

20 Years of Crisis in Mexico, 1968-1988

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is devoted to analyzing the political transition that Mexico experienced from 1968 to 1988, through three sources of information: historical documents, economic and demographic statistics and public opinion. **The first part** of the work examines four particularly relevant historical processes concerning the relationship between State and society that can be identified by very precise symbolic events defined here as *crisis*: 1) the October 2, 1968, massacre that culminated the student uprising; 2) the August 31, 1976, peso devaluation that marked the climax of the confrontation between the Echeverrista government and the domestic business class; 3) the September 1, 1982, bank nationalization that symbolized the excesses of the oil boom and foreign indebtedness; 4) the October, 1987, stock market crash that ended unrealistic market euphoria of political origin.

The second part of the thesis seeks to quantitatively outline these historical processes and establish a basis for comparing them one with another. To this end, several statistical series from 1940 to 1987 are used to measure the social, economic and political behavior of the period with the purpose of clarifying the relationship between the qualitative historical facts and the quantitative statistical figures.

The third part is dedicated to examining the opinions of individuals or, more precisely, the different perceptions that for different reasons Mexicans held about the same events and circumstances, as well as the effect that such a heterogeneous mix of opinion can have on a nation's ability to persevere in the face of the four crises of the last 20 years.

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INTRODUCTION

The central proposition of this thesis is that in 1968 a period of transition opened in Mexico as the product of a series of accumulated causes that created *crisis* and exploded in the student movement of that same year. The transition continued without resolution into 1987 and was expressed in successive explosions -- the *crises* of 1976, 1982 and finally the stock market crash of 1987-- that were linked principally through the centralist presidency and the old Mexican state. The links in the chain were forged by the government response to each one of the *crises* it faced. And so, the central scheme of this project is the historical review of these political responses and, for this reason, the work is primarily political science rather than sociology or statistics --although support is sought from these other disciplines.

The analysis begins with four central hypotheses. First, the response to each of the four *crises* of the last 20 years has generated the following *crisis*, because the response --particularly through a strong, centralist presidency-- has primarily attacked immediate, superficial effects and not profound causes. This has produced a pernicious historical chain of events, exacerbating Mexico's problems. Second, the first hypothesis notwithstanding, the country has improved since the 1940s, though in an accidental manner, owing to the relatively autonomous behavior of the political, economic and social spheres and the ability of each to neutralize and resist the negative effects of the others. Third, the last four *crises* have revealed the existence of a great structural heterogeneity that gives the society an important capacity to resist adverse circumstances through the diversity of perception about the same reality. And, fourth, the superstructural element --values, perceptions, mass media, culture-- creates, spreads and propagates the characteristics that drive the behaviors described in the first three hypotheses and, therefore, perception is as important as reality.

The response of President Luis Echeverría to the loss of legitimacy from the 1968 Tlatelolco massacre was to win support from the nation's youth through public appointments, public spending and rhetoric; tactics which also inspired opposition from domestic business and led to the *crisis* of 1976. The response of President Jose López Portillo was to regain the support of business with big projects financed through foreign loans that were secured thanks to the oil bonanza. But, López Portillo carried this strategy to unsustainable levels, inviting the *crisis* of 1982 that ended in the bank nationalization and the alienation of international capital. The response of President Miguel de la Madrid was to regain the confidence of international lenders through scrupulous payment of the foreign debt (even though the tactic would halt economic growth and produce unemployment for at least six years) and a show of economic optimism, albeit based on stock market euphoria that became unsustainable and ended in the *crisis* of October, 1987, with the market crash.

The qualitative historical analysis of the first four chapters requires an empirical test to see: whether or not there was such a transition; whether or not the four stipulated *crises* indicate a transition; whether or not the four crises were linked and, if so, provoked by political rather than economic or other forms of social behavior. At the beginning of this work I assume that public opinion regarding the government --and, further, the statistical indicators of its performance-- would show drops or be turbulent during each of the four key periods, as evidence of the existence of the *crises* and the deteriorating conditions of the country, which, as a global result of hard economic times, would show a profile of general decline for the last 20 years. And so, the chapters dealing with statistical series are only indicative. That is to say, I saw them as a way of testing the central hypotheses, but not as constituting the theses and propositions to be tested. The statistics are only an attempt to get an empirical, less speculative measure of the four assumed *crises* along with their profundity and severity. I collected data from a 20-year period before and after the transition to accumulate

enough statistical information to compare with a certain degree of validity the pre- and post-1968 behavior, which is taken as the inflexion point of the transition.

The initial assumptions were not previously checked, and testing them proved highly rewarding. Public opinion did not turn against the government in 1982 or 1987, at least not in the general indiscriminate manner that had been hoped. The statistical indicators did not collapse around the four dates of the crises, at least not in the pronounced way that I believed they would. The quantitative outline of the 20-year period did not show the general economic and social decline that conventional wisdom would have guessed. Public opinion revealed much more complex, rich and sophisticated patterns concerning all of the hypotheses, above all unanticipated contrasts between regions and social groups. The statistical series revealed a system capable of attenuating, neutralizing or destroying the global effects that could have arisen from disturbances in different sectors of the economy and society. The quantitative outline of the period, despite its ups and downs, showed general improvement rather than decline up to the beginning of the 1980s.

These results led me to reformulate the original argument. Why were the initial conjectures refuted? Nonetheless, the refutations strengthened another explanation based on the great heterogeneity of Mexican society: the weakly connected behavior between polity, economy and society during the period; the increasing maturity of civil society; the important formation and participation of a new organic intellectuality; the notion that the country had advanced despite its governments; and, perhaps most important, signs that the transition was about to end.

The analysis contradicts the argument that the four crises have produced a profound, national decline. Each period has been characterized, to greater and lesser degrees, by a problem of perception - a phenomenon of public opinion. Such problems notwithstanding, as well as the conceptual difficulties and theoretical limitations of

studying *crisis*, the analysis is useful because it reveals elements and characteristics of the State --above all of the relationship between State and society-- that under normal conditions are very difficult to identify.

PART ONE: THE FACTS

The point of departure is the historic search for the Mexican transition of 1968 to 1988 through the four crises of the period and, for this reason, it is important to delimit them. The first crisis under analysis --the repression of October, 1968, in Tlatelolco-- seems to have been caused by the protests of an ascendant middle class wanting to participate. The traditional, authoritarian aspects of the political system and the inequalities of the economic system were openly denounced, inspired in part by the worldwide spirit of popular protest of the times. The second crisis --the peso devaluation of August, 1976, that climaxed the business-government confrontation of the second half of Echeverría's sexenio-- seems to have been produced by business leaders and their lack of confidence in the president's political opening to and rapprochement with the middle class; a strategy Echeverría put into practice in response to the lessons of 1968. The third crisis --the bank nationalization of September, 1982, as the culmination of a process of distrust and capital flight-- seems to have been provoked by the political leadership to check its defeat from the attempted reconciliation with the business class; a strategy adopted by López Portillo because of the events of the Echeverría sexenio. The fourth crisis --the stock market crash that began on October 6, 1987, with the nomination of the PRI's candidate for president-- seems to have been provoked by the public and private leadership through a chain of mutual errors and blunders, not all of which were inevitable. The four crises reveal distinct responses of the national leadership: the government reconciliation with the middle classes beginning in 1968; the government-business reconciliation beginning in 1976; the reconciliation between government and international capital beginning in 1982. The responses to the crisis of 1987 are too fresh to be delineated.

The analysis about the nature and magnitude of the crisis, as well as about the process of government decision making, was carried out from the end of the 1970s by all social groups and sectors who

expressed public and private opinions, forming a prevailing awareness about the problems that caused the crisis. A sample of the debate appears in *Nexos* in March of 1983, where several contradictory opinions are expressed about Mexico's conditions. Some commentators interpreted the moment as dangerous for the nation, while others saw it as an opportunity.

The first group saw a transitional stage in the world balance of powers that hurt Mexico, Latin America and the third-world countries. They argued that the new correlation of political forces was based strategically in military superiority that permitted a redefinition of the west's hegemonic space and was accompanied by a direct attack on the exportation of the socialist revolution, open criticism of Marxist ideology and a heightened disparagement of the reality of the socialist world. For them, the politics of the military buildup was being entrenched and rationalized in the west through technology exchange, the strategic alliance, and the general notions of shared danger and defense of human rights, peace and liberty in the context of a new cold war.

On the other hand, the second group saw in the worldwide realignment a new international division of labor, seeking a strategic specialization to create economic growth with high levels of productivity and efficiency in a competitive, international capitalist system, which would promote re-equilibration of the international market and "healthy" industrialization. From this neo-liberal perspective, the cultural dimension of the crisis was being diagnosed as a degeneration of traditional institutions and values, such as the family, the church, honesty, hard work, and in general all of the traditional mores of western civilization. The effects of the worldwide political realignment in Mexico and Latin America could be recognized in their cycles of economic crisis; their fragile political stability; growing international pressures; decay in national identity, pejoratively called *nativism*; the proven incapacity of their administrative forms and techniques; and in

general the atmosphere of uncertainty, mistrust, recession and poverty in acutely polarized social systems.

Although in other more ideological terms, the Mexican public sector recognized some problems with diagnosing the international political context as unstable, conflictive, unequal and ungovernable. And so foreign policy would be conducted according to its traditional principles, although not without important internal disagreements. Nonetheless, the government disagreed with interpretations that insisted that North American neo-liberalism was gaining too much influence domestically. The government accepted even less that this current would exert influence through the International Monetary Fund, the International Development Bank and the international banking community. Still less the government believed that such an advance could generate in Mexico a new national right closely tied to the North American right, as well as adverse conditions for the abatement of the crisis and structural change.

For Carlos Tello¹ it was paradoxical and dramatic that with the rise of favorable conditions for development, the country created a more unequal society; that "among the success we have in terms of growth and material gains, we are worse off and our crisis is more acute, profound and generalized." For him, the crisis of the pattern of growth and accumulation was accompanied by a crisis of ideas now that Mexico insisted on the use of orthodox economic policy instruments that already had proven insufficient. This argument that re-emphasized the development-distribution problem was expressed principally by worker and campesino organizations as well as by leftist political parties who defined as causes of the crisis the public and private sectors. In what is referred to as the recycling of the crisis through improper political-economic management, we can observe the persistence of the ideological struggle between monetarists and structuralists.

1 Oceano-Nexos 1983: pag.8

Rolando Cordera² argued that the situation in 1983 had begun in the 1970s with the exhaustion of the old model of growth; that we experienced at the time a more acute phase of a long crisis or economic exhaustion that spun off several short-term crises. For him what failed was the attempt to change to a new economic policy. He described the problem as a "crisis of the management of the crisis in the errors and stalemates of the bureaucracy". In this sense, he argued that the crisis within the governing group was associated with a crisis in the development of ideas brought on by a fondness for the obsolete theories of the past. Rene Villarreal³ argued that the "strategy of development centered in accelerated growth and based on oil and foreign debt, far from resolving the structural problems, would make them more acute and also create a more profound crisis than the previous one." He pointed out that the traditional structural problems had been exacerbated in practically all of the economic sectors and that the crisis had reached private business.

From these fundamentally economic analyses, we can perceive a relative consensus about the obsolescence of the development model that Mexico had historically applied, as well as the changing international context and its effect on our economy. Also emphasized is the lack of creative new ideas and the incapacity of orthodox economic paradigms to deal with the crisis.

Pablo González Casanova⁴ upon asking what were the specific characteristics of the Mexican crisis, argued that it was accompanied by bankruptcy, equating the crisis with a decapitalization that, in order to solve the problem, employed policies that did not work --at least not in the way the government said they would work. To him the government's real objective was to bankrupt the working class and middle class, veiled in an optimistic belief that the problems would be solved through monetarist

2 Ibid, pag. 24

3 Ibid, pag. 63

4 Ibid, pag. 21

prescriptions. Soledad Loaeza⁵ expressed her worry about the absence of a political project that supported the economic program of the recent governments, now that the announced economic prescriptions seemed not to take into consideration the perverse political consequences that could arise. She questioned the intent of reducing the presence of the state and foresaw possible intolerance in vital matters, given the politics of economic stabilization through demobilization and control of social demands.

José Carreño⁶ spoke of "a crisis of direction, of leadership, of the governing class" that extended to the leadership of labor, business, political parties, intellectuals as well as government. He argued that the social changes had not been assimilated politically, that "vertical, paternalistic, concentrated and exclusionary structures remained" and were in crisis. His analysis was related to the phenomenon of a new generation of politicians and to the weakening of civil society. This last point was interpreted completely differently by other analysts and politicians, since they saw that in the context of crisis civil society was becoming more plural through great pressure and was in the process of political reorganization and ideological redefinition.

Roger Bartra⁷ argued that two opposite alternatives were creating the crisis --one from the right and the other from the government. The option of generating alternatives from the government had difficulties, because, for Bartra, the system was unable to reproduce itself now that it only recognized the interests of the dominant class without creating alternatives that were politically viable and could be imposed. Manuel Buendía⁸ said that he saw the crisis as a revolution conquered or as a triumphant counter-revolution and that the dilemma posed by Tello and Cordera in *La Disputa por la Nación* already had been resolved against the

5 Ibid, pag. 47

6 Ibid, pag. 10

7 Ibid, pag. 44

8 Ibid, pag. 92

revolutionary project. Carlos Monsiváis⁹ argued that the crisis brought, along with a national psychological crisis, a daily life that in time would create a cultural, social and political backwardness. He argued that the space of civil society already had been eclipsed --in dialogue, democratic participation, confidence and hope-- and that the social consensus was being articulated through fear and resignation.

On the side of the government Francisco Suárez Dávila¹⁰ argued that the crisis of the mythology of false and static diagnoses rested on responses that experience had shown to be inadequate and unrealistic. Manuel Camacho¹¹ questioned the critics about the absence of a political project in the Miguel de la Madrid government and argued that the political project was strengthening our nationalism with economic and social efficiency, based on a non-authoritarian political rationality. Francisco Ruiz Massieu¹² argued that the intellectual debate lacked the consideration of the politics of social governance, which, for him, made the analysis at best superficial for establishing a position or attempting to impinge on public opinion.

The existence of the *crisis* has been taken as fact in the last few years, but only to that point has there been consensus. Whenever attempts have been made to conceptualize the crises or propose options to resolve them, great theoretical, methodological and normative differences have arisen. Analyses of particular aspects have been made, such as the collections coordinated by Pablo González Casanova and Enrique Florescano, *Mexico Hoy*, in 1979; Oceano and Nexos, *A Mitad del Tunel*, in 1983; and González Casanova and Hector Aguilar Camín, *Mexico ante la Crisis*, in 1985. They have not been integrated in a global analysis of the situation. But such a work is not easy since there is no basic consensus --even in such

9 Ibid, pag. 16

10 Ibid, pag. 80

11 Ibid, pag. 84

12 Ibid, pag. 87

apparently fundamental aspects as whether the problem is more political than economic or vice versa, or whether it includes a more ideological connotation. The confusion is included in the term.

The concept of crisis

It is not the purpose of this section to exhaustively review the evolution of the theoretical studies about the term *crisis*. Rather it seeks to clarify the difficulties and advantages of using the concept and to make some bibliographic references. The term comes from the greek name, which means to judge, decide. And, in effect, *crisis* defines above all a moment of decision. Adopted first by medical science, the concept referred to the moment when the symptoms of an illness reached their decisive point. From there the options for the sick body remained well-defined: improve and recover health or worsen to the point of no return. From medicine the concept flowed to other areas of thought. Psychology adopted it, conferring a meaning similar to that of medicine: the moment when the altered individual loses complete control of himself and stops being responsible for his own acts. From psychology the term *crisis* jumped to the vast universe of the social sciences, where it has become one of the central and, at the same time, most polemical concepts.

In the field of human relations the first meaning we find for the term is armed confrontation among nations. War is, from the beginning, the typical *crisis* situation, which is prolonged throughout the hostilities and comes to an end in armistice. A long time before the social sciences were recognized as such, students of international relations spoke of crises. With the ideologues of the proletariat, especially the Marxists, the term *crisis* takes on a new meaning: the moment of rupture in the established social order which can lead to a radical transformation of property relations --social revolution. The Soviet revolution of October would be the best example of *triumphant revolutionary crisis*: the end of the old feudal organization of politics and industry and the beginning of

the construction of socialism. Of course, *révolutionary crisis* does not always lead to proletariat success but could also bring its defeat.

With capitalism and the increasingly clear revelation of its contradictions, the term was popularized as a reference to *economic crises* as the moment in which a stage of prosperity and growth comes to an end --at times suddenly. As such, *the crisis of 1929*--evidenced in the stock market crash of October, massive closings, general unemployment and pronounced drops in production, trade and consumption-- becomes the prototype of *crisis*.

In addition to its inroads into political economy and Marxism, the concept has transcended virtually all disciplines within social science. It is possible to find references to political, social, ideological or cultural crises as moments that have little or nothing to do with the economic cycle or proletarian revolutions. The meanings are multiple and, at times, contradictory, but in all of them is the single common connection of the original idea of the decisive moment in the history of an individual or social group.

A review of the different concepts of *crisis* that prevail in the field of social science¹³ reveals a panorama of great confusion, as much for its time and special references as for its character, dimension and effects. And so, by *crisis* are understood things so dissimilar as a moment of rupture or a process of several years; an event that improves or one that destroys a system; the total dimension of reality or a singular specific event; a product of

13 Of 76 titles about crisis, emphasized are *En torno a Galileo: Esquema de las Crisis* by Ortega and Gasset published in 1933; *La Crisis de Nuestra Era* and *Las Filosofías Sociales de Nuestra Época de Crisis: El Hombre Frente a las Crisis* by Sorokin, published in 1941 and 1950 and *Las Crisis en México* by Cosío Villegas written in 1947; more recently the Marxist works of Jürgen Habermas (1973) *Problemas de Legitimación en el Capitalismo Tardío*, Alan Wolfe (1977) *Los Límites de la Legitimidad*, Claus Offe (1978) *Ingobernabilidad: El Renacimiento de las Teorías Conservadoras*, Goran Therborn (1979) *¿Cómo domina la clase dominante?*. In the functionalist perspective Meadows (1973), Glazer (1975), Bell (1976), Inglehart (1977), Hildebrandt (1978), Kagles (1978), Janowitz (1978) and Von Alemann (1979).

material conditions or psychological ones; the end or the beginning. These hardly represent a review of the work of those who have seen in the study of *crisis* an opportunity to advance social thought.

And so, several definitions of *crisis* can be found: from those that describe it as contradiction, chaos, transition, rupture, revolution; through others that characterize it as confusion, disorder, danger, suspense, tension, discontinuity, counter-tendency, disarticulation, perturbation, dysfunction; to those that see it as renovation, adaptation, reinstitutionalization, realignment, adjustment, purification and regulation. In all of these definitions we can find emphasized the idea of movement, of change, of transformation, although evidently with different senses that correspond to different theoretical-epistemological and methodological perspectives. For Gramsci¹⁴ *crisis* consists precisely in that "the old dies and nothing new can be born", while for Robert K. Merton¹⁵ it is a dysfunction "that weakens the adaptation or adjustment of the system" and for Max Weber¹⁶ *crises* are "irrationalities of every type (effects, errors), as a deviation from the anticipated development of rational action".

Regarding the characteristics of *crisis*, some people argue that they are spontaneous and frequently unpredictable;¹⁷ others that they stem from the development of contradictions like historic phase transitions in a mechanical, evolutionary and economic process;¹⁸ others see them more as the failure of existing rules and the search for new ones;¹⁹ and, also, some characterize *crises* as the unresolved problems of self government.²⁰ Regarding the spatial-temporal, some consider *crises* as limited²¹ while others that they

14 Gramsci: 1971, P. 313.

15 Merton: 1980, P. 126.

16 Weber: 1947, P. 7.

17 Bobbio 1981, P. 454.

18 Poulantzas: 1977, P. 36 and 37.

19 Kuhn: 1971, P. 292.

20 Habermas: 1973, P. 19.

21 Bobbio: 1981, P. 454.

cover the whole terrain;²² some see them as cyclic processes of strength and weakness which may include the perception of unlimited time and space.²³ Regarding the dimension of crises we find that they can be international, regional, national, local, affecting sectors, groups, families and individuals; as well as endogenous or exogenous; narrow or broad.

Regarding origins and causes, some emphasize internal or external roots, dependent or autonomous, structural or functional, historic or conjunctural, general or particular, abstract or concrete, material or ideological, determined or accidental, peaceful or violent, physiological or pathological, latent or manifest, of input or output, organic or causal. Others include as causes and effects of crisis tension and anxiety, uncertainty and the need of participants to act, the loss of control over events and their implications, impatience and tension in the sectors of the system, changes in the relations among participants, future repercussions to the participants, the dangers included in the goals and objectives of the participants, as well as the formulation of alternative solutions.²⁴

As we see crises can arise in any social activity or organization: systems, structures, institutions, mechanisms, actors, strata, sectors, groups, elements, organs, forces, functions, processes, activities, strategies, projects, values, beliefs, theories, methods and ideals. As well as in any setting: from demographic composition to ecological reproduction, from the family to the international community, from investment to consumption, from demand to supply, from participation to retribution, from direction to dominance, from right to might, from folklore to technology; in synthesis, from the society and economy to politics and culture. From this we can identify different problems in the scholarly analysis of crisis, since for some what is significant is its

22 Poulantzas: 1977, P. 36.

23 Gunder Frank: 1983, P. 120.

24 Garcia Cantú 1983, *Excelsior*, March 23, pag. 1.

character and for others the identification of its phases; others emphasize the understanding of its origins and causes or its levels, relations and dimensions; also, some focus on impacts, effects and prediction and others in the decisions, responses and resolutions.

This probably is the product of the confluence of new phenomena, of sudden events, unanticipated realities, unknown problems, flaws in traditional methods, and also inadequate theories, mistrust of paradigms and the lack of practical techniques in the social sciences. Given the new problems and the lack of explanatory power of current theories, social scientists have to re-evaluate and explore existing alternatives to participate in the description of new realities and in the elaboration of alternative bases for action. Throughout this work the common use of the term, which normally identifies *crisis* as the ex-ante and ex-post stages around the *critical moment* in a process, will not be used. *Crisis* will refer to the *critical moment* itself that marks the culmination of a process of decline.

1. THE CRISIS OF 1968

The first crisis of the last 20 years, the student movement of 1968 that ended in the October 2 massacre, seems to have taken the country by surprise. In the 1960s Mexico enjoyed great prestige in business and financial circles in and outside of the country. Economic growth, open credit and solid money were some of the bases for this prestige. In fact, the celebration of the Olympic Games in Mexico City symbolized that successful image. The political system, regardless of how peculiar or heterodox it could appear, had been able to give the country more than 50 years of political stability. It had not shown any need to use general repression, despite the chronic economic inequality in large sectors of the population. The stability was explained until the 1970s in terms of the formal expressions of democracy: political parties, elections, civilian presidents and free press being among the most important.

But the crisis should not have been such a surprise. In reality the 1968 movement represented a break caused by the structural contradictions deeply embedded in the process of state building in Mexico since 1917; a break that had been expressed through previous decades although with less intensity. To see the profound significance of the 1968 crisis it is necessary to understand the process of the formation of the contradictory state in Mexico and its effects on the orientation of the productive apparatus. But an understanding of the event would be incomplete without paying attention to the more far-reaching and profound reactions that came as a response to the 1968 crisis: the government's attempted reconciliation with the middle class and the project of reorienting economic policy from stable to shared development; both constitute the leading threads of the centralist presidency.

Carefully and thoroughly mapping out the analysis of the first crisis can help clarify its causal relation with the second crisis in 1976 and of the second with the third in 1982 and of the third with the fourth in 1987. That is to say, I can attempt to recon-

struct the pernicious chain of successive crises in the last 20 years that point to a far-reaching transition.

The formation of the contradictory State

The State and politics in Mexico are defined by two structural peculiarities: first, the revolutionary and, therefore, popular origin of the state; second, its commitment to a policy of capitalist development, more than with a capitalist class.²⁵ In these terms, the contradiction explains the simultaneous presence of two structural aspects in conflict: a mass-based political system and a capitalist economy. The evolution of the state and politics in Mexico since the Revolution appears then as the response to two leading threads: support for the masses and the requirements of capitalist development. The empirical result of these two aspects has been social mobility (respecting the popular masses) and economic growth (respecting capitalism).

The insoluble binomial "populism-capitalism" since 1917 explains the alternating evolutionary pattern in Mexican politics. Thus the relations between state and the masses has been, at the same time, as much of alliance and support as of manipulation and control. The first requires social mobility and benefits; the second corporatism and authoritarianism. If the commitment to capitalism had not been constrained by the popular origin of the state, the need for popular alliances could have appeared much later. In a similar way, if Mexican populism had not been limited by the commitment to capitalism, the need for control and manipulation could have taken a very different form. This is not, however, an exercise in conjectures about possible alternatives to the Mexican Revolution. It is only an attempt to emphasize the fact that the alliance with and control of the masses was an inevitable characteristic of the "populist-capitalist" state.

25 For a deeper account of the development of this structure, Cfr: Basañez (1981a): 169-183.

The essential aspects were those that permitted the state to maintain the support and loyalty of the masses, to wit, the hegemony of the Mexican state. State hegemony--ideological leadership of the society--was based in the fact that the new order was responding to the aspirations of the masses (land, jobs, education) at least as they were perceived. Consequently, Mexico seems to have evolved as a *praxi-cracy* more than as a democracy (government of the people). All of the structures and practices, which responded to mass aspirations, became a powerful foundation for state hegemony. Particularly relevant were those matters crystallized in four constitutional articles: education (3rd.), land reform (27), work (123) and no re-election (83).

The stability of the Mexican political system is explained in terms of its capacity to provide the masses with social mobility and benefits, through skillful administration of education, land, labor and electoral matters. Nonetheless, it should be recognized that from the beginning the system began to develop its contradictory nature. While producing benefits for a given group, it was also establishing a mechanism to control it.

The populist nature of the Mexican state required pursuing, first, the goal of ideological leadership of the masses (hegemony), while its capitalist nature required maintaining at the same time control and manipulation. However, hegemony was the rule as much as control was the exception. These were, then, two faces of the same coin--hegemony and corporatism--the first being essential and the second instrumental.

Mexican hegemony (ideological leadership of the society by part of the political-military bureaucracy that took control of the state apparatus) was built upon the following four ideological standards that, although not in operation with equal effectiveness at the end of the 1980s, were very powerful for almost 50 years: redistribution of land, labor unions, mass education and no re-election. These four standards grew out of three important legacies

from the 19th century: sentiments of nationalism and independence formed from the war of independence (1810-1821) and later reinforced in the United States military invasions and French intervention (1863-1867); the long-debated matter of federalism vs. centralism that consumed the period of 1824-1854; and the separation of church and state that covered the period of 1857-1876. Thus the constitution of 1917 would retain provisions as much liberal as they were revolutionary.

It is certainly not true that the four ideological pillars essential to the revolutionary program were contributed by the dominant political-military group (the constitutionalists) headed by Carranza. On the contrary, Carranza was forced to accept them. But, having accepted them, the constitutionalists found alliances that brought support from different fronts. Carranza, as well as Madero, was inclined more toward small conservative changes than toward social innovations that he would have considered *exotic*. However, Obregon's pragmatism proved to be more adequate.

The 1917 Constitution evolved as the center piece of the new political order. It was the crystallization of the specific correlation of forces that emerged from the Revolution. In the same way that the political forces of 1917 formed a heterogeneous mosaic, its ideological orientation was likewise heterogeneous. The caudillist period that followed 1917 came quickly to understand that in as much as the four ideological standards were kept alive the loyalty of the workers, campesinos, middle classes and political-military bureaucracy would remain with the *revolutionary family*. Consequently, a mechanism began to grow and mature for alternately and successively reaffirming the four revolutionary pillars.

The foundation for hegemony in Mexico was, therefore, laid by the Revolution. The caudillist period of the 1920s initiated the development of the principle characteristics of Mexican hegemony in order to permit in the 1930s the opening of a period of consolidation. The creation of the PNR (Party of the National Revolution) in

1929, the Cardenas-Calles split in 1936 and the oil expropriation in 1938, and the constitutional reform by Cardenas provide basically the same structure that prevails until today. A powerful presidency (more than the president himself) rules the country through five institutional groups: official political party, congress, executive bureaucracy, the courts and public enterprise.

Within this mechanism, the official party is essential to political stability. The PNR (later the PRM and then PRI) structure basically reflected revolutionary ideology: one sector for labor, another for campesinos and two for the middle classes--the military sector and bureaucracy. Four years later, the military sector was dropped and only the popular sector remained.

The 1940s would have to bring an important change to the Mexican political system as the *populist-capitalist* government began to experience a disequilibrium because it was increasingly emphasizing capitalist development.²⁶ Several economic aspects can be brought to bear as an explanation for the change: the economic boom of the war period; the expectations generated by the import substitution process; the new international agencies that emerged at the end of the war and, extremely important, the cold war in itself. As a result, the change made the hegemonic aspects of the state less dynamic. Inversely, the other side of the coin, corporatism and authoritarianism, began to gain importance.

As this tendency progressed, groups began to appear that could not find a place within the new order. In a certain sense, the pre-eminence of *economic development* required the submission of the *populist* aspects of the system. Thus the cooptive nature of the system was restricted. The division of the CTM in 1947, the rail-workers and teachers movements of 1958, the intellectual movement (National Liberation Movement) of 1961, the formation of the Independent Federation of Campesinos (CCI) in 1963, the doctors

26 Labastida: 1974, P. 638.

movement of 1964 and, finally, the student movement of 1968 point unmistakably to the gradual closing of political space throughout all of these years. In this sense, 1968 is nothing but the growing of a tendency that began in the 1940s. It could seem then that in the second half of the 1940s the faith put in private enterprise increased while the alliances with the masses weakened.

The orientation of the productive apparatus²⁷

It is practically outside of the reach of a government (not to mention a whole society) to give lasting definition to its economic orientation. Mexico was enmeshed in a colonial system that it did not choose much less create--that of imperial Spain. As a result, the country served for three centuries as a provider of primary products (mainly gold and silver) to Spain. This situation formed the biggest part of the country's economic structure.

The independence of 1810 did not drastically change Mexico's economic activity as an exporter of primary products, which produced most of the country's economic growth that peaked between 1880 and 1910. Very important changes followed in the transition from the model of exportation of primary products to that of import substitution industrialization (ISI) in the 1930s. In Mexico, World War I did not promote the industrialization taking place in the majority of Latin American countries because of the 1910-1920 Revolution, which was followed by a period of marked political uncertainty (1921-1928).²⁸ Nonetheless there was a significant industrialization during the 1920s, but it was not until the Great Depression (1929-1933) when Mexico began to break with the model of primary exports; a break that lasted until 1939.

Explicit formulations toward a change to the import substitution model existed from the first sexennial plan of 1934-1940, pre-

27 For a broader development of this section, Cfr: Basañez (1981a): 147-156.

28 Villarreal: 1976, P. 24.

pared by the PNR in 1933.²⁹ However, it was necessary to wait until 1940 (during World War II) to promote the ISI model more decisively. Further, it was not until 1946³⁰ when the objectives of the ISI model became better defined within the more general context of political economy.³¹

In a more general perspective, the economic history of Mexico after 1910 is divided into two parts: one of slow growth until 1935 and another of rapid sustained growth from then on. After the Depression of 1929-1933, Mexico entered a stage of accelerated growth driven mainly through agricultural expansion. This expansion began with public investment in transportation and irrigation, as well as with land reform.³² The stage of sustained growth is itself subdivided into two parts: one of growth driven by agriculture (1936-1956) and another driven by industry after 1956.

The first stage (1936-1956) was predominantly oriented toward external markets, while the second (after 1956) changed the emphasis to the internal market. Equally, the financing of imports during the first stage was through agriculture exports while imports were financed in the second stage through tourism and foreign investment, as much direct as through public credit. Finally, regarding inflation and the politics of stabilization, the first stage is characterized by growth with inflation and three currency devaluations--1938, 1948 and 1954³³--while the second is subdivided into: 1) growth without inflation (1956-1970) known as stable development and 2) the attempt to reduce social inequality and restructure the economy (1970-1976), known as shared development. Although decisions about economic orientation are not easy to manipulate, given the existence of restrictions (domestic as well as international), this fact should not lead to minimizing the role of the State. The economic importance of the public sector in capital accumulation

29 Solis: 1975, P. 22.

30 Izquierdo: 1983, P. 247.

31 Trejo Reyes: 1973, P. 152.

32 Solis: 1979, P. 111.

33 Ibid, PP. 109-115 and 218.

has been made clear and it is necessary to distinguish four different stages to provide the context for the changing role of the State in the economy. There is a logical sequence in the growth of dependent capitalism: 1) exporter of primary products (EMP); 2) import substitution industrialization, phase one (ISI-1); 3) import substitution industrialization, phase two (ISI-2), and; 4) internal contradictions.³⁴

The stage of exportation of primary products is characterized by the dominance exercised by the primary export sector (agriculture or extractive) over the economy, which generates global demand. In this phase, the public sector only provides specific infrastructure and depends on exports taxes. Second, the first stage of import substitution industrialization emerges through the growth of national industry against the pattern of demand generated by exports from the primary sector, under the favorable conditions that arise during periods of war in the international arena. In this context the role of the public sector basically involves providing general infrastructure and financing development. The resources of the state come principally from export taxes and high taxes on imports.

The second stage of import substitution is characterized by renewed foreign penetration through transnational business. The public sector is limited to the role of protecting capital, receiving support from international agencies. Finally, the stage of contradictions is characterized by low rates of productive investment, slow growth and chronic difficulties in the balance of payments. The solution to the contradiction, in terms of sustained growth (apart from the return to the exportation of primary products), requires greater expansion of demand or state control over the structure of production and consumption.

34 Fitzgerald: 1974, P. 2.

This model of four stages essentially applies to the Mexican case, despite the fact that the country (although solely in terms of chronology) remained outside of the Latin American path. The conversion to the first stage of ISI in several Latin American countries in the period 1910-1920 was delayed in Mexico until the 1930s, when the second push toward import substitution took place. The stage of foreign penetration (ISI-stage 2) in the period 1950-1965 is basically out of step with the rest of Latin America as well. Fitzgerald's observations in 1973 brought him to conclude that "Mexico had found a particular solution to growth."³⁵ However, he later modified his position saying that the stage of internal contradictions would be taking place beginning in the 1980s. In sum, the economic history of Mexico can be divided into five periods regarding economic orientation: 1) exporter of primary products (before 1929); 2) transition (1929-1939); 3) import substitution phase one (1939-1956); 4) import substitution phase two (1956-1970); 5) transition (after 1970).

This brief summary underlines the compromise of the Mexican State with capitalist growth since its foundation in 1917. In this respect, although it was not in the hands of the forgers of the State to choose the productive structure or the strategy of growth, the State was certainly able to conform itself to the logic of capitalist growth. What must not have been very clear was the implicit long-run contradiction with another basic commitment of the Mexican State: its popular origin. This contradiction broke politically in 1968 and was made evident in economic terms in 1976.

The first crisis: the student movement of 1968 ³⁶

The events of 1968 were considered by some as a storm in a tea cup. Those involved in the student movement were not masses of poor people, organized workers or campesinos demanding land. The partic-

35 Ibid, P. 7.

36 For a deeper treatment of the theme developed in this section, Cfr: Basañez (1981a): 169-184.

ipants were mainly from the pampered sectors of the middle class confronting the traditional establishment. But, was this really the case? Did Mexico really only have a storm in a tea cup?

The simplistic points of view that tried to explain the political problems of 1968 only in terms of the authoritarianism of Diaz Ordaz or the outside influence of the Soviet Union or United States gave way to broader more elaborate perspectives, which essentially pointed toward an eroding political order that received a great challenge in 1968.

It would be deceptive to set aside the analysis of the student movement of 1968 at this point. Its importance does not stem from the fact that it was a serious challenge to the system, whether in economic, political or ideological terms. Rather its relevance derives from the fact that it revealed the contradictory nature of the Mexican State, which made possible the propagation of the movement. Besides, and more important still, the disclosure effect of the events of 1968 unleashed a series of changes in the operative agreements between the public and private sectors, which seem to have become irreversible.³⁷

In 1970 the leader of the Senate of Lopez Mateos said that 1968 culminated and continued the essential aspects of the process of crisis:

For this reason we insist on characterizing this year as very important in national life. Throughout the year many problems emerged that had been hidden in the past: reactions against deceit and corruption were made well-known; the anti-democratic methods that abound in national life and the form in which authorities violate fundamental norms to advance their self interest were denounced. 1968 clearly revealed the official limitations placed on all popular and class movements, on all serious disagreements with the general orientation of economic development and its deviations, on all criticism of government action. The use of certain tactics to reprimand or

³⁷ Tello: 1979, P. 34.

punish in illegal, barbarous or uncivilized manners is another sign of the crisis that pierces the country...in the future no small number of events will be considered tied to 1968 and its antecedents.³⁸

The main contribution of the analysis of this theme can be found in Zermeño's examination of causes and the environment of the student movement of 1968. He identifies four profound motivations: 1) the inadequacy of the political system to absorb and represent the demands of the new social sectors; 2) deterioration of the relationship between the state and the universities; 3) weakening of the cultural model; and, 4) reorientation of the state toward a function directly favorable to a sector of the upper classes--a perception held by certain middle-class sectors highly sensitive in this respect.³⁹

Regarding the first, the inadequacy of the political system refers primarily to its restricted possibilities for promoting and mobilizing the new professional groups. Zermeño calls attention to the growing importance in numbers and quality of the professional sector, to the institutional obstacles facing the professionals and their aspirations and to the lack of channels of mobility. The second cause, the split between the State and the universities, arose for historic reasons and for lack of interest by government to change these conditions. This abandonment can be seen in the amount of resources the government spent on the universities: after moderate increases in the proposals of 1963 and 1964, toward 1967 resources declined progressively until reaching 1959 levels.⁴⁰

The third cause is the weakening of the cultural model or the dominant ideology of Mexico. The historic process of forming a powerful ideological trilogy--*nationalism-populism-development*--explains the high grade of social cohesion in Mexico, which came to its climax during the 1930s, especially under the Cardenas regime.

38 Moreno Sanchez, Manuel: 1970, P. 13.

39 Zermeño: 1978, P. 55.

40 Ibid, P. 60.

These three elements, although revealed at first as congruent alternatives, proved in time to be profoundly contradictory. Two of the three elements began to be especially contradictory as industrialization proceeded: nationalism and development. Through the 1950s it became evident that, under our conditions of late capitalism, the logic of profit-making brought the local bourgeoisie to quickly disassociate with its national identity. This entrepreneurs not only appears increasingly driven to take advantage of international technology to increase profits, above from the average rate, but also tends to merge its capital with that of international business which reappeared on the scene in our countries.⁴¹

The integrating force of nationalism, as much in politics as ideology, began to decrease to the extent that foreign economies and ideology penetrated slowly and cautiously. As a result, several signs of ideological disintegration were present toward the end of the 1960s. The last profound cause of the 1968 student movement in Zermeño's analysis is the reorientation of the state toward a function that clearly favors the upper classes. In other words, the metamorphosis of the *populist state* in a state of classes. Mexico's historic consistency was based in the formula of *strong state-weak civil society*, which was clearly expressed during the sexenio of Diaz Ordaz.⁴²

Assuming the success or the failure of the student movement regarding its initial demands is really a question of timing. Although during the Diaz Ordaz regime no concessions were made to the students, Echeverría, on the other hand, put several in place. The most important impact of 1968 was to raise the level of alarm for the public and private sectors. Several segments of the public sector had already lost in the 1960s their initial faith in the role of private business to improve the country. Equally, different segments of the private sector had by then lost their inevitable initial dependence on government support to survive. From there the

41 Ibid, P. 84.

42 Ibid, P. 89.

basic material conditions of harmonious dependence had been exceeded. The public sector wanted to continue in control, although it was less able to give its total services to the private sector. For its part, the private sector was not prepared to be deprived of any support that it had traditionally enjoyed. Further still, it could be prepared to try a realignment of prevailing forces if it considered any of its past conquests to be threatened.

Under this weak arrangement, the student movement made evident that the original alliance between the public and private sectors was being undermined. Additionally, the faith in private enterprise as well as in late capitalism received an open, public challenge, coming from the ideological leaders of the movement: Heberto Castillo, Demetrio Vallejo, Valentin Campa, Jose Revueltas.⁴³ The first half of the Echeverría sexenio is, therefore, an attempt to revitalize the alliance; the second half, on the other hand, is an effort to resist the private sector's attempt to gain the managerial role of the country. As a result, if the student movement brought to light the implicit contradictions of the Mexican model up to 1968, the Echeverría sexenio made them explicit.

In 1968 the challenge to state hegemony came from the educated middle classes--university students and professors--and not from the classes least favored by the development model in place since the regime of Aleman: workers and campesinos. Against the ebb and flow of the labor movement and the dispersion of the campesino movement, only the middle classes could carry the struggle for the recovery of the popular classes during the 1960s, and against the existence of objective conditions to raise such a struggle, the middle classes could not refuse the challenge. The student movement of 1968 was the last and most extensive of the middle class recovery movements.

⁴³ Ramirez: 1969, Vols. I and II and Poniatowska: 1971.

The government reconciliation with the middle classes ⁴⁴

From his presidential campaign Luis Echeverría proposed to open communication channels with the social sectors that were hurt in the student movement of 1968, especially with the universities and dissident groups of the left. With this objective he undertook the politics of democratic opening, which was seen as a new alternative for suspending the criticism from society of the repressive acts of the Diaz Ordaz government. In this sense, the new government was presented as openly self-critical, which increased its legitimacy and raised the credibility of the system. And so, the recovery of hegemony rested in a flexible and tolerant attitude by the government with the most active and contrary civil groups and organizations.

In this context, beginning in 1970 the voting age was lowered as well as the minimum age to run for public office, broadening the activity of young people in public matters. Leftist organizations emerged, such as the National Committee of Auscultation and Consultation (CNAC), which reunited leaders of middle sectors, labor groups and intellectual political organizations that promoted independent syndicalism.

The constitutional reforms and the renovation of the electoral law in 1973 allowed the Mexican Communist Party (PCM) to surface from underground and the Mexican Workers Party (PMT) and Socialist Workers Party (PST) to form, at a time when the other existing political parties were strengthening themselves as well. In this form, the violent political participation of 1968 had other institutional outlets in political parties as well as in political organizations subjected to law.

The political opening worked as a rapprochement between the State and civil society in a framework of contention and prevention

⁴⁴ For a deeper treatment of the theme developed in this section, Cfr: Basañez (1981a): 185-201.

of violence through tolerance and political dialogue, with the prospect of recovering social credibility and political control over dissident groups.

In reality the effects of 1968 began to be felt after Echeverría was designated as the PRI's presidential candidate in November of 1969. The style, concepts and rhetoric that Echeverría chose for carrying out his campaign seem to have alienated some influential people. From the beginning he tried to distance himself from the labels of left and right, with his slogan "neither left nor right, arise and go forward". The idea also surfaced that the most important change the country required was not only in social, political and economic conditions but a change of *attitudinal structure*.

Equally, he began to speak of self criticism, political opening and the value of praxis. However, what should have worried the influential people was not Echeverría's discourse itself, but the fact that it was being reinforced through the incorporation of people generally considered as opposition into his campaign. Alfonso Martínez Domínguez, ex-president of the PRI, had suggested that Díaz Ordaz think about retiring the candidacy of Echeverría. Such events indicate an internal split that could have involved the private sector. Therefore, the degree of deterioration in the relationship between Echeverría and the private sector explains the purpose of the first half of his sexenio in revitalizing this alliance.⁴⁵

The pillar of hegemony that mass education constituted as a form of social mobility was particularly reinforced during Echeverría's presidency. Public spending had been reduced throughout the education system during the sexenio of Díaz Ordaz,⁴⁶ and government-university relations had deteriorated. After Echeverría came to power, the situation began to change. He proposed to bring

45 Whitehead: 1979, P. 14.

46 Zermeño: 1978, P. 60.

the government and universities to terms, as well as open channels of participation to previous movements of opposition parties and dissident groups. Especially beginning in 1971 there was a substantial increase of jobs in education; many new schools were created and the universities received important subsidy increases.

Respecting channels of participation, it is noteworthy that many government-dependent organizations (particularly related with rural areas, such as Conasupo, Inmecafe, SRA, SAG, etc.) established programs that employed, under very good conditions, teachers, university professors, researchers and students. Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, considered a leftist academic, became Rector of the National Autonomous University (UNAM) under Echeverría, and Enrique Gonzalez Pedrero, Director of the School of Social and Political Sciences at UNAM, became second in charge of the PRI. The incorporation of dissident groups provoked several conflicts within the public sector.⁴⁷

Echeverría not only continued this conciliatory path but also dedicated considerable time to developing relationships and contacts with intellectuals, professors and students. He also promoted the granting of awards and scholarships, scholarly publishing and the naming of distinguished intellectuals to the diplomatic corps.⁴⁸

His interest in closing the breach between government and university led him to attend the inauguration of courses at UNAM in March of 1975. A dark and violent incident occurred on this occasion, in which Echeverría and the entire audience were attacked resulting in a head injury to the president from a rock. Echeverría blamed the incident on the CIA.

Despite the good relations, intellectual freedom and the reinforcement of social mobility through the education system, a decline in the demand for higher education was perceived by the be-

47 Ibid, P. 66.

48 Shapira: 1977, p. 573.

ginning of the 1980s, which could mean the premature end of the ideological aid of mass education. At the time it could deprive the political system of one of its four pillars.

Nonetheless, despite the efforts of the Echeverría administration to build bridges to the dissident sector and reconstruct the state's lost legitimacy, no one could have prevented the sectors most radicalized through the injuries of 1968 from resorting to violent means in the political struggle. Rural and urban guerrilla warfare emerged and reached important dimensions: first in the southern states of Mexico and second in Mexico City. The state had to deploy a vast repressive apparatus to defeat the League of September 23 and other guerrilla groups operating in the cities and the peasant guerrillas commanded by Genaro Vazquez and later by his successor Lucio Cabañas.

In these years an ambitious government project took place to renovate the essential components of the State's ideology. It started appealing to themes such as development with social justice, the eradication or reduction of social inequalities and the broadening of channels of the expression of democratic ideas. Given the outdated political discourse and the clear advance of mass media in creating a new rhetoric far from the official ideology of the Mexican Revolution, the state suddenly undertook an aggressive political campaign to promote national values, exalt the Latin American and third-world identity of the country and recover our indigenous and popular roots.

Such politics had appreciable success above all among the radical and young university sectors. The cultural and artistic expressions swelled to the new pulsating of Latin American identity and the exaltation of the cultural values of the people. Mexico City was inundated with centers for diffusing Latin American music; groups of *canto-nuevo* proliferated and figures from Latin American folklore filled the stages of the capital's theatres. But the subordinate classes were not alone in promoting their values and po-

litical organization. The private sector did the same thing and, motivated by the discontent that was provoked by the politics of the Echeverría regime, pushed a process of internal organization that would end in the Foundation of the Business Coordinating Council.

Shared Development ⁴⁹

At the end of the 1960s, Mexico was seen as the epitome^e of progress. The following facts are noteworthy in this regard: The country had changed from a rural-agricultural economy to an urban-industrial one; the percentage of the population living in localities of more than 2,500 inhabitants had grown from 34 to 60; the percentage of the workforce occupied in agriculture dropped from 21 to 11, while that in industry rose from 24 to 34. In addition, the highway network had increased from 5,000 to more than 70,000 kilometers; electricity output from 0.5 to 7.5 million watts; oil production grew more than four times over the level of the 1930s; irrigated land was expanded from 0.1 to 3.0 millions of hectares; public education, social security and health services had been extended significantly.⁵⁰ Although some problems were foreseen for the country, the main prognosis was triumph.

From the Echeverría campaign a different vision of the benefits and results of Mexican development began to develop. This new vision found room for expression in the political opening promoted by Echeverría, as well as in the legacy of critical thought left behind by the student movement of 1968. Reinforcing this new vision, some negative aspects of economic development arose. Under these conditions, a current critical of Ortiz Mena's (Secretary of Hacienda 1958-1970) policy of stable development began to propagate. The challenge to several of its bases, added to the unfavorable economic conditions of 1970, led to the formulation and subse-

49 For a deeper treatment of the theme of this section, Cfr: Basañez (1981a): 140-163.

50 Tello: 1979, P. 13.

quent implementation of a new economic strategy: shared development.

The new strategy emerged amid the changing economic circumstances of the 1970s, but was originally formulated more as a criticism of stable development than as a well-elaborated and developed alternative. As a result, the characteristics and objectives of shared development were initially uncertain.⁵¹ As time passed, the new strategy gained definition and in 1973 an attempt was made to systematize it in a plan of development. In no way did the attempt to systematize the plan receive presidential support, to such an extent that it could go no further than a document titled *Outlines for the Formulation of a Plan of Development 1973-1980*. In one simplification, Gerardo Bueno described the objective of stable development as growth in terms of gross domestic product (GDP), while that of shared development would be redistribution of wealth and employment.⁵²

And so, a period of transition seems to have opened in 1970 in the Mexican economy, going from the second stage of import substitution to an alternative strategy. Several events point to this change: first, the end of the Díaz Ordaz regime in 1970; second, the critical challenges from the Echeverría campaign to the policy of stable development; third, the legitimacy crisis stemming from the student movement of 1968; fourth, the decline in the international economy and, fifth and most important, the exhaustion of the ISI-2 model once the market established in Mexico had been saturated.

The first year of the Echeverría regime (1971) is characterized over all by an internal austerity that resulted in economic stagnation. It already has been noted that beginning with the campaign of 1970 the characteristics of stable development were under attack. The criticisms emerged as much from structuralist

51 Bueno: 1977, P. 30.

52 Ibid, P. 31.

economists as from monetarists, although from different sets of assumptions and for different reasons. As the alternative of shared development remained immature, the perspective that prevailed was one of caution suggested by the largest economic institutions (Hacienda and the Bank of Mexico) in such a way that *atonía*, decline, was the economic opening of the sexenio.

Atonía was not only the product of infighting among economists, but rather a response to international economic conditions as well as national ones. Echeverría had promised to reduce the balance of payments deficit and keep inflation below what it was in the United States.⁵³ He was responding to the economic problems that were observed at the beginning of the 1970s, according to Hacienda and the Bank of Mexico. In the international scene, 1970 was for the United States a year of economic restriction and problems in strengthening the dollar, as well as a year of disorder in the international monetary system. The worst effect for Mexico was the 10 percent charge on imports imposed by Nixon in 1971, which aggravated the economic stagnation here. And so, although inflation and the external deficit were reduced, per-capita income fell and unemployment rose.

Although GDP per capita fell in 1971, the private savings rate increased,⁵⁴ to the level that the bank system had reserve funds in excess of legal requirements. This fact destroyed the objections to increasing government spending and diminished as well the credibility of the monetary authorities. Equally, the negative effects of the economic stagnation on the social and political agenda of Echeverría ended in the discrediting of Hacienda and the Bank of Mexico in the eyes of the president. And so, the recommendations of the structuralists (headed by Flores de la Peña of Patrimonio Nacional) rose to the highest level at a time when the international economy allowed such a change because of easy available credit in the international market. Despite its peculiarities, the

⁵³ Whitehead: 1979, P. 29.

⁵⁴ Fitzgerald: 1979, P. 40.

decline of 1971 was occurring not only in México but practically in all of the capitalist world.

2. THE CRISIS OF 1976

The principle^{al} responses to the demands of 1968 were the government reconciliation with the middle classes and the economic strategy of shared development, which created new tensions and worries. A war of words broke out between government and business and reached the breaking point in the peso devaluation of 1976 --a true social disturbance after 22 years of fixed parity. Once again this event would summon the leading thread of the centralist presidency that would take the country in tow toward a new reconciliation; not with the middle classes this time but with business. Intimately tied to the strategy was a form of financing the reconciliation, because there is no lasting alliance with business or any other group if it is not sustained through easy and abundant resources. It is here where oil in the period of López Portillo gained significance and took center stage.

The confrontation between the public and private sectors

Until the decade of the 1970s the relations between government and business seem to have been dominated by a fundamental agreement: the project of capitalist development in which private enterprise was essential. This is a labor of reciprocal dependence. Contrary to expectations, the 1960s were generating certain doubts about the ability of the economic project to solve the country's problems as well as about the need for private enterprise as the *Salvation Army* of the future. When the student movement of 1968 arose, the basic premises of the operative relation became suspect. Consequently, when the 1970s witnessed confrontations between the public and private sectors, the fundamental agreement became the subject of examination.¹ Within this context emerged the fruitless attempt of Echeverría to build an alliance with the private sector through the head of the Monterrey Group--Eugenio Garza Sada.

¹ Labastida: 1974, P. 638.

In the second half of the 1970s the leading sectors of the economic factions were sufficiently strong to pursue their own path with or without the--in other times vital--support of the State. On the other hand, the relation seemed rather inverted to the extent of making the public sector severely dependent (economically speaking) on the private sector. But once more a perturbing element appeared: the oil discovery, which would make it difficult to subordinate the public sector to the private. Because of this, the reinforcement of the political apparatus of the private sector was not abandoned. The concentration and polarization tendencies of economic power continued their course in a similar way as did those of the control over the private sector's political organization.

To give a general context to the infighting of the business sector, the first characteristics of the period should be recalled. A good understanding with the Diaz Ordaz regime (1964-1970) could explain the apparent lack of interest in the precandidates for president, who in 1968 included the secretary of Governance (Luis Echeverría), the regent of the Federal District (Alfonso Corona del Rosal) and the secretary of the Presidency (Emilio Martínez Manatou). When the army reproved the student movement in October of 1968, the private sector backed Diaz Ordaz's decision and did the same when he announced the presidential candidacy of Echeverría in November of 1969.

This good disposition seemed to begin to change very rapidly and fundamentally with a reaction to Echeverría's rhetoric, which business perceived as too radical and populist. There were serious internal disagreements and pressures within the public sector that could have led to a change in candidates. One journalist during Echeverría's regime explored this question, although in a novel.² In any event, the situation produced a moderation in Echeverría's position toward the private sector. It is not clear, however, if the pressure in this case came from business, the military or both.

2 Spota: 1976.

More specific challenges came from the man who had been president of Coparmex since 1960, Roberto Guajardo Suarez, who heaped criticism on Echeverría in December of 1970 and March of 1971.³ Sufficiently unanticipated, nonetheless, was the fact that after the ferocious initial attack, Guajardo Suarez quickly adopted an attitude of collaboration and one year later was promoting and supporting Community Action A.C. (Acomac) which served as the tie between the PRI and Coparmex. Acomac was directed by Luis Sanchez Aguilar, who was second in command to Guajardo Suarez at Coparmex.

Guajardo Suarez's change in attitude cannot be explained in terms of a moderation by Echeverría. On the contrary, the new agrarian reform law had been approved, the education reform was in progress, the State was nationalizing the sugar industry, a fiscal reform was announced, among other similar actions. The explanation rather seems to rest in the *bone-of-contention* role played by Eugenio Garza Sada in 1973 against the general business unrest.⁴

Mexican businessmen were worried about four important aspects: fiscal, labor, state intervention and political opening. However, it seems that before 1973 no important, open confrontation occurred between the public and private sectors. The important variable seems to have been introduced by the United States Ambassador to Mexico Robert McBride, when in December of 1972 he questioned Echeverría's plans to regulate foreign investment. Such a criticism had not been seen up to that point. In April of 1973, CAMCO began to openly promote itself as a defender of free enterprise and led a boycott against the newspaper *Excelsior* because it was at odds with Televisa.⁵ In May, Guajardo Suarez was forced to resign from Coparmex. In August, Frank Loretta, president of Dupont and ex-president of the American Chamber of Commerce, delivered the Powell Paper to businessmen in Monterrey.

3 Tirado: 1979, P. 85.

4 Arriola 1978, P. 42.

5 Rodriguez Toro: 1980, P. 2.

The actions to unify the line of the political organization of the private sector progressed relatively rapidly. In September, Allende fell in Chile, which seems to have inspired Mexican business to oppose Echeverría's politics. A week later (September 17) Eugenio Garza Sada was assassinated, the same day that a general increase in salaries was signed and the period of open confrontation between political and economic elites peaked and the salary accord was forgotten. After Ricardo Margain Zozaya's aggressive speech at Garza Sada's burial, business action intensified. In response Echeverría ordered two of his secretaries to call a conference with the military and labor to prepare for major action. A *popular national alliance* was put in place. Vast demonstrations to support Echeverría were held throughout the country on October 4, and a few weeks later the family of Eugenio Garza Sada reproved Margain's speech, announcing their total confidence in the president and their commitment that investment would be more abundant.⁶

In January of 1974 business leaders declared that their confidence had been restored. Nonetheless, the conflict persisted, although on a smaller scale. The main reasons cited by business as the causes of discontent were, among the most relevant, government tolerance of independent syndicalism, worker demands for salary increases, the price control program and the consumer protection law. Especially acute were the attacks by Coparmex on the Authentic Labor Front (FAT), accusing the organization of being tied to the Soviet Union, Cuba and the marxist Bishop Sergio Mendez Arcero (FAT was promoting independent movements).

A national strike protesting the salary increases was announced September 20, 1974, by business organizations. Echeverría, upon announcing the possibility of extending price controls, forced business to the negotiating table with labor. The issue of price controls, however, caused such a commotion that John Langley (president

⁶ Arriola: 1976, P. 50.

of CAMCO) declared in December of 1974 that Brasil was a more attractive investment option for the United States.⁷

Regarding the internal actions of the private sector's political apparatus, 1974 was dedicated by Coparmex to increasing the ties and strengthening the unity among several sectors of the business world. It is reported that Coparmex increased its membership from 13,000 to 18,000.⁸ Most active among the leaders of the private organizations in 1974 was Andres Marcelo Sada (vice president of Coparmex and member of the prominent Monterrey group), who earned the title *businessman of the year* by expanding a Mexican version of the North American magazine Fortune.⁹

Rupture at the top

Notwithstanding the cordial public sector-private sector relationship expressed publicly in 1974, the truth is that three courses of action took off which do not seem to have been stopped at least until 1976. One was the contraction of investment and capital flight. Another involved the specific steps taken to improve the image of business and recover public confidence.¹⁰ The third was the unification of the private sector's political actions.

The year 1975 was especially relevant in the period, because a presidential candidate would have to be selected. The creation of the National Business Coordinating Council (CCE) in April of this year was an attempt by business to influence the selection as well as a need by grand capital to centralize political control over the business sector. The need of such a centralization stemmed from the problems of controlling the different leaders of business organizations.

7 Ibid, P. 56.

8 Tirado: 1979, P. 83.

9 Arriola: 1976, P. 58.

10 Ibid, P. 56.

From there, for example: 1) Orvañanos was disciplined in Coparmex, although not as much as big business had wanted; 2) Amilcar Ranero, recently named in Canacintra, had returned to the nationalist position of Terrones Langone to such an extent that he opposed the creation of the CCE and, as a result, Cancintra was not unified. Naturally, Ranero was not allowed to take the traditional vice presidency of Concamin or be re-elected in Canacintra; 3) Alvarez Guerrero in Concamin ventured to back Canacintra and publicly recognize Guajardo Suarez for his 13 years as president of Coparmex, which disappointed powerful business groups; 4) Concanaco also faced different pressures which became evident when Juan Rodriguez proposed, while López Portillo was presidential candidate, the abrogation of the Concanaco law to permit small business (the great majority) to separate and form a chamber of small businessmen, which became a member of the PRI.

The structure of the CCE itself reveals much about its intent to control. The directive body of CCE was made up of six members, one for each of the six constituent organizations: Concamin, Concanaco, Coparmex, Association of Bankers; the Mexican Association of Insurers and the Mexican Council of Businessmen. All CCE directors had equal representation, without regard to the fact that Concanaco had more than 300,000 members and the Mexican Council of Businessmen had only 30.¹¹

After the formation of the CCE, only a few isolated declarations of uncertainty were made by business organizations. Business abstained from suggesting a candidate, thinking that doing so would disqualify their pick. But business was tenacious in specifying the qualities they desired in a candidate. The electoral interest of business is reflected in the debate that arose within its ranks about the question of uniting with the PRI. While Concamin sent a letter to all of its members prohibiting political participation in the PRI, Coparmex on the other hand considered it discriminatory¹²

11 Tirado: 1979, P. 56.

12 Arriola: 1976, P. 67

to prohibit businessmen from affiliating with the party. Regardless, the debate seems to have concluded when the candidacy of López Portillo was announced in 1975.

Despite the complacency shown toward the candidate selection, political activity in the business sector did not decrease. On the contrary, in November of 1975 the CCE began its most important public confrontation with the government: the agriculture strike in Sinaloa. The strike was intended to halt action by agricultural authorities in Sinaloa and Sonora that were interpreted by businessmen and growers as "an attack on free enterprise and a deviation toward communism".¹³ The political business organization called a national strike in support of the growers of Sinaloa and Sonora. The call for a strike exposed the real political forces of businessmen, now that they were unable to reach their goal by a wide margin.

This experience taught both business and government that the economic faction's capacity to politically mobilize had been eroded to the low levels experienced during the López Mateos regime over issues of text book content and the Cuban Revolution.¹⁴ Notwithstanding the low level national strike, business was successful in facing the agrarian actions of 1975. Correspondingly, the government gave way in order to proceed with its agrarian program a year later. A few weeks before the end of the Echeverría administration, ejidarios invaded several private farms in Sonora. The conflict polarized toward two extremes: Echeverría and Monterrey. In October of 1976, Echeverría declared that

...The rich and powerful of Monterrey claim to be Catholic and beat their chests in contrition, but they refuse to help their fellow man and, although they create industry, lack a social conscious, which translates into a profoundly reactionary group who are enemies of the people.¹⁵

13 Ibid, P. 65.

14 Arriola: 1976, P. 35.

15 Loaeza: 1977, P. 140.

In sum, the rapprochement of Echeverría with the popular classes as an indispensable action to regain hegemony had as a logical counterpart the alienation of the private sector leadership. The nation's businessmen, satisfied with the balance of the Diaz Ordaz regime and perhaps as well with the night of Tlatelolco, supported Echeverría's nomination as PRI presidential candidate. Despite the populist rhetoric of the new president, they had sufficient reasons to suppose that Echeverría would not, at least in the first half of his term, try to alienate business. The good relations that he established with the head of the Monterrey Group, Eugenio Garza Sada, and with the leadership of Coparmex, at whose head was a man of liberal tendencies--Roberto Guajardo Suarez--as well as the decision to keep business taxes low and finance growing public spending through massive indebtedness, show that for Echeverría the goals were not incompatible of reaching out to the dissident sector and popular classes and at the same time maintaining good relations with the private sector.

However, much of what Echeverría wanted to do was not appreciated by business; for them, he brought a certain nucleus of nationalistic and progressive ideas to the presidency--stemming from his strategy of incorporating the university dissidents--and stamped his government with an unambiguous seal of social democracy. But possibly what contributed most decisively to the alienation and real threat at the top was the promulgation of the law of regulation of new foreign investment and technology transfer. The external faction of the private sector, predominantly North American capital, considered their interests damaged by the new legislation and responded aggressively.

The political confrontation between Echeverría and the private sector had been unprecedented since the Cardenas era and constituted the first threat in post-war history to the basic agreement of the ruling class. The loss of confidence was mutual and the fight by businessmen against the new politics drew government criticisms over the behaviour and social role of entrepreneurs. The sexenio ended,

in fact, in the middle of a severe crisis of confidence, aggravated by Echeverría's final decision to expropriate large tracts of land in Sonora to form ejidos.

Among the new legacies left by the Echeverría sexenio, one stands out because it transcends contemporary politics and makes identifies the true place of hegemony in Mexico. The private sector was not able to create a real possibility of commandeering the social hegemony, despite its repeated attempts to do so and despite the hidden but palpable support of transnational capital, which was disappointed as well with the president of Mexico. The private sector's most notable defeat in its attempt to put the regime in doubt was the national strike staged, and headed by the recently founded Business Coordinating Council (CCE), in support of the growers of Sinaloa and Sonora. The strike, a true test of the private sector's mobilization capacity, failed and only had certain isolated and local repercussions. On the other hand, the State showed that it more or less maintained its capacity to mobilize support from the great contingents of workers and campesinos for its boldest and most far-reaching decisions. Not even the new onslaught of rumors of catastrophe could seriously jeopardize State hegemony and political stability. Regardless of what the businessmen said or did, Echeverría's sexenio came without major setbacks to its end.

The second crisis: the devaluation of 1976¹⁶

Despite the fact that: 1) private investment remained stable at 11-12 percent of GNP; 2) manufacturing had reacted favorably to the State's expansion program and; 3) private savings had increased throughout the period, the government-private sector relationship surprisingly began to deteriorate toward the end of 1972 and the private sector's opposition to the State's strategy of economic expansion grew progressively. The internal economic conditions (despite the populist overtones of the government) did not seem to

¹⁶ For a more detailed examination of the theme of this section, Cfr: Basañez 1981a: 147-168.

give sufficient evidence to explain such a clear and drastic change. The explanation for this sudden turn by the private sector seems to be dominated by an emphatic absence of real internal causes before 1973 and by a peculiar presence of external influences after 1972.

When the fiscal reform at the end of 1972 was blocked, Echeverría had to be content with making tax collection more efficient and introducing minor sales taxes. Public sector prices were revised in 1973 and those of oil and electricity rose 50 and 30 percent respectively. The public sector price increase (that was called the end of the fictitious economy) certainly contributed to inflation after 1973, but was not the principal reason. In every way, these limited measures were quite insufficient to finance the increased state spending that the economy required. As a result, the borrowing requirements of the public sector to finance its rapid expansion of investment in state enterprises rose from 2 percent of GNP in 1971 to 6 percent in 1973 and to 10 percent in 1975.¹⁷

After 1973, State expansion and inflation became the private sector's pet circular explanations for the country's economic problems. However, lagging production in agriculture and manufacturing in 1973 was more important, having reduced their share of GNP. However, the main difference (from the political perspective) among these two types of explanations rests in the fact that the first (state expansion and inflation) allowed the private sector to pour the blame for the economic problems on Echeverría's program of shared development; the second (decline in manufacturing and agriculture) could place the blame with the private sector. As a result, state expansion and inflation confirmed the dangers of abandoning the old model of stable development, in the eyes of the private sector.

The economic problems in 1973 might have been enough to devalue the peso. In every way, in addition to technical reasons, political

¹⁷ Fitzgerald: 1979, P. 42.

considerations prevailed in Echeverría's decision to maintain parity and free convertibility: first, the 1954 devaluation had weakened labor support for the PRI, and, second, the capital flight of 1973 was responding more to a political reality (the change in secretaries of public finance) than an economic one. And so, government borrowing continued to prop up the peso. The international lending euphoria allowed the Echeverría regime in 1974 and 1975 to enjoy almost unlimited external credit, as much to finance the deficit as to support the peso. The immediate objective of the loans was to permit the public sector to finance imports, but the indirect result was the financing of private capital flight toward the dollar.

During 1974-1975 inflation seemed to have important implications for the overvalued peso. But the internal inflationary process, explained by the private sector in terms of state expansion, was not the main cause of the peso decline. Rather, the principal cause was an exogenous problem that penetrated the Mexican economy through the prices of commercial goods. Meanwhile, salaries did not contribute fundamentally to inflation though real salaries rose 12 percent--they did not precede the price increases in systematic form. Analysis of wholesale and consumer price indices in Mexico and the United States reveals that although wholesale prices in both countries had fluctuated in more or less similar terms, consumer prices rose much faster in Mexico. One effect of this was that demand did not generate internal production (that is, goods away from the international market) at a time when import prices were rising. As a result, the balance of payments rapidly deteriorated.¹⁸

In 1976 it became clear that the balance of payments was in severe disequilibrium. And so, it was necessary to take drastic action. In every way, public spending continued to grow to complete government programs before the end of the sexenio, but the rates of agricultural and manufacturing growth had declined seriously. Continuing the line of open confrontation from 1972, the private

¹⁸ Ibid, pp. 43-44.

sector was spreading rumors of rural and urban land reform, the nationalization of transnationals and the freezing of bank deposits. Such campaigns came to be effective destabilization strategies, as capital flight assumed disastrous proportions. To make matters worse Mexico was the object, from the beginning of 1976, of a tourism boycott by North American Jews because of Mexico's vote on Zionism in the United Nations. Within this context, the Bank of Mexico finally withdrew its support of the peso on August 31, 1976, allowing the currency to float to its own level. This decision brought the International Monetary Fund once again to the Mexican scene as the Echeverría period was ending.

It is certain that from a strictly technical point of view the 1970-1976 period can be considered an unfortunate time in the economic history of Mexico. However, when the relevant events are placed within internal and international socio-political contexts, the panorama can seem quite different. First, Echeverría was convinced that continuing with the stable development policy, despite the success it had had, would lead to a very dangerous political situation, such as the 1968 student movement. And so, the primary objective of Echeverría was "to decapitate the perceived danger to political stability even at a cost of economic decline".¹⁹

Second, the Echeverría period strengthened the public sector's position vis a-vis the private sector. Borrowing policies made enormous gains in resources for the public sector without contributing disproportionately to inflation.²⁰ State enterprises grew from 84 in 1970 to 845 in 1976.²¹ Agriculture investment avoided a bad situation and the fruits of investment from oil exploration and production were already on the horizon.

Finally, the disciplinary measures taken by the U.S. government and the IMF did not produce the drastic experiences that they had in

19 Whitehead: 1979, P. 64.

20 Fitzgerald: 1979, P. 45.

21 Fitzgerald: 1978c, P. 278.

other Latin American countries. It is certain that internal economic conditions as well as external ones can provide part of the explanation for the disequilibrium of 1970-1976. But it is also certain that U.S. as well as domestic politics played a very important role in producing the destabilizing factors in this period.

Public finance and oil

The open presence of the IMF in Mexico a few months before the end of the Echeverría administration was seen as the only way out of the public finance and balance of payments crisis. In the first place, the magnitude of the peso devaluation required it. According to the IMF agreement, any currency devaluation more than 10 percent required the fund's supervision. Second, because the financial support of this institution was needed--the fund offered the Mexican government up to 1.2 billion dollars to deal with its economic difficulties--even when such support implied adoption of a stabilization agreement. Third, because the government's outside creditors demanded the endorsement of the IMF to keep doing business with Mexico.

The pact signed with the IMF,²² set a maximum limit on overall monetary expansion, considered highly inflationary; demanded the strengthening of international reserves; limited the net external debt--short and long term--coming from any source to no more than 3 billion dollars for the first year of the agreement; agreed to reduce the public sector deficit and to this end established directives concerning salaries and prices as well as other aspects related to fiscal structure and para-state business.

It announced as well the intent to establish an economic program to restore real rates of growth, raise employment and GDP in real terms and to stimulate domestic saving and capital formation. As part of the program a decision was made to let the Mexican peso

22 *Nexos*, No. 13, January 1979, P. 41.

float and, in the meantime, Mexican gold would be valued at 1976 levels. Other adopted measures included the creation of an export tax, suspension of the certification system for tax returns (CEDIS) and the progressive dismantling of unnecessary import controls, as well as reducing the level of imports of industrial inputs and refusing to adjust prices that were not based in cost increases.

The main objectives were to adjust the public sector deficit, external finance and local bank credit. The concession of new credit by the IMF was subject to ratification by the incoming administration. The following goals were established for the 1977-1979 period: 1) increase production from 4 percent in 1976 to 5 percent in 1977 to reach 7 percent in 1979; 2) raise the rate of capital formation from the 23 percent of GDP obtained in 1976 to 26 percent in 1979 and base the increase in domestic saving; 3) restabilize the balance of payments equilibrium in such a way that the current accounts deficit would fall to 2.6 percent of GDP in 1979; decelerate the inflationary process to insure price stability in 1979.

In a parallel form but far from the presence of the IMF in Mexico it can be said that the years of the oil boom (1978-1981) brought the country a period of growing optimism across a wide spectrum of Mexican society, especially among the middle class and popular sector, before what seemed the beginning of a long period of national prosperity guaranteed by the rising price of oil that would translate into growing opportunities for upward social mobility. There were objective reasons to justify this optimism. The acquisitive power of the society was constantly increasing, thanks to the progressive overvaluation of the peso. This facilitated patterns of consumption that previously were exclusively reserved for the accommodated classes. The number of Mexicans that traveled abroad, taking advantage of the favorable exchange rate, rose to unprecedented levels and Mexican tourists exhibited a great capacity to spend.

Real estate investment in the United States spread among the country's upper classes. Facilitated once again through the overval-

ued peso, the acquisition of houses and land in the United States reached such levels that it was said Mexicans finally had recovered the territory lost in the last century. The economic boom of 1979-1981 created an extraordinary number of jobs. During these years young people entered the labor market at rates above the growth of the economically active population and among other phenomena associated with the accelerated growth in employment, women took more and more jobs in industry and expansion services. The construction industry in particular grew at such high rates in these years that the armies of bricklayers and peons were not enough to cover the demand for labor and should have been complemented by massive hirings of campesino immigrants to the cities, whose low skill level for non-agricultural work alone prevented it.

For a period of time--that later would be seen as incredibly ephemeral--the majority of Mexicans were under the illusion that the country would soon be counted among the industrial powers of the West. When oil peaked and the peso began to fall--and with it the population's high level of consumption--at a time when public finance was near collapse in August of 1982, it was not possible to avoid the discouragement and pessimism that gripped a people who for a fleeting moment believed that poverty and underdevelopment would soon be a thing of the past.

The high rate of economic growth after 1978 was made possible by an unprecedented increase in the capacity to import, stemming not only from oil wealth but also from an active concentration of external credit from overabundant resources in the international money market. The oil potential of the country and the announced energy policies facilitated the access of the public and private sectors to the international markets. This capacity of the nation was reflected not only in the number and amount of repaired operations but also in the financial conditions offered to Mexico.

The additional resources foreseen by the public sector as a result of the oil activity had a double effect. First was the increas-

ing relative size of the public sector in the economy and second was, while loans based on income from oil exports increased, the losses to the public sector--especially those coming from decentralized parastate businesses through the sale of public goods and services that lagged considerably. This situation resulted in subsidy increases granted to specific sectors of the economy. This was feasible in virtue of the intense use of external debt and the broadening monetary base as sources of finance.

The loss of competitiveness of Mexican products abroad and the intense internal activity were reflected in the virtual stagnation of non-oil exports. The gradual overvaluation of the oil trade was a decisive factor in the great acquisitions of foreign assets of every type. The oil wealth created, in some businesses, the idea that a permanent overvaluation was feasible that would permit them to finance investments in and acquisitions of new businesses with foreign credit at a cost in pesos equal to the foreign interest rates.

Income from Pemex exports grew at a much more dynamic rate than the exports themselves because of the strong increase in energy prices in the world market between 1979 and 1980. The adjustment of the economy to this notable rise in the flow of wealth from abroad came immediately; when prices rose Mexico invested the oil resources and used additional external finance at a large scale. The current account deficit of the balance of payments grew 2.7 times between 1978 and 1980, projecting a strong tendency toward disequilibrium with the external sector.

With the growth of the public sector and the decline, in real terms, of the income from its businesses, the requirements for financing multiplied. The growth in current spending made the budget structure less flexible, exacerbating the internal disequilibrium of public finance. Despite the improvement in terms of trade, the economy became more vulnerable to outside perturbations and less efficient in generating foreign exchange in every sector except oil.

The fall in international oil prices, observed since the first quarter of 1981, was not a chance event. The evolution of crude oil prices had been always determined by the volumes of extraction, exportation, storage and consumption, which define the levels of supply and demand in industrial as well as in producer countries.

Beginning in 1973 crude oil prices rose constantly and peaked in 1980. Countries such as Libya and Nigeria began to quote prices as high as 40 dollars a barrel of high quality crude oil, while Mexico charged 38.50 dollars per barrel for isthmus oil. However, 1980 marks as well the year of transition toward the stage of sustained decline in the international price of oil. The United States was the principal promoter of reversing the adverse effects of OPEC's market controls on developed countries. The most important changes came on the demand side.

In response to the oil crisis and constant rise in crude oil quotes, the industrial countries implemented programs to save energy and increase strategic reserves. In 1981 these countries consumed 8 percent less energy and 24 percent less oil to obtain practically the same level of economic production of 1979. On the supply side, it is possible to identify among structural factors the discovery and development of new oil fields and alternative sources of energy along with common factors such as the accelerated growth of oil inventories and the record production of Saudi Arabia throughout 1981. All of these factors combined in such a way that the spring of 1981 saw the first international price decline since 1973.

The reconciliation with business

Before the express recognition of the exhaustion of the strategy of Mexican development, López Portillo made, during his presidential campaign, a joint diagnosis that expressed the need to rebuild the national economic base through the expansion of production and employment. Beginning with this objective and in order to confront the problems of the crisis, he proposed two central actions

for the first years of his government: *political reform* to transform the regime's democratic institutions; and the *popular, national, democratic alliance for production* to recover from and supercede the crisis.

These two lines of strategy were meant to reconcile the government program with social demands, fundamentally with the private sector to recover its confidence and reactivate it economically and with the dissident sector which continued demanding greater political participation. A third line of strategy, the so-called administrative reform, was intended to support the alliance for production and the political reform. Its slogan of "organize the government to organize the country" meant that internal public power would be reorganized politically and economically.

In the sexennial perspective, the *alliance for production* was intended to cultivate the bases and qualitative changes that would allow consolidation of the economy in the medium run and accelerated growth in the last two years of the regime. With the alliance the private sector was given incentives, subsidized and supported fiscally and financially, which regained its confidence since, to the extent that the nation grew, the resources were designated for the private sector in addition to the fact that they generated greater profits. In contrast, the social sector was in for grave problems stemming from inflation, unemployment, salary disputes and unequal distribution of wealth.

Jose López Portillo won an important political victory the day he took office. The most disgruntled group with Echeverría's performance, the private sector, reacted favorably to his speech on December 1, 1976, and the most respected voices of business said that his regime had regained their confidence.

When the period began all of the attacks on the president stopped, although some attacks on Echeverría continued. The action of business took three main paths from there: 1) maintenance of con-

trol over the private sector's political organization; 2) personification of the economic leadership of business in the Alfa group of Monterrey (particularly in its boss, Bernardo Garza Sada); and 3) increased private sector penetration of the government. Nothing special happened in the political organization of business after López Portillo took office, except that Alfa predominated. This was consistent with the personality of Garza Sada. The preoccupation with publicity came to be relevant because the majority of past business leaders were notorious for avoiding publicity.

More important, however, seemed to be the business penetration of government dependencies. Scant attention has been paid to this subject, even when it could be considered important; different situations point toward this fact. Santiago Roel (secretary of foreign affairs from 1976-1979) was closely tied to Monterrey. One high government official interviewed illustrated the bond when he said that Roel occasionally invited persons from Monterrey to join official commissions concerning foreign matters. Such commissions were able, naturally, to make use of the private airplanes of the Monterrey group.

Another official close to a member of CMHN revealed that in November of 1976 (that is, a few weeks before López Portillo took office) he did an analysis of the possible secretaries for the next cabinet. On this occasion business leaders expressed the opinion that the candidate for secretary of Commerce was good, although in a couple of years they would like to see in the post someone with the qualities of Jorge de la Vega. From another point of view, it is interesting to note as well the different coincidences between a proposal by Banamex and the *Global plan of development 1980-1982*.²³

The possible influence of Monterrey and Televisa in the resignations of Porfirio Muñoz Ledo (1978) and Jesus Reyes Heróles (1979), as well as the Santiago Roel period (1976-1979), should have

23 Hodara: 1978.

brought these groups to consider the prospects very promising for their aspirations. These aspirations seemed to have reached their climax in the Pope's visit in 1979.

The modernity of the Alfa group, its expansion, its power, had by 1980 turned it into prototypical economic and political leader of business. Beginning with 1974 Alfa constituted the array of businesses of the Garza Laguera and Garza Sada families in Monterrey, which initiated a peculiar stage in the history of business in Mexico. Its influence over the public sector could be observed in such cases as the law of the promotion of farming in 1980, which was hotly debated as inoperable, but which the group saw as essential for expanding its investment in the rural sector. Its influence over the private sector can be seen in the stock market euphoria of 1981 fueled in part by the group's activity in the market. In May of that year Alfa continued enjoying its glory. The credit of 178 million dollars granted by Eximbank seems to corroborate this. What is missing now is an examination of the not insignificant part played by Alfa in the formation and precipitation of the third crisis in 1982.

In sum, during the López Portillo sexenio, the leading thread of policy was the economy, which is understandable given the legacy of political stability and legitimacy left by Echeverría at a time when economic disequilibrium was requiring urgent attention. The conciliatory attitude of the new regime and the conditions imposed by the IMF brought Monterrey to consider that, despite not having gained political leadership, they probably should have a fundamental say in important decisions. And in truth, the first half of the Lopez Portillo sexenio (1976-1979) seems to have been dominated by a pro-business discourse.

3. THE CRISIS OF 1982

The third crisis under analysis, the bank nationalization that mobilized national public opinion on both sides of the issue, has been perhaps the most debated event of the last 20 years. It encouraged and discouraged at the same time certain segments of the population and conditioned in an important way subsequent political and economic actions. In the first three months, it provoked a broad mobilization in support of the measure that a little later turned into disapproval.

In the formation and evolution of this crisis, the influence of several actions grounded in U.S.-Mexican relations should not be underestimated. After the ominous negative reaction of the U.S. to the purchase of Mexican gas, when was almost ready the construction of the Cactus-Reynosa gas line in December of 1977, the relations between presidents López Portillo and Carter were not good, as was obvious during Carter visit to Mexico City in February of 1979. The decision not to enter GATT in March of 1980 and the visit to Cuba in September of the same year, along with López Portillo's assessment of international politics and his study about the value of private property for the IV Reunion of the Republic in Hermosillo in February of 1981 and the joint announcement with France about El Salvador in August of this year, must have heightened attitudes of fear and caution toward Mexico in strategic U.S. agencies. The North-South reunion in Cancun in December of 1981 and support for Nicaragua were fleshing out a Mexican activism in international affairs that surely created growing discomfort for the United States.

In 1982 Mexico had difficult economic times. The factors that precipitated the crises were, on one hand, the contradictions stemming from the country's development model and the inflexibility of economic policy to respond favorably to adverse circumstances and, on the other hand, changes in international economic conditions -- falling oil prices, rising interest rates, tight financing. In addi-

tion, an excessive public deficit, growing alarm within the external sector --including widespread capital flight-- inflation and drops in GNP, among other factors pointed to a grave economic disequilibrium.

To understand the crisis of 1982 it is essential to note, in addition to the bilateral relationship with the U.S., the oil crash that dragged down government and business as well as the presidential succession process that has become increasingly unsettling. As in the analysis of the previous two crises, complete comprehension of the third requires examination of the strong reactions that it provoked: without a doubt, international concern as well as the slow but growing emergence of internal pressures to risk levels.

The oil crash

The multiplication of oil income beginning with the second victorious OPEC offensive in 1979 and the increase in the production of crude by Pemex upset the tranquil, natural order of things and established the state as the grand sector of national political and economic life, making remote the objective possibilities for the private sector to take over national hegemony. The López Portillo government seems not to have found an adequate formula for assimilating the new, abundant oil income, a good part of which was lost in financing an artificially high rate of consumption, as much by the government as the rest of society.

To finance development of the energy sector and the massive imports of capital goods --which sought to maintain an abnormally high rate of growth as well-- the country accelerated the process of external indebtedness that eventually would become unsustainable and end in the suspension of outside credit after the deterioration of confidence from the business sector, the crisis of public finance and the bank nationalization.

The structural imbalances of the Mexican economy could be overcome and postponed thanks to the oil bonanza. However, the grave and growing decline intensified the contradictions and made evident the great fragility of the scheme of finance based on debt, especially foreign debt and oil resources.

A broad debate about the course of the global economy broke out in 1980 in response to the decision that Mexico might enter the GATT and expand its program of oil exploitation. It is certain that the debate arose in this year, but it was really only one phase in a more profound process of inquiry that had begun 10 years earlier. One important advance toward the economic redefinition of the period of readjustment (1968-1980) came on the anniversary of the oil expropriation, March 18, 1980. First, Mexico did not give in to pressure from the U.S. to increase oil production beyond the 2.5 to 2.7 million barrels a day level --only a 10 percent variation was accepted. Second, entrance into the GATT was rejected. Third, the system of Mexican foodstuffs (SAM) was proposed and implied a more direct participation by the state in the production of food.

Although these amounted to partial redefinitions, they were enough to produce several changes in internal arrangements in 1980. First, in April a global plan of development was presented that included some of the fundamental ideas proposed by the private sector, especially by Banamex. Second, in the president's May trip to Europe, Televisa expressed its disappointment by pulling all of its coverage of the trip. Third, in agreement with the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States, more than 4 billion dollars was left in the private banks for the end of May.¹ A separate but relevant characteristic in this panorama was the offer in February from a Chicago banker to the Chamber of Commerce to provide "North American military help to Mexico in exchange for oil".²

1 *Informativa*: 53, P. 18.

2 *Informativa*: 50, P. 19.

The disturbances in the international price of oil beginning in June of 1981 seem to have had an impact of finance that affected Alfa. In July the consortium could not obtain a loan in New York for 200 million dollars and a month later Bernardo Garza Sada declared that the rumors of layoffs and bankruptcy in Alfa were unfounded; however, a decline in the value of the group's assets and suspension of its plans to diversify were observed by October. Finally, Banobras announced an extension of 17 billion pesos in credit to Alfa on November 1, the day after the Social Democratic Party (PSD) denounced the technical bankruptcy of the consortium and demanded the nationalization of Alfa. Garza Sada declared that there was neither crisis nor bankruptcy, but presented a petition to the stock exchange agents to freeze the group's assets. With this, the viability of a *business project*, as an option for the nation's development, was frozen as well --at least for a while. The demoralization of business became apparent.

As in the case of Diaz Serrano, the obvious causes of the rapid and strident decline of Alfa --expansion, high costs and debt-- are hidden in unknowns that shadowed the event. The first unknown can be called the strong internal rivalry between Alfa and Visa; the second, a possible profound tie between Visa and the Social Democratic Party (PSD). In either case much is missing to illuminate and, above all, establish the links between the bankruptcy of Alfa and the precipitation of the crisis of 1982.

The presidential succession

If the economy was upset, political life was that much more unstable. The most turbulent period in Mexican politics is definitely the presidential transition, although preoccupation over the successor exists practically throughout the entire sexenio. This preoccupation traditionally intensifies after the fourth presidential address to the nation and heightens as the fifth approaches. This provokes reshuffling of government posts and pressures that affect political behavior.

However, two events are noteworthy in the succession of the López Portillo administration: the discourse of Roberto Casillas, particular secretary of the president, in August of 1980 and a series of interviews granted by Luis Echeverría in April of 1981 to *El Universal*. The effect of Casillas' discourse was a televised interview by the president, who denied his role as the *great elector* and qualified it as *fiel de la balanza*, the scale pointer. The effect of the Echeverría interviews was the switching of posts between the president of the PRI and the secretary of agrarian reform, eight days after the *supersonic breaking of silence*. In both cases, the president showed a need to strengthen his grip over the nation's political situation in a progressively unsettled environment.

In contrast with events before July of 1981, later events made control over the succession process difficult. On one hand, the oil-price problem that arose was analyzed and had an important impact on the president's plans. On the other hand, was the dismissal of Diaz Serrano which seemed to be due to more than the disagreement over price reductions per barrel of exported oil. In addition, the pressures coming from the industrial bloc headed by Alfa and from the financial sector foreshadowed the arrival of erratic and disarticulated business actions that came to be the basis of rumor, lack of confidence and capital flight. Finally, the three interviews with President Reagan all on U.S. soil, with no reciprocity. The times and activities surrounding the presidential nomination during the last half of September are suggestive. On the 14th, Diaz Serrano said he was ready to return to political life. On the 17th, López Portillo went up for the third consecutive time to meet with Reagan, this time in Grand Rapids, Michigan. The day after his return, López Portillo announced at a meeting in Monterrey that the PRI would reveal its candidate in a few days and it was leaked that Diaz Serrano would leave to be ambassador to the Soviet Union, and on the 25th the PRI disclosed its candidate, almost a month earlier to the Cancun meeting --the expected date of *destape*. Without resorting to

conspiracy theory, it will be important in the future to investigate the possible relationship between the contributing elements: Bush, Alfa, Diaz Serrano, Grand Rapids and the anticipation of the unveiling of the PRI presidential candidate.

Five weeks after the resignation of Diaz Serrano, the president gave a press conference on board the airplane Quetzalcoatl upon his return from Guadalajara July 10. On this occasion he denied that a climate of no confidence was being created: "a dirty, unfounded, emotional charge based on rumor and gossip..."; he declared himself against the devaluation and press terrorism. He promised "to return to the Cancun meeting with all of the force of the presidency of the republic".³ A week later, on July 17, López Portillo referred again to *press terrorism* against the peso. He used a press conference with foreign correspondents as his forum.⁴

It seemed that the two press conferences helped to temporarily calm the general anxiety, which heated up again as the celebration of the V Reunion of the Republic approached on Feb. 5, 1982. On that day the president once again requested tranquility, confidence and solidarity: "We defend our peso in order to not make it the toy of the most despicable element of the society: those who enrich themselves through speculation and the defeat of others".⁵ The effect was the opposite of what he intended and on February 17 the withdrawal of the Bank of Mexico from the exchange market was announced. The peso against the dollar went from 27.06 on February 17 to 47.25 on the 26th.⁶ The ability of the financial sector to unleash an efficient pressure mechanism had been proven once again, but the inability to regain control was revealed as well.

The financial conditions sharpened the economic debate. The irreconcilable propositions of the monetarists and structuralists

3 *El Dia*, July 11, 1981, P. 2.

4 *Uno mas Uno*, July 18, 1981, P. 1.

5 *Excelsior*, February 6, 1982, P. 1.

6 *Uno mas Uno*, February 28, 1982, P. 9.

came to a head: free exchange rates and tight bonds with the international monetary system vs. controlled exchange rates and financial self-determination. Under this scenario the heads of Public Finance and the Bank of Mexico were switched respectively on March 16 and 17, 1982, , which was interpreted as a step forward in the transition toward the new government as the new appointees were close to the candidate. To that point, the monetarists seemed to predominate. At least that was the general impression when the director of the Bank of Mexico published "a pragmatic --not dogmatic-- analysis about the suitability" of exchange controls, in which he came to the *firm conviction* that they could not be adopted in Mexico.

Rumor and disparagement continued hurting the president's image during a political period --the transition-- that already was difficult for him. On May 11, 1982, López Portillo formulated an extensive explanation televised in the program *Twenty Women and a Man*, where he argued that the country had problems with financial liquidity but denied the existence of an economic crisis. He made a call for confidence, but admitted "that I enjoy less credibility than a bank teller".⁷ Capital flight continued in greater and greater degrees. During June and the beginning of July, public attention was monopolized by the closing days of the political campaigns and by predictions of high voter turnout for the elections. But after the electoral euphoria, the rumors returned.

The severity of the financial situation became apparent August 1 with price hikes for gasoline, bread and tortillas, especially given the considerable amount of government subsidies they absorbed. The difficulties became apparent once again on August 5 when double exchange parity was established. This decision was the first step toward general exchange controls announced on September 1, which showed that the balance of political forces in the dispute over the country's economic policy was changing rapidly.

⁷ *El Nacional*, May 12, 1982, P. 1.

The third crisis: the bank nationalization

The announcement of the bank nationalization and general exchange rate controls during the president's VI address to the nation took the country by surprise. Except for the cabinet secretaries who ate breakfast that morning with the president in Los Pinos, the president elect --who was informed the previous afternoon-- and a small group who had worked on related projects, no one knew anything about the measure.

Since March there had been general considerations about certain aspects of the policy change by people close to the president, but it was not until the adoption of double parity on August 5 that the process reached the point of no return. In the last week of July the economy's vital signs were revised in order to conclude that strong remedies were needed for serious illnesses. It became clear as well that in the magic of the Mexican political system there seemed to be only 18 weeks every six years during which difficult decisions could be made: from July 15 to November 30 of the last year of the government, 15 days after the election of the new president and one day before leaving office.

Because of the taboo against controlling free exchange rates, the events of August 5 seemed to indicate that the president had decided to break definitively with the past. The celebrated marriage between private bankers and the government in 1925 blew up and was undoubtedly dissolved by September 1. The affairs of the peculiar pair had gone along acceptably for nearly 40 years. A flexible and moderate fiscal policy in exchange for internal financing of a small public deficit was a happy formula for many years.

One important danger that threatened the bank nationalization was the popular lack of confidence that could have exploded upon reopening the banks on September 6. The danger seemed to arise with the first change in regulations announced by Carlos Tello on television on Saturday, September 4: fixing parity at 50 and 70 pesos per

dollar; reducing interest rates; eliminating commissions on checking accounts; increasing interest on savings accounts from 4.5 to 20 percent; reducing the 23 percent in credits for low cost housing to establish it at 11 percent, among many other things.

The fundamental chronology of the arrangements that began on September 13 in which were given the general rules for exchange rate controls went as follows; on September 21 the president sent to the Chamber of Deputies the constitutional reforms to reserve bank and credit services to the state, to control labor relations through part B of article 123 and to convert the Bank of Mexico into a decentralized public agency; on the 22nd, 21 banking institutions sought protection and, finally, on the 27th the constitution of a trusteeship was announced to repatriate real estate at a time when Carlos Tello declared that an agreement would be signed with the IMF.

The principal observation that can be made about the reactions that the bank nationalization and exchange controls produced is that they were truly moderate compared with the aggression and opposition that other events had received in recent Mexican history, particularly during the Echeverría sexenio.⁸ There was a manifest absence of opposition that was anticipated from a faction of the church. Notable as well was the disarticulation of the business sector and the heterogeneity of its reactions. Among lawyers a debate arose about the constitutionality of the measures, but they remained far from reaching a consensus. The workers movement and political parties, with the exception of the PAN and PDM, came out in favor. Televisa contained itself and the editorial pages were divided. Private investors and a good part of public investors were opposed.

⁸ Basañez: 1982c, P. 57.

Figure No. 1

Nationalization of the Banking System (By Party Preference)								
	VG	G	F	B	VB	DK	NA	TOT
PAN	11	26	22	16	8	12	5	100
PRI	22	38	18	5	2	10	5	100
PSUM	31	38	16	6	1	5	3	100
PPS	15	30	22	5	4	15	9	100
PRT	26	29	24	5	3	13	-	100
PDM	13	33	28	13	-	13	-	100
PST	21	32	17	2	-	21	7	100
PMT	31	26	17	3	-	14	9	100
PARM	8	50	17	8	-	17	-	100
ABS	11	28	21	12	6	18	4	100
NC	12	24	18	10	3	12	21	100
NS	20	-	40	-	-	20	20	100
	1007	1811	1042	432	178	646	301	5417
SUMA	19	33	19	8	3	12	6	100

Question: ¿Do you think the banks' nationalization was...?
 VG=Very Good / G=Good / F=Fair / B=Bad / VB=Very Bad /
 DK=Don't Know / NA=No Answer

The real state of Mexican public opinion was not being reflected in the measures, as is seen in the poll taken by the author in November of 1982.⁹ Actual support for the government run at 71 percent of those interviewed, in a range that varied from 64 percent of businessmen at the low end to 87 percent of politicians at the top end, as was indicated in the poll results.

One expression of the maturity process in civil society can be observed in the heterogeneous influence of political parties in the process of the formation of public opinion, which arose in the nationalization issue. It can be noted that while sympathizers of PAN,

⁹ The poll included 5,417 anonymous interviews with uniform quotas across 13 occupational groups and proportional numbers across 31 states and the Federal District according to population. The questionnaire contained 41 closed and five open questions. The percentage of men and women was 62-38, with 24 percent of the interviewees making less than one minimum salary, 46 percent making between one and four minimum salaries, 22 percent making more than four minimum salaries and 8 percent refusing to answer questions about income.

PDM and PARM as well as abstainers and those without an opinion, registered the lowest percent of very good responses at levels from 8 to 13 percent, members of PSUM and PMT, on the other hand, registered the highest percentages at the 31 percent level. Sympathizers of PRI, PRT and PST came in between 21 and 26 percent. At the other end of the scale, the highest expression of bad opinion came from sympathizers of PAN, PDM, PARM, abstainers and those who did not answer questions about party preference.

Figure No. 2

Nationalization of the Banking System (By Income Level)								
	VG	G	F	B	VB	DK	NA	TOT
Low	11	32	16	5	1	26	9	100
Middle Low	14	31	22	4	1	21	7	100
Middle	19	36	20	6	1	13	5	100
Middle High	23	37	19	7	3	7	4	100
High	21	32	19	14	7	4	3	100
NA	16	27	16	9	4	15	13	100
TOTAL	1007	1811	1042	432	178	646	301	5417
	19	33	19	8	3	12	6	100

Question: ¿Do you think the banks' nationalization was...?
 VG=Very Good / G=Good / F=Fair / B=Bad / VB=Very Bad /
 DK=Don't Know / NA=No Answer

The influence of income level on opinion about the bank nationalization was clearly apparent as well. It can be seen in the preceding figure that the most negative opinions (21 percent of bad and very bad) came from the highest income groups at the eight minimum salary level, while the most positive responses (60 percent of good and very good) came from the upper middle group (between four and eight minimum salaries).

Despite the generally accepted impression that government functionaries overreported their opinions to square with the official party line, the bank poll showed that when granted anonymity they

were inclined to agree with parties of the center-left. A minority exists in the public sector that can demand a more radical role for the state, a more nationalistic position that emphasizes social policies to benefit the masses. This could be reflected in the support for opposition parties that supported similar demands, but it also could be a sign of the government's latent capacity to move a little bit toward the left in order to coopt dissidents. On the other hand, whatever measure of government support for the left would probably strengthen the right sustained by the groups that support the government less.

The crisis of 1982 contains one peculiarity. It was not the dissidents, nor the private sector, nor the middle classes but precisely the public sector that exploded the crisis. Nonetheless, the bank nationalization was a determining factor in the reconstruction of state legitimacy and consensus among the popular masses. The demonstrations that followed in September --and that inhibited the business reaction-- would seem to support this. However, the López Portillo era was almost over and the attempt to make enormous structural changes in the nation's financial relations soon came to an end.

International concern of the new Administration

The centerpiece of the government response to the 1982 crisis was defined from the beginning. The attempt would be made to comply scrupulously with the country's outside agreements --specifically to cover external debt service of the order of 10 billion dollars a year-- and the adverse internal effects of such a decision would be countered with a broad respect for the free expression of ideas and a strong political reform.

Under these circumstances, Mexico saw as indispensable the re-evaluation of the importance of the international context in its economic orientation and the adoption of the premise of complying with the outside as a condition for domestic development. This re-

quired a strong internal adjustment and broad promotion of the acquisition of foreign exchange -- in a perspective of frugality in the public use of foreign exchange, reduction of imports and augmentation of exports, specifically non-oil exports, along the path of industrial reversion and liberation of commerce.

We can identify two periods in the Mexican government's attitude concerning its agreements abroad: the first goes from December of 1982 to February of 1986, in which the principle of compliance at any cost is imperative; the second begins in February of 1986 and is characterized by an attitude of modified compliance. The maxim of compliance at any cost undertaken by the Mexican government is understandable as much for the socio-political composition of the group that came to power in 1982 as for its vision of adverse external and internal circumstances throughout the country.

The strategic North American agencies were very sensitive to Mexican foreign policy especially regarding Central America. Constantine Menges, head of the Latin American section of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) at the beginning of the new Mexican administration 1982-1988, was one of the officials most concerned about an alleged alliance between the Mexican government, the Soviet Union and Cuba,¹⁰ in which Mexico would support Nicaragua and El Salvador, according to Menges, and the Soviet Union and Cuba would keep the Mexican left under control. To show tangentially that Mexico was not on the road to communism, nor in alliance with anyone, the new Mexican government chose the path of scrupulous compliance with external agreements regarding the debt. However, such efforts and financial discipline were irrelevant for the North American security agencies, which continued pressure campaigns on the pretext of fighting drug trafficking, threats to tourists or government corruption in Mexico.

¹⁰ Lorenzo Meyer, "Imperios del Mal y Bien", *Excelsior*, P. 7, May 25, 1988.

It is interesting to contrast the dominant government opinion with that of the rest of the society on the debt issue.¹¹ As can be seen in the following figure, government officials held the least unfavorable opinion (7 percent good and 77 percent bad) followed by the campesinos (6 percent good and 56 percent bad). But, in either case, the national contrast between those for and those against (4 percent vs. 78 percent) shows society's open rejection of the debt.

Figure No 3

External Debt (By Occupation)				
	Good	Fair	Bad	DK
Government	7	11	77	5
Business	4	7	79	10
Professional	3	8	84	5
White Collar	3	10	79	8
Civil Servant	3	8	82	7
Blue Collar	3	9	76	12
Farmer	6	12	56	26
Unemployed	2	9	75	14
National	4	8	78	10

Question: ¿What is your opinion of the current external debt of Mexico?

In August of 1983 Mexico was rated by higher ups in international financial circles as a country with an exemplary recovery program that was being imitated by other countries in financial trouble. This perception was argued and spread by specialized newspapers and magazines with great international circulation that indicated that no country in modern times had applied an adjustment program so radical, rapid, firm and successful as Mexico. In June of 1984, the IMF's executive director sent out a memorandum that described Mexico as an example of how to adjust and negotiate for debtor and creditor nations; the memorandum was backed by the president of the U.S. Federal Reserve.¹² To that point, international

¹¹ Poll in April of 1983. See Appendix.

¹² *Cronica Presidencial*: 1985, P. 276.

opinion about Mexico had gone from skeptical and adverse to favorable in response to the national economic recovery. This meant that the new governing group was recovering credibility and confidence in international financial centers. But not so in the centers of strategic security.

Against the growing concerns that Latin America would confront the international financial community with a unified position, expressed in the meetings of Quito and Cartagena in 1984, the Mexican posture of compliance at any cost remained firm. The possibility of participating in the formation of a so-called *debtors club* was rejected and Mexico questioned the viability of any initiative of force, rupture or confrontation against the international financial centers.

Compliance with the agreements stems from a series of effects of different social and economic variables. The public deficit was financed with internal credit, which implied a vicious circle that exacerbated the problem each time, because a large part of the credit went to pay interest on the internal debt. As the internal financing of the public deficit increased, resources were absorbed that otherwise would have been directed toward productive activities, creating a financial constriction that among other things was characterized by a practically null availability of finance for the private sector.

The 1985 fall in international oil prices, the growth of inflation, the reduction in industrial production and the effects of the September earthquakes, despite the use of emergency fiscal measures in exchange rates and commerce, did not ease the growing difficulties in complying with external agreements. It was in this context that the presidential discourse of February 21, 1986, marked a shift in the policy of compliance at any cost. A change in the government's attitude about this policy was first observed in mid-1985. As much for the government as for the society, it seemed evident that the economic containment policy initiated with the Immediate Program

for Economic Recovery (PIRE) and reinforced with tight credit that year could not continue in effect much longer, without risking structural damage to the industrial plant. External creditors had been agreed to cover Mexican debt service, granting minor concessions through restructuring, but since 1984 the country had not received additional credit. Under these conditions, the progressive decapitalization of the country was not a very tempting option.¹³

On February 21, 1986, Miguel de la Madrid sent a message to the nation and the external creditors through the media that his administration was no longer willing to continue sacrificing the standards of living of the majority of Mexicans in order to export, through debt payments, resources generated internally, while external financial flows continued virtually cancelled and oil income had been cut to less than half. Two months later, upon inaugurating the 21st session of CEPAL, de la Madrid declared that the present situation could not continue:

We have reached the limit of being able to sustain the transfer of capital to the rest of the world and our people demand and end to the crisis that becomes less tolerable every day... (As a result) Mexico urgently demands restructuring of international economic relations that embrace, along with the debt, the problems of finance and money, commercial flows and terms of trade, technological support and international cooperation.¹⁴

The undersecretary of Public Finance Suarez Davila observed at the end of April that Mexico could take unilateral action regarding the external debt, as it would be a reduction of interest beyond the approval of the creditors, in order to put the paid revenues only two points above the international inflation rate. The then-secretary of Public Finance and Public Credit, Jesus Silva Herzog, also insinuated the possibility of a unilateral moratorium.

¹³ *Excelsior*, February 22, 1986, P. 1.

¹⁴ *Excelsior*, April 22, 1986, P. 1.

In May in the extraordinary national council of the PRI and in June in Hermosillo, Sonora, de la Madrid insisted on these plans to break with the policy of compliance. By mid-June the nation was surprised by news of Jesus Silva Herzog's resignation and his replacement by the until-then-general director of Nafinsa, Gustavo Petriccioli. The change provoked a lot of conjectures, some contradictory. For some analysts, the resignation stemmed from his radical declarations over the past three months that had included the possibility of a moratorium. For others, the resignation was obligatory if a change toward a more firm policy with external creditors was desired. Others still saw the resignation in terms of the beginnings of the presidential succession.¹⁵

The Mexican strategy of gaining better conditions in debt payments bore its first fruits in July of 1986. Despite the favorable conditions for Mexico in the pact, independent analysts continued emphasizing that other important demands of the Mexican government were not accepted by the IMF, such as substantial modifications in the terms of payments and concessions regarding interest rates and length of loans.

The conditions agreed upon with the international financial centers and the return of rising oil prices that began in October of 1986 generated a certain flexibility in the internal adjustment program and strengthened the goal of diversifying our exports as well as increasing the national acquisition of foreign exchange.

Internal pressures

Three types of internal pressures can be identified as a result of the decision to respond to the 1982 crisis by scrupulous compliance with international financial agreements: pressures from the popular bases of workers and peasants; pressures from leftist orga-

¹⁵ *El Nacional*, June 24, 1986.

nizations and parties; and pressures from right-wing organizations and parties.

Regarding **popular pressures** we can say that since the Immediate Program of Economic Recovery (PIRE) was put in place in December of 1982, the workers expressed their dissatisfaction with the economic policies of the de la Madrid government, especially with the policy of wage and price controls. The growing opposition to wage containment, price hikes and public tariffs, reduction and elimination of subsidies and liberation of price controls on some general consumer goods had been coordinated through all of the country's labor organizations including independents as well as members of the Labor Congress.

The intensive and extensive growth in **labor pressures** arose at the end of 1982 through the unusual increase in alternative proposals to existing economic policies, the number of strikes, public criticism of the government's management of the economy, different protest movements and demonstrations, as well as the growth of labor demands. In fact, top government officials had recognized the social cost that the economic crisis and policies were causing in the working class.

The CTM as well as the CT developed alternative economic and social policies and used generalized strikes as resources in the defense of their corporatist territory. However, the organized labor movement mainly developed a pressure campaign of criticism and opposition to the programs, measures and policies that the public sector implemented. It questioned as well the accuracy of the government's assessments and the viability of its prescriptions along with the competence of some public officials.

The independent labor movement, which was organized into large groups such as the *la mesa de concertacion sindical*, had pushed the majority of strikes and demonstrations against the so-called *austerity program*, had struggled more combatively for salary increases,

employment and price controls and had generated greater opposition to different aspects of the government's economic policy.

Among the main worker mobilizations recorded in 1983 are the strikes by 10 university syndicates; the general strike of the CTM which some independent syndicates joined (May); the break out of the Uramex faction of Sutin and the work stoppage by 176,000 employees of SARH (June); the abandonment of moderation in the context of the solidarity pact of the labor movement (November). In 1984 the mobilizations of teachers in Chiapas and Oaxaca (February); the demonstrations of discontent in the labor parade (May); the 10 proposals of the Labor Congress to protect basic mass consumption and the president's response not to cave in to pressures (June); the REQUISAS of Telephones of Mexico and the confrontation among workers (September).

In 1985 the strike of 1,300 miners (February); the slowing down movements of the Mexicana Airlines employees (July); the strike of the section of the Siderurgica de Lazaro Cardenas in the state of Michoacan (August); demonstrations against massive layoffs of public employs (July); conflicts in institutions of higher education, among them Colmex and UAM (August); the doctors' demands on Hospital General and Juarez (October). In 1986 the threaten of the oil workers in the visit to the president (January); the demonstration of 100,000 independent workers (end of January); the strike of Dina (February); the demonstrations by more than 100,000 workers (March and July); the criticisms by CTM and CT of economic policy (July); the student and worker mobilizations convened to create a conflict in UNAM by the CEU (November).

The **campesino movement** also created some pressure during the de la Madrid sexenio. In contrast with the labor movement, whose struggles and demonstrations took place in urban centers and as a result received wide press coverage, the campesino struggles took place in remote places and their magnitude and gains were much less

known. Nonetheless, certain mobilizations have captured a broad segment of national public attention, among them are the following:

The land conflict in Ocoyoacac, Mexico (January 1983); the Chiapas peasant mobilization of CIOAC (October 1983); campesino marches from the valley of Toluca and the north of the state of Mexico to Mexico City (February 1984); the national campesino caravan of solidarity with a final destination of Mexico City as well (March 1984); the mobilization of the national coordinating Plan de Ayala (CNPA) (march 1984); the violent confrontation between members of the CNC and the CIOAC in the city of Venustiano Carranza, Chiapas (October 1984); the campesino eviction of Tequixquiac, state of Mexico (April 1984); the conflict between the Ruta 100 union and campesinos for the possession of some property in Acolman, state of Mexico (February 1985); the new armed confrontation between campesinos of CNC and CIOAC (August 1986); the merge between the independent campesino movement of the CNPA and the popular independent urban movement, organized in Conamup, to make a joint march toward the Zocalo in Mexico City on the anniversary of Emiliano Zapata's birth.

The main campesino demands were for increases in basic consumer goods and transportation, guaranteed prices, supports and subsidies for agriculture, a crackdown on the corruption and inefficiency in the agrarian bureaucracy, the delays in their trials, the allotment, tenancy and restitution of land, the unionization of day labor and an end to repression in the countryside.

With respect to **pressures from the left** it was obvious that President Miguel de la Madrid continued the line of opening and tolerance begun by his two immediate predecessors. Once again the legalization of leftist organizations and the channeling of official funds to registered parties were a political counterweight to the general malaise in the population due to the drastic austerity measures taken to fight the crisis; the policy worked as well to counteract the advances of the right.

Regarding the economy, the leftist parties constantly criticized the adjustment policies, arguing that in practical terms such policies did nothing but put the full burden of the crisis on the working classes, exacerbated employment problems as well as income distribution and exclusively favored large monopolies and oligopolies.

The leftist parties took, among others, the following demands to the de la Madrid regime: push a profound fiscal reform that would burden capital; remove the value added tax; eliminate subsidies to private business; establish severe controls over foreign investment; break with the IMF and declare a moratorium on debt payments; establish general exchange rate controls; nationalize the foodstuff, pharmaceutical and export industries; increase public spending on education, health, housing, public transport and other social programs; reform government institutions and the judiciary; democratize the Federal District through the popular election of the municipal government in Mexico City; clean up the judiciary and elect its ministers and judges; dismantle presidentialism; create an agency to certify elections that would be completely independent from the presidency; free political prisoners and reveal the names of those who were disappeared for political reasons; completely respect democratization of the unions; stopping unemployment; reduce the concentration of wealth and the capacity to declare strikes nonexistent; upscale salaries; reform several aspects of labor law in favor of the unions; remunerate salaries and pay workers 56 hours in wages for working 40; unionize day labor and peons; reduce limits to small-scale farming and ranching and form collective ejidos; fix guaranteed wages for peasant labor; channel credit to ejidatarios, communes and organized peasants; reduce and freeze rents; make a radical urban reform; grant decent housing to laborers; preserve the environment and protect the ecology.

In support of their demands leftist parties and organizations frequently promoted demonstrations, marches, meetings, highway

blockages and other forms of popular mobilization. In the demonstrations that the left periodically organized, party members usually marched with independent unions, tenant farmers, student groups and sometimes with campesinos as well.

The moments of greatest pressure from the left came during electoral campaigns, especially for municipal governments. The most important include the August 1983 elections in Oaxaca when the PRI recaptured the government of Juchitan and the COCEI installed its own parallel government that eventually was removed from town hall by public force. Three years later, in August of 1986, the PRI declared victory in Juchitan and once again the COCEI denounced electoral fraud and demanded the elections be annulled.

After local elections in Chihuahua and Oaxaca, in July and August of 1986 respectively, the left captured new ground in its politics of alliances upon announcing the formation of a forum for effective suffrage with the parties and organizations of the right to ensure respect for the vote and to travel the country denouncing the presumed electoral fraud committed against both sides. The leftist parties closest to the PRI --PPS and PST-- decried the decision of the PSUM, PMT and PRT to join forces with the PAN and the PDM to combat electoral fraud. In addition, the leftist parties made new attempts to form alliances, at least electoral alliances. The politics of alliances on the left seemed to tend to overcome its historic fragmentation that had made electoral politics so adverse for the individual organizations.

The relations between the de la Madrid government and dissident intellectuals in general were stable. Nonetheless, they passed through two difficult moments: One stirred up by the introduction of the crime of moral injury in the civil code and the other provoked by the assassination of journalist Manuel Buendia. Another cause for concern in the newspaper guild was including the crime of disloyalty in the law of responsibilities of public servants, which could implicate a functionary who leaked information.

For its part, the intellectual community has shown a great deal of interest and willingness to get involved in the political debate and in electoral results during the past few years. After the elections of 1986 in Chihuahua and Oaxaca, against the backdrop of repeated protests by the PAN --supported by the leftist parties-- and amid a general feeling that major fraud had been committed in favor of the PRI, a group of 20 distinguished intellectuals publicly demanded that the elections be annulled.¹⁶

Regarding pressure from the **organizations and parties on the right**, it should be noted that beginning in 1982 they were centered mainly in a systematic attack challenging the government's capacity and direction in managing the economic crisis; the representativeness of the national political leadership; the democratic forms and procedures in the Mexican political system; and the peace, liberty and security that existed in Mexico.

In this sense, Mexico's conservative groups were homogenized, articulated and founded dynamically and organically among themselves and they established tacit alliances with some North American groups, with private sector associations and groups and with some university and mass media organizations. In a framework of civil disobedience, the right intensified its pressure campaign using corruption, fraud and the government's authoritarianism as vehicles to call attention to the crisis. Also, the increase of the church's political and partisan activities has been notable for its open participation in favor of the right in the North of the country and in favor of the left in the South and for its discrete opposition to the public sector.

Since 1982 the conflicts and inconformities surrounding electoral processes have increased. The most frequent complaints have

¹⁶ *La Jornada*, July 24 and August 30, 1986, P. 5 and P. 4.

come from opposition parties and practically all of them are based on accusations of some type of electoral fraud.

The conflicts, increasingly on a larger scale, are being accompanied by political mobilizations in the form of protests and demonstrations in front of public buildings, threats of civil disobedience --particularly in the payment of taxes-- hunger strikes, occupations of state and municipal offices as well as of roads, bridges and important avenues. For their part, the mobilizations are the antecedents of violent confrontations among partisans in conflict or between them and public forces. This is illustrated by some municipal confrontations in the states of Oaxaca (August 1983), Sinaloa (September 1984), Chiapas (February 1985), San Luis Potosi (January 1986), Puebla (April 1986), Chihuahua (July 1986) and Durango (August 1986).

The electoral advance of the PAN in 1983 that brought the party 31 municipalities --among the most noteworthy were important capitals such as Chihuahua, Durango, Hermosillo and San Luis Potosi-- shows that the rightist offensive was focused on large important cities, mainly in the north of the country where it found much support from business and the church. In fact, the PAN's strategy seems to be based on running regionally important businessmen as candidates who in some way are government dissidents, the clearest examples of this are found in Puebla, Sonora and Baja California.

The elections for federal deputies in July 1985, as mid-term elections in the sexennial perspective, caused particular unrest and political reflection because they became tests of strength for the PAN, the left and the PRI as well as indicators of the national political system's stability. Most analyses referred to the PAN's electoral rise, the militancy and support of rightist businessmen to this party, the church's participation in politics, the North American interventions on behalf of the PAN, the descent of the PRI and the fragmentation of the left.

The process of the politicization of business and its insertion in political parties was seen by some as a decision with a view toward obtaining recognition as a political actor with an organized legitimate public presence, as well as specific political positions that contributed to guaranteeing the existing mechanisms of consultation, to broadening the channels of business participation in the highest decisions and, in general, to assuring entrance into new political-ideological spaces that would serve as the basis for promoting the right's hegemony.

Even when Mexican conservatives lacked their own articulated national program¹⁷ they had, however, a private point of view about the functioning of society with which they openly defended free enterprise, acting as well in defense of the interests of capital. The objective was to take control over the national economic project, using among other things the withdrawal of investment and capital flight as well as the disparagement of the state's managerial ability.

Some proposals from the right were: promote the increase and broadening of national capital as a real alternative to overcome the crisis and guarantee the survival of national unity; eliminate barriers to the free flow of commerce and capital; liberalize or privatize public enterprises; condition and limit the public sector's intervention in the economy; exclude and politically fragment the left; articulate and contain the social demands of labor.

Some ex-private bankers had argued that the Mexican State was unable to further national development. In this context, their ideologues proposed the dissemination of a neoliberal ideology to aid the gradual transformation of the Mexican political system to a bi-party PRI-PAN system that would keep the state apparatus from functioning in a monolithic way. As a result, the response the private sector developed was not chance, because it was conditioned in the

17 Basañez (1981a), P. 109.

causes, circumstances and effects of the crises of the last 20 years and structurally responded to the participation of the public sector in certain economic-productive and service areas, in a mixed economy that conditioned its enrichment.

4. THE 1987 CRISIS

The 1987 crisis --the Mexican stock market crash that began October 5-- is perhaps the clearest illustration, on one hand, of the narrow ties between politics and the economy and, on the other hand, of the fundamental role that perception, subjectivity and awareness play in the development of the crises and, therefore, in the transformation of reality. But, additionally and in contrast with the three previous crises, the 1987 market crash shows that the influence of perception not only effects the small number of actors in the national leadership but a much broader segment of society that at least includes the 375,000 players in the stock market. That is, it would seem that an old and in other countries well-known actor opened on the Mexican political stage: the phenomenon of the formation of public opinion.

In October of 1987 there were no real changes in the economy or society, in contrast with the months of February of 1986 and September of 1985, when there were concrete reasons that justified use of the word crisis because of the respective fall in oil prices and the Mexico City earthquakes. However, neither the oil crash nor the earthquakes were generally conceptualized as crises because at no time were they perceived as such but rather as abnormal situations and emergencies that required broad social measures.

The stock market rise that began in 1983 was inconsistent with the real behavior of the economy; that is, the stock index grew while production fell. Government policy sent clear signals of encouragement to capital and subjection and control to labor, giving a positive picture of the future to businessmen and investors, motivating them to risk capital not on industry but on assets. The market rise was detained and left with no real basis other than the culmination of the presidential succession process, sprinkled just in case with some important announcements which, when signs of the crash increased, became a phenomenon of public opinion and acquired the force and capacity to arrest real and important economic vari-

ables: the price of the dollar, interest rate, salary demands, public sector prices and tariffs, among other things, generating the fourth crisis.


And so, market euphoria and presidential succession are the two cores to understanding the formation of the fourth crisis. The immediate reactions such as the economic pact of solidarity should be explored provisionally to complete the analysis. However, in a couple of years, once the current policies have fully developed, it will be possible to revise and deepen the analysis. Meanwhile and to help identify some characteristics of the crisis, it is important to review the economic context behind the market crash without losing sight of the market disturbances in New York, Tokyo and London, among others.

Market euphoria

The Mexican stock market (BMV) began a long-term rise in 1983 that was not detained until the crash of 1987. The path of its general index gives us an idea of the magnitude of this gain: in 1982 the market closed at 676 points with a loss of 271 on the last day of 1981. As is remembered, the market had suffered an abrupt drop in June of 1979 and was not able to recover despite the oil boom that drove the economic bonanza during the next two years. At the end of 1983 and despite the fact that the economy suffered a drastic drop in GDP of 5.3 points that year, the market index had multiplied by a factor of four to 2,451 points. In 1984 growth persisted and at the end of the year the index reached 4,038 points. In 1985, it jumped to 11,197 points (177 percent growth) and in 1986 shot up to 47,101 points (320 percent growth). As is observed, there was a total lack of correspondence between the path of the market and that of the general economy. The most notable growth came during the two most difficult years for the real sector (1983 and 1986) and was least -- although important as well-- in the years of production growth: 1984 and 1985.

Considering everything, growth in 1986 remained completely obscured by what happened in 1987, particularly in the last trimester of the year. In the first semester of 1987 the index grew 114,586 points. Between 1983 and June of 1987 the total price of assets in circulation increased 9,541 per cent, passing from 436 million to 42.3 billion pesos, practically without a change in the number of assets. From the 161,668 points that the index had reached by June 30, 1987, the figure grew to 343,544 over the next three months --an increase of 181,876 points or more than the market had grown in its previous 93 years of existence.

Figure No. 4



	Index of the Mexican Stock Exchange Market					
	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
Jan	793	3375	3710	14204	60281	139620
Feb	865	4032	4202	14150	79825	200586
Mar	837	3350	4396	13378	98524	174398
Apr	918	2885	4818	12802	120303	154159
May	1098	3282	4597	14677	143308	188067
Jun	1424	3172	4958	15998	161667	184189
Jul	1598	3302	5698	19399	226988	188078
Aug	1571	3885	6743	22365	287395	196524
Sep	2013	4366	7286	28629	343545	197872
Oct	2002	3997	9608	35251	200018	197822
Nov	2037	4200	10832	41699	113628	229579
Dec	2452	4038	11197	47101	105670	211532

As the price index grew so did the number of market investors, increasing from 84,476 in 1983 to 186,023 in 1986 and to 373,822 in August of 1987 and dividing among themselves practically the same number of assets.¹ The brokerage houses built branches in the biggest cities of the province, covering all important places from Ciudad Juarez to Merida. As September ended, the BMV reached the zenith of its vigor and prestige and its meteoric rise attracted the enthusiasm and optimism of the investors and drove them away from the enormous, bureaucratic and low-profitable national banking system. How could the market grow so much in so little time? It is necessary to list government support first among the reasons that explain the rise.

From the day de la Madrid took office, the government tried to recover business confidence lost during the bank nationalization, announcing the reprivatization of 34 per cent of the capital of the banks that had been nationalized three months earlier. Months later, a generous program of indemnification for the expropriated ex-bankers was completed and implemented; a decision that was followed by a perhaps more important one --giving priority to the ex-bankers in acquiring the reprivatized banks. Among such businesses were brokerage houses, insurance companies and the rest of the non-bank financiers. However, all of this was still not enough. The financial faction of the business sector had been deprived of its means of accumulation-- the banks. Even though brokerage houses had been returned, they were still weak institutions unable to serve even as substitutes for the nationalized banks. It was unthinkable to encourage a process of accelerated growth that would convert the small and almost insignificant brokerage houses into powerful instruments of capital accumulation. The most effective mechanism that the federal government adopted to drive the growth of brokerage houses was to deposit volumes of growing government assets in them. The Bank of Mexico --the key

¹ Zuñiga, Juan: 1988.

institution in the recovery of lost business confidence-- sponsored the triangulation of the federal government's internal debt in favor of the non-bank financiers by limiting government access to what was the traditional source of internal resources: the *encaje legal*. In a totally contradictory way, if it is considered that the rates of *encaje legal* are lower than those in the capital markets, the Bank of Mexico sponsored the release of treasury certificates and other government assets of insured value *PAGAFES*, oil bonds, etc.) that would be deposited precisely through the brokerage houses. With this fundamental change, volumes of capital and investors began to flow increasingly to the stock market. Talk began as well of the existence of a parallel bank.

The State strengthened its strategy of consolidating non-bank financiers by promulgating new bank legislation that, among other things, prohibited banks from possessing brokerage houses, leaving the management of the stock market exclusively in private hands and by limiting to a predetermined amount the maximum level of financing that the Bank of Mexico could grant to the federal government. In this way the private mediation of the the public sector's internal financing remained institutionalized. Banks were prohibited from managing even their own stock market investment funds. Only the brokerage houses would have access to the trading floor of the Mexican stock market and their agents would be the only ones authorized to buy and sell assets and stocks.

At the same time, the credit policy dictated by the central bank contributed to the market peak. From July 1985 a virtual total freeze of bank credit was decreed that in practice temporarily cancelled the traditional function of financiers as channels between bank savings and investment. Businesses began to see the stock market as an alternative for obtaining funds that strengthened the role of the non-bank financiers. But above all, the banks were subject to an interest rate policy that objectively favored the stock sector, as the bank rates were always maintained considerably below those of treasury certificates negotiated in the brokerage houses. In this

way, the bank share that had shown a moderate advance in 1984 and the first of 1985 began to decline at the end of this second year and was depressed from then on.


The peak of the asset market had as its point of departure and support base the money market, particularly that of treasury certificates, CETES. The attractive returns on these instruments, added to an exchange policy that offered a stable flow from pesos to dollars, reversed a considerable part of the capital flight that flowed en masse to the flowering stock market and provoked the boom of 1986 and 1987. The money market was unable to absorb it and skillful management of the investment community (whose portfolios normally included a mix of fixed- and variable-return assets) provided the going up of business stocks quoted on the market. And so began the market boom that would not end until October of 1987.

It was noticeable that even stocks from companies with clear problems of production and marketing --for example, the Pliana group in 1986-- went up as if they were completely successful. A gap opened between the real and market values of the assets that was growing more and more thanks to the affluence of the new contingents of investors who flowed into the market to buy practically anything.

The broad intense publicity campaign undertaken to attract a growing flow of investors --through a broad distribution of profits-- should be counted among the props of the market boom. The enthusiasm of financial columnists of various newspapers was carried through the formal channels of publication and, with rare exceptions, encouraged readers to run to the market. The main reason behind market growth --speculation in the price of assets-- was carefully couched and explained in the rosiest scenario of the nation's economy or, rather, in the context of investor confidence in the government's economic policies. It can be accepted that confidence was an essential factor in explaining the market boom,

but not general confidence as can be seen in the following figure,² nor even that of the investors who were directed to the stock market. It was only the confidence of the financial faction of the business elite, carefully rebuilt by the government after having blown it to pieces in September 1982.

Figure No. 5



The government drove the market boom, as we have seen, and not only that but maintained an almost complete deregulation of the market despite the notorious growth of the market as repository and administrator of the savings of many Mexicans. Such a deregulation, as was proved later, set off the gigantic speculative mechanism that precipitated the October crash and, also, fraud and abuse against investors in some brokerage houses. However, all of this was subordinated to the objective of mending the broken alliance at the apex of power, which was essential for maintaining the traditional hegemony of the Mexican State.

The market crash itself and its immediate result of dollarization, capital flight and devaluation, should not be considered as

² For the 1983 and 1987 polls see the Appendix.

the loss of recovered confidence, but rather as the cost of such a recovery. The profit taking that unleashed the fall would have consolidated in the end with private finance capital and would have marked a point of no return on the road to restoring its old decision making power over the Mexican financial network. Five years later, the country once again had a solid and influential financial sector in the dominant class, reconciled finally with the Mexican government.

The presidential succession

The municipal governments in state capitals won by the PAN after 1982, the federal legislative elections in 1985 that attracted scholarly attention³ and above all the 1986 elections in Chihuahua encouraged a debate about the prospects for democratization of the Mexican political system, initiated to a great extent by Enrique Krauze, that was extended throughout the entire pre-nomination period for the PRI presidential candidate. Certain prominent PRI voices were lifted to request internal democratization, such as those of ex-president of the PRI, Porfirio Muñoz Ledo; ex-governor of Michoacan and son of Lazaro Cardenas, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas; and ex-secretary general of the PRI and then-embassador to Spain, Rodolfo Gonzalez Guevara.

In August 1986 the formation of a *democratic current* was announced that demanded fundamental internal structural and procedural changes as well as a global reorientation of government policy in favor of the interests of the popular classes. However, the current was not the only source of demands for profound internal changes in the political system. Many observers and intellectuals in magazines and journals such as *Vuelta*, *Nexos* and *La Jornada* speculated about the suitability of widening the circle where the next PRI presiden-

³ Twenty researchers participated in the compilation of *Las Elecciones en Mexico*, edited by Gonzalez Casanova in 1985 with abundant use of historical material and empirical data. For another source, Cfr Basañez's electoral predictions in *Nexos* 91, July of 1985.

tial candidate was decided; a circle that was presumed to include only the president of the republic.

At the same time, it was taken as fact that the succession -- including the electoral process-- would be different from what it had been on the previous five or six occasions, given the heavy influence that the economic crisis had on the world of political relations. The possibility was not discarded of some type of opening in the system to respond to the malaise generated by the crisis. Besides, the internal dissidence of the PRI did not stop denouncing the problems that impeded a real participation of the bases in the decision-making process.

In this context, three presidential aspirants who had been covered widely by the press were brought before the Congress: Manuel Bartlett, Alfredo del Mazo and Carlos Salinas. A month later the president of the PRI in the Federal District, Salazar Toledano, said that there were four precandidates: the three previously mentioned ones plus Miguel Gonzalez Avelar, secretary of Education. The announcement made before a group of women journalists had a marked impact on public opinion. In fact it recalled the list revealed in 1974 by Rovirosa Wade, secretary of Hydraulic Resources for Echeverria.

In the following months and through the national leadership of the PRI, other names were added to Salazar Toledano's list: Sergio Garcia Ramirez, general procurator of the republic and Ramon Aguirre, head of the Department of the Federal District. These half a dozen names of aspirants occupied the columns of all of the newspapers. It was known that one of them would be the next president of Mexico, although speculation persisted about the possibility of a dark horse, as commentators and politicians talked about the possibility of a candidate different from the six aspirants that could come from the ranks of former cabinet members. Cited as such was ex-secretary of Public Finance, Jesus Silva Herzog.

The political system was receptive to demands for change in the presidential succession process. At the end of June the six distinguished *priistas* who had been commonly cited as probable candidates were trotted out by the party in front of the television cameras to discuss their views about the big national problems. The comparisons took place in July and set a precedent. For the first time in the post-Cardenas era, the aspirants dared to make known their positions before the general public without the fear of being disciplined; on the contrary their own party invited them to talk openly. This provoked an overestimation of the importance of public opinion, above all that of the middle class, which began to be reflected in several opinion polls⁴ that showed preferences for Mazo and Bartlett.

The comparison of the six aspirants generated commentaries of every type in the national press, which, despite their diversity, can be classified into three groups: those of known apologists, who tried to present the situation as irrefutable proof of the prevalence of democratic procedures in the PRI; negative commentaries that cast the comparison as a legitimate mechanism without real content; and the intermediate positions that, although noting the situation was not an indicator of effective democratization, accepted the comparisons as a healthy indication of a willingness at the top to open the system that could lead to more profound changes.

And so the awaited moment arrived, without the occurrence of any unforeseen event. In the two months that preceded the unveiling, the PRI's national leadership insisted that the dates set during its 13th National Assembly in March would be respected. On October 4, nomination day, the representatives of the three sectors of the party attended the speech of PRI president Jorge de la Vega, in which he made known the name of the pre-candidate of the PRI: Carlos Salinas. On the same morning there was a strange misunderstanding spread by prominent politicians who said erroneously that Sergio

⁴ Highlighted in particular are polls by Adip Sabag (*Excelsior*, September 18, 19 and 20, 1986, Pag. 4 and *Universal*, March 25 and June 4, 1987, Pag. 1) and those by *El Norte* (September 11, 12, and 13, 1987).

Garcia Ramirez was pre-candidate. But except for this incident that made presidential intervention in the process more apparent, the first phase of the presidential succession --to many the most difficult-- concluded according to traditional patterns.

The disappointment of some PRI sectors with the Salinas de Gortari nomination was evident. Two cases are particularly noteworthy: that of the *democratic current*, which subsequently abandoned the PRI, and that of the CTM. The first had to do with ideology and differences over economic policy; the second had more pragmatic causes. Fidel Velazquez had tried to block the candidacy of the budget secretary because it was taken as fact that the president would be inclined toward del Mazo. Thus, the PRI campaign went forward with little enthusiasm from the CTM and with a growing opposition that had emerged within the union and that finally crystallized around the presidential candidacy.

For the first time since the PRI's founding, the small subordinate parties to the government decided not to support the government's candidate and threw their support to Cuauhtemoc Cardenas. The PARM registered his presidential candidacy and was joined by the PPS and the PST, which changed its name to the Party of the Cardenist Front for National Renovation (PFCRN). A few weeks before the election, Heberto Castillo renounced his presidential candidacy in the PMS in favor of Cardenas. The left created a broad electoral front in support of the presidential candidacy of Cardenas; only the PRT remained on the outside.

The 1988 political campaigns were perhaps the most competitive and real in the last 35 years. However, the government and the PRI did not share this opinion, being accustomed to the lack of opposition and their capacity to fill the *plazas* at top. It had not occurred to anyone that the old corporatist structure could mobilize large contingents but not guarantee the content of the vote. The

first surprise came with the publication of an opinion poll⁵ that showed for April a high level of support for Cardenas in the Federal District (26 percent) and placed Salinas at less than half of the electorate (45 percent). A second poll⁶ --this time national-- gave the victory in the Federal District to Cardenas and nationwide to Salinas with barely 50 percent, such as the electoral results confirmed. A few days later the PRI itself announced the end of the "single-party era." The popular discontent produced by the crisis oddly had been channeled toward the new Cardenist option instead of the established PAN opposition. The official figures give 50, 31 and 17 percent of the vote to the PRI, Cardenistas and PAN, respectively.

The fourth crisis: the market crash

We can place the beginning of the 1987 crisis in the stock market close decreed at the request of the financial authorities on Monday, October 5. The traditional journalistic voices of finance capital --Luis E. Mercado and Jose Perez Stuart, among others-- expressed the discontent that the measure generated among non-bank financiers. On behalf of financial capital and as partial compensation for having nationalized the banking system, the federal government had thoroughly interfered in a market that in theory should have functioned only according to the law of supply and demand.

The non-bank financiers responded to the interventionist measure by spurring a drop in the stock market. The drop --that originally was intended for moderate levels-- not only would underscore the discontent of the non-bank financiers but would complete the work of purging investment portfolios, forcing the small investors to the brokerage houses. However, the market drop in Mexico was reinforced 10 days later with the crash on Wall Street and other markets in the west during the second half of October, and acquired its

5 *La Jornada*, May 23, 1988.

6 *La Jornada*, July 5, 1988.

own dynamic independent of the calculations of the financiers that precipitated a drop in the stock index to unforeseen levels.⁷

The drop in stock quotes created capital flight. An important part of the capital that had returned in the last few years left the country again on evidence that the great stage of profit taking had ended on the Mexican stock market. There are different and contradictory assessments of the amount of capital flight for the first half of October. New York experts⁸ calculated the figure at more than a billion dollars; finance executives at 80 million dollars a day for most of the month preceding the devaluation (2.4 billion dollars in total); sources close to the Bank of Mexico at 3 billion dollars.

Jose Angel Gurria, top-level official to the secretary of Public Finance, affirmed that among the factors that precipitated the exit of foreign exchange was the wave of prepayments to the exterior by indebted businesses.⁹ In reality, the prepayments can be considered a *euphemism* for planned speculation with controlled currency. It seems that such businesses acquired controlled dollars not to make pre-payments but to negotiate them in private exchange houses (tied directly to the brokerage houses) at a cost, in effect, of the reserves of the Bank of Mexico. The speculation in controlled dollars would have completed the necessary circuit for the flight of capital. The private exchange houses functioned as capital flight carriers by buying such dollars for their clients' accounts to place them in the exterior. And so, the market fell along with the resources that were drained into foreign banks.

Under these circumstances, the Bank of Mexico had no other alternative but to withdraw from the free market to safeguard, at

7 For future studies it will be important to try to establish what the impact, psychological rather than economic, of the international market signal could have been on the fall in the Mexican stock market.

8 Matt Moffett, *Excelsior*, November 26, 1987, P. 1, seccion financiera and William Cline, *UnomasUno*, November 21, 1987, P. 16.

9 *Excelsior*, November 19, 1987, P. 1.

least through this channel of speculation, its monetary reserves. A primary conclusion derived precisely from this process is that, despite the new legislation of the central bank and despite the state character of the bank, finance capital was able to find the appropriate mechanisms to reconstitute its capacity to place capital in the exterior. The State's economic rectory, which seemed to be strengthened with the bank nationalization, had shown its limits against the action of the private financiers. They were able once again to organize capital flight on a large scale and provoke another currency devaluation.

Although the central bank was able to save part of its reserves, the political, social and economic cost was great. Upon withdrawing from the free exchange market, the Bank of Mexico took another measure, criticized severely by the orthodox Director of Bancomer, Ernesto Fernandez Hurtado --raising interest rates to unprecedented levels in order to encourage internal savings. The Bank of Mexico had opposed repeatedly any type of exchange controls and had made interest rate increases its main weapon against speculation and capital flight. The increase in interest rates, nearly 20 points in only three weeks, would introduce serious disturbances in the economic strategy planned for 1988, by provoking the boom in internal public debt service and therefore the government deficit, as well as pushing a long run increase in inflation.

The devaluation of the dollar, made on November 18 with the Bank of Mexico's withdrawal from the free exchange market, provoked a wave of speculation in prices that translated into the reappearance of inflation. Despite the fact that no direct relationship exists between the type of free exchange and the goods and services produced internally, during the next four weeks a process of merchandise mark up was unleashed that in some cases generated price increases up to 50 percent. The secretary of Commerce applied economic sanctions and temporary closings of businesses that refused to respect controlled prices or else hid merchandise --the measures did not exclude large commercial businesses such as Sears and Aurrera--

that nonetheless did not work very well against the magnitude of the speculative wave. The mark up was a factor that brought the country close to hyperinflation and, above all, that exacerbated the labor malaise given the drop in real wages. It became even more urgent to contain inflation.

At the same time, the devaluation of the free parity made virtually inevitable a devaluation of the controlled parity, in order to narrow the exchange gap in favor of the first, which objectively encouraged speculation with controlled dollars --as much with dollars acquired by exporters as those supplied by the Bank of Mexico to indebted businesses for compliance with external contracts. In addition, the devaluation of the controlled parity had been demanded by exporters since before the October crisis, given that the growth in internal prices throughout much of the year had considerably exceeded the percentage of the peso's slide against the dollar and reduced the competitiveness of Mexican products in foreign markets. The devaluation of the free parity was a factor that had, since then, encouraged even more inflation.

The economic solidarity pact

The rapid growth of internal prices not only effected competitiveness of exports but public finance as well: public sector prices and tariffs outstripped for most of the year the general inflation index; a fact that at the end of 1987 was cutting into the public sector's operative balance. Despite the addition impulse toward inflation that the price and tariff adjustments would mean, they were indispensable if major imbalances were desired.

And so several factors made necessary the adoption of a radical and urgent anti-inflation program. It was necessary to respond to labor demands, to exporter demands, to the worsening of the public deficit and to the increase in internal and external debt service provoked by the devaluation of the controlled parity and the rise in internal interest rates enacted to avoid dollarization and capital

flight in a contest of growing internal inflation. The federal government responded to everything within a framework of not disturbing the financial arrangements for external debt service with the adoption and implementation of the so-called *economic solidarity pact*.

The pact was presented as the product of negotiation between the federal government and the three main sectors of the Mexican society, whose essential goal would be to abate inflation.¹⁰ This represented the formal end to the program of encouragement and growth and of any intent to recover economic growth in the short run. The goal of abating inflation was put before any other economic objective. The pact --announced the night of December 15-- stipulated the following measures: 1) an emergency salary increase of 15 percent for the minimum wage and contracted salaries. The traditional minimum wage hike in January would be 20 percent and would not apply to contract wages; 2) 85 percent increases in the prices of gasoline, natural gas, telephones and electricity with the promise of not increasing public sector prices and tariffs during January and February and tying further increases beginning in March to the predicted inflation rate for each month; 3) stable evolution of peso-dollar parity that in fact did not change in January and in February took a very moderate path, of three pesos daily, with the rationale that maintaining this rate would reduce inflationary pressures; and 4) acceleration of the commercial liberation program.

A commission was created to monitor and evaluate the pact with the participation of the secretaries of Commerce, Labor and Public Finance and representatives from the private, labor and campesino sectors and a broad public awareness campaign was initiated to persuade the general population that the program's success was indispensable to the future health of the economy. To counteract labor malaise given the evident disparity between salary increases and hikes in public sector prices and tariffs, the federal

¹⁰ The three sectors involved were business, labor and peasant as business was substituted for the popular sector of the PRI.

government announced at the end of the year a plan to index the prices of a bundle of basic goods to the minimum wage, beginning in March.

According to an opinion poll,¹¹ the public responded in a balanced way to the publicity campaigns: 26 percent of the respondents described the pact as good or very good, 21 percent as bad or very bad, 46 percent as fair and 7 percent had no opinion. However, the perception of individuals concerning the behavior of prices and their future expectations were not very encouraging. Forty-nine percent said that they felt as though March prices were higher than February prices, while only 18 percent said that they seemed lower. In a similar way, 43 percent said that the rise in April prices would be greater than in March and only 20 percent said that it would be less. It is important however to remember that public perception about prices is mainly tied to consumption goods --food and clothing-- while a much broader array of goods and services is included in the inflation indicators.

On the other hand, public opinion perceived the beneficiaries of the pact as follows: the government (46 percent), everyone (20 percent), workers (11 percent), no one (6 percent), business (6 percent), the United States (5 percent) and who knows (6 percent); the losers were perceived as follows: workers (30 percent), everyone (23 percent), business (14 percent), no one (13 percent), the government (6 percent), the United States (6 percent) and who knows (8 percent). It can be observed that nearly half of the population saw the government as the main beneficiary, while a similar number saw the main losers as workers and everyone. In other words, the technical complexity of the pact made it difficult for the public to understand, but the perception of its consequences, at least immediate, was very polarized.

¹¹ Perfil de La Jornada, May 31, 1988, P. V.

The real economy

Taking into consideration that the social function of the economy is to satisfy the general population's need for goods and services and not only that of the financial sector, the most accurate form --though not the simplest-- of measuring the economy's performance is through identifying the means of satisfying this need: income distribution. Another less exact but more practical form is measuring the production of the domestic economy: growth in gross domestic product (GDP).

Regarding domestic production we find that in 1982 GDP dropped 0.6 percent. For 1983 the drop was 4.6 percent, almost two points more than predicted by the *National Plan of Development*, which forecast a decline of between two and four points for the year. In 1984 GDP experienced a favorable rise, growing 3.57 points; the recovery continued into 1985 --more precisely, in the first semester-- and by the end of the year GDP had grown 2.6 percent.

The imbalances that this moderate growth created in the balance of payments and public finances, led economic authorities to promote a new deceleration which produced a 3.99 percent drop of GDP in 1986 in real terms. Throughout most of 1986 the effects of the oil shock were exacerbated, reducing all of the macroeconomic aggregates.¹² For 1987 GDP recovered lightly with 1.4 percent growth.

From 1982 to 1987, GDP growth was reduced to an annual rate of 0.9 percent, which meant that its 1987 level was 2.8 percent less than its 1982 level in real terms. This path resulted from two important drops in 1983 and 1986. Increases were registered in the other years, although of minor proportion.

The analysis of Mexico's commercial relations with the rest of the world from 1982 to 1987 shows an average annual growth of 19.6

12 SHCP: 1987, P. 72; Bank of Mexico: 1985, P. 65; 1986, P. 22.

percent in non-oil exports --with the notable 41.1 percent increase in the last year being the salient figure-- among the most important aspects. Non-oil exports doubled during these years, going from 4.8 billion dollars in 1982 to 9.7 billion in 1986.¹³

The value of oil exports between 1982 and 1986 dropped 10.2 billion dollars, going from almost 16.5 billion dollars in the first year to only 6.3 billion in the second, which was the last year that registered a major drop (8.5 billion dollars).¹⁴ The problems of the international hydrocarbon market implied a reduction in the implicit price of Mexican crude oil that went from 29.24 dollars a barrel in 1982 to 24.02 in 1985 and 11.84 dollars a barrel in 1986.

From 1983 to 1986 the value of merchandise imports (11.2 billion dollar annual average) was substantially less than that during the 1980 to 1982 period (19.1 billion dollars). This reduction stemmed from, among other causes, the drop in the nation's economic activity, as well as the exchange policy that raised the price of foreign products and spurred import substitution.

Merchandise imports have faithfully reflected the evolution of GDP, registering equally with GDP reductions in 1983 and 1986 and increases in 1984 and 1985. This behavior was observed in all imports and in their three main aggregates: consumer goods, intermediate goods and capital goods. However, during the period the accumulated reductions were very different: -44.1 percent, -8.2 percent and -36.6 percent respectively for each of the three types of goods.

As a result, the commercial balance, traditionally in deficit up to 1981, was in surplus from 1983 to 1986, however, the reduction in oil exports produced a gradual reduction in the positive balance for the remaining years of the period, going from 13.8 billion dollars in 1983 to 4.6 billion in 1986.¹⁵

13 SHCP: 1985, P. 75. SHCP: 1987, PP. 26 and 28.

14 Ibid, PP. 75, 26 and 28.

15 SHCP: 1987, P. 73.

The real rate of growth of public investment between 1978 and 1981 was 20 percent annually, a figure that contrasts with the negative average registered between 1982 and 1985 of -10.95 percent. Private investment registered negative averages in 1982 and 1983; 8.8 percent real growth in 1984 that rose a little more than 4 point in 1985, reaching 13.1 growth. And so, the 1985 recovery stemmed from greater private investment, considering that the real volume of public investment remained practically unchanged.

Regarding sectorial results of production, it can be said that 1982 to 1986 severely effected all types of productive activities with the exception of some farming, forest and fishing activities. Equally affected were commerce and services with the notable exception of financial services. The overall result of these effects was a stagnation in the evolution of the productive structure that in previous decades sought changes in the secondary sector as the basic motor of the economy, which at the time spurred growth in the tertiary sector. This dynamic was lost from 1982 to 1986, giving rise to irregular movements. However, the long-run tendency measured in terms of the population employed in the three sectors is not as impressive as the graph indicates, because industry has been unable to absorb more than a fifth of the economically active population, while those leaving the agricultural sector have moved to the service sector.¹⁶


Industrial GDP dropped to an annual average rate of 1.2 percent between 1982 and 1986. Every year it behaved much like the national economy in its entirety: abrupt drop in 1983 (-8.1 percent); important recovery between 1984 and 1985 (4.4 percent and 4.8 percent respectively) and strong drop in 1986 (-5.5 percent). The last year not only counteracted the 1984 and 1985 advances but contracted industrial GDP to a level less than the 5 percent of 1982.¹⁷

16 Nafinsa: 1981, P. 14 and Nafinsa: 1985, P. 20.

17 Ibid, PP. 165 and 3.

In terms of its components, this behavior was determined by manufacturing industrial sector that began at the same level with commerce, almost one-fourth of GDP, and reduced its share to an average annual rate of 0.7 percent during the period. And so in 1983, GDP for this sector dropped 7.3 percent in 1982; grew 4.8 and 5.8 percent respectively in 1984 and 1985; and contracted again by 5.6 percent in 1986. With this last drop, manufacturing GDP ended up 2.9 percent below its 1982 level. This behavior was practically general for all manufacturing branches, although the rates varied reflecting important differences among them.¹⁸

Figure No. 6




In cumulative terms, between 1982 and 1986 only three industrial branches showed positive results: food; paper products; and chemicals and oil derivatives, which registered higher GDP levels in 1986 than in 1982. The rest of the branches greatly resented the productive contraction of 1986, which reversed the recovery observed in 1984 and 1985. Service sector GDP dropped to an annual average much like the rest of the economy (0.5 percent). Notwithstanding the dynamism registered in 1984 and 1985, GDP of this sector did not re-

¹⁸ Inegi-SPP: 1987a, P. 170; Inegi-SPP: 1987b, P. 4.

cover its 1982 level and the fall of 1986 placed service sector GDP 3.1 percent below this level.¹⁹

Figure No. 7



Distribution of Government Revenue
(Thousands of millions of current pesos)

	Federal		States		Mpios*		Total**	
	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%
1970	41.4	77.1	10.0	18.7	2.3	4.27	53.7	100
1971	44.7	76.7	10.9	18.8	2.6	4.49	58.2	100
1972	53.3	76.7	13.4	19.3	2.8	3.99	69.6	100
1973	70.1	75.9	18.8	20.3	3.5	3.75	92.4	100
1974	97.0	76.8	24.7	19.6	4.6	3.68	126.3	100
1975	133.4	78.0	31.7	18.5	5.9	3.46	170.9	100
1976	163.3	79.1	35.7	17.3	7.5	3.64	206.5	100
1977	232.2	79.3	50.7	17.3	9.7	3.33	292.7	100
1978	309.2	78.9	69.9	17.8	12.7	3.25	391.8	100
1979	418.7	77.9	100.8	18.7	18.1	3.37	537.7	100
1980	683.1	77.5	170.7	19.4	27.5	3.12	881.4	100
1981	930.6	75.7	258.0	21.0	41.4	3.37	1,230.0	100
1982	1,515.4	77.9	366.9	18.9	62.0	3.19	1,944.4	100
1983	3,396.6	80.2	717.9	17.0	120.7	2.85	4,235.2	100
1984	5,089.0	76.3	1,320.2	19.8	262.6	3.94	6,671.8	100
1985	8,218.4	77.1	2,021.2	19.0	423.3	3.97	10,662.9	100


* The figures for municipal revenues from 1970 to 1975 for INEGI in 1982, were corrected one year due to a typographical error.

** The sum of revenues from 1970 to 1975 does not match the INEGI series because INEGI discounts federal funds (50% of local revenues) from the total.

19 Inegi-SPP: 1987a, P. 165; Inegi-SPP: 1987b, P. 3.

The unequal behavior pattern shows, on the other hand, a constant, sustained decline in the distribution between federal, state and municipal levels as well as between distinct strata of society that would seem to follow more profound causes and reasons than the efforts and intentions of an administration. In the 15 years from 1970 to 1985, the federation absorbed four-fifths of the national government's income, leaving only 20 percent to the states where only half went to their own income and the other half to federal projects. All of the country's municipalities, together, have not received more than 4 percent, which explains their dependence on the governors who depend in turn on the federation, as the graph of the distribution of government income shows.

Figure No. 8



Year	20% poorest	20% richest	Index
1950	6.1	59.8	09.8
1958	5.0	62.9	12.5
1963	4.2	62.6	15.0
1968	3.4	58.2	17.1
1975	2.0	60.0	30.0
1977	2.9	54.5	18.8
1981	2.0	62.7	31.4
1987	2.4	65.5	27.3

Regarding income distribution, the Gini coefficient for 1950 to 1977 is 0.50 and appears to have remained basically constant throughout the period, which is not certain²⁰ and become more evident taking into consideration the distinct strata of the population. On the contrary, a tendency to deteriorate is observed in the graph of the inequality index. The top line indicates the income of the upper 20 percent of the population, which maintains itself at 60 percent of the total; the bottom line shows the income of the poorest 20 percent of the population and drops from 6 percent in 1950 to 2 percent in 1987. The bars indicate how much richer the upper strata is than the lower: 10 times in 1950 and almost 30 times in 1987.²¹

Finally, by 1985 the average real salary had been dropping 9.5 percent a year. In the last five years, the increases in the legal minimum wage were lower than the inflation rate: while the official inflation rate reached 98.9 percent in 1982, the minimum wage was allowed to rise only 73.8 percent. In 1983, both figures were 80.8 and 44.22 percent respectively; in 1984 inflation reached 59.2 percent, while the minimum wage rose 56.6 percent; in 1985 inflation was 63.7 percent and the minimum wage grew 54.05 percent. For 1986 inflation hit 105.7 percent and the minimum wage grew 102.5 percent.²²

20 Aspe: 1984, P. 40.

21 Fuentes:

1950: VII Censo General de Poblacion, Dir. Gral. de Estad. Sria. Ind. y Com.

1958: Encuesta sobre Ingresos y Egresos, Dept. de Muestro, Sria. Ind. y Com.

1963: Encuesta sobre Ingresos y Egresos, Banco de Mexico, S.A.

1968: Encuesta de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares, Banco de Mexico, S.A.

1975: Encuesta de Ingresos y Gastos Familiares, Cenet, Styts.

1977: Enc Nal de Ingr y Gastos de los Hogares, Dir. Gral, de Estadistica.

1981: I Encuesta Nacional sobre los Valores de los Mexicanos, Banamex.

1987: II Encuesta Nacional sobre Los Valores de los Mexicanos, Banamex.

22 Nacional Financiera: 1985, PP. 52 and 301; Banco de Mexico 1986, P. 109.

PART TWO: THE FIGURES

In the introduction it was mentioned that the purpose of this second part consists in establishing an empirical profile for the historical process described in the first four chapters, in such a way that common factors can be identified to measure the depth, longevity and severity of the analyzed crises as well as to compare their similarities and differences. The social changes seem to coincide more with economic than political changes, the latter seeming secondary. And so, the popularity that the system enjoyed in 1982 and that will be seen more clearly later on when public opinion is analyzed does not seem to stem as much from political factors themselves as from the incremental improvements in day-to-day living standards during the long period from 1940 to 1982. As a result, the loss of popularity after 1982 is not only explained in the personality of de la Madrid but rather in the economic hard times of the period. So many years of growth had given the country much room to maneuver and had allowed for political stability despite the severity and depth of the crises.

Several statistical series from 1940 to 1987 are presented as a way to measure the political, economic and social behavior of the country before and after 1968, which is taken as the inflection point of the period of crisis, with the aim of clarifying the relationship between the qualitative historical facts and the quantitative data. The analysis of the statistical data available in the country shows the difficulties and inconsistencies inherent in working with significant and useful long-run series. In a good number of cases, Mexican statistics should be considered as *relative truths* -- the product of an agreement among specialists and not as a reflection of reality. Notwithstanding all of their limitations and despite the fact that they come from official sources, the data presented here can help place the historical events in a less speculative context. How severe was each of the four crises? What limits did they push? How are they expressed in quantitative terms? What long-term effects can they expose? How are they affected by politi-

cal, economic and social problems? Are there strong relationships among them, weak and indirect ones or practically none? These are some of the questions that the following chapters attempt to address.

To study social change several important aspects are considered: 1) the confidence that the government generated in society; and 2) the government's policy orientation; 3) demographic behavior; 4) the level at which the population's basic needs were satisfied; and 5) the degree of government attention to social problems. **The confidence that the government generated in society** attempts to identify the signals that the government was sending and the form in which the society perceived them through indicators of defense spending, annual creation of new businesses and capital flight. The balance of **government orientation** between promotion of economic growth and attention to social needs is sought through the historical behavior of variations in per-capita federal budget outlays and government social spending. The study of **demographic behavior** tries to identify population pressures on the economy and government through data concerning the rate of population growth, average family size, proportion of rural-urban populations and the annual net balance of migration and immigration. **The level of basic needs** acquired by the population attempts to identify the pressure for basic necessities put on the government or the economy and is explored through indicators of nutrition, education, health and transportation. Finally, **the level of government attention to social problems**, which can indicate the level of government perception of the problems of individuals and its awareness of population tensions, is studied in data about illiteracy, social security and university students.

Data concerning production, finance and employment are used to survey economic behavior. Regarding **production**, statistics about economic growth, gross domestic product, trade and payment balances, exports and finance are explored. **Finances** are analyzed through statistics about inflation, internal savings, public investment,

foreign investment, payments to the exterior, fiscal revenue and the share of the federal budget in GDP. Finally the study of **employment** includes statistics on salaries, economically active population, and the share of the economically active population employed in industry and the service sector.

To explore political behavior several aspects that have received scholarly attention are reviewed: 1) plurality in the political elite; 2) the electoral behavior of the society; 3) the level of conflict within the government. The study of **plurality in the political elite** attempts to establish the ties between the base of the social pyramid and the elite, starting from the fact that the Mexican political system beginning with the revolution of 1917 was an important social mobilizer for the popular sectors and received from them important doses of cohesion and legitimacy. Eight indicators of elite characteristics are taken: 1) popular origin; 2) family ties; 3) studies in private schools; 4) university studies; 5) studies abroad; 6) party membership; 7) electoral experience; and 8) representation of popular, labor or peasant sectors. **The electoral behavior of the society** attempts to measure the degree of participation in public processes through percentage of electoral abstention, votes for the opposition in general and for the left in particular, and the yearly formation of new national parties. **Conflict within the government** is identified through the impeachment of state governors.

5. THE SOCIETY

To explore social behavior several important aspects are covered: 1) confidence generated by the government in society; 2) government policy orientation; 3) demographic behavior; 4) level of basic needs satisfied within the population; and 5) the amount of government attention to social problems. The behavior of each selected social indicator is shown graphically.

Confidence

The analysis of confidence focuses on reactions of intranquillity, reproval, force and conflict within the public sector as well as between the public sector and the private or social sectors. Capital flight and increases in defense spending are elements that reflect decline because they express ruptures and threats, while the creation of new businesses acts in an opposite sense because it assumes a perception of political stability and tranquility.

Confidence oscillates constantly although with an upward trend between 1940 and 1968. In 1969, a phase of contrast with previous years begins, which, seen together, conform to a stage of stagnation. A prolonged drop begins in 1969 that ends in 1976 with an ephemeral peak in 1972. Confidence begins to recover in 1977, but it was a short improvement as in 1980 it drops off again only to recover in 1983.

This description agrees to a great extent with other well-known interpretations of the evolution of public confidence: the drop in 1969 is normally explained by the disturbance provoked by the 1968 student movement and its infamous outcome along with the uncertainty generated by the presidential succession. The 1972 recovery is interpreted as a result of the economic upturn that followed the *atonía* of the previous year, and the 1973 regress is explained as a result of the assassination of Eugenio Garza Sada and the beginning of conflict between Luis Echeverría and the Monterrey Group. The re-


covery of 1977 is attributed to Lopez Portillo's speech upon taking office and the implementation of an IMF adjustment program. The new drop in 1981-1982 is interpreted as a result of the international oil market decline, the subsequent complication of public finances and, finally, the bank nationalization. The recovery of confidence in 1983 is associated with the arrival of a government committed to eradicating *populism* and to complying with an IMF adjustment program in public finance.

All of this makes sense with the rest of the variables considered here. The fall of 1969 is associated with the return of capital flight that year, which flared up again in 1973 and 1976 and reached its highest levels in history in 1981 and 1982. The decline of the first half of the 1970s was exacerbated by the increasing number of state governments abolished through impeachment, a sign of political instability. The fall that began in 1980 is explained as well by a decreasing number of new business starts per-capita, a process that became acute in 1982 and lasted until 1987 at the rate of the general economic decline. If the evolution of confidence has not been worse in the last 20 years, it is due to the behavior of military spending as a percentage of the total budget, which has been reduced to minimum levels and in fact continued declining in the last year considered in this study.

1. Creation of new businesses' firms

As an indicator of private sector confidence, the creation of new businesses per 1,000 inhabitants varied between a minimum of 97 in 1949 and a maximum of 250 in 1980. The figure is presented proportionally to the population to give it comparative significance, because in absolute terms the 2,950 businesses created in 1943 seem very small compared with the 15,000 established in 1984, when in proportional terms the magnitudes are similar. A period of relative stability in the curve is observed until 1963, when a phase of con-

tinual ascent begins that is temporarily interrupted between 1975 and 1977 and in 1980.¹




40	119.1	50	111.3	60	137.8	70	160.8	80	249.7
41	119.3	51	108.0	61	127.5	71	174.2	81	231.7
42	130.1	52	112.0	62	109.8	72	162.8	82	193.9
43	138.4	53	105.2	63	100.4	73	181.3	83	183.9
44	130.1	54	101.7	64	116.8	74	191.5	84	194.4
45	120.4	55	115.3	65	138.8	75	180.4	85	152.4
46	134.0	56	123.2	66	143.2	76	168.4		
47	122.4	57	128.0	67	145.7	77	150.3		
48	108.5	58	119.6	68	148.6	78	171.2		
49	97.2	59	126.6	69	158.8	79	196.5		

2. Capital flight

Capital flight is represented here with the change in the number of "errors and omissions" in the balance of payments. To better appreciate the real impact of capital flight it is expressed as a percentage of GDP. The overall curve shows relatively stable behavior until 1976, when capital flight as a percentage of GDP jumped to almost 3 percent. From then on its behavior is erratic,

¹ The series of new businesses was obtained from the *Anuarios Estadísticos* (AE 1942 P. 1264, AE 1943-45 P. 790, AE 1946-50 P. 572, AE 1982 P. 475, AE 1985 P. 615-616 and AE 1986 P. 662) and from *La Economía Mexicana en Cifras* (Nafinsa 1981 P. 302-303) and is divided among the series corrected for population in *Estadísticas Históricas de México* (INEGI 1986, P. 311).

rising to two maximum values during the period: 3.5 percent in 1981 and 5 percent in 1982. In the last few years it has been relatively stable.²




40	0.00	50	-1.23	60	-1.41	70	-1.13	80	1.96
41	-1.05	51	-1.75	61	0.65	71	-0.48	81	3.49
42	-0.91	52	0.00	62	0.60	72	-1.77	82	5.10
43	-1.12	53	-0.29	63	0.06	73	0.72	83	0.69
44	0.52	54	1.38	64	0.41	74	0.78	84	0.52
45	-1.41	55	-0.69	65	-0.84	75	0.97	85	0.92
46	-0.52	56	-0.36	66	-0.38	76	2.74	86	-0.34
47	0.31	57	-0.95	67	-0.77	77	0.02	87	-0.59
48	0.17	58	0.00	68	-1.04	78	0.13		
49	1.10	59	-0.53	69	0.53	79	-0.51		

3. Defense spending

The defense budget from 1940 to 1987 varied from 16.5 to 0.6 percent of the federal budget, showing an invariable downward trend and an annual average of 4.8 percent during the period. We find three well-differentiated cycles: one of elevated spending from 1940

² The line of errors and omissions in the balance of payments from 1940 to 1969 defined capital in the short run. However, the series was eliminated from 1970 to 1987, which means the two periods are not strictly comparable. Here it was converted from pesos to the value of average parity and divided by current GDP.

to 1954; one of moderate spending from 1955 to 1964 and one of low spending after 1965.³



40	16.3	50	7.4	60	3.4	70	1.5	80	0.9
41	16.1	51	6.0	61	3.8	71	1.4	81	1.1
42	15.0	52	5.2	62	4.2	72	1.4	82	1.0
43	14.2	53	6.4	63	4.4	73	1.2	83	0.5
44	11.4	54	5.1	64	3.7	74	1.2	84	0.8
45	11.9	55	4.9	65	1.7	75	1.1	85	1.1
46	11.3	56	4.7	66	1.8	76	1.4	86	1.0
47	10.5	57	4.2	67	1.5	77	1.2	87	0.6
48	8.3	58	4.4	68	1.7	78	1.1		
49	6.6	59	4.5	69	1.7	79	1.1		

Government orientation

The orientation of the government's social policies seeks to measure the priority the government assigned to the satisfaction of basic needs by the population and therefore is indicated by the level of social spending and where public money is spent in the social pyramid. It is assumed that increases in per-capita federal spending and the budget share of social spending can be politically advantageous, although, on the other hand, can do economic damage.

³ Nafinsa 1981 P. 313-317, IV Informe de Gobierno, Anexo Estadístico (IGAE 1986) P. 95-96, Diario Oficial de la Federación (DOF), December 31, 1986. Cfr ONU 1983, CELEE 1986 and ONU 1986.


The government policy orientation toward social problems shows an initial phase of relative decline that encompasses the sexenios of Avila Camacho and Aleman Valdes. During the Ruiz Cortines government the decline ends but without a significant improvement. Improvement does not come until 1959, then accelerates up to 1976 when it momentarily stops and recommences in 1980 and reaches its highest level in 1982. The following year a new phase of pronounced decline begins and persists until 1986.

The decline that is observed in the first 12 years of the period considered here is explained by the contraction of social spending as a percentage of the budget during the Avila Camacho and Aleman Valdes sexenios. The year 1952 is precisely the lowest point on the curve of social spending. The recovery begins in the first year of the Ruiz Cortines government and continues until 1963, only to fall in 1964 and remain stagnant during the Diaz Ordaz administration. During the Echeverria sexenio social spending reaches its historic high --in 1972-- then drops slowly and recovers by 1976. Beginning with 1977, social spending drops almost vertically, falling to 1969 levels by 1987.

The evolution of social spending alone explains a good part of the behavior of what falls under the heading of government policy orientation, although another factor considered here --per-capita budget spending-- at times counteracts the variation of the first, as happened in the Lopez Portillo sexenio. Although social spending dropped in relative terms during these years, it rose in absolute terms because budget outlays reached their historic highs up to that point. The highest value of per-capita spending is reached in 1982, only to fall the next year. It was thanks to the real budget increases from 1976 to 1982 that the path of government attention to social problems continued rising until 1982. In the last years of decline in social spending and the budget, nothing has kept government policy orientation from dropping to historic lows.

4. Per-capita federal budget outlays

Between 1940 and 1987, per-capita federal spending varied between a low of 0.27 and a high of 8 thousands of pesos, showing an overall tendency to rise and an average annual growth of 2.04 percent. We can observe three big cycles: one low and stable from 1940 to 1964; one high and growing from 1965 to 1982; one high and declining from 1983 to the present.⁴




40	0.27	50	0.37	60	0.77	70	2.14	80	6.29
41	0.28	51	0.41	61	0.73	71	2.18	81	6.55
42	0.31	52	0.51	62	0.68	72	2.46	82	8.02
43	0.33	53	0.43	63	0.64	73	2.92	83	5.97
44	0.32	54	0.54	64	0.82	74	3.09	84	5.49
45	0.32	55	0.52	65	1.75	75	3.77	85	5.38
46	0.27	56	0.55	66	1.68	76	4.11	86	3.84
47	0.30	57	0.55	67	1.90	77	4.35	87	4.50
48	0.37	58	0.59	68	1.89	78	4.61		
49	0.46	59	0.58	69	2.08	79	5.13		

5. Government social spending

The share of social spending in federal outlays from 1940 to 1987 has varied between 8 and 25 percent, with an annual average of

⁴ Nafinsa 1981 P. 313-317, IGAE 1986 P. 95 and DOF December 31, 1985 and December 31, 1986.

16 percent. We can see in the overall path three big cycles: one low from 1940 to 1952; one growing from 1953 to 1977; one declining from 1978 to 1987, which registered the lowest value for the entire period.⁵



40	18.2	50	13.0	60	13.4	70	22.5	80	14.8
41	18.3	51	11.1	61	14.8	71	23.9	81	14.6
42	17.1	52	9.8	62	16.6	72	25.3	82	11.5
43	15.0	53	12.6	63	17.7	73	22.5	83	12.0
44	14.2	54	11.6	64	16.6	74	22.8	84	12.8
45	16.1	55	11.2	65	13.8	75	21.1	85	10.8
46	15.0	56	12.0	66	18.3	76	23.7	86	12.4
47	15.0	57	12.7	67	15.9	77	22.4	87	8.1
48	12.6	58	13.1	68	17.4	78	19.4		
49	11.0	59	14.3	69	17.1	79	18.0		

Demography

In this section an attempt is made to measure population pressures on the economy and public policy through statistics on population growth, average family size, the rural-urban population mix and the annual net balance of migration and immigration.


⁵ Nafinsa 1981 P. 313-317, IGAE 1986, P. 98 and Dof December 31, 1985 and December 31, 1896.

Two cycles are observed in the demographic figures: one from 1940 to 1970 characterized by a tendency to worsen constantly, and another from 1970 to the present with a constant tendency to improve. Beginning with its best performance in the first year of the period considered here (1940), the demographic path begins a constant decline up to 1970, when it reaches its worst point. Beginning in this year, a gradual recovery begins but still remains far from the zenith in 1940. This evolution is explained by three decisive factors: the increase in the rate of demographic growth (that reached its height toward the end of the 1970s), the growth of the average family size and the positive growth in the migration-immigration balance. Together, these three factors generate undeniable demographic pressure that only begins to ebb beginning in 1971, thanks to new demographic control policies.

6. Demographic growth

Demographic growth from 1940 to 1987 has fluctuated between a rate of 3.83 and 1.73 percent, with an annual average of 3.03 percent. Two cycles are distinguished: one of accelerated growth from 1940 to 1968, and another of continual decline from 1968 to 1987. It is assumed that a high rate of demographic growth pressures the economic, political and cultural systems by quantitatively increasing the amount of demands on the systems.⁶

⁶ This is a fundamental series because population size affects many other statistics. However, no single source exists that provides annual statistics since 1940. Further, the calculations by Inegi, Conapo, Banamex and Nafinsa are all inconsistent with each other. To arrive at these figures, the annual rates of population variation are calculated beginning from the most complete series, *Estadísticas Históricas de México*, Inegi 1986, P. 311-312, but correcting the values for the years 1961 to 1971 that show an abrupt discontinuity between 1970 and 1971 (which becomes obvious by taking the second derivative) and the projections of Nafinsa 1986 P. 21. Finally, a smoothing function is applied for 10 periods. For other examples, Cfr Hernandez Millan 1974, Alba 1986 and Martinez 1987.




1940	1.73	1950	2.30	1960	3.05	1970	3.29	1980	2.73
1941	1.78	1951	2.37	1961	3.10	1971	3.27	1981	2.62
1942	1.83	1952	2.45	1962	3.15	1972	3.21	1982	2.55
1943	1.88	1953	2.53	1963	3.18	1973	3.18	1983	2.47
1944	1.94	1954	2.61	1964	3.21	1974	3.14	1984	2.39
1945	1.99	1955	2.68	1965	3.24	1975	3.09	1985	2.32
1946	2.04	1956	2.76	1966	3.26	1976	3.03	1986	2.25
1947	2.09	1957	2.84	1967	3.27	1977	2.97	1987	2.19
1948	2.14	1958	2.92	1968	3.28	1978	2.90		
1949	2.19	1959	2.99	1969	3.29	1979	2.83		

7. Average family size

Average family size has fluctuated between 4.12 and 4.98 members from 1940 to 1987, with an annual average of 4.55. Two trends, closely tied to the rate of demographic growth, are observed: one of accelerated growth from 1940 to 1960 and another of continual decline beginning in 1961. Greater family size means greater demand for basic necessities, contributing as well to more pressure on the economy and public policy.⁷

⁷ Coplamar 1982, Tomo 3, P. 34, X Censo de Poblacion y extrapolacion a 1987. For other examples, Cfr Valdes 1980, Leñero 1983, Juarez 1983 and Lopez 1987.




40	4.09	50	4.32	60	5.15	70	4.91	80	4.71
41	4.11	51	4.40	61	5.13	71	4.89	81	4.69
42	4.14	52	4.49	62	5.10	72	4.87	82	4.67
43	4.16	53	4.57	63	5.08	73	4.85	83	4.65
44	4.18	54	4.65	64	5.05	74	4.83	84	4.63
45	4.21	55	4.74	65	5.03	75	4.81	85	4.61
46	4.23	56	4.82	66	5.01	76	4.79	86	4.59
47	4.25	57	4.90	67	4.98	77	4.77	87	4.57
48	4.27	58	4.98	68	4.96	78	4.75		
49	4.30	59	5.07	69	4.93	79	4.73		

8. Migration balance

From 1940 to 1987 the balance of migration as a percentage of the total population has varied between 0.05 and 1.63 points. Three phases are distinguished throughout the period: one of relative stability and low values from 1940 to 1961; one of accelerated growth from 1962 to 1973; one of elevated levels but with notable oscillations from 1974 to the present. The peak year is 1981.

The migratory balance has been positive, which means that Mexico is a net receiver of immigrants presumably from Central America, a situation that has been insufficiently attended. Another possibility is that the official figures are totally unreliable, above all because of undocumented migration and immigration. It should be understood that increases in this variable DE SER TAL,

augment natural population growth which places even greater demands on the volume of basic necessities and the provision of goods and services.⁸




40	0.08	50	0.18	60	0.23	70	1.11	80	1.50
41	0.05	51	0.17	61	0.29	71	1.20	81	1.63
42	0.05	52	0.17	62	0.35	72	1.34	82	1.57
43	0.07	53	0.16	63	0.47	73	1.54	83	1.38
44	0.05	54	0.23	64	0.54	74	1.21	84	1.20
45	0.07	55	0.22	65	0.56	75	1.19	85	1.45
46	0.07	56	0.21	66	0.64	76	1.21	86	1.48
47	0.06	57	0.26	67	0.68	77	1.10	87	1.52
48	0.09	58	0.25	68	0.90	78	1.38		
49	0.13	59	0.24	69	0.91	79	1.27		

9. Rural population

The rural population --those who live in locations with fewer than 2,500 persons-- shows a downward trend from 78.1 percent in 1940 to 32.5 in 1987, with an average of 59.8 percent. A very clear constant decline is observed throughout, corresponding to the country's urbanization process. It is assumed that reductions in

⁸ This series refers to the net balance of entries and exits of residents to and from Mexico, and comes from series corrected for population with an extrapolation for 1986 and 1987: AE 1946-50 P. 125, AE 1960-61 P. 103, AE 1970-71 P. 143, AE 1980 P. 69 and AE 1986 P. 305. For other examples, Cfr Brambila 1982, Diez Cañedo 1984, Medina 1986, but above all the studies of the Colegio de la Frontera Norte in Tijuana, Baja California.

rural population facilitate the provision of goods and services and the integration of the national population.⁹



40	78.13	50	71.10	60	60.70	70	51.02	80	39.67
41	77.52	51	70.06	61	59.73	71	49.78	81	38.63
42	76.88	52	69.02	62	58.75	72	48.57	82	37.59
43	76.21	53	67.98	63	57.78	73	47.38	83	36.57
44	75.53	54	66.94	64	56.81	74	46.22	84	35.56
45	74.83	55	65.90	65	55.85	75	45.08	85	34.56
46	74.11	56	64.86	66	54.88	76	43.96	86	33.55
47	73.38	57	63.82	67	53.91	77	42.86	87	32.54
48	72.63	58	62.78	68	52.95	78	41.78		
49	71.87	59	61.74	69	51.99	79	40.72		

The level of satisfaction of basic necessities within reach of the population tries to identify the degree of tension that the demand for basic necessities puts on the economy or public policy and is explored through indicators of nutrition, education, health and transportation.

This variable has maintained an upward trend from 1940 to the present, owing to a constant improvement in minimum welfare (health, education and nutrition) that continues, with some ups and downs, to the present. However, a phase of decline is observed that began in


⁹ Nafinsa 1981, PP. 4 and 5, with extrapolations for 1981-1987. For other examples, Cfr Unikel 1973.

1966 and lasted 10 years. Such a decline is explained by three main factors: 1) the beginning, in 1966, from what can be called the agriculture crisis: a slow reduction in the per-capita production of basic grains stemming from the reorientation of public spending toward investment in industry and away from the countryside. The decline in production of basic grains would have cut negatively both in the external sector of the economy and in nutrition indicators; 2) the relative drop in education: the average number of students per teacher grew perceptively in 1970 and once again in 1976; and 3) the relative drop in health conditions, illustrated by the growth in the infant mortality rate in 1969 and again in 1976. The two last factors stem from demographic pressures that were never again so strong. In 1977, a notable recovery in welfare began which brought the path to its highest point in 1981. In 1982 another decline was registered that began to be reversed the following year, although not to 1981 levels.

10. Education

The number of students per teacher is taken as an indicator of the level of attention to education, although the statistic has only existed since 1950. The values have varied between a low of 25.6 and a high of 35.8, with an average of 32.6 for the period. Two cycles are distinguished: one high, from 1950 to 1975 and another low, from 1976 to the present. The greatest numbers of students per teacher are registered for the sexenios of Avila Camacho and Diaz Ordaz and the lowest numbers during the Lopez Portillo and de la Madrid sexenios. The decline after 1976 can be related to the demographic crest stemming from the children born at the end of the 1960s. For the purposes of this study, it is assumed that a greater number of students per teacher implies a lower level of attention to education.¹⁰

¹⁰ AE 1982, P. 225, AE 1986 P. 312 and extrapolations for 1986-1987. For other examples, Cfr Fuentes Molinar 1983.




50	35.12	60	33.66	70	34.80	80	29.58
51	35.43	61	33.42	71	34.21	81	27.69
52	34.01	62	35.68	72	33.34	82	27.02
53	35.44	63	35.81	73	32.72	83	26.60
54	31.41	64	35.67	74	32.73	84	27.22
55	32.64	65	35.14	75	31.55	85	25.56
56	32.23	66	34.90	76	33.08	86	25.56
57	32.91	67	34.37	77	30.16	87	25.56
58	32.17	68	34.00	78	29.99		
59	33.56	69	33.49	79	30.17		

11. Health

Infant mortality is used as an indicator of attention to public health. From 1940 to 1987, the figure has varied between 126 and 29 deaths of children younger than 1 year for every 1,000 live births. A constant downward trend is observed, with a slight increase from 1963-1969 probably because of demographic pressures that reached their highest level during the period; similarly, the subsequent demographic deceleration contributes to the improvement in the performance of this indicator. It is assumed that a higher infant mortality rate implies a lower level of government attention to public health.¹¹

¹¹ The data up to 1975 are for every five years, with the annual figures being interpolated; no information was obtained after 1984. Inegi 1986 P. 151, IGAE 1986 P. 316, and IGAE 1988 P. 183. For other examples, Cfr Aguirre 1980, Mina 1984 and Jimenez 1985.




40	125.70	50	96.20	60	74.20	70	63.75	80	37.24
41	122.14	51	93.62	61	71.50	71	60.80	81	35.15
42	118.58	52	91.04	62	68.80	72	57.85	82	33.03
43	115.02	53	88.46	63	66.10	73	54.90	83	30.10
44	111.46	54	85.88	64	63.40	74	51.95	84	29.16
45	107.90	55	83.30	65	60.70	75	49.00	85	28.86
46	105.56	56	81.48	66	62.20	76	49.69	86	27.79
47	103.22	57	79.66	67	63.70	77	46.48	87	26.70
48	100.88	58	77.84	68	65.20	78	39.56		
49	98.54	59	76.02	69	66.70	79	36.88		

12. Transportation

Annual per-capita consumption of gasoline is taken as an indicator for government attention to transportation, which from 1940 to 1987 shows an upward trend, varying between 30.5 to 307 litres, with an average of 142. It is assumed that an increase in the amount of gasoline available for consumption indicates an improvement in the transportation of people and goods.¹²

¹² The series is not totally comparable because until 1976 the figures refer to consumption and after to production. The data for 1986 are preliminary and for 1987 are estimated. Nafinsa 1981 P. 192 and IGAE 1987 P. 493. For other examples, Cfr Islas 1986.




40	30.53	50	77.31	60	129.2	70	162.4	80	299.2
41	34.86	51	85.12	61	129.5	71	167.7	81	293.9
42	37.44	52	91.81	62	126.8	72	175.1	82	276.3
43	39.11	53	95.38	63	126.5	73	187.7	83	274.9
44	38.38	54	101.9	64	131.7	74	187.7	84	274.8
45	42.42	55	105.3	65	132.6	75	186.6	85	270.6
46	50.62	56	111.9	66	136.7	76	194.9	86	268.2
47	57.46	57	115.6	67	143.2	77	211.8	87	307.5
48	66.65	58	119.0	68	150.0	78	220.0		
49	72.67	59	121.7	69	157.3	79	246.0		

13. Nutrition

The production of maize is taken as an indicator, not of nutrition, but of the degree of government attention to nutrition, despite the many problems and limitations of the measure. In the first place, corn is a basic product that is substituted for similar products such as beans, rice or wheat, and is also a means of income. A precise measure would require distinguishing the substitution from the income effects of corn production. However, corn production was supported for many years by the government and served as a symbol of government attention. For that reason this indicator was chosen.

From 1940 to 1987 it has fluctuated between 83 and 208 kilograms per person, with an average of 156. Three cycles are identified: one of 27 years (1940-1956) of relatively constant growth; an-

other of 10 years (1967-1976) in decline; and another of 11 years (1977-1987) characterized by instability and notable ups and downs, during which the effect of the Mexican Food System (SAM) is considerable. It is assumed that growth in the amount of corn available per person indicates a government concern with nutrition, because this foodstuff is a fundamental part of the diet among the middle and lower strata of the social pyramid.¹³



40	83.44	50	121.1	60	154.9	70	174.3	80	178.3
41	105.2	51	128.8	61	171.9	71	185.1	81	204.2
42	113.9	52	116.9	62	168.0	72	168.7	82	138.5
43	84.79	53	131.8	63	175.4	73	152.4	83	174.2
44	105.7	54	154.2	64	207.9	74	134.6	84	168.4
45	97.1	55	149.6	65	211.7	75	140.5	85	177.7
46	103.0	56	141.7	66	211.5	76	129.4	86	146.2
47	105.9	57	141.1	67	189.0	77	158.9	87	172.5
48	115.9	58	160.6	68	203.2	78	166.5		
49	114.4	59	164.2	69	171.5	79	125.3		

The degree of government attention to social problems, which can indicate the level of the government's perception of the problems of individuals and its awareness of population pressures, is examined in data about literacy, housing, social security and university education. It enables reckoning the provision of some

¹³ The data for 1986 are preliminary and for 1987 are estimated. Nafinsa 1981 P. 117 and IGAE 1987 P. 373. For other examples, Cfr Garcia Mata 1983, Barkin 1983, Luisselli 1985 and Inegi 1987.

public services and supports to the base of the social pyramid and, consequently, the rise or decline of social pressure on the economy and public policy. In this sense, illiteracy and lack of housing do not contribute to the improvement of the popular classes, while the increases in university students and people insured through social security do contribute.


This variable, --mainly linked to governmental expenditure as well as that of welfare-- shows an upward trend from 1940 to 1965, while a slow deceleration appears as the period advances. In 1965 a phase of stagnation began that lasted six years and ended in an open reversal in 1970. In 1972, recovery begins, gains greater vigor in 1978 and reaches its peak in 1981. However, the recovery was ephemeral as in 1982 a new phase of stagnation begins and lasts until the present. In the long run, however, the social spending of Echeverria and Lopez Portillo did not have the impact that the deceleration of population growth had. More than public spending, sustained economic growth seems to have been the important factor.

The stagnation of 1965 stemmed mainly from two factors: the deceleration of the percentage of the insured population and the ebb in housing shortages. In 1965 the gradual reduction in the housing shortage ended --which had persisted since 1940-- and an increase decline began that has not yet ended. The percentage of the insured population remained almost invariable in the second half of the 1960s despite that country's experience of rapid industrial growth. Both processes stem, very probably, from the accelerated demographic expansion and the absence of any compensatory increase in government social spending.

In the 1970s rapid growth in the insured population and percentage of university students is observed, although the housing shortage continued rising. The new phase of stagnation, begun in 1982, is explained by the erratic behavior of these same factors.

14. Illiteracy

Illiteracy from 1940 to 1987 has dropped from 47.9 to 3.5 percent with an average of 24.9 percent for the period. Two cycles are distinguished: one of high levels with a downward trend from 1940 to 1960 and another moderate one with a slight acceleration in the downward trend from 1961 to 1987, with the arrival of low levels in recent years. A high percentage of illiteracy assumes the absence of formation and information in the population, which reflects restrictions on the provision and satisfaction of public education that has repercussions mainly for the lower strata of the social pyramid.¹⁴




40	47.88	50	34.67	60	30.22	70	15.55	80	9.52
41	46.37	51	34.25	61	28.40	71	14.80	81	9.05
42	44.90	52	33.82	62	26.66	72	14.08	82	8.22
43	43.48	53	33.39	63	25.02	73	13.40	83	7.42
44	42.10	54	32.95	64	23.45	74	12.75	84	6.52
45	40.76	55	32.51	65	21.96	75	12.14	85	5.62
46	39.47	56	32.07	66	20.54	76	11.56	86	4.51
47	38.21	57	31.62	67	19.20	77	11.01	87	3.51
48	36.99	58	31.18	68	17.92	78	10.48		
49	35.82	59	30.73	69	16.71	79	9.990		

¹⁴ Up to 1977 the series includes a population of 6 years and older who do not know how to read and after this date the series refers to the above-15 population. AE 1958-59, P. 48-50, AE 1962-63 P. 36-37, AE 1986 P. 179-180 and IGAE 1987 P. 281-282. For other examples, Cfr Ruiz 1977 and UNESCO 1982.

15. University Students

The percentage of university students in the population has varied from 1950 to 1987 (no previous data exists) between 0.07 and 1.53, with an average of 0.55. Two cycles can be identified: one low and stable from 1950 to 1960; another of rapid growth after 1961. Note that in the last two years a tendency to stagnate arose. The growth in the proportion of university students assumes an opening to higher education, a greater provision of public university education, which increases expectations for social mobility.¹⁵



40	no data	50	0.12	60	0.08	70	0.53	80	1.35
41	no data	51	0.07	61	0.23	71	0.60	81	1.41
42	no data	52	0.12	62	0.25	72	0.65	82	1.44
43	no data	53	0.10	63	0.25	73	0.72	83	1.50
44	no data	54	0.08	64	0.27	74	0.81	84	1.49
45	no data	55	0.16	65	0.33	75	0.90	85	1.53
46	no data	56	0.08	66	0.40	76	0.92	86	1.49
47	no data	57	0.15	67	0.43	77	0.95	87	1.48
48	no data	58	0.08	68	0.47	78	1.11		
49	0.09	59	0.07	69	0.50	79	1.26		


One of the profound long-term impacts will be the formation of well-developed, critical, participative individuals, which in time will

¹⁵ The series includes normal education to the licenciante level. Inegi 1986 P. 86 and IGAE 1987 P. 279. No data were gathered for the 1940-1948 period and 1987 is estimated. For other examples, Cfr ANUIES 1983 and Gomez 1983.

give rise to the appearance of a new actor on the political scene: public opinion. This is going to be a phenomenon at the end of the 1980s that will be witnessed in the explosion of opinion polls, studies and research projects.

16. Insured population

The population insured by the Mexican Institute of Social Security (IMSS) from 1944 to 1987 is taken as an indicator of this variable. The percentage has varied between 1.6 and 40.2 percent of the total population, with an average of 16.7 percent for the period.



40	- - -	50	3.78	60	9.55	70	19.43	80	34.77
41	- - -	51	3.95	61	11.19	71	19.38	81	37.78
42	- - -	52	4.21	62	12.66	72	21.21	82	36.77
43	- - -	53	4.42	63	13.28	73	23.70	83	35.98
44	1.62	54	4.63	64	15.61	74	24.53	84	38.27
45	2.37	55	5.25	65	16.14	75	26.29	85	40.15
46	2.73	56	5.86	66	16.37	76	26.83	86	38.75
47	3.15	57	6.58	67	16.73	77	27.23	87	39.73
48	3.41	58	7.65	68	17.33	78	30.14		
49	3.56	59	8.33	69	18.50	79	31.08		

We find two cycles: one of constant sustained ascent from 1944 to 1981; one of instability between 1982 and 1987. It is assumed that

growth in the provision of insurance by the institutions of social security and public health implies government attention to the increase of welfare for the base of the social pyramid.¹⁶

¹⁶ The series refers to data of IMSS only and is not available for prior to 1944. Inegi 1986 P. 140 and IGAE 1987 P. 327. For other examples, Cfr Hernandez Llamas 1984 and IMSS 1984.

6. THE ECONOMY

To study the economy data about production, finance, income distribution and employment are used. The behavior of each one of the chosen economic indicators is shown graphically.

Production


To examine this topic data concerning economic growth and gross domestic product are reviewed. Between 1940 and 1987 the curve shows a general upward trend, although several phases are observed along the path. The first, from 1940 to 1957 is one of stagnation and low values despite the variations. In 1958 a stage of long-term ascent begins and lasts until 1972, when the first big drop of the period is observed, which only begins to rise again in 1976. In this year, accelerated growth resumes and reaches its maximum value in 1983. In recent years high values have been maintained, although with an appreciable tendency to fall.

This behavior in recent years stems from a combination of several factors: a notable improvement in the external sector, as much in the commercial balance as in the balance of payments, combined with a stagnation of internal finance and a rapid deceleration of economic growth that has shown its only negative values for the period.

17. Economic growth

Economic growth from 1940 to 1987 has fluctuated between -5.3 and 11.7 percent, with an average of 5.7 percent. The period is marked by unstable behavior with years of ups and downs. The years of highest growth are 1950, 1954 and above all 1964. The low-growth years are 1982, 1983 and 1986, when the economy, after 42 years of positive growth, registered negative rates for the first time.¹

¹ This series is calculated from the annual variance of gross domestic product by Inegi 1986 P. 311, Banxico 1986 P. 207 and Banxico 1987 P. 199.




40	1.38	50	9.89	60	8.12	70	6.92	80	8.32
41	9.74	51	7.73	61	4.93	71	4.17	81	7.95
42	5.61	52	3.98	62	4.67	72	8.49	82	-0.54
43	3.70	53	0.27	63	7.99	73	8.41	83	-5.27
44	8.16	54	10.00	64	11.69	74	6.11	84	3.68
45	3.14	55	8.50	65	6.48	75	5.61	85	2.78
46	6.57	56	6.84	66	6.93	76	4.24	86	-3.75
47	3.44	57	7.58	67	6.27	77	3.44	87	1.43
48	4.12	58	5.32	68	8.14	78	8.25		
49	5.48	59	2.99	69	6.32	79	9.15		

18. Gross domestic product

Gross domestic product per-capita has fluctuated between 3.56 and 12.75 thousands of pesos (measured in constant terms of 1970 pesos) during the period. The behavior shows a practically uninterrupted upward trend from 1940 to 1981, when a downward phase begins and lasts until the present. The phase of positive growth shows a moderate growth cycle between 1940 and 1962 and one of rapid growth between 1963 and 1981.¹

¹ Inegi 1986 P. 311, Banxico 1986 P. 207 and Banxico 1987 P. 199.




40	3.56	50	4.84	60	6.44	70	8.72	80	12.13
41	3.80	51	5.06	61	6.51	71	8.75	81	12.75
42	3.91	52	5.10	62	6.56	72	9.19	82	12.36
43	3.94	53	4.96	63	6.83	73	9.64	83	11.42
44	4.15	54	5.30	64	7.35	74	9.90	84	11.56
45	4.17	55	5.57	65	7.53	75	10.14	85	11.62
46	4.32	56	5.78	66	7.76	76	10.26	86	10.95
47	4.35	57	6.03	67	7.94	77	10.31	87	10.90
48	4.41	58	6.16	68	8.27	78	10.84		
49	4.52	59	6.15	69	8.47	79	11.51		

Finances

The state of national finances is analyzed through data on inflation, internal savings, public investment, foreign investment, profits to the exterior, fiscal revenue and the federal budget. After an initial phase of high financial instability coincident with the World War II years, the general curve begins in 1945 with an upward trend that lasts until 1972. In 1973 a stagnation period begins that includes some peaks with strong drops. In the last two years decline has characterized the pattern after a notable recovery between 1983 and 1985. Recent behavior is explained above all by the initial recovery of the price index and the lower percentage of profits taken by foreign investors, followed by a return of inflation (1986 and 1987) and the progressive erosion of real savings.

19. Inflation ²

The annual inflation rate from 1940 to 1988 has varied between -2 and 159.2 percent, with an average of 18.2 percent. We observe a general upward trend with three cycles: one moderate and unstable between 1940 and 1958, with 1953 being notable for deflation; another low and stable from 1959 to 1970; and one of marked increase from 1970 to 1987. It is assumed that inflation does not contribute to economic improvement because of the disturbances it generates in financial and productive markets, as well as the lack of confidence and instability it creates among consumers, producers and investors.




40	1.3	50	6.7	60	4.9	70	4.8	80	29.8
41	3.4	51	12.3	61	1.7	71	5.2	81	28.7
42	16.5	52	14.3	62	1.2	72	5.5	82	98.8
43	30.7	53	-2.00	63	0.6	73	21.3	83	80.8
44	25.7	54	5.0	64	2.2	74	20.7	84	59.2
45	7.5	55	15.7	65	3.6	75	11.2	85	63.7
46	24.7	56	4.9	66	4.3	76	27.2	86	105.7
47	11.9	57	5.5	67	3.0	77	20.7	87	159.2
48	6.4	58	11.5	68	1.5	78	16.2	88	51.7
49	5.0	59	2.5	69	3.5	79	20.0		

² Nafinsa 1981 P. 235, Nafinsa 1986 P. 303 and Banxico 1987 P. 21. For other examples, Cfr Fiorella 1983, Blejer 1984 and Silva 1984.

20. Savings ³

Real savings from 1940 to 1987 has varied between 90 and 3,860 pesos (in constant 1970 pesos) per-capita. We identify two cycles during the period: one of constant ascent that lasts until 1982 and another of decline from 1983 to the present. It is assumed that increases in real savings improve the economy, because they imply monetary surplus that is recycled productively through the banking and financial system.




40	0.09	50	0.30	60	0.61	70	1.26	80	2.39
41	0.11	51	0.37	61	0.68	71	1.36	81	2.84
42	0.15	52	0.35	62	0.74	72	1.41	82	3.86
43	0.18	53	0.46	63	0.83	73	1.39	83	3.14
44	0.16	54	0.51	64	0.91	74	1.44	84	2.72
45	0.21	55	0.45	65	0.95	75	1.76	85	2.65
46	0.19	56	0.43	66	0.98	76	2.33	86	2.31
47	0.21	57	0.42	67	1.10	77	2.36	87	2.16
48	0.25	58	0.44	68	1.20	78	2.15		
49	0.25	59	0.47	69	1.25	79	2.42		

³ This series includes the obligations of the banking system up to 1984 and beginning in 1985 the total intake. The data come from Inegi 1986 P. 829 and Banxico 1987 P. 215. For other examples, Cfr Comejo 1964, Goldsmith 1965 and Gelover 1970.

21. Public investment ⁴

The proportion of public investment over gross fixed investment from 1940 to 1987 has fluctuated between 25.7 and 71 percent, with an average of 42 percent. We find three cycles: one of a downward trend that combines two high and low points between 1940 and 1957; another with an upward trend between 1958 and 1965; one with a downward tendency that includes moderate and low periods between 1966 and 1987.




40	48.33	50	49.48	60	34.38	70	38.00	80	54.29
41	42.12	51	38.71	61	40.95	71	42.59	81	50.25
42	66.29	52	38.16	62	49.09	72	34.05	82	48.41
43	71.00	53	33.03	63	41.89	73	39.43	83	45.94
44	59.73	54	36.62	64	48.32	74	37.34	84	31.68
45	49.88	55	30.42	65	51.37	75	43.20	85	27.77
46	37.00	56	25.69	66	42.60	76	40.59	86	39.03
47	39.70	57	25.69	67	38.49	77	41.32	87	27.40
48	41.59	58	31.48	68	38.66	78	45.66		
49	44.45	59	31.96	69	39.32	79	44.94		

It is assumed that growth in public investment over gross fixed investment does not contribute to economic improvement in the current context, because it implies government expansion in an

⁴ Nafin 1981 P. 321, Nafin 1986 P. 108, AE 1985 P. 390, AE 1986 P. 458, Banxico 1985 P. 78, Banxico 1987 P. 76, IGAE 1987 P. 582.

economy that inhibits and generates lack of confidence in domestic and foreign private enterprise. Of course, a distinction in the objectives of public investment would have to be made to study this topic in more detail.

22. Foreign investment




40	9.72	50	7.49	60	4.00	70	2.84	80	2.32
41	9.50	51	7.98	61	5.15	71	2.86	81	2.74
42	9.28	52	3.29	62	4.55	72	1.99	82	1.95
43	9.05	53	4.39	63	3.63	73	2.17	83	1.31
44	8.83	54	9.66	64	3.81	74	2.10	84	0.95
45	8.61	55	9.81	65	4.93	75	1.15	85	1.30
46	8.38	56	8.85	66	2.70	76	1.22	86	4.03
47	8.16	57	8.24	67	1.86	77	2.18	87	11.57
48	7.94	58	5.36	68	2.22	78	1.74		
49	7.71	59	4.56	69	3.38	79	2.17		

Foreign investment from 1940 to 1987 has fluctuated between 0.95 and 11.57 percent of total investment, with an average of 4.87. A general downward trend is observed that is divided into three cycles: one high and in decline from 1940 to 1951; one moderate with ups and downs between 1952 and 1965; one low and relatively stable from 1966 to 1984. In the last three years of the period, foreign investment tended to grow rapidly, registering its peak in 1987 mainly because of swaps. It is assumed that growth in the foreign

share of total investment improves the economy in the short run, but not in the long run because it implies increases in profits taken abroad.⁵

23. Profits sent abroad

Profits sent abroad from 1940 to 1987 have fluctuated between 11.9 and 857.8 percent of direct foreign investment, with an average of 145.4 percent.



40	351.4	50	88.1	60	192.9	70	69.9	80	41.4
41	194.6	51	73.1	61	130.6	71	74.3	81	48.2
42	152.8	52	226.3	62	136.3	72	92.2	82	108.9
43	354.8	53	207.3	63	183.8	73	75.5	83	39.9
44	63.9	54	77.7	64	166.4	74	65.4	84	61.6
45	875.8	55	72.2	65	114.6	75	102.7	85	78.7
46	181.9	56	93.6	66	186.7	76	163.7	86	21.6
47	129.9	57	86.1	67	243.9	77	57.8	87	11.9
48	214.7	58	130.1	68	227.5	78	55.6		
49	156.4	59	173.1	69	161.3	79	53.6		


Two cycles are distinguished: one unstable with moderate and high movements between 1940 and 1969; one low and relatively stable between 1970 and 1987. It is assumed that increases in profits sent

⁵ Nafin 1981 P. 348, Nafin 1986 P. 108, Nafin 1986 . 318, AE 1985 P. 390, AE 1986 P. 458, Banxico 1985 P. 78, Banxico 1986 P. 227 and Banxico 1987 P. 213. For other examples, Cfr Bohrisch 1968 and Freixas 1983.

abroad as a percentage of direct foreign investment do not improve the economy, because they imply an increase in capital transfers to the exterior.⁶

24. Fiscal revenue

The proportion of fiscal revenue to the federal budget (PEF) has fluctuated from 1940 to 1987 between 50.6 and 91.7 percent.



40	74.84	50	84.32	60	50.56	70	85.68	80	93.55
41	81.96	51	85.91	61	53.11	71	87.03	81	75.95
42	74.43	52	69.52	62	59.89	72	80.78	82	65.26
43	86.52	53	73.84	63	68.39	73	80.50	83	64.41
44	76.73	54	60.78	64	59.64	74	82.62	84	77.64
45	77.43	55	76.17	65	71.10	75	80.92	85	77.78
46	91.70	56	73.49	66	81.87	76	75.35	86	60.18
47	83.39	57	65.63	67	79.76	77	81.15	87	63.36
48	67.58	58	63.98	68	84.82	78	83.95		
49	66.29	59	64.23	69	82.34	79	87.52		


Despite the great instability of overall behavior, three cycles are distinguished: one of decline from 1940 to 1960; one of ascent from 1961 to 1980; one of decline from 1981 to the present. The growth in the percentage of fiscal revenue over the federal budget

⁶ Nafinsa 1981 P. 348, Nafinsa 1986 P. 317 and Banxico 1987 P. 202. Cfr. Henríquez 1962, Brothers 1967 and Bennett 1974.

contributes to economic improvement, because it implies a balance between public revenues and spending.⁷

25. Federal budget outlays

The share of the federal budget in gross domestic product (GDP) from 1940 to 1987 has varied between 6.34 and 37.4 percent. Three cycles are seen in the period: one low and relatively stable from 1940 to 1971; one high and growing between 1972 and 1982; one with great ups and downs from 1983 to the present.



40	7.66	50	8.21	60	12.62	70	11.86	80	20.45
41	7.39	51	8.59	61	11.75	71	11.39	81	24.78
42	7.84	52	10.60	62	10.82	72	13.68	82	37.43
43	8.25	53	9.05	63	9.76	73	14.81	83	26.06
44	7.73	54	10.71	64	11.52	74	15.10	84	23.79
45	7.65	55	9.86	65	13.73	75	18.23	85	24.17
46	6.34	56	9.98	66	10.93	76	20.07	86	33.13
47	6.91	57	9.56	67	12.57	77	20.09		
48	8.38	58	10.11	68	11.43	78	19.58		
49	10.27	59	10.06	69	12.52	79	19.02		

It is assumed that increases in the federal budget share of GDP above a level of 15 to 20 percent do not contribute to economic

⁷ Inegi 1986 P. 632, Banxico 1985 P. 165 and Banxico 1987 P. 233. This series includes revenue from the parastate sector from 1965 on to make it consistent with the federal budget, which incorporates the expenses of the parastate sector after 1965.

performance because they imply an excess of public spending relative to national production.⁸

EMPLOYMENT

Finally, the study of **employment** includes data on real salaries, economically active population, proportion of economically active population employed in industry and in the service sector. The employment data indicate the level of work in the formal sector as well as the distribution of jobs in the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy.


Three phases are observed along the employment time patch between 1940 and 1987: one of high values and great stability between 1940 and 1960, which stems from sustained growth in the economically active population as a percentage of total population and from the economically active population employed in industry. In 1960 a phase of long-term decline begins and lasts until 1977, as a result of the decreasing percentage of the economically active population that stems from the rapid demographic growth in those years. In 1978, a relatively stable phase at low levels begins, which is explained by the temporary recovery of the economically active population up to 1980, combined with a stagnation of industrial employment and moderate growth of employment in the service sector.

26. Real wages

Real salaries from 1940 to 1987 have fluctuated between 6.49 and 39.48 pesos (1970) per day, with an average of 18.61. We observe three cycles: one low and relatively stable from 1940 to 1959; one of growth from 1960 to 1976; one unstable and in decline between 1977 and 1987. It is assumed that increases in real salary con-

⁸ Inegi 1986 P. 628 and 642, IGAE 1987 P. 101. This series represents total public sector spending; from 1965 on parastate expenses are subtracted to make the series consistent with the figures from 1940 to 1964.

tribute to economic improvement because they imply greater acquisitive power for the middle and lower strata of the social pyramid.⁹




40	11.09	50	8.05	60	12.52	70	26.99	80	30.43
41	10.41	51	6.49	61	12.41	71	25.63	81	30.94
42	9.44	52	10.00	62	15.32	72	28.90	82	33.86
43	7.79	53	10.19	63	15.24	73	30.44	83	24.19
44	7.95	54	11.05	64	20.36	74	28.32	84	22.90
45	7.14	55	9.72	65	19.99	75	34.55	85	22.36
46	8.10	56	10.61	66	22.79	76	38.98	86	17.64
47	7.65	57	10.18	67	22.16	77	33.23	87	16.68
48	8.65	58	10.93	68	25.23	78	32.10		
49	7.90	59	10.81	69	24.43	79	31.71		

27. Economically active population (PEA)

The PEA as a percent of total population from 1940 to 1987 has fluctuated between 27.2 and 32.3, with an average of 30.46 percent. Four cycles are distinguished: one growing from 1940 to 1959; one declining from 1960 to 1970; one growing between 1971 and 1980; and one of decline that begins in 1981. It is assumed that growth in the economically active population improves the economy, but does not imply that workers are necessarily better off.¹⁰

⁹ This series refers to the minimum wage denominated in 1970 pesos. Nafin 1981 P. 356 and Nafin 1986 P. 52.

¹⁰ Nafin 1981 P. 14 and Nafin 1986 P. 20. For other examples, Cfr Levy 1980, Gollas 1982 and Kuri 1983.




40	29.81	50	32.07	60	32.22	70	27.23	80	31.80
41	30.20	51	32.09	61	31.68	71	27.46	81	31.48
42	30.56	52	32.11	62	31.16	72	27.69	82	31.18
43	30.87	53	32.14	63	30.64	73	27.93	83	30.94
44	31.14	54	32.16	64	30.12	74	28.16	84	30.73
45	31.38	55	32.18	65	29.62	75	28.39	85	30.57
46	31.58	56	32.20	66	29.13	76	28.62	86	30.36
47	31.75	57	32.22	67	28.64	77	28.85	87	30.26
48	31.89	58	32.24	68	28.17	78	29.07		
49	32.00	59	32.26	69	27.69	79	29.30		

28. Population employed in industry

The proportion of the PEA employed in industry between 1940 and 1987 has fluctuated between 15.02 and 22.95 percent with an average of 19.09. Two cycles are observed: one growing from 1940 to 1969 and another in sharp decline from 1971 to 1987. The sexenios of Diaz Ordaz and Luis Echeverria registered the highest levels of industrial PEA. The growth of industrial PEA as a percentage of total population contributes to economic improvement because it implies higher levels of aggregate value with the employment of a greater number of people in the secondary sector of the economy.¹¹

¹¹ Nafinsa 1981 P. 14 and Nafinsa 1986 P. 20.




40	15.52	50	15.95	60	19.02	70	22.95	80	20.23
41	15.02	51	16.24	61	19.41	71	22.68	81	20.33
42	15.09	52	16.56	62	19.80	72	22.41	82	20.39
43	15.18	53	16.87	63	20.20	73	22.13	83	20.47
44	15.30	54	17.17	64	20.59	74	21.86	84	20.97
45	15.43	55	17.48	65	20.99	75	21.59	85	20.63
46	15.58	56	17.79	66	21.38	76	21.32	86	20.79
47	15.75	57	18.09	67	21.77	77	21.05	87	20.86
48	15.94	58	18.40	68	22.16	78	20.77		
49	16.15	59	18.71	69	22.56	79	20.50		

29. Population employed in the service sector

The proportion of the service sector PEA within the total population from 1940 to 1987 has varied between 15.02 and 55.3 percent showing an upward trend throughout the period that continues to the present. Two phases of rapid growth are distinguished: from 1941 to 1950 and from 1961 to 1980, separated by intervals of moderate growth.¹²

¹² Nafinsa 1981 P. 14 and Nafinsa 1986 P. 20.



40	19.09	50	25.74	60	26.83	70	37.65	80	53.94
41	9.010	51	25.86	61	27.91	71	39.28	81	54.12
42	11.38	52	25.98	62	28.99	72	40.91	82	54.30
43	13.55	53	26.09	63	30.08	73	42.54	83	54.44
44	15.53	54	26.20	64	31.16	74	44.17	84	54.58
45	17.35	55	26.32	65	32.24	75	45.80	85	54.75
46	19.02	56	26.43	66	33.32	76	47.42	86	55.05
47	20.55	57	26.55	67	34.40	77	49.05	87	55.25
48	21.96	58	26.67	68	35.49	78	50.68		
49	23.25	59	26.79	69	36.57	79	52.31		

7. POLITICS

In this chapter data about three important aspects of political life from 1940 to 1987 are presented: 1) the plurality of the elite; 2) the society's electoral behavior; and 3) the level of conflict within the government. The behavior of each indicator is shown graphically.

PLURALITY

The political elite is analyzed to determine the degree of access to leadership positions --whether the channels for incorporating the lower and middle strata of the population are open or closed-- and to study the upward social mobility of the country. The study is based on data about 1,846 political leaders in the top 200 government positions over the last nine sexenios from 1935 to 1985.¹

Seen in historical perspective, the plurality of the political elite has tended to worsen because a progressive exclusionary process has closed the channels of mobility and ascent. Nonetheless, it has not been a linear process. In fact, the greatest decline has occurred in the last two decades. After a moderate improvement in 1952 --because Ruiz Cortines incorporated a greater percentage of leaders of popular origin in his government-- the plurality of the elite began a long-term decline that was only interrupted during the Lopez Portillo sexenio. In 1958 it dropped slightly, despite the fact that the number of leaders of popular origin had risen, because of the

1 All information about the elite comes from the data base of Roderic Camp, who has studied the topic in greatest detail. The government posts considered include presidents, secretaries, sub-secretaries, governors, directors of large public agencies, rectors and directors of the main education institutions, principle ambassadors, supreme court justices, senators, deputies and leaders of important syndicates; the numbers break down by sexenio as follows: 1934: 227; 1940: 151; 1946: 156; 1952: 145; 1958: 141; 1964: 190; 1970: 243; 1976: 190; and 1982: 129. Other analyses can be consulted in Brandenburg 1955, Smith 1981, Rendon 1984, Philip 1985, Castelazo 1985 and Salim 1987.

influx of leaders with university degrees but without membership in the PRI and without any experience in elected office.

During the Diaz Ordaz sexenio the degree of plurality did change, only to drop abruptly in 1970 to unprecedented levels for the period. The drop in the plurality of the leadership in the Echeverria sexenio seems to contradict the apparent *populist* character that is often attributed to his government; what is certain is that never before had there been such high levels of exclusivity in the leadership, which was characterized by elites with university studies and degrees from foreign universities but totally lacking in electoral experience. The percent of leaders of popular origin was reduced to 26, the lowest percentage at least since 1934. To understand such a pronounced reversal in the plurality of the elite, it is necessary to remember the student movement of 1968 and its effects on the composition of top political leadership. Luis Echeverria, as one of his responses to 1968, coopted several young university students to give substance to his *democratic opening*, but the cost of such a policy was precisely the elitization of the leadership, an issue that did not seem to cause much concern at the time.

The sexenio of Lopez Portillo marked an important recovery of plurality that is explained by a notable increase in leaders of popular origin with electoral experience and by a decline in the percentage of leaders who had studied abroad. The percentage of leaders who represented agriculture and labor interests also improved in relation to the Echeverria sexenio. Despite all of this, the elite did not recover the level of plurality it had during the Ruiz Cortines administration.


In 1982, elite plurality fell to its lowest level for the entire period considered here. Leaders of popular origin with membership in the PRI dropped to their lowest level (with PRI members almost disappearing from the top posts). In addition, leaders with electoral experience from the labor and agriculture sectors reduced

in ranks as well. On the other hand, those with private-school and foreign educations increased, in both cases, to the highest levels for the period.

The shrinking plurality of the elite, evident since 1970 and acute since 1982, becomes one of the central factors in explaining the erratic political behavior of the last two decades. With the exception of nepotism, which historically has tended to decline in the government, practically all other indicators of elite plurality have worsened. The leadership has become more of a plutocracy, slowly distancing itself from the social base and closing one important channel of mobility and ascent.


30. Government leaders of popular origin

The percentage of political leaders of popular origin from 1940 to the present has fluctuated between 24 and 49, with the lowest values registered during the de la Madrid and Echeverria sexenios and the highest during the Lopez Mateos administration. The overall behavior of the curve shows a series of up and down cycles that, seen in historical perspective, seem to tend to decline, which would imply a gradual elitization of the political leadership.




31. Leaders with family ties among themselves

The percentage of political leaders related to other politicians from 1940 to the present has fluctuated between 22 and 34 percent, with lowest values --contrary to popular opinion-- in the de la Madrid and Lopez Portillo sexenios and highest levels during the Avila Camacho and Ruiz Cortines sexenios, with an average of 28 percent for the period. The historical behavior of the curve shows a downward trend that accelerates after 1976, which would indicate an overall slow reduction in the *nepotism* index.




32. Leaders with university studies

The percentage of politicians with university studies between 1940 and the present has risen constantly from 68 to 97 percent, with lowest values during the Avila Camacho and Ruiz Cortines sexenios and highest values during the Echeverria and Lopez Portillo years. The historic tendency has been to rise, although it would seem to have reached its highest possible level.




33. Leaders who have studied in private universities

The percentage of politicians who have studied in private universities declined from 1940 to 1970 and rose from then on, which indicates an initial strengthening of public university education and a subsequent weakening. Although the values for this variable have not been very high in the period considered, the important information here is more qualitative than quantitative. That is, private university graduates, despite their few numbers, are those who have increasingly occupied the best government positions.




34. Leaders who have studied abroad

The percentage of politicians who have studied abroad from 1940 to the present has grown from 5 to 28, with a relatively stable time path until 1958 and notable growth since then. Once again, the Echeverria and de la Madrid sexenios register the highest values.




35. Leaders with party membership

The percentage of politicians with party experience from 1940 to the present varied between 13.5 and 0.8, with the highest levels during the Echeverria and Lopez Portillo administrations and the lowest during that of de la Madrid. The curve shows erratic behavior, although relatively stable until 1982, when it fell to an unprecedented low.




36. Leaders with electoral experience

The percentage of leaders with electoral experience varied between 38 and 52 percent from 1940 to the present, with the lowest levels during the Avila Camacho and Luis Echeverria sexenios and the highest levels during the Ruiz Cortines and Diaz Ordaz regimes. Despite the oscillations, the historic tendency seems to be decline. The drop during the Echeverria government seems to be explained by the replacement of old-line politicians with university students.



37. Leaders with popular representation

The percentage of politicians with agricultural or labor representation from 1940 to the present has fluctuated between 10 and 20 percent, with lowest levels during the Avila Camacho and de la Madrid regimes and the highest level during the Diaz Ordaz sexenio, with an overall average of 16 percent. The historic behavior seems to include two phases: one rising from 1940 to 1970 and one declining from 1970 to the present.



PARTICIPATION

The analysis of participation includes electoral and party behavior. It is assumed that an increase in abstentionism in an urban and educated society like modern Mexico is a negative sign, because it implies a lack of participation that can be due to apathy, incredulity or a rejection of political life. On the other hand, it is assumed that within certain margins, votes for the opposition in general and the left in particular --because of its ties to the popular strata-- as well as the formation of new parties indicate

that participation is being channelled institutionally, which implies an improvement.²

In contrast with elite plurality, participation has evolved favorably but not uniformly. It rose continuously until 1975 only to drop notably in 1976 and recover in 1982. This behavior is explained by the growing participation of the opposition in general and the left in particular, as well as in the progressive reduction in the level of electoral abstention and the moderate increase in the formation of new parties. The conjunction of these four factors explains the rise in participation between 1940 and 1975.

The apparent acute decline in 1976 stemmed from the equally abrupt reduction in electoral participation by the opposition, caused by the absence of opposition presidential candidates in elections that year. In 1982, the participation curve shows an important recovery, thanks mainly to the democratizing effect of the political reform, which was expressed in a very participative presidential election, which in turn produced the highest percentage of votes for the opposition and for the left and a minimum rate of abstention, according to official figures. However, the unreliable official figures on abstention in 1988 pose a serious reliability problem for all previous available information.


38. Electoral abstention³

The official figures, which are not reliable but are the only ones available, show abstention in presidential elections between 1940 and the present varied between 25 and 58 percent, with an average of 39 percent. The lowest levels came during the de la Madrid and Diaz Ordaz sexenios and the highest during the Ruiz Cortines and

² For analyses of participation and elections Cfr Leher 1980, Granados Chapa 1982, Gonzalez Casanova 1985, Arriola 1985, Loaeza 1987, Nuncio 1987 and Lopez Moreno 1987.

³ Gonzalez Casanova 1967 P. 88, Idem 1985 P. 193 and *Excelsior*, July 13, 1988. The 1958 value rose because suffrage was extended to women; the 1988 rise created a great controversy. The best consensus points to a high level of participation and a low increase in the number of fictitious votes.

Lopez Mateos regimes. Two big cycles are observed: one of high abstention from 1940 to 1958 and another of lower abstention from 1964 to the present, with an overall downward trend. Abstention in Mexico has two modes: one passive, that would run from 1920 to 1960, as a product of a predominantly rural and dispersed society; another active, that would run from 1960 to the present, stemming from an urbanized, politically mobilized society with the will to reject the system.




39. Votes for the opposition⁴

Votes for the opposition varied between 6 and 29 percent from 1934 to 1982, with low participation during the Avila Camacho and Lopez Portillo sexenios and moderate participation in those of Miguel Aleman, Ruiz Cortines and Miguel de la Madrid, who all surpassed the overall average of 15 percent. The low levels up to 1946 probably are explained by the centralization of power within the triumphant groups of the revolution; after 1946 we find three twelve-year cycles: one of moderate opposition from 1946 to 1958;

⁴ Gonzalez Casanova 1967 P. 22 and Gonzalez Casanova 1985 P. 192.

one of little opposition from 1958 to 1970; an atypical cycle that includes little and moderate opposition from 1970 to 1982. The peaks of 1950 and 1982 are explained by the postulation of opposition candidates with relatively high profiles: Miguel Enriquez Guzman in the first case and Pablo Emilio Madero in the second. The fall in 1976 is explained by the absence of officially registered opposition party candidates in the presidential elections that year.

The case of 1988 is unique in its dimensions. In the first place, the biggest opposition emerged from an internal split within the PRI in a context of popular discontent, stemming from a severely restrictive set of economic policies. On the other hand, opposition votes have channeled toward Cardenism, a recent electoral phenomenon, rather than toward the PAN with a longstanding opposition tradition.




40. Votes for the left⁵

The vote for the left has varied between 0.1 and 8.6 percent from 1940 to 1982 with an average of 2.3 percent and two cycles: one

⁵ Gonzalez Casanova 1967 P. 180 and Gonzalez Casanova 1985 P. 204.


low and stable from 1940 to 1970 and one of relative growth from 1970 to 1982, this last as a result of the political reform and the appearance and reorganization of leftist parties. Before 1970 the notable growth in votes for the left in the 1952 elections was due to the candidacy of Vicente Lombardo Toledano. The case of 1988 breaks from the pattern of the period with the candidacy of Cuauhtemoc Cardenas attracting almost 4 times more votes than the previous all-time high in 1982.



41. Formation of new national parties


The formation of new national parties from 1940 to the present shows an average of 2.4 per sexenio, with two periods of intense formation: 1940 to 1958 and 1970 to the present. In this last period, the emergence of new parties can be interpreted as a cushion to the political tensions stemming from 1968.⁶

⁶ Cfr Conchello 1975, Gonzalez Casanova 1981, Moreno 1982, Lajous 1985, *Todo Mexico*: 1985, P. 89, Carr 1986.



42. The impeachment of state governors

The disqualification, dissolution or anticipated change of state powers from 1940 to the present has varied between 3 and 12 with an average of 5.4 per sexenio. The sexenio of Diaz Ordaz registers the lowest number while that of Miguel Aleman the highest.⁷



⁷ Cfr Camp 1982 P. 426 and Ortiz Rocha 1973.

PART THREE: PUBLIC OPINION

Throughout this work an attempt has been made to analyze the Mexican reality with objective criteria, without paying much attention to the necessarily subjective views held by different groups in the society. The first four chapters focused on qualitative historical information and the four subsequent chapters on statistical data. In this section, the perceptions of a representative sample of the population are analyzed against the encompassing objective reality. The analysis reveals a heterogeneity in Mexican society that gives the nation capacity to resist the four crises studied here.

The differences among the different regions of the country are relatively well-known. The greater development of the regions of the north, compared with the majority of the central entities or the backward areas in the south. A brief review of the statistics indicates that a great heterogeneity exists in health, education, housing, nutrition, urbanization, purchasing power, per-capita GDP and many other social and economic variables among the different entities, making it possible to distinguish comparable regions according to their states of development.

Much less known are the regional cultural and political differences that cut into and affect national life. Despite the fact that it is easy to assume that the social and economic heterogeneity would be correlated with cultural heterogeneity, this last topic has received little attention. To the present there is a dearth of information about the socio-cultural disparities that exist in the country, with only some exceptions.¹

Heterogeneity is explored by comparing the responses to eight central themes contained in two national opinion polls taken in 1983

¹ The work of Leopoldo Zea, Samuel Ramos, Abelardo Villegas, Pablo Latapi, Octavio Paz, Carlos Fuentes, Luis Leñero Otero, Gilberto Jimenez, Frederick Turner, Erich Fromm and Enrique Alduncin.

and 1987²: 1) party preferences; 2) government approval rating; 3) opinion of the bank nationalization; 4) opinion of the right to strike; 5) opinion about church participation in politics; 6) opinion of military participation in politics; 7) personal attitude toward change; and 8) newspaper preference. The responses were ordered by social strata and later filtered by federal entity and geographic region, which facilitated the identification of large horizontal cleavages in the social pyramid and regional differences.

The social pyramid includes three large strata --popular, middle and elite-- which are each disaggregated into three substrata because of important differences found within each stratum. The popular class includes three groups that conform to the Mexican social base: workers, peasants and marginals. The first two groups are relatively self-explanatory, while marginals include the underemployed who survive in urban centers thanks to a variety of activities outside of the formal sector and the unemployed who subsist on support from family networks. More generically, they include the rural population without land and the urban dwellers without jobs. The middle classes include professionals or technicians with credentials, private sector employees and public sector bureaucrats.

Finally, the elite includes three groups that direct Mexican society: business leaders who hold economic power; public functionaries and political leaders who monopolize political power; and intellectuals³ --in the broad sense of the term: journalists, teachers, analysts, artists, writers-- who have power over the formation, communication and transmission of ideas. Although in quantitative

2 See Appendix.

3 The business stratum in the sample comprises the results obtained from five different groups in the private sector: business leaders (functionaries in business associations, congresses and management syndicates), industrial magnates, merchants, growers and ranchers, and service providers. Public functionaries include politicians at the highest level of federal, state and local administration as well as directors of political organizations, even if they are not clearly integrated into the state machinery.

terms⁴ it is important to include housewives and in qualitative terms students, they were omitted from the data base to simplify the analysis.

It will be seen repeatedly that party preferences, opinion of the government and opinion about the bank nationalization changed substantially during the period for different reasons. Party preference changed because the 1983 poll clearly captured the effects of the 1982 presidential campaign that translated into low abstention and high definition of preferences, while the 1987 poll found the contrary: high abstention and low definition of preferences. Opinion of the government changed in an important way, possibly as a result of the country's difficult economic conditions during the period. Finally, the shift in opinion about the bank nationalization expressed the loss of initial enthusiasm, surely the result of confirming years later that the nationalization meant really little for the general public and the country, given the de la Madrid government's distaste for the measure.

It is valid to ask why three and not five or eight regions, when it is possible at times to identify socio-economic and socio-cultural contrasts within the same state. A first response is practical. The breakdown of a large number of regions would have exponentially multiplied the quantity of comparisons and analyses, exceeding the scope of this work. In addition, because of the essentially exploratory character of this study, the presumption could not be risked of the existence of hypothetical regions that by chance might not be real or, on the contrary, disregard differences worthy of attention. As a result, three regions were chosen that have been commonly accepted as legitimate entities in economic and

⁴ 37,000 Politician = 0.09 percent, 59,000 businessman = 0.13 percent, 689,000 intellectual = 1.59 percent, 861,000 professional = 1.99 percent, 2,685,000 employee = 6.19 percent, 2,044,000 bureaucrat = 4.72 percent, 5,450,000 worker = 12.57 percent, 5,498,000 campesino = 12.61 percent, 9,035,000 marginal = 20.93 percent, 15,988,000 housewives = 36.88 percent, 1,000,000 students = 2.30 percent; this breakdown comes from the 1980 census.

socio-demographic studies, without forgetting that within the three regions important sub-regional contrasts surely exist.⁵

The first region, which we have labeled *north*, includes the six border states with the United States of America, plus Baja California Sur. These seven states share many similarities, among them the most salient is their geographic proximity with the exterior. Besides, they are states with standards of living above the national average, greater degrees of agricultural and industrial productivity, relatively minor social inequalities and little influence from the center of the country.

The second and without a doubt the most heterogeneous of the regions is called *center*. It includes the greatest number of states and is the most populous of the three areas and definitely could have been divided into two or more sub-regions. It is made up of the Federal District and the states on the immediate periphery of the political and cultural center of the country, plus the states of the west, north-center and Veracruz. Despite its heterogeneity it is possible, however, to find some similarities such as the great political, ideological and socio-cultural influence of Mexico City in this region compared with that in states farther north and south and the persistence of pronounced social inequalities in all of the states considered, exacerbated at times by the presence of important core industrial areas such as the valley of Mexico, Puebla and Guadalajara.

The third region, the *south*, is made up of the southern Pacific states and those of the Yucatan peninsula. In general, these are states with a much lower level of industrialization than in the north and center, with indexes of productivity, per-capita income, welfare and living standards far below the national average and with much more visible social inequalities. In recent years, the develop-

⁵ Perhaps the most careful breakdown of the country is Angel Bassols' 8 large divisions (1986 P. 370), which for the purposes of this study are aggregated into the three that are clearly distinguishable in terms of public opinion.

ment of oil in Tabasco and in parts of Chiapas and the rise of tourism in Quintana Roo have helped reduce some of the socio-economic backwardness of the region, although the characteristic signs have basically remained constant.

The identification of the political and socio-cultural differences between regions and between strata led to the inference that cross tabulations of both series would yield significant results. In effect, they revealed notable variations in the perceptions of each strata with its correspondent region. They also showed that the differences among distinct strata are not uniform in each of the regions, tending on occasion to attenuate and on others to polarize. This third part shows the differences that exist between the distinct strata in the same region and within the similar strata of the three different national regions for each of the chosen topics. Chapter 8 includes differences of opinion by region and by strata; Chapter 9 outlines public opinion in 1983; Chapter 10 outlines public opinion in 1987.

8. DIFFERENCES OF OPINION

Regional differences

Regarding the question in 1983, *Which political party do you prefer?*, the PRI continued being the party with the majority of sympathizers: 55.3 percent of those interviewed said they preferred the PRI, while 10.5 percent cited the PAN and 26.1 percent said none. Behind the PAN was the PSUM with 3.8 percent. The other parties enjoyed little popularity, oscillating between 1.3 percent for the PST and 0.5 percent for the PMT. In 1987, the results were very different, with preferences for the PRI suffering an acute drop, falling to 29.6 percent of the total and losing the majority. However, the reduction in preferences for the PRI did not result in an increase for other parties. The PAN registered a slight drop from 10.5 to 10.3 percent and the PMS, successor of the PSUM, only increased its margin from 3.8 to 4 percent, which could be due to the fact that the new party included several organizations that acted independently in 1983. The rest of the parties considered together went from 4.3 to 9.6 percent.

Party Preference

	PRI		PAN		PSUM		OTHERS		NONE	
	83	87	83	87	83	87	83	87	83	87
NORTH	48.2	36.2	16.4	16.9	2.7	1.4	3.2	5.5	29.6	39.9
CENTER	56.9	26.0	9.8	8.6	4.2	4.8	4.4	10.6	24.6	50.1
SOUTH	56.5	37.8	6.5	10.3	3.1	3.2	5.2	9.3	28.6	39.4
NATIONAL	55.3	29.6	10.5	10.2	3.8	4.0	4.3	9.6	26.1	46.7

This important increase could have originated in better organization on behalf of several parties: the new PMS and PST and the renovated PDM on one hand, and the traditional but governmentally reinforced PARM and PPS. Nonetheless, it was the abstentionist option *none* that registered the greatest increase, from 26.1 to 46.7 percent, suggesting not a shift in party prefer-

ences in the population but the important effect that the presidential campaigns had had on the electorate.

In 1983, in the three regions considered, the north held the largest number of PAN sympathizers and the least number for the PRI. Among all those interviewed in the region, 16.4 percent indicated a preference for the PAN compared with the national average of 10.5 percent, while only 48.2 percent compared with a national average of 55.3 percent preferred the PRI. Sympathies for the other parties were very low, varying between 2.7 percent for the PSUM and barely 0.2 percent for the PMT and the PRT. It was in the center where the PRI reached its highest number of sympathizers with 56.9 percent and also where the leftist parties made their best gains, especially the PSUM with 4.2 percent of the preferences. The PAN only won 9.8 percent of the preferences, a percentage substantially lower than in the north (16.4 percent) and than the national average (10.5). The PAN obtained the least number of sympathizers in the south (6.5 percent), while the PRI reached a slightly lower percentage in the south than in the central zone but higher than in the north (56.5 percent). The PSUM won a larger share of sympathizers than in the north (3.1 percent) although not as much as in the center.

In 1987, the regional distribution of sympathies changed significantly for reasons mentioned. Although preferences for the PRI dropped in the three regions, it was in the north, paradoxically, where the reduction was least: from 48.2 percent to 36.2 percent, a decline of 12 points. In the south PRI support fell from 56.5 percent to 37.8 percent (18.7 points), but it was in the center --the most populous region-- where the PRI suffered its severest setback: from 56.9 percent to 26 percent, a drop of 30.9 points. From being the region with the greatest margin of PRI sympathizers, the center became the area with the lowest proclivity for the PRI, much less even than in the north. The PAN slightly raised its support in the north (16.4 to 16.9 percent) and in a more pronounced way in the south (6.5 to 10.3 percent), but it experienced a setback in the center, falling from 9.8 to 8.6 percent. The PMS lost popularity in

the north (2.7 to 1.4 percent) but gained some in the center (4.2 to 4.3 percent) and in the south (3.1 to 3.2 percent). The none response registered massive increases in the three regions, with the south being the most notable: The number of respondents who expressed their skepticism about all political parties rose from 24.6 percent (the lowest in 1983) to 40.7 (the highest in 1987) in the center of the country.

To the question in 1983, *How would you rate the current government?*, the national level response was 41.6 percent good or very good, 35.3 percent fair and only 14 percent rated the government negatively (bad or very bad). The most negative response came from the north (18.6 percent bad or very bad) and only 36.4 percent good or very good. The center registered the intermediate response with 42.5 percent favorable opinions and 13.8 percent negative, while the south was the region where the government was most popular with 43.2 percent favorable opinions and only 9.2 percent negative opinions.

Government Approval

	GOOD		FAIR		BAD		DK	
	83	87	83	87	83	87	83	87
NORTH	36.4	33.4	38.4	34.0	18.6	28.3	6.6	4.1
CENTER	42.5	27.2	33.7	34.3	13.8	30.9	10.0	7.5
SOUTH	43.2	33.9	39.6	36.1	9.2	22.3	8.0	7.6
NATIONAL	41.6	29.3	35.3	34.6	14.0	29.2	9.1	6.9

By 1987 things had changed. Along with shifts in party sympathies, the government lost popularity in the three regions with a drop in favorable opinions and an increase in negative ones. At the national level, the favorable responses dropped from 41.6 to 29.3 percent, while the unfavorable opinions rose from 14 to 29.2 percent. It was once again in the center region where the government lost the most favorable responses, going from 42.5 to 27.2 percent -- a drop of 15.3 points. In the north positive opinions barely dropped, going from 36.4 to 33.4 percent, and in the south they fell from 43.2 to 33.9 percent, a setback of 9.3 points. Negative re-

sponses themselves grew in all three regions: almost 10 points in the north, 17 points in the center and 13 points in the south.

In the first two months following the decree, the bank nationalization, was supported widely by the population. To the question, *The bank nationalization seems to be a measure?* 52 percent of those interviewed said they favored it, while only 11.3 percent said they opposed it and 19.2 percent described it as fair. If the non-negative responses (fair and good) are summed, the approval rating is a very pronounced 71.2 percent.

The bank nationalization --as the right to strike, government approval rating, and the majority of the other political-ideological themes-- was less popular in the north than in the center and in both regions than in the south. This variable confirmed once again the correlation between geography and culture in our country, as it was not only supported less but rejected most in the north than in the rest of the nation. Only 5.1 percent of those interviewed in the south expressed a negative opinion of the bank nationalization, while 11.7 in the center and 15.2 percent in the north rejected it. Backing for the bank nationalization reached 48.6 percent in the north against 52.6 percent in the south and 52.8 percent in the center.

Bank Nationalization

	GOOD		FAIR		BAD		DK	
	83	87	83	87	83	87	83	87
NORTH	48.6	29.8	18.5	22.5	15.2	33.2	17.8	14.5
CENTER	52.8	30.4	18.9	23.0	19.9	28.2	16.5	18.3
SOUTH	52.4	40.3	21.5	21.5	5.1	18.0	20.9	20.2
NATIONAL	52.0	32.0	19.2	22.7	11.3	27.4	17.5	18.0

By 1987, however, public opinion of the bank nationalization had changed substantially. The favorable responses dropped 20 points, hitting 32 percent, while the negative responses rose 27.4 points. In this case, and in contrast with party preferences and

government approval, the north remained the most skeptical of the three regions. In fact, unfavorable responses (33.2 percent) surpassed favorable ones (29.8 percent), which did not happen in the other regions. In the center, favorable responses dropped 22.4 points and negatives rose 16.5; in the south the respective percentage changes were 12.1 and 12.9, leaving this region as the most amenable to the bank nationalization.

Right to Strike.

	GOOD		FAIR		BAD		DK	
	83	87	83	87	83	87	83	87
NORTH	52.8	57.1	20.9	20.6	15.5	15.2	10.7	7.1
CENTER	56.4	58.9	16.1	17.2	12.2	13.5	15.3	10.3
SOUTH	62.1	60.5	17.8	18.2	10.4	10.8	9.6	10.5
NATIONAL	56.6	58.9	17.2	17.9	12.4	13.4	13.8	9.8

To the question, *You believe the right to strike is...?*, the nation expressed a high consensus, judging by the results of both polls. In 1987, favorable responses reached 58.9 percent, while only 13.4 percent responded negatively. As in the cases of government approval and preference for the PRI, the right to strike lost popularity moving from south to north. The south registered the highest percentage of favorable responses (60.5), with the center coming in at 58.9 and the north at 57.1 percent. The level of negative responses came in inverse order: they were least in the south (10.8 percent), intermediate in the center (13.5) and greatest in the north (15.2).

Church Participation

	GOOD		SOMETIMES		BAD		DK	
	83	87	83	87	83	87	83	87
NORTH	3.2	18.1	22.1	12.7	62.5	61.8	12.2	7.5
CENTER	3.7	11.4	20.5	9.2	66.1	69.5	9.7	9.9
SOUTH	4.4	15.1	20.5	10.5	68.5	63.4	6.6	10.9
NATIONAL	3.7	13.1	20.8	10.0	65.8	67.3	9.7	9.7

Both the 1983 and 1987 polls revealed a broad rejection to the question: *how do you feel about the church participating in politics?* In 1987, 67.3 percent of those interviewed were openly opposed to such participation while only 13.1 percent approved it, almost 4 times more than in 1983. Another 10 percent conceded that the church could intervene at times in politics. By region, we find that the north registered the most tolerance to church participation in politics --favorable responses were the highest among the three regions (18.1 percent) and negatives were the lowest at 61.8 percent-- followed by the south. The center was the region most averse to church intervention, registering the highest disapproval (69.5 percent) and the lowest approval (11.4 percent).

Military Participation.

	GOOD		FAIR		BAD		DK		NA	
	83	87	83	87	83	87	83	87	83	87
NORTH	14.2	22.8	18.4	17.5	37.1	47.5	4.1	6.9	24.2	5.3
CENTER	23.6	16.4	20.2	12.6	46.0	57.0	4.2	7.6	5.8	6.4
SOUTH	26.3	26.4	24.1	15.8	43.6	42.7	3.9	7.1	2.2	8.0
NATIONAL	22.7	19.1	20.5	13.9	44.2	53.2	4.2	7.4	8.5	6.5

Although not to the same extent as church participation in politics, the political participation of the military was also rejected by the majority. In 1987, 53.2 percent of those interviewed rejected the idea, while 19.1 percent approved it; in this case, however, it was in the south where military intervention was least unpopular with 26.4 percent in favor and 42.7 percent opposed, followed by the north. The center was revealed as the region least inclined toward political activity by the military, similar to the church participation issue. This fact would tend to confirm that the ideological legacy of the post-revolutionary State continued being strongest in the center of the country and in the regions nearby than on the outskirts.

To the question in 1983, *In your opinion, what we should do now is...?*, the majority of the sample favored changes at the national

level, but not necessarily radical ones. The most popular response was to *change some things and conserve others*, which, when added to the percentage of responses to the choice *slightly change things*, totaled 57.3 percent. However, 30.4 percent of the respondents favored radical change; in contrast, only 8.8 percent picked *conserve as much as possible* and an even smaller percentage (3.5) opted for *leave everything the way it is*. In total, the conservatives represented only 12.3 percent of those interviewed.

Attitude Toward Change

	Radical *		Moderate		Conservative	
	83	87	83	87	83	87
NORTH	34.8	25.8	57.4	56.5	7.8	17.6
CENTER	30.0	23.3	57.2	60.8	12.9	15.9
SOUTH	26.9	23.7	58.0	60.4	15.1	16.0
NATIONAL	30.4	23.72	57.3	60.07	12.3	16.21

* Radical here does not mean leftist, but willingness for change.

In agreement with the regional classification adopted here, we find the inclination toward radical change rises moving from south to north. Those favoring radical change were 26.9 percent in the south, 30 percent in the center and 34.8 percent in the north. In the same sense, those who preferred to *keep things as they are* were 15.1 percent in the south, 12.9 percent in the center and only 7.8 percent in the north. This paints a very clear tendency: The desire to introduce fundamental changes at the national level were greater in the north than in the center; and in both cases, greater than in the south.

In 1987 the level of radical responses dropped in the three regions and there was an increase in the percentages of moderates and conservatives. It is not easy to explain this shift toward conservatism within the Mexican population, above all if it is considered that the approval rating of the same government in power dropped, except for its international influence. The north continued being the region most inclined toward radical change (25.8 percent),

though it came to be the area with the highest index of conservative responses (17.6 percent), which suggests a major polarization of attitudes in that region compared with the other two.

The influence of newspapers published in the nation's capital is very great in practically all parts of the country. More than 50 percent of those who read a daily prefer one from the capital. In contrast, only 28.5 percent of those interviewed in 1987 named a local periodical. Among the capital dailies included in the survey -- those that we could call *national newspapers*-- the most read was *Excelsior*, which could be described as center on the partisan political scale, followed by *Novedades*, which could be described as right. The other national periodicals received much less support.

Newspaper Preference.

	EXCELSIOR		NOVEDADES		OTHER NAL		LOCAL		NA	
	83	87	83	87	83	87	83	87	83	87
NORTH	11.9	8.4	12.5	2.5	24.1	41.2	43.6	39.9	7.9	8.2
CENTER	19.1	11.4	10.9	4.9	46.2	47.8	15.1	22.4	8.7	13.4
SOUTH	19.8	10.5	20.3	8.0	23.9	25.8	24.6	42.5	11.4	13.4
NATIONAL	18.0	10.7	12.5	5.0	39.3	43.3	21.2	28.5	9.0	12.5

In the regions considered, we find a relatively high preference for local newspapers in the south (42.5 percent) and less for the nationals. In the north as well there is a clear preference for local dailies (39.9 percent). The center, as could be expected, is where the national dailies have the highest percentage of readers, in contrast with a low percentage for local newspapers (22.4 percent). Two great tendencies seem apparent: one that points toward a reduction of readers from the traditional large newspapers (*Excelsior* and *Novedades*) to other nationals and, another, that indicates a growing preference for local newspapers, except in the north.

Social differences

The following figure highlights in the first column the loss of sympathy for the PRI between 1983 and 1987 (from 55 to 30 percent), which is similar to the reduction in the percent of radicals in the same period (from 30 to 20), as is observed two figures back, and as well in the drop in the favorable rating of the government (from 42 to 29), as is seen two figures ahead.

On the other hand, in 1983 the PRI reached its highest levels of popularity, as would be expected, among public functionaries and politicians, three-fourths of whom (74.9 percent) openly declared their sympathies for the government party. Among businessmen, preferences for the PRI nonetheless reached 50.9 percent, with the lowest levels among merchants (46.5 percent) and in the service sector (47.1). The lower affinity for the PRI among businessmen explains why sympathies for the party among elites only hit 62.9 percent. Nonetheless, this percentage was greater than that for the middle strata (57 percent) and the base (54).

Party Sympathy

	PRI		PAN		PSUM		OTHERS		NONE	
	83	87	83	87	83	87	83	87	83	87
Government	74.9	52.1	5.4	4.0	4.1	3.0	1.0	7.3	10.9	32.6
Business	50.9	31.7	13.5	11.0	2.8	2.9	0.8	11.0	28.7	43.4
Intellectual	N.D	23.3	N.D	9.6	N.D	7.3	N.D	8.4	N.D	51.4
Professional	53.7	27.4	8.5	9.0	5.1	4.7	3.4	7.5	29.4	51.4
White Collar	50.2	28.5	9.4	11.6	5.8	2.8	8.0	9.9	26.6	47.4
Civil Servant	67.1	33.6	5.3	6.9	5.3	4.8	1.8	8.7	20.4	46.0
Blue Collar	52.7	21.9	14.9	14.7	4.7	6.3	5.2	11.6	22.4	45.4
Farmer	64.5	29.5	7.3	9.4	2.8	2.7	3.5	7.7	22.0	50.8
Unemployed	44.8	23.6	10.9	12.4	4.6	2.2	7.9	6.5	31.6	55.2
National	55.3	29.6	10.5	10.2	3.8	4.0	4.3	9.6	26.1	46.7

Regarding the PAN, its results among elites contrasted. Among public functionaries only 5.4 percent sympathized with the PAN, but support from business hit 13.5 percent, the second highest percentage among all strata with labor coming in at (14.9). The PSUM gained

4.1 percent of functionaries and barely 2.8 percent of business for an average of 3.4 percent of elite sympathies.

Among the middle strata, the PRI had the most sympathies among bureaucrats (67.1 percent), but only obtained 50.2 percent of the employees and 53.7 percent of the professionals and technicians. This made its average among the middle strata around 57 percent, less than that for the elite. Regarding the PAN, its average level of support among the middle strata was 5.3 percent, less than among the elites, given the low level of sympathy among bureaucrats (5.3) and the relatively high level of support among professionals and technicians (8.5 percent) and employees (9.4 percent). The PSUM reached its largest level of sympathies among the middle strata, especially among employees (5.8 percent), but followed closely by bureaucrats (5.3 percent) and professionals or technicians (5.1 percent).

Sympathies for the PRI at the base (54 percent) were even less than those among the middle strata and were markedly lower among the marginals (44.8 percent), while workers preferred the PRI in 52.7 percent of the cases. If the average at the base was not even lower, it was because the campesinos remained loyal to the PRI (64.5 percent). Regarding the PAN, its support at the base was surprisingly greater than among the middle and elite strata: 11 percent. The strata that expressed the greatest level of preference for the party was labor (14.9 percent), a higher percentage than business registered. The marginals as well sympathized with the PAN in 10.9 percent of the cases. The third highest source of PAN support came from the campesinos at 7.3 percent. For the PSUM, things did not bode well among the popular strata. Only 2.8 percent of the campesinos (similar to the level of business support) sympathized with PSUM, along with 4.6 percent of marginals and 4.7 percent of labor. Its average level of preference at the base was 4 percent, appreciably less than that from the middle strata.

As was indicated before, sympathies for the PRI suffered a marked erosion between 1983 and 1987 which should not be interpreted as a change in preference as much as an increase in political indifference, abstention or apathy for reasons cited above. In each one of the strata in the social pyramid the setback in sympathies for the PRI was evident. Politicians maintained the highest level of support for the PRI and in fact only they remained above 50 percent. Business, which in 1983 had registered among the lowest levels of support for the PRI, changed its relative position in 1987, not so much by increasing its level of support but by not dropping off as much as the majority of the other strata (31.7 percent). Intellectuals, who figured only in the 1987 poll, registered very little sympathy for the PRI: 23 percent, which was only higher than that of labor. On average, the three elite strata preferred the party in power in 36.6 percent of the cases, an overall percentage higher than that of the middle and lower strata.

Regarding the PAN, the party's setback among elites was notable. Its sympathies among politicians fell to 4 percent (5.4 percent in 1983) and among businessmen to 11 percent (13.5 percent in 1983). Intellectuals, however, showed relatively high preferences for the PAN (9.6 percent) which did not keep the PAN average among elites from dropping to 8.2 percent. The PMS improved its performance among elites in 1987. This was due not to its sympathies among politicians, which fell to 3 percent, or among businessmen, which remained constant at 2.9 percent, but because of the inclusion of intellectuals who supported the PMS at the rate of 7.3 percent --the best result for the PMS at the top of the social pyramid. In fact, the elites came to be the sector with the highest index of support for the PMS, surpassing that of the middle and lower strata.

Among the middle strata, the bureaucrats maintained their position of closest affinity to the PRI, albeit at a very reduced rate from 1983: 33.6 percent. Among employees PRI preferences fell to 28.5 percent and among professionals it fell further still: to 27.4 percent. On average, the middle strata preferred the PRI in 29.8

percent of the cases. For the PAN, things improved considerably: all three middle strata registered increases in preferences for the party. Nine percent of professionals opted for PAN, 11.6 percent of the employees (the third highest percentage) and 6.9 percent of the bureaucrats. On average, the middle strata supported the PAN in 9.2 percent of the cases. The PMS, on the other hand, experienced a marked setback among the middle sectors. It lost support among the three middle strata, falling to only 4.7 percent among professionals, 4.8 percent among bureaucrats and barely 2.8 percent among employees, for an average of 4.1 percent compared with 5.4 percent in 1983.

At the base PRI sympathies averaged barely 25 percent, being particularly low among workers (21.9 percent) and marginals (23.6 percent) and relatively high among campesinos (29.5 percent). Workers came to be the strata less inclined toward the PRI, surpassing the marginals who had occupied the spot in 1983, followed by employees and business. Workers themselves maintained their position as most supportive of the PAN: 14.7 percent, although the level was slightly less than in 1983 (14.9). On the other hand, the PAN improved its cut among the marginals (12.4 percent) and even among the campesinos (9.6 percent), for an average of 12.2 percent of the preferences at the base. Together the middle and base strata seem to be more closely tied to the PAN today than five years ago, in contrast with changes at the elite level.

The PMS gained considerably among labor, with an increase to 6.3 percent of worker preferences; nonetheless, this advance was counteracted by a loss of popularity among marginals: to 2.2 percent from 4.6 in 1983. Among campesinos, things stayed about the same: 2.7 percent. The setback among marginals meant that preferences for the PMS remained almost constant: 4 percent, compared with 3.8 in 1983.

Government Opinion

	GOOD		FAIR		BAD		DK	
	83	87	83	87	83	87	83	87
Government	59.2	60.2	27.6	22.2	9.2	14.1	3.9	3.4
Business	39.2	31.2	35.7	33.8	15.3	29.0	9.7	5.9
Intellectual	N.D	30.0	N.D	33.2	N.D	28.8	N.D	7.0
Professional	43.9	28.1	35.2	34.7	17.7	31.5	3.2	5.7
White Collar	39.6	26.1	37.6	39.0	15.2	28.4	7.6	6.5
Civil Servant	48.3	34.7	32.3	31.9	14.5	27.1	5.0	6.2
Blue Collar	32.7	23.8	39.1	39.6	16.4	31.5	11.8	5.1
Farmer	40.3	21.1	30.6	40.0	6.8	30.8	22.2	8.1
Unemployed	36.7	19.6	36.8	35.0	15.1	33.3	11.3	11.8
National	41.6	29.3	35.3	34.6	14.0	29.2	9.1	6.9

As in the case of the PRI, government popularity drops from top to bottom of the social pyramid. In 1983, we found the highest level of favorable opinions among elites, led by the strata of public functionaries and political leaders (59.2 percent). Nonetheless, the second elite strata (business) was much more skeptical of the government, granting it only a 39.2 percent approval rating. The average among both strata was 49.2 percent, greater, as has been said, than among the middle strata and greater still than among the lower strata. Regarding negative opinions, the same contrast is observed. Only 9.2 percent of the public functionaries and political leaders responded negatively, compared with 15.3 percent of entrepreneurs (one of the highest). The average of unfavorable opinions was 12.2 percent, which is less than that among the middle and lower strata, which correlates with previous results.

Among the middle strata, positive opinions of the government were registered in 43.9 percent of the cases. The bureaucrats were the most positive (48.3 percent), followed by professionals (43.9 percent). On the other hand, only 39.6 percent of employees (a percentage similar to that of business) spoke well of the government. Although the favorable opinions of the middle strata were not lower than those at the base, we find the negative opinions (15.8 percent) highest here among the three groups. Professionals were the most critical (17.7 percent) among all strata, but employees (15.2 per-

cent) and bureaucrats (14.5 percent) showed high levels of government rejection.

The base had the lowest level of positive responses (36.6 percent), although unfavorable opinions (12.8 percent) were not as abundant as in the middle strata. Campesinos were --as in the case of the PRI-- the most favorable to the government (40.3 percent), followed by marginals (36.7 percent); workers expressed, among all strata, the lowest percent of positive responses: 32.7 percent. The workers also were the most critical (16.4 percent negative opinions) at the base, only surpassed by professionals among all strata. The marginals expressed negative views in 15.1 percent of the cases and campesinos only did so in 6.8 percent, revealing themselves again as the great bastion of legitimacy for the regime.

In 1987 as in 1983 the elites continued being the group tied most closely to the government, although in reduced numbers. Politicians remained the strata with the highest index of favorable opinions (60.2 percent, slightly higher than in 1983), but on the other hand, approval dropped to 31.2 percent among business; intellectuals expressed positive opinions in 30 percent of the cases. On average, elite support for the government hit 40.5 percent --highest among all three strata owing, above all, to the predictable support from the politicians. Regarding negative opinions, intellectuals were the most critical strata at 29.8 percent, followed very closely by business at 29 percent. The politicians were the least critical sub-strata in the elite (14.1 percent) and throughout the entire social pyramid.

Among the middle strata positive opinions fell to 29.6 percent and the negatives grew to almost the same figure: 29 percent. The bureaucrats continued being the strata most favorable to the government with 34.7 percent approval. Among professionals, the percent was 28.1 and only 26.1 among employees. Negative responses were higher than positive ones among these last two sub-strata, reaching 31.1 and 28.4 respectively.

As in the case with the PRI, the base registered the most skeptical responses against the government. Only 21.5 percent of those interviewed in this level expressed positive opinions about the government, while 31.9 percent were critical, percentages that, in contrast with those of 1983, show a clear erosion of support for the government among the most populous sectors of society. Among marginals, positive opinions barely reached 19.6 percent (the lowest among all strata) and negatives rose to 33.3 percent (the highest); among campesinos the setback was more marked, with favorable responses dropping from 40.3 percent in 1983 to 21.1 percent in 1987 and negatives rising from only 6.8 percent in 1983 to 30.8 percent in 1987. The labor strata became the least averse to the government although negative responses (31.5 percent) exceeded positive ones (23.8).

And so, a direct relationship can be established between socio-economic level and support for the government. As we descend the social ladder, we find less favorable opinions of the government, which was already evident in 1983. Nonetheless, the 1987 poll reiterated that in the broad strata at the base the government already had lost the balance in its favor between negative and positive responses. Perhaps the clearest case is that of the workers who had changed its positions more than any other group, revealing perhaps a very low degree of class consciousness.

In 1983 an acute contrast is observed between the positions of two elite strata: public functionaries and politicians were the most enthusiastic defenders of the bank nationalization, while entrepreneurs were its biggest critics. The first group responded favorably to the bank nationalization in 72.4 percent of the cases, while the second group in only 43.2 percent. Despite this, the average level of support for the measure among elites (59.2 percent) was greater than that among the middle and lower strata.

Bank Nationalization.

	GOOD		FAIR		BAD		DK	
	83	87	83	87	83	87	83	87
Government	72.4	47.3	14.9	20.4	7.6	25.5	5.2	6.7
Business	43.2	33.7	21.7	20.8	18.5	30.6	16.4	14.7
Intellectual	N.D.	39.0	N.D.	25.6	N.D.	28.7	N.D.	6.6
Professional	59.4	32.4	19.4	28.5	12.8	29.8	8.3	9.3
White Collar	48.4	31.7	20.5	24.1	9.6	27.7	21.4	16.4
Civil Servant	60.5	33.7	19.5	23.5	6.3	30.1	13.4	12.5
Blue Collar	54.8	28.3	17.8	28.0	4.8	25.3	31.6	18.4
Farmer	51.1	21.5	11.4	17.8	4.0	15.8	33.5	45.0
Unemployed	49.3	24.3	17.5	18.5	3.5	23.2	29.4	34.0
National								
	52.0	32.0	19.2	22.7	11.3	27.4	17.5	18.0

The difference between functionaries and business also sharply contrasts on the negative side. The average of negative responses was barely 7.6 percent, while business criticized the measure in 18.5 percent of the cases, the highest level among all strata. The relatively frequent expression of unfavorable views among entrepreneurs drove the overall average of negative responses among elites to 12.3 percent, also the highest level among all three strata.

The middle strata showed less enthusiasm for the bank nationalization, but also were less critical. Favorable opinions averaged 57.4 percent and negatives 9.8, both less than among elites. The major supporters of the nationalization were bureaucrats (60.5 percent), followed by professionals (59.5 percent). Employees only supported it in 51.5 percent of the cases. However, regarding negative opinions, professionals were most critical (12.8 percent), followed by employees (9.7 percent) and in last place bureaucrats at 6.3 percent.

Among the popular strata the bank nationalization seems to have awakened relatively minor interest, considering that support as well as opposition were much lower than in the middle and elite strata. The marginals supported it in 49.3 percent of the cases, which was less than the campesinos (51.1 percent) and workers (54.8 percent). Labor was also relatively more critical, with 4.8 percent unfavor-

able opinions, followed by campesinos at 4 percent and marginals at 3.5. Negative responses at the base barely averaged 4.1 percent and positives reached 48.7 percent, slightly higher than that among the middle strata.

Approval of the bank nationalization changed radically from 1983 to 1987. All strata registered drops in favorable indices and increases in negative opinions. Politicians modified their positions to the greatest degree with only 47.3 percent expressing approval in 1987 compared with 72.4 percent in 1983, while 25.5 percent disapproved in 1987 compared with only 7.6 percent in 1983. Business continued being the most critical sector of this federal government decision. Their negative opinions were most intense (30.6 percent), although their positive opinions were not among the lowest. Intellectuals expressed a moderate attitude of the nationalization, with 39 percent positive responses (the second highest percentage) and 28.7 percent critical, also one of the highest percentages. Together, the elites constituted the stratum where the nationalization enjoyed the most support (40 percent), much more than in the middle and lower strata.

In 1987, as in 1983, the middle strata supported the nationalization less, but also criticized the measure less than the elites. Though the balance between negative and positive responses changed considerably --to the point of practically equaling each other-- bureaucrats, who were the main supporters of the nationalization in 1983, became the most critical sector of the measure registering the highest percentage of negative responses (30.1) in the middle strata and the second highest throughout the entire social pyramid, just behind business. It is probable that the growth in the number of university students has provoked among the middle classes a strengthening of a more independent set of attitudes than is expressed in a topic like this.

At the base, once again in 1983, the positive and negative opinions were, both, the lowest among the three levels, confirming

the fact that the nationalization stirred and maintained much less interest among the less-privileged groups. Workers, campesinos and marginals supported the nationalization in 24.7 percent of the cases and criticized it in 21.4 percent (a percentage much higher than the 4.1 percent in 1983). Campesinos were distinguished as the strata furthest from the bank nationalization, registering the lowest margins of support (21.5 percent) and criticism (15.8 percent) in the entire social pyramid.

As in the case of the bank nationalization, public opinion about the right to strike tended to polarize at both ends of the social pyramid. The highest level of support is found among elites, but also the highest rejection rate of this labor weapon. Public functionaries were its biggest supporters in 1983 (74.6 percent) and business was one of the strata least convinced of the necessity of this right (50.2 percent). Regarding negative opinions, business registered the highest percentage (15.9 percent), while public functionaries and political leaders the lowest at 8.1 percent. The elite averages were 62.4 percent for and 12 percent against.

Right to Strike.

	GOOD		FAIR		BAD		DK	
	83	87	83	87	83	87	83	87
Governments	74.6	62.0	11.8	13.7	8.1	19.8	5.2	4.6
Business	50.2	56.7	20.2	18.8	15.9	14.8	13.7	9.8
Intellectual	N.D.	66.8	N.D.	15.8	N.D.	12.4	N.D.	5.0
Professional	65.7	65.9	16.0	19.2	9.6	7.8	8.6	7.2
White Collar	51.4	59.3	16.0	21.4	14.0	10.3	18.6	9.1
Civil Servant	64.6	69.0	15.6	13.4	8.3	9.6	11.5	8.0
Blue Collar	65.1	56.2	13.6	20.2	9.5	15.1	11.8	8.4
Farmer	38.7	44.0	16.9	23.0	10.7	11.8	33.8	21.4
Unemployed	49.0	53.2	19.8	17.7	14.7	13.0	16.5	16.0
National	56.6	58.9	17.2	17.9	12.4	13.4	13.8	9.8

Among the middle strata, professionals were the biggest supporters of the right to strike (65.7 percent); bureaucrats supported it in 64.6 percent of the cases and employees were the least enthusiastic middle stratum, registering positive opinions in only 51.4 percent of the cases. Employees also were the most critical with 14

percent negative opinions. Professionals rejected the right to strike 9.6 percent of the time and bureaucrats 8.3. The averages for the middle strata were 60.6 percent for and 10.6 percent against, both less than the elite averages.

The lowest indices of support for the right to strike in 1983 were registered at the base. Among campesinos, the percentage of favorable opinions barely reached 38.7 percent, significantly less than that for business. The marginals only supported it in 49 percent of the cases, another percentage lower than that of business. Only workers registered a majority of positive opinions, which can be easily explained by their personal stake in the right to strike, supporting it in 65.1 percent of the cases. The negative responses to the right to strike were higher at the base (11.6 percent) than among the middle strata. Marginals rejected it 14.7 percent of the time, a percentage only surpassed by business. Campesinos were critical in 10.7 and workers in 9.5 percent of the cases. It is interesting to note that public functionaries, bureaucrats and professionals were less critical of the right to strike than were workers themselves.

Although profound differences are found between the 1983 and 1987 results regarding party sympathies and opinion of the bank nationalization, the tendencies remained firm concerning the right to strike, showing only minor differences in the responses from one year to the other. This fact should be taken seriously in evaluating the general results of both polls.

Among elites, the average of favorable opinions to the right to strike was 61.8 percent in 1987 compared with 62.4 percent in 1983; considering everything, it is worthwhile to mention some changes that, although small, should not go unobserved. Among public functionaries the right to strike lost points, converting this stratum from the most favorable to the most critical. Its positive opinions dropped from 74.6 percent to 62 percent and the negatives rose from 8.1 to 19.8 percent, the highest in 1987. However, the overall re-

sults among elites do not change much, thanks to the inclusion of intellectuals in 1987, who were revealed as the most favorable sector to the right to strike (66.8 percent) and one of the least critical (12.4 percent); business, for its part, improved its position by increasing positive opinions 6.5 points (to 56.7 percent) and slightly reducing negative opinions from 15.9 to 14.8 percent.

Public opinion of the right to strike also improved among the middle strata, with marginal increases in positive responses among all three sub-strata and reductions of negative responses in two of the three. Bureaucrats were most identified with the right to strike (69 percent support) among all strata and their negative opinions (9.6 percent) were counted among the least critical. Employees continued being the least favorable among the middle strata.

Together, the base maintained its position: 51.1 percent favorable opinions (50.9 percent in 1983) and 13.3 negative (11.6 percent in 1983). Nonetheless, it was notable that worker support of strikes lost 9 points and rejection gained more than 5 points, although such results were offset by an increase in favorable opinions among campesinos and marginals. The loss of credibility of the right to strike among workers could have been due to the poor image that strikers created in recent years.

In accordance with the 1983 results, opposition to church participation in politics --although elevated in all strata-- tended to slacken from top to bottom of the social scale. Opposition was more pronounced among elite than middle strata and more pronounced among both than at the base.

In contrast with what was observed in the previous variables, there were no marked differences among elite strata regarding church participation, although some differences persisted. Negative responses among business (66.3 percent) were less than among public functionaries and political leaders (76.7 percent), but open approval was equally low among both groups: 2.8 percent in the first

case and 3 percent in the second. Regarding the possible responses *little* and *very little*, functionaries and political leaders expressed them in 14.4 percent of the cases and business in 20.4 percent. And so we have elite averages of 2.9 percent open support, 17.4 percent of some tolerance and 71.5 percent rejection.

	Church Participation							
	GOOD		FAIR		BAD		DK	
	83	87	83	87	83	87	83	87
Government	3.0	11.5	14.4	9.2	76.7	74.4	5.8	5.0
Business	2.8	13.1	20.3	8.4	66.3	68.9	10.4	9.4
Intellectual	.D	9.1	N.D	8.1	N.D	76.7	N.D	6.0
Professional	4.0	12.7	20.5	7.4	71.0	73.4	4.5	6.5
White Collar	3.2	13.7	23.0	13.0	66.8	64.8	7.0	8.5
Civil Servant	4.2	10.4	16.1	8.5	72.1	70.8	7.8	10.2
Blue Collar	3.6	16.6	29.1	9.9	54.2	61.3	13.1	2.0
Farmer	5.6	16.1	22.0	10.3	48.5	53.8	24.0	19.6
Unemployed	5.7	15.1	24.2	14.6	60.4	56.4	9.7	13.9
National	3.7	13.1	20.8	10.0	65.8	67.3	9.7	9.7

Among the middle strata, the rejection rate dropped slightly (70 percent), while tolerance (19.9 percent) and open approval (3.8 percent) rose. Bureaucrats were most opposed to church participation (72.1 percent), although this sector also registered a relatively high level of open support: 4.2 percent. Professionals were opposed in 71 percent of the cases and in favor in 4 percent. Finally, employees showed the least amount of open support (3.2 percent) but were also least opposed (66.8 percent).

The popular strata showed much more tolerance of church participation than the others. Open rejection among them reached only 54.4 percent, compared with 25.1 percent of moderate tolerance and 5 percent open support. Within this segment was a polarization similar to that of the middle strata, as is indicated by the fact that marginals were the strata most opposed (60.4 percent) but also most favorable (5.7 percent). Campesinos backed church participation in politics 5.6 percent of the time, which was almost as high as among marginals, and their rejection rate was substantially less (48.5

percent). Campesinos were the most tolerant sector. Workers rejected church participation in 54.2 percent of the cases --a percentage only higher than that of the campesinos-- and tolerated it at times in 29.1 percent. On the other hand, only 3.6 percent of workers expressed open support.

In 1987 the responses to this question showed some change, above all regarding favorable opinions.⁶ Among elites, approval went from only 2.9 percent in 1983 to 11.2 percent in 1987, even though intellectuals proved to be the least inclined of all strata to such intervention (9.1 percent). In the middle strata, the jump in favorable opinions was no less notable: from 3.8 to 12.2 percent. At the base it went from 5 to 15.9 percent.

At any rate, one result was confirmed in 1987: approval of church participation in politics grew from top to bottom on the social scale: less among elites, moderate in the middle, and more at the base. There was no sector more inclined toward such participation than the workers (16.6 percent). On the other hand, intellectuals distinguished themselves with the opposite sentiment followed closely by the bureaucrats whose approval rating was second lowest at 10.4 percent.

Possibly the different structuring of responses had something to do with the drop in intermediate (fair) opinions in all strata as well. In reality, the sum of the choices *good* and *fair* in both polls yielded very similar results.

⁶ In 1987 the structure of responses was modified to make them coincide with the question about military participation in politics. Instead of the four possible responses for 1983 (*a lot*, *a little*, *at times*, and *no*), the 1987 options were as follows: *definitely yes*, *yes*, *at times*, *no* and *definitely no*. To make the results comparable for both polls, the choices *a little* and *at times* were summed to constitute the response *fair*; in the 1987 poll, the choices *definitely yes* and *yes* were summed to constitute the positive responses and *definitely no* constitutes the negatives, leaving three types of responses in each poll. It may explain why favorable opinions to church participation in politics went up in all strata, which should be taken with some reservation.

Negative responses, higher in 1987 than in 1983, supported the idea that church participation in politics did not win any new converts in recent years and probably lost some. Among elites the negatives went from 71.5 to 73.3 percent, highlighting once again the intellectuals as the clearest opponents of church intervention in politics: 73.3 percent. It is worth mentioning that negative opinions rose among businessmen and, on the other hand, dropped (although very slightly) among politicians.

In the middle strata negative opinions remained practically unchanged, although registering an increase among professionals and a decrease among employees and bureaucrats. At the base, as among elites, negative opinions rose, except among the marginals. The same tendency emerged for criticism of church participation as for support of it: The most critical were the elites, followed by the middle strata, while the base demonstrated greater tolerance of such participation.

The responses in 1983 to military participation in politics were adjusted in the same way as those for church participation. Rejection of military intervention, once again, was greater among elites than among the middle strata and among both than at the base. Similarly, open approval was greater at the base than among the middle strata and among both than at the top.

Military Participation.

	GOOD		FAIR		BAD		DK	
	83	87	83	87	83	87	83	87
Government	17.5	20.0	23.8	13.4	50.2	61.0	8.4	5.8
Business	21.5	17.3	19.4	14.5	46.2	55.8	12.6	12.4
Intellectual	N.D	17.4	N.D	12.4	N.D	63.1	N.D	7.1
Professional	18.5	21.4	21.7	15.7	53.3	52.3	6.6	10.7
White Collar	20.4	22.0	19.2	12.4	48.2	48.0	12.2	17.7
Civil Servant	25.1	16.2	24.0	14.8	41.6	54.9	9.3	14.1
Blue Collar	28.4	22.1	20.4	13.1	35.5	49.0	15.5	15.7
Farmer	30.6	19.4	15.0	13.6	30.1	41.6	24.4	25.4
Unemployed	29.7	20.3	18.7	12.6	39.2	48.4	12.6	18.7
National	22.7	19.1	20.5	13.9	44.2	53.2	12.7	13.9

In this there also were no evident differences among the elite groups. Although some differences persisted, they seemed instead to be hues of the same color. Rejections among public functionaries and political leaders (50.2 percent) was greater than among entrepreneurs (46.2 percent) and the approval rating among the former (17.4 percent) was less than among the latter (21.6). On the other hand, acceptance at *times* of military intervention among functionaries and political leaders (23.8 percent) exceeded that among business (19.4). The respective averages among elites were: 48.2 percent for open rejection, 21.6 percent for acceptance at *times* and 19.5 percent for frank support. As was observed, even at this level, where the opposition to military intervention was great, it did not come close to the level of opposition against church intervention in politics. It can be definitely concluded that Mexican society is much more tolerant of military intervention than church participation in politics.

Among the middle strata, open opposition dropped (47.7 percent) and acceptance rose (21.3 percent) although both to very slight degrees. Acceptance at *times* (21.6 percent) was similar to that among the elites. The greatest rejection at this level came from the professionals (53.3 percent) and also the least approval (18.5). Employees expressed opposition in 48.2 percent of the cases and approval in 20.4. The most inclined toward military intervention were the bureaucrats, among whom only 41.6 percent openly rejected and 25.1 percent supported it.

An increase of tolerance toward military intervention is really notable among the popular strata. At this level, only 34.9 percent were opposed while 29.5 percent admitted to open support. Campesinos were most inclined to such intervention with a refusal rate of only 30.1 percent, while their level of support was 30.6. This was the only strata in which backing for military participation in politics was greater than opposition to it and can be explained perhaps in the original high campesino composition of the army, although today

the army is mainly made up of middle class and urban popular class enlistees. The marginals maintained a high level of support (29.4 percent) although their level of refusal was higher than that of campesinos (39.2 percent). Workers favored military intervention 28.4 percent of the time and opposed it 35.5 percent.

Nationwide public opinion of military participation in politics showed slight changes between 1983 and 1987. The results in general were very similar for each of the strata, although a moderate reduction of positive responses and a slightly sharper increase of negatives was noted. Among elites, politicians were one of the few strata to show a greater inclination toward such participation over the four-year period: 20 percent in 1987 compared with 17.4 percent in 1983. But, on the other hand, business reduced its approval rating to such an extent that it offset the increase among politicians. Intellectuals were not too keen on the idea; only 17.4 percent of them approved it. However, negative opinions rose almost 10 points among politicians and increased as well among businessmen. Intellectuals were the strata most opposed to military participation: 63.1 percent, for which, on average, elites constituted the most critical level against such participation. The choice *fair* lost ground not only among elites but in the other two strata in favor of open opposition.

In the middle strata, the level of approval dropped as well and negative responses increased. Nonetheless, professionals as well as employees became more inclined toward military intervention, so much so that in both cases while positive responses rose, negative ones declined. If the average of the three strata yielded the above-mentioned result it was because bureaucrats appreciably reduced their approval (from 25.1 to 16.2 percent) and increased their disapproval from 41.6 to 54.9 percent. It should not be forgotten, however, that except for the bureaucrats, the middle strata showed more receptivity to military participation.

It was at the base where the idea in question lost the most ground. Favorable opinions dropped 9 points and negatives gained 12. The campesino strata showed the greatest drop in approvals, falling from 30.6 percent in 1983 to only 19.4 percent in 1987, the biggest drop at the base. Regarding disapproval, the workers registered the largest increase, going from 35.5 to 49 percent. Also, positive responses dropped and negatives increased among marginals. In sum, although the base continued being the level least opposed to military participation, its disapproval grew more than in other levels to the point of almost equaling them.

Attitude Toward Change

	RADICAL		MODERATE		CONSERVATIVE		DK	
	83	87	83	87	83	87	83	87
Government	27.7	17.9	65.3	56.5	7.0	14.8	N.D	10.9
Business	31.6	17.8	56.2	50.5	12.0	15.8	N.D	15.9
Intellectual	N.D	24.1	N.D	53.4	N.D	12.7	N.D	9.8
Professional	34.1	18.4	58.2	59.8	7.8	9.3	N.D	12.2
White Collar	29.0	22.4	55.8	53.1	15.2	9.8	N.D	14.6
Civil Servant	32.5	21.1	56.4	54.3	11.1	12.0	N.D	12.2
Blue Collar	28.0	20.9	52.4	45.6	19.5	15.1	N.D	18.2
Farmer	34.2	23.9	46.6	34.5	19.2	15.2	N.D	26.4
Unemployed	31.6	17.9	55.4	41.5	13.1	14.9	N.D	25.7
National	30.4	19.9	57.3	50.4	12.3	13.6	N.D	16.1

With the exception of the campesinos, all other strata came out in favor of moderate changes in national life, which remained the most firmly entrenched attitude among those interviewed. Nonetheless, from the conservative and radical sides notable differences were observed. Contrary to what might be expected, the percentage of conservative attitudes was greatest at the base, moderate in the middle and least at the top. Preferences for moderate change were, in contrast, greater at the top, moderate in the middle and least at the base. Regarding radical change, the same distribution of attitudes was not observed, with the most radical being in the middle, followed by the base and then the elites.

Interesting results were observed among elites. Business expressed more conservative attitudes (12 percent) than public func-

tionaries (7 percent) but also more radical ones, with the former at 31.6 percent and the latter at 27.7 percent. Public functionaries and political leaders exhibited a greater tendency among all strata for moderate change (65.3 percent). The averages among elites were: 29.6 percent for radical change, 60.8 percent for moderate change and 9.5 percent for keeping things the way they were.

Among the middle strata, the conservative responses were higher (11.3 percent) as well as radical ones (32.5 percent), reducing the preference for moderate change (56.8 percent) in relation to elite attitudes. Such results show a greater polarization in the second level than at the top, showing less social stability among the middle strata. The most radical were professionals (34.1 percent), followed by bureaucrats (32.5 percent) and employees (29). Employees were, for their part, the most conservative (15.2 percent), followed by bureaucrats (11.1) and professionals (7.8 percent), who were identified as the most inclined among the middle strata toward great changes.

Conservatives at the base were proportionally more numerous (18.2 percent) than in the middle strata, although radicals were less abundant (31.2 percent). Those who opted for moderate change (51.4 percent) were also fewer than those in the other two levels. The most conservative sector at the base was the workers (19.5 percent) with the campesinos close behind at 19.2. Although less, the percentage of marginals who wanted the present reality to be conserved continued rising (13.1 percent). Although the campesinos were the second most conservative stratum, they were also the most radical of all (34.2 percent), which made this the most polarized sector in its internal positions. Radical workers represented 28 percent of the cases with radical marginals coming in at 31.6 percent. Only public functionaries and political leaders were less radical than workers.

In 1987 the results were very different although it should be recognized in part as a result of the new questionnaire design: The

inclusion of new choices (don't know and no answer) reduced the margin of significant responses. Nonetheless, such a change is not enough to explain an almost constant result in all strata: the reduction in the percentage of favorable responses to radical change and a moderate increase in conservative responses.

The drop in radical attitudes was similar in all three levels; among elites radical responses dropped almost 10 points; among the middle strata 11 points and a little more than 10 points at the base. The strata that registered the biggest changes in this sense were business (14 points), professionals (16 points) and notably the marginals (14 points). It should be said that intellectuals proved to be the most radical stratum: 24.1 percent.

Moderate attitudes also registered drops in all strata, with the single exception of professionals. The most pronounced drops were registered at the base, especially among campesinos (12 points) and the marginals (14 points). The middle strata maintained their indices of moderate attitudes without apparent changes: 9 points in the case of functionaries and 6 points for business.

On the other hand, the percentage of conservatives went up at the national level, although with considerable variations among the sub-levels. At the top, functionaries and business tended more toward conservatism, going from 7 to 14.8 points among the former and from 12 to 15.3 percent among the latter. Regarding intellectuals, 12.7 percent of them proved to be conservative. Among the middle strata, professionals and bureaucrats became more conservative, although at very small rates. Employees, on the other hand, reduced their percentage of conservative responses.

At the base, the percentage of conservative responses rose only among marginals and only to a small degree. Workers as well as campesinos proved to be less conservative than before, although in the case of the campesinos, as has been seen, all of their significant responses were reduced proportionally.

In 1983, the two national newspapers with the largest circulation --*Excelsior* and *Novedades*-- tended to be read with greatest frequency by the elites than by the middle and popular strata, while, on the other hand, the preference for local dailies was greater at the base than among the middle strata and among both of them than at the top.

Public functionaries and political leaders proved to have the greatest predilection for national dailies, especially for *Excelsior* (34 percent) and the least for local dailies (13.6 percent). Entrepreneurs also preferred *Excelsior* (15.5 percent), although their affection for *Novedades* (21.6 percent) was proportionally greater and they tended to read local dailies with more frequency (17.4 percent) than politicians. The average number of readers of local dailies at the top was 15.5 percent.

Newspaper Preference.

	EXCELSIOR		NOVEDADS		OTHER NAL		LOCAL		NA	
	83	87	83	87	83	87	83	87	83	87
Government	34.0	14.8	17.6	5.3	33.6	41.8	13.6	32.7	1.2	4.2
Business	15.5	12.1	21.6	5.9	37.5	44.7	17.4	30.5	8.0	8.8
Intellectual	N.D	18.2	N.D	4.7	N.D	51.1	N.D	26.7	N.D	4.8
Professional	24.9	11.9	12.8	7.4	35.8	44.7	20.9	30.1	5.6	6.0
White Collar	12.2	9.8	10.4	5.9	45.0	38.4	26.4	32.7	6.0	10.7
Civil Servant	16.4	9.0	12.7	5.1	41.6	51.6	25.5	32.6	3.8	7.9
Blue Collar	8.9	7.9	8.4	3.2	47.1	48.2	24.0	26.9	11.6	10.8
Farmer	5.3	4.4	3.0	1.1	52.2	40.1	22.0	19.2	17.5	34.1
Unemployed	6.1	5.9	8.4	2.0	42.3	43.0	27.8	19.4	15.4	28.6
National	18.0	10.7	12.5	5.0	39.3	43.3	21.2	28.5	9.0	12.5

The preference for *Excelsior* (17.8 percent), *Novedades* (12 percent) and in general for all of the national dailies was lower among the middle strata, while the preference for local dailies was higher. Professionals read national dailies most frequently, although their preference for local dailies (20.9 percent) was higher than that among elites. At the other extreme, employees preferred locals in 26.4 percent of the cases and very infrequently

read *Excelsior* (12.2 percent) and *Novedades* (10.4 percent). The bureaucrats were in the middle, with a 25.5 percent preference for local newspapers.

The preference for national dailies was particularly low among the popular strata, especially among campesinos, among whom only 3 percent read *Novedades* and 5.3 percent *Excelsior*. It is important to observe that campesinos preferred two other national dailies: *El Herald de Mexico* (9.2 percent) and *la Prensa* (7.5 percent). On the other hand, 22 percent of campesinos opted for local dailies. The marginals showed little enthusiasm for *Novedades* (8.4 percent) and *Excelsior* (6.1 percent), preferring *la Prensa* (10.5 percent) and *El Sol de Mexico* (6.9 percent) more than *Excelsior*. At any rate, 27.8 percent of them --the highest percentage within the group-- opted for local dailies, which is understandable given the need to find work. Workers, for their part, read the *Esto* as much as *Excelsior* (8.9 percent for each one), leaving *Novedades* (8.4 percent) in third place; 22 percent of them picked local dailies.

The design of this question changed considerably in 1987. Three more periodicals were included: *El Dia*, *La Jornada* and *El Nacional*, which made the percentages drop for the other newspapers. *Excelsior* especially registered drops up to more than 50 percent in some strata, such as among politicians (from 34 to 14.8 percent) and professionals (from 24.9 to 11.9 percent). On the other hand, intellectuals proved to be most tied to *Excelsior* (18.2 percent). Preferences for this newspaper, although lower than in 1983, maintained the same pattern of distribution: greater at the top than among the middle strata and among both of them than at the base.

The drop in the margin of preference for *Novedades* was even more pronounced than in the previous case. In some cases the newspaper lost up to 75 percent readership, such as among marginals. Among politicians only 5.3 percent chose it (17.6 percent in 1983) and among business 5.9 percent (21.6 percent in 1983). Intellectuals preferred it in a scant 4.7 percent of the cases. Slightly less was

the drop among the middle strata, which in fact ceased to be the level at which *Novedades* achieved its best results: 7.4 percent among professionals and 5.9 percent among employees. At the base, preferences for this periodical almost disappeared: 3.2 percent among workers, 2 percent among marginals and 1.1 percent among campesinos. In fact, *Novedades* fell to third place on the national preference list, coming in behind the *Heraldo de Mexico*, also conservative.

In contrast with what happened with these national dailies, preferences for local dailies and other national periodicals went up considerably across all strata. Highlighted among the other nationals for relatively high percentages of readers was the *Heraldo de Mexico* (5.3 percent), the *Esto* (4.3 percent) and *la Prensa* (4.6 percent); the last two continued being preferred at the base, with *Novedades*, *Excelsior* and *La Jornada* preferred in the middle and *Excelsior* and the *Heraldo* preferred at the top. Functionaries expressed high preferences for *El Nacional* and *Unomasuno* and intellectuals for *La Jornada*.

9. PUBLIC OPINION IN 1983

A low percentage of sympathies for the PRI and a high percentage for the PAN emerged in the north --not within one or a few strata but throughout the social pyramid in the region. Without exception all strata in the north expressed fewer preferences for the PRI than in the center, including the traditional bastions of PRI support: public functionaries, political leaders and bureaucrats. In the same sense and with the single exception of the bureaucrats, all strata in the north expressed greater preference for the PAN than did the strata in the center. In some cases the differences were quite notable, as among functionaries and political leaders. Those in the north sympathized with the PAN at rates higher than the national average.

PARTY SYMPATHY

Strata	PRI				PAN				PSUM			
	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg
Government	65.3	77.1	75.5	74.9	3.9	13.1	2.5	5.4	3.2	4.4	4.4	4.1
Business	45.5	51.2	56.4	50.9	13.1	20.2	7.2	13.5	2.3	3.4	0.6	2.8
Average	55.4	64.1	65.9	62.9	8.5	16.6	4.8	9.4	2.7	3.9	2.5	3.4
Professional	52.2	55.6	45.8	53.7	8.4	12.0	4.2	8.5	2.2	5.2	8.3	5.1
White Collar	45.7	51.2	51.4	50.2	8.4	13.8	8.3	9.4	1.1	7.8	2.8	5.8
Civil Servant	57.0	70.3	65.3	67.1	5.9	5.4	2.8	5.3	5.4	4.7	8.3	5.3
Average	51.6	59.0	54.2	57.0	7.6	10.4	5.1	7.7	2.9	5.9	6.5	5.4
Blue Collar	38.2	57.2	47.6	52.7	12.5	22.4	17.5	14.9	3.9	5.1	3.2	4.7
Farmer	53.2	65.9	68.1	64.5	8.0	9.7	1.4	7.3	3.2	3.0	1.4	2.8
Marginal	32.4	44.9	56.2	44.8	10.8	16.2	6.8	10.9	7.4	4.8	1.4	4.6
Average	41.3	56.0	57.3	54.0	10.4	16.1	8.6	11.0	4.8	4.3	2.0	4.0

In the south, PRI preferences remained relatively constant in comparison with the center, while those for the PAN tended to drop. Nonetheless, the fact that workers in the south once again were the sector most closely tied to the PAN leads to the conclusion that the notorious inclination of labor to this party is not a regional phenomenon but a general national characteristic. Regarding the PSUM, its low popularity in the north and relatively high popularity in

the center is clear. If we consider the three parties together, we conclude that the north remains inclined toward the political right, in contrast with the greater plurality of the center and the relatively high level of support for the government in the south.

The north once again showed the highest level of skepticism toward the government. There was no stratum more skeptical than northern workers, who also maintained this position in the other two regions. But among northern elites as well there was very little backing for the government. Almost one in three functionaries in this region expressed a negative opinion and only one in three businessmen expressed a positive one.

Government Opinion

Strata	GOOD				FAIR				BAD			
	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg
Government	53.3	60.7	59.1	59.2	28.6	27.0	29.7	27.6	32.2	8.1	5.0	9.2
Business	32.3	39.8	45.3	39.2	41.3	33.5	40.5	35.7	21.2	15.4	7.4	15.3
Average	42.8	50.2	52.2	49.2	34.9	30.2	35.1	31.6	26.7	11.7	6.2	12.2
Professional	34.8	45.7	45.8	43.9	33.7	35.1	37.5	35.2	27.2	15.9	15.3	17.7
White Collar	30.8	42.5	37.5	39.6	41.5	35.3	43.1	37.6	19.2	15.0	11.1	15.2
Civil Servant	46.3	50.0	43.1	48.3	37.6	30.0	36.1	32.3	12.9	14.4	16.7	14.5
Average	37.3	46.1	42.1	43.9	37.6	33.5	38.9	35.0	19.8	15.1	14.4	15.8
Blue Collar	28.9	34.1	30.2	32.7	42.1	37.6	42.9	39.1	18.4	16.0	15.9	16.4
Farmer	40.3	41.3	36.2	40.3	38.7	28.8	31.9	30.6	9.7	6.5	5.7	6.8
Marginal	35.3	35.3	43.9	36.7	36.8	37.4	34.2	36.8	20.6	14.7	12.3	15.1
Average	34.8	36.9	36.9	36.6	39.2	34.6	36.3	35.5	16.2	12.4	11.3	12.8

In the center, the government's popularity rose considerably and was a little higher still in the south. A uniform tendency is observed across the three regions: Support for the government drops from top to bottom of the social scale; support is greater among elites than among the middle strata and among both than at the base. In conclusion, government popularity decreases in two directions: from south to north and from the elites to the popular sectors.

Regarding variables such as political participation by the church and military, opinions polarized much more markedly in the south than in the center and north. While differences among elites, middle and base strata were minor in the north, they were acute in the south. Concerning church participation, the hypothesis could be advanced that businessmen in the north were less obstinate toward such intervention because in that region the church seems frequently allied with the more conservative business sectors in opposition to the political system. On the other hand, where the influence of the so-called *popular church* is great, businessmen vehemently challenged a political attitude that would incline itself to the popular strata.

Church Participation

Strata	Yes				Sometimes				No			
	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg
Government	2.6	1.9	8.6	3.0	18.9	13.3	14.1	14.4	66.7	79.7	74.7	
Business	3.0	2.7	3.1	2.8	25.2	18.7	23.1	20.4	61.6	66.7	70.8	
Average	2.8	2.3	5.8	2.9	22.0	16.0	18.6	17.4	64.1	73.2	72.7	71.5
Professional	3.3	4.9	0.0	4.0	21.7	20.7	18.1	20.5	70.7	69.2	80.6	71.0
White Collar	3.2	3.6	1.4	3.2	18.0	24.0	25.0	23.0	69.1	66.8	63.9	66.8
Civil Servant	4.3	3.8	5.6	4.2	21.5	16.2	8.3	16.1	65.6	71.8	81.9	72.1
Average	3.6	4.1	2.3	3.8	20.4	20.3	17.1	19.9	68.5	69.3	75.5	70.0
Blue Collar	3.9	3.5	3.2	3.6	21.1	32.5	22.2	29.1	55.3	52.4	61.9	54.2
Farmer	1.6	5.9	7.2	5.6	11.3	24.3	20.3	22.0	50.0	48.1	49.3	48.5
Marginal	2.9	6.0	6.8	5.7	16.2	25.2	27.4	24.2	69.1	59.3	57.5	60.4
Average	2.8	5.1	5.7	5.0	16.2	27.3	23.3	25.1	58.1	53.3	56.2	54.4

The great polarization of opinion in the south tended to be corroborated in the case of military intervention. Businessmen in this region opposed the idea more vehemently than their colleagues in the other regions; on the other hand, the popular strata supported it to such an extent that in the case of the campesinos support was considerably greater than opposition.

In this case, of course, a similar hypothesis to that for church participation would not work. An explanation could begin from

the assumption of a lower level of traditional values of civilian life in the south, or, rather, of a greater level of discontent among the popular strata --evidenced in the cases of PRI and government approval-- which moves them to consider to a great extent the possibility of truly radical changes.

Military Participation

Strata	GOOD				FAIR				BAD			
	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg
Government	18.1	16.5	20.9	17.4	16.4	25.9	22.6	23.8	38.3	52.6	54.7	50.2
Business	15.5	22.9	22.4	21.6	17.5	18.8	24.3	19.4	40.5	47.4	48.9	46.2
Average	16.8	19.7	21.6	19.5	16.9	22.3	23.4	21.6	39.4	50.0	51.8	48.2
Professional	14.2	19.9	16.7	18.5	19.6	20.4	30.6	21.7	47.8	54.8	52.8	53.3
White Collar	12.7	19.2	36.1	20.4	20.2	19.2	18.1	19.2	41.4	53.0	34.7	48.2
Civil Servant	18.3	28.6	18.1	25.1	26.9	22.4	27.8	24.0	32.3	42.4	50.0	41.6
Average	15.1	25.6	23.6	21.3	22.2	20.7	25.5	21.6	40.5	50.1	45.8	47.7
Blue Collar	21.1	31.2	23.8	28.4	10.5	21.9	25.4	20.4	27.7	36.0	42.8	35.5
Farmer	8.1	32.4	42.0	30.6	14.5	15.4	13.0	15.0	29.1	30.2	30.4	30.1
Marginal	16.1	31.5	32.9	29.4	16.2	17.1	28.8	18.7	38.2	41.3	30.1	39.2
Average	15.1	31.7	32.9	29.5	13.7	18.1	22.4	18.0	31.7	35.8	34.4	34.9

The analysis of public opinion about the right to strike confirmed a conservative tendency in the north as well as high polarization across strata in the south.

Right to Strike

Strata	GOOD				FAIR				BAD			
	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg
Government	68.0	75.2	80.5	74.6	15.8	11.6	8.9	11.8	9.6	7.9	14.3	8.1
Business	40.1	50.9	59.5	50.2	26.7	18.6	20.5	20.2	21.1	15.0	13.5	15.9
Average	54.0	63.0	70.0	62.4	21.2	15.1	14.7	16.0	15.3	11.4	13.9	12.0
Professional	64.1	64.6	73.6	65.7	20.7	14.7	16.7	16.0	13.0	9.3	7.0	9.6
White Collar	56.4	47.3	63.9	51.4	12.8	16.8	16.7	16.0	21.3	12.9	9.7	14.0
Civil Servant	64.5	64.1	66.7	64.6	21.5	13.2	19.4	15.6	8.6	8.9	5.6	8.3
Average	61.7	58.7	68.1	60.6	18.3	14.9	17.6	15.9	14.3	10.4	7.4	10.6
Blue Collar	61.9	65.6	66.7	65.1	18.4	11.3	19.0	13.6	10.5	9.7	7.9	9.5
Farmer	39.1	28.9	38.7	14.5	16.0	23.2	16.9	8.0	13.0	1.4	10.7	
Marginal	45.5	52.1	49.0	20.6	20.4	16.4	19.8	10.3	15.3	16.5	14.7	
Average	57.3	50.0	49.2	50.9	17.8	15.9	19.5	16.8	9.6	12.7	8.6	11.6

The elite and middle strata in the north expressed less inclination toward the right than their counterparts in the center who were even less inclined toward the right than those in the south. Things were different in the popular strata. Workers showed the same tendencies as the elite and middle strata, but campesinos and marginals supported the right to strike more in the north than in the south, which resulted in a great polarization of public opinion in this last region.

Regarding personal attitude to change, we find that two elite strata were more inclined toward radical change in the north than in the center and in both regions than in the south. In contrast, the popular strata in the south were the most radical and those in the north least. This was especially clear in the case of labor, although the same tendency was also observed among campesinos. The middle strata behaved similarly to the elites in general: more radical in the north than in the center and in both cases than in the south. Once again, extreme positions appeared in the south: high conservatism among elites and great radicalism at the base.

Attitude Toward Change

Strata	RADICAL				MODERATE				CONSERVATIVE			
	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg
Government	35.1	26.8	22.9	27.7	61.0	62.4	68.2	65.3	3.8	7.5	8.8	7.0
Business	38.6	31.9	20.7	31.6	53.6	55.9	62.7	56.3	7.7	12.0	16.5	12.0
Average	36.8	29.3	21.8	29.6	57.3	59.1	65.4	60.8	5.7	9.7	12.6	9.5
Professional	41.3	31.1	40.3	34.1	56.5	59.1	55.6	58.2	2.2	9.8	4.2	7.8
White Collar	39.4	26.3	27.8	29.0	55.3	56.0	55.5	55.8	5.4	17.7	16.7	15.2
Civil Servant	32.3	32.1	34.7	32.5	58.0	55.9	57.0	56.4	9.7	12.0	8.3	11.1
Average	37.6	29.9	34.2	31.8	56.6	57.0	56.2	56.8	5.7	13.1	9.7	11.3
Blue Collar	21.1	27.3	39.7	28.0	63.1	51.1	46.0	52.4	15.8	21.5	14.3	19.5
Farmer	33.9	34.1	34.8	34.2	53.2	45.7	44.9	46.6	13.0	20.1	20.3	19.2
Marginal	39.7	28.1	39.7	31.6	53.0	59.0	41.1	55.4	7.4	12.9	19.2	13.1
Average	31.5	29.8	38.0	31.2	56.4	51.9	44.0	51.4	12.0	18.1	17.9	17.2

THE TOP OF THE SOCIAL PYRAMID

The political elite

The identification of the government elite with what we could call the ideology of the Mexican state tended to clearly drop off in the north and intensify in the south. Preferences for the PRI and favorable opinions of the government, the bank nationalization and the right to strike were clearly higher in the south than in the center and in the center than in the north, where political leaders exhibited a clear tendency toward the right, defined in terms of preferences for the PAN and acceptance of church and military participation in politics. The term right winger is not used here as a synonym for conservative regarding the existence of right wing radicals in the northern states.

PAN preferences among public functionaries and political leaders in the north hit a significant 13.1 percent, while it reached only 3.9 percent in the center and 2.4 in the south. Public functionaries and political leaders in the north also showed more tolerance for church and military participation in politics than their counterparts in the center and south.

The fact that northern elites read local newspapers much more frequently than their counterparts in other regions suggests that their identification with events in the center is lower as well. There exists, however, a variant that merits consideration: public functionaries and political leaders in the north were much more inclined toward radical change than those in the center and more still than those in the south. In the same sense, the margin of conservatives that did not desire changes in this strata was higher in the south than in the center and in both regions than in the north. But given the structure of previous responses, it seems necessary to conclude that a considerable segment of the northern political elite was clearly inclined toward the right.

The business elite

The responses given by businessmen conform surprisingly to the pattern exhibited by the political elite, although of course business identification with the government was notably less.

Businessmen in the south identified with PRI in a proportion higher than the national average; in the center it was slightly lower than the national average and in the north business identification was almost 10 points lower than the national average (45.5 percent compared with 55.3).

Business identification with the main opposition party --the PAN-- ran in the opposite direction, with a 7.2 percent level in the south, 13.1 in the center and 20.2 in the north. Regarding the PSUM, sympathies were low among businessmen in all three regions, although highest in the south (3.4 percent).

Northern businessmen also were more critical of the government and the right to strike than were those in the center and in both cases than those in the south. Northern businessmen were also more tolerant of church and military participation in politics, with southern businessmen being more opposed.

Regarding the bank nationalization, on the other hand, business was generally skeptical across the three regions, without considerable variations.

Northern businessmen also were more faithful readers of local newspapers than were those in the center and south and also --as in the case of the political elite-- the inclination toward radical change was greater in the north than in the center and in both regions than in the south.

The two elite sectors considered only had in common the uniformity in regional tendencies. Great differences remained between them in terms of the eight themes analyzed here. Regarding party sympa-

thies, business preference for the PRI was 20 points lower in the north, 26 points in the center and 19 points in the south. In fact, while the political elite was in each of the three regions the strata most enthusiastic about the PRI, the business elite, on the other hand, was among the strata least inclined toward the party.

Regarding government approval, the differences are equally significant. In the north, favorable opinions among public functionaries and political leaders were 21 points higher than among businessmen; in the center there was a similar difference and in the south the gap dropped to 11 points.

Opinions about the right to strike constituted another discrepancy between the political and business elites. Support among political elites in the north was more than 28 points higher than support among businessmen, 24 points in the center and 21 points in the south. In fact, the political elite was the most enthusiastic defender of the right to strike, while the business elite was its main detractor in the north and one of the main detractors in the center and south.

The differences were smaller regarding church and military participation in politics, although in almost all cases tolerance among businessmen was greater than tolerance among politicians. Business elites in the center and especially in the north proved to be more radical than functionaries and political leaders, although the conservative wing among business was larger than that among politicians as well. In the three cases, the politicians proved to be more inclined toward moderate change than businessmen. Some differences also appeared in the question about newspaper preferences. In the three regions, businessmen read local dailies more frequently and their taste for *Excelsior* --the most read paper by functionaries and political leaders-- was relatively less; in fact, in the north and south, businessmen preferred *Novedades*.

THE MIDDLE CLASSES

Professionals

Although professionals in the north --in almost every state of this region-- were inclined toward the right, those in the south tended toward the left, without implying, of course, that leftists constitute the majority of southern professionals.

The tendency was particularly notable in the case of party sympathies: southern professionals, together with bureaucrats from this region, proved to be the biggest sympathizers for the PSUM throughout the country (8.3 percent). On the other hand, they exhibited a relatively poor preference for the PRI: 45.8 percent, the lowest in the south and one of the lowest across all three regions. In addition, southern professionals' preferences for the PAN were relatively scant: 4.2 percent, very inferior to those expressed by professionals in the center and in the north, although, it is worth emphasizing, in none of the three regions did professionals support the PAN to a great degree.

In the center, professionals' preferences for the PSUM represented 5.2 percent of the cases; certainly not a very high percentage but still one of the highest for this region. In the north, professionals expressed a relatively high degree of support for the PRI (52.2 percent) which also was one of the highest within this stratum across the three regions. Conservatism among professionals was not reflected in party sympathies.

Regarding the other variables, professionals in the three regions tended to be relatively more progressive than those of the other strata and were, once again, most progressive in the south. Southern professionals were the most enthusiastic defenders of the bank nationalization, behind southern public functionaries; they also held the highest percentage of positive opinions of the right to strike --higher even than that among workers themselves-- behind

public functionaries; professionals were also the firmest opponents of church and military participation in politics (none of them approved such participation) and, although exceeded in this case by professionals in the center region, southern professionals were, in their region, the second most critical sector of church and military intervention.

Professionals proved to be particularly critical of the government (those in the north more so than those in the center and south, as always) in comparison with the other strata; although they proved to be especially disposed to radical change, more so in the north and in the south, professionals expressed a prevalent disposition toward maintaining order as well --the lowest in the two regions. Preference among professionals for *Excelsior* was, in each region, second highest among all strata, exceeded only by that among public functionaries, but, in contrast with politicians, professionals also expressed a high preference for local newspapers.

Employees

Employees expressed considerable regional heterogeneity in their party sympathies. In the north, they were less inclined toward the PSUM (1.1 percent), but in the center were quite favorable (7.7 percent). In the south, where sympathies for the PAN were very scant among the other middle strata, employees were the second most-inclined stratum toward this party, only surpassed by workers. In the three regions their level of preference for the PRI remained below regional averages.

In each of the regions, employees also were less supportive among the strata of the government, the bank nationalization and the right to strike, although regarding the first two themes they were not very critical either, tending instead toward indifference.

Regarding church participation in politics, employees expressed ambivalent attitudes. In the center and in the south they were the

most tolerant among the middle strata and in the north they were less tolerant than bureaucrats and almost as intolerant as professionals. In the case of military intervention, employees in the south were much more tolerant than in the center and north and in fact employee backing of the military was the highest among all strata in the south except among campesinos. Regarding personal attitude toward change, employees were hardly inclined toward radicalism and more disposed to keeping things as they were. In the north, they were a little less conservative than bureaucrats.

Southern employees expressed a high preference for local newspapers (38.9 percent), which was the highest in the region. In the center the preference for local periodicals was still very high (18.9 percent), only surpassed by that of the campesinos. In the north, employee interest for local dailies was relatively minor, contradicting once again the general tendency.

Bureaucrats

Bureaucrat affinity for the regime was clear in all regions and in almost all of the variables. In the north and in the center they were the group that sympathized most with the PRI and expressed the most favorable opinion of the government, with the exception of public functionaries and political leaders. In the south they were surpassed by the campesinos, but maintained their positions. In the same sense, compared with the general increase of PAN sympathies in the north, northern bureaucrats were the group least-inclined toward the party (5.4 percent) and in fact were the only group in the north whose PAN preferences were less than those expressed in the center. However, bureaucrats are in the central states, the middle classes segment less enthusiastic about PAN and PSUM and in the south, in contrast with their scant preferences for PAN, expressed considerable backing for the PSUM (8.3 percent), the highest in the region together with professionals.

Regarding the right to strike, bureaucrats expressed considerable support, which was greater even than that among workers in the northern region and among the highest in the other two regions. Their backing of the bank nationalization was also very clear in each of the regions.

Southern bureaucrats were particularly averse to church participation in politics, expressing the highest level of opposition in all regions (81.9 percent). In the center, only public functionaries and political leaders surpassed bureaucrats in this respect, but in the north their firmness dropped as bureaucrats expressed the most tolerance among the middle strata. The same disparity is observed regarding military intervention, contradicting the general tendency. Northern bureaucrats --and to a lesser degree those of the center-- proved to be relatively disposed toward military participation in politics, expressing very moderate opposition and the second highest level of support in the region, behind workers.

Regarding personal attitude toward change, bureaucrats tended toward conservatism along with employees and their regional results were also very ambivalent, as in the case of employees. In the north, they were less radical than employees and more radical in the center and in the south. In all cases, they were more conservative than the third middle stratum: professionals. Bureaucrats also were not too fond of national newspapers and in fact were very faithful readers of local dailies in the north (53.8 percent), with high margins in the center and south as well.

From the previous analysis important differences among the middle strata are pointed out. Professionals proved to be the most progressive of them, although this does not mean professionals were fond of the regime. Southern professionals proved to be particularly critical of the regime and were slightly inclined toward the left. Employees also were not very supportive of the regime, but in this case the differences with the regime tended to place employees on the political right. In any case, employees proved to be the most

atypical of the middle strata, tending toward the right in the north and in the south, while tending toward the left in the center.

Bureaucrats were the stratum most closely tied to the PRI and the government in all regions, but did not have a clearly defined attitude toward military participation in politics and their greater conservatism and inclination toward local dailies distanced them a little from the stratum of public functionaries and political leaders, with whom, despite this, bureaucrats maintained the most similarities.

The most unpredictable and variable strata in the social pyramid were the middle sectors, among whom great regional contrasts were perceived and the most heterogeneous influence of political parties was expressed. Among the middle strata, the left has been able to consolidate its greatest gains.

THE POPULAR BASE OF THE SOCIAL PYRAMID

Workers

The labor stratum proved to be the most skeptical of the regime and its political traditions and social conquests. As much in the north as in the south labor expressed less sympathy for the PRI and in both regions was the group most frequently in favor of the PAN. Even in the center, where labor backed the PRI at higher levels than in the other two regions, it proved to be the stratum with the second highest approval of the PAN and remained above the national average concerning preferences for this party. In fact, it can be affirmed that there was no stratum more inclined toward the PAN throughout the nation than labor. In contrast, labor support for the PSUM was much lower, hitting 5.1 percent in the center, the third highest level behind employees and professionals.

The government approval results among workers were not better than those for the PRI. In the three regions labor expressed little

approval of the national government and in the center it most commonly expressed frankly negative opinions.

In the north it was the stratum with least enthusiasm for the bank nationalization, less even than that among businessmen who were most directly affected by the measure. Labor was not favorable toward the bank nationalization in the center or the south, coming in among the sectors with the least positive opinions --nonetheless, workers were not among the sectors most critical of the bank nationalization, which leads to the conclusion that the act was, for them, far removed from their immediate interests.

It cannot be said that labor support for the right to strike was low, but it is notable that such support was not high in any region. As in the case of the middle and elite strata, the popularity of the right to strike among workers was greater in the south, moderate in the center, and less in the north. Regarding church participation in politics, campesinos proved to be more tolerant than labor. Northern workers were more tolerant than those in the center, although less tolerant than those in the south. Northern workers were those who backed church participation most, surpassing even southern workers on this issue.

The tendency was the same regarding military participation in politics: more tolerance in the north, moderate in the center and less in the south. In fact, northern workers expressed the least opposition.

Workers were distinguished as well by their scant inclination toward radical change. It is necessary to not lose sight of the fact that in the Mexican social pyramid labor belongs to the upper 50 percent of the population above peasants and marginals. In the north labor proved to be the least radical stratum (21.1 percent) and the most conservative (15.8 percent), and in the center labor also was most conservative (21.5 percent). Only in the south did labor express more interest in radical change. Regarding periodical

preference, no norther workers picked *Excelsior* and only 7 percent named *Novedades*. On the other hand, 51.3 percent preferred local dailies, a percentage only surpassed by bureaucrats. Labor preferences for the national dailies mentioned remained low in the center and south, although not as low as among the other popular strata.

Campesinos

After public functionaries and bureaucrats, campesinos proved to be the sector most identified with the PRI. They also were relatively supportive of the government, above all through the marked lack of negative opinions which were the lowest among all strata. On the other hand, campesinos were far removed from the positions of the other strata associated with the government concerning the other themes examined here.

In the south campesinos surpassed even the bureaucrats in their preferences for the PRI. In contrast, their preferences for the PAN and the PSUM (1.4 percent for each) were the lowest among all strata in this region. In the center, campesino preferences for the PSUM (3.0 percent) were also the lowest among all strata, but for the PAN reached a not inconsiderable 8.0 percent. Finally, in the north campesino preferences for the PSUM were relatively higher, while those for the PAN were the lowest in the region, with the exception of the bureaucrats. The general tendency in party sympathies across regions was similar to that in all cases: less sympathy for the PRI and more for the opposition in the north, intermediate levels in the center, and more preference for the PRI and less for the opposition in the south.

Concerning the government, campesinos were very moderate. Their level of favorable opinions was not always counted among the highest, but the negatives were always among the lowest. In the north, campesinos were the third most favorable sector to the government, behind bureaucrats and public functionaries. In the center cam-

pesinos lost this position, falling in behind bureaucrats and public functionaries as well as employees and professionals who all expressed higher government approval ratings. In the south, the groups more favorable to the government included business. In this sense, campesinos contradicted the general tendency of more popularity for the government in the south, moderate amounts in the center and less in the north.

Regarding the bank nationalization, campesinos were the only strata that did not express as much opposition in the north as in the south, but the positive opinions were not noted for their abundance. As in the case of labor, campesinos tended rather toward indifference, confirming that the measure stirred a minor amount of interest among the popular strata.

Something similar occurred with the right to strike. In the center and in the south campesinos supported it less and in the north only business surpassed them in this respect. However, it would be erroneous to infer from this fact that campesinos were opposed to this right. In the north and in the south for example they were the least critical strata, as a result of which it must be concluded --as in the case of the bank nationalization-- that campesinos were not much interested in a right that does not directly benefit them and that they probably do not have a fundamental knowledge of.

Regarding church participation in politics, campesinos were the most tolerant stratum, given the low frequency with which they openly opposed it. But important regional differences were expressed here. In the north campesinos were least inclined to support church participation, for which the conclusion would be similar to that in the previous two points. However, in the center, campesinos tended to support church participation with more frequency and in this region campesinos were only surpassed by marginals in this sense. Finally, in the south campesinos were the sector that most backed political activity by the church, for which it is necessary to out-

line a new tendency: a growing identification of campesinos with the clergy from north to south.

Military participation in politics definitely marks a point of departure, with the other sectors most tied to the regime. Campesinos not only were the least critical stratum but also most frequently openly backed military intervention. This was particularly apparent in the center and more so in the south; regions where campesinos who supported military participation were more numerous than those who opposed it. Only in the north did campesinos approach the general tendency, supporting military participation to a very low degree, although their rejection rate remained among the lowest.

Regarding attitude toward change, campesinos tended to polarize, being among the strata that most frequently demanded radical change --in the center they were the extreme-- but also among the most conservative sectors as well. Among the popular strata, campesinos tended to be the most radical, but more conservative than the marginals and almost as conservative as labor. Regarding periodical preference, it is notable that in the north campesinos did not read *Novedades* and rarely read *Excelsior* (4.8 percent); on the other hand, their preference for local dailies hit 33.9 percent. In the center and in the south campesinos also read *Excelsior* and *Novedades* very infrequently, being inclined more toward local newspapers. It is interesting to note that, among national dailies, northern campesinos mentioned only two: *Excelsior* and *el Herald* (4.8 percent for each). In the center their top national newspapers were *la Prensa* (12.8 percent) and *el Sol de Mexico* (10.4 percent); on the other hand, only 3.0 percent read *Novedades* and 5.3 percent *Excelsior*. In the south as in the north, the catalog of morning national dailies that campesinos read was very limited.

The marginals

Marginals sympathized least with the PRI among all strata. This was particularly notable in the north, where only 32.4 percent of them expressed a preference for this party. On the other hand, northern marginals were most favorable to the PSUM (7.4 percent) and the third most favorable to the PAN (16.2 percent), surpassed only by workers and business. In the center marginals were also the stratum least inclined toward the PRI (44.9 percent) and once again the third most tied to the PAN (10.8 percent), surpassed again by labor and business. On the other hand, their preferences for the PSUM were relatively low in this region, remaining behind those expressed by the middle strata. In the south the PRI position among marginals was a little better, but it seems to be owing, above all, to the limited amount of support other parties have generated among marginals. Together with labor, marginals were the strata furthest from the party in power.

Regarding government approval, marginals proved to be less averse than to the PRI, although they remained very far from identifying with the government. In the three regions, marginals placed among the most negative strata, while marginal supporters never figured among the top groups. However, from one sense to the other, marginals were among the most radical strata in each region.

As was common among the popular strata, the bank nationalization did not generate much enthusiasm among the marginals, with their results being poor in both directions. Regarding the right to strike, marginals were not favorable. In the center as well as in the south they expressed the highest indices of contrary opinions to the right to strike and in the center only campesinos backed the right with less frequency.

Among the popular strata marginals were the most critical of church participation in politics, but continued being more tolerant than the middle and elite strata. Regarding open support, however, the marginals surpassed even workers and campesinos. Regarding mili-

tary participation, the position of the marginals was similar: they were the most critical of the base strata but still more tolerant than the other strata. Nonetheless, in the south marginals were the most tolerant, even more than campesinos. In sum, in neither issue did marginals contradict the general tendency: more support at the base for church and military participation in politics. As always, tolerance among marginals tended to increase from north to south.

In the same sense, opposition to change among marginals tended to increase from north to south: less in the north than in the center and in both than in the south. However, southern marginals proved more radical than those in the center and as much as those in the north. In the north, marginals were the most radical stratum at the base. As in the case of labor and campesinos, marginals had scant affection for national newspapers (especially in the north and center) and much for local dailies. In the north the preferred national was neither *Excelsior* nor *Novedades* but *el Herald de Mexico* (8.8 percent). In the center marginals preferred *la Prensa* (13.5 percent) and *el Sol de Mexico* (8.7 percent) to the other two already mentioned, although in the south marginals opted for *Novedades* (24.7 percent) and *Excelsior* (6.8 percent).

The major contrast at the base of the social pyramid was the difference between campesinos on one hand and labor and marginals on the other regarding the PRI and the government. The erosion of government legitimacy among the latter two strata is clear, to such a degree that both proved to be the most critical among all sectors. In particular, the high degree of influence of the PAN among labor and to a lesser degree among marginals was surprising. The study reveals that labor sympathy for the PAN was not restricted to the northern region but extended throughout the nation.

Regarding the other topics, the three popular sectors showed great similarities: low levels of interest in issues such as the bank nationalization; significantly great tolerance --and at times frank support-- of military and church participation in politics;

little affinity for the national dailies preferred by elite and middle strata and preference for others, such as *la Prensa*, *el Sol de Mexico* and *el Herald de Mexico*.

General observations

After comparing the regional results for the eight variables considered, it is possible to recognize an ideological and political difference among the three regions under analysis. It can be affirmed that the north is, taken together, more conservative than the center and the south, while the south is more progressive --and, it seems, more tied to the regime-- than the other two regions. These affirmations are supported by several characteristics. The backing of the government and the PRI and the consensus over the government's conquests and historic traditions, such as the right to strike or the exclusion of the church and military from politics, were definitely less in the north than in the center and the south. Among the latter two regions, the differences, although less sharp, were reflected in the fact that the government and the right to strike were more popular in the south, which suggests a major identification with the regime and the official ideology, but support for military and church intervention was also greater in the south than in the center.

The essentially rightist bias in the north was seen in the major influence the PAN has had there and the scant --and in some cases virtually null-- influence of leftist parties. In this sense, the center was distinguished by its greater political plurality, having as much influence from the right as from the left. In the south the right seemed to have a minor impact and the left much more influence than in the north, although far from what it had in the center.

It is a very interesting finding that the desire to introduce radical change was also greater in the north than in the other two regions. In this case, of course, radicalism is not synonymous with

the left, such that the changes that seem to be demanded in the north would mainly be to the right. As with radicalism, the north exhibits a greater degree of localism or regionalism than the other two regions, as is suggested by its greater preference for local newspapers --an indicator that would show a major indifference to the culture and ideology of the center and something closer to a cultural tradition of its own.

The analysis of the responses by the eight strata to the variables used here leads to the conclusion that a considerable political and ideological heterogeneity exists in the social pyramid, to which is necessary to add the before-mentioned regional heterogeneity. The popularity of the PRI and the government drops from top to bottom of the social pyramid, although in each of the three levels considered the regime maintains a strong base of legitimacy: with public functionaries and political leaders among elites; bureaucrats among middle strata and campesinos at the base. Outside of these three strata, opinions of the PRI and the federal government tend to be comparatively poor, especially among the two other popular strata: labor and marginals. Marginals were the most skeptical of all strata of the PRI, while workers proved to be the most skeptical of the government. At any rate, backing for the PRI and the government were appreciably low --above all in the second case-- among business, private employees and professionals.

If the PRI achieved its best results among elites, thanks to the enormous backing from public functionaries, the PSUM achieved its best from the middle strata and the PAN, surprisingly, from the popular strata which, it should not be forgotten, constitute the popular majority. These results contradict certain common preconceptions about the political sociology of modern Mexico, such as the presumption that the middle classes would be the most politically conservative and that the popular classes would be the most radical. This can be affirmed not only because of their relative preferences for the different political parties, more for the right at the base

and for the left among the middle strata, but also because of the responses to other variables.

The affirmations in the previous paragraph are supported by the responses to questions about the right to strike and political participation by the church and military, because the results point invariably to a greater conservatism at the base than among the middle and elite strata or, at least, a smaller degree of identification by the popular strata with the government's conquests and historic traditions. Labor certainly revealed scant consciousness of its own particular interests by opposing the right to strike in higher percentages than other strata and the campesinos proved to be frankly inclined --in contrast with the other strata-- toward military intervention in politics.

No less suggestive is the apparent antagonism among the elite strata. If the political leadership was the most enthusiastic supporter of the PRI and the government, the business leadership, on the other hand, was particularly averse to the PRI and expressed a very poor opinion about the government. Public functionaries and political leaders were most pleased with the bank nationalization and entrepreneurs most unhappy.

The right to strike achieved its greatest backing among the business leadership and one of the lowest among the political leadership. Although in a less clear way, the same differences persisted concerning the issues of church and military participation in politics, newspaper preferences and personal attitude toward change. In this last case, public functionaries and political leaders were significantly for moderate change, while business came out at both extremes: for keeping everything as it was and for radical changes.

If we begin from the assumption that one of the fundamental pillars of political stability is elite consensus, we should look carefully at the different positions taken by the political and economic elites regarding the questions that are under analysis.

Although the 1983 poll is nothing more than a snapshot in time, ~~does~~
not pre-announce about the probable evolution of the given differences.
If these have tended to decline in recent years, then the probability of a split at the top would be less now than then, although the contrary could have occurred. In this context, the comparison with the 1987 poll becomes crucial.

From the preceding one conclusion seems clear: The current social consensus is markedly less in the popular strata than in the middle and than in both than at the top. It is reasonable to suppose that such a fact could be due to the relatively greater impact of the last crises and the difficult economic situation that has persisted at least since 1982. Labor, campesinos and marginals have seen their standards of living drop to a greater degree than those among the middle and elite strata --without a doubt. The difficult economic situation, which for a professional could mean a reduction in his level of consumption, or for a businessman a drop in profits, has meant unemployment for workers with subsequent marginalization and economic and social insecurity.

Less easy to explain is why the popular strata --workers and marginals-- tend, in what seems an increasing degree, to look to the political right instead of the left. It could be affirmed that the reason is a historic lack of class consciousness of material interests, but such an affirmation would be superficial and reductionist. It is not easy to take as fact that worker consciousness is more backwards than that of the campesinos --whose living standards are lower than those of the working class-- who have not shifted to the right but have remained faithful to the party of the "institutionalized revolution". The probable explanation would have to be sought in the area of the dominant ideology, which among other things tends to view the current state of affairs as a result of bad government administration and corruption. The discrediting of the government seems to translate into a shift to the left, whose positions maintain some similarities with the official ideology of the Mexican Revolution. At any rate, to the probable effects of the dom-

inant ideology in labor class consciousness should be added the historic disarticulation of leftist political organizations, whose fragmentation and absence of viable strategies have impeded until very recently any real inroads into national affairs.

Nor is it easy to explain the shift to the right in the north region in comparison with the rest of the country. Such a shift is particularly acute in the two key strata in the formation of Mexican society: labor and business. Once again, to establish the basis of an explanation it is necessary to return to the considerable socio-cultural influence of the neighboring nation to all of the border states. It also should not be forgotten that the northern businessman --especially from Monterrey-- has always had a much smaller affinity for the post-revolutionary governments than the private sector in the center and the south has had. Northern businessmen developed into a special interest prior to the Revolution and never were --nor have been up to the present-- fully integrated into the governing bloc. The great distance between northern business and the current regime, whose weaknesses due to centralism are well-known, seem to have tended to be reproduced among workers who labor in northern factories, commonly operating in a model of syndicalism that has little or nothing in common with the official model incorporated into the PRI.

Finally, the shift to the right among business and labor, as well as the lower degree of identification with the central government, seems to have permeated all of northern society, including the middle classes and the political elite. In the north, the whole population is proportionally more identified with the PAN and more critical of the government, including the regime's own functionaries.

The study identifies a fundamental heterogeneity among the political and ideological positions that affect not only the social stratification but the human geography of the nation as well. We can take as fact that the social perception of the crisis has been mod-

eled after this heterogeneous base. As a result, it seems clear that all strategies designed to confront the economic difficulties and their political repercussions, will not be successful if social and regional differences are disregarded when defining and implementing policy.

10. PUBLIC OPINION IN 1987

As in the previous chapter, the responses given by each stratum in each region to the eight central questions are analyzed and from them profiles are drawn for each of the 27 regional strata in Mexico. In addition, the evolution of the tendencies for the four-year period between polls is reviewed.

Regarding party sympathies, the most profound setback for the regime was observed in the center region, which is the largest and most populous of the three. It was in the center where the PRI achieved its best results in 1983 and its worst in 1987. On the other hand, the same distribution of PRI sympathies throughout the society re-emerged: more at the top, moderate among middle strata and less at the base. Something similar occurred with favorable opinions, supporting the idea that a direct relationship exists between socio-economic position and affinity for the regime. It should be noted that favorable responses for the PRI and the government dropped considerably in all cases. The PRI ceased to be the majority party that it was even in 1983, with a drop in sympathies to less than 30 percent.

In fact the drop in PRI sympathies was proportionally greater at the base, where PRI supporters only represented 25 percent of the total. The base strata in the center as well as those in the north were the two sectors least favorable to the PRI: only 22.8 percent identified with this party. The base strata in the north came out in favor of the PAN in 21.2 percent of the cases, a percentage very similar to that for the PRI.

Party Sympathy

Strata	PRI				PAN				PSUM			
	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg
Government	62.8	46.4	51.5	52.1	19.8	4.4	4.9	4.0	0.0	3.7	2.9	3.0
Business	40.3	27.6	40.4	31.7	15.1	9.8	12.2	11.0	1.4	3.6	1.7	2.9
Intellectual	32.1	19.3	31.1	23.3	19.8	6.9	10.7	9.6	1.9	9.2	4.9	7.3
Average	49.5	31.1	41.0	35.7	12.2	7.0	9.2	8.2	1.1	5.5	3.1	4.4
Professional	45.3	22.5	29.9	27.4	10.4	7.4	14.0	9.0	0.0	6.7	0.9	4.7
White Collar	31.1	24.4	42.5	28.5	26.4	9.4	5.7	11.6	0.9	2.8	4.7	2.8
Civil Servant	52.1	28.5	36.2	33.6	6.7	7.5	4.8	6.9	1.0	5.3	6.7	4.8
Average	42.8	25.1	36.2	29.8	14.5	8.1	8.1	9.1	0.6	4.9	4.1	4.1
Blue Collar	19.4	20.0	32.4	21.9	29.6	10.8	15.2	14.7	0.9	6.9	9.5	6.3
Farmer	31.7	26.0	42.3	29.5	18.8	7.4	8.7	9.4	3.0	2.8	1.9	2.7
Marginal	17.5	22.4	34.9	23.6	30.1	7.8	14.2	12.4	0.0	3.2	0.0	2.2
Average	22.8	22.8	36.5	25.0	21.1	8.6	12.7	12.1	1.3	4.3	3.8	3.7

It would be difficult to continue considering bureaucrats and campesinos as bastions of legitimacy for the PRI in 1987. Although both groups remained the most favorable strata, there was such an erosion of positive responses among them that they practically lined up with their neighbors. Only politicians continued to clearly identify with the regime, although the setback in their approval rating was very marked: Only 52 percent of them said they identified with the PRI compared with 75 percent in 1983.

Regarding other parties, the pronounced advances by the PAN among all northern strata and the majority of southern strata should be emphasized. In the north, some advances were spectacular, as in the case of politicians, whose PAN sympathies grew from 4 to 20 percent. Northern labor continued being one of the the most favorable regional strata to the PAN: 29.6 percent, equal to the national average of sympathies for the PRI. But in 1987, northern labor was surpassed by northern marginals on the issue of PAN sympathies: 30.1 percent of marginals expressed preferences for the PAN. However, the PAN declined considerably in the center, where it lost ground among all strata except among bureaucrats. The greater relative weight of the center region meant that the PAN's national approval rating dropped slightly.

The PMS experienced a general setback in the north, where it was excluded in the preferences of politicians, professionals, and marginals and almost completely excluded in those of labor and employees. The party also declined among the middle strata in the center and south, where it had made clear gains in 1983. However, it achieved important advances among elites in the center and south -- above all thanks to the inclusion of intellectuals in the 1987 poll -- and at the base in the south. Intellectuals in the center became the most favorable strata to the PSUM expressing preferences for the party in 9.2 percent of the cases.

Another result of the 1987 poll that was as notable as the drop in PRI sympathies, was the increase in the number of people who identified with no party, owing to the different times in the sexennial calendars of the two polls: the first was taken just after the 1982 presidential election and the second a year before the 1988 election. In this sense the central region was illustrative, going from the area with the most clearly defined party preferences to the one with the most undefined sympathies of the three regions. Half of those interviewed in the center (50.1 percent) refused to identify with any party, when just four years earlier the same response had been 24.6 percent.

In conclusion, the salient tendencies were the PAN's advance in the north and in the south especially among the middle and base strata, the relatively high identification of intellectuals with the PMS and the general drop -- particularly accented in the center -- of PRI sympathies, together with the increase in the percentage of people who identified with no party in the center region.

Government Opinion

Strata	GOOD				REGULAR				BAD			
	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg
Government	62.8	59.5	60.2	60.2	26.7	19.1	31.1	22.2	8.6	17.0	7.8	14.1
Business	34.9	28.8	38.0	31.2	31.4	34.3	34.7	33.8	32.7	30.6	19.1	29.0
Intellectual	42.4	25.3	36.9	30.2	26.4	31.3	48.5	33.2	25.5	35.2	11.6	28.8
Average	46.7	37.8	45.0	40.6	28.1	28.2	38.1	29.7	22.2	27.6	12.8	24.3
Professional	35.9	26.0	28.9	28.1	36.8	32.9	40.2	34.7	22.7	35.0	26.2	31.5
White Collar	33.0	23.7	29.2	26.1	34.9	38.5	45.3	39.0	26.4	30.2	22.6	28.4
Civil Servant	22.8	37.6	37.3	34.7	41.9	30.1	29.5	31.9	30.5	25.8	29.5	27.1
Average	30.5	29.1	31.8	29.6	37.8	33.8	38.3	35.2	26.5	30.3	26.1	29.0
Blue Collar	37.0	18.7	31.5	23.8	37.0	43.3	26.7	39.6	21.3	33.2	35.2	31.5
Farmer	23.8	19.8	24.1	21.1	49.5	40.0	30.8	40.0	22.8	33.1	28.9	30.8
Marginal	21.4	17.7	25.4	19.6	41.7	32.7	37.7	35.0	33.0	14.8	27.4	33.3
Average	36.9	18.7	27.0	21.5	42.7	38.6	31.7	38.2	28.3	27.0	30.5	31.8

As in the case of PRI sympathies, the center became the most critical region of the government, replacing the north. Favorable opinions in the center became reached their lowest levels and negatives their highest. The three base strata in the center were among the most critical of the government; in no case did their favorable opinions reach 20 percent, surpassing by a longshot those of the north. In fact and in a notable manner, favorable opinions of the government rose in the north among politicians and businessmen, professionals and employees and among workers.

On the other hand, in terms of the entire social scale, the 1987 results fully reinforced those of 1983. Positive opinions of the federal government were higher at the top, moderate in the middle and lower at the base, with negative opinions falling in inverse order.

Church Participation

Strata	GOOD				REGULAR				BAD			
	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg
Government	1.9	10.4	26.2	11.5	12.4	8.3	9.7	9.2	81.9	76.0	59.3	74.4
Business	21.2	11.5	11.8	13.1	9.6	8.4	7.3	8.4	63.0	70.6	67.7	68.9
Intellectual	12.3	7.6	12.6	9.1	7.5	6.0	17.5	8.1	73.6	81.2	61.2	76.7
Average	11.8	9.8	16.8	11.2	9.8	7.5	11.5	8.5	72.8	75.9	62.7	73.3
Professional	16.1	10.4	18.7	12.7	12.3	6.0	8.4	7.4	66.0	76.4	68.2	73.4
White Collar	22.7	12.0	11.3	13.7	18.9	12.4	9.4	13.0	50.0	67.1	70.7	64.8
Civil Servant	18.1	7.8	14.3	10.4	11.4	7.1	11.4	8.5	53.8	74.4	62.8	70.8
Average	18.9	10.0	14.7	12.2	14.2	8.5	9.7	9.6	56.6	72.6	67.2	69.6
Blue Collar	23.1	13.1	24.8	16.6	17.6	7.6	11.4	9.9	49.0	66.6	52.4	61.3
Farmer	18.8	15.2	17.3	16.1	13.9	9.7	9.6	10.3	53.5	54.0	52.9	53.8
Marginal	20.4	13.1	17.9	15.1	19.4	12.2	19.8	14.6	50.5	58.3	54.8	56.4
Average	20.7	13.8	20.0	15.9	16.9	9.8	13.6	11.6	51.1	59.6	53.3	57.1

The center region also was distinguished by an increase in opposition to church and military participation in politics. We already have mentioned that because of a restructuring of responses on the 1987 questionnaire there was a general increase in favorable responses regarding church participation in politics, but such an increase was much less marked in the center than in the north and south. Regarding negative opinions, the center was the only region where they went up, to such a degree that the national average also went up even though negative responses decreased in the north and south.

The same pattern emerged in the case of the military. While favorable opinions of intervention rose in the north and south, they dropped in the center to such an extent that the national average dropped as well.

Military Participation

Strata	GOOD				REGULAR				BAD			
	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg
Government	15.2	16.8	37.9	20.0	15.2	11.3	20.4	13.4	66.7	65.5	35.9	61.0
Business	22.8	14.1	25.0	17.3	16.8	13.7	15.5	14.5	51.3	59.8	43.8	55.8
Intellectual	21.7	15.6	20.4	17.4	14.2	10.6	18.4	12.4	54.3	66.9	55.3	63.1
Average	19.9	15.5	27.7	18.2	15.4	11.8	18.0	13.4	57.4	64.0	44.9	59.9
Professional	24.5	17.1	35.5	21.4	17.9	15.3	15.0	15.7	47.2	67.1	37.3	52.3
White Collar	33.0	17.6	29.3	22.0	15.1	11.3	14.2	12.4	30.2	53.7	42.4	48.0
Civil Servant	14.3	14.6	24.7	16.2	23.8	12.8	14.3	14.8	50.5	57.6	48.5	54.9
Average	23.9	16.4	29.8	19.8	18.9	13.1	14.5	14.3	42.6	56.1	42.7	51.7
Blue Collar	30.6	17.3	33.3	22.1	16.7	10.8	19.0	13.1	40.8	56.0	28.6	49.0
Farmer	20.8	18.6	21.1	19.4	22.8	12.0	11.5	13.6	34.6	43.4	40.4	41.6
Marginal	28.1	18.7	19.8	20.3	16.5	9.7	20.8	12.6	42.8	49.8	48.1	48.4
Average	26.5	18.2	24.6	20.6	18.6	10.8	17.1	13.1	39.4	49.7	38.9	46.3

Unfavorable opinions rose in the center by more than 10 points, although in this case the north followed the same trend. The south confirmed its inclination toward church and military participation in politics, evident in 1983, but the overall geographic tendency changed because of variations in the center. This region became the biggest opponent of such participation, replacing the north, in the same way that it replaced the north on the issues of government approval and PRI preferences.

The analysis of the results by strata confirmed the regional results. The decrease in favorable opinions toward participation by the military and church in politics was general in the center, being particularly pronounced among elites but notable as well among the middle and base strata.

In the same sense, the increase in negative opinions was also general in the center, as much in the case of the church as with the military. Elites in the three regions confirmed their great aversion to political activity by the clergy and military and the base, also throughout the three regions, confirmed its greater tolerance, reaffirming the tendency observed in 1983: the acceptance of political

participation by the church and military increased from top to bottom of the social scale.

Right to Strike

Strata	GOOD				REGULAR				BAD			
	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg
Government	57.2	61.9	68.0	62.0	21.0	9.7	23.3	13.7	18.1	23.2	6.8	19.8
Business	60.9	54.8	60.0	56.7	20.4	18.4	18.7	18.8	14.4	16.3	8.7	14.8
Intellectual	62.2	70.1	57.3	66.8	21.7	14.3	16.5	15.8	13.2	10.1	21.4	12.4
Average	60.1	62.2	61.7	61.8	21.0	14.1	19.5	16.1	15.2	16.5	12.3	15.6
Professional	65.1	67.1	61.7	65.9	17.9	18.3	24.3	19.2	10.4	7.4	6.5	7.8
White Collar	54.7	58.7	66.1	59.3	26.4	21.0	17.9	21.4	8.5	10.8	9.5	10.3
Civil Servant	63.8	72.4	60.0	69.0	11.4	13.0	17.1	13.4	12.4	8.5	11.5	9.6
Average	61.2	68.8	62.6	64.7	18.5	16.5	19.7	18.0	10.4	7.7	9.1	9.2
Blue Collar	52.8	55.0	64.8	56.2	18.5	22.6	12.4	20.2	24.1	13.4	13.4	15.1
Farmer	39.6	42.3	54.8	44.0	32.7	22.5	15.4	23.0	7.9	11.7	15.4	11.8
Marginal	57.2	50.4	60.4	53.2	23.3	18.0	11.3	17.7	13.6	13.6	10.3	13.0
Average	49.8	49.2	60.0	51.1	24.8	21.0	13.0	20.3	15.2	12.9	13.0	13.3

The 1987 results confirmed in general the high degree of acceptance of the right to strike among all strata. The regional results were practically the same in both polls, with only slight variations within the range of two percent. However, at the regional level there were some changes worthy of attention. The most notable was the general decline that the strike image suffered among workers. In the three regions, favorable responses dropped and unfavorable ones rose in this stratum, which is without a doubt most directly affected by the right to strike. The variations were particularly notable in the case of northern workers, whose favorable opinions dropped almost 10 points and whose negative ones rose 14. A pronounced decline was observed as well among workers in the center.

In the north, the right to strike lost ground not only among workers but across the three strata at the base, which could indicate that this region continues more on the path toward more conservative positions than the majority of groups in the population. In fact, if the north did not experience a general hardening toward the right to strike, it was because of an increase of support among elites, thanks to the inclusion of intellectuals in the 1987 poll --

who supported it-- although business also improved its position. It was notable that northern businessmen proved in 1987 to be more inclined toward the right to strike than the workers themselves. Only the campesinos were less favorable than the workers in the north.

Another result worthy of consideration was the pronounced increase in favorable opinions to the right to strike among the middle strata in the center region: around 10 points, with special emphasis given in this sense to employees and bureaucrats. Unfavorable opinions went down consistently across the three strata. If we consider the notable decline of sympathies for the PRI and government approval in this region, the similar setback of the PAN and the moderate surge of the PMS, we could conclude that the center region (especially among the middle strata) was expressing a tendency toward progressive change as would seem to be confirmed as well from its high identification with the right to strike.

Before continuing with the results to the question about personal attitude toward change in 1987, it should be taken into account that the responses *do not know* and *no answer* were not included in the 1983 poll. All of the strata expressed fewer responses in favor of change, but the variations in each substantive response were not constant across responses. The decline in the number of radicals among politicians in the north was very notable (from 35.1 to 7.6 percent) and in general among all elites in this region. Northern intellectuals as well proved to be much less radical (10.4 percent) than their counterparts in the center (28.7 percent) and in the south (18.4 percent). On the other hand, the radical percentages rose among northern workers and campesinos, creating a greater polarization of personal attitudes in that region.

Attitude Towards Change

Strata	RADICAL				MODERATE				CONSERVATIVE			
	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg	Nth	Ctr	Sth	Avrg
Government	7.6	18.6	25.2	17.9	63.8	54.9	55.3	56.5	10.5	15.6	15.5	14.8
Business	19.7	17.4	17.9	17.8	48.2	51.9	47.0	50.5	18.2	15.6	13.9	15.8
Intellectual	10.4	28.7	18.4	24.1	60.4	51.3	55.3	53.4	17.0	11.7	12.6	12.7
Average	12.5	21.5	20.5	19.9	57.4	52.7	52.5	53.4	15.2	14.3	14.0	14.4
Professional	25.5	17.6	15.0	18.4	50.0	60.6	66.4	59.8	11.3	8.8	9.3	9.3
White Collar	34.0	20.5	18.9	22.4	37.7	56.7	53.8	53.1	9.4	10.4	7.5	9.8
Civil Servant	21.9	21.0	21.0	21.1	53.3	56.6	45.7	54.3	12.4	11.9	12.4	12.0
Average	27.1	19.7	18.3	20.6	47.0	57.9	55.3	55.7	11.0	10.3	9.7	10.3
Blue Collar	27.8	20.0	17.1	20.9	38.9	47.2	45.7	45.6	13.0	15.9	14.3	14.1
Farmer	40.6	21.1	19.2	23.9	27.7	34.7	40.4	34.5	14.9	14.9	16.3	15.2
Marginal	20.4	19.1	10.4	17.9	37.9	42.4	41.5	41.5	20.4	13.4	16.0	14.9
Average	29.6	20.0	15.5	20.9	34.8	41.4	42.5	40.5	16.1	14.7	15.5	15.0

Regarding conservative attitudes, there were shades of differences that should be noted. Among elites in the three regions, the percentage of conservatives rose, but at the base and among the middle strata in the center and south it declined. The north is set apart from the other two regions for its increase in the percentage of conservatives across all strata with the exception of workers. The center, on the other hand, showed an acute drop in the percentage of conservatives in the middle and base strata, although not enough to offset the increase of conservatives among elites, for which, seen together, the center region also experienced a moderate increase in conservative positions. Finally, the south was the only region in which the percentage of conservatives went down thanks above all to changes at the base. It is possible, therefore, to conclude that in 1987 there was a greater polarization in the social pyramid on the issue of the need for change. Elites tended toward greater conservatism while the middle strata and mainly the base strata tended toward radicalism.

In conclusion, it can be affirmed that in the four-year period between 1983 and 1987 important changes in political-ideological positions arose in the national population. The most notable change was, of course, the profound erosion in the credibility of the government and the party in power during these years. It cannot be hid-

den that the erosion was much more pronounced in the center, which is precisely where the decisions are made and where the regime's presence is most immediately felt.

On the other hand, a direct relationship was established between socio-economic status and affinity for the PRI and the government. Such an affinity tends to decline from top to bottom of the social pyramid or, in other words, from the least populous strata to the most populous. The north showed a bias toward the right, illustrated eloquently by the notable gains of the PAN in this region. The center, on the other hand, seemed to tend toward the left, although much more notable was the surge in responses of abstentionism or apathy. The south could be said to have maintained its position as most closely tied to the regime, although with a drop big enough to place it close to the north. The south confirmed its position as the region less identified with the values of the post-revolutionary ideology: secularism in politics and diffusion of certain social conquests such as the right to strike.

THE TOP OF THE SOCIAL PYRAMID

The political elite

If in 1983 politicians in the center had been the most enthusiastic supporters of the PRI and those in the north the least, the situation changed in 1987. Politicians in the center came to be the least tied to the PRI (46.4 percent), replacing those in the north (62.8 percent in 1987 compared with 65.3 percent in 1983) who were relatively more *priista* along with those in the south. In reality, the drop in PRI popularity, although high in all regions, was particularly pronounced in the center, where the party lost its high margin of sympathies in all strata.

The sympathies lost by the PRI among politicians were not gained by any other party. On the contrary, the PAN as well as the PMS lost popularity --which already was slight-- among politicians in the three regions with only one important exception: in the north politicians who sympathized with the PAN went from 3.9 to 19.8 percent, an advance offset, however, by the drop in PAN sympathies among politicians in the center (13.1 to 4.4 percent). As in the majority of the other strata, the choice that absorbed the most PRI defectors was *none*, which in the case of politicians jumped from 7.3 in 1983 to 23.2 percent in 1987, for the reasons mentioned in the previous chapter.

The same tendency was observed in the case of government approval. Politicians in the center became the most skeptical, with their positive responses dropping to their lowest levels and negatives rising to the highest of the three regions, surpassing northern politicians who four years earlier had been the most critical regional group within the stratum.

Another important change was registered by politicians on the issue of the right to strike. From being the most supportive in 1983 they became the most critical in 1987, surpassing even business. Their positive opinions dropped in the three regions, especially in the center where they fell 13 points.

Regarding the participation of the church and military in politics, the most significant changes were registered by politicians in the south: Their favorable opinions of church participation rose from 8.6 to 26.2 percent and for military participation from 20.9 to 37.9 percent. In fact, southern politicians became the most enthusiastic supporters of both types of participation among all strata in the region. By contrast, church and military participation lost ground among politicians in the north, who came to be one of the most averse regional strata to such intervention. In the center, there were no significant changes, except an apparent polarization

of opinions regarding the church, with the positive opinions rising as much as the negatives.

Regarding personal attitudes to change, the 1983 tendency was inverted when radicalism had been higher in the north, moderate in the center and lower in the south. In 1987 it was exactly the opposite. Politicians in the three regions adjusted nonetheless to the general pattern: by increasing the percentage of responses against change and decreasing (except in the south) responses for change. As in the rest of the social pyramid, the politicians stratum proved to be more conservative than before.

The business elite

As in the case of politicians, businessmen in the central region lost the great margin of sympathies for the PRI: from 51.2 percent in 1983 to only 27.6 percent in 1987. In the north, on the other hand, the setback was only 5 points (45.5 to 40.3 percent) and in the south 16 points (56.4 to 40.4 percent). Businessmen in the center came to be the least *priista* of all, much less than those in the north who, on the other hand, stayed at the same level as those in the south.

Once again as in the case of politicians, business did not throw their sympathies to other parties --at least not toward the PAN and the PMS-- while in the case of the PAN preferences dropped from 13.5 to 11 percent and those for the PMS remained almost the same: 2.8 percent in 1983 and 2.9 in 1987. The PAN made some gains among businessmen in the north and south which were offset by the decline in the center. The PMS lost ground among northern businessmen and gained some among them in the center and south. On the other hand, business sympathies for other parties went from less than 1 percent in 1983 to 11 percent in 1987 and their level of identification with no party reached 35.4 percent compared with 22.2 in 1983. As with politicians, businessmen who stopped sympathizing with the PRI did not switch in general to another party.

The major setback in government approval among businessmen was also registered in the center, where it fell more than 11 points. In the south, government approval dropped 7 points and in the north it rose, surprisingly, from 32.3 to 34.9 percent. Nonetheless, business came to be one of the most critical strata of the government because the setback in favorable opinions was, as we will detail later, much more pronounced in the middle strata and above all at the base. Regarding negative opinions, the biggest relative increase was registered in the south, where businessmen who expressed disapproval rose from 7.4 to 19.1 percent; in the center negative opinions doubled, from 15.4 to 30.8 percent; and in the north they gained 11 points, going from 21.2 to 32.7 percent. It should be observed that, in absolute terms, northern businessmen were those who continued expressing the poorest opinion of the government.

Regarding the right to strike, it was notable that businessmen in the three regions increased their positive opinions, although the most pronounced increase --which was notable as well-- came in the north: from 40.1 to 60.9 percent, making northern businessmen more enthusiastic about the right to strike than those in the center and in the south. Negative opinions dropped, but only in the north and in the south. In the center, the number of businessmen opposed to the right rose, although very slightly.

Support for military and church participation in politics lost ground among businessmen, although with marked regional differences. Negative opinions grew in the north and in the center but dropped in the south, as much in the case of the military as the church. Favorable opinions in the case of the church grew in all three regions, but the restructuring of responses that led to such an increase in all strata should be remembered. Finally, favorable opinions to military participation increased in the north and in the south, although not enough to offset the proportionally more significant decline in the center.

Businessmen who opted for radical change reduced ranks in all three regions, although the most marked drop was in the north (from 38.6 to 19.7 percent). The same happened in the case of moderate responses, while conservative responses gained ground except in the south. In the north, conservative responses went from 7.7 to 18.2 percent and in the center from 12 to 15.6 percent. In the south, on the other hand, they dropped from 16.5 to 13.9 percent.

Intellectuals

Intellectuals distinguished themselves are one of the strata least tied to the PRI, surpassed in this sense only by labor. Intellectual preferences for this party were particularly low in the center, where they barely reached 19.3 percent and were the lowest in the region. In the north and in the south the results were similar: a little more than 30 percent in both regions.

Northern intellectuals showed relatively high preferences for the PAN (19.8 percent), but not those in the center (6.9 percent) and in the south (10.7 percent). Together, however, intellectuals did not exceed the national average in preferences for a party. On the other hand, intellectuals in the center proved to be the regional stratum most tied to the PMS: 9.2 percent, which was the best result for this party. Also in the north intellectuals were the strata most favorable toward the PMS, but only because the results were almost nil among the other strata for this party. In the south 4.9 percent of intellectuals picked PSUM, falling in an intermediate range among all strata. It should be mentioned that 43.9 percent of intellectuals did not sympathize with any party, the second highest percentage of abstention only behind the marginals.

Government approval among intellectuals was the lowest among all elite strata, but still higher than the approval ratings among the middle strata, confirming the direct relationship that exists between socio-economic status and opinion of the government. Once again, intellectuals in the center were distinguished by their minor

inclination toward the government: 25.3 percent favorable opinions compared with 42.4 percent in the north and 36.9 percent in the south. Both tendencies were confirmed by the negative responses as well. In the center, intellectuals who spoke poorly of the government reached 35.2 percent of those interviewed; the highest percentage in the region. In the north and in the south, the respective percentages were 25.5 and 11.6; both falling in an intermediate range.

Regarding the right to strike intellectuals were favorable, being the most enthusiastic stratum behind bureaucrats. Intellectuals in the center were the biggest supporters of the right: 70.1 percent (compared with 62.2 in the north and 57.3 in the south), confirming the great bias of the center intelligentsia toward progressive positions.

Intellectuals were the most opposed among the strata to church and military participation in politics. Regarding the church, their favorable opinions reached only 9.1 percent, the lowest in the social pyramid and regarding the military positive responses were 17.4 percent --one of the lowest. Negative opinions hit 76.7 percent in the case of the church and 63.1 percent concerning the military, the highest in both cases. Once again the intellectuals in the center demonstrated their great radicalism: They were the most fervent opponents of church and military participation in politics.

Intellectuals were the most radical on the social scale: 24.1 percent of them came out for radical change, and those in the center were even more definite: 28.7 percent compared with 10.4 percent in the north and 18.4 percent in the south. Nonetheless, regarding preferences for no change, intellectuals were more conservative than the three middle strata, although less than the other strata at the top. Intellectuals in the center were, once again, the least conservative (11.7 percent) of their strata.

The periodical preferred by intellectuals was *Excelsior*. In fact, no other strata expressed as much affinity for this newspaper - 18.2 percent. In this case, the intellectuals of the south were the most inclined: 33 percent opted for *Excelsior*, compared with 15.1 percent in the north and 15.4 percent in the center. On the other hand, *Novedades* did not make many inroads among intellectuals (4.7 percent), who preferred other periodicals such as *La Jornada* (9.8 percent) and *Unomasuno* (5.4 percent). Intellectual preferences for local dailies were lowest among elites and throughout the entire social pyramid, with the exception of campesinos and marginals, revealing the great integration of intellectuals into the dominant currents of national thought.

THE MIDDLE CLASSES

Professionals

In 1987 professionals came to be the least sympathetic toward the PRI among the middle strata, a position that was occupied by employees four years earlier. Although sympathies for the PRI fell among professionals in all regions, the most drastic drop came in the center: from 55.6 to 22.5 percent, a reduction of more than half as can be seen. In the north, as with the other strata, the reduction was substantially less: from 52.2 to 45.3 percent; in the south the same thing happened.

Professional sympathies for the PAN increased slightly at the national level (from 8.5 to 9 percent), but the results were uneven at the regional level: in the north a moderate advance was registered (8.4 to 10.4 percent) with a more pronounced increase in the south (4.2 to 14 percent); on the other hand, PAN sympathies dropped from 12 to 7.4 percent in the center. The opposite occurred with the PMS, but it should be remembered that when in a poll the proportions are more reduced, as in the case of the PMS, the margins of deviation increase. Sympathies among professionals for this party rose in the center (from 5.2 to 6.7 percent) and fell in the north and the

south. In the north, preferences dropped from 2.2 percent in 1983 to 0 in 1987; in the south they fell from 8.3 to only 0.9 percent during the four years.

Regarding government approval, it was notable that northern professionals increased their positive opinions and reduced the negatives, in acute contrast with what happened in the center and in the south. In the center, positive responses fell from 45.7 to 26 percent and negatives grew from 15.9 to 35 percent. In the south, the drop in government credibility was important as well, although something less than in the center. The professionals constituted the middle stratum that most frequently opposed the government: 31.5 percent.

Professionals continued being one of the strata most partial to the right to strike and in fact the most partial in the northern region. At the national level only the intellectuals expressed a greater degree of positive opinion. Nonetheless, unfavorable opinions among professionals reached their lowest levels, lower even than among intellectuals. In the south, positive opinions of the right to strike among professionals declined from 73.6 to 61.7 percent, making professionals the least partial to this right in the middle strata, although four years earlier they were the most partial. However, regarding negative opinions, southern professionals continued being the most critical within their strata (6.5 percent).

Regarding participation by the church and military in politics, the position among professionals did not change considerably. In the case of the military, favorable opinions rose from 18.5 to 21.4 percent and negatives dropped from 53.3 to 52.3 percent, which indicates an almost imperceptible shift in opposition. It should be noted, however, that the acceptance of political activity by the military grew in the north and above all in the south but dropped, on the other hand, in the center. Something similar happened with the church. Professionals in the north and south proved to be more tolerant of church participation (above all in the south), although

not enough to offset the lower level of tolerance in the center. In fact, the percentage of professionals opposed to church participation rose from 71 to 73.4 percent.

As much in the north as in the south, professionals had been the most radical strata in 1983 and the second most radical at the national level, only behind campesinos. In 1987, professionals lost this position, becoming the least radical of the middle strata and one of the least radical on the social scale. The drop in the percentage of radical professionals was particularly large in the south (from 40.3 to 15 percent) and also in the center (from 31.3 to 17.6 percent) and a little less in the north (from 41.3 to 25.5 percent). Regarding conservative attitudes, the marked rises in the north and south contrasted with the reduction --albeit slight-- in the center. Although conservative professionals increased from 7.8 to 9.3 percent, the stratum remained the least openly conservative in the social pyramid.

Excelsior continued being the preferred periodical among professionals, although to a lesser degree than in 1983, when they constituted stratum with the second highest affinity for this newspaper, behind politicians. Professionals were the most frequent readers of *Novedades* (7.4 percent) with those in the south being the most faithful readers of this newspaper among all strata in the region (17.8 percent). Half of the southern professionals read local newspapers, compared with only 21.5 percent in the center and 45.3 percent in the north. Nonetheless, professionals were the most frequent readers of national newspapers among the middle strata, although not as frequent as those in the elite strata. Other periodicals read by professionals in relatively high degrees were *el Universal* and *La Jornada* (5.4 percent each).

Employees

Employees ceased to be the least sympathetic with the PRI among the middle strata, having been surpassed by professionals.

Nonetheless, the PRI registered a marked setback among employees which was greater, as happened in general, in the center region. Employees in the center came to be least tied to the PRI within their stratum, surpassing those in the north. Overall, employees remained in an intermediate range regarding PRI support.

Northern employees were set apart, on the other hand, by the marked increase in their sympathies for the PAN: from 8.4 in 1983 to 26.4 percent in 1987, a percentage that almost equaled northern employee preferences for the PRI (31.1 percent). However, the PAN lost ground among southern employees, which meant the party increased its overall national level of sympathies by 2 points (from 9.4 to 11.6 percent). The PMS did not lose as much ground among any other stratum as it lost among employees. In the center employees had registered the highest margin of preference for the party in 1983 (7.8 percent), which four years later dropped to 2.8 percent. The PMS also lost ground among northern employees, but made gains among those in the south: from 2.8 to 4.7 percent. At any rate, the pronounced setback in the center meant that national level sympathies for the PMS fell from 5.8 to 2.8 percent. In addition, employees picked the option *none* 38.7 percent of the time, which became their favorite choice.

As in the cases of the professional and elite strata, northern employees increased their government favorability rating from 30.8 to 33 percent. In contrast, southern employees and above all those in the center substantially reduced their positive responses: from 37.5 to 29.2 percent in the south and from 42.5 to 23.7 percent in the center. As a result, employees continued being the least tied to the government among the middle strata. Regarding negative opinions, northern employees fell into line with their southern and center counterparts: The percentages went up in all three regions.

The image of the right to strike improved among employees. Negative opinions fell in all three regions and positives rose in

the center and south. At any rate, employees remained the least partial to this right among the middle strata.

Employees came to be the most inclined toward the political participation of the church and military among the middle strata. Regarding the church, positive opinions grew from 3.2 to 13.7 percent, registering the most significant advance in the north: from 3.2 to 22.7 percent; in the same sense, employee opposition to the political activity of the church dropped in general and most drastically in the north, from 69.1 to 50 percent. It should be noted that employees in the center and south increased their opposition slightly, but not enough to offset the changes among norther employees.

Employees also improved their position on military participation in politics. Such a change came primarily once again in the north, where favorable opinions rose from 12.7 to 33 percent; as in the case of the church, employees in the center and the south went in the opposite direction: favorable opinions dropped 2 points in the center and 7 in the south, but the increase of approval in the north increased the national average. Something similar happened regarding disapproval: negative responses rose in the center and in the south but not enough to offset the reduction in the north from 41.4 to 30.2 percent. At any rate, the discrepancy between northern employees on one hand and those in the center and south on the other should be noted. Northern employees took a marked turn toward the PAN and, as can be seen, toward church and military intervention in politics.

Employees were not set apart from the other strata in the sense that their attitudes in favor of radical change did drop, but on the other hand they were one of few strata --the only among the middle strata-- whose conservative responses did not increase but decreased. Northern employees once again remained apart from those in the center and south, in that those in the north increased their conservative responses (from 5.4 to 9.4 percent), but on this

occasion those in the center and south reduced their conservative responses enough to offset the shift to the right among their northern counterparts: from 17.7 to 10.4 percent in the center and from 16.7 to 7.5 percent in the south. It can be affirmed that, despite the reduction in preferences for change, employees were, together with the base, the only stratum that did not show a clear shift toward conservatism.

Excelsior and *Novedades* continued being the preferred periodicals among employees, although both lost ground in the north and in the center but gained some in the south. Employees proved to be, along with politicians, the most partial to local newspapers.

Bureaucrats

Bureaucrats remained the second most partial stratum to the PRI, behind politicians, but the drop in bureaucrat preferences for this party was extraordinary, above all in the center region where they went from 70.3 in 1983 to 28.5 percent in 1987. In the north, as in the majority of the cases, PRI sympathies fell a little among bureaucrats in that region: from 57 to 52.1 percent. In the south the drop was high, although not as high as in the center: 65.3 to 36.2 percent.

In contrast, the PAN gained ground among bureaucrats in all three regions, demonstrating the shift of the middle strata to this party. In the center, bureaucrats exceeded even professionals in their sympathies for the PAN (7.5 percent), changing the intra-strata relationship that existed four years previous. On the other hand, the PMS went backwards to the point of almost losing any sympathy among northern bureaucrats (5.4 to 1 percent), and also lost ground in the south, where bureaucrats had been the most partial stratum to this party in 1983: (from 8.3 to 6.7 percent); on the other hand, PMS sympathies among bureaucrats in the center rose from 4.7 to 5.3 percent. As a result the overall drop in PMS sympathies

was not so sharp: from 5.3 to 4.8 percent. Bureaucrats opting for no party doubled their percentage: from 15.6 to 34 percent.

If the drop in PRI sympathies among northern bureaucrats was not so marked, the opposite happened regarding government approval: Positive opinions fell from 46.3 to 22.8 percent, which meant northern bureaucrats went from being the most partial of the middle strata to the government in 1983 to the least partial in 1987. Positive opinions among bureaucrats dropped in the center and south regions as well, although to a lesser degree. As a result bureaucrats in both regions (and nationwide) came to be the second most favorable stratum of the government, behind politicians. Negative opinions among bureaucrats rose in the three regions and in fact were the highest (30.5 percent) in the north behind business. Negative opinions were also the second highest in the south, behind labor in this case. In sum, bureaucrats ceased to be one of the bastions of government legitimacy in the political system.

The popularity of the right to strike among northern and southern bureaucrats dropped slightly, with favorable opinions dropping from 64.5 to 63.8 percent in the north and from 66.7 to 60 percent in the south, but in the center they grew from 64.1 to 72.4. As a result, the national average grew from 64.6 to 69 percent. Regarding negative opinions, the tendency re-emerged: growth in the north and south and decline in the center, although the national average of bureaucrats opposed to the right to strike grew from 8.3 to 9.6 percent.

In contrast with the other strata considered, bureaucrats expressed different attitudes regarding political participation by the church and military. In the case of the church, tolerance increased and in the case of the military it decreased. In both cases, however, the regional differences were significant. Negative opinions among bureaucrats toward church participation in politics rose in the center (from 71.6 to 74.4 percent) but fell in the north and in

the south, in such a way that opposition nationwide among bureaucrats went down.

Regarding the military, favorable opinions to its participation in politics fell among northern and center bureaucrats but rose in the south. At any rate, the national percentage decreased from 25.1 to 16.2 percent. Negative opinions evolved in the same way as they did in the church's case: increase in the center but decline in the other two regions, although in this case the increase in the center was enough to raise the overall national average of opposition to military intervention in political life.

Bureaucrats came to be the most conservative of the middle strata (it had been employees in 1983) thanks to the increase in conservative attitudes in north and in the south; in the center they barely modified their position. Radical attitudes dropped, as always, in the three regions in very similar percentages (about 11 points in each case).

The periodical preferred among bureaucrats continued being *Excelsior*, but to a lesser degree: 9 percent. Second place went not to *Novedades* (5.1 percent) but to *La Jornada* (6.6 percent), followed by *el Herald de Mexico* (5.6 percent). Local newspapers gained points among bureaucrats, particularly in the center region, where preferences for them went from 17.1 to 28.3 percent. In the north, on the other hand, local periodicals declined 10 points among bureaucrats.

THE POPULAR BASE OF THE SOCIAL PYRAMID

Labor

Labor became the stratum least partial to the PRI: 21.9 percent (52.7 in 1983). The setback was, once again, much more marked in the center, where sympathies for this party dropped from 57.2 to only 20 percent. In the north, the drop was also very marked: from 38.2 to

19.4 percent and a little less in the south: from 47.6 to 32.4 percent. The PAN, on the other hand, continued gaining ground among workers in the north: 22.4 to 29.6 percent. It should be noted that, according to these results, northern labor sympathized much more with the PAN than with the PRI.

However, the PAN's advances among workers were not uniform. In the center and south there were declines in labor support for the PAN: from 12.5 to 10.8 percent in the center and 17.5 to 15.2 in the south. As a result, sympathies for the PAN nationwide dropped from 14.9 in 1983 to 14.7 percent in 1987, although the percentage was high enough so that workers kept their place as the stratum most partial to the PAN throughout the social pyramid.

The shift to the right among northern workers was confirmed by the notable drop in labor support for the PMS: from 3.9 to only 0.9 percent, making almost imperceptible the influence of the most important party on the left among northern labor. In contrast --and in accordance with the PAN results-- the PMS gained ground in the center and in the south, going from 5.1 to 6.9 percent in the center and from 3.2 to 9.5 percent in the south. In the south, labor became the stratum most partial to the PMS and in the center the second most partial, only behind intellectuals. At the national level PMS preferences among workers rose from 4.7 to 6.3 percent, which was only surpassed by intellectuals.

As in all strata except that of the politicians, the government favorability rating among workers went down: from 32.7 (the lowest in 1983) to 23.8 percent. This variation was due to a decrease of 15 points in the center with increases in the north and south. On the other hand, the growth of negative opinions was constant across the three regions, although much more marked in the center and south. Workers continued being the most critical stratum of the government behind the marginals.

The right to strike, surprisingly, became less popular among workers, probably as a result of fruitless strikes during the four-year period. In the three regions, the percentage of favorable opinions dropped and negatives rose, making labor one of the most critical strata of this right. In the north, positive responses dropped 9 points, in the center 11 and in the south 2. Negative responses rose 14 points in the north, 6 points in the center and 5 in the south. In fact, only politicians in general were less favorable than labor to the right to strike.

Regarding political participation by the church and military, labor tended to polarize and were the most critical of military participation. It should be noted that labor became the stratum with the highest percentage of favorable responses to church participation: 16.6 percent, putting labor in first place in this regard in the north and center and in second place in the south. Nonetheless, negative opinions also rose at the national level: from 54.2 to 61.3 percent, but the increase is due only to a rise in the center as negative opinions in the north and south dropped. Overall, workers became at the same time more inclined and more critical of the church's participation in politics, which makes it possible to speak of a polarization process.

Regarding military participation, workers became more critical, although with some important regional differences. In the north and south, favorable opinions rose but not enough to offset the decline in the center (from 31.2 to 17.3 percent); negative opinions rose in the north and center and also at the national level, but dropped in the south from 42.8 to 28.6 percent. Overall, it can be said that southern labor became much more inclined to the political participation of the clergy and military, in contrast with northern labor.

Workers were not set apart by their attitudes toward radical change --which in all cases dropped-- but it was notable that conservative responses dropped as well as those for radical change. As in all base strata, the general discourse of significant

responses among workers was due to the abundance of *do not know* and *no answer* responses (18.2 percent overall). At the regional level, the exception was northern workers, whose attitudes in favor of radical change rose from 21.1 to 27.8 percent.

The popularity of *Excelsior* among northern workers, which had been nil in 1983, rose to 9.3 percent in 1987 (the highest across the three regions), and also rose in the south, but in spite of this the newspaper overall was less popular among workers, dropping from 11.6 to 7.8 percent in the center and nationwide from 8.9 to 7.9 percent. *Novedades* remained a periodical of scant interest among workers and in fact lost ground in the three regions, especially in the center where its readership fell to 0 and in the north where it fell to 0.9 percent. Worker preferences for other national newspapers rose across the three regions in favor of the sports daily *Esto* and *la Prensa*, according to the national results. Labor cannot be counted among the strata most partial to local newspapers (only 26.9 percent of workers preferred local dailies).

Campeños

The campesino stratum continued being the most partial to the PRI at the base, but in margins so reduced that it would be difficult to keep considering campesinos as one of the bastions of legitimacy for the regime. Four years earlier only politicians and bureaucrats sympathized more than the campesinos with the PRI, but in 1987 they were surpassed as well by business, intellectuals and professionals in the north, business in the center and employees in the south. The drop in campesino sympathies for the PRI in the center was, according to the general trend, from 65.9 to 26 percent.

The PAN gained ground among campesinos: 7.3 in 1983 to 9.4 percent in 1987, but at the regional level the advance of the PAN only came in the north (8 to 18.8 percent) and in the south (1.4 to 8.7 percent), with a setback in the center from 9.7 to 7.4 percent. Despite the notable increase in campesino sympathies in the north

and south, this stratum continued being the least partial to the PAN among the three at the base. The PMS, on the other hand, lost ground among campesinos: from 3.2 to 3 percent in the north and from 3 to 2.8 percent in the center; in the south, the opposite happened with the PMS increasing from 1.4 to 1.9 percent. Campesinos were included among the most abstentionist strata, picking *no party* 42.8 percent of the time compared with only 12.6 percent in 1983. They were only surpassed in this sense by intellectuals and marginals.

Campesino opinion of the government, relatively good in 1983, became negative in 1987, with unfavorable responses (30.8 percent) exceeding favorable ones (21.1 percent). The drop in positive responses among campesinos was, once again, particularly accentuated in the center (from 41.3 to 19.8 percent), although also high in the north (40.3 to 23.8 percent) and in the south (36.1 to 24.1 percent). Part of the setback in positive responses was channeled to the *fair* option (30.6 to 50 percent), and the rest --the majority-- to the negatives. The growth of negative opinions was constant across the three regions, despite the fact that campesinos remained the least critical of the government among the base strata.

The image of the right to strike improved among campesinos in the center and in the south, but dropped in the north (from 46.8 to 39.6 percent). Although at the national level favorable opinions rose, campesinos continued being the stratum least identified with the right to strike at the base. Negative opinions fell in the north and in the center, but rose notably in the south (from 1.4 to 15.4 percent) which increased the national average as well: from 10.7 to 11.8 percent of campesinos opposed to the right to strike.

Campesinos increased their level of opposition to political participation by the church and military. In both cases, negative opinions increased in each region, although in both cases as well campesinos kept their place as the base stratum least opposed to such participation. Favorable opinions on the other hand evolved irregularly. Regarding the military, favorable responses dropped in

the center (from 31.2 to 17.3 percent) but grew in the north and in the south; regarding the church, favorable opinions rose, as in all strata, but to a less significant degree than among workers and marginals.

In contrast with the vast majority of regional strata, campesinos in the north increased their percent of responses in favor of radical change: from 33.9 to 40.6 percent, but in the center and in the south, they followed the general tendency and as a result the percentage of radical attitudes nationwide dropped from 34.2 to 23.9 percent. In spite of this, campesinos became the most radical stratum at the base. Campesinos partial to moderate change became the smallest group across the three regions, while those partial to conservatism also diminished in the center and south. Campesinos in the north expressed a great polarization regarding change, such that those inclined toward conservatism grew from 13 to 14.9 percent while those inclined toward radicalism increased their ranks as well in this region.

In contrast with the other strata considered, neither *Excelsior* nor *Novedades* were preferred by campesinos. *Excelsior* was already barely read by campesinos in 1983 and dropped even further in popularity in the north and center --and nationwide-- but increased a little among campesinos in the south. *Novedades*, for its part, dropped to an almost insignificant 1.1 percent, thanks to a setback from 3 to 1.1 percent in the center and 5.8 to 1 percent in the south, which were not offset by the 0 to 1 percent advance in the north. On the other hand, the rest of the other national dailies increased their readership from 24.5 to 40.1 percent among campesinos; local newspapers lost ground, dropping from 22 to 19.2 percent. It should be noted that above *Excelsior* and *Novedades*, campesinos preferred *la Prensa* (9.4 percent) and *el Esto* (5 percent). It was notable that 34.1 percent of campesinos did not pick any newspaper, compared with only 17.5 percent in 1983. . . Campesinos continued being the stratum least likely to read newspapers throughout the entire social pyramid.

Marginals

In 1983 the marginals had been the stratum least partial to the PRI throughout the social pyramid, but ceded the position in 1987 to labor. At any rate, the national average of marginal preferences for this party (23.6 percent) continued being one of the lowest. The setback in PRI sympathies among marginals was more pronounced in the center (44.9 to 22.4 percent) and in the north (32.4 to 17.5 percent) but rose in the south. In the north marginals continued being the stratum least tied to the PRI among all strata.

PAN popularity jumped among marginals in the north, from 10.8 to 30.1 percent and also gained in the south, from 6.8 to 14.2 percent. On the other hand, there was a considerable setback in the center from 16.2 to 7.8 percent, as a result of which the national average only grew 1.5 points (from 10.9 to 12.4 percent). In the north marginals exceeded even workers in PAN sympathies.

In consonance with the growth of PAN sympathies in the north and south, sympathies among marginals for the PMS fell to 0 in both regions and also dropped from 4.8 to 3.2 percent in the center. The influence of the PMS among marginals became, according to these results, almost non-existent. In addition, the other parties suffered a setback among marginals from 7.9 to 6.5 percent, while it was marginals who most frequently picked *no party*: 45.9 percent. Marginals continued being the stratum least identified with the party system and, therefore, potentially the most unstable.

Marginals also were the stratum with the poorest opinion of the government. Their favorable opinions were the lowest (19.6 percent) and their negative opinions were the highest (33.3 percent). The center became the region where marginals expressed their lowest margin of favorable opinions (17.7 percent, compared with 35.3 in 1983), followed by the north (21.4 compared with 35.3 in 1983).

Marginals slightly increased their favorable opinions of the right to strike. Approvals rose from 49 to 53.2 percent (greater than that among campesinos and almost as high as that among workers), although in the north approvals dropped 6 points. Negative opinions reached their lowest level going from 14.7 to 13 percent; marginals in the north affirmed their low affinity for this right, as unfavorable opinions rose 3 points among them.

Tolerance of church participation in politics rose among marginals, but declined in the case of the military. In the three regions favorable opinions of church participation rose and unfavorable declined, placing marginals as the least opposed stratum to such activity, behind campesinos. Regarding the military, however, there were regional differences: in the north, favorable opinions rose from 16 to 28 points, but dropped in the center and in the south and nationwide as well. Negative responses, on the other hand, rose across the three regions, and especially in the south.

Responses in favor of radical change fell among marginals to 17.9 percent, the most reduced percentage at the base and only comparable to those among elites. The drop was general across the three regions, although much more pronounced in the south than in the center and in both than in the north. Regarding preferences for keeping everything as it was, marginals in the center and especially in the north showed increases, in contrast with those in the south, where the conservative ranks diminished. At the national level, conservative responses grew, which reduced the level of radical responses and would indicate a shift toward conservatism among marginals, despite their precarious socio-economic conditions. A possible explanation would have to be sought in the expansion of the underground economy during this period.

Preferred periodicals among marginals were, as in the case of the other base strata, *el Esto* (6.8 percent) and *la Prensa* (5.9 percent) along with *Excelsior* at the same percent. At the regional level, *Excelsior* slightly increased its readership among marginals

in the north and center but lost some in the south. *Novedades* lost almost all of its marginal readers, dropping to 0 in the north and south and from 5.4 to 3 percent in the center. The rest of the national newspapers gained ground (34.1 to 43 percent) while local newspapers declined in popularity, although slightly. After campesinos, marginals proved to be the stratum least likely to read newspapers.

CONCLUSIONS

In the introduction it was said that this investigation attempted to test four central hypotheses. First, that the response to each one of the three crises of the last 20 years has created the following crisis, because the responses have mainly attacked the apparent effects and not the fundamental causes, producing a pernicious historical chain reaction, particularly through the institutional presidency, which has deepened Mexico's problems. Second, that notwithstanding the previous, the country has improved slightly in an accidental way beginning with the 1940s, thanks to a relative autonomy in the behavior of the political, social and economic spheres which has allowed each one to neutralize and offset the excesses of the others. Third, that the crises have made evident the existence of a great structural heterogeneity in the society that provides an important capacity to resist adverse situations through the diversity of perceptions of the same reality. And fourth, that this superstructural sphere (perceptions, values, mass communication, culture) is what ties, transmits and propagates the phenomena discussed in the first three hypotheses and, therefore, perception is as important as reality.

The first hypothesis seems to be supported by finding in Mexico in the last 20 years a chain of causes and effects, of preconditions and over-determinations that is present from sexenio to sexenio precisely through the force of presidentialism. The enormous political and economic power that presidents of the republic traditionally have had over a weak civil society, although not enough to transform society, has granted a capacity to contain national events, at least from Díaz Ordaz to De la Madrid. The centralist presidency seems to have inhibited and obscured the emergence and action of other social institutions.

The pressures of the mid-1960s, stemming from economic inequality and political authoritarianism, for an increasingly robust middle class, seem to have produced the student conflict of 1968 as an

expression of rebellion and protest heightened by the spirit of the times throughout the world. The repression of Tlatelolco on October 2, 1968, constitutes the first crisis under analysis, which created a delegitimizing effect for the State in the eyes of part of the middle class and determined the leading thread of the Echeverria sexenio: regain the support of these middle class groups, particularly through young people.

Echeverria adopted the language of the students, incorporated many young people into his government, helped the intellectuals and universities and slowly made advances toward relegitimacy. There were not in reality fundamental changes, as the systems' benefits continued flowing to the top of the social pyramid, but there were disquieting formal changes that gave rise to a confrontation that, though seeming to be sterile, was unsettling.

The United States government was bothered by the third world rhetoric and actions of Echeverria. Perhaps as well the U.S. believed they were seeing international communism on the rise in Mexico and felt obliged to detain it. The ignorance of the the Nixon administration about the Mexican political system became very evident to the Echeverria government. There was no conflict in the first half of the sexenio, despite the North American concern, because of the central role played by Eugenio Garza Sada from Monterrey, who understood the rules and helped maintain calm among the younger and more irritated youth.

The death of Garza Sada led to a growing lack of confidence in the government among the business elite, which would culminate in a *second moment of crisis*: the currency devaluation of August 31, 1976. This constitutes the leading thread of the oil sexenio: regaining the confidence of business. Lopez Portillo captivated and enthused the country with the *presidential magic* in his inauguration speech.

This leading thread explains the alliance for production, the solution for everyone and the enormous confidence this administration generated for half of the sexenio through oil exploitation. But the party did not last very long. The unfavorable combination of an overheated economy with an abrupt drop of 2 dollars in the international price of oil precipitated the events of the end of this sexenio, which did not create open confrontation but an acceleration of capital flight --already at important levels-- and which were not checked either by a currency devaluation or by exchange controls and finally ended in the bank nationalization, the third crisis under analysis in this investigation.

For this study it is of some importance to explore the considerations that led to the decision that constitutes the *third moment of crisis* --the bank nationalization-- on September 1, 1982. For the hegemonic faction of the new governing group that was three months from taking power, the bank nationalization constituted an unjustified, unanticipated and abrupt split that could have caused more serious injuries to the country than those the government was trying to avoid. They put on the table new considerations about the confidence of international strategic security agencies and international financial centers and demonstrated the will to comply scrupulously with Mexico's foreign agreements. This presidential will of Miguel de la Madrid constitutes the leading thread of his administration and explains the events of recent years and corroborates the postulated causal chain of events of the last 20 years precisely through the above-mentioned presidential will.

Miguel de la Madrid proposed an immediate economic reordering (PIRE); initiated an intense restructuring of the Mexican debt; strengthened ties with foreign bankers and promoted entrance into the GATT and foreign investment as well as the orientation of production toward exports; arranged for the slow liberation of prices; the elimination of subsidies; the sale of state businesses; the control of salaries and reduction of the fiscal deficit. In sum he complied scrupulously with the conditions demanded by our creditors and

advanced solidly toward the stated purposes of his administration. But this sexennial commitment had, as well as the previous commitments of Echeverria and Lopez Portillo, a high price --the discontent of the middle and popular strata because of the internal economic difficulties generated by compliance with the exterior.

Reiterating, Echeverria sought and regained support from the middle classes, but the price he paid was lack of business confidence. Lopez Portillo sought and gained business confidence, only to lose it again. And additionally, according to some, he lost the confidence of the international strategic security agencies through the bank nationalization, although the measure had popular support. De la Madrid sought and gained compliance with the international community, but the price he paid was skepticism among the masses.

The next sexenio, following this logic, should seek to regain mass support, but such a strategy would create conflict with the middle classes, at least. What is not so clear is whether the conditions exist to allow the system of alliances to continue operating as it has in the last 60 years and whether the traditional consensus will respond to the new circumstances. It should not be forgotten, first, that the economic consensus was blown to pieces when the Bank of Mexico changed its legal constitution from a private to a decentralized public organization in November of 1982 and excluded private elites who had constituted its board of directors since its creation in 1925. Second, that the ideological consensus with UNAM was wrecked, as was illustrated in the rector's speech to the university council.¹ And third, that the traditional political consensus frayed in the *Party of the Institutionalized Revolution*, as Garrido has suggested in his book of the same title, as seen in the movement headed by Cuauhtemoc Cardenas and Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, the *democratic current*, which took off with great velocity beginning in August of 1986. It seems that both the national agreement as well as the constituent parts are fading.

¹ Fortaleza y Debilidad de la UNAM, April 16, 1986.

It was postulated in the second hypothesis that despite the pernicious chain of events from 1968, 1976, 1982 and 1987, the country has improved slightly beginning with the decade of the 1940s. After reviewing the statistical results in the second part, it is possible to affirm that the improvement was sustained between 1940 and 1968 --the year with the highest value of the period-- but from then on there was a stagnant period that only improved temporarily from 1983 to 1985 but included a jump above 1968 levels.

The third hypothesis postulates that the existence of a great structural heterogeneity has been made evident during the last three crises that gives the society a capacity to resist adverse circumstances through the diversity of perceptions of the same reality.

After comparing the regional results for the eight variables considered it was possible to recognize ideological and political differences among the three regions under analysis. The *north* is, overall, more right wing than the center or south. The *south* is a little more left wing and also more partial to the regime. Support for the government and the PRI and the consensus on the state's conquests and historic traditions, such as the right to strike and the exclusion of the military from politics, are definitely lower in the north. Support of military and church intervention in politics is greater in the south than in the center.

To the regional heterogeneity already discussed it is necessary to add that a considerable political and ideological heterogeneity underlies the social pyramid. The results of the analysis yield the conclusion that the current social consensus is markedly less in the popular strata than in the middle strata and in both than at the top. It is reasonable to suppose that such a fact could be due to the relatively great impact in recent years of the difficult economic situation, which has been constant at least since 1982. Labor, campesinos and marginals have seen their standards of living drop without a doubt in greater percentages than standards among the mid-

dle and upper strata. The difficult economic situation, which for a professional could mean a reduction in consumption or for a businessman a drop in profits, has represented unemployment with subsequent marginalization and economic and social insecurity for an important nucleus of workers, although it has expanded the universe of the informal economy.

The identification of clear political and socio-cultural differences across regions and strata would lead to the inference that cross tabulations of both series would yield significant results. In effect, the cross tabulations revealed notable variations in the scores of each strata with their counterparts in other regions. In addition, it was shown that the differences within distinct strata were not uniform in each of the regions, tending on occasion to attenuate and on others to polarize.

In sum, the results of part three support the postulated hypothesis. The clear differences among the nine population strata and three national regions lead to the conclusion that the impact of the crises was differential concerning depth and magnitude along the social scale and across regions.

It can be affirmed that the popular strata were absent as authors and actors in the crises --though not as receptors-- in such a way that there was a great concentration in the participation and perception of the crises among elites, with the exception of 1968 and the high involvement of the middle classes. In the three cases also, initially at least, the authors and actors have been concentrated in the center of the country and especially in the Federal District with a great absence of spectators in the rest of the country. On the other hand, in countries with relatively more homogeneous societies than Mexico and where the impact of crises and the processes of mass communication are more rapid, it would seem that the capacity to resist adverse circumstances would be less and vulnerability would be greater.

However, social and political authors and actors have progressively emphasized the need to broaden and deepen Mexican democracy; and not necessarily in defense of principles, but for practical reasons: creative thought from the base of the social pyramid can enrich and improve situations distant from the elite. This is a new interpellation, urban and industrial, that is present in the current conditions of the country. The democratic interpellation is different from the four traditional ones --land, unionism, education, and no re-election-- that arose from the Revolution. This real social impulse is what is behind phenomena such as the *democratic current* and the center-left Cardenista movement.

Final reflections

Two political currents of similar force and electoral weight appear with increasing clarity in the society, as was seen in the July 1988 election. One comes from economic modernization, so necessary for the nation; the other from political democratization, also indispensable for Mexico. These forces have arisen within the PRI. On one side are the *technico-priistas* who by ideology are center-right and by economic policy are moderate conservatives. They have electoral support among the middle and upper classes and economic support from business, while their ideas are mainly directed at economic development. They can easily build alliances and establish ties with the PAN and the church. On the other side are the *politico-priistas* who by ideology are center-left and by economic policy are moderate progressives. They have electoral support among the popular urban and rural classes and economic support from labor, while their ideas are mainly directed toward social development. They can easily build alliances and establish ties with those in the Cardenista movement.

Those who yearn for the old PRI monopoly or the arrival of a sweeping new force seem misled. Democracy will come rather in the articulation of a plural system and not in exclusion by a homogeneous force. But plural articulation does not mean that there will

be some opposition aldermen in municipal government; nor that in state government there will be a handful of opposition officials; nor that in the local and federal congresses there will be dissident representatives. Plural articulation means, above all, respect for diversity, with all of the implications it carries: respect for the syndical vote, for the civic vote, for opposition governments and the alternation of parties in the presidency.

Cardenas brought electoral weight to the left from the first *politico-priista* split and the left brought its theoretical congruence to his forces. Salinas is bringing to Mexican politics, with his actions, the clarity that had been lost in order to define the internal boundaries of the system. If the *politico-priistas* know their future, it is not with the *technico-priistas*, but what is possible and desirable is a gradual political articulation, state by state, that will permit them to regain their role and positions at the local level and eventually and alternately at the national level; as a result, their future is promising. If on the other hand there is an internal fight, their future looks bleak. In the electoral geography of Mexico it is more or less clear which states, given their respective histories and circumstances, would be on one side or the other.

In a larger context, Mexico's future appears promising because the exhaustion of the national leadership that began in 1968 and that has deepened in the last 20 years, seems to be coming to an end. During this transition, the leadership has weakened, its series of projects has weakened, and the social cohesion has weakened.

The historic chain of the last 20 years seems to be explained also by the absence of powerful external *global impulses* in a long cycle. In 1891, the Porfirio Diaz regime put down an extensive student movement that spawned the youth who would in the course of the next 20 years mature in their grievances and upon changing along with the conditions of the country would help bring about the Revolution of 1910. This along with World War I extended the inter-

nal conflict until 1917, producing a broad revolutionary process that would mark the structure of the Mexican State.

It would seem that the *historic impulse* that drove the Revolution of 1910 and World War I lasted until the decade of the 1930s, pushing domestic events along the same worldwide course. A *second powerful wave* was produced in the 1940s with World War II and its effects seem to have lasted until the 1970s, when a third impulse was needed but never arrived.

The *third impulse* --powerful, historic, worldwide-- that might have given direction to internal events did not arise in the 1970s or the 1980s. And so, the external guide was lost, which was associated with the biological exhaustion of the national leadership and put the country through a period of transition in the last two decades, in which the weakening of the leadership and the *social pact* led to the exacerbation of contradictions so long as civil society matured and the false consciousness broken by 1968 continued to fall into pieces. In this sense the student movement had a double significance for the nation: on one side, as an awareness raiser of the contradictory nature of the Mexican State and, on the other, as a catalyst for the formation of a *fundamental generation*.²

The rising production of ideas and profusion of studies about the *transition* or the *crises* in their multiple aspects are tied to Ortega and Gasset's concept of *generation*.³ And so, a new generation seemed to emerge at the end of the 1960s, marked by the beginning of

2 Camp, Roderic, "Generaciones Politics en Mexico", *Vuelta*, No. 119, October 1986, P. 30.

3 "Among all of the generations that exist in any given moment, contemporaneous generations more than contemporary generations, two stand out in particular: young men from approximately 30 to 45 years of age, who struggle to build a new world and the generation of men between 45 and 60 who have been enthroned in power in the world they built and who have impressed their vision on the order of things. In general, before the age of 30, men are still projects in the making, without having taken or committed to any cause. After age 60, men only sporadically intervene in history". Ortega y Gasset, *En torno a Galileo: Esquema de las Crisis*.

the transition phase, who are now coming to leadership roles as they approach age 45.

The generation of intellectuals --concretely, of social scientists-- who began to contribute to the development of theory in the 1970s, have found one of their most recurring themes in the topic of transition. If transition defines our era, it was necessary to undertake a fundamental study of it. It is not difficult to show that the *crisis* or *crises* --whatever the case-- have been the leading thread of the work of an entire generation of social scientists. This is proved by the sheer number of social scientists who have focused their work on crisis.

And so, two historical tendencies persist at the close of the 1980s: the traditional inertia of the authoritarian-corporative state and the emergence of the new modern, defiant, democratic society. However, the future can be tentatively viewed with optimism, because after 20 years of internal conflict in the national elite and the weakening of its internal ties and those with the base of the social pyramid, the need to re-establish the social pact and strengthen internal cohesion becomes increasing more evident. In this context, the rearticulation of the signers of and the concertation of the clauses in the *new pact* acquire relevance.

In order to define the previous process, it is important to understand the process of renovation among the three sectors of the national leadership --that is, political, economic and intellectual leaders-- as well as the ties that bind them. While the ideological leadership has a relatively rapid renovation process, by the more or less open character of the integration of its components, the economic leadership, on the other hand, has a relatively slow process of renovation, because of the traditionally closed character of the process of the transmission of economic power through the passing on of private business through inheritance. The speed of the renovation of the political elite is moderate, because the process is not to-

tally open or hereditary: family name and prestige are helpful along the political ladder, but are not definitive.

On the other hand, while the business pyramid has economic interest as its cement and the political pyramid has upward mobility, the cement in the intellectual pyramid is the affinity for ideas. The differences among the three different kinds of cement are important, because that of business and politics is more concrete and tangible than that of ideology, but on the other side ideological bonds have a greater reach and penetration than the others. And so, *cohesion* and *speed of renovation*, combined with the impact of 1968, the strengthening of the middle class and of civil society and the speed of communication today, are producing the formation of a new *invisible* pyramid which is the ideological army.

This *army* is made up of three groups: first, a small upper stratum of a couple of dozen lucid Mexican intellectuals, the majority of whom come from the generations preceding the 1968 student movement; second, the middle ranks made up of academic researchers, university professors, technical advisers in official agencies, units of economic analysis in private companies -- these can number as many as 100,000; and, third, the ideological rank and file mainly made up of youth --students, analysts, assistants-- who interact with the second group and who could number as many as 1 million.

This pyramid has as well a differentiation in the structure of ages that ties the older with the younger and, as a result, the ideological pyramid is able to penetrate the political and economic pyramids from the top to bottom, invading them through the intellectual formation of the future economic and political leaders of Mexico. The strength of the upper ideological stratum is based in its ability to read the social reality, formulate it in clear, easily communicated terms and then to be reinforced with credibility, prestige and moral authority, that both the economic and political leadership are losing in favor of the intellectual leadership.

In addition and in benefit to the intellectual pyramid, it seems that in Mexico at this time the great connector between the events of the social, economic and political spheres is precisely this superstructural element, the cultural element, which is to say the raising of awareness and the perception of reality that individuals possess, *filtered* through their values in whichever of these three spheres. This brings us once again to the analysis of the importance of culture for understanding reality and perception. The cultural context in which people perceive the economic, political and social realities is going to powerfully influence behavior at the individual and aggregate levels across these three spheres.

A tendency that certainly will attract academic attention will be the reconstruction of the consensus that after 50 years started to unravel in 1968 --the consensus that came together among the different groups in Mexican society at the turn of the century. It does not seem that the work will be done by just one person, nor by one group of people, nor perhaps by only one political party. It seems rather the work of an entire generation that will be done in what remains of this century by the students of 1968 who now, 20 years after, are beginning to acquire economic, political and social power in Mexico.

There are favorable signs to this generational possibility, such as the political opening during the last three presidencies; the growing participation of civil society that is being expressed in several forms; the renovation of the CTM leadership in the next decade; the electoral mobilizations at the local and some state levels, among others.

In undertaking this work it will be necessary to review, in the framework of *culture*, how new concepts of *neighbor*, *work* and *criticism* can be constructed and defined; how these new concepts can take root in the law, religion, education, mass media, public discourse, morality and ethics; if it is necessary to re-establish relations with the church, to found a new religion or to nationalize

the current one; whether to revolutionize or expropriate the education system and the mass media or give them to Televisa or to the church; whether to break or strengthen the political discourse; whether to revise the foundations of the law or maintain them in their current traditions and customs.

In the *economy* it will be necessary to study whether to grant the states and municipalities new functions and their own sources of fiscal revenue or to strengthen even more their financial dependence on the federal government; whether to continue with a profound fiscal reform, patrimonial taxes or any other possible or convenient, or if this should be avoided at all costs; whether income ranges should be fixed relative to age, qualifications and years of experience --*maximum salaries*-- from one to 25 minimum salaries, or whether the current path of growing social inequality should be maintained; whether the productive plant should be oriented first to winning foreign markets through international competition, or, on the contrary, to satisfying the internal demand and taking advantage of the country's renewable natural resources.

In the *polity* it will be necessary to study whether to reduce to four or increase to 30 the number of cabinet posts; whether to reduce to two or raise to 15 the number of political parties; whether to change the electoral calendars of the states to produce stronger governors and weaker secretaries or viceversa; to see if and when the government will accept opposition victories; if the sectorial positions in the party should be strengthened or broken; if the demand to respect the vote will become effective. These revisions and many others constitute work to be done. What is clear is that the created interests and correlations of forces do not change easily with words, ideas, arguments, or public pronouncement, irrespectively of how sound and convincing they may appear.

Appendix

The April 1983 poll included 7,051 anonymous interviews with uniform quotas for 15 occupational groups in 31 states and the federal district according to population. The questionnaire included 46 closed questions. The profile of the sample is as follows: 66 percent men and 34 percent women; 40 percent from age 18 to 30, 30 percent from 31 to 40, 19 percent from 41 to 50 and 11 percent older than 50; 5 percent without education, 28 percent with some elementary school, 17 percent with some junior high school, 18 percent with high school, 29 percent with professional training and 3 percent with graduate studies; 18 percent with no declared income, 17 percent below minimum wage, 26 percent between 1 and 2 minimum salaries, 24 percent between 2 and 4 minimum salaries, 11 percent from 4 to 8 minimum salaries and 4 percent with more than 8 minimum salaries. The July 1987 poll included 9,032 anonymous interviews with uniform quotas for 14 occupational groups in 70 localities in 31 states and the federal district according to census population figures for those 18 and older. The questionnaire included 46 closed questions. The breakdown by sex was 66 percent men and 34 percent women; by age, 40 percent from 18 to 30, 33 percent from 31 to 40, 19 percent from 41 to 50, and 8 percent older than 50; by income, 47 percent less than minimum wage, 38 percent between 1 and 4 minimum salaries, 10 percent between 4 and 8 minimum salaries and 5 percent with more than 8 minimum salaries.

The following table contains the margin of error at a confidence level of 99.9 percent (C.A. Moser and G. Kalton, *Survey Methods in Social Investigation*, London: Heinemann, 1977, P. 74), for each of the figures presented in Chapter 8, from which the figures in Chapters 9 and 10 were disaggregated. The significance tests made by the MacIntosh StatView package yield a level of 0.001. The size of the sample permits valid use of the theory that equates binomial to normal distribution. The formula used to calculate the margin of error is the following: $3.3 \times \text{the square root of } (p/100 \cdot ((1-p)/100)/n) \times 100$, where 3.3 is the z value, or the area beneath

the curve of the normal standard distribution corresponding to a confidence interval at the significance level of 0.001; p is the percentage to estimate; n is the sample size. For example, 55.3 percent of sympathy for the PRI in the 1983 poll with 7.051 interviews yields a margin of error of 1.95, calculated as follows: $3.3 \times \text{the square root of } (55.3/100 (1-55.3/100)/7051) \times 100, = 3.3 \times \text{the square root of } (0.553 (0.447)/7051) \times 100 = 3.3 \times \text{the square root of } (0.247191/7051) \times 100 = 3.3 (0.005916) \times 100 = 1.95228$ (Cfr Ronald Walpole, *Introduction to Statistics*, New York: MacMillan, 1968, P. 195).

The limitations of sampling by quotas as well as the problem of estimating error are without a doubt inconvenient (see Moser and Kalt, op cit P. 127). However, the non-existence of reliable sampling frameworks and the costs associated with resolving these problems impede random sampling. Nonetheless, the results obtained in the two polls are internally consistent and consistent as well with the results obtained by Enrique Alduncin (*Banamex, Los Valores de los Mexicanos*, 1986) taken from two polls in 1982 and 1987. As can be observed, the margin of error, were the surveys random, in all cases is less than 2 percent.

Margin of error at a significance level of 0.001

		1		2		3		4		5	
		83	87	83	87	83	87	83	87	83	87
A.	(%)	55.3	29.6	10.5	10.2	3.8	4.0	4.3	9.6	26.1	46.7
	error	1.95	1.59	1.20	1.05	0.75	0.68	0.80	1.02	1.73	1.73
B.	(%)	41.6	29.3	35.3	34.6	14.0	29.2	9.1	6.9		
	error	1.94	1.58	1.88	1.65	1.36	1.58	1.13	0.88		
C.	(%)	52.0	32.0	19.2	22.7	11.3	27.4	17.5	18.0		
	error	1.96	1.62	1.55	1.45	1.24	1.55	1.49	1.33		
D.	(%)	56.6	58.9	17.2	17.9	12.4	13.4	13.8	9.8		
	error	1.95	1.71	1.48	1.33	1.30	1.18	1.36	1.03		
E.	(%)	3.7	13.1	20.8	10.0	65.8	67.3	9.7	9.7		
	error	0.74	1.17	1.60	1.04	1.86	1.63	1.16	1.03		
F.	(%)	22.7	19.1	20.5	13.9	44.2	53.2	4.2	7.4	8.5	6.5
	error	1.65	1.36	1.59	1.20	1.95	1.73	0.79	0.91	1.10	0.86
G.	(%)	30.4	23.7	57.3	60.1	12.3	16.2				
	error	1.81	1.48	1.94	1.70	1.29	1.28				
H.	(%)	18.0	10.7	12.5	5.0	39.3	43.3	21.2	28.5	9.0	12.5
	error	1.51	1.07	1.30	0.76	1.92	1.72	1.61	1.57	1.12	1.15

A Party sympathy: 1=PRI, 2=PAN, 3=PSUM, 4=Others, 5=None / B Government Approval: 1=good, 2=regular, 3=bad y 4=don't know / C Bank Nationalization: 1=good, 2=regular, 3=bad, 4=don't know / D Right to Strike: 1=good, 2=regular, 3=bad, 4=don't know / E Church In Politics : 1=good, 2=some times, 3=bad, 4=don't know / F Military In Politics : 1=good, 2=regular, 3=bad, 4=don't know y 5=no answer / G Attitude Towards Change: 1=radical, 2=moderate y 3=conservative / H Newspaper preference: 1=Excelsior, 2=Novedades, 3=other national, 4=local y 5=no answer

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