The British Press and Greek Politics, 1943-1949

by

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This thesis is a study of British attitudes towards Greece, during the period 1943-1949 through the eyes and voices of the British daily and weekly press.

This study seeks to examine these attitudes within a period which started, in Europe and in Greece, with the best of hopes and expectations for world peace, democracy and social justice and ended finding Greece exhausted by a four-year civil war and the world separated into two opposed ideological and political blocks. It, therefore, observes the fluctuation of attitudes and opinions as they correspond to the changing world situation. It is also a study of Labour and Liberal opinion in Britain. The decisive four years (1944-1947) for the fate of the Greek crisis found Britain deeply involved in Greece. The conduct of British policy towards that country, since July 1945, as pursued by a Labour government, represented a real challenge for Labour and Liberal opinion concerning its ideological principles and morals.

The nature of the Greek crisis and the strategic location of the country made it an important episode during the height of the Cold War, further complicating the country's already acute internal differences. Thus, this thesis is also a study of the press reactions to the hardening Cold War attitudes. The aim has been to discover whether the Greek developments themselves were faced on their merits or whether they were related to the Cold War climate; whether the attitudes towards Greece were kept with the general political and philosophical outlooks. Misconceptions, misinterpretations, deceptions and illusions will be also considered and, in particular how, if at all, these features are related to Cold War propaganda.

A significant part of this study will be given on the issue of the relationship between government and press. Freedom of information and governmental pressure on the press, either direct or indirect, are issues under consideration.

Papers will also examined as much for their attitudes and opinions they espoused as for how they went about their business, e.g. ownership, staff, finance, circulation figures, readership.

Finally this thesis, it is hoped, will contribute some valuable first-hand evidence to the overall study of the Greek civil war as it will attempt to portray the prevailing psychological and political atmosphere at the time.
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acronyms</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preface and Acknowledgments</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Introduction</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Wartime and Post-War Mass Psychology</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government and The Press</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece in the 1940s: Myths and Realities</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. The British Press, 1943-1949</strong></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II. Press Attitudes from January 1943 to November 1944</strong></td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece from January to December 1943</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece from January to November 1944</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>III. The December 1944 Storm</strong></td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Press</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Official Documentary Record</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV. The Storm was Weathered, January-February 1945</strong></td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factors in the Changing Press Attitude</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press: Reconsidering the Military Intervention in Greece</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Official Response</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>V. The Gathering of a New Tension, March 1945-March 1946</strong></td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece in 1945</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Growing Estrangement: The Soviet Press</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-War Organisational Re-arrangements</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece at the United Nations Security Council</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VI. &quot;In Our View The Main Danger to Law and Order in Greece Comes</strong></td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from the Communists&quot;, April 1946-March 1947</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Greek Parliamentary Elections of March 1946</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Plebiscite</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reign of Terror</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Policy and Greece in 1946</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towards the Truman Doctrine</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**VII. Internationalisation of the Greek Crisis, April 1947-October 1949</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Cooperation to Confrontation, 1947-1949</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece from April 1947 to April 1948</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensification of the Military Offensive, April 1948-October 1949</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold-War Propaganda Exercises, 1947-1949</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conclusion</strong></td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bibliography</strong></td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGIS</td>
<td>Anglo-Greek Information Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIS</td>
<td>Allied Information Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFHQ</td>
<td>Allied Forces Headquarters, Mediterranean Theater, Caserta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMAG</td>
<td>American Mission for Aid to Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Associated Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMFOGE</td>
<td>Allied Mission for Observing the Greek Elections</td>
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<tr>
<td>BUP</td>
<td>British United Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>Columbia Broadcasting System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-in-C</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COI</td>
<td>Central Office of Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAM</td>
<td>Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo (National Liberation Front)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDES</td>
<td>Ethnikos Demokratikos Ellinikos Syndesmos (National Democratic Greek League)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EKKA</td>
<td>Ethniki kai Kinoniki Apeleftherosis (National and Social Liberation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELAS</td>
<td>Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos (National Popular Liberation Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELD</td>
<td>Enosi Laikis Dimokratias (Union of Popular Democracy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FO</td>
<td>Foreign Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHQME</td>
<td>General Headquarters Middle East</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRD</td>
<td>Information Research Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUSMAPG</td>
<td>Joint US Military Advisory and Planning Group in Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KKE</td>
<td>Kommounistikio Komma Ellados (Communist Party of Greece)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>Ministry of Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEEA</td>
<td>Politiki Epitropi Ethnikis Antistasis (Political Committee of National Liberation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PID</td>
<td>Political Intelligence Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWB</td>
<td>Political Intelligence Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>PWE</td>
<td>Political Warfare Executive</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKE</td>
<td>Socialistiko Komma Ellados (Socialist Party of Greece)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOE</td>
<td>Special Operations Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUC</td>
<td>Trades Union Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRRA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCOB</td>
<td>United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>United Press</td>
</tr>
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<td>WAC</td>
<td>Written Archives Center</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis is a study of British attitudes towards Greece, during the period 1943-1949 through the eyes and voices of the British daily and weekly press.

This study seeks to examine these attitudes within a period which started, in Europe and in Greece, with the best of hopes and expectations for world peace, democracy and social justice and ended with Greece exhausted by a four-year civil war and the world separated into two opposed ideological and political blocks. It, therefore, observes the fluctuation of attitudes and opinions as they correspond to the changing world situation. It is also a study of Labour and Liberal opinion in Britain. The decisive four years (1944-1947) for the fate of the Greek crisis found Britain deeply involved. The conduct of British policy towards that country, since July 1945, as pursued by a Labour Government, represented a real challenge for Labour and liberal opinion in terms of its ideological principles and morals.

The nature of the Greek crisis and the strategic location of the country made it an important episode at the height of the Cold War, further complicating the country's already acute internal conflicts. Thus, this thesis is also a study of press reactions to the hardening Cold War attitudes. The aim has been to discover whether the Greek developments themselves were dealt with their merits or whether they were related to the Cold War climate; whether the attitudes towards Greece were consistent with the general British political and philosophical outlooks. Misconceptions, misinterpretations, deceptions and illusions will also be considered and, in particular how, if at all, these features are related to Cold War propaganda.
A significant part of this study will be devoted to the issue of the relationship between
Government and press. Freedom of information and governmental pressure on the press, either
direct or indirect, are issues under consideration.

Newspapers will also be examined as much for the attitudes and opinions they espoused
as for how they went about their business e.g. ownership, staff, finance, circulation figures,
readership.

Finally this thesis, it is hoped, will contribute some valuable first-hand evidence to the
overall study of the Greek civil war, as it will attempt to portray the prevailing psychological
and political atmosphere at the time.

The thesis is divided into seven chapters, arranged in chronological order. After
introducing the British papers and their editors, the study will examine their attitudes to the
Greek politics of 1943-1949.

Chapter II covers the period from January 1943 to November 1944 and examines the
policies of the British Government towards the Greek King and EAM/ELAS as well as the
various other resistance organisations. The British policy of support for the King was
incompatible with any form of cooperation with EAM/ELAS which by virtue of its rapidly
expanding popularity, was posing a serious challenge for the King and his Government.
Therefore EAM's image had to be weakened, through the press and the BBC. Thus, this
chapter also examines the efforts made by the British Ambassador, Reginald Leeper, and the
Foreign Office to win over the press, which, in its majority, had been increasingly critical of
Churchill's policy towards liberated countries in Europe and especially towards Greece and was
particularly distrustful of the Greek King.
Chapter III presents the storm of united press reaction against the British military intervention in Greece in December 1944 and it shows the greater efforts made by the Foreign Office and British Embassy in Athens to retrieve the situation. A special reference will be made to the long battle between The Times and the Foreign Office over Greece (examined more closely in the following chapters) which was just beginning.

Chapter IV covers the period until the signing at Varkiza of a political settlement which ended the December crisis. It observes the press's drift back towards support for official British policy and it examines the several factors which contributed to it. It also examines the earnest official efforts to deal with the press corps by keeping the British correspondents "on the rails" and by winning over the more approachable American correspondents.

Instead of forming the basis for the peaceful reconciliation of the opposing factions in Greece, the Varkiza Agreement became, in the hands of the Government, an instrument of revenge: the prelude to the subsequent civil war. Chapters V and VI observe the increasing press uneasiness at the growing political violence, mainly exercised by extreme right-wing bands, and the monarchists' strenuous efforts to win the parliamentary elections of March 1946 and to force a decision for a speedy plebiscite. To counteract the growing press criticism on the decline in public order, the Foreign Office and the British Embassy decided to present the Communists as the main danger to law and order in Greece. All papers were contacted and the great majority of them submitted to Foreign Office's advice. At the same time systematic efforts were made to replace "irresponsible" correspondents. Meanwhile, a new element was added to the Greek scene, that of the growing criticism and hostility of the Soviet Press, which first became apparent in February 1945. Chapter V examines in detail how that came about and how
the British reacted to it. An attempt also is made to indicate the significance of this new element to British-Soviet relations.

Chapter VII covers the crucial years from April 1947 until the end of the Civil War in October 1949. It is, deliberately, the longest chapter. It attempts to show how intensification of the Cold War was reflected in the attitudes of the press. The Marshall Plan was a milestone in this. Those who, until 1947 had considered that cooperation with the Soviet Union was both necessary and desirable, came full circle and they increasingly mistrusted Soviet post-war objectives. This breach can be clearly seen in the Labour Left press. The Greek crisis was henceforth seen, not as a mainly internal problem, but an international one; an East-West conflict. In this chapter, there is a detailed discussion of the end of the long battle between The Times and the Foreign Office over Greece and over the paper's general foreign policy.

This thesis attempts to show that press attitudes towards Greece corresponded to the changing world situation. The Second World War had radicalised a large part of British public opinion. The British Press, by and large, was feeling sympathetic to the European resistance movement and they believed that these new forces had an important role to play in Europe. There was also optimism about cooperation between all three major powers. In particular, cooperation with the Soviet Union was seen as a prerequisite to a peaceful and prosperous new world. The Press, especially the liberal and Labour, maintained a critical line towards the official policy of failing to support the newly emerged forces in Europe and to some extent it was reluctant to conform to the official policy; favourable press comment on EAM would continue for quite a long time.
However, the Cold War tensions proved catalytic. The Press gradually became distrustful of the Soviet Union's post-war objectives. When the British and the Americans decided to view the Greek civil war as an East-West conflict, rather than an indigenous political problem, the Press was more receptive to Foreign Office' advice and guidance. The defeat of the Communists in Greece was presented as representing the containment of the Soviets and international communism.

The study of press attitudes towards Greece from 1943 to 1949 thus demonstrates that the press moved from wartime and early post-war optimism to the ideological and political fixities of the Cold War.

I should like to express my gratitude to those who helped me most:

My supervisors Professors D Cameron Watt, who first introduced the topic to me, and Paul Preston, for his continuing support. They both read the manuscript thoroughly and made some valuable comments on points of detail and style. I welcome this opportunity to thank Prokopis Papastratis, Professor of History in the Panteion University, Athens, for his advice and support.

For his kindness and hospitality, I am indebted to Mr. Mark Barrington-Ward for putting at my disposal his father's diary.

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I am especially grateful to Marion Sarafis for her encouragement and generous help in advising me on the use of English language in the text.
My greatest gratitude of all, however, should remain with those who gave me their unwavering moral support and to whom this thesis is ultimately dedicated. First to the memory of Despina Katifori, Professor of Modern Greek History in the University of Athens, without whose encouragement and support this study would have never been conceived; and finally to my parents for their support during many a trying moment.
INTRODUCTION

British Wartime and Post-War Mass Psychology

The Second World War, "the people's war" as George Orwell and others had viewed it, generated in Britain a popular radicalism. Social enthusiasms and idealism kindled between 1939 and 1945 found expression in an almost unique support for the Left.(1)

As soon as the war started there was a swift proliferation of *ad hoc* institutes and bureaux dedicating themselves to the problems of war aims, peace terms, general European Construction and World Order which attracted a young generation of thinkers and writers. The most important of such bodies was probably the 'Post-War Bureau', initiated by Edward Hulton(2), the young and wealthy proprietor of *Picture Post* magazine, founded in 1938 and already by 1940 successful with its blend of photo-journalism and progressive politics. Amongst the members of this group were Gerald Barry, editor of the *News Chronicle*, Tom Hopkinson, editor of *Picture Post*, Francis Williams, editor of the *Daily Herald* until January 1941, and E H Carr, assistant editor and leader-writer on *The Times*. Soon the 'Post-War Bureau' died out, but it was important as a precursor of what was to come.

Before long the '1941 Committee' emerged largely through the combined efforts of Edward Hulton and J B Priestley. The latter, a novelist playwright and broadcaster, was among the many varied apostles of wartime radicalism. Out of this Committee grew the Common Wealth Party, founded by a member, Sir Richard Acland. This Party preached a kind of Christian socialism and appealed, above all, to middle-class 'progressives' who looked forward to a new beginning in Britain.(3) The Common Wealth Party faded away as soon as the
two-party system re-asserted itself in 1945. Richard Acland became a Labour MP in 1947; its general secretary and chairman, R W G Mackay, also became a Labour MP in 1945.

The '1941 Committee' attracted not only those concerned with the 'Post-War Bureau', but also journalists such as Michael Foot, editor of the Evening Standard (1942-1944) and Philip Jordan of the News Chronicle, and politicians such as Ellen Wilkinson, who became minister for education in the 1945 Labour Government.

Hulton was also involved, along with G Barry, in setting-up the 'Shanghai Club', an informal meeting-place to discuss politics. Named after a Soho restaurant, the 'Shanghai Club' was composed of most of the younger left-wing journalists in London.

Regulars at the 'Shanghai' included E H Carr, Geoffrey Crowther and Barbara Ward of The Economist, Norman Luher of the BBC Talks Department, Ronald Fredenburgh, later diplomatic correspondent of The Observer, Tom Hopkinson, David Astor the proprietor and later editor of The Observer, Ted Castle, news editor of the Daily Mirror and Donald Tyerman, deputy editor of The Economist. Sebastian Haffner, writer and a main figure of The Observer until early 1950s, George Orwell, Jon Kimche, Isaac Deutscher, all contributors in Tribune and some other papers, such as The Economist and The Observer, and John Strachey(4), the wealthy editor in the 1920s of the Socialist Review, the New Leader and Miner, the weekly of the National Union of Miners(NUM) and later contributor to Tribune, also belonged to the club.(5)

This emerged generation of writers and journalists was a thoughtful and serious one. They had fought through the Second World War, and had also seen -and in some cases experienced- the miseries of Depression, the failure to combat Fascism in the 1930s. They had still fresh the memories of the pre-war battle to establish a popular front against Fascism.(6) Enthusiasm generated by the successes of the Soviet Army, especially after the battle of Stalingrad, also
helped in radicalising their approach to world affairs, as happened with the greater part of British public opinion.(7)

In home affairs this generation believed in the progressive political thinking of wartime Britain. They advocated a 'peaceful revolution' in domestic politics after the war, producing a Welfare State and increased central Government planning. They thus supported the Beveridge Report and nationalisation of certain industries. In world affairs alliance and cooperation with the Soviet Union was seen as a prerequisite for a peaceful and prosperous new world. To this generation, ideas about politics, disarmament and world peace were serious issues. Such ideas were also in a considerable state of flux, which gave this generation the opportunity for constructive thinking about the world and its difficulties that had been denied to an earlier generation, and was to be denied to a later one brought up on the fixities of the Cold War.

This generation, who called themselves 'Socialists' or 'progressive Tories', reflected and championed the gradual leftward shift of British wartime society as a whole. The defection of The Times, The Observer and other traditional voices of the Conservative fold foreshadowed, and reflected, the collapse of the Conservative vote at the 1945 election. Labour was identified with this sweeping change of mood during the war years, and with the new social agenda that emerged. It alone seemed to understand and project the new mood.(8)

Throughout the post-1945 period, the Liberal tradition remained a vital element of British political and social culture. There were the Liberal daily newspapers, the Manchester Guardian, the News Chronicle, to give heart to the faithful and to make sense of Liberal pretensions after 1945. Liberal commentators such as A J Cummings of the News Chronicle, were respected figures with a wide public.

In general, the mood of 1945 was perpetuated for some time to come, at least until the end of 1946. An intellectual and cultural climate continued that was sympathetic to the outlook.
of the Labour Party. But the optimism and advance soon yielded to a more cautious, perhaps pessimistic mood.

The changes in the international political climate led to growing doubts about Soviet post-war intentions. Yet, until June 1947, it seemed to many that whatever their dislike for the politics of Russia it was more than counterbalanced by their equal dislike of the policies of America.

The Marshall Plan placed the world in the melting-pot. Apart from its economic and political ramifications, it seriously affected attitudes towards the Soviets. For many it represented a test as to whether Russia was willing to cooperate with the West. The division became apparent even within the Labour Left. The ensuing series of events greatly accelerated the process of alignment on the British Labour Left which ended in the isolation of a tiny minority of pro-Soviets and a drastic weakening of those who, while reluctantly anti-Soviet, remained suspicious of the Americans. Personalities, like Professor Harold Laski, could see little place for themselves in the bifurcated world of the cold war. "I have the feeling", Laski wrote on September 27 1947, to his close friend, Felix Frankfurter, "that I am already a ghost in a play that is over." (10)

In retrospect, one must say that it was impossible for the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries within her sphere of influence to participate in the Marshall Plan without ceding the political initiative to the United States.

Grimly, inexorably, the world divided into massive, hostile blocs. Many of the leftist pioneers of pre-war years become less enthusiastic, and in some cases critical, of any cooperation with the Soviet Union. The case of George Orwell is indicative. His work may rightly be included with the anti-Communist drift of the cold-war years. (11) Newspapers and the weeklies showed something of the same movement. The fate of Tom Hopkinson's Picture
Post is symptomatic. During the post-war period, it continued its wartime tradition of crusading left-wing journalism. By 1950, however, the proprietor, Edward Hulton, had himself moved to the right, and even joined the Conservative Party early that year. Hulton forced Hopkinson's dismissal as editor in October 1950. (12) Thereafter, Picture Post went into a speedy decline and later 'folded'.

Yet, as the high and rising circulation of Kingsley Martin's New Statesman after 1945, with easily the largest readership of all the weeklies, shows that the intellectual energy of the political-literary left, surviving from the thirties, was still alive.

**Government and the Press**

The impact of the press in forming public opinion and its propaganda potential came to be recognised over the years by the policy-makers.

It was the First World War which decisively changed the relationship between Government and press. In 1914 two Government agencies were established, the Press Bureau and, linked to it, the Foreign Office News Department with the purpose of harnessing and exploiting the propaganda potential of the press. In 1918, a Ministry of Information (MOI) was created. After the war the Ministry was wound up, but, as its wartime services proved to be of potential value in peacetime, its activities were carried out by the Foreign Office. In early 1919 the News Department was reconstituted and was amalgamated with another wartime creation, the Political Intelligence Department (PID) -originally the Intelligence Branch of the Department of Information. Thus the Foreign Office News Department was the pioneer of what may be termed official public relations. The extension of broadcasting would further
stimulate this process and the BBC in these years would play a complementary role to Fleet Street.

In July 1939, the News Department lost a part of its foreign publicity apparatus to a Foreign Publicity Department, which was formed within the Foreign Office, but it retained its responsibility for giving information to British and foreign correspondents in London. On the outbreak of war in 1939 the Ministry of Information, reintroduced and staffed with a substantial number of recruits from Fleet Street, contrasted with the Foreign Office which recruited staff predominately within its own ranks. The new MOI absorbed the Foreign Publicity Department and a great deal of the work of the News Department, which during the war was in the same building as the Ministry. The residual News Department was responsible for liaison between the Political Departments of the Foreign Office and the MOI.

The Labour Government gave great importance to publicity issues. In April 1946 it gave a permanent status to the Ministry of Information, which was renamed the Central Office of Information (COI). A number of information departments were set up to deal with foreign publicity, such as the American, East European etc. Information Departments. In 1949 they were all absorbed into the Information Policy Department. Information Research and Information Services Departments were also established at about this time, the latter disappearing in 1954. With the Cold War, a clandestine information body would be created against Soviet influence. This was the Information Research Department of the Foreign Office established in 1948. (13)

The Second World War had a profound effect on British journalism, more far-reaching even than the war of 1914-18. Once again, newspapers were put under pressure to keep boosting public morale and to promote national unity.
The wartime censorship not only confined to the banning of publications - the Daily Worker and The Week were banned (January 1941), while Churchill's attacks on the Daily Mirror (March 1942) were unsuccessful - it also prevented newspapers from printing unwanted material, and Defence Notices were sent to all editors concerned with subjects that could not be reported without the permission of the Ministry of Information's Censorship Division.

Moreover, the scarcity and the rising cost of newsprint also acted as a form of censorship. In consequence, the number of newspaper pages was substantially reduced. The limitation of the papers' space meant that news had to be compressed or suppressed. Some papers, including The Times and the Manchester Guardian, reduced circulation in order to remain at eight or ten pages, but were still unable to cover events comprehensively.

Another serious issue was the concentration of the main daily and weekly newspapers into fewer hands in both London and the provincial press. In 1921 there had been 169 daily and Sunday newspapers and 1,485 weeklies in Britain, but by 1948 this number had fallen to 128 and 1,162 respectively. This phenomenon was, partly at least, a consequence of the ways in which the newspaper industry had developed over the previous century and the first third of the twentieth century. Press chains had existed in the past but the trend towards the concentration of ownership accelerated to such an extent after the end of the First World War that by 1943, the British press was dominated by five groups: Lord Beaverbrook, the Berry brothers (Lord Camrose and Lord Kemsley), Lord Rothermere, the Cadbury Trust, Odhams. Rothermere, the Berrys and Beaverbrook were strong supporters of Conservatism, and were not averse to intervening in national politics in the same autocratic way that they interfered in the management and editorial policies of their papers.

The political power of the barons was one of the matters of a serious and far-reaching public debate about the press, particularly in view of Beaverbrook's later admission that he ran
the Express "merely for the purpose of making propaganda". Other matters were: the cost of launching a national newspaper had become virtually prohibitive; national advertising encouraged the enlargement of popular national newspapers(17) and placed more emphasis on the entertainment side in relation to news and comment; the State/Press relationship.(18) The debate was conducted throughout the 1920s, and especially so in the 1930s. It was intensified during and immediately following the Second World War and led to the setting-up of a Royal Commission to investigate all aspects of the British press.(19) The Royal Commission on the Press began its work in 1947 and reported in 1949.(20)

Despite the limitation on space, and other restrictions it has to be said that some newspapers continued to perform a high quality service to their readers. Independent-minded voices did get heard, thus saving the good name of the British Press.

Greece in the 1940s: Myths and Realities

The events of the 1940s had an extremely important impact on post-war Greece leaving an indelible mark upon its internal development and external orientation.

For more than two decades the study of the 1940s in Greek historiography lacked scholarly investigation, for a number of reasons: the political climate of nationalist fundamentalism and anti-communist ideological campaign, the inaccessibility of primary sources, the sensitive nature of the issues were some of them. Thus, the monolithic and highly emotionally-charged interpretation of the period that was offered left the official version virtually unchallenged. It was, therefore, not symptomatic that initial approaches of understanding the nature and mechanics of the conflict were initiated abroad.(21)
In the early 1970s the publication of documents from foreign state archives (British and American) and political reforms in Greece (restoration of democracy in 1974) led a new generation of historians to re-examine and to question many of the traditional interpretations.(22)

Most accounts of the Greek Civil War concluded with a series of value judgements that either tried to justify or to condemn the policy of the British or the Soviets towards Greece or the policy of one of the Greek political parties. Furthermore, as regards the second point, in order to find an 'alibi' for the actions of the Greek political leaders or parties, such accounts had come to consider foreign intervention as the most important factor of the post-war Greek developments.

The most recent approach to studying the Greek Civil War, liberated from the old passionate partisanship and fanatic commitment to one side of the conflict, leads to the conclusion that the civil war was produced by the conflicting objectives of two Greek camps, each determined to impose its will upon the nation, each believing in its own legitimacy and each realising that the sources of its efforts ultimately depended upon external factors and upon the foreign assistance it could secure.

For Greece, as for the rest of Europe, the Second World War released new forces that became manifest in the 1940s. Their anti-fascist and democratic spirit, which was at the basis of the popular national unity achieved during the war in Albania (1940-1941), continued and acquired a stronger consciousness during the occupation (1941-1944), because of the efforts of the national resistance movement.
By the time of liberation EAM/ELAS, the most powerful of all resistance movements, had become the dominant power in Greece by virtue of its popular following. On the other hand, the traditional parties, deeply demoralised and discredited in the eyes of the Greek people and totally devoid of the popular support necessary to organise a mass resistance against the foreign invader, seemed to be in a state of permanent eclipse. They refused to cooperate with EAM, as the events up to December 1944 (the clash between EAM/ELAS and British in Athens) showed.

It is well documented that the policy of Churchill, who often took personal charge of Greek policy, was to safeguard British strategic interests in the eastern Mediterranean by restoring Britain's political influence in Greece with the Greek King as the basic factor in this policy, and his decision to neutralise by any means, political or military, the entire Left camp. The Greek power elites, threatened by EAM's challenge, offered their services to the British in the hope of regaining their lost influence. And it is in this light that the problem of foreign intervention in Greece should be viewed.

As the Lebanon and Caserta Agreements and the official documents of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) demonstrate, the EAM/ELAS and the KKE—which, owning to the dynamics of the struggle, constituted EAM's leading element—were willing to cooperate with the British-sponsored Government of National Unity for the establishment in Greece of a multi-party parliamentary system. (23) At the moment of liberation, though deeply suspicious of the British and the Right, but confident of EAM's popular support, they decided to act with moderation and to try to pursue their objectives by political and not military means. (24) The myth that the EAM or the KKE had planned to seize power by military action must be rejected.

The December events ended with the defeat of EAM and the signing of the Varkiza Agreement in February 1945. Although vague and subject to conflicting interpretations, the
Varkiza Agreement politically offered a practical basis for compromise and eventual reconciliation. Instead, it was followed by a wave of rightist terror against the Left and led to yet another and more bloody conflict, that of 1946-1949.

With the new Labour Government in Britain from July 1945, the British imperial concern remained unchanged. Britain's intention to establish in Greece a Government of the centre was negated by her policy of non-intervention, leaving the Right and the extreme right-wing organisations, such as the notorious 'X', in control of the state machinery.

Meanwhile, the KKE continued in 1945-6 to advocate a policy of reconciliation, as the resolution of the Twelfth Plenum (July 25-27, 1945) demonstrated(25) and the various public statements of KKE leader, Nikos Zachariadis, showed. As the right-wing terror was in full swing, it was decided in February 1946 at the second Central Committee Plenum to form a limited armed self-defence against the White Terror and not, as some writers have argued(26), an immediate armed revolt. The myth, therefore, that in the immediate post-Varkiza period the communists were regrouping and preparing for the so-called 'third round', must be cast aside. Indeed, until the Third Plenum of September 11-12, 1947 there was no reinforcement of partisan activity.(27)

In their decision to intervene in Greek affairs, Britain and the United States were strongly influenced by fears of Soviet expansion in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Yet there is no tangible proof of Moscow's interest in Greece. The myth of Soviet instigation of the Greek civil war cannot be sustained. Stalin's first consideration was to serve his country's interest. He kept his part in the 'percentage agreement' of 1944, never gave more than minimal help, economic or military, to the Greek communists and did not recognise KKE's Provisional Democratic Government.(28)
The deeper causes of the civil war surely lie in the interwar period and the General Metaxas dictatorship; the immediate origins are to be found in the years of enemy occupation and the resistance movement. It is, therefore, safe to argue that, in its fundamentals, the Greek crisis was of domestic origins. Yet, its course and outcome were influenced, directly or indirectly, by clashing regional and international interests. Strategic considerations of the Cold War between the Soviets and the western alliance, as well as the antagonism between the United States and Britain in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East were entangled with Greece's internal differences, disorienting them and giving them a Cold War ideological dimension.

The forces of renewal in Greece during the 1940s seem to have lost their cause which they believed in as the absolute truth. Whether they were wrong or not it has been proved in the long run. And there may perhaps lie the catharsis of this Greek tragedy.
NOTES


2. For Sir Edward Hulton, see in Encyclopedia of the British Press (1922), 324-5


4. John Strachey was son of St. Loe Strachey, proprietor and editor of The Spectator (1898-1925). He became Labour MP for Dundee in 1945 and served in various governmental positions. "He influenced the Labour movement on several occasion: towards Marxism in the 1930s, towards the New Deal and away from communism and Marxism generally in the 1940s." (Hugh Thomas, John Strachey, (1973), 298. See also N Thompson, John Strachey: An Intellectual Biography, (1993)

5. Information about 'Shanghai Club' is from Richard Cockett, David Astor and The Observer, (1991)


7. In January 1942 Gallup put the question "Would you like to see Great Britain and Russia continuing to work together after the war?" 86% answered Yes and 6% No. In March 1943 to the question "Will USA try to boss Britain after the war?" 31% answered Yes. To the question "Will Russia try to boss Britain after the war?" 58% answered No. (Bell, P.M.H., John Bull and the Bear, 95)


9. It is indicative that only six MPs cast their votes against the North Atlantic Treaty, when it came before the House of Commons in May 1949, and seven out of the fifteen original Keep Left members endorsed the formation of NATO. (Hansard, vol.464, may 12, 1949, cols. 2127-30)


15. George Murray, The Press and the Public (1972), 54


17. See, for example, A P Wadsworth's views in Newspaper Circulations, 1800-1954, (March 9 1955), 28-30. The steady rise of the popular press is shown in his classic graphs on the circulation of the papers 31-39.

18. These tendencies in the press had already been noted in a report by PEP broadsheet 'Planning', on "Report on the British Press" Nos. 118, 119, 120, Vol. V(1938)


24. Vlavianos, op.cit. 251-2, Close(ed.),133

25. Vlavianos, op.cit 254; Close(ed.), 132


27. Vlavianos, op.cit. 256
It seems that Stalin was opposed from the start to the communist struggle in Greece. KKE leaders repeatedly approached Moscow requesting financial and military assistance, they were unequivocally turned down. (Vlavianos, op.cit. 69-72; Close(ed.), op.cit., 139-140, 148, 193) As early as February 10, 1948, Stalin told the Yugoslavs that the fighting in Greece "must be stopped, and as quickly as possible", because it was provoking the Americans and the British. (Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (1962), 164) As Iatrides has pointed out material assistance from communist sources, mainly Yugoslav, represented "no more than 10 percent of the total number of weapons in insurgents' hands" (Iatrides(ed.) Greece in the 1940s, Hanover, 1981, 212-213)
CHAPTER ONE

THE BRITISH PRESS: 1943-1949

1. The Times

From 1922 the paper was in the hands of John Jacob Astor, the co-chief proprietor with John Walter. It was administered by a Trust, established in 1924. John Astor's best service to The Times was that he maintained the independence of the editor from any interference, beginning with himself. He never meddled with the policy of the paper and he made sure that other directors of the company stood back in exactly the same way. (1)

From 1941 to early 1948 editor of The Times was Robert M Barrington-Ward. He first joined the paper in 1913 and after service in the First World War went to The Observer where he became J L Garvin's assistant editor in 1919. Rejoining The Times in 1927, he was appointed deputy editor in 1934, and finally succeeded Geoffrey Dawson as editor from October 1, 1941. (2)

During his editorship The Times was subjected to violent criticism, never before experienced in its history. The paper's conciliatory line towards the Soviet Union in the 1940's led its critics to charge The Times with continuing policies of appeasement through the two decades, first towards Nazi Germany and now towards the Soviet Union. The paper was also charged with preaching 'power politics', as recognising 'spheres of influence', reminiscent of that doctrine of realpolitik which supposedly Britain was at war to oppose.

Already in the war years, Times leaders had started to discuss postwar international relations and proclaimed that the war was not being fought to restore the status quo ante in Europe. The Versailles settlement had failed and a stable new European system could no longer
be fabricated without the participation of all Great Powers, including Russia. The paper envisaged that a new peace settlement should be based upon the mutual trust, understanding and cooperation of the Great Powers: a new Concert was what was now required, not so much "a Concert of Europe but a Concert of the World."(3)

Upon this model was based the idea of division of the world into spheres of influence. As The Times in a leader had put it, "zones of influence exist, were bound to exist, and will continue to exist."(4) The paper argued that this model would succeed if all the Great Powers were treated as equals. The Times recognised that as Britain claimed a preponderant influence in the Middle East or America in the Pacific and the Western hemisphere as a whole, so too the Soviet Union claimed predominance in Eastern Europe, an area of utmost sensitivity for her security.

As relations between the wartime allies began to deteriorate once the war had been won, the paper blamed both sides as equally guilty. There was no monopoly either of guilt or of innocence.

A projection of The Times' ideas on organising Europe after the war, was the line it adopted on Greece after the British intervention in 1944. It was seen as the most important test case up to that time as to whether the British Government was willing to work with the new forces that were emerging in European countries. An imaginative handling of these new forces in Greece, rather than repression of them, would prove to Russia that Britain was not a reactionary, imperialist power and that proof would provide the basis for a better east-west understanding in Europe.(5)

A fierce dispute broke out between Churchill and The Times which will be discussed at length below. The polemic against its editor continued for quite a long time. In his diary entry
on February 10, 1945, Barrington-Ward would write, "This Greek business has taken a great deal out of me."(6)

The tone of any great newspaper, however, is something which cannot be entirely established by any one man.

E H Carr was a well-known intellectual, who had served for twenty years in the Foreign Office when in 1936 he was appointed professor of international politics at the University College of Wales, in Aberystwyth. He had contributed to The Times since 1937 and in 1941 he became assistant editor until 1946.(7) He played a strong part in the paper under Barrington-Ward. He laid down the bases of the policy vis-à-vis Russia which The Times was to follow throughout the war and for some years afterwards. Barrington-Ward's confidence in him is demonstrated from the fact that he confined his own interventions in the leaders to matters of presentation rather than of comment. In 1946 Carr left the paper to pursue his academic career and occasionally contributed leading articles.

Donald Tyerman, assistant and deputy editor of The Economist from 1937 to 1944, and in 1943-44 deputy editor of The Observer, was one of the most effective men of the paper. He joined The Times as assistant editor in May 1944 and stayed until 1955. After the death of Barrington-Ward in 1948 he was considered as his natural successor. Instead he was put in charge of home affairs on the paper, lending an important voice in the shaping of The Times' domestic policies.(8)

Other main leader-writers on Greece were Basil Davidson, who worked for The Times from 1947 to 1949 and then joined The New Statesman and the Daily Herald as special correspondent(9) and J D Pringle who came in early 1948. Both would leave their distinctive stamp on the paper, as we will see below. An equally important figure of the paper was its diplomatic correspondent until 1948 and then its assistant editor in charge of foreign affairs,
Iverach McDonald. He was widely trusted in the Foreign Office who always preferred to channel any intercourse with the newspaper through him.

The contrast between the argumentative and advocate, Barrington-Ward and the relaxed and quiet new editor, William Casey (1948-1952), clearly demonstrated that Casey-despite his advanced age and poor health-was selected not simply to weather the storm, but "to ensure that within Printing House Square at all events there would be no storm to be weathered." (10) The paper gradually shifted to the right and all those who gave it colour in the past decade drifted away to new fields which suited them better.

The radical line The Times had adopted did not damage its circulation. On the contrary, the paper was prospering and made record profits in 1945. (11) It made a profit each year until 1948. From 1948 to 1952 there was a decreasing profit which in 1952, the last full year of Casey's term, reached its lowest. (12)

The Times was very critical of British intervention in Greece in 1944 and it believed that the main cause of the Greek civil war lay in Greece's internal problems and refused to accept the international dimension which the official policy had advocated. The special correspondents in Greece were: Geoffrey Hoare, Alkeos Angelopoulos, a 'stringer', and from 1947, Frank Macaskie.

2. Manchester Guardian

From a provincial Lancashire Whig newspaper, the Manchester Guardian had been transformed into an internationally known and respected Liberal journal under C P Scott's editorship (1872-1929). In 1936, following the precedent of The Times, the proprietorship of the paper was reconstituted as a trust. (13)
In the interwar years the paper became increasingly independent. A P Wadsworth (April 1944-56) was the first editor who was not a member of the Liberal Party. The 1945 election ended the official link between the paper and the Party, without, of course, formally dissociating itself from it.(14)

A P Wadsworth joined the newspaper in 1917. In 1940 he was appointed assistant editor and in April 1944 succeeded W P Crozier as editor. As a long-term Guardian Labour correspondent he had many dealings with Ernest Bevin, the then trade union leader. He had admiration for him and as editor he supported Bevin's policies. His experience as Labour correspondent had kept his ear to the ground and he sensed that new social forces were coming out of the war. He was among the first in the left wing press to attack Churchill openly and criticised pretty severely Churchill's Fulton speech.(15) His attitude to the Soviet Union developed slowly and he ended, as we will see, fully supporting Bevin's policy of breaking with Russia.

The Manchester Guardian's circulation had a steady wartime and post-war increase, at a rate by which in 1950 The Times had 270,000 readers and the Daily Telegraph 940,000, while the Guardian sold in the same specialised market 140,000 issues.(16) Its main competitors were other 'quality' papers and not the 'populars' except perhaps, to some extent, the News Chronicle.

This liberal intellectual newspaper was very much interested in international affairs. Under Wadsworth there was a growing attention to world affairs. He spent much more money on foreign news than his predecessor, Crozier, a career foreign editor. Thus foreign news got nearly two-thirds (65 per cent) of its pre-war amount, and home politics only half.(17)

After the war, the most pressing problem the new editor had to face was the paper's foreign staff service. It was decided that it would not be wise to call back F A Voigt, an
outstanding figure of the Manchester Guardian in the interwar years. His violent anti-Communism and his views were unacceptable to the European left and he was considered rather eccentric. Voigt showed great interest in the Greek events and visited the country numerous times. His views on the Greek crisis were recorded in his book, The Greek Sedition (1949).

The paper kept its own men in the Soviet Union and the United States. One of Wadsworth's most important foreign developments was the establishment for the first time of an American service, under Alistair Cooke, who had several years' experience with America first in The Times and then in the Daily Herald. In Moscow it had Alexander Werth, who had perfect knowledge of the language and was considered the most successful foreign correspondent in wartime Russia. In early 1949 A. P. Wadsworth did not offer him a new staff job on the view that he had become too much influenced by the communists. Werth started to write regularly for The New Statesman.

Apart from its staff correspondents, due to its limited resources, most of the paper's reporting had to be done through others: it shared The Times service under an agreement which ended in 1948; it bought news from the agencies, of which the two principal were Reuters and the United Press; it had its 'stringers' and outside contributors. The latter helped the paper so that it could, by modest payments, keep its readers well-informed about sensitive areas of the world, something that it could never have afforded to do by sending a staff man on such journeys. Philips Price, later a Labour MP, was among such contributors from 1913 onwards. He visited Greece several times during his extensive journeys in the Balkans and the Middle East.

One of the best leader-writers the Manchester Guardian ever had and the one responsible for most of the paper's reports on Greece was J. P. Pringle, the assistant editor of the
paper from 1944 to 1948. He condemned the British intervention in Greece in 1944, although later he would reverse his views. In 1973 he noted in his memoirs, "I think I was wrong though I never wrote better leaders in my life."(23) In 1948 he joined The Times as a special writer and stayed with this paper until 1952.(24)

3. Daily Telegraph

The Daily Telegraph came under the sole proprietorship of Sir William Berry (Lord Camrose) in 1937, who in the same year bought the Morning Post, thus adding the majority of its 117,000 readers to those of the Daily Telegraph.

Camrose revitalised the newspaper. In 1940 the circulation peaked, then fell sharply until 1942, when the decline was arrested. In 1947 the "magic target of one million" was reached.

The Daily Telegraph was unmistakably a pro-Conservative and Imperialist paper. It gave its complete support to the Chamberlain Government, though it was more sympathetic to the Eden-Churchill line on Germany. After the war one of Camrose's main concerns was to ensure that the Conservatives would return to power in the 1945 general elections, so that Churchill would continue as prime minister.(25)

Churchill wrote occasional editorial articles. Of all major politicians, Churchill made use of the press "both for income and propaganda". His principal outlet used to be in late 1930s the Evening Standard, and when his contract was terminated he shifted to the Daily Telegraph.(26) In April 1947 Churchill contributed to the newspaper three articles on the changing world situation.(27) In that of April 14, he wrote that the Soviets at the Potsdam Conference had claimed a base either at the port of Salonika or at Alexandroupolis. That caused great sensation.
in Greece, and the London correspondents of Greek newspapers asked the Foreign Office if they had any official knowledge of this matter. After a long research, the Foreign Office found no document supporting Churchill's statement. On May 30 the Foreign Office wrote to Churchill's private secretary, Miss Gilliatt, asking Churchill to throw light on the matter.(28)

With Camrose as editor-in-chief, "not merely the general policy and character of the paper, but the details of every issue" were determined by him. The Daily Telegraph held to a tradition of 'faceless editors', uniformly designated as managers or heads of staff.(29) The proprietor kept a tight rein on his editors, who were relegated to the shadows. Arthur E Watson served the paper for 48 years of which 26 as its editor(1924-1950). He acted largely as an organiser, overseeing operations generally. The news was left to the News Editor, under Camrose's supervision, and the leaders were all written under his supervision, keeping news and opinion separated. Other, more independent-minded men might not have been able to accept such a limitation of their authority and control, but Watson was willing to work within such an editorial structure.(30)

The Daily Telegraph had a number of correspondents dealing with Greek affairs. Richard Capell was succeeded by Christopher Buckley, Martin Moore, David Woodford.

4. News Chronicle

The News Chronicle, "the most liberal of all Fleet Street titles", was launched in 1930 as the result of the amalgamation of the Daily News and the Daily Chronicle, two venerable Liberal papers.
Owners of the paper were the Cadbury family trust, and Lawrence Cadbury represented the family's interests. The first major appointment for the new paper was that of Sir Walter Layton, who was appointed editorial director.

The *News Chronicle* in June 1947 had a figure of 1,623,475. It competed for the third place with the *Daily Mail* after the *Daily Express* and the *Daily Herald*. The paper devoted more space and consideration to political matters than most popular papers.

The general policy of the paper may be called Liberal or radical and not Labour, although it qualified as a sympathetic source of Labour news. In the 1930s it provided a platform for G D H Cole's advocacy of the socialist state and featured a column by Ellen Wilkinson. As a report by Mass-Observation, prepared for the Advertising Service Guild in 1949, estimated, half the paper's readers were Labour supporters, one fifth conservative and only one eighth Liberals. (31)

Conflicts inside the newspaper were inevitable because of its structure. The determination of the Cadburys, old Liberals but gradually moving to the Tories, to keep the paper from taking a really radical stand led to frictions with the editor, Gerald Barry, and the staff. One striking example was the suppression by Layton of a leading article on the eve of Chamberlain's departure to Munich in 1938. On December 14, 1944 Barry would remind Layton, "during the critical days of that humiliating period we were obliged to hold in our horses, and -if I may mix my metaphors- back-pedal." (32)

During Layton's service in 1940 in the Ministry of Supply and the Ministry of Production, until his return to the paper after the war, Barry had a new Chairman in Laurence Cadbury, who was another person intent on editorial interference. The divergence of opinion between radical staff and restrained directors was especially apparent in the City and business departments of the paper. Such was the disparity that it threatened to "destroy the
homogeneous nature of the paper". Cadbury agreed that while different views made the paper interesting, "there cannot be too great a divergence of opinion and outlook if the paper is to carry conviction." Cadbury regretted the News Chronicle's progressive stand as a drain on circulation, always his primary concern. He held partly responsible himself for not holding regular policy conferences and regretted the absence of Walter Layton.(33)

Gerald Barry was the editor of the News Chronicle from 1936.(34) His duties as the Managing Editor of the News Chronicle were constantly encroached upon to the effect that Layton would warn him that "policy must be one which commands the concurrence of the proprietors, and though the Daily News Trust has never sought to put its Editor into leading strings, it almost inevitably involves some adjustments on his part, particularly if he is a man of strong conviction."(35) Though Barry's days were obviously numbered, he remained editor of the News Chronicle until November 1947, when disagreements with the returned Layton caused him to resign. Barry was to tell Tom Hopkinson, editor of Picture Post, that Layton wanted to decide everything that appeared in the paper -"and I'm left as a kind of dignified office boy." One night when Barry returned to the paper and found that once again Layton had been amending his leader, it proved too much: 'I'm the bloody editor. He's only the Chairman."(36) Moreover the News Chronicle had become more and more critical of the Labour Government and of Russia, and in both these directions Barry was not in agreement.(37) He was succeeded by R Cruikshank and this change signaled a shift to the right in the editorial views of the paper, especially over foreign affairs.(38)

Vernon Bartlett was the diplomatic correspondent. He had been elected to Parliament in 1938, as an Independent Progressive, in opposition to the Government's German policy and he was an Independent MP in the 1945 Parliament. Another prominent writer on the paper was A J Cummings, the political editor. Cummings, one of the most influential and
well-informed radical journalist of the 1930s, was not only a distinguished contributor to the press but also a commentator on it. In 1920 he became assistant editor of the Daily News and he was to serve the News Chronicle for 35 years. His 'Spotlight on Politics' column was "a very valuable feature in the paper" - as Cadbury himself had pointed out - and one of the best read in the British press. Cadbury defended Cummings' "great latitude" of the views he expressed, and when he was taken to task from an "important quarter" about him he replied that "it was our policy to give him this freedom of expression." When, in October 1948, the Daily Express offered him a place on the paper, he refused, "because he felt he would be compromising his loyalties to the Liberal Party and policies."

The newspaper took an specially keen interest in Greek affairs and vigorously opposed the British intervention of 1944 in Greece. Correspondents who served the paper in Greece were Philip Jordan, Southern-Keele of Christian Science Monitor, and Chronis Protopappas, a Greek 'stringer'. In 1945 Stephen Barber joined the paper, after leaving the Associated Press because of its "anti-British" attitude, and served the paper as its Athens correspondent until the end of the civil war.

5. Daily Herald

The paper was first launched as a strike sheet during a printers' lock-out in January 1911. In 1929 Odhams Press Ltd, under J S Elias (later Viscount Southwood), purchased a 51 per cent interest, and the remaining 49 per cent was held in the names of thirty-two Trades Union Officials as trustees of the Labour Party. Odhams had four directors on the Board including the chairman, Elias, the Trades Union Congress (TUC) four with Ernest Bevin as
vice-president. The Daily Herald had no associate paper, although Odhams printed the Sunday paper The People.

The Daily Herald's circulation in 1947 was over two million. Odhams deeds ensured that the political policy of the paper should be that of the Labour Party and its industrial policy that of the TUC. The constitution of the paper did not provide any safeguards for the editor or even discuss his position. That resulted in the dismissal of two editors in five years and in the resignation of a third, Francis Williams (1937-1940). To the TUC an editor was no more than another paid official at the receiving end of a Congress resolution, and to Elias, a technician hired to do a production job. (45) Despite the complications of pleasing all co-owners of the paper, Percival Cudlipp, the new editor, remained in the chair until November 1953. (46)

As the official newspaper of the Labour Party, the Daily Herald followed the divisions of the Party on important issues in the 1930s like the Popular Front, the League of Nations, armaments, pacifism, and policy towards Germany. (47) One can attribute this to the domination of the Board of Directors by representatives of Trades Unions like Walter Citrine and Ernest Bevin, both of right-wing attitudes. The paper gave its fullest support to the Labour Government and its Foreign Secretary, Bevin. Labour Britain never gave the slightest hint of lining up with the Soviets, and Bevin had advocated a pro-American policy. The paper's loyalty to the Labour Government was one factor in the evolution of its anti-Soviet outlook.

W N Ewer was the diplomatic correspondent, with a wide range of contacts and sources. Michael Foot (48) had a weekly political column, in addition to editing Tribune.

The paper kept for all seven years (1943-49) the same Athens correspondent F G Salusbury, and sent Dudley Barker to cover the election of 1946. The Daily Herald's reaction to the Greek crisis reveals, indeed, a general identity problem. As it will be shown below, there
was considerable divergence of opinion between the often critical attitude of the editorial staff and W N Ewer, and the paper's Athens correspondents, who were more aligned with the official policy.

6. Daily Express

The Daily Express under the financial control of Lord Beaverbrook (Max Aitken), since 1917 was invigorated and resulted in an outstanding rise of circulation from 1.69 million in 1930 to a sale of 3,856,963 in 1947.

There were two other papers in the Express group: The Sunday Express, which Beaverbrook founded in 1919, and the evening paper, the Evening Standard, which he acquired in 1923.(49)

Beaverbrook took active control in the conduct of his papers, especially the Daily Express in which his interest and command were greatest and most direct. Editor of the Daily Express was Arthur Christiansen. He first joined the Express group in 1925 as a casual sub-editor on the Sunday Express to become in 1932 the editor of the Daily Express, a post that he retained for almost 24 years.(50) His job and his outlook were entirely non-political. In his autobiography he was to write: "I was a journalist, not a political animal. My proprietor was a journalist and a political animal. The policies were Lord Beaverbrook's job, the presentation mine."(51)

Throughout the inter-war period the Express group would preach the twin doctrines of Imperial Preference and Isolation. The same principles would prevail in the post-war era:

We stand where we have always stood. We are Isolationist not in the American sense but in the British sense. The term connotes a political interest in Britain and the British Empire. The policy involved a determination to arm to the teeth, to seek and to sustain companionships with the U.S., and to refuse to take any part in the pre-war quarrels of
Europe...When the job is done and the war is over, the Daily Express will be found, on
the same banner, espousing the same course, believing in the same wisdom...Splendid
Isolation and Companionship with the U.S.(52)

Friendship with America should be between equals. Beaverbrook's line always was to
defend British independence against American encroachments. It is characteristic that while the
British press widely and extensively reported Marshall's speech on November 18, 1947 the
Daily Express reported it in two column inches at the foot of its front page.(53) On April 25,
1948 Beaverbrook wrote to Roy Howard "I am opposed to the Marshall Plan...I deplore the
disintegration of the British Empire. I condemn the Socialists. And I detest the Tories who
helped the Socialists to perpetrate these follies."(54)

Similarly Beaverbrook would mobilise his newspapers against British participation in
Western Union. On October 28 he wrote to Christiansen:

You should make it very clear that we are not opposed to Western Union. That may be
very good for Europeans. Our opposition is to Britain joining Western Union. And that
opposition is based on two lines of criticism: (1) It separates us from the Empire sooner
or later; (2) It separates us from the United States and makes us a subsidiary instead of
an equal partner.(55)

The paper noisily opposed Britain's acceptance of entanglements on the European
continent, most particularly if these involved military intervention. In 1947, as we will see later,
the Daily Express was strongly expressed in favour of the British troops' withdrawal from
Greece.

Beaverbrook regarded the Soviet Union as a lesser danger to Britain's interests than the
United States. From October 1917 onwards the Express group would consistently advocate
non-intervention in the affairs of the Soviet Union by all other powers.(56) Friendly relations
between Britain and the Soviet Union were in the national interests of both countries.
Pragmatic considerations of national interest should be the sole guide in determining British
foreign policy, and not ideological ones. Thus, among the conservative press the Express group would be the more sceptical of hardline policies towards the Soviet Union.

The Express newspapers proclaimed themselves as being the voice of "independent conservatism." "Party considerations have played, and will play, no part in the propounding of this policy. The Express newspapers will give their support to any politician, Tory, Socialist or Liberal, who advocates it."(57) This claim was apparently true in the field of economic policy, e.g. the American loan of 1946. However, whatever his differences with the official Tory policy, at election times his newspapers would always advise their readers to vote Conservative. Beaverbrook championed the Conservative party more out of loyalty to Churchill than any other reason.(58) In the 1945 election he became "in effect the party manager"(59) and the Daily Express "the most politically-prejudiced paper in the country."(60) After 1945 Beaverbrook pulled out of public events. He retained, however, his active control over his newspapers and he watched every detail of them until the last day of his life.(61)

The Daily Express devoted little space to Greek events. Eric Grey served as the paper's Athens special correspondent.

7. Daily Mail

With Lord Northcliffe gone in August 1922, the running of the paper passed to his younger brother, the first Lord Rothermere. He exercised an active and personal control over the newspaper which was included, with many other titles, in the Associated Newspapers Group. In 1937 he was succeeded by his son, Viscount Rothermere, a loyal Churchillian, who also controlled the general policy and character of the paper.
The Daily Mail became notorious for its admiration towards the Nazi regime and its celebration of Hitler as the saviour of western civilisation. (62)

The circulation of the Daily Mail in 1939 reached a record low compared with its figure at the start of the decade. It continued to tumble until 1940, bottomed out from then until 1942, and thereafter began to creep upwards. In 1947 it sold 2,007,542 copies. (63)

Rothermere changed editors, roughly every two years, in his effort to dent the Daily Express’ circulation lead, as the paper had been locked in rivalry with the Beaverbrook newspapers for almost two decades. In the period 1944-49, editors of the newspaper were S F Horniblow (1944-47) and Frank Owen (1947-50). Horniblow was forced to resign, allegedly owing to Lady Rothermere’s contempt for him as an editor. (64) Owen, who in 1938 was editor of the Evening Standard, was a man of liberal ideas. It is indicative that, while he himself did not agree with Appeasement, he accepted, however, to serialise Mein Kampf as he knew well that Hitler’s name sold newspapers. (65)

The Daily Mail was almost indifferent to the Greek drama. News from Greece came from its chief European correspondent, Alexander Clifford and from correspondents who were sent only occasionally, such as Tetlow, John Fischer.

8. The Observer

Founded in 1791 The Observer was the oldest Sunday paper. In 1911, it was sold to Viscount Astor. In 1919, David Astor succeeded his father, Waldorf, as proprietor. In 1944, The Observer was run by a Trust on non-profit-making, non-party lines.

David Astor very early had shown a keen interest in journalism and he started writing for the paper in 1941, introducing a new column, 'Forum.' J L Garvin, the editor, interpreted the
Forum' topics as anti-Churchill in an almost paranoid manner and coupled with other political differences with Lord Astor, he left the paper in February 1942, when his contract had run out.

Following Garvin's departure, The Observer's politics underwent a radical transformation.

Ivor Brown, the dramatic critic, was appointed in August 1942 the "acting" editor, but the real force in the office was David Astor, who moulded the paper in his image. Most of his carefully chosen recruits came from groups of young and progressive thinkers and journalists-writers who had met during the war and formed such groups as the 'Post-War Bureau', '1941 Committee', the 'Shanghai Club', the Socialist Bookcentre bookshop. To mention some of them: Sebastian Haffner, Michael Foot, George Orwell, Stephen King-Hall, Ronald Fredenburgh, Alastair Forbes, Jon Kimche, Isaac Deutscher, and Donald Tyerman.

This influx of new talent had an almost revolutionary, effect on The Observer. There were many new features that marked the difference in the paper. In 1943 Kimche started the famous 'Liberator' column under which pseudonym Haffner also wrote. In April 1945 Deutscher started a column called 'Peregrine's European Notebook', whose powerful views became widely quoted. Another important feature which was to become the most famous hallmark of The Observer, was the 'Profile'. The Profiles' were, perhaps, the first sustained attempt at a deeper understanding of public figures in the British press. Haffner, who was writing leaders for 'Liberator', as well as several of the 'Profile' features and some leaders, would later create his column under the pseudonym 'Student of Europe', another famous feature of the paper.(66)

All these innovations by young, talented writers were making the paper intellectually exciting. The Times under the guidance of Barrington-Ward and E.H. Carr was the only paper to rival its sense of intellectual excitement. They were both papers that had traditionally been
loyal to the Conservative Party, but that now advocated new social, economic and international solutions to post-war problems.

In the years 1943-46 it was the competition between Haffner and Deutscher that dominated The Observer. Both were men of strong conviction, with irreconcilable "world views". Deutscher, a Polish-Jew, was a Marxist intellectual, the most famous Marxist anti-Stalinist writer of his generation. Haffner, German-born, anti-Nazi was principally conservative. One of the hallmarks of The Observer under David Astor was the accommodation of conflicting views at the same time, thus giving readers a choice. A characteristic example of this was the article of December 12 1944 on the British intervention in Greece. In the same leader Deutscher presented the "case against" and Haffner the "case for" the British intervention in Greece.

The Observer never advocated Socialism and David Astor was never a Socialist. It believed in a federated Europe led by Britain and as such became the first advocate of the Marshall Plan for European recovery. Following on from this the paper became a firm advocate of NATO and the Anglo-American alliance. The left-wingers on the paper, Deutscher, Orwell, Kimche were anti-Stalinist and the paper adopted a distrustful attitude towards the Soviet Union, expressed as early as in 1943.(67)

The paper gradually shifted towards the right. The wartime recruits who were at the core of the paper, such as Kimche and Deutscher left, the former in 1945 and the latter in 1946. Deutscher, found the paper "too bourgeois...and has a very militant anti-communist slant."(68) Haffner, though the main architect of the paper's advocacy of the Marshall Plan and NATO, after a visit to America in 1950, was disillusioned by American militarism and extreme anti-Communism. As a result he started arguing for a strong, neutral Europe to stand between
the USA and USSR. That brought him in disagreement with Astor and the paper's adopted pro-American policy. He finally left the paper in 1955.

David Astor became the foreign editor from 1945 to 1948, and in that year he took control as editor. He replaced Kimche, Deutscher and others with a new generation of writers. Among them were Hugh Massingham, the political correspondent from 1945 to 1961 and the founder of the modern political column, Patrick O'Donovan and Robert Stephens, the Middle East correspondent.

The Observer's influence and rise in circulation continued steadily under David Astor. Its average yearly sale in 1942 had been 241,613, whereas in late 1947 it was 359,912.

The Observer, in 1945, had in Athens a 'stringer', Philip Deane, the pen-name for Gerassimos Gigantes.(69) Massingham and O'Donovan went to Greece in 1947 and 1948 respectively and contributed several articles on the Greek crisis.

9. Sunday Times

The Berry brothers bought the paper in 1915. In 1937 they divided their newspaper empire, and the Sunday Times came under the control of Gomer Berry (Viscount Kemsley). The paper was included in Allied Newspapers, the vast network of provincial papers and the London Daily Sketch and the Sunday Graphic.

Kemsley ran his newspapers to climb the ladder of the peerage as much as anything else, and thus required them to be as inoffensive and unexciting as possible. Under his uninspired direction the paper was stuffy, archaic and establishment-minded. The official historians of the Sunday Times acknowledge the problem. There was "too much nagging attention to detail and no full-time reporting staff to gather or analyse news."(70)
W W Hadley, aged 64, became editor of the paper in 1932 until his retirement in 1950 at the age of 82. Though he had been bred a Liberal "he accepted Kemsley's unintelligent brand of Conservatism with a certain complacency."(71) His successor, H V Hodson(1950-61), wrote about him "he believed strongly in the close partnership of editor and proprietor in the conduct of a newspaper...and admired and accepted Lord Kemsley's strong control of...general policy."(72)

An equally important outlet of editorial opinion were the full-strength, leader-page articles contributed by Robert Ensor under the pseudonym of 'Scrutator'. He held this post from 1941 until 1953. He had achieved experience as leader writer on the Daily News(1909-1911) and on the Daily Chronicle, with which he stayed until 1931.(73)

The Sunday Times never made a pretense of basing its foreign policy on anything save what it regarded as British self-interest. It carried little Greek news.

The Kemsley Press was served in Athens by Claire Hollingworth and Archibald Gibson.

10. The Economist

Founded in 1843, The Economist was owned half by Financial Newspaper proprietors, and half by leading financiers. In the period 1943-49 the journal had five Trustees, among them was Sir W Beveridge. Brendan Bracken was on the Board of Directors until he went into Government in 1941 and returned in 1947 for another eight years.(74)

The war had greatly extended The Economist's readership. From 10,000, in 1947 the circulation rose to 35,000 copies and at the end of Crowther's editorship it would reach more than 55,000.
A moderately liberal weekly, it acquired its international prestige under the editorship of Sir Walter Layton (1922-1938) and enhanced it under his successor Geoffrey Crowther (1938-1956). (75)

The journal had a tradition of editorial independence. In the Articles of Association of the company, the second paragraph of Article 105 gave the editor the sole control of editorial policy "to the exclusion of the Board of Directors". In 1938 it was modified involving more the trustees and the directors. (76) Crowther's tenure as editor was marked by his total control over policy and he was "always fearless in the columns of his paper." In wartime, Donald Tyerman, deputy editor from 1939 to September 1944, acted as editor on many occasions, as Crowther had been engaged in various governmental posts.

Crowther and Tyerman concerned themselves with the paper's foreign policy. Isaac Deutscher served as a part-time writer on Central Europe and on Soviet affairs. Barbara Ward was another foreign editor who served the paper from 1939 until 1950. From the beginning of 1947 she shared the foreign editorship with Donald McLachlan.

Barbara Ward served the paper first as an editorial assistant and she was swiftly to establish herself as Crowther's equal. She, like him, was part of the vigorous journalistic culture that believed in the progressive political thinking of wartime Britain. The Crowther-Ward partnership worked well, as "the head and the heart" of the paper. (77)

Donald McLachlan joined The Economist in 1947 as assistant foreign editor. In early 1954 he went to the Daily Telegraph as deputy editor and became the first editor of the Sunday Times. McLachlan was never particularly an Economist man. Compared to Ward, McLachlan was "certainly a hardliner". His analysis of the state of East-West relations led to the conclusion that there was no room for compromise.
The Economist believed that the problem for Britain had always been how to contain the potential master of the Continent, and the fact that he now spoke Russian, instead of German or French, was not a fundamental change. The real important change was the emergence of the United States as a full-time power and her willingness to form and lead a Grand Alliance.

It was Crowther's own idea the creation of a new feature, 'American Survey', as a distinct entity in the paper, which first appeared on January 17 1942. Margaret Cruikshank, an American, ran the London end. Her husband was Robin Cruikshank the editor of the News Chronicle from 1947, who during the war was director of the American division of the Ministry of Information. The journal gave its full support to the Marshall Plan as "an act without peer in history."(78)

The Economist was not driven by anti-communism but by the desire for some kind of world order that would give maximum stability and liberty to the world. In the 1930s, when most of the other newspapers avoided any contact with Soviet embassy officials, The Economist as well as the News Chronicle maintained a friendly attitude to Russia. As Barbara Ward put it in the late 1940s, "Every responsible statesman in the Western world can have only one objective - to achieve lasting peace by agreement with Russia." But she came down against premature negotiations which might weaken the West's position.(79)

In the Greek crisis The Economist raised an independent voice, by being often critical of the Greek Government and of British policy and by arguing that the cause of the civil war was mostly internal.
The Spectator, founded in 1828, came to be regarded as perhaps the most influential of conservative weeklies. The two provincial proprietors, who owed 61 per cent of The Spectator Ltd., were Sir John Evelyn Wrench, its editor (1925-1932), and Sir J Angus Watson. From 1932 to 1953 the editor was Wilson Harris. Under his long editorship, The Spectator had considerably enhanced its reputation and more than doubled its circulation.

The Spectator's policies during the 1940s were generally determined by Wilson Harris. Yet, his editorship was not free of proprietorial supervision and interference. But such interference was rarely necessary, for, as Harris himself had put it "there were not many questions of policy which caused serious perplexity and none, I think, which involved differences of opinion between Proprietors and Editor." After the war both Wrench and Watson were so occupied elsewhere that they were kept away from the paper. "I was therefore" wrote Harris in his autobiography, "left completely to myself so far as the conduct of The Spectator on the editorial side was concerned."

It was Harris' view that "The Spectator has never identified itself with that or any other organised party." Harris in the 1945 election stood for "a continuance of National Government under Winston" and he was elected as Independent MP for Cambridge. In its politics and personnel, The Spectator was a moderate Conservative.

The Spectator had from its early days been an advocate of close Anglo-American cooperation, particularly under the editorship of its proprietor since 1897 John St Loe Strachey. The journal concentrated its themes on Imperial, Commonwealth and American issues. On the other hand the journal throughout the thirties expressed a loathing for Communism while it openly supported appeasement. In the forties it retained its pro-American attitude and
supported the Atlantic Pact, without ruling out completely any chance for "hard bargaining" with the Soviet Union. Harris in his capacity as M.P. had opposed the complete cut-off of relations with the Soviet Union in the House. As he later put it "I hoped, perhaps impractically, for more active efforts to get some sort of negotiations with that all but impossible country started."(86)

Harris wrote most of the leaders and editorial notes, as well as the weekly 'A Spectator's Notebook', signed 'Janus'. This was what he wrote about 'Janus': "under cover of pseudonymity, even pseudonymity worn thin, he (the author) can permit himself an irresponsibility and freedom of comment not appropriate to articles with full editorial weight behind them."(87)

Comment on international affairs in the journal was also proffered in Harold Nicolson's weekly 'Marginal Comment', a Spectator's feature with a wide following.(88)

Harold Nicolson, educated at Balliol College, Oxford, entered the diplomatic service as a career diplomat in 1909 and he was posted to Madrid, Constantinople, Teheran and Berlin. In 1929 he resigned from the Foreign Office, something that he later "bitterly regretted."(89) In 1930 he joined the Evening Standard. In 1935 he was elected as National Labour MP and during the Second World War was to serve briefly at the Ministry of Information. In 1948 he stood unsuccessfully in a by-election as a Labour candidate. Thereafter, he abandoned politics and devoted the rest of his life to writing.(90)

The Spectator defended British policy towards Greece. Nicolson, who had visited Greece several times, failed to understand the real causes of the Greek conflict.
Tribune was launched in January 1937 by a group of Labour MPs, Aneurin Bevan, Ellen Wilkinson, Sir Stafford Cripps and George Strauss, the latter two providing the bulk of the necessary capital. When Sir Stafford and Strauss joined the National Government they officially severed their connection with the paper but maintained some influence on its production.

Tribune was the product of the controversy in the Labour Party over policy on Spain. The journal had specifically and primarily come into being in order to mobilise public support for the Republic and for a ‘united front’ against fascism.

The policy of the journal was determined by an editorial board which met at regular weekly meetings. The first editor was William Mellor (1937-1938), who was succeeded by R J Hartshorn. At the beginning of the war Jon Kimche served for a while as editor, before he left for The Observer in mid-1942. Aneurin Bevan became a Director and the editor until he took office in the Labour Government in 1945. He was succeeded on the Board by Jennie Lee, MP, his wife. In 1947 editor was Jon Kimche who had left The Observer. Michael Foot took over from 1948 until 1952. Issac Deutscher was writing for Tribune until 1943 under the pseudonym Major Rabski and George Orwell, literary editor (1943-1945), had the regular column 'As I please.'

The journal was one of the few papers which were openly in opposition to the wartime Government. When Labour came to power in 1945 Tribune had close ties with the Government. Bevan, Cripps, Strauss and Wilkinson were, or would be Cabinet ministers. Michael Foot who from 1945 until 1974 was managing director of the journal was Bevan's
close friend and he was close enough to the Government to write a weekly column for Labour's official organ, the Daily Herald.

Initially, Tribune had been critical of Bevin's close cooperation with the Americans and of his hostile approach to the Russians and it had criticised the British policy in Greece. Yet, when in January 1946 Soviet delegates at the United Nations criticised British policies in Greece, Tribune leaped to Bevin's defence. It was the first of the Labour Left weeklies to sound an anti-Soviet warning. If British Labour succeeded in bringing about the socialist transformation peacefully, then "the Soviet Union might have to face competition from the international attraction of a country which is neither capitalist and reactionary, nor Bolshevik, but the champion and pathfinder of democratic socialism." This tone would characterise Tribune articles during the cold-war period (92).

13. The New Statesman and Nation

The New Statesman was the most important of the serious weeklies in the forties and the most widely read and the most widely quoted. Martin offered an explanation when he wrote that The New Statesman "was successful because it understood the perplexities of the pacifists, the Liberals, of Labour, the Communists and even of the Conservatives...We are a reflection of everyone's perplexities." (93)

The New Statesman was founded in 1913 by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, leading figures of the Fabian Society, G Bernard Shaw and Clifford Sharp, its first editor, with the primary purpose of promoting social and economic reform according to the lights of Fabian socialism.
Among his editorial campaigns over the next four years were: for the opening of a 'Second Front' in Europe and for the support of resistance movements in the Nazi-occupied countries.

The New Statesman gave expression to the evolution of Left feeling and thinking during this era and its influence was on intellectual leaders, on teachers, professionals, the activators of local movements whose influence was important. It had, therefore, played an important part in canalising this feeling into the current which won the 1945 election.

The coming in 1945 of a strong Labour Government, with all their promise of application in practical Government of the theories that the nineteenth-century Fabians or even the Popular Frontists of the thirties had been thinking and talking about, was relished as victory in the present and promise for the future. The New Statesman tone for this epoch was set in the editorial of May 12, 1945. A measure of optimism seemed justifiable; an era of peace, with all three major powers cooperating, seemed possible.

Yet, Martin's socialism was not a party Socialism. The New Statesman was not organically linked to the Party as Tribune was, though Martin's chief lieutenant at this time was R H S Crossman, a Labour MP, and others connected with the weekly included Labour MPs then associated with the left wing of the party such as Stephen Swingler, Woodrow Wyatt and Maurice Edelman. Whereas Tribune was required reading for left-of-centre Labour Party activists, The New Statesman appealed equally to independent leftists associated with Common Wealth, the Independent Labour Party(ILP) or even in 1945, the Communist Party. It was a journal more rarefied and intellectual in tone than Tribune. It supported the Government consistently in home policy, like the creation of the Welfare State. But in world affairs it would have been inconsistent, with the policies the journal was preaching, to support Ernest Bevin's foreign policy.
The battle against Bevin's 'Toryism' abroad was started by R H S Crossman, a prominent member of the Parliamentary 'Keep Left' Group, in the summer of 1945 when Bevin gave his first speech on foreign policy. The journal's criticism was not confined to the Crossman-Bevin row. It was critical of the American loan negotiations, of the Bretton Woods agreement, of the Greek as well as the Palestine policy. Through Crossman, the paper became deeply involved in and for a time committed to faction-fighting within the Labour Party. "It became the darling, once again, of the non-Communist Left; but it became anathema, as it had never quite been before, to the orthodox Labour men."  

At the end of the war the journal had seen the possibility of a United Europe under British leadership and with Russian friendship; its principal preoccupation became that of trying to make sure that the opportunity presented by this promise was not lost.

The Cold War tensions proved catalytic. The New Statesman remained distrustful of America's counter-strategy of the Marshal Plan and espoused a more conciliatory approach. It continued to argue that Britain and Europe should constitute a third bloc ('Third Force' idea), politically democratic like the United States, economically socialist like the Soviet Union, to balance and eventually to reconcile the other two. Yet, The New Statesman's mistrust of America's aims never amounted to general anti-Americanism.

The New Statesman believed that it was very necessary indeed to make a special and deliberate effort to understand and be friends with the Russians. The paper regarded the Soviet Union's 'peace offensive' seriously. It was alone in watching, uneasily, the development of the 'anti-Communism disease', and unique in forecasting McCarthysm, in an article by E Penning Powell.

The New Statesman had a number of influential contributors, such as Professor Harold Laski and H N Brailsford. The first was Martin's political mentor, who became the link between
worked with her, and she had contacts with the Resistance groups all over Europe. The paper was the first to give real hard news concerning the activities of the European resistance movements.

A late recruit was Basil Davidson who became in 1949 a special correspondent. But it quite soon became apparent that their opinions were not, in important respects, the same. Martin gradually became distrustful of Communism, however willing to work with it for world peace; Davidson had not undergone quite such a crisis of confidence and it was from this that the differences between him and the editor arose.

Major foreign policy leaders in the 1940s were usually written by Martin. Brailsford, Crossman and Cole were frequent editorial contributors. The 'London Diary' column, which contained much political comment, was mostly written by Martin. The weekly news review notes ('Comments') were written by the various staff members.

The New Statesman was alone in advocating a compromise solution in Greece in 1949.
Another prominent figure was R H S Crossman, the chief leader writer on foreign affairs. He started to write for *The New Statesman* as a reviewer, and in 1938 he became assistant editor. In 1945, he was elected Labour MP for Coventry East and was to retain that seat until 1974. In the thirties he opposed the Popular Front as a gimmick and he was distrustful of the Communists. He was among those who developed the idea of the 'Third Force' on the axiom that "we have two enemies: Communism and anti-Communism." He was a founder-member of the 'Keep Left' group. *The New Statesman*, and notably R H S Crossman, urged the Labour Government to provide a positive lead and policy, and later he dealt harshly with Bevin when he failed to do so. Crossman reversed himself later and adopted a more sympathetic approach towards the Marshall Plan. His new line was opposed to the view held by Ian Mikardo and others in the 'Keep Left' group, who accepted Marshall Aid, but at the same time they argued for "achieving a greater independence of American economics."

G D H Cole was a veteran *New Statesman* journalist who had influenced the journal's character. He was a Guild Socialist and all his writings, both as a writer and a journalist constituted, almost on their own, an encyclopaedia and dictionary of the Labour movement as well as a socialist philosophy. He wrote for the *Manchester Guardian* and *The Nation*, until, in 1918, he joined *The New Statesman*. On the non-communist Left, he continued almost alone to question the wisdom of accepting Marshall Aid.

The journal's chief exponent of the European case became Dorothy Woodman, who was Secretary of the Union of Democratic Control, of which Martin was the Chairman. Woodman devoted the Union's principal energies to creating a 'climate' propitious to post-war Socialism. The anti-Fascists in the European Governments-in-exile became her friends and
NOTES

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5. McDonald, op.cit., 117-118
6. Ibid.
9. McDonald, op.cit., 150
10. Ibid., 166
11. McLachlan, *In the Chair*, 259; McDonald, op.cit., 68
12. McDonald, op.cit., 196
16. Ayerst, op.cit., 593, 596
17. Ibid., 572, 574
20. Ayerst, op.cit., 577-8
21. Ibid., 582-3
22. Ibid., 547. For M Philips Price see *Who was Who*, vol. VII, 639
23. Pringle, op.cit., 35
24. For A D Pringle see *Who's Who*, 1991, 1490
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28. FO371/67120, R5997, Mitsides to Miss Sturdee, 28/4/1947; Elisabeth Gilliatt to FO, 29/4/1947; Roberts to Northern Department, 13/5/1947; 16-20/5/1947 Minutes by McCarthy, Selby, Colville; FO to Gilliatt, 30/5/1947
30. A E Watson, see: *Encyclopedia*, 584
32. Barry Papers, 11, Barry to Layton, 14/12/1944 and Layton to Barry, 14/12/1944
33. Barry Papers, 10, Cadbury to Barry 16/12/1942

47
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35. Barry Papers, 10, Layton to Barry, 23/5/1942
36. Charles Wintour, The Rise and Fall of Fleet Street (1989), 74
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50. Arthur Christiansen, Encyclopedia, 154-5
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53. Daily Express, 19/11/1947, Conflict Will Lessen
55. Ibid. 588
59. Ibid., 564
60. Beaverbrook Papers, H/114, L A Plummer to Roberston, 13/6/1945. See also Taylor, op. cit., 565
61. A J P Taylor, op. cit., 579-0
62. Daily Mail, Ward Price (Berlin corr.,) 21/9/1936
63. Camrose, op. cit., 160; Koss, op. cit., 558, 615
64. Beaverbrook Papers, H/122, Robertson to Beaverbrook, 4/3/1947
65. Frank Owen, Encyclopedia, 450
66. For The Observer see Richard Cockett's David Astor and The Observer, (1991)
67. The Observer, 30/5/1943, Britain and the Soviet Union
68. Quoted in Cockett, op. cit., 142
69. G Gigantes (or Tsigantes) reported for The Observer and for three Greek papers on the Korean War. See his book, Philip Deane, I Should Have Died, (1976)
71. Ibid., 230
72. W W Hadley, Encyclopedia, 284-285
73. Sir Robert Ensor, Encyclopedia, 222
75. Geoffrey Crowther (1907-1972) DNB, 1971-80, 199-200
76. See the original and the revised second sentence of Article 105 in Edwards, op.cit., 738 and in Camrose, op.cit., 146
77. Edwards, op.cit., 758.
78. The Economist 10/4/1948
79. Ibid., 18/2/1950
80. Camrose, op.cit., 148 and Encyclopedia, 526
82. Ibid., 256
83. Ibid., 246
84. Ibid., 271-2
86. Harris, op.cit., 294
87. Ibid., 237
88. Ibid., 238
89. Nigel Nicolson, Portrait of a Marriage, (1973), 215
90. Sir Harold Nicolson, DNB, 1961-70, 793-6
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94. Camrose, op.cit., 147-8
95. Edward Hyams, The New Statesman, The History of the First Fifty Years, 1913-1963, (1963), 113
96. For B K Martin see Encyclopedia, 404; his two volumes of autobiography: Father Figures (1966) and Editor (1968); see also Mervyn Jones, Kingsley Martin, Portrait and Self-Portrait, (1969) and C H Roph, The Life, Letters and Diaries of Kingsley Martin, (1973)
97. Hyams, op.cit., 253
98. The New Statesman, Britain and Europe, 25/8/45
99. Hyams, op.cit., 280
100. The Left Book Club, founded in 1936, aimed "to help in the struggle for World Peace and a better social and economic order and against Fascism." For more details see Victor Gollancz, "The Left Book Club", The Left Book News, no 1, May 1936 and Gollancz, The Left Book Club, (London, 1936)
101. As editor of the ILP's New Leader, Brailsford greatly raised the standard of Left-Wing journalism. Hyams, op.cit., 201
102. For Richard Howard Crossman (1907-1974) see his memoirs, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister (1975) and The Backbench Diaries of R Crossman (1981)
103. Hyams, op.cit., 284
105. Ibid., 93-5
106. Ibid., 90, 92
107. The Union of Democratic Control (UDC) was founded in September 1914 with the aim of securing a new course in diplomatic policy. It demanded the ending of the war by negotiation, open and democratic diplomacy. After 1918 these aims continued to guide its activities. See Swartz, M., The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics
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CHAPTER TWO
PRESS ATTITUDES FROM JANUARY 1943 TO NOVEMBER 1944

Greece became involved in the Second World War when she refused to submit to an Italian ultimatum on October 28, 1940. The Greeks inflicted a severe defeat on the Italians, but the German advance into Greece in April 1941 led to defeat of the Greek army and the division of the country into three occupation zones: German, Italian and Bulgarian. The King and his Government under E Tsouderos left for Cairo and then for London. In Athens a collaborationist Government was installed headed by Tsolakoglou, the general who had concluded the surrender to the Germans.

Resistance began as a spontaneous movement. The first such movement to appear, and by far the strongest and most important was the National Liberation Front (EAM) and its military wing, the National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS). It was formed in September 1941, on communist initiative, and offered both a way to resist the enemy and a promise for freedom and social justice in postwar Greece. Gradually it secured the active support of a large proportion of the population and by liberation it had some two million members and it became virtually a de facto Government and consequently a rival of the regime in exile. (1)

The other two main resistance groups were the National Republican Hellenic League (EDES) led by Colonel Zervas and the National and Social Liberation (EKKA) led by Colonel Dimitrios Psarros. They were regional in their activities and military in character. Despite their republicanism, they had no consistent ideology and they failed to develop into a cohesive unit. Their appeal was based more on the personal qualities of their leaders than on their political programmes. They had much less popular response and became dependent on British political and economic support for their survival. (2)
As the war progressed Greek developments were decisively affected by British political and military decisions. The British basic objective was to restore, after liberation, Britain's political influence in Greece in order to safeguard British interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. As in the pre-war period, the King still remained the basic factor in this policy, despite his unpopularity due to his association with the Metaxas dictatorship.

British short-term military objectives were soon to conflict with long-term political interests. Given the predominantly republican and left-wing character of the resistance movement, by supporting the expansion of guerrilla activity, it might in the end run counter to the British Government's policy of safeguarding the position of the Greek King. Thus, by late 1943, political considerations began to receive primary attention.

In August 1943, representatives of the three main resistance organisations, EAM/ELAS, EDES and EKKA, arrived in Cairo in an effort to obtain recognition of their status as a part of the Greek armed forces. They also demanded an unequivocal statement from the King that he would not return to Greece prior to the conduct of a plebiscite. After consulting with both Churchill and Roosevelt, the King refused. Thus, an attempt to bridge the gap between the guerrilla groups, the Government-in-exile, the King and the British authorities failed. The Cairo delegation returned to Greece in September with nothing accomplished and deeply frustrated.

As a direct result of the Cairo events civil war erupted in October 1943 between ELAS and EDES. Colonel Zervas secretly arranged a cease-fire with the German occupation forces and he then turned the whole of his army against ELAS. The British cut off all supplies to
ELAS and their policy towards EAM/ELAS was modified, which meant a complete break with it and an effort to win over the moderates of its rank and file.

On March 15 1943, in the midst of a serious crisis within the Greek armed forces in the Middle East, King and cabinet left London for Cairo.

Records from the Foreign Office indicated the efforts the British Ambassador to Greece, Reginald Leeper, and the Foreign Office made to "sell" the King to the Greek people.

When the King arrived to Cairo, an intensified propaganda campaign in his favour followed. Wide press and broadcasting coverage was given to his attendance at parades by Greek troops, in Tripolis, in Baalbek, his visit to the battlefield of El Alamein and to the Greek refugee hospital at Moses Wells.(6)

Leeper, an expert in propaganda matters(7), after studying the Greek King "at close quarters", sent to the Foreign Office his analysis of the King's personality "as a study in propaganda". His personality and past record made normal types of propaganda difficult. The only successful line of propaganda that Leeper could see was to present the King as standing above political strife and to portray him as possessing qualities different from those of the average Greek.

The Foreign Office concurred with Leeper's estimate and asked him to submit his ideas for detailed propaganda tactics regarding the King.(8)

As part of this 'building-up-the-King' operation, Leeper suggested to Sir Orme Sargent, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that a booklet should be published giving an account of the part played by the King in the war. It should be written by a well-known historian and introduced by a preface either by M Palairet, former British Ambassador to Greece, or by General Wilson, C-in-C Middle East, and also might have a strategic annex by
Sir A Cunningham, Admiral C-in-C Eastern Mediterranean Fleet. The Foreign Office was rather sceptical of this idea. It was felt that a book published under British auspices praising the former regime and the King's association with this regime might be interpreted to mean that the King was wedded to dictatorial rule and that the British supported him in his attitude. Sargent informed Leeper that as the whole trend of the British propaganda hitherto had been to dissociate the King from the Metaxas regime, therefore "the less we say about the King's past record the better."(9)

The Foreign Office policy of support for the King and his Government was incompatible with any form of support and cooperation for EAM/ELAS. The British authorities soon had to acknowledge that EAM/ELAS was a rapidly expanding political mass resistance movement, which, in contrast to EDES and the Tsouderos Government, was absolutely not to be directly manipulated by the British. By autumn 1943, the British EAM policy was to try to reorganise the resistance movement and bring it under the control of the British authorities in Cairo.

A first step in this direction was to break the connection between the resistance movement and EAM. In early February 1943, the idea of forming what were to be called 'National Bands' was developed. These bands would be non-political, militarily unified and under the orders of the C-in-C Middle East. This project aimed at minimising the political activities of the guerrilla bands, and as such concerned the political activities of ELAS. The negotiations with EAM on this issue lasted from April to July 5 1943, when the Military Agreement, as the accord was renamed, was signed.(10)

The Political Warfare Executive(PWE), with Leeper's agreement and Tsouderos' encouragement, suggested the opening of a radio station, the 'Free Voice of Greece', complementary to the BBC Greek Service. Its chief aim was to promote the idea of the
'National Bands' and in the process to win over the Left wing to an attitude of tolerance, "if not enthusiasm", for the King. The Foreign Office, however, felt that its effect might be the opposite of that intended, since encouraging the Greeks to join the National Bands would be to increase recruits for the EAM as the most powerful and best organised of the bands. Besides, it was felt, that the BBC services were sufficient. The idea was finally dropped.(11)

Instructions were given to the BBC that there should be no reference by name to individual resistance organisations and the term 'National Guerrilla Bands of Greece' should be used in referring to all guerrilla activity.(12). After a mention of EAM/ELAS in a BBC broadcast on July 4, fresh instructions were issued and a better coordination was established between the PWE, the BBC and the Greek Government Information Bureau -which had a bulletin of 10 minutes a day of the BBC's time- in order to avoid differences in presentation of news. To ensure that the material put forward did not conflict with official policy, it had to be subjected to PWE censorship.(13) Meanwhile, staff in the BBC Greek Section and the Greek Government Information Bureau, suspected of left-wing views, were dismissed.(14)

On April 25, the Minister of State, Cairo, Lord Moyne, gave The Times correspondent a message "with suitable embellishments" concerning the National Bands and asked from the Foreign Office when The Times correspondent's message arrived in London to give it widest publicity.(15)

The Press welcomed the plan for the formation of the 'National Bands'.(16) Tribune was the only paper which clearly pointed out the expediency of this plan. The journal wrote:

The change of the name might be incomprehensible to people unfamiliar with Greek politics, but it is not without significance. Indeed, it is symptomatic of the present policy of the Greek Government towards the active anti-Fascist forces inside Greece, and even gives an idea of the plans, harboured by this Government for the post-war period.(17)
In March, reporting of the serious crisis which had erupted within the Greek armed forces was kept from publication by a censor Stop which had been put on all news of disturbances.(18)

While news of military developments were easier to control by strict military censorship, political news was always more difficult to handle.

In September, the press commented extensively on the EAM mission to Cairo and its implications for Greek politics.

The Times Cairo correspondent reported that it was the "vexed question" of the future position and movements of the King in which most of the dissatisfaction and trouble in Greek political circles had centred.(19) The Manchester Guardian in an editorial stated that it was a "great mistake" the Greek Government's refusal of the EAM request to be represented in the Government.(20)

The News Chronicle, Tribune and The New Statesman stressed that the failure of the deputation to Cairo would have grave repercussions in Greece.(21)

It was, however, The Observer's comment which infuriated the Foreign Office. On September 26, it suggested that a "complete unity" in military matters existed among all the organised guerrilla forces under the "single command" of Colonel Sarafis, the guerrilla C-in-C. "If the Greeks are anything like as united in seeking these political aims as they are in the organisation of their resistance to the invader the consequences may be serious." As it was thought in the Foreign Office that the origin of The Observer's article was in Cairo, they asked Leeper to impose stricter censorship control.(22) After exhaustive enquiries Leeper concluded that the article was written in London. He assured the Foreign Office that he was doing his best to influence correspondents and to persuade them to cut out "undesirable passages" in their political messages. He asked whether the Foreign Office could exercise similar influence on
editors and diplomatic correspondents in London. (23) Author of The Observer article was Ronald Friedenberg (or Fredenburgh), its diplomatic correspondent since 1943, a Canadian assistant editor of the anti-Nazi Stephen King-Hall Newsletter. (24) John Cameron, News Department, had spent nearly an hour with him before he wrote it. "I used every argument I could think of to dissuade him...He is in short an unreasonable person but we shall continue to reason with him to the best of our ability." (25)

On October 9, fighting between ELAS and EDES raged throughout Greece. At that time the German mopping-up operations against the resistance movement concentrated on ELAS, since Zervas secretly arranged a cease-fire with the German occupation forces. (26)

News of the clashes were kept secret, until, on October 18, a report in the Daily Herald and the following day in the Manchester Guardian, made it public. On October 19, Dilys Powell of the Political Intelligence Department (PID) wrote to E M Rose, Southern Department, "I feel very strongly that we shall not be able for long to ignore the facts in our broadcasts to Greece without undermining the prestige of the BBC as a reliable source of impartial news." She suggested that an authoritative English spokesman should be invited to deal with the subject in a broadcast in which the central theme should be: "Is this what thousands of Greeks have died for?" On October 20, the Foreign Office asked Leeper his view on that suggestion. (27)

The British Embassy carefully prepared a background story of the conflict which was released to the press on October 26. The line adopted was approved by SOE, and PWE telegraphed it to London for use by the BBC. The propaganda line was to strengthen morale of the EDES and not yet to openly attack ELAS. The main points were: (1) a denial that EDES were collaborating with the Germans, (2) a statement that EDES were not (sic) aggressors, (3) Zervas' appeal to ELAS leaders to stop attacks on him (4) a statement that Germans wished
ELAS and EDES to fight each other, as being in German interests. The Embassy informed the Foreign Office that point (4) was "not one which we intend to lay first emphasis and to keep in forefront."(28)

Apart from the conservative press, which argued that the main reason of ELAS-EDES clashes was the German propaganda which intended to sow seeds of dissension among resistance organisations(29), the liberal and Labour press mostly related it to the question of the King's return to Greece.

The Times Cairo correspondent attributed the fighting "to political reasons aggravated and to some measure, it is thought, inspired by clever German propaganda."(30)

The Manchester Guardian pointed out that the monarchist issue had become "acuter than ever in Greek politics."(31) The News Chronicle commented that "the underlying causes of conflict in Greece are deeper and more complex than mere German propaganda...Greek political differences revolve mainly around the problem of the monarchy."(32)

The Observer assessed that the rebuff which the six guerrilla leaders received in Cairo had been "followed by an intensification of the feeling against the present Monarch and doubts regarding British policy in this matter."(33)

The Economist accused the Greek Government. "To steer the authoritarian course means to incur the danger of civil strife."(34)

The New Statesman and Tribune stressed the British share of responsibility for the failure of the EAM mission and blamed Churchill for encouraging the King's intransigence.(35) Tribune in particular was a fierce critic of the King whom it regarded as the main cause of the Greek crisis.(36)

On October 28, Leeper, irritated by what he called "a stream of EAM propaganda in the British Press", asked whether the Foreign Office could make an effort to stop this. Indeed
on November 2, Cameron prepared guidance notes to assist the News Department. They were
that: the troubles had been brought about by German political warfare, the baseless accusation
against the EDES of treating with the enemy and the issue of monarchy which did not arise. On
November 5, Leeper was informed that the News Department had been fully briefed and they
would continue to do their utmost to guide journalists. It was also explained that until a
decision was reached to attack ELAS leaders, News Department had to rely "on the incorrect
and ineffectual line that present disorders are due solely to German propaganda." (37)

Leeper felt that in the meantime something should be done "to undo the harm which was
being done by the British press". The Foreign Office doubted that his suggestion of building up
Tsouderos' own personality, widely criticised by the British press, would really be effective in
changing the views of journalists. But they found sound his idea of pointing out to
correspondents that by undermining Tsouderos' Government, they were playing into the hands
of those of the EAM leaders who aimed at using it to establish their personal rule. The whole
idea, therefore, was to detach the rank and file of EAM/ELAS from their leaders by discrediting
them. Nash pointed out that for the time being Leeper's guidance combined with Cameron's
points of November 2 would be most helpful. In another cable to Leeper on November 12, the
Foreign Office stressed that in any campaign against EAM/ELAS it should be shown that their
activities were hampering the war effort. And a campaign against EAM/ELAS would be far
more effective if their case was stated explicitly in dispatches from Cairo as a result of guidance
by the Embassy to correspondents there. These would prepare the ground for comment in
London. "I trust, therefore, that as soon as we inform you that decision has been reached you
will be able to provide such guidance, which we on our side will do our best to reinforce. Left
wing journalists here are very ready to detect what they regard as signs of 'reactionary Foreign
Office policy'." (38)
Indeed, until the end of November the British policy towards Greece was in a process of change.

In early October, reports from Greece showed the rapidly expanding strength of EAM/ELAS and the certainty of active opposition if the King should return. After his return from Cairo, Eden submitted on November 14 a memorandum to the War Cabinet proposing a number of important changes in policy towards Greece. Leeper, too, submitted a plan of his own to the Foreign Office. On November 22, the War Cabinet met again and approved the proposed new course of action, based on Leeper's proposals. That was: to break with EAM and to attempt to divide the movement by discrediting its leadership and winning over its moderate members; and a pledge given by the King that he would not return to Greece until the question of the regime had been settled, until which time he would appoint Archbishop Damaskinos as Regent.(39)

On November 29, the Foreign Office sent to Leeper a note on the propaganda line to Greece which had been discussed with Sir Orme Sargent and P W Scarlet, Head (Acting) of Coordination of Propaganda Department. This was based on two main lines: (a) appeal for unity based on the King's declaration and incorporation of guerrillas in Greek forces; (b) attack on EAM/ELAS leaders. This attack "should be on military rather than political grounds and might well be opened by a message from Commander-in-Chief". In other words, it must clearly be based on the assumption that they were hindering the war effort and aiming at establishing a dictatorship for personal ends, and not that they were Communists, anti-British or opposed to the King and the Greek Government. It was also felt that the rank and file would not be won over unless "a powerful campaign" were to be launched against their leaders. For this purpose, leaflets would be dropped over Greece and they would be fully supported by broadcasts. It
was, however, pointed out that this new policy was to be adopted after the King's declaration. In the meantime the Foreign Office proposed to continue its present line of supporting Zervas and countering EAM allegations against him. As all the details of how to prepare the way for the new policy by shifting responsibility for the civil war from German propaganda and putting it squarely on EAM-ELAS leaders had to be worked out in Cairo, the Foreign Office asked Leeper for his views and comments. (40)

Tribune, in a well-informed article on December 17, exposed the Foreign Office propaganda line to abandon ELAS in favour of Zervas, whom it was seeking "to popularise as a national hero."

Tribune's comments were picked up by Tass, London, and were published in Pravda on December 29, criticising the British line on Greece. So far it was the only published comment that there had been in Soviet papers about the Greek situation. On May 5, Eden took the matter up with the Soviet Ambassador to London, F Gousev, who promised to look into it. (41)

In the meantime, extensive enquiries were made to find out the origin of this leakage. Tribune's usually very well-informed articles on the Balkans and the recent leakage of information concerning Zervas (42) puzzled the Foreign Office. Following the enquiries, the PWE and MI5 (Military Intelligence) informed the Foreign Office that the leakage was a PWE directive circulated to the BBC, including the Balkan Intelligence Section. The leakage occurred through one of the staff of the above services, evidently in touch with somebody connected with Tribune. (43) Since there were no grounds for official action, which could only be based on breaches of censorship regulations (44), a rebuke to Tribune's editor had to be ruled out.

Meanwhile, Churchill and Eden, now in the Middle East for the Cairo and Teheran Conferences, strongly advised the King to make the desired declaration. Eventually, in view of the King's persistently negative attitude to such a declaration, a compromise was found. In a
letter to Tsouderos, the King consented to examine again the question of the date of his return. His consent was given to the press in mid-December and it was received well.

In the conservative press the Daily Telegraph's Cairo correspondent, Douglas Williams, stated that a clarification of his attitude might be opportune. He regarded the King as "the sole constituted representative of the Greek people" and the maintenance of his legitimacy was of paramount importance. (45)

The Times Cairo correspondent reported that King's move was a positive one and a significant step in Greek politics. (46)

The Manchester Guardian in an editorial remarked that the Greek Government was clearly coming to the view that the resistance movement was too strong to be ignored and a letter had been published by the King to this effect. (47)

The Observer's diplomatic correspondent considered that the letter fell considerably short of meeting the demands of the resistance movement (48), while its Cairo correspondent wrote that it was "an extremely wise move", the most astute made by Monarchists in the last two and half years. (49)

Tribune stated that the King's letter was the result of pressure exerted on him by the British Premier and the Foreign Secretary. (50)

Greece from January to November 1944

In 1944 the main preoccupation of British policy towards Greece was to subdue EAM, by seeking the formation of a national Government in which EAM would be invited to participate, neutralising it in a coalition Government with a bourgeois majority. If EAM were to
refuse to join the Foreign Office was ready to denounce it to the Greek people as responsible for preventing national unity.

The King's refusal of a regency on March 10 1944, coincided with the formation of PEEA, the 'Political Committee of National Liberation' dominated by EAM. PEEA was an administrative body aiming at the establishment of a Government of National Unity. A serious crisis arose from its formation. In early April, the Greek armed forces stationed in the Middle East mutinied in a demand for the recognition of PEEA. Tsouderos was forced to resign. The British intervened decisively and by the end of April the mutiny was over. The April events presented the Greek and British authorities with the opportunity of purging the Greek forces of their leftist and Republican elements. Out of this, the Third Brigade was formed which was used against the ELAS forces in the Battle of Athens of December 1944.

At this point what the Foreign Office needed to put its policy into action was an able politician with a strong personality of his own who would, however, faithfully abide by British policy requirements, and whom the British could confidently promote as the right person for the premiership in the new National Government. On April 26, George Papandreou was appointed the new prime minister.

In May, a conference was held in Lebanon with the aim of forming a Greek National Government. Ostensibly called by the Greek Government, it was in fact organised by the British Ambassador, who carefully controlled every aspect of it.

EAM's decision to participate in the conference and to join in the national Government, and consequently to sign at the end of September the Caserta Agreement -placing ELAS under the direct command of the British General Officer Commanding Greece, Lt-Gen Ronald Scobie- was undoubtedly influenced by the fact that the Soviet Union had not recognised PEEA, as well as by Soviet advice to them in accordance with the secret British-Soviet
With the Press, the situation was slightly different. The newspaper editors were not compelled to submit items for advance censorship. However, they were restrained by strict censorship regulations. The correspondents were accredited to the British Army and their function was limited. Apart from the Anglo-Egyptian censorship which was applied also to local and non-accredited correspondents, there was a whole network controlling the news. A Stops Committee was set up, under the Minister of State, in order to coordinate-ordinate censorship Stops and Guidance to censors in the Middle East. This Committee included representatives of: the British Embassies in Egypt, Greece and Yugoslavia, PWE, Ministry of Information, Allied Liaison Staff, GHQ Middle East, Force 133 and Army Public Relations(PR3), GHQ Middle East. Censorship Stops were of two kinds, General and Service. The former were initiated by various civil and diplomatic authorities, and were submitted monthly for confirmation to a Stops Committee. Service Stops were initiated by higher Service authorities and, when required, they were revised, amended, canceled or new Stops were introduced. The final agreed lists of Stops and Guidance was issued by PR3, who had the necessary machinery, to all political and military censors in the Middle East.(58) Thus, it was almost impossible for something to slip through the net, and any kind of criticism of British policy could come mainly from the London staff of the papers.

The April crisis was reported in the press when it was already over, on April 24. The Times Cairo correspondent, said that the mutiny was "entirely political." EAM had weakened its cause because of "the mistaken tactics of its extreme Communist elements."(59)

The Manchester Guardian, W N Ewer of the Daily Herald and The Observer cast responsibility for the troubles on the King's delays and hesitation in proceeding with the formation of a united Government. The Manchester Guardian hoped that the British
agreement on the Balkans under which the British would play the major part in Greece and the Soviets in Rumania. (54)

As it was not possible to ignore EAM, its image had to be weakened, through the press and the BBC.

The BBC was subject to rigorous rules of censoring. The European Service of the BBC was placed under the Political Warfare Executive (PWE) and served as its main instrument of propaganda to enemy and enemy-occupied countries. (55)

Leeper was most keen to make full use of the BBC. In early January he complained to the Foreign Office that the BBC's broadcasts were hostile to the Greek Government. Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, BBC Political Adviser, defended its performance:

The fact that the Ambassador to Greece has had cause to complain does not seem to me very material...I am afraid I remain of the opinion that the Greek service here has performed the difficult task of putting out broadcasts to which the Greek nation will listen without repugnance, without at the same time conveying the impression that we are attacking or are hostile to the Greek Government. (56)

On February 2, Lord Moyne together with Leeper asked the Foreign Office to take the necessary action towards the BBC to reduce to a bare minimum the guerrilla news. He informed them that Leeper was to speak to Tsouderos in order to bring the Greek Information Bureau into line and asked if a parallel action could be taken in London with the Greek Embassy. On March 20, the Foreign Office instructed Cairo that bulletins concerning Greek guerrilla activities should be approved by the Embassy, Force 133 and MI6 (Security Intelligence Service) and telegraphed to the Foreign Office at least 24 hours in advance. These telegrams would serve to check messages sent by Cairo correspondents. They would also be passed to the MOI for release to the BBC and to the Greek Embassy in London. (57)
Government would put the strongest pressure on the King to avoid anything that could further embitter Greek politics. (60)

The conservative press held the opposite view. The Daily Telegraph praised the King as trying to reconcile the Greeks and helping the formation of a united Government and condemned the mutineers. (61) Similarly the Daily Mail presented the King as a King devoted to his people who disregarding all advice and warnings of danger, returned from London to Cairo "to exert all his influence to bring about unity." (62)


Bartlett criticised the British policy of supporting Tsouderos' procrastination in forming a national Government. "There is unfortunately no evidence that his British advisers disapproved of his procrastination. There is, indeed evidence in the other direction." He wrote that the British Government in their fear of Communist influence gave financial and other encouragement to leaders "of insignificant and artificial movements" and notably to Zervas. This policy had had three results: (1) The task of forming a genuinely national Government had been immensely complicated; (2) The British were looked upon more and more as the upholders of the King against his people; (3) The popularity of Communism was growing rapidly amongst a people who would normally be little inclined to accept it. (63)

The New Statesman stressed that if the British Government really desired an agreement, they must stop encouraging "the reactionary and truculent King". (64) Tribune, in particular, criticised Leeper's interference in Greek internal politics. "Greek Government crisis cannot be understood without including in it the role of Reginald Leeper, the virtual manipulator of Greek policy and the guiding spirit in Cairo." (65) On April 28, an article,
entitled "King and Keeper", criticised the British policy as it was leading to a further weakening of Britain's position and to further antagonising of popular opinion abroad.

A. Clark Kerr, British Ambassador to Moscow, complained to the Foreign Office that such items as Bartlett's article, were liable to give Soviet authorities the impression that the British policy towards Greece "is encountering strong opposition in Great Britain." W Ridsdale, News Department, talked to Bartlett the day his article was printed. Two days later an occasion arose when Ridsdale and the Greek Ambassador, an old friend of Bartlett, had a talk with him. On another occasion, Eden when lunching with the News Chronicle's editorial staff also had a conversation on the Greek situation with Bartlett. "I have the impression that these efforts have not been without effect" Ridsdale minuted. (66)

Complaints were also lodged against Tribune's article of April 28, the Daily Worker's article and Low's cartoon in the Evening Standard of May 2. D S Laskey, Southern Department, was of the view that it was difficult for the News Department alone to correct these "misapprehensions." He thought that the time might have come to make the British Government's attitude clear by statements in Parliament. D F Howard, Head of the Southern Department, like Ridsdale, considered that they should wait and see how the conference would develop before they committed themselves very deeply in public as to British future policy:

If the Conference succeeds, it would be an admirable opportunity for congratulating every one and expressing pious hopes for the future. If, as I fear, no unity is achieved, it might also be a good opportunity for us to lay the blame where it is due almost certainly on the shoulders of EAM, with an explanation of our policy. (67)

On April 26, Papandreou was appointed the new premier. The day before the Foreign Office asked Leeper for a brief account on Papandreou to help their News Department to assure him a good reception in the press. (68) Leeper sent the required details immediately. Papandreou was the founder of the small Social Democratic party, an offshoot of the main
Venizelist party, and with an advanced socialist programme. He had won the respect of all after an uncompromising attitude of resistance to the invader. Although he opposed the return of the King, he took no uncompromising stand on the issue believing that resistance to the invader should take precedence. In order to avoid the new premier being criticised as a "turn-over politician", Leeper pointed out that it was important that the press should be made to realise that Papandreou considered the situation as having changed completely. (69) On April 27, Leeper asked the BBC to give full publicity to Papandreou's two statements, one the programme of the Government and the other a declaration to the Greek armed forces. (70) Churchill's message of support to Papandreou and the latter's reply to the British premier were broadcast in Greek by BBC and Cairo. (71) On July 5, Kirkpatrick wrote to Sargent, "We will do our best to boost Papandreou. I do not think that he has any reason so far to feel that he has not received the necessary degree of support and when I spoke to the Greek Ambassador the other day he told me that he has no complaint to make about the BBC." (72)

Papandreou was received favourably by the British press. He was portrayed as a man of the Left-centre with a resistance record who had recently returned from occupied Greece.

The Times in an editorial gave him wide support. "He is an experienced politician who enjoys a respect not always given to political leaders by his compatriots...His appeal, courageous, sober and democratic, deserves success." (73) The Manchester Guardian's diplomatic correspondent titled his article "A Man of the Left" and wrote that he was "a convinced republican", and one of the chief organisers of Greek resistance. (74)

The conservative press also expressed itself in the same tone. In the Daily Telegraph under the title "King's Invitation to Republicans", the diplomatic correspondent wrote that "Papandreou is a representative of the Greek Left parties." He escaped from Greece and arrived in Cairo as a "crusader for national unity." According to the paper, the King's invitation
to the leader of the Greek Social Democrats means that he is carrying out his recent promise to broaden the basis of the Greek Government." Papandreou was a declared Republican, but "at the same time he has stated that he would subordinate the question of the monarchy to the general welfare of the state, and that he would probably be willing to serve under the King."(75)

The Economist and The Observer were reserved. For the first, it was too early to say whether Papandreou was an acceptable leader(76) and the latter's diplomatic correspondent, under the title "Diminishing Hopes of Unity", did not share others' optimism for new hopes of unity under Papandreou's premiership. Papandreou "has shown every sign of being a willing lieutenant in the carrying out of the King's policies." And the King "never really intended to bring the guerrillas into his Government, but rather to make it impossible for them to join in."(77)

The New Statesman was strongly opposed to the view that Papandreou was 'a man of the Left.' It stated that in order "to lend colour to King George's attempt to 'broaden' his Government, Papandreou...is alleged to be a Socialist. In fact, he belongs to the Right-wing of the Venizelists."(78)

Carefully preparing for the conference, on April 16 Leeper asked the BBC to maintain complete silence on guerrilla activities until after the conference. He wanted to eliminate the importance of EAM as a fighting force, and so to prevent it from taking the initiative at the conference or playing a leading role. Churchill intervened personally in this regard, instructing Lord Moyne in Cairo that nothing that reflected credit of any kind upon EAM was to be allowed out without his special approval.(79) On April 24, Lord Moyne assured the Foreign Office that complete stoppage had now been imposed on reports of ELAS activities. He
recommended that the BBC should be forbidden to make any reference from any sources outside Egypt, unless specially authorised. (80)

As a result, on May 2, twenty-three accredited war correspondents vigorously protested in a letter against censorship of Greek news and sent it to the British and American authorities in Cairo. They pointed out that no comment, unless it reflected official policy was permitted, and therefore, the correspondents were "in danger of being used as mouthpieces for official views and propaganda." (81)

The Times published extracts from the letter of protest. (82) The Economist wrote that "the only possible conclusion must be that where such strenuous efforts are made to smother news, there must be a great deal to cover up." (83) The New Statesman wrote that "this effort by the British censorship to stifle criticism and suppress the facts is the more scandalous in that the virtual control of Greek politics has passed to Downing Street." (84) Tribune stated that "it is hard to distinguish truth from propaganda under these circumstances." (85) Bartlett put a Question in Parliament on July 5. (86)

On the other hand, the Daily Telegraph defended the Government. "Official circles deprecate free discussion as tending only further to embitter dissensions at a moment when round-table talks are about to be held." (87)

The Greek Stops were mostly devised by the British Embassy to Greece, which occasionally added fresh ones and seldom reduced their list, which, as A V Coverley Price, former Chairman of the Stops Committee noted, was one of the longest. When complaints were received from press correspondents, he asked Lord Moyne to take up the question with Leeper. (88)

The matter seemed to subside -as, after the conference, the censorship Stops were reduced (89) and the correspondents did not renew their protest (90)- until it was again taken up
by the Americans in mid-June. On instructions from the State Department, Robert D Murphy, US Political Adviser, raised in Algiers the question of political censorship on Greek news as contrary to the policy that censorship should be exercised on military grounds alone. Should, therefore, political censorship be imposed and be complained of by American correspondents or be attacked editorially in the United States, the State Department declared that they would be obliged to make an official statement that it opposed the imposition of such censorship and that it continued to oppose it. (91) The Foreign Office, Lord Moyne and Leeper strongly opposed a withdrawal of political censorship, because it would affect not only Greek news but a wider field, including news relating to Zionist matters and Russo-Polish relations. (92) Churchill himself, in an extremely strongly-worded Minute to Eden, demanded that a firm answer should be given to the State Department. (93) Yet, the Foreign Office's view was to try first to convince the Americans to leave things as they were, without using, in the first instance, a sledge-hammer to kill "what is probably only a very weakling State Department mouse." If the State Department were determined to keep the matter up, then Churchill's line had to be used. (94) A solution was finally found that the American Military Press Censorship was to fully participate in the censorship of all material submitted to PR3 by correspondents for transmission abroad. From 1942 to June 1944, the practice was only to submit matter to the American censors which contained information that had an American angle or was written by Americans for American consumption only. The new arrangement was to continue indefinitely. (95) Apparently, the Americans were seeking to share responsibility in the Middle East, where the British were exclusively in control and of which they had just began to appreciate the importance with its rich oil reserves.
While the conference lasted, it was arranged that Papandreou would keep Leeper regularly informed so that he could deal with the correspondents who gathered in numbers in Beirut. The actual seat of the conference was kept secret. (96)

Leeper suggested to the Foreign Office that the proceedings of the conference should be published and thus, in the case that EAM refused to join in a National Government, automatically, exposed it, without having the British make a unilateral denunciation, with which the American Government might be reluctant and the Soviet Government would refuse to be associated with. The Foreign Office agreed. (97)

What is known as the Lebanon Agreement was signed on May 20, 1944, by all delegates, including the Communists.

Leeper suggested that everything possible should be done to bring to the Greek people, particularly in Athens, and in urban centres, news of the Lebanon conference. PWB had secured from the RAF one special sortie over Athens and they were taking up at RAF Headquarters the question of more. On June 2, Sargent wrote to General L C Hollis of the War Cabinet Offices, that the dissemination of leaflets over Greece should be maintained at as high a rate as possible since "leaflets were a much more powerful and effective propaganda weapon than broadcasting." He stressed that the present moment was a critical one for decisively influencing Greek public opinion and detaching it from EAM and the Communists. He, therefore, asked whether the chiefs of Staff would consider asking General Wilson to do his utmost to see that the needs of PWB for more sorties were met. (98)

The majority of the press regarded the conference as a personal success for Papandreou. However, there were not a few voices who cast doubt on its success and the ability of Papandreou to form a National Government.
The Times suggested that the successful outcome of the conference reflected great personal credit on Papandreou, who had emerged "as the man of the hour". The News Chronicle in an editorial noted that in Papandreou "the Greeks seem to have found a leader", and Jordan reported that "an air of optimism" now prevailed in Greek circles. In the Daily Herald Salusbury reported that "the first step towards Greek national unity has been achieved." In contrast, an editorial on May 30, entitled "Slow Motion", felt that Papandreou would fail to form a united Government.

With reserved enthusiasm, the Manchester Guardian in an editorial hoped that if Greek political and fighting unity was really achieved, it would be "devoutly thankful." The Observer, in the 'Profile,' traced the political career of Papandreou. "If the partisans accept the terms of the agreement and if Papandreou accepts their representatives in his Government, then the Lebanon conference may become an important date...in Greek history."

The two Left Labour weeklies doubted the acclaimed success of the Lebanon conference and remarked that the resistance organisation had so far received no representation in the Greek Government. The New Statesman wrote that it was early to judge how far the conference was a success and how much it would contribute to Greek unity. Tribune also advised "caution." "There is yet no evidence that, this new unanimity will survive its application to Greek practical politics." Both weeklies pointed out the role played by Leeper as a back-stairs intriguer in Cairo and accused him of undue interference in Greek affairs.

Leeper in a personal message to Eden, on May 23, complained about attacks which Tribune and other British papers continued to make on him. Churchill himself reassured him of his Government's confidence in him and Eden promised he would defend him in the debate in the House. "We are grateful for all your help in bringing about the success for the Lebanon Conference", Eden wrote to him.
Meanwhile EAM, KKE and PEEA did not approve the conciliatory attitude their delegates had displayed at the Lebanon conference. In this situation the British and Papandreou decided to exert pressure on EAM by means of broadcasts from London and Cairo. Sargent asked Robert Bruce Lockhart, Political Intelligence Department (PID), to ensure that the BBC followed any lead which Cairo would give.

The Times criticised EAM for failing to honour the pledges given by its delegates at the Lebanon conference and to take part in the National Government. On July 28, after Eden's statement in the House of Commons the previous day, it would state in an editorial, "The present policy of EAM is aiding no one but the Germans and Bulgarians and inflicting serious injury on a great cause." The Manchester Guardian considered that the real obstacle to the solution of the Greek crisis was still centred around the position of the King. On July 29, in an editorial it would state "we shall weaken our influence if we show ourselves too strongly attached to the Greek King, too firmly committed to backing Mr. Papandreou... At this stage of the war the presumption in an occupied country should rather be in favour of the forces of resistance on the spot than of the exiles outside."

W N Ewer pointed out that the main reason for the EAM abstention was still the question of the King's position and his failure to pledge himself.

Vernon Bartlett doubted whether Papandreou would succeed in forming a Government of national unity and that in the meantime great harm was being done to Anglo-Greek relations. "I had thought of putting all this in an article", he wrote to Eden on June 26, "but I don't want to wash all this dirty linen in public if I can avoid it." He went on, "it would be most interesting to find out what proportion of our own many agents in Greece take the favourable view of Tsouderos and the unfavourable one of EAM that have influenced British policy during the last
year or two." Eden asked for a fairly full reply and Laskey prepared a seven-page draft. "I think it may be worth going into some detail in replying to Bartlett, and I have, therefore, tried to draft a reasoned statement of the situation in Greece and of the aims of our policy." Sargent and A Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, found it excellent. On July 8 the reply was sent to Bartlett. Some days later, Bartlett would write in the News Chronicle, "behind the careful phraseology of Mr. Eden's statements there is apparent the unspoken threat that if EAM does not come to heel, and quickly, it will forfeit any further British sympathy and support, which will henceforth be reserved exclusively for the King's Government under M Papandreou." Laskey noted, "not a bad article." 

The Observer moderated its tone compared to its previous open and vigorous attacks on Papandreou and the King. Its diplomatic correspondent expressed the opinion that the chance of real unity depended on whether the EAM and Greek Communist Party could eliminate "the handful of trouble-makers."

The New Statesman accused Papandreou of cunning use of the conference. The EAM delegates were subjected to strict supervision and were prevented from communication with their supporters either in Greece or in the Middle East. Tribune stated that Lebanon Conference was a "clever work." But "cleverness in these fundamental matters is apt to have a boomerang effect."

The Foreign Office was in general satisfied with the outlook of the press. Apart from certain outbursts, usually coming from its editor, Percy Cudlip, the Foreign Office found that the Daily Herald's attitude was "not too bad." News Department did not think that the paper had a deliberately destructive policy towards Papandreou, though its diplomatic correspondent, W N Ewer, had been consistent in his doubts as to whether any Government could be able to hold the situation in Greece without the fullest of EAM support. Cameron
noted that "when it can be shown that he [Papandreou] has succeeded in unifying the country these misgivings will cease." Ridsdale agreed. "Yes, W Ewer is a doubting Thomas capable of ultimate conversion."(119)

The Observer's considerable change of line, showed in the 'Profile' of June 4 and in the article of July 2, was welcomed by the Foreign Office.(120)

As regards the critical line adopted by Tribune the Foreign Office felt that it would be "worse than useless to argue with[it]"; as for The New Statesman it was suggested that contact with its editor, Kingsley Martin, might be worth trying.(121)

Thus, when Leeper reiterated yet again that the British press had accorded EAM too much favourable comment, the Foreign Office did not agree. In a communication with Sargent, on June 22, Leeper deplored the fact that the British press on Greek affairs revealed "a curious state of mind on the part of many journalists who ought to know better." In his view a section of the British Press had hardly reflected the views of the British correspondents in Cairo. He mentioned Philip Jordan of the News Chronicle and F G Salusbury of the Daily Herald who complained that most of what they sent to their papers was blue penciled except such passages as could be construed by careful editing to be favourable to EAM. "I mention these instances to show that any influence I can exert on the British correspondents is of small value unless the editorial staff in London are prepared to play fair." Laskey agreed that "some British newspapers, such as the Daily Herald and The New Statesman, are proving extremely reluctant to accept Papandreou and to revise their views of EAM...We are still in no position to embark on an outright denunciation of EAM...I hope, however, that News Department will do all they can to educate editorial staffs over here."
The News Department estimated that on the whole the British press cooperated well in support of the British policy in Greece while avoiding the appearance of interference in internal politics. On the other hand, the more critical tone of Left newspapers, had played true to form. According to the News Department, the "Left Wingers" feared that Papandreou meant the return of the King without a plebiscite and that a dictatorship would follow in the wake of this development. On the military side, they inclined to regard ELAS as the most significant fighting force engaged against the Germans in Greece and therefore as holding the leadership in Greece. While they were prepared to accept Papandreou, however, they were very far from accepting the King, whom they regard as "slippery." As regarded the complaint of the Daily Herald's and the News Chronicle's correspondents, the Department was of the view that it was a justifiable exercise of editorial authority in deciding whether or not to publish dispatches. News Department had had long conversations both with E W Ewer of the Daily Herald and with E P Montgomery of the News Chronicle on the general subject of the position in Greece, "and neither of them is in the least inclined to whitewash EAM." News Department would do all they can to educate the journalists in London, while it expected that the feeling in favour of EAM was likely to persist. A reply was given to Leeper based on the above lines.(122)

On October 18 1944, the Greek Government and its British support force entered Athens.

The press continued to discuss Greek internal problems such as the future form of the Greek Government, the question of the date of the King's return to Greece. But, for the most part, it regarded that the question of bringing relief into Greece and of restoring the financial and economic situation in the country was now of such overwhelming importance that any internal political affairs must take second place. Therefore, it avoided raising controversial
matters. Besides the News Department exerted their influence and warned editors and
diplomatic correspondents of the danger "of undue interference" in Greek internal
questions.(123)

Meanwhile, Greek internal problems were heading for a crisis. On November 6, The
Times and Daily Herald published reports from their correspondents in Athens about a
deterioration in the political situation. They referred to an EAM procession on November 4, the
gravest example of tension so far. In the Home Service, the BBC referred to the collapse of the
Greek currency and to "impressive" demonstrations by EAM.

The Foreign Office did its best both with the BBC and with the press in London to
prevent publication of alarming reports. On November 6, in a communication with Leeper, the
Foreign Office asked him to do his best "to convince correspondents in Athens of the heavy
responsibility which rests upon them and to persuade them to take a moderate and helpful
line."(124)

The political situation had become so explosive that it was no longer possible for the
British to suppress the news.
NOTES

1. For a well-balanced account on EAM/ELAS see Hondros, Occupation and Resistance: Iatrides(ed.), Greece in the 1940s
2. Hondros, op.cit., 171-99; Iatrides, op.cit., 48-60
3. Papastratis, British Policy Towards Greece, 1941-1944, 217-8
4. On the conflict between the Foreign Office and SOE on Greece see Auty and Clogg (eds), British Policy (1975); E Barker, South-East Europe (1976); Clogg, "The Special Operations Executive in Greece" in Iatrides(ed.), op.cit., Papastratis, op.cit., 133-143
5. Myers, Greek Entanglement (1955), 236-65; Auty and Clogg (eds), op.cit., 136-66; Hondros, op.cit., 163-9, Papastratis, op.cit., 105-112
6. FO371/37231, R2764, Minister of State, Cairo to FO, 26/3/43; R3959, Leeper to FO, 30/4/42
7. It was on Leeper's initiative that the British Council was founded in 1934, and he was largely responsible for persuading the BBC to inaugurate broadcasts in foreign languages for the first time in 1938. In 1938, he was charged with the task of reconstructing the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, and he also became involved in 'black' propaganda preparations in wartime. In thus comes as no surprise to see him emerge in 1940 as the head of the Political Warfare Executive. (Philip M Taylor, The Projection of Britain, British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda, 1919-1939, 28-43)
8. FO371/37231, R5915
9. FO371/37204, R8034, Leeper to Sargent, 16/8/43; Minutes by Laskey, Howard, Sargent, Sargent to Leeper, 13/9/43
10. Papastratis, op.cit., 139-143
11. FO371/37197, R5308, D+General Directive 31/3/43; Minutes by Laskey, Dixon, Scarlett; Dixon to Leeper 4/8/43
12. FO371/37204, R4882, Dilyss Powell to Laskey, 17/8/43
13. FO371/37204, R7358, Leeper to Howard, 31/7/43; Minutes by Laskey, Howard, PWE to Laskey; Dixon to Kirkpatrick, 5/9/43
14. Ibid.
15. FO371/37201, R3769, Minister of State to FO, 25/4/43
16. The Times, Instabul corr., 4/5/43 and 25/5/43; Manchester Guardian, leader, 19/8/43; Daily Telegraph, Special corr., Cairo 14/9/43; Daily Herald, 3/7/43 and 6/7/43; Daily Mail, Quinton Varley, 21/10/43
17. Tribune, Greek Guerrillas, Generals and a King, 11/6/43
19. The Times, Cairo special corr., 21/9/43
20. Manchester Guardian, leader, 19/10/43
21. News Chronicle, 28/10/43; The New Statesman, 2/10/43; Tribune, 8/10/43
22. FO371/37199, R9047, Minutes by Laskey 30/9/43 and 6/10/43; FO to Leeper, 1/10/43.
23. FO371/37200, R10364, Leeper to FO 9/10/43; Minutes by John Cameron, 23/10/43
24. Richard Cockett, David Astor and The Observer, 75, 109
25. FO371/37200, R10364, Leeper to FO, 9/10/43; Minutes by Cameron 23/10/43
26. Iatrvides(ed.), op.cit., 48-60; Hondros, op.cit., 174-175, 182-3; Papastratis, op.cit., 152
27. FO371/37206, R10779
28. FO371/37206, Minister of State to FO, 26/10/43
29. Daily Telegraph, 27/10/43
30. The Times, special corr., Cairo, 27/10/43
31. Manchester Guardian, 20/10/43
32. News Chronicle, E P Montgomery, diplomatic corr., 28/10/43
33. The Observer, diplomatic corr., Greek Tension Growing over King's Position, 24/10/43, p.1
34. The Economist, 32/10/43, p.547
35. The New Statesman, The War Within War, 23/10/43
36. Tribune, George of Hellenes Future, 16/7/43; Cairo Greek Myths, 12/11/43; Churchill and Greeks, 5/11/43; Eden and King, 17/12/43; FO and the Greek King, 24/12/43
37. FO371/37200, R10859, Leeper to FO, 28/10/43; Minutes by Laskey, Cameron; Cameron's Guidance Note 2/11/43; FO to Leeper 5/11/43
38. FO371/37200, R 11316, Leeper to FO 6/11/43; Minutes by Laskey, Nash; FO to Leeper 12/11/43
39. Papastratis, op.cit., 144-151
40. FO371/37213, R12519, FO to Leeper, 28/10/43
41. FO371/3722, R13932, Balfour(Moscow) to FO 29/12/43; Minutes by Laskey, Eden, Sargent; FO to Moscow, 2/1/44
42. See Tribune's editorial comment, "Eden and Zervas", 4/2/44
43. FO371/43750, R2849, Powell(PID) to Laskey, 19/2/44 and Barker to Powell 19/2/44; R4913, Brock(MI5) to Howard, 22/3/44, Minutes by Laskey; FO371/43714, R2139, Minutes by Laskey 18/2/44
44. FO371/3722, R13932, Minutes by Laskey.
45. Daily Telegraph, Douglas Williams, 22/12/43
46. The Times, special corr., Cairo, 13/12/43
47. Manchester Guardian, leader, 12/12/43
48. The Observer, diplomatic corr., 12/12/43
49. Ibid. Cairo corr., 19/12/43
50. Tribune, 17/12/43
51. For more details see H Fleischer, op.cit., 5-36 and Spyropoulos, op.cit.
52. Papastratis, op.cit., 172
53. Ibid., 177
54. A documentary record of the "percentage agreement" exists in the papers of Lord Inverchapel, then Sir A Clark-Kerr; See also Yergin, Shattered Peace (Boston, 1977), 60; Resis "The Churchill-Stalin..", American Historical Review, vol. 83, April 1978, 268-87.
55. P M H Bell, John Bull and the Bear, 14-17
56. FO371/43706, R73, Kirkpatrick to Dew, 5/1/44; Howard to Kirkpatrick, 7/1/44
57. FO371/43706, R1782
58. FO371/43707, R10322, Aide Memoire by Lord Moyne to Macmillan, 7/7/44; R10665, Minute by A V Coverley Price, 18/7/44; R12576 Extract from a letter by Lt-Col Stephens, head of the Military Press Censor, PR3, 26/7/44

80
59. The Times, Cairo corr., 24/4/44 and 16/5/44
61. Daily Telegraph, special corr., Cairo, 13/4/44
63. News Chronicle, V Barteltt, 28/4/44, pp. 1,4
64. The New Statesman, 29/4/44, p.281
65. Tribune, 14/4/44
66. FO371/43686, R7065, Moscow to FO, 2/5/44; Minutes
67. FO371/43715, R6941, Minutes; FO371/43686, R7065 Minutes by Howard.
68. FO371/43730, R6615, FO to Leeper, 25/4/44
69. FO371/43730, R6661, Leeper to FO, 25/4/44
70. FO371/43730, R6734, Leeper to FO, 27/4/44
71. FO371/43715, R7014, FO to Leeper, 30/4/44; Leeper to FO, 30/4/44
72. FO371/43707, R10821, Kirkpatrick to Sargent, 5/7/44
73. The Times, leader, 1/5/44
75. Daily Telegraph, diplomatic corr., 27/4/44; Daily Mail, corr, Cairo, 28/4/44
76. The Economist, 29/4/44, p.568
77. The Observer, diplomatic corr., 30/4/44, p.1
78. The New Statesman, 29/4/44, p.281
79. FO371/48251, Leeper to FO 15/4/44; Leeper to FO, 16/4/44; FO to Minister Resident, Cairo, 23/4/44
80. FO371/43706, R6624, Prime Minister's telegram Serial no. T.925/4, Prime Minister to Lord Moyne 23/4/44; Lord Moyne to FO 24/4/44.
81. FO371/43707, R10322. Among the signatories were F G H Salusbury(Daily Herald), Richard Capell(Daily Telegraph), Kenneth Matthews(BBC), Joseph G Harrison(Christian Science Monitor), Claire Hollingworth(Kemsly Press), Geoffroy Hoare(The Times), Philip Jordan(News Chronicle), Eric Bigio (Daily Express) Richard Mowrer (Chicago Daily News), Panos Moschopoulos (Newsweek) Thomas Healy (Daily Mirror), Art Cohn (International News Service), Denis Martin(Reuters), George Moorad(Columbia Broadcasting Service), G Walter Collins (United Press) F G Massock (Associated Press), Stephen Barber (Associated Press),
82. The Times, special corr, Cairo, 3/5/44
83. The Economist, 6/5/44, pp. 595-6
84. The New Statesman, 6/5/44, p.297
85. Tribune, 12/5/44, p.4
86. Hansard, 5/7/44, vol. 401, col. 1134
87. Daily Telegraph, special corr., Cairo, 3/5/44
88. FO371/43707, R10665, Minute by A V Coverley Price, 18/7/44
89. FO371/43707, R11228
90. FO371/43707, R10572, Minutes, 8/7/44
91. FO371/43707, R11224, Macmillan(Algiers) to FO, 17/7/44 92. FO371/43707, R10665, Lord Moyne to FO, 8/7/44; FO to Resident Minister(Caserta) 12/7/44; Sargent to Group Captain Earle, War Cabinet Offices, 13/7/44
92. FO371/43707, R11910, Churchill's Minute 19/7/44
93. Ibid., Minutes; R11224 FO to Washington, 24/7/44
94. FO371/43707, R12576, extract from a letter by Lt-Col Stephens
96. FO371/43730, R7211, Leeper to FO 5/5/44
97. FO371/43715, R7200, Leeper to FO, 5/5/44; Draft Minute to Prime Minister by Sargent.
98. FO371/43706, Leeper to FO, 31/5/44; Sargent to General L C Hollis, War Cabinet, 2/6/44
99. The Times, special corr, Beirut, 22/5/44; leader, 23/5/44
100. News Chronicle, leader, 22/5/44; P Jordan, 24/5/44
101. Daily Herald, F H Salusbury, 25/5/44
102. Manchester Guardian, leader, 23/5/44
103. The Observer, Profile, 4/6/44
104. The New Statesman, 27/5/44, p.346
105. Tribune, 2/6/44
106. FO371/43715, R8493, Leeper to Eden 23/5/44; Eden to Leeper, 25/5/44
107. FO371/43732, R8465, FO to Leeper, 1/6/44; Sargent to Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, 2/6/44
108. The Times, leader, 28/7/44
109. Manchester Guardian, leader, 17/6/44
110. Ibid., leader, 29/7/44
111. Daily Herald, W N Ewer, 15/6/44
112. FO371/43733, R10240, Bartlett to Eden, 26/6/44; Minutes; Eden to Bartlett, 8/7/44
113. News Chronicle, V Bartlett, 28/7/44
114. FO371/43733, R11809, Minutes by Laskey
115. The Observer, diplomatic corr., 2/7/44
116. The New Statesman, 3/6/44
117. Tribune, 7/7/44 and 27/7/44
118. FO371/43732, R8731, Prime Minister's Minute No 665/4, 30/5/44; Minutes
119. FO371/43732, R9345, Minutes
120. FO371/43732, R8950, Minutes; FO371/43733, R10427, Minutes
121. FO371/43732, R8923, Minutes
122. FO371/43707, R10034, Leeper to FO, 22/6/44; Minutes; Sargent to Leeper, 7/7/44
123. FO371/43781, R17015, Minutes, FO to Athens, 6/11/44
124. Ibid.
CHAPTER THREE
THE DECEMBER 1944 STORM

The most crucial problem which the Greek Government had to solve after the liberation was the demobilisation issue. Under the terms of the Caserta agreement all guerrilla groups were to be demobilised, and together with the Greek armed forces from the Middle East, were to form a new national army. Although Papandreou, the Greek Premier, announced that ELAS and EDES were to be disbanded on December 10, he had no plans for the dissolution of the Third Brigade, which, after the purge following the April mutiny, was fanatically Royalist and anti-communist. EAM refused to sign this unilateral decree of demobilisation and on December 2, after intricate negotiation, its ministers resigned from the Government. EAM called for a demonstration on the next day, to be followed by a general strike on the 4th. The mass demonstration at Syntagma Square was fired upon by the police, causing many deaths and injuries. The next day fighting broke out in various parts of Athens while ELAS units began attacks on police stations.

For the British, the chance had come to intervene and destroy EAM/ELAS. On December 5, Churchill sent a strong directive to General Scobie, charging him with responsibility "for maintaining order in Athens and for neutralising or destroying all EAM/ELAS bands approaching the city." The directive ran:

Do not however hesitate to act as if you were in a conquered city where a local rebellion is in progress...We have to hold and dominate Athens. It would be a great thing for you to succeed in this without bloodshed if possible, but also with bloodshed if necessary.

On the same day, Churchill cabled Scobie: "The clear objective is to defeat EAM. The ending of the fighting is subsidiary to this. I am ordering large reinforcements to come to
Athens."(3) The dispatch of British reinforcements, undoubtedly, was the decisive factor that determined the outcome of the conflict.

British and American public opinion had been shocked by Churchill's 'conquered city' policy. In Washington, on December 5, the new Secretary of State, E R Stettinius, publicly distanced his country from support for British policy in liberated Europe.(4) In London, a bitter debate took place in the House of Commons on December 8 and 20. Such was the domestic impact of the popular protest(5) and press criticism that no doubt contributed to the change of British tactics to seek a 'political solution.'

The Press

The press storm over Greece had a direct impact on international and British domestic opinion which much concerned the British policy-makers. Therefore, in this section each paper will be treated with somewhat proportionately the same amount of attention and space as the paper itself devoted to Greek news.

In December 1944, six British correspondents were in Athens. They were Geoffrey Hoare for The Times and the Manchester Guardian, Eric Bigio(Grey) for the Daily Express, F H Salusbury for the Daily Mail and Daily Herald, John Nixon for the BBC, Robert Bigio, Eric's brother, for Reuters, Claire Hollingworth for the Kemsley Press. Another British correspondent, Richard Capell of the Daily Telegraph, arrived in Athens later, on December 16. They all gathered at the Grande Bretagne Hotel, in Syntagma Square.

They were serving as war correspondents accredited to the British forces. The terms of their accreditation precluded them crossing over to EAM/ELAS territory while communications from EAM headquarters rarely reached them. Strict military censorship and
interference by the British officials imposed a severe barrier on their freedom to report fairly the events from Athens and newspapers often complained in their columns of lack of authentic and complete information. Their information about the developments came from briefings by British and Greek officials as well as from a communications-network of Greek informants and ‘stringers.’(6)

On December 1944, the British press presented almost complete unity against British foreign policy towards Greece. Exception to that unity was the Daily Telegraph, which from the start of the Greek crisis completely distanced itself from the rest of Fleet Street.

Never in its history was The Times subjected to such violent criticism as it was during the editorship of R Barrington-Ward. During the battle for Greece, Geoffrey Hoare was the newspaper’s special correspondent in Athens and the leading articles were based upon his dispatches. For the period from December 5 1944 to March 26 1945, the authors of most of these articles, some of them very critical of British intervention in Greece, were D Tyerman, assistant editor of the newspaper, who wrote twelve and E H Carr who wrote six. T E Utley, C Falls and P P Graves each contributed one.(7) Yet, the trouble started with Hoare’s dispatch on December 4 beginning with these emotive words:

Seeds of civil war were well and truly sown by the Athens police this morning when they fired on a demonstration of children and youths.

Hoare gave an account of the demonstration in graphic details arguing that the police were entirely unjustified and unprovoked. He wrote: "the sooner the Greek Government shows good faith in a purge of the public services, and the trial of collaborators and especially members of security battalions, the sooner it will be possible for Greece to return to normal life."
The following day's comments in the paper were mild. The diplomatic correspondent, I McDonald, doubted the peaceful nature of the demonstration: "there is some reason to believe that EAM had the intention of marching its forces against the capital and seizing it". Any such intention, he wrote, neither the Allied authorities nor the Greek Government could ignore. Few warnings were given in an editorial written by Utley. He simply said that, though Britain had a direct and overriding interest in law and order, that interest "must not be allowed to imply any participation in the politics of Greece."

The campaign in the paper's columns opened two days later, on December 7, with Carr's leader. It was "the disagreeable truth that British armed forces have become involved in a Greek civil war" he wrote. The maintenance of Papandreou in power by the ban of a foreign Government would result in sacrificing British lives "fighting against Greeks on behalf of a Greek Government which exists only in virtue of military force." This was the leader which infuriated Churchill and provoked Leeper's protests to the Foreign Office, as we will see.

On December 9, another leader appeared, written by Tyerman and amended "a good deal" by Barrington-Ward. It stressed that EAM was not a gang of communists and bandits as Churchill had maintained in the House of Commons on the previous day, but embraced "the whole range of opinion from Centre to extreme Left." It emphasised that "Britain cannot afford, to put it no higher, to be committed to one side of a civil war."

Tyerman, in his leader of December 14, argued that British policy "has been a failure" as the British troops would be called upon to suppress an organised section of the Greek population which was "in control, if not in a numerical majority" in most of the country. He believed that the resistance movements in Europe had a significant role to play in the post-war politics of their countries: "The National provisional Government of any liberated country, in justice and expediency alike, must be built around the active and mostly turbulent resistance
movement...Its head must be a man accepted by and active in resistance. Its members must comprise a majority of resisters. Its policies and programme must be in tune with those, which have worked out, close to realities, in the fighting underground."

Though it was the leading articles which went further in criticism of British policy towards Greece than Hoare's messages(11), a whole controversy was aroused around him. Geoffrey Hoare was an experienced Middle East correspondent. His critics complained that he did not get about enough and depended too much on the British mission. Others, however, praised his independent attitude and much of what he sent was confirmed by reputable British and American journalists on the spot. His dispatches were conscientiously written and well balanced on the whole.(12) Hoare thought that one of the main contributory factors to the Greek crisis was the weakness of moderate Left-wingers.(13) "The issue is now in fact amplified to a fight between Right and Left."(14) For Hoare there were only two alternatives; a war or a compromise. The prerequisites for a compromise should be (a) the political parties to get together, preferably under British advice and supervision, and to agree to disarm the whole country, including the Mountain Brigade; (b) to purge all the services, to try the collaborators and (c) to apply with equal thoroughness to the Right as well to the Left all measures of security.(15)

The Manchester Guardian had not had its own special correspondent in Greece during December 1944. It was mainly served by Reuters and Associated Press staff and after December 9 by a joint correspondent with The Times with the attribution "The Times and Manchester Guardian Service". Thus, during the conflict in Athens, both newspapers relied on the reports of Geoffrey Hoare. Most of the Manchester Guardian leaders on Greece were written by John Pringle. Like Barrington-Ward, A P Wadsworth, the paper's editor, was very
critical of Churchill, especially during the December events, and together with The Times, was
to earn a word of reprimand for its conduct over Greece eight years later in Churchill's war
memoirs. (16)

On December 4, the Reuters' correspondent gave a lively account of the demonstration
similar to that of Hoare in The Times: "Greek Government police opened fire...on...unarmed
demonstrators, who included women and girls." The paper's first leader appeared on December
4 and it was condemnatory of Britain's involvement in the crisis. Giving particular importance
to the new social forces in the liberated countries, it stressed that "if Britain is to escape the
accusation of maintaining a dictatorship of the Right, an attempt must be made to form a new
Government including the resistance parties."

Another leader, on December 6, condemned Britain's decision to support the Greek
Government by force. "It is not enough to point to the passive majority which always support
"law and order" against change and revolution. Somehow we must find a way to give
expression to this feeling and to give the resistance movements a share in the temporary
Government of their countries."

Pending the Commons debate on December 8, the paper called for a full restatement of
Britain's whole attitude towards liberated Europe and an account of the machinery by which the
Grand Alliance was held together. (17)

But Churchill's speech was not encouraging. "At times the speech did not seem quite
attuned to the underlying tragedy...One infers that the Government is looking for a swift victory
over ELAS to dissipate the crisis" noted the political correspondent. (18)

The paper felt that the only solution of the crisis must be a political one. It believed that
a compromise was possible and it was not certain that everything had been done to secure
one. (19)
As the official organ of the Labour Party, the Daily Herald's reporting of the Greek crisis is of direct interest.

In December 1944, the Daily Herald found itself in a very uncomfortable dilemma. By condemning Churchill's policy in Greece it would put the three prominent Labour Ministers (Clement Attlee, deputy Prime Minister, Ernest Bevin, Minister of Labour and National Service, and Herbert Morrison, Home Secretary) into an embarrassing position. The newspaper chose, therefore, to put the blame for the Anglo-Greek conflict not so much on the National Government as on Churchill personally and the Papandreou Government.

The paper's views were expressed through the leading articles, its diplomatic correspondent, W N Ewer, and the political columnist Michael Foot. However, these opinions do not always harmonise with the dispatches of its Athens special correspondent, F H Salusbury, who gradually came to adopt a more sympathetic attitude towards official British policy.

At the beginning Salusbury aligned himself with most other war correspondents. He placed the responsibility for the bloody events of December 3 firmly on the police and blamed the British policy of backing with British arms a reactionary regime. His dispatch of December 4 was no less impressive than that of Geoffrey Hoare. Its headline ran: "Procession Gunned. Children Among 160 Killed and Injured by Police". He described the horror of the police attack on a crowd which "could never have been accused of disorder."

Next day Ewer blamed British diplomacy for supporting one faction in the struggle. He traced the troubles to the Lebanon conference. Ever since the conference, Papandreou was aiming at the assertion of his own authority and not at a genuine coalition. After establishing himself in Athens and with British encouragement, instead of being restrained, Papandreou
headed for trouble. "Now as a result we seem to be well on the way to a Papandreou dictatorship enforced by British arms." A further proof of Papandreou's real intentions, the paper would write some days later, was his statement in the *Daily Telegraph* of December 22. "It is worse than unconstructive; it is blatantly mischievous." It implied a hope that the British forces would utterly crush his political rivals and therefore the British Government should at once dissociate itself from his policy.

In its first editorial on Greece, on December 5, the *Daily Herald* urged Britain not to re-enter Europe "as the champion of discredited monarchs and Right-wing regimes", but to pursue "a radical and democratic policy which accords with the mood of the liberated people."

Churchill's speech in the Commons was strongly criticised: "to the bullets and shells which British forces are pouring into the ranks of EAM he added rockets of rhetorical abuse." The speech did nothing to relieve public anxiety about the lack of a unified political strategy among the Allies. "We invite disaster unless, during the final stages of Europe's liberation and during the years of reconstruction, the policies of Britain, Russia and America are more closely coordinated and synchronised."(20)

The paper in its leaders of December 18 and 20 also condemned the lack of cooperation and understanding between the Big Allies. Poland, Italy, Greece were three examples of the lack of coordination. The Allied statesmen must renew and intensify their efforts to attain political unity.(21)

More sustained in his criticism of Government policy was Michael Foot. As a libertarian socialist, Foot believed that the future of Europe rested upon the peaceful coexistence and cooperation of the three Great Powers. He was convinced, however, that the spread of political freedom in Europe could not be achieved without the implementation of the principle of self-determination and representative democracy. He repudiated the system of
power politics and he gave particular importance to the role which the resistance movement in
Europe could play in laying the foundations of a social renovation.(22)

Michael Foot put forward these views in his first article on Greece, on December 8. He
stated that the shots fired that Sunday morning had killed more than just the handful of
unarmed demonstrators. They had killed the notion that "small nations do not count in the
modern world and that the big Powers alone can dictate the herald of Europe"; the notion that
the war was becoming less ideological. If Britain was to retain her position "in the new age
when kings and courtiers and capitalists count for little and the people count for all" she should
give an active support to the progressive forces in Europe. According to Foot, EAM/ELAS
had not been preparing to seize power by force, but they had acted out of a "real fear of a
Right-wing coup d'état."

In his second article on Greece, on December 12, Foot referred to Churchill's speech in
the House of Commons. Churchill's reference to the origin of the Greek expedition, convinced
him that the strategy of sending British forces to Greece "was a strategy directed not against
the Germans, but against EAM." On the other hand, Churchill's "lordly" address on democracy,
Foot commented, would puzzle many when in 1944 he still "speaks kind words to Prince
Umberto, Marshal Badoglio, General Franco, King George of the Hellenes and, even in
retrospect, Signor Mussolini."

The News Chronicle, the other major liberal newspaper, had a much more uniformly
and consistently critical stand to British policy in Greece than the official organ of the Labour
Party, the Daily Herald.

At the time that the crisis broke out in Greece, the newspaper did not have its own
correspondent in Athens, but shared the services of the correspondents of other newspapers. It
was served, only occasionally, by a Greek correspondent, Denis Devaris, who together with Bigio, the Reuters' correspondent, sent messages on December 4. Later, on December 15, the paper took on the services of Joseph Harrison of the Christian Science Monitor and throughout January-February 1945 of T Southwell-Keely of the Sydney Morning Sun.(23)

The paper's critical attitude was made clear right from the start. The leader, on December 4, warned, "we must never run the risk of using our bayonets to force an unacceptable Government upon a liberated people." The Greek crisis "has been shamefully misrepresented as a struggle between 'Law and Order' and 'the Reds'. It is, in fact, nothing of the kind. If the British Government's idea is to uphold the monarchy in Greece, it is going the wrong way about it."(24)

After the Commons debate, the paper stated that Churchill did nothing to allay the anxiety that "Britain's attitude is not whole-heartedly behind the democratic forces stirring in Europe."(25)

The paper's views were also expressed by its diplomatic correspondent, Vernon Bartlett, and the political editor, A J Cummings. Bartlett, in his parliamentary capacity as an Independent MP, had voted against the Government. He remained firm throughout in his main point that the British policy had been fundamentally flawed in not understanding that EAM was something much more than a mere communist front and that the British Government underestimated the strength of and the popular support for EAM. For him two important points would have to be cleared up for successful negotiation: the future of the Mountain Brigade and the Sacred Battalion and a precise pledge by the Greek King not to return to Greece until after a plebiscite.(26) His critique, however, was less sharp than that of A J Cummings, who took an especially keen interest in Greek affairs and vigorously opposed British policy in Greece throughout the crisis, through his 'Spotlights'.

92
Cummings warned the British Government of the deep feeling of horror and resentment that had been aroused in British public opinion. "The injury will not be repaired by abusing the so-called 'rebels'...It can be repaired, in part, only by a bold, honest, immediate effort, unprejudiced by official predilections for a discarded dynasty, to bring the fighting to an end."

The Government escaped the Commons challenge more luckily than it deserved because of the strong and prudent disinclination in all parties to break up the Coalition. But he added, "one more 'advance against stubborn resistance', one more bombing attack, in another friendly country...and the die would be cast."(27)

In a four-column comment, on December 15, Cummings stated that the main cause of the Greek crisis was Churchill's "sentimental fondness for Kings and princelings" and the policy of Papandreou. The British soldiers were fighting not "a few picturesque Red brigands", as they thought to meet, but the Greek people itself. Cummings saw that new dynamic forces had arisen in almost every part of Europe. "What chiefly matters is that the British Government should give no support, moral or material, to any attempt to strangle or subdue the new forces" he wrote.(28)

A leader, on December 21, was written on similar lines. Greece was a test case. "The future of the liberated peoples, and the future of inter-Allied good will both depend upon our giving the new dynamic forces in Europe the fullest possible scope to express themselves."

On December 23, Devaris dispatched an exclusive interview with Mitsos Partsalidis, the General Secretary of the EAM Central Committee. In this interview Partsalidis displayed EAM's conciliatory spirit and its willingness to reach an agreement.

The conservative press stood behind Churchill and his Government throughout the crisis. Initially, the Daily Mail and the Daily Express seemed to take some share in the criticism of the official policy in Greece on the grounds that it had not done what it could to prevent the
crisis. Later, however, they shifted their ground to the less serious count of criticising that policy for inadequacies of presentation.

From the start of the Greek crisis, the Daily Telegraph gave its complete support to the British Government. The special correspondent to Greece was Richard Capell, a journalist with extreme conservative views. A former music critic, he had become interested in Greek affairs since September 1944 when, as a correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, he accompanied the commander of the Aegean Raiding Force on a trip to the Aegean Islands. He was not in Athens to witness the Sunday events, having been recalled by his newspaper back to London, but his views were defined while he was in Egypt and they are presented in his book Simiomata, in which he describes his experiences in Greece from September 1944 until March 1945. His views, very critical of EAM, passed the military censors but his newspaper judged it impolitic to publish it. When Capell returned to Athens, on December 16, he felt that his expectations had been somewhat confirmed: EAM/ELAS was a minority group which was now attempting to carry out its long-prepared plan to seize power by force and impose a communist regime. He was exasperated by the "exaggerated" reports of most of his colleagues in Athens and especially of Geoffrey Hoare. He was particularly outraged by The Times' leaders and he regarded the strong public reaction in Britain as a "wave of lunacy."(33)

The Daily Telegraph tended to see Britain's involvement in Greek affairs as disinterested and benevolent. "The British aim is to do everything possible to ensure law and order, but not to take sides between political parties" and "that is the beginning and the end of our intervention in Greece politics."(34)

The paper disapproved of the American detachment from the British intervention in Greece, which, as the Washington correspondent wrote on December 5, enabled the State Department "to escape the criticism being leveled against the British." But "once the United
States becomes a member of a fully-fledged United Nations organisation she will be bound to share an equal responsibility for any measure necessary to put any principle she advocates into effect."(35)

The paper agreed with Churchill's statement in the Commons, on December 8, that EAM had planned a coup d'état.(36) It was exasperated by "the avidity of some people to seize on the first convenient stick to beat a Prime Minister to whom,..., they owe their own and the nation's survival." It dismissed the assumption that the British eagerly took sides as "fantastic" and repeated that the British intervention in Greece had been "inspired with an unselfish desire for Greek freedom."(37)

On December 18, Richard Capell sent his first dispatch to the paper. He reported that within a few days after the Sunday bloodshed EAM had revealed its ruthless and brutal character: they wounded members of UNRRA, kidnapped middle-class women and girls, killed foreigners, collaborated with armed Bulgarians in northern Greece and terrorised the countryside.(38) He welcomed Scobie's tightening offensive against ELAS as it would "spell the beginning of the end of the rebels' attempted coup d'état."(39)

Capell's interview with Papandreou was carried as the front page headlines on December 22. This interview, so abundant in gratitude for Britain's role in the crisis, was carried out at a time when Papandreou's role as Prime Minister to cope with the crisis was discredited. He was presented not only as the legitimate Premier, but as the leader of a socialist party, in an effort to re-establish his authority, and to give an answer to those critics of the British policy of intervention in Greece.

The Papandreou interview was welcomed in London, wrote the diplomatic correspondent, where it was studied "in responsible quarters with interest." It also evoked sensation in America, wrote the Washington correspondent, when details of the interview were
cabled by the Associated Press and published in the afternoon newspapers throughout the country. "The Greek Premier's statements were most timely. In spite of protracted debates in the House of Commons it is doubtful if many Americans appreciate the efforts made by the British Government to establish in Greece a provisional Government representative of all parties or realise that, as M Papandreou said that "Greece is being defended against terrorism."(40)

The Daily Express was served by Eric Grey, and it used, for a while, Marcel Fodor's(41) services of the Chicago Sun.

The December 4 events were headlined, "Royalists Battle With Reds. All-Day Fights in Athens, Rome." Grey reported that a crowd of several thousand men, women and children marched, unarmed, carrying Greek, British, American and Russian flags. The police opened fire without warning. The next day an Express Staff Reporter in Athens wrote that what was happening was a bitter struggle between the Right and the Left. A new factor in Greek political life was a "strong Left or Labour movement" which had taken the lead in resisting the Germans during the occupation, whereas the old established parties remained passive. There was a good deal of mistrust among the two factions. The Right was disdainful of the Left and the Left was fearful lest the Right attempt a coup d'état to bring King George back, "who for many his citizens, symbolises an iron dictatorship". The first thing General Scobie must do was the disarming of all partisan forces, including the Mountain Brigade.

Pending the Commons' debate, Guy Eden, the political correspondent, said that a clear statement of the Government's policy must be given by Churchill or Eden that: a) British troops would never be employed to force one form of Government on any nation; b) the war effort against Germany would not be weakened by fighting behind the lines; c) the cabinet spokesmen
would deal with many misleading stories now current about British interference in Greek and Italian affairs. Editorially, the paper defended British policy, "Britain is fighting for no regime, royalist, reactionary or revolutionary, in any liberated country...It is fighting to beat the Germans, and then to allow the nations to decide for themselves."(42)

Grey in his dispatches of December 12 and 15 reported the conciliatory spirit of EAM, and its readiness to accept Scobie's terms provided they had been given guarantees for the future political freedom of their parties and an amnesty. However, the Greek Government had talked of nothing but "unconditional surrender of the Left."(43)

The other conservative paper, the Daily Mail appeared less critical than the Daily Express.

The paper was served by Salusbury of the Daily Herald, as its special correspondent and temporarily used the services of a Greek correspondent, Chronis Protopappas. On December 5, Protopoppas praised British troops that they "have so far kept at bay the terror of civil war" while the leading article defended Churchill's Greek policy. "What other course could he pursue? The Papandreou Government is the only properly constituted authority in Greece."

The following day, the special correspondent in his dispatch alleged that the "Communists were evidently out to seize power by force, and the time for action had come." Vincent Church, in a two-column article headlined "Greece: What it's all about", alleged that the demonstrators' aim was to impose by violence a Communist dictatorship. He praised Zervas' EDES as non-political consisting of remnants of the Greek regular troops, and militarily more efficient than ELAS in fighting the Italians and the Germans. As for Papandreou "he is a more lively Socialist than our Mr. Attlee."(44)
The paper was satisfied with the Commons debate which succeeded in clearing the air as to Britain's real intentions. "Had our foreign policy been more openly declared, we should not have exposed ourselves to suspicion and snubs from our own good friends."(45)

While the Daily Mail welcomed Churchill's actions in Greece it was sharply critical of the inadequacies of its presentation. It thought that this secretive policy deprived the Government of valuable press and popular support. In the leader of December 8, the paper demanded more news to be released in order to be in a better position to make judgements. "Until the Government's case has been made, and a fuller knowledge of the facts thus becomes available, no good purpose can be served by criticism." A leader, on December 13, complained of refusal of permits to civilian press correspondents wishing to enter Greece. It stated that accurate reports from independent observers were vital and it suggested that restriction might now be relaxed. Another leader, on December 14, blamed the lack of authentic information for the troubles over Greece facing the British Government. "We cannot defend them on all points because we feel that some of these difficulties may be of their own making. The original mistake was to keep the public in the dark."

The cause of these bitter leaders was that, because of the embargo imposed by Scobie on the arrival of new correspondents, the paper could not transfer its Rome correspondent, Tetlow, to Athens.(46) William Ridsdale, Head of the News Department, on December 15, instructed the Athens Embassy that Scobie should lift the embargo on the arrival of new correspondents and facilitate Tetlow's early transport to Athens. Yet, Scobie's Relations Office was reluctant to press the matter "as place should be kept vacant for a possible arrival from London", and anyway the paper was covered already by Salisbury and Derek Patmore was on his way to Athens from Cairo.(47)
One of the hallmarks of The Observer under David Astor was tolerance of conflicting views. This was greatly demonstrated in a four-column article on December 10, entitled "The British Policy in Greece. The Case For and Against." Haffner was invited to publish the "case for" and Deutscher the "case against" intervention side by side on the leader page. Anonymously, Haffner stated, "this war would not advance the cause of democracy if we allowed left tyrannies simply to take the place of right tyrannies." Deutscher, in the case against, wrote "the events that preceded the Athens disaster speak loudly in favour of the defendant, the Greek Left...In this civil war the aggression is not on the left but on the right."

The paper was against any strategic or ideological sphere of influence. The alternative policy should be that decisions on major political issues, such as the regimes to be established in Greece, Poland, must be made jointly by the Allied Great Powers in agreement with the smaller nations whose fate hung in the balance.(48)

In a similar vein the 'Student of Europe' in a three-column article on December 17, titled "Partition and Unity" examined the plan of partition of Europe into zones of influence, as it was exemplified in British policy towards Greece and Poland. He felt that there was the danger that the United States might interpret the whole zoning agreement in a looser and more temporary way even perhaps, as the case of Greece showed, to the extent of dissociating herself from it. "That some implications of Teheran hurt their inborn idealism can readily be understood. But idealism is not enough. Have they another equally workable basis to offer for Allied unity and peace?"

The paper believed that EAM was an organised mass political movement and not "an incursion of brigands from the hills" as the British Government was wrongly informed. "There is no doubt", stated the leader on December 17, "that the ELAS forces could be compelled in time to surrender unconditionally if sufficient British troops and weapons were diverted from
fighting the Germans...But the price of such victory would be high...It might break the Coalition. It might injure gravely our relations with the United States. For these practical reasons it is essential to consider alternatives." These were: to bring the fighting to an end with an armistice on the terms acceptable by ELAS; the EAM leaders to join a new coalition Government, not necessarily under Papandreou; and disarmament on agreed lines.

The Sunday Times correspondent in Greece was Claire Hollingworth. It was also served by Reuters, AP, Exchange, BUP.

The paper's views were expressed in the leader of December 10. ELAS attempted to seize power. Papandreou had been unfairly treated in the press. He was Socialist and his Government Republican, rather markedly to the Left. The issue in Greece was not between Monarchists and Republicans, but between "the upholders of genuine and constitutional freedom and those who behind the facade of a false vocabulary are seeking to impose their ideology and their rule by force of arms." Hollingworth expressed the fear of the fighting being spread to other parts of Greece.(49)

The paper defended British policy against its critics in the House of Commons. Their arguments were "wholly against reason as well as against facts."(50)

More analytical and abundant in comments and judgements was the periodical press.

The Spectator, in its first comment on the Greek crisis on December 8, though it disapproved the practice of foreign intervention in the internal disputes of a liberated country, it did, however, justify its purpose. "Intervention...is undesirable, but the situation that might develop in the absence of intervention would often be more undesirable still."(51) The journal's view on the Greek events was further explained on its editorial on December 15. It believed

100
that EAM/ELAS attempted by a coup d'état to seize power." It justified and idealised the British intervention for, if Britain had walked out at such moment, it would have been "desertion and cowardice" and a "betrayal of Greece":

Is it suggested that when the Government which called us in was attacked by this strongly organised faction...we ought to have withdrawn our troops and done nothing? Should we have washed our hands of all responsibility and left the usurpers to stamp out the Government and to demonstrate successfully that the arms they were so anxious to retain were wanted only to impose the supremacy of their faction? That was unthinkable. We were there to bring food to the starving, to maintain order, and to serve an agreed regime who were pledged as soon as possible to submit to the verdict of a free election.(52)

Similarly, Harold Nicolson in his 'Marginal Comment' of December 12 defended the British policy in Greece. Its principle, he wrote, was that it was "directed constantly to the defence and support of liberal as against despotic constitutions." Britain had not taken sides in the Greek dispute but she was merely preventing a single element from profiting by the circumstances of liberation. Nicolson expressed similar views in his speech of December 8 1944 in the House of Commons and in his diaries.(53)

The Economist believed in the new forces emerging in Europe after the war, promising a social renovation. Most of these forces would be found in the resistance movements of occupied Europe. Just a day before the events of December 3 in Athens, the journal, in an editorial, argued that it was necessary for the Allies to understand the nature of the political and social tensions among the liberated peoples. The Governments, which in the present circumstances had no electoral basis and would have even less claim to legitimacy until elections were called, ought "to keep in the closest possible touch with the active minority of resisters who have kept alive the spirit of the nation."(54)

On December 9, in a leading article entitled, "The Greek Disaster", the journal saw that the British Government still had "a marked tenderness" for the Right wing forces of Europe,
while Churchill himself seemed "to be possessed of an especial weakness for kings and princelings." A Britain "radical in mood and liberal in foreign policy has a great role to play in Europe. Britain, friend of royalists and reactionaries, has none."(55) The Greek crisis would not be solved by unconditional surrender, but British influence must be used to restore a representative Government including EAM.(56)

In a long analysis of the Greek political situation, the journal described EAM as a large, popular movement. The Communists no doubt played an influential part, disproportional though to their small numerical strength. EAM/ELAS stood for a "progressive Leftist Parliamentary Republic" and they "certainly did not plan a Communist coup d'état." The real issue was not Communism at all. It was the Monarchy and the controversy over Republic and Monarchy. The Right was haunted by the spectre of a "Red Republic", the Left feared that the Monarchy would soon become a tyranny. Only the disarming of all partisan forces, the appointment of an impartial Regency could prepare the ground for a Greek democracy.(57)

Amongst the papers more sustained in their criticism of Government policy were Tribune and The New Statesman.

Tribune viewed that responsibility for the British intervention in Greece was laid with the British Prime Minister whose support for the Royalists was almost obsessive.(58)

The journal also criticised the Labour leadership for lack of effective criticism of the intervention. After the 1944 Labour Conference (December 11-15), it would editorially write that "the choice before the Labour Movement will always be the same -either to sacrifice its principles to save its leaders or to sacrifice its leaders to save its principles." And the conference resolution on Greece mirrored the sacrifice of the principles to save the leadership which "is lethargic, incompetent and out of touch with the membership."(59)
The New Statesman condemned Churchill's policy on liberated Europe, aimed at building British influence on "discredited forces of the past."(60) In conducting this course, Churchill was waging war not against a political faction, but against the Greek people and he was pursuing a division of Europe into spheres of influence.(61) The journal opposed the "spheres of influence" and the "power politics" as "dangerous anachronisms". The alternative was a system of collaboration between the Powers.(62)

Like Tribune, The New Statesman rested no less responsibility with the Labour Ministers. If the Party was given a chance to speak its mind, it would certainly call for a new departure in policy.(63) Thus, the Conference's acceptance of the resolution on Greece "reflects not the feeling of the Party or of the country, but simply the success of the executive in obscuring the real issue."(64)

The Official Documentary Record

The Foreign Office files on the Greek crisis demonstrate a tendency of the centre and periphery each to urge the other to greater efforts to retrieve the situation.

So far, the needs for publicity were served by Allied Information Services(AIS). The first AIS personnel arrived in Athens two days before the arrival of the Greek Government, on October 16, 1944. Their functions covered all functions of a press attaché. Their work divided into: a) giving news of the outside world to Greece; b) organising Greek Information services c) reporting the state of Greek public opinion in all parts of the country.(65) On November 27, the Foreign Office asked Leeper, the British Ambassador, whether the need for a press attaché meant that the AIS had to close down or whether an arrangement can be found to enable AIS
Churchill's displeasure with the paper was expressed in more than one way. He believed that the leading article of December 7 represented "the opinion of Professor Carr" and he wondered "whether this might not be the occasion for some straight talking to Mr. Barrington-Ward". His secretary was told to consult Brendan Bracken, the Minister of Information.(73) That the rebuke was passed on is suggested by the editor's diary note. "This morning's leader is said to have enraged Winston. But it is he who had made it possible for the Greek troubles to be laid at our door."(74) Leeper had also protested about The Times article of 7 December.

Harold Macmillan, Minister-Resident at AFHQ Caserta, who arrived in Athens from Caserta on December 11, also complained to Sir Orme Sargent, head of the Southern Department. "Next to extremists of ELAS", he wrote, "the intellectual perverts of Printing House Square are amongst our most dangerous enemies...Apart from The Times we have to struggle with the BBC especially its European service which is run by one Newsome...If you could deal with these two snakes in the grass we could fight our open foes."(75) On December 15, Sargent responded that since Lancaster left London Eden had seen Barrington-Ward and there was hope that as a result the attitude of The Times might become less perverse. "Where is some indication that having got themselves well out on a limb they are now trying to crawl back along the bough."(76)

Two days after Lancaster left for Athens, his first report, which reached Churchill himself, was to stress most of the themes his later reports would repeat and amplify.(77) The first of these was to pass a negative judgement on the professional competence of the press representatives as a whole. The British correspondents "are of third-rate quality politically naive and journalistically irresponsible." Hoare, sincere but emotional, needed "guidance", for which he was "pathetically eager"; Bigio of Reuters "quick witted and irresponsible", was incapable of
to work with a press attaché attached to the Embassy. (66) Leeper responded that he did not want a press attaché as long as AIS were functioning in Greece. (67)

Leeper, former head of Foreign Office News Department himself, had a low opinion of the press. His relations with the press corps had deteriorated much earlier, in Cairo, particularly with the Americans. Even Capell, an admirer, admitted that the Ambassador's character was somewhat deficient in winning the press corps over to his side. As the true dimensions of the crisis became apparent, Leeper had a hard time in keeping the correspondents "on the rails." He raged at their "very poor quality" and inability to appreciate the overall situation in Greece and to understand it in its wider diplomatic context. Moreover, General Scobie's Public Relations Section was quite unequal to the task. Thus in an urgent telegram, on December 5, he said that the situation demanded "not press attaché but a man trained in dealing with our own press." (68)

That man was found in the person of Osbert Lancaster of News Department as "the best man" for the job. (69) Lancaster arrived in Athens on December 13. The Foreign Office was in such a hurry to send Lancaster to Athens that the Ministry of Information was informed after his departure, on 16 December. (70)

Among the correspondents who were mostly criticised for incompetence was Geoffrey Hoare of The Times. According to Lancaster, he had been "a big disappointment... handicapped by total inability to select from a mass of facts these few which were significant." (71) The Times' articles provoked the irritation both of the Foreign Office and of the Ambassador. The Foreign Office in a telegram on December 4 particularly pin-pointed Hoare's article of that morning which suggested that the police action had sown the seeds of civil war. But the real cause of all the indignation were the paper's leaders' criticism that Hoare's messages justified. Early in the crisis Churchill, himself had drafted a letter to The Times, which was never sent, complete with offensive references to Munich. (72)
handling a difficult political story and he would be relieved to see him go. As for the Americans, they were biased and anti-British and "worst of the lot is News [grp. undec.] who are represented by American-born Greeks in close contact with ELAS." On the other hand, the friendly correspondents, like Sedgwick of the New York Times and Salusbury of the Daily Herald, were singled out. A series of harsh satirical personal vignettes of the offending journalists followed, with the most withering fire reserved for the Americans.(78) Leeper agreed with Lancaster's critique about Bigio, whose report of the shooting in Athens was "emotional and inaccurate."(79) To improve press coverage of developments in Greece, Lancaster suggested the sending of "a really good diplomatic correspondent." He proposed Sylvain Mangeot, the Reuters Paris correspondent, well-known both to Leeper and himself, should come to Greece as Reuters correspondent.(80) That implied the general idea of replacement of the war correspondents by diplomatic correspondents. The reason was that as war correspondents they had not the political background and experience to understand the political developments in Greece.(81)

Yet, Mangeot's accreditation required permission from the War Office. There was a ruling for single representation of agencies and newspapers and Reuters had already had one. After lengthy consultations between the News and Southern Department, the War Office, Reuters, and the Athens Embassy, it was decided to treat Reuters exceptionally, and send Mangeot to "reinforce and guide" Bigio, on the grounds that Reuters was the only British agency and the main channel of British news from Greece, which was primarily a British concern, so they had a defensible case if the two American agencies UP and AP complained.(82)

Complaints were raised not only about the performance of Reuters' Athens correspondent, Robert Bigio, but about the agency itself. Reuters had carried A J Cummings,
one of the Government's hardest critics over Greece, in full on their overseas service as 'Reuters political commentator', in a message dated December 13, which was distributed to the troops. "This is doing untold harm" Lancaster complained to Ridsdale on December 15. Reuters had bought the copyright of Cummings' notes -"a most unfortunate action on their part." Ridsdale felt that this was a matter rather tricky to handle. "It is risky procedure to chide them for doing so since there is a chance that any action on our part of this nature would get back to Mr. Cummings. The result would be a powerful article from Mr. Cummings' pen castigating the Foreign Office for "interfering with the freedom of the press" and "exerting undue influence upon Reuters!"(83) On December 20, Ridsdale cabled Lancaster that "investigation of Cummings incident shows that Reuters quoted him as "News Chronicle political commentator" but by accident the reference to News Chronicle was omitted thus leading to a natural conclusion that he was a Reuters' correspondent. Reuters may, however, use his comments on home affairs."(84) After Churchill and Eden returned from Athens, a cabinet meeting was held to examine the case. The question of its Government subsidy was raised and a cabinet committee under the Minister of Labour was appointed to investigate the whole affair. In the meantime, C J H Chancellor, the head of Reuters, volunteered not to quote anything from Cummings' column dealing with foreign affairs.(85)
NOTES


3. Ibid., 254

4. Ibid., 258-9

5. The state of the popular mind can be seen in some opinion polls, which, though patchy and rough, do help us to draw some conclusions. October 1944, Q-1: "In general, do you approve or disapprove of Mr. Churchill as Prime Minister? Approve 91%, Disapprove 7%, No opinion 2%"; Q-2: "In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the Government's conduct of the war? Satisfied 81%, Dissatisfied 12%, No opinion 7%". In January 1945 in the same questions there were given the following answers, for Q-1, Approve 81%, Disapprove 16%, No opinion 3%; for Q-2, Approve 43%, Disapprove 38%, No opinion 19%; Q-3 "Do you approve or disapprove of Mr. Churchill's attitude on the Greek question? Approve 43%, Disapprove 38%, No opinion 19% (Gallup (ed.), Gallup International Public Opinion Polls: Great Britain, 1937-1975 (New York, 1976), vol. 1, pp. 98-9, 103) The conclusions one can reach are: (a) Churchill's personality was so formidable that even at the height of the Greek crisis in January 1945 he did not lose of his personal popularity; (b) the Government enjoyed less public confidence than Churchill who was considered as the war leader; (c) while the war against Germany was still on, the British people stood firmly behind its war leader and Churchill's general attitude towards the European resistance movement was questioned by almost half the population.


7. The Times Archives, File "Greece 1945-54"

8. Ibid, 5/12/1944

9. Ibid, 7/12/1944, leader "A Tragedy of Errors"

10. Barrington-Ward Diary, December 8, 1944

11. Iverach McDonald The History of The Times, vol. 5, 119; Donald McLachlan, In the Chair, 255

12. McLachlan, op.cit., 251 and McDonald, op.cit., 119

13. The Times, 11/12/1944

14. Ibid., 15/12/1944

15. Ibid., 18/12/1944


17. Manchester Guardian, 8/12/1944

18. Ibid., 9/12/1944

19. Ibid., 12/12/1944

20. Ibid., 9/12/1944

21. Ibid., 18 and 20/12/1944

22. Foot's views on post-war politics were clearly illustrated, for instance, in his article in the Daily Herald, 19/12/1944; "Was it for this that they suffered and died?"

23. FO371/48233, FO to Athens, tel. No. 32, 3/1/45

24. News Chronicle, 7/12/1944, leader
25. Ibid., 9/12/1944, leader
26. Ibid., 14/12/44 and 19/12/44
27. Ibid., 12/12/1944, "First Stop Fighting in Greece"
28. Ibid., 15/12/1944, "But the Brigands are Veteran Troops"
29. Kenneth Matthews, the BBC Athens correspondent wrote of Capell: "He belonged to an earlier generation than mine, and his judgements based on uncompromising Christian and conservative faiths, swam bravely against the current", Memories of a Mountain War, Greece: 1944-1949 (1972) 56
30. Richard Capell (1894-1983) Who was Who, 1951-60, 182
31. Foster, op.cit., 458
32. Richard Capell, Simiornata, (1948), 93
33. Ibid., pp. 111-2
34. Daily Telegraph 6, 7 and 8/12/1944
35. Ibid., 11/12/1944
36. Ibid., 8 and 15/12/1944
37. Ibid., 12/12/1944, leader "Facts and Malice"
38. Ibid., 18/12/1944
39. Ibid., 19/12/1944
40. Ibid., 22/12/1944
41. M W Fodor was considered a Balkan expert. Hungarian-born, he reported for Balkans, after the First World War. In the 1930s was Manchester Guardian correspondent in Vienna.
42. Daily Express, 7/12/1944
43. Ibid., 12/12/1944
44. Daily Mail, 6/12/1944
45. Ibid., 9/12/1944
46. FO371/43710 (R21254/73/19) and FO371/43709 (R21155/73/19)
47. FO371/43709, tel. 633, Leeper to FO, 17/12/44
48. The Observer, a 'Special Correspondent', 10/12/44
49. Sunday Times, 10/12/1944, C Hollingworth and leader.
50. Ibid., 24/12/1944, leader
51. The Spectator, 8/12/1944, "Governments and Disorders", 519-0
52. Ibid., 15/12/1944, "Action in Greece", 541
54. The Economist, 2/12/1944, "Liberation Pains", pp. 723-4
55. Ibid., 9/12/1944, "The Greek Disaster", pp. 761-2
56. Ibid., 16/12/1944, "Towards a Greek Settlement?", p.799
57. Ibid., 23/12/1944, "Greek Political Parties", p.837. See also "The Real Issue in Greece, p.830
58. Tribune, 22/12/1944
59. Ibid., 15/12/1944, "The Issue Before Labour"
60. The New Statesman, 9/12/1944, "The Challenge of Greece", 381
61. Ibid., 16/12/199, "Greece and the People of Britain"; see also "Mr. Churchill's War", p.394
63. Ibid., 9/12/1944, p.381
64. Ibid., 16/12/1944, "Greece and the People of Britain"
65. FO371/43708, tel. 405, Athens to FO, 30/11/44
66. FO371/43708, tel. 292, FO to Athens, 27/11/44
67. FO371/43708, Leeper to FO.
68. FO371/43708, tel. 474, Athens to FO, 5/12/44
69. FO371/43708, tel. 479, Athens to FO, 6/12/44
70. FO371/43708, letter FO to MOI, 16/12/44 and MOI to FO, 23/12/44.
71. FO371/48234, Memorandum from Lancaster to Ridsdale, 21/12/44
72. McLachlan, op.cit., 255, 256, 257
73. FO371/43709 (R21228/73/19), 11/12/44
74. Barrington-Ward's diary (McLachlan, op.cit., 255, 256, 257)
75. FO371/43698, tel. 594, Athens to FO, 13/12/44. Yet, Newsome had left Bush House two months ago. (FO371/48234, R1889, tel. 554, FO to Athens, 24/12/1944
76. FO371/43698, tel. 470, FO to Athens, 15/12/44
77. PREM3 212/12, Athens to FO, 15/12/44
78. Lancaster, who used to be an art-critic and caricaturist, even as press attach had not discarded his pencil. One of his drawings, was said to depict the disarming of Ares by Aphrodite represented by a lady war-correspondent Claire Hollingworth. Another was Quixotic, with Geoffrey Hoare out to succour an imprisoned lady, attended by Claire Hollingworth as page and Marcel Fodor as Sancho Panza. (Capell, op.cit., 129)
79. FO371/43736, tel. 459, Athens to FO, 4/12/4 and FO371/43710, tel. 756, Athens to FO, 29/12/44
80. FO371/43710, tel. 756, Athens to FO, 29/12/44
81. FO371/43709, tel. 609, Athens to FO, 15/12/44
82. FO371/43709, tel. 503, FO to Athens, 18/12/44
83. FO371/43709, Minutes 19/12/44
84. FO371/43709, tel. 523 FO to Athens, 20/12/44
85. FO371/47709, tel. 471, FO to Athens, 15/12/44
CHAPTER FOUR

THE STORM WEATHERED. JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1945

In the first two months of 1945 the British press continued to concern itself with the current developments in Greece, but after the signing of the truce, on January 11, much newspaper space was devoted to general analyses of the character of the conflict in Athens and to recommendations for a lasting peace. Papers which had previously questioned the motives of the Government's actions in Greece were now adopting a more restrained stance on official policy. It appeared to them that Churchill's policy was not mistaken and that military intervention was probably unavoidable. Yet, this movement back towards support for official British policy was in no sense universal or uniform. Sometimes, newspapers could differ as much within themselves as between themselves. Even so the same newspaper, foreign correspondents, leader-writers and diplomatic correspondents did not always march in perfect step.

Several factors can clearly be discerned as contributing towards this reversal of attitudes. The Christmas flight of Churchill and Eden to Athens and Churchill's speech in defence of British policy towards liberated Europe in the Commons on 18 January, both much praised in the British press, helped in improving the tone of Fleet Street's coverage of British policy in Greece. Reports of civilian hostages held by ELAS, publication of letters from soldiers serving in Greece very critical of ELAS and the publication of the Trades Union Congress (TUC) delegation report, on February 9, changed unfavourably the atmosphere for EAM/ELAS. It must, however, be pointed out that the one-sided nature of available information was a serious handicap for the critics of Churchill's Greek policy. As a result, official allegations could be questioned but they were difficult to disprove and, consequently,
the Government's actions remained unchallenged. In addition, the anti-EAM propaganda in Britain -stories of terrorism, hostage taking, mass reprisals, and serious repression by EAM/ELAS during the fighting- exerted a significant influence on the public against EAM.

Factors in the Changing Press Attitude

The continuing fierce fighting in Athens and the mounting hostility of public opinion in Britain and the United States played a significant role in the change of British Government's tactics. It was realised that the return of the King, under the existing circumstances in Greece, might prove disastrous, since the King's unpopularity would strengthen EAM's unity, foment more fighting and arouse domestic and international public reaction to British policy. Churchill's key advisers, including Eden, Leeper, Macmillan and General Alexander, all advised him to modify his original course of policy and to agree to Archbishop Damaskinos being appointed Regent.

On Christmas Eve, Churchill flew to Athens with Eden. He convened an all-party conference, including EAM/ELAS. Although a political solution to the crisis was not found, Churchill succeeded in satisfying two important demands of EAM: that the King should not return to Greece prior to a plebiscite favourable to him and that the Papandreou Government should be replaced by a more representative one, demands which had also been espoused by the British press.

Great efforts were made to ensure full publicity for the speeches made by Churchill at the Athens conference. Leeper in a telegram to the Foreign Office, on December 27, stressed the importance that Churchill attached to being correctly quoted by the British press. "All
possible precautions have been taken with the censorship here to ensure that no off the record remarks are sent out." This was passed to the MOI. (1) On the same day wrote to Brendan Bracken: "I think the best guidance I can give you is to see that this afternoon's proceedings are given a good press, and to feature success already achieved in bringing the two sides together around a table." (2) The News Department did their best to contact the newspapers as soon as the telegrams with the speeches arrived. The Department also contacted the BBC, Home and Dominion Services and the PWE to allow fresh broadcasts. Indeed, the speeches at the all-party conference and Churchill's remarks at the press conference received the fullest possible publicity in evening newspapers on 27 and 28 December and John Nixon's BBC report was received in time for inclusion in the midnight bulletin on December 28. (3) Yet, the morning newspapers carried only summarised versions, due to the late arrival of Reuters report and of the official texts, something which caused embarrassment. N E Nash, News Department, instructed Lancaster in Athens, on December 29, that they should adjust the hour of future news releases in time. (4) Nash, however, admitted that on the whole publicity had not seriously suffered. (5)

All British papers responded positively to Churchill's initiative for the major modification in British policy to which their consultations were eventually to lead.

In The Times, Tyerman appraised Churchill's "statesmanlike courage." He stated, however, that this flying mission would have no meaning unless it had been made with the most open of minds. "Greece belongs to the Greeks" and they alone could make a real settlement. A new Government must be built upon the experience and the aspiration of the resistance and the distinction between "Government" and "rebels" which still tended to be invoked in justification of British partiality "has little relevance or reality." (6)

The Manchester Guardian stated that Churchill's visit to Athens was "one of those flashes of courage and imagination which will always cause his countrymen to forgive his
occasional errors of judgement." In that mission, the paper stated, "what is necessary is a proof of our good faith and willingness to trust and work with the Left."(7) Similarly, the News Chronicle saw Churchill's journey to Athens as evidence of his vigour, imagination and sense of duty. "If he can restore the bewildered faith of the Resistance movement throughout Europe in Britain's sympathy with their aspirations, his Athens visit may have wider and much needed results."(8) The Observer congratulated Churchill for his "high moral and political courage to see his error" and to have the generosity and the statesmanship to correct it.(9)

The Daily Telegraph considered Churchill's visit as an act "of lofty self-sacrifice."(10) Its Washington correspondent reported that it was loudly praised and convinced the Americans "that the British Government is doing everything in its power to resolve the complexities of the Greek situation."(11) The Daily Mail hailed Churchill's political and physical courage and it claimed that, whatever the past mistakes, there could be no doubt as to the "disinterestedness and ultimate benevolence of British purposes in Greece."(12) In the same tone the Sunday Times stressed that the British leaders' trip to Greece had greatly manifested the disinterested nature of British policy in Greece. "There has been a good deal of talk in the United States about "power politics." We do not understand the phrase in this connection. Power for what? Britain seeks nothing in Greece for herself. British troops are there because they were the nearest Allied forces available."(13)

The Daily Herald "unreservedly" welcomed Churchill's decision to visit Athens as a demonstration that British policy towards the rival Greek factions was absolutely impartial.(14)

On January 18, Churchill opened the debate on the war situation in the House of Commons. He defended British policy towards liberated Europe, with special reference to
Greece, and made a slashing attack on the press treatment of the Greek crisis.(15) Despite this, the press gave Churchill's performance a surprisingly generous reception.

E H Carr wrote The Times leader on Churchill's speech. Barrington-Ward asked him to write "a good-tempered piece sustaining the right of criticism even in wartime."(16) Carr's long leader was a calmly balanced statement, welcoming the moves towards peace in Greece, condemning the brutalities there as strongly as Churchill had done, and giving unreserved support to the cause of national unity in the war against Germany and Japan. It went on:

But the unity the coalition represents has never been, and never should be, construed as inhibiting a right of independent judgement and criticism; and the criticism which have been addressed to some aspects of Government policy on Greece are a healthy vindication of the right of democracy to examine fully and frankly how far particular actions and particular policies are likely to contribute to the attainment of the declared national aim. Public confidence in the coalition, consistently upheld in these columns as a necessity now and for as long as national security in the fullest sense demands more that party Government, depends not least upon the assurance that the Press will discharge its natural duty.(17)

The Manchester Guardian, on January 19, warmly congratulated Churchill on his Commons defence of the Government's foreign policy, claiming that British policy in Greece was inspired by honest and honourable motives. "A mass of misunderstanding has been piling up not only here but in America and the world at large about British policy...The critics were anxious only to secure the objects that Mr. Churchill now so well expresses."(18) Like The Times, the paper believed that it was unwise to concentrate on the past, but to look forward for bringing about a lasting peace, for stamping on revenge and reprisals, and for winning over the moderate elements in EAM.(19)

A good reception received Churchill in the News Chronicle. The paper also defended its right of criticism. "The strong concern that showed itself in this country was inspired, not by partisan or political feelings in Britain, but by a passionate desire that we should not lose the central purposes of the war."(20)
The Daily Telegraph in a series of leaders praised the definition of the British policy Churchill had given in his Commons speech and attacked the Government's critics: "What has happened is that British action in Greece has saved the underdog from, at the best, oppression and, at the worst, death. It has never any political bias whatever, and the only reference a responsible British commentator need make upon internal Greek politics is to acknowledge the patriotic unselfishness of the King of Greece in promptly agreeing to every course which might increase the chances of peace in his distracted country." Unlike most of the British press, the newspaper did not accept that EAM deserved a place in a Greek Government and denounced those papers who held this view. "They seem to think that the past can all be washed out and a Government of National Unity formed tomorrow. That is not so." (21) Capell, in a three-column article, summarised the paper's views:

To appreciate the Greek situation it must never be lost sight of that these [ELAS] are violent revolutionaries prepared to spill their fellow-countrymen's blood in rivers in fulfilment of their ambition. What British Arms have accomplished is the checking of a revolution as retrograde as it is criminal; a revolution fratricidal beyond anything known in the country's troubled history; a revolution whose success would have been an encouragement to violence and despair of all friends of freedom. (22)

The Daily Mail found that Churchill's speech was one of his "great speeches - noble in utterance, lofty in sentiment, sure and true in fact." His measured statement, furnished with "marshalled facts and first-hand information" was a shattering defeat to "those reckless and irresponsible elements who...are always ready to lend a credulous ear to any ruffian with a pink-edged label round his neck, even to the detriment of their own country." (23) Justifying its reversal of attitude, the newspaper blamed the detrimental policy of secrecy adopted by the British Government. "The public fell victim to the demagogues...What else was to be expected? The public had no facilities for impartial judgement. The Government left the "facts" to be
In his January 18 speech, Churchill had made particular use of official Embassy reports of the holding of civilian hostages by ELAS and their maltreatment.

The sole or main motive for seizure of hostages by ELAS was retaliation against the dispatch by the British of ELAS prisoners, allegedly including civilians, to the Middle East. This unfortunate practice proved to be a serious mistake: it forced the Greek Left to adopt a defensive attitude in the armistice negotiations, making too many concessions to the Greek Right and the British and it provided the British Government with a propaganda weapon which it skilfully used in order to justify the intervention in Greece and to blacken EAM/ELAS in the eyes of world public opinion.

Tyerman in The Times, though stressing that "explanation is not excuse", argued that it was "their last defence against wholesale victimization." Carr added that "acts of savagery have been no monopoly of any party; and to attempt to extract political capital from them would be as ungrateful and unrewarding as to attempt to excuse them." The detention of hostages had done great damage to ELAS's reputation. "It has done", wrote I McDonald, "more than any other single ELAS measure to keep bitterness acute against the leaders." Hoare, too, wrote ELAS "have lost a great part of the sympathy which moderate people felt for them at the beginning of the civil war."(26)

The Manchester Guardian also condemned the detention of hostages. ELAS, by their violence, "may have lost the popularity they had won by resistance to the Germans, but they still hold the greater part of Greece."(27) Besides, Reuters' Athens correspondent stated that to understand fully the ELAS attitude with regard to hostages "it must be remembered that about
thirteen thousand ELAS supporters, who were captured or arrested during or immediately after the fighting in Athens, are at present detained by the Greek Government or the British, including 8,000 who were deported to the Middle East. In the Middle East also are over ten thousand Greek troops who have been detained since the mutiny the previous April.(28)

The News Chronicle deplored the detention of hostages which it described as "a relic of barbarism."(29) The Daily Herald also detested this practice.(30) Michael Foot, in his article of January 23, pointed out that ELAS atrocities had to be taken in proportion.

Much earlier than any other British correspondent, Capell of the Daily Telegraph reported the arrests of civilians by ELAS.(31) He attacked the "anti-British propaganda" which was labouring to represent the prisoners that were shipped to Africa as comparable with the hostages held by the ELAS. "But none here on the scene can swallow such humbug."(32) Eric Grey of the Daily Express wrote that "the bitterness of the civil war has resulted in shocking treatment for both the hostages in ELAS hands and prisoners in the Government's hands."(33) The Daily Mail pointed out that "the ELAS leaders by their conduct over the past few weeks have done much to disillusion the people of this country."(34)

On January 12, news from Greece circulated in the British press that two groups in the EAM coalition, the Union of Popular Democracy (ELD) and the Socialist Party of Greece (SKE), had broken away from EAM, and that certain trade union representatives visited Leeper to express their gratitude for the British intervention. These reports were instrumental in creating the impression that EAM consisted merely of militant Leftists and that the Greek Labour movement wholeheartedly supported Churchill's policies. Yet, doubts were raised about the authority and the authenticity of the signatories of the secession statement and of the trade unions' representatives. Meanwhile a White Paper was published on January 31, divided
into two parts. The first part entitled, "Treatment of hostages by ELAS", contained several telegrams from Leeper and three from T. Rapp, British Consul-General in Salonika, most of them ordered for the purpose of Churchill's speech of 18th January in the House of Commons. The second part entitled, "Statements by Greek political parties", consisted of a falsified version of EDES character, the secession statement of ELD, the SKE's denunciation of EAM.(35)

Indeed, the ELD and SKE groups at the beginning of January issued a statement in which they condemned the civil war and KKE and announced their breach with EAM. Yet it was not until April 10 that ELD and SKE broke away from EAM. Though this statement was disavowed by the ELD leader, Elias Tsirimokos(36), the impression that ELD had broken with EAM remained in force.

From the late summer of 1943, as we have seen, British policy concentrated on attempting to divide the movement by winning over EAM's moderate members and isolating the hard core of KKE.(37) If they succeeded, EAM would be seen by world opinion as synonymous with the Communist Party. Leeper in a series (four) of telegrams, on January 10, informed the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Information and the War Office about that split. On January 12, the Foreign Office telegraphed to Washington Embassy, and repeated to Moscow, a telegram of "particular secrecy" with all four of Leeper's telegrams. It requested to make use of Athens telegrams to emphasise complete split in EAM. "These messages are being given maximum publicity in this country and emphasis is being laid on isolation of Communists which results from secession of the moderate groups."(38)

When the news of a split in EAM circulated, The Times was cautious in judging the significance of this secession. It found difficult to conceive that so small an extremist minority was capable of both completely silencing and of coercing into action so large a proportion of
EAM, or to reckon the representative strength behind these pronouncements in relation to the whole of Left-wing political opinion in Greece. (39)

The Manchester Guardian was also reserved in assessing the measure of that secession. But in any case, the paper believed that the progressive forces in Greece were so significant in numbers that "disintegration of EAM need not mean the disruption or even weakening of the Progressive forces in Greece." The diplomatic correspondent wrote that until matters were clarified "judgement upon the full significance of the secession movement must be held in abeyance." (40) The News Chronicle (41), and The Observer (42) also doubted the authority commanded by the two secessionist groups and the authenticity of the trade union representatives. The News Chronicle stated that in the confusion "we must not ignore the aspirations of those who looked for a new era in Greece." (43)

In contrast, the Daily Telegraph, Daily Express and Daily Mail pointed out the significance of this secession as it proved that EAM did not represent the great majority of the Greek people, and thus fully justified British action in Greece. All three papers praised Churchill's political foresight in seeing this. (44) They also welcomed a TUC delegation to go to Greece to collect evidence to dispel much confusion on the issue of Greek trade unions. (45)

A major part in turning around press opinion was the publication of the report of the Citrine Commission, on February 9. The anti-EAM/ELAS propaganda campaign had reached its peak.

The Greek trade union delegation, who visited Leeper on January 10, expressed the hope that a TUC delegation might come to Greece to study the situation on the spot. The issue was discussed on January 12 and 16 between Churchill and the General-Secretary of the TUC, Sir Walter Citrine, who accepted Churchill's invitation to head a deputation. His task, as
outlined by Churchill himself, was to study Greek trade union problems and make suggestions as to how these problems could be solved. He should keep clear of politics and avoid holding talks with EAM/ELAS members. (46)

The delegation stayed in Athens from January 22 to February 3. During this time, they saw a great many people, including Leeper, General Scobie, the Regent, the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Justice, Labour, and Foreign Affairs, British and American press correspondents. They also met representatives of the Association of Greek industries and the Chamber of Commerce. But with the exception of one discussion with EAM trade union leaders on January 27, they had no contact with representatives of the Greek Left.

Despite Churchill’s instruction not to be drawn into Greek politics, Citrine and the other British trade unionists devoted much time to the alleged EAM/ELAS atrocities, the prisoners of war and the morale of British troops. The delegation was taken to a cemetery in Peristeri, a suburb of Athens, and shown the exhumed bodies of hundreds of people who, according to the Greek authorities, had been executed by guerrillas. (47) Citrine was outraged "to find that only a few of the correspondents of the [British] newspapers had actually visited this dismal scene of slaughter." (48) Then they interviewed a number of British prisoners of war recently released by ELAS and addressed an audience of 500 British paratroopers detailed by Scobie. They were told that ELAS maltreated its prisoners, was fighting not the Germans but the Greek people and that if the British troops had not intervened there would be wholesale massacre. Citrine accepted their version of events and made no attempt to check the truth of their allegations.

On January 29, Citrine turned his attention to trade union issues and organised a conference in which trade union representatives and the Labour Minister, Sideris, participated. Agreement was reached that once the country returned to normal peacetime conditions elections should be held.
"It was an astute move of the Government" wrote Barrington-Ward in his diary on January 27, "to send a union delegation, headed by Citrine, to Athens...[its] purpose was to get the Greek trade unions going again after eight years of suppression, but Citrine is also investigating the conditions and the excesses of the outbreak. He has found much to justify the British intervention and much, not surprisingly, that exposes the cruelties of ELAS, all of which would be much to his taste as a sturdy hater of Communism." Fearing that an attempt might be made to implicate The Times in Citrine's attacks on British newspapers that they had misrepresented and even suppressed the facts and that the troops were indignant, and feeling that "bitter trouble was brewing given the present state of political feeling", Barrington-Ward had instructed C D R Lumby, The Times' Rome correspondent(49), to go to Athens to report and Hoare to send two turnovers urgently on the trade union visit and its results and on the present backing in the country for EAM/ELAS. On February 8, he wrote in his diary "Citrine's report out today...It will further blacken the reputation of ELAS...Talked to Carr and gave him (...) the line we ought to follow. Carr's leader pretty good."

Carr remarked that the Report followed the line of the White Paper, which had been published a week earlier. Although the trade union mission found it difficult to segregate the issue with which it had come to deal from the prevailing atmosphere of tension, suspicion, recrimination, and fear of reprisals, it neither attempted any systematic inquiry into them, nor did it make any recommendations. ELAS had committed atrocities, but both sides were equally responsible. It was not a struggle between black and white. "Nothing in Sir Walter Citrine's report", Carr stated, "bears, or was intended to bear, on those longer-term issues, which were nonetheless determining factors in everything that had occurred."(50)

Similarly, the Manchester Guardian doubted whether the Citrine report gave all the answers needed, or whether its answers were complete. "They were content to consider the
civil war as a separate episode and to take the facts as they found them from the British soldiers and others...But it was and it is impossible to form a fair opinion of the Greek civil war without taking into account past history...In the past the Right had been as guilty as the Left, if not more so, and during the civil war the Government policy was not entirely innocent. There can be no easy division into sheep and goats." It went on: "When everything that can be said against ELAS has been said it still seems true that originally EAM like the resistance movements in France, Italy and Yugoslavia, represented a genuine popular movement."(51) Gerald Barry, the News Chronicle editor who visited Athens at almost the same time as the TUC delegation, also condemned the atrocities of both sides, but nevertheless he sought for motives and explanations.(52)

Ewer in the Daily Herald felt that the White paper did not give the whole picture. The full records were still withheld in the archives of the Foreign Office.(53)

The Observer's Athens correspondent (Eric Coventry?) commented that Citrine's visit to Greece had been "a major factor in the improved outlook." EAM hoped that this delegation would leave convinced of the justice of the EAM cause. Instead, the opposite occurred. "In the conference between the EAM and Government Labour leaders, the British delegation ranged itself on the side of the Government spokesmen."(54)

The publication of the White Paper and the Citrine Report were the utmost vindication for the Daily Telegraph, which triumphantly stated, "the British public can now see for itself that the fighting in Greece was no civil war in any accepted sense of the term, but a defence of law, order and civilised decency against the most barbarous gangsterdom."(55) With the publication of the Citrine Report "truth has in the end prevailed, and [it] has so thoroughly rubbed certain noses in the dirt of irresponsibility."(56) Similarly, the Daily Mail carried on the
front page the headlines "Truth about atrocities. ELAS Masks Off." On the back page Sir Walter Citrine published his impressions while in Greece.(57)

Around the same time, in mid-January, letters of protest from the British armed forces in Greece appeared in the correspondence columns. They were protesting at the way their role had been relayed by the press in Britain. Churchill himself first noted a particularly emphatic letter, fervently against ELAS, in the *Yorkshire Post* on January 6, which appeared also in several other newspapers around the same time. The same letter reached the editor of the *Daily Herald* and the paper asked Salusbury to find out from the Embassy what "official encouragement had been put over to persuade the British troops to write such letters." In a communication between Embassy and the Foreign Office, any official encouragement of the letter was denied.(58) That letter signed by thirty-seven men of a Royal Signals Unit serving in Greece, claimed 99 per cent troop support for Churchill's policy.

In the *Manchester Guardian* a series of letters from readers appeared (January 11, 12) pointing out that the sudden flood of such letters, together with their pronounced similarity of tone, content and format, suggested official inspiration. The fact that despite stringent military censorship and the King's regulations forbidding direct communication with the press the letter reached the press from Greece in eleven days only, made many readers wonder whether that particular letter had not be sent through the usual channels and it "had special facilities." Cummings in the *News Chronicle* also suggested official inspiration.(59)

The *Daily Telegraph* induced its readers to see the picture delineated by the "acidulated critics" of British policy and as drawn by "numbers of the humblest British soldiers in Greece. The former picture...is a vicious caricature. The latter picture...is an accurate photograph."(60)
Press: Reconsidering the military intervention in Greece

Gradually the controversy over events in Greece began to die down, especially after the truce was signed on January 15. The signing of the Varkiza Agreement a month later, on February 12, sealed the end of the three months’ storm over the Greek crisis. The press, in its majority, came to adopt a more sympathetic attitude towards the official policy. They still condemned the intervention, but they also felt that their lack of information about the internal developments in Greece had induced them to be less than fair to their own Government in judging motives.

The Times remained critical throughout January. On January 1, The Times printed a leading article by E H Carr, who was in charge of the paper in the absence of the editor for a few days' rest out of London, which irritated Churchill. Barrington-Ward wrote in his diary: "last Friday I passed the torso of a leader by Carr on Greece for possible use this morning. In view of yesterday's better news from Athens I expected him to modify it but deliberately abstained from ringing him up to tell him so. No good trying to drive the car from the back seat. It was not much modified and seemed to me rather fiercer than it needed to have been."(61) The leader argued that progress had not gone very far; fighting was still going on, and so long as the British were fighting against one of the Greek forces they could not claim to be holding the balance impartially.(62)

The editorial of January 5 reiterated the view that a British victory would offer no solution. The requirements of a solution were the cessation of hostilities and the creation of a provisional Government which would embrace "both the personnel and the policies of the Resistance."
However, on February 9, The Times seemed to accept that as the situation had developed "no other course was open to the British Government than that which they pursued." The paper argued that "the view of the civil war in Greece as a struggle between "democratic" and "reactionary" elements or between Left and Right is certainly ill-judged. But equally false and still more dangerous is the view of it as a struggle between black and white."

Later in the month the paper would praise Churchill for his contribution to the improvement of the Greek situation:

"Mr. Churchill's share in the achievement will be warmly acknowledged -not least by those who, at an earlier and darker stage, felt it their duty to insist that the issues, as the event showed, could not be reduced merely to the suppression of criminal violence and to press upon the British Government the policy of conciliation and negotiation."

The Manchester Guardian, which had insistently urged a peace settlement, welcomed the truce with relief. After the Varkiza Agreement, it defended the right of criticism. "If the Left here had not been critical,...who can doubt what the result would have been?"

The News Chronicle reports on Greece had often enraged the Foreign Office. Ridsdale favoured encouraging the paper to send out to Greece its diplomatic correspondent, Vernon Bartlett, who was generally regarded as moderate and able. In the event, Bartlett became ill and so the newspaper was encouraged to send out its editor instead. In a telegram, on January 9, to Lancaster in Athens, Ridsdale noted: "That he will see the facts of situation himself should have direct effect upon editorial policy of the News Chronicle and other papers who have a followed similar line of criticism. I have talked to him at length and find him intensely anxious to reach the truth but hard to shake out of pre-conceived ideas. Have also arranged for Foreign Secretary to see him before departure. Barry is perturbed at the report's refusal to permit access to "other side" and will undoubtedly be critical unless latitude is allowed for a thorough investigation of political situation. I have assured him you are all frustrated by complete failure..."
of large proportion of British press to grasp the facts and that you have nothing to conceal."(66)

Barry took himself off to Greece and made an on-the-spot investigation from January 18 to February 1. His findings were published in a series of three articles.(67) On his first day he met Leeper at the Embassy. He wrote in his diary "I found him... rigid, in blinkers and determined to stay in them, and rather bitter. I listened while he expounded the new familiar thesis, reflected the same afternoon in Churchill's speech in Westminster...Leeper seems to have written off EAM/ELAS completely. They needn't be considered from the point of view of policy."(68) He also talked with members of the Greek Government, many other prominent Greek politicians of all shades of opinion, British military and diplomatic authorities, soldiers, prisoners from both sides, Greek civilians, and members and spokesmen of EAM and KKE. The resulting report attempted "to set out the facts and background as I found them honestly and impartially, without consideration of parties or personalities."(69)

His first impression was that it was wrong to explain the Greek situation as the devil versus virtue. In an atmosphere of fear and bitterness, acts of violence on both sides were inevitable. On the matter of taking of hostages and of terrorising of the population, EAM made two serious blunders which had cost them "an immeasurable amount of sympathy." Some of these atrocities were acts of personal vendetta, some were the result of indiscipline among the rank and file; some were executions of former collaborators who had been condemned to death. It must in fairness be stated, however, that deeds of ill-treatment of prisoners and mass arrests from the Government side, could readily be turned to propagandist advantage by the other side. Barry believed that the deeper cause of this problem went back to the violent years of the Metaxas dictatorship and the German occupation.(70)
In his second report, Barry examined the causes of the Greek crisis and the refusal of ELAS to disarm. EAM had "many reasons" to have the strong conviction that power was at all costs to be kept from their hands and a coup d'état by the Right was imminent. The British refused to acknowledge the strength of EAM's following and to recognise their part in fighting the Germans; they directly or indirectly supported the Greek King; though they sincerely intended to cooperate after the Lebanon Conference, something Papandreou himself in an interview with Barry had admitted, his Government had not fulfilled the Lebanon agreement; the 'X' organisation continued to control and terrorise, while the public service and the security forces remained unpurged. That was why the Left refused one-sided disarmament and demanded some safeguards against a coup from the Right before ELAS troops surrendered their weapons. The Government, however, did nothing to disperse EAM suspicion that the Right-wing Mountain Brigade was to be used as political counterweight. As a result, EAM lost its faith in Papandreou, its Ministers resigned and a fierce conflict broke out. Any agreement would be useless, "unless a great many difficult things could be done to eradicate distrust, mollify hatred, and rebuild the ruined economic and moral fabric of the Greek nation." (72)

Barry believed that "the problem of Greece was the problem of Europe." The Greek crisis exemplified the struggle between the Old and the New which was basic to current European history. To ignore or misinterpret the significance of the New would be to pursue a policy which in the long run would cost Britain her leadership and endanger her future in Europe and the world. (73)

In the conservative press, the Daily Telegraph felt vindicated and fortunate in having a correspondent like Richard Capell, "whose messages from the beginning to the end of this distressing episode were models of accuracy and objectivity and thus enable us to claim that any charge of irresponsibility against the British Press as a whole is unfounded." (74)
Capell's dispatches continued to be hostile to EAM/ELAS. His views were that it was "a powerfully armed class of fanatics" who had refrained from anti-Nazi activity because their preoccupation was with a plan to establish a communist dictatorship. Reports, that they had the sympathy of the Left-Wing in Western Europe, "have imbued the rebels with fierce stubbornness."(75) Responsible for these reports, according to Capell, were some war correspondents "naturalised, not strictly English-speaking Americans, including two American Greeks [who] for long months engaged in propaganda for the EAM/ELAS organisation."(76) That was a point further exploited in the next day's leader. These correspondents were one reason for the "stream of distortion" emanating from Athens.(77) Following the protest of the 11 American correspondents against the strict security ban, a leader, on January 15, stated: "the bewilderment about events in Greece has been increased and exploited in many instances by partisan correspondents on the spot...A reputable anonymity or a technically objective nationality may conceal a personality stuffed with bias."(78)

On February 13 the Daily Telegraph welcomed the Varkiza Agreement, though it recognised that it was "only peace on paper", and "the high feelings engendered not only during the recent troubles but for many years before have surely not magically disappeared."(79) The Daily Mail's and the Daily Express' first leading articles on Greece did not appear until more positive news came from there. On January 13, after the truce, the Daily Express stated that "a great deal of the heat and passion developed against the Government was ill-founded and ill-timed." It was a tribute to Churchill's sober views, political foresight and firmness, to be able to see that "ELAS is not Greece; it is far from representing a majority in Greece".(80) Similarly, the Daily Mail argued that the truce was a tribute to Churchill's energy and integrity. Now the "shriller cries of anger from certain commentators in this country" would stop since "the ground is being cut from beneath their feet."(81)
The Daily Mail was the paper which had persistently asked permission to send its own diplomatic correspondent to Greece. Alistair Forbes, political correspondent, was finally sent to the eastern Mediterranean for on-the-spot investigation. "I hold my original belief that critics and potential critics should be allowed to see conditions on the spot themselves", he wrote on January 17 in a long article, in which he gave his total support to the official policy. "The more the facts about Greece come to light the more one sympathises with the strong and angry language used by the Prime Minister." The Greek people had started to realise that they had been saved from "the wolf of old-fashioned, terroristic Communism dressed up in the sheep's clothing of a modern Popular Front." He concluded, "it really is too absurd for anybody to suggest that our Government is pursuing a reactionary or undemocratic policy in Europe."(82)

The Daily Herald kept the line of putting the blame for the still inflamed Greek situation on those who were failing to implement British Government's policy, namely on the British representatives in Greece and on Plastiras' Government.

The paper claimed that General Plastiras was conducting a policy at variance with that of the British Government and mocked British attempts to end the crisis and "fulfil our democratic professions."(83) For the paper "the whole problem now seems to be whether the British Government will and can control this fire-eating General."(84) Britain should also ensure that all its representatives in Athens were impartial "in word and action".(85)

Salusbury was the first correspondent to cross the 'truce line' after the signing of the Varkiza Agreement. He travelled to Trikala, the headquarters of ELAS, Lamia, Larissa and Levadia in Central Greece, and met with Greek and British officers. His impressions were that "the disarming of the ELAS is proceeding loyally according to plan, and that there is a great chance of peace for Greece if all parties to the agreement observe its terms honestly and conscientiously." However some extremist organisations were still operating and terrorising the
countryside, such as the right-wing extremist Sourlas. At the ELAS headquarters he met George Siantos, while Generals Mandakas and Hadjimichalis(86) were present. He was told that the EAM organisation would resume the political struggle on constitutional lines.(87)

Tribune retained its strongly critical stand to official policy. Greece was to be made safe as a British zone of influence at whatever cost and in this the British policy succeeded. The British policy in Greece felt heavily restricted even powerless against a mounting popular movement developing and a way out was to be found with the one-sided disarmament of ELAS. It was against this background that the two official reports on Greece, the White Paper and the TUC Report -in which, "with shame and disgust", one finds the same case advocated as in the White Paper- should be judge.(88)

The Official Response

Outbursts against the press continued throughout January and February 1945, mostly emanating from the Athens Embassy. On January 1 Major Macagan of the War Office expressed his uneasiness over the reporting of the BBC and press correspondents and suggested that they should have guidance, in order to secure a more "judicious outlook."(89) On January 5, Harold Macmillan, the Minister Resident, angered by what he regarded as a particularly irresponsible Times leader on Greece of December, 28: "I do not like to see The Times once again completely misrepresenting the facts. It seems where Greece is concerned prejudice colours all that appears on the leader page. We are making a gallant effort to banish from Greece 'Trotskyite deviation to the Left'. But it grows like a rank weed in Printing House Square."(90) On January 7, Leeper telegraphed to the Foreign Office arguing that the British press had no comprehension of realities in Athens at present. "The Times bluntly speaks of
National Liberation Front having to come into Government. There is no such thing today as National Liberation Front. It was always a fiction: it has now ceased to exist." According to him, the Press had been content with "the poorest set of correspondents I have ever come across. That is most charitable explanation I can find for editorials in The Times, Daily Herald and News Chronicle...The only remedy which I can see is to send to Athens a few unofficial visitors whose word will be trusted at home so that they may see things as they are."(91)

The Foreign Office took up Leeper's and Macmillan's suggestion that MPs and representatives of the Trade Unions might go to Greece to judge the position for themselves. D F Howard, head of Southern Department, agreed that for the moment "the work we can do is to arrange for MPs, TUC representatives and special press correspondents to visit the scene of action. I understand that as Mr. Bartlett is ill, that Barry is to go out. This sort of thing may have some good effect." Churchill took an interest in sending MPs to Greece.(92)

Meanwhile, Lancaster sent a more extensive memorandum, written on December 21 concerning press affairs in Athens, which reached the Foreign Office on January 9. Though inevitably out of date, Lancaster earned appreciation for his work by the Foreign Office, together with instructions to the News Department to pass it back to their source. Ridsdale, to whom the memorandum was addressed commented, on January 11, that "the presence in Athens of Mr. Lancaster has well justified itself. He knows what it is possible and correct to do at this end so far as our relations with the press are concerned."(93)

On January 17, Lancaster passed on some sensitive information about Geoffrey Hoare of which The Times might be ignorant. He suggested that this information should be confidentially passed to The Times via its diplomatic correspondent, Iverach McDonald. Hoare's general ill-health was compounding the difficulties consequent upon his deafness for which reason the correspondent had ceased attending the daily Embassy press conferences

132
"where he can hear nothing." Because of his bad health he had been confined to his bed a great deal where his only contact was Claire Hollingworth. On such occasions he was entirely dependent on her for the raw material of his dispatches. Lancaster suspected that "not infrequently" Hoare's messages were actually written by her over his signature.

In fact The Times was not ignorant of all that. On December 5, Major W M Cordrington, being in Athens at the time, wrote to Barrington-Ward from the British Embassy about Hoare's severe deafness and low standing as correspondent. The editor responded: "It is true that he is somewhat deaf. But a correspondent, like anyone else, has a right to be tested by results, and his dispatches, by whatever test including the test of comparison with messages to other papers, have kept a high level...Deafness may be a handicap at times but it has not shown itself in our Athens service so far, and I cannot forget that the greatest of Balkan correspondents, J D Bouchier, whom the Bulgarians rewarded with a special set of postage stamps, was stone deaf." The Times was also aware about the close cooperation between Hoare and Hollingworth. While in Cairo and awaiting his next assignment, Hoare suggested to Ralph Deakin, The Times Foreign News Editor, if the paper was not sending anyone to Greece then Claire Hollingworth, with whom he had worked in Cairo, would have been very pleased to cover for The Times. In another letter, on January 17, Hoare informed his paper that during his absence in Cairo for four or five days she "has again agreed to cover for me."(94)

Ridsdale cabled Lancaster on 30 January saying that The Times proposed sending C D R Lumby for about a fortnight to Athens to write "two comprehensive turnover articles". His presence in Athens would not, however, affect Hoare's position as he would not handle current news.(95)

Lumby stayed in Athens from mid February to end of April. He sent to his paper two articles and a confidential memorandum. His last task was to send his remarks on the
controversy in which The Times was involved. He considered that The Times leaders erred by assuming that EAM represented a majority of the nationalist and anti Nazi forces in Greece. Regarding Hoare, he believed that his reports were "very fair and balanced." He went on, "the man who seems to have got his knife into Hoare is Leeper, who I presume is responsible indirectly for my being here. I understand that in a dispatch which he sent home and which was circulated to the cabinet he described Hoare as broken down in health, stone-deaf, and quite unfit for the job. That is not true...He was laid up with a cold for some days. My first impression of meeting him was that he was a great deal fitter than when I had last seen him in Cairo, and that his hearing was better, and that impression is maintained. Besides repeating insistently to me that Hoare was not fit Leeper criticised The Times for sending a 'war correspondent'. When I explained that Hoare had done political correspondence for The Times from Cairo for a number of years he seemed surprised." Barrington-Ward was particularly satisfied with Lumby's remarks. He wrote to him "I was particularly anxious that you should go because I felt sure that it would strengthen, not weaken, Hoare's position after so much controversy, and so it has been proved. You have reported just what I expected to hear, namely that the line which he has taken was substantially justified. For Hoare's own sake...it was essential to get that reassurance."(96)

The bitterest of all the attacks on the British Press's coverage of the Greek crisis, especially directed at The Times, was Churchill's House of Commons speech on January 18. He stated:

There is no case in my experience, certainly no case in my war experience, when a British Government has been so maligned and its motives so traduced in our country by important organs of the press among our own people. That this should be done amid the perils of this war, now at its climax, has filled me with surprise and sorrow...How can we wonder at, still more how can we complain of, the attitude of hostile and indifferent newspapers in the United States when we have, in this country, witnessed such a melancholy exhibition as that provided by some of our most time-honoured and
responsible journals (loud and prolonged cheers) and others to which such epithets would hardly apply. (laughter) (97)

The uproar was renewed when Churchill spoke of the Government's difficulties being increased "by a spirit of gay, reckless, unbridled partisanship", let loose upon those who had to bear the burden of decision.

Listening in the gallery was the editor of The Times. Barrington-Ward knew instantly what was behind the demonstration. He was shocked by the Prime Minister's open onslaught against the paper's line on Greece. In his diary, he bitterly commented: "This -direct and obvious reference to The Times- immediately touched off the loudest, largest and most vicious- ever savage!- cheer that I have heard in the House. It must have lasted a full minute or more...It was a vent for the pent-up passions of three years, a protest against all that has, wrongly or rightly, enraged the Tories in the paper during that time." (98)

Some days later, in the House of Lords debate, Lord Cranborne renewed the charges recently made in the House of Commons and this time mentioning The Times by name. He accused the paper of having "absolutely misapprehended and therefore entirely misrepresented the situation" as a struggle between the Right and the Left. Barrington-Ward wrote in his diary, "This (attack) could not be passed over. Accordingly I asked Tyerman to make certain points in a very short leader. Unfortunately he produced five pages, which I had to carve up (or down). The real answer to Boberty [Lord Cranborne] i.e. to Winston is that we have pressed for the programme the Government have adopted. Why then do they reproach us? This is the answer which I attempted to give. The attack was a surprise and to be regretted. If they want unity now is the time to get it." (99) Tyerman defended the aims of the paper in handling the Greek crisis: "Those who have read the series of leading articles on Greek affairs on this page and the dispatches from Athens will be able to decide on the justice of this charge. So far from
presenting a clash between Right and Left as a leading issue, the main concern of the advice offered here, in terms of consistent restraint, has been to prevent the essential unity of the Greek nation from being fatally and finally prejudiced by it. The purpose had been to secure the conditions of discussion and conciliation in which alone free institutions could be established and operated and to maintain the conciliatory and impartial role marked out for British policy... The imputation officially made against the newspapers would indeed seem inconsistent with the policy which the Government are pursuing with welcome pertinacity."(100)

Another attack on the press correspondents in Greece came this time by Major Randolph Churchill, during an unofficial visit to Athens. In a statement, on February 13, he presented his views upon the Greek problem and its treatment by the British press. Major Churchill was "extremely insistent" that this statement should be sent to Britain not by him, through the normal ""telegraphese""(sic), but by S Mangeot, Reuters' correspondent in Athens. Mangeot thought that to have circulated this message with its attack upon the British press, to the newspapers normally served by Reuters, would have been disastrous. Yet, the statement became known in Britain. It was not Reuters who released the statement, as Chancellor explained to Ridsdale, but it was published by one of the Athens papers.(101) Cummings in the News Chronicle attacked Major Churchill. Gerald Barry shared Cummings' view. As he had met in Athens all correspondents, he was convinced that "the great majority were doing a difficult job honestly, conscientiously and successfully." He believed that the foreign Press representatives in Athens had been much maligned. "The high spot was reached by Major Randolph Churchill, whose recent intervention was a monstrous piece of impudence." In order to understand the Greek crisis properly, he wrote "it has all along been important to distinguish between the events of the crisis itself and the long sequence of events leading up to it." Some of the correspondents in Athens tried to understand the reason why the situation developed "and it

136
was their attempts to explain it in their dispatches which upset the authorities." He went on, "it
did not help matters that distinguished visitors, knowing nothing of the true facts of the
situation for themselves and taking no trouble to find out, should have accepted prejudiced
official opinion and used it for public denunciation of the Press. Churchill and Citrine might
reflect that their attacks...do little to encourage confidence and good feeling between the two
countries at a highly critical time."(102)

Although the major pre-occupation of the Athens Embassy was always with the press
treatment of Greek affairs, concern was also expressed at the general performance of the BBC
over Greece. The first incident was when the BBC had transmitted its nine o'clock news
broadcast on the events of December 3 in Athens. Anxiously, Churchill instructed his staff to
express to the Corporation his dissatisfaction with its performance because, in his opinion the
conflict was not, as John Nixon had presented it, a simple clash between royalists and
 republicans.(103)

Leeper was seriously alarmed by the treatment given to the Commons debate of
December 8 by the Greek Service of the BBC, alleging that it had given prominence to
speeches attacking the British Government's Greek policy. "In these very circumstances all that
was required was your own speech which alone contained accurate facts." The Foreign Office
soothed Leeper's undue anxiety. "You should realise that a parliamentary debate cannot be
handled in the manner you suggest in your telegram. A careful investigation has shown that the
Greek debate of December 20th was properly reported...Indeed, the opposition speeches were
reduced to the minimum...I have full confidence in Mr. Clark the new Controller."(104)
Similarly, they placated Lancaster's disquiet when Nixon told him that the BBC in a service
message to him said that they would not use any stories concerning ELAS, unless they were
vouched for by highest official authority, or were eye-witness accounts.(105) MOI showed the
memorandum to Brendan Bracken and asked A P Ryan, the BBC Controller (News) for his comments. Bracken and Ryan considered that the charge "in line with others which have been made by the Embassy at Athens and found, on investigation" unjustifiable. (106)

On the whole, the BBC's performance was considered satisfactory. Alan Wadley of the News Department wrote on February 23, "the only occasion I remember when the Home Service gave cause for embarrassment in regard to Greece was at the beginning of the troubles; their correspondent, Nixon, took a very similar line to that taken by The Times and others." (107) Moreover the BBC's local correspondents were well acceptable by the Foreign Office. John Nixon had impressed Lancaster on first introduction. In his memorandum of December 21 he wrote "Nixon is a very good man indeed, and willing to accept guidance. I think, like many of the others, he was rather bowled over by the events immediately following the Sunday demonstration, but the effect of this is now wearing off." Kenneth Matthews was highly regarded in all official quarters and Antony Eden had spoken for him well. (108) With the lifting of dual representation ban for agencies, both Nixon and Matthews stayed in Athens. (109)

The response of the Foreign Office to the reports from the Embassy was mixed. There was a more measured approach to the crisis with a relative scepticism and coolness. It was thought in the Foreign Office that accountable for the inadequate news coverage from Greece were correspondents, trained to report military operations. Thus when Lancaster proposed the replacement of the war correspondents with civilian correspondents as soon as the military situation permitted, he was strongly supported, as it was also within the MOI. On February 2, Lancaster cabled Francis Williams, head of Press and Censorship Division of the MOI, that in his view "the sooner 'accredited correspondents only' rule is abolished the better." (110) On
February 4, Williams transmitted his strong support of that point and stressed "the great importance attached to this by the Ministry."(111)

As result to the appointment of civilian correspondents the Foreign Office had to face the "pressing problem" of the status of the communist Daily Worker. This paper had been repeatedly denied war correspondent accreditation, but now was entitled to representation. It had applied to the Foreign Office to send Ivor Montagu. The Foreign Office asked Lancaster to give his confirmation for him. "We are very anxious Daily Worker should be able to have correspondent earliest possible date."(112) Lancaster was reluctant for admission of Montague and Leeper of Cockburn. But, if the Foreign Office regarded the Daily Worker's representation "as absolutely essential", Lancaster proposed to get the Daily Worker to employ a French Communist, for 'Humanité' has taken a much more realistic line on Greece."(113)

There were varied reactions in the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Information. Laskey with Howard and others agreed with Lancaster about not sending a representative of the Daily Worker, who would be likely to make trouble. He was of the view that the decision for not sending one would cause a bitter grievance and it would suggest that "we have something to hide."(114) Eden wrote to Bracken to say that he was in favour of refusing the Daily Worker's application, but suggesting that this responsibility had to be taken by the British and not by the Greek Government, who, as was suggested by Lancaster, would refuse Montagu a visa "unless we pressed them very hard." On 26 March, the Foreign Office reported to the Athens Embassy that application for Monatgu's appointment should be put to the Greek Government in the same way as for other civilian correspondents. "While you should not press them to accept it, you should make it clear to them unofficially that we think they would be advised to do so."(115)
While the question of sending a Daily Worker correspondent to Athens was under consideration, Lancaster asked, on February 18, Williams of MOI to send him the names of the civilian correspondents for agreement. The correspondents should contact Lancaster on arrival. These were Alistair Forbes for the Daily Mail, Stephen Barber for the News Chronicle and G E R Gedye for the Daily Herald. Lancaster opposed the replacement of Salusbury by Gedye. "Ambassador would be very sorry to see Salusbury go as not only has he done a very good job but he has valuable contacts in certain Greek circles which render him highly useful to Embassy." He asked the Foreign Office to intervene in persuading the Daily Herald not to proceed with this replacement. If the Daily Herald did intend to replace Salusbury, Lancaster proposed that Eden should "say a word" to Citrine. Ridsdale transmitted to Lancaster "will do anything within the bounds of discretion to persuade Herald to maintain Salusbury in Athens, but Francis Williams and I are agreed it would be most unwise to invoke Citrine. For various reasons Herald are touchy about Salusbury, whose criticisms of editorial treatment of his dispatches, some of which were passed on by Citrine, would probably cause them to resent any move of this kind. Incidentally, such action here would do Salusbury no good, particularly if it emerged that initiative derived from the Foreign Office." 

Strict censorship on press reports had been established at the beginning of December and maintained into February. The military censors were "over-worked" making slight changes in dispatches, such as substituting one descriptive word for another, which might be very significant in altering the content itself. Moreover stories which the military censors felt should be checked, even when not for military or political reasons, were referred to Osbert Lancaster, in the Embassy.
As we have seen the correspondents were precluded from crossing over the EAM/ELAS territory and any communication from ELAS headquarters was almost impossible. To prevent any intercourse with the ELAS the correspondents were confined inside the closely guarded hotel - an "armed fortress" as John Nixon of the BBC said - they were unable to walk even short distances for safety reasons and military transport was difficult to find. There was barbed wire round that side of the Grande Bretagne Hotel, where the correspondents worked. Any information from ELAS headquarters was passed secretly through Greek 'stringers', working for an agency or a newspaper, or from some anonymous informants. Once the information was considered important it was sent at once to the British Embassy. The correspondents, fearing arrest, refused proposed interviews with the ELAS leaders, proposed by the 'stringers'.

Foreign correspondents, too, were refused any contact with the "enemy" as ELAS were called by the Military who spoke of them "in much the same way as they have been accustomed to refer to the Germans". Lancaster admitted that "this has infuriated the Press..., but they have lately modified their tone and their relations with the Press are consequently improved." 

The British press had often complained of the paucity of independent news and comment from Athens, which became less and insufficient to allow fair judgement. The matter was taken to Parliament. On January 6, during Question Time, Tom Driberg and John Dugdale, Labour MPs, asked the Prime Minster why General Scobie had forbidden interviews with any ELAS member, while opponents were permitted to publish anti-ELAS propaganda. Churchill replied that "while fighting is in progress it would obviously be undesirable for persons to cross into ELAS territory."
During the truce talks American correspondents asked permission from the British authorities to interview EAM delegates, now in Athens, in the presence of British officers and to present their dispatches to British censorship. The four EAM delegates were under guard by British sentries "outside the single room where they sleep and have their meals." (125) Scobie refused to allow them. In protest, all American correspondents, save A C Sedgwick (New York Times) (126) and the representative of Associated Press, petitioned for State Department intervention. (127) Sedgwick, further distinguishing himself, sent a letter of his own to American Ambassador in Athens, MacVeagh, for transmission to State Department entirely dissociating himself from his colleagues and expressing complete approval of the attitude of the British military authorities.

The liberal and Labour papers supported the protest. The Times wrote, "none of the scanty evidence which filters out through narrow official channels with the representatives of the British and American Press still denied access to the leaders of ELAS, gives a clear picture." And it went on, "in spite of the campaign in both Athens and London to vilify the earlier dispatches of the Press correspondents, it is certain that the Greek scene was more satisfactorily and objectively portrayed before their work was unfortunately hampered." (128) The Manchester Guardian, the News Chronicle and the Daily Herald shared the same views. (129)

Lancaster considered that the protest would increase the strain on Anglo-American relations and it would be important if the whole story were filed down as much as was possible. (130)

The State Department, before taking any action in regard to the protest, asked the British Embassy in Washington to give them an answer. On February 2, the Foreign Office responded to the Embassy that the best answer to the State Department would be Sedgewick's letter to them. Additionally they transmitted Churchill's statement in Parliament on January 6

142
and they pointed out that many of the American correspondents in Greece were Greeks and
ardent supporters of the Greek Communist Party "on whose behalf they have been carrying out
active propaganda throughout the recent disturbances." On that last point the Foreign Office
wrote that the Athens Embassy could provide them with more information.(131)

Athens sent that information to Washington on February 5. They singled out four
American correspondents with whom "it was that American protest originated." The comments
were bitter and harsh about Weller of Chicago Daily News, Fodor of Chicago Sun,
Morphopoulos of News Weekly, and Poulos of Overseas News Agency. According to the
Athens Embassy, Weller and Fodor were obstinate and fanatically anti-British. But the most
criticism was reserved for Morphopoulos and Poulos. "The former is probably a
communist...The latter has consistently behaved outrageously...Both of these men are known to
have had contact with ELAS throughout the battle period."(132) Fodor, however, was
considered by J B Donelly of the Foreign Office, who knew him well personally, as a journalist
with international reputation and extremely pro-British. Donelly doubted "strongly" that Weller
was fanatically anti-British.(133) Poulos had already attracted the attention of the British
Embassy in December. He had complained to his Agency and the Agency had told the State
Department that he had received a number of letters threatening his life and that his hotel room
had been rifled and his documents stolen. The Embassy in Washington asked for his adequate
protection. "It would be most unfortunate if anything should happen to Poulos whilst he is in
Athens and it would be very undesirable that he should return to his country now with a story
that he had been unable to remain in Greece because the British authorities could not give him
adequate protection."(134) Leeper replied to the Foreign Office that Poulos was suspected by
military security authorities of maintaining contact with ELAS. For this reason he was being
watched by the security police. He believed that "the sooner the man leaves the country the
better. While it is no doubt true he would continue his propaganda in the United States."

Laskey agreed with Leeper for Poulos to go back to America. As it was expected that the volume of American criticism of British policy would die down soon, if Poulos returned to America he would be less harmful. The News Department agreed.(135)

A further cause of irritation to the British was the tone of much American critical comment upon operations in Greece. In Washington, the Embassy worked hard to alleviate the situation. In Athens, Macmillan and Lancaster made an earnest effort to win over the more approachable American correspondents, but only with the most limited success. The Athens Embassy was seeing British correspondents together with Americans. Lancaster held two conferences a day at the Embassy for briefing them. The efforts of the Embassy to "handle the correspondents personally", as was suggested by Lord Halifax(136), were not helped by the "ostentatiously disinterested attitude" adopted by the American Embassy. "The situation would be consistently eased if Macveagh could be induced either to look after the American Press himself or else be provided with a Press Attaché. So far the only attempt at control exercised by United States authorities on the spot was one talk to correspondents by General Sadler. This I understand soon got out of hand and instead of recalling his audience to a sense of their responsibilities the General found himself being lectured by them."(137) Churchill was much upset by the attitude of the American press. In his memoirs, he harboured a grievance against the "irresponsibility" of the American journalists during those critical days of December 1944:

The vast majority of the American Press violently condemned our action, which they declared falsified the cause for which they had gone to war. If the editors of all these well-meaning organs will look back at what they wrote then and compare it with what they think now they will, I am sure, be surprised.(138)

In contrast to the American press, the attitude of the Soviet press during the first three months of British intervention in Greece remained restrained. John Lawrence, the press attaché
at the Moscow Embassy, daily monitoring the Soviet press, reported to London clear evidence of Soviet reticence. (139) Without their own correspondents in Athens the Soviet papers confined themselves to brief news items based on press dispatches from London and New York. (140) These were factual and without comment. In February 1945, Churchill, after he had met Stalin at the Yalta conference, told his cabinet about his satisfaction that not a shadow of criticism of British action in Greece had appeared in the Soviet press. That Soviet silence testified that Stalin was keeping his part of the 'percentage agreement'. Churchill, in his memoirs, recalled that Stalin "adhered strictly and faithfully to our agreement of October, and during all the weeks of fighting the Communists in the streets of Athens, not one word of reproach came from Pravda or Izvestia." (141) However, by the end of February 1945 the Soviet reticence would be broken under new strains.
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2. FO371/43709, Colonel Kent to Brendan Bracken, 27/12/44
3. FO371/43739, Minutes by Sir O. Sargent, 27/12/44
4. FO371/43739, tel. 595, FO to Athens, 29/12/44
5. FO371/48233, Minutes by N. E. Nash, 28/12/44
6. The Times 27/12/44. See also 29/12/44
7. Manchester Guardian 27/12/44
8. News Chronicle, leader, 27/12/44
9. The Observer, by a Corr., 31/12/44 "What Next in Greece"
11. Ibid. 28/12/44 and 30/12/44, Washington correspondent.
12. Daily Mail, 29/12/44
13. Sunday Times, leader 31/12/44
14. Daily Herald, 27/12/44 and leader 28/12/44
16. Iverach McDonald, The History of The Times, vol. 5, 123
17. The Times, leader "Mr. Churchill on Greece", 19/1/45
18. Manchester Guardian, leader "British Policy", 19/1/45
19. Ibid., 20/1/45; The Times, "Greece in the Commons, 17/1/45
20. News Chronicle, leader, 20/1/45
22. Ibid., Richard Capell, 31/1/45
24. Ibid., leader "Pandora's Box", 22/1/45
26. The Times, leaders 13/1/45 and 17/1/45. See also leaders, 9/1/45 and 15/1/45; leader, 19/1/45; diplomatic correspondent, 22/1/45; Geoffrey Hoare, 29/1/45
27. Manchester Guardian, leader 8/1/45
28. Ibid., Reuters, 12/2/45
29. News Chronicle, 17/1/45
30. Daily Herald, Ewer, 13/1/45
31. Daily Telegraph, 30/12/44 and 1/1/45
32. Ibid., 18/1/45
33. Daily Express, Eric Grey, 13/1/45
34. Daily Mail, leader "Uneasy Truce", 13/1/45
35. Documents regarding the situation in Greece, January 1945
36. FO371/48250, R1905/4/19, Leeper to FO, 25/1/45
37. Papastratis, British policy towards Greece, p.221-222
38. FO371/48234, (R1326) Leeper's tels.: nos. 127, 130, 134, 135, 10/1/45; tel. 379, FO to Washington, 12/1/45
39. The Times, leader, 12/1/45
40. Manchester Guardian, diplomatic correspondent, 12/1/45
41. The Observer, industrial correspondent, 14/1/45
42. News Chronicle, Ian Mackay, 15/1/45

146
43. Ibid., leader, 20/1/45
44. Daily Telegraph, "Opinion Column" 13/1/45, Daily Express, leader 13/1/45 and Daily Mail, leader "Prospects in Greece", 12/1/45
45. Daily Telegraph, Trevor Evans; Daily Mail, Wilson Broadbent, political correspondent, 16/1/45
46. FO371/48246, R770, Leeper to FO, 10/1/45; FO371/48247, R1053; FO371/48248, R1415, draft letter from Churchill to Citrine, 16/1/45
47. What We Saw in Greece, Report of the TUC Delegation, p.16,17
49. C D R Lumbly (1888-1946). Magdalene College, Cambridge. Foreign correspondent for The Times in many European centres, 1913-1931; Middle East correspondent, 1931-1937; correspondent in Rome, 1937-39; sent to Rotterdam at outbreak of war, 1939; war correspondent in Middle East, 1940; North Africa and Italy from 1943 until his death. (I McDonald, op.cit., 79)
50. The Times, leader 9/2/45
51. Manchester Guardian, leader, 9/2/45
52. Reynolds News in an editorial on 11/2/45 wrote: "And after reading both reports, we say with regret that for an understanding insight into the historical and contemporary causes of the tragedy we have to turn not to the report of our own movement, but to the editor of a Liberal newspaper."
54. The Observer, 4/2/45
55. Daily Telegraph, leader "Nazi Legacy", 2/2/45
56. Ibid., leader "Truth Conquers", 9/2/45
57. Daily Mail, 9/2/45
58. FO371/48233, R356, Lancaster to Ridsdale, 5/1/45. Minutes 6-7/1/45
59. News Chronicle, J M Cummings, 12/1/45
60. Daily Telegraph, leader "Truth will out", 19/1/45
61. Barrington-Ward Diary 1/1/45
62. The Times, leader, 1/1/45
63. Ibid., 28/2/45
64. Manchester Guardian, leader "Peace at last", 13/1/45
65. Ibid., leader, 13/2/45
66. FO371/48233 (R385) tel. 103, Ridsdale to Lancaster, 9/1/45
67. News Chronicle, "Report On Greece", 8, 9 and 12/2/45
68. Sir Gerald Barry's Papers, Barry in Greece, Diary, 24,19/1/45
69. Ibid., 25, 15/2/45
70. News Chronicle, 8/2/45
71. Sir Gerald Barry's Papers, 24, "Col. Sheet"
72. News Chronicle, 9/2/45
73. Ibid., 12/2/45
74. Daily Telegraph, leader "Truth Conquers", 9/2/45
75. Ibid., 2/1/45, 8/1/45, 1/1/45, 4/1/45 respectively.
76. Ibid., 10/1/458
77. Ibid., leader "Facts in Greece", 11/1/45
78. Ibid., leader "Is it peace?", 15/1/45
79. Ibid., leader, 13/2/45
80. Daily Express, leader, 13/1/45
Daily Mail, leader 12/1/45. See also leader, 13/1/45
82. Ibid., Alistair Forbes "Have we lost our sense of justice?"
83. Ibid., leader "We say no", 6/1/45
84. Ibid., Ewer, 18/1/45 85. Ibid., leader 16/1/45. See also 17/1/45
86. G Siantos (1890-1947). Chief of KKE Central Committee, 1942; Replaced by Zachariadis as Secretary of KKE Central Committee, 1945. Generals Mandakas and Hadjimichalis were members of the Central Committee of ELAS.
87. Daily Herald F H Salusbury, 21/2/45
88. Tribune, Greek Civil War Ends, 16/2/45, pp. 6-7
89. FO371/48233, R209, Major Maclagan to Laskey M.O.5/D.O 1/1/45
90. FO371/48233, tel. 64, Athens to FO, 5/1/45
91. FO371/48233 (R515), tel. 83, Leeper to FO, 7/1/45
92. FO371/48233 (R515), tel. 83 Athens to FO, 7/1/45. Minutes, Laskey and Howard 9/1/45. Howard 13/1/45
93. FO371/48234 (R1889)
94. The Times Archives. W M Cordington to R Barrington-Ward, 5/12/44. Barrington-Ward to Cordington, 18/12/44
95. FO371/48234 (R1365), tel. 239, Lancaster to Ridsdale 17/1/45. Ridsdale to Lancaster, 30/1/45.
98. Barrington-Ward Diary, 18/1/45
99. Barrington-Ward Diary 25/1/45
100. The Times, leader "Aims In Greece", 23/1/45
101. FO371/48235 (R3613) Major Randolph Churchill's statement 13/2/45. Letter from Chancellor (Reuters) to Ridsdale 16/2/45. Minutes, Ridsdale 16/2/45, Laskey 19/2/45
103. PREM3 212/10 Peck to Sendall, 4/12/44.
104. FO371/48234, R1889, Athens to FO, 21/12/44; FO to Athens 24/12/44
105. Lancaster's Memorandum of 21/12/44
106. FO371/48234 (R1889), Ryan to Sendall, 17/1/45. Sendall to Ridsdale, 18/1/45. Minutes by Laskey 30/1/45 and 27/2/45.
107. FO371/48234, Minutes 23/2/45
108. See FO371/48234 Ryan to Sendall, 17/1/45
109. FO371/48234 (R1153) Ridsdale to Lancaster, 18/1/45
110. FO371/48235 (R2402), tel. 403, Lancaster to Francis Williams, 2/2/45. See also tel. 457 (additional to tel. 403) 6/2/45
111. FO371/48235 (R2402), tel. 385 Williams to Lancaster, 4/2/45
112. FO371/48235 (R2668), tel. 515, Williams to Lancaster, 15/2/45
113. FO371/48235 (R3429), tel. 561, Lancaster to Williams 18/2/45
114. FO371/48235 (R3429), Minutes 12/2-1/3/45
115. FO371/48235 (R3425), tel. 775, FO to Athens, 26/3/45
116. FO371/48235 (R3473), tel. 560 Lancaster to Williams, 18/2/45
117. FO371/48235 (R3473), tel. 599, Williams to Lancaster 28/2/45
118. FO371/48236 (R4467), tel. 683, Lancaster to Ridsdale, 6/3/45
119. FO371/48236 (R4467), tel. 666, Ridsdale to Lancaster, 9/3/45
120. Richter, op.cit., 43-4 n.30

121. Byford-Jones, The Greek Trilogy, 155-60

122. FO371/48234, Lancaster's Memorandum, 21/12/44

123. See The Times, diplomatic corr., 3/1/45 and 4/1/45; leader 5/1/45 and 9/1/45. Manchester Guardian, 8/1/45


125. Manchester Guardian, 12/1/45. See also, Hoare 30/1/45 126. A C Sedgwick had social relations with the Greek upper class. His Greek wife, Roxane, (née Sotiriadis) came from a banking family of conservative political views. She was served at the British Embassy before the war as an interpreter-guide for visiting notables. She was assigned to Sir Walter Citrine as interpreter. (Richter, op.cit., 30 n. 56) The Sedgwicks did not stay at the Grande Bretagne Hotel, as did the rest of the press corps. Their luxury apartment overlooked the British Embassy. Among their family friends were Cyril and Marina Sulzberger, a New York Times correspondent, who later served in Greece and Mary Cavadias (now Lady Henderson), who later became the Time-Life's correspondent and got married to Stephen Barber, the AP Athens correspondent and later News Chronicle's Athens correspondent. (Mary Henderson, Xenia - A Memoir, Greece 1919- 1949 44, 46, 128)

127. The protest goes: "Lt.Gen. Scobie has placed in force, on a ground of military security, regulations which make it impossible for American correspondents to interview and make known to the American public the political views of EAM leaders who are opposing him. The correspondents have asked, in the public interest, to be permitted to interview EAM leaders with British officers present. Gen. Scobie, replying to this request, has forbidden all contact with the 'enemy'. We ask that the US Government take all required steps to ensure that American correspondents may be freed from the restraint named, in order that the deeply interested American public may be enabled rightfully and without any infringement of British military security to hear occasionally part of the EAM view of the present conflict." This letter was signed by M. W. Fodor, Farnsworth Fowle, Clay Gowran, Joseph Harrison, Reg. Ingraham, Guthrie Janssen, Dimitri Kessel, Panos Morphopoulos, C Poulos, J Roper and G Weller. (Capell, Simiomata, 120-130)

128. The Times, leader "Greece in the Commons", 17/1/45

129. See Manchester Guardian, political corr., 17/1/45; News Chronicle 17/1/45; Daily Herald, Ewer 18/1/45

130. FO371/48233 (R889), tel. 147, Lancaster to Ridsdale, 11/1/45

131. FO371/48233 (R889), tel. 1084, FO to Washington, 2/2/45

132. FO371/48235 (R2570), tel. 11 Athens to Washington, 5/2/45

133. FO371/48235 (R2570), Minutes by Donally 7/2/45

134. FO371/48233 (R750), tel. 187, Washington to FO, 9/1/45

135. FO371/48233 (R910), tel. 148, Athens to FO 11/1/45. Minutes by Laskey, 12/1/45

136. FO371/48233 (R889), Washington to MOI, No 40 Empax, 29/1/45

137. FO371/48235, R2570, Athens to Washington, 5/2/45


139. National Peace Council, "Two Worlds in Focus", p.105

140. The first Soviet reporter arrived in Athens in mid February 1945.

141. Churchill, op. cit., 255

149
CHAPTER FIVE

THE GATHERING OF A NEW TENSION, MARCH 1945 - MARCH 1946

Within a few months after the Varkiza Agreement a mounting wave of 'White Terror' swept most of Greece. The situation can only be accurately described as "a one-sided civil war waged by the monarchist right against its defenceless opponents - of politically all shades."(1)

The governments that came to power in 1945-1946 failed to carry out their obligations which ought to have consisted of the restoration of civil and trade union liberties as well as of the purging from the state apparatus of Metaxists and wartime collaborators. Their weakness and incompetence further undermined the process of reconciliation that was supposed to have begun at Varkiza.(2)

The year 1945 can be characterised as the prelude to the subsequent civil war. It seems certain that if the Greek governments of the period had been committed to establishing normal political conditions and improving the economic and financial situation the drift toward a new phase of uncertainty and violence could have been averted.

Greece in 1945

Following the signing of the Varkiza Agreement most of the war correspondents dispersed to more active battlefronts and Greece was relegated to a less important position on the foreign affairs pages of the British papers. British eyes were now riveted on other important events: the military operations in Germany, the Yalta (February) San Francisco (April) and the Potsdam (May) Conferences, etc. They glanced at Greece only occasionally. In fact, the British
press was anxious to see the Greek crisis resolved, because of the great harm it caused to the
good name of Britain abroad and of the criticism arose at home.

Despite a relative peacefulness after the end of hostilities in Athens, there was a
growing anxiety at the mounting wave of 'White Terror', which by mid-1945 had reached
enormous dimensions. Taking advantage of the situation, Right-wing activities were directed to
bring back the King. The fall of the Plastiras Government in April brought into the open the
forces of the Right to consolidate their position.(3) In all that the deplorable economic and
financial situation was another cause for great concern.

Already in January 1945, after Plastiras' uncompromising statements about ELAS, the
British press expressed its fears of Right-wing reprisals and victimisation of the Left. Geoffrey
Hoare of The Times was the first to report renewed activities of extreme Right-wing gangs. In
March The Observer and the Daily Herald reported the right-wing tendency to abuse their
new-found position.(4) C D Lumby of The Times, who had been sent from his paper to write
two turnovers, in his second and last report he summed up the situation:

EAM and its followers are being penalised in a variety of ways. Former ELAS men are
beaten up, arrested, and tried on trumped-up charges. Hundreds of employees of public
utility companies in Athens are being discharged for what is described as "anti-national
activities" which simply means membership of EAM. Many of these men worked
loyally for the British during the German occupation. Thus the Varkiza pact, which
looked at the time of its signature as if it might be the means of ending civil war strife,
has become a dead letter. Fresh strife is brewing.(5)

On the other hand, it was generally accepted that ELAS carried out its part of the Varkiza
Agreement. On March 4, The Observer's Athens correspondent reported that the arms
surrender had gone strictly to plan, evidence of "a genuine desire on the part of EAM-ELAS to
live up to its recent treaty bargain." Similarly Hoare in The Times and Manchester Guardian
and Reuters in the News Chronicle reported that ELAS were loyally carrying out the terms of
the agreement and that the transfer was taking place smoothly.(6)

Out of tune with the rest of the press was again Richard Capell of the Daily Telegraph.
He admitted that the political situation in Greece was less than reassuring but he argued that
incidents which had occurred since the Varkiza treaty had been relatively few but violently
magnified, in some cases invented and in others they were mere village vendettas.(7)

Plastiras' resignation became inevitable when, on April 5, an Athens newspaper
published a letter written by him to the Greek Ambassador in Vichy in July 1941 to bring about
some kind of negotiated peace between Greece and Italy through German mediation. The
publication of the letter was timed to coincide with the anniversary of the German invasion of
Greece (April 6 1941). On April 6, the Allied Information Services(AIS) HQ Land Force sent
to the War Office for Political Warfare Executive(PWE) a telegram indicating the importance
for the British press to realise that the resignation, if it occurred, was not a Leftist victory over
dictatorship, but brought about by the manoeuvres of the extreme Right to cause political
confusion.(8)

Although the British Government were thinking that Plastiras should be replaced as
soon as possible, if the publication of this letter was made the excuse for his dismissal it might
prove embarrassing to the British. A copy of this letter had come into possession of the Foreign
Office on October 1941 and therefore it would be impossible for them to deny all previous
knowledge of it. Eden had defended Plastiras during the debate in the Commons, on January
19, against the charge of being a quisling and it might be said that the British were prepared to
back Plastiras in spite of their knowledge about his record and that they had only thrown him
over when the facts became public. The Foreign Office instructed the Embassy to avoid making
the letter the open and acknowledged ground for Plastiras' dismissal and to ensure that, if the
change of Government came about, this was not directly attributed to British intervention. (9) The Embassy assured them that they would "clamp down on the letter and assist it to be forgotten as quickly as possible." (10)

Salusbury of the Daily Herald was the first to report on April 3 Plastiras' resignation and to write about the existence of this letter. Hoare and Capell reported it on April 7. (11) Unanimously the press stated that the publication of this letter was the culmination of a Right-wing campaign to compel an early plebiscite. (12)

Plastiras' fall from power dashed the hopes of the republican Right to lead the national reaction. Anti-communism was now synonymous with the cause of the King. (13) On April 7, Admiral Voulgaris was appointed Premier.

The liberal and Labour press called attention to the Monarchists' strenuous efforts to force a decision for a speedy plebiscite and the consequences it would have for the country. As early as March 21, W N Ewer on the front page of the Daily Herald wrote that the monarchist campaign was in full swing and its leaders were now confident of winning in the coming plebiscite. "The monarchists' biggest asset of all is the widespread belief that the British Government wants a restoration of the monarchy." (14) In April, more reports came from Athens by the News Chronicle and The Observer's special correspondent. (15) Lumby formed the same impression, while in Athens. In his second article, printed on April 17, he warned about the danger of a coup from the Right. "If the plebiscite produces a vote for the King, he will inevitably be hailed by his supporters not as constitutional arbiter of politics but as the standard-bearer of a negative and entirely reactionary policy. If the Royalists are disappointed -if, for example, the plebiscite should be delayed and the pendulum begin to swing again- there will be a grave risk of a coup d'état." Lumby, who estimated that last October "probably four-fifths of the people were against King's return", believed that before long there would be a
swing back to the Left. "EAM is at present in disgrace; but in its prime it comprised a great part of the most vital forces of the Greek nation." He believed that "what this country sadly lacks is an able statesman to lead it back to a middle way, to take the EAM programme out of the hands of the Communists and make it the platform for a centre block of progressive Democrats."(16)

In a confidential memorandum to Deakin, The Times Foreign News editor, on March 29, Lumby stated that the root of the matter was that the British Government appeared to the Greek people all along to be backing the King, and the King was extremely unpopular especially after he left the country to its fate in 1941. "The people did not want to have him back. (The fact that they do now does not alter things)...Apart from this the picture which Winston has given of the Greek affair makes everything black and white. It is not like that. Most of it is half-tones."(17) The leading article of April 17 was based on Lumby's remarks and categorically stated that "elections or a plebiscite held now in this highly charged atmosphere could in no way be satisfactory."

The Foreign Office considered that Lumby's two dispatches contained "much good sense", although "it may exaggerate extent and effectiveness of extreme Royalist activities"; it was not fair to say that the Varkiza Agreement was a dead letter and it did not deal with infringements of the Agreement by Left-wing extremists. However, it was thought, as The Times "has much influence on public opinion in Great Britain" to get Noel Paton to broadcast a speech over The Times' findings in Greece. Paton gave Laskey a version of the speech. Laskey thought that certain alterations must be made and Miss Dilys Powell of the PWE prepared a second copy "fuller and more completely factual of what The Times says."(18)

Meanwhile, the Foreign Office, in a telegram of "particular secrecy", asked Leeper to give his comments on allegations contained in Lumby's articles, "since I anticipate that
questions will be asked in Parliament."(19) On April 22, Leeper wrote back that The Times article did not give an entirely balanced picture for two reasons: 1) it neglected the effect on the Right and centre opinion of KKE propaganda threatening 'a third round'; 2) it did not take account of certain measures being taken by the Greek Government under the Varkiza Agreement to rectify matters. Then he gave his own account of facts and he stressed that they should continue to emphasise British views about the Varkiza Agreement.(20)

As the succession of Admiral Voulgaris as Prime Minister seemed to have been made without violent repercussions, it seemed likely that Athens might be fairly peaceful for a while. During May and June, news from Greece was reported only occasionally.

The Times taking advantage of the relative lull in Greece considered Hoare's position. Before Lumby left Athens to Belgrade he spoke to Hoare about finding a stringer.(21) It was to be Alkeos Angelopoulos, correspondent of the Athenian liberal newspaper Eleftheria and of the International News Service. Angelopoulos started his Times service in June as the paper's "own correspondent."(22)

Hoare anxious about his future, wrote to Deakin on February 2 asking if he could go to Bucharest and Belgrade for a short visit to write turnovers on the two countries. Lumby had already put his name down to go to Belgrade, and thus he had lost his chance. Feeling that "there was a determined attempt to get me out of Greece and also, I believe, to discredit me in your eyes", he asked Deakin, on April 23, if he could return to the Middle East.(23) He reassured him on his physical fitness and on the healing of his deafness after he had received an American "hearing aid". Almost simultaneously, on April 27, Deakin wrote to him that "we have talked over your position several times, but we have always felt that the only satisfactory plan will be for you to come to London for consultation" for two or three weeks. "If, while you
were away, a sudden outbreak occurs, we should have to ask Lumby to fly over and cover it."(24) Hoare was reluctant to return to London fearing that "once I was out of this country [Greece], it might not be easy to get back, at least, from the United Kingdom." Another reason for his reluctance was that because of his rheumatoid arthritis he was advised by his doctor not to return to England to avoid damp and cold. He therefore suggested coming back to London at the end of July.(25) In September, in a last effort, he communicated with his editor. Barrington-Ward, after giving him "high praise for his work", told him that while he was prepared to continue his wartime temporary employment, he could not put him on the full staff. "He is not quite up to that" he wrote in his diary, "apart from his deafness, and there are stronger claims, in time, to be met."(26) His last Greek article for The Times was on May 17 and 18, reporting from Crete the liberation of the Aegean Islands. After a short service in Beirut and Damascus in June and July, he returned to Cairo and then to London via Athens on October 5. When he returned to Athens in December he was no longer with The Times, but with the News Chronicle.

By the end of June, the situation in Athens had become explosive and there was fear of a Right-wing coup d’etat.(27) In July, Greece had again occupied a position of high interest in the British press, although all the press correspondents were instructed to cut down their filing to the bare minimum in view of the very small amount of space available in the British press for any foreign news items as the British general election was coming up(July 26).(28)

Observers believed that Greek political developments would be influenced by the outcome of the British elections. On July 5 the News Chronicle's big headlines on the front page ran: "Greek Monarchists Are Hoping for Tory Victory. Plot to Seize Power in Athens." Unless strong persuasion was used by Britain to induce the Greek Government to enforce law and order, to protect the lives and liberties of Left-wing elements and to suppress monarchist
agitation, a fresh outbreak in Greece at an early date seemed inevitable. (29) On July 12, the 
Daily Herald had on the front page similar headlines: "Plot to Seize Power, Restore King in 
Greece. Royal Storm Prepare for Rising. Coup if Plebiscite Backs Republic." Ewer wrote that 
the Greek Government, though professing complete impartiality, was passively conniving at 
activities going on openly under its nose. 

On July 13, the Manchester Guardian editorially criticised Churchill's policy in Greece 
and asked that further and stronger action should be taken to ensure that Greece was really and 
truly rid of fascism. Greece stood as a test case for Europe. Britain should invite the Soviet 
Union and the United States to join her in the task of bringing Greece back to normality. "Only 
in that way shall we avoid the suspicion of trying to impose on Greece a Government 
subservient to our needs."(30) This article caught the attention of the Foreign Office. Laskey 
minuted, "although the situation in Greece at the moment is by no means as good as we should 
wish to see it, it nevertheless approaches nearer to democracy than the situation in any other 
Balkan country. It is extremely difficult to get this simple fact across to the British press 
because of the total black-out on news from the other Balkan countries."(31) That was an idea 
which would be given further thought, as we will see. 

On July 25, Stephen Barber of the News Chronicle in a four-column article entitled 
"Greece Awaits our Elections Results", stated that there was still plenty of potential trouble 
around and ELAS was not "the special source of unease", but the Royalist Right was more 
important and dangerous. The republicans' fear that elections and a plebiscite held under 
present conditions would be merely a farce, was not unnatural as in charge of internal security 
was the National Band, which had lost whatever impartiality it had. 

On the day of the British general election all eyes in Greece were turned upon Britain. 
The victory of the Labour Party over Churchill's Conservatives came as a profound shock to 
157
everyone. AIS reported: "No event since the December revolution has produced an impact upon Greek political life comparable in unexpectedness and breadth of possibilities to those of the British elections...psychologically a whole new world of possibilities has been created in the minds of the Greeks." The royalists feared the prospect of an alliance between the Greek and the British Left. The Liberals were heartened; they felt certain that it would prevent the return of King George. The ELD/SKE was enthusiastic: it more than any other Greek party felt an ideological affinity with British social democracy. The KKE, although pleased by Churchill's fall from power, remained wary of his successors, who were known to feel little sympathy for Communism.(32)

Capell of the Daily Telegraph estimated that the Right Wing had lost 20 per cent, of their following as a result of the British elections; that if the Greek elections had been possible last autumn the Left Wing would have swept the country; and that after the December events 80 per cent of Greeks would have voted for restoration of the Monarchy, but now the figure would not be more than 60 per cent.(33)

In the meantime, the News Department felt that criticism of the situation in Greece and hence of British policy was increasing in the Left-wing press and that they might be in more trouble later. Several British papers printed statements made by Greek republican politicians, such as Sofianopoulos(34) in The Observer(35) and the News Chronicle and Kafandaris(36) in the News Chronicle(37), who pointed out that conditions for fair elections were lacking. Ridsdale drew Laskey's attention to an article which appeared in The Observer on July 19, where Kafandaris declared that his party would not participate in plebiscite or elections.(38) On July 20, the Foreign Office sent Harold Caccia(39) a copy of that article, adding that this was no doubt part of the campaign now being waged by republican and other Left wing parties.
against the Government's announced intention of holding the elections and plebiscite this year.

The Foreign Office telegram went on:

Unfortunately such declarations tend to be accepted at their face value by Left Wing press here and for lack of positive evidence to the contrary the impression may grow up that Right Wing excesses are increasing and that internal security situation so far from having improved is deteriorating. I hope, therefore, that you will report any evidence that their efforts are proving successful. It would, of course, be most helpful if correspondents in Athens could be persuaded to give a more balanced picture.(40)

Caccia responded to the Foreign Office saying that Lancaster "has been doing his best to get such few British correspondents as remain in Athens to give a fair and balanced picture of events...Most of the recent grossly distorted accounts of the situation here have been the work of stray Americans passing through...and never make contact with the Embassy."

On August 20, Bevin made his first speech as Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons. It became clear that there would be little change in the conduct of foreign affairs.

Most of the British press welcomed Bevin's speech and they pointed out the continuity in British foreign policy.

In the liberal press, A P Wadsworth, editor of the Manchester Guardian, was an admirer of Bevin, and the paper warmly supported his policies(42); the News Chronicle wrote that in his speech there was no radical change of British policy. "In Greece, for example, the status quo is accepted."(43)

In the conservative papers, J L Garvin in the Daily Telegraph wrote, "with his strong national traits and his fund of common sense, it is just possible that Mr. Bevin may prove not merely a successful Foreign Secretary but a great one"; the Daily Mail wrote that Bevin "like Mr. Churchill, has not come to office to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire."
Regarding Greece, Bevin's policy "is clearly in no whit different from that of Mr. Churchill's."(44)

In the Labour Left press, The New Statesman wrote that Bevin's policy "expressly reaffirmed the continuity...with that of Mr. Eden, and associated this country with US State Department protests against 'Left-wing dictatorship in the Balkans'." Regarding Greece, his statements were "by no means reassuring." The journal defended the right to criticism because, if constructive and well-informed, it augured well for the future.(45) Tribune stated that "Labour has given a bold lead in transforming the Churchillian legacy in the West. It has only been able to lift the veil from some of the consequences of the zoning policy. It cannot attack the root of the trouble -the principle of zoning- unless it has cleared the Greek stumbling block out of the way."(46)

Bevin's statement on Greece was greeted with astonishment in Athens. All parties had expected the Labour Government to throw its weight firmly behind the republican cause. The monarchists could scarcely believe their good fortune, while the republicans were thrown into "disorder, if not actual panic."(47)

The communist leader, Nikos Zachariadis, in a speech in Salonika on August 23, warned that there would be a resort to arms if the British adhered to the Churchillian policies Bevin had outlined in his Commons speech. Sylvia Sprigge(48) was among the 150,000 audience in the Hermes Stadium. After the speech, in an hour's interview, Zachariadis, responding to her question whether he wanted British troops to be withdrawn, said that when the troops go "there will be civil war for two months. Then everything will be all right."(49)

After this interview Sprigge reported what had happened to Reuters local correspondent who was also editor of a liberal Salonika paper. He "could not resist the temptation" and he published the story in his paper on August 25.(50) Zachariadis denied his
statement to Sprigge in a letter to Professor Laski published on August 28 in Rizospastis, the KKE daily paper: "I only gave this correspondent the text of my speech with some additional facts concerning Monarchist-Fascist activity in which the British military authorities had directly participated." Sprigge insisted that "the fact remains that Mr. Zachariadis said precisely the words reported."(51) An editorial in the Manchester Guardian the following day condemned Zachariadis' tactics. "Mr. Zachariadis himself gives an interview one day and, on second thoughts, flatly denies it the next. How can the outside world be expected to take any Greek Communist allegations at their face value?"(52)

It was thought in the Foreign Office that Zachariadis' statement must have done the Communist cause great harm both in Greece and in Britain. The News Department were making all they could of the Salonika telegrams, stressing the complete inconsistency of the Communist Party in arguing that a fascist terror existed in Greece, while Zachariadis was able to hold mass meetings and to attack the Greek and the British Governments. Laskey also draw the attention of News Department to the assurances Zachariadis had given to Leeper in June shortly after his return from Dachau prison that "he would work for close cooperation between the three major allies and he would not stir up trouble in Greece."(53) Zachariadis' phrase was much quoted as an indication that KKE intended to renew their attempts to seize power. Bevin, too, at the UN Security Council in January 1946, launching his offensive against Andrei Vyshinsky, member of the Soviet delegation, quoted at length from this interview.

In retrospect we know Zachariadis was only sabre-rattling. His threats to start a civil war were an exercise in political bargaining. In any event, for the next twelve months no practical measures were taken to translate these threats into concrete policy.(54)

Sprigge, the Manchester Guardian's Rome correspondent, was sent to Greece in August for a short visit after Hoare had terminated his Greek assignment. She wrote three long
articles on her "Impressions of Greece" on: Anglo-Greek relations; Greece and her northern neighbours and the question of monarchy.

On her first article, "The Friendship with Britain", she wrote that Greece was an allied country in a Balkan world which disliked England and British imperial interests. "Today in Greece, British naval needs in Greek ports are taken so much for granted that they are hardly discussed." She wrote of the country's appalling war devastation affecting the economy and of the legacy of the Metaxas dictatorship and German occupation which had accentuated the political hatred. "This is the background against which the claim that there is a white terror in Greece must be examined."(55)

In her third article Sprigge dealt with the question of monarchy. "Everyone I saw, whether British or Greek, with only one exception, said that it would certainly be a great relief if the King would abdicate...The King's cause in Greece of 1945,..., is far too thin to enlist any but the most reactionary and heavy-witted supporters. Modern Greece refuses to be ruled by the King's men, and in Greece that is what monarchy means." She went on, "we shall certainly stay in Greece and see her through the difficult times ahead...But it would be a tragedy if our presence there had to be enlisted in a Royalist cause which we have no grounds for believing in and which the majority of Greeks do not support. EAM must get back into a Coalition Government."(56) Her article on "The Macedonian Problem" will be examined later.

The problem of the timing of the plebiscite and elections became acute and Damaskinos came to London to discuss the matter personally with Bevin.(57) Maximum publicity was arranged for his visit. On August 27, Field Marshal Sir Alan F Brooke of the War Office passed on to Sir A Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office, a message from Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander in Athens about the need for good coverage of the forthcoming
visit of Damaskinos to London. Bevin considered that the Regent should be regarded as the guest of the British Government. A reception was also arranged by the Archbishop of Canterbury and on September 10 a press conference at MOL. On September 6, Damaskinos arrived in London. On September 19, on his day of departure from England, an Allied Statement (excluding the Soviets) postponing the plebiscite was issued by the Foreign Office to the Press. On September 20, another statement was issued, summing up the value of his visit and giving brief note of subjects discussed in London e.g. the material assistance afforded to Greece.

The Times published the Regent's statement. The News Chronicle stated that the "the illusion cherished in some quarters" that the weight of British influence was being thrown on the side of the Royalist Right would disperse with the acceptance by Britain, alongside of France and the United States, to postpone the plebiscite. "There is no reason to doubt that the British Government sincerely desires the fairest possible elections held in Greece on the widest possible register, and fervently hopes that a stable representative Government will result from the polling." That editorial pleased Laskey who wrote that "this is the most friendly article in the News Chronicle which I have seen for a long time. I hope News Department can keep it up."

Yet, Bevin was unwilling to involve himself any deeper in Greek affairs. He had already interfered with the scheduling of the plebiscite in the Allied statement of September 20. He found himself in the predicament of wanting Damaskinos to behave independently but also in a manner pleasing to Britain.

In Greece, the Voulgaris 'service' Government failed to fulfil its purpose and on October 6 he submitted his resignation. Balked at the prospect of angering the royalists, Damaskinos was unwilling to create a Government of the Left-Centre. On October 10 he invited Sofoulis to
head a Government of all parties save the KKE. But the Populists refused to cooperate and
demanded a new 'service' Government. On October 12, several thousands of royalists defied a
ban on public gatherings and demonstrated in Syntagma Square. The police dispersed them and
made many arrests, but most of the prisoners were freed by soldiers and military cadets who
arrived on the scene. Fear of a royalist coup d'état gripped Athens again. On October 17,
Damaskinos assumed the premiership himself in a desperate attempt to restore calm.

The deterioration of the situation in Athens was alarming and the British Embassy
suggested to Sir Orme Sargent, Under-Secretary of the Southern Department, that it would be
useful if Laskey would pay a short visit to Athens to see people on the spot and report to the
Department orally. Laskey left for Greece on October 31. The Foreign Office felt that there
might be a renewal of public interest in Greece during the next few months. They, therefore,
were interested in having some details about the present situation as regards press
 correspondents. On October 31, the Southern Department asked Lancaster to send a list of the
correspondents, more especially those of British papers and agencies, with brief comments
giving his own opinion of them and of the extent to which they cooperated with the
Embassy.

The British press unanimously supported the view that, under the prevailing
circumstances, a more active British intervention might save the situation.

On October 17, The Times Athens correspondent wrote, "undoubtedly the policy of
scrupulous non-intervention, adopted by the British Government...has been misinterpreted by
the right and has encouraged it to stifle every attempt to for a Government which would not be
entirely under its control."

On October 20, the Manchester Guardian stated in a leader that it was impossible for
the British Government to try to restore democracy to Greece without intervening in Greek
politics. Britain's political reputation in Europe depended in part on making sure that Greece did get democratic Government, "even if it means more active intervention than we should wish." Similarly the News Chronicle editorially stressed that "surely the worst of all policies is to intervene half-heartedly...The moral leadership of Europe is open to us if we demonstrate that, where our own writ runs, we are determined to see that the popular will prevails."(66)

The Labour Left press also stressed that Britain should intervene to protect Greece from a right-wing dictatorship. On October 19, Tribune stated, "now to practise strict non-intervention...is in fact to sanction the artificial ascendancy of the Right."(67) The New Statesman agreed. This passive policy permitted the Right to dominate the country and encouraged it to intensify its anti-communist campaign.(68)

On October 20, Bevin took a hesitant step towards a forceful intervention. In a personal message to Damaskinos, he made it evident that his sympathies lay with the republicans by stating that he would gladly consider a postponement of the elections until the spring of 1946.(69) On November 23, in the House of Commons, Bevin defended his decision to agree to a postponement of the plebiscite.(70) Both the Manchester Guardian and the Daily Herald praised his decision. The first wrote that Bevin on Greece "was both illuminating and wise"(71); the latter stated that it was "a gesture of idealism and realism combined, an act of true moral leadership."(72)

With a new Left-Centre Government in Greece under the liberal Sofoulis, formed in November 1945, and the postponement of the plebiscite the British press was waiting for the Greek general elections announced for March 31 1946.
Closely related to the political crisis was the ruined state of the Greek economy. On December 13, the British Economic Mission had arrived in Athens (73) and every possible measure was taken to ensure its good publicity. Leeper, in a correspondence with McNeil on December 11, stated that it had been arranged with the Greek Under-Secretary of Press with the assistance of British information services to launch a full scale propaganda campaign in support of the Government's reconstruction programme. There was the thought that in future it might be useful to employ the Greek radio and press, as well as the British news service in Athens for this campaign. (74)

While the Economic Mission was doing a "great job", with regard to British correspondents in Athens Leeper was not equally impressed. On December 17, he cabled McNeil that the main difficulty was the absence of "any really first-rate" correspondent. (75) The Times still had "a local Greek", Alkeos Angelopoulos, "whose copy though balanced and accurate they seldom print." He asked whether The Times could send their diplomatic correspondent for a short while, and whether the BBC could be induced to expedite Kenneth Matthews, who knew Greece well and he "was very fair minded last year and could be relied upon to concentrate on essentials." (76)

The Foreign Office made inquiries about C D R Lumby and Basil Davidson of The Times whether they were available to go to Greece. Lumby had established himself in Rome and Davidson was in Belgrade and his paper had other plans for him. Concerning McDonald, The Times was not thinking to send him to Athens. McNeil spoke to J J Astor, The Times proprietor, who told him that he was looking for somebody who had served with the Army in Greece and who had been demobilised, provided that he had sufficient ability. As the Southern and the News Departments did not have any officer in mind who would do the job, it was thought to ask Lancaster in Athens and the PR Department of the War Office whether they

166
could suggest a suitable candidate. Thus the choice for the new *Times* correspondent was taken up by the Foreign Office and high-ranking officials. "Meanwhile we can hammer away at The Times in London" wrote Nash. He met McDonald on December 24 and till January 1 he had spoken on several occasions to *The Times.*(77)

Concerning the BBC correspondent Kenneth Matthews, the Foreign Office was informed that he was covering the Nuremberg trials which were expected to last more than three months. The BBC was thinking of sending another less experienced correspondent for a "tip and run" visit of a few days. But McNeil stressed that he would very much like to have a good man from the BBC to send out to Athens. Laskey agreed that it would be not much use for someone to be sent out simply for a week or two. "We want a man who will be able to stay in Athens at least until the Economic Mission gets well under way and this period would not be likely to last less than a couple of months." Nash took up the question of a BBC representative with Patric Ryan of the News Division. Ryan promised "to keep its need of Athens well to the fore." Nash was awaiting the result of the BBC consultations.(78)

**The Growing Estrangement: the Soviet Press**

The Soviet reticence demonstrated during the December events lasted for less than three months. A rapid change of Soviet attitude towards Greece would set the tone for the future, and that was one of increasing hostility. In noting this change of Soviet attitude, Clark Kerr -who had been one of the few eye-witnesses of the 'Balkan percentages' meeting at Moscow on October 1944- would report back to the Foreign Office, "this abandonment by the Soviet press of previous ostentatiously neutral attitude about Greece is doubtless connected with line we are taking over Rumania which Soviet Government regards as having been given
them in exchange for Greece." He suggested that this change first became apparent on February 25 1945. Laskey's own impression, however, was that the change of the Soviet Government's attitude had not been so sudden as Clark Kerr suggested. The Soviet press on February 23, Laskey argued, was already critical of the Greek Government. To his opinion another cause of this change of attitude might well have been the arrival of a TASS correspondent in Athens on about February 17, whose dispatches, as Leeper stated, had been uniformly critical of the Greek Government. Nash, Howard and Sargent agreed.(79) Lincoln MacVeigh, the American Ambassador in Athens, agreed with the Foreign Office that the Soviet change of attitude became apparent with the arrival of the TASS correspondent.(80)

The TASS correspondent was Leonid Velitchansky.(81) His personality had impressed the British Embassy on first introduction. He was described as "earnest and polite, he strives to conceal behind a facade of nervous generosity a considerable shrewdness."(82) Since the Soviets had no Ambassador in Athens - Colonel Popov, Soviet Ambassador in Athens had left Greece after the Varkiza Agreement and the new Ambassador, Admiral Rodionov, arrived on December 30- and there was no other diplomatic representative, Velitchansky would become the highest ranking Soviet representative in Greece, from whom even the Soviet Military Mission took orders.(83)

As the Foreign Office was aware of Velitchansky's hostile dispatches to Moscow, it considered measures to restrict him. In May, Sir O Sargent wondered whether a plausible excuse could be found for expelling him.(84) But for three reasons Velitchansky's expulsion was difficult: a) he had not committed any offence; b) the Soviet authorities had not expelled British correspondents from Bulgaria or Rumania(85) and c) if they expelled him as an open reprisal for the treatment of British correspondents in Rumania and Bulgaria or for the destruction by the Soviet authorities of the work of British missions in those countries, it might
annoy the Soviet Government without, at the same time, leading to better treatment being given to them. The only way, therefore, in which the British could take action was to censor his dispatches. But, as the Athens Embassy telegraphed to Sargent, there was no British political censorship and no Greek censorship and it would be difficult to change this policy suddenly at this stage. "If we were to stop TASS correspondent's messages on these grounds we should have to treat other dispatches in the same way. Sooner or later this will embroil us with the Americans."(87)

Velitchansky's criticism of the Greek Government became sharper and it was, of course, an implied criticism of the British policy there. On June 27, Clark Kerr from Moscow reported to the Foreign Office that the Greek Ambassador was seriously concerned at the increasing strength of the press campaign against the Greek Government.(88) On the same day, Caccia transmitted to the Foreign Office that since Velitchansky's return from a short visit to Turkey "his articles have become even more offensive than before. Hitherto he had confined himself to transmitting the violent passages in the local KKE press but now he is writing his own messages." Since Velitchansky's reports formed the basis for attacks on the Greek Government and since it was impossible to rely on censorship to modify or suppress his messages, Caccia also suggested whether the Greek Government should be encouraged to raise the matter in Moscow.(89)

Laskey supported Caccia's idea, which in May had been rejected because the Foreign Office did not wish to embroil Greece with Russia.(90) "A protest in Moscow", Laskey argued, "might not produce any very marked improvement but it could scarcely make the position worse and it would pave the way for Velitchansky's expulsion if this latter became necessary." He suggested that the Greek Government might take up this question with that of Soviet diplomatic representation in Greece. "It is ridiculous that 8 months after liberation the Soviet
Government should still rely on a press correspondent and a low-level military mission for all their direct information about events in Greece."(91) The Southern and News Departments agreed that if action was to be taken in Moscow the British should play the principal role and not merely support a Greek protest. It adopted Laskey's suggestion that the best form for an approach to the Soviet Government might be to link it with that of Soviet representation in Greece, a point with which Hayter did not agree. It was also agreed that, as it was expected that articles would shortly appear in the British press critical of Soviet policy in Bulgaria and Rumania, it was important that British protest about the Soviet press should be made before these articles appeared, since the Soviet Government might complain that the British were launching a press campaign against them at the very moment when they were asking them to moderate the tone of their own press.

On July 4, a telegram was sent to Moscow Embassy along the above lines, plus a suggestion made by C F A Warner, Foreign Office Counsellor, that the matter might be raised at a Big Three Meeting "in the hope of reaching agreement for cessation of press criticism on both sides." That point was objected to by C W Lloyd of the MOI. In a letter to Eden he wrote, "it may be that the Foreign Office merely have in mind the possibility of influencing the press to moderate the tone of their criticism of Russian policy in Bulgaria and Romania in return for similar action by the USSR. If this is so, I only hope that the Foreign Office are not overrating their chances of success. They are, in our view, extremely limited."(92) Clark Kerr, as we will see, objected this idea and the whole suggestion dropped.(93)

In Athens, Caccia informed the Foreign Office, on July 7, on a marked increase in Soviet propaganda in Greece "in the last few weeks", of which the most recent manifestation was the founding of a Greek-Soviet League. Its aim was the furtherance of good relation between the two countries and with, as it seemed, endless funds had an ambitious programme
of conferences, lectures and discussions. The Greek sponsors were mainly Leftist and liberal academic members, while the open participation of KKE had been "carefully avoided." The management of the League's affairs was entirely in the hands of Velichansky and Pirlianos, the director of Sovfilm, a film company. Caccia also pointed out that Velitchansky, after his recent visit to Turkey, brought back with him a large quantity of propaganda material. But, he went on, there were indications that the decision to issue propaganda material was a hasty one and that no long-term plan had previously been worked out. He stressed that even the Greek Government accepted the League on its face value and had the blessing of the Greek Minister of Information, Zacynthinos. He then suggested that it was essential that the British Council should receive all the support they could take. He asked for the supply of books, newspapers, lectures etc. to be speeded up and, in particular, that the Council should quickly appoint their local representative and acquire "suitable premises despite the fact that these are, in present circumstances, bound to be costly." Laskey took up the matter with the Cultural Relations Department, which arranged for regular sending of propaganda material to Greece. It was also felt essential to appoint a full-time Council representative to Athens, and to re-open the question of the Anglo-Greek Cultural Convention(94), signed in 1940, but never ratified.(95)

The British decided to counteract Soviet press criticism by giving publicity to developments in areas under Soviet influence in South East Europe. There had been British correspondents in Rumania(96) and in Bulgaria there were none until the Daily Herald had asked permission in late April 1945 to send one.(97) Clark Kerr welcomed this news, and agreed that public opinion should not be left uninformed of happenings in South Eastern Europe. "It seems to me desirable that publicity should not confine itself to the position in individual countries, but should also bring out under-lying pattern of developments throughout
the area under Soviet influence."(98) He disapproved the idea of bringing up question at the Big Three meeting. "Any such proposal would take us into very deep waters. The Soviet Government would naturally interpret it as implying admission that the British Government can effectively control the press, which we have hitherto always denied. Even if we could, we should then be committed to participating in news blackout in Eastern Europe, against which we have protested so strongly, and which there is now some hope of lifting. Finally, we should lay ourselves open to charges of bad faith if individual British newspapers refused to come into line as seems only too likely." He suggested continuing protesting against Soviet misreporting and seeing that correspondents have full facilities to report from South East Europe.(99)

Meanwhile in mid-June, TASS and the Yugoslav, Albanian and Bulgarian news agencies intensified their attacks against the "monarcho-fascist" Greek Government and alleged that it was suppressing the Slav minority in Macedonia. On 21 June, Borba, the Yugoslav Communist newspaper, spoke of a "separate Macedonian nationality". During the Potsdam Conference, the Yugoslav Government submitted a memorandum to the three major powers, and a protest to the Greek Government, alleging persecution of the "Macedonians of the Aegean" whom it described as "our co-nationals." More important than these allegations was the attitude of Tito himself. On July 8 1945, he spoke of the oppression of "Slav minorities" in Greece, which was compelling "democratic Greeks and Slavo-Macedonians" to take refuge in Yugoslavia. On October 11, he made a speech which was widely interpreted as laying claim to "Aegean Macedonia."(100) The British did not know quite what to make of Yugoslav policy on the Macedonian question in general. The Foreign Office at times suspected Tito of using this issue as a pretext for invasion of northern Greece. But Tito assured them that he had no designs
on Greek territory, and the British Embassy in Belgrade was inclined to take him at his word. (101)

On July 30, Frank Roberts of the British Embassy in Moscow informed the Foreign Office that the Yugoslav Ambassador invited correspondents of the Anglo-American Press Association in Moscow on a twenty-day tour of Yugoslavia. He believed that whatever these correspondents might write about Macedonia or Venezia Giulia would be so doctored by Yugoslav censorship, and perhaps Russian also, as to turn it into pro-Tito propaganda. He wrote: "in view of the present position in Greece it seems to me to be undesirable that the British press should publish dispatches on the Macedonian problem which could provide raw material for the Yugoslav and Soviet propaganda machines, and possibly also mislead British public." To forestall this, he suggested that the Greek Government should be asked to invite British and American journalists to tour Greek Macedonia, so that two versions of the story would reach London and the United States. The MOI, though did not share Roberts' gloomy view, and they thought that the trip might produce some material of which they would be able to make convenient use, they were in favour of a visit of British journalists to Greek Macedonia.

The Foreign Office found "very odd" the Yugoslav action in inviting the journalists from Moscow, and in having rushed this scheme through without consulting the British, or even informing them. They agreed with Roberts that the purpose of this invitation was to serve the ends of Yugoslav propaganda, though sharing the MOI's view that the tour might not be an unqualified success from Yugoslav Soviet-point of view. On August 4, they instructed Stevenson of the Belgrade Embassy to extract an explanation from the Yugoslav Government of their conduct and motives. The following day, they asked the Athens Embassy to arrange a visit of British journalists to Greek Macedonia. It was thought the journalists must be sent
independently from the Greek Government, otherwise it would be seen as a rival party to the
Yugoslav one. It would also show that the British accepted the Yugoslav tour as a propaganda
device and that they were nervous of its effects. It would therefore be much better for the
Greek tour to be arranged after the Yugoslav one was over and after the British had seen what
it produced.(102)

At the suggestion of the News Department five British and American correspondents
were sent to Macedonia to investigate the situation. They were: Salusbury of the Daily Herald,
Barber of the News Chronicle, Alexander Clifford(103) of the Daily Mail, Sedgwick of the
New York Times and King of Associated Press. Sylvia Sprigge of the Manchester Guardian,
"the only nigger in the woodpile" as Lancaster had written about her, was sent from Rome by
her newspaper.

The five correspondents left for Macedonia on about August 11 and remained there a
fortnight. They went independently and unsponsored by the Greek Government, for "the Greek
Ministry of Press might only too easily antagonise correspondents by overdoing propaganda,"
wrote Caccia to Foreign Office.(104)

The correspondents' reports were unanimous on the following points: a) the Greek side
of the frontier was quiet and all Yugoslav and Bulgarian reports of armed incursions over the
border were without foundation; b) reports that the Slavophone population was being
persecuted were always grossly exaggerated and in most cases baseless; c) armed bands
terrorising border regions were largely composed of Slavs and a fair proportion of ex-ELAS
men. They were undoubtedly encouraged and assisted by Yugoslavs; d) Yugoslav frontier
guards were truculent and did not conceal their anti-Greek sentiments; e) no genuine desire for
an autonomous Macedonia existed even among Slavophones on the Greek side of the frontier;
and f) that it was the deliberate intention of Slav powers aided by certain extreme Left-wing
Greek elements to provoke an incident and that the whole situation was tense and potentially highly dangerous.

Lancaster recommended that the "maximum publicity could be secured for these dispatches and editors induced to use them as far as possible in full."(105) Bevin suggested that the conclusions of these newspaper correspondents should be passed on to "one or two responsible newspapers." "We could only do this" wrote Nash to Hayter of the Southern Department "by representing these reports as coming from independent sources, as newspapers naturally hesitate to adopt the views of their rivals...I have been in touch with the BBC who have undertaken to carry it on their Home, European and Overseas Services."(106)

On August 27, the Daily Mail printed Clifford's article, an "excellent" one Laskey and Nash commented.(107) The News Chronicle did not publish Barber's and the Daily Herald Salusbury's. The News Department urged both papers to print them; the Daily Herald argued that Salusbury's article was far too long and "did not merit publication"; the News Chronicle argued that the article arrived at a time when they had a good deal of Greece in the paper. The Foreign Office kept urging the News Chronicle, unsuccessfully, to publish Barber's article.

"Other newspapers", wrote Nash on September 13, "whom we approached have kept well on the rails." Thus the Daily Telegraph printed an article on September 13 and the Daily Mail another on September 17.(108)

Sylvia Sprigge of the Manchester Guardian had also been in Salonika. She was not "persona grata" with the military authorities because, before her arrival from Rome, she had written an article attacking British troops in Italy. She met Zachariadis in KKE headquarters. Lancaster wrote to the Foreign Office that she spent a lot of time in KKE headquarters and she "was much struck with Zachariadis charm and ability" and he was expecting "the worst" from her messages.(109) Sprigge interviewed Zachariadis who gave her the famous statement that
"there will be civil war for two months and then everything will be all right." Despite Lancaster's fears for "the worst", Sprigge's three-series article on "Impressions of Greece" was considered by the Foreign Office as "not bad articles though the third ("The Question of the Monarchy") contains some curious misstatements and is much too favourable to EAM."(110)

The Labour Left press, which was critical of Bevin's policy almost immediately after his first speech in the Commons on August 20, attacked Bevin's Balkan policy. On August 25, The New Statesman stated that Bevin's policy in South-Eastern Europe was in danger not only of antagonising Russia, but of obstructing economic and social reconstruction there(111); on September 15, in a long article it was argued that the British together with the Americans constituted "a united front to stem the tide of Russian Communism." The publication was against dividing Europe into spheres of interest. It was the fears and the profound misunderstanding of Anglo-American policy which poisoned the atmosphere in South-Eastern Europe. It was this mental atmosphere of South-Eastern Europe that should be appreciated.(112) On September 14, Tribune argued that the deterioration of Greek relations with her neighbours, particularly with Yugoslavia "which was not exclusively the fault of Greece" was the inevitable result of the attempt at making Greece an anti-Communist bastion.(113)

At the end of December 1945, attacks against the Greek Government for terrorising the Slavo-Macedonians were renewed in the Soviet and Yugoslav press.(114) These attacks were soon to be brought before the UN Security Council. The growing estrangement between Soviets and British became only too apparent.

While the Soviet criticism increased in volume, the American press continued its attack on British policy towards Greece, but in a less fierce way. Names like Drew Pearson, Richard Mowrer of the New York Post, Harold Lehrman and Roi Ottley, special Athens
correspondents of New York "P. M.", even the New York Times and Washington Post continued to keep the British officials busy. The Washington Embassy asked for guidance and material to enable them to reply to eventual enquiries. Leeper in Athens was worrying about an increase of American propaganda in Greece. Churchill himself tried to soothe him. "Do not worry too much" he wrote to Leeper on April 20. "Now with President Truman we have a man...who advances with a firm step and is, I believe, extremely friendly to Great Britain." On the same day, April 20, the Foreign Office instructed Halifax to seek an opportunity of impressing on the State Department "the dangers which we foresee if we and the Americans do not keep closely in step over Greek affairs...we should welcome an exchange of views with them on any aspect of the situation whenever they think it advisable."

American criticism mostly concerned the deteriorating state of ELAS's persecutions by rightist and royalist elements. The Foreign Office responded by counteracting the unfavourable criticism as the case of Lehrman's article suggests. This article was printed in P.M on June 17 and appeared in The New Statesman on June 23. Lehrman, who spent sixteen days touring in Thessaly, Macedonia and Thrace, argued that the "national bands" had not yet been disbanded and they helped the National Guard in rounding up communists; many people had been imprisoned without charges and in some cases persons had been jailed without good cause; there was discrimination against the Leftist press and whilst Leftist activities were suppressed, there was unrestricted propaganda for the King.

Though Lehrman's main attack was directed against the Greek Government, it "is nevertheless calculated to...lay the blame at our door" cabled Halifax from Washington. Both he and Caccia in Athens suggested that a statement by the British Government should be issued, not merely to point out that the Greek Government was attempting to get the situation in hand but also to indicate that, besides supporting and assisting the Greeks, the British
Post-War Organisational Re-arrangements

As the end of war in Europe was fast approaching, there was, among others, the need for reorganisation of information services in Greece. One section of the Press Department of the British Embassy was the Anglo-Greek Information Service (AGIS). Its head was Colonel Kenneth Johnstone, who had been the British Council representative in Greece before the war. The AGIS depended on the PWE and the War Office, who were responsible for paying half the salaries of the 500 AGIS members. The Greek section of PWE provided a great deal of material for AGIS, and the War Office provided trained staff and non-military technical supplies such as paper and wireless equipment.

On June 19, a meeting was held at the Foreign Office to discuss the future of the AGIS. Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, Head of the PWE, explained that the Treasury were pressing them over the expenditure on AGIS which at present amounted to about 100,000 a year. Moreover,
PWB in Italy would shortly be liquidated and some new arrangements would therefore be
necessary, since AGIS depended on PWB. Present were Sir Reginald Leeper, Colonel
Johnstone and John Paniguian of the Athens Embassy. All agreed that AGIS must continue at
its present strength at least until the plebiscite and elections were held in Greece. They were
also contemplating whether AGIS should be transferred either to the MOI or to the War Office.
Paniguian stressed the importance of preserving the London end of AGIS -PWE- intact during
the coming critical months. The Greek Section of PWE provided a great deal of material which
AGIS would continue to need. The meeting agreed that the Greek Section of PWE should
continue so long as AGIS itself existed. Then the MOI should be invited to make plans for
taking over publicity work in Greece as from the date on which AGIS would cease to function.
The meeting then considered the measures which should be adopted immediately in order to
ensure that, when AGIS disappeared towards the end of 1945, the work it had been doing
would be carried on. The most important of these measures was the reorganisation of Radio
Athens.(123) It was reformed as a state-controlled company on the lines of the BBC, and
British assistance was to be given in the form of equipment and technical advisers.(124) On
June 20, Lancaster sent to the Foreign Office a memorandum covering some of the subjects
which were raised at the meeting in the Foreign Office on June 19. Most of the
recommendations in this memorandum dealt with the MOI organisation which would have to
come into being when AGIS went.(125)

As the Greek elections had been arranged for March 31 1946, it was thought to keep
AGIS functioning for a period after January 1 1946, if necessary, to avoid interruption of
information services at this crucial time. Careful consideration was given to maintain "the high
standard" of the AGIS and it was arranged for a senior MOI official to go to Greece in
mid-November in order to arrange matters regarding policy, personnel, finance and administration.

Newspapers too were to reorganise their post-war staff. After the Varkiza Agreement most of the correspondents dispersed to other theatres, most of them to Belgrade. Hoare of The Times left Greece in April leaving A Angelopoulos in charge; Robert Bigio of Reuters returned to London in April leaving Sam Modiano(127) in his place, Kenneth Matthews of the BBC went to Germany to cover the Nuremberg trial. Salisbury of the Daily Herald and Capell of the Daily Telegraph remained in Athens.

Lancaster welcomed the news that Bigio was to go. "This is an admirable idea of which I am all in favour" he wrote to Nash. But he suggested that it would be preferable to appoint a British substitute in Bigio's place, instead of Modiano. Though Modiano was a "good journalist" and "trustworthy" he could not treat him with the same confidence as he would a British substitute. Moreover, in view of the row in the House of Commons on the subject of British papers employing foreign correspondents in Athens, he felt that if trouble broke out there, there might be unfavourable criticism if Reuters had a local Greek. Nash reassured him that Modiano's appointment was merely a stopgap arrangement and Chancellor agreed to send a suitable staff substitute in about three weeks.(128)

F H Salisbury was the favourite of both the Foreign Office and the Embassy. They were anxious, as we have seen, to have this particular correspondent kept in place, whilst they would have been happy to see most of the other correspondents replaced. He was considered, as Laskey had put it on April 15, "by far the best British correspondent in Greece."(129) Salisbury, however, never ceased to complain to his editor at how little of his copy appeared in the Daily Herald. Their relations were weakened when in August it was learnt that he had
improper links with the royalist Athens press. He was writing for the monarchist Athens paper Embros and he was showing his dispatches to this paper. As some of his cables were not published in the Daily Herald, that was apt to be embarrassing. In an exchange of letters between the correspondent and his editor, Salusbury denied that Embros was a reactionary monarchist organ and expressed the strong view that his contributions to the newspaper were calculated to have a favourable effect, and that a useful purpose was also served by showing Embros copies of his cables to London. The Daily Herald took the view that he must cease showing these cables and that he must cease writing for Embros. Salusbury took a poor view of this. He remained in Greece until 1949.

Meanwhile The Times, as we have seen, was looking for a new correspondent and the BBC was trying to find a suitable substitute for Kenneth Matthews.

**Greece at the UN Security Council**

Indicative of the growing friction between Britain and the Soviet Union over their post-war aims was the bringing of the 'Greek Question' before the newborn Security Council three times during 1946. The United Nations had been transformed into a forum of Cold War propaganda which the Great Powers used as an additional tool to further their conflicting post-war objectives. Greece was treated, as The Times put it, as "a kind of shuttle-cock in the play between powers." On January 21, the Soviet Government addressed a statement to the Security Council. The Soviet complaint stated that the British military presence in Greece constituted interference in the internal affairs of the country, threatening both the democratic citizens of Greece and the maintenance of international peace. The timing of the Soviet action strongly suggested that it
was intended as a retaliatory manoeuvre, countering the Iranian complaint of January 19 1946.

After a compromise agreement, the issue was taken off the agenda.

The reaction of the British press to the Anglo-Soviet confrontation in the Security Council is instructive for the light it throws on the fluctuation of attitudes and opinions as they correspond to the changing world situation.

The whole press defended the British Government. They interpreted the Soviet action as a counter-move to the pressure directed on themselves by the Iranian complaint. This was an "artificial crisis", the papers stressed, and one had to examine the "real motives" of Soviet policy behind this. All the papers attributed the Soviet objectives to "power-politics" and to strategical aims. The Economist summed up the general feeling:

The Russian charges are simply part of a larger struggle world-wide, unresolved Great Power struggle for power, interests and security. At the moment, all three Great Powers are engaged in the oldest of all games, the diplomatic struggle for a 'favourable' balance of power, for strategic security, for spheres of influence. For the protection of vital interests, for concessions, bases and zones...Today, as always, the danger points in world affairs are the areas where the lines of interest and influence of the Great Powers overlap. At these points, their struggle to make their influence exclusive inevitably leads either to conflict or to retreat by one or other side.

Bevin's speech, delivered on February 1, was warmly welcomed. McDonald of The Times stated that "this country owes a considerable debt of gratitude to Bevin for his forthright and sustained defence of Britain." Michael Foot, a prominent figure on the Labour Left, gave his warm support for Bevin's "bold exertion...to establish Anglo-Soviet relations on the only basis which will last, mutual self-respect." Britain was not concerned to play power politics but to save lives, rebuild Europe and make the new international authorities work. D H Brandon in the Sunday Times said that Bevin "is making history as a protagonist of open diplomacy, a policy which can only strengthen confidence in the future of the United Nations." Tribune also leaped to Bevin's defence. Initially it had been critical of Bevin's
close cooperation with the Americans and of his hostile approach to the Soviets. This was the first anti-Soviet sound the journal had made which it would keep during the cold-war period.(139)

Yet Bevin's plain speech roused some scepticism. The Times, though accepting that Bevin's speech was a "masterly statement", wrote, "it was no joy that the Council heard the delegates of two of the principal allies using words, sometimes blunt, sometimes barbed against each other."(140) The Economist and The New Statesman were more categorical. For the first, "Bevin's attitude may prove a serious obstacle to any hope of restoring reasonable relations with Russia and may gradually commit this country to a disastrous breach"(141); for the latter, "Bevin made a mistake of confusing the occasional advantages of rudeness in private with the necessity of suavity in dealing with a great and super-sensitive Power in public."(142)

On 9 February, after the compromise agreement, The Times considered the issue on its merits:

It brought to light in the sharpest detail the dangers which menace the peace of the world if the present state of international friction and tension is allowed to continue. It is hoped that the lesson drawn from this test case will have a sobering effect on all concerned and will inspire them with greater moderation.(143)

As for Greece itself, the internationalisation of the crisis further complicated matters and, far from helping, pushed her even closer to civil war. The New Statesman(144) and Tribune(145) agreed that the Anglo-Soviet clash was bound to heighten tension between Right and Left. Tribune remarked that Greece's problem "has been so bedevilled by the interest of the great powers that it is impossible to confine it strictly to its merits."(146)
NOTES

1. George Mavrokordatos "The 1946 Election and Plebiscite" in Iatrides (ed.), Greece in the 1940's, 182
2. Mavrokordatos, op. cit., 188-189; Vlavianos, Greece, 1941-49, 80-84
3. The Times, Special correspondent, 17/4/45
5. Ibid., Special correspondent, 17/4/45, "Dangers in Greece. Swing of the political pendulum. Campaign to exploit the Monarchy". Confidential Memorandum to Deakin on 28/3/45, The Times Archives, File "Greece 1945-53"
9. FO371/48264, R6244, FO to Athens, 6/4/45
10. FO371/48264, R6366
11. The Times, Hoare, 7/4/45; Daily Telegraph, Capell, 7/4/45. See also The Observer, Athens correspondent, 8/4/45
14. Daily Herald, Ewer, 21/3/45 "Plotting to get Greek King Back on Throne, p1
17. The Times Archives, Second Installment, 29/3/45. 16. See also Confidential Memorandum to Deakin on 28/3/45.
19. Ibid.
20. FO371/48267, R7256, Athens to FO, 22/4/45, tel. 1632
21. The Times Archives, Hoare to Deakin, 23/4/45
22. Alkeos Angelopoulos, Private Papers
23. The Times Archives, Hoare to Deakin, 23/4/45
24. The Times Archives, Deakin to Hoare, 27/4/45
25. The Times Archives, Hoare to Deakin, 25/5/45
26. Barrington-Ward Diary, 20/9/45
27. Vlavianos, op.cit., 84-85.
28. FO371/48274, R11679, Caccia to FO, 9/7/45
29. News Chronicle, A special correspondent, 5/7/45
30. Manchester Guardian, leader, 13/7/45, "Greece Again"
31. FO371/48239, R11943, Minutes by Laskey, 19/7/45 and 21/7/49; by Sir O Sargent and R. Scott 20/9/45
32. Alexander, op.cit., 125
33. Daily Telegraph, Capell, 6/8/45
34. J Sofianopoulos, leader of the Left Republican Union, a democratic party not associated with EAM. He led the Government delegation to the Varkiza conference.
35. **The Observer**, Athens correspondent, 15/4/45

36. George Kafandaris was former prime minister and founder of the Progressive Party.

37. **News Chronicle**, 19/7/45, "Greece living under Royalist terror"

38. **The Observer**, 19/7/45

39. Harold Caccia took charge of the British Embassy in Athens until September 1945, during Leeper's leave in Britain.

40. FO371/48274, R12288, Minutes by Laskey, 19/7/45. FO to Athens 20/7/45, tel. 1545

41. FO371/48275, R12459, Caccia to FO, 24/4/45, tel. 1586


43. **News Chronicle**, leader, 21/8/45; See also Walter Layton, 1/8/45, "Liberty is not enough. Some reflections on Labour's victory"


46. **Tribune**, 24/8/45, p1-2, "The Legacy and the Heir"

47. FO371/48279, R 14971, Weekly reports by AIS: 12-18 August 1945; R15079, 19-25 August. FO371/48419, R 14411, Rapp to FO, 25/8/45

48. Sylvia Sprigge (née Saunders) from 1929 until 1931 worked as a stringer for the Manchester Guardian in Rome. Then she went to the Ministry of Labour, refused a place in Reuters and rejoined the Guardian, her "spiritual home", as a staff correspondent in Rome, joining her husband, Cecil, a former City correspondent, who was there for Reuters. Sprigge "belonged in spirit and style to an earlier generation of Guardian foreign correspondents. She was a participant, almost a partisan...She openly took sides against Fascists and Communists." When she died the Guardian described her writing and herself as "sparkling, vivid, energetic, full of fun, with a touch of malice, a warm, even headlong play of feeling... In the same headlong way she could be notably inaccurate and indiscreet. Because of this she made some heroic blunders and a number of enemies. Yet even when her reporting was inaccurate in detail...it was often penetrating true in substance; even when it was frankly prejudiced it gave the reader a much truer sense of the emotional pitch of a situation than he could have got from reports outwardly more balanced and careful." *(Guardian 13 June 1966)* See Ayerst, op.cit., 559, 581-82. Manchester Guardian Archives, Sprigge's File B/S308/1/338 (1941-1956)


50. **Nea Alithia**, 25/8/45. FO371/48419 (R14520), Rapp (Salonika) to Athens, 27/8/45

51. **Manchester Guardian**, special corr., 29/8/45, "*White Terror* in Greece. Communist claim. An invitation to Professor Laski"

52. Ibid., leader, 30/8/45

53. FO371/48419 (R14520), Minutes by Laskey, Hayter, Sargent, 31/8/45.

54. Vlavianos, op.cit., 103

55. **Manchester Guardian**, Our special corr., 18/9/45, "I. Impressions of Greece. The Friendship with Britain"

56. Ibid., our special corr., 21/9/45, "II. Impressions of Greece. The Question of the Monarchy"

57. FO371/48276, R13649, Caccia to FO, 13/8/45 and FO371/48277, R14008, Caccia to Sargent, 14/8/45
58. FO371/48278, R14476, Sir Alan F Brooke (War Office) to Sir A Cadogan, 27/8/45.
59. FO371/48278, R14602, Minutes by Laskey and Hayter; R14638, R14684, 28/8/45. FO to Government Hospitality Fund, 28/8/45
60. FO371/48280, R16350, Minutes by Laskey, 27/9/45
63. FO371/48282, R18206, 14/10/45. Report by Ralph, British Police Mission. One of the first acts of the Police Mission had been to disarm the police in order to prevent a recurrence of the bloodshed of 3/12/44
64. FO371/48282, R16732, Athens to FO, 1/10/45 and FO to Athens, 23/10/45
65. FO371/48242, R17934, FO to Athens, 31/10/45
66. News Chronicle, leader, "Terrorism in Greece"
67. Tribune, 19/10/45
68. The New Statesman, 27/10/45
69. Alexander, op.cit., 138-145
71. Manchester Guardian, leader, 24/11/45, "New Hope"
72. Daily Herald, leader, 24/11/45, "Britain gives a lead"
74. FO371/48243, Leeper to McNeil, 11/12/45
75. FO371/48243, R20810, Leeper to FO, 11/12/45
76. FO371/48416, R21098, Leeper to FO, 17/12/45
77. FO371/48243, R20810, Minutes by Laskey, 12/12/45
78. FO371/48416, R21098, Minutes by Laskey, 21/12/45 and Nash, 24/12/45
79. FO371/48236, R4568, Moscow to FO, 7/3/45. Minutes by Laskey.
80. Economidis, Ph., Polemos, Diidisi ke Propaganda. (War, Intervention and Propaganda) (Athens, 1992), 86
81. Velitchansky, of Jewish origin, had served in Turkey before he came to Greece. He covered the Greek civil war until its end in 1949. Later he went to the United States and he died in Moscow. According to confidential information given to Economidis, Velitchansky was cadre of the Soviet Communist Party and KGB officer. His wife, Larissa, who accompanied him in all his journeys abroad, learnt Greek and later, when she returned to the Soviet Union, she was working for the Moscow radio, Greek Service. She was also a member of the Communist Party. After Zachariadis' return to Greece, Economidis went on, Velitchansky became the main liaison between the Communist leader and Admiral Rantionov, the Soviet Ambassador to Greece, who was also a high-ranking KGB officer, (Ph. Economidis, op.cit., 86-93)
90. FO371/48269, R8000, FO TO Athens, 6/5/45
91. FO371/48273, R11022, Minutes by Laskey, 29/6/45
92. FO371/48238, R11041, Minutes by Laskey, 30/6/45, Hayter, 30/6/45, Warner, 1/7/45, Sargent, 1/7/45
93. FO371/48238, R11702, W.Mabane to Lloyd, 25/7/45
94. FO924, LC1703/16/452, 1944
95. FO371/48238, R11703, Caccia to FO, 7/7/45. Minutes by Laskey 12/7/45 and by Huxtedley(?), 19/7/45
96. A M Gibson, bilingual in English and Russian, was special correspondent in Rumania for The Times, 1940-43 and for the Kemsley press, 1/9/1943 to 5/6/1945. (Manchester Guardian Archives, B/S308/32)
97. FO371/48269, R8000, Minutes by Laskey, 4/5/45
99. FO371/48238, R11702, Kerr to FO, 9/7/45
100. C M Woodhouse, The struggle for Greece, 158-161
101. Alexander, op.cit., 199
103. Alexander Clifford, of Scottish descent, had read philosophy, politics and economics at Oriel College, Oxford. He spoke six languages including Greek. Although a career in the Foreign Office had been forecast for him, he joined Reuters as a night sub-editor before being promoted to work abroad; first in Spain and then in Germany. Then he joined the Daily Mail. He was a colleague and friend of Alan Moorehead. (Tom Pocock, Alan Moorehead, 73)
104. FO371/48389, R13247, Caccia to FO, 7/8/45
105. FO371/48389, R14639, Lancaster to FO, 29/8/45
106. FO371/48390, R16120, Nash to Hayter, 13/9/45
108. Daily Mail, 17/9/45, "Tito agents begin terror war"; Daily Telegraph, 13/9/45,
109. FO371/48389, R14639, Lancaster to FO, 29/8/45
110. FO371/48280, R16108, Minutes by Laskey, 25/9/45
111. The New Statesman, 25/8/45, p.119
112. Ibid., 15/9/45, p.171, "Balkan realities"
113. Tribune, 14/9/45, p3 "Greece again"
114. Pravda, 30/12/45; Politika, 29/12/45
116. FO371/48266, FO to Athens, 20/4/45
117. FO371/48266, FO to Washington, 20/4/45
119. FO371/48272, R10743, Halifax to FO, 23/6/45
120. FO371/48272, R10743, Minutes by Laskey, Howard, Sargent, 25/6/45
121. FO371/48273, R10915, Caccia to FO, 26/6/45
122. FO371/48273, R11237, Washington to Athens, 30/6/45; FO371/48274, R11590, Caccia to Washington, 7/7/45
123. On July 16 1945 the Athens radio was renamed Ethniko Idryma Radiophonias (E.I.R) (National Broadcasting Institute), forerunner of today's E.R.T. (Syntaktiki Praxis, 54/45, Nomiko Prossopo Dimosiou Dikeou)
124. FO371/48238, R10564, records of the meeting, 19/6/45
125. FO371/48238, R10740 Lancaster's memorandum, 20/6/45
126. FO371/48242, R19268, Propaganda in Greece, telegram to and from PWE to Greece, 14/11/45 and 17/11/45
127. Sam Modiano, of Jewish origin, Reuters correspondent in Salonika before the war.
128. FO371/48237, R7092, Lancaster to Nash, 19/4/45; N 24/4/45
129. FO371/48237, R6642, Minutes by Laskey,
130. Daily Worker, W. Holmes, 19/10/45
131. FO371/48242, R17934, Minutes, 24/10/45. That information was given to the Foreign Office in direct confidence.
132. The Soviet complaint: 21/1/46-6/2/46; the Ukrainian complaint: 24/8/46 and the Greek appeal: 3/12/46
133. The Times, diplomatic corr., 29/1/46
134. See, Manchester Guardian, diplomatic corr., 23/1/46, leader, 28/1/46; Daily Telegraph, J L Garvin, 7/2/46; Daily Mail, leader, 25/1/46; The New Statesman, 9/2/46, p93
135. The Economist, 26/1/46, pp. 121-2
136. Daily Herald, Michael Foot, 5/2/46
137. The Times, diplomatic corr., 23/1/46
138. Sunday Times, O H Brandon, 3/2/46; Diplomatic corr., 3/2/46
139. Tribune, 2/2/46
140. The Times, Diplomatic corr., 2/2/46 and 4/2/46
141. The Economist, 9/2/46, p.201-2
142. The New Statesman, 9/2/46, p.93
143. The Times, Our Corr., Instabul, 9/2/46
144. The New Statesman, 2/2/46, p77
145. Tribune, 1/2/46, p.3
146. Ibid., By a Correspondent who spent..., 13/9/46
CHAPTER SIX

"IN OUR VIEW THE MAIN DANGER TO LAW AND ORDER IN GREECE COMES FROM THE COMMUNISTS", APRIL 1946 - MARCH 1947

Two important events of the period between April 1946 and March 1947 were the holding of the parliamentary elections, on March 31, and of the plebiscite on the monarchy, on September 1. The two ballots, as will be showed in this chapter, failed to solve the political crisis, and once again the country was drifting toward a new period of uncertainty and violence.

On December 27, 1946 the rebel bands were officially renamed the "Democratic Army of Greece." Yet the Communist Party continued to exhibit caution and reserve towards the guerrilla movement, while its leader, Zachariadis, still refused to give them his unqualified support.(1)

As the KKE was gradually engaging itself in civil war in a state of doubt and division, the British Government, on February 21 1947, informed the State Department that because of internal economic difficulties it would have to suspend economic aid to Greece by the end of March. With the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, on March 12 1947, Greece came into the area of American responsibility.

The Greek Parliamentary Elections of March 1946

The Sofoulis Government, formed in November 1945, had committed itself under British and American pressure, to holding the elections at the latest in March 1946. By the end of March, Greece was still in a state of anarchy. Certain problems urgently demanded a solution: end of the White Terror; establishment of law and order; purge of the army, the
security forces and the public service; grant of a wider amnesty; revision of the electoral lists. Sofoulis and his Government had failed to fulfil their promises and the Left had decided to abstain. Greek politicians, among them Sofoulis himself, tried in vain to convince Ernest Bevin that the elections should be postponed.(2)

On Bevin's instructions, Sargent apprised the Greek Government, on February 17, that the elections must not be delayed. The following day, Sofoulis made publicly that the elections would be held on March 31. On February 20, the leaders of SKE/ELD appealed for a two months postponement and for the fulfilment of the conditions laid down by EAM in their February 7 memorandum.(3) The next day, The Times and the News Chronicle argued that a postponement should be considered. The Times printed an editorial in which it argued that these elections "will disappoint all the hopes that have been set on them,..., if they take place without the active participation of all political groups and without general confidence that the political changes which must follow them can be carried through without leaving a sense of unappeasable bitterness and frustration in the losers."(4) On the same day the News Chronicle carried an article by Vernon Bartlett entitled "Greek poll: Bevin says, "Go ahead". He argued that there were "important arguments" in favour of postponing them and that some might interpret British advice against postponement as another proof of British sympathy for the Greek reactionaries. On balance he presented the British Government's view that conditions for a fair elections were as good now as they were likely to be if there were further months of postponement. These two articles, particularly that of The Times, irritated the Foreign Office. "The Times is at its most nauseating" wrote R W Selby of the Southern Department.(5)
On February 22, EAM announced its final decision to boycott the elections. That prompted a discussion in the British press on how far existing conditions were the appropriate ones for free and fair elections. It also discussed the prospect of a conditional postponement.

On March 8, The Times in an editorial stated categorically that "it should be clear to the British Government that the free elections...cannot be held on March 31." If the demand of EAM for a postponement was to be satisfied, "as it should be", this must be made on three conditions: EAM should use all of its influence for the maintenance of order, take full and legal part in the elections postponed to an agreed date and a representative national Government should be formed to carry it through the electoral period.(6) McDonald was also of the view that holding immediate elections with the abstention of the left-wing parties "seems to many to offer very serious dangers of civil strife."(7)

The Times' foreign policy had often outraged the Foreign Office. The paper had strongly and insistently advocated full cooperation with the Soviet Union and it was critical, though moderate in tone, of Churchill's Fulton speech.(8) On March 11, Bevin met Barrington-Ward in his office and made an extraordinary attack on The Times. Coupled with the paper's persistence on postponement of the Greek elections, Bevin accused it of having no policy, of being "spineless", "a jellyfish", neither for him nor against him, more pro-Soviet than pro-British. Then be brought up Greece. The editor noted in his diary.

We also clashed over Greece. I told him I had only supported the postponement of the elections when I found that reputable and responsible Greeks considered it essential. He said 'have you ever known a reputable Greek?' Very silly. Rendis, the foreign minister, and Agnides, the excellent Ambassador in London, are as reputable as anyone I knew. But Bevin thinks that Russia has stoked up the EAM and is turning the heat on him there too.(9)

Barrington-Ward was taken 'by surprise' and was deeply shocked by the "crude onslaught." He told Bevin that The Times defended British interests as anyone else would and
did its best to apply reason to foreign affairs. A few weeks later, the paper's general policy was discussed by its directors, all Conservatives, but Barrington-Ward's independence as editor was confirmed.(10)

The Manchester Guardian, earnest supporter of Bevin, found that many of the arguments supporting a postponement were "highly questionable"; it admitted, however, that some of them were "reasonable".(11)

The News Chronicle and The Observer(12), aligned themselves in favour of a postponement, otherwise a renewal of civil war was almost inevitable.

The conservative press was undivided in their support for holding the elections on the arranged date. They shared the logic of the Daily Telegraph: it was difficult to see how a postponement could benefit the country and it was doubtful whether any improvement could be expected. The reverse seemed more likely.(13)

The divergence of opinion within the Daily Herald is interesting. W N Ewer found the idea of a postponement "not unreasonable" since with the abstention of EAM the "grim prospect of a Right wing...being returned in incomplete elections, opens up" with a fear, after British troops' withdrawal, of a Right-wing dictatorship or civil war.(14) Dudley Barker, who was sent to Greece to cover the elections, was totally opposed to Ewer's views. A few days before the elections he wrote, "the widely circulated stories of excesses, intimidation, and false registers, even prophesies of a new civil war, are largely false, or at least widely exaggerated...I doubt the total of this pressure will affect the main results of the polls".(15)

On March 20, the Foreign Office issued a statement, announcing the election day on March 31. It is thought to have brought to an end the intense political and Press campaign for a postponement of the electoral date. Yet, some papers were still considering the possibility of an eleventh hour postponement.(16)
The whole postponement controversy can be summarised in *The Times*’ editorial comment on March 21:

At least, it would appear that there is a choice of evils. To postpone the elections still further now will be to give way to the threat of boycott from one side and the threat of domination by force from the other; and as yesterday’s statement asserts the present state of undeclared war and national paralysis will persist. To hold the elections as arranged, however, invites a possible travesty of democratic procedure with no assurance either that the verdict will be a fair reflection of national views or that it will be accepted by the unsuccessful minority. The question is whether any reasonable chance exists of better and fairer conditions at a future date. Mr. Bevin does not think so.

In the meantime, the country proceeded to hold the elections. On March 20, Ridsdale sent Lancaster the names of the British correspondents sent by their papers to cover the elections. They were: Hugh Massingham(17) for *The Observer*, who also contributed to *The New Statesman*, Archibald Gibson(18) for Kemsley Newspapers.(19) *The Times* served by Alkeos Angelopoulos, the *Daily Telegraph* had Christopher Buckley, the *Manchester Guardian* sent Sylvia Sprigge from Rome, the *News Chronicle* had Geoffrey Hoare. The Washington Embassy believed that there was likely to be considerable interest in the United States in the Greek elections. On March 26, they asked the Foreign Office that in order to "ensure material of the right kind", would be available to the US press to supplement official releases, it would be helpful to arrange with Reuters that their reports from Athens be carried on their 'Globe' service, which was extensively received in that country.(20)

With the elections one or two days away, there was a general fear that they would not provide a lasting solution. This was clearly pointed out by *The Economist*, on the eve of the elections:

to record the general expectation that the elections will pass off comparatively quietly is not to sound a note of optimism that they will provide a lasting solution in the real interests of Greece or, indeed of Britain.(21)
Sprigge of the *Manchester Guardian* assessed that the elections "will probably lead to the election...of an extreme Right wing Government panting for revenge at home, for adventure abroad, and worst of all for a restoration of the monarchy with all that this would mean, by faking a plebiscite."(22) Buckley of the *Daily Telegraph* wrote that "Royalists will have the power as they seem to evince the will, to ride roughshod over the opposition and introduce the King even at the risk of pushing things to armed conflict."(23) Clifford of the *Daily Mail* believed that "the Sunday elections are not going to provide a solution."(24) He feared that unless goodwill were used then the Undeclared civil war would have to be prevented from breaking out sooner or later.(25) The diplomatic correspondent of the *Sunday Times* wrote that if the Monarchists seized the opportunity of paying off old scores, a period of civil unrest would follow.(26) Massingham in *The Observer* stated that this was "an election which can prove nothing and solve nothing."(27) In *The New Statesman* he prophesied that if a civil war broke out:

> it will not begin as it did before, with sudden exploding risings in towns and villages. Men could drift away to the hills and join thousands there already in hiding; arms would be sent over the border, and Greece would become another of the dangers to Peace.(28)

On the election day almost all the correspondents remained close to Athens. Their assessment of the situation was excessively optimistic. The elections had passed off in a calm atmosphere.(29) Yet, some incidents were reported and not only in the *Daily Worker*, but in the *Daily Mirror* and the *Daily Dispatch*(30)

Peter Burchett(31) of the *Daily Express* was the only British correspondent not to stay in Athens on March 31. Conditions in the capital were not representative of the whole of Greece. In the North and in the provinces the situation was different as Burchett witnessed:

> many of Salonika's young men left the town today to join the 120,000 partisans already in the mountains...to avoid what they believe to be a reign of terror for the Leftists for the next few days.
He wrote about police atrocities:

The police seem to feel they are on the top of the world today...declaring their Nationalist and aggressive attitude...Many times the police tried to prevent me talking to the Greeks. I had gone to some pains to make myself look as Greek as possible, and it was only by producing my passport that I saved myself from arrest each time.

The text of this message was printed in the local press. Populist newspapers attacked Burchett and demanded his deportation. Soviet press and radio reported the London TASS message quoting Burchett's Salonika dispatch.(32) On April 3, the acting British Consul-General, wrote to the Athens Embassy, "I have advised Burchett of the danger of laying himself open to this form of attack." The following day, Laskey asked the News Department to drop a hint to the Daily Express. Salonika papers published the démenti letter by Burchett where he toned down his statements, "many thousands" became "many young men" and "terrorism" was softened while it was admitted that the expected post-elections wave of terrorism did not break out.(33) On April 5, Burchett left for England. On April 9, Sir John Cameron of the News Department informed Laskey that he had spoken to the assistant Lobby correspondent, in Guy Eden's absence in New York, who promised to raise the matter with the Foreign Editor.(34) Cameron remarked, "I hope M Burchett will profit by this lesson which will, I am sure, he rubbed in by his newspaper."(35)

On April 4, Norton estimated that the final figures showed a poll of 47 per cent voting. "This low average is disappointing from the point of view of publicity" he reported to the Foreign Office. Laskey worried that "if abstentions reach 53%, as now seems probable we shall certainly have to face strong criticism of the elections...I think we can only await the Allied Missions report." The News Department agreed.(36)
On April 10, the AMFOGE report assessed that 9.3% took part in the boycott, and the proportion of those who abstained for "party's reasons" was about 15% and certainly between 10% and 20%. The report concluded that "the general outcome represented a true and valid verdict of the Greek people" and that "had the Leftist parties taken part in the elections this would not have altered this general outcome."(37) But the findings of the report are open to serious doubt. The figures themselves are questionable, the estimate of illegal voting is dubious, the reasons for not participation of the 40.3 per cent of the electorate is doubtful.(38) The Foreign Office's rough estimate seems to be closer to the real situation.

"A very satisfactory report" Laskey noted.(39) Selby felt that "for all practical purposes it would be wiser to stick to the estimate given in the AMFOGE report."(40) There was a thought to publish the whole report and to make it freely available to all and not merely to MPs or the press. If the State Department were prepared to publish anyhow, the British Ambassador was instructed to make simultaneous publication. It was finally decided not to publish the whole report.(41)

It must be noted here that most of the allied observers were ignorant of the Greek language and Greek politics. Moreover prior to their arrival in Athens they had been "indoctrinated" in Italy.(42) Despite the intentions of some of the members of the AMFOGE, it was obvious that the Mission could not have contradicted the established policy of their Governments. One of the observers, however, had disclaimed association with the report's conclusion and he sent a letter to The New Statesman, signed "C.M.F. Observer, AMFOGE", describing it as "misleading and harmful."(43)

The findings of the AMFOGE report were also challenged by some papers. On April 14, Massingham of The Observer wrote that it "has tended to increase tension rather than to diminish it. The Right are naturally arguing that if the elections were "on the whole free and
fair" they have a mandate to hold the plebiscite."(44) For the Daily Worker it was a "whitewashing report."(45) The Southern Department did not worry so much about "the attacks from outside", but "these attacks from the Observer Mission itself." The News Department assured them that there was not "much anger."(46)

While the technical side of the elections was generally considered satisfactory, hopes for resolution of the political stalemate remained bleak. Many British papers had no illusions.

On April 2, a leader in The Times questioned whether the elections had done much to create the right conditions which would permitted the withdrawal of the British troops. On the same day a leader in the Manchester Guardian stressed that "it is more than ever important that the British Government should use its influence now, while there is still time, to secure a moderate Government in Greece to encourage tolerance, to urge on economic reforms." Above all, Britain should insist that the question of the monarchy should not be held until passions had cooled. On April 3, in an editorial the News Chronicle would write more pessimistically that the result of the elections "from a practical point of view was singularly unhelpful...and the political dilemma, both for Britain and Greece, is unsolved."

The conservative press also stressed the need for moderation. On April 1, Buckley of the Daily Telegraph wrote that it should put a brake upon any right-wing policy of reprisals and suppression of political opponents. On April 8, Clifford in the Daily Mail considered that "the prospects remain very dark and the outlook is black." Similarly, for The Spectator the "omens for the future are not entirely propitious."(47)

The Economist expressed the general feeling:

The populists are faced with two alternatives. The first and more irresponsible is to give the nation no respite from politics, to disregard the country's economic plight and to do this is to court civil war, and the intervention of northern neighbours...The second alternative is perhaps, too much to hope for in the present state of passions in
Greece...It is to form a coalition with the centre parties, to refrain from provoking the Left into appeals for help from its friends across the northern frontiers, and to secure a firm footing by placing at the top of the new cabinet's agenda the measures necessary to deal with the country's economic plight...Unfortunately the Populists show no sign of possessing a leader or leaders of the calibre to take such a decision. Their most recent moves suggest the first course.(48)

On April 5, Tribune in a long article, entitled "Sowing the wind", argued that the elections results were inevitable. "We know that it is absurd to suspect him[Bevin] of active sympathies for the Royalist Right." However by allowing or even encouraging the reactionary Right once again to emerge as the rulers meant not only aiding social reaction but also fostering anti-democratic regimes. This conduct "is not only incompatible with the Socialist and democratic principles of the Labour movement; it is also impolitic, because it turns the popular movements in all countries...into our enemies."

On April 7, Hugh Massingham in The Observer in a lengthy article under the headline "Greece after the Polls" warned, "we shall be made to pay for March 31" and explained why:

The legacy of muddle and misconception which Mr. Bevin inherited dates back a long way. To Mr. Churchill's generous fancy, King George of the Hellenes was an heroic David who had set out all alone on our behalf; to many Greeks he was a perjured monarch who had connived at the Metaxas dictatorship...British authorities...had not realised how widespread was the King's unpopularity. It was not until 1943 that they appreciated what was really happening, and by then EAM,,, was the only effective authority inside Greece. Much that has happened since could have been prevented if the British had accepted the position and if the King had spontaneously withdrawn, but unfortunately neither changed their attitude...instead of making EAM as representative as possible, the Britain tried to detach the Centre and Moderate Left leaders from it, thus bringing about the very thing which they wanted to avoid: they increased Communist influence in the ranks of the partisans...forgetting that if the Left abstained the Government could neither strong nor representative...People who feel that a Communist Greece would be menace to British interests would also realise that the Right Government, which is potentially Fascist, will be taken by the Russian as a menace to theirs.
The Plebiscite

Obtaining the approval of British and American officials, the Tsaklaris Government announced, on May 13, that the plebiscite on the Monarchy would be held in that September rather than in March 1948 as originally scheduled.

Tsaklaris' intention of holding the plebiscite as early as possible was well known during his electoral campaign. Although Bevin had originally pressed him to stick to the agreement to hold the plebiscite in 1948, at the end he acquiesced in holding the plebiscite earlier. On May 10, on Bevin's instructions, Clifford Norton, the new British Ambassador to Greece, informed Tsaklaris that the British had decided to agree to a plebiscite in the autumn after all.(49)

A leak of information permitted The Observer to reveal the British intention for an early plebiscite. On April 4, the journal's diplomatic correspondent in an article entitled "Britain Seeks Early Greek Plebiscite" made known British plans. On April 7, Massingham wrote that "the British have already refused to agree to a plebiscite in May[1948]. He interviewed Sofoulis who stated that the return of the King would be a catastrophe. The following day, Selby noted, "the Sunday Press contained a number of suggestions that our policy in Greece was undergoing a change, but there was nothing so detailed or well informed as this article in the Sunday Observer. There must have been a leak somewhere, presumably in New York." Cameron, News Department, informed the Department that this article was written by Frank Roberts, a recent recruit to The Observer, but his source was unknown.(50) On May 8, during Question Time W N Warbey, Labour MP, asked P J Noel-Baker, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, what proposals the British Government had made to the United States Government in regard to the date of the plebiscite. He also asked him to give assurance that there would be no departure from the policy announced by the Foreign Secretary that no plebiscite in Greece should be held.
Having succeeded in bringing forward the date of the plebiscite, Tsaldaris' next move was to silence any opposition to the King's return. On May 3, he revived the notorious Committees of Public Security of Metaxas' dictatorship. On June 6, he submitted to Parliament a draft law entitled 'Resolution III' which was implemented in full in August. This law set up summary courts empowered to pass the death sentence, established the death sentences for anyone generally acting against the state, imposed imprisonment on those attending assemblies forbidden by law, empowered the police to search private houses without warrant and impose a curfew at night. "The constitutional statute passed...in June is stiffer than anything Mussolini ever made for the Italian people" wrote Sprigge on August 30.(52) By contrast, no effort was being made to stamp out royalist terrorism.(53)

An extraordinary wave of terror began in Greece. Unanimously the British Press shared The Times' anxiety on the consequences that such a terror might have on the conduct of a fair plebiscite. We read in The Times:

"with armed bands both of the Left and the Right...influencing the voters...it is difficult to see how a plebiscite can produce a result that would not be open to dispute and too little esteemed here and abroad to be of any value as a balm for this country's open wound."

This time the Allied observers announced that they would not supervise the referendum—as they had done in the March elections.(55) In any case, according to The Economist and The New Statesman, their presence would serve no purpose. They "will be no safeguard; the terror will have done the work long before they arrive, and their presence will merely whitewash a piece of phoney electioneering."(56) wrote in May The New Statesman. Similarly for The
Economist "even if AMFOGE stays on, it will for technical reasons be unable at this late date to
give such a well-supported verdict as is needed."(57)

After all these developments, it was certain that the King would obtain "a comfortable
majority." The question was whether the plebiscite of September 1 was designed to solve the
constitutional crisis in Greece or not. On May 22, The Foreign Office agreed with Norton that
the plebiscite should be limited to a referendum on whether or not King George was to return
to Greece. "We have always had in mind that the issue of the plebiscite should be the King's
return and not Republic versus Monarchy"; however, it went on, "what would the position be if
the voting went against the King's return? Is it assumed that Greece would then automatically
become a Republic or would a further plebiscite to decide this issue be required?"(58)

Four leading British papers noticed the paradox of this plebiscite. In May,
Angelopoulos of The Times wrote that the question of the plebiscite had to be one of a choice
between a republic and a monarchy and not one of the return or otherwise of King George.(59)
Barber of the News Chronicle wrote that "it is paradox that six months ago...the political
election was fought largely on a constitutional issue, now the constitutional plebiscite is being
fought on a political issue."(60) The Observer explained the absurdity of the plebiscite:

while the plebiscites in 1924,1935 were concerned with the clear-cut issue, Monarchy
or Republic, the question now before the people is an equivocal one, namely, if
they do or do not wish the return of King George. Therefore if the answer were "Not",
it would not mean that the constitutional issue was finally settled.(61)

Similarly, The Economist wrote:

If a majority vote against him, there will be a political and constitutional crisis of the
first order, for the vote is not for the regime but is concerned only with the return of the
King personally...Thus, if the people do not want him, Greece will be a monarchy
without a ruler, and the alternatives of another monarch or a republic will still have to
be decided.(62)
With the plebiscite approaching, Norton, on August 24, stressed to Sargent that this time the fairness of the plebiscite would be judged by the press correspondents and reported to the world long before "the considered views" of observers or Allied missions could be published. Therefore, he wrote, it was essential that newspapers must be represented by suitable correspondents. Especially The Times should be served by a correspondent "of the calibre of Lumby." On August 27, the Foreign Office informed Norton that The Times, the Daily Herald and the Daily Telegraph "now all have first-class correspondents in Athens and that Reuters hope to send Elisabeth Barker there in time for the plebiscite. I think therefore that your point was adequately covered." The Times had sent to Athens Mavrodi, "their excellent Instabul correspondent" as Sargent minuted, the Daily Herald had Salusbury and the Daily Telegraph Buckley, "both of whom are very good." Elisabeth Barker, now in Trieste, was also "excellent" as Sargent noted.(63) The Manchester Guardian sent Sprigge. She left Italy on August 27 and stayed until September 7.(64) Alan Moorehead(65) represented The Observer.

The plebiscite was conducted on September 1. Although all declared republicans had participated including the communists, it resulted in a large majority for the return of the King George II. The combined effects of terror and extensive falsification gave the monarch an overwhelming 68 per cent as opposed to 32 per cent for the republic.

With an officially reported 48 per cent increase in turnout compared with the March elections, one may wonder what brought about the change of popular feeling in favour of the King, which up to the end of 1943 was overwhelmingly against him.

Even before the March elections, five leading newspapers, The Times, the Manchester Guardian, the Daily Telegraph, the News Chronicle and the Daily Mail had noticed a tendency in favour of the King's return.(66) This swing to the Right, according to the press, was the
result of: a) bitter memories of December 1944; b) the failure of the Centre to unite and form a
strong centre under a leader; c) the fear of a Communist expansion, threatening Greek
independence; d) the longing for quiet and order.(67)

Tribune wondered whether these factors were really the basis for the Greek people to
decide rationally and dispassionately on the issue of Monarchy:

What influenced them were such factors as fear of monarchists' reprisals or fear of
Communist terror; hope for economic help and national support from Britain and
apprehension about the danger of Slav aggression-fears and hopes, in other words,
which, as such, had little or nothing to do with the issue of the monarchy and which
therefore were bound to falsify the plebiscite in a much more significant sense than
mere technical irregularities.(68)

King George II arrived in Athens on September 27. In a personal message from the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the British Prime Minister, it was agreed that it was
most important not to give any colour to any rumours that the British were providing a naval
escort for King George. The Ministry of Civil Aviation and the Admiralty were informed
accordingly. In a top secret message the Admiralty instructed the C-in-C, Mediterranean that at
the appointed time, no British ships should be on the horizon when the King went back.(69)

Reign of Terror

Politically motivated violence was recorded in the British press already in January
1946.(70) In the north of Greece, where the Left enjoyed most of its support, the situation was
comparatively quieter, but in Central and Southern Greece the right-wing bands of Sourlas,
Kalabalikis and Manganas, all members of 'X' with the backing of the local gendarmerie
continued to terrorise the countryside. This time their target was the town of Kalamata.(71)
Leeper was worrying that as a result of the Kalamata incident there might be a good deal of talk
about a reign of terror in Greece and that the state of law and order was so bad as to make early elections a farce. On January 23, he wrote to the Foreign Office that "our press should be careful not to fall into this trap." (72) Apart from the News Chronicle and Reuters' messages in the Manchester Guardian and The Times (73), it was not further discussed in the press.

After the elections, political violence and mass insecurity increased dramatically and even further after the plebiscite.

Initially papers like The Times, the Daily Herald and The Economist recognised the legitimate desire of the Greek Government to restore internal order. But later they were disappointed with its handling of the situation and they expressed anxiety for the consequences an partial and unfair Government conduct might have for the restoration of public order. The Daily Telegraph, though accepting that the Government's tactics were not always good, considered that under the existed circumstances they were in some extent justifiable.

After a short period of optimism, hoping that the new Government would meet the needs of Greece for an end of force and intimidation and a beginning of re-establising the economy, The Times would realise their illusion. On May 7, its Athens correspondent reported "the wave of crime and terrorist activity which is sweeping the Greek mainland from the northern borders to Matapan and from the Ionian to the Aegean coast." This article activated the Foreign Office to take measures in forestalling the press reaction on the terror in Greece. On the same day the Foreign Office wrote to Norton, "British newspapers and particularly The Times, have in the past few days been carrying reports from their correspondents in Athens of a decline in public order...I should be glad to know if there is any foundation for them. They are likely to give rise to Parliamentary Questions." (74)

In response, Norton wrote that there had in fact been a decline in law and order since mid-March. He attributed the increase to two causes: a) the Populist victory at the elections,
which had put new heart into the Right Wing pursuers of old vendettas, especially in areas where the Right were numerically in the ascendant and b) -what was much more dangerous- to a coordinated Communist plan which was just beginning to make its appearance. In his view, however, Communist ability to provoke any major disorders remained comparatively slight as long as the British troops were in Greece; nor had he any indication of their planning to do so. According to intelligence sources, Norton assumed that the Communists intended to go all out during the next few months. He saw that "the only effective counter" to all this, was the Greek Government to show impartiality in the administration of justice and in repression of disorders. He asked for the authority to speak "plainly" to the Greek Government to that effect.

Regarding reports of press correspondents he said that the Athens area was one in which the Right Wing "misdemeanours" tended to predominate and that permanent correspondents seldom travelled far from the capital. It was the less accessible Northern and Central Greece which brought up the total score of Communist "excesses". Norton continued, "we are doing what we can to enlighten the journalists by making official material available." He then discussed The Times representation: "as we have frequently pointed out it is deplorable that a newspaper of the standing of The Times should continue to depend on an un-intelligent and unreliable Greek for its news from this country."

Norton's remarks were much welcomed in the Foreign Office. W G Hayter, Head of the Southern Department, suggested that in order to anticipate the expected reaction of the press to the decline of normal conditions in Greece, they should make it plain "that in our opinion the main danger to law and order in Greece comes from the Communists." He instructed the News Department to do all in their power to convey this impression to the British press at an early date. He also asked them to encourage the correspondents to travel in areas of Central and Northern Greece where the Communists were more active. Regarding the question
of The Times representation he noted: "It is clearly most desirable that The Times should have a better correspondent in Greece, but I fear that there is not much hope of securing this."

Nash, head of the News Department, communicated at once with the newspapers. He spoke "at considerable length" to the Sunday Times and he found them very receptive. He had also a long talk with David Astor of The Observer and he arranged for Hugh Massingham, the sharpest critic of British policy in Greece, to contact the Foreign Office. Until 13 May Nash had a long talk with MacLachlan of The Times and found him very sympathetic. He had also spoken to representatives of the leading provincial newspapers. He had arranged to meet someone from the Daily Telegraph, whom he did not think would be unreceptive. He thought that nothing more could be done with the popular press: the News Chronicle had its mind made up, and in an opposite direction, so had the Daily Mail.

Hayter was satisfied with the work of the News Department. Five more papers submitted to Foreign Office's advice. As for the suggested meeting with Massingham, Hayter doubted whether the Foreign Office would get much help from him, "judging from the telegrams he sent from Athens during the period of the elections." Yet, Hayter had a talk with Massingham and found him "very appreciative." "I hope it will yield results", Nash wrote on June 14. The Observer replaced him with Alan Moorehead.

The Foreign Office granted Norton with the authority he had asked for to talk with the Greek Government. In order to give the impression of impartial handling of the situation Norton was instructed to suggest to Tsaldaris to "publish details of arrests of X-ites and other Right-wing extremists as well as details of arrests of Left-wing extremists."(77)

A chance came with the capture of Manganas on May 22. He was a notorious Right-wing villain, who with his band had committed, in the Peloponnese, many murders and he had been involved in many raids. On 23 May, Norton stated that the capture of Manganas
should be given to the press and made full use of as an example of the Greek Government's determination to bring down justice on Right-wing bandits. He gave the lines on which it should be plugged in the press, ending "it is a great day for impartial Greek justice and British trained gendarmerie; it gives the lie direct to false allegations of deliberate partiality." Yet, he confidentially noted that there were worries about Manganas' escape or rescue, "but now that the story is out we must make some hay."

The Times and the Daily Worker printed the story, but they stated that it was a British officer and not the Greek authorities who, unarmed, caught him. On May 27, the Foreign Office informed Athens that "every effort was made to plug this story but without much success. The press here laid great stress on the reported fact that the arrest was made by a British member of the police mission. As a result, should Manganas now be allowed by the Greeks to escape, the effect here will be doubly unfortunate. It would consequently be unwise to try to make much more of this story until there is a reasonable certainty that Manganas would not be able to escape." 

After the plebiscite, British and American officials intensified their efforts to isolate the Greek Left through the incorporation of centrists into the Tsaldaris Government. However, this strategy of forging a Right-Centre coalition failed largely because of the Liberals' refusal to join a cabinet under a Populist leader. The Government's reorganisation under Maximos early in 1947 brought no improvement in the Greek state of affairs while the activities of the guerrilla forces became widespread in Thessaly, Macedonia and other areas, leading to heavy fighting with Government troops. Until November 1946 the guerrilla movement was a largely spontaneous, and essentially defensive movement. In the absence of a systematic and
centralised plan of action, the rebels could deliver jabs, which were embarrassing, even painful but hardly fatal. It was lacking an all-out effort and a coordinated plan of action.

That changed in November 1946 when KKE convened a conference of *capetanioi*, which proceeded to establish a General Partisan Headquarters, under Markos Vafiadis, for the purpose of coordinating the bands in Macedonia, Thessaly, Epirus and Rumeli. In December the bands were officially renamed the "Democratic Army of Greece".

On September 17, Norton informed the Foreign Office of the increase in the activities of Communist bands in Thessaly and Macedonia and that the Greek Government was becoming seriously alarmed. Matthews of the News Department wrote, "this is a damning summary and should receive full publicity." He sent a copy to Colonel Frazer of the BBC.(80) A few weeks later, Edward Peck, the British Consul in Salonika, reported to the Foreign Office that there were disturbances in Western Macedonia. His main conclusions were: a) military punitive expeditions did little to harm the rebels but in fact drove the able bodied villagers to the hills; b) the Greek Army were not capable of either defeating or effectively countering the rebels in mountainous country; c) reports of outside assistance to the bandits have been greatly exaggerated.(81)

In September and October, press correspondents made their way to the North reporting on the worsening situation in the Balkans as well as within Greece.

Sprigge was in Salonika in September covering the plebiscite. "Up here", she wrote, "in the capital of Macedonia there is evidence enough to warrant an international inquiry into the headquarters of the Macedonian "autonomous" movement at Skopje, in Yugoslavia, where all the trouble begins." She visited Paikon and Vermion mountain villages where "the bands are operative."(82) She was convinced that "these bands should be operating under instructions from Skopje army headquarters in Yugoslavia and in the name of Soviet democracy."(83)
Christopher Buckley's report on his findings from a journey in Macedonia coincided with Tsaldaris' speech at Salonika on 25 September. Tsaldaris Declared that armed bands were carrying on "war from abroad." Buckley found that the "bandits" operations were not casual or haphazard but very carefully coordinated. "They give indications of working in accordance with a long-term plan", that of isolating Macedonia and dividing Greece and of maintaining a war of nerves against the Greek Government in the hope of bringing about its fall. (84)

In October, The Times sent their special correspondent. He estimated that the bands were small, and there was lack of organisation. "They have no chief commander, no unwieldy headquarters, no lines of communication." Help might come from across the border but its extent was not precisely computable. The mainspring of the rebel movement was the KKE, but it included many non-Communists and plain Republicans. The purpose behind these activities was a war of nerves against the Athens Government in the hope to bring it down. But that could mean ultimately the entry of Greece into a Balkan Communist block. Yet the aspirations of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were not secret. KKE was then in a dilemma. "Its ideology is in conflict with its patriotism. The resultant strain within the KKE ranks is not easily estimated, but many Greeks otherwise attracted to the extreme left hesitate to harm their country."

Contending with this situation was a not broadly based Greek Government which had refused the cooperation of the moderate left-wing parties and had been accused of being vindictive and of employing draconian severity against its opponents. (85)

In early October, a correspondent of The Economist travelled through the northern areas of Greece. He found that the whole issue was a part of the internal struggle for power and that the evidence provided by the Greek authorities for actions in the north was not always convincing. The correspondent said that the Greek authorities believed that there was a master-plan behind these tactics to isolate Macedonia. "This sounds impressive, but one gets
the feeling that the Greek military read more into the activity of the bands than is merited by the facts." He argued that there was the need for a settlement before the country had been disrupted by internal strife and terror. (86)

Kenneth Matthews of the BBC was among the British correspondents who visited northern Greece. In October 1946, he "drove into the mountain country beyond Salonika, hoping to make the mysterious raids comprehensible." (87) In his broadcast of October 20, he stated that the situation was too bad to be dismissed as a series of local incidents. The guerrillas numbered about 5,000, they were reasonably disciplined and coordinated. The prospects of reducing the rebel bands by military measures were extremely unpromising. (88)

On December 3 1946, with the full knowledge and encouragement of Britain and the United States, the Greek Government appealed to the General-Secretary of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, claiming that the whole guerrilla movement was receiving substantial support from countries adjacent to Greece's northern boundaries and that guerrillas were being trained, organised, and armed in foreign territory before being sent to Greece. After a three-weeks discussion on the Greek memorandum, the Security Council unanimously voted to send a commission, representing all member-States on the Council and authorised to conduct investigations on the frontiers between Greece and her northern neighbours. The commission carried out its task between January 30 and May 23, 1947. The majority of the members reached the conclusion that Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria had been supporting guerrilla warfare across the Greek frontier. (89) The Soviet Union and Poland, in a separate report, attributed the tension to the actions of the Greek Government. In the following months, the commission's report together with reports of a Subsidiary Group were discussed at the Security
Council but, on September 15 1947, on a motion by the American delegates, the Greek question was taken off the agenda.(90)

The sending of the UN Commission attracted the attention of the British press which sent their correspondents to investigate what the Commission had to face in Greece.

For The Times and the Manchester Guardian, both disputant parties should equally be blamed; to The Times the Yugoslav, Bulgarian and Albanian charges were "grossly one-sided and exaggerated. Nevertheless agitation from across the Greek frontiers would be powerless if it did not find a response, within Greece itself."(91) The Manchester Guardian in an editorial on December 9, doubted that the state of public order could solely be attributed to "foreign influences" as Tsaldaris had claimed, and its origins might be found in the internal situation:

Quite clearly the present disorders in Greece cannot be wholly the result of foreign encouragement, they have their roots in the domestic situation.

Of the same view was M Philips Price, MP, who in early December paid a short visit to Athens, after a tour in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Turkey as the Manchester Guardian's "special correspondent."(92) In his article, printed on December 11, he argued that:

In Greece...internal weakness is a heaven-sent opportunity for her northern neighbours to fish in troubled waters. Hostile broadcasts from the Slav countries would have little effect and the operations of Communist bands give no grounds of worry if Greece were sound internally.

and he concluded:

One feels it is time the Greeks pulled themselves together and realised that their danger is mainly internal.

In December, the paper sent Sprigge for a third time in a year to Greece to report on the situation in Macedonia. She stayed there from early December to late January 1947. She stationed for a while in Athens and on December 17 she visited Salonika and Macedonia. Before she left Greece she went down to Corinth, Megara and Patras in the Peloponnese. She
was asked by her paper to write four or five articles, while the Royal Institute for International
Affairs had also asked her for a 16-page article on Macedonia, which she sent off on December
16.

Sprigge had some pre-determined views. On December 1, while still in Rome, she
wrote to her editor, Wadsworth: "I'll do my best. My only prejudice, very difficult to eradicate,
is that Tito definitely wants to annex Greek Macedonia as an eighth Federal State of Jugoslavia
and unless things have changed greatly up there, it is difficult to see why on earth he should do
so. That means a Jugoslav Salonika and I gather we and the Americans fight against that, if
necessarily bringing up reinforcements. I shall try to put the case for and against this." As she
was convinced of Tito's plan of annexing Greek Macedonia, she suggested to Wadsworth that
"the proper thing to do" would be to go to Greece via Belgrade and "see Tito first", but it was
"a bit late in the year now."(93) Sprigge always felt that Trieste -Salonika- Azerbaijan "are a
sort of trilogy which can readily be covered by the same correspondent" and she asked
Wadsworth to let her visit the Soviet-Turkish frontier.(94) By January 13 1947, she had sent
three of the five articles she had to write on Greece. In a communication with Wadsworth, on
January 23, she wrote, "the articles were rewritten 4 times! from the originals...I have seldom
found any articles as difficult to write."(95)

In Salonika, Sprigge met two of the first journalists to have spent three weeks with
commanders of the Greek guerrilla bands in Thessaly and Macedonia. One of them was an
American correspondent called Robert Blake(96), who was "most keen" on sharing his
experiences with the Manchester Guardian. He said that wherever the gendarmes went to
occupy new villages "flocks of young men take to the hills like birds and join the guerrillas."
Discipline in the army seemed to be maintained without any difficulty. All the guerrillas he met
disclaimed any connection with Jugoslavia, Bulgaria or Albania. They were using British
equipment, the officers wore British or American uniforms and that all the arms were British or American, which must have been kept from the days when supplies were dropped by air to EAM.

The other journalist Sprigge saw was the Frenchman Jean Durkheim. "He's an extraordinary little man", Sprigge wrote to her editor, "...with a profound hatred of 'l'empire britannique' and a leaning towards everything Russian. He was proposing to write a series of "revelations about the British in Greece" he told me in Reynolds [News] and other papers, and I suppose I have queered his pitch a bit, and not wholly unintentionally. Anyway I dont think he'll try to bring an action." In that article of January 4, Sprigge had Blake saying that Durkheim was reporting for the French Communist paper Ce Soir. Durkheim in a letter to Sprigge complained that he never said that he was reporting for Ce Soir. "I wish to know who had Blake saying words which he had never said and for which purpose this method was used. In any case I do not think that it is profitable to anybody to use these methods."(98)

Blake's story was printed in the Manchester Guardian on January 4 and on this article the paper based a sub-leader. The Southern Department was annoyed by that "rather pernicious" and "tendentious" article and the "dubious information" the Manchester Guardian had used. Yet, no action was taken by the News Department to rebuke the paper.(99)

Sprigge's three articles on "Macedonian Troubles" appeared in the paper on 17, 18, and 22 February. The first concerned Macedonia itself: communications, public order, economic revival. She wrote that the leadership and strategy of the bands were Communist, but "few of the bandsmen are Communists." The ELAS had maintained its organisation in spite of the Varkiza agreement and they had their own call-ups. Their motives were: a) Communist dislike of the presence of the British troops making Greece part of Britain's sphere of influence; b) mistrust of the whole commercial apparatus of Western capitalism; c) Communist
Mediterranean strategy. In her second article she stated that restoration of order must go hand in hand with restoration plans and a policy of reconciliation. "But reconstruction plans are not possible as long as there is incitement from across the border."

The third article was on Britain's extended responsibility in Greece. She claimed that some time in 1943 ELAS decided, either on its own or on orders from above, that Greece was to be a Communist preserve and that British trespassers were to be prosecuted, if necessary by force of arms. "This would explain the whole course of ELAS policy since." She stated that "it is no more possible to dissociate our going to Greece in October 1944, from our general Mediterranean policy than it is to dissociate the behaviour of ELAS then and since from Soviet policy in the Balkans." And she concluded: "Greece needs all the help we can give her."

The same month Martin Moore, the new Daily Telegraph's special correspondent, visited Axioupolis, Yannitsa, Pella, Salonika in West and Central Macedonia. Like his predecessor, he believed that a well-planned, centrally-directed campaign was in full swing to cut off Western Macedonia from Greece and to proclaim it an autonomous Slav State. He wrote that the bands were "Slavonic autonomists and their non-Slavonic Communist collaborators", and among them were "professional bandits and outlawed criminals."(100) A few days later, however, on December 16, he would write: "the dubious cloud which hangs over the whole subversive agitation is nowhere thicker than around the question of autonomy. Communist EAM bands form the majority of the guerrillas, and official EAM policy is against cutting Macedonia off from Greece." Moore seemed to admit that the troubles were not after all external. Even the frontiers were being sealed, he wrote, the operations might be correspondingly reduced, but there was small hope that they would end Greece's tragedy. "With or without weapons in their hands the intransigents of both sides, political outrages and cries of vengeance would continue."

214
In January 1947, The Times Athens correspondent, Alkeos Angelopoulos, toured Macedonia and Thrace. His first two impressions were the tremendous harm done by the continuation of a state of civil war and the unanimous demand among the people for unity and peace. Concerning the allegations made by the Greek Government of help to the rebels from across the northern frontiers he believed that they enjoyed some degree of support, though some times the Greek Government and military services might have exaggerated the amount of such help. He believed that though the revolt in its origin was still domestic, it provided opportunities for exploitation by foreign interests which soon overshadowed its domestic character and the Greek Government had not treated the internal part of the problem in an appropriate manner. "A coalition including all parliamentary parties, which would adopt a policy of conciliation, would do much to solve the internal problem."(102)

On January 31 1947, Stephen Barber of the News Chronicle together with his wife, Mary Cawadias, of the Time-Life American magazine, and John Fisher of the Daily Mail, visited the village of Drosopigi, "the stronghold of the 'Democratic Army'", headquarters of the Vitsi command. They were warmly welcomed by the rebels despite warnings from "the other side" that they would be "shortened 25 centimetres." Barber and Fisher were impressed by their high morale and exemplary discipline. They did not find any evidence that they were receiving assistance from abroad. "I looked hard" Barber wrote "for signs of weapons of Russian or other distinctively 'Slav' origin, but did not see any. They also both agreed that the movement was growing very fast, "so fast" Barber reported "that it is difficult to estimate from day to day the exact strength." Fisher wrote that the rebels' forces had a large number of Elas-ites in it, "but it is not entirely communist. Many of its later recruits are Liberals of various shades. Equally its programme is not so Left-wing as that of the Communists." On one hand the rebels with their high morale and strength and on the other the Greek Government, with British aid
and advice, convinced both journalists that a bloodbath was lying ahead for Greece. Fisher ended his report saying, "observers here question whether even with the northern frontier shut the authority of the present duly-elected Greek Government could be maintained without British troops fighting alongside Greeks... I could not help wondering whether I was talking to simple outlaws who will one day be pardoned, locked up, or shot; or whether we have been making enemies of the future rulers of Greece."(103)

In the Left Labour press, The New Statesman did not believe that the war of nerves waged by Greece's northern neighbours for greater Macedonia, as the Greek Government claimed, deserved credence. On February 8 1947, it argued that "since no Greek patriot (the Greek Communist not excluded) could for a moment contemplate such a crippling loss of strategic territory, it is difficult to see how a Greater Macedonia along these lines could be formed as a result of anything short of another European upheaval or the complete submission of Greece and her Western sponsors as a result of a merciless war of nerves."(104)

Tribune argued that the guerrilla war had not been instigated by forces outside Greece. There was no need for Yugoslavia or anyone else outside Greece to instigate this rebel movement. The successive Right-wing Greek Governments and their gendarmerie have done all the necessary instigating.(105)

**British Policy and Greece in 1946**

During the Labour Government's first year in office critics of British foreign policy, though they maintained their critical attitude, did not show any tendency to attack their leaders.

Ernest Bevin faced the more critical audience than even before in the House of Commons debate on foreign affairs on June 6, 1946. Francis Noel-Baker complained about the
A few months later, in the foreign affairs debate of October 22-23, several Labour MPs took the opportunity to voice their dissatisfaction with the Government's foreign policy. In November, fifty-seven MPs signed and tabled an amendment, calling on the government to recast its conduct of international affairs so as to "provide a democratic and constructive socialist alternative to an otherwise inevitable conflict between American capitalism and Soviet communism." The amendment was defeated, but the revolt represented the most serious critique of Bevin's foreign policy ever to come from within the Parliamentary Labour Party. Yet, its importance must not be overemphasised since the protesters remained loyal to their party leadership. Newspapers and weeklies, particularly those with a critical stance, showed something of the same attitude.

Bevin's policy of non-intervention encouraged the organised terror that the royalist Right was waging against all Left forces. The British policy in Greece had failed to prevent these developments, the Greek crisis remained as acute as ever and a civil war was about to erupt.

Many papers talked about British responsibility; others wrote of "mistakes" of British policy; others saw its "failure" and worried about that the "good name of Britain" would be spoilt in the world's eyes.

Britain bore a special responsibility, The Times wrote in an editorial on September 3, for the succession of events leading first to the elections in March and to the plebiscite. In supporting Greek 'service' Governments since the autumn of 1944, though her role was disinterested, Britain "has been open to both misinterpretation abroad and exploitation in Greece itself." The Manchester Guardian argued, in an editorial on September 27, that British present position was equivocal and therefore dangerous. "If Britain's original purpose in
entering Greece was to prevent a dictatorship of the Left, we should make it equally clear that our troops are there to protect the interests of the Greek people as a whole, not to grant immunity for the dictatorial behaviour of the Right."

Harold Nicolson in his "Marginal Comment" in The Spectator, argued that British policy was "dual."

"Our pathetic attempt, he wrote in December, to combine military intervention with political abstention has exposed us to many errors."(108)

The Daily Telegraph had all along supported Bevin's foreign policy. "It is not the fault but the misfortune of Britain that her efforts have not so far produced better results" wrote the diplomatic correspondent in March 1947.(109)

Sharper criticism came from the left-wing Labour press. The New Statesman stated that the Labour policy based on foundations laid by Churchill. The fault of Bevin's policy towards Greece was: a) to pin hopes on the ramshackle Centre Government and to exclude from it all the Left; b) to override the protests of Sofoulis and to insist on elections being held last March; c) to preserve order by retaining in Greece a strong British garrison helped by a British-trained police against whose political character Sofoulis had protested in vain; d) to turn a blind eye to X-ites terror.(110) For Tribune the fault of the Labour Government's policy was negative rather than positive: it was not intervention on behalf of the Right but the absence of intervention on behalf of a Left Centre combination.(111)

However, despite their criticism The New Statesman, Tribune and the Reynolds News, official organ of the Co-operative Movement(112) stated that Bevin's policy in Greece was "well-intentioned". The New Statesman argued that taken in isolation, each successive step in Bevin's policy might be capable of defence and might have been excusable.(113) Tribune found it "absurd to accuse the Labour Government and Ernest Bevin in particular of having given support to Fascism and Royalist reaction against the democratic forces of the people."(114)
Similarly, David Raymond in Reynolds News wrote, "I do not believe that Bevin ever planned to put the Royalists in power. What he planned was to avoid any dealings with the Left." (115)

Towards the Truman Doctrine

Since mid-1946 British officials were growing increasingly divided over the issue of maintaining their financial commitment in Greece as too heavy for Britain. The Treasury was conscious of Britain's severe economic difficulties and campaigned for a withdrawal of British troops from Greece. Attlee was also reluctant to contemplate further aid to Greece. (116) The military and the Foreign Office, on the other hand, feared that if Britain withdrew completely the Greek Government would collapse and the country would fall into Soviet orbit. Subsequently the whole strategic position in the Middle East would alter to the Soviet advantage.

At the cabinet meeting of January 30 1947, the issue of further aid to Greece was discussed, and it was concluded that Britain should ask the Americans what part of the burden they were prepared to bear. On February 21 1947, the British Government informed the State Department that it would have to suspend economic aid to Greece by the end of March.

Truman's declaration, on March 12, illustrated the widening rift between the Soviet Union and the western powers. It became further wider in April after the collapse of the four-power conference of foreign ministers in Moscow. It was, however, Marshall's offer of American aid in June which made the division more serious than the rhetoric of the Truman Doctrine.
The new foreign leader writer of The Times, Con O'Neil(117), a former Foreign Office senior official, who joined the paper on May 1 1946 shortly before E H Carr left, was less optimist of Big Power cooperation.(118) When General Marshall rallied the West with his economic plan, The Times was wholeheartedly behind him. O'Neil was one of the first to say that close economic partnership must lead on to close political partnership.(119)

Alistair Cooke, the Manchester Guardian American correspondent, expressed caution when he stated that until more information became available as to justify or not "so uncompromising a decision", no one could be sure "whether the direct challenge to Russia was courageous or fairly provocative."(120) An editorial, on March 17, stated that as the Americans preferred "dramatic and strong colours", Truman's message was being read against an alarming background of British weakness and Russian strength. "Both estimates are sadly overdone."(121) A few months later, the paper would applaud the Marshall plan and Wadsworth would recognise Bevin's rapid response to it as "a stroke of genius."(122)

The conservative press hailed Truman's speech. On March 15, an editorial in the Daily Telegraph supported that friendship with Russia must come from strength and not from weakness. For The Spectator Truman's purpose was purely constructive and it would be a substantial contribution to stability in Europe and the word.(123) The 'Scrutator' applauded the speech as "a breath of fresh air to Europe's sick-room." He condemned, "the policy of continuous expansion" of the Soviet Union and its potential domino effect to the rest of Europe which would lead to the disappearance of the European civilisation.(124)

The Observer, too, welcomed the President's message. On March 16 The 'Student of Europe' argued that the Greek and Turkish loans were quite a "routine transaction" in international affairs and they did not constitute a diplomatic offensive of a shift in the balance of power. "They leave the ideological frontier exactly where it was. America takes over a specific
financial burden which Britain feels no longer able to bear; that is all."(125) This attitude can be explained not as a failure to understand or to underestimate the substance of Truman's message but it demonstrated the journal's policy under David Astor, an American himself. The Observer became the first public advocate of the Marshall Plan(126) and following on this, a firm advocate of NATO and the Anglo-American alliance.(127)

The Daily Herald together with The Economist and the Left Labour press regarded the Truman doctrine with scepticism. An article printed in the Daily Herald on March 13 argued that only unity among the Great Powers would avert war. Britain must become ever more active in her endeavour to bring about a real understanding between her two great allies.(128) The following day, Michael Foot argued that Truman's act was one of power politics, a new departure in the strategical manoeuvres which America, Russia and Britain had been executing since the end of war. The aid to Greece and Turkey was not made on humanitarian grounds, but in the interests of the foreign policy of the United States. "But the peoples of the world may ask, have we really returned to the old anarchy so soon? Is power the only test? Is there really no other way of reaching a settlement?...America acting in the interest of 'national security'? Or the United Nations acting in the interests of the world? In the case of peace there should be one answer."(129) Yet, it was Foot who would write in Tribune on June 13, 1947: "If the Russians...contract out[of the Marshall Plan], then they alone will be the architects of a divided Europe."

The Economist stated that the American tough line sounded as a declaration of war. "A 'tough line' clearly aiming at agreement with the Russians, and prepared, when the time comes, to meet them halfway, is something we can support; a 'tough line' seeking to humiliate the Russians and destroy their society, is, for any British Government, a policy of despair." It feared that "dollar diplomacy will invite a headlong collision with Communist policy unless General
Marshall and Mr. Molotov can get on to terms of confidence. A permanent split across Europe between east and west could hardly be averted. The journal concluded "for better or worse, we cannot deviate far from America's course." British interest was to support the eastward advance of American policy provided that two things were clearly understood: that loans of dollars and advisers would not automatically relieve Britain of her international responsibilities; and that American diplomacy must have for its ultimate aim a firm understanding with the Soviet Government.

The New Statesman argued that Truman's declaration discussed "the cheapest and surest way of arming against the hypothetical aggression of Russia." The journalist argued for a British and French-led federalist Europe, "neither to belong to an American nor Russian bloc", which would be able "to exercise a beneficial and peaceful influence." Tribune was in favour of an Anglo-French alliance of political and economic planning as to draw in other European countries. "We must avoid permanent dependence on American supplies and dollars." Regarding American aid to Greece, the publication argued that it would be made "conditional upon real reform and democratisation, with the full restoration of trade union liberties and the holding of fresh elections at the earliest opportunity."
NOTES

1. Vlavianos, Greece, 1941-1949, 235
2. Many attempts at a postponement of the election day had been made. In January J Sofianopoulos, Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent a telegram to the British, French and American Governments, arguing for a postponement until mid-April 1946. This telegram resulted in an apology on his behalf and a promise to send a telegram of rectification to the three Governments concerned. In February, Sofoulis made two further attempts to persuade Bevin, to allow him to postpone the election. He first sent his new Foreign Secretary C Rendis to London to discuss the matter directly with Bevin and the Foreign Office. But Rendis failed to change Bevin's mind. Then on February 15, Sofoulis in a memorandum made a direct appeal to Bevin for two to three months postponement, but it also failed. On March 2, Sofoulis informed Bevin that apart from KKE, EAM, ELD/SKE, the left Liberals and the Union of Left Republicans (Sofianopoulos) would abstain if the elections were not postponed. Bevin replied that the abstention was not a serious reason to deprive the Greek people of a choice of Government. (For more details on the matter see Vlavianos, op.cit., 145-167)
3. EAM's demands were: a) the formation of a representative Government with the participation of EAM; b) an end to the terror, a genuine disbanding and disarming of the terrorist organisations, restoration of order and equality before the law; c) a general amnesty; d) a rectification of the electoral lists and e) a purge of the state apparatus of the fascist and quisling elements.
4. The Times, leader, "The Greek elections", 21/2/46
5. FO371/58676, R2796.
6. The Times, leader, "New Crisis in Greece", 8/3/46
7. The Times, Diplomatic correspondent, 9/3/46
8. The Times, leaders, 6/3/46 and 9/3/46
10. I McDonald, History of The Times, vol. V, 138-144
14. Daily Herald, 9/2/46. See also, 27/2/46 & 21/3/46
15. Ibid., Dudley Barker, 25/3/46
17. Son of one of the most famous editors of Fleet Street, H W Massingham, editor of The Star, Daily Chronicle and The Nation (The Encyclopedia of the British Press, 406)
18. Archibald Gibson, after his assignment in Rumania for The Times and the Kemsley press, was appointed member of staff of the British Embassy in Turkey. In 1945 he became Middle East correspondent for the Kemsley Newspapers. In March 20 he was sent in Greece to cover the elections, with the instructions "to be as quick off the mark as the agencies", and not to engage any local help. (Gibson to Sprigge, March 1946, Sprigge's file, B/S308/32). He was seeking to write for the Manchester Guardian. He contacted Sprigge, while both were in Athens, but she found him "so passionately
anti-Russian" and she wrote to Wadsworth, "you may not like his things." (Sprigge to Wadsworth, 5/5/46, Manchester Guardian Archives, B/S308/33)

19. FO371/58678, R3664, FO to Athens, 20/3/46
20. FO371/58681, R4845, Washington to FO, 26/3/46
21. The Economist, 30/3/46, p.495
22. Manchester Guardian, Spec. corr., 30/3/46. See also 22/3/46
23. Daily Telegraph, Buckley, 27/3/46, p.1
24. Daily Mail, Alexander Clifford, 29/3/46
25. Daily Mail, Clifford, 29/3/46
27. The Observer, Hugh Massingham, 31/3/46
28. The New Statesman, Massingham, 30/3/46, p.224
30. 1/4/46, Daily Mirror, p.1; Daily Dispatch, Reuters, A.P., p.1
31. Wilfred (Peter) Burchett, Australian. After World War II, he served as correspondent of the Daily Express. He spent the late 1940s in Central Europe and the Balkans. He was the first correspondent to enter Hiroshima. He reported from China, Burma, Korea, Cambodia, Vietnam. He has written his experiences in many books. (Wilfred Burchett, At The Barricades, 1981)
32. FO371/58683, R5277, Salonika to Athens, 3/4/46; R5171, Moscow to Athens, 2/4/46
33. FO371/58687, R6248, Peck(Salonika) to Athens Embassy, 11/4/46; Ellinokos Voras, Phos, 3/4/46
34. FO371/58683, R5277, Salonika to Athens, 3/4/46
35. FO371/58683, R5277, Minutes by Laskey, and Cameron on 11/4/46; FO to Athens 11/4/46
36. FO371/58684, R5358, Athens to FO, 4/4/46, Minutes by Laskey, 6/4/46, and by Williams, 8/4/46
38. For a detailed analysis see Vlavianos, op.cit., 167-170
39. FO371/58686, R5679, Minutes by Laskey, 13/4/46
40. FO371/58686, R5812, FO to Athens, 13/4/46; Minutes by Selby, 18/4/46; Allied observers (AMFOGE) from Britain, the United States and France supervised the March elections. They arrived in Athens in November 27, 1945. The Soviet Union had refused to participate.
41. FO371/58687, R6089, FO to Washington, 24/4/46
42. On p. 7 of the AMFOGE Report we read: "a week of general indoctrination followed during which lectures were delivered on the organisation and purpose of the Mission, geography, history, constitution and politics of Greece..." One wonders what kind of indoctrination actually took place when the 'X' organisation is portrayed in the Report as being one of the Resistance organisations. AMFOGE Report, p.20; (Quoted in Vlavianos, op.cit., 298, 194fn. See also McNeil, The Greek Dilemma, 191
43. The New Statesman, 4/5/46, p.318; "C.M.F., Observer" was presumably Brigadier-General Arnaud Laparra, Chief of the French Mission. No other initials from the list of the AMFOGE members match to the above initials (AMFOGE Report, p.6)
44. The Observer, Massingham, 14/4/46, p.1
45. Daily Worker, 13/4/46, p.1
46. FO371/58688, R6624, Minutes by Selby and Williams,
47. The Spectator, 12/4/46, p.366
48. The Economist, 6/4/46, p.534
49. For the reasons on which Bevin was finally convinced for an early plebiscite see G M Alexander, Prelude to the Truman Doctrine, 191-194; Vlavianos, op.cit.,227-228
50. FO371/58689, R6888, Minutes Selby, 8/5/46, Cameron, 13/5/46
51. FO371/58689, R7044
52. Manchester Guardian, special correspondent, 30/8/46
54. The Times, Angelopoulos, 20/8/46. Also diplomatic corr., 31/8/46
55. T. Windle and Leland Morris, the British and American heads of AMFOGE, remained in Greece to "informally" observe the plebiscite.
56. The New Statesman, 11/5/46, p.330
57. The Economist, By a Corr., 31/8/46, p.338
58. FO371/58691, R7376, FO to Athens, 22/5/46
59. The Times, Our corr., 18/5/46
60. News Chronicle, Stephen Barber, 30/8/46
61. The Observer, Our corr, 1/9/46, p.1
62. The Economist, By a corr., 31/8/46, p.338
63. FO371/58705, R12809, Norton to Sargent, 24/8/46; FO to Athens, 27/8/46; Minutes by Sargent, 28/8/46
64. Manchester Guardian Archives, Sprigge to APW, 21/8/46 Sprigge's file, B/S308)
65. Alan Moorehead, Australian. He worked on various newspapers in Australia and England, mostly as war correspondent, 1930-46. When he retired from active journalism he wrote books, Who was Who, vol.VIII,532. See also, Tom Pocock, Alan Moorehead, 1990)
68. Tribune, 2/9/46, p.2
69. FO371/58706, R13112, Hayter to Dixon, 7/9/46; Admiralty to C in C, Mediterranean,, Top Secret, 13/9/46
70. News Chronicle, Hoare, 7/1/46
71. The Kalamata incident started on January 16 and ended on January 21. (See Vlavianos, op.cit.,155-156)
72. FO371/58670, R1252, Athens to FO, 23/1/46
73. News Chronicle, 21/1/46, Manchester Guardian, Reuter, 23/1/46 and The Times, 22/1/46
74. FO371/58689, R7023, FO to Athens, 7/5/46

225
75. FO371/58690, R7098, Norton to FO, 9/5/46; Minutes by Hayter, 11/5/46; FO to Athens, 11/5/46; Minutes by Nash, 11/5/46 and 13/5/46.
76. FO371/58690, R7135, Minutes by Hayter, by Nash.
77. FO371/58690, R7099, FO to Athens, 15/5/46
78. The Times, "Greek brigand arrested", 24/5/46; Daily Worker, "Greek bandit arrested by agreement!", 24/5/46
79. FO371/58692, R7733, Athens to FO, 20/5/46; Minutes by Selby,
80. FO371/58708, R13859, Athens to FO, 17/9/46; Minutes by Matthews, Selby and Scott
81. FO371/58711, R15193. Peck's report, 9/10/46
82. Manchester Guardian, special corr., 4/9/46
83. Ibid., special corr., 6/9/46
84. Daily Telegraph, Buckley, 26/9/46
85. The Times, special corr., 14/10/46
86. The Economist. By a corr. recently in Athens, 12/10/46, 94. 87. Kenneth Matthews, Memories of..., 132
88. BBC, WAC, Matthews's dispatch, 20/10/46; 9 o'clock news broadcast, 21/10/46
90. Iatrides, Greece in the 1940's, 281-85
91. The Times, leader, 21/12/46
92. Manchester Guardian Archives, M Philips Price file, 338/2
93. Manchester Guardian Archives, Sprigge to APW, 1/12/46
94. Ibid., Sprigge to APW, 16/12/46
95. Ibid., Sprigge to APW, 13/1/47
96. R W Blake, an American soldier recently demobilised and turned journalist for his own local paper the Cleveland Plain Dealer.
97. Jean Durkheim, grandson of the philosopher of that name was staff contributor for three French newspapers: Ce Soir, La Marseillaise and La Tribune Des Nations.
98. Durkheim to Sprigge (in French), Manchester Guardian Archives, B/S308/51
99. FO371/66995, R336, Minutes by McCarthy, Selby, Nash
100. Daily Telegraph, Martin Moore, 2, 6, 9, 16/12/1946.
101. Ibid., Moore, 16/12/46
102. The Times, Our Athens correspondent, 7/1/47
103. News Chronicle, Barber, 31/1/47; Daily Mail, Fisher, 31/1/47
104. The New Statesman, from a corr., 8/2/47, p.110
105. Tribune, 7/2/46, p.3
108. The Spectator, 'Marginal Comment' 13/12/46, p.640
111. Tribune, 2/9/46 and 13/9/46
112. The British Co-operative movement emerged in 1814; in 1917 the Co-op party was founded and became a major component of the Labour movement. (Pollard, S, "The Foundation of the Co-operative party", Essays in Labour History, 1886-1923, 185-210)
114. Tribune, 2/9/46, p.2
115. Reynolds News, Raymond, 1/9/46
118. The Times, leaders: Mr Truman's Challenge, 13/3/47; World's Security, 14/3/47 and The Truman Doctrine, 27/3/47
119. I McDonald, op.cit., 145-6
120. Manchester Guardian, Alistair Cooke, 14/3/47, 15/3/47
121. Ibid., leader, The Aid to Greece, 17/3/47
122. D Ayerst, op.cit.,572
123. The Spectator, 14/3/47, p.257-8
124. Sunday Times, 'Strutator', A Breath of Fresh Air, 16/3/47
125. The Observer, 'A Student of Europe', "America's New Frontier", 16/3/47
126. The Observer, 22/6/47
127. Richard Cockett, David Astor and The Observer, 174-5
128. Daily Herald, "America, Greece, Turkey -and Russia", 13/3/47
129. Ibid., M Foot, "US or UN? That is the Question", 14/3/47
131. The New Statesman," Where is Britain?", 15/3/47, p.167
CHAPTER SEVEN

INTERNATIONALISATION OF THE GREEK CRISIS, APRIL 1947-OCTOBER 1949

Once the Truman administration had decided to provide Greece with large-scale assistance, it set out to directly control virtually all key sectors of the state apparatus. The task was achieved through a number of formal agreements between the United States and Greece, and by carefully apportioning jurisdiction between the American Ambassador and Dwight Grisworld, the chief of the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG), who arrived in Athens on July 15, 1947. (1) Additionally, specific functions were also assigned directly to the Joint US Military Advisory and Planning Group, Greece (JUSMAPG) established in November 1947 to provide advice to high-level Greek military staff. (2) On January 26, 1948, General James van Fleet was appointed JUSMAPG director.

In the summer and autumn of 1947, the civil war assumed large-scale proportions. Despite the massive American assistance of every kind and direction, the 'Democratic Army' strengthened its hold on the countryside, especially in the North. Its attacks, however, on towns and villages were relatively successful. For instance, the attack on Konitsa, by the Albanian border, in July and again in December 1947, designed to provide the capital of the newly proclaimed Provisional Democratic Government (December 24, 1947) failed miserably. Moreover, aid from abroad was far less than expected while recognition of the Provisional Government did not come even by the communist states.

In Athens, the Government had launched a ferocious campaign against the Left, making thousands of arrests and deportations, without trial, to the island concentration camps. (3) In
September, a coalition Government was formed headed by Sofoulis, designed to calm down the public opinion. An amnesty was offered to the guerrillas but, when this failed, new repressive laws were passed. The main law was 'Emergency Law 509' of December 27, 1947, which outlawed the Communist party and penalised so-called communist activity itself with harsh penalties.(4)

Meanwhile the Government forces launched in summer 1948 a major offensive in the Grammos mountains, in north-west Greece, the Democratic Army's most popular base. Despite the bitter fighting -American napalm bombs were used for the first time- the government offensive failed to defeat the guerrillas. It was not until August 1949 when the 'Democratic Army', after a heavy defeat at Mount Vitsi, was finally beaten. Heavy losses, the problem of finding new reserves, the inadequate assistance from the communist states and the internal dissent in the KKE over the Tito-Kremlin split and the conduct of the war were several factors of its collapse. On October 16, Radio 'Free Greece' announced a 'cease fire.' The civil war was over.

From Cooperation to Confrontation, 1947-1949

Cooperation with the Soviet Union, in 1944 and 1945, was dictated only by the British desire to safeguard her exclusive position in the Mediterranean and Middle East, which was the focus of her military strategy.(5)

By 1947, the Cold War tensions, to which the Soviets partly contributed, were evident. The fear of communism was added to the fear of failing to bring about post-war recovery and the fear of Britain losing her imperial influence and great power status.
In that sense, the idea of a 'Western Union' seemed attractive: a British-led Western European bloc linked to the Empire and independent of both the Soviet Union and the United States. This attitude towards the Soviets coincided with the wish of many back-bench Labour MPs, notably the members of the 'Keep Left' group led by Richard Crossman, Michael Foot and Ian Mikardo. This group opposed both confrontation with the Soviet Union and avoidance of overt Atlantic partnership and proposed the 'Third Force' as the Socialist alternative to 'balance of power' politics. (6)

Bevin had been advocating the 'Third Force' concept during the first years of the Attlee Government. In his speech to the House of Commons on January 22 1948, he proposed a 'Western Union,' which culminated in the signature of the Brussels Treaty on March 17 1948. Bevin's concept of 'Third Force' was seen as a partnership between two equals: the United States on one hand and a British-led western Europe on the other.

The Americans, however, had not decided how to support 'Western Union'. Yet, pressure of outside events, and particularly what was seen as the ever-increasing Soviet threat, weakened the idea of 'Western Union'. Britain could not provide the military power needed to counterbalance that of the USSR and Europe's need for American economic assistance, demonstrated by the Marshall Plan, together led to replacement of the 'Third Force' by the Atlantic Pact, signed on April 4 1949. After the Berlin blockade, the 'Keep Left' group accepted partnership in an Atlantic Pact. (7)

By 1949, dependence on the United States was seen as necessary if the Empire was to be saved. American support for Britain was deemed important, not least because of the need to prevent Soviet-American rapprochement, as in 1945, undermining British interests. (8) Indeed, throughout the first half of 1949, the Soviet Union veered towards a conciliatory foreign policy, stressing peaceful coexistence and the dangers of war. (9)
In 1948, The Times, under W F Casey's(10) editorship, returned to "that old, simple truths" which "after the tremendous convulsions of recent times there is a risk" to be forgotten while Churchill was often named in the editorials. The paper was not enthusiastic with the idea of a 'Third Force', and it welcomed every step taken in the direction of the signing of an Atlantic pact. "New policies had been offered", the paper wrote, "Some say that there is no choice but to select either the United States or the Soviet Union and then simply to follow the leader. Others still look for some independence, but take independence to mean equal detachment from the United States and Soviet Union and an equally aloof approach to American and Russian policies. The first proposal is to give up having a policy at all; the second is impossible. Both ignore what Mr Churchill has called "the wonderful unconscious tradition of British foreign policy", which, having consistently survived the transformations of more than four hundred years, can usefully be called in aid now". It went on "policy must have its foundation and spring-board of strength, and the latest transformation in Europe's balance of power has simply broadened the field of defence from the Entente to western Europe, and from Western to Atlantic Union...the combination of western Europe for recovery and revival, with American help, is the pillar of safety."(11) The paper did not trust any agreement with the Soviets: first, it would spread confusion in the world, second the Soviets would seek to bargain one area against another and third they would "seek to persuade the Americans to reach decisions in matters of vital importance to the countries of western Europe."(12) As regards the Soviet 'peace offensive' in early 1949, The Times believed that Stalin did not really want to reach a settlement "but is only concerned to squeeze the last drop of propaganda."(13)

The Manchester Guardian gave its full support to Bevin's policy and it was its editor's, A P Wadsworth's, main act during his first years on the paper, "to lead the intellectual left away
from appeasement of Russia.”(14) The paper had argued hard to rally the Labour intellectuals to the Western Alliance. It followed the incidence of Bevin's policy. It stated that after the failure of the London conference in December 1947 "with the best will in the world is it no longer possible to believe in a system by which, as Mr Bevin said, the European nations can work out their own salvation "under the umbrella of the four Great Powers." What was needed was therefore a "more active cooperation with the countries of Western Europe." As regards the relations with the Soviet Union, the paper considered wise the Government's policy not to create "a closed block."(15) After the discussion in the Commons, on January 22 1948, the paper stated that "a stronger West is the first condition on which we can hope to test the hopes of an East-West settlement."(16) In June, the paper stated "there are some who believe that Europe's future is to be a 'bridge' between Russian Communism and American capitalism...But on all fundamental things we cannot be a bridge, for there be no traffic between a free society and a totalitarian State. If we are valued by the people of the United States and the Dominions it is rather as a bastion than a bridge."(17) About the Soviet 'peace offensive', "it is fairly safe to assume that the 'pacific' moves are tactical and are not intended for any other end than the weakening of those who, by all the most doggedly-held Communist theory, they regard as their inevitable enemies."(18)

The News Chronicle assessed that the Brussels Treaty "almost certainly will be hailed as the beginning of an era in the progress of Western Civilisation."(19) It considered that it was "sensible" to attempt to approach the Soviets. "Many vital British interests are bound to be involved in any agreement America may make. But no interests are threatened by an honourable settlement. There is no appeasement involved in this. We, and every other nation, have nothing to lose and everything to gain from an honest and straightforward effort to recreate one world."(20) However a few months later the paper would write: "Soon, if she can
give no proof of sincerity and good will, the Soviet Union will have levelled against her the disapproval of every country in the world." (21)

In the conservative press, the Daily Telegraph was a strong supporter of the Atlantic pact. It was a "Magna Carta", "a far better guarantee of peace for the world and of safety for themselves than any previous attempt in modern times to organise collective security." The participation in it of the United States was the most important feature of the Pact. (22) The paper doubted the sincerity of Russia's offer of a settlement. (23) The Daily Express, fervent supporter of the Empire, assessed that "Britain must live or perish by her own trade within the Empire", and the "main threat to the British Empire today lies in the dislike of the Americans for our colonial policy." The Socialists, the Tories, and the Liberals all had helped the process of decline of the Empire "when they approved the negotiations with the United States which resulted in the American Loan and the Marshall plan...What is to be said of the conduct of the people in this country who were prepared to throw away the structure of British Empire Preference in return for quick, easy, fleeting dollars? The pity of it!" (24) The Daily Mail believed that closest ties of friendship with the United States "will present a menace to nobody, except to potential disturbers of the peace. And to them its strength, combined with the strength of America will rightly appear so overwhelming that they will be forced to abandon all ideas of aggression." (25) The Sunday Times compared the Soviet 'peace offensive' with Hitler's method and it found it "so close that one cannot help asking whether the motive is not the same. We have had no Munich yet." (26) About the Atlantic Pact, "its object is not only to defeat aggression if it comes, but if possible to deter the aggressor." (27) The Spectator, though it did not trust the Soviets, suggested that while closer relations between the nations of Western Europe and the United States should be developed "with all speed", they should be vigilant for any signs that the Soviet Union would be ready with some better policy. "It is necessary to wait
for what seems a genuine chance for advance, but the waiting must not induce complete somnolence."(28) The Western Powers should make the fullest use of their own strength and their opponents' weakness, a "hard bargaining on a basis of hard fact."(29)

The Observer was a fervent advocate of the Anglo-American 'special relationship' and close cooperation.(30)

The Economist urged not only for a close economic but also for a military relationship with the United States. The Brussels treaty did not solve the problem of security, since "the crucial question -the military relationship between the five western Governments and America-remains unanswered." Only solid American action could reassure "the mass of continental people, who are still mostly irresolute and vulnerable to defeatist, even pacifist arguments."(31)

The two most influential Labour Left weeklies, The New Statesman and Tribune had undergone a decisive shift in their attitudes towards the Soviet Union and Britain's world position.(32) Tribune, initially critical of Bevin's close cooperation with the Americans and of his hostile approach to the Russians, was the first of the Labour Left journals to sound anti-Soviet. After the Commons debate in January 1948, it would write that the Marshall Plan "cannot succeed without a European initiative and closest European cooperation"; the journal urged the Government to seize this "unique opportunity" to help shaping Europe's future.(33) It considered the Brussels Treaty as an "important alliance", but an alliance which "will not handicap the eventual emergence of a Western Union, but, on the contrary, may facilitate it."(34) Tribune did not have faith in the Soviet offer of peace talks. It "looks more like a propaganda stunt than a desire for settling down to serious business." Any talks with the Soviet Union "need not and must not mean that reconstruction plans in the West are held up. Nor do we accept any suggestions that the American Government was considering a new Munich at Britain's expense."(35)
The New Statesman, on the other hand, less severe than Tribune in its condemnation of Soviet policies, was the only paper still maintained that Britain should not ally with the United States in opposing the Soviet Union. More committed to the 'Third Force', the journal argued that Europe and Britain should be independent of both and balance and eventually reconcile the other two. As regards the Soviet offer for peace talks in May 1948 it stated "if not a settlement, at least an agreement to live and let live...Indeed, the needs of the Eastern and Western power blocs are complementary.(36) Regarding the Atlantic Treaty, the journal stated that the Treaty was not about "how the third world war is to be averted, but how that war is to be won."(37) In April 1949, The New Statesman devoted a full-page article, entitled "Peace and Propaganda", to the Soviet "peace offensive." It stated, "as things stand today, we do not doubt that Russia does fear Western aggression and that she has more reason to fear military attack from the West than the West has to fear such an attack from Russia." To those who said that rearmament and political union on a military basis in the West was the only way of avoiding war, the journal suggested that "the only alternative to war must be some form of agreement with Russia." And "before it is too late and the arms race has totally outstripped reason", the West must decide on what basis they were seeking agreement with the Soviet Union. "If an increased strength is for the purposes of peace, the sooner we make clear our constructive proposals the better...If we reject both war and a Soviet peace, we must state our alternative."(38)
Greece from April 1947 to April 1948

After the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, Greece was relegated to a less important position on the foreign pages of the British press. Most of the papers carried feature articles on Greece which were of a universal nature to interest the average reader. Others, mainly the popular press, dropped Greece almost altogether. Weeks would go by with no mention whatsoever of Greek events, only to have them suddenly burst into print.

Some changes were made on the staff of the papers. The Times was served by Alkeos Angelopoulos until the end of March 1947(39), and from April a new special correspondent, Frank Macaskie(40), took over. The Manchester Guardian was also served by The Times correspondent. The Daily Telegraph had David Woodford(41) and in 1949 Lovett-Edwards, the paper's correspondent who had been attached to the UNSCOB. Buckley, who was travelling in East Europe, also sent reports, when he was in Greece. The Daily Herald retained Salusbury and the News Chronicle kept Barber until the end of the civil war. The Daily Mail had the services of John Fisher and temporarily used its Greek stringer, Chronis Protopapas and sent Alexander Clifford, Judy Cowel and Alan Humphreys for quick visits to Greece, especially in 1949. The Daily Express had Eric Grey until 1947, and occasionally sent Walter Lucas in 1948, and Bernard Wicksteed in 1949, while its chief foreign correspondent, Sefton Delmer, in his "Newsmap" gave some feature articles on Greece and the Balkans. The Observer had Alan Moorehead and Patric O'Donovan(42) who stayed in Greece from January 11 to early May 1948; Claire Hollingworth moving between Belgrade and Athens was reporting for the paper in late 1948. In 1949, the Sunday Times had Keith Butler.
Most of the British papers tended to see the Greek crisis in its international dimensions and avoided criticising the actions and measures of the Greek Government. Yet, its severe measures against everybody suspected of left-wing sympathies made the British and the American Governments apprehensive about reactions in Britain and the United States which might be provoked. On March 5, following mass arrests the day before, McVeagh and Norton called on Tsaldaris to give explanations. Norton and the Foreign Office found that these arrests were "doubtless" justified but "dangerous" politically. Norton was instructed to bring this to the Greek Premier's attention. Washington sent a strong personal message to the Greek Premier stressing the very bad effect which reports of Right Wing excesses were having on public opinion and on the proposed legislation establishing American aid to Greece. In June, when more reports of severe measures reached London, it was thought that some action must be taken. On June 9, McCarthy noted "One sees and defends the logic of Greek policy in this respect, but it is not easy to forget that retaliation is of itself no solution." On June 20, a letter was sent to the Athens Embassy to this effect.

The divergence of approach to the Greek crisis between The Times and its new correspondent, became at once perceptible. As we have seen, John Astor was looking for a suitable Athens correspondent since December 1945. He was to be found in Lt Col F G Macaskie. He first came to Greece in 1941, probably as an agent of MI9 (Military Intelligence). In September 1943, he was involved in talks with Archbishop Damaskinos and A Evert, the chief of the Athens police and an associate of Damaskinos, in an effort to build an anti-EAM/ELAS front in Athens. After the liberation, he was employed on the staff of the British Embassy in Athens and became the liaison officer between the Archbishop, who had become the Regent and the Reginald Leeper, the British Ambassador. In later years he enjoyed
"to a remarkable degree" the confidence of King Paul and Queen Frederica. He accompanied them on many journeys throughout the country and he "came to be regarded as one to be consulted at times of crisis."(48)

In a letter on May 2 1948, Macaskie wrote to Barrington-Ward, "I remember almost your last words to me in London were that we should do something about the present Greek Government. So far in my messages I have not been critical of it, though there are many of its actions and measures that are ill-advised...I think until the American attitude towards it becomes clearer criticism would not be helpful." On May 30, Barrington-Ward, replying to Macaskie's letter, wrote: "your task is certainly delicate. There is no reason at all why you should not report Greek opinion from time to time, however strongly expressed. It will be your duty as a correspondent to do so. But you will be reporting as a detached observer."(49)

In contrast to Macaskie's dispatches, the tone of The Times editorials was noticeably different and more critical of the Greek Government. On May 23, The Times stressed in an editorial that the Greek Government "hopes, with the help of American money, to finish off the war by crushing the rebels entirely." The Americans would have to decide whether to let the Greek Army have its head or whether to try to enforce a new policy which would bring the war to an end. "It is possible, in fact, by a generous amnesty, by a programme of moderation combined with economic reform, and if necessary by new elections and a new Government, to lure the rebels from the hills and to heal the wounds which are bleeding Greece to death." Such an American enforcement "it will, of course, be intervention rather than the mere financial support of an anti-Communist regime."(50)

The Manchester Guardian took the view that though Greece's northern neighbours were to blame, the Greek Government was by no means blameless. On May 10, in a leader it argued that "what was first represented by the Government as a military operation in defence of
Greece's independence is more and more clearly becoming a political crusade against any opposition."(51) On June 20, another editorial stressed that much would depend on the Government's own behaviour in dealing with the political situation. However, a few days later, on June 23, the paper carried another editorial, entitled "Plain Tale", turning the blame more to the Soviet side. It wrote that "the Soviet Government could give no better proof of its desire to collaborate with the West than by calling off the war in Greece." "This is a good corrective" noted McGarthy of the Southern Department.(52)

In June and July 1947, the Greek Government launched a rumour-campaign aiming at highlighting the international danger of the Greek crisis and justifying further arrests of its opponents.

In early June, publicity was given to rumours that an 'international brigade' was being formed to come to the assistance of the guerrillas, and that Communists recruited in France, Italy, Spain and Germany had already reached Greece's northern borders through a Yugoslav port. On June 2 Macaskie reported in The Times that, though it was impossible to check the truth or the origin of such reports, their effect was to unite all anti-Communists in Greece.

"Unity is nearer that at any time since Greece fought united against the Axis Powers in 1904-41" he wrote.(53) On June 6, The Spectator wrote "whether it is true or not, it has already led to a patriotic drawing together of the Greek parties."(54) The Foreign Office investigated the matter and, on June 11, McCarthy minuted that "such rumours of an 'International' Brigade have so far not been found true."(55) Meanwhile, the press continued to report moves of the obscure 'International Brigade' until late July, when the story was proved to be false. When the battle at Konitsa occurred, which was reported on the front pages of all papers(56), a Greek official communiqué presented it as an invasion from Albania of units of
the 'International Brigade.' Since there were no signs of the 'Brigade', the press began to doubt that it was existed at all. On July 15, the Manchester Guardian in an editorial stated that "Athens has apparently changed its mind about the invasion of Greece by an international brigade.' It is time the dark rumours about this 'brigade' were tested in the light of day."(57) On July 17, Salusbury of the Daily Herald interviewed Canellopoulos, Air Minister, who told him that he deplored sensational reports in sections of the Greek press. "He reminded me", Salusbury wrote, "that he had never suggested an 'international brigade' was in Greece, but had simply received reports of the presence in Albania of unspecified units."(58) On July 26, the Manchester Guardian wrote in an editorial, "there is little doubt that General Zervas and other members of the Greek Government deliberately exaggerated the importance of the operations on the Albanian frontier in order to impress the Americans and perhaps, to justify the widespread arrests of 'Communists', real and imagined, in Greece. No international brigade appeared."(59)

Another story circulated in the British press was about an alleged 'plot' by Communists -scheduled for July 9- to commit sabotage and murder and provoke disorder in Athens and other Greek towns. On July 8, the Greek Government claimed that the 'plot' was connected with a Communist threat to establish a separate Government(60) and was intended to show that the rebels were strong in the towns as well as the mountains. On this pretext the police made mass arrests in all major cities and towns. Police and army units were ordered to stand by.(61)

On July 10, The Times, together with the Manchester Guardian and the Daily Telegraph published the 'plot' story. On July 11, Macaskie reported in the Manchester Guardian that the arrests had reached a total number of more than 3,000. However, he added, "any suspicions that the Greek Government has used the well-worn Eastern Europe technique of
inventing an imaginary plot as an excuse for putting away political opponents appear to have been removed by the fact that only the extreme Left-wing has disapproved of yesterday's mass arrests.\(^{62}\) On the same day \textit{The Times} carried an editorial condemning the mass arrests: "It seems clear that the purpose of the Government's action was to destroy further opposition by the left-wing coalition still represented by EAM... These...arrested in the last few days... are accused of plotting the overthrow of the present regime at a moment when, in common knowledge, the leaders of EAM, hard-driven and in retreat, were attempting a reconciliation with those who have now arrested them." The paper went on, "those who plot against the State must be arrested; but the reasonable aspirations of a large section of the Greek people must also be given voice and freedom for peaceful development. Any other policy can only lead straight to dictatorship."\(^{63}\) This editorial, together with another one, published on July 15 would cause great indignation at the Foreign Office, as we will see later.

\textit{The New Statesman} and \textit{Tribune} also severely criticised the mass arrests. \textit{The New Statesman} stated the alleged plot was the excuse for the mass arrests of Communists. "The new arrests are most unwise unless the Government is seeking the complete liquidation of all opposition and the creation of a naked dictatorship living on American charity."\(^{64}\)

\textit{Tribune} wrote, "this 'plot', real or invented, was in any case only an excuse for the full scale swoop...by which the Government hopes, once and for all, to put an end to the activities of the Communists and, indeed, to their survival as a political force." Yet, \textit{Tribune} pointed out that these arrests, which had stirred up fresh sympathies with the Communist victims, "must not obscure the fact that the situation in Greece is an international issue as much as a domestic one. It is on Greek soil that the Russian conflict with the West has developed into an open clash."\(^{65}\)
Three editorials on Greece would cause considerable dismay in the Foreign Office: those of The Economist, printed on July 5 and of The Times printed on July 11 and 15 1947.

The Economist adopted the view that the roots of the Greek crisis were primarily internal. In May, the journal had stressed that it was the unpopularity, incompetence and corruption of the Greek Government on which Greece's northern neighbours counted on to stir troubles on the frontiers. In the editorial of July 5, entitled "Knife Edge in Greece", the journal made that point again. It stated that "inside Greece the futility and savagery of the Government have re-created a measure of popular support for the guerrillas...Outside Greece, the Russians and the satellites are ready to exploit this internal situation." The American policy, therefore, should be to check and play down the frontier incidents on the one hand and to work fast to reduce internal tension inside Greece on the other. Meanwhile, it was in Greece itself that the major effort of pacification should be made. The Americans should make their assistance conditional upon a broadening of the Government to include the Liberal opposition and later if possible the moderate fringe of EAM. "These policies are perhaps less sensational and emotionally satisfying than banging on the big drum, proclaiming that Greece is "the frontier of freedom" and drifting in a flurry of fine words and ill-considered actions into a conflict which the world must seek by every means to avoid."

McGarthy found that "the article is pernicious, tendentious, and inaccurate in the extreme", that it gave "a completely false outline of the position in Greece." Colonel Castle, member of the British Economic Mission in Greece, had passed to McCarthy, the day before, a draft letter addressed to the Editor of The Economist, in which he criticised the article. McCarthy sympathised with Colonel Castle's eagerness to reply to it. As he pointed out, the Foreign Office had no press relations officer and the article "badly" needed an answer but Castle's position as a quasi Civil Servant precluded his writing a rejoinder to this article or
engaging in public controversy about it. McCarthy informed Castle that A Pallis, the head of the Greek Information Office in London, had approached an MP, who had been to Greece as a member of a Parliamentary Delegation, in order to induce the latter to sign a rejoinder. On July 11, Castle replying to McCarthy wrote that a friend of his who had been in Greece in a business trip, wrote a letter to the Editor of The Economist. "I have done what I can by asking the staff to look out for the letter and to give it favourable treatment."(67) On July 12, in The Economist correspondence columns Peter Calvocoressi(68), back from "a fairly long visit to Greece", defended the Greek Government saying that it "substantially reflected the popular will and their administration of the rest of the country, whether competent or incompetent, is not characterised by terrorism or strong-arm practices." Incidents which suggested a more sinister conclusion, "seem to be attributable to a lack of Governmental authority and a lack of efficient administrative machinery rather than to deliberate policy. Often they are due to nothing more than frayed nerves." The Spectator, a few days later, printed a full-page article by Calvocoressi, entitled "Issues in Greece", based on the same lines. Yet, on September 6, The Economist reiterated its view that the rebel movement was not entirely the work of Greece's neighbours, but it was rooted in Greece itself. "It is clearly nourished by the reactionary inefficiency of the Greek Government, and the creation of a more able and representative cabinet is one of the essential preliminaries to domestic pacification."(69)

The Times editorial condemnation, on July 11, on the mass arrests carried out by the Greek Government prompted the immediate action of the Foreign Office. David Balfour, Southern Department, spoke to News Department to arrange a visit by a representative from The Times on July 14.(70)

Meanwhile, on July 15, another leader appeared, appraising what progress had been made so far in solving the Greek crisis. "So long as the Greek opposition, whether political or
military -and both are aspects of the same republican conviction- is treated merely as the paid agent of powers outside Greece, no settlement may be expected...The bulk of the guerrilla forces...are not bandits but men who believe that they are fighting for the same just cause which inspired them during the war." A calm judgement on these matters by those in power in Athens would alone bring the fighting to an end. The paper saw that there were three courses of action: a dictatorship of the right or of the left or compromise. There were serious difficulties which stood in the way of compromise. But British and American moderating influence in Greece might be decisive.(71) Macaskie's dispatch of the same day was written in a totally different tone. He wrote that "the issue dividing Greece has nothing to do with the old game of Greek party politics, has little to do with right and left, and, least of all, it is connected with the issue of monarchy and republic which has been dead and buried for many months. There is now a clear division of the population into nationalists and Communists."

This editorial and that of July 11 aroused a storm of controversy. On July 15, the Greek Chargé d' Affaires in London complained to Barrington-Ward that "the interpretation your paper is placing on events is one which can only increase the difficulties of my country in the present moment against both external and internal enemies." Pallis, the bearer of the letter, was sent "to explain to you the situation as we see it, and which I think is not so much at variance with the facts as telegraphed by your Athens correspondent."(72) Numerous letters poured into paper's correspondence columns.(73) In Athens, Patric Reilly, Councillor of the Athens Embassy, on July 16, informed the Foreign Office that "The Times leaders of July 11th and 15th have caused considerable stir here. They have been acclaimed by the extreme Left Wing press and the second leader...has been published in full by Rizospastis."(74)

On July 15, Basil Davidson(75), the writer of the leaders, visited the Foreign Office. Wallinger, Head of the Southern Department, and Balfour did their best "to make his outlook
more realistic."(76) J R Colville, Southern Department, noted that "ever since December 1944 when it strongly espoused the cause of EAM, The Times has pursued a dog-in-the-manger policy about Greece." He thought that "two personalities account for the colour which tinges all The Times leading articles on Greece"; one was H Stannard, who had written in the past most of the Greek articles and who "has a bee in his bonnet about Greece, and also an unshakeable conviction that the Foreign Office is always wrong"; the other was B Davidson, a new recruit to the leader-writing staff, an able journalist who was one of Marshal Tito's liaison officers and "has a deep admiration for Marshal Tito and all his works." Colville pointed out that Stannard and Davidson paid "exceedingly little attention to the facts of the case as represented to them by The Times correspondent in Athens"; he added that these articles "entirely disregard the fact that the position of the Greek frontier is being debated on the Security Council and that the overwhelming majority of the Greek Commission has pronounced a verdict against Greece's Northern neighbours." For that purpose, Wallinger gave Davidson a copy of the Greek Commission's report to read. Colville thought that in view of the effect which these articles had had in Greece, the matter should not be allowed to rest there, and perhaps Bevin might be willing to write to Barrington-Ward.(77)

The result of these rebukes was for Davidson to write a third short leader on July 18, responding to the controversy which had arisen. "Whoever touches Greece touches controversy. Letters appearing in these columns show that acerbity and passion of dispute aroused in Greece do not remain confined within the frontiers of that country. The issues, certainly, are complex and contentious, and reach now far into the international arena. But they will scarcely be settled by a blind acceptance of the views of one side or the other." He argued that only measures shaped not by passion and prejudice but by reason and moderation could help to end the civil war in Greece. "Those who criticise the diagnosis of the Greek situation
printed in these columns appear willing to forget the long and chequered political story behind the unhappy state of Greece today." Davidson believed that the present situation suggested the wisdom of employing other than only military weapons. "Force is the Government's legitimate and necessary response to rebellion, especially rebellion assisted from abroad, but an undiscriminating denunciation of 'Communists' and 'bandits' that ignores the tragic animocities afflicting Greece and the blunders by which they have been exacerbated can only increase the numbers and determination of the forces it is sought to overthrow."(78)

The tone and content of Davidson's third article left the Foreign Office still dissatisfied. "It deals rather with what has evidently been a spate of correspondence on the two earlier and pernicious articles and it does not take cognizance of any of the points made to Mr Davidson by Mr Balfour and myself" noted Wallinger. And he continued "Mr Davidson defended the articles on the lines that they presented the problem as a Greek and not an international problem -demonstrably a nonsenical proposition -and we gathered that the presentation of the international aspect would follow in a later leader...I think we should wait and see if any more rational conclusions are drawn at the end. I should add at once that I do not think that we made any deep impression on Mr Davidson's thinking on Greece: whether that was because of his political convictions or because he was the father protecting his young (the articles). I do not know." When, on July 21, the Manchester Guardian printed Macaskie's report from Yannina, entitled "Inquiry into Guerrilla invasion of Greece" McCarthy minuted "this article was also carried word for word by today's Times. It may help to cancel out some of the effect of the unfortunate leaders which The Times carried last week."(79)

These two editorials activated in The Times an interim debate on the paper's foreign policy. On July 18, Macaskie wrote to Barrington-Ward expressing his distaste for the articles of July 11 and 15 which were based "upon misinterpretation of the facts and actual
circumstances of the situation here." He continued, "I had imagined, I am afraid, that I had presented in my correspondence a clear picture of the situation as seen by most British and American observers here in the two Embassies and the various mission." In this letter one can see Macaskie's views on the Greek question, as they were presented in his dispatches from there. He wrote:

in order to give the presentation proper perspective I have emphasised the external danger to Greece and the efforts being made by her northern neighbours to incorporate Greek Macedonia, as a first step, into the Slav bloc; and because of this I have represented the communist element in Greece as a fifth-column rather than ordinary political opponents...I have stressed the fact that the situation has little to do with this or that Greek Government or party... this Government still has the support of the majority of the Greek people, who elected it in fair and internationally supervised elections... This Government in its efforts to protect the country from these dangers has erred on the side of safety and has discriminated against some non-communist elements; but in times of war - and let it not be forgotten that Greece is fighting a war against undeclared aggression - mistakes are bound to be made...

.....

It is difficult to understand why the Turks can lock up any vague socialist who rears his head and not a word is said in Britain; why the Persians can impose, as at this moment, martial law and suppress the press because it has attacked the Government and nobody cares; yet when the Greeks, who are in the forefront of the battle... there is an outcry from abroad.
The words left and right have ceased to have any meaning in Greece... The persons were arrested for their anti-national activities and sympathies and not because they were republicans or held so-called left-wing opinions.

.....

It is an exaggeration to suggest that the rebels represent a large section of the Greek people. The international body which supervised the Greek elections...estimated that the total number of abstainees for political reasons,..., was not more than 15% of the population...Even the description of the present tragedy in Greece as 'civil war' seems to require some qualification,... The war going on in Greece at the moment has little to do with the Greeks themselves and would never have started without outside interference. Russia's satellites are arming, equipping, and encouraging the rebels, and we and the Americans are doing the same for the Greek State, not to uphold this or that Government but to keep Greece outside the Russian orbit...

...until the war can be reduced to an internal affair and the frontiers are sealed, no internal political measures of the Government or any other Greek Government will be of any avail. If the outside interference could be stopped and it became a purely Greek civil question fighting would probably no longer be necessary. The Greek State could afford to be lenient and appeasing, and offer a general amnesty with some hope after the previous attempt at reconciliation and appeasement at Varidza, presumably because they had in mind this present revolt with help from outside.

.....
... From here it seems that we are back in the days of 1938; that Greek Macedonia is the Sudetenland and Greece the Czechoslovakia. It remains to be seen in Lake Success...whether we are going to have another Munich and appease the Russians, in which case Greece will be lost and the seeds will be sown for another war; or whether the Americans and ourselves will show the Russians that we are prepared to take action to prevent aggression against Greece-in which case I believe the Russians will draw back and we shall have peace.

The fact that the two recent leading articles on Greece in The Times have been quoted by the Communist press...is disturbing and makes one wonder whether they were based on the full facts of the situation as seen from here. It is for this reason and because I believe the situation is dangerous that I have written to you so fully.

This letter was discussed among Davidson, Tyerman, the Assistant Editor, and Barrington-Ward. On July 28, Davidson wrote to his editor his comments: "1. Macaskie's views appear to be built up on a number of assumptions for which he claims the support of fact: 'The war going on in Greece... interference': I think this entirely wrong, although I realise that the British Government, at the end of 1944, thought that the Greek authorities could quickly master EAM/ELAS. There was no outside interference then, or in 1945, and yet the civil war has grown steadily since then in size and violence.

Macaskie goes on: 'If the outside interference.. probably no longer be necessary..' Why only 'probably'?

And why was there no attempt at 'reconciliation and appeasement' after Varkiza? Certainly not because foreigners were coming over the frontier to fight in Greece.

2. If the guerrillas represent only 15 per cent of the Greek people, what explains the persistence of wide-spread and important fighting? The report of the Security Council's commission, which I have studied, makes it clear that intervention has been only on a small scale. It seems clear that the assumption that the guerrillas are a small minority is a grave under-estimate, and reveals a great lack of comprehension of the position. It must be clear, also, that the guerrillas have the support and sympathy of the mass of peasants in the areas in which
they operate: my own experiences during the war are enough to convince me that peasant opposition is fatal to any guerrilla movement."

Next day, Tyerman sent a memorandum to Barrington-Ward. One of the issues discussed in that memo, was Macaskie's letter. "I feel that inevitably it (the letter) is too simple and that it proves too much...I would say that, while Macaskie sees the essentials of the official case and the facts of the actual conflict..., he doesn't fully allow for the conflicting and confusing shades which blur the Greek scene, and indeed the scene in all the eastern countries-so maddeningly. He doesn't take a sufficiently detached and sophisticated view of the historical course of which to-day's happenings are only the latest sub-chapter. I have said that he 'proves too much'. At any point of time in situations like this it is always possible to say that 'repression is indispensable and conciliation impossible'; what you have got to bear in mind is that if you go on saying it from day to day, month to month and year to year the result is perpetual repression and there is no way out. Secondly - and this is a common error, I think - he writes with the tacit assumption that if the situation were different the Greek Government as at present constituted would favour democratic ways, conciliation, amnesty and the rest; this I just don't believe, any more than I believe that the communists are frustrated democrats. Again and again in eastern Europe we get the argument which says that, because the communists are not democratic, therefore those who wish to get rid of the communists are democratic, and ninty-nine times out of a hundred that this necessity has the support of all good Greeks. But it is false argument to assume that therefore all good Greeks are positively in favour of the various internal measures which have accompanied the defence of the realm. I found Macaskie's treatment of the arrests quite as unsatisfying as the similar justifications given in, say, Rumania or Bulgaria for the whole-sale arrests of 'plotters'." He went on:

Macaskie goes nearest to frankness on this point when he says that we and the Americans are in Greece "to keep Greece outside the Russian orbit". If this is so, then
for heaven's sake don't let us pretend that we are striving for democracy in Greece; let us at least be honest. Are we really in Greece solely for the reasons of grand strategy? If so, have we gone the right way about it since 1944? The whole burden of my comment is "let us be honest".

"When Macaskie" Tyerman continued "asks why the Press does not criticize repressive measures adopted by Turks and Persians, with the implication that since the press doesn't criticize these, it shouldn't criticize repressive measures in Greece, I say that he has got the argument the wrong way round. Certainly we should criticize repressive measures in Greece -and in Turkey and in Persia and in Poland and in Yugoslavia and wherever they occur. The one thing we must not do is to pretend, for strategic or ideological reasons, that repression anywhere is just the distasteful duty of good, though well disguised, democrats."

On August 1, Barrington-Ward sent to Macaskie a personal letter explaining The Times policy towards Greece. "I have been following your dispatches with interest and I have read and re-read the 'appreciation' which you send me. Greece, as The Times has good reason to know, is a highly controversial topic whether in the country or outside it...This is partly because critics from either side are ready to smite hip and thigh anyone who does not agree with the whole of their own case." He went on presenting The Times' policy on Greece:

It will help perhaps if I set out certain fundamentals of The view of the Greek troubles. In the first place, it has no intention of seeing Greece handed over to the Russian sphere. Back in 1944 the Russians, as the FO frequently allowed in private at the time, treated Greece as a country within the Anglo-American orbit. Perhaps if we had tacitly accepted the same status for countries within the Russian orbit, it would have been better in the end for Greece and better for them. However that may be, Greece and Turkey are on our side of the fence and we must act accordingly.

This does not mean that we are bound to approve automatically of all the actions of the Greek Government. On the contrary, it puts a certain responsibility on us and the Americans to see that Greek policy commands the utmost fundamental assent at home and is as little provocative as possible abroad. There can be no question but that, in present circumstances, it has a right and duty to take all the military measures needed to maintain the integrity of its territory and to repress rebellion at home, as The Times has expressly and naturally recognized. Incursion of bands across the frontier, even though they may be chiefly bands of Greeks, are a direct challenge to the Government and have to be answered by force.
These are indisputable truths, but those on whom some of the consequences of a prolonged struggle may fall are not under any obligation to give the Greek Government a political blank cheque. There was no help across the border for Greek rebels in 1944 or 1945 and yet the civil war has grown steadily since then in size and violence. The Greek Communist party was never very large and I venture to doubt, incidentally, whether EAM in the days of the resistance was merely or mainly Communist and Russian-controlled. It is hard to believe that the guerrilla bands could have maintained themselves so long in face of a massively hostile peasant population. However, I do not doubt your judgement that the increasing severity and danger of the conflict have simplified, or indeed over-simplified, for the moment the old and complex issues which have tormented the country for the past ten years. That very fact demands that the Government should use the political as well as the military weapon in developing their strategy. It may be easy to urge this consideration at a distance but it may also not be a mistake.

I sent you this as a brief explanation of the comment which The Times has offered. Let me assure you that in no one's mind in this office or elsewhere here is there felt to be any parallel with 'Munich' and all that. No one is going to let the Greeks down, even though unpalatable advice may be offered from time to time.

Your own course is perfectly clear. You have only to continue faithfully reporting the facts as you see them. With a correspondent as with a diplomat it is right that he should pursue to the extent that he conscientiously can a sympathetic interpretation of the plans and actions of the country to which he is accredited. That need not affect his own nor his paper's independence.

The same day when The Times carried their much-discussed editorial of July 15, the Manchester Guardian was more cautious. "Both sides have finally decided that compromise is impossible. The Greek Government...now openly plans to suppress the Communists, if not the whole of the Left Opposition. The Communists know that their chances of seizing power will dwindle as soon as American military help arrives." A month later, on August 20, an editorial would state that "the cause of Greece's troubles lies deep in the present unhealthy political situation." The Greek Government, who had been living on the credit of a mandate, which has long since run out, was "incompetent to deal with the rebels by force and unable or unwilling to try persuasion." If the American aid was not to be wasted hitherto, it must be carefully administered, and "not to the Greek Government but to Greece." Only if both those who took refuge in the mountains and those in the ballot-box, "can be induced to come out of their refuge and take a constructive part together in Greek affairs can we hope to see a beginning of
democracy in Greece." A week later, on August 27, another editorial stated that "it might be
better for Greece in the long run to drop the pretence of democratic forms and start again by
setting up a provisional non-party Government which would dissolve parliament and announce
a new election."(81)

Among the feature articles on Greece(82), the more interesting were those of the Daily
Mail, in which the Greek crisis was seen as an ideological war between two conflicting
ideologies, and of the News Chronicle, in which the Greek problem was viewed as one of great
strategy between the Great Powers. Another one printed in The Spectator expressed the official
view. Alexander Clifford, the chief European correspondent of the Daily Mail after a six-weeks
visit to Moscow in April 1947(83), was convinced that Communism must be regarded as a
fanatical religion out to conquer the world. "Is there in the world today a faith with sufficient
strength to beat Communism", he wondered. In an article on June 4, entitled, "The Cross v The
Kremlin. The Battlefield is the mind. Make No Mistake This is a Holy War", he stated, "I
believe that any answer to the Communist state of mind must fundamentally be a religious
answer...But are there any saints, missionaries and martyrs available now to do it? I can only
end with the question, for the answer is hidden in the future." On July 14, the Daily Mail printed
an article by Peter Howard. His argument was based on the same idea as Clifford's. To his view
what was happening in Greece was an ideological war. "The Communists in Greece" he wrote
"as in every other country outside Russia, are a minority. But they are united with a philosophy,
a plan, and a passion...We need unity in an inspired and answering ideology for
democracy...We shall then outpace and even win Communists or any other ists with our own
philosophy, our own plan, and our own passion."(84)
On November 14, the *News Chronicle* printed a long article by Barber, entitled "A Nation in Chaos". He stressed that the real Anglo-American objectives in Greece were to prevent her from becoming a Soviet satellite: "We don't want Russia in the Mediterranean. We never have. We therefore wanted to preserve Greece from becoming a Soviet satellite...We want our version of democracy to prevail."(85)

On October 3, *The Spectator* printed L D Gammans', MP, article in which he argued that it was needed to be recognised first that the fighting in Greece was the battle for the whole of the Middle East and for the continuance of Western civilisation in the Mediterranean. Second, that the first priority was to establish law and order in Greece as a condition precedent to economic rehabilitation. Third, that the small token force of British troops should remain in Greece both as a symbol and an encouragement. "If the USA and Great Britain abandon Greece now by a Balkan Munich, then history will repeat itself."(86)

On July 28, on Bevin's proposal, the British Chiefs of Staff Committee asked its members to examine and report on the possibility of complete withdrawal of British forces by 30 September 1947.(87) Though there is nothing in the record to explain what prompted this proposal, the circumstantial evidence strongly suggests that the troops issue was mainly a bargaining point to gain some objective which had nothing to do with Greece, e.g. to force the United States to realise how serious the British financial situation was in mid-summer 1947, to urge for the dispatch of American troops to Greece, which the British ardently desired or to press the Americans to take a greater part in international affairs.(88) The suggestion that Bevin acted under left-wing political pressure to remove the troops is untenable, since a thorough study of the press fails to show this. The few papers which engaged any continuous campaign
for withdrawal it was little more than an expression of regret. The fact, therefore, remains that the British did not intend to withdraw their troops.(89)

When in the *Daily Express*, on January 5 1948, an editorial demanded the immediate withdrawal of the British troops, the Foreign Office immediately reacted. The paper stated: "the danger now emerges that those soldiers may be caught up in an ideological war waged by Greek Communists and their foreign allies against the forces of the Greek monarchy...Britain has no authority in Greece, no influence with the Greek Government. At the elbows of the Greek Ministers sit American advisers...Wisdom dictates one course, and one only. Withdraw the five thousand." The same day Peck asked Nash his comments. Nash replied: "It is (sic) a strange break. I have spoken to the *Express* about the article which appears to have been tossed off quite lightheartedly...I was ensured confidentially that no new line of policy by the *Express* was to be read into the leader...I don't think the paper will return to the subject -but the *Express* is unaccountable." It was agreed that the Foreign Office should "keep an eye open for further isolationism from the D.E. [*Daily Express*]"(90)

In an outward telegram from the Commonwealth Relations Office it was emphasised that "in answer to any press enquiries here, we shall emphasise that measure is purely one of administrative convenience and that does not signify impending withdrawal of UK troops from Greece or any lessening of UK troops in pressing stability in Greece. No appreciable reduction of UK troops is involved. Our policy continues to be that UK troops, who are in Greece at the invitation of successive Greek Governments will be withdrawn as soon as practicable."(91)

Greece was again brought into the limelight on October 31 1947 when the *Daily Worker* published on its front page photos of the execution in Salonika of forty-seven people, including a woman of 25 years old. Winston Churchill, the same day, sent a confidential letter...
to Sir Orme Sargent. "I was rather shocked by the enclosed picture, and in view of the part I played three years ago I should like to be better informed upon the subject... it seems to me very unwise for the present Greek Government to carry out mass executions of this character and almost reduces us to the Communist level."(92) Before Sargent replied to Churchill, the attention of the Foreign Office had been called to another atrocity story carried on the front page of the Daily Mirror of November 10. Under the title "What Are we British Doing", the paper published pictures of Greek soldiers in British battledress mounted on horseback carrying the decapitated heads of Greek guerrillas. The photos were supplied to the Daily Mirror by ex-Corporal S H Starr who described how they were taken by his friend Sergeant Alfred Kings, and drew a vivid picture of the police terror which he himself had witnessed many times when stationed at Trikala, central Greece. In an editorial, the paper urged for the withdrawal of British troops."Something should be done about Greece. The first thing to be done is to get the British Army of that filthy hell's broth."(93)

The news fuelled the debate in the liberal and Labour Left press on the future of the British troops. On November 11, the News Chronicle published an interview with Starr and an editorial which questioned the purpose of keeping British troops in Greece.(94) The Manchester Guardian in an editorial, entitled "Quit Greece Now", stressed that the British troops, with their small number, could not prevent these atrocities from being committed and therefore they must withdraw. "The Government announced its intention to withdraw three months ago. It should carry out its promise without delay."(95) In The New Statesman a special correspondent wrote that in his personal experience "the Mirror was neither exaggerated nor untypical." But mere withdrawal of the troops would not solve the Greek problem. "The solution cannot be easy, but even if it means bargaining in the international sphere with Russia, or giving way and losing face at some other point to Russian claims, it
should be attempted."(96) Tribune argued that the gruesome story and the pictures of atrocities committed by the gendarmerie and Government troops showed that the Truman Doctrine had been "as tragic a failure, as British intervention before". The journal believed that the real failing in Greece consisted not in too much but in too little intervention.(97)

On the other hand, Macaskie wrote characteristically in The Times, that in his experience travelling throughout Greece many times, he had found "no evidence at all" of atrocities committed by the regular State forces. Excesses had been undoubtedly committed, "but by outraged nationalist civilians."(98)

British officials found the Daily Mirror's report considerably disturbing. On the same day these pictures were published, the Minister of Defence, before a meeting of Ministers at No 10 Downing Street, drew Bevin's attention to the Daily Mirror's report. After a discussion between the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Minister of Defence, it was decided: 1) the British Ambassador in Athens should draw the attention of the Greek Government to the harm these reports of atrocities caused and obtain an immediate report from the Head of the British Military Mission and Police Mission on the facts; 2) British Ambassador at Washington should draw the attention of the United States Government to the Daily Mirror report.(99) However it was thought that the US Government could hardly be expected to take any responsibility vis-à-vis the Greek Government for these atrocities took place not later than June 1947 and that at that period the American Mission for Aid to Greece had barely set foot in the country.(100) Although, as it was suggested by Peck, Southern Department, a reply would add probably little to what was already known, Pierson Dixon, Bevin's private secretary, recommended that for the present General Rawlins would be asked for an immediate report. "According to its contents, the Secretary of State will be able to decide whether to pursue the matter."(101)
On November 12, Norton confirmed that facts regarding both incidents were substantially correct. On the same day he spoke to Tsaldaris, and General Rawlings personally warned Greek Military Authorities that if such disgraceful behaviour occurred again the Mission representatives would be withdrawn. In the conversation with Norton, Tsaldaris drew his attention to a statement by Constantine Rendis, Minister of Public Order. Rendis had stated that "a price had been put on many brigands, most of them were criminals sentenced to death by the courts, and that it had always been the custom to produce the head on which a price had been placed." Rendis had stated that "a price had been put on many brigands, most of them were criminals sentenced to death by the courts, and that it had always been the custom to produce the head on which a price had been placed."(103)

C R Mayhew, Parliamentary Under-Secretary in an urgent communication, on November 14, with C F A Warner, Superintending Under-Secretary of the Southern Department, expressed his dissatisfaction with Athens' answer and with Rendis' statement. "The important point, which is entirely missing in these telegrams, seems to me", he wrote, "to be that the Greek Government is apparently paying money for the heads of bandits and proposes doing so...It can be argued logically enough that, since the British Police and Military Missions are concerned only with the training and equipping of those who perform the decapitations, they cannot be held responsible; but this position, cannot, in my view, be maintained in the House. We must, therefore, insist that if our Missions are to remain in Greece, the Greek Government must cease this practice of paying for heads." As several Parliamentary Questions had been put down on the question of these atrocities, Mayhew stated that no attempt should be made to defend the practice of decapitation. "I should be glad to have a redraft condemning the atrocities and showing the strong action that we have taken with the Greek Government in the matter."(104) On the same day, a redrafted telegram was sent to Athens on these lines.(105)
Acts of decapitations were known in the Foreign Office since June 1947(106) and, when S Tiffany, Labour MP, on July 22 had put down a Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State on this issue, he had denied that there was any evidence. On November 17 1947, at Question Time Mayhew denied to G Thomas, J Platts-Mills, C Smith and J Carmichael, Labour MPs, that the War Office had any information that Greek regulars were beheading guerrillas or displaying their heads.(107)

On December 1, the Athens Embassy sent to the Southern Department the report of the British Police Mission representative at Larissa, W H Linaker, dated November 22, about the atrocities referred by the Daily Mirror and the three photographs taken.(108) On December 12, J A Turpin minuted, "two of the enclosed photographs are those published in the Daily Mirror. It's just as well we did not suggest that they were faked! It is to be hoped the third one does not fall into any mischief-making hands!". Peck wrote "the third photograph is an official Greek effort."(109)

Greece became again the focus of the front pages of the British press with the announcement on Christmas Eve 1947 of the formation of the 'Provisional Democratic Government' and the prospect of its recognition by the communist countries. Its formation did not come as a surprise, since rumours of the formation of such a Government were circulating since last June.

As the establishment of a rebel Government was considered imminent, Norton, on December 19, suggested to Wallinger that it should be considered what guidance would be given in the event of a 'democratic government' being set up. "Points that occur to me are: a) Internationally supervised elections showed that only a small minority disapproves of the present democratic and parliamentary Government; b) it is improbable that even that
percentage which abstained from voting...would all approve of armed rebellion especially when the latter is aided by the Slavs; c) on the assumption that the free Government does not include people like Svolos and Sophianopoulos...we should try to drive a wedge between them and the Communists...Mild ridicule and refusal to take it seriously should be the note rather than the headline." Norton had also mentioned the above to the United States Chargé d'Affaires. Balfour noted that it was difficult to say in advance exactly what form guidance should take, until the actual emergence of a counter-Government in concrete circumstances. "But meanwhile such points as these can be collated and produced. It would be a mistake, however, to take any initiative here which would give the impression in journalistic circles that the FO is preoccupied and nervous." The News Department was asked whether they were able to make "a good case" from the material already sent to them.(110)

On Christmas Eve, the Consul-General at Salonika reported to Foreign Office the formation of the 'free' Government. "At 800 hours this morning December 24 Bandit Radio announced formation of Government...All...are Communists."(111) The news reached the Foreign Office by 10.30 that morning. Immediately the Foreign Office informed Norton in two communications that the formation of the Markos Government was considered to be "a serious development implications of which are being studied with all urgency." Lord Inverchapel was asked to obtain Marshall's reaction and Leon Melas, the Greek Ambassador in London, was called in, on December 24, to be given a memorandum in which it was stressed that it was "clearly of the greatest importance that all anti-Communist parties and personalities in Greece should show absolute solidarity in facing the future and that the world should be convinced of the reality of Greek unity."(112) On December 26, Norton saw Queen Frederica -King Paul was ill- and emphasised the necessity of the Coalition sticking together.(113) The Foreign Office instructed the Athens Embassy to "take similar line at every opportunity" and to keep
their American colleagues informed. Meanwhile, suggestions in Norton's telegrams of December 19 had been used for press guidance. It was also agreed that while they should ridicule the Markos Government, they should also stress "the underlying seriousness of this manoeuvre as part and parcel of the stepped-up offensive of international communism of which the Cominform declaration and subsequent strikes in Italy and France and confiscations and 'nationalisations' in orbit countries are other facets."(114) Meanwhile, Peck congratulated W L C Knight for being first with the news of the formation of the Markos Government. "Your speed in reporting this development enabled the Foreign Office, quite exceptionally, to 'scoop' the news owing to the absence of any newspapers over the holidays."(115)

In Washington, Lord Inverchapel reported to the Foreign Office, on December 26, that the State Department had represented to the President that "the present development was in the nature of a test the handling of which by the major Western Powers would disclose whether their determination to uphold the independence of small nations was greater than the resolve of the Soviet Union to extinguish it." It was also thought that the question of sending US troops to Greece, which had hitherto been ruled out, had now moved into the realm of possibility. On December 29, the Foreign Office transmitted to Washington "we are grateful for US...proposed plan of action and agree generally with their views. We should welcome the opportunity of...consider[ing] parallel and simultaneous action here."(116)

Meanwhile the Greek Government was panicky. They revived Venizelos' notorious *Idionymon* Law of 1929 (which authorised the persecution of all those whose acts and thoughts were judged to undermine the existing order) and dissolved the Left Wing parties; arrested some hundreds of suspect communist sympathisers; made a détourche to the United Nations; and asked the American and British Governments to make public statements
condemning the rebel Government. On 27 December, Leon Melas sent a memorandum to the
Foreign Office suggesting what measures the Greek Government considered necessary.

Wallinger thought that the wholesale arrest of EAM supporters and the attempt to ban
all Left-wing parties was a mistake. He suggested that they should at once instruct Norton,
who in consultation with his US colleague to suggest to Tsaldaris that instead of indulging in
wholesale arrests and bannings, the opportunity should be taken to wean all non-communists
parties from their present KKE connections and to bring such leaders as Tsouderos and Svolos,
into line behind the Government. From the point of view of world opinion, a move of this kind
would be particularly helpful. "Another point that might be put to the Greek Government is that
they are making a mistake in presuming the recognition of the Markos regime by the Soviet
bloc. From a publicity standpoint, the right line would appear to be to insist upon the entirely
unrepresentative character of this so-called Government, to make capital out of the fact that it
is a purely communist concern, and to suggest that, as it has no real backing in Greece, it can
hardly be expected that any Government should grant recognition to it." Wallinger did not see
much advantage in any official declaration by British Government at this stage and he thought
that it was important that Britain should show the utmost solidarity with the Americans "at this
time." Other points which would require urgent consideration, Wallinger went on, "are our
propaganda line and the effect of the Markos declaration upon the proposals for the
co-ordination of the activities of the British and American Service Missions in Greece." The
position was discussed, the same day, at a meeting held in Sir Orme Sargent's, Superintending
Under-Secretary of the News Department, office, with Wallinger and C F A Warner,
Superintending Under-Secretary of the Information Policy Department.

The Foreign Office communicated with Melas, on December 30, on the lines Wallinger
had suggested.(117) Moreover, on December 29, Norton was instructed to suggest to the
Greek Government that "presumption in public statements should be that this rebel set-up, which has neither a capital nor any particular mandate nor any general support from the Greek people, can have no legal standing in international law and will not therefore be recognised by any foreign Government.; that the Markos 'provisional Government' should never be described as either free or Greek or indeed a Government; nor Markos himself as 'General.' Suitable terms might be Communist or rebel Junta or headquarters." The British Ambassador in Washington was instructed to inform the State Department on the above lines.(118)

The Foreign Office, as we saw, had responded with great speed to ensure the proper publicity. Bevin himself had made it quite clear, on Christmas Eve, that he attached great importance to the declaration of the Markos Government from the point of view that "it is a portent of the major attack which is being developed by the Cominform." The energetic measures taken by the Foreign Office bore results. On December 29, Wallinger would note: "I think that, on the whole, comment by the press and BBC has been not unsatisfactory, with the exception of The Times leading article on December 27."(119)

The Times editorial of December 27 argued that though moral and material aid, "on a much smaller scale than the Greek Government has declared", had come from the northern neighbours, "no guerrilla movement could exist for long, or achieve important successes, if it did not posses the backing of a considerable section of the people among whom it operates...Where EAM never succeeded in unifying the political and military leadership of the war-time resistance, General Markos and his fellow Communists appear to have been working steadily at bringing the two together." The continued failure to produce a strong and coherent coalition with a constructive political plan and an effective economic programme deprived the Greek Government of the power to win over waverers.(120)
The same day, Norton notified the Foreign Office that The Times leader would have a "deplorable" effect in Greece. "Such facile and ignorant generalisations are 'the voice of the enemy'". The influence we can still exert in Greece, now chiefly of a moral kind, in the direction of patience and moderation, has been gravely undermined. Could not this point at least be ruled into The Times. Their correspondent here is, of course, not responsible." In London, the Greek Ambassador registered his "deep regret" at the leader and pointed out the harm done to the cause of Greece and Great Britain, as well as indignation likely to be roused in Athens. In the Foreign Office, Balfour suggested that the matter should be taken up with The Times, "if at all, on a really high level."(121) Indeed Ridsdale, Head of News Department, took it up "vigorously" through the paper's diplomatic correspondent, I McDonald.

As a result, only three days after the first leader, The Times took the usual step of printing another one on the same subject, entitled "The Greek Challenge". The new editorial adopted a different attitude:

What began as a civil war between rival parties in Greece has now become an issue of international importance and a cause of partisan intervention.

"There was a moment", the leader continued, "at the end of 1944 or earlier, when the left-wing forces in Greece could have been won for a moderate solution under a British aegis...But the course of the civil war and its latest manifestations leave no doubt that this is no longer the case. What is now in dispute is nothing less than the whole position of Greece in the international scale of loyalties. What the Greek rebels are fighting for is the establishment of a Communist regime which would swing Greek loyalties towards Moscow and away from London and Washington." Acceptance of rebel terms for a 'cease fire' - appeared in The Times on September 10- would mean the overturning of the present regime: "it would reverse the election and repudiate the decision of a majority of Greeks; and for the western Powers, as well
as for the non-Communist parties in Greece, it would signal a retreat at a point in time and geography where no retreat can be made. The task now was to bring the contest to a quick and successful end. "If larger success is to be achieved, present efforts in the military field must be reinforced with better tactics and accompanied by political warfare."(122)

The Foreign Office seemed satisfied. Ridsdale minuted that The Times new leader on Greece marked "a notable change" from the one of December 27, which was written by Basil Davidson. Ridsdale, who had spoke to McDonald about it "in no uncertain terms", found he shared the Foreign Office views. McDonald took up the matter vigorously with his editor with the result that the new leader was composed, not this time by Davidson. "The Times does not relish eating its words or changing its line and consequently the appearance of today's leader is a notable development and I hope promises better things. It is certainly a snub for Mr Davidson and derives from the cumulative effect of the constant representations we have made about his work." Norton was informed that though representations to The Times had hitherto been "unavailing", the change of line on this occasion was encouraging.(123)

On January 1 1948, McDonald further smoothed the storm, when he wrote that the formation of the rebel Government was a means of testing how strongly the western powers would respond, that it consisted of an exclusively Communist leadership and that it had not had the support of the northern districts. In another editorial, on December 31, The Times would argue that the formation of the Markos Government was the beginning of a new and serious attempt to win Greece for the eastern block." At this moment clear thinking was necessary. "The present Greek Government is a poor thing as democratic Governments go..., but it is the legal Government of the country...Dislike of the Greek Right and sympathy with the Greek Left must not be allowed to obscure these facts." The paper did not believe that a more liberal and progressive Government in Greece would alter the situation; "but a better Greek Government
would be in a far stronger position." The United Nations should take the initiative, "for it would be dangerous indeed to leave everything to the United States," with the aim "to make Russia realise that she cannot annex one nation after another to the Communist Empire in the vain pursuit of security but that in resisting Communist aggression we do not wish to threaten Russia itself."

In the rest of the press, the Manchester Guardian in its editorial argued that the formation of the rebel government was a matter of "very grave importance." It was a dangerous fact that "major outside Powers are deeply involved in the survival of one or other of the two contending sides." As its diplomatic correspondent stated "a position would then arise in Greece in which neither side in the civil war could surrender without causing a serious and direct loss of face to at least one important Power."(124)

Barber in the News Chronicle argued that "never before in the 15 months since Markos proclaimed the formation of his 'Democratic Army' has anything like the same spirit or purpose shown itself on the Government side." Editorialy, the paper conformed to the Foreign Office guidance. Under the title "Guns not enough", the paper stated that "there can be no question of recognising the 'Government' of General Markos, whose existence is only made possible by the arms and assistance supplied by Communist Yugoslavia and Bulgaria and whose authority is at present purely nominal and entirely without legal basis. Whatever the faults of the Athens Government, it was legally elected by a majority of the people under the supervision of an International Commission." Yet, the question for the paper was whether to suppress the rebel movement by sheer force. "We believe that it is of urgent importance that a new approach should be found," because "guns have never solved anything." Like The Times, the paper suggested that the United Nations should take the lead for "a situation where the United States alone has a practical responsibility for Greek recovery has obvious dangers."(125)
The Daily Telegraph emphasised the international aspect of the Greek crisis. Its Athens correspondent stated that any delay of American means to strengthen the size and equipment of the Government forces "may transform Greece into a battlefield in which a new war world be rehearsed." The paper's diplomatic correspondent noted that the establishment of the Markos Government "shows that the Cominform is pressing on with a policy that cannot but widen the breach between East and West."(126) On January 1, the Daily Telegraph printed a delayed article by Buckley. He wrote that "the totalitarian menace has advanced a further stage in Europe,...If this does not persuade the credulous fellow-travellers in Britain, of the true nature of the rebel movement in Greece nothing will." He stated that this proclamation was made by the Slav Powers to test the reaction of the West. "The feeble the reaction the greater will be the support they are likely to give to Markos...the lesson of Greece shows clearly that the 'cold war' is only just beginning."(127) For The Spectator "Markos is a puppet and a dupe...What matters most are his material resources -and the force available to counter them."(128)

The Observer diplomatic correspondent wrote that the move had been ordered from outside Greece and was only the prelude to a general offensive of the Cominform against Greece. The 'Student of Europe' believed that the proclamation was a test for the Western reaction to the Cominform plans. "Quick, massive and incisive action now can clear the sultry international air, and restore a sense of security far beyond the local Greek scene." "At this fateful hour" it was everyone's first duty to clear his own mind. "For three years now the real issues in Greece have been obscured in the British public mind by highly irrelevant criticism of the Greek Government...We are not now asked to defend a particular Greek Government, but Greece." And:

Nor are we asked to defend Greece simply for sentimental reasons...We are asked to defend Greece -however poor her elected Government of the moment- because a free Greece is necessary for our own security, and for world security. The freedom and security of Greece are indispensable to the freedom and security of Britain and the
British Commonwealth for inescapable reasons of geography...The fall of Greece would cut the throat of the British Commonwealth from ear to ear.

The journal assessed that "all that is needed is a determined and vigorous police action inside Greece with the double purpose of blocking Greece's northern frontier from inside, and of rounding up and liquidating the terrorist forces caught inside the country. The first necessary step is for the Assembly to pass by a two-thirds majority a motion calling on Britain and America to act."(129)

The Economist, in a long editorial, stated that the Markos Government was entirely Communist. A change in its policy is noteworthy:

The real reason for the new move has, however, little to do with the internal politics of Greece. The decisive factor is Russia's general policy in eastern Europe and is only one aspect of the measures the Russians believe necessary to ensure the failure of the Marshall Plan.(130)

On January 17, the journal pointed out that though the Greek crisis concerned the United Nations as a whole, "an Anglo-American lead will be necessary if this body is to act with sufficient vigour and speed to check the present irresponsibly adventurous phase of Russian policy in Greece."

In the Labour Left press, The New Statesman stressed the geopolitical aspect of the affair. "In Greece, as in Spain, a civil war is being transformed into a struggle between Great Powers by the demands of geopolitics and strategy...Both they [the Americans] and the Russians will invoke, with ever-decreasing relevance, the name of democracy, and commit themselves ever more deeply to a struggle for power in which the welfare of the Greek people is almost forgotten." What should British policy be? Britain must act as mediator on the Security Council for a compromise solution of the Greek problem.(131)

Tribune saw the international dimension of the crisis. "For a long time already the political struggle and civil war in Greece has ceased to be mainly an internal affair of the Greek
people. Increasingly, Greece had been turned into the central battleground chosen by Russia to attack the Western Powers where they appeared politically most vulnerable. (132)

On May 3, all the papers reported the leftist assassination of Christos Ladas, Minister of Justice. (133) Following Ladas's death, widespread public executions were ordered. Within a few days more than 250 were executed. The Greek Government denied that the executions had any connection with Ladas' assassination but they said that they had been arranged before his death. Yet a Reuters message from Athens, on May 4, stated that "twenty-five Greek Communists were executed today for murders committed during the December, 1944, uprising in Greece [and] orders had been given to shoot 115 more Communists." Immediately, on May 4, the Foreign Office asked Athens what truth was in that report. "If true it will represented as mere reprisal for assassination of Ladas and will do great harm to Greek cause. You should take all possible steps to urge moderation upon Greek authorities." (134)

On May 5, more reports appeared in the British press. Macaskie in The Times reported the execution of 152 persons, and he added "the timing of these executions [is] unfortunate, since they come immediately after the murder of Mr Ladas, and might be seem to be a revengeful act. They are not, however, an act of revenge." The News Chronicle Athens correspondent wrote that it was "the biggest ever day of executions today since the terror of December 1944," a "savage reaction" to Ladas' assassination, while "another 830 condemned men seem likely to have the same fate within the next few days."

On May 5, forced by press reports and fearing the reactions of the public opinion, the Foreign Office instructed Norton that he "should leave Greek Government in no doubt of hostile and bitter reactions in this country to this wholesale execution of persons who have already languished in goal for up to three years. I expect reaction to be such that His Majesty's
Government will have difficulty on maintaining their present Greek policy, including the retention of our troops in Greece. You should therefore use the strongest language in your representations to the Greek authorities."(135) Winston Churchill himself complained about the executions to Queen Frederica and told the new Greek Minister of Justice to "leave the killing of prisoners to the Bolshevists."(136)

Yet, soon the British began to retrieve from the issue of political executions. On May 10, in the House of Commons, McNeil asserted that the reports of mass executions were "misleading" and declared that it was quite unjustifiable to call them "judicial murders...the figures...do not add up to that."(137) On same day, the Foreign Office cabled Athens that "Americans are clearly not inclined to intervene and reception of further statement in the House of Commons today indicates that storm here may now be dying down. We do not therefore anticipate need for any further action."(138) The Southern Department told News Department "to push out the stuff" on political executions.(139)

The press widely condemned the executions. On May 6, The Times editorially disapproved of this action. "Mass shootings after long imprisonment strongly suggest policy rather than justice." Yet, on May 8, Macaskie reported in The Times that "the American mission to Greece...are satisfied that the policy of the Greek authorities in carrying out these death sentences is correct and could not have been otherwise."(140)

The Manchester Guardian also found the executions "highly distasteful to civilised feelings."(141) But after the Commons debate, on May 11, in an editorial it would state that "Mr. McNeil's statement on the Greek executions puts an unpleasant business in better perspective...In Greece as it is today it would not be surprising if murder were answered by murder. That in the present case at least has happily not been so."
The Spectator, too, deplored this practice: "The right place to attack Communists is in the mountains - not in prison yards."(142)

The Left-wing press, on the other hand, did not find McNeil's statement in the Commons sufficient. The New Statesman wondered whether there had been any reasonable equality of executions on both sides. Apart from the collaborators, there were many well-known cases of Right-wing terrorists, such as Manganas, Sourlas, Katsareas, who had been active since the liberation, yet not one execution has been reported. There had never been news of the arrest, trial or execution of the murderer whether of the Communist journalist, Kostas Vidalis, killed in August, 1946, or of the Communist leader, Zevgos, killed in Salonika in March 1947. "The 'even balance' of Greek barbarities which Mr. McNeil discerns lacks - to put it mildly, statistical support."(143)

Tribune, in an editorial, stated, "imagine for a moment that the present Government of Greece were headed, not by M Sofoulis, but by the Communist 'General' Markos... What would official British and American reaction be? Would Mr. McNeil diplomatically state that,..., it was 'unfair to call them mass executions'?... Could The Times Correspondent have coolly reported from Athens that 'the timing of these executions [is] unfortunate'?... They are in danger of forgetting that it is not Communism which makes barbarity monstrous, but barbarity which makes Communism monstrous."(144)

The Daily Telegraph's correspondent waited until May 10 to make any comment. He counteracted the criticism made in most of the British press with an odd story of "40 strangled children" by the rebels, without, however, specifying the source of this information. No other paper reported this story. On June 22, Buckley back in Greece from Prague, was irritated by "the carefully orchestrated chorus of indignation in a large section of the British press." He
went on: "In fact, the Greek Government decided, as any British Government would have
decided, one supposes, in its place, that the law must be upheld."(145)

Intensification of the military offensive, April 1948- October 1949

In April 1948, the Greek National Army, strengthened in equipment by American aid and
trained by the British and under the guidance of General Van Fleet, began its spring offensive.

The Grammos campaign was much advertised by the Greek Government that it would
eliminate the rebels in the North and it would bring the civil war to an end.

In August, press reports were devoted to the military effort to reducing the rebel
strongholds in the Grammos mountains. The Times, on August 10, in an editorial stated that
"military progress into the mountains seems to bring the Government very little nearer to a
political solution of Greece's problems."(146) The Manchester Guardian in its editorial stated
that the guerrillas had the moral and material help of their northern neighbours. "But Grammos
is not the only scene of guerrilla operations, nor are the guerrillas Greece's only problem...The
Greeks will be wise to keep things in perspective."(147)

The Daily Telegraph envisaged the dispersal of the guerrillas before the advent of
winter. But "if a battle has been won the war, unhappily, goes on, and will go on until peace has
been attained between East and West."(148)

With the same tone of optimism Salusbury of the Daily Herald would write a
two-column article, entitled "Things are looking up in Greece". He stated that the American aid
was beginning to show results. The presence of British Army personnel had helped to build up
the efficiency and morale of the Greek army, and had thus contributed to its success. However
the Greek problem would be insoluble so long as outside aid continued. "Continuance of the
domestic war in Greece is vital to the Communist master-plan for Europe" he wrote.(149)

In The Economist, a Special Correspondent also thought that "so long as its northern
neighbours feel protected by encouragement or approval of the Cominform, the danger of a
relapse will always remain. Greece can easily be used for indirect and inexpensive attack on
British and American interests in the Near East."(150)

The New Statesman wondered whether the inconclusive result of the Grammos
campaign would be utilised as an opportunity to press for "a new deal in Greece." If Greece
were placed under provisional UNO trusteeship, and a genuinely representative coalition
Government were formed in Athens, there might still be a chance of reconciliation.(151)

The spring offensive failed to end the civil war. On October 2 1948, the situation in
Greece came up for discussion in the Political Committee of the General Assembly. After more
than two weeks' debate the Political Committee adopted by forty-eight votes to six a resolution,
upholding the findings of UNSCOB and calling on Greece's northern neighbours to cease
aiding the Greek guerrillas. It also carried a resolution moved by the Australian delegate,
Colonel Hodgson, empowering the President of the Assembly, Dr. Herbert Evatt, to convene
immediate Balkan talks in Paris for the purpose of seeking a conciliatory solution of the Greek
conflict.(152) The State Department and the Foreign Office were "much perturbed" by the
Australian's proposals. The Secretary of State sought the help of the American Embassy in
Camberra to "clean up" misunderstandings with Dr. Evatt and make sure he understood how
seriously the United States viewed the situation in Greece.(153) On November 17, the Foreign
Office wrote to Wallinger, UK Delegate to the UN, Assembly, Paris to make further attempts
to bring round the Australians to a "more helpful attitude on Greece". "Do the Australians
realise, I wonder, how exactly, they are following the Communist line on this subject?"(154)

272
To these developments in the United Nations the British press responded accordingly. In *The Times*, now under Casey's editorship, there were two political groups: on the Left those who had been appointed by Barrington-Ward and on the Right those who had joined the paper more recently. Lacking any clear direction from the top, the two groups did not weld into a single instrument and often leading articles, however well argued and informed, tended to convey a rather confused impression. "It was not unusual for *The Times*" wrote Pringle in his memoirs, "to put forward opposing views in two different leaders or, sometimes, in two different paragraphs of the same leader."(155)

This tendency is apparent in the paper's leading articles on Colonel Hodgson's proposals. In an editorial, on October 4, the paper did not find the Athens explanation satisfactory of the failure of the Greek Army to eliminate the main force of its opponent by the rebels having crossed into Albania and returned to Greece by undefended routes. "This still does not entirely explain the tenacity and coherence of the guerrillas, their capacity to recruit their losses within Greece and their increased belligerence in areas well away from the frontiers. Purely military measures seem insufficient to end a conflict." The Powers must ask again "whether there is indeed no other solution and, in the Paris discussions, whether it is beyond the bounds of practicability to consider making an international approach to what, after all, has long since become an international problem."(156) A leading article, on November 1, is indicative: "Many will regard with sympathy the attempt by Colonel Hodgson, to find some new way out, even if they do not necessarily approve of what he proposes." Yet, his suggestions "unfortunately seems to rest largely on the view that the real cause of the trouble is a dispute between Greece, on the one side, and Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania on the other. This is certainly not all the truth." Even if a solution were to be found among Greece and her neighbours, "there would remain Russia's strategic aim of a Communist Greece...No amount of
conciliation could solve these problems at present; nor can the Greek civil war be explained solely by external interference." The tragedy of Greece was part of the failure of the post-war period; like Germany, Greece was no-man's land, the debatable ground between East and West. "The western Powers cannot abandon Greece, but it is difficult now to see a third way of settlement. This is why, if, say, the suggestions of Colonel Hodgson were to offer only the glimmer of hope, they would deserve the most careful scrutiny, for the sake of a country that is cruelly torn." In the Correspondence Columns, Raymond Blackburn, Labour M P, criticised this editorial. "If we were to adopt Colonel Hodgson's suggestion, which receives far more commendation from you than from the British Government, we should be negotiating with Communist Governments, even while they continue to commit acts of indirect aggression which have been condemned by the United Nations."(157) A few days later, another editorial stated, "Certainly if it were possible on fair and honourable terms reconciliation between Greece and her neighbours might do much to prepare the way for a better atmosphere within Greece itself." In December, a leader would state, "In considering means of ending this disastrous war the western Powers seem to have only two practical courses open to them. Either they must give the loyal forces in Greece more machines and more money, which even then would offer no sure end to the fighting, or they must take up again the project of mediation and endow it with much greater authority than was given to Dr. Evatt."(158)

The Manchester Guardian's response was an editorial, on October 14, based on a report by three American observers who went to Greece on behalf of the 'Twentieth Century Fund' between February and April 1947. The American observers found that there was a "general belief that Britain had deliberately set out to destroy the Left." The Right, which expected to profit by this, felt the press correspondents' presence as a restraining hand from which they then hoped the Truman Doctrine would release them. "This persistence is still driving new recruits
on to the mountains from villages where...the gendarmes were as much if not more feared than the guerrillas." Its last sentence oddly ran: "This is a situation that Greece's neighbours and Russia find easy to exploit; and yet few of the Opposition whom this team of observers spoke to, whether in the mountains or in Athens itself, believed that they were fighting for anything but a free and independent Greece."(159)

Controversy arouse for this leading article. In the Foreign Office McCormick and Peck, Southern Department, found it "unfortunate." It was thought that in quoting that Report the article gave the impression that it had some sympathy with the rebels. Its last sentence was interpreted as "an editorial gloss attempting to redress the balance since it appears to hint very obliquely and in a most ambiguous way, that the rebels think they are fighting for a "free Greece" and do not realise that they will become another satellite of the Kremlin" remarked Peck.(160) A few days later, in the paper's Correspondence columns, Derek Starforth Jones, President Philhellenic Society, Merton College, Oxford criticised the editorial and he claimed that the present Greek Government had a substantial majority in the last elections. "The 'M.G' does not appear to realise that...The fall of the Coalition would probably entail the fall of Greece." The editor of the paper gave this answer: "If the present Coalition, formed only in September 1947, and reshuffled last May, claims a direct mandate from the elections of March 1946, what of the other three post-election Government, two of them purely Royalist? The forms of democracy may exist in Greece, but this shaky super structure suggests something seriously wrong with the foundation. Only those now in power in Greece try to deny this."(161)

The Daily Telegraph doubted that Colonel Hodgson's proposal for direct conversations between Greece and her northern neighbours "will prove any more fruitful than it did in...any other matters at issue between East and West...the rebel movement, as long as it continues to
receive outside support, can be neither put down nor appeased. It can only be contained. 

Similarly, *The Spectator* argued, "it would be unrealistic for the United Nations to assume that the trouble will end automatically if and when the parties get round a table" and any settlement between the Balkan countries would be only temporary. (163)

*The Economist* argued that "everything depends on the suppression of the rebellion" and this seemed impossible as long as infiltration across the border continued. "The 'liquidation' of the Albanian nuisance depends of course on the attitude of...Moscow's Holy Office." (164) In November 13, a long editorial on "UNO Discusses Greece" assessed that "it is useless to suppose that the civil war can be stopped simply be internal reforms...No change of Government, no reform of taxation or fiscal policy will reconcile the people by the offer of quick prosperity." The first step was to end the fighting with the first aim to seal off the northern frontier and to increase and intensify the intervention of the United Nations. The National Army should be reinforced with more men and arms, for "the Greeks cannot be asked indefinitely to do the lion's share of military action in a war which has a Mediterranean as well as purely local significance." (165)

In the Labour Left press, *The New Statesman* argued that the only alternative to war was mediation initiated by Britain and America. "By ruling out mediation with highly legalistic arguments, Mr. Attlee increases this mood of cynical despondence and confirms the intransigence of a Government which has a vested interest in civil war." The basis for an accord might be hard to find. "But this is not a reason for refusing to try, or for dismissing as 'appeasement' the only policy which can recreate Greek democracy and provide the basis for a genuine Western orientation of Greek opinion." (166)

*Tribune* asked for "a more direct and more effective form of political and administrative [American] intervention". (167)
The stiffening of the Government army operations against the rebels had shrunk for journalists "the chances of crossing and recrossing the shifting no-man's land between the armies...to nothing."(168) The information had been limited to official communiqués and when correspondents toured the country it was to report the security situation in the provinces or to follow the Government army in its operations. The Foreign Office encouraged such reports which would discredit the rebels. In a communication with the Athens Embassy, it was stated, "You know our views on the way such stories are best put across -they come best from journalists on the spot- if they can be persuaded to visit such out-of-the-way areas."(169)

It was every correspondent's ambition to reach Markos or make personal contact with the rebels.(170) This ambition would cost George Polk, a Columbia Broadcasting System(CBS) correspondent, his life and it would be used against the Left.(171) Kenneth Matthews of the BBC was among the "hundred foreign correspondents assigned to the Greek civil war" who indulged the same ambition.(172)

On October 11, Matthews, without giving any notice, went to Mycenae, which lay on that "fluctuating line." Initially it was suggested that his action was a pre-arranged meeting with the rebels, but later it was explained as an irresponsible action. The Athens Embassy sent at once (13 and 14 October) J C A Roper, First Secretary of the Embassy, and Major J T Harington, the Assistant Military Attaché, to the spot in order to investigate and report on Matthews' capture. One of the first concerns of the British authorities was the possibility that Matthews, when released, might be tempted to give a graphic account of his adventure "favourable to the bandits." On October 13, Norton suggested to the Foreign Office to warn the BBC of the implications involved. Next day Wallinger had spoken to the BBC to this effect.
The Foreign Office sent immediately to Athens a message prepared by BBC for Matthews on his return, saying:

we consider that the Greek rebels have gained more than enough publicity for themselves from your capture. We therefore do not want to let them have any more than is absolutely unavoidable. For this reason we do not wish you to tell anyone of your experiences except in so far as you report the date, time and place of your release. You should of course report fully to the Embassy if you are asked to do so. We very much hope that you will refrain from making statements to Greek authorities which they would release through their own channels. You should send as soon as possible a full story by circuit to the BBC. All arrangements for the use of the story will be determined here after full consideration of all relevant facts, and you should explain this to all enquiries at your end. (173)

With Roper's recommendations, it was agreed that Noble of the British Police Mission in the Peloponnese, should see Matthews before anyone else and before he, Matthews, could telephone to Athens. He would then urge him most strongly to say nothing until he got in touch with Rouse. Noble himself will telephone any news direct to Fisk of the Police Mission or to Roper. (174)

Meanwhile, two journalists of Columbia Broadcasting System and United Press arrived in Tripolis, Arcadia in connection with Matthews' kidnapping. On October 23, Norton ensured the Foreign Office that Noble would make every effort to reach Matthews first. Nash was sure that the BBC message would "seal his lips until he has been in touch with the Embassy." Peter Matthews noted that every effort should be made to get in touch with Matthews "before any journalists have a chance of picking his brains", and to avoid the appearance of wishing to "seal off" Matthews. "There is an obvious danger in appearing frightened.. and any appearance of this would certainly be used with great effect against us." (175)

Matthews was released on October 27. He was taken to gendarmerie headquarters where he was seen by the British Consul and he was given the BBC message. He was not permitted to communicate with any unauthorised person. On October 28, Norton transmitted
to Foreign Office: "Matthews has obviously been impressed by the bandits' organisation and strength" and that if it might be necessary to make statement to the Greek authorities, "I will see that one of my staff is present."(176) He also suggested that Matthews should be recalled to Britain by BBC. On October 29, the BBC told Nash that they would withdraw Matthews.(177) Ironically, in Paris the United Nations Assembly were debating Freedom of Information. On October 30, C F A Warner, Super-Intending Under Secretary of Information Policy Department, and now with the British delegation at the UN General Assembly wrote to C H Bateman, Superintending Under-Secretary of Southern Department, "Minister of State considers that we should under no circumstances take any action [to persuade the BBC to recall Matthews]in this matter...it would be most injudicious to seek to direct correspondents on political grounds at a moment when we are debating Freedom of Information in the UN."(178) Matthews left for England on November 2.(179)

Meanwhile, the BBC considered Matthews' report and a version was released on October 29 at the one o'clock news, which was "on the whole a harmless one"(180), giving little more than his itinerary.(181) The full report to the BBC and the Embassy was given by Reilly and by Colonel Shortt, Military Attaché. It stated that: 1) the rebels in the Peloponese were well organised and disciplined and control a wide area, 2) they did not seem to rely on aid from abroad, 3) the existence of Right-wing bands and right wing excesses have driven many men to join the rebels, 4) the population had a longing for peace and quiet at any price. Matthews also said that "he had been in the Peloponese in the period immediately after Varkiza and he was convinced that there, at any rate, ELAS had observed the terms of the agreement and had turned in practically all its weapons. He was convinced that the Left Wing element in the Peloponese had believed in the Varkiza Agreement, and that they had been bitterly disillusioned by the Right Wing reaction which followed it. He considered that if
Varkiza had been really enforced in this area, the situation would now be entirely different. He stated that little or no political instruction was given. He also observed that discipline was of a very high order, and immediate obedience to orders was general. It DON'T(sic) appear to be maintained by terroristic methods. Matthews was convinced that this applied throughout the 'Democratic Army': there were no signs of the Peloponese being a 'private' party and loyalty to Markos was complete. (182)

The Foreign Office did not intend to release Matthews' report. When, on November 12, J Platts-Mills, M P asked C. P. Mayhew whether Matthews' report to the Embassy at Athens might be made public, the Foreign Office refused to disclose it. On November 15, Peck minuted "While we can hardly deny that such a report was made, its contents must remain confidential and we must be prepared to maintain this view in Parliament." (183)

Matthews complied with the BBC's guidance and he had been careful not to communicate his experiences. In mid-November he submitted his resignation to the BBC, which was not accepted. (184) On December 21, B Ruhven-Murray wrote to Peck "Matthews himself is now doing a sort of penance at the BBC...they have relegated him to some minor job as a sub-editor in the Foreign News Department. He told me that he has been inundated with enquiries and requests for articles on his experiences, from both Greek and British newspapers, Left-Right- and Time and Life Inc. made him a handsome offer for his memoirs. He has, however, most scrupulously avoided embroilment in any direction and I think his discretion is praiseworthy." When the Union for Democratic Control invited him to add his name to those who recently called for a UN Mediation Commission, Matthews refused. In his memoirs, which were published in 1972, he would write about the "frigid and disapproving" attitude towards him. "The news editor [of the BBC] of that time asked me if it was wholly unfavourable to the rebels and, told that it was not, ruled that its publication might be regarded as a condemnation
of kidnapping and might encourage the kidnapping of correspondent in other guerrilla wars...I
followed the denouement of the war from the distant shelter of a London office...The story of
my odyssey among the rebels remained untold...What, if I spoke, did they expect me to tell
them? That the rebels were not merely bandits? That they counted in their ranks brilliant
minds..., gentle spirits, innocent children?”(185)

Matthews's capture was reported in The Times and the Daily Telegraph on October 14.

The Greek crisis was entering its fourth year, with hopes for an early peace even more
remote.

In the House of Commons, on March 23 1949 -where Greece figured prominently-
McNeil hinted that more help was to be given to the Greek Government and that Bevin would
talk over the whole Greek situation with Acheson, when he went to Washington for the signing
of the Atlantic Pact.(186)

McNeil's statement and Bevin's forthcoming trip to the United States prompted a
discussion in The Times, initiated by I McDonald, between him, Casey, Tyerman and the two
main leader-writers on Greece, B R Davidson and J D Pringle(187), about the lines which a
forthcoming leader on Greece should be written. This discussion, which would decide the
paper's line on Greece until the end of the fighting, demonstrates that the long contest between
the two forces inside the paper was coming to an end. William Casey, the new editor since
April 1 1948, had appointed Iverach McDonald, so far the diplomatic correspondent, as the
assistant editor for foreign affairs, with a special brief to look after the foreign leaders; foreign
editor was still Deakin, but in fact the editor was McDonald.(188) Tyerman, who was expected
to be the successor to Barrington-Ward, became the deputy editor in charge of home affairs.
After the stormy years of Barrington-Ward's editorship, the paper moved to a respite. The paper's policy gradually changed more to the right. It was no longer sustained by Barrington-Ward's hopes of a general agreement with the Soviet Union. The paper was firmly convinced that a balance of power must be urgently established by greater western strength and greater western unity. The Times also regarded the confrontation between the two blocks chiefly as a confrontation between two groups of national states and Stalin as more a nationalist than a revolutionary ideologue.(189)

In that discussion Davidson suggested that the situation in Greece appeared to be a) that the Greek government no longer, for various reasons "which are not only military", disposed of forces adequate to prevent the guerrillas from seizing and holding "large tracts of land"; b) that the government could probably keep the guerrillas at bay in the high mountains, if it were given more money and more equipment; but c) these additional resources would not end the civil war. Davidson saw two possible approaches to the Greek problem: "Either (a) to reinforce the Government with money and material... and,..., to wait upon events, an eventual end of the war. In this case, however, it must be recognised that much money will have to be spent at once,...and that the decision may after all, in the end, fail to go in favour of Athens. Or (b) to attempt to end the war quickly. I feel that there are the strongest political and humanitarian reasons for exploring every means of ending the war quickly. Yet I can see only two possibilities: (a) the first is to use British and American forces for direct military intervention. My view is that this would be a terrible mistake;.. (b) The second possibility is unpalatable, but practicable. It is to force a compromise on both sides, seeking in this the aid of the Soviet Union (perhaps as a member of a three Power Commission with GB and the USA), but stipulating that British garrisons shall remain for a reasonable period to ensure that the compromise is not broken by the Left. I dont suggest that this would be easy. But it would at
least end the war at a time when the British-American cause is strong in Greece and before there had been any serious question of Soviet intervention in that country. I suppose that everyone can now see -even if they dont like admitting it- that Churchill was horribly wrong in December 1944 and that The Times was entirely right. The time has come to make good this mistake as best may be -and while there is still time."

Pringle did not believe that now any compromise would solve the Greek problem. "No coalition Government which included the Communists is possible -and almost all the other parties who count at all are in the present one. It is equally difficult to believe in a three Power commission of Russia, Britain and US to settle on Russia agreeing to any solution which would leave British (but not Russian) troops in Greece. We must therefore hope and work for a victory by the Greek Government...This time there do seem to be some grounds for optimism -e.g. better Government, better army, unified command etc...I dont suppose for a moment the spring offensive will do the trick but we might let them try and see how it goes before making up our minds. Assuming (as one must) that it fails and the war goes on. I am strongly against sending British or American troops for direct intervention...I [think] that just adding men and arms wont work though I think we should provide them with really good planes and train the pilots."

Thus, both Davidson and Pringle emphasized that, even if the Greek Government were given more help, it would take a long time at best to decisively beat the guerrillas. Yet they differed in their proposals, Davidson strongly suggesting a new attempt at a compromise peace, Pringle opposing it.

The same day McDonald, who had made enquiries at the Foreign Office to see if anything special was being prepared, sent his memorandum to the Editor and attached the two memoranda by Davidson and Pringle on Greece. McDonald agreed with Pringle that any
attempt of compromise could not be successful now. "Passions are high in Greece and any attempt at a peace would in any case require Russian cooperation, which I cannot see being offered until other matters (Germany) are nearer to solution. I even doubt whether a compromise peace would be in our national interest, given Greece's strategic position. To bring Communists into the Government would surely bring in the Trojan horse...There is another point. The rebels themselves seem to have despaired of getting the main part of Greece at this stage. If they (and their Bulgarian neighbours) were more confident they would hardly have declared their desire for a united Macedonia -splitting Greece, and giving Greek patriots a fresh incentive for continuing the fight. Confidence would have made them continue proclaiming the liberation of Greece as their sole desire (as Markos, it seems, wanted to do). The above consideration make me think that we should at any rate hesitate before floating the idea of a compromise peace. Moreover, we should see how the quarrel with Tito develops...the future relations are uncertain, and that provides us with another reason for not taking the initiative in coming to terms with the rebels. What then ought our policy to be? We cannot let the rebels over-turn Greece. We cannot send troops ourselves for all the reasons which Davidson adduces. The time, I suggest, is not ripe for mediation. We are left with the delivery of more arms and planes to the Greek Government planes especially. At the FO it is admitted that the Greek Government cannot secure a victory this year, but there is a hope that by this time next year the Government's gains will be really substantial...it seems to me that the provision of more arms to allow the Greek Government to raise their present "ceiling" for the total strength of their forces, and the provision of planes, offers the only practicable way forward at the present time. The Greek Government and the US advisers in Athens are much too cheerful at the moment. Our comment would have to dwell on the great difficulties still ahead."
On March 31, Tyerman wrote to McDonald and informed his editor: "I agree, within its limits, with what you say about Greece in your latest note, provided: (a) that you recognise that what you envisage will not remove, but at the best only ease "the intolerable strain" on Greece (this is your phrase with which this discussion started); (b) that you also recognize the possibility that yet another fifteen months, even with better Government progress, may be more than Greece can bear. I still feel, as did many speakers in last week's debate, that to end the strain, as distinct from easing it, other methods will be needed in addition...You will see from the speeches of Macmillan and Maclean, as well as McNeil, that the diplomatic counterpart of military operations is uppermost in everybody's minds and cannot therefore be left out of any discussion in The Times -though I admit, to quote McNeil again, that to attempt to go into detail about what is being done, or will be done, might be 'improper'."(190)

The editorial, a combination of Pringle's and McDonald's suggestions and entitled "The Need of Greece", was printed on April 4, the day of the signing of the Atlantic Pact. It stated that apart from the continuation of the civil war with unabated loss of life and Greece's collapsing economy, there were other aspects of this many-sided disaster which call for the attention of those "who have pledged themselves to help the Greek Government": the undergrowth of Balkan nationalism, the changed attitude of Marshal Tito towards Moscow and the Comintern and the issue of Macedonia. As regards the latter the Greek Communists had to take it into account. "They would hardly have let Macedonian separatism advertise itself now if they were confident of military victory throughout Greece." These disputes "in the enemy camp" could only help the Greek Government and they could be used to good effect, only against the background of sound military tactics and hard fighting. "In the long battle that lies ahead the Greeks can count with certainty on the undiminished moral and money support and more arms, aircraft, and equipment must be found, and will be found...The peoples of the west
have an obligation to do whatever lies reasonably within their power to stand by Greece in her hour of need."(191) In the Letters to the Editor, R A Leeper, former British Ambassador in Greece, agreed with the conclusions the leading article made.(192)

As the western position had been strengthened diplomatically with the signing of the Atlantic Pact, any compromise with the Soviet Union became even more distant. When, therefore, Andrei Gromyko, the head of the Soviet UN delegation, proposed a three-Power mediation in Greece, on the prospect of a cessation of hostilities, followed by a general amnesty and fresh elections under international supervision, compromise was out of the question.(193) The conversations with Dean Rusk, the Assistant Secretary of State for UN Affairs, and Hector McNeil, on April 26, May 4 and 14, had been tentative and informal, and had, by common consent, been kept secret until a leakage occurred in the American press. Following upon this leakage, the Tass published a communiqué on May 20 giving the Russian side of the story. The State Department and the Foreign Office followed suit giving their own. The whole story was thus known to the world.(194)

The Greek Government was particularly uneasy with the Soviet peace proposals, as the war was going fairly well for its forces, and, as there was a universal desire to put an end to the conflict, the Greek people were apt to criticise the Government for not seizing any chance that offered for ending the war.(195) L Melas, the Greek Ambassador, visited the Foreign Office three times. First, on May 19, the day the Tass communiqué appeared, he saw Sir H A C Rumbold, Counsellor, who gave him the statement at about the same moment as it was being handed out to the press by the News Department.(196) In spite of this Melas visited Bateman, on May 23, and opened the conversation by professing anxiety about a phrase in The Times of May 21 to the effect the Soviet proposals "were being studied". Bateman told him that that was
"only a polite way of avoiding a flat rejection of the Soviet proposals."(197) On May 26, he visited Roger Makins, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, reiterating the anxiety which had been caused to his Government by the Soviet overtures in New York and the Tass communiqué. He was again assured that there was no intention of taking any steps on the Greek question without the fullest consultation with the Greek Government or of discussing this question in the Council of Foreign Ministers.(198) However, Melas was instructed by his Government to go to Paris, in spite of the repeated assurances given both in Athens and in London.(199)

Most of the British papers tended to interpret the rebels' peace offers as part of Moscow's general 'peace offensive', which throughout the first half of 1949 characterised Soviet foreign policy.

The Times in an editorial described the Soviet action as "a Trojan horse in its twentieth-century form." As the Soviet proposals implied an equality of status as between the rebels and the Greek Government, they were inadmissible. Other proposals, however, deserved to be considered such as the suggestion for supervised elections and for a watch on the frontiers. Yet, "there can be no thought of bringing the rebel leaders back into political partnership."(200)

The Manchester Guardian editorially doubted the sincerity of the Soviet step, but it added "if Paris shows that the international temper has truly begun to simmer down, then we should not refuse."(201) On May 26, Alexander Werth, now in Paris, interviewed Sofianopoulos, who favoured a Greek peace settlement. The following day Greek press reacted violently to that interview, while it caused little interest in Britain.(202)

W N Ewer of the Daily Herald used the same diplomatic language of The Times and the Manchester Guardian. He wrote that "the British Government's feeling is that they can
neither be accepted nor rejected out of hand. They need careful study and more elucidation."

The Economist believed that "The new Russian proposals must appear to be more an attempt to bypass and discredit the Greek Government or snatch a propaganda victory in the peace campaign, than a genuine effort to secure a solution." Nevertheless, should in Paris there be reasonable proof that Russia wanted a settlement and not a tactical gain in the cold war, the western powers would be well advised to discuss in Paris the issue of Greece.

In The Spectator, in the 'Marginal Comment', Harold Nicolson, wrote "in their curious, tentative way the Russians have allowed us to see the tip of the tail-feathers of the dove of peace...Yet we know that the civil war will never be brought to a rapid end so long as the forces of ELAS can escape across the frontier; that frontier can only be closed to them with Soviet assent."

Among the Left-wing press, The New Statesman, strong supporter of the Soviet 'peace offensive', believed that "international mediation...seems the only sensible course, whether in the defence of democracy, of the lives of the Greek people, or of British interests in the Eastern Mediterranean."

Tribune argued that "whatever the prospect of success this offer should be most seriously considered...even the smallest chance of early peace must not be neglected. Any other attitude would be criminal." A few weeks later, on June 17, Tribune would write, "We agree with Mr. Bevin that the inspiration for the rebels is largely external. If Moscow were to give the world no doubt the civil war would cease."

The spring offensive of 1949 was proved successful, partly as a result of the extensive aid and training the 'National Army' received from the Americans and the British, partly of the
closure of Yugoslav frontiers in July 1949, partly of changes of the rebels tactics from indirect to direct attacks, and partly of failure to secure substantial military assistance from the Soviet Union and the countries of the Eastern bloc.

On October 16 1949, the rebel radio announced in the name of the 'Provisional Government of Free Greece' that the guerrilla forces ceased operations in order to avoid the "complete annihilation" of Greece. At the same time, they declared that the 'Democratic Army' had not been defeated but it had been forced to retreat in face of the enormous superiority resulting from foreign aid and supported by Tito's defection and treason.(208)

The news passed to the press by a Reuters message from Athens and was placed on the front pages. Yet, most of the papers tended to regard the guerrilla announcement with scepticism. The Times stated, "Greece has gained much, but not yet peace or security." To prevent a new flaring of the flames, the paper suggested an effective control of rebel movement across the frontier and the disbandment of the rebel camps in Albania and Bulgaria. Then, "the Greek Government could wisely turn to the real work of pacification at home, to new elections and a wide amnesty." The Manchester Guardian diplomatic correspondent argued that the Soviets by this move were seeking to gain some benefit in exchange.(209)

Vernon Bartlett wrote in the News Chronicle that "Whatever the motives of the Soviet Government and the Greek rebels, there is great satisfaction that for the first time there is a prospect of an armistice in Greece." The Greek Government should be prepared to show "more than lip-service to democracy. A cold war cannot be won by oppression."(210)

For the Daily Herald the essential fact was that the civil war was ended or ending. The Greek Government now "is face to face with a test as searching as that of war." Greece needed not only the cessation of fighting, but a wise peace, a genuine democracy and an enlightened social policy.(211)
The Daily Telegraph thought that it was premature to assume that the civil war was over. At any case, the Greek Government had now the opportunity of relaxing some of their harsh decisions and of broadening their support in the country.(212)

The Economist in a full page article argued that "The guiding features of policy must be moderation with determination behind it, and a zeal for reform tempered by understanding of what is practicable." The journal stressed that "there can be no question of allowing the Communists and their fellow travellers back into any position from which they could launch another attempt to seize power;...Democracy must be given a chance to fire, if necessary, on five cylinders instead of six; but it is better that it should do that than fail to run at all."(213)

The New Statesman considered that the civil war was not over since the guerrillas still might filter back across the frontiers of Albania and the Athens Government was incapable by itself of taking the steps that might lead to peace. The United Nations must sponsor and supervise the conditions of peace. These, at a minimum, would include a genuine amnesty, disbandment of the rebels and surrender of their armament, a removal of Right-wing terrorists from the army and police, the restoration of civil rights, and a general election held in the presence of United Nations' observers.(214)

Cold-War Propaganda Exercises, 1947-1949

To deal with publicity needs, the Foreign Office had the News Department and the Information Policy Department. As the Cold War settled over Europe, it was felt that to contain Soviet influence an agency was needed to deal with covert propaganda. After a long
campaign, waged in early 1946, there was created in January 1948, within the Foreign Office, the Information Research Department (IRD).

In many respects the IRD was a peacetime Political Warfare Executive. In 1948, it adopted a 'defensive/offensive' programme, which suited more to the new tenet in British foreign policy of the 'positive' projection of the 'Third Force'. By 1949, the abandonment of 'Third Force' allowed the IRD to concentrate on 'offensive' propaganda. In early 1949, the IRD counterattacked the Soviet 'peace offensive' with 'information' exposing Soviet hostility and intransigence, especially in the United Nations with the 'veto on peace' used by the Soviets in the Security Council twenty-eight times since 1946.

Most of IRD's activities even today remain secret. Yet, from fragmented evidence, it is known that IRD based its information on carefully selected material distributed to a great variety of recipients: British Ministers, MPs and trade unionists, the International Department of the Labour Party and UN Delegates, British media and opinion formers including the BBC World Service, selected journalists and writers. This material was also directed to information officers in British Embassies and to the Foreign Offices of other countries.

The position in Greece played a certain role in the evolution of the IRD. C Mayhew, who created IRD, suggested that it was his experience at the United Nations -where the British "being under heavy attack" by the Soviets "for Colonialism, the Empire, activities in Greece"- that made him decide on the urgent need for such a department. In February 1949, in two meetings held by the Russia Committee -formed on April 1946 to assess Soviet action and define policy- saving Greece from the Soviet orbit was Bevin's first of the three immediate objectives for the Foreign Office.
In September 1947, a meeting of American and British officials agreed on the "ineptness of Greek propaganda" and suggested specific remedies. (221)

One of the uglier 'psychological warfare' exercises of the Greek propaganda was the issue of the evacuation of Greek children to the countries of Eastern Europe, the "paidomazoma." The guerrillas claimed that the children had been evacuated for their protection, while the Government charged that the children had been abducted with the aim to transform them into new recruits. Initially, some Americans in Athens had thought that the issue might be useful for propaganda, but many important American officials including the Secretary of State George Marshall remained unconvinced about the propaganda value of the 'paidomazoma' charges. (222)

The response of the British press was not particularly extensive; it was more a war in the papers' correspondence columns between officials of the Greek Department of Information in London and well-known British conservatives and Greek and British intellectuals. (223) C M Woodhouse would write in October, 1948 in The Spectator: "what is remarkable is that it [the issue of children] does not seem to have been much of a shock to the world's conscience. Some voices here and there have been raised in protest, but immediately answered by louder voices representing a new and strange point of view." (224)

The case of children was brought to the attention of the United Nations, the International Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies by the Greek Government. (225)

Wide publicity was given on the Makronisos concentration camp -established in the beginning of 1947 by the Minister of War, George Stratos- the main detention island for men. Most of the 30,000 detainees on Makronisos were put through a lengthy programme of
political propaganda and coerced patriotism. Eventually, about 70 per cent abjured Communism. (226)

The Greek Government attempted to present the Makronisos-operation as a successful 'school of moral rehabilitation' and took pains to ensure favourable comments by foreign visitors. Thus, on May 26, 1948, the Minister of War, Stratos, and the Minister in the Prime Minister's Office, Mavrocordatos, visited Makronisos with party of American and British officers and Greek and foreign journalists in the hope to convince them of its "beneficial results." (227) Among them was Macaskie of The Times who, on May 31, wrote "the visitors,..., witnessed remarkable demonstrations of loyalty to the national army, the nation, and the head of the State." (228) Several other British commentators were also favourably impressed. In April 1949, the Athens correspondent of the Daily Mail reported that "Makronisi is an undoubted success" and "if its cure proves permanent, it will have started something which should arouse the passionate interest of the whole world." (229) F A Voigt in The Spectator -"a propagandist in the cause of the Greek Government" (230)- felt, after a visit to Makronisos, that "all these institutions -Makronisos, Leros,...-are small Christian communities" and "the beginnings of a national regeneration." (231) In August, Steven Runciman, the distinguished scholar, visited the island twice and in an article in the Manchester Guardian concluded "in Makronisos the old spirit is being reborn, vital, eager, and full of faith and hope." (232)

The Greek Government might have succeeded in obtaining these favourable reports, but the whole story had not been told. The solution of the concentration camps, as C M Woodhouse wrote, "became highly controversial" (233) and the employed methods were debatable. That was witnessed by Basil Davidson, in a visit to Makronisos, and followed by French and Swiss journalists. Davidson, now with The New Statesman, found that apart from
physical pressure, and the systematic demoralisation, the detainees had also been through a process of nationalist indoctrination. He wrote "I could not discover exactly in what the 're-indoctrination' consists unless it be this everlasting repetition of the national anthem, of nationalist slogans, of speeches and lectures against 'the virus of Communism', of proof that the only way of getting off Makronisos is to shout and sing and grin as loudly and widely as the next man."(234)

While the Greek Government's propaganda may be considered partly successful, its anti-Communist campaign with American and British help was wholly effective on the issue of Macedonia. Already in late spring 1948, successful efforts were made to exploit Greek nationalist sentiment against the alleged dangers of Macedonian irredentism.(235) On January 13 1949, John McCormick noted, "it is true that something should be done along the lines of organising better [Greek] Governmental ballyhoo...As regards anti-Communist propaganda, there has been some Anglo-American-Greek discussion recently on the principles of psychological warfare. The Athens radio puts out a great deal of anti-Communist propaganda, and great play is made with the anti-national character of the Communist movement. The Embassy supply the Greek Government regularly with items of news of an anti-Communist flavour."(236) Several propaganda committees and publishing companies were set up in Greece to promote the 'anti-national' character of Communism.(237)

Since 1936, the KKE had firmly resisted the creation of an autonomous Macedonia. When, in February 1949, the idea for Macedonian autonomy was revived, the KKE quickly repudiated it. However the harm had been done. It was easily interpreted as an attempt by KKE to detach Greek territory and cede it to Bulgaria, as part of a Cominform move to undermine
Tito's control of Yugoslav Macedonia by stirring up Macedonian separatism, and thus promoting Soviet foreign policy's interests.(238)

Within Greece, disarray was such that it became a fertile soil for 'planting' allegations of the anti-national character of the rebels. Throughout March 1949, just before the signing of the Atlantic Pact, it would be a major item in all the major British papers. The Athens correspondent of the Daily Telegraph was the first in the British press to write about a rebel plan to separate Macedonia from the rest of Greece. "The policy of 'liberating' Macedonia was inspired by the Cominform", he wrote on February 14. He went on "Communist party followers throughout Greece are strongly condemning the separatist policy towards Macedonia."(239)

On March 12, the Manchester Guardian in a short editorial stated that "the Greek Communists have already been faced with the awkward choice between alienating their supporters in Greece (if they appear to agree with Bulgarian and Yugoslav plans for the future of Macedonia) and falling out with Mr. Dimitrov and Marshal Tito if they press the legitimate Greek claim to territory peopled entirely by Greeks."(240)

On March 14, in The Times Macaskie reported that some Greek Communists met Rendis and "declared that in their opinion the international Communist leadership had deceived and sacrificed them."(241)

On March 20, in an article on the front page of the Sunday Times, entitled "Check to Russia in Greece", the diplomatic correspondent wrote, "It has long been believed that the Cominform had two alternative policies for Greece -its total Communisation,.., or the detachment of Aegean Macedonia to unite it with the Slav bloc...Many Greek Communists are volubly objecting to being exploited in the interest of Slav expansion."
On March 23, Barber wrote a long article on the issue of Macedonia. He argued that "Greek Macedonia no doubt, is viewed as Phase Two in the Cominform's plans for tidying up the Balkans."(242) On March 23, in the House of Commons Macmillan, Conservative MP, giving the Commons the warning of a Soviet drive, said that "Moscow plans a political coup which could destroy Tito's position and destroy Greece, and that is a plot to create the so-called Macedonian Federation under Bulgarian leadership."(243)

On March 24, Geoffrey Wakeford of the Daily Mail wrote on the front page, entitled "Stalin plan to grab Greece. Bevin talks in US." On March 25, Barber, on the occasion of Greece's National Day, wrote: "In spite of everything, however, the great mass of the Greeks remain staunchly independent, and therefore, anti-Communist. They recognise the Communists for agents of a Slav imperialism."(244)

On March 29, the front page of the Daily Mail would be Alexander Clifford's dispatch from Athens. He wrote that Moscow might encourage "an unofficial invasion of Northern Greece from Bulgaria, as much in order to rob Tito as to rob Greece."(245)

On March 31, the Daily Telegraph Vienna correspondent, on the front page entitled "Tito to Stop Support for Greek rebels. Macedonia Key to New Policy." The paper's Athens correspondent noted "the Greek Communist rebellion is daily losing its 'Greek' aspect and assuming a larger Balkan appearance."

The same month, March, the Americans, at the suggestion of Mrs. Grady, the American Ambassador's wife, organised a propaganda campaign, the 'Work and Victory Week', from March 20 to 25. This was the first major activity of a "special morale group" consisting of Greek and American officials appointed by H F Grady.(246) The British were invited to join in the promotion of the campaign whose intention was to boost the morale of the Greek Government and to support the aid to Greece now before Congress. Although the idea was
considered by the Foreign Office as "very good", it was decided not to send to Greece a special representative. However "suitable publicity" had been arranged: the Archbishop of Canterbury was to send a message to Archbishop Damaskinos -which was published in The Times on March 16- and to issue a call for prayer for the Greek children on March 20; the BBC had promised their cooperation and Norton was to speak on the Athens radio on March 24.(247) On March 21, Macaskie reported "Mr. Truman's latest report to Congress on American aid to Greece is regarded as fair and accurate, and the enthusiastic support which all branches of American agencies operating here and giving to this week's Greek national rally have further convinced Greeks that they are not fighting militant Communism alone."(248) On March 30, Norton transmitted his impressions: "many of the proceedings were bound to seem cheap, gaudy...The whole episode was a remarkable example of what can be done in a small country by high-powered American publicity methods, coupled with dollars."(249)

In June, The Times evaluated the whole Macedonia campaign and its effect on the course of the civil war. It would state editorially that, unfortunately for the schemes of the Cominform, the plan for an autonomous Macedonia, which had been pressed forward with considerable vigour since last March, had seriously increased the dissensions in the ranks of the Greek Communists, "for no Greek with a spark of patriotic feeling could join in advocating the dismemberment of his country."(250) The day of the rebels' announcement of 'cease-fire' The Times diplomatic correspondent wrote that the background of the rebels' announcement was first the defeats which the Greek army inflicted on them and second the political offensive assumed by the Soviet Union against Yugoslavia. "Incidentally, by projecting into the quarrel, for the purposes of embarrassing Yugoslavia, a plan for an autonomous State composed of the three Macedonias, the Russian Communist party sowed dissension in the Greek rebel
movement and reduced its effectiveness. Those Communist Greek rebels who retained patriotic feelings were not of a mind to accept dismemberment of their country."(251)

With most of the records of IRD remaining secret, questions arise of how much of the material in the British press and the BBC was 'planted' by that Government body? What were "the principles of psychological warfare" in Greece? What other projects were undertaken to contain Communism in that country?

The fact, however, is that the campaign to "prove" the "anti-national character of the Communists" had a profound effect. Until recently, the dominant language spoke of the "bandit war"; the very reference to 'emphylios' ('inter-racial') struggle, was sufficient proof of leftist convictions. Those who opposed the Government could not be Greeks and could not belong to the domestic political body. They were simply bandits, slavo-communists, EAMoslavs, or EAMbulgars. A nationalist fundamentalism was thus elaborated which resembled Metaxas's tenets of: nation, army, religion, family, Greekness and tradition. The civil war was followed by a period of repression, cultural sterility and foreign intervention, which ultimately led, as some historians, believe, to the military dictatorship of 1967-74.
NOTES

6. Schneer J, Labour's conscience. The Labour Left, 52-76
7. Rothwell V, Britain and the Cold War, 1941-47, 414; Morgan K O, Labour People -Leaders and Lieutenants: Hardie to Kinnock, 155ff
8. J Kent, op.cit., 217
9. Marshal D Shulman, Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised
13. Ibid., leader, "The New Diplomacy", 3/2/49; See also, leader "Russia in Europe", 5/12/49
14. David Ayerst, Guardian..., p.586
16. Ibid., leader, "A United People", 24/1/48; see also leader, "Russian Policy", 7/2/48
17. Ibid., leader, "Europe", 11/6/48
18. Ibid., leader,
20. Ibid., Leader, "One World", 12/5/48
21. Ibid., leader, "The Battle of Ideas", 30/9/48
23. Ibid., leader, "A Fresh Move", 12/5/48
24. Daily Express, leader, 30/8/48
27. Ibid.,'Scrutator', "Truth About the Atlantic Pact", 20/2/49

299
29. Ibid., "Dealing with the Russians", 6/8/48. See also "Russia the Ambiguous", 4/2/49
30. The Observer, W D Clark, "Is America to Blame?", 20/2/49; 'A Student of Europe', "American Danger" 20/2/49 and "Russia's New Aims", 22/5/49
31. The Economist, "Lull in the Cold War?", 24/4/48, pp. 663-4
33. Tribune, 23/1/48, p.3 and 30/1/48, p.3
34. Ibid., 19/3/48, p.3
35. Ibid., 14/5/48, p.3
37. Ibid., "The Lesson of History," 26/3/49,
38. Ibid., "Peace and Propaganda", 2/4/49
39. A Angelopoulos Private Papers, On February 25, 1947 Deakin inform Angelopoulos that The Times intended to appoint F Macaskie as its representative in Greece. This letter was lost in the post, while rumours circulated in the Greek press that his replacement was imminent. Angelopoulos wrote to Deakin on March 4 about "the harm" these rumours were causing to his "professional prestige." When he was offered twice (March, September) to serve as deputy correspondent during Macaskie's absence, he refused to accept the post. Macaskie left London for Rome on March 10, 1947 and in mid-March was in Athens.
40. Lt Col Frank Macaskie (1913-1952) He met Sylvia Sprigge in Athens in September 1946. As his assignment in Athens was about to finish in October 1946 he wrote to Sprigge, then in Rome, asking whether the Manchester Guardian was interested employing him as correspondent for Greece and Turkey. Sprigge wrote to M D P(Pringle?) about him. "You will be interested I know to hear him on Greece, even if there is n't a prospect for him. I don't think he'd be much use...writing for he's been out of England too long." (F Macaskie File: D/2263/1-2, Manchester Guardian's Archives)
41. David Woodford (d. 1948) Daily Telegraph obituary, 24/9/48
43. FO371/67062, R2870, Consul General, Salonika to FO, 3/3/47, Minutes by McCarthy, Colville and Matthews. FO to Salonika 8/3/47
44. FO371/67063, R3043, Norton to FO, 6/3/47 and FO to Norton, 21/3/47; FO371/67063, R3060, Athens to FO 6/3/47; Minutes by Colville and Matthews, FO to Norton, 11/3/47
45. FO371/67040, R5158, Norton to FO, 15/4/47; Minutes, 18/4/47
46. FO371/67075, R7593 Minutes by McCarthy 9/6/47 and Selby 13/6/47; Letter to Athens 20/6/47
48. The Times Archives, Macaskie to Barrington-Ward, 2/5/47; Barrington-Ward to Macaskie, 30/5/47
49. The Times, leader, "Greece", 23/5/47
50. Manchester Guardian, leader, "Greece and UN", 10/5/47

300
52. Ibid., leader, "A Plain Tale", 23/6/47; FO371/67120, R8561, Minutes by McCarthy 26/6/47
53. The Times, Athens corr., 2/6/47. It was also reported in the Manchester Guardian, 3/6/47, the Daily Telegraph, Athens corr., 2/6/47, the Daily Mail, New York corr., 14/7/47
55. FO371/67120, R7740, Minutes by McCarthy, 11/6/47
56. On 14, 15 and 16 July it was reported in the Manchester Guardian, Daily Telegraph, News Chronicle, Daily Herald, Daily Mail
57. Manchester Guardian, leader, "Greek Troubles", 15/7/47
58. Daily Herald, Salisbury, p.1, 17/7/47
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307
CONCLUSION

In looking at the daily and weekly press, this study has attempted to investigate British attitudes to Greece in the 1940s. The aim has been, by observing the press across the Left-Right spectrum, to find out what those attitudes were, what underlay them and in what policies they resulted. It has also aimed to discover how far the Cold War affected the presentation of the Greek developments and to what extent governmental pressure on the press had influenced its coverage of the crisis.

The Second World War had radicalised a large part of public opinion in Britain and even traditional Conservative opinion, as can be seen in The Times' and The Observer's defection, shifted leftwards. In occupied Europe, new social dynamics were emerging which posed a challenge to the status quo ante. In the case of Greece, the war provided the spark which kindled a fire smouldering for years.

During the interwar period, particularly during the Metaxas dictatorship of 1936-1939, fundamental changes in social and economic life released new forces which became manifest in the 1940s. The traditional power elites, which were lacking popular endorsement and had neither the resources nor the vision to deal with the country's problems, felt threatened and they offered their services to the British for sanction and support. And it is in this light that foreign intervention in Greece should be viewed.

The basic objective of British policy with regard to Greece was to safeguard Britain's strategic interest in the Eastern Mediterranean by restoring Britain's political influence in that country. To this end, British policy-makers decided to support the discredited Greek King and, by any means, political or military, to neutralise the entire left camp.
The British press formulated their attitudes towards Greece in line with their general political and philosophical outlook. The conservative press almost invariably supported British official policy towards Greece, as it was expressed by Churchill and was continued by Attlee. The liberal and Labour press adopted a critical line. Feeling sympathetic to the European resistance movement, they criticised the official policy as being hostile to the new forces in Europe and jeopardising Big Three cooperation. Later, their attitudes would vary in relation to the changing world situation.

As we have seen, throughout 1943 and until November 1944, the British press, mainly the liberal and Labour press, showed an increasing uneasiness and criticism of Churchill's foreign policy. The conservative press, with the notable exception of The Times and The Observer, stayed firmly behind the British Government's policy towards Greece and was always ready and quick to justify it.

The liberal and Labour press was particularly distrustful of the Greek King because they feared that he would return without a plebiscite and that a dictatorship would follow. On the other hand, they regarded EAM as a genuine mass popular movement and ELAS as the most significant fighting force engaged against the Germans in Greece, seeing them together as the most representative political formations after the war.

Despite the uneasiness of Reginald Leeper, the British Ambassador, at the favourable press comment on EAM, the Foreign Office did not seem worried and they attributed it to the lack of decisive British policy towards EAM and a clear propaganda line. They felt confident that once the new policy of direct attack on EAM and its leaders was adopted, it should be possible to convince those who were inclined to support EAM. Meanwhile they tried to win over the more approachable correspondents, e.g. Vernon Bartlett of the News Chronicle, by giving them information. The News Department also tried to "reason" with journalists whose
comments were regarded as undesirable, e.g. Ronald Friedenberg of The Observer and approached others who were suspicious of Foreign Office policies, e.g. W E Ewer of the Daily Herald and E P Montgomery of the News Chronicle.

It was also felt in the Foreign Office that the best way to denounce EAM/ELAS was for the lead to come from Cairo as a result of guidance by the Embassy to correspondents there. Leeper, an expert on propaganda matters and extremely suspicious of the press, had, therefore, to keep journalists "on the right track." Moreover rigorous censorship regulations, imposed both on the BBC and the press, and the terms of correspondents' accreditation to the British Army would work to complementary effect.

The combined efforts of the Foreign Office and Leeper bore fruit. This became obvious with the press reaction to the result of the Lebanon Conference. Despite their doubts and reservations of how far the Lebanon Conference -carefully prepared and manipulated by Leeper himself- had really achieved Greek political unity, some papers complied with the Foreign Office's guidance: The Observer considerably modified its tone, Bartlett seemed convinced by the information he was given by the Foreign Office and the Daily Herald, apart from "certain outbursts", was "not too bad". Others, such as the Manchester Guardian and the Labour-left press sustained their critical stand.

As the true dimensions of the Greek crisis became apparent with the dramatic events of December 3 1944, Leeper and the Foreign Office found it harder to keep the correspondents "on the rails." The press storm over Greece had a direct impact on international and British domestic opinion and, no doubt, contributed to the change of British Government's tactics to seek 'a political solution' instead of eliminating EAM by force.

The British press presented almost complete unity against the British intervention in Greece, with the sole exception of the Daily Telegraph.

310
The Times and the liberal and Labour press carried a great debate onto their editorial pages on the theme that Britain could play a great role in Europe by being friendly with the emerging new social forces and not by backing illiberal and unpopular governments.

As time progressed up to March 1945, certain parts of the press adopted a more restrained stance to official British policy. In the conservative camp the Daily Express and the Daily Mail returned after a spell of oscillation on the grounds that the British Government had not done what it could to prevent the crisis. The Daily Telegraph felt proud that it had not been deceived by the "stream of distortion." Yet this movement back was in no sense universal.

The several factors which contributed to this process have been examined in detail. It was an anti-EAM propaganda consisting of stories of terrorism, hostage-taking, mass reprisals, and serious repression by EAM/ELAS during the fighting. The one-sided nature of available information, and the paucity of Greek news, as strict censorship on press reports had been imposed at the beginning of December and maintained into February 1945, prevented independent commentators from questioning official allegations and therefore official actions remained unchallenged. To that, one must add the systematic efforts of the Foreign Office and the Embassy to replace "irresponsible" correspondents and as such were considered Geoffrey Hoare of The Times, Robert Bigio of Reuters, and to a lesser degree John Nixon of the BBC. Bigio was replaced by Sylvain Mangeot and the BBC was reinforced with the highly regarded Kenneth Matthews, while a great controversy raged around Hoare. On the other hand, trustworthy correspondents such as F H Salusbury of the Daily Herald were singled out and efforts made to keep them in place.

The Foreign Office favoured the idea of sending to Athens unofficial visitors whose word would be trusted at home in order to "see things as they are." Thus apart from MPs and representatives of the Trade Unions, special press correspondents were encouraged to visit
Greece. As a result Gerald Barry of the News Chronicle -due to Bartlett's illness- and C D R Lumby of The Times visited the scene of action. Yet, both were convinced that the great majority of press were doing a job "honestly, conscientiously and successfully" and Lumby found that Hoare's reports, which had caused so much rage were "very fair and balanced." As Lumby realised, the man who was behind all this controversy was the British Ambassador.

Leeper, in particular, and Osbert Lancaster, who was sent to Athens at the height of the crisis to help Leeper in handling the press, had shown undue anxiety regarding the press treatment of the Greek crisis and the general performance of the BBC over Greece. Charges made by the Embassy, were sometimes found, on investigation in London, unjustifiable. The Foreign Office's response to the crisis had been more measured and balanced.

Following the signing of the Varkiza Agreement British eyes were turned to other important world events and Greece was relegated to a lesser position on the pages of the press.

An extraordinary wave of mainly right-wing terror swept Greece. As early as March, 1945, the liberal and Labour press called attention to the Monarchists' strenuous efforts to force a decision for a speedy plebiscite and the consequences that might have for the country. Several newspapers like the News Chronicle and The Observer printed statements made by Greek republican politicians declaring that they would not participate in plebiscite or elections and pointing out that conditions for fair elections were lacking. By mid July 1945, the News Department sensed that criticism of the situation in Greece and hence of British policy was increasing in the left-wing press and that it might be more trouble later. The Foreign Office feared that the impression might grow that right-wing excesses were increasing and that internal security so far from having improved was deteriorating. Therefore, they instructed the Athens Embassy to report any evidence that the Greek Government's efforts were proving successful and that correspondents in Athens should be persuaded to give "a more balanced picture."
By October 1945, the deterioration of the situation in Athens was alarming and the British press unanimously supported the view that under the prevailing circumstances a more active British intervention might save the situation.

Meanwhile, as a renewal of public interest in Greece was expected, the Foreign Office asked Lancaster to send a list of the correspondents, with brief comments giving his own opinion of them and of the extent to which they co-operated with the Embassy. Leeper was not impressed with those already in Athens and he asked whether The Times could send Iverach McDonald, the diplomatic correspondent, and whether the BBC could send Kenneth Matthews. The Foreign Office took up the matter with The Times and the BBC.

The Greek parliamentary election brought Greece again into limelight. Despite the many attempts for postponement of election by Greek politicians and the British press campaign, they were finally held on March 31 1946. While there was a general satisfaction in the press with the technical side of the election (though not universal as Peter Burchett of the Daily Express and his hasty return to England testified), all British newspapers were in agreement that hopes for resolution of the Greek political stalemate remained bleak.

The election was followed by the plebiscite on the monarchy, on September 1 1946, rather than in March 1948 as originally scheduled. The British press had been largely opposed to an early plebiscite and it had long maintained that, under the prevailing circumstances, it would lead the country into a civil war. Carefully selected correspondents were sent to Greece to cover the plebiscite. Among them was not included this time Hugh Massingham of The Observer, because in his coverage of the elections he had sharply criticised British policy towards Greece and the Foreign Office rebuked his editor. The thought was that this time the fairness of the plebiscite would be judged by the press correspondents and reported to the world before "the considered views" of observers or Allied missions could be published.
After the March elections, political violence, mostly exercised by extreme right-wing bands, increased dramatically and mass insecurity increased even further after the plebiscite. But, even papers who had kept a critical stand refused to acknowledge the problem and avoided criticising the Greek Government for its handling of the situation, until things came to a head.

It was The Times' report of May 7 1946 which urged the Foreign Office to take action. Fearing that press reports of a decline in public order might give rise to Parliamentary Questions, they asked the Embassy for information. Clifford Norton, the new British Ambassador, although he questioned Communist ability to provoke any major disorder, admitted that he had no indication of their planning to do so and accepted the partial handling of the situation by the Greek Government, he threw the blame for this decline in public order mainly on the Communists. Based on his report the Foreign Office decided that the line to be followed in regard to the expected reaction of the press and to questions in Parliament would be that "the main danger to law and order in Greece comes from the Communists." The News Department was instructed to do all in their power to convey this impression to the British press as early as possible. Indeed, all papers were contacted and the great majority of them submitted to Foreign Office's advice.

The Marshall Plan placed the world in the melting-pot and it affected attitudes towards the Soviet Union. Those who, until now, had considered that cooperation with the Soviets was both necessary and desirable, came full circle and they increasingly mistrusted Soviet post-war objectives. This breach of confidence can be clearly seen in the Labour-left press.

The Greek crisis was now viewed not as a result of the country's internal differences, but it was caught up in the political and ideological antagonisms of the Cold War and it was disguised as an international problem.
By 1947, most of the British papers, liberal and Labour, which had regarded the crisis as mainly internal and not a result of foreign encouragement, now saw it as an international problem. And the papers which still insisted on the internal nature of the crisis, such as The Times, The Economist and the Labour Left press, faced an outraged Foreign Office.

A great chance to win over the papers which still insisted on viewing the problem as a Greek and not as an international one was given to the Foreign Office with the formation of the 'Provisional Democratic Government' on Christmas 1947. The absence of any newspapers over the holidays enabled the Foreign Office to 'scoop' the news and it gave them the time to ensure the proper publicity: it was only the prelude to a general offensive of the Cominform. However, The Times remained firm in its view. After constant representations by the Foreign Office, the paper finally produced the desired phrase that the civil war "has now become an issue of international importance." A few days later The Economist and Tribune followed suit.

The determination of the Foreign Office not to give any chance to the rebels was clearly illustrated in Kenneth Matthews's ordeal. This BBC correspondent, highly respected in British official circles, reported favourably on the rebels, but his report was never disclosed and Matthews himself was treated unfairly.

The final act of the long battle between The Times and the Foreign Office was played out on the day of the signing of the Atlantic Pact. The Times' article of April 4 1949 demonstrated that the long contest of the two forces within the paper was coming to an end. Under a new editor, and with a re-arrangement of key staff positions, the paper's policy gradually moved to the right. Barrington-Ward's hopes of a general agreement with the Soviet Union were no longer sustained by the paper.
As we have seen, the Foreign Office were anxious to avoid arousing hostile reaction from Parliament and from the public for their conduct of the Greek crisis. When there were indications that something was about to happen (or it had already happened) which was probably to receive (or had received) press criticism, the Foreign Office responded to it quickly so that it would not become an explosive issue.

To mould public attitudes about foreign policy the Foreign Office had several means at their disposal. A key channel lay in the system of briefings given by the News Department to the diplomatic correspondents. "The danger is", as Yoel Cohen wrote, "that over a period of time the journalist comes to see things from the vantage point of the Foreign Office and fails to question basic assumptions about policy goals."(1)

Another channel through which support for British foreign policy could be gained was the contacts between Embassy and the British foreign correspondents. Their value as eyewitnesses, as journalists 'on the spot', was far more effective and had greater impact on public opinion than the best analysis written by an office critic in London. It was, for instance, Geoffrey Hoare's dispatches in The Times in December 1944 which shocked world opinion and started the trouble in Britain and not the paper's editorial comments which went further in criticism of British policy towards Greece than Hoare's messages justified.(2) The Foreign Office's great concern for appointing "reliable" Athens correspondents demonstrated their importance. Their dispatches would prepare the ground for comment in London which the Foreign Office on their side would reinforce. The Foreign Office were well aware of the danger of any action on their part to chide the critics directly which might be interpreted as exertion of undue influence upon the press and castigated as Foreign Office's interference with the freedom of the press.
Thus, subjected to Foreign Office influence, diplomatic and foreign correspondents often came to support the official policy and that, in some cases, led them at to be in dispute with the leader-writing staff of their papers. We have seen how that happened at The Times, the Daily Herald and the News Chronicle. Those of the foreign correspondents who did keep their independent voice faced a hostile Embassy and in the end were replaced by others. We mention here the cases of Geoffrey Hoare, Eric Bigio, Peter Burchett, Hugh Massingham Kenneth Matthews.

The British policy towards Greece failed to unite the country around a stable and moderate Government, which would have prevented an outbreak of civil war (if one assumes that that was the objective of British policy in Greece). The conservative press had all along supported the official policy and it claimed that it was not the fault but the misfortune of Britain that her efforts had not produced better results. The liberal and Labour press criticised Britain's mistakes and condemned the failure of her policy; the sharper criticism came from the Labour-left press. However their criticism never amounted to a clear and unequivocal condemnation of British foreign policy. Especially during its first year in power the Labour Government's foreign policy was not severely challenged by even its sharpest critics. And when some of the Government's supporters later became disillusioned with the Labour policies, they would constitute a tiny and marginalised minority which could hardly pose any serious danger. Moreover most of the papers were not unwilling to follow the News Department's guidance and to accept the Foreign Office's advice. In the process, the press was won over. The success of manipulation by the Foreign Office was facilitated dramatically by the general change of attitudes, consequent upon the Cold War. The New Statesman alone would continue to oppose the division of the world into two opposing blocs. The Cold War had taken its grip and
weakened the capacity for clear thinking. Yet, it is to the credit of the British press that it kept its mind open for so long and let several independent voices emerge.

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(Also numerous others were examined, namely the Financial Times, Daily Dispatch, Daily Sketch, Evening News, The People, The Star, Sunday Graphic, Sunday Dispatch, Sunday Express, News of the World, Labour Monthly, Intelligence Digest. This was done for the year 1946, however the reference to Greek events was limited, and it was decided to focus research on the main thirteen papers mentioned above.)

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337
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