contained in a kit resembling a lunch box. Each Werwolf carried fifteen to twenty pounds of explosive material, plus footmines and unexploded American incendiary sticks, of which the Germans had collected a total stock of approximately two hundred and fifty thousand. American and British weapons were obtained through parachute drops in Holland, by which the Allies had hoped to equip Dutch patriots, but which actually fell into the hands of the SS. Werwölfe were issued with military uniforms, but were given free latitude to dress in civilian clothes in "emergency cases."  

Werwolf Gruppen were provided with hidden ammunition caches, and various agencies of the German Government and military also did some detailed studies about the use
of natural caves as large-scale secret supply dumps.¹⁷ Left behind enemy lines, the Gruppen were based in hidden bunkers, or "galleries", which were intended as living quarters and command posts. In the southern and central Rhineland, most galleries consisted of camouflaged caves, unused mineshafts, air raid shelters or derelict factories, but further north, the dense woods of the Reichswald afforded an opportunity for the construction of custom-made bunkers. About thirty such installations were dug by Ruhr miners loaned from the Hibernia mining concern, apparently under the purview of the Beauftragter für den Westwallbau (Director of West Wall Construction). The main means of communication with German lines was by wireless transmitter or line crossers, although there was also a nebulous plan to link the bunkers by an underground telephone net in the Rhineland operated by Reichspost technicians.¹⁸

To oversee the Werwolf, Himmler appointed a "personal representative" who was given the title of "General Inspekteur für Spezialabwehr." Unfortunately for the Nazis, the SS-Police official appointed to this post was Obergruppenführer Hans Prützmann, a charter member of the Schutzstaffel aristocracy whose undeniable
wit and intelligence was more than offset by his vast conceit and by a notable lack of attention to business. Prützmann was also a legendary adventurer and spendthrift who had brutally acquired an immense rural estate near Zhitomir during the heyday of German colonial exploitation in the Ukraine. During the early stages of Unternehmen Werwolf, Prützmann emerges in the historical record as a blustery figure who bragged that his organization would bring about "a radical improvement in Germany's military situation," and who delighted in showing-off secret sabotage equipment to impressionable associates and acquaintances.¹⁹

A native of East Prussia, Prützmann was physically a handsome man who had celebrated his forty-third birthday shortly before his posting. Like several other senior SS leaders, his most notable physical characteristic was a facial scar suffered during a sword duel. Prützmann was an agricultural accountant by profession, but after joining the SS in 1930, he rose rapidly through its ranks to become Inspector-General of the Waffen-SS and Liaison Officer with the Wehrmacht. After the outbreak of war, he was stationed as HSSPF in Hamburg, whereafter he was transferred to the same post
in Königsberg and thence on to a dual posting as HSSPF of both the Ukraine and Southern Russia. After two and half years in the East, where he commanded an Einsatzgruppe -- with all the savagery that implies -- he temporarily replaced Obergruppenführer Wolff as HSSPF in northern Italy, and was thereafter transferred back to his dual posting on the Eastern Front. During these assignments, Prützmann had accumulated a nearly unrivalled knowledge of guerrilla warfare, and had actually negotiated with the Ukrainian Partisan Army (UPA) to bring it into alliance with Germany. This experience -- plus his background in East Prussia -- stood him in good stead to serve as the SS partisan chief, particularly since Werwolf units were first deployed on the Eastern Front.20

It should also be noted that the German evacuation of the USSR meant that Prützmann's old posts as an HSSPF in that country had become redundant, and that in October 1944 -- after he had been re-assigned to the Werwolf -- the SS Personal-Hauptamt requested permission to announce that Prützmann had been relieved of his former duties.21 In November, he officially replaced General Glaise-Horstenau as German Plenipotentiary-General in Croatia,22 but this appointment was probably for the purpose of
public and Allied consumption; the Werwolf, after all, was a top-secret undertaking, and Prützmann was expected to turn up somewhere.

The construction of the SS guerrilla inspectorate began with the formation of a central staff — Dienstelle Prützmann — which was first based at Petz near Berlin, and later transferred to Rheinsburg. There was no danger of Prützmann and company being tied to a home base, however, since the ostentatious General-Inspekteur soon equipped himself with a private train on which he could travel throughout Germany; at various sidings, special telephone cables were installed bearing direct lines to different parts of the country.

Prützmann's staff of two hundred was organized like that of a military corps and was led by Standartenführer Karl Tschiersky, who had experience running Unternehmen Zeppelin, but had also run afoul of the infamous RSHA commando chief Otto Skorzeny — their personal animosity thereafter became part of the generally frosty relations between the Werwolf and the RSHA. Tschiersky was replaced in March 1945 by Brigadeführer Opländer, an official on the staff of Karl Frank in Bohemia-Moravia, whose services Prützmann had specifically requested. The
main staff members were SA-Brigadeführer Siebel, in charge of training and technical administration (Inspectorate "I"); Standartenführer D'Alguen, an SS publicist who had run Operation "Skorpion", the diffusion of "Russian Liberation" propaganda on the Eastern Front; Standartenführer Kotthaus, in charge of personnel matters; and Frau Maisch, who led a female component of Werwolf which was formed in early 1945 and eventually composed ten percent of the whole. In the spring of 1945, a regular military officer, Generalleutnant Juppe, was also appointed as Prutzmann's "deputy."\(^2\)

In addition to the central Werwolf Dienstelle, there was a "Zentrale für geheime Spezialzerstörungsmittel" -- which gathered sabotage material -- plus a special guerrilla signals center hidden in the Harz Mountains.\(^2\) However, the most important sub-section of Dienstelle Prützmann was the semi-autonomous Hitler Jugend Command under Oberbannführer Klos, a 35 year-old HJ leader from Usingen who was equipped with the official title of "HJ Beauftragter der Reichs-Jugendführung". In the fall of 1944, Klos had been appointed by the HJ chief, Arthur Axmann, as the head of an independent partisan organization -- in fact, he was even given a mandate to
educate the entire HJ for guerrilla activities -- but at the turn of 1944/45 he and his staff were transferred to Dienstelle Prützmann in the wake of a joint HJ-Werewolf planning conference at Potsdam. A circular in January 1945 informed SS-Police officials that HJ guerrilla Gruppen and individual agents were forthwith under their tactical direction.

Even after this HJ-Werewolf amalgamation, however, HJ guerrillas retained much of their independence -- Klos, for instance, maintained a separate training battalion, titled "Albert Leo Schlageter", as well as a separate system of training schools, about which organizers in the mainstream organization knew very little. Not surprisingly, Werewolf officers complained bitterly about the lack of cooperation between the two wings of the movement, and one SS-Police general was even led to believe that the SS effort to annex the HJ program had failed.25

The HJ organization in the Rhineland was run as a practically independent fief by its chief, Hauptbannführer Memminger, and many HJ officials involved in the scheme remained under the impression that the program was still run solely by Axmann, and was entirely
a HJ affair.²⁶ A number of HJ guerrilla groups were active in western Germany,²⁷ by far the most important of these being Unternehmen "Kurfürst Baldvin," which was run totally independent of the Werwolf by Hauptsturmführer Rolf Karbach, the former HJ-Obergebeitsführer of the Moselle region. Karbach drew recruits from the Wehrmacht, the Waffen-SS, and the HJ (including the former Luxemburger Volksjugend), and he eventually succeeded in collecting over seven hundred men, which he sub-divided into twelve Gruppen and eight "Special Troops," plus a headquarters staff based at Bingen. Such Gruppen, in fact, ranked among the most successful of all German partisans, and succeeded in destroying several stretches of railway track in the Hunsrück forest, as well as demolishing a captured munitions plant and an American fuel dump. Karbach's very success, however, contributed to his eventual dismissal as a guerrilla chief: local Party and SS-Police officials became jealous of the achievements of "Kurfürst Baldvin," and after a smear campaign against Karbach, he was transferred to the Reichsjugendführung and his organization was formally brought under the main Werwolf chain of command.²⁸
Aside from the autonomous HJ sub-section, which was an anomaly, the Werwolf was regionally organized according to the boundaries of the Wehrmacht's home defence regions and within these districts it was controlled by the Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer, who locally represented Himmler in his capacity as Chief of German Police. Under a system first devised for the borderland HSSPF and then extended to the remainder of the Reich, each HSSPF was ordered by Himmler to appoint a special representative to control the local recruitment, training and deployment of guerrillas; thus was devised the position of "Werwolf Beauftragter", which was later designated as "Kommandeur für Spezialabwehr". Prützmann preferred that Army officers serve in these local posts, since he wished to build his essentially civilian organization around a military core. Associated bodies, such as the Party, the HJ, and the SA, were also supposed to appoint their own regional "Werwolf Beauftragter" to maintain contact with the SS movement, although it is unlikely that all these representatives were ever actually appointed.

Because the Werwolf movement was based upon the HSSPF command structure, its organizational character was
shaped by the role of the HSSPF within the dual chain of command existent within the SS. The office of the HSSPF had originally been created during the late 1930s as a means of breaking the monopoly of command channels established by the senior commands of the various offices within Himmler's SS-Police empire, particularly the Waffen-SS and the Sicherheitspolizei. The highly centralized chain-of-command within these organizations had led to a stifling parochialism which made local cooperation between two or more branches of the overall SS organization difficult to achieve -- thus Himmler introduced the HSSPF as a means of preventing the constituent parts of his empire from falling apart, and he particularly used the channel as a means of by-passing the SS central offices, especially the RSHA, in order to carry out "special tasks."

Because the HSSPF had a measure of authority over local offices of the regular police, the RSHA, and the Waffen-SS, such officials had the ability (at least in theory) to draw together the various resources regarded by Himmler as necessary for the success of his partisan units. Moreover, many of the HSSPF had personal experience in the occupied Eastern territories, and like
Prutzmann, they were supposed to have accumulated a specialized knowledge of partisan warfare. The important thing to note, however, is that the original raison d'être of the HSSPF was the centralized regional direction of all the branches of an overall organization — as opposed to centralized direction in Berlin of individual SS and Police agencies — and that this pattern of horizontal rather than vertical organization was naturally bequeathed to Unternehmen Werwolf. Prutzmann, for his part, was formally attached to the SS-Hauptamt³², but was otherwise directly subordinate to Himmler, meaning that Dienstelle Prutzmann was the only intermediate command channel between Himmler and the HSSPF (in their capacity as regional Werwolf organizers).

This system of regionalization had definite advantages: for instance it allowed for a degree of local improvisation rarely evident in "totalitarian" states, and was suitable for a period when the geographic unity of the Reich was collapsing under the strain of Anglo-American air attacks. On the other hand, the system's great weakness was that HSSPF officials -- by their very nature -- were isolated from regular command channels and therefore stood upon a weak bureaucratic
foundation. Because they lacked their own resources of men and material, they were effective only when called upon by the Reichsführer to perform a "special task": only in this event did the flow of business switch from the routine channels to the special channel running from Himmler via the HSSPF to the local RSHA commanders, the Befehlshaber des Sicherheitspolizei (BdS). When "special tasks" extended over a considerable period, such as Unternehmen Werwolf, the RSHA and other SS-Police agencies could raise considerable roadblocks to protracted demands on their resources. Thus, the HSSPF was essentially an outsider, often at conflict with the RSHA, the Waffen-SS, and the Party, and this problem was transferred directly to the Werwolf organization superimposed upon the HSSPF system of command.

For better or worse, this system was first applied in the German borderland regions and then gradually spread inward. On the Eastern Front, Werwolf units were first launched during the fall of 1944 in Prützmann's old fief of East Prussia, which was also an early testing ground for the mass militia, or Volkssturm. Because the HSSPF in Königsberg fell ill about the time that Werwolf was launched, Prützmann returned to personally serve as
Acting-HSSPF and so remained on hand for the rest of 1944, thus giving East Prussia a special status within the overall organization. Prützmann's idea of basing Werwölfe in camouflaged bunkers, or "galleries", seems to have been originally based upon the suitability of such structures in the deep East Prussian forests, and the dominant role played by veterans of the Eastern Front during the formative stages of the Werwolf -- ie. Hildebrandt, Prützmann, Siebel, Tschiersky, D'Alquen -- generally gives the impression that the organization was originally poised mainly in an eastward direction.

By 1945, Werwolf units were deployed along the length of the Eastern Front, and the Soviets noted that a considerable number of stay-behind saboteurs were being overrun by the rapid advances resulting from the Winter Offensive in Poland and eastern Germany. Captured cities were plagued by snipers and arsonists, and in February and March the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS launched a desperate attempt to disrupt Soviet supply lines and thereby break-up the impending Soviet assault upon Berlin. Even after the fall of the Reich capital itself, the city experienced a wave of terrorism similar to that which had occurred in cities further to the
east, and it is possible that Werwolf assassins were responsible for the death in mid-June of General-Polkovnik N.E. Berzarin, who was one of the first Soviet commanders to storm into the capital and who was subsequently appointed as the city's commandant. Soviet and Polish Communist sources report that Werwölfe and "Green Partisans" remained active throughout 1945-46 in occupied eastern Germany, and although some of these claims were undoubtedly exaggerated in order to provide an excuse for anti-German razzias in areas of the Reich annexed by Poland, there is also some independent evidence that German partisans were actually active.

Although operations in the West never equalled the intensity evident in the eastern German provinces, the western marches were certainly not forgotten. In September Prützmann and his adjutant toured Wehrkreis VI -- Westphalia and the northern Rhineland -- and instructed the local HSSPF, Obergruppenführer Gutenberger, to form a Wehrkreis guerrilla organization. Similar arrangements were soon thereafter made with Obergruppenführers Stroop and Hofmann, who controlled respectively Wehrkreis XII -- the Eifel, the Palatinate, the Saar, southwestern Hesse and Lorraine -- and
Wehrkreis V -- Baden, Wurttemberg, and Alsace. Each HSSPF was told to assemble a small staff to control the new organization, and to appoint a W-Beauftragter (respectively Standartenführer Raddatz, Hauptsturmführer Gunther, and Obersturmführer Müller). Three Waffen-SS officers were also dispatched in order to select volunteers for "Bataillon West." 44

These Wehrkreis-based organizations directed extensive preparations for guerrilla fighting in the Rhineland, but without much final effect: the local population was so opposed to such operations, and the Werwölfe themselves so demoralized, that when the Werwolf galleries were overrun by the Allies, the guerrillas meekly surrendered themselves or fled into the surrounding countryside with the intention of drifting back into civilian life. 45 Among the original western ranges of the Werwolf, only the Schwarzwald produced signs of considerable guerrilla fighting, perhaps because it was more suited geographically than areas west of the Rhine, and perhaps because the French were comparatively weaker than the other occupying powers. 46

Although Unternehmen Werwolf was subsequently extended into the inner Wehrkreise, it was never as well
organized as in the original borderland regions, mainly because Prützmann dallied on such organizational matters in order to spare the thought of Allied or Soviet penetrations into the German heartland; procrastination, it seems, is indeed the thief of time. In Weimar, for instance, Skorzeny inspected the local Werwolf group in March 1945 and found it suffering from a variety of ills: some of the partisans were conscripted; arms and ammunition were in short supply; there was no provision to contact higher echelons by radio; and the guerrillas only had a vague conception of their assignment. In many areas, local Party and Police officials supposed to form the core of the organization often found themselves opposed to it in both practice and in principle, particularly in Hamburg, Vienna, and Leipzig. In Austria, Allied intelligence officers later concluded that "those charged with [Werwolf] activities did little more than talk, and tried, for the sake of their own safety, to give the impression that the orders were being obeyed". Particular mention must be made of three regions in the interior which were distinguished by special efforts, particularly by Prützmann's personal intervention in
overriding the prerogative of the local HSSPF to choose their own Werwolf commanders. Perhaps the most important of these areas was the southeast section of Wehrkreis XI, namely the Harz region, which had traditionally comprised a refuge for German guerrillas and which loomed large in the sort of Teutonic pagan mysticism held so dear within the SS. In the spring of 1945, brief preparations were made in order to convert the Harz into a Werwolf Festung: the HJ-Gebeitsführer in Mansfeld, for instance, formed HJ recruits into a six hundred man "Kampfgruppe Ostharz," which was led by disabled Waffen-SS NCOs from local military hospitals. An intense Kleinkrieg engulfed the area when it was surrounded by American forces in mid-April 1945, and although the pocket was formally mopped up by 21 April, sabotage attacks and guerrilla warfare continued to flare up for at least another month. The Americans responded with fierce aerial bombing attacks and "prompt and effective reprisal measures" against the local population, as well as the deployment of Polish counter-guerrillas, who reportedly tossed grenades into every nook and cranny in the mountains. The main Werwolf Kampfgruppe was almost completely liquidated, although it is interesting to note that even after the Red Army
occupied the eastern Harz in the summer of 1945, Soviet troops continued to run a certain risk of ambush and local mayors were warned about the possibility of further reprisals.51

In two other areas deemed sufficiently important, Prützmann chose his own officials who took orders directly from him rather than from the regional HSSPF. One of these cases was Wehrkreis XIII -- Franconia -- which in the Nazi view required an extra measure of guerrilla activity to befit its reputation as the spiritual center of Naziism. The local HSSPF, Benno Martin, was ordered in February 1945 to appoint a W-Beauftragter, but Martin stood true to the Nazi code of unwarranted optimism -- believing the Allies would never reach his Wehrkreis -- and therefore delayed the posting until early April. Although a local SS-Police official was finally appointed, Prützmann immediately intervened and replaced the local choice with Dr. Hans Weibgen, a fanatic Nazi answerable directly to Dienstelle Prützmann. Weibgen quickly imported some of his own people into the embattled region, including two SS officers from Berlin, who were supposed to prepare the Nuremberg Gestapo for "the coming Freedom Movement".52
Nazi fanatics subsequently made a more determined effort to defend the cities and towns of Franconia than perhaps any other area in central Germany, and the Wehrkreis military commander, Weissenberger, opened up the region's armouries to Werwolf partisans, reportedly allowing large stocks of equipment to be withdrawn. Civilians were cajoled into bearing arms, and the civilian levee-en-masse proceeded with far more vigour than in any other area, which in turn made the Allied crossings of the Main River more difficult than the earlier crossings of the Rhine. In cities such as Assschaffenburg, Würzburg, Neustadt, and Nuremberg, large numbers of franc tireurs fought the Allied advance with fanatic ferocity, usually unmarked by armbands identifying them as combatants.53

A third area of particular concern for the Werwolf was the Alpine region of Tyrol-Voralberg, particularly after March 1945, when Hitler reportedly ordered Prützmann to prepare the Werwolf for a long fight and, if necessary, to retreat into the Austrian Alps in order to join the SS for a last stand.54 The W-Beauftragter in the area (Wehrkreis XVIII) was Hauptmann Anton Mair, but the Tyrol-Voralberg was independently controlled by
Sturmbannführer Kurreck, who, like Tschiersky, was transferred to Werwolf from Unternehmen Zeppelin. Kurreck was appointed in late 1944, and although attached to the staff of Gauleiter Hofer, he was responsible directly to Dienstelle Prützmann. Mair also reported directly to Prützmann after his HSSPF, Obergruppenführer Rosener, showed signs in April 1945 of wanting to abandon the Werwolf project.55

Although Tyrol-Voralberg was the heart of the so-called "Alpine Redoubt", the northern and northeastern approaches to the area -- namely Wehrkreise XVII (Northern Austria) and VII (Southern Bavaria) -- received lesser attention. Preparations in the former were begun in January 1945, under HSSPF Schimana and W-Beauftragter Fahrion,57 and in the latter only in late March 1945, under HSSPF von Eberstein and W-Beauftragter Wagner. These extremely tardy preparations on the northern edge of the Redoubt suggest that the Nazis were surprised by the rate of the Allied thrust into Central Germany, and because of this delay neither von Eberstein nor Wagner had much hope for the success of the organization in the Bavarian Alps. In fact, the period of time from Wagner's appointment (13 April) until the day when he fled from
office in the face of the American advance (28 April) was a mere two weeks.

After appointing Wagner, von Eberstein had hoped to have ridden himself of the whole distasteful Werwolf matter, but he was disconcerted to find that he would not be allowed to fade away in true soldierly fashion, thus avoiding the scrutiny of the advancing Allied forces. Because of American drives which had nearly sundered the Reich in two by mid-April, most central Reich offices were split into autonomous northern and southern sections, and the unenthusiastic von Eberstein — on the strength of his reputation as an "älter Kämpfer" — found himself chosen as plenipotentiary for the entire southern component of Unternehmen Werwolf. When Brigadeführer Siebel arrived with news of this unwanted promotion on 20 April, von Eberstein was aghast and refused to accept the order unless it was put into written form, something which Siebel could not immediately produce. By the time that Siebel got back to von Eberstein — who by now had been chased out of Munich and set up headquarters in a town on the Sternbergersee — his name had been withdrawn for the appointment. Siebel himself had taken the post, and in view of the obvious recalcitrance of von Eberstein
and his staff, the fanatical Weibgen was given a wider sphere of responsibility as Franconian **W-Beauftragter**, taking further areas of Bavaria under his control.\(^{58}\)

Before fully considering these final days, however, the narrative must first return to the more general problems contributing to this ultimate collapse -- problems which lay at least partly in the inadequacy of the **Werwolf**'s bureaucratic foundation. A **Wehrmacht** document noted, for instance, that "The **Werwolf** has no provisionment organization nor will one be built...",\(^{59}\) so it was clear that the organization was totally dependent in such matters upon the Army, the **Waffen-SS**, and such RSHA sabotage groups as the **Jagdverbände** and the **Frontaufklärung** units. Transportation was supposedly provided by the **HSSPF**'s own "**K-Staffel**", or Motor Pool.\(^ {60}\)

Obviously, this system depended essentially upon the goodwill of quartermasters among the agencies involved, and it therefore quickly broke down. By the final year of the war, the various German armed forces each faced such severe shortages that they were unlikely to willingly pass on supplies to a nebulous partisan organization. Skorzeny's **Jagdverbände**, for instance, were struggling to bring about their own activization,
and at this formative stage were hardly likely to offer enthusiastic support to their rival. Skorzeny told his Supply Officer that Prützmann's representatives could be given 10% to 20% of Jagdverbände stocks, but in no circumstances would Jagdverbände interests be jeopardized to maintain an adequate flow of supply to the Werwolf. All difficulties were supposed to be reported to Skorzeny's headquarters at Friedenthal, and eventually complaints arrived from each Jagdverbänd unit regarding "exorbitant demands" by Werwolf organizers. Skorzeny categorically refused each such request.  

The regional HSSPF frequently complained about lack of supplies, even in the critical Alpine Redoubt, although a concerted effort was made to send weapons, food and treasure into this region, where it was subsequently hidden in secret caches and caves. Allied intelligence reports noted that Werwolf supplies were "in many areas completely inadequate", and that if the SS partisans had hoped to operate effectively, they would have been forced to depend largely on supplies salvaged from abandoned Wehrmacht ordinance depots or stolen from the enemy. Prützmann's only limited success in this field was attained by following Skorzeny's advice to get
supplies directly from local munitions plants, a method which at least ran on a first-come first-serve basis and thereby eliminated the severe difficulties of long-distance transportation. There is also some evidence that the army and the Armaments Ministry attempted to hinder the delivery of supplies to the Werwolf -- presumably in an attempt to defang the organization -- although it is not known how much this obstructionist manoeuvre was actually responsible for Werwolf shortages.

The recruitment and training system was a similar hodgepodge, euphemistically described as the "snowball system" because the movement was supposed to grow as it gained momentum. Because the Werwolf lacked exclusive rights to any specific pool of personnel, it once again ended up with the left-overs sent to it by other agencies. Originally, this recruitment hodgepodge consisted of three basic mustering channels:

One -- the Waffen-SS: The Werbkommissionen (Recruiting Commissions) of the SS-Hauptamt toured local offices of the HJ, the SA, and various other Party agencies, from which volunteers were obtained and then examined by a Musterungs-Kommission. Party chiefs in the borderland Gaue were also instructed to provide a list of
recommended volunteers to the local HSSPF -- the recruits thereafter being called-up through the Waffen-SS Ergänzungstelle (Recruiting Office) -- and some Waffen-SS divisions apparently set up special Entlassungstellen (Demobilization Centers), where SS volunteers were equipped with phoney demobilization papers and civilian clothes, then secretly posted to underground service against the enemy occupation forces.\[^{68}\] The problem with this system was that there was no incentive to send first-rate people to the Werwolf; thus the Waffen-SS naturally kept the best young men for its own units,\[^{69}\] while the Gauleiter also reserved suitable recruits for the Party's own system of local defence, namely the Volkssturm.\[^{70}\]

Two -- The Army: In the autumn of 1944, a number of men were released by the Army for partisan training, and a limited number of soldiers were also provided by the Divisions and Corps in the borderland districts, and by the Heereswaffenschulen (Army Weapons Schools). The most valuable military recruits were those with technical qualifications, such as radio operators, although most Army personnel attached to the Werwolf had only recently been inducted, and were passed-on to Werwolf training
schools immediately after basic training.71

Three -- The RSHA: This medium of recruitment ran through the regional BdS, who controlled local offices of the Gestapo, the SD, and the Kripo, and who was subordinate to the HSSPF under the "special tasks" chain of command running downward from Himmler. The first BdS appeal for Werwolf recruits was issued at Düsseldorf in mid-September 1944, and called for "old Party members" willing to undergo a demolitions course and thereafter cause damage in the enemy rear. Unlike the other two recruitment channels, this one had considerable success, mainly because the kind of Gestapo and SD men thus attracted to the Werwolf banner were often so hopelessly compromised that the idea of surrender was unbearable: the Werwolf thus became something of an alternate means of committing suicide. The SD, in particular found its offices in eastern Germany drained by such BdS recruitment campaigns for the Werwolf and other last-minute defence measures. Once recruited, such elements frequently tended to organize themselves as a group apart from recruits who had been stampeded into the organization, and apparently regarded themselves as the cream of the Werwolf crop.72
It must also be recalled that the HJ also controlled its own semi-autonomous wing of the organization, which in turn had its own system of recruitment, based mainly upon lists submitted by the local HJ-Bannführers. This scatter-shot method of recruitment generally did not produce good results. The number of recruits, in the first place, was simply insufficient, and total membership in the organization probably never exceeded several thousand guerrillas. In fact, Prützmann and Siebel both complained vigorously about the lack of partisan trainees -- particularly those who were already skilled radio operators or scouts -- and SS recruiters were occasionally heard to tell Army officers that the enlistment of volunteers was extremely difficult. Recruiters, therefore, resorted to such expediencies as conscription, particularly of older recruits, and the tricking of would-be volunteers by providing a purposefully vague or fallacious description of the activities that Werwölfe would be called upon to perform. These practices naturally led to problems when the conscripts and deluded volunteers found out what was really expected of them, such as penetrating enemy lines in civilian clothes, or accepting poison suicide ampules
to swallow in case of impending capture. Many of the recruits subsequently deserted or refused to undergo training, and when Himmler reacted by threatening drop-outs with a concentration camp sentence, morale in the organization was hardly encouraged.

Recruits, both willing and unwilling, were trained by Wehrmacht, Waffen-SS and Jagdverband officers, usually veterans of anti-partisan warfare in Russia and the Balkans, although a largely abortive effort was also made to recruit former Feldjäger as instructors in guerrilla techniques. Not surprisingly, instruction was conducted at HJ and Waffen-SS schools, and Skorzeny was also forced to share his Jagdverband training camps at Friedenthal, Neustrelitz, Kileschnowitz, and Kloster Tiefenthal (near Wiesbaden). The entire program was coordinated with the SS Chef der Bandenkampfverbände, and Sturmbannführer Erhardt, on this staff, was frequently in liaison with Dienstelle Prützmann and with the Abteilung Ausbildungswesen (Training Section) of OKH.

The courses given under this regime were based on translations of Soviet guerrilla training manuals, although in January 1945 a comprehensive German manual was printed under the title "Werwolf: Winke für
Jaadeinheiten" ("Tips for Hunting Units"). Courses were given in sabotage, Morse, wireless transmission, terrain reconnaissance, and assassination techniques, plus all the usual regimens of drill, athletics and speed marching. Female agents were specially trained to act as spies while serving as clerks and secretaries in MG offices, while others were shown how to seduce and murder Allied soldiers. Each recruit was deprived of ID papers, not only to prevent identification by the Allies in case of capture, but also to deprive him of his past and accentuate his total surrender to the aims of the SS organization; in place of his own name and life history, the recruit received a new identity, complete with Waffen-SS paybook and dogtags. Each new pupil was also required to sign a pledge which -- unlike the military pledge to Hitler -- was not directed toward an individual bound by his mortality, but to the organization itself, and to the principle of national resistance.80

Despite the fact that training was tough, it was also very short, ranging anywhere from five days to five weeks. Considering all the topics covered, even the longest of these courses was extremely crammed, and the Allies decided -- upon the basis of preliminary contact
with the Werwolf — that guerrilla training had been "hurried and superficial". Prützmann was naturally cognizant of this fact, and on several occasions he complained to Skorzeny that the instruction given by Jagdverband officers was insufficient in detail, but the commando chief replied that given time limits and the pressure on Jagdverband personnel for other duties, more complete courses were impossible to provide.

It must also be noted that the Jagdverbände usually taught only Gruppen leaders, and that the instruction received by the rank-and-file was probably even less thorough. FAK officers who visited a Werwolf unit near Stettin in March 1945, for instance, noted that there was a considerable lack of trained instructors, and that as a result, extra strain was put upon officers leading the Werwolf Gruppen behind Soviet lines. At the Sudeten town of Kaaden, a Flak defence guard half-finished a training course for a band of young girls before she even realized — to her horror — that she was training a Werwolf unit.

Since these myriad difficulties in training -- not to mention recruitment and supply -- were at least partly caused by the Werwolf's lack of a firm bureaucratic base,
it soon became obvious that the organization could not properly establish itself without the patronage of a well-grounded military or para-military agency which could hold its own amid a desperate struggle for resources. Himmler, with his eye for bureaucratic detail, seemed to have grasped this underlying factor, and during a meeting of SS security chiefs in November 1944 he actually offered control of the Werwolf to Skorzeny, a proposition which would have kept the Werwolf firmly within the SS orbit. Prützmann, who was present, reportedly lowered his head and uncomfortably shuffled his papers, but Skorzeny respectfully refused the assignment, saying he already had more than enough work to fill his time. It is apparent that Skorzeny thought that the Werwolf was an inefficient and unnecessary duplication of his own Jagdverband program -- into which he had invested much time and effort -- and it is thus possible that he also believed that the latter would eventually replace the Werwölfe, being converted into a domestic guerrilla organization.

While Skorzeny did not take control of the Werwolf, he did negotiate a number of agreements with Prützmann which ensured FAK participation in the deployment of
Werwolf Gruppen. FAK units were told to provide the Werwolf with training officers and give limited access to FAK supplies -- particularly on the Eastern Front -- for which they were reciprocally given partial operational control of Werwolf activity.86

Similar agreements were negotiated between Prützmann and the military High Command on the Eastern Front (OKH), mainly along the same pattern of diminished Werwolf autonomy in return for material considerations. While senior level cooperation had already been agreed upon in 1944 -- with a line running from OKH to the SS-Hauptamt87 -- by early 1945 the need for much closer collaboration between the armed forces and the guerrillas was obvious: the Werwolf was accumulating abundant information of tactical importance, and in a period when the military was rapidly expanding its own capability for partisan warfare against the Red Army, the Werwolf was already in a position to perform many such special missions; the Army, on the other hand, could offer the ill-equipped guerrillas both supply and transport. Such factors of mutual need had already drawn together the Army and the RSHA's Russian partisan organization, Unternehmen Zeppelin, and the same effect now worked upon the Army
151

and the Werwolf.

Thus, it was decided in early February that the Werwolf would place a permanent liaison officer at the various Army unit headquarters along the Eastern Front in order to ensure closer participation by Army Group intelligence officers in the deployment of Werwolf Gruppen, and to increase the cross-flow of information about the enemy. OKH in return issued an order (6 February) empowering intelligence officers in northeast Germany to meet Werwolf's need for provisions, and "regulated" other German groups operating in the enemy rear -- SS-Jagdverbände, FAK units, and SS-Streifkommandos -- as a consequence of the Werwolf-Wehrmacht arrangement. The OKH Abteilung Ausbildungswesen also requested that the same order be distributed via OKW to Army commands in Western Europe.

Not only was the military beginning to influence Werwolf deployment, but the Army also gained an important function in the guerrilla organization's recruitment and training processes. The OKH Abteilung Ausbildungswesen had always taken healthy interest in these matters, particularly the enthusiastic Training Sub-Section of the "Sapper and Fortifications Staff": surviving
documentation shows, for instance, that during 1944, the possibilities of guerrilla warfare were extensively discussed by the faculty at Pionier-Schule I at Dessau-Rosslau, and that the eventual results of these discussions was a ten page memorandum called "Kleinkrieg in Our Own Country," which was circulated amongst various senior staffs of the Wehrmacht. 91 By the beginning of 1945, the Training Sub-Section had begun assigning engineer troops for Werwolf operations, and a number of these men were run through a special Werwolf training course at Höxter and eventually transferred to the control of Dienstelle Prützmann in March 1945. 92 In conjunction with the Army's effort to strengthen its capabilities for partisan warfare on the Eastern Front, a particular effort was made in February to scour the Wehrkreise in search of engineer training troops willing to enlist in eight man guerrilla Gruppen to be trained at Höxter and then deployed in the East. 93

As well, the Army in early 1945 suggested a new Werwolf mustering channel almost entirely in military hands. Desperate for men, Dienstelle Prützmann agreed to send out a widely circulated order directing that military recruits for the Werwolf be trained at the
Abteilung Ausbildungswesen's own special training facilities, the Heereschulen. Although different versions of the order were disseminated, it generally explained that new military recruits were needed in order "to speed up the establishment of the Werwolf Organization", and that such men were to take part in a spring Werwolf training program at Heereschule II, which was located at Turkenburg in the Carpathian Mountains of western Slovakia. It was specified that personnel considered for the course should have at least a second-class Iron Cross, and must be non-Catholic; moreover, recruits were to come from communities or rural areas only on the eastern and western fringes of the Reich which were already occupied or immediately threatened by the enemy. "Special emphasis" was placed on the East, and surviving documents show that at least one unit was specifically asked for a man "whose hometown is in Russian-occupied territory".

The final results were mildly impressive; although some units either refused the order or disobeyed it, approximately 300 men passed through the two week course, two complete cycles of which were conducted before the Soviets overran western Slovakia. It is possible that
additional military recruits were trained at Heereschule I, near Wismar, and it is also known that by the last month of the war Wehrmacht officers were being directly seconded to the Werwolf with no intermediary training. The faculty of Heereschule II was itself withdrawn into the Böhmerwald and converted into a Werwolf company codenamed Kampfgruppe "Paul", after the name of its commander, Oberst Paul Krüger. The specialized expertise of the officers and men of this unit made it potentially the most effective and dangerous Werwolf guerrilla group in Germany, although it was still broken up with comparative ease in May 1945 after one of its members defected to the Allies.

It might be argued, incidentally, that the military as a whole degenerated into a partisan force during the last four months of the war. This process began in the East, where the disastrous collapse caused by the Soviet Winter Offensive forced the eastern field armies to resort to any expedient capable of slowing the pace of the Soviet advance. Army Groups "Centre" and "Vistula" formed guerrilla raiding units to function in the Soviet rear, and they also organized so-called Panzer Jagdkommandos, which were supposed to function
independently along enemy flanks and lines of communication in order to disrupt the advance of armoured spearheads. Several German sources reported in February 1945 that extensive partisan warfare had broken out behind the Soviet front in eastern Germany, and there was apparently some attempt to exploit bands of German stragglers in the Soviet rear in conjunction with the abortive Arnswald Counter-Offensive.

The same kind of measures were undertaken in the West after Allied spearheads began to cut deep into central Germany in late March 1945, and in this case it is possible to outline the development of the guerrilla strategy in even greater detail because of the existence of extensive documentation. We know, for instance, that Generaloberst Jodl instructed the western field armies on 29 March that Allied tank spearheads could only be defeated by cutting their rearward communication with supply bases, and that this order was followed by directives to individual German units which repeatedly hammered home the necessity of raiding activity and guerrilla warfare. Moreover, German troops by-passed by the Allies and trapped in the Allied rear were also directed to join the Werwolf and convert to Kleinkrieg
operations: such orders, for instance, were conveyed to the 6th SS Mountain Division -- which was stranded in the Taunus region in late March -- as well as to other remains of Army Group "B" which were overrun in the Ruhr some two weeks later.

In such conditions, the creation and deployment of special forces was also greatly accelerated: Army intelligence officers, for instance, were ordered to employ bands of volunteer soldiers for attacks on Allied supply lines and staffs; Luftwaffe signals troops on the Frisian coast were instructed to form stay-behind reconnaissance teams; the remains of Kampfgruppe "von der Heydte," a paratroop skirmishing unit deployed in the Ardennes, was formed into a Werwolf-style organization; and Panzer Jagdeinheiten became synonymous with Werwolf units -- in fact, six Panzerjagd companies in north Germany were formally subjugated to Dienstelle Prützmann in mid-April. The Allies actually encountered some Army and Waffen-SS diversionary units during the last month of the war -- for instance, in the Teutobergerwald, the Sauerland, the Odenwald, and Altmark -- and in a few cases, Allied troops had to be recalled from the front in order to extinguish guerrilla flare-ups based around such
One of the main propellants behind this increasing military interest in the Kleinkrieg was General Reinhard Gehlen, head of the OKH intelligence section, Fremde Heere Ost (FHO). Gehlen's main task was the collection of intelligence, although he realized by the winter of 1944-45 that in the desperate straits in which Germany and her allies now found themselves, large-scale intelligence operations in the Soviet rear could only be motivated by inculcating a sense of pride in direct anti-Communist guerrilla resistance among the operatives. Thus, FHO began to take intensive interest in the theory of partisan warfare and in early 1945, Gehlen ordered preparation of a study investigating the construction of an anti-Soviet underground using the Armija Krajowa as a structural model. On 9 February, Hauptmann Friedrich Poppenberger submitted a preliminary paper which suggested an expanded Werwolf incorporating all existing German commando groups, and based mainly upon sixty man military Einsatz units which would operate from secret hide-outs in the Soviet rear. Gehlen, however, decided that such a program must be preceded by the organization of a pure intelligence-gathering network, and to suit
this purpose he sent out a call for a thousand Wehrmacht volunteers to put themselves at the disposal of FAK units 102 and 103 as line-crossers.\textsuperscript{110}

Despite the fact that the final AK study apparently questioned the effectiveness of a long-term resistance movement, Gehlen pushed forward with the partisan scheme, particularly after he had been relieved from command at FHO for challenging the Führer's genius with embarrassingly accurate intelligence reports on the strength of the Red Army. Gehlen, however, had such strong influence at FHO that he was able to keep alive a Machiavellian plan to transfer the massive files of the staff westwards, where he hoped they would provide a convenient gift with which to introduce himself to the Americans, and in this same regard he viewed the provision of an existing anti-Soviet guerrilla underground as an added advantage. With these factors in mind, Gehlen got in touch with his friend in the RSHA, Schellenburg, who in turn used the resources of Unternehmen Zeppelin to conduct a parallel study of the AK.

In early April, Schellenburg laid some of these plans for guerrilla warfare before Himmler, but the
Reichsführer reacted with a standard Nazi recital of taboos on the possibility of post-capitulation partisan warfare, calling the scheme "defeatist". One can imagine that Himmler immediately recognized that the Gehlen plan introduced large-scale military and RSHA influence into the Werwolf, simultaneously removing his own direct control channel via the HSSPFs, and that he was adverse to any such shrinkage of his prerogatives, even despite such incremental factors as greater efficiency; the Gehlen plan, after all, threatened to recreate the Werwolf within the military and Secret Service spheres, where it should have been placed from the beginning. In any case, Schellenburg immediately withdrew the plan, although the Poles have since charged that OKH actually initiated at least part of the program, particularly the infiltration of military partisans into Polish-annexed areas.

Even without the full implementation of the Gehlen plan, Dienstelle Prützmann still felt an almost inevitable bureaucratic tug which eventually settled the Werwolf within the most natural command channels -- in fact, Prützmann and his staff became largely superfluous to the entire process of fielding Werwolf Gruppen. The
Dienstelle's intelligence division tried to remain relevant by issuing bi-monthly intelligence briefs for the service of those agencies directly controlling Werwolf deployment, but there was little else they could do to involve themselves in the process. Siebel's deputy, Oberstleutnant Sulle, complained to a local Werwolf organizer in April that as a command center, Dienstelle Prützmann had become paralysed -- it could no longer even keep track of its Werwolf Gruppen because communications throughout Germany had become badly disrupted, and because the few remaining wireless stations were so overworked that they could only rarely be used. Thus, in effect, the Gruppen remained only nominally under Prützmann's authority -- after February 1945, they had quickly slid under the control of the Army Group intelligence officers and the FAKs. Moreover, under the new regime, the nature of their work altered; senior military authorities began to insist, for instance, that Werwolf guerrillas be used to carry out reconnaissance assignments, a purpose for which they were not originally intended, and a French report noted that by March 1945, Gruppen on the Eastern Front were no longer being dispersed in the usual Werwolf fashion, but
were concentrated so that the Army could quickly direct them to new tasks when their services were required.\textsuperscript{113}

With straightforward partisan warfare thus slipping out from under his control, Prützmann gradually turned to more eclectic pursuits, such as the possibility of mass-murder by poison, a tactic which Winston Churchill once called "the difference between treachery and war."\textsuperscript{115} The RSHA had already begun the production of poisons for food and alcohol in the fall of 1944, and in October a conference on the matter was actually held at an SS-Police research center in Berlin called the \textbf{Kriminaltechnisches Institut} (KTI). Prützmann apparently took an immediate interest in the matter -- particularly since the KTI was already a source for poison suicide ampules for the use of Werwölfe themselves -- and the entire project was soon turned over to the purview of Department IVb of Dienstelle Prützmann, along with large quantities of poisons. By early 1945, tests on the injection of lethal doses of methyl into alcohol had been carried out -- this had already been decided upon during the October Conference as the best means of poisoning liquor -- and further tests on more exotic chemicals were underway.\textsuperscript{116} Knowledge of such poisoning methods was
widely disseminated among potential Nazi resisters, and special squads were soon dispatched along both the Western and Eastern Fronts, the task of which was to poison liquor and food likely to be consumed by Allied and Soviet troops. Unfortunately, this was probably the most successful of all Werwolf programs -- at least in terms of a body count -- and its effect lingered well into the postwar period. Hundreds of Allied soldiers were thus killed -- particularly by methyl alcohol in liquor -- and in eastern Europe casualties among Soviet troops certainly ran even higher.

It is also notable that Allied forces discovered German underground caches of poison gas and other chemical warfare substances, and also secret pilot plants which seemed designed to begin the further production of such material after enemy occupation. I. G. Farben had produced these stocks of poison gas, as well as a highly flammable liquid called N-Stoff -- which burst into flames upon contact and emitted noxious fumes -- and near the end of the war, the Armaments Ministry had come under pressure to transfer such substances to the Werwolf and its sister group, the Freikorps Adolf Hitler. In a post war interview, Albert Speer apparently told British
interrogators that Werwolf and Frikorps officials were forwarded from his agency to the Wehrmacht Ordinance Department (Heereswaffenamt), which supplied the deadly material.\textsuperscript{120} There is no evidence, of course, that these stocks were actually used by the Werwolf or any other military group, and the only known case where chemical weapons were deliberately sent into a threatened area -- i.e. offensively placed -- was in East Prussia during the Soviet drive in January 1945.\textsuperscript{121}

The Werwolf was also involved with such seamy activities as assassination and intimidation by threat of violence. In October 1944, Himmler enacted a decree which forbade unevacuated civil officials in enemy territory to perform "any service to the enemy" -- although the provision of essential administrative and welfare services for the remaining population was permitted -- and this decree was supplemented by secret orders to the HSSPF West, Gutenberger, authorizing "our organization behind the American Front to execute death sentences upon traitors".\textsuperscript{122} Nazi hierarchs subsequently began singling out officials in the occupied territories who had incurred their displeasure and were thus made the object of special Vehme assassination teams. Some of
these conspiracies failed to reach the point of fruition, but in a number of cases in late March and April 1945, local civil officials within Allied-occupied territory were in fact liquidated by Werwolf assassins. The first isolated attacks upon female "collaborators" -- the girlfriends of Allied troops -- also occurred during the final month of the war, although this form of resistance only reached a significant level during the fall of 1945, when Allied non-fraternization bans were rescinded.

The most important of the Vehme missions -- "Operation Carnival" -- was undertaken in the west German city of Aachen, which had been the first major community to fall into Allied hands. The hapless target was the Oberbürgermeister, Franz Oppenhof, who was fingered by both Himmler and Goebbels as the first intended victim for the long arm of Nazi justice. The task was first detailed to the Jagdverbände, which refused it on the grounds that it was a domestic Reich matter and was therefore the proper concern of the Werwolf. With the dirty work thus returned to his sphere, Prützmann delegated the job to the W-Beauftragter of Wehrkreis VI, Raddatz, who in turn presided over the
training of a five member team under Untersturmführer Wentzel, a veteran of the Skorzeny organization. However, like everything else in the Werwolf, the Oppenhof assassination was undertaken reluctantly, and Gutenburger succeeded in repeatedly postponing the operation -- which was originally intended to proceed through the frontline infiltration of Wentzel's unit -- until Prützmann finally forced the matter by convincing the Luftwaffe to provide a captured B-17 for a parachute drop.\textsuperscript{127}

On 20 March, Wentzel's team was dropped into a wooded borderland region in the southeast Netherlands, and was almost immediately detected by a Dutch border guard, who was killed in the subsequent skirmish. Within five days the group had made its way to the outskirts of Aachen, where they quickly found Oppenhof's home and subsequently murdered the unfortunate mayor with a pistol shot to the head. Four days later, DNB announced that Oppenhof had been tried by a "Court of Honour" and sentenced to death.\textsuperscript{128}

The effect of this outrage upon public opinion -- combined with the news of other similar killings -- was immediately noticeable. Even in Aachen, it had been
difficult to find a suitable candidate brave enough to accept the mayoralty, and after Oppenhof's killing, the task became even harder, both in Rhenish towns that had been occupied for some time, and in newly occupied communities in central Germany. Moreover, in Nazi-held territory, civic officials who were preparing for the Allied advance also became alarmed about Werwolf activities; in Stuttgart, Oberbürgermeister Strölin wrote to the local HSSPF, Hofmann, claiming that a continuation of city government was provided for in Himmler's 1944 directive, and that clear guidelines were needed regarding the propriety of performing administrative tasks in occupied areas. It was bad enough, Strölin noted, that civic officials might bear the brunt of Allied reprisals against the "Freedom Movement", without these same officials being the target of the movement itself.

Officials like Strölin had good reason for worry, particularly since even in Nazi-held territory, the Werwolf functioned as a strong-arm unit for advocates of Hitler's "scorched earth" resistance; the direct and indirect connivance of the collapsing regime in such activity thus gave the Werwölfe an aspect not unlike the
"death squads" later characteristic of right-wing terrorism in Latin America. Werwölfe were instructed that "traitors" were fair game even in areas not yet occupied by the enemy, and in certain regions the "Werwolf" theme became a virtual license for the extrajudicial suppression of dissidents by the Party: for instance, a French report noted that in southwest Germany, the Schwenningen Werwolf was quickly transformed into the personal instrument of the local Kreisleiter, who used it to manhandle political opponents.

This expanded role for the Werwolf resulted directly from the disastrous collapse of morale and the obvious lack of any capacity for further national resistance -- obvious even among the middle and lower strata of the Party which formed the usual bulwark of the regime -- and it also formed the logical culmination of the general SS drive against "traitors," a campaign which had burned hot since the 20 July Putsch attempt. A tendency toward authoritarian vigilantism -- even within Party ranks -- became evident in August 1944, when Bormann suspended the proceedings of Party courts in favour of summary judgements by competent political leaders. This was followed by drum-head court martials within the military,
and by a HJ memorandum in late February 1945 which recommended that wavering officials be shot, even, if necessary, by their subordinates, a suggestion which Bormann found so uplifting that he circulated it among his Gauleiters. Finally came extralegal "Flag Orders," which stipulated that anyone flying white flags was subject to immediate execution. National Socialism, as Sebastian Haffner notes, had finally turned upon the Germans themselves as its final victim: if the population would not faithfully participate in a true "people's war," then it must be punished in a final flurry of destruction.

Werwölfe naturally thrived within such a climate, and in April 1945 they were found freely smearing town walls with such fearsome sayings as "Beware traitor, the Werwolf watches" — or "Whoever deserts the Führer will be hanged as a traitor". Vehme units went on a killing spree, executing deserters, political unreliables, and mayors or civil servants who had the gall to prepare for the continuation of civil life with a modicum of destruction — all were shot or hung and their bodies tagged with Werwolf warning notes. In western Germany, priests were special targets because of the suspicion
that many of them would preach a doctrine of Christian conciliation with the victors; "There will be," said Goebbels, "a good field of activity for our terror groups here." 140

Finally, the frenzy began to feed even upon the Party itself (a fate which seems a rather common affliction of revolutionary movements throughout history). Werwölfe hunted down Party officials who fled their posts in the face of danger,141 and they also loomed behind local Party leaders who considered minimizing the destructiveness of the collapse -- no less a figure than Franz Hofer, the political chief of the Alpine Redoubt, was threatened with Werwolf retaliation after he publicly called for the cancellation of defence measures for Innsbruck.142 Major Party dissidents, such as the Armaments Minister, Albert Speer, and the Gauleiter of Hamburg, Karl Kaufmann, were forced to build personal guard units as a defence against Nazi terrorists. "The Wehrwolf's activities", Speer later told the Allies, "were directed against people like him more than against the Americans."143

Nazi terrorists were also needed to augment the Wehrmacht, which stubbornly balked at carrying out
Hitler's infamous "scorched earth" decrees. On 19 March, the Gauleiters were given partial responsibility for the destruction of industrial and economic enterprises of likely use to the enemy, and Prützmann dutifully visited German industrialists to discuss the uncomfortable possibility of placing saboteurs within factories to make sure that they were destroyed before the arrival of the Allies or the Soviets. Special Volkssturm and Werwolf "Sprengtruppe" were actually trained and deployed, and these saboteurs occasionally became involved in melees with outraged workers who angrily defended the nation's industries and its economic infrastructure. Economic installations which were not destroyed prior to the enemy advance were sometimes prepared for demolition by stay-behind agents, and the Werwolf was also involved in the mining of buildings likely to be used as billets or headquarters by the enemy, and which could subsequently be detonated by time-delay fuses or by saboteurs.

One might rightly conclude from this unfortunate attack upon the nation's economy, that the raw anti-industrialism long inherent within Naziism had finally been unbound, and that the "Sprengtruppe" were modern-day Luddites ordered to undo the Industrial Revolution. It
is particularly ironic that while Nazi propagandists were berating the Americans for the infamous "Morgenthau Plan," which suggested the deindustrialization of the Reich, the Government and Party had simultaneously assigned Nazi hoodlums to carry out exactly the same measures.

In the final analysis, however, such terrorism produced fear and confusion, but it could not induce the spirit of national resistance which had failed to emanate spontaneously from the natural well-springs of German feeling. In fact, Werwolf intimidation only increased public hatred of an already discredited regime: assassination of civic officials, for instance, caused not only fear but also resentment -- "The Ludendorffs lose our wars," said one observer, "while the Erzbergers lose their lives." In a few instances, HJ diversionist bands were even forcibly disbanded or run out of town by local officials, and in one case a regional Werwolf chief was assassinated by members of a local antifa. Moreover, public opinion was probably influenced by the fact that the Catholic church finally arrayed itself in full force against National Socialism and condemned the Werwolf as a brutal and useless coda to six years of
Despite the efforts of the Werwolf to enforce the spirit of resistance in everyone else, the organization's own morale was disastrous, and steadily became worse as the moment of final collapse drew nearer. Priitzmann himself led the way: by the spring of 1945 his vanity had disappeared and his mood wavered wildly between an over-expressive confidence and desperate drunken nights in which he contemplated suicide. Moreover, he was well on the path toward becoming Germany's version of the Yugoslav Chetnik leader Costa Pecenac -- ie. the commander of an "official" guerrilla movement who was more interested in collaboration with the occupation forces than in wholesale resistance. Not only was Priitzmann associated with Himmler's last minute attempts to negotiate with the Western Powers, but he also established his own independent effort to achieve a general armistice with the West, thereby attempting to remove the Werwolf's raison d'etre in western Germany and reorient it solely toward the East.

This story began in mid-March 1945 and played itself out in Priitzmann's old fief of Hamburg, where the Werwolf chief had once served as HSSPF. Priitzmann presumably had
good contacts in the area, and during this period he resumed close relations with Gauleiter Kaufmann -- a key German official in favour of capitulation to Germany's Western enemies -- and also hinted that he shared Kaufmann's dour appraisal of the overall strategic situation. Three weeks later, Prützmann arrived in Hamburg with important news: Himmler, he said, had agreed to cancel Werwolf's guerrilla operations in western Germany, converting it into an agency with which to spread the idea of accommodation with the West. From this point onward, said Prützmann, the Werwolf would work for an armistice with the Western Powers and for the continued defence of Reich frontiers in the East; the final aim would be an anti-Bolshevik union of Europe designed to protect its "age-old cultural values".156

How should this bold initiative be interpreted? Several salient facts do in fact suggest that such an alteration of the Werwolf was at least under consideration at the most senior levels of the SS: first, a draft SS plan (3 April 1945), later found amongst the OKW archives, discussed in detail a restructuring of the "Freedom Movement" as a broad neo-Nazi front which would strive not only toward liberation
from foreign rule, but also toward a reformed National Socialism purged of the corruption of the Party bureaucracy and freed from the arrogance of power politics at both home and abroad -- the final goal of this document was to fit Germany into an egalitarian European Union; second, Himmler in late April told the head of the Luftwaffe's special services squadron that his main intent was to achieve a "special peace" with the Western Powers and to subsequently form an anti-Communist "Freikorps" in Mecklenburg and Holstein; and third, Himmler spoke on several occasions concerning his doubts about the Werwolf and the plan to organize a Werwolf redoubt in the Alps. Given these facts, however, clear and unambiguous documentary evidence also shows that the Werwolf was still fully functional in the West throughout April 1945, and that any scheme to change its status was therefore never fully implemented. At most, the plan seems nebulous and provisional -- more of a trial balloon than a solid decision.

Prützmann's tendency to push this vague intention as a firmly established fact reveals -- in truth -- an intense desire to ingratiate himself with the rebellious Party element at Hamburg, perhaps in the hope of getting
one foot into the camp of the dissidents, while leaving
the other in the camp of the die-hard resisters. In any
case, the local HJ-Werwolf chief was soon won over to
this new definition of Werwolf activity, although the
overall W-Beauftragter, Standartenführer Knoll, was a
Nazi fanatic who remained loyally bound to the cause of
last ditch resistance and even made arrangements for
post-captulation activity.\textsuperscript{161}

After Prützmann made his startling announcement
about the Werwolf's supposed new course, Kaufmann
announced his own plan to act independently in ensuring
that the population of northwest Germany was not
butchered in a useless attempt to defend the area.
Although Prützmann worried about the danger of openly
expressing such views, he admitted thorough agreement
with the proposal, and by the end of the month he had
answered the Gauleiter's call to help in arranging a
truce on the Northwest Front. At the time of Hitler's
death, both men were attempting to contact the Danish
Resistance in the hope of using it as an intermediary
through which to negotiate with the British.\textsuperscript{162}
Prützmann's last message to his Werwolf followers
instructed that "unnecessary loses" be avoided,
particularly among young Werwölfe.\textsuperscript{163}

The formal end for the Werwolf came as a result of the reassertion of military dominance within the dying Reich after the self-destruction of Hitler and Goebbels within Berlin. The centre of power thereafter devolved upon OKW, located first at Plön and then at Flensburg, and military men became the leading figures in the new constellation of political and military power, most particularly Grand Admiral Dönitz, the new Chief of State, and \textit{Generaloberst} Kesselring, who commanded plenipotentiary powers in the now cut-off regions of south Germany.

In view of this development, a few additional words must be said about the background of military-Werwolf relations: although the High Command had been comfortable with the Werwolf as a tightly controlled network of units suitable for reconnaissance and diversion, most military men -- irrespective of rank -- were opposed to the kind of ideological and political nature which the Werwolf movement assumed near the end of the war (and about which more will be said later). Moreover, many German soldiers believed that in the post-captulation period, \textit{Werwolf} activity would degenerate
into the uncontained chaos of fanatic banditry, based largely upon a core of irresponsible SS and Party desperados and almost totally devoid of public support. In this scenario, the guerrillas could scarcely bring about the victory that the mighty Wehrmacht had failed to achieve, but rather, would merely hinder reconstruction and provoke massive enemy reprisals upon the already battered German populace. In any case, such activity was well outside the proper bounds of the traditional Clausewitzian military ethic.\textsuperscript{164}

It is true that there was some Army sympathy for the cause of German guerrillas in Soviet-occupied regions -- where there appeared little left to lose\textsuperscript{165} -- and it was on the Eastern Front that there were several isolated cases where junior officers resolved to ignore defeat and fight on as partisans, quite independent of the senior staffs of their formations.\textsuperscript{166} Even in the East, however, there was a strong strain of military conservatism, which was combined with a fear that fanatic Werwolf propaganda would only make Soviet savagry even worse: several units, in fact, were overtly forbidden to participate in the construction of the Werwolf.\textsuperscript{167} By the end of the war, such doubts about partisan warfare were almost
openly expressed: an Armed Forces radio broadcast on 19 April bitterly condemned the theory and practice of German guerrilla warfare,\textsuperscript{168} while simultaneously the generals defending Berlin connived with Speer in a plot — which, incidentally, was never executed — to seize the main Werwolf radio transmitter and thereafter broadcast a daring speech by Speer abolishing the movement and cancelling the "scorched earth decrees".\textsuperscript{169}

It is thus no surprise that once the military became the authority of last resort, it showed little further tolerance for any Werwolf activity, particularly since it might get in the way of reaching a modus vivendi with the West. On May 5, the day after the proclamation of a regional armistice in northwest Europe, two instances of such Werwolf activity came to light, the most significant of which was evidence of a plot to deploy airborne saboteurs in the enemy rear. Unknown to OKW, Command West of the Luftwaffe had in mid-April organized its own Werwolf units which were based mainly in the Alpine Redoubt and intended to land sabotage teams in enemy-occupied areas by means of light aircraft. Although thirty to forty aircraft manned by such agents were actually dispatched, the crews apparently committed few
effective acts of sabotage, and one such unit, Sonderkommando Totenkopf, had already begun to disintegrate in late April after exhausting its limited supplies of men and material. The Allies, however, had meanwhile become acquainted with this enterprise through "Ultra" intercepts and interrogations of captured airmen, and an angry Allied demand for the final cessation of the operation was sent to OKW headquarters at Flensburg.

Immediately after reception of this message, Dönitz sent urgent orders to Luftflotte Reich, prohibiting any further Werwolf activity, and he also called into his presence the melancholy figure of Prützmann, who had in the meantime effectively abandoned his leadership of the Werwolf, but now pretended to the status of "liaison officer" between Himmler and the new Head of State. Dönitz had no desire to liaise with the discredited Himmler, who had been unceremoniously dropped from the Cabinet, but he addressed Prützmann in his old role of Inspekteur für Spezial Abwehr, in effect telling him that the Werwolf was forthwith forbidden to function because the end of Wehrmacht resistance had rendered it superfluous.

Several hours after the revelations about an aerial
Werwolf, OKW also received a sharp note from Field Marshal Montgomery, claiming that 21st Army Group had monitored a vitriolic speech delivered over Wilhelmshaven Sender -- one of the few German radio stations still broadcasting -- which called for rebellion and resistance against the capitulation agreement. Yet another OKW telegram was sent out, this time to Wilhelmshaven, ordering an investigation and authorizing "drastic measures" against the Party functionary who had delivered the offensive speech. On the evening of 5 May, Dönitz held a meeting with the Gauleiter from the Wilhelmshaven area (Gau Weser-Ems), and after again stressing the need for a prohibition of Werwolf activity, he arranged for a public announcement to this same effect to be broadcast over the wavelength of Deutschlandsender, then based at Flensburg. At midnight, the station announced that the "scorched earth" decrees were cancelled, and an hour later, Germans were asked to abstain from "illegal" underground activity in either the Werwolf or its sister organizations, although it is notable that the movement was not formally dissolved nor did the prohibition against Werwolf activity apply to Soviet-occupied territory.
On the following day, Kesselring instructed Obergruppenführer Hausser -- the ablest and most popular of SS generals -- to prevent any guerrilla warfare in the Alps by disgruntled SS units, and several days later the General Staff of Army Group "G" warned that any incipient efforts to construct a Freikorps would constitute a fruitless endangerment to the German people. Thereafter, the Wehrmacht freely provided the Allies with available information on the Werwolf, and in areas where the defeated Army was given temporary responsibilities for policing and the implementation of control measures, they scrupulously worked to prevent sabotage and civilian or military unrest.

As for the overlords of the Werwolf, their eventual fate was not a happy story. Himmler refused the advice of his adjutants, who encouraged him to absolve the SS of their oaths of loyalty and formally dissolve the Werwolf, but he rather became totally fixated upon his own fate. He wandered north Germany for several weeks incognito, and when captured by the British on 23 May, he bit upon one of the poison suicide ampules that had been so widely distributed within the Werwolf organization. He died within several minutes.
Prutzmann, meanwhile, had witnessed Himmler's maudlin farewell speech on 5 May and then toyed with the idea of escaping in a U-Boat or an airplane, although in actuality he was soon captured by the British and immediately sent to a detention camp. He initially tried to convince British interrogators that in November 1944 he had been replaced by Brigadeführer Siebel as General Inspekteur für Spezialabwehr, but when this lie failed to lead the British astray, he visited the latrine and -- like Himmler -- departed the world by means of a suicide ampule. Both Prutzmann and Himmler, it was rumoured, had given up on attempts to deal with the Allies and were on their way southward toward the supposed Werwolf Redoubt in the Alps.

While Prutzmann had originally headed north to Schleswig-Holstein, his headquarters staff, under the command of Siebel, had retreated south toward the Alpine Redoubt. However, not only did the Dienstelle travel in a different geographical direction than its chief, it was also on a different path philosophically -- most notably in the sense that these officers remained much more devoted than Prutzmann to the idea of last ditch resistance and diversionary activity. In fact, while on
the way to the Redoubt, Prützmann's aides developed a bold strategy for postwar Werwolf operations: the main intent -- remarkably similar to the later formulations of Guevera, Debray, and Marighela -- was to harass the occupation forces, cause reprisals, and thereby create a mutual hatred between the population and the occupation forces. It was foreseen that such a program would eventually create the conditions for a political revival of National Socialism and also lay the groundwork for a rebellion in case of a major armed conflict between East and West.  

In truth, however, the Dienstelle's fate was somewhat less grandiose and important than these plans suggested: after reaching Maishöfen, the headquarters staff was formed into a seventy-five man Werwolf Kommando, and this unit was subsequently instructed to destroy a V-2 facility near Garmisch-Partenkirchen which had been captured by the Americans. The unit was shot up and dispersed by American forces while on its way to carry out this ill-fated mission.

The regional sections of the Werwolf collapsed in a number of ways. Many of the HSSPFs emulated their leader by negotiating surrender, while a number of local
organizations unofficially dissolved or were formally terminated; a particularly notable example was the abolition of the Styrian Werwolf by Gauleiter Oberreither on 4 May, which shows that such disintegration sometimes occurred even in areas about to fall to the Red Army.\textsuperscript{183} The only notable last stand occurred in the Segeberg Forest in Schleswig-Holstein, where a desperate band of three hundred SS men and Werwolf was determined to pay a final homage to the god of battles. This concentration was dispersed only several days after the final Armistice, when British forces sealed off the area and OKW used troops of the 8th Parachute Division to sweep the forest.\textsuperscript{184}

In a few cases, some of the most fanatic Werwolf chiefs made preliminary plans for postwar activity,\textsuperscript{185} and it is true that a few cells sputtered into the post-capitulation period, even despite Dönitz' cessation order.\textsuperscript{186} Occupation authorities, for instance, obtained the minutes of a secret meeting of Werwolf "Untergruppe VIIa, Section 4e", where it was decided that local Werwolf agents should pose as anti-Nazis and otherwise make every conceivable effort to win the confidence of Allied Military Government and security officers.\textsuperscript{187}
There is also some evidence that certain Werwölfe in eastern Europe tried to keep their Gruppen intact in the hope that they could play a role in any hostile Allied advance against the Soviets: for instance, five Werwölfe captured by the Czechs at Znojemsku told their captors that they were waiting for American airdrops of arms and equipment, and that they expected to aid the advancing American forces both by guerrilla activity, and by subsequent service as a police agency after the Americans had arrived. Thus, while the British and Americans were sanguine about Werwolf capabilities and had already written off the organization by the mid-summer of 1945, the Soviets and their East European allies retained an active interest in the Werwolf well into the 1950s.

One major Werwolf element which does not fit easily into this picture of breakdown and disintegration was the HJ sub-section, which retained a sense of coherence and organizational identity lasting well into 1946. This was chiefly due to the fact that the HJ chief, Axmann, was the only senior Nazi leader who prepared a detailed scheme for the final phase of the war when most -- or all -- of Germany would be occupied. This "Axmann Plan" was partially executed in April 1945, when the
Reichsjugendführung was shifted to the Bavarian Alps and an endeavour was made to preserve the "essence of the nation" by attempting the transfer of thirty-five thousand HJ partisans to the inaccessible hill country of southern Germany, particularly the Alps, the Böhmerwald, and the Schwarzwald. Senior HJ couriers were sent out to the four corners of the Reich with orders for local HJ staffs to retreat southwards, or, if this was impossible, to go underground and await the development of a favourable environment for underground work. Leaflets circulated under the purview of the RAD chief, Ley, advised Werwölfe that extended survival in the Böhmerwald and other remote areas was possible, and that the Soviets and Americans could thus still be opposed.

In fact, an unknown number of HJ guerrillas actually reached the southern mountains, where they were directed to carry out partisan activity and prepare for the outbreak of war between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union. Local HJ resources in the Alps were also exploited: the faculty and students of the main HJ elite school (Junkerschule) at Bad Tölz, for instance, retreated into the Alps to form a two hundred and fifty man guerrilla unit, while further east, HJ-Werwolf
detachments were organized and attached to 6th SS Panzer Army for operations against the Russians.\textsuperscript{193} Axmann himself remained in Berlin to direct HJ activity in the besieged capital, but after Hitler's death he infiltrated the Soviet ring around the city and fled to secret hideouts in Bohemia and southern Germany, whence he remained in contact with his followers.\textsuperscript{194}

The real mark of genius in the Axmann Plan was its provision for a continuing and self-replenishing source of funds for \textit{Wervolf} activity. Along with appointing a leader for the politico-military wing of the Alpine \textit{Werwolf}, \textit{Hauptbannführer} Franke, Axmann also transferred over a million \textit{Reichsmarks} to his economic advisor, \textit{Oberbannführer} Willi Heidemann, and he too was sent to the Alps as head of an independent economic section of the movement. Heidemann was given orders to divorce himself from casual contacts with active \textit{Werwölfe}, but to build a legal business enterprise in close association with AMG -- which was exactly the course he followed. Heidemann based himself in Bad Tölz and in late April made a sound investment by buying Tessmann and Sons, a transportation company with offices in Dresden and Lübeck. Not only did this eventually provide a constant
flow of funds for the desperados in the mountains, but
the very nature of the company improved Werwolf
communications and its dealings in food and coal gave it
close contacts with General Patton's lax AMG regime in
Bavaria. During the course of the summer, Heidemann
proved himself an adept businessman, and by the end of
1945 he had bought five additional companies and expanded
throughout the American and British Zones and into
Austria -- fear of the Deuxième Bureau, notably, kept him
out of the French Zone. Moreover, HJ and Werwolf
elements in the British Zone had spontaneously
reorganized during the same period, and by the autumn of
1945 they were in contact with the Heidemann combine,
although he could give them no promise of immediate
funding.195

The most notable aspect of these developments,
however, was that the survival of the movement was not
accompanied by a continuing commitment to the typical
Werwolf program of sabotage and assassination. Heidemann
believed that his rapid business success would be
threatened by the oppressive Allied police activity which
Werwolf operations would surely provoke, and on this
basis he quickly turned against such activity, which he
derided as "fire and thunder methods". Rather, he devoted himself to the more lofty and long term goal of the Axmann Plan — ie., the preservation of the "national substance", which he hoped to achieve by building his combine into a major economic force in the new Germany, capable of influencing politics and serving as a core for Nazi ideological torch bearers (Ideenträger).

The politico-military side of the movement had similar ideals, although it is possible they retained a greater commitment to the principle of direct action, and that this caused tension with the economic wing under Heidemann. It seems likely, for instance, that a group loosely connected with the movement in the British Zone operated in conjunction with such violent youth gangs as the Edelweiss Piraten, and that they committed sabotage in the Soviet Zone — eg. the alleged derailment of a train near Magackwig in November 1945.

Of course, the HJ-Werwolf was such a large conspiracy that it soon came to the attention of the Allied counter-intelligence services, who thereafter made an effort to infiltrate it with undercover agents. By late 1945, the Allies had obtained membership lists — a compilation of a thousand names associated with the
southern group and fifteen hundred with the northern -- and on this basis a complex counter-intelligence mission was run during the winter of 1945-46. Code named "Operation Nursery", this series of raids netted almost the entire HJ-Werwolf leadership, beginning with Axmann in December, followed by Heidemann in January and the heads of the British Zone conspiracy in February. Over eight hundred of the subordinate members were swept up in a large-scale razzia in late March, and at scattered points there were gun battles between Allied troops and hunted Werwölfe. A few cells survived the Nursery raids -- most notably a Schleswig group built around an HJ leadership group evacuated from East Prussia -- but in several months, these too were rolled up by the occupation authorities. Thus ended the last important manifestation of activity based upon the original Werwolf organization, and therefore the last flicker of the Third Reich.

Despite this semi-successful postwar remnant, it must be reiterated that most of the Werwolf was unprepared for the postwar period and therefore experienced a general collapse. On the other hand -- given that the organization was provided with a strict
pre-capitulation mandate -- its performance perhaps should not be judged upon its eventual break-down, since the Werewolf was never intended to operate in a post-capitulation environment. Considered in light of its assigned task of harassing the enemy rear, while the Wehrmacht was still in the field, the Werewolf achieved mixed results. It is true that enemy lines of communication were occasionally sabotaged, and that the Soviets and Western Allies were occasionally forced to draw men from the front to deal with disruptions in the rear: the Red Army, in particular, had to allocate considerable numbers of men for guard duty wherever worthwhile industrial or military targets were captured intact, and they were also forced to form ten to twenty man "Suchkommandos" for the purpose of hunting down German guerrillas. On the other hand, the Werewolf never succeeded in Prützmann's aim of promoting a so-called "radical improvement" in Germany's military fortunes, and it might rightly be argued that much of the disruption in the rear of the invading armies was actually caused by straggler bands having little or no connection with the Prützmann agency.

It is thus impossible not to conclude that the
Werwolf was poorly organized, and that most of the limited successes in German guerrilla warfare were gained despite the organization rather than because of it. The most basic organizational mistakes were the lack of an extensive mandate; the lack of a competent leader; and an insufficient bureaucratic foundation, the last of these problems being the worst because it left the Werwolf unprepared to survive amid the savage battle for resources which had arisen by 1944-45. In retrospect, it appears that Himmler had placed the organization under a command channel in which he had an opportunity for personal interventions, but that unlike Churchill with his Commandos, or John Kennedy with his Green Berets, the Reichsführer failed to pay the special attention required to ensure the full fledged success of such a group. In a war-weary nation short of resources, time, and manpower -- and subject to physical disintegration from the effects of falling bombs and invading enemy armies -- such problems were insurmountable.

But could it have been otherwise? The nature of the Hitler dictatorship drove it toward bureaucratic confusion, while at the same time, a people dragged through six years of debilitating effort could hardly
have been expected to support further destruction, particularly not self-destruction. In any case, such elaborate advance efforts to prepare for guerrilla fighting were doomed not only by the condition of the German Reich and its people, but were perhaps ill-conceived in the first place. The British had experienced considerable difficulties with the same matter in 1940, and in the cases of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, standing plans for guerrilla activity in the rear of an invading army had made little impact on the actual course of partisan warfare. An apt example in the German context was the geographic configuration of guerrilla activity within the collapsing Reich: although the Werwolf was better prepared for partisan warfare in the Rhineland, it was the area between the Rhine and the Elbe which became more of a problem for Allied forces, mainly because stragglers and bands of HJ were able to exploit suitable terrain features, and because the populace tended to be more hostile than in areas further west.\textsuperscript{202}

Aside from preparing arms caches and supply dumps, it might be argued that a retreating power can do little to encourage a kind of activity that must, by its very
nature, emanate from popular sources (although it can be organized subsequently). Sabotage leaders, writes one authority, "are less chiefs in the military sense than they are chiefs of popular tribes. They must be men who have arisen from the people...By gaining distinction among their fellows, they gain the individual confidence of their followers."²⁰³ This is not to argue that guerrilla activity cannot be encouraged -- SOE style -- but that elaborate bureaucracies intended to "seed" partisan warfare are of little use.


3. ACA Intelligence Organization "Joint Weekly Intelligence Summary" #16, 27 Oct. 1945, p. 5, FO 1007/300, PRO. See also British Troops Austria "Joint Weekly Intelligence Summary" #9, 31 Aug. 1945, pp. 9-10, FO 1007/300, PRO.


6. The first documented mention of the organization was in a Himmler memorandum of 16 September 1944,
in which he notes that "the responsibility for the resistance movement in the German border provinces is disseminated in one of my verbal orders". SS-Rf. Himmler to O/Gruf. Kaltenbrunner, 16 Sept. 1944, Records of the Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police, Microcopy #T-175, Roll 122, frame 2648215, NA. A French intelligence bulletin noted that a written order from Himmler creating an Inspectorate to oversee guerrilla warfare "on German soil behind enemy lines" was actually captured at Nuremberg, although no trace of it remains. Direction des Services de Documentation Allemagne, "Note sur la formation du Werwolf", 6 July 1945, p. 1, IRR File XE 049 888 "Werewolf Activities Vol. I", RG 319, NA. According to the testimony of an SA general, Himmler's directives on the matter were preceded by an order from Hitler to the Reichsführer. CSDIC (WEA) BAOR, "Final Report on SA Brigf. u. HDL Fritz Marrenbach", FR 29, Appendix "A", p. iii, ETO MIS-Y-Sect. Final Interrogation Reports, 1945-49, RG 332, NA.

7. SS-O/Gruf. Richard Hildebrandt to H. Himmler, 19 Sept. 1944, NS 19/2884, BA.

8. The first documented mention of the "Werwolf" title was in an SS-Police organizational chart of 20 October 1944, which referred to the "Werwolf Organisation für Deutschland." "Liste der Höchsten- und Höheren SS und Polizeiführer sowie de SS- und Polizeiführer", 20 Oct. 1944, p. 3, NS 19/1637, BA. Otto Skorzeny later suggested that the title was originally suggested by Party Secretary Martin Bormann, and it is true that Lüns' book Der Werwolf was republished in great numbers during the fall of 1944 under the purview of the Party Chancellery. On the other hand, a former staff member of the Werwolf central headquarters noted that the Werwolf name was selected by the chief of the organization, Hans Prützmann. Arno Rose suggests that the name may have been chosen by the head of the SS-Hauptamt, Gottlieb Berger, who was a great fan of Lüns. Whatever the case, there was some opposition to the name -- both from inside and outside the organization -- mainly on ground that it was unmilitary in spirit and suggested bands of armed

9. The Waffen-SS had its own Panzer Reconnaissance Training Abteilung, which seems a natural base that could have been used to prepare the Werwolf.


11. Whiting, *Hitler's Werewolves*, p. 147; Trevor-Roper (1950 ed.), pp. 51-52; BAOR Int. "Appreciation of the Werewolf Movement", 29 Aug. 1945, p. 4, IRR File XE 049 888 "Werewolf Activities Vol. I", RG 319, NA; and British Troops Austria, "Joint Weekly Intelligence Summary" #9, 31 Aug. 1945, pp. 9-12, FO 1007/300, PRO. Note, for instance, that the Werwolf manual defined guerrilla warfare in purely Clausewitzian terms: the Kleinkrieg, it said "is an effective means to aid one's own military and political struggle... In desperate situations it is the ultimate means to defend freedom and life of the nation to the utmost. Conducted in conjunction with general military operations, clear political objectives and qualified means, the Kleinkrieg can


Reports 1940-48, RG 407, NA; Intelligence Div., Office of Chief of Naval Operations "Intelligence Report", 6 Aug. 1945, OSS XL 18145, RG 226, NA; SHAEF JIC "Political Intelligence Report", 20 June 1945, p. 3, WO 219/1700, PRO; MI-14 "Mitropa" #1, 29 July 1945, p. 4, FO 371/46967, PRO; Col. Sands, Chief 12th AG G-2 ACOS 3rd Army G-2 ACOS 9th Army G-2, and ACOS 15th Army G-2, 13 May 1945, WO 219/1602, PRO. A Soviet source notes that "strong points" were also prepared for German diversionists on the Eastern Front, and that they were stocked with weapons and radios. Korovin and Shibalin, p. 104. For the existence of such dumps in Bohemia, see Drska, pp. 62, 67.


203


CSDIC(UK) Special Interrogation Reports, 1943-45, RG 332, NA. There was also an intention on the Eastern Front to establish a "Werewolf-like organisation" built on HJ resources and under the purview of Sturmbannführer Schimmelpfennig, the "Bevollmächtigter für den Osteinsatz der HJ." Rose, p. 122. For sabotage and reconnaissance activity by HJ teams on the Eastern Front, see "Wichtigste Ereignisse von H. Gr. Mitte," 12 March 1945, RH 2/2008, EMA; Max Florheim, "Der Einmarsch der Russen in mein Heimatgebeit Först/Lausitz im Früjahr 1945 und die dort durchgeführten Kämpfe," 11 Jan. 1956, pp. 1-2, Ost Dok. 8/711, BA; and Eberhard Schopfer, "Der Kampf in Elbing" (no date), p. 16, Ost Dok. 8/247, BA.

27. See, for instance, Rose, p. 121; History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, Vol. XX, pp. 31-32, 64-65; and Vol. XIX, pp. 40, 67, 71-72, 84, 98, 108-109, NA.


unlikely that local Party Gauleiters uniformly appointed a Werwolf Beauftragter, although they were ordered to do so in November 1944 and the order was repeated by Bormann in March 1945. CSDIC (WEA)/BAOR, "Final Report on SA Brigf. u. HDL Fritz Marrenbach", FR 29, 21 Jan. 1946, Appendix "A", p. ii, ETO MIS-Y-Sect. Final Interrogation Reports, 1945-49, RG 332, NA.


32. Oberst Bonin, OKH, Memo "Kampf in Rücken des Feindes" 12 Nov. 1944, RH 2/1929, BMA.


Activities Vol. I", RG 319, NA; and History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, Vol. XX, p. 4 NA. It should also be noted that the Soviets have excused some of the barbaric behaviour of their own forces in eastern Germany by blaming it on Werwölfe and SS diversionists. According to Soviet authorities, such Nazi stay-behind units allegedly dressed in Red Army uniforms and terrorized their own countrymen in order to discredit the Red Army. See, for instance, Count Heinrich von Einsiedel, The Shadow of Stalingrad (London: Allan Wingate, 1953), p. 170; and I.A. Kosikov, "Diversanty 'Tet' ego Reikha," in Novaia i Noveishaia Istoriya, #2 (March-April 1986), p. 225. For reports about Werwölfe and German bandits allegedly clothed in Soviet uniforms during the immediate postwar period, see The Stars and Stripes, 29 Nov. 1945; 14 Jan. 1946; and 3 March 1947.


39. Harry C. Butcher, "Notes on Berlin Surrender" (no date), p. 5, in David Irving, Papers Relating to
the Allied High Command, 1943/45, Reel #3; PID "Germany: Weekly Background Notes" #4, 4 July 1945, p. 5, FO 371/46993, PRO; The New York Times, 12 May 1945; The Christian Science Monitor, 12 May 1945; Time, 21 May 1945, p. 20; MI-14 "Mitropa" #1, 29 July 1945, p.5, FO 371/46967, PRO; The Stars and Stripes, 13 June 1945; HQ Berlin Area "Intelligence Summary" #1, 8 July 1945, p. 2; #5, 30 July 1945, both in WO 205/1078, PRO; The Globe and Mail, 12 May 1945; and 13 June 1945. It is perhaps significant that the sabotage chief for the Berlin region was only winkled out of his command post/bunker four weeks after the capitulation of the city. Mader, Hitlers Spionagegenerale sagen aus, pp. 331-333.

40. John Erickson, The Road to Berlin (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983), p. 779; and Albert Seaton, Stalin as Warlord (London: Batsford, 1976), p. 254. Officially, Berzarin died in a traffic accident. In March 1945, German radio also claimed that Marshal Chernyakhovskyi, the hero of the Soviet advance in East Prussia, had been killed by "the bullet of a German worker," allegedly in revenge for brutalities perpetrated upon the assassin's family. FO "German Intelligence Report" #166, 24 March 1945, p. 4, FO 371/46764, PRO. Soviet sources claim that Chernyakhovskyi was killed by a shell burst.

Tass reported on 28 May 1945 that armed German units were still roaming the woods in Soviet occupied areas, and that these units waged guerrilla warfare against the Red Army and plundered isolated farms and villages. FO Weekly Political Intelligence Summaries, Vol. 11, Summary #276, 6 June 1945, p. 3. For a report on a Soviet expedition against a German guerrilla band in Saxony, see The New York Times, 3 June 1945.

42. A Polish study notes, for instance, that although the Werwolf failed in its goals, "it is not surprising that... persons suspected of having contact with the Nazi underground were exposed -- especially as long as the war was still going on -- to repressions from the Soviet and Polish military authorities." Stanislas Schimitzek, Truth or Conjecture? German Civilian War Losses in the East (Warszawa: Zachodnia Agencja Prasowa, 1966), p. 312. For reports from eastern German refugees regarding Polish raids and arrests against the alleged Nazi underground, see Walter Gräbsch, "Augenzügenbericht über die Vorgänge bei der Räumung Schlesiens, 1945/1946", 22 Aug. 1949, pp. 1-2; Pastor Weichert, "An den grossen und kleinen Brennpunkten der Schlesischen Kirche vom 25.5.1943 bis 31.12.1946" (no date), p. 9; Gertrude Kromer, untitled report, 8 May 1951; "Verhandlung gegen Max Gottwald," 9 Feb. 1952, pp. 1-2, 4; Martha Pawlowski, "Bericht über die Ermordung des Millermeisters Bernard Pawlowski," 21 May 1951, all in Ost Dok. 2/177, BA; Erich Ritler, "Bericht über Verbrechen gegen Menschlichkeit," 15 July 1951, Ost Dok. 2/183, BA; sig. illegible, untitled report, 10 Sept. 1953; Georg Thomas, "Verbrechen in Schlaup, Kr. Jauer," 9 Oct. 1952, both in Ost Dok. 2/189, BA; and The Tragedy of Silesia. 1945-46 (Munich: "Christ Unterwegs," 1952-53), pp. 444, 488. Most of these reports claimed that Polish charges were unfounded, but were motivated by a "fear psychosis," or by a deliberate policy of racial and economic warfare against the German population. To some extent this was true: the British Vice-Consul in Stettin, for instance, reported that Werewolf hysteria in that city during the summer of 1947
almost certainly lacked any foundation in objective reality. According to this observer, a spate of fires allegedly caused by German arsonists was in fact caused by dry summer weather in combination with several other special factors, such as careless smoking by Polish scavengers. F. Savory, FO Northern Dept., Minute on the Stettin fires, 17 Sept. 1947; and J. Walters, Vice-Consulate at Stettin to Russel, British Embassy, Warsaw, 21 Nov. 1947, both in FO 371/66217, PRO.

43. Radio intercepts show that after the German capitulation, some two hundred Werwölfe remained trapped deep behind Soviet lines in East Prussia. The Soviets deployed three security divisions to track down these guerrillas, probably with considerable success, although a source available to the British reported that scattered SS partisans were still roaming Masuria in late 1945. An AK dispatch from southern Poland (24 March 1945) reported that German guerrillas were also active in this area, where they attacked Soviet transports and pillaged local villages. A former concentration camp prisoner briefly appointed by the Soviets as the Bürgermeister of several villages south of Berlin later reported that there was Werwolf activity in this area, particularly the setting of forest fires, and in Pomerania, an East Prussian refugee came face-to-face with local German partisans when they helped this unfortunate girl escape from Soviet troops who had abducted her (June 1945). Arno Rose has also uncovered the interesting story of a Werwolf unit in eastern Pomerania, which conducted a sabotage campaign against the Soviets until it finally retreated and broke through to the West in the autumn of 1945. Rose, p. 324; MI-14 "Mitropa" #12, 29 Dec. 1945, p. 6, FO 371/55630, PRO; AK to the Polish Gov t. (London) 24 March 1945, in Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations, 1939-1945 (London: Heinemann, 1967), Vol. II, 560; Gunther Weisenborn, "Reich Street," in We Survived, ed. Eric Boehm (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC - Clio, 1985), pp. 210-211; and Hanna Buettler, "Niederschrift über Flucht aus Ostprußen," 25 Oct. 1950, p. 2, Ost Dok. 2/13, BA.

45. BAOR/Int. "Appreciation of the Werewolf Movement", pp. 3-4, IRR File XE 049 888 "Werewolf Activities Vol. I", RG 319, NA; CCG (BE) "Intelligence Review" #12, Sept. 1946, p. 24, FO 1005/1700, PRO; History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, Vol. XIX, pp. 57, 78, Vol. XX, pp. 18, 26, 45, 59-60, 72, 125-126, 144-147, 152, NA; Capt. Pierre de Tristan, 1st French Army 5th Bureau, "Monthly Historical Report", 1 May 1945, p. 5, WO 219/2587, PRO; SHAEF PWD Int. Sect., "A Volkssturm Company Commander", 15 March 1945, OSS 120243, RG 226, NA; History of the Fifteenth United States Army: 21 August 1944 to 11 July 1945 (Bad Neuenahr: US 15th Army, 1945), p. 27; SHAEF PWD - "Reactions to 'Werwolf' in Cologne," 26 April 1945, OSS 128265, RG 226, NA; and Leach, p. 136. There were, of course, some minor German successes in the Rhineland: it is possible, for instance, that HJ commando teams were related to a rash of nocturnal stabbing attacks upon American infantryman in newly occupied Cologne, and the Chief of the HJ, Arthur Axmann, also claimed that HJ guerrillas had managed to bomb several bridges in the Allied rear. FO Weekly Political Intelligence Summaries, Vol. 11, Summary #289, 18 April 1945, p. 3; The New York Times, 26 March 1945; and 4 April 1945.


49. GSI 8th Army "Joint Weekly Intelligence Summary" #5, 3 Aug. 1945, p. 12, FO 371/46611, PRO; and GSI British Troops Austria "Joint Weekly Intelligence Summary" #7, Part I, pp. 15-16, FO 371/46612, PRO.


51. Lowenthal, pp. 147-148. Lowenthal also mentions a case of Werwolf pamphleteering, as well as the trial and execution of a local Nazi leader accused of concealing a Panzerfaust.

52. USFET Interrogation Center, "Preliminary
Interrogation Report (PIR) #40 - Benno Martin", 3 Aug. 1945, OSS 141752, RG 226, NA; 21 AG "Weekly CI News Sheet" #81, p. 2, IRR File XE 049 888 "Werewolf Activities Vol. I", RG 319, NA; 3rd US Army Interrogation Center (Prov.) "Interrogation Report" #39, 8 Sept. 1945, OSS XL 19643, RG 226, NA; and History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, Vol. XX, p. 97, NA. It is also significant that Benno Martin was a police officer by profession and was not a particularly rabid species of Nazi. In fact, it was Martin who helped engineer the downfall of Julius Streicher as Franconian Gauleiter. By April 1945, Martin was involved in an attempt by various south German Nazis to approach the Allies and negotiate an armistice. Peterson, The Limits of Hitler's Power, pp. 246-252; and OSS Memo for the JCS, "Approaches from Austrian and Bavarian Nazis," 9 April 1945, in Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part I -- 1942-45: European Theatre, Reel #11.


54. Infield, Skorzeny, p. 110.

56. USFET Interrogation Center, "Intermediate Interrogation Report (IIR) #6 - HSSPf Walter Schimana", 31 July 1945, p. 2, OSS 142090, RG 226, NA.


58. Wenck, OKH to the Heeresgruppen and Armeen, 6 Feb. 1945, RH 2/1930, BMA.

According to a system devised by Himmler's Home Army headquarters in the fall of 1944, all requests by the HSSPFs for equipment, weapons, and ammunition flowed through Dienstelle Prützmann; allocations were supposed to be made via the military Wehrkreis offices. Ultra Document BT 7004, 12 March 1945, Ultra Micf. Coll., Reel 65.

61. British Troops Austria, "Joint Weekly Intelligence Summary" #9, 31 Aug. 1945, p. 11, FO 1007/300, PRO; BAOR/Int. "Appreciation of the Werewolf Movement", p. 3; and US 12th Army "Werewolves", 31 May 1945, p. 2, both in IRR File XE 049 888 "Werewolf Activities Vol. I, RG 319 NA. Prützmann also begged supplies from the RSHA central ordinance service, which was run by his old protege, Josef Spacil, but was reportedly refused in all such requests. USFET MIS Center, "Intermediate Interrogation Report (IIR) #16 - O/Führer Josef Spacil", 28 Aug. 1945, p. 19, OSS 15135, RG 226, NA.

(Germany), RG 59, NA. For the transfer of Reichsbank financial resources into the Alps in order to fund resistance activity, see Ian Sayer and Douglas Botting, Nazi Gold (London: Grenada, 1985), pp. 24, 29-38. For the transfer of weapons and supplies from northern Italy in order to provision HJ guerrillas in the Alpine Redoubt, see CX Report, 16 June 1945; and CSDIC/CMF/SD 21 "The Werewolf Organization", 10 June 1945, both in IRR File XE 049 888 "Werewolf Activities Vol. 19", RG 319, NA. After a meeting of sabotage chiefs in Hamburg, it was also decided to reserve a Dynamit A.G. factory in the Redoubt area solely for the production of Werewolf material, and several technicians were sent south to undertake the necessary steps. Office of the Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, Interrogation Br. "Interrogation Summary #819 - Georg Gerhard," 31 Dec. 1946, p. 1, IWM.

63. EDS Report #34 "Notes on the 'Werewolves'", IRR File XE 049 888 "Werewolf Activities Vol I", RG 319, NA.


65. One example of transport difficulties: supplies were actually set aside in Berlin, Hamburg, and Breslau for the use of Stroop's Werwolf section in Wehrkreis XII, but the regional Werwolf organizations were responsible for transport and in this case there was only enough fuel to send supply trucks to and from Berlin. Available supplies in the other two cities were never utilized, at least not by the intended Wehrkreis. 12th AG "Unternehmen W.", 12 June 1945, IRR File XE 049 888 "Werewolf Activities Vol I", RG 319, NA.


69. There was a particularly fierce battle between the Werwolf and the Waffen-SS in the spring of 1945, fought entirely over recruitment. Werwolf officers in Wehrkreis XII had apparently convinced officials in the local SS recruiting office in Wiesbaden that the Werwolf had been given exclusive rights to several classes (Jahrgänge) of HJ youths trained at a local camp, and to the 1927 class of the local Reich Arbeitsdienst, most of whom would have normally gone to the Waffen-SS. With two to three thousand young recruits at stake, this was a considerable achievement for the regional Werwolf. However, this news soon reached the ears of the Waffen-SS overlord, Obergruppenführer Berger, who swiftly radioed the local HSSPF, Stroop, and forbade him to hand over any of "his boys" to Unternehmen Werwolf. CSDIC (UK) "SS Hauptamt and the Waffen-SS", 23 Aug. 1945, p. 10, OSS 144337, RG 226, NA.

70. CSDIC/WEA BAOR "Final Report on SA Brgf. u. HDL Fritz Marrenbach" FR 29, 21 Jan. 1946, Appendix

71. CSDIC/WEA BAOR "Second Interim Report on SS Obergruf. Karl M. Gutenberger", IR 34, 1 Nov. 1945, pp. 4-5, ETO MIS-Y-Sect. CSDIC/WEA Interim Interrogation Reports 1945-46, RG 332, NA. An OKW memo noted that soldiers within the Werewolf were volunteers and were employed as leaders of Werewolf "troops". Winter, memo from WFST./Op (H)/Ia to Chef WFST., Stellv. Chef, OP(H), Ia, Ic, Qu, 28 Feb. 1945, RW 4/v. 702, BMA.


74. SHAEF intelligence reports quoted German sources as citing a total Werwolf membership of one to two thousand, while a number of published accounts settle upon a figure of four to five thousand. EDS Report #34, "Notes on the 'Werewolves'", IRR File
219


A secret Werwolf recruitment pamphlet prepared under the direction of the HJ office in Wiesbaden - mainly to appeal to boys living west of the Rhine - was most general in nature and gave no hint of what was expected of the teenage volunteers. "Report from Captured Personnel and Material Branch, MID, US War Dept.", 9 May 1945, p. 1, State Dept. Decimal Files 1945-49, 740.00119 Control (Germany), RG 59, NA.

Gutenberger later claimed that although a high standard of physical fitness was maintained for Werwolf entrants, less attention was paid to strength of character and as a result "a fairly large percentage of undesirables merely working for their own gain appeared in the ranks of the W Movement". This, he surmised, was one of the causes of the organization's failure.

A case in point was the experience of two 16 year old boys captured by the US Army in the spring of 1945. While at a HJ leadership school, they were made to sign documents which they had not read, and were then told that they were novice partisans and should consider enrolling in a full training program. When they refused, they were sent to a political reformatory at Ballenstadt, along with
six hundred boys of similar age. Even then, however, the Nazis had not yet given up on these supposed slackers, who were given weapons instruction and told to return home to organize small bands of boys into behind-the-lines resistance groups. These two particular boys wisely ran away when they sighted the advancing American forces. PWE "German Propaganda and the German", 30 April 1945, p. C4, FO 898/187, PRO.


82. Sig. illegible, Leitstelle II Ost für FAK to OKH/Genst. d. H/Frende Heere Ost, 20 March 1945, Records of OKH, Microcopy #T-78, Roll 565, frame 915, NA; and Wilhelmine Hoffman, "Bericht Über meine Erlebnisse in Sudetenland" (1956-57), p.5, Ost Dok. 2/279,BA.

69; and Rose, p. 28.

85. British Troops Austria, "Joint Weekly Intelligence Summary" #9, 31 Aug. 1945, p. 11, FO 1007/300, PRO.


88. Wenck, OKH to the Heeresgruppen and Armeen, 6 Feb. 1945, RH 2/1930, BMA; and Direction des Services de Documentation Allemagne, "Note sur la formation du Werwolf", 6 July 1945, pp. 3-4, IRR File XE 049 888 "Werewolf Activities Vol. I" RG 319, NA. During this same period, OKW published guidelines for the establishment of sabotage dumps for the use of commando groups or military units cut-off in the enemy's rear. "Richtlinien für die Anlage von S-Depots". Records of OKW, Microcopy #T-77, Roll 1441, frames 652-660, NA.

89. Sig. illegible, OKH Gen. Std. H/Ausb. Abt (I) to OKW/WPSt., 6 Feb. 1945, RH 2/1523, BMA. Arno Rose describes a so-called "Gneisenau-Werwolf" order from the Operations Section of the Wehrmachtführungstab, which established that intelligence officers of the field commands were to work closely with the HSSPFs in organizing last ditch resistance, and that Werewolf partisans were to be led by volunteers from the Army. Rose, pp. 168-169.


92. Ultra Documents BT 1789, 9 Jan. 1945 (Reel 57); BT 7004, 12 March 1945 (Reel 65); and BT 7689, 19 March 1945 (Reel 62), all in Ultra Micf. Coll. For the deployment of Pionier Sonderkommandos on Werewolf missions, see History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, Vol. XX, pp. 84-85, NA; Robert Hewitt, Work Horse of the Western Front: The Story of the 30th Infantry Division (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), p. 265; and 6 SFSS HQ 5 Corps "Notes on the Political Situation in Carinthia and Western Styria May 1945", 22 May 1945, FO 371/4610, PRO. In Thuringia, US troops captured documents from a German engineer company showing that the unit had orders to convert to partisan activity in case of a local breakthrough by American troops -- the codeword was "Werewolf." 3rd Army G-2 Documents Sect., Translations of captured Werwolf orders, 19 April 1945, IRR File XE 049 888 "Werewolf Activities Vol. I," RG 319, NA.


95. For evidence of the direct transfer of Wehrmacht
officers to Werewolf units in Magdeburg and Augsberg in April 1945, see 12th AG Mobile Field Interrogation Unit #4, "PW Intelligence Bulletin" #4/2, Annex "Notes on Werewolf", 7 May 1945, pp. 15-17, OSS OB 27836, RG 226, NA; and Rose, p. 286.


100. Ultra Documents BT 6948, 6 April 1945 (Reel 69); KO 4, 10 April 1945 (Reel 70); KO 57, 10 April 1945 (Reel 70); KO 24, 12 April 1945 (Reel 71); KO 1201, 23 April 1945 (Reel 72), all in Ultra Micf. Coll.; Franz Kurowski, Armee Wenck: Die 12. Armee zwischen Elbe und Oder, 1945 (Neckargemund: Kurt Vowinckel, 1967), p. 31; and John Toland, The Last 100 Days (New York: Bantam, 1967), p. 425.

101. Rose, p. 171.
102. Guerrilla groups based upon elements of 6th SS Mountain Division, along with a number of armed civilians, caused considerable commotion in the Taunus. After the division was cut off, Army Group "B" in the Ruhr ordered it to form Werwolf Kampfgruppen and harass American supply lines, which was in fact done with a vengeance: several thousand guerrillas from SS 6th Mountain Division ambushed numerous Allied supply convoys, overran a mobile field army hospital, and besieged the headquarters of an American artillery battalion at Geisal. Such guerrillas also revelled in the brutal SS code of warfare: in one case, recaptured Wehrmacht POWs were machine gunned; in another instance, Black soldiers belonging to an American ammunition company were also massacred. Such incidents naturally caused alarm among American commanders, and elements of three American divisions and a Cavalry Group were recalled to the rear in order to deal properly with such outrages. Most of the SS guerrillas were either hunted down or fought their way back to German lines in early April, although a Luftwaffe squadron is on record on 17 April still inquiring about supply flights for SS elements in the Taunus. Dyer, pp. 392-393, 398; MacDonald, The Last Offensive, pp. 349-350; The New York Times, 4 April 1945; The Times, 3 April 1945; 4 April 1945; The Fifth Infantry Division in the ETO (Vilshofen: Fifth Div. Hist. Sect., 1945); Whiting, Hitler's Werewolves, pp. 180-181; Nat Frankel and Larry Smith, Patton's Best: An Informal History of the 44th Armoured Division (New York: Hawthorne, 1978), pp. 126-127; Capt. Kenneth Koyen, The Fourth Armoured Division: From the Beach to Bavaria (Munich: Fourth Armoured Div., 1946), p. 113; Die Letzten Hunderte Tage (München: Kurt Desch, 1965), p. 117; Ultra Documents BT 9333, 3 April 1945 (Reel 68); KO 26, 10 April 1945 (Reel 70); and KO 654, 17 April 1945 (Reel 71), all in Ultra Micf. Coll.

only subsequent evidence of guerrilla warfare in the Ruhr was occasional nocturnal sniping around lonely stretches of road, as well as trouble caused by bands of French and Dutch SS men near Rechlinghausen. History of the 94th Infantry Division in World War Two, p. 481; and History of XVI Corps (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), p. 76.


107. Ultra Document KO 387, 14 April 1945, Ultra Micf. Coll., Reel 70. For the use of Panzer Jagdkommandos to attack Allied supply lines, see Ultra Documents KO 4, 10 April 1945 (Reel 70); and KO 1230, 24 April 1945 (Reel 71), both in Ultra Micf. Coll. Panzer Jagdbrigade "Schill", which was described to potential Army volunteers as a tank destroying formation, was actually a full-fledged Werewolf unit. When volunteer troops arrived at the unit's base near Flensburg, they found themselves faced with an intensive sabotage training course. Allied Intelligence Report, c. Aug. 1945, pp. 30-31, OSS OB 28993, NA.


109. In December 1944, FHO circulated throughout the General Staff translated excerpts from The Guerrilla War, Partisanism and Sabotage (1931), a classic work by the Soviet strategist Drosov. Abt. Fremde Heere Ost (III F), "Teilübersetzung - Der Kleinkrieg, Partisanentum und Sabotage von Drosow,
1931", Records of OKH, Microcopy #T-78, Roll 565, frames 835-839, NA.


"This is complete nonsense. If I should discuss this plan with Wenk [Commander of Army Group Vistula] I would be the first defeatist of the Third Reich. This fact would be served boiling hot to the Führer. You need not tell this to your Gehlen. You need only to explain to him that I strictly refuse to accept the plan. Besides -- it is typical of the high class general staff officer to sit in the Frankenstrupp [an OKW bunker] nursing post-war plans instead of fighting."

Gehlen freely admitted in his memoirs (1971) that he threw himself into the self-appointed task of redesigning the guerrilla movement in order to avoid the Front and thereby save himself for the all-important task of guiding the FHO files westwards.

112. Höhne and Zolling, p. 48; MI-14 "Mitropa" #5, 22 Sept. 1945, p. 4, FO 371/46967, PRO; and MI-14 "Mitropa" #12, 29 Dec. 1945, p. 6, FO 371/55630, PRO.

114. ACA Intelligence Organization, "Joint Intelligence Summary" #16, 27 Oct. 1945, p. 5, FO 1007/300, PRO.


116. 1st Canadian Army "Intelligence Periodical" #3, 30 May 1945, pp. 14-15, WO 205/1072, PRO; The Times, 4 Oct. 1945; CSDIC (WEA) BAOR, "Sixth Combined Interim Report - Stubaf. Kopkw, Stubaf. Thomsen, Stubaf. Noske", IR #62, 31 May 1946, ETO MIS-Y-Sect. CSDIC (UK) Interim Interrogation Reports 1945-46, NA; and USFET MIS Center, "CI Intermediate Interrogation Report (CI-IIR) #24- O/Gruf. Jürgen Stroop", 10 Oct. 1945, p. 4, OSS XL 22157, RG 226, NA. RSHA Amt VI also had an extensive poisons program conducted under Hauptsturmführer Winter at the Jagdverband training camp in Neustrelitz. Amt VI developed poison cigarettes which only became toxic when heated, and it was rumoured that one million of these were distributed in Yugoslavia during 1944. SHAEF CI War Room, "German Terrorist Methods", 2 April 1945, p. 2, WO 219/1602, PRO; Capt. L.S. Sabin, US Navy to Director, CAD, 28 April 1945, Enclosure "A" - "German Use of Poison for Assassination Purposes", CAD 014 Germany, RG 165, NA; and OSS Report from Yugoslavia #GB-2787, 26 Nov. 1944, OSS 105325, RG 226, NA.

117. Col. Benton G. Wallace, Patton and His Third Army (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Pub. Co., 1946), p. 188; The New York Times, 1 April 1945; and 17 April 1945. A French intelligence report noted that techniques for the poisoning of food and water were taught at Werwolf training schools. 1ère Armée Française 2ème Bureau "Bulletin de

118. The US Army Surgeon General reported that one hundred and eighty-eight American soldiers were killed by methyl alcohol in liquor during the period 1 February to 10 July 1945. The Globe and Mail, 24 July 1945. For individual cases of poisoning and attempted poisoning during the period 1945-47, see The Times, 26 April 1945; 1st Canadian Army "Intelligence Periodical" #3, 30 May 1945, p. 14, WO 205/1072, PRO; USFET "Weekly Intelligence Summary", #11, 27 Sept. 1945, p. 47; #14, 18 Oct. 1945, p. 41; #26, 10 Jan. 1946, p. 58; #32, 21 Feb. 1946, p. A14; #45, 23 May 1946, p. C12; #48, 13 June 1946, p. C10; #61, 12 Sept. 1946, p. C12; #65, 10 Oct. 1946, p. C14; Eucom "Intelligence Summary", 5 June 1947, p. C7, all in State Dept. Decimal File 1945-49, 740.00119 Control (Germany), RG 59, NA; The Stars and Stripes, 18 Jan. 1946; 28 Feb. 1946; 26 Feb. 1947; CCG(BE) "Intelligence Bulletin" #12, 10 May 1946, p. 2, FO 1005/1701, PRO; BAOR "Fortnightly Military Intelligence Summary" #4, 10 June 1946, p. 2, ETO MIS-Y-Sect. Intelligence and Interrogation Reports 1945-46, RG 332, NA; CCG(BE) "Intelligence Division Summary" #7, 15 Oct. 1946, p. 6, FO 1005/1702, PRO; and Frederic Sondern Jr., "Are We Bungling the Job in Germany?" in Reader's Digest, Feb. 1946, p. 88. In one of the cases cited, British investigators could find no evidence of malicious intent in the poisoning of two British soldiers by methyl alcohol, although most of the remaining cases were either left open or attributed to deliberate sabotage. Several incidents involved the deliberate poisoning of food -- where there was no doubt of foul play -- and a similar case occurred at a British military mess in Gifhorn, where soldiers found pins inserted into their food. CCG(BE) "Intelligence Bulletin" #10, 10 April 1946, p. 4, FO 1005/1701, PRO.

119. R. Malinovsky, "Befehl an die Truppen der 2. ukrain. Front" #017 (Germ. transl.), 8 Feb. 1945 (frame 6474401); "Auszug aus Frd. Heere Ost (III g) Az. 6b Kgf. #1291 v. 17.2 1945, Kgf. Vern" (frame
231

6474473); 3rd Byelorussian Front Pol. Office Memo, (Germ. transl.), 22 Feb. 1945 (frames 6474493 - 6474494), all in Records of OKH, Microcopy #T-78, Roll 488, NA; Oberkommando der Heeresgruppe Mitte, Abt Ic "Ic Tagesmeldung vom 28.2.45", p. 7, RH 2/2008, BMA; Joseph Stukowski, "Bis zuletzt in Schneidemühl" (no date), p. 24, Ost Dok. 8/698, BA; and 5 Corps "Weekly Intelligence Summary" #6, 17 Aug. 1945, p. 2, FO 1007/299, PRO. Although the Red Army was accustomed to having its troops poisoned by anti-Soviet resisters in the Ukraine, the first such instances on German territory occurred in December 1944. The number of cases greatly increased during the next several months, particularly in East Prussia, where troops of the 3rd Byelorussian Front had crossed the frontier in strength. As a result, the Red Army began to issue urgent appeals for its men to guard against poisoned liquor left behind by "the Hitlerite scoundrels". Such warnings continued to circulate in Austria well into the summer of 1945.

120. Office of the US Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, Evidence Division, Interrogation Br. "Interrogation Summary #819 - Georg R. Gerhard", 31 Dec. 1946, pp. 1-2, IWM; and Enemy Personnel Exploitation Sect., Field Information Agency Technical CC(BE), "Two Brief Discussions of German CW Policy with Albert Speer", 12 Oct. 1945, pp. 13-16, OSS XL 22949, RG 226, NA. Speer's remarks in an interrogation on 21 September 1945 are the matter of some dispute. His own typed transcript of the interrogation stated that chemical warfare supplies may have been provided to the Werwolf and Freikorps Adolf Hitler, while his two interrogators claimed that during the actual conversation Speer had unequivocally admitted the transfer of such material. Speer's interrogators later charged that his written statement had deliberately muddied the waters in order to leave an air of ambiguity over his admission that poison gas had in fact been supplied to the guerrillas. Maj. E. Tilley to Lt. Col. G. L. Harrison (undated), FO 1031/150, PRO.


123. Goebbels, in particular, initiated two unsuccessful assassination attempts. One was against Bürgermeister Vogelsang, the mayor of Goebbels' hometown of Reydt. His crime was to have presided over the happy welcome given to American troops who occupied the town. The other target was a Jewish ex-policeman, Karl Winkler, who was in mid-March 1945 appointed Polizeipräsident of occupied Cologne. The assassination team appointed to kill Vogelsang was actually dispatched, but somehow failed in its aim after leaving German lines. Final Entries, 1945 - The Diaries of Joseph Goebbels, ed. Hugh Trevor-Roper (New York: Putnam's 1978), pp. 94-95, 105, 258, 279; and Wolfgang Trees and Charles Whiting, Unternehmen Karnival: Der Werwolf-Mord an Aachens Oberbürgermeister Oppenhoff (Aachen: Triangr, 1982), pp. 261-262.

124. The mayors of Metzenich, Kirchlenger, Masstetten, and Krakenhagen were all killed by Wervölfe in late March and early April 1945. A collaborationist doctor at Geissen was killed by a two man Werwolf hit team; a German civilian in Burkhardsfelden was killed by German stragglers; and the murder of a German policeman in Cologne was also regarded as a possible Wervolf act -- perhaps carried out by HJ diversionists who made nocturnal crossings of the Rhine in rubber rafts. At Düsseldorf, no less than five members of an antifa were murdered by Nazi terrorists -- reportedly from the Sipo -- after these anti-Nazis had worked to surrender the city and denazify the police force. Rose, pp. 247, 304; The New York Times, 30 March 1945; 11 April 1945; History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, Vol. XX, pp. 85-86, NA; Siegbert Kahn, Werewolves German Imperialism - Some Facts (London: ING, 1945), p. 38; Trees and Whiting, p. 262; 12th AG to SHAEF Main for G-2(CIB), 7 April 1945; 12th Ag from sands from Sibert sqnd. Bradley to 1st US Army, 9th US Army, and 15th US Army, 8 April 1945, both in WO219/1602, PRO; SHAEF JIC (45) 14 (Draft)
"Security Problems Facing the Allies in Germany," 11 April 1945; "Annex A," WO 219/1659, PRO; Whiting, Hitler's Werewolves, p. 179; Pearson, Vol. II, 170; FO Weekly Political Intelligence Summaries, Vol. 11, Summary #289, 18 April 1945, p. 3; PWE "German Propaganda and the German", 7 May 1945, p. C6, FO 898/187, PRO; Görlitz, Vol. II, 551; and SHAFF JIC "Political Intelligence Report," 30 April 1945, p. 2, WO 219/1700, PRO. There were relatively few Vehme-style murders after the conclusion of hostilities. However, the massacre of a South Tyrolean anti-Nazi -- along with his entire family -- was attributed to Werwölfe. It is not clear whether the murders of the Police Chief of Zehlendorf and of a Berlin banking official, both in the summer of 1945, were committed on personal or political grounds. German Directorate "Weekly Intelligence Summary" #36, 11 July 1945, p. 1, OSS 140955, RG 226, NA; USFET G-5 "Bi-Weekly Political Summary" #3, 29 Sept. 1945, p. 5, OSS XL 20917, RG 226, NA; and MI-14 "Mitropa" #4, 8 Sept. 1945, p. 4, FO 371/46967, PRO.

125. Note, for instance, the woman murdered by Werwölfe in Lorrach after dating a French NCO, and also the girl shot in the backside when caught en flagrante delicto with an American soldier in the woods near Passau. "Maquis Allemands" (no date), p. 6, 7P 125, SHAT; and Peter Seewald, "Gruss Gott, ihr seid frei," in 1945: Deutschland in der Stunde Null, ed. Wolfgang Malanowski (Hamburg: Spiegel, 1985), p. 105.


130. K. Strölin, Der Oberbürgermeister der Stadt der Auslandsdeutsch to HSSPF Hofmann, 5 April 1945, Records of the Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police, Microcopy # T-175, Roll 223, NA.


132. Rose, pp. 238-239.

133. 1ère Armée Française 2ème Bureau, "Bulletin de Renseignements", 16 May 1945, Annex II, pp.1-3, 7P 125, SHAT. At Villingen, also in Southwest Germany, a Werwolf Gruppe attempted to blow up a Stalag holding Allied POWs, probably in the hope of destroying any chance of reconciliation between their countrymen and the advancing Allied troops. Direction Générale des Études et Recherches "Bulletin de Renseignements -- Allemagne: Services Spéciaux. Wehrwolf", 23 June 1945, 7P 125, SHAT.


136. Joachim Fest, *Hitler* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974), p. 731. For the text of a "flag order," see *Die Letzten Hunderte Tage*, p. 116. When Berlin came under Soviet attack, local Werwölfe were openly encouraged to take "ruthless action" against people who hoisted white flags; such persons, said Werwolf radio, were agents of the "Freies Deutschland" committee. PWE "German Propaganda and the German," 30 April 1945, p. A4, FO 898/187, PRO.

137. Haffner, pp. 158-162.


139. For a list of people killed in Nazi-held territory by Werwölfe — including the Bürgermeister of Schandahal, a police inspector in Wilhelmshaven, and the Landrat of Braunschweig — see Rose, pp. 117-118, 208, 232-237, 239-240, 276-277, 286, 289. Germany's own propaganda services announced that
Bürgermeister Velten of Meschede had been assassinated by Werwölfe on 28 March 1945, almost two weeks before Meschede was overrun by American troops, and on 7 April Werwolf Sender added that Werwölfe had murdered "another German mayor prepared to surrender his village." The Globe and Mail 3 April 1945; The New York Times, 3 April 1945; 8 April 1945; and Time, Vol. XLV, #15 (9 April 1945), p. 25.


141. For the case of a Party official who attempted to sneak away from Hannover, but was caught and killed by Werwölfe, see Ernst Jünger, Jahre der Okkupation (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett, 1958), p. 16. For mention of an SS guerrilla unit tracking a cowardly Nazi Party official, see Allied Intelligence Report, p. 12, OSS 133195, RG 226, NA.


144. Speer, pp. 442, 562; Lang, p. 310; and Infield, Skorzeny, p. 110.

145. For the organization and purpose of "Sprengkommandos", see SS-Partei Kanzlei-Wehrmacht, "Verwendung des Deutschen Volkssturms", 28 March 1945, p. 2, NS 6/99, BA; 21 AG "CI News Sheet" #27, 14 Aug. 1945, Part III, p. 8, WO 205/997, PRO; and Rose, pp. 227-228. "Sprengkommando" agents also had orders — in some cases — to operate after enemy occupation if their targets were not properly destroyed. Allied Intelligence suspected that such an agent was responsible for an arson attack upon the main building of the Siempelkamp Machine Works in Krefeld, which produced armour plating for tanks, as well as other vital military material. The main suspect was an executive at the plant who was thought to be an "undercover Nazi labour spy," and who was subsequently evacuated as a security threat, although he was never formally convicted. History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, Vol. XIX, pp. 83-84, NA.


147. The electricity generating station at Trier, for instance, was prepared for destruction by stay-behind saboteurs, although the explosives were discovered by Allied troops before they could be detonated. SHAEF JIC "Political Intelligence Report," 3 April 1945, WO 219/1659, PRO.

148. Werwölfe were involved in an attempt to blow up an Allied headquarters in the Rhineland — which was apparently successful — as well as an abortive plan to blow up Hermann Göring's palatial east German estate, Karinhall, under the feet of the Russians. "Report from Captured Personnel and Material Branch, MID, US War Dept. -- The Werewolf
Movement" 9 May 1945, p. 2, State Dept. Decimal File 1945-49, 740.00119 Control (Germany), RG 59, NA; and Memo for Dienstelle Obergruppenführer Prützmann "Vorbereitungen für den Werwolf in Karinhall," Records of the Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police, Microfilm #T 175, Roll 452, frame 2967661, NA. For the explosion of mined buildings in Alsace-Lorraine and western Germany, see Dyer, p. 262; Wallace, p. 127; 21 AG "CCI News Sheet" #14, Part I, pp. 6-7, WO 205/997, PRO; and American Military Intelligence Report, p. 6, OSS 134 791, RG 226, NA.

149. Kästner, p. 79.

150. Rose, p. 119; and SHAEF PWO Int. Sect., "A Volkssturm Company Commander," 15 March 1945, OSS 120243, RG 226, NA.

151. US Constabulary G-2 "Weekly Intelligence Summary" #98, 19 April 1948, p. 6, WWII Operations Reports 1940-48, RG 407, NA.

152. The Vatican newspaper L'Osservatore Romano called the Werwolf the war's "epilogue of hate," and the movement was further condemned in a pastoral letter by the Archbishop of Freiburg, also broadcast on Radio Vatican. "How senseless and suicidal it is," said the Archbishop, "still to try to engage the victorious army in rearguard skirmishes, or even worse, to hatch plans for revenge; and how criminal it is to terrorize the population from hideouts in the mountains and valleys of the Black Forest and to kill off inconvenient and hated men." Time, Vol. LXV, #16 (16 April 1945), p. 26; and PID "Germany: Weekly Background Notes" #4, 4 July 1945, p. 11, FO 371/46933, PRO.

153. According to an account by a former Allied prisoner in Germany, who was marched passed a HJ training camp in April 1945, adolescent Werwölfe ran out to greet the POW column and readily expressed their anxiety about being committed to combat. Their officers did nothing to interfere with the conversation. Aidan Crawley, Spoils of War (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973), p. 15.

155. Ibid., pp. 184-186; and Rose, p. 319.


157. "Die Deutsche Freiheitsbewegung (Volksgenossische Bewegung)," 3 April 1945, Records of OKW, Microfilm #T-77, Reel 775, frames 5500617-5500621, NA.


159. Schellenburg, p. 440; and Moczarski, p. 238.

160. For the efforts of regional Werewolf leaders in April 1945 to reinforce Werewolf activity in occupied western Germany, see Ultra Documents BT 9696, 7 April 1945 (Reel 69); and KO 729, 18 April 1945 (Reel 71), both in Ultra Micf. Coll.


163. Rose, p. 327.

164. MID Report, 16 Sept. 1944, OSS L 45595, RG 226, NA; SHAEF G-5 "Weekly Intelligence Summary" #1, 22 Feb.


168. PWE "German Propaganda and the German", 23 April 1945, pp. C5-C6, FO 898/187, PRO.


170. History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, Vol. XX,
p. 146, NA; SHAEF G-2 "Weekly Intelligence Summary" #59, 6 May 1945, Part II, WO 219/5170, PRO; Sayer & Botting, America's Secret Army, p. 209; Ultra Documents KO 786, 19 April 1945 (Reel 72); KO 919, 20 April 1945 (Reel 71); KO 1349 25 April 1945 (Reel 72); KO 1351, 25 April (Reel 72); KO 1139, 23 April 1945 (Reel 72); KO 1255, 24 April 1945 (Reel 73); KO 1822, 1 May 1945 (Reel 73); KO 1860, 2 May 1945 (Reel 73); KO 1877, 2 May 1945 (Reel 73); and KO 1988, 4 May 1945 (Reel 73), all in Ultra Micf. Coll. Luftwaffe squadrons on the Northeastern Front were instructed to examine the possibility of forming similar sabotage teams for action in the Soviet rear. Ultra Document KO 918, 20 April 1945, Ultra Micf. Coll., Reel 71.


172. Gauleiter Wegener to Gauleiter Stellvertreter Joel, Wilhelmshaven, 5 May 1945, Records of OKW, Microcopy # T-77, Roll 864, frame 5611864, NA; and Schultz-Naumann, p. 89. See also FO Weekly Political Intelligence Summary, Vol. 11, Summary #292, 9 May 1945, p. 2.


175. The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Kesselring (London: William Kimber, 1953), p. 290. See also p. 286; and Rose, pp. 293-204. Hauser met with a number of HSSPFs at Taxenbach on 7 May, where it was decided that Kesselring's surrender order would be obeyed. USFET MIS Centre "CI Intermediate Interrogation Report #24 -- 0/Gruf. J. Stroop," 10 Oct. 1945, p. 5, OSS XL 22157, RG226, NA.

176. 1st Canadian Army "Intelligence Periodical" #1, 14 May 1945, WO 205/1072, PRO. The sceptical French were amazed when an Oberstleutnant in command of military hospitals in Tübingen requested the arrest of one of his non-commissioned officers, who was a Werwolf propagandist. Capt. P. de Tristan, 1st French Army 5th Bureau, "Monthly Historical Report", 1 May 1945, WO 219/2587, PRO. A Werwolf cache discovered in May 1945 by the staff of a Wehrmacht field hospital near Eutin was almost immediately reported to the British authorities, who dismantled it. CSDIC (WEA) BAOR "Final Report on Gunter Haubold" FR 94, p. 9, ETO MIS-Y-Sect. CSDIC/WEA Final Interrogation Records 1945-47, RG 332, NA.

177. "Administration and Military Government", Report by British 2nd Army, June 1945, WO 205/1084, PRO. Two examples of the military's strict measures against sabotage and unrest: several Germans who fired upon members of the Norwegian Home Army on 22 May were later sentenced to death by a Wehrmacht military court at Trondheim; similarly, a German in Holland who accidentally blew up some gasoline containers after lighting a cigarette was shot on the spot by his own officer. Canadian officers were told: "We mustn't run the risk of sabotage at this stage. We must make an example." PID "News Digest" #1770, 29 May 1945, p. 20, Bramstedt Collection, BLPES; and
The Stars and Stripes, 20 May 1945.


179. Moczarski, pp. 244-246.


181. Rose, pp. 326-328; and Trees and Whiting, p. 275.

182. ACA Intelligence Organisation, "Joint Weekly Intelligence Summary" #16, 27 Oct. 1945, p. 5, FO 1007/300, PRO.

183. 5 Corps "Weekly Intelligence Summary" #7, 30 Aug. 1945, pp. 10-11, FO 1007/299, PRO. One of the Styrian Werwolf units -- Sondereinheit Kirchner -- was dissolved at Paissail on 8 May. Local Styrian Nazis told British interrogators, however, that some Werwolf units still intended to function in Russian occupied territory. 6 SFSS HQ 5 Corps "Notes on the Political Situation in Carinthia and Western Styria, May 1945," 22 May 1945, FO 371/46610, PRO.


185. Note, for instance, that Werwolf cells in southeast
Bavaria under the command of Kriminalsekretär Huber, received clear instructions to operate in the post-capitulation period. The strategy of these units was to lay inert for approximately six weeks, but to incite resentment of the occupation forces by spreading stories of rape by Black soldiers. The next stage was to begin a large-scale sabotage campaign and to assassinate collaborators. All cessation orders from the Dönitz Government were to be ignored on the assumption that they would be issued only to fool the Allies. Interrogation Report #5, "Werwolf Organization in Bayern," OSS XL 11218, RG 226, NA. A similar desire to survive the capitulation was shown by Werwolf leaders in German Frisia. According to a Werwolf officer later captured by the British, he was transferred to the control of the Wilhelmshaven Werwolf commander, Beauftragter Lotto, after the capitulation. Lotto told him to obey all orders, even if German women were shot in reprisal — "This should not be objectionable to you. We have enough women in Germany. I've already taken care of my family." The core of the Werwolf in Frisia was broken only with the arrest of Lotto in the autumn of 1945. 21 AG/Int. "Appendix C" to 2nd Cdn. Corps Sitrep, 22 June 1945, pp. 4-5, IRR File "Werewolf Activities Vol. I," RG 319, NA; and Direction Générale des Études et Recherches "Bulletin de Renseignements" #9, 8 Nov. 1945, p. 3, 7P125, SHAT.

186. The Werwolf cell in Hannover reportedly remained intact until 1950, while the cell in Fulda engaged in the harassment of local KPD members as late as 1946. At least a dozen Werwolf resisters were arrested in western Germany from the fall of 1945 to the spring of 1947, one of whom was acting as a spy in the clerical pool at British MG headquarters in Hamburg. Cookridge, pp. 100-101; USFET "Weekly Intelligence Summary" #58, 22 Aug. 1946, p. C6, State Dept. Decimal File 1945-49, 740.00119 Control (Germany), RG 59,NA; The Stars and Stripes, 23 Oct. 1945; 28 Jan. 1946; The Times, 10 April 1946; Direction Générale des Études et Recherches "Bulletin de Renseignements" #9, 8 Nov. 1945, p. 3, 7P 125, SHAT; 250 British Liaison Mission Report

188. Drska, p. 65.


190. Whiting, Hitler's Werewolves, p. 189; Lucas, Kommando, p. 333; and Hans Fritsche, The Sword in the Scales (London: Allan Wingate, 1953), p. 304. It is possible that the Soviets remained interested in the Werewolf because they suspected that Gehlen's defection to the Americans would allow for the revived use of Werwolf agents under Gehlen's control. According to E.H. Cookridge, Dienstelle Prützmann actually provided Gehlen with detailed information about the deployment of Werwolf Gruppen behind the Eastern Front, and Gehlen was able to make some use of this information in the postwar

191. USFET G-2 "Weekly Intelligence Summary" #33, 28 Feb. 1946, State Dept. Decimal File 1945-49, 740.00119 Control (Germany), RG 59, NA; Tauber, Vol. II, pp. 1040-1041; CCG(BE) "Intelligence Review "#13, Oct. 1946, p. 9, FO 100/1700, PRO; CSDIC (WIA) BAOR, "Report on Nursery" SIR 28, 18 April 1946, pp. iv, vii, ETO MIS-Y-Sect. Intelligence and Interrogation Records, 1945-46, RG 332, NA; Ultra Documents KO 476, 15 April 945 (Reel 70); KO 1716, 30 April 1945 (Reel 73), both in Ultra Microf. Coll.; Rose, p. 109; and Moczarski, pp. 243-244. For the testimony of HJ leaders who actually ran the gamut and reached the Alps during the final days of the war, see Melita Maschmann, Account Rendered (London: Abelard-Schumann, 1964), pp. 167-168; and Kästner, p. 94. For ambush activity in the Alps by Werwolf and HJ bands, see Dyer, p. 420; Turner and Jackson, p. 182; and Lucas, Last Days of the Reich, pp. 203, 205-206.

192. USFET Interrogation Center "Intermediate Interrogation Report (IIR) #5 - O/Gruf. Friedrich K. von Eberstein", 27 July 1945, p.3, OSS XL 13016, RG 226, NA; and USFET MIS Center "CI Intermediate Interrogation Report (CI-IIR) #24 - O/Gruf. J. Stroop", 10 Oct. 1945, p. 5, OSS XL 22157, RG 226, NA. For details on a number of mountain huts south of Bad Tölz, which were prepared as supply depots for HJ Wervölfe, see Karl Sussmann, CIC Special Agent, Memo for the Commanding Officer, Garmisch Sub-Region, HQ CIC Region IV, 10 Sept. 1946, IRR File XE 049 888 "Werewolf Activities Vol. I," RG 319, NA. These huts actually housed HJ guerrillas until July 1945, when they were abandoned due to American raids in the area.

193. "Trained raiding detachments of the Hitler Youth," attached to 6th SS Panzer Army, are referred to in Ultra Document KO 1702, 30 April 1945, Ultra Microf. Coll., Reel 73. For reference to a Werwolf unit formed by the staff of the "1st Austrian HJ Division," see ACA(BE) Intelligence Organization,
"Joint Fortnightly Intelligence Summary" #50, 24 Jan. 1948, p. A3, FO 1007/303, PRO; and FORD "Digest for Germany and Austria" #698, 17 Jan. 1948, p. IV, FO 371/70791, PRO.

194. Trevor-Roper (1987 ed), p. 245; The New York Times, 1 April 1946; The Stars and Stripes, 1 April 1946; USFET G-2 "Weekly Intelligence Summary" #33, 28 Feb. 1946, State Dept. Decimal File 1945-49, 740.00119 Control (Germany), RG 59, NA; CCG(BE) "Intelligence Review" #13, Oct. 1946, p. 9, FO 100/1700, PRO; and MI-14 "Mitropa" #19, 6 April 1946, p. 6, FO 371/55630, PRO.


196. CSDIC (WEA) BAOR "Report on Nursery" SIR 28, 18 April 1946, pp. i-ii, vi, viii, xi-xiii, ETO MIS-Y-Sect. Intelligence and Interrogation Records 1945-46, RG 332, NA; The Times, 1 April 1946; Brown, p. 767; CCG(BE) "Intelligence Review" #13, Oct. 1946, pp. 9-11, FO 100/1700, PRO; MI-14 "Mitropa" #18, 23 March 1946, p. 7, FO 371/55630, PRO; USFET G-2 "Weekly Intelligence Summary" #33, 28 Feb. 1946, pp. C16-C17; #34, 7 March 1946, pp. C16-C17, both in State Dept. Decimal File 1945-49, 740.00119 Control (Germany), RG 59, NA; The Stars and Stripes 31 March 1946; 1 April 1946; and ACC Report for the Moscow Meeting of the CFM, Feb. 1947, Sect II "Denazification", Part 9, p. 2, British Zone Report, p. 1, American Zone Report, p. 1, FO 371/64352, PRO. There was some disagreement between British and American intelligence agencies over the tendency toward sabotage entertained by
the wing of the movement in the British Zone. The British accepted the declarations of the captured conspirators that they had forbid underground warfare among their followers, while American sources claim they had made tentative plans for direct action. Anthony Cave Brown suggests that there may have been a connection between elements which later surfaced in the northern organization and the bombing of a Bremen police station in June 1945.

197. CCG (BE) Intelligence Division "Summary" #12, 31 Dec. 1946, pp. 4-5, FO 1005/1702, PRO. The Soviets were notified in March 1946 that the HJ-Werwolf had begun operations in the Soviet Zone. The New York Times, 31 March 1946.

198. The New York Times, 31 March 1946; 1 April 1945; 2 April 1945; The Times, 1 April 1946; 3 April 1946; MI-14 "Mitropa" #18, 23 March 1946, pp. 7-8; #19, 6 April 1946, p. 6, both in FO 371 55630, PRO; CCG(BE) "Intelligence Review" #13, Oct. 1946, p. 11, FO 100/1700, PRO; USFET G-2 "Weekly Intelligence Summary" #33, 28 Feb. 1946, pp. C17-C20; Eucom "Intelligence Summary" #1, 13 Feb. 1947, p. C19, both in State Dept. Decimal File 1945-49, 740.00119 Control (Germany), RG 59, NA; The Stars and Stripes, 31 March 1946; 1 April 1946; 2 April 1946; and Brown, pp. 767-770. In connection with Operation Nursery, riflemen of the US Third Army also overran an Alpine hut and a nearby weapons cache used by the Werwolf underground.

199. CCG(BE) Intelligence Division "Summary" #9, 15 Nov. 1946, p.2; #12, 31 Dec. 1946, pp. 1-2, both in FO 1005/1702, PRO.

200. Lucas, Kommando, p. 331. For mention of an NKVD regiment and some smaller units of security troops moved from Cracow to Pless in order to secure the Soviet rear, see Abt. FHO (IIa) "Zusammenfassung der Frontaufklärungsmeldungen," 16 Feb. 1945, p.1, RH 2/2127, BMA. For the withdrawal of American units to control disruptions in the rear, see SHAEF JIC "Political Intelligence Report", 14 April 1945, p.1, WO 219/1700, PRO; Col. H.D. Kahn, US 9th Army


202. For reference to various straggler and HJ bands in Central Germany (not including groups roaming the Alps, the Harz, the Schwarzwald, and the Segeberg Forest), see Lord Ogmore, "A Journey to Berlin,

The RSHA and the Werwolf

It will be recalled that when the Werwolf was formed in September 1944, part of the partisan program was reserved for the RSHA. After convening a meeting of senior SS leaders in mid-September, Himmler circulated his own version of the SOE "Charter" of 1940, stating that Amt VI of the RSHA was responsible for the organization and leadership of foreign resistance movements built upon pro-German elements in threatened or evacuated territories.¹ A later memorandum (dated 12 November 1944) made clear that Amt VI was also expected to establish links with existing anti-Soviet groups on the Eastern Front -- particularly in Poland, the Ukraine, Lithuania, and the Soviet interior -- and that the FAKs and Army Group intelligence offices had already established contact with such organizations as the Ukrainian Partisan Army (UPA).² In January 1945, FHO "deception units" were transferred to RSHA control, and General Gehlen was told that Amt VI was forthwith in charge of all behind-the-lines operations on the Eastern Front.³

The Werwolf, on the other hand, was strictly limited
to activity within the Reich, although Werwolf Gruppen
and HJ sabotage teams functioned in such fringe areas as
Alsace-Lorraine,4 Eupen-Malmedy,5 southeastern Holland,6
Danish Schleswig,7 the South Tyrol,8 northern Slovenia,9
Bohemia,10 and the western Hungarian enclave of Sopron.11
As originally conceived, however, the dividing line
between the two agencies was quite clear: the Werwolf
functioned within the boundaries of the Greater Reich,
while the Amt VI guerrilla program held sway in foreign
territories.

The main figure within the RSHA charged with this
new organizational responsibility was the Viennese
terrorist Otto Skorzeny, who was considerably more
efficient than his counterpart at the head of the
Werwolf. Born in 1908, Skorzeny had joined the Austrian
Nazi Party in 1930 and the Waffen-SS a decade later,
although he soon found himself at odds with the
traditional regimentation and disciplinarism of the
German Armed Forces. Although he was invalided at the
end of 1942 while suffering from gallstones, this
apparent career set-back was in fact a stroke of destiny,
since it left Skorzeny on hand in Berlin at a time when
Hitler was pressing for a German equivalent to the
British commando corps. Skorzeny's name was put forward by a university acquaintance, and in April 1943 he was charged with the organization of a new SD-Ausland sabotage unit, the so-called "Friedenthal Formation." His reputation soon skyrocketed because of the famous Mussolini rescue operation at Gran Sasso -- although most of the planning was done by SS and Luftwaffe paratroops -- and this new stature was further elevated by his loyal and efficient behaviour during the July 20th coup attempt. Thus, when the Nazi leadership sought to organize a major guerrilla warfare program in evacuated territories, they naturally turned to this apparent man of wonders, particularly since he had already tried his hand at such matters by the dispatch of commandos to Iran.

Thus equipped with a directive to set Europe ablaze, Skorzeny and his faithful deputies, Sturmbannführer Radl and von Földkersam, began the task of creating a German equivalent to SOE. In fact, the Brandenburg Division had already allotted some of its foreign language speakers to the fulfilment of such a scheme, and during the summer of 1944 they had created the skeletal basis for a number of regionally based Streifkorps -- i.e.,
stay-behind parties which were intended to prepare the populations of evacuated territories for guerrilla resistance and facilitate the operation of Brandenburg raiding detachments to be sent from German-held territory. After the dissolution of the Abwehr, these skeletal Streifkorps were annexed by Skorzeny and formed into the four regional battalions of the SS-Jagdverbände (Hunting Units) -- Ost (which covered the Soviet Union and Poland); Nordwest (northern Europe); Südwest (western Europe); and Südost (the Balkans, Slovakia and Hungary). The SS-Friedenthal Formation was converted into a central core unit, Jagdverband Mitte, which formed a Praetorian Guard for the commando chief. The Skorzeny organization also included a special SS paratroop battalion; a Vienna headquarters for sabotage in the Balkans (Dienstelle 2000); plus a special air force organization called Kampfgeschwader 200, which remained under formal Luftwaffe oversight but controlled special squadrons which serviced the Jagdverbände, using Heinkels and captured enemy aircraft to drop German saboteurs behind enemy lines.

The actual working components of the Jagdverbände were platoon-size "Jagdkommandos", which in turn were
grouped into sub-regional companies called *Jagdeinsatz* (eg. *Jagdeinsatz Italien*, *Jagdeinsatz Bulgarien*, *Jagdeinsatz Balticum*, etc.). Each *Jagdverband* consisted of three to eight commando companies and a central staff, while *Mitte* was composed of three infantry companies plus an armoured reconnaissance unit. Although Skorzeny received permission to recruit as many as five thousand men, only *Mitte* had achieved its full complement by the end of 1944, while the four regional battalions were approximately seventy percent complete.\(^{17}\) Judging from available figures, it seems that individual *Jagdverband* size ranged from four hundred to six hundred men.\(^{18}\)

Organizationaly, the *Jagdverbände* were obviously in a stronger position than the *Werwolf* due to the fact that the regional components were not merely loosely subordinate to an Inspectorate, but were directly responsible to Skorzeny, who, in turn, had direct access to Hitler. Moreover, the *Jagdverbände* benefitted from inclusion within the RSHA and inherited access to the same sources of supply and manpower available to its predecessors, the SS-Friedenthal Formation and the Brandenburg Division. Obviously, these advantages weakened toward the spring of 1945 -- when supplies ran
short and communications broke down" -- but these final blows were at least caused by the progress of the war and not by the kind of bureaucratic folly that had artificially weakened the Werwolf.

It is also important to note that Skorzeny's units were composed of better human material than the ranks of inexperienced, insincere, or desperate individuals who were forced into the Werwolf. Rather, many members of the Jagdverbände were bequeathed by its parent organizations, and having been recruited at the high water mark of the Wehrmacht's success, they were expressions of German victory rather than German defeat. Although it is true that a considerable percentage of these men were non-German soldiers of fortune, their pro-Nazi political convictions were supported by strong psychological factors, such as the pride of belonging to elite units and an ethos of military professionalism.

The Jagdverbände also possessed some tactical advantages over the Werwolf, such as the greater size and mobility of its raiding parties, whereas the Werwolf Gruppen were small and were usually tied to their behind-the-lines bunkers.20 Jagdverbände raiding groups were platoon-size detachments which infiltrated enemy
territory — often dressed in civilian clothes or enemy uniforms — and camped in wooded areas for a period as long as four weeks. Each Trupp was divided into four six-man squads which worked independently, unless concentrated upon a major target, and which usually operated upon the basis of intelligence provided by local collaborators. KG 200 also facilitated such work, dropping over six hundred commandos into the enemy rear during the last eight months of the war, some of them anti-Soviet provocateurs dressed in American uniforms. Such activity gives the lie to several published works which imply that Skorzeny's force was underemployed; rather, it is probable that many such missions are unrecorded because the men thus deployed met their fate in isolated pockets of resistance and therefore did not return to tell the tale. In any case, it is notable that Allied Intelligence noted a rise in sabotage problems as soon as the Jagdverbände were activated.

Aside from raiding parties, the main Jagdverband-FAK activity was to establish training camps for foreign guerrillas, and the laying of supply dumps for such groups active in enemy territory; the FAKs, for instance laid literally thousands of supply caches in both western
and eastern Europe. As with all developments in German guerrilla warfare, however, the process of supporting foreign partisans was made acutely uncomfortable by inter-departmental rivalries, in this case between the new Jagdverbände, which were full of Nazi fire and fury, and the fading FAKs, which still retained some of the spirit of the Abwehr. FAK officers tended to regard their Amt VI counterparts as dilettantes and apparatchiks who lacked any understanding of partisan warfare, and therefore deserved to be frozen out of various programs and manoeuvres; in France, for instance, FAK officers blithely refused Jagdverband Südwest the use of any of one thousand sabotage dumps which had been laid before the German retreat.

In the East, former Abwehr officers felt that the RSHA had long contributed to the deliberate alienation of independent nationalist groups -- such as UPA and the AK -- which the Abwehr had hoped to convert to a pro-German course. In fact, there were a number of instances on the Eastern Front where the military and Abwehr armed groups that the SS was simultaneously hunting. The most open confrontation occurred in Latvia in late 1944, when the Waffen-SS and Jagdverband Ost apparently inspired a
clumsy German attempt to forcibly "levy" members of a semi-independent Latvian partisan group — the "Kurelis" organization -- which had already established a close working relationship with FAK 212. In the process, the entire Latvian guerrilla program was ruined, and German relations with Latvian nationalists in general were thrown into an uproar which lasted until the end of the war.27

In western Europe, however, the guerrilla program suffered from even worse problems than organizational infighting, since the entire effort was based upon the fallacious assumption that pro-German collaborators actually possessed a broad appeal, or at least that such an appeal would develop once the various provisional democratic regimes proved incapable of stopping Communism or maintaining order. French and Italian commandos were diligently trained for sabotage activities in the Allied rear, but they were usually quickly captured once airdropped or infiltrated through the front lines, a repeated process which eventually led Allied intelligence agencies to wonder why the RSHA even bothered with the effort.28 Of course, there were some isolated successes: in France, a few "White Maquis" groups were reinforced by
air-dropped German weapons and paratroopers, and they maintained an elusive presence in various southern mountain chains; while in Italy, German agents were credited with helping to provoke the anti-conscription uprising which rocked Sicily in the winter of 1944-45.\textsuperscript{29} There was also some suspicion by Allied authorities that French and Belgian commandos were given special orders to create diversions in order to support the Ardennes and Alsace counter-offensives in late 1944.\textsuperscript{30}

It was in the East, however, that efforts to spur guerrilla warfare paid truly handsome dividends, even despite the lack of amity between the German control organizations supporting such activity. A German report, for instance, noted that no less than six hundred anti-Soviet guerrilla attacks had been launched in the western Soviet Union during the second half of 1944, and another intelligence report in February 1945 noted that Soviet lines of communication were so harassed and disrupted that the Red Army was experiencing difficulty in resupplying Soviet forces at the front.\textsuperscript{31} All along the length of the battleline, \textit{Jagdverbände} and FAK units trained anti-communist commandos who were then sent -- or left -- in the enemy rear,\textsuperscript{32} specifically in the
Ukraine, Byelorussia, Poland, the Baltic States, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, Croatia, and Serbia; in fact, the whole operation was so successful and had such a unity of theme and purpose that General Gehlen even suggested coordinating the pro-German guerrilla groups under an umbrella organization called the "Secret Federation of Green Partisans." As in the West, there is also evidence that the Germans hoped to augment a major counter-offensive -- this one in the Lake Balaton region of Hungary -- not only with guerrilla warfare, but with full scale uprisings in several Soviet-occupied countries.

Special mention should be made of the attempt to use German stragglers and Volksdeutsch civilians stranded behind Soviet lines in Eastern Europe, a project also under the direction of Skorzeny. According to German intelligence reports, thousands of German stragglers and Volksdeutschen were trapped in the Soviet rear during 1943-44, and such elements gradually transformed into guerrilla groups or joined existing nationalist bands, particularly UPA. To exploit this resource, Skorzeny organized small Jagdverband paratroop teams which dropped into the Soviet hinterland, either to help these groups
conduct guerrilla warfare or lead them back to German lines.\textsuperscript{46}

The single most intensive effort was directed toward Transylvania and the Rumanian Banat, with their substantial German-speaking minorities. \textit{Volksdeutsch} refugees from these areas were trained for partisan warfare and parachuted back into the Soviet rear, including such senior Nazi officials as Andreas Schmidt, the Rumanian \textit{Volksgruppenführer}. Together with German stragglers and Rumanian fascists, these commandos succeeded in causing considerable disruption along Soviet lines of communication: supply trains were reportedly ambushed; Soviet troops were waylaid or poisoned with toxic plum brandy; and the Red Army headquarters in Brasov was blown up (28 February 1945). Schmidt and his associates ran loose behind Soviet lines until they were gradually rounded up by Soviet and Rumanian security agencies in 1945; Schmidt himself was wounded in an air crash and captured by the Rumanians, who, in turn, quickly handed him over to the Russians.\textsuperscript{47}

In early 1945, \textit{R-Aufgaben}, or stay-behind resistance tasks, were also delegated to both the \textit{Jagdverbände} and the FAKs, the \textit{"R-Plan"} stipulating that whole
Jagdkommandos and sub-regional companies be left in the enemy rear, preferably within the territory of the Greater Reich; the codeword for such operations, not incidentally, was "Werwolf." Cut-off in the enemy hinterland, the commando units were supposed to continue aid to pro-German resistance movements in adjacent countries and also to cooperate closely with the Prützmann organization. Along the central section of the Eastern Front, for instance, much of the Bohemian "Werwolf" was in fact formed from military reconnaissance units attached to Army Group "Mitte," and Jagdverband Südost also attempted to establish secret underground hideouts in eastern Austria and Moravia before its orders were hastily changed in April because of the unexpected magnitude of the Soviet advance. Südst then retreated into the Alps where it was supposed to play a role in an expanded version of the R-Aufgabe called Schutzkorps Alpenland, of which more will be said later.

While Skorzeny's commando units were undertaking so-called "Werwolf" activities, the domestic agencies of the RSHA were also beginning to seep into the formal sphere of Unternehmen Werwolf. At the time of the Werwolf's formation in September 1944, it became clear that the
placement of stay-behind espionage agents would be necessary in order to form an intelligence network to service the Werwolf and other German commando groups. In some cases, these stay-behind missions inevitably developed a more active aspect than mere observation, as intelligence agents received independent instructions to engage in sabotage and subversion.

Organizationally, the domestic secret police section of the RSHA was sub-divided between two Amts, the SD-Inland or Amt III, and the Gestapo, or Amt IV. The former was designed to survey public opinion and carry out the surveillance of opposition groups, which supposedly served the intelligence needs of the Gestapo and the Criminal Police, or Kripo. The Gestapo, on the other hand, was the executive arm of the secret police, which initiated more limited investigations and arrested security suspects. The SD-Inland was a Party organization and was financed from Party funds, which made it virtually independent of normal RSHA control. The Gestapo was a state organization which consisted of a centralized conglomeration of the political police departments formed by the various Länder during the Weimar era.
As the most intellectual and self-important of the German police agencies, the SD in particular had difficulty envisioning the continuation of life in any area of the occupied Reich without itself constantly monitoring such workings of society. At first, plans for the continuation of such surveillance were confined to occupied areas of the Rhineland; no similar schemes were laid for eastern territories occupied by the Soviets, since the SD took the view that the Russians would depopulate the eastern provinces by expulsion of the population to Siberia.49

In September 1944, when the Werwolf was formed, there was also considerable pressure for the continuation of SD activities in occupied areas; apparently this pressure came both from above -- Goebbels, Bormann, Hitler, and Himmler -- and from below, namely the various Amt III Gruppenleiters. The SD Amtschef, Gruppenführer Otto Ohlendorf, discussed the matter with Himmler and Schellenberg, each of whom agreed that an information service would have to be maintained in occupied areas of the Reich. Thereafter, Ohlendorf dispatched Obersturmbannführer Rolf Höppner on a tour of the SD Abschnitte in Strasbourg, Metz, Koblenz, Cologne and
Düsseldorf, which were the areas most threatened with enemy occupation. Höppner's task was to outline the scheme and question the Abschnitte about their technical requirements for signals communications. On his return journey to Berlin, Höppner also spoke to the Abschnittsleiters of Dortmund and Bielefeld, but they each felt that the organization of stay-behind networks in their cities was superfluous, since Allied penetration to this depth would spell the loss of the Ruhr and the consequent end of the war.

The western Abschnitte were faced with considerable problems in their given tasks. For one thing, their best agents and informers were constantly being drawn into the military, the Volkssturm, alarm-units, or a rival SD intelligence service called the Bundschuh. However, it was felt that a small but possibly adequate number of personnel was available, especially if pro-Nazi Alsatians and Lorrainers were employed. An even worse problem concerned the unpreparedness of SD agents for work in enemy territory; in Germany, after all, they had communicated their findings by means of telegraph, teleprinter or courier service, and therefore lacked the slightest experience in the operation of radio
transmitting equipment. Ohlendorf instructed the Abschnitte to proceed with the training of personnel, while he negotiated with Schellenberg for the provision of both radio equipment and operators. Amt VI was able to provide the former but not the latter, and there matters rested until the loss of Metz and Strasbourg, the first large cities within the projected sphere of operations.

The subsequent troubles experienced by the western Abschnitte were perhaps typified by the fate of Unternehmen Zugvogel, the projected SD stay-behind network in Metz. The plans for Zugvogel were developed in September 1944, shortly after Ohlendorf had issued orders for a western German information service, and they were placed in the hands of Haupsturmbannführer Dupin. Throughout the fall, little progress was made because of the shortage of either radio equipment or technicians to instruct SD men in radio procedure. Late in the year, Dupin travelled to Berlin to meet Sturmbannführer Siepen, Director of the Havel Institute and the competent signals authority for Amt VI. Siepen told his guest that because of the lack of time in which to train SD radio operators, the only possible method of connection would be short
range transmissions between agents and aircraft flying overhead. This shifted the crux of the problem toward getting aircraft, a matter which was naturally referred to KG 200. This was as far as the plan proceeded; KG 200 was desperately overworked during this period and could not spare the aircraft required for the transmission of information back to unoccupied territory.\textsuperscript{50}

Despite such problems the SD continued its attempt to organize local information networks in threatened areas, even after the Rhine was forged -- as late as mid-April, Ohlendorf instructed one of his section chiefs to establish a behind-the-lines information service in Saxony.\textsuperscript{51} All available evidence indicates that these networks rarely functioned properly, if indeed, they developed beyond the planning stage. "Shortage of W/T sets hampers the work of stay-behind agents", said a SHAEF report, "and though their network produces some information it is much less than the Germans intended".\textsuperscript{52}

The more basic matter of organizing an SD resistance network to survive the total defeat of Germany was so sensitive that, as Höppner later noted, "no responsible person in Germany dared admit such a possibility".\textsuperscript{53} Nevertheless, even as early as the spring of 1944, SD
agents in the East privately discussed the matter amongst themselves,\(^5\) and in February 1945, two SD section chiefs, Standartenführer Spengler and Obersturmbannführer von Kielpinski, came to Ohlendorf with plans for a post-defeat intelligence service. The Amtschef at first turned down the plan, believing that such a "defeatist" suggestion would cost him his life, but he eventually reconsidered because of the likelihood that the Western Allies would consider both him and his senior officers as war criminals. Kaltenbrunner would decide neither for nor against the project, so Ohlendorf proceeded, believing that the network could continue to secretly serve any German government serving under Allied administration. He claimed in postwar interrogations that he had intended to place the network at the disposal of the Allies in order to prevent chaos in Germany; this may have been true, but Allied intelligence officials regarded the plan as "intended ultimately to be an effective means of resistance".\(^5\)

The original plan in March 1945 called for the withdrawal of most prominent SD officers from threatened areas, but provided for the stay-behind of three officials per Abschnitt, plus a number of low-profile...
collaborators or "confidence men" (V-Männer) who were reliable but politically unknown. These small contact groups, or Nachrichtenköpfe, were to form focal points for the surviving intelligence service, the national centre of which was supposed to be a secret SD headquarters in the Harzgebirge. The movement was geographically divided into four sections, a Northern and Southern sector, each in turn divided into an Eastern and Western district. In addition, there were supposed to be numerous sub-divisions with contact points, or Anlaufstellen, as the centres of each. The whole network was to be tied together by a primitive courier system.

Needless to say, the organization of the network did not proceed according to this well-ordered plan. In a staff meeting with the Abschnittsleiters from central Germany on 3 April, it became clear to Ohlendorf that "it was too late to form a successful underground intelligence network and that the Harz offered no real concealment facilities for an Intelligence headquarters". As US forces advanced toward the Harz, efforts to provide SD stay-behind teams with supplies -- including such unusual items as mourning clothes and hand organs -- met
the same response from the RSHA supply service that earlier Werwolf requests had inspired, i.e., they were flatly refused. Worse yet, almost all the regional SD officers sent telegrams to Berlin indicating severe difficulties in their tasks and appealing for further instructions. Only the head of the Brunswick Abschnitt volunteered to stay in his area and serve as a focal point for the new intelligence network; however, he was quickly taken prisoner by the Americans, and although he managed to escape, he was so shaken by the experience that he declined to seek further refuge in his own Abschnitt, but rather fled to Berlin.57

The same problems with radio equipment that had inhibited the organization of regional intelligence networks in the western Abschnitte also caused difficulties in the broader, long-range program. The need for transmitting and receiving sets was addressed by Kielpinski, who made a painstaking but futile attempt to secure such equipment directly from the RSHA supply service. Failing the attainment of radios, the best that was hoped for was the relay of intelligence by means of basic human contact. Moreover, Ohlendorf was sceptical that either couriers or the core-members of the
Nachrichtenköpfe could be protected by false ID papers — "The longer the use of false identity cards was considered, the more its futility was appreciated, as it was found that it had become extremely difficult to live in Germany under a false name". Thus, apart from a few "useless remnants" left in place at Dresden, Berlin, Brunswick and Bremen, no proper reporting channels were ever organized, nor were any reports from the system ever received by the SD central staff.58

After their capture in late May — following the break-up of the Dönitz regime — Ohlendorf and his subordinates claimed that they had opposed the organization of violent underground resistance; indeed Ohlendorf maintained that the prospective SD intelligence network was supposed to include Nazi resistance groups among the objects of its observation.59 This may or may not be true, but it is clear that the most senior Nazi warlords disliked Ohlendorf — the SD's reports on German public opinion late in the war had been too realistic for easy consumption — and they therefore by-passed his chain of command in organizing a more dependable underground intelligence service.

Party hierarchs also disliked Gestapo chief Heinrich
Müller, the professional Munich policeman who had actually fought the Party during the Kampfzeit and was therefore long refused Party membership, even several years after he had assumed control of the regime's chief instrument of coercion. By 1945, Müller's professionalism had begun to resurface at the expense of his late-blooming Nazi zeal, and as a man with roots in the soil he tended to see matters more clearly than some of the leaders of the Hitler-Himmler stripe, lost in the clouds of Nordic mythology and Wagnerian romance. Unable to fool himself, Müller contemptuously noted that Unternehmen Werwolf was "entirely a forced effort"; that the Party was "contaminating itself with this sort of thing"; and that any resistance effort would result in vicious enemy reprisals. Müller and Ohlendorf, although they despised one another, were linked by their common effort to improve the means of repression by constantly monitoring the pulse of the nation; as a result, they were the first senior figures to recognize the lack of grass-roots appeal for anything approximating a Nazi resistance movement.

In view of such "defeatist" sentiments, Himmler bypassed both men and their staffs, which meant a direct
approach to the regional offices of the SD and the Gestapo in order to construct an underground intelligence system supposedly charged with the true spirit of Nazi resistance. To do this, the Reichsführer resorted to using regional SS-Police officials as organizers, the same tactic used during the formation of the Werwolf. In this case, the chosen instruments were the Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei as well as the Kommissioner der Sicherheitspolizei (KdS), the latter a series of positions created in the summer of 1944 to oversee the joint operational control of the Gestapo and Kripo. As with the Werwolf, these SS officials were employed because of their control over regional offices of the secret police, particularly the Gestapo and the SD.

It is not clear whether the system of intelligence networks so established comprised a union of local organizations, or whether each regional group -- despite its similarity to the others -- was actually independent; the latter scheme in fact seems more likely, since occasionally two or more similar networks functioned in the same area. On the other hand, an informer within one of these organizations told Allied interrogators in June 1945 that a central headquarters, located somewhere in
Europe, controlled all the local secret police resistance organizations based in the Gaue. Whatever the case, the dominant organization in the northwest was "Aktion Bundschuh," a name recalling the secret peasant organizations established during the 15th century, while in the southwest it was Elsa, and in the southeast Sigrune.

The first Bundschuh-type organization was organized in Alsace and Baden in late August 1944, and Allied intelligence reports in the fall of 1944 indicated that the Gestapo was then forming resistance networks in south Baden. Lest such precautions be judged as "defeatist", Gestapo organizers explained that "the General Staff expected a possibility [of occupation] but that the German forces would soon return." The initial effort was followed by a three-page order from Himmler to all regional BdS (15 January 1945) which outlined the need for an organized information and sabotage service in occupied areas. Himmler's order was supplemented by further decrees from Kaltenbrunner, most of which arrived at the offices of local SS police officials in March or early April. These were activization orders which called for groups of line-
crossers to establish information nets in occupied territory; the information from each group was to be relayed by pigeons or radio, and once received by German officials in unoccupied areas, was to be immediately addressed to Berlin. Such orders were to be "executed without delay", and the text thereafter burned.65

In April, local formations of the Bundschuh system began to take shape in the remaining unoccupied zones of Germany. These local groups were dominated either by the SD, as in Dresden and Bremen, or by the Gestapo, as in Württemberg; there was also limited involvement by the SD-Ausland as well as by the Kripo. The Bundschuh was especially active in the Bremen area and along the northern edge of the Lüneberg Heath, where it was organized by the commander of the Hamburg Sipo, while Elsa's main base was in Württemberg, where it was commanded by an ex-Abwehr officer, Hauptsturmführer Renndorfer.66 In fact, these were the two main centers of activity for the Bundschuh-Elsa-Sigrune network.

Recruits for the system were drawn mainly from the SD or Gestapo regional offices, but the results were usually meagre. SS-Police officers were typically given a choice of either joining the Waffen-SS or the
underground, and it was a measure of the unpopularity of the latter that most officers opted for the Waffen-SS. The Baden Bundschuh, for instance, could muster only fifteen volunteers, and the organization could do only marginally better in Munich and Bremen, the former of which yielded twenty members and the latter fifty.67 Elsa, on the other hand, was quickly built up to a strength of one hundred and fifty to two hundred volunteers, one quarter of whom were female.68

In several areas, a more thoughtful approach was made to recruitment, based upon the natural expectation that security officials would be the first target of Allied round-ups, and that any organizations built upon their participation would thereby be fatally weakened. In Augsburg the local Gestapo chief made arrangements in late March to have recruiters draw-up lists of politically inconspicuous individuals who were unmarked by close association with the NSDAP, and could thus continue to function as Sigrune agents once the area was occupied.69 In Dresden, SD and Gestapo officers attempted to recruit industrial managers and businessmen for participation in Sigrune.70

These organizations evolved so rapidly that the
purpose originally intended -- that of providing intelligence for both Wehrmacht and the Werwolf -- was soon surpassed by an intention to form the Bundschuh, Elsa and Sigrune themselves into sabotage groups. This change of purpose resulted from an almost natural extension of the normal activities of the SD, namely the collection of information and the direction of German public opinion. The SD was familiar with the tactic of delivering implicit threats to force opinion in the desired direction, but it was realized that in occupied areas, mere threats would no longer always suffice. For this purpose, Bundschuh and its companion organizations made plans not only to collect information and intimidate collaborators, but also to punish its opponents through murder and the destruction of property. Several Bundschuh assassins -- seconded from the Gestapo -- were captured by the Americans near Bensheim while on their way to carry out a mission, and in Freiburg a Polizeimajor was actually murdered by a Bundschuh operative on charges of failing to cooperate with the Werwolf. The Bundschuh system was also awarded further responsibilities because of the anaemic performance of
Unternehmen Werwolf, and its inability to fulfil its supposedly central role in the realm of guerrilla warfare. By April, Bundschuh and Elsa organizers had been told to initiate their own sabotage actions "independent of" -- but in aid of -- Werwolf activities. These missions aimed at the impediment of rail traffic, the destruction of bridges, and the burning of goods confiscated by the Allies, and it is known that in Hesse, at least, an eight-man Bundschuh team was actually dispatched on such sabotage missions. Moreover, because of the breakdown of Werwolf in southwest Germany, Elsa was given the task of organizing isolated Werwolf Gruppen and bands of German soldiers which survived in the enemy rear. Members of Elsa were supposed to seize command of these so-called "wild groups" and bring them under control, although no one except the commander was supposed to share knowledge of the greater organization. Elsa agents were authorized to use "any methods" necessary to bring these guerrilla bands under control, and "undesirable members" were to be either expelled or shot.

In order to undertake such missions, agents of the Bundschuh network were formed into a command structure
based upon the Züge, and advancing upwards to the Gruppe
and Kommando, the last of which was the basic local unit
of control. In many areas, Bundschuh-Elsa members were
formed into three man terror squads aimed at committing
sabotage, assassinating Bürgermeisters, and attacking
Allied troops. They were also supposed to carry out a
"vigorous recruiting program", forming focal points for
the construction of guerrilla bands based upon Wehrmacht
stragglers or civilians loyal to the Nazi cause. In
Elsdorf, a Gestapo agent with an order to kill west
German Bürgermeisters was actually found within the
confines of the city, and was suspected of stalking the
mayor.

Women in the Bundschuh organizations were either
formed into special line-crossover and liaison units or
were attached to the regular Gruppen. Since the women
were often young and attractive, it was expected that
they could, "get information that the men could not get",
as an Allied report delicately stated. The basic intent
was to use female agents to seduce Allied officers and
thereafter take note of interesting pillow-talk, especially information regarding Allied round-ups of Nazi
resistance fighters. It was even rumoured that
secretaries from the SD bureaucracy would be employed for the dangerous job of capturing Allied officers to be used as hostages. 78

To undertake such escapades, agents of the Bundschuh system were naturally supplied with arms, supplies and false identity papers. The weapons included grenades, handguns, small arms and Panzerfäuste, and the supplies consisted of basic food items, a medical kit, sleeping bag, poison suicide tablets, and a supply of saccharin intended for barter with locals. These provisions were supplemented from supply dumps laid by the SD. The false papers included a bogus Kennkarte and Ausmustierungschein, plus various other papers of lesser consequence, as well as phoney letters addressed to the bearer in his assumed name and address. 79 The general quality of these documents was very poor; the Kennkarte, for instance, violated the standard German practice of always showing the left ear of the bearer in the accompanying photo, and papers for the Bremen Bundschuh were done in the wrong kind of ink, and lacked the proper stamp. By May, the Allies had alerted their military security forces to look for such defects, the watchword being, "The right ear is the Werewolf ear." 80
Ironically, although the Bundschuh and its sister organizations were originally intended as intelligence nets, they never received radio transmitters, largely because of the same problems that had simultaneously debilitated Ohlendorf's SD intelligence service. In place of a radio net contact was maintained by a primitive courier system, so that messages were passed on verbally or by means of coded letters. Couriers formed the sole means of contact between Kommandos and were therefore the weak point in the organization -- the Elsa group, for instance, was given a fatal blow when one of the organization's three main couriers defected to the Americans on 3 May, bringing with him detailed information on the organization's central command structure plus eight of its twenty Kommandos.

The Bundschuh network also suffered from other problems as well as a crude system of communications. The very nature of the organization made it ineffective: because it was organized so late, everyone knew it would fail; because it was presented as an alternative to the Waffen-SS, it drew slackers and cowards; and because it provided false identity papers to its recruits, it proved a handy method of concealment for secret police agents.
who knew they were marked by the occupation regime. In short, as noted by an Allied intelligence agency, recruits to the Bundschuh-type services regarded these groups "as a means of dropping from sight, returning home, and becoming civilians again." Thus, there were numerous reports of Bundschuh members who dutifully collected their supplies and false IDs, and then, after setting forth on their missions, suddenly realized "that they were not doing anyone any good, least of all themselves"; this thought-process was typically concluded by a decision to quietly abandon their tasks and return home.

The final point of refuge for much of the detritus of the RSHA was the so-called "Alpine Redoubt", which despite its elevation was in effect a sink hole which sucked-in the numerous odds and ends of the dying regime. Kaltenbrunner -- who was placed in charge of the area -- arrived in late April, along with a miniature army of adjutants and aides. He hoped that the Allied fear of an Alpine Fortress, which the RSHA had itself sponsored, could be used to cajole the enemy into recognizing an "independent" Austrian regime backed by the Austrian elite of the RSHA, particularly Skorzeny and
Kaltenbrunner himself. After this scheme failed, Kaltenbrunner and several aides retreated into the Totesgebirge, near Alt Aussee, a retreat which the RSHA chief favoured, even over one recommended by Skorzeny, because of the presence of a local RSHA cell equipped with a radio. Although Kaltenbrunner lacked faith in the prospect of an Alpine Maquis, he sought to use the radio to maintain contact with regional underground groups throughout Germany, which in turn could be used to sustain resistance against the Soviets. He also held the mistaken view that the local populace would help him survive; in truth, however, the very guide who led him to the mountain hut willingly provided this information to the American occupation forces, and several days after the capitulation the same guide led two platoons of US troops who overran Kaltenbrunner's hide-out.

Since it was hoped that the RSHA could be reconstituted in some remote fold of the Alps to serve as the coordinating agency for sabotage and guerrilla warfare throughout enemy occupied territory, other key elements of the organization also conglomerated in the mountains. The SD-Inland, for instance, sent south a
number of representatives after the abandonment of the projected Harzgebirge redoubt, particularly the two officers who had originally suggested the construction of an SD underground, von Kielpinski and Spengler. Since Ohlendorf himself fled north to Flensburg, mainly as a result of Himmler's direct order to do so, Spengler was designated as his main representative in the South and was supposed to cooperate with Skorzeny in the construction of an underground "terror organization".\textsuperscript{88} Another notable presence in the Alps was the staff of the infamous RSHA Jewish Affairs Bureau, the mass-murder directorate whose chief, Adolf Eichmann, was assigned the task of forming a partisan force in the Totesgebirge based upon rag-tag RSHA elements and Rumanian fascists who had retreated into the area.\textsuperscript{89}

Naturally, the central figure in this final RSHA effort was Skorzeny, whose commando brigade comprised the potential muscle of the Alpine\textsuperscript{Maquis}. Despite his aptitude for commando operations, Skorzeny apparently had little appreciation for the overall course of the war, and only became actively interested in the Alpine Redoubt after the collapse of the Rhineland Front: as late as February 1945, when Schellenburg held a discussion on the
need for underground preparations within Amt VI, Skorzeny interpreted the suggestion as "defeatist" and immediately tattled to Kaltenbrunner. By March, however, even the most determined Nazi realized that the only hope for a final stand was in the Alps, and Skorzeny accepted willingly when he was ordered by Kaltenbrunner (31 March 1945) to transfer his staff into the mountains. After several meetings with Feldmarschall Schörner, who commanded the adjacent front in Czechoslovakia, it was decided to form an Alpine guerrilla movement which was to engage in espionage, perform small acts of sabotage, and generally keep itself ready to play an active role in the impending clash between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, almost certainly on the side of the West. According to a participant in these meetings, the movement was also supposed to maintain close relations with other anti-Soviet groups, particularly those in the Ukraine and Poland, thus continuing the usual work of the Jagdverbände.

This guerrilla movement began to take shape on 15 April 1945, when Skorzeny and Kaltenbrunner issued final directives calling for the Jagdverbände to gather in the Alps under the new title of Schutzkorps Alpenland. The
Friedenthal headquarters company and two hundred and fifty men from Mitte had already been transferred into the mountains, but the participation of the other battalions was problematic: Ost, Nordwest, the paratroop unit and much of Mitte had already been destroyed in conventional fighting on the Oder Front, where Skorzeny had briefly served as a divisional commander in early 1945, although a small successor to Ost, called battalion Ost II, was probably expected to withdraw into the mountains along with Schörner's Army Group. Südwest, meanwhile, was largely deployed on suicidal R-Aufgaben in western Germany. Thus, only Südost was able to pull considerable resources into the mountains, although it is likely that at least one Südwest Jagdkommando also succeeded in reaching the Bavarian Alps near Oberstdorf. It was also assumed, however, that Alpenland could recruit further adherents from the civilian population in South Germany.  

Skorzeny also visited local Army and Waffen-SS headquarters, attempting to convince the unit commanders to join him if their forces withdrew into the highlands. A few agreed, but before this moraine was effectively driven ahead of the Allied advance, ninety percent of the
military manpower in the mountains was comprised of rear echelon troops who had been evacuated into the region. A few days before the end of the war, a desperate attempt was made to block entrance into the mountains for anything except organized combat units, and an attempt was also made to send civilian refugees out of the mountains and back to their home areas in the enemy occupied lowlands: both measures, of course, were too late to have much practical effect.

Hitler also decided in late April that an effort must be made to utilize the rear echelon troops already in the Alps, and for this purpose all offices of the Wehrmacht not decisively engaged in the war were dissolved, and the affected officers were either sent to the Front, held for the Führerreserven in the Redoubt, or given special discharge papers preparatory to deployment as Werwölfe in the enemy rear. In fact, a Sonderbeauftragter of the Führerreserven, Oberstleutnant Ehrenspenger, was actually appointed to tour the Redoubt and choose suitable officers to serve as guerrillas. Skorzeny also recommended the "Axmann Plan" to Hitler, whereby HJ recruits were transferred to the mountains and given Werwolf training by Jagdverband officers. An OSS
report on 21 April estimated that as a result of all such efforts, Skorzeny had collected a hundred thousand troops and partisans under his command, although this seems a considerable over-estimate.

Based upon this uncertain force, a start was actually made toward activating the Alpenland organization: three months rations were distributed to a core group of several thousand men; large RSHA financial resources were transferred to Skorzeny and buried in the hills; a rough radio net was established, centered upon a main station called "Brieftaube"; and a massive central supply dump was established in a copper mine near Bischofshaven, Austria. This latter installation was stocked with three quarters of a million items of small arms, grenades and ammunition, plus two thousand cases of explosives. After the dump's existence was eventually revealed to the Allies by Skorzeny, it was described as "the most important sabotage discovery so far made in the European Theatre".

No amount of eleventh hour effort, however, was sufficient to overcome the debilitating circumstances surrounding the ill-fated Redoubt. Actual "Letzi"-type positions had been prepared only on the southern and
western edges of the mountains -- facing Italy and Switzerland -- and there had been few long-term efforts to stockpile supplies or develop essential industries within the region. It is true that after the American 12th Army Group crossed the Rhine, suggestions to fortify the northern approaches to the Alps were taken to heart at Führer headquarters, but the resulting Hitler directive was dated 20 April, only two weeks before the final cessation of hostilities.99 Nevertheless, an OKW officer in the area later recalled that grandiose plans were still handed down from on high as late as 29 April, calling for the construction of underground ammunition factories and even aircraft plants.100 Moreover -- as noted above -- the Alps were overrun by an influx of military and civilian bureaucrats, which the Bavarians and Austrians contemptuously called "the northern invasion."

Perhaps worst of all, there was no sign of the ten or twelve fresh Waffen-SS and Gebirgsjäger divisions which could perhaps have helped defend the passes into the mountains. Furthermore, the Wehrmacht was severely constrained by Hitler's usual tactic of issuing do-or-die orders aimed at defending forward positions rather than
favouring a voluntary withdrawal to more defensible terrain. Thus, most of the German forces in the so-called "Alpenvorland" -- both north and south of the massif -- were destroyed in the last half of April, before they had a chance to retreat: along the northern edge of the mountains, for instance, two thirds of the defence force was wiped out before reaching the Redoubt proper, and the remaining three hundred thousand men were dispersed to such an extent that they fled into the hills as a disorganized rabble.101

These developments and revelations apparently came as shock to Skorzeny, who, like many Germans, had believed the same SD disinformation which was fed out to the Allies but seeped back into Germany itself. Everywhere the commando chief was confronted with confusion and unpreparedness, and even the supreme warlords at the center of his limited universe had seemed to mislead him -- "I had imagined from all I had heard in Berlin", he later lamented, "that the necessary preparations had been completed long before".102

Such disappointments in the final month of the war conspired to turn Skorzeny into a most unpleasant character, along with the fact that the apparent commando
triumphs of the several previous years had swollen his ego to almost unmanageable proportions. Much of the confusion Skorzeny saw in the Alps was blamed upon the lack of a strong leader for the area,\textsuperscript{103} and the similar lack of a leader for sabotage activities in general: after all, Prützmann was incompetent and -- in any case -- had fled north to Schleswig Holstein; the North German Schellenburg was not interested in the Redoubt and also displayed annoyingly moderate tendencies once the end of the war loomed near; Obergruppenführer Wolff, the main SS officer in northern Italy, thought that the concept of a Redoubt was "madness,"\textsuperscript{104} and was busily negotiating a surrender to the Western Allies; while the garrison Commander in the northern Alps, Generalleutnant von Hengl, was opposed to guerrilla warfare on the grounds that it was pointless, and had even approved a staff memorandum to this effect which was sent to Bormann.\textsuperscript{105}

As for the formal Redoubt commander, General Schörner, he was favourable to partisan warfare but was busy desperately defending the Bohemian Basin from the Red Army.\textsuperscript{106}

The egocentric Skorzeny, of course, sought to step into this vacuum and establish himself as the supreme
leader of the final guerrilla struggle. First, he convinced Kaltenbrunner to fire Schellenburg, whom Kaltenbrunner disliked in any case; in early April, Skorzeny thus replaced the more urbane and cosmopolitan Schellenburg as the overall chief of Amt VI.\(^{107}\) Schellenburg, in any case, had already been abruptly informed by Skorzeny that anyone joining him in the Alps "would have to place themselves under his orders; everything else was rubbish". Toward the end of April, von Hengl was also sacked and replaced by the more pliant General Jacksch (although it is not clear that von Hengl's dismissal was directly attributable to Skorzeny's influence).\(^{108}\)

The commando chief, like Prützmann, also began to adopt the airs of a field marshal, transporting himself around in a personal headquarters train and grandly barking out orders to all and sundry. Such megalomania was a source of amusement to Kaltenbrunner, who nicknamed Skorzeny the "Partisan Napoleon",\(^{109}\) although it must also be noted that the RSHA leader more than put up with Skorzeny's antics and granted him almost carte blanche authority toward the end of the war.

Skorzeny's behaviour in the Alps ranged from
overbearing to brutal. The wives and daughters of Alpine farmers, for instance, were thrown into the desperate last minute preparation of defence works and munitions depots with the usual heavy-handed Nazi methods -- often a threat of death for "traitors" who refused to join the fight -- and Skorzeny was also given command of an SS-Sicherheits Grenadier Battalion which combed the German rear for deserters and began to assume an aspect not unlike the infamous NKVD "blocking units" of 1941. Such relations with both the military and the civilian population were unlikely to encourage the necessary dose of enthusiasm and local patriotism needed to sustain Alpine guerrillas over any appreciable period.

Moreover, Jagverbände troops took part in a hostile multi-sided struggle over supplies and the use to which they would be put: in at least one case, Skorzeny commandos forcibly commandeered a truck-full of weapons on its way to a rival Werwolf guerrilla band, while the organization's own supply dumps were by no means safe from civilian looting. In several cases, Jagverbänd Sudost dumps were discovered and destroyed by retreating Wehrmacht forces.

It is thus hardly surprising that once the Allies
arrived in the Alpine heartland, the Schutzkorps Alpenland was in no position to lead a popular guerrilla struggle against the invaders, although they reportedly undertook a few operations to prevent Allied looting. On 8 May, Schutzkorps headquarters at Radstadt was evacuated and Skorzeny fled to the surrounding mountains along with the faithful Radl and several other SS officers. According to Skorzeny, the rest of his Alpenland guerrillas were given strict orders to also hide in the mountains and await further instructions, although it is apparent that many of his officers obeyed Dönitz' order to cease guerrilla activity and that they surrendered at the time of the general capitulation.113 It is also claimed that during the last days of the war, even Himmler prohibited anti-Allied activity by Alpine partisans, and that this order was forwarded south by Kaltenbrunner and directly resulted in the collapse of Eichmann's guerrilla band in the Totesgebirge.114

A few of the Jagdkommandos, however, remained in the mountains for several months beyond the capitulation, where they were aided by local farmers; as late as mid-summer, for instance, American troops in Bad Aussee captured an SD officer and nearly forty members of
Alpenland skulking in the surrounding area. Another such unit showed off its military prowess four days after the capitulation by attacking Hungarian forces near Badgastein and stealing some of the Hungarian crown jewels, although the subsequent disposition of this treasure caused internal quarrelling within the band. A BDM girl who was withdrawn into the mountains to act as a servant for one of these units later recalled that most of the commandos seemed more concerned with their own personal safety than with furthering the Nazi cause, although this self-interest was suppressed below a thin veneer of continuing fanaticism. Briefly suspended in this land of fantasia, the guerrillas spent their days planning commando operations and their nights consuming stocks of brandy and reading poetry by candlelight. "Four weeks after the ceasefire", said the BDM informant, "we were still living in our familiar world of military procedure and Nazi ideas. The utterly unreal hope that we could one day re-establish this world from our funkhole protected us from the annihilating realization that it had already ceased to exist".

The most important of these disparate bands was a core group of Jagdeinsatz Kroatien, which in mid-April
was ordered to retreat from its base in Zagreb and act as a stay-behind unit in the St. Veit area, where a number of small villages remained abnormally sympathetic to Naziism and were expected to shelter the unit's men and sabotage equipment. Part of the unit surrendered to the British on 12 May, but another sub-section -- styled Einsatzgruppe Glödnitz, after the name of a local village -- survived in nebulous form well beyond the capitulation. This unit, for instance, may have been related to the "considerable hostile band" noted by British troops at Glödnitz in late May, which in turn was connected with the escape of one hundred and fifty Waffen-SS men from a local concentration area on the night of 28/29 May. The Glödnitz band remained true to Alpenland's main goal of preserving itself to oppose an expected Soviet or Yugoslav invasion, at least until it was smashed by the British in June 1945. Even then, several key members of the group escaped capture and eventually went on to form a new underground group, the Widerstandsbewegung, which by 1946 had extended its tentacles throughout Carinthia.

As for Skorzeny himself, he spent his last few days of freedom hiding in a mountain chalet, where he and Radl
carefully considered their options. The commando chief eventually decided to surrender himself and a group of three hundred SD guerrillas, probably because the Alpenland unit had been designed to function mainly against the Soviets, and since the Western Allies had occupied most of the Alps the Korps had become redundant. In any case, the headquarters of the eastern component of Alpenland — which would have borne the brunt of partisan activity against the Red Army — had already broken up and fled for American lines rather than retreat into the mountains as planned. Thus, in mid-May 1945, Skorzeny surrendered himself to an American outpost at Annaberg and was thereafter sent to imprisonment in Salzburg.\textsuperscript{1,2,0}

Even in captivity, however, Skorzeny remained at the centre of the Nazi underground. He retained strong contacts with a group of scattered Brandenburg and Jagdverband members, who coalesced into the so-called "Skorzeny Movement", based principally in Bavaria and financed at least partly by Alpenland assets recovered from numerous secret caches in the Alps. This network was mainly a veteran's mutual aid society — and as such was associated with the infamous "ODESSA" — although it also undertook surveillance of the KPD and in one case
even assumed an anti-American aspect; i.e., in Mannheim, a former Skorzeny adjutant formed an ODESSA sabotage cell which made elaborate plans for the destruction of American supply dumps and transportation facilities.

The American CIC launched an investigation of the Skorzeny organization in 1946 (Operation Brandy), but after Skorzeny's escape from prison two years later, the net was "turned" and indirectly went to work for several American intelligence agencies. The intermediary in this relationship was the indestructible Reinhard Gehlen, who in the meantime had succeeded in his own plan to transfer his organization to American control. Skorzeny eventually surfaced in Franco's Spain and remained a senior figure in such shadowy postwar Nazi groups as the Kameradenschaft and die Spinne.

Several of the RSHA regional resistance networks also had postwar histories, although these were brief and lacked the relative importance of the "Skorzeny Movement". Elsa, for instance, made plans to survive the capitulation, and in a meeting of agents on 21 April, the Württemburg KdS, Obersturmbannführer Tümler, announced that the military conflict could last only another two weeks, so that preparations were necessary for the
continuation of an illegal political fight. As with the Axmann Werwolf, last minute withdrawals were made from Party accounts for the purpose of financing, and Elsa members were provided with aliases and cover jobs, and then told to remain inert for a period of at least six weeks. Of course -- as noted above -- these careful plans were ruined by the defection of an Elsa courier on 3 May, and by the late summer of 1945 the G-2 section of the US 7th Army concluded that the group was safely "under control".122

A similar group with postwar aspirations was the Thuringian Sigrune, which had been formed under the direction of Gestapo officer Friedrich Fischer during March and April 1945. Fischer and several associates managed to maintain a loose underground network for several weeks beyond the end of the war, based mainly around a bakery which served as a central Anlaufstelle in Weimar. However, the CIC successfully "turned" several Sigrune members soon after the American arrival in Thuringia, and these double agents participated in a sting operation codenamed "King," which soon uncovered the entire network. Shortly before US-Soviet territorial adjustments placed most of Thuringia under Soviet
control, the Sigrune was smashed by the arrest of forty resisters and the capture of an underground ammunition dump containing more than twelve hundred pounds of dynamite.123

As for Aktion Bundschuh, a few of its cells resurfaced during the fall of 1945 and were linked by a courier network codenamed "Danube", although it is unclear whether this was the actual title of the group or was merely the keyword for the investigative operation launched by the British and Americans. The CIC arrested a number of members in late 1945, although the group remained active -- at least in the British Zone -- well into the following year. It eschewed acts of violence, but concentrated instead upon the penetration of Allied MG agencies, thus returning the Bundschuh to its original raison d'etre.124

In the final analysis, it is difficult to arrive at any single conclusion about the RSHA Resistance Movement, mainly because its activities were so diverse. The only thread which runs consistently through the entire process was the gradual movement of the RSHA away from the margins of involvement in diversionist activity toward a central role, mainly because the Werwolf could not
properly manage its hegemony.

On the other hand, the RSHA-Police establishment was not particularly well suited for underground activity. One member of the Gestapo hinted at the reasons when he later told Allied interrogators "that any attempt to make active saboteurs out of middle-aged officials of the Stagostelle Nürnberg was doomed to failure".\(^{125}\) Despite the enormous crimes of the Gestapo and the SD, members of these organizations were wrapped in a veil of legality and prided themselves as the guardians of order; they were therefore not psychologically predisposed to engage in activity that could not pass as anything but illegal and destabilizing. In any case, the best human material was already in the armed forces, and many of the remaining Gestapo and SD men who possessed the foresight to see their names on an Allied blacklist -- that is, to imagine themselves as desperados rather than as lawmen -- had already joined the Werwolf. The Bundschuh and similar networks were a favoured option for only a very few.

Skorzeny and his knights-errant presented a different problem. They were especially effective, and caused a not inconsiderable problem to Germany's foes,
particularly by aiding anti-Soviet partisan groups behind the Eastern Front. In fact, guerrilla bands armed and trained by the Germans not only harassed Red Army lines of communication during the war, but in many cases continued to fight on for at least several years after their German benefactors had perished. Even in the West, Jagdverband Südwest gave the Allies scattered trouble by mining supply routes, ambushing vehicles, and otherwise supporting Werwolf activity in the Allied rear.126

It might thus be concluded that if there was a natural base for German diversionary resistance, the Skorzeny organization comprised such a core. This factor applied, however, only as long as the Nazi regime stood standing, and the Führer was able to defiantly shake his fist at the encroaching enemy powers. After the collapse of the regime, Skorzeny and his men meekly presented themselves to the Western Allies, except for a few groups which held out in the Alps, obviously hoping to play a role in any new Western crusade against the East.

At first consideration, an attempt to conduct guerrilla warfare in the Alps might have seemed a natural course for the Jagdverbände, particularly since there were also numerous Waffen-SS and HJ bands in the
mountains which could conceivably have been convinced to participate. Why then, did Skorzeny and his men not attempt to struggle on as Alpine guerrillas? It has already been noted that the Alpenland Korps was prepared mainly for combat against the Soviets, who reached only the eastern edge of the group's intended sphere of operations, but there were also additional factors of perhaps even greater importance.

In the first place, Alpenland had no broad base of support among the mountain folk -- not only because of Skorzeny's brutal behaviour -- but also because the mountaineers shared the assessment of most Germans that guerrilla fighting could achieve nothing of consequence and would result in reprisals and the indefinite delay of reconstruction. In fact, Austrian and Bavarian antifas helped the Allies combat Nazi Maquisards -- the guerrillas near Oberstdorf, for instance, were mopped by the local Heimatschutz\textsuperscript{128} -- and the Austrian Resistance also had a hand in the capture of Kaltenbrunner himself.\textsuperscript{129} The pockets of pro-Nazi opinion which continued to exist were not sufficient to balance these adverse factors, nor was it expected that partisans could replace the value of popular loyalty with the benefits
extracted by raw intimidation.

Closely related to this sociopolitical failure was an equally disastrous ideological failure, which allowed doubt and uncertainty to creep into the minds of the commandos themselves, mainly because they had no sustaining belief to counteract the open contempt of the population. As Hugh Trevor-Roper has noted, Naziism essentially offered a bargain of World Power or Ruin, and there was little place in this equation for Nazi guerrillas, particularly since there was scarce preparation for the ideological survival of the movement beyond the death of its founder and chief prophet. One participant in the Alpenland Maquis later recalled the numbing shock and sense of betrayal which came with the eventual news of the Führer's suicide, and that the only available response of the commandos was to drink themselves into an anaesthetized stupor. It is true that the ideological element is thin in many partisan movements, and that personal factors play an important role in the membership of a considerable number of recruits, but ideological considerations are important at least in the initial stages of existence, before the momentum of expansion sweeps up large numbers of less
committed members.

Of course, the partisans did have an immediate political-military strategy based upon a supposedly impending break-down in the alliance between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies, but this did not serve as a substantial substitute for more realistic material inducements to carry on the fight, especially once the predicted break down did not occur after a short interval. It is true that a few Jagdverband units hung on for several months beyond the capitulation -- along with scattered SS bands -- but they were rarely able to convert the negative impulse to escape capture into a positive intent to oppose the occupying powers. Without a strong motive for resistance, the last few guerrillas abandoned their mountain domiciles when the advent of the first cold weather in late 1945 made such a lifestyle sufficiently uncomfortable.\textsuperscript{133}

Most important of all, however, there was a crucial absence of any means of replenishing supplies and manpower. Unlike the anti-Nazi European resistance movements of the preceding years, Schutzkorps Alpenland had no hope of victory because it had no surviving allies, apart from the distant Japanese. Thus, there was
no prospect of friendly supply planes dropping weapons and advisors, nor any sympathetic power to make inspirational radio broadcasts in order to maintain morale. Combined with the absence of local popular support and the emergent conservatism of the Tessmann enterprise -- the one self-replenishing source of funds available to the Alpine Maquis -- the lack of external allies was a devastating blow. Once the movement's own caches of weapons and financial resources ran short, Alpenland would have been totally dependent on the precarious necessity of capturing all arms and supplies from the enemy. This must have seemed a burdensome proposition even for Skorzeny's commando elite; in fact, it is possible that such a challenge posed a psychological threat to a group in which a sense of inherent superiority was based upon skimming the cream of Europe's manpower and technology in small arms, resources which were no longer available. A final Götterdämmerung in the mountains had a certain heroic appeal, but it also risked exposing the myth of inherent preeminence, particularly since clear signs of disintegration had already appeared by the time of the general capitulation.

Skorzeny's first quiet days in the fresh mountain
air seem to have allowed such realizations to unfold — or at least some similar pattern of reasoning took sway — and his plans for glory as a partisan chief thus began to melt away as fast as the receding mountain snows. Ten days after the capitulation, "the most dangerous man in Europe" emerged from his lofty retreat, safe in the assumption that past deeds of daring had not been besmirched by a final struggle with little chance of either honour or glory.
1. H. Himmler to O/Gruf. Kaltenbrunner, 16 Sept. 1944, Records of the Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police, Microcopy #T-175, Roll 122, frames 2648214-2648215, NA.


3. Cookridge, p. 93.


5. For the activity of HJ line-crosser units in Eupen-Malmedy (and also in Alsace), see PID "Background Notes", 17 Jan. 1945, FO 371/46789, PRO; History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, Vol. XVIII, pp. 14, 18, 20-21, 47, 56-57, 64, 81, 95-97, 101-102, NA; 21st AG "CI News Sheet" #23, Jan. 1945, p. 8, WO 205/997, PRO; and The Stars and Stripes, 12 Jan. 1945.

6. Rose, pp. 299-300.


11. USFET Interrogation Center "Intermediate Interrogation Report (IIR) #6 -- Walter Schimana", 31 July 1945, p. 3, OSS 142090, RG 226, NA.

12. For Skorzeny's career, see Infield, Skorzeny; Otto Skorzeny, Skorzeny's Special Missions (London: Robert Hale, 1957); and Foley.

13. For SD-Ausland and Abwehr activities in Iran, see Foley, pp. 55-56; Mader, Hitlers Spionagegenevalesagen aus, pp. 324-325, 348-349, 351-354, 370-371, 380-381, 388; Leverkeuhn, pp. 9-10; Keith Eubank, Summit at Tehran (New York: William Morrow, 1985), pp. 191-194; and MID Military Attache Report from Capt. Edwin Wright, G-2 USA FIME, 7 July 1943, OSS 40955, NA. For sources on the abortive assassination attack upon the Big Three Conference in Tehran (Operation "Long Jump"), including mention of Skorzeny's brief involvement, see Alexandrov, pp. 316-324; Erickson, The Road to Berlin, pp. 149-154; and A. Lukin, "Zagover ne Sostoyalsya," in Front bez Linii Fronta (Moscow: Moscovskni Rabochni, 1970), pp. 328-349.

14. Von Fölpersam took charge of Jagdverband Ost in
January 1945, and subsequently disappeared after being trapped behind Soviet lines. He was replaced by Obersturmbannführer Walter.


16. Military Intelligence Service in Austria, "First Detailed Interrogation Report - Girg, Walter", 22 Jan. 1946, pp. 3-4, OSS XL 41372, NA; 21 AG "CI News Sheet" #24, 27 June 1945, Part II, Appendix "C", WO 205/997, PRO; German Military Intelligence, 1939-45, pp. 306-307; Rose, pp. 204-206; and Korovin and Shibalin, p. 104. According to Otto Heilbrunn, about eighteen hundred Brandenberg officers and men were transferred to Skorzeny's formations, while Helmuth Spaeter puts the figure at three hundred and fifty. Heilbrunn, p. 64; and Spaeter, p. 501. See also Kriegsheim, pp. 273, 305-306, 315. For the history and composition of Kampfgeschwader 200, see Lucas, Kommando, pp. 281-304; The Stars and Stripes, 9 Feb. 1947; Air P/W Int. Unit, 1st Tact. AF, "Interrogation Report on Survivors of German Crew which Flew a Captured B-17 Shot Down at 0615 Hours, 3 March 1945, near Luvigny, France", 6 March 1945, OSS 120249, RG 226, NA; Kahn, pp. 285-286; Ultra Document BT 4583, 11 Feb. 1945, Ultra Micf. Coll., Reel 61; and 15 AG "Notes on Counter Intelligence in Italy" #8, 10 April 1945, p. 2, WO 204/822, PRO.

17. Military Intelligence Service in Austria "First Detailed Interrogation Report - Girg, Walter", 22 Jan 1946, pp. 3, 5-6, OSS XL 41372, NA.

18. Karl Radl cites a figure of five hundred for Südost; Walter Girg claims that Mitte had a unit strength of four hundred at the end of 1944; and figures calculated from Hans Gerlach's interrogation report show a manpower pool of at least five to six hundred for Südwest. See, respectively, 21 AG "CI News Sheet" #24, 27 June 1945, Part II, Appendix "C", WO 205/997, PRO; Military Intelligence Service in Austria "First Detailed Interrogation Report - Girg, Walter", 22 Jan. 1946, p. 3, OSS XL 41372, PRO; and USFET Interrogation Center "Intermediate Interrogation
Radl's figures - ninety men each in Süidwest and Ost and one hundred and twenty in Nordwest - seem unrealistically low, and even his figure of five hundred for südost is low considering that this Jagdverbände included eight separate Jagdeinsatz.


23. For a second-hand account, see Maschmann, p. 170. At the end of the war, Soviet intelligence detected an SS band in the forest near Barth, on the Baltic coast, which was apparently preparing a Jagdverbäende-style provocation -- eg. this group intended to attack a nearby camp of liberated American and Canadian POWs while dressed in Soviet uniforms. The band was wiped out by Soviet units in early May 1945. Soviet Generals Recall World War II, ed. Igor Vitukhin (New York: Sphinx, 1981), p. xiv.
24. Heilbrunn, p. 67. *Jagdverband* raiding units were ostensibly meant to return to German lines, although in 1944, when the Nazi leadership was inspired by the example of Japanese *Kamikaze* units, OKW introduced the principle of "Totaleinsatz" — i.e., highly dangerous missions for volunteers who had little chance of survival. Military Intelligence Service in Austria "First Detailed Interrogation Report — Girk, Walter," 22 Jan. 1946, p. 10, OSS XL 41372, NA; and Baumbach, pp. 268-269.

25. 21 AG "CI News Sheet" #10, 22 Nov. 1944, Part III, p. 13, WO 205/997, PRO.


32. Ilya Dzhirkvelov, Secret Servant: My Life with the KGB & The Soviet Elite (New York: Touchstone, 1988), pp. 34-35; and "Memorandum of Conference with Marshal Stalin, 15th January 1945," David Irving, Papers Relating to the Allied High Command, 1943/45, Reel #4. Stalin, in speaking to a grouping of British and American generals, noted "that the Germans, when driven out of occupied territory, had invariably left behind agents drawn from Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, Roumanians, and Ukrainians... The agents were surprisingly well-trained and organized, and well equipped with radio sets."

319


35. For German aid to the Polish nationalist guerrilla movement NSZ, see Stefan Korbanski, The Polish Underground State (New York: Columbia UP/East European Monographs, 1978), pp. 104, 106, 178; OSS Mission for Germany "General Situation Report" #2, 15 July -- 1 Sept. 1945, p. 5, OMGUS AG Security-Classified Decimal File 1945-49, 350.09 (Intelligence, General), RG 260, NA; Hanns von Kranhals, Der Warschauer Aufstand 1944 (Frankfurt a.M.: Bernard & Graefte Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1962), pp. 52, 211; and Witold Sagajllo, Man in the Middle: A Story of the Polish Resistance, 1940-45 (London: Leo Cooper, 1984), pp. 121-122. According to General Gehlen, the AK -- by February 1945 -- also appeared ready "to enter into cooperation against Bolshevism without political conditions," and to send heavily-armed reconnaissance teams into Soviet-occupied territory. The Germans themselves scoured POW camps for "volunteers" -- willing and otherwise -- to fight a guerrilla war in Poland. At least one SD camp for such training was established at Tomosczow, and some of these Polish groups were actually deployed in 1945. FHO "Vertragsnotiz über zur Aktivierung der Frontaufklärung," 25 Feb. 1945, pp. 2-3, RH 2/1930, BMA; Lev Kopelev, No Jail for
Thought (London: Secker Warburg, 1977), pp. 95-97; Reports from Tomosczow to the SD (re Polish deserters), 15 Jan. 1945; and 14 Jan. 1945, both in R 70/134, BA; and Ultra Document KO 1122, 22 April 1945, Ultra Micro. Coll., Reel 72.


271-282; Milovan Djilas, *Wartime* (New York: HBJ, 1977), p. 447; Tomasevich, pp. 434-435, 439; and OSS R & A Belgrade, untitled report on German-sponsored anti-Partisan activity, 2 April 1945, OSS 124423, RG 226, NA. For the deployment of Chetnik reconnaissance groups -- along with German signals personnel -- in Bosnia, see Spaeter, pp. 435-436.

43. Generalmajor Gehlen, Abt. FHO "Vortragsnotiz über zur Aktivierung der Frontaufklärung", 25 Feb. 1945, RH 2/1930, BMA. Gehlen suggested that the "Secret Federation" could be organized solely on the theme of anti-communism and should be only loosely linked to the Germans and totally unassociated with General Vlasov, thus making it acceptable to ethnic partisan bands within the Soviet Union. He also saw it as a middleman through which cooperation with the Polish AK could be rendered acceptable both to his own Nazi overlords and to the anti-German Polish exile regime in London. "Through use of an 'Organization of Green Partisans'," he said, "cooperation with the Poles will not be carried out from the German side, but rather from the side of anti-Bolshevist Russians. This will avoid the chance that cooperation could somehow radiate into the political sphere." For the historical background of "Green" bands in the Soviet Union, see Oliver Radkey, *The Unknown Civil War in Soviet Russia: A Study of the Green Movement in the Tambov Region, 1920-1921* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1976); Micheal Malet, *Nestor Makhno in the Russian Civil War* (London: MacMillan, 1982), pp. 150-156; and Vakar, p. 139. For the re-emergence of "Green" bands in the Soviet rear during World War Two, see Abt. FHO (IIa) "Frontaufklärungsmeldungen", 13 Jan. 1945, RH 2/2127, BMA; Hoffmann, *Deutsche und Kalmyken*, pp. 91-92; and Vakar, p. 196.

44. Schmidt, "Aufzeichnungen über die zweite Unterredung zwischen dem Führer und dem ungarischen Nationsführer Szalasi ... in der Reichskanzlei am 4 Dezember 1944", in *Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik, 1918-1945*, Serie E, Band VIII, p. 589; Joint Intelligence Committee #142 "German Strategy and Capacity to Resist," 28 March 1945, Enclosure,


46. L. Rossetto, "Skorzeny's Testament," in The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal, Vol. III, #4 (Oct. 1981), p. 426; and Skorzony, La Guerre Inconnue, pp. 337-338. The most infamous of these missions was the effort to rescue the so-called "Lost Legion," a supposed group of over twenty-five hundred German stragglers isolated in Byelorussia. Reports of the existence of this group originally came from German intelligence sources in Moscow in the late summer of 1944, and after extensive efforts to verify its authenticity -- including the
dispatch of two Jagdverband Ost paratroop teams -- OKH assured the unit's commander, Oberstleutnant Scherhorn, that every conceivable effort would be made in order to return the formation to German lines. Supplies and specialist personnel were subsequently flown into Byelorussia by KG 200, while behind German lines the military and FAK 103 fought with the Jagdverbände for the control of the rescue effort. However, after the Soviet Winter Offensive -- and the consequent westward shift of the front -- all hope of extraction disappered and "Unternehmen Scherhorn" was completely handed over to Jagdverband Ost, which was suspected of wanting to use the alleged "Lost Legion" as a guerrilla band. Evidence which has come to light since the war suggests that the Scherhorn formation was never genuine at all, but that Scherhorn and a small number of German POWs were working for the NKVD in an effort -- apparently successful -- to divert German supplies and personnel. "Unternehmen Scherhorn," c. 31 Dec. 1944, RH 2/2152, BMA; Abt. FHO "Vortragsnotiz," 25 Feb. 1945, pp. 1, 4; Hptm. Bahrenbruch, FAK 103 to Gen. St. d. Heeres/FHO, 12 Feb. 1945; Ostubaf. Skorzeny to General Gehlen, FHO, 6 March 1945; Abt. FHO (Ib) "Vortragsnotiz," 6 March 1945; Obstdt. Scherhorn to Abt. FHO (Ib), 8 March 1945; FHO (Ib) to Obstdt. Scherhorn, 9 March 1945; FHO (Ib) "Vortragsnotiz," 9 March 1945; FHO (Ib) "Vortragsnotiz," 10 March 1945; OKH Generalstab des Heeres Abt. FHO (Ib) "Unternehmen Scherhorn," 11 March 1945; OKH Generalstab des Heeres Abt. FHO (Ib) "Unternehmen Scherhorn," 11 March 1945; OKH Generalstab des Heeres Abt. FHO (Ib) "Unternehmen Scherhorn," 17 March 1945; Obbt. Risler "Geheime Kommandosache," 10 April 1945, all in RH 2/2153, BMA; Foley pp. 170-175; Dieter Sevin, "Operation Scherhorn," in Military Review, Vol. 46, #3 (March 1966), pp. 35-53; and Skorzeny, La Guerre Inconnue, pp. 349-355.


48. History of the Counter Intelligence Corps. Vol. XX, p. 4, NA; USFET MIS Center "CI-IIR/42 - H/Stuf. W. Kirchner", 3 Jan. 1946, pp. 4-5, OSS XL 40257, NA; Drska, pp. 62-63; Rose, pp. 200, 206-208; Sayer and Botting, America's Secret Army, p. 206; and Ultra Document KO 780, 19 April 1945, Ultra Micf. Coll., Reel 72. There is also evidence that toward the end of the war, the Jagdverbände began to train teenagers who were given orders by Himmler formally identifying them as members of the Jagdverbände rather than as Wervölfe. One such group of fifty-five adolescents underwent an eight day course at the Jagdverband Nordwest school at Kileschnovitz, whereafter they were infiltrated through American lines in groups of three to four, each accompanied by an SS officer. Their mission was to sabotage enemy air fields and railways, and to execute collaborators. A sabotage detachment involved in a shoot-out with American troops at Hof in early May was probably composed of graduates of the Kileschnovitz course. Officer de Liaison Auprès d'un Groupe D'Armes Americain "Saboteurs Allemands", 17 May 1945, 7P 125, SHAT; and History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, Vol. XX, p. 16, NA.


52. SHAEF JIC (45) 14 (JIC Draft), "Security Problems Facing the Allies in Germany", 11 April 1945, p. 1, WO 219/1659, PRO. A former section chief of the SD told Allied interrogators that plans for stay-behind agents suffered "a complete breakdown" and that "no information was received by Amt III from the territory evacuated." CSDIC/WEA, "2nd Interim Report on Standf. Hans Erlic", IR 8 Nov. 1945, ETO MIS-Y-Sect. CSDIC/WEA Interim Interrogation Reports, 1945-46, RG 332, NA.


54. 21 Army Gr., "CI News Sheet" #10, 22 Nov. 1944, p. 1, WO 205/997, PRO.

55. CSDIC (UK) Interrogation Report, "Amt III (SD Inland) RSHA", 30 Sept. 1945, pp. 16-17, ETO MIS-Y-Sect. Special Interrogation Reports, 1943-45, RG 332, NA.

56. Ibid., p. 17; 21 Army Gr., "CI News Sheet" #23, 13 June 1945, p. 13, WO 205/997, PRO; and Intelligence Div., Office of Chief of Naval Operations, "Intelligence Report", 25 June 1945, p. 3, OSS XL 12705, RG 226, NA.


60. USFET MIS Center, "Intermediate Interrogation Report (IIR) #16 - O/Führer Joseph Spacil", 28 Aug. 1945, pp. 19-20, OSS 15135, RG 226, NA.

61. USFET G-2, "Weekly Intelligence Summary #11", 27 Sept. 1945, State Dept. Decimal File 1945-49, 740.00119 Control (Germany), RG 59, NA.

62. MI-14 "Mitropa" #1, 29 July 1945, p. 4, FO 371/46967, PRO; 7th US Army SCI Report #5-965, "Waffen SS and Werewolf Activities", 25 May 1945, p. 3, IRR File XE 049 888 "Werewolf Activities Vol. I", RG 319, NA; and Enclave Military District ACoS 6-2 "CI Periodic Report" #3, 18 July 1945, pp. 2-3, OSS XL 12926, RG 226, NA. There were also various independent, locally-based Gestapo reconnaissance and terror units which were apparently unrelated to the Bundschuh, the Werwolf, or any other large-scale program. See, for instance, USFET 6-2 "Weekly Intelligence Summary" #11, 27 Sept. 1945, State Dept. Decimal File 1945-49, 740.00119 Control (Germany), RG 59, NA; and Rose, pp. 298-299. The most important of these groups was set up by the Cologne Gestapo, which in
1944/45 became the main Gestapostelle in the West because it was the collection point for all agents fleeing from France, the Low Countries, and the Rhineland. Werner Klemmer, the chief of the investigative and control arm of the Cologne Staoostelle, organized many of the elements which flowed into Cologne into river-crossing units with intelligence and sabotage tasks in the Allied-occupied Rhineland. Such activity was badly compromised by American success in "turning" captured agents and came to an end when the Ruhrgebiet was surrounded and overrun by the enemy. Klemmer himself was eventually captured and a nine man terror squad organized to operate in the Ruhr disintegrated. USFET G-2 "Weekly Intelligence Summary" #13, 11 Oct. 1945, p. 46, State Dept. Decimal Files 1945-49, 740.00119 Control (Germany), RG 59, NA; USFET Interrogation Center "Consolidated Interrogation Report (CIR) #5," 24 July 1945, pp. 1-4, OSS XL 13776, RG 226, NA; History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, Vol. XIX, pp. 43-45, 95-97; Vol. XX, pp. 77-80, NA; and Rose, p. 302.


68. 21 Army Gr., "CI News Sheet" #25, 13 July 1945, Part I, p. 3, WO 205/997, PRO.

69. Extract from "CI Spotlight" #2, 13 Aug. 1945, p. 3, OSS 14083, RG 226, NA.

70. CSDIC (WEA) BAOR, "Final Report on Krim. Rat. Gottfried Richard Lothar Wandel (a) Ludwig Wagner",


73. History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, Vol XX, p. 117, NA; and Rose, pp. 300-301.

74. 5 Corps "Weekly Intelligence Summary" #3, 25 July 1945, p. 6, FO 1007/299, PRO; Intelligence Div., Office of Chief of Naval Operations, "Intelligence Report", 25 June 1945, p. 2, OSS XL 12705, RG 226, NA; and History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, Vol. XX, p. 117, NA.


RG 319, NA; Draper, p. 228; and Enclave Military District ACoS G-2 "CI Periodic Report" #3, 18 July 1945, p. 2, OSS XL 12926, RG 226, NA. In Bremen, this collapse of operations was aided by Ohlendorf, who took advantage of the breakdown in the special Himmler-dominated command channels by intervening to instruct the chief of the Bremen SD Abschnitt to cease forming Bundschuh units in northwestern Germany. CSDIC (UK) Interrogation Report, "Amt III (SD Inland) RSHA", 30 Sept. 1945, p. 23, ETO MIS-Y-Sect. Special Interrogation Reports, 1943-45, RG 332, NA.

85. Minott, pp. 25-26, 28, 31, 41-42; Infield, Skorzeny, p. 112; 6th SFSS HQ 5 Corps "Notes on the Political Situation in Carinthia and Western Austria May 1945", 22 May 1945, FO 371/46610, PRO; Toland, p. 289; Bradley Smith and Elena Agarossi, Operation Sunrise: The Secret Surrender (New York: Basic Books, 1979), p. 62; Black, pp. 236-250; OSS Memo for the JCS, "Approaches from Austrian and Bavarian Nazis," 27 March 1945; and OSS Memo for JCS "Approaches from Austrian Nazis (Continued)," 13 April 1945, both in Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part I 1942-45: European Theatre, Reel #11. Kaltenbrunner gave detailed orders in late March regarding the organization of supply dumps for resistance groups in the Redoubt. Obergruppenführer Spacil, head of the RSHA supply service, claims that there was only a limited response. USFET MIS Center "Intermediate Interrogation Report (IIR) #16 - O/Führer Josef Spacil", 28 Aug. 1945, p. 19, OSS 15135, RG 226, NA.


87. GSI 8th Army "Joint Weekly Intelligence Summary" #1, 6 July 1945, Part I, p. 10, FO 371/46610, PRO.

88. CSDIC (UK) Interrogation Report "Amt III (SD-Inland) RSHA", 30 Sept. 1945, pp. 20-21, ETO MIS-Y-
Sect. Special Interrogation Reports, 1943-45, RG 332, NA. Ohlendorf's use of the term "terror organization" in his initial interrogation was later followed by a recantation similar to that expressed by Speer with regard to the supply of poison gas to Nazi guerrillas. After a period of reflection, Ohlendorf disclaimed use of the term "terror organization", and stated that he had been misinterpreted by his interrogators.

89. Eichmann Interrogated: Transcripts from the Archives of the Israeli Police, ed. Jochen von Lang (London: Bodley Head, 1983), pp. 216-262; Whiting, Hitler's Werewolves, p. 188; Toland, p. 639; and Hoetttl, p. 309. The infamous British traitor Norman Baillie-Steward was in the Alps in May 1945, and reported in his memoirs that an unidentified RSHA unit with a radio transmitter/receiver was based in Alt Aussee but fled to pre-prepared positions in the mountains upon the advance of the Americans. Baillie-Stewart called the band the "worst kind of Gestapo and SS Guards", who were undoubtedly responsible for much villainy, although they were later dispersed without firing a shot. Norman Baillie-Steward, The Officer in the Tower (London: Leslie Frewin, 1967), pp. 198, 200.

90. "Report on Interrogation of Walter Schellenburg, 27th June - 12th July 1945", 18 Feb. 1946, ETO MIS-Y-Sect. Miscellaneous Intelligence and Interrogation Reports, 1945-46, RG 332, NA. Schellenburg approved "technical preparations" for resistance, and the testimony of an SD-Ausland officer captured and interrogated in February 1945 gives some sense of these plans:

In general, German resistance plans are based on lessons learned from Soviet partisans. Cadres of the movement will be formed by Jagdverbände with similar sabotage and intelligence units and individual agents... Intelligence and sabotage plans are worked out by Amt VI under Schellenburg, assisted
by Schmitz, who helped Franco's armies in the Spanish War. Most resistance leaders will come from Amt VI...


91. Skorzeny, Skorzeny's Special Missions, p. 195; and OSS Mission for Germany "General Situation Report" #2, 15 July - 1 Sept. 1945, OMGUS AG Security Classified Decimal File 1945-49, 350.09 (Intelligence, General), RG 260, NA. For more on the intention to maintain the Redoubt as a "last bulwark against Bolshevism," and the attempt to reserve a German force for participation in a coming showdown between East and West, see Toland, The Last 100 Days, pp. 489-490.


93. Infield, Skorzeny, pp. 112.

94. Ultra Document, KO 1858, 2 May 1945, Ultra Micf. Collection, Roll 73; and Black, p. 257.

95. Genlt. I.A. Maisal to OB West, AOK 1, AOK 19, Wkr. VII, and Wkr. XVIII, 28 April 1945 (frames 5610751-5610752); and Genlt. I.A. Maisal, "Vortragsnotiz für Chef HPA", 29 April 1945 (frame 5610750), both in Records of OKW, Microcopy #T-77, Roll 863, NA. These documents -- which passed from Hitler through the hands of the northern Redoubt Commander,

96. Infield, Skorzeny, pp. 111-112.

97. OSS Report from Switzerland RB-10995, 21 April 1945, OSS 126098, RG 226, NA. On 1 May, a Nazi Political Indoctrination Officer with the 19th Army reported to Himmler that large groups of Waffen-SS, Security Service and Gestapo men in the Tyrol were refusing to join in conventional fighting on the claim that they were saving themselves for a "special task" of the Reichsführer-SS. Ultra Document KO 1879, 2 May 1945, Ultra Microf. Collection, Roll 73.


date), pp. 2, 9-10, all in World War II German Military Studies, Vol. 24; and Ultra Document, KO 1674, 29 April 1945, Ultra Micf. Collection, Roll 73. A Wehrmachtführungstab memo on 18 April 1945 estimated that it would require twenty-five supply trains, each with a thousand tons of goods, to bring supplies in the Alps up to the level needed to sustain a two month hold-out. Rose, p. 313.

100. ACA (BE) CMF "Joint Weekly Intelligence Summary" #23, 15 Dec. 1945, p. 17, FO 1007/300, PRO.

101. Reuben James, "The Battle of the German National Redoubt -- Planning Phase," in Military Review, Vol. XXVI, #9 (Dec. 1946), pp. 6-8; Reuben James, "The Battle of the German National Redoubt -- Operational Phase," in Military Review, Vol. XXVI, #10 (Jan. 1947), pp. 24-26; and Gen. Mark Clark, Calculated Risk (New York: Harper and Bros., 1950), pp. 440-441. Not only did Hitler fail to withdraw proper forces into the Alps, but he also managed to demoralize the 6th SS Panzer Army, which had already been pushed into the eastern Alps and which could conceivably have formed the main guerrilla force against the Soviets. After several elite Waffen-SS divisions failed to force a breakthrough in Hungary in March 1945, Hitler impetuously stripped them of their prized SS armbands, implying that the units had failed him and dishonoured the Nazi cause. As Gerald Reitlinger notes, the rage and disappointment thus induced "effectively prevented the SS playing the role of fanatical candidates for self-immolation, the logical consequence of the role for which Hitler had always intended them." Reitlinger, p. 87, 370-371; and Karl O. Paetel, "The Reign of the Black Order -- The Final Phase of National Socialism: The SS Counter-State," in The Third Reich (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1955), pp. 672-676.

102. Skorzeny, Skorzeny's Special Missions, p. 195. See also Infield, Skorzeny, p. 116; and Foley, pp. 193, 195.

103. Skorzeny, Skorzeny's Special Missions, p. 195.
104. Bradley and Agarossi, p. 97.


106. Minott, pp. 101-102. For the appointment of Schörner as Redoubt commander, see Rose, p. 314; and Toland, pp. 489-490. Schörner only reached the Redoubt -- via airplane -- on 9 May, and then went immediately into hiding.


111. USFET Interrogation Center "Intermediate Interrogation Report (IIR) #6 - Walter Schimana", 31 July 1945, p. 3, OSS 142090, RG 226, NA.

112. USFET MIS Center "Interrogation Report - H/Stuf. Wolfram Kirchner" CI-IIR 42, 3 Jan. 1946, p. 5, OSS XL 40257, RG 226, NA.

Kirchner" CI-IIR/42, p. 6, 3 Jan. 1946, OSS XL 40257, RG 226, NA; 6 SGSS 5 Corps. "Notes on the Political Situation in Carinthia and Western Styria, May 1945", 22 May 1945, FO 317/46610, PRO; and Infield, Skorzeny, p. 122.


115. BAOR/CIB "CI News Sheet" #28, 9 Sept. 1945, p. 7, WO 205/997, PRO.


118. 15 AG "Security Summary", 16 June 1945, p. 8, WO 204/831, PRO; GSI 8th Army "Joint Weekly Intelligence Summary" #3, 20 July 1945, pp. 12-14; #4, 27 July 1945, p. 5, both in FO 371/46611, PRO; #7, p. 16, FO 371/46612, PRO; 5 Corps "Weekly Intelligence Summary" #1, 11 July 1945, p. 6; #7, 30 Aug. 1945, p. 9, FO 1007/299, PRO; and USFET G-2 "Weekly Intelligence Summary" #16, 1 Nov. 1945, p. 1, State Dept. Decimal Files 1945-49, 740.00119 Control (Germany), RG 59, NA.

119. ACA (BE) Intelligence Organization "Digest" #16, 16 Jan. 1946, p. 2, FO 1007/289, PRO; ACA (BE) Intelligence Organization "Joint Weekly Intelligence Summary" #26, 12 Jan. 1946, pp. 2-3; #28, 26 Jan. 1946, p. 4; #29, 2 Feb. 1946, p. 4, all in FO 1007/300, PRO; and MI-14 "Mitropa" #15, 9 Feb. 1946, p. 8, FO 371/55630, PRO. The loosely-knit "Widerstandsbewegung" was built by associates of Obersturmführer Krüger, formerly of Jagdverband Südost and included at least one ex-Werwolf. They specialized in infiltrating British Army ski schools as instructors. It is possible that the organization was aided by the Soviets -- supposedly the chief foe of Schutzkorps Alpenland -- since the Red Army reportedly supplied Krüger with papers after arresting him in the Soviet Zone of Austria.

121. Infield, Skorzeny, pp. 130-132, 154-163; "Interrogation Report - Hans Gunther Redel", 18 April 1948, pp. 1-2; I. Harris, Dept. Director of Intelligence, OMGUS to Director of Intelligence, Commanding General, US Forces Austria, 14 Dec. 1948; J. McCraw, Chief, Public Safety Branch OMGUS to Dir. of Intelligence OMGUS, 8 Sept. 1948, all in OMGUS ODI General Correspondence, 080.4, RG 260, NA; USFET "Theatre Commander's Weekly Staff Conference" #28, p. 5, 2 July 1946; USFET "Weekly Intelligence Summary" #62, 19 Sept. 1946, p. C5, both in State Dept. Decimal File 1945-49, 740.00119 Control (Germany), RG 59, NA; CCG (BE) Intelligence Division "Summary" #5, 13 Sept. 1946, p. 1, FO 1005/1702, PRO; Wiesenthal, pp. 89-93; and Infield, Secrets of the SS, pp. 195-198.


124. CCG (BE) "Intelligence Bulletin" #13, 24 May 1946, p. 3 FO 1005/1701, PRO.

125. 3rd US Army Interrogation Center (Prov.). "Interrogation Report" #39, 8 Sept. 1945, OSS XL 19643, RG 226, NA.


1945.


131. Maschmann, pp. 174-175.

132. Watson, pp. 343-344.

Aside from RSHA intervention into the Werwolf field, there were also some last minute attempts by Party chieftains to promote partisan warfare. This trend particularly centered upon the efforts of three powerful men whose careers had developed within the Party bureaucracy and whose bases of power lay within that realm: Josef Goebbels, the Gauleiter of Berlin and Minister of Propaganda, who stood as the only first rate intellect in the senior Nazi hierarchy; Martin Bormann, the stocky and sinister head of the Party Chancellery, who once fought the French as an underground fighter during the Ruhr occupation, but had since switched his expertise to bureaucratic infighting; and Robert Ley, the drunken satyr who had risen from his position as Gauleiter of Cologne to become chief of the Deutsch Arbeitsfront (DAF). These were the "old Party comrades" who remained loyal to Hitler's apparent desire for the self-immolation of the Reich, and who during the final months huddled together with their master in the gloomy Chancellery bunker.

Of course, they can only loosely be considered a
group because of the vicious rivalry amongst them, particularly between Goebbels and Bormann, although even this antagonism was dulled in the spring of 1945 because of the agreement of both men on the need to buoy up German resistance by means of fanatic propaganda.\textsuperscript{1} Goebbels and Bormann alike indulged in day dreams about the good old days of the \textit{Kampfzeit}, and hoped to revive the Party as a self contained political-fighting unit:\textsuperscript{2} the former sought by such means to save the ideological aspect of Naziism -- or at least force Germany to undergo the passage of the movement amid a rain of revolutionary fire and brimstone -- while the latter had the more limited goal of saving himself and the basis of his bureaucratic power.

These officials fancied having a leftist or "popular" orientation which naturally led them toward the expedient of a "people's war". The parallels with the self-assumed role of the Soviet Communist Party in 1941-42 are obvious. It will be recalled, however, that the main proponents of such a course throughout the early history of the Party had been the SA, and that even after the SA's eclipse, it continued to dominate programs such as civilian rifle training, which began in 1939. For a
short period in the spring of 1944 — when the civilian rifle training course was expanded under the title SA-Wehrschiessen — it appeared that the SA might emerge from the shadows, but this was only a momentary development. By the late summer — with the Soviets and Western Allies both hovering over Germany's frontiers — the preparation of domestic resistance was suddenly no longer a distant precaution, but a serious business in which the major institutions of the Nazi state began to involve themselves. It became apparent that the SA had never recovered from the blow of the Röhm "putsch", and the Storm Troopers helplessly found their former sphere of control in adult paramilitary training now poached upon by powers of a higher order. One captured SA official told the Americans that as a focal point of Nazi resistance warfare, "the SA may be considered a dead issue".

With the Wehrmacht on the verge of collapse in August and September 1944, various generals began to demand civilian labour call-ups in borderland regions — for the purpose of constructing defence works — and they also requested the formation of a civilian defence militia, perhaps built around the surviving core of the
Hitler accepted the basic plan, but rather than allot responsibility to the SA or to the military, he turned to the Gauleiters, who by Hitler's order were appointed as "Reichsverteidigung Kommissars" ("Reich Defence Commissioners"). The most energetic Gauleiters in the marchlands quickly seized this opportunity and established themselves as local warlords; Erich Koch, for instance, established a "People's Army" in East Prussia; Franz Hofer aided in the call-up of fifty thousand Alpine minutemen, or Standschützen, in the Tyrol; while in the eastern Ruhrgebiet, Albert Hoffmann established a "Freikorps Sauerland", as a regional formation of Home Guards.

In the early fall such regional organizations were incorporated into a new national militia coordinated by the Party Chancellery, although the Standschützen and Freikorps Sauerland retained a limited autonomy within the larger organization. Helmuth Auerbach suggests that both the Werwolf and the new militia, the Volkssturm, were actually mirror images of the same program, with the Volkssturm serving as the component of the "people's war" at the front, and the Werwolf as its expression in the enemy rear. It is certainly true -- in theory at
least -- that both the Werwolf and the Volkssturm were supposed to combine Party and SS efforts, with the Party handling the political and ideological side of matters, and the SS the military side. This new "people's war" was also launched with a great deal of blustery propaganda, which hinted at the possibility of fighting behind Allied lines but rarely stated this threat directly because of the "defeatist" implications of such declarations.11

At the time of its establishment, there was some doubt about whether members of the Volkssturm were responsible merely for service on the German side of the front, or were also expected to act as franc tireurs and partisans in the enemy rear. Although the Volkssturm was based upon a secret Führer decree of 6 September 1944 (and a formal decree issued three weeks later),12 it was introduced to the public in a speech by Himmler on 18 October. Not incidentally, the speech was given in East Prussia, where Volkssturm units first became operational, and it also commemorated the anniversary of the 1813 Battle of Nations, which was fought partly by the Prussian Landsturm. Himmler continually returned to the inspiration of the Landsturm, but he also made reference
to a revival of the Werwolf bands active during the Thirty Years War -- "Even in territory which [the enemy] believes they have conquered, the German will to resist will again and again flare-up in their rear, and like Werwölfe, death-defying volunteers will injure the enemy and cut his lifelines".\textsuperscript{13}

This statement naturally created considerable alarm among both friend and foe: "Hitler Rallies Guerrillas", ran the banner headline in \textit{Stars and Stripes}, and at SHAEF, Allied officers hinted that unmarked Volkssturmmänner operating in the Allied rear would not be protected by the Hague Rules of War. On the same day that the Volkssturm was announced, SHAEF G-5 released the legal outline for Allied military government, which contained a well-publicized authorization for firing squads to deal with German civilians blocking the progress of Allied armies.\textsuperscript{14}

Thus facing this almost insurmountable barrier to the construction of the Volkssturm, most Nazi propagandists immediately began to reverse the signal sent out in Himmler's address. Both domestic and international propaganda heavily stressed that the militia would not be a partisan movement. "The
Volkssturm" said the 12 Uhr Blatt, "is no casual heap of poorly armed civilians, but a highly disciplined army of soldiers. It will not fight with flails or ARP axes, nor in secret and cowardly ambushes, but with weapons of modern war, and fearlessly, as true soldiers do..." The same message was conveyed in local newspapers and journals, and also in an important address to foreign journalists by the military propagandist Sündermann, made on the same day as Himmler's speech. To strengthen the claim of such irregular formations to proper treatment, the Germans were also careful to apply the Hague Convention to members of the AK captured in the Warsaw Uprising.\textsuperscript{15}

SHAEF G-2 decided in late October that it had originally misinterpreted the Volkssturm, and a week later SHAEF CoS, General W.B. Smith, issued a directive noting that Volkssturm units would be given appropriate treatment under the Hague Rules of War, provided they were commanded by a responsible officer, bore a recognizable emblem, and carried their weapons openly.\textsuperscript{16} British Intelligence had already figured out that Himmler's reference to Werwölfe probably did not apply to the main body of the Volkssturm, and on the last day of
October, the Undersecretary of the Foreign Office told the House of Commons that, "No substantial distinction can be drawn between the position in international law of the Volkssturm and of the Local Defence Volunteers when they were formed in 1940...they are entitled to be treated as legal combatants". The Soviets, however, were unbound by any similar sense of restraint, perhaps because they had earlier employed their own militia units as guerrilla bands, and thus naturally expected that the Germans would do the same; in any case, they routinely massacred captured Volkssturmmänner on the assumption that they were partisans.

Was, in fact, the Volkssturm meant to have a guerrilla character? Directives from the Party Chancellery clearly show that the organization was regarded mainly as a means of stopping armoured thrusts by the enemy, and that it was intended to operate strictly within the bounds outlined in the Hague Convention; in fact, Bormann even forwarded to the Gauleiters summaries of the Hague rules in order to guide the proper formation and training of local Volkssturm units. In actual practice, there were two types of Volkssturm detachments: Einsatzbataillonen, which were
mobile and were used as a tactical reserve for frontline service; and Standbataillonen, which were locally-raised levies intended for the defence of the hinterland, particularly against tank breakthroughs or air- and seaborne landings, and also served to protect German lines of communication.\textsuperscript{20}

Of course, the \textit{Volkssturm} had its own "\textit{Spähtruppe}" (reconnaissance units) which ran patrols behind the enemy's frontlines,\textsuperscript{21} and it is also possible that according to the preferences of the local Gau- and Kreisleiters, whole Standbataillonen were trained for partisan warfare\textsuperscript{22} -- it is known, for instance, that certain training courses for the \textit{Standschützen} in March and April 1945 were in fact training programs in sabotage intended to produce full-fledged \textit{Werwölfe}.\textsuperscript{23} It is also true that the \textit{Volkssturm} had definite associations with the \textit{Werwolf}, particularly through the limited passage of personnel from the former to the latter,\textsuperscript{24} and in Gau Lower Danube, there was an especially blurred distinction between the two groups, mainly because both functioned under a single commander, Obersturmbannführer Fahrion.\textsuperscript{25} Arno Rose suggests that while the great majority of \textit{Volkssturmmänner} did not consider themselves guerrillas
or terrorists, there were a few who identified with the Werwolf, and that this minority occasionally became involved in deeds that had little to do with the proper concerns of a conventional militia.26

For several months immediately after Himmler's Volkssturm speech, however, the Party tended to keep its focus away from the SS-dominated Werwolf and upon the Volkssturm, where the Party was actually gaining influence at the expense of the SS.27 It will be recalled, for instance, that the Gauleiters had been given important tasks relative to Werwolf recruitment, but that this allotment of responsibility had failed because of the tendency of Party bosses to direct resources toward the Volkssturm. The Gauleiters had also been given extensive local control of Werwolf propaganda (with guiding principles drafted by the Propaganda Ministry), and it was expected that the resulting material would be airdropped into enemy territory or shot in by means of leaflet shelling. Once again, almost nothing was done in this sphere aside from the air-drop a few miniature copies of Völkischer Beobachter, and the re-publication of Lön's Der Werwolf, which was mandatory reading both for members of the SS guerrilla organization.
and for so-called "worthy men" of the *Volkssturm*.

It is true that the master SS propagandist Gunther D'Alguen was attached to Prützmann's staff to handle propaganda matters, and that in October 1944, D'Alquen published an article on the likelihood of Nazi partisan warfare in his popular SS journal, *Das Schwarze Korps*. However, D'Alquen was subsequently incapacitated by scarlet fever for the winter of 1944-45, and was in hospital from the beginning of November until March. During this period, the *Werwolf* was thus left without much propaganda punch, although this actually pleased some of the secretive SS officers running the organization, who saw its role as a diversionary force better served by secrecy than by open publicity.

There were also some more basic problems inhibiting *Werwolf* propaganda. In the first place, consideration of guerrilla warfare would have broken the Nazi taboo on admitting the possible loss of considerable stretches of territory, and also presumed that the *Wehrmacht* was no longer capable of defending the Reich. Such admissions seemed especially inappropriate during a period when the fronts in both East and West had solidified and the Army and *Waffen-SS* were in fact preparing a major counter-
attack aimed at splitting American and British forces. During the period of panic in September 1944 certain German sources had hinted at the possibility of partisan warfare -- as noted above -- but even during this period assurances of the Wehrmacht's capability to defend German frontiers easily overwhelmed any suggestions of guerrilla fighting occasionally heard or seen in the domestic media. Little or nothing was said about partisan warfare against the Soviets.

A further difficulty was caused by German evacuation policy, according to which the bulk of the loyal citizenry was supposed to leave threatened areas in advance of the enemy's arrival. Although such directives were frequently flaunted in western Germany, Party and propaganda agencies could hardly report about extensive resistance activities in areas that were supposed to be evacuated, and the best they could do was suggest that German civilians would have readily ambushed the invaders had they been asked to do so.

Yet another problem for the Nazis lay in the fact that the limited scale of resistance actually underway in the occupied zones was carried out principally by teenagers. Although press and radio occasionally
admitted this, Nazi opinion-makers probably feared that widespread knowledge of such a children's war would alienate the increasingly irritable home population in unoccupied areas, and as late as March 1945 reports of sabotage by teenage HJ members were attributed by DNB to "systemic" Allied black propaganda.33

By the beginning of 1945, however, the factors which had oriented the Party away from the Werwolf in favour of the Volkssturm had begun to erode. In the first place, the much-heralded Volkssturm proved both incapable and vastly unpopular. When committed at the front, it performed so poorly that arrangements were made in January to keep Volkssturm battalions constantly stiffened by Army and Waffen-SS troops, lest they collapse and create holes in the front.34 Moreover, the compulsory mass call-up to the organization caused tremendous resentment, not only because of the demands caused by part-time training, but also because the formation of Einsatzbataillonen as a mobile reserve was felt a betrayal of the assurance that the Volkssturm was strictly a measure for local defence.35 Most important of all, people naturally realized that civilians with pick-up weapons would be slaughtered attempting to
succeed where the Wehrmacht had already failed; Himmler's comparison of the Volkssturm to the 1813 "Freiheitskämpfer" was rejected as totally unrealistic. Many Germans were further convinced by Himmler's inaugural speech that Volkssturmmänner were in effect partisans -- notwithstanding Allied assurances of protection under the Hague Convention -- and this unsettling suspicion also caused a continual erosion of morale.

Another problem concerned the stubborn presence of the Anglo-American forces, who refused to be pushed back from their narrow beachheads on German soil. There were disturbing signs of timidity and collaboration by the few Rhinelanders under this enemy's thumb, so that despite the psychological restraints, German propagandists eventually had to admit the need to punish collaborators, even if this could be done only in fiction rather than actual fact. For this purpose, propaganda policy was altered to allow for the introduction of an alleged organization called the "Rächer Deutscher Ehre", or "Avengers of German Honour", which was supposed to combat collaborationism by executing the sentences of Vehme courts. Throughout the first several months of 1945,
various Rhenish newspapers carried harrowing reports about the killing of "dishonourable" Germans, beginning with an Aachen merchant allegedly executed in early December 1944. The increasing activity of the Rächer, said the Nazis, "made the Americans extremely nervous", and "had stiffened the secret resistance of the nationally-minded population". The Allies, however, were doubtful that any such killings actually occurred; SHAEF's Psychological Warfare Division noted that, "No evidence has been received to suggest that the stories are true", and an American CIC unit characterized the Rächer as a "product... of fancy and fanatical imagination".

By February 1945, the problems posed by the occupied territories had multiplied tenfold, since the Western Allies had further expanded their toe-holds in the Rhineland and the Soviets had also captured large stretches of territory in the wake of their massive Winter Offensive. Party leaders therefore began to take a second look at the Werwolf movement, which the SS was now accused of unconscionably neglecting. Several Bormann minions produced proposals for initiating partisan warfare, particularly Hauptbereichsleiter Hans
Dotzler, a Bavarian poultry farmer and Party official who suddenly bloomed into an expert on guerrilla warfare along the Eastern Front. Bormann passed one of Dotzler's memoranda on to Himmler, who, in turn, gave the document to Prützmann and ordered the Werwolf leader to report to Bormann and provide the Party chief with full details about his **Sonderauftrag** (special assignment).41

By March 1945, Bormann had waded deep into the Werwolf morass. Gauleiters in immediately threatened areas were supplied with false identity papers and ordered to go underground in order to help in organizing guerrilla groups, and Party officials were also ordered to give up any state or civic posts that might be held concurrently with their Party positions. This latter measure freed Party bureaucrats for possible underground work and also created a class of "surrender officials" who were specifically set up by the Nazis for the purpose of later knocking them down, either with propaganda, threats, or Werwolf assassination teams. Bormann also began to warm to the idea of an Alpine Redoubt: a memorandum to the **Führer** suggesting the construction of an Alpine fortress had already been submitted in November 1944 by the Tyrolean Gauleiter, Hofer, but it lay
gathering dust for four months until Bormann's opinions on the matter had shifted and he tardily forwarded the document to Hitler.\textsuperscript{42}

Even more importantly, Dotzler was appointed to head a Werwolf political directorate, which made plans for the re-establishment of secret Party cells and the spread of underground propaganda. According to Kurt Tauber, the desperados of Dienstelle Prützmann made big plans for Dotzler's office even as the Third Reich disintegrated and they themselves fled toward the Alpine Redoubt. Siebel and company reportedly saw the Dotzler bureau as the directing force in an eventual political revival of Naziism, perhaps under the camouflage of a religious movement with a Christian-Communist orientation.\textsuperscript{43}

After Bormann's meeting with Prützmann — at which the latter presumably complained about the non-compliance of the Gauleiters in aiding Werwolf activities — Bormann also issued a circular to the Gauleiters strictly ordering them to appoint a W-Beauftragter responsible for recruitment, and thence to forward the names to Dotzler's office at the Party Chancellery; the immediate posting of such officials, said Bormann, "was of great importance for this highly significant task".\textsuperscript{44} The effort to
encourage the aid of Party bosses in _Werwolf_-related matters had heretofore fallen upon Prützmann, Ley, and the chief of the Party Hauptpersonalamt, Marrenbach, but none of these figures could ensure the kind of compliance which Bormann could rightly demand.

It is not unreasonable to surmise that Bormann's increased commitment to _Werwolf_ activism during this period ensured a reciprocal extension of his influence within the organization, particularly since the conversion of _Werwolf_ into a strong-arm unit for enforcing "scorched earth" decrees and assassinating "defeatists" bears the unmistakable imprint of his influence. It is notable, for instance, that some of the _Werwolf_ murders in the Braunschweig area were actually committed by a _Kreisleitung "Rollkommando"_ (a term with Vehmisch connotations dating back to the early 1920s), and that the posting of threatening _Werwolf_ placards in Wuppertal was done by _Kreisleitung_ functionaries who had taken it upon themselves to organize the local _Werwolf_.

Several senior German leaders who first came into contact with the _Werwolf_ in March and April 1945 even believed that the organization was directly under Bormann's command and later testified to this effect at the
Nuremberg Trials.47

The Party also interested itself in repairing the unpreparedness of the SS by encouraging resistance in territories already overrun (despite Bormann's stern rebuke to Himmler "that at the moment of deep enemy breakthroughs it is already too late"48). A meeting was held in February between Bormann's deputy, Oberbefehlsleiter Friedrichs, and Goebbels' main underling, Staatssekretär Naumann, at which such matters were discussed. A suggestion to air-drop sabotage instructions and propaganda into Soviet-occupied areas was rejected on the assumption that the Soviets would react with massive reprisals, and that the measure would therefore be counter-productive. Rather, it was decided to exploit the apparatus of Unternehmen Skorpion, a top secret operation for spreading Vlasovite and pro-UPA propaganda which was originally launched by D'Alquen's "Kurt Eggers" Standarte in Poland during the summer of 1944. The Skorpion operation apparently had some sort of line-crossing capability, and Naumann supposedly established liaison with the ubiquitous Skorzeny, who had since assumed control of the Skorpion enterprise; a call was subsequently issued for volunteer wireless
transmitters who were "urgently required for special employment" with the "Kurt Eggers" unit. It is likely that the construction of a mobile transmitter to control Werwolf Gruppen was also discussed at the Friedrichs-Naumann meeting, and shortly afterwards Naumann forwarded instructions to another Goebbels deputy, Hans Fritsche, directing the development of plans for a secret mobile station.

Goebbels' interest in the Werwolf lay mainly in its potential in the West, which was perhaps natural since the Propaganda Minister was a native Rhinelander. It was on this front that the policy of systemic evacuation had broken down during February -- a development which was never paralleled in the East -- and Bormann had soon recommended formally terminating the process because of the confusion it created in the interior. In fact, the Reichsleiter had openly advised Gauleiters in the West that German civilians left in the wake of the enemy advance were no longer to be regarded unfavourably. One of the main factors inhibiting a guerrilla propaganda campaign had thus disappeared.

There was also an obvious need for a propaganda jolt to bring western Germans back into line, since most of
the population which remained in the Allied rear had been unwilling to either confront the enemy advance or to show hostility to Allied troops once they arrived. Moreover, the Party had given an embarrassingly poor account of itself, its functionaries often being the first to flee towns threatened by the enemy. Goebbels, however, did not lose faith in the fortitude of his countrymen, believing that they had shown courage under aerial bombing, but that this devastating campaign had shattered them both physically and mentally, a condition worsened by the experience of seeing the Wehrmacht routed. In retrospect, it must be noted that Goebbels possessed an amazingly optimistic faith in both the loyalty of Germans to the Nazi cause and in their capacity to maintain a fanatical antagonism toward the occupying powers; "The people need only a good sleep and release from the scourge of the air war to come to themselves again ... I am of the opinion that slowly the partisan war will start in West Germany. There are already a number of signs of it". Goebbels believed that the key to such a turn of events was the anticipated food shortage, and that if such a factor did not cause a rebellion before the loss
of the remaining sections of unoccupied territory, it
would surely do so afterward. The Western Allies, he
surmised, would unwisely attempt a dual-track policy of
enforced starvation side-by-side with democratization:

Should the enemy in their blind hate
really allow themselves to be led in
such a direction, leaving the
defeated German people hungry in a
world of plenty, indeed possibly for
months and years, then they would
never know what hit them. In
Germany, they will not lure the dog
out from behind the stove with
democracy alone. And if democratic
theory in practice denotes hunger,
they will see how the emaciated and
apparently dull Germans bear hunger
placards through their bombed
cities, and how they unreservedly
throw themselves into the arms of
political radicalism. Where
Communism cannot reap the fruit of
radicalization -- and its chance of
success in Germany is not very great
after all the wrongs and horrors
which the Bolsheviks have caused in
our eastern provinces -- a Neo-
National Socialism will be born,
pure and honest, uncompromising and
strong from the collapse and the
following misery as emergence from a
purgatory.54

As a spark to ignite this conflagration, Goebbels
hoped to win control of Unternehmen Werwolf, and then re-
orient it in a more radical direction, an initiative
which also fit with Goebbels' general effort to get
almost all matters of domestic policy under his own
control. He approached Hitler with this suggestion in late March 1945, and was rewarded with the transfer of initiative for Werwolf propaganda away from the Gauleiters and toward the Propaganda Ministry. Although he had presumably asked for more, Goebbels was pleased with this partial victory, which at least gave him a foothold from which to further expand his grip -- in early April he noted that he still had plans "to get the organization of the Werwolf movement into my own hands", although he now admitted this must be done gradually. "Not only do I think myself suited to do it", he noted, "but I believe the Werwolf must be led with spirit and enthusiasm". 55

Goebbels' intervention into Werwolf affairs naturally created an open rivalry between himself and Prützmann, particularly since the latter was not a party to the new arrangements allowing the Propaganda Ministry to conduct a Werwolf publicity campaign. Goebbels felt that Unternehmen Werwolf was a failure, and that Prützmann was proceeding far too hesitantly. Prützmann, in defence, argued that the population of occupied districts was apathetic and openly opposed to the Nazi Party, which made it necessary to proceed slowly in the
organization of partisan warfare.\textsuperscript{56} In light of such a position, it is hardly surprising that Prützmann became enraged when the Propaganda Ministry proceeded to surround the Werwolf with a radical and spirited propaganda campaign that did not reflect his views nor had been previously submitted for the review of his office. Such an approach, he told Gauleiter Kaufmann, was "wrong, dangerous and stupid", and caused "grave dissentions" between himself and the Goebbels Ministry.\textsuperscript{57}

Several days after the propaganda campaign had begun, Prützmann burst into Goebbels' office and openly confronted him, claiming that his guerrillas needed to operate with a certain modicum of secrecy.\textsuperscript{58} Goebbels totally rejected such a view: "We do not intend to hide our light under a bushel and do secret service work", he noted in his diary. "On the contrary, the enemy should know precisely what we are planning and doing".\textsuperscript{59} Moreover, the Propaganda Ministry took a particularly broad view of the Werwolf: according to a memorandum circulated by Naumann on 4 April, the full activization of the movement would convert all "activist fighters" into Werwölfe, both in occupied areas and in unoccupied Germany as well.\textsuperscript{60}
The main subject of the Goebbels-Prützmann battle was Werwolf Sender, a radio station which Goebbels began to assemble in March 1945, possibly with Bormann's backing. This was the final development of the idea for a mobile transmitter -- which was first muted in February -- and after a considerable rush, it began to broadcast on Easter Sunday, 1 April (when the symbol of rebirth and the symbol of lunacy appropriately fell upon the same date). In the afternoon, the Home Service broadcast an "important bulletin" which had supposedly just been received: "In the German territories of the West which are occupied by the enemy, a German Freedom Movement has come into existence..." Thereafter, a steady stream of melodramatic reports about the new movement sought to build up excitement, until finally it was announced that the Werwolf possessed its own transmitter behind enemy lines and that an "effort" would be made to pick up their inaugural proclamation. This was achieved and the proclamation was broadcast at peak listening time, between 19.00 and 20.00 hours. Thereafter, it was announced that Werwolf Sender would broadcast nightly at 19.00 on 1339 m., the old Deutschlandsender wavelength.
A Wehrmacht Signals expert later pointed out that Goebbels had actually botched the proclamation, since it appealed for listeners in both the West and the East, but mentioned only one secret behind-the-lines transmitter -- the clever listener would have immediately realized that to reach listeners on both fronts, the station was probably in the mid-section of the country and had to be using broadcasting facilities of considerable output. In truth, the transmitter was located at the old Deutschlandsender station at Königswüsterhausen, southeast of Berlin, but the idea of a secret station on enemy occupied soil was apparently regarded as a necessary ingredient if the proceedings were to develop any decent sense of conspiratorial romance.

To provide an organizational structure for the new station, a special branch called the Werwolf Referat was reportedly organized within the Propaganda Department of the Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda. The radio station itself was placed in the hands of Horst Slesina, who was transferred from his post as chief of the regional Propaganda Office in Westmark. He was chosen for the position because of his adroit understanding of the situation in western Germany --
where Werwolf Sender's main efforts were directed — and because he had made a considerable effort on the Saar Front to rouse civilian resistance to the invading Allied armies. Slesina, however, remained something of a junior manager, since both Goebbels and Naumann took great interest in the day-to-day affairs of the station, as well as regularly writing propaganda copy for its announcers.

Another bureaucratic adjustment was the dismissal of Goebbels' other Staatssekretär, Reich Press Chief Otto Dietrich, mainly because he had not shown sufficient zeal for this latest propaganda development — "With men like Dr. Dietrich", Goebbels told the Führer, "how am I supposed to conduct propaganda, such as that for the Werwolf movement at present, which must be of an extraordinarily radical nature". Dietrich had particularly angered both Goebbels and Hitler by his dilution of Goebbels' strongly worded announcement on the shooting of the Oberbürgermeister of Aachen, especially since he attempted to delete mention of a fictional Vehme trial which was supposed to have condemned the mayor to death. It is notable, however, that with the Press Department in an uproar, Goebbels failed in his intention
to launch a Werwolf newspaper, which was projected to serve as a natural media partner for the radio station.

For the three weeks after its establishment, Werwolf Sender engaged in two chief operations, amid playing lively pop music: one was issuing threats, and the other was reporting on various acts of sabotage supposedly committed by the Werwolf movement. Propaganda against native collaborators did not go into great detail, but rather confined itself to general threats and the naming of lists of individuals under condemnation. Special invective was directed toward German officers in the Soviet-sponsored Freies Deutschland movement who were reportedly dropped behind German lines in the last weeks of the war -- "Upon discovery of such an officer", said Werwolf Sender, "it is the duty of every German citizen to tear him apart". As for the enemy, the main targets of abuse were General George Patton and the U.S. financier and presidential advisor Bernard Baruch, who visited occupied Germany in mid-April; Baruch in particular, was portrayed as an archtypical representative of sinister, behind-the-scenes Jewish influences, and since he was in fact a veteran of the American delegation to Versailles and a key supporter of
the Morgenthau Plan, he merited repeated Werwolf death threats while in Europe.69

Werwolf Sender's other main activity was to provide reports on Werwolf successes in inflicting damage upon Allied forces. Most of the reports broadcast by Werwolf Sender were quite fantastic: on 4 April, for instance, they claimed to have captured the Secretary of the "American Extermination Commission", an Allied Einsatzgruppe allegedly based in Koblenz, while three weeks later "Werwolf Commandos" were reported to have blown up part of the Leuna Synthetic Petroleum Works near Leipzig, an announcement that must have seemed strange to listeners in the Leuna area, where it was well known that most of the plant had already been flattened by Allied bombers.70

In truth, the Propaganda Ministry admitted in mid-April that -- "We know little or nothing of what is happening in these [occupied] areas", and Goebbels was the first to admit, at least privately, that Werwolf Sender's output was not actually the news, but "the news as it should be". In fact, the Propaganda Minister personally dictated many of the station's fictional reports, and when he lost inspiration he would wander the
corridors of his office, calling out for ideas from his assistants. Needless to say Goebbels and his aides received no help from Dienstelle Prützmann -- although that office prepared its own internal reports documenting local successes by Werwolf Gruppen -- and one Werwolf official disapprovingly noted in mid-April "That the heroics extolled over the Werwolf radio net were either pure fiction or the accomplishments of small scattered remnants of troops who had no connection with the Prützmann program".

The purpose of broadcasting largely fictional reports was to create the impression that the Werwolf was widespread, or at least had extensive reach, thus building the proper psychological climate for a real terrorist campaign. It also gave sympathetic listeners in the occupied territories implicit instructions on the kinds of activities they might employ in order to disrupt Allied forces. In fact, Werwolf Sender even broadcast blunt indications of what could be done -- "set up barriers and traps on roads, remove place names and signposts... remove minefield markings... take note of the location of the enemy's ammunition and petrol dumps, food stocks and other material. Whenever there is an
opportunity -- and such opportunities must be brought about by every possible means -- the enemy's dumps and stores must be destroyed". Such instructions formed a large part of the Werwolf "Sixteen Commandments" broadcast on 7 April. It was admittedly inconvenient that the enemy could listen in and take the necessary counter-measures, but Goebbels had already indicated -- both to Prützmann and in his diary -- that his flights of fancy would remain unaltered by such minor embarrassments. In truth, of course, the public airing of sabotage instructions was actually an indication of extreme weakness; such a measure would have been unnecessary but for the rapidity of the Allied advance into Germany and Prützmann's inability to get his own agency ready to fully meet this contingency.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Werwolf Sender was the highly ideological nature of its propaganda output, which both recalled the revolutionary roots of National Socialism as well as recent political and social trends within the Nazi state. Goebbels repeatedly pointed out that Werwolf Sender represented a return to the essential features of National Socialism, and would play an extremist role similar to the newspaper
Der Angriff "in the good old days of our struggle". Even the notorious early Nazi rabble-rouser Julius Streicher, whose pathological behaviour had caused his dismissal as Gauleiter of Franconia in 1940, was recalled from the wilderness in order to deliver short Werwolf diatribes, although Werwolf Sender apparently ceased broadcasting before the world was treated to a glimpse of this political come-back. Streicher's presence was not missed, however, since Goebbels himself wrote much wild-eyed copy for the station, which proudly took no account "of regular methods of conducting war or of wartime foreign policy", and thus -- in terms of radicalism -- far surpassed the regular propaganda in which Goebbels' authorship was openly acknowledged. This was a great psychological release for the Propaganda Minister who, after being muzzled since 1934, was finally able to vent his own brand of leftist radicalism -- "It is really refreshing", he said, "for once to be able to talk as one used to do during our struggle period". It is interesting to note that by April 1945, Goebbels liked to place himself in the same category as Stennes, Strasser, and Röhm, except that he was loyal to the Führer, and they supposedly were not.
In line with Goebbels' opinions, Werwolf Sender found the war almost immaterial compared with the fact that a pan-European, anti-bourgeois revolution was underway, and it revived the old SA heresy about the need for "permanent revolution", a matter that had cost Röhm his head in 1934. Goebbels also believed that in the course of such a revolutionary struggle, the methods of "bourgeois" warfare should be totally abandoned, and it was mainly through the intervention of such "moderates" as Himmler and Göring that his call for a unilateral abrogation of the Geneva Convention went unheeded. Werwolf Sender provided a handy forum for such views, however, and declared on its opening day of broadcasting that Werwölfe would happily disregard the rules of war. However, such heady revolutionary declarations were too extreme even for the Werwolf's target audience, and on 5 April the station was forced to broadcast a lengthy apologia, in which the disavowal of the rules of war was attributed to enemy propaganda and met by the argument that it was the Allies who had broken international law by unleashing a war of aggression and conducting aerial bombing -- the Werwolf, it said, was "rising to reinstitute the violated law".
From the very beginning, Werwolf Sender was designed to appeal to "the unflinching pertinacious political minority which has always formed the steel tip of the popular leaden lance". This vanguard was believed to consist of about ten percent of the German population, but was thought capable of carrying the majority in the direction which it led, a concept which has since become a general article of faith among revolutionaries. In order to build an attitude of tolerance for Werwolf activities beyond the activist minority, however, Werwolf Sender also took the views of the population-at-large into consideration. Despite publicly divorcing itself from "stuffy public opinion", Werwolf Sender displayed a surprising willingness to recognize and even pardon the war-weariness of the western German population -- "We Werwölfe blame no one for being tired. This weariness will pass. No one can do more than his strength allows". An early broadcast from the station openly admitted that pressuring civilians to join the Werwolf would be useless, but indicated that, "There will come a time when all will join us, including those who have been tired out by war and the murderous bombing".

In order to further make itself palatable to the
general populace, Werwolf Sender could hardly portray its followers as the cutting edge of the National Socialist revolution -- Nazi popularity was, after all, in serious decline -- but it rather sought to portray Werwölfe as local vigilantes protecting civilians from the wanton cruelty of Allied soldiers. In Cologne, for instance, a Werwolf was said to have distinguished himself by attacking an American soldier who had pushed an old woman with his gun barrel, and dozens of similar stories were told. Werwolf Sender also claimed that guerrillas stole food from Allied depots in order to foil the enemy "starvation campaign".80

Goebbels also injected into Werwolf Sender his repugnance of the western Gauleiters, whose corruption and parochialism had generally impeded his effort to concentrate domestic power around himself, especially after his appointment as General Plenipotentiary for Total War in July 1944. However, this anti-establishment tendency arose not only from Goebbels' own particular obsession, but was probably inevitable given the situation in which the Nazi state now found itself: Werwolf Sender, for instance, closely followed the example of the Fascist Republican Party in Italy, when,
in the wake of the 1943 Armistice, it re-established its credentials as a radical movement and condemned the Party "bosses" who had sacrificed their patriotism for wealth, rank, and a life of comfort. Werwolf Sender also proclaimed its intention to "suffer no careerists, no job-hunters, no doddering place holders, no bosses, for they put their own ends before the common good". The station's program of 13 April was especially critical of Party bosses and corrupt Bürgermeisters:

In the good old times they made use of their social position to grow rich at the expense of the people. For years they have been preaching a Spartan life without living it. Their own positions were more important to them than a moral life. Most of them have never come near a real fight in this war; they have never felt the war to the same extent as the masses of the people...They are lazy and out only for personal power.

In private conversation with his aides, Goebbels went even a step further, claiming that the rising tide of chaos brought about by the Werwolf and enemy occupation was a blessing in disguise: the fire of National Socialism, he said, had "threatened to smother under the slag of the 'bosses regime' in the Third Reich. The storm wind of enemy rule will rekindle it to a new
Werewolf propaganda was also remarkable for avoiding the name of the Führer, as if this supreme "boss" was considered a liability rather than an asset. When Hitler was mentioned, as on his birthday on 20 April, he was presented as a "revolutionary Socialist", whose "historical achievement is to have freed Socialism from all surrounding propaganda, lies, distortions, and misinterpretations and to have led it to victory". Even this occasion was used as yet another chance to attack those "bourgeois souls" who "loudly proclaimed [Hitler's] name" because "they feared socialism". Only during the last few hours of its existence, when the Führer was besieged in Berlin, did Werewolf Sender present him as the heroic figure so common in Nazi propaganda: "Hitler", it was noted, "did not flee to South Germany... He stands in Berlin and with him are all those whom he has found worthy to fight beside him". The "bosses", "reactionary elements", "cowards" and other "impeding elements" had all been sent away, so that "only the uncompromising revolutionary fighters have remained" -- led, of course, by Gauleiter Goebbels, "the Führer's trusted friend". Because of such rhetoric, it is hardly surprising
that the Werwolf was formally disavowed by the Party establishment, which portrayed it as a spontaneous movement of freedom fighters about which little was known. Perhaps the Party leadership felt that such a disclaimer would automatically absolve it of blame for guerrilla activity; after all, it was hardly eager to accept blame for a propaganda movement which was openly hostile to many Party officials as well as to the enemy powers. Even the most devout Nazis also had considerable doubts on the whole principle of partisan fighting, since they, like almost all Germans, feared Allied reprisals and an indefinite prolongation of confusion. It is perhaps a measure of Werwolf Sender's distinctiveness — and its contrast to the Nazi establishment — that the term "neo-Nazi" was first coined in April 1945 as a description of its output.

Werwolf Sender was certainly a harbinger of future trends — most of the distinctive features of postwar Eurofascism were already apparent in its broadcasts — but it was also a product of radicalizing currents which arose in the several years before it was born, particularly the leftward turn of Naziism and the revival of revolutionary sentiments reminiscent of the 1933-34
period. After the July 1944 Putsch, National Socialists increasingly saw themselves as the spearhead of a "people's war" against not only Jewry, Bolshevism and western plutocracy, but also against the surviving forces of reaction and defeatism at home -- forces which, incidentally, might be expected to reveal their treachery by collaborating with the enemy powers once they had crossed the German frontier.

Another radicalizing trend was the class levelling caused by bombing, rationing, and ground warfare, all of which destroyed the material goods forming the background of bourgeois society. Goebbels and company could barely contain their joy arising from this process of "proletarianization", which had begun in the Great War and was advanced by the erosive inter-war years of inflation and depression. This destruction of the bourgeois way of life created new legions of propertyless outcasts and casualties of society, exactly the kind of people who formed the bed-rock support of Naziism before the Junkers and industrialists had hitched on to the rising star. In the 1930s, National Socialism had diluted itself by appealing to a middle class which still existed but felt threatened, mainly at the upper level by
Communism, and at the petite bourgeois level by Jewish economic competition. Werwolf Sender, on the other hand, sought to build a new base among those dispossessed by the bombs of "Anglo-American plutocracy", while at the same time not totally neglecting the danger to Germany's "culture" posed by Russian "barbarism".89

The rhetoric to stimulate the desired anti-bourgeois impulses reached well beyond the boundaries of socialist radicalism and into the realm of nihilism:

Together with the monuments of culture [said Werwolf Sender], there also crumble the last obstacles separating us from the fulfilment of our revolutionary task. Now that everything is in ruins we are forced to rebuild Europe. In the past private possessions tied us to bourgeois morality and mentality; these possessions have gone now and with them all our bourgeois restraint. Far from killing all Europeans, the bombs have only smashed the prison walls which held them captive... In trying to destroy Europe's future, the enemy has only succeeded in smashing the past and with it everything old and outward has gone. The crumbling of the facade of tradition has only revealed the inception of a new revolution, and all who are strong and healthy realize their task, which is that of a revolutionary.90

Thus was revealed what Hugh Trevor-Roper called "the authentic voice of Naziism uninhibited" -- "The doctrine
of purposeless but gleeful destruction of life and property and all those values of civilization which the German Nazi, though he sometimes tries painfully to imitate them, fundamentally envies and detests". Hermann Rauschning's "Revolution of Nihilism" was thus brought full circle.

A second main element of Werwolf Sender propaganda was its romantic adventurism, specifically designed for teenage boys and girls. The station gave considerable attention to the adventure stories of Karl May, a 19th century literary hack whose novels about the old American West were eagerly consumed by several generations of German boys. Such adolescent romanticism, brought to life, had inspired the Wandervogel organizations of the late Imperial period, and since the beginning of the war, had motivated the independently-minded Edelweiss Piraten groups which fought the HJ and whose members lived a vaguely anarchistic life based on love of adventure. These groups -- and a much larger number of teenagers acting alone or in small gangs -- were responsible for the steep rise in juvenile delinquency in Germany after 1940, and for the general increase in misbehaviour and rudeness among German youth. Such problems became worse
as teenagers were increasingly drawn further away from
the influence of the family, and even the school, as they
were drafted into war industries or employed as Flak
auxiliaries.92

Werewolf Sender sought to convert these problems
from liabilities into assets by using the spirit of
teenage rebellion against the new authority figures in
the western occupied zones; the followers of Werewolf
Sender were, in effect, Nazified Edelweiss Piraten.93
This appeal to teenage romanticism was especially
apparent in the symbols which Werewolf Sender provided for
the resistance movement, and even in its story for the
origin of the Werewolf name, which it claimed was derived
from the "wild men" of German mythology, "who clad in the
skins of animals bound from the darkness of the woods
with the utmost fury upon everything living".94 The
Werewolf emblem was the Wolfsangel, which was variously
explained as either the curve of a werewolf fang, or the
hinge of a wolf's trap, a symbol which during the Thirty
Years War was carved into trees where foreign soldiers
were hanged.95 Werewolf Sender also provided the movement
with its own theme song, appropriately sung by "Werewolf
Lily":

383
I am so savage; I am filled with rage,
Hoo, Hoo, Hoo
Lily the werewolf is my name,
Hoo, Hoo, Hoo,
I bite, I eat, I am not tame,
Hoo, Hoo, Hoo,
My Werwolf teeth bite the enemy,
and then he's done and then he's gone,
Hoo, Hoo, Hoo.96

This, then, was the sorry stuff with which Werwolf Sender sought to inspire a new generation of German heroes.

Surprising as it may seem, however, Werwolf Sender did make some impact on young minds already oriented toward Nazi ideology. Within the rapidly shrinking limits of the unoccupied Reich, a wave of new adolescent recruits reportedly stepped forward to volunteer for Unternehmen Werwolf,97 and throughout the occupied western zones a variety of local resistance gangs were inspired -- in theme at least -- by the Goebbels publicity campaign; few of these groups had any formal contact with the Prützmann program. Such spontaneous Werwolf groups remained active as late as 1947, conducting minor sabotage and propaganda against the occupation forces and harassing the workings of the KPD.98

When not preaching to the converted, however, Werwolf Sender had much less effect, which even the
station itself admitted: "Only a small minority", they noted, "refuses to be intimidated and accepts the challenge". The remainder not only found the Werwolf broadcasts absurd,99 but deeply resented the danger posed to the general population by such a call to arms. Moreover, much of the listenership was permeated by an abhorrence of guerrilla fighting which Werwolf Sender -- despite its best efforts to portray Werwölfe as self-defence vigilantes -- could not erode. Most Germans, after all, had been taught since the Prussian experience with French franc-tireurs in 1870-71 that partisan warfare was dishonourable, and Nazi propaganda since 1940 had certainly reinforced this indoctrination, particularly by equating guerrilla fighters with bandits and criminals.100 An extrapolation of such attitudes toward their own guerrilla warriors was almost inevitable, at least to some extent, so that in 1945 it was not uncommon to find Germans who believed that Werwölfe should suffer the same fate as other partisan-bandits, ie., they should be flogged, imprisoned, or shot. One Rhinelander told American officers that the Allies need not worry themselves with inflicting such punishments -- "We'll take care of that".101
The end for Werwolf Sender came with the final Soviet advance upon Berlin, which prompted a last minute shift of focus away from the West, and toward the advancing nemesis in the East. On 23 April, Werwolf Sender announced that Hitler and Goebbels were remaining in Berlin, and that they would be defended by the best surviving forces at Hitler's disposal, even if these had to be withdrawn from the western front; sixteen divisions were said to be already marching toward the threatened capital and were soon expected. "Herewith", said the station, "the Reich testifies to its resolve to defend Berlin at all costs". Moreover, Werwolf Sender noted that even if the city were lost, "the Werwölfe in it will never be overcome...We shall fight until the Reich capital is once again the capital of freedom". Such declarations were supported with a ringing affirmation that, "the main enemy now lay in the east".102

After this final release of bombast, Werwolf Sender ceased broadcasting because its transmitter was overrun by the Red Army, and only a week later Goebbels committed suicide in the Chancellery bunker, shortly after his appointment as Chancellor of the Reich. In the interim between these two events, little more was heard of the
**Werewolf** in any of the Reich's remaining media services, a policy apparently dictated by the need to rebuild bridges to the Western Allies and recruit them in the anti-Communist crusade. In any case, the most powerful transmitter yet in Nazi territory was kept out of the hands of fanatics by the shrewd actions of **Gauleiter** Kaufmann, who on 27 April sent a special **Volkssturm** company to occupy **Hamburg Sender** and thus prevent it from becoming a replacement for the Königswüsterhausen station.\(^{103}\)

In late April, however, units of the **Luftwaffe** Radio Interception Service were also given instructions to split up into small groups and infiltrate Allied lines in order to set up auxiliary stations and "supplement Werewolf activity", and it is likely that members of the SS Interception Service and the Gestapo Wireless Service were given similar tasks. Little came of these plans to establish truly clandestine propaganda networks, although one such **Werewolf** unit of about a dozen men was reported in the Andreasberg-Westharz district (April 1945),\(^{104}\) and a few underground Nazi transmitters were sporadically active during the immediate postwar period.\(^{105}\)

Before concluding, mention must also be made of the
third major figure in the Party triumvirate, Dr. Robert Ley. During the period when Bormann and Goebbels were attempting to strengthen the Werwolf -- or at least bend it toward their own particular purposes -- Ley was consumed by the problems posed by the failure of the Volkssturm, particularly the question of whether the Party was still capable of effective mass action. Ley was firmly convinced that despite all appearances, the Party was still a credible agent of revolutionary zeal, and as proof he touched upon the idea of a national, Party-based Freikorps, which would presumably show the fiery spirit that had recently been lacking in German defence efforts. Following numerous precedents in naming a Freikorps after its leader, Ley decided to apply the name of the Führer himself as the unit's designation.

Ley was a strange figure to head an "elite" para-military organization. In fact, he was an even more unlikely guerrilla chief than Bormann, who, incidentally, kept well away from the Freikorps project because he was convinced that Ley had neither the temperament nor the prestige to lead it. Ley, unlike Bormann, was not a former member of the post-WWI Freikorps, nor was he especially capable in organizational matters. Rather, he
was best known as a drunkard and inveterate womanizer, and he was not particularly successful even at the latter, since his thick composition and stocky, low-slung build gave him a brutal and neanderthal appearance. He bore no exciting experiences in his past, but was by profession a chemist who had left a job at IG Farben to become a full-time member of the NSDAP, thereafter rising stolidly through the ranks of the movement. Ideologically, he sympathized with the radical wing of the Party, and yet his capacity as a chief Party organizer led him to a close association with the corrupt and over-bureaucratized Party hierarchy.\textsuperscript{107}

Finally, it is also worth noting that in the last months of the war, Ley's inherent instability made him the proverbial loose cannon on the ship of state. Goebbels noted in his diary in late March 1945 that Ley, "has become somewhat hysterical... He is pretty well knocked-out and thoroughly rattled by recent developments, particularly in the west". The diary jottings of another senior Propaganda Ministry official were less delicately phrased: "As usual, Ley has had a clownish brainwave which he is trying to sell all over the place. He has cast himself for the part of last
minute saviour. Everybody, even Goebbels, is laughing at this repulsive idiot". 108

The inspiration for the Freikorps apparently came to Ley in a sudden flash in late March, while on a tour of Vienna and eastern Austria. Since he was a man whose passion for an idea burned intensely bright, if usually only for a short period, he immediately rushed back to Berlin and demanded to see Hitler. Ushered into the Führer's presence, Ley suggested enthusiastically that an elite volunteer corps could be formed from National Socialist officials who had fled from occupied territory and were therefore ready for further employment. "I can promise you at least forty thousand fanatical fighters, mein Führer. They can hold the Upper Rhine and passes through the Black Forest. You can rely on that."

Hitler, at first, did not seem overly impressed, but he gradually warmed to the idea -- in fact, two days after Ley had suggested the formation of the Freikorps, Hitler was already heard to babble that if the gaps in the Western Front could be plugged for the immediate future, "The Adolf Hitler Freikorps can then slowly make its appearance". As a man of intuition, Hitler apparently began to feel that Ley's radical enthusiasm
was more inspiring than any practical difficulties involved in either the basic scheme or in Ley's suggestion of himself to run it -- Ley, he said, was "a real fanatic who, within certain limitations, can be useful for tasks requiring fanaticism".

Ley argued that the purpose of Freikorps Adolf Hitler (FAH) was to ambush tank spearheads with Panzerfäuste, a task which he had once expected of the Volkssturm, but which that organization rarely performed effectively. During the last year of the war, the menace of tank breakthroughs had become increasingly severe, although it was hoped that once these occurred on German soil they could at least be combatted by a concerned civilian population. In late 1944, military and political authorities formed a "Panzerabwehr Organisation" from various elements of replacement troops and Volkssturm, and in 1945 regular civilians were also inducted into the early warning system of the organization. Although the FAH did not wholly replace the Panzerabwehr, it definitely comprised a Party initiative to consolidate efforts in this direction -- in fact, several Wehrmacht Panzerjagd units in Western Germany were formally subordinated to Freikorps authority
(although they remained under the operational control of the Army). Not surprisingly, the Freikorps also underwent a rapid transition to guerrilla activity similar to that which affected the Army in April 1945, as combat against enemy tank spearheads naturally degenerated into partisan warfare.

The purpose and constitution of the FAH was made clear in a trio of documents signed on 28 March and published several days later. The first of these was a Führer Directive which decreed the creation of the movement, and ordered that it should be formed of volunteers from the Party, the Volkssturm, and the Wehrmacht. This was no ordinary comb-out of extraneous personnel, but a plain effort to rob these organizations of their best people in order to create an elite band of tank destroyers and partisans. The Volkssturm, military and business concerns were under compulsion to release volunteers of eighteen years and older who wished to enlist in the Freikorps, a measure which angered even hardened Nazis. Supporters of the Volkssturm felt that their organization, in particular, would lose what little backbone it possessed.

A second inaugural document consisted of an
hysterical appeal by Ley which attempted to derogate the very doctrine of armoured movement and concentrated superiority which had earlier formed the basis of the German Blitzkrieg:

A small number of enemy tank packs are engaged in utilising critical situations at the front to break into the Reich. In fact they are nothing but a bogey. We have men and arms to annihilate them and the small groups of infantry which follow without remainder. It is only a question of our will and our readiness to act. You, my old Party comrades, have already once before achieved victory as a minority in numbers but fanatics of our nation in faithful self-sacrifice and energy... Volunteers, come forward! To the merciless annihilation of these intruders into our country. They must and will never be allowed to rest. Invisible and therefore hard to catch, we shall continually attack and annihilate them.

Ley also outlined the organizational structure of the Freikorps, noting that like the Volkssturm, detachments would be led by the Gauleiters and set up by the Kreisleiters and Ortsgruppenleiters.115

A third document was distributed by Goebbels, who overcame his own original opposition to the Freikorps as soon as he heard of the Führer's approval; thereafter, he received Ley for a visit and negotiated with him for
control of Freikorps propaganda. Goebbels' text dealt with further organizational matters, particularly the fact that volunteers would be employed full-time by the FAH, regardless of the importance of their civilian jobs. He also noted that Freikorps volunteers were expected to supply their own field kit and clothes -- preferably of military cut and colour -- plus three days worth of rations. Their transport was to be accomplished not by railway, but by bicycle, which were provided by the recruits themselves or were drawn from a communal stock. Finally, Goebbels noted that each Gau was supposed to contribute one hundred men, although this may have only been an initial allotment -- in his diary, the Propaganda Minister mentioned that the Gauleiters were actually capable of contributing ten thousand "activists" to the movement.

Although Party officials were not particularly pleased about such a fuss over the Easter holiday, formation of the Korps proceeded apace in the next several weeks. An organizational staff and main supply depot was established at Heuberg, in Swabia, and an operational staff was also set up and based in Berlin. Recruits were drawn mainly from Ley's own organization,
the DAF,\textsuperscript{121} although volunteers also reported from the HJ, the SA, and the Gau staffs. According to Allied intelligence reports, the new organization also depended heavily upon the cadres of the \textit{Politische Staffeln}, which were para-military goon squads formed by Ley in 1943 in order to give the local \textit{Kreisleiters} a counter-weight to the Gestapo.\textsuperscript{122} Drawn from such incongruous elements, approximately three thousand volunteers reported in early April to military training grounds scattered throughout Germany, mainly at points between the Rhine and the Elbe.\textsuperscript{123} As James Lucas notes, the mental image presented by this congregation is a sad one: hundreds of middle-aged cyclists pedalling sedately through the German countryside, dressed in sensible clothes and provided by their wives with packed lunches, few of them with any realistic idea of what lay ahead.\textsuperscript{124} It was certainly a far cry from the marching legions of young Aryan supermen who had once been the only fit material for Nazi "elite" units.

As Lucas suggests, many of the \textit{Freikorps} volunteers were middle-aged bureaucrats, although their ranks were nearly matched by a number of over-excited teenaged boys. It is also true that nearly fifteen percent of the
organization's total membership was composed of girls and women (one of whom was Lore Ley, daughter of the Freikorps chief himself). When this mixed assembly reached the various training grounds, Wehrmacht and SS instructors found that they were not generally the type of trainees who easily responded to the tasks put before them, although they were still forced to race through an extremely restricted training schedule -- at most, preparation for combat consisted of two weeks training. The brief courses which the instructors had time to present emphasized tank-busting techniques, plus such guerrilla tactics as laying booby-traps and learning how to blow up sabotage targets with high explosives. Females were given the same training course as men, although less intensive, and were expected to take part in combat if necessary.

Toward the end of the Freikorps' formative stage, the organizers became increasingly reconciled to the fact that FAH members would probably engage in partisan warfare, if only because the field for conventional anti-tank warfare was rapidly diminishing. In response, secret arms caches were laid, false identity papers were forged, and cadres were given alternate missions, such as
terrorizing collaborators, in case their frontline positions were overrun.\textsuperscript{127} Deep in the Alpine Redoubt (near Admont), Ley even ordered the establishment of a special training camp -- designated as a \textit{Werwolf} facility -- at which one hundred and thirty-five guerrilla-trainees were given instruction in partisan warfare, and subsequently formed into sabotage "\textit{Schwärme}" of twenty-five men each.\textsuperscript{128}

When Ley began \textit{Freikorps Adolf Hitler}, he worried about adequate armament for the troops, and in late March he told Hitler that OKW would have to make eighty thousand sub-machine guns available. Ley thereafter bounced from one authority to another in search of arms, until he finally arrived at the office of General Juttner, head of the \textit{Heereswaffenamt} (or Army Ordnance). Once conducted along the right channel, however, Ley was treated like a king, his needs being given precedence even over those of the \textit{Wehrmacht}. An \textit{Oberleutnant} from the \textit{Heereswaffenamt} was attached to his staff, and his FAH partisans were given access to the best remaining small arms in the Reich, including sub-machine guns and rifles with telescopic sights. Hitler himself was induced to pressure one of Speer's section chiefs to make
twenty thousand Panzerfäuste available to the new organization, and as noted earlier, it is also likely that stocks of poison gas were issued.\textsuperscript{129}

In mid and late April, Freikorps units were actually deployed at the Front, especially at a number of points in southwest Germany, and in Berlin; in the Czech Protectorate, a special formation, "Freikorps Böhmen", was also in the process of formation and deployment. Freikorpsmänner faced the enemy in Wehrmacht camouflage uniforms and peaked caps, although instructions stipulated that this uniform was to be quickly discarded in case of a switch-over to partisan activities, and it is known that female FAH members often carried out reconnaissance missions in civilian clothes. Freikorps troops fought alongside the Wehrmacht, and were usually deployed as one hundred man Gau contingents, although these groups were sub-divided into eight-to-ten man operational units, obviously preparatory to their conversion into partisan cells. Intelligence reports and divisional histories of the Western Allied armies bear no reports of encounters with the Freikorps Adolf Hitler, although this may result largely from the fact that FAH contingents could easily be mistaken as Volkssturm or
Wehrmacht scratch units. Two thousand FAH members in Berlin fought alongside the Waffen-SS in the desperate last ditch defence of the central Government section, and Ley later testified that these formations were almost completely wiped out.\textsuperscript{130}

In Southwestern Germany, the FAH was also deployed against the so-called "inner enemy", particularly Bavarian separatists who rose in revolt at the end of April 1945. After the withdrawal of some six hundred Freikorps members from the collapsing front in Baden, a para-political task force was formed called "Gruppe Hans," so named because the regional chief of the FAH was the writer Hans Zöberlein. Members of "Gruppe Hans" served in special execution squads code-named "Werwolf Oberbayern", who specialized in terrorizing "defeatists" and in breaking up the ranks of Bavarian particularists who re-emerged from the shadows as the Allies approached. On 28 April, drunken squads of "Werwolf Oberbayern" reacted to separatist demonstrations in the town of Penzberg by launching a savage raid upon the community, which resulted in at least fifteen dead and in a hard-fought shoot-out on the outskirts of town. Southern Bavaria was also flooded with "Werwolf Oberbayern"
handbills, which showed the Wolfsangel and warned, "Our vengeance is death!" 131

As the end steadily approached, Ley -- like so many German guerrilla leaders -- failed to immolate himself in a final furioso, but rather sought to melt into the background. Ultra intercepts show that he was still busy establishing Gau contingents of the FAH as late as 24 April, 132 but he then declined to join his "elite" units in a final fight; rather he fled to the Redoubt, supposedly to join in a last ditch effort by a more credible military force, the SS Sixth Panzer Army. No such action occurred -- Ley claimed that Sepp Dietrich's wife convinced him of the futility of this intention 133 -- and in May the Freikorps chief was discovered near Berchtesgaden by American troops; hardly the picture of a dangerous desperado, Ley was captured and taken into custody in his pyjamas and slippers. Five months later, shortly before the opening of the Nuremberg Trials, he brought his tortured existence to an end with an ugly suicide in his prison cell.

Meanwhile, most Freikorps detachments were dispersed, including the Werwolf Schwärme at Admont, and members were prohibited from killing Allied officers. 134
As was the case with the Werwolf, a few units outlived the desertion of their chief and attempted to maintain a shadowy post-capitulation existence, although they were by no means intended for such a role. For instance, one FAH unit led by Hauptmann Keller -- and composed mainly of Politische Staffel hoodlums -- fled into the Alps in Voralberg, obviously with the intention of forming a guerrilla band. Several other Freikorps cells in Bavaria also survived the end of the war, and thereafter occupied themselves with the task of composing threatening letters and pamphlets; as a reprisal against denazification proceedings, for example, they threatened to lift the ban on assassinations that had been imposed in May 1945. FAH remnants also functioned in British and French occupied areas, and French authorities charged in 1946 that an organization of two thousand Freikorps members existed in southwest Germany, still under the direction of Zöberlein.

In the final analysis, however, neither the Freikorps nor its postwar shadow were ever effective. Locally, of course, it was perhaps of some significance when organized by an effective Gauleiter or when commanded in combat by an adroit SS officer. A few of
the post-capitulation Freikorps remnants, in particular, were dominated by former officers and NCOs of the SS, which represented the take-over of a body which was originally a product of the Party's political side, especially the DAF. Considered in its original form, however, the FAH was doomed to failure simply because it was established by the most inefficient and corrupt segment of the Nazi Party. Moreover, the concept itself was fatally flawed; it was intended to replace the Volkssturm with a kind of elite, Party-based super-Volkssturm, and yet most of the elite were already in the armed forces or were dead, leaving only boys and middle aged officials to serve as Freikorps cannon fodder. Any fit human material between these extremes usually consisted of professional slackers who had previously used every possible dodge to escape active service and were thus not likely to set an example of courage in the field.

An Allied intelligence summary from late April 1945 probably touched upon the essence of the Freikorps in surmising that it grew forth from the small-minded rivalry between the Party proper and the SS, which had already organized the Werwolf. "It is difficult to
believe", said the report, "that its formation was not
due to the sudden belated realisation of the Party
'bosses' that the direction of the Werewolves had gotten
into the hands of people who were hostile rather than
friendly to the established Party hierarchy. The
"Freikorps Adolf Hitler' is nothing but the quasi-
military organization of all these 'bosses', from the
local Ortsgruppenleiter at the bottom to the fat drunken
Reichsleiter Ley at the top, whom the Werewolves
disown".139 While only a few misguided zealots were
willing to fight on for the Nazi revolution, even fewer
were ready to sacrifice themselves for the sake of Party
hacks and local political kingpins who hardly represented
the idealistic side of the movement.

The Freikorps was not the only Nazi resistance
movement which disintegrated while its leaders fled for
safety or dickered with the enemy; in fact, certain Party
chieftains showed a pronounced tendency to sacrifice the
Werwolf in a last minute bid to preserve themselves or
save some small measure of their power. Bormann himself
may serve as the prime example: on 2 May 1945 -- with
the Red Army only several blocks away -- he reached a
last minute deal with Goebbels' deputy Fritsche, in which
the capitulation of the Berlin garrison was briefly delayed in order to facilitate his (Bormann's) own personal attempt to flee the Government Quarter and break-out of the encircled capital; Bormann, in return, agreed to Fritsche's contention that further guerrilla warfare was senseless and issued an order to dissolve the Werwolf, which was his last act as a public official. Bormann himself had presumably dispatched Vehme assassination teams for acts which paled in comparison to this ultimate betrayal of the Werwolf spirit.

Even Goebbels, who was willing to throw both himself and his family upon the funeral pyre of the regime, made little effort during his final days to maintain Werwolf hostility against the West. Goebbels, however, was much more than a glorified apparatchik of the Bormann or Ley type; rather, he was the archetypical revolutionary rabble rouser -- much more effective at undermining authority than in exercising it. As Joachim Fest notes, Goebbels' power rebounded exactly during the period when the position of the Third Reich became critical, precisely because no one was more psychologically adept at fighting a desperate battle of survival; only then could his brutal demagogy and revolutionary passions be
unleashed without fear of causing offence. "We have burnt our bridges behind us," he said in 1943. "We are forced to proceed to extremes and therefore resolved to proceed to extremes."\textsuperscript{141}

Goebbels, moreover, was the only senior Nazi leader fully cognizant of the need for a political and ideological foundation for partisan warfare; in fact, he shared much of the spirit of the Marxist and anti-colonial revolutionary warfare which was waged so intensely in the years after 1945. While Anglo-American statesmen and soldiers had worried about unleashing the chaos of guerrilla fighting, Goebbels thought more like Mao Tse-Tung, who exploited partisan warfare not only as a diversionary tactic, but as a means of bonding a revolutionary Party to the people it claimed to represent. The Werwolf, in Goebbels' view, emerged as a means of changing society, and as a true movement rather than a mere organization. It was in this sense that Werwolf Sender obviously sought to set the tone for post-capitulation resistance,\textsuperscript{142} despite the absence of any explicit admission to this effect.

It has already been shown that Goebbels' propaganda struck the right note for a small minority amongst the
Party's dwindling constituency, but for most Germans it lacked any appeal. The anti-materialist and anti-establishmentarian themes were more suited to a mature materialist society beginning to tire of consumerism than to a people who had just grown accustomed to the benefits of the industrial and agricultural revolutions, only then to promptly lose them. The bombed-out refugee who had once enjoyed a warm hearth and a comfortable bed was hardly likely to find ideological satisfaction sleeping in the cold, eating turnip soup, or -- worst of all -- risking violent reprisals for the purpose of further prolonging the violence which had already brought ruin upon his country. Mass resistance is based upon the calculation by a significant segment of the population that present conditions are certainly no worse than the risks entailed by resistance (the latter, of course, gains added attractiveness by idealistic expectations of a better life after the expulsion of the invader). These assumptions did not exist in the occupied Reich -- at least not in the West -- nor was any amount of nihilistic bombast able to compensate for this lacking, or even to cause a deterioration of conditions to such a degree that the resistance equation would take effect.
It is true that the first bare cupboard years of enemy occupation caused a spiritual yearning in many Germans -- particularly in light of the vacuum which followed the bankruptcy of National Socialism -- but this longing was filled largely by religion rather than ideology. In any case, the first signs of economic recovery in 1948 encouraged Western Germans to embrace materialism more strongly than ever, and they were joined by literally millions of compatriots from the East who obviously wished to live in the same environment. The revolutionary crises of confidence in material things which Werwolf Sender sought to create only occurred in the 1960s, and in turn created the impetus for the radical terrorist groups of the following decade.
Footnotes


4. 1st US Army Interrogation Report Extract "Lorenz' Opinions on the Occupation of Germany" (undated), OSS XL 5732, RG 226, NA.


898/187, PRO; and Mobile Field Interrogation Unit #1 "PW Intelligence Bulletin" #1/32, 30 January 1945, G-2 Intelligence Div. Captured Personnel and Material Branch Enemy POW Interrogation File (MIS-Y) 1943-45, RG 165 NA.


10. Auerbach, p. 354. The title "Deutscher Volkssturm" was apparently only chosen very shortly before the Führer decree of 25 September which set the requisite wheels in motion. A Bormann memorandum to the Gauleiters only a week earlier referred to the militia by the alternate designations of Volkswehr, or Landsturm. M. Bormann, Partei-Kanzlei, "Rundschreiben" 262/44, 18 Sept. 1944, NS 6/98, BA. It seems possible that the first half of the first alternate name was combined with the last half of the second.

1944, pp. A1-A2, C4-C6; 16 Oct. 1944, p. C11; and
23 Oct. 1944, p. 3, all in FO 898/187, PRO.

12. A. Hitler, "Erlass über die Bildung des Deutschen
Volkssturmes", 25 Sept. 1944, NS 6/78, BA. The
original decree is cited in SS-H/Stuf. and Adj.
Eppenaur to Personlichen Stab Reichsführer-SS, 7
Oct. 1944, Records of the Reich Leader of the SS
and Chief of the German Police, Microcopy #T-175,
Roll 122, frame 2648068, NA.

13. "Ansprache an Volkssturmannner in Bartenstein am
18.10.1944", NS 19/4016, BA; and PWE "German
Propaganda and the German" 23 Oct. 1944, pp. A3,
C2-C4, FO 898/187, PRO.

1944.

15. PWE "German Propaganda and the German", 23 Oct.
1944, pp. A3, C2; 30 Oct. 1944, pp. C1, C3, both in
FO 898/187, PRO; The Times, 19 Oct. 1944; Review of
the Foreign Press. 1939-1945, Memorandum #262, 12
Dec. 1944, p. 1, Series A, Vol IX; OSS R & A
1944, p. 1, WO 219/3761A, PRO; and The New York
Times, 14 March 1945.

16. SHAEF G-2 "Weekly Intelligence Summary" #32, 29
Oct. 1944, Part I, pp. 16-17, WO 219/5168, PRO; and
SHAEF CoS Lt. Gen. W. B. Smith, memo on "Treatment
of Partisans in Germany", 6 Nov. 1944, WO 219/1602,
PRO.

17. FO Weekly Political Intelligence Summaries, Vol.
10, Summary #264, 25 Oct. 1944, p. 2; and The
Times, 1 Nov. 1944.

18. Soviet Partisans in World War II, p. 79; Silesian Inferno, pp. 55;
192; Thorwald, pp. 72, 135; Lucas, The Last Days of
the Reich, pp. 28, 59; RSHA Amt VI C2b, "36
Wochenbericht über Aussen- und Innenpolitik der
SU," 10 March 1945, p.13, RH 2/2330, BMA; Adolf
Fischer, "Insterburg und Ostpreussen in der Zeit vom
1.6.44 bis 10.2.1945," 8 March 1950, p.3; Frau
Traum, "Mein Erlebnis, 1892-1951" (no date), both in
19. M. Bormann, Partei-Kanzlei "Anordnung" 290/44, 1 Oct. 1944, and "Auszug aus der Haager Landkriegsordnung", Annex to "Anordnung" 277/44, 27 Sept. 1944, both in NS 6/98, BA. Dietrich Orlow also argues that in the wake of 20th July, Bormann -- by placing the instrument of a regionally based militia within the hands of the Gauleiters -- sought to deter any would-be putsch by the military Wehrkreis commands. Involvement by the Party bureaucracy also prevented the other main anti-reactionary force -- the SS -- from pushing the Party into the background. The Volkssturm, in this view, emerges as a vital mass-based counterweight to the Army and as the Party's last main effort to launch a Nazi social revolution in the face of such conservative forces as the military, the orthodox nationalists, and the clergy. Orlow, pp. 462, 474-475.

20. Review of the Foreign Press, 1939-1945, Memorandum #161, 12 Dec. 1944, Series A, Vol. IX; and PWE "German Propaganda and the German" 20 Nov. 1944, pp. C7-C8, FO 898/187, PRO. After the beginning of 1945, Volkssturm Battalions "for Special Service" were also formed, although their purpose is unclear. They were probably intended for internal security. Ultra Document BT 5196, 19 March 1945, Ultra Micr. Coll., Reel 62.
21. For one example -- the report of a patrol conducted behind enemy lines by a five man group from Sonder Kommando Haupt of the Gotha Volkssturm -- see sig. illegible, "Meldung", April 1945, NS 6/135, BA.

22. Civilians interrogated by the US 1st Army in the vicinity of Eschweiler claimed that newly formed Volkssturm units in this area had been trained for sabotage, the disruption of communications, and sniping. Although organized as military units, they were instructed to escape enemy scrutiny by posing as normal civilians. US 1st Army, "Intelligence Bulletin" #2, 6 Nov. 1944, p. 7, WO 219/3761A, PRO.


27. The matter of declining SS involvement in the
Volkssturm was touched upon by the former Polizeipräsident in Leipzig, who claimed that in December 1944 Himmler confided that he was withdrawing from deep involvement in the Volkssturm because it had become an instrument of power for Bormann. Grolmann, "The Collapse of the German Reich as Seen from Leipzig," p. 19, World War II German Military Studies, Vol. 24. In the autumn of 1944, Himmler's deputy Berger had actually tried to increase Waffen-SS control within the Volkssturm, but this met with a white hot reaction from Bormann, who was determined to keep the organization under the supervision of the Party. Orlow, pp. 475-476; and Erickson, The Road to Berlin p. 399.


30. For reference to D'Alquen's hospitalization, see Steenberg, p. 149; and Jurgen Thorwald, The


32. FO Weekly Political Intelligence Summaries, Vol. 11, Summary #288, 11 April 1945, p. 12.

33. FO "German Intelligence Report" #162, 20 March 1945, p. 4, FO 371/46764, PRO.


36. PWE "German Propaganda and the German", 27 Nov. 1944, pp. C4-C5; 8 Jan. 1945; 12 March 1945, pp. C1-C2, all in FO 898/187, PRO; SS Ostuf. to SDRF-SS-SD Leitabschnitt Stuttgart "Stimmen zum Erlass des Führers über die Bildung des Deutschen Volkssturms", 8 Nov. 1944, Records of the NSDAP, Microcopy #T-81, Roll 95, frames 108117-108119, NA; and OSS Report "Germany -- Morale, the Volkssturm, etc.", 27 Nov. 1944, OSS L 50687, RG 226, NA. In the Saarland, a Volkssturm company was code named
"Massenmord" (Mass Murder), but when it became apparent that this morbid joke was simply too blatant, the code was changed to "Alpenveilchen", a mountain flower with a short lived bloom. US 1st Army G-2 "Periodic Report" #262, 27 Feb. 1945, p. 5, OSS OB 25552, RG 226, NA. Volksstürmanner in the Eifel area actually refused to answer the call-up, or if they did show up at the front they often abandoned or buried their weapons. Hptm. T. Heinz, Pz. jag.-Abt. 246 to Reichsleiter M. Bormann, 15 March 1945, p. II, NS 6/51, BA.

37. SS O/Stuf. to SDRR-SS-SD Leitabschnitte Stuttgart "Stimmen zum Erlass des Führers über die Bildung des Deutschen Volkssturms", 8 Nov. 1944, Records of the NSDAP, Microcopy #T-81, Roll 95, frames 108118-108120, NA; The New York Times, 14 March 1945; The Christian Science Monitor, 14 March 1945; The Times, 13 March 1945; Dr. Heinrich Gröll, "Die Ereignisse im Kreise Kranau O/S während der russischen Offensive auf Oberschlesien in Januar 1945" (1953), p. 2, Ost Dok. 2/768, BA; and Ultra Document, KO 340, 13 April 1945, Ultra Microf. Collection, Reel 70. Shortly after the Himmler address, one brave Alsatian wrote an open letter to his local Kreisleiter, claiming that his compatriots were dubious of protection under international law for the Volkssturm. He requested dissemination of the relevant Hague texts protecting the militia: "If the Alsatians -- against all international law -- are being forced to fight, let them at least be honest soldiers, and not terrorists or bandits". Annex "A" to SHAEF G-2 "Report" #178, 14 Dec. 1944, WO 219/1602, PRO.

after the American occupation of the city claimed that a hundred man Gestapo unit in civilian clothes -- "die rächende Schar" -- had been left behind after the main body of the Gestapo was evacuated. The main mission of the unit was supposedly the detection and elimination of collaborators. Allied Intelligence regarded the story as dubious. "Weekly Summary for Psychological Warfare" #25, 19 March 1945, p. 3, FO 371/46894, PRO.

39. SHAEF PWD "Weekly Intelligence Summary for Psychological Warfare" #22, 24 Feb. 1945, Part I, p. 4, FO 371/46894, PRO; and History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, Vol. XIX, p. 62, NA. Another CIC unit, however, "developed new information which showed that the underground organization known as Rächer Deutscher Ehre (Avengers of German Honour) was functional". History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, Vol. XIX, p. 73, NA.

40. In a note to Himmler on 8 February, Bormann strongly implied that the SS had allowed preparation of guerrilla warfare to fall behind. M. Bormann to H. Himmler, 8 Feb. 1945, NS 19/3705, BA.


43. Tauber, pp. 23-24.


47. Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal Vol. XVII, 230; Rose, p. 218; Enemy Personnel Exploitation Sect., Field Information Agency Technical CC (BE), "Two Brief Discussions of German CW Policy with Albert Speer", 12 Oct. 1945, p. 12, OSS XL 22959, RG 226, NA; Tauber, p. 23; and Trevor-Roper (1950 ed.), p. 53. Speer believed that Bormann attempted to form the Werewolf as a mass, popular movement, which was a jealous reaction to the formation of an elite Party militia, the Freikorps Adolf Hitler, controlled by Ley. Speer's information on the Werewolf was second hand, however, provided mainly by his own Armaments Ministry section heads and by several of Bormann's deputies.

48. M. Bormann to H. Himmler, 8 Feb. 1945, NS 19/3705, BA.

50. Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Vol. XVII, 229.

51. M. Bormann to H. Himmler, 8 Feb. 1945; Bormann Memo to Ten Western Gauleiters, "Vorbereitungen auf Feindoffensive in Westen" (no date), both in NS 19/3705, BA; and Ultra Document BT 4666, 12 Feb. 1945, Ultra Micf. Collection, Reel 61.


53. Ibid, pp. 188-189, 286-287. See also pp. 170-171, 195. For the same view in a circular signed by Naumann, see Rose, p. 266.


57. "Extract from Interrogation of Karl Kaufmann", 11 June 1945, Appendix "A" -- "The Werewolf Organization in Hamburg", pp. 1-2, IRR File XE 049 888 "Werewolf Activities Vol. I", RG 319, NA. Arno Rose claims that great unease was caused among the Prützmann Werwölfe by the work of Werwolf Sender, mainly because these paramilitary commandos now
found themselves lumped together with Goebbels' spontaneous "Werwölfe". This, in turn, further increased the chances of dying a humiliating death at the end of a hangman's rope. Rose, p. 265.


60. Rose, pp. 265-266.

61. Auerbach, p. 354.


63. Detailed Interrogation Report, "German Signals Counter-Intelligence", 6824 DIC (MIS)/M.1136, 23 April 1945, p. 4, OSS 126394, RG 226, NA.

64. 7th US Army Interrogation Center "'Wehrwolf Section' of Propaganda Ministry", 10 July 1945, IRR File XE 049 888 "Werewolf Activities Vol, I", RG 319, NA.


66. Ibid., p. 296; and Special Detention Center "Ashcan", "Detailed Interrogation Report - Friedrich Wilhelm Kritzinger", 27 July 1945, p. 7, OSS XL 13731, RG 226, NA. Naumann was later arrested by the British in 1953 after the discovery of the infamous Naumann Conspiracy, in which the former Staatssekretär had followed the Trotskyite tactic of "entryism" by secretly infiltrating Nazis into a legitimate political party as a stepping stone toward the re-establishment of Nazi doctrines.


71. PWE "German Propaganda and the German", 23 April 1945, p. A4, FO 898/187, PRO; Lang, p. 313; and Reiss, pp. 401-402.


73. PWE "German Propaganda and the German", 9 April 1945, p. C6, FO 898/187, PRO; and The Nation, Vol. 160, #16 (21 April 1945), p. 445. During the same period when Werwolf Sender became active, the HJ also published its own series of mass leaflets containing broad information on sabotage

74. Final Entries, 1945 - The Diaries of Joseph Goebbels, pp. 269, 277-278, 280, 296, 310; and Oven, p. 641.

75. PWE "German Propaganda and the German", pp. 2-3, 16 April 1945; 23 April 1945, pp. C9-C10, both in FO 898/187, PRO; and SHAEF G-5 "Journal of Information" #10, 26 April 1945, p. 4, WO 219/3918, PRO.


77. PWE "German Propaganda and the German", 9 April 1945, p. C7, FO 898/187, PRO.


79. PWE "German Propaganda and the German", 9 April 1945, p. C8; 16 April 1945, p. 3; 23 April 1945, p. C12, all in FO 898/187, PRO.


81. SHAEF Report, "Observations Concerning Occupied Germany", 5 May 1945, p. 11, State Dept. Decimal
Files 1945-49, 740.00119 Control (Germany), RG 59, NA.

82. PWE "German Propaganda and the German", 9 April 1945, p. C4, FO 898/187, PRO.

83. Ibid., 16 April 1945, p. 3, FO 898/187, PRO.

84. Oven, p. 620.


87. FO Weekly Political Intelligence Summaries, Vol. 11, Summary #287, 4 April 1945, p. 2; OSS Report, p. 9, OSS XL 7777, RG 226, NA; ECAD "General Intelligence Bulletin" #42, 11 April 1945, p. 11 WO 219/3760A, PRO; and The Times, 3 April 1945.

88. PWE "German Propaganda and the German", 23 April 1945, pp. C4, C10-C11, FO 898/187, PRO; and PID "Background Notes", 26 April 1945, pp. 1-2, FO 371/46790, PRO.


90. PWE "German Propaganda and the German", 16 April 1945, p. 2; and 23 April 1945, p. C9, both in FO 898/187, PRO.

91. Trevor-Roper, p. 57.


93. SHAEF PWD "Guidance Notes for Output in German for the Week 30 April-7 May 1945", 29 April 1945, pp. 1-2, FO 371/46894, PRO.

94. FO Weekly Political Intelligence Summaries, Vol. 11, Summary #287, 4 April 1945, p. 2.

95. Kahn, p. 37.


97. Whiting, Hitler's Werewolves, pp. 146-147. Even within several days of the commencement of Werwolf Sender's activities, German mail captured by the Allies yielded several letters by young girls eager to join the newly-revealed Werwolf organization. PID Background Notes, 19 May 1945, p. 1, FO 371/46790, PRO. An individual example of this last minute wave which stepped forward for the Werwolf program was Ruth Thieman, who was captured by the CIC in Frankfurt in 1946. Thieman had been a member of the BDM since 1938, and in the last few weeks of the war she volunteered for service in the Werwolf. After the capitulation she also joined a right-wing Edelweiss Piraten group, and as a concurrent member in both organizations, she assisted in hiding SS men, bought and distributed weapons, cut US Army communication lines, and snipped off the hair of various women associating with the American occupation troops. "I am still very much in favour of the Werewolf organization", she told her CIC interrogators. "I am and always will be a Nazi; nobody can convince me otherwise". USFET "Weekly Intelligence Summary" #58, 22 Aug. 1946, p. C6, State Dept. Decimal Files 1945-49, 740.00119 Control (Germany), RG 59, NA.

98. Intelligence Office, Chief of Naval Operations


100. FWE "German Propaganda and the German", 9 April 1945, p. C5; 16 April 1945, pp. 3-4, both in FO 898/187, PRO; Baird, p. 84; Rose, pp. 260-261; Theodore Heuss, Aufzeichnungen, 1945-1947 (Tübingen: Rainer Wunderlach, 1966), pp. 48-49; and Kästner, p. 79.

101. SHAEF PWD Intelligence Div. "Reactions to 'Werewolf' in Cologne", 18 April 1945, OSS 128265, RG 226, NA.

Information" #12, 11 May 1945, p. 4, WO 219/3918, PRO; and EDS "Extracts from PID Daily Intelligence Summary for Germany and Austria #211 of 24 April 1945", IRR File XE 049 888 "Werewolf Activities Vol I", RG 319, NA.

103. Moller, p. 114.

104. EDS Report #34 "Notes on the 'Werewolves'", IRR File XE 049 888 "Werewolf Activities Vol. I", RG 319, NA; 21 AG "CI News Sheet" #25, 13 July 1945, Part III, pp. 16-17; and #28, 9 Sept. 1945, pp. 6-7, both in WO 205/997, PRO.

106. Arno Rose claims that Ley conceived of this Freikorps as being an elite concentration of Party fanatics and activists within the Volkssturm. Rose, p. 281.


111. General-Inspekteur d. Pz.-Truppen, "Richtlinien für die Durchführung der Panzerabwehr im rückwärtigen Gebiet und in den Grenzwehrkreisen", 1 Jan. 1945 (frames 109899-109903); and Kommandant, Wehrmachtkommandateur, Hamburg to Kreisstabsführer, Obersturmführer Koppenberg, 11 April 1945 (frames 109887-109888), both in Records of the NSDAP, Microcopy #T-81, Roll 95, NA.

112. Rose, p. 281.

113. PWE "German Propaganda and the German", 23 April 1945, p. C7, FO 898/187, PRO.

115. PWE "German Propaganda and the German", 23 April 1945, pp. C7-C8, FO 898/187, PRO

116. Final Entries, 1945 - The Diaries of Joseph Goebbels, pp. 234, 261, 269-270. It is notable, however, that Goebbels underplayed the FAH in propaganda, lest it draw attention and resources from his own efforts to boost the Wervolf. Rose, p. 280.

117. Gauleiter Karl Wahl, "Rundspruch #11 an alle Kreisleiter", 30 March 1945, Records of the NSDAP, Microcopy #7-81, Roll 162, frames 300554-300555, NA. See also Lucas, Kommando, pp. 338-339.


119. Gauleiter Karl Wahl, "Rundspruch #11 an alle Kreisleiter", 30 March 1945, Records of the NSDAP, Microcopy #T-81, Roll 162, frame 300555, NA.

120. Ultra Document KO 1402, 25 April 1945, Ultra Micf. Collection, Reel 72; and Air P/W Int. Unit, 1st Tactical AF (Prov.) (Adv.), "Detailed Interrogation of an ME 109 Pilot," 25 April 1945, p. 4, OSS 127823, RG 226, NA.

121. Sig. illegible, NSDAP - Gauleitung Schwaben, "Rundschreiben #96/45", 18 April 1945, Records of the NSDAP, Microcopy #T-81, Roll 162, frame 300551, NA; and 7th US Army Interrogation Centre "Interrogation of Dr. Robert Ley", 29 May 1945, State Dept. Decimal Files 1945-49, 740.00119 Control (Germany), RG 59, NA.

122. SHAEF Rear G-2, EDS to SHAEF Main for G-2 (CI), 19 June 1945, WO 219/1603, PRO; and OSS R & A Branch, "European Political Report", RAL-3-33, 20 Oct. 1944, p. 3, WO 219/3761A, PRO. The OSS suspected that the formation of the Politische Staffeln had definite ramifications for postwar resistance, and this theory was later partially substantiated by a German POW, who claimed "that members of the Politische Staffel were under orders to stay behind in the event of occupation". OSS R & A #1934.1,

123. SHAEP G-5 "Weekly Journal of Information" #11, 4 May 1945, p. 6, WO 219/3918, PRO. For the estimate on FAH manpower, see British Troops Austria "Joint Weekly Intelligence Summary" #9, 31 Aug. 1945, p. 11, FO 1007/300, PRO.


128. 5 Corps "Weekly Intelligence Summary" #1, 11 July 1945, p. 6, FO 1007/299, PRO.

Air P/W Int. Unit, 1st Tactical AF (Prov.) (Adv.), "Detailed Interrogation of an ME 109 Pilot", 15 April 1945, p. 4, OSS 127823, RG 226, NA; Gudern, p. 348; and History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, Vol. XXVI, p. 43, NA. While the FAH had some luck in siphoning supplies from the Army, they apparently had less success in leaching the SS. A Freikorps unit in the Alpine Redoubt failed in mid-April to get either equipment or billets from the SS Hauptamt. Ultra Document KO 1007, 21 April 1945, Ultra Micf. Collection, Reel 72.

130. The Times, 24 April 1945; 7th US Army Interrogation Center "Interrogation of Dr. Robert Ley", 29 May 1945, State Dept. Decimal Files 1945-49, 740.00119 Control (Germany), RG 59, NA; Air P/W Int. Unit. 1st Tactical AF (Prov.) (Adv.), "Detailed Interrogation of an ME 109 Pilot", 25 April 1945, p. 4, OSS 127823, RG 226, NA; History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, Vol. XXVI, p. 43, NA; David Irving, Hitler's War (New York: Viking, 1977), pp. 782-783; CSDIC/WEA BAOR, Appendix H, "Report on Nursery", SIR 28, p. i, 18 April 1946, ETO MIS-Y-Sect. Intelligence and Interrogation Records 1945-46, RG 332, NA; Rose, pp. 281-282; and Tony le Tissier, The Battle of Berlin, 1945 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1988), p. 31. For reference to the "Freikorps Böhmen," see Ultra Document BT 9963, 9 April 1945, Ultra Micf. Collection, Reel 69; and Ultra Document KO 1581, 28 April 1945, Ultra Micf. Collection, Reel 73. It is probable that "Freikorps Böhmen" was the forerunner of a resistance group called Organisation Schäfer, which was limited strictly to the Sudetenland and Bohemia. Like the Freikorps, Schäfer was composed wholly of Nazi Party members and was under the operational control of the Party, although it was trained by the SS and was supposed to cooperate closely with Unterhehmen Werwolf. A meeting to launch Schäfer was held on 30 April, when it was decided that members should remain inactive for several months until security restrictions eased. Schäfer signs were occasionally seen chalked upon walls after the enemy occupation of the Sudetenland. History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, Vol. XXVI, pp. 76-77, NA.


133. 7th US Army Interrogation Centre "Interrogation Centre "Interrogation of Dr. Robert Ley", 29 May 1945, State Dept. Decimal File 1945-49, 740.00119 Control (Germany), RG 59, NA.

134. GSI 8th Army "Joint Weekly Intelligence Summary" #5, 3 Aug. 1945, p. 12, FO 371/46611, PRO; CSDIC/WEA BAOR Appendix H, "Report on Nursery", SIR 28, Part I, p. ii, 18 April 1946, ETO MIS-Y-Sect. Intelligence and Interrogation Records 1945-46, RG 332, NA; British Troops Austria "Joint Weekly Intelligence Summary" #5, 3 Aug. 1945, p. 12, FO 1007/300, PRO; 5 Corps "Weekly Intelligence Summary" #1, 11 July 1945, p. 6, FO 1007/299, PRO; and MI-14 "Mitropa", 8 Sept. 1945, p. 4, FO 371/46967, PRO.


137. ACA Intelligence Organisation "Joint Weekly Intelligence Summary" #11, 14 Sept. 1945, pp. 11-12, FO 1007/300, PRO; and ACC Report for the Moscow CFM Meeting, Feb. 1947, Sect II, "Denazification", Part 9, French Report, pp. 2-3, FO 371/64352, PRO. British security agencies suspected that the line of reasoning evident in FAH pamphlets scattered throughout Carinthia in the summer of 1945 -- i.e. that resisters should perpetrate sabotage
singly rather than in groups — showed that the writers were not original members of the Freikorps, but were rather using the name to give greater significance to their activities than they would otherwise achieve.

138. Several German sources noted that certain Freikorps formations were of impressive fighting calibre. Air P/W Int. Unit, 1st Tactical AF (Prov.) (Adv.), "Detailed Interrogation of an ME 109 Pilot", 25 April 1945, p. 4, OSS 127823, RG 226, NA; and History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, Vol. XX, p. 98, NA.

139. PWE "German Propaganda and the German", 23 April 1945, p. C9, FO 898/187, PRO.


142. PWE "German Propaganda and the German," 16 April 1945, p. 2, FO 898/187, PRO; and Rose, pp. 148-149.
Conclusion: Consequences and Significance of the Werwolf

A great deal of ground has been covered in this work, but from this mass of material a few primary conclusions arise. Perhaps the most basic of these points is the very existence in 1944-45 of a significant Werwolf organization, which comprised one of the chief initiatives of the dying Nazi Reich, and which was intended to harass the invading Allied and Soviet armies to such a degree that the Nazi regime could save some semblance of its power and authority.

Moreover, the Werwolf and its sister groups were sporadically active, particularly if we accept Goebbels' expanded definition of the movement; i.e., that any German who committed an act of resistance -- even if solely on his/her own initiative -- was in fact a Werwolf. We now know, for instance, that civilian franc tireurs occasionally fired at Allied troops; that by-passed groups of soldiers and SS men harassed Allied supply lines (and were occasionally stiffened by special stay-behind sabotage teams); that scores of German "defeatists" and collaborators were liquidated by Werwolf
 assassins; that *Werwölfe* and SS stay-behind units attempted to disrupt the Soviet rear behind the Eastern Front; and that minor sabotage and terrorism continued for several years after the end of the war. In addition, we now know that the Germans attempted to support *Volksdeutsch* and non-German guerrilla resistance and that they had some success in this endeavour on the Eastern Front, where nationalist partisans actively disrupted Soviet lines of supply -- in fact, the war did not wholly peter out in Eastern Europe until the late 1940s.

The final toll of such violence is unknown, but must certainly extend into the thousands, even if we do not strictly include the damage done by nationalist guerrilla groups allied to the Germans. In addition to persons killed directly as a result of *Werwolf* activity, the toll must also include many hundreds who died in reprisal killings or in anti-partisan razzias such as that which occurred at Aussig-an-der-Elbe in late July 1945. A final total of at least a thousand dead ranks the *Werwolf* as a final drop in the torrent of blood spilt during World War Two, but it is more significant if considered in its own right as an example of recent partisan warfare and terrorism in Europe.
While a considerable degree of Nazi partisan warfare must be granted, however, the final note on the Werwolf must address why it failed in its objectives. The most obvious determinants of this failure appear repeatedly throughout this study and comprise the debilitating structural faults in the movement. Recall, for instance, the absence of strong leadership; the lack of independent access to weapons and personnel by the Prützmann agency; and the general employment of policemen who were often burdened with an overly legalistic attitude toward guerrilla tactics. There was also a bitter competition between rival agencies, and as the Werwolf decision-making loop grew larger, Prützmann's control correspondingly diminished: the military took over Werwolf Gruppen for use in tactical or reconnaissance missions; Bormann expanded the Werwolf as a domestic terror force; and Goebbels established a propaganda channel which launched a call to arms mainly aimed at teenagers.

Perhaps worst of all, Prützmann and Skorzeny alike were stuck in a frame of thought outlined by Clausewitz more than a century before, which considered guerrilla warfare strictly as an adjunct to regular military
operations. Only at the last desperate minute was guerrilla warfare given consideration as a post-capitulation, revolutionary sort of tactic, and even these hasty plans were mere wisps of smoke which disappeared during the final scramble for safety -- only Axmann had the verve to actually carry through an attempt to bring the Werwolf into the post-capitulation period. Among the most senior echelon of the Nazi leadership, it was Goebbels alone who perceived the vast revolutionary possibilities of partisan warfare, although he lacked either the time or the means to shape such a movement.

Evidence of such chaos and confusion within the Nazi regime adds extra weight to the so-called "structuralist" or "functionalist" school of historiography, which regards the Third Reich as a "polycracy" of competing centres of power, and which portrays the Führer as a figure strangely remote from the day-to-day operations of the civil and Party bureaucracies.¹ The Werwolf, in fact, was the penultimate act in the bureaucratic anarchy that resulted in the black night of lawlessness and self-destruction so aptly described by Hans Mommsen. On the other hand, one would doubt that even the staunchest advocates of a Hitler-centered, "programmatic"
historiography would deny that Hitler's position had drastically weakened by 1944-45, and that any "program" advocated by the dictator had already failed, thus allowing the bureaucratic factions within the regime to spiral into a whirlwind of confusion and barbarism.

Another basic problem -- and one of even greater impact -- was that the Werwolf enjoyed no public support beyond a fringe element usually estimated at ten to fifteen percent of the population. In fact, most Germans were eager to point out Nazi saboteurs to the occupation authorities, since failure to eliminate this danger in a quick and efficient fashion seemed to promise reprisals as a consequence. In fact, the entire Werwolf program was based on a faulty premise, at least in western Germany, where the Allies were the only potential force standing in the way of Soviet occupation; the average German could hardly have relished the prospect of a continual Soviet push westwards should Allied forces slow up the pace of their advance in order to deal with harassments in the rear. Since considerable public support has traditionally been regarded as a necessary prerequisite for large-scale guerrilla warfare -- a point repeatedly made in the Werwolf instruction manual itself
— the Werwolf must be regarded as a misbegotten effort.

Aside from the psychological complications of the basic Werwolf strategy in the west, five main factors contributed to the widespread disillusionment with Werwolf warfare:

First, the Werwolf was irrevocably associated with the National Socialist Party -- despite propaganda efforts to prevent this association -- and by 1945 National Socialism was discredited in the eyes of most Germans. The Nazis, as Edward Peterson notes, were a populist party dependent upon success, and in this sense they could not sustain the terrible failure which they had incurred.³ It is clearly evident that the collapse of the Third Reich gave rise to a reassertion of the centuries old German tradition of aversion to politics, rather than to a wave of final loyalty to either the Party or the Führer: "Alles vorüber, alles vorbei" became the motto of the common man.⁴

Given these circumstances, the best chance of success for the Werwolf would have been to convert itself into a strictly patriotic rally against the occupiers or to portray itself as a self-defence mechanism. Both strategies were in fact applied -- usually without much
effect — although it is perhaps significant that the Soviets and French, the least benevolent of the conquerors, probably also experienced the most trouble. It is also interesting to note that Nazi efforts to stir up a spirit of vengeance based upon the Allied Luftkrieg almost totally backfired: the majority of the populace in heavily bombed areas felt that their own Government's failure to clear the skies of the Reich was inexcusable and they staunchly refused to become cannon fodder for resistance efforts.  

Second, Germany's moment of defeat was much worse than that of such countries as France or Yugoslavia, in the sense that partisans in those nations had foreign sources of supply, and a justified hope for eventual victory. Even in these cases, it is significant that resistance was minimal until well after the entry of the USSR and the United States into the war. Alternately, Nazi guerrillas had no foreign supply bases, nor were they able to preserve the so-called "National Redoubt" as a base area (another prerequisite of successful partisan warfare). Considering that most Wermölen assumed on Clausewitzian grounds that guerrillas alone were incapable of defeating a regular military force, they
were left with no belief in the possibility of eventual victory. The only flicker of hope for Naziism's mere survival was a clash between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, and the continued existence of the movement even amidst the flames of such a conflict seemed unlikely. The desperation of this situation was realized by the bulk of the population and made the Werwolf seem an entirely hopeless effort.

Third, the German people were too tired, both physically and psychologically, to respond to Werwolf appeals, a factor which even Werwolf Sender was forced to acknowledge. People who worked ten hours per day; who spent almost all their spare time in food queues; and who suffered under a constant barrage of aerial bombardment, could hardly have been expected to oppose the final end of the conflict which had created these conditions in the first place. "The war-weary population", said one German general, "will prove to be a poor breeding ground for guerrilla activities of any kind other than of irresponsible and sporadic nature".7

Similarly, in the post-capitulation period, the average German was too concerned with the immediate survival of himself and his family to find time to engage
in resistance activities — foraging and Black Market operations necessarily consumed spare time. In fact, British intelligence reports noted in early 1947 that resistance to Allied rule was a reasonable expectation but for the factors of cold and hunger that largely governed German behaviour; one is reminded of the maxim that revolutions are made not by the desperate, but by the marginally well-off. On the other hand, it is certainly no coincidence that the spirit of Nazi underground resistance flourished most among children and teenagers, the segment of the population least affected by the demands of war, and — in the postwar period — the only social group with spare time to fill.

Fourth, there was a great fear of enemy reprisals against anyone harbouring resisters, and even in Soviet-occupied territory, where deep hatred of the conqueror created a considerable psychological basis for guerrilla warfare, the intense savagery of the occupation troops largely paralysed the populace and sapped any capacity for vigorous activity. A few supporters of the Werwolf had believed that harsh enemy reprisals would actually help the movement by driving uncommitted Germans into the Nazi camp, but in truth, fear of retaliation produced
the opposite effect: captured Werwölfe told Allied interrogators they often had as much difficulty evading German civilians as in dodging Allied troops, and many Germans were sorely tempted to attack or disarm Werwölfe in order to prevent any possible disturbances. Werwolf supply dumps were also plundered or betrayed to the occupation authorities, and the written report of one SS guerrilla band -- in noting such plunderings -- said that the opposition of the local population generally made partisan operations most difficult: "The civilians are glad the war is over for them. They pander to the Americans in the most revolting way and bar their doors to German soldiers still willing to fight".

Certainly this widespread fear of the Kleinkrieg was not without reason, since the invading powers generally adopted draconian reassures to crush partisan resistance -- measures which, in a few extreme cases, led to unfortunate incidents that might rightly be described as atrocities. Resistance by guerrillas or civilian gunmen resulted in the whole or partial destruction of a number of captured towns in reprisal, most notably Jarmin, Naumberg, and Koch, all on the Eastern Front, Sogel and Freisoythe, which were destroyed by the
Canadians, and Marbach, which was partially sacked and destroyed by French and Moroccan soldiers; General Patton's personal war diary reveals that several towns near the Thuringian Forest were "removed" by the US Third Army due to sniping and the ambush of an American staff car. Other towns were forcibly evacuated or hostages were taken and sometimes shot; in at least three cases -- Arnsberg, Freudenstadt, and Memel -- the entire male populations of newly-occupied communities were locked up in concentration compounds for a limited period. Invasion troops also had orders to summarily execute any resisters in civilian clothes who hid weapons or fired on the occupation forces, and throughout 1945 scores of Germans were executed on such grounds. Moreover, Soviet troops were instructed to regard as a partisan anyone found in the woods and to treat such persons accordingly; as well, all civilians caught aiding Army and SS stragglers were executed and their homes burned down.

Reprisals against German and Volksdeutsch resisters in Eastern Europe were especially harsh, the Soviets having set an unfortunate precedent by the mass expulsion of Volksdeutschen along the Middle Volga (August 1941)
and in Transylvania and the Banat (January 1945), in both cases on grounds of pro-German resistance activity. Thereafter, the Russians regularly conducted mass "labour drafts" among Germanic populations in newly occupied areas, and it was even suggested by a captured Soviet officer that there were plans to disperse all the Germanic settlement areas in Eastern Europe because of the threat of partisan warfare. As late as 1946, outbreaks of resistance in the Soviet Zone were routinely answered by the large-scale round-up and deportation of teenagers in the affected area (much to the embarrassment of the Soviets when news of such operations leaked out to the West).

Pro-Soviet regimes in several central European countries also exploited resistance by ethnic Germans in order to uproot entire towns and villages in mass expulsions, and in a number of cases, large groups of hostages were shot as a reprisal for alleged resistance activity: in the Yugoslavian Banat, for instance, one hundred and seventy-five Volksdeutschen were executed in March 1945 because a Soviet officer had been killed by a civilian sniper. Such measures unfortunately remind one of the Nazis own tactics in Eastern Europe, where anti-
partisan operations were designed to achieve genocide as well as physically eliminating active partisans. The worst single instance of this self-righteous policy of vengeance occurred in the Sudeten town of Aussig-an-der-Elbe, where an ammunition dump was blown up by alleged "Werwolf sabotage" in the mid-summer of 1945, and where a large number of innocent Sudeten-German townspeople were subsequently beaten and killed in a wild razzia by Czech security forces -- the final number of deaths arising from this pogrom have estimated at anywhere between four hundred and two thousand. It is little wonder, therefore, that a Czech labour unionist who toured the Sudetenland in mid-1945 reported that despite numerous reports of sabotage, most of the Germanic population was in a zombie-like state and seemed to lack the psychological capabilities for any effective resistance.

A fifth and final factor mitigating against resistance was that the social and political climate of the unified Reich had conditioned several successive generations of Germans to regard partisan warfare as an illegitimate tactic. Werwolf propaganda desperately sought to reverse this belief by appealing to strong
traditions of German "popular" warfare, but given the short time in which Werwolf Sender could influence opinion, it is hardly surprising that little was accomplished. In the final analysis, most Germans retained almost as much contempt for their own guerrilla fighters as for the "bandits" and "Reds" who had harassed the Wehrmacht. It would be incorrect to conclude, however, that Germans were somehow unsuited for partisan warfare on racial or long-term cultural grounds.

Finally, one must add that lack of popular support also doomed many of the foreign resistance movements sponsored by the Jagdverbande and FAK units, although the Germans achieved considerable results in Rumania, and also succeeded in urging several independent resistance groups, such as UPA and the Chetniks, toward a program of cooperation with German forces. There was certainly no reservoir of pro-German sentiment in Eastern Europe, but there was a great wave of anti-Communist feeling which the Germans were able to exploit. A corresponding attempt to seed guerrilla warfare in liberated western Europe failed almost completely -- particularly in France and the Low Countries -- but the fact that the Germans still pushed forward with such matters is hardly
surprising; recall, for instance, the strange euphoria that had overcome England in the summer of 1940, when it was hoped that undercover exploits and a call to rebellion in Europe could reverse the vast material resources then pitted against embattled Britain.

Examination of the German side of the story does not, of course, tell the entire tale. No one can have read this account without wondering about the reactions of the Allies and Soviets, and it is perhaps proper to offer a few final observations on this matter before closing. In short, it might be concluded that the threat of Nazi partisan warfare had a generally unhealthy effect on broad issues of policy among the occupying powers. General Eisenhower, for instance, considered the Germans a warlike race who would never surrender, and he suggested that the German Army would break down into individual centers of resistance -- possibly anchored in an Alpine Redoubt -- rather than capitulate. Based on such expectations, he contributed substantially to the hardening of American occupation policy in the late summer and fall of 1944: in August, he encouraged Treasury Secretary Morgenthau's quest for a so-called "hard Peace", and soon after he also asked for the
revision of a directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff which had made Allied forces initially responsible for the maintenance of regular public services and utilities in occupied Germany:

...it may well be that the German Army as a whole will never actually surrender and that we shall enter the country finding no central German authority in control, with the situation chaotic, probably guerrilla fighting and possibly even civil war in certain districts ... If conditions in Germany turn out to be as described it will be utterly impossible effectively to control or save the economic structure of the country ... and we feel we should not assume the responsibility for its support and control.37

The pragmatic British were mortified by such a suggestion,38 but the American War Department naturally took considerable account of the Supreme Commander's opinions and for some time was quite amenable to suggestions from the Treasury that occupation policy should be more draconian in nature.39

The eventual outcome of these changes in policy was Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067 (for US forces only), the SHAEF Occupation Directive of 9 November 1944, and the much-revised Handbook for Military Government in Germany, a final version of which was published in
December 1944. Such documents called for harsh denazification guidelines, non-fraternization between Allied troops and German civilians, and the schooling and re-education of German youth — all measures which were intended to safeguard the immediate security of the occupation forces, as well as laying the groundwork for a long-term solution of "the German Problem."  

When Allied forces arrived in Germany they brought with them an immense system of rules and regulations which governed the day-to-day existence of Germans well into the summer of 1945, and in some cases much longer. German life, for instance, was regulated by a curfew and by strict travel restrictions (which damaged agricultural production); all meetings of more than five persons were banned (which effectively eliminated all political activity); Germans had to surrender hunting rifles and ceremonial arms (which meant that farmers could not protect crops from wild animals); German mail services and news media were closed and when re-opened were subject to strict censorship (which suffocated freedom of communication and expression); and German children were prohibited from forming Boy Scout Troops or clubs engaged in so-called "militaristic" sports (which put
the onus on ill-equipped Allied troops to entertain and remould German youth). In addition, German POWs were held by the victorious powers for several years after the conclusion of the war -- in contravention of international law -- and in 1945 several hundred thousand suspect Nazis were locked away in internment camps.

These anti-partisan measures certainly contributed to the successful suppression of underground activity, but at a considerable price: treating the German nation as a uniformly hostile entity also undermined the confidence of anti-Nazi Germans, and it created a vast gulf between the occupation forces and the German people during a brief period of profound psychological and social dislocation, when German society might otherwise have been most open to new influences. Revolutionary committees, or "antifas," were broken up, and the first major anti-Nazi demonstration in postwar Germany -- a rally in Cologne for home-coming concentration camp prisoners (20 May 1945) -- was dispersed by Allied military police who fired above the heads of the demonstrators.

Such incidents occurred not from a conscious fear of
the Left, as is sometimes suggested, but from a zealous application of measures specifically meant to smother Nazi opposition. Allied security mania, for instance, was evident in an American intelligence summary from the summer of 1945, which noted that even seemingly legitimate political movements could be a cloak for subversives, or in a British directive which warned that, "It is ... necessary to ensure that [Naziism's] place is not taken by other more disguised anti-democratic, reactionary, and militarist movements." The final results of such a fear were soon obvious: the postwar premier of Schleswig-Holstein, Herr Steltzer, noted in December 1946 that Allied expectations of Werwolf resistance had led to an attempt at bureaucratic over-control, and had thus resulted in a reign of debilitating inefficiency. Once this "vast apparatus" was in place, claimed Steltzer, it became an end in itself and worked "so negatively" that it crushed any hope of a German recovery and generally convinced Germans that it was an instrument for the "annihilation or enslavement" of the country.

The first security measures to be rescinded were strict travel and curfew limits, which damaged the German
economy, but it was only after the Potsdam Conference in the mid-summer of 1945 that a general thaw began, first in the removal of bans on political activity, and then in the cancellation of formal non-fraternization rules. Even then, the various Allied security agencies continued to zealously ferret out underground plots and to generally cast aspersions upon German "national character," and numerous restrictions upon German society remained in place. As late as 1948-49, the American Civil Liberties Union complained that restrictive licensing and censorship regulations were still imposed upon western Germans. However, it might also be noted that fear of guerrilla warfare had at least one positive implication: as early as June 1945, it was realized that food would necessarily have to be imported into Germany in order to prevent starvation and the resultant breakdown in law and order, particularly since it was suspected that many of the arms and sabotage caches lain by Nazi commandos were not yet uncovered. "If they're hungry this winter," said one Allied officer, "they'll dig up the guns and start shooting."

Fear of Nazi guerrilla warfare also influenced Allied military strategy during the final months of the
war. As the Allies advanced into Germany, General Eisenhower specifically instructed that no towns be left unoccupied and that no pockets be left in the Allied rear, a policy which naturally complemented the broad front strategy and avoided the kind of mistakes made by the Germans themselves in Russia and Yugoslavia -- mistakes which had eventually yielded large scale guerrilla resistance. Rather than reaching geographic targets, Eisenhower constantly emphasized the destruction of the German Wehrmacht and the Nazi capability for resistance. Thus, the Allies rarely ignored by-passed straggler/guerrilla bands, but constantly employed troops to double back and eliminate these dangers. Several counter-insurgency combat manuals were also published, and troops were trained in the methods necessary for suffocating guerrilla resistance. In March 1945, an entire Army, the 15th, was activated as a garrison force in the Rhineland, specifically for the purpose of blocking possible efforts at sabotage by bands of Germans on the western bank of the river.

Eisenhower's decisions to eliminate the Alpine Redoubt and the Ruhr Pocket rather than to drive upon Berlin comprised a natural culmination to the broad front
strategy and the desire to eliminate any pockets of possible partisan resistance. The last minute switch of emphasis away from Berlin and toward Berchtesgaden was a particularly difficult choice, and was certainly influenced by the flood of low grade intelligence which had been surging into SHAEF since 1943 and which told of extensive preparations for German guerrilla warfare, possibly based upon strongholds in an Alpine base area.63 There was some tendency to disregard these reports as deliberate SD disinformation,64 but many highly competent intelligence authorities took the available intelligence at face value — Colonel Dick White, for instance, noted in February 1945 that, "Not enough weight is given to the many reports of a probable Nazi last stand in the Bavarian Alps."65 During this same period SHAEF received the first Ultra intelligence about German intentions to transfer important aircraft manufacturing facilities into the mountains,66 and in early March came the first Ultra confirmations of the German withdrawal of military headquarters into the Alps and of the attempts to establish a widespread Werwolf guerrilla movement.67 Aerial reconnaissance showed the construction of bunkers in the Berchtesgaden area.68
Around this same period, the SHAEF Joint Intelligence Committee warned that if the Alps were not rapidly occupied "guerrilla or dissident movements will gain ground and the Nazis may be able to put into effect some of their plans for establishing subversive organizations in Germany and other countries." The conclusion was obvious: "We should... be prepared to undertake operations in Southern Germany in order to overcome rapidly any organised resistance by the German Armed Forces or by guerrilla movements which may have retreated to the inner zone and to this redoubt." 69

Based upon such advice, Eisenhower and Bradley decided in mid-March to shift the focus of Allied operations away from a northern drive toward Berlin, in favour of a push into central Germany in order to cut Germany in two by linking up with the Soviets -- in the bargain, the Allies would also get the Thuringian industrial complex, which was the center of German small arms production and was thought to play an important role in the manufacture of weapons for Nazi guerrilla warfare. A second step was then to destroy Nazi forces in southern Germany before they could withdraw into the National Redoubt. 70
It has often been argued, of course, that Eisenhower's central and southern drives resulted from a faulty strategy which over-emphasized the threat of an Alpine Redoubt and underemphasized the political value of Berlin. However, given the fact that within several weeks of Eisenhower's decision, numerous German partisan bands had actually congregated in the Allied rear; given the fact that the Werwolf and the Jagdverbände actually did attempt to turn the mountains into a guerrilla stronghold; and given the fact that Hitler decided only on 22 April to stay in Berlin and forego the tremendous option of personally rallying his troops in the mountains, Eisenhower's decision was perhaps not totally misguided after all. Moreover, the actual inadequacy of preparations in the Alps should not obscure the fact that the Germans had a consistent record of muddling through such disabilities and achieving more with less, particularly when given a breathing space in which to recoup. In their postwar memoirs, both Eisenhower and his intelligence chief, General Kenneth Strong, recalled that the Nazi guerrilla movement was a real threat which may well have posed a considerable danger to the Allied forces had it not been speedily
neutralized.\textsuperscript{72}

It is likely that Soviet strategy and occupation policy was also influenced by the Werwolf danger, although the outline of this story is not nearly so clear as in the West. We do know, however, that like the Western Allies, the Soviets were exercised by the possibility of a guerrilla stronghold in the Alps (or in East Prussia);\textsuperscript{73} that like the Western Allies, the Soviets were deeply suspicious of Germans claiming socialist or democratic leanings and therefore broke-up local antifas on the suspicion that they were penetrated by Nazis;\textsuperscript{74} and that like the Western Allies, the Soviets maintained stringent security measures,\textsuperscript{75} and even added an extra element by the deployment of full-scale NKVD divisions organized to maintain security in the rear.\textsuperscript{76}

Although the evidence is thin, it appears that the development of Soviet policy in Germany was a mirror image of the same process in the West. First came a reactive policy designed partly to crush Nazi underground resistance, although this policy was much more dependent on the indigenous population than was its Western counterpart. Once the Werwolf failed to bloom into a major threat to the occupation forces, this improvised
policy was gradually replaced by an ideological attempt to mould the Germans in the image of their occupiers, as also occurred in the West.

During the early part of 1945, Soviet policy in Germany was clearly disorganized, short-term, and exploitative. The dominant figures were Georgi Malenkov, whose Reparations Committee sought to deindustrialize Germany as quickly as possible,\textsuperscript{77} and Ilya Ehrenburg, whose blood-curdling hate propaganda helped whip millions of troops into a frenzy of pillage and rape. Aside from these destructive forces, official Soviet policy was based upon a "liberation" of the German people,\textsuperscript{78} and the final destruction of fascism through the continued unity of the Grand Alliance. German Communist cadres were trained to aid the occupation forces, but were told not to expect the establishment of socialism; rather, their task was to "democratize" the German people and to construct an anti-fascist, democratic mass organization, the ultimate purpose of which was "to convince [the population] that the extermination of Naziism is in the interest of the German people, and that therefore all honest Germans must help with the tracking and elimination of war criminals, fascist terrorists, and
Soviet propaganda appealed to Germans for help in eliminating Nazi resisters, and threats to kill hostages in retaliation for Nazi terrorism were carefully funnelled through newly-appointed German civil officials in order to keep such declarations one step removed from Soviet Military Authorities.

When several German Communist special teams were actually sent into eastern Germany in early May 1945, they aided in liquidation of secret Nazi resistance cells, and reportedly attempted to prevent "excesses" in German-Soviet relations. In fact, the Berlin team was encouraged by Marshal Zhukov to be even more vigilant in such matters, and its chief, Walter Ulbricht, testily replied that it was Soviet Intelligence which was failing to hold Nazi activists even after they had been identified and apprehended. "In the Ulbricht group," noted one member, "we greatly overestimated the influence of the Nazis."

By June, however, the contours of Soviet and German Communist policy had begun to change. The head of the Berlin Werwolf had recently been captured, and although there had been scattered sniping, arson attacks, and
guerrilla warfare, there had been no major outbreaks of rebellion, the possible exception being an uprising in the Berlin district of Charlottenburg. Not surprisingly, it was at this point that Communist policy showed signs of turning away from a solely reactive, security-conscious position, and toward a more ideologically oriented policy: the KPD was officially refounded, a Communist press was established, and directives from Moscow ordered an acceleration of leftist policies such as land reform. Although this change was clothed as part of a general democratic revival, in which major bourgeois parties were also allowed to reorganize, the real shift in policy was impossible to ignore: the monolithic anti-fascist movement, which had earlier been posited as a weapon against the Nazi underground, was now being replaced before it even appeared, mainly by a reestablished Communist Party. There were also other external manifestations of a much-heralded Communist revival -- the so-called Zhdanovschina -- within the Soviet Union: for instance, Malenkov's powerful Reparations Committee was progressively weakened by opposition from the Party, the military, and the Commissariat of Foreign Trade. Moreover, Political
Officers attached to the Army had made a desperate effort to stop looting and rape by Red Army troops, and in April 1945, Ehrenburg's nationalist hate propaganda was publicly denounced by a senior Party official.84

With Soviet patronage assured, German Communists were subsequently able to seize the commanding heights of the expanding Eastern Zone bureaucracy. Together with Soviet security agencies, they gradually combined the process of wiping out the surviving Nazi opposition with the act of emasculating all legitimate contenders for power. It is rarely possible, as Isaac Deutscher notes, to separate these two processes and determine when the authorities were acting on valid concerns for Red Army lines of communication and the suppression of fascism, and when they were settling accounts with non-Nazi parties and groups which they were only too eager to suppress.85 Within a relatively short period of time, however, Communist-dominated police agencies began to cast an increasingly wide net which turned up alleged links between the armed underground and legitimate bourgeois political groupings, or at least "demonstrated" bourgeois tolerance of Nazi activity.86 Occasional terrorist attacks -- such as the attempted assassination
President of the Thuringian Diet, or the bombing of a Socialist Unity Party headquarters in Halle -- were fabricated into elaborate conspiracies and thus seized as opportunities to cajole the various Länder Diets into passing so-called "Laws for the Protection of Democracy." Notably, the exploitation of such sporadic terrorist incidents as an excuse for authoritarian crackdowns is a familiar tradition both in the history of the Soviet Union (i.e., the Purge of the Old Bolsheviks, 1935), and in the history of Germany as well (i.e., the Karlsbad Decrees, 1819; the Anti-Socialist Laws, 1878; and the Enabling Act, 1933). In such an atmosphere, elections eventually became little better than stage-managed shams, and the opposition parties were either neutralized or -- in the case of the Socialists -- annexed and communized by the KPD.

The full significance of this turn of events in the Soviet Zone was that it represented merely one instance of the general pattern of affairs in Eastern Europe -- allowing, of course, for regional variations. Throughout the so-called "Soviet security zone," Communist parties were uniformly placed in charge of police apparatus by the Soviets, and were thus encouraged to push themselves
forward as the guardians of law and order. In the process of crushing pro-German underground groups — many of which had been organized or at least belatedly supported by the Jagdverbände and FAK units — the Communists helped lay the groundwork for their own dictatorships. The classic case was Rumania, where guerrillas trained and supported by the Jagdverbände succeeded in early 1945 in creating considerable confusion deep in the Soviet rear; with a major German counter-offensive looming upon the adjacent front in Hungary, the Soviets willingly replaced the moderate Rumanian coalition government with a strongly pro-Soviet regime, claiming that the Rumanians were otherwise unable or unwilling to protect Soviet lines of communication. Together with the Soviet secret police, this Rumanian puppet regime subsequently wiped out all opposition, fascist and democratic alike.

Seen in dialectical terms, it might thus be concluded that it was the antithesis to the Werwolf and to Werwolf-type groups which gave the Nazi guerrilla movement its historical significance: the Werwolf had an impact not because it succeeded, but merely because it existed. As a diversion, it drew Allied troops away from
Berlin -- only to allow the capital to fall to the Soviets -- and it also momentarily diverted the occupying powers from the long term task of imposing their own social beliefs and value systems upon Germany. After a brief interim, when it quickly became clear that the occupation forces would not have to function under a continuous state of siege, the occupying powers got back to the work of achieving their own long term goals within the truncated Reich. The reactive influence of the Werwolf threat thus dates mainly to a few months in the spring and early summer of 1945, the so-called "Stunde Null," although the significance of this brief period for the overall history of the occupation should not be underestimated. Only a profoundly Whiggish approach to historiography would deny that the lost periods and failed movements of history have no influence upon the continuity of events.

Of course, considered solely on the merits of its success in prompting a guerrilla war, the Werwolf was a movement which achieved a few limited successes, but which otherwise stands as a classic example of the Kleinkrieg gone wrong. One is especially reminded of another partisan levy raised in a lost cause, the French
franc tireurs of 1870-71, particularly in the sense that both movements caused much more damage to their own people than to the enemy. The obvious willingness of the Hitler regime to subject its people to this final trial is perhaps the ultimate indictment of the Nazi system; Hitler was in fact heard to groan that because Germany had lost a war of extermination, the welfare of the surviving population was no longer a matter of consequence.90 "Homo homini lupus est" -- man is indeed wolf to his fellow man.
Footnotes

1. For the "functionalist" school of thought, see Broszat; Peterson, The Limits of Hitler's Power; and Hans Mommsen, "Hitlers Stellung im nationalsozialistischen Herrschaftssystem."


5. Clifford Kirkpatrick, "Reactions of Educated
Germans to Defeat," in American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 54 (1948/49), pp. 39-42, 46-47; and USSBS "The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale" (May 1947), Vol. I, pp. 1, 12, 17-18, 21, 51-52, 62, 76-77, 97-99, in The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (New York: Garland, 1976), Vol. IV. Contrary to all expectations, Allied forces reported that the inhabitants of towns which were heavily bombed actually tended to have a more cooperative attitude toward the occupiers than the inhabitants of towns which were undamaged. SHAEF G-5 "Political Intelligence Letter" #8, 28 May 1945, State Dept. Decimal Files 1945-49, 740.00119 Control (Germany), RG 59, NA.


7. DIC (MIS) "Possibilities of Guerrilla Warfare as Seen by a Group of Seventeen German Generals," 17 May 1945, OSS 130749, RG 226, NA. See also, Heuss, p. 48.


13. History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, Vol. XX, p. 72, NA; and Whiting, Hitler's Werewolves, p. 189.


15. M. Gross, "Beglaubigte Abschrift im Auszuge," 23 Nov. 1950, Ost Dok. 2/13, BA; Silesian Inferno, p. 77; and The Tragedy of Silesia, 1945-46, p. 190. According to a report forwarded to American sources by the Vatican, the Soviets waged a fierce campaign against partisan resistance in Berlin -- "Russian reprisals to certain reactions of the Wehrwolf were terrible; using flame throwers the Russians destroyed entire blocks of houses causing the deaths of hundreds of the inhabitants." Enclosure, H. Tittmann, Asst. to the Representative to the Holy See to the Sec. of State, 15 Oct. 1945, State Dept. Decimal Files 1945-49, 740.00119 Control (Germany), RG 59, NA.


20. The Fifth Division in the ETO.


22. Fremde Heere Ost (III/Prop.) Memo, p. 8, Records of OKH, Microform #T-78, Reel 488, frame 6474504, NA.

23. Armed resistance, sabotage, and possession of weapons were all defined as capital crimes in the basic SHAEF ordinances promulgated in the autumn of 1944, although General William Beddell-Smith removed from the final draft of Allied Proclamation #1 an outright threat of death for resisters, which he replaced with a notation that -- "Resistance to the Allied Forces will be ruthlessly stamped out." It was only after Allied forces encountered heavy civilian resistance in the area around the Main River (i.e., late March 1945) that Eisenhower authorized the immediate execution of German franc-tireurs. MG Ordinance #1 -- "Crimes and Offences," filed under SHAEF Directive for Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender, 9 Nov. 1944, WO 219/1634, PRO; SHAEF Hist. Sect. Analysis Sheet, 6 Nov. 1944, containing draft Proclamation #1, WO 219/3761A, PRO; The New York Times, 26 March 1945; 28 March 1945; 12 April 1945; and Wallace, p. 184.


26. For the Soviet decree connecting the Volga deportations to the threat from "diversionists and spies," see Koch, p. 284; and Fleischhauer, p. 81.

27. For claims that the 1945 deportation of a hundred thousand Transylvanian and Banat Volksdeutschen was connected with the dangers caused by Nazi guerrilla warfare, see OSS Report from Rumania, GR-136, 7 Jan. 1945, OSS L 51159, RG 226, NA; OSS Report from Rumania, GR-150, 13 Jan. 1945, OSS L 51507, RG 226, NA; OSS Report from Rumania, GR-160, 16 Jan. 1945, OSS L 51646, RG 226, NA; Joseph Schechtman, European Population Transfers, 1939-1945 (New York: Oxford UP, 1946), p. 236; and Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Rumänien, ed. Theodore Scheider, Band III, Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa (Bonn: Bundesministerium für


30. See, for instance, The Tragedy of Silesia, p. 345; The Stars and Stripes, 23 July 1945; and Sig. illegible to Dr. Renner, 11 Aug. 1945, p. 5, Ost Dok. 2/240, BA.

31. In at least three separate cases, groups of twenty Sudeten-German hostages were shot by Czech militiamen in reprisal for alleged Werwolf attacks and sabotage. Franz Dresler, untitled report, 5 March 1953; Emil Kirmke, "Bericht über die Austreibung 1945/46," 8 Dec. 1955, p. 3; Johann Wildner, "Schreckensregiment und Blutgericht in Freudenthaler KZ," 28 Aug. 1947, p. 2, all in Ost Dok. 2/253, BA; Sig. illegible, "Meine Erlebnisse in der Tschechoslowakei nach Beendigung des Krieges" (undated), Ost Dok. 2/313, BA; Hans Happ, "Verhandlungsschrift," 3 July 1954, p. 2; and Johann Weisbach to the Staatskommissariat für das Flüchtlingswesen, 28 March 1947, pp. 1-3, both in Ost Dok. 2/262, BA.


37. SCAF 68, SHAEF to AGWAR for CCS, 23 Aug. 1944, CAD 014 Germany, RG 165, NA. One of Eisenhower's main advisors on military government policy, General Julius Holmes, noted in September 1944 that SHAEF's rejection of mandatory resuscitation of the German economic infrastructure had actually anticipated the new Morgenthauist policy — "... we were the first to become aware of the fact that it would be not only dangerous but futile for us to attempt to prop up the rickety economic and financial structure of Germany." Gen. J. Holmes to Gen. J. Hildring, 11 Sept. 1944, CAD 014 Germany, RG 165, NA.

38. Draft telegram to the JSM in Washington, Annex II to Note by Secretariat, APW, 29 Aug. 1944, CAB 87/8, PRO. Churchill, on 26 July 1944, advised the War Cabinet that Germany would submit "totally" once organized resistance ceased, and that there would be little SS guerrilla warfare in mountainous areas of the Reich. (The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton, ed. Ben Pimlott (London: Jonathan Cape, 1986), p. 774.) A British study completed and circulated by the Joint Intelligence Committee during this same period concluded that limited Nazi guerrilla resistance was to be expected, but it was implied that it was no more of a concern than the reemergence of German Communism or the weakening of the food collection and price control systems. Even with these elements considered, Germany would probably not relapse into a state of economic chaos. Joint Intelligence Committee (44) 38, "Estimate of Conditions in Germany following Collapse," pp. 2-3, 5-8, 10, CAB 87/88, PRO.

39. Ziemke, p. 105; Foreign Relations of the United


41. For the immediate security aspect of denazification, see 21 AG "Counter Intelligence Instruction No. 4: The Occupation of Germany," 1944, WO 205/1086, PRO; and Gen. Robertson to Jenkins, Control Office, 7 March 1947, FO 371/64352, PRO. For the relationship of non-fraternization to security against Nazi terrorists, see SHAEF G-5 Historical Sect. Analysis Sheet, 2 Aug. 1944, Hilldring to Troops in Germany, p. 3, WO 219/3652, PRO; Paraphrase of State Dept. cable information War Dept., 13 July 1945; and Maj. Gen. R.B. Lord, Comm. Zone ETO, Memo on "Relations with German Clergy," 9 April 1045, both in CAD 250.1, RG 165, NA. For the desire to get German children back into school in order to occupy their time and remove any residual influences leading them toward resistance activities, see SHAEF G-5 "Educational Technical Manual Advanced Edition," Jan. 1945, p. 1, WO 219/2587, PRO.

G-5 Internal Affairs to ACoS SHAEF G-2, 1 July 1945, all in WO 219/1648A, PRO; SHAEF sigd. SCAEF to AMSSO for JIC, 17 March 1945, WO 219/1651, PRO; SHAEF G-5 "Political Intelligence Letter" #9, 4 June 1945, FO 371/46933, PRO; Peterson, The American Occupation of Germany, p. 157; and Dyer, p. 462. Extensive restrictions of movement were also placed upon North German fishermen, since the Allies were well aware of the value of fishing vessels in providing escape routes and aiding subversion. Again, however, this restriction curtailed food production. SHAEF G-5 "Political Intelligence Letter" #9, 4 June 1945, FO 371/46933, PRO; and 21 AG "News Sheet" #26, 30 July 1945, Part III, p. 10, WO 205/997, PRO.


44. Peterson, The American Occupation of Germany, p. 138; Davidson, p. 137; The Stars and Stripes, 9 March 1947; James Warburg, Germany -- Bridge or Battleground (London: William Heinemann, 1947), p. 7; and Zonal Advisory Council, Minutes of the 3rd Meeting Held in Hamburg, 2/3 May 1946, FO 371/55614, PRO.

46. W. Strang, "Diary of a Tour through Westphalia and the North Rhine Province, 15-17 October 1945", FO 371/46935, PRO; US Berlin District, "The Problem of German Youth," 3 Dec. 1945, State Dept. Decimal Files 1945-49, 740.00119 Control (Germany), RG 59, NA; R. Murphy, Pol. Adv. Germany to Sec. of State, 10 Aug. 1945, State Dept. Decimal Files 1945-49, 862.4081/1-145, RG 59, NA; and CG, USFET from Clay sgd. Eisenhower to War Dept. CAD, 3 Aug. 1945, CAD 080 Boy Scouts of America, RG 165, NA. The Scouting Movement was initially prohibited by the Allies and Soviets because of the fear that local Scout groups might metamorphose into neo-HJ cells.

47. MI-14 "Mitropa" #10, 1 Dec. 1945, pp. 3-4, FO 371/46967, PRO; and FORD "Digest for Germany and Austria" #726, 26 Feb. 1948, p. 9, FO 371/70792, PRO.


49. Davidson, p. 168. Churchill announced in the House of Commons in April 1945 that Allied policy was to hold all German officers as POWs as long as the threat of Nazi guerrilla warfare existed. The New York Times, 25 April 1945; and The Globe and Mail, 25 April 1945.


53. Berlin Dist. "Weekly Intelligence Summary," 26 July 1945; and "Guidance for Output in German for the Week 23-30 April 1945," 21 April 1945, p. 1, FO 371/46894, PRO. Even the Danish autonomy movement in South Schleswig was suppressed under the heavy hand of Military Government -- British authorities suspected it was a disguised Nazi movement. 21 AG "Weekly Political Intelligence Summary" #4, 28 July 1945, p. 16, FO 371/46933, PRO.

54. Steltzer interview in Der Zeit, 5 Dec. 1946 (press extract); and FORD "Germany Weekly Background Notes" #74, 2 Jan. 1947, p. 1, both in FO 371/64389, PRO.

55. R. Murphy, US Pol. Adv. (Frankfurt) to Berlin, 8
Aug. 1945, State Dept. Decimal Files 1945-49, 740.00119 Control (Germany), RG 59, NA.


59. 7th Army, Memo on "Military Operations in Germany Territory," 10 April 1945, p. 2, WO 219/3513, PRO; and D. Lerner, SHAEF PWD "Notes on a Trip through Occupied Germany," 18 April 1945, p. 1, State Dept. Decimal Files 740.0011 EW, Micf, M982, Reel 217, NA. Special CIC squads were formed and sent to isolated villages in southern Germany reported as possible centers of clandestine resistance. 6th AG Report "Resistance Organizations (Germany)," IRR File XE 049 888 "Werewolf Activities Vol. I,“ RG 319, NA.

60. SHAEF G-3 "Combatting the Guerrilla," WO 219/2921, PRO; and G (trg.) GHQ MEF "Notes on the Development of Guerrilla Warfare in Europe," March 1945, OSS 128640, RG 226, NA.

61. SHAEF G-3 (Main) Memo "German Guerrilla Warfare Tactics and Underground Activity," 1 Nov. 1944, p. 1, WO 219/1602, PRO. The command of the French First Army, in particular, ordered each division to train special units for anti-partisan operations. Such detachments were formed largely from former members of the French Maquis. Ministre de l'Information "Articles et Documents," 17 Sept. 1945, Nouvelle Serie #274, p. 3, 7P 125, SHAT.

11 April 1945, WO 219/3760A, PRO; FO Weekly Political Intelligence Summaries, Vol. 11, Summary 290, p. 4, 25 April 1945; and OSS Report from Switzerland #B-2612, 25 April 1945, OSS 125162, RG 226, NA.


67. Ralph Bennett, Ultra in the West: The Normandy Campaign, 1944-45 (London: Hutchinson, 1979), p. 238; and Ultra Document BT 7004, 12 March 1945, Ultra Micf. Col., Reel 65. Ultra intelligence on the Werwolf was immediately reinforced by the interrogations of German POWs who had seen the memos circulated by Dienstelle Prützmann in February 1945, which called for Army volunteers to attend the Werwolf training course at Heereschule II. Field Interrogation Unit #1 "PW Intelligence Bulletin" #1/47, 13 March 1945, G-2 Intelligence Div. Captured Personnel and Material Branch Enemy POW Interrogation File (MIS-Y) 1943-45, RG 165, NA. See also Strong, Intelligence at the Top, p. 188.


69. Combined Intelligence Committee Memo #49 "Ability of the German Army in the West to Continue the War," 15 March 1945, Enclosure, in Records of the JCS, Part I, 1942-45: European Theatre, Micf. Reel


72. Eisenhower, p. 397; and Strong, Intelligence at the Top, p. 188.


78. According to Soviet POWs, a Soviet Army daily order of 13 October 1944 instructed that occupied German territory be treated the same as "liberated" territory, provided the civilian population offered no resistance. "Analage zu VI Wi Wiesbaden, #708/45" (no date), Records of OKH, Microform #T-78, Reel 488, frame 6474435, NA. See also K. Rokossovsky, A Soldier's Duty (Moscow: Progress, 1970), pp. 288-289.


80. Silesian Inferno, pp. 181, 183; PID "Weekly Background Notes" #1, 8 June 1945, pp. 1-2, FO 371/46933, PRO; The Times, 2 June 1945; and 5 June 1945. The Soviet commandant in Berlin, General Gorbatov, announced in July 1945 that standard Soviet practice was merely to lecture young Werwolfe and then send them home to their parents. MI-14 "Mitropa" #2, 11 Aug. 1945, pp. 5-6, FO 371/46967, PRO.

[Werewolf] concept before we entered German territory. But neither I nor anyone of my comrades, either in East Prussia or in our prisons and camps, had found any 'Werwolves' whatsoever."


82. Leonhard, pp. 326-329.


84. OMGUS Office of Dir. of Intelligence "Special Intelligence Summary -- Soviet Russia in Germany," 8 March 1947, p. A1, State Dept. Decimal Files 1945-49, 740.00119 Control (Germany), RG 59, NA; Gen. Konev, "Befehl an die Truppen der 1. Ukrainischen Front" #004 (Germ. transl.), 26 March 1945 (frames 6474428-6474430); "Auszug aus Meldungen der Hgr. Weichsel Ic Nr. 221/45 vom 21.2.45" (Frame 6474412); Lt. Col. Maljarov to the Mil. Justice Div., 48th Army (Germ. transl.), 23 Jan. 1945 (frames 6474499-6474500); Col. Orlov, "Befehl an die Truppen der Garnison der Stadt Koben" (Germ. transl., 26 March 1945; "Auszug aus Kgf.-Aussagen -- Pz. Div. 'Kurmark' Ic v. 16.2.45" (frame 6474470); "Auszug aus 208. Inf. Div. Ic v. 11.3.45: Gef. Vern. #38" (frame 6474470); "Auszug aus 'Feststellungen zur Feindlage (A/Ausw.111)' -- Leitst III Ost für FAK #2012/45 geh. Lage vom 9.2.45" (frame 6474479); Col. Rodionov, Chief of the Pol. Sect./VIII Gde. Corps to the Pol. Office/Rgts. Comm. (Germ. transl.), 25 Jan. 1945 (frames 6474471-6474472); "Auszug aus Frd. Heere Ost (III g) Az. G b. Kgf. #1291 v. 17.23.45, Kgf. Vern" (frame 647443); "Auszug aus Kgf. -- Aussagen -- 203. I.D. Ic v. 7.2.45" (frame 6474475); "Auszug aus 'Wichtige Gefg.-Aussagen' -- I/M vom 3.3.45" (frame 6474478); Leitstelle III Ost für FAK "Feststellungen zur Feindlage, A-Auswertung 273 -- Grundätzliche sowjetsche Befehle zum Verhalten in den besetzten Gebieten," 7 March 1945 (frame 6474482); Gen. Rokossovski, "Befehl an die Truppen der 2. Weissruss. Front" #006 (Germ. transl.), 22 Jan. 1945 (frames 6474495-6474496); "Auszug aus Kgf.-Aussagen-FAK Kdo 103 v. 15.2.45" (frame


86. As early as the summer of 1945, the Berlin chief of the Christian Democrats, Andreas Hermes, was dismissed as head of the regional food administration because of the claim that undercover Werwölfe within the system were sabotaging food deliveries. FO Weekly Political Intelligence Summaries, Vol. 12, Summary #304, 1 Aug. 1945, pp. 2-3; and Vol. 12, Summary #305, 8 Aug. 1945, p. 2. Similar claims were laid forth by the Communist press in the Soviet Zone of Austria, where food shortages were blamed on "saboteurs and Fascist reactionaries" allegedly linked with the People's Party. MI-14 "Mitropa" #10, 1 Dec. 1945, p. 5, FO 371/46967, PRO.


90. Speer, p. 440. In an order on 29 March 1945, directing "fanatical" attacks upon the lines of communication behind enemy spearheads, Hitler noted that "no regard [is] to be paid... to the civilian population." Ultra Doc. BT 9227, 2 April 1945, Ultra Micf. Coll., Reel 68; Speer, pp. 456-457; and Fest, Hitler, p. 731.
Chart #1: Unternehmen Zeppelin, early 1944

Amt VI, Gruppe VI C
Location: Berlin

Hauptkommando Nord
- oper. adm. int. & train.
- training schools
- Special Units: Udarnaja Bgd.

Hauptkommando Sud
- oper. adm. int. & train.
- training schools
- Sonderlager "L" Location: Blamau
- Special Units: Cossacks, Armenians, Turkomans, etc.

Aussenkommandos I - V
Nebenkommendos

Aussenkommandos I - IV
Nebenkommendos

Chart #2: Dienstelle Prützmann

Reichsführer-SS
Heinrich Himmler
(Operational Abwehr)

OKW Liaison
Lt. Unger — — —

General Inspekteur
für Spezialabwehr
0/Gruf. Hans Prützmann

Deputy (to
Prützmann):
Gllt. Juppe
(April 1945)

Adjutants:
Stubaf. Kamm
Stubaf.
Müller-West

Chef des Stabes
Staf. Tschiersky
(later Brgf.
Opländer)

Personnel
Matters:
Stubaf.
Kotthaus

Training:
Brgf.
Siebel

Signals:
Hptm. d.
Pol.

Medical:
Dr. Hühn
Schweizer

Female W:
Frau Maisch

Adjutant:
Oblt.
Sulle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wehrkreis</th>
<th>HSSPf</th>
<th>Headquarters</th>
<th>Extent of Influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I (Nordost)</td>
<td>O/Gruf. Georg Ebrecht (later replaced by Prützmann)</td>
<td>Königsberg</td>
<td>East Prussia, Memel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II (Ostsee)</td>
<td>O/Gruf. Emil Mazew</td>
<td>Stettin</td>
<td>Mecklenburg, Pomerania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III (Spree)</td>
<td>O/Gruf. August Heissmeyer</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>Brandenburg, Altmark, Neumark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV (Elbe)</td>
<td>Gruf. Rudolf von Alvensleben</td>
<td>Dresden</td>
<td>Saxony, Thuringia, Northwest, Sudetenland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V (Südwest)</td>
<td>O/Gruf. Otto Hoffmann</td>
<td>Stuttgart</td>
<td>Württemberg, Baden, Alsace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI (West)</td>
<td>Gruf. Karl Gutenberger</td>
<td>Düsseldorf</td>
<td>Westphalia, Rhineland, Eastern, Belgium</td>
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<tr>
<td>VII (Süd)</td>
<td>O/Gruf. Karl von Eberstein</td>
<td>Munich</td>
<td>Southern Bavaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII (Südost)</td>
<td>O/Gruf. Heinrich Schmauser</td>
<td>Breslau</td>
<td>Silesia, Sudetenland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX (Fulda-Werra)</td>
<td>O/Gruf. Josias, Erbprinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont</td>
<td>Kassel</td>
<td>Hessen, Western Thuringia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X (Nordsee)</td>
<td>Gruf. Georg von Bassewitz-Behr</td>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>Frisia, Schleswig</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chart #3 (cont.): HSSPfs in the Greater Reich</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>XI (Mitte)</td>
<td>Gruf. Hermann Höfle (later replaced by Querner)</td>
<td>Hanover Hanover Prov., Brunswick, Anhalt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII (Rhein-Westmark)</td>
<td>Gruf. Jürgen Stroop</td>
<td>Wiesbaden Southwest Hesse, Eifel, Palatinate, Saar, Lorraine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIII (Main)</td>
<td>Gruf. Benno Martin</td>
<td>Nuremberg Northern Bavaria, Western Bohemia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVII (Donau)</td>
<td>0/Gruf. Rudolf Querner (later replaced by Schimana)</td>
<td>Vienna Northern Austria, Southern Sudetenland</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>XVIII (Alpenland)</td>
<td>Gruf. Erwin Kösener</td>
<td>Salzburg Southern Austria, Northern Slovenia</td>
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<tr>
<td>XX (Weichsel)</td>
<td>Gruf. Fritz Katzmann</td>
<td>Danzig Polish Corridor, Danzig, Western East Prussia</td>
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<tr>
<td>XXI (Warthe)</td>
<td>Brgf. Heinz Reinefarth</td>
<td>Posen Western Poland</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>General-Gouvernement (Ost)</td>
<td>0/Gruf. Wilhelm Koppe</td>
<td>Cracow Central and Southern Poland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bohemia-Moravia</td>
<td>0/Gruf. Karl Frank</td>
<td>Prague Central Bohemia, Moravia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bialystok (under Wkr. Nordost)</td>
<td>Brgf. Otto Hellwig</td>
<td>Bialystok Northeast Poland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: "Liste der Höchsten und Höheren SS- und Polizeiführer soweit der SS- und Polizeiführer", 20 Oct. 1944, NS 19/1637, BA.
Chart #4: The SS-Police Command Structure

Reich Ministry — Chef d. Deutschen Polizei — Reichsführung-SS
          H. Himmler                           H. Himmler

                      Chef der Ordnungs-Polizei
                      A. Wunnenberg

                      Regular Police
                    Hauptamt (ORPO)

                    Höhere SS u. Polizeiführer
                    (HSSPf)

Höhere Polizei-Behorden — Befehlshaber of the Regular
                          Police (BdO)

National Police Administration — Local Police Authorities

Befehlshaber or Inspekteur der Sicherheitspolizei
u. des SD (BdS or IdS)

Regional Kripo, Gestapo, and SD Offices

Source: Finding Guide to the Records of the Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of German Police, German Military Records, NA.
Chart #5: An Example of Regional Werwolf Organization --
The Werwolf Staff of HSSPf Gutenberger (Wehrkreis VI)

Dienstelle Prützmann

HSSPf West
Karl Gutenberger

Werwolf Beauftragter
SS-Standf. Raddatz

Executive Training
and Organization
Obstlt. Neinhaus

Liason with
Army Group "B"

Werwolf
Training
Schools:
Lubbecke
and Schloss
Hülcrath

Administration
Ostuf. Haase

Personnel
Matters
Hptm. Hansen

Medical
Dr. Oster-
meyer

Transport
Hptm.
Schröder

Training
Officer
U/Stuf.
Wenzel

Werwolf
Gruppen

Chart #6: The SS-Jagdverbände

Schools:
- Neustrelitz
- Friedenthal
- Seehof
- Kuhhof
- Heinrichsberg
- Harzgebirge (Sig. Sch.)
- Kloster Tiefenthal
- Kileschnowitz

Central Staff
- Commander:
  - Ostubaf. Skorzeny
  - CoS: Stubaf. von Fölkersam (later O/Stubaf. Walter)
  - Location: Sachsenhausen

Flusskampf- schwimmer
- Location: Vienna
  - Dienstelle 2000
    - Location: Vienna

Kampfgeschwader 200
- Location: Gatow

Signal Unit

Supply Unit

Jagdverband Südost
- Location: Krems
- Commander: Benesch
- Composition: Volksdeutsch, Hungarian, Rumanian, Slovakian, Bulgarian

Jagdverband Ost
- Location: Hohensalzach
- Commander: Stubaf. Auch
- Composition: Volksdeutsch, Ukrainian, Finnish, Polish, Russian

Jagdverband Mitte
- Location: Friedenthal
- Commander: S/Stuf. Fucker
- Composition: German Volunteers

Jagdverband Nordwest
- Location: Neustrelitz
- Commander: H/Stuf. Heuer
- Composition: Flemish, Dutch, Danish

Jagdverband Südwest
- Location: K. Tiefenthal
- Commander: H/Stuf. Gerlach
- Composition: Belgian, French, Italian

Chart #7: Kampfgeschwader 200

Oberkommando der Luftwaffe

Luftflotte Reich

RSHA

Abwehr (until summer 1944)

Jagdverbände
Central Staff
(O/Stabaf. Skorzeny)

KG 200 HQ
Commander:
Oberst Heigl
(later Oberst Baumbach, then Major von Hernier)
Location: Gatow

No. 1 Group

No. 2 Group

No. 1 Staffel
Long Distance Staffel
(Outstations
"Olga"
"Carmen"
"Toska"
"Klara"

No. 2 Staffel
Short Range

No. 3 Staffel
Training

No. 4 Staffel
Technical

Chart #8: An Example of Regional Jagdverband Organization -- Jagdverband Südwest

W/T Unit

Commander: H/Stuf. Gerlach

Location: Tiefenthal

Jagdverband Südwest HQ

Army and Waffen-SS

Intelligence Officers

Kampfschule

---

HSSPf West

(Wehrkreise XII)

(Werwolf)

Jagdeinsatz

Nord

- Stein

- Pavel

- Weissenberger
  (later Weissenberger II)

- Berndt

- Well
  (later transferred to
  Jagdverband Nordwest)

Jagdverband Südwest

Jagdkommandos:

- Haase

- Hossfeld

- Perner

Jagdeinsatz

Süd

Jagdeinsatz

Italien

Jagdkommandos:

- Meyer

- Fischer

- Stiegler

- Kieswetter

- Solder

Unternehmen Reichstadt

(French Fascist Resistance Movement)

Unternehmen Moretti

(North Italian Fascist Resistance Movement)

Chart # 9: An Example of a German-Organized Resistance Movement -- The "Central Office for the Aktion in Rumania"

Rumanian "National Government"

Central Office for the Aktion in Rumania
Location: Vienna

Training Schools
(Intelligence, Communications, Special Service)

German Volksgruppe in Rumania

SD

Army Intelligence

Subsidiary Office for the Aktion in Rumania
Location: Budapest

Front Intelligence Group
Front Recruitment Group
Aktionsgruppe in Rumania

Intelligence Recruitment Organization

Source: "Organisationstand der Nationalen Rumänischen Regierung nach 6 wöchiger Tätigkeit", NS 19/2155, BA.
Chart #10: The Volkssturm

Reichsführer-SS and Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres
H. Himmler

training equipment, military matters

Chief der SS-Hauptamt 0/Gruf. Berger

Beauftragter für Bewaffnung und Ausrüstung des Deutschen Volkssturms

Chef des SA Stabschef Schepmann

Rifle Training

Korpsleiter des NSKK Korpsleiter Kraus

Mechanical Training

German Red Cross Hauptf. Dr. Hoth

Supplies

Reichsleiter DAF
Dr. Ley

Inspection Tours

Gauleiters and Reichsverteidigungskommissars

Leiter der Partei Kanzlei M. Bormann

administrative, political matters

Source: "Bezeichnung der Dienstellen des Deutschen Volkssturms", Records of the NSDAP, Microcopy #T-81, Roll 94, frames 107830-107832, NA.
BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

The primary source material collected for this study tends to fall into four basic categories: 1) original German documents pertaining to the Werwolf; 2) Allied intelligence summaries, many of which are based upon interrogations of captured Germans, or upon the broadcasts of Werwolf Sender; 3) straightforward interrogation reports; and 4) reminiscences of events during the dying days of the Third Reich, either gathered in the Ost Dokumente Collection at the Bundesarchiv, or included within published memoirs.

Original Werwolf material is, of course, the most valuable type of source, and also, unfortunately, the most rare. In this entire study, only several cited documents actually originated at Dienstelle Prützmann, most of them versions of the February 1945 order instructing various military commands to provide personnel for the Werwolf course at Heeresschule II. A note to Dienstelle Prützmann concerning the mining of Göring's east German estate is also cited, but aside from a few such documents, very few communications either to or from the Werwolf Command are available in the archives.

Most of the remaining German material comprises military, SS, or Nazi Party records touching upon the relationship of these groups with the Werwolf, or upon their own development of so-called "Werwolf" operations. Such Party records are in the German archives in Koblenz, while the SS and military material is available both in Germany and on National Archives microfilm. Also included within this sphere are several dozen Ultra intercepts -- German radio communications monitored and decoded by the Allies -- although the surviving texts of these messages are unfortunately not in the original German wording, but are paraphrased summaries prepared by Allied intelligence analysts. These too are available on microfilm. I also made some use of published diaries, particularly Goebbels' daily scribblings, which comprise one of the chief sources on Werwolf Sender and on Party policy vis-a-vis the guerrillas.

Such original German material, viewed in isolation, would have been very difficult to mold into any sort of comprehensible narrative. The glue which holds this study together is therefore derived from the second and third categories of sources, namely Allied intelligence records and interrogation summaries. This sort of information is not, of course, without its limitations. Allied intelligence reports dated prior to April 1945 are almost worthless as reliable sources on the Werwolf because they are based largely on hearsay or upon agent reports of dubious reliability. One major problem, for instance, was that during this period the SD deliberately disseminated fearsome reports about the Alpine Redoubt in order to panic the Allies into negotiations with Berlin, and these stories frequently turned up in Allied intelligence summaries. Such material has second hand value, however, as an indicator of
the sort of expectations and fears that Allied planning was based upon.

After late March, captured Werwölfe and, occasionally, captured documents, contributed to a radical improvement in the caliber of Allied reports. By 9 April, for instance, SHAEF could already produce a study called "The SS Guerrilla Movement", which was a fairly accurate appreciation of the entire Werwolf organization. The quality of such reports increased steadily over the next year, although one must keep in mind that the information provided by captured Germans was still filtered through the prejudices and perceptions of the Allied intelligence officers who authored these reports. The History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, also much used in this study, is similar both in its scope and its limitations. The documents which most reduce this evaluatory intervention are clear-cut interrogation summaries of such regional Werwolf and Jagdverband leaders as Karl Gutenberger, Ernst Wagner, or Hans Gerlach, although even these documents are outline summaries of the interrogations, rather than word for word transcripts.

It is also important to note that after the beginning of April 1945, the existence of the Werwolf became public knowledge because of the activities of the Königswüsterhausen transmitter, and that the best existing record of these broadcasts is in Allied monitoring reports. The PWE's evaluations of Werwolf Sender's output, presented in "German Propaganda and the German", are extensive, detailed, and include a considerable amount of quoted material.

Although most of these Allied intelligence reports and interrogation summaries are widely scattered throughout various War Office, FO, OSS, and State and War Department files, two particular clusters of information are worthy of note. One is a thick file designated "Werewolf Activities Vol. I", which is an American General Staff dossier formerly stored in Fort Meade as part of the Investigatory Records Repository (IRR), and presently available in the Modern Military Records section of the National Archives. This file includes numerous first rate reports gathered from a number of subsidiary sources. A somewhat similar consolidated file, 7P 125, sits in the French Military Archives in Vincennes, and covers the morale of the civil population in the French Occupation Zone, including detailed information on all sorts of Nazi resistance groups active in southwestern Germany and Voralberg.

Although intelligence summaries and interrogation reports provide the basic superstructure for this study, valuable supplementary material was also gathered from a fourth type of basic source, ie., the reminiscences of various Germans. Thousands of short reports written in the late 1940s and 1950s by eastern German refugees are collected in the Ost Dokumente file at the Bundesarchiv, most of which endlessly repeat the savage horrors experienced by these people at the hands of the Soviets and their allies. Several of these reports, however, also detail the construction of Werwolf
organizations or the presence of German guerrillas in enemy-occupied territory, although it must be recognized that there was a natural tendency for the authors to deemphasize anything which made their collective mistreatment seem at all warranted. It is also clear from these reports that the Soviets, Poles, and Czechs justified much of their own brutality through an alleged desire to stamp out the Werwolf.

Aside from the Ost Dokumente, several other published memoirs were also consulted, particularly works by Skorzeny. An important second hand memoir was Moczarski's Conversations with an Executioner, which detailed the jail cell confessions of Jürgen Stroop, former HSSPf and Werwolf overlord. These conversations, as recorded by Stroop's fellow prisoner, Moczarsci, complement Stroop's interrogation records in the National Archives.

Finally, brief mention must be made of secondary source material which proved a valuable asset to my research. German-language works by Arno Rose and Hellmuth Auerbach comprise the only existing studies covering the Werwolf movement as a whole, and the only sources toward which I could compare my own findings, while Charles Whiting's Hitler's Werewolves is the definitive study of Unternehmen Karnival, the assassination of the Oberbürgermeister of Aachen. Books by E.H. Cookridge and James Lucas also contain valuable chapters on the Werwolf, particularly Lucas' Kommando. A large number of Allied unit histories were also consulted, a few of which yielded important information on individual incidents of German guerrilla activity.
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