The London School of Economics and Political Science

Civil-Military Cooperation in the Canadian Army

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Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without the prior written consent of the author. I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party.
Abstract

The aim of my thesis is to explain why civil-military cooperation is practiced the way that it is by the Canadian Army. Civil-military cooperation (the practice by military forces of engaging with civilian actors in order to improve the relationship between the civilian populace and the military forces), largely in the form of relief and reconstruction activities, has come to be a hallmark of contemporary military interventions, both in war and peace support situations. My thesis looks at civil military cooperation as it is actually performed and includes not only an examination of doctrine, but also of practice.

In determining why civil-military cooperation is practiced in the way that it is, I use Clausewitz’s Trinity as the basis for my explanation. I focus on the secondary aspect of the Trinity; namely, its actors: the People, the Government, and the Military. By doing so, and including an analysis of the relationships between these actors, it is possible to see that civil-military cooperation is a product of the combination the people’s passion (which is ambivalent), the government’s direction (which is ambiguous), and the army’s skills (which they apply antagonistically). This resulting context is sufficiently indeterminate as to require significant interpretation on the part of those individuals conducting civil-military cooperation activities in the field. This runs counter to most established theories of civil military relations, which expect that government direction should determine military activity.
Acknowledgements

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Introduction:
The Politics of Civil-Military Cooperation

"We had the experience but missed the meaning, 
And approach to the meaning restores the experience 
In a different form..." T.S. Eliot, The Dry Salvages

"There is no irony," declared The Times editorial, "in the fact that those who are so supremely competent at war should also prove so adept at picking up the pieces after the conflict." Speaking of the efforts of the British army following the combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom (the U.S. led coalition’s intervention into and occupation of Iraq), the stoic editors captured, but failed to adequately resolve, the tension inherent in contemporary military ‘stability’ operations. There is something ironic in having soldiers act as peacebuilders, calling upon them to combine the management of violence with humanitarian relief, social development, and economic renewal.

An earlier war occasioned a similar juxtaposition. In 1999, during Operation Allied Force (NATO's bombing campaign over Serbia) Prime Minister Tony Blair visited the Alliance headquarters to see the staff and thank them for their efforts. He wanted to let the officers know that he appreciated not just “the military actions, but also the humanitarian work” that NATO was conducting in Kosovo, Serbia, and Albania. What an odd thing to say--the juxtaposition of high-level bombing and caring for refugees jangles our senses. How could the occasion arise whereby an organization designed with warfighting in mind, was not only carrying out so-called “humanitarian tasks”, but doing so while applying overwhelming and destructive military force at the same time?

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1 The Editor, “Paradox of Peace: The Army is an instrument of welfare as well as warfare,” The Times, 26 December 2003.
In Afghanistan, as a way of extending Western military control over the country, several Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have been established, each comprised of civilian development experts and military personnel. Jointly these professionals engage in a variety of activities, ranging from monitoring the security situation, to (re)building infrastructure, to advising on matters of governance and security sector reform. These civil-military teams are seen as a vital component of success within Afghanistan, achieving the dual aim of improving the situation of the local population, as well as overseeing and pacifying them. However, the controversy surrounding civil-military cooperation has reached new heights in Afghanistan. During the air campaign of early 2002, American forces were chastised for dropping food as well as ordnance; much of the food was unsuited to the needs of the Afghan population and the yellow colour of the packages could be confused with unexploded components from cluster bomb units (CBU), often with catastrophic results. Furthermore, in a press release explaining their withdrawal from Afghanistan, the international relief NGO Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) blamed US civil-military cooperation practices for an increase in the level of violence against aid workers in the country. American soldiers were operating out of white vehicles and wearing civilian clothes, distributing food and medicine. MSF believes they went beyond ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the Afghans, using aid as a lever to gain intelligence and cooperation in return for food.³ The military, according to MSF, endangered aid workers by confusing the distinction between humanitarian relief and more instrumental military activities.

This confusion of role has been felt not only by NGOs. In the Balkans, for instance, the military, “found themselves embroiled in activities—whether intentionally or otherwise—traditionally outside [their] remit.” A senior military officer frankly admitted “it is still difficult engaging with the staff of international organisations and NGOs...This is a two way problem.” On ‘both sides’ of the debate, practitioners and commentators were asking what role, if any, the ‘other’ should play in these complicated and overlapping missions. A review of some of the titles of recent articles reveals the extent to which civil-military cooperation is regarded as an uncomfortable practice, with observers remarking on its “impossible necessity,” likening it to “herding cats,” speaking of “uncertain partners” or “strange bedfellows,” and commenting on a relationship plagued by “cultural dissonance.” In sum, as Micheal Pugh notes, “the certainties of military and civilian roles...have become hazy.”

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5 Rollins, 128.


Key Terms and Concepts

Hazy or not, the performance or coordination of humanitarian or development related tasks by military personnel, known (within NATO countries at least) by the military term ‘civil-military cooperation’ (or CIMIC as it is abbreviated) is a characteristic of contemporary military operations. Civil-military cooperation can be defined as

all measures undertaken between commanders and national authorities, civil, military and para-military, which concern the relationship between military forces, the national governments and civil populations in an area where military forces are deployed or plan to be deployed, supported, or employed. Such measures would also include cooperation and co-ordination of activities between commanders and non-governmental or international agencies, organizations and authorities.13

I will use the term civil-military cooperation (and its acronym CIMIC), throughout this thesis because it is the current term of art, despite the fact that it is problematic for two important reasons. First, the term is a value laden one, in that it assumes a degree of cooperation or partnership that is by no means universally present. However, it is the term most used by the participants themselves, especially in military and government circles. Other authors have used other terms such as ‘civil-military interactions’ and ‘civil-military relations’.14 These terms eschew the normative assumptions of ‘civil-military cooperation’ but they are not widely known (not to mention recognized or adopted) by the military organizations conducting the activity in question.

13 Canada, Information Operations in Land Operations. B-GL-300-005/FP-001 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence): 55. I use a Canadian definition here because I intend to evaluate CIMIC practice as performed by the Canadian military.
Second, the term connotes collaboration or coordination of, not necessarily direct involvement in, a range of activities. This does not accord with the practice of contemporary civil-military cooperation. As Donna Winslow notes, “military mandates have become wider and more ambiguous and the tasks more multi-dimensional and multi-functional.”\textsuperscript{15} I intend to use civil-military cooperation in its widest possible sense, noting the term “all measures” in the definition provided above. Civil-military cooperation, then, describes those practices where elements of armed forces coordinate or engage with civilian entities, such as local authorities or other government agencies; non-governmental organizations, international/intergovernmental organizations; \textit{and} local populations. This practice takes place during some form of crisis situation, whether it be after a natural disaster, during or after a war, or, increasingly, during complex peace support and stability operations. It can take the form of contingency planning or the high level coordination of resources and objectives, but can also manifest itself as aid delivery or reconstruction activity by military forces, with or without the involvement of other agencies or organizations.\textsuperscript{16} Paradoxically, civil-military cooperation does not always involve cooperation at all.

It is important to note here that in order to understand the full dimension of civil-military cooperation it must be examined not merely as an idea, a theory or a doctrine, but rather as practice. Doctrine is important, of that there can be no doubt. As John Gooch rightly states, “doctrine is the bridge between thought and action. It interprets the higher conceptualization of war, embodied in strategic theories and operational plans,

\textsuperscript{15} Winslow, 113.
into working guidelines for action. In a word, doctrine articulates war."\(^\text{17}\) Christopher Lord further highlights the importance of doctrine by reminding us that “doctrine ideally combines experience...in a balanced and reasoned whole, in such a manner as to provide a framework of understanding...Military doctrine...is a curious hybrid of analysis and folk wisdom, tradition and careful innovation."\(^\text{18}\)

However, an investigation that looked solely at doctrine would only examine part of the picture. In terms of Gooch’s metaphor, by looking only at the bridge of doctrine, and not the abutments critical to its existence (namely thought and action), much would be lost. This is extremely important in an area where, as we shall see, doctrine is sparse—and not necessarily followed. Lord is correct when he states that ideally doctrine combines a number of important pieces of information. The reality can be far from ideal, however; doctrine is often unconnected from operational requirements and may not reflect ‘what actually happens’. As Dominick Donald helpfully points out “doctrine can only achieve so much; the best doctrine is of no use at all if soldiers, or their political masters, will not apply it.”\(^\text{19}\)

My focus, then, is on civil-military cooperation as practice, incorporating its ideas, its doctrine, and its actions. This reflects Iver Neumann’s assertion that examining only “textual approaches...brackets out the study of other kinds of action, and so cannot


account for social life understood as a whole.”

He continues by calling for International Relations scholars to examine “not just...narrative discourse and rhetoric, but how politics is actually effected...[This] must include the analysis of practice understood as the study of social action itself.”

One difficulty in presenting civil-military cooperation in an institutionalized form is that it connotes that it is a coherent, well-oiled set of practices. In fact, it is not, but rather depends on “the creativity and improvisational skills of its practitioners” for its success. Civil-military cooperation appears highly differentiated across national approaches and variable across the geographies in which it has been deployed. Observers speak of peacekeeping missions as being ad hoc affairs and comment on how different personalities and perspectives have enormous effect on the conduct and outcome of such practices. For example, in Somalia, the ham-fisted and unsuccessful efforts of the US Army can be contrasted with the nuanced, and consequently more harmonious, approach of the US Marine Corps. Stuart Gordon states that civil-military cooperation practices are “highly context dependent” and while there has been a move towards its institutionalization, it is at best incomplete:

[Western states] have begun the process of creating civil affairs-type capabilities that may, with time, enable a more structured, predictable, and enduring civil-

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21 Neumann, 628.
military relationship to be created...Nevertheless...this...relationship [between military forces and aid agencies]...is likely to continue to defy predictability.25

There is no single version that has been institutionalized, but rather several coexisting brands of civil-military cooperation, as James Landon illustrates in Figure 1.1 below.

Even in situations governed by a common mandate and, presumably, similar situational demands (e.g. the need to provide emergency shelter, the need to feed hungry populations, etc.) the existence of national perspectives lead to a host of different mission interpretations, and therefore, different civil-military cooperation practices.

Figure 1.1: National Perspectives and CIMIC Mission Interpretation26

![Figure 1.1: National Perspectives and CIMIC Mission Interpretation](image)

This is because civil-military cooperation is not simply motivated by an overarching globally connected master narrative (whether that is neo-liberalism or

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cosmopolitanism), nor is it an ‘objective’ response to situations on the ground. It is a reflection of the people who carry it out; civil-military cooperation is a based upon the norms and expectations of those who practice it. Not only of the actual soldiers but also of the collectivities (organizational, social, and political) in which they are embedded. Ignatieff insists “we are more interested in ourselves than we are in the places, like Bosnia, that we take up as causes.” Robert Cooper has stated that a country’s foreign policy needs to “get under the domestic skin” in order to be successful. In fact, this is only partially correct: foreign policies are born of the domestic flesh that makes up a country. If we believe that the same applies to military roles and missions, then this perspective can help clarify the ironic tension inherent in the notion of warfighters also being peacebuilders.

Seen in this light, military activity is a process, “a set of relationships [rather] than an individual event.” Even within the most hierarchical aspect of these relationships—the relationship between the government and the army—efficiency relies to a large degree on cooperation, bound up in “a complex interplay of societal, political and military interests, values, and expectations.” If military action results from a process of relations, and if that process is a dynamic and multi-faceted one, war cannot help but be affected. Clausewitz states that policy does not just initiate military action, but also “will...

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determine its character".  A contemporary example of this can be seen in the course of military operations in Bosnia. Despite desperate cries from journalists, analysts, commanders and diplomats on the ground, Western countries were loathe to do much, as Sarajevo was torn apart, and then enclave after enclave of Bosnian Muslims were attacked and, infamously in Srebrenica, slaughtered. The people of Europe and North America may have been transfixed by the nightly news, but their passions were not sufficiently aroused to call for an immediate, robust response. Instead, their cry was that ‘something must be done’. Following from this sentiment, but lacking any clear vision of what that something might look like, “the head-shaking and hand-wringing of politicians [was] eventually translated into military action.” Born of dithering, the military action that eventually took place bore the hallmarks of trepidation, caution, and failure to act. The people, the government, and the army all play a part in creating the type of ‘war’ that occurs, be it savage and brutal, or effete and ineffectual.

**Aim of the Thesis**

Civil-military cooperation embodies a vital contradiction. It is, by definition, something *odd*. This oddness is worthy of sustained study on several grounds, both practical (in terms of military and political ‘lessons learned,’ for example) and theoretical, but there are other worthy reasons as well. First, civil-military cooperation is a defining feature—perhaps even the defining feature—that marks the transition from peacekeeping to peace support operations and beyond. Second, civil-military cooperation

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33 Lord, 16.
is set to continue, perhaps even to intensify. As Max Boot, the American neo­
conservative thinker, writes in his history of ‘small wars,’ the 21st Century will be full of
“wars in which...soldiers act as ‘social workers.’”

Daniel Pipes, agrees, although appears to be more jejune in his appraisal: “Almost unnoticed, war as social work has
become the expectation.”

Whether or not one agrees with the principles behind or practice of civil-military cooperation, it is likely to be with us for some time, as it has been for centuries, albeit in different forms and under different names. As Hugo Slim reminds us “militaries and humanitarians have represented two sides of the same coin—humankind’s inability to manage conflict peacefully”; therefore, they find themselves thrust together, forced to work side by side.

At the same time, little has been written about civil-military cooperation from a theoretical perspective. As the review of literature (in Chapter 2) will illustrate, civil­
military cooperation is often subsumed under the rubric of peacekeeping or peace support operations, where it receives little sustained attention. There are exceptions to this rule (most notably by Michael Pugh and Larry Weiss) but these works have not tended to look at the internal dynamics of civil-military cooperation; that is, they have not focused on the ‘domestic arrangements’ that underpin and drive civil-military cooperation. In this thesis, I seek to interrogate those arrangements, and using a theoretical framework from

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36 Even the initial pessimism surrounding “humanitarian intervention” evident at the beginning of the Bush administration has begun to subside. No matter what they are labeled—stability operations is the latest moniker—it is likely that such interference and convergence is set to continue. See Sung-han Kim, “The End of Humanitarian Intervention?” Orbis. (Fall) 2003: 721-736.
classical ‘war studies’, explain how it is that civil-military cooperation has come to be the way that it is.

Furthermore, the existing theoretical work tends to examine civil-military cooperation in terms of its affect on NGOs and aid agencies, while most of the writing concentrating on the military settles for a ‘lessons learned’ (and therefore non-theoretical) format. I wish to bring some balance to the literature by concentrating on civil-military cooperation from the point of view of the military. This focus is warranted for several reasons. While I will demonstrate that the practice of civil-military cooperation is the product of a Trinitarian relationship within a given society, it is largely carried out by only one of those actors—the military. There are some indications that this may be beginning to change (with the advent of larger civilian components within Provincial Reconstruction Teams, for instance), but during the time period under examination in this study (that is, 1999-2007), civil-military cooperation is a military practice. My qualifying phrase “with a given society” above is also of importance. There are several perspectives from which one might examine civil-military cooperation, including that of the ‘beneficiary’ populations or implementing partners. These avenues of inquiry are legitimate and fascinating in their own right, and while there is much work to be done in these areas, they do not form the basis of this study. Other observers have done so (as discussed in Chapter 1) and I have done so elsewhere.\textsuperscript{38} Even in complex, multi-actor phenomena there can be value in an in-depth look at one actor’s motivations and

behaviours. Furthermore, while civil-military cooperation may connote a partnership, in many cases, especially early on in its application as a practice, it was almost completely the reserve of the military.

I may be looking at one actor, but I aim to do so in a theoretically robust fashion. Alex Bellamy asserts that the ‘next stage’ in peace operations theory must be normative, subjective, and reflexive. While I agree with the latter two premises, I do not recognise the dichotomy between instrumental and normative theory. The notion that policy relevance somehow hobbles theory is absurd; good policy can and should be informed by good theory. What must be done is to connect civil-military cooperation literature to wider theoretical knowledge without withdrawing completely from the policy world. After all, the problems that instrumental literature tries to address are serious challenges. Rather than relying on conventional wisdom, or ignoring problems altogether, it might be possible to create ideas, rich in theory and constructive in terms of practice. Rather than having to choose between the work of ‘doers’ and ‘thinkers’, I prefer Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin’s contention that there is a “continuing gap between the formal theories and

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39 For example, Mark Duffield looks at contemporary development practice, from the perspective of (mostly British) government aid agencies. For him, the recipients of the fruit these NGOs are not the primary focus and, therefore, receive little consideration. See Mark Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples. Cambridge: Polity, 2007.

40 In the Canadian case, for instance, in Bosnia during the period under review, the only Canadian aid agency representative in the country was attached to the Embassy in Sarajevo, far from the area of operations in the northeast where civil-military cooperation was taking place. Likewise in Kosovo in 1999: there was a Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) representative, located in Pristina, who departed once the Canadian military established an effective presence in the province. Similarly, in other missions, CIDA deployed very few staff to be involved with civil-military cooperation, preferring to see the military as an ‘implementing partner’. It is not really until the deployment of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan that civilian participation, at the government aid agency level, is formalized, and even then, it is dwarfed in size by the number of military personnel involved. While soldiers may well come in battalions, government aid workers do seem to come as single spies.

It is that gap that this thesis is attempting to bridge, albeit with specific regard to civil-military cooperation. I wish to avoid falling into the trap Pugh describes, that of taking my subject matter as given:

the received view of peacekeeping in global governance is not neutral but serves the purpose of an existing order within which problem solving adjustments can occur. The concentration...on ‘the doable’ and on ‘working with what we’ve got’ may yield important practical lessons, but the prevailing wisdom, and much of the dissent on the issue, does not interrogate the order itself and, by accepting it as “reality”, reinforces its underlying values and structures.43

However, I believe that it is still important to understand how and why ‘the prevailing wisdom’ has accepted anything as ‘reality’, and just how its ‘underlying values and structures’ are implicated. Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin hint at the importance of this by asking two questions with regard to their study of peacekeeping. Not only are they interested in determining “the chief characteristics of the contemporary political environment in which peacekeepers operate” they also wish to understand “how...peacekeepers [have] come to understand their role within it.”44 In order to do so, it is vital that the actors involved in civil-military cooperation are examined.

While Landon’s picture (Figure 1.1 above) may be worth a thousand words, it does not problematise the prism of ‘national perspectives’. To mix metaphors, Landon’s prism is a ‘black box’. A key aim of this thesis, then, is to explore one of those national perspectives and the corresponding rays of military practice. I want to look at this in a way similar to what Minear and Weiss describe as the politics of humanitarianism:

politics is the arena in which priorities are established, social contracts formed, participation and accountability nurtured. As the term “arena” suggests, politics is an ongoing struggle, within nations and between them. It commands

44 Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, p.1.
constituencies by virtue of the vision that it promotes. Whether an issue is a
domestic one such as abortion or an international one such as ethnic cleansing,
political courses of action reflect understandings of shared values and
responsibilities. The question is not, therefore, whether humanitarian and
political action intersect but rather how the interplay is understood and
managed.45

While I will not look at the politics behind interventions, but rather at how they are
conducted once they are underway, this political orientation remains central.46

Accordingly, the overarching question becomes, “Why is civil-military
cooperation practiced the way that it is?” This can be broken down to two related
questions:

1. How is civil-military cooperation conceived of within a state and did it come
to be understood this way?
2. How does the actual practice of civil-military cooperation change the way that
it is understood?

The thesis is an examination of the actors, rules, expectations, and identities involved in
the development and conduct of civil-military cooperation.

It is worthwhile to note that this thesis is not an examination of the effectiveness
of civil-military cooperation as a practice. It does not evaluate how well civil-military
cooperation actually delivers aid or improves the lives of the population or even if it
meets the objectives set out for it by the military commanders who carry it out. While

45 Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss, “Humanitarian Politics,” (Washington: Foreign Policy Association,
course there are many other politics at work here besides the domestic politics of intervening states,
including the political relationships between peacekeepers and the host nation, amongst regional actors, and
throughout the so-called international community. See Neil MacFarlane, “Politics and Humanitarian
Action,” Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute For International Studies And The United Nations University

46 An even more fundamental definition of politics can be said to be at work here, taken from the title of
Harold Lasswell’s classic, Politics: Who gets what, when, and how. (New York: Peter Smith Publishers,
1990).
this line of analysis is fascinating and important, it is not my aim at this stage.\textsuperscript{47} The reasoning for such delimitation is that prior to any form of measurement, it is important to come to grips with the way in which a practice has been conceived and understood. Based on such an understanding, a clearer picture of what can be expected and what can be measured would be possible, and indeed stand a better chance of capturing the relevant qualitative as well as quantitative aspects of evaluation.

In answering these questions I will use data that reflect civil-military cooperation journey through peacekeeping to stability operations, discussed above. The first case I will draw from will be the NATO mission to Kosovo, in 1999, known as the Kosovo Force (KFOR). Following immediately on the heels of the Allied air campaign against Yugoslav forces in the region, KFOR's early months were spent dealing with the return of refugees and other displaced people, as well as the chaos surrounding the flight of Serb officials who were largely responsible for providing official civil administration. Civil-military cooperation undertaken during the ground campaign that followed was initially very 'event driven' reacting to perceived emergencies, in the form of assessing the extent of the humanitarian situation and the provision of basic shelter before the arrival of winter. The second case looks at Bosnia in 2002, again concentrating on the NATO mission (known as the Stabilization Force or SFOR). By 2002 SFOR was a 'mature mission'; that is to say, it was not considered to be working in an emergency situation and was executing an elaborate, predetermined campaign plan. Civil-military cooperation still dealt with issues of humanitarian assistance, but for the most part its

\textsuperscript{47} Evaluations of this type are now starting to appear, albeit in different formats and focusing at the 'strategic level'. For one such study, which looks at the wider post-conflict reconstruction effort in Iraq, from an American perspective, see Stuart W. Bowen, Jr, \textit{Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience}. (Washington, DC: Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction, 2009).
focus was on more advanced forms of aid to the local communities, including community
reconstruction and rudimentary economic development. The final case is that of
Afghanistan, both under the aegis of the American-led Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF) in 2002 and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from
2003 onwards to 2007. Military activities in Afghanistan run the gamut from those
conducted on peacekeeping operations to combat tactics conducted as part of stability
operations. While I will use data from these cases, I will not be examining each case
individually, but will be drawing on them throughout the empirical sections of the thesis,
according to a theoretical framework (developed in Chapter 3).

So that the dynamics behind civil-military cooperation can be understood as
richly as possible, the thesis concentrates on one country: Canada. Such a focus allows
for the relevant domestic actors to be investigated comprehensively and their
relationships fully charted. I have chosen Canada for three main reasons. First, it is a
frequent participant in peacekeeping, PSOs, and stability operations. It has been involved
in all the cases listed above, and many more besides, ranging from traditional UN
missions in Cyprus, to more ambitious ventures in Cambodia and East Timor. Second,
the current literature is dominated by analyses of American, and to a lesser extent British,
civil-military cooperation practices. Canada provides a useful counterbalance to these
studies and my findings may be more applicable to other ‘middle’ powers involved in
civil-military cooperation (such as, say, the Netherlands, and the various Scandinavian
and Nordic countries). Third, owing to my own background and experience, I have
been able to secure access to documents and people within Canada that would be

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48 I am a Canadian citizen, and spent 12 years in the Canadian Forces as an infantry officer, from 1988 until
2000. While I took part in overseas peacekeeping and peace support missions (in Croatia 1992-1993 and
Kosovo 1999) I was not involved in the performance of CIMIC tasks.
extremely difficult to replicate in other countries. It is important to stress that this study is not comparative: it looks at a single country’s experience and does not relate it to that of others. While this ‘single country’ focus may limit the universal generalisability of my study, I believe this is more than made up for by the depth of the findings.\textsuperscript{49}

There is a correlation between the country in focus and the case selection. Quite independent of their wider geopolitical significance, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Afghanistan played important roles within Canadian political, social, and military spheres as well, particularly as it relates to civil-military cooperation. From a political perspective, Kosovo was seen—and portrayed to the public—as a ‘human security mission’: the military was there to rescue the Kosovar minority from Serbian oppression. For the military, Kosovo was envisioned primarily as a ‘peace enforcement mission’ and the contingent was designed with the possibility of combat (to push out the remaining Yugoslav forces, in accordance with the mission’s mandate). Civil-military cooperation was assigned to a company as a ‘be prepared’—that is, a secondary—task. However, from early on it became evident that civil-military cooperation (running the gamut from humanitarian relief to civil administration) was to become the main thrust of the battalion’s effort. For Canada, “Kosovo was very much a ‘come-as-you-are’ affair [and its] military forces were forced to conduct peacebuilding with their warfighting hats on.”\textsuperscript{50}

Bosnia, of course, was a mission that predated Kosovo. However, the period under study in this thesis, as mentioned above, is of NATO forces in a “mature mission”.

\textsuperscript{49} M. Williams calls this making “moderatum generalizations”. M. Williams, “Interpretivism and Generalisation” \textit{Sociology} 34.2 (2000): 215. I will comment on this more fully in the methodological appendix found at the end of this study.

Indeed, for Canada, the unit I visited represented the 15th ‘rotation’ into the theatre.

Quite differently from Kosovo, the Canadian battalion in Bosnia in 2003 was organized with civil-military cooperation staff in its headquarters and a forty soldier strong civil-military cooperation platoon, drawn from Reservists, deployed throughout the area of operations. This was, in fact, the first battalion to be so organized. Previously, within Bosnia (both under NATO and United Nations auspices) and even in Croatia (in 1992-1993), civil-military cooperation was not conducted by specially designated troops, but rather as a either a ‘secondary task’ (assigned to a rarely used sub-sub-unit such as an anti-tank platoon) or just a task that ‘everyone’ was expected to carry out.

Afghanistan represents a step change in importance from Canada’s Balkan involvement, but can be seen as a ‘step backwards’ in some respects, at least initially, as far as civil-military cooperation is concerned. Largely viewed in terms of Canadian-American relations following September 11th, 2001, the various missions to Afghanistan (from 2002 to 2007) carried out civil-military cooperation in a variety of ways: in 2002, the battalion deployed with only a single, untrained civil-military cooperation officer. Over the course of the six-month mission, conducted under American command, the realization of the need for civil-military cooperation led to an innovative approach. After that initial deployment, Canada deployed a variety of civil-military cooperation structures, from ‘cells’ within battalions to Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

Outline of the Thesis

This introduction has situated civil-military cooperation by illustrating the characteristics of peace support operations and how civil-military cooperation fits into

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that framework. It has introduced the key terms and concepts that will be relevant throughout the study, and identified the thrust of the thesis (namely, the politics of civil-military cooperation).

Chapter Two is a review of the literature surrounding civil-military cooperation, including scholarship not only on peacekeeping and peace-support operations, but on civil-military relations and military doctrine. One of the most important findings coming out of this chapter is that no model current exists that incorporates the key actors, their shared context, and the relationship between them.

Chapter Three traces the construction of such a model, based on Clausewitz's 'secondary trinity': people, government, and the armed forces. To this construct is added Peter Katzenstein's regard for the culture of national security and Gwyn Harries-Jenkins' appreciation for legitimacy and Benjamin Gregg's understanding of indeterminacy. The resulting comprehensive model allows for the politics of civil-military cooperation to better understood.

The next three chapters (Chapters Four, Five, and Six) form the empirical heart of the thesis. In accordance with the theoretical model developed in Chapter Three, they look at the contribution of the people, the government, and the armed forces (respectively), in the context of shaping civil-military cooperation as a practice. Each chapter begins with a brief description of the constituent elements of the actor in question, and proceeds to map out the ways in which each actor contributes to the practice of civil-military cooperation.

Chapter Seven is concerned with the synthesis of the findings from the preceding analysis. In so doing, it paints the full picture of how the elements of Clausewitz's trinity
interact to shape military practice. Chapter Eight concludes by evaluating the impact of this interaction—the true politics of civil-military cooperation—both in policy and theoretical terms, for Canada and other states.
Chapter 1:

Missing Pieces: The State of the Literature

It is possible to write in a variety of styles, some of which rely on a manipulation of grammar for their effect. Take three examples. First, if a writer leaves out the active subject of a sentence, that sentence is said to be written in the ‘passive voice’ (or, as it is increasingly known, the ‘bureaucratic voice’). Things happen, but it is not clear how. The focus is on completed action and ultimate effect rather than on any actor. This style has the effect of creating an atmosphere devoid of responsibility; when a child explains ‘the window got broken,’ it begs the question ‘who broke it?’ Ernest Hemmingway provides a second example of a literary style; he was famous for his simplified writing, noted for its lack of adjectives and adverbs. The result is terse and abrupt prose, one where the characters’ context (the extent of their relationship, for example) is often implicit or assumed. The focus is on the character (Nick Adams, say) rather than his history. This gives the reader the strange feeling of eavesdropping on a conversation and not being quite ‘up to speed’ with what is being said. The novel *Le Train de Nulle Part* provides the third example: is written entirely without verbs—description *par excellence*. The common critical complaint is predictable: not enough action. Its pseudonymous author, Michel Thaler, is not unaware of this effect, claiming, “I am like a car driver who has smashed the windscreen so he cannot see into the future, smashed the rear-view mirror so he cannot see the past, and is travelling in the present.” Each of these styles can be mobilised by artistically eliminating some degree of grammatical pleonasm or other (Thaler regards verbs as weeds, and Hemmingway notoriously declared war on

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adjectives) in order to create a desired poetic effect. However, none of them would be suited to a holistic explanation of complex social phenomena. Yet, it is if the body of literature surrounding and concerning civil-military cooperation were afflicted with each of these styles to some degree. Much of the field concentrates on structural explanations for actions, ignoring the variety of actors involved. Other parts of the literature focus on the actors, but give no attention to the context surrounding them. Moreover, there are many authors who describe civil-military cooperation as if it were a set of static relationships, with no indication of those relationships changing or evolving.

The challenge, then, is to create a theoretical framework that can encompass all the necessary components required of a holistic analysis of the complex set of practices that is civil-military cooperation, one that accommodates actors, their dynamic relationships and their context. This chapter will explore the existing literature surrounding civil-military cooperation, highlighting both its strengths and its weaknesses, concluding with a set of criteria upon which a successful theoretical framework can be based, with a view to using this framework to understand the main research question of this study, “Why is civil-military cooperation practiced the way that it is?”

**Instrumental and Normative Perspectives**

The salience of civil-military cooperation may have increased over the course of the last decade and a half, but the amount written about it has not followed the same trend. What little literature there is “has been determined by problem solving imperatives, concerning the diplomatic politics and techniques of peacekeeping, lessons-learned from operations and prescriptive analysis for improving performance in these
areas."\textsuperscript{53} Accordingly, a common refrain within the literature is to claim that peacekeeping has been approached atheoretically.\textsuperscript{54} Such an observation, however, is not to deny that instrumental literature is important and well intentioned; at the very least it illustrates the attention that scholars and practitioners have paid the topic. And it is practitioners (or those who write with practitioners in mind) that have produced a good portion of the literature. They range from military planners,\textsuperscript{55} doctrine writers,\textsuperscript{56} and civil-military cooperation operatives\textsuperscript{57} to NGO-oriented researchers.\textsuperscript{58} These writings concentrate on the relationship between military forces and civilian organizations involved in civil-military cooperation activities, or investigate the procedural, organisational and logistical obstacles or mistakes that have arisen in the course of civil-military cooperation experiences, in search of the ever elusive ‘lessons’ that may be identified and hopefully learned so that future occasions may occur more smoothly. As Chris Seiple notes, for instance, his work “is written...from the point of view of those who operate at ground level, where, no matter the official positions of governments organizations, a working policy must be developed which ‘works.’”\textsuperscript{59}

Some scholars criticise this approach because they believe it to be “self-referential”; that is “it takes peacekeeping activities as its starting point and asks how

they can be done better” rather than questioning whether they should be done at all.  

This is not surprising, given the aim of the writing or the background of the writers.

From a practitioner’s point of view, improving practice is a perfectly legitimate outcome of analysis. However, by focusing on effectiveness and efficiency, this body of work tends to ignore fundamental issues. As Alex Bellamy notes:

instrumental approaches are predicated on significant normative assumptions that are left unexplored. They are: international peace and security is a moral good in itself; violent conflict represents a ‘breakdown’ of normal social relations; the great majority of people prefer peace to war and need only be represented with ‘paths’ to peace; there is a direct link between international peace and good governance at the domestic level; and ‘good’ governance equates to Western-style statehood, democratization, neo-liberal economics and the existence of an active civil society.

Agreeing with Bellamy’s assessment of the implicit assumptions, Beth Fetherston goes so far as to claim that all peacekeeping theory is bound up within the “unproblematized discourse of modernity.” That is to say, it is concerned with the notion of solving problems in the name of effecting progress. There certainly is evidence of the normative agenda being either neglected or pushed aside in much of the civil-military cooperation literature. Peter Erickson is typical of this seemingly pragmatic attitude; his article stems from the ‘fact’ that a joint civilian and military approach is required in order to achieve success in contemporary peace support operations, and therefore, progress should be made in making the system work more efficiently.

61 Bellamy, 19.
However, much instrumental writing *does* establish its normative perspective (if not its agenda). Nick Spence is quite clear in the opening section of his article on civil-military cooperation; he believes that old approaches are no longer workable, and that new techniques are necessary:

> the scale and nature of the challenges in contemporary operations are such that no single component has the wherewithal to address completely the root causes, thereby enabling longer-term socio-political transition to a stable and self-sustaining environment and resolution of the crisis. Complex crises are fundamentally political. The deployment of a security force to address an unresolved conflict and the employment of humanitarian organisations to relieve suffering are, by themselves merely anaesthetizing a dynamic situation and preventing it from reaching its culminating point; at best they provide an enforced ‘negative peace’. Unless the symptoms, causes and underlying dynamics of the situation are addressed then its resolution will never progress beyond prolonged containment.64

Spence may not label it as such, but he is laying out an unmistakable liberal understanding of conflict. It goes well beyond a simple ‘peace as the absence of direct system-level violence’ orientation, and advocates intrusive means of conflict resolution. Therefore, to characterise all instrumental literature as mere tinkering would be inaccurate. Many authors in this school would be quite happy to have peacekeeping (and its constitutive practices such as civil-military cooperation) radically changed, rather than merely modified or improved. An example of authors who believe in large scale change, but not in the same direction as Spence, can be seen in the work of Jane Barry and Anna Jefferys who, for instance, believe that there must be a limit to the close contact between military forces and civilian development agencies and although they do not explicitly lay out a normative manifesto, make it perfectly clear what their idea of an ideal situation looks like.65 Andrew Terrell, on the other hand, proceeds from an equally lucid

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64 Spence, 165-166.
65 Barry and Jefferys, 1-3.
normative point of origin; he believes that civil-military cooperation should be less collaborative and more directive—with the military fully in control—changing it from cooperation to coordination. Bellamy may be correct in stating that such writing does not explicitly lay out its normative standpoint, but it cannot be denied that authors that advocate ‘improvements’ to civil-military cooperation often do so from distinct normative positions. It is not necessarily the case that these writers have not considered such arguments, just that they do not state them unambiguously. However, in terms of the literary images at the beginning of this chapter, the instrumentalists are the most Hemmingway-like in their writing, tending to ‘leave out’ much of the context in their stories.

Roland Paris, another critic of the instrumentalist camp, believes that the implicit liberal agenda underpinning much of what has been written in the instrumental vein is only part of the problem. Because “the literature...is too limited in the scope of its inquiry and devotes too much attention to ‘policy relevance,’ or the goal of offering advice and recommendations to decisionmakers” it has become “cut off from the rest of political science.” His assessments are accurate and applicable to civil-military cooperation literature. Much of the work in the field does tend to be incremental and devoid of any theoretical influence, often informed instead by ‘common sense’ and personal experience. The problem may not be a focus on existing ‘problems’ or the lack

of an explicit normative agenda, but that the extant (and implicit) normative agenda “silences other possibilities.”

**Systemic and Domestic Accounts**

Because of the dominance of ‘common sense’ approaches, it is not surprising that the most visible emerging trend in the theoretical literature is to ascribe to a ‘critical theory’ perspective, which has tended to explain civil-military in terms of the larger phenomena of globalisation or global governance. As alluded to above, Paris sees contemporary peacebuilding as a modern day *mission civilatrice*, whereby Western states take it upon themselves to bring failed states back into line—with the tenets of liberalism defining both the ends and the means of the process. Mark Duffield connects civil-military cooperation to the convergence of security and development, as a result of an increasingly globalised economy, where the West cannot ‘afford’ some conflicts. As a result, “strategic complexes” are formed, made up of a variety of actors, which are in essence nothing more than instruments of the Western states. Rather than accept the implicit liberal agenda (as described by Spence and Bellamy above) these authors question and problematise the assumptions that underpin practices like civil-military cooperation, putting them into the context of larger transnational or global processes.

Neorealists, such as Barry R. Posen, argue that the nature of the international system determines military doctrine. Posen argues that military doctrine is “a state’s theory about how to it can best ‘cause’ security for itself” and is created “given an anarchical international environment [within which] the number of possible threats is

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68 Fetherston, 190.
great...Because [national] resources are scarce, the most appropriate military means should be selected to achieve the political ends in view. Military doctrine, then is a matter of evaluating external threats, determining political ends, and allocating resources, or means, in the best way possible in order to meet those ends, in light of the given threats. In the course of this development, "priorities must be set". States will act in accordance with this formula, or at least they should: the winners will be the ones who manage to do it most effectively, and the losers will be the ones who made the most mistakes along the way. To Posen and other neorealists, there is no need to problematise how those threats are perceived, how the ends are determined, or how those priorities are to be set. The answer to these how questions are not provided for in neorealist theory, but are critical factors in explaining differences in military practices across national and cultural boundaries, as well as consistencies in military practices over time, even as the international environment changes.

The realist contention, based on Thucydides's *Melian Dialogue*, is that "The strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept" often advanced as an explanation for what military practices states adopt, is equally unhelpful. In particular, it does not explain what 'weak' actors do. The range of options left open to them, even if constrained by their material 'power', cannot be determined solely by reference to their environment. Such a perspective can explain why

72 Posen, 13.
74 Consider this statement by Paul Kennedy: "No doubt it is theoretically possible for a small nation to develop a grand strategy, but the latter term is generally understood to imply the endeavours of a power with extensive (i.e. not just local) interest and obligations, to reconcile its means and its ends." Paul Kennedy, *Grand Strategies in War and Peace* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991): 6, fn 18.
Austria, for example, accepted neutrality in 1955, but it does not explain why they chose to send troops to take part in the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). States, strong or weak, can chose—even is only within constraints—to do a lot, or a little. Why they chose to do so lies within themselves. The relevant components of a state must be examined if any sense is to be made of the resultant military practice, especially when looking at specific military practices, such as civil-military cooperation, which is not aimed at guaranteeing state survival. Realist and Neorealist theory, “is...intentionally bereft of any detailed analysis of the domestic characteristics of states, such as culture, ideology, and political institutions. These characteristics are only considered in terms of how they enhance or diminish the power of the state in the international arena (but state behaviour in general will be unaffected in the long term).”

It is possible to see a softening of this position. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, Posen warned, “if the United States is to sustain both public and international support for the war on terrorism, it will need to resolve long-delayed questions about its future foreign and security policy through an extended discussion involving policymakers, policy analysts, and the American people.” Whereas Posen originally spoke of the need for a military doctrine to be appropriate, he referred to its suitability to “cause” security in light of the threats posed by and in the international environment. In his later work, he appears to be saying that military doctrine must be appropriate domestically as well. The international system is, therefore, not the sole determinate of national policies, even for powerful states.

It would seem that something akin to a “normative shift” has occurred. Cora Bell claims that in such a shift we are witnessing “the social process of changing domestic or international rules about what is deemed acceptable or unacceptable behaviour” and that since the end of the Cold War this “has been a factor in decisions ranging right up to military action, and even the form such action has taken.” Bell believes that this shift has been away from “realist/nationalist norms to alternatives that may be in part called “cosmopolitan.” Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin pick up on this tendency towards cosmopolitanism, but caution that it is not quite a full-blown shift as yet. Indeed, they claim that peacekeeping is caught in a conceptual tussle “between those who see [its] role in global politics in Westphalian terms and those who see it in more ambitious, post-Westphalian terms.” They explain that post-Westphalian peacekeeping is predicated on the understanding that “threats to international peace and security are not limited to acts of aggression between states but may also result from violent conflict and illiberal governance within them.”

Therefore, for those like Jurgen Habermas, contemporary peace support operations are a form of “cosmopolitan law enforcement” which aims to ‘get at’ matters internal to states and ‘correct’ them, for the benefit of all concerned. Although Habermas considers this kind of approach to be a positive step, others who share his police imagery are less accepting. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri also

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79 Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, 1.
80 Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, 2.
81 Jurgen Habermas. “Bestiality and Humanity: A War on the Border between Law and Morality,” in William Joseph Buckley, ed. Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions (Grand Rapids, MI: William E. Eerdmans, 2000):313, cited in Bellamy, p. 25. It is interesting to note that domestic policing has undergone a similar ‘normative shift’ over the past thirty years. Issues which were once considered private matters and therefore not police business (such as domestic violence) are now clearly ‘fair game’ for police officers in many parts of the world. As such, policing has moved from a reactive ‘arrest criminals’ stance to an active ‘prevent crime’ stance. See, for example, Alysia W. Tate, “Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy,” The Chicago Reporter. Jan 2004. [online edition].
use a policing metaphor in their work, but characterise what is happening not so much as a desirable normative shift but as a continuation—perhaps an acceleration—of hegemonic practices already embedded in international relations. Michael Pugh, for one, is sceptical of the extent to which a cosmopolitan project can be achieved through practices such as civil-military cooperation. Indeed, he regards what he perceives to be the institutionalisation of civil-military cooperation as having “given military organizations a new authority and voice.” Civil-military cooperation, then, is characteristically hegemonic, rather than emancipatory, and is conducted as a “substitute” for more intense military action (in the form of actually protecting civilian populations); as a means of “filling a gap” left because of the chronic underinvestment in other aid delivery organisations; and/or because militaries recognise that they must “create a role” for themselves in the absence of any traditional, conventional threat.

The problem common to all structural approaches (whether they are realist or cosmopolitan or in between) is that they do not explain how the structural processes come to be established. Jim Whitman’s comments on the wider global governance literature are appropriate here: there is a “conspicuous absence of considerations of agency.” In essence, purely structural accounts are all process and no actor. Recalling the grammatical models described above, these writers are essentially writing in the passive voice. While the structural level of analysis cannot be completely discounted, it cannot

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84 Pugh, Civil-Military Relations, 231-238.
become understood as necessarily deterministic. Structures and processes are constructed by actors, who are in turn influenced and constituted by their very creations. To explain a complex phenomenon such as the rise of civil-military cooperation through a structural explanation alone is insufficient. It is necessary to take structural factors (e.g. systemic trends, transnational/global phenomenon, etc.) into account but these factors must connect in some way to actors (whether these actors are people, NGOs, or states) and therefore, into what is regarded as the domestic environment. If civil-military cooperation is a bid towards hegemony, we are left to ask how that has become the case, and if it is the case, from whence did the notion of hegemonic desire arise? We must interrogate not only the ‘what’ but also the ‘who’, the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ of civil-military cooperation. To do otherwise is to eschew issues of responsibility.

If we turn to examine domestic factors in order to understand the source and nature of military practice, we find several explanatory possibilities. John Gooch, a historian of military doctrine, believes that it is a “cocktail” whose “ingredients, which combine together differently in each and every case, include: the nature of weapons technology; the influence of formative experiences; organisational and institutional interests; ideology; national culture; [and] the political/strategic situation.” While this may be a comprehensive description, the manner in which the cocktail is distilled and mixed is left unexplored.

87 Whitman does not use the word responsibility, but rather he identifies the problem of much of the global governance literature as one of avoiding issues of accountability. Whitman, Global Governance, 50-54.
There have been attempts to explain civil-military cooperation by looking at specific actors. Robert DiPrizio in his study of American humanitarian interventions in the 1990s, puts forward what he calls “a theory of ‘presidential discretion’”. That is, a sitting president has much leeway in responding to humanitarian crises and is not tethered by the media, public opinion, Congress, or the Pentagon as many people think.”⁸⁹ I agree that individuals have a significant impact on the process of formulating and executing military practice. The very human elements of creativity, enthusiasm, confusion and fallibility are at play in social life. This perspective—one of individual prerogative—supported by the findings of several cases, might be compelling on its own, save for the rejoinder added by DiPrizio himself: “In the end, the context matters very much.”⁹⁰ What that context is and how it affects the decision-maker, are left unexamined in DiPrizio’s work. I agree that the context matters very much, and that is why it is critical to evaluate it, systematically.

There are other problems with DiPrizio’s work with regards to its applicability to this study. The particular aspects of the US political system, with its strong executive role, stark two party political spectrum, and its pervasive ‘checks and balances’, not to mention its unequalled hegemonic status (at least in terms of military power) make it in many ways a sui generis case that is non-generalisable, and DiPrizio wisely makes no attempts to do so. Furthermore, perhaps partly because of American relative political and military strength, DiPrizio dismisses any consideration of the international system in his analysis. Finally, DiPrizio concentrates on the decisions to intervene in humanitarian

⁹⁰ DiPrizio, xii.
crises, rather than on the conduct of military forces once committed, and therefore sheds little light into how any actors other than the executive elite think or act.

Theo Farrell suggests an approach that takes both the international and the domestic level into account with his concept of “transnational institutionalism”. While not focusing on civil-military cooperation or peace support operations, he introduces the idea that national (military) actors are influenced by developments in transnational ideas and trends, but that in order to understand the effect of these ideas, it is necessary to analyse the domestic actor and its environment. What matters is not only the systemic level, but the institutional arrangements and cultures at play within the state or organisation in question. Put another way, global trends are what actors make of them, and what they make of them is related to a complex set of relationships that surround the actors (both in terms of domestic space and history). Farrell’s contribution is suggestive of a constructivist (or at least sociological) approach to the study of civil-military cooperation, and we will return to that later in this chapter. For the moment, Farrell’s argument reminds us that actors matter and that they need to be investigated in order to make sense of global trends.

Looking more closely at civil-military cooperation as a practice involving agents, rather than solely as a constituent part of a larger global process, we can see that there are several ways in which to proceed, each of them valid, with each one facilitating a different understanding of the issue. Pugh suggests that “civil-military relations in peace support operations can be represented in several dimensions: relations between external military forces and internal civilian authorities or society; between internal regular or

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irregular forces and external civilian agencies; and between the external military and
civilian components of interventions" where internal refers to that which belongs to the
host/target/victim/beneficiary of international intervention, and external refers to
everything else. Following this schema, most scholars focus on last category—external
military forces and external civilian components—mostly in the shape of Western armed
forces and international NGOs or IOs. Exceptions to this pattern are rare; Fitz-Gerald’s
work on the relationship between multinational peace support forces and host societies
(in Pugh’s typology, external forces and internal societies) stands out.

While not commenting on civil-military cooperation directly, some observers do
focus on the importance of the domestic context in shaping military policy. Douglas
Bland and Sean Maloney contend that

Security and defence policies, like charity, begin at home. Sets of decisions
reflected in these policies originate in what citizens, political leaders, and military
officers think about such things as national interests, national security, wars,
allies, armed forces and society, and civil-military relations. More often than
‘rational managers’ would have us believe, people’s thoughts on security and
defence are shaped by what they think has gone before, by popular explanations
of national experiences and by national myths.

92 Michael Pugh, “Civil-Military Relations in International Peace Operations,” in Kurt R. Spillman,
Thomas Bernauer, Jürg M. Gabriel, Andreas Wenger, eds. Peace Support Operations: Lessons Learned
and Future Perspectives. (Bern: Peter Lang, 2001): 1
93 For instance, see Seiple (note 7), Eriksson (note 11), Barry and Jeffreys (note 13), Terrell (note 14), as
well as many authors discussed in the introductory chapter of this volume, such as D.L. Byman, “Uncertain
Partners: NGOs and the Military,” Survival. 43(2) 2001: 97-114; J.H. Eisenhour and E. Marks, “Herding
cats: overcoming obstacles in civil-military operations,” Joint Force Quarterly. Summer 1999: 86-90; and
Larry Gardenker and Thomas Weiss, eds. Soldiers, Peacekeepers and Disasters. London: Macmillan,
94 Ann Fitz-Gerald, “Examining the Local Impact of ‘Multinational Responses’ in Multinational Peace
University, 2001.
95 Douglas L. Bland and Sean M. Maloney, Campaigns for International Security: Canada’s Defence
I contend that this paragraph accurately and concisely explains how defence policy, and military practice, come to pass. Bland and Maloney further point out that, contrary to the notion that a single ‘rational actor’ makes policies, that

policy is found more often that it is made...defence policy reflects a consensus arrived at through some process of informal bargaining around ideas among prominent authorities inside and outside the defence establishment. The policy process, therefore, is best seen as a mechanism, both formal and informal, through which ideas are expressed by society, politicians, opinion-makers, military leaders, government officials, allies, and even opponents and then weighed against other ideas and assessed in the light of the ‘facts of national life’.96

Again, the notion that ‘context matters’ is clearly articulated, as indicated by the need for any policy to be assessed against a set of ‘facts of national life’.

As much as I am sympathetic to the thrust of their work, I believe Bland and Maloney stumble in two key areas with regard to the context surrounding defence policy formulation (a key source in the development of military practice). First, while they acknowledge its importance, they do not examine the manner in which these ideas, thoughts, and myths influence decision-makers. In the penultimate line of one chapter they state “people of authority acting on ideas and perceptions they support are the critical component of this process, but they are ultimately inseparably intertwined with the structures that turn their ideas and perceptions into concrete results.”97 They do not go further and interrogate this ‘intertwining’.

Second, they seem to lament the fact that ‘ideas matter’, decrying the presence of myths as some how ‘clouding’ judgements. Ideas may be a starting point, but are watered down along the way to becoming policy. This they call the ‘pragmatic

96 Bland and Maloney, 58.
97 Bland and Maloney, 58.
approach’, as opposed to a more ideational, but less realistic ‘normative approach’. Furthermore, as indicated in the passage above, they concentrate on the role of ‘prominent authorities’ that make decisions based on perceptions and only after negotiations. They tend to assign other actors (such as the media and the public) the role of ‘dangerously misguided’ fools, confused by national myths, adding nothing more than fuzzy externalities to the decision making process. There is a reality out there, but decision-makers are prevented from acting on it. Consensus, therefore, is nothing more than ‘whatever the market will bear.’ Essentially, they wish that defence policy making (in Canada, at least) were more rational, itself an inherently normative argument.

What is missing, then, is the possibility of examining the relationship between those military forces carrying out civil-military cooperation practices and their parent governments and societies; in other words, a missing ‘external-external’ variation in Pugh’s schema. In order to do so, we can turn to the academic field of Civil-Military Relations, which deals with this dimension as its focus.

**Civil-Military Cooperation as Civil-Military Relations**

Civil Military Relations is an appropriate body of theory to use in examining civil-military cooperation, because as, James Burk states, its “empirical domain...is large. It includes direct and indirect dealings that ordinary people and institutions have with the

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98 Bland and Maloney, 54.

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military, legislative haggling over funding, regulation, and use of the military, and complex bargaining between civilian and military elites to define and implement national security policy."Civil Military Relations is the study of armed forces and society and provides a theoretical guide for investigating Pugh's missing 'external-external' category. That being said, however, Civil Military Relations as a field is not without its problems, which must be appreciated and compensated for if it is to be adequate for the purposes of explaining civil-military cooperation. Not unlike peacekeeping literature, it tends to be undertheorised; to be more correct, it is dominated by a few theories which are rarely questioned. Most importantly for our purposes Civil Military Cooperation can be said to suffer from three major flaws. First, it makes too much of the difference between military and civilian activity. In 1767, the Scottish Enlightenment scholar Adam Ferguson wrote in his *Essay on Civil Society* that modern states rely upon the separation of the political sphere from the military sphere. Indeed, Ferguson's neologism 'civil society' was meant to distinguish it from a 'martial' one. In achieving this separation, societies benefited from the particular specialisation achieved in each sphere. Freed from having to be a leader on and off the battlefield, the head of the state was able to concentrate on affairs of state, which included, but were not at all limited too, matters of defence. Equally free from martial concerns was the merchant; through the establishment of what would come to be called a professional military class, those not called to the

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102 Adam Ferguson. An Essay on Civil Society. 1767. [http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3113/ferguson/civil.html; accessed 1 Feb 2003]. See also John Gooch, *Armies in Europe*. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980). This separation, it is argued, is a particularly Western development. Furthermore, even within European militaries, it tended to occur within armies (as opposed to navies) fighting in "paradigmatic conflict" in Europe (as opposed to European forces fighting in India or other "peripheral geographies"). See Jeremy Black, *War: Past, Present, and Future*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000): 61.
colours are able to focus on making money and generating economic growth. The most crystalline manifestation of this thinking would come from Frederick the Great: he “wanted to fight [his] wars without the peasant behind his plow [sic] and the townsman in his shop even being aware of them.”\textsuperscript{103} Militaries are separate, and should be separate, from ‘normal’ social and political discourse.\textsuperscript{104}

Much Civil Military Relations literature takes this division as given, and is occupied with the implications of it. Bland, for instance, claims that there are “four problems of Civil-Military Relations”: the “praetorian problem” (fear of military takeover); problems of good order and discipline (making sure that the military does as it told); problems which require protecting the military from political interference; and problems in relating expert military advise to generalist political decisionmakers.\textsuperscript{105} Bland exaggerates to a certain extent: there are many studies that challenge the strict divide between the military and the rest of society, but even in doing so, they proceed from the premise that militaries are ‘not quite like’ the rest of us. If the relationship were to be drawn as a Venn diagram, there would be two circles, one for the military and one for the rest of society. Scholars might disagree as to the amount of overlap between the circles, but the two circles would remain separate to some degree. Drawing on this idea of separation, Civil Military Relations authors, like Samuel Huntington and Samuel Finer\textsuperscript{106}, see the military as being ‘functionally differentiated’ from other elements of society and the state. The military’s job, in the colloquialism of the U.S. Army, is to fight


\textsuperscript{104} See, for example, Martin Edmonds. \textit{Armed Forces and Society.} (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988): esp. 131.

\textsuperscript{105} Bland, A Unified Theory, 12-13.

and win the nation’s wars. As such, Civil Military Relations focuses on dramatic events, such as wars, coups, and epic struggles between politicians and generals.

While there are authors who examine Civil Military Relations in peacetime contexts, they tend to do so with an air of disdain, as if peace support operations are a distraction, a diversion from the true nature of military business. Sam Sarkesian and Robert Connor, for instance, seem troubled by contemporary events:

The US military faces challenging and troubling issues. The strategic landscape remains unsettled, American society is changing, military contingencies have become embroiled in what many call non-traditional missions, while the military is struggling to respond to a variety of internal travails…All of this is taking place as budgetary restraints and social expectations seem to dominate the political landscape. Thus, the…military faces a dilemma: how to respond to the uncertainties of the new domestic and strategic landscapes, nurture the proper relationship with society, and yet retain its raison d’etre.107

As mentioned above, while an explicit normative agenda may not be present, it is clear where the authors stand on this issue. Militaries should not be constrained by “social expectations”; if they are, it will detract from their ability to carry out their ‘core competencies’. Although they concede that some form of “proper relationship” needs to be developed with the rest of society, the reader is not left with the impression that this will be an easy task. As if to leave no doubt where they stand, Sarkesian and Connor added this biblical verse to the frontpiece of their book:

For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to battle? I Corinthians 14,8

The notion of separation is of critical importance to the study of civil-military cooperation, because, as a practice, civil-military cooperation breaks down the barrier between military and other activities. Civil-military cooperation challenges some

authors’ understandings and beliefs of what militaries can and should do, in that it fits into what Sarkesian and Connor have categorised as “non-traditional activity” and, as such, is suspicious. The idea of tradition is noteworthy because it connotes a degree of historical coherence and a cultural appreciation of what is appropriate or acceptable practice. I will return to this topic later in the chapter.

The second fault in Civil Military Relations deals with the relationship between the divorced entities. Not only are the military and social spheres separated, the relationship between them is most often portrayed as conflictual. Most evident in the work surrounding coups and coup prevention, Civil Military Relations literature sees an inherent tension between military officer and political master. Bland’s “praetorian problem” has been sufficiently addressed in the West by, so that according to Hackett “from the late 18th Century onwards...the soldier and the statesman were...no longer interchangeable [and] the subordination of the military to the civil was...complete.”

Coups have become exceptions in the West, and yet the literature is haunted by their possibility. The imagery of Finer’s *Man on Horseback* is of a powerful figure waiting in the wings to take over control of the country: “...there is a common assumption, an unreflecting belief, that it is somehow ‘natural’ for the armed forces to obey the civil power...But no reason is adduced for showing that civilian control of the armed forces is, in fact, natural.”

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109 Coups are an obsession in much of Civil Military Relations literature and the emphasis on them is unwarranted not only with reference to the West, but to Eastern Europe, Russia, and the republics of former Soviet Union. See David J. Betz, *Civil-Military Relations in Russia and Eastern Europe*. (London: Routledge, 2004): 6.

110 Finer, 5.
Hence, Huntington’s theory centres on the idea of “objective control” whereby the military is kept out of political circles and under the watchful eye of civilian bureaucracy, legislature, and executive. Each actor has a particular sphere of competence, where each is expert, with the civilian sphere dominant in terms of policy direction. Peter Feaver continues in the Huntingtonian tradition in his recent work. The relationship between the general and the politician is one where once an order is given, the military may decide to “work” (follow the order) or “shirk” (ignore or modify the order). Moreover, what determines the military decision is the extent to which they will be “monitored” by the politicians and, if caught, “punished.”\textsuperscript{111} There is no room for trust, as the military as it is inherently untrustworthy. Their functional imperative (that is, to prepare for and conduct military operations) will always be in conflict with their socio-political imperative (that is, to fit in with society’s norms and values). As Burk puts it, in a Huntingtonian world “freed from state restraints, the military would pursue the objects of its own passions and pose an internal threat to sovereign power.”\textsuperscript{112} In this setting, the civilian authority must be vigilant and precise in its dealings with the military: it must say clearly and forcefully command the army to ‘jump’ when it wants it to jump, otherwise the army may decide to disregard the order, either by refusing to jump, or jumping whenever the it feels that the need arises.

Morris Janowitz is often regarded as Huntington’s foil. Within Civil Military Relations, Huntington represents a political science perspective, while Janowitz is dean of the sociological school. Rather than objective control, he believes that the military must be inculcated with a strong sense of professional responsibility so that they will

\textsuperscript{111} Peter Feaver. \emph{Armed Servants}. (Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).
\textsuperscript{112} Burk, 10.
eschew political domination. However, he does so partly because he fears that civilian oversight will never be sufficient to prevent a coup. What is required, therefore, is a body of citizen-soldiers, to whom the idea of a coup would be inherently unthinkable. Military service would be founded on civic virtue, and that ideal of virtue would include the keys to civilian supremacy. The military’s own (i.e. internalised) ethos would prevent it from taking over the country.\textsuperscript{113} Despite its somewhat gentler portrayal of the armed forces, Janowitzian theory is a dialectic which relies upon the difference between ‘soldier’ and ‘citizen.’

The difference between Huntington’s approach and that of Janowitz can be summarized succinctly. In Huntington’s understanding, the military should stick to its core business, and remain detached from either social engineering or political interference. They, in short, should be motivated by their functional imperative. Janowitz, on the other hand, believes that militaries should be tied to the mores of their parent societies. Indeed, disconnected militaries, cut off from the rest of the state are to be regarded as dangerous. Janowitz’s militaries, then, are driven by their societal imperative. Starkly put, these two ideal positions represent two poles between which real militaries must strike a balance.

Bland attempts to overcome the divide between military and civilian in his “unified theory of civil-military relations” where he claims that rather than a conflictual relationship marked by a struggle for dominance of one side over the other, in contemporary settings, ‘good’ civil-military relations rely on shared responsibility.\textsuperscript{114} His public administration approach demonstrates a theoretical maturity, which allows that


evolution is possible; a recognition that relationships are not fixed, that they can change over time. To believe otherwise, to retain a model driven by a single, fixed relational possibility is to become stuck on Thaler’s train to the present, allowing for no past and no future.

The third problem with existing Civil Military Relations literature is that, by strictly separating the military from the civilian, and by maintaining a the view that the armed forces need to be kept at bay lest they interfere with ‘normal’ politics, the literature disembeds the military from the rest of society. This means that the military is treated in isolation from existing social and political trends. In effect, militaries regarded in this fashion become caricatures, entities which are grotesque in that they are outside any particular cultural milieu. Without social or cultural grounding, militaries appear in a state of stasis and theories based on these assumptions simply do not accommodate contemporary military activity. Tom Sower examined Feaver’s ‘work or shirk’ model in the context of peace support operations in Kosovo, and found that it was unable to account for military behaviour there. The range of choices facing a military commander in a multinational operational setting was much larger and the actual military performance was far more nuanced than Feaver’s forecast binary choice would suggest. Sowers found that there were distinct differences between American commanders and their British counterparts; it appears that factors such as national strategic culture do have an impact on how soldiers interpret the orders they receive. Theories that ignore the contribution of culture because they remove militaries from their cultural environment

are insufficient to aid in our understanding of complex practices such as civil-military cooperation.

A related tendency is to view American civil-military relations as somehow universally applicable. For example, Sarkesian and Connor assert that in order for the American people to understand the utility of the use of force in contemporary international relations, the American military is “the critical actor” that should be involved in providing that explanation “by virtue of its unique purpose.” If we assume that this is the case in the United States (and that is questionable), can we also assume that the military plays such an important role in other societies, such as, say, France, or South Africa, or Canada? While Civil Military Relations has examined countries other than the US, it often does so with Huntingtonian theoretical expectations that are dubious at best. In leaving context out of the treatment of civil-military relations, much of the literature appears suspiciously in Hemmingway’s shadow.

In contrast to this singular treatment of civil-military relations, Katzenstein presents a wide selection of alternative, culturally sensitive examinations. Proceeding from the perspective that “issues dealing with norms, identities, and culture are becoming more salient” in issues of international security, Katzenstein et al demonstrate that the military is not a-cultural, and that its relationship with its civilian masters, as well as its

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116 Sarkesian and Connor, 3.
117 The two areas that have explored the most within CMR have been Latin America and Eastern Europe. The focus in both regions has been on military reform, with a liberal democratic objective in mind. It is surprising how often that model is predicated on Huntingtonian principles, despite large variations in national experience. See, for example, Larry Diamond and M.F. Plattner, eds. Civil-Military Relations and Democracy. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1996) for a selection of non-US case studies.
118 Peter Katzenstein, ed. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). While Katzenstein et al might not categorise themselves as working within the field of Civil Military Relations, their subject matter and approach makes their inclusion in this field justified.
119 Katzenstein, 1.
parent society, varies across time and space. In fact, he concludes that all national security policy (including, ostensibly, practices such as civil-military cooperation) is socially determined by two factors: the particular cultural-institutional context of a state, as well as the collective identity of the actors (be they states, elite, or military organisations). Therefore, military activity is social activity, where actors are affected by their context, but also shape that context through their actions, which stem (in part) from the way they see themselves ‘fitting in’. Therefore, in contrast to writers like Feaver who believe they ‘know’ what the military’s interests are (to increase its ability to fight and win wars) and Posen, who attributes military practice to the ‘natural’ state of international anarchy, Katzenstein claims that “one cannot deduce the interests of the military from either the functional needs of the military or from the international balance of power.” Rather he reminds us that “we should not take for granted what needs to be explained: the sources and content of national security interests that...governments pursue.”

It is important to differentiate between cultural treatments that recognise national differences and theories that explain all behaviour by reference to nationality. While it is constructive to appreciate that the particular social and political structure of a country may have an impact on military activity, it is not helpful to resort to some form of national essentialism. Stephen Rosen highlights an example of where John Gooch attributed the poor performance of the Italian army in WWI to “the nature of Italian political culture and the structure of Italian society”. Rosen comments that “it remains possible that poorly trained, suspicious Italian soldiers and incompetent Italian officers were the result of poorly drafted conscription laws and lack of money for training” rather

120 Katzenstein, 10-11.
than anything inherently Italian. This is wise counsel, although we might press further to ask why it is that the troops were poorly trained, the officers incompetent, the laws poor, and the money scarce; after all, it could be that this was due to the peculiar nature of Italian society at the time. The point is, though, that it is the context and the identity of the actors, rather than their nationality per se that determines military behaviour.

Such a culturally sensitive perspective allows the question of why militaries conduct civil-military cooperation operations to be explored. However, in order to do so fully, it must be clear who the actors are that operate within a given cultural context.

While the accounts in Katzenstein’s volume vary, they tend to focus on elites. National security policy is the product of negotiated identities and expectations between civilian decisionmakers and military commanders. Kier, for instance, looks at the decision by French military officers to adopt a defensive doctrine in the wake of the French cabinet’s policy to include large numbers of conscripts and reservists in the overall order of battle (rather than funding more regular, professional troops). In her analysis there is no examination of the wider French society and their expectations.

Contemporary societies are involved in civil-military relations. Their influence varies, again according to particular historical and institutional settings, but it needs to be accommodated in any theoretical framework. Of particular interest in this regard is the work by Charles Moskos and others, who have investigated the impact of “post-modern” societies on civil-military relations. They believe that there

is [a] cultural shift in public attitudes and opinion. Old verities are questioned rather than accepted. There are fewer overarching authorities to whom people are willing to defer. There is a shrinking consensus about what values constitute the public good, and little confidence that we know how, by use of reason, to determine what the public good might be. The eighteenth century’s faith in reason, the nineteenth century’s faith in the nation-state, and our own century’s [the twentieth] confidence in science and technology have all lost their hold on our imagination... Inasmuch as the nation-state is the *sine qua non* of the Modern military, such developments fundamentally change civil-military relations.\(^\text{124}\)

They are not alone in their assessments. Phillip Bobbitt claims that the new epoch of military activity will be shaped by the post-modern “market state” and its mandate to facilitate its citizens’ prosperity.\(^\text{125}\) Robert Cooper observes that Europe and other affluent societies have become postmodern and in the process have given up on warfare in favour of welfare.\(^\text{126}\) Christopher Coker believes that Western societies’ “new civil values” explain the recent move towards “humane warfare.”\(^\text{127}\) Whether or not societies have become as postmodern as some observers would have us believe, the fact is that societies cannot be left out of any explanation of a military activity such as civil-military cooperation.

**Conclusion**

It is clear from the literature that the way in which we conceive of the military’s place within societies is changing, perhaps spilling over the conceptual banks set for it in earlier times. As these expectations change, they have a direct impact on the types of roles that the military can be expected to perform. In turn, as the military conducts new operations, these expectations may be modified. Particularly key in this regard are the notions of the functional and societal imperatives. The tension between them is played

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\(^{124}\) Moskos, Williams, and Segal, 4-5.
\(^{125}\) Bobbitt, 213-242.
out—almost in staccato fashion—when armies conduct civil-military cooperation. These concepts play a critical role in the development of the argument that follows.

The aim of a literature review is not merely to provide a critique of the existing scholarship, but hopefully to find some giants’ shoulders upon which to build a foundation for further research. In this sense, it is important to see not only gaps in the current writing, but to note and incorporate its ‘good’ points. Moreover, the intent of this chapter is to establish, from a review of the literature, a set of criteria for a theoretical framework that will assist our understanding of civil-military cooperation practices. It is now evident, then, that such a framework must have space for actors, their contexts, and the dynamic relations that exist between them. It must enable an examination of the domestic level, but at the same time accommodate the fact that this level of analysis is influenced, and in turn influences, the international or global (i.e. the systemic) level. A theoretical model that does not allow for change (for instance, in the relations between actors, or in the way that certain concepts are understood) is equally unhelpful. Finally, any framework must be informed from the perspective that ‘ideas matter’, in terms of norms and identities, and equally in terms of particular cultural contexts. Before moving on the look at a model that will satisfy these requirements, let us turn to examine the evolution of civil-military cooperation and the context within which it occurs.
Chapter 2:
The Evolution of Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace and War

Civil-military cooperation has come to be considered a pre-requisite for the success of international interventions, but such a judgment has not been without controversy. The evolution of ideas can be difficult to trace; terms and notions that were once clear can become muddled over time. The process of what Terence Ball calls “conceptual change” is present in the fields within which civil-military cooperation is a part. This becomes clear when we follow the evolution of peacekeeping into peace support operations and stability operations. First, we can locate civil-military cooperation within the wider field of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping, a product of the Cold War, was based on consent of the parties and a strict code of ‘non-interference’ in domestic affairs. It evokes images of U.N. authorized soldiers in blue helmets interposed

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130 For an alternate account of the evolution of peacekeeping, see John Mackinlay, “Defeating Complex Insurgency: Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan,” Whitehall Paper 64. (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2005): 1-18. Mackinlay marks the evolution in terms of ‘traditional peacekeeping’, ‘containment’, and ‘intervention forces’. I find these terms misleading, as all such missions are interventions and have been implicated in the wider context of conflict containment.

131 Of course, prior to the age of peacekeeping, which began in earnest after the Second World War, militaries had interacted with civilians. Those seeking to avoid becoming embroiled in battle, and those unlucky enough to be unable to do so, were ‘dealt with’ as a problem to managed by elements from the military police, the medical, as well as civil affairs or civil administration officers. Services included “evacuation assistance, hygiene, shelter, burials, and utilities.” For example, Canadian Civil Affairs troops, under the command of a brigadier and as a part of the Allied Military Government, landed in Normandy one month after D-Day, with the explicit aim to “keep civilians out of the way of the fighting troops”, especially in and around Caen. Serge Bernier, “Civil Affairs in the Canadian Army in the Second World War.” Presentation made at Canada House, London. 6 June 2004.
between two warring factions who have agreed to a peace treaty or cease fire, and have consented to the deployment of a neutral and impartial international force. This force is not only neutral and impartial, it is relatively inert: “traditional peacekeepers do not propose or enforce particular political solutions. Rather, they try to build confidence between the belligerents in an attempt to facilitate political dialogue.” Civil-military cooperation was limited, as militaries tended to ‘stay in their lanes’, or perhaps more aptly, stay in their watchtowers.

Over the course of the 1990s, the West ‘discovered’ the reality of intrastate conflicts, characterized by the confluence of communal violence; humanitarian suffering (be it in the form of population displacement, famine or abject poverty); and opportunistic, criminal economic exploitation. As if this were not enough, intrastate conflicts tended to occur in places noted for the absence of indigenous state-based structures and institutions, labeled as failed, failing, fragile, collapsed or disrupted states. Consent was not always possible to obtain. Building on Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s seminal An Agenda for Peace, ideas such as ‘peace enforcement’ and even

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'peacemaking' were introduced into the vocabulary of international diplomacy and the lines between the political, the military, and the humanitarian began to blur. Built on such a foundation, the British military doctrine of "Wider Peacekeeping" was conceived as wedding of operational reality and theoretical legitimacy. It wrestled with the ideas of consent and coercion, trying to design pragmatic, but intellectually and morally defendable, definitions of peace enforcement and peacemaking; it sought to come to grips with the increasingly blurry 'Mogadishu Line' which was acting as an unhelpful and self-limiting barrier in 'real world' operations in the Balkans. This line was further smudged by the conclusions of the Brahimi Report, which castigated the notion of impartiality as pretence for inaction. Peacekeeping forces should not be impartial, but rather committed to the principles of the UN charter, unafraid to call a spade a spade, and more importantly, take robust action when necessary. Non-interference (especially in light of the disastrous events of Srebrenica) was seen to be a cop out. Accordingly, peace support operations were designed to meet a predetermined political vision or 'endstate'. Furthermore, Brahimi asserted that, due to the need for more than just passive military

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supervision, “peacekeepers and peace-builders are inseparable partners in complex operations.”

In contrast to traditional peacekeeping, peace support operations (PSOs) saw the deployment, often on ‘humanitarian interventions,’ of well-armed troops with robust rules of engagement that allowed them to ‘interfere’ with the conflict parties, often forcefully. Peace support operations saw the intervening military not as merely monitoring or observing, but enforcing some agreement, even without the explicit consent of the conflicting parties. Within peace support operations, then

Military activities...are designed to conclude conflict by conciliation among the competing parties or ethnic groups, rather than a short-term and superficial termination of the conflict by force. A stable settlement, not military victory, is the ultimate measure of success. Military activities will generally focus on alleviating the symptoms of the crisis while creating the conditions in which other diplomatic and humanitarian agencies can more ably redress the underlying causes of the conflict.

While Philip Wilkinson focuses on the immediate objectives of military forces in peace support operations, others go further, linking this military activity to the wider context of international politics, claiming that peace support operations are designed to help establish liberal-democratic peace in its post-Westphalian sense. That is, they aim to establish liberal-democratic societies within states as the most effective means of maintaining international peace and security. They combine robust military forces capable of limited peace enforcement tasks should a ceasefire break down, with a strong civilian component that includes civil administration, humanitarian elements and civilian policing. Peace support operations attempt to enforce a political agreement, the substance of which has been dictated by the interveners and supports the establishment of liberal democracy.

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139 United Nations, 3.
140 For a comprehensive history of this trend, beginning before the Second World War, see Tim Laurence, “Humanitarian Assistance and Peacekeeping: An Uneasy Alliance?,” Whitehall Paper 48, (London: Royal United Services Institute, 1999).
142 Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, 6.
Solutions to “complex emergencies” within troubled states or regions would have to come from outside143. The new interventions—into situations of complex, multidimensional problems—would require complex, multifaceted solutions. Indeed, it can be said that peace support operations are meant as a corrective to the uni-dimensional approach of traditional peacekeeping. Rather than dealing with conflicts only at the systemic level, and with separate, often conflicting instruments (such as diplomacy, military action, and development), peace support operations have been “characterized by [their] complex, multilevel, multidimensional nature...[and] signify the attempt to create an operational, normative, just, democratic fabric...in and between civil societies.”144

Civil-military cooperation, according to this line of thinking, is a key element that is designed to move away from a pure ‘interpositional force’ approach. It allows military commanders another set of tools that can influence the situation on the ground. If force is a stick—then civil-military cooperation, in the form of reconstruction projects or humanitarian relief—is a carrot.

The history of civil-military cooperation is not solely tied up with the evolution of peacekeeping. The American military, partly as a result of its historical experience, and perhaps partly out of ideological preference, has shied away from the notion of peacekeeping.145 However, this does not mean that they have not had a history of conducting civil-military cooperation. Perhaps the seminal encapsulation of the

American experience with these types of military operations can be found in the United States Marine Corps *Small Wars Manual*. Written in 1940, it defined ‘small wars’ as

> Operations undertaken...wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the *internal or external* affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation.\(^{146}\)

In these small wars “measures will be taken to...break the resistance to law and order by a combination of effort of physical and moral means.”\(^{147}\)

The moniker of small wars eventually faded away, but the concept remained. By the time of the Vietnam War the U.S. Army labeled these kinds of actions stability operations, which it defined as

> Internal defense and *internal development* operations and assistance provided by the armed forces to maintain, restore, or establish a climate of order within which responsible government can function effectively and without which progress cannot be achieved.\(^{148}\)

The American military participated in numerous UN peacekeeping (e.g. Somalia and Haiti) and NATO peace support operations (e.g. Bosnia and Kosovo) over the course of the 1990s and the U.S. Army briefly introduced a thin doctrinal volume on such operations, but this referred to ‘traditional peacekeeping’ and did not allow for intrusive actions, such as civil-military cooperation.\(^{149}\) Perhaps not surprisingly the conceptual encapsulation of what conflict had become by the middle of the 1990s did not take doctrinal form. Rather the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, General Krulak, expressed it as a metaphor. In 1999 he described a world where the armed forces

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would find themselves fighting a Three Block War, a situation where they would be
"confronted by the entire spectrum of tactical challenges in the span of a few hours and
within the space of three contiguous city blocks", forced to conduct "humanitarian
assistance, peace-keeping, or traditional warfighting" virtually at the same time.\(^{150}\) This
imagery captured the imagination of military commanders throughout the West for two
key reasons. First, for many soldiers outside of the US, it reflected their reality. British,
French, even Canadian troops found themselves in situations similar to that described by
Krulak, in places like Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda. Second, Krulak’s vision was not
one of despair, but one of opportunity. Because soldiers found themselves within a Three
Block War, they could escape the notion that they were tied to older, now-defunct
images, whether they were ‘NATO’s Central Front’ or the equally outdated ‘Cyprus’s
Green Line’.

Despite Krulak’s allegorical tale, the transition from a Democrat to a Republican
administration in the United States in 2001 was marked, as a part of Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld’s campaign of transformation, by a strong opposition to the idea of
peacekeeping, which was associated with ‘nation-building’\(^{151}\). This can be seen in the
decision to close the United States Army War College’s Peacekeeping Institute by the
summer of 2003.\(^{152}\) However, the necessity of stability operations was reinforced

\(^{150}\) Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” Marines Magazine,

\(^{151}\) During the presidential candidate debate with Al Gore, George W. Bush declared, “...we can’t be all
things to all people in the world. I am worried about over-committing our military around the world. I want
to be judicious in its use. I don’t think nation-building missions are worthwhile.” Presidential Debate at


following the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. The doomed Peacekeeping Institute was reborn, now as the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. In doctrinal terms, the U.S. Army was prepared to conduct ‘Stability Operations and Support Operations’ (SASO), which made provision for active involvement in the internal workings of the countries targeted. Stability Operations became the popular term of art used by government officials and civilian observers. It provided a way out of discussing peacekeeping, and the equally problematic term ‘nation-building’155, but was to a large degree congruent with peace support doctrine, as conceived of by NATO and other Allied militaries.

Events continued to shape American thinking. The realities of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan prompted the Joint Staff to abandon the term Stability Operations in favour of the more descriptive ‘security, transition, and reconstruction operations’:

Formerly, operations similar to these were referred to as stability operations. Stability can be a misleading word... Stability understood as “status quo antebellum” will not often be our strategic goal. Rather, the United States (and its coalition partners) will seek a new, better status quo—a status quo in which civilians are better off than they were before conflict erupted. In fact, transition to a new and better status quo will often involve instability.156

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155 Even though, by this time, the U.S. Administration had softened somewhat on the term, as evinced by statements by officials such as then-National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. Jay Nordlinger, "‘Power and Values’ A conversation with Condoleezza Rice,” National Review. September 18, 2002. (http://www.nationalreview.com/flashback/flashback-nordlinger091802.asp; accessed 7 March 2007)
Security, transition, and reconstruction operations would see “the joint force commander, as part of a multinational and integrated multiagency operation... provid[ing] initial humanitarian assistance, limited governance, restoration of essential public services, and other reconstruction assistance.” Furthermore, the document stressed that these kinds of operations “are essential for the ultimate achievement of strategic aims. [They] are a core mission of the military services and civilian agencies.”

The U.S. Army lagged behind the Joint Staff in their move to distance itself from the idea of ‘stability’. However, drawing on the older concept of counterinsurgency, something that had traditionally been the domain of special operations forces, they began to see the need to revitalize their thinking. David Kilcullen claims that counterinsurgency “is armed social work, an attempt to redress basic social and political problems while being shot at. Max Boot, in his historical account The Savage Wars of Peace, agrees, stating that American military operations in the Twenty-first Century will be characterized in part as “wars in which U.S. soldiers act as ‘social workers’”. This makes [operations such as civil-military cooperation] a central CI [counter insurgency] activity, not an afterthought.” This has been formally enshrined in the latest American

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Army and Marine Corps doctrine. Written largely by Lieutenant General David Petreaus, 

*Counterinsurgency* states that

> A counterinsurgency campaign is...a mix of offensive, defensive and stability operations...It requires soldiers and marines to employ a mix of familiar combat tasks and skills more associated with non-military agencies. [These include] civil security; civil control; [the provision of] essential services; governance; [and] economic and infrastructure development.161

In the contemporary jargon, successful military operations require a mix of both kinetic (hard combat activities) and non-kinetic (softer activities, such as civil-military cooperation and information operations). Counterinsurgency, then, as the latest manifestation of Western military performance, is an extension of an earlier trajectory.

If American generals Krulak and Petreas mark the edges of a decade long evolution of how civil-military cooperation has come to be understood, the one general who has been able to most thoughtfully encapsulate the entire conceptual journey is perhaps the British general Rupert Smith. Focusing on how armed force is employed and how armed forces are deployed, Smith believes that the West now fights “wars amongst the people”. In Smith’s conceptualization, we have moved from Matthew Arnold’s darkling plain to somewhere far subtler, and therefore more difficult. Smith holds “a view of the world as one of confrontations and conflicts rather than war, and therefore one in which military force has a role to play; but that role is not a detached one, nor one which will achieve the strategic objective itself.” In this world, Smith believes that “the job of the military *alongside all agencies conducting the operation* is to


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defeat the opponent and *win the will of the majority of the people* for the future."\(^1\)

Informed by his experience as a commander in the Balkans, Smith asserts that armies are not enough: commanders must understand that they fight amongst—but more importantly, *for*—people: the societies within the failed or fragile states in which they operate. This necessitates understanding and harnessing the capabilities of the media, politicians, and aid organizations at home, internationally, and in the theatre of operations.\(^2\) As John MacKinlay puts it, "Commanders at most levels recognize that the population in the operational space is their vital ground and that winning them over to their side requires more than the provision of military security, such as providing water, power, schools, hospitals and a livelihood."\(^3\)

The idea of fighting amongst the people is an important re-calculation, and an even more important re-casting, of the context of contemporary military operations. At the same time, it is an inescapable, almost obvious conclusion. The 'enemies' (if you could call them that, for often they posed little threat to the foreign interveners) in these new battles were not martial peers (as had been assumed to be the case throughout the Cold War), nor even second-rate pretenders (as had been the case in the first war of the West against Iraq in 1991). It was more accurate to see them the way war correspondent Anthony Loyd did, as a "spangle cracked gang movement."\(^4\) Rather than squaring off against a like-minded and similarly prepared formation on a battlefield, Western

\(^2\) Smith, 58.
militaries were called in after brutal violence had been meted out against civil populations. This scene became the equivalent of the set-piece battle of earlier wars:

The cluster of houses smoldered dismally in the midday sun... Tanks and mortars had pulverized them a day earlier, before the infantry moved in and torched what remained. The centre of the village was little more than rubble, any surviving houses gutted by flame... bodies tossed and chopped like salad by shellfire, riddled with bullets; burned, splintered, cracked; bone-bleached, green-rotten, peach-fresh; single, group, multiple; soldier, civilian; man, woman, child. 166

In the face of such destruction, sickeningly repeated hundredfold throughout the Balkans, Africa, and western Asia, observers came to see that the conceptual centre of conventional mechanized warfare could not hold. 167 Although lagging, the mind had no choice but to change, given what the eye perceived. The soldiers and others caught up in these ‘new wars’ must have thought that, surely, some revelation was at hand. 168

**Humanitarian Responsibility**

Indeed, the evolution of the military concept of civil-military cooperation traced here did not occur in a vacuum, but rather against the backdrop of two related journeys: the evolutions of humanitarianism and normative international relations. The tale of humanitarianism over the course of the final decade of the Twentieth and the first decade of the Twenty-first centuries is a paradoxical one. At first blush, the 1990s were the period within which humanitarianism flourished. Indeed, the term ‘humanitarian intervention’ and ‘international community’ were not only coined at this time, but became part of the vocabulary of mainstream international politics: “As crisis after crisis

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166 Loyd, 14-15.
168 With apologies to William Butler Yeats.
and episode of mass murder wracked the Balkans, sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia, the triumphalist rhetoric about a new humanitarian order became more and more the norm in Western official circles, the United Nations, the World Bank, and the relief organizations." Tony Blair chose his words carefully in his Chicago speech of April 24, 1999, where he set out the ‘doctrine of the international community’. Genuine concern for the welfare of the people was at the heart of NATO’s military campaign to stop the Serbs in Kosovo: “Anyone who has seen the tear stained faces of the hundreds of thousands of refugees streaming across the border, heard their heart-rending tales of cruelty or contemplated the unknown fates of those left behind, knows that Bismarck was wrong.” Humanitarianism was founded on values, not the Realpolitik of an earlier age.

However, humanitarianism, despite its centrality, came to be seen as a fig leaf, if not for military domination, then certainly for a Western penchant for order and stability. Even when wrapped in the banner of humanitarianism, “the test of a successful intervention is [not] whether it defeats an enemy or stops a human rights abuse, but whether it sets in train the nation-building process that will prevent the area from becoming a security threat once again.” Clearly rise of humanitarianism, as conceived of in the capitals of the West, contributed to the crisis that the humanitarian community found itself in.


And yet, as controversial as the notion of humanitarian intervention was\textsuperscript{172}, it did not wither on the vine, discarded as some cynical cover story. Instead, it evolved, to become the formal doctrine of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’. The emphasis shifted from a ‘right to intervene’ to a ‘duty of care’. As stated by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, there exist three elements to the overarching idea of the responsibility to protect:

a. The responsibility to prevent: to address both the root... of... conflict.
b. The responsibility to react: to respond to situations of compelling human need.
c. The responsibility to rebuild: to provide... full assistance with recovery, reconstruction, and reconciliation.\textsuperscript{173}

The idea of a state based reaction to human catastrophe was made stronger under this doctrine, which was formally—and unanimously—adopted by the United Nations General Assembly as part of its 2005 World Summit. The moral imperative behind humanitarian intervention gained a degree of legal standing, at least and as far as declaratory, non-binding UN resolutions went. Some states were perhaps drawn to the idea of a responsibility to protect, not due to its humanitarian aspects, but rather to its ability to address state failure. Following September 11, 2001 both the United States and the European Union in the security strategies emphasized failed states as threats to security.\textsuperscript{174} In this context, military involvement becomes critical, perhaps even central,

\textsuperscript{172}J.L. Holzgrefe characterizes the axes around which the controversies over humanitarian interventions as ethical ones, encompassing a variety of schools of thought, such as utilitarianism, natural law, social contractarianism, and communitarianism, and legal positivism. See his J.L. Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” in J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003: 15-52. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri characterize the controversy more in terms of “biopolitics” and the continual process of domination in world politics. See Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, \textit{Empire}. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000): 34-41.


to the idea of humanitarianism. Humanitarian disasters cause security problems, and therefore become security problems themselves. Relief, aid, and development are important, but only as far as they help to achieve some strategic objective. Indeed, some observers have gone so far as to claim that places like sub-Saharan Africa may be in the ‘fortunate’ position of having a combination of “ungoverned spaces”\textsuperscript{175} and humanitarian disasters, making them ideal targets for both economic development and military assistance.\textsuperscript{176} “The problem is that the military and some governmental departments... see the humanitarian actors as ‘force multipliers’ and part of the overall strategy. But the humanitarian practitioners see themselves... as part of a completely different programme. This is more than an absence of glue, these are completely different views of what is happening in the same operational space, and... humanitarians have an unremitting resistance to being co-opted into a [security] strategy.”\textsuperscript{177} Civil-military cooperation must be seen against this backdrop.

**Hallmarks of the Evolution: Interference, Convergence, and Institutionalisation**

Whether based in a peace support, small wars, or ‘strategic humanitarian’ tradition, the instances of military intervention since the beginning of the 1990s have aspects that set them apart from the traditional peacekeeping. First, they are instances of

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direct political and military interference in the internal affairs of a country, with or without explicit consent.\textsuperscript{178}

Second, these interventions were responses to what have become known as ‘complex political emergencies’ and consequently they led to the convergence of political, military, and humanitarian assets and capabilities.\textsuperscript{179} In other words, the concept of intervention changed in line with the changing concept of conflict. It is certainly debatable whether or not conflict has changed or merely our interpretation of it; it could be said that all emergencies are complex and always have been. What is important here is that the ‘problems’ of the 1990s began to be interpreted differently than they had been before. They were no longer ‘proxy wars’ between the superpower camps, nor were they to be ‘depoliticised’ and presented as ‘famines’ or ‘disasters’. Politics could (re)enter the mainstream discourse.\textsuperscript{180}

Wilkinson has labeled this convergence the “New Response Paradigm,”\textsuperscript{181} and within it is not only politics that is embraced. Mark Duffield believes that over the course of the 1990s, the Western involvement in “The New Wars” led to the “merging of development and security,” whereby there has been an “incorporation of war into development discourse.”\textsuperscript{182} This has led to a distortion or “radicalization” of


\textsuperscript{182} Duffield, 2. Collier provides a concrete example of this ‘inclusion’. In his high-profile work for the World Bank, he has stated that “war is development in reverse” and that “development can be an effective instrument for conflict prevention.” See Paul Collier, et al. \textit{Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy}. (Oxford: Oxford UP for the World Bank Group, 2003): ix.
development, whereby humanitarian resources are to be used strategically, in order to punish or entice, rather than be distributed based entirely on need. "Societies must be changed so that past problems do not arise" and development 'properly' used is the tool that can bring about that change. However, it is not merely this increased instrumental approach to development that is striking:

There is a noticeable convergence between notions of development and security. Through a circular form of reinforcement and mutuality, achieving one is now regarded as essential for securing the other. Development is ultimately impossible without stability and, at the same time, security is not sustainable without development. [This convergence] embodies the increasing interaction between military and security actors on the one hand, and civilian and non-governmental organizations on the other. 183

While Duffield's work concentrates on this convergence mainly from the perspective of development studies, his observations are just as germane to the study of the military. NGOs are convinced they need security, and armies are convinced they need development. That each party does not agree on how they might proceed or what the precise nature of the convergence might be is a matter for discussion and negotiation in the light of the compelling and overarching conceptual accord. 184

Flowing from these notions of interference and convergence is the third aspect of military intervention since the end of Cold War: its apparent institutionalization. The reasons for this appear diverse. Thomas Weiss suggests that they are a combination of "the end of East-West tensions, the erosion of sovereignty, the evolution of [international] norms, genuine altruism, domestic politics, media coverage, and the desire

183 Duffield, 16.
184 There are those, of course, who oppose the idea of convergence altogether. See Astri Suhrke, "Peacekeepers and Nation-builders: Dilemmas of the UN in East Timor," International Peacekeeping. 8.4 (Winter) 2001: 1-20.
to contain refugee flows". Building on the idea of domestic politics, Ann Fitz-Gerald
and F. Walthall contend that the trend follows “in the wake of recent calls for ‘joined up
government’”. David Chandler takes a different tack, believing that they are indicative
of “the people-centred approach”, popular in development circles, being applied in the
arena of international politics. Indeed, rhetoric from a number of Western
governments highlights the need for a ‘human security strategy’ based on humanitarian
values as a substitute for the traditional ‘state security’ paradigm. There are ideas,
though, that situate the rise in ‘military humanitarianism’ as part of a larger scheme.
Labelled by Slim as “geopolitical conspiracy theories” they see “humanitarian missions
as rehearsals for short notice invasions”.

Regardless of the reasons behind it, some have concluded that civil-military
cooperation has become institutionalized within the system of global governance or
international conflict management. Not only does institutionalization refer to a
formalization of civil-military cooperation, it suggests that that military is driving the
process, constructing for itself a “hegemonic position.” Ranging from some
militaries’ attempts to impose a system of ‘command and control’ over aid agencies in

185 Thomas G. Weiss, Military-Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises. (Oxford:
Rowman, and Littlefield, 1999.)
186 Anne M. Fitz-Gerald and F. Walthall, “An integrated approach to complex emergencies: the Kosovo
3 February 2003]
188 For example, see Lloyd Axworthy, “Canada and Human Security: The Need for Leadership,”
189 Hugo Slim, “The stretcher and the drum: civil-military relations in peace support operations,” in J.
190 Michael Pugh, “Civil-Military Relations in International Peace Operations,” in Kurt R. Spillman,
Thomas Bernauer, Jürg M. Gabriel, Andreas Wenger, eds. Peace Support Operations: Lessons Learned

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Somalia\textsuperscript{191}, to the fact that some militaries have now ‘taken over’ humanitarian tasks, such developments signify a deliberate military invasion of the so-called ‘humanitarian space.’\textsuperscript{192} Pugh believes that such an invasion serves to lessen the potential good that can be achieved by the true cosmopolitan actors in conflict situations—local actors and representatives from ‘global civil society’ in the form of international organizations and NGOs.\textsuperscript{193}

Martin Shaw sees this shift towards institutionalisation as one of what he calls “The Rules of Risk-Transfer War” (which is how he characterizes “the new Western way of war”): ‘Humanitarianism’ and ‘humanitarian’ organizations must be annexed to compensate for violence against civilians.\textsuperscript{194} In his conceptualization, civil-military cooperation serves two purposes:

On the one hand, it reassures Western publics by promoting ‘humanitarian’ action \textit{simultaneously} with the launch of war... On the other hand, ‘humanitarianism’ is a way of mitigating, or appearing to mitigate, the consequences of war. It has had real consequences:... genuine care for some of the injured and sick, and support for some healthcare and other systems... But their other, perhaps more important significance has been to reassure Western publics about the minimal, civilian-friendly character of the violence their armies have carried out.\textsuperscript{195}

Others see the idea of institutionalization going beyond mere mitigation (whether it be mitigation of domestic angst or foreign suffering). The very idea of what now constitutes military victory is such that some sort of civil-military cooperation is unavoidable. William Martel’s criteria for victory illustrate this clearly:

1. Defeat enemy military forces and its economic infrastructure;
2. Control the enemy state;

\textsuperscript{192} Barry and Jeffreys, 1.
\textsuperscript{193} Michael Pugh, Civil-Military Relations in International Peace Operations, 9-11.
\textsuperscript{194} Martin Shaw, \textit{The New Western Way of War}. (Cambridge: Polity, 2005): 91.
\textsuperscript{195} Shaw, 92.
3. Political and governmental reform; 
4. Rebuild the economy and infrastructure; 
5. Realign the enemy state’s foreign policy; and 
6. Build a new strategic relationship with the defeated state.  

According to this schema, civil-military cooperation is obviously implicated in rebuilding the economy and infrastructure of the ‘defeated state’ (number four in Martel’s list). However, as demonstrated by the broadening of the spectrum of military involvement in ‘stability and support operations’, one can make the case that security sector reform and strategic advisory activities have a role in to play (number three and five). Finally, it can be said that in cases where post-conflict states are left dependent on military and development assistance, a new ‘strategic relationship’ has been built. Civil-military cooperation, as a practice, then can be seen as a means of achieving victory, not merely (or, perhaps, not at all) about helping the victims of violence. If this is the case, civil-military cooperation cannot be humanitarian because it is not conducted for humanitarian reasons alone.  

There are those, however, who believe that such institutionalization is an indication of the great potential of contemporary military operations. Civil-military cooperation and other such tasks demonstrate that armed forces are capable of much 

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198 Such as disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR).
more than merely "killing people and breaking things"\textsuperscript{199}. While still state-directed and state-executed, civil-military cooperation aims to better the plight of the victims of conflict, whether they are refugees, internally displaced people (IDPs), or those survivors who remain in place. Dealing with the displaced, providing medical treatment, and feeding the hungry are examples of what might be termed ‘emergency relief’ and militaries are no strangers to these kinds of activities, either in wartime, post-conflict, or post-disaster scenarios.\textsuperscript{200} However, in recent interventions militaries have gone much further, conducting not only relief, but development tasks, including reconstruction (of infrastructure and accommodation), civil administration, police and prison services, even local capacity-building and economic development.\textsuperscript{201} Furthermore, there are many examples linking military activities on peace support operations to conflict resolution and peacebuilding.\textsuperscript{202} Therefore, as Whitman notes, there is little point in asking merely whether the military can be humanitarian; on that point, there can be little doubt.


Soldiers (and armed forces as a whole) can and do ‘do good’ in peace support operations.\textsuperscript{203}

The whole issue of institutionalization hinges on the question at the heart of this study, which is to ask why militaries are involved in such activities in the first place.\textsuperscript{204}

On the one hand, Bellamy, Williams and Griffin assert that it is the desired ends and not the means that are important in evaluating modes of peacekeeping. On the other hand, Pugh contends that, \textit{prima facie}, military involvement in peace support operations (because they are tied to a hegemonic purpose) restricts genuine progress. In his view the ends \textit{taint} the means.

It is possible to see the antithetical position with regards to civil-military cooperation: even if the ultimate aim is ‘world domination’ if some lives are improved along the way, then that must be seen as a good thing. Michael Ignatieff, for instance, acknowledges that nation-building practices (such as civil-military cooperation) are a part of a wider project of empire, but cautions us not to throw the baby away with the bathwater:

\begin{quote}
Imperialism doesn’t stop being necessary just because it becomes politically incorrect. Nations sometimes fail, and when they do only outside help—imperial power—can get them back on their feet. Nation-building is the kind of imperialism you get in a human rights era, a time when great powers believe simultaneously in the right of small nations to govern themselves and in their own right to rule the world.\textsuperscript{205}
\end{quote}

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\end{flushleft}
Put less controversially, perhaps, he claims that “humanitarian action is not unmasked if it is shown to be the instrument of imperial power. Motives are not discredited just because they are shown to be mixed.” Civil-military cooperation, while not carried out for purely humanitarian reasons, can have a humanitarian effect. The means can be justified by reference to the ends to which they contribute.

Conclusion

Civil-military cooperation has existed, in some form or another, within military thought for some time. Increasingly, though, the international political backdrop has highlighted the importance of marrying warfighting with peacebuilding. It is virtually impossible to conceive of a contemporary (or future) military intervention without some kind of humanitarian or reconstruction aspect to it, whether it takes shape as the justification behind the intervention in the first place, or as an integral part of the campaign plan. As Gordon points out,

> The political objectives underpinning interventions have become more ambitious, resulting in a greater degree of complexity in the institutional responses of states...The convergence of the human security and traditional, narrowly defined state security agendas, the gradual importation of ‘political economy’ approaches to conflict analysis, state and international organisations’ pursuit of multi-dimensional missions and policy ‘coherence’ between the various aspects of these interventions have each been significant factors in [the] evolution” of civil-military cooperation.

Ulrich Beck describes this as an indication that we have entered a period of “post-national war”, whereby cosmopolitan concerns for human rights lead to, among other things, a “new kind of post-national politics of military humanism is emerging”.

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206 Ignatieff, 23.
Indeed, countries now fight “peace-war”, motivated by both a self-regarding desire for security and an impulse to resolve issues of human rights, seen as the root of international insecurity.\footnote{Beck, 18.} Seen in this light, “no state possesses a legitimate monopoly on the use of force, because the legitimacy and legality of the use of force is placed under the reservation that human rights are recognized as the highest good.”\footnote{Beck, 14.} In this way, a state’s national performance must be judged against a set of international criteria. This would explain, for instance, Tony Blair’s Chicago speech ahead of the war in Kosovo. We fight not for national interests, but for universal values. According to Beck, the fact that states fight on account of their “cosmopolitan responsibility” means that such wars “can...no longer be understood through the Clauswitzian conceptualization”.\footnote{Beck, 8.}

Such a change in the way in which state action is judged is, according to Robert Cooper, nothing short of “extraordinary”. In what he calls The Postmodern (what Beck refers to as the Second Modern) Period, Cooper claims that “The legitimate monopoly on force, which is the essence of statehood, is thus subject to international—but self-imposed—constraints.”\footnote{Robert Cooper, “The Postmodern State and the World Order,” (London: Demos, 1996): 17-18.} Cooper’s subordinate clause makes all the difference here. My contention is that, even if it is the case that states fight for supranational or postnational ends, the means they employ strive to be in accordance with their own internally defined legitimacy. This legitimacy is contingent, culturally constructed, dynamic and, therefore, indeterminate. Most importantly, it is the product of the set of relations that exist between the people and their passions; the government and their...
policies; and the military and their skills. The objective of the next chapter is to explore those relations further.
Chapter 3:
A Clausewitzian Framework for Analysis

*Political guidance can be really helpful if you get it.*
General Sir Mike Jackson

*What the whole community comes to believe in grasps the individual as in a vice.*
William James

As we confront civil-military cooperation as a practice, in order to understand why it takes the particular shape it does, we require some kind of framework to guide our thinking. Building on what we have learned in our examination of the existing literature, any such framework needs to be comprehensive; dynamic; sympathetic to the notion that immaterial factors (such as ideas and norms) matter; and it must allow for a degree of agency, rather than attempting to proscribe action through its very structure. The purpose of this chapter is to develop just such a framework, so that the empirical explorations that follow can be better understood. The model introduced here seeks to explain the elements that underpin military activity, but more importantly to highlight the significance of the dynamic inter-relations between those elements. It introduces the idea that legitimacy is the key to those relationships, and explains how actors seek to establish legitimacy, in order to gain a certain freedom of action. Legitimacy, however, is not some ‘ever fixed star’; rather, it is contingent on several factors, including the particular cultural context within which it can be found. A final element in the model will focus on the indeterminate nature of even a culturally informed system. In the end, individuals—whether citizens, politicians, or soldiers—cannot escape the need to interpret the variety of signals that surround a particular choice. Ultimately, one’s cultural milieu may form a background, but each individual has to act according to his or her own understanding of what that means.
We have already seen that civil-military cooperation is deeply embedded in both the ‘peace support’ and ‘small wars’ traditions of military activity. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that the most appropriate place to find our framework lies within the works of a philosopher of war: Carl von Clausewitz. Properly understood, his ‘Trinitarian’ approach to war provides the best scheme for increasing our comprehension of why civil-military cooperation is carried out, and why it is carried out in the peculiar ways that it is. Clausewitz’s model, which is most often regarded as strictly a tool for understanding conventional war, encapsulates and allows for all the necessary actors, relationships, contexts, and ambiguities necessary in order to understand contemporary ‘operations other than war’, such as civil-military cooperation. Far from being a relic of the European 19th Century, dominated by the spectre of Napoleon, the idea of the ‘Remarkable Trinity’ remains relevant and powerful today.

Military Activity as Political Activity

Clausewitz’s signal contribution to understanding the nature of military activity begins with his recognition that war is “…a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”213 There is no more hackneyed phrase in the field of Strategic Studies than this, but it is of vital and subtle significance. Most importantly, it establishes that military activity is not something that is carried out in theoretical or physical isolation from the other affairs of state. Clausewitz stresses this point in several places within On War, but also elsewhere. In his private correspondence with a contemporary Prussian officer on the General-Staff, Major Röder, he emphasises

213 Carl von Clausewitz, On War. Michael Howard and Peter Peret, eds. and trans. (London: David Campbell Publishers, 1993): Book 1, Chapter 1, §24, Page 99. [Due to the various editions of this work in print, I have included, in addition to the page number, the Book, Chapter, and Section identifiers for easier reference.]
that “War is not an independent phenomenon, but the continuation of politics by other means. Consequently, the main lines of every major strategic plan are largely political in nature...According to this point of view, there can be no question of a purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue, nor of a purely military scheme to solve it.”

The two separate but inter-related premises that underpin Clausewitz’s perspective should not be underestimated. The first is that military activity is intrinsically political. The second is that military activity “is not wholly autonomous” and is, in fact, subordinate to higher order considerations.

Nearly two centuries after the publication of Clausewitz’s great work, most military officers and students of military affairs purport to understand this concept. Indeed, it is in some form or other learned by rote and recited in staff colleges around the world. However, as Clausewitz complained in 1827, while this “point of view is almost self-evident” it is obvious that “it has not yet been fully accepted, as shown by the fact that people still like to separate the purely military elements of a major strategic plan from its political aspects, and treat the latter as if they were somehow extraneous.” While much of contemporary professional doctrine (of both militaries and civilian aid agencies, for example) and academic study holds the civil and military spheres as separate, Clausewitz reminds us that this is folly.

This is particularly relevant in military endeavours that fall short of what might be described as wars of national survival. Clausewitz argues that “the less intense the

\[215\] Peret and Moran, 21.  
\[216\] In his introductory essay, Michael Howard cites Wilhelm Rüstow who describes Clausewitz as “well-known but little read.” This may well still be the case. Michael Howard, “The Influence of Clausewitz,” in *Clausewitz,* 29.  
\[217\] Peret and Moran, 21.
motives... the conflict will seem increasingly political in nature. In the stability operations that mark the contemporary period, the objectives of the Western intervening states are such that their life or death does not hang in the balance. These peace support operations or small wars are often maligned for the level of political 'interference' inherent in them. Decisions on things such as targeting, rules of engagement, timing, tempo, and sequencing are not left to generals, but rather kept close to the chests of the political leaders involved. As frustrating as that may seem to some military officers (and their ardent supporters qua commentators), Clausewitz chastens them not to carp about "harmful political influence on the management of war... Their quarrel should be with the policy itself, not with its influence." Clausewitz goes on to admit that even where policy can be found wanting, this is not enough to outweigh the need to recognise its primacy: "Policy, of course, is nothing in itself: it is simply the trustee for all these interests... That it can err, subserve the ambitions, private interests, and vanity of those in power, is neither here nor there. In no sense can the art of war ever be regarded as the preceptor of policy..." No matter what else it might be (horrifying, exhilarating, destructive, life-changing) military activity, then, is a means to some end. Clausewitz makes this plain when he points out that "The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their

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218 Clausewitz, Book 1, Chapter 1, § 25, Page 99. Emphasis in orginal.
221 Clausewitz, Book 8, Chapter 6, Page 733.
purpose."\textsuperscript{222} For now, we shall leave aside any further exploration between the means and the ends of military activity. Suffice it to say that Clausewitz’s recognition is of critical importance for the understanding (not to mention the successful conduct) of contemporary military operations.

**The Paradoxical Trinity**

As remarkable as Clausewitz’s ‘war as the extension of politics’ maxim is, he did not stop there. While war is a political activity, it cannot be understood fully by simply focussing on a country’s ruler and its army. Clausewitz understood that the crucial aspect of war was that it was the product of three factors. In his own words, war is, “a paradoxical trinity—comprised of primordial violence, hatred, enmity…; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of [an] element of subordination.”\textsuperscript{223} Each factor of the trinity adds its own unique character to war and each piece is required. Portrayed graphically, each factor would take the form of a vertex, with war occupying the area circumscribed within the resultant triangle.

To Clausewitz, these factors were not disembodied forces. Rather, each factor was borne by a particular segment of the State\textsuperscript{224}:

The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of the government alone.\textsuperscript{225}

Besides assigning a function to particular groups, it is instructive to note how Clausewitz alters slightly the phrasing. Whereas he first spoke of enmity, he now opens up the

\textsuperscript{222} Clausewitz, Book 1, Chapter 1, §24, Page 99.
\textsuperscript{223} Clausewitz, Book 1, Chapter 1, §28, Page 101.
\textsuperscript{225} Clausewitz, Book 1, Chapter 1, §28, Page 101. Emphasis added.
posibility of a more inclusive range of emotions by saying that the people bring *passion* to war. This is not a small semantic point, but an important development in Clausewitz’s conceptualisation. The people’s passions sometimes run to ‘primordial violence’ but could include other emotions. The particular passion espoused by the people at a given time will contribute to the character of the resulting military activity. If the people are fearful of their opponents, or if they regard them with disdain, the nature of the ensuing battles will be different.

Note, too, that the army’s *creativity and talent*, rather than the notion of chance are stressed in this passage. In effect, what Clausewitz is saying is that chance, in and of itself, does not determine a war’s course. Rather, it is what a commander is able to do within the framework of uncertainty that is important. Since chance affects both sides of a war in an evenly ‘random’ way, it is crucial to observe what a commander does (in terms of training, materiel preparation, and planning) and the decisions he takes. Of course, there are variables beyond a general’s control (such as weather or illness), but war is a contest between human beings, not a game decided by fate or the gods, a roll of the dice, or some other piece of pure chance.

That the political aims belong solely to the government, as discussed above, is a clear point, although it has not always been followed in practice, even in liberal democracies. Similarly, it is not extraordinary to consider the character of the army and its leadership as making a contribution to the process of warmaking. The two most significant aspects of a Trinitarian model of military activity are the role attributed to the people and the relationships between the three factors and those that exist between their bearers.
Writing after the French Revolution would force Clausewitz to bring society 'back in' to the business of war, assigning them key—indispensable—roles. Politics might be the engine of war, but an engine needs fuel. "It would be an obvious fallacy," Clausewitz states, "to imagine war between civilized peoples as resulting merely from a rational act on the part of their governments...emotions cannot fail to be involved...they will...affect it to some degree." Emotion is the fuel and the people, as Clausewitz refers to them, provide just that. The people do more than accelerate the violence of war, though, they can also serve to circumscribe it. Since ancient times, "it is society which determines when a soldier kills, whom he kills and even how he kills." The particular timbre of the passion brought to bear by the people at any given time cannot be taken as given. In a contemporary sense, democratic societies may exercise this influence, as "they will determine through their votes how [the country] will be defended, how many dollars will be spent on defence, and what risks will be taken and what vulnerabilities will be accepted." This theme is picked up by Robert Carlyle, who claims that

Democratic values impact upon the character of the armed forces, in particular limiting what types of behaviour are acceptable. Moreover, during the preparation for war, social and political organization is the primary determinant of the types of military organization that will be acceptable to the parent society. **228**

So powerful can the people be that it is possible for Victor Davis Hanson to ask, with reference to the pivotal Tet Offensive of 1968,

*Can anything good come of a volatile Western citizenry that dictates when, where, and how its soldiers are to fight, even as it permits its writers, artists, and...

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journalists freely and sometimes wildly to criticize the conduct of their own troops? Even though he believes such scrutiny can have detrimental effects on the conduct of military operations in the short term, Hanson admits “this strange propensity for...civilian audit and popular criticism of military operations—itself part of the larger Western tradition of personal freedom, consensual government, and individualism—can ensure accountability and provide for a wide exchange of views.” Indeed, he includes “Dissent and Self-Critique” in his list of reasons contributing to the superiority of the Western way of war.

As Clausewitz notes, the “social conditions of the states themselves...give rise to war; the same forces circumscribe and moderate it. They themselves are not part of war; they already exist before the fighting starts.” In the current age of globalization, it is not just the populations of a single nation-state who matter. Global civil society has assumed many of same characteristics of the people in Clausewitz’s original Trinity:

thanks to technology [such as satellite television and the Internet], the public practice of monitoring the exercise of power across borders has begun to take root. The informed citizen is debating how, when and where to use force, and he is doing so in the context not so much of war, but of global policing. Even if the people are not taking up arms or marching in the streets, the peoples’ contribution cannot be trivialized; they form the backdrop before which war is carried out and can even shape the way in which war is exercised and understood. Clausewitz’s Trinity recognizes this and is the stronger for it.

229 Victor Davis Hanson, Why The West Has Won: Culture and Carnage from Salamis to Vietnam. (London: Faber and Faber, 2001): 437.
230 Hanson, 438.
231 Clausewitz, Book 1, Chapter 1, §3, Page 84.
In addition to the role assigned to the people, another essential aspect of Clausewitz’s Trinitarian understanding of war is that the Prussian went beyond identifying the key forces and actors behind war; he also saw the importance of the relationship between them:

These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory which ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.\(^{233}\)

To Clausewitz, war is not conducted in isolation, like an experiment in a laboratory, under controlled conditions. Policy is not simply ‘decided’, orders to commanders not dryly ‘cut’, armies not merely ‘dispatched’ to win or lose on the battlefield, like in some board game. The conditions of real war are not controlled, but rather messy. As mentioned above, policies can be ill-conceived, or tainted by personal vanity. The emotions of the people can be of such a frenzy as to compel politicians to act, perhaps unwisely. The talent of a commander might not be up to the task at hand. Equally, the politician and the commander might not get on well. History is replete with examples of just such occurrences and each of these relational realities makes a significant mark on the resulting military operation.

While at first reading, Clausewitz’s Trinitarian model can appear mechanical, it is important to bear in the variability mentioned above. As Christopher Bassford points out, each force of the Trinity affects...human actors to some quite variable extent. The army’s officers and men and the political leaders are also, to varying degrees in different societies, members of “the people”. In democratic societies at least, the people are expected to play a role in rational decision making, whereas political leaders are as often

\(^{233}\) Clausewitz, Book 1, Chapter 1, §28, Page 101.
driven by personal needs by rational calculation of their societies’ practical requirements. Events on the army’s battlefields have a tremendous influence both on the the people and on the political leadership, while popular and political factors, in turn, affect the army’s performance.\(^{234}\)

Here Bassford points to three axes of variability. The first axis records the fact that each actor may not espouse its given Trinitarian force in an ideal fashion. The people, for instance, may not be the consummate ‘cheerleaders’ one might hope: “it is quite possible to fight and even win wars about which one’s people don’t give a damn.”\(^{235}\) The second axis’s variability highlights the fact that there are no clear dividing lines between each actor. As Bassford indicates, soldiers and politicians are people too, subject to emotions and passions. Similarly, the people, in some circumstances, can have an important role to play in the development of policy. The third axis of variability touches upon the interplay between the forces and their actors. The impact of one can affect all the others, the end result being a different kind of war than might be the case if each actor had been allowed to act in isolation. As Christopher Coker puts it “state, society, and army all [have]...mutual claims on each other.”\(^{236}\)

These claims form what Gianfranco Poggi describes as “a process of mutual accommodation”.\(^{237}\) Indeed, far from seeking the weakening of, or absolute autonomy from, its co-actors, each actor depends on the others doing their jobs, fulfilling their roles. Poggi, speaking of the relationship between Church and State as holders, respectively of normative and political power, describes this dependance. The Church relies on the State


\(^{235}\) Bassford, 4.


to establish and enforce laws in the area of, for instance, charitable giving and private property, or the transformation of certain sins into crimes (such as divorce or abortion).

In modern, Western societies the Church is shorn of an independent ability to do these things, but at the same time is utterly dependant on their existence. It needs the State to function, and therefore, may actively support it, encouraging its followers, through the exercise of its considerable normative power, to obey the authority of the government. The relationship is symbiotic, because the State benefits from the normative power of Church, leveraging, for instance, the authority of God in its oaths and ceremonies, or its blessing for military activities "making it easier for...authorities to send young men to be killed in war and for judicial authorities to settle a pending dispute." In some cases, this symbiosis goes beyond mere convenience into what must be deemed collusion:

The most significant benefit the church could normally offer the state in its negotiation has been its ability to legitimate the political system and thus (to use Weber's expression) to 'domesticate' its subjects, making them more amenable to political control and discipline—indeed to oppression. In the liturgy of the Russian Orthodox Church, for instance, the inculcation of obedience and indeed devotion to the tsar was the central message, incessantly broadcast to the faithful.239

Lest this example seem too extreme or arcane, it is worth recalling God's role in the British national anthem as the 'One' saving the monarch, not to mention sending her victorious, and the reciprocal duty of the sovereign as the 'Defender of the Faith'. Similarly, the relationship between American President George W. Bush and the so-called 'religious Right' can be seen to be mutually beneficial to both parties.240

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238 Poggi, 82.
239 Poggi 83.
While not speaking of Church and State, Clausewitz himself appreciates this mutuality. As mentioned above, he describes the tendencies of the Trinity to be “variable in their relationship to one another” and aimed to develop a theory “that maintains a balance between [them], like an object suspended between three magnets.”\(^{241}\) It is worth considering this metaphor carefully. An object, to be truly suspended between magnets as described by Clausewitz, would be significantly influenced by each pole in its turn. The strength of each magnet would be an important component of the position and stability of the object. But, beyond the properties of any one magnet, the suspended object would be dependent on the combined effect of all the magnets. As Bassford explains, “the actual path of the suspended object is never determined by one force alone, but by the interaction between them, which is forever and unavoidably shifting.”\(^{242}\) Indeed, the three magnets and the object cease to become separate pieces, but rather form a system in equilibrium. Variations in the strength or position of any of the magnets would change the location of the suspended object and fluctuations would decrease its stability, causing the object to be attracted directly to a pole or to wobble and crash.

**Mutual Claims as Legitimacy**

Clearly, the social world in which people, governments, and militaries occupy, and within which military activity is carried out, is not as simple as a hypothetical physics thought experiment might suggest. However, it is possible to find an analogue for the idea of equilibrium in the concept of legitimacy. What does legitimacy mean? In basic terms it can be said that actors have legitimacy “when they are supported by the society’s

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\(^{241}\) Clausewitz, Book 1, Chapter 1, §3, Page 101.

\(^{242}\) Bassford, 4.
shared values and beliefs, underwritten by moral consensus. The basis for this legitimacy can be found in tradition, reason, or law and amounts to “the capacity of a social or political system to develop and maintain a general belief that the existing social order and its main solutions are generally appropriate.”

Put bluntly, possessing legitimacy can mean the difference between being found to be accepted or unacceptable. In societies where the military is vested with a monopoly of collective violence in the interest of the state, a certain inequality arises. Soldiers, in the execution of their duties, may use deadly force to kill other human beings, something that other citizens (non-soldiers) may not do. In order to justify this inequality, which lies at the heart of modern liberal society, the military’s use of force must fall into some schema that renders it acceptable, even desirable. The enablement of such a schema relies on the military’s existence, and their holding of a monopoly of violence, being deemed and seen to be legitimate. From this we can see that legitimate military activity is that which accords with the prevailing political discourse; for our purposes, this discourse claims that the political is the superordinate realm. Illegitimate military activity, on the other hand, is that activity which is out of sync with this political organising principle: “Leaders who are considered to be acting in ways that citizens threaten their world order risk forfeiting the legitimacy to rule.”

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246 Bobbitt 5-12.
247 Van Doorn 22.
Following from a Weberian conceptualisation of legitimacy, Van Doorn believes that the key to a legitimate role for the military lies in institutionalization, the process of bureaucratization and de-personalization that can be traced to the beginning of the Modern Period. We can see this process clearly articulated by Clausewitz and his Remarkable Trinity. By entering into a process of formalisation, the military becomes embedded into the existing order, rather than a body completely separated from it. This is of vital importance, not only for the government, who no longer need to be weary of the military lurking in the shadows, but also for the military itself. Legitimacy understood in this way means that the military does not need to worry about whether or not it will be accommodated or accepted by society. Each time a new general is appointed at the head of the armed forces, or a new parliament is elected, there is no need to question whether or not the military has a role to play in the organs of the state; institutionalised legitimacy means, for the military at least, that "they can generally rely upon their being accepted." As Gianfranco Poggi explains,

> Legitimacy means that [an actor] can assume, in their routine operations, that subjects or citizens will comply with...orders...on the basis not only of unreflecting habit or fear of punishment, but also of a willing disposition to obey, motivated by a sense of obligation and of moral self-respect.

The main issue in civil-military relations, then, becomes the establishment and maintenance of this legitimacy.

However, located with this notion of virtuous restraint, is a paradox, for "the more unlikely major military conflicts become, the more difficult it is for the soldier, as well as

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249 Van Doorn 23.
250 Van Doorn 22.
251 Poggi, 82.
his culture, to retain belief in his efforts and existence." The difficulty for the military becomes, therefore, how to maintain some kind of relevance, while at the same time obedience its political master, who may not provide a role for the military to fill. This difficulty is compounded when the society that surrounds both the politician and the general is added to the picture. In a democratic society the military is not only subordinate to the government, but both together are subject to the approval of the citizenry at large. The parent society may confer legitimacy to the military, but it does so largely on its own terms. Unlike in what Harries-Jenkins describes as a ‘militocratic’ regime (where the military serves as the ‘guardian of the state’, taking its role directly from the constitution or founding principles of the state), in democracies “the legitimacy of the military is evaluated against a subjectively determined concept of ‘what ought to be’ rather than ‘what is’. This normative concept changes over time, but also changes at a faster rate in the parent society than in the armed forces.” This phenomenon means that the military is often seen to maintain “a seemingly outmoded interpretation of the common good.”

In addition to this unavoidable reality, there are two other reasons why armed forces must concern themselves with issues of legitimacy. The first is because in the West, especially since the decline of conscription, the military is increasing seen as non-representative of the wider society. The public regard the military as a ‘closed society’, self-selecting, secretive, and in some cases, drawn from a particular segment of,

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252 Van Doorn 34.
254 Harries-Jenkins 56.
255 Harries-Jenkins 53.
rather than the whole, society. Due to this, the military can be seen as an alien organisation requiring special attention and oversight. Although in some cases positive steps are taken to 'correct' the perceived imbalances within the armed forces, by the introduction of 'equalisation' programs such as affirmative action or employment equity, most often it is the fact that the government (which is seen to be representative, at least in liberal democracies at any rate), is in charge which resolves this issue. Often, then, the military must rely on its bond with the government for its own legitimacy. Harries-Jenkins calls this "derived or reflected legitimacy", whereby it is political oversight which brings about the legitimacy, rather than anything inherent within the military itself.

Secondly, and perhaps more practically, since the military absorbs a great deal of a country's treasure, there is a need to ensure that this money is spent in a manner that delivers the most 'bang for the buck'. Issues of effectiveness (how well does the military meet the government's objectives?) and efficiency (how well do they utilise their resources in this pursuit?) demand that the military be accountable for their budgetary allotments. The importance of this fact gives rise to the popular macro-economic imagery of 'guns or butter'. It is felt that given these stark choices, the military cannot be left to make decisions on their own. Harries-Jenkins goes so far as to state the "military

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256 Over time this segmentation has taken based on class, race, religion, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation. In some cases, the 'unrepresentativeness' of the armed forces has concentrated on the officer corps' dependence on aristocratic elites (e.g. the purchasing of commissions) while in other contexts it has been reflected in a concern (correct or otherwise) that the 'ranks' were over-filled with poor, uneducated, racial minorities (e.g. during U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War). For a comprehensive examination of how this segmentation plays out in the American case, see Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, eds. Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001).

purpose embraces two...motives: that of...legitimacy and...effectiveness. Without the former, achieving the latter is impossible.

Without political legitimacy, the armed forces within a democratic system would be fish without water, unable to concentrate on their assigned tasks. Precious time and resources would have to be siphoned off in order to justify each and every action undertaken. While not completely freed from this type of activity now, the military has a certain amount of legitimate capital that it can draw on; this capital is the product of institutionalisation, whereby a contract of sorts has been put in place. In exchange for formalized relations with the government and the people, and based on the notion of professional restraint or the instrumentalized use of violence, the armed forces are granted a degree of autonomy.

The military, as a single actor, is not alone in the need to maintain legitimacy. Governments, too, rely on the establishment of relationships with the people and with the military. In democracies, this legitimacy is established not only through the rule of law and whatever particular constitutional arrangements that may exist, but also through various forms of influence exercised by the people, whether it be in voting, or in the inevitable opinion polling that fills nearly every day between elections.

If legitimacy is a form of capital the military must make periodic investments in order to sustain and maintain it. It is not the case that militaries ‘achieve’ legitimacy once and for all. Legitimation “is more a set of relationships than an individual event.”

The first of these relationships is that between the military and the government. The most obvious way in which the process of civil control of the military is carried out is by legal

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258 Harries-Jenkins, 237.
means. Constitutions and statutes shape (i.e. enable and restrain) the military and make the limits of legitimate military activity clear.\textsuperscript{260} It can be said that they represent the "articulation" "...of the generalised values of the superordinate system" since they stem from the very highest levels of that system.\textsuperscript{261} The intended audience for these legal methods is three fold: they speak to the military, but equally to the government and the people.\textsuperscript{262} These laws (which differ across national contexts) deal with almost every aspect of political oversight, from the appointment of a commander in chief, to the role of the armed forces, to the establishment of political offices designed to provide political direction to the armed forces, to the kinds of financial and disclosure regulations that apply to the armed forces, to the way in which a military might apply discipline to its own soldiers. They are the most formal instruments of control and since they derive by definition from the political-cum-legislative apparatus of the state, they embody in their very existence the critical element of civil control.

A less formal but more important relationship is the one that exists between the military and the society. In one sense this relationship is mediated by the government, where that government is seen to be representative of the people. However, in a significant regard, the people themselves have a role to play. After all, it is their values, will, and moral consensus that are seen as the fount of legitimacy within a liberal democratic political order. Seen in this light, the idea of popular sovereignty means that the military is doubly under civil control. As Harald Laski notes "the will of the state is

\textsuperscript{260} Bobbitt, 6-7. While it might be interesting to explore which comes first the value or its legal expression, I will not go into that here. For the purposes of this paper, it is acknowledged that abstract notions of 'good' are held prior to any laws being written; however, when dealing with a mature political order, it is impossible to return to an 'original position' where a society might exist in a pre-legal situation.\textsuperscript{261} Van Doorn 21.

\textsuperscript{262} Reinforcing the notion that the government is an intended recipient of law, Bobbitt claims that prior to the written constitution of the United States, sovereign states were not subject to the laws of their own country. Bobbitt, 262.
subject to the scrutiny of all who come within the ambit of its decisions.” And, as has been mentioned above, military activity is in many respects no different than other state functions, particularly in this regard. The people get a say as to how the military operates within a given political system, if for no other reason than because it is their tax money that pays for it.264 This input can take many forms ranging from the relatively benign (and therefore common), such as public access to defence information, media questioning, lobbying and participation in policy reviews and formulation processes, to the significant (and therefore rare), such as the recall of defence minister or the defeat of a government in an election. These means, of course, are part of the greater institutionalisation mentioned above, and the end of which is the transference of popular legitimacy to the armed forces.

It should be remembered that popular support is often fickle and, as Harries-Jenkins mentions above, highly subjective and dynamic. Changes in the landscape caused by demographic shifts, recent military escapades which vary in popularity, and the role and mission of the military may have a significant impact on public opinion of, support for, and consequently the legitimacy of, the armed forces. While it may be possible to gauge what the public will support and what it will not, this cannot be taken for granted.

Writing of welfare states, Harries-Jenkins claims that government “decisions are often irrational in the sense that they are derived from an ill-defined and normative

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263 Harald Laski, cited in Harries-Jenkins 43.
ethical posture which represents an absolute standard of values”\textsuperscript{265}; these absolutes can easily become out of step with the more fluid societal norms. Again, it is instructive here to recall that Clausewitz warned against viewing the Trinitarian balance as a static concept, castigating those who sought to ‘fix arbitrary relationships’ between the elements of the Trinity. Furthermore, for Clausewitz “war was not only a continuation of politics: it was also an activity that took place within a social context.”\textsuperscript{266} Since particular societies differ in the way in which they are organised and in which the values they find meaningful, “the sources of legitimacy...are an expression of a [particular] social climate.”\textsuperscript{267}

But what are ‘the sources of legitimacy’? Philip Bobbitt believes that “legitimacy...derives from history”, which in his eyes is more that merely a dispassionate record of what has happened, but rather “an understanding of past practices that characterizes a particular society.”\textsuperscript{268} Bobbitt’s emphasis that is not the ‘material’ nature of history (what happened when) that is the key to legitimacy is important: it is how that history is understood, or interpreted, that matters most. Actually, that \textit{interpreted} history, shaped by language and the subjective perspectives of those who record it, publish it, and pass it on, ceases to be history and is transformed into something much greater. It takes on far more potency, as far as the establishment of legitimacy is concerned, in the form of myth.\textsuperscript{269} As Christopher Coker describes it, “myth is a story that enables us to imagine our social surroundings and to carry out the collective practices that make up our social

\textsuperscript{266} Philip Windsor, \textit{Strategic Thinking: An Introduction and Farewell}. Mats Berdal and Spyros Economides, eds. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner Press, 2002): 34.
\textsuperscript{267} Van Doorn 21.
\textsuperscript{268} Bobbitt, 7.
\textsuperscript{269} Van Doorn 21.
A myth is “an allegory of the real and not its passive reflection which allows a soldier to assess, understand and judge the value of his own profession... Myth is the transcendent encounter which tells us how to live our life.” In order to be legitimate, in fact, a soldier (or any other actor) must act within the framework of expectation contained within the mythical history of the society to which he belongs. The other actors, too—in our case the government and the people—have expectations, derived from myths, to which they hold the soldier to account. Moreover, there are expectations to which the people and the government are compared, equally shaped by myth. To be ‘in sync’ with those mythical expectations is to be legitimate.

The myths to which we ascribe are really the “self-portrayal of a society that enables it to know its identity.” What we choose to include and recall in our myths, what we choose to highlight of our collective narrative of the past, serves to bolster what we value today. Myths provide us with the vocabulary to describe our present actions and future intentions and, in turn, that language and metaphor...[has] immense impact on our assessment of the ethics of our conduct. We fashion cloaks from words and images and place them on events. These cloaks deeply affect our perception of those events, our moral intuitions about them, and what we see as ethical responses to them.

Bill Sweeney underlines the power of these mythical references when he says that they “acquire a facticity which we perceive as the objective constraint on our thinking and

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271 Coker, 35.
272 Bobbitt, 5-6.
behaviour.” In fact, it can be said that the social world in which we act is constructed from them.

The notion that actions are tied to ideas is most keenly associated with Max Weber. He defines action as “human behaviour when and to the extent the agent or agents see it as subjectively meaningful.” Perhaps more important to the model which lies at the heart of this chapter is Weber’s observation that action is only truly social action when “behaviour is related in its meaning to the behaviour of other people.”

The foundation on which this link between ideas and action is based is made up of norms. Theo Farrell defines them, in the tradition of Max Weber, thus:

Norms shape action by providing actors with ways of defining problems and responding to them appropriately; these are regulatory norms. Constitutive norms also shape action by enabling actors to construct identities which give meaning to their actions the actions of others. In other words, in addition to asking themselves, “What kind of situation is this?” and “What am I supposed to do?” actors may also ask, “What am I supposed to do as (say) a French Army officer?

Norms, then, can be seen as link between Coker’s myths and Sweeney’s constraints. Indeed, norms are what myths are made of, and myths serve merely as vehicles for transmitting norms, which in turn form the basis of legitimacy. Something is legitimate if it is in accordance with the normative framework suggested by myths. **Indeterminacy**

However, perhaps Sweeney’s idea that myths form constraints goes too far. After all, as our myths are reinterpreted over time, any constraint formed by them would have a

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276 Runciman 7.
certain elasticity to it. However, I believe he is right in the sense that there are boundaries formed through our interpretations of myths, which while not absolute, do influence what we consider as legitimate. In a sense, they are like the piste markers on a ski slope: skiing outside may be possible, but most of us tend to stay on the well-groomed runs, leaving the fresh powder for the more adventurous. In this sense, we might view such “persistent patterns of behaviour”\textsuperscript{277} as a description of social action. Put slightly differently, Peter Katzenstein claims that the environment within which actors operate is marked by “collectively shared expectations”, which he believes are a product of social factors, such as norms and identities.\textsuperscript{278}

How does this relate to Clausewitz’s work? It is the Prussian himself that reminds us that any particular military activity is a product of the specific circumstances that give birth to it. Writing again to Major Röder, Clausewitz states that, “every major war plan grows out of so many individual circumstances, which determine its features, that it is impossible to derive a hypothetical case with such specificity that it could be taken as real. We are not referring simply to trivialities, but to the most important issues.”\textsuperscript{279} Clausewitz was referring to such things as the nature of the political regime at war and the manner in which its leaders came to power. It is interesting that these ‘most important issues’ are based on values and ideas (norms), and not merely on physical or material factors, such as the number of men or canon available. Ideas shaped such things as how a society is organised and whether or not it chooses how it is governed, and these things matter in shaping how a military campaign might be prosecuted.

\textsuperscript{279} Peret and Moran, 22.
Furthermore, Clausewitz also stressed that a sense of historical contingency is vitally important if we are to understand how any certain military action came to occur:

The exceptional circumstances in which Bonaparte and France found themselves since the Wars of the Revolution, allowed him to achieve major victories on almost every occasion, and people began to assume that the plans and actions created by those circumstances were universal norms. But such a view would summarily reject all of the earlier history of war, which is absurd.  

Ideas are important in war, according to Clausewitz, and those ideas change over time.

To believe that they remain fixed is delusional.

Clausewitz did not stop with history. The future counts too, and he regarded it as a something that could not be predicted. Again making reference to Napoleon’s battlefield success, Clausewitz was sure to register both the possibility and importance of variability, in this example, within the relationship between the people and the government and the effect that would have on future war:

War, untrammelled by any conventional restraints, had broken loose in all its fury. This was due to the peoples’ new share in these great affairs of state; and their participation, in turn, resulted partly from the impact that the Revolution has on the internal conditions of every state...Will this always be the case in the future? From now on will every war in Europe be waged with the full resources of the state, and therefore have to be fought only over major issues that affect the people? Or shall we see again a gradual separation taking place between government and people? Such questions are difficult to answer, and we are the last to dare to do so...  

This idea of contingency is explained here with reference to the power of ideas: the rise in the importance of the people following on from the French Revolution, and the mythical notion of liberté, égalité, et fraternité. These terms were mythical and

280 Peret and Moran, 24.
281 Clausewitz, Book Eight, Chapter 3, 717.
normative in the sense discussed above: they provided the resources necessary for agents to construct meaning, and from there, to take social action. As these ideas change over time, Clausewitz tells us, the resultant action, too, may change.

However, it is not simply the case that norms change; their power or influence over social action is not absolute. Myths—and the norms within them—do not dictate action, they must first interpreted by individuals, who use them to construct what Ann Swidler calls "strategies of action."\(^{282}\) As Alexander Wendt explains, it is not the mere presence of ideas that leads to action, but rather each actor must choose which ideas to act upon, and how.\(^{283}\) Confronted by the several, often competing norms, different actors may choose to act differently, giving different priorities to the relevance or importance of any set of ideas.\(^{284}\) This is especially so in contemporary societies, which are freed from the stifling constraints of more traditional times. As Charles Moskos and James Burk point out, today's societies in the West are marked by "radical uncertainty" which means that "we cannot easily judge the relative importance of collective activities."\(^{285}\) Vaclav Havel believes that we live in a world with "no unified meaning...where everything is possible and almost nothing is certain."\(^{286}\)

Benjamin Gregg believes that this gives rise to a condition that he calls normative indeterminacy:


[this] refers to the lack of clear, distinct, and rationally persuasive knowledge. It refers specifically to knowledge of what a normative rule means, and how groups and individuals should apply it...It refers to indefinite knowledge about norms as...direct guides to behaviour...The thesis of indeterminacy asserts that...no theory, rule of principle constrains us...to interpret or apply the norm in a particular way. Consequently a normative question or problem could have many different answers or solutions—yet all of them valid. But if different answers are equally valid, then validity can no longer serve...as a criterion to guide public policy.287

The idea of indeterminacy is an important one, as it means that while myths and norms may form structures within which actors perform social action, the subjective nature of the way in which those actors understand the myths and norms means that agency, too, is present. As Gregg describes, indeterminacy places a premium on interpretation:

norms, whose meaning and proper application are unknown or unclear, cannot be used without interpretation. Indeterminate norms cannot be used without the direct and vital intervention of human agency in social structures, such as society's political and legal remine or cultural understandings. Only the interpreters, never the indeterminate norms themselves, can decide which meaning and applications are politically or morally acceptable and which are not.288

In the case of civil-military cooperation, as well shall see, the role of interpreter is played by actors within the people, the government and the military. However, it is perhaps most acutely applicable to the tactical level military commander who, while deployed 'on the ground and in the field' must put in place an effective plan. And while a commander may be guided by the norms, collective expectations, and myths found within their own professional, political, and social settings, it is they who must

288 Gregg, 19. Emphasis added.
decipher—and pass on—some meaningful message, as a guide to action. This allowance for reflexive subjectivity gives rise to the important concept that “meaning [cannot] be thought of as somehow objectively ‘correct’ or ‘true’ by some metaphysical criterion”.

Often times, military commanders find themselves in situations of combat, or at least crisis, which bear little resemblance to the abstract world of norms and myths. This has a profound effect on what is decided:

Norms can be interpreted only in ad hoc ways. The meaning of a norm is ‘found’ or ‘discovered’ within the situations in which the norm is applied. In the end, every instance of an indeterminate norm’s application can be accounted for only separately, by reference to specific, local, and contingent determinants. The meaning of a norm is elaborated in ad hoc ways to cover the idiosyncracies of a situation within which it is applied. The norm may be ‘stretched’ if need be to fit the particular situation.

This final phrase reminds us, though, that the individual interpreter is not given a completely free hand in interpretation. The need to stretch norms reminds us that norms, if not absolute, do have power. As I have indicated above, actors strive to obtain and maintain legitimacy. In order to do so, no matter how liberal an interpretation may be, it must bear some resemblance to the normative, often mythical, expectations. This is what allows us to see individual interpreters, such as the fictitious Colonel Kurtz in Apocalypse Now, or the real-life Lieutenant Calley at My Lai, as having gone too far in their normative ad hocery. Not only must there be subjectivity (individual interpretation), but also intersubjectivity (mutual or collective understanding). In the Clausewitzian sense, each actor in the Trinity, then, may see the world within a framework informed by myth; however, as each actor is not disembedded from, but rather a part of, a larger society, the

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289 Runciman 7.
290 Gregg 28.
way in which he or she sees the world depends to a large degree on the other actors. This is akin to the Trinity's maintenance of 'magnetic equilibrium': there may be room for manoeuvre, but it is limited. A move too far from any pole would upset the delicate balance. There is a latent dynamism inherent in this conceptualisation of social action: as myths are interpreted and reinterpreted, they are seen to be both enduring and malleable—perhaps not radically, but perceptibly.

Conclusion

Clausewitz's Trinitarian approach to military activity provides us with an important framework within which to analyse and understand contemporary civil-military cooperation. Above all, Clausewitz tells us that war (and, by extension, all military operations) is not purely a military activity. Rather it is the result of inputs from all aspects of a state. The people contribute passion; the government provides direction; and the military applies its skill within the realm of chance to affect a result.

These contributions cannot be taken for granted though. They may change over time and across different states. Variations in emphasis, in intensity, and in capability abound and can mean that outcomes, too, are dynamic. Equally important, Clausewitz points out, are the relations between the actors. The links, for instance, between people and government or between the military and the people are not fixed. A war from one age may not resemble a war from another, given these changes.

However, this is not to say that within any given state, the spectrum for variation is infinite. Norms, which help inform both the actions and the relations between the actors, are passed on in the form of powerful narratives called myths. These norms speak to the values and characteristics that are meaningful within a particular social or cultural
environment. Norms concern topics such as the proper use of force, or the role or objective that particular society sets for itself. These might include ideas like 'it is right for our society to help others in need' or 'we have a responsibility to respect the autonomy of other societies and not interfere in their internal affairs.' Norms raise collective expectations and action that is not in accord with these expectations can be said to be illegitimate. Legitimacy, for any actor, is important because it enables and facilitates action. Without legitimacy, an actor must spend valuable resources explaining or defending how it operates within society.

As important as norms are, they are not absolute determinates of action. Their meanings are often vague, or in competition with other norms. This indeterminacy requires that individuals first must interpret norms before deciding how to implement them. So, despite the existence of a framework, such as the Trinity, and constraining guidelines, such as myths, agency is retained.

The notion that individuals strive for legitimacy in their actions, in the face of imprecise and conflicting normative environments, forms the basis for the analysis of how civil-military cooperation is carried out in by Canada. I will now look at how each actor in Clauswitz's Trinity operates and what military activity results.
Chapter 4:
The People: Ambivalent Supporters

"Active military combat is just not consistent with Canadians' self-image of what we should be doing abroad... We continue to see ourselves as a kind of Baden-Powell of the world community, doing good deeds, not getting killed or killing others."

Allan Gregg, Pollster

"Is the Canadian society anti-military or just poorly informed about the military and its role today and historically?"

Seminar discussion question set at Canadian Army Tactics School, 1998

The intensity of the people's role in military activity has changed from the days of mass mobilization war which characterized the West in the 19th and first half of the 20th Centuries.291 When, for instance, NATO armies are deployed, the populations of most of Europe and North America may "sympathize but do not suffer; they empathize but they do not experience."292 However, that is not to say that the people have no role in contemporary operations. In democracies like Canada, the population has a significant influence on the way both the government and the military conduct themselves on the battlefield. So while Colin McInnes may be correct in his assessment on suffering, he is wrong when he says that "society no longer participates, it spectates from a distance."293 Philip Everts believes that, "Whether the consequences are good or bad, and whether we like it or not, the public is...always involved in wars, their participation, conduct or prevention, and whatever their form, as participant or observer." Therefore, he continues, "public opinion, what people think and the way they look at the world and how they act upon their convictions in the political process [is] not only a topic of concern to

293 McInnes, 2.
governments, but consequently also a major factor in understanding foreign policy and international politics.”

This chapter will examine the role of the Canadian public in the formulation and shaping of foreign policy and military activity. The Canadian people, as a Trinitarian actor, while perhaps not projecting “hatred and enmity,” certainly provide the government and the military with a degree of passion to be harnessed. This passion is animated by the images of peacekeeping and other mythical ideals and, therefore, helps form expectations of what the Canadian Army should do at home and overseas. Furthermore, those expectations are not necessary enough to support robust, prolonged or coherent responses. The people may be fickle, but far from having no role, their contribution to their Trinitarian partners is important.

The people, as an entity, are more than opinion polls. As discussed in Chapter 3, it is their expectations that form the basis upon which other actors are deemed to be legitimate or not. Therefore, their collective understanding about the importance of certain symbols, norms, and values—in essence, the myths—surrounding the nature of military activity can be influential to both political and military decision makers. They form the context and parameters within which military activity is conceived, deployed, and ultimately, evaluated.

Assigning the people a role in the shaping of military practice is not to dismiss or discount the difficulty in tracing it accurately or explaining it fully. This difficulty is

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compounded by the problematic nature of the polling conducted. As Pierre Martin has noted,

although the [Department of National Defence] has done extensive polling through the years, the results of these polls are not easily accessible, they tend to present a discontinuous image of the public's policy preferences (i.e. few questions are consistently repeated over long periods), and they do not tend to make full use of modern techniques to assess both the causes of opposition to...policies and the true strength of support for these policies.296

It is not the aim of this chapter to conduct quantitative analysis into the impact that public opinion has on defence policy. Rather this chapter aims to show what the people's contribution is to the larger process of the formulation and execution of military practice. However, it is worthwhile reviewing the two schools of thought govern public opinion research.297 The dominant school of thought is the Almond-Lippmann tradition, which is based on American research from the 1950s. Effectively, this school holds that public opinion is "volatile and incoherent, having little impact on policy outputs."298 Others, building on work which focused on the relationship between public opinion and the Vietnam War, have concluded that public opinion could have an effect on policy. Authors varied on the nature of that effect (some felt that it was constraining, others saw it as a significant driver) but concluded that the Almond-Lippmann tradition was not always and everywhere valid.299 Several authors examining the Canadian case (using

298 Carrière et al, 2.
299 Carrière et al, 2-4.
quantitative methods) tend to agree with the dissenting school of thought. Indeed, they
would agree that “the public must and can be treated as a full partner in the making and
implementing of...policy.”

Listening to the People

One important indicator of the contribution made by public opinion is the value
placed in it by governments and, increasingly, militaries. The importance attached to
monitoring public opinion can be gauged by examining the level of resources dedicated
to this task. While relatively modest, Canadian Forces spending on public opinion
research, mainly in the form of polling and focus groups, has increase significantly since
2004 (see Figure 4.1). The value placed on public opinion within the military should not
be underestimated:

Public support is vital to the Department of National Defence and the Canadian
Forces. It is important as the Government sets its priorities. It is invaluable to the
men and women of the CF as they carry out their roles in support of Canada and
Canadians. And, it is an indicator of the willingness of Canadians to have Canada
play a meaningful role in the world.

The Department of National Defence is consistently one of “the 10 [government]
departments and agencies that were most active in public opinion research” across
Canada. Clearly, the Canadian military considers it “important to capture and track the
views, perceptions and attitudes of Canadians toward the Forces.”

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301 Martin and Fortmann, 67.
Observers differ in their opinion as to the reasons underpinning this move. Denis Stairs believes that the Department of National Defence and the military conduct opinion polling, and public consultations (through a number of mechanisms, some of which will be described below), as a form of “defensive politics”. Because the public’s trust in government is low, Stairs contends, politicians and officials must be seen to measure the mood and preferences of the electorate. Therefore, while “these consultations may, or may not, be genuinely intended as mechanisms for acquiring useful policy advice…it is highly unlikely in the present political climate that…a high-profile declaration of government policy would be pursued on an ‘in-house’ basis alone.” The government has a “sense that the legitimation of whatever they do depends on their having embarked on ostentations displays of ‘outreach’ activity as an integral part of their approach to

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decision-making." On the other hand, Pierre Martin is less cynical. Polling and consulting the public are not defensive politics, Martin claims, but rather represents part of a larger evolution: “in foreign policy as in other areas of activity, governments have become more *accountable* to their publics.” Whether as an aspect of defensive or positive politics, there is a degree of commonality between these perspectives.

Government in Canada seeks to find out what the people think about foreign and defence issues.

What does the government find out when it asks people about defence and foreign policy issues? The answer seems to accord with the first part of the Almond-Lippmann school of thought: Canadian public opinion certainly appears incoherent, and at times, even volatile. However, there are consistent aspects of it, which provide a clear, if muted, message. Jack Granatstein, a noted military historian, claims that “Canadians want their army to be fierce in war, social workers in peace...caring and efficient in natural disasters, and they want this without cost to them. This is not sensible, but that is the state of affairs.”

It hardly seems surprising that what people say about defence issues depends on what is asked. For instance, there is lukewarm support, relatively consistent over time, for the armed forces (see Figure 4.2). This tepidity is matched by Canadian approval ratings for defence policy over a 21 year period (see Figure 4.3). However, armed only with this information, a decision maker would not know enough to even begin designing

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306 Martin, 1.
a strategy. What do the people of Canada like or dislike about the military and defence policy? It is not clear from these data.

Figure 4.2: Support for the Military

In order to understand the character of public 'support' for the military in Canada, it is necessary to ask two further types of questions. First, it is important to understand the people's policy preferences in priorities. In short, what do the people think the most pressing issues are for the country at any given time? This would allow, in theory, a decision-maker to allocate the necessary resources in order to address these priorities. The military may or may not figure into the resulting strategy. Second, a decision-maker must contextualize public support for the military within the framework of what the people see as the military's role. Armed with this information, a decision-maker would better understand why the military enjoys, or does not enjoy, the support of the people.

The Canadian people, when asked, do not seem to place defence high on the list of ‘most important issues to be addressed’ by the government. Figure 4.4 shows the results from polling in 2007. Healthcare, the economy, and education top the list, with only 3% perceiving security and defence as their number one priority. It would seem, therefore, within this context, that the government could afford to concentrate on issues other than defence. However, when the same sample of people was asked to focus solely on defence and foreign policy issues, they provided conflicting information (see Figure 4.5). A majority expressed the opinion that “national defense” should be a high priority for the government.

Figure 4.4: Public Priority Issues

What should the government focus on most? (2007)

- Int. Affairs
- Jobs
- Tax Reform
- Social Issues
- National Security/Defence
- Other
- Poverty/Welfare
- Don't Know
- Education
- Economy
- Healthcare

0 10 20 30 40
% Choosing as Top Priority

Figure 4.5: Foreign and Defence Policy Priorities

What Priority Should the Government Place on these Issues? (2007)

- National Defence
- Protecting National Security
- Improving Canada/US Relations
- Representing Canada Internationally

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100
% Expressing Choice

High
Med
Low

Adding to the confusion is the fact that, over time, responses change, a feature that is exacerbated when different questions are asked, and different polling firms are employed. For instance, when a poll was repeated several times over a period of eleven years, public opinion as to ‘the most important issue facing the country’ appeared to be, as predicted by the Almond-Lippmann thesis, quite volatile (see Figure 4.6). This can be explained, perhaps, by the events dominating the news at the time of the polling. For instance, it is not surprising to find concern over issues related to “world conflict/war/security” during the first quarter of 2003 as being the foremost concern of over 22% of Canadians. What is surprising, perhaps, is that represents a ten-fold increase in four years, followed by a five-fold decrease the following year.

Figure 4.6: Most Important Issues Facing Canadians

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A similar poll, conducted by the government Department of Communications, in 2002 and 2003, seems to contradict some of the patterns seen in Figure 4.6. (See Figure 4.7). Concerns over national security seem highest in the Fall of 2002, not in the Spring of 2003, around the time of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. As noted by Martin, without further probing by the questioner at the time of the poll having been conducted, it is difficult to understand these variations. Again, a clear picture of Canadian public opinion does not arise, except to the extent that defence issues appear not to be the most important issues in the minds of Canadians. This, to a limited but somewhat helpful extent, can aid our understanding of the weak support expressed by Canadians for their military: the Canadian Forces are not the instrument best placed to address concerns over the economy, healthcare, and education.

Figure 4.7: Public Priorities 2002-2003

With that in mind we can turn to the second aspect of contextualization and explore what it is that Canadians believe the role of the military is. There are two aspects of this line of questioning: what is that role and what should it be? In 1995, according to a poll commissioned by the Canadian government as part of the preparation for a new White Paper on policy, Canadians seemed very confident with regards to what they saw as the main, actual role for the Canadian Forces: 77% state that it was peacekeeping (see Figure 4.8).

**Figure 4.8: Main Role for CF Overseas**

![Graph showing the main role for CF overseas in 1995](image)

Other polling, carried out by Environics over a period of 27 years, speaks to the desired role of the Canadian military (see Figure 4.9). For the entire period, Canadians, when given the choice between “peacekeeping” or “traditional military” activity, chose...
peacekeeping as the role on which the CF ought to focus. While the ratio changes over time (with “traditional military” gaining ground in recent years), what is most interesting is the increased clarity of opinion expressed over the period. In 1979, 38% of respondents answered that they did not have an opinion with regards to the military’s role (more than those who expressed peacekeeping as an response). By the year 2000, the number of ‘don’t knows’ reduced to just over 3%.

Figure 4.9: Role of the CF

The public’s focus on peacekeeping was not limited to the role of the CF. In 1995, Canadians believed that peacekeeping was the most important contribution made by Canada overseas, by a ratio of 3:2 over the next choice, which was ‘don’t know’ (see Figure 4.10). Here, at last, Canadian public opinion appears clear: peacekeeping is important and should be the main role for the Canadian military.

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Against this mixture of volatility, incoherence and consistency, it seems that the government decision-maker’s options are not at all clear. A final set of data add more texture to the landscape. Perhaps the most important aspect of public opinion is the level of funding (and thereby importance) the people place on an activity (see Figure 4.11). While the findings shown in Figure 4.11 do not take into account trade-off points (that is, what other accounts should be increased or decreased in support funding preferences), it shows mounting support for the government to increase defence spending. It is not surprising to see a surge in desire for increased defence spending immediately following the September 11th attacks in the US. It is interesting to note that, similarly with the clarity on peacekeeping as the preferred role for the CF, the level of indecision on spending has significantly reduced in recent years. Finally, given the rise in real spending since 1998 (which has been conspicuously announced in the press, by both

political parties when in power) it is perhaps normal to note a cooling off in demand for increased spending since 2002.

Figure 4.11: Public Preferences on Defence Spending

However, it should be highlighted that, in relative terms, Canada spends the second lowest amount in NATO defence, beating only Luxembourg. In absolute terms, despite increases recently, spending levels, in real terms, are only now beginning to approach the level of 1994 expenditure (see Figure 4.12).

\[\text{Data extracted and formatted by author.}\]

\[\text{NATO, NATO-Russia Compendium of Financial and Economic Data Relating to Defence. (Brussels: NATO International Staff, 2007): Table 3, page 10.}\]
If the public opinion discussed so far has been difficult to read clearly, we might take solace in the fact that it has largely been in response to abstract, hypothetical questions. Focusing on an actual mission may provide us with a more concrete expression of popular opinion regarding the Canadian military and its roles. In the spring of 2006, Canada altered its troop commitment to the Afghanistan mission, moving from Kabul, where it operated under command of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in the capital, to Kandahar, where it would work, at first for, and then as NATO expanded, beside US forces in the much more dangerous south of Afghanistan. As casualties mounted, public opinion dwindled; a mere 41% supported the mission (on average) from March 2006 until July 2007 (see Figure 4.13).

Conclusions

In trying to determine why the military might be interested in public opinion, we are confronted with two contradictory theoretical arguments. First, given traditional Huntingtonian civil-military relations theory, there should be little need for such opinion data, outside of, say, for recruitment purposes. The military’s functional imperative should be such that it concentrates of developing its relevant skills, acquiring adequate equipment, and so on. In Feaver’s application of civil-military relations, the military’s primary concern is following the direction given to it by the government. There should be no need, then, for the military to concern itself with what the people think. Once their political masters have spoken, their duty is to obey, regardless of the popularity of these orders with the ‘person in the street’.

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On the other hand, following Janowitz’s conception of the societal imperative, it is vital that the military fit into its wider society. It follows from that premise that in order to fit it, the military must know their social environment. The military does not have an inherent mechanism for gaining feedback, in the way that votes or sales figures function for politicians and commercial firms. Therefore, it needs to rely on polls and other such instruments to gain a sense of the public’s ‘views, perceptions and attitudes.’

A problem arises in the Canadian case. The message that one gains from the polling figures and in-depth focus group sessions can hardly be taken as a mandate. On the contrary, from the perspective of the military, it is not clear what the Canadian people want, that the Canadian public know what they want, or even that they know much about what it is they say they want. The people make a contribution to their Trinitarian partners, to be sure, but that contribution is largely one of ambivalence.
Chapter 5:
The Government: Delicious Ambiguity

"Canada was beset by ambivalencies which...created their own complexities."

Henry Kissinger

"Neurosis is the inability to tolerate ambiguity."

Sigmund Freud

At its most basic level, the relationship between the civilian, political leadership and the armed forces of a country appears straightforward. As one observer states, “a fundamental requirement of any nation is to ensure that the activities of its armed forces are subordinated to the political purposes of constitutional government; hence, the armed forces must be under civil control.” Not only does this arrangement prevent the violent hijacking of the state by the army, it ensures “an unbroken line of accountability from officers commanding...units in the field to the Chief of Defence Staff, to Parliament, and finally to the people.” Furthermore, this clear subordination is a virtue, not of expertise, but of role. The political masters in liberal democracies may not be up to date with the latest military tactics and technologies, but their job is to set priorities and provide direction: the uniformed, military expert “is not in a position to determine the value the people will attach to different issue outcomes...only the civilian [leader] can set the level of acceptable risk for society” by virtue of having been elected to be an responsible representative of the population. This positional power, according to Peter Feaver, is absolute: “Regardless of how superior the military view of a situation may be,

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321 The term ‘delicious ambiguity’ is attributed to Gilda Radner, the famous comedienne who died in 1989.
322 Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), 383.
the civilian view trumps it. Civilians should get what they ask for, even if it is not what
they really want. In other words, civilians have the right to be wrong.” As Clausewitz
succinctly stated, “political aims are the business of the government alone.”
Governments dictate, militaries deliver.

Or so the theory goes. The assumption underpinning this crude rendition of civil
control of the military, is that governments (that is, politicians and senior bureaucrats) ask
for something; that they actually dictate. Often the exchange is not as clear as a
politician saying, ‘jump’ and a general responding (as he prepares to leap) ‘how high?’
Sometimes, political guidance does not come at all. Sometimes, when it does come, that
guidance is vague, or contradictory.

The aim of this chapter is to look at the direction, in terms of foreign and defence
policy guidance, provided by Canadian governments, from the mid-1990s to 2005, with
an eye to gauging how it shapes military practice. It is worth stressing that the aim is not
to critique the content of the guidance, but rather to gauge its impact. In so doing, we
will consider the policy environment in which political leaders found themselves. From
there it will be possible to identify the salient elements within contemporary Canadian
foreign and defence policy (which, display a remarkable consistency, even as political
control has passed from prime minister to prime minister, and political party to political
party). Despite the presence of deeply held principles, the addition of new ideas and
emphases, and changing circumstances, Canadian policy guidance can be seen, above all,
to maintain political legitimacy in the particular Canadian setting. Perhaps ironically,
then, this ambiguous guidance helps to further establish and shore up the basis for

326 Feaver, 6. Emphasis added.
327 Carl von Clausewitz, Book 1, Chapter 1, §28, Page 101.
legitimate military activity. The Canadian Forces, in Freud's terms, appears to have avoided neurosis: despite the indeterminate nature of contemporary foreign and defence policy the Canadian military has proven to be remarkably adroit in its interpretation of the government's direction, and has translated that interpretation into concrete action, such as civil-military cooperation.

**Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy: 1995-2005**

Canadian foreign and defence policy, it has been noted, is full of "curious ambiguities." There is no consensus over the threats to Canada and Canadians, and, equally, it has proven difficult for governments to articulate Canada's national interests in a satisfying manner. This lack of certainty has been exacerbated since the end of the Cold War, which provided a context, while hardly a determinant, that did provide some shape to Canadian foreign and defence policy since the end of World War Two. As Robert Cooper has noted, for countries of the West, during the Cold War, "most foreign policy issues could be viewed in the light of a single overwhelming question." Since the early 1990s, though, "this rather artificial unity of vision has been lost." Confronted by the political challenges of the first Gulf War (Canada made a token air and naval contribution) and the international response to the violent collapse of Yugoslavia (where Canada played a major role as a troop contributor to the UN and NATO forces in Croatia and Bosnia since 1992), the Canadian Liberal government under Jean Chrétien responded with a new White Paper on foreign affairs. *Canada in the World* took advantage of the change in circumstances brought about by the end of the Cold War. Rather than focusing

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329 Delvoie 36-37.
on tasks (such as the defeat of a particular enemy, or the support of a particular ally or alliance), the White Paper sought to carve out themes that Canada would like to work on.

In this sense, the government of the day was explicit in its intent:

> to meet the challenges of an evolving world, the Government will pursue foreign policy to achieve three key objectives:
> - The promotion of prosperity and employment;
> - The protection of our security, within a stable global framework; and
> - The projection of Canadian values and culture.\(^{331}\)

*Canada in the World* was notable for several reasons. First, the previous White Paper had been published 25 years earlier. Second, it elevated the idea of “integrated” international action. The government signaled its desire to “draw on all available foreign policy instruments” in a coordinated fashion.\(^{332}\) It created, within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, a Bureau for Global Issues, headed by an Assistant Deputy Minister, to deal with transnational (and interdepartmental) files, such as peacebuilding, population growth, and the environment.\(^{333}\) Third, it introduced the idea of ‘value projection’ as both an ends and means of foreign policy. *Canada in the World* contains the first official references to human security within the Canadian government. The doctrine of human security was to become the key to both Canadian foreign and defence policy for the remainder of the decade.

The person responsible for transforming these ideas into practice was Lloyd Axworthy. A long-serving member of parliament, Axworthy had always wanted to be foreign minister, and made it clear to his staff that he would be making the most of his

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332 Canada, *Canada in the World*, ii.
new cabinet appointment.\textsuperscript{334} He wanted to transform Canadian foreign affairs activities, and make a difference on the world stage.\textsuperscript{335} Axworthy had been looking for a way to address global problems, as it had become “overwhelmingly obvious to him that conflict had changed” since the end of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{336} At first he thought that human rights would be the best focus, but then decided that it was too narrow and legalistic to serve as a basis for a foreign policy agenda.\textsuperscript{337} Guided by ideas put forward in Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s \textit{An Agenda for Peace}, Axworthy wanted to focus on both conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding and needed an overarching theme to connect them both.\textsuperscript{338} Furthermore, this new theme needed “new resonance, something to shock people’s conscience.”\textsuperscript{339}

One of Axworthy’s first overseas trips as Foreign Minister, in March of 1996, saw him visit Bosnia. While there, he noted that the only Canadian presence he could detect was that of the Army, working as part of NATO’s Stabilisation Force (SFOR). The soldiers with whom he spoke stated that they were trying to address the needs of the population by way of small community improvement projects, but complained of a lack of money.\textsuperscript{340} Axworthy could see that Canadian military peacekeeping “had a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{334} Lloyd Axworthy, \textit{Navigating A New World: Canada’s Global Future}. (Toronto: Knopf, 2003): 30. Prior to January 1996, Axworthy had been minister responsible for Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC).
\item \textsuperscript{335} Interview with Heidi Hulan, former Political Assistant to Lloyd Axworthy (Ottawa, Ontario, 18 March 2003).
\item \textsuperscript{336} Interview with Hulan.
\item \textsuperscript{337} Interview with Hulan.
\item \textsuperscript{339} Interview with Paul Heinbecker, former Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister Mulroney and Canadian Permanent Representative to the United Nations under Lloyd Axworthy (London, UK, 14 February 2003).
\item \textsuperscript{340} Interview with Axworthy.
\end{itemize}
This event prompted Axworthy to take two important steps.

First, he made the first mention of the ‘theme’ he had been looking for. During his speech to the United Nations General Assembly delivered in September 1996, he claimed that, “Changing times have set us a new and broader agenda, which includes focusing on the security needs of the individual—in other words, sustainable human security.”

Axworthy had “appropriated the term” human security from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), but took liberties with its focus. He “discarded UNDP’s narrow focus and their idea of measurement,” but seized on the idea of providing protection for individuals as a organizing principle for foreign policy. Axworthy used this occasion in a way akin to a ‘speech from the throne’, laying out his foreign policy agenda for the next four years: he signaled his wish to address the issues of anti-personnel landmines, war-affected children, and small arms disarmament, all of which he understood to be within the rubric of human security. He was explicit in what Canada was going to do to further this agenda:

we are currently focusing our approach to these issues. We have started to rework our own tool kit to improve our ability to initiate and support peace-building operations in areas such as preventive mediation and dialogue; human rights monitoring and investigation; media and police training; judicial reform; and demobilization.

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341 Interview with Paul Heinbecker.
342 Lloyd Axworthy, “Notes For An Address by The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs to The 51st General Assembly Of The United Nations,” New York, New York. 24 September 1996.
344 Axworthy, “Notes for an Address.”

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Axworthy’s second step was to follow this speech up with a meeting between senior officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the Department of National Defence (DND), and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). At this meeting, held in October 1996, he laid out his vision for a focus on peacebuilding and human security, which required a coordinated approach across all departments, under the umbrella of the Bureau of Global Affairs outlined in *Canada in the World*. His ideas were not met with much enthusiasm.

DFAIT, in the words of one director, “would have to be dragged kicking and screaming into anything involving the military.”345 The CIDA representative at the meeting was so affronted by the notion that he actually said, ‘no’ to the foreign minister.346 The military was less opposed to cooperation, but cool to the idea of a peacebuilding focus, as they feared it would include having to hunt for indicted war criminals in Bosnia, something they were not eager to do.347 Axworthy, though, was not taking no for an answer: “he was pushing things pretty hard on this.”348

The first concrete act that Axworthy wanted to achieve was the creation of the anti-personnel landmines treaty, what would be known as the Ottawa Process. He needed all three foreign actors within the government to cooperate. Because established “institutional links were not there”349 Axworthy’s approach was to hold a series of separate and joint meetings, cajoling and encouraging the parties to sign up to the initiative. For instance, he convinced the military leadership that a peacebuilding

345 Interview with Jill Sinclair, former Director General International Security Affairs, DFAIT (Ottawa, 30 May 2003).
346 Interview with Axworthy.
347 Interview with Axworthy.
348 Interview with Heinbecker.
349 Interview with Sinclair.
framework would allow the armed forces to gain additional funding, especially for “rebuilding as well as warmaking.”350 So-called “purists” from CIDA believed that such coherence, which necessitated having to cooperate with the military, “muddied the waters” and was the beginning of militarized aid.351 They went so far as to put up “barriers to cooperation”, such as suggesting that they could not use money allocated for aid and development for security purposes, pointing to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) restrictions.352

Eventually, though, the three departments did cooperate and, 15 months after his speech to the General Assembly, Canada became the first country to sign the Ottawa Convention on 3 December 1997.353 The treaty was a success for Axworthy and a boost for the idea of human security, in and outside Canada.354 It also helped forge personal relationships amongst players from all three departments, relationships which would prove useful as other issues were addressed.355 Over the next three years, Axworthy would promote his human security agenda, giving support to such initiatives as the creation of the International Criminal Court—and taking advantage of Canada’s election

350 Interview with Axworthy.
351 Interview with Hulan.
352 Interview with Sinclair; Interview with Mark Berman, the Deputy Director, Social Policies and Governance Directorate, CIDA (Hull, Québec) 30 October 2002. There were no clear restrictions on funding, but the issue was sufficiently unclear to prompt the DAC to promulgate a set of guidelines on the subject. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation on the Threshold of the 21st Century. (Paris: OECD, 1997).
353 The full name of the treaty is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction.
355 Interview with Sinclair; Interview with Axworthy.
to a two-year stint on the United Nations Security Council—raising the profile of conflict
diamond smuggling, small arms proliferation, sanctions for Angola, and other issues.356

While the military was involved to some extent in these cases, the watershed
moment, where the cause of human security came to most affect the Canadian Forces,
was Kosovo. Three years into Axworthy’s tenure, “Canadian participation” in the NATO
operations in the skies over and on the ground in Kosovo “was linked to the humanitarian
imperative.”357 Military action taken against Serbia in 1999 was seen by Axworthy as
“an opportunity to substantially advance the credibility of the concept of human
security... The ultimate test for a human security policy was a willingness to exercise
military force to uphold the policies of protection—an argument we were able to advance
day after day in Parliament and the media.”358 Until Kosovo, human security, even to its
proponents, was “a genuine diplomatic innovation, but not a operational doctrine.”359 As
detailed in Chapter 6, the initial military response to Kosovo was to undertake a major
role in the air campaign, dropping bombs on military and strategic infrastructure targets
in Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo. Air to ground sorties, though, could not be the sum
of the Canadian intervention. Canada, and its NATO allies, “could not turn away from
the humanitarian crisis taking place... That is why Canadian pilots are part of the effort,
why we are providing humanitarian relief and why we are offering sanctuary for 5000
refugees.”360 According to Heidi Hulan, the military leadership “got it instantly. They

356 McRae and Hubert, 267-273.
357 Interview with Hulan.
358 Axworthy, 186.
359 Interview with Heinbecker.
360 Lloyd Axworthy, “Kosovo and the Human Security Agenda,” Notes for An Address By the Honourable
Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International
Relations, Princeton University. 7 April 1999: 2.

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knew that they needed to be engaged in human security in Kosovo.”\textsuperscript{361} The shape of the
ground force elements deployed in Kosovo reflected that realization.\textsuperscript{362} As Hulan put it,
Canada’s contribution to the Kosovo crisis was “a combination of the political imperative
and the nature of the situation on the ground.”\textsuperscript{363}

Human security was the framework within which Axworthy and the Liberal
government of Jean Chrétien made good their promise to project Canadian values, so
clearly announced in \textit{Canada in the World}. However, in terms of putting it into practice,
the government was divided. Politicians and officials from DFAIT saw CIDA as
“terminally slow, unwilling to adapt.”\textsuperscript{364} CIDA, from its perspective, preferred to
concentrate on long term development, rather than the short-term focus humanitarian
assistance and reconstruction.\textsuperscript{365} As one senior CIDA director stated, the development
agency was not happy about what it saw as the political agenda inherent in Human
Security, but they had no choice but to “play along. We had to deal with real life.”\textsuperscript{366}
Opinion in DND and the military was equally undecided. In Bosnia, civil-military
cooperation practitioners felt that “it [was] CIDA’s mandates [they were] fulfilling, not
the Army’s.”\textsuperscript{367} The senior staff officer responsible for civil-military cooperation, who

\textsuperscript{361} Interview with Hulan.
\textsuperscript{362} For a detailed discussion of the civil-military cooperation activity in Kosovo, see Chapter 6.
\textsuperscript{363} Interview with Hulan.
\textsuperscript{364} Interview with Heinbecker.
\textsuperscript{365} Interview with Almir Tanovic, CIDA program officer, Canadian Embassy to Bosnia-Herzegovina
(Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina) 3 January 2003. Also see Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, \textit{The
\textsuperscript{366} Interview with Hélène Corneau, CIDA Manager of programs in Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania 1998-
2000 (Gatineau, Quebec) 30 October 2002.
\textsuperscript{367} Interview with Captain Chris Atkin, CIMIC Project Officer, Infantry Battle Group, Operation
Palladium, Bosnia, September 2002-March 2003 (Zgon, Bosnia, 27 December 2002).
had been involved in several steering and working groups aimed at fostering cooperation
between the three departments, characterized the best-case scenario as "coexistence."

In 2005, the Liberal government of Prime Minister Paul Martin published what it
believed to be a landmark document that aimed to correct this problem. Canada's
*International Policy Statement—A Role of Pride and Influence in the World* was billed as
"the country's first integrated plan designed to strengthen Canada's role in the world."

The *International Policy Statement* (IPS) championed a whole of government approach
to international affairs, an approach which was often referred to as 3D (diplomacy,
defence, and development), or 3D + T (when international trade was included). In it, the
government addressed global challenges (the threat of failed states, terrorism, poverty,
etc.) holistically, stating how each department would apply itself to them, in a spirit of
coherence and cooperation. Building on the theme of value projection contained in the
1995 foreign policy statement of his predecessor, Martin claimed that "a doctrine of
activism that over decades has forged our nation's international character...will serve us
even better in today's changing world. The people of our country have long understood
that, as a proud citizen of the world, Canada has global responsibilities."

Launched in the aftermath of three best-selling critiques of Canada's diminished international
capabilities, the IPS was an attempt by Martin to make up for drastic reductions in

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368 Interview with Major P.W. (Peter) Hewitt, Staff Officer responsible for Civil-Military Relations and
Environmental Health, Canadian Forces Joint Staff, International Operations (J3 International). (Ottawa,
Ontario) 29 May 2003.

Office of the Prime Minister) 19 April 2005.

370 Canada. "Prime Minister's Foreword," *Canada's International Policy Statement—A Role of Pride and

371 Andrew Cohen, *While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World.* (Toronto: MacMillan and
Collins, 2004).
spending, cuts which he had made as finance minister a decade before. In essence, the constraints alluded to in Canada in the World were lifted. As Martin described it there was a slow erosion in Canada's commitment to its military, to international assistance and to our diplomatic presence around the world...During the nineties, there were more cutbacks as our government made tough decisions to save the country from financial calamity. As a result, our international presence has suffered. But thanks to the sacrifice and resolve of Canadians, we have restored our fiscal sovereignty and have spent the past year renewing our investments in domestic priorities, such as health care. Now is the time to rebuild for Canada an independent voice of pride and influence in the world.372

If Kosovo served as the crystallization of Canadian international policy, as expressed in Canada and the World, then the focalizing event for the International Policy Statement was Afghanistan. Just as Canada in the World can be seen as an attempt to provide intellectual coherence to Canadian activity in the Balkans, which had begun before its publication, so too can the International Policy Statement be read as a way of providing guidance for the future, as well as describing Canadian activity of the recent past. Canadian participation in Afghanistan began in 2002 and the seeds for many of the ideas presented in the International Policy Statement were already planted by 2005.

Since 2006 and the rise to power of the Conservative Party of Canada, there has been no official policy document published. However, much of the previous policy, formulated under the Liberals, remains. The notion of the 3D approach, for instance, continues as a hallmark of Canadian declaratory policy.373 Hugh Segal, speaking as a Conservative Senator, further demonstrated the consistency, across time and political party boundaries, of the power of value-projection as a theme in foreign policy: "The

372 Canada. "Prime Minister's Foreword." 2. Much has been made of Martin's feelings of guilt over the cuts made in the 1990s, and of his desire to focus on foreign affairs because his father had been foreign minister a generation earlier. See John Gray, Paul Martin: The Power of Ambition. (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2003).
primary purpose of foreign policy is the advancement of a country’s fundamental values and core interests abroad.  

**Ambiguity: Inconsistency in words and deeds**

Looking at the two key international policy documents, spanning the period under study in this thesis, it would appear that there was sufficient policy direction for the various departments, agencies, and the military to implement. However, the sources of ambiguity and indeterminancy stemmed not from the lack of documents, but from the content of those documents. Furthermore, as each actor interpreted and implemented these policies, a degree of inconsistency, or incoherence, developed across the government, giving rise to greater ambiguity.

In evaluating the content of the foreign policy guidance provided by the government, it is possible to see that the notion of ‘value projection’, and a later a ‘doctrine of activism’, that gave rise to the most difficulties. Observers felt that they were poor substitutes for concrete objectives. Louis Delvoie, a former long-serving senior diplomat, complained that Canadian foreign policy as adrift and instead of identifying clear priorities, was instead searching for rationales. Denis Stairs, a prominent academic, titled his 2006 O.D. Skelton Lecture, “The Menace of General Ideas in the Making and Conduct of Canadian Foreign Policy.” An editorial in a leading

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newspaper accused the government of basing foreign policy and military action on nothing more than “just a confusing set of feel-good ideas.”

While these ideas may have been somewhat fuzzy, they were portrayed as having two important hallmarks: they were new and they were Canadian. Two senior diplomats gushed that “the human security paradigm not only changes the way we look at the world, it leads to a new way of acting in the world—and to a new diplomacy.” No less humble was the Canadian Permanent Representative to the United Nations: “Human Security is...a shift in the angle of vision: a new way of seeing things and doing things. Some consider it Copernican in its ambition. It is, at least, a paradigm shift in the conduct of foreign policy.” As Axworthy saw it, Canada had a “particular” role to play in this new world. Canada had, he claimed, “attractive values, a reputation as an honest broker, skills at networking, a democratic tradition of openness, a willingness to work closely with civil society.” Together, this novelty and nationalism was supposed to achieve the stated goal of Canadian international policy. Both Canada in the World and the International Policy Statement claimed that Canada was to (re)claim a leadership role in the world. As Prime Minister Chrétien recalled in his memoirs, “Canada has been able to maintain its international influence less by the success of its economy or the strength of its military than by demonstration of its values...Our values weren’t just the standards we wanted to achieve at home; they were the guidelines by which we intervened abroad.”

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377 Editorial. “Social work at gunpoint: Jean Chrétien is confused about when to deploy the military,” The Ottawa Citizen. 15 July 2003: A11.
378 McRae and Hubert, xxii.
380 Axworthy and Taylor, 193.
381 Jean Chrétien, My Years as Prime Minister (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007): 335.
Canadian foreign policy, as expressed in the 1995 and 2005 white papers, may have been explicit, but it was still full of ‘curious ambiguities’, both in terms of what was said and what was done. First, the objectives set out in *Canada in the World*, when taken as a whole, seemed to be strangely at odds with each other. Just what were Canadian values, given that its first priorities were ensuring Canadian prosperity and security? As Denis Stairs later noted that what Canadians seem to “want, in other words, is to be safe and rich, and we want to be seen as virtuous.”

Second, there seemed to be a disconnect between the ambitious, nearly open-ended set of objectives and the allocation of resources in order to realize them. The 1995 White Paper itself contained its own warning: “Until we get our own financial house in order, we will be seriously limited in our ability to act abroad to further Canadian objectives. Canadians recognize that we cannot do everything that we would like and that we must be selective...We will not do everything we have done in the past, nor shall we do things as we have done before.” Unfortunately, the Government was less than explicit in describing exactly what would be cut; instead, at face value, *Canada in the World* can be said to add more to the foreign policy agenda.

The third curiosity is perhaps less puzzling when viewed in the light of the resource constraints mentioned above. While enumerating its policy *ends*, and warning of its lack of *means*, *Canada and the World* says little about the *ways* in which it might

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383 Canada, *Canada in the World*, 8. At the time, Canada was experiencing a severe financial crisis. The first budget of Jean Chrétien’s government, in March of 1995, was introduced by then Finance Minister, later to be prime minister, Paul Martin. The Canadian budget deficit in 1993/1994 was 5.8% of GDP and was reduced, through spending cuts, to 1.1% of GDP in 1996/1997. However, the country’s debt (the accumulation of years of deficit spending) was still 67% of GDP, one of the highest in the OECD. See International Monetary Fund, “IMF Concludes Article IV Consultations with Canada,” Public Information Notice 98/6. (Washington: IMF) 19 February 1998.
achieve those ends. Here, it is ambiguous, as noted by a prominent non-governmental think-tank in its contemporary critique of the White Paper:

Unfortunately, this framework [based on the three pillars of prosperity, security, and value projection] is so broad that it provides the government maximum scope to rationalize a very wide spectrum of responses to any given foreign policy issue.\(^{384}\)

While this observation is valid, it is unlikely that the Government was unaware of it, or that it was accidental. As Kim Richard Nossal would observe at the end of the Liberal government’s reign, Canadian foreign policy is replete with “the purposeful confusion of values, goals, and interests.”\(^{385}\)

The problem with this confusion goes beyond the rhetorical. The logic of value-projection as a policy can lead to several conclusions, not just those reached by the Canadian government. For example, if Canada were committed to the values and principles of Human Security, there would have been several options open to it when faced with the challenge of Serbian aggression in the Balkans:

Canada, with its reputation as a non-combatant mediator of disputes and innovator of United Nations peacekeeping, might have offered high-level leadership on conflict prevention, development support and alternatives to bombing campaigns to resolve disputed issues, not just in Kosovo, but throughout the Balkans and at a much earlier stage. Canada’s successful federal state—officially bilingual and multicultural—was attained through constitutional, legal, policy, and economic incentives...Canada was uniquely positioned to offer leadership on self-determination, ethnic co-operation, and nation-building in Yugoslavia. Instead, a decade of disaster and lost opportunities followed as armed secession became the order of the day.\(^{386}\)

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Indeed, whether or not the NATO campaign in Kosovo can be considered a victory for values is not clear.\(^{387}\)

One can extend this logic further still and claim that if Canada possesses such strong humanitarian values, it should withdraw from its North Atlantic and North American defence alliances, which do not so openly espouse those same values.\(^{388}\)

Finally, and predictably, a policy based on values can be seen as acquiring an imperative at the heart of its mandate. Failure to act in accordance with those declared values \textit{each and every time} they apply can bring calls, not only of the foible of inconsistency, but the sin of hypocrisy, or “selective indignation”.\(^{389}\) Such universality is not possible, as Donald Smith, Canadian ambassador to Croatia, lamented: “I believe our view of human rights and our human rights objectives must be the same everywhere throughout the world. Unfortunately, there are constraints on governments. We cannot be everywhere and do everything.”\(^{390}\)

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The notion of values in foreign and defence policy is controversial, but not unique to Canada, by any means. Observers, academic and otherwise, have long commented on a undercurrent of idealism in Canadian foreign policy. What makes it different in the case of the 1995 and 2005 White Paper is the *formal importance* placed on values: values changed from being a *source* of Canadian foreign policy to become the *substance* of that policy. While some values were expressly spelled out, such as respect for human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, others are far more vague, such as tolerance, diversity, and thoughtful compromise. Again, it is worth highlighting that values were not a subsidiary focus within this policy document: on the contrary, the Government posited that “unity around these values permits the identification of a new compass for the development of foreign policy in a world where sweeping certainties have been replaced by doubts about what is ahead and where the surest path lies.” In previous government pronouncements, values had not enjoyed such prominence. In *Challenge and Commitment*, the Defence White Paper published in 1987, the Government stressed that its priority was “to promote a stronger and more stable international environment, in

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which our values and interests can flourish.” The 1992 Defence Policy paper mentioned nothing about values, while the 1994 White Paper on Defence spoke only of the need to provide for “the defence of Canada and Canadian interests and values.” In terms of providing direction to the national instruments of foreign policy, including the military, what is important about Canada in the World is not the presence of values, but the adoption of value-projection as a governmental priority. Nossal reminds us that their prominence should not be underestimated:

Each country’s history, its founding myths, its ideology, and its political culture will all affect how a country defines its interests, and therefore its foreign policy goals... But what has happened in Canada is that values, instead of just determining Canada’s foreign policy objectives, have been turned into Canada’s foreign policy objectives by the government in Ottawa.”

This is an important distinction. If the values-based language could merely be dismissed as rhetorical, it would be of only passing interest. Equally, if the zeal for values expressed in the document were truly tempered by the lack of resources, its importance would be limited. However, value-projection did become policy, and took shape in the range of actions carried out in the period following the publication of Canada in the World, despite warnings about a shortage of resources. Eleven years after the publication of Canada in the World, the Conservative foreign minister Peter Mackay would demonstrate the persistency of values in Canadian foreign policy. Speaking ahead of a parliamentary debate on the extension of the Afghanistan mission, he claimed Canada’s

398 Nossal 7.
operant values to be “freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law.”

Perhaps the most persistently invoked foreign policy role for Canada is that of ‘peacekeeper.’ The idea that Canada, represented by Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson, invented peacekeeping serves as a distinguishing feature, setting Canadians apart from the Great Powers (Britain and France), who were thought to be too entangled in colonial ambitions, and more recently, the United States, who are thought to be too ‘American’. As discussed in Chapter 4, the myth of Canada qua peacekeeper is pervasive and powerful within the Canadian public. As such, it serves as the ultimate reference point for Canadian foreign policy. Any time a particular act or policy needs to be defended, Pearson or a Blue Helmet—or both—are harnessed to the task. The image of the Canadian peacekeeper—and of Canada as a nation of such peacekeepers—seems an indelible component of the Canadian mosaic. Uniquely, Ottawa is home to its own monument to peacekeeping; in turn, that monument adorns the reverse side of the ten dollar bill. A senior civil servant believes, or at any rate states, that “every school child learns that Canada is a peacekeeping nation.” A minister of national defence believes, or at any rate states, that “the UN is probably part of the DNA of most Canadians.”

David Eaves provides a succinct summary of the story:

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400 For example, when then minister of defence Paul Hellyer was looking for reasons to bolster support for his controversial proposal to unify the three military services into a single Canadian Forces organization, he claimed that this “would enhance their peacekeeping capabilities.” See Denis Stairs, “The Political Culture of Canadian Foreign Policy,” Canadian Journal of Political Science. 15.4 (December) 1982: 677.
Lester B. Pearson received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his and Canada’s suggestion and deployment of a peacekeeping force that would separate opposing forces in the Suez while a peace plan was implemented. It was the birth of peacekeeping. The Crisis remains the defining moment of Canadian foreign policy, symbolizing Canada’s international role as a pacifist that puts global interests before national self-interest.⁴⁰³

Peacekeeping, as portrayed in this foundational myth, is something beyond rationality, beyond explanation, a part of the national character, which, as Christopher Coker notes, “lies in the practices and sentiments for which other nations have no words.”⁴⁰⁴

This incredible image persists, despite the reality of contemporary Canadian involvement with UN missions.⁴⁰⁵ It has been the subject of criticism, usually from military historians upset by lack of solid reason for its existence and influence.⁴⁰⁶ One prominent historian made a representative observation: “for too many Canadians peacekeeping has become a substitute for policy and thought... Some countries... try to deal with problems by throwing money at them; our people and, to some substantial extent, our governments try to deal with the world’s problems by sending peacekeepers.”⁴⁰⁷ Whether or not this assessment is completely accurate, it certainly

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begs the question why the image of peacekeeping has come to be so associated with Canadian foreign policy. 408

The answer lies mainly in the fact that peacekeeping has been presented as a quintessentially Canadian activity. Historically, Canada has played a “central role” in peacekeeping since its inception in the middle of the Twentieth Century. 409 However, more importantly, peacekeeping “has been central to the definition of Canada’s national identity.” 410 Peacekeeping is something that Canada does which distinguishes it from other countries. In that sense, 1956 marked the ‘end of empire’ not only for Great Britain, but also for Canada. It was not the Suez Crisis per se that is the milestone for Canada, but its role in the peacekeeping mission that followed it: “Pearson’s Nobel Peace Prize told Canadians that their country had arrived on the world stage.” 411 Peacekeeping was not just ‘not British,’ it was also ‘not American’, an ever-present important distinguishing feature for Canadian governments. 412 Bill Graham would stress peacekeeping as a symbol of Canadian identity. After all, Canadians were at the origin of the concept of peacekeeping, and the term reflects who we are as a people. Canadians believe passionately in peace, and they seek to promote it, to consolidate it and to maintain it. Our constitution, which is unique in the world in this regard, puts emphasis on ‘peace, order, and good government.’ 413

408 According to one former senior defence official, this question is rarely asked within political or policy circles. See Delvoie, “Canada and International Security Operations: The Search for Policy Rationales,” 11.
A regard for Canadian exceptionalism is rooted, in part, in a key aspect of Canadian political life: national unity. National crises during both world wars occurred over the issue of compelling French Canada to fight for ‘Mother England’. The first post-War expression of Canadian foreign policy, made by then foreign minister, later prime minister, Louis St. Laurent, would ensure that such discord was never a problem again: “The first general principle upon which I think we are agreed is that our external policies shall not destroy our unity. No policy can be regarded as wise which divides the people whose effort and resources must put it into effect.” St. Laurent’s successors, arguably up until 2002, when Canada sent troops to Afghanistan, followed his advice: “foreign policy is one area where there has been a surprising degree of national consensus over the past fifty years...there are no national divisions.” Speaking in 2005, Michael Ignatieff echoed St. Laurent: “If we are distracted and divided at home, we cannot project power and influence abroad. Canada matters to the world only to the degree that Canada remains united at home. We can’t get the balance between foreign and domestic policy

l’origine du concept de maintien de la paix, et ce terme reflète ce que nous sommes en tant que people. Les canadiens croient passionnément en la paix, et ils s’efforcent de la promouvoir, de la consolider et de la maintenir. Notre constitution, qui est unique au monde à cet égard, met l’accent sur «la paix, l’ordre et le bon gouvernement».


right unless both are aligned to serve the fundamental purpose of national government:

maintaining the national unity of our country."  

The image of Canadian military activity as peacekeeping is especially important in Québec, where federal governments have insisted on portraying a strong, independent Canada, as an antidote to separatist visions. However, there is another, perhaps more subtle, strategy at work here. The logic of using peacekeeping as a point of reference proceeds like this: ‘Peacekeeping is a nice thing to do. Peacekeeping is a Canadian activity. Therefore, Canada is a nice country.’ Thus the moralism identifiable in Canadian foreign policy is not so much about a crusade abroad, but rather about a ‘pep talk’ at home. Peacekeeping may be about doing good, but it is also about feeling good. Canadian soldiers are transformed from instruments of national policy into proxies for national identity. Bill Graham, the Liberal defence minister, speaking in 2005, extolled the virtues of the Canadian military at work in Afghanistan:

[The Canadian Forces have] a sophisticated set of skills and instruments, including combat capabilities, negotiation and diplomatic skills, and a willingness to help others rebuild their institutions in a way that is culturally sensitive to their distinct local needs. We are there to rebuild; winning battles is only part of the job.  

In so doing, he gave all Canadians a pat on the back as well:

Our men and women in uniform embody Canadian values of tolerance and respect combined with a steely determination to defend our rights. These values are a result of our history as a bilingual and multicultural nation that has, over the years, become one of the world’s most successful models of embracing cultural differences among one of the world’s most diverse populations.

As Peter MacKay, the Conservative foreign minister, stated in 2006, “What Canada does in Afghanistan matters at home.”\(^{420}\) MacKay, like his colleagues and predecessors, understood that international policy and action rests on domestic legitimacy. That legitimacy, in turn, relies on making the ‘appropriate’ connections to Canadian idealized symbols, such as peacekeeping.

Of course, outside of the timeless world of mythical peacekeeping, real changes were occurring. An astonished reporter remarked in 2005, after more than two years of operations in Afghanistan, under the command of both NATO and the US, “Canada’s peacekeeping role is changing.” More problematic, though, was her conclusion that “Canada is moving away from its traditional peacekeeping role and becoming Americanised.”\(^{421}\) This was not the kind of imagery that a Canadian politician welcomed. When, in an interview, Graham was challenged he tried to limit the damage by resorting to some rather opaque double-speak:

**Question:** Do you think Canada’s military is moving away from the traditional role of peacekeeping?

**Answer:** No, I think what is moving away is that peacekeeping is changing…The point is that Canada is a peacekeeping nation, but we have recognized that you cannot effectively be a peacekeeper in a place where there is open conflict going on…That’s exactly what we are going to be doing in Afghanistan. It’s peacekeeping, but it’s peacekeeping with the recognition that to be effective, you’ve got to have a combat capacity to defend yourself in a very volatile situation.\(^{422}\)

\(^{420}\) Peter MacKay, “Canadian Foreign Policy and Our Leadership Role in Afghanistan,” Notes for an Address by The Honourable Peter MacKay, Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, Ottawa, 30 October 2006.


\(^{422}\) Vongdouangchanh, 22.
Of course, Graham’s questioner was right, Afghanistan, as Graham’s Conservative successor would later admit, Afghanistan was “not a traditional peacekeeping mission. It never has been. There is no ceasefire to patrol, no negotiated peace agreement to respect. Al-Qaida and the Taliban are not interested in peace.”

Conclusion

Rather than being comprised of clear, straightforward objectives, constraints, and restraints, Canadian policy direction since at least 1995 has been marked by ambiguity. Additionally, Doug Bland describes contemporary civil control of the military as “a complex interplay of societal, political, and military interests, values, and expectations.” Government pronouncements appear rhetorical or abstract, despite protestations by politicians, claiming that “it is important…to be clear about…what we think should be done; otherwise we’re just spectators.” Micheal Ignatieff, in his run up to the leadership contest for the Liberal Party, warned senior public servants of the consequences of absent or unclear policy direction: “political indecision destroys bureaucracies, weakens their esprit de corps. Leaders must lead.”

It would be preferable, then, if that leadership took concrete form, in the substance of a clearly expressed, well supported document, “a clearly articulated set of interests and values [that] allows is to ration resources and capabilities effectively.” There is certainly no shortage of treatises, even within the Canadian context, which encourage the formulation, or suggest their own version, of just such a document. Colin

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423 Mackay, “Canadian Foreign Policy and Our Leadership Role” 1.
426 Ignatieff, 6.
427 Ignatieff 1.
S. Gray, writing in 1971, pleaded with Canada to develop its own “strategic thought”\textsuperscript{428}. Canada, at the time, suffered from “the total absence of a clear, well-defined national defence policy. Since the government came to power we have had ad hoc, irrelevant and inconsistent measures taken, and we still have to hear the minister’s grand design.”\textsuperscript{429} Over thirty years later, Hugh Segal would criticize prime ministers John Diefenbaker, Pierre Trudeau, and Jean Chrétien because “they had no concept of how military, diplomatic, and democratic capacity were jointly and severally essential to the advancement of our genuine national interests and shared values.”\textsuperscript{430} Beyond mere criticism, Segal offers a vision of what he believes required:

a “grand strategy for a small country” that integrates military, diplomatic, and foreign aid instruments in a thrust that preserves security and opportunity at home, advances leverage with our allies, and responds in an integrated way to the threats that are real from abroad…These need to be built into real plans and models that maximize the ability of each to engage constructively on Canada’s behalf, and that enhance the leverage of a combined application where appropriate and helpful.\textsuperscript{431}

Going further still, Segal reveals the logical national instrument that such a grand strategy would necessitate, summed up as an “enhanced deployable military capacity, joined up with our key post-conflict transitional abilities and infrastructure”.\textsuperscript{432} This, according to Segal, is how clear policy should lead to concrete capabilities.

\textsuperscript{432} Segal 6.
Perhaps, though, the search for such clarity in policy is illusory, or as Ignatieff inadvertently suggests, an “intellectual task”, more suited to the classroom than the political arena. As Denis Stairs characterizes it, this predilection for clarity derives in part from a Cartesian dislike of the clutter of muddling through... There is a reassuring, though, often illusory, sense of order, and of control, that can result from being able to conceptualize disparate and eclectic phenomena as parts of an integrated whole, especially if this can then be subjected to analysis and evaluation from first principles and basic priorities.

For those charged with developing national policy on foreign and defence issues, perhaps this aversion to ‘muddling through’ is not as well developed as it may be in academic circles. Looking out the window at the world—especially the post-Cold War world—from Ottawa might be too daunting for some. Having to cut through the din of events and construct a neat and understandable document could seem overwhelming. Janice Gross Stein chastises such reluctance: “Well, get a life! Frankly! [The world] is disorderly, messy and disorganized, but that doesn’t mean we can’t have policy.”

Of course, even in the absence of explicit direction, governments indicate their desires in more subtle ways. Rather than in formal policy statements and white papers, government direction can be divined from its words and acts. Because actors are not guided by clear objectives and parameters, they must use less formal, more general information in their interpretations. Speaking of the Canadian stance on the 2003 Iraq

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434 Stairs, “The Political Culture of Canadian Foreign Policy,” 688.
435 One is reminded of the comic epithet that practitioners want to get things done, academics want to get things right, and bureaucrats are not fussed either way.
436 This applies not only to Canada. See Martin Shaw, Post Military Society. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991): 1. For a look at a generation of men from Canada, largely educated in Britain, who did not shy away from the challenge of turbulent times, and as a result put in place most of the modern Canadian social, political, and economic architecture, see J.L. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935-1957. (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1998).
War, one observer noted with frustration “Our attitude…is clear: What’s our policy?” There are dangers for actors involved in this ‘reading’ of governmental desires, though. Indeterminacy, as we have seen in Chapter 3, requires interpretation as the first step for those actors forced to operate in such an environment. That interpretation is subjective and therefore, can be inconsistent across organisations and time, giving rise to even more variability in the execution of policy than may exist in the policy itself. Actors, of course, are compelled to enter into some form of interpretation, even given these pitfalls. They cannot choose not to act; their survival (as measured by the continued allocation of resources) depends on their ability to gain and maintain legitimacy. A large part of gaining legitimacy for the military means ascertaining and following the government’s intent, no matter how hard it may be to read. For the government’s part, legitimacy, too, is a goal. The direction they give to the military must accord with the passions of the people. And since those passions are themselves ill-defined, it should not be a wonder that the resultant direction is often general and vague.

The military in Canada, it is true, has had to deal with ambiguous guidance from their political masters. They have been expected to cover the spectrum of capabilities in order to discharge whatever particular foreign policy objective they were assigned. Very often, the civilian master did not tell to the general to ‘jump!’ Rather, the message has been more subtle, akin to something like ‘move about in a vertical way, but please do so in keeping with the gentle and idealized expectations that we have formed and promulgated about you.’ However, the Radneresque deliciousness of the ambiguity (as alluded to in the title of this chapter) lies in the fact that there is room for interpretation—

within limits. In the next chapter we shall see how the military applied its own skills against this backdrop.
Chapter 6:  
The Military: Ambitious Institution, Ad lib Individuals

"Civil-military cooperation is the responsibility of old colonels not fit for operations."
Opening Address to NATO Civil-Military Cooperation Course
Oberamergau, Germany, October 2002

"Civil-military cooperation is a pseudo-military activity."
Canadian Commander, Task Force Mirage, December 2004

Although Clausewitz is correct in saying the war is the product of several factors, at its very core lays the military. Military activity may be initiated by the government and influenced by the people, but men and women, in uniform, on the ground, carry it out. Following the framework developed in Chapter 3, this chapter will examine the military's part in the practice of civil-military cooperation. The chapter is based on a series of two related questions. First, we will examine how the military conceived of its role. Second, we shall turn to how they turned that understanding into practice, vis-à-vis civil-military cooperation.

In doing so, it is important to look at the military at two distinct levels. The first is the level of the military as an institution. As an institution, the military has a corporate or organizational culture and a view of itself, which it takes the time and effort to record and publish. It is as an institution that the military establishes norms and does its best to transmit them through the development of doctrine, the inculcation processes inherent in training, the actual organistational and structural choices that are made, as well as through less formalized system of rewarding those who 'live up to expectations', in part by promotion and appointment. The institutional military in Canada has a love-hate

439 Throughout this chapter, I will refer to the military and the Army. The military will refer to the entire armed forces (in this case, the Canadian Armed Forces, which is often referred to simply as the Canadian Forces, and abbreviated as the CF). The military is made up of naval, air and land forces. However, in terms of civil-military cooperation in the areas I am focusing on, the land forces, referred to as the Army, are the most germane.
relationship with civil-military cooperation. On one hand, it is opposed to the idea of ‘warriors’ losing sight of their main job: closing with and destroying the enemy.

Activities, like civil-military cooperation, detract from a strict warfighting focus, and therefore, are to be avoided. However, on the other hand, the military as an institution understands that if it wants the legitimacy (in the eyes of the government and the people) it needs to conduct operations in places like Afghanistan, it needs to be able to present a less destructive image, more in line with the tradition, mythical image of peacekeeping. It needs to create its own compelling strategic narrative. Civil-military cooperation can help it do just that.

The second level of the military is that of the individual. While the institutional military may write and play the music, it is the individual soldier—be it General or Private—who must perform the dance. As we shall see, the dance that is civil-military cooperation reflects a wide range of different interpretations. Some soldiers agree with the institutional military view of civil-military cooperation: they see it as a necessary evil to be tolerated and conducted as economically (in terms of resources and effort) as possible. Others regard this minimalist position as cynical and old-fashioned. They believe that the wars of the present and future, which are not like the conventional battles for which their old ‘Cold Warriors’ prepared to fight and for which they still pine, are something more like ‘4th Generation Warfare’, counterinsurgency, or stabilization operations. In these wars, civil-military cooperation provides a way of getting ‘amongst the people’: more than just a way of winning ‘hearts and minds’ it is a conduit through which intelligence can be gained from and through which key messages can be distributed to the local populace. A final group of soldiers see civil-military cooperation
more as a genuinely humanitarian, or at the very least developmental, activity. It is a means by which states, economies, societies, and most importantly, individual lives might be rebuilt following devastating conflict. At the individual level, the military is undecided about civil-military cooperation and, as such, it is practiced in a fluid, almost personalized fashion, depending on the particular individual responsible for it at any given time.

**How did the military understand its role in Canadian society?**

**The Impact of Somalia**

The Canadian Army was rocked in the 1990s by the actions of soldiers within the Canadian Airborne Regiment who on 16 March 1993 apprehended, tortured, and beat to death Shidane Arone, a Somali teenager, while on operations in Mogadishu. The repercussions of that night went far beyond individual charges and trials: the government of the day established a commission of inquiry, whose five volume report, published in 1997, detailed serious misconduct, neglect, and apathy within not just the Airborne Regiment, but the Army, Canadian Forces, and the Department of National Defence. The most visible step taken as a result of the Somalia Inquiry was the disbandment of the Airborne Regiment (a step not seen in the West since the disbandment of the French Premiere Regiment Etranger Parachutiste or 1REP, for rising up against the French administration in Algeria in 1961.) Perhaps less visibly but more importantly, the Inquiry attempted to look more deeply at the systemic problems that may have contributed to Arone debacle. In its report, the Inquiry included two key sections that set out the

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foundations of how the military should work within society. In its first volume, it included a nine page essay entitled “Civil-Military Relations”, which emphasized the correct, legal, relationship between the military, and the government (made up of elected ministers and appointed civil servants). Its third sentence illustrates the thrust of the essay:

Civil control [of the military] is intended to ensure that decisions and risks affecting national defence and the employment of the Canadian Forces are taken by politicians accountable to the people rather than by soldiers, officials, and others who are not.441

This statement underlined a strong conclusion of the Inquiry: the politicians had taken their eyes off the armed forces and bore responsibility for the corrosion of ethical conduct that had occurred.

The Inquiry went further in its second essay, entitled “The Military in Canadian Society,” contained in the fifth volume of its report. Not only had the government neglected the military, so had the people of Canada:

Regrettably, in recent times little interest has been shown in our armed forces, and national discussions about defence policy or the operations of the CF have been rare...Overall, the military tends to make a faint imprint on the consciousness of many Canadians...The CF is increasingly out of the public mind.442

However, in the eyes of the Inquiry, the blame for this lacuna had to be shared between the people and the military itself: “Whenever military leaders ignore their relation to the larger society, they put the relationship between the armed forces and society at risk...Military leadership must be sensitive to...public perception and work continually

to stay abreast of changing attitudes in society." The Army had drifted too far from the society from which it came and this was the fault of the government, the military, and the people of Canada.

The government and the military responded rapidly to this criticism. First, the Chief of Defence Staff was relieved of command. Second, the Army published a landmark doctrinal publication aimed at demonstrating “that the army is a unique social institution which reflects Canadian values and character within the framework of military professionalism and the requirement for warfighting.” The manual became mandatory reading for all ranks in an attempt to articulate and instill an “ethos or moral code” which would become “the bedrock of the army’s preparedness in peace and is key to its effectiveness in war and operations other than war.” Canada’s Army stresses that this ethos is tied to Canadian society claiming, “the army constitutes national beliefs and ideals in action.” AND while the manual was produced for distribution only within the Canadian Forces, it was hoped that the result would be conduct and performance by the Army which would allow Canadians to “see that their army proudly reflects the best of themselves, serving not only the needs of the nation, but helping Canadians make a difference in the world.”

Nothing like Canada’s Army had ever been published before in Canada. It was meant to act as a ‘capstone manual’ within the military. It should be regarded as a philosophical expression of an overarching idea. All subsequent doctrine was to stem

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444 Canada. The Army. Canada’s Army: We Stand on Guard for Thee. B-GL-300-000/FP-000. (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1998): i. The phrase “We Stand on Guard for Thee” is taken from the first line of the Canadian national anthem.

445 Canada. The Army. Canada’s Army, i.

446 Canada. The Army. Canada’s Army, ii.

447 Canada. The Army. Canada’s Army, ii.
from it, providing more detail and focusing on specific activities perhaps, but certainly
keeping in line with its tenets.

The year after Canada’s Army was published, the Canadian Forces attempted to
build on its foundations, in a paper that aimed at setting the course of the institution for
the next two decades. In Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for
2020 the CF stated the military’s role was to “defend Canadian values” and then went on
to list what they were:

Democracy and the rule of law;
Individual rights and freedoms as articulated in the Charter [of Rights and
Freedoms];
Peace, order, and good government, as defined in the Constitution; and
Sustainable economic well-being.448

In addition to these values, the CF went on to state the “within Canadian society, issues
of diversity, gender, lifestyle, disability and family support will increase in
importance.”449 As the Somalia Inquiry had suggested, the CF needed to understand and
reconnect with Canadian society.

Moving beyond merely stating which values and issues were important to
Canadians, the Shaping the Future described the “security environment” within which the
Canadian Forces would be expected to operate:

There remain direct and indirect threats to our national security for which a
military response may be required, including drugs, organized crime, illegal
immigration, terrorism and the uncertainty caused by the growing proliferation of
missiles carrying weapons of mass destruction. As with our allies, Canadian
defence planning is now based upon the capabilities Canada needs to protect and
promote its interests and values in a responsive manner, rather than upon direct
threats to our well-being.450

448 Canada. Canadian Forces. Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020. (Ottawa:
Queen’s Printer, 1999): 1.
The CF was clearly to be focused on values rather than threats. The archetypal role for
the military was seen as “spearheading large, complex, time-sensitive security and
humanitarian operations at a regional or national level.”

Three points stand out in Canada’s Army and Shaping the Future. The first is the
immediate and direct link they have with the Somalia Inquiry. The national (and
international) disgrace of the Arone incident spurred the military to reestablish, as
quickly as possible, a sense of legitimacy. Second, the idea that the military could help
Canadians ‘make a difference in the world’ is a recurring theme, as we will explore in
more depth below. Third, the two manuals exposed a profound contradiction: how could
it be possible for an organization that reflected the best Canadian values, also have at its
core the ability to fight and kill? Canada’s Army tried to square this tension somewhat
by stating that those great Canadian values would need to be understood “within the
framework of military professionalism.” Just what that meant, though, or how it might
be implemented on operations, was not spelled out.

The Importance of Kosovo

The post-Somalia military spent a great deal of effort reconnecting with what it
perceived to be Canadian society, attempting to regain legitimacy. Kosovo was the first
real test of whether or not it had been able to do that, while retaining a degree of combat
capability. Canadian air and naval assets were involved in the early stages of NATO’s
operations against Serbia throughout 1999, but this did not mean the same level of risk

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452 Canada. The Army. Canada’s Army, i.
453 Six Canadian F-18 fighters operated out of the NATO air base in Aviano, Italy. In fact, Canadian planes
flew 10% of all NATO sorties, the most of any nation other than the United States. See David Bashaw, et
associated with the commitment of ground forces. Risk not only from the possibility of incurring Canadian casualties, but also from the potential for the army to embarrass Canada, as it had done in Somalia. The mission to Kosovo, as we saw in Chapter 5, was extremely important to the government of Canada and Lloyd Axworthy’s idea of human security. The military understood this: it knew that it needed to succeed in Kosovo, needed to fit into a human security schema. The Canadian army contribution to the Kosovo mission was considerable\(^{454}\) and although they remained in the province for only twelve months, they acquitted themselves well.

The Kosovo deployment was important for the Canadian military for three main reasons. First, it demonstrated that it was possible for it to deploy quickly, in a manner that was relevant to the Canadian government. Human security was important and from time to time it would need a “hard edge”\(^{455}\). Second, since the mission was predicated on the need to deter Serbian forces from abrogating their political commitments, it was conceived of as needing a great deal of combat power. The army took this opportunity to highlight its warfighting capabilities by structuring its forces for combat and by deploying tanks, the first time its tanks had deployed on operations since the Korean

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\(^{454}\) The Canadian ground contribution included eight surveillance and medium utility helicopters; an armoured reconnaissance squadron consisting of ten state-of-the-art Coyote 8-wheeled vehicles equipped with 25mm cannons and a ground surveillance package capable of providing real-time coverage out to a range of 15kms; and a mechanized infantry battle group made up of over 500 soldiers, with a troop of 5 Leopard I medium tanks, an armoured engineer troop, and three rifle companies. The Canadians were under operational control of the British-led multinational brigade and were assigned an area of operations in the Drenica Valley, the heartland of the Kosovo Liberation Army. See Mike Ward, et al., “Task Force Kosovo: Adapting Operations to a Changing Security Environment,” Canadian Military Journal. 1.1 (Spring 2000): 67-74.

War. The third way in which the Kosovo mission was important was due to the fact that despite expectations, combat was not necessary: Serb forces left Kosovo, largely intact despite the air campaign, without need for NATO land troops to apply force.

Almost immediately the mission became one of administering a failed state. Instead of having to conduct an advance into hostile terrain, replete with anti-ambush tactics and pitched battles, soldiers found themselves engaged in the allocation of accommodation, in the coordination of relief and development assistance, and in reconstruction tasks. Even warfighting missions would entail ‘operations other than war’.

For the Army, Kosovo had shown that there was a space for asserting its own values. Being a Canadian did not have to mean not being a soldier: military norms could exist alongside civilian ones. Lieutenant-General Mike Jeffries summarized this feeling somewhat tenuously in late 2000 when he wrote the introduction to an important doctrinal report for the Army:

Volatile, uncertain, unsettling—call them what you will, the last ten years have most certainly been different from the previous forty. [Canadian Forces stationed in Germany] and NATO’s Central Front are no longer the focus of our professional lives. Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor and places yet to come to the fore have replaced them. The dangerous, yet relatively stable atmosphere of the Cold War has been supplanted by a world of instability and strife...Although our current focus is on peace support operations, the possibility of escalation to peacemaking, or indeed war, is always with us. In all we do we must never lose sight of the fact that the bottom line in our business is war, and the Army must be prepared to engage in combat operations.

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Although far from jingoistic, this reminder to the Army was an important marker: combat, and the skills and values that it requires, should not be neglected, even in Canada.

If the idea that it was okay for war to form part of the Army’s imagination began to seep into the publication following Kosovo, it represented a perplexing inconsistency. The Canadian Army, despite a decade of peace support operations, still thought a lot about—and trained for—war. As the Director-General of the Land Staff Brigadier General Vince Kennedy proclaimed in July 2000, the Army’s real problem was not what was suggested by Lieutenant General Jeffries: the Canadian Army was not thinking too soft, they were still stuck in their Cold War ways:

We are continually designing systems of command and control to fight and win at View 1 warfare [conventional, inter-state engagements]—this is what we are comfortable with technical warfare against a uniformed and capable, but not too capable, world class enemy, system versus system, the ultimate Milton-Bradley game turn. And while we profess that View 2 warfare [asymmetric, intra- or sub-state operations] has a majority overlap with View 1 in terms of capabilities needed, I suspect that this is overstated, and undoubtedly oversimplified, especially in execution. View 2 warfare pulls us back down from technowar to the chaos that is at the heart of the character of war, and personalizes war with its uncertainties, where malequipped commanders and staffs are not necessarily immediately able to adjust their less-than-optimum structures and thinking to the View 2 realities.459

If Kennedy was correct, and warfighting is how the Army thought, why was it necessary for Jeffries to remind the Army that warfighting should not be forgotten?

There are several possible explanations, but one stands out as most probable: Jeffries and Kennedy were addressing two different audiences. Jeffries, as the commander of the

Army, was addressing the most senior military (outside the Army and within the Canadian Forces as a whole) and political leadership, introducing the notion that despite years of employing the army in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, warfighting was a possibility and something that deserved attention. Kennedy, as the person responsible for coordinating Army strategy, was addressing its various component elements, who were led by senior officers who had ‘grown up’ during the Cold War and perhaps continued to display a mentality best suited to it. Regardless of the accuracy of this explanation, the fact that senior Army officers were transmitting different messages suggests that there were different interpretations of the role of the organization.

The Power of Afghanistan

If Somalia and Kosovo were milestones along the route of the Canadian Army’s evolution, then the events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent military intervention in Afghanistan was a turning point. As we have seen in Chapter 5, the Canadian government was keen to be involved in the international intervention in Afghanistan, but in a peace support capacity, something akin to what had occurred in Kosovo. However, that was not to be; on 22 February 2002, a Canadian light infantry battalion would deploy as a part of the American Operation Enduring Freedom, under the operational command of the 101st Airborne Division. The Chief of Defence Staff did not mince words when he declared, “We’re not there to do traditional peacekeeping. We’re there to bring security and stability to the region.” The Canadians would remain in Afghanistan for most of the next six years, under both American and NATO auspices and incur over

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seventy fatalities and many more injuries\textsuperscript{462}. They would deploy not only infantry troops, but also special forces teams, artillery batteries, engineering squadrons, and a Provincial Reconstruction Team. At times they provided the largest contingent to the mission, and in recognition of this, Canadian generals would assume senior posts within the International Security Assistance Force, including as deputy commander and commander of the mission; as commander of the Multinational Brigade in Kabul; and as commander of Regional Group South based in Kandahar.

The early lessons from Afghanistan were reflected in the Army document \textit{Advancing with Purpose}.\textsuperscript{463} This document highlighted that the Canadian Army was a capable organization that had the ability to rapidly mount and conduct operations that were at the centre of Canadian foreign policy and that the security environment was more complex than perhaps initially understood. The army could not focus solely on either what NATO called ‘View 1’ or ‘View 2’: they would have to be prepared to do both. Moreover, \textit{Advancing with Purpose} contained a sense that the army had done well in Afghanistan, and could afford to assert itself. It made a deliberate move away from the sensitivities reflected in \textit{Canada’s Army} and \textit{Shaping the Future}: the Canadian public and the values they wanted were \textit{contributing} factors to be considered as the army conducted its business, but they were neither the only nor the most important ones. In fact, the army presented both the Canadian government and people not as hierarchical superiors, but as equals (as illustrated in Figure 6.1).

\textsuperscript{462} There is evidence that the Canadian military in Afghanistan suffered a disproportionate level of casualties, relative to the number of troops deployed, when compared with other NATO forces. See Steven Staples and Bill Robinson, “Canada’s Fallen: Understanding Canadian Military Deaths in Afghanistan,” \textit{Foreign Policy Series} 1.1 A Report of the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. (September) 2006.

\textsuperscript{463} Canada. The Army. \textit{Advancing with Purpose: The Army Strategy}. (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 2002).
Gone was the Army afraid of its own strength, portraying itself as subservient, and only marginally relevant. Indeed, the Army portrayed the national leadership (the government of Canada) and the people of Canada as ‘stakeholders’, alongside the Army itself, and other Allied militaries.

This conceptualisation illustrates that the Army set out to shake off, once and for all, the stigma of Somalia. It wanted the rest of the Canadian Forces to trust them, just as it wanted its allies to recognize its expertise. Its performance on missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan had achieved these goals, as well as demonstrating the Army’s relevance to the government. Clearly the desire for legitimacy was still evident and for this the Army needed to continue to interact with the public. What is key in *Advancing with Purpose*, though, is that all of this had to be done in such a way as to develop and foster a sense of identity within the Army. The opening line of *Advancing with Purpose* illustrates how
far the Army had come from the sentiments expressed in *Canada’s Army*. “In every modern Western democracy,” the Army wrote, “the armed forces are the ultimate guarantor of the state itself.” The Army was not simply reflecting the values of Canadian society, it was now portrayed as its defender and as such it was felt that the “The Army needs to be more agile and lethal.” Tough talk for Canada.

However, as much as *Advancing with Purpose* tried to reassert a martial vision for the Army, it could not escape fully from its societal tether. Consider how the Army expressed its *raison d’etre*: “The Army exists first and foremost: to protect vital national interests; to contribute to international peace and security; and to promote national unity and well-being.” While the first two missions reflect traditional military activities, the third serves to anchor the Army to Canadian society. As seen in Chapter 5, the concern for national unity is also a chief concern of the Canadian government.

As operations in Afghanistan continued, and as the profile of the Canadian Army increased at home, the confidence of the institution grew. By the spring of 2004, the Army would publish the sequel to *Advancing with Purpose*, an even more audacious expression of its determination to be regarded as an efficient fighting organization. *Purpose Defined* opens, understandably enough, with a clear definition of purpose: “Our Army must be prepared to fight and win in the 21st Century land battle...Domestically or internationally, we cannot fail.” The notion of the Army needing to be relevant remains, but is not expressed in terms of a connection to social needs. Rather

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In order to achieve strategic relevance, the Army must at all times provide the nation with decisive land-power... It must make a meaningful, timely and recognized contribution to Canadians... Above all, the Army must be tactically decisive.\footnote{Canada. The Army. \textit{Purpose Defined}: 1.}

Gone are any references to Canadian values; instead, it asserts that Canadians want a powerful and effective army, capable of winning on the battlefield.

Over the course of ten years, following on from the disaster of Somalia, the Army leadership attempted to establish itself again, to dispel its image as disconnected and irrelevant. In doing so, however, they have highlighted the tension which exists between the need to ‘fit in’ with the social values of the wider society, while maintaining the ability to perform tasks which rely on the ability to generate and manage violence. The struggle to balance between the societal and functional imperatives (as discussed in Chapter 1) has meant that the Army has tried to be explicit about its relationship with the Canadian public, and about its professional capabilities and its desire to be seen as an effective fighting force. It is possible to see an evolution in the way that this has been handled. The earliest public pronouncement, \textit{Canada's Army}, can be interpreted as an almost desperate attempt to portray the Army as an institution that understands and appreciates the values and norms of Canadian society; this is the Army’s societal imperative manifesto. Six years later, confident in the fact that the relationship to the public had been reestablished, and following on from successes on the battlefields of Kosovo and Afghanistan, \textit{Purpose Defined} articulates a much tougher message; this is the Army’s functional manifesto.

These declarations established a normative foundation for the Army. Together they form the strategic narrative that the Army developed over a period of nearly ten
years. In relation to civil-military cooperation, however, the philosophical vision of the Army is too abstract to provide us with a clear understanding of how the Army operationalises these values. The first indications of how coherently this is executed can be seen through an examination of Army doctrine, which is the “formal expression of military knowledge and thought, that the army accepts as being relevant at a given time, which covers the nature of conflict, the preparation of the army for conflict, and the method of engaging in conflict to achieve success.”

According to Christopher Lord, “Doctrine ideally combines experience ancient and modern in a balanced and reasoned whole, in such a manner as to provide a framework of understanding for all those collaborating in a…military venture.” It should be built on a “moral element”, but in reality is “a curious hybrid of analysis and folk wisdom, tradition and careful innovation.”

Doctrine, then, like its normative foundations, contains a dynamism: it tries to provide intellectual guidance for the performance of activity in a changing environment, while at the same time retaining some degree of continuity with established and familiar practices. This tension is played out in Canadian civil-military cooperation doctrine, which over a period of over fifteen years, has evolved considerably, although not consistently. Sometimes civil-military cooperation is regarded as a supporting activity, undertaken as part of peacekeeping operations and on the margins of war; other times, it is described as a core activity, vital to the success of every mission.

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471 Lord 11.
In some form or other, the Canadian Army has carried out civil-military cooperation since at least the Second World War. Civil-military cooperation as practice, though, came to the fore in the explosion of peacekeeping operations that followed the end of the Cold War. Despite conducting civil-military cooperation operations in the Former Yugoslavia, Africa, the Caribbean, and South East Asia, prior to 1998, the Canadian Forces had no single doctrinal manual dedicated to civil-military cooperation. The publication of a manual entitled *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis, and War* was an attempt to codify military thinking on the topic, but strangely it (and the other doctrinal manuals published that year that contained references to civil-military cooperation) did not reflect the realities encountered by the Army over the course of the 1990s. The manuals seemed rooted in the teachings of the Cold War, which in turn reflected the experience of the European theatre during World War Two. Civil-military cooperation, the doctrine claimed,

may be critical to the achievement of military objectives. On the one hand, CIMIC can enhance support to an operation by obtaining supplies, information, facilities, services and labour resources with the cooperation of the local population. On the other hand, uncoordinated movement of civilians in the vicinity of operations, hostile actions by the population, or failure of the population to cooperate with friendly forces can significantly disrupt military operations.

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473 However odd it may be that Canada had no doctrine until 1998, it is worth noting that NATO had no formalized civil-military cooperation doctrine until 2000. See North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. Allied Joint Publication 9 (AJP 9). Civil-military Cooperation. (Brussels: SHAPE, 2000).


Civil-military cooperation as the military use of civilian labour and the coordination of civilian populations on the battlefield was not what Canadian soldiers had experienced in places like Croatia, Bosnia, Haiti or Cambodia. Civil-military cooperation was about the distribution of emergency relief and reconstruction of accommodation and infrastructure, alone or alongside UN agencies and NGOs, in places where hundreds of thousands of people had been displaced. For that reason, the Army found it necessary to provide a more useful guide for civil-military cooperation by publishing a more informal, but more relevant, pamphlet. The February 1999 edition of the quarterly Dispatches: Lessons Learned for Soldiers was dedicated to the topic of civil-military cooperation. Its Foreword expresses a far more realistic vision:

In the past...the interaction between civilian organizations and the military may [have] been largely limited to mitigating the impact of one upon the other, with the military having the responsibility and authority to make this happen. [More recently] this interaction may include numerous areas of concern, and involve several civilian agencies, all requiring constant and detailed consultation. In all instances, there is the real and ongoing need for the military to become actively involved with civilian organizations as well as the population in general, and for this contact to be effectively planned and implemented to facilitate mission success.476

The pamphlet contained information that was grounded in recent experience, based on reports from the field. It included sections on the organization of a civil-military cooperation cell within a unit; models for command and control; and a host of factors for consideration, such as where to locate civil-military cooperation projects and the legal aspect of negotiations. It was useful stuff, practically delivered, but it was a stop-gap measure. It provided suggestions for interested parties, but it was not doctrine.

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The doctrinal shortcomings of the late 1990s were compounded by the fact that
the Canadian Army offered no civil-military cooperation training courses. Officers who
were interested, or who were assigned to ‘G5’ posts,\textsuperscript{477} were encouraged to take
American, British, NATO, or non-military courses.\textsuperscript{478} One such non-military course was
offered by the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Cornwallis, Nova Scotia. Jointly funded
by the Departments of National Defence and Foreign Affairs, the Centre was run as a
private, civilian ‘think tank’, with total independence in terms of curriculum
development. It offered courses to civilians and foreign military officers, mainly from
former Warsaw Pact or developing countries, as a part of Canada’s Military Training
Assistance Program. Its version of civil-military cooperation, which was not a derivative
of any particular military doctrine, became the major source of civil-military knowledge
in the Canadian Army. Its approach, its definitions, its proscriptions were different from,
and in some cases contradictory to, Canadian (and Allied) doctrine. This exacerbated the
problem of weak doctrine in Canada, and had significant effects on operations.\textsuperscript{479}

Regardless of its source (whether from formal doctrinal manuals, or the collected
learnings from practitioners) or its method of delivery (whether from a military course
conducted by an allied army, or an arms-length think tank) the thinking about civil-
military cooperation in Canada was not very sophisticated. Civil-military cooperation
was a supporting activity, meant to complement ‘real soldiering’. Commanders were
busy prosecuting campaigns (whether in war or peacekeeping) and civil-military

\textsuperscript{477} Following the ‘Continental Staff System’ Canadian Army doctrine labeled all formation level staff
departments with a G (originally indicating ‘general staff’) and a number; 5 (and later 9) indicated Civil-
military Cooperation. The significance of this organizational decision will be discussed further below.
\textsuperscript{478} Canada. “Lessons Learned,” 36.
\textsuperscript{479} Interview with Major P.W. (Peter) Hewitt, Staff Officer responsible for Civil-Military Relations and
Environmental Health, Canadian Forces Joint Staff, International Operations (J3 International). (Ottawa, 1
November 2002).
cooperation allowed them the freedom of action to pursue their objectives. Rebuilding schools and houses would allow populations to return, perhaps, but that was only a side-effect of the primary Army mission: providing security by defeating (or at least deterring) those forces who sought to disturb the peace.

This was the doctrinal basis for civil-military cooperation throughout the Balkan deployments, including Kosovo in 1999, and it was extant at the beginning of the Afghanistan missions in 2002. However, doctrine, as it should, changed, because of the Army’s experience in Afghanistan. Whether the missions there were to be called peace support, stabilization or counterinsurgency, at a theoretical level at least, the need for civil-military cooperation to take on more focus became apparent to the Army leadership.

In late 2003, the Army’s Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts published *Towards the Brave New World: Canada’s Army in the 21st Century*, an edited volume with contributions from military and civilian thinkers from Canada, the United States, and Europe. Its preface summed up the problems faced by the Canadian Army:

> Advancing ideas for a future Army structure is...laden with emotion. After all, we are all prisoners of our experience and carry with us the baggage of our formative training, assignments, and regimental affiliations. For most of the current Army leadership, this translates into the Cold War and the 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group [stationed in Germany] experience. However, the post-Cold War era...shattered that old paradigm...Failed states...civil wars and unrest...prompted...Canada to undertake peace support operations [that] no longer resembled the classic peacekeeping model...These operations proved to be a dramatic departure from the doctrinal and operational model of the Cold War era.

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The jumble of doctrine, wedged between a view of the past and a vision of the future had to change. As the authors of *Towards a Brave New World* stated baldly, “the status quo is untenable.”

Unlike during the 1990s when most of the senior leadership of the Canadian Army and the Canadian Forces had been trained for Cold War contingencies and was not deployed to places like Yugoslavia, the Army leadership at the beginning of the 21st Century had been company and battalion, brigade and division commanders in Croatia and Bosnia. Most significantly, the two officers to serve as Chief of Land Staff since 2003 have been commander or deputy commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Their experiences on operations shaped their views on the role of the Army and the utility of activities such as civil-military cooperation. As Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, the Chief of Land Staff, announced to the Army

> Canada has one of the most flexible, durable, and task-oriented armies in the world. We have been this way for decades. We succeed at whatever mission we’re given. But the traditional battlefield of the last half of the 20th Century has changed. Wars are no longer about massive armies fighting each other over a period of several years. The threats that face a stable world come from suicide bombers, in the narrow streets of urban areas, or by belligerents that may or may not be supported by a recognized state government. Therefore, the Canadian Army is in the middle of a period of necessary change. We must modernize our long-held ideas of how we train and fight.

A new idea was introduced to help move the Army away from its past. Beginning in early 2005, a key concept that was introduced into formal doctrinal thinking, was that of the ‘Three Block War’. As discussed in Chapter 2, the metaphor of the Three Block

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483 For a biography of Generals Hillier and Leslie, see http://www.dnd.ca/dsa/app_bio/engraph/FSeniorOfficerAddressBook_e.asp?mLimit=Gen&SectChoice=1.
War was first used by the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps. It was an attempt to understand and explain the complexity of contemporary military operations, which had to focus on several activities at once. It was an attempt to replace a narrow focus on any one aspect of a military mission: warfighting and peacekeeping were not insulated from each other. Notions such as ‘low intensity’ or ‘high intensity’ no longer made any sense in places such as Somalia. Upon return from his tenure as Commander of the International Security Assistance Force, his promotion to General, and appointment to the position of Chief of Defence Staff, Rick Hillier began using the term Three Block War in briefings to other military officers, the government, and the Press. In one such presentation, he claimed that the “default focus” of the Canadian Forces was on “conventional operations” against “Hostile Nation Forces” (which he labeled “The Bear”, in reference to the Soviet Union), while they adopted an “ad hoc approach” to “asymmetric operations” against “Non-State Actors” (which he labeled “The Snakes”). Instead, since the main threat to international peace was from “Failed States”, the focus should be changed to reflect the realities of the “Three Block War”, which he explained consisted of “warfighting, stability operations, and humanitarian operations”.

Hillier’s use of the Three Block War metaphor resonated with the Army. In a statement aimed at the entire Army, Leslie wrote:

We will immediately recognize that this [The Three Block War] is exactly what we’ve been doing on operations...You need to be able to conduct a direct action, take out terrorists, conduct a cordon and search...face down or destroy a militia or remove a suicide bomber. But we can also search out the good folks, support

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them and enable them to achieve stability and to what do they need to do to rebuild their lives, their families, their communities and their countries.\footnote{Canada. The Army. “A Soldier’s Guide to Army Transformation,” 24 July 2006 [http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/lf/English/5_4_1.asp; accessed 13 January 2007]}

The Three Block war provided a framework for understanding contemporary operations, and underlined the importance of activities such as civil-military cooperation.

However, the specific doctrine that followed Hillier’s speech continued to portray civil-military cooperation as a support function. In the 2006 manual \textit{Civil-Military Cooperation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures}, civil-military cooperation is defined as a “military function that supports the commander’s mission by establishing and maintaining coordination and cooperation between the military force and civil actors in the commander’s area of operations.”\footnote{Canada. The Army. \textit{Civil-Military Cooperation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures}. B-GL-355-001/FP-001. (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 2006): 2.} Civil-military cooperation should be carried out in order to “enhance a commander’s situational awareness” by gathering information from the local population. Furthermore, civil-military cooperation “may contribute to force protection by building trust and confidence.”\footnote{Canada. The Army. \textit{Civil-Military Cooperation Tactics}, 3.} The manual did add more detail on how to conduct assessments and design relief and reconstruction projects, but envisaged civil-military cooperation remaining under the auspices of a separate directorate within a commander’s staff.\footnote{Canada. The Army. \textit{Civil-Military Cooperation Tactics}, 19.} Seen in this light, civil-military cooperation would not be a main thrust, but simply a side-show. There was no trace of the Three Block War here.

Eleven-months later, though, the latest Canadian Army doctrinal manual appeared to correct that.\footnote{Canada. The Army. \textit{Land Doctrine in the Modern Age}. (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 2007).} \textit{Land Operations in the Modern Age} broke with existing written thinking and instead “drew on living doctrine,” the actual experience of soldiers
in places like Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{492} \textit{Land Operations in the Modern Age} addresses the kinds of missions Hillier described in his Three Block War speech. According to one of its drafters, the aim of Army is to "target the environment in counterinsurgencies and peace support operations more than we target our adversaries. The objective is to conduct activities in order to affect the will and behaviour of the population in order to engender support and to isolate the enemy."\textsuperscript{493} The Army, according to the doctrine, would conduct a number of different activities; some like seizing "key terrain objectives" or defeating "land based adversaries" were clearly linked to combat. Others, though, reflected a more subtle use of Army resources; the Army would have a "positive influence on populations," "enable other agencies to operate," and "serve as a symbol of political commitment."\textsuperscript{494} This doctrine was grounded in the complex situations that Canadian soldiers had operating in from the Balkans, to East Timor, to Afghanistan. The spectrum of conflict that the Canadian Army would work in stretched from "peaceful interaction" all the way to "general war" and would include "peace support", "counter-insurgency" and "major combat" operations.\textsuperscript{495} Activities (the name for the things the Army would do while on operations) would take place on two planes: the cognitive and the physical. The idea of any activity was to affect the behaviour of an adversary, in order to achieve some objective. On the physical plane, the Army would conduct physical activities, which would produce effects on an enemy's capability. On the cognitive plane, the Army would conduct influence activities, which would produce

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{492} Interview with Major General S.A. Beare, Commander Land Force Doctrine and Training System. (by telephone 24 April 2007).
\item \textsuperscript{493} Interview with Major D.J. Lambert, Director of Army Doctrine 4, Officer of the Director General Land Capability Development. (by telephone, 7 March 2007).
\item \textsuperscript{494} Canada. The Army. \textit{Land Doctrine in the Modern Age}, Ch 3, p. 4-5.
\item \textsuperscript{495} Canada. The Army. \textit{Land Doctrine in the Modern Age}, Ch 3, p. 11.
\end{itemize}
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cognitive effects on an enemy’s will. Civil-military cooperation was now termed an
influence activity.  

As both these planes (the cognitive and the physical) were equally important to
achieving success, the goal was to address them comprehensively. Moreover, the planes
could be mutually reinforcing: affecting an opponent’s capability could affect his will,
and vice versa. Comprehensiveness meant realizing that

The need to influence a target audience may be key to the long-term success of a
mission. For example, key to success in a counter-insurgency campaign is the
need to separate the insurgents from physical and moral support of the populace
and gain and maintain the support of the populace for the campaign.
Commanders at the lowest levels must be made to understand the importance of
such influence activities and the effects, positive and negative, that may be gained
from them.  

This had a major impact on the way in which civil-military cooperation was to be
understood:

CIMIC [Civil-military cooperation] has moved from supporting operations to
being operations…CIMIC and the related activities (reconstruction, governance
development, etc.) are considered influence activities because of their ability to
inform, demonstrate, influence, and persuade…CIMIC activities therefore need to
be coordinated with the overall operational plan, in terms of impacts upon civil
audiences and their leaders in order to ensure that activities work to support
overall objectives.  

Civil-military cooperation would no longer be a part of a subsidiary general staff
department (G5 or G9), but rather move to the main department responsible for
implementing a commander’s operational plan (G3).  

Indeed, civil-military cooperation was no longer conceived as a supporting
activity, but rather a key way in which a commander could achieve an objective, a kind of

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500 Interview, Maj. D.J. Lambert.
“manoeuvre on the cognitive plane” of warfare. Doctrinally this evolution mirrored the transition that had occurred with the Army’s philosophy: a move from ad hoc peacekeeping to determined warfighting. But whether we speak of vision or doctrine, we are speaking of words, of ideas, of how the Army would wish things to be. While this is important, it is vital to follow Iver Neumann’s advice and turn to an examination of practice. If this is what the Army thought, what did the Army actually do?

**How did the Army turn understanding into practice?**

While the Army seems to have eventually constructed a doctrinal context for civil-military cooperation, its record of civil-military cooperation as a practice seems to be less coherent. Examining operations from Kosovo (1999), Bosnia (2002-2003) and Afghanistan (2002-2007) it is possible to see that civil-military cooperation is a varied activity, whose ultimate shape depends, to a large degree, on the *individual* understanding of those carrying it out, rather than on a unified or common understanding across and throughout the institution. These appear to not evolve over time, with advances and reverses in approach apparent across missions.

Such a lack of common understanding is perhaps understandable given that very few of those involved in conducting civil-military cooperation appear to have consulted Canadian doctrine. In Kosovo, the officer responsible for civil-military cooperation did not consult any doctrinal manual. Given the fact that the unit was given only six weeks to mount the operation, there “were too many other things to prepare for, like getting the

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soldiers ready for their battle tasks.” This meant that over the course of the mission, where over $750 million was spent on civil-military cooperation, the officer felt as if he were “flying by the seat of [his] pants.”

Others read the Canadian doctrine but found it out of touch with the realities that they faced on the ground. Speaking of his time in Afghanistan in 2005-2006, the Operations Officer of the Provincial Reconstruction Team, looked elsewhere for ideas on civil-military cooperation:

At the time of the operation, I had not read CIMIC doctrine in detail. Instead, I skimmed what was available, and continued my reading on campaigns such as British operations in Dhofar, Malaya, and previous Soviet operations in Afghanistan. The small amount of doctrine that I did read was not particularly helpful, as we did not have concrete guidance as to what National wished us to accomplish in terms of CIMIC…We did not fall in on a coherent plan.

This, of course, is compounded by the fact that no training existed on the doctrinal foundations of civil-military cooperation; any such training provided came from other organizations. In Bosnia in 2002, an officer charged with coordinating civil-military cooperation activities within the Battle Group headquarters stated, “for us, there was no real doctrine. Our SOPs came to us from the US and other places, like PPC [Pearson Peacekeeping Centre].”

Exacerbating the individual focus of civil-military cooperation was a lack of relevant guidance or direction from superior headquarters, namely either Army or the CF,

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504 Interview, Delaney.
506 Interview with Captain G. Longhurst, G5 Operations Staff Officer, Infantry Battle Group on Operation Palladium, Bosnia September 2002-March 2003 (Camp Maple Leaf, Zgon, Bosnia, 28 December 2002).
This lack of direction meant that individual commanders were left to conduct a mission analysis on their own, divining their own priorities and emphases. As such, some had no clear idea of where or how civil-military cooperation fit into their operations. The Commanding Officer in Bosnia, when I called to introduce myself and arrange to meet him on operations in order to conduct research, said, “I am glad you called. I am just in the middle of trying to write my concept of operations for the Battle Group. I have been given a CIMIC cell: I just don’t know what it’s for.”

The first Commanding Officer in Kosovo, regarded civil-military cooperation as a “dangerous distraction,” a form of “mission creep” that would lead his unit to “over extend and become so enmeshed in CIMIC that they would lose sight of the real mission, which was the provision of security.” Besides, since the unit was only going to be in the country for a short time, “any CIMIC effect would be transitory and non-self-sustaining.” He had to be careful, he felt, not to “go ahead building things and providing services that are unsustainable, because it will raise the population’s expectations.”

His successor expressed his confusion even more succinctly, “Our focus was initially on warfighting, but there was no warfighting to be done. So, we went on to the next thing to be done: helping people.”

There was a cascade effect in this regard, where each level, in the absence of clear doctrine and direction was ‘free’ to interpret what civil-military cooperation meant according to their own experience. In Kosovo, Delaney relied on his experience as a staff

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507 Interview with Delaney.
508 Interview with Lieutenant C.R. King, Commanding Officer, Infantry Battle Group on Operation Palladium, September 2002-March 2003 (by telephone 17 August 2002).
509 Interview with Lieutenant Colonel S.A. Bryan, Commanding Officer, Infantry Battle Group on Operation Kinetic, Kosovo July-September 1999 (Ottawa, Ontario, 31 October 2002).
510 Interview with Lieutenant Colonel S.B. Brennan, Commanding Officer, Infantry Battle Group on Operation Kinetic, Kosovo October-December 1999 (Kingston, Ontario, 29 October 2002).
officer in a divisional headquarters six years earlier where, in preparation for a mission to evacuate foreign nationals from Haiti, some standard operating procedures (SOPs) had been hastily prepared.\textsuperscript{511} The fact that these SOPs focused more on preventing refugees from interfering with military operations, rather than on relief and reconstruction, may have contributed to the confusion felt by other members of the mission. The officer appointed as the ‘project manager’ (who was reassigned one month into the mission from the Reconnaissance Platoon) felt that civil-military cooperation on the operation was an “ad hoc, word of mouth affair”.\textsuperscript{512}

Not every commander was confused. In some cases, a commander’s mission analysis did reveal the importance of civil-military cooperation. The Commanding Officer in Bosnia in 2000 conducted “a detailed mission analysis,” which led him to understand the role of civil-military cooperation as that of a combat multiplier, which enabled the entire mission. It was a tool to influence the population. Good people got aid, bad people did not. We were not neutral, had to get involved in the local political scene. We used CIMIC as a way in. Our motto was, ‘help until it hurts.’ And we found that the bad people weren’t really in need of help anyway. The way we figured it was, if war breaks out, then we have failed in our mission, so we need to do whatever we can to prevent war. If we can do that, we win.\textsuperscript{513}

Similarly, the Commanding Officer of the first Canadian unit in Afghanistan in 2002 recognized that

\begin{quote}
We were not going to be doing humanitarian assistance. We were going to be nation-building. We couldn’t accept the idea of a phased approach, with combat first, then peacekeeping. It all had to happen at the same time, on different lines
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{511} Interview with Delaney.
\textsuperscript{512} Interview with Captain O.A.J. Savage, CIMIC Project Officer, Infantry Battle Group, Operation Kinetic, Kosovo August-December 1999 (Kingston, Ontario, 29 October 2002).
\textsuperscript{513} Interview with Major S. Wyatt, Senior Liaison Officer, Infantry Battle Group, Operation Palladium, Bosnia February to September 2000 (Kingston, Ontario, 30 October 2002.)
[of operation] but working together. CIMIC was part of what we called ‘conflict termination’. It was how we supported everything else that we were doing.514

The Canadian general in charge of Multinational Brigade Northwest in Bosnia went a step further. He did not see a separation between civil-military cooperation and ‘other’ operations. In his words, “I was the senior CIMIC officer. All operations are CIMIC in the modern world. We need civil-military engagement to achieve our mission.”515

Some commanders may have started a mission with very little idea about civil-military cooperation, but once they realized the nature of operations, they developed a clearer idea of how civil-military cooperation would help them achieve their mission. Indeed the commander who did not even know what he had a civil-military cooperation cell for went on to develop a sophisticated and far-reaching model of civil-military cooperation as economic development. In a letter seeking increased funding for Community Improvement Projects he stated that: “Without stimulation to the local economy and efforts to build greater economic capacity, unemployment and poverty will remain high providing fertile ground for future social action and potential conflict.”516

It is interesting to note the variety of approaches devised by commanders. Owing to the lack of clear doctrinal or command guidance, they were largely left to improvise and ‘figure it out’ for themselves. Some saw their role as that of facilitating relief. They saw that there should be a clear division of labour between what relief agencies did and

514 Interview with Colonel P. Stogran, Commanding Officer, Infantry Battle Group, Operation Apollo, Kandahar, Afghanistan February-August 2002 (Ottawa, Ontario, 29 May 2003).
515 Interview with Beare.
what the military did. The military might provide information to aid providers, or ensure coherent coverage, or marry up needs with resources. This was the case in Kosovo, where the civil-military cooperation thrust was to find donors with money (such as aid agencies like CIDA or DFID) and NGOs who needed to deliver services (such as CARE or the Albanian organization Mother Theresa) and have them build shelters in areas where the Battle Group was operating.\textsuperscript{517} Using this formula, the Battle Group in Kosovo was able to coordinate the delivery and construction of over 5000 shelter kits, with a range of partners, from UNHCR, to NGOs from Albania, Canada, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.\textsuperscript{518} The emphasis was on ensuring an efficient coverage of the Canadian unit’s area of operation; without coordination there would have been redundancy or gaps in shelter distribution. When the military got involved with actual projects at all it was as a last resort, often in order to address those projects that no one wanted to take on. For instance, in the town where the Battle Group was located a large community centre, which also served as a high school, that was extensively damaged. It required more than simple carpentry to be fixed. It required major repairs, such as re-roofing and the provision of windows and a new furnace. No single donor or NGO could complete the project. The Battle Group took on the role of project coordinator, hired a local engineer, divided the work into smaller projects, obtained money ($150,000) and found organizations willing to do the work.\textsuperscript{519} As the Commanding Officer later said, it was worthwhile trying to help the NGOs do their work.

\textsuperscript{517} Interviews with Delaney, Savage.
\textsuperscript{519} Memorandum from Delaney, Annex D.
because, "We were going to feel the effect of their failures, in terms of an unhappy population, so we might as well share in their successes."^{520}

The idea of a division of labour was not only espoused by the Canadians in Kosovo. One non-commissioned officer involved with civil-military cooperation in Bosnia in 2002 described his role as "pimping. NGOs have money, we give them projects to do."^{521} Indeed the staff officer overseeing all civil-military cooperation from Ottawa felt that such a separation was vital, lest anyone think that they were "getting in bed with an NGO or municipal government...We’re good at soldiering, NGOs are good at the humanitarian thing: let’s find ways of complementing each other."^{522}

What is missing from this, though, is any indication of an overarching objective. Why should militaries, particularly the Canadian Army, be involved with civil-military cooperation in the first place, regardless of the modalities of how they comport themselves?

Civil-military cooperation as a ‘feel good’ and a ‘do good’ activity

Not surprisingly, many, especially those soldiers personally involved with civil-military cooperation believe that the reason the Canadians bothered was "part of a larger goal of helping others."^{523} Reconstruction, in particular, was a clear expression of Canada’s, and by extension, the international community’s, "desire and ability to help in the healing process and bridge the ethnic divide."^{524} Aid represented more than charity or material improvement, it was a form of "non-instrumental communication" with the

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^{520} Interview, Bryan.
^{521} Interview with Sergeant G. Powell, Company CIMIC Sergeant, Infantry Battle Group, Operation Palladium, Bosnia, September 2002-March 2003 (Zgon, Bosnia, 27 December 2002).
^{522} Interview with Hewitt.
^{523} Interview with Brennan.
^{524} Interview with Savage.
local population.\footnote{Interview with Savage.} The fact military personnel carried out that civil-military cooperation, but in a non-aggressive manner, "without weapons in plain sight" helped restore the community’s "sense of dignity and self-worth, while at the same time humanizing the military image."\footnote{Interview with Savage.} In Bosnia, one civil-military cooperation operative believed that she was not "really peacekeeping here. It's more about making the locals feel better about themselves."\footnote{Interview with Lieutenant Heather Burke, Company CIMIC Officer, Infantry Battle Group, Operation Palladium, Bosnia, September 2002-March 2003 (Zgon, Bosnia, 29 December 2002).} Even staff officers at headquarters felt some degree of moral imperative to lend a hand. According to one:

> I mean, what happens to the people while we're fighting? They are the collateral damage. And, when you look at it, even before we got involved in the fighting, the people were being mistreated by their own leaders. Somebody has to do something to sort the people out.\footnote{Interview with Hewitt.}

For some commanders, there was little intrinsic value in conducting civil-military cooperation activities, but there were collateral benefits. One of the most basic of these was that rebuilding schools or distributing humanitarian relief supplies was, according to the civil-military cooperation officer in Kosovo, "good for the boys."\footnote{Interview with Delaney.} In other words, it was a morale boost for the soldiers. "It makes the troops feel good, a part of something larger than just patrols or guarding the gate [to the camp]."\footnote{Interview with Brennan.} "It provides soldiers with a sense of accomplishment, a sense that they have made a difference."\footnote{Interview with Bryan.} Even units that had no formal association with civilians developed ways of "getting involved." A field engineer troop in Bosnia used their own time and money to rebuild a school for thirty

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Interview with Savage.}
\footnote{Interview with Savage.}
\footnote{Interview with Lieutenant Heather Burke, Company CIMIC Officer, Infantry Battle Group, Operation Palladium, Bosnia, September 2002-March 2003 (Zgon, Bosnia, 29 December 2002).}
\footnote{Interview with Hewitt.}
\footnote{Interview with Delaney.}
\footnote{Interview with Brennan.}
\footnote{Interview with Bryan.}
\end{footnotes}
children in the town of Drvar. Even those commanders who had developed some understanding of the mission specific function of civil-military cooperation identified troop morale as a “good reason to continue” even when faced with funding shortages. One civil-military cooperation specialist was rather blunt in his assessment of why Canadian soldiers were involved in civil-cooperation in the first place: “We are happy to sell a little hope, but basically, we are salving our own consciences.”

Unfortunately, though, civil-military cooperation as a ‘feel good’ exercise can lead to problems, as was the case in both Bosnia and Afghanistan. In Bosnia, soldiers discovered an elderly Muslim woman living in an unheated goat pen near to their camp. Several groups (such as military police and mechanics) who passed by her dwelling came to ‘adopt’ her, providing her with food and clothing (often sent from Canada for this purpose). Because she was a nearby and symbolic victim, she became a “pet” of the unit, receiving much more aid than others in similar situations. This became a problem for the civil-military cooperation team, as they were left the difficult task of explaining her status to local leaders and, eventually, of requesting the commanding officer to halt further ‘donations’ to her. In Afghanistan, the civil-military cooperation team found themselves having to arrange for “photo opportunities” so that Canadian soldiers could deliver teddy bears from home to local children. This perplexed community leaders and

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532 Interview with Captain Chris Atkin, CIMIC Project Officer, Infantry Battle Group, Operation Palladium, Bosnia, September 2002-March 2003 (Zgon, Bosnia, 27 December 2002).
533 Personal observation, Glogovac, Kosovo, August-December 1999.
534 Letter from King, 2.
535 Interview with Powell.
536 Interview with Powell.
created confusion as to the real purpose and value of more formal civil-military cooperation projects.537

Civil-military Cooperation as ‘Intelligence Gathering’

Commanders also saw civil-military cooperation as a means of gathering information, with the short-term benefit of providing force protection to their own troops. Of course, since civil-military cooperation usually entails a degree of interacting with the population, it is easy to regard those soldiers involved in it as “the eyes and ears of the commander.”538 As a civil-military cooperation officer explains:

A [commander] gathers his knowledge / power by gaining information about the environment he is operating in. Guidance is issued for the collection of information in the form of a...matrix. CIMIC operates in a broad spectrum gathering information across the width and depth of the...matrix...Command gathers much of its information through various sources that interact with a variety of organizations including local citizens, government, local as well as international NGOs and the [international community]. Much of the valuable information gathered is done through established relationships based on trust, respect and reciprocity. CIMIC plays a significant role in the information gathering process as much of the key information is generated from CIMIC members who create those valuable relationships with people. After information is processed...it then becomes intelligence, which can be used in the decision making process by command.539

Regardless of the process by which it is generated, the reasoning behind using civil-military cooperation as a source of intelligence goes beyond mere presence: it is viewed as a means of gaining support for the mission. If building schools and feeding some of the hungry can reduce the amount of rock throwing, mine laying and ambushes targeted at military forces, then that in itself is an achievement. As one Canadian commander in Bosnia put it, “CIMIC offered an opportunity to enhance force protection

537 Interview with Beubier.
538 Interview with Hewitt. This sentiment is echoed by a commander in Kosovo, who called those charged with civil-military cooperation as “an excellent set of sensors.” Interview with Bryan.
by demonstrating to the local population that we were there to support them.540 Civil-military cooperation, then, is the means by which the military force engages with the local population in order to ‘tame’ or ‘soothe’ them. Humanitarian relief (in the form of emergency food and clothing) and small development projects (such as basic infrastructure reconstruction) are used to this end. In short, the logic behind ‘civil-military cooperation qua force protection’ is that people will not bite the hands that feed them. As stated in the formal orders regarding the distribution on humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan in 2002:

The overarching purpose [of civil-military cooperation] is to improve the quality of life for persons in the immediate vicinity of [the Canadian Army’s location]. This will have the effect of also giving a favourable image of the Coalition, particularly Canadian Forces personnel, and of reinforcing the security of Coalition of personnel and assets.541

In a subsequent mission to Afghanistan, this time in Kabul, the civil-military cooperation mission was even clearer: “to enhance force protection to Canadian and [International Security Assistance Force] personnel and provide support to the local population.”542

In this regard, the relationship between civil-military cooperation and intelligence is quite straightforward. The primary CIMIC function is to placate the locals, and the intelligence aspect of this effort is twofold. First, information may be traded for assistance. Aid becomes conditional on ‘good behaviour’, a component of which is seen as a reliable flow of information about possible threats.543 Second, the process of moving amongst the population, handing out food or supervising reconstruction projects, allows

540 Interview with Wyatt.
543 3PPLCI BG HQ, Fragmentary Operations Order 09, p. 2, para 3a(1)(b). This practice was also acknowledged by officers in Kosovo (Interview with Delaney) and Bosnia (Interview with Wyatt).
for opportunities for contact with locals, both the ‘average person’ and the existing social and political leadership. As guidance to Canadian troops in Afghanistan makes clear, civil-military cooperation activities were tactical, not altruistic, in nature:

Any HA [humanitarian aid] distributed should be targeted and deliberate. No aid should be given without a deliberate intent of gaining the support of the local populace, and therefore increasing our force protection and engendering a strong flow of HUMINT (human intelligence).544

An article written for the families of soldiers serving in Afghanistan at this time expands on this point:

Our patrols involve Canadian soldiers meeting and interacting with the local population in as friendly and non-threatening a way as possible. We voice our concerns (through interpreters), and they voice theirs. We want to preserve the security of the airfield, and we can best do that by that by developing a close relationship with our neighbours in the airfield vicinity... It’s in everybody’s best interests to get Afghanistan back on its feet. In the short-term, we want to keep villagers on our side, so that they can help us detect Al Qaeda and Taliban elements that are still active in Kandahar province. Last week, local farmers pointed out a landmine that had been laid on a road in our sector. A few days ago, a local boy showed us to three rockets that had been fired at but missed the airfield.545

Civil-military cooperation, it seems, is a way of buying the villages’ loyalty. This is the often clichéd ‘hearts and minds’ rationale for performing civil-military cooperation, expressed by one sergeant as “force protection through friendship.”546

The advantages from civil-military cooperation, from this perspective, are indispensable in providing early warning to deployed troops through local contacts. By 2000, this kind of low-level civil-military cooperation related intelligence was credited as providing 60-70% of all information received at the battalion level within Canadian

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544 3PPLCI BG HQ, Fragmentary Operations Order 09, p. 2, para 3a(1)(b)i.
545 Alexander Watson, “PIC Patrol article,” Mimeo in possession of author.
elements of NATO’s Stabilisation Force (SFOR)\textsuperscript{547}. In 2002, the intelligence collecting non-commissioned officer assigned to civil-military cooperation project patrols was considered to be “the best intelligence source in the [American-led] brigade.”\textsuperscript{548}

However, there are suggestions that, in Afghanistan at least, the importance of CIMIC-related intelligence might extend beyond the unit level: one analyst credits intelligence arising from civil-military cooperation as providing evidence of “active disinformation by [a foreign] intelligence [agency] about Canadian CIMIC efforts.”\textsuperscript{549}

Despite these suggestions, there are limitations with the use of—and undue reliance on—civil-military cooperation as a source of intelligence. Civil-military cooperation are often untrained in intelligence gathering and can lack the necessary ‘situational awareness’ of wider intelligence issues to be of more than basic assistance.\textsuperscript{550}

Indeed, in Bosnia, despite rhetoric from commanders to the contrary, one intelligence officer confided that he relied on CIMIC personnel only for “passive collection, which amounts to a series of requests to ‘report if observed’. I do not task them to pump people for information. I don’t expect a lot from them, but they do provide raw data which sometimes acts as a trigger for further investigation.”\textsuperscript{551} This ‘collateral’ approach to intelligence gathering is borne out by the fact that personnel involved with civil-military cooperation in Kosovo, and other missions in Bosnia and Afghanistan, who claim that

\textsuperscript{547} Interview, Wyatt. Commanders from missions in Kosovo (1999) and Bosnia (2002) also credit civil-military cooperation with providing critical intelligence, although they do not assign a numerical estimate to its value. Interview with Brennan; Interview with Bryan; Interview with Longhurst.

\textsuperscript{548} Interview, Captain Alexander Watson, Civil-Military Cooperation Officer, Infantry Battle Group, Operation Apollo, Kandahar, Afghanistan, February-August 2002 (St-Jean sur Richelieu, Québec, 10 November 2004).

\textsuperscript{549} Interview, Confidential Source, Canadian Intelligence Officer, Ottawa, 23 March 2005.

\textsuperscript{550} Interview with Captain James Godefroy, Unit Intelligence Officer, Infantry Battle Group, Operation Palladium, Bosnia, September 2002-March 2003 (Zgon, Bosnia, 28 December 2002).

\textsuperscript{551} Interview with Godefroy.
they were “never tasked with intelligence collection.” In one case, the formal guidance to the civil-military cooperation team was “to work towards filling the commander’s PIRs [primary information requirements], but the reality was, they were only finalized six weeks after we started operations.”

Gauging the success of the relationship between civil-military cooperation and intelligence can be extremely difficult. The necessary metrics for determining ‘lives saved due to tips from locals directly attributable to humanitarian relief and reconstruction efforts’ are simply impossible to design, let alone observe. As a Canadian commander of a multinational brigade remarks, “We are looking for signs that we are succeeding in rebuilding this country. Unfortunately, we are trying to measure things with a stopwatch when, in fact, we should be using a calendar.” In fact, relying on civil-military cooperation as a shield can be misleading: at the beginning of the Falujah uprising in the spring of 2004, a CNN reporter asked a bewildered US Army captain why the Iraqis were shooting at his company. He responded by saying that he had no idea; he and his men had recently completed over one hundred community improvement projects and the Iraqis should not have been reacting the way they were. Nonetheless, if Western militaries are able to help reduce casualties in their forces, even if only hypothetically, the price of a few humanitarian or development projects will not be seen as a burden. One life saved because of a ‘bomb not planted’ will be seen as worthwhile.

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552 Interview with Savage; Interview with Delaney; and Interview with Captain D. Myles, Task Force Civil-military Cooperation Officer, Operation Athena, Kabul, Afghanistan, August 2004-January 2005 (Camp Julien, Kabul, Afghanistan, 14 December 2004).
553 Interview with Longhurst.
554 Interview with Beare.
Civil-military cooperation as ‘Information Operations’

There were signs, though, that civil-military cooperation does serve a higher military purpose, beyond mere force protection. Many officers regarded civil-military cooperation as a force multiplier, something that allowed the commander to focus on his main mission.\(^{556}\) By increasing the credibility of the military forces in a given theatre of operations, civil-military cooperation was an activity that could be exploited to provide for better freedom of action.\(^{557}\) According to one civil-military cooperation operative, “We are here to achieve the commanding officer’s intent.”\(^{558}\) The only difficulty with viewing civil-military cooperation in this way is that the terms ‘force multiplier’ and ‘commander officer’s intent’ are so fungible as to be meaningless. In essence, given the wide variations in understanding of missions, coupled with the variations in the understandings of civil-military cooperation itself, civil-military cooperation becomes ‘all things to all people’ and as a result, retains no intrinsic meaning. As one officer summed it up, “The military’s mission in Bosnia is to create a safe and secure environment. CIMIC works with a network of NGOs and locals to do just that. Therefore, CIMIC supports the overall mission.”\(^{559}\) Civil-military cooperation is seen as an ancillary function, supporting *something, somehow.*

\(^{555}\) Interview with Lieutenant J. Watt, Company CIMIC Officer, Infantry Battle Group, Operation Palladium, Bosnia, September 2002-March 2003 (Zgon, Bosnia, 27 December 2002); Interview with Master Warrant Officer J. Fink, Company CIMIC Warrant Officer, Infantry Battle Group, Operation Palladium, Bosnia, September 2002-March 2003 (Zgon, Bosnia, 27 December 2002); Interview with Major Michel Boire, J5 Campaign Planner, NATO LANDCENT/KFOR HQ, June-November 1999 (Kingston, Ontario, 23 October 2002); Interview with Hewitt.

\(^{556}\) Interview with Delaney; Interview with Bryan; Interview with Wyatt.

\(^{557}\) Interview with Fink.

\(^{558}\) Interview with Watt.
However, there were more focused understandings of civil-military cooperation, beyond the view of it as an activity only undertaken to improve the lives of the local population, or as a simple source of information about threats to the peacekeeping force. As a component of a larger Information Operations campaign, CIMIC helps to gather information that a commander will need in order to make decisions. Are the locals content? What are their concerns? What needs to be done? The answers to these kinds of questions allow commanders to ‘fine tune’ their activities, changing emphasis from, say, deterring aggression from military elements, to addressing intimidation from organised criminal groups or reducing corruption and political thuggery. As a commander of Canadian troops put it: “Civil military interface can provide useful intelligence [which] allows you to see the direction of the conflict, to figure out what the drivers are. The more you know, the more influence you have, the better you can push the right levers. The value of CIMIC is getting the real idea as to who’s who.”

In Bosnia in 2002, after an initial period of confusion, a very sophisticated arrangement was developed to select, implement and exploit civil-military cooperation. Lacking any specific doctrinal framework, the unit adopted a targeting approach; that is, it viewed a civil-military cooperation activity in the same way as any other military weapon: an instrument for creating an effect. In this way, they created a targeting board, with representatives from the operations, psychological operations, intelligence, public affairs, and civil-military cooperation teams. Each civil-military cooperation activity would be designed in such a way as to tie into other activities and ‘target’ specific groups of people, whether it was the local population or the community leaders. Each target group might be given a different message, with a view to producing a different effect.

Interview with Bryan.
Not only were the desired effects enumerated, so where ways by which the unit could measure the level of effectiveness of any given activity. When a particular civil-military cooperation activity was carried out, all actions would be coordinated to make the most out of the occasion. One such event provides a clear illustration of the principle. After many months of fundraising, coordination, and construction, a multi-ethnic community centre was rebuilt in the Bos Petrovac area of northwestern Bosnia. An official opening was planned for 10 January 2003. Psychological Operations staffs would place announcements in the local press and on the NATO-funded current affairs radio programs, as well as distributing leaflets and flyers. Public Affairs staffs would circulate press releases and ensure press coverage of the event itself. Intelligence operatives would seek to understand the existing social and political networks in the communities by watching who attended the opening. The range of effects that were to be achieved spanned the spectrum of possibilities devised by the Canadians, modified from American information operations doctrine:

- **Inform**: Provide information/counter misinformation
- **Influence**: Change perceptions and attitudes
- **Warn**: Provide notice of intent
- **Co-opt**: Gain cooperation
- **Disrupt**: To temporarily interrupt the flow of information
- **Isolate**: Minimise the power or influence of someone
- **Encourage**: Inspire to act in a particular manner.

In the press release produced for the event, the unit closed with this simple message:

> While the Canadian Battle Group’s primary focus is to maintain a safe and secure environment, SFOR supports the international community in helping Bosnians

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561 Interview with Captain K. Barry, Information Operations Officer, Infantry Battle Group Operation Palladium, Bosnia, September 2002-March 2003 (Zgon, Bosnia, 6 December 2003).

rebuild their nation, through initiative such as the reconstruction of the Bos Petrovac Social Welfare Centre. Civil-military cooperation, clearly, was more than just ‘helping people’. It was seen as a way of altering behaviour.

The process in Afghanistan in 2002 was not dissimilar. Rather than conducting CIMIC projects in their own right, other elements were combined to achieve a synergistic effect. So-called “PIC Patrols” were formed, whereby elements of psychological operations, intelligence, and CIMIC were integrated into single tactical groups. These groups would travel through villages, stopping to discuss with locals topics such as the arrival or departure of young men in the area, seeking any knowledge of upcoming paramilitary or terrorist activity, or the pre-occupation identity and role of key actors in the community. Often these discussions were predicated on, or revolved around, civil-military cooperation projects (either those completed, underway, or required in the future). Patrols would visit wells or schools that had been completed in a village, and use this opportunity to gather, and disseminate, more information.

There were those who preferred to use civil-military bluntly, but still with the aim of influencing behaviour. In Bosnia, one commander saw “[civil-military cooperation] as a carrot that can be withdrawn...If we don’t get cooperation, perhaps we should stop our projects in this area.” Others understood civil-military cooperation as an activity contributing to a longer-term change in behaviour. In Afghanistan in 2005 civil-military cooperation would enable us to buy goodwill, and show the populace that there were immediate, tangible benefits to themselves in exchange

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564 Interview with Major S. Carr, Officer Commanding, ‘C’ Company, Infantry Battle Group, Operation Palladium, Bosnia, September 2002-March 2003 (Zgon, Bosnia, 30 December 2002).
for supporting the legitimate government. This would eventually improve the local security situation, and would create a body politic more in line with Western ideas than what was then in place, which was essentially tribal feudalism.565

The CIMIC-intelligence relationship goes well beyond first-order force protection matters. Force protection, while important, is essentially a ‘wait and see’ defensive tactic; aid is distributed and development assisted in the hopes that information can be acquired. There is often a more active component to civil-military cooperation, one that aims to not only protect soldiers but also change the behaviour of the local population. For example, in Bosnia, the Canadian commander stated that by 2002, at least, “CIMIC [was] involved in both changing the behaviour of locals and influencing that behaviour (carrot and stick).” Accordingly, the desired results of CIMIC “community improvement projects” were many:

a. Reward reform minded leaders/communities;
b. Deter obstructionism;
c. Build public confidence and long-term hope;
d. Increase civic awareness and identity;
e. Build inter-ethnic cooperation; and
f. Improve community relations with SFOR.566

CIMIC is a two-way conduit for information, and therefore, a means to achieving information superiority: messages can be sent out to the population in the course of CIMIC activities and the effect of those messages can be monitored with the collection of intelligence. More than that though, CIMIC is not just seen as a shield, but as a lever for accomplishing the wider mission.

565 Questionnaire response from Zilkalns.
566 Presentation prepared by Lieutenant Colonel C.R. King, Commanding Officer, Infantry Battle Group Operation Palladium, Bosnia, September 2002-March 2003 (Zgon, Bosnia, 6 December 2003).
Conclusion

The Canadian Army was deeply shaken by the events of Somalia in the early 1990s and struggled to articulate a balanced account of its place within Canadian society. At first, in Huntington's terms, it emphasized its societal imperative (to fit in) at the expense of its functional imperative (to fight wars). Conceptual tensions existed between an image of the Canadian Army as a peacekeeping force and an image of the Canadian Army as a Cold War force. Both these images, though, were at odds with the reality of the missions that the Army found itself deploying on, in places like Croatia, Kosovo, and East Timor.

However, a string of successful and high profile operations, beginning with Kosovo, demonstrated that the Army could be relevant and effective. Doctrinally, the Canadian Army gained confidence and began to cast activities such as civil-military cooperation as intrinsically linked to warfighting, and not merely as support functions. The aim of not only civil-military cooperation, but of all military operations, then is similar: "in the pursuit of an overall objective, a commander must do what it takes to deal with actors and factors that get in the way." From one point of view, the doctrine of "manoeuvring on the cognitive plane", written in 2007, is an attempt to capture that concept, one that has been understood and practiced, in varying degrees, by the Canadian army since 1999. From another perspective, though, the evolution has been patchy and sporadic. Even as late as 2005, an officer figured that

The reason we do CIMIC operations is that we have blundered our way into them...Essentially, we began with some very low-level "feel good" projects in Yugoslavia...and as our allies began emphasizing CIMIC we decided to pretend

567 Interview with Beare.
to play. In the standard CF manner, we have paid some lip service towards CIMIC without actually committing the resources and work necessary in order to create a real capability.5 6 9

If we look at the conceptual progression that runs through civil-military cooperation doctrine over the past decade and compare that with ways in which commanders and practitioners have understood and practiced civil-military cooperation, we do not see a neat correlation between thought and deed. Instead, variations in individuals’ understandings of civil-military cooperation has led to elements of different purposes being present in several missions, sometimes ahead of doctrinal development, sometimes behind it.

In Clausewitzian terms, the military, as a Trinitarian actor, can be seen to have applied its skill to the problems it encountered on the battlefield—the realm of chance. In so doing, it first had to grapple with the notion of how best to apply that skill. Was civil-military cooperation a part of the solution to the problem posed by contemporary peace support and counterinsurgency operations? Or was it a relic of the ‘simpler’ times, of peacekeeping and Cold War conventional warfare? It is clear that only once the Canadian Army was able to cast civil-military cooperation as a core activity, rather than a complementary or even supplementary activity, was any coherent strategy for carrying it out possible. Doctrinally, this state of understanding was reached after a progressive series of revisions, but this tidy evolution was not matched in practice. This is due in large part to the variations in personal understanding of the commanders and practitioners involved, who had differing experiences and perspectives. That the Canadian Army had (and has) no civil-military cooperation training course of its own, but rather relies on

other institutions for its provisions, must contribute to the lack of a common understanding. Individuals were left to interpret formal doctrine (if they bothered to read it) and the norms that underpinned it as they saw fit. Several practitioners claimed that they received little or no direction from their military chain of command in terms of how they should regard civil-military cooperation. Furthermore, traditional military norms that regard combat as the ultimate goal of a soldier provided little guidance in situations where housing returning refugees or creating economic growth were the priority.

To call the resulting approach to civil-military cooperation *ad hoc* at first seems fitting. However, it is instructive to note that the approaches undertaken by Canadian soldiers do not appear to be ‘to the purpose’ as *ad hoc* would suggest. If this were the case, each mission or operation would have a different approach, tailored to the specific needs of that *situation*. Instead, what we see is a range of approaches, some simple, some sophisticated, taking place on a number of missions, whether those missions are in a Kosovo (an early intervention operation), in Bosnia (by 2002, a mature mission), or Afghanistan (from 2002 until the present, a mission that includes a far greater degree of poverty and conflict than anything experienced in the Balkans). The more appropriate Latin descriptor would, then, appear to be ‘*ad lib*’, connoting improvisation according to the preferences of the performer.

This chapter has examined the Canadian Army has translated its understanding of its role in society into action in the field. In terms of Clausewitz’s Trinity, we have now looked at each of the actors and seen how they have played their part in determining the character of military activity. In the next chapter, we will focus on the relationships between those actors, looking specifically how the government and the military attempted
to use civil-military cooperation as a means of maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of the people of Canada. Extending the idea that civil-military cooperation has been *ad lib*, the next chapter will demonstrate that just as for a musician, improvisation must occur within limits.
Chapter 7
Putting it all Together: Building an Effective Strategic Narrative

"The military commander must develop more political orientation, in order to explain the goals of military activities...He must develop a capacity for public relations."
Morris Janowitz, The Military Professional

"I often get asked...why are you there?...We're there because you sent us...As a soldier, it's not my job to explain why you sent us. Soldiers don't do that. We tell you what we're doing, we tell you how we're doing it, but we should not be in the position of explaining to the people of Canada why we're there. The responsibility for that lies with the political leadership and those who sent us."
Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie

The evolution of civil-military cooperation as a military activity can be seen as an attempt by the Canadian Army to come to terms with its identity as a fighting organization. By putting civil-military cooperation into a decidedly warfighting context, they have been able to distance themselves from the image of peacekeeping. This allowed them to develop a mature and balanced account of what they do, even if it is not practiced consistently yet.

However well that strategy may have worked internally, it is important to recall that the Army does not exist in a vacuum. A resurgent military, embracing a robust role as a capable, combat force still has to exist within the framework of its wider social and political landscape. The functional imperative of being effective, in the Canadian case at least, cannot fully trump the social imperative to fit in with the expectations of the government and the people, which, as we have seen, are still largely grounded in a peacekeeping tradition. This 'fitting in' is about gaining and maintaining legitimacy and it can be accomplished in two distinct ways. The first is to alter one's practices; that is, to conduct activities that are in line with the legitimate ideal. The second is to emphasise those activities, to highlight them, and to make them take on more importance than might
normally be the case. In both these senses, civil-military cooperation becomes ‘the price to be paid’ by the Canadian Army for being permitted to continue its more martial activities, indeed, its existence. The government of Canada is quick to underscore the ‘good works’ of the Canadian Army as well. For them, a military that ‘does good’ fits in with their overall political and policy goals, as we have presented them in Chapter 5.

This chapter will explore how the Canadian Army and Government have gone about promoting the military in the image expected of Canadians. It is, returning to the model sketched out in Chapter Three, an examination of how the military, as an actor, interacts with its Trinitarian partners, and an illustration of the partnership strategies that are developed in order to maintain legitimacy. Perhaps unwittingly, but effectively nonetheless, the doctrinal model developed by the Army for influencing the behaviour of its enemies on the battlefield, has come to be skillfully applied to the home front as well.

The Military History of An Unmilitary People570

The First World War was the last time Canada was ‘forced’ to deploy its military forces.571 Since then, Canadian military operations have been voluntary affairs, prompted less by a fear of extinction or ambition for gain, than by other factors. As Joe Jockel and Joel Sokolsky point out, “The Canadian government has the luxury of choosing when and where it will commit the Canadian military in support of Canadian values and, if it chooses to participate, to select the level of commitment.”572

571 Prior to the Statute of Westminster of 1931, when the United Kingdom declared war that declaration applied to all of its dominions and colonies as well. In 1939, Canada exercised its new found sovereignty by waiting a full week after Britain’s declaration before declaring war on Germany.
While that luxury is certainly a blessing for the country as a whole (there would be no shortage of people and states who would wish to be in the same situation) it does pose challenges for the Canadian Army. As the Dean of Arts of the Royal Military College is reported to have explained to members of the Pentagon staff in a meeting after September 11, 2001: “Canada's military problem is that Canada has no military problem.” This reality is reflected in the legislative mandate given to the military in Canada:

The Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence are unique among government agencies and departments in that neither has a stated statutory purpose... Therefore, the government of the day must choose how it wishes to use the Canadian Forces. This condition places special responsibilities on the government and Parliament to give clear direction to the Canadian Forces and to oversee its activities carefully.

As we have seen in Chapter 5, clear direction does not always come. Neither do the explicit choices about the use of the Canadian Forces. A leading Canadian newspaper's editorial page ran the headline “Social work at gunpoint: Jean Chrétien is confused about when to deploy the military.”

This state of affairs should not be surprising. According to Micheal Desch, when states are confronted with neither internal nor external military threats, the “objective threat environment... does not determine a military’s mission.” Instead, “we need to consider the role played by the prevailing ideas about the military’s proper mission and

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its role in society." Essentially, Desch is saying that the notion of the functional imperative cannot rule supreme in the absence of a clear requirement and, instead, the military’s societal imperative becomes more important. His use of the term proper to describe the mission of the military connotes the idea of legitimacy. The military must do what it is expected to do. In the United States, that might be to “fight and win the nation’s wars”. The Army in Canada, however, is located within one of Charles Moskos’s “warless societies,” and is therefore bound to face “goal displacement,” whereby the lack of a clear and pressing need for armed force means that, quite literally, the government is spoilt for choice as to what to do with its military. While perhaps not the “fireproof house” that Senator Dandurand described in 1924, Canada in the 1990s certainly was a long way from the “flammable materials” of internal or external threats. What the proper mission for the military might be in these circumstances is not evident.

Certainly in the beginning of the 1990s, at the end of the Cold War, and faced with successive budget cuts, the Canadian Forces came to resemble what Morris Janowitz had labeled a “constabulary force”, which he defined as a force that is continually prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory, because it has incorporated a protective military posture.

578 On 17 June 1924, Senator Raoul Dandurand, the Canadian representative at the fifth League of Nations assembly in Geneva, uttered the phrase “Canada is a fireproof house far from flammable materials,” in his opposition to Article X of the League Charter, which obligated member states to provide military assistance when another state was the victim of armed aggression. http://www.international.gc.ca/department/history/canada5-en.asp; accessed 17 April 2007.
The implications of such a transition would have subtle effects on the military. On one hand, its members would acquiesce and take up their new role quietly, entering into a clear understanding with the population:

The constabulary officer performs his duties, which include fighting, because he is a professional with a sense of self-esteem and moral worth. Civilian society permits him to maintain his code of honour and encourages him to develop his professional skill...He is integrated into civilian society because he shares its common values.580

To a certain extent, this is an accurate picture of what happened to the Canadian Army following the Somalia scandal. The publication of Canada's Army and Shaping the Future (discussed at length in Chapter 6) demonstrated the Army's willingness, or at least its resignation, to go gentle into that dark night. The Army was saying that it was fully prepared to carry out the kinds of values-based missions the government wanted it to, even if those missions were not clearly defined. If that meant becoming a constabulary force, so be it.

As predicted by Janowitz, however, not everybody in the Canadian military was quite so ready to abandon the functional imperative:

Heroic leaders...tend to thwart the constabulary concept because of their desire to maintain conventional military doctrine and their resistance to assessing the political consequences of limited military action which do not produce 'victory.'581

Whether they were heroic or not, there were Canadian officers who resisted. The publication of Advancing with Purpose and the manuals that followed it proved that.

However clear the military was about the need to maintain combat capability, it still faced the problem that the government had not decided on its proper mission.

580 Janowitz, 78.
581 Janowitz, 64.
Canada was not alone in this. Writing in 1991, Martin Shaw stated that “There is greater uncertainty today about the roles of war and military institutions in human society than at any time in the Twentieth Century.”

Eleven years later, Phillip Bobbitt observed a similar phenomenon:

What seems to characterize the present period is a confusion about how to count the costs and benefits of intervention, preparedness and alliance. What does the calculus for the use of force yield us when we have done our sums? Only an unconvincing result that cannot silence the insistent question: “What are our forces for?” Because no calculus can tell us that.

Jacques Van Doorn warned that when armed forces find themselves in situations where basic questions such as ‘What are our forces for?’ cannot be answered easily, they face a “crisis of legitimacy”. And since, “the sources of legitimacy are part of a certain political culture and are an expression of a particular social climate,” any attempt to regain legitimacy must reflect that culture and that climate. As we shall see, it is precisely this that the Canadian Army did.

Canada, like most countries, has an image of itself as an actor on the international scene. For many Canadians, as we saw in Chapter 4, that image remains one of a progressive state, a “helpful fixer” in international relations. Indeed, as Doug Bland, notes, “The notion that an ‘unmilitary people’ has a discernable way to use force, including at times, deadly and indiscriminate force, may seem alien to Canadians and

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585 Van Doorn, 21.
their political representatives raised on the myth that Canadians are peacekeepers.”

This understanding must have an impact in shaping what the “proper mission” for the Canadian military is. Moreover, as the rhetoric surrounding military interventions over the course of the 1990s began to take on a ‘value-based’ rather than an ‘interest-based’ justification, it seemed logical that the military response would also be value-based. As Colin McInnes makes clear, the West, including Canada, went to war in the name of “the victim of rape in Bosnia [and] ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.” Moving into the early Twenty-First Century, we might add to this the Bhurka clad-women and illiterate girls of Afghanistan. Jockel and Sokolsky go so far as to state that

Anything that can threaten life or welfare of the individual—war, poverty, the environment, and the very government under which people live—becomes a legitimate concern for the international community and a justification for intervention.

The point is that this is why we are expected to fight and it has a profound impact on the way we are expected to fight. If we are outraged about the destruction of livelihoods in some far off land, should not our response be not only to stop (or even punish) those who are destroying, but also to reconstruct those livelihoods that are destroyed? After all, the welfare of the individual and the establishment of a stable way of life is what we want for ourselves and what we created through our network of social programmes. If foreign

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589 Jockel and Sokolsky, 8.
policy mirrors domestic policy, the answer seems obvious: “Military intervention can be seen as another form of foreign aid.”

On one hand, this perspective on the use of force runs contrary to the institutional ideals of the military. Surely soldiers are warriors, not social workers? In 1999, when then-Prime Minister Jean Chrétien referred to the Canadian Forces as “boy scouts” (in his mind a positive connection with their role as peacekeepers) the military was furious.

On the other hand, however, some analysts believed that such a perspective was responsible for “rescuing Canadian defence policy from military irrelevance and strategic sterility.”

Furthermore, the Canadian military was being pushed to alter not only its mission but its approach. In a seminar discussing the role of the Canadian Forces in 2000, following the publication of *Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020*, it was made clear that the military had no choice but to address its style of “governance”:

Not only is the specific role of the CAF [sic] being modified, the institution is also forced to adapt to important changes in its environment that have little to do with its original vocation. In a pluralistic, heterogeneous, factured and turbulent social context, the need for legitimacy by the CAF [sic] requires that it becomes more adaptive to change, more representative of this social reality and capable of maintaining more rigorous ethical standards than the general citizenry.

It would seem inescapable for the Canadian military: the societal imperative would have to be addressed.

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590 Jockel and Sokolsky, 3.
592 Jockel and Sokolsky, 1. Concerns about strategic sterility in Canada have been widespread amongst the analytical academic community since at least the early 1970s. See Colin S. Gray, “The Need for Independent Canadian Strategic Thought,” *Canadian Defence Quarterly*. 20.1 (1990): 7-15 [this is a reprint of a 1971 article of the same name.]; Colin S. Gray, *Canadian Defence Priorities: A Question of Relevance*. (Toronto: Clarke Irwin, 1972).
Building An Effective Strategic Narrative

It is possible to discern a concerted effort to portray the Canadian military and Canadian soldiers in a way that corresponds to the expectations of the Canadian public. This effort is surprisingly constant across time, is taken up equally by military commanders and politicians, regardless of party affiliation. This is despite changes in the internal narrative developed by the military, one that stressed a move away from peacekeeping as a *leit motif*. This is despite changes in the nature of the military interventions to which Canadian governments committed troops. What emerges is a campaign to ‘sell’ Canadian military activity in a certain light.

In highlighting the Army’s ‘humanitarian’ side, senior military commanders and politicians used two techniques. The first was to stress the link between current Canadian military activity and the peacekeeping and humanitarianism that the public has come to respect and expect. The second technique was to demonstrate not only how ‘Canadian’ the military’s activities were but how ‘Canadian’ the soldiers were who conduct them.

Humanitarian Missions

In his speech to the House of Commons announcing the deployment of Canadian troops to fight as part of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, Minister of National Defence Art Eggleton was careful to remind Canadians that “one of the objectives of the coalition is to assist with the humanitarian needs of the Afghans [sic] in the region.”

Speaking at the parade welcoming those same troops home, a new defence minister remarked to the soldiers that they “led patrols into treacherous Afghan

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mountains...protected both allies and the local population from Al’Qaida incursions...and carried out much needed humanitarian work.”

This rhetoric set the tone for the next four years. Many speeches would be made saying things such as “The Afghanistan mission is right for Canada...It speaks to Canadians’ Pearsonian instinct to help a country in distress, to provide security, which is the sine qua non for progress.” Bill Graham, speaking in 2004, spoke of how the Canadian Army had “worked to improve the shattered infrastructure of Bosnia-Herzegovina, including helping to build and repair schools, water systems and roads.” Graham remarked on how the Canadian soldiers were responsible for “important signs of progress: bustling streets, packed cafés and well-stocked stores. Hundreds of thousands of refugees are returning to their homes, and essential infrastructure is on track to be rebuilt.”

The Canadian military ensured that this perspective of its work was showcased in the press releases and mission backgrounders distributed to media outlets. This is how they characterized the Canadian Forces’ role in Kosovo:

As well as performing the patrolling and observation duties intrinsic to peace-support operations, the Canadian contingent carried out humanitarian aid operations, such as roofing buildings, reconstructing schools and medical facilities, installing small bridges, and building playgrounds. Under an agreement with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Canadian

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contingent received $750,000 in CIDA funding for small-scale humanitarian projects.\textsuperscript{598}

A similar resume was completed for Bosnia:

Through civil-military cooperation efforts, hundreds of necessary infrastructure projects have also been completed.\ldots such as building rural electrical systems, reconstructing schools and repairing water wells, septic systems, bridges and roads have enabled the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina to return to their land and homes, re-establish local businesses and begin to rebuild their lives.\ldots In their personal time, many CF members have also volunteered to participate in community projects to improve the quality of life of the local people. In countless ways over the years, hundreds of CF members have raised and donated thousands of dollars and given their time and skills to improve the lives of the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina. From donating school supplies, toys and clothing for children to purchasing furnaces, bedding and first aid equipment for orphanages and hospitals, Canadians have made notable contributions towards improving conditions for the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina.\textsuperscript{599}

Newsletters and articles were produced by the military detailing Canadian civil-military cooperation activities, with titles like "Helping Clinics Better Serve Community," "Canadian Soldiers Give Hope to Kabul Students," "Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team Helping to Build Capacity, Communities."\textsuperscript{600}

The message of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces was clear: when you think of the Canadian Army, think humanitarian reconstruction. The message was sometimes taken to extremes and can seem overdone. For instance, when the military announced that it would be purchasing four C-17 strategic airlift and 17 C-

130 tactical airlift airplanes for a total of $8.3 billion\textsuperscript{601}, Lieutenant-General Michel Gauthier, the Commander, of Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM) claimed:

> This strategic airlift capability is great news for our expeditionary forces and for Canada. It will provide us with an unprecedented level of responsiveness, independence and strategic agility. \textit{Among many other things}, strategic airlift will enhance Canada's ability to project humanitarian assistance to any part of the world. The Canadian Forces Disaster Assistance Response Team - the DART - will use strategic lift to great advantage by deploying more troops and more equipment more quickly to alleviate suffering in those parts of the world afflicted by crisis due to natural disaster.\textsuperscript{602}

It is difficult to believe that the Canadian government would spend what amounts to nearly 50% of the annual defence budget on one equipment purchase purely for humanitarian and disaster relief. The subordinate clause, 'among many other things' emphasised in the passage above covers, presumably, transporting main battle tanks to Afghanistan, the first mission that these planes actually performed. Even the deployment of those tanks, though, contained a reference to rebuilding: "The presence of the tanks in Afghanistan will improve the security environment and allow others to focus on the reconstruction effort."\textsuperscript{603}

In 2005, the Canadian Forces changed their recruitment campaign to reflect the idea of new mission focus for the military. Taking the form of on-line videos and advertisements shown before feature films and on television, the campaign has actors portraying Canadian soldiers rescuing victims after natural disasters and assisting refugees fleeing from conflict. The video is grainy and gloomy; the music is mournful,

but moving; the victims are predominantly women and young people. The tag lines are inspiring: “Fight Fear, Fight Distress, Fight Chaos, Fight with the Canadian Forces.”

The Canadian military, then, are rescuers, bearers of hope and comfort. While the campaign does use the word ‘fight’ repeatedly, the public is encouraged to fight abstract nouns, not concrete enemies. Even the choice of abstract nouns is instructive: the Army is not fighting ‘terror’—which might be how an American military advertisement would phrase it—but rather elements which are resonant with the idea of human security, with its dual focus on freedom from fear and freedom from want. This is not combat, but something altogether ‘nicer’, even more noble.

Canadian soldiers: Canadians first, soldiers second

In addition to highlighting the kinds of tasks performed by the military, generals and ministers also spoke of the kinds of people who performed those tasks. In 1999, then Chief of Defence Staff, General Maurice Baril, made one such speech that claimed, “The Canadian Forces are putting the moral convictions of Canadians into action.” At the time, Canadian fighter-bombers were destroying targets in Serbia and Kosovo. Later that year, the Chief of the Land Staff, Lieutenant-General William Leach, praised the work of the soldiers deployed in Kosovo:

Every day, these young soldiers, Canadian men and women, have to deal with real human security issues...In the many missions we have participated in for some 50 years now, the Canadian Forces have gained substantial experience in skills in conflict resolution, confidence building, and peace monitoring...The Canadian Forces clearly have much to contribute to the advancement of human security.

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604 See http://www.recruiting.dnd.ca/v3/Default.aspx?bhcp=1 for the on-line component of the campaign. The slogan to ‘Fight with the Canadian Forces’ replaced the previous, long-standing motto: There’s No Life Like It.


There is no mention of the use of force, or even of the presence of arms. The Canadian Forces soldiers of 1999 are to be seen as kindler, gentler, more relevant and acceptable to Canadians. Speaking in 2005, Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie reinforced this image, claiming that the work of Canadian soldiers was “saving lives and protecting people” in Afghanistan. No mention was made of the ‘other work’ Canadian soldiers had performed in 2002, such as that done by its snipers, including killing members of the Taliban from over 2.4 kilometers away. In fact, the snipers were recommended for Bronze Stars for their valour by the American Army, but the Canadians delayed their awards for nearly two years. Leslie insisted that Canadians “use force to protect people under [their] charge. In fact, the CF has evolved into a very sophisticated instrument for doing this stuff—peacekeeping, peacemaking, stability—whatever its called.”

Politicians, too, projected the message. On the occasion of the deployment of troops to Kosovo, then Prime Minister Jean Chrétien informed the House of Commons that “the sole objective [of the mission] was the principal objective that Canada has pursued for many years in Kosovo: a fair and just peace.” Speaking in Mexico in 2002, while Canadian soldiers were preparing to fight under American command as part of Operation Enduring Freedom, the Liberal Minister of Defence, Art Eggleton stated that

The UN is part of the DNA of most Canadians. Our involvement in all aspects of the UN’s activities certainly is proof of this, particularly in the field of

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608 Michael Friscolanti “Record-breaking snipers were treated fairly: Canadian Forces ombudsman,” Maclean's Magazine. Apr 25, 2007: 5.
609 Leslie, “Panel Discussion”.
610 Right Honourable Jean Chrétien, Comments to the House of Commons. Hansard: House of Commons Debates. 27 April 1999.
peacekeeping. In fact, a former Canadian Prime Minister and Nobel Prize winner, Lester Pearson, was instrumental in the creation of peacekeeping during the Suez Crisis in 1956. Since then Canada has participated in virtually every UN mission. The protection of civilian populations is now central to the mandate of many of these missions.611

Canadian soldiers were not simply killing machines; they were capable of far more nuanced things. As the Liberal Minister of National Defence Bill Graham noted

Dealing with situations in failed or failing states is not simply about waging war “over there.” Rather it requires a sophisticated set of skills and instruments, including combat capabilities, negotiation and diplomatic skills, and a willingness to help others rebuild their institutions in a way that is culturally sensitive...We are there to rebuild society, winning battles is only part of the job. Our soldiers are truly warrior-diplomats.612

Rebuilding societies is an activity far more in keeping with what the people of Canada were used to. It was something of which all Canadians could be proud. Other ministers had echoed the sentiment, claiming that Canadian soldiers made a “world of difference”613 wherever they went, and even acted out of a sense of “altruism”.614

This realization extended across party boundaries. The Conservatives, too, reminded the public of the reasons Canadian soldiers were in Afghanistan: “We’ve made a commitment based on what we as Canadians hold dear: freedom, democracy, rule of law, and respect for basic human rights.” And the Army’s part in this? “They are standing up for what we believe in.”615

The idea that Canadian soldiers were a ‘force for good’ emerged in several of the interviews I conducted with senior military commanders. The commander of Canadian troops in Kosovo felt that his men and women “warmed to civil-military cooperation tasks, because of who they are.”616 The commander of the first deployment to Afghanistan claimed that “the single best aid-worker in the world was a Canadian soldier.”617 While commanders, such as Lieutenant-Colonels Bryan and Stogran, may have been vague as to what they meant, others were more explicit. One commander involved with operations in Afghanistan in 2004 felt that “the national characteristics of Canadians allowed its soldiers to conduct civil-military cooperation effectively: tolerance, acceptance, and respect.” Furthermore, “the desire for Canadians deployed overseas to do good, to do what is right, is irrepressible.”618 Major-General Beare, the commander of a multinational division in Bosnia, went even further: “We [Canadians] are culturally suited for this kind of operation. It is a part of our national culture. We do things for the right reasons, for the sake of Canada. It’s visceral, from the troops. We ask ‘What needs to be done?’ rather than ‘What do I want to do?’”619

Perhaps the clearest example of the effort to portray Canadian soldiers as something Canadians could believe in came from then Chief of Land Staff, Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier during a memorial service to two soldiers killed by a suicide bomber in Afghanistan:

It is the soldier, not the journalist, who guarantees freedom of speech. It is the soldier, not the politician who guarantees our democracy. It is the soldier, not the

616 Interview with Bryan.
617 Interview with Stogran.
618 Interview with Colonel P. Kummel, 1 December 2004. Camp Mirage.
619 Interview with Beare.
diplomat that becomes a tangible expression of a nation’s willingness to extend its values and its ideals worldwide.620

The speech was an attempt to do two things. First, Hillier aimed to glorify the deaths of the two soldiers, to make them more important than the accidents and ‘friendly-fire’ incidents of previous missions621. Second, he aimed to demonstrate the value that the Canadian military brought to the country. It was an attempt, perhaps, to make Canadians and soldiers proud of their Army.

It is possible to examine the campaign to portray the Canadian military in a softer light from a different perspective, by looking at an example of when the opposite was attempted. By focusing on aspects of the Afghanistan mission that were perceived to be ‘un-Canadian,’ the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Prime Minister found themselves facing an unhappy population. In the summer of 2005, General Hillier warned the Canadian public that the Afghanistan mission might entail casualties—on both sides: “We are not another [government] department. We are the Canadian Forces and our job is to be able to kill people.”622 In a television interview the same summer, General Rick Hillier said that the Canadian Forces were in Afghanistan because of “detestable murderers and scumbags” and that Canada’s job was to “take them out.”623 To some, this candour was found to be refreshing, but many others were not impressed. This comment

621 Canadian soldiers had been killed on peacekeeping missions, including in the Balkans, largely due mine strikes and traffic accidents. In their first deployment to Afghanistan in 2002, four Canadian soldiers were killed when an American F-16 pilot engaged them with a 500 pound bomb. See the Seventh Canadian Book of Remembrance for a listing of all military related deaths on operations since 1947 (excluding those during the Korean War).
posted to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's website is indicative of that negative reaction:

We definitely [sic] need a debate in Parliament [sic] about this confusing snowjob of changing our "Peacekeeping Image" to one of seeking out in the words of Rick Hillier "murderous scumbags". I do not believe Mr. Hillier should be speaking for Canadians on the world stage as Canadians are very divided about having our reputation as progressive thinkers and seekers of the truth taken away from us.624

A prominent columnist echoed this sentiment, claiming “we’ve created a monster.”625

Hillier had gone too far, too far outside the public expectations, too far removed from Canadian tradition. As Bill Graham, the defence minister at the time, later recalled, “comments about scumbags put the nature of the mission in a totally different light and we lost our ability to persuade people that it was what I call ‘peacekeeping heavy.’”626

This move caused Hillier to be regarded as illegitimate in the eyes of many Canadians.

Shortly after coming to office, Prime Minister Stephen Harper, a Conservative, flew to Afghanistan and delivered his first foreign policy speech. Although his speech contained references to humanitarianism and peacekeeping, he chose to use language similar to that of American President George W. Bush in emphasizing Canada’s commitment to the mission:

Our Canada is a great place, but Canada is not an island...And what happens in places like Afghanistan threatens and affects all of us back home in our own country...Standing up for these core Canadian values may not always be easy at times. It’s never easy for the men and women on the front lines. And there may be some who want to cut and run. But cutting and running is not your way. It’s not my way. And it’s not the Canadian way. We don’t make a commitment and then run away at the first sign of trouble. We don’t and we won’t.627

625 Andrew Coyne, “We’ve created a monster,” The National Post. 19 April 2006: A17.
627 Stephen Harper, “Address by the Prime Minister To the Canadian Armed forces in Afghanistan,” Speech delivered in Kandahar, Afghanistan. 13 March 2006.
In the eyes of the government, the reaction from the public was overwhelmingly negative. So much so, that the Clerk of the Privy Council (the most senior public servant in the country), Kevin Lynch, addressed a memorandum to the Prime Minister on the subject. In it, referring on a study commissioned from a public relations firm, Lynch wrote that public support for the mission in Afghanistan was only forty per cent. However, “if put in a broader context of helping the Afghan people—especially if the diplomacy and development elements are mentioned alongside the defence efforts—the mission still elicits support of a solid majority of people.” The public relations firm was more specific, suggesting dropping references such as “cut and run” and using terms such as “rebuilding,” “enhancing the lives of women and children,” and “peacekeeping.” Indeed, in the executive summary of report prepared for the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the public relations firm provided a convenient table outlining “concepts to reinforce” and “concepts to avoid”:

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630 Freeman, A1. I was shown a copy of the original memorandum written by Kevin Lynch, which included the report from the firm Strategic Counsel. Since the memorandum is classified ‘Secret’, I was unable to obtain a copy. Their advice was based on focus group work done in connection with a national poll conducted in May 2006. See for the polling data, but not the focus group work, see Strategic Counsel, “A Report to the Globe and Mail and CTV: Federal Budget and Afghanistan,” 5 May 2006. http://www.thestrategiccounsel.com/our_news/polls/2006-04-10%20GMCTV%20May3-4%20(May%205).pdf; accessed 13 February 2007.
Vocabulary/Terms/Phrases/Concepts to Reinforce

- Rebuilding
- Restoring
- Reconstruction
- Stability
- Security
- Reinforcing and supporting basic human rights
- Enhancing the lives of women and children
- Part of an international effort
- Providing peacekeeping and peace support
- Hope
- Opportunity
- A future for the Afghan people

Vocabulary/Terms/Phrases/Concepts to Avoid

- Freedom, democracy, liberty—in combination this phrase comes across as sounding too American
- Avoid developing a line of argumentation too strongly based on...imposing Canadian values.
- Protecting Canadians
- Fighting terrorism/the War on Terror
- 9/11—References to September 11th simply tend to reinforce perceptions that this is an American war
- Linking Canada's involvement too closely with American actions in the region.

In essence, what the Clerk and the Strategic Counsel were suggesting was a return to the kind of rhetoric Canadians were used to. Shortly after Lynch's memorandum, the Department of National Defence created a new webpage, aimed at explaining the Afghanistan mission to Canadians. It is entitled 'Why are we there?' and runs only two pages. On it, the Department has written a twenty paragraph essay which is filled with terms listed in bold-face type. It is instructive to examine those highlighted terms:

- UN-sanctioned mission...
- improve the security situation...
- assist in rebuilding the country...
- consent and at the request of the people...
- hope for a brighter future...
- promote development...
- delivery of programs and projects...
- economic recovery and rehabilitation...
- addressing humanitarian needs...
- rebuild their lives and their country...
- laying the foundation...
- Canadian tradition...
- we are making progress...
- troubled region...
- reconstruction and a better life...
- nation building...
help build a democratic and secure society...632

While the words “Taliban” and “terrorist” are mentioned on the website, they are not placed in bold-face type. Also notably absent is any reference to what the Canadian Army might actually do to the Taliban.

After Lynch’s message to the Prime Minister, the tone of the speeches also changed. In September the Minister of Defence said:

It’s fitting that we’ve gathered on Parliament Hill, because Afghanistan is about nation-building...I am so proud that our country is represented by such dedicated, brave, caring—such decent—men and women. I’m proud of them, and I’m proud of the work they’re doing in Afghanistan.633

His colleague, the Minister for International Cooperation, told the House of Commons Committee on National Defence that

Our troops are there to protect with a purpose. Their role is to help expand a democratic Government of Afghanistan’s reach in Kandahar...to address sources of insecurity and to create conditions conducive to long-term development. This means starting with basic needs. In the province of Kandahar alone [Canadian soldiers] have made tangible improvement in the life of villagers and the rural population.634

It would appear that Lynch’s advice was taken to heart.

Manoeuvring on Whose Cognitive Plane?

Considering the development of the campaign to portray the mission and soldiers of the Canadian military in a certain, ‘public friendly’ light, it is possible to categorise it as an attempt by the military and political leadership to generate what Lawrence Freedman calls a strategic narrative, which he defines as

Compelling story lines which can explain events convincingly and from which inferences can be drawn...Narratives are designed or nurtured with the intention of structuring the response of others to developing events. They are strategic because they do not arise spontaneously but are deliberately constructed or reinforced out of the ideas and thoughts that are already current.635

The notion that the Army is a force made up of decent, altruistic Canadians engaged on missions of mercy is strategic. Its aim is to increase public support for the institution and its operations, in short, to bolster its legitimacy. In so doing, senior military commanders and politicians—across party lines and over time—have exploited what they believe are the Canadian public's preferred images and motifs. As Freedman states, narratives “may rely on appeals to emotion, or on suspect metaphors and dubious historical analogies.”636

The invocation of Lester Pearson’s name and the association of tanks with reconstruction are but two examples of references that are suspect and dubious.

According to Michael Vlahos, such narratives have three related purposes:

First, it is the organizing framework for policy. Policy cannot exist without an interlocking foundation of “truths” that people easily accept because they appear to be self-evident and undeniable. Second, this “story” works as a framework precisely because it represents just such an existential vision. The “truths” that it asserts are culturally impossible to disassemble or even criticize. Third, having presented a war logic that is beyond dispute, the narrative then serves practically as the anointed rhetorical handbook for how the war is to be argued and described.637

Because they draw on existing symbols, strategic narratives can be seen as attempts to unify—or at least consolidate—the understanding of an issue. They represent concerted

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636 Freedman, 23.

efforts to build or shape intersubjective knowledge, in the hopes that the result will have
enough meaning to form the basis for effective social action.

As discussed in Chapter 3, we can view this in Clausewitzian terms. Clausewitz
understood well the vagaries and contradictions in the relationships between the people,
the government, and the military. He did not paint a simple or simplistic picture of how
war was waged. On the contrary, he displayed a keen appreciation for subtly and
compromise. One such appreciation is appropriate to further our understanding of how
civil-military cooperation is used in the Canadian case:

Sometimes the political and the military objective is the same... In other cases the
political objective will not provide a suitable military objective. In that event, another military objective must be adopted that will serve the political purpose
and symbolise it.... The less involved the population and the less serious the
strains within the states and between them, the more political requirements in
themselves will dominate and tend to be decisive. Situations can thus exist in
which the political object will almost the sole determinant.638

In the kinds of peace support and stabilization operations that the Canadian Army has
found itself involved in over the last decade or so, we have seen a divergence in
objectives. At times, it was unclear what the political objective was; perhaps just ‘being
there’ was enough. For the Army, it might be said that the military objectives were not
so much objectively military (that is, relevant to the immediate battlefield) but rather
institutional. In any event, the expectations of the Canadian people were such that both
government and military came to understand that it mattered how the military acted just
as much as what they did.

The need to paper over that divergence leads to the combined effort by the
military and the government to create a single strategic narrative that serves both

638 Carl von Clausewitz, On War. Michael Howard and Peter Peret, eds. and trans. (London: David

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interests. In line with Poggi’s concept of power sharing, the holders of political and military power are attempting to tap into the normative power of the people, in order to increase their legitimacy and enable them to more easily pursue their particular interests.

The concept of narrative generation can be seen in another light, though. The military doctrine of information operations described in Chapter 6 speaks of “influence activities” that are designed to “affect behaviour” of a particular target. The idea is that, by performing activities, such as civil-military cooperation, it is possible to shape the “understanding” and “perception” of the target, and thereby mold their “will.” Of course, ‘will’ is the key:

Will changes behaviour and enables individuals to overcome fear and adversity as well as the cohesion that holds them together. It includes cognitive aspects such as belief in a cause, indoctrination and judgment as well as emotive responses such as patriotism, ethnicity, religious zeal, and esprit de corps. As written, such influence activities are aimed at influencing an opponent and the population that supports him. For instance, Canadian doctrine suggests

CIMIC activities may assist in civil reconstruction in order to engender moral support form a government and its populace and to enhance the perception of the campaign and its legitimacy amongst a local populace.

The idea of generating such legitimacy has been suggested as critical in peacekeeping and counterinsurgency. However, the idea of strategic narrative and its use in generation of legitimacy in this case has been applied to the domestic government and population. The Canadian

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640 Canada. The Army. Land Doctrine in the Modern Age, Ch 5, p. 3.
641 Canada. The Army. Land Doctrine in the Modern Age, Ch 5, p. 7.
Army can been seen to have used a focus on civil-military cooperation as an “influence activity” targeted at Canadians. Indeed, in the targeting exercise in Bosnia, described in Chapter 6, the Canadian government and population were listed as targets. Canadian military doctrine, imperfectly applied in operations abroad, has been skillfully adapted for use on the home front.

The effectiveness of the campaign, though, has not been clear. Public opinion for the Afghanistan mission, for instance, remained mixed in 2007. And while reaction to the campaign has not been as hostile as that which met General Hillier’s tough talk or Prime Minister Harper’s ‘cut and run’ speech, observers have expressed concern over the use of “spin” and “propaganda”. Writing in a French language newspaper, Francis Dupuis-Déri, asks, “L’armée canadienne en Afghanistan: mission guerrière ou humanitaire?” (Canadian Forces in Afghanistan: Combat or humanitarian mission?) and mocks the campaign to promote the softer side of operations in Afghanistan as Orwellian:

In the language of Big Brother, a cat is a dog... Who, indeed, would publicly declare to wage a dirty war, unjust and bloody?... Big Brother’s propagandists would certainly approve.

However, the fact that a particular strategy has not, so far, generated overwhelmingly positive results does not negate the fact that the strategy was developed and deployed. The Canadian Army uses civil-military cooperation activities to fight for ‘hearts and minds’—including Canadian ones.

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646 Francis Dupuis-Déri, “L’armée canadienne en Afghanistan: mission guerrière ou humanitaire?”, Le Devoir. 27 June 2007 : B2. Translated from the French original by author: “Dans le langage de Big Brother, un chat est un chien... Qui, en effet, déclarerait publiquement mener une guerre sale, injuste et sanguinaire?... Les propagandistes de Big Brother auraient certainement apprécié.”
Conclusion

Clearly, none of the operations performed by the Canadian military in the recent past have been about the defence of Canada or Canadians. No enemies have manifestly threatened Canadian territory, no matter how the echoes of 11 September 2001 may sound. Canadian wars (if we can call them that) have been wars of choice and have been about Alliance partnership and global citizenship more than they have been about self-defence or acquisition. As Lawrence Freedman explains, this state of affairs can be troublesome:

> When the security of the state is threatened by a large and self-evidently hostile enemy then all social and economic resources can be mobilized in response. When, by contrast, there is a debate to be had about the nature of the threat and whether matters are made better or worse by direct action, military operations appear to be more discretionary and national mobilization on even a modest scale becomes more difficult.\(^{647}\)

Again, Clausewitz points out that this can have ramifications for the army:

> The less intense the motives, the less will the military element’s natural tendency to violence coincide with political directives. As a result, war will be driven further from its natural course [that is escalating violence] the political object will be more and more at variance with the aim of ideal war [total annihilation of the enemy] and the conflict will seem increasingly political in character.\(^{648}\)

Given this perspective, it should not be surprising that the Canadian Army has adopted a highly politicized approach to the way that it promotes its activities. Having found itself isolated and illegitimate after Somalia, the Army struggled to ‘get its message out’ effectively. A former Chief of Defence Staff stated that the problem was deeply rooted in the Canadian Forces to the extent that “it has great difficulty differentiating between its own institutional interests and aspirations and the real interests of the state,

\(^{647}\) Freedman, 7.
\(^{648}\) Clausewitz, Book 1, Chapter 1, §25, Page 99.
viewing both as coincident when, in fact, they are often very different. What changed over the period of our study is not so much an abandoning of those institutional interests, but rather the adoption of a strategy to better meet the interests of the government, and the expectations of the people. The Army’s legitimacy depended on its ability to act in accordance with the ideals held in the minds of the government and the people. In so achieving these societal imperatives, the Army was counting on being given the freedom and the resources to achieve its functional imperative.

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Conclusion:  
**The Many Whys of Civil-Military Cooperation**

*A society only articulates itself as a nation through some common intention among its people.*

George Grant, *Lament for A Nation*[^650]  

*This is the only story of mine whose moral I know. I don’t think it’s a marvelous moral; I simply happen to know what it is: We are what we pretend to be, so we must be careful about what we pretend to be.*

Kurt Vonnegut, *Mother Night*[^651]

In his famous semi-autobiographical novel *Slaughterhouse Five*, which details in his unique style the terror-bombing of Dresden, Kurt Vonnegut’s main character, Billy Pilgrim, who has been abducted by aliens, asks a simple question, “Why?” The aliens look at Billy with a wry smile, saying, “That is a very *Earthling* question to ask...Why *anything*?...Because this moment simply is...Well, here we are...trapped in the amber of this moment. There is no *why*.”[^652] In trying to figure out why a particular practice is conducted in the way that it is, it is tempting after some research, a few interviews and some observations, to come to this conclusion. There is often little conscious understanding on the part of those performing a complex activity, such as civil-military cooperation, as to the reason behind their mission. The Operations Officer of the Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar, Afghanistan, speaking of his experience with civil-military cooperation in 2005, echoes this sentiment when he states that, “Notably missing was a representative from any government department. Essentially we saw our mission as follows: It was an economy of force operation.

intended to buy time... In my opinion, the reason we do CIMIC operations is that we have blundered our way into them.”

At the same time, different elements may place different values on the task, some regarding it as a strategic activity, necessary for ‘higher purposes’, far from the actual tactical performance of the activity itself. The Tralfamadorians may, then, be wrong: there may be many whys, not none. This thesis has been about addressing the answers to those multiple whys. The research question that framed our inquiry was “Why is civil-military cooperation practiced the way that it is?” This concluding chapter will provide the answers to that question, as well as suggesting avenues for further exploration.

At the highest level, civil-military cooperation—as conceived of and practiced by the Canadian Army in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan—is the product of the Canadian people’s passion; the Canadian governments’ direction; and the Canadian Army’s skill. If any of these actors had discharged their functions in a different way—if the Canadian people expressed the desire to punish the Yugoslav army, without regard for the Kosovar population, for instance—then the resulting action would have been carried out differently. It is important to note that it is not the mere existence of Clausewitz’s Remarkable Trinity which is responsible for the military practice, but rather the particular way in which each actor discharges its function and the relationships between the actors themselves. In the Canadian case, the people are ambivalent. Their passions are tepid, not intense. As Desmond Morton states, “Canadians will live in the future much as they have lived in the past—day by day.... Canadians want their country to play a modest,

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responsible and constructive role in a sometimes dangerous and often cruel world."654

Clearly, a passion bearing the hallmarks of modesty and responsibility is very much different to one marked by hatred and enmity.

The people’s passions, though, are not alone in shaping military activity. The government, simply put, harnesses the people’s passion and converts it into direction. Here we can see the immediate effect of lukewarm passions. Not only are do they tend to be mild mannered, but the public choices of Canadians are often contradictory, as Chapter 4 has illustrated. Canadians want to eat their cake, and have it, too. Faced with such an ambivalent mandate, the government in Canada tends to hedge its bets, providing equally fuzzy direction to its various departments. As noted in Chapter 5, this ambiguity, while perhaps confusing, can be pregnant with opportunity. Consensus is rarely formed and individual government departments and agencies take advantage, often continuing with pre-existing programmes or introducing new ones, which they feel are actually the most important.

The military is no different in this regard. Over the course of the 1990s and the first decade of this century, following from the nadir that was the Somalia dabacle, the Canadian Army, in particular, attempted to construct for itself an image of martial competence and relevance. This has reached its apogee under the eye of Chief of Defence Staff General Rick Hillier, who has put forth an image of the Canadian Army as one of competence and combativeness. Canadian developments in doctrine and investments in equipment demonstrate the journey from a highly segregated understanding of the military’s role, with warfighting and peacekeeping separated, to a more comprehensive approach, one which tries to contextualise a variety of roles for the

military within a coherent framework, more in keeping with the nature of the post-Cold War, and even more so, the post-911, world. While this evolution can be seen as a maturation of thought and self-respect, it can be also understood in a way akin to that which Stephen Posen saw the American military in the 1990s: "There is no permanent norm defining what is or is not the dominant professional activity of the organisation."655

This indeterminancy is a key characteristic of the landscape within which Canadian civil-military cooperation has been practiced. There is neither clear direction nor permanent norms and this requires that each actor interpret what little that does exist in search of...In search of what exactly? In Chapter 3, we discussed that norms, as depicted in myths, help shape the goals of each actor. However, as we have seen, this is not always and everywhere the case. The norms are weak, the myths persistent but empty of definition, and the interests of the actors such that only strength and clarity could hope to align them. In this regard, Ann Swidler helpfully points out that while the dominant cultural model "argues that culture shapes action by supplying ends or values towards which action is directed," this may be too simple an explanation of the role of values, norms, and myths.656 She believes that an alternative approach to cultural aspects of action is more helpful. Swidler sees culture, "as a 'tool kit' of symbols, stories, rituals and world-views, which people may use in varying configurations to solve different kinds of problems." Accordingly, she sees culture's "causal significance not in defining ends

of action, but in providing cultural components that are used to construct strategies of action.\textsuperscript{657}

The construction and deployment of strategies of action, built using a tool kit replete with stories of Pearsonian peacekeeping, has been examined at length in Chapter 7. These strategies, utilised by both the government and the military, are critical to our understanding of civil-military relations, writ large. Governments do not clearly dictate their instructions and militaries have more choices that merely obeying or disobeying, working or shirking in Feaver's terms. The relationship between these Trinitarian actors is far more dynamic than conventionally portrayed.

The nature of that relationship can be summed up as one of balance, the equilibrium between the magnets, in Clausewitz's terms. That balance is about legitimacy. Gaining and maintaining legitimacy is what each actor in the Trinity strives to do, and it is to this end that strategies of action are deployed. In theory, there are many bases for legitimacy and, therefore, a number of strategies of action that can be used. However, as we have seen, it is critical that the strategies of action that are developed use the appropriate tool kits. In the Canadian case, for example, when the Chief of the Defence Staff referred to the Taliban and Al Qaeda as 'detestable murderers and scumbags', we can say that he risked being seen as illegitimate, outside the accepted boundaries of debate. More subtly, but equally to the point, Prime Minister Harper's use of phrases such as 'cut and run' and 'God bless Canada' in his first speech about Afghanistan also put him out of balance. The appropriateness of any strategy of action will, in part, determine its effectiveness. However, there are clearly limits to this approach. The idea that the Canadian Forces purchased billions of dollars worth of
strategic airlift with humanitarian relief foremost in mind is too farfetched to be believed. The realm of legitimacy is finite. This is not to say that options do not exist, but, as Kim Richard Nossal observes, cultural aspects of any debate “may determine the general bounds within which governments have to operate—determining which issues must be dealt with, or limiting the range of acceptable policy choices.” Canadian military missions to Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan—although very different from each other—were portrayed, to varying degrees, as peacekeeping missions. Civil-military cooperation, in the form of quick, photo-friendly reconstruction projects, was a key element in these portrayals.

The bounds of action are not universal or generic; they are contingent on certain culturally salient symbols. That contingency is multiplied in that the saliency of those symbols may vary across time and geography. In our case, specifically Canadian symbols, rooted in a particular reading of Canadian history, were seen by all the Trinitarian actors as being appropriate and were, therefore, harnessed. As we have seen, though, the Canadian case is marked by what might be termed “low coherence [and] consistency.” People, for example, want to have good healthcare and a responsive military, but are unwilling to pay for both. Swidler believes that in “settled cultures” where “traditions and common sense” are key (as opposed to unsettled cultures, marked by imposed ideologies), this variability is characteristic and has differing short- and long-term effects. In the short-term, the incoherence and inconsistency mean that norms and values have “weak direct control over action”. There are just too ambiguous to provide a

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659 Swidler, 282.
It is critical to note that, just as cultural aspects should not be seen as deterministic, we must be careful not to conceive of strategies of action being the product of a system or structure, or much less some *deus ex machina*. It is individuals who must develop these strategies, based on their interpretation of the contents of their cultural tool kits. This leads to a variety of responses, as each interpretation is inherently subjective. Again, to be effective, that subjectivity must be tempered and remain within bounds. In Chapter 5 we can see that at a doctrinal level, the evolution of civil-military cooperation progressed in line with experience and in keeping with the growing confidence of the Canadian Army, in relation to its idea of itself as a warfighting organisation. However, in terms of practice, civil-military cooperation proved to be far more chaotic, with so many advances and regressions that perceiving any sense of evolution is impossible. So, while it is clear in theory that civil-military cooperation was supposed to be about both genuine concern for the local population and the furtherance of the wider military mission, it often came across quite different on the ground. Recall that in Bosnia, Canadian troops ‘adopted’ an elderly woman, providing aid and assistance in a human and non-instrumental way, to the detriment of the unit’s ability to distribute civil-military cooperation more appropriately within its area of operations. Consider this statement by a Canadian company commander in Afghanistan in 2006.

I said, ‘Let’s stop, let’s ask what’s going on, what concerns [the locals] have.’ They wanted the school rebuilt, and we knew the clinic had been burnt, and I wanted to compare the replies of the locals and the answers of the district leader... I said, ‘What do you need today?’ and a man said, ‘I’m just a farmer. I need a shovel.’ I turned around to my [armoured vehicle] and I said, ‘There’s a

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660 Swidler, 282.
shovel in there. I will give you that shovel right now; you tell me where the Taliban is right now and I will give you that shovel.' And he's, 'Oh, we don't know where the Taliban is.' Yeah, right. We got shot at the next time we went in there.661

Confronted by real problems, and having experienced combat in that same village on several occasions, notions of civil-military cooperation as "manoeuvre on the cognitive plane" were frustrated by a desire to close with and destroy the enemy.

The overall picture that results is one of civil-military cooperation marked by chaos. Individual commanders and practitioners have differing ideas and approaches to what civil-military cooperation is and how it should be used. Often these ideas are in direct contrast to the doctrinal model of the day. One is tempted to describe civil-military cooperation as an *ad hoc* activity, but that would denote that it was developed in order to deal with a particular set of circumstances. However, there is enough evidence to suggest that this is not the case. Civil-military cooperation is not always tailored to the current situation; rather, it is often conducted in similar ways, in circumstances that are very different. Practices in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, despite vast differences in circumstances, were often similar. This prompts the use of *ad lib* as perhaps a more appropriate Latin descriptor: civil-military cooperation is practiced as the practitioner 'pleases' rather than in strict accord with either doctrine or the particular circumstances at the time.

**Implications for Policy**

An *ad lib* approach to civil-military cooperation has several practical consequences. First, it can mean that civil-military cooperation may fall short of its doctrinal purpose—that is, to bring about changes in the behaviour of an enemy. If each

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practitioner, over geography and over time, is acting independently, in accordance with his or her own understanding of the situation and civil-military cooperation’s purpose, there is little hope of conducting a coherent campaign of reconstruction and assistance, except within the broadest of boundaries. In Bosnia, one commander interpreted civil-military cooperation as being about ensuring compliance with legal and political agreements, and used it as a stick. Eighteen months later, a different commander, from the same country (indeed, the same regiment), in the same area of Bosnia, interpreted civil-military cooperation as a means of creating economic opportunities for the local population, with the aim of providing the young, male population something to do other than fight. He saw civil-military cooperation as a carrot. That both commanders were free to interpret and implement civil-military cooperation in this manner is a testament to the lack of understanding at several levels within the military and political chain of command.

Second, more than just producing contradictions within the military, and perhaps confusion within the local population, an ad lib approach to civil-military cooperation can lead to contradictions between what the political and military leaders are saying to the people of Canada, and what individual practitioners are doing. To the extent that the people are capable of seeing what is going on in an operation (through the media, for instance) this could generate problems. If the government promises that aid is going to ‘those who need it most’, but commanders on the ground are providing it to ‘those who can provide the best information’, and the public at home finds out, there may need to be explanations made. Such a condition could lead to a tightening of scope provided to those in the field, with a more centralised, dictated approach to civil-military cooperation.
So far, in the Canadian case, neither in Bosnia, Kosovo, or Afghanistan, has there been such a drive. Instead, it seems that there has been a more robust strategy of action on the part of the military and political leadership, portraying the missions as being in line with public expectations.

This, in itself, has ramifications. The most serious implication is that rather than merely implementing direction, the military is seen to be shaping opinion of both the people and the government. As one activist, opposed to the current Canadian deployment to Afghanistan, remarked: “I’ve been on panels where a serving member of the Canadian Forces was sent to debate me and they went far beyond providing information...There’s a conflict there because you have the military becoming a lobbyist to try and influence the decisions of government.”

While it is much more likely that military ‘lobbying’ of this type would influence the people, rather than the government, there have been politicians who have felt that the military has told them what they wanted to hear—using the peacekeeping toolkit—in order to get what they want. As Prime Minister Paul Martin recalled after his retirement: “I made...demands of [Chief of Defence Staff General] Hillier before I agreed to [the extended mission to Kandahar in 2005]...I want in, but I want out. We do peacemaking and reconstruction and win hearts and minds.” Hillier, according to Martin, gave these assurances. Another senior politician, though, implies that while Hillier may have made promises, the politicians were more than ready to accept them. “We needed lightly equipped, agile soldiers who would go into villages, ‘make love to the people’ and ‘kill

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Within a year, the Canadian Army would take several casualties and deploy heavy artillery and main battle tanks to Afghanistan. One of the reasons a military strategy of action built on ideas of humanitarian aid and reconstruction was so effective, was because it was in accord with expectations. The appropriateness of the message helped achieve the legitimacy for the military that would then lead to freedom of action to meet its own objectives.

Rather than being duped, as Martin might have us believe, it is more likely the case that, in line with what Gianfranco Poggi suggests (and has been discussed in Chapter 3), the two actors (government and military) saw fit to collaborate, using the motif of ‘Afghanistan as an extension of the Canadian peacekeeping tradition’—a motif dependent on activities such as civil-military cooperation. In so doing they developed a strategy for action, which took the particular form, as discussed in Chapter 7, of a particular strategic narrative. This narrative tries to paint a coherent picture of what is happening, framing it to look as if it were unfolding according to a plan. Its intent is to provide a common, acceptable vision in order to facilitate further activity. Of course, if the reality is more chaotic than such a narrative would suggest, then the strength of the narrative deployed must be increased. One might measure that strength in terms of the appropriateness of the elements from the cultural tool kit used to construct it. As one observer has suggested in Chapter 7, this can tend to a rather Orwellian extreme if it is not kept in check. Should a unit of approximately 400 soldiers, with a handful of civilians, scant expertise in non-military tasks, and little money actually be called a

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664 Bill Graham, cited in Gross Stein and Lang, 186.
Provincial Reconstruction Team? As its Operations Officer noted, rather concentrating on the winning of hearts and minds,

We mouth the correct words on CIMIC and how we will use it to win the campaign in Afghanistan, but we do not emphasize it. In times of trouble, people revert to what they were earliest taught; what I have seen is commanders at all levels revert to is kinetic operations to destroy an enemy physically. This is easy to do, it is easy to measure...and it is what we have studied our entire careers. Unfortunately, we are fighting for dominance of the human key terrain, and without coming up with a realistic, coherent, and holistic approach to how we will win the support of the local populace, we will never succeed. Instead, we will continue to kill a lot of people, be tolerated by the locals while we outgun them, and see Afghanistan revert to its natural state once we leave.666

This leads to a particularly difficult paradox for the military. It is axiomatic to state that honesty is the best policy. Orwellitean double-speak is nothing one wants to be accused of if maintaining legitimacy is important. Peacekeeping missions are peacekeeping missions, and combat missions are combat missions, no matter what a well-crafted press release might state. Civil-military cooperation, in this case, would either continue to be a sporadic, amateur practice, or develop into the more doctrinal sound influence activity that some envision. To act in this manner would be honourable. However, it is entirely likely, based on the expectations of the government and the people of Canada, that the Canadian military would no longer find itself on operations where combat was the hallmark, such as Afghanistan. The government and the military leadership, after all, had taken great pains to downplay, if not successfully cover up, combat activities, such as the sustained encounter with Croatian forces in Medak 1993 and the record-breaking sniper operations as part of Operation Anaconda (discussed in

666 Response to questionnaire by Zilkins.
Chapter 6). If appropriate activities, such as civil-military cooperation, were not to form the core of military missions, there would be no missions at all. As one political advisor put it, "It is just not politically viable to engage in conflicts where you do not engage in the humanitarian dimension." In other words, the balance of legitimacy is a delicate one. Does the Army attempt to legitimate its actions with reference to images in keeping with Canadian myth, *argumentum ad captandum*, thereby guaranteeing its own freedom of action? Or does the Army refrain from deploying such strategies of action, tell the truth, and risk being seen as illegitimate in the long-term, in that there might appear to be no reason to keep the Army around, if all it is going to do is combat? This is a real dilemma and one which platitudinous recommendations are likely to be unhelpful. Suggesting that the Army and the Government 'do the right thing' is as spurious as it is condenscending.

Equally spurious is the recommendation that what is necessary is a re-education of the Canadian public, so that the Pearsonian scales might fall from their eyes. Legitimacy might then be restored, because the Canadian people would finally 'get it'. Since it is not clear exactly where and how myths are developed, nor how one might radically and abruptly alter those myths in practical, concrete terms, advice of this nature, while present, is not helpful. It assumes both a method and a point of 'correct reference' that are not, themselves, unambiguous. To suggest otherwise is to try and take the politics out of politics. Perhaps the best that can be recommended is to remind all actors—the military, the government, and the people—that they are jointly responsible

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668 Interview with Heidi Hulan, former Political Assistant to Lloyd Axworthy (Ottawa, Ontario, 18 March 2003).
for what military activities take place. No one is excluded from the process and the
degree to which they are aware and involved can make significant differences, at least in
terms of what is carried out on the ground.

**Theoretical Implications**

The first theoretical implication arising from the research conducted in this thesis
is that Clausewitz’s Trinity—both in its primary and secondary forms—provides a useful
framework for investigation. Far from being a relic of the 19th Century, the Trinity, when
treated with the dynamism intended by Clausewitz, is relevant to contemporary military
practice. Even in cases that seem distant from the battles of the Napoleonic era, the
actors, functions, and relationships described in *On War* remain relevant. For instance,
Ulrich Beck considers that Kosovo was a post-national war, where “in the place of
‘either-or’ appears ‘both-and’: both war and peace, both police and military, both crime
and war, both civilian and soldier.” While this may be true, it does not follow that when
a “war is post-national” it “can thus no longer be understood through the Clauswitzian
conceptualisation.”669 Despite the ‘post-national’/cosmopolitan objectives attributed to
some contemporary conflicts, because they are carried out by armed forces from nation-states, the structures suggested by Clausewitz still apply.

The second theoretical implication relates to the dichotomy posed by Huntington
and Janowitz and their ‘functional versus societal imperative’ debate. In the Canadian
case, at least, it would appear that armed forces cannot choose either imperative as the
sole basis for their actions. To rely solely on the functional imperative may risk being
perceived as being too far outside the bounds of acceptability by the government and the

people. On the other hand, if the societal imperative is applied too strictly, this may lead to conflicts within the military itself, as it would run contrary to their established self-identity goals. Activities such as civil-military cooperation can be considered as attempts to square this circle. They are designed as bridges between the imperatives and as such, suffer from a ‘neither one nor the other’ quality. This quality is evident in the tortured mess that is Canadian civil-military cooperation practice today. In that sense, then, we might redefine the notions of functional and societal imperatives. If the function of the military is defined by the government and society in such a way as to demand that humanitarian or peacekeeping tasks are performed, we can begin to see a merging of the imperatives. This merger would not have been possible in the original Huntingtonian versus Janowitzian formulation because of the particular social and political environment within which they were conceived (i.e. America in the mid-20th Century).

Similarly, depending on the particular social and political environment, replete with its own boundaries of legitimacy, Feaver’s dichotomy of ‘work’ and ‘shirk’, may not fit. Certainly, in the Canadian case, it does not. Before any working or shirking may be carried out, a phase of interpretation and negotiation must take place, in order to determine exactly what is being required of the military. Sometimes, no exact determination is found—or sought—and the resulting ambiguity seen as an opportunity for exploitation rather than resolution.

Because many of these theoretical frameworks developed within the field Civil-Military Relations—imperatives or ‘principle-agent’ theories—are based on observation of American political and military activity, it would be instructive to carry out similar research in different countries. This would allow greater comparison across cases and
could shed light on the particularity of the observations made here. With so many national militaries involved in civil-military cooperation, in Afghanistan alone, there is an opportunity to design comparative projects, using a Clausewitzian framework.  

A final step towards an extension of the findings is produced here. Largely absent from this study has been any discussion of the identities of the actors themselves. In Chapter 6, we did see an attempt to reconstitute an institutional image or identity for the Army, moving away from Somalia. The course of these attempts was somewhat meandering, winding between the poles of warrior and citizen. Civil-military cooperation poses a challenge to that effort. For some—but importantly, not all—of those involved with civil-military cooperation, the feeling of satisfaction and reward was evident. They believed that by building a school, or handing out toques to freezing children, they were doing good. For many, both in the relatively static peacekeeping environment of the Balkans and in the dynamic counterinsurgency environment of Afghanistan, surrounded by the confusion and frustration of the seemingly unwinnable military situation, they could conduct one more patrol, stand on guard for one more sentry shift, or skirmish with one more Talib. Civil-military cooperation offered something different, but also something more. It was a chance to exercise agency, to achieve something, even if only in a limited sense of the word. In Afghanistan, for instance, the operation was about—or at least had been touted as being about—sending girls to school, something unthinkable before the arrival of the Coalition. Therefore, what could be greater than helping to build a school at which girls might someday study?

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Similarly, in Kosovo and Bosnia, a major theme of international effort there was to achieve the reintegration of the various ethnic groups. By opening a community centre or electrifying a village allowing refugees to return home, soldiers involved in civil-military cooperation were getting the job done. Again, for some, this was a source of pride.

How does this fit in with the idea of a warrior ethos? Perhaps in the Canadian case, the warrior ethos had eroded enough, through years of neglect and lack of practice, to be ripe for redefinition. However, there is an alternative way of looking at this. There is no global, objective definition of what it means to be a warrior, despite the existence of a persistent Classical narrative, largely based on readings of Greek epics. As Christopher Coker admits, “morality is embedded in a social context. Ethical codes are not arrived at by universal agreement any more than they are discovered by universal reason.” In this light, we can see that civil-military cooperation as a practice is in keeping with a new military ethos. The highest calling for the Canadian military, it seems, is “duty with honour” and “honour can only be bestowed if [soldiers] acquit themselves in a manner that reflects the values, beliefs and expectations of fellow Canadians.”

Perhaps Canadians, like Nietzsche, see virtue as more than sitting ‘quietly in the swamp’. They expect their soldiers to go beyond the idea of discipline and martial prowess, and embrace other qualities, such as compassion and humanitarianism. That they have not clearly plumbed what these concepts might mean, or understood the implications of their existence, is not to say that they are expected any less strongly. A

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671 British General, Sir Hew Pike, was one who believed this, claiming “the Canadians have surrendered any claim to be a war-fighting force. Their army... is now really just a peacekeeping force.” Cited in Martin Shadwick, “British Candour, Harsh Reality,” Canadian Defence Quarterly, (Winter) 1997: 34.


controversial study conducted by the Army, based on interviews from over 800 officers involved in overseas operations during the 1990s, concluded with an explicit warning. Like it or not—and several respondents to the survey had clearly expressed that they had not liked what they perceived to be a move away from ‘real soldiering’—times were changing:

Military forces must wholeheartedly accept the roles of humanitarian assistance and aid to the civil power in disaster or environmental crisis, in addition to their traditional roles of war and deterrence. They must internalise the expectations of these roles and broaden the measure of what it means to be in the military. The addition of roles to the military is a call to redefine themselves in terms of the future, to redefine what professional and job satisfaction means. In other words, what it means to ‘feel good’ about being a soldier should now have an expanded dimension. The traditional warrior ethic and the comments of ‘wasting their time with peacekeeping’...must change. The soldiers who complain of not ‘feeling the hero’...as a result of humanitarian service must not be encouraged to cling to...obsolete expectations.

Actually, the entire idea of what it is to be hero in Canada may be the pivotal point here. Canadians appear ambivalent about heroes, in the traditional sense. John Ralston Saul uses the game of hockey to illustrate the point:

You feel the Canadian audiences are only marginally interested in a Heroic approach to the game. They watch it as they know it is played at its best—a flying, rough, corps de ballet...The game has thus become one of those basic physical mythologies which reveal and reflect the larger myths. If Canadians are anti-heroic, they will treat their basic game as anti-heroic and team oriented.674

Not for Canadians the image of a warrior as hero, then? Ralston Saul may yet be wrong. In the Classical tradition heroism is about sacrifice. Indeed, as Coker puts it, sacrifice is necessary for there to be anything sacred.675 And it is here that heroism returns to the Canadian experience, although perhaps in altered form. Heros may not be those who die

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675 Coker 120.
defending Canadian soil, or capturing foreign territory. They are those who sacrifice in
the service of Canadian values. And, in at least some instances, this has been internalised
by the heros themselves. A single example will suffice to illustrate the point. Captain
Nicola Goddard, an artillery Forward Observation Officer, was killed in an ambush in
Afghanistan on 17 May 2006. She was trained to direct artillery fire and call in air
strikes, tasks she did on several occasions in Afghanistan. But her mission, in her own
words in a letter to her parents, was to be “part of something so much bigger than
[herself]”:

> we are where we are now, with the choices that we have available to us. It seems
to me that we have such a burden of responsibility to make the world a better
place for those who were born into far worse circumstances. It is more than
donating money to charities – it is taking action and trying to make things
better.\(^6\)\(^7\)\(^8\)

For sacrifice to define heroism, it must be done for something meaningful, otherwise it is
mere suicide. Meaning, to be understood and shared widely, and therefore form a basis
for social action, clearly cannot be merely defined “on purely idiosyncratic grounds,”\(^6\)\(^7\)\(^8\) but must accord with the expectations of society. Heores may be exceptional, but they
must also be legitimate. When meaning such as this is internalised within the military
and valued by its members, an ethos is created. Warrior or otherwise, perhaps a new
ethos—one in which activities like civil-military cooperation can rightfully hold a
place—is forming in the Canadian Army.

Civil-military cooperation, as we saw in the beginning of this study, is a living contradiction. It embodies, at least in theory, both war and peace, reconstruction carried out by those trained to destroy. In this sense, it is an uneasy practice to understand, let alone carry out. To some, in the thick of combat or faced with an overwhelming array of complex social and economic factors, it appears as a solution in search of a problem, something imposed from above, something one does, while not fully knowing why. It is a compromise: a bridge between conflict and stability, between physical and cognitive planes. In that sense, perhaps, it is very Canadian, akin to another Canadian invention: the houseboat. These awkward but pleasant craft are neither great houses, nor great boats. And yet they serve a purpose. So it is with civil-military cooperation. As a practice it is neither truly civil nor wholly military, and yet it serves a purpose. Martin Shaw, writing about the West’s contemporary approach to warfare warns:

We have a choice: we can continue with war as a means...becoming ever more mired in brutal struggles that we cannot win. Or we can follow the logic of our commitments to global institutions, democracy and human rights, and renew our determination to avoid war. We cannot have it both ways.  

Civil-military cooperation is an attempt to do just that.

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Annex A:

Research Design and Methodology

It is important, in a doctoral thesis, to record how the study was conducted. In order not to break up the overall narrative flow of the thesis, the use of a methodological annex is preferred. This annex will describe the methods used, the reasons why they were selected, and provide commentary on their utility and suitability.

This thesis draws conclusions from a series of case studies. From the outset it is important to state that a case study is not a method, per se. It is often conflated with ethnography or participant-observation (which are methods of data collection), but this is an inaccurate categorisation. Stoecker suggests referring to case studies as ‘frames’ rather than methods, while Cresswell considers them to be one of five qualitative traditions. Indeed, within one case study, it is possible for several research methods to be employed, including a mixture of qualitative and quantitative strategies. In this thesis, this pattern was certainly followed, as interviews, documentary research, and observation were used.

Having made it clear what a case study is not, it is possible to look at definitions of what a case study is. Yin defines a case study as

An empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, [and which] relies on multiple sources of evidence.

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684 Yin, 9.
685 Yin, 13.
This definition captures the case study’s connection with empirical events and its ability to examine situations in their ‘authentic’ contexts. If Yin’s definition were applied minimally, however, one might expect case studies to largely be matters of description. Others point out that the fundamental aspect of the case study is that it allows the researcher to “explain wholistically [sic] the dynamics of a certain historical period of a particular social unit.”686 Feagin, Orum, and Sjoberg stress that the case study achieves a rich understanding of a particular phenomenon. They define a case study as “an in-depth, multifaceted investigation, using qualitative research methods, of a single social phenomenon.”687

The specific way in which the depth of study is achieved is the use of many different sources, ranging from documents, to interviews, to observations. The multifaceted aspect pointed out by both Yin and Feagin et al in their definitions allows for a rich picture to be developed. Yin goes so far as to describe this as the case study’s “unique strength.”688

Indeed the case study tradition allows the researcher to see a wide spectrum of statements and perceptions, which “permits the investigator to examine how humans develop definitions of the situation.”689 By examining such sources as policy statements, private correspondence, and reports, complemented by interviews and observations, the case study researcher is able to “preserve the unusual and serendipitous” (Cresswell 1998, 142) which is important if a detailed understanding of complex and highly

686 Stoecker, 98.
688 Yin, 8.
689 Feagin, Orum, and Sjoberg, 11.
personalised situations is desired. A case study allows the "emic meanings"
constructed and held by those involved to be told more fully and completely than other
methods might allow. At the same time, though, because ‘public’ documents are also
analysed the ‘impersonal’ or collective discourses are also captured.
Within the arc ascribed by these definitions, two key features stand out: case studies
allow a researcher to look at something in depth and in context. It is precisely this
combination of description and explanation that made the case study the most appropriate
tradition for this thesis.

Opposition to case studies centres on the apparent lack of generalisability, owing
to the low ‘n’ of instances examined. However, case study proponents are quick to point
out that the idea of generalisability is often misunderstood (or at least misapplied). As
Feagin, Orum, Sjoberg remind us “the study of the single case…remains indispensable to
the progress of the social sciences.” Stake asserts that case studies rightly focus on
particular instances which may or may not be typical of larger phenomena and that the
idea of generalisability need not be central in all academic work. Yin believes that
case studies are generalisable, but only to theory, not to entire “populations or
universes.” Stake agrees, stating “the purpose of a case report is not to represent the
world, but to represent the case.”

Even so, generalisations can be made, as long as they are tempered. Cresswell
prefers to use the term assertion, rather than conclusion, to describe the outcome of a case

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690 Cresswell, 142.
692 Feagin, Orum, and Sjoberg, 11.
693 Stake, 437; 439.
694 Yin, 10.
695 Stake, 448.
study. Assertions are “interpretations of the ‘lessons learned’ [and] may be couched in terms of personal views or in terms of theories or constructs in the literature.”

Williams believes that case study researchers “can generalize, but make *moderatum* generalizations.” A term that is often used is ‘naturalistic generalisation’, which Cresswell defines as making the case understandable. In popular parlance, naturalistic generalisations might be dubbed as the ‘take aways’ from the case or “what the reader learns about or from the case.” Yin clarifies the confusion between claims of generalisability by stating

> The case study, like the experiment, does not represent a sample, and the investigator’s goal is to expand and generalise theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization).

The emphasis on ‘tentativeness’, then, is in keeping with the case study’s focus on the particular, albeit as a part of a larger theoretical and ‘real-world’ context.

This thesis is comprised of three instrumental case studies; that is case studies that “focus on a specific issue rather than the case itself. The case then becomes a vehicle to better understand the issue.” Stake asserts that in instrumental case studies

> the case is of secondary interest, it plays a supporting role, and it facilitates our understanding of something else. The case is still looked at in depth, its contexts scrutinized, its ordinary activities detailed, but all because this helps the researcher to pursue the external interest.”

In this thesis, the issue is understanding how a state develops and implements a particular military practice. The cases focus on three different episodes where one state (Canada)
developed such a practice (civil-military cooperation) in three different missions (Kosovo, Bosnia, and Afghanistan). Selecting “one aspect of the case for presentation” is also known as “embedded analysis.”

The issue of case selection, then, is not so much one of sampling. Stake states “selection by sampling of attributes should not be the highest priority…opportunity to learn is of primary importance.” Accordingly, I selected revelatory cases, or cases which allow the researcher to “observe and analyse a phenomenon previously inaccessible to scientific investigation.” It was not my intention to strictly compare the three cases from the outset; they are meant to be separate cases involving the same central actor. If I were focus on case comparison, then there is a risk that “uniqueness and complexities will be glossed over.” Indeed, rather than comparison per se, it was my intention to see how ideas and practices changed over time and across cases. Therefore it was my intention to “simultaneously carry on more than one case study.”

I feel that this choice has proven to be fruitful.

I chose to examine this problem using qualitative research methods and styles of analysis and presentation. While no definitive list of characteristics of qualitative or quantitative methods could exist, using a list of contrasts between the approaches devised by Bryman, it is possible to show why qualitative methods are better suited to the current study.

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702 Stake, 250.
703 Stake, 447.
704 Yin, 40.
705 Stake, 444.
706 Stake, 436.
This study deals with ‘words’ not ‘numbers’. While the study is empirical in nature, the ideas and phenomenon in question (that is, the process of developing a military practice) do not come “naturally in quantities.”

The study focuses more on the participants’, rather than the researcher’s, points of view. While no complete separation of the two is ever possible (i.e. perfect objectivity is unachievable), this thesis attempts to tell the story from the perceptions and discourses of the parties. The study is ontological in nature; that is, it holds that “something is real when it is constructed in the minds of the actors involved in the situation.” This means that a degree of “closeness to the subjects” was sought, something that is generally avoided in quantitative work. Stoecker claims “our ‘subjects’ respond to us in idiosyncratic ways and we miss essential and valuable information if we are too ‘objective’ to notice their…responses, and our responses in turn.”

The cases focus on dynamic events where actions, meanings and discourses change over the period of study. ‘Snapshot’ techniques (even longitudinal ones, such as surveys) may miss the subtle and idiosyncratic variations that develop in complex relationships. Of course, the use of survey data has been necessary when gauging the feelings of the people in this thesis; however, even here, precision and cross-tabulation is not the aim.

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709 Cresswell, 254.
710 Bryman, 284.
711 Stoecker, 96.
• **Meaning, and not strict behaviour, is the focus.** Qualitative research is seen by some to be better at providing explanations of how meaning is generated and reproduced within a social context.\(^{712}\)

• The study uses "rich, deep" data and not necessarily "hard, reliable" data. Bryman characterises this as a difference between qualitative researchers concentration on context, rather than "the precision offered by measurement."\(^{713}\) Examples of the kinds of data sought in this study include personal opinions and impressions, 'performances' and rituals. This contrast is tied to the notion of generalisibility, which has been discussed at some length above.

• The target phenomena are **micro-level interactions, not macro-level trends.** Tesch stresses that a case study is "concerned with one piece of data and what it means, not with regularities or patterns across many pieces of a similar kind."\(^{714}\) This process is best achieved using qualitative methods of data collection and analysis.

   It has been mentioned above that a strength of the case study as a research frame is that it allows for the use of a wide variety of data sources. Table 1 illustrates the types of sources used in this thesis.\(^{715}\) Comments as to issues of access are included.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Category</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Applicable Case</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Documents</td>
<td>•Official, published (reports, publications, testimonials/publicity material)</td>
<td>Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan</td>
<td>Freely available; includes doctrinal publications</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{712}\) Stoecker, 93.
\(^{713}\) Bryman, 285.
\(^{714}\) Tesch, 94.
\(^{715}\) The categories and sources of data in Table 1 have been adapted from Yin, 80-90 and Bryman, 369-384.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Category</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Applicable Case</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>•Official, unpublished ('war diaries', orders/instructions, plans)</td>
<td>Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan</td>
<td>Special access required; negotiated access with participants during interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>•Unofficial, published (personal accounts in professional journals/newspapers, etc)</td>
<td>Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan</td>
<td>Freely available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>•Unofficial, private (correspondence, diaries/journals, retained files, etc)</td>
<td>Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan</td>
<td>Negotiated access with participants during interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>•Field level participants</td>
<td>Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan</td>
<td>Travelled to Ottawa, Kingston, Bosnia, and Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>•Headquarters level policymakers</td>
<td>Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>•Field Observations</td>
<td>Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan</td>
<td>Served in Kosovo. Travelled to Bosnia and Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By drawing on a variety of data sources, the study has been able to depict the nature of the relationships between the government, the people and the military. Official documentary sources will help to define the 'public transcript', or the public face of this relationship, while private documents and interviews allowed a glimpse at some of the 'hidden transcripts' that exist. Finally, observations in the field allowed me to discern the subtle ways in which these transcripts are 'performed.' In one way, the diversity of data permitted a degree of triangulation; on the other hand, and perhaps more importantly in this case, the diversity should help to reveal the contradictions and inconsistencies in the discourse of civil-military cooperation.
Three specific data collection methods are worthy of discussion here. Since personal accounts and perceptions are critical to this study interviews were conducted in an “open-ended”\(^{716}\) or “unstructured”\(^{717}\) fashion. The methods of interviewing roughly followed the guidelines set out by Kvale\(^{718}\), Stroh\(^{719}\), and Denscombe\(^{720}\) all of which I found to be particularly helpful and accessible, in that they are written for postgraduate researchers. However, I would add that in many cases I needed to adapt my interviewing approach to accommodate whether it was a face to face interview, one conducted over the telephone, or by email.

In order to see the relationship in its “natural setting”\(^{721}\) I engaged in observing how military forces conducted civil-military cooperation as a practice. This I was able to do impressionistically in Kosovo in 1999 (where I served alongside civil-military cooperation specialists) and more formally in Bosnia in 2002 and in Afghanistan in 2004. The logistical preparations and requests for authorisation were far more complicated than any textbook can prepare a researcher for and should not be discounted in research design. The fact that I had been a military officer for twelve years provided me with distinct advantages in terms of access to soldiers in operational situations.

The area where I had to rely far more on survey data was in producing the chapter on the people and their role in shaping civil-military cooperation as a practice. While I could not conduct relevant surveys on my own, I did perform meta-analysis of a number

\(^{716}\) Yin 84.
\(^{717}\) Bryman 285.
of large ‘n’ surveys. In so doing, I restricted my analyses to those surveys that were conducted in accordance with sound statistical practices (such as sampling, cross-tabulation, and confidence checking) rather than ‘instant polls’ often used on media websites, for example. This is a realistic approach for most researchers working alone with limited funding.

It was essential that I obtained both public, or declaratory, rhetoric as well as privately held (or at least less publicly expressed) opinions and beliefs from military and government sources. Accordingly, two types of data analysis seem most appropriate: discourse analysis and hermeneutics.

Discourse analysis covers a variety of methods, but in general it “emphasises the way versions of the world, of society, events and the inner psychological worlds are produced in discourse.” Exact methods can range from the heavily coded to the barely structured, some using computer software, and others not. I adopted a “less codified” version of discourse analysis that relies on “sceptical reading” or “reading for the purpose lurking behind the ways that something is said or presented.” The particular relevance of discourse analysis to my research is that allows for flexibility, reveals multiple meanings, and is both “anti-realist” and “constructionist.” This accords with the ontological nature of the material under examination.

The second analysis method is actually a method of data collection and analysis. Bryman states that “the central idea behind hermeneutics is that the analyst of a text must

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722 This is in line with the approach described in Philip P. Everts, Democracy and Military Force. (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002): 15.  
723 Bryman, 360.  
724 Bryman, 361.  
725 Bryman, 360.
seek to bring out the meanings of a text from the perspective of its author." The analyst is examining texts "with a view to interpreting them to find out the intended or expressed meaning, in order to establish a co-understanding." When this interpretation also includes a detailed understanding of the context (through an examination of other texts), as well as the author's point of view, it has been described as "critical hermeneutics." This is a close approximation of the method I employed in completing this thesis.

If discourse analysis can be 'less than structured', so too can hermeneutics. However, that is not to say that it is without a process. At its most fundamental, hermeneutics might be described as "dialoguing with the data" (Tesch 1995, 93), where the researcher focuses first on the particular, relating it to the larger context. In so doing, the meanings of both the particular and the context are better understood. This process of relating the 'piece' to the 'whole' and vice versa continues and interpretations are made and refined throughout the process. This is known as the hermeneutic circle and it continues until the researcher has "reached a sensible meaning, a valid unitary meaning, free of inner contradictions." Stevenson, though, reminds us that there is no absolute or knowable end-state, and that the researcher's judgement must be used in determining when to stop the cycle of analysis. Hermeneutics can seen as particularly relevant to my study; as Tesch points out, in cases where "the research interest is the comprehension of the meaning of text/action" a hermeneutic case study approach is the

726 Bryman, 283.
727 Klave, 47.
728 Bryman, 383.
729 Tesch, 93
730 Klave, 47. See also Tesch, 94.
best way forward. In particular, the hermeneutic method can be useful in open-ended interviews, by “elucidating the dialogue producing the interview texts to be interpreted, and then by clarifying the subsequent process of interpreting the interview texts produced.” (Klave 1996, 46).

In order to overcome criticisms of validity or verification, the qualitative researcher must take positive steps to ensure certain standards or ‘best practices’ are followed. This means that in addition to performing the methods ‘correctly’, aspects of research design and quality control must be put in place to ensure that others might have confidence in the findings of the study. There are many such standards mentioned in the methodological literature. Yin, for instance, takes as his starting point the hallmarks of quantitative methodology and believes they are equally applicable in qualitative works, if in a somewhat modified form. Two of his criteria—construct validity and reliability—appear most applicable. By construct validity Yin means using multiple sources of evidence and establishing a clear and logical chain of evidence. Additionally, he recommends having ‘key informants’ review the final product for accuracy. Yin’s reliability criteria centre on accurate and thorough record keeping.

Other authors mention quality criteria specifically designed for qualitative projects. Cresswell lists seven criteria that should be used to judge the quality of such work.

- Prolonged engagement with sources;
- Triangulation or the use of multiple data sources and analytic methods;
- Peer review;

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732 Tesch, 16.
733 Klave, 46.
734 Yin, 31-32.
735 See also Stake, 443 and Bryman, 274.
- Negative case analysis, where the working hypothesis is revised as the case develops;
- Member checks;
- Clarification of researcher bias; and
- The use of rich descriptions (to aid in determining whether or not the case is applicable in other situations).

Bryman lists four desirable qualities of qualitative research:

- **Credibility**, achieved through member or participant validation;
- **Transferability**, achieved through the use of “thick descriptions”;
- **Dependability**, achieved through good record keeping and a “audit approach”; and
- **Confirmability**, achieved not through ‘total objectivity’, but by demonstrating that the researcher has at least “acted in good faith” and not let bias or presumptions completely distort the research.

I have tried to incorporate as many of these quality control factors into this study as possible. While I have subjected parts of the thesis to both peer and participant review, I have not done so for the entire thesis. Furthermore, while the ideal of triangulation was the aim, it was not possible or practical in every circumstance. On the whole, I feel, data has been triangulated, but in each instance to strive for such a standard would prove paralytic: it would prevent an author from making any claims and diminish the creative aspect of such a work. There must be scope for individual judgment, even in social science.

Lest this all sound too scientistic, I should mention that despite my attention to the formal components of research design and data collection, my intent and much of my practice followed the advice of Hedley Bull, who advocated what he called the “Classic Approach,” that is an approach to theorizing that derives from philosophy, history, and law, and that is characterized above all by explicit reliance on the exercise of judgement and by

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736 Cresswell, 201-203.
737 Bryman, 272-274.
the assumptions that if we confine ourselves to strict verification and proof there is very little of significance that can be said about international relations, that general propositions about this subject must therefore derive from a scientifically imperfect process of perception or intuition, and that these general propositions cannot be accorded anything more than the tentative and inconclusive status appropriate to their doubtful origin.  

Hopefully this attitude pervades the work and that the thesis serves Bull’s several purposes “communication between specialists seeking understanding of the subject...education, persuasion [and] public entertainment.”

The intended audience of this work is a mixed one, comprising scholars, decision-makers and practitioners. In the descriptive parts of thesis there is probably nothing new to practitioners. For them it is hoped that the analytical aspects of the work can provide some insight into how what they do fits in to the wider picture. Some policymakers would welcome a stronger link between academic inquiry and political action.

Paul Nitze believes “it is by action—in my terms, by the practice of politics—that theory...can be kept in touch with reality...The two are inseparable; theory and practice being complementary, they constitute harmonic aspects of one whole.” Not everyone agrees on this point. Christopher Hill, for instance, claims that “the more [scholars] strain for policy relevance, even if only to justify our existence in the eyes of society at large, the more difficult it becomes to maintain intellectual integrity.” If there is truth in Hill’s statement then surely it can be found in the idea that it is the strain that is potentially damaging, not the mere fact that academics work in areas of policy interest and concern. As Joseph Lepgold and Miroslav Nincic put it, “The issue...is whether the

739 Bull, 365.
741 Christopher Hill, cited Lepgold and Nincic, 1.
production of knowledge with concrete bearing on practical problems may undermine the intellectual foundations on which that knowledge rests.”742

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