

MANAGING MEMBERSHIPS:
PARTICIPATION AND INCLUSION IN A
POLITICAL PARTY SETTING

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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores whether the experience of political party membership can be enhanced for individual members whilst, at the same time, parties can increase membership productivity. This exploration is conducted via a central hypothesis: “Satisfaction with the experience of membership is a stronger predictor of commitment to a political party than partisanship.” An interdisciplinary approach drawing on marketing, nonprofit studies, organizational behaviour and political science is used to identify appropriate analytical frameworks for testing this hypothesis.

A questionnaire survey of 1,849 members of a political party, Plaid Cymru The Party of Wales, indicated that, in terms of behavioural commitment, one partisanship variable - values motivations – predicted whether members took part in any one activity. But two satisfaction variables – socialization and job satisfaction – predicted the numbers and types of activities in which members participated. Job satisfaction was also found to predict the making of donations. In respect of attitudinal commitment, more relationships were observed with partisanship variables than with satisfaction variables.

The experience of membership was found to differ between demographic groups of members. Linguistic and membership density groups showed differing levels of overall satisfaction, gender groups showed differing levels of participation. The less affluent and less well-educated members of Plaid Cymru benefited disproportionately more from their membership than other groups; whilst middle-aged, affluent members contributed more to the party than they appeared to receive.

The appropriateness of using communications tools for membership management is discussed. Specific communications strategies to aid recruitment, socialize members, raise political efficacy levels, and generate increased revenues are described. It is argued that these communications strategies will simultaneously deliver the benefits that members want and increase their propensity to participate. The actions that political parties can take towards improving the experience of membership and the potential management implications of these actions are described.

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MANAGING MEMBERSHIPS: PARTICIPATION AND INCLUSION IN A POLITICAL PARTY SETTING

INTRODUCTION

This is a PhD thesis which began as a Master's dissertation which began by accident. The accident happened when I first approached Britain's major political parties to discuss research into potential uses of marketing techniques in politics. I was going to suggest a project dealing with the value of focus groups in policy formulation. But what party managers told me they wanted to know was how they could use marketing techniques to manage their members. I decided to listen to my "customers'" needs and wants, and quickly revised my research plans. Shortly afterwards, the Liberal Democrats made available considerable party resources for a postal survey of nearly 2,000 of its newest members to investigate their decision to stay in or leave the party at the end of their first year of membership.

The results of that project suggested that party members behaved like consumers of commercial services when making the decision whether or not to renew membership for the first time. If they were satisfied with the experience of membership, they renewed; if they were dissatisfied, they quit. Their reasons for renewing membership were quite different from their reasons for joining, indicating that they critically evaluated their membership during the course of the first year. There seemed to be a "virtuous circle" between participation in activities and renewal. And there was evidence suggesting that expenditure on membership was price sensitive.

If satisfaction with the experience of membership explained one type of membership behaviour, could it explain any of the others? It seemed to me that participation in party activities was the next behaviour to investigate. Did members become active because they believed in their party's ideology, or because they enjoyed the experience of being party members? And was the experience of party membership the same for all its members? I approached four British parties with a proposal for this research. This time Plaid Cymru The Party of Wales gave me research access to a substantial proportion of its total membership.

On the face of it, an exploration into membership behaviour in British political parties covers well-trodden ground. But this thesis will argue that existing research has been

inadequately theorized. Membership behaviour has previously been analysed by means of frameworks devised by political scientists. But the nature of membership of a political party implies a number of other academic disciplines are just as relevant. Firstly, the financial relationship between person and party is one in which the person buys annual membership; therefore frameworks analyzing consumer behaviour are relevant. Secondly, membership is voluntary; therefore frameworks analyzing volunteer behaviour should also be used. Thirdly, political parties are organizations; therefore frameworks analyzing organizational behaviour are relevant. There is no comprehensive consideration of any of these frameworks in studies of British party participation to date.

This thesis also departs from previous research in that it adopts a problem-solving approach towards studying political party members rather than using survey data as a vehicle for conducting a wholly theoretical model-testing exercise. My intention in taking the problem-solving route was that, in addition to making a contribution to academic knowledge, I wanted this research to deliver a tangible benefit for political party practitioners: the formulation of appropriate, workable tools with which to manage the experience of party membership. In order to achieve this ambition I chose to focus this research on issues which are germane to the everyday operation of party life rather than progress it to the levels of abstraction which have rendered previous academic studies unhelpful for practitioner purposes.

Chapter One of this thesis introduces the central hypothesis of this research. It appraises the contribution of political science to the study of political party membership behaviour and describes the relevant literature from the academic disciplines alluded to in the paragraph above: marketing, nonprofit studies, and organizational behaviour. The relevant concepts and frameworks from each field which are appropriate for use in the context of a political party are identified. Chapter Two describes how relevant frameworks were incorporated into a research instrument – a postal questionnaire designed for self-completion – and describes the methodological and logistical considerations necessary for the implementation of the research. This chapter also contains overviews of the response to the survey, and of the statistical techniques used to analyse this response.

The results of the survey are presented in the next three chapters. Chapter Three examines the antecedents of five key behaviours of party members. Three of these behaviours relate to participation: what prompts members to participate at all, what underlies the decision to spend time on party activities and what accounts for the number and type of activities that

members choose to undertake. The remaining two behaviours relate to the financial relationship between member and party: why do members give donations, and what are the antecedents of paying the annual subscription. Subsequent chapters examine how different demographic groups of members experience their membership. Chapter Four examines the attitudinal commitment of members to their party. Chapter Five considers which groups of members benefit most from their membership – and which groups also benefit the party.

Chapter Six examines the management tools that are available to Plaid Cymru simultaneously to encourage its members to participate in the party, and to enhance the experience of membership. Communications tools for the recruitment and socialization of members, increasing political efficacy and raising party funds are presented and discussed.

Chapter Seven describes the contribution to knowledge made by this thesis in the fields of political science, organizational behaviour and nonprofit management. Chapter Eight appraises the strengths and weaknesses of this thesis, and highlights the management implications of the research. It suggests areas for further practitioner and academic research into the behaviour of political party members. The concluding examination of the central research hypothesis is presented, and the contribution of marketing to political party membership management is discussed.

CHAPTER 1 - LITERATURE REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

There is a myth about political parties. Political parties are “different”. Political parties are a discrete area of study reserved exclusively for political scientists. No other academic discipline has posed any serious academic challenge to this view.

Adherence to the myth has led to some serious shortcomings in research. Nowhere are these more apparent than in the study of party membership participation. The study of participation is essentially a study of behaviour. Yet analytical frameworks on which existing studies of party members are based are drawn substantially from political theory. This, presumably, is considered to be appropriate on the grounds that political parties are “different” and therefore frameworks from other disciplines do not apply to them.

This thesis challenges that approach. This thesis is based on the premise that there is nothing very “different” about political parties. This thesis conceptualizes political parties as “organizations of individuals united in ideological cause for the purpose of winning power of government”¹. From this conceptualization it follows that, as political parties are organizations, then, like all other organizations, they will have organizational goals and their activity will be directed towards achieving those goals. In common with many other organizations, the way in which individuals affiliate with political parties is structured around a system of membership. The main criterion for membership is payment of an annual fee, and members undertake a substantial proportion of the organization’s activities. What distinguishes political parties from other organizations is that they aim to achieve power of governance, and their activities are directed towards that end. In short, political parties are a distinct category of organization, *sui generis* rather than being fundamentally “different”. There is no reason why the disciplines involved in studying behaviour in organizations should not be relevant to studying behaviour in political parties.

The perception that political parties are “different” has resulted in a considerable lacuna in the existing literature about political party members, the parameters of which can be defined as follows: Most of the literature regarding the motivation and behaviour of political party members is to be found in writings by political scientists. The value of this literature is diminished by the use of analytical frameworks which are inappropriate for use

¹ This is my own definition, based on the definition of ‘political party’ in Heywood (2002).

in exploring the behaviour of individuals in organizations. Much of the academic literature concerning organizational behaviour is limited to the study of behaviour in organizations where individuals work in exchange for payment. This research has not been applied to organizations where the flow of money is the precise opposite - from person to organization. Researchers of membership associations have not studied political parties. Marketers, who study those who pay organizations for goods and services, have begun to study consumer behaviours in membership associations in general and political party members in particular. But, to date, this research has concentrated on joining and renewal behaviours, not participation.

The aim of this thesis is to begin to fill this void, and, in so doing, to make an original contribution to existing knowledge about the organizational behaviour of political party members. This contribution to knowledge will comprise the identification of antecedents of desirable membership behaviours and the identification of differences in the attitudes and behaviours of different groups of members. It will also include the development of appropriate management tools designed simultaneously to enhance the participation rates of members, and their experiences of membership.

This literature review will begin with the introduction of a central research hypothesis, and brief introductions to the key theoretical concepts that underpin it. This will be followed by an overview of the work of political scientists, including a critical examination of existing empirical work into British party membership behaviour. The chapter will go on to consider the contribution that theoretical frameworks associated with marketing, the study of nonprofit organizations and organizational behaviour can make to our understanding of the behaviour of political party members².

SECTION 1.1 – THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS AND KEY THEORETICAL CONCEPTS

1.1.1 – The central research hypothesis

What is the role of a political party member? Despite the vast literature written on political parties and their members, there are only a handful of studies that attempt to define what grassroots members do for their party (Duverger 1954, Milbrath 1969, May 1973, Seyd and Whiteley 1992, Whiteley *et al* 1994, Mair 1994, Scarrow 1994, Scarrow 1996, Martin and

² Relevant works in the fields of economics and sociology are cited where appropriate but most of the debates in these disciplines fall outside the bounded nature of this particular research project.

Cowley 1999, and most recently Seyd and Whiteley 2002). These studies are characterized by the assumption – sometimes explicitly stated, sometimes implicit - that support for party policies is the primary factor underlying participation. The primary difficulty with this assumption is that it is not convincingly supported by any psychological evidence. Additionally, empirical research into the relationship between belief and participation has yielded only inconclusive evidence that this is significant. The assumption that partisanship precedes participation will be tested in this thesis. It will be argued that rational choice explanations for participation are both more plausible psychologically and demonstrable empirically; members participate because it is a vehicle towards realizing other benefits. Indeed, in the opinion of a major writer in the field of rational choice theory (Olson 1965), rational individuals simply can not and do not act in order to achieve collective goods derived from ideological goals.

In practice, when the authors of earlier studies have defined precisely what it is that members do, what they have described is a hybrid role – part supporter, part funder and part worker. These descriptions across studies are remarkably consistent, and the similarities between them are particularly noticeable when presented together (*see Table A1.1 in Appendix 1 for a summary of the findings of each of these studies*). However, the theoretical implications of this hybrid role have not been recognized. The general assumption of the political science literature is that the supporter role of members predicts the roles of funder and worker. This thesis challenges that assumption. In addition, this thesis will argue that where political scientists have attempted to model alternative explanations for membership participation, the theorization underlying these models has been inappropriate. This thesis will put forward the case that theoretical frameworks used to analyse the behaviour of individuals who fund organizations and those who work for organizations are appropriate and relevant in increasing our understanding of the motivations and behaviours of political party members. Similarly, as much of the work undertaken for political parties by its members is done so in an entirely voluntary capacity, frameworks for analyzing the motivations of volunteers are also appropriate.

Whilst the exclusion of potentially helpful analytical frameworks has created one set of difficulties in exploring what motivates participation in political parties, another set of difficulties has arisen because of the terminology used to describe what party members do. Work is not called work by political scientists when it is done in the context of a political party. Work is called activism. This may appear to be a minor point, but it would seem to account for many of the shortcomings in current research into the behaviour of political

party members. A dictionary definition of activism (Concise Oxford Dictionary 1976) describes it as a “policy of vigorous action in politics”. This immediately gives political scientists two conceptual problems. The first problem is to locate the boundary between what constitutes vigorous action and what does not. A number of political scientists deal with this problem by avoiding it; focusing research only on those members who participate in party activities to very high levels (eg Abramowitz, McGlennon and Rapoport 1983, Costantini and King 1984, Archer and Ellis 1994, Costantini and Valenty 1996, Archer and Whitehorn 1997). This would explain the relative dearth of empirical studies into the behaviours of “grassroots” members. The second conceptual problem with defining work as activism is that, as the scope of activism is confined only to action within a political context, analytical frameworks have been developed within the political science arena with no recourse to theories from any other relevant discipline. Political scientists may have assumed that only “political” frameworks are relevant because activism is “different” from work. But there is nothing in a dictionary definition of work - “Expenditure of energy, striving, application of effort or exertion to a purpose” (Concise Oxford Dictionary 1976) - which precludes the possibility that activism is a form of work.

In terms of a central research hypothesis, this challenge to the assumption of political science writers is expressed in the following statement and model:

“Satisfaction with the experience of membership is a stronger predictor of commitment to a political party than partisanship.”



Two major psychological theories underpin this hypothesis. The first theory – commitment to an organization – is referred to directly in the research hypothesis. The second – incentives theory – is germane to the remainder of this review, and, indeed to the whole research. A brief introduction to each theory appears in the remainder of this section.

1.1.2 – What motivates action - organizational commitment

Commitment to an organization can be attitudinal or behavioural (Meyer and Allen 1984, Meyer *et al* 1989, Meyer and Allen 1990, Lydka 1996, Meyer and Allen 1997). Attitudinal commitment is defined as “the relative strength of an individual’s identification with and involvement in a particular organization” (Mowday, Steers and Porter 1982). Three components of attitudinal commitment have been identified: affective, normative and continuance commitment (Meyer and Allen 1997). Affective commitment refers to

emotional attachment to, identification with and involvement in the organization (Meyer *et al* 1989). Normative commitment is described by Marsh and Monnari (1977) as a sense of moral obligation to stay in the organization and conform with its goals and values.

Continuance commitment arises where an individual has created a series of investments in an organization which keeps him or her a member of it (Hrebriniak and Alutto 1972).

Behavioural commitment is defined by Salancik (1977) as a state of being in which an individual becomes bound to the organization by their actions.

This thesis will examine the antecedents and outcomes of organizational commitment in a political party setting in some detail. The concept of commitment will be referred to again in this chapter (*see Section 1.5.3*) and will constitute a major theme throughout the rest of this thesis.

1.1.3 - What motivates action – incentives theory

There is a substantial body of thought which assumes that motivation arises out of what is essentially individual selfishness; although there are conflicting ideas as to the ends to which that selfishness is directed. The desired outcome can be to fill individual needs in a hierarchical order (Maslow 1954), or along a series of discrete dimensions (McClelland 1961). In the context of joining a group, Olson (1965) suggests altruism as motivation for joining is exceptionally rare. He argues that “rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests” without either coercion or “some separate incentive”. That incentive can be economic, or less tangible; but the group has to offer that benefit to each individual member separately and selectively. Vroom’s (1964) expectancy theory is a variation on these themes. This theory argues that motivation is determined by whether an individual considers that using ability and effort will produce the anticipated satisfaction from an outcome. This theory suggests that, in addition to need fulfillment, efficacy might also underlie action. An individual will not embark on a course of action if there is uncertainty about being able to sustain or complete it.

If motivation is essentially selfish, incentives theory (Clark and Wilson 1961) argues that organizations seeking to motivate individuals to work for them must provide incentives for those individuals to do so. Indeed, the incentive system may be regarded as the principal variable affecting organizational behaviour. Incentives may be material, solidary or purposive. Material incentives are tangible; they have a monetary value or a monetary value can be easily placed on them. Solidary incentives are defined as those which are essentially intangible, *e.g.* socializing and congeniality. A financial value cannot easily be placed on

them. These incentives may vary considerably between individual members. They are derived from the act of belonging to an organization, but are generally independent of organizational aims. Purposive incentives, conversely, are those deriving from the aims of the organization itself and not from the act of association. These benefits are also intangible, without financial value, but are easier to identify as their origin lies in the goals of the organization. This thesis takes the view that this theorization of the role of incentives in participation is congruent with psychological theory, and will therefore deal with some length with the identification of possible incentives for participation.

Jordan and Maloney (1996) argue that in British politics, any benefits sought by members are likely to be less tangible than direct economic gain³. If political science thinking assumes that the worker role of members is predicted by the supporter role, then it follows that political scientists will explore evidence of purposive incentives operating amongst party members. But if other roles predict activity, other incentives may be salient. The central research hypothesis of this thesis seeks to assess the relative importance of purposive incentives *and* solidary incentives underlying behavioural and attitudinal commitment to a political party.

SECTION 1.2 - ACTIVISM: THE POLITICAL SCIENCE LITERATURE

1.2.1 - Introduction

This section will consider the contribution of political scientists to our understanding of participation in political parties. Two contrasting frameworks analyzing participation that are frequently cited by political scientists are described, as is the way in which the role of incentives has, to date, been dealt with. Relevant empirical findings from previous studies of British party members are presented and discussed.

1.2.2 – May’s Law

If activism has overriding associations with political work, the temptation to explain “activism” in terms of political belief is very strong. A number of political scientists have attempted to explain grassroots “activism” by linking it to belief in party ideology. For the past three decades, the theory generally known as May’s Law (May 1973) has provided the

³ In the context of British politics, using party membership for tangible material gain is considered to be corruption and, accordingly, carries considerable negative connotations. A practical consideration in my decision not to explore material incentives for activism was that I felt political parties would not be willing to host research on such a sensitive subject by a researcher with whom they had not worked previously.

underpinning for this line of enquiry. May argued that a “special law of curvilinear disparity” applied to the opinion structure of party leaders, activists and voters. He argued that activists had more extreme opinions than either party voters or party leaders. Those operating along purely ideological considerations had more freedom to be active without the constraints of having to appeal to electorates in order to retain elected office. Their belief in ideology led to aspirations of shaping candidate selections and party policies in order to promote their particular point of view. This argument was based on historical data, and not subjected to empirical testing by its originator.

Empirical work across Western European parties and party systems has failed to demonstrate that it is generally applicable. Kitschelt (1989), who carried out research in two Belgian ecology parties, found support for May’s Law in one party, but not the other. He concluded that, rather than the concept of curvilinear disparity establishing a general rule, it was only valid under distinctive behavioural, organizational and institutional conditions. Seyd and Whiteley (1992) claimed that their study of British Labour Party activists demonstrated some support for May’s Law. However, this finding was not repeated in their subsequent study of the Conservative Party (Whiteley, Seyd and Richardson 1994), nor in their most recent work on the Labour Party (Seyd and Whiteley 2002, Whiteley and Seyd 2002⁴). Norris (1995) suggested that only those who are the most committed to party principles will be motivated to do “the rather mundane chores that form the backbone of party life”. But her study, using data from the 1992 British Candidate Survey and British General Election Study concluded that party leaders tended to be more radical than their followers. Narud and Skare (1999) also cast doubts on the robustness of May’s theory. Their study of differences in opinion between Norwegian voters, party activists and leaders on a number of different issues showed that only one party out of six, the Conservatives, demonstrated curvilinear disparity of opinion structure over a majority of those issues. Unfortunately, this latter study cannot be dealt with in more detail here because its authors did not provide any mechanism for linking opinion structure to participation.

1.2.3 – Rational choice theory and the role of selective incentives

A contrasting theory used by political scientists to analyse participation is that of rational choice. This model is closely associated with Downs (1957) who suggested that individuals can make a decision from a range of alternatives by ranking these alternatives in order of preference and choosing the alternative which is ranked highest. Olson (1965) is closely

⁴ Both of these works were published towards the end of 2002, after this doctoral research had been completed.

identified with the applications of rational choice theory specifically to participation, and one of his key findings is introduced below.

At this point in the literature review, however, it is relevant to locate the position of this thesis within the current of more recent thinking on rational choice. A key text in this area (Dunleavy 1991) is highly critical of rational choice theory on the grounds that it is based on highly restrictive assumptions and that it is frequently, although not exclusively, associated with right-wing political values. However, its author states unambiguously that, despite its problems: “the rational choice approach is too powerful an analytical tool-kit to neglect or abandon” (p5). In the field of interest groups and collective action, Dunleavy clearly considers that other approaches give unsatisfactory explanations of participation. He argues that these “pluralist accounts” are ungrounded in their “prevailing optimism about the group process”(p43); nor can they counter satisfactorily some of the points made by the proponents of rational choice. Indeed, in the Preface to his book, he states that despite initial hostility towards rational choice theories: “I now recognize the value of instrumental models as a mode of thinking clearly about the manifold complexities of political life and could not pursue research without using them” (p*xz*).

This thesis adopts this pragmatic approach towards rational choice theory by using it as an analytical tool; a helpful mechanism for thinking through the pervasive myth that political parties are “different” that has previously characterised studies of membership behaviour. As I argued in Section 1.1.1 above, rational choice explanations are both psychologically plausible (perhaps echoing Dunleavy’s sentiments that other approaches suffer from a lack of grounding) and demonstrable empirically through the specific application of relevant frameworks. However, it is not my intention to associate this study of organization behaviour with any one set of political values. Although a running theme of Dunleavy’s work is the association between rational choice approaches and right-wing values, he also draws attention to the use of such approaches by Marxist theorists and others on the left. Indeed, he clarifies at the outset that he does not consider rational choice methodology to be “intrinsicly tied” to the political values of the right.

Returning to the work of Olson (1965) which has been mentioned previously in this chapter, his key book “The Logic of Collective Action” identified a crucial difficulty which surrounds participation in an organization working to provide collective goals resulting in collective goods. Collective goods, by their very nature, are available to everyone, whether or not they participate in the organizations’ efforts to realize these collective goods.

Therefore if individuals realize that they will reap the benefits of success whether or not they participate in the organization, they will generally choose not to participate – the phenomenon of free-riding. British political scientists consider that this line of argument presents a “paradox of participation” (Seyd and Whiteley 1992, Whiteley, Seyd and Richardson 1994, Whiteley *et al* 1994). Why should anyone participate at all, if, by free-riding they can get the collective goods they seek without having to incur any of the costs of participation? This question assumes that participation is “atypical” in some way and that there must be something that distinguishes participants from free-riders. The purpose of research into participation is, accordingly, to find out what makes participants “different” from anyone else.

Yet the way in which these authors deal with rational choice and incentives theories is somewhat ambiguous. They draw heavily from Olsonian theory to put forward the argument that individuals respond to incentives in the context of joining a political party or becoming active within it. They formulate a number of categories of incentive to which individuals might respond. But they include amongst these categories variables such as “collective incentives ... motivated by collective goods” which directly contradict Olsonian theory. Olson’s view is that free riding occurs precisely because rational individuals will not join forces to promote collective goals (*see Sections 1.1.1 and 1.1.3 above*). They also include one category of incentive which they call “altruism” deriving from emotional attachment; yet it is unclear what the role of emotional attachment is in relation to rational choice theory. Having identified categories of incentives that might be used to explain the “paradox of participation”, there is no further use of incentives theory precisely to define any specific incentives falling within each category.

This lacuna is particularly noticeable in respect of selective incentives and the discussion of incentives theory presented at the beginning of this chapter (*Section 1.1.3*) suggests that an alternative question is relevant in this context. Which selective incentives are so valued by individuals that they choose to participate in organizations working for collective goals in order to receive them? This question suggests an analytical framework where participation is not a paradox. Indeed, it suggests that there could be a “pre-requisite of participation” in collective action organizations. Individuals who value the selective incentives offered by participation must participate in order to get them. Additionally, in this scenario, there is no such thing as free-riding. Those who do not participate simply do not value the selective incentives offered by the organization enough to be motivated by these incentives. Whether or not they want the collective goods on offer may simply not be relevant. This

latter approach is echoed strongly in research in the fields of marketing and volunteering which suggests that the selective incentives for participation are of crucial importance for understanding why it occurs (*to be covered in Sections 1.3 and 1.4.4 in this chapter*). But this is not a line of enquiry that has been pursued methodically within political science. Where this thesis departs from the approach of political scientists is that it will identify and test selective incentives for participation drawn from a wide range of relevant analytical frameworks spanning several disciplines. This avoids the conceptual straitjacket within which political scientists operate because of their failure to recognise “activism” as the “work” that it is (*see Section 1.1.1*).

Within their rather limited framework, British political science researchers have suggested that there are three selective incentives for participation (Seyd and Whiteley 1992, Whiteley, Seyd and Richardson 1994). But, as noted above, incentives theory, or very little other theoretical underpinning for any of the suggested selective incentives is presented in either of these studies. These writers suggest that selective incentives are either outcome-oriented, concerned with achieving private goals through the political process, or process incentives, deriving from the process of participation itself. They identify one outcome-oriented incentive – political ambition – and two process incentives - “the individual’s attitude to political activism in general”, and “left-right ideology”.

Political ambition, the only outcome-oriented incentive to be identified, refers to the desire to pursue a career in politics. But no theoretical justification is been provided to explain why this should be the only outcome-oriented incentive potentially available to political party members. For example, whilst a category of “social norms” is used to indicate which members join because of the influence of family or friends, this desire for social approval is not interpreted as an outcome-oriented incentive for participation. This omission illustrates clearly the differences in approach between political scientists and scholars in other disciplines discussed in this chapter. In the systematic preparation for a measure of volunteers’ motivations (*see Section 1.4.4*), the desire for social approval emerged as a consistent and important motivation for volunteers across a variety of organizations. In the more *ad hoc* approach used in studies of political party members, the desire for social approval appears not to be considered relevant as an incentive.

Additionally, the measurement of political ambition is substantially flawed. In their first study of Labour party members (Seyd and Whiteley 1992), the authors admitted using what they called an “indirect approach to the measurement of political ambitions” on the

grounds that their pilot work showed members were uncomfortable with divulging their personal political ambitions⁵. Unfortunately, the items used subsequently were so indirect (*see Table A1.2 in Appendix 1*) that what they actually measure are respondents' perceptions of their political efficacy, defined by Kelly and Breinlinger (1996) as a "feeling that the individual can have an impact on the political process". Outcome incentives are measured in a similar way throughout subsequent research produced by these authors.

Process incentives, defined as deriving from the process of participation have also been measured in a way somewhat at odds with their definition. Process incentives, as defined above, could include concepts such as job satisfaction and socialization (*which are introduced in Section 1.5 of this chapter*). But, in practice, the two process incentives identified in the Labour and Conservative studies appear to be based on the assumption that attitudes precede participation.

The first of these two process incentives is described by the authors as "the individual's attitude to political activism in general". But there are two substantial flaws undermining this line of reasoning. Firstly, a simple psychological definition of attitude - "an...evaluative reaction toward something or someone, exhibited in one's beliefs, feelings or intended behaviour" (Myers 1999) - indicates that attitude does not necessarily constitute an incentive for actual behaviour. Indeed, there is a considerable body of psychological evidence suggesting that behaviour determines attitudes (Myers 1999). Even in the trade union studies that have found a relationship between pro-union attitudes and participation, this relationship is indirect (*see Section 1.4.2 later in this chapter*): ideological belief predicts attitudinal commitment, attitudinal commitment precedes participation. Secondly, if attitudes precede participation, how can they be a direct incentive for it?

The second process incentive identified in the Labour and Conservative studies is labelled "Left-right ideology" and is intended to represent May's (1973) "special law of curvilinear disparity": those who are activists must have the most extreme political opinions. The authors claim that holding extreme opinions operate as an incentive for participation because "it gives ... a chance to give expression to deeply-held views which are deviant from the dominant political values in society" (Seyd and Whiteley 1992 p106). Although this is the only selective incentive to be supported by any theoretical justification, there is a serious difficulty with the argument; it fails to account for participation by party members

⁵ The pilot work in question appears to have comprised face to face interviews (Seyd and Whiteley 1992 p 221).

whose opinions fall well within the parameters of extremity. Additionally, the researchers fail to operationalise this construct correctly. The measure of this construct asks only for respondents to place themselves on an ideological spectrum (*see Table A1.2 in Appendix 1*), without asking them whether they considered that they had sufficient opportunities to express their views. It simply is not plausible to infer from peoples' ideological views alone whether or not they consider that political party membership allows them adequate expression of those views.

A further feature of the measurement of selective incentives by British political scientists is that some incentives were measured differently across political parties (*see Table A1.2 in Appendix 1*). It is therefore very difficult to compare the findings between the first study of Labour party members and the Conservative study, and no comparable results are provided in the most recently published surveys of Labour party members (Seyd and Whiteley 2002, Whiteley and Seyd 2002). Therefore, it is very difficult to compare the results regarding the role of incentives and participation between parties, or over time within the same party.

However, a striking feature of the available data is that, in both the Labour and Conservative parties, two similar, statistically significant and very robust antecedents of activism are amongst the three variables with the strongest correlations with activism. The similarities between members of the two ideologically disparate parties are clearly apparent in Table 1.1 overleaf. In both parties, the "outcome incentives" variable appears as one of the two strongest variables with a relationship with activism, the relationship is statistically significant, and the strength of the relationship is virtually the same. Similarly, in both parties, the measure labeled "personal influence" ranks within the top three variables with a relationship to activism despite differences in relationship strength.

What this data indicates is that political efficacy accounts for the greatest amount of variance of all the possible bivariate relationships with activism, and that this relationship is consistent between political parties, regardless of ideology. This finding echoes one of the key assumptions of expectancy theory (Vroom 1964) that perceived ability is a key element of motivation to participate. The reader will recall from the paragraphs above that the "outcome incentive" variable was the measure, ostensibly, of political ambition but, *de facto*, of political efficacy. In both parties the "personal influence" item is a more direct measure of political efficacy – even though it is measured in completely different ways in each organization (*see Table A1.2 in Appendix 1*). The discrepancy in the results of this item between parties could, therefore, be accounted for by the discrepancy in measurement.

Table 1.1 – Correlations and bi-variate regressions between participation, outcome incentives and personal influence in the Labour and Conservative parties

Labour		Conservative	
1. Outcome Incentives	.35**	1. Personal Influence	.35**
2. Collective Goods	.24**	2. Outcome Incentives	.31**
3. Personal Influence	.23**	3. Process Incentives	.27**
4. Left-Right Ideology	-.17**	4. Expressive Index	.22**
5. Process Incentives	.13**	5. Altruism Index	.13**
6. Expressive	.08**	6. Collective Benefits	.11**
7. Social norms	-.05**	7. Social norms	.07**
8. Group Influence	-.02	8. Group Influence	.05**
9. Transformed Gp Inf	.02	9. Left-right ideology	.03
10. Perceived costs	.02	10. Participation costs	-.02

Average n= 4991

Average n= 2467

*** denotes coefficient significant at the p<.05 level*

Data taken from Table 5.9 p112 Seyd and Whiteley (1992) and Table 5.4 p117 Whiteley, Seyd and Richardson (1994). The organization of the data is my own in order to show the relative importance of each variable in each party, highlights are my emphasis.

The relative importance of process incentives also differs considerably between parties, but this difference is difficult to interpret because of the inadequate theorizing and measurement of the process incentives construct. The importance of social norms to party members is similar in ranking and robustness between the parties, although the relationship is negative amongst Labour members. Given the completely different ways in which this construct was measured (see Table A1.2 in Appendix 1), it is difficult to attempt any meaningful interpretation of this data.

The remaining variables with significant relationships with activism in both parties are variables labeled “collective goods/benefits” and “expressive”. The former refers to respondents’ opinions on policy issues of the day. Even though in both parties there is a statistically significant relationship between this item and participation, the variance in participation accounted for and the relative importance to each set of respondents are so disparate that it is hard to know how to interpret this data. As with position on the ideological position, policy opinion appears to far more important to one set of party members than the other. The “expressive” variable was measured in different ways

between the parties (*see Table A1.2 in Appendix 1*), therefore no meaningful interpretation of the data is possible.

In summary then, the British studies identify efficacy as an important antecedent of participation, but shed little light on the incentives that encourage participation. This work leaves unanswered the question of what incentives members are looking for when they decide to participate in their party. Or, in other words, what is it that people are buying when they buy political party membership? This is a crucial question to ask because the benefits that individuals seek to realize by joining a party may well influence their subsequent behaviours and attitudes. Nowhere in the political science literature is it disputed that the relationship between party and member begins with a financial transaction – payment of a subscription fee – but nowhere in the political science literature are the implications of this relationship satisfactorily explored. It is at this point that the marketing literature becomes relevant as this provides the analytical frameworks necessary for exploring the behaviour and attitudes of those who pay for access to goods or services – customers.

SECTION 1.3 – PAYING TO WORK: THE MARKETING LITERATURE

1.3.1 - Introduction

This section of the literature review considers the insights into party membership behaviour facilitated by using the analytical frameworks associated with customer behaviour. It begins with a description of the available evidence that political party members behave like consumers, and, therefore, could be reasonably expected to respond to the stimuli affecting consumer behaviour in other settings. Two competing marketing paradigms are presented and discussed in relation to the purchase of political party membership, and the consumer setting with which political party membership most closely corresponds is subsequently considered.

1.3.2 – The applicability of marketing theories to political party members

Incentives theory (Clark and Wilson 1961), expectancy theory (Vroom 1964) and Olson's arguments on the role of incentives in participation (1965) provide the theoretical background for the use of marketing theory in studies of membership participation. Marketing is defined by the UK Chartered Institute of Marketing (2002) as the "process responsible for identifying, anticipating and satisfying customer requirements profitably". However, in nonprofit organizations, where profit generation is not the primary

organizational goal, this definition can be adapted appropriately *eg* “Marketing is the process of identifying, anticipating and satisfying customer needs in line with organizational objectives” (Granik and Zaidi 1997).

But can any comparison between the behaviours of party members and consumers be empirically justified? There is some evidence that political party members display consumer-like behaviours, although this literature is sparse and, to date, is limited to work on joining behaviour and retention. The earliest indication that political party members might behave like consumers can be extrapolated from the work of Bartolini (1983). His study of socialist party membership in Western Europe over a period of nearly 100 years found that fluctuations in membership occurred in relation to changing economic conditions. Throughout the period, membership grew in times of economic development and wage increases, and declined during phases of economic crisis. This implies that political party membership is considered expendable when discretionary spending money is limited. Bauer *et al* (1996) suggested that political party members go through a process similar to pre-purchase and post-purchase evaluation when deciding whether to join or stay in a party. This suggestion was theoretically derived and not subjected to empirical testing. My own exploratory empirical research, outlined in the introduction to this thesis, found evidence that new political party members exhibited four distinct types of consumer behaviour when deciding to renew their subscriptions for the first time (Granik 1997, 2001a). These behaviours included post-purchase evaluation of membership (supporting the hypothesis of Bauer *et al*), and an indirect relationship between household income and subscription renewal (in line with Bartolini’s empirical findings).

Supporting evidence that marketing frameworks offer an appropriate means of facilitating study into membership behaviour comes from the small amount of marketing literature analyzing the consumer behaviour of subscription-paying members of associations. This focuses primarily on retention rather than on participation. Ferguson and Brown (1991) hypothesized that delivering “quality service” to members aided retention. Empirical work in a professional association (Gruen *et al* 2000) found that the delivery of promised membership services did affect retention as hypothesized. However, this research has neither been expanded into political parties specifically, nor has it been expanded to include other types of membership behaviour other than retention.

1.3.3 – Competing marketing paradigms

A brief discussion about which marketing paradigms are germane to the question of what it is that political party members are buying is appropriate at this point. Traditionally, academic authorities - most famously Bagozzi (1975) - viewed marketing as a process of rational exchange of money in return for access to products and services. The research into political party members described in the previous section suggests that there is evidence of rational exchange operating in a party context; if members are satisfied with their membership they stay, if not, they leave. But the “exchange relationship” paradigm underlying marketing does not necessarily explain participation. Why should members have to do anything to contribute towards their membership experience when they have fulfilled their side of the exchange by paying their subscription?

The view of an “exchange relationship” came under sustained criticism in the mid-1980’s (Brown 1997), and by the early 1990’s the basic framework underpinning this process of exchange was condemned as a conceptual straitjacket (Gummesson 1991). Brown describes a discipline which fragmented into “a multiplicity of hostile factions, retrenchment and a search for a new guiding paradigm”. The paradigm that emerged was relationship marketing, defined by Morgan and Hunt (1994) as “establishing, developing and maintaining successful relational exchanges” between organization and customer. Gwinner, Gremler and Bitner (1998) summarised the organizational benefits of relational exchanges as loyal customers leading to increased profitability because of increased purchases and lower costs; customers benefited from anxiety reduction and increased confidence in the organization, social benefits such as personal recognition from employees, and special treatment benefits.

My approach towards marketing theory in this thesis is to use it as a vehicle for exploring the nature of the potential relationships between member and party. In 1995 a landmark article in the relationship marketing literature by Sheth and Parvatiyar claimed that consumers engaged in relational market behaviour primarily to reduce their available choice. They put forward the suggestion that consumers engage in relational market behaviour to “achieve greater efficiency in their decision making, to reduce the task of information processing, to achieve more cognitive consistency in their decisions, and to reduce the perceived risks associated with future choices.” Alongside their choice reduction argument, Sheth and Parvatiyar also suggested that consumers engaged in relational market behavior because of family and social norms, peer group pressures, government mandates, religious tenets, employer influences and marketer policies.

Responding to their article, Bagozzi (1995) suggested that “another motive for entering a marketing relationship in other (rare) instances might be to be part of the relationship . . . and not necessarily for what the relationship might lead to in an instrumental sense. In other words, a marketing relationship may be an end in and of itself for some customers”.

It should be noted that not all of the elements identified by Sheth and Parvatiyar are relevant in the context of British political party membership. For example, political party membership is not mandatory in Britain, and there is no documented evidence that employers influence their workers to join. Therefore it is difficult to test responses to the “government mandates” and “employer influences” elements of the argument. Political party membership as a response to religious tenets is certainly a salient issue in some parts of the United Kingdom, but not necessarily in Wales, where the fieldwork for this research was conducted.

Even so, the “reductionist strategy” and “social approval” elements of the Sheth and Parvatiyar argument are still relevant for testing in a British political party setting. If political party members are buying a relationship which offers them such benefits, one would expect that party members would participate in activities as a means of expressing and reinforcing their beliefs, and preventing exposure to conflicting ideas and ideologies that might expose them to doubt their current values. They may hope that participation will bring them benefits, including, perhaps, social approval. A combination of this line of argument and the psychological theories of motivation discussed in Section 1.1.3 suggests strongly that if certain benefits are sufficiently valued by members, and if these benefits can be obtained via a relationship with the organization, it is in parties’ interests to ensure that members get what they value. This argument indicates that it is not sufficient to be casual about defining the various purposive and solidary incentives available to party members. If members perceive specific incentives for participation as benefits of that relationship, delivering others is a waste of organizational resources.

Alternatively, it can be hypothesized that Bagozzi’s suggestion that entering into a relationship with an organization for the relationship’s sake would be far less rare in the context of a political party than it would be in the context of a relationship with a profit-making organization. For example, it is quite plausible that an individual joins a political party to “nail their colours to the mast⁶”, and, having made this public declaration, feels no need to do anything more. Members falling into this category will be fairly resistant to

incentives to encourage them to participate, because all they want is a passive relationship with the party of their choice.

1.3.4 – Membership marketing and services marketing

An observation made in my earlier research (Granik 1997) was that the characteristics of political parties and the nature of membership are directly analogous to the characteristics of services organizations and purchasers observed by Shostack (1977). The status of membership is intangible; it is an experience and little about it can physically be owned. Membership comes into being after payment of a subscription, and exists for a stated period of time; therefore the member can only start to experience the full benefits of membership once that status has been achieved. My earlier research suggests that members' self-reported experience of membership bears a number of similarities to characteristics of the extraordinary service experience documented by Arnould and Price (1993).

This comparison between membership behaviour and consumer behaviour in services is particularly helpful because it can assist in answering the question of how customer satisfaction can be defined in the context of a political party. In the service environment, satisfaction is defined by Hoffman and Bateson (1997) as a comparison of perceptions and predicted expectations. There is no reason why this should not apply in the political party context⁷. This comparison between the perceptions of membership as it is experienced, and the expectations of what the membership of a party “should” be like is entirely congruent with the concept of expectancy disconfirmation (Cadotte *et al* 1987). This states that if perceptions match expectations, expectations are said to be confirmed and the customer is said to be satisfied. If perceptions do not match expectations, disconfirmation results. If expectations are exceeded, disconfirmation is said to be positive, and, like confirmation, satisfaction is the outcome. However, if perceptions fall below expectations, disconfirmation is said to be negative and dissatisfaction develops. In my own previous research, the third distinctive consumer behaviour that I was able to identify amongst party members was that they had experienced confirmation/ disconfirmation with the experience of membership and that this had a statistically significant relationship with renewal. Members whose expectations of membership were fully met were well over four times more likely to renew membership than those who had no prior expectations (treated as a control group in this context). There was also a striking relationship between renewal and

⁶ This was a sentiment expressed by a number of respondents in my survey of the Liberal Democrats.

⁷ If members join the party without specific expectations (Granik 1997) it is easier for the party to frame predicted expectations through recruitment materials and other communications (discussed in more detail in Chapter 6).

negative disconfirmation - those experiencing negative disconfirmation were only 20% as likely to renew as members with no prior expectations of membership (Granik 2001a).


The ability to compare the purchase of political party membership with the purchase of a service is particularly helpful because it explains, in part, why members would have to participate in activities in order to enjoy their membership to the full. Another documented feature of behaviour in service settings is that customers purchasing a service learn that to gain maximum benefit from it, they have to play an appropriate role (Zeithaml and Bitner 1996). Indeed, if the service proves unsatisfactory, customers may often blame themselves for their own inadequate behaviour (Zeithaml and Bitner 1996). The fourth consumer behaviour amongst party members that I found in previous research (Granik 2001a) was that the most active respondents in the survey (comprising those who had participated in any number of activities greater than the mean number for the party as a whole) were more than two and a half times more likely to renew their subscription than the least active members of the party. Additionally, members who renewed their subscriptions reported higher participation rates across a range of activities than those members who let their subscription lapse. This feature of consumer behaviour appears to corroborate the argument of the previous section (*see Section 1.3.3*) that if membership is, at least in part, a vehicle for realizing other benefits, then clearly members may have to do something in order to get the benefits they want.

1.3.5 – The implications of marketing theories for exploring the research hypothesis

The use of relationship marketing theories to test the nature of the relationship between member and party has two implications for the central hypothesis of this research. Firstly, they may provide the evidence to support the hypothesis that satisfaction with the experience of membership is a stronger predictor of commitment to a political party than partisanship. Alternatively, these theories could challenge the central research hypothesis, rather than support it. It is possible that satisfaction with the experience of membership can be an outcome of commitment, rather than an antecedent. After all, if a member has to participate in activity in order to realise the full benefits of membership as Zeithaml and Bitner (1996) imply, activity may precede satisfaction.

Marketing theories, therefore, are the gateway to a series of subsidiary research hypotheses examining a number of possible relationships between satisfaction, partisanship, and attitudinal and behavioural commitment. For example, in the relationship between person and organization suggested by the frameworks of services marketing suggests partisanship


may generate attitudinal commitment leading to behaviours that bring about satisfaction with the experience of membership:



An alternative argument, that suggested by the “reductionist” paradigm of Sheth and Parvatiyar (1995), suggests that the more one benefits from party membership, the more likely one is to engage in behaviours which are helpful to it, and, as a by-product, have one’s own political attitudes reinforced and enhanced. In other words, satisfaction may encourage behavioural commitment and, in so doing, lead to increased attitudinal commitment and stronger partisanship. If so, which of the various dimensions of satisfaction encourage desired behaviours?



Perhaps it is possible to be ideologically and attitudinally committed to a party without any behavioural commitment being made. In this scenario, which is congruent with the “exchange relationship” theory associated with Bagozzi (1975, 1995) satisfaction with the experience of membership is simply irrelevant. However, it is questionable whether anything can be done to motivate members to participate in any desired behaviours.



1.3.6 - Summary, and discussion of other marketing literatures

In summary, the little empirical research exploring consumer behaviours amongst political party and association members indicates very strongly that members behave like consumers in respect of membership retention. If members are responsive to incentives to stay in membership the possibility is raised that they may also be responsive to incentives to participate in their party’s activities. A “reductionist” relationship marketing paradigm suggests that members may respond positively to incentives designed to increase participation, but an “exchange relationship” paradigm puts forward the possibility that members may find incentives irrelevant because all they want is to have a relationship with their party for the sake of it. The similarities between membership behaviour and the behaviour of consumers in service suggest how members might perceive satisfaction with

the experience of membership, and how their reason for purchasing membership might influence subsequent behaviours.

A distinguishing feature of this review of the marketing literature thus far is that it has not drawn extensively on the two subdisciplines of marketing which might be expected to make a contribution to this research topic: political marketing and nonprofit marketing. The reason for this is quite simply that the emphasis of most of the literature in both disciplines is somewhat removed from the field of membership management, which is the primary focus of this thesis.

It has been acknowledged by political marketers that marketing frameworks might fruitfully be applied in the area of party membership management (Lock and Harris 1996, Lees-Marshment 2001, Johansen 2002). However, theoretical literature and empirical study in this field is still very scarce (with the exceptions of Bauer *et al* (1996) and my own research). This situation may well have arisen as a result of a debate as to who is the “customer” of political parties. An early article in the field (Smith and Saunders 1990) drew an analogy between customers and voters, and the development of the discipline since, with its substantial emphasis on campaign studies and political communications (Scammell 1999), indicates that most scholars in the field concur with this view. Ironically, the result is that political marketing has given little attention to the one group of individuals who choose to enter into a direct and ongoing financial relationship with their party of choice.

The area of nonprofit marketing has also made little contribution to our understanding of how membership participation may be managed for mutual benefit. Nonprofit marketers have focused almost exclusively on those who donate to an organization rather than those who participate in it. For example, a key article in the first edition of the *Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Marketing* proposes a research agenda exploring service delivery and giving behaviours, but not participation (Paton 1996). A standard British textbook on marketing management in nonprofit organizations mentions volunteers only in passing, and discusses internal marketing (marketing to organizational members) only in relation to paid employees (Sargeant 1999a). A model of individual charity giving behaviour which specifies that “outputs” can comprise gifts of time, gifts of kind and loyalty makes little contingency for organizational relationships as a possible antecedent of those outputs (Sargeant 1999b). A notable exception to this rule is Moyer (1990) who argued that “buyer-behaviour concepts” could be used to attract and retain volunteers – although he was unable to provide the empirical evidence that volunteers would respond in the desired

way. Fortunately for the purposes of this thesis, other strands of the nonprofit literature contribute a number of helpful insights into the motivation of volunteers, and this literature is discussed in the following section.

SECTION 1.4 – WORKING FOR “NOTHING” – THE NONPROFIT LITERATURE

1.4.1 - Introduction

Political parties are recognised in the International Classification of Non-profit Organizations (Salamon and Anheier 1993), yet scholars of nonprofit organizations appear to have abrogated the study of parties to political scientists. Nevertheless, there is a rich body of thoughtful research into participation in membership association and volunteer settings, and this section of the literature review explores which concepts and frameworks in these fields are also appropriate for use amongst political party members. In particular, relevant research into two other types of membership association – trade unions and public interest groups – will be considered, whilst the discussion of volunteer-related literature will be more wide-ranging.

It should be noted at this point that not all membership associations are the same. They may share a common financial relationship with their members, in that the individual pays the organization to be a part of it. But they differ in their aims, admission criteria, financial costs of membership, participation requirements, and in the selective benefits which they promise their members⁸ (see Table 1.2). The results of one comparative study suggest that the aims of the organization may influence the people who join it as members (Williams and Ortega 1986). Political parties are *sui generis* amongst membership associations in that they alone aim to achieve power of governance. It is not safe to assume that variables underlying motivation to work within one type of association will necessarily have the same effect in another.

⁸ These selective benefits do not include commercial deals offered to members such as credit cards, discounts on insurance or other products and services. The term selective benefit refers to the benefits that can only be accessed through membership of that particular organization eg a trade union providing access to legal advice. Commercial deals are widespread across all types of membership association as an additional source of revenue.

**Table 1.2 – Differences between membership associations:
political parties, trade unions and public interest groups**

	Political party	Trade union	Public interest group
Organizational aim	Achieving governance	Providing service and achieving influence	Achieving influence
Admission criteria	Low	High	Low
Annual financial cost of membership	Low	Varies	Low
Promised selective benefits (not commercial deals)	Information	Access to information, advice and representation	Information
Participation requirements	Not obligatory	Not obligatory	Not obligatory

1.4.2 - Trade union studies

The study of trade unions informs this research into political parties in a number of respects. Trade union literature indicates that antecedents of behavioural and attitudinal commitment in a membership organization include ideological belief, group efficacy and the generation of collective benefits, satisfaction with membership, the generation of selective benefits, organizational socialization and individual personal efficacy.

The main difference in aim between trade unions and political parties is that parties exist to achieve power of governance and trade unions aim to protect the rights of workers. Unions seek to do this in two ways: they provide information, advice, assistance and legal representation to their members, and they seek to influence the wider legislative agenda relevant to their areas of interest. Accordingly they attract two types of member: those who join in order to access the promised services, and those who join in order to support the wider union aims. Newton and Shore (1992) classify these members as, respectively, instrumentally or ideologically attached to their union. These dimensions of attachment are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Most members join trade unions for instrumental reasons (Waddington and Whitston 1997) and tend to view membership as a contractual arrangement; an exchange of access to services for the price of a subscription (Sverke and Sjöberg 1997). Ideologically attached members see union membership as being congruent

with their personal values. They are generally the union's most active members and are the most likely to hold official positions (Klandermans 1986, Sverke and Sjöberg 1997).

Ideological attachment - There is a consensus of trade union scholar opinion that ideological attachment to the union predicts attitudinal commitment (Klandermans 1986, Sverke and Sjöberg 1997). Commitment, in turn, has been found causally to precede participation (Fullagar and Barling 1989). A meta-analysis of 15 studies of union commitment (Bamberger *et al* 1999) concluded that pro-union attitudes had an effect on union commitment equal to, if not stronger than, union instrumentality. In fact, there is more unanimity of opinion that ideological belief predicts participation, via attitudinal commitment, amongst trade union scholars than there is amongst political scientists regarding party members.

Group efficacy and collective benefits - Flood *et al* (1996) found that the presence of a vibrant branch committee had a significant relationship with workplace union participation. Unions which can demonstrate evidence of collective benefits on behalf of their members are able to use these examples to encourage further recruitment and participation (Premack and Hunter 1988, Newton and Shore 1992, Bamberger *et al* 1999). These findings suggest that the perceived efficacy of a membership organization both at local level and on a wider scale has a relationship with participation.

Membership satisfaction - There is some evidence that satisfaction with the experience of membership has relationships with desirable membership behaviours. A major study of union commitment (Gordon *et al* 1980) found that satisfaction variables displayed significant positive correlations with union loyalty, although not with willingness to participate. An earlier study (Glick *et al* 1977) had previously found evidence of a positively correlated relationship between satisfaction with the union and willingness to participate in union activities – but only amongst individuals indicating strong “higher order needs” for example, decision making and accomplishment. Satisfaction with the overall experience of membership may have a stronger relationship with the decision to stay in membership of the organization than it does with the decision to participate.

Selective benefits - The evidence that selective benefits encourage membership participation in trade unions is mixed. The Gordon *et al* study (1980) found that the benefits unions provided to their members emerged as the most important basis for commitment. Van de Veen and Klandermans (1989) found that negative experiences with

union services was frequently cited as a reason for leaving, and Klandermans (1992) subsequently suggested that services prevented quitting but did not motivate participation. He argued that members ranked individual services as being less important to them than collective bargaining.

Socialization – The Gordon *et al* study (1980) concluded that socialization into the union is closely associated with member loyalty, has a high correlation with a general belief in unions and enjoys a significant relationship with commitment. McShane (1986) demonstrated that union members who were more “socially integrated” into their union branch were likely to attend more union meetings and more likely to participate in strikes than those members who knew fewer people. A later study (Flood *et al* 1996) was able to replicate Gordon’s finding that the existence of an induction procedure impacted positively on pro-union orientation, but also found that induction procedures only had a significant relationship with one specific type of participation.

Personal efficacy – The evidence that personal efficacy is an antecedent of union activity is mixed. McShane (1986) found that members with the higher levels of education associated with personal efficacy were significantly more likely to participate in union administration. Kelly and Kelly (1994), who took a more direct measure of political efficacy, found that it did not have a significant relationship with individual participation in trade unions, except for when members identified only weakly with their union.

1.4.3 – Public interest group studies

Drawing comparisons between public interest groups and political parties requires even more caution than comparing parties with trade unions. Parties and trade unions share one at least one common denominator: that membership is defined by subscription status. Some of the larger public interest groups may also define membership by who has paid to join, whilst smaller ones may have less formal membership structures. Some organizations might consist of a handful of individuals and may be extremely short-lived (Beres and Wilson 1997). Others may be transnational. Recent technological developments mean that some groups are barely organizations at all, but essentially exist as organizational spaces on the internet (Clark and Temudo 2002).

Social psychological studies of those in public interest groups have been conducted on a pan-organizational level, and therefore focus more on social movements rather than individual groups within each movement. Nevertheless, the literature from studies of

public interest groups emphasizes the potential of political efficacy and attitudinal commitment as variables which might also be relevant to the behaviour of party members.

A major analytical framework in this field (Gamson 1992) identifies three components preceding collective action: a sense of injustice, an element of identification with those against whom the injustice has been perpetrated, and agency - a belief that one can alter the conditions or policies which lead to injustice. This "collective action framework" has two major implications for the study of party members. The first is that specific ideological beliefs are not necessarily antecedents of activism. Of course, ideological beliefs might dictate one's sense of what constitutes an injustice, but membership of any one given public interest group or social movement is not necessarily congruent with political party categories. The second implication is that if one is motivated to undertake collective action, there must be some sort of belief that the group with which one is associating oneself has sufficient efficacy to bring about the outcome that is desired. Therefore, in line with the findings from trade union studies, perceptions of group efficacy may be crucial in deciding whether or not to participate in collective actions.

Kelly and Breinlinger (1996) identify three major individual psychological factors which may lead to participation in collective action: political efficacy, individualist-collectivist orientation and locus of control. Political efficacy is closely related to the agency component of Gamson's framework. Individualist-collectivist orientation, which refers to the extent to which one's identity is characterized by personal choices, goals and achievements or by the nature of the groups of which one is a member, is generally measured in the context of culture. Locus of control, which is closely related to political efficacy, refers to individuals' perceptions of events as being a consequence of one's own actions, and therefore under one's personal control. But, in their view, the empirical evidence that individual psychological factors are related to activism in social movements is mixed.

Evidence that attitudinal commitment to social movements is related to participation in them was put forward by Klandermans (1997) who cited empirical findings of affective and continuance commitment underlying participation and exit behaviours within social movements. There is less evidence suggesting significant relationships between normative commitment and behaviours. However, aside from this study, there is very little available research which applies a rigorous framework for the analysis of attitudinal commitment in the context of a public interest group.

1.4.4 – Volunteer studies

Comparisons between political party members and volunteers pose further difficulties, not only because of the considerable differences between parties and voluntary organizations (*Table 1.3 below*), but because the voluntary sector is so diverse. Within the sector itself there are huge variations in organizational scale and scope, and in the recruitment, training and use of volunteers. For example, volunteering to rattle a collecting box once a month requires no admission criteria, volunteering to mentor a school pupil once a term requires an application process, training and a police check. Some memberships of voluntary organizations can run into hundreds of pounds a year, other voluntary organizations do not have membership schemes. Some volunteering programmes promise career benefits or social opportunities, other organizations promise very little.

**Table 1.3 – Differences between non-profit organizations:
political parties and voluntary organizations**

	Political party	Voluntary organization
Organizational aim	Achieving governance	Providing service and achieving influence
Admission criteria	Low	Varies
Annual financial cost of membership	Low	Varies (if applicable)
Promised selective benefits (not commercial deals)	Information	Varies
Participation requirements	Not obligatory	Volunteers expected to undertake duties they volunteered for: few disciplinary sanctions available to organization

There is also some question as to whether the position of ‘member’ and ‘volunteer’ are similar enough to be used for comparative purposes. Even the definition of what constitutes ‘volunteering’ is a matter for debate in the nonprofit literature (eg Cnaan *et al* 1996, Harris 1996, Cameron 1999). Perhaps in consequence, the distinction between volunteer and member status has received relatively little attention. Exceptions to this general rule are studies of religious congregations by Harris (1996) and Cameron (1999). In the former study, the distinguishing features between members and volunteers are presented as members having more “commitment” to organizational values than

volunteers, and members' greater expectations that the organization should take their views into account. The latter study suggested that members were more likely to consider their primary "commitment" as being to the organization, whilst volunteers were more likely to identify with the beneficiaries of their work. However, in a political party context, the majority of those who work for it are members, rather than sympathizers; and all work undertaken by members is voluntary. For this latter reason alone, I can see no reason why frameworks used for exploring the motivations of volunteers are not also relevant for exploring the motivations of members.

Indeed, the volunteering literature is extremely helpful to this research in that it appears to be characterized by an implicit support for rational choice theory. In consequence, there is a substantial body of research exploring the incentives that motivate individuals to work for "nothing". Several articles have attempted to identify the motivations of a wide range of volunteers. Possible motivations range from opportunities to give service (Widmer 1985, Bhattacharya 1998), or express one's values (Carroll and Harris 1999) to personal development (Covelli 1985, Widmer 1985, Omoto and Snyder 1993), social incentives (Widmer 1985, Latham and Lichtman 1984, Pearce 1993, Bhattacharya 1998, Carroll and Harris 1999), career enhancement (Vaillancourt and Payette 1986), and increasing one's self-esteem (Covelli 1985, Latham and Lichtman 1984, Logan 1984, Vaillancourt and Payette 1986, Pearce 1993).

One writer with practitioner experience of managing volunteers (Francies 1983) examined the concept of the fulfillment of psychological needs as motivation for volunteering, and concluded that the degree of match between psychological need and work assignment had a positive relationship with volunteer satisfaction and with retention. This theme was developed further by psychologists with an interest in volunteering (Clary and Snyder 1991, Clary, Snyder and Ridge 1992), resulting in an analytical framework measuring six distinct functional motivations which lead to volunteering: the Volunteer Functions Inventory (VFI).

The six functional motivations measured by the VFI are values, understanding, career, social, enhancement and protective motivations. These were identified by reference to the results of earlier empirical studies of volunteers in a number of different settings and noting which benefits of volunteering emerged most clearly and most consistently from these studies (Clary and Snyder 1991). The values motivation refers to the opportunities which volunteering gives to individuals to act on their beliefs, to express their own values in a

meaningful way, and to serve a cause that has some personal meaning for them. The understanding motivation is the desire to know more about the cause which one serves, or even to learn for the sake of learning. The career motivation is satisfied when individuals can learn additional skills through volunteering, or when volunteering can lead to opportunities to explore new careers, or introductions to potential contacts. The social motivation is identified as using volunteering to gain social approval. Family, friends or social groups may provide a normative influence to volunteer, or individuals may wish to be seen to behave in socially desired ways. Volunteering can enhance esteem by making the individual appear needed and important, whilst the protective motivations for is defined as allowing volunteers some relief or escape from negative feelings about oneself.

The VFI has been tested on at least six occasions (Clary *et al* 1998) in order to establish levels of volunteer satisfaction with their work, and the relationship between satisfaction with volunteering and intention to volunteer again in the future. However, there was no attempt to link volunteers' satisfaction with the amount of voluntary work they actually did. There is no indication in the literature as to whether subjects who reported that volunteering delivered salient benefits exceeded the workload - either in terms of quality or quantity - of those who were less satisfied. Four out of six documented attempts to use it were in laboratory conditions, and one field test was used primarily to ascertain scale validity. The research described in this thesis will attempt to develop the use of the VFI further by examining the relationship between delivery of functional benefits and levels of activity.

Evidence from laboratory and field tests of the VFI concluded that those subjects who chose: "service opportunities that provided benefits matching their initial motivations more strongly believed that they would make volunteerism a continuing part of their lives than individuals who chose opportunities that did not provide functionally relevant benefits or that provided functionally irrelevant benefits" (Clary *et al* 1998). This finding adds more evidence to the argument that delivering incentives to members that are unlikely to result in desired behaviours is simply wasteful of organizational time and resources. Nor is it in the interests of any nonprofit organization to try to satisfy their members if satisfaction is not an antecedent of any desired behaviour.

SECTION 1.5 – WORKING FOR THE PARTY: THE ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOUR LITERATURE

1.5.1 - Introduction

The major advantage of using organizational behaviour literature to inform research into the behaviour of political party members is the abundance of analytical frameworks which can be used to examine why people work. The major drawback of this strand of literature is that the majority of these frameworks analyse components of the experience of working in organizations where individuals are paid for doing so. Therefore some aspects of paid work - job security, pay, absenteeism, supervision and appraisal, to give some examples - are simply not relevant in a membership association context.

But some concepts identified as operating in the workplace do apply in a political party. All party members join the organization at some point, hence organizational socialization is a relevant area of study. All members have the potential to identify with and become involved with their party, hence attitudinal commitment is also relevant. Those members who do choose to work for the party may or may not experience satisfaction with what they do. This section of the literature review will outline these three concepts.

1.5.2 - Socialization

Socialization is described as the process by which individuals acquire the skills, social knowledge and behaviours needed to participate as an organizational member (Van Maanen and Schein 1979). The organizational behaviour literature suggests that there is evidence of socialization preceding commitment in the workplace environment (*eg* Buchanan 1974, Wanberg and Kammeyer-Mueller 2000). Workplace studies have additionally found that successful employee socialization also has links with job satisfaction, intent to stay in the organization and job performance (Kelley 1992, Chao *et al* 1994, Bauer and Green 1998, Wanberg and Kammeyer-Mueller 2000).

Whilst some work on the relationships between socialization and participation has been carried out in a trade union context (*see Section 1.4.2*), no equivalent research has been carried out in political parties and other membership associations. The purpose of measuring socialization in the context of political party members is, firstly, to investigate whether socialization can be considered a valid construct in a political party context, and, secondly, whether it has the relationships with commitment, job satisfaction, intent to stay in the organization and activity that studies in other environments suggest.

1.5.3 - Organizational commitment

*“A militant is not twice or three times more attached to the party than a member: he is attached to it in a different way”
Duverger (1954: p116)*

The study of individual attachment to political parties was presaged by one of the more insightful political science writers on membership issues nearly 50 years ago. However, there has not since been any systematic study of organizational commitment in political parties. The studies of trade union members referred to in Section 1.4.2 indicate clearly that attitudinal commitment in that environment precedes activity. The research in this thesis aims to explore whether there is a relationship between attitudinal commitment and behaviour operating within political parties.

In studies of attitudinal commitment in the workplace, variables such as organization structure and policies, work experiences, demographic characteristics, and personal investments in the organization, along with alternatives to being a part of it have been identified as relevant antecedents (Meyer and Allen 1997). A recent finding with considerable implications for membership associations suggests that commitment can be predicted by perceptions of organizational values (Finegan 2000) The greater the similarity between personal values and perceived organizational values, the greater levels of affective commitment are likely to be. However, levels of continuance and normative commitment appear to be unaffected by person-organization value congruence.

In terms of behavioural commitment, the Salancik (1977) framework described in section 1.1.2 of this review suggests that the behaviours of political party members are very committing. There is little question their decision has been voluntary. Paying money is an explicit act that binds members to the organization for at least the duration of their subscription fee. Far from keeping their membership private, members may deliberately publicise it. In one study of a constituency party, 94% of respondents said friends knew about their party membership, and 83% said work colleagues knew of their affiliation (Martin and Cowley 1999) Indeed, my previous research into new party members indicates that they may often talk to others about their new membership in order to erase any doubts over their decision to join (Granik 1997).

But one of the least well-explored aspects of either dimension of commitment is the impact on commitment by the direction of money flow between individual and organization.

Where money flows from organization to individual, as it does in the workplace, the precise nature of the relationship between pay and organizational commitment has been identified as one where further research is needed (Mathieu and Zajac 1990, Lydka 1996). Extrinsic factors such as pay appear to be less important than intrinsic factors in fostering commitment, however, there is a weak but robust correlation between pay and attitudinal commitment (Mathieu and Zajac 1990, Irving *et al* 1997). Pay may have some influence on some antecedents of commitment *e.g.* perceived fairness (Arnold *et al* 1998) and perceived alternatives (Lydka 1996).

Empirical studies of volunteers' commitment assume that there is no financial relationship between person and organization (Gouldner 1960, Latham and Lichtman 1984, Dailey 1986, Pearce 1993, Liao-Troth 2001). Dailey suggests that job satisfaction, work autonomy, job involvement and feedback from the work itself are strong predictors of organizational commitment, but the outcomes of commitment are not discussed. Whilst studies of trade union members measure the ideological antecedents of commitment, any commitment arising from satisfaction with the experience of membership is less thoroughly explored. The hybrid roles of party members identified in the introduction to this literature review suggest that the antecedents of attitudinal commitment in political parties, as well as behavioural commitment, may be hybrid in nature and based on either the supporter, funder or worker satisfaction.

1.5.4 - Job satisfaction

Simply defined, job satisfaction is how people feel about their jobs and different aspects of their jobs (Spector 1997). Job satisfaction can be considered to be an outcome of activity rather than an antecedent, or as a factor motivating continued and better performance (Hackman and Lawler 1971). It is important to this research to have at least a basic indication of job satisfaction amongst political party members for two reasons. Firstly, no existing research considers whether political party members experience job satisfaction or not. This research will be to take a measure of job satisfaction within political party members for the first time. If job satisfaction exists among political party members, it can be interpreted as a source of satisfaction with the overall experience of membership. It is satisfaction derived from their "worker" role. Job satisfaction can be considered as an overall feeling about a job, or as a related set of attitudes about various aspects of the job. In this research, job satisfaction was considered as an overall feeling; partly because it is the first time job satisfaction has been measured in a political party, and partly because a

detailed examination of all the potential facets of job satisfaction lies outside the bounded scope of this thesis.

SECTION 1.6 – CONCLUDING REMARKS

The contributions to the study of political party membership behaviour of each of the academic disciplines discussed in this literature review are summarized in Table 1.4 below.

Table 1.4 – Summary of contributions from various academic disciplines informing the study of political party members

	Political science	Marketing	Nonprofit organizations			Org. behaviour
			<i>Trade unions</i>	<i>P.I. groups</i>	<i>Vol. orgs</i>	
Ideological belief	√		√			
Membership satisfaction		√	√		√	√
Personal efficacy	√			√		
Group efficacy			√	√		
Solidary incentives		√			√	
Purposive incentives	√	√		√	√	
Org. commitment			√	√	√	√
Org. socialization			√			√

Evidence from political party and trade union studies indicates that ideological belief may precede commitment to participation, evidence from marketing, trade union, volunteer, and organizational behaviour studies suggests that satisfaction could underlie both behaviours and attitudes of party members. Personal efficacy is identified as an antecedent of behavioural commitment in the political science and public interest group literature, although the evidence of it operating in a trade union environment is rather mixed. Both the trade union and the public interest group literature identify group efficacy as an antecedent of participation.

Marketing literature and studies of volunteers, which implicitly accept rational choice theory, indicate that the examination of which solidary incentives for participation are salient to political party members could be a valuable line of enquiry. The importance of purposive incentives is also recognized in these two disciplines, and studies of public interest groups and political parties also deal with the importance of purposive incentives. The study of attitudinal commitment in political party members is informed by work in a range of nonprofit organizations and in organizational behaviour, whilst the role of

socialization in engendering both attitudinal and behavioural commitment is dealt with in the trade union and organizational behaviour literature.

This thesis will consider the sets of relationships between partisanship, satisfaction and attitudinal and behavioural commitment identified above using evidence from an empirical intra-party study of members.

CHAPTER 2 - METHODOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

This chapter outlines the methodology involved in conducting the research described in this doctoral thesis. It describes how access for research purposes was sought and obtained, how the research instrument, a questionnaire, was compiled, tested, revised and implemented. The characteristics of the survey sample are introduced. The chapter concludes with a description of the various techniques used to analyse the data obtained from the questionnaire. The research instrument itself, both in its pilot and final version, can be found in the appendices to this chapter, together with a brief description of Plaid Cymru's history, ideology and organizational structure.

SECTION 2.1 - SECURING ACCESS

2.1.1 - Introduction

This section describes how access to a political party for research purposes was sought and obtained. It describes how the granting of access had substantial implications for the scale and scope of research and its original contribution, and the methodology employed.

2.1.2 – The original scope of this research

At the start of the research process, I aimed to obtain access to political parties in order to examine the commitment of members in ideologically diverse parties. This would have allowed direct cross-sectional comparisons of membership commitment, and observations of similarities and dissimilarities of behaviour and/or attitudes across ideologies. The benefit of the research as originally intended would have been to test whether the commitment of political party members is similar regardless of ideology, or whether ideological differences, behavioural outcomes and attitudinal differences are associated.

However, contingency was made for the event that access to only one political party would be possible (Granik 1999), not least because the total universe of established credible political parties in Great Britain is so small that the opportunities for access are extremely limited. The research hypothesis described in the previous chapter was therefore designed so that it could be tested satisfactorily within the context of a single site case study. A multi-site case study would have been ideal, but all that was strictly necessary to retain the essence of the proposed doctoral thesis was access to one political party.

2.1.3 - Selection rationale

I wanted to carry out research only within established and credible political parties. My main criterion for whether a political party was both established and credible was whether it had any representatives in the UK House of Commons as of 1 January 1999. At that time, nine parties had MPs at Westminster, but from this total universe a number of parties were excluded. The four parties representing constituencies in Northern Ireland were not approached. I judged that a research project intended, in part, to investigate inclusion within political parties could not be satisfactorily implemented in an environment where membership can be highly stratified along sectarian lines. The Liberal Democrats were informed that the research was going ahead, but were not specifically invited to take part in order to avoid the risk that this thesis would largely replicate previous research findings rather than expand them (see Introduction). Therefore, initial correspondence was begun with the four remaining political parties represented in the House of Commons. These parties were, in alphabetical order, the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, Plaid Cymru The Party of Wales and the Scottish National Party.

2.1.4 - Process of contact

In the last week of January 1999 I wrote letters to all four of the parties listed above. This allowed a five-week window of opportunity to communicate with parties before the beginning of campaigning in earnest for the local, regional and European elections to be held later that year. Where I knew relevant individuals, I wrote directly to them. Otherwise, I selected the most senior official responsible for membership by referring to party websites and checking details. In all correspondence a letter, a brief research note and a brief CV was sent. The letter and research note are reproduced at Section A2.1 of Appendix 2. Follow-up approaches to parties who did not respond to the initial letter were sent at the end of June, after the various election campaigns had finished.

2.1.5 - Securing agreement

Following a meeting in March with the then Chief Executive of Plaid Cymru, access to the party for research purposes was agreed. The terms of agreement were clarified in writing shortly after the meeting. The terms included an undertaking by me to keep details of Plaid Cymru affairs in confidence, and not to discuss the project with anyone who would be inappropriate. I also undertook to restrict eventual publication of research results to the academic environment, and anticipated that it would be unlikely for any publication to appear before the year 2002. I undertook to give the Plaid Cymru Chief Executive sight of all material submitted for publication in good time to correct factual inaccuracies and make

comments. Plaid Cymru would not have any right of veto over publication of material, either in whole or in part and ownership of the research data and copyright of any materials generated as part of the research project would remain with me. The Chief Executive indicated in writing that he was content with these terms.

Initial approaches from other parties did not result in access for research being given. An expression of interest from the Welsh constituent party of a major political party was not taken further for reasons of logistics, political sensitivity and costs. This party had no central records of party members in Wales, and permission would have had to have been sought from regional leaders to have access to membership lists for their area. This approach seriously reduced the likelihood of being able to draw up a random sample of party members for research. Accepting access to this party might have endangered Plaid Cymru's support for the project on the grounds of retaining the confidentiality of information. The cost implications are dealt with more fully in the following section.

2.1.6 – The research setting, and implications for research conduct

History - Plaid Cymru¹ was founded in 1925 as a pressure group with the aim of defending Welsh culture and identity. At first, its efforts were centred on the preservation and protection of Welsh language and culture: self-government for Wales did not become an organizational goal until 1932 (Evans 2000). Its initial activities were limited chiefly to a Welsh language party newspaper (eventually supplemented by an English language publication) and annual summer schools. Academics, intellectuals and clergy formed much of the core membership until 1936, when the arrest and imprisonment of three founder members who set fire to an RAF bombing school in Caernarfonshire generated considerable publicity and an increased membership base.

The organization participated in elections to Westminster from 1929 onwards - generally by fielding a candidate in a selected constituency. Plaid Cymru's gradual metamorphosis into a credible political party took off in earnest after 1945 (Davies 1983). In that general election year it contested eight seats, and by 1959 Plaid candidates were standing in 20 Welsh seats. The party won its first seat at Westminster in 1966 when the party's charismatic president Gwynfor Evans won a by-election in Carmarthen. In the 1970 general election Plaid Cymru fought all 36 Welsh seats for the first time and secured 11.5%

¹ Originally called Plaid Genedlaethol Cymru, the party shortened its name in 1945. In 1998 the party changed its official name to Plaid Cymru The Party of Wales. Throughout this thesis, the party is referred to as Plaid Cymru.

of the vote, although no more seats. After that watershed, the percentage of votes for Plaid Cymru declined, although in 1974 they secured two, and then three Parliamentary seats (Evans 2000). The later 1970s saw Plaid Cymru make gains in local elections, although some of these were later overturned (Plaid Cymru 2001). Performance in general elections was patchy for several years.

In the 1990s the party's fortunes changed noticeably. In 1992 Plaid Cymru won its fourth Parliamentary seat. In 1994 the party achieved its highest ever share of the vote in Wales - 17.1% in European elections. In 1995 elections to new local authorities, Plaid Cymru came second only to the Labour Party and won overall control of Gwynedd county council (Plaid Cymru 2001). In 1997 the party retained all four of its Westminster MPs. In 1999, elections to the newly created National Assembly of Wales surpassed even the party's own expectations (Davies 1999). The party won nearly 30% of the total votes cast, and 17 of the 60 available seats - including some in Labour strongholds - to become the second largest party in the National Assembly (Plaid Cymru 2001). In local elections on the same day Plaid Cymru gained control of three county councils and recorded its highest ever number of county councillors (Daily Telegraph 1999). In European elections one month later, Welsh voters elected Plaid Cymru's first two MEPs to Brussels.

During the writing of this thesis, the party's electoral position remained stable. It retained one Westminster parliamentary seat in a by-election in 2000 forced by the resignation of the sitting MP. In the 2001 General Election, Plaid Cymru lost one constituency that it had represented for some years, but gained another, keeping its number of Westminster MPs at four. However, in National Assembly elections held in May 2003, whilst this thesis was being prepared for submission, the party fared badly, losing five of its seats.

Ideology - Plaid Cymru's primary ideological identity is that of nationalism, the ambition that Wales can take control of its own affairs. However, it is a style of nationalism characterized by socialism, republicanism and environmentalism (McAllister 2001). Leading party figures during Plaid Cymru's early years fought hard to add a socialist dimension to its agenda in order to distinguish its brand of nationalism from less democratic strains then emerging in Europe. A strong republican and decentralist streak ran through the party from the outset, with some of its members gaining notoriety in the early 1980s during a trial of Welsh socialists accused of conspiring to attack government and Conservative party targets (McAllister 2001). The party's early commitment to protecting the land of Wales was intrinsically environmentalist, but specific

environmentalist policies were not developed until the mid 1980s. A period of close collaboration with the Welsh Green Party in the early 1990s saw the joint formulation of Plaid Cymru's policies on the environment and related matters (McAllister 2001).

The challenge for the party has been to develop a form of socialism that is both “distinctly Welsh” and distinct from the ideology of its nearest rival, the Labour party. It has done so by advocating community socialism, the concept that, whenever practical, decisions should be made by the people affected by them. McAllister (2001) describes Plaid Cymru's “distinctive brand” of socialism as a “clever compromise: an anti-state, decentralist, community form of socialism”.

Party structure - At local level, Plaid Cymru comprises 220 local branches grouped into 29 rhanbarthau (districts). These rhanbarthau correspond either with Westminster constituencies or local government boundaries. Members usually join through one of the branches, and contact details for those joining directly through the party's Head Office in Cardiff are passed on to their nearest branch. Plaid Cymru members living in London, Oxford and the north of England are incorporated into the framework of rhanbarthau via a twinning system. Those few members living in the remainder of the UK and overseas (primarily in the USA, Brussels and Australia) are administered by Head Office.

Each local branch sends delegates to represent them on the relevant rhanbarth committee. The branches and rhanbarthau send delegates to the National Council which meets four times a year. This refines policies between Annual Conferences, approves election manifestos and amends standing orders. Branches also elect delegates to the Annual Conference which decides policies and changes in the party's constitution. The management and financing of Plaid Cymru is overseen by a National Executive Committee (NEC) of 25 members. The NEC also guides policy formulation and strategy.

Research implications - Access to Plaid Cymru was gratefully received; however the party's language policy had considerable implications for the methodology involved in this doctoral research. Plaid Cymru is officially bilingual, as could be expected from its beginnings and its long campaigns to achieve Welsh/English language parity in Wales. Approximately two thirds of its members use Welsh as their language of choice. Therefore any research had to be conducted both in Welsh and English, not only to comply with Plaid's official policy, but to allow all members participating in the research the opportunity to express themselves in their preferred language.

A bilingual research environment had a number of implications for the scale and scope of study. I have no knowledge of Welsh; therefore all research instruments needed translation by a third party, considerably adding to the costs of research. Whilst my original proposition of a questionnaire survey of a mainly quantitative nature was still feasible, the additional logistical arrangements and costs of implementing and translating proposed supplementary qualitative research into membership experiences were not appropriate for a bounded doctoral project. Additional costs also mitigated against a two-party study, particularly one which would have also involved working in a bilingual environment. If the essence of the research project could comfortably be achieved with one site, the costs involved in a multi-site study could not be justified by the results.

However, access to Plaid Cymru allowed a unique opportunity to obtain insights as to how political party members from differing cultural backgrounds relate to the same organization. Prior to the survey commencing, there was little academic literature published in Britain analysing the commitment of groups of members of differing cultural backgrounds to their chosen political parties. In addition to the potential to identify differences in the experience of membership based on demographic variables such as gender, age and education status, access to Plaid Cymru provided an opportunity to identify the differences in membership experience for those of different cultures. This was an unforeseen and exciting addition to the scope of research.

SECTION 2.2 - COMPILING THE RESEARCH INSTRUMENT

2.2.1 - Introduction

This paper discusses some of the methodological and practical issues raised in the compilation of the research instrument. The rationale underlying the selection of a questionnaire for self-completion as the most appropriate research instrument, contents of the questionnaire and selection of questionnaire items are discussed in full. This section also describes a number of methodological issues which arose during questionnaire compilation, namely language issues, the choice of open or closed questions, question ordering, and measures taken to minimise potential respondent fatigue. English language versions of both the pilot and final questionnaires are at Sections A.2.2 and A2.5 of Appendix 2.

2.2.2 - Selection of research instrument

For the purposes of my particular research question, I considered that a questionnaire survey would be the most appropriate instrument to use for data collection. Bryman (1989) observes that this method of research provides an opportunity to collect quantifiable data in respect of a considerable number of variables which is necessary for a research project designed to explore patterns of association. Questionnaire surveys are also appropriate mechanisms for conducting research in a bilingual environment (Blais and Gidengil 1993). I also considered that a questionnaire designed for self-completion would allow respondents both anonymity and privacy, and the opportunity to express their views on their relationship with the party in a non-judgemental atmosphere. As most Plaid Cymru members live in Wales, mailing a questionnaire for self-completion through the post offered a far more efficient and cost-effective method of communicating with people than travelling considerable distances to conduct face-to-face structured interviews.

Indeed, given the circumstances of the research setting, a postal questionnaire for self-completion appeared to be the only realistic method of data collection. Face to face structured interviews were unsuitable, not just because of the geographical constraints, but also because of the potential difficulties posed by the presence of interviewers.

Characteristics of interviewers, such as age, gender and social class have been shown to affect interviewee response, both in terms of answering questions and the nature of the answers given (Bryman 1989). In fact, at the time of the survey, I was the first English researcher who had been given access to party membership, and I considered that my nationality might well have inhibited response to any structured interview that I might have conducted. Additionally, I would have needed a translator to enable individuals to respond in Welsh if need be; that would have introduced yet another personality into the proceedings, and added considerably to the costs. The same nationality and language issues would have been salient if telephone research had been conducted, even though this method drastically reduces the financial costs and logistical difficulties associated with face to face interviewing (Bryman 1989).

Ideally, as described in Section 2.1.2, I had wanted to conduct a two-party study, even though I realised that this might be hard to achieve. In the planning of the research project, I included in my contingency plan that, in the foreseeable event of access to just one party being given, I would like to include an element of qualitative work (Granik 1999). This would have been longitudinal in nature, tracking the experience of membership over the period of approximately one year. The chief benefit of including longitudinal research

would have been that this research, rather than cross-sectional research would have been more likely to identify the direction of the relationships between attitudes and behaviours. However, in view of logistical constraints, and the anticipation that appropriate tools for statistical analysis could create a substitute for longitudinal research, this element of the research design was dropped.

Cross-sectional qualitative research, such as in-depth interviews or follow-up interviews were not used in this research. I considered that such methods were unlikely to achieve my stated research aim of identifying the relationships between attitudes and behaviours to any greater accuracy than the cross-sectional quantitative research forming the bulk of this thesis. Indeed, personal interviews could have presented a highly misleading picture of this relationship as, according to self-perception theory (Bem 1972) interviewees might have inferred their attitudes towards party membership from their actual or remembered behaviours. Had the scope of this research been somewhat different, for example, an exploration of the meanings or symbolism of aspects of party membership to individual members, then cross-sectional qualitative research would have been more appropriate. This would have allowed members to discuss deeper emotions on more personal aspects of their relationship with the party than was provided for in the approach used in this thesis. But, given that the central hypothesis of this thesis was:

“Satisfaction with the experience of membership is a stronger predictor of commitment to a political party than partisanship.”

the information required from party members about their relationship with the party was straightforward enough to be gathered by quantitative methods.

In order to test the hypothesis, information was required from party members about how they perceived their relationship with the party. In order to elicit that information, members were asked questions about their joining history and behaviour, their political antecedents, the activities they did for the party, and their satisfaction with the experience of membership. They were asked about the extent to which they felt socialized into the party, whether they considered that party membership satisfied any psychological motivations, and the nature of their attitudinal commitment to the party. They were also asked for some simple demographic information.

A secondary purpose of the questionnaire was to test a number of analytical frameworks in a political party context in order to examine the attitudinal and behavioural commitment of

members in an appropriate way. Most items used in the questionnaire were selected on the basis that they had already appeared in published work, and that they were potentially applicable to the political party environment. However, the wording of question items on each set of measures was modified so that they were relevant both to the political party environment, and to the cultural sensitivities of Plaid Cymru members.

The questionnaire was compiled with the active assistance of the then Plaid Cymru Chief Executive, who particularly advised on the cultural sensitivities of members. The then Chairman of Plaid Cymru also had input to a late draft version of the questionnaire.

2.2.3 - Questionnaire contents

This section contains a detailed discussion of the rationale underlying the inclusion of each question used in the research instrument. One potential point of controversy that arose during the planning stage of this thesis was whether frameworks from disciplines outside the political party environment would operate in the same way if used in a political party environment. Evidence available at that time (Dailey 1986), and another study published as work was in progress (Liao-Troth 2001), suggested that the major constructs used to study employee behaviour and work attitudes functioned in a similar fashion in respect of the work attitudes of volunteers. In this survey, too, there was considerable evidence to suggest that the scales worked well in a political party environment (*see Section 2.4.5 in this chapter and Sections 7.2 and 7.3 in Chapter 7*).

Two further issues related to the above arguments concern the operationalization of some of the key concepts used in this research. The first issue is whether the use of highly structured questions is an appropriate approach for measuring fluid constructs such as, for example, values, job satisfaction, partisanship and commitment. The second is whether potential respondents are capable of giving answers which reflect their views on fluid concepts in the structured environment of the questionnaire. The issue of using highly structured questions was broached by using measures with a track record of practical use amongst a wide range of research settings, and successful use in that the outcomes of the research in which they were involved were deemed of sufficient importance for publication. In respect of the second issue, I made the assumption that most members of a political party would be capable of expressing their views on matters salient to their experience of membership. I assumed that these views would include opinions as to their values, ideological leanings and relationship with their party. I further assumed that, so long as the wording of the questionnaire was meaningful to respondents, even highly structured

questions would be appropriate vehicles for expressing these views. Membership is a further concept that can be interpreted as being reasonably fluid, as the overview of the literature regarding the differing status of 'member' and 'volunteers' indicated (*see Section 1.4.4 of Chapter One*). In this case, I made the assumption that a fully paid subscription would denote membership status.

The involvement of the then Chief Executive of Plaid Cymru at the very earliest stages of the questionnaire design was a crucial element in ensuring that the modifications to the original measures were meaningful to Plaid Cymru members and reflected their cultural sensitivities and everyday use of language. His involvement in checking the Welsh translation of the questionnaire from the original English (*see Section 2.2.4*) ensured that the research instrument was appropriate culturally and idiomatically in both languages.

Joining history and behaviour and political antecedents

Questions 1 - 10 asked for information about respondents' background regarding Plaid Cymru membership, their ideological position within the party and other affiliations. The main purpose of this section was to establish baseline measures of motivation for joining, partisanship, and other affiliations. The information from this section was also intended to facilitate differentiation between members who held paid-up subscriptions and those who did not.

The statements contained in Questions One and Two were compiled jointly by me and the Chief Executive of Plaid Cymru. I used my prior experience of surveying political party members to suggest some statements. The Chief Executive developed further statements testing possible cultural and nationalistic related reasons for joining the party, and advised on the ways in which it was possible for members to have joined Plaid Cymru.

Questions Four and Five were taken directly from the published accounts of surveys carried out amongst members of the Labour and Conservative parties (Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Whiteley, Seyd and Richardson 1994) in order to test frequency of agreement with the party as a whole and position on the ideological spectrum. Questions Six, Seven and Eight were designed to test longevity and continuity of membership, and subscription behaviour. Question Nine about parental membership was designed to test whether respondents had any close family associations to Plaid Cymru prior to joining. The options in Question Ten were chiefly suggested by the Chief Executive, in order to test whether

those with a propensity to join organizations were any more active than those who were only members of one organization.

Questions 24 and 25 were intended to measure individual and group efficacy. A measure of individual political efficacy was necessary to test for possible relationships between personal efficacy and dimensions of attitudinal commitment (a relationship found in studies of workplace attitudinal commitment (Meyer and Allen 1997)); and behavioural commitment, as the work of Gamson (1992) and McShane (1986) would suggest.

Perceived personal efficacy was measured by a series of statements, mostly from Olsen (1969) together with an additional statement used amongst members of both the Labour and Conservative parties (Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Whiteley, Seyd and Richardson 1994). A further question dealing with the perceived efficacy of the local branch, originally used in the Labour and Conservative party member surveys (Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Whiteley, Seyd and Richardson 1994) was also being used in this questionnaire. The aim of testing perceived group efficacy was to investigate any relationships between organizational “vibrancy” and participation similar to those found by Flood *et al* (1996) in trade unions.

Behavioural commitment

Questions 11 - 17 asked for information about respondents’ participation within the party and donations to the party in order to establish measures of behavioural commitment to the party in terms of both time and money. Activities were grouped into three types – routine activities, election time activities and internal party activities – on the basis of the Chief Executive’s assessment of the kind of work that members would be the most likely to do for Plaid Cymru. The section also included the short Michigan Organizational Assessment Questionnaire (Camman *et al* 1983) to investigate levels of satisfaction with the work that respondents did. This scale was selected particularly for its brevity (Spector 1997) and its direct applicability to work done outside the scope of paid employment. All three scale items: “All in all, I am satisfied with the things I do for the party”, “In general I don’t really like the things I do”, and “In general, I like working for Plaid Cymru ” were presented to respondents in Question 16.

Satisfaction with the experience of membership

Questions 18 - 23 and 27 were intended to gather data about satisfaction with the experience of political party membership. Satisfaction was measured along a number of dimensions including the relationship between respondents and their local party branch, whether expectations of membership were met, whether respondents felt they benefited

from membership, whether any psychological functional motivations were satisfied by membership, and overall feelings about membership.

The relationship between individual respondents and their local branch was identified as a key cause of dissatisfaction in my earlier research. For the purposes of this project, the relationship between individual and local branch was measured by an adapted version of the Organisational Socialization Scale (OSS) devised by Kelley (1992). This scale originally measured employee perceptions of the extent to which they perceived that they had been socialized into their organizations. It is one of the few measures which attempts to quantify the content of socialization, an area of weakness in the socialization literature identified by others as an area where more work is needed (Chao *et al* 1994). The full 20-item scale (Bearden and Netemeyer 1999) is directly applicable to the party political context with only very minor alterations to the wording. A further advantage of this scale is that it is specifically designed to be distinct from, and used in conjunction with, measurements of organizational commitment, which are discussed below.

Disconfirmation was measured by two open-ended questions asking respondents whether they had any expectations of party membership, and if so, whether these expectations had been met. Another open-ended question asked respondents whether they felt membership had done anything for them in any way. The Volunteer Functions Inventory (VFI) (Clary *et al.* 1992), which was discussed in greater detail in section 1.4.4 of Chapter 1, provided a means of exploring any possible relationships between functional motivations and the experience of membership. The VFI was presented to respondents in Question 22. Values motivations were tested by two statements: “I feel that party membership helps me to help other people” and “I can do something for Wales and that is important to me.” These two statements were deliberately chosen for their non-partisan nature, in order to be able to make some differentiation between personal values and belief in party ideology during the analysis stages.

Two measurements of overall satisfaction with the experience of membership also fell within this category. A seven point product/service satisfaction scale (Westbrook 1980) allowed respondents to categorise their overall feelings about membership. An open-ended question asking respondents whether they consider party membership to represent good value for money was deliberately separated from the body of measures of customer satisfaction (*see discussion of question order, in Section 2.2.4 below*).

Attitudinal commitment

There were a number of established measures of attitudinal commitment that could have been used in this survey, some of which had been developed specifically for use amongst volunteers or members. However, these proved to be some of the least suitable for use. A short measurement instrument devised by Pearce (1993) in her study of volunteer commitment omitted normative commitment. The Gordon *et al* (1980) measures of commitment to trade unions contain a number of items specifically referring to union commitment relative to workplace commitment which are inappropriate outside the trade union environment.

There were a number of well-established scales from workplace studies which could have been used in Plaid Cymru. The Organizational Commitment Questionnaire (Mowday, Steers and Porter 1979) is one of the most widely used measures of commitment (Mathieu and Zajac 1990) and one of the most widely criticised (Meyer and Allen 1984, Allen and Meyer 1990, Guest 1992, Benkhoff 1997, Meyer and Allen 1997) for compacting attitudes and behaviours (Guest 1992). The “British version” of the OCQ, the British Organizational Commitment Scale (Cook and Wall 1980) also suffers from the same drawback (Lydka 1996). Subsequent attitudinal measurement scales developed by Meyer and Allen (1991) and Meyer *et al* (1993) distinguishing between and measuring independently affective, normative and continuance commitment had, at the time of this research taking place, received more favourable commentary (Hackett *et al* 1994, Irving *et al* 1997). These scales, known as the Affective, Continuance and Normative Commitment Scales (ACNCS), required only very slight alterations to some wording to be made directly applicable to the political party context. Accordingly, these measures of attitudinal commitment were used for the survey instrument and appeared at Question 26.

Demographic information

In line with usual practice in questionnaire design (Oppenheim 1992), questions of a personal nature appeared at the end of the survey. Questions 28 - 35 were concerned with eliciting demographic information including gender, age, Welsh language ability, educational qualifications, household income and area of residence. It was intended that data from this section would be used to investigate whether the experience of membership varied for members in different demographic groups.

2.2.4 Questionnaire design issues

Language

The research instrument was presented to respondents both in Welsh and English. The questionnaire was compiled in English, and translated into Welsh by a reputable translation company known to Plaid Cymru. The Welsh language translation was checked by the then Plaid Cymru Chief Executive, who is bilingual, before the whole questionnaire was sent to print. The document was laid out in the conventional format for bilingual publications.

Question format

The main considerations guiding the choice of open or closed questions were the appropriateness of the question format for the data required, the need to obtain clarity of data, and constraints posed by resources.

For the majority of questions in the research instrument the issue of appropriateness of format was fairly clear cut. Where the selection options were mutually exclusive, a scale or tick box format were appropriate. Even in some of the tick box questions, where there was a possibility of any other contingency, some open space was left for respondents to give their answer.

However four questions, mainly relating to aspects of consumer satisfaction, required the respondents' subjective opinion. Three of these questions had been used before in my previous research amongst new Liberal Democrats (Granik 1997). In theory, these questions could have been asked with tick box categories based on the replies achieved from the Liberal Democrats. Nevertheless, this option was not chosen for a number of reasons. Firstly, political party members are rarely asked about their satisfaction with the experience of membership. The aim of leaving the question open-ended was so that members could answer in their own words, and not in the potentially rather suggestive vocabulary of tick box options (Schuman and Presser 1981). Secondly, the members themselves may not have previously thought about their membership in terms of expectations or benefit. The freedom to think through a response allowed by open-ended questions (Sheatsley 1983; Oppenheim 1992) might have assisted respondents more than the potentially abrupt nature of tick boxes. Thirdly, if the categories presented to respondents had been based on the responses from the Liberal Democrat survey, this would have assumed that Plaid Cymru members would respond in the same way as Liberal Democrats. This could possibly have biased the response. I considered it better to ask questions to each set of respondents on equal terms.

Question One, which asked respondents to specify one main reason for joining Plaid Cymru, could have been asked as either open-ended or closed. The decision on which format to use was ultimately made on the basis of data clarification and resource issues. In previous surveys where an open question had been used to elicit one main reason for joining political party, there was evidence that replies could easily give more than one reason (Seyd and Whiteley 1992). The methods of quantifying these open-ended responses left the validity of the final results open to some question (Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Whiteley, Seyd and Richardson 1994). However, in this doctoral research, I decided to ask Question One as a closed tick box question to discourage ambiguity of response. Evidence from the Liberal Democrats survey indicated that if respondents strongly felt they had more than one reason, they would find a means of communicating that, even though the opportunities for them to do so were very limited. The other reason for choosing a closed question format was concerned with resources. Firstly, the potential costs of translating Welsh language replies to open-ended questions meant that their use was restricted to the essential minimum. Secondly, as the responsibility of data inputting fell exclusively on me, the use of open-ended questions was deliberately kept to the essential minimum in order to keep the time needed for this task to manageable proportions.

Question order

The ordering of questions in this research instrument followed the general principle of placing questions which are the easiest to answer at the beginning, followed by harder questions, and ending with requests for personal information (Moser and Kalton 1971; Oppenheim 1992).

Question One, asking respondents for their main reason for joining, raised the issue of whether the ordering of statements within a question would influence the response (Schuman and Presser 1981). In order to test for any possible order bias at pilot stage, two versions of the pilot questionnaire were printed (*see sections A2.2 and A 2.3 in Appendix 2*). One version contained a Question One with its statements in the order that I originally envisaged. In the other version, the order of the statements was almost completely reversed. This, in effect, divided the pilot survey into two, with each group of respondents having a different version of the first question (*see section 2.3 below*).

However, the main concern regarding question order was that some responses might influence responses to subsequent questions (Schuman and Presser 1981), particularly in

regard to the customer satisfaction questions. The order of these questions in particular was carefully considered, as members might not previously have thought about their membership in terms of whether or not they were satisfied with it. Specifically, the question about perceptions of value for money was separated from the main body of customer satisfaction questions. This was done so that previous satisfaction indicators would not contaminate response to that particular item. The value for money question was placed at the end of the main body of the questionnaire for two reasons. Firstly, I thought that it would be one of the hardest questions for respondents to answer. Secondly, had it been placed nearer the beginning, respondents' answers to subsequent questions might have been affected by trying to justify their perceptions of value for money.

Respondent fatigue

The length of the questionnaire - ten sides of A4 paper - raised the potential for respondent fatigue. An overlong questionnaire could have the potential to affect the response rate adversely (Moser and Kalton 1971; Oppenheim 1992). Not only was the questionnaire quite lengthy in itself, but some the length of some of the measurement scales within the questionnaire contained a number of items. Moreover, the bilingual nature of the questionnaire meant that the finished document could have appeared to respondents twice as long as, in reality, it was. On first sight, the questionnaire could have appeared to some respondents to be 20 sides in length, and this could have inhibited the propensity for response.

A number of steps were taken to minimise the actual length of the questionnaire, and the potential perception of respondents that the questionnaire would be too long. These steps included shortening measurement scales, selecting short measurement instruments and using layout techniques to minimise perceptions of length.

Two established measurement scales, the adapted VFI and the adapted OSS were considerably shortened from their original lengths. The original VFI tested each of the six distinct motivations for volunteering with four Likert-scaled statements. It was relatively straightforward to reduce this to two items per motivation in this research instrument. In the case of the OSS, the scale items were not so neatly categorised. However, in the process of adapting the scale for use in the political party environment, it became apparent that some items of the scale were more relevant to the local party branch, whilst other items were more relevant to the party as a whole. In the context of this research, it seemed more appropriate to use the OSS to test for socialization into the party at branch level,

because that is the level is where most members have the most contact with the party. The removal of items which were more relevant to the party as a whole reduced the OSS by about half. The remaining established measurement scales, the ACNCS, were left intact on the grounds that they formed much of the substance of the research topic and of the questionnaire. As discussed in section 2.2.3 above, the Michigan Organizational Assessment Questionnaire was selected, in part, because of its brevity.

Some basic layout techniques were also used to minimise perceptions of length (Oppenheim 1992). Firstly, the questionnaire was arranged for double-sided printing which reduced the bulk of the final document by using the minimum number of pieces of paper necessary. Secondly, attempts were made to provide some visual variety on each page of the questionnaire in order to break up the questions, and make long questions seem less intimidating. Question headings were placed in shaded boxes to break up the page format and provide different colours on the page. Scale items were always alternated with tick box questions so that respondents did not repeat the same mechanical tasks for each question. Where possible, longer scale items were placed at page breaks, so that they appeared as two shorter sets of questions, rather than one long battery.

SECTION 2.3 - QUESTIONNAIRE IMPLEMENTATION

2.3.1 - Introduction

This section deals with the implementation of the pilot survey and the main survey. It begins with a description of the procedures used to draw a sample of party members for both surveys. The results of the pilot survey are discussed, and the resulting changes made in order to carry out the main survey are described. This section concludes with brief comments about the conduct of the main survey.

2.3.2 - Sampling

The sample population consisted of members of Plaid Cymru registered with party HQ as holding a current subscription to the party. The membership lists provided for survey use (Plaid Cymru 1999, 2000) showed total membership of over 15,000, most of whom had a paid up subscription.

Estimating sample size - My prior experience of surveying the Liberal Democrats suggested that an unsolicited questionnaire of party members could generate a response rate in the region of 35% both in the pilot and main surveys. An assumption was made that

a precision rate of $\pm 3\%$ would be acceptable for doctoral research. In order to achieve this level of precision with a 35% response rate, the questionnaire would have to be sent to a random sample of 1,067 party members (Healey 1996). However, if response fell below the predicted 35% threshold, there might not be enough data for a satisfactory doctoral survey. A greater precision rate of $\pm 2\%$ would have involved a sample size of 2,400. But this would have run the risk of increasing the time necessary for data entry and increasing the costs of translating responses, with only a very small potential gain in precision. I considered that a precision rate of $\pm 2.5\%$ would provide contingency for a low response rate without unjustifiably escalating the costs. A survey designed to achieve this precision rate would involve sending questionnaires to a sample of 1,900 members in the main survey, preceded by 200 questionnaires for the pilot survey.

Sample drawing - Plaid Cymru's membership details are entered on a database with a number of fields potentially available for sorting. The most reliable field for sorting was at the level of party organization roughly corresponding with a parliamentary constituency or a unit of local government. This is known in the party as rhanbarth level.

Pilot survey - In order not to contaminate the main survey results with those of the pilot survey, I decided to isolate one rhanbarth and to carry out the pilot survey amongst its members. To make a random decision at which rhanbarth should be selected for the pilot, I calculated the mean number of members in all the rhanbarthau combined, and selected the rhanbarth with membership closest to this figure. The Taf Elai rhanbarth in South Wales came closest to the mean figure with 434 members in total (Plaid Cymru 1999). This meant sampling one in two members in this area.

Plaid Cymru provided the names of members printed on labels, and every second label was used to address an envelope to ensure that the sample of Taf Elai members was random. However, this method did not allow any simple mechanism for following up non-response, or any means of recording which members received each version of the questionnaire.

2.3.3 - The pilot survey

The pilot survey took place in the second week of January 2000. Members were sent a bilingual questionnaire and covering letter together with an addressed stamped envelope, and were asked to return their questionnaires within two weeks.

Response rates - Of the 200 questionnaires sent out, 44 useable questionnaires were returned, giving an overall response level of 22%. This response was somewhat lower than expected. However, a closer look at returns revealed that response rates were markedly different for each version of the questionnaire. The questionnaire with the original version of Question One achieved a 31% response rate, bringing the level of response more into line with expectations. The average was dragged down by the amended version which achieved a response rate of just 13%.

Additionally, there was a statistically significant relationship between the version of the questionnaire used, and response by gender ($p=0.02$, $r=0.38$). Of those who answered the original version of the questionnaire, 86% were male and 14% were female. This meant that women were underrepresented in this question, even by the standards of response to the survey (see gender representation below). In the reverse order question, the response was 50% male and 50% female, meaning that relative to the survey respondents (see gender representation below) women were over represented.

Gender representation - Women were substantially underrepresented amongst survey respondents relative to their numbers in Plaid Cymru as a whole. Membership of the party is virtually 50/50 (Plaid Cymru 1995); however amongst survey respondents only 25% were women. There was no obvious explanation for this outcome. There was no evidence available which indicated why female response to the original version of Question One had been so low. There was no statistically significant relationship between gender and the way in which Question One was answered ($p=0.20$). A hypothesis that women in the pilot area of South Wales would traditionally not participate in political activities as much as men was not corroborated by the party Chief Executive (Davies 2000a). Another suggestion was that women were not included on equal terms in the survey sample. This seemed unlikely, but possible. The sample was “selected” by taking every second label from sheets of labels provided by the party. The labels were not sorted by gender and so, in this respect, selection should have been random. However, there was no simple means of checking whether equal proportions of women and men were included in the survey sample.

Quality of response - The quality of response received was generally been very good. Most questions achieved response rates of well over 80%. Tables showing the response rates to all pilot survey questions appear at in Tables A2.1– 2.5 in Section A2.4 of Appendix 2, together with brief comments about the substance and/or quality of the response. The main areas of concern centred around the relatively low response rates

achieved by two key scales, the job satisfaction scale and the organisational socialization scale. The response to this is discussed in Section 2.3.4 below.

Statistical analysis - The very small number of respondents made statistical analysis with regard to activity levels generally unproductive.

Administrative arrangements - The translation arrangements worked well. Instructions were followed closely and the work was returned swiftly. The cost of the pilot survey was considerably lower than estimated because of the low response rate and a lower than expected proportion of Welsh language responses.

2.3.4 - Modifying the research instrument

The above response rates suggested that overall the questions worked well, and there was little reason substantially to modify the wording of most of the questionnaire. Minor modifications were made to the following questions:

Question 15 - (How much time on average was devoted to party activity) - The structure of this question allowed some individuals who had, in the preceding sections, ticked a small number of activities, to select an option that they spent no time on party affairs. I felt that this posed a danger of under-representing the time spent by members on activities. Question 15 was changed to read: "If you were involved in any one activity over the past 12 months, how much time, on average, did you devote to party activities each week?" with tick box items marked as before but with no option for "none".

Question 16 - (Job satisfaction subscale) - This achieved one of the lower response rates of the questionnaire. Members seemed to consider that items one and three (generally positive statements) made item two superfluous and the response rate for item two was some percentage points lower than for the other two statements. Item two was removed from the final questionnaire.

Question 18 - (Socialization scale) - This achieved high response rates for the first item, the lowest response rate for the second item, and subsequent rates which did not again reach the peak of the first item. The second item was moved slightly further into the body of that question, to try to boost the overall levels of response.

In the light of the high response rate, Question 27, about value for money, was simplified into a tick box question “Yes/No”.

2.3.5 - Implementing the main questionnaire

Question One had clearly given some cause for concern (*see section 2.3.3 above*). The ordering of items appeared to have had a substantial effect both on the response rate for the survey and the gender representation amongst respondents. To proceed with the original version suggested that response would be good, but there was a risk that women might be under-represented. To proceed with the reverse version implied more equal representation, but an unacceptably low rate of response. However, there was no statistically significant relationship between the question order and the response to the question ($p=0.29$).

There appeared to be four possible ways of proceeding with the questionnaire. Going ahead with the original version of Question One suggested a potentially good response rate without having to increase sample size, but risked inhibiting response from women. Proceeding with a questionnaire with the reverse version suggested that the sample might be more representative along gender lines, but that response could be poor enough to damage the credibility of the research. Another pilot survey to trial a new version of Question One could have been conducted to give an opportunity to adjust the trade-off between response rate and representation. This would have delayed the main survey; added to costs and reduced the total population of Plaid Cymru members amongst whom the main survey could have been conducted. Alternatively, a questionnaire with the reverse version of Question One could have been sent out to a far larger survey sample than planned, perhaps with a circulation of 2,400, the figure necessary for a precision rate of $\pm 2\%$. This had the potential to redress the gender imbalance and produce a viable number of responses, but ran the risk of increasing costs and having an overwhelming number of questionnaires to process if response improved.

I decided to take the first option, going ahead with the original Question One. There was no firm evidence as to what had inhibited response from women in the pilot survey, whilst the reverse order of the question had clearly led to an unacceptably low response rate. The essence and credibility of the doctoral research was more easily retained with an acceptable response rate rather than an overall gender imbalance.

The 1,900 members needed to achieve a precision rate of $\pm 2.5\%$ amounted to one in eight members of Plaid Cymru who were not in the Taff Elai rhanbarth. The few members of the party registered at addresses outside the UK were also excluded from the sample. The party provided the names of members of all rhanbarthau except Taff Elai and members outside the UK printed on labels, and every eighth label was used to address an envelope. This resulted in 1,849 members being selected to receive a survey. Again, this method had the advantage of simplicity but did not allow any simple mechanism for following up non-response. The final version of the questionnaire and a covering letter were sent with a stamped addressed envelope for reply. The English language version of the letter and questionnaire, incorporating all the amendments listed at 2.3.4 above is at Section A2.5 of Appendix 2.

SECTION 2.4 - ANALYSIS OF RESPONSE

2.4.1 - Introduction

This section describes how the responses from the main survey were analysed. Response rates, the characteristics of the main survey sample, and exploratory statistical analysis are described. The section concludes with a summary of the main statistical techniques used in the analysis and presentation of data in the remainder of this thesis.

2.4.2 - Response rates

The response rate from the 1,849 members who received a survey was slightly higher than that of the pilot survey. A total of 478 questionnaires were returned, giving a response rate of 25.85% which was considered acceptable for the purposes of PhD research. Six of the returned questionnaires were unusable as they were returned blank, leaving a survey sample of 472. However, the quality of response to individual questions was generally lower than that which was received for the pilot survey (*see Tables 2.1 to 2.6*).

Table 2.1 - Demographic profile of respondents (n=472)

Question	Pilot response rate %	Main survey response rate %
Age	98	99
Gender	91	98
Income	96	89
Education	98	96
Language of response	n/a	n/a
Region	100	99

Table 2.2 - Joining history and behaviour profile of respondents (n=472)

Question	Pilot response rate %	Main survey response rate %
Organizational tenure	96	90
Membership continuity	98	98
Joining method	100	98
Parental membership	100	98
Other memberships	98	98

Table 2.3 - Political profile of respondents (n=472)

Question	Pilot response rate %	Main survey response rate %
Main reason for joining	100	100
Left/right spectrum	96	96
Feelings about policies	93	98
Political efficacy (6 items)	86-93	81-90
Branch efficacy	93	93

Table 2.4 - Satisfaction measures (n=472)

Question	Pilot response rate %	Main survey response rate %
Overall satisfaction	95	97
Expectations on joining	81	73
Expectations met	57	53
Benefits	81	73
Job satisfaction	55-67 (3 items)	59-63 (2 items)
Organisational socialization scale (10 items)	62-76	65-78

Table 2.5 - Attitudinal measurement scales (n=472)

Question	Pilot response rate %	Main survey response rate %
Volunteer Functions Inventory (12 items)	93-83	87-76
Organizational Commitment Questionnaire (18 items)	91-86	86-78

Table 2.6 - Finance and activity profile of respondents (n=472)

Question	Pilot response rate %	Main survey response rate %
Any donations made	100	95
Amount of donations	80	72
Value for money	97	92
Participation	100	100
Time spent	96	46
Numbers of activities	98	100

The changes made to improve response to the statements measuring socialization had a negligible result, with response levels improving only very slightly. Changes made to the measures of and value for money decreased response slightly, whilst the response rate to Question 15 measuring time spent on activities plummeted from 96% to 46%.

However, the substantial imbalance of gender representation was greatly improved. Although women were slightly underrepresented given the known composition of the party, they were only underrepresented by 6.8% (*Table 2.6*). Men were overrepresented by just 4.2%. Other demographic features of the survey sample were in line with expectations. The profile was checked with the party Chief Executive who confirmed that it was broadly in line with his expectations (Davies 2000b). Therefore there is no evidence to believe that the survey results are affected by non-response bias. The characteristics of the survey sample are described in full at Table 2.7 overleaf.

2.4.3 - Initial analysis of survey returns

Data from the survey returns were entered into a computer spreadsheet using the specialist SPSS package. Initially categories for data input were created corresponding with every statement and option presented to respondents on the questionnaire. New categories were created to codify responses gathered from the open-ended questions.

The raw data were then grouped in order to form meaningful categories of response and to allow sufficient information in each category to facilitate reliable statistical analysis.¹ A description of how these groupings formed appears at Section A2.6 in Appendix 2.

¹ The raw data was used for exploratory bivariate analysis - primarily hypothesis testing - in order to become familiar with the data and to look for possible patterns of relationships which would inform the direction of further analysis. This exploratory work is not presented in this thesis.

Table 2.7 - Characteristics of the survey sample (n= 472)

Characteristic	Frequency	%
Language of response to questionnaire		
Welsh	311	65.9
English	161	34.1
Gender		
Male	256	54.2
Female	204	43.2
Missing	12	2.5
Age		
16 – 24	14	3
25 – 34	29	6.1
35 – 44	68	14.4
45 – 54	122	25.8
55 – 64	98	20.8
65 – 74	83	17.6
75+	52	11
Missing	6	1.2
Household income		
Up to £8,000	70	14.8
£8,000 - £15,000	82	17.3
£15,001 - £25,000	104	22
£25,001 - £40,000	96	20.3
£40,001 - £60,000	46	9.7
£60,001+	23	4.9
Missing	51	10.8
Education level		
CSE/GCE/GCSE	27	5.7
A/S level or technical	37	7.8
Professional	74	15.7
University degree/ diploma	228	48.3
None	64	13.5
Missing	20	4.2
Date of first joining Plaid Cymru		
1999-2000	29	6.1
1994-98	63	13.3
1989-93	36	7.6
1979-88	59	12.5
1969-78	81	17.2
1968 or earlier	156	33.1
Missing	48	10.2

All the constructs measured by Likert scale – job satisfaction, socialization, political efficacy, all three dimensions of attitudinal commitment, and all six functional motivations for volunteering – were operationalized as follows. Firstly, where relevant, reverse-scored items were brought into line with the rest of the items. Each respondents' total score for each construct was calculated. For each construct measured by two Likert scale items, the mean point was used to further divide scores into “highest” and “lowest” groups for the purposes of statistical analysis. For political efficacy, socialization and each dimension of attitudinal commitment, quartile points were used to divide the scores.

The two separate measures of partisanship described in Section 2.2.3 above were also treated separately for the purposes of data analysis in order to have some mechanism to distinguish whether different manifestations of partisanship might have different attitudinal or behavioural outcomes. Individual responses to frequency of agreement with policies were ranked on a scale with the highest score indicating that the respondent usually agreed with policies. Responses to position on a far-left to far-right ideological spectrum were also allocated a scale number. Membership status was inferred from responses to whether or not individuals held a current subscription to Plaid Cymru.

2.4.4 - Statistical techniques used for analysis

The first task of analysing the data was to establish which relationships existed between a given dependent variable and groups of independent variables. Where the dependent variable could be measured on a scale with constant intervals, multiple regression analysis was used. However, as this method is inappropriate for dichotomous dependent variables, multivariate analysis techniques also had to be used (Bohrstedt and Knoke 1994). I chose to use logistic regression estimation in such circumstances. This was particularly suitable as none of the dependent variables that required multivariate analysis had any more than two discrete categories. Analysis of data in order to examine the experience of membership for different demographic groups was carried out chiefly by exploratory multiple analysis of variance techniques (MANOVA). This allowed statistical testing of the difference of means for two or more groups of party members, and allowed differences within groups, as well as those within groups, to be identified.

I had also intended to carry out data analyses to establish causal relationships between variables even though it was apparent from the outset that data-driven analysis of a cross-sectional study would not be an ideal method of doing so. The optimum possible research design for establishing causal relationships between variables was simply not practical given

the constraints of a bounded doctoral research project. Ideally, such a design should have comprised a longitudinal project: after initial testing and statistical identification of the variables believed to predict participation, the outcomes of appropriate controlled management interventions should be measured with a re-test of the survey sample. However, this would have involved additional time and expense that could not be justified for research of this nature. It is worth noting that published longitudinal studies in organizational behaviour are relatively scarce compared to the large numbers of studies that infer causal relationships from cross-sectional research.

In the context of this project, path analysis would have been suitable for establishing causal relationships between quantitative variables; however, as the majority of variables warranting further investigation were qualitative in nature, this technique was not sufficient. A more complex form of structural equation modelling would have been more suitable. This method would also, potentially, have allowed the causal outcomes from any given set of observed indicators to be established. In order to undertake this analysis, I would have had to create single higher-order measures of behavioural commitment, partisanship and satisfaction in order to meet the requirements of a structural equation modelling package (in this case AMOS 8).

At this point, it became clear that structural equation modelling would not be possible because some key behavioural outcomes had been measured in a way that proved to be unsuitable for this type of analysis. Many of the key behavioural indicators could only generate dichotomous responses, and dichotomous variables cannot be used in structural equation modelling. For example, the answer to the questions “Do you have a current subscription” or “Have you made any additional donations to Plaid Cymru over the past 12 months” can only be answered yes or no.

Only two of the variables used to measure behaviours were continuous, and therefore suitable for structural equation modelling. One of these was the number of activities in which respondents participated. But complications arose with the second continuous variable, the amount of time spent per week on activities. Firstly, as a result of the difficulties encountered in the pilot survey, respondents had not been given the opportunity to record a “no time spent” response. Consequently there was nothing to distinguish those members who had done nothing from those who had failed to answer the question. This may have contributed to the extremely disappointing response rate to this question (*see Table 2.6 above*). The responses that were given were heavily negatively skewed

towards the lowest amount of time spent – up to five hours a week – with nearly 70% of respondents (n=152) selecting this option. A further 18% (n=40) reported working between six and ten hours a week, and responses from the remaining 12% (n=27) were distributed across the remaining three time bands. All the statistical advice I received during this research indicated that these latter categories were too small to yield meaningful results; hence they were grouped into a single category comprising 67 responses. A continuous variable could have been created by adding a “zero” category, but the question design meant there was no mechanism for distinguishing “zero” and missing responses.

The alternative to creating a single higher-order measure for behavioural commitment would have been to analyse the central hypothesis with each of the hypothesized components of each construct in turn. This would have been a time-consuming and meaningless exercise, as some of the hypothesized components of the measures could have been correlated with each other. Clearly, a data-driven exploration of the central hypothesis was out of the question. But it certainly did not obviate the possibility of a theoretically-driven analysis of the central hypothesis. There is always the danger that a data-driven approach can reflect artefacts of the particular dataset that is subject to analysis. A theoretically-driven approach to analysis is, perhaps, more appropriate to interdisciplinary research because concepts and insights from a range of literatures can be incorporated. Accordingly, the concluding analysis of the central research hypothesis of this research is primarily theory-driven (*see Section 8.4 of Chapter 8*). But even though it was possible to make this small research virtue out of necessity, the failure to have taken into account the requirements of statistical analysis packages at the research design stage constituted a substantial limitation of this project. This subject is returned to in a fuller discussion of research limitations in Section 8.1.2 of Chapter 8.

2.4.5 – The major measurement scales: internal consistency and new subscales

Despite the difficulties described above, it was still possible to use structural equation modelling to estimate the internal consistency of most of the measurement scales used for the first time in a political party environment. Additionally, subscales of each of these major scales were created as a by-product of exploring whether the variables observed were a good fit of the overall construct I had hoped to measure. This section describes work on the socialization scale, the political efficacy scale and the scales used to measure each dimension of attitudinal commitment². Although the results of this exploratory exercise are

² The MOAQ scale measuring job satisfaction and the Volunteer Functions Inventory scales could not be treated in this way, because each of these comprised just two statements.

not used in the analysis in the remainder of this thesis, their presentation here demonstrates that, where these scales have been used in a political party setting for the first time, they show internal reliability levels similar to those found in workplace environments. This provides some statistical evidence that analytical frameworks from other disciplines can work very well in a political party environment, and there is little data-driven evidence to suggest that they are inappropriate for use.

Of course, the primary purpose of exploring the internal consistency of the various measurement scales was in order to ascertain whether each of the items in the various batteries of questions had measured the same construct. The internal consistency of each of the measurement scales comprising three or more items was estimated by obtaining the coefficient alpha. A summary of the coefficient found for each of the major scales appears at Table 2.8 below.

Table 2.8 – summary of alpha coefficients of measurement scales

Scale	α
Socialization	.8897
Affective commitment	.7578
Continuance commitment	.5728
Normative commitment	.7817
Political efficacy	.5467

The socialization scale achieved a very high alpha coefficient, which was close to the coefficient of .87 reported in the study from which it originated (Kelley 1992). The affective and normative commitment scales achieved alpha coefficients which were in line with coefficients achieved in other documented uses: median reliabilities for these scales are .85 and .73 respectively, and reliability estimates, with a few exceptions, are said to exceed .70 (Meyer and Allen 1997). The internal consistency of the continuance commitment scale in this study falls short of the median reliability for the scale in other studies (.79); nevertheless its level of consistency is sufficient to be considered suitable for research in the social sciences. Perhaps this finding can be partially explained by the fact that of all three dimensions of commitment, there are fewer directly comparable antecedents of continuance commitment in workplace and party settings (see Section 4.2.3 in Chapter 4). The internal consistency of the political efficacy scale is also low, but still within the limits considered suitable for research purposes. This is less surprising, as the scale used

in this survey was an amalgamation of statements measuring efficacy taken from two separate sources (*as described in Section 2.2.3 of this chapter*).

Before it became apparent that the central hypothesis could not be tested in its entirety by structural equation modelling, I had explored whether it was possible to group together the observed variables from the socialization, efficacy and attitudinal commitment scales to into models representing each of the key constructs. I was able to test that the measures used in the questionnaire achieved a good fit with the overall construct being tested for in a political party setting. For each measurement scale, I placed all scale items in a correlation matrix and incorporating scale items from the resulting matrices into models as observed variables. The parameters of each model were estimated in order to examine whether all the scale items measured the same construct. Scale items indicating the greatest source of misfit with the relevant latent variable were identified from the sample correlations estimates and were removed.

The socialization scale proved the most problematic in terms of modelling a latent variable. Even though the internal consistency of the scale was high, half of the items from the original measurement instrument had to be removed in order to achieve a good fit of data with a higher construct of socialization. This was probably a consequence of deciding to use a data-driven approach in order to model a latent construct from the observed variables, rather than any defect in the scale, or any peculiarities arising from using the scale in a political party environment. The first items to be removed were the two negatively scored statements, a third item identified as a source of misfit early in the modelling process appeared to duplicate another statement and was also removed. In subsequent models two other statements were dropped after the modification indices indicated that they were also sources of misfit. The resulting five item model which did prove a reasonable fit of the data (RMSEA = .057, df = 5, CFI = .998) was named the Party Socialization Subscale (PSS)³.

The six item instrument measuring political efficacy did not initially fit a latent variable of efficacy. As mentioned above, respondents' perceived political efficacy was measured by an amalgamation of statements; mainly from Olsen (1969) together with additional statements from the two British studies. However, after removal of the one item which modification indices indicated was a source of misfit (originating from the British studies), the remaining

five item model was a close fit of the data (RMSEA=.038, df = 5,CFI=.979). This subscale was renamed the Political Efficacy Subscale (PES)⁴. Similarly, none of the initial models testing the measurement of the latent variables of affective, continuance and normative commitment were a good fit. In the case of affective commitment, two negatively scored scale items were removed, leaving a four-item model which was a reasonable fit of the data (RMSEA = .060, df = 2, CFI = .961). The four items in the new model formed an Affective Commitment Subscale (ACS). In the case of continuance commitment, the one item constituting the greatest source of misfit in the initial model was removed, leaving a five item model, the Continuance Commitment Subscale (CCS), which was a close fit of the data (RMSEA = .049, df = 5, CFI = .968). Similarly, in the case of normative commitment, only one item constituted a substantial source of misfit. A five item model, the Normative Commitment Subscale (NCS), achieved a reasonable fit of the data (RMSEA = .049, df = 5, CFI = .987).

SECTION 2.5 - CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter has demonstrated that measuring key constructs such as socialization, efficacy and organizational commitment in a political party environment proved to be relatively straightforward and successful. However, whilst there was nothing ostensibly wrong about the way in which behavioural commitment was measured, the information obtained by measuring it turned out to be unsuitable for use in a sophisticated modeling computer package. The chief implication of this for analyzing the antecedents of behaviour (*see the following chapter*) is that variables are grouped into models on the basis of theorizing rather than on the basis of data-driven explorations of “goodness of fit”. Similarly, the causal relationships in the central hypothesis cannot be demonstrated, although they can be inferred, given what is known from various strands of literature. However, as the following chapters demonstrate, there is still enough information available from the data that were obtained, to attempt a comprehensive analysis of the antecedents of different behavioural outcomes in a political party setting.

³ The statements comprising the PSS are: “I get along with my branch officers”, “The activities are what I expected I would do”, “I am in control of the work I do for the party”, “My local branch can depend on me” and “I am trusted by the people I work with”.

⁴ The statements comprising the PES are: “I believe public officials don’t care much what people like me think”, “People like me can have a real influence on politics if they are prepared to get involved”, “Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that I can’t really understand what’s going on”, “There is no way other than voting that people like me can influence the actions of the government”, and “People like me don’t have any say about what the government does.”

CHAPTER 3 - SATISFACTION, PARTISANSHIP AND FIVE KEY BEHAVIOURS

INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the main findings from this research in respect of five key political party member behaviours. These behaviours – participation in at least one activity, the number of activities undertaken, time spent on activities, making a donation and renewal of subscriptions – are what managers would like their members to do for the party (House 1996). Participation supports the party's workload; making donations and renewing subscriptions supports the party financially. This chapter describes the process of identifying the variables with statistically significant relationships with activism. A detailed analysis of each key behaviour is presented and discussed. But, for the reasons discussed in the previous chapter, it is not possible statistically to test the nature and direction of these relationships. This chapter attempts only to identify which relationships exist.

These findings demonstrate that satisfaction models have more statistically significant relationships with participation than political antecedents models. Only one individual political antecedent has a relationship with participation, and that variable measures efficacy rather than partisanship. Conversely, two individual satisfaction variables demonstrate relationships with a range of behaviours. Demographic, psychological and organizational variables also demonstrate relationships with some behaviours.

The difference between those members who do not participate and those who do at least one activity lies with respondents' age and functional motivations. Respondents aged 55-64 were five times more likely to take part in at least one activity than the least active age group (those aged 75+). Respondents scoring highest on values and protective motivations were more than twice as likely to undertake at least one activity than respondents scoring the lowest on these dimensions. Values motivations also had a relationship with the amount of time spent on activities. Those scoring the highest were more than twice as likely to have spent an average of more than five hours a week on party matters during the period covered by the survey.

The number of party activities undertaken by any one individual appears to be best explained by a combination of political efficacy and satisfaction variables. Political efficacy,

job satisfaction, and varying levels of socialization appear, in different permutations, time and again as statistically significant factors where the amount of activity is concerned.

The decision to make donations to the party is explained by job satisfaction, careers functional motivations and organizational tenure. The total amount donated is explained primarily by household income although organizational tenure remains significant. Tenure also has a relationship with holding a current subscription, as does continuous membership – but these relationships are negative. Respondents aged 45-54 are the most likely to have a paid-up subscription.

Analysis models

For the purposes of statistical analysis, the variables in the survey were grouped into eight models which will be referred to throughout this chapter¹.

The ***satisfaction*** model contains a number of direct measures of satisfaction, one inferred measure, and one proxy measure. The direct measures comprise the extent to which respondents' expectations of membership were met, job satisfaction, and their overall feelings about membership. Satisfaction is inferred from the variable measuring whether respondents received any benefit from their membership. The proxy variable included in this model is that of socialization.

The ***political antecedents*** model contains all variables measuring the respondents' partisanship and perceived political efficacy. The variables indicating partisanship comprise: respondents' main reason for joining Plaid Cymru, the frequency with which they agree with party policies, and their self-reported place on a left/right spectrum in relation to the party as a whole. Respondents' perceptions of the efficacy of their local branch is also included in this model.

The ***functional motivations*** model comprises measures of career, enhancement, protective, social, understanding and values motivations. The position of values motivations in this model is a little ambiguous, as the definition offered by Clary *et al* (1992) which was cited in the literature review (*See Section 1.4.4*) imply that these must be accompanied by a feeling of person/organization value congruence. Therefore, values motivations could also be interpreted as indicating partisanship. However, at this stage of

¹ The variable names used in logistic regression tables for each model appear at Appendix 3.

analysis, I included this variable in the functional motivations model rather than the political antecedents model so that the relative importance of each functional motivation could be more easily identified.

The *demographic* model includes measures of age, gender, language of response, education level, household income, and the party density in the area where the respondent lived at the time of the survey. The *organizational factors* model comprises variables measuring the respondents' organizational tenure, their continuity of membership, their method of first joining Plaid Cymru and their membership of other organizations. Parental membership of Plaid Cymru is included in this model, as it might indicate some socialization into the party prior to joining. The *attitudinal commitment* model comprises measures of affective, normative and continuance commitment, divided into quartiles for the purposes of analysis.

The *financial indicators* model comprises measures of whether respondents held a current subscription to Plaid Cymru at the time of the survey, their additional donations and the total amount donated in the period covered by the survey, and their perceptions of membership in relation to value for money. Slightly differing permutations of the variables in this model are used, where appropriate, in the analysis of donation and subscription behaviours. Variables included in the *activity index* are whether the respondent did any one activity, the number of activities they participated in during the period of the survey and the average time spent per week on activities. This model is only used for the analysis of donation and subscription behaviours.

In the remainder of this chapter, each model in turn is tested for statistical relationships with each of the five key behaviours. Where variables in a model achieved statistical significance with a key behaviour they were put into a composite model alongside the statistically significant variables from all the other models. Variables retaining their significance at this stage went into subsequent models until a final model of significant variables was achieved for each key behaviour. Only the composite and final models (together with a couple of models which illustrate key theoretical points) appear in the body of this chapter; preliminary models showing at least one statistically significant relationship with a key behaviour can be found at Appendix 3.

SECTION 3.1 – PARTICIPATION AND NON-PARTICIPATION

3.1.1 - Introduction

The 12 months immediately preceding the membership survey were busy for Plaid Cymru. In the first two months of that period, the party fought three elections: the first-ever elections to the National Assembly in April 1999 and elections for local councils and the European Parliament in May. The survey results suggest that Plaid Cymru members joined in wholeheartedly with the party's efforts. A total of 76.9% of respondents reported having taken part in at least one party activity in the 12 months prior to the survey and, of these, 82.8% took part in two or more different types of activity (*Table 3.1*). Although such rates of participation appear to be very healthy, it is likely that overall levels of activity within the party over this period were lower. It is likely that the most active members are over represented amongst survey respondents, on the basis that they would be amongst the most likely to return an unsolicited questionnaire. Just over 30% of respondents contributed more than five hours a week, on average, to party activities. However, as levels of response to this question were very low (*Chapter 2, Table 2.6*), it is likely that the overall percentage of members contributing more than five hours a week is considerably lower (*Table 3.2*).

Table 3.1 - Respondents' activity levels

Number of activities	(%)
One activity	17.1
2 - 5 activities	44.4
6 -10 activities	25.1
More than 10 activities	13.2

Table 3.2 - Respondents' time commitment

Time spent on activities, per week	(%)
Up to five hours	69.4
6 - 10 hours	18.3
11 - 15 hours	3.2
16 - 20 hours	4.1
More than 20 hours	5.0

Two key questions are raised by these results. What are the differences between those individuals who choose to take part in Plaid Cymru activities and those who do not participate? What are the differences between the third of party members spending more than five hours a week on activities and the rest of the party? The remainder of this section attempts to identify these differences.

3.1.2 - The difference between participation and non-participation

The difference between doing at least one party activity and doing nothing lies in the functional motivations of party members and in their age. Those scoring highest on values and protective motivations are the most likely to be active, as are those members aged between 55-64.

A logistic regression analysis of the political antecedents model indicated that the partisanship variables did not account for the difference between participants and non-participants (*Table A3.1 in Appendix 3*). Medium high political efficacy (TOTPOLFQ 2) only very narrowly missed significance at the five per cent level in this model, and so was included in a composite model of significant variables. Even this constituted one more relationship with participation than could be found in the satisfaction model. No satisfaction variable had any statistically significant relationship with participation.

Age was found to be far more likely to account for the difference between activity and inactivity. The control group for this analysis comprised the very eldest members (75+) who were the least likely to participate. The likelihood of members aged 55-64 being active was five times greater, than that of the control group, with the 45-54 group being almost twice as likely to participate than the control. Respondents aged 16-24 constituted the third most active group (*see Table A3.2 in Appendix 3*).

There were no significant variables in the attitudinal commitment model, but the functional motivations model contained two variables with a statistically significant relationship with the decision to participate. Members scoring highest on protective motivations were two and a half times more likely to participate in any one activity than those scoring lowest. Similarly, the likelihood of members scoring highest on values motivations doing at least one activity was nearly two and a half times greater than those scoring lowest (*Table A3.3 in Appendix 3*).

Statistically significant organizational factors in relation to participation were continuity of membership and membership of 21 years or more. Members in the party for over 21 years were three times more likely to participate than the control groups of the very newest members. Those who were continuous members of Plaid Cymru were 2.8 times more likely to participate in any one activity than those who had let their membership lapse at some point (*Table A3.4 in Appendix 3*).

In the financial indicators model, perceived value for money only narrowly missed statistical significance with participation at the $p < .05$ level and so was included in a subsequent composite model. Members who believed that their membership represented good value for money were just over twice as likely to participate in any one activity than those who do not (*Table A3.5 in Appendix 3*).

In a composite model of all the above significant variables (*Table 3.3*), only age bands 4 and 5, representing those aged 45-64, values motivations, protective motivations and length of membership between 21-30 years (PCYEARS3) retained significance. In a subsequent composite model, length of membership and age band 4 representing the 45-54 group lost statistical significance (*see Table A3.6 in Appendix 3*). The three variables left in the final model retained their statistical significance with participation in any one activity. A Hosmer-Lemeshow test indicated that the model is a good fit (*Table 3.4 overleaf*). Those scoring highest on values and protective motivations, and in the 55-64 age band are the most likely to participate in at least one activity.

Table 3.3 - Composite model/Any one activity

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp (B)
AGE			8.8023	6	.1850	.0000	
AGE (1)	1.3916	.9407	2.1882	1	.1391	.0252	4.0211
AGE (2)	1.5785	.8789	3.2257	1	.0725	.0644	4.8476
AGE (3)	1.0494	.7120	2.1721	1	.1405	.0241	2.8559
AGE (4)	1.5799	.6823	5.3612	1	.0206	.1067	4.8543
AGE (5)	1.9715	.7284	7.3253	1	.0068	.1343	7.1816
AGE (6)	1.2100	.7433	2.6497	1	.1036	.0469	3.3533
TOTVFIP	.1792	.0804	4.9590	1	.0260	.1001	1.1962
TOTVFIV	.1414	.0655	4.6576	1	.0309	.0948	1.1519
CONTYN (1)	-.5377	.4243	1.6061	1	.2050	.0000	.5841
PCYEARS3	1.0414	.5101	4.1673	1	.0412	.0856	2.8331
PCYEARS4	.5919	.4537	1.7026	1	.1920	.0000	1.8075
TOTPOLFQ2	.1802	.3860	.2180	1	.6406	.0000	1.1975
SUBPAID	.6599	.5659	1.3598	1	.2436	.0000	1.9347
SUBVALUE (1)	-.4189	.4641	.8149	1	.3667	.0000	.6578
Constant	-2.7796	.9824	8.0049	1	.0047		

Table 3.4 - Final model/Any one activity

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp (B)
TOTVFIPG	1.0061	.3129	10.3382	1	.0013	.1532	2.7348
TOTVFIVG	.8002	.3191	6.2892	1	.0121	.1099	2.2259
AGE5	.9670	.4095	5.5757	1	.0182	.1003	2.6301
Constant	.6228	.1878	10.9984	1	.0009		

Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness-of-fit test Sig= .3926

3.1.3 - A brief history of time

In a triple election year, just over 30% of respondents contributed more than five hours a week to Plaid Cymru. But no statistically significant differences between these members, and those who did not give so much time to the party were found in any of the models investigating the relationship between political antecedents, satisfaction, attitudinal commitment, organizational factors or financial indicators.

The members most likely to contribute the most time were those scoring highest on values motivations. Those scoring highest on values motivations (TOTVFIVG) were nearly three times more likely to contribute more than five hours of their time each week to the party than those scoring lowest (*Table A3.7 in Appendix 3*). There was also a gender-based time gap, with women nearly four times less likely than men to spend more than five hours a week on party activities (*Table A3.8 in Appendix 3*) but this faded into statistical insignificance in relation to values motivations. In a composite model of these two significant variables, (with men used as the control gender variable) gender lost significance at the five per cent level (*Table 3.5 overleaf*). With only one statistically significant variable, values motivations, retaining significance, a Hosmer-Lemeshow test for goodness of fit was not appropriate.

Table 3.5 - Composite model/More than five hours on party activities

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp (B)
GENDERM	.5478	.3310	2.7394	1	.0979	.0553	1.7294
TOTVFIVG	.6813	.3232	4.4437	1	.0350	.1006	1.9765
Constant	-1.5077	.3235	21.7253	1	.0000		

3.1.4 – Discussion of findings

The findings of the analytical exercises described above indicate that one dimension of partisanship does have a statistically significant relationship with participation in party activities – but not the dimension one would expect given the previous studies of party

members. Partisanship as defined by political scientists – frequency of agreement with policies and position on the political spectrum, for example, has nothing to do with participation, according to this analysis. But partisanship defined in psychological terms – values motivations – clearly does have a very significant relationship with participation and with the time spent on activities. Another psychological explanation for participation is also found to operate in political parties – protective motivations. It makes sense that those who use membership as an escape from the pressures of life elsewhere should busy themselves with party activities. The relationship between age and activities merely confirms what has already been documented in studies of British party members (Seyd and Whiteley 1992, Whiteley, Seyd and Richardson 1994) that “middle-aged” members are a very active demographic group.

The model explaining time spent on activities is clearly not satisfactory. It does seem quite remarkable that values motivations alone have a relationship with the time spent on activities, although this finding ties in with the argument that individuals agreeing closely with party values might be the most prepared to *make* the time available to participate. But at least this variable has been isolated as an antecedent of spending time by a methodical analytical process, in contrast to guesswork, out of an extremely wide spectrum of other possible variables. Clearly, this finding is a starting point towards exploring what accounts for donations of time, in a political party context, but it is by far the last word on the matter.

SECTION 3.2 - NUMBERS OF ACTIVITIES

3.2.1 - Introduction

Most Plaid Cymru members who participate in party activities take part in more than one different type of activity (*see Table 3.1*). This section looks in greater detail at the variables with a statistically significant relationship with the number of activities in which an individual participates. It subsequently attempts to identify which of those variables have a statistically significant relationship with the type of activity in which members choose to participate.

Respondents were asked if they had participated in any of 19 specific activities which Plaid Cymru members have the opportunity to do. These activities were arranged into three different groups. The routine party activities group refers to activities carried out at local branch level. These include: attending branch meetings or public meetings, helping to

organize local fundraising and social events, providing clerical assistance to the local branch, delivering leaflets, organizing a petition, or recruiting new members. Election activities involved canvassing - either door to door or over the telephone - helping on election day itself and standing as a party candidate in a local election. Internal party activities included standing for party office either locally or nationally, attending a rhanbarth meeting, a national meeting, or national conference, and serving on a national committee. The overall number of activities was calculated by adding together the numbers of activities that respondents indicated they had done.

Three variables showed strong and robust statistical relationships with the number of activities undertaken by members and appeared, in different permutations, across the range of activity type. Only one of these was drawn from the political antecedents model, and that was perceived political efficacy, not any of the variables indicating partisanship. The remaining two variables were drawn from the satisfaction model: high socialization and job satisfaction. Some other variables had statistically significant relationships with individual activity types, but, overall, political efficacy, high socialization and job satisfaction scores are the most important variables which have statistically significant relationships with participation.

These findings lend further support to the argument against using May's Law as an analytical framework for examining party participation. There is no evidence suggesting any statistically significant relationship between the most active members of Plaid Cymru and their place on the political spectrum. It is the combination of satisfaction variables and personal political efficacy that deserves the closer examination which begins below.

3.2.2 - Overall number of activities

The importance of socialization and job satisfaction are immediately apparent from the results of the satisfaction model (*Table A3.9 in Appendix 3*). All three levels of socialization, and job satisfaction, show a statistically significant relationship with the overall number of activities undertaken. A further variable, receipt of some kind of social or personal benefit from membership, also showed significance with the overall number of activities. One other variable, mixed feelings about membership, so narrowly missed statistical significance that it was included in the subsequent composite model of significant variables.

In contrast to the number of variables achieving significance in the satisfaction model, only high political efficacy achieved significance in the political antecedents model (*Table A3.10*

in Appendix 3). Indeed, the significance of high political efficacy accounted for the significance of the whole model. Whilst the satisfaction model accounted for 32% of the variance in overall numbers of activities (see table A3.9 in Appendix 3), the political antecedents model accounted for just 11%. Nor did the model provide any support for the appropriateness of May's Law as an analytical framework of participation. May's Law would suggest that statistical significance would be demonstrated between position on the political spectrum and the number of activities undertaken. As Plaid Cymru is a left of centre party, May's Law predicts a link between members describing themselves as being to the far left of the party as a whole and the number of activities undertaken. In fact, no position on the party spectrum has a statistically significant relationship with the overall number of activities undertaken by members.

The only demographic variable to have a statistically significant relationship with the number of activities is age (Table A3.11 in Appendix 3). Contrary to the myth that young people are the most active members of a political party (Davies 1999b), it is the 55-64 age band that is most likely to take part in the highest number of activities. In terms of joining history and behaviour, members who belong to more than one other organization, and members who have been in the party for six years or more are those who demonstrate a statistically significant link with the number of activities undertaken (Table A3.12 in Appendix 3).

In the attitudinal commitment model, medium high and high affective commitment reached statistical significance with the overall number of activities (Table A3.13 in Appendix 3). In the functional motivations model, values motivations show a statistically significant relationship with the overall number of activities (Table A3.14 in Appendix 3). The financial indicators model shows preliminary evidence of a "virtuous circle" between activities and the amount of donations made (Table A3.15 in Appendix 3) - the only financial indicator that has any statistical significance with the number of activities undertaken.

Due to the large number of variables achieving significance in the initial models, two composite models of significant variables were tested. The first (Table 3.6 overleaf) comprised those variables reaching significance in the satisfaction and political antecedents models. Half of these variables - high political efficacy, job satisfaction and high socialization - retained their significance. The second composite model (Table 3.7) comprised all the significant variables from the other models. The two attitudinal

commitment variables retained their statistical significance, alongside values motivations and total of donations.

Table 3.6 - Composite model 1/Number of activities - regression coefficients

	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig
(constant)	-.179	1.195		-.150	.881
High political efficacy	1.323	.625	.150	2.118	.036
Job satisfaction	.447	.129	.289	3.464	.001
Medium high socialization	2.733	.849	.292	3.218	.002
High socialization	1.181	.779	.125	1.515	.132
Mixed feelings	-.731	1.275	-.040	-.573	.568
Social and personal benefit	1.126	.725	.110	1.553	.123

Model summary: R=.555, R² = .308, Adjusted R² = .279, F ratio =10.532, Sig = .000

Table 3.7 - Composite model 2/Number of activities - regression coefficients

	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig
(constant)	-2.218	1.349		-1.644	.102
55-64	1.185	.632	.114	1.875	.062
Medium high affective commitment	1.598	.716	.156	2.230	.027
High affective commitment	1.755	.738	.184	2.377	.018
Values motivations	.312	.119	.173	2.609	.010
Members between 6-20 years	.762	.870	.072	.876	.382
Members between 20-30 years	1.510	.941	.129	1.605	.110
Members more than 30 years	.631	.848	.069	.744	.458
More than one other membership	.458	.564	.050	.813	.417
Total of donations	.607	.211	.182	2.884	.004

Model summary: R=.439, R² = .193, Adjusted R² = .161, F ratio =6.115, Sig = .000

In a third composite model, only the political efficacy, socialization and job satisfaction variables retained their significance (Table 3.8). These variables all retained their significance in a final model (Table 3.9). This final model explains 28% of the variance in the overall number of activities in which members choose to participate. However, a Durbin-Watson score of 1.7 indicates that these variables are correlated with each other to some extent.

**Table 3.8 - Composite model 3/Number of activities
- regression coefficients**

	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig
(constant)	-.548	2.128		-.258	.797
Medium high affective commitment	.818	.860	.086	.951	.343
High affective commitment	.235	.936	.025	.251	.803
Values motivations	-.218	.175	-.111	-1.244	.216
Total of donations	.465	.259	.137	1.795	.075
High political efficacy	1.408	.697	.158	2.019	.046
High socialization	2.269	.765	.243	2.967	.004
Job satisfaction	.637	.141	.375	4.509	.000

Model summary: R=.556, R² = .309, Adjusted R² = .271, F ratio = 8.111, Sig = .000

Table 3.9 – Final model/Number of activities - regression coefficients

	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig
(constant)	-.716	1.132		-.632	.528
High political efficacy	1.610	.589	.179	2.736	.007
High socialization	2.211	.677	.233	3.265	.001
Job satisfaction	.553	.115	.346	4.831	.000

Model summary: R=.542, R² = .294, Adjusted R² = .281, F ratio = 23.286, Sig = .000, Durbin-Watson = 1.707

3.2.3 - Type of party activities

The high socialization, job satisfaction and high political efficacy variables appear, in different permutations, across all three activity types. Yet each of the three activity types differ from each other quite noticeably in terms of the variables that show statistical significance. Routine activities have a statistically significant relationship with lower socialization scores, not just those falling into the upper quartile. Political efficacy loses significance in respect of election time activities. Socialization loses significance with internal party activity; whilst total of donations - which kept significance with the overall number of activities until the third composite model – retains a statistically significant relationship with this activity type.

Activity types and the satisfaction model - In the satisfaction model, the variables of socialization and the total score of job satisfaction emerged as significant antecedents of both routine and election time activities. However, no satisfaction variable achieved statistical significance at the $p < .05$ level with internal party activities. In the case of routine

activities, receipt of some kind of social or personal benefit reached statistical significance, although this significance was lost in a later model. In the case of election time activities, the variable for mixed feelings about membership also gained statistical significance, albeit indicating a negative relationship that lost significance in later models (see Table A3.16 in Appendix 3).

Activity types and the political antecedents model - There is only one variable in the political antecedents model which reaches statistical significance at the $p < .05$ level (Table A3.17 in Appendix 3). This variable is not one of those crucial in terms of May's Law - position on the political spectrum - which consistently and substantially miss significance at this level of stringency. This variable is personal political efficacy, which achieves statistical significance across all party activities. Slight branch efficacy so narrowly misses significance in the model when applied to election time activities, that it is included in a later composite model. The political antecedents model applied to internal party activities is the "acid test" for May's Law. If those on the extreme of the political spectrum are those who play the most active part in party activities, one would expect to see a significant statistical relationship between number of party activities and those on the far left of the political spectrum. In this case, none of the variables regarding position on the political spectrum achieve significance at the five per cent level with internal party activities. These results do not provide any evidence that May's Law is an appropriate framework for analysing the antecedents of party activity.

Activity types and the demographic model - The statistical significance of the demographic model in respect of routine and election time activities is accounted for by age (Table A3.18 in Appendix 3). For routine activities, the age range 55-64 is significant, in the election activities model this group is joined by the 45-54 age range. However, in the case of internal activities, it is gender, not age, that makes the model significant.

Activity types and the attitudinal commitment model - Medium high and highest affective commitment are statistically significant across the range of activities. (Table A3.19 in Appendix 3).

Activity types and the functional motivations model - Values motivation is the only functional motivation that is statistically significant across the full range of activities. No other functional motivation reaches statistical significance with routine activities and internal activities. In election activities, understanding motivations are also statistically

significant, but this relationship is negative. This suggests that the higher an individual scores on understanding motivations, the less likely they are to take part in election activities. (*Table A3.20 in Appendix 3*).

Activity types and the organizational factors model - The variables with a statistically significant relationship with routine party activities are continuous membership, and membership of more than five years. Membership of more than five years is also statistically significant with election time activities. However, in the case of internal party activities, organizational tenure does not show any statistical significance until the over 30 years group. Membership of more than one other organization also has a statistically significant positive relationship with the number of internal party activities undertaken (*Table A3.21 in Appendix 3*).

The financial indicators models - The total of donations made over a 12 month period has a statistically significant relationship with all three types of activity (*Table A3.22 in Appendix 3*).

Routine party activities - composite and final models

The statistically significant variables included in the composite model for routine activities were: age bracket 55-64, medium high and highest affective commitment, receiving a social/personal benefit from membership, medium low, medium high and highest socialization, job satisfaction, highest political efficacy, values motivations, continuous membership, membership over five years and total of donations over 12 months (*Table 3.10*). The only variables which retained significance in this model were medium low, medium high and highest socialization and job satisfaction. All four variables continued to retain significance in a final model (*Table 3.11*).

Table 3.10 - Composite model 1/Routine party activities - regression coefficients

	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig
(constant)	-.895	1.557		-.575	.567
55-64	.458	.396	.094	1.155	.251
Medium high affective commitment	.345	.481	.073	.718	.474
Highest affective commitment	-.230	.503	-.051	-.457	.648
Social and personal benefit	.674	.397	.137	1.699	.092
Medium low socialization	2.018	.639	.363	3.157	.002
Medium high socialization	1.506	.605	.327	2.487	.015
Highest socialization	2.880	.667	.625	4.320	.000
Total - job satisfaction	.215	.082	.260	2.609	.010
Highest political efficacy	.362	.382	.082	.948	.345
Total - values motivations	-.076	.101	-.079	-.758	.450
Continuous membership	.272	.539	.044	.506	.614
Members between 6-20 years	.506	.743	.097	.682	.497
Members between 21-30 years	.490	.794	.091	.617	.539
Members more than 30 years	-.415	.714	-.096	-.561	.562
Total of donations	.201	.150	.117	1.343	.182

Model summary: R=.620, R² = .384, Adjusted R² = .293, F ratio = 4.203, Sig = .000

Table 3.11 - Composite model 2/Routine party activities - regression coefficients

	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig
(constant)	-.136	.573		-.238	.812
Medium low socialization	1.215	.455	.207	2.671	.008
Medium high socialization	1.410	.438	.284	3.218	.002
Highest socialization	2.299	.465	.473	4.941	.000
Total - job satisfaction	.210	.063	.252	3.319	.001

Model summary: R=.555, R² = .308, Adjusted R² = .292, F ratio = 19.993, Sig = .000, Durbin-Watson = 1.816.

This model was statistically significant and explained 29% of the variance in taking part in routine party activities; however, in order to test it against the model for overall activities, a further model was produced which included high political efficacy (Table 3.12). The resulting final model is also statistically significant and explains 30% of the variance in the decision to participate in routine party activities. All variables retain their significance within the model, however a Durbin-Watson score of 1.684 suggests that there is some correlation between the variables.

Table 3.12- Final model/ Routine party activities - regression coefficients

	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig
(constant)	-.112	.582		-.191	.848
Medium low socialization	1.138	.457	.198	2.493	.014
Medium high socialization	1.273	.441	.258	2.889	.004
High socialization	2.294	.474	.469	4.842	.000
Total - job satisfaction	.191	.064	.232	2.989	.003
High political efficacy	.600	.300	.130	2.004	.047

Model summary: R=.567, R² = .322, Adjusted R² = .301, F ratio = 15.736, Sig = .000, Durbin-Watson = 1.684

Election activities - composite and final models

The variables comprising the composite model for election activities were: mixed feelings about membership, medium high socialization, job satisfaction, perceived slight branch efficacy, age brackets 45-54 and 55-64, medium high and high affective commitment, understanding motivations, values motivations, membership over five years, and total of donations over 12 months. The only variable to retain significance in this model was job satisfaction (*Table 3.13*).

Table 3.13 - Composite model/Election activities - regression coefficients

	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig
(constant)	-1.043	1.089		-.958	.340
Mixed feelings about membership	-.224	.687	-.029	-.326	.745
Total - job satisfaction	.238	.058	.374	4.085	.000
Medium high socialization	-.086	.298	-.025	-.290	.772
Slight branch efficacy	.389	.370	.092	1.053	.295
High political efficacy	.162	.308	.049	.526	.600
Age 45-54	.289	.337	.083	.858	.393
Age 55-64	.386	.349	.104	1.108	.270
Med-high affective commitment	.603	.381	.171	1.582	.116
High affective commitment	.645	.428	.185	1.507	.135
Understanding motivations	-.044	.057	-.080	-.771	.442
Values motivations	-.042	.092	-.058	-.462	.645
Members between 6-20 years	.774	.540	.196	1.433	.155
Members between 21-30 years	.289	.577	.074	.502	.617
Members more than 30 years	.604	.526	.183	1.149	.253
Total of donations	.126	.117	.100	1.085	.280

Model summary: R=.310, R² = .096, Adjusted R² = .092, F ratio = 27.579, Sig = .000

As this did not seem to be a satisfactory outcome bearing in mind the combination of variables with relationships with overall number of activities, the job satisfaction variable was tested with the variables of high socialization and high political efficacy which had showed statistically significant relationships with the overall number of activities. In this test model, high socialization showed statistical significance with election activities whilst high political efficacy did not (*Table 3.14*).

Table 3.14 - Test model/Election activities - regression coefficients

	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig
(constant)	-.128	.438		-.291	.772
Total - job satisfaction	.175	.044	.303	3.958	.000
High socialization	.656	.262	.190	2.503	.013
High political efficacy	.341	.228	.104	1.498	.136

Model summary: R=.444, R² = .197, Adjusted R² = .182, F ratio = 13.724, Sig = .000

In a final model of job satisfaction and high socialization both variables retained their significance. Whilst the model itself is statistically significant, it explains only 18% of the variance in participation in election time activities (*Table 3.15 overleaf*). Additionally, a Durbin-Watson score of 1.85 indicates that there is some slight autocorrelation between variables.

Table 3.15 - Final model/Election activities - regression coefficients

	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig
(constant)	-.029	.422.		-.232	.817
Total - job satisfaction	.182	.042	.315	4.313	.000
High socialization	.681	.247	.201	2.761	.006

Model summary: R=.437, R² = .191, Adjusted R² = .182, F ratio =21.508 , Sig = .000, Durbin-Watson = 1.856

Internal party activities - composite and final models

The statistically significant variables comprising the composite model were high political efficacy, gender, medium high and high affective commitment, values motivations, membership of more than one other organization, Plaid Cymru membership of more than 30 years and the total of donations over 12 months. The only variables to retain

significance in this model were high political efficacy and the total of donations (Table 3.16).

Table 3.16 - Composite model 1/Internal party activities - regression coefficients

	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig
(constant)	-.444	.430		-1.034	.302
High political efficacy	.597	.168	.238	3.557	.000
Gender	-.095	.156	-.039	-.614	.540
Medium high affective commitment	.051	.193	.019	.266	.790
High affective commitment	.132	.203	.052	.653	.514
Values motivations	.046	.034	.098	1.389	.166
More than one other membership	.127	.155	.052	.817	.415
Members more than 30 years	-.056	.165	-.023	-.344	.731
Total of donations	.185	.057	.210	3.249	.001

Model summary: R=.429, R² = .184, Adjusted R² = .154, F ratio =6.169, Sig = .000

The two variables retaining statistical significance in a subsequent composite model (Table 3.17), were tested alongside those other variables which had reached significance in relation to the overall number of activities. High socialization was initially significant (Table 3.18), but lost its significance when job satisfaction was added to the model (Table 3.19).

Table 3.17 - Composite model 2/Internal party activities - regression coefficients

	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig
(constant)	-.073	.152		-.481	.631
Total of donations	.206	.051	.235	4.023	.000
High political efficacy	.688	.148	.272	4.656	.000

Model summary: R=.397, R² = .158, Adjusted R² = .151, F ratio =24.354, Sig = .000

Table 3.18 - Test model 1/Internal party activities - regression coefficients

	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig
(constant)	-.042	.234		-.180	.858
Total of donations	.181	.073	.183	2.493	.014
High political efficacy	.673	.196	.253	3.433	.001
High socialization	.429	.198	.156	2.161	.032

Model summary: R=.380, R² = .145, Adjusted R² = .129, F ratio = 9.248, Sig = .000

Table 3.19 - Test model 2/Internal party activities - regression coefficients

	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig
(constant)	-1.218	.521		-2.338	.021
Total of donations	.212	.085	.200	2.502	.014
High political efficacy	.556	.223	.210	2.493	.014
High socialization	.226	.245	.078	.923	.358
Total - job satisfaction	.123	.045	.233	2.734	.007

Model summary: R=.426, R² = .181, Adjusted R² = .157, F ratio = 7.311, Sig = .000

The total of donations, high political efficacy and job satisfaction retained their significance in a final model (Table 3.20 overleaf). The model itself is significant, but explains only 16% of the variance in the decision to take part in internal party activities. A Durbin-Watson score of 1.864 indicates that there may be some autocorrelation between these variables.

Table 3.20 - Final model/Internal party activities - regression coefficients

	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig
(constant)	-1.180	.419		-2.819	.005
Total of donations	.207	.069	.210	3.000	.003
High political efficacy	.564	.185	.213	3.040	.003
Total - job satisfaction	.125	.035	.247	3.609	.000

Model summary: R=.418, R² = .175, Adjusted R² = .161, F ratio = 12.449, Sig = .000, Durbin-Watson = 1.864

3.2.4 – Discussion of findings

These findings indicate that there is no evidence of May's "law" operating within Plaid Cymru in respect of the numbers of activities that members do. In fact, there are no statistically significant relationships between any variable indicating partisanship and the numbers and types of activities in which members participate. In contrast, two satisfaction variables, job satisfaction and socialization, occur in various permutations across the range of activities. Clearly, whilst partisanship in the form of values motivations has a relationship with whether an individual participates or not, there is no evidence that it has any bearing on what, or how much, that individual chooses to do.

Job satisfaction and socialization account for both the overall number of activities in which respondents take part, and, particularly in the case of socialization, which activities they

take part in. Clearly, members who have only been socialized into the party to a limited extent are still prepared to take part in its routine activities, but higher levels of socialization are required before they are prepared to undertake election duties. It is difficult to speculate why socialization loses significance with participation in internal activities once job satisfaction is controlled for. One possible explanation for this might be that socialization could result in a tendency to consider oneself “one of the group”, rather than to generate a desire to lead. The consistency of job satisfaction as an antecedent of all activities can be explained by the observation that, in a voluntary environment, it would be unlikely that individuals would do something that they did not enjoy doing.

The third antecedent of how many and which activities members do is political efficacy. This is consistent with the findings from studies of Labour and Conservative party activists (Seyd and Whitely, 1992, Whiteley, Seyd and Richardson 1994) that were discussed in the opening chapter (*see Section 1.2.3 of Chapter 1*). Clearly, the importance of political efficacy as an antecedent of activism is consistent across parties of completely differing ideologies, providing more evidence that differences in belief do not necessarily result in differences in behaviour. But political efficacy does not appear to be an antecedent of election activities when job satisfaction and socialization are controlled for – and it is not immediately apparent why this should be. One explanation could be that, in the context of routine and internal activities, members may feel that they are more directly responsible for the outcomes of what they do. In election time there is more uncertainty because they are not directly responsible for the choices that voters will make; therefore less political confidence is needed to take part.

Nor is there any immediate explanation for the relationship between the total amount of donations made and participation in internal party activities. It may be evidence of a “virtuous circle” between donations and participation – but this is unlikely, because the evidence to be presented in the following section of this chapter substantially challenges this hypothesized relationship. Or this *prima facie* relationship may indicate the existence of other, submerged, relationships that are common to those who participate in internal activities. For example, members who are well educated are more likely to have the average or high household incomes that are related to the total of donations (*Section 3.3.3 below*), and are more likely to feel politically efficacious (*see Table A5.5 in Appendix 5*).

From the organizational behaviour point of view, an interesting feature of these results is that there appears to be no statistical relationships between any dimension of attitudinal

commitment and any type of party activity that retained significance into the final model. Preliminary models indicated that medium high or high levels of affective commitment had statistically significant relationships across the spectrum of party activities, which would be in line with expectations arising from studies of commitment in the workplace (Meyer and Allen 1997). But, clearly, in contrast to what one would expect, the significance of this relationship was not retained in later models. This appears to indicate that the outcomes of attitudinal commitment in a political party setting may be different from those in the workplace, and this is discussed in some detail later in the thesis (*see Section 7.3 in Chapter 7*).

SECTION 3.3 - DONATION AND SUBSCRIPTION BEHAVIOUR

3.3.1 - Introduction

Political parties do not need members just because members work for the party. Members also pay for the privilege of working for the party via their subscription fees and by making additional voluntary donations. For “smaller” political parties such as Plaid Cymru, where substantial donations from external organizations are not generally forthcoming, the bulk of party income is made up of funding from members. Plaid Cymru carries out a major fundraising appeal amongst all party members once a year on St David’s Day, several other collections are held at regular intervals, for example at branch meetings, at National Conference, or from Head Office in respect of specific one-off campaigns.

The survey respondents reported responding positively to these appeals. Only 23.8% of respondents said they had not made any donation in the 12-month period prior to the survey. Of the 76.2% of respondents who had made an additional donation, slightly over half (57.1%) made donations which totalled less £25 over the course of the year (*Table 3.21*). This finding suggests that the survey respondents’ pattern of giving is frequent but modest.

Table 3.21 - Total donations by survey respondents

Amount donated in 12 months	(%)
Under £10	21.0
Between £10.01 - £25.00	36.1
Between £25.01 - £50.00	15.1
Between £50.01 - £100.00	13.9
Over £100	13.9

This section attempts to identify what prompts members to make additional donations, and what factors determine the amount of money they donate. It also examines what prompts members to make another type of financial contribution to Plaid Cymru, renewal of their annual subscriptions. Each of these three behaviours is examined in turn, and, in a concluding section, the results are compared – where possible – with those from other documented studies of these behaviours.

3.3.2 - The decision to donate to Plaid Cymru

Job satisfaction shows itself again to be of significance when decisions about donations are made. This time it combines with one joining history and behaviour variable - organizational tenure - and one of the functional motivations - careers motivations - to explain the decision whether or not to make any additional donations. Only one variable from the political antecedents model, perceived political efficacy, showed an initial relationship with making a donation, but it lost significance in subsequent models.

The satisfaction model reveals additional evidence of a “virtuous circle” between participation in activities and donations made presented above (*Table 3.20*). In this satisfaction model (*Table A3.23 in Appendix 3*) a relationship emerges between job satisfaction and whether any donation is made. Survey respondents scoring highest on job satisfaction (TOTJBSAG) are five times more likely to have made an additional donation than those scoring lowest.

But belief in party ideology does not open purses and pockets. There is no statistically significant relationship between any of the political antecedents measuring belief and making an additional donation (*Table A3.24 in Appendix 3*). The only variable in this model that has a statistically significant relationship with making a donation is political efficacy (TOTPOLFQ), and this relationship is negative. The relationship is largely accounted for by members rating their efficacy as medium high (TOTPOLFQ 2), who are one third as likely to make a donation than the control group, which in this case was those who perceived their efficacy to be low.

Several demographic variables have a statistically significant relationship with making a donation, but, in composite models of significant variables, all of them lose significance. The most visible variation in donation behaviour between demographic groups is age (*Table A3.25 in Appendix 3*). The youngest members (AGE 1) are nearly 24 times more likely to make an additional donation than the control group which, in this case, is the very oldest

members. The next age group, those aged 25-34 (AGE 2) are 11 times more likely to make a donation than the very oldest. They are followed by the 35-44 year olds (AGE 3) who are 3.7 times more likely to make a donation than the control group. After that point, age differences lose their significance. The next variable in the demographic model to show significance is household income. Those who are the most likely to make a donation are those from the lowest income households (INCM0DGP) who are nearly three times more likely than the highest income households (used as the control group in this case) to do so. The last remaining demographic variable to affect making additional donations is language of response to the survey. The negative relationship indicates that those who responded in Welsh are a third as likely than their English speaking counterparts to have made a donation.

The attitudinal commitment model indicates that a sense of obligation is likely to loosen the purse strings. Normative commitment is the only variable in this model to have a statistically significant relationship with making an additional donation (*Table A3.26 in Appendix 3*). Most of that significance is accounted for by medium low normative commitment (TOTNORMQ 1), with respondents falling into this category nearly four times more likely to make a donation than the control group of those scoring lowest on normative commitment. Statistical significance between making a donation and medium high normative commitment is only just missed (TOTNORMQ 2) so this variable also went forward to a composite model of significant variables. Individuals in this category are 2.3 times more likely to make a donation than the control group.

Two categories of functional motivation have a statistically significant relationship with whether or not any additional donations are made (*Table A3.27 in Appendix 3*). Those respondents scoring highest on careers motivations (TOTVFICG) are 2.25 times more likely to make an additional donation than those scoring lowest. The other significant variable is values motivations, but here the relationship is a negative one. Those scoring highest on values needs are less likely to make a donation, indeed, they are a third as likely to do so than their counterparts with lower values needs.

A number of variables in the organizational factors model influence the propensity to make additional donations (*Table A3.28 in Appendix 3*). These are membership of other organizations, organizational tenure and continuity of membership. Those members whose membership has been continuous (CONTYN1) are very nearly three times more likely to make an additional donation than their counterparts who have not always maintained a

current subscription. The other statistically significant relationships are negative. Those members who are members of more than one other type of voluntary or collective action organization (JOININGDP 2) are half as likely to make an additional donation to Plaid Cymru than their counterparts who are not members of any other group. Organizational tenure also affects the propensity to donate in a negative way. Those who have been in the party between 21 -30 years (PCYEARS3) are a third as likely to make a donation than those in the party for under a year; similarly, those in the party for over 30 years (PCYEARS4) are even less likely to make a donation.

The origins of the significance of subscription status (SUBS) in the financial indicators model (*Table A3.29 in Appendix 3*) appears to lie with the control group - those who have newly joined the party. It is therefore unclear what the nature of that significance is. However, this variable loses significance in a composite model.

The activities model describes a little more of the nature of the “virtuous circle” of activities and donations (*Table A3.30 in Appendix 3*). The overall number of activities is significant in this model - but it is the more modest numbers of activities that show statistical significance. Those members who have undertaken at least one activity over a 12 month period (ACTIVITY 2) are 6.7 times more likely to make an additional donation than those who more than ten activities, who are the control group in this model. Those who undertook between two and five activities (ACTIVITY 3) are 3.7 times more likely to make an additional donation than those who did the most activities.

In a composite model of all the significant variables discussed above, only a few retained their statistical significance: career motivations, continuity of membership, and organizational tenure of more than 30 years (*Table 3.22 overleaf*). One surprising casualty, given the amount of circumstantial evidence of a relationship between activity and donations, was the variable indicating those who undertook between two and five activities. Another surprising casualty was job satisfaction (TOTJOBSAG) which missed significance, but only slightly. For this reason, it was included in a second composite model (*Table 3.23*) where it regained significance. The variables put forward into the final model were job satisfaction along with careers functional motivations and tenure of more than 30 years.

All variables in the final model (*Table 3.24*) retain their significance and a Hosmer-Lemeshow test indicates that this model is a good fit. Those members scoring the highest

on career motivations and job satisfaction are the most likely to make additional donations to the party. Those members who have been in the party for over 30 years are the least likely to make an additional donation.

Table 3.22- First composite model/Making an additional donation

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
ACTIVITY			4.0633	4	.3975	.0000	
ACTIVITY(1)	.8833	1.2442	.5039	1	.4778	.0000	2.4188
ACTIVITY(2)	1.6163	1.1058	2.1366	1	.1438	.0273	5.0346
ACTIVITY(3)	1.2214	.9316	1.7191	1	.1898	.0000	3.3920
ACTIVITY(4)	.3269	.9972	.1075	1	.7430	.0000	1.3867
AGE1	.2139	1.1330	.0357	1	.8502	.0000	1.2386
AGE2	.2656	.8368	.1007	1	.7510	.0000	1.3042
AGE3	-.3012	.6693	.2025	1	.6527	.0000	.7399
CONTY	-1.8249	.7520	5.8896	1	.0152	-.1454	.1612
JOINDGP2	-.4453	.5553	.6431	1	.4226	.0000	.6406
TOTPOLFQ2	.6755	.6256	1.1659	1	.2802	.0000	1.9651
PCYEARS2	-.6693	.6125	1.1943	1	.2745	.0000	.5121
PCYEARS3	-.9687	.8313	1.3581	1	.2439	.0000	.3796
PCYEARS4	-2.6369	.9304	8.0331	1	.0046	-.1811	.0716
RESPEW	-.2236	.5404	.1712	1	.6791	.0000	.7996
SUBS(1)	-1.0751	1.0561	1.0363	1	.3087	.0000	.3413
TOTVFIGG	1.5007	.5627	7.1128	1	.0077	.1668	4.4848
TOTJBSAG(1)	1.1823	.6247	3.5821	1	.0584	.0928	3.2620
NORMGP1	.3048	.5570	.2995	1	.5842	.0000	1.3564
NORMGP2	-1.2414	1.3576	.8360	1	.3605	.0000	.2890
Constant	.0346	1.8127	.0004	1	.9848		

Table 3.23- Second composite model/Making an additional donation

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
CONTY	-.6943	.4512	2.3681	1	.1238	-.0400	.4994
PCYEARS4	-1.9302	.5092	14.3687	1	.0002	-.2320	.1451
TOTVFIGG	1.1198	.3702	9.1476	1	.0025	.1763	3.0642
TOTJBSAG(1)	.8409	.4149	4.1080	1	.0427	.0958	2.3185
Constant	-1.3867	.5277	6.9052	1	.0086		

Table 3.24 - Final model/Making an additional donation

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
PCYEARS4	-1.9066	.5061	14.1940	1	.0002	-.2301	.1486
TOTVFIGG	1.0513	.3603	8.5122	1	.0035	.1681	2.8613
TOTJBSAG(1)	.8248	.4116	4.0147	1	.0451	.0935	2.2814
Constant	-1.9096	.4205	20.6212	1	.0000		

Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness-of-fit test Sig=0.3936

3.3.3 - Deciding what to give

The total amount of money donated to Plaid Cymru by an individual member is not a statement of political support for the party. Nor is it a statement about the satisfaction derived from party membership. It is primarily a statement about the financial circumstances of the donor.

Members from average or high income households are the most likely to give the most in donations to the party. As approximately one third of survey respondents live in households with a total income of under £15,000 (*see Table 2.7 in Chapter 2*) the modest donation profile of Plaid Cymru members described in Table 3.21 is not really a surprise. Length of membership also shows a significant relationship with the total amount of donations. This section looks at those statistically significant variables that separate the 42.9% of survey respondents who donated more than £25 in a year from their less generous counterparts.

The income difference is apparent straight away in the demographic model (*Table A3.31 in Appendix 3*). Members living in households with an average income (INCM1DGP) are three and a half times more likely to donate over £25 a year than those in the lowest income households, who were taken as the control group for this model. Those in the highest income households (INCM2DGP) are six times more likely to fall into the over £25 donation bracket than those in the lowest income households. The only other demographic variable with a statistically significant relationship with the amount of money donated is education, but this relationship is the reverse of what one might expect. Graduate members (QUALSGP1) are less than half as likely to donate over £25 a year to the party. There is no obvious explanation for this finding, and, in any event, this variable loses significance in subsequent models.

Personal political efficacy is significant in the political antecedents model, but the relationship is negative and loses significance at a later stage. Table A3.32 in Appendix 3 indicates that members rating their political efficacy as medium low (TOTPOLFQ1) are only a third as likely to donate more than £25 than their counterparts who rank their political efficacy in the lowest quartile.

Those in the most generous 42.9% of the survey sample are highly likely to be amongst the most longstanding members of Plaid Cymru. Table A3.33 in Appendix 3 indicates a statistically significant relationship between length of membership over 21 years and

donations over £25. Those in the party between 21-30 years (PCYEARS3) are five times more likely to be amongst the most generous donors than new members who have been in the party for less than one year. Those whose organizational tenure spans more than 30 years are 4.6 times more likely to donate over £25 a year. Plaid Cymru members who also belong to more than one other organization (JOINDGP2) are also amongst the most generous donors. They are twice as likely to give over £25 than individuals who are in Plaid Cymru only. There is a negative relationship between parental membership of Plaid Cymru and donations that so narrowly missed statistical significance at the five per cent level that this variable was included in a composite model. If one or both parents also held party membership (PARENTGP1) respondents were half as likely as their counterparts to donate over £25. The concept of a “virtuous circle” between donations and activities is challenged again by the results of the activities model (*Table A3.34 in Appendix 3*). There is a statistically significant negative relationship between those taking part in between two to five activities (ACTIVITY 3) and donating over £25 a year to the party. They are one third as likely to donate this amount than those who undertook the most activities for the party, who are used as the control group in this model.

There were no statistically significant variables with donations over £25 in the satisfaction, attitudinal commitment, functional motivations or financial indicators models.

Four variables retained significance in a composite model of all the significant variables described above: the average and high household income groups (INCM1DGP and INCM2DGP), and the length of membership variables measuring 21 or more years in Plaid Cymru (PCYEARS3 and 4) (*see Table 3.25 below*). These variables remained significant in a final model (*Table 3.26 overleaf*). A Hosmer-Lemeshow test indicates that this final model is a good fit.

Table 3.25 - Composite model/Donations over £25

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp (B)
INCM1DGP	1.2310	.3762	10.7098	1	.0011	.1641	3.4247
INCM2DGP	2.3601	.5058	21.7709	1	.0000	.2473	10.5921
QUALSGP1	.3859	.3216	1.4401	1	.2301	.0000	1.4709
JOINDGP2	.5458	.3128	3.0453	1	.0810	.0569	1.7260
PCYEARS3	1.3314	.4358	9.3315	1	.0023	.1506	3.7863
PCYEARS4	1.2049	.3564	11.4318	1	.0007	.1708	3.3364
PARENTGP (1)	-.2345	.3854	.3703	1	.5428	.0000	.7909
TOTPOLFQ1	.1397	.3820	.1337	1	.7146	.0000	1.1499
BREFDGP3	.0899	.3961	.0515	1	.8204	.0000	1.0941
ACT3	-.6241	.3294	3.5908	1	.0581	-.0701	.5357
Constant	-2.0873	.5727	13.2843	1	.0003		

Table 3.26 - Final model/Donations over £25

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp (B)
INCM1DGP	1.5245	.2929	27.0932	1	.0000	.2440	4.5930
INCM2DGP	2.5011	.4083	37.5216	1	.0000	.2903	12.1955
PCYEARS3	1.1566	.3606	10.2840	1	.0013	.1402	3.1790
PCYEARS4	1.0937	.2992	13.3633	1	.0003	.1642	2.9854
Constant	-2.0954	.3213	42.5364	1	.0000		

Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness-of-fit test Sig=0.1533

3.3.4 - Holding a current subscription

Membership subscriptions are a vital source of income to any political party. Once a year, every member has a choice whether to renew their subscription or not. This section looks at the antecedents of holding a current subscription. The newest members, and members with a history of discontinuous membership, appear to be the least likely individuals to hold a current subscription to the party. Those members aged 45-54 are the most likely to hold a current subscription.

Neither satisfaction variables nor political antecedents appear to have any direct relationship on subscription behaviour. However, an initial model of the relationship between political antecedents and renewal indicates that perceptions of branch efficacy are important in the renewal decision. The relationship with perceptions of higher levels of branch efficacy and having a current subscription (BREFDGP3) is statistically significant; these members are nearly seven times more likely to hold a current subscription than a control group of those who consider that their branch is not at all efficacious. The relationship between perceptions of slight local branch efficacy (BREFDGP2) only marginally misses strict significance at the $p < .05$ level, yet these members are over two and a half times more likely to renew their subscription than members who believe that their local branch is not at all efficacious (*see Table 3.35 in Appendix 3*).

In the demographic model, members aged 45-54 appear the most likely, in terms of statistical significance, to have a current subscription - nearly seven times more likely than the very oldest members, who are used as the control group in this model (*Table A3.36 in Appendix 3*). The organizational factors model has a number of variables which have statistical significance with holding a current subscription (*Table A3.37 in Appendix 3*). In this model, continuity of membership is measured by those membership has been discontinuous (CONTN). They are a third as likely to have a current subscription than

those whose membership has not been interrupted. Organizational tenure, measured by PCYEARS, is also statistically significant. The significance is accounted for by PCYEARS1, the newest members who joined within the 16 months prior to the survey taking place. These members are less than ten per cent as likely to hold a current subscription than the control group in this case - those with organizational tenure of 30 years or more.

There were no direct statistically significant relationships between holding a current subscription with any of the variables in the satisfaction model, the attitudinal commitment model, the psychological needs model, the financial indicators model or the activities model.

In a composite model of significant variables, both of the variables measuring perceived branch efficacy lost their statistical significance (*Table 3.27*). All other variables retained their significance, and were placed in a final model (*Table 3.28*).

Table 3.27 – Composite model/Holding a current subscription

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp (B)
AGE4	1.4649	.6377	5.2771	1	.0216	.1205	4.3273
CONTN	-.9967	.4518	4.8678	1	.0274	-.1127	.3691
BREFDGP2	.5482	.4143	1.7509	1	.1858	.0000	1.7301
BREFDGP3	.8299	.6006	1.9095	1	.1670	.0000	2.2931
PCYEARS (1)	-2.1761	.5267	17.0699	1	.0000	-.2585	.1135
Constant	2.2216	.3503	40.2096	1	.0000		

Table 3.28 - Final model/Holding a current subscription

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp (B)
AGE4	1.4513	.6265	5.3655	1	.0205	.1186	4.2687
CONTN	-1.1030	.4279	6.6444	1	.0099	-.1393	.3319
PCYEARS (1)	-2.1221	.5059	17.5972	1	.0000	-.2554	.1198
Constant	2.6305	.2564	105.2383	1	.0000		

Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness-of-fit test Sig=0.4266

In this final model, all variables retain statistical significance, and a Hosmer-Lemeshow test indicates that the model is a good fit. However, it explains more about who is the least likely to hold a current subscription - the very newest members, and those whose pattern of membership is discontinuous - than their counterparts who are fully paid-up.

3.3.5 - Discussion of findings

How do these findings compare with those of previous studies into the donation and subscription patterns of political party members? It is very difficult to compare results directly because no other study of grassroots members has taken the measures of variables such as job satisfaction, functional motivations and organizational tenure which this survey has found to be significant antecedents of donation behaviour. Fisher (1999) tested a hypothesis that donations were a form of “contracting out” of participation. He found that the donation patterns of Labour members supported this hypothesis, but the patterns of Conservative members only partially supported it. This research indicates that there is no support for this hypothesis in the behaviour of Plaid Cymru members. There is no enduring statistical relationship between any type of participation and making a donation, or the amount of money given. The results of the Plaid Cymru research indicate that the quantity of participation is not relevant to members’ donation patterns – but the perceived quality of it is. There is a significant relationship between the quality of members’ experience – as expressed by job satisfaction - and whether a donation is made or not. Fisher, who used the models of Seyd and Whiteley (1992) and Whiteley et al (1994) in his research, would only have been able to measure quantity, not quality.

One further observation is relevant here. Although it is clear that the model explaining the amount of time spent on participation was far from satisfactory, the process of obtaining the models explaining the amount of money spent on the party indicated that the antecedents of both kinds of decision are not the same. Donations express income levels and organizational tenure, not values. There is little evidence of a consistent “time/money” tradeoff in Plaid Cymru. Gifts of time and gifts of money appear to be given for different reasons, and further research in non-profit marketing is appropriate to find out why.

It is also relevant to note two striking similarities between the subscription renewal behaviour of Plaid Cymru members as expressed in model form (*see Table 3.28*) and that of new Liberal Democrats surveyed in my previous research (Granik 1997). Firstly, respondents aged between 45-54 in Plaid Cymru were amongst the most likely to hold a current subscription. A statistically significant relationship between age and subscription renewal was found amongst new Liberal Democrat members, and that same age group showed one of the highest renewal rates (81%) of all respondents. In Plaid Cymru, newer members were significantly less likely to keep their subscriptions up to date. In the Liberal Democrats, renewal rates amongst first year members ran at 45%-50%, compared with renewal rates for the rest of the party that ran between 80%-90% (House 1996). These

observations can only describe similarities between subscription patterns in both parties, rather than provide a direct comparison; nevertheless, they do suggest congruence in some aspects of renewal behaviour across political parties.

3.4 - CONCLUDING REMARKS

A summary of the variables identified as having a statistically significant direct relationship with the key behaviours of political party members appears in Table 3.29 overleaf. This chapter has dealt, in some detail, with each of the variables that appear in this table. The variables that are conspicuous by their absence are position on the ideological spectrum and frequency of agreement with politics; the variables that May's "law" suggested should have accounted for behaviour. But whilst partisanship, indicated in this case by person-party value congruence, clearly has relationships with whether an individual participates at all in Plaid Cymru and the amount of time they spend on activities, satisfaction variables explain not only which activities members do, but how many they do. Job satisfaction, in particular, is the only variable to enjoy relationships with all three types of activities. It is also present in the model indicating whether or not individuals choose to donate money to Plaid Cymru. On balance, satisfaction variables have more relationships with the behavioural commitment of party members than do partisanship variables.

This finding is not only crucial to the analysis of the central hypothesis; it is crucial to the *raison d'être* of this thesis. If most of the antecedents of desirable membership behaviours are related to satisfaction with the experience of membership, then it follows that party managers can take steps to encourage more behavioural commitment to Plaid Cymru by providing members with the experience they want. The findings presented in this chapter provide empirical evidence that some membership behaviours are likely to be a response to the perceived quality of the membership experience. This, in turn, supports the arguments put forward in this thesis that rational choice theory offers the most plausible explanation for participation in political parties. From the practitioner point of view, it seems possible that party officials *can* manage behaviour for mutual party/member benefit. But, in practice, these results alone do not indicate very satisfactorily what party members actually want from their membership. Without some appreciation of this, party managers are unlikely to be able to provide a "quality" experience. This question is dealt with in greater detail in Chapter 5 of this thesis.

Table 3.29 - Summary of significant variables

	Models						
	Political antecedents	Satisfaction	Demographic	Attitudinal commitment	Functional motivations	Joining history	Financial indicators
Activity/ Inactivity	<i>none</i>	<i>none</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Age 55-64 	<i>none</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Values Protective 	<i>none</i>	<i>none</i>
Time spent	<i>none</i>	<i>none</i>	<i>none</i>	<i>none</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Values 	<i>none</i>	<i>none</i>
Overall number of activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> High political efficacy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> High socialization Job satisfaction 	<i>none</i>	<i>none</i>	<i>none</i>	<i>none</i>	<i>none</i>
Number of routine activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> High political efficacy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Medium low to high socialization Job satisfaction 	<i>none</i>	<i>none</i>	<i>none</i>	<i>none</i>	<i>none</i>
Number of election activities	<i>none</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> High socialization Job satisfaction 	<i>none</i>	<i>none</i>	<i>none</i>	<i>none</i>	<i>none</i>
Number of internal activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> High political efficacy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Job satisfaction 	<i>none</i>	<i>none</i>	<i>none</i>	<i>none</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Amount of donations
Additional donation	<i>none</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Job satisfaction 	<i>none</i>	<i>none</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Careers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 30+ years of membership 	<i>none</i>
Total donated	<i>none</i>	<i>none</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Household income 	<i>none</i>	<i>none</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 21+ years of membership 	<i>none</i>
Current subscription	<i>none</i>	<i>none</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Age 45-54 	<i>none</i>	<i>none</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continuous membership 1 year of membership 	<i>none</i>

But before that, the second dimension of party commitment mentioned in the central hypothesis needs to be explored. Is satisfaction or partisanship the strongest predictor of attitudinal commitment to Plaid Cymru? The attitudinal commitment of Plaid Cymru members to their party is explored in full in the following chapter. This chapter has considered the behaviour of the party's membership as a "whole", which is appropriate because of the relatively few significant demographic differences in participation. Chapters Four and Five will depart from this approach by examining the attitudinal commitment and membership experience of the different groups of members in Plaid Cymru.

CHAPTER 4 – DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION IN A POLITICAL PARTY SETTING

SECTION 4.1 - INTRODUCTION

This chapter of the thesis looks at the diversity issues that are germane to Plaid Cymru, and examines how diversity impacts on its members' relationships with the party¹. Political parties in Britain are not renowned for the good management of diversity within their ranks and, from time to time, all major parties have to contend with accusations that one group of members or another is unfairly disadvantaged, or underrepresented or discriminated against. The chapter opens with a brief examination of issues in Plaid Cymru's development that explain which demographic differences are particularly significant in within the party. Subsequent sections will examine how diversity affects the attitudinal commitment of members to their party, their integration into the party and their propensity to participate in party activities. The chapter concludes with a summary of the differences – and similarities – between the various groups of members in Plaid Cymru.

The two English language narrative histories of Plaid Cymru published at the time of writing (Davies 1983, McAllister 2001) suggest that there are three major demographic fault lines between groups of members. The most obvious demographic split amongst members is along linguistic dimensions. Welsh speakers (Cymrophones) form about two thirds of party membership, with English speakers (Anglophones) forming a substantial minority. It should be noted that differences between Cymrophones and Anglophones are linguistic and cultural, not racial (Berresford Ellis 1985). The party is split along regional lines, with members living in the county of Gwynedd forming a distinctive in-group. There is also a division in the party based on gender. Even though the composition of Plaid Cymru as a whole is roughly equal, women are underrepresented in the party's internal hierarchy, and amongst the candidates put forward to contest elected office.

4.1.1 – Linguistic groups in Plaid Cymru: the birth of a party

Plaid Cymru was founded with the aim of preserving and protecting Welsh language and culture. Its original membership was wholly Welsh-speaking. Its first regular publication, "Y Ddraig Goch" launched in 1926, was written entirely in Welsh, despite advice from a

¹The purpose of this chapter is to identify any differences in the ways that groups of members experience their membership of Plaid Cymru. It is not intended to pass any judgement on Plaid Cymru's historical handling of diversity, or to imply that it is any "better" or "worse" than any other significant political party in the way it currently deals with diversity issues.

major party donor that a bilingual journal would allow the party to present its arguments to Anglophones. (Davies 1983). A regular English language publication was not produced until 1932. Although it was designed merely to supplement “Y Ddraig Goch”, its publication caused so much controversy within the party, that its leaders banned the use of English for party business for the following nine years. In 1943 two senior party members threatened to leave the party if it refused to attract Anglophones to its cause. Their threats were taken seriously, and the party’s first office in an Anglophone area of Wales was opened the following year (Davies 1983).

A series of developments beginning in the 1960’s reduced the necessity for Plaid Cymru to resist bilingualism, and encouraged Anglophones to join the party (McAllister 2001). A separate Welsh Language Society was started in 1962, freeing Plaid Cymru to concentrate on a fuller spectrum of political issues. The use of Welsh was given some legal protection in the Welsh Language Act of 1967. In 1980 the creation of a Welsh language TV channel was announced; fulfilling another long-held aspiration of Plaid Cymru. Welsh achieved official parity with English in the Welsh Language Act of 1993. At its Annual Conference in 1998, a substantial majority of delegates voted to change the party’s official name to Plaid Cymru The Party of Wales. This represented a deliberate attempt to develop a bilingual organizational identity, and to appeal to Anglophone voters in the run-up to the first National Assembly elections. The exclusion of Anglophones became, officially, consigned to the past.

The language divide in Plaid Cymru is reflected in the returned questionnaires - 66% of respondents chose to complete the Welsh language version of the questionnaire and 33% the English. The survey data indicates that language groups differ in their attitudinal commitment to the party, in their socialization into the party and in their overall satisfaction with the experience of membership. Language groups join the party with differing expectations, and receive different benefits from their membership. These findings are discussed in more detail in the next two sections of this chapter.

4.1.2 – Geographic groups in Plaid Cymru: location, location and location

Plaid Cymru draws the bulk of its electoral support and membership from the north west and west of Wales, a Welsh-speaking “heartland”, known as Y Fro Gymraeg (Balsom 1985, Osmond 2002). The party is so electorally strong in just one county in this area, Gwynedd, that its political opponents nickname it “Plaid Gwynedd” as a term of abuse (McAllister 2001). Plaid Cymru draws a quarter of its membership from Gwynedd alone. A further

39% of the party's membership is spread over just four districts. Three of these - Carmarthenshire, Ceredigion and Anglesey - also fall within Y Fro Gymraeg, and account for 14%, 11% and 7% of members respectively. Cardiff, the capital of Wales, located in the south-east of the country, accounts for the remaining 7% of members in this group. None of the remaining 16 counties of Wales are home to any more than 5% of members². The geographical profile of respondents to this survey is shown in Table A4.1 in Appendix 4.

If density of membership within the party is used as a framework for analysis, any effects on the experience of membership arising from the proximity - or lack of it - of other party members can be observed. The area of highest membership density is, clearly, Gwynedd. The second grouping, representing medium membership density, comprises Carmarthenshire, Ceredigion, Anglesey and Cardiff. The remaining counties of Wales, together with the whole of England and Scotland, represent low membership density.

There are differences in the experience of membership between the different membership density groups, which broadly reflect many of those pertaining to language groups. Membership density groups have differing levels of socialization into the party and of overall satisfaction with the experience of membership. They differ in their perceptions of branch efficacy, and they experience different benefits from membership. Additionally membership density groups experience differing levels of job satisfaction with the work they do for Plaid Cymru. These differences are analyzed in more detail in Section 4.3 of this chapter.

4.1.3 – Gender groups: Plaid Cymru, the party of males

Plaid Cymru has had a womens' section since its beginnings in 1925. Women raised funds and worked in campaign and election administration, but, with the exception of a few notable individuals, their political role was limited (McAllister 2001). During an ideological swing to the left in the late 1970's and 80's a substantial number of women, many of them involved in radical organizations, joined the party, and equality of opportunity within the Plaid Cymru hierarchy rapidly became a contentious issue. One controversial experiment

² One of these counties, Rhondda Cynon Taff, contains the Taff Elai rhanbarth in which the pilot survey was conducted (See Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2). This rhanbarth was excluded from the main survey. A total of 3.4% of respondents in the main survey recorded Rhondda Cynon Taff as their usual county of residence. To allow for the possible effects of underestimating party density because Taff Elai had been excluded, the percentage of the 44 respondents to the pilot survey in relation to the 472 respondents to the main survey was calculated, and added to the 3.4% for Rhondda Cynon Taff. A 10.72% increase in the recorded membership figure brings membership density in the area to 3.72% - still well under the five per cent threshold for areas of low membership density.

introduced in 1981 and scrapped five years later saw the introduction of positive discrimination in elections to the party's principal strategic body. The initiative had little lasting effect. In 1993, a Gender Balance Commission was set up to address the issue of how to ensure women candidates stood for elections to internal party posts. Their report starkly highlighted the lack of women in the party hierarchy: women made up approximately 50% of Plaid Cymru members, 28% of its branch chairs, 17% of its county councillors and 10% of its National Executive (Plaid Cymru 1995)³.

In the 12 months immediately prior to the survey described in this thesis, women made some substantial gains in winning publicly elected office for Plaid Cymru, due in part to a policy of guaranteeing women favourable rankings on regional "top-up" lists. Plaid Cymru saw six female candidates returned to the National Assembly, and the election of its first female MEP. Nevertheless, gender inequality in the party hierarchy is an area where there is still concern⁴ and the party's National Executive Committee approved an even more favourable policy of regional list placings for women candidates in Assembly elections (Plaid Cymru 2002).

Despite the very visible preponderance of men in the upper echelons of Plaid Cymru, there are very few statistically significant gender differences in either attitudes or behaviour. The differences which exist - in participation, time spent on activities, political efficacy ratings, reasons for joining the party, and agreement with party policy – are discussed in more detail in Section 4.4 of this chapter.

SECTION 4.2 - ATTITUDINAL COMMITMENT

4.2.1 - Introduction

This section explores one of the key differences between Anglophones and Cymrophones in Plaid Cymru – their attitudinal commitment to the party. Preliminary results indicate that the majority group, Cymrophones, have the highest mean scores on each of the three dimensions of commitment. But the detailed examination of the antecedents of commitment which is presented in this section indicates that many of the linguistic differences lose significance when other variables are controlled for. In particular, linguistic

³ At the time of this survey, the known gender composition of Plaid Cymru was still 50/50. The male/female composition of respondents to this survey is 55.7% and 44.3% respectively.

⁴ I was invited to present my research findings on gender inequality in Plaid Cymru to a Constitutional Conference of the party in November 2001.

differences across all three dimensions of commitment lose significance when socialization is controlled for.

These differences are not necessarily an outcome of the Plaid Cymru's distinctive history. Statistically significant differences in the attitudinal commitment of different linguistic groups in the same organization also occur in a workplace context (Kanungo 1980). Indeed, one by-product of the analysis of attitudinal commitment presented in this section is that comparisons can be drawn with the documented antecedents of attitudinal commitment in the workplace and the antecedents of attitudinal commitment to Plaid Cymru. The *prima facie* relationship between linguistic groups and attitudinal commitment is illustrated in Table 4.1⁵.

Table 4.1 - Results of ANOVA analysis of attitudinal commitment mean scores by linguistic group

Scale Item	Group	Mean	SD	SE	Variance	F	Sig
Affective	All	31.6897	7.2407	.3881	52.428	4.039	.045
	Anglophone	30.5983	7.4128	.6853	54.909		
	Cymrophone	32.2424	7.1043	.4674	50.471		
Continuance	All	21.2593	7.4094	.4116	54.899	3.986	.047
	Anglophone	20.1261	7.4835	.7103	56.002		
	Cymrophone	21.8498	7.3186	.5015	53.562		
Normative	All	29.7350	8.5434	.4560	72.990	10.993	.001
	Anglophone	27.6667	8.8549	.8083	78.409		
	Cymrophone	30.8095	8.1922	.5390	67.111		

4.2.2 - The antecedents of affective commitment in a political party setting

Affective commitment refers to an individual's emotional attachment to, identification with and involvement in an organization to which they belong (Meyer *et al* 1989). The antecedents of affective commitment are categorised by Meyer and Allen (1997) into three groups: organizational characteristics, person characteristics and work experiences. This section will focus primarily on person characteristics and work experiences as antecedents of affective commitment, as research into the first category of antecedents, organizational

⁵ Tests for homogeneity of variance indicate that there are no differences within language groups in respect of commitment (p= .262 for affective commitment, p=.906 for continuance commitment, p=.188 for normative commitment).

characteristics, fell outside the bounded nature of this doctoral thesis. Organizational characteristics refer to constructs such as perceptions of organizational justice and the manner in which organizational policy is communicated (Meyer and Allen 1997). There were no pre-existing measures of these constructs suitable for use in a political party environment at the time of this research. Therefore, an assessment of organizational justice in a political party setting would have required the development, testing, and validation of entirely new measures. This would have run counter to the overall purpose of this research – to test *existing* frameworks from appropriate disciplines in a political party context for the first time. Moreover, the available evidence from workplace studies that organizational characteristics influence affective commitment was considered neither strong nor consistent in at least one major overview of the commitment literature (Mathieu and Zajac 1990).

Person characteristics

This category can be further broken down into two sub-groups of variables: demographic and dispositional (Meyer and Allen 1997). In this study, the demographic variables of gender, educational level, age and organisational tenure are used. Exploratory MANOVA analysis (*Table A4.2 in Appendix 4*) suggests that, controlling for gender and educational level, language is still significant with affective commitment (Models 1 and 2), but that it loses significance at the $p < .05$ level when age is controlled for (Model 3). Additionally, language loses significance with affective commitment when organizational tenure is controlled for (Model 4). Tenure is statistically significant with affective commitment in its own right, indicating that length of membership in the party reduces the differences in this dimension of commitment between linguistic groups. Controlling for tenure additionally eliminates the significance of the relationship between affective commitment and age (Model 5).

These findings are entirely consistent with the known antecedents of affective commitment in the workplace. There is no relationship noted between education level and affective commitment (Meyer and Allen 1997). Gender and affective commitment are also unrelated; age and affective commitment are significantly related, albeit weakly (Mathieu and Zajac 1990). Organizational tenure is consistently cited as a significant factor in the development of affective commitment (Meyer and Allen 1997).

Replicating the dispositional antecedents of affective commitment found in workplace studies in a political party environment was less straightforward. Meyer and Allen (1997)

further categorise dispositional variables into two groups: personality related and values related. Although they remark that there is scant consistent evidence linking personality characteristics with affective commitment, Meyer and Allen (1997) identify high achievement needs, a strong work ethic and a propensity to become committed to organizations as variables found to have a significant relationship with it. In the context of this survey, the batteries of questions necessary to measure the latter two concepts could have added considerably to the volume of a questionnaire that was already quite lengthy. But a measure of political ambition could have provided some kind of rough proxy measure of achievement needs. The failure adequately to measure political ambition was, in retrospect, a significant failing of this research (*see Sections 8.1.3 and 8.3.2 in Chapter 8 for a fuller discussion of this issue*). However, both Meyer and Allen (1997) and Mathieu and Zajac in their earlier overview (1990) identify peoples' perceptions of their own competence as having a significant positive relationship with affective commitment. A variable measuring respondents' self-reported political efficacy (POLEFF) was used as a proxy measure of their perceived competence as party members.

There is little literature from workplace studies about the role of values-related person characteristics in the development of attitudinal commitment, with the exception of work by Finegan (2000) exploring which individual values had relationships with the various dimensions of commitment. She found that the greater the similarity between employees' personal values and the perceptions of the values of their organization, the greater was their affective commitment. In the context of this study, congruence of personal and organizational values is clearly indicated by the values functional motivations variable (VALUES). Additionally, in a political party environment, the self-reported frequency of agreement with party policies (POLICIES) and members' self-reported ideological position (SPECTRUM) can also be used to indicate values-related dispositional variables.

Exploratory MANOVA analysis (*Table A4.3 in Appendix 4*) provides evidence that linguistic differences in affective commitment remain statistically significant when perceived political efficacy is controlled for, and political efficacy is significant with affective commitment in its own right (Model 1). In Model 2, however, the differences between the affective commitment of linguistic groups of members disappear if their personal values and the core values of the party they support remain the same. Congruence of personal and party values is statistically significant with affective commitment in its own right, consistent with Finegan's (2000) findings. Language differences also retain their significance when agreement with policies and position on the ideological spectrum are controlled for (Model

3). Frequency of agreement with policies is a significant antecedent of affective commitment in its own right, but position on the ideological spectrum is not.

A final model of dispositional variables (Model 4), confirms that the significant relationship between language differences and affective commitment is lost when agreement with policies and congruence of values are controlled for. Political efficacy also loses its significance with affective commitment when these two variables are controlled for, and only these latter two variables remain significant with affective commitment in their own right. This finding indicates that it is harder to draw the direct parallels between commitment in a political party and a workplace organization that are possible in the case of demographic characteristics. Certainly the relationship between political efficacy and affective commitment found in workplace studies can be replicated in this one, but it is a relationship which loses significance when other variables that are not necessarily germane to the workplace are taken into account.

Work experiences

The strongest, most consistent correlations with affective commitment are those variables measuring work experience (Meyer and Allen 1997). However, the frameworks used for quantifying workplace experiences in the world of work cannot be transferred wholesale to the political party environment. Most of these frameworks are so firmly grounded in the context of paid employment that they need amendment for meaningful use in environments where individuals work voluntarily and unpaid. In an environment where all work is entirely voluntary, many of the established variables upon which attitudinal research has traditionally relied, for example pay, absenteeism or appraisal, are not appropriate.

In this study, therefore, the job satisfaction variable (JOBSAT) was used as a direct measure of positive work experience and the organizational socialization variable (SOCO) was used as a proxy measure. Language differences lost their significance with affective commitment when job satisfaction was controlled for, and job satisfaction achieved statistical significance with affective commitment (*see Model 1 in Table A4.4, Appendix 4*). Language differences also lost significance with affective commitment when socialization was controlled for, and socialization itself achieved a statistically significant relationship with affective commitment (Model 2). In order to explore the relationship between affective commitment and work experiences further, the variable measuring satisfaction with the overall experience of membership (FEELINGS) was also included in the analysis.

Again, language differences lost their significance with affective commitment, and satisfaction itself appears to have a statistically significant relationship with affective commitment (Model 3). These findings are entirely consistent with the known antecedents of affective commitment in the workplace. A final model (Model 4) confirms that language differences lose their significance when work experience variables are controlled for. Socialization and satisfaction with the experience of membership retain their significance with affective commitment, but job satisfaction marginally loses its significance when these two variables are controlled for.

In summary, linguistic differences in affective commitment disappear when a number of other variables are controlled for: namely age and organizational tenure, person-party values congruence, job satisfaction, socialization and overall feelings about membership. Where it is possible to make direct comparisons with the known antecedents of affective commitment in the workplace and those operating in a political party context, a number of similarities are apparent. The person variables of age, organizational tenure, efficacy and values are antecedents of affective commitment in both kinds of organization. The work experience variables of job satisfaction and socialization also precede affective commitment in both types of organization. Two additional antecedents of affective commitment in Plaid Cymru, are frequency of agreement with policies, and overall feelings about membership, but these do not have any direct equivalents in the existing workplace literature.

4.2.3 - The antecedents of continuance commitment in a political party setting

Continuance commitment in the workplace relates to the employees' awareness that costs are associated with leaving the organization. The individual has created a series of investments in the organisation which keeps him or her a member of it (Hrebriniak and Alutto 1972). Becker (1960) argued that commitment to an organization results from an individual making a series of side bets linking themselves to it. They therefore stand to incur losses of some sort if they leave the organization. These losses might be monetary, or they might be non-tangible losses, such as reputation or skills, which might impact negatively on future employment prospects.

The development of continuance commitment is less well researched than the development of affective commitment (Meyer and Allen 1997). The antecedents of continuance commitment which have been identified by empirical studies include: whether employees are the only or major wage earner in their household, the "side bets" such as status and job security that employees fear they will forfeit by moving, employees'

perceptions of available employment opportunities and of the transferability of their skills and education, and employee age and organizational tenure.

Clearly, not all of these antecedents have their equivalent in the political party sphere. Grassroots members of a political party do not earn a wage from it. But other antecedents of continuance commitment in the workplace are recognisable in the context of political parties. For example, political party members do not stand to lose job security by quitting the party, but they may stand to lose any sense of belonging in Plaid Cymru which they have, and they may lose any social status which has built up through their membership. In order to test whether these could be antecedents of continuance commitment in Plaid Cymru, the socialization variable (SOCO) was used as a measure of respondents' sense of belonging, and the respondents' scores on social motivations (SOCIAL) for joining as a measure of the importance of status. Table A4.5 in Appendix 4 indicates that language differences lose their significance with continuance commitment when socialization and social motivations are controlled for. Socialization does not have a statistically significant relationship with continuous commitment in a political party context, but social motivations display a statistically significant relationship with continuance commitment. This indicates that if a party member perceives that social approval accrues through party membership, their continuance commitment will be greater than those members who do not perceive that membership brings them social status.

The concept of perceived transferability also has its equivalent in the political party context. In the context of the workplace, transferability is referred to in terms of skills and education. This is clearly not relevant to the political party context; most of the activities in which grassroots members participate are broadly similar across parties. But political parties are distinguished from each other by their ideological background and values, and, usually, their policies. It is reasonable to hypothesize that members may consider themselves committed to their current party because no other party adequately expresses their beliefs and values. This hypothesis was tested by regressing the variables measuring frequency of agreement with policies (POLICIES) and values motivations (VALUES) against language and continuance commitment (*Model 1 in Table A4.6, Appendix 4*). Language differences lost stringent significance with continuance commitment when these two variables were controlled for. Values motivations for membership failed to achieve stringent significance with continuance commitment. This finding is in line with the relationship between person-organization value congruence and the antecedents of continuance commitment in the workplace (Finegan 2000). However, frequency of agreement with policies was found to

be significantly related to continuance commitment in its own right, indicating that those members who agree most frequently with Plaid Cymru policies are those who are most likely to consider that membership of other parties would not be appropriate for them.

Another test of perceived transferability in the political party context involves the variables indicating why respondents initially joined Plaid Cymru. It was hypothesized that members who joined because they supported Plaid Cymru policies (SUPPORT), and those who joined because they considered Plaid Cymru membership as a means of expressing their identification with Welsh nationalism and culture (CULTURE) would score highly on continuance commitment. However, Model 2 in Table A4.6 (*see Appendix 4*) indicates that neither of these variables have a statistically significant relationship with continuance commitment in Plaid Cymru. This provides more evidence supporting the hypothesis that reasons for staying in a political party are quite distinct from the reasons for joining it (Granik 2001).

Continuance commitment in the workplace is also found to be correlated with employees' perceptions of available employment opportunities (Meyer and Allen 1997). Political party managers generally accept that some members will join a party deliberately to seek elected office (House 1996), with the corollary that they leave reasonably swiftly if they think that they will not succeed. They may then try their luck with another political party⁶. However, as there was no direct measure of political ambition in the research described in this thesis, this could not be tested for. This is more evidence that failure to measure political ambition constitutes a substantial limitation of this research.

The demographic antecedents of continuance commitment - member age and organizational tenure - were also measured in this study. Language differences lose their significance when age and tenure are controlled for (*Table A4.7 in Appendix 4*), but age does not have a significant relationship with continuance commitment in its own right. Organizational tenure, however, does show a statistically significant relationship with continuance commitment in Plaid Cymru.

In summary, linguistic differences in continuance commitment disappear when socialization and social motivations are controlled for. They lose significance when person-party value congruence and frequency of agreement with policies are controlled for. They

⁶ This observation is based on comments from respondents in my survey of new Liberal Democrats, and subsequent conversations with individuals expressing interest in a political career.

also lose significance when age and organizational tenure are taken into account. There are some similarities between the antecedents of continuance commitment in a political party setting, and those occurring in the work place, but these do not appear with the frequency apparent in the study of affective commitment. Job security and position in the family as wage-earner are not relevant antecedents of commitment in a voluntary context.

Commitment to Plaid Cymru based on the availability of opportunities for a political career was not tested for in this research. There was no evidence to suggest that age is an antecedent of continuance commitment in Plaid Cymru, although this is a relationship that has been documented in workplace studies. Organizational tenure and concerns for social status are found to be antecedents of continuance commitment both in the workplace and in a political party setting. The equivalent of the workplace antecedent of transferability – frequency of agreement with policies – also appears to be an antecedent of continuance commitment in Plaid Cymru.

4.2.4 - The antecedents of normative commitment in a political party setting

Normative commitment refers to a sense of obligation of an organizational member to stay in that organization (Meyer and Allen 1997). Of the three components of commitment, least is known about the way in which normative commitment develops, but the empirical research which there is identifies two sets of antecedents, socialization experiences and the “psychological contract” between organization and member.

Wiener (1982) argues that socialization experiences take place in two stages. The first stage is one of “primary” conditioning, where individuals absorb and internalise the values and expectations of their immediate environment at a young age. The second stage takes place on entry into an organization where individuals learn what is expected of them and valued by their employer and colleagues. The survey data allowed measurement of both of these stages of socialization. A proxy measure of primary conditioning was taken by using the variable identifying whether or not respondents had parents who were members of Plaid Cymru (PARENTGP). This was done on the assumption that members whose parents were party members would have been accustomed to an environment in which Plaid Cymru was favourably regarded. Language differences retained their significance with normative commitment when parental membership was controlled for (*see model 1 in Table A4.8, Appendix 4*). This was to be expected as most of those respondents whose parents had been members of Plaid Cymru would have had Cymrophone parents. But parental membership of Plaid Cymru is not a statistically significant antecedent of normative commitment in its own right. The second stage of socialization was measured directly by

the socialization variable (SOCO) (*see model 2 in Table A4.8, Appendix 4*). Socialization is significant with normative commitment in its own right, and it subsumes the language differences in normative commitment to Plaid Cymru.

Psychological contracts are defined as “individual beliefs, shaped by the organization, regarding terms of an exchange agreement between individuals and their organization” (Rousseau 1995). These can take a number of different forms, the most widely recognized of which are relational and transactional. Relational contracts refer to principles of social exchange between member and organization. In the context of a political party, it can be hypothesized that members will perceive their relational contract to be based on the party representing the values and policies in which the members believe. This can be tested by the variables directly measuring party-person value congruence (VALUES) and frequency of agreement with policies (POLICIES). Model 1 in Table A4.9, Appendix 4 indicates that both the variables hypothesized to constitute the relational contract between member and party have a statistically significant relationship with normative commitment to Plaid Cymru. However, neither of them overcome the differences in normative commitment between the linguistic groups.

Transactional contracts are based on the economic exchange between individual and organization. In the workplace context this clearly refers to the flow of salary and other benefits from the organization to the individual members of it. But in the context of association membership the transactional relationship is reversed. Members provide the organization with much of its resources, and can choose whether or not to continue to provide organizational resources whenever a donation is sought, or whenever subscription renewals become due. The healthy response rate to the survey question which asked respondents whether they considered Plaid Cymru membership to be good value for their subscription money provides some evidence that members perceive that there is a transactional contract between them and Plaid Cymru (*see Chapter 2, section 2.4.2*). A lower response rate could have implied a lack of perception of any transactional contract between party and member. It can be hypothesized that this transactional contract is based on whether members receive what they want from their membership in relation to the amount of money which they give to the party. Model 2 in Table A4.9, Appendix 4 indicates that the “value for money” variable (SUBVALUE) has the statistically significant relationship with normative commitment that the wider organizational commitment literature predicts. However, this relationship does not subsume the language differences in normative commitment which remain significant in their own right.

To sum up these findings, linguistic differences in normative commitment disappear when socialization is controlled for, and socialization is a significant antecedent of normative commitment in its own right. The other variables to have a statistically significant relationship with normative commitment – personal-party value congruence, frequency of policy agreement and value for money – do not subsume differences between linguistic groups. Early socialization into the party by virtue of parental membership does not appear to be a significant antecedent of normative commitment. Nor does it overcome linguistic differences in commitment, but this may be for historical reasons. As is the case with the other two forms of commitment, where direct comparisons of the known antecedents of normative commitment in the workplace are possible, there are striking similarities between these and the antecedents of normative commitment in Plaid Cymru.

4.2.5 – Discussion of findings

The findings described above have two substantial implications. Firstly, the *prima facie* attitudinal differences between Anglophones and Cymrophones towards Plaid Cymru can be overcome. There are a number of variables which, when controlled for, make linguistic differences lose significance as antecedents of the three forms of commitment. These variables are summarized in Table 4.2 below.

Table 4.2 – Summary of variables overcoming linguistic differences in organizational attachment

	Affective Commitment	Continuance commitment	Normative commitment
Variables overcoming language differences	Age Tenure Value congruence Job satisfaction Socialization Overall feelings	Age Tenure Value congruence Social motivations Socialization Policy agreement	Socialization

Some of these variables are clearly beyond Plaid Cymru’s control. The party cannot manage members’ ages or psychological motivations, nor, to an extent, their organizational tenure. But the party can manage other variables which could reduce differences between linguistic groups, *e.g.* job satisfaction, overall feelings and socialization. Of these three, socialization is clearly the most important, as it is the only variable which reduces language differences across all three dimensions of attitudinal commitment. Therefore, it is likely

that active management of socialization within the party could help to reduce any tensions between the linguistic groups that might arise because of differences in attitudinal commitment. Issues surrounding the management of socialization in a political party setting are discussed in greater detail in Section 6.3 of Chapter 6 and Section 8.2 of Chapter 8.

The second major implication of these findings is that there is nothing so very “different” about the antecedents of the attitudinal commitment of political party members when compared to the broadly similar antecedents of attitudinal commitment in the workplace. This constitutes preliminary evidence that the development of attitudes in disparate types of organization can follow very similar lines. This evidence suggests that there is no reason why frameworks from organizational behaviour cannot be used as analytical tools to understand the commitment of political party members to their party. Indeed, it calls into question the overall quality of work that does not use the appropriate frameworks.

But this finding seems to contradict some of the observations made in the previous chapter about the *outcomes* of attitudinal commitment (*Section 3.2.4 in Chapter 3*) where results indicated that there was no enduring statistically significant relationship between any dimension of commitment and participation outcomes. Whilst the antecedents of attitudinal commitment are demonstrably not very “different” from those to be found in the workplace, the outcomes appear to be at odds with the existing workplace literature. The findings about the development of attitudinal commitment constitute an original contribution to knowledge in that this is the first occasion in which the antecedents of commitment in a political party setting have been examined. But the findings about the outcomes of attitudinal commitment appear to raise more questions than answers about its operation in a political party. These results are dealt with at greater length in Section 7.3 of Chapter 7.

SECTION 4.3 - LANGUAGE AND REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN PLAID

CYMRU

4.3.1 - Introduction

The differences in attitudinal commitment are not the only differences between linguistic groups in Plaid Cymru. This section looks at the remaining differences between these two groups, and between the three different membership density groups. Language and the area in which respondents live are closely related, and many of the differences observed between language groups are reflected in the differences between membership density groups.

Given the findings presented in the previous section, the most important difference between the cultural groups is a statistically significant difference in socialization. Anglophones score well below the party mean for socialization indicating that it is the Cymrophone members of Plaid Cymru who have a greater sense of belonging to the party (*Table 4.3 below*). However, there are also statistically significant differences within both groups that make further analysis difficult⁷. These findings are reflected in differences in socialization scores for membership density groups, which increase as density rises (*Table 4.3*), but further analysis is difficult because of differences within each membership density groups⁸.

Table 4.3 - ANOVA analysis of socialization mean scores by language and membership density

Socialization	Group	Mean	SD	SE	Variance	F	Sig
<i>Language</i>	<i>All</i>	53.8333	11.0715	.6974	122.578	10.302	.002
	<i>Cymrophone</i>	55.2914	10.0138	.7570	100.277		
	<i>Anglophone</i>	50.5195	12.6185	1.4380	159.277		
<i>Membership Density</i>	<i>All</i>	53.9084	11.0292	.6962	121.644	4.023	.019
	<i>High density</i>	55.8269	9.6887	1.3436	93.871		
	<i>Medium density</i>	55.1284	9.9360	.9517	98.724		
	<i>Low density</i>	51.3222	12.5446	1.3223	157.367		

⁷ A test for homogeneity of variance shows a significance level of .011. These differences may be attributable to age (*see Table A5.15 in Appendix 5*).

⁸ A test for homogeneity of variance shows a significance level of .021.

Other differences between linguistic and membership density groups in Plaid Cymru are apparent in why they join, what they expect of membership and what they receive from it. These differences are described in the remainder of this section.

4.3.2 - Language and membership density joining reasons and expectations

There is a statistically significant relationship between the reason for joining Plaid Cymru and area of membership density (*Table 4.4*). Members in medium density areas show the highest percentage of joining because of political support, whilst those in the lowest density areas show the highest percentage joining for Welsh cultural or nationalist reasons. The low density group also contains the greatest percentage of those joining for miscellaneous reasons.

Table 4.4 - Crosstabulation of joining reason with membership density

	Respondents (%)		
	<i>High density</i>	<i>Medium density</i>	<i>Low density</i>
<i>Policy support/habitual voter</i>	49.6	55.9	39.6
<i>Welsh nationalist/cultural reasons</i>	28.6	28.8	34.9
<i>Miscellaneous</i>	21.8	15.3	25.4

n=465, p=.032

A greater percentage of Cymrophones join Plaid Cymru without any expectations than do their Anglophone counterparts. This is not a particularly surprising finding; it reflects the tendency for Anglophone members to consider their party membership very carefully, whilst for Cymrophones, Plaid Cymru membership may be a family tradition or be perceived as a natural extension of a sense of Welsh identity (Davies 1999c). But larger percentages of Anglophone members want to see Welsh independence, expect to do something for Wales, want to have some personal involvement in politics and hope for information about Plaid Cymru or politics in general (*Table A4.10 in Appendix 4*). A larger proportion of Cymrophones expect their membership to support Welsh language and culture, and to help Plaid Cymru. There is no evidence of any statistically significant difference between either language or membership density groups as to whether or not these expectations were met.

4.3.3 - Language and membership density and the experience and benefits of membership

With such differing expectations, it is hardly surprising to find statistically significant differences regarding the perceived benefits of membership between language and

membership density groups. In terms of the benefits cited by members, the largest percentage of respondents saying that membership made them more proud and aware of Welsh culture and their own identification with Wales were the Anglophones. This is reflected in the differences between membership density groups; a greater percentage of members in the predominantly Anglophone low membership density areas cite cultural or nationality benefits from membership than any other region. However, greater percentages of Anglophone respondents and those living in low membership density areas say they did not receive any benefit from being in Plaid Cymru. Greater percentages of Cymrophones cited political and social benefits from their membership (*Table A4.11 in Appendix 4*).

Linguistic groups and membership density groups differ in their functional motivations. There is evidence of statistically significant differences between linguistic groups and understanding motivations and between membership density groups and social motivations (*Table A4.12 in Appendix 4*). Anglophones score far higher on understanding motivations than their Cymrophone counterparts, which is in line with the expectations of membership. The differences between language groups and understanding needs remain significant when all other demographic factors are controlled for (*Table A4.13 in Appendix 4*). Members in high-density Gwynedd score far higher on social motivations than members in other parts of Wales. When interpreted in conjunction with the higher Cymrophone scores on political and social benefits from membership discussed in the preceding paragraph, this finding constitutes evidence that “majority” groups in political parties are very sensitive to associations with success. They are, perhaps, the most likely groups to use political party membership as a mechanism for advancement in social status. But the differences between membership density groups and social motivations remain significant only when income and qualifications are controlled for. Exploratory MANOVA analysis indicates that the differences between groups lose statistical significance at a stringent level when language, gender and age are controlled for (*Table A4.14 in Appendix 4*).

There are statistically significant differences between linguistic groups and their self-rated personal political efficacy. This time it is the minority group, the Anglophones, who rate their efficacy higher than their Cymrophone counterparts (*Table A4.15 in Appendix 4*). These differences in efficacy between language groups retain their statistical significance when education status, income and age are controlled for, but they lose significance when

gender and membership density are controlled for (*Table A4.16 in Appendix 4*) There are no differences in political efficacy within linguistic groups⁹.

There are statistically significant differences between membership density groups in respect of their perceptions of branch efficacy (*Table 4.17 in Appendix 4*). A greater percentage of members in the high density area of Gwynedd rate their branch efficacy higher than those in the lowest density areas. This is not a surprising finding; Gwynedd county council had been under Plaid Cymru overall control for four years prior to the survey taking place, providing ample opportunity for party members locally to experience Plaid Cymru's performance in office.

This finding is also reflected in the statistically significant differences between membership density groups and job satisfaction (*Table A4.18 in Appendix 4*). Members in Gwynedd have the highest levels of job satisfaction, and job satisfaction decreases as does membership density. There are two explanations for this. The first is that members in Gwynedd, with its Plaid Cymru controlled county council and its solid Westminster parliamentary representation, are able to see tangible and continuous political results from their work, and that this is responsible for their higher levels of job satisfaction. The second is that the proximity of substantial numbers of fellow party members make the social dimensions of political party work more enjoyable. The differences in job satisfaction between membership density groups retain significance when all other demographic variables, including language, are controlled for (*Table A4.19 in Appendix 4*) and there are no differences in job satisfaction within membership density groups¹⁰.

The disparity of experience between Plaid Cymru's linguistic and density in-groups and out-groups is reflected by the fact that these are the only demographic groups in the party who show statistically significant differences in their overall feelings about membership (*Table 4.5 overleaf*). The percentage of Cymrophones describing themselves as "delighted" with their membership is more than double the percentage of their Anglophone counterparts. In high density Gwynedd, half of all members are "delighted" with their membership, in the medium and low density areas this figure drops to 37% and 30% respectively.

⁹ A test for homogeneity of variance shows a significance level of .233.

¹⁰ A test for homogeneity of variance shows a significance level of .206.

Table 4.5 - Crosstabulation of feelings about membership with language and with membership density

	Respondents (%)				
	<i>Cymrophone</i>	<i>Anglophone</i>	<i>High density</i>	<i>Medium density</i>	<i>Low density</i>
<i>Delighted</i>	46.1	20.3	50.0	36.9	29.9
<i>Pleased</i>	25.2	33.3	21.1	29.0	31.7
<i>Mostly satisfied</i>	21.6	28.8	20.2	23.9	26.8
<i>Mixed</i>	4.6	15.0	5.3	6.8	11.0
<i>Mostly dissatisfied</i>	1.6	1.3	3.5	1.1	0
<i>Unhappy</i>	0.3	1.3	0	1.1	0.6
<i>Terrible</i>	0.7	0	0	1.1	0

n=459, *p*=.000 *n*=454, *p*=.013

The stark message for Plaid Cymru is that the experience of membership differs substantially for its members along the lines of the language they speak and the place where they live, and that these differences are reflected in respondents' socialization into the party and their feelings about membership. Socialization impacts on satisfaction with membership (see Chapter 5, section 5.2.3), with participation in activities (Chapter 3, Table 3.29), and with other behaviours such as continuity of membership (Granik 2002). Plaid Cymru has to address the linguistic and geographical divides amongst its membership for its own benefit, as well as that of its members. Management tools for promoting the socialization of all party members are discussed in Section 6.3 in Chapter 6.

SECTION 4.4 – GENDER AND PARTICIPATION IN PLAID CYMRU

4.4.1 - Introduction

In contrast to the findings presented in the previous section, the differing experience of membership for women and men is not reflected in any differences in key indicators such as socialization or overall feelings about membership. This may be because the differences are fewer in number, or because they are mainly behavioural differences, not attitudinal. There are differences between women and men in participation in some activities, and on the time spent on party activities. There are statistically significant gender differences in political efficacy ratings, in reasons for joining the party, and in frequency of policy agreement. But there are no such differences in respect of expectations of membership, whether expectations were met, the benefits of membership cited, job satisfaction or psychological motivation. This section describes briefly the main behavioural differences between male and female Plaid Cymru members, and concludes with a discussion of why these differences may arise.

These few differences are discussed in the context of social identity theory. Despite there being so few behavioural and attitudinal differences between women and men in Plaid Cymru, women clearly are not reaching positions of power and influence in the party to the same extent as men (*see Section 4.1.3 of this chapter*). Social identity theory is germane to the discussion about how this situation might be accounted for. Social identity theory is defined by Tajfel and Turner (1979) as consisting of “those aspects of an individual’s self-image that derive from the social categories to which he perceives himself as belonging.” However, once individuals define the appropriate groups to which they belong, a number of psychological processes combine to bring about pressure to evaluate one’s own group (the in-group) positively through comparisons with other relevant groups (the out-groups). Individuals attempt to maintain or enhance their self-esteem, and in doing so they aim to achieve or to maintain positive social identity. This can be done by making comparisons between their groups and out-groups, which inevitably favour the individual’s own group. Negative characteristics are attributed to relevant out-groups.

Social categorization theory argues that individuals depersonalize the attitudes, feelings and behaviours operating within so that they conform to the relevant in-group or out-group prototype (Hogg and Abrams 2001). This stereotyping forms the basis for relations between the various groups. Intergroup relations are not just confined to attitudes and perceptions; they are also behavioural, and one key behavioural feature of intergroup relations is discrimination (Hogg and Abrams 2001). This can take many forms; if discrimination exists in Plaid Cymru it is most likely to operate in the forms of favouritism and exclusion.

4.4.2 - Gender and membership behaviour in Plaid Cymru

There is no relationship between gender and participation in any one activity, but the first indication of a female out-group in respect of participation is the statistically significant gender difference in the amount of time spent on activities (*Table A4.20 in Appendix 4*). Well over one third of men spend more than five hours a week on activities, but just over one fifth of Plaid Cymru’s women members report this level of time commitment.

Female out-group participation status is confirmed by statistically significant differences in respect of election time and internal party activities (*Table 4.6 below*). In line with the findings of Plaid Cymru’s Gender Balance Commission, women score well below the party mean on both types of activities. But there is also evidence of statistically significant

differences within gender groups in respect of their participation in these types of activity¹¹. This restricts further statistical examination of the differences in participation between gender groups (although it is possible to speculate that differences within groups can be attributed to age (see Chapter 5, section 5.1.2)).

**Table 4.6 -
ANOVA analysis of activity-type mean scores by gender**

Activity type	Group	Mean	SD	SE	Variance	F	Sig
Routine	All	2.1761	2.1737	.1013	4.725	.533	.466
	Men	2.2422	2.2025	.1377	4.851		
	Women	2.0931	2.1395	.1498	4.577		
Election	All	1.1935	1.4339	.0668	2.056	4.003	.046
	Men	1.3125	1.5731	.0983	2.745		
	Women	1.0441	1.2250	.0857	1.501		
Internal	All	.5087	.9890	.0461	.978	8.671	.003
	Men	.6289	1.1092	.0693	1.230		
	Women	.3578	.7906	.05535	.625		

Unequal participation occurs only across some groups of party activities. There is no statistically significant difference between women and men and the amount of routine activities which they undertake, and there are no differences within gender groups in respect of routine activities¹²

There is a statistically significant difference between male and female perceptions of their own political efficacy. Men rate their efficacy higher than the mean score for the party as a whole (Table A4.21 in Appendix 4). Exploratory MANOVA based analysis of political efficacy and gender indicates that these differences between genders remain significant when all other demographic variables except for education are controlled for (Table A4.22 in Appendix 4).

Finally, a larger percentage of women frequently agrees with party policy than men. The percentage of women saying they always agree with policy is 12.9%, in contrast to the 4.8% of men in the same category (Table A4.23 in Appendix 4).

¹¹ A test for homogeneity of variance shows a significance level of .000.

¹² A test for homogeneity of variance shows a significance level of .363.

4.4.3 - Why is there a gender out-group in Plaid Cymru?

It is easier to describe the gender differences in membership behaviour than to explain them. Even though this thesis measured a wider range of possible antecedents of party participation than has been used in previous works, there is still little firm evidence to explain the differences in female and male participation in Plaid Cymru. For example, it is difficult to offer an explanation of why women spend less time on party activities than men based on the results of this research. The only antecedent of time spent on activities to retain statistical significance throughout a systematic process of elimination was values motivations (*see Chapter 3, section 3.1.3*). There is no statistically significant difference between genders in respect of their values motivations. Therefore, there is no evidence to sustain any argument that psychological differences between the sexes are antecedents of differing activity rates.

It is also difficult to explain away differences in participation on the grounds of differences in political efficacy. The results presented in Chapter 3 (*Table 3.29*) suggest that political efficacy is an antecedent of the numbers of routine activities and internal party activities. But there is no gender difference in participation in routine activities. And there are statistically significant gender differences in participation in election time activities, for which political efficacy is not a statistically significant antecedent. There is no evidence to sustain an argument that the difference in political efficacy ratings between the sexes are antecedents of different participation rates.

One possible explanation for gender difference in participation suggested by members of Plaid Cymru¹³ is that women do not reach the higher echelons of the party because responsibilities to their children prevent them from spending time on party activities. This research did not ask respondents about their status as parents. However, the age ranges of the respondents could be used as a very rough proxy measure to gauge the likelihood that members would have very dependent children living with them in their household. Chi-square tests indicated that there was no relationship between gender, age and participation in any one activity, or between gender, age and spending more than five hours a week on party activities. There is no statistically significant evidence to suggest that women who are the most likely to have young children in their household are any less likely to participate in Plaid Cymru than women who do not.

¹³ Comments cited by Plaid Cymru members in this section were made by participants at the party's Constitutional Conference held in Builth Wells, Wales, in November 2001.

Anecdotes aside, Fox (2001) offers another explanation as to why women participate less in some party activities. Her empirical study into how women achieve work/family/volunteering balance identified prioritization of commitments as a key strategy adopted by women to enable them to undertake three roles. One respondent in her survey is quoted as saying "... I have been forced to prioritize where I expend my energy. Family and work (because we need the money) are my priorities ... I'd rather be volunteering, but it doesn't put food on the table." One-third of Plaid Cymru respondents live in households with total incomes of £15,000 or less (*see Chapter 2, Table 2.7*). Nearly half of Plaid Cymru's women live in the lowest income households, compared to less than one third of men (*Table A4.24 in Appendix 4*). Family responsibilities alone might not inhibit women's participation in politics; but family responsibilities combined with work commitments and low income might. Additionally, there is a relationship between income groups and participation rates which is described in detail in the following chapter.

A further suggestion put forward by party members is that female participation in Plaid Cymru should be encouraged by asking women to stand for party or public office. There is evidence that Plaid Cymru's out-groups can be very responsive to approaches aimed specifically at them (*see the concluding section of this chapter*). But Fox's study found that women volunteers turn down a number of the voluntary tasks that they are asked to do in order to have time for all three work, family and volunteer roles. One extrapolation of Fox's finding might be that women can find the time to participate in the routine activities of the party but hold back from accepting responsibilities which they perceive to be more time consuming. Therefore, the evidence suggesting that a proactive "asking" strategy would be successful in bringing about equality of participation for women is mixed.

Is there any evidence from this survey that women in Plaid Cymru are discriminated against? It is true that this survey took no direct measure of whether members consider they are treated fairly by the party. However, as was apparent in the previous section, different experiences of membership can be reflected in measures such as socialization into the party or overall satisfaction with membership. There are no differences between gender groups on either of these measures. It is therefore difficult to draw any conclusions about the nature of gender discrimination, or lack of it, in Plaid Cymru. If there is discrimination operating within the party, women either do not perceive it as such or are not affected by it to the extent that it adversely affects their experience of membership.

Do the results call into question the hypothesis that women are an “out-group” in Plaid Cymru? Currently the party can point to a highly successful and visible cadre of women holding seats in the National Assembly and the European Parliament. A woman competed for the party leadership in the summer of 2000 (albeit unsuccessfully). Whilst this thesis was being prepared the party was chaired by women for two successive years. In short, has Plaid Cymru overcome its gender inequality? The evidence in this survey that there is “no problem” is mixed. It is possible to interpret the lack of gender differences in overall feelings about membership and socialization as indicative that women do not consider themselves *de facto* as an out-group. However, if the definition of equality is that women are seen to be represented at all hierarchical levels in proportion to their numbers, Plaid Cymru clearly has a considerable amount of progress to make.

The term “glass ceiling” has been coined to describe the invisible barriers which mitigate against women achieving on equal terms with men in a number of walks of life. This research has not helped to make the whereabouts of the glass ceiling within Plaid Cymru any more visible. This research has clearly not identified much evidence explaining why women are not equally represented throughout the party hierarchy. It has certainly eliminated some possibilities; namely gender differences in respect of socialization, job satisfaction, functional motivations and ratings of political efficacy. The only new suggestion this research can offer is that women may restrict their own participation in the party due to their perceived responsibilities for coping with the consequences of low income. As long as Plaid Cymru draws the bulk of its female membership from low income households, its work towards gender equality will not only have to be concentrated on shattering a glass ceiling, but also on raising an equally invisible “glass floor”.

SECTION 4.5 - CONCLUDING REMARKS

The demographic fault lines in Plaid Cymru have developed for different reasons. The linguistic divide has come about due to the party’s origins, and the continuing numerical preponderance of Cymrophones in the party. The geographic divide has been created because of the substantial concentration of party members in one region of Wales. The gender divide is based on unequal representation of women in the party hierarchy relative to their overall numbers in the party. The main differences in the experiences of membership between and within Plaid Cymru’s in-groups and out-groups are summarised in Tables 4.7 to 4.9 overleaf.

It is also relevant to note that the differences between the groups emerge even as they join the party, different groups join in different ways (*Table A4.25 in Appendix 4*). Nearly half of male and Anglophone members of the party initiate contact with Plaid Cymru in order to join. Conversely, around 40% of both Cymrophones and women report having joined in response to some sort of recruitment method. Members joining the party through someone they already know hover around the 20% mark for all categories, but the percentage of women joining via a personal contact is nearly 25%. Additionally, different demographic groups can be extremely sensitive and responsive to party attempts to recruit them, as statistically significant differences in organizational tenure in *Table A4.26 in Appendix 4* illustrate. One-third of all Anglophone members of Plaid Cymru joined the party in the five years prior to the survey taking place *ie* between 1994-2000. One third of these members joined in the space of one year, 1999. This is the period immediately following Plaid Cymru's official adoption of a bilingual name in the autumn of 1998 (*section 4.1.1 of this chapter*). The bulge of female entrants during 1989-1998 coincided with a sustained effort by Plaid Cymru to recruit women into the party (Closs-Stevens 2001). At no other time other than this nine year period has the percentage of women recruits to the party exceeded that of men.

This illustrates that gender and linguistic groups are extremely responsive to different recruitment methods, with the clear implications that the party can manipulate the entry of different demographic groups to its ranks if it so wishes. The implications of this are discussed in more detail in Section 6.2 of Chapter 6. But social identity theory suggests that if individuals are psychologically predisposed to create in-groups and out-groups, and to treat out-groups in a negative way, then increasing out-group representation in the party might only create more members who do not feel welcome in its ranks. However, once social identity theory has been identified as applying within Plaid Cymru, strategies can be undertaken to try to ameliorate its effects. The party can provide guidance as to which sorts of behaviours are acceptable – by rewarding them, or, at the very least, condoning them - and which are not.

Table 4.7 – Summary of differences between and within in-groups and out-groups, party behaviours and political efficacy

	Over 5 hrs on activities		Routine activities		Election activities		Internal activities		Political efficacy	
	<i>B</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>W</i>
Gender	√	x	x	x	√	√	√	√	√	x
Language	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	√	x
Region	x	x	√	√	x	√	x	x	x	x

√=significant relationship, x = no significant relationship, *B* = between groups, *W* = within groups

Table 4.8 - Summary of differences between and within in-groups and out-groups and overall experience of membership

	Joining reason		Initial expectations		Frequency of agreement		Feelings		Socialization	
	<i>B</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>W</i>
Gender	√	x	x	x	√	√	x	x	x	√
Language	x	√	√	√	x	x	√	√	√	√
Region	√	x	x	x	x	x	√	√	√	√
	Job satisfaction		Cited benefits		Social motivations		Understanding motivations		Branch efficacy	
	<i>B</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>W</i>
Gender	x	x	x	x	X	√	x	√	x	x
Language	x	x	√	√	X	x	x	x	x	x
Region	√	x	√	√	√	x	√	x	√	√

√=significant relationship, x = no significant relationship, *B* = between groups, *W* = within groups

Table 4.9 - Summary of differences between and within in-groups and out-groups, and organisational attachment

	Affective		Normative		Continuance	
	<i>B</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>W</i>
Gender	x	√	x	x	x	√
Language	√	x	√	x	√	x
Region	x	x	x	x	x	x

√=significant relationship, x = no significant relationship, *B* = between groups, *W* = within groups

The survey results indicate that language differences in attitudinal commitment to the party can be overcome by using strategies to equalize levels of socialization within the party. Standardising socialization procedures may also disproportionately benefit members who live outside the “charmed county” of Gwynedd. It is harder to know which management strategies will reduce the out-group status of women as the survey results did not provide any conclusive evidence of the antecedents of their exclusion from the party hierarchy.

Management tools at the party’s disposal to reduce the differences between Plaid Cymru’s demographic groups are discussed in detail in Chapter 6. A pragmatic approach suggests that Plaid Cymru, a party of just 15,000 members which has only recently begun to taste the fruits of political success in Wales, cannot afford to be seen to disproportionately favour or exclude any of the groups within its ranks. An active and appropriate internal policy of diversity management is one of the responsibilities which comes with aspiring for the electoral support of a diverse group of people. Political parties are open to public vilification if they are seen not to treat different groups of members evenhandedly.

CHAPTER 5 – WHO BENEFITS FROM POLITICAL PARTY MEMBERSHIP?

INTRODUCTION

Most organizations have some mechanism of controlling who is allowed to join them and who is not. Political parties are expected to include everyone. This is not entirely unreasonable: after all they seek power of governance over all sections of society, and it is in their interests to be accessible to all sections of society in order to gain legitimacy. Nevertheless, political parties appear to be the only organizations expected to welcome into their ranks individuals who are not necessarily going to be of much benefit to them. Nor do they have much scope to reject applications from potential members who might not benefit from membership. This chapter of the thesis looks at the experiences of membership – for both the party and its members – from the viewpoint of the benefits which each gives to the other.

Plaid Cymru membership is open to all, both in constitution and in practice. However, having drawn its membership base from various sections of society, it runs the risk that some members will participate less than others, and that some will experience their memberships less favourably than others. This chapter examines the benefits of membership as they relate to members of different ages, income and education levels. These three groups have been selected because they are demographically interlinked. There are statistically significant differences in behaviours between these groups, and in many of the purposive and solidary benefits that these groups receive (*summarized in Tables 5.8 to 5.10 in Section 5.3.3 of this chapter*). After a brief description of the composition of these groups, the first section of this chapter examines their behaviours and describes the benefits which Plaid Cymru derives from their membership in terms of their activity and financial contributions.

The bulk of the chapter, however, will be devoted to an examination of the purposive and solidary benefits which the different groups of members obtain from their membership. Chapter One of this thesis drew attention to the lack of appropriate identification or measurement of solidary benefits in studies of political party membership behaviour to date. This deficiency in the literature is significant because evidence from nonprofit studies indicates that if salient solidary benefits are delivered to volunteers, desirable volunteer behaviours result (Clary *et al* 1998). Thus the solidary benefits of membership in a political party context must be appropriately defined. Parties have to know which incentives

motivate desirable membership behaviours before organizational resources are used to deliver benefits.

In the discussion section of the chapter, the results described in the earlier sections are summarized into a “benefits matrix”, allowing identification of those members who benefit Plaid Cymru most, and those members who benefit most from their membership. The implications of the findings are discussed in full.

SECTION 5.1 – WHO BENEFITS PLAID CYMRU?

5.1.1 – Age, education and income groups in Plaid Cymru

The demographic profile of Plaid Cymru respondents to this survey appeared in full at Table 2.7 of Chapter 2, but a brief summary is given here for ease of reference. In common with Britain’s other main political parties, the bulk of Plaid Cymru’s membership (75%) is over the age of 45. The respondents were fairly evenly divided in terms of degree status; 48% reported an education up to degree level, 47.5% are non-graduates. The six household income bands presented in Table 2.7 have been grouped together in this chapter for the purposes of analysis, the 32% of respondents declaring incomes of up to £15,000 form the lowest income category, the £15,001-£40,000 categories have been used to indicate average incomes (42% of respondents), and the remaining two groups constitute the high income category (14.5% of respondents)¹.

The less educated and less affluent members of Plaid Cymru are often the same people. Well over two-thirds of those in the lowest income households are non-graduates and just over half of all non-graduates live in the lowest income households. Far greater percentages of members over pensionable age are to be found amongst the low income group than members below the age of 65. The most affluent members of Plaid Cymru are those in the 45-54 age bracket followed very closely by the slightly younger 35-44 group. These groups, along with 25-34 years olds, are also the most educated; 60% or more of members in each age bracket hold a degree.

5.1.2 – Who is active in Plaid Cymru?

Two age groups stand out as the most active over the range of party activities - those aged between 45-54 and 55-64. These two age groups have the greatest percentage of members

¹ These categories omit missing responses.

taking part in at least one party activity (*Table 5.1*). The 45-54 group contains the greatest percentage of members spending more than five hours a week on party activities (*Table 5.2*). There are no differences between qualification and income-based groups, their propensity to take part in any activities or the time spent on activities.

Table 5.1 - Crosstabulation of activity/inactivity with age group

	Respondents (%)						
	16 - 24	25 - 34	35 - 44	45 - 54	55 - 64	65 - 74	75+
<i>Did any one activity</i>	78.6	79.3	73.5	80.3	89.8	68.7	61.5
<i>Did no activities</i>	21.4	20.7	26.5	19.7	10.2	31.3	38.5

n=466, p=.002

Table 5.2 - Crosstabulation of time spent on activities with age group

	Respondents (%)						
	16 - 24	25 - 34	35 - 44	45 - 54	55 - 64	65 - 74	75+
<i>Over five hours a week</i>	28.6	6.3	33.3	45.5	25.0	31.3	15.4
<i>Five hours a week or less</i>	71.4	93.8	66.7	54.5	75.0	68.8	84.6

n=215, p=.051

There are statistically significant differences between age and income based groups in the numbers and types of activities in which they participate. Different age groups show statistically significant differences in their participation in routine and election time activities, and, to a less stringent level, internal party activities (*Table A5.1 in Appendix 5*). However, further analysis of these figures is not possible because tests for homogeneity of variance indicate that there are differences within groups as well as between groups². Similarly, the statistically significant differences between income groups and their participation in each sort of activity mask differences within income groups in respect of election time and internal party activities³. Across the full range of activities, members from low income households show mean activity scores below the mean score for the party as a whole. The average and high income households show mean scores above the party

² *p* = .006 for routine activities; *p* = .000 for both election and internal activities.

³ Tests for homogeneity of variance on each of these two activity types resulted in a significance level of .000.

average (*Table A5.2 in Appendix 5*)⁴.

There is no evidence of statistically significant differences between education groups and numbers of activities undertaken, but in respect of election time and internal party activities there are differences within education groups⁵.

The most active age groups in Plaid Cymru also consider themselves to be the most politically efficacious (*see Table A5.4 in Appendix 5*), reinforcing the considerable evidence that efficacy is an antecedent of participation in a political party setting. Members aged between 45 and 64 are the only age groups scoring higher than the overall party mean of 21.5. The 45-54 group scores highest (22.7) with the 55-64 group close behind. There is no evidence of differences in political efficacy within age groups⁶.

There are also statistically significant differences between education groups and income groups and their perceptions of their political efficacy. Non-graduates and members from low income households score well below the party mean (*see Table A5.6 in Appendix 5*). The differences between both groups remain statistically significant when each of the other demographic variables are controlled for⁷.

5.1.3 - Who donates to Plaid Cymru?

All three demographic groups discussed in this chapter show statistically significant differences in the amounts which they donate to Plaid Cymru. Greater percentages of the 35-54 age groups donate over £25 a year to Plaid Cymru than members from other age groups (*see Table A5.9 in Appendix 5*). This appears to contradict the evidence presented in Chapter 3 indicating that, when other variables are controlled for, age does not have a significant relationship with the levels of donation made (*see Table A3.31 in Appendix 3*). But what the percentage breakdown presented in Table A5.9 probably reflects is the higher income levels of these groups; as discussed above, these two age groups are the most affluent in the party. Similarly, Table A5.10 in Appendix 5 may appear to contradict the

⁴ Results of MANOVA based analysis of routine activities indicates that the differences between income groups remain significant only when language and membership density are controlled for. Income marginally loses significance when qualifications are controlled for, and loses significance when age and gender are controlled for (*Table A5.3 in Appendix 5*).

⁵ Tests for homogeneity of variance indicate a significance level of .018 for election time activities, and a level of .009 for internal activities.

⁶ Tests for homogeneity of variance indicate a significance level of .490. Age differences retain their significance with political efficacy when all other demographic variables except for income are controlled for (*see Table A5.5 in Appendix 5*).

⁷ MANOVA based analyses of the relationships between educational and income groups and political efficacy appears in Appendix 5 (*see Table A5.7 and A5.8 in Appendix 5*).

negative relationship between education and amounts donated presented in Table A3.31. This has probably arisen because the cruder measurement in Table A5.10 may also reflect the higher incomes enjoyed by graduate members rather than their propensity to give just because they happen to have a degree. In any event, the relationship between education and donation amounts loses significance when other variables in a composite model are controlled for (*Table 3.25 in Chapter 3*). There is no contradiction between the two sets of results and the relationship between donations and household income. Table A5.10 in Appendix 5 clearly corroborates the finding in Chapter 3 (*Table 3.26*) that those in average or high income households donate the most money to Plaid Cymru.

5.1.4 – Who stays in Plaid Cymru?

Plaid Cymru is beginning to reap the rewards of its own longevity. Most of the youngest members of the party have a relationship with it that begins with their parents (*Table A5.11 in Appendix 5*). Over 71% of the 16-24 year olds and well over half of those aged 25-34 have at least one parent who was, or still is, a member of the party. The corollary of this finding is that existing members over the age of 45 have been a source of new members for Plaid Cymru. This is congruent with findings in other British political parties (Seyd and Whiteley 1992) that parental political affiliation affects their childrens' opinions and membership behaviour. Some parents take a more direct approach, and sign their children up to party membership whilst they are in their early teens (indeed, some survey respondents said this was their experience). This explains the extraordinarily long tenure periods reported by some of the youngest members (*Table A5.14 in Appendix 5*): about 7% of 16-24 year old members report having been in the party for between 11 and 20 years. Otherwise, the statistically significant relationship ($p=.000$) between the age of respondents and their organizational tenure is in line with expectations. Well over half of all members over the age of 55 report memberships spanning 30 years or more. However, middle or old age is no bar to short organizational tenure. Around 5% of all members over the age of 65 first joined Plaid Cymru within the 12 months immediately prior to the survey.

Greater percentages of the 45-64 age groups keep their subscriptions up to date than any other age group (*Table A5.13 in Appendix 5*). The youngest members show the greatest propensity to let their subscriptions lapse, with nearly one third of them not holding a current subscription to the party at the time of the survey. These observations are congruent with the self-reported subscription status of young party members in my previous study of the English Liberal Democrats (Granik 1997) which were referred to earlier in this thesis (*see Section 3.3.5 of Chapter 3*). The statistically significant relationship

between age and holding a current subscription ($p=.027$) appears to be that younger members are more fickle in their relationship with the party, whilst members over the age of 45 are more stable in their membership patterns.

5.1.5 – Discussion of findings

The analysis above highlights the consequences faced by political parties in being open to all. Certain groups of members – those aged 45-64, the affluent, and graduates – will be active, will be likely to support Plaid Cymru with donations and regular subscription income, and will even supply the party with new members. In terms of what they contribute to the party, these members appear to be more equal than others. But, for a number of ethical and political reasons which are dealt with later in this chapter (*see section 5.3.3*), Plaid Cymru is in no position to place restrictions on who may join and who is welcome.

An alternative strategy, and one which is far more acceptable from the ethical point of view, is for Plaid Cymru to attempt to manage the behaviour of those who join it. This does not mean that Plaid Cymru should constantly ask one group of members to participate whilst ignoring those who do not fit the demographic profile of those most likely to benefit the party. It means that, whilst trying to encourage those who are the most likely to participate to do so, Plaid Cymru should also try to take what action it can to removing some of the obstacles which appear to prevent other members from taking part. Fortunately, the key difference between the non-graduate, lower income members and others is one that Plaid Cymru can, potentially, do something about. Non-graduate lower income members score lowest on political efficacy – a key antecedent of participation identified in Chapter 3 (*Table 3.29*). Management strategies for increasing political efficacy amongst Plaid Cymru members are described in detail in Chapter 6 (*see Section 6.4*).

The other method that Plaid Cymru can employ to encourage participation amongst its members is to give them incentives to do so. This strategy will only work if the incentives which lead to participation are valued by members as benefits, and if members are prepared to participate in order to reap those benefits. Further, this strategy will only be effective in increasing participation amongst low income non-graduate members if these groups are actually in receipt of “benefit incentives”. These issues are dealt with in detail in the following section.

SECTION 5.2 – WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS OF MEMBERSHIP?

5.2.1 - Hypothesising the benefits of membership

It was argued in the opening chapter of this thesis that existing research into the benefits of political party membership is inadequate because the potential purposive and solidary benefits of membership were previously theorized in an ad hoc fashion (*see Chapter 1, section 1.2.3*). It was also argued that a precise understanding of which benefits are sought by political party members is crucial to understanding their behaviour. There is congruence between incentives theory, which is cited often by political scientists, and marketing theory, which is not. Incentives theory (Clark and Wilson 1961) argues that organizations seeking to motivate individuals to work for them must provide incentives for those individuals to do so. Marketing theory (Bagozzi 1975) specifies that these incentives must be salient to organizational members, or they will not be effective. This section examines whether incentives for activism are also benefits of membership, and, if so, which groups of members receive them.

Two approaches towards identifying the incentives for participation were identified in the opening chapter of this thesis. In studies of British party membership (Seyd and Whiteley 1992, Whiteley *et al* 1994), the potential incentives were selected by the authors. In studies of volunteers, the main incentives for volunteering identified by the volunteers themselves were incorporated into the Volunteer Functions Inventory (VFI) (Clary *et al* 1992). This measurement instrument was tested in laboratory conditions before being used extensively in the field (Clary *et al* 1998).

The purposive incentives for participation - those related directly to the goals of the organization – were identified in the political science literature as frequency of agreement with policies, and position on the ideological spectrum. In this thesis, the values motivation function measured by the VFI can also be considered as a purposive incentive. The opportunity to express one's personal values must imply congruence between personal values and the values of the organization. The solidary incentives for participation in a political party were hypothesized by political scientists to be fulfillment of political ambition, and "attitude to political activism in general". The VFI identified another five potential solidary incentives: careers, enhancement, protective, social and understanding incentives. The results of Chapter 3 (*Table 3.29*) suggested two further solidary incentives for participation, socialization and job satisfaction. Each group of incentives is examined in

turn to explore whether incentives for participation are valued by party members as benefits of membership.

5.2.2 - Purposive benefits of membership

The first step in this process was to try to identify the criteria against which an incentive could be identified as a benefit. I hypothesized that there would be a significant positive relationship between an incentive that members valued, and overall feelings about the experience of membership. I also hypothesized that if an incentive was perceived to be a benefit, members be unlikely to think that they had not benefited from their membership at all. A significant negative relationship would be expected between each incentive/benefit and a measure of whether respondents considered that they had received nothing from their membership.

These predicted relationships were initially measured by a series of bivariate regressions, which appear in Table 5.3 below. In both tests, the predicted relationships were found for two out of the three potential purposive incentives, values motivations and frequency of agreement with policies. Ideological position showed a positive relationship with overall satisfaction, but this relationship was not statistically significant. In the “no benefits” test, not only did the relationship fail to reach statistical significance, but the direction of the relationship was positive, rather than negative. This result is further evidence that there is little empirical justification for using May’s “Law” as a framework for the analysis of participation.

Table 5.3 – Correlations and bivariate regressions between purposive incentive variables, overall satisfaction and no benefits

	Overall satisfaction	No benefits
Frequency of agreement	.30**	-.15**
Ideological position	.05	.02
Values motivations	.34**	-.37**

*** denotes coefficient significant at the $p < .01$ level or above, * denotes coefficient significant at the $p < .05$ level or above.*

I then hypothesized that if frequency of agreement and values motivations were perceived as benefits, the mean scores of each of these variables would be higher amongst members who were satisfied with their membership than amongst those who were not, and these differences would be statistically significant. Feelings about membership ranging from delighted to mostly satisfied were coded as high satisfaction, the remainder as low

satisfaction, and the means of each group were compared (*Table 5.4 below*). Although the mean scores for frequency of agreement between satisfaction groups showed the predicted statistically significant differences, these results were unreliable because of evidence of statistically significant differences within groups. This heterogeneity could have arisen from the combination of the low number of members falling into the low satisfaction category (n=36) and the relatively large standard deviation (.69) amongst members in that category. The evidence that frequency of agreement is a purposive benefit of political party membership is therefore somewhat mixed. The mean scores for values motivations also demonstrated the predicted statistically significant differences, but without the differences within groups. This finding provides additional evidence that the opportunity to act on one's values is perceived as a functional benefit of political party membership by Plaid Cymru members.

Table 5.4 - means, standard deviations and contrast effects of purposive benefit scores and overall satisfaction

	Mean scores			
	Frequency of agreement		Values motivations	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
High satisfaction	2.9	.33	10.8	2.5
Low satisfaction	2.5	.69	7.8	3.0
<i>Contrast F</i>	42.275** (1,412)		50.525** (1,341)	
<i>Levene statistic</i>	92.912**		1.639	

** *p* < .05 level

There are no statistically significant differences between any demographic group in respect of values motivations. There are statistically significant differences between age groups and frequency of agreement with policies⁸ but these differences probably do not affect behaviour to any extent because frequency of agreement with policies is not an antecedent of any form of participation.

5.2.3 - Solidary benefits of membership

In the case of identifying the solidary benefits of membership, it was less easy to explore the incentives hypothesized in the Labour and Conservative studies: fulfillment of political ambition, and “attitude to political activism in general”. In the case of the latter incentive, I

⁸ The very youngest members appear to comprise the age group most likely to experience any purposive benefits to be had by virtue of agreeing with party policy. The very eldest members appear to agree less frequently with party policies, indicating that they are the least likely to derive these purposive benefits from party membership (*see Table A5.14 in Appendix 5*). These differences do not occur between income and education groups.

previously argued that there was some confusion as to whether attitudes functioned as an antecedent or an outcome of participation. Therefore I did not believe that the theorizing behind the “attitude to political activism” incentive was of sufficient quality to include any measurement of it in the research instrument. But the inability of this research to take account of political ambition was a serious failing on my part. This survey did not include a direct measure of respondents’ political ambition, for reasons that are described in full in Section 8.1.3 of Chapter 8. In short, this research is unable to test whether political ambition is an incentive for participation, how important an incentive it is in relation to other variables, and whether the fulfillment of political ambition is seen to be a benefit of party membership. This is a serious limitation of the research, and is discussed in full in the closing chapter.

Nevertheless, it was still possible to repeat the tests described in section 5.2.2 above for the seven remaining hypothesised solidary incentives of political party membership. As before, a statistically significant positive relationship between an incentive and overall satisfaction, and a statistically significant negative relationship with the “no benefits” variable were predicted to demonstrate that the incentive was a benefit. These two sets of relationships were found to occur in respect of job satisfaction, socialization, and enhancement, protective and understanding motivations. The variable measuring career motivations failed to reach significance in either test, and in the regression with the “no benefits” variable demonstrated a positive relationship rather than the negative one predicted. There is no evidence that Plaid Cymru members perceive career benefits accrue to them by virtue of their membership. The position regarding social motivations is not as clear cut. The relationship with overall satisfaction was not significant, but the hypothesised negative relationship with “no benefits” was found to exist. The results appear at Table 5.5.

Table 5.5 – Correlations and bivariate regressions between solidary incentive variables, overall satisfaction and no benefits

	Overall satisfaction	No benefits
Job satisfaction	.24**	-.22**
Socialization	.30**	-.23**
Career motivations	.03	.01
Enhancement motivations	.16**	-.18**
Social motivations	.08	-.15**
Protective motivations	.12**	-.16**
Understanding motivations	.18**	-.26**

*** denotes coefficient significant at the $p < .01$ level or above*

The mean scores of respondents on each of these variables were compared to explore whether these would be higher amongst members who were satisfied with their membership than amongst those who were not, and whether these differences would be statistically significant. As before, feelings about membership ranging from delighted to mostly satisfied were coded as high satisfaction, the remainder as low satisfaction (*Table 5.6 overleaf*). Although all the potential benefits showed the hypothesized differences in mean variable scores, these differences were not statistically significant in respect of potential social benefits. The results for social benefits are, therefore, unreliable, and added to the mixed evidence of the first stage of analysis, it is doubtful as to whether Plaid Cymru members as a whole perceive that social approval from others is a benefit of their membership. Additionally, the results for potential protective and understanding benefits were unreliable because of evidence of statistically significant differences within groups. In both cases, these differences within groups could have arisen from the combination of the low number of members falling into the low satisfaction category and a relatively large standard deviation (for protective benefits $n=42$, $S.D.=2.2$, for understanding benefits $n=42$, $S.D.=3.9$).

The three remaining potential benefits of membership, job satisfaction, socialization and enhancement, displayed the predicted relationships in each of the three tests. Within the satisfaction-based groups illustrated in *Table 5.6 overleaf*, there were no statistically significant differences in respect of any of these three potential purposive benefits. The evidence from this exploration is that the purposive benefits of party membership valued by members are: liking the work they do, feeling a part of their organization, and being able to boost their self-esteem via their membership.

Table 5.6 - means, standard deviations and contrast effects of purposive benefit scores and overall satisfaction

	Mean scores					
	Job satisfaction		Socialization		Enhancement	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
High satisfaction	10.6	2.6	55.1	9.9	7.6	3.3
Low satisfaction	8.2	2.4	44.7	11.6	6.0	3.0
<i>Contrast F</i>	15.968**(1,256)		24.869**(1,248)		9.374** (1,372)	
<i>Levene statistic</i>	.739		.169		.641	

** $p < .05$ level

	Mean scores					
	Protective		Social		Understanding	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
High satisfaction	4.4	3.0	7.8	3.6	9.8	3.1
Low satisfaction	3.2	2.2	6.9	3.7	7.8	3.9
<i>Contrast F</i>	5.794**(1,368)		2.335(1,365)		13.573**(1,373)	
<i>Levene statistic</i>	8.0**		.029		6.7**	

** $p < .05$ level

There were no statistically significant differences between age, education or income groups in respect of their mean scores on job satisfaction. There are statistically significant age-based differences in socialization, with the three youngest age groups falling well below the mean socialization score of the party as a whole, and those above the age of 45 exceeding it (see Table A5.15 in Appendix 5).⁹

There are also clear demographic differences in the functional motivations of members. Age groups and education groups show statistically significant differences in respect of careers, enhancement, protective and social motivations (see Tables A5.17 and A5.18 in Appendix 5). There are statistically significant differences between income groups and enhancement, protective and social motivations (Table A5.19 in Appendix 5). To deal with enhancement motivations first, as enhancement is clearly considered to be a benefit of membership, low income groups score well above the party mean. They are more likely to use party membership as a vehicle for fulfilling their self-esteem than their counterparts on average or high incomes. These differences between income groups retain their statistical significance when all other demographic variables are controlled for (Table A5.20 in

⁹ A test for homogeneity of variance indicated no differences within age groups ($p = .293$) (see Table A5.16 in Appendix 5).

Appendix 5) and there are no significant differences within income groups.¹⁰ Non-graduates' enhancement motivations also exceed the party mean score, but this difference loses statistical significance when household income is controlled for (*Table A5.21 in Appendix 5*).¹¹ Differences within age groups in respect of enhancement functions prevent further statistical analysis, but it is possible to speculate that these may also be attributable to income group¹².

Plaid Cymru's members in the 16-34 age groups have substantially higher mean scores on career motivations than does the party as a whole. However, there are also significant differences within age groups which prevent further analysis. These differences might be attributable to education status. Non-graduates score just above the party mean, indicating that the use of political party membership as a mechanism to boost career prospects is more important to them than to graduates. The statistically significant differences within educational groups which prevent further analysis, may, of course, be accounted for by age¹³.

The pattern of less educated, low income members using membership as a vehicle for realising solidary motivations appears to occur again in the case of social motivations, with both non-graduate members and those on low incomes scoring well above the party mean. Differences between educational groups and income groups lose statistical significance when each of these variables are controlled for in relation to each other (*Tables A5.22 and A5.23 in Appendix 5*). Statistically significant differences between age groups in respect of social needs, with members over the age of 55 scoring above the mean of the party as a whole, also lose significance when income is controlled for (*Table A5.24 in Appendix 5*). Party members who are older, less educated or on low incomes also demonstrate scores above the party mean in respect of protective functions. Statistically significant differences within age, education and income groups prevented further analysis of the demographic differences in protective functions of party membership. There are no differences between age, education and income groups in respect of understanding motivations, although differences within income groups may be attributable to language.

¹⁰ A test for homogeneity of variance shows a significance level of $p=.319$.

¹¹ There is no statistically significant difference within educational groups ($p=.554$ in a test for homogeneity of variance).

¹² A test for homogeneity of variance shows a significance level of $p=.003$.

¹³ A test for homogeneity of variance within age groups shows a significance level of $p=.000$; a test for homogeneity of variance within educational groups shows a significance level of $p=.001$.

5.2.4 – Benefits to members - discussion and conclusions

There is no evidence to suggest that the purposive incentives for participation suggested by political scientists are actually perceived as benefits by members. There is no evidence whatever to suggest that position on the ideological spectrum is considered by members to be a benefit of membership. The relationship between frequency of agreement with policies and satisfaction with the experience of membership shows there are significant differences within groups. Although this may well be caused by statistical artefact, it still renders unreliable the evidence that members consider frequency of agreement with policies to be a benefit of membership.

Values motivations emerged as a statistically significant benefit of membership at each test. Members value having the opportunity to express their personal values within the context of an organization whose values are congruent with their own. There are no differences between any demographic group and their mean scores on values motivations or benefits. Therefore, it is unlikely that any manipulation of purposive benefits in Plaid Cymru will result in greater inclusion in participation within the party.

These results also suggest that participation in a political party is unlikely to be affected by changes to specific policies - so long as these changes fall within the parameters of the values that members believe their party stands for. The finding described in Chapter 3 (*see Table 3.29*) of a relationship between participation and values motivations provides additional evidence that it is value shift - not policy shift - that has the propensity to affect participation.

These results provide evidence that the solidary benefits of party membership reported by members are satisfaction with the work they do, feeling that they are part of the party, and being able to feel better about themselves. There is also some evidence that members receive protective benefits - a sense of distraction from their everyday lives - and understanding benefits - an opportunity to learn more about their party and the political process. However, this evidence is, statistically speaking, unreliable, even though this could well be attributable to statistical artefact. The evidence that members perceive social approval to be a benefit of membership is very mixed indeed. If it is perceived to be a benefit of membership, it appears that the less well-educated, less affluent members are those who are the most likely to receive it. Unfortunately, due to a flaw in the research design, it was not possible to test whether members perceive fulfilment of political

ambition - which political scientists hypothesize to be a benefit of membership - as a benefit.

There are no differences between age, income and education groups in respect of job satisfaction, although results from the previous chapter indicate that increasing job satisfaction in Plaid Cymru would particularly benefit members outside Gwynedd (*See Section 4.3.3 in Chapter 4*). The age differences in socialization indicate that younger members stand to feel more included in Plaid Cymru if the party adapted socialization strategies. The results of the previous chapter indicate that Anglophones would also benefit from such a strategy (*see Section 4.3.1 in Chapter 4*).

The results of this exercise also allow us to identify which incentives/benefits are the most important for Plaid Cymru to deliver to its members. Table 5.7 below shows the antecedents of participation, donation and holding a current subscription, and those solidary and purposive incentives for which there is reliable statistical evidence that members consider them benefits of membership. This table demonstrates that values motivations, job satisfaction and socialization are both incentives for activism and benefits of membership. It is this combination of incentives and benefits that is the optimum for Plaid Cymru to deliver to its membership. The ways in which Plaid Cymru can do so are discussed at length in the following chapter.

Table 5.7 – Purposive and solidary incentives and benefits

	Incentive	Benefit
Purposive		
Values	✓	✓
Frequency of agreement	x	x
Position on spectrum	x	x
Solidary		
Job satisfaction	✓	✓
Socialization	✓	✓
Career	✓	x
Enhancement	x	✓
Protective	✓	x
Social	x	x
Understanding	x	x

One noticeable feature of this table is that, just as the variables never before tested in a political party environment form the majority of the antecedents of participation identified in this research, they also form the majority of the benefits cited by members. This

constitutes further evidence both that rational choice theories offer the most plausible explanation for participation, and that frameworks from the field of organizational behaviour and of nonprofit management can potentially make a substantial contribution towards understanding membership participation. The use of each of these frameworks - the VFI, amended OSS and MOAQ - is examined in considerable detail in Chapter 7.

SECTION 5.3 – WHO BENEFITS FROM POLITICAL PARTY MEMBERSHIP?

Finally, this chapter will conclude by identifying which members benefit the most from their membership, and which members benefit the party. The pattern of findings which emerges from the preceding sections of this chapter is of a small group of members - graduates aged between 45-54 on average or high incomes - disproportionately benefiting the party; with a larger number of less well educated and less affluent members disproportionately using their party membership as a vehicle for receiving solidary benefits which are, perhaps, unavailable to them elsewhere. This section expresses the results of the data yielded from this research in matrix form, and discusses the implications arising from the membership benefit matrix.

5.3.1 – Mapping the benefits of political party membership

The most accessible method of displaying the benefits of membership both to party and to members was to do so by mapping the data from the survey onto a 2 x 2 matrix that could measure both dimensions simultaneously. However, there were a number of difficulties in preparing the available data for a matrix. The first difficulty was that the measurements of the variables comprising each construct varied, and there was little opportunity for standardizing the data obtained. The second difficulty was that not all demographic groups exhibited differences on all of the variables within each construct. In order to try to resolve the first difficulty, scores were standardized by the following method. Where there were statistically significant differences between different types of members, each group of member was ranked in order, and allocated points in inverse proportion to their place in the rankings (ie – for age groups first place in the rankings was awarded seven points, and seventh place in the rankings was given just one point). Where there were no statistical differences between members one point was allocated to each group of member. Differences within the groups were not taken into account in these calculations, nor were adjustments made in order to take into account differences between groups that were subsumed by other demographic factors. There was no attempt to try to quantify the value

of each type of benefit to individual or party; therefore each type of benefit was given equal weight and equal points.

The process was done twice, once with the variables measuring benefits to party and the other with variables measuring benefits to member. The benefits to party variables were: a total score for activity comprising participation in any one activity, spending more than five hours a week on party activities, and totals of routine, election time and internal activities; political efficacy; donating over £25 a year; and holding a current subscription. The benefits to member variables were: cited benefits; the purposive benefits of frequency of agreement with policies and values benefits; socialization; job satisfaction; and the solidary functional benefits.

The points scored by each group of members for each set of variables were added together. In order to standardise the scores to place them on a matrix, the sum of the total number of points was divided by the numbers of categories of members (seven for age, three for income and two for education), and the number of variables in each set of benefits (four for benefits to party, five for benefits to members). Matrix placings were rounded to one decimal place. The scores for each group of members for each set of benefits, together with the appropriate matrix placing appears at Tables A5.26 and A5.27 in Appendix 5. A cut-off point of 1.0 was selected as the dividing line between low and high benefits. Table A5.26 in Appendix 5 comprises a summary of the matrix placings of each group of members for each set of benefits, together with their high/low classification. Fig 5.1 overleaf shows these results in matrix form.


5.3.2 – Features of the benefit matrix

The first distinctive feature of the benefit matrix is that the “high-high” mutual benefit category is empty. This has serious implications for Plaid Cymru. The party clearly has considerable scope for improving the benefits for its members.

In fact, it is clear from the benefit matrix that most categories of member fall below the low member benefit threshold. The position of members aged 65+ is perhaps somewhat better than it looks, because they are disproportionately likely to fall within the low income and non-graduate categories which do disproportionately benefit from membership.

Interestingly, the matrix placings do not translate into dissatisfaction amongst current membership of Plaid Cymru: members may be highly satisfied with what they receive, although this matrix suggests they do not receive very much. But it is possible to speculate

Fig 5.1 – Membership benefits matrix



that this may explain why membership figures for Plaid Cymru are low. People who may have dropped out of the party, or who may not wish to join it, because they think membership has done, or will do, very little for them, were not included in this survey. Speculating further, if this finding is replicated across political parties, it may explain why the total membership of parties in Britain falls well below that of the National Trust (Richards 2000). The National Trust has a well-defined package of benefits that it offers in return for a membership subscription: most political parties do not.

As the narrative in this chapter would suggest, the less affluent, less educated members of Plaid Cymru are the only group of members falling into the high member benefit category. They are net gainers from political party membership, they do not contribute to the party what they get from it. This is altogether a bad thing for Plaid Cymru, after all, these groups constitute a substantial proportion of their members, and probably the bulk of their voters. But it follows that it is these members whom the party has most scope for moving into the high-high mutual benefit category. If desirable membership behaviours could be increased amongst this segment of the membership, Plaid Cymru could find itself with many more productive members. The methods which the party could use to do so are discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

Conversely, those members who are benefiting the party the most are gaining least from their membership. Members aged 45-64 are the most active, those on average and high incomes contribute the most financially and are also very active, and the 35-44 age group is one of the most affluent in the party. In an environment where membership is voluntary, their position well below the “high benefit” threshold smacks of rough justice. These members could also be moved into the “high-high” mutual benefit category, although the mechanism for so doing needs to be considerably different than that for moving the current “net-gainers” discussed above. One argument against moving these groups of members into the “high-high” matrix category is that if they are already net contributors to the party, concentrating on them wastes organizational resources - they are already quite content as they are. However, running counter to this are the arguments that increasing the benefits available to this group acts as an “insurance” against them quitting, and that there is scope for ensuring that these benefits make them even more productive than they already are. These concepts will be explored more fully in the following chapter.

5.3.3 - Social inclusion in a political party setting: is it possible and is it worthwhile?

The differences between age, education and income groups in Plaid Cymru in respect of their contribution to the party are summarized in Table 5.8 below. Members aged between 45-64 are the most likely to participate and score highest on political efficacy, less well-educated and less affluent members score lower on political efficacy, participate less and donate less to the party.

Table 5.8 - Summary of differences between and within demographic groups, behaviours and political efficacy

	Activity/ inactivity	+ 5 hrs activities	Routine activities		Election activities		Internal activities	
			<i>B</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>W</i>
Age	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
Education	x	x	x	x	x	√	x	√
Income	x	x	√	x	√	√	√	√

	Donation amount	Current subscription	Political efficacy	
			<i>B</i>	<i>W</i>
Age	√	√	√	x
Education	√	x	√	x
Income	√	x	√	x

√=significant relationship, x = no significant relationship, B = between groups, W = within groups

The differences between the groups in terms of their experience of membership is summarized in Tables 5.9 and 5.10 below. Young and less-well educated members are the most likely to use their membership as a means of fulfilling careers motivations. Older members, the less-well educated and less affluent members are the most likely to use their membership to fulfil enhancement, protective and social motivations. Members under the age of 45 are the least likely to consider themselves socialized into the party.

Table 5.9 - Summary of differences between demographic groups, and purposive motivations/benefits

	Frequency of agreement	Left/right spectrum	Values	
			<i>B</i>	<i>W</i>
Age	√	x	x	x
Education	x	√	x	√
Income	x	x	x	x

√=significant relationship, x = no significant relationship, B = between groups, W = within groups

Table 5.10 - Summary of differences between and within demographic groups and solitary motivations/benefits

	Socialization		Job satisfaction		Career		Enhancement	
	<i>B</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>W</i>
Age	√	x	x	x	√	√	√	√
Education	x	x	x	x	√	√	√	x
Income	x	x	x	√	x	x	√	x

	Protective		Social		Understanding	
	<i>B</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>W</i>
Age	√	√	√	x	x	x
Education	√	√	√	x	x	x
Income	√	√	√	x	x	√

√ = significant relationship, x = no significant relationship, *B* = between groups, *W* = within groups

The most cynical interpretation of the benefits matrix is that it is clearly in Plaid Cymru’s interests to concentrate on recruiting and retaining members amongst the demographic groups who seem to benefit the party the most. The results of the matrix imply that recruitment efforts should be concentrated amongst individuals aged between 45-64 living in households with average or high incomes. But being too selective about who is most welcome to become a Plaid Cymru member is not necessarily in the party’s interests. It immediately limits the total population of prospective members from which recruits can be drawn and potentially alienates existing members of the party and members of the public in Wales who fall outside these categories. Plaid Cymru could recruit a small cadre of good quality members, and would pay the heavy price of seeming irrelevant to other sections of society and losing the legitimacy conferred by weight of numbers.

The previous two chapters have concentrated on identifying the differences between groups of members, and it might seem reasonable to assume that there is little scope for recruiting members with the most propensity to become active without discriminating in some way against some demographic segment of the population. This is not the case. This study has identified one variable where there are no significant differences between any of the demographic groups. This variable is an antecedent of activism and is a benefit of membership. This variable is values motivations. No one demographic group has any greater or less tendency than another to use Plaid Cymru membership as a vehicle for acting on and expressing their values. A strategy using values motivations as an inducement to join would constitute the most socially inclusive method of recruitment at Plaid Cymru’s disposal. Once members are in the party, differentiated management strategies are

necessary to ensure that as many members as possible are as productive as possible and as satisfied with their membership as possible. These strategies are discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 6 – MORE MEMBERS, MORE WORK AND MORE MONEY: COMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT IN A POLITICAL PARTY ENVIRONMENT

INTRODUCTION

The chapter will deal with organizational communications in a political party environment. Specifically, this chapter will use evidence from the survey to devise communications tools likely to be effective in recruiting members, socializing them, raising their efficacy levels to increase the likelihood of participation, and in generating more revenue from them.

The first section of the chapter introduces a framework describing how communications are used as management tools in workplace organisations, and draws parallels with their use in a political party environment. The lack of academic interest in researching the use of communications as a management tool and the patchy nature of the study of research into political communications is discussed. The section concludes with the arguments in favour of political parties using communications tools as a means of managing its membership.

This is followed by a consideration of how communications messages and methods can be incorporated into a managed recruitment strategy. The content and process of socialization communications is discussed at some length, reflecting the importance of socialization as both a part of the recruitment process, and as an antecedent of activism. A communications strategy aimed at increasing political efficacy, another antecedent of activism, is also presented. The chapter concludes with a discussion with the communications implications of income generation, an area which is overlooked in academic research.

SECTION 6.1 - COMMUNICATIONS AS MANAGEMENT TOOLS

6.1.1 – Organizational communication - management functions and forms

Van Riel (1995) identifies two ways in which communication is expected to contribute to the achievement of organizational objectives. Firstly, communication has a “window” function. Organizations prepare and execute a “communications policy resulting in messages that portray all facets of the organization in a lucid and appealing way” in order to bring about anticipated outcomes. Secondly, communication has a “mirror” function. Organizations monitor relevant environmental developments in order to anticipate their consequences for their individual policy.

Three distinct forms of corporate communication identified by the same author are marketing, management and organizational communication. Marketing communication is used as a general term to cover various elements of promotional activity that, in the context of a commercial enterprise, might involve advertising, direct mail, personal selling and sales promotions. Management communication refers to managers' roles in persuading individual members of an organization that its goals are desirable, in order to secure the consent of those members to be managed. Organizational communications, in a workplace context, includes public relations, public affairs, labour relations, investor relations and internal communications.

A further observation made by van Riel (1995) is that the study of corporate communications as an academic discipline is very new, even though topics which are germane to the subject are often dealt with by scholars in more established fields. There is certainly very little work on internal communications published by human resource management and organizational behaviour scholars. Bies and Moag (1986) argue that this deficiency in the literature is due to the pervasive nature of communication. It is such an integral aspect of any organizational procedure that it is hard to distinguish between the substance of the procedure, and the communication of it. Oliver (2001) agrees that academic human resource management texts fail to recognize the value of communications as a management tool. She argues that the importance of communication tools as a resource for operationalising corporate strategy is not acknowledged, and, in practice, the success or failure of many large-scale change programmes hinges on communications tools. Whilst the substance of change programmes might be sound, they risk being unsuccessful at implementation because not enough thought is given to how change should be communicated to those involved.

6.1.2 - Communication in a political party context – the state of current research

These functions and forms of communications identified by van Riel (1995) have their direct equivalents in the context of a political party setting. Table 6.1 overleaf summarises how these definitions can be applied to the specific context of a political party.

But existing studies in the sub-disciplines of political marketing and political communications do not offer a comprehensive coverage of all three forms of communications. In her review of trends in political communication research in the 1980s,

Table 6.1 - The uses of communications in a political party environment

	Window	Mirror
Marketing communication	Media handling Campaign implementation Event implementation Fundraising	Responding to current events: “rapid rebuttals”/campaign adaptations etc
Management communication	Campaign planning Party event planning Accountability Supporting elected representatives	Policy formulation Commissioning research Opinion polling Campaign evaluation
Organizational communication	Alliance building Resource allocation Party discipline Membership recruitment/retention Long-term donor relations	Strategic recruitment Internal evaluation

Table 6.2 - Summary of academic interest in political party communications

	Window	Mirror
Marketing communication	Political marketing and political communications – numerous studies of specific campaigns	Political marketing - narrative accounts of recent campaigns
Management communication	Political marketing and political science - historical narrative studies on the development of individual campaign strategies	Political marketing - narrative accounts of opinion tracking throughout campaigns. Political communications – explores individual responses to media coverage in terms of opinion formulation
Organizational communication	None	None

Johnston (1990) identified the relationship between political communication and political attitudes, behaviour and information as a growing area of interest. However, the thrust of this research was directed at examining how individuals process and respond to political information carried in the media, rather than how communications directly from parties influenced its members. Scholars of political communications since have concentrated almost exclusively on party communications directed at voters (*eg* McNair 1995, Scammell

1995, Bartle and Griffiths 2001) It was noted earlier in this thesis (*see Section 1.3.6 of Chapter 1*) that the development of political marketing has also focused on the party-voter relationship. Most recently, Davis (2002) summarized this situation with the observation that the study of political communications “focused rather narrowly on the PR involved in institutional politics – most especially on general elections”. The different sub-disciplines involved in the study of political communications “rarely engage with the literature and empirical material produced on other sides of the academic divide.” This bias in the academic literature towards an over-emphasis on marketing communications in relation to the other forms of communication is clearly apparent in Table 6.2 above.

6.1.3 - Why use communications tools for membership management?

The one remaining area for discussion in this introductory section is a consideration of why political parties should use communications tools to manage their members. There are two main reasons: parties have very few other management tools at their disposal, and they have a great deal of communications expertise.

The reality for membership associations is that most of the tools available for the management of employees are simply not relevant for the management of members (*see Chapter 1, section 1.5.1*). Parties do not have formal recruitment procedures for members and they have very few mechanisms available to encourage members to work. They lack the tools of formal performance appraisal or compensation open to employing organizations, they have very limited parameters for job design, and there are few sanctions for unacceptable behaviour. Far from being the management tool that goes overlooked, as Oliver would argue, communication is one of the few management tools which political parties possess.

All credible political parties have experience and expertise in communicating. All communicate regularly with external media, all communicate extensively with the general public each time there is an election campaign. But what parties do not generally do is use this experience and competence to communicate to their own members. Occasionally parties run serious recruitment drives, backed by appropriate leadership commitment and resources (Whiteley and Seyd 1998), but there is little evidence that these campaigns are sustained in any way, either in terms of continuing to recruit, or by attempting to retain the members which were so hard won. Communicating to members is simply not considered to be as high a priority to party leaders as communicating to voters. In contrast, Davis (2002) noted that British trade unions have made concerted and sustained efforts to

communicate with their memberships over the past twenty years. In his survey of individuals employed in union communications, 42.9% described their first communications priority as internal and membership communication, and a further 26.2% said their first priority was membership recruitment.

The drawback with using communications as a management tool is that they can be open to misinterpretation. A message can pass through as many as six stages from sender to recipient (Schramm 1954). In the process of going through these stages, there are opportunities for the message to be distorted, either through differences of understanding between the sender or recipient, or because of environmental “noise” making it difficult for the receiver to interpret the message as intended by the source. It is therefore important that communications with a membership audience, or targeted segments of that audience, should be as unambiguous as possible. A desirable feature of all mass communications programmes is to have some means of monitoring and evaluating the response to messages that are sent out. These can be used to ascertain that messages are understood by the recipients in the way that was intended by the senders, or to try to evaluate why communications campaigns did not show the desired results.

This potential for misunderstanding is compounded by the differing meanings that different cultures may give to the same message (Blais and Gidengil 1993). In some cases, different strategies have to be created to convey the desired message accurately to two different groups: Gallois and Callan (1997) note that this a technique used that has been used in public information campaigns in the USA to reach Anglophone and Hispanic target audiences. Differing culture-based interpretations of messages also occur during communication at individual levels (Gallois and Callan 1997). However, of all the political parties in Britain, Plaid Cymru already has an appreciation of bicultural communications issues and experience in using communications tools in such a way that both its Cymrophone and Anglophone members feel that the central organization communicates with them on equal terms.

SECTION 6.2 - COMMUNICATIONS TOOLS FOR RECRUITMENT

6.2.1 - Introduction

Relationships between potential employees and workplace organizations begin with communication during the recruitment process (Hunt 1992, Greenshields 1997).

Relationships between potential customers and product or services providers may often

begin with advertising communications (Fill 1995, Zeithaml and Bitner 1996). It is reasonable to assume that recruitment or advertising communications may also influence the relationship between a prospective political party member and their party. This section will discuss how party recruitment communications messages and processes can be managed to achieve the membership composition it wants.

Hunt (1995) describes the three stages of recruitment in a workplace organization as: describing the job, finding the people and inducting those who are accepted. With some adaptation, this simple description provides a framework which political parties can follow in their own recruitment processes, backed by appropriate communication tools. This section of this chapter will deal with the first two stages of recruitment; the next section will discuss in more detail communications tools for inducting new members.

6.2.2 - “Describing the job”: recruitment strategies

In workplace organizations, job descriptions should comprise statements of job objectives, descriptions of responsibilities and resources controlled, performance evaluation criteria and a statement of how the position fits into the organisation’s future plans (Hunt 1995). This clearly assumes that individuals are recruited into the organization specifically to do individually tailored jobs. In the context of party membership recruitment, individuals are recruited *en masse* and not for specific posts, and all work is voluntary. Consequently the type of description used in workplace recruitment is not wholly appropriate. Responsibilities, resource control and evaluation criteria are simply not relevant to potential party members.

However, Plaid Cymru does need to consider where the membership fits in to the organization’s future plans. The decisions that the party makes regarding its overall membership objectives will largely dictate recruitment policy, and the communications tools necessary to carry out that policy. Therefore, the first strategic decision for Plaid Cymru to take is to decide what it wants its recruitment strategies to achieve. In the light of the findings of this survey, there are three possible directions which recruitment strategies could take: increasing membership numbers; recruiting members who would most benefit the party; and using recruitment to correct the demographic imbalances within the party described in Chapters Four and Five. These strategies do not necessarily have to be mutually exclusive, nor do they necessarily have to result in any individuals or groups being discouraged from joining. The broad implications of each recruitment strategy are discussed below.

“Growing” the party - Plaid Cymru is not a large political party. Its membership of 15,000 makes it the second largest party grouping in Wales after the Labour Party¹. One legitimate recruitment strategy could be to equal, and then overtake, Labour as the party with the largest membership in Wales. This would probably call for a prolonged and sustained recruitment drive aimed at rapid growth in numbers, such as that orchestrated by the Labour Party between 1994-1997 (Whiteley and Seyd 1998). Such a campaign would necessitate commitment from the central party leadership, co-operation from local branches and rhanbarthau, and, almost inevitably, a considerable commitment of finances.² In recruiting to grow the party, Plaid Cymru would attempt to offset the costs of a recruitment campaign by the sheer numbers attracted to join. However, one risk is that the net result of the campaign would be to attract more of its “natural constituency” of members who disproportionately benefit from their membership without substantially helping the party.

Recruiting “net contributor” members - The risk of recruiting “more of the same” membership can be offset by targeting the “net contributor” members, *i.e.* those who contribute the most to the party for recruitment. The first step in this process involves identifying which members are most useful to have. This survey strongly indicates that two demographic groups are the most likely to fall into the “net contributor” category. In terms of participation in activities, the most desirable new members are between the ages of 45-64 (or those approaching the age of 45). In terms of donating to the party, the most useful members are those who have, or potentially have, enough disposable income to be generous (*see Chapter 3, Table 3.28*). The survey results also indicate that psychological segmentation can identify desirable potential recruits: those scoring highly on values and protective functional motivations (*see Chapter 3, Table 3.29*).

In practical terms, members scoring highly on protective motivations would be quite difficult to identify as a target group. Conversely, identifying potential members in the “net contributor” age and income brackets, and those likely to score highly on values motivations is relatively straightforward via standard target prospecting mechanisms. The costs involved in specifically identifying and contacting such potential “net contributor”

¹ Approximate Welsh membership figures from the other main parties are as follows: Labour have 17,000 members, the Conservatives have 10,000 members and Liberal Democrats claim 2,500 (figures from the public information units of each party, August 2002).

recruits would be greater per member than the costs involved in a more generalised strategy. One difficulty in a “net contributor” recruiting campaign is that this survey shows no evidence of statistically significant relationships between joining method and the desired age groups ($p=.382$), income brackets ($p = .916$) or high scorers on values motivations ($p=.356$). Accordingly, the mechanisms which might mitigate in favour of targeted individuals joining the party have yet to be proven, meaning that a “net contributor” campaign could be, initially at least, very risky. Plaid Cymru would be taking the calculated risk that the greater potential contribution of the “net contributor” members would, in time, more than justify the increased costs and efforts of recruiting them.

Recruiting for social inclusion – In this recruitment strategy Plaid Cymru would elect to correct the demographic imbalances in the party by deliberately focusing recruitment effort at those sections of society who are currently the “out-groups” of the party as a whole. The groups of members which this survey identified as “out-groups” (*see Chapter Four*) were Anglophones, those living outside Gwynedd, and women. In the latter case, the available evidence suggests that, in particular, the targeting and recruitment of affluent women would be necessary (*see section 4.4.3 of Chapter 4*). In this strategy, as the last, the target populations are possible to identify and contact, but run the corresponding risk of being more costly to recruit than in a more generalized campaign. The payback for Plaid Cymru in this scenario may not be quantifiable in terms of increased activism or donations, but could accrue in terms of popular legitimacy if it could demonstrate that it was capable of representing all sections of society in Wales within its own organization.

There is evidence that “out-groups” can be very responsive to attempts to attract them. In the five years prior to the survey taking place, Anglophone new membership was more than double that of Cymrophones (Granik 2001b); this coincided with the period which included the party’s name change to attract more Anglophone members. A greater percentage of Anglophone members put themselves forward for membership compared to their Welsh counterparts, more of whom had been recruited into the party (Granik 2001b). Female new recruitment exceeded male new recruitment to the party during a nine-year period which was coincided with a sustained campaign to encourage more women to join the party (Granik 2001b, Closs-Stevens 2001). A strategy of recruiting for inclusion, therefore, could be less risky to operate than a “net-contributor” strategy, although the

² I recall reading an item in PRWeek, the trade publication for PR practitioners, that Labour’s spend on direct mail recruitment communications alone during their membership drive was in the region of £2 million.

quality of members recruited might be poorer.

6.2.3 - Finding the people

Two key practicalities of attracting new members to the party are selecting which messages to use to attract them, and which methods should be used to communicate these messages and facilitate joining.

Recruitment messages - Whatever the recruitment strategy selected by the party, it has to decide what recruitment message it wants to communicate to prospective members. This involves another communications challenge: should the recruitment message be differentiated in order to attract different groups of members, or should it be the same across the board? There are a number of dangers involved in differentiating recruitment messages. Firstly, recruitment messages are, in effect, promises to potential members as to what they can expect to find when they join (Greenshields 1997). If Plaid Cymru makes too many promises to too many different groups, it may fail to retain the groups to whom it cannot fulfil the promises it has made, and could appear to be inconsistent. Secondly, evidence from this survey suggests that the different demographic groups within Plaid Cymru's membership have different reasons for joining, different expectations of membership and different experiences of membership. Differentiated messages could constitute *de facto* discrimination against those demographic groups which are not responsive to particular recruitment messages.

A more compelling reason for a single across-the-board recruitment message is the evidence from this survey that, of all the attitudinal and behavioural variables tested for in this research, only in respect of values motivations are there no statistically significant differences between any of the demographic groups. Individuals scoring highly on this variable are the most likely to contribute their activity to the party. A recruitment message using values motivations as an inducement to join would constitute the most socially inclusive message of recruitment at Plaid Cymru's disposal. It would be the message most likely to attract those members who would work for the party. Field studies of volunteer responses to recruitment literature provide evidence that individuals who have the propensity to score highly on values motivations respond positively to recruitment literature stressing fulfillment of these motivations (Clary *et al* 1998). A recruitment message stressing values motivations is highly appropriate for use in a political party environment.

Recruitment methods – Whilst Plaid Cymru should keep its recruitment message consistent, it should be possible to communicate that message to different groups by using differentiated recruitment methods. As discussed above, there is already evidence that recruitment methods can be used productively for inclusivity recruitment, even though their impact on “net-contributor” recruitment has not yet been proven. Different recruitment communications methods will have different managerial implications.

Generalised recruitment communications are joining messages which appear in environments where Plaid Cymru has relatively little or no control over the demographic composition of the individuals who are likely to see the message *eg* recruiting via paid-for advertising, party broadcasts, and the party website. One issue with generalized communications is that whilst all political parties use them, mainly because advertisements or broadcasts provide the opportunity, only a very small percentage of individuals actually join via these advertisements (House 1996, Davies 1999c).

Wholly differentiated communications methods involve carefully selecting which individuals Plaid Cymru would like to receive its recruitment messages. Names and contact details of prospective members can be obtained from customer lists of other organizations and prospects contacted directly by mail, or even telephone. The difficulty inherent in direct mail or telephone recruitment is that local parties are not always assiduous in establishing contact with members who join in this way (House 1996). Members have fewer opportunities to be socialized into the party. The propensity to participate in a party or renew subscriptions is not necessarily dissipated by having joined by direct mail, as some academic commentary suggests (Maloney 1996, Whiteley and Seyd 1998) but by being neglected by the rest of the party thereafter. Recruitment by direct mail reinforced by a socialization programme could potentially be a useful tool for party recruitment.

Hybrid communications methods refer to methods which appear to be generalized, but can be adapted to disproportionately attract the individuals which the party would like to have. For example, recruitment stalls in local towns or at national events provide a mechanism for simple, low-cost trials as to whether adaptation will have the desired effect. If it is right that people are attracted to make a purchase on the grounds that the purchase is aimed specifically at “people like them” (Choi and Hilton 1995), the age ranges of volunteers on each stall can be varied (*eg* people aged between 30–45 could be used on one occasion and between the ages of 45–60 on another), the ages of members of the public showing interest noted, and the data analysed to see if prospects of a similar age are attracted. Doorstep

leafleting and recruiting can also be targeted towards desired demographic groups, and can be planned down to ward, or street level.

Whatever method is used to recruit new members, the last remaining stage in the recruitment process is induction or socialization. It is at this stage of the process where time and effort invested by a party in recruitment is often wasted. Because of its importance, communication tools for socializing members are discussed in the following section.

SECTION 6.3 - COMMUNICATION TOOLS FOR SOCIALIZATION

6.3.1 - Introduction

The survey results presented in Chapter 3 provide evidence that the extent to which members are socialized into Plaid Cymru has a significant relationship with the amount of activities that they perform. Socialization into the party also accounts for some of the difference between members who continuously renew their subscriptions and those that do not (Granik 2002). It is clearly in Plaid Cymru's interests to ensure that all its members feel that they are part of the party, as this is likely to increase activity levels and promote continued membership. It is also in the members' interests that they feel a part of the party. The evidence presented in Chapter 5 (*see Table 5.7 in Section 5.2.3*) clearly demonstrated that socialization is considered by the party membership to be a benefit of their membership. Mean scores on socialization were higher amongst members who were satisfied with their membership than amongst those who were not (*see Table 5.6 in Section 5.2.3*). In summary, members want to be socialized, and they contribute more work for the party if they are.

Organizational socialization has a further outcome: it is the only variable which reduces the differences in attitudinal commitment to Plaid Cymru experienced by linguistic groups of members (*see Section 4.2 in Chapter 4*). This finding suggests that managing socialization not only reduces membership turnover and increases benefits to members; it can also potentially reduce any tensions between Cymrophones and Anglophones which may arise because of differing attitudinal commitment to the party.

Organizational socialization is defined by Van Maanen and Schein (1979) as "the process by which an individual acquires the social knowledge and skills necessary to assume an

organizational role.” One of the assumptions on which these authors based their theory of organizational socialization was that individuals experiencing any transition into or within an organization were in an “anxiety-producing situation” where they were “more or less motivated to reduce this anxiety by learning the functional and social requirements of their newly assumed role as quickly as possible”. In other words, organizational members are particularly receptive to information about their new environment when they join and are likely to be sensitive to all communications and cues in order to learn about the new social situation in which they find themselves.

But subsequent organizational behaviour literature did not focus specifically on these communications and cues. Meyer and Allen (1997) recognize this as a deficiency in the existing literature, commenting: “It might well be that the message conveyed to employees during socialization is more important in determining their commitment than are the structural characteristics of the practices”. This section of the thesis uses the results of the survey to devise the optimum content of communications messages designed to encourage socialization, and uses organizational socialization theory to suggest which processes are most likely to apply in a party setting. The combination of content and process suggests very strongly that the onus for socializing members into the party lies with local branch officials.

6.3.2 - The content of party socialization messages

The results of this survey provide some evidence that there are two sets of socialization messages that are likely to be effective in a political party setting. One set of messages can be devised from the evidence presented from the statistical analysis of the socialization scale itself. The second set of messages can be devised from the other antecedents of participation that were presented in Chapter 3.

The construction of a Party Socialization Subscale (PSS), which was described in Section 2.4.5 of Chapter 2, indicated that, of the ten statements measuring socialization in the survey, the five statements comprising the best source of fit with the latent construct are: “I get along with my branch officers”, “The activities are what I expected I would do”, “I am in control of the work I do for the party”, “My local branch can depend on me” and “I am trusted by the people I work with”. Whilst the latter two statements are difficult to incorporate into socialization messages, the first three statements indicate what grassroots members consider to be the key elements of socialization.

The first statement indicates strongly that grassroots members use their relationships with elected branch officers as a cue for judging their relationship with the party. It is crucial for socialization levels that each member perceives they have a positive relationship with branch officers. The clear implication for party officials is that they are primarily responsible for the socialization into Plaid Cymru of their branch members, in addition to their duties as specified “on paper”.

The second two statements of the PSS suggests that much of the content of effective socialization messages hinges on the work they do. Socialized members have their expectations of party activities met. Expectations of work can be framed as early as the recruitment stage (Greenshields 1997), much in the same way as companies frame customer expectations by using “service promises” (Ziethaml and Bitner 1996). Party officials should certainly introduce or reinforce those expectations when new members join. A sense of control over workload is also seen to be important for socialization. Prospective or new members can be asked what kind of work they would like to do, and their wishes should be accommodated as much as possible, especially in the early months. New members who do not want to participate should be able to indicate this preference without any “loss of face”, and should still be contacted at regular intervals to be kept informed of branch activities unless they indicate that they do not want this kind of contact. Mechanisms for non-participants to start becoming active should be made widely available to all members.

The results presented in Chapter Three (*see Table 3.29*) clearly suggest that socialization messages acknowledging the other antecedents of participation - values motivations, protective motivations, political efficacy and job satisfaction – may also be highly effective in simultaneously fostering a sense of belonging and encouraging activity. Socialization messages can emphasize the opportunity to express one’s support for Plaid Cymru that participation offers. Prospective or new members who may doubt their own efficacy can be offered help or training to be able to join in. Whilst the tasks that party members are asked to do are not always intrinsically very interesting, satisfaction with the work can be enhanced by the context in which it is done. The purpose of all work should be explained to participants in terms of what they are contributing to the party; work should be done in as congenial surroundings as are possible, in company, and supplemented by social activities afterwards. Lastly, all members should be treated courteously, particularly the newest ones. Members should be welcomed to meetings or work sessions, thanked for participating in tasks, and told that their contributions are valued. Party officials should try

to take a genuine interest in those who have joined. Party activities should become something that members look forward to, rather than avoid.

6.3.3 - Dimensions of party socialization

Van Maanen and Schein (1979) identified six dimensions of socialization that they observed occurred across a wide variety of workplace organizations. Four of these dimensions appear to be particularly relevant to the political party setting³, and, using these dimensions as a framework, it is possible to characterize the processes by which socialization is likely to take place. This helps to identify which communication processes are likely to be most effective for socialization in a political party setting. The relevant dimensions are:

Collective vs individual dimensions – cohorts of new recruits can be socialized together, or individuals can be socialized alone. Collective socialization usually occurs where recruitment is planned and induction procedures instigated at regular and predictable times eg military training. In political parties, planned recruitment drives are often irregular and the number of resulting new members per branch cannot easily be estimated. Therefore individual socialization into a party branch is more likely to be the norm.

Fixed vs variable – fixed socialization processes give a recruit a fixed timescale for completing a given passage; variable socialization processes do not. My research suggests that in a political party there is a timetable associated with socialization; but it is incumbent on the party, not on the individual new member (Granik 1997). New recruits indicate their feelings at the end of a year of association, either by renewing their membership at the first opportunity, or by letting it lapse.

Serial vs disjunctive - in serial socialization processes, experienced members of the organization groom newcomers. When newcomers do not follow predecessors, and when no role models are available, the socialization process is disjunctive. In the absence of any

³ The two less relevant dimensions of socialization are as follows. ***Sequential vs random*** socialization refers to the differences between preparing for a role by undertaking specific assignments and experiences over a specified time period, and preparation by a training system which is unknown, ambiguous or continually changing. In a political party setting, there is no compulsion to do anything, nor necessarily to assume any target role. ***Formal vs informal*** socialization is the difference between keeping new recruits segregated from established members until they know the work, or putting them on the job straight away. These dimensions are more relevant to organizations where extensive preliminary training is required, eg police forces, than to political party members.

organized mentoring scheme in Plaid Cymru, it is likely that most members will experience disjunctive socialization.

Investiture vs divestiture – Investiture socialization processes encourage and make use of the individual characteristics of each new organizational member. Divestiture socialization processes attempt to strip away certain personal characteristics. The discussion of the content of socialization messages in the preceding section indicates that investiture is far more likely to be a productive socialization process for a political party.

This framework suggests that socialization into a political party is likely to be conducted along dimensions of individuality, randomness, disjunctivity and investiture, ideally within a fixed timescale. This reinforces the considerable importance of personal relationships between existing and new members as an element of socialization. Individuality, randomness, and investiture are, by definition, extremely difficult to standardize into an operational process. Impersonal mass communications cannot operate effectively along these dimensions. The framework suggests very strongly that the onus for socializing new party members lies squarely at local branch level, and, specifically, with local branch officials. The management implications of this are discussed in the following section. The party can add some supplementary standardized elements to the socialization process, but our existing knowledge indicates strongly that the extent to which new members become a part of the party is likely to be determined by the officials whom they meet at branch level, and the way in which those officials treat them.

6.3.4 - The management implications of socialization

The central challenge for managing socialization communications in a political party is this: to what extent can the party regulate and standardize human relationships? After all, party officials are themselves volunteers. There are management challenges involved in getting these volunteers to take on increased responsibilities, particularly if these responsibilities include being told how to conduct one's relationships with other people. There is also very little sanction available to the party if these officials do not do what is required of them, or do it badly. A socialization strategy might involve a substantial revision of the role of local branch official. It might meet resistance from existing officials who do not see socializing members as part of their role. It might not find favour with existing members who perceive it as unnecessary, chiefly because they were never consciously socialized into the party. A socialization programme might involve training local officials in the skills needed to communicate effectively and productively with all sections of society. This would involve

considerable costs in expense and organization in order to implement a strategy that, although potentially beneficial, has yet to be proven.

There is, interestingly, one potential beneficial by-product to be had from giving branch officials *de facto* responsibility and training for socialization. A party official who can train to relate to people from all sections of society in her/his local branch will have increased skills in relating to potential constituents in a local council, National Assembly or Westminster seat. Training local officials for socialization, together with an expectation that candidates for elected office must have held some a branch role first, might be simultaneously a mechanism for attracting ambitious individuals to stand for branch posts, and for producing high quality candidates for office.

Plaid Cymru HQ can certainly take steps to supplement the process of socialization into the party. A “welcome pack” can be sent to new members, regular communications such as party magazines, news updates and policy briefings can be sent. The party can also introduce feedback systems for monitoring the experience of new members, and use the information to evaluate the effectiveness of socialisation initiatives at branch level are performing. Feedback systems can also be reinforced with a mechanism for dealing with, and learning from, any complaints from new members. But any such centralized socialization communications measures are likely only to supplement the messages and cues being communicated at branch level. Because centralized communications are remote and relatively impersonal, the socialization tools that are the easiest to manage are the ones that are probably the least useful.

SECTION 6.4 - COMMUNICATIONS TOOLS FOR INCREASING EFFICACY

6.4.1 - Introduction

This survey provides evidence that political efficacy underlies activism in Plaid Cymru (*see Table 3.29 in Chapter 3*). It is also equally clear that a substantial proportion of the party’s membership falls within the demographic groups - those on low incomes, non-graduates, and the very elderly - whose political efficacy is statistically significantly lower than others. These are also the very demographic groups which disproportionately benefit from their membership in relation to the activity and finance which they donate to the party (*see Section 5.3.2 in Chapter 5*). This survey also provides evidence that Plaid Cymru members consider

learning to be a benefit of membership⁴. Respondents' mean score on understanding motivations ranked as the second most important functional benefit of party membership (*this is discussed again in Section 7.4 in Chapter 7*). A small group of party members values learning benefits very highly indeed. Eight per cent of those specifying a benefit from membership cited more knowledge or understanding of politics as that benefit. Four per cent of respondents said that they specifically expected information about the party and politics when they joined Plaid Cymru. Table 5.6 in Chapter 5 demonstrated a statistically significant positive relationship between understanding motivations and satisfaction with the experience of membership.

One communications strategy links the desire for learning expressed by the membership with the party's need to increase membership productivity by increasing efficacy: communicating to members via an education programme. The remainder of this section considers the possible nature and potential benefits and drawbacks of an intra-party educational programme aimed at increasing political efficacy amongst its members.

6.4.2 - Political parties and political education

Organizations currently promoting citizenship education focus almost exclusively on delivering such training and education through schools (Citizenship Foundation 2002, Institute for Citizenship 2002). Yet the findings in this research and in my previous research indicate that most members joining a political party for the first time are over the age of 35⁵. This, perhaps, suggests that an interest in multi-issue politics is one which develops with maturity. There seems to be very little organized provision for adult education in citizenship or allied subjects.

Political parties are ideally suited to provide education in citizenship-related subjects. Each party participates in the democratic process, each party has a direct relationship with thousands of individual members who are clearly interested in political processes in some way. Parties contain a great deal of political expertise. Political matters are highly salient to

⁴ This does not exclusively apply to Plaid Cymru members. In my previous research with the English Liberal Democrats, 9.2% of respondents said they had expected increased knowledge of the party and its policies when they joined, and 12.3% of respondents cited increased knowledge of the party and of political processes to be a benefit of membership. A further 7.7% considered increased understanding of local issues and ability to influence them to be benefits of membership.

⁵ Amongst survey respondents who had joined Plaid Cymru in the year prior to the survey, 92.9% of respondents were aged 35+. In my research into new Liberal Democrat members, 84.1% of respondents were over the age of 35.

party members. Iyengar (1990) suggests that individuals are very receptive towards learning about political matters when they are in an environment where these matters are salient.

One need look no further than trade unions to realize that membership organizations have the potential to deliver a comprehensive range of salient educational benefits to members. Many trade unions have comprehensive training programmes for their elected officials on issues such as health and safety at work (eg BFAWU 2002), and dealing with members' casework (eg NASUWT 2002) and, for their members, vocational skills training (eg BFAWU 2002, NUJ 2002), seminars on workplace rights (eg USDAW 2002) and retirement and financial planning (eg NASUWT 2002). The Trades Union Congress runs a number of courses for union representatives which are designed to increase efficacy in negotiation and communication skills, using information technology, and building membership (TUC 2002). All these courses serve to develop the efficacy of their members along dimensions which are appropriate and relevant to memberships with an interest in work related issues. There seems no reason why political parties cannot develop similar, appropriate, political efficacy training for members interested in politics.

A further consideration is whether political parties have the suitability or capacity to take on an educational role. There is some evidence to suggest that political parties already educate voters and members to a limited extent. Joslyn (1990) observed that election campaigns contain an educational element, with voters learning about the important issues of campaigns, and to recognize and differentiate candidates and parties. However, much of this learning is communicated via press or broadcast media coverage, which is not within the political parties' direct control. The major parties in Great Britain already run a limited amount of training for their members, predominantly focusing on campaigning techniques in the run-up to elections⁶.

6.4.3 - The scope of political efficacy training

The political efficacy training most likely to be of benefit to parties would be different in emphasis from existing party membership training and citizenship education schemes. The main focus of efficacy training should not be on how to win elections for Plaid Cymru

⁶ This statement is based on conversations with staff in public information units of the Conservative Party, the London Labour region, the Liberal Democrats, and the SNP during August 2002. In addition to *ad hoc* local training in campaigning, the Conservative Party organizes some IT courses for members, and the Liberal Democrats trains its members in newsletter production. The Labour Party delegates training to the regional level: in the London region, for example, councillors and school governors receive specialised training programmes.

(although campaigning training could well be an element of the programme), but on how individuals can understand the institutions of government and other organizations in order to be able to communicate with them, contribute to them and achieve change through them. The emphasis of the programme should be on increasing individuals' perceptions of their own efficacy first and foremost, and then on harnessing that increased sense of efficacy for the party. Efficacy classes should have a considerable element of practicality, with small achievable democratic "tasks" to do throughout so that members can build up their political confidence. After the classes have ended, participants can be offered a range of tasks to do for the party.

For example, each political efficacy training course could comprise of 10 weekly sessions lasting two or three hours a week, accommodating about 20 people. The first four or five weekly sessions of the course could comprise a "core" guide to the structure and responsibilities of the democratic institutions affecting Wales - local authorities, the National Assembly, the parliament at Westminster, and the European Parliament – and how individuals can access their representatives at each institution, and be effective in dealing with it. Each week between classes, participants, either in pairs or small groups, could complete a small exercise in trying to elicit information from each kind of institution *eg* using the National Assembly website to find data about population changes in Wales, or finding out the names and contact details of senior local authority officials. A further "core" session - probably held near the end of the course - could comprise an introduction to the history of Plaid Cymru and a description of current opportunities for participation at all levels of the party. The remainder of the course could be tailored to the specific interests of each group of participants, maintaining the formats of practical "tasks" and pair or group-working throughout.

Courses could be tailored to appeal to those segments of Plaid Cymru who are currently disproportionately benefiting from membership. For example, classes held during daytime hours could be aimed at Plaid Cymru's members aged 65+ who score low on efficacy but potentially have a great deal of time to spare on party activities. Free or very low cost places on the course could be reserved for individuals who are unwaged. Some classes could be designated for women only. Selected courses could be more advanced in content, and could be tailored towards identifying potential high-flyers within the party. Courses could also potentially be opened to non-members of Plaid Cymru as a form of "outreach" to the wider community; either by offering places to members of organizations likely to be

sympathetic to Plaid Cymru *e.g.* Welsh language and cultural societies or trade unions, or simply reserving some places for interested members of the public.

All courses could and should be followed up with requests to participants for some further help for the party that builds on their basic efficacy training. This could include assistance with the running of the local branch or in running a campaign or fundraising drive or assisting Plaid Cymru councillors with basic constituency casework. Course materials, and any materials produced by participants on the courses, could and should be pooled at national level, so that over time the party can build up a resource of education and training materials which could be made available for all members to use.

6.4.4 - Potential benefits and drawbacks of communication through education

The potential benefits of a political efficacy training programme are substantial. Firstly, the party has a genuine opportunity to increase the overall efficacy of those members who currently rate themselves below the party average. The statistically significant relationship between efficacy and participation indicates that this is likely to result in increased numbers of members participating in the party. Indeed, the party has a means of identifying those members who have the capability and willingness to do other tasks for the organization after their class stops. The second main benefit is that, at the same time, the party is delivering to its members a benefit which members want and value. This is likely to result in increased retention and satisfaction with the experience of membership. A third benefit is that training is likely to promote socialization (Tannenbaum *et al* 1991), particularly if participants have the chance to meet and work with others outside their immediate branch. Fourthly, the party can build up central training resources, prepared by course tutors and participants.

The main drawback of training is that it is expensive. Finance to pay for tutors, course materials and suitable venues has to be found. Whilst Plaid Cymru should be prepared to make a financial commitment to a strategy which is an investment in members' future productivity, there are a number of avenues to explore for offsetting costs. A small financial contribution towards training from the participants would signal some commitment on their part, but this should be kept at a minimum, not least because those who need the training most are predominantly in low-income households. Avenues for appropriate sponsorship of course materials could be sought, and the costs of outsourcing the training to an outside educational institution could be compared with conducting it in-house. Plaid Cymru could explore the possibility that establishing a separate education

division and opening classes to non-members might make the programme eligible for grants from public or voluntary sources.

A second potential issue is that training might disproportionately benefit Anglophones, who score highest on understanding motivations. The survey results indicate that participants in the training might be overwhelmingly Anglophone, particularly if the course content was seen to lead to a greater understanding of Welsh matters. The course participation rates would have to be monitored to see who, in practice, volunteers for efficacy training. This disadvantage could be offset if Anglophone perceptions of socialization improve as a result of training. Political efficacy training might result in making Plaid Cymru a more pleasant place to be for potential and actual Anglophone members.

SECTION 6.5 - COMMUNICATIONS TOOLS FOR REVENUE GENERATION

6.5.1 – Introduction

Parties communicate with their members to ask them for money. Every communication sent from the party to each individual member sends a message to that member that has the potential to enhance or dissipate the relationship between the two. This is as applicable to communications designed to generate revenue as it is for any of the other communications discussed in this chapter.

The most obvious source of revenue generation communications is fundraising. Appeals for money can be made relatively informally at branch meetings, or more formally by set-piece speeches at party conferences and meetings, or by direct mail appeals (which Plaid Cymru sends out at least once a year coinciding with St David's day). There is a vast literature surrounding the compilation of fundraising messages and likely responses to fundraising and direct mail appeals (*eg* Sargeant 1999b, Diamond and Gooding-Williams 2002, both of which articles provide substantial references drawn from the UK and US respectively) and there is little in that literature to suggest that these processes and responses should be any different in political parties than it is in other voluntary and membership environments. As the purpose of this thesis is to make an original contribution to knowledge, no purpose is served by repeating the communications principles of fundraising here.

However, the other source of revenue generation for political parties has been almost completely overlooked in academic and practitioner literature⁷. This source of revenue comes from commercial activities, which all the major parties, Plaid Cymru included, offer to its members⁸. These can comprise specific products or services commissioned and sold by the party itself (party trading), or opportunities for members to buy the products or services of commercial organizations at a discount, for which the party receives commission (brokered deals). Parties enter into these deals with the hope that members will contribute increased funding via profits from commerce or via commissions from brokered deals. Members are assumed to enter into these deals with goodwill towards the party, hoping that it will benefit from their purchases.

This chapter will argue that the commercial activities offered by political parties affect membership attitudes and behaviour and will present the available empirical evidence that appears to demonstrate this relationship. This chapter will also discuss the criteria that Plaid Cymru can use to select a range of deals to communicate messages or benefits to its members congruent with their perceptions of what the party represents to them. It will conclude with a discussion of Plaid Cymru's unique advantages and disadvantages in relation to its potential strategy for communicating via its commercial activities.

6.5.2 - Membership responses to commercial activities – empirical evidence

My previous research with the Liberal Democrats represents, as far as I am aware, the first occasion on which the impact of party commercial activities on membership behaviour was explored. It provided evidence of statistically significant relationships between commercial products and services offered by the party and membership attitudes and behaviour (Granik 1997). There were statistically significant relationships between first year members' overall satisfaction with their membership and three out of the seven commercial services available to them ($p < .05$ in all three cases). Take-up of two of these services, both of which delivered information about the party, appeared to be positively related to satisfaction. In the remaining case, a financial services product, take-up appeared to be related to dissatisfaction. Additionally there were statistically significant relationships between subscription renewal rates and each of the seven available commercial services ($p <$

⁷ To illustrate the extent to which party trading is overlooked, the Hansard Society (2002) recently published a discussion document about the principles of political party funding without acknowledging the existence of party trading.

⁸ Political parties are not permitted by law to carry out any trading activities. However, they are permitted to set up wholly owned subsidiaries to trade on their behalf, with all profits going back to the party. For the sake of clarity, in this section of the thesis all references to any specific political party should be taken to refer to its trading subsidiary, unless the context clearly dictates otherwise.

.05 in all cases). Members who had used products giving them either information about the party or allowing them to identify with the party in some way had renewal rates of between 70-82%. Renewal rates amongst members using services which delivered neither of these benefits ran at 20-57%.

Anecdotal evidence from Plaid Cymru itself indicates that deals involving generic products may only enjoy limited success. Brokered deals such as insurance enjoy a high take-up rate amongst new members joining Plaid Cymru, who then continue with the insurance provider for one or two years. After that, members look for alternatives. There are a large number of insurance products widely available on the market. It is easy for members to find other competitive deals (Day 2002). Plaid Cymru cannot deliver any insurance product that is unique or special enough for members to keep buying, because insurance is not necessarily germane to the values or strengths of the party.


6.5.3 - Selecting a portfolio of commercial activities

These results strongly suggest that political parties should choose their commercial activities with care. The first criterion of every potential activity is that it must be profitable enough for the party to offer. But even if a potential deal appears *prima facie* to be financially attractive, the evidence available suggests that if it does not deliver a salient benefit to members - *eg* information, or an opportunity to express values – it may simply be unsuccessful in the longer term. However, a portfolio of activities which only delivered information about or allowed members to show affinity with Plaid Cymru would probably leave the party with only a very few options to consider.


One way of widening the scope of potential activities is to consider what else Plaid Cymru represents to its members, in addition to being the political party to which they belong. There are some clues from this research as to what some of these representations might be. Firstly, and most obviously, Plaid Cymru is seen by its members as an integral part of being Welsh or living in Wales. Just over 30% of respondents indicated in their answer to Question 1 of the survey that they joined the party specifically for these reasons. This gives Plaid Cymru considerable scope for a commercial portfolio comprising Welsh products or services which deliver salient information and/or expressive benefits to members. Secondly, as discussed in Chapter 5 (*see Tables 5.3 and 5.4*) one of the most important purposive benefits of membership for members is being able to express their values. This suggests that commercial activities which appeal to members' values could also be a fruitful avenue for exploration. Thirdly, members may well associate Plaid Cymru with policies

which differentiate it from other parties. In the context of commercial deals, the concepts of environmentalism, and “small is beautiful” community socialism (*see Section 2.1.6 in Chapter 2*) are useful distinctive policies on which to build a congruent commercial portfolio.

To express this in diagrammatic form, by widening the scope of what Plaid Cymru might mean to its members, the available range of commercial activities is broadened from information about or expressing affinity with:



to a range which includes information about or demonstrating affinity with:



In terms of how this might translate into actual commercial activities, Table 6.3 overleaf makes some suggestions about which commercial activities would be compatible with each construct.

To widen the range of potential activities even further, it might also be appropriate for Plaid Cymru to offer services which may facilitate socialization. This could lead towards considering brokered deals for groups of members on special interest holidays in Wales (or further afield) or to major cultural or sporting events. A further source of revenue generation could be developed from paid advertising in party publications from companies and organizations offering products and services congruent with Plaid Cymru’s philosophy and salient member benefits.

Table 6.3 – Compatibility of potential commercial activities with policy constructs and meanings of membership

Construct	Information about ...	Express affinity with...
Party/politics	Priced party publications	<i>pt</i> Party memorabilia
	Book clubs	<i>bd</i> Party products (eg Xmas cards)
		Affinity credit cards
“Part of being Welsh”	Book clubs	<i>bd</i> Welsh language products
	Preferential subscriptions to other publications	<i>bd</i> Welsh-made products
“I can express my values”	–	Fairly traded products
		“Ethical” /mutual financial services
Environment	Preferential subscriptions to other publications	<i>bd</i> Green/organic products
		Eco-travel
		“Green” utilities
“Small is beautiful”/ community	Directory of independent Welsh produce/crafts/ etc hosted on party web-site	<i>pt/</i> Arrange Welsh farmers’ markets
		<i>bd</i>

pt = party trading; bd = brokered deal

6.5.4 – The advantages and disadvantages of policy/benefit congruent commercial activities

Plaid Cymru has one major inbuilt advantage in the context of creating a policy/benefit congruent package of commercial activities. It holds an easily identifiable ideological position that has the potential to translate into a very distinctive selection of products and services for its members. It has an opportunity to communicate its values and policies – and deliver membership benefits – and generate revenue at the same time. In marketing terms it is a very good example of being in a position profitably to occupy a market niche, defined by Kotler (1994) as “a ... narrowly defined group that may seek a special combination of benefits”. In terms of the existing empirical research about the effects of commercial deals on membership attitudes and behaviour, it is very well placed to be able to enhance membership behaviour through the products and services it can offer.

However, a number of potential disadvantages may mean that a range of products and services tailored solely with a view to impacting on membership behaviour may not be the optimum commercial portfolio from the operational and commercial point of view. Many of the commercial activities which are policy and benefit-congruent would have to be negotiated separately with a large number of relatively small enterprises, rather than the “pre-packaged” arrangements for membership organizations which larger concerns offer. This would involve proportionately more staff time being spent on business development

work and negotiations in order to be confident that smaller scale deals would result in sufficient revenue to justify themselves.

This leads to another potential disadvantage. All business activity involves risk. Plaid Cymru as an organization may have to be prepared to take risks in order to build up a stream of income from members via commercial activities. Whilst brokered deals appear to minimize financial risk, the trade-off is that they introduce another kind of risk. If the performance of a product or service provider dissatisfies members, some of this dissatisfaction may reflect back on the party (Worthington and Horne 1996, Granik 1997). Plaid Cymru has to pick its trading partners with care, and put systems in place to monitor membership reaction to the providers it chooses.

A third disadvantage for Plaid Cymru lies in its relatively small percentage of very affluent members. The income composition of its membership is not necessarily attractive to all business partners. Plaid needs to make money on commission from premium priced products, but at the same time does not want to alienate a large section of its membership by offering deals which are clearly out of their reach. This dilemma could be resolved by not offering all possible commercial deals to all members. A strategy of identifying the affluent members through records of their previous donations could form the basis of productive talks with small enterprises seeking manageable numbers of customers to buy premium products. Even in its commercial dealings, small could be beautiful for Plaid Cymru.

SECTION 6.6 - CONCLUDING REMARKS

In Section 6.1 of this chapter I described the main functions of communications for organizations in general, and, in respect of political parties, identified the lacuna in the existing political marketing and political communications literatures in relation to organizational communications (*see Table 6.2*). This chapter has demonstrated that, in addition to being vital to campaigning success, communications tools are important to organizational success. Communications tools are appropriate and productive mechanisms for membership management. Using these tools can ensure that members get the benefits of membership they value, and that parties can get the productive members they need. Communications tools can address directly the variables identified in this research as having a direct relationship with participation. All political parties have considerable expertise in communications. They need only redirect their efforts to include internal

audiences as well as external ones in order to enhance the range of membership management mechanisms available to them.

This thesis represents the first occasion on which, to the best of my knowledge, there has been any systematic description and discussion of the use of organizational communications as a management tool in political parties. Certainly this is an area which academic literature has not yet addressed, and an area where further academic research could be of considerable use to party practitioners. In the context of this thesis, however, it represents only one element in its overall contribution to knowledge. The remainder of the original contribution of this thesis to political science, organizational behaviour and nonprofit studies is discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 7 – THE ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION OF THIS THESIS

INTRODUCTION

In the opening chapter of this thesis, I suggested that this research had the potential to make an original contribution to understanding the organizational behaviour of political party members by using appropriate analytical frameworks to identify the antecedents of desirable membership behaviours, identify differences in the attitudes and behaviours of different groups of members, and to formulate appropriate management tools to simultaneously enhance the participation rates of members, and their experiences of membership (*see Introduction to Chapter 1*). The preceding four chapters of this thesis have covered each of these areas in considerable depth. The contribution to knowledge of political party membership is made by these four chapters is completely original because it is the first occasion on which analytical frameworks measuring job satisfaction, attitudinal commitment, socialization and functional motivations have been used in a political party.

This chapter will begin with an overall summary of the contribution made to political science by these four frameworks by comparing, where possible, the results obtained in this study with the results of previous studies of British political party members. The section will demonstrate that using these four frameworks leads to models explaining a greater amount of variance in participation than comparable models from studies of Labour and Conservative members. The multidisciplinary approach in this thesis can be seen to have anticipated the direction in which political studies of party membership behaviour may now be heading. It will also be argued that, as a result, another original contribution of this thesis is to put forward models of membership behaviour that can be used by practitioners.

But the bulk of the chapter will outline how this research has also made original contributions to the fields of organizational behaviour and nonprofit studies by virtue of exploring how job satisfaction, attitudinal commitment, socialization and functional motivations operate in a political party setting. It should be stressed, that, because of the exploratory nature of this research, these contributions could, and should, be subjected to further testing to see if they withstand scrutiny. For the most part, the findings of this research amongst political party members echo other studies (Dailey 1986, Liao-Troth 2001) which found that major constructs used to study employee behaviour and work attitudes function in a similar fashion relative to work attitudes for volunteers. However, there also appear to be some differences - either in antecedents or outcomes – between these research findings and other research.

In summary, the main findings of this chapter are as follows:

Job satisfaction can be said to operate in a political party environment, and is the only variable to be an antecedent of all three activity types. The limited evidence available from this research indicates that, even though the outcomes of job satisfaction appear to be similar across workplace studies and this research, there may be differences in its antecedents. Most of the antecedents of workplace job satisfaction were either not relevant or not measured in this research. There was no reliable statistical evidence from this survey that job characteristics or socialization are antecedents of political party job satisfaction. Four of the functional motivations and membership density appear to be antecedents of job satisfaction in Plaid Cymru.

There appeared to be striking similarities between the antecedents of *attitudinal commitment* in a political party setting and the antecedents of commitment in the workplace. But the outcomes of attitudinal commitment amongst party members appear to be different from those found amongst employees.

Socialization is a construct that operates amongst political party members. It is important because it is an antecedent of participation in two activity groups. Socialization also has a relationship with continuity and discontinuity of membership in Plaid Cymru.

Use of the *Volunteer Functions Inventory* has yielded a great deal of new information about the operation of the scale. Firstly, there appear to be substantial similarities between the relative importance of each functional motivation across and between different groups of volunteers. This study confirms the documented relationship between age and career motivations scores, and has found evidence that age has significant relationships with other functional motivations. This study appears to be the first occasion in which relationships between education, income, language and membership density and functional motivations have also been reported. It also appears to be the first occasion on which a relationship between values functional motivations and the time spent on activities has been found. This research has found differences in the outcomes of functional motivations from those reported elsewhere. In contrast to the results or implications of earlier studies, functional motivations do not predict the type of activities done when other variables are controlled for; nor do they appear to have a relationship with actual repeat membership.

SECTION 7.1 – CONTRIBUTION TO POLITICAL SCIENCE

7.1.1 – Summary of contribution

This research contributes to political science the identification of antecedents of party participation that explain more of the variance in participation than has been explained by comparative models from previous studies. The results of this research are presented as the evidence on which to claim that the analytical frameworks used to obtain them are more appropriate for understanding the attitudes and behaviour of party members than those frameworks currently in use within the discipline. Indeed, it appears that political scientists may seek to use a wider spectrum of analytical frameworks in future research. This thesis also contributes to political science a model of membership participation that party practitioners can use. This section of the thesis will deal with each of these points in turn.

7.1.2 - Explaining the variance in participation: comparisons with previous findings

This research represents a starting point in attempting to identify similarities in the antecedents of participation across and between parties of differing ideologies. Unfortunately, it is only possible to undertake a very limited comparison of findings from the Labour and Conservative studies with the findings from this research because of the substantial methodological differences between them.

The first opportunity for comparison involves looking at the bivariate regressions for each of the potential antecedents of participation that can be compared directly, taking into account the descriptions of the ways in which individual variables were measured. Only four variables can be directly compared across studies. This is due in part to the differing methodologies used between their studies and this doctoral thesis, and partly because, across the Labour and Conservative studies, the authors made substantial changes to how they measured some variables, without similarly changing the labels given to those variables (see *Table A1.2 at Appendix 1*). Moreover, it is only possible to compare the results of their first study of Labour members as similar data was not made available in published accounts of their most recent survey of the party (Seyd and Whiteley 2002)

Of the four variables which can be directly compared, the first, outcome incentives, refers to the measures of political efficacy that had originally been intended to measure ambition¹

¹ The measures which Seyd and Whiteley used directly to measure political efficacy differed substantially between the Labour (1992) and the Conservative studies (see *Table A1.2 at Appendix 1*); consequently they are not meaningful for the purposes of comparison.

(see Section 1.2.3 of Chapter 1). The results across all three parties are very similar indeed, all the bivariate regressions are significant to a stringent level, and the strengths of these relationships lie within a narrow range. In terms of the bivariate relationship between Left-Right ideology and participation, the Plaid Cymru results are very similar with those of the Labour party, even down to the negative direction of the relationship. It is also noticeable that the statistically significant relationships between Plaid Cymru and Conservative members regarding collective benefits/frequency of policy agreement are strikingly similar. Across all three parties the extremely weak non-significant relationship between the costs of participation, or, in Plaid Cymru, a sense that membership was detrimental, is almost identical. These results are summarized in Table 7.1 below.

Table 7.1 – Comparison of bivariate relationships with activism found in British political party surveys

Seyd and Whitely variable	Thesis equivalent	Lab	Cons	Plaid Cymru
Outcome incentives	Political efficacy	.35**	.31**	.29**
Left-Right ideology	Left-Right ideology	-.17**	.03	-.12**
Collective benefits	Frequency of policy agreement	.24**	.11**	.09**
Perceived costs	Membership detrimental	.02	-.02	.02

** $p < .05$ level

The table demonstrates that, in the few instances where it is possible to compare like antecedents of participation, there are similarities in membership behaviour between and across parties of differing ideologies. The main point of interest in this table is to try to explain why Plaid Cymru members show similarities with members of one party but not the other in relation to the two ideological variables (Left-Right ideology and collective benefits/frequency of agreement) with a bivariate relationship with participation. For example, is there any significance in the finding that there is a similar bivariate relationship between left-right ideology and activism between Plaid Cymru and another left-of-centre party? Would any significance matter, given that the relationship between ideology and participation disappears when other variables are controlled for? Could the similar relationships between participation and frequency of agreement/collective benefits in Plaid Cymru and the Conservative party be an outcome of homogeneity of opinion within both parties at the time at which members were surveyed? Clearly, these few results indicate that genuine replication of research across party memberships to identify differences and similarities in behaviour they are, is vital to our understanding of which behaviours are

party specific, which are generic, and which are influenced by external factors, including the party's position in office or opposition.

The other measure of comparison that was possible with the Seyd and Whiteley studies was to compare the ranking of the strongest bivariate relationships with participation in the Labour and Conservative parties with the strongest bivariate relationships found in the Plaid Cymru study. Two variables in the Plaid Cymru study, socialization and job satisfaction (in bold type in Table 7.2 below), explained more variance in participation in Plaid Cymru than any of the variables identified in the other studies. In this analysis, political efficacy (in italics in Table 7.2) appears to be less important than its equivalent in the Labour and Conservative parties, ranking fifth, rather than in the top two antecedents of participation. However, as noted in Table 7.1, the range of political efficacy scores across political parties is quite narrow. This drop in the rankings can be explained by the finding of variables with stronger relationships with participation in the Plaid Cymru study than in the previous two studies. The relative ranking of efficacy may be considerably lower, but the strength of the bivariate relationship is not.

Table 7.2 – Comparison of the strongest bivariate relationships with activism found in British political party surveys

Labour		Conservatives		Plaid Cymru	
1	<i>Outcome Incentives</i> .35**	Personal Influence	.35**	Socialization	.43**
2	Collective Goods .24**	<i>Outcome Incentives</i>	.31**	Job satisfaction	.38**
3	Personal Influence .23**	Process Incentives	.27**	Affective commitment	.34**
4	Left-Right Ideology -.17**	Expressive Index	.22**	Values motivations	.33**
5	Process Incentives .13**	Altruism Index	.13**	<i>Political efficacy</i>	.29**

** $p < .05$ level

A more important way of comparing the different sets of results is to examine the multivariate models offered for activism, where comparisons are possible. As before, this is not straightforward. The research in this thesis was designed to investigate overall rates of participation, and rates of participation per activity type. Participation in this study was interpreted as being congruent with the Concise Oxford Dictionary (1976) definition of work. In the Labour and Conservative studies, the making of donations was considered to be a party activity (which is not work as defined by the Concise Oxford Dictionary and is therefore treated separately in this research). Moreover, Seyd and Whiteley explicitly state that the data gathered in their Conservative study are hard to interpret as a single measure

of overall activism rates. Table 7.3 below compares the variance in participation explained by the optimum models created for the Labour and Conservative parties and the final model for the numbers and types of activities reached in this research (*Table 3.9 in Section 3.2.2 of Chapter 3*). What this table indicates is that the model achieved in the Plaid Cymru study explains more of the variance in activity as I have defined it than either of the comparable models achieved by Seyd and Whiteley for activity as they have defined it. The discrepancy in results does not necessarily lie in the varying definitions of activity. It could be a consequence of using more appropriate analytical frameworks for the research in Plaid Cymru than for studies carried out elsewhere.

Table 7.3 - Variance in activism explained by optimum multivariate models

Study	Variance (R²)	F
Labour	.18	not provided
Conservative	.21	63.3
Plaid Cymru	.28	23.2

Shortly after my doctoral research had been completed, this same team of researchers published a further book exploring “high intensity participation” in British politics (Whiteley and Seyd 2002), with the data from their first book on Labour party members (Seyd and Whiteley 1992)² and their study of Conservative members (Whiteley, Seyd and Richardson 1994). High intensity participation was defined as “participation that takes a lot of time and effort on the part of those who are involved in it.” They identified which activities were low and high-intensity by using structural equation modeling (LISREL8W). In order to meet the requirements of this package, they were only able to use activity variables which had been measured continuously. The LISREL output suggested that there were, indeed, two distinct “activism scales”. The low-intensity participation scale comprised four items: having contact with activists, displaying an election poster, signing a petition, and donating money to the party. The high-intensity participation scale comprised five items: delivering leaflets, attending a meeting, canvassing voters, running for party office, standing for elected office.

² At the same time, the authors published a second book, containing data from a survey of Labour Party members carried out in 1997 (Seyd and Whiteley 2002). All the data in this book are presented in percentage terms, and models explaining participation are not presented. It is not possible, therefore, to make comparisons between that data as published, and their previous work.

However, a theoretically-driven exercise to defining what constitutes “low-intensity” and “high-intensity” participation would suggest flaws in this data-driven approach. The former group of activities barely constitutes participation, either in terms of “activism” or “work” (see Section 1.1.1 of Chapter 1). The activities in the “high-intensity” group are diverse. Delivering leaflets is likely to be a less “high-intensity” activity than the effort involved for standing for public office. Indeed, it is hard to justify why an exercise to categorise activities needed to be data-driven at all. Whilst a data-driven approach could be appropriate for complex analysis, or exploratory analysis carried out for the very first time, the exercise described in this instance falls into neither of these categories.

The authors then tested four different theoretical models of participation in respect of low-intensity “participation” and high-intensity participation. These models were:

- a *civic voluntarism* model comprising the “personal influence” measure of political efficacy, measures of full-time employment, household income, social class, educational attainment and method of recruitment to the party;
- a *social psychological* model comprising the “personal influence” measure of political efficacy, social norms, expressive incentives and an item labelled “Expected benefits” which did not appear in their earlier work. This item measures the perceptions of respondents that a particular method of participation is effective or influential for their chosen party;
- a *rational choice* model comprising the “personal influence” measure, the variables measuring collective benefits, the costs of participation, the misguided “outcome incentives” measure, the “process incentives” measure and position on the ideological spectrum; and
- a *general incentives* model comprising the rational choice model with the addition of measures of group influence, and expressive incentives.

Unfortunately, it is not possible meaningfully to compare the results of this exercise with Labour and Conservative data and the results obtained from my survey of Plaid Cymru. This is because the participation variables in the Labour and Conservative studies are measured continuously, and, in my research, participation in any given activity was measured dichotomously. The shortcomings of taking insufficient numbers of continuous measures of behavioural commitment indicators were identified earlier in this research (see Section 2.4.4 of Chapter 2) and are dealt with again in Section 8.1.4 of the concluding chapter of this thesis.

Nevertheless, comments made by the authors following their model-testing exercise hint strongly at the second contribution that this thesis has made to political science. They comment: "... there is no clear optimal model that encompasses all the others, so it appears that different variables from the civic voluntarism, social psychological and general incentives models are needed to define such an optimal model." This suggests very strongly that Britain's leading scholars of political party membership are moving towards the idea that a multidisciplinary approach offers the optimal explanation of participation. In short, the contribution of this thesis to political science is to have anticipated this approach, to have provided the initial evidence that this approach explains more of the variance in participation than has previously been possible, and, as the next section will make clear, identified some of the key analytical frameworks that are appropriate for use.

7.1.3 - Analytical frameworks

The value of using established organizational behaviour frameworks for measuring party organizational behaviour is summarized succinctly by Table 7.2 above, which ranks in order the strongest bivariate relationships with activism. Four out of the five variables with the strongest bivariate relationships with activism were identified by the MOAQ, the OSS, the ACNCS and the VFI. Socialization and job satisfaction were found to have a stronger bivariate relationship with activism than any variables identified in the Labour and Conservative studies.

As a result of using appropriate frameworks for the analysis of party membership behaviour, this thesis has also contributed to political science the first research project in which the attitudes of political party members regarding their experience of political party membership have been systematically explored. For example, use of the OSS, MOAQ and VFI has allowed for the first time a systematic and rigorous definition of the solidary benefits of political party membership, and an appreciation of which groups of members experience these benefits, and which do not. Use of the OSS and the ACNCS has allowed an exploration of the ways in which different groups of members are attitudinally attached to the party, which groups are the most content with their experience of membership, which benefit most from that experience, which groups perceive themselves as outgroups, and explanations as to how they feel this way.

Not only are these analytical frameworks grounded in appropriate theory, but they are characterized by their practicality. It is not a coincidence that the publications in which these frameworks were originally presented include some consideration of how managerial

policies or practices can impact on, for example, commitment or socialization, or how practitioners can use research findings in a management setting (eg for socialization, Van Maanen and Schein 1979, Kelley 1992; for attitudinal commitment, Meyer and Allen 1997; for the VFI, Clary *et al* 1992, Clary *et al* 1998). As a result of using analytical frameworks that are both appropriate and practical, not only does this research represent an original contribution to political science theory, it additionally makes an original contribution to party management practice.

7.1.4 – Practicality of models

The contribution of this research to party managers is that it creates models of participation that practitioners can use. It was noted in the Introduction to this thesis that previous research has been largely unhelpful to membership management practitioners. The optimum models presented for participation in these studies are presented in equation form, and have a number of substantial drawbacks for those who are not *au fait* with rigorous statistical modeling. For example, the optimum model for participation in the Conservative party study is $A_i = (p_i)(B) - C_i + S(O_i) + S(P_i) + I_i + Al_i + S_i + E_i$. There are a number of difficulties in translating this equation into management practice. For example, at least one variable in the model does not have a significant relationship with participation (the social norms variable indicated by the symbol S_i) but this is not apparent in the equation. The perceived costs, altruism and ideology variables have negative relationships with activism (C_i , Al_i and I_i), but the equation does not make these relationships clear either. What can a manager do to “multiply the perceived probability that participation will bring desired benefits with collective goods and benefits and subtract the costs of activism from it” - which is essentially the instruction delivered by the first part of the equation $((p_i)(B) - C_i)$. Whilst equations are valuable vehicles for conducting theoretically driven model-testing exercise, their practical use in this context is very limited.

It is also interesting to note that, throughout their canon of work, British researchers have only ever made one recommendation for increasing participation in a political party – recruit more members. This recommendation in itself clearly makes no sense. Recruiting new members does nothing to encourage participation amongst existing members, or stem outflows of members or guarantee that new members are any more active than existing ones. Additionally, and perhaps most seriously, this recommendation is not based on their own optimum model for participation.

The models in this doctoral research are more helpful to practitioners because they explain more of the variance in participation than those previously available, and because they are more parsimonious. The few crucial variables that must be managed in order to achieve desired behaviours are isolated, because they have been identified by a principle of eliminating variables that fail to retain significance. Variables which are less important in motivating the desired behaviours simply do not appear in the final models of this research. Additionally, the models can be made to work. The antecedents of activism identified earlier in this thesis lend themselves to communications strategies that can be clearly defined. It is no accident that these antecedents can be managed. The analytical frameworks used to identify them have been developed for use in organizations in order that the findings can be incorporated into practice.

A last point that is potentially helpful for membership management practitioners is the finding that many of the antecedents of activism identified in this research are autocorrelated (*see Chapter 3 – sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3*). Whilst for statisticians this would represent a point of difficulty, for practitioners this represents an opportunity. The finding implies that, by concentrating on raising levels of any one antecedent of activism, other antecedents may be raised in the process. The findings, as presented in this research, do not tell practitioners why the antecedents of participation are related to each other, but, in operational terms, it may not necessarily matter.

7.2 - CONTRIBUTION TO ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOUR (I): JOB SATISFACTION

7.2.1 – Summary of contribution

The main purpose of measuring job satisfaction in this thesis was to find out whether political party members can be said to experience it (*See Chapter 1, Section 1.5.4*). Due to this somewhat limited purpose, and due to the irrelevance of many facets of workplace job satisfaction to a political party setting, a very basic measure of the construct was taken. The very short MOAQ comprised only two Likert-scaled statements. This section of the thesis will present and discuss the very limited evidence available about job satisfaction in a party environment. Job satisfaction can be said to exist within the political party environment, but, whilst the outcomes of it appear to be similar to those found in the workplace, its antecedents appear to be different.


7.2.2 – Does job satisfaction exist in a political party?

The first step in investigating whether job satisfaction could be said to exist in a political party context was to look at the response rates to the relevant questionnaire items. Two assumptions were made about this response. The first was that if members had difficulty in thinking in terms of whether they experienced satisfaction with their work they would not be able to give a response to the statements included in the questionnaire. Secondly, it was assumed that responses would be fairly low to this question if, as anticipated, some of the respondents had not participated in any activities. Responses to the subscale were some of the most disappointing in the survey (*see Table 2.4.2 in Chapter 2*). In the pilot survey, where three statements were included, response rates per statement ranged from 55% to 67%. In the main survey, of the two statements presented to respondents, one achieved a response rate of 59% and the other achieved a rate of 63%. But, even with the factors mitigating against response, well over half of the respondents in both surveys had given some indication of their level of job satisfaction. This is sufficient evidence to suggest that party members are able to recognise job satisfaction in the context of their voluntary activities.

A further test of whether job satisfaction could be said to exist amongst Plaid Cymru members was to examine the distribution of the response scores. I hypothesized that, where work was voluntary, the distribution of the scores was likely to be positively skewed, because people would be more likely to work if they liked the work that they did. The distribution of scores of the 262 respondents who had responded to both scale items displayed this pattern. For these respondents the lowest possible score was 2, and the highest possible score was 14, indicating that a normal distribution would show a mean score of about 8. Instead, the mean score of these respondents was 10.43 with a standard deviation of 2.73. This pattern is illustrated in Fig 7.1 overleaf.

Having established that job satisfaction can be said to exist in a party environment, the next step of analysis was to attempt an investigation into whether the antecedents of job satisfaction in Plaid Cymru are similar to those in the workplace. Spector (1997) identified two groups of antecedents of workplace job satisfaction, environmental factors and personal characteristics. These groups of antecedents will be examined in turn in the remainder of this section.

Fig 7.1 – Distribution of job satisfaction scores



7.2.3 - Environmental antecedents of job satisfaction in Plaid Cymru

Environmental antecedents of job satisfaction relate both to the environment in which the work is done, and factors associated with the job itself. In Spector's (1997) overview of workplace job satisfaction literature, environmental antecedents include: job characteristics, organizational constraints, role variables, work-family conflict, job stress, workload, control, work scheduling, and pay. Some of these antecedents are inappropriate in a study of grassroots party membership. Clearly, pay is not applicable. Other antecedents, such as role variables, job stress and workload, might apply to the relatively few members holding elected office in the party, but no mechanisms for measuring these variables had been included in the survey because of the very limited purpose of exploring job satisfaction. Factors such as organizational constraints, control over work and work scheduling, which could potentially affect more party members, were also not measured in this research for similar reasons. The case for suggesting that work/family/volunteering conflict could be relevant to some members was discussed earlier (*see Section 4.4.3 of Chapter 4*). Clearly this is an area where more research is needed.

The one remaining variable element that was measured in this survey, albeit in a fairly rough proxy form, is that of job characteristics. This refers to the content and nature of the job tasks themselves; individuals can be motivated to work by the intrinsic satisfaction generated by what they do, and the core characteristics of different tasks can lead to psychological states which, in turn, lead to job satisfaction (Hackman and Oldham 1971). The variables which acted as rough proxies for job characteristics were those measuring each kind of activity – routine, election time and internal activities. It was hypothesized that

mean scores would be highest amongst members taking part in internal activities where the tasks could be more complex, and potentially higher in autonomy and significance than the tasks involved in routine party business or election campaigning.

Job satisfaction mean scores were calculated in respect of each activity group. Meaningful comparisons using raw data were not possible because different numbers of activities had been measured in each of the groups. In order to resolve this, responses in each of the groups were re-categorised into whether members had done up to half of the activities available in each group, or half or more of what was available. It was hypothesized that job satisfaction mean scores would be lowest amongst those who took part in the least activities.

The mean scores followed the pattern that the hypotheses predicting job satisfaction between activities, and between the least active and most active members had suggested. But the Levene statistics for each group indicate that there are differences within activity groups, as well as between them (In all three groups of activities $p = .000$). This heterogeneity is unlikely to be a result from statistical artefact as only one category of the six comprised a low number of members³. In this very limited examination of job characteristics, there is no reliable evidence to suggest that this is an antecedent of job satisfaction in a political party environment. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 7.4 below.

Table 7.4 – Job satisfaction mean scores, standard deviations and contrast effects with type and amount of activities

	Routine activities		Election activities		Internal activities	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Up to half of activities	10.2	2.6	10.4	2.7	11.0	2.1
Half or more activities	11.7	1.8	11.2	1.9	12.2	1.1
<i>Contrast F</i>	15.758** (2,259)		12.263** (2,259)		9.761** (2,259)	
<i>Levene statistic</i>	8.2**		9.7**		10.3**	

** $p < .05$ level

One further variable which could be included as an environmental antecedent of job satisfaction is socialization. Although this is not specifically included in Spector's (1997)

³ Only 11 members participated in more than half of all internal activities.

overview, he comments that relations with others can be included in this category of antecedents. It was hypothesized that job satisfaction mean scores would rise as socialization levels rose, and Table 7.5 below indicates that there is a statistically significant relationship between job satisfaction and socialization which shows this pattern. But a test for heterogeneity of variance indicates that there are statistically significant differences within groups ($p=.013$). In this case, because the numbers in each category of socialization are small, and the standard deviations relatively wide, this heterogeneity could well be a result of statistical artefact. However, at this stage, this research does not provide statistically reliable evidence that socialization is an antecedent of job satisfaction in Plaid Cymru.

Table 7.5 – Job satisfaction mean scores, standard deviations and contrast effects with socialization quartiles

<u>Socialization quartile</u>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
Lowest (n=44)	7.9	2.5
Medium low (n=46)	9.9	1.8
Medium high (n=58)	10.8	2.4
Highest (n=52)	12.2	1.6
<i>Contrast F</i>	<i>33.250** (3,196)</i>	
<i>Levene statistic</i>	<i>3.7**</i>	

** $p < .05$ level

7.2.4 - Personal antecedents of job satisfaction in Plaid Cymru

Attempts to find direct parallels in a party setting with the known personal antecedents of job satisfaction in the workplace were not possible at this exploratory stage of research. This survey did not take measures of personal antecedents identified by Spector (1997) as potentially having relationships with workplace job satisfaction: personality traits, particularly locus of control and negative affectivity, and person-job fit.

However, it could be assumed that political scientists would be interested in whether belief in ideology could constitute an antecedent of job satisfaction in a party setting. Therefore, relationships between job satisfaction and position on the ideological spectrum, frequency of agreement with policies and reasons for joining Plaid Cymru were explored. None of these variables had a statistically significant relationship with job satisfaction ($p=.975$, $r=.002$ in respect of ideological position, $p=.291$, $r=.006$ for frequency of agreement with policies and $p=.972$, $r=.002$ for reasons for joining).

However, the values motivation identified by the VFI – indicating person-party value congruence - was one of four functional motivations found to have a significant relationship with job satisfaction. It was hypothesized that if participation in any activities fulfilled the functional motivations of individual respondents, higher levels of job satisfaction would result. Those scoring highest on each functional motivation would also register higher job satisfaction mean scores. Statistically significant relationships were found to exist between job satisfaction mean scores and four out of six of the functional motivations, including values motivations. Career and protective motivations did not achieve significance. The nature of the four significant relationships also appeared as predicted; respondents scoring highest on each functional motivation showed higher job satisfaction mean scores than those scoring lowest. Tests for heterogeneity of variance indicated that there were no statistically significant differences within groups in any of the four motivations. These results are summarised in Table 7.6 below:

Table 7.6 – Job satisfaction mean scores, standard deviations and contrast effects with functional motivations scores

	Enhancement		Social		Understanding		Values	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Lowest	9.7	2.7	9.7	2.6	9.7	2.6	9.5	2.8
Highest	11.2	2.4	11.2	2.6	10.8	2.7	11.3	2.4
<i>Contrast F</i>	17.746** (1,235)		18.041** (1,234)		10.430** (1,233)		30.018** (1,242)	
<i>Levene statistic</i>	.94 (<i>p</i> =.333)		.00 (<i>p</i> =.962)		.20 (<i>p</i> =.652)		2.0 (<i>p</i> =.155)	

** *p*<.05 level

This research took measures of other variables which could also potentially be non-demographic personal antecedents of job satisfaction: respondents' perceptions of their political efficacy, their expectations of membership on joining, and their perceptions of whether these expectations had been met. There were no statistically significant relationships between job satisfaction and any of these variables⁴.

7.2.5 - Demographic and cultural differences in job satisfaction

Spector's overview of job satisfaction literature (1997) contains a brief section on research into the cultural and demographic differences in job satisfaction. The literature described is neither extensive nor conclusive. In summary, it is believed that age has a relationship with job satisfaction, although the nature of this relationship is not clear; findings of gender or

⁴ Nor was there a statistically significant relationship between job satisfaction mean scores and respondents' perceptions of local branch efficacy (*p*=.136).

racial differences regarding job satisfaction are inconsistent and do not stand up to meta-analytic scrutiny; and, whilst substantial differences in job satisfaction in different countries has been demonstrated in comparative studies, no explanation as to why these differences occur has been offered.

This research found only one statistically significant demographic difference in job satisfaction, between membership density groups (*see Section 5.3.2 in Chapter 5*). Members in high-density Gwynedd had the highest levels of job satisfaction, and levels of job satisfaction declined as membership density decreased. These differences between membership density groups retained significance when all other demographic variables were controlled for and there were no differences in job satisfaction within membership density groups⁵. Possible explanations for this occurrence were discussed in Chapter Four, the most relevant of which for the purposes of exploring workplace job satisfaction being that Gwynedd members had the most exposure to success and to tangible and consistent outcomes of their work. There does not appear to be any research into workplace job satisfaction in multi-site organizations with regard to whether this differs between workers in different locations.

7.2.6 - Conclusions

The main contribution of this research to the study of job satisfaction has been to identify that this is a construct which operates in a political party setting, and about which almost nothing is known. But while the outcome of job satisfaction in a party setting appears to be increased participation, the antecedents of it are less clear. Certainly, there is evidence to suggest that four functional motivations – enhancement, social, understanding and values motivations – have a relationship with job satisfaction. There is also clear evidence of a significant relationship between job satisfaction and membership density. What is notable about these two variables is that they are not antecedents of job satisfaction that have been identified as operating in the workplace. Indeed, this research could not produce any reliable statistical evidence that socialization and a rough proxy measure for job characteristics – two antecedents of workplace job satisfaction – are also antecedents of job satisfaction in a political party context. These findings are highly provisional and should be treated with extreme caution. Yet they clearly indicate that further research into job satisfaction in political parties is called for, and this will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

⁵ $p=.206$ in a test for homogeneity of variance.

7.3 - CONTRIBUTION TO ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOUR (II): ATTITUDINAL COMMITMENT AND SOCIALIZATION

7.3.1 – Summary of contribution

The main purpose of measuring attitudinal commitment in this thesis was to explore, for the first time, the relationship between this aspect of commitment and participation in a political party. This thesis represents the first occasion on which attitudinal commitment has been distinguished from behavioural commitment in a political party context, and, the first occasion on which the antecedents and outcomes of all three dimensions of attitudinal commitment towards a political party have been explored.

The original contribution to knowledge in respect of socialization in a party setting is that, for the first time, socialization is identified as a valid construct operating within political parties; and that it is a crucial construct as it is an antecedent of two types of membership activity and a key difference identifying which members stay in continuous membership and which are discontinuous.

7.3.2 - The antecedents of attitudinal commitment

The antecedents of attitudinal commitment in Plaid Cymru were identified and described in detail in Sections 4.2.2-4 of Chapter Four. For ease of reading, they are summarized again here. The antecedents of affective commitment in Plaid Cymru were: the person characteristics of age, organizational tenure, efficacy, person-organization value congruence and frequency of policy agreement; and the experience characteristics of job satisfaction, socialization and overall feelings about membership. The antecedents of continuance commitment were: frequency of policy agreement, social functional motivations and organizational tenure. The antecedents of normative commitment were: socialization, person-organization value congruence, frequency of policy agreement and value for money.

These findings make a number of original contributions towards understanding how attitudinal commitment operates in political parties. The first contribution is the finding that there are many similarities between the antecedents of attitudinal commitment in workplace organizations and in political parties. Table 7.7 below summarises the significant antecedents of all three dimensions of commitment variables found in Meyer and Allen's 1997 summary of workplace studies, and their counterparts or nearest equivalents in this political party setting. The distinguishing feature of this table is that, with the exception of some minor differences in the antecedents of continuance and normative commitment,

there are considerable similarities between the antecedents of organizational commitment in Plaid Cymru and the antecedents of commitment elsewhere.

Table 7.7 – Antecedents of attitudinal commitment

	Workplace studies	Plaid Cymru
<u>Affective commitment</u>		
<i>Organization</i>	Perceived fairness of policy	<i>not tested</i>
	Communications mechanisms	<i>not tested</i>
<i>Person</i>	Age	Age
	Organizational tenure	Organizational tenure
	Efficacy	Efficacy
	Person-organization value congruence	Person-organization value congruence
	<i>n/a</i>	Frequency of policy agreement
<i>Work experiences</i>	Job satisfaction	Job satisfaction
	Socialization	Socialization
	<i>n/a</i>	Overall feelings
<u>Continuance commitment</u>		
	Only/major wage earner	<i>n/a</i>
	Available employment opportunities	<i>not tested</i>
	Transferability	Frequency of policy agreement
	Status	Social functional motivations
	Job security	<i>n/a</i>
	Age	<i>not significant</i>
	Organizational tenure	Organizational tenure
<u>Normative commitment</u>		
<i>Socialization</i>	Early socialization	<i>not significant</i>
	Organizational socialization	Organizational socialization
<i>Psychological contract</i>	Relational contract	Person-organization value congruence
	Transactional contract	Frequency of policy agreement
		Value for money

This is potentially an important finding because, if it can be substantiated, there are two considerable implications for further research into political parties. The first of these is that if there are no, or few, substantial differences in the antecedents of the development of attitudinal attachment towards party and workplace, what justification is there for not analyzing party membership behaviour with organizational behaviour frameworks? These findings indicate that there is nothing particularly “different” or unique about the way in which attitudinal commitment between member and organization develops, regardless of whether that organization is a workplace or a party. In fact, in addition to demonstrating

for the first time that the ACNCS can operate successfully in a political party environment⁶, this study supports the conclusions of Liao-Troth (2001) that the ACNCS can operate successfully in volunteer organizations, and those of Gruen *et al* (2000) that it can work well in membership associations. This leads to the second research implication: the ACNCS could act as a standardized measure of attitudinal commitment across the nonprofit sector. It would allow genuine comparisons between different groups of volunteers, and between volunteers and association members.

There are two implications for management practice arising from the research into attitudinal commitment contained in this survey. The first of these refers to the discussion above. If the antecedents of attitudinal commitment in a workplace and in a political party setting are similar, it is not unreasonable to assume that methods used to manage workplace commitment may well be effective in managing party commitment. The second contribution to management practice is that these results have indicated how significant attitudinal differences between linguistic groups can be reduced. There is one variable which, when controlled for, causes language differences along each dimension of commitment to lose their significance. This variable is socialization (*see Table 4.2 in Chapter 4*). It follows from this finding that the single most important thing that any one political party can do to reduce the differences between the cultural groups in the party is to try to manage the process of membership appropriately for each cultural group to ensure that they feel equally a part of the party. This is alluded to the previous chapter (*see section 6.3 in Chapter 6*) of this thesis.


7.3.3 - The relationship between attitudinal commitment and socialization

But this study into commitment appears to raise a paradox. Whilst the antecedents of commitment appear similar in the Plaid Cymru study and workplace studies, the outcomes of commitment, particularly affective commitment, appear to be different. The evidence presented in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3 identifying the antecedents of individual behavioural outcomes found that even though various dimensions of commitment had statistically significant relationships with membership activism in preliminary models, they did not retain their significance when a range of other variables were taken into account. The most surprising finding was that affective commitment lost its relationship with activism when socialization was controlled for. In this study, socialization has a statistically significant

⁶ It will be recalled from Chapter Two (Section 2.4.5) that the affective and normative commitment scales showed Cronbach's alpha coefficients well above the .70 considered to represent a high standard of internal consistency, although the results for continuance commitment were disappointing.

relationship with affective commitment, explaining .51 of the variance in affective commitment. Affective commitment has a statistically significant relationship with number of activities undertaken, and appears to account for .34 of the variance in the number of activities undertaken (*see Table 7.2 above*). But the relationship between affective commitment and the numbers of activities undertaken is not as strong as the direct, statistically significant relationship between socialization and the numbers of activities undertaken, in which socialization appears to account for .43 of the variance in activism. These relationships are presented in Fig 7.2 below.

Fig 7.2 –Relationships between socialization, affective commitment and number of activities



**p*<.05 level

These results appear to run counter to almost every documented study dealing with the impact of affective commitment on behavioural outcomes. The available literature on affective commitment suggests that an outcome of this dimension of attachment should be activity. In their overview of research of attitudinal commitment Meyer and Allen (1997) cite a well-established body of evidence that, in the workplace, affective commitment is positively related to retention, attendance, and work effort. They conclude that “employees with strong affective commitment to the organization will be more valuable employees than those with weak commitment”. Commitment has been found causally to precede participation in trade unions (Fullager and Barling 1989), and socialization has been found causally to precede commitment (Fullager *et al* 1994).

The paradox can be resolved with reference to the socialization literature. This suggests that individual responses to socialization can include both affective *and* behavioural outcomes (Van Maanen and Schein 1979, Feldman 1982, Dubinsky *et al* 1986, Kelley 1992). Scholars of the affective outcomes of socialization have not studied the behavioural outcomes. Indeed, the number of studies dealing exclusively on the behavioural outcomes is very small. In empirical studies which investigated socialization amongst sales forces and service employees, Dubinsky *et al* (1986) proposed a model that cited job performance as a direct outcome of the socialization process, and Kelley (1992) found statistically significant

positive relationships between organizational socialization and motivational effort. Kelley additionally found a relationship between socialization and attitudinal commitment, although the dimension of commitment was not specified, and the strength of the relationship between commitment and motivational effort was not documented.

In short, the Plaid Cymru study replicates Kelley's findings that socialization simultaneously has a relationship with performance outcomes and attitudinal commitment. In this respect, therefore, these results are not new. They merely confirm that both affective commitment and socialization have direct relationships with work effort. However, this research appears to represent the first occasion on which the relative amount of variance in performance indicators accounted for by affective commitment and socialization has been explored simultaneously. The results can only be said to apply to a political party environment, and should be subjected to testing in a number of different organizational environments. Nevertheless, these results highlight the vast discrepancy between the amount of organizational behaviour research into the affective outcomes of socialization and that into the behavioural outcomes of socialization.


7.3.4 - Socialization in a political party setting

It was noted in the literature review that this study represents the first occasion on which socialization has been measured in a political party setting (*Section 1.5.2 in Chapter 1*). The stated aims of measuring socialization were to investigate whether it could be considered as a construct operating in a political party context, and, secondly, whether it has the relationships with variables such as attitudinal commitment, job satisfaction, intent to stay in the organization and activity that studies in other environments suggest.

This survey has found that socialization is a valid construct to use in a political party setting. The ten-item subscale adapted from the OSS showed a Cronbach's coefficient alpha of .89 in this research. It was also possible to judge whether members could describe their experience of membership in terms of socialization by looking at the response rates to the relevant questionnaire items. These response rates ranged from between 65% to 78%, indicating that at least two thirds of respondents to the questionnaire felt able to describe their experience of party membership in relation to socialization (*see Table 2.4 in Chapter 2*). A further test of whether socialization could be said to operate in Plaid Cymru was to examine the distribution of the response scores. It was hypothesized that, in a voluntary environment, the distribution of the scores was likely to be positively skewed, because if members did not feel part of the organization they would feel no obligation to stay. Indeed,

the distribution of scores of the 261 respondents who had responded to all ten scale items displayed this pattern. For these respondents the lowest possible score was 10, and the highest possible score was 70, indicating that a normal distribution would suggest a mean score of about 40. Instead, the mean score of these respondents was 54 with a standard deviation of 10.63. This pattern is illustrated in Fig 7.3 below.

Fig 7.3 – Distribution of socialization scores



More importantly, this survey has found that socialization is a crucial construct in explaining membership behaviour. Socialization has a significant relationship with two specific activity types (*see Table 3.29 in Chapter 3*) and different levels of socialization were found to have relationships with different activities. The relationship between socialization and affective commitment (discussed at length above) is in line with two documented studies. However, as described fully in the previous section of this chapter, evidence of a statistically significant relationship between socialization and job satisfaction is not reliable.

There is no evidence from Chapter Three that socialization has a direct relationship with whether an individual holds a current Plaid Cymru subscription. However, socialization has a statistically significant relationship with one of the variables that is an antecedent of holding a current subscription with Plaid Cymru - continuous membership. A detailed examination of the antecedents of continuous membership fell somewhat outside the scope of this thesis, primarily due to space and narrative constraints. However, I examined this relationship in some detail in a separate conference paper⁷ which identified the key demographic and attitudinal variables distinguishing continuous and discontinuous

⁷ Versions of this paper were presented to the 2002 Annual Meeting of the UK Academy of Marketing, University of Nottingham and the Political Science Association Annual Conference 2003 at the University of Leicester.

members of Plaid Cymru. Exploratory MANOVA analysis was used to test a hypothesis: “Socialization retains significance with continuity of membership when all other variables are controlled for”. Four models, respectively incorporating the significant variables indicating activity (Model 1), organizational commitment (Model 2), functional benefits (Model 3) and demographic factors (Model 4) were formulated in order to test the hypothesis, with socialization used as a variable against which to regress them.

The results of this analysis appear in Table 7.8 overleaf. The only variable distinguishing continuous and discontinuous membership to retain its significance when socialization was controlled for was regional density (Model 4). Socialization retained its significance with continuity of membership when the significant variables indicating activity, normative commitment and other demographic indicators were controlled for (Models 1, 2 and 4) and only very marginally lost significance at the $p < .05$ level when four significant functional motivations were controlled for (Model 3). In a final model of variables retaining significance at this stage, both socialisation and regional density remained significant with continuity of membership, and in their own right (Model 5). This empirical finding is congruent with Feldman’s (1981) comments that “if the ... recruit leaves the organization, the organization has not successfully transformed the outsider into a participating member”.

Table 7.8 - Exploratory MANOVA based analysis of continuous/discontinuous membership with socialization and other significant variables

Model	Factors	SS	DF	MS	F	Sig
1 Activity Indicators	SOCIALIZATION	1.18	3	.39	3.09	.028
	ACTIVITY	.00	1	.00	.01	.936
	DONATION	.02	1	.02	.16	.691
	<i>Within</i>	30.81	243	.13		
	<i>Total</i>	32.20	248	.13		
2 Attitudinal commitment	SOCIALIZATION	1.38	3	.46	3.61	.014
	NORMATIVE	.38	3	.13	.99	.399
	<i>Within</i>	28.51	224	.13		
	<i>Total</i>	30.39	230	.13		
3 Functional benefits	SOCIALIZATION	1.02	3	.34	2.63	.051
	CAREER	.00	1	.00	.03	.869
	ENHANCEMENT	.06	1	.06	.47	.494
	PROTECTIVE	.05	1	.05	.39	.535
	VALUES	.10	1	.10	.79	.375
	<i>Within</i>	29.29	226	.13		
<i>Total</i>	31.15	233	.13			
4 Demographic variables	SOCIALIZATION	.78	3	.26	2.09	.103
	AGE	1.01	6	.17	1.35	.234
	DENSITY	.87	2	.44	3.49	.032
	EDUCATION	.03	1	.03	.26	.611
	<i>Within</i>	28.77	231	.12		
<i>Total</i>	32.08	243	.13			
5 Significant variables	SOCIALIZATION	1.15	3	.38	3.11	.027
	DENSITY	.88	2	.44	3.56	.030
	<i>Within</i>	29.96	243	.12		
	<i>Total</i>	32.20	248	.13		

SECTION 7.4 – CONTRIBUTION TO NON-PROFIT STUDIES

7.4.1 – Summary of original contribution

The use of the VFI in this study has made an original contribution to the field of nonprofit studies inasmuch as this field test of the measurement instrument has found a number of outcomes that previously have not been documented. This study confirms the documented relationship between age scores and career motivations, and has found evidence that age has significant relationships with other functional motivations. This study appears to be the first occasion in which relationships between education, income, language and membership density and functional motivations have also been reported. This research shows some differences in the outcomes of functional motivations as described in previous studies. The relationship between values functional motivations and the time spent on activities does not appear to have been previously documented elsewhere. In contrast to the results or implications of earlier studies, functional motivations do not predict the type of activities done when other variables are controlled for, and functional motivations do not appear to have a relationship with actual repeat membership.

7.4.2 - The order of importance of functional motivations

The relative importance to respondents of each of the functional motivations identified by the VFI was gauged by ranking the motivations in order according to the mean scores obtained. Values motivations were clearly the most important to party members ($M = 10.51$, $SD = 2.77$), followed by understanding ($M = 9.60$, $SD = 3.27$), social ($M = 7.72$, $SD = 3.69$), enhancement ($M = 7.47$, $SD = 3.35$), protective ($M = 4.32$, $SD = 2.98$) and career motivations ($M = 3.41$, $SD = 2.31$).

These results indicate that the functional motivations underlying Plaid Cymru membership fall into three distinctive groups, each comprising two motivations. First and foremost, as one would expect, political party membership is perceived as a mechanism allowing individuals to express and act on their own personal values. Secondly, substantial numbers of members value the opportunity to learn as part of their membership experience⁸.

Social and enhancement motivations mean scores fall well below this first group, but are very close together in their importance to members. Both sets of scores are characterised by relatively wide standard deviations indicating that using membership as an opportunity

⁸ And, as I noted in Section 6.4.1 in Chapter 6, this finding is congruent with findings from my previous research in the English Liberal Democrats.

to gain approval from others and boost their own sense of self-esteem is highly important to some members (possibly the low income non-graduate members who score highly on both items). The third group comprises protective and career motivations, where the low mean scores and relatively large standard deviations indicate that these are highly important to numerically small groups of members.

There is, clearly, no mechanism for comparing these findings with results from other parties, but it is possible to examine the ranking of these responses to the VFI and those from two other field studies from voluntary organizations documented by Clary *et al* (1998). Table 7.9 below presents a summary of the relative importance (in descending order) of each functional motivation from respondents from two voluntary organizations in the U.S., and from Plaid Cymru⁹.

Table 7.9 – comparison of ranked volunteer functional motivations in three organizations

Title	<i>VFI validation study</i>	<i>Volunteer satisfaction study</i>	<i>Plaid Cymru study</i>
Rank 1	Values	Values	Values
2	Understanding	Enhancement	Understanding
3	Enhancement	Understanding	Social
4	Career	Protective	Enhancement
5	Protective	Social	Protective
6	Social	Career	Career
Sample	<i>Volunteers in five health related service providers, Minneapolis/St Paul (USA), n=467, mean age=40.9 yrs (SD=13.38)</i>	<i>Volunteers in community hospital, Indiana (USA), n=61, mean age = 70 years (SD not known)</i>	<i>Political party members, Wales and other parts of UK, n=472, mean age not known</i>

Respondents in all three organizations achieved their highest scores on values motivations and understanding motivations were ranked consistently amongst the most important functional motivations. Career and protective motivations were ranked consistently amongst the least important. However, the greatest differences between party members and volunteers appear in respect of social and enhancement motivations. Party members ranked social motivations as their third most important functional motivation, well above the sixth and fifth places that volunteers assigned to it This might be an outcome of the high proportion of nongraduate, low income members in Plaid Cymru; the education and income status of the volunteer groups in other studies is not described. The differences in

⁹ The mean scores and standard deviations obtained on each occasion are not provided, because the Plaid Cymru study used only two statements to measure each motivation whilst the other studies used five.

importance of enhancement motivations are not as substantial, ranking fourth in Plaid Cymru compared with third and second in the other two groups. In summary, it appears that in available documented uses of the VFI, there are distinct similarities in the relative importance of each functional motivation across organization type.

7.4.3 – Demographic variables and functional motivations

This research indicates that there may be more statistically significant relationships between demographic variables and functional motivations than have been previously documented. A statistically significant relationship between age and career motivations has been reported in a previous study using the VFI (Clary *et al* 1992). The Plaid Cymru study replicated this finding, and additionally found evidence of statistically significant relationships between age and protective and social motivations. The Plaid Cymru study also produced evidence of statistically significant relationships between education level and four functional motivations, income status and three functional motivations, and cultural background and understanding motivations. The evidence in Section 4.3.3 of Chapter Four, of a relationship between the area where respondents live, organizational strength and social motivations is also an original contribution to our understanding of functional motivations. These findings are discussed in more detail below.

Age and functional motivations - Clary *et al* (1992) found a significant negative correlation ($\beta = -.53$) between the age of volunteers and their career scores, indicating that career concerns are more important to younger volunteers. This relationship between career concerns and age, with younger members exhibiting the highest mean scores on careers motivations, was also present amongst political party members ($\beta = -.27$). However tests for homogeneity of variance indicated that there were significant differences in the scores on careers motivations *within* age groups ($p = .001$), a finding which was not documented in previously reported studies of the VFI. This study also found statistically significant age relationships with social and protective motivations that have not been documented in previously reported studies of the VFI (*see Section 5.2.3 of Chapter 5*).

Education, income and functional motivations – Career motivations are not the only set of motivations to have a statistically significant relationship with education level. Education status has statistically significant relationships with social, protective, and enhancement motivations, indicating that non-graduates attach more importance to using their party membership as vehicles for fulfilling a range of functional motivations than do

graduate members. Similarly, this survey found statistically significant relationships between income group and the same three functional motivations (*see Section 5.2.3 of Chapter 5*).

These findings constitute new information about the functional motivations identified by the VFI. None of the studies documented by Clary *et al* (1998) make any reference to the income levels of respondents, and no relationships between income and motivation appear to have been explored prior to this research. Neither have any relationships between functional motivation scores and education level previously been reported. The VFI validation exercise is the only field study where the educational profile of the sample is provided, 89% received post-high school education, with 60% reporting at least an undergraduate degree. The four laboratory studies documented in the same article were conducted amongst samples of university students; chiefly at undergraduate level.

Cultural groups and functional motivations – Neither the previously documented laboratory nor field studies using the VFI (Clary and Snyder 1992, Clary *et al* 1998) provided any information about the cultural composition of the samples taking part. However, the evidence presented in Section 4.3.3 of Chapter 4 suggests that functional motivations can differ between cultural groups of members within the same organization. This finding that the functional motivations of volunteers are, potentially, culturally sensitive, appears to be new information. It would clearly be of benefit to understand whether these differences operate only within Plaid Cymru, or within all political parties, or within all voluntary organizations, and this is clearly an area where more research is needed.

Membership density and functional motivations – One final observation regarding the relationships between functional motivations and demographic variables pertains to the geographic location where respondents live and the relative strength of the organization in that locality. All the documented field studies using the VFI appear to have taken place in one geographical location, the Plaid Cymru study represents the first occasion on which the VFI has been used in a field study in a multi-site organization. Section 4.3.3 in Chapter 4 presented evidence of statistically significant differences between membership density groups and social motivations. Members in the lowest density group of branches score lower on social motivations than members from Gwynedd and high density areas, although exploratory MANOVA analysis indicated that the differences between the groups lost statistical significance at a stringent level when language, age and gender are controlled for. Nevertheless, the possibility remains that the perceived or actual strength of a voluntary organization in one given locality may attract volunteers with differing functional

motivations, and this is another area where research might be helpful to some organizations.

7.4.4 - Outcomes of functional motivations

Three of the studies documented in Clary *et al* (1998) give an indication of potential outcomes arising from the functional motivations of volunteers. In one laboratory study, a significant relationship was found between functional motivation scores and responses to recruitment literature. An empirical study found evidence that volunteers who received functionally relevant benefits from their volunteering reported greater levels of satisfaction from it. A further laboratory study replicated the finding of a relationship between receiving functionally relevant benefits and satisfaction, and also found a relationship between receiving functionally relevant benefits and intention to continue with volunteering in the future.

The findings from the Plaid Cymru study are that, although functional motivations do have a statistically relationship with desirable membership behaviours, many of these relationships lose significance when other variables - particularly socialization, political efficacy and job satisfaction – are controlled for. Values and protective functional motivations can predict whether or not association members participate in activities (*See Chapter 3, section 3.1.2*), but lose significance in respect of which activities are done (*See Chapter 3, section 3.2.3*). Values functional motivations have a relationship with the amount of time spent on participation (*See Chapter 3, section 3.1.3*). There were no statistically significant relationships between any of the functional motivations and whether respondents currently held a paid-up subscription to the party (*see Chapter 3, section 3.3.4*). Relationships with continuous membership lost their significance when socialization was controlled for (see previous section of this chapter). Responses to recruitment literature were clearly not tested for, although the manipulation of functional motivations in recruitment literature were discussed in some depth in the previous chapter (*see Section 6.2.3*)

It should be made clear from the outset, however, that the methodology involved in exploring the outcomes of the functional motivations used in this study was substantially different from the methodologies employed in the documented uses of the VFI. The documented studies dealt with satisfaction levels and intention to volunteer in the future. They used test/re-test techniques and linked the responses to volunteers' actual experience. The bounded scope of this thesis did not allow for a replication of this methodology. It

should also be noted that in the VFI studies, functional motivations appear to be the only antecedents of behaviours that were explored. In this study, functional motivations were investigated in relation to a number of other possible antecedents of behaviours.

Differences in the outcomes of functional motivations may also lie in the differences in the nature of volunteering and party membership. When an individual volunteers to do something, it is usually with the expectation that there will be something to do; perhaps a specific post, or a selection from a range of tasks. When an individual joins a political party, membership begins with the payment of a subscription and as long as that subscription is current, remains a member. Participation in activities is discretionary; members have considerable latitude to pick and choose what they do, and party officials have very few mechanisms for coercion. In these circumstances, functional motivations may well have differing outcomes between volunteers and association members. More comparative research between the two groups would be extremely helpful in order to specify what volunteers and members have in common; and where they differ.

7.4.5 – The functional motivations, discussion and conclusions

In summary, most demographic variables - with the sole exception of gender - have statistically significant relationships with most of the six functional motivations tested for by the VFI. This study expands existing knowledge of the differing functional motivations of volunteers by confirming the significant relationships between age and functional motivations, and by finding additional significant relationships between demographic variables and functional motivations. It is also appropriate to repeat here an observation made in the previous chapter (*see Section 6.2.3*) that the only functional motivation that does not appear to be sensitive to any demographic factor is the values motivation.

These findings are not only original, they are important because of their implications for use of the VFI in the field. The VFI's authors designed it to be of practical use to administrators of voluntary organizations. They advised administrators that this functional approach could assist in assigning to volunteers to tasks likely to increase satisfaction with volunteering (Clary *et al* 1992). However, the wide-ranging demographic differences in functional motivations found in this research indicates that over-reliance on the VFI for assigning volunteer tasks could lead to *de facto* or perceived discrimination. For example, based on the results of this research, "career track" volunteer roles could be assigned to disproportionately more younger volunteers than others, or members of cultural minorities

could find themselves placed almost exclusively in roles where understanding benefits accrue. This is why further research into the demographic sensitivities of the VFI is necessary, and could be of genuine benefit to academics, practitioners and volunteers alike.

Overall, the use of the VFI as a framework for the systematic measurement of the perceived benefits of membership has been extremely useful and productive (*see Sections 5.2.2-3 in Chapter 5*). The VFI provides a methodological framework for meaningful comparative studies of the benefits of membership in different parties, or even between association members and volunteers. The results provide a means of identifying which purposive and solidary incentives for behaviour in political parties are valued by particular groups of members.

The only difficulty with using the present form of the VFI in a political party is that the scale omits one important solidary incentive which may predict participation for some political party members - political ambition. This is not a defect of the scale; it was designed specifically for use in an environment where building a political career is not relevant. Nevertheless, items measuring individual political ambition would be extremely useful additions to the VFI in order to adapt it more specifically to the political party environment. Developing such a measure would, understandably, take some considerable time to bring into line with the standards of the rest of the VFI. But a “Party Member Functional Inventory” that incorporates a systematic measure of ambition would bring to political science a systematic framework for analyzing the incentives for and benefits of participation in party activities.

SECTION 7.5 - CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter has outlined the original contributions made by this thesis to three discrete academic disciplines: political science, organizational behaviour and nonprofit studies. It was made clear in the opening paragraph of this chapter that these contributions must be qualified by the fact that this is essentially exploratory research, and that all could, and should, be subjected to further testing. The following chapter will set out in greater detail agendas for practitioner and academic research into the attitudes and behaviour of political party members. This chapter will conclude with a brief summary of the further research which might be of interest to those working in the field of organizational behaviour.

The narrative in this chapter has highlighted a number of areas in the organizational behaviour literature where shortcomings have arisen. For example, very little is known

about job satisfaction in environments where individuals work voluntarily. Frameworks are not designed to measure job satisfaction outside the workplace, and, as will be discussed in the following chapter, it will be a laborious task to identify its antecedents. It also appears that very little is known about whether or how job satisfaction in the same organization varies across geographical location. This may have arisen because multi-site studies are logistically and financially more challenging to organize than single site studies, but studies in this area could be of value to organizations – both profit and nonprofit making – operating from a number of locations.

In the field of attitudinal commitment, the most glaring area for research must be that into differences in commitment between different cultural groups in the same organization. This is an area where there has been only a very limited amount of research in workplace organizational behaviour literature (eg Kanungo 1980), whilst in the nonprofit organizational behaviour literature there is almost nothing¹⁰. In societies which are multicultural, and where rights to equality of opportunity and treatment for all are increasingly incorporated into workplace and other legislation, academia is doing a disservice in allowing research to lag so far behind practice. If research is not done into pinpointing which differences exist between groups and why they exist, those who are expected to provide equality of opportunity and treatment on a day-to-day basis simply will not be able to acquire the knowledge or skills to make this happen.

In the field of socialization, this research indicates that the relationships between socialization, attitudinal commitment and performance outcomes need to be clarified. At the very least, studies need to be conducted into the relative importance of commitment and socialization in respect of performance indicators. In fact, for all the literature written about affective commitment in particular, the number of studies actually linking it to quantifiable outcomes other than retention is very small (a notable exception is Benkhoff 1997). This research would even dispute that affective commitment has a significant relationship with retention once socialization is controlled for (see Table 7.8). Once it is established what the relationships between socialization, affective commitment and performance are, in either a workplace, or association, or voluntary setting, it might then be possible to see how these relationships differ, or stay the same, across organization types.

¹⁰ A paper based on the information in Chapter 4 about the differences between cultural groups in Plaid Cymru was accepted for presentation at conferences in the fields of nonprofit studies, political science and political psychology, and appeared to break new ground in each of these fields.

One outstanding issue is whether any of the contributions to knowledge outlined in this chapter also constitute contributions to theory. I believe that findings in respect of the psychological underpinning of membership behaviour, the relationship between commitment and socialization and job satisfaction may well be generalizable and thus make contributions to theory which are, for the most part, minor, but original nonetheless.

This thesis indicates that the behaviours of political party members are underpinned by the same psychological processes that apply to individuals in other kinds of organizations. I believe that similar results could be found across parties: it is simply not plausible to argue that adherents to one or other specific ideology are able to suspend their everyday psychological functioning during the time spent on party matters. These results suggest that future studies of grassroots party members need to be grounded in relevant psychological theory rather than the *ad hoc* reasoning that has been used to date.

I also believe that this thesis has made a contribution to commitment and socialization theories in that it provides some evidence that relationships between socialization, affective commitment and behaviours may be similar in different types of organizations. If these relationships can be found to be generalizable further, this could result in nothing less than a fundamental revision of the value of the concept of affective commitment. This would be an extremely significant theoretical step in organization behaviour, and would constitute the most substantial contribution to theory of this thesis. The concept of affective commitment has been heavily researched, particularly during the last 15 years or so. The volume of published literature surrounding the subject is substantial. Yet the finding in this thesis that the direct relationship between socialization and behavioural outcomes is stronger than the relationship between affective commitment and behavioural outcomes has the potential to challenge this pre-existing research. In short, it calls into question a key assumption underpinning the study of affective commitment: that it leads to certain behaviours as a result of having been generated by socialization. In the possible scenario suggested by the results of this study, the concept of affective commitment simply becomes irrelevant in accounting for behavioural outcomes once socialization is controlled for. The findings of this thesis strongly suggest that a synthesis of the two strands of socialization literature is necessary in order to produce a more rounded understanding of its various outcomes.

I also believe that the finding of differences in job satisfaction across multi-site organizations may also constitute a contribution to theory if evidence of these differences

can be replicated across organization type. I believe it is quite plausible that levels of job satisfaction can differ between workers in a corporate HQ and those in a peripheral outpost, just as they clearly differ between members in an associational stronghold and those in weaker locations. The contributions to job satisfaction theory of pursuing the line of research suggested by this finding would be to find out whether these differences are generalizable, and, if so, what the antecedents of this differences could be.

CHAPTER 8 - LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY, MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS, AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH AND CONCLUSIONS

INTRODUCTION

This research project has a number of strengths. It is the first occasion on which the full range of appropriate theoretical frameworks has been used to explore the behaviour of political party members. Use of these frameworks has led to the identification of the contrasting experiences of membership enjoyed by different groups of members. Accordingly, it has been possible to use these results to form the basis of a set of internal communications tools designed specifically for use in a political party environment.

But the limitations of this research must also be taken into account. The two most substantial limitations were a failure to adequately explore the central hypothesis and a failure to take a measure of political ambition. The circumstances giving rise to these limitations are described and discussed, and suggestions for overcoming these limitations in the future are put forward. Some additional limitations to this study are also discussed although they are of lesser importance because they did not fundamentally affect the findings of this research. These limitations are the failure to take measures of respondents' employment status or religion.

The chapter continues with a consideration of the management implications of the research findings. This section will argue that political parties need to invest more local level resources into membership management in order to deliver a mutually beneficial experience of membership. In addition to receiving increased support from paid party staff, active party members should also be given diversity training in order to be able to deal equitably with all their colleagues. This section of the chapter also deals with implications for further practitioner research. It will argue that an ongoing process of monitoring and valuing membership activity should be implemented, and it will also argue that research into donation behaviour is best carried out at practitioner, rather than academic, level.

Further academic research within political party environments should concentrate primarily on developing scale measures for socialization, job satisfaction, and political ambition; however, one outstanding research question for political scientists is also discussed.

This chapter concludes with a summary of the main research findings, a narrative examination of the central and subsidiary hypotheses on which this research is based, and a discussion on the use of marketing theories and techniques in the area of public participation.

8.1. – LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY

8.1.1 - Introduction

All research programmes have their limitations. This is particularly true of doctoral research which is limited not only in scale and scope, but by the relative inexperience of the researcher. The two most substantial limitations of this particular doctoral study were the constraints placed on the analysis of the central hypothesis, and a failure to take a measure of political ambition. Two other minor limitations of the study were a failure to take a measure of respondents’ religion and education status, but these limitations did not substantially affect the outcome of the research results.

8.1.2 – Constraints on the analysis of the central hypothesis


The reader will recall from the opening chapter of this thesis that the central hypothesis of this research project was:

“Satisfaction with the experience of membership is a stronger predictor of commitment to a political party than partisanship.”



And the subsidiary hypotheses were:


There are self-reinforcing relationships between partisanship, attitudinal commitment, behavioural commitment and satisfaction with the experience of membership.



There is a self-reinforcing relationship between satisfaction and behavioural commitment that might result in attitudinal commitment leading to increased partisanship.



It is possible to be ideologically and attitudinally committed to a party without any behavioural commitment being made.



It was not possible to undertake a satisfactory data-driven exploration of this central hypothesis for the simple reason that a number of the variables measuring behavioural commitment did not meet the statistical requirements for analysis by structural equation modeling (*described in full of Section 2.4.4 of Chapter 2*). This limitation did not become apparent until the survey responses were being analysed. Clearly it arose because the implications of needing to use specific techniques of statistical analysis were not incorporated into the research instrument at the design stage.

With the benefit of hindsight, other measures could have been used to assess behavioural commitment. The reader will recall from the opening chapter that behavioural commitment has been described as a state of being in which an individual becomes bound to the organization by their actions if these actions are voluntary, explicit, public and difficult to revoke (Salancik 1977). Alternative measures of behavioural commitment could have included the extent to which members make their membership known to others. This approach has been taken in at least one small scale study of local Labour party participation (Martin and Cowley 1999) which found that 94% of respondents said their friends knew they were party members and 83% of respondents said their work colleagues knew they were members. Accordingly, a further continuous measure of behavioural commitment could be devised on the basis of the assumed “closeness” of others whom members tell about their membership eg closest family, personal friends, work colleagues, acquaintances etc. Another measure which could constitute a continuous variable is the likelihood that respondents would ask a personal friend to join the party which could be measured by a scale measure.

8.1.3 - Political ambition

Another serious flaw in this research is that it contains no specific measure of political ambition. It is little consolation that, for reasons discussed in the literature review (*see Section 1.2.3 of Chapter 1*), there is no specific measure of political ambition in any other published study of party membership behaviour. In fact, my failure to be able to measure political ambition came about, in part, precisely because there was no pre-existing measure to use. However, a number of mechanisms in the survey instrument which had been included in anticipation of achieving a proxy measure of political ambition failed to operate

as hoped. This meant that it was not possible to include political ambition as a variable in any of the modeling presented in this thesis.

The lack of pre-existing research into the measurement of political ambition created a dilemma: should measures from other studies be used, or should a new measure be created for the survey? Using the pre-existing measures from the British studies which claimed to measure ambition whilst, in fact, measuring efficacy did not appear to offer any research benefit. Creating a new measure of ambition would have increased the likelihood of measuring the right construct, but the time necessary to devise, test and validate a measure would have been considerable. Testing the measure would have been complex, particularly with regard to drawing samples of respondents to validate it. Perhaps it could have been tested in laboratory conditions, with volunteer students who were members of political parties. This would have been difficult to arrange, and would have meant testing it out on an age-group (18-23) composing a very small subsection of total Plaid Cymru membership. Or perhaps a measure could have been pre-tested on a pilot basis amongst Plaid Cymru membership. Lack of success would have meant that further testing in pilot surveys could have reduced the total pool of members available for the main survey. The costs of translation and distribution would have had to be borne each time. But the main reason for not devising a new framework for measuring political ambition was because it ran counter to the overall purpose of this research – to test *existing* frameworks from a number of academic disciplines in a political party context for the first time.

It was anticipated that those respondents who were politically ambitious could be identified by using two proxy variables. Question 1 of the research instrument which asked members for their main reason for joining, provided one tick-box option stating “I was interested in standing for election” and another stating “I wanted to get involved in politics”. Respondents ticking either of these two categories could have been grouped into a category indicating those likely to be politically ambitious. This would have been a rough proxy, admittedly, but would have given a variable which could have been used for analysis nevertheless. My previous research with the English Liberal Democrats indicated that respondents were prepared to be frank about their political ambitions in anonymous environment: 12.7% of respondents to that questionnaire ticked a statement “I was interested in holding public office.” However, Plaid Cymru respondents simply did not select either of these two options. In the main survey, only one respondent claimed to have joined out of a wish to be involved in politics. Therefore, not even the “fallback” position of using a proxy measure of political ambition was available for use in analysis.

So, what went wrong, and why? Firstly, the organizational culture in Plaid Cymru might make the expression of political ambition unacceptable, even in an anonymous environment such as this questionnaire. Secondly, Plaid Cymru's electoral performance has been erratic for decades (McAllister 2001). It gained overall control of a major local authority only for the first time in 1995, and more substantial opportunities for elected office-holding arose only in 1999 when the party became the official opposition in the National Assembly. In short, until a year prior to the survey, Plaid Cymru was not an obvious party of choice for careerists selecting a party affiliation on the likelihood that they might achieve personal office as a result of the party's success. If Plaid Cymru can sustain electoral success, it will be more attractive to political careerists. Future surveys may reveal more respondents willing to acknowledge ambition.

8.1.4 - Minor limitations of the study

Employment - This study did not measure respondents' occupations. This measure was excluded primarily because of the space constraints on the research instruments. A Cornell University doctoral student who carried out research in Plaid Cymru roughly contemporaneous to mine did measure occupational category (Van Atta 2003) albeit using a smaller sample (n=301) than that achieved in this survey (n=472). She found that slightly under half of respondents (48%) were employed, and of those who were in work, most of them (40.3%) worked in what she called the "educational/cultural sector". A further 18.8% worked in the private/commercial sector, and 17.4% described themselves as public sector workers.

The theoretical defence for leaving out a measure of employment is that political science research has not yet demonstrated that occupation has a significant relationship with political behaviour (as distinct from political beliefs). More relevant demographic variables underlying behaviour would be those such as educational attainment and level of household income, both of which were measured in this survey. The results of Chapter Five demonstrated that whilst different educational and income groups experience membership in different ways, neither of these variables retained any significance with any behavioural outcome - with the sole exception of the relationship between income and the amount of donations made.

The reason that not taking some measure of the occupational make-up of membership is, in retrospect, a failing of this research, is for practitioner considerations rather than for

academic ones. They arise because of the implications for selective recruitment. One basis for segmentation of attractive future members could be by occupation. Indeed, if Plaid wants to try to select members on the basis of likely household income, or to expand the inclusion of groups that are relatively under-represented within the party, segmentation by occupation can be a very convenient method. Names and contact details of registered members of professions, or subscribers to relevant professional publications are relatively easy to obtain, paid-for advertisements or flyers can be distributed via these publications. Local branches can make efforts to obtain new members or supporters through major employers in their area. Clearly, according to Van Atta's data, there is considerable scope for Plaid Cymru to turn its recruitment efforts away from the educational/cultural sector and towards the public and private sectors in order to expand its membership outwards from its traditional supporters. In fact, Plaid Cymru is very well placed to do so. Public sector workers may well be attracted by values-based recruitment messages. The party also has a record of being able to fully accept individuals contributing private sector management skills to its organization¹. A detailed understanding of the occupational make-up of party membership would assist party practitioners in planning strategic recruitment drives.

Religion - Nor did this survey examine respondents' religious affiliation, again primarily because of space constraints. My substantial experience of working with or for politicians before commencing this doctoral research did not give me any reason to think that religion has any relationship with participation in party activities. Fortunately, some empirical research published during the course of writing this thesis provided some harder evidence to back up my rather anecdotal judgement. Jones-Correa and Leal's (2001) study of general political participation amongst Latinos in the USA found that denominational differences (Protestant/Catholic) did not have a statistically significant relationship with political participation, other than with voting in some types of election. Attendance at church, however, did have a statistically significant positive relationship with political participation. In other words, association with and attendance at one's place of worship is a better predictor of political participation than the denomination of that place of worship.

¹ Dafydd Wigley AM, who was President of Plaid Cymru for two terms totalling 12 years and a Westminster MP for 25 years, pursued a career in financial management for a number of multinationals, including Hoover in Merthyr Tydfil where he was Head of Finance (McAllister 2001).

However, this study did not specifically include party membership or activism as a participation variable.

Jones-Correa and Leal's conclusion that "associational membership in general" had a relationship with participation was tested to a limited extent in this doctoral research by the variable indicating whether respondents held any other memberships (including those of religious organizations) alongside that of Plaid Cymru. It may be recalled from Chapter 3 that holding membership of more than one other organization had preliminary relationships with the number of activities undertaken overall, participation in internal activities, the frequency of donations and the amount of donation made. None of these preliminary relationships retained statistical significance past the composite models of significant variables. Therefore, the empirical evidence available so far strongly suggests that association with a place of worship has a more significant relationship with general participation than the denomination of that place of worship; and that variables such as values motivations, socialization and job satisfaction have more significant relationships with intra-party participation than with membership of other associations. Whilst there may be academic interest in the relationships between religion and participation, in the light of this particular study, this is not an area is an obvious priority for further research.

8.2 - MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS AND AREAS FOR PRACTITIONER RESEARCH

8.2.1 – Introduction

Even though this research has its limitations, these do not affect the substance of the key implications for practitioners of its findings. The antecedents of participation in political parties can productively be managed – if political parties are prepared to invest the commitment and resources necessary for doing so. In practice, though, most political parties invest little in developing their membership participation, outside election-time campaigning techniques, and most receive a proportionate return on their investment.

Some of the management implications of investing more in developing membership participation were briefly mentioned in Chapter 6. The socialization strategy, in particular, had some far-reaching managerial implications that could only briefly be touched on in that chapter. This section will look at these implications in a little more detail, concentrating on where Plaid Cymru can make investments in membership that are likely to be productive for the party.

This section of the thesis will also argue that, just as parties invest effort in researching electoral opinion to win votes, they should also invest in an ongoing programme of research into their members to win their participation. A programme for practitioner research is also discussed in this section, and not only because of the relationships between organizational change, monitoring and evaluation. Practitioners need to use research to understand patterns of behaviour amongst their own membership to increase retention, plan fundraising, structure commercial ventures, and – it has emerged from this research – ensure that as many members as possible can enjoy an experience of membership that is mutually productive.

It was noted in Sections 6.3.3 and 6.3.4 of Chapter 6 that all the academic and empirical evidence available points strongly at socialization being at its most effective at the lowest possible level of the organization. It was also noted in that section that a socialization strategy might involve substantial pressures on existing local branch officials, in respect of the way they conduct their relationships and in the time spent in voluntary work for Plaid Cymru. Clearly there are two management implications that arise as a result of these observations. The first of these is investment in supporting volunteer branch officials who will have the primary responsibility for introducing changes at local level. The second implication is investment in training, not only for branch officials but potentially for all party members.

8.2.2 – The staffing implications of managing socialization

It was previously suggested in Chapter Six of this thesis (*see Section 6.3.4*) that the local role of branch membership secretary should be elevated within the party, perhaps to the point of becoming one of the stepping stones on the route to selection for candidates for public posts. But organizing induction programmes, and even political efficacy training is an additional burden on voluntary post holders. Currently, responsibility for regional support for membership development is given to regional co-ordinators on Plaid Cymru's National Executive Committee, but these co-ordinators are also volunteers and support for members is not always adequate. The party employs staff in nine areas of Wales as regional organizers. Currently the role of these employees is primarily to support local councillors, deal with local media, and organize local campaigns. A practical step towards offering support for local branch officials in managing membership would be to add membership development to the list of the responsibilities of party regional employees. What these employees could reasonably be expected to do is to organize socialization events on a regional level to which local voluntary officials could be encouraged to send new members.

They could act as a sounding board for local officials who would like to introduce some kind of socialization mechanisms into their branch. They could act as a central point for collecting and sharing examples of good practice and “success stories” in socializing members. Responsibilities could also include co-ordinating research exercises to monitor the amount of work done for Plaid Cymru by its members (*see Section 8.2.4 below*). Additionally, regional level is also the most appropriate unit of party organization to consider running political efficacy training programmes.

Plaid Cymru’s existing regional employee infrastructure is so well-placed to support membership development that an obvious question to ask is why it is not already doing so. I would argue that political parties generally invest very little in membership participation because their management processes do not allow for placing a cash value on their work. The value of what regional employees do in terms of electoral performance can be measured by votes. But because membership work is not quantified in any way, it is all too easy for its value to the party to be overlooked.

It is easy to take a rough measure of the value of members’ work to Plaid Cymru. Based on the results of this survey, (*see Chapter 3, Section 3.1.1*), 76.9% of respondents participated in at least one party activity over the previous 12 months. Allowing for the likelihood that the respondents to this survey are atypical members, in that they may be amongst the most active, a cautious estimate of the participating proportion of Plaid Cymru’s 15,000 members lies between 35%-50%. Most survey respondents (60%) spent, on average, up to five hours a week on party activities. A cautious estimate would allow for the likelihood that participating party members would spend one hour a week on activities, and that allowing for holidays and politically quiet times, participation is spread over 25 weeks of the year. The value of work done for the party can be calculated by assuming that, if Plaid Cymru paid for this work, the minimum wage payable by law to workers aged 22 or over (the bulk of Plaid Cymru membership) of £4.20 per hour (DTI 2002) would apply. An hourly rate for some activities requiring specific skills or knowledge, such as running a local branch or regional or national level work could be considerably more.

Using these extremely cautious parameters, the value of work done for Plaid Cymru by its members ranges from £551,250² up to £787,500³. In practice, the true monetary value of

² Based on 35% of total party membership (5250 members) working for 25 hours a year at £4.20 per hour (£105).

³ Based on 50% of total party membership (7500 members) working for 25 hours a year at £4.20 per hour (£105).

members' work for Plaid Cymru could easily be over £1,000,000. To put this figure into perspective for Plaid Cymru, at the time of writing this chapter, the party's annual turnover was in the region of £450,000 (Day 2002b). Even the most conservative estimate of the value of members' work to Plaid Cymru indicates that they contribute to the party more than its financial turnover; in practice possibly over twice as much. When the contribution to the party made by members' work is quantified in this way, it is easier to justify the introduction of management processes to measure participation (*see section 8.2.4 below*), and investing more resources in membership development. Allocating some regional employee time towards managing productively what could be £1,000,000 of party resources is a reasonable proposition; so is the possibility of hiring part-time administrative support staff in order to free some regional organizer time for membership development. Employees are expensive in terms of cash resources, but this expense should be offset in terms of the increased value that they bring to the party in terms of boosting the amount of work done for it.

A final point to make in this section is that membership development is not equally necessary or desirable throughout Wales. For example, a programme in Gwynedd, which already has the highest level of socialization in Plaid Cymru, will probably be wasted. Where party organization is at its weakest, socialization programmes make little sense without a carefully planned expansion strategy into such regions, as there is not the infrastructure to support them. Socialization schemes are most likely to have the most benefit in the four second-tier membership density areas and in the most substantial of the lowest density areas. In fact, one of the counties in the lowest density group would make an excellent site for a trial because there is everything to gain, and very little to lose if mistakes are made. A trial scheme could be run for a year and its outcomes evaluated before being introduced to other regions.

8.2.3 – The training implications of managing socialization

It was also noted in Chapter 6 (*see Section 6.3.4*) that training local officials to be able to relate to people from all walks of life is likely simultaneously to aid the socialization of party members and to raise the skills of individuals likely to stand for public office for Plaid Cymru. Of all the demographic differences within Plaid Cymru, the implications of the differing membership experiences between the two linguistic groups are the ones that most urgently need to be overcome. Although 66% of Plaid Cymru members are primarily Welsh-speaking, Cymrophones currently comprise 18.5% of the total population of Wales (ONS 2002). Plaid Cymru has already acknowledged the political reality that Anglophone

votes are necessary to achieve electoral success, and the party is currently experiencing its most rapid membership growth amongst Anglophones.

Another political reality is that when a party is in opposition, there is a tendency for media commentators to use the way in which it runs its internal affairs as a proxy measure for how well it might perform in office. For example, in the run-up to the 1997 General Election, Tony Blair's fitness for office was judged, in part, on his leadership record of imposing discipline on a fractious party. Plaid Cymru's particular vulnerability is that if Anglophone members are not perceived to be welcome, or not seen to be treated equally, the party runs the risk that this will be interpreted as a proxy of how it will exercise power in Wales. Whilst Plaid Cymru dealt with the first point in 1998 by changing its name, the results of the survey give concrete evidence that Anglophones are not as satisfied with their experience of membership as Cymrophones.

One formal training method with the potential to overcome the unequal experience of membership currently experienced between cultural groups is diversity training. Historically (and not entirely successfully) Plaid Cymru has taken an "equal opportunities" approach to redressing imbalances between demographic groups in the party. This "bolt-on" approach towards achieving equality has been characterized by a series of piecemeal initiatives, some of which have been more durable than others, and by adopting specific procedures to reach goals such as ensuring women gain office and attracting Anglophones to the party. A diversity approach is different in emphasis, requiring awareness of one's individual assumptions and transformations in organizational culture rather than compliance with legislation (although reinforcing principles of diversity through party codes of conduct would be a highly effective management tool).

According to one commercial organization offering diversity training (Domino Consultancy UK 2002⁴), the outcomes of such training should be as follows: participants can identify their own biases, prejudices and assumptions arising from their own cultural programming, and they can identify the connection between their biases and behaviour and the performance of others. This is not a frivolous proposition for Plaid Cymru. This survey has provided considerable evidence that the party does not offer equality of membership experience to all its members. Women appear to accept this inequality, Anglophones clearly

⁴ I have no connection with this company and do not intend to endorse its services by citing its material. However, their website does offer one of the most helpful definitions of diversity training that I have been able to find.

do not. At the very least, diversity training for all party officials and a substantial proportion of membership could be considered a preventive measure to ensure that intra-party differences between linguistic groups do not impede its electoral progress. At best, diversity training could lead to an organizational culture that welcomes as many potential participants in the democratic process as agree with Plaid Cymru policies. Diversity training could also contribute to the skills of Plaid Cymru candidates for public office, making them attractive to wide segments of the Welsh electorate. In short, Plaid Cymru has little to lose, and much to gain, by introducing systematic diversity training into its educational activities for officials and grassroots members.

8.2.4 – Practitioner research - monitoring and evaluating participation

All political parties consider it their business to gather as much intelligence about their voters and potential voters as they can. Just as parties have core competencies in communications, they also have core competencies in commissioning research and incorporating the results into their work. This competence could also be used to good effect towards understanding membership behaviour. It rarely is; either because party practitioners may take their members' work for granted, or because they assume that because this work is voluntary it cannot effectively be managed.

The discussion in Section 8.2.2 above indicates very strongly that research and management processes can be very closely interlinked, particularly when other management mechanisms are not appropriate. Quantifying the value of labour illustrates the point. In a workplace organization, the net value of a workforce is relatively easy to quantify. Financial indicators such as turnover, profits or losses, salary, tax and National Insurance costs, expenses levels, and office overheads are readily available to calculate the aggregate net value of employees, or even individual members of staff. By contrast, political parties appear to have very few means available to them to quantify what their volunteers are doing for them.

As a first step to quantifying the value of Plaid Cymru's membership workforce, a programme of monitoring and valuing work levels should be set up. Members should be asked to make some sort of record of the average hours per week that they contribute to the party over a given period. Even a fairly rough and ready annual measure for grassroots members would serve as an indicator to monitor the value of work done and any broad trends in participation. The participation of local branch officials and other elected post

holders could be monitored more often, perhaps quarterly. The benefits of monitoring and quantifying participation are that Plaid Cymru will be able to build up a more detailed knowledge of who participates in the party, and how. The party will be able to assess the relationships between local party work effort and electoral performance at local, regional or national levels. Additionally, party employees who want to use party resources for membership development initiatives will be able to produce quantifiable evidence to support investment proposals to the volunteer officials who approve the budgets for such initiatives

Membership research can also act as a management mechanism for assessing the outcomes of any programmes of organizational change. Any new initiatives that are piloted should be closely monitored and evaluated to see if they are having the desired outcomes. For example, if induction schemes are piloted, do the areas where piloting takes place show increased membership activity and membership retention? If not, there is little case to answer for socialization programmes being continued.

On the basis of my previous research (Granik 1997) I believe that asking new members to participate in monitoring exercises right from the start is likely to make them feel more included within the party, and valued for their views. For example, on joining, new members can be asked to select the kind of work they would like to do for the party, and what kind of information, out of a specified range, they would like to receive. Members coming up for their first renewal could, and should, be asked to evaluate their experience of the first year of membership, so that any issues affecting membership retention can be identified and dealt with. Exit surveys of members who leave should become standard practice to try to identify where, when and why memberships are likely to lapse.

8.2.5 – Practitioner research – monitoring donations

Similarly, party practitioners need to be fully aware of why members donate to party funds. This is a matter of considerable concern for political parties. The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act (2000) makes parties increasingly reliant on their members for funding. Anyone who donates more than £200 to a political party over the course of a year must be prepared to be publicly identified with that party. Tight regulations govern political donations by companies and “third party” organizations. In short, it is harder now for political parties to solicit and receive large-scale donations from organizations than it has been for many years.

This is also one area of research where practitioners are more likely to produce more immediately useful results for than academic research is likely to achieve. This situation has come about for two reasons. Firstly, it was argued earlier in this thesis (*see Section 3.3.5 of Chapter 3*) that current research into party membership donation patterns is based on the under-theorised models of activism that are not entirely helpful. Secondly, recent academic research in the nonprofit sector is beginning to suggest that donor patterns are quite distinctive between categories of nonprofit organization, and even between organizations within the same categories (Bennett 2002, Clotfelter 2001). If donors within any one given organization can be segmented (just as the behavioural patterns of groups of Plaid Cymru members have been segmented in this research), the weight of evidence suggests that organizational practitioners are the best placed researchers to find out what their particular donor profile is.

Plaid Cymru, with its profile of small but frequent donations, has a particularly challenging task to find out who its donors are and how other donor groups can be tapped. For example, the research results presented earlier in this thesis indicate that there is a statistically significant negative relationship between making a donation and organizational tenure of 21 years or more (*see Section 3.3.2 of Chapter 3 and Table A3.28 in Appendix 3*), but a positive relationship between long organizational tenure and the amount of donations made. Plaid Cymru needs to understand why its most longstanding members - a group which constituted 50.3% of the respondents to this survey (*see Table 2.7 in Chapter 2*) - are some of the least likely members to give a donation, although when they do they donate generously (*see Table 3.26 in Chapter 3*). This is clearly a very distinctive donor pattern. Steps can be taken to try to find the underlying causes for this pattern – and if these are causes that the party can tackle, it could be very profitable for them to do so. Additionally, members could be asked what it is that prompts them to donate at local party level and what are the triggers for donating to the national party (this distinction was not covered by this doctoral thesis). Plaid Cymru very rarely receives the substantial donations that require notification under existing legislation because its members are disproportionately drawn from relatively low-income households. It is therefore faced with the demanding challenge of raising the frequency of the modest donations that its members are able to give.

8.3 AREAS FOR FURTHER ACADEMIC RESEARCH

8.3.1 – Introduction

The previous chapter highlighted a number of areas for research in the disciplines of organizational behaviour and nonprofit management that would make a genuine contribution to our understanding of how certain concepts operate in environments other than political parties. This section will concentrate almost exclusively on further academic research within political party environments.

Specifically, areas of further research suggested by the survey results are the development of scale measures for socialization, job satisfaction and political ambition. An additional avenue of exploration into the psychological antecedents of membership participation that was not included in this survey, trait theory, is also discussed. The nature of these areas for further research strongly suggest that they should be undertaken from scholars from a range of disciplines including political science. But one outstanding research question that is particularly appropriate for political scientists to answer is discussed at the end of this section: what was it that May (1973) saw when he observed his “Special Law”?

But firstly, a brief discussion about research design first mentioned in the methodology chapter of this thesis (*See Section 2.1.2 in Chapter 2*) is appropriate. Even though circumstances did not, on this occasion, permit the research across two parties that was originally proposed, this would be useful research to undertake. The benefits would be the ability to make direct cross-sectional comparisons of membership behaviour across political parties, and observations of similarities and dissimilarities of behaviour across ideologies. Research designed in this way would also have facilitated an exploration of whether ideological differences and behavioural differences are associated. In a single-party research environment, this line of enquiry was not possible.

An alternative to a two party study could be a replication study of this research in another political party. Even though this might be an acceptable substitute, a replication study has some drawbacks. Firstly, it would replicate all of the limitations of this study, as well as its strengths. Secondly, because this study points further research so strongly in the direction of the development of frameworks for measuring the experience of political party membership, it would be more helpful to develop and test these new measures before putting them into another major field survey. Thirdly, by surveying two or three parties at different times, there may be a temptation to explain behavioural differences in the context

of two different external political environments. It would be more helpful to examine behavioural differences in the context of the same external environment.

8.3.2 – Development of new scale measures

Socialization: The socialization scale based on ten items from Kelley's OSS (1992) appeared to work well in this research. Alternatively, a shorter subscale consisting of the five statements comprising the greatest source of fit with the latent construct of socialization could be used if a ten-item measure was considered to be too long. The disadvantage of using the subscale is that, unlike the full measure, it has not been tested in the field. The subscale was compiled in a data-driven exercise. This runs a risk that these subscale items might only constitute the greatest source of fit with socialization amongst Plaid Cymru members, and not amongst members of other parties. Therefore pilot studies testing the validity and internal consistency of the shorter subscale would also be needed to see if it performs as well as, or better than, the ten-item scale.

Political ambition motivations: Scale items should be a direct measure of the extent to which respondents want to hold elected office, and not the extent to which they feel they might be good at it. For example, statements such as "I would like to stand for public office one day" or "I am interested in having a political career" scored on a Likert scale format would identify party members who hold political ambitions, and would allow comparisons between their behavioural, attitudinal and demographic profiles, and those of the rest of the party.

One consideration in creating a political ambition motivations scale is that it might be difficult to test a measure in order to establish construct validity. There will not necessarily be the methodological luxury of testing the statements under the laboratory conditions enjoyed in the development of the existing VFI items (see Clary *et al* 1998) when it will be a *de facto* necessity to find a set of political party members to test the scale with. For this reason, it may take some time to develop scale items measuring political ambition motivations to the standard which existing VFI items measure their respective constructs.

It may also be difficult to elicit responses to a political ambition motivations scale when used in the field. Respondents might feel that disclosing their ambitions might leave them open to ridicule, or to accusations of being arrogant or self-centred, or may lead to reprisals. Therefore, not only would the statements measuring ambition have to be very carefully worded, but a great deal of thought would be necessary for the instructions

preceding those statements. For example, the introduction could make clear that it is acceptable for respondents to express feelings of political ambition. There are also features of questionnaire design - number coding, or a requirement to disclose names and addresses - that could inhibit response to such measures. Research instruments that are seen to permit anonymity are more likely to get frank views from respondents – at the risk of the researcher facing subsequent criticism for failing to include mechanisms for following up non-response, or for allowing test/re-test research environments.

Job satisfaction: The results of this survey indicate that job satisfaction exists amongst political party members, but its antecedents are not clear. Research clearly needs to be carried out into the antecedents of job satisfaction in a political party. It will be recalled from the previous chapter that, in this exploratory study, it was not possible to take measures of all the known antecedents of workplace job satisfaction, but this has emerged as one of the most important areas for further research.

The environmental antecedents of job satisfaction identified by Spector (1997) that seem likely to affect most party members are organizational constraints, control over work and work scheduling, with the additional factor of possible conflicts between party activity and employment and family responsibilities. These are not difficult to measure, but the development of analytical frameworks would have to be appropriate to the context of a political party. An exploration of the additional potential antecedents of job satisfaction for members holding elected office would also increase our understanding of the experience of being highly active in a political party environment. These antecedents – role variables, job stress and workload – could also be measured fairly easily in a political party environment.

Measurement of the personal antecedents of job satisfaction also fell outside the scope of this survey. Even in workplace studies the evidence as to whether these antecedents have a statistically significant relationship with job satisfaction is insubstantial. But, as there has been no systematic psychological research into the participation of grassroots members, nothing is known about whether personality traits are antecedents of membership participation in political parties.

8.3.3 - Personality traits and activism – the Big Five

The use of personality traits as a framework for understanding behaviour in organizations is a particularly credible method because these traits are relatively stable over time (Costa

and McCrae 1988). Various models of personality characteristics have been published (eg Digman 1990) which generally conclude that there are five major traits underlying personality structure. These traits are summarized by Arnold *et al* (1998) as: extraversion, emotionality (including anxiety and insecurity), agreeableness, conscientiousness and intellect (including curiosity and openness to experience). Previous studies of volunteers (eg Horton Smith 1966, Graziano and Eisenberg 1994) indicate that there is a relationship between personality characteristics and volunteering behaviour. Recent doctoral research (Bekkers 2001) indicates that, specifically, there are statistically significant relationships between extraversion and both belonging to a voluntary organization and being active in it. Needless to say, there has not yet been any systematic research into whether there are any relationships between personality traits and grassroots participation in political party activities. If any such relationships are found to be significant, a logical extension of this avenue of research would be to investigate whether these relationships retain significance with participation when values motivations, socialization and job satisfaction are controlled for, and similarly, whether these variables retain significance when personality characteristics are controlled for.

Another potentially valuable area for further research could be to use trait approaches to investigate whether there are any statistically significant differences in personality traits between grassroots members, mid-level activists and those representing parties in public office. The reason that this research would be valuable is that, to date, the only argument that has been put forward to explain behavioural differences between individuals at varying levels in party hierarchies is that their opinion structure is different. This brings us back to May's "Special Law" of curvilinear disparity.

8.3.4 – Further research in political science - May's "law"

Political scientists have established that May's "law" does not apply consistently across parties. This research found no evidence that May's "law" operated amongst Plaid Cymru members at the time of the survey. But clearly, May's "law" operates sometimes, in some parties (see Seyd and Whiteley 1992 and Narud and Skare 1999). To the best of my knowledge, there has been no systematic published study that attempts to investigate why. A multi-disciplinary theoretical approach, such as the one used in this study, suggests that the use of relevant frameworks other than those drawn from political science, could make a helpful contribution to this 30-year long debate.

To date, scholars who have tested May's "law" have interpreted their findings the context of political science frameworks. For example, Kitschelt (1989) hypothesized that May's "law" could only operate amongst British and American political parties because they operated within two-party systems. In Europe, he argued, the greater number of political parties, their structures and their relationships with national and local institutions of government mitigated against May's "law" being applicable. This is challenged by evidence from Herrera and Taylor (1994) who found no evidence of differential opinion structures amongst either Republicans or Democrats in the United States; and by those of Narud and Skare (1999) who found evidence of May's "law" operating amongst leaders, mid-level activists and voters in one Norwegian party. However, Narud and Skare did not offer any suggestion as to why May's "law" operated consistently in only one of their documented examples. Norris (1995) hypothesized that patterns in opinion structure arose because "... the incentives to become involved in different strata vary substantially between elected representatives and constituency workers." However, this argument can be criticised on the grounds that, prior to this research, the incentives for political party activism had been under-theorized and inaccurately identified.

What no-one yet appears to have done is to have compared their own research findings with the original data used by May (the sources of which are clearly cited in his 1973 article). On the face of it, this does not seem a difficult exercise, and, although this particular research problem has fallen outside the scope of this doctoral study, it is research that needs to be done. May's observations can clearly be replicated across parties and countries, and an appreciation of the circumstances pertaining to the parties at the time which May's observations were made would deliver tangible benefits to academics and practitioners alike. When, why and how can members with views more radical than their leaders and supporters appear to dominate the corps of activists within a political party? Could this phenomenon, for example, occur in a party going through difficult external circumstances such as a period of prolonged electoral failure? Could it be symptomatic of some organizational dysfunction, such as ineffective leadership or a sudden haemorrhage of members? Do certain parties have internal constitutions or informal cultural systems that are likely to prevent – or encourage - this phenomenon from occurring?

In short, if a combination of historical analysis and organizational behaviour frameworks are used, it would be possible to explore whether May discovered a "law" of activist opinion structure and behaviour which applies for ideological reasons or for organizational ones. An analysis of the likely organizational factors operating in each of the parties where

May's "law" has been observed at the time when the studies were made, might bring us closer to recognizing what May's "law" actually identifies. For academics, understanding what May observed would add to the number of appropriate frameworks available to analyse the behaviour of party members. For practitioners, recognition of sets of circumstances under which members holding extreme opinions are seen to predominate within a party would give party managers the ability to plan ahead to manage any possible adverse consequences of this phenomenon. This thesis has demonstrated that the use of appropriate analytical frameworks can offer explanations for membership attitudes and behaviours that would otherwise have been overlooked.

8.4 - CONCLUSIONS

8.4.1 – Summary of main research findings

According to the evidence presented in this research, the factors that are related to whether political party members are likely to participate in party activities at all are values motivations, protective motivations and falling within the 55-64 age range. Values motivations alone appear have a statistically significant relationship with the time spent on party activities. The number of activities in which respondents participate has statistically significant relationships with political efficacy, socialization and job satisfaction. The combination of these variables differs slightly with activity type. Participation in internal activities additionally has a significant relationship with the amount of donations made.

Job satisfaction, career motivations, and organizational tenure of 30 years or more appear to account for whether respondents make an additional donation to the party or not, but the amount that members donate is dictated largely by household income, together with tenure of 21 years or more. Members who are the most likely to hold a current subscription to Plaid Cymru are those in their first year of membership, those who have never let their membership lapse, and those in the 45-54 age bracket. No model was formulated to account for continuity of membership, but an analysis of differences between continuous and discontinuous members found statistically significant differences in their levels of socialization, and the membership density areas in which they lived.

The experience of membership of Plaid Cymru is different for different demographic groups of members. The most substantial differences – those between groups but not within groups – are summarized here.

Language and membership density: Cymrophones join Plaid Cymru without expecting anything from their membership, and score higher than Anglophones on all three dimensions of attitudinal commitment. Anglophones score higher on understanding motivations. The linguistic groups report different benefits from their membership. Membership density groups differ in their reasons for joining, their perceptions of branch efficacy and their levels of job satisfaction. Plaid Cymru's linguistic and density demographic groups show statistically significant differences in their overall feelings about membership.

Age: Members aged between 45 and 64 are the most active in Plaid Cymru, the most politically efficacious, and the most likely to have a current subscription. Members aged 45-54 are the most likely to spend more than five hours a week on party activities. Members over the age of 45 are the most socialized into the party. The very youngest members are the most likely to have a parent in Plaid Cymru, are more likely to always agree with policies, and are more likely to score highly on careers motivations. The very oldest members score highest on enhancement, protective and social motivations.

Gender, education and income: Women spend less time on party activities than men, but a greater percentage of women claim to always agree with party policy than do men. Non-graduates and members from low income households score well below the party mean for political efficacy. These groups score higher on enhancement, protective and social motivations

Members report that the purposive benefits of Plaid Cymru membership are values benefits – the ability to express and act on their personal values – and being in an organization where they are in agreement with their fellow members. They report that the solidary benefits of membership are satisfaction with the work they do, feeling socialized into the party, and enhancement benefits – membership gives them the opportunity to feel better about themselves.

No one demographic group of members simultaneously benefits from membership and benefits the party. A small group of members - graduates aged between 45-54 on average or high incomes - disproportionately benefit the party; whilst a larger number of less well educated and less affluent members disproportionately use their party membership as a vehicle for receiving solidary benefits not available to them elsewhere.

Communications strategies are appropriate management tools for minimizing the differences between groups of members, and for managing the membership experience so that members can simultaneously reap benefits from their membership and benefit the party. Communications are a core competence of political parties, and expertise in communicating to voters can be adapted for an internal communications environment. Communications strategies for productive membership management include targeted recruitment drives, socialization procedures and political efficacy training. A fourth communications strategy, designed to generate increased revenue from members, is to increase the appropriate range of commercial ventures available to members.

8.4.2 - Examining the central hypothesis

This research was conducted in order to explore a central hypothesis:


“Satisfaction with the experience of membership is a stronger predictor of commitment to a political party than partisanship.”



The evidence from this survey suggests very strongly that elements of satisfaction are more likely to predict behavioural commitment to a political party than partisanship. Indeed, this survey provides no evidence that partisanship has any relationship with behavioural commitment at all. Conversely, the variables indicating partisanship have more frequent statistically significant relationships with attitudinal commitment than do the satisfaction variables. Frequency of agreement with policies and person-party value congruence are statistically significant antecedents of both affective commitment and normative commitment. Frequency of policy agreement additionally has a statistically significant relationship with continuance commitment. Of the satisfaction variables, socialization has statistically significant relationships with affective and normative commitment, and overall feelings about membership has as relationship with affective commitment (*see Section 4.2.5 in Chapter 4*).


In conclusion, the relationships between satisfaction, partisanship and commitment amongst political party members can be summarized quite simply. Satisfaction with membership is the strongest predictor of behavioural commitment to a party; partisanship is the strongest predictor of attitudinal commitment. Therefore, there is evidence to support the central hypothesis in respect of behavioural commitment, but little evidence to support the central hypothesis in respect of attitudinal commitment.

The review of literature presented in Chapter One also suggested a number of subsidiary hypotheses which can also now be discussed in the same terms as above. The first of these suggested that there could be self-reinforcing relationships between partisanship, attitudinal commitment, behavioural commitment and satisfaction:




There is little evidence to support this hypothesis. Although there are clearly relationships between all three dimensions of attitudinal commitment and variables indicating partisanship, this hypothesis does not stand up to scrutiny because there is no evidence to suggest that attitudinal commitment leads to behavioural commitment when socialization is controlled for.

The second subsidiary hypothesis suggested that any relationship between satisfaction and behavioural commitment might lead to increased attitudinal commitment and stronger partisanship:



This survey has certainly found evidence that satisfaction variables lead to behavioural commitment. The survey has also found evidence that this relationship could be self-reinforcing. For example, where all work is voluntary, job satisfaction is initially an outcome of participation; only subsequently will it be an antecedent of further participation. However, because there is no relationship between behavioural commitment and attitudinal commitment which retains significance, there is no firm evidence to support the second part of the hypothesis. This research has not found any evidence to suggest that satisfaction with the experience of membership leads to increased partisanship via the mechanism proposed by this subsidiary hypothesis.

The third subsidiary hypothesis suggests that perhaps it is possible to be ideologically and attitudinally committed to a party without making any behavioural commitment:



This research found qualified support for the first part of the hypothesis. On balance, partisanship is a stronger predictor of attitudinal commitment than satisfaction. This research did not explore the concept of mutual reinforcement between attitudinal commitment and partisanship that this subsidiary hypothesis also implies. Whilst there is considerable evidence from this research that partisanship variables are antecedents of some dimensions of attitudinal commitment (*see Chapter 4, Section 4.2*), there is less evidence available to suggest that partisanship is an outcome of attitudinal commitment. There is also little support for the last part of this hypothesis as the relationship between attitudinal commitment and actual behaviours does not retain statistical significance when other variables are controlled for.

The implications of these findings are that there may be two groups of political party members. One group will be those who are highly attitudinally attached to the party, through their partisanship. The other group will comprise those who enjoy the experience of membership, and are more likely to be the most active. In other words, the attitudinal commitment of some members is likely to be based on ideological foundations, but substantial behavioural commitment, as measured in this survey, is likely to be based on more instrumental considerations. If these groupings of members have a slightly familiar ring to them, it is because they broadly parallel the ideologically and instrumentally attached membership groups found in the studies of trade union members cited in the opening chapter of this thesis (*see Section 1.4.2 in Chapter 1*). However, the behaviours of each group across appear to be quite different between the two kinds of organization. In political parties, the ideologically attached members appear to be the least likely to be active, in trade unions such members form the bulk of activists. In trade unions, instrumental attachment does not appear to precede substantial participation; in political parties there is a statistically significant relationship between socialization, job satisfaction and participation.

This can be explained by the following argument. If a trade union member has joined to gain access to the offerings of insurance and representation, they need do nothing more to retain that access but to keep their subscription up to date. If a member joins a political party to make a statement about their political beliefs, there is nothing more that they have to do to make that statement but to stay in the party. In fact, it is also perfectly possible to make a statement about one's own political beliefs by doing nothing more than voting. Conversely, if an individual has become involved in a trade union to act on political principle, then non-participation is not going to satisfy that member's motivations. Participation will be a necessity in order to make a political statement through union

membership. In a political party setting, few of the solidary benefits of membership will be realized without associating with other members and taking part in activities.

One potential difficulty with this classification of members into ideologically and instrumentally attached groups is that it appears to contradict the evidence in the membership benefit matrix presented at Figure 6.1 in Chapter Six. In this matrix, those members scoring highest on benefits from membership, the less affluent and less educated members of Plaid Cymru, were amongst the least active, and the members most benefiting the party appeared to gain the least from it. No demographic group of members fell within the “high-high” mutual benefit category.

The ideological/instrumental categories of membership do not contradict the existing evidence. Instead these categories serve to highlight the importance of the third element of the overall participation model – political efficacy. It is highly likely that the propensity for participation amongst the most instrumentally attached members is curtailed by their own low ratings on political efficacy. Consequently, investment in political efficacy training for these members could have a substantial payback in terms of raising their activism rates. That is why efficacy training must be a priority for any party whose membership is disproportionately likely to be drawn from the least well-educated and lowest income strata of society.

Moving the “net-contributors” into the high-high mutual benefits category is trickier. This group shows more of a propensity to be active in return for relatively little, and there is a danger that investing resources on this group will not have the payback likely to apply to the net gainers. The converse is that fewer organizational resources might be required - than for the substantial commitment necessary for efficacy training - to make these “net-contributor” members even more productive than they already are. For these members, high-level socialization tactics might be just as effective, for example, “access” clubs or invitations to contribute to the policy formulation process which might bestow a sense of prestige or being valued by the party. Whilst this research has been able to identify which benefits are of value to the less well-educated, low income members of Plaid Cymru, the measurement scales used in the survey did not satisfactorily identify motivations or benefits on which better educated affluent members score highest. This is a further area for practitioner research, so that party managers can identify what benefits are worthwhile to deliver to those valuable members who currently appear to be having a fairly raw deal from membership.

Finally, the classification of party members into ideological/instrumentally attached groupings offers a small but potentially significant clue towards further explaining the paradox of women's under-participation in Plaid Cymru. The reader will recall from Section Four of Chapter Four that women appear to constitute an outgroup in the party in that they participate less, and are under-represented in the upper echelons of the party. But, in contrast to the linguistic and membership density out-groups, there are no statistically significant gender differences in overall feelings about membership. A key finding of this research is that a larger percentage of women (12.9%) claim to always agree with party policy than men (4.8%) (*see section 8.4.1 above*). If it is right that ideological belief results in attitudinal commitment rather than behavioural commitment, it is possible that women may under-participate because more of them consider their membership to be a statement of political belief, and nothing more than that. Men may be over-represented amongst active participants because they are more likely to be instrumentally attached to their party.

This discussion takes us back to one of the opening questions of this thesis: what are political party members buying when they buy political party membership? The reader will recall the debate over why customers enter into relationship marketing behaviour that was outlined in Section 1.3.3 of Chapter One of this thesis. In summary, Sheth and Parvatiyar (1995) claimed that consumers did so primarily to reduce choice. Bagozzi (1995) suggested that in some instances, customers enter into a marketing relationship for the sake of having that relationship.

Just as this research has left very little doubt that there are differences between the attitudes and behaviours of different groups of political party members, there is no reason to suspect that all political party members are buying into the same construct when they buy political party membership. In fact, I would argue that the two differently committed groups of members are likely to be buying two different membership packages. Ideologically attached members are the most likely to be buying a relationship, whilst instrumentally attached members are the most likely to be buying a choice reduction mechanism⁵.

⁵ It follows that members who are motivated by political ambition – the ones we know nothing about because of the limitations of this survey – are more likely to fall into the instrumental category of members than the ideological category.

What is the evidence from this research to suggest that the purchase of political party membership operates primarily as a relationship for ideologically attached members? Firstly, person-party value congruence, as indicated by values motivations, is seen as a benefit of membership that can only accrue so long as the member remains in the party. And, whilst value congruence may well precede at least some kind of participation, on balance, the relationships between values motivations and attitudinal commitment are more extensive and conclusive than the relationships between values motivations and behavioural commitment. Those scoring highest on person-party value congruence are the most likely to participate in at least one activity. Values motivations appears to be the only variable with a relationship with time spent on activities. But values motivations do not have any statistically significant relationships with the number or types of activity that members do, nor donation patterns, nor quitting or staying behaviour. Values motivations are antecedents of two of the three dimensions of attitudinal attachment explored in this research (*see Table 7.7 in Chapter 7*). Secondly, members perceive frequency of agreement with party policy as a benefit of membership, but not as an incentive for participation (*see Section 5.2.2 in Chapter 5*). Additionally, frequency of agreement with policy is the only variable to be a statistically significant antecedent of all three forms of attitudinal commitment (*see Table 7.7 in Chapter 7*). A particularly crucial finding in this respect is that it is frequency of policy agreement, not values motivations, which has a relationship with continuance commitment. Members stay in Plaid Cymru because they feel that, politically speaking, they have nowhere else to go. Continuance commitment is clearly not an incentive for participation; evidence from workplace studies suggests that employees with strong continuance commitment might be poorer performers with those scoring weaker on the construct (Meyer and Allen 1997).

What is the evidence from this survey that purchase of political party membership can operate as a choice reduction strategy for instrumentally attached members? Both of the solidary benefits of party membership which are significantly related to participation are such that they demand participation in order to get. For example, in order to receive job satisfaction, one has to work. In order to feel socialized into one's organization, one has to have participated in it in some way. Just as there is evidence that individuals purchasing services have to play an appropriate role to obtain the full benefit of those services (Zeithaml and Bitner 1996, Hoffman and Bateson 1997), party members have to do what is necessary to receive the solidary benefits they value. But this argument appears to be contradicted by the model achieved for time spent on activities (*see Table 3.5 in Chapter 3*) where those scoring highest on values motivations spend the most time working for Plaid

Cymru. Surely this constitutes evidence that the most active members are those who are ideologically attached? I think that the reverse relationship might be a more likely explanation. Some of the most instrumentally attached members of Plaid Cymru will believe that they genuinely share party values because behaviours predict attitudes (Myers 1999). Individuals are likely to infer their own attitudes by observing what they do. Self-perception theory (Bem 1972) suggests that Plaid Cymru members who are highly active in order to receive solidary benefits are likely to assume that they share party values to a substantial extent. This will help them rationalize their decision to spend such a great amount of time on party matters. In this scenario, values motivations are not an antecedent of spending time on party activities, but an outcome.

8.4.3 – Using marketing for membership management

A final “loose end” left over from the opening chapter is to define what contribution this thesis has made to marketing knowledge. I would suggest that it has contributed the preliminary finding that the variables with significant relationships with financial donations are substantially different from those with relationships with time. This challenges prevailing assumptions (Sargeant 1999b) that “gifts” of time and monetary donations are similar responses to organizational requests, even taking into account the unsatisfactory model “accounting for” time. Clearly, this finding should be tested in further nonprofit marketing research.

But the primary importance of this thesis to marketing as a discipline does not lie with this point. This thesis demonstrates that the use of rational choice theories, the marketing theory that derives from them, and marketing techniques can make the original and substantial contributions to the other disciplines involved in this thesis - political science, organizational behaviour and nonprofit studies – which were described in the previous chapter. More importantly than that, the use of marketing theories and techniques has made possible a comprehensive blueprint of a “win-win” mechanism for managing political party members. The marketing techniques used in this research are very basic; they comprise segmenting different groups of customers, identifying the needs of each customer, and creating organizational strategies to satisfy these needs in line with the party’s own objectives.

The implications of using these techniques are more far-reaching than their simplicity would suggest. A customer-focused approach matters in the arena of public participation because of the perception – articulated by politicians, the media, and academics alike – of a

decline in the numbers of people prepared to get involved in politics. Politicians in Britain have looked to any number of institutions – except their own parties - to “do something” about it. Local authorities are supposed to introduce a wider variety of voting methods. The BBC is to try to make its political coverage “more attractive” to younger viewers. Curriculum time in schools is now compulsorily spent on “citizenship education” (which differs from the concept of political efficacy training which I have suggested in this thesis). These tactics might not do any harm. But they are not going to do much good if anyone inspired to join a political party as a result is treated with the same benign indifference that most party members are currently offered now. There is absolutely no reason why political parties should not share the responsibility of ensuring that individuals can participate fully in British politics. Indeed, to take on that responsibility could mean more members, more legitimacy, and more money for them.

My aim in undertaking this research has always been very straightforward. I wanted to explore whether it was possible for individual members of political parties to have an enjoyable experience of membership by virtue of having their needs, expectations and motivations better understood, and for political parties to have practical, workable management tools for managing members in a mutually beneficial way. I believe that the results of this research demonstrate that “win-win” methods of managing political party members are possible and practical. This research shows that membership management is a more complex task than academics or party managers have hitherto appreciated. But it also demonstrates that it is possible to identify these complexities and to have functional management strategies either to reduce them or to accommodate them.

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APPENDIX 1

Table A1.1 – Supporter, funder and worker elements of political party member roles

	Supporters	Funders	Workers
Seyd and Whiteley (2002)	-	“Donating money ... is a key function of party members”	Campaigning and representation, “ambassadors in the community”
Martin and Cowley (1999)	Testing ground for party policy	Fund party organization	Campaigners, recruit and socialize leaders and representatives, party staff, “ambassadors”
Scarrow (1996)	“...a source of democratic legitimacy”	“... an important component of party fundraising strategies”	Contribute free labour both during and between election campaigns, a channel of communication keeping the party in touch with “grass roots” opinion, a source of new ideas
Mair (1994)	Legitimisers	“Membership fees and donations still constitute an important source of revenue”	Occupy official positions, help mobilize voters, select party leaders
Scarrow (1994)	Loyal voters	Provide essential funds	Ambassadors, volunteer workers, provide ideas, potential candidates
Whiteley et al (1994)	“Generalised support”	Pay subscription, donate funds.	Participate in consultation, fundraising, campaigning, selecting candidates for elections
Seyd and Whiteley (1992)	-	Contribute money	“...the activities of keeping the party in existence at the local level ... preparations for elections ... running the election campaign ...holding elective office”
May (1973)	Adherents	Dues payers, financial contributors	Local office bearers, delegates to conventions, canvassers, campaign work, conduits of opinion
Milbrath (1969)	-	Monetary contribution required for membership	Participate in meetings, caucuses and conventions; holding office; doing “the multitude of chores required around party or campaign headquarters”; canvass voters at election time
Duverger (1954)	“Adherent”	“The party is essentially based upon the subscriptions paid by its members”	Attend meetings, share in the spreading of the party’s slogans, help to organize its propaganda and prepare its electoral campaigns

Table A1.2 – Differences in the measurement of variables between Labour and Conservative parties

Variable Label	Labour ¹	Conservative
Value of collective good	Respondents asked whether they thought the government should or should not do various things on eight policy oriented questions; higher scores went to respondents whose views most closely accord with those of Labour party.	Respondents asked whether they thought the government should or should not do various things on nine policy oriented questions; higher scores went to respondents whose views most closely accord with those of Conservative party.
Personal influence index	<p>Three Likert-scaled items:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • People like me can have a real influence on politics if they are prepared to get involved • Sometimes politics seems so complicated it is difficult for a person like me to understand what is going on • Parties in general are only interested in peoples votes, not in their opinions 	Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they felt that they could personally influence politics by participating in various specified activities. Responses measured on a four point scale ranging from “A large extent” to “not at all”.
Group influence index	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • When party members are united and work together they can really change Britain • The party leadership doesn’t pay a lot of attention to the views of ordinary party members • By and large, Labour MPs try to represent the views of ordinary party members 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • When Conservative party members are united and work together they can really change Britain • The party leadership doesn’t pay a lot of attention to the views of ordinary party members • The local Conservative party has really made a difference to the way in which our community has developed

¹ This refers to research in the Labour party published as “Labour’s Grass Roots” (1992)

Label	Labour	Conservative
Selective incentives		
Process incentives		
<i>Attitude to political activism</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The only way to be really educated about party politics is to be a party activist • Being an active party member is a good way to meet interesting people • Labour party members are part of a great movement of like-minded people who work together in solidarity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The only way to be really educated about party politics is to be a party activist • Being an active party member is a good way to meet interesting people • Getting involved in party activities during an election can be fun
<i>Left-right ideology</i>	Seven point spectrum	Seven point spectrum
Outcome incentives		
<i>“Ambition”</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A person like me could do a good job of being a local councillor • Labour would be more successful if more people like me were elected to Parliament 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A person like me could do a good job of being a local Conservative councillor • The Conservative party would be more successful if more people like me were elected to Parliament
Expressive/altruistic concerns	Thermometer scale to measure how “warm and sympathetic” members were to policy (0-100)	Respondents were asked: “Would you call yourself a very strong Conservative, fairly strong, not very strong, or not at all strong”
Social norms	Higher scores inferred from isolating respondents who indicated that their initial reason for joining was due to the influence of friends/relatives	<p>Respondents were asked: “Consider the person whose opinions you most respect. Would you say that they agree or disagree with the following statements”. This was followed by three Likert-scaled items:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • On the whole members of the local Conservative Association are respected figures in the local community • Many Conservative party activists are extremists • People can have a real influence on politics if they are prepared to get involved

APPENDIX 2

SECTION A2.1 - Text of letter and research note sent to political parties, January 1999

DATE
ADDRESS

Dear

I am writing to ask whether the [...] Party would be interested in participating in a postgraduate research project regarding the attitudes and behaviour of political party members.

I am a full-time MPhil/PhD student at the London School of Economics, studying in the Department of Industrial Relations. I have some prior experience of working with political parties in the field of membership management, having carried out research in this area in 1997. My interests lie in the area of the motivation and behaviour of political party members; why they join, why they become active, and the effects on their behaviour of paying a subscription fee and being asked to work.

In outline, the research I envisage would involve some sort of survey of party members in order to identify their needs, expectations, motivations and behaviours. This information can then be used to devise practical, workable tools for managing members in a mutually beneficial way.

It is my intention that this research will be carried out with a view to publication in an academic environment in the form of a thesis submitted for the research degree, articles in relevant academic journals, and, possibly, in book form.

Please be assured that I am aware of the political sensitivities of such a project, and that, should the [...] Party wish to participate, you would rightly expect a high degree of discretion and confidentiality on my part. I have no political axe to grind or point to prove in undertaking this research - I am interested solely in the application of organizational management techniques to members of political parties.

A brief summary of my research interests and the aims and benefits of the proposed research is included. Should you wish, I would be happy to discuss these with you at a mutually convenient time. I also enclose a brief CV setting out in full my professional experience and qualifications.

Thank you for taking the time to consider this letter.

Yours sincerely

Sue Granik

The motivation and behaviour of political party members

Introduction

There is much research into the motivation of individuals who are paid to work. Far less is known about the motivation of individuals who work voluntarily, even paying organisations for the privilege. Yet large numbers of voluntary organisations, including all Britain's political parties, depend heavily on such individuals for financing and labour.

Outline of research interests

Most political party members join without necessarily consciously seeking any tangible or specific individual benefit, pay a subscription in order to join, and are subsequently requested to make some further commitment in the form of donations or labour. These points can affect individuals' behaviour in three ways:

1. Organisations offering no specific individual benefit generally appeal to a sense of altruism or ideological belief in order to attract members. However, altruism does not always lead to activism or the propensity to donate funds.
2. The payment of a subscription raises a possibility that members may behave like paying customers of that organisation, even if they do not necessarily think of themselves as such.
3. Members who work for the organisation might behave as they do in paid employment, although they will not necessarily consider themselves to be employees.

These points need to be examined in detail to allow insights into the practical management challenges they pose for political parties. The implication of the second point is that the delivery of incentives is fundamental to getting people to join, be active within the organisation and stay, because coercion is not an option. As many party members are, in effect unpaid party staff, the implication of the third point is that satisfying their needs may be important in order to motivate them to "work" effectively.

Aims and benefits of research

The aim of this research is, therefore, to find out why political party members pay to work, and how they behave when they do so. The research should provide an explanation of why people choose to join political parties, how and why they become motivated to work or donate money, to attempt to define their behavioural characteristics, and to attempt to identify which individuals are most likely to join, become active and donate funds.

There is evidence that the experience of membership of such organisations can be actively managed. A further aim of this research, therefore, is to devise practical, workable management tools which can be used to manage members in a mutually beneficial way. Therefore, an integral outcome should be the construction of models of motivation and behaviour to assist practitioners recruit, retain and manage productively their organisation's membership. I would also seek to illustrate the impact of organisational strategy, structure, internal relationships and recruitment methods on decisions to join, stay, leave or participate in activities.

A final potential benefit is that, by virtue of having their needs, expectations and motivations better understood, individual members would have a more enjoyable experience of membership. It is in the gift of these organisations to increase their memberships in an enduring way; this research aims to help them do so.

SECTION A2.2 - Pilot survey covering letter, and questionnaire with original version of Question One

January 2000

Dear Sir/Madam,

I am carrying out a survey on behalf of Plaid Cymru to ask its members how they feel about being in the party.

This survey is being carried out as part of a research exercise to find out what members really think about their experience of party membership. By understanding people's views about being in Plaid Cymru, the party can take steps to ensure that membership is productive for the party and its members.

I would appreciate it if you would be kind enough to fill in the enclosed questionnaire and return it to me at the London School of Economics, where I am a doctoral candidate. The questionnaire should not take too much of your time, and I hope you will find it interesting and enjoyable. It is completely anonymous so there is no need to give your name or address. Postage has already been paid on the reply envelope which is also enclosed, so you won't need to use a stamp. Please return the completed questionnaire by 24 January 2000.

Thank you for taking the time to read this letter, and many thanks for filling in the questionnaire. I am really looking forward to finding out your views.

Yours faithfully

Sue Granik

PLAID CYMRU MEMBERSHIP SURVEY

This survey is being carried out in order to understand how Plaid Cymru members feel about being in the party. Please complete the following questionnaire and post it to the London School of Economics by **24 January 2000**, using the pre-paid envelope enclosed.

Thank you for letting us know what you think.

1. What was your MAIN reason for joining Plaid Cymru? Please tick ONE box only.

- I had always voted Plaid Cymru
- I thought Plaid Cymru did a good job on the local council
- I joined because Plaid Cymru defended the Welsh language
- I admired the leader of the party
- I agreed with Plaid Cymru policies
- I was interested in standing for election
- I wanted to get involved in politics
- Plaid Cymru is very strong in this area
- Being a member of Plaid Cymru is part of being Welsh
- I wanted to meet some new people
- A friend/relative invited me to join
- I didn't like Labour/the Liberal Democrats
- Joining seemed the right thing to do because I live in Wales
- Other

If you selected "Other", please could you explain below what this reason was:

2. How did you join Plaid Cymru? Please tick ONE box only.

- I contacted Plaid Cymru headquarters and asked to join
- I responded to a party political broadcast/advertisement
- I contacted my local branch and asked to join
- I joined at a Plaid Cymru local event or meeting
- I joined through a Plaid Cymru student/youth group
- I was given a form by a friend
- I joined at a national event
- A leaflet was put through my letterbox and I decided to join
- I joined at a Plaid Cymru stall locally
- Other

If you selected "Other", please could you explain below how you joined::

3. Which branch of Plaid Cymru do you belong to?

4. How do you feel about Plaid Cymru's policies? Please tick the box next to the statement which is closest to your views. Please tick ONE box only.

- I always agree with party policies
I usually agree with party policies
I occasionally agree with party policies
I neither agree nor disagree with party policies

5. In relation to the party as a whole, do you consider yourself:

- On the far left of the party
To the left of the party
In the centre of the party
To the right of the party
On the far right of the party

6. In which year did you first join Plaid Cymru?

7. Have you been a member continuously since that time?

- Yes
No

If you selected "No", how many years have you been a member altogether? _____

8. Have you renewed your subscription to Plaid Cymru within the past 12 months?

- Yes
No

9. Before you joined the party, were either your father or mother a member of Plaid Cymru? Please tick ONE box only.

- Both parents were members
Father was a member
Mother was a member
Neither parent was a member
Don't know

10. Are you a member of any of the following sorts of group? Please tick the box next to EVERY group of which you are a member.

- A language organisation
A major pressure group eg CND Greenpeace etc
A trade union
A religious organisation
A local pressure group eg anti open-cast coal

11. Over the past 12 months, were you involved in any of the following activities? Please tick the box next to EVERY activity in which you were involved.

- Attending a local branch meeting
- Helping organise local fundraising events
- Helping organise local social events
- Providing clerical assistance to Plaid Cymru
- Delivering leaflets
- Attending a public meeting
- Recruiting new members
- Organising a petition

12. Over the past 12 months, were you involved in any of the following election activities? Please tick the box next to EVERY activity in which you were involved.

- Standing as a candidate in a local election
- Telephone canvassing
- Door to door canvassing for a candidate in a local election
- Door to door canvassing for a candidate in the National Assembly or Euro elections
- Helping in some way on election days e.g telling, knocking up

13. Over the past 12 months, were you involved in any party activities? Please tick the box next to EVERY activity in which you were involved.

- Standing for office within the party locally
- Standing for office within the party nationally
- Attending a rhanbarth meeting
- Attending national Party Conference
- Attending a National Council meeting
- Serving on a national party committee

14. If you have done any other activities for or within Plaid Cymru over the past 12 months, which are not mentioned above, please list those activities below:

15. Over the past 12 months, how much time, on average, did you devote to party activities each week?

- None
- Up to five hours
- From six up to 10 hours
- From 11 up to 15 hours
- From 16 up to 20 hours
- More than 20 hours

16. Overall, what are your feelings about the activities you do within the party? Please indicate your opinion about EACH statement by placing a circle around the appropriate number on the scale.

	<i>Strongly agree</i>						<i>Strongly disagree</i>
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
All in all I am satisfied with the things I do in the party							
In general I don't really like the things I do							
In general, I like working for Plaid Cymru							

17. Over the past 12 months, have you made any donations to Plaid Cymru?

- Yes
 No

If you selected "Yes", into which category did the TOTAL of all your donations fall (including, for example, the St David's Day Appeal, collections at local branches, other appeals from National Office or locally)

- under £10.00
 between £10.01 - £25.00
 between £25.01 - £50.00
 between £50.01 - £100.00
 over £100.00

18. Overall, what are your feelings about your local branch? Please indicate your opinion about EVERY statement by placing a circle around the appropriate number on the scale.

	<i>Strongly agree</i>						<i>Strongly disagree</i>
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I feel comfortable in my local branch							
People in my local branch have explained what is expected of me							
I get along with my branch officers							
The activities I do are what I expected I would do when I thought about joining Plaid Cymru.							
I am trusted by the people I work with in the party							
My local branch can depend on me							
Sometimes I don't feel like I belong in my local branch							

	<i>Strongly agree</i>						<i>Strongly disagree</i>
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I am similar to the other members							
I am in control of the work I do for the party							
The other people in my local branch can count on me to do what I say I will do							
My responsibilities in the local branch are unclear to me							

19. Thinking back to when you first joined Plaid Cymru, did you have any specific expectations about what you wanted from your membership?

20. To what extent were these expectations met?

21. Do you think that being a member of Plaid Cymru has done anything for you in any way?

22. People have many different reasons for being a member of Plaid Cymru. Below are a number of possible reasons for being a member of the party. For EVERY statement, please indicate how important or accurate that reason is for you by placing a circle around the appropriate number on the scale.

	<i>Very important/ accurate</i>			<i>Not at all important/ accurate</i>			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
People I'm close to want me to be a Plaid Cymru member	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Membership of Plaid Cymru helps take my mind off things	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I feel that party membership helps me to help other people	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Plaid Cymru membership makes me feel less lonely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I can make new contacts that might help my business or career	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I can learn more about Plaid Cymru	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Membership allows me to gain a new perspective on Welsh politics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Others with whom I am close place a high value on serving the community	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I can do something for Wales and that is important to me	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Being a Plaid Cymru member makes me feel better about myself	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Being active in Plaid Cymru will look good on my CV	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Political party membership is a way to make new friends	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

23. Overall, how would you describe your feelings about being a member of Plaid Cymru? Do you feel: (Please tick ONE box only)

- Delighted
- Pleased
- Mostly satisfied
- Mixed (about equally satisfied and dissatisfied)
- Mostly dissatisfied
- Unhappy
- Terrible

24. Do you believe that people like you can have an impact on the political process? Below are a number of statements about the political process. Please indicate your opinion about each statement by placing a circle around the appropriate number on the scale.

	<i>Strongly agree</i>							<i>Strongly disagree</i>
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
I believe public officials don't care much what people like me think								
People like me can have a real influence on politics if they are prepared to get involved								
Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that I can't really understand what's going on								
A person like me could do a good job of being a local councillor								
There is no way other than voting that people like me can influence actions of the government								
People like me don't have any say about what the government does								

25. In your opinion, has your local branch of Plaid Cymru made a difference to the way in which your community has developed? Please tick ONE box only.

- Yes, a great difference
- Yes, some difference
- Yes, a slight difference
- No

26. How do you feel about remaining as a member of Plaid Cymru? Below are a number of statements about remaining as a member of the party. Please indicate your opinion about each statement by placing a circle around the appropriate number on the scale.

	<i>Strongly agree</i>							<i>Strongly disagree</i>
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
It would be very hard for me to leave the party right now, even if I wanted to								
I would be very happy to spend the rest of my political career in Plaid Cymru								
I would not leave Plaid Cymru right now because I have a sense of obligation to the people in it.								
If I had not already put so much of myself into Plaid Cymru, I might consider joining another party								

	<i>Strongly agree</i>						<i>Strongly disagree</i>
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I do not feel like “part of the family” at Plaid Cymru	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I would feel guilty if I left the party now	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Too much of my life would be disrupted if I decided I wanted to leave Plaid Cymru now	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I do not feel a strong sense of belonging to Plaid Cymru	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Plaid Cymru deserves my loyalty	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I do not feel any obligation to remain with Plaid Cymru	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
One of the few negative consequences of leaving Plaid Cymru would be that there are no real alternatives	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Plaid Cymru has a great deal of personal meaning for me	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I do not feel “emotionally attached” to the party	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Even if it were to my advantage, I do not feel it would be right to leave Plaid Cymru now.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Right now, staying with the party is a matter of necessity as much as desire	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
One of the major reasons I continue to work for Plaid Cymru is another party may not match the overall benefits I have here	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I really feel as if this party’s problems are my own	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I owe a great deal to Plaid Cymru.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

27. Bearing in mind the cost of your subscription fee, would you say that, overall, membership of Plaid Cymru is good value for money?

28. Are you:

- Male
Female

29. In which age range do you fall?

- 16 - 24 55 - 64
25 - 34 65 - 74
35 - 44 75+
45 - 54

30. Are you able to speak Welsh? Please tick ONE box only.

- Yes, very well
Yes, quite well
Yes, a little
No

31. Are you able to read Welsh? Please tick ONE box only.

- Yes, very well
Yes, quite well
Yes, a little
No

32. Are you able to write Welsh? Please tick ONE box only.

- Yes, very well
Yes, quite well
Yes, a little
No

33. Do you have any of the following qualifications?

- CSE/GCE/GCSE
A or S level, or technical qualification (eg City and Guilds, NVQ)
Teacher training, nursing or other professional qualification
University degree or diploma
None
Other

If you selected "Other", please could you specify which qualification this is:

34. Please could you tick the box next to the range within which your household income falls.

- Up to £8,000
- £8,000 - £15,000
- £15,001 - £25,000
- £25,001 - £40,000
- £40,001 - £60,000
- £60,001+

35. In which region of Wales do you usually live?

- Blaenau Gwent
- Bridgend
- Caerphilly
- Cardiff
- Carmarthenshire
- Ceredigion
- Conwy
- Denbighshire
- Flintshire
- Gwynedd
- Isle of Anglesey
- Merthyr Tydfil
- Monmouthshire
- Neath Port Talbot
- Newport
- Pembrokeshire
- Powys
- Rhondda Cynon Taff
- Swansea
- Torfaen
- Vale of Glamorgan
- Wrexham
- I usually live outside Wales

Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. Now please place the questionnaire in the enclosed reply-paid envelope, and post it back to the London School of Economics by 24 January 2000.

Again, thank you for taking part in the survey.

SECTION A2.3 - Amended version of Question One

1. What was your MAIN reason for joining Plaid Cymru? Please tick ONE box only.

- Joining seemed the right thing to do because I live in Wales
- I didn't like Labour/the Liberal Democrats
- A friend/relative encouraged me to join
- I wanted to meet some new people
- Being a member of Plaid Cymru is part of being Welsh
- Plaid Cymru is very strong in this area
- I wanted to get involved in politics
- I was interested in standing for election
- I agreed with Plaid Cymru policies
- I admired the leader of the party
- I joined because Plaid Cymru defended the Welsh language
- I thought Plaid Cymru did a good job on the local council
- I had always voted Plaid Cymru
- Other

If you selected "Other", please could you explain below what this reason was:

SECTION A2.4 - Analysis of response from pilot questionnaire

Table A2.1 - Demographic profile of respondents (n=44)

Question	Response rate %	Comments
Gender	91	Male 75%, female 25%. Women appear to be underrepresented amongst respondents relative to Plaid Cymru as a whole (50/50 split)
Language of response	n/a	English 66%, Welsh 34%. In line with expectations, bearing in mind the pilot area.
Age	98	Normal distribution; in line with expectations
Income	96	Normal distribution; in line with expectations
Education	98	

Table A2.2 - Political profile of respondents (n=44)

Question	Response rate %	Comments
Main reason for joining	100	Low response rate for version 2 of this question suggests that if recipients were not able to answer the question they did not complete or return the questionnaire. Substance of response in line with expectations
Left/right spectrum	96	In line with expectations
Feelings about policies	93	In line with expectations
Parental membership	100	In line with expectations
Membership longevity	96	
Membership continuity	98	
Political efficacy (6 items)	86-93	

Table A2.3 - Donations and activity profile of respondents (n=44)

Question	Response rate %	Comments
Any donations made	100	
Amount of donations	80	Response rate in line with expectations
Participation	100	
Time spent	96	
How many activities	98	Levels of each reported activity in line with expectations (52%-2%)
Other memberships	98	

Table A2.4 - Major measurement scales (n=42)

Question	Response rate %	Comments
Volunteer Functions Inventory (12 items)	93-83	Response rate exceeded expectations
ACNCS (18 items)	91-86	Response rate exceeded expectations

Table A2.5 - Organizational issues (n=42)

Question	Response rate %	Comments
Joining method	100	In line with expectations, one option not selected but no reason to drop from survey
Value for money	97	Response rate demonstrates that respondents can think and respond in terms of value for money. Perhaps format as a closed question in main survey
Branch efficacy	93	
Overall satisfaction	95	Positive skew of Lib Dems survey overcome, in line with expectations
Expectations on joining	81	Response rate exceeded expectations; possibly some “retrospective memory” going on here?
Expectations met	57	Response rate in line with expectations
Benefits	81	Response rate exceeded expectations
Job satisfaction (3 items)	67-55	Below expectations; respondents seemed to have problems with the second scale item; maybe they thought this was covered by the first.
Organizational socialization scale (11 items)	76-62	Response rate a little disappointing

SECTION A2.5 - Main survey covering letter and questionnaire

April 2000

Dear Sir/Madam,

I am carrying out a survey on behalf of Plaid Cymru to ask its members how they feel about being in the party.

This survey is being carried out as part of a research exercise to find out what members really think about their experience of party membership. By understanding people's views about being in Plaid Cymru, the party can take steps to ensure that membership is productive for the party and its members.

I would appreciate it if you would be kind enough to fill in the enclosed questionnaire and return it to me at the London School of Economics, where I am a doctoral candidate. The questionnaire should not take too much of your time, and I hope you will find it interesting and enjoyable. It is completely anonymous so there is no need to give your name or address. Postage has already been paid on the reply envelope which is also enclosed, so you won't need to use a stamp. Please return the completed questionnaire by 20 April 2000.

Thank you for taking the time to read this letter, and many thanks for filling in the questionnaire. I am really looking forward to finding out your views.

Yours faithfully

Sue Granik

PLAID CYMRU MEMBERSHIP SURVEY

This survey is being carried out in order to understand how Plaid Cymru members feel about being in the party. Please complete the following questionnaire and post it to the London School of Economics by 20 April 2000, using the pre-paid envelope enclosed.

Thank you for letting us know what you think.

1. What was your MAIN reason for joining Plaid Cymru? Please tick ONE box only.

- I had always voted Plaid Cymru
- I thought Plaid Cymru did a good job on the local council
- I joined because Plaid Cymru defended the Welsh language
- I admired the leader of the party
- I agreed with Plaid Cymru policies
- I was interested in standing for election
- I wanted to get involved in politics
- Plaid Cymru is very strong in this area
- Being a member of Plaid Cymru is part of being Welsh
- I wanted to meet some new people
- A friend/relative encouraged me to join
- I didn't like Labour/the Liberal Democrats
- Joining seemed the right thing to do because I live in Wales
- Other

If you selected "Other", please could you explain below what this reason was:

2. How did you join Plaid Cymru? Please tick ONE box only.

- I contacted Plaid Cymru headquarters and asked to join
- I responded to a party political broadcast/advertisement
- I contacted my local branch and asked to join
- I joined at a Plaid Cymru local event or meeting
- I joined through a Plaid Cymru student/youth group
- I was given a form by a friend
- I joined at a national event
- A leaflet was put through my letterbox and I decided to join
- I joined at a Plaid Cymru stall locally
- Other

If you selected "Other", please could you explain below how you joined:

3. Which branch of Plaid Cymru do you belong to?

4. How do you feel about Plaid Cymru's policies? Please tick the box next to the statement which is closest to your views. Please tick ONE box only.

- I always agree with party policies
- I usually agree with party policies
- I occasionally agree with party policies
- I neither agree nor disagree with party policies

5. In relation to the party as a whole, do you consider yourself:

- On the far left of the party
- To the left of the party
- In the centre of the party
- To the right of the party
- On the far right of the party

6. In which year did you first join Plaid Cymru?

7. Have you been a member continuously since that time?

- Yes
- No

If you selected "No", how many years have you been a member altogether? _____

8. Have you renewed your subscription to Plaid Cymru within the past 12 months?

- Yes
- No

9. Before you joined the party, were either your father or mother a member of Plaid Cymru? Please tick ONE box only.

- Both parents were members
- Father was a member
- Mother was a member
- Neither parent was a member
- Don't know

10. Are you a member of any of the following sorts of group? Please tick the box next to EVERY group of which you are a member.

- A language organisation
- A major pressure group eg CND Greenpeace etc
- A trade union
- A religious organisation
- A local pressure group eg anti open-cast coal

11. Over the past 12 months, were you involved in any of the following activities? Please tick the box next to EVERY activity in which you were involved.

- Attending a local branch meeting
- Helping organise local fundraising events
- Helping organise local social events
- Providing clerical assistance to Plaid Cymru
- Delivering leaflets
- Attending a public meeting
- Recruiting new members
- Organising a petition

12. Over the past 12 months, were you involved in any of the following election activities? Please tick the box next to EVERY activity in which you were involved.

- Standing as a candidate in a local election
- Telephone canvassing
- Door to door canvassing for a candidate in a local election
- Door to door canvassing for a candidate in the National Assembly or Euro elections
- Helping in some way on election days e.g telling, knocking up

13. Over the past 12 months, were you involved in any party activities? Please tick the box next to EVERY activity in which you were involved.

- Standing for office within the party locally
- Standing for office within the party nationally
- Attending a rhanbarth meeting
- Attending national Party Conference
- Attending a National Council meeting
- Serving on a national party committee

14. If you have done any other activities for or within Plaid Cymru over the past 12 months, which are not mentioned above, please list those activities below:

15. If you were involved in any one activity over the past 12 months, how much time, on average, did you devote to party activities each week?

- Up to five hours
- From six up to 10 hours
- From 11 up to 15 hours
- From 16 up to 20 hours
- More than 20 hours

16. Overall, what are your feelings about the activities you do within the party? Please indicate your opinion about EACH statement by placing a circle around the appropriate number on the scale.

	<i>Strongly agree</i>						<i>Strongly disagree</i>
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
All in all I am satisfied with the things I do in the party							
In general, I like working for Plaid Cymru							

17. Over the past 12 months, have you made any donations to Plaid Cymru?

- Yes
 No

If you selected "Yes", into which category did the TOTAL of all your donations fall (including, for example, the St David's Day Appeal, collections at local branches, other appeals from National Office or locally)

- under £10.00
 between £10.01 - £25.00
 between £25.01 - £50.00
 between £50.01 - £100.00
 over £100.00

18. Overall, what are your feelings about your local branch? Please indicate your opinion about EVERY statement by placing a circle around the appropriate number on the scale.

	<i>Strongly agree</i>						<i>Strongly disagree</i>
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I feel comfortable in my local branch							
I get along with my branch officers							
The activities I do are what I expected I would do when I thought about joining Plaid Cymru.							
I am trusted by the people I work with in the party							

	<i>Strongly agree</i>						<i>Strongly disagree</i>
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My local branch can depend on me							
Sometimes I don't feel like I belong in my local branch							
I am similar to the other members							
I am in control of the work I do for the party							
The other people in my local branch can count on me to do what I say I will do							
My responsibilities in the local branch are unclear to me							

19. Thinking back to when you first joined Plaid Cymru, did you have any specific expectations about what you wanted from your membership?

20. To what extent were these expectations met?

21. Do you think that being a member of Plaid Cymru has done anything for you in any way?

22. People have many different reasons for being a member of Plaid Cymru. Below are a number of possible reasons for being a member of the party. For EVERY statement, please indicate how important or accurate that reason is for you by placing a circle around the appropriate number on the scale.

	<i>Very important/ accurate</i>			<i>Not at all important/ accurate</i>			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
People I'm close to want me to be a Plaid Cymru member							
Membership of Plaid Cymru helps take my mind off things							
I feel that party membership helps me to help other people							
Plaid Cymru membership makes me feel less lonely							
I can make new contacts that might help my business or career							
I can learn more about Plaid Cymru							
Membership allows me to gain a new perspective on Welsh politics							
Others with whom I am close place a high value on serving the community							
I can do something for Wales and that is important to me							
Being a Plaid Cymru member makes me feel better about myself							
Being active in Plaid Cymru will look good on my CV							
Political party membership is a way to make new friends							

23. Overall, how would you describe your feelings about being a member of Plaid Cymru? Do you feel: (Please tick ONE box only)

- Delighted
- Pleased
- Mostly satisfied
- Mixed (about equally satisfied and dissatisfied)
- Mostly dissatisfied
- Unhappy
- Terrible

24. Do you believe that people like you can have an impact on the political process? Below are a number of statements about the political process. Please indicate your opinion about each statement by placing a circle around the appropriate number on the scale.

	<i>Strongly agree</i>						<i>Strongly disagree</i>
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I believe public officials don't care much what people like me think							
People like me can have a real influence on politics if they are prepared to get involved							
Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that I can't really understand what's going on							
A person like me could do a good job of being a local councillor							
There is no way other than voting that people like me can influence actions of the government							
People like me don't have any say about what the government does							

25. In your opinion, has your local branch of Plaid Cymru made a difference to the way in which your community has developed? Please tick ONE box only.

- Yes, a great difference
- Yes, some difference
- Yes, a slight difference
- No

26. How do you feel about remaining as a member of Plaid Cymru? Below are a number of statements about remaining as a member of the party. Please indicate your opinion about each statement by placing a circle around the appropriate number on the scale.

	<i>Strongly agree</i>						<i>Strongly disagree</i>
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
It would be very hard for me to leave the party right now, even if I wanted to							
I would be very happy to spend the rest of my political career in Plaid Cymru							
I would not leave Plaid Cymru right now because I have a sense of obligation to the people in it.							
If I had not already put so much of myself into Plaid Cymru, I might consider joining another party							

	<i>Strongly agree</i>						<i>Strongly disagree</i>
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I do not feel like “part of the family” at Plaid Cymru	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I would feel guilty if I left the party now	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Too much of my life would be disrupted if I decided I wanted to leave Plaid Cymru now	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I do not feel a strong sense of belonging to Plaid Cymru	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Plaid Cymru deserves my loyalty	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I do not feel any obligation to remain with Plaid Cymru	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
One of the few negative consequences of leaving Plaid Cymru would be that there are no real alternatives	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Plaid Cymru has a great deal of personal meaning for me	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I do not feel “emotionally attached” to the party	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Even if it were to my advantage, I do not feel it would be right to leave Plaid Cymru now.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Right now, staying with the party is a matter of necessity as much as desire	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
One of the major reasons I continue to work for Plaid Cymru is another party may not match the overall benefits I have here	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I really feel as if this party’s problems are my own	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I owe a great deal to Plaid Cymru.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

27. Bearing in mind the cost of your subscription fee, would you say that, overall, membership of Plaid Cymru is good value for money?

- Yes
No

28. Are you:

- Male
Female

29. In which age range do you fall?

- 16 - 24 55 - 64
25 - 34 65 - 74
35 - 44 75+
45 - 54

30. Are you able to speak Welsh? Please tick ONE box only.

- Yes, very well
Yes, quite well
Yes, a little
No

31. Are you able to read Welsh? Please tick ONE box only.

- Yes, very well
Yes, quite well
Yes, a little
No

32. Are you able to write Welsh? Please tick ONE box only.

- Yes, very well
Yes, quite well
Yes, a little
No

33. Do you have any of the following qualifications?

- CSE/GCE/GCSE
A or S level, or technical qualification (eg City and Guilds, NVQ)
Teacher training, nursing or other professional qualification
University degree or diploma
None
Other

If you selected "Other", please could you specify which qualification this is:

34. Please could you tick the box next to the range within which your household income falls.

- Up to £8,000
- £8,000 - £15,000
- £15,001 - £25,000
- £25,001 - £40,000
- £40,001 - £60,000
- £60,001+

35. In which region of Wales do you usually live?

- Blaenau Gwent
- Bridgend
- Caerphilly
- Cardiff
- Carmarthenshire
- Ceredigion
- Conwy
- Denbighshire
- Flintshire
- Gwynedd
- Isle of Anglesey
- Merthyr Tydfil
- Monmouthshire
- Neath Port Talbot
- Newport
- Pembrokeshire
- Powys
- Rhondda Cynon Taff
- Swansea
- Torfaen
- Vale of Glamorgan
- Wrexham
- I usually live outside Wales

Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. Now please place the questionnaire in the enclosed reply-paid envelope, and post it back to the London School of Economics by 20 April 2000.

Again, thank you for taking part in the survey.

SECTION A2.6 - Groupings of raw survey data

The chart below describes the treatment of raw data as the response categories used for the purposes of statistical analysis were formed. Where the categories presented in the questionnaire at A2.5 were not altered for the purposes of analysis, this is indicated by the words “no change” in the column displaying the original categories.

Number	Subject	Original categories	New categories
1	Main reason for joining	Agreed with Plaid Cymru; always voted Plaid Cymru Plaid Cymru defended Welsh language; membership is part of being Welsh; the right thing to do because I live in Wales; statements of nationalist sentiment in open-ended section Admired leader; friend/relative encouraged me; other.	⇒ Policy agreement/habitual voter ⇒ Nationalist and Welsh related ⇒ Misc reason
2	Method of joining	Responded to party political broadcast/advertisement or leaflet through door; joined at local stall or local event/national event; joined through student/youth group Contacted Plaid Cymru headquarters and asked to join; contacted my local branch and asked to join Given a form by a friend	⇒ Reactive joiners ⇒ Proactive joiners ⇒ Joined through personal contact
3	Branch name	-	Response was not possible to codify down to branch level as many respondents gave only their rhanbarth name
4	Agreement with policies	No change	-

Number	Subject	Original categories	New categories
5	Position on left/right spectrum	Far left Left Centre Right and far right of the party	No change No change No change ⇒ Right of the party
6	Year of first joining	-	Response was codified into membership cohorts: members under one year (1999 and 2000) members between one and five years (1994 -1998) members between six and 20 years (1993-1979) members between 21 and 30 years (1978-1969) members over 30 years (1968 and earlier)
7	Continuous membership	No change	-
8	Subscription status	No change	-
9	Parental membership	Both parents were member, father was a member, mother was a member Neither parent was a member, don't know	⇒ One or both parents was member ⇒ Neither parent was member/don't know
10	Membership of other groups	No change	Additional categories were created indicating whether the respondent held no other memberships, held one other membership or held two or more
11 - 13	Specific activities	-	Activities grouped by overall number and number per category of activity type
14	Miscellaneous activities	No change	-
15	Time spent on party activities	-	Responses were grouped into two categories - "under 5 hours a week" and "5 hours a week or more"

Number	Subject	Original categories	New categories
16	Job satisfaction		The scores of each respondent for job satisfaction were added together to reach a total figure. The median of the total figure was computed. A category labelled "lowest" was created for scores up to and including the median, and a category labelled "highest" was created for scores over the median.
17	Donation history	-	Responses to donation amount were grouped into two categories - "under £25.00" and "£25.01 and over".
18	Socialization	Individual statements measuring socialization	The scores of each respondent for socialisation were added together to reach a total figure. The frequencies of the total figure were computed. Categories labelled "low", "medium low" "medium high" and "high" were created to correspond with quartile points.
19	Specific expectations of membership	-	Responses were grouped into the following categories: No expectations Welsh independence To help Plaid Cymru and show support Influence, information and involvement in politics To do something for Wales and its language/culture Other
20	Expectations met	-	Responses were grouped into the following categories: Expectations not met Expectations partially met Expectations fully met
21	Benefits of membership	-	Responses were grouped into the following categories: No benefit; Unspecified benefit; Cultural/nationality benefit; Political benefit; Social/personal benefit

Number	Subject	Original categories	New categories
22	Volunteer Functions Inventory	Individual statements measuring six different functional motivations.	The scores of each respondent for each type of functional motivation were added together to reach a total figure. The median of each total figure was computed. For each type of needs a category labelled entitled "lowest" was created for scores up to and including the median, and a category labelled "highest" created for scores over the median.
23	Satisfaction rating scale	Delighted; pleased Mostly satisfied Mixed Mostly dissatisfied Unhappy; terrible	⇒ Most satisfied No change No change No change ⇒ Most dissatisfied
24	Political efficacy	Individual statements measuring political efficacy	The scores of each respondent for political efficacy were added together to reach a total figure. The frequencies of the total figure were computed. Categories labelled "low", "medium low" "medium high" and "high" were created to correspond with quartile points.
25	Branch efficacy	No change	-
26	Organizational commitment scales	Individual statements measuring three different dimensions of organizational commitment	The scores of each respondent for each dimension of organizational commitment were added together to reach a total figure. The frequencies of each total figure were computed. Categories labelled "low", "medium low" "medium high" and "high" were created to correspond with quartile points.
27	Value for money	No change	-
28	Gender	No change	-

Number	Subject	Original categories	New categories
29	Age range	No change	-
30 - 32	Ability in speaking, reading and writing Welsh	No change	-
33	Education	University degree or diploma All other categories	⇒ Graduate ⇒ Non-graduate
34	Household income	up to £8,000 and £8,000-£15,000 £15,001-£25,000 and £25,001-£40,000 £40,001-£60,000 and £60,001+	⇒ households below average income ⇒ households at around average income ⇒ households above average income
35	Region of Wales	The 22 Welsh counties, and a statement indicating that the respondent usually lived outside Wales (although within the UK)	Plaid Cymru membership is geographically concentrated; slightly over 25% of the membership live in Gwynedd. A category labelled “high density of membership” was created for Gwynedd alone. A category labelled “medium density of membership” included Carmarthenshire, Ceredigion, Cardiff and Anglesey which together account for just over 38% of the membership. No other county, including the “outside Wales” category, accounts for more than 4% of membership. These counties were combined in a “low density of membership” category.

APPENDIX 3

Variable names used in logistic regression tables

Satisfaction model:

EXTDGP1	extent to which expectations were met (groups)
TOTJOBSAG	job satisfaction (groups)
FEELGP	overall feelings about membership (groups)
BENFTGP	any benefit from membership (groups)
TOTSOCQ	socialization (quartiles)

Political antecedents model:

REASGP	main reason for joining Plaid Cymru (groups)
POLICIES	frequency of policy agreement
SPECTFL/SPECTL/SPECTC	self-reported place on a left/right spectrum
TOTPOLFQ	personal political efficacy (quartiles)
BREFDGP	local branch efficacy (groups)

Functional motivations model: (all divided into groups)

TOTVFICG	career
TOTVFIEG	Enhancement
TOTVFIPG	Protective
TOTVFISG	Social
TOTVFIUG	Understanding
TOTVFIVG	Values

Demographic model:

AGE	Age
GENDER	Gender
RESPEW	language of response
QUALSGP	education level (groups)
INCMDGP	household income (groups)
REGDGP	party density (groups)

Organizational factors model:

PCYEARS	Organizational tenure (groups)
CONTY, CONTN	Continuity of membership
METHODGP	Method of joining (groups)
JOINDGP	Membership of other organizations
PARENTGP	Parental membership (groups)

Organizational commitment model: (all divided into quartiles)

TOTAFFQ	Affective commitment
TOTCONTQ	Continuance commitment
TOTNORMQ	Normative commitment

Financial indicators model:

SUBS Holding a current subscription (groups)
 Making additional donations
 Total amount donated to Plaid Cymru
 SUBVALUE Value for money

Activity index: (all divided into groups)

ACTYN Any one activity
 ACTIVITY Number of activities
 ACTTIME Time spent on activities

Table A3.1 - Political antecedents model/Any one activity

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp (B)
BREFDGP1	.8531	.4890	3.0434	1	.0811	.0560	2.3468
BREFDGP2	.3601	.3683	.9556	1	.3283	.0000	1.4334
BREFDGP3	.5811	.4468	1.6915	1	.1934	.0000	1.7880
POLICIES			1.7077	3	.6352	.0000	
POLICIES (1)	1.1781	1.0835	1.1823	1	.2769	.0000	3.2481
POLICIES (2)	1.0861	.9654	1.2656	1	.2606	.0000	2.9626
POLICIES (3)	.7052	1.1002	.4109	1	.5215	.0000	2.0243
REASGP1	-3.7449	13.5066	.0769	1	.7816	.0000	.0236
REASGP2	-3.3533	13.5078	.0616	1	.8039	.0000	.0350
REASGP3	-3.4764	13.5098	.0662	1	.7969	.0000	.0309
SPECTFL	-.3469	.7584	.2092	1	.6474	.0000	.7069
SPECTL	.4447	.4817	.8525	1	.3558	.0000	1.5601
SPECTC	.2414	.4435	.2964	1	.5862	.0000	1.2731
TOTPOLFQ			4.3022	3	.2306	.0000	
TOTPOLFQ (1)	-.7493	.4318	3.0116	1	.0827	-.0552	.4727
TOTPOLFQ (2)	-.8616	.4419	3.8018	1	.0512	-.0736	.4225
TOTPOLFQ (3)	-.6006	.4356	1.9014	1	.1679	.0000	.5485
Constant	3.8862	13.5573	.0822	1	.7744		

Table A3.2 - Demographic model/Any one activity

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
AGE			13.2784	6	.0388	.0542	
AGE (1)	.5910	.7624	.6009	1	.4383	.0000	1.8057
AGE (2)	.5551	.6168	.8100	1	.3681	.0000	1.7422
AGE (3)	.2800	.5027	.3101	1	.5776	.0000	1.3231
AGE (4)	.6593	.4790	1.8950	1	.1686	.0000	1.9335
AGE (5)	1.6118	.5304	9.2339	1	.0024	.1290	5.0121
AGE (6)	.1602	.4501	.1266	1	.7220	.0000	1.1737
GENDER	-.0132	.2548	.0027	1	.9586	.0000	.9869
QUALSGP (1)	.0632	.2630	.0577	1	.8102	.0000	1.0652
INCM0DGP	-.3753	.4302	.7614	1	.3829	.0000	.6871
INCM1DGP	-.1318	.3670	.1289	1	.7195	.0000	.8765
RESPEW	.2391	.2728	.7680	1	.3808	.0000	1.2701
REGDGP1	.1263	.2931	.1856	1	.6666	.0000	1.1346
REGDGP2	.0845	.3391	.0621	1	.8032	.0000	1.0882
Constant	.3639	.7234	.2531	1	.6149		

Table A3.3 – Functional motivations model/Any one activity

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
TOTVFICG	.3288	.3497	.8838	1	.3472	.0000	1.3893
TOTVFIG	-.4813	.3784	1.6181	1	.2034	.0000	.6179
TOTVFIPG	.9078	.3892	5.4395	1	.0197	.1001	2.4789
TOTVFISG	-.0017	.3444	.0000	1	.9961	.0000	.9983
TOTVFIUG	.2990	.3332	.8052	1	.3696	.0000	1.3485
TOTVFIVG	.8782	.3442	6.5096	1	.0107	.1147	2.4065
Constant	.7163	.2032	12.4242	1	.0004		

Table A3.4 – Organizational factors model/Any one activity

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
CONTY	1.0362	.3097	11.1910	1	.0008	.1469	2.8184
JOINDGP1	-.4165	.3003	1.9233	1	.1655	.0000	.6593
JOINDGP2	.0250	.3450	.0052	1	.9423	.0000	1.0253
METHODGP			.6319	2	.7291	.0000	
METHODGP (1)	-.2046	.3569	.3285	1	.5665	.0000	.8150
METHODGP (2)	.0189	.3391	.0031	1	.9556	.0000	1.0190
PARENTGP (1)	-.5836	.3441	2.8772	1	.0898	-.0454	.5579
PCYEARS1	.7196	.5317	1.8314	1	.1760	.0000	2.0536
PCYEARS2	.5872	.4935	1.4159	1	.2341	.0000	1.7990
PCYEARS3	1.1221	.5308	4.4693	1	.0345	.0761	3.0712
PCYEARS4	1.2723	.5037	6.3809	1	.0115	.1014	3.5689
Constant	.2548	.6107	.1741	1	.6765		

Table A3.5 - Financial indicators model/Any one activity

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
SUBPAID	-.1396	.6033	.0536	1	.8170	.0000	.8697
AMOUNTGP	.4292	.2928	2.1487	1	.1427	.0211	1.5360
DONATION	-.2440	1.1114	.0482	1	.8262	.0000	.7835
SUBVALUE	.7607	.3917	3.7706	1	.0522	.0730	2.1397
Constant	.4724	1.2698	.1384	1	.7099		

Table A3.6 - Subsequent composite model/Any one activity

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
TOTVFIP	.1866	.0775	5.8022	1	.0160	.1083	1.2052
TOTVFIV	.1807	.0574	9.9168	1	.0016	.1562	1.1980
PCYEARS3	.5776	.4302	1.8030	1	.1794	.0000	1.7818
AGE4	.5586	.3443	2.6332	1	.1047	.0442	1.7483
AGE5	1.2137	.4547	7.1242	1	.0076	.1257	3.3661
Constant	-1.4791	.5605	6.9646	1	.0083		

**Table A3.7 – Functional motivations model/More than five hours
on party activities**

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
TOTVFICG	-.0391	.3774	.0107	1	.9175	.0000	.9617
TOTVFIEG	-.2894	.3956	.5352	1	.4644	.0000	.7487
TOTVFIPG	.6964	.4340	2.5745	1	.1086	.0499	2.0065
TOTVFISG	.0435	.3722	.0137	1	.9069	.0000	1.0445
TOTVFIUG	-.5519	.3543	2.4260	1	.1193	-.0430	.5758
TOTVFIVG	.9994	.3685	7.3549	1	.0067	.1523	2.7166
Constant	-1.2703	.3362	14.2747	1	.0002		

Table A3.8 - Demographic model/More than five hours on party activities

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
AGE			11.1293	6	.0845	.0000	
AGE (1)	7.2233	20.0138	.1303	1	.7182	.0000	1371.0181
AGE (2)	4.9700	20.0244	.0616	1	.8040	.0000	144.0220
AGE (3)	7.4182	20.0010	.1376	1	.7107	.0000	1666.0079
AGE (4)	7.8386	19.9996	.1536	1	.6951	.0000	2536.6087
AGE (5)	6.7123	19.9997	.1126	1	.7372	.0000	822.4268
AGE (6)	7.4008	20.0004	.1369	1	.7114	.0000	1637.2160
GENDER	-.9234	.3688	6.2682	1	.0123	-.1346	.3972
INCM0DGP	-.1839	.5769	.1016	1	.7499	.0000	.8320
INCM1DGP	-.0199	.4400	.0020	1	.9639	.0000	.9803
REGDGP1	.6150	.4231	2.1135	1	.1460	.0220	1.8497
REGDGP2	.8590	.5124	2.8102	1	.0937	.0587	2.3607
RESPEW	-.3721	.4007	.8623	1	.3531	.0000	.6893
QUALSGP1	.2365	.3597	.4322	1	.5109	.0000	1.2668
Constant	-6.6209	20.0132	.1094	1	.7408		

Table A3.9 - Satisfaction model/Number of activities - regression coefficients

	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig
(constant)	2.565	2.946		.871	.386
Cultural/nationality benefit	.822	1.096	.071	.750	.455
Political benefit	.392	.960	.039	.408	.684
Social/personal benefit	2.339	.921	.245	2.539	.013
Expectations not met	-.049	1.863	-.003	-.026	.979
Expectations partially met	.428	1.281	.049	.334	.739
Expectations fully met	-.873	1.276	-.100	-.685	.495
Mostly dissatisfied	-2.611	3.717	-.079	-.702	.484
Mixed	-5.759	2.951	-.339	-1.951	.054
Mostly satisfied	-3.885	2.729	-.360	-1.424	.158
Most satisfied	-4.508	2.685	-.480	-1.679	.096
Medium low socialization	2.659	1.210	.228	2.197	.030
Medium high socialization	3.323	1.136	.362	2.925	.004
High socialization	3.263	1.237	.342	2.638	.010
Total job satisfaction	.471	.145	.325	3.259	.002

Model summary: R=.635, R² = .40, Adjusted R² = .32, F ratio = 4.876, Sig = .000

Table A3.10 - Political antecedents model/Number of activities - regression coefficients

	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig
(constant)	4.041	4.497		.899	.369
Slight branch efficacy	1.052	.732	.096	1.438	.152
Some branch efficacy	.514	.618	.061	.831	.406
High branch efficacy	.272	.710	.026	.383	.702
Medium low political efficacy	.090	.642	.009	.142	.887
Medium high political efficacy	.982	.612	.102	1.606	.109
High political efficacy	3.327	.618	.355	5.387	.000
Policies - occasionally agree	2.153	2.026	.121	1.063	.289
Policies - usually agree	3.281	1.823	.279	1.800	.073
Policies - always agree	3.346	1.972	.212	1.697	.091
Joining reason - policy /habitual voter	-5.124	4.018	-.610	-1.275	.203
Joining reason - nationalist/Welsh related	-5.160	4.023	-.569	-1.283	.201
Joining reason - misc	-5.389	4.040	-.486	-1.334	.183
Centre	.424	.735	.050	.577	.564
Left	.895	.773	.101	1.158	.248
Far left	-.408	1.313	-.019	-.311	.756

Model summary: R=.391, R² = .153, Adjusted R² = .113, F ratio = 3.899, Sig = .000

**Table A3.11 - Demographic model/Number of activities -
regression coefficients**

	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig
(constant)	4.200	1.175		3.574	.000
16-24	-.453	1.314	-.020	-.344	.731
25-34	.517	1.073	.032	.481	.631
35-44	.647	.916	.059	.707	.480
45-54	1.363	.858	.152	1.588	.113
55-64	2.053	.842	.207	2.440	.015
65-74	.226	.849	.021	.266	.790
Gender	-.476	.417	-.059	-1.140	.255
High incomes	.038	.570	.004	.068	.946
Low incomes	-.863	.508	-.102	-1.700	.090
Qualification by group	-.100	.429	-.012	-.234	.815
Medium regional density	.801	.481	.096	1.664	.097
High regional density	.236	.552	.026	.428	.669
Language of response	-.390	.455	-.046	-.856	.392

Model summary: R=.252, R² = .063, Adjusted R² = .032, F ratio = 2.023, Sig = .018

**Table A3.12 – Organizational factors model/Number of activities -
regression coefficients**

	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig
(constant)	-.148	1.068		-.139	.890
Continuous or discontinuous membership	1.057	.554	.095	1.910	.057
No other memberships	.520	.495	.057	1.051	.294
More than one other membership	1.269	.495	.141	2.584	.011
Method of joining (by group)	.308	.287	.054	1.073	.284
Parental membership (by group)	.161	.505	.016	.319	.750
Members between 1-5 years	1.356	.972	.114	1.395	.164
Members between 6-20 years	2.338	.917	.238	2.551	.011
Members between 21-30 years	2.865	.936	.269	3.060	.002
Members more than 30 years	3.262	.896	.379	3.638	.000

Model summary: R=.276, R² = .076, Adjusted R² = .055, F ratio = 3.618, Sig = .000

**Table A3.13 - Attitudinal commitment model/Number of activities -
regression coefficients**

	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig
(constant)	1.749	.606		2.885	.004
Medium low affective commitment	1.150	.709	.128	1.622	.106
Medium high affective commitment	2.678	.794	.270	3.371	.001
High affective commitment	3.353	.808	.349	4.150	.000
Medium low continuance commitment	-.081	.700	-.008	-.116	.908
Medium high continuance commitment	-.355	.734	-.037	-.484	.629
High continuance commitment	-.178	.805	-.019	-.220	.826
Medium low normative commitment	.681	.782	.067	.870	.385
Medium high normative commitment	.992	.782	.108	1.269	.205
High normative commitment	1.451	.938	.152	1.546	.123

Model summary: R=.373, R² = .139, Adjusted R² = .119, F ratio = 5.393, Sig = .000

**Table A3.14 – Functional motivations model/Number of activities –
regression coefficients**

	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig
(constant)	-1.564	.921		-1.699	.090
Total - career motivations	-.051	.109	-.027	-.474	.635
Total – enhancement motivations	.074	.087	.056	.854	.394
Total - protective motivations	.064	.099	.004	.066	.948
Total - social motivations	.089	.068	.077	1.316	.189
Total - understanding motivations	-.085	.079	-.065	-1.075	.283
Total - values motivations	.541	.097	.348	5.570	.000

Model summary: R=.375, R² = .141, Adjusted R² = .126, F ratio = 9.273, Sig = .000

**Table A3.15 - Financial indicators model/Number of activities –
regression coefficients**

	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig
(constant)	5.349	2.121		2.522	.012
Total of donations over 12 months	.847	.178	.259	4.785	.000
Made any one donation	-2.718	1.729	-.084	-1.572	.117
Subscription status	-.971	.791	-.066	-1.227	.221
Value for money	.705	.750	.050	.940	.348

Model summary: R=.291, R² = .084, Adjusted R² = .073, F ratio = 7.470, Sig = .000

Table A3.16 - Summary of activity types and the satisfaction model

	<u>Routine party activities</u>					<u>Election time activities</u>					<u>Internal party activities</u>				
	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig
(constant)	1.135	1.484		.765	.446	1.778	1.131		.1572	.119	-.348	1.102		-.316	.753
Cultural/nationality benefit	.202	.552	.033	.365	.716	.705	.421	.166	1.674	.097	.081	.054	.181	1.511	.134
Political benefit	.438	.483	.084	.907	.367	-.345	.369	-.094	-.936	.352	-.083	.410	-.023	-.205	.838
Social/personal benefit	1.484	.464	.300	3.200	.002	.440	.354	.127	1.244	.217	.299	.359	.095	.832	.407
Expectations not met	.824	.938	.093	.879	.382	-.801	.715	-.129	-1.119	.266	.414	.344	.139	1.203	.232
Expectations partially met	.471	.645	.104	.730	.467	-.198	.492	-.062	-.403	.688	-.072	.696	-.014	-.104	.917
Expectations fully met	-.166	.642	-.037	-.259	.796	-.696	.490	-.220	-1.420	.159	.155	.479	.057	.324	.746
Mostly dissatisfied	-1.742	1.872	-.101	-.931	.354	-.005	1.427	.000	-.004	.997	-.011	.477	-.004	-.024	.981
Mixed	-2.865	1.486	-.325	-1.928	.057	-2.513	1.133	-.406	-2.217	.029	-.864	1.390	-.084	-.622	.536
Mostly satisfied	-2.020	1.374	-.360	-1.470	.145	-1.640	1.048	-.417	-1.565	.121	-.382	1.103	-.072	-.346	.730
Most satisfied	-2.535	1.352	-.521	-1.875	.064	-1.766	1.031	-.517	-1.713	.090	-.225	1.020	-.067	-.221	.826
Medium low socialization	1.560	.609	.258	2.560	.012	.527	.465	.124	1.134	.260	-.207	1.004	-.071	-.206	.837
Medium high socialization	1.785	.572	.375	3.120	.002	.921	.436	.276	2.112	.037	.572	.452	.158	1.264	.209
High socialization	1.992	.623	.402	3.197	.002	.816	.475	.235	1.717	.089	.617	.425	.216	1.454	.149
Total job satisfaction	.239	.073	.317	3.278	.001	.151	.056	.286	2.717	.008	.456	.463	.153	.985	.327
<i>Model summary:</i> R=.662, R ² = .438, Adjusted R ² = .360, F ratio = 5.624, Sig = .000					<i>Model summary:</i> R=.580, R ² = .337, Adjusted R ² = .245, F ratio = 3.662, Sig = .000					<i>Model summary:</i> R=.376, R ² = .142, Adjusted R ² = .023, F ratio = 1.190, Sig = .295					

Table A3.17 - Summary of activity types and the political antecedents model

	<u>Routine party activities</u>					<u>Election time activities</u>					<u>Internal party activities</u>				
	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig
(constant)	3.669	2.365		1.551	.122	1.155	1.646		.701	.484	-.782	1.160		-.674	.501
Slight branch efficacy	.446	.385	.078	1.158	.248	.518	.268	.132	1.933	.054	.088	.189	.032	.468	.640
Some branch efficacy	.209	.325	.047	.642	.521	.328	.226	.109	1.448	.149	-.022	.159	-.011	-.143	.886
High branch efficacy	.043	.373	.008	.117	.907	.283	.260	.075	1.089	.277	-.054	.183	-.021	-.299	.765
Medium low political efficacy	.061	.337	.012	.183	.855	-.065	.235	-.018	-.280	.780	.094	.165	.037	.574	.567
Medium high political efficacy	.437	.322	.087	1.359	.175	.311	.224	.091	1.388	.166	.234	.158	.096	1.484	.139
High political efficacy	1.580	.325	.324	4.864	.000	.893	.226	.267	3.951	.000	.853	.159	.359	5.360	.000
Policies - occasionally agree	1.178	1.066	.127	1.105	.270	.545	.742	.085	.735	.463	.431	.522	.095	.824	.410
Policies - usually agree	1.761	.959	.287	1.836	.067	.980	.667	.233	1.469	.143	.540	.470	.181	1.149	.251
Policies - always agree	1.673	1.037	.203	1.613	.108	1.173	.722	.208	1.625	.105	.500	.508	.125	.984	.326
Joining reason - policy agreement/ habitual voter	-3.948	2.114	-.903	-1.868	.063	-1.632	1.471	-.544	-1.109	.268	.456	1.036	.214	.440	.660
Joining reason - nationalist/ Welsh related	-3.933	2.116	-.833	-1.859	.064	-1.609	1.473	-.497	-1.092	.268	.383	1.037	.166	.369	.712
Joining reason - misc	-4.073	2.125	-.705	-1.197	.056	-1.764	1.479	-.445	-1.193	.234	.449	1.042	.159	.431	.667
Centre	.089	.386	.021	.233	.816	.271	.269	.090	1.009	.314	.062	.189	.029	.331	.741
Left	.393	.406	.086	.968	.334	.319	.283	.101	1.127	.260	.182	.199	.081	.915	.361
Far left	-.202	.691	-.018	-.292	.770	.004	.481	.001	.010	.992	-.211	.339	-.038	-.624	.533
<i>Model summary:</i> R=.368, R ² = .136, Adjusted R ² = .096, F ratio = 3.402, Sig = .000					<i>Model summary:</i> R=.332, R ² = .110, Adjusted R ² = .069, F ratio = 2.684, Sig = .001					<i>Model summary:</i> R=.355, R ² = .126, Adjusted R ² = .086, F ratio = 3.134, Sig = .000					

Table A3.18 - Summary of activity types and the demographic model

	<u>Routine party activities</u>					<u>Election time activities</u>					<u>Internal party activities</u>				
	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig
(constant)	2.131	.671		3.176	.002	1.108	.449		2.469	.014	1.000	.321		3.114	.002
16-24	-.374	.695	-.031	-.538	.591	-.066	.465	-.008	-.143	.886	-.011	.333	-.002	-.035	.972
25-34	.064	.568	.008	.113	.910	.512	.380	.090	1.347	.179	-.059	.272	-.015	-.220	.826
35-44	.060	.485	.011	.136	.892	.424	.324	.110	1.407	.192	.158	.232	.057	.680	.497
45-54	.471	.454	.099	1.038	.300	.640	.304	.202	2.107	.036	.252	.217	.112	1.160	.247
55-64	1.041	.445	.197	2.339	.020	.719	.298	.205	2.415	.016	.292	.213	.117	1.373	.171
65-74	-.226	.449	-.040	-.504	.615	.451	.300	.119	1.500	.135	.001	.215	.000	.006	.995
Gender	-.044	.221	-.010	-.203	.839	-.187	.148	-.065	-1.268	.206	-.244	.106	-.120	-2.306	.022
Low incomes	-.404	.362	-.090	-1.116	.265	-.343	.242	-.115	-1.415	.158	-.155	.173	-.073	-.897	.370
Average incomes	.058	.302	.014	.195	.845	-.070	.202	-.025	-.349	.727	-.027	.144	-.013	-.189	.850
Qualification by group	-.000	.227	.000	-.002	.998	-.109	.152	-.038	-.719	.473	.009	.109	.005	.086	.932
Med. regional density	.467	.255	.106	1.834	.067	.291	.170	.099	1.709	.088	.042	.122	.020	.349	.728
High regional density	.055	.292	.011	.190	.850	.004	.195	.002	.023	.982	.176	.140	.076	1.262	.208
Language of response	-.196	.241	-.043	-.813	.417	-.022	.161	-.007	-.139	.889	-.172	.115	-.080	-1.490	.137
<i>Model summary:</i> R=.261, R ² = .068, Adjusted R ² = .037, F ratio = 2.190, Sig = .009					<i>Model summary:</i> R=.238, R ² = .057, Adjusted R ² = .025, F ratio = 1.790, Sig = .043					<i>Model summary:</i> R=.221, R ² = .049, Adjusted R ² = .017, F ratio = 1.530, Sig = .104					

Table A3.19 - Summary of activity types and the attitudinal commitment model

	<u>Routine party activities</u>					<u>Election time activities</u>					<u>Internal party activities</u>				
	<u>B</u>	<u>S.E</u>	<u>Beta</u>	<u>t</u>	<u>Sig</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>S.E</u>	<u>Beta</u>	<u>t</u>	<u>Sig</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>S.E</u>	<u>Beta</u>	<u>t</u>	<u>Sig</u>
(constant)	1.092	.320		3.410	.001	.548	.219		2.508	.013	.109	.158		.693	.489
Med-low affective commitment	.525	.375	.112	1.403	.162	.373	.256	.116	1.458	.146	.252	.184	.113	1.366	.173
Med-high affective commitment	1.425	.420	.273	3.396	.001	.806	.286	.227	2.816	.005	.447	.207	.180	2.163	.031
High affective commitment	1.590	.427	.315	3.728	.000	1.211	.291	.352	4.159	.000	.551	.210	.230	2.624	.009
Med-low cont. commitment	-.039	.370	-.008	-.107	.915	-.095	.252	-.027	-.377	.707	.053	.182	.022	.293	.770
Med-high cont. commitment	-.229	.387	-.036	-.591	.555	-.111	.264	-.032	-.418	.676	-.015	.191	-.006	-.080	.936
High continuance commitment	-.113	.425	-.023	-.265	.791	-.047	.290	-.014	-.163	.871	-.017	.209	-.007	-.084	.933
Med-low norm. commitment	.437	.413	.082	1.059	.291	.161	.282	.044	.570	.569	.0827	.203	.033	.407	.684
Med-high norm. commitment	.599	.413	.125	1.452	.148	.347	.282	.106	1.230	.220	.046	.203	.020	.227	.821
High normative commitment	.763	.495	.152	1.541	.124	.394	.338	.115	1.164	.245	.294	.244	.124	1.205	.229
<i>Model summary:</i> R=.359, R ² = .129, Adjusted R ² = .103, F ratio = 4.934, Sig = .000					<i>Model summary:</i> R=.352, R ² = .124, Adjusted R ² = .098, F ratio = 4.729, Sig = .000					<i>Model summary:</i> R=.253, R ² = .064, Adjusted R ² = .036, F ratio = 2.280, Sig = .017					

Table A3.20 - Summary of activity types and the functional motivations model

	<u>Routine party activities</u>					<u>Election time activities</u>					<u>Internal party activities</u>				
	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig
(constant)	-.606	.485		-1.250	.212	-.312	.331		-.944	.346	-.647	.239		-2.704	.007
Career motivations	-.031	.057	-.032	-.553	.580	-.044	.039	-.067	-1.140	.255	.024	.028	.052	.870	.385
Enhancement motivations	.037	.046	.055	.821	.412	.025	.031	.054	.812	.417	.011	.023	.034	.501	.617
Protective motivations	.007	.052	.010	.145	.885	.015	.035	.029	.436	.663	-.016	.026	-.044	-.644	.520
Social motivations	.049	.036	.082	1.393	.164	.037	.024	.091	1.547	.123	-.001	.018	.006	.107	.915
Understanding motivations	-.018	.042	-.028	-.453	.651	-.056	.028	-.122	-1.991	.047	-.009	.021	-.029	-.471	.638
Values motivations	.250	.051	.308	4.892	.000	.176	.035	.319	5.047	.000	.115	.025	.294	4.557	.000
<i>Model summary:</i> R=.357, R ² = .127, Adjusted R ² = .112, F ratio =8.238 , Sig = .000					<i>Model summary:</i> R=.345, R ² = .119, Adjusted R ² = .103, F ratio =7.609 , Sig = .000					<i>Model summary:</i> R=.292, R ² = .085, Adjusted R ² = .069, F ratio = 5.262, Sig = .000					

Table A3.21 - Summary of activity types and the organizational factors model

	<u>Routine party activities</u>					<u>Election time activities</u>					<u>Internal party activities</u>				
	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig
(constant)	.421	.551		.765	.445	.000	.374		.001	.999	-.050	.261		-.192	.848
Continuity of membership	.635	.292	.108	2.175	.030	.311	.198	.078	1.569	.117	.112	.139	.041	.809	.419
One+ other memberships	.242	.277	.051	.875	.382	.197	.188	.062	1.044	.297	.309	.132	.139	2.351	.019
Method of joining	.158	.151	.053	1.045	.297	.122	.103	.061	1.184	.237	-.028	.072	.020	.398	.691
Parental membership	.065	.266	.012	.248	.804	.054	.180	.015	.303	.762	.040	.126	.016	.320	.749
Members 1-5 years	.630	.512	.101	1.230	.220	.536	.348	.127	1.541	.124	.190	.243	.065	.783	.434
Members 6-20 years	1.074	.483	.208	2.225	.027	.873	.328	.250	2.662	.008	.391	.229	.161	1.706	.089
Members 21-30 years	1.514	.493	.271	3.069	.002	.951	.335	.252	2.841	.005	.401	.234	.152	1.711	.088
Members +30 years	1.579	.472	.350	3.344	.001	1.137	.321	.373	3.546	.292	.546	.224	.257	2.435	.015
<i>Model summary:</i> R=.261, R ² = .068, Adjusted R ² = .047, F ratio =3.205 , Sig = .001					<i>Model summary:</i> R=.248, R ² = .062, Adjusted R ² = .040, F ratio = 2.872, Sig = .003					<i>Model summary:</i> R=.231, R ² = .053, Adjusted R ² = .032, F ratio = 2.461, Sig = .010					

Table A3.22 - Summary of activity types and financial indicators model

	<u>Routine party activities</u>					<u>Election time activities</u>					<u>Internal party activities</u>				
	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig	B	S.E	Beta	t	Sig
(constant)	3.207	1.126		2.849	.005	1.650	.755		2.186	.030	.492	.538		.916	.360
Total of donations	.351	.094	.204	3.722	.000	.237	.063	.207	3.754	.000	.258	.045	.308	5.732	.000
Made any one donation	-1.216	.918	-.072	-1.324	.186	-.893	.615	-.079	-1.450	.148	-.610	.438	-.074	-1.392	.165
Subscription status	-.713	.420	-.093	-1.699	.090	-.218	.281	-.042	-.774	.439	.039	.200	-.011	-.197	.844
Value for money	.373	.398	.051	.936	.350	.209	.267	.043	.782	.435	.123	.190	.034	.649	.517
<i>Model summary:</i> R=.251, R ² = .063, Adjusted R ² = .052, F ratio = 5.458, Sig = .000					<i>Model summary:</i> R=.232, R ² = .054, Adjusted R ² = .042, F ratio = 4.623, Sig = .001					<i>Model summary:</i> R=.317, R ² = .100, Adjusted R ² = .089, F ratio = 9.041, Sig = .000					

Table A3.23 - Satisfaction model/Making an additional donation

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
BENFTGP2	1.7215	.9208	3.4949	1	.0616	.1104	5.5929
BENFTGP3	-7.3558	40.5369	.0329	1	.8560	.0000	.0006
BENFTGP4	1.2136	.9849	1.5182	1	.2179	.0000	3.3655
EXTDGP1	-.8097	.7336	1.2183	1	.2697	.0000	.4450
EXTDGP2	.0808	.7512	.0116	1	.9144	.0000	1.0841
FEELGP1	-16.5442	59.4052	.0776	1	.7806	.0000	.0000
FEELGP2	-8.3715	42.3325	.0391	1	.8432	.0000	.0002
FEELGP3	-9.0098	42.3270	.0453	1	.8314	.0000	.0001
FEELGP4	-9.0003	42.3254	.0452	1	.8316	.0000	.0001
TOTJBSAG(1)	1.6278	.7510	4.6978	1	.0302	.1483	5.0929
TOTSOCQ			6.6329	3	.0846	.0718	
TOTSOCQ(1)	.2809	.7698	.1332	1	.7152	.0000	1.3244
TOTSOCQ(2)	-1.1836	.8268	2.0490	1	.1523	-.0200	.3062
TOTSOCQ(3)	-1.5246	.9469	2.5925	1	.1074	-.0695	.2177
Constant	6.8251	42.3338	.0260	1	.8719		

Table A3.24 - Political antecedents model/Making an additional donation

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
BRAEFF			1.0166	3	.7972	.0000	
BRAEFF(1)	-.0686	.4074	.0284	1	.8663	.0000	.9337
BRAEFF(2)	-.3213	.3592	.8001	1	.3711	.0000	.7252
BRAEFF(3)	-.1452	.4283	.1150	1	.7346	.0000	.8648
POLICIES			3.0826	3	.3791	.0000	
POLICIES(1)	1.4612	1.2727	1.3182	1	.2509	.0000	4.3112
POLICIES(2)	.8240	1.2019	.4700	1	.4930	.0000	2.2795
POLICIES(3)	1.2985	1.3089	.9843	1	.3211	.0000	3.6640
REASGP1	3.5312	13.5059	.0684	1	.7937	.0000	34.1646
REASGP2	3.2244	13.5069	.0570	1	.8113	.0000	25.1385
REASGP3	4.5228	13.5072	.1121	1	.7377	.0000	92.0956
SPECTC	.2564	.4489	.3261	1	.5680	.0000	1.2922
SPECTL	.3263	.4634	.4958	1	.4814	.0000	1.3858
SPECTFL	.1004	.7581	.0175	1	.8947	.0000	1.1056
TOTPOLFQ			13.4982	3	.0037	.1370	
TOTPOLFQ(1)	-.6255	.3663	2.9150	1	.0878	-.0479	.5350
TOTPOLFQ(2)	-1.0040	.3557	7.9652	1	.0048	-.1222	.3664
TOTPOLFQ(3)	.1878	.3585	.2745	1	.6003	.0000	1.2066
Constant	-5.2019	13.5692	.1470	1	.7015		

Table A3.25 - Demographic model/Making an additional donation

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
AGE			32.4990	6	.0000	.2080	
AGE (1)	3.1773	.8306	14.6342	1	.0001	.1633	23.9824
AGE (2)	2.4427	.6399	14.5726	1	.0001	.1629	11.5035
AGE (3)	1.3149	.5658	5.4000	1	.0201	.0847	3.7244
AGE (4)	.9275	.5406	2.9438	1	.0862	.0446	2.5282
AGE (5)	.3830	.5383	.5063	1	.4767	.0000	1.4667
AGE (6)	.3902	.5392	.5237	1	.4693	.0000	1.4773
GENDER	.3642	.2528	2.0749	1	.1497	.0126	1.4394
INCM0DGP	1.0460	.4296	5.9295	1	.0149	.0911	2.8463
INCM1DGP	.3867	.3722	1.0794	1	.2988	.0000	1.4720
QUALSGP	-.0668	.2624	.0647	1	.7991	.0000	.9354
RESPEW	-.9850	.2701	13.3008	1	.0003	-.1544	.3734
REGDGP1	-.0889	.2877	.0955	1	.7573	.0000	.9149
REGDGP2	-.1564	.3478	.2022	1	.6529	.0000	.8552
Constant	-1.3108	.7661	2.9276	1	.0871		

Table A3.26 – Attitudinal commitment model/Making an additional donation

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
TOTAFFQ			.5337	3	.9114	.0000	
TOTAFFQ (1)	.0500	.4063	.0151	1	.9021	.0000	1.0513
TOTAFFQ (2)	-.0379	.4130	.0084	1	.9270	.0000	.9628
TOTAFFQ (3)	-.2411	.4383	.3025	1	.5823	.0000	.7858
TOTCONTQ			6.0883	3	.1074	.0167	
TOTCONTQ (1)	.0724	.5166	.0196	1	.8885	.0000	1.0751
TOTCONTQ (2)	-.9222	.5458	2.8556	1	.0911	-.0521	.3976
TOTCONTQ (3)	-.0290	.4750	.0037	1	.9513	.0000	.9714
TOTNORMQ			9.6025	3	.0223	.1068	
TOTNORMQ (1)	1.3683	.4742	8.3270	1	.0039	.1415	3.9288
TOTNORMQ (2)	.8347	.4391	3.6133	1	.0573	.0715	2.3041
TOTNORMQ (3)	-.0919	.8363	.0121	1	.9125	.0000	.9122
Constant	-1.5582	.4177	13.9126	1	.0002		

Table A3.27 – Functional motivations model/Making an additional donation

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
TOTVFICG	.8133	.3073	7.0015	1	.0081	.1123	2.2552
TOTVFIEG	-.1324	.3220	.1690	1	.6810	.0000	.8760
TOTVFIPG	-.5550	.3333	2.7722	1	.0959	-.0441	.5741
TOTVFISG	-.0386	.2992	.0166	1	.8974	.0000	.9622
TOTVFIUG	.3834	.2932	1.7103	1	.1909	.0000	1.4673
TOTVFIUG	-1.0906	.3084	12.5087	1	.0004	-.1628	.3360
Constant	-.8799	.2006	19.2313	1	.0000		

Table A3.28 – Organizational factors model/Making an additional donation

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
CONTYN(1)	1.0789	.3077	12.2985	1	.0005	.1485	2.9415
JOINDGP1	-.3636	.2818	1.6654	1	.1969	.0000	.6951
JOINDGP2	-.6811	.3249	4.3957	1	.0360	-.0716	.5061
METHODGP			2.2378	2	.3266	.0000	
METHODGP(1)	-.4831	.3352	2.0776	1	.1495	-.0129	.6169
METHODGP(2)	-.3601	.3090	1.3584	1	.2438	.0000	.6976
PARENTGP(1)	-.3462	.2933	1.3935	1	.2378	.0000	.7073
PCYEARS1	.1929	.4977	.1503	1	.6983	.0000	1.2128
PCYEARS2	-.5191	.4773	1.1828	1	.2768	.0000	.5951
PCYEARS3	-1.1007	.5100	4.6572	1	.0309	-.0754	.3326
PCYEARS4	-1.4503	.4919	8.6934	1	.0032	-.1197	.2345
Constant	.4441	.5107	.7561	1	.3845		

Table A3.29 - Financial indicators model/Making an additional donation

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
SUBS			14.9654	2	.0006	.1432	
SUBS(1)	-.8466	.7725	1.2011	1	.2731	.0000	.4289
SUBS(2)	.5462	.8405	.4222	1	.5158	.0000	1.7266
SUBVALUE	-.1149	.3121	.1355	1	.7128	.0000	.8915
Constant	-.1893	.8092	.0547	1	.8150		

Table A3.30 - Activities model/Making an additional donation

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
ACTTIME0	.1805	.4139	.1902	1	.6628	.0000	1.1978
ACTYN(1)	.7881	1.2195	.4177	1	.5181	.0000	2.1992
ACTIVITY			13.1588	3	.0043	.1773	
ACTIVITY(2)	1.9050	.7462	6.5167	1	.0107	.1408	6.7192
ACTIVITY(3)	1.3129	.5512	5.6731	1	.0172	.1270	3.7170
ACTIVITY(4)	.2534	.5865	.1867	1	.6656	.0000	1.2884
Constant	-2.2121	.5136	18.5487	1	.0000		

Table A3.31 - Demographic model/Donations over £25 a year

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
AGE			1.2198	6	.9759	.0000	
AGE (1)	-6.8527	15.7692	.1888	1	.6639	.0000	.0011
AGE (2)	-.2035	.7650	.0708	1	.7902	.0000	.8159
AGE (3)	.0059	.5859	.0001	1	.9919	.0000	1.0059
AGE (4)	.1074	.5309	.0409	1	.8397	.0000	1.1134
AGE (5)	-.1429	.5191	.0758	1	.7831	.0000	.8668
AGE (6)	.1955	.5088	.1476	1	.7008	.0000	1.2159
INCM1DGP	1.2593	.3350	14.1292	1	.0002	.1667	3.5229
INCM2DGP	1.7902	.4380	16.7087	1	.0000	.1836	5.9908
GENDER	-.1999	.2663	.5637	1	.4528	.0000	.8188
QUALSGP (1)	-.6085	.2637	5.3256	1	.0210	-.0873	.5442
REGDGP1	-.0457	.3026	.0228	1	.8800	.0000	.9553
REGDGP2	.2523	.3482	.5251	1	.4687	.0000	1.2870
RESPEW	.2107	.2956	.5084	1	.4758	.0000	1.2346
Constant	-1.0209	.7163	2.0313	1	.1541		

Table A3.32 - Political antecedents model/Donations over £25

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
BREFDGP1	.8066	.4776	2.8519	1	.0913	.0497	2.2402
BREFDGP2	.1611	.4039	.1591	1	.6900	.0000	1.1748
BREFDGP3	.6309	.4704	1.7993	1	.1798	.0000	1.8794
POLICIES			.7131	3	.8701	.0000	
POLICIES (1)	.2044	1.3897	.0216	1	.8830	.0000	1.2268
POLICIES (2)	.4670	1.2832	.1325	1	.7159	.0000	1.5952
POLICIES (3)	.8479	1.4184	.3573	1	.5500	.0000	2.3347
REASGP1	-4.9278	13.5064	.1331	1	.7152	.0000	.0072
REASGP2	-5.1847	13.5064	.1474	1	.7011	.0000	.0056
REASGP3	-5.7999	13.5105	.1843	1	.6677	.0000	.0030
SPECTFL	.9314	.8671	1.1537	1	.2828	.0000	2.5379
SPECTL	.4172	.4969	.7048	1	.4012	.0000	1.5177
SPECTC	.3810	.4744	.6452	1	.4218	.0000	1.4638
TOTPOLFQ			7.8088	3	.0501	.0724	
TOTPOLFQ (1)	-1.1364	.4085	7.7385	1	.0054	-.1290	.3210
TOTPOLFQ (2)	-.5093	.3810	1.7873	1	.1813	.0000	.6009
TOTPOLFQ (3)	-.5301	.3594	2.1747	1	.1403	-.0225	.5886
Constant	4.2452	13.5924	.0975	1	.7548		

Table A3.33 - Organizational factors model/Donations over £25

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
CONTYN (1)	.2139	.3697	.3348	1	.5629	.0000	1.2385
JOINDGP1	-.0222	.3189	.0048	1	.9446	.0000	.9781
JOINDGP2	.8303	.3253	6.5154	1	.0107	.1054	2.2940
METHODGP			3.3545	2	.1869	.0000	
METHODGP (1)	-.7021	.3889	3.2596	1	.0710	-.0556	.4955
METHODGP (2)	-.3988	.3701	1.1610	1	.2813	.0000	.6711
PARENTGP (1)	-.6347	.3279	3.7472	1	.0529	-.0655	.5301
PCYEARS1	-.1930	.8333	.0537	1	.8168	.0000	.8244
PCYEARS2	1.3136	.7259	3.2742	1	.0704	.0560	3.7194
PCYEARS3	1.6103	.7294	4.8740	1	.0273	.0840	5.0042
PCYEARS4	1.5375	.7091	4.7009	1	.0301	.0815	4.6531
Constant	-.8129	.7483	1.1802	1	.2773		

Table A3.34 - Activities model/Donations over £25

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
ACTIVITY			7.9663	4	.0928	.0000	
ACTIVITY (1)	-1.8042	1.2038	2.2461	1	.1340	-.0320	.1646
ACTIVITY (2)	-.7320	.8480	.7452	1	.3880	.0000	.4809
ACTIVITY (3)	-1.0491	.4427	5.6163	1	.0178	-.1228	.3503
ACTIVITY (4)	-.2974	.4138	.5166	1	.4723	.0000	.7427
ACTTIME1	.3442	.3551	.9394	1	.3324	.0000	1.4108
Constant	.4444	.3685	1.4543	1	.2278		

Table A3.35 - Political antecedents model/Holding a current subscription

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
BREFDGP1	1.1155	.6605	2.8524	1	.0912	.0682	3.0510
BREFDGP2	.9752	.5051	3.7278	1	.0535	.0972	2.6518
BREFDGP3	1.9118	.8117	5.5478	1	.0185	.1392	6.7653
POLICIES			1.3511	3	.7170	.0000	
POLICIES (1)	.6298	1.4767	.1819	1	.6698	.0000	1.8772
POLICIES (2)	.6000	1.2832	.2187	1	.6401	.0000	1.8222
POLICIES (3)	-.1870	1.4397	.0169	1	.8966	.0000	.8294
REASGP1	-1.6038	22.2609	.0052	1	.9426	.0000	.2011
REASGP2	-1.8538	22.2613	.0069	1	.9336	.0000	.1566
REASGP3	-2.0352	22.2641	.0084	1	.9272	.0000	.1307
SPECTFL	.3665	1.2680	.0835	1	.7726	.0000	1.4426
SPECTL	.0588	.7649	.0059	1	.9387	.0000	1.0605
SPECTC	-.1380	.7130	.0375	1	.8465	.0000	.8711
TOTPOLFQ			5.2694	3	.1531	.0000	
TOTPOLFQ (1)	-.7742	.5928	1.7059	1	.1915	.0000	.4611
TOTPOLFQ (2)	-.4699	.6430	.5341	1	.4649	.0000	.6251
TOTPOLFQ (3)	.6982	.7721	.8179	1	.3658	.0000	2.0102
Constant	3.1277	22.3169	.0196	1	.8885		

Table A3.36 - Demographic model/Holding a current subscription

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
AGE			11.9411	6	.0633	.0000	
AGE (1)	-.5662	.8595	.4339	1	.5101	.0000	.5677
AGE (2)	.0244	.7996	.0009	1	.9756	.0000	1.0247
AGE (3)	.4912	.7286	.4545	1	.5002	.0000	1.6343
AGE (4)	1.9454	.8395	5.3705	1	.0205	.1220	6.9965
AGE (5)	1.2677	.7423	2.9163	1	.0877	.0636	3.5525
AGE (6)	.3249	.6496	.2501	1	.6170	.0000	1.3839
GENDER	-.3777	.3897	.9394	1	.3324	.0000	.6854
INCM0DGP	.1927	.6619	.0848	1	.7709	.0000	1.2125
INCM1DGP	.1897	.5713	.1102	1	.7399	.0000	1.2089
QUALSGP (1)	1.1902	.4091	.2161	1	.6420	.0000	1.2095
REGDGP1	.6923	.4535	2.3298	1	.1269	.0382	1.9983
REGDGP2	.7200	.5177	1.9337	1	.1644	.0000	2.0544
RESPEW	.0491	.4170	.0139	1	.9063	.0000	1.0503
Constant	1.5128	1.0764	1.9754	1	.1599		

Table A3.37 – Organizational factors model/Holding a current subscription

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
CONTN	-1.0188	.4416	5.3223	1	.0211	-.1184	.3610
JOINDGP1	.1456	.4230	.1185	1	.7306	.0000	1.1568
JOINDGP2	.7579	.5345	2.0107	1	.1562	.0067	2.1337
METHODGP			3.5603	2	.1686	.0000	
METHODGP (1)	-1.1410	.6052	3.5541	1	.0594	-.0809	.3195
METHODGP (2)	-.7588	.5747	1.7428	1	.1868	.0000	.4683
PCYEARS			20.8864	5	.0009	.2142	
PCYEARS (1)	-2.5151	.6314	15.8671	1	.0001	-.2418	.0809
PCYEARS (2)	-.8282	.5591	2.1946	1	.1385	-.0286	.4368
PCYEARS (3)	-.6910	.6475	1.1390	1	.2859	.0000	.5011
PCYEARS (4)	.5654	.8145	.4820	1	.4875	.0000	1.7602
PCYEARS (5)	-.1502	.6085	.0609	1	.8050	.0000	.8605
Constant	3.5985	.6758	28.3565	1	.0000		

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4

Table A4.1 - Geographical profile of survey respondents

Region	Respondents (%)	Region	Respondents (%)
Gwynedd	25.5	Conwy	3.2
Carmarthenshire	13.9	Swansea	2.6
Ceredigion	10.9	Flintshire	1.9
Cardiff	6.7	Bridgend	1.1
Isle of Anglesey	6.7	Neath Port Talbot	1.1
Caerphilly	4.3	Wrexham	1.1
Denbighshire	4.3	Torfaen	0.6
Powys	4.1	Merthyr Tydfil	0.4
Outside Wales	3.9	Vale of Glamorgan	0.4
Pembrokeshire	3.4	Blaenau Gwent	0.2
Rhonda Cynon Taff	3.4	Newport	0.2

Table A4.2 - Exploratory MANOVA based analysis of affective commitment mean scores with language and demographic variables

Model	Factors	SS	DF	MS	F	Sig
1	LANG	226.90	1	226.90	4.34	.038
	GENDER	.83	1	.83	.02	.900
	<i>Within</i>	17900.69	342	52.34		
	<i>Total</i>	18127.64	344	52.70		
2	LANG	212.66	1	212.66	4.04	.045
	QUALS	.13	1	.13	.00	.960
	<i>Within</i>	17950.76	341	52.64		
	<i>Total</i>	18163.72	343	52.96		
3	LANG	167.78	1	167.78	3.46	.064
	AGE	1513.98	6	252.33	5.21	.000
	<i>Within</i>	16468.56	340	48.44		
	<i>Total</i>	18192.48	347	52.43		
4	LANG	.28	1	.28	.01	.936
	TENURE	2933.59	5	586.72	13.76	.000
	<i>Within</i>	13730.57	322	42.64		
	<i>Total</i>	16968.32	328	51.73		
5	LANG	.08	1	.08	.00	.966
	AGE	486.78	6	81.13	1.94	.075
	TENURE	1919.39	5	383.88	9.16	.000
	<i>Within</i>	13243.79	316	41.91		
	<i>Total</i>	16968.32	328	51.73		

Table A4.3 - Exploratory MANOVA based analysis of affective commitment mean scores with language and dispositional (values) variables

Model	Factors	SS	DF	MS	F	Sig
1	LANG	272.05	1	272.05	5.26	.022
	POLEFF	551.54	3	183.85	3.55	.015
	<i>Within</i>	16917.84	327	51.74		
2	LANG	96.59	1	96.59	2.17	.142
	VALUES	2770.50	1	2770.50	62.20	.000
	<i>Within</i>	14965.26	336	44.54		
	<i>Total</i>	17899.03	338	52.96		
3	LANG	301.66	1	301.66	6.56	.011
	POLICIES	1133.58	2	566.79	12.33	.000
	SPECTRUM	21.76	4	5.44	.12	.976
	<i>Within</i>	13974.22	304	45.97		
	<i>Total</i>	15427.68	311	49.61		
4	LANG	129.55	1	129.55	3.21	.074
	POLEFF	174.78	3	58.26	1.44	.231
	VALUES	1739.15	1	1739.15	43.03	.000
	POLICIES	830.78	2	415.39	10.28	.000
	<i>Within</i>	11802.33	292	40.42		
	<i>Total</i>	15598.67	299	52.17		

Table A4.4 - Exploratory MANOVA based analysis of affective commitment mean scores with language and work experience variables

Model	Factors	SS	DF	MS	F	Sig
1	LANG	.24	1	.24	.01	.932
	JOBSAT	2632.27	12	219.36	6.69	.000
	<i>Within</i>	7045.03	215	32.77		
	<i>Total</i>	9722.65	228	42.64		
2	LANG	17.99	1	17.99	.50	.479
	SOCO	2342.29	3	780.76	21.78	.000
	<i>Within</i>	8282.38	231	35.85		
	<i>Total</i>	10792.18	235	45.92		
3	LANG	25.36	1	25.36	.77	.380
	FEELINGS	6838.44	6	1139.74	34.77	.000
	<i>Within</i>	11144.10	340	32.78		
	<i>Total</i>	18192.48	347	52.43		
4	LANG	12.13	1	12.13	.49	.484
	JOBSAT	521.40	12	43.45	1.76	.058
	SOCO	240.57	3	80.19	3.25	.023
	FEELINGS	1210.17	6	201.70	8.18	.000
	<i>Within</i>	4116.31	167	24.65		
	<i>Total</i>	8113.81	189	42.93		

Table A4.5 - Exploratory MANOVA based analysis of continuance commitment mean scores with language and socialization and status indicators

Model	Factors	SS	DF	MS	F	Sig
	LANG	15.84	1	15.84	.33	.566
	SOCO	175.60	3	58.53	1.22	.303
	SOCIAL	1140.13	1	1140.13	23.80	.000
	<i>Within</i>	9962.94	208	47.90		
	<i>Total</i>	11483.03	213	53.91		

Table A4.6 - Exploratory MANOVA based analysis of continuance commitment mean scores with language and transferability indicators

Model	Factors	SS	DF	MS	F	Sig
1	LANG	148.71	1	148.71	2.88	.091
	POLICIES	342.27	2	171.14	3.31	.038
	VALUES	185.64	1	185.64	3.59	.059
	<i>Within</i>	14725.21	285	51.67		
	<i>Total</i>	15529.30	289	53.73		
2	LANG	203.92	1	203.92	3.75	.054
	SUPPORT	18.21	1	18.21	.33	.563
	CULTURE	11.57	1	11.57	.21	.645
	<i>Within</i>	17413.43	320	54.42		
	<i>Total</i>	17732.22	323	54.90		

Table A4.7 - Exploratory MANOVA based analysis of continuance commitment mean scores with language and demographic variables

Model	Factors	SS	DF	MS	F	Sig
	LANG	40.53	1	40.53	.80	.373
	AGE	211.45	6	35.24	.69	.655
	TENURE	1108.56	5	221.71	4.36	.001
	<i>Within</i>	14888.45	293	50.81		
	<i>Total</i>	16797.66	305	55.07		

Table A4.8 - Exploratory MANOVA based analysis of normative commitment mean scores with language and socialization

Model	Factors	SS	DF	MS	F	Sig
1	LANG	826.68	1	826.68	11.62	.001
	PARENTGP	11.80	1	11.80	.17	.684
	<i>Within</i>	24624.30	346	71.17		
	<i>Total</i>	25460.19	348	73.16		
2	LANG	139.08	1	139.08	2.23	.137
	SOCO	1086.71	3	362.24	5.80	.001
	<i>Within</i>	14244.72	228	62.48		
	<i>Total</i>	15648.39	232	67.45		

Table A4.9 - Exploratory MANOVA based analysis of normative commitment mean scores with language and “psychological contracts”

Model	Factors	SS	DF	MS	F	Sig
1	LANG	423.55	1	423.55	6.97	.009
	VALUES	2334.15	1	2334.15	38.39	.000
	POLICIES	663.64	2	331.82	5.46	.005
	<i>Within</i>	18788.98	309	60.81		
	<i>Total</i>	22788.30	313	72.81		
2	LANG	814.60	1	814.60	11.94	.001
	SUBVALUE	1014.53	1	1014.53	14.86	.000
	<i>Within</i>	23751.76	348	68.25		
	<i>Total</i>	25546.36	350	72.99		

Table A4.10 - Crosstabulation of expectations of party membership with language

Expectation	Respondents (%)	
	<i>Cymrophone</i>	<i>Anglophone</i>
To see Welsh independence	23.3	24.6
To do something for Wales	4.0	9.8
To support Welsh language/culture	6.7	2.5
To help/support Plaid Cymru	16.1	15.6
To influence/be involved in politics	4.0	8.2
Information about party/politics	2.7	7.4
No expectations	35.9	23.0
Other	7.2	9.0

n=345, *p*=.01

Table A4.11 - Crosstabulation of cited benefits of membership with language and with membership density

	Respondents (%)				
	<i>Cymrophone</i>	<i>Anglophone</i>	<i>High density</i>	<i>Medium density</i>	<i>Low density</i>
<i>Political benefit</i>	21.6	19.7	24.4	19.9	19.4
<i>Cultural/nationality benefit</i>	13.2	23.9	9.8	15.4	23.4
<i>Social benefit</i>	22.0	16.2	20.7	22.1	17.7
<i>Unspecified benefit</i>	31.3	14.5	32.9	27.9	17.7
<i>No benefit</i>	11.9	25.6	12.2	14.7	21.8

n=344, *p*=.000

n=342, *p*=.054

Table A4.12 - ANOVA analysis of functional motivations mean scores with language and membership density

Motivation	Group	Mean	SD	SE	Variance	F	Sig
Understanding	<i>All</i>	9.6053	3.2726	.1690	10.710	4.279	.039
	<i>Cymrophone</i>	9.3636	3.3325	.2095	11.105		
	<i>Anglophone</i>	10.1066	3.0984	.2805	9.600		
Social	<i>All</i>	7.6923	3.6859	.1932	13.586	3.039	.049
	<i>High density</i>	7.9756	3.9689	.4383	15.752		
	<i>Med. density</i>	8.0946	3.6128	.2970	13.052		
	<i>Low density</i>	7.0746	3.5278	.3048	12.446		

Table A4.13 Exploratory MANOVA based analysis of understanding motivations mean scores with language

Model	Factors	SS	DF	MS	F	Sig
1	LANG	66.84	1	66.84	6.45	.012
	INCOME	22.71	2	11.35	1.10	.335
	<i>Within</i>	3606.73	348	10.36		
	<i>Total</i>	3703.44	351	10.55		
2	LANG	47.31	1	47.31	4.47	.035
	QUALS	14.80	1	14.80	1.40	.238
	<i>Within</i>	3874.30	366	10.59		
	<i>Total</i>	3940.83	368	10.71		
3	LANG	55.75	1	55.75	5.26	.022
	DENSITY	9.62	2	4.81	.45	.635
	<i>Within</i>	3898.16	368	10.59		
	<i>Total</i>	3955.31	371	10.66		
4	LANG	54.83	1	54.83	5.20	.023
	GENDER	33.87	1	33.87	3.21	.074
	<i>Within</i>	3880.53	368	10.54		
	<i>Total</i>	3962.86	370	10.71		
5	LANG	56.71	1	56.71	5.39	.021
	AGE	97.56	6	16.26	1.55	.162
	<i>Within</i>	3827.16	364	10.51		
	<i>Total</i>	3974.42	371	10.71		

Table A4.14 Exploratory MANOVA based analysis of social motivations mean scores with membership density

Model	Factors	SS	DF	MS	F	Sig
1	DENSITY	80.84	2	40.42	3.17	.043
	INCOME	87.88	2	43.94	3.45	.033
	<i>Within</i>	4284.34	336	12.75		
	<i>Total</i>	4448.63	340	13.08		
2	DENSITY	82.66	2	41.33	3.16	.044
	QUALS	109.02	1	109.02	8.33	.004
	<i>Within</i>	4620	353	13.09		
	<i>Total</i>	4794.31	356	13.47		
3	DENSITY	76.01	2	38.01	2.82	.061
	LANG	.26	1	.26	.02	.891
	<i>Within</i>	4849.63	360	13.47		
	<i>Total</i>	4931.54	363	13.59		
4	DENSITY	75.10	2	37.55	2.80	.062
	GENDER	9.00	1	9.00	.67	.414
	<i>Within</i>	4781.26	356	13.43		
	<i>Total</i>	4869.60	359	13.56		
5	DENSITY	68.76	2	34.38	2.64	.072
	AGE	224.78	6	37.46	2.88	.009
	<i>Within</i>	4576.08	352	13.00		
	<i>Total</i>	4880.77	360	13.56		

**Table A4.15 -
ANOVA analysis of political efficacy mean scores with language group**

	Group	Mean	SD	SE	Variance	F	Sig
Political efficacy	<i>All</i>	21.4807	5.4081	.2842	29.248	4.439	.036
	<i>Cymrophone</i>	21.0504	5.2044	.3374	27.086		
	<i>Anglophone</i>	22.3065	5.7100	.5128	32.605		

Table A4.16 - Exploratory MANOVA based analysis of political efficacy mean scores with language and other demographic variables

Model	Factors	SS	DF	MS	F	Sig
1	LANG	186.81	1	186.81	6.87	.009
	QUALS	798.37	1	798.37	29.37	.000
	<i>Within</i>	9596.38	353	27.19		
	<i>Total</i>	10526.97	355	29.65		
2	LANG	176.89	1	176.89	6.76	.010
	INCOME	980.90	2	490.45	18.74	.000
	<i>Within</i>	8897.68	340	26.17		
	<i>Total</i>	9991.81	343	29.13		
3	LANG	157.98	1	157.98	5.62	.018
	AGE	519.36	6	86.56	3.08	.006
	<i>Within</i>	9861.75	351	28.10		
	<i>Total</i>	10509.74	358	29.36		
4	LANG	108.59	1	108.59	3.71	.055
	DENSITY	2.24	2	1.12	.04	.962
	<i>Within</i>	10378.85	355	29.24		
	<i>Total</i>	10505.72	358	29.35		
5	LANG	102.98	1	102.98	3.62	.058
	GENDER	321.75	1	321.75	11.31	.001
	<i>Within</i>	10095.96	355	28.44		
	<i>Total</i>	10551.43	357	29.56		

**Table A4.17 - Crosstabulation of perceived branch efficacy
with membership density**

	Respondents (%)		
	<i>High density</i>	<i>Medium density</i>	<i>Low density</i>
<i>Great</i>	26.2	20.5	19.4
<i>Some</i>	54.2	49.7	38.7
<i>Slight</i>	10.3	15.8	20.6
<i>None</i>	9.3	14.0	<i>Low density</i>

n=433, p=.016

**Table A4.18 -
ANOVA analysis of job satisfaction mean scores by membership density**

	Density group	Mean	SD	SE	Variance	F	Sig
Job satisfaction	<i>All</i>	10.4330	2.7302	.1690	7.454	4.039	.019
	<i>High</i>	11.0877	2.3244	.3079	5.403		
	<i>Medium</i>	10.6176	2.7143	.2688	7.367		
	<i>Low</i>	9.8824	2.8711	.2843	8.243		

Table A4.19 - Exploratory MANOVA based analysis of job satisfaction mean scores with membership density and other demographic variables

Model	Factors	SS	DF	MS	F	Sig
1	DENSITY	59.83	2	29.92	4.10	.018
	LANG	2.74	1	2.74	.38	.540
	<i>Within</i>	1876.49	257	7.30		
	<i>Total</i>	1938.08	260	7.45		
2	DENSITY	56.13	2	28.07	3.93	.021
	AGE	77.01	6	12.84	1.80	.100
	<i>Within</i>	1776.32	249	7.13		
	<i>Total</i>	1912.08	257	7.44		
3	DENSITY	55.49	2	27.75	3.82	.023
	QUALS	22.46	1	22.46	3.09	.080
	<i>Within</i>	1807.58	249	7.26		
	<i>Total</i>	1881.33	252	7.47		
4	DENSITY	50.53	2	25.26	3.63	.028
	INCOME	1.52	2	.76	.11	.897
	<i>Within</i>	1614.22	232	6.96		
	<i>Total</i>	1665.82	236	7.06		
5	DENSITY	49.38	2	24.69	3.35	.037
	GENDER	8.97	1	8.97	1.22	.271
	<i>Within</i>	1856.18	252	7.37		
	<i>Total</i>	1918.44	233	7.52		

Table A4.20 - Crosstabulation of time spent on activities with gender

	Respondents (%)	
	Male	Female
Over five hours a week	36.5	21.6
Five hours a week or less	63.5	78.4

n=214, *p*=.020

Table A4.21 - ANOVA analysis of political efficacy mean scores by gender

Group		Mean	SD	SE	Variance	F	Sig
Political efficacy	All	21.4860	5.4365	.2873	29.556	12.304	.001
	Men	22.3190	5.5145	.3805	30.410		
	Women	20.3041	5.1132	.4203	26.145		

Table A4.22 - Exploratory MANOVA based analysis of political efficacy mean scores with gender and other demographic variables

Model	Factors	SS	DF	MS	F	Sig
1	GENDER	352.11	1	352.11	12.71	.000
	AGE	503.74	6	83.96	3.03	.007
	Within	9666.88	349	27.70		
	Total	10509.24	356	29.52		
2	GENDER	321.75	1	321.75	11.31	.001
	LANG	102.98	1	102.98	3.62	.058
	Within	10095.96	355	28.44		
	Total	10551.43	357	29.56		
3	GENDER	354.38	1	354.38	12.29	.001
	DENSITY	8.95	2	4.47	.16	.856
	Within	10123.73	351	28.84		
	Total	10498.74	354	29.66		
4	GENDER	198.05	1	198.05	7.54	.006
	INCOME	780.03	2	390.01	14.86	.000
	Within	8872.90	338	26.25		
	Total	9991.31	341	29.30		
5	GENDER	1.15	1	1.15	.11	.745
	QUALS	53.39	1	53.39	4.91	.027
	Within	3948.90	363	10.88		
	Total	4006.96	365	10.98		

Table A4.23 - Crosstabulation of agreement with policies with gender

	Respondents (%)	
	Male	Female
<i>Always agree</i>	4.8	12.9
<i>Usually agree</i>	85.2	78.2
<i>Occasionally agree</i>	8.8	5.4
<i>Neither agree nor disagree</i>	1.2	3.5

n=452, p=.003

Table A4.24 - Crosstabulation of income with gender

	Gender	
	Men (%)	Women (%)
<i>Lowest</i>	27.6	46.2
<i>Average</i>	53.4	40.7
<i>Highest</i>	19.0	13.2

n=414, p=.000, r=.17

Table A4.25 - Crosstabulation of joining method with gender and language groups

	Respondents (%)			
	<i>Cymrophone</i>	<i>Anglophone</i>	Male	Female
<i>Proactive</i>	38.4	49.7	49.4	33.3
<i>Reactive</i>	39.1	29.0	31.1	42.3
<i>Personal contact</i>	22.5	21.3	19.5	24.4

n=462, p=.048 n=452, p=.003

Table A4.26 - Crosstabulation of organizational tenure with gender and language groups

	Respondents (%)			
	<i>Cymrophone</i>	<i>Anglophone</i>	Male	Female
<i>Within one year</i>	3.6	12.2	7.6	5.1
<i>Over 1 year - less than 5 years</i>	9.7	23.8	11.4	19.2
<i>Between 6 - 10 years</i>	9.7	7.5	7.2	11.9
<i>Between 11 - 20 years</i>	12.3	17.0	16.9	10.7
<i>Between 21 - 30 years</i>	19.9	17.7	20.7	16.4
<i>Over 30 years</i>	44.8	21.8	36.3	36.7

n=424, p=.000 n=414, p=.026

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 5

**Table A5.1 -
ANOVA analysis of activity type mean scores by age**

Activity type	Group	Mean	SD	SE	Variance	F	Sig
Routine	<i>All</i>	2.1761	2.1670	.1004	4.696	3.934	.001
	<i>16 - 24</i>	1.4286	1.6968	.4535	2.879		
	<i>25 - 34</i>	2.0000	1.6690	.3099	2.768		
	<i>35 - 44</i>	2.0441	2.2423	.2719	5.028		
	<i>45 - 54</i>	2.3934	2.2510	.2038	5.067		
	<i>55 - 64</i>	2.8980	2.3528	.2377	5.536		
	<i>65 - 74</i>	1.6988	1.9110	.2098	3.652		
	<i>75+</i>	1.5385	1.8520	.2568	3.430		
Election	<i>All</i>	1.1888	1.4409	.0667	2.076	3.403	.003
	<i>16 - 24</i>	.6429	.9288	.2482	.863		
	<i>25 - 34</i>	1.3103	1.3914	.2584	1.936		
	<i>35 - 44</i>	1.1618	1.4722	.1785	2.167		
	<i>45 - 54</i>	1.3607	1.5485	.1402	2.398		
	<i>55 - 64</i>	1.4490	1.5672	.1583	2.456		
	<i>65 - 74</i>	1.1446	1.3893	.1525	1.930		
	<i>75+</i>	.4808	.7273	.1009	.529		
Internal	<i>All</i>	.5064	.9843	.0456	.969	2.015	.062
	<i>16 - 24</i>	.2857	.8254	.2206	.861		
	<i>25 - 34</i>	.2759	.6490	.1205	.421		
	<i>35 - 44</i>	.5441	.9840	.1193	.968		
	<i>45 - 54</i>	.6311	1.2412	.1124	1.541		
	<i>55 - 64</i>	.6633	.9838	.0993	.968		
	<i>65 - 74</i>	.3976	.8545	.0938	.730		
	<i>75+</i>	.2308	.5903	.0706	.259		

**Table A5.2 -
ANOVA analysis of party activity mean scores by income group**

Activity type	Group	Mean	SD	SE	Variance	F	Sig
Routine	<i>All</i>	2.1425	2.1599	.1053	4.665	3.459	.032
	<i>Low</i>	1.7763	2.0007	.1623	4.003		
	<i>Average</i>	2.3500	2.2231	.1572	4.942		
	<i>High</i>	2.3478	2.2349	.2691	4.995		
Election time	<i>All</i>	1.2019	1.4506	.0707	2.104	5.405	.005
	<i>Low</i>	.9013	1.2002	.0973	1.441		
	<i>Average</i>	1.3400	1.5317	.1083	2.346		
	<i>High</i>	1.4638	1.6141	.1943	2.605		
Internal	<i>All</i>	.5131	1.0038	.0489	1.008	3.842	.022
	<i>Low</i>	.3355	.7274	.0590	.529		
	<i>Average</i>	.6000	1.0704	.07569	1.146		
	<i>High</i>	.6522	1.2582	.1515	1.583		

**Table A5.3 - Exploratory MANOVA based analysis of routine activity
mean scores with income and other demographic variables**

Model	Factors	SS	DF	MS	F	Sig
1	INCOME	33.32	2	16.66	3.61	.028
	LANG	3.63	1	3.63	.79	.376
	<i>Within</i>	1923.92	417	4.61		
	<i>Total</i>	1959.45	420	4.67		
2	INCOME	31.22	2	15.61	3.40	.034
	REGION	20.83	2	10.41	2.27	.105
	<i>Within</i>	1903.42	414	4.60		
	<i>Total</i>	1954.83	418	4.68		
3	INCOME	26.46	2	13.23	2.94	.054
	QUALS	.05	1	.05	.01	.913
	<i>Within</i>	1824.74	406	4.49		
	<i>Total</i>	1855.14	409	4.54		
4	INCOME	26.33	2	13.16	2.83	.060
	GENDER	.12	1	.12	.03	.870
	<i>Within</i>	1907.25	410	4.65		
	<i>Total</i>	1935.41	413	4.69		
5	INCOME	17.49	2	8.75	1.94	.145
	AGE	68.04	6	11.34	2.51	.021
	<i>Within</i>	1853.96	411	4.51		
	<i>Total</i>	1954.85	419	4.67		

Table A5.4 - ANOVA analysis of political efficacy mean scores by age

	Group	Mean	SD	SE	Variance	F	Sig
Political efficacy	<i>All</i>	21.5042	5.4182	.2860	29.357	2.869	.010
	16 - 24	21.0769	4.0303	1.178	16.244		
	25 - 34	20.7600	5.1258	1.0252	26.273		
	35 - 44	21.0952	4.7949	.6041	22.991		
	45 - 54	22.7944	5.4249	.5244	29.429		
	55 - 64	21.8481	6.0597	.6818	36.720		
	65 - 74	20.7234	5.1655	.7535	26.683		
	75+	18.3600	4.8208	.9642	23.240		

Table A5.5 - Exploratory MANOVA based analysis of political efficacy mean scores with age and other demographic variables

Model	Factors	SS	DF	MS	F	Sig
1	AGE	519.36	6	86.56	3.08	.006
	LANG	157.98	1	157.98	5.62	.018
	<i>Within</i>	9861.75	351	28.10		
	<i>Total</i>	10509.74	358	29.36		
2	AGE	483.38	6	80.56	2.81	.011
	DENSITY	13.32	2	6.66	.23	.793
	<i>Within</i>	9949.32	347	28.67		
	<i>Total</i>	10456.93	355	29.46		
3	AGE	503.74	6	83.96	3.03	.007
	GENDER	352.11	1	352.11	12.71	.000
	<i>Within</i>	9666.88	349	27.70		
	<i>Total</i>	10509.24	356	29.52		
4	AGE	365.76	6	60.96	2.26	.037
	QUALS	619.86	1	619.86	22.99	.000
	<i>Within</i>	9356.52	347	26.96		
	<i>Total</i>	10484.50	354	29.62		
5	AGE	188.52	6	31.42	1.19	.312
	INCOME	710.49	2	355.24	13.43	.000
	<i>Within</i>	8832.16	334	26.44		
	<i>Total</i>	9949.14	342	29.09		

**Table A5.6 - ANOVA analysis of political efficacy mean scores
by education and by income groups**

	Group	Mean	SD	SE	Variance	F	Sig
Political efficacy							
MODEL 1	<i>All</i>	21.5084	5.4455	.2886	29.653	26.913	.000
Education group	<i>Non-graduates</i>	19.8718	4.9601	.3971	24.603		
	<i>Graduates</i>	22.7850	5.4771	.3873	29.999		
MODEL 2	<i>All</i>	21.5233	5.3973	.2910	29.131	17.234	.000
Income group	<i>Low</i>	19.1589	4.9070	.4744	24.078		
	<i>Average</i>	22.3200	5.4193	.4097	29.368		
	<i>High</i>	23.3548	4.8115	.6111	23.151		

Table A5.7 – Exploratory MANOVA based analysis of political efficacy mean scores with education status and other demographic variables

Model	Factors	SS	DF	MS	F	Sig
1	QUALS	630.47	1	630.47	23.18	.000
	GENDER	235.13	1	235.13	8.65	.000
	<i>Within</i>	9546.16	351	27.20		
	<i>Total</i>	10526.47	353	29.82		
2	QUALS	798.37	1	798.37	29.37	.000
	LANG	186.91	1	186.81	6.87	.009
	<i>Within</i>	9596.38	353	27.19		
	<i>Total</i>	10526.97	355	29.65		
3	QUALS	619.86	1	619.86	22.99	.000
	AGE	365.76	6	60.96	2.26	.037
	<i>Within</i>	9356.52	347	26.96		
	<i>Total</i>	10484.50	354	29.62		
4	QUALS	301.90	1	301.90	11.61	.001
	INCOME	568.34	2	284.17	10.92	.000
	<i>Within</i>	87.66.60	337	26.01		
	<i>Total</i>	9966.55	340	29.31		
5	QUALS	764.56	1	764.56	27.55	.000
	DENSITY	76.32	2	38.16	1.38	.254
	<i>Within</i>	9684.59	349	27.75		
	<i>Total</i>	10474.13	352	29.76		

Table A5.8 – Exploratory MANOVA based analysis of political efficacy mean scores with income and other demographic variables

Model	Factors	SS	DF	MS	F	Sig
1	INCOME	780.03	2	390.01	14.86	.000
	GENDER	198.05	1	198.05	7.54	.006
	<i>Within</i>	8872.90	338	26.25		
	<i>Total</i>	9991.31	341	29.30		
2	INCOME	980.90	2	490.45	18.74	.000
	LANG	176.89	1	176.89	6.76	.010
	<i>Within</i>	8897.68	340	26.17		
	<i>Total</i>	9991.81	343	29.13		
3	INCOME	922.08	2	461.04	17.20	.000
	DENSITY	19.21	2	9.61	.36	.699
	<i>Within</i>	9031.88	337	26.80		
	<i>Total</i>	9958.75	341	29.20		
4	INCOME	568.34	2	284.17	10.92	.000
	QUALS	301.90	1	301.90	11.61	.001
	<i>Within</i>	8766.60	337	26.01		
	<i>Total</i>	9966.55	340	29.31		
5	INCOME	710.49	2	355.24	13.43	.000
	AGE	188.52	6	31.42	1.19	.312
	<i>Within</i>	8832.16	334	26.44		
	<i>Total</i>	9949.14	342	29.09		

Table A5.9 - Crosstabulation of donation amount with age group

	Respondents (%)						
	16 - 24	25 - 34	35 - 44	45 - 54	55 - 64	65 - 74	75+
<i>Over £25 in 12 months</i>	0	46.2	55.6	52.8	41.6	41.3	21.4
<i>Up to £25 in 12 months</i>	100.0	53.8	44.4	47.2	58.4	58.7	78.6

n=334, p=.006

Table A5.10 - Crosstabulation of donation amount with education status and with household income

	Respondents (%)					
	Graduate	Non-graduate	Low income	Average income	High income	
<i>Over £25</i>	56.5	29.7	16.2	53.4	69.1	
<i>Up to £25</i>	43.5	70.3	83.8	46.6	30.9	

n=326, p=.000 n= 302, p=.000

Table A5.11 - Crosstabulation of parental membership with age

	Respondents (%)							
	16 - 24	25 - 34	35 - 44	45 - 54	55 - 64	65 - 74	75+	
<i>One/ both parents were members</i>		71.4	57.1	33.8	13.2	20.2	11.3	6
<i>Parents not members/ don't know</i>		28.6	42.9	66.2	86.8	79.8	88.8	94

n=455, p=.000

Table A5.12 - Crosstabulation of organizational tenure with age

Length of tenure	Respondents (%)						
	16 - 24	25 - 34	35 - 44	45 - 54	55 - 64	65 - 74	75+
<i>Within one year</i>	14.3	0	9.4	8.0	5.7	5.4	4.7
<i>1 - 5 years</i>	35.7	48.1	18.8	8.8	11.5	6.8	14.0
<i>6 - 10 years</i>	42.9	22.2	14.1	7.1	6.9	4.1	0
<i>11 - 20 years</i>	7.1	29.6	25.0	15.0	6.9	12.2	4.7
<i>21 - 30 years</i>	0	0	32.8	22.1	16.1	14.9	20.9
<i>Over 30 years</i>	0	0	0	38.9	52.9	56.8	55.8

n=422, p=.000

Table A5.13- Crosstabulation of current subscription with age group

	Respondents (%)						
	16 - 24	25 - 34	35 - 44	45 - 54	55 - 64	65 - 74	75+
<i>Holds a current subscription</i>	71.4	86.2	89.6	96.6	93.8	88.6	88.0
<i>Subscription has lapsed</i>	28.6	13.8	10.4	3.4	6.2	11.4	12.0

n=453, p=.027

Table A5.14 - Crosstabulation of agreement with policies by age group

	Respondents (%)						
	16 - 24	25 - 34	35 - 44	45 - 54	55 - 64	65 - 74	75+
<i>Always agree</i>	28.6	27.6	0	5.8	8.2	6.3	16.0
<i>Usually agree</i>	71.4	69.0	92.5	86.8	79.4	80.0	70.0
<i>Occasionally agree</i>	0	3.4	6.0	5.0	12.4	10.0	8.0
<i>Neither agree nor disagree</i>	0	0	1.5	2.5	0	3.8	6.0

n=458, p=.000

**Table A5.15 –
Results of ANOVA analysis of socialization mean scores by age**

Group	Mean	SD	SE	Variance	F	Sig
All	53.8367	11.0935	.7002	123.065	4.948	.000
16 – 24	48.1250	10.5348	3.7246	110.982		
25 – 34	51.5500	9.9445	2.2236	98.892		
35 – 44	47.6531	11.3202	1.6172	128.148		
45 – 54	54.9750	10.6545	1.1912	113.518		
55 – 64	57.1569	8.1471	1.1408	66.375		
65 – 74	56.5667	11.0225	2.0124	121.495		
75+	57.8462	12.3071	4.2454	234.065		

Table A5.16 - Exploratory MANOVA based analysis of socialization mean scores with demographic variables

Model	Factors	SS	DF	MS	F	Sig
1	AGE	3247.70	6	541.28	5.00	.000
	LANG	1132.30	1	1132.30	10.46	.001
	<i>Within</i>	26296.38	243	108.22		
	<i>Total</i>	30766.30	250	123.07		
2	AGE	3292.79	6	548.80	5.06	.000
	DENSITY	866.69	2	433.35	3.99	.020
	<i>Within</i>	26157.94	241	108.54		
	<i>Total</i>	30410.06	249	122.13		
3	AGE	3276.42	6	546.07	4.83	.000
	GENDER	19.96	1	19.96	.18	.675
	<i>Within</i>	27356.48	242	113.04		
	<i>Total</i>	30751.52	249	123.50		
4	AGE	3343.12	6	557.19	4.94	.000
	QUALS	6.59	1	6.59	.06	.809
	<i>Within</i>	26932.53	239	112.69		
	<i>Total</i>	30384.62	246	123.51		
5	AGE	2584.61	6	430.77	3.85	.001
	INCOME	164.87	2	82.44	.74	.480
	<i>Within</i>	25404.17	227	111.91		
	<i>Total</i>	28300.35	235	120.43		

**Table A5.17 -
ANOVA analysis of functional motivation mean scores with age**

Motivation	Group	Mean	SD	SE	Variance	F	Sig
Career	<i>All</i>	3.4106	2.3086	.1220	5.330	6.107	.000
	<i>16 - 24</i>	6.1538	3.9968	1.1085	15.974		
	<i>25 - 34</i>	4.4444	3.1542	.6070	9.949		
	<i>35 - 44</i>	3.6615	2.4576	.3048	6.040		
	<i>45 - 54</i>	3.4352	2.1886	.2106	4.790		
	<i>55 - 64</i>	2.8750	1.7311	.1935	2.997		
	<i>65 - 74</i>	2.9111	1.6212	.2417	2.628		
	<i>75+</i>	2.5500	1.0501	.2348	1.103		
Enhancement	<i>All</i>	7.4528	3.3482	.1738	11.211	2.285	.035
	<i>16 - 24</i>	7.7692	2.6190	.7264	6.859		
	<i>25 - 34</i>	8.2963	3.0986	.5963	9.601		
	<i>35 - 44</i>	6.6094	3.3741	.4218	11.385		
	<i>45 - 54</i>	6.9459	2.9721	.2821	8.823		
	<i>55 - 64</i>	8.0964	3.2408	.3557	10.503		
	<i>65 - 74</i>	7.6122	3.7406	.5344	13.992		
	<i>75+</i>	8.3750	4.3918	.8965	19.288		
Protective	<i>All</i>	4.3079	2.9864	.1559	8.919	3.867	.001
	<i>16 - 24</i>	4.0000	2.5495	.7071	6.500		
	<i>25 - 34</i>	4.8519	3.3935	.6531	11.516		
	<i>35 - 44</i>	3.7538	2.3850	.2958	5.688		
	<i>45 - 54</i>	3.9815	2.5060	.2411	6.280		
	<i>55 - 64</i>	3.9750	2.9121	.3256	8.480		
	<i>65 - 74</i>	4.8936	3.0874	.4503	9.532		
	<i>75+</i>	6.5185	4.5773	.8809	20.952		
Social	<i>All</i>	7.6923	3.6866	.1932	13.591	2.899	.009
	<i>16 - 24</i>	6.7692	3.5859	.9946	12.859		
	<i>25 - 34</i>	7.1538	3.3430	.6556	11.175		
	<i>35 - 44</i>	6.6875	3.3136	.4142	10.980		
	<i>45 - 54</i>	7.3458	3.7845	.3659	14.323		
	<i>55 - 64</i>	8.1026	3.5587	.4029	12.665		
	<i>65 - 74</i>	8.9020	3.7162	.5204	13.810		
	<i>75+</i>	9.0400	4.0567	.8113	16.457		

**Table A5.18 -
ANOVA analysis of functional motivation mean scores with education status**

Motivation	Group	Mean	SD	SE	Variance	F	Sig
Career	<i>All</i>	3.4028	2.2968	.1219	5.275	4.241	.040
	<i>Non-grad</i>	3.6883	2.5655	.2067	6.582		
	<i>Graduate</i>	3.1841	2.0472	.1444	4.191		
Enhancement	<i>All</i>	7.4592	3.3250	.1733	8.691	5.928	.015
	<i>Non-grad</i>	7.9217	3.4112	.2648	11.636		
	<i>Graduate</i>	7.0792	3.2112	.2259	10.312		
Protective	<i>All</i>	4.2865	2.9481	.1547	8.691	8.147	.005
	<i>Non-grad</i>	4.7764	3.3930	.2674	11.512		
	<i>Graduate</i>	3.8960	2.4786	.1744	6.143		
Social	<i>All</i>	7.6889	3.6745	.1937	13.502	7.258	.007
	<i>Non-grad</i>	8.2704	3.6917	.2928	13.629		
	<i>Graduate</i>	7.2289	3.6038	.2542	12.987		

**Table A5.19 -
ANOVA analysis of functional motivation mean scores with income group**

Motivation	Group	Mean	SD	SE	Variance	F	Sig
Enhancement	<i>All</i>	7.4000	3.2771	.1752	10.739	7.183	.001
	<i>Low</i>	8.3832	3.4550	.3340	11.937		
	<i>Average</i>	6.9611	3.1558	.2352	9.959		
	<i>High</i>	6.9841	2.9811	.3756	8.887		
Protective	<i>All</i>	4.2219	2.8990	.1556	8.404	5.474	.005
	<i>Low</i>	4.9810	3.4418	.3359	11.846		
	<i>Average</i>	3.8278	2.5277	.1884	6.389		
	<i>High</i>	4.0806	2.6936	.3421	7.246		
Social	<i>All</i>	7.5656	3.6243	.1957	13.135	3.162	.044
	<i>Low</i>	8.2941	3.6304	.3595	13.180		
	<i>Average</i>	7.3427	3.5718	.2677	12.758		
	<i>High</i>	7.0159	3.6389	.4585	13.242		

Table A5.20 - Exploratory MANOVA based analysis of enhancement motivation mean scores with income and other demographic variables

Model	Factors	SS	DF	MS	F	Sig
1	INCOME	138.51	2	69.26	6.72	.001
	GENDER	2.57	1	2.57	.25	.618
	<i>Within</i>	3545.66	344	10.31		
	<i>Total</i>	3697.68	347	10.66		
2	INCOME	152.22	2	76.11	7.33	.001
	LANG	5.13	1	5.13	.49	.483
	<i>Within</i>	3593.87	346	10.39		
	<i>Total</i>	3748.00	349	10.74		
3	INCOME	152.69	2	76.34	7.32	.001
	DENSITY	12.71	2	6.35	.61	.545
	<i>Within</i>	3579.48	343	10.44		
	<i>Total</i>	3745.68	347	10.79		
4	INCOME	130.77	2	65.39	6.39	.002
	QUALS	13.87	1	13.87	1.36	.245
	<i>Within</i>	3507.76	343	10.23		
	<i>Total</i>	3686.41	346	10.65		
5	INCOME	89.77	2	44.88	4.33	.014
	AGE	66.51	6	11.08	1.07	.381
	<i>Within</i>	3528.31	340	10.38		
	<i>Total</i>	3745.43	348	10.76		

Table A5.21 - Exploratory MANOVA based analysis of enhancement motivation mean scores with educational status and other demographic variables

Model	Factors	SS	DF	MS	F	Sig
1	QUALS	68.05	1	68.05	6.24	.013
	LANG	11.42	1	11.42	1.05	.307
	<i>Within</i>	3981.29	365	10.91		
	<i>Total</i>	4057.39	367	11.06		
2	QUALS	67.65	1	67.65	6.14	.014
	DENSITY	12.14	2	6.07	.55	.577
	<i>Within</i>	3976.85	361	11.02		
	<i>Total</i>	4054.75	364	11.14		
3	QUALS	53.39	1	53.39	4.91	.027
	GENDER	1.15	1	1.15	.11	.745
	<i>Within</i>	3948.90	363	10.88		
	<i>Total</i>	4006.96	365	10.98		
4	QUALS	44.52	1	44.52	4.13	.043
	AGE	123.15	6	20.53	1.91	.079
	<i>Within</i>	3865.85	359	10.77		
	<i>Total</i>	4055.01	366	11.08		
5	QUALS	13.87	1	13.87	1.36	.245
	INCOME	130.77	2	65.39	6.39	.002
	<i>Within</i>	3507.76	343	10.23		
	<i>Total</i>	3686.41	346	10.65		

Table A5.22 - Exploratory MANOVA based analysis of social motivation mean scores with educational status and other demographic variables

Model	Factors	SS	DF	MS	F	Sig
1	QUALS	98.29	1	98.29	7.39	.007
	LANG	3.49	1	3.49	.26	.609
	<i>Within</i>	4747.35	357	13.30		
	<i>Total</i>	4847.16	359	13.50		
2	QUALS	109.02	1	209.02	8.33	.004
	DENSITY	82.66	2	41.33	3.16	.044
	<i>Within</i>	4620.26	353	13.09		
	<i>Total</i>	4794.31	356	13.57		
3	QUALS	86.47	1	86.47	6.49	.011
	GENDER	6.46	1	6.46	.49	.487
	<i>Within</i>	4729.16	355	13.32		
	<i>Total</i>	4830.76	357	13.53		
4	QUALS	51.74	1	51.74	3.97	.047
	AGE	164.22	6	27.37	2.10	.053
	<i>Within</i>	4578.90	351	13.05		
	<i>Total</i>	4841.80	358	13.52		
5	QUALS	37.27	1	37.27	2.89	.090
	INCOME	57.90	2	28.95	2.25	.107
	<i>Within</i>	4329.22	336	12.88		
	<i>Total</i>	4460.53	339	13.16		

Table A5.23 - Exploratory MANOVA based analysis of social motivation mean scores with income and other demographic variables

Model	Factors	SS	DF	MS	F	Sig
1	INCOME	80.59	2	40.29	3.10	.047
	GENDER	.51	1	.51	.04	.843
	<i>Within</i>	4387.24	337	13.02		
	<i>Total</i>	4474.45	340	13.16		
2	INCOME	83.32	2	41.66	3.20	.042
	LANG	2.02	1	2.02	.16	.694
	<i>Within</i>	4408.23	339	13.00		
	<i>Total</i>	4492.27	342	13.14		
3	INCOME	87.88	2	43.94	3.45	.033
	DENSITY	80.84	2	40.42	3.17	.043
	<i>Within</i>	4284.34	335	12.75		
	<i>Total</i>	4448.63	340	13.08		
4	INCOME	57.90	2	28.95	2.25	.107
	QUALS	37.27	1	37.27	2.89	.090
	<i>Within</i>	4329.22	336	12.88		
	<i>Total</i>	4460.53	339	13.16		
5	INCOME	23.39	2	11.69	.91	.405
	AGE	110.37	6	18.39	1.43	.203
	<i>Within</i>	4292.79	333	12.89		
	<i>Total</i>	4486.33	341	13.16		

**Table A5.24 - Exploratory MANOVA based analysis of social needs mean scores
with age and other demographic variables**

Model	Factors	SS	DF	MS	F	Sig
1	AGE	232.20	6	38.70	2.93	.008
	GENDER	23.14	1	23.14	1.75	.186
	<i>Within</i>	4668.86	354	13.19		
	<i>Total</i>	4917.19	361	13.62		
2	AGE	224.78	6	37.46	2.88	.009
	DENSITY	68.76	2	34.38	2.64	.072
	<i>Within</i>	4576.08	352	13.00		
	<i>Total</i>	4880.77	360	13.56		
3	AGE	229.83	6	38.31	2.90	.009
	LANG	2.40	1	2.40	.18	.670
	<i>Within</i>	4701.89	356	13.21		
	<i>Total</i>	4933.54	363	13.59		
4	AGE	164.22	6	27.37	2.10	.053
	QUALS	51.74	1	51.74	3.97	.047
	<i>Within</i>	4578.90	351	13.05		
	<i>Total</i>	4841.80	358	13.52		
5	AGE	110.37	6	18.39	1.43	.203
	INCOME	23.39	2	11.69	.91	.405
	<i>Within</i>	4292.79	333	12.89		
	<i>Total</i>	4486.33	341	13.16		

Table A5.25 – Scores and matrix placings for benefits of membership to party

Group	Activity score	Efficacy score	Donation over £25	Current sub	Overall score	Matrix placing
<i>Age</i>						
16-24	12	4	1	1	18	0.6
25-34	16	3	5	2	26	0.9
35-44	19	5	7	5	36	1.3
45-54	26	7	6	7	46	1.6
55-64	25	6	4	6	41	1.5
65-74	14	2	3	4	23	0.8
75+	6	1	1	3	11	0.4
<i>Income</i>						
Low	5	1	1	1	8	0.6
Average	9	2	2	1	14	1.2
High	10	3	3	1	17	1.4
<i>Education</i>						
Grad	5	2	2	1	10	1
Non-grad	5	1	1	1	8	0.8

Table A5.26 – Scores and matrix placings for benefits of membership to members

Group	Cited benefits	Purposive benefits	Social-ization	Job satisfaction	VFI benefits	Overall score	Matrix placing
<i>Age</i>							
16-24	1	8	2	1	17	29	0.8
25-34	1	7	3	1	21	33	0.9
35-44	1	6	1	1	10	19	0.5
45-54	1	6	4	1	14	26	0.7
55-64	1	4	6	1	15	27	0.7
65-74	1	3	5	1	18	28	0.8
75+	1	2	7	1	23	34	0.9
<i>Income</i>							
Low	1	2	1	1	11	16	1.0
Average	1	2	1	1	6	11	0.7
High	1	2	1	1	7	12	0.8
<i>Education</i>							
Grad	2	2	1	1	5	10	1.0
Non-grad	1	2	1	1	9	14	1.4

Table A5.27 - Benefits of membership - matrix placings

Group	Benefit to party	Benefit to member	Benefit to member	Benefit to member
16-24	Low	0.6	Low	0.8
25-34	Low	0.9	Low	0.9
35-44	High	1.3	Low	0.5
45-54	High	1.6	Low	0.7
55-64	High	1.5	Low	0.7
65-74	Low	0.8	Low	0.8
75+	Low	0.4	Low	0.9
Low income	Low	0.6	Mid	1.0
Average income	High	1.2	Low	0.7
High income	High	1.4	Low	0.8
Graduate	Mid	1.0	Mid	1.0
Non-graduate	Low	0.8	High	1.4